

Global Tides

Volume 3

Article 3

1-1-2009

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Recommended Citation

McRill, Michael R. (2009) "Identifying the Postmodern/Cold War Interlock— Soliciting a Security Studies Pedagogy Au Courant," *Global Tides*: Vol. 3, Article 3.
Available at: <http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/globaltides/vol3/iss1/3>

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**Identifying the Postmodern/Cold War Interlock—
Soliciting a Security Studies Pedagogy Au Courant**

Michael R. McRill

ABSTRACT

One scholarly faction contends that the arenas of security studies and international politics have remained essentially the same post-World War II. The other sees the 1960s as illuminating a fundamental paradigm shift concerning security studies. The latter group asserts that the majority of security concerns has either been dropped or sharply shifted post-Cold War. Since then, studies have expanded to encompass a scholarly plea for broader definitions of national security. The advent and increase of nonmilitary threats has led many to argue that these threats must be considered within the arena of national security concerns, and other scholars assert that domestic issues must be incorporated into the national security agenda as well.

Given certain post World War II changes, a new perspective is needed to identify how language, culture, psychology, geography, technology, sociology, economics, force, power, strategy, rhetoric and entertainment contribute to scenarios that may lead to war. The integration of various disciplines, technologies and views is required to decenter the securities scholar and broaden the domain of inquiry. Cultural and historical context must be expanded beyond their traditional Western focus and prevailing notions of rationality and reality must be suspended along with current normative presumptions. Thus, the security scholar is charged with the task of defining and redefining the dimensions that are present within security.

Two events constituting the pinnacle of the modern era were World War II and the perilous entry into the atomic age. The two sides of the current debate concerning security studies—riddled with contradistinctions, dissatisfaction with the positioning of various emphases within the discipline, and multifarious critiques of its performative complexion (the scope of daily behaviors of individuals based on norms or habits)—exist on either side of a nebulous division. One scholarly faction contends that the arenas of security studies and international politics have remained essentially the same post-World War II. The other sees the 1960s as illuminating a fundamental paradigm shift concerning security studies. The latter group asserts that the majority of security concerns has either been dropped or sharply shifted post-Cold War. New questions would necessarily require new answers, and no longer would security studies focus primarily on military security. What changes to international politics were veritably inaugurated after the Cold War? A certain methodological approach is compulsory in the critical appraisal of this inquiry. A background requisite to this project is the critical consciousness capable of excavating generative themes within the Cold War itself—themes which will serve as the cardinal locations from which the case for an ultramodern security study is posited.

Despite historical aversion to contemplating the need for an internally valid and consistent theoretical framework, the security scholar asks the relevant questions concerning how and why individual groups and communities obtain what they desire through the use of force or coercion. If the wide, theoretically-bound considerations are not attached to a methodological approach of analysis, it would be tantamount to asking a psychologist merely to assess the physiological dimensions of a patient's brain and to formulate a prescriptive measure for the entire mental condition. Certainly this method of analysis is detrimentally reliant upon outdated forms of scientific inquiry and institutional regimes charged to "produce truth." Whereas traditional sciences have sought the limits of control, development in the security studies discipline remains theoretically discontinuous and paradoxical. Perhaps discourse is itself the

answer—the intertextual dialogues occurring among individuals, states and communities.

Contemporary performativity ascribes to a systematic logic driven by the comparative efficiency gained within social systems, with little regard to its tangible and immediate effects upon humans.

Pedagogical transformations must occur at the educational and institutional levels; a necessity to re-explore the manner in which one considers international politics and national security is imperative. However, this charge presupposes that a change has occurred. Although some recent indicators (e.g. Afghan and Iraqi wars) indicate that military power remains salient, it is evident that the military's importance and power have recently been declining. But does the fact that the military as a concept seems to be losing its previous power indicate that military actions are less effective or that force is becoming less efficient? Could it indicate a decline in military threats? While these questions may be unanswerable at the present, it appears that many changes in circumstance were elicited post-Cold War. Within critical inquiry there is another thematic certainty: post-Cold War studies have been expanding following a scholarly plea for broader definitions of national security. Scholars tend to disagree on questions as to whether issues should be categorized as “domestic” or “international.” Some argue that nonmilitary threats must be considered within the arena of national security concerns, but other scholars assert that domestic issues must be incorporated into the national security agendas to prevent critical deficit.

Despite the quibbles that exist over the weight or importance of certain threats, one must first understand why security studies have become such an integral facet of international relations. To properly frame the discussion, it is paramount to define security studies. One definition suggests that security studies be defined as the study of threats, uses and controls of military force, but such a definition marginalizes other groups, such as the neo-realists and the social constructivists. For the purpose of a more inclusive analysis, in this paper, security studies

will be defined as an inquiry into the nature, effects, causes and prevention of war.¹ This definition erodes the traditional place of the state as the privileged entity of security studies, but by expanding the definition, intellectual coherence is not lost, but rather gained. The complexion of future security studies will not undermine the epistemology or ontology of past studies, but instead, it will accommodate the new realities encountered.

