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GIGA Research Programme:
Violence and Security

Does Violence Pay? The Effect of Ethnic Rebellion on Overcoming Political Deprivation

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No 244

March 2014

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GIGA Research Programme “Violence and Security”

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Does Violence Pay?

The Effect of Ethnic Rebellion on Overcoming Political Deprivation

Abstract

Studies have found that politically deprived groups are more likely to rebel. However, does rebellion increase the likelihood of achieving political rights? This article proposes that rebellion helps ethnic groups to overcome deprivation. I illustrate this by using a “typical” case (the Ijaw’s struggle against the Nigerian government) to demonstrate how ethnic rebellion increases the costs for the government to a point where granting political rights becomes preferable to war. Further, I exploit time-series-cross-sectional data on deprived ethnic groups to show that rebellion is significantly associated with overcoming deprivation. The statistical analysis shows that democratic change is an alternative mechanism.

Keywords: political deprivation, ethnic conflict, violence, effectiveness

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Does Violence Pay? The Effect of Ethnic Rebellion on Overcoming Political Deprivation

Carlo Koos

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1 Introduction

Research on ethnic conflict has largely focused on the determinants of why ethnic groups rebel. Since Gurr's (1970) seminal work on rebellion, the relative deprivation of groups has been viewed as a major cause of violent uprisings. Recent studies have found strong empirical support that horizontal inequalities between and the deprivation of ethnic groups within a society are robustly associated with civil wars (Cederman et al. 2011; Cederman et al. 2010; Stewart 2008; Østby et al. 2009; Østby 2008).

Remarkably, most of these studies appear to implicitly share a particular view on the function of violent rebellions: an ethnic group's rebellion is a strategy to improve the group's political status. Of course this assumption makes sense, as groups will only resort to violence if they expect that the benefits of rebelling outweigh the costs. However, this claim has received surprisingly little explicit scholarly attention. As Mack (1975: 175–176) noted almost 40 years ago, "In the field of conflict research, the study of the outcome and the conduct of wars, as against that of their etiology, has received remarkably little attention. The outcome of 'asymmetric conflicts' [...] has been almost totally neglected." Since then, the theoretical and empirical literature has clearly grown extensively, but research on the effectiveness of rebellions has not.

This article contributes toward filling this gap and asks whether rebellions by deprived ethnic groups help to overcome political deprivation. Violent rebellions and civil wars are bloody endeavors that disrupt and traumatize societies, sometimes even two or three generations. Considering the bloodshed and atrocities associated with civil wars, rebellions are hardly ever efficient. But are they effective – that is, do they put governments under enough pressure so that they at some point grant the rebel groups political rights?

In this article I propose that violent rebellions are an effective tool for deprived ethnic groups to overcome deprivation and attain political rights. Theoretically, when governments deprive particular ethnic groups within a nation, they do so intentionally – not accidentally. By depriving ethnic groups, governments exclude them from engaging in conventional political channels and drive them toward violent rebellion (e.g. Gurr 2000: 157). Hence, violent rebellion becomes a viable alternative for deprived groups.

History has witnessed plenty of politically excluded ethnic groups that have resorted to violence against the state and have succeeded in overcoming their deprivation. One example is the Ijaw's violent conflict with the Nigerian government and the subsequent nomination of Goodluck Jonathan as vice president. Another example is the struggle of South Sudanese ethnic groups against the Sudanese government, which led to autonomy arrangements, government representation and finally independence. There are plenty of other examples of how rebel ethnic groups have achieved political rights after (oft-enduring) violent struggles.

These groups would have known that warfare would be costly and that the state security forces would be militarily stronger. Nevertheless, that knowledge did not stop any of these weaker groups from rebelling. Of course, not all rebelling groups win against the state; victory, however, may not actually be the objective. The target of overcoming deprivation and achieving political rights is more modest than defeating the state and the groups in power. By rebelling, ethnic groups – often implicitly – aim at increasing the costs of deprivation to the point where granting political rights becomes cheaper to those in power.

To test the argument that ethnic rebellion helps groups to overcome deprivation, this paper uses information from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset. Utilizing time-series-cross-section data on the political status of ethnic groups, I find robust support for the claim

that previous rebellions were associated with overcoming deprivation and achieving political rights.

This article continues as follows: I introduce the relevant literature, outline the theoretical line of reasoning (i.e., when and why rebellion works) and derive the hypothesis. I then use the case of the Ijaw in Nigeria to illustrate the logic of the argument, after which I introduce the statistical analysis of ethnic groups' access to political power. I then present my conclusion and discuss the wider implications of my findings.

2 Political Deprivation as a Cause of Ethnic Rebellion

A well-established body of research on the grievances-conflict link dating back at least to Gurr's (1970) relative deprivation theory posits that deprived groups within a society are more likely to take up arms against the state. "Deprivation" can be understood as the outright discrimination of ethnic groups or, less extremely, as the nonrepresentation of ethnic groups at the national or subnational level.

Political discrimination aims at depriving certain groups within a nation of fundamental political rights. Cederman et al. (2010: 99, 101) argue, for instance, that political discrimination is "directly targeted at an ethnic community – thus disregarding indirect discrimination based, for example, on educational disadvantage or discrimination in the labor or credit markets." They add that "group members are subjected to active, intentional, and targeted discrimination, with the intent of excluding them from both regional and national power. Such active discrimination can be either formal or informal."

In the less extreme version of political deprivation, ethnic groups are powerless and "elite representatives hold no political power at either the national or the regional level without being explicitly discriminated against" (Cederman et al. 2010: 100).¹

In both instances, outright discrimination and the more subtle denial of representation can cause frustration among ethnic groups, which can result in protest and even violent uprising.

Recent studies have found strong evidence that politically disadvantaged ethnic groups are more likely to rebel (Cederman et al. 2010; Buhaug et al. 2013; Cederman et al. 2011). Engaging in rebellion is implicitly understood as a group's attempt to forcefully end a continuous state of deprivation. This is a straightforward and unsurprising understanding of the function of rebellion.

However, what do we actually know about the effect ethnic rebellion has on helping excluded groups to achieve political rights? At first glance, it would seem not that much.

1 I use the definition of Cederman et al. (2010) because it complies with the data used in the quantitative analysis.

3 Theorizing Ethnic Rebellion as a Path to Political Rights

Although there is a lack of studies on whether ethnic rebellion actually helps deprived groups to achieve political rights, the extensive work on interstate wars, state building, strategic government-rebel interactions and nonviolent campaigns provides valuable insights into related aspects and similar processes. On a meta-level, there are those who argue that violence produces political power and remains an integral process of state building (Tilly 1985). Some even claim that nonviolence only fills the gaps between phases of violence (Ginsberg 2013). Mao's statement that "political power grows out the barrel of a gun" and Clausewitz's observation that "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means" exemplify this position.

These claims are contrasted by several newer studies that argue that nonviolent campaigns are better suited to achieving political objectives than violent ones (Shaykhutdinov 2010; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Nonviolent campaigns are considered more powerful because they enjoy moral superiority. Consequently, nonviolent movements can count on more international and domestic support. It is suggested that security forces would hesitate in cracking down on nonviolent protests. The puzzle, then, is why have so many groups resorted to violence?

