

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

How Winning Teams Become Championship Teams: a Baseball Team

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this project was to understand why certain Major League Baseball teams are extremely successful during Major League Baseball's regular season, but often do not have that same success in the play-offs. Similarly, why do certain teams have tremendous success in the play-offs? This project analyzed the architecture of Major League Baseball teams that had success in the regular season to teams that had success in the post season. More specifically, the teams were separated into two groups: teams that were Regular Season champions and teams that were World Series champions. The teams were analyzed and compared on the basis of how they distributed their payroll and statistics within their rosters. The analysis showed that there were differences between the two groups. There were also many similarities between the two groups which proved that successful teams are built in many of the same ways. Finally, recommendations were made on how a team can build its roster to have not only a winning team, but a championship team.

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INTRODUCTION

Every year, in late February, Major League Baseball (MLB) players report to their respective camps in Arizona or Florida for Spring Training. As they begin training and establishing their team roles, there is one ultimate goal for each of the 30 major league teams: to win the World Series. The journey of a World Series Championship team begins in early March with Spring Training game and ends in late October with the playoffs.

The building of a World Series Championship team, on the other hand, can last for years with the development of young players, the signing of free agents, the trading of veterans and prospects, and the overall development of the team structure. In general, it is the general manager's duty to produce the 25 man roster that you see throughout the baseball season. The GM uses the processes listed above to assemble the baseball team for that season; in today's baseball world, a team is never exactly the same from one season to another.

The initial objective of a GM would obviously be to find the best players possible to play for his team; this is done through scouting and analysis of previous statistical information of the players. At this point, an initial dilemma arises in the pursuit to assemble a championship team. First, there is a problem that there are 30 Major League baseball teams, thus not all of the teams can get the best players. In addition, there are different roles and positions in baseball that not every player can fill. For instance, if a team had three excellent hitting and fielding first basemen, but those players could only

play first base. The team would then have two very good players with nowhere to play most games.

An even bigger problem arises because the GMs of teams are usually forced to work within a payroll budget that is established by the owners of the teams. Today, professional baseball players make millions of dollars a year to play for a certain team: the better players normally cost more than the lesser players. In the end, GMs are forced to make hard decisions on which players to sign or let go while trying to establish a championship team and stay within the payroll budget.

After the team is assembled and the season begins, the 25 man roster will stay relatively the same. There are always some mid-season trades and young prospects called up, but the overall roster will not usually change by more than a few players.

The Major League Baseball regular season consists of 162 games for each team. After that, the top teams from each of the six divisions and the next two teams with the best record in each league (wildcard teams) make the playoffs. A World Series team will play anywhere from 11 to 19 games in the playoffs, much less than the regular season.

It would be predicted that a team that is successful during the regular season, would be successful in the playoffs. The game of baseball does not change in the playoffs other than increased pressure, which cannot be measured and should affect all of the playoff teams equally. However, for some reason, the most successful teams in the regular season are often not the most successful teams in the playoffs. For instance, over the last five years only one of the teams that had the best record in the regular season went on to win the World Series.

This project seeks to find an answer to why winning regular season teams are not always championship teams. Specifically, is there a way that the teams are built that causes them to be more apt to win in the playoffs? In looking at how the teams are built, this project will consider the distribution of the teams' payroll and specific statistics. The overall goal will be to find relationships between the distribution of these variables and the playoff success, in hopes of presenting recommendations on how to assemble a championship team.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Baseball may be known as America's pastime, but some of the game's most famous features were created by a non-American. In 1824, in Exeter, England, Henry Chadwick was born; he would eventually be hailed as "Father Baseball." Jules Tygiel (2000) states that "the ways in which Americans would absorb and analyze baseball from the late nineteenth century to the present emerged largely from Chadwick's vision, innovation, and reforming passion" (pp. 15-16).

Henry's father, James Chadwick, was an important figure in society; he followed Thomas Paine and supported the French Revolution and other radical causes. As a kid, Henry was athletic and played sports such as rounders and cricket. When Henry was 12, his father moved him and his second family (he had been previously married before Henry's mother) to Brooklyn. Here, Henry was first introduced to American culture and sport; he enjoyed games such as townball and baseball (Tygiel, 2000, pp. 15-16).

At the age of 23, Henry married and began a career as a reporter who covered sports such as cricket for New York newspapers. However, in 1856, Henry was once again exposed to baseball, and this time it caught his attention for good. He later recalled that "the game was being sharply played on both sides and I watched it with deeper interest than any previous base ball match that I had seen. It was not long before I was struck with the idea that base ball was just the game for a national sport for Americans." It was then that Henry Chadwick began to advance the game of baseball (Tygiel, 2000, pp. 15-17).

Chadwick, who had been influenced by his father's reforming attitude, also supported reform on most issues. Chadwick began to market baseball as an activity that could help solve the urban social order problems with its utilitarian advantages. He once described that baseball deserved "the endorsement of every clergyman in the country ... (As) a remedy for the many evils resulting from the immoral associations boys and young men of our cities are apt to become connected with." Chadwick thought that all team sports, not just baseball, were great for the reforming American society because they taught order and discipline (Tygiel, 2000, pp. 16-19).

In 1860, Chadwick published the first model baseball club constitution. It suggested punishments for many of the same things we are still trying to fix today, such as arguing with umpires, obscene language, and lack of self control. Well ahead of his time, Chadwick also fought for reform on gambling and alcohol use in baseball. Chadwick also favored pitchers that did not try to strike out every batter and teams that did not rely on the homerun. Chadwick's attempts at social reform were not always welcome. In 1868, Chadwick wrote that "I have devoted myself to improving and fostering the game in every way ... Seeing that everything connected with the game, almost, was new, its rules crude and hastily prepared ... I began to submit amendments to the rules of the game." He made many enemies and was considered by many to be someone that was just holding the game down. However, it is what predominantly led him to statistical analysis (Tygiel, 2000, pp. 17-19).

In the mid 1800s, America was well behind Europe in its use of statistical research in all arenas. Thus, anyone that had statistical knowledge was able to begin using statistical research in America. Chadwick used his previous knowledge reporting

cricket, which had been using box scores and other statistics since the 1840s, began to create a way to report data from baseball contests. Statistics, according to Chadwick, were a way to persuade and reform the game of baseball. Since Chadwick's ultimate goal was to make baseball a "national game", there had to be national standards that made the game easily understandable everywhere (Tygiel, 2000, pp. 20-21).

Chadwick's first scoring system used letters to describe each play; "L" stood for a foul ball and "K" stood for strikeout, mainly because those letters were emphasized in those words. As time went by, numbers began to replace the letters describing the plays, but K still stands for strikeout. Chadwick sent out blank scoring forms and directions with all his annual guides, quickly standardizing the way baseball was recorded, which in turn standardized the way it was played. The initial scoring method quickly led Chadwick to creating the box score, which was adapted from the cricket box score. Chadwick recorded his first box score in 1859, and it is very similar to today's box scores; he included runs, hits, individual fielding statistics, and an inning-by-inning line score. Box scores were not important to Chadwick because of the recording of game results, but because it gave players credit for what they did well and acknowledgement of what they did poorly (Tygiel, 2000, pp. 22-24).

As Chadwick's box scores progressed into the 1860s, he began to keep cumulative statistics of individuals and summaries of the entire seasons, something that is now common in all sports. By 1867, when the professional game began, Chadwick's statistics were being used to evaluate players. In 1868, Chadwick wrote that "Outs and runs ... is no criterion of a batsman's skill at all. We have known of dozens of instances in which batsmen have secured first or second base on their hits, but due to the inferior

batting of their successors, have had a large score of outs and no runs. There is but one true criterion of the skill at the bat, and that is the number of times bases are made on clean hits" (Tygiel, 2000, pp. 26-27). This, of course, led to the establishment of the batting average in 1872. Shortly afterward, Chadwick realized there were different types of hits, which led to the establishment of the slugging percentage. However, it should be noted that Chadwick never liked the home run, because it seemed to go against his calculations on what could be measured. At times, he outright said that single hitters were better than homerun-hitters, such as when he said "Now although the striker made four bases on his hit, he only secured one run, whereas the players who made but one base on their hits necessarily each secured a run." While his distaste for the homerun was at times illogical, it came from his belief that science and control should beat brute strength (Tygiel, 2000, pp. 26-28).

Another opinion of Chadwick and most of his peers of the time was that walks were not due to skilled hitting, but bad pitching. Similarly, strikeouts were due to bad hitting, not good pitching; these beliefs have been completely flipped in today's game. However, the debate on how walks should be recorded and counted in players' statistics went on for years. Finally, towards the late 1880s, it was decided that walks would not be counted in a player's batting average (Tygiel, 2000, pp. 30-31).

As the 19th century progressed, Chadwick's position in baseball changed. He was now known as "Grandfather Chadwick," not the innovator he once was. He was now the voice of baseball's status quo, no longer fighting for reform; he had created the national game that he aspired to. In 1881, Chadwick became editor of the annual *Spalding Baseball Guide*, and continued to do so through the 1890s, even though he started to

suffer from health problems. On April 20, 1908, Henry Chadwick died at the age of 84. He had been honored heavily in the previous five years for his work, but died before he could finish his book on the history of baseball, which he had started a few years before; Albert Spalding, urged by Chadwick in his will, completed the history of baseball and published it as *America's National Game* (Tygiel, 2000, pp. 32-33).

Throughout the next century, Chadwick's statistical measures were criticized and new and better ways were found to measure and record baseball. In his book *Past Time*, Jules Tygiel (2000) states that:

If in this area Chadwick's handiwork has led us astray, however, the broader imprint of his grand achievement remains. Chadwick's incorporation of the modern passion for statistics into the core of the game, his invention of a scoring system and insistence on uniform standards, his innovation in forms of quantitative reporting and measurement, and the moral fervor with which he pursued these activities transplanted the enjoyment of baseball from the playing field to the parlor and beyond. Henry Chadwick invented the baseball experience (pp. 33-34).

Baseball continued into what many call a Golden Age in the first half of the 20th century. Scoring continued, but it was not always a popular activity to do. In the 1920s, scoring of the game was the sportswriter's job, which paid at times \$1.50 a game. Sportswriters often complained that they were making less than the players; they also faced repercussions from the players that they perhaps gave an error. It was a thankless job for the sportswriters, but it was extremely important for the game. David Voigt (1970), explained that "The word alone is enough to frighten most Americans, but

baseball statistics are meat and drink to dyed-in-the-wool fans. Although most writers did not deny their importance, few liked the job of working with statistics" (pp. 237-238).

As the 20th century pressed towards its midpoint, baseball finally found writers that actually enjoyed recording statistics. In 1939, Ernie Lanigan took over as historian of the Baseball Hall of Fame; he eventually gave way to Lee Allen who took sports writing and statistical data to the next level. Allen worked with two amateur statisticians named Sherley Thompson and Frank Marcellus. Eventually, Thompson and Marcellus would assist in creating the first *Encyclopedia of Baseball*. First published in 1951, this was the biggest update that had occurred in baseball statistics since Chadwick (Voigt, 1970, pp. 238-239).

In 1955, Paul Richards wrote the book *Modern Baseball Strategy*. The book discusses baseball strategies from topics such as how to handle pitchers to when to hit and run. However, there is a specific chapter dedicated to assembling a batting order; this issue was never really discussed in the 19th century by Chadwick or any of his peers. The first topic Richards discusses, not ironically, is the lead-off position. This is where the manager wants a batter that gets on base a lot and has patience at the plate. In the second hitter, Richards says a manager should, "look for a player who bunts well and is a good right-field hitter, whether he bats left or right-handed" (pp. 179-180).

Next, the third hitter should be the best hitter, and hopefully be faster than the fourth hitter. The five and six spots in the order should be the next best batters that do not fit into the top four spots. If possible, the manager should try to alternate left and right-handed hitters in this spot; it makes it harder for the opposing team to bring in relief pitchers for match-Ups when managers alternate left and right-handed hitters. Lastly, a

normal inclination is for teams to put their worst hitter in the eighth spot, right before the pitcher (this was written before the designated hitter (DH) rule). Often times the catcher is the worst hitter and is placed in the eighth spot. However, this is a strategic mistake most times because the catcher is normally one of the slowest runners, which makes it harder for the pitcher in the ninth spot to bunt the eighth spot hitter over if he would get on base. Due to this fact, when facing a decision between seven and eight spot hitters, the manager should put the faster runner in the eighth spot so that he can easily be bunted over (Richards, 1955, pp. 180-181).

In 1964, Earnshaw Cook wrote the book *Percentage Baseball*, which discusses such issues of chance and probability in the game, strategy, and evaluation of players. Cook, like so many baseball writers before and after him, tried to find the best possible and most complete way to evaluate players. Cook used over ten different hitting and fielding statistics to come up with a position players net runs; the player with the highest net runs was statistically the best player in the league. Also, Cook believed that important managerial decisions should be made by statistics, not by biased managers that could not possibly make the perfectly right decision every time. In his book, he wrote "Why rely upon notoriously fallible human judgment when elementary probability theory can provide unprejudiced and unemotional data for nearly all the more important decisions of the game" (Cook, 1964, pp. 172-182)?

One issue that has been wrestled with lately is the immergence of O.P.S. (on-base plus slugging percentage). OPS first began to appear in the 1970s, as statistical gurus were starting to research new ways of evaluating batters, other than the traditional batting average. From the beginning, researchers knew that adding on-base and slugging was not

the most accurate way to measure a batter's ability. Most baseball fans figured that on-base percentage was more important than slugging, usually because when you get on-base you are not making outs. David Wright of the Mets described the difference by saying "you can always make things happen when you get on base. When I think of slugging percentage, I think of sitting back for the three-run homer, which might not happen" (Schwarz, 2007).

It now appears that researchers and stat gurus are centering in on what they believe to be a more accurate measure of OPS. Victor Wang, a high school student in Minnesota, discovered that the on-base percentage should be weighted 80 percent more than slugging percentage. The *Society for American Baseball Research Journal* published Wang's research. In addition, the *Hardball Times* has produced similar results when trying to relate OPS to run production, which clarifies the accurateness of both the studies (Schwarz, 2007).

Researchers are now taking the OPS measurement and dividing it by four to create a new measurement called Gross Production Average (GPA). The reason for this simple transformation is to put the measurement in more common baseball parameters; GPA looks very similar to the traditional batting average. For instance, a GPA of .200 is considered very bad, .265 is average, and around .360 is the best. This new measurement should be easily understood by the average fan (Schwarz, 2007).

In 2003, Michael Lewis wrote the book *Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game*. The book chronicles how Billy Beane, the Oakland Athletics (A's) General Manager, built the 2002 A's team and planned for future seasons. The Oakland A's and Billy Beane became famous for their new way of building a baseball team, which is now

called "moneyball." The idea centers around choosing players on statistics that were not commonly looked at in the past, such as on-base percentage (OBP). Using this "moneyball" method, the A's have consistently been very successful in the regular season with one of the lowest payrolls in Major League Baseball. In 2002, the A's tied for the best record in the league with a 40 million dollar payroll; the team they tied with, the Yankees, had a payroll of \$125 million. However, with all of their regular season success, the A's have not made the World Series during Billy Beane's tenure as general manager (Lewis, 2003).

Michael Lewis explains this lack of success in the playoffs by stating "The postseason partially explained why baseball was so uniquely resistant to the fruits of scientific research: to any purely rational idea about how to run a baseball team... It was that the season ended in a giant crapshoot." In fact, it has been calculated that one run in a baseball game is due to skill, while four runs are due to luck. Using this rationale, the worst team in baseball could beat the best team in a five game series 15% of the time. Hence, the conclusion of this book is that the World Series Champion is simply the team that gets hot in the playoffs (Lewis, 2003, p. 274).

Jim Albert and Jay Bennett, authors of *Curve Ball*, come to much the same conclusion as Michael Lewis. They take a more statistical analysis approach, but in the end they conclude "chance variability has a lot to do with teams' performances during a season." They continually mention that "chance occurrences" such as players getting "hot" or umpires making questionable calls can influence the outcomes of these shortened playoff series (Albert & Bennett, 2001, p. 341). Earnshaw Cook's research in

1964 agreed with Albert and Bennett's; the play-off series are so short that the best team will not always win (Cook, 1964, pp. 265-276).

Finally, not everyone attributes playoff success to "getting hot". In 2006, Nate Silver wrote an article called "The Secret Sauce" that discussed an analysis of past playoffs in *Baseball Prospectus*, published by Bill James. Bill James is considered by many to be the founder of the "moneyball" revolution and has continuously found new ways to evaluate how the game of baseball is played (Silver, 2006).

This particular analysis found that there were three major factors in predicting playoff success: pitchers' strikeout rate (how many strikeouts they averaged per nine innings), quality of defense (calculated by the measure fielding runs above average (FRAA)) and the strength of their closer (calculated with Win Expectation above Replacement (WXRL)). These are fairly complex calculations, but they did successfully point to the 2005 World Series match-up between the Houston Astros and the Chicago White Sox. However, these same calculations predicted that the 2006 World Series match-up would be the New York Mets and Minnesota Twins; the actual match-up was the Detroit Tigers (ranked 5th out of 8 playoff teams) and the St. Louis Cardinals (ranked 8th out of 8 playoff teams). The exact measure that predicted the World Series Champion in 2005, ranked the 2006 World Series Champion last in its rating. Hence, this measurement is obviously not perfect. However, it may give hope that there is a way to find a factor that directly contributes to playoff success (Silver, 2006).

Recently, baseball statistics have entered the headlines for an unusual reason. In 2006, Major League Baseball was involved in a legal battle with CBC Distribution & Marketing, which operates as CDM Fantasy Sports. Fantasy sports, where fans compete

against each other by assembling teams of real athletes that have the best statistics, has been growing exponentially. Fantasy sports have accumulated revenue over \$100 million and are growing about 8% a year; fantasy baseball is the second most popular fantasy sport, right behind fantasy football (McCarthy, 2006).

Previously, Major League Baseball had entered licensing agreements with about 20 companies that provided fantasy games. However, Major League Baseball has lessened many of its licensed operators so that there are now only seven. They have also been increasing the licensing fees, which will most likely be passed on to the consumer. However, when CBC Distribution & Marketing was turned down for a licensing agreement in 2005, they filed suit against the players union and MLB.com (*C.B.C. Distribution and marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media*, 2006).

CBC is different than some of the larger fantasy providers, such as ESPN and Yahoo, because it does not use photos of players or logos of teams; they only use names of players and statistics which they get from MLB.com. Rudy Telscher, lawyer for CBC, argued that CBC is "disseminating information to the public about baseball players no different than what a newspaper does. The American populace, at least a significant portion of it, has a fascination with baseball, they have a fascination with following the statistics, and I think the popularity of fantasy sports is borne right out of that passion for tracking the game and the statistics." While CBC is the only fantasy operator filing suit, many other small unlicensed operators will be hoping for a victory, which could allow them to stay in business (Schwarz, 2006).

Lee Goldsmith, the lawyer for Major League Baseball Advanced Media, argues that fantasy baseball is different from conventional journalism, "What a company like

CBC is selling is not nearly a repackaging of statistics. They're selling and they're marketing the ability to buy, sell, draft and cut Derek Jeter, Alex Rodriguez, Albert Pujols. And part and parcel of the reason that people are willing to pay for that ability is the persona of Jeter, or Rodriguez, or Pujols" (Schwarz, 2006). Major League Baseball Advanced Media chief executive, Bob Bowman, added "the business here is not publishing statistics. The business here is running a league." It should be known, that there is not a copyright claim being made; a decision by the United States Court of Appeals in 1997 over National Basketball Association statistics found that sports statistics are public-domain facts. Alan Schwarz, of the New York Times, states that "the central issue concerns celebrities' ability to control use of their names in commercial ventures, and how this "right of publicity," which has developed under state common law and statute over the last half century, may commingle with Constitutional press protections under the First Amendment," (2006).

Other than the 1997 NBA case, there have been two other rulings that are significant to the *CB.C case*. In 1953, Topps Chewing Gum Company was not allowed to print trading cards that had baseball players' name and likeness without the players' permission, due to a ruling that created the term "right of publicity," (*Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.*, 1953). Also, two baseball board games that only used names and statistics, were found by a Minnesota state court in 1970 to have "misappropriated the players' marketable identities and were subject to license." This case seemed extremely similar to the *CB.C case* (Schwarz, 2006).

