

## **EU Intergovernmental Conferences**

### **A Quantitative Analytical Reconstruction and Data-Handbook of Domestic Preference Formation, Transnational Networks, and Dynamics of Compromise during the Amsterdam Treaty Negotiations**

Paul W. Thurner  
Franz Urban Pappi  
Michael Stoiber

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Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES)

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## Abstract

The Amsterdam Treaty constitutes a further step in the process of the gradual EU constitution building. By this quantitative analytical reconstruction of the respective negotiation structures and processes our objective was a) to identify the domestic formal as well as informal structures of EU member states having been in charge for the preparation of Intergovernmental Conferences; b) to make visible intranational as well as international preference constellations with regard to the agenda of an IGC; c) to trace the dynamic aspects of such negotiations. We outline the metatheoretical and theoretical starting point as well as the conceptualization of our study design. Operationalizations of core concepts are delivered. In order to make transparent data collection and to point to the possibilities of quantitative case studies we provide extensive tabulation and visualization.

# Contents

1.	Introduction .....	11
1.1.	General Goal.....	11
1.2.	Research Question .....	12
1.3.	Theoretical Background: Multilevel Governance and Multilevel Games .....	15
1.4.	Research Design.....	17
1.5.	Data Collection: Combining Document Analysis and Elite Surveying .....	22
2.	The Agenda: Notes, Issues, and Issue Groups.....	25
2.1.	The (Re)Construction of a Negotiation Space .....	25
2.2.	Operationalization and Data Collection .....	25
2.3.	Translating Notes into One-dimensional Issues .....	29
2.4.	The 46 Issues.....	33
3.	The Intranational Game .....	47
3.1.	A Theory of the Governmental Organization .....	47
3.2.	Operationalization .....	49
3.2.1.	The organization of the governmental preparation process .....	49
3.2.2.	Intranational Preference Constellations .....	55
3.3.	Data Collection.....	56
3.4.	Formal and informal coordination structures .....	59
3.4.1.	Austria .....	59
3.4.2.	Belgium .....	62
3.4.3.	Denmark.....	65
3.4.4.	Finland.....	68
3.4.5.	France .....	71
3.4.6.	Germany.....	74
3.4.7.	Great Britain .....	77
3.4.8.	Greece.....	80

3.4.9.	Ireland .....	83
3.4.10.	Italy .....	86
3.4.11.	Luxembourg .....	89
3.4.12.	The Netherlands.....	92
3.4.13.	Portugal.....	95
3.4.14.	Spain .....	97
3.4.15.	Sweden .....	100
3.5.	Intranational Preference Constellations.....	103
	Issue 1.1: Citizenship of the Union .....	103
	Issue 1.2: Procedure for Adding Art. 8 (Citizenship) Without Revision of the Treaty.....	104
	Issue 1.3: Introducing Fundamental Rights to the Treaty.....	105
	Issue 1.4: Monitoring Observance of Fundamental Rights.....	106
	Issue 1.5: Principle of Subsidiarity.....	107
	Issue 1.6: Review of Compliance With the Principle of Subsidiarity .....	108
	Issue 1.7: Transparency: Opening up the Council's Proceedings.....	109
	Issue 1.8: Legal Personality for the European Union .....	110
	Issue 2.1: CFSP: Responsibility for Planning and Preparation .....	111
	Issue 2.2: CFSP: Decision-making Procedure .....	112
	Issue 2.3: CFSP: Responsibility for the Implementation .....	113
	Issue 2.4: Financing the CFSP .....	114
	Issue 2.5: Art. J.4.: Common Defence Policy .....	115
	Issue 2.6: : The Union's Relations With the WEU .....	116
	Issue 2.7: The Armaments Question .....	117
	Issue 3.1: Objectives and Scope within JHA .....	118
	Issue 3.2: Modes of Action within JHA .....	119
	Issue 3.3: Decision-making Procedures .....	120
	Issue 3.4: JHA: Democratic Control.....	121
	Issue 3.5: Judicial Control within the JHA .....	122
	Issue 3.6: Financing the JHA.....	123
	Issue 4.1: Composition of the European Parliament .....	124
	Issue 4.2: Uniform Electoral Procedure for the European Parliament.....	125
	Issue 4.3: Decision-making in the Council: Unanimity and QMV .....	126
	Issue 4.4: Decision-making in the Council: QMV-Threshold .....	127
	Issue 4.5: Decision-making in the Council: Weighting of Votes in the Case of Enlargement ....	128
	Issue 4.6: Decision-making in the Council: Dual Majorities.....	129
	Issue 4.7: Composition of the Commission .....	130
	Issue 4.8: Enhanced Cooperation: Introducing Flexibility .....	131
	Issue 4.9: Enhanced Cooperation: Conditions for Flexibility .....	132
	Issue 5.1: European Parliament : Right for Drafting Proposals.....	133