Fearon and Laitin (2011: 199) claim that "the prevalence of ethnic civil wars has been increasing over time. Fifty-three percent of the 17 civil wars we code as breaking out in the years 1945–1949 were ethnic. For the next six decades, the corresponding percentages are 74, 71, 67, 81, 83, and 100 (for 2000–2008)." While these figures do not directly imply that – in absolute numbers – more ethnic groups rebel, they illustrate at least that ethnic rebellions are far from uncommon. However, if nonviolence is more effective, why do so many ethnic groups engage in violence? Would it not be more effective for deprived ethnic groups to take to the streets to peacefully demand that their grievances be addressed?

Presumably, some deprived groups have initially pursued nonviolent means, which have been met by brute force by the state, thus setting a violent dynamic in motion. Although this runs against the "nonviolence works" argument, it is not uncommon for nondemocratic governments to crack down on nonviolent movements, with the aim of wiping out the rebellious momentum (Davenport 1995) and setting an example for other potential protesting groups (Walter 2006). This shows that not all governments care about moral superiority as suggested by the "nonviolence works" argument.

Whereas cracking down on a broadly supported nonviolent movement may have severe negative repercussions for the state (e.g., defection within the security forces, see Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), the potential costs faced by the government for repressing a nonviolent campaign by a deprived ethnic group are likely to be smaller. In the latter scenario, a government (i.e., the representatives of the ethnic groups in power) could expect a less extreme backlash from its own ethnic support base as repression of "others" would be perceived as

defending the “own” group’s status. In such a context, governments may prefer to use suppression to establish a societal belief that nonviolent resistance by ethnic minorities is futile.

Yet, this strategy often backfires and instead makes the aggrieved groups aware that their tool of choice – namely, nonviolence – is ineffective.

Once a group realizes that discrimination will not be overcome purely through conventional political channels and nonviolent protest, it may consider violent means and mobilize its members to fight against the state. Why would armed rebellion be an effective option for overcoming discrimination in such a situation? First and foremost, governments that deprive ethnic groups do so by choice – not by accident – in order to control and limit these groups’ access to power and resources (see e.g. Davenport and Inman 2012; Davenport 1995; Levi 1989). Without a strong reason to do so, those in power generally have little interest in granting concessions to such groups as this might create incentives for other groups to rebel as well (Stedman 1997; Tull and Mehler 2005; Mehler 2009; Toft 2009: 43).

Violent uprising might therefore become a viable option in order to achieve rights if non-violent strategies have failed to yield the expected results or have been a poor tactic per se. Gurr (2000: 157) asks the following: “If rebellion is the last resort of those seeking minority rights and self-determination, does that imply that conventional politics is their first resort?” He answers, “Sometimes yes, but minorities often are closed out of conventional politics.” Gurr further states that “if the political rules of the game exclude or marginalize ethnic and national minorities, then engaging in conventional politics constitutes a poor strategic choice for their leaders.”

While – or rather because – violent uprising is a risky endeavor, it will demonstrate to the groups in power that the mobilized rebels are committed to their objective of overcoming discrimination, can mobilize recruits, have access to arms, and are a threat to the state’s monopoly on the use of violence at the local or even national level. For both sides (i.e., the state and the insurgents), the question of whether to engage in an armed struggle is a matter of weighing up the costs and benefits.

On paper, the military imbalance between a state and an insurgent movement would suggest that the state is always likely to win. Yet, history shows that in many asymmetric wars, the weaker party won. Referring to the Vietnam War, Mack (1975: 177) argues “that the simplistic but once prevalent assumption – that conventional military superiority necessarily prevails in war – has been destroyed.” Arreguín-Toft (2005: 4) also points out that “weaker” actors have won 51 percent of all asymmetric wars since 1950. In other words, a state’s power does not wholly determine the outcome of a conflict, because other factors will play a significant role too.

What factors offset state military strength and allow an ethnic group to attain political rights? Much depends on the rebels’ goal. If a group aims to defeat the state and its ruling elite, the chances of success will be very low in most cases. If, on the other hand, the goal is more modest – for example, to “only” achieve basic political rights and end group-targeted

discrimination – there will be a greater chance of success. The strategy is rather to increase the pressure on and the costs for the state to such a degree that conferring political rights on the discriminated group is less costly than being at war with them.

In his seminal work on why big states lose small wars, Mack (1975) proposes the concept of relative interest as a critical factor for success in asymmetric wars. Weak actors, he argues, fight for survival and are therefore more determined to carry the costs of conflict, whereas stronger opponents have a comparably lower relative interest but higher costs – that is, public costs and the ruling elite's unwillingness to endure the high costs of long wars make strong actors succumb to the demands of the rebels. Mack (1975: 177) explains how weak actors can win politically without winning militarily:

In every case, success for the insurgents arose not from a military victory on the ground – though military successes may have been a contributory cause – but rather from the progressive attrition of their opponents' political capability to wage war. In such asymmetric conflicts, insurgents may gain political victory from a situation of military stalemate or even defeat.

More practical aspects matter too. Rebels enjoy several home-turf advantages if government troops are deployed to and warfare takes place in their territory. In the *Art of War*, Sun Tzu underlines the importance of knowing the territory:

The contour of the land is an aid to an army; sizing up opponents to determine victory, assessing dangers and distances, is the proper course of action for military leaders. Those who do battle knowing these will win, those who do battle without knowing these will lose.

Local rebels will know best where to hide and retreat because they will be more familiar with the particularities of the local terrain. Such knowledge provides them with advantages when setting up bases and training camps and organizing logistics. In contrast, government facilities and garrisons are often limited to urban hubs. It is therefore much harder for nonnative government troops to gather reliable intelligence on insurgency movements and plan counterinsurgency actions.

A rebel group fighting for its ethnic community's cause often enjoys strong local backing. As a result, the local population will provide the rebel group with support in terms of information (while misinforming government actors), food, labor, recruits and often even money. These uninterrupted support services by the local community are crucial to a rebel group's success (see e.g. Weinstein 2005). Government forces, on the other hand, will encounter problems in distinguishing combatants from civilians and consequently face a disadvantage.

In short, taking their relative weakness into account, ethnic rebel groups' most effective option in terms of obtaining political rights or autonomy is to wear down the government and those in power by attrition. Once the government realizes that the costs of warfare exceed the benefits of suppressing a group, they will consider ceasing discriminatory practices.

Of course, a group's political representation will depend on the quality of their representatives and the effectiveness of their election campaigns.

In the following section, I present qualitative evidence that demonstrates how the process chain of ethnic discrimination, state repression, violent rebellion, and civil war leads to political rights.

4 Qualitative Accounts on the Effectiveness of Ethnic Rebellion

The struggle of the Ijaw minority in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta is a typical case of how an ethnic rebellion can pressure the government into ceding political rights. The Ijaw is the largest ethnic minority in the Niger Delta. Since oil production began in the region in the 1950s, the area has been subject to large-scale environmental damage that has severely affected the livelihoods of local fishermen and farmers. Both fishing grounds and farmland have been destroyed by oil spills, but compensation payouts have been inadequate. At the same time, the local population has felt excluded from the financial benefits that the oil companies and the state have generated on its land. Taken together, the above-mentioned factors and the lack of political representation aggravated the Ijaw's grievances (see e.g. Ukiwo 2011; Watts and Ibaba 2011).

At the end of the 1990s, the Ijaw mobilized large-scale nonviolent protests and demanded more political representation and that their complaints be addressed by the federal government. The Ijaw Youth Council insisted that the Ijaw control Ijaw land and set an ultimatum to foreign oil companies to withdraw from their territory. The Nigerian state responded to these demands and nonviolent protests heavy-handedly, with security forces crushing public protests, shooting protesters and raiding villages in the area (Okonta and Douglas 2003).