The History of Security Studies: An Unfulfilled Legacy

A widespread sentiment exists that scholarly inquiries began to narrow during the Cold War. Mid-1940s texts concerning security studies address the topic of security studies with a more comprehensive, but as the decades passed, the functionality of approaches to security became increasingly inadequate. Several decades of security studies were reliant—to their detriment, in terms of replicability and consistency—upon these works. Contemporary studies have and will continue to suffer unless a reorientation occurs. Whether the aim is a peaceful international dynamic or a new world order, scholars in international relations and its security studies subfield must focus their attention upon pursuing security, determining what security entails, and deciding how to incorporate the domestic element. If these goals are not accomplished, the likelihood of managing the post-Cold War world with a comprehensible framework is unlikely.

The field of security studies did not generate spontaneously following the Cold War era, but rather, it existed far before the conflict, and appeared during the Cold War as something markedly different. These early studies were consolidated and narrowed in treatment and focus during the Cold War. A period of particular rigidity came after scholars argued against enjoining conceptual analyses with empirical observations. Certainly, the continuity of security as a concept would construct a cyclical continuum where the result rendered becomes a terminological function. Sheer conceptualizations turn a blind eye to advancing power structures and social constructions.

Between the First and Second World Wars, scholars held that democracy, arbitration, national self-determination, disarmament, and collective security were the greatest tenets to the promotion of international peace.ⁱⁱ They felt that a focus on organization superseded military power. During this interwar period, war was viewed as something that could and should be “cured;” by viewing it in such a manner, war became a failure of the international system. Unsatisfied by this position, a few scholars advocated that military force should instead be the instrument by which national security was promoted, and indeed, this position served as the basis around which interwar security studies were framed.

With the advent of World War II, national security became the primary concern within international relations, and policy conflicts would be considered within the realm of force and its use. Within the first years after the war, many universities began implementing courses on war and national policy.ⁱⁱⁱ By the 1950s, there was a growing concern about the doctrine of massive retaliation, and as such, the quantity and quality of monographs produced on the subject increased significantly during this time. The mid-1950s are considered to be the most creative and thoughtful period in security studies.^{iv} This period did not concern itself with deterrence or nuclear arms to the degree that it would in the decades to come, and during this post-World War II expanse, security was seen as one among many concerns of the state. Security was not always the most imminent concern, and when security was considered, it was within its relevant historiographical contemplations. This decade-long span also treated security as a collaborative effort between civilians and the military. For instance, the Cold War security dilemma often witnessed military policies adopt a systemic operative prudence. Through a non-military focus, this decade became demarcated by its focus on domestic affairs and how they interrelated with national security and the greater political process.^v Unfortunately, the decline of this era would become evident only through the subsequent era’s avoidance of certain topics. Perhaps the twenty-first century would not be in its current state of affairs if scholars had continued the

earlier decade's research concerning tradeoffs as they pertained to foreign policy objectives, domestic affairs, foreign affairs, military policy instruments, and nonmilitary policy instruments.

The years between 1955 and 1965 are commonly referred to as the “golden age” of security studies.^{vi} This decade was saturated by discussions of nuclear arms, the control of nuclear arms, and limited war. The looming question was the manner in which states could use nuclear arms or other weapons of mass destruction as policy instruments, and this inquiry was framed by the notion that a nuclear exchange could occur. The “golden age” provided security studies with the deterrence theory, a military strategy by which countries threaten retaliation if attacked. Despite this achievement, there were too many gaps in the breadth and depth of contextual analysis, and there was a disproportionate emphasis on the military at the expense of the cultural, political and psychological.^{vii} There was a focus on the means through which threats would be manipulated, and, thus, force became the central concern of the era. Kolodziej notes that the agenda was circumscribed, technical and managerial, although he concedes that the agenda was urgent and ample.^{viii}

In the next fifteen years, security studies system was so focused on United States-Soviet Union relations that it could not facilitate an understanding of the Vietnam War. The Cold War had become less salient to the American mind.^{ix} The military, to this point, knew very little about “peasant nationalism” or the mechanics of counterrevolutionary war,^x and as such, a blind eye was turned to the ethical and legal implications in the primary focus on war's ability as a national policy instrument. Given the nature of the 1960s, security studies were offset by a great desire for an increased focus on peace studies, and as the years passed, alternative issues such as economics, the environment, and poverty became more important. But the erosion of the détente and the subsequent rise in war tensions in the late 1970s served as the historical backdrop for a new age of international security studies. These studies incorporated psychology, history and organizational theory to permeate deterrence theory and nuclear weapons policy.^{xi}

The 1980s made a few revolutionary contributions to security, but it was mainly a reversion to a 1950s' brand of military and strategic studies. As the Cold War came to an end, many scholars began to identify the whole-scale militarization of security studies, and as Cold War stresses waned and waxed, the series of rising tensions routinely prioritized national security, which became understood relative to its military means. This is precisely the locus from which a pedagogical shift must occur. Mainstream studies are narrowly focused on military issues and the preservation of the status quo through a highly state-centric discipline, and given this limited scope, security studies have not yet been able to contextualize the deterministic reality of anarchy. Despite the extensive scholarship by preeminent authors in the field—Kolodziej, Morgan, Buzan, etc—there was, and still is, little agreement concerning how states should cope with security in a postmodern/post-Cold War era.

