

University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor

OSSA Conference Archive

OSSA 3

May 15th, 9:00 AM

Rhetoric and dialectic in the twenty-first century

Michael Leff

Follow this and additional works at: <http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive>



Part of the [Philosophy Commons](#)

Leff, Michael, "Rhetoric and dialectic in the twenty-first century" (1999). *OSSA Conference Archive*. 3.
<http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA3/keynotes/3>

This Keynote is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Title: Rhetoric and dialectic in the twenty-first century

Author: [Michael Leff](#)

(c)2000 Michael Leff

During this past winter, Northwestern University was privileged to host Doug Walton as a Fulbright visiting scholar. The visit gave me the opportunity to talk with Doug about almost all topics of interest to argumentation scholars, including the one that often seems the most difficult and vexing--how to find a good, inexpensive hotel room in Amsterdam. Doug and his wife Karen believed that Ralph Johnson had actually solved this problem, but they could not recall the name of the hotel. So, Doug asked Ralph to help me out, and Ralph kindly sent me an e-mail message with all the relevant particulars.

The note came while I was anxiously involved in preparing this presentation, and I had decided, quite contrary to my original intentions, that much of it should center on the concept of "dialectic" implicit in Johnson's formulation of the dialectical tier (Johnson 1996a, 1996b, 1998a, 1998b). Consequently, when I sent a thank-you note back to Ralph, I also told him something about what I was doing--partially out of politeness, but more urgently in the hope of getting confirmation from the man himself about a critical point. I wrote to him that other informal logicians, such as Doug Walton, seemed to deal with dialectic primarily in terms of a dialogic model, but that he (Johnson) conceived dialectic primarily in terms of oppositions between alternative positions and that this difference was important in thinking about the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic. In response to this note, Ralph replied: "Actually I don't think in terms of dialectic but rather of what is logically required. I don't know what to make of 'dialectic' anymore; both Rhetoric and Logic remain freestanding disciplines, but not, it seems, Dialectic."

This was deflating news. I was embarked on a project designed to explicate, critique, and enlarge Johnson's concept of dialectic from a rhetorical perspective, and now I learned that Johnson was disclaiming dialectic. What was I to do? Well, of course, I could always resort to rhetoric, and Ralph himself, in his paper at the last OSSA conference, had indicated how a rhetorician could dodge just this kind of problem. Logic, he had maintained, has the telos of rational persuasion, and thus it requires that the arguer respond to all relevant objections to her position. On the other hand, rhetoric has effective persuasion as its telos, and so it does not entail any such obligation. "Suppose," Johnson continues, "that there is an objection, let us call it O*, which the arguer knows about and which the arguer has very good reason to believe his audience does not know about. We may suppose for example that the arguer is editor of a journal that has just received a paper publication in which this objection is raised; and we suppose that the arguer knows that the author of the paper is not in the audience. From the point view of rhetoric, there is no obligation for the arguer to deal with O*--his argument can be perfectly effective without it" (1998a).

The rub is that I cannot count on Ralph's absence; and so even if I accepted his view of rhetorical obligations, which I do not, the situation would still force me to recognize the problem. Consequently, unaccustomed as I am to logically candid persuasion, I am going to have to acknowledge Ralph's hesitation about the "D" word and advance the thesis that Ralph Johnson, along with all the other rhetoricians and logicians here assembled, should leave open an important space for dialectic in their theories of argumentation.

To support this thesis, I will begin on an historical note. I will present some characteristic differences between rhetoric and dialectic that appear in the pre-modern tradition and that offer a basis for understanding more recent developments. Then, in light of this historical analysis, I want to characterize some current approaches to dialectic, with special attention to Johnson's dialectic tier. Finally, I will suggest that the addition of a rhetorical component into that tier might help to resolve the problems of infinite regress and discrimination that Govier (1998a, 1998b) has located as the most significant weaknesses in Johnson's position. More generally, against Johnson's doubts about the status of dialectic as "free-standing" discipline, I want to maintain that a hybrid conception of dialectic has the virtue of negotiating between logic and rhetoric, or more properly, between strictly propositional views of rationality and strictly instrumental views of persuasion.