Issue 5.2: European Parliament : Procedures.....	134
Issue 5.3: Scope of the Legislative Procedures .....	135
Issue 5.4: European Parliament : Election of the President of the Commission .....	136
Issue 5.5: European Parliament : Budget Power.....	137
Issue 5.6: Role of the National Parliaments .....	138
Issue 5.7: Power of the Commission .....	139
Issue 5.8: Power of the Court of Justice.....	140
Issue 5.9: Power of the Committee of the Regions .....	141
Issue 5.10: Power of the Economic and Social Committee.....	142
Issue 6.1: Employment: Objectives and Employment Chapter .....	143
Issue 6.2: Employment Committee.....	144
Issue 6.3: Environment .....	145
Issue 6.4: Stricter Rules on Environmental Policy by Member States .....	146
Issue 6.5: Community Policies : New Policies.....	147
Issue 6.6: External Economic Relations .....	148
4. The Transnational Game .....	149
4.1. Practical and Theoretical Background .....	149
4.2. Operationalization .....	150
4.3. Transnational Networks: The Member States' Perspective .....	152
4.4. Transnational Networks: Enhanced European Cooperation of Jurisdictions .....	159
5. The International Game .....	164
5.1. Theoretical Background .....	164
5.2. Data Collection and Operationalization .....	166
5.3. The Positions of the Member States.....	169
Issue 1.1: Citizenship of the Union .....	169
Issue 1.2: Procedure for Adding Art. 8 (Citizenship) Without Revision of the Treaty.....	171
Issue 1.3: Introducing Fundamental Rights to the Treaty.....	173
Issue 1.4: Monitoring Observance of Fundamental Rights .....	175
Issue 1.5: Principle of Subsidiarity.....	177
Issue 1.6: Review of Compliance With the Principle of Subsidiarity .....	179
Issue 1.7: Transparency: Opening up the Council's Proceedings.....	181
Issue 1.8: Legal Personality for the European Union .....	183
Issue 2.1: CFSP: Responsibility for Planning and Preparation .....	185
Issue 2.2: CFSP: Decision-making Procedure .....	187



Issue 2.3: CFSP: Responsibility for the Implementation .....	190
Issue 2.4: Financing the CFSP .....	192
Issue 2.5: Art. J.4.: Common Defence Policy .....	194
Issue 2.6: The Union's Relations With the WEU .....	196
Issue 2.7: The Armaments Question .....	199
Issue 3.1: Objectives and Scope within JHA .....	201
Issue 3.2: Modes of Action within JHA .....	203
Issue 3.3: Decision-making Procedures.....	205
Issue 3.4: JHA: Democratic Control .....	209
Issue 3.5: Judicial Control within the JHA .....	211
Issue 4.1: Composition of the European Parliament .....	213
Issue 4.2: Uniform Electoral Procedure for the European Parliament.....	215
Issue 4.3: Decision-making in the Council: Unanimity and QMV .....	217
Issue 4.4: Decision-making in the Council: QMV-Threshold .....	220
Issue 4.5: Decision-making in the Council: Weighting of Votes in the Case of Enlargement ....	223
Issue 4.6: Decision-making in the Council: Dual Majorities.....	226
Issue 4.7: Composition of the Commission .....	229
Issue 4.8: Enhanced Cooperation: Introducing Flexibility .....	232
Issue 4.9: Enhanced Cooperation: Conditions for Flexibility .....	234
Issue 5.1: European Parliament : Right for Drafting Proposals.....	237
Issue 5.2: European Parliament : Procedures.....	239
Issue 5.3: Scope of the Legislative Procedures .....	241
Issue 5.4: European Parliament : Election of the President of the Commission .....	244
Issue 5.5: European Parliament : Budget Power.....	246
Issue 5.6: Role of the National Parliaments .....	248
Issue 5.7: Power of the Commission .....	250
Issue 5.8: Power of the Court of Justice .....	252
Issue 5.9: Power of the Committee of the Regions .....	254
Issue 5.10: Power of the Economic and Social Committee.....	256
Issue 6.1: Employment: Objectives and Employment Chapter .....	258
Issue 6.2: Employment Committee.....	261
Issue 6.3: Environment .....	265
Issue 6.4: Stricter Rules on Environmental Policy by Member States .....	267
Issue 6.5: Community Policies : New Policies.....	269
Issue 6.6: External Economic Relations .....	271
6. Constitutional Ratification Requirements.....	274
6.1. Conceptualization, Data Collection and Operationalization.....	274
6.2. Ratification Trees .....	275