In the end, U.S. Magistrate Judge Mary Ann L. Medler discarded Major League Baseball's argument that players' identities and statistics are the intellectual property of

the league, in the *CB. C case*. In her ruling, Medler wrote "The undisputed facts establish that the names and playing records of (MLB) players as used in CBC's fantasy games are not copyrightable and, therefore, federal copyright law does not pre-empt the players' claimed right of publicity" (*CB. C Distribution and marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media*, 2006. p. 26). While an appeal could be made by Major League Baseball, it appears that numbers and statistics, which are what baseball communicates by and bases fame off of, belongs to the public (Schwarz, 2006).

METHODS

The methods section identifies and describes all of the processes involved in the finding, organizing, and analyzing of statistical and non-statistical data. All processes were executed in a non-bias manner or to prove that one baseball team or player is better than another team or player.

The first step of this study was to identify the teams that were going to be used. The last five seasons (2002-2006) were chosen for the research. Since the research was trying to find a reason that certain teams win in the regular season but do not win in the postseason, teams that had had success in each were chosen. The World Series winner from each of the seasons, representing success in the play-offs, and the regular season champions from each league were chosen for the research. There was only one overlap of a team that did both, the 2005 Chicago White Sox. Also, in 2002, two teams tied for the American League regular season championship; therefore, both teams were used in the research. A total of 15 teams were used in the research, but the 2005 Chicago White Sox were used twice because they accomplished both the regular season championship and the World Series championship. The teams are shown below.

2002- Regular Season Winners- New York Yankees, Oakland Athletics, and Atlanta Braves; World Series Champion- Anaheim Angels

2003- Regular Season Winners- New York Yankees and Atlanta Braves; World Series
Champion- Florida Marlins

2004- Regular Season Winners- New York Yankees and St. Louis Cardinals; World
Series Champion- Boston Red Sox

2005- Regular Season Winners- Chicago White Sox and St. Louis Cardinals; World
Series Champion- Chicago White Sox

2006- Regular Season Winners- New York Yankees and New York Mets; World Series
Champion- St. Louis Cardinals

The next step of this study was to identify the 25-man rosters of each of the teams. This was difficult because each team had at least some changes during the year, but it was important to identify the most important 25 men to the team. The rosters were determined using statistics from www.baseball-reference.com. In general, the 25 players that played the most for the respective team were the ones used on the roster. However, there were some issues that were faced during the roster organizing that did not allow the rosters to simply followed games played for that team.

First off, for this study the rosters needed to resemble, as much as possible, an actual baseball roster. For one, each team needed to have between 10-12 pitchers, since that is the normal numbers carried by a major league team. The teams varied in how many they had, but all rosters are between 10-12 pitchers, which put them at 13-15

position players. In most cases, roster decisions between batters were decided by at-bats, while roster decisions between pitchers were decided by innings pitched. Next, all rosters were required to have at least two catchers. Even though some of the back-up catchers did not have many at-bats or games, the majority of major league teams carry at least two catchers.

The next issue to deal with was the mid-season trades that happened during the season. Since the research is predominantly looking at why teams succeed in the play-offs, the rosters needed to be closer to the play-off rosters more than the opening day rosters. As a result, any player that was traded from the team during the season was left off the roster. However, if a player was traded to the team during the season, he could be on the roster. Basically, a player needed to be on the team at the end of the season to be included on the roster.

After the 25-man roster was set, a batting order needed to be created for the batting spot analysis. At www.baseball-reference.com, they list every batting order used during the entire season. The information that was used to make the batting order decisions was the most common batting order and the spot that individual players batted in the most. This information was combined together to get the batting order for each team. The most common batting order was not used every time because it wasn't always an accurate portrayal of the whole season. For instance, the most common batting order as a whole could have had Player A batting second, but Player A actually batted lead-off 100 games and second only 20 games. The most common batting order can be skewed because of one or two players being switched out due to injuries or a platoon system. In

review, both the most common batting orders and individuals' most common spots were used to create the batting orders used in the research.

The next issue on player information was position. The starters were given their most common position played as shown by www.baseball-reference.com. The bench players, however, often played multiple positions, hence they were given titles such as OF (any outfield position), IF (any infield position), UT (multiple positions), to designate how they were used on the bench.

Players' salaries were determined from *USA Today's* salary database on-line. However, some of the players listed on rosters did not have salaries for the given year. In this case, their following year's salary was used most of the time. Also, many of the younger players had no salary information from any year; in this case, \$300,000 was used because that seemed to be what many of the younger players made. In any instance, these small salary predictions will not influence the project greatly, as the project centers on the primary starters of the teams, which in all cases had salary information. Also, there could be cases where players that were acquired via trade have another team paying a portion of the salary; this is not taken into account in the study.

All roster and salary decisions, pertaining to specific teams that were not routine to the process, are shown below:

2002 Yankees- Raul Mondesi and Jeff Weaver were acquired via mid-season trade. Jeff Weaver was put on the roster over Randy Choate because they were very similar in number of games played for the Yankees, but Weaver had over 50 more innings pitched.

2002 Athletics- Ray Durham and John Mabry were acquired via mid-season trade. Mark Ellis's 2003 salary was used. Aaron Harang's 2004 salary was used. Eric Byrnes 2003 salary was used. Eric Byrnes was used over some players with a few more at-bats because he had almost double the amount of games they played with 90.

2002 Braves- 2003 salaries for Darren Bragg, Kevin Gryboski, and Matt Franco were used.

2002 Angels- 2003 salaries for John Lackey, Brendan Donnelly, and Scot Shields were used.

2003 Yankees- Derek Jeter was selected to bat second in the batting order, even though he had fewer games there than Nick Johnson, because he also had many at-bats in the number one and three spots. Hence, Jeter was always a top of the order batter, and needed to be represented as such in this study. Also, Jeter would have been the normal number two hitter if he had not been injured early on in the season. Karim Garcia was purchased mid-season and Ruben Sierra was acquired mid-season via a trade. Juan Rivera's 2004 salary was used. \$300,000 was used for Erick Almonte's salary.

2003 Braves- Shane Reynolds' 2004 salary was used.

2003 Marlins- Ugueth Urbina and Jeff Conine were acquired mid-season via trade.

Conine was put on the roster over Nate Bump because Conine played a lot after joining the team, especially down the stretch.

2004 Yankees- Tanyon Sturtze was acquired mid-season via trade. John Olerud was signed as a free agent in August of the 2004 season. Jose Contreras was traded mid-season, but he was kept on the roster because he had already logged almost 100 innings as a Yankee, making him vital to the analysis. Sturtze's 2005 salary was used.

\$1,000,000 was used for Olerud's salary; he was initially listed at \$7,100,000 for the 2004 season. However, he was released by the Mariners and then signed with the Yankees for a contract that was probably quite less than his initial salary.

2004 Cardinals- Roger Cedeno and Larry Walker were acquired mid-season via trade. Larry Walker was used as a starter in the batting order even though he had less at-bats and games than many other players because he was a starter once he came over in the trade in August. The 2005 salaries were used for John Mabry and Yadier Molina.

2004 Red Sox- Orlando Cabrera and Doug Mientkiewicz were acquired mid-season via trade. Gabe Kapler was used as a starter over Pokey Reese because Reese is a shortstop and lost the starting spot when the Red Sox acquired Orlando Cabrera, who is used as the starting shortstop. Curt Leskanic was signed mid-season as a free agent and his 2004 salary was used. The 2005 salary was used for Kevin Youkilis.

2005 White Sox- Bobby Jenks was used over Frank Thomas, even though Thomas played two more games, because Jenks came on at the end of the season and was more intricate to their late success. The 2006 salaries were used for Brandon McCarthy and Bobby Jenks.

2005 Cardinals- John Rodriguez was acquired mid-season via trade and his 2006 salary was used. Scott Rolen and Reggie Sanders were injured much of the 2005 season, but the most common starting line-up was used, which does not include Rolen. Brad Thompson's 2006 salary was used.

2006 Yankees- Craig Wilson, Cory Lidle, and Bobby Abreu were acquired mid-season via trade. Hideki Matsui and Gary Sheffield missed quite a bit of time due to injuries and are not in the starting line-up, but they are still on the rosters. A salary of \$300,000 was given to Melky Cabrera.

2006 Mets- Shawn Green and Orlando Hernandez were acquired mid-season via trade. Xavier Nady was traded mid-season, but is still included on the bench. Lastings Milledge, John Maine, and Pedro Feliciano all used \$300,000 for their salary.

2006 Cardinals- Ron Belliard and Jeff Weaver were acquired mid-season via trade; some of Jeff Weaver's salary was paid for by the Angels. Preston Wilson was signed mid-season for an undisclosed amount which was estimated as \$500,000. Scott Spiezio's

salary was estimated at \$500,000. A salary of \$300,000 was used for Chris Duncan and Anthony Reyes.

There were 12 total statistical areas being measured in the research (6 for batters and 6 for pitchers). All statistical information was attained through www.baseball-reference.com. Also, when a player was acquired mid-season via a trade, only his after trade statistical information was used. Specifically, the statistics used are statistics gained while playing for that team.

The statistics recorded for batters were at-bats (AB), on-base percentage (OBP), slugging percentage (SLG), runs batted-in (RBI), runs scored (R), homeruns (HR), and stolen bases (SB). At-bats were used as a gauge for playing time while the rest of the statistics were analyzed. More specific descriptions of on-base percentage and slugging percentage are given below:

$$\text{OBP} = (\text{hits (H)} + \text{walks (BB)} + \text{hit-by-pitch (HBP)}) / (\text{at-bats (AB)} + \text{BB} + \text{sacrifices (SF)} + \text{HBP})$$

$$\text{SLG} = (\text{total bases (TB)}) / (\text{AB}) \quad \text{TB} = \text{singles} + 2 * \text{doubles} + 3 * \text{triples} + 4 * \text{homeruns}$$

The statistics recorded for pitchers were earned-run average (ERA), wins (W), losses (L), innings pitched (IP), hits (H), walks (BB), strikeouts (K), and saves (SV). Some of these statistics were combined to come up with other measures. The final six statistical categories that pitchers were analyzed by ERA, win-loss percentage (W-L %),

IP, walks-hits per innings pitched (WHIP), strikeout ratio (*K/9 IP*), and SV. Descriptions of the statistics are given below:

$$\text{ERA} = (9 * \text{earned runs}) / \text{IP}$$

$$\text{W-L}\% = \text{W} / (\text{W} + \text{L})$$

$$\text{WHIP} = (\text{BB} + \text{H}) / \text{IP}$$

$$\text{K/9 IP} = (\text{K} / \text{IP}) * 9$$

All of these rosters, statistics, positions, batting orders, and salaries are shown in Appendix A. They were analyzed using methods such as mean and median to find common occurrences and relationships within the data. All of the data was first re-organized into a new Excel table. All of the World Series Champions (2002 Angels, 2003 Marlins, 2004 Red Sox, 2005 White Sox, 2006 Cardinals) were put in one Excel table, and all of the regular-season champions (2002 Yankees, 2002 Athletics, 2002 Braves, 2003 Yankees, 2003 Braves, 2004 Yankees, 2004 Cardinals, 2005 White Sox, 2005 Cardinals, 2006 Yankees, 2006 Mets) were placed in a different Excel table. The 2005 White Sox were used in both groups because they achieved both championships. All statistical analyses were performed the same on both groups.

First, the total payroll of the teams' 25-man roster was calculated by adding the salaries given for each player. This number may not reflect the teams' total payroll

because not all of the players that played for the team were on this roster and because, as mentioned before, parts of certain players' salaries were being paid for by other teams due to trade agreements. The average team payroll was also calculated for each group..

The roster payroll was then separated into four parts:

Starting Lineup- The first eight players on the National League rosters or the first nine players on the American League rosters were categorized as the starting lineup.

Bench- Every position player (anything but a pitcher) that was not in the starting lineup was categorized as part of the bench. The numbers of players on the bench vary by team, with as little as four players to as much as seven players.

Starting Rotation- The starting rotation was made up of the players that had started games consistently for their teams. They were labeled as SP in the data and each team had five or six pitchers in the rotation.

Bullpen- The bullpen was made of pitchers that usually came into games out of the bullpen for relief; they were any player that was labeled as a RP or CL in the data.

Teams varied in number of players in the bullpen from four players to seven players.

For each team, the payroll of these four parts and the percentage of the total team payroll were calculated. Then, within the two separate groups, the median payroll of each part, mean payroll of each part, and the average percentage of the team's payroll was calculated.

Next, every player's salary was divided by his team's total salary to calculate what percentage of the team salary the players' salaries accounted for (% TP); this can be seen in Appendix B. This measure was used to identify the emphasis of a given player in the distribution of the team's salary, instead of a simple salary compared to other salaries. All 25 percentages were added to make sure the sum was 100 percent.

After the payroll distribution, the median salary and mean salary were calculated for each batting order spot of each group. The median salary was calculated because the mean salary could be influenced greatly by one extremely high salary that may not represent the majority of the salaries from that spot in the batting order. In addition, the average percentage of team payroll accounted for by the given batting order spot was calculated. National League teams had one through eight batting spots while American League teams had one through nine batting spots because of the designated hitter. Hence, the sample size for the ninth spot is smaller than the rest of the spots in the batting order. Some differences in batting order strategy could occur because of this difference between leagues, but the difference would be minimal and noticed only at the bottom of the batting order.

The next step in the study was to conduct the same calculations, median salary, mean salary, and average percentage of team payroll, by field position. The entire roster was included in these calculations, including pitchers. However, bench players were conducted under one category (Bench), not by the individual positions they play; this was done because most bench players play multiple positions, aside from the back-up catcher, and it would be extremely difficult to decide a specific position to categorize by them. Some of the bench players on these rosters are normally starters, but because of injuries

they only qualified to be a bench player on these rosters; this could shift the calculations by making the bench a bigger percentage that it should be. The median calculation should help solve this possible problem. Since bench was used as one of the four parts earlier, bench players' were not calculated again.

Starting pitchers (SP) were ranked one through five or one through six, depending on how many starters the team had on their roster. The ranks were simply given by the amount of wins the starting pitcher had accumulated that season. Hence, the starter with the most wins was considered the number one starter. If starters were tied in wins, then the pitcher with the least losses got the better ranking. The starter with the most wins is not always considered the team's number one starter, but this was the simplest way to rank the pitchers since they are never really ranked except for the opening week of the season.

The bullpen was divided into two separate positions: closer (CL) and other relief pitchers (RP). These distinctions were given by www.baseball-reference.com. While most teams only had one closer, there were a few that had two designated closers, but that was the most. Relief pitcher numbers on the teams varied from three relief pitchers to six relief pitchers.

In the end there were 18 possible positions:

C- catcher

1B- first baseman

2B- second baseman

3B- third baseman

SS- shortstop

LF- left-fielder

CF- center-fielder

RF- right-fielder

DH- designated-hitter (only used on American League teams)

Bench- any bench player

SP1- the number one starting pitcher

SP2- the number two starting pitcher

SP3- the number three starting pitcher

SP4- the number four starting pitcher

SP5- the number five starting pitcher

SP6- the number six starting pitcher (only used on teams that had six starters)

CL- closer (some teams had two, but all had at least one)

RP- relief pitchers other than closers (number of RP varied by team)

The bench, closer, and relief pitchers were the only positions that a team could have more than one player classified as that position; the rest of the positions only have one representative from each team. The designated-hitter and number six starting pitcher were the only positions that some teams did not have; the rest of the positions are accounted for on every team. Also, no player duplicates into two positions.

The next portion of the analysis was the distribution of the statistical categories, which is shown in Appendix C. First, totals for the teams were calculated. For position players, AB, RBI, R, HR, and SB were all totaled by just adding the players' statistics. OBP and SLG% for the team was calculated using a weighted average, not a total. The

position players' at-bats were calculated as a percentage of the team's total at-bats. Then, that percentage was multiplied times the OBP or SLG% of the player to get a weighted number. This number is labeled as the statistic, such as OBP, with a W in front of it, so for OBP, it is labeled WOBP. That number was added to get the team OBP or SLG%. This means that a player with more at-bats at more weight in the calculation and it should represent the roster's actual OBP or SLG%.

Pitchers' totals for each team were calculated slightly differently. IP and SV were calculated by simply adding the individual statistics. Wins and losses were added separately and then compared to get the team W-L%. All of the team's pitchers' Hand BB were added and then divided by IP to get the team WHIP. The total K of the pitching staff was divided by IP to get the team $K/9$ IP. Finally, the team ERA was weighted to IP just like AB was to OBP and SLG%.

After the team totals were completed, the average team totals of all of the statistics for each study group were calculated. Then, distribution of the teams' statistics throughout the individual players was calculated. This was done by dividing the individual's specific statistic by the team total. However, OBP, SLG%, ERA, W-L%, WHIP, and $K/9$ IP were all weighted in some way to another statistic. Hence, there was no total, but an average statistic. In these cases, the individual's specific statistic was still divided by the entire team statistic, but it was not a distribution of a total. This measure instead gauged where the individuals' statistics were compared to the weighted average of the team. Some of the percentages were over 100 percent, meaning that that player was better than the team average, and a percentage under 100 percent meant that that player was worse than the team average.

Next, the average distribution or percentage of players , statistics compared to their team was calculated for each group. The first average that was calculated was the batting order spots of each group, just like it was done with the salary distribution analysis. Then, the averages were calculated by position using the same directions as the salary distribution analysis. No medians were used in this analysis because there were not huge gaps between some of the statistics like there were for players' salaries.

RESULTS

The following is all of the calculated salary and statistical distribution data.