Even though Nigeria introduced democracy in 1999, the Ijaw believed that nonviolence would not help them to realize their goal. Building on broad support for their cause, the Ijaw leadership mobilized a violent campaign. The Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force and the Niger Delta Vigilante, the two largest Ijaw militias, spearheaded the struggle against the state. During the course of the Niger Delta conflict, a number of other militias emerged – including the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (Watts and Ibaba 2011; Okonta and Douglas 2003).

Besides directly confronting the state via battles with security forces, the ethnic militias also indirectly targeted the government through various strategies. One such tactic was to exploit the Nigerian state's dependence on oil revenues by sabotaging oil-production infrastructures. This saw Nigerian oil output drop by 30 percent, which had a severe impact on the state budget. Another strategy was to hack into pipelines and steal oil, commonly known as bunkering. Rebels also began kidnapping politicians, their families and foreign oil workers for ransom (Ukiwo 2007). All of these methods resulted in massive costs to the Nigerian state.

The government's strategy of relying on military means only yielded a minor improvement to the security situation in the Niger Delta. In an attempt to address local grievances, the federal government created the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000. The NDDC was mandated to improve social and environmental conditions in the region. However, it was popularly viewed as nothing more than a vehicle to embezzle funds. Even today the NDDC's track record on infrastructure development projects remains very modest (UNDP 2006). Ultimately, the government's initiative had no effect on restoring peace.

For the Nigerian government, the conflict in the Niger Delta became increasingly costly. The ongoing attacks on oil facilities and large-scale oil theft seriously reduced government revenues. It was not until President Yar'Adua appointed Goodluck Jonathan (an ethnic Ijaw) as vice president in 2007 that the dynamic of the conflict changed for the better. Some observers believe that Vice President Jonathan's appointment was a strategic response to the unresolved armed conflict in the Niger Delta as the selection of an Ijaw vice president would be received positively by the Ijaw community and assure them that their grievances would be addressed (International Crisis Group 2007).

Since taking office, Jonathan has been instrumental in facilitating the disarmament and demobilization of ethnic militias in the Niger Delta. He introduced an amnesty program that offered Ijaw militants in the Niger Delta a stipend of around USD 400 per month for turning in their weapons. Although the amnesty program was not designed to address the underlying root grievances of the Niger Delta, the level of violence dropped drastically after its introduction (Aghedo 2012; Davidheiser and Nyiayaana 2011). With the appointment of Goodluck Jonathan (an ethnic representative of the Ijaw) as vice president, the state's political promises became more credible.

To conclude, violent rebellion was not the Ijaw's first choice. Their initial efforts to effect change entailed several nonviolent campaigns that were crushed by the Nigerian state, which wanted to set an example that any uprising would fail. After the failure of nonviolent action, the Ijaw turned to violent campaigns in order to pressure the government to address their grievances. The Ijaw not only managed to overcome their deprivation, they also saw one of their representatives appointed as vice president.

Apart from the Ijaw and Nigeria, other ethnic rebel groups have experienced similar trajectories. The South Sudanese's long and violent struggle for political and economic participation against the Sudanese government in Khartoum cost around two million lives. This conflict finally resulted in a power-sharing agreement in 2005 and later saw South Sudan gain independence. In Niger, the Tuareg rebellion was the forerunner to the subsequent peace agreements in 1993 and led to Tuareg organizations receiving a share of senior positions in the central government. In Cote d'Ivoire, the violent uprising of the Mande and Voltaic in 2002 resulted in a power-sharing agreement. The Central African Republic experienced a rebellion by the Yakoma tribe in 2001, which led to their inclusion in a power-sharing

agreement. Other examples include the Mayas who overcame discrimination in Guatemala (1996) and the Lithuanians and Estonians who gained regional autonomy from Russia (1957). There are more examples in Togo (1991), Chad (1991), Congo-Brazzaville (1995, 1998), Ethiopia (1992), Yugoslavia (2000), Afghanistan (2002) and Kenya (2008) of how armed struggle has helped ethnic groups to achieve political representation.

5 Formulating a Testable Hypothesis

What are the measurable implications of the proposed causal relationship between rebellion and overcoming deprivation? The hypothesis expects that when a deprived ethnic group engages in a rebellion, the likelihood of overcoming deprivation will increase. If the causal chain works as suggested, a previous rebellion should have a statistically significant effect on an ethnic group's political status – that is, the subsequent improvement from deprived to not deprived.

H: Ethnic rebellion increases an ethnic group's chances of overcoming political deprivation.

6 Data

To test the proposed hypothesis, this paper makes use of several data sources. Most importantly, data on politically deprived ethnic groups are drawn from the GROWup data compilation (Hunziker 2011), which includes the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Cederman et al. 2010) and data on ethnic conflict (Cunningham et al. 2009; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012).

The EPR data include all politically relevant ethnic groups living in sovereign countries (excluding colonies and failed states) with more than 500,000 inhabitants. A group is considered politically relevant and thus included in the data “if at least one political organization claims to represent it in national politics or if its members are subjected to state-led political discrimination” (Hunziker 2011: 5–6). For the purpose of this analysis, the EPR dataset is preferable to the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset because EPR includes all politically relevant ethnic groups – both large and small – and not just mobilized minorities as is the case with the MAR dataset. In this sense, the EPR dataset overcomes the selection bias found in the MAR dataset.

The EPR dataset records the political status of each group in the respective year with a one-dimensional ordinal scale.² The scale measures distinct states of access to federal and subregional governmental power, ranging from the most powerful groups (“monopoly,” “dominant”), to nationally represented groups (“senior partner,” “junior partner”), to groups only represented at the subnational level (“regional autonomy”), to groups not politically

2 See variable “1.5.43 Status_Pwrrank” (Hunziker 2011: 23).

represented at all (“powerless,” “discriminated”) (Cederman et al. 2010: 100–101).³ The universe of cases for this analysis consists of a subsample of the EPR dataset. Given the theoretical interest in whether ethnic rebellion works for politically deprived groups, I limit the sample to ethnic groups that experienced at least one year of deprivation (i.e., status “powerless” or “discriminated”) between 1946 and 2008.

The unit of analysis is group-years. As such, each observation can be uniquely described by combining the group’s identification code i and the year of the observation t . In the remainder of this section, I describe the operationalization of my hypothesis and its data sources. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables described below.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	mean	sd	min	max
<i>Outcome variable</i>				
Overcoming deprivation	0.0584	(0.235)	0	1
<i>Explanatory variable</i>				
Rebellion (t-1/3)	0.102	(0.302)	0	1
<i>Control variables</i>				
Rebelling groups	0.528	(1.440)	0	7
Group size	0.125	(0.165)	0.001	0.980
Groups in power (logged)	0.330	(0.635)	0	2.639
Military personnel pc (logged/t-1)	-5.867	(0.873)	-9.097	-1.554
GDP pc (logged/t-1)	6.344	(1.488)	4.281	10.62
Polity2 (t-1)	-1.958	(6.823)	-10	10
Democratic change (t-1)	0.0318	(0.176)	0	1
Nonviolent campaign (t-1)	0.00185	(0.0430)	0	1
Autocracy (t-1)	0.664	(0.472)	0	1
Partial democracy (t-1)	0.156	(0.363)	0	1
Democracy (t-1)	0.180	(0.384)	0	1
Observations	3,236			
Number of groups	164			

3 Groups may have one of the following statuses:

- 1) Monopoly: the group’s representatives hold absolute executive power and exclude other ethnic groups.
- 2) Dominance: similar to monopoly, but members of other groups are incorporated.
- 3) Senior partner: elite members of the group participate as senior partners in a power-sharing agreement.
- 4) Junior partner: similar to senior partner, but members hold junior positions in a power-sharing agreement.
- 5) Regional autonomy: group representatives have no influence at the central government level, but some at the lower provincial or state level.
- 6) Separatist autonomy: similar to regional autonomy, but indicates that the local government declared unilateral territorial independence from the central government.
- 7) Powerless: representatives have no access to national or regional power, but are not explicitly discriminated against.
- 8) Discriminated: group members are being actively discriminated against with the intention of excluding them from regional and national power.