Annex 1: Questionnaires .....	282
Annex 2: List of Delegation Members .....	285
References .....	287

## 1. Introduction<sup>1</sup>

### 1.1. General Goal

This handbook provides a collection of data for a specific multi-actor, multi-issue, multilevel negotiation system: the Intergovernmental Conference 1996 (IGC 1996) resulting in the Amsterdam treaty. This conference took place from April 1996 to June 16/17 1997, i.e. 16 months. Mostly, personal delegates of the foreign ministers carried out the negotiations. But also IGC-focused meetings of particular ministers were held. At the summit night the head of states or governments bargained in a medieval tournament way questions left open by the mandated delegates.

The European Union is considered a unique organizational form world wide, because of its mixture of at the same time supranational and international components of the organizational architecture. Whereas actors inspired by federalist ideas try to centralize, to fusion and to build up a supranational, hierarchical organization, more intergovernmentally oriented actors try to preserve the member states as sovereign nations.

EU Intergovernmental Conferences are international treaty making or treaty reforming conferences of the EU. They have the function to develop a constitution for the European Union, i.e. to set up an institutional design. The IGC 1996 is part of a whole sequence of such intergovernmental conferences resulting in the Treaty of Rome (1957), the Maastricht (1992) and Nice Treaty (2000). The IGC 1996 had the purpose of fulfilling Political Union, of (re-)balancing the division of power, but especially of preparing the institutional setting for EU enlargement.

In international relations intergovernmental treaties set up the “rules of the game“. Treaties form the constitutions of international relations. Intergovernmental Conferences are rule-making negotiations. Like national constitutions, intergovernmental treaties contain only global goals and procedures for future decision-making. Inherently, such negotiations are characterized by their sheer complexity and therefore by a lack of transparency for the involved actors. As a consequence, the problems of cooperation and efficiency, well known for bilateral collective-decision making settings, are multiplied. The aim of our problem-driven and theory-driven presentation is to make understandable the complexities of such negotiations by offering appropriately measured data. This purely descriptive handbook is the documentation of a research project titled as 'International Negotiations and

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<sup>1</sup> This work is a result of the project “International Negotiations and National Interministerial Coordination“ (INNIC), part of the Research Group “Institutionalization of International Negotiation Systems” (IINS - <http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/arb2/iins/IINSStart.htm>), financed by the German Research Foundation. We wish to thank Beate Kohler-Koch, Christian Henning, Helen Milner, Peter-Christian Müller-Graff, Fritz W. Scharpf, George Tsebelis, Helen Wallace, the members of the 'IINS'-Group, and the participants of the conference “Resolving Conflicts. Acknowledging a Scientific Approach” at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research in Bielefeld for helpful comments and discussions. We also thank Clemens Kroneberg, Eric Linhart, and Cornelia Weinmann for their dedicated research assistance.

Interministerial Coordination: The IGC 1996'. The descriptions to follow have been a necessary first step<sup>2</sup> for our explanatory oriented approaches (Turner/Stoiber 2002, Stoiber 2002, Linhart 2002, Linhart/Turner 2002, Turner/Linhart 2002, Turner/Kroneberg/Stoiber 2002).

In order to dissect the structure and processes of the negotiations under view we will provide extensive tabulation as well as graphical visualizations. By means of these presentations we want to show possibilities of a reduction of negotiation complexities. We provide a 'tomography' of human interactions in order to predict the emerging outcomes. However, as the reference to King et al. (1994) should have made clear, data collection and presentation is not an end in itself. This data handbook is intended to bring together formal theorists, empirically working scientists as well as practitioners. It is an offer to those who are interested in the measurement and mapping of human interaction and those interested in mathematical and statistical methods for the empirical analysis of collective decision-making.

Comparable social research on international relations has been done by Raiffa (1982), Friedheim (1993), Sebenius (1984), or concerning the EU by Schnorpfeil (1996) or by Henning (2000). The authors measure the decision-making situation of international negotiations according to multi-attributive decision theory and according to the spatial theory of voting. However, the lack of sufficient good data on international politics continues (cf. King/Keohane/Verba 1994: 24).

We aim at providing new problem- and theory-driven operationalizations, measurements and descriptions of multilevel negotiations with regard to the gradual constitutionalization of the European Union. We intend to leave behind the often metaphorical as well as purely formal use of the concept of multilevel games / multilevel negotiations, multilevel governance and – hopefully – offer new perspectives and insights.