Payroll Analysis

World Series Champions

2002 Anaheim Angels:

Total Team Payroll	\$60,001,667	% Team
Starting Lineup	\$32,180,000	53.63%
Bench	\$1,890,000	3.15%
Starting Rotation	\$17,906,667	29.84%
Bullpen	\$8,025,000	13.37%

2003 Florida Marlins:

Total Team Payroll	\$52,775,000	% Team
Starting Lineup	\$29,115,574	55.17%
Bench	\$8,400,000	15.92%
Starting Rotation	\$7,484,426	14.18%
Bullpen	\$7,775,000	14.73%

2004 Boston Red Sox:

Total Team Payroll	\$117,108,125	% Team
Starting Lineup	\$54,627,500	46.65%
Bench	\$9,948,125	8.49%
Starting Rotation	\$38,682,500	33.03%
Bullpen	\$13,850,000	11.83%

2005 Chicago White Sox:

Total Team Payroll	\$64,697,000	% Team
Starting Lineup	\$26,550,000	41.04%
Bench	\$2,195,000	3.39%
Starting Rotation	\$29,732,000	45.96%
Bullpen	\$6,220,000	9.61%

2006 St. Louis Cardinals:

Total Team Payroll	\$97,162,371	% Team
Starting Lineup	\$46,414,371	47.77%
Bench	\$6,957,000	7.16%
Starting Rotation	\$30,525,000	31.42%
Bullpen	\$13,266,000	13.65%

Total Group:			
Average Team Payroll:	\$78,348,833		
	MED	AVG	AVG%
Starting Lineup	\$32,180,000	\$37,777,489	48.85%
Bench	\$6,957,000	\$5,878,025	7.62%
Starting Rotation	\$29,732,000	\$24,866,119	30.89%
Bullpen	\$8,025,000	\$9,827,200	12.64%
By Batting Order:	MED	AVGSAL	AVG%
1	\$1,000,000	\$2,662,667	2.74%
2	\$2,300,000	\$2,838,000	4.78%
3	\$9,650,000	\$8,447,500	11.91%
4	\$8,750,000	\$10,481,267	12.18%
5	\$3,450,000	\$4,964,940	6.31%
6	\$4,000,000	\$4,530,000	6.08%
7	\$2,250,000	\$2,218,115	2.62%
8	\$400,000	\$980,000	1.32%
9	\$750,000	\$1,091,667	1.53%
All	\$32,550,000	\$38,214,156	49.46%
By Position:	MED	AVGSAL	AVG%
C	\$2,250,000	\$3,980,000	5.86%
1B	\$4,250,000	\$6,515,000	8.52%
2B	\$490,000	\$1,673,000	2.83%
3B	\$3,700,000	\$4,531,267	5.78%
SS	\$2,150,000	\$2,692,667	3.11%
LF	\$700,000	\$5,733,115	5.85%
CF	\$6,250,000	\$5,864,940	6.93%
RF	\$3,500,000	\$4,270,000	6.61%
DH	\$4,000,000	\$4,195,833	5.59%
Bench	\$6,957,000	\$5,878,025	7.62%
SP1	\$3,400,000	\$4,196,885	4.34%
SP2	\$5,150,000	\$6,275,000	6.91%
SP3	\$4,500,000	\$5,675,000	8.10%
SP4	\$4,350,000	\$4,383,000	5.48%
SP5	\$3,500,000	\$4,209,833	5.89%
SP6	\$316,000	\$316,000	0.41%
CL	\$3,500,000	\$3,705,714	5.13%
RP	\$344,500	\$1,054,364	1.24%

Regular Season Champions

2002 New York Yankees:

Total Team Payroll	\$137,228,083	% Team
Starting Lineup	\$69,236,364	50.45%
Bench	\$5,905,000	4.30%
Starting Rotation	\$38,600,000	28.13%
Bullpen	\$23,486,719	17.12%

2002 Oakland Athletics:

Total Team Payroll	\$44,624,167	% Team
Starting Lineup	\$28,596,667	64.08%
Bench	\$3,400,000	7.62%
Starting Rotation	\$4,880,000	10.94%
Bullpen	\$7,747,500	17.36%

2002 Atlanta Braves:

Total Team Payroll	\$83,825,367	% Team
Starting Lineup	\$41,855,000	49.93%
Bench	\$3,445,000	4.11%
Starting Rotation	\$26,068,700	31.10%
Bullpen	\$12,456,667	14.86%

2003 New York Yankees:

Total Team Payroll	\$130,911,814	% Team
Starting Lineup	\$59,149,814	45.18%
Bench	\$4,162,000	3.18%
Starting Rotation	\$46,500,000	35.52%
Bullpen	\$21,100,000	16.12%

2003 Atlanta Braves:

Total Team Payroll	\$103,575,667	% Team
Starting Lineup	\$52,266,500	50.46%
Bench	\$3,490,000	3.37%
Starting Rotation	\$34,337,500	33.15%
Bullpen	\$13,481,667	13.02%

2004 New York Yankees:

Total Team Payroll	\$175,065,000	% Team
Starting Lineup	\$84,607,143	48.33%
Bench	\$18,003,571	10.28%
Starting Rotation	\$52,414,286	29.94%
Bullpen	\$20,040,000	11.45%

2004 St. Louis Cardinals:

Total Team Payroll	\$95,523,500	% Team
Starting Lineup	\$51,175,000	53.57%
Bench	\$9,173,500	9.60%
Starting Rotation	\$22,325,000	23.37%
Bullpen	\$12,850,000	13.45%

2005 Chicago White Sox:

Total Team Payroll	\$64,697,000	% Team
Starting Lineup	\$26,550,000	41.04%
Bench	\$2,195,000	3.39%
Starting Rotation	\$29,732,000	45.96%
Bullpen	\$6,220,000	9.61%

2005 St. Louis Cardinals:

Total Team Payroll	\$86,537,833	% Team
Starting Lineup	\$42,281,833	48.86%
Bench	\$14,152,000	16.35%
Starting Rotation	\$17,550,000	20.28%
Bullpen	\$12,554,000	14.51%

2006 New York Yankees:

Total Team Payroll	\$198,180,229	% Team
Starting Lineup	\$103,490,298	52.22%
Bench	\$29,039,321	14.65%
Starting Rotation	\$45,981,269	23.20%
Bullpen	\$19,669,341	9.92%

2006 New York Mets:

Total Team Payroll	\$97,645,528	% Team
Starting Lineup	\$42,475,490	43.50%
Bench	\$13,615,898	13.94%
Starting Rotation	\$28,595,640	29.29%
Bullpen	\$12,958,500	13.27%

Total Group:

Average Team Payroll:	\$110,710,381		
	MED	AVG	AVG 00
Starting Lineup	\$51,175,000	\$54,698,555	49.78%
Bench	\$5,905,000	\$9,689,208	8.26%
Starting Rotation	\$29,732,000	\$31,544,036	28.26%
Bullpen	\$12,958,500	\$14,778,581	13.70%
By Batting Order:	MED	AVGSAL	AVG 00
1	\$800,000	\$3,584,271	3.27%
2	\$12,666,667	\$9,586,276	7.71%
3	\$11,000,000	\$9,907,900	9.25%
4	\$12,357,143	\$12,399,547	11.04%
5	\$7,000,000	\$7,754,779	7.40%
6	\$7,000,000	\$6,124,260	5.95%
7	\$1,500,000	\$2,996,282	2.86%
8	\$675,000	\$1,886,227	1.77%
9	\$698,750	\$841,525	1.00%
All	\$53,697,560	\$55,081,067	50.24%
By Position:	MED	AVGSAL	AVG 00
C	\$6,599,206	\$5,697,291	4.75%
1B	\$8,750,000	\$7,798,701	7.10%
2B	\$630,000	\$767,955	0.86%
3B	\$3,700,000	\$6,911,793	5.13%
SS	\$3,625,000	\$7,978,621	6.21%
LF	\$6,000,000	\$5,707,593	6.24%
CF	\$12,000,000	\$9,816,775	8.71%
RF	\$11,000,000	\$8,803,030	8.77%
DH	\$1,250,000	\$2,230,792	3.68%
Bench	\$5,905,000	\$9,689,208	8.26%
SP1	\$2,700,000	\$3,823,120	3.71%
SP2	\$8,623,700	\$7,880,466	6.88%
SP3	\$9,500,000	\$8,686,545	7.52%
SP4	\$7,666,667	\$7,079,178	6.61%
SP5	\$3,000,000	\$2,626,364	2.55%
SP6	\$2,350,000	\$3,186,400	2.17%
CL	\$8,600,000	\$7,474,722	6.82%
RP	\$1,075,000	\$1,518,078	1.43%

Statistical Analysis

World Series Champions

2002 Anaheim Angels:

Team Totals/Averages

OBP	0.342	ERA	3.65
SLG%	0.439	W-L%	0.606
RBI	774	IP	1344.9
R	812	WHIP	1.277
R	148	KI91P	6.13
SB	111	SV	54

2003 Florida Marlins:

Team Totals/Averages

OBP	0.344	ERA	3.84
SLG%	0.437	W-L%	0.568
RBI	666	IP	1246
R	721	WHIP	1.293
HR	149	KI91P	7.158
SB	147	SV	36

2004 Boston Red Sox:

Team Totals/Averages

OBP	0.365	ERA	4.06
SLG%	0.481	W-L%	0.608
RBI	859	IP	1263.4
R	876	WHIP	1.244
HR	211	KI91P	7.124
SB	56	SV	35

2005 Chicago White Sox:

Team Totals/Averages

OBP	0.326	ERA	3.49
SLG%	0.428	W-L%	0.624
RBI	672	IP	1425.2
R	709	WHIP	1.238
HR	185	KI91P	6.302
SB	136	SV	46

2006 St. Louis Cardinals:

Team Totals/Averages

OBP	0.344	ERA	4.45
SLG%	0.449	W-L%	0.588
RBI	690	IP	1297.5
R	716	WHIP	1.284
HR	175	KI91P	6.532
SB	52	SV	42

Total Group:

Group Averages			
OBP	0.344	ERA	3.9
SLG%	0.447	W-L%	0.588
RBI	732	IP	1297.5
R	767	WHIP	1.284
HR	174	KI91P	6.532
SB	100	SV	42

Batting Order:

	AB	%AB	aBP	%OBP	SLG %	%SLG	RBI	% RBI	R	%R	HR	%HR	SB	%SB
1	581	11.34%	0.361	104.86%	0.386	86.25%	49	6.46%	96	12.37%	6	3.34%	34	30.78%
2	507	9.84%	0.354	102.92%	0.451	101.11%	62	8.33%	85	11.07%	14	7.90%	13	11.35%
3	520	10.18%	0.374	108.57%	0.537	119.95%	107	14.62%	89	11.67%	30	17.09%	5	5.72%
4	559	10.90%	0.365	105.92%	0.547	122.38%	111	15.09%	94	12.25%	33	19.13%	4	4.90%
5	521	10.14%	0.345	100.24%	0.450	100.80%	84	11.50%	76	9.97%	20	11.89%	10	8.64%
6	503	9.87%	0.355	103.08%	0.495	111.20%	78	10.84%	76	10.06%	24	13.96%	12	12.16%
7	382	7.46%	0.320	92.89%	0.422	94.58%	56	7.79%	48	6.34%	11	6.43%	2	2.89%
8	443	8.66%	0.316	91.59%	0.402	90.20%	55	7.57%	53	6.86%	12	6.84%	1	1.63%
9	415	7.89%	0.319	92.74%	0.417	93.26%	52	7.04%	58	7.34%	10	5.41%	9	9.06%

By Position:

	AB	%AB	aBP	%OBP	SLG %	%SLG	RBI	% RBI	R	%R	HR	%HR	SB	%SB
C	456	8.91%	0.323	93.62%	0.404	90.37%	62	8.55%	56	7.39%	13	7.16%	4	5.32%
1B	530	10.36%	0.388	112.71%	0.525	117.72%	97	13.55%	92	12.27%	30	17.41%	7	6.99%
2B	506	9.88%	0.353	102.52%	0.415	93.05%	55	7.41%	76	9.90%	9	5.21%	12	11.04%
3B	483	9.44%	0.348	100.91%	0.480	107.78%	86	11.95%	80	10.41%	24	14.38%	5	5.76%
SS	469	9.17%	0.329	95.71%	0.410	91.90%	53	7.44%	64	8.37%	10	6.02%	7	8.49%
LF	461	8.93%	0.354	102.64%	0.512	114.06%	77	10.06%	76	9.77%	21	12.12%	13	10.47%
CF	568	11.05%	0.347	100.59%	0.423	94.67%	69	9.39%	90	11.65%	13	6.96%	25	23.66%
RF	492	9.65%	0.331	96.26%	0.459	103.26%	76	10.71%	73	9.61%	19	11.61%	9	9.38%
DH	500	9.54%	0.349	101.23%	0.523	116.03%	95	12.25%	76	9.38%	28	14.90%	5	3.98%
Bench	165	3.25%	0.319	92.36%	0.383	85.23%	19	2.61%	22	2.89%	4	1.96%	3	3.17%

	ERA	%ERA	W-L%	%W-L	IP	%IP	WHIP	%WHIP	KI91P	%K9	SV	%SV
SP1	3.26	84.47%	0.705	120.08%	207.2	16.00%	1.152	89.90%	6.847	104.65%	0	0.00%
SP2	4.08	103.53%	0.601	102.00%	211.2	16.27%	1.255	97.59%	6.673	101.18%	0	0.00%
SP3	4.24	108.92%	0.595	101.60%	192.4	14.86%	1.386	108.10%	5.901	90.85%	0	0.00%
SP4	4.77	120.74%	0.563	95.42%	163.8	12.56%	1.388	107.93%	5.564	85.43%	0	0.00%
SP5	4.45	115.13%	0.516	88.38%	138.5	10.67%	1.399	109.00%	6.529	98.66%	0	0.43%
SP6	4.55	114.69%	0.492	84.25%	76.2	5.88%	1.281	98.28%	7.022	115.05%	0	0.00%
CL	2.50	65.13%	0.599	101.77%	59.0	4.56%	1.168	91.21%	8.434	129.32%	26	62.30%
RP	3.59	92.77%	0.553	93.77%	61.7	4.75%	1.273	99.33%	6.630	102.59%	1	2.81%

Regular Season Champions

2002 New York Yankees:

Team Totals/Averages

aBP	0.357	ERA	3.75
SLG%	0.46	W-L%	0.66
RBI	843	IP	1304
R	872	WHIP	1.289
HR	221	KI91P	7.04
SB	97	SV	53

2002 Oakland Athletics:

Team Totals/Averages

aBP	0.341	ERA	3.54
SLG%	0.439	W-L%	0.648
RBI	700	IP	1287.9
R	707	WHIP	1.265
HR	181	KI91P	6.366
SB	42	SV	47

2002 Atlanta Braves:

Team Totals/Averages

aBP	0.34	ERA	3.02
SLG%	0.427	W-L%	0.64
RBI	635	IP	1331.7
R	677	WHIP	1.24
HR	162	KI91P	6.528
SB	74	SV	56

2003 New York Yankees:

Team Totals/Averages

aBP	0.361	ERA	3.98
SLG%	0.463	W-L%	0.633
RBI	740	IP	1312.1
R	769	WHIP	1.271
HR	203	KI91P	7.01
SB	75	SV	41

2003 Atlanta Braves:

Team Totals/Averages

aBP	0.357	ERA	4.06
SLG%	0.491	W-L%	0.624
RBI	839	IP	1362.5
R	878	WHIP	1.357
HR	229	KI91P	6.137
SB	68	SV	46

2004 New York Yankees:

Team Totals/Averages

aBP	0.355	ERA	4.32
SLG%	0.463	W-L%	0.641
RBI	851	IP	1231.5
R	881	WHIP	1,298
HR	239	K/91P	6.672
SB	81	SV	59

2004 St. Louis Cardinals:

Team Totals/Averages

aBP	0.354	ERA	3.73
SLG%	0.482	W-L%	0.648
RBI	787	IP	1281.9
R	824	WHIP	1.267
HR	213	K/91P	6.389
SB	110	SV	55

2005 Chicago White Sox:

Team Totals/Averages

aBP	0.326	ERA	3.49
SLG%	0.428	W-L%	0.624
RBI	672	IP	1425.2
R	709	WHIP	1.238
HR	185	K/91P	6.302
SB	136	SV	46

2005 St. Louis Cardinals:

Team Totals/Averages

aBP	0.352	ERA	3.44
SLG%	0.446	W-L%	0.624
RBI	697	IP	1364.8
R	740	WHIP	1.257
HR	163	K/91P	6.034
SB	82	SV	48

2006 New York Yankees:

Team Totals/Averages

aBP	0.367	ERA	3.93
SLG%	0.471	W-L%	0.609
RBI	835	IP	1160.2
R	875	WHIP	1,283
HR	200	K/91P	6.586
SB	130	SV	42

2006 New York Mets:

Team Totals/Averages

OBP	0.349	ERA	3.73
SLG%	0.475	W-L%	0.628
RBI	764	IP	1120
R	780	WHIP	1.256
HR	193	KI91P	7.232
SB	139	SV	42

Total Group:

Group Averages

OBP	0.351	ERA	3.73
SLG%	0.459	W-L%	0.635
RBI	760	IP	1289.3
R	792	WHIP	1.275
HR	199	KI91P	6.572
SB	94	SV	49

By Batting Order:

	AB	%AB	OBP	%OBP	SLG	%SLG	RBI	%RBI	R	%R	HR	%HR	SB	%SB
1	581	11.38%	0.348	99.34%	0.445	96.93%	62	7.99%	101	12.69%	17	8.13%	29	29.40%
2	478	9.33%	0.375	106.97%	0.463	100.88%	60	7.84%	82	10.18%	14	6.90%	13	13.53%
3	526	10.35%	0.398	113.34%	0.553	120.48%	107	14.22%	103	13.06%	34	17.18%	9	10.72%
4	544	10.65%	0.388	110.56%	0.520	113.57%	103	13.63%	97	12.27%	30	15.48%	8	9.41%
5	524	10.27%	0.366	104.40%	0.509	110.81%	97	12.77%	87	10.93%	27	13.83%	7	7.35%
6	471	9.25%	0.349	99.53%	0.441	96.35%	74	9.79%	65	8.28%	18	8.88%	5	5.76%
7	380	7.47%	0.336	95.77%	0.455	98.70%	58	7.62%	57	7.21%	16	7.85%	4	4.41%
8	394	7.72%	0.307	87.46%	0.402	87.65%	52	6.82%	49	6.19%	11	5.66%	4	3.76%
9	376	7.24%	0.336	95.47%	0.425	93.41%	47	6.16%	49	6.09%	11	5.38%	4	3.57%

By Position:

	AB	%AB	OBP	%OBP	SLG	%SLG	RBI	%RBI	R	%R	HR	%HR	SB	%SB
C	441	8.65%	0.344	98.03%	0.446	96.93%	71	9.21%	61	7.68%	17	8.47%	1	1.08%
1B	483	9.52%	0.382	108.95%	0.520	113.43%	92	12.13%	87	11.05%	30	15.35%	3	3.50%
2B	490	9.61%	0.342	97.62%	0.453	98.64%	59	7.76%	75	9.46%	16	7.88%	15	16.84%
3B	494	9.66%	0.345	98.35%	0.471	102.44%	86	11.17%	78	9.75%	24	11.63%	8	9.50%
SS	609	11.94%	0.355	101.15%	0.442	96.40%	75	9.92%	102	12.90%	16	8.01%	23	24.54%
LF	473	9.26%	0.358	102.10%	0.452	98.73%	70	9.23%	74	9.32%	17	8.50%	12	11.25%
CF	546	10.69%	0.366	104.21%	0.492	107.16%	89	11.73%	96	12.11%	27	13.56%	9	8.85%
RF	373	7.29%	0.371	105.77%	0.501	109.28%	67	8.87%	64	8.20%	19	9.58%	7	8.21%
DH	356	6.89%	0.343	97.64%	0.443	97.73%	57	7.38%	54	6.74%	15	7.09%	3	4.62%
Bench	180	3.54%	0.315	89.57%	0.389	84.85%	22	2.88%	23	2.86%	5	2.37%	2	2.48%

	ERA	%ERA	W-L%	%W-L	IP	%IP	WHIP	%WHIP	K/91P	%K9	SV	%SV
SP1	3.62	97.17%	0.717	113.08%	210.6	16.37%	1.248	97.89%	6.069	92.73%	0	0.22%
SP2	3.90	104.46%	0.654	103.02%	206.6	16.02%	1.245	97.78%	6.328	96.27%	0	0.00%
SP3	3.61	96.62%	0.651	102.58%	186.6	14.45%	1.278	100.29%	6.614	100.20%	0	0.00%
SP4	4.14	111.60%	0.619	97.66%	179.5	13.85%	1.283	100.66%	6.090	92.13%	0	0.00%
SP5	4.34	118.19%	0.586	92.31%	120.2	9.21%	1.358	106.57%	6.768	102.50%	0	0.37%
SP6	4.63	119.31%	0.616	96.65%	96.2	7.57%	1.420	111.60%	6.531	95.69%	0	0.75%
CL	2.32	64.12%	0.487	76.78%	67.7	5.27%	1.074	84.69%	8.622	131.83%	39	79.98%
RP	3.55	95.10%	0.580	91.43%	61.5	4.84%	1.339	104.82%	6.970	107.15%	1	2.71%

DISCUSSION

The first measurement that stood out in the study was very simple. The average team payroll of the World Series Champions was \$78,348,833, while the average team payroll of the Regular Season Champions was \$110,710,381. A \$30 million plus difference means that while money can buy you winning, it certainly doesn't always buy you a championship. It also means that the World Series Champions probably have some type of difference in how they are using their payroll.

The next issue calculated was the distribution of payroll between the four parts of a team: starting lineup, bench, starting rotation, and bullpen. While some of the median and mean salaries of the four parts were different, the distribution of payroll was very similar between the two groups. None of the parts had more than a one or two percent difference in distribution between groups.

While the actual percentage of payroll spent on the batting order was similar between the groups, there were some differences with how it was distributed between the batting order spots. World Series Champions, on average, spent less of a percentage on the numbers one and two hitters, while spending more on the numbers three and four hitters. World Series Champions spent about four percent less of the total payroll on the numbers one and two hitters and about four percent more of the total payroll on the numbers three and four hitters than Regular Season Champions. It would seem that World Series Champions take the four percent out of the top of the order and put it into the middle of the order. There were not any other significant differences in batting order

distribution of payroll. Along with the difference in batting order distribution, came some similarities; the number four hitter was the highest paid in each group with the number three hitter the next highest paid. The bottom three hitters (7, 8, and 9) were always the lowest paid. This means that all teams are usually concerned with getting very good middle of the order hitters, which are normally the highest paid in baseball.