1. Rhetoric and Dialectic: Some Traditional Distinctions

I need to begin this section with an important caveat. In what follows, I am going to distinguish between rhetoric and dialectic in terms of some general characteristics. This procedure necessarily oversimplifies a very complex historical development and might encourage the attitude that rhetoric and dialectic are stable disciplines possessing clear, distinct, and neatly opposed features. In fact, no such stability exists.¹ The historical record is one of almost constant change as the identity, function, structure, and mutual relationship of these arts become issues of argumentative contestation. The two are not fixed entities but evolving disciplines defined and redefined by generations of squabbling teachers, and it would be a mistake to think that the differences I note are absolute or essential. What I attempt to do, instead, is to locate some tendencies that mark family resemblances and differences.

In his De topicis differentiis, Boethius succinctly articulates one of the most persistent distinctions made in separating dialectic from rhetoric: "The dialectical discipline examines the thesis only; a thesis is a question not involved in circumstances. The rhetorical [discipline], on the other hand, discusses the hypothesis, that is, questions hedged in by a multitude of circumstances. Circumstances are who, what, where, when, why, how, by what means" (1205C). The dialectical thesis--e.g. should a man marry?--is unencumbered by particulars, and thus dialectical arguments focus upon principles of inference per se. On the other hand, the rhetorical hypothesis--e.g. should Cato marry?--must deal with the specific persons and actions that enter into consideration of a social or political situation, and so rhetorical argument

must apply principles to actual cases.² This distinction in the issues proper to the arts leads to two characteristic differences between them. First, dialectic deals more directly with argumentative procedures than does rhetoric, since rhetoric must consider how such procedures embody themselves in material cases rather than with procedures abstractly considered. Secondly, because the dialectical thesis engages the genus of argument, dialecticians normally treat argumentation in its entirety. Rhetoricians are far more likely to divide argument into different fields or genres and to consider how subject-matter, institutions, and traditions condition the conduct of argument. Or, as my colleague Jean Goodwin (1999) has said: "Where dialectic tries to model argument universally, rhetoric aims only at local usefulness."

So, in the first place, rhetoric and dialectic contrast because the one deals with concrete issues, while the other deals with abstract issues. The second difference I want to note is more complex and has to do with the way that the propositions of the two arts are situated. This distinction can be illustrated by comparing Aristotle's Topica with his Rhetoric: The Topica develops argumentative principles based on how terms connect within and across propositions. Thus, the topics are divided into the categories of definition, genus, property, and accident, and participation in the dialectical game requires considerable technical knowledge about the lore of predicables. The Rhetoric does not require such knowledge, since propositions are not broken down into terms, and the proposition itself serves as the atomic unit of argument. Rhetorical argumentation also involves something more than propositional relationships, because, as Richard McKeon has noted, rhetorical arguments must develop not just in terms of their plausibility "relative to their alternatives, but in their plausibility relative to the audience addressed" (1952:222).

Once again dialectic emerges as more closely connected with "reason" than does rhetoric. Dialectic need consider only the logos of argument and can bracket matters of character (ethos) or emotion (pathos).³ Moreover, dialectic seems to be rationally autonomous because it proceeds according to its own procedural norms, while rhetoric must answer to the extrinsic demands of the audience. It is tempting to move from these observations to the conclusion that rhetoric has no intrinsic normative standards. A number of informal logicians, for example, offer a sharp contrast between the normative rationality of logic or dialectic and the rhetorical standard of effectiveness.⁴ The reasoning here is that since the end of rhetoric is persuasion, and since persuasion ultimately is a matter of pragmatic effect, rhetoric can have only an extrinsic telos—effective persuasion as measured by audience response. But this conclusion misrepresents the position of Aristotle and most other classical rhetoricians, and I would like to pause for a moment and consider whether and to what extent rhetorical art can sustain intrinsic norms.

Aristotle does stipulate that the audience determines the genres of rhetoric and the end and object of a speech. Yet, he clearly is not thinking about particular and actual audiences; he is working within a typology of audience

functions. Thus, in the case of deliberative rhetoric, the audience must make a judgment directed toward future time about the expediency or in expediency of a proposed action; in forensic oratory, the audience judges past fact in order to decide about the justice or injustice of some action; and in ceremonial oratory, the audience acts not as judge but as spectator (Rhetoric: 1358a-b). This classification is not simply empirical; it establishes logically proper functions for audiences in different contexts and implies normative standards of obligation connected with the activity of rhetoric itself.