Security is not completely contingent upon a state's military power. With the majority of funds going to military concerns during the 1980s, new threats began demanding attention. For instance, poverty, education, drug trade, immigration, crime, the environment, and depleting natural resources were all candidates for the receipt of redirected fiscal resources.^{xii}

Recontextualixing an Era: Periodizing The Late 20th Century – Cold War

Although there are numerous difficulties encountered when periodizing an era, the scholarly data generally addresses the same historical occurrences. The era of late capitalism proves arduous to periodize given its global expanse, but it can be seen that the two most influential periods are those of postmodernism and post-colonialism. These two terms cannot be extracted from their respective positions within capitalism and its corresponding hegemonic disposition, nor can they be considered outside their Western venues and expansionist tendencies. Postmodernism seeks to elaborate upon a Eurocentric and American territorial theater in order to convey the modes of modernization. Post-colonialism generally refers to those countries termed 'Third World' and their respective peoples.^{xiii}

As it relates to periodicity, the Cold War embodies a unique point of view. The Cold War was defined by the foreign policy struggles of the United States against the regimes of communism. The United States championed its capitalistic system over the closed-market Soviet Union and its satellite territories. The term ‘Cold War’ was coined by the United States to denote the historical span where it engaged the Soviet Union in a nuclear arms race to garner power and construct an enclosed region of influence.^{xiv} The material conditions of contemporary times hinge upon the global supremacy of the United States and an expanse of multinational corporations. How did the United States accomplish such a feat? Transnational corporations, technological systems and the atom bomb were all contingent upon the outcome of World War II. Many scholars agree that the Cold War tensions emerged in the final year of the war, even despite the Soviet Union’s position as an ally. With the outcome of the war, the U.S. was endowed with its newfound economic power, the existence of televisions, new weaponry and computers, and the entitlement toward self-justifiable action.^{xv}

The Postmodern Effect

A prevailing theme of postmodernism is its attraction to the unknown. Post-modernity attempts to calculate extensions of the unknowable and unveils certain interactions and entanglements within governmental agencies and departments and how they constantly struggle to meet, if not surpass their rival transnational corporations. A thematic paranoia and tendencies toward conspiracy both constitute the postmodern complexion. Never before had the United States witnessed so many operational scenarios in which secret missions were launched and espionage, with its double agents and secret weaponry, disguised identities and forged documentation, permeated international intelligence gathering. Notions of conspiratorial intentions were furthered by events such as Truman’s 1948 doctrine of plausible deniability, the CIA’s plan to assassinate Fidel Castro in 1960, and President Eisenhower’s denial of any involvement in that activity. These instances convert smoothly into their postmodern context.

Any time after 1990 falls under the veil of post-modernism, which is characterized by the rejection of the linear historical foundations of post modernism. The features that denote postmodernism deserve close study, or such a period would surely lack empirical data and, thereby, have indefinable limits. Certain instances for concern set within the formal elements of society are its most prominent features. Features such as a paranoia concerning the future and a certain pastiche have, among other things, constituted this era.

Notions of paranoia have served to configure a certain social significance. Even though the attempts to place autonomy within the human have—to a degree—succeeded, they were not intended to revert to a modern moment, but rather to a postmodern character called to interact with its ominous structures of paranoia. There appears to be no one historical instance of importance to generate such paranoia, but postmodern life is itself is governed by the historically influenced notions of power. Paranoia can be described by the very illness Freud noted in personal experience regarding meaning and sexual etiology.

A certain effect has occurred within postmodern literature where the same master narratives of the past are refashioned with critical features of satire and parody. Satire undercuts the historical legitimacy of the master narrative, but an all-encompassing vision of the contemporary has effectively been established. Such a vision comes as a response to apprehensions lying within political and economic structures. A skeptical concern, similar to that of the anarchist, pervades the era in a paradoxical way, either manifesting as comedic or freely anarchic.

A staggering number of critical interpretations spawned from the public's resentment following the perception of censored and uncensored knowledge. New fields of criticism entered academia; new forms sought to decenter the current compartmentalization of knowledge and classification of information. These status quo practices have extended to nearly all strategic actions and shifted the image of information to one that exists as partially belonging to the

people and partly belonging to the government.