When the distribution by fielding positions was looked at, there were five positions that had significant differences between groups. Shortstops accounted for three percent less of the payroll on World Series Champion teams than they did on Regular Season Champion teams. Also, center-fielders and right-fielders accounted for two percent less individually on World Series Champion teams than they did on Regular Season Champion teams. Since the overall distribution of the starting lineups was equal between groups, there has to be somewhere that this extra payroll goes for the World Series Champion teams. One place is the designated-hitter, where World Series Champions pay two percent more of the total payroll. Another position where World Series Champions paid two percent more of the total payroll was second-base. The rest of the excess payroll figures in to many of the small differences between other positions. The results of the fielding positions relate back to the batting order results. Traditionally, shortstops and center-fielders would be faster, not power-hitting players, which would mean they often bat at the top of the order. As mentioned before, World Series Champions pay less for top of the order batters, which is a reason why they also pay less for shortstops and center-fielders. Furthermore, designated-hitters are traditionally power hitters that would normally be a three or four hitter, which is why World Series Champions pay more for those.

While there was not much difference in the overall distribution of payroll to the pitching staff, there were some differences and oddities in the specific player distributions. For instance, the number one starter was usually one of the lowest paid starters in both groups. This means that often times a successful team's best pitcher is most likely a young pitcher who has not received a huge pay raise yet. A difference between the groups was that World Series Champions usually committed more of their payroll to the number five starting pitcher. The closer and bullpen salaries were distributed fairly similarly between the groups, with Regular Season Champions spending one or two percent more on a closer. Closers, in general, were one of the two or three highest paid pitchers on all of the teams.

Overall, there were no drastically different results between the two groups. However, there were many small differences that when studied and implemented properly could make the difference between a World Series Champion and a Regular Season Champion.

Next, the group average data for the statistical analysis was quite distinguished. The Regular Season Champions were better than the World Series Champions in all of the statistical categories except one, which was average stolen bases by a narrow margin. This was somewhat expected since the statistics that were used were from the regular season, and those teams had been the most successful in the regular season. Still, the fact that the World Series Champions were sufficiently beaten in almost all of the categories during the regular season would seem to support the belief that the World Series Champion is a team that just gets hot at the right time and not a clearly better team.

However, there are clearly differences between the distributions of those statistics between groups. In regards to OBP, World Series Champions number one batter was on average one of the best OBP on the team while it wasn't even close to one of the best on Regular Season Champions. This is even more alarming because OBP is normally a very important statistic for a number one hitter and on average Regular Season Champions are committing more of their payroll to their number one hitter, but getting less of a return in comparison to the rest of the team. On the other hand, number one hitters on Regular Season Champions did hit more homeruns for their team, but that is not their main duty as a lead-off hitter.

The rest of the batting order statistics were distributed similarly between the groups. The first five or six batters usually had higher OBP and SLG% than the bottom three or four batters. The three, four, and five hitters had the most RBI and HR. Also, the higher they were in the batting order, the more Runs and SB they usually had. All of this data supported the general consensus of how batting orders are put together and how they develop statistically.

Moving on to the position distribution, catchers for Regular Season Champions usually had more power, in the form of more SLG%, RBI, and HR. This was unusual because the Regular Season Champions actually paid less for their catchers; it most likely attributed to the fact that defense is a huge issue for catchers, so World Series Champions may have had better defensive catchers and paid them more because of that. Data for first-basemen, second-basemen, and third-basemen were very similar between both groups. This may be due to the fact that there is not much differentiation in types of players for these positions. For example, most first-basemen are slow and hit a lot of

homeruns, whereas most second-basemen are fast and get on base a lot. Due to the fact that most of the players in the league that play those positions are similar, the two groups are not going to differ very much.

Shortstop and center-field were two positions that were different between the groups. Regular Season Champions' shortstops and center-fielders were much more productive in all statistical categories than World Series Champions' shortstops and center-fielders. This is as it should be because Regular Season Champions are paying more for their shortstops and center-fielders. However, shortstop and center-field are also very important defensive positions, so World Series Champions' shortstops and center-fielders could have the upper hand in this. The corner outfield spots, right-field and left-field, varied slightly in some statistical categories between groups, but there were no major differences. Also, the designated-hitter was overall more productive for the World Series Champions, which is most likely why more of their payroll was committed to them.

Moving on to distribution of pitching statistics, World Series Champions' number one starters were quite a bit more effective than Regular Season Champions' number one starters, beating them in ERA, WHIP, and *K/9* IP. Oddly enough, the rest of the starting rotation for Regular Season Champions was better than the rest of the starting rotation for World Series Champions in most of the statistical categories. This would seem to support the notion that a team needs a star starter going into the playoffs and that having five dependable starters going into the play-offs is not the best formula for success. This is most likely because play-off series are so short and have enough off days that many four and five starters will never start a game in the play-offs.

The relief pitchers for both groups were very similar statistically; they usually had a slightly worse ERA than the starters, but a better *K/9* IP. The closers were also similar between the two groups, but very effective compared to the other pitchers. Closers, of course, had the majority of the saves. In addition, they had an extremely high *K/9* IP, and an extremely low ERA and WHIP. The closers should be more effective since they are getting paid more of the payroll than most of the pitchers on the rosters.

Overall, there were some interesting differences in statistical distribution. There were also some important relationships between statistical distributions compared to payroll distribution. However, there were many more similarities between the two groups, mainly because all of these teams being compared are good teams.

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study was to find differences between the World Series Champions and the Regular Season Champions. While differences were found and can be discussed, most of the analysis found similar results between the two groups; this is not without meaning. The similarities can point out ways that successful teams, in general, are assembled. While many of these teams did not accomplish the ultimate goal of winning the World Series, they were still some of the best teams in the league. Hence, any similarities between the two groups should be looked at as models for other teams.

To conclude, recommendations about the architecture, or way teams are put together, can be made on the basis of the data and analysis. First, while most of the World Series Champions had a lower payroll than the Regular Season Champions, it would be foolish to say that a lower payroll is needed to win the World Series. However, it is important to recommend that teams pay attention to the distribution of their payroll, because throwing money at a team does not automatically mean success at any level; there are many current examples to prove this.

Next, close to 50% of a team's payroll should be committed to the starting lineup. This is because the players in the starting lineup are the most active on the team. No pitchers play everyday, regardless of their position, and bench players have limited roles. Most of the starting lineup will be in the game everyday and for all the innings. Within the starting lineup, your highest paid players should be your numbers three and four hitters, with the fifth hitter close behind. These three spots should provide plenty of

power in the lineup in the form of SLG%, HR, and RBI. The fielding positions that match up to this salary and statistic distribution are first-base, third-base, and a corner outfield spot (left-field or right-field), hence those three should be the three highest paid batters and should hit in some combination of the three, four, and five spots in the batting order; for now, we will use right-field as the corner outfield spot because left-field fits in somewhere else.

The first two spots in the batting order should be satisfied by players with a high OBP, SB, and R. These spots should also be the next highest paid behind the three, four, and five hitters; however, the six hitter can have a salary very close to these two spots. The positions that match up the best with this salary and statistic distribution are center-field and left-field. The next best hitter and highest paid hitter should hit sixth, which in the American League will usually be the designated-hitter; the seven, eight, and nine hitters will usually be the shortstop, second-baseman, and catcher in no particular order. In the National League, these positions would be the sixth, seventh, and eighth hitters because there is no designated-hitter. The last three spots should be paid the least out of anyone in the starting lineup. In the end, the lineup should resemble this:

<u>National League</u>		
8A Spot	Position	Salary Rank
1	CF	5
2	LF	4
3	RF	2
4	1B	1
5	3B	3
6	2B	6
7	SS	7
8	C	8

<u>American League</u>		
BA Spot	Position	Salary Rank
1	CF	5
2	LF	4
3	RF	2
4	1B	1
5	3B	3
6	DH	6
7	2B	7
8	SS	8
9	C	9

About seven to eight percent of the total payroll should be committed to the bench. However, the only real recommendation for make-up of a bench is that it is multi-faceted. Not every player on the bench should be slow, power-hitters that play first-base. Variety in position and statistical categories is the key for a successful bench.

Recommendations for pitching are more complicated. Although the data studied shows that the best starter from these successful teams usually is paid the least, that does not mean that teams should go out and pay their best pitchers a small amount of money. Ideally, you would pay your number one starting pitcher the most and your number five starter the least. However, this study proves that for a truly successful team, some pitchers have to step up and perform above expectations. It is a recommendation, however, that starters are paid more than relief pitchers, except for the closer, and that starters have a good W-L%, IP, and WHIP. Relief pitchers, on the other hand, are recommended to have a good ERA and *K/9* IP. It is beneficial for the team to have an established closer that is the second or third highest paid pitcher, as most all of the team did not have more than two throughout the year. Hence, a successful closer should have a high SV and % SV, along with a very good ERA, WHIP, and *K/9* IP.

In conclusion, this study has compared World Series Champions and Regular Season Champions over the last five baseball seasons. These recommendations are made with the purpose of helping a team win the World Series. However, these recommendations also relate to being a good baseball team in general. There were not many major differences between the two groups, which would seem to support the theory that a certain team gets hot in the playoffs and goes on to win the World Series. However, some of those small differences could be what ignites a team to go on that hot streak, and allows them to go from a winning team to a championship team.

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APPENDIX A

Team Rosters and Base Data

Year	Team	Player	Pos.	Salary	RBI	R
2002	Athletics	Durham, Ray	DH 1	\$6,300,000	22	43
		Hatteberg, Scott	1B 2	\$900,000	61	58
		Tejada, Miguel	SS 3	\$3,625,000	131	108
		Chavez, Eric	3B 4	\$2,125,000	109	87
		Dye, Jermaine	RF 5	\$7,166,667	86	74
		Justice, David	LF 6	\$7,000,000	49	54
		Ellis, Mark	2B 7	\$307,500	35	58
		Long, Terrence	CF 8	\$675,000	67	71
		Hernandez, Ramon	C 9	\$497,500	42	51
		Mabry, John	UT Bench	\$500,000	40	27
		Saenz, Olmedo	IF Bench	\$800,000	18	15
		Myers, Greg	C Bench	\$800,000	21	15
		Velarde, Randy	IF Bench	\$1,000,000	8	22
		Bymes, Eric	OF Bench	\$300,000	11	24
		Zito, Barry	SP	\$295,000		
		Hudson, Tim	SP	\$875,000		
		Lidle, Cory	SP	\$2,550,000		
		Mulder, Mark	SP	\$800,000		
		Harang, Aaron	SP	\$360,000		
		Koch, Billy	CL	\$2,433,333		
		Bradford, Chad	RP	\$235,000		
		Mecir, Jim	RP	\$2,366,667		
		Venafro, Mike	RP	\$812,500		
		Tam, Jeff	RP	\$700,000		
		Magnante, Mike	RP	\$1,200,000		

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Year Team
2003 Yankees

Player	Pos.	Salary
Soriano, Alfonso	2B	\$800,000
Johnson, Nick	DH	\$364,100
Jeter, Derek	SS	\$15,600,000
Giambi, Jason	1B	\$11,428,571
Williams, Bernie	CF	\$12,357,143
Posada, Jorge	C	\$8,000,000
Matsui, Hideki	LF	\$6,000,000
Boone, Aaron	3B	\$3,700,000
Garcia, Karim	RF	\$900,000
Zeile, Todd	IF Bench	\$1,500,000
Sierra, Ruben	OF Bench	\$600,000
Rivera, Juan	OF Bench	\$312,000
Wilson, Enrique	IF Bench	\$700,000
Flaherty, John	C Bench	\$750,000
Clemens, Roger	SP	\$10,100,000
Pettitte, Andy	SP	\$11,500,000
Mussina, Mike	SP	\$12,000,000
Wells, David	SP	\$3,250,000
Weaver, Jeff	SP	\$4,150,000
Rivera, Mariano	CL	\$10,500,000
Hammond, Chris	RP	\$2,200,000
Contreras, Jose	SP	\$5,500,000
Osuna, Antonio	RP	\$2,400,000
Hitchcock, Sterling	RP	\$6,000,000
Acevedo, Juan	RP	\$900,000

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| Player | Pos. | Lineup |
|--------------------|------|--------|
| Damon, Johnny | CF | 1 |
| Bellhorn, Mark | 2B | 2 |
| Ortiz, David | DH | 3 |
| Ramirez, Manny | LF | 4 |
| Millar, Kevin | 1B | 5 |
| Varitek, Jason | C | 6 |
| Cabrera, Orlando | SS | 7 |
| Mueller, Bill | 3B | 8 |
| Kapler, Gabe | RF | 9 |
| Reese, Pokey | IF | Bench |
| Youkilis, Kevin | IF | Bench |
| Mirabelli, Doug | C | Bench |
| Roberts, Dave | OF | Bench |
| Mientkiewicz, Doug | 1B | Bench |
| Nixon, Trot | OF | Bench |
| Schilling, Curt | SP | |
| Martinez, Pedro | SP | |
| Lowe, Derek | SP | |
| Wakefield, Tim | SP | |
| Arroyo, Bronson | SP | |
| Foulke, Keith | CL | |
| Timlin, Mike | RP | |
| Embree, Alan | RP | |
| Leskanic, Curt | RP | |
| Mendoza, Ramiro | RP | |

| Player | Pos. | Lineup | W-L % | IP | H | BB | WHIP | K | K/9 | IP | SV |
|--------------------|------|--------|-------|----|-----|----|------|-----|-----|----|----|
| Damon, Johnny | CF | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| Bellhorn, Mark | 2B | 2 | | | | | | | | | |
| Ortiz, David | DH | 3 | | | | | | | | | |
| Ramirez, Manny | LF | 4 | | | | | | | | | |
| Millar, Kevin | 1B | 5 | | | | | | | | | |
| Varitek, Jason | C | 6 | | | | | | | | | |
| Cabrera, Orlando | SS | 7 | | | | | | | | | |
| Mueller, Bill | 3B | 8 | | | | | | | | | |
| Kapler, Gabe | RF | 9 | | | | | | | | | |
| Reese, Pokey | IF | Bench | | | | | | | | | |
| Youkilis, Kevin | IF | Bench | | | | | | | | | |
| Mirabelli, Doug | C | Bench | | | | | | | | | |
| Roberts, Dave | OF | Bench | | | | | | | | | |
| Mientkiewicz, Doug | 1B | Bench | | | | | | | | | |
| Nixon, Trot | OF | Bench | | | | | | | | | |
| Schilling, Curt | SP | | | 21 | 206 | 35 | | 203 | | | |
| Martinez, Pedro | SP | | | 16 | 193 | 61 | | 227 | | | |
| Lowe, Derek | SP | | | 14 | 224 | 71 | | 105 | | | |
| Wakefield, Tim | SP | | | 12 | 197 | 63 | | 116 | | | |
| Arroyo, Bronson | SP | | | 10 | 171 | 47 | | 142 | | | |
| Foulke, Keith | CL | | | 5 | 63 | 15 | | 79 | | | |
| Timlin, Mike | RP | | | 5 | 75 | 19 | | 56 | | | |
| Embree, Alan | RP | | | 2 | 49 | 11 | | 37 | | | |
| Leskanic, Curt | RP | | | 3 | 24 | 16 | | 22 | | | |
| Mendoza, Ramiro | RP | | | 2 | 25 | 7 | | 13 | | | |

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| Team | Player | Pos. | Lineup | Salary |
|-----------|--------------------|------|--------|-------------|
| White Sox | Podsednik, Scott | LF | 1 | \$700,000 |
| | Iguchi, Tadahito | 2B | 2 | \$2,300,000 |
| | Everett, Carl | DH | 3 | \$4,000,000 |
| | Konerko, Paul | 1B | 4 | \$8,750,000 |
| | Rowand, Aaron | CF | 5 | \$2,000,000 |
| | Dye, Jermaine | RF | 6 | \$4,000,000 |
| | Pierzynski, A.J. | C | 7 | \$2,250,000 |
| | Crede, Joe | 3B | 8 | \$400,000 |
| | Uribe, Juan | SS | 9 | \$2,150,000 |
| | Ozuna, Pablo | IF | Bench | \$330,000 |
| | Perez, Timo | IF | Bench | \$1,000,000 |
| | Widger, Chris | C | Bench | \$500,000 |
| | Harris, Willie | UT | Bench | \$365,000 |
| | Buehrle, Mark | SP | | \$6,000,000 |
| | Garcia, Freddie | SP | | \$8,000,000 |
| | Contreras, Jose | SP | | \$8,500,000 |
| | Garland, Jon | SP | | \$3,400,000 |
| | Hernandez, Orlando | SP | | \$3,500,000 |
| | McCarthy, Brandon | SP | | \$332,000 |
| | Vizcaino, Luis | RP | | \$1,300,000 |
| | Politte, Cliff | RP | | \$1,000,000 |
| | Cotts, Neal | RP | | \$330,000 |
| | Hermanson, Dustin | CL | | \$2,000,000 |
| | Marte, Damaso | RP | | \$1,250,000 |
| | Jenks, Bobby | CL | | \$340,000 |

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ERA W L W-L % IP H BB WHIP K K/9 IP SV

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-----|----|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| 7 | 240 | 40 | 1 | 1 | | | | | |
| 7 | 225 | 60 | 1 | 1 | | | | | |
| 7 | 177 | 75 | 1 | 1 | | | | | |
| | 212 | 47 | | | | | | | |
| | 137 | 50 | | | | | | | |
| | 62 | 17 | | | | | | | |
| | 74 | 29 | | | | | | | |
| | 42 | 21 | | | | | | | |
| | 38 | 29 | | | | | | | |
| | 46 | 17 | | | | | | | |
| | 45 | 33 | | | | | | | |
| | 34 | 15 | | | | | | | |

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| Year | Team | Player | Pos. | Lineup | Salary | W-L % | IP | H | BB | WHIP | K | K/9 | IP SV |
|------|------|--------------------|------|--------|--------------|-------|-----|----|----|------|-----|-----|-------|
| 2006 | Mets | Reyes, Jose | SS | 1 | \$401,500 | | | | | | | | |
| | | Lo Duca, Paul | C | 2 | \$6,599,206 | | | | | | | | |
| | | Beltran, Carlos | CF | 3 | \$13,571,428 | | | | | | | | |
| | | Delgado, Carlos | 1B | 4 | \$13,500,000 | | | | | | | | |
| | | Wright, David | 3B | 5 | \$374,000 | | | | | | | | |
| | | Floyd, Cliff | LF | 6 | \$6,616,856 | | | | | | | | |
| | | Valentin, Jose | 2B | 7 | \$912,500 | | | | | | | | |
| | | Nady, Xavier | RF | 8 | \$427,000 | | | | | | | | |
| | | Chavez, Endy | OF | Bench | \$500,000 | | | | | | | | |
| | | Woodward, Chris | IF | Bench | \$825,000 | | | | | | | | |
| | | Milledge, Lastings | OF | Bench | \$300,000 | | | | | | | | |
| | | Franco, Julio | 1B | Bench | \$1,050,000 | | | | | | | | |
| | | Castro, Ramon | C | Bench | \$800,000 | | | | | | | | |
| | | Green, Shawn | OF | Bench | \$10,213,898 | | | | | | | | |
| | | Glavine, Tom | SP | | \$9,993,640 | | 202 | 62 | | | 131 | | |
| | | Trachsel, Steve | SP | | \$2,500,000 | | 185 | 78 | | | 79 | | |
| | | Martinez, Pedro | SP | | \$14,875,000 | | 108 | 39 | | | 137 | | |
| | | Hernandez, Orlando | SP | | \$327,000 | | 103 | 41 | | | 112 | | |
| | | Maine, John | SP | | \$300,000 | | 69 | 33 | | | 71 | | |
| | | Oliver, Darren | SP | | \$600,000 | | 70 | 21 | | | 60 | | |
| | | Heilman, Aaron | RP | | \$359,000 | | 73 | 28 | | | 73 | | |
| | | Wagner, Billy | CL | | \$10,500,000 | | 59 | 21 | | | 94 | | |
| | | Bradford, Chad | RP | | \$1,400,000 | | 59 | 13 | | | 45 | | |
| | | Feliciano, Pedro | RP | | \$300,000 | | 56 | 20 | | | 54 | | |
| | | Sanchez, Dueaner | RP | | \$399,500 | | 43 | 24 | | | 44 | | |