More generally, Aristotle does not define rhetoric in terms of persuasive effect. Instead, he says that rhetoric is the faculty for observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. This position implies a difference between using the art properly and achieving a specific outcome, and Eugene Garver aptly calls this a distinction between what can be done with words and what can be done by words (1994: 22-41). Rhetorical argument, no matter how well constructed, cannot always succeed in achieving its end. Too many chance factors enter into the persuasive situation for the art to control success in any particular case, and so rhetoric cannot always succeed by words. Yet, the art can establish standards for excellence in performance, for what can be done with words, and that standard is connected with values intrinsic to rhetoric. In that sense, for example, political rhetoric can exhibit excellence as a practice that is independent of immediate persuasive effect.

Rhetoricians in the Latin tradition make much the same point when they differentiate the end and the duty of the orator. The end is to persuade through speech; the duty is to speak in a manner suited for persuasion.⁵ Judged according to these terms, the orator can fulfill his duty by speaking in accordance with the art without actually achieving an extrinsic end. There is, of course, considerable ambiguity about what it might mean to speak well artistically, and a number of possibilities have been articulated. For Quintilian, the standard for speaking well is ethical; for renaissance humanists, often it is to achieve eloquence in expression; for speech act theorists (see Kauffeld, 1999), it might be to fulfill the obligations imposed by a certain kind of discursive situation; and for other contemporary rhetoricians (see Wenzel, 1998), it might be to demonstrate an enlarged and embodied sense of rationality. Whatever the differences among these conceptions in other respects, all of them posit normative standards for rhetoric.

The issue, then, is not a contrast between a normative art of dialectic and a merely empirical art of rhetoric. Rather, it is a matter of the characteristic differences between the norms associated with both arts. From that perspective, the most obvious conclusion is that dialectical norms are less ambiguous, better focused, and more specific. Rhetorical standards are so much less settled that it is difficult to locate a dominant position. But, at least in the pre-modern tradition, I think that there is a discernable general tendency, and that is a tendency toward a norm of appropriateness. To speak well rhetorically as a matter of art is to demonstrate a capacity to adapt to changing local circumstances. In other words, the circumstantial and situated character

of rhetoric encourages a norm of accommodation and flexibility--a norm connected with phronesis or prudencia. The more stable context of dialectical argument encourages a norm that more closely approximates abstract rationality.

I have now considered two traditional points of comparison between rhetoric and dialectic, the one having to do with the issues they engage, the other with the norms that they invoke. A third distinction arises from the discursive practices connected with the two arts. Dialectic proceeds through questions and answers between two interlocutors, and the goal of each interlocutor is persuade the other. Rhetoric proceeds through uninterrupted discourse, one speaker addressing many, and the goal is not to persuade opposing speakers but to persuade an audience that does not participate directly in the exchange (see, Boethius: 1205C-1206C).

This is a simple and an apparently superficial difference, but it has a number of important consequences. When associated with a specific academic exercise, as it is for most of its pre-modern history, dialectic is essentially and unavoidably dialogic. A competent rhetorician must invoke premises that the audience will accept and must anticipate objections, but the encounter with the other is not direct. In dialectic, the turn-taking process forces an unmediated interaction. Secondly, since the interlocutors in dialectic engage one another, the process has a private character, whereas rhetoric is necessarily public. Jacques Braunschwig finds this contrast crucial to Aristotle's conception of how the two arts relate to one another: "Dialectic and rhetoric are antitrophic in the precise sense that what dialectic is to the private and conversational use of language (between two people alternatively speaking and hearing, asking questions and answering them), rhetoric is to the public use of language (political in a broad sense) addressed by a single speaker to a collective audience" (1996:36). It is possible to conceive dialectic in a way that is less directly connected with its origin as a private, conversational exercise, but that origin leaves a strong impression on almost all future developments.