The superstructure of post-modernity exists as the relative circuitry where economics, culture, and politics frame the post-Cold War enterprise. Granted, the postmodern age may not be explained outside its Cold War context, but this does not imply that World War II marked the genesis of post-modernism. Post-colonialism can also be said to exist historically within the Cold War context: the oppressed Third World and its long struggle for autonomy became unregulated following the devastations of World War II and the imperial forces. The Cold War served as the catalyst for U.S. violence in Third World discourse.^{xvi} Any slightest mention of the term ‘Cold War’ raises a series of interpretations. The traditional outcome of war was signaled by either victory or defeat; “Cold War,” however, implies a non-combat environment that comports itself in a manner which neither seeks peace, nor appears like a war (posing a unique opportunity for study). The National Security Council sought to formulate psychological terminology that would convince the American populace that it was, in fact, engaged in a real war. The then Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that it was integral to “bludgeon the mass mind” with an item that was “clearer than truth.”^{xvii}

The postmodernist critique of power becomes most coherent when studied through the lens of the prevalent dishonesty of the Cold War era. A thematic postmodern psychological displacement came pursuant to a geographical exercise in which the Cold War became “hot” in exclusively Third World territories. Moreover, the American Cold War foreign and domestic policies presented themselves as the visage of Western success, while simultaneously exploiting Third World labor. The certain exclusions of the Marshall Plan (most notably Africa and Latin America) uncovered its true nature as a decoy that diverted attention away from the Third World and the reparations that were owed it.^{xviii}

The United States was central to the periodizing effort. It is clear that the ramifications of its power extended as far as the global level; however, the United States, as a neocolonial

power following its covert operations and market dominance, also opened itself to vulnerability. Historian Michael Kammen describes the U.S. body as “compound identities,” as its citizenry was constituted by many races, and as it served as the host country for millions of Eastern Europe and Third World immigrants. Hence, Kammen asserts that the United States’ force of justification was due to this status.^{xix} Charged with exceptionalism, private American corporations began issuing loans to a ravaged post-war Germany. The Marshall Plan enabled the American strategy in European lending to stabilize. Despite this interconnectedness within social institutions, a certain displacement was in effect due to a disjuncture between language and perceptible reality.^{xx} Noam Chomsky referred to the United States as an international gangster—one that demonstrated the traits of a clinical psychopath who was beyond the reach of values and who failed to internalize any normative behaviors. Terms relating to this psycho-status were employed liberally throughout Cold War rhetoric, and “Cold War-speak,” as it was termed, constructed a reverse subject-object designation. Instead, the critic himself (e.g. the American government and its multinational corporations) was the real psychopath.

When periodizing the twentieth century, one is poised to comprehend the discursive compositions of both postmodernism and post-colonialism. Postmodernism appears unable to situate post-colonialism and mainly denies post-coloniality itself; however, post-colonialism proves quite adept at contextualizing the postmodern. This ability was mirrored in the Marxist thought that assessed capitalism in a much shrewder manner than its Western counterpart-ideologies.

In the wake of conspiratorial deceit and cultural psychosis, the first generation of post-World War II artists began to radically reinvent their work, and manifestations of resistance were becoming prevalent. As the century progressed, art and resentment reached their pinnacle, only to fall to neocolonialism, where many of the artists, intellectuals, and leaders were assassinated or deposed. As these leaders and public figures fell, an entire belief system fell alongside them.

The hope, the possibility, and the potential for deliverance fell to the hand of the Cold War.^{xxi, xxii}

Despite the great melancholia, if not circumstantial despair within the worlds of Cold War scholarship, some great intellectuals remained ardent in their cause. Du Bois, Fanon, Mills, and James, among others, wrote creatively against the tenets of Marxism in order to illuminate the necessity of critical analysis and how contemporary times can actually provide a new praxis within the muck.

What Can We Learn from the Cold War?

As humans, we have continued to promote an unhealthy equilibrium where one groups' needs are over-met and another group withers from the extreme lack of basic necessities. This inequality is furthered by a neo-Hobbesian understanding of human nature, and contrasted against a neo-Kantian understanding that there is, and will be, an emerging world order. But why? Current political leaders studied international politics in a world stage where realism went primarily without question, but today, these neo-realist thinkers are heavily scrutinized, as they are full of presuppositions and fundamental missteps in logic. Neo-realists contend that war is a phenomenon developed within an anarchic world theater. A persistent reliance on these beliefs in international politics has proven the foundation upon which states are ready and willing to assume a sole self-help stance, and once such a stance is adopted, the state will go on a conquest of war, which it believes fully appropriate and justified. Since the 1970s, a post-realism has emerged as students of international politics realize that anarchic structures among states are actually beneficial to achieving and sustaining order. Although this pedagogical switch from realism to post-realism has yet to be fully manifested, significant progress has been made.

As well as in much of the modern era, an axiom of the primacy of national security is being systematically adopted today by world governments.^{xxiii} Governments will overlook other concerns insofar as they believe them to interfere with national security. Theories of state behavior have been circumscribed within threat perceptions, because those threats could be

linked to the larger coercive expectations of states. The status quo reality is simple: the international system motivates states to act in anyway necessary to ensure their survival. The ultimate goal is life, and the alternatives appear to matter only once the first condition is met. There is, however, a logical complication: survival can never be absolutely guaranteed; security can never be absolutely guaranteed. These two tacit understandings provide a milieu that no amount of funds or resources could possibly satisfy. Yet, such a system could also entail that there is a threshold where, once reached, other goals may be pursued.