## **1.2. Research Question**

In the following, we introduce the reader to the guiding research question. Starting from theoretical literature on multilevel games<sup>3</sup> we successively develop an empirical operational research question. Abbreviated, we ask whether and how national governmental organizational structures and processes have an impact on international negotiations. More precisely, we ask whether we can deduce intergovernmental negotiation outcomes during the IGC 1996 and settled in the Amsterdam treaty from variability in the interministerial coordination structures, from preference constellations and coalition building both on the national, transnational and international level. The IGC 1996 has been

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<sup>2</sup> "[w]e cannot construct meaningful causal explanations without good description; description, in turn, loses most of its interest unless linked to some causal relationships. Description often comes first; it is hard to develop explanations before we know something about the world and what needs to be explained on the basis of what characteristics" (King/Keohane/Verba 1994: 34).

<sup>3</sup> For an overview cf. Milner 1997.

chosen in order to make a contribution to ongoing debates<sup>4</sup> in IR literature. The questions we treat have been raised by the competing grand theories like (neo-)functionalism, (neo-)liberalism and neo(realism), namely

- whether EU integration is driven mainly by intergovernmental conferences with EU Member States acting as monolithic actors (cf. Moravcsik 1998),
- or whether specific intranational factors determine the member states' decision making (cf. Milner 1997),
- or whether there is a fusion of ministerial bureaucracies towards a unified European administration (cf. Wessels 1997),
- or whether IGC negotiation outcomes are power-driven (cf. Moravcsik 1998),
- or whether the outcomes are driven by policy-specific needs of (asymmetrically affected) Member States (cf. Stone Sweet 2001).

More specifically, we ask how the following factors impede or facilitate the delegation of power/authority towards supranational organizations and how they influence ministries' capability to get their most preferred negotiation positions through:

- Type of negotiation issue under view,
- Configuration of preferences (intra- and international),
- Structure of national political institutions,
- Interministerial coordination styles,
- Intranational and international allocation of power.

These general questions require first to identify the respective policy-making processes within the negotiating countries. How do ministries in different parliamentary systems manage the preparation of their negotiation positions? How do governments manage conflicts between ministries before and during negotiations? How can we explain the agenda setting and agenda selection process of intergovernmental negotiations as well as the outcome of the IGC 1996? Whereas the bulk of the literature concentrates on problems and solutions of preparing and coordinating the daily business of EU policy-making (e.g. Pappas 1995, Rometsch/Wessels 1996), Menon (2000: 91) explicitly points to a new type of coordination, neglected so far: the so called 'non-routine coordination'. The fields of preparing European Council meetings and IGCs face similar problems of interministerial coordination as the coordination of daily business, but often specific coordination mechanisms are implemented.

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<sup>4</sup> For overviews cf. Moravcsik 1998, Sandholtz/Stone Sweet 1998, Stone Sweet/Sandholtz/Fligstein 2001.

In order to derive the empirical operational concepts in a theoretically consistent way, first we introduce the theoretical and methodological background. Then we make transparent the prescriptions and rules for the operationalizations of concepts we used.

### 1.3. Theoretical Background: Multilevel Governance and Multilevel Games

For a systematic conceptualization of the relationship between interministerial coordination processes and international negotiations we borrow from multilevel governance approaches. The problem of multilevel governance<sup>5</sup> is virulent as long as political actors are engaged and committed in different arenas: The more a political system is centralized, the less coordination efforts between veto powered actors at lower levels are required. At the same time the accountability of political decisions is higher the higher the centralization in a political system. On the other hand, the value-added of political coordination efforts may be considerable given the existence of valuable decentralized information as well as potentially conflict-inducing heterogeneous preferences.

A first outline how to conceive these problems more systematically has been proposed in the meanwhile classical article of Putnam (1988)<sup>6</sup>, who used the concept of multilevel games in order to develop generalizable propositions on the complex relationship between the level of an international negotiation system and the domestic level where the ratification of the negotiation results takes place. Putnam assumes that the actors have Euclidean preferences over negotiation issues and applies the notion of win sets as a solution concept. The 'win set' of an international negotiation system is the set of all agreements that are ratifiable by all domestic principals of the negotiators since they improve or are at least not worse than the status quo (cf. Shepsle / Bonchek 1997, Tsebelis 2002).