In fact, the private or academic character of dialectical practice fits well with other features of dialectic that distinguish it from rhetoric--most notably the dialectician's tendency to treat argumentation as a more formal and more abstract activity than does the rhetorician. Braunschwig concludes that, at least for Aristotle, the configuration of the two arts follows from their proximity to or distance from the public world: "Dialectic basically is a greenhouse flower that grows and flourishes in the protected atmosphere of the school. The philosopher is able to keep it under intellectual control.... But rhetoric is a plant growing in the open air of the city and public places. This is why it smashes abstract schemas into fragments; it offhandedly makes fun of the most respectable theoretical distinctions" (1996: 51).

This metaphorical and, I suppose, rather rhetorical contrast between the two disciplines leads to the last in my list of characteristic differences--the modes of expression proper to each of them. Rhetorical language is open, expansive,

adaptive, and ornamented. Dialectical language is closed, precise, technical, and plain. This is a very common distinction, and it is often treated as though rhetoric simply has something that it can add to dialectic. Dialectic expresses arguments in the blue-collar language of logical functionality; rhetoric does a make-over by ornamenting the verbal exterior.

This view presupposes a dichotomy between language and argument that is alien to the mainstream rhetorical tradition. In the tradition that stretches from Isocrates to Cicero and from there to the Renaissance humanists, content and style, words and thoughts, the aesthetic and the rational are regarded as interconnected parts of eloquence. Rhetorical argument is not simply decoration added to logic. It is a fully embodied expression of reason that is at once accommodated to and also capable of intervening in public situations. Rhetoric, then, imbricates style and argument to achieve evocative and emotional force, and while rhetorical argumentation often uses dialectical principles, it does not add a linguistic veneer to them so much as it transforms them into instruments for public action. The language of rhetoric, therefore, effects a substantive difference between rhetorical argument and its dialectical counterpart.

All told, I have sketched four points of contrast between dialectic and rhetoric: (1) Dialectic deals with general, abstract issues, rhetoric with specific, circumstantial issues; (2) dialectic considers the relationship of propositions to one another and follows norms of logical rationality, while rhetorical argumentation considers the relationship between propositions and situations and follows norms that refer to appropriate social relationships; (3) dialectic proceeds through question and answer, and the interlocutors seek to persuade one another; rhetoric proceeds through uninterrupted discourse, and speakers seek to persuade the audience; and (4) dialectic employs unadorned, technical language, whereas rhetoric accommodates and embellishes language for persuasive purposes.

Set out in these synoptic terms, the contrasts may appear orderly and decisive. But, as I noted earlier, the tradition is not so simple, and the record shows notable instances where scholars have mixed elements I have placed in opposition here, often with interesting and useful results.⁶ My schematic is designed only to establish characteristic differences of tendency between the two arts and to function as a rough historical ground for sorting out contemporary issues. The most general of these tendencies, and the main point of this exercise, bears on the relationship of argumentation to social context. Dialectic tends to generate procedures that work autonomously within the practice of the art; rhetoric tends to adjust argumentation to public situations.

Even on this point, I need to issue a caution. This isolated antithesis between rhetoric and dialectic may exaggerate the differences between them and make them appear as categorical opposites. As a corrective, we need to remember that, although dialectic has some affinity with the ambitions of formal logic, it

always remains a more interactive and flexible medium of reasoning. Dialectic, after all, deals with argumentation, not disembodied thought, and if it tends to restrict the argumentative encounter according to rational procedures, it also acknowledges the interplay of opposing positions and the presence of speakers who seek to persuade one another. It employs modes of inference that are more responsive to the matter of argument than the apodeictic logic of the Scholastics, and it can never yield to the silent rigor of modern deductive logic. It also derives its premises from items of social belief (endoxa) rather than the axioms of a science or facts established through rigorous empirical inquiry (Walton, 1999: 136-143). Consequently, dialectic emerges as more formal than rhetoric but as more socially responsive than formal logic. It is, perhaps, difficult to conceive as a self-standing enterprise precisely because it is neither entirely one thing or the other. Nevertheless, however impure its status, dialectic has a crucial role to play within the language arts, since it offers space for mediation between the isolated thinker and the socially engaged speaker.

2. The New Dialectic and Rhetoric

After several centuries of virtual exile from the academy, dialectic is once again emerging as an important concept. This recovery follows from the rise of informal logic during the last few decades and the effort to replace the once dominant formal deductive model with a more flexible and practical approach to argumentation. The historical connection between dialectic and informal reasoning naturally brought the old term back to contemporary attention, and though, as my opening remarks indicate, dialectic is still viewed with some suspicion, it is making a strong bid to become the term of art for scholarship in informal logic.