6.1 Outcome Variable

The central question of this analysis is whether rebellion is an effective strategy to overcome political deprivation. For the outcome variable, I constructed a binary variable that captures a group's change in political status from deprived to nondeprived. This variable takes the value of "1" when a group's political status changes from being deprived ("discriminated" or "powerless") in year_{t-1} to nondeprived (all other statuses) in the subsequent year. The value remains "0" in cases where there is no change. Subsequent observations after the improvement in status are dropped from the sample, but they are reincluded in the sample in cases where a group reexperiences deprivation.

In theory, the variable's ordinal scale would allow the capture of more variation. For instance, the variable could measure whether a group jumps from being "powerless" to "monopoly" or "regional autonomy" or any other status. However, I restrict the variable's values to the deprived-nondeprived dichotomy because the argument is restricted to groups seeking to overcome deprivation, not their attempts to achieve a specific political status. The constructed variable *overcoming deprivation* features 227 events out of 3,236 group-years.

6.2 Explanatory Variable

My hypothesis suggests that engaging in violent rebellion increases the likelihood of a politically deprived ethnic group overcoming political deprivation. Hence, the independent variable measures whether an ethnic group was active in an armed conflict in which it was represented by a rebel group. Hunziker's (2011: 12; 18) compilation of EPR data and other sources includes a dummy variable per group-year observation that indicates whether a group or rebel organizations connected to it were involved in an armed conflict with the government. These conflict data are based on version 4/2010 of the Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) (Gleditsch et al. 2002). I constructed the dummy variable *rebellion* to indicate whether the observed group had been involved in an armed conflict during the three years prior to an observation. A total of 330 out of 3,236 group-years feature an ethnic war. I decided to use the three years prior in order to account for the temporal proximity between an ongoing rebellion and the outcome variable.⁴ Both events (i.e., a rebellion in the three years prior and overcoming political deprivation) only coincide for 37 out of 164 ethnic groups, meaning that 23 percent of the ethnic groups that overcame political deprivation were engaged in an armed conflict during the three years prior to the observation.⁵

4 A three-year lag may be arbitrary. Therefore, I use a variety of alternative lags (e.g. last 5 years, last 10 years, etc.) for the explanatory variable in the section on robustness checks. All lags are robust with regard to their effect direction and statistical significance level.

5 Table A7 in the online appendix lists these groups.

6.3 Control Variables

Whether a deprived ethnic group achieves political rights will not only depend on a rebellion, but also on a number of additional other factors. Therefore, I include a number of other variables of theoretical importance.

Rebelling groups. Another factor that might play a role is whether a state experiences multiple rebellions. If a state has limited resources to deal with rebellions, this may have implications on the success of a rebellion. The variable *rebelling groups* counts the number of ongoing wars per state and year.

Group size. The size of a group is likely to be an important factor in overcoming discrimination because larger groups might be harder to suppress (Gurr 1970) and may have distinct advantages in mobilizing recruits (Lichbach 1995; Olson 1965). I use the variable *group size* from the EPR dataset (Cederman et al. 2010) to control for this effect. *Group size* measures a group's relative size within the state.

Groups in power. The number of groups in power at the federal level (Cederman et al. 2010) is used as an indicator of plurality and may facilitate access for deprived groups.

Military capacity. The military capacity of the state is a factor that will likely influence whether a group's armed struggle to overcome political deprivation will be successful, because governments that adopt discriminatory ethnic policies (Sorens 2010) will try to repress and eliminate insurgency movements that target the state's authority (Davenport and Inman 2012; Davenport 1995). The success of the state in doing so will partly depend on its military capacity. A high level of military capacity will make the territorial control of rebelling areas easier in the long term (Sepp 2005). Only if state success becomes unlikely, will the state and groups in power be willing to drop discriminatory policies and provide rights or even accommodate rebelling groups in power-sharing agreements (Luttwak 1999). I use data from the Correlates of War's National Material Capabilities dataset (Singer 1987), which records a state's military personnel per year. I use a lagged version of *military personnel per capita* to account for a delayed effect of military power.

Nonmilitary state capacity. While military capacity accounts for the coercive side of a state, it fails to account for a state's administrative and bureaucratic capacity. A strong network of state institutions is likely to implement government policies (also discriminatory ones) more effectively in remote areas of the state territory. Hendrix (2010: 274) argues that the capacity of the state to monitor its population and to identify potential insurgents and their bases is better captured by a state's bureaucratic capacity than by its military capacity. This suggests a shift from the state's brute force to its ability to collect and analyze information. Fearon and Laitin (2003: 79–80) suggest that if governments knew about the bases of insurgent movements at the beginning of a conflict, it would be easier to deter such threats against the state. This ability is likely to depend on the capacity of the state in remote areas and may negatively affect a discriminated group's chances of overcoming discrimination. As a measure for the bureaucratic capacity of the state, the literature suggests using a logged

version of GDP per capita. GDP per capita is highly correlated with a number of measures of bureaucratic capacity (Hendrix 2010: 277). The *GDP pc* variable comes from the World Bank's (2013) database.

Level of democratization. Whether a rebellion is an effective strategy or, more importantly, even necessary is influenced by the level of democratization. Democratic countries provide formal channels through which political demands can be brought forward and are likely to have a positive effect on the probability of overcoming deprivation with nonviolent means. Discriminatory policies toward particular groups are likely to be more frequent in autocratic states than in democratic ones. While democratic states are more receptive to nonviolent protests and demands, autocratic governments are less likely to respond positively – particularly if groups demand access to state resources, territorial autonomy or even independence (Fein 1993: 82; Fox 1998; Gurr 2000). It is unlikely that defamation by the international media and human rights groups or targeted sanctions would affect a relatively stable autocratic government (Desch 2002; 2003). In such contexts, peaceful endeavors may not yield the desired success. To measure this, I use data from the Polity IV project (Marshall et al. 2010) and include a lagged *polity2* measure to control for regime status.

