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**Refocusing Intelligence:
Keeping Intelligence Relevant Beyond the Global War on Terrorism**

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
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ABSTRACT (100-200 WORDS):

Historically, the intelligence community has been unprepared to meet emerging threats. This is due to intelligence focusing on current and past threats rather than being oriented towards the future. The attacks on 9/11 and subsequent war on terrorism only cemented this fact. This study looks at the history of intelligence to reveal this pattern along with relevant reforms to the intelligence community. Unfortunately, the current reforms only meet the needs of the current issues facing the intelligence community without preparing the community for the future. Looking at potential threats faced by the nation, the potential shortfalls in intelligence become known. This study proposes four reform areas that are required in the intelligence community and ways to implement the reforms. Ultimately, unless further reforms are implemented, the intelligence community may remain unprepared to meet the intelligence needs of future conflicts and operations.

Refocusing Intelligence:

Keeping Intelligence Relevant Beyond the Global War on Terrorism

Robert Kollas

“Prediction is difficult, especially about the future”

- Niels Bohr

On September 11, 2001, the intelligence services of the United States, as well as much of the world, were caught unaware. Prior to that event, there had been large terrorist attacks, but nothing that compared to the scale and scope of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. The planning, resources, and execution that went into these attacks were immense, yet all the signs were missed. However, the subsequent investigation found many of indicators leading up to the attacks existed in databases. Up to this time though, very little emphasis had been placed on terrorism, and the warning signs were ignored. Since 9/11, the intelligence community has become more adept at tracking potential terrorist plots and stopping potential terrorists from attempting attacks, however, has the United States left itself open to other strategic threats?

Does the tendency to focus primarily on current or past conflicts severely hinder long-term intelligence readiness? Also, how has intelligence reform affected this trend? If the current focus has a tendency to hinder long-term readiness, the possibility exists to miss or ignore an emerging threat until it is too late. This has already happened in the past, with both 9/11 as well as Pearl Harbor. Intelligence needs to be able to see beyond the current conflict and be forward looking. While analyzing what has happened is a large part of intelligence, the ability to provide predictive analysis is far greater.

In order to determine the effect of conflict focus, this paper will begin by examining the history of intelligence, from the American Revolution through the global war on terrorism. It will

also look intelligence reform that has been completed since 9/11. Then the paper will discuss some emerging threats to national security before discussing the needed intelligence reform to prevent another surprise attack catching the country unaware.

History

Although intelligence organizations were not formally created until the late 1800's, intelligence has been utilized since the earliest days of the United States. Under the direction of General George Washington, the second Continental Congress created the Committee of Secret Correspondence which focused on foreign communications and the gathering of information related to foreign affairs.¹ Along with the Committee of Secret Correspondence, the Continental Congress had previously created the Secret Committee, which was charged with the clandestine procurement of military supplies. The Secret Committee worked in conjunction with the Committee of Secret Correspondence in the gathering of intelligence on British supplies both domestically and abroad. The Committee of Secret Correspondence evolved into the Committee on Foreign Affairs and then into the Department of Foreign Affairs, the precursor to the current Department of State. This organization retained its mission of "...obtaining the most extensive and useful information relative to foreign affairs."²

Many of the original intelligence activities during the revolutionary war were due to General George Washington's belief in the necessity of intelligence. Washington was responsible for creating small units that conducted intelligence and reconnaissance. One such unit was Knowlton's Rangers named for their commander Lieutenant Colonel Thomas

¹ Central Intelligence Agency, *Intelligence in the War of Independence*, (Washington D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1997), under "Organization of Intelligence."

² Ibid.

Knowlton, who is considered to be one of the first military intelligence professionals. The unit itself is considered a forefather to the Army's modern day Special Forces and Rangers.³ There were also many other significant personalities in the early days of intelligence that assisted in intelligence gathering and operations. These efforts ranged from counterintelligence to propagandist information operations.⁴

The Civil War saw the beginnings of technological collection efforts. Both the North and South utilized balloons to collect information on encampments and movements, although the North had more success than the South.⁵ Another key piece of technology utilized during the Civil War was the telegraph which allowed for the quick transmission of information between forces and locations. Although useful, the telegraph was easily compromised with opposing sides able to easily tap the telegraph lines and copy the messages.⁶ Due to this drawback, both sides continued to utilize couriers and cryptographic codes to prevent the loss of their messages. It was also during this time that saw the Union create the Bureau of Military Information, an early precursor to the Military Information Division. This bureau was created by Colonel George Sharp, under orders from his commander, Major General Joseph Hooker. Through this bureau, Sharp was able to provide thorough details of Confederate force strengths and movements.⁷ Ultimately, the Bureau of Military Information of disbanded at the end of the Civil War.⁸

Intelligence would remain an ad-hoc creation through the first century of America's existence. In 1885 the Secretary of War posed to a question to the Adjutant General, Brigadier

³ P. K. Rose, *The Founding Fathers of American Intelligence*, (Washington D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999).

⁴ Rose; CIA, *Intelligence in the War of Independence*, under "Personalities."

⁵ CIA, *Intelligence in the Civil War*, (Washington D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), under "Intelligence's New Tools."

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., under "The Bureau of Military information."

⁸ Ibid., under "Epilogue."