Given this multilevel setting, Putnam derives two hypotheses: The risk of a failure of the international negotiation increases the more the win set shrinks due to domestic restrictions. Then, the discretionary leeway of the negotiating agent is reduced. At the same time, domestic restrictions constitute leverage because the agent ostensibly is committed to make no concessions without running the risk of losing his mandate or the support of its domestic clientele. Putnam informally provides further domestic determinants influencing the size of the win set, especially the structure of preferences of domestic level actors and coalitions: Is the domestic arena characterized by homogenous or by heterogeneous preferences? Are the issues to be negotiated internationally one-dimensional or multidimensional with only the latter ones offering possibilities of compromise through issue linkage and cross-issue compensation. Further relevant variables according to Putnam are the domestic institutional settings: Do ratification requirements have direct implications for position taking in international negotiations and the resulting win set?

Meanwhile, the informal suggestions of Putnam have been successively formalized in number of articles with the aim of deriving consequences for single aspects under specified conditions. (Cf. Morrow 1991, Mayer 1992, Lohmann 1993, Iida 1993, von Witzke/Hausner 1993, Dupont 1994, McGillivray 1995, Milner/Rosendorff 1995, Mo 1994,1995, Pahre 1994a, b, 1996). As a rule, the studies can be classified according to how they specify the actors (voters, interest groups,

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<sup>5</sup> We define political governance as formal and informal political organizational designs leading to collectively binding decisions. The collective subject to such decisions has to be specified.

<sup>6</sup> For a new perspective on that article, cf. Thurner/Linhart 2002.

bureaucracy, governments etc.), how they specify the actors' preferences (homogenous, heterogeneous, one- versus multidimensional), and how they specify the distribution of information (asymmetric versus symmetric incomplete information on the domestic and/or international level).

According to Milner (1997, 1998), institutional variants of domestic political governance forms play a crucial role for international negotiations. These governance forms can be arrayed along a continuum from pure hierarchy over polyarchy to anarchy. In the view of the realist school of international relations, hierarchy corresponds to the assumption of a unitary actor with a unipolar and concentrated center of power. Anarchy refers to a situation in which each actor has veto power and decides unilaterally. Forms of polyarchy are located in between and are characterized as networks.<sup>7</sup>

These studies have made impressive progress in formalizing the problem of multilevel governance for selected aspects. They have derived numerous interesting counterintuitive insights. This literature has sensibilised the *scientific community* that the assumption of the state as a unitary actor constitutes only a simplification within explanations which has to be – under specific conditions, not always – complemented by antecedent conditions on the micro-level or, at least, at lower levels of aggregation (cf. Tsebelis 1990 and Milner 1998 for the IR context).

However, especially the contributions of game theoretical studies have been restricted again – necessarily – to constellations of highly aggregated actors. Most of the time, the specified underlying strategic situations are limited to two bargaining agents. In the study of Milner e.g. (1997), the disaggregation of the intranational game reduces to the President and the Congress as well as to two interest groups providing signals. However, negotiation systems most of the time are multilateral with their own logic (Keeney/Raiffa 1993, Ruggie 1993, Zartmann 1994). Such multi-person games are hardly manageable with non-cooperative game theory.

Further problems are:

1. The domestic structures of the political system are highly stylized or neglected.
2. Most of the studies assume a one-dimensional issue space. Consequences of multi-issue bargaining are insufficiently researched.
3. The dependent variable is in general the failure/success of the negotiations. However, in real world negotiations the process and the sequencing of bargaining constitute an explanandum for itself.

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<sup>7</sup> A similar typology of forms of governance can be found in Scharpf (1997). For a conceptualization of governance structures using network analysis, see Thurner/Stoiber (2002).



4. Last but not least, there is lack of empirical applications and tests of the propositions as derived by formal models. Especially quantitative social research methods have not been applied so far.<sup>8</sup>

As for most of the formal theory literature there is a lack of translations into operational models that specify the propositions as hypotheses that can fail when confronted with empirical evidence. The interplay between the domestic arena and the international arena has to be formulated in an empirically operational way. This applies especially to the context of the European integration where the de-nationalization of states (cf. Zürn 1998) has dramatically advanced. Whereas numerous studies stress the multilevel character of the EU system (Scharpf 2000, Hooghe/Marks 2001) and the new quality of the EU governance system (Kohler-Koch 1997), the insights and conjectures of these studies have never been tested empirically. There are only a few studies focusing on the preparation of EU policy proposals in the domestic arena of EU member states and vice versa the influence of EU decision-making on national administrations (Pappas 1995, Rometsch/Wessels 1996, Kassim et al 2000). The question of interministerial coordination efforts for the preparation of international negotiation positions in parliamentary systems has never been researched. Our study follows recent suggestions (Milner 1998) for comparative institutional analyses on both the domestic and international level in order to fill this gap.