This current revival has developed along two rather different lines. One of these options is primarily associated with the Dutch school of pragma-dialectics, and it places emphasis on the dialogic aspects of argumentation. The normative orientation of this approach follows from its conception of argumentation as a cooperative effort to resolve differences of belief, and this conception, in turn, depends upon Gricean notions of implicature and cooperation in private conversation. The older conception of the art sustained a disputational and agonistic view of the dialectical encounter, and in this respect, the irenic model of van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and their colleagues contrasts with the tradition. Nevertheless, the commitment to the relatively controlled sphere of interpersonal dialogue marks an interesting line of continuity.

While the pragma-dialectic theory originally did not specify any relation to rhetoric, van Eemeren and Houtlosser now have raised this issue directly and in some detail (1998a, 1998b). They regard rhetoric as "strategic maneuvering," recognize that self-interested elements inevitably enter into the argumentative process, and set out to fold rhetoric into their dialectical project. Specifically, they hold that rhetorical concerns enter into three aspects of

argumentation: the selection of premises, the accommodation to audiences, and the use of presentational devices. This effort is still in its early stages, and it is difficult to judge how well it can contain the sprawl of rhetoric within a cooperative model of dialectical interaction. But signs of complication already have appeared in Walton's recently developed concept of dialectic. Walton also bases his theory on dialogical principles, but instead of a single overarching goal for argumentation, he recognizes six different dialogical forms, some of which do not adhere to the telos of cooperation (Walton, 1998, 1999).

The second option, associated most clearly with Ralph Johnson and Tony Blair, minimizes the significance of dialogue and stresses the defeasible and oppositional nature of argumentation. For Johnson, the end of argumentation is rational persuasion and not cooperative resolution of difference, and Blair (1998) has argued that the dialogic model cannot encompass the field of dialectic. Dialogue, he maintains, properly applies to "turn-taking verbal exchanges between pairs of interlocutors," and while one can conceive of other argumentative contexts by analogy to dialogue, this model tends to misrepresent what happens in these contexts. For example, Blair notes that much argumentation occurs in solo performances (e.g. speeches, articles, books) where advocates of opposing positions are not actually present, and in these cases the regulative principles of conversation hardly seem appropriate. Thus, he concludes that all argumentation should be considered dialectical, in the sense that it involves "doubts or disagreements with at least two sides," but that "norms derived from dialogues" do not apply to all types of argumentation.

Johnson has extended and refined this sense of argumentation into a concept he calls the "dialectical tier." The concept is elegant and has attracted much attention. But there are also problems connected with it, and I suppose that these problems are the cause of Johnson's current doubts about the status of dialectic. In the remainder of this paper, I want to examine the dialectic tier in order to understand how rhetoric might enter into it and why some concept of dialectic seems necessary to sustain this rhetorical insight.

Johnson maintains that the first tier of argumentation--the "illative core" of the activity--consists in the structure of premises and conclusions that logicians typically study. But, he contends, this first tier does not include everything necessary for rational persuasion because arguments emerge within a field of controversy where objections and criticisms abound. Should an arguer fail to address such "objections and criticisms then to that degree her argument is not going to satisfy the dictates of rationality. Hence, if the Arguer really" wishes "to persuade the Other rationally, the Arguer is obligated to take account of these objections, these opposing points of view, these criticisms" (1996a:354, see also Johnson, 1996b:264-65). This obligation occurs at the second or dialectical tier of argument, and for Johnson, the argumentative task remains incomplete unless and until this tier is engaged. Moreover, the obligation the arguer incurs is not ethical or pragmatic, and Johnson insists, it is decidedly not rhetorical. It is something derived from the manifest rationality of argumentation per se, and it establishes stern requirements for dialectical

arguers. They must deal with an objection even if the audience is unaware of it and even if it raises doubt about the rationality of their position; and indeed the arguer must even respond "to criticisms that he believes (or knows) are misguided" (Johnson 1998a, 1998b). The dialectical obligation, then, seems dialectically structured all the way down.