General R.C. Drum which the general was unable to answer. This spurred the creation of the Military Information Division (MID) in the army while the Office of Naval Intelligence had been established earlier in 1882.⁹

Although established, the newly formed intelligence agencies remained ad-hoc for a period of time through the Spanish-American and Philippine wars. The information provided by the MID to deploying forces to the Philippines consisted of only the Encyclopedia Britannica's entry on the Islands. This led commanders on the ground to develop their own forms of collection that were ultimately combined into a centralized bureau as the war went on.¹⁰ While the MID created in 1885, and its subsequent efforts in the Spanish-American and Philippine wars were deemed successful, the creation of the Military General Staff in 1903 nearly destroyed intelligence in the military. Intelligence remained an afterthought until just before 1917 when the by then Major, Ralph Van Deman had managed to speak to the Secretary of War and was granted permission to redevelop a military intelligence service.¹¹

While Van Deman's work was primarily at the strategic level, General John Pershing saw the need for tactical intelligence while commander of U.S. Forces during WWI. Mimicking his European counterparts, GEN Pershing created organic intelligence sections at every unit level, formalizing what had partially occurred in the Philippines; however these organizations still lacked standardization.¹² WWI also saw the further technical advances in the gathering of

⁹ The Military Information Division is also referred to in literature as the Division of Military Intelligence, Military Intelligence Division and others. Military Information Division is its most common name and is used throughout this paper. Elizabeth Bethel, "The Military Information Division: Origin of the Intelligence Division," *Military Affairs* 11, no. 1 (Spring 1947), p. 17-18.

¹⁰ Brian McAllister Linn, "Intelligence and Low-Intensity Conflict in the Philippine War, 1899-1902." *Intelligence and National Security* 6 no. 1 (1991), p. 91

¹¹ Military Intelligence Officer Training Course, "History of Military Intelligence," (lecture, Military Intelligence Officer Transition Course, Ft. Huachuca, AZ.) posted by Federation of American Scientists.

¹² Ibid.

intelligence. The widespread use of aircraft and aerial photography brought the advent of imagery intelligence (IMINT), along with the use of radio communication which brought about signals intelligence (SIGINT). While all-source information was available, reliance remained on information gathered from prisoners and raids or what is known as human intelligence (HUMINT) at lower command levels.¹³ During this time period, the military intelligence services continued to work with Department of State with the collection of foreign intelligence.¹⁴

As with previous inter-conflict periods, the interwar period between WWI and WWII saw a decrease in the emphasis placed on intelligence.¹⁵ WWII however, saw further improvements both in the military intelligence services and the national intelligence services. Prior to American involvement in the war, the Office of the Coordinator of Information, later to be the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was created by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the nation's first specific peacetime intelligence service. This organization, the predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was created to perform espionage, sabotage and other activities needed to assist in defeating the Germans in WWII.¹⁶ By creating an agency specifically for espionage, it shifted some responsibilities from the Department of State that they had held since they were the Committee of Secret Correspondence. Along with the evolution of intelligence that occurred at the national level, the military intelligence services that were started prior to and during WWI continued to evolve as well. The MID set up by Van Deman transitioned to the Army Intelligence System in 1944 and continued the use of all-source analysis.¹⁷ At the lower tactical levels, the organic intelligence services originally created by GEN Pershing were

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Michael A. Turner, *Why Secret Intelligence Fails*, (Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2005), p. 19

¹⁵ Military Intelligence Officer Training Course.

¹⁶ Richard Harris Smith, *OSS the Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*. (Guilford, CT: Lyons, 2005), p. 1.

¹⁷ Military Intelligence Officer Training Course.

standardized so that one intelligence shop operated no differently than the next, streamlining tactical intelligence. After the war was completed, militarily the country demobilized limiting advances in intelligence through a lack of manning as in previous inter-conflict periods.¹⁸ However, the National Security Act of 1947 reinforced the intelligence community at the national level. The act turned the OSS into the CIA, created the National Security Council and reorganized the military forces.¹⁹

The Korean War saw a loss of abilities militarily along with mistakes by the relatively newly formed CIA. With the force drawdown after WWII and subsequent reconstitution of the national army for the Korea War saw military intelligence suffer manning issues. Compounding this was a lack of trained linguists, which affected both radio collection as well as interrogations of prisoners. As the conflict progressed, military intelligence regained the abilities that it had lost after WWII.²⁰ Vietnam saw a similar issue on the side of military intelligence, with a lack of trained linguists, along with an over-reliance on new technology that was not fully effective for the environment. Further hindering military intelligence during these wars was that intelligence units were typically attached to the commands they supported rather than belonging directly to the command. These attached sections were also limited in the types of intelligence they collected and analyzed rather than being all-source.²¹

Nationally, the Korean and Vietnam Wars saw errors by the CIA as it came into its own as a new agency. In Korea, the CIA missed the invasion of the North and the subsequent involvement by the Chinese, while in Vietnam, the CIA miscalculated the strength and desire of

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Turner, p. 21

²⁰ Military Intelligence Officer Training Course

²¹ Ibid.

the North Vietnamese fighters. The CIA did have success during this period as well, such as predicting Sputnik, as well as efforts in Russia and the Middle East.²² More broadly, this period also saw an expansion of the intelligence community with the creation of the National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National Photographic Interpretation Center, an early precursor to today's National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA).²³ Although the 1950's and 1960's saw great growth in the intelligence fields, the 1970's saw curbs placed against the intelligence services. Much of this had to do with the intelligence community being used for domestic purposes against civil rights organizations and war protestors during the Vietnam War along with international efforts for the removal of democratically elected governments.²⁴ These efforts brought the intelligence community under congressional oversight.

By the early 1990's, and the first Gulf War, the intelligence community had come of age. During Operation Desert Shield / Desert Storm saw military intelligence become truly useful from an upper level command standpoint. However, much of what occurred militarily occurred on short notice prior to the war starting.²⁵ The intelligence community also correctly predicted the invasion of Kuwait even though the community had been unable to forecast the end of the cold war.²⁶ The findings after the first Gulf War were that militarily, intelligence was highly successful working in a top down format, coming from the corps and division levels and being pushed down to lower levels that were properly manned.²⁷ This was a change from previous

²² Turner, p. 22, 24

²³ Ibid., p. 23

²⁴ Ibid., p. 24

²⁵ BG John F. Stewart Jr., *Operation Desert Storm the Military Intelligence Story: A View from the G-2 3rd US Army*, (Ft. McPherson, GA: 3rd US Army, 1991), p. 3, posted by The National Security Archive.