Under “the state” it is not surprising that a focus on military security and threats is assumed. Security problems, particularly international concerns, arise with regard to wealth and welfare due to the state’s indispensable role as the mechanism within which economic growth may be pursued. Other institutions must adopt this concern as a core tenet of their organization. An environmental group, for instance, could argue that the environment is our greatest concern—even a security concern. Additionally, the environment and its resources are integral to human survival. Some awareness is present within institutionalized government, but it is growing too slowly. A healthy balance is the only possible solution. But what can be done? The notion of marginal utility may be argued. A shift in focus and resources must follow the argument that one area is inherently more beneficial than another. The argument that environmental concerns transcend military threats could be put forward with the argument that the environment provides the greatest social utility. In other words, the marginal utility of spending for the environment is greater than the marginal utility for the military. This type of logic appears compatible with institutionalized government. The more prevalent security is, the less value it retains at the margin, according to the law of diminishing marginal utility.^{xxiv} A discernible majority of Cold War scholars argue that a greater degree of security has been attained post-Cold War. Now is the time when society ought to focus on other issues.

Rethinking Security Studies: Proposals, Implications and Considerations

Redefining security studies involves a shift in institutional discourse, and certain issues must be elevated within the political realm. Even though these issues existed before, speaking of their importance is a political act in itself. However, there is a teleological pitfall encountered when labeling. Defining something with predetermined intent may presuppose a telos that is itself flawed. By labeling, for instance, 'war economies' upon a region, certain problems are encountered because the term 'war economy' draws implications that are often precarious and unpredictable. The subjectivity following the modern era is indicative of this very logic, which becomes evident in the definitional divide between region and "regionness." Because the regional dynamic generally pertains to the developing world, there is a fine distinction when granting a region the delineation of independence. Despite the highly precarious nature of making operational distinctions, it is undeniable that regions have become highly salient features of international relations post-Cold War. However, the regional referent is a pragmatic inclusion within security studies if its treatment is done with care and awareness.

Before a pedagogical switch can be made, the players themselves must be plainly articulated. Until now, actors have been defined within a state-centered mentality, but clearly, non-state actors are becoming an increasingly pressing concern. For instance, transient terror organizations and rogue networks threaten the world to a significant degree, and overlooking their presence would assuredly lack strategic diligence. However, the United Nations should also be considered as a viable international actor. The U.N. cannot be deconstructed and understood merely as the current actors and their interactions within the U.N. itself. The U.N. itself has an influence in its own right. Its symbolic importance hinges on the notion that it establishes international norms within the international community. Granted, the U.N. works in a manner that is primarily dictated by its permanent members, it also has a marginal autonomous right that provides its own influence. Furthermore, the norms established through the U.N. provide the means for an increased moral approach to conflict.

As most security studies critiques stem from the fact that the discipline has been rooted greatly in realism, perhaps liberalism may be the solution. As the Cold War era—once riddled with international rivalries, arms races and power grabs—has become more globalized, and much of its hostile sentiments have slowly eroded and there have been an increase in multilateral efforts in a variety of international institutions. Rather than maintaining realism, it appears comparatively beneficial to adopt a theory capable of managing politics within the transnational community as well as the global level. Currently, there are numerous questions relating to the modern effects of technology upon the military. Some scholars wish to preserve the status quo because there are still issues concerning nuclear nonproliferation that remain to be addressed, but whether one side acquires scrutiny for focusing too heavily on economics or military, a general consensus is being reached that vouches for an “everything-is-fair-game” mentality: non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, politics, individual actors, gender dynamics, societal norms, ideological focuses and domestic politics.

Within the field of realism, one major point of contention lies in the perceptions of another’s motives within the greater anarchic theater. Misperceptions can bring years of stressed relations and weak policies, and as such, realists are charged to assume a definitive offensive or defensive stance.

Cultivating Cooperation

States that seek security face a number of perilous tradeoffs (e.g., the “security dilemma”)^{xxv} due to the vulnerabilities risked for the potential benefits. Gestures of respect are expected within international relations: one state may deescalate its military in an attempt to reassure other states as to its peaceful intentions. Although other states become motivated to follow in kind, there is no tangible force governing guaranteed action. Despite the actual gesture, the other state may misperceive the intentions as offensive when they were intended for defense. Significantly fewer conflicts would exist in an environment where intentions are clearly

and truthfully articulated. When defense is perceived as a distinct state posture, reassurance of peaceful intentions can be attained simultaneously with the development and maintenance of all states capabilities to defend themselves equally.

Realists often view will as esoteric, and therefore, a realist is tempted to perceive and label any action as competitive. The one who believes liberalism to be an unstable venture must consider the simple reality that realism is forged from conditions and ideologies that inherently cannot dissolve threats (with any degree of permanency) within the security dilemma. An interesting opportunity for positive progress exists as the potential for policies to better articulate a state's intent. For instance, an arms control agreement could explicitly convey a state's intention and would serve as a strategic tactic within the greater effort to quell conflict. However, when an action is legally binding, the states that ascribe to the policy would be exposing a window into their central motives. Moreover, as history confirms, a state may break an agreement, pact or international law if it believes that it is substantially entitled or compelled to do so. Additionally, an aversion toward whole-scale transparency exists within states. States would become vulnerable (or perceive themselves as vulnerable) and, consequently, be less likely to adopt policies that limit arms or disarm completely.