Democratic change. It is not only the level of democracy that may be significant, but also the dynamic and process of democratization (Davenport 1999). Autocratic regimes that undergo strong democratic reforms are likely to drop discriminatory policies toward certain groups. This may signal to discriminated groups that violent rebellion is not necessary to achieve political rights. Democratic change is driven to a substantial degree by domestic forces demanding political freedom, civil rights, freedom of the press and the like. Broad nonviolent movements can be the driving forces of democratic reforms and regime change (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Democratic transition is likely to present a rival explanation to violent rebellion. The dummy variable *democratic change* takes the value of “1” if a country experienced a major democratic change in the previous year (Marshall et al. 2010: 35–36).⁶

Nonviolent campaigns. As addressed in the theoretical section, several recent studies find that nonviolent campaigns are generally more effective than violent ones (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Chenoweth and Lewis 2013; Shaykhutdinov 2010; Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). The second version of the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013) codes 250 nonviolent and violent campaigns between 1945 and 2006. NAVCO's unit of analysis is the campaign and therefore cannot be directly merged with the group-level EPR data. To account for nonviolent campaigns by ethnic groups, I use a subsample of the NAVCO data. I filter those campaigns that can be linked

6 Polity4's variable “regtrans” captures various degrees of regime change within a polity. The *democratic change* variable is coded as “1” if the polity4 variable “regtrans” has a value of “3,” indicating an increase of six or more on the polity score over a period of three years.

to an ethnic group, are primarily nonviolent and do not have a radical, violent wing.⁷ The remaining list of nonviolent campaigns by ethnic groups (Table A8 in the online appendix) features 60 campaign-years of which 27 could be linked to a group-year within the EPR data. The binary variable nonviolent campaign is coded as “1” if a group was involved in a nonviolent campaign during the two years prior to an observation.

The other 33 campaign years could not be associated with particular ethnic groups because the campaign descriptions only referred to broad nonethnic categories (e.g., Argentina pro-democracy movement, Democracy movement in China, Greece Anti-Military, Public Against Violence in Slovakia, etc.)

Following Epstein et al. (2006), I created three dummies to estimate the effect of political regime categories: autocracies (-10-0), partial democracies (1-7) and full democracies (8-10).

7 Model

Given the binary nature of the outcome variable, I relied on logistic regressions to estimate the effects of rebellion and alternative factors on whether ethnic groups overcame political deprivation. The model utilizes group-level fixed effects to account for time-invariant unobserved group heterogeneity. The assumption here is that not all groups have the same propensity to use violence when facing deprivation. Some groups are more likely to use violence because, for instance, their cultural norms regarding the legitimacy of violence (which I do not measure) differ. By using group-level fixed effects, it is possible to account for such group-specific features, which are not randomly distributed across all groups. This approach reduces, but does not eliminate, the risk of omitted variable bias (Frees 2010, chap. 2; Wooldridge 2002: 412). Hence, the fixed effects estimator relies on within-group variance and omits from the analysis those variables without within-group variance. With regard to this sample, those groups that remain politically deprived for the period of observation drop out of the analysis.

Admittedly, as this analysis makes use of observational data, problems of reverse causality and omitted variables may arise and lead to biased estimates. For instance, while my hypothesis suggests that rebellion has an effect on overcoming discrimination, the opposite may be true too – specifically, discrimination may affect whether an ethnic group decides to rebel. To account for this, I use lagged versions of the explanatory variables.

Given that the yearly observations within a group are not independent from each other, the analysis need only account for time dependence – that is, what happens to group A in the

7 NAVCO features a variable called “cdivers_ethnicity,” which indicates whether a campaign features ethnic diversity. In this sense ethnic diversity indicates a broad social movement. As this study looks at specific ethnic group aspects (discrimination, rebellion, political rights), I include only campaigns that do not feature ethnic diversity. Furthermore, the subsample only considers campaigns that are primarily nonviolent (prim_method) without a radical wing (rad_wing).

year 1998 will have an effect on what happens to group A in 1999 and so on. As suggested in the literature on time-series models, I use cubic polynomials to account for temporal dependency (Carter and Signorino 2010). The single, square and cubic terms count the years of political deprivation per group and stop when a group changes its status to being not deprived.

8 Results

Table 2 reports the results of the likelihood on overcoming deprivation. All six logistic models use group-level fixed effects. The sample covers the whole period of observation between 1946 and 2008.

Model 1 shows the results for the baseline model without the *rebellion* explanatory variable. The number of *groups in power* has, as suggested, a positive effect and is statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level across all models. This suggests that more inclusive governments are more likely to accommodate representatives of politically deprived ethnic groups. The *military capacity* of the state has a negative effect. Depending on the model specification, the significance level of military capacity varies between 5 percent and 0.1 percent. The bureaucratic capacity of the state measured as GDP pc is not statistically significant in any model. Both *polity2* (level of democracy) and *democratic change* have a positive effect. However, while the level of democracy is not statistically significant, democratic change is statistically significant at the 1 percent or 0.1 percent level. This lends support to the conventional thesis that democratic change presents an alternative route for deprived groups to achieve political rights. The variable *nonviolent campaign* has a negative effect but is not statistically significant in any model. This finding does not necessarily imply that nonviolent campaigns do not work in general, but that nonviolent campaigns by single ethnic groups are not successful. It is highly plausible that a significant share of the variable *democratic change* is influenced by broad social movements and nonviolent campaigns as suggested by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011).

In model 2 the explanatory variable *rebellion* was added to the baseline model. *Rebellion* shows a positive effect, is statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level and remains robust across all models. This result is in line with the suggested causal mechanism. It is worth noting that adding *rebellion* barely changes the influence of the other control variables. Most importantly, the significance level of *democratic change* is not affected when *rebellion* is added. This illustrates that rebellion is an alternative mechanism.

In model 3 I added the number of *rebelling groups* to the model, assuming that the opportunity costs per group decrease when several groups challenge a government. The variable shows the expected positive effect and is statistically significant at 0.1 percent. Again, the effects of the other variables hardly change.

The *polity2* variable is dropped in models 4, 5, and 6 and replaced with dummy variables (*autocracy*, *partial democracy* and *full democracy*, respectively) using the coding scheme of Epstein et al. (2006). In line with the *polity2* variable, none of these dummies is statistically sig-

nificant. It is worth noting that *democratic change* remains robust across these models. I also added the *group size* variable, which has a positive effect and is – depending on the model – statistically significant at the 5 percent or the 0.1 percent level.

In sum, the following aspects are important: First, the effect of *rebellion* is positive and statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level and robust across all models. This lends strong support to the proposed hypothesis that ethnic rebellion increases the chances of overcoming political deprivation. Second, in countries with more groups in power, the chances of overcoming deprivation increase. Third, when a government is facing multiple rebellions, the chances of achieving political rights increase. Fourth, state capacity barely matters. Fifth, like violent struggle, democratic change was found to have a positive and statistically significant effect on overcoming political deprivation.

Table 2: Logistic Regression on Overcoming Deprivation, 1946-2008

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Rebellion (t-1/3)</i>		2.996***	2.618***	2.558***	2.581***	2.491***
		(0.746)	(0.758)	(0.752)	(0.753)	(0.754)
<i>Rebelling groups</i>			1.563***	1.774***	1.789***	1.771***
			(0.345)	(0.364)	(0.363)	(0.369)
<i>Group size</i>				82.85**	87.09***	84.33***
				(25.83)	(25.55)	(25.48)
<i>Groups in power (logged)</i>	7.827***	8.382***	9.644***	11.03***	11.15***	11.19***
	(0.945)	(1.011)	(1.147)	(1.261)	(1.261)	(1.270)
<i>Military personnel pc (logged/t-1)</i>	-1.144*	-1.495**	-1.701**	-1.890**	-1.969***	-1.817**
	(0.498)	(0.511)	(0.561)	(0.576)	(0.569)	(0.559)
<i>GDP pc (logged/t-1)</i>	0.185	0.224	0.358	0.637	0.643	0.524
	(0.656)	(0.642)	(0.675)	(0.635)	(0.630)	(0.647)
<i>Polity2 (t-1)</i>	0.0726	0.0315	0.0154			
	(0.0460)	(0.0494)	(0.0503)			
<i>Democratic change (t-1)</i>	1.616**	1.963**	1.879**	2.018***	2.127***	1.894***
	(0.568)	(0.624)	(0.611)	(0.589)	(0.574)	(0.575)
<i>Nonviolent campaign (t-1)</i>	-8.034	-10.81	-14.52	-10.79	-14.68	-20.27
	(513.4)	(608.8)	(3,769)	(624.9)	(4,523)	(71,587)
<i>Autocracy (t-1)</i>				0.00421		
				(0.527)		
<i>Partial democracy (t-1)</i>					-0.486	
					(0.504)	
<i>Democracy (t-1)</i>						1.054
						(0.736)
<i>Observations</i>	3,236	3,236	3,236	3,236	3,236	3,236
<i>Number of groups</i>	164	164	164	164	164	164
<i>Log likelihood</i>	-194.7	-185.2	-176.8	-172.7	-172.2	-171.7