In two recent papers, Trudy Govier has offered a constructive and thoughtful critique of Johnson's view of the dialectical tier. This critique locates and focuses upon two problems, discrimination and infinite regress. As I understand her comments, both of these issues open ground for a less purified and more rhetorically sensitive approach to the dialectical tier than is permitted in Johnson's original version. The limitation of time, however, prevents me from examining the discrimination problem, and so I must concentrate on the issue that Govier finds the more troublesome--infinite regress.

The problem of infinite regress, Govier maintains, arises from Johnson's requirement that every argument at the illative or core level must receive support at the second or dialectical level. Thus, the illative argument must be supplemented by arguments mindful of objections or alternatives to the initial argument. But every supplementary argument is itself an argument with an illative core and a dialectical tier, and so each supplementary argument demands additional support from arguments that anticipate objections, and those arguments must also have a dialectical tier, and so on through an infinite series. This regress, Govier notes, is intolerable from either a theoretical or a practical standpoint. And though she makes a concerted effort to find a way out of the endless spiral, she is unable to construct either a coherent restriction on its movement or a benign interpretation that redeems it. In the end, Govier cannot offer an account of dialectical adequacy; that is, she cannot explain how an argument can be adequate at the dialectical level without getting caught in a disastrous regression (Govier, 1998b).⁷

Even as Govier and Johnson were engaged in this exchange at the last OSSA conference, Nicholas Rescher presented a paper, on an apparently unrelated theme, that sheds considerable light on the central problem in Johnson's argument. A probative dialectic, Rescher observes, reasons from some propositions to other propositions. This pattern of inference must proceed from commitments already established, and in general these commitments are obtained by other rational inferences. But, as Aristotle discovered long ago, this process cannot continue all the way down. Somewhere there must be a stopping point, a concession that emerges from agreements not secured through the inferential sequence. And, says Rescher, this is precisely the point at which rhetoric comes into play.

For Rescher, rhetoric has an evocative power; it can persuade by eliciting agreement not through an analytic chain of discreet propositions but through synthetic expression that captures and highlights regions of our experience and brings them to conscious attention. Rhetorical assent, in this sense, comes from a fittingness with some overall scheme, from the intrinsic appeal of

what is said. And this rhetorical evocation is necessary to establish the ground for a probative dialectic: "Rational dialectic cannot dispense with rhetoric.... It is not the presence or absence of rhetoric that is at issue: the only question--the pivotal question, so to speak--is not whether but how much" (Rescher 1998).

Perhaps "how much rhetoric?" is not the only question. I also want to ask: "What kind of rhetoric?" Rescher's kind is simplified and magnified; its single function is to effect non-inferential persuasion, and it has the grand purpose of redeeming discursive reason, of saving it from its incurable regressivity. The kind of rhetoric I described earlier in comparison to dialectic is a more complex and far less exalted business. It is connected with a teaching tradition that seeks to impart skills used in practical situations, and in this tradition, rhetoric is not opposed to argumentation, because students must learn how to argue if they are to persuade in the places where rhetoric ordinarily occurs--in law courts and legislative bodies, in school boards and faculty meetings. In its every day manifestations rhetoric does small jobs using all the verbal and cognitive tools that are available.

Nevertheless, Rescher's grand rhetoric exhibits many of the same tendencies that characterize the more common variety. In both manifestations, rhetoric treats language as integral, and not ancillary, to its persuasive work. In both, rhetoric attempts to grasp a situation and to offer a fitting response to it, and in both cases, the rhetorical faculty is better able to deal with a concrete situation as a whole than it is to offer an epistemic or analytic account of an abstract subject or process. Rhetoric, in big matters or small, seems able to position arguers and arguments through an exercise of practical judgment and to offer parameters for reason that reason alone cannot construct. It offers a ground for argumentative relevance, since, as Raphael Demos has said: "The enumeration of all the relevant points in favor of a theory and against its opposite can never be completed; far more effective is to state a viewpoint in all its completeness and in all its significant implications, and then stop: the arguments become relevant only after this stage has been completed" (1932: 229).⁸

To return to the dialectical tier, I think we can now say that the problem with Johnson's conception is that it lacks situational ballast. Johnson wants to construct an autonomous dialectical system that can encompass all instances of argument, and to achieve this end he must know the criteria for dialectical adequacy in advance of any particular case of dialectical argument. But this leaves him with an impossible task--abstract reason cannot furnish such criteria, since it is condemned to fall into a pattern of abstract regression. The rhetorical sensibility cuts through this cycle of frustration by offering a grounded judgment about the case at hand and thus providing a provisional, local closure. Such judgment is, of course, imperfect, but it is also corrigible. One arguer's point of closure can become the ground for another's alternative position, and the choice between the two, once they are embodied, is open to rational argument.