Historically, states have been known to strategically solicit cooperative behaviors by a willingness to integrate with an adversary state on an issue that is comparatively small or constitutes a portion of the greater conflict. The reception of this invitation also signals the other state's likelihood toward benign behavior. The received gesture would invariably point at cooperation, malign intentions, or sustain a state of stressed and uncertain relations. However, this strategy has proven to work in very specific environments. The ability to differentiate conditional reassurances without risking vulnerability presents in a country's ability to distinguish between a defensive or offensive measure. A sizable defensive advantage further compounds the inability to communicate reassurance. Motives only manifest through actions

that match the threshold of the adversary state. However, in a world where countries possess great force, a move in either direction may be problematic due to the marginal loss or gain of force in contrast with the entire body of arms capabilities. Hence, the perception of the gesture is diminished.

An evident theme in the scenarios of reassurance is that power, coercion, and various tactics work to an extent, but that they are never entirely effective. The only effective solution rests in the ability of states to choose. Actions appear defensive to some, offensive to others, and uncertain to most. If a state is committed to reassuring its adversary of benign and cooperative intentions, it will reduce or limit its most destructive, most advanced, and most capable weaponry (despite their nature as being offensive or defensive).

If states must be satisfied before there can be peace, deterrence theory sharply comes into question. Security scholars, most notably, Patrick Morgan, advocate for a general deterrence study. With this general survey, psychological considerations may be integrated as they certainly pertain to relevant concerns. A state's affective processes engineer certain deterrence regimes accordingly. An incorporation of psychological studies will also offer historiographical findings by shedding light on the reasons adversarial states often efface the deterrence systems of competing states. Failing to incorporate a psychological viewpoint demonstrates the sheer narrowness and disciplinary rigidity of the security survey to date. John Lewis Gaddis (1997) wrote that

The role of the historian is, or ought to be, to focus exclusively neither on individuals nor on the circumstances they inherit, but on how they intersect. One way to do that is to think of history as an experiment we can rerun—if only in our

minds— keeping Tocqueville-like trends constant but allowing for Marx-like variations in the individuals who have to deal with them. If the result replicates what actually happened, then it seems safe to assume that, on balance, circumstances and not men determined the outcome. But if it appears that different individuals might have altered the course of events—if rerunning the experiment does not always produce the same result—then we should question deterministic explanations, for what kind of determinism empowers unique personalities at distinctive moments?”^{xxvi}

Today, perceptible global trends indicate a move toward defensive forces. It is assumed that if all actors were defensive actors, a rogue offensive action would likely lead to failure. However, smaller states, perceiving the greater offensive/defensive dynamic, are more likely to submit to a defensive posture (according to their resources, size, population, military, and geography), despite their actual motive. This proves problematic as it reveals that defensive gestures may indicate little in regard to motive. Defensive measures as well as offensive measures constrain reassurance.^{xxvii} Both can be regarded as equally effective, thereby problematizing the indeterminacies that lie within structural variables. Clearly, a country’s intent must be discovered in different area (such as an analysis of its political and economic conditions or its historical preponderance), since the offense/defense model only indicates likely intent and relative probabilities.

Countries that are prominent within the international system, in order to maintain status, are greatly interested in preserving dominance by reassuring opponents. Realists, to their credit, have been quite adept at recognizing this potential for reassurance. Still, the realist project oversteps the margins at which it is reflective and seeks, for example, weapons so advanced that

no challenger can post an equal threat.^{xxviii} As few non-contradictory measures arise within realism, alternative strategies of reassurance must be considered.^{xxix} These new strategies may reject the realist mentality or affirm its validity. If any fundamental flaws in logic, inherently paradoxical schemas, pre-suppositional pitfalls or unaddressed gaps are excavated, alternative solutions must then be pursued.

There must be a reexamination of current and past assumptions as they pertain to the Cold War. A broader definition of security would resonate throughout the university level by creating a wider variety of focused departments and experts who would construct a more comprehensive and collaborative field of inquiry. It proves rather ironic that universities have focused so disproportionately upon military studies as they pertain to security, yet the military itself has little to no academic contingency.^{xxx} This fact has improved since the late 1960s, but much work is still to be done. Modern militaries rely upon individuals within to offer security advice indirectly through their knowledge of either history or political science. The military should supplement itself with a much-needed academic counterpart. This new interdisciplinarity is precisely what is needed to infuse the armed forces with the overdue reflection and critical logic it has lacked. The military is not the only victim of poor structural planning; academic institutions, held in high, and often unquestioned, regard have failed to integrate military sciences with more traditional political sciences. Perhaps military studies will be the one element that will surround political studies with a pragmatic force uniting theory and practice by recontextualizing the information.