²⁶ Turner, p. xii

²⁷ BG Stewart, p. 16-17

conflicts where the lower levels were the collectors and analyzers and the upper levels acted as information repositories and distribution centers. However, the push to man and equip lower echelons with the proper personnel and equipment remained. National intelligence provided support to the war fighter as well, however it was noted that the national agencies needed a way to bring consensus to divergent analysis.²⁸ While the gulf war itself was a success, the remainder of the decade saw a number of intelligence failures from Africa, to the Balkans, Asia and the Middle East.²⁹

Terrorism directed towards the United States began to creep into the national consciousness during the 1990's. Starting with the truck bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa and the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in a Yemeni port, trans-national, global terrorism had become a factor to be dealt with. That said though, in 2001, in light of reports indicating an impending terrorist attack on American soil, it was not until mid-morning of September 11th that a true recognition of the terrorist threat was realized.³⁰ The errors leading to 9/11, coupled with the mistakes that provided the false pretenses to invade Iraq, led to an attempted reorganization and redirecting of the intelligence community.³¹ At the national level, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 which took on the roles of domestic security, while the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to coordinate intelligence efforts across the intelligence community. Since the Vietnam War, the

²⁸ United States Central Command, *United States Central Command, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Executive Summary*, (Tampa Bay, FL: United States Central Command, 11 July 1991), p. 20, posted by The National Security Archive.

²⁹ Turner, p. xii.

³⁰ Thomas Powers, *Intelligence Wars: American Secret History From Hitler to Al-Qaeda*, (New York: The New York review of Books, 2004), p. xi.

³¹ United States Committee on Government Affairs, *Summary of Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*, (Washington: GPO, 6 December 2004), posted by The National Security Archive.

intelligence community had become overly reliant on technology. The events of 9/11 returned the focus towards HUMINT.³²

Completed Intelligence Reform

As mentioned above, the intelligence community has gone through numerous reforms in an attempt to improve intelligence at the national level since 9/11. The DHS and its intelligence arm, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHSOIA) were created “for the purpose of preventing, protecting against, preparing for, and responding to threats of terrorism and other threats [against the homeland].”³³ The DNI and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on the other hand were created in response to the 9/11 Commission report and were designed to manage the entire intelligence community which was now at 17 agencies.³⁴ While both agencies are beneficial, they do not go far enough to address all the issues facing the intelligence community.

The single biggest issue facing the DNI is the lack of budgetary and management control over the other intelligence agencies.³⁵ While technically having some budgetary control, the various budgets are set in multiple committees in congress preventing a consolidation of the intelligence community budget under the DNI.³⁶ While allowing for the continued classification of the intelligence community budget, this diffusion of appropriations prevents the DNI from

³² Saxby Chambliss, “We Have Not Correctly Framed the Debate on Intelligence Reform,” *Parameters*, Spring 2005 (Ft. Leavenworth, KS.: U.S. Army War College, 2005), p. 11.

³³ Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, *Summary of Legislation to Establish a Department of Homeland Security*, (Washington: GPO, December 2002), p. 1.

³⁴ United States Committee on Government Affairs, *Summary of IRTPA of 2004*.

³⁵ Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “The Cultural Revolution in Intelligence: Interim Report,” *The Washington Quarterly* 31 no. 2 (Spring 2008), p. 49; Helen Fessenden, “The Limits of Intelligence Reform,” *Foreign Affairs* 84 no. 6 (November-December 2005), p. 107

³⁶ Fessenden, p. 116

having any actual budgetary control.³⁷ The primary budgetary issues came from the Department of Defense (DOD) which did not want to relinquish budgetary control over its subordinate agencies such as the DIA, NGA, NRO, NSA, and others.³⁸ Not only has the DNI been saddled with inadequate budgetary and managerial control, since its inception it has also watched over a massive growth in personnel and contractors performing intelligence roles.³⁹ The fact that the DNI was created can be directly connected to 9/11 as its position or something similar had been called for a number of times previously, but always passed over in the congress.⁴⁰

Not being tied to a single intelligence agency is the DNI's greatest benefit.⁴¹ This has given the office the opportunity to push reforms across the entire community dealing with connecting analysts between agencies. Another benefit the DNI has is the ability to recommend or agree with appointments made to the other intelligence agencies.⁴²

Emerging Threats

Although terrorism has garnered the greatest amount of attention in the media since 9/11, numerous other threats remain to national security. The unknown and changing situation in North Korea with an eventual power succession, a potentially nuclear armed Iran, a continually emergent and modernizing China, cyber network attacks and leaks along with lone-wolf terrorism all need to be monitored. Even with the recent killing of Osama Bin Laden, trans-national terrorism still remains a threat that needs to be monitored. All of these are areas that need attention as they are the events that may potentially affect national security directly.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 115

³⁸ Ibid., p. 107

³⁹ Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, "Top Secret America," *Washington Post*, 19 July 2010, Online edition.