In order to develop an operational conceptualization we take up suggestions from early decision-theoretic approaches in IR (Allison 1971, Allison/Zelikow 1999) as well as from new respective literature on Comparative Politics (Laver/Shepsle 1994, 1996) and Institutional Economics (Weingast/Marshall 1988, Dixit 1996).

## 1.4. Research Design

The aim of this handbook is purely descriptive. However, we do not adhere to the postulate of considering European integration as well as every other historical event as a 'sui generis' phenomenon<sup>9</sup> that can only be described. Quite contrary, we postulate that European integration can be analyzed with conventional social science methods<sup>10</sup> leading to simplification and abstraction. According to concepts of descriptive and normative negotiation theory (Raiffa 1982) we analytically reconstruct the IGC 1996. We display the structures and processes of the respective intranational and international negotiation systems. We identify the actors and their preferences, their organizational embeddedness, their informal interactions, the decision points they faced and the choices they made. We are inspired by multi-attributive decision theory as proposed by Keeney/Raiffa (1993) and as

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<sup>8</sup> For an exception, cf. Thurner/Stoiber 2002, Thurner/Linhart 2002.

<sup>9</sup> For a proponent of considering European Integration as a phenomenon sui generis, cf. Hix (1994), for proponents of the unity of science postulate King et al. 1994.


<sup>10</sup> Again we follow the proponents of the unity of science postulate: "The real question that the issue of uniqueness raises is the problem of complexity. The point is not whether events are inherently unique but whether the key features of social reality that we want to understand can be abstracted from a mass of facts" (King/Keohane/Verba et al 1994: 42).

applied to international negotiations by Raiffa (1982). Furthermore we follow exchange theory (Coleman 1990, Pappi et al. 1995, Knoke et al. 1996, Pappi/Henning 1998, Henning 2000) conceiving collective decision-making as a political (Walrasian) market leading to efficient outcomes. Further theoretical references are organizational economics approaches as well as the theory of multi level games (Scharpf 1999, Tsebelis 1990, Putnam 1988, Milner 1998, Epstein/O'Halloran 1999) dealing with problems of delegation and actors competing in different arenas. This data handbook documents our operationalizations of the core concepts of this literature.

In order to produce generalizable insights, we had first to select the case intentionally according to our research objectives and strategy. We focus exclusively on an Intergovernmental Conference dealing with constitutional questions, i.e. we selected intentionally "a range of the values of the dependent variable" (King/Keohane/Verba 1994: 141). Therefore, our arguments have to be viewed only with regard to constitutional rule making, whereas other theories focusing on EU's every day policy-making in order to explain EU's gradual (des-)integration are not covered by our theoretical approach and measurement efforts.

We conceive the IGC 1996 negotiations as follows:

**Figure 1: Stylized Chronological Sequence of Negotiations**



A chronological reconstruction has to start with the Maastricht Treaty, which contained provisions for the amendment of the constitutional framework of the EU. These provisions included the date of reconvening as well as particular issues to be negotiated. The reason behind fixing these amendment provisions is commonly seen as conceding an opportunity to the Germans for bargaining an intertemporal compensation for giving away the Deutsche Mark without at the same time having fulfilled political integration (Eichengreen et al. 1994).

The preparation of the IGC took place within the so-called Westendorp reflection group from June 1995 to December 1995. During these meetings, the group of delegates of the Member States discussed further issues in order to construct an agenda. Therefore, these sessions had partly cheap talk character, because they provided the opportunity for a brainstorming and for exchanging views and standpoints. Only the final report of the reflection group was committing insofar as the proposed agenda was more or less unanimously agreed. Deviating positions of single member states were made explicit.

The report of the Westendorp group provided a set of roughly formulated issues, i.e. they delivered broad political goals and guidelines. These global issues were processed into precise issues with hard, European Law compatible options by the Service Juridique of the Council, i.e. a special service division of a supranational organ with legal expertise elaborated concrete legal options. The resulting notes were sent by fax to the foreign ministries of the member states, where regularly the coordination units preparing the negotiations were located. These temporary project managements had been installed by national governments in order to coordinate the 'distributed decision making' with regard to the proposed legal options within ministries. The project management had to aggregate information and preferences of these political subdivisions. Contrary to complex models of hierarchies in distributed decision-making (cf. Schneeweiss 1999, Sahn 2002) we conceive the process as a simple non-iterative process: The legal options were sent as an externally provided input to the responsible ministries. Following formal as well as informal internal coordination, the ministries provided feedback in form of more or less fuzzy stated preferences (preferred options, salience). Then governments sent public messages, mostly in form of declarations, to the international environment as well as to the intranational environment in order to signal their preferences.