Another field that is identifiably lacking is the field of military history studies. Only a handful of universities offer a military history course or have a military history expert within their institution. This is likely the result of the hostility many professors harbor toward the misguided U.S. foreign policy efforts (e.g. Vietnam and Iraq). Although strategic studies may often be included within political science at some universities, there is an inherent lack of

comprehensive rigor and attention. Security studies should become a clear and distinct study itself. The lack of students is certainly related to the fact that these military-minded intellectuals are very few in number. Often, officers who retire go on to obtain higher degrees. The military needs individuals who are both civilian but also are highly aware and sensitive to military issues. Still, there is a hesitation to incorporate civilians into strategic studies, given their relatively low knowledge of critical issues that directly affect lives, and as such, many of these civilians are critical of the military, which they see as brashly acting with little attention to the circumstances and implications of their operations.

Economics serve as a very crucial referent in explaining the world post-Cold War. Often, the disciplinary shortsightedness disregards or lowers the importance of economics that are central to global security.^{xxx1} Clearly, for such a referent to be so grossly overlooked, there are presuppositions undergirding security inquiries. These assumptions need to be excavated and identified. The incorporation and study of alternative theories concerning the genesis of war and armed conflict must be integrated.^{xxx2}

Political science, most notably international relations, is often thought to be a study that draws from all other academic fields. However, such an assumption has served to somewhat erode the study. To understand war, one needs to both know the consequences as well as all the aspects that contributed to its development. A certain worldly knowledge is needed to identify how culture, psychology, geography, technology, sociology, economics, entertainment, strategy, force, and power all contribute to scenarios that may lead to war. At the academic level, the ability to integrate studies should be the quality rewarded. Today, the ability to focus on one field and master the technical, literary, theoretical and historical features of the field is greatly rewarded. However, it is interdisciplinarity (the ultimate aim of security studies) that will soon prove to be the object of desire.

Despite a slew of recommendations for change, the perceptions of strategic and security

studies must be redirected. Once this is achieved, actual success and progress may be reached. Perceptions of strategic studies fluctuate in their relative proportions to wars observed, and this is a dangerous link, as strategic studies may be equipped to contribute a great deal of reflection upon other facets of society.

Primary Conclusions: Rewriting Contemporary Praxis

There needs to be a criteria by which a security scholar or analyst may follow in the course of research or teaching, and I derive these recommendations with all prior considerations in mind. It is crucial for a security scholar to remain both humble and neutral. Neutrality augments the domain for inquiry, as there are no entanglements between the researcher and policymakers, or certain interests privileged over others. Humility should also apply to personal behavior; unfortunately, however, ego often pervades the fields of academic scholarship. By assuming a posture of mutual respect and collaboration, a greater cultivation of shared research will not fall to self-limitations. With the assumption of an outlook of mutual respect and neutrality, security studies will flow into other fields, transcending its currently overlooked role.

The cultural and historical contexts must be expanded beyond the traditional Western focus. Once one viewpoint is elevated above the rest, the ‘portrait of reality’ becomes distorted. A rigorous foundational understanding of competing ideologies is necessary to understand the nature of anarchy, and a non-Western study is paramount to this venture. Anarchy and chaos are no more synonymous than anarchy and order. Anarchy is the initial base from which all human manipulations, formulations, structures and growth are manifested. A wider theoretical survey will enable a security analyst the critical awareness necessary to prescribe proper forms of order if necessary.

Normative presumptions, as they relate to research methodologies, must be suspended. Given a scholar’s academic development, there likely exist certain biases regarding the proper methods of research. Therefore, experimenting with and against formalized methods is

necessary to the renewal and development of ultramodern security studies. Despite all the past philosophical contemplations regarding international behaviors, progress will only come from a creative integration of numerous disciplines. The interdisciplinary relations created must be creative themselves. In the absence of creativity (working with and against formalized manners of research and experimentation), no matter how many disciplines are incorporated, the end result will probably aim at a collectively presupposed conclusion. It is very simple to fall into a general pattern of interaction between academics. Broadening the domain of inquiry will help in “decentering” the scholar. Moreover, a broader base will elevate the field in terms of its prominence and monetary resources available. When security studies become more well-known and understood, no longer will security be a subject attached to so many stigmas, and it will then be able to be incorporated progressively into public dialogue.

The security scholar is charged with two difficult tasks. First, notions of the “real” must always be cautiously suspended to avoid the risk of ascribing to a fragmented portrait of reality. The West has culturally constructed the notion of “rationality.”^{xxxiii} Once the nature of such a construction is grasped, the security profession will certainly become humbled to a point that many of its past presuppositions will evaporate or be radically altered. In order for one to act rationally, one must do so at the prescription of world culture; norms shape, effect, change, distort, and disperse instrumentally rational behavior. Still, the security scholar must also attempt to define and redefine the dimensions that are present within security and reality. Such a definition must be posited qualitative, as quantitative forms require an enormous amount of proof to validate their academic vigor. Questions pertaining to reality must avoid relegation to a list of testable queries.