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10; Group-level fixed effects and cubic time included in all models

Since the effect size of the coefficients cannot be directly interpreted, I simulated the substantive effect of *rebellion* and *democratic change* on the predicted probabilities of overcoming political deprivation.⁸

In the baseline simulation the values of the continuous variables are set to their median. The binary variables *rebellion* and *democratic change* are set to “0,” suggesting that neither a rebellion nor democratic change has taken place. In this model the probability of a group overcoming deprivation is estimated at 7 percent. The first simulation estimates the effect size of *rebellion*. The probability of overcoming deprivation increases to 13 percent when *rebellion* is set to “1,” hence the chances of overcoming deprivation almost double. In the second estimation I reset *rebellion* back to “0” and change *democratic change* to “1” to simulate the effect of a major democratic change within a nation. Unsurprisingly, the effect of a major democratic change is large: the probability of overcoming deprivation increases to 29 percent. While these estimations should not serve as a precise scale of magnitude, they illustrate two things: First, both rebellion and democratic change have a substantial effect on overcoming deprivation. Second, democratic change exceeds the effect of rebellion.

9 Robustness Checks

To test the robustness of the results, I performed a number of additional estimations with alternative models and specifications (for tables, see online appendix). The major conclusions are discussed below.

As a first robustness check, I ran the same specifications as in Table 2 without group-level fixed effects. Although the assumptions of the fixed effects model are more conservative and better suited to this analysis, it comes with a drawback as all groups that feature no variance on the dependent variable are dropped from the analysis. Therefore, I ran a random effects model to consider between-group variance in the estimation.

Table A4 in the online appendix shows the results for the random effects logistic models with the identical variable specifications as provided in Table 2. As we can see, the number of observations and groups in the sample is much higher than in the fixed effects model because groups showing no variation in relation to the outcome variable remain in the sample. The major results are as follows. *Rebellion* is, as expected, positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level across all models. This suggests that unobserved heterogeneous factors do not eliminate the effect of *rebellion*. This is important and strengthens the robustness of the hypothesis. The number of *rebellious groups* does, however, lose its statistical significance. Also, *group size* is not statistically significant. The performance of *groups in power* is similar to the

8 For this I use the Clarify package for Stata (King et al. 2000; Tomz et al. 2003). As Clarify only supports a limited number of statistical models, the following simulations have been performed with a standard logit model without group-level fixed effects using the variable specification of model 3 in the main regression table.

fixed effects models: positive and significant at 0.1 percent. The same holds for *military personnel pc*, which remains negative and statistically significant at 5 percent. Removing fixed effects increases the significance of *GDP pc* up to 0.1 percent. Most importantly, *democratic change* remains robust and positively significant at 0.1 percent across all models. Although the random effects model drastically changes the sample size, the results of the main variables remain robust.

Table A5 shows the results for rare event logit estimations (King and Zeng 2001). As the name suggests, this model is suited to distributions where the dependent variable has only few positive occurrences. While this aspect is beneficial to the analysis, the model allows neither group effects nor modeling of the time-series–cross-section structure of the data. By and large, the results remain robust. The *rebellion* variable is positive, but its statistical significance decreases. Oddly, the number of *rebellious groups* and the *polity2* index now have a negative effect. The other variables remain largely robust as described in the random effects model above.

Table A6 tests various specifications of the explanatory variable *rebellion*. In the other models, rebellion captures whether a deprived group is represented by a rebel group during the three years prior to an observation. Table A6 exploits different time spans of the explanatory variable (e.g., rebellion within the previous 5 years, 6 years, 10 years, etc.). The effect of *rebellion* remains positive and significant at the 0.1 percent level. In short, the results remain robust.

In this section I described the number of robustness checks I performed, whereby I changed the baseline model from fixed to random effects, employed a rare event estimator and scrutinized different operationalizations of the explanatory variable. The results are robust and lend further support to the hypothesis. Besides these findings, the effect of *democratic change* has proven to be robust. Across almost all models and specifications, *democratic change* has a positive effect for groups attempting to overcome political discrimination and is mostly statistically significant at 0.1 percent.

10 Conclusion

The literature on ethnic conflict is largely concerned with the reasons why ethnic groups rebel. Recent studies have found strong empirical evidence that excluded ethnic groups are more likely to rebel (Cederman et al. 2010; Cederman et al. 2011; Østby et al. 2009; Stewart 2008; Østby 2008). However, surprisingly little attention has been paid to whether such ethnic rebellions actually have an effect on improving groups' access to political rights – that is, whether it pays off for politically deprived ethnic groups to rebel.

This paper set out to help fill this gap in the literature. The argument in this article is that violent rebellion increases the chances of ethnic groups overcoming deprivation. The argument presented is straightforward: in states where governments choose to deprive a certain

populace, conventional political means of voicing demands or employing nonviolent means are less fruitful than in democratic, rather inclusive societies. Therefore, violent rebellion presents an alternative route to attaining political rights. On paper, the military power asymmetry between states and politically deprived ethnic groups suggests that a rebel victory is unlikely. As I have argued, however, politically deprived groups do not necessarily aim to defeat governments; they often seek to increase the costs of denying political participation to a point where granting political rights becomes the cheaper option for those in power.

To illustrate this argument, I presented qualitative evidence on how the deprived Ijaw took up arms against the Nigerian government. The Ijaw resorted to violence after nonviolent protests had been repressed by state security forces. By attacking government facilities and oil production sites, the Ijaw were able to successfully increase costs for the Nigerian government and attain political representation.

The statistical analysis of deprived ethnic groups lends further robust support for the proposed hypothesis. Rebellion is a solid predictor of deprived groups gaining political rights. At the same time, the analysis confirms that democratic change serves as a solid alternative predictor of overcoming deprivation. Democratic change has been theorized as a rival mechanism through which deprived ethnic groups can attain rights. Democratic change does not just happen; it is likely to be driven by – among other things – broad social movements calling for civil rights, democratic transition and regime change. In this sense, democratic change may be a proxy for successful nonviolent campaigns. This speculative interpretation relates in particular to more recent studies on the effectiveness of nonviolent campaigns (see e.g. Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).

To gain a more systematic view on the interplay between nonviolent and violent strategies in ethnic conflicts, future research would benefit from more fine-grained data on escalation processes. Such an endeavor would facilitate more rigorous testing of the assumption that violence is likely to become more viable once nonviolence has failed.