National delegations negotiated during 16 months in Brussels, i.e. here we identify the ongoing intergovernmental negotiations. During these negotiation rounds member states made additional efforts to make their positions clear, or to signal a change of their initial preferences, or to propose completely new issues and options, or to bring in positions backed by several member states (Thurner/Kroneberg/Stoiber 2002). This process led to a preliminary settlement of a part of the issues in the Dublin II report (December 1996). We consider all questions unresolved at that time as constituting the 'final game' which have to be analysed apart from regular negotiations, at least as this IGC is concerned. The final game reached its climax and end during the Amsterdam summit. The resulting Amsterdam Treaty was formally implemented through a ratification process under specific constitutional provisions in each member state. We conceptualize the ratification process as sequences that are determined both by constitutional stipulations as well as political power constellations.

Having provided this simplified chronological sequence and the theoretical concepts of how we conceive the decision-making process within and between member states; we are now able to make transparent the analytical reconstruction of this complex negotiation system.

In order to avoid the "N=1 problem"<sup>11</sup> of case studies we increased the number of observations<sup>12</sup> Following the tradition of quantitative case studies as applied by Pappi and collaborators (Pappi et al. 1995) we built the Cartesian product of issues and actors, i.e. we multiplied observations from a single case by 'exploding' the IGC 1996 into observations on each involved relevant actor having preferences on each of the issues on the bargaining table. Thus, we apply the same measures to new

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<sup>11</sup> Cf. the insightful summary of solutions to this problem in King/Keohane/Verba 1994.

<sup>12</sup> Because: "In general, .....the single observation is not a useful technique for testing hypotheses or theories" (King/Keohane/Verba 1994: 211).


units in order to find out generalizable propositions about the relationship between interministerial coordination and intergovernmental negotiation outcomes. Evidently, large numbers of observations can be treated also statistically.

For the disaggregation of the issue space, this is rather straightforward. Treating the whole universe of negotiation issues instead of packages or single negotiation texts (Raiffa 1982, Spector 1994) is simply richer in information. Our whole study is centered on the agenda of the IGC 1996 that we consider to be exogenously given. The EU-Council Secretariat's 30 Confidential Notes (CONF 3801/96 to CONF 3830/96) constitute the initial bargaining space (see below, chapter 2.2).

Similarly, the actors in our study are multiplied. Instead of national governments we consider the involved national ministries as focal actors. Again, this idea is not new: "Theories that apply to the nation-state might be also tested on government agencies or in the framework of particular decisions..." (King/Keohane/Verba 1994: 220) and the authors refer to Putnam's work (1993) on the impact of social resources on the performance of regional governments in Italy.

Conceiving intergovernmental negotiations as going on between sovereign states is –and has always been – a simplification. Our research design is driven predominantly by methodological concerns. It does not prejudice a position against realism in IR with its unitary actor assumption. As Allison (1971) and Tsebelis (1990) have shown, it is often sufficient to choose this perspective. Evidently, it is sufficient to make statements about "Germany's" or "London's" bargaining position if we have a valid model about the aggregation of information and preferences within the German and British political system, respectively. However, disaggregation enables us at least to describe the information and preference aggregation as it actually takes places and to construct baseline models in order to test whether the realist perspective – whatever it may mean operationally – is adequate.

**Figure 2: Specification of a Two-Level Game**



From a substantial point of view we follow distinguished specialists (Hayes-Renshaw / Wallace 1997), arguing that since IGCs are dealing with highly abstract topics of international law, ministries are the main relevant actors in preparing such negotiations. We distinguish between the intranational game where negotiation positions are prepared within nation states and the international game where sovereign states are bargaining. Again, we use it only as a baseline model against which we will also show integration induced perforations of the nation state, i.e. transnational networks indicating enhanced cooperation between governmental actors adjusting their positions before the official start of the negotiations.

As a baseline conceptualization we use the approach of Laver and Shepsle (1994, 1996) as proposed for the formation of governments and the enactment of policies. Put simply, they argue that a government consists of a collection of departments where each minister is a dictator in his jurisdiction. The involved actors we study are assumed to possess rational preferences and expectations on these issues. They interact strategically. However, in order to avoid naïve reifications, conceptually we have to distinguish between individual and composed actors, so-called corporate and collective actors<sup>13</sup> with specific formal and informal organizational settings for the aggregation of preferences (Tsebelis 2002, Stoiber/Thurner 2000).