This cooperative interaction between rhetoric and discursive logic, however, cannot occur unless we have an available conception of dialectic. If logic is left to its illative core and contemplates only isolated products of reasoned argument, then it will stew in its own rational juices. This allows logicians the freedom to offer intricate, technical, and precise accounts of argumentation, but it does not help argument do work in the world. If rational argument is to mean something in practice, it must be conceived in relationship to the controversies and disagreements that enter into our real world experience, and it is precisely here that argument becomes dialectical. Of course, as it touches social reality, dialectic loses complete autonomy over its operations; it must depend upon rhetoric to close and define the situations in which it can operate, and so its status as a "self-standing" discipline becomes endangered. But the loss of purity seems a small and abstract thing compared to the practical gain that is achieved. In fact, rhetoric hazards its own definitional autonomy in this process, since once it sets the wheels of reason into motion, its effort to achieve "effective persuasion" must be disciplined by dialectical rationality..

In sum, neither the rhetoric of effective persuasion nor the logic of rational persuasion should adopt theoretically purified goals. If effective persuasion means something more than pandering to an audience, then rhetoric must find ways to open situations to reasoned argument and to pursue reason within these situations. And if logic means something more than an academic exercise, it must find ways to enter the world of controversy and respond to the rhetorically situated needs of public business. This is not deny the important and irreducible differences between the rhetoric and logic. The two cannot be collapsed into one another, and if they both occupy the space of argumentation, they are most comfortably positioned at opposite ends of that space. The boundary, however, is not impermeable, and the voice of each art can carry over to influence the other and correct its characteristic vices, the rhetorical evocation turning dialectic away from regressive abstraction, and the disciplined voice of dialectic turning rhetoric away from vicious relativism. So the two arts speak to one another in a pattern of call and response, or to use an image from Greek theater, in balanced verses like those recited by the chorus. And here my inquiry ends as it leads back, at the end of the millennium, to Aristotle's insight that rhetoric is the antistrophos of dialectic.

Endnotes

- [1](#) Mack (1993:1-14) notes some of the complications in the historical record.
- [2](#) For a more detailed account of this distinction and its importance in rhetorical and dialectical argumentation, see Leff (1983).
- [3](#) This point is noted by Tindale (1998) and Johnson (1998a).
- [4](#) As, for example, Johnson (1998a).

[5](#) See for example, Cicero, *De inventione*, I

[6](#) For evidence of this, see, *inter alia*, Cogan (1984: 163-194), Mack (1993), and Meerhoff (1988: 270-280).

[7](#) Govier's papers on the dialectical tier are conveniently collected in her forthcoming book *The Philosophy of Argument* (1999).

[8](#) Demos' essay was brought to my attention by Jost and Hyde (1997: 23). Their essay offers interesting commentary on this concept of evocation and its relationship to rhetoric.

References

Blair, J. Anthony. (1998). "The Limits of the Dialogue Model of Argument.", *Argumentation and Rhetoric*, CD-Rom. Hans V. Hansen, Christopher W. Tindale, and Athena V. Colman (Eds.). St. Catharines, Ontario: Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation.

Braunschwig, Jacques. (1996). "Aristotle's Rhetoric as 'Counterpart' to Dialectic." In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Ed), *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric*. Berkeley: University of California Press: 34-55.

Boethius. (1978). *De topicis differentiis*. Translated with Notes and Essays on the Text by Eleonore Stump. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Cogan, Mark. (1984). "Rudolphus Agricola and the Semantic Revolutions of the History of Invention." *Rhetorica* 2: 163-194.

Demos, Raphael. (1932). "On Persuasion." *The Journal of Philosophy* 29: 225-232.