⁴⁰ Tucker, p. 48

⁴¹ United States Committee on Government Affairs, *Summary of IRTPA of 2004*, p.3

⁴² Ibid., p. 4

Of these threats that directly affect national security, North Korea is the most obvious. North Korea already has plutonium based nuclear weapons, having tested a crude nuclear bomb in 2006 and more efficient weapon in 2009.⁴³ Furthering their nuclear efforts, an American scientist was given a tour of North Korea's uranium enrichment facility, giving them the capability of creating more effective weaponry.⁴⁴ Kim Jong-Il has evidently identified his youngest son, Kim Jong-Un as his apparent heir as the North Korean "Supreme Leader." This has been accomplished through a series of promotions for Kim Jong-Un into successively higher ranks up to supposedly the vice chairman of the National Defense Commission, second only to his father.⁴⁵ Over the last couple of years, the North has militarily provoked the South with artillery shelling of a South Korean controlled island and the sinking of a South Korean naval ship.⁴⁶ These attacks are a continuance of the North's policy of brinkmanship. The past decade has also seen efforts by the south in attempts to reunite the peninsula, but so far this has been a one sided effort. As long as the North remains a separate entity, they will remain a destabilizing factor in the region.

China poses both traditional and non-traditional threats to the security of the United States. Although China has assisted the United States in dealing with North Korea their assistance has never been consistent. China has also embarked on a rapid military modernization over the past few years, working to achieve a modern air force with stealth technology along with a naval force capable of projecting power.⁴⁷ Additionally, China has attempted to exert its

⁴³ Justin McCurry and Tania Branigan, "North Korea Tests Nuclear Weapon 'As Powerful as Hiroshima Bomb,'" *Guardian* (Manchester), May 25, 2009.

⁴⁴ Jay Solomon and Adam Entous, "North Korea Nuclear Fears Grow," *Wall Street Journal*, November 21, 2010.

⁴⁵ Marc McDonald, "Kim Jong-il's Son is Reportedly Given No. 2 Post," *New York Times*, February 16, 2011.

⁴⁶ Martin Fackler, "A Pattern of Aggression," *New York Times*, November 23, 2010.

⁴⁷ Jeremy Page, "A Chinese Stealth Challenge?," *Wall Street Journal*, January 5, 2011; Ronald O'Rourke, *China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress*, (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, April 22 2011) posted by Federation of American Scientists.

power regionally in East and Southeast Asia through economic means, diplomatic issues with regional states, and military efforts. Economically, China has recently become the second largest single economy in the world.⁴⁸ Diplomatically, China claims a number of island groups in the South China Sea as well as the entirety of the South China Sea.⁴⁹ While China's military modernization is beneficial to the United States in that it provides another force capable of interoperability on the global stage such as with the anti-piracy mission⁵⁰; it is a danger in that an improved military becomes a threat to Taiwan, and other U.S. allies in Southeast and East Asia. Coupled with China's economic abilities, their capability to influence actors regionally and globally continues to grow.

In regards to non-traditional threats, China is accused of supporting cyber-warfare, although the Chinese routinely deny all involvement in cyber-warfare.⁵¹ On top of this, the Chinese own the largest portion of the United States' treasury securities of all foreign holders.⁵² While not likely to require a traditional military response, a significant cyber attack would cause a significant disruption to daily life in the United States with the reliance placed on electronic systems throughout the country. On the other hand, a massive sell off of U.S. Treasury holdings from China would cause significant devaluation of the U.S. Dollar as China owns nearly 25 percent of all foreign held treasury securities.⁵³ While currently this would significantly hurt China as well, if China were to allow the Chinese Yuan to float on the global market, it would give them incredible economic leverage against the United States.

⁴⁸ CIA, *The World Factbook*, "Country Comparison: GDP," (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2011).

⁴⁹ John Pomfret, "Beijing Claims 'Indisputable Sovereignty' Over South China Sea," *Washington Post*, July 31, 2010.

⁵⁰ Associated Press, "U.S. Praises China Anti-Piracy Role Off Somalia," *USA Today*, February 28, 2009.

⁵¹ Simon Elegant, "Cyberwarfare: The Issue China Won't Touch," *Time*, November 18, 2009.

⁵² U.S. Department of the Treasury, *Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities*, (Washington, D.C.: April 2011)

⁵³ *Ibid.*

The cyber threat does not end with China though. As was seen with the wiki-leaks incident, the cyber threat does not have to be actually from an external source. The wiki-leaks episode showed that a single disgruntled government employee is capable of compiling a large amount of information and giving it away to be posted to the global world.⁵⁴ Posting the information to the global world is the greatest difference from the cold war where the typical spy would be selling information to whatever country was paying them for the information. While the immediate reaction would be to limit and further control access to information, this would cause further issues of its own. As the 9/11 commission noted, one of the major factors that allowed the attacks to occur was a lack of information sharing among agencies and departments.⁵⁵

As mentioned, even with the death of Osama Bin Laden, terrorism remains a threat to the national security of the United States. Information being slowly released shows that Bin Laden retained operational control of Al Qaeda and the planning and approval of attacks.⁵⁶ While these larger scale attacks remain a threat, there have been a number of successes of preventing these attacks from occurring. These include the printer bombs from Yemen, the Fort Dix Five and others. Where the greater threat lies is with lone wolf terrorism. The United States has been lucky in this regard with the underwear bomber, the times-square bomber and the shoe bomber were stopped before their attacks were completed although they managed to get their explosives to their targets.

⁵⁴ Charlie Savage, "Soldier Faces 22 New WikiLeaks Charges," *The New York Times*, March 2, 2011.

⁵⁵ Thomas H. Kean, et al., *The 9/11 Commission Report*, Final Report of the National Commission On Terrorist Attacks upon the United States by the 9/11 Commission, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2004).

⁵⁶ Adam Entous, "U.S. Releases bin Laden Videos," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 8, 2011.