In a nutshell, political leaders in nondemocratic regimes should be aware that politically deprived groups will aim to achieve political rights. Regimes can respond to nonviolent calls for political rights with democratic change or repression. Should a state react with democratic change, this will signal that nonviolent means are effective in overcoming political deprivation. Should a state counter with repression, this will indicate that nonviolence is ineffective and lead to radicalization and rebellion, which – as shown in this analysis – may work in favor of the politically deprived.

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Online-Appendix

Does Violence Pay? The Effect of Ethnic Rebellion on Overcoming Political Deprivation

Carlo Koos

Table A4: Logistic Regression (Random Effects) on Overcoming Deprivation, 1946-2008

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Rebellion (t-1/3)		0.950**	1.093**	1.061**	1.047**	1.028**
		(0.346)	(0.352)	(0.350)	(0.348)	(0.349)
Rebelling groups			-0.227	-0.234	-0.240	-0.209
			(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.150)
Group size				1.692	1.809	1.978+
				(1.184)	(1.162)	(1.194)
Groups in power (logged)	3.102***	3.289***	3.055***	3.007***	2.937***	3.099***
	(0.434)	(0.456)	(0.467)	(0.456)	(0.466)	(0.451)
Military personnel pc (logged/t-1)	-0.459*	-0.502**	-0.475*	-0.433*	-0.403*	-0.396*
	(0.182)	(0.190)	(0.185)	(0.181)	(0.177)	(0.180)
GDP pc (logged/t-1)	-0.544***	-0.518***	-0.522***	-0.532***	-0.592***	-0.635***
	(0.130)	(0.135)	(0.130)	(0.126)	(0.120)	(0.129)
Polity2 (t-1)	-0.0365	-0.0395+	-0.0407+			
	(0.0231)	(0.0238)	(0.0234)			
Democratic change (t-1)	2.191***	2.228***	2.248***	2.287***	2.281***	2.006***
	(0.325)	(0.332)	(0.328)	(0.328)	(0.317)	(0.305)
Nonviolent campaign (t-1)	-18.34	-18.46	-19.90	-18.71	-37.40	-23.34
	(16,283)	(14,855)	(30,351)	(17,267)	(2.018e+08)	(176,682)
Autocracy (t-1)				0.620*		
				(0.283)		
Partial democracy (t-1)					-0.764**	
					(0.285)	
Democracy (t-1)						0.269
						(0.352)
Constant	-7.903***	-8.847***	-8.323***	-8.478***	-7.280***	-7.550***
	(1.781)	(1.898)	(1.882)	(1.864)	(1.789)	(1.826)
Observations	10,123	10,123	10,123	10,123	10,123	10,123
Number of groups	430	430	430	430	430	430
Log likelihood	-1022	-1018	-1017	-1015	-1014	-1017

Standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.10; Cubic time included in all models.

Table A5: Rare-event Logit on Overcoming Deprivation, 1946-2008

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Rebellion (t-1/3)		0.244	0.676*	0.662*	0.635*	0.627*
		(0.232)	(0.263)	(0.266)	(0.267)	(0.263)
Rebelling groups			-0.277***	-0.280***	-0.287***	-0.279***
			(0.0618)	(0.0624)	(0.0649)	(0.0633)
Group size				0.336	0.380	0.493
				(0.383)	(0.377)	(0.366)
Groups in power (logged)	0.640***	0.643***	0.581***	0.617***	0.563***	0.514***
	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.135)
Military personnel pc (logged/t-1)	-0.0315	-0.0319	-0.0380	-0.0303	-0.0350	-0.00881
	(0.0821)	(0.0823)	(0.0811)	(0.0814)	(0.0806)	(0.0796)
GDP pc (logged/t-1)	-0.479***	-0.471***	-0.492***	-0.473***	-0.498***	-0.555***
	(0.0852)	(0.0859)	(0.0834)	(0.0832)	(0.0769)	(0.0763)
Polity2 (t-1)	-0.0191	-0.0204	-0.0164			
	(0.0145)	(0.0146)	(0.0146)			
Democratic change (t-1)	1.686***	1.683***	1.813***	1.919***	2.055***	1.728***
	(0.261)	(0.262)	(0.264)	(0.274)	(0.289)	(0.255)
Autocracy (t-1)				0.399*		
				(0.195)		
Partial democracy (t-1)					-0.667**	
					(0.224)	
Democracy (t-1)						0.229
						(0.262)
Constant	-2.484**	-2.577**	-2.369**	-2.742**	-2.136**	-1.821*
	(0.902)	(0.899)	(0.878)	(0.921)	(0.821)	(0.790)
Observations	10,123	10,123	10,123	10,123	10,123	10,123
Log likelihood
AIC

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.10; Clustered standard errors and cubic time included in all models.

Table A6: Various Specifications of the Explanatory Variable, 1946-2008

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Rebellion (t-1/3)	2.504***					
	(0.603)					
Rebellion (t-1/5)		2.342***				
		(0.594)				
Rebellion (t-1/10)			2.857***			
			(0.601)			
Rebellion (t-1/6)				2.376***		
				(0.554)		
Rebellion (t-6/10)					2.647***	
					(0.715)	
Rebellion (t-3/5)						2.553***
						(0.663)
Rebelling groups	1.130***	1.189***	1.168***	1.194***	1.281***	1.260***
	(0.299)	(0.296)	(0.302)	(0.294)	(0.281)	(0.289)
Groups in power (logged)	9.131***	8.990***	8.888***	8.856***	8.912***	9.073***
	(1.015)	(1.007)	(0.998)	(1.003)	(1.001)	(1.022)
Military personnel pc (logged/t-1)	-0.903*	-0.865*	-0.913*	-0.882*	-0.842*	-0.921*
	(0.400)	(0.401)	(0.403)	(0.403)	(0.416)	(0.405)
GDP pc (logged/t-1)	-0.00617	-0.0109	0.0294	0.00498	-0.0285	-0.00697
	(0.239)	(0.239)	(0.244)	(0.241)	(0.244)	(0.243)
Polity2 (t-1)	0.0116	0.0208	0.0112	0.0161	0.0469	0.0339
	(0.0437)	(0.0439)	(0.0450)	(0.0443)	(0.0433)	(0.0431)
Democratic change (t-1)	1.997***	1.945***	2.007***	1.978***	1.868***	1.910***
	(0.532)	(0.530)	(0.537)	(0.527)	(0.516)	(0.504)
Nonviolent campaign (t-1)	-5.942	-5.016	-6.746	-7.967	-7.985	-8.331
	(808.1)	(510.1)	(960.7)	(2,391)	(2,341)	(2,349)
Observations	3,705	3,705	3,705	3,705	3,705	3,705
Number of groups	185	185	185	185	185	185

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.10; Group-level fixed effects and cubic time included in all models.