One method that coincides with all of these recommendations is the constructivist critique, which aims at research forms that both emanate interdisciplinarity and seek alternative avenues of inquiry in order to address issues of security, society, history, culture, language and

economics. The base of constructivist critiques is rooted in the position that social factors are the primary concern within human interactions. Constructivists reject materialist ontologies, while conceding that material structures are important evaluative standards for assessing human agents in regards to social rules; social structures serve as a very important constitutive matrix in the revealing of interests and identities of agents. Agency is entangled within the social rules that both form and regulate it.^{xxxiv} It is important to understand that a cyclical continuum exists where agents construct structures, while structures also construct agents. This cycle yields a scenario in which rules construct agents and, correspondingly, agents construct rules. However, though the role of agency is often mentioned, it tends to be overlooked, which short circuits the causal flow between structures and agents. Despite the constructivist argument that such a critique disregards the essence of their ontology, empirical applications require a degree of sequential logic to function.

Constructivists assess the extent to which structures either restrict or enable state actors by assessing all relevant factors.^{xxxv} The assessment simultaneously notes the potential for deviation from these structures. By looking at these two factors, the constructivist may identify how a state action can reproduce the structure. Generally, state actions, or state behaviors, are assessed against a normative value; however, this judgment is made possible only in an intersubjective context. Actors develop relationships according to norms and practices, and through these actions, a state develops a distinct identity. Behavioral patterns become evident after these intersubjective identities are understood. The prime difference between constructivists and realists presents at this point: constructivism theoretically and empirically questions identity within given historical contexts, and neo-realism relegates identity to that of self-interest. Hence, a great number of realists abstain from theorizing the most fundamental elements of international politics—its actors. Realism assumes a fatally outmoded transcendentalism with regard to the *a priori* disposition of the state. It seems comparatively

more logical to adopt the constructivist project that views identities as variable and historically dependent upon social context.

One major credit that may be given constructivism is its ability to theorize the missing interests within states. Given that identities and structures are socially produced, the omission of interests exists in accord with the social construction it underwent. When one studies a practice of power in relation to its social context, uncertainty is greatly diminished. Social practices contain the power to produce entire communities, reproduce international communities and reproduce all the intricate identities within them.^{xxxvi} However, power is not only discursive. In order to place forth any degree of discursive force, status quo economic resources must be in place to sustain the institutions that continually reproduce social practices. Indeed, the constructivists address many of the concerns that rose post-World War II. Still, it is imperative to sidestep complacency and regularly search for new and inventive research methods.

Concluding Note

Security studies scholars must be aware of all types of research methods, as well as a broad survey of critical theory. Doing so exposes the catalysts for resistance, the dynamics of population movement, the effects of modern media systems, and the impacts of capital. Enabled with this new knowledge, the security scholar will be equipped with a more universal portrait of security. This perspective will make it possible for the security scholar to determine the parameters of a specific security framework, and rather than employing a specific political theory, one could use a universal outlook to determine the proper essentiality of one's own self-generated theory.

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- ^{xvi} The U.S. is a unique power given its history. Gertrude Stein once referred to the U.S. as the oldest modern territory. The U.S. was the one great power with the most colonial past. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. *Teaching for the Times, The Decolonization of Imagination*, ed. Jan Nederveen Pieterse and Bhikhu Parekh (London: Zed Books: 1995).
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- ^{xxii} The postmodernism of the early 1960s contrasted the codified high modernism which preceded it. A revitalization of the European avant-garde was in effect. After only a decade, the avant-gardism movement exhausted itself and the 1970s gave way to a cultural eclecticism. The 1970s' brand of postmodernism was resistant to negation, transgression or criticism. In contrast, another postmodernism existed in which critique and resistance were refashioned in both non-modern and non-avant-garde terms, ones which both suited the contemporary culture as well as the political. The 1960s critics as well as artists both adopted a fundamentally similar view of the new cultural situation. Some critics and artists viewed the postmodern turn as the advancement toward the liberation of consciousness. The postmodernism of the 1960s manifested in an imagination that boasted a strong sense of the future, of crisis and generational conflict, of discontinuity and rupture, an imagination reminiscent of continental avant-gardism.
- As the 1970s began, earlier optimism regarding popular culture, the media and technology systems made way for critical assessments. The confidence of the 1960s was devastated under the weight of Watergate and the Vietnam War. Media systems now seen as cultural pollution and counter-cultural movements against the war began to be termed infantile aberrations of American history. Lucie Smith, Edward. *Art in the Seventies*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 1980).
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^{xxxiv} Contrary to the belief of some contemporary scholars, constructivists value structures, because structures reproduced by an actor’s daily discourse also reproduce certain self-limitations and constraints. Constructivists view agency in terms of its relevant structural grounding. They acknowledge that social progress is quite difficult.

^{xxxv} Constructivists assume a broad spectrum of studies. Some use dialogical methods of analysis to explore the ethical challenges within colonialism. Other scholars study larger narratives in security communities by analyzing current social interactions as social dialogues. Some constructivists take a phenomenological approach in order to analyze the identities of individual actors. Other constructivists analyze the discursive actions’ approach in order to contextualize certain policy efforts. When taken together, such moves have brought a fresh approach to world politics. However, the empirical value of the constructivist approach is the larger question. The ability to explain the phenomena and perspectives for which they speak is crucial for constructivism to prove beneficial.

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