There are other events that may need contingency plans for humanitarian or diplomatic assistance. These include natural and or manmade disasters, unforeseen revolutions in friendly or non-friendly states and humanitarian disasters perpetrated by governments against their own people. All of these areas need to have processes to help identify a crises before it happens or immediately after and to be able to respond effectively. While not all of these events require a response, having the knowledge and intelligence to back up a response is critical. The recent past has shown the United States takes an active role in responding to natural disasters such as the tsunamis in Asia, the earthquakes in Haiti and Pakistan along with others. Knowing information about the infrastructure and culture of areas prior to providing humanitarian support allows such missions to operate more efficiently. In regards to unforeseen revolutions, the “Arab Spring” has shown that revolutions are capable of occurring essentially spontaneously.⁵⁷ While the United States has a history of creating these revolutions or coups in countries in the past which needs to be avoided, a necessity remains to know where they may occur. This is so that the United States can be fully aware of the situation while allowing it to occur organically.

Needed Intelligence Reform

Looking at its history from earlier, the intelligence community was developed on an as needed basis, responding to events that had occurred with only marginal efforts to look forward. Events of the 20th century caused the United States to attempt to look further ahead; yet as 9/11 proved, the United States was still unable to see new threats. Although 9/11 spurred some needed reforms, there are many that are still needed. These reforms are both internal to the intelligence community as well as the community’s relationship to external groups. It should be noted that as with any bureaucracy, reform takes time to occur and solidify. As an example, the Department of

⁵⁷ Michael Slackman, “Bullets Stall Youthful Push for Arab Spring,” *The New York Times*, March 17, 2011

Defense took over a decade to fully implement the reforms the Goldwater-Nichols Act.⁵⁸ There are four key areas that need to be addressed; intelligence community and congressional relations, balancing collection between human and technical sources, improved foreign language capabilities and finally balancing the differences between “tactical” and “national” intelligence.

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker states that the relationship between the intelligence community and Congress needs to be corrected above all other reforms. While this is as much a reform of Congress as it is the intelligence community, the oversight and appropriations functions of Congress need to be reformed to solidify the reforms of intelligence community.⁵⁹

The Congressional appropriation process for intelligence is the area in most need of reform. As mentioned previously, with the budgetary appropriations spread across multiple committees in both houses of Congress it is impossible for the DNI to execute budgetary control over the intelligence community. It is estimated that the DOD with its retained appropriations receives nearly 80 percent of the total intelligence budget.⁶⁰ Granted the DOD contains eight of the 17 agencies that make up the intelligence community, an estimated 80 percent is still more than its fair share of the budget. The integration and streamlining of the intelligence appropriations process would allow the DNI the budgetary control granted to it by law. In order for this to happen, the multitude of appropriations committees in both houses would have to relinquish authority to a single intelligence appropriation committee per house. Along with this, the separate agencies would have to give up their ability to request funds directly from Congress and go through the DNI to request their budgets. The DNI would then submit a total intelligence budget to Congress. Further, the DOD would need to give up the National Geo-Spatial Agency

⁵⁸ Emma Ashburn, “Of Note, Intelligence Reform,” *SAIS Review*, 28 no. 1 Winter-Spring (2008), p.139

⁵⁹ Tucker, p. 54

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 49

(NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National Security Agency (NSA) and allow them to become standalone agencies underneath the DNI. This would likely free up a significant portion of the intelligence budget to be given to the DNI. These three particular agencies provide national level support across the community and not just to the military community. The DOD should retain the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Army, Marine, Navy and Air Force intelligence services as they provide support specifically to the military services. The Coast Guard intelligence service falls under the DHS and as such already falls under the purview of the DNI.⁶¹

One of the major concerns of streamlining the budgetary process is that the information would become declassified. According to the arguments, this would give the adversaries of the United States vital information of what the United States places a priority on.⁶² This would be true if the specifics of the budget were declassified. However, with a streamlined budgetary request and appropriations process, only broad strokes of the budget would need to be declassified. This would require the total amount of the intelligence budget to be declassified, along with possibly broad areas underneath the total such as totals for personnel, equipment and possibly programs. By declassifying sections of the intelligence community budget as such would provide the country with a measure of transparency without divulging the most sensitive portions of the budget. Ultimately this budgetary reform would accomplish two things; it would give the DNI budgetary control over the majority of the intelligence community and it would provide transparency of the budget to the nation.

⁶¹ Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

⁶² Fessenden, p. 117

Not only does the budgetary process in Congress need to be improved, so does the relationship of the intelligence community and the congressional oversight committees. Tucker notes that partisanship in the congressional oversight committees has increased along with requesting numerous reports from the intelligence community. All these reports require intelligence professionals to report to Congress repeatedly, taking away from their time to complete critical tasks.⁶³ As with budgetary issues, these multiple reporting requirements come from a diffuse process on intelligence in the various committees and sub-committees in Congress. Streamlining congressional committees on intelligence will not only improve budgetary control, but bring efficiency to the oversight functions as well.

Providing efficiency to the oversight functions will not fix all the problems. In order for oversight to be fully effective, it has to be a give and take. If the oversight committees do not provide constructive avenues to identify best practices along with mistakes in the intelligence community, then their purpose is negated. Tucker points out that the friction between the oversight committees and the intelligence community comes from both sides. The intelligence community needs to become willing to share information with Congress and Congress needs to be willing to actually pay attention to those in the intelligence community. As Richard Betts points out, intelligence failures are rarely the fault of collectors or analysts, but the fault of the decision makers who receive the products.⁶⁴ If the primary role of congressional oversight is to identify errors, and if the committees are making the same errors the decision makers made initially, then the committees are failing at their role.