Table A7: List of Ethnic Groups that Overcame Deprivation and Were Engaged in an Armed Conflict during the Previous Three Years

countryname	year	groupname	statusname
Mexico	1995	Indigenous peoples	SEPARATIST AUTONOMY
Spain	1979	Basques	REGIONAL AUTONOMY
Yugoslavia	2000	Albanians	SEPARATIST AUTONOMY
Mali	1991	Tuareg	JUNIOR PARTNER
Mali	1996	Arabs/Moors	JUNIOR PARTNER
Niger	1993	Tuareg	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ivory Coast	2003	Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)	JUNIOR PARTNER
Liberia	1990	Gio	STATE COLLAPSE
Liberia	1990	Mano	STATE COLLAPSE
Nigeria	1970	Igbo	JUNIOR PARTNER
Nigeria	2007	Ijaw	JUNIOR PARTNER
Central African Republic	2009	Goula	IRRELEVANT
Central African Republic	2003	Yakoma	JUNIOR PARTNER
Chad	1991	Hadjerai ٪	JUNIOR PARTNER
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1997	Tutsi-Banyamulenge	SENIOR PARTNER
Democratic Republic of the Congo	2003	Tutsi-Banyamulenge	JUNIOR PARTNER
Uganda	1986	Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur)	IRRELEVANT
Burundi	2002	Hutu	SENIOR PARTNER
Rwanda	1995	Tutsi	DOMINANT
Djibouti	1992	Afar	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ethiopia	1992	Oroma	JUNIOR PARTNER
Ethiopia	1991	Christian Eritreans	SEPARATIST AUTONOMY
Ethiopia	1991	Muslim Eritreans	SEPARATIST AUTONOMY
Sudan	1972	Azande	REGIONAL AUTONOMY
Sudan	1972	Bari	REGIONAL AUTONOMY
Sudan	1972	Dinka	REGIONAL AUTONOMY
Sudan	2006	Dinka	JUNIOR PARTNER
Sudan	1972	Latoka	REGIONAL AUTONOMY
Iraq	1991	Kurd	SEPARATIST AUTONOMY
Afghanistan	2002	Hazaras	JUNIOR PARTNER
Afghanistan	2002	Tajiks	SENIOR PARTNER
Afghanistan	2002	Uzbeks	JUNIOR PARTNER
India	2003	Bodo	REGIONAL AUTONOMY
India	1987	Indigenous Tripuri	REGIONAL AUTONOMY
India	1963	Naga	REGIONAL AUTONOMY
Myanmar	1960	Buddhist Arakanese	SEPARATIST AUTONOMY
Myanmar	1962	Kachins	REGIONAL AUTONOMY
Myanmar	1960	Mons	SEPARATIST AUTONOMY
Myanmar	1958	Muslim Arakanese	SEPARATIST AUTONOMY
Myanmar	1962	Shan	SEPARATIST AUTONOMY
Philippines	1971	Moro	SEPARATIST AUTONOMY

Table A8: Nonviolent Campaigns without Radical Flanks and without Ethnic Diversity according to NAVCO 2.0

<i>Campaign</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Target</i>	<i>Link to ethnic group-year according to EPR</i>
Argentina pro-democracy movement	Argentina	1980	military junta	No
Argentina pro-democracy movement	Argentina	1982	military junta	No
Argentina pro-democracy movement	Argentina	1983	military junta	No
Democracy Movement	China	1976	Communist regime	No
Democracy Movement	China	1978	Communist regime	No
Democracy Movement	China	1979	Communist regime	No
Hundred Flowers Movement	China	1956	Communist regime	No
Tiananmen	China	1989	Communist regime	No
Croatian Institutional Reform	Croatia	1999	semi-presidential system	No
Croatian Institutional Reform	Croatia	2000	semi-presidential system	No
Ethniki Organosis Kyprios Agoniston	Cyprus	1954	British occupation	No
Gamsakhurdia and Abkhazia	Georgia	1990	Georgian occupation	Yes: Abkhazians
Gamsakhurdia and Abkhazia	Georgia	1991	Georgian occupation	Yes: Abkhazians
Anti-Rawlings	Ghana	2000	Rawlings govt	No
Anti-Karamanlis	Greece	1963	Karamanlis regime	No
Greece Anti-Military	Greece	1973	Military rule	No
Greece Anti-Military	Greece	1974	Military rule	No
Marxist rebels (URNG)	Guatemala	1963	government of Guatemala	Yes: Mayas
Marxist rebels (URNG)	Guatemala	1964	government of Guatemala	Yes: Mayas
Anti-Burnham/Hoyte	Guyana	1990	Burnham/ Hoyte autocratic regime	No
Druze resistance	Israel	1982	Israeli occupation of Golan	No
Latvia pro-dem movement	Latvia	1991	Communist regime	No
Nyasaland African Congress	Malawi	1958	British rule	No
Nyasaland African Congress	Malawi	1959	British rule	No
Anti-Gayoom	Maldives	2003	Maumoon Abudul Gayoom's regime	No
Anti-Gayoom	Maldives	2004	Maumoon Abudul Gayoom's regime	No
Anti-Gayoom	Maldives	2005	Maumoon Abudul Gayoom's regime	No
Anti-Gayoom	Maldives	2006	Maumoon Abudul Gayoom's regime	No
Mali Anti-Military	Mali	1992	Military rule	No

<i>Campaign</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Target</i>	<i>Link to ethnic group-year according to EPR</i>
Ogoni movement	Nigeria	1990	Nigerian govt and corporate exploitation	Yes: Ogoni
Ogoni movement	Nigeria	1991	Nigerian govt and corporate exploitation	Yes: Ogoni
Ogoni movement	Nigeria	1992	Nigerian govt and corporate exploitation	Yes: Ogoni
Ogoni movement	Nigeria	1993	Nigerian govt and corporate exploitation	Yes: Ogoni
Ogoni movement	Nigeria	1995	Nigerian govt and corporate exploitation	Yes: Ogoni
IRA	Northern Ireland	1968	British occupation	Yes: Catholics in N.Ireland
Carnation Revolution	Portugal	1973	Military rule	No
Rwandan independence	Rwanda	1956	Belgain occupation	No
Rwandan independence	Rwanda	1958	Belgain occupation	No
Public Against Violence	Slovakia	1989	Czech communist government	No
Public Against Violence	Slovakia	1990	Czech communist government	No
Public Against Violence	Slovakia	1991	Czech communist government	No
Anti-Thaksin	Thailand	2005	Thaksin regime	No
Tibetan Uprising	Tibet	1987	Chinese occupation	Yes: Tibetans
Tibetan Uprising	Tibet	1988	Chinese occupation	Yes: Tibetans
Tibetan Uprising	Tibet	1989	Chinese occupation	Yes: Tibetans
Tunisian independence movement	Tunisia	1952	French occupation	No
West Papua Anti-Occupation	West Papua	2002	Indonesian occupation	Yes: Papua
West Papua Anti-Occupation	West Papua	2003	Indonesian occupation	Yes: Papua
West Papua Anti-Occupation	West Papua	2004	Indonesian occupation	Yes: Papua
West Papua Anti-Occupation	West Papua	2005	Indonesian occupation	Yes: Papua
West Papua Anti-Occupation	West Papua	2006	Indonesian occupation	Yes: Papua
Western Sahara Freedom Movement (POLISARIO)	Western Sahara	1982	Moroccan occupation	Yes: Sahrawis
Croatian nationalists	Yugoslavia	1970	Yugoslav government	Yes: Croats
Croatian nationalists	Yugoslavia	1971	Yugoslav government	Yes: Croats
Kosovo Albanian	Yugoslavia	1989	Serbian rule	Yes: Albanian
Kosovo Albanian	Yugoslavia	1991	Serbian rule	Yes: Albanian
Kosovo Albanian	Yugoslavia	1992	Serbian rule	Yes: Albanian
Kosovo Albanian	Yugoslavia	1994	Serbian rule	Yes: Albanian
Kosovo Albanian	Yugoslavia	1995	Serbian rule	Yes: Albanian
Kosovo Albanian nationalist movement	Yugoslavia	1981	Yugoslav government	Yes: Albanian