APPENDIXB

Individual Player Payroll Information and Distribution

World Series Champions

| Year | Team | ALINL | Player | Pos. | Lineup | Salary | % TP |
|------|--------|-------|--------------------|------|--------|--------------|---------|
| 2002 | Angels | AL | Eckstein, David | SS | 1 | \$280,000 | 0.47% |
| | | | Erstad, Darin | CF | 2 | \$6,250,000 | 10.42% |
| | | | Salmon, Tim | RF | 3 | \$9,650,000 | 16.08% |
| | | | Anderson, Garret | LF | 4 | \$5,000,000 | 8.33% |
| | | | Glaus, Troy | 3B | P | \$4,000,000 | 6.67% |
| | | | Fullmer, Brad | DH | 6 | \$4,000,000 | 6.67% |
| | | | Spiezio, Scott | 1B | 7 | \$2,275,000 | 3.79% |
| | | | Molina, Bengie | C | 8 | \$350,000 | 0.58% |
| | | | Kennedy, Adam | 2B | 9 | \$375,000 | 0.62% |
| | | | Palmeiro, Orlando | UT | Bench | \$1,000,000 | 1.67% |
| | | | Gil, Benji | C | Bench | \$400,000 | 0.67% |
| | | | Wooten, Shawn | 1B | Bench | \$250,000 | 0.42% |
| | | | Nieves, Jose | IF | Bench | \$240,000 | 0.40% |
| | | | Appier, Kevin | SP | 3 | \$9,500,000 | 15.83% |
| | | | Ortiz, Ramon | SP | 2 | \$575,000 | 0.96% |
| | | | Washburn, Jarrod | SP | 1 | \$350,000 | 0.58% |
| | | | Sele, Aaron | SP | 5 | \$7,166,667 | 11.94% |
| | | | Lackey, John | SP | 4 | \$315,000 | 0.52% |
| | | | Schoeneweis, Scott | RP | | \$325,000 | 0.54% |
| | | | Weber, Ben | RP | | \$240,000 | 0.40% |
| | | | Levine, Alan | RP | | \$1,325,000 | 2.21% |
| | | | Percival, Troy | CL | | \$5,250,000 | 8.75% |
| | | | Donnelly, Brendan | RP | | \$325,000 | 0.54% |
| | | | Pote, Lou | RP | | \$255,000 | 0.42% |
| | | | Shields, Scot | RP | | \$305,000 | 0.51% |
| | | | Total Team Payroll | | | \$60,001,667 | 100.00% |

| Year | Team | AUNL | Player | Pos. | Lineup | Salary | %TP |
|------|---------|------|---------------------|------|--------|--------------|---------|
| 2003 | Marlins | NL | Pierre, Juan | CF | 1 | \$1,000,000 | 1.89% |
| | | | Castillo, Luis | 2B | 2 | \$4,850,000 | 9.19% |
| | | | Rodriguez, Ivan | C | 3 | \$10,000,000 | 18.95% |
| | | | Lowell, Mike | 3B | 4 | \$3,700,000 | 7.01% |
| | | | Encarnacion, Juan | RF | 5 | \$3,450,000 | 6.54% |
| | | | Lee, Derrek | 1B | 6 | \$4,250,000 | 8.05% |
| | | | Cabrera, Miguel | LF | 7 | \$165,574 | 0.31% |
| | | | Gonzalez, Alex | 5B | 8 | \$1,700,000 | 3.22% |
| | | | Hollandsworth, Todd | OF | Bench | \$1,500,000 | 2.84% |
| | | | Banks, Brian | IF | Bench | \$300,000 | 0.57% |
| | | | Redmond, Mike | C | Bench | \$1,050,000 | 1.99% |
| | | | Fox, Andy | IF | Bench | \$800,000 | 1.52% |
| | | | Mordecai, Mike | IF | Bench | \$500,000 | 0.95% |
| | | | Conine, Jeff | UT | Bench | \$4,250,000 | 8.05% |
| | | | Pavano, Carl | 5P | 4 | \$1,500,000 | 2.84% |
| | | | Penny, Brad | 5P | 3 | \$1,875,000 | 3.55% |
| | | | Redman, Mark | 5P | 2 | \$2,150,000 | 4.07% |
| | | | Willis, Dontrellé | 5P | 1 | \$234,426 | 0.44% |
| | | | Beckett, Josh | 5P | 5 | \$1,725,000 | 3.27% |
| | | | Tejera, Michael | RP | | \$300,000 | 0.57% |
| | | | Looper, Braden | CL | | \$1,600,000 | 3.03% |
| | | | Phelps, Tommy | RP | | \$300,000 | 0.57% |
| | | | Almanza, Armando | RP | | \$775,000 | 1.47% |
| | | | 5pooneybarger, Tim | RP | | \$300,000 | 0.57% |
| | | | Urbina, Ugueth | CL | | \$4,500,000 | 8.53% |
| | | | Total Team Payroll | | | \$52,775,000 | 100.00% |

| Year | Team | AUNL | Player | Pos. | Lineup | Salary | %TP |
|------|---------|------|--------------------|------|--------|----------------------|---------|
| 2004 | Red Sox | AL | Damon, Johnny | CF | 1 | \$8,000,000 | 6.83% |
| | | | Bellhorn, Mark | 2B | 2 | \$490,000 | 0.42% |
| | | | Ortiz, David | DH | 3 | \$4,587,500 | 3.92% |
| | | | Ramirez, Manny | LF | 4 | \$22,500,000 | 19.21% |
| | | | Millar, Kevin | 1B | 5 | \$3,300,000 | 2.82% |
| | | | Varitek, Jason | C | 6 | \$6,900,000 | 5.89% |
| | | | Cabrera, Orlando | SS | 7 | \$6,000,000 | 5.12% |
| | | | Mueller, Bili | 3B | 8 | \$2,100,000 | 1.79% |
| | | | Kapler, Gabe | RF | 9 | \$750,000 | 0.64% |
| | | | Reese, Pokey | IF | Bench | \$1,000,000 | 0.85% |
| | | | Youkilis, Kevin | IF | Bench | \$323,125 | 0.28% |
| | | | Mirabelli, Doug | C | Bench | \$825,000 | 0.70% |
| | | | McCarty, David | OF | Bench | \$500,000 | 0.43% |
| | | | Mlentkewicz, Doug | 1B | Bench | \$2,800,000 | 2.39% |
| | | | Nixon, Trot | OF | Bench | \$4,500,000 | 3.84% |
| | | | Schilling, Curt | SP | 1 | \$12,000,000 | 10.25% |
| | | | Martinez, Pedro | SP | 2 | \$17,500,000 | 14.94% |
| | | | Lowe, Derek | SP | 3 | \$4,500,000 | 3.84% |
| | | | Wakefield, Tim | SP | 4 | \$4,350,000 | 3.71% |
| | | | Arroyo, Bronson | SP | 5 | \$332,500 | 0.28% |
| | | | Foulke, Keith | CL | | \$3,500,000 | 2.99% |
| | | | Timlin, Mike | RP | | \$2,500,000 | 2.13% |
| | | | Embree, Alan | RP | | \$3,000,000 | 2.56% |
| | | | Leskanic, Curt | RP | | \$1,250,000 | 1.07% |
| | | | Mendoza, Ramiro | RP | | \$3,600,000 | 3.07% |
| | | | Total Team Payroll | | | <u>\$117,108,125</u> | 100.00% |

| Year | Team | AUNL | Player | Pos. | Lineup | Salary | %TP |
|------|-----------|------|--------------------|------|--------|---------------------|---------|
| 2005 | White Sox | AL | Podsednik, Scott | LF | 1 | \$700,000 | 1.08% |
| | | | Iguchi, Tadahito | 2B | 2 | \$2,300,000 | 3.56% |
| | | | Everett, Carl | DH | 3 | \$4,000,000 | 6.18% |
| | | | Konerko, Paul | 1B | 4 | \$8,750,000 | 13.52% |
| | | | Rowand, Aaron | CF | 5 | \$2,000,000 | 3.09% |
| | | | Dye, Jermaine | RF | 6 | \$4,000,000 | 6.18% |
| | | | Pierzynski, A.J. | C | 7 | \$2,250,000 | 3.48% |
| | | | Crede, Joe | 3B | 8 | \$400,000 | 0.62% |
| | | | Uribe, Juan | SS | 9 | \$2,150,000 | 3.32% |
| | | | Ozuna, Pablo | IF | Bench | \$330,000 | 0.51% |
| | | | Perez, Timo | IF | Bench | \$1,000,000 | 1.55% |
| | | | Widger, Chris | C | Bench | \$500,000 | 0.77% |
| | | | Harris, Willie | UT | Bench | \$365,000 | 0.56% |
| | | | Buehrle, Mark | SP | 2 | \$6,000,000 | 9.27% |
| | | | Garcia, Freddie | SP | 4 | \$8,000,000 | 12.37% |
| | | | Contreras, Jose | SP | 3 | \$8,500,000 | 13.14% |
| | | | Garland, Jon | SP | 1 | \$3,400,000 | 5.26% |
| | | | Hernandez, Orlando | SP | 5 | \$3,500,000 | 5.41% |
| | | | McCarthy, Brandon | SP | 6 | \$332,000 | 0.51% |
| | | | Vizcaino, Luis | RP | | \$1,300,000 | 2.01% |
| | | | Politte, Cliff | RP | | \$1,000,000 | 1.55% |
| | | | Cotts, Neal | RP | | \$330,000 | 0.51% |
| | | | Hermanson, Dustin | CL | | \$2,000,000 | 3.09% |
| | | | Marte, Damaso | RP | | \$1,250,000 | 1.93% |
| | | | Jenks, Bobby | CL | | \$340,000 | 0.53% |
| | | | Total Team Payroll | | | <u>\$64,697,000</u> | 100.00% |

| Year | Team | ALINL | Player | Pos. | Lineup | Salary | %TP |
|------|-----------|-------|---------------------|------|--------|---------------------|---------|
| 2006 | Cardinals | NL | Eckstein, David | SS | 1 | \$3,333,333 | 3.43% |
| | | | Duncan, Chris | LF | 2 | \$300,000 | 0.31% |
| | | | Pujols, Albert | 1B | 3 | \$14,000,000 | 14.41% |
| | | | Rolen, Scott | 3B | 4 | \$12,456,336 | 12.82% |
| | | | Edmonds, Jim | CF | 5 | \$12,074,702 | 12.43% |
| | | | Encarnacion, Juan | RF | 6 | \$3,500,000 | 3.60% |
| | | | Molina, Yadier | C | 7 | \$400,000 | 0.41% |
| | | | Miles, Aaron | 2B | 8 | \$350,000 | 0.36% |
| | | | Taguchi, So | OF | Bench | \$825,000 | 0.85% |
| | | | Spiezio, Scott | UT | Bench | \$500,000 | 0.51% |
| | | | Belliard, Ron | IF | Bench | \$4,000,000 | 4.12% |
| | | | Rodriguez, John | OF | Bench | \$332,000 | 0.34% |
| | | | Bennett, Gary | C | Bench | \$800,000 | 0.82% |
| | | | Wilson, Preston | OF | Bench | \$500,000 | 0.51% |
| | | | Carpenter, Chris | SP | 1 | \$5,000,000 | 5.15% |
| | | | Suppan, Jeff | SP | 3 | \$4,000,000 | 4.12% |
| | | | Marquis, Jason | SP | 2 | \$5,150,000 | 5.30% |
| | | | Mulder, Mark | SP | 4 | \$7,750,000 | 7.98% |
| | | | Reyes, Anthony | SP | 6 | \$300,000 | 0.31% |
| | | | Weaver, Jeff | SP | 5 | \$8,325,000 | 8.57% |
| | | | Hancock, Josh | RP | | \$355,000 | 0.37% |
| | | | Wainwright, Adam | RP | | \$327,000 | 0.34% |
| | | | Looper, Braden | RP | | \$3,500,000 | 3.60% |
| | | | Isringhausen, Jason | CL | | \$8,750,000 | 9.01% |
| | | | Thompson, Brad | RP | | \$334,000 | 0.34% |
| | | | Total Team Payroll | | | <u>\$97,162,371</u> | 100.00% |

Regular Season Champions

| Year | Team | AUNL | Player | Pos. | Lineup | Salary | %TP |
|------|---------|------|---------------------|------|--------|----------------------|---------|
| 2002 | Yankees | AL | Soriano, Alfonso | 2B | 1 | \$630,000 | 0.46% |
| | | | Jeter, Derek | SS | 2 | \$14,600,000 | 10.64% |
| | | | Giambi, Jason | 1B | 3 | \$10,428,571 | 7.60% |
| | | | Williams, Bernie | CF | 4 | \$12,357,143 | 9.00% |
| | | | Posada, Jorge | C | 5 | \$7,000,000 | 5.10% |
| | | | Ventura, Robin | 3B | 6 | \$8,500,000 | 6.19% |
| | | | Mondesi, Raul | RF | 7 | \$11,000,000 | 8.02% |
| | | | White, Rondell | LF | 8 | \$4,500,000 | 3.28% |
| | | | Johnson, Nick | DH | 9 | \$220,650 | 0.16% |
| | | | Spencer, Shane | OF | Bench | \$885,000 | 0.64% |
| | | | Vander Wal, John | OF | Bench | \$1,850,000 | 1.35% |
| | | | Coomer, Ron | IF | Bench | \$750,000 | 0.55% |
| | | | Wilson, Enrique | UT | Bench | \$720,000 | 0.52% |
| | | | Widger, Chris | C | Bench | \$1,700,000 | 1.24% |
| | | | Mussina, Mike | SP | 2 | \$11,000,000 | 8.02% |
| | | | Wellb, David | SP | 1 | \$2,250,000 | 1.64% |
| | | | Clemens, Roger | SP | 4 | \$10,300,000 | 7.51% |
| | | | Hernandez, Orlando | SP | 5 | \$3,200,000 | 2.33% |
| | | | Pettitte, Andy | SP | 3 | \$9,500,000 | 6.92% |
| | | | Weaver, Jeff | SP | 6 | \$2,350,000 | 1.71% |
| | | | Stanton, Mike | RP | | \$2,500,000 | 1.82% |
| | | | Karsay, Steve | RP | | \$4,000,000 | 2.91% |
| | | | Mendoza, Ramiro | RP | | \$2,600,000 | 1.89% |
| | | | Rivera, Mariano | CL | | \$9,450,000 | 6.89% |
| | | | Hitchcock, Sterling | RP | | \$4,936,719 | 3.60% |
| | | | Total Team Payroll | | | <u>\$137,228,083</u> | 100.00% |

| Year | Team | ALINL | Player | Pos. | Lineup | Salary | %TP |
|------|-----------|-------|--------------------|------|--------|---------------------|---------|
| 2002 | Athletics | AL | Durham, Ray | DH | 1 | \$6,300,000 | 14.12% |
| | | | Hatteberg, Scott | 1B | 2 | \$900,000 | 2.02% |
| | | | Tejada, Miguel | SS | 3 | \$3,625,000 | 8.12% |
| | | | Chavez, Eric | 3B | 4 | \$2,125,000 | 4.76% |
| | | | Dye, Jermaine | RF | 5 | \$7,166,667 | 16.06% |
| | | | Justice, David | LF | 6 | \$7,000,000 | 15.69% |
| | | | Ellis, Mark | 2B | 7 | \$307,500 | 0.69% |
| | | | Long, Terrence | CF | 8 | \$675,000 | 1.51% |
| | | | Hernandez, Ramon | C | 9 | \$497,500 | 1.11% |
| | | | Mabry, John | UT | Bench | \$500,000 | 1.12% |
| | | | Saenz, Olmedo | IF | Bench | \$800,000 | 1.79% |
| | | | Myers, Greg | C | Bench | \$800,000 | 1.79% |
| | | | Velarde, Randy | IF | Bench | \$1,000,000 | 2.24% |
| | | | Byrnes, Eric | OF | Bench | \$300,000 | 0.67% |
| | | | Zito, Barry | SP | 1 | \$295,000 | 0.66% |
| | | | Hudson, Tim | SP | 3 | \$875,000 | 1.96% |
| | | | Lidle, Cory | SP | 4 | \$2,550,000 | 5.71% |
| | | | Mulder, Mark | SP | 2 | \$800,000 | 1.79% |
| | | | Harang, Aaron | SP | 5 | \$360,000 | 0.81% |
| | | | Koch, Billy | CL | | \$2,433,333 | 5.45% |
| | | | Bradford, Chad | RP | | \$235,000 | 0.53% |
| | | | Mecir, Jim | RP | | \$2,366,667 | 5.30% |
| | | | Venafro, Mike | RP | | \$812,500 | 1.82% |
| | | | Tam, Jeff | RP | | \$700,000 | 1.57% |
| | | | Magnante, Mike | RP | | \$1,200,000 | 2.69% |
| | | | Total Team Payroll | | | <u>\$44,624,167</u> | 100.00% |

| Year | Team | AUNL | Player | Pos. | Lineup | Salary | % TP |
|------|--------|------|--------------------|------|--------|---------------------|---------|
| 2002 | Braves | NL | Furcal, Rafael | SS | 1 | \$405,000 | 0.48% |
| | | | Franco, Julio | 1B | 2 | \$600,000 | 0.72% |
| | | | Sheffield, Gary | RF | 3 | \$9,916,667 | 11.83% |
| | | | Jones, Chipper | LF | 4 | \$11,333,333 | 13.52% |
| | | | Jones, Andruw | CF | 5 | \$10,000,000 | 11.93% |
| | | | Castilla, Vinny | 3B | 6 | \$3,000,000 | 3.58% |
| | | | Lopez, Javy | C | 7 | \$6,000,000 | 7.16% |
| | | | Lockhart, Keith | 2B | 8 | \$600,000 | 0.72% |
| | | | Blanco, Henry | C | Bench | \$1,512,500 | 1.80% |
| | | | Giles, Marcus | IF | Bench | \$210,000 | 0.25% |
| | | | Bragg, Darren | OF | Bench | \$450,000 | 0.54% |
| | | | Derosa, Mark | UT | Bench | \$222,500 | 0.27% |
| | | | Helms, Wes | IF | Bench | \$250,000 | 0.30% |
| | | | Franco, Matt | UT | Bench | \$800,000 | 0.95% |
| | | | Glavine, Tom | SP | 2 | \$8,623,700 | 10.29% |
| | | | Maddux, Greg | SP | 3 | \$13,100,000 | 15.63% |
| | | | Millwood, Kevin | SP | 1 | \$3,900,000 | 4.65% |
| | | | Moss, Damian | SP | 4 | \$215,000 | 0.26% |
| | | | Marquis, Jason | SP | 5 | \$230,000 | 0.27% |
| | | | Smoltz, John | CL | | \$7,666,667 | 9.15% |
| | | | Hammond, Chris | RP | | \$450,000 | 0.54% |
| | | | Remlinger, Mike | RP | | \$2,000,000 | 2.39% |
| | | | Holmes, Darren | RP | | \$325,000 | 0.39% |
| | | | Gryboski, Kevin | RP | | \$315,000 | 0.38% |
| | | | Ligtenberg, Kerry | RP | | \$1,700,000 | 2.03% |
| | | | Total Team Payroll | | | <u>\$83,825,367</u> | 100.00% |