⁶³ Tucker, p.53-54

⁶⁴ Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable," *World Politics* 31, no. 1 (October 1978), p. 61

Looking back at the history of intelligence again, HUMINT played a significant role in intelligence collection through WWI and WWII. During the two wars, the United States began developing its technological collection capabilities. These technological capabilities, both in imagery and signals collection, came to take prominence over the latter part of the 20th century, supplanting HUMINT as a primary source of intelligence. Both forms of intelligence gathering have their benefits as well as their drawbacks. Technological collection is great in that it can reach areas where traditional spies cannot, however this form of collection rarely gets the full intention of the target. HUMINT on the other hand has the benefit of being able to draw out intentions of the collected information, although HUMINT collectors are limited in the areas in which they can operate. Unfortunately, both technological collection methods and HUMINT collection are subject to deception. By overly relying on one form or the other for intelligence gathering leaves significant gaps in the information analysts have to work from. As both a U.S. Representative and as a U.S. Senator, Saxby Chambliss (R.-GA) has called for increased HUMINT, calling it the most important area to work on, to assist in the War on Terrorism.⁶⁵ While HUMINT needed significant improvement after 9/11, doing so at the expense of other collection forms would be counterproductive. Focusing primarily on HUMINT also would be reactionary to the current conflict in line with the history of intelligence. Differing forms of intelligence collection can and should cooperate together providing an all-source picture.⁶⁶

Rather than relying on a single source of information, an intelligence analyst should take information from multiple sources and intelligence disciplines to come up with a relevant analytical summary. This provides the difference between information and intelligence, information being the raw data collected, whether it is a radio intercept, an image or answers to

⁶⁵ Chambliss, p. 7

⁶⁶ John Deutch and Jeffrey H. Smith, "Smarter Intelligence," *Foreign Policy* 128 (January – February 2002), p. 65

an detainee's interview question, it only becomes intelligence after the information has been analyzed and its relevance and accuracy determined. Relying on only one source of information limits the ability to judge the information's relevance and accuracy. Had the information provided to the then Secretary Colin Powell been checked against other sources, the briefing that he gave to the United Nations may have gone differently.⁶⁷

In balancing collection efforts between technological and HUMINT, the United States will become more adept at recognizing emerging threats and situations. In order for the different disciplines to work together this effectively requires further efforts towards interoperability of the intelligence agencies. While efforts have been made to achieve this goal of interoperability, further efforts need to be made. On top of this, the wiki-leaks episode should not be allowed to prevent a further opening of the intelligence community amongst itself. Locking down the intelligence channel in each agency in the name of security after the wiki-leaks issue would return the intelligence community to where it was prior to 9/11.

One way to avoid this prevention of information sharing is to create inter-agency intelligence centers. Modeled after the joint forces commands created by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, these inter-agency centers would facilitate the sharing of information and best practices between agencies. Following the requirement of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that the military leadership is required to serve in joint positions to advance to the highest levels of the military, intelligence professionals would be required to serve in these inter-agency centers in order to progress to the most senior, non-appointed levels of the intelligence community. To ease the effects on the military, these positions could be used to fulfill the requirement for a joint military assignment as well.

⁶⁷ Tucker, p. 51

A lack of analysts and collectors trained in foreign languages has historically been another shortfall in the intelligence community.⁶⁸ With the military's and the government's continued involvement around the world, foreign language skills are a necessity. This was noted in 2000 by Ellen Laipson, the then Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, in an address to the Senate Government Affairs Committee. In April 2010, John Negroponte, a former ambassador, and the first DNI, gave a speech noting the issues facing the Foreign Service in regards to language proficiency. Even as far back as 1993, Richard Lambert noted the general need to improve foreign language capability in the United States.

Laipson outlined how foreign language skills play a part in the intelligence cycle, "from collection to exploitation to analysis and production."⁶⁹ She also noted that while finished intelligence products are in English, the sources they are based on often times are not. This requires high levels of language proficiency in order to ensure proper interpretations. While discussing the shortfalls in language abilities, Laipson noted key shortfalls in Arabic and Farsi language ability in September 2000, nearly a full year prior to 9/11.⁷⁰ Finishing, she outlined four core principles that had been developed to guide improving language abilities in the intelligence community. These priorities were focusing on important regions and countries, requirements "driven by collection, analysis, and reporting," responsiveness to crises, and that capability should be proportional to the need.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Clifford F. Porter Ph.D., *Asymmetrical Warfare, Transformation, and Foreign Language Capability*, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Army Combined Arms Center, Combat Studies Institute, 2006), p. 1

⁶⁹ Ellen Laipson, "Foreign Language Requirements in the Intelligence Community," (address, Statement to Senate Government Affairs Committee, Capitol Hill, Washington D.C.. April 14, 2010), posted by DNI

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

In his April 2010 speech, former Ambassador John Negroponte called the need for language qualified officers as the “greatest challenge” facing the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development. This is even though their total number of officers had increased in recent years.⁷² Ambassador. Negroponte focused on the need for recruiting and training, and most importantly keeping, officers in key languages and geographical areas to build key contacts and expertise in their areas. Amongst this issue is the deployment of Foreign Service Officers that are unable to communicate with the populations that they work with, especially in current war zones.⁷³

In 1993, Richard Lambert wrote more generally on the need to improve the foreign language ability of adults in America. In his article, he discussed the issues facing language competency at that time, namely a lack of competency in languages beyond a cursory level, and a lack of a proper standard for measuring language competency.⁷⁴ Lambert called for identifying adult language needs that produce usable foreign language abilities among adults.⁷⁵ He further called for a revamping of the Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) and the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages (ACTFL) testing metrics. These metrics would be used to determine the needs and the methods of teaching the needed language skills. In revamping these metrics, Lambert called for a further revision of their lower levels for beginners and more accurate testing standards for reading and writing⁷⁶.

⁷² John Negroponte, “Speech to the American Foreign Service Association,” quoted in Joe Davidson, “Language Proficiency Is Foreign Service’s ‘Greatest Challenge,’ Negroponte Says.” *The Washington Post*, sec. B: 03, 8 April 2010.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ Richard D. Lambert, “The Improvement of Foreign Language Competency in the United States.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* Foreign Language Instruction 490, A National Agenda, (1987).