Garver, Eugene. (1994). *Aristotle's Rhetoric: An Art of Character*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Goodwin, Jean. (1999). "Response to Hegelund and Kock's Macro-Toulmin: The Argument Model as Structural Guideline in Academic Writing.", *Argumentation at the Century's Turn*, CD-Rom. Christopher W. Tindale, Hans V. Hansen, and Elmar Sveda (Eds.). St. Catharines, Ontario: Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. [[click here to view](#)]

Govier, Trudy. (1998a). "Arguing Forever? or: Two Tiers of Argument Appraisal.", *Argumentation and Rhetoric*, CD-Rom. Hans V. Hansen, Christopher W. Tindale, and Athena V. Colman (Eds.). St. Catharines, Ontario: Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation.

Govier, Trudy. (1998b). "Progress and Regress on the Dialectical Tier." Paper presented at the meeting of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation. Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

Govier, Trudy. (1999). The Philosophy of Argument. Newport News, Va: Vale Press.

Johnson, Ralph. (1996a). "The Need for a Dialectical Tier in Arguments." In D.M. Gabay and H.J. Ohlbach, (Eds), Practical Reasoning: International Conference on Formal and Applied Practical Reasoning. Berlin: Springer, 349-360.

Johnson, Ralph. (1996b). The Rise of Informal Logic. Newport News, Va.: Vale Press.

Johnson, Ralph. (1998a). "Argumentative Space: Logical and Rhetorical Approaches.", *Argumentation and Rhetoric*, CD-Rom. Hans V. Hansen, Christopher W. Tindale, and Athena V. Colman (Eds.). St. Catharines, Ontario: Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation.

Johnson, Ralph. (1998b). "Response to Govier's Arguing Forever? or: Two Tiers of Argument Appraisal.", *Argumentation and Rhetoric*, CD-Rom. Hans V. Hansen, Christopher W. Tindale, and Athena V. Colman (Eds.). St. Catharines, Ontario: Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation.

Jost, Walter and Michael J. Hyde, Eds. (1997). Rhetoric and Hermeneutics in Our Time. New Haven: Yale.

Kauffeld, Fred J. (1999). "Dialectical Tier Argumentation as Structured by Proposing and Advising.", *Argumentation at the Century's Turn*, CD-Rom. Christopher W. Tindale, Hans V. Hansen, and Elmar Sveda (Eds.). St. Catharines, Ontario: Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. [[click here to view](#)]

Leff, Michael C. (1983). "The Topics of Argumentative Invention in Latin Rhetorical Theory from Cicero to Boethius." Rhetorica 1:23-44.

Mack, Peter. (1993). Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic. Leiden: Brill.

McKeon, Richard. (1952). "Aristotle's Conception of Language and the Arts of Language." In R.S. Crane (Ed). Critics and Criticism, Ancient and Modern. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 176-232.

Meerhoff, Kees. (1988). "Agricola et Ramus--dialectique et rhetorique." In F. Akkerman and A.J. Vanderjagt (Eds). Rudolphus Agricola Phrisius (1444-1485). Leiden: Brill: 270-280.

Rescher, Nicholas. (1998). "The Role of Rhetoric in Rational Argumentation.", *Argumentation and Rhetoric*, CD-Rom. Hans V. Hansen, Christopher W. Tindale, and Athena V. Colman (Eds.). St. Catharines, Ontario: Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation.

Tindale, Christopher W. (1998). "Introduction: The Importance of Rhetoric for Dialectic.", *Argumentation and Rhetoric*, CD-Rom. Hans V. Hansen, Christopher W. Tindale, and Athena V. Colman (Eds.). St. Catharines, Ontario: Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation.

van Eemeren, Frans H. and Peter Houtlosser. (1998a). "Delivering the Goods in Critical Discussion." Paper presented at the conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation. Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

van Eemeren, Frans H. and Peter Houtlosser. (1998b). "William the Silent's Argumentative Discourse." Paper presented at the conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation. Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

Walton, Douglas. (1998). The New Dialectic: Conversational Contexts of Argument. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Walton, Douglas. (1999). Appeal to Popular Opinion. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Wenzel, Joseph. (1998). "The Rhetoric of Argumentation: A Rejoinder.", *Argumentation and Rhetoric*, CD-Rom. Hans V. Hansen, Christopher W. Tindale, and Athena V. Colman (Eds.). St. Catharines, Ontario: Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation.