| Year | Team | AUNL | Player | Pos. | Lineup | Salary | % TP |
|------|---------|------|---------------------|------|--------|----------------------|---------|
| 2003 | Yankees | AL | Soriano, Alfonso | 2B | 1 | \$800,000 | 0.61% |
| | | | Jeter, Derek | SS | 2 | \$15,600,000 | 11.92% |
| | | | Giambi, Jason | 1B | 3 | \$11,428,571 | 8.73% |
| | | | Williams, Bernie | CF | 4 | \$12,357,143 | 9.44% |
| | | | Matsui, Hideki | LF | 5 | \$6,000,000 | 4.58% |
| | | | Posada, Jorge | C | 6 | \$8,000,000 | 6.11% |
| | | | Johnson, Nick | DH | 7 | \$364,100 | 0.28% |
| | | | Boone, Aaron | 3B | 8 | \$3,700,000 | 2.83% |
| | | | Garcia, Karim' | RF | 9 | \$900,000 | 0.69% |
| | | | Zeile, Todd | IF | Bench | \$1,500,000 | 1.15% |
| | | | Sierra, Ruben | OF | Bench | \$600,000 | 0.46% |
| | | | Rivera, Juan | OF | Bench | \$312,000 | 0.24% |
| | | | Wilson, Enrique | IF | Bench | \$700,000 | 0.53% |
| | | | Flaherty, John | C | Bench | \$750,000 | 0.57% |
| | | | Almonte, Erick | IF | Bench | \$300,000 | 0.23% |
| | | | Clemens, Roger | SP | 3 | \$10,100,000 | 7.72% |
| | | | Pettitte, Andy | SP | 1 | \$11,500,000 | 8.78% |
| | | | Mussina, Mike | SP | 2 | \$12,000,000 | 9.17% |
| | | | Wells, David | SP | 4 | \$3,250,000 | 2.48% |
| | | | Weaver, Jeff | SP | 6 | \$4,150,000 | 3.17% |
| | | | Contreras, Jose | SP | 5 | \$5,500,000 | 4.20% |
| | | | Rivera, Mariano | CL | | \$10,500,000 | 8.02% |
| | | | Hammond, Chris | RP | | \$2,200,000 | 1.68% |
| | | | Osuna, Antonio | RP | | \$2,400,000 | 1.83% |
| | | | Hitchcock, Sterling | RP | | \$6,000,000 | 4.58% |
| | | | Total Team Payroll | | | <u>\$130,911,814</u> | 100.00% |

| Year | Team | ALINL | Player | Pos. | Lineup | Salary | %TP |
|------|--------|-------|---------------------------|------|--------|----------------------|---------|
| 2003 | Braves | NL | Furcal, Rafael | SS | 1 | \$2,200,000 | 2.12% |
| | | | Giles, Marcus | 2B | 2 | \$316,500 | 0.31% |
| | | | Sheffield, Gary | RF | 3 | \$11,416,667 | 11.02% |
| | | | Jones, Chipper | LF | 4 | \$13,333,333 | 12.87% |
| | | | Jones, Andruw | CF | 5 | \$12,000,000 | 11.59% |
| | | | Fick, Robert | 1B | 6 | \$1,000,000 | 0.97% |
| | | | Lopez, Javy | C | 7 | \$7,000,000 | 6.76% |
| | | | Castilla, Vinny | 3B | 8 | \$5,000,000 | 4.83% |
| | | | Derosa, Mark | UT | Bench | \$340,000 | 0.33% |
| | | | Franco, Julio | 1B | Bench | \$600,000 | 0.58% |
| | | | Bragg, Darren | OF | Bench | \$450,000 | 0.43% |
| | | | Blanco, Henry | C | Bench | \$1,300,000 | 1.26% |
| | | | Franco, Matt | 1B | Bench | \$800,000 | 0.77% |
| | | | Maddux, Greg | SP | 2 | \$14,750,000 | 14.24% |
| | | | Ortiz, Russ | SP | 1 | \$4,662,500 | 4.50% |
| | | | Hampton, Mike | SP | 3 | \$13,625,000 | 13.15% |
| | | | Ramirez, Horacio | SP | 4 | \$300,000 | 0.29% |
| | | | Reynolds, Shane | SP | 5 | \$1,000,000 | 0.97% |
| | | | Hodges, Trey | RP | | \$300,000 | 0.29% |
| | | | Smoltz, John | CL | | \$10,666,667 | 10.30% |
| | | | Hernandez, Roberto | RP | | \$600,000 | 0.58% |
| | | | King, Ray | RP | | \$600,000 | 0.58% |
| | | | Gryboski, Kevin | RP | | \$315,000 | 0.30% |
| | | | Bong,Jung | RP | | \$300,000 | 0.29% |
| | | | Holmes, Darren | RP | | \$700,000 | 0.68% |
| | | | Total Team Payroll | | | \$103,575,667 | 100.00% |

| Year | Team | AUNL | Player | Pos. | Lineup | Salary | %TP |
|------|---------|------|--------------------|------|--------|----------------------|---------|
| 2004 | Yankees | AL | Williams, Bernie | CF | 1 | \$12,357,143 | 7.06% |
| | | | Jeter, Derrek | SS | 2 | \$18,600,000 | 10.62% |
| | | | Sheffield, Gary | RF | 3 | \$13,000,000 | 7.43% |
| | | | Rodriguez, Alex | 3B | 4 | \$22,000,000 | 12.57% |
| | | | Matsui, Hideki | LF | 5 | \$7,000,000 | 4.00% |
| | | | Posada, Jorge | C | 6 | \$9,000,000 | 5.14% |
| | | | Sierra, Ruben | DH | 7 | \$1,000,000 | 0.57% |
| | | | Clark, Tony | 1B | 8 | \$750,000 | 0.43% |
| | | | Cairo, Miguel | 2B | 9 | \$900,000 | 0.51% |
| | | | Lofton, Kenny | OF | Bench | \$3,100,000 | 1.77% |
| | | | Giambi, Jason | 1B | Bench | \$12,428,571 | 7.10% |
| | | | Wilson, Enrique | IF | Bench | \$700,000 | 0.40% |
| | | | Olerud, John | 1B | Bench | \$1,000,000 | 0.57% |
| | | | Flaherty, John | C | Bench | \$775,000 | 0.440/~ |
| | | | Vazquez, Javier | SP | 2 | \$9,000,000 | 5.14% |
| | | | Lieber, Jon | SP | 1 | \$2,700,000 | 1.54% |
| | | | Mussina, Mike | SP | 3 | \$16,000,000 | 9.14% |
| | | | Brown, Kevin | SP | 4 | \$15,714,286 | 8.98% |
| | | | Contreras, Jose | SP | 6 | \$8,500,000 | 4.86% |
| | | | Hernandez, Orlando | SP | 5 | \$500,000 | 0.29% |
| | | | Quantrill, Paul | RP | | \$3,000,000 | 1.71% |
| | | | Gordon, Tom | RP | | \$3,500,000 | 2.00% |
| | | | Rivera, Mariano | CL | | \$10,890,000 | 6.22% |
| | | | Sturtze, Tanyon | RP | | \$850,000 | 0.49% |
| | | | Heredia, Feliz | RP | | \$1,800,000 | 1.03% |
| | | | Total Team Payroll | | | <u>\$175,065,000</u> | 100.00% |

| Year | Team | ALINL | Player | Pos. | Lineup | Salary | %TP |
|------|-----------|-------|---------------------|------|--------|---------------------|---------|
| 2004 | Cardinals | NL | Womack, Tony | 2B | 1 | \$300,000 | 0.31% |
| | | | Walker, Larry | RF | 2 | \$12,666,667 | 13.26% |
| | | | Pujols, Albert | 1B | 3 | \$7,000,000 | 7.33% |
| | | | Rolen, Scott | 3B | 4 | \$8,625,000 | 9.03% |
| | | | Edmonds, Jim | CF | 5 | \$9,333,333 | 9.77% |
| | | | Renteria, Edgar | SS | 6 | \$7,250,000 | 7.59% |
| | | | Sanders, Reggie | LF | 7 | \$2,000,000 | 2.09% |
| | | | Matheny, Mike | C | 8 | \$4,000,000 | 4.19% |
| | | | Lankford, Ray | OF | Bench | \$650,000 | 0.68% |
| | | | Anderson, Marlon | UT | Bench | \$600,000 | 0.63% |
| | | | Mabry, John | UT | Bench | \$725,000 | 0.76% |
| | | | Cedeno, Roger | OF | Bench | \$5,375,000 | 5.63% |
| | | | Taguchi, So | OF | Bench | \$1,200,000 | 1.26% |
| | | | Molina, Yadier | C | Bench | \$323,500 | 0.34% |
| | | | Luna, Hector | IF | Bench | \$300,000 | 0.31% |
| | | | Morris, Matt | SP | 4 | \$12,500,000 | 13.09% |
| | | | Marquis, Jason | SP | 3 | \$525,000 | 0.55% |
| | | | Suppan, Jeff | SP | 1 | \$1,000,000 | 1.05% |
| | | | Williams, Woody | SP | 5 | \$8,000,000 | 8.37% |
| | | | Carpenter, Chris | SP | 2 | \$300,000 | 0.31% |
| | | | Isringhausen, Jason | CL | | \$7,750,000 | 8.11% |
| | | | Eldred, Cal | RP | | \$900,000 | 0.94% |
| | | | Taverez, Julian | RP | | \$1,600,000 | 1.67% |
| | | | King, Ray | RP | | \$900,000 | 0.94% |
| | | | Kline, Steve | RP | | \$1,700,000 | 1.78% |
| | | | Total Team Payroll | | | <u>\$95,523,500</u> | 100.00% |

| Year | Team | ALINL | Player | Pos. | Lineup | Salary | % TP |
|------|-----------|-------|--------------------|------|--------|---------------------|---------|
| 2005 | White Sox | AL | Podsednik, Scott | LF | 1 | \$700,000 | 1.08% |
| | | | Iguchi, Tadahito | 2B | 2 | \$2,300,000 | 3.56% |
| | | | Everett, Carl | DH | 3 | \$4,000,000 | 6.18% |
| | | | Konerko, Paul | 1B | 4 | \$8,750,000 | 13.52% |
| | | | Rowand, Aaron | CF | 5 | \$2,000,000 | 3.09% |
| | | | Dye, Jermaine | RF | 6 | \$4,000,000 | 6.18% |
| | | | Pierzynski, A.J. | C | 7 | \$2,250,000 | 3.48% |
| | | | Crede, Joe | 3B | 8 | \$400,000 | 0.62% |
| | | | Uribe, Juan | SS | 9 | \$2,150,000 | 3.32% |
| | | | Ozuna, Pablo | IF | Bench | \$330,000 | 0.51% |
| | | | Perez, Timo | IF | Bench | \$1,000,000 | 1.55% |
| | | | Widger, Chris | C | Bench | \$500,000 | 0.77% |
| | | | Harris, Willie | UT | Bench | \$365,000 | 0.56% |
| | | | Buehrle, Mark | SP | 2 | \$6,000,000 | 9.27% |
| | | | Garcia, Freddie | SP | 4 | \$8,000,000 | 12.37% |
| | | | Contreras, Jose | SP | 3 | \$8,500,000 | 13.14% |
| | | | Garland, Jon | SP | 1 | \$3,400,000 | 5.26% |
| | | | Hernandez, Orlando | SP | 5 | \$3,500,000 | 5.41% |
| | | | McCarthy, Brandon | SP | 6 | \$332,000 | 0.51% |
| | | | Vizcaino, Luis | RP | | \$1,300,000 | 2.01% |
| | | | Politte, Cliff | RP | | \$1,000,000 | 1.55% |
| | | | Cotts, Neal | RP | | \$330,000 | 0.51% |
| | | | Hermanson, Dustin | CL | | \$2,000,000 | 3.09% |
| | | | Marte, Damaso | RP | | \$1,250,000 | 1.93% |
| | | | Jenks, Bobby | CL | | \$340,000 | 0.53% |
| | | | Total Team Payroll | | | <u>\$64,697,000</u> | 100.00% |

| Year | Team | ALINL | Player | Pos. | Lineup | Salary | %TP |
|------|-----------|-------|---------------------|------|--------|---------------------|---------|
| 2005 | Cardinals | NL | Eckstein, David | SS | 1 | \$2,333,333 | 2.70% |
| | | | Walker, Larry | RF | 2 | \$12,666,667 | 14.64% |
| | | | Pujols, Albert | 1B | 3 | \$11,000,000 | 12.71% |
| | | | Edmonds, Jim | CF | 4 | \$10,333,333 | 11.94% |
| | | | Sanders, Reggie | LF | 5 | \$4,000,000 | 4.62% |
| | | | Grudzielanek, Mark | 2B | 6 | \$1,000,000 | 1.16% |
| | | | Nunez, Abraham | 3B | 7 | \$625,000 | 0.72% |
| | | | Molina, Yadier | C | 8 | \$323,500 | 0.37% |
| | | | Taguchi, So | OF | Bench | \$550,000 | 0.64% |
| | | | Mabry, John | UT | Bench | \$725,000 | 0.84% |
| | | | Rolen, Scott | 3B | Bench | \$11,625,000 | 13.43% |
| | | | Rodriguez, John | OF | Bench | \$332,000 | 0.38% |
| | | | Luna, Hector | IF | Bench | \$320,000 | 0.37% |
| | | | Diaz, Einar | C | Bench | \$600,000 | 0.69% |
| | | | Carpenter, Chris | SP | 1 | \$2,000,000 | 2.31% |
| | | | Marquis, Jason | SP | 5 | \$3,000,000 | 3.47% |
| | | | Mulder, Mark | SP | 2 | \$6,050,000 | 6.99% |
| | | | Suppan, Jeff | SP | 3 | \$4,000,000 | 4.62% |
| | | | Morris, Matt | SP | 4 | \$2,500,000 | 2.89% |
| | | | Taverez, Julian | RP | | \$2,600,000 | 3.00% |
| | | | Reyes, Al | RP | | \$450,000 | 0.52% |
| | | | Isringhausen, Jason | CL | | \$7,000,000 | 8.09% |
| | | | Flores, Randy | RP | | \$320,000 | 0.37% |
| | | | King, Ray | RP | | \$1,850,000 | 2.14% |
| | | | Thompson, Brad | RP | | \$334,000 | 0.39% |
| | | | Total Team Payroll | | | <u>\$86,537,833</u> | 100.00% |

| Year | Team | AUNL | Player | Pos. | Lineup | Salary | %TP |
|------|---------|------|--------------------|------|--------|---------------|---------|
| 2006 | Yankees | AL | Damon, Johnny | CF | 1 | \$13,000,000 | 6.56% |
| | | | Jeter, Derek | SS | 2 | \$20,600,000 | 10.39% |
| | | | Abreu, Bobby | RF | 3 | \$13,600,000 | 6.86% |
| | | | Rodriguez, Alex | 3B | 4 | \$21,680,727 | 10.94% |
| | | | Giambi, Jason | 1B | 5 | \$20,428,571 | 10.31% |
| | | | Posada, Jorge | C | 6 | \$12,000,000 | 6.06% |
| | | | Williams, Bernie | DH | 7 | \$1,500,000 | 0.76% |
| | | | Cabrera, Melky | LF | 8 | \$300,000 | 0.15% |
| | | | Cano, Robinson | 2B | 9 | \$381,000 | 0.19% |
| | | | Phillips, Andy | 1B | Bench | \$333,150 | 0.17% |
| | | | Cairo, Miguel | IF | Bench | \$1,000,000 | 0.50% |
| | | | Matsui, Hideki | LF | Bench | \$13,000,000 | 6.56% |
| | | | Sheffield, Gary | RF | Bench | \$10,756,171 | 5.43% |
| | | | Wilson, Craig | UT | Bench | \$3,300,000 | 1.67% |
| | | | Stinnett, Kelly | C | Bench | \$650,000 | 0.33% |
| | | | Johnson, Randy | SP | 2 | \$15,661,427 | 7.90% |
| | | | Wang, Chien-Ming | SP | 1 | \$353,175 | 0.18% |
| | | | Mussina, Mike | SP | 3 | \$19,000,000 | 9.59% |
| | | | Wright, Jaret | SP | 4 | \$7,666,667 | 3.87% |
| | | | Lidle, Cory | SP | 5 | \$3,300,000 | 1.67% |
| | | | Proctor, Scott | RP | | \$352,675 | 0.18% |
| | | | Villone, Ron | RP | | \$2,250,000 | 1.14% |
| | | | Rivera, Mariano | CL | | \$10,500,000 | 5.30% |
| | | | Farnsworth, Kyle | RP | | \$5,416,666 | 2.73% |
| | | | Myers, Mike | RP | | \$1,150,000 | 0.58% |
| | | | Total Team Payroll | | | \$198,180,229 | 100.00% |

| Year | Team | ALINL | Player | Pos. | Lineup | Salary | %TP |
|------|------|-------|--------------------|------|--------|---------------------|---------|
| 2006 | Mets | NL | Reyes, Jose | SS | 1 | \$401,500 | 0.41% |
| | | | Lo Duca, Paul | C | 2 | \$6,599,206 | 6.76% |
| | | | Beltran, Carlos | CF | 3 | \$13,571,428 | 13.90% |
| | | | Delgado, Carlos | 1B | 4 | \$13,500,000 | 13.83% |
| | | | Wright, David | 3B | 5 | \$374,000 | 0.38% |
| | | | Floyd, Cliff | LF | 6 | \$6,616,856 | 6.78% |
| | | | Valentin, Jose | 2B | 7 | \$912,500 | 0.93% |
| | | | Chavez, Endy | RF | 8 | \$500,000 | 0.51% |
| | | | Nady, Xavier | OF | Bench | \$427,000 | 0.44% |
| | | | Woodward, Chris | IF | Bench | \$825,000 | 0.84% |
| | | | Milledge, Lastings | OF | Bench | \$300,000 | 0.31% |
| | | | Franco, Julio | 1B | Bench | \$1,050,000 | 1.08% |
| | | | Castro, Ramon | C | Bench | \$800,000 | 0.82% |
| | | | Green, Shawn | OF | Bench | \$10,213,898 | 10.46% |
| | | | Glavine, Tom | SP | 1 | \$9,993,640 | 10.23% |
| | | | Trachsel, Steve | SP | 2 | \$2,500,000 | 2.56% |
| | | | Martinez, Pedro | SP | 4 | \$14,875,000 | 15.23% |
| | | | Hernandez, Orlando | SP | 3 | \$327,000 | 0.33% |
| | | | Maine, John | SP | 5 | \$300,000 | 0.31% |
| | | | Oliver, Darren | SP | 6 | \$600,000 | .061% |
| | | | Heilman, Aaron | RP | | \$359,000 | 0.37% |
| | | | Wagner, Billy | CL | | \$10,500,000 | 10.75% |
| | | | Bradford, Chad | RP | | \$1,400,000 | 1.43% |
| | | | Feliciano, Pedro | RP | | \$300,000 | 0.31% |
| | | | Sanchez, Duaner | RP | | \$399,500 | 0.41% |
| | | | Total Team Payroll | | | <u>\$97,645,528</u> | 100.00% |