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 13-14

As noted issues regarding foreign language proficiency are not something new to the United States. Progress has been made to improve proficiency levels overall along with the diversification of languages studied, however gaps still remain. Many solutions have been already been attempted, and many of those remain useful to closing these gaps in ability and availability. Ultimately, the push to improve the foreign language abilities of Americans needs to start at the elementary level, not just in adult education.

In order to improve foreign language abilities, the continued refinement and universal adherence to language proficiency standards is paramount as stated by Lambert. The ACTFL has updated their standards as recently as 1999 for oral, and 2001 for writing.⁷⁷ While the ACTFL does not provide testing requirements for listening and reading, the ILR does include testing and rating for these, as well as translation and interpretation performance.⁷⁸ Furthering Lambert's ideas, additional refining of the lower levels of language proficiency is required in order to judge initial improvements in ability; or rather an all new scale needs to be created to measure the performance of initial language learners. Along with the refining of testing standards, a push for universal adherence to the standards needs to be achieved, starting at least at the secondary level and possibly even down into the middle or elementary levels as well.

As proficiency standards become more universal, encouragement needs to be given to education institutions at all levels, from elementary to graduate, to increase and broaden their language offerings. These offerings should include more than just the basic European languages, and critical languages such as Arabic, Chinese and Russian, but should include Sub-Saharan

⁷⁷ "ACTFL Certified Proficiency Testing Programs (oral and written) - American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages," American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages, <http://www.actfl.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=3642>.

⁷⁸ "Introduction to ILR." Interagency Language Roundtable, <http://www.govtilr.org/Skills/ILRscale1.htm>.

African languages, Central Asian languages, as well as Southeast Asian languages; especially as these areas continue to develop and become more prominent on the world stage. Where traditional classroom education is not possible, distance learning technologies and computer software should be utilized to their maximum potential. This will increase the availability of languages to more areas and schools. Guidance needs to be provided by the National Government in terms of specific languages that are required for the United States and its diplomatic and intelligence communities. Further funding should also be made available to increase overall ability in regards to promoting foreign language proficiency. Encouragement should also be given to those that desire to become multilingual beyond only two languages.

The government guidance should be based on the four priorities that were given by Ms. Laipson. Using these priorities will ensure that language education has increased relevancy in regards to the needs of the country as well as the world. As languages are deemed vital to the government, further incentives to teach and learn each of those languages identified could be provided to encourage their study. This method would also allow for the continued study of languages not identified by the government by those that so desire.

Increased language training and proficiency not only provides the ability to communicate in other areas of the world, it also provides a needed understanding of foreign cultures. From an intelligence standpoint this allows analysts and decision makers the ability to truly understand their enemy.⁷⁹ Having trained analysts and collectors also reduces the need for separate translators as well. While dedicated translators, both verbal and written, will always be required to assist in the translation of excess documents and communication assistance, language proficient analysts and collectors improve the quality of finished intelligence products by

⁷⁹ Porter, p. 1

inherently understanding the cultural differences of the area in which they operate. The same is true for diplomats working in foreign countries as well.

Finally, all the reforms discussed so far impact the balancing of the need between “tactical” and “national” intelligence. In their roughest forms, tactical intelligence collects information in the field and provides information to military commanders conducting operations, while national intelligence uses technology controlled by “national agencies” to collect information and provides this information to decision makers in Congress and the White House. Senator Chambliss calls these definitions archaic.⁸⁰ However, Senator Chambliss is discussing primarily the ability to collect information while only glossing over the recipients. However, he does make a good point; in that over all, intelligence needs to be useful to the president while also providing timely information to the soldier in the field from all levels.⁸¹

Intelligence should not be defined by who collects the information, but by who receives the information. It should also be understood that finished intelligence may be utilized by all levels, not just service members in the field or by politicians in D.C. This further reinforces the need to move the previously mentioned agencies out of the Department of Defense. Senator Chambliss called for the creation of INTCOM⁸² to unify the multiple military intelligence agencies under one commander.⁸³ Chambliss envisions this command to oversee all eight of the intelligence services currently under the DOD.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Chambliss, p. 8

⁸¹ Ibid. p. 13

⁸² Although not explicitly stated in his article, INTCOM likely stands for Intelligence Command.

⁸³ Chambliss, p. 11

⁸⁴ Ibid.

The intent of this command would be to give the DNI a single point of contact for all DOD intelligence services. While this is a worthwhile idea, it would be more efficient to move the NGA, NRO and NSA out of the DOD directly under the control of the DNI and utilize the DIA as the single point of contact for military intelligence related issues. The three separated intelligence agencies would maintain their missions to support the war fighter. However as agencies that support both the military and the government, NGA, NRO and NSA will be better utilized under the control of the DNI.

As mentioned, the previously discussed areas of intelligence reform affect the balance of national and tactical intelligence. Ultimately intelligence is about getting the right information to the right person at the right time.⁸⁵ Notice the lack of who provides the information, the recipient is the primary focus. Improving the relationship of the intelligence community and Congress will provide the ability to make the structural changes needed to make this possible. Along with this, Congress is only entity that can provide the DNI the full authority he needs to ensure that the proper intelligence is being produced and disseminated to the appropriate recipient.

Secondly, balancing human versus technical collection assists in balancing tactical and national intelligence. Once again, redefining tactical versus national intelligence as the recipient instead of the provider does much of this. It is entirely possible that a soldier on patrol or an interrogator in a prison could provide a vital piece of information that allows the President the ability to make decision as an example of “tactical” asset providing “national” intelligence. On the other hand, satellite imagery or a UAV video feed could provide the necessary information to a soldier in a war zone as an example of “national” assets providing “tactical” intelligence.