APPENDIX

Individual Player Statistical Information and Distribution

World Series Champions

| Year | Team | AL/NL | Player | Pos. | Lineup |
|------|--------|-------|--------------------|------|--------|
| 2002 | Angels | AL | Eckstein, David | SS | 1 |
| | | | Erstad, Darin | CF | 2 |
| | | | Salmon, Tim | RF | 3 |
| | | | Anderson, Garret | LF | 4 |
| | | | Glaus, Troy | 3B | 5 |
| | | | Fullmer, Brad | DH | 6 |
| | | | Spiezio, Scott | 1B | 7 |
| | | | Molina, Bengie | C | 8 |
| | | | Kennedy, Adam | 2B | |
| | | | Palmeiro, Orlando | UT | |
| | | | Gil, Benji | C | |
| | | | Wooten, Shawn | 1B | |
| | | | Nieves, Jose | IF | |
| | | | Appier, Kevin | SP | |
| | | | Ortiz, Ramon | SP | |
| | | | Washburn, Jarrod | SP | |
| | | | Sele, Aaron | SP | 5 |
| | | | Lackey, John | SP | 4 |
| | | | Schoeneweis, Scott | RP | |
| | | | Weber, Ben | RP | |
| | | | Levine, Alan | RP | |
| | | | Percival, Troy | CL | |
| | | | Donnelly, Brendan | RP | |
| | | | Pote, Lou | RP | |
| | | | Shields, Scot | RP | |

| % OBP | % RBI | R | % R |
|---------|--------|-----|--------|
| 105.99% | 8.14% | 107 | 13.18% |
| 91.39% | 9.43% | 99 | 12.19% |
| 110.96% | 11.37% | 84 | 10.34% |
| 96.94% | 15.89% | 93 | 11.45% |
| 102.78% | 14.34% | 99 | 12.19% |
| 104.24% | 7.62% | 75 | 9.24% |
| 108.33% | 10.59% | 80 | 9.85% |
| 80.00% | 6.07% | 34 | 4.19% |
| 100.74% | 6.72% | 65 | 8.00% |
| 107.45% | 4.01% | 35 | 4.31% |
| 89.64% | 2.58% | 11 | 1.35% |
| 96.65% | 2.45% | 13 | 1.60% |
| 88.47% | 0.78% | 17 | 2.09% |

| Year | Team | AL/NL | Player | Pos. | AB | % SLG | RBI | % RBI | % R | HR | % HR |
|------|---------|-------|---------------------|------|-------|-------|---------|-------|--------|----|--------|
| 2003 | Marlins | NL | Pierre, Juan | CF | 1 | 668 | 85.37% | 41 | 6.16% | 1 | 0.67% |
| | | | Castillo, Luis | 2B | 2 | 595 | 90.87% | 39 | 5.86% | 6 | 4.03% |
| | | | Rodriguez, Ivan | C | 3 | 511 | 108.49% | 85 | 12.76% | 16 | 10.74% |
| | | | Lowell, Mike | 3B | 4 | 492 | 121.31% | 105 | 15.77% | 32 | 21.48% |
| | | | Encarnacion, Juan | RF | 5 | 601 | 102.08% | 94 | 14.11% | 19 | 12.75% |
| | | | Lee, Derrek | 1B | 6 | 539 | 116.27% | 92 | 13.81% | 31 | 20.81% |
| | | | Cabrera, Miguel | LF | 7 | 314 | 107.12% | 62 | 9.31% | 12 | 8.05% |
| | | | Gonzalez, Alex | SS | 8 | 528 | 101.39% | 77 | 11.56% | 18 | 12.08% |
| | | | Hollandsworth, Todd | OF | Bench | 228 | 96.36% | 20 | 3.00% | 3 | 2.01% |
| | | | Banks, Brian | IF | Bench | 149 | 87.66% | 23 | 3.45% | 4 | 2.68% |
| | | | Redmond, Mike | C | Bench | 125 | 71.41% | 11 | 1.65% | 0 | 0.00% |
| | | | Fox, Andy | IF | Bench | 108 | 59.28% | 0 | 0.00% | 0 | 0.00% |
| | | | Mordecai, Mike | IF | Bench | 89 | 74.62% | 2 | 0.30% | 2 | 1.34% |
| | | | Conine, Jeff | UT | Bench | 84 | 103.45% | 15 | 2.25% | 5 | 3.36% |
| | | | Pavano, Carl | SP | | 4 | | | | | |
| | | | Penny, Brad | SP | | 3 | | | | | |
| | | | Redman, Mark | SP | | 2 | | | | | |
| | | | Willis, Dontrelle | SP | | 1 | | | | | |
| | | | Beckett, Josh | SP | | 5 | | | | | |
| | | | Tejera, Michael | RP | | | | | | | |
| | | | Looper, Braden | CL | | | | | | | |
| | | | Phelps, Tommy | RP | | | | | | | |
| | | | Almanza, Armando | RP | | | | | | | |
| | | | Spooneybarger, Tim | RP | | | | | | | |
| | | | Urbina, Ugueth | CL | | | | | | | |

| Year | Team | AL/NL | Player | Pos. | Lineup | AB | % OBP | RBI | % RBI | % SB |
|------|-----------|-------|---------------------|------|--------|-----|---------|-----|--------|--------|
| 2006 | Cardinals | NL | Eckstein, David | SS | 1 | 500 | 101.71% | 23 | 3.33% | 13.46% |
| | | | Duncan, Chris | LF | 2 | 280 | 105.49% | 43 | 6.23% | 0.00% |
| | | | Pujols, Albert | 1B | 3 | 535 | 125.25% | 137 | 19.86% | 13.46% |
| | | | Rolen, Scott | 3B | 4 | 521 | 107.23% | 95 | 13.77% | 13.46% |
| | | | Edmonds, Jim | CF | 5 | 350 | 101.71% | 70 | 10.14% | 7.69% |
| | | | Encarnacion, Juan | RF | 6 | 557 | 92.12% | 79 | 11.45% | 11.54% |
| | | | Molina, Yadier | C | 7 | 417 | 79.62% | 49 | 7.10% | 1.92% |
| | | | Miles, Aaron | 2B | 8 | 426 | 94.15% | 30 | 4.35% | 3.85% |
| | | | Taguchi, So | OF | Bench | 316 | 97.35% | 31 | 4.49% | 21.15% |
| | | | Spiezio, Scott | UT | Bench | 276 | 106.36% | 52 | 7.54% | 1.92% |
| | | | Belliard, Ron | IF | Bench | 194 | 85.73% | 23 | 3.33% | 0.00% |
| | | | Rodriguez, John | OF | Bench | 183 | 108.68% | 19 | 2.75% | 0.00% |
| | | | Bennett, Gary | C | Bench | 157 | 79.62% | 22 | 3.19% | 0.00% |
| | | | Wilson, Preston | OF | Bench | 111 | 87.18% | 17 | 2.46% | 11.54% |
| | | | Carpenter, Chris | SP | 1 | | | | | |
| | | | Suppan, Jeff | SP | 3 | | | | | |
| | | | Marquis, Jason | SP | 2 | | | | | |
| | | | Mulder, Mark | SP | 4 | | | | | |
| | | | Reyes, Anthony | SP | 6 | | | | | |
| | | | Weaver, Jeff | SP | 5 | | | | | |
| | | | Hancock, Josh | RP | | | | | | |
| | | | Wainwright, Adam | RP | | | | | | |
| | | | Looper, Braden | RP | | | | | | |
| | | | Isringhausen, Jason | CL | | | | | | |
| | | | Thompson, Brad | RP | | | | | | |

Regular Season Champions

| Year | Team | AL/NL | Player |
|------|---------|-------|---------------------|
| 2002 | Yankees | AL | Soriano, Alfonso |
| | | | Jeter, Derek |
| | | | Giambi, Jason |
| | | | Williams, Bernie |
| | | | Posada, Jorge |
| | | | Ventura, Robin |
| | | | Mondesi, Raul |
| | | | White, Rondell |
| | | | Johnson, Nick |
| | | | Spencer, Shane |
| | | | Vander Wal, John |
| | | | Coomer, Ron |
| | | | Wilson, Enrique |
| | | | Widger, Chris |
| | | | Mussina, Mike |
| | | | Wells, David |
| | | | Clemens, Roger |
| | | | Hernandez, Orlando |
| | | | Pettitte, Andy |
| | | | Weaver, Jeff |
| | | | Stanton, Mike |
| | | | Karsay, Steve |
| | | | Mendoza, Ramiro |
| | | | Rivera, Mariano |
| | | | Hitchcock, Sterling |

| ERA | W | L | W-L % | %W-L | IP | % IP | H | BB | WHIP | %WHIP | K | K/9 IP | %K9 | SV | % SV |
|------|----|----|-------|---------|-----|------|-----|----|------|-------|-----|--------|------|----|------|
| 3.81 | 18 | 10 | 64.3% | 97.40% | 208 | 48% | 208 | 48 | 1.25 | 100% | 182 | 7.8 | 100% | 0 | 0% |
| 3.81 | 19 | 7 | 73.1% | 110.72% | 210 | 45% | 210 | 45 | 1.19 | 100% | 137 | 5.9 | 100% | 0 | 0% |
| 3.81 | 13 | 6 | 68.8% | 103.67% | 172 | 63% | 172 | 63 | 1.19 | 100% | 192 | 10.0 | 100% | 0 | 0% |
| 3.81 | 8 | 5 | 61.5% | 93.24% | 131 | 36% | 131 | 36 | 1.22 | 100% | 113 | 7.8 | 100% | 0 | 0% |
| 3.81 | 13 | 5 | 73.1% | 109.43% | 144 | 32% | 144 | 32 | 1.25 | 100% | 97 | 6.2 | 100% | 0 | 0% |
| 3.81 | 7 | 1 | 87.5% | 132.58% | 81 | 57% | 81 | 57 | 1.19 | 100% | 57 | 6.3 | 100% | 0 | 0% |
| 3.81 | 6 | 4 | 60.0% | 90.91% | 73 | 28% | 73 | 28 | 1.27 | 100% | 44 | 5.4 | 100% | 0 | 0% |
| 3.81 | 8 | 4 | 66.7% | 101.01% | 87 | 30% | 87 | 30 | 1.25 | 100% | 65 | 6.8 | 100% | 0 | 0% |
| 3.81 | 1 | 4 | 20.0% | 30.30% | 102 | 16% | 102 | 16 | 1.31 | 100% | 61 | 5.3 | 100% | 0 | 0% |
| 3.81 | 1 | 2 | 33.3% | 50.51% | 35 | 11% | 35 | 11 | 1.43 | 100% | 41 | 10.5 | 100% | 0 | 0% |
| 3.81 | 57 | 15 | 79.3% | 100% | 57 | 15 | 57 | 15 | 1.27 | 100% | 31 | 4.9 | 100% | 0 | 0% |

| AL/NL Player | Pos. | Lineup | AB | % OBP | % SLG | % R | HR | % SB |
|------------------|------|--------|-----|---------|---------|--------|----|--------|
| Durham, Ray | DH | 1 | 219 | 102.51% | 104.15% | 6.08% | 6 | 14.29% |
| Hatteberg, Scott | 1B | 2 | 492 | 109.54% | 98.68% | 8.20% | 15 | 0.00% |
| Tejada, Miguel | SS | 3 | 662 | 103.68% | 115.78% | 15.28% | 34 | 16.67% |
| Chavez, Eric | 3B | 4 | 585 | 101.92% | 116.92% | 12.31% | 34 | 19.05% |
| Dye, Jermaine | RF | 5 | 488 | 97.53% | 104.61% | 10.47% | 24 | 4.76% |
| Justice, David | LF | 6 | 398 | 110.12% | 93.44% | 7.64% | 11 | 9.52% |
| Ellis, Mark | 2B | 7 | 345 | 105.14% | 89.79% | 8.20% | 6 | 9.52% |
| Long, Terrence | CF | 8 | 587 | 87.28% | 88.88% | 10.04% | 16 | 7.14% |
| Hernandez, Ramon | C | 9 | 403 | 91.67% | 76.35% | 7.21% | 7 | 0.00% |
| Mabry, John | UT | Bench | 193 | 94.31% | 119.19% | 3.82% | 11 | 2.38% |
| Saenz, Olmedo | IF | Bench | 156 | 103.68% | 106.66% | 2.12% | 6 | 2.38% |
| Myers, Greg | C | Bench | 144 | 99.87% | 87.06% | 2.12% | 6 | 0.00% |
| Velarde, Randy | IF | Bench | 133 | 95.19% | 75.44% | 3.11% | 2 | 7.14% |
| Byrnes, Eric | OF | Bench | 94 | 85.23% | 97.09% | 3.39% | 3 | 7.14% |
| Zito, Barry | SP | 1 | | | | | | |
| Hudson, Tim | SP | 3 | | | | | | |
| Lidle, Cory | SP | 4 | | | | | | |
| Mulder, Mark | SP | 2 | | | | | | |
| Harang, Aaron | SP | 2 | | | | | | |
| Koch, Billy | CL | | | | | | | |
| Bradford, Chad | RP | | | | | | | |
| Mecir, Jim | RP | | | | | | | |
| Venafro, Mike | RP | | | | | | | |
| Tam, Jeff | RP | | | | | | | |
| Magnante, Mike | RP | | | | | | | |

Y=0 ZOO: T=0 C=0

AL

AL/NL Player

Pos. Lineup

AB

% OBP

% SLG

% R

HR

% SB

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| Year | Team | AL/NL | Player |
|------|-----------|-------|------------------|
| 2002 | Athletics | AL | Durham, Ray |
| | | | Hatteberg, Scott |
| | | | Tejada, Miguel |
| | | | Chavez, Eric |
| | | | Dye, Jermaine |
| | | | Justice, David |
| | | | Ellis, Mark |
| | | | Long, Terrence |
| | | | Hernandez, Ramon |
| | | | Mabry, John |
| | | | Saenz, Olmedo |
| | | | Myers, Greg |
| | | | Velarde, Randy |
| | | | Bymes, Eric |
| | | | Zito, Barry |
| | | | Hudson, Tim |
| | | | Lidle, Cory |
| | | | Mulder, Mark |
| | | | Harang, Aaron |
| | | | Koch, Billy |
| | | | Bradford, Chad |
| | | | Mecir, Jim |
| | | | Venafro, Mike |
| | | | Tam, Jeff |
| | | | Magnante, Mike |

| IP | % IP | H | BB | WHIP | %WHIP | K | K/9 IP | %K9 | SV | % SV |
|-----|------|---|----|-------|-------|---|--------|-----|----|------|
| 182 | 78 | 1 | 1 | 7.143 | | | | | | |
| 237 | 62 | 1 | 1 | 5.741 | | | | | | |
| 191 | 39 | 1 | 1 | 5.203 | | | | | | |
| 182 | 55 | 1 | 1 | 6.903 | | | | | | |
| 78 | 45 | 1 | 1 | 7.356 | | | | | | |
| 73 | 46 | 1 | 1 | 8.933 | | | | | | |
| 73 | 14 | 1 | 1 | 6.693 | | | | | | |
| 68 | 29 | 1 | 1 | 7.046 | | | | | | |
| 45 | 14 | 1 | 1 | 3.892 | | | | | | |
| 56 | 13 | 1 | 1 | 3.127 | | | | | | |
| 38 | 11 | 1 | 1 | 3.449 | | | | | | |

| Year | Team | AL/NL | Player |
|------|--------|-------|-------------------|
| 2002 | Braves | NL | Furcal, Rafael |
| | | | Franco, Julio |
| | | | Sheffield, Gary |
| | | | Jones, Chipper |
| | | | Jones, Andruw |
| | | | Castilla, Vinny |
| | | | Lopez, Javy |
| | | | Lockhart, Keith |
| | | | Blanco, Henry |
| | | | Giles, Marcus |
| | | | Bragg, Darren |
| | | | Derosa, Mark |
| | | | Helms, Wes |
| | | | Franco, Matt |
| | | | Glavine, Tom |
| | | | Maddux, Greg |
| | | | Millwood, Kevin |
| | | | Moss, Damian |
| | | | Marquis, Jason |
| | | | Smoltz, John |
| | | | Hammond, Chris |
| | | | Remlinger, Mike |
| | | | Holmes, Darren |
| | | | Gryboski, Kevin |
| | | | Ligtenberg, Kerry |

| Pos. | Lineup | AB |
|------|--------|-----|
| SS | 1 | 636 |
| 1B | 2 | 338 |
| RF | 3 | 492 |
| LF | 4 | 548 |
| CF | 5 | 560 |
| 3B | 6 | 543 |
| C | 7 | 347 |
| 2B | 8 | 296 |
| C | Bench | 221 |
| IF | Bench | 213 |
| OF | Bench | 212 |
| UT | Bench | 212 |
| IF | Bench | 210 |
| UT | Bench | 205 |
| SP | 2 | |
| SP | 3 | |
| SP | 1 | |
| SP | 4 | |
| SP | 5 | |
| CL | | |
| RP | | |
| RP | | |
| RP | | |
| RP | | |
| RP | | |

| % SLG |
|---------|
| 90.61% |
| 89.44% |
| 119.88% |
| 125.49% |
| 119.88% |
| 81.48% |
| 87.10% |
| 77.50% |
| 78.43% |
| 93.42% |
| 93.89% |
| 100.44% |
| 94.82% |
| 121.05% |

| R | % R |
|----|--------|
| 95 | 14.03% |
| 51 | 7.53% |
| 82 | 12.11% |
| 90 | 13.29% |
| 91 | 13.44% |
| 56 | 8.27% |
| 31 | 4.58% |
| 34 | 5.02% |
| 17 | 2.51% |
| 27 | 3.99% |
| 34 | 5.02% |
| 24 | 3.55% |
| 20 | 2.95% |
| 25 | 3.69% |

| SB | % SB |
|----|--------|
| 27 | 36.49% |
| 5 | 6.76% |
| 12 | 16.22% |
| 8 | 10.81% |
| 8 | 10.81% |
| 4 | 5.41% |
| 0 | 0.00% |
| 0 | 0.00% |
| 1 | 1.35% |
| 5 | 6.76% |
| 2 | 2.70% |
| 1 | 1.35% |
| 1 | 1.35% |

AL/NL Player

- NL Furcal, Rafael
- Franco, Julio
- Sheffield, Gary
- Jones, Chipper
- Jones, Andruw
- Castilla, Vinny
- Lopez, Javy
- Lockhart, Keith
- Blanco, Henry
- Giles, Marcus
- Bragg, Darren
- Derosa, Mark
- Helms, Wes
- Franco, Matt
- Glavine, Tom
- Maddux, Greg
- Millwood, Kevin
- Moss, Damian
- Marquis, Jason
- Smoltz, John
- Hammond, Chris
- Remlinger, Mike
- Holmes, Darren
- Gryboski, Kevin
- Ligtenberg, Kerry

| IP | % IP | H | BB | WHIP | %WHIP | K | K/9 IP | %K9 | SV | % SV |
|-----|------|---|----|---------|-------|-------|--------|-----|----|------|
| 210 | 78 | 1 | ~ | 103.38% | | 5.087 | | | | |
| 194 | 45 | 1 | ~ | 96.73% | | 5.329 | | | | |
| 186 | 65 | 1 | ~ | 93.30% | | 7.382 | | | | |
| 140 | 89 | 1 | ~ | 103.19% | | 5.581 | | | | |
| 127 | 49 | 1 | ~ | 124.20% | | 6.614 | | | | |
| 59 | 24 | 1 | ~ | 83.37% | | 9.527 | | | | |
| 53 | 31 | 1 | ~ | 89.15% | | 7.461 | | | | |
| 48 | 28 | 1 | ~ | 90.15% | | 9.132 | | | | |
| 41 | 12 | 1 | ~ | 78.15% | | 7.733 | | | | |
| 50 | 37 | ~ | ~ | 135.73% | | 5.745 | | | | |
| 52 | 33 | ~ | ~ | 102.79% | | 6.882 | | | | |

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003

AL/NL Player

AL Soriano, Alfonso
Jeter, Derek
Giambi, Jason
Williams, Bernie
Matsui, Hideki
Posada, Jorge
Johnson, Nick
Boone, Aaron
Garcia, Karim
Zeile, Todd
Sierra, Ruben
Rivera, Juan
Wilson, Enrique
Flaherty, John
Almonte, Erick
Clemens, Roger
Pettitte, Andy
Mussina, Mike
Wells, David
Weaver, Jeff
Contreras, Jose
Rivera, Mariano
Hammond, Chris
Osuna, Antonio
Hitchcock, Sterling

Pos. 5:809
2B
SS
1B
CF
LF
C
DH
3B
RF
IF
OF
OF
IF
C
IF
SP
SP
SP
SP
SP
SP
CL
RP
RP
RP

AB
682
482
535
445
623
481
324
189
151
186
174
173
105
100
88.89%

% OBP
93.60%
108.83%
114.10%
101.63%
97.76%
112.16%
116.86%
83.63%
94.71%
81.42%
89.45%
84.19%
76.43%
82.25%

% SLG
113.42%
97.22%
113.86%
88.80%
93.98%
111.91%
101.97%
90.31%
98.73%
75.40%
94.41%
101.11%
78.43%
98.73%
75.62%

RBI
91
52
107
64
106
101
47
31
21
23
31
26
15
14
11

% RBI
12.30%
7.03%
14.46%
8.65%
14.32%
13.65%
6.35%
4.19%
2.84%
3.11%
4.19%
3.51%
2.03%
1.89%
1.49%

% R
14.82%
11.31%
12.61%
10.01%
10.66%
10.79%
7.80%
4.03%
2.21%
3.77%
2.47%
2.86%
2.34%
2.08%
2.21%

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AL NL Player

AL Soriano, Alfonso
 Jeter, Derek
 Giambi, Jason
 Williams, Bernie
 Matsui, Hideki
 Posada, Jorge
 Johnson, Nick
 Boone, Aaron
 Garcia, Karim
 Zeile, Todd
 Sierra, Ruben
 Rivera, Juan
 Wilson, Enrique
 Flaherty, John
 Almonte, Erick
 Clemens, Roger
 Pettitte, Andy
 Mussina, Mike
 Wells, David
 Weaver, Jeff
 Contreras, Jose
 Rivera, Mariano
 Hammond, Chris
 Osuna, Antonio
 Hitchcock, Sterling

| Player | %ERA | W | L | W-L % | %W-L | IP | % IP | H | BB | WHIP | %WHIP | K | K/9 IP | %K9 | SV | % SV |
|------------------|---------|----|---|-------|------|-------|------|-----|----|------|-------|-----|--------|-----|----|------|
| Soriano, Alfonso | 98.24% | 17 | | | | 211.7 | | 199 | 58 | | | 190 | 8.077 | | | |
| Jeter, Derek | 101.00% | 21 | | | | 208.3 | | 227 | 50 | | | 180 | 7.777 | | | |
| Giambi, Jason | 85.42% | 17 | | | | 214.7 | | 192 | 40 | | | 195 | 8.174 | | | |
| Williams, Bernie | 104.01% | 15 | | | | 213.0 | | 242 | 20 | | | 101 | 4.268 | | | |
| Matsui, Hideki | 150.49% | 7 | | | | 159.3 | | 211 | 47 | | | 93 | 5.254 | | | |
| Posada, Jorge | 82.91% | 7 | | | | 71.0 | | 52 | 30 | | | 72 | 9.127 | | | |
| Johnson, Nick | 41.71% | 5 | | | | 70.7 | | 61 | 10 | | | 63 | 8.020 | | | |
| Boone, Aaron | 71.86% | 3 | | | | 63.0 | | 65 | 11 | | | 45 | 6.429 | | | |
| Garcia, Karim | 93.71% | 2 | | | | 50.7 | | 58 | 20 | | | 47 | 8.343 | | | |
| Zeile, Todd | 136.68% | 1 | | | | 49.7 | | 57 | 18 | | | 36 | 6.519 | | | |

| Year | Team | AL/NL | Player |
|------|--------|-------|--------------------|
| 2003 | Braves | NL | Furcal, Rafael |
| | | | Giles, Marcus |
| | | | Sheffield, Gary |
| | | | Jones, Chipper |
| | | | Jones, Andruw |
| | | | Fick, Robert |
| | | | Lopez, Javy |
| | | | Castilla, Vinny |
| | | | Derosa, Mark |
| | | | Franco, Julio |
| | | | Bragg, Darren |
| | | | Blanco, Henry |
| | | | Franco, Matt |
| | | | Maddux, Greg |
| | | | Ortiz, Russ |
| | | | Hampton, Mike |
| | | | Ramirez, Horacio |
| | | | Reynolds, Shane |
| | | | Hodges, Trey |
| | | | Smoltz, John |
| | | | Hernandez, Roberto |
| | | | King, Ray |
| | | | Gryboski, Kevin |
| | | | Bong, Jung |
| | | | Holmes, Darren |

| ERA | W | L | W-L % | %W-L | IP | % IP | H | BB | WHIP | %WHIP | K | K/9 IP | %K9 | SV | % SV |
|------|----|---|-------|--------|-------|--------|-----|----|------|---------|-----|--------|--------|----|------|
| 3.80 | 11 | 7 | 61.0% | 100.0% | 225.0 | 100.0% | 177 | 33 | 1.02 | 87.09% | 177 | 7.0 | 100.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 3.80 | 8 | 8 | 50.0% | 100.0% | 186.0 | 82.7% | 181 | 72 | 1.10 | 102.39% | 181 | 8.7 | 100.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 3.80 | 9 | 9 | 50.0% | 100.0% | 191.0 | 85.0% | 191 | 59 | 1.10 | 102.27% | 191 | 8.9 | 100.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 3.80 | 3 | 3 | 50.0% | 100.0% | 69.0 | 30.7% | 69 | 31 | 1.10 | 112.16% | 69 | 7.1 | 100.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 3.80 | 3 | 3 | 50.0% | 100.0% | 48.0 | 21.3% | 48 | 8 | 1.02 | 112.16% | 48 | 4.4 | 100.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 3.80 | 4 | 4 | 50.0% | 100.0% | 61.0 | 27.1% | 61 | 43 | 1.10 | 127.73% | 61 | 9.0 | 100.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 3.80 | 4 | 4 | 50.0% | 100.0% | 46.0 | 20.4% | 46 | 27 | 1.10 | 91.17% | 46 | 9.5 | 100.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 3.80 | 2 | 2 | 50.0% | 100.0% | 44.0 | 19.6% | 44 | 23 | 1.10 | 111.45% | 44 | 8.9 | 100.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 3.80 | 2 | 2 | 50.0% | 100.0% | 56.0 | 24.9% | 56 | 31 | 1.10 | 112.47% | 56 | 8.9 | 100.0% | 0 | 0.0% |
| 3.80 | 4 | 4 | 50.0% | 100.0% | 47.0 | 20.9% | 47 | 11 | 1.02 | 101.76% | 47 | 9.8 | 100.0% | 0 | 0.0% |

AL/NL Player
AL

Williams, Bernie
Jeter, Derrek
Sheffield, Gary
Rodriguez, Alex
Matsui, Hideki
Posada, Jorge
Sierra, Ruben
Clark, Tony
Cairo, Miguel
Lofton, Kenny
Giambi, Jason
Wilson, Enrique
Olerud, John
Flaherty, John
Vazquez, Javier
Lieber, Jon
Mussina, Mike
Brown, Kevin
Contreras, Jose
Hernandez, Orlando
Quantrill, Paul
Gordon, Tom
Rivera, Mariano
Sturtze, Tanyon
Heredia, Feliz

Pos. Lineup
CF 1
SS 2
RF 3
3B 4
LF 5
C 6
DH 7
1B 8
2B 9
OF 10
1B 11
IF 12
1B 13
C 14
SP 15
SP 16
SP 17
SP 18
SP 19
SP 20
RP 21
RP 22
RP 23
RP 24
RP 25

AB
561
643
573
601
584
449
307
253
360
276
264
240
164
127

11.92%
12.60%
13.28%
12.71%
12.37%
8.17%
4.54%
4.20%
5.45%
5.79%
3.75%
2.16%
1.82%
1.25%

101.84%
115.46%
110.70%
112.86%
104.00%
98.59%
99.03%
90.16%
85.40%
81.94%
70.27%
85.62%
100.54%

HR
22
23
36
36
31
21
17
16
6
3
12
6
4
6

% SLG
94.05%
101.84%
115.46%
110.70%
112.86%
104.00%
98.59%
99.03%
90.16%
85.40%
81.94%
70.27%
85.62%
100.54%

| Year | Team | AL/NL | Player |
|------|-----------|-------|---------------------|
| 2004 | Cardinals | NL | Womack, Tony |
| | | | Walker, Larry |
| | | | Pujols, Albert |
| | | | Rolen, Scott |
| | | | Edmonds, Jim |
| | | | Renteria, Edgar |
| | | | Sanders, Reggie |
| | | | Matheny, Mike |
| | | | Lankford, Ray |
| | | | Anderson, Marlon |
| | | | Mabry, John |
| | | | Cedeno, Roger |
| | | | Taguchi, So |
| | | | Molina, Yadier |
| | | | Luna, Hector |
| | | | Morris, Matt |
| | | | Marquis, Jason |
| | | | Suppan, Jeff |
| | | | Williams, Woody |
| | | | Carpenter, Chris |
| | | | Isringhausen, Jason |
| | | | Eldred, Cal |
| | | | Taveres, Julian |
| | | | King, Ray |
| | | | Kline, Steve |

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| Year | Team      | AL/NL | Player             |
|------|-----------|-------|--------------------|
| 2005 | White Sox | AL    | Podsednik, Scott   |
|      |           |       | Iguchi, Tadahito   |
|      |           |       | Everett, Carl      |
|      |           |       | Konerko, Paul      |
|      |           |       | Rowand, Aaron      |
|      |           |       | Dye, Jermaine      |
|      |           |       | Pierzynski, A.J.   |
|      |           |       | Crede, Joe         |
|      |           |       | Uribe, Juan        |
|      |           |       | Ozuna, Pablo       |
|      |           |       | Perez, Timo        |
|      |           |       | Widger, Chris      |
|      |           |       | Harris, Willie     |
|      |           |       | Buehrle, Mark      |
|      |           |       | Garcia, Freddie    |
|      |           |       | Contreras, Jose    |
|      |           |       | Garland, Jon       |
|      |           |       | Hernandez, Orlando |
|      |           |       | McCarthy, Brandon  |
|      |           |       | Vizcaino, Luis     |
|      |           |       | Politte, Cliff     |
|      |           |       | Cotts, Neal        |
|      |           |       | Hermanson, Dustin  |
|      |           |       | Marte, Damaso      |
|      |           |       | Jenks, Bobby       |

| Pos. | AB        |
|------|-----------|
| LF   | 507       |
| 2B   | 511       |
| DH   | 490       |
| 1B   | 575       |
| CF   | 578       |
| RF   | 529       |
| C    | 460       |
| 3B   | 432       |
| SS   | 481       |
| IF   | Bench 203 |
| IF   | Bench 179 |
| C    | Bench 141 |
| UT   | Bench 121 |
| SP   | 2         |
| SP   | 4         |
| SP   | 3         |
| SP   | 1         |
| SP   | 5         |
| SP   | 6         |
| RP   |           |
| RP   |           |
| RP   |           |
| RP   |           |
| CL   |           |
| CL   |           |

| % RBI  | R  | % R    | HR |
|--------|----|--------|----|
| 3.72%  | 80 | 11.28% | 0  |
| 10.57% | 74 | 10.44% | 23 |
| 12.95% | 58 | 8.18%  | 15 |
| 14.88% | 98 | 13.82% | 40 |
| 10.27% | 77 | 10.86% | 13 |
| 12.80% | 74 | 10.44% | 31 |
| 8.33%  | 61 | 8.60%  | 18 |
| 9.23%  | 54 | 7.62%  | 22 |
| 10.57% | 58 | 8.18%  | 16 |
| 1.64%  | 27 | 3.81%  | 0  |
| 2.23%  | 13 | 1.83%  | 2  |
| 1.64%  | 18 | 2.54%  | 4  |
| 1.19%  | 17 | 2.40%  | 1  |

| Player             | % RBI  | R  | % R    | HR |
|--------------------|--------|----|--------|----|
| Podsednik, Scott   | 3.72%  | 80 | 11.28% | 0  |
| Iguchi, Tadahito   | 10.57% | 74 | 10.44% | 23 |
| Everett, Carl      | 12.95% | 58 | 8.18%  | 15 |
| Konerko, Paul      | 14.88% | 98 | 13.82% | 40 |
| Rowand, Aaron      | 10.27% | 77 | 10.86% | 13 |
| Dye, Jermaine      | 12.80% | 74 | 10.44% | 31 |
| Pierzynski, A.J.   | 8.33%  | 61 | 8.60%  | 18 |
| Crede, Joe         | 9.23%  | 54 | 7.62%  | 22 |
| Uribe, Juan        | 10.57% | 58 | 8.18%  | 16 |
| Ozuna, Pablo       | 1.64%  | 27 | 3.81%  | 0  |
| Perez, Timo        | 2.23%  | 13 | 1.83%  | 2  |
| Widger, Chris      | 1.64%  | 18 | 2.54%  | 4  |
| Harris, Willie     | 1.19%  | 17 | 2.40%  | 1  |
| Buehrle, Mark      |        |    |        |    |
| Garcia, Freddie    |        |    |        |    |
| Contreras, Jose    |        |    |        |    |
| Garland, Jon       |        |    |        |    |
| Hernandez, Orlando |        |    |        |    |
| McCarthy, Brandon  |        |    |        |    |
| Vizcaino, Luis     |        |    |        |    |
| Politte, Cliff     |        |    |        |    |
| Cotts, Neal        |        |    |        |    |
| Hermanson, Dustin  |        |    |        |    |
| Marte, Damaso      |        |    |        |    |
| Jenks, Bobby       |        |    |        |    |



| Year | Team      | AL/NL | Player              | Pos. | L     | W | AB  |
|------|-----------|-------|---------------------|------|-------|---|-----|
| 2005 | Cardinals | NL    | Eckstein, David     | SS   | i     |   | 630 |
|      |           |       | Walker, Larry       | RF   | 2     |   | 315 |
|      |           |       | Pujols, Albert      | 1B   | 3     |   | 591 |
|      |           |       | Edmonds, Jim        | CF   | 4     |   | 467 |
|      |           |       | Sanders, Reggie     | LF   | 5     |   | 295 |
|      |           |       | Grudzielanek, Mark  | 2B   | 6     |   | 528 |
|      |           |       | Nunez, Abraham      | 3B   | 7     |   | 421 |
|      |           |       | Molina, Yadier      | C    | 8     |   | 385 |
|      |           |       | Taguchi, So         | OF   | Bench |   | 396 |
|      |           |       | Mabry, John         | UT   | Bench |   | 246 |
|      |           |       | Rolen, Scott        | 3B   | Bench |   | 196 |
|      |           |       | Rodriguez, John     | OF   | Bench |   | 149 |
|      |           |       | Luna, Hector        | IF   | Bench |   | 137 |
|      |           |       | Diaz, Einar         | C    | Bench |   | 130 |
|      |           |       | Carpenter, Chris    | SP   |       | 1 |     |
|      |           |       | Marquis, Jason      | SP   |       | 5 |     |
|      |           |       | Mulder, Mark        | SP   |       | 2 |     |
|      |           |       | Suppan, Jeff        | SP   |       | 3 |     |
|      |           |       | Morris, Matt        | SP   |       | 4 |     |
|      |           |       | Tavarez, Julian     | RP   |       |   |     |
|      |           |       | Reyes, Al           | RP   |       |   |     |
|      |           |       | Isringhausen, Jason | CL   |       |   |     |
|      |           |       | Flores, Randy       | RP   |       |   |     |
|      |           |       | King, Ray           | RP   |       |   |     |
|      |           |       | Thompson, Brad      | RP   |       |   |     |

| R   | % R    | HR | SB |
|-----|--------|----|----|
| 90  | 12.16% | 8  | 11 |
| 66  | 8.92%  | 15 | 16 |
| 129 | 17.43% | 41 | 5  |
| 88  | 11.89% | 29 | 14 |
| 49  | 6.62%  | 21 | 8  |
| 64  | 8.65%  | 5  | 0  |
| 64  | 8.65%  | 8  | 2  |
| 36  | 4.86%  | 8  | 0  |
| 45  | 6.08%  | 8  | 11 |
| 26  | 3.51%  | 8  | 0  |
| 28  | 3.78%  | 5  | 1  |
| 15  | 2.03%  | 5  | 2  |
| 26  | 3.51%  | 1  | 10 |
| 14  | 1.89%  | 1  | 0  |





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| AL/NL | Player           |
|-------|------------------|
| AL    | Damon, Johnny    |
|       | Jeter, Derek     |
|       | Abreu, Bobby     |
|       | Rodriguez, Alex  |
|       | Giambi, Jason    |
|       | Posada, Jorge    |
|       | Williams, Bernie |
|       | Cabrera, Melky   |
|       | Cano, Robinson   |
|       | Phillips, Andy   |
|       | Cairo, Miguel    |
|       | Matsui, Hideki   |
|       | Sheffield, Gary  |
|       | Wilson, Craig    |
|       | Stinnett, Kelly  |
|       | Johnson, Randy   |
|       | Wang, Chien-Ming |
|       | Mussina, Mike    |
|       | Wright, Jaret    |
|       | Lidle, Cory      |
|       | Proctor, Scott   |
|       | Villone, Ron     |
|       | Rivera, Mariano  |
|       | Farnsworth, Kyle |
|       | Myers, Mike      |

| Pos. | Lineup |
|------|--------|
| CF   | 1      |
| SS   | 2      |
| RF   | 3      |
| 3B   | 4      |
| 1B   | 5      |
| C    | 6      |
| DH   | 7      |
| LF   | 8      |
| 2B   | 9      |
| 1B   | Bench  |
| IF   | Bench  |
| LF   | Bench  |
| RF   | Bench  |
| UT   | Bench  |
| C    | Bench  |
| SP   | 2      |
| SP   | 1      |
| SP   | 3      |
| SP   | 4      |
| SP   | 5      |
| RP   |        |
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|  | % SLG   |
|--|---------|
|  | 102.40% |
|  | 102.61% |
|  | 107.71% |
|  | 111.11% |
|  | 118.54% |
|  | 104.52% |
|  | 92.63%  |
|  | 83.07%  |
|  | 111.53% |
|  | 83.70%  |
|  | 67.98%  |
|  | 104.95% |
|  | 95.60%  |
|  | 77.54%  |
|  | 64.58%  |

|  | % R    | HR |
|--|--------|----|
|  | 13.14% | 24 |
|  | 13.49% | 14 |
|  | 4.23%  | 7  |
|  | 12.91% | 35 |
|  | 10.51% | 37 |
|  | 7.43%  | 23 |
|  | 7.43%  | 12 |
|  | 8.57%  | 7  |
|  | 7.09%  | 15 |
|  | 3.43%  | 7  |
|  | 3.20%  | 0  |
|  | 3.66%  | 8  |
|  | 2.51%  | 6  |
|  | 1.71%  | 4  |
|  | 0.69%  | 1  |

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      .LO(JL1  IN~CX'LO'INOCJL'
      CO~ .NNO'INOC(JLO'LNOCW' .LOMCOO
      .LO(JL1  IN~CX'LO'INOCJL'
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      CO~ .NNO'INOC(JLO'LNOCW' .LOMCOO
  
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AL/NL Player

|    |                    |
|----|--------------------|
| NL | Reyes, Jose        |
|    | Lo Duca, Paul      |
|    | Beltran, Carlos    |
|    | Delgado, Carlos    |
|    | Wright, David      |
|    | Floyd, Cliff       |
|    | Valentin, Jose     |
|    | Chavez, Endy       |
|    | Nady, Xavier       |
|    | Woodward, Chris    |
|    | Milledge, Lastings |
|    | Franco, Julio      |
|    | Castro, Ramon      |
|    | Green, Shawn       |
|    | Glavine, Tom       |
|    | Trachsel, Steve    |
|    | Martinez, Pedro    |
|    | Hernandez, Orlando |
|    | Maine, John        |
|    | Oliver, Darren     |
|    | Heitman, Aaron     |
|    | Wagner, Billy      |
|    | Bradford, Chad     |
|    | Feliciano, Pedro   |
|    | Sanchez, Duaner    |

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|    | ERA | W     | L       | W-L % | %W-L |  |
|----|-----|-------|---------|-------|------|--|
| 15 | 7   | 0.682 | 108.59% |       |      |  |
| 15 | 8   | 0.652 | 103.86% |       |      |  |
| 9  | 8   | 0.529 | 84.31%  |       |      |  |
| 9  | 7   | 0.563 | 89.58%  |       |      |  |
| 6  | 5   | 0.545 | 86.87%  |       |      |  |
| 4  | 1   | 0.800 | 127.41% |       |      |  |
| 4  | 5   | 0.444 | 70.78%  |       |      |  |
| 3  | 2   | 0.600 | 95.56%  |       |      |  |
| 4  | 2   | 0.667 | 106.17% |       |      |  |
| 7  | 2   | 0.778 | 123.87% |       |      |  |
| 5  | 1   | 0.833 | 132.72% |       |      |  |

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University Honors Program

Capstone Approval Page

Capstone Title: (print or type):

II-Qu/ Winn,!!J Lep"?7J Become Championship  
Teams: a Baseball Em drcA:ltlv-":!  
Il~?)rj


Student Name (print or type):

Zach Alessandri

Faculty Supervisor (print or type):

ROD CAUGHON

Faculty Approval Signature:



Department of (print or type):

KNPE/SPORT MANAGEMENT

Date of Approval (print or type):

3 May, 2007