⁸⁵ Chambliss, p.13

However, it should be re-noted, HUMINT is one of the areas that the intelligence community is lacking in and needs to be strengthened.⁸⁶

Finally, language training further improves the balance of intelligence. Having analysts and collectors proficient in foreign languages at all levels of the intelligence community only improves the community's ability to recognize and responds to situations around the world. Having soldiers in the field proficient in the language and culture of their operating environment allows them to provide their commanders with immediate assessments of information. These same service members would also be capable of immediately recognizing information of importance that needs to be passed to higher levels. At the national agencies, having language proficient analysts and collectors allows these agencies to manage the vast amounts of information collected and disseminate the appropriate information to the appropriate levels.

Conclusions

In discussing the intelligence community, the intent was to see if intelligence missed emerging threats by being focused on current and previous conflicts. If this were the case, the intent was also to see how or if recent reforms to the intelligence community had affected this trend.

In retrospect, the history of the intelligence community in the United States, was initially found to be far worse than just being focused on the previous conflict. The intelligence community only reacted at the start of a conflict playing catch up to provide the necessary information. This was due to that between conflicts; intelligence was never a primary focus until the early twentieth century. As permanent intelligence services were created in response to the

⁸⁶ Chambliss, p. 11

world wars, issues continued to remain. The military services had to continually evolve their use of intelligence as conflicts progressed. With the government becoming militarily involved in more areas of the world, a lack of personnel trained in the languages of these areas became an issue as well. The latter half of the twentieth century saw an increased reliance on technological efforts for information collection as well.

While the first gulf war was a success for the intelligence community, the end of the century saw a number of issues the intelligence community missed and were unprepared for. The terrorist attacks of the late 1990s and 9/11 further cemented the intelligence community's inability to recognize the emerging threat.

Since 9/11, a number of intelligence reforms have been passed to improve the intelligence process. However, other than a handful of reforms attempted internally, these reforms do little to assist the intelligence community in looking forward. The reforms enacted by Congress improved and streamlined the command structure of intelligence community, however further reforms are still needed to ensure that another significant event does not catch the intelligence community off guard.

In looking at all of this, the intelligence community has regularly been unprepared for new threats and conflicts. On a positive note though, the history also shows the intelligence community to be highly adaptable to meet the needs of the issue or event at hand. While being adaptable has been a useful quality for the intelligence community, this adaptation only occurs after an event requires the community to adapt to it. As long as the intelligence community maintains this pattern, another event such as 9/11 or Pearl Harbor or even the fall of the Soviet Union can and likely will occur in the future. While an event such as these will likely occur

sometime in the future, if the intelligence community moves to a forward focused institution, the impact on the national security will be decreased. The varying threats the United States faces, from natural and humanitarian disasters to traditional all out war and everything in-between, requires an intelligence community that is highly flexible and forward looking.

As discussed, there are a number of reforms proposed to prepared the intelligence community for the future. Of the mentioned reforms, improving the relationship between Congress and intelligence community needs to come above all others. Reforming the balance between human and technical intelligence can be accomplished internally to the community. However, if Congress is willing to work with the intelligence community, this goal can be achieved more efficiently. While the redefinition of intelligence can be accomplished by the community, the definition loses its effect if policy makers do not understand the difference between defining tactical and national intelligence based on who collects the information or who receives the information. Looking at improving the nations secondary language capability will require congressional assistance as well. Ultimately, to fully implement the reforms needed, the intelligence community needs to be able to work with Congress.

The intelligence community and policy makers need to move from defining tactical and national intelligence by the method of collection and define the difference by who receives the product. No one agency serves one customer exclusively. In redefining the difference in tactical and national intelligence in this way removes the distinction of whether an agency is military or national. This further allows for a portion of the intelligence agencies beneath the DOD to be moved under the DNI to efficiently utilize the resources available to the intelligence community. In moving the NGA, NRO and NSA from the DOD, allows these agencies to better support the intelligence, military and government communities. Moving these agencies would not change

their overall mission, it would only recognize their role in providing information to both the military and government.

The balance of human and technical collection efforts needs to be addressed as well. Intelligence collection has become increasingly reliant on technology while utilizing human collectors less. This has left the intelligence community with gaps in its ability to gain information on relevant groups around the world. As mentioned previously though, technical collection can gather information from places that human collection is unavailable as well as the opposite. That being said, there needs to be balance in the ability to collect information rather than favoring one method over the other. In balancing collection abilities across the intelligence community will further lead to improved cross agency communication. To assist in this, interagency intelligence centers should be created similar to the joint forces commands in the military. Requiring intelligence professionals to work in these interagency centers will improve information sharing among the agencies.

Improving secondary language capabilities needs to be a national priority. The lack of properly trained language personnel has been a failure in the intelligence community for much of its history. In order for the intelligence community to maintain and improve its ability to recognize and respond to events around the world, foreign language skills need to be improved. While language training can be provided to members of the intelligence community once they join, in order to have truly proficient speakers, language education needs to begin in elementary school. Along with pushing for improved language training at all education levels, revisions to foreign language testing standards need to follow. These improvements to the testing standards will provide more accurate benchmarks in which to judge language progression. There are multiple ways to improve language education in the country which need to be implemented.

Finally, although the intelligence community has proven itself to be adaptable and has seen significant reforms since 9/11, further reforms are needed. If further reforms are not implemented in the intelligence community, the community risks being caught unprepared with a future event. By implementing the proposed reforms above, the intelligence community can prepare itself to meet the needs of the country for now and into the future, regardless of the event or threat faced. In doing so, intelligence will be able to remain relevant beyond the Global War on Terrorism.

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