According to an actor oriented institutionalism (Tsebelis 1990, Milner 1998, Scharpf 1997) we define interministerial coordination (cf. Mayntz/Scharpf 1975, Scharpf 1993) as a process of strategic interaction of intentional actors within forms of governmental organization. Information and preferences are aggregated to a policy-specific collective decision – in our case a national bargaining position. The complexity of the issues inducing, as a rule, interdependency among several jurisdictions requires as horizontal as well as vertical coordination of the heterogeneous preferences within the same government and of the more or less asymmetrically distributed information.

Actors are deciding and acting within organizational structures. We distinguish between formal and informal intranational organization structures (Thurner/Stoiber 2002, Stoiber 2002). Existing coordination rules as well as networks can measure both. We conceive interaction patterns deviating from formal rules as informal coordination structures. According to institutional economics, these structures constitute resources in the sense of property rights, social capital as well as restrictions in the sense of prescriptions (Scharpf 1997).

Transcending predominant typological approaches in Comparative Politics we propose an alternative Comparative Governmental Organization approach, which relies on empirical organization analysis. Contrary to Laver/Shepsle's (1994) simplifying approach of a one- or two-dimensional typology, we measure formal and informal coordination structures and processes via multiple categorical as well as continuous attributes (see below).

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<sup>13</sup> We define 'corporate actor' as an actor, though being made up of more than one individual, who has a single and unique ideal point, usually represented by the leader. Ministries may be subsumed under this category (cf.

Having identified formal and informal authority structures and coordination processes we are able to draw organizational boundaries<sup>14</sup> and to distinguish action arenas or levels of collective decision-making. Conceptually, multilevel games address the interplay between politics in the international and in domestic arenas (Putnam 1988, Milner 1998). According to this concept political actors engage and commit themselves in more than one political arena. However, "too often this literature has merely offered a metaphor for politics" (Bates et al 1998: 6).

### **1.5. Data Collection: Combining Document Analysis and Elite Surveying**

Here we provide a short overview of the chronological sequence of data collection. Conceptual and methodological details are delivered in the respective chapters. Our data collection started with documentary analysis and combined it with standardized interviews of top-level bureaucrats<sup>15</sup>. The survey is centered around, originally confidential documents, so called fiches (CONF 3801/96 to CONF 3830/96, see chapter 2.2) as provided by the EU-Council's secretariat with the aim of an optimal structuring of the issues at the table. We conceive these documents as the elaboration of the negotiation space by several experts – top lawyers of the Service Juridique – who had to reach themselves an agreement on the final form of the fiches. These experts on the one side had to closely follow the conclusions of the prenegotiations on the political level of the so-called Westendorp-Group in 1995. At the same time they structured these conclusions into precise, ordinal arrayed options that are compatible with international law.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, it was rather easy to translate these documents into two standardized questionnaires, because we escaped the enormous problems of validly coding European Law options. One standardized questionnaire was developed for the final game with only 15 issues. The second questionnaire was very voluminous with 46 issues of the initial intergovernmental game with extensive list of issues and all their respective options.

For the identification of involved actors we applied multi-stage boundary specifications for several reasons: First, during a research stay at the Council it was possible for one of the authors to closely follow the negotiations. Here, it was decided to, first, limit the analysis to the final game: issues and actors of the intergovernmental bargaining game after the Dublin II summit. The unresolved issues after the summit of Dublin in December 1996 were identified with the support of the Commission's Task Force IGC 1996 and the Councils' Service Juridique, respectively. With the support of two top level involved bureaucrats, it was possible to cross-validate their view of the bargaining space at the final game and to ensure a maximum of validity ("double coding by bureaucrats"). The involved actors at the international level were identified by getting the list of the delegations (see annex 2) with

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Mayntz/Scharpf 1995: 43). By contrast, a 'collective actor' consists of numerous elements with differing ideal points. Houses of parliament may be classified into this category.

<sup>14</sup> For the concept of boundary specification in network and policy analyses, cf. Pappi 1984.

<sup>15</sup> For a model study, cf. Aberbach/Putnam/Rockman 1981. Contrary to these authors preferring open-ended questions, we rely mainly on standardized questionnaires, complementing them only with open-ended questions.

<sup>16</sup> And, as we argue in our analyses, are also compatible with the concept of Euclidean preferences of spatial theory of voting.

complete addresses. Most of the delegations had at least one member in Brussels. Therefore, it was possible to contact and interview most of the delegations just weeks after the Amsterdam summit.

In a second boundary definition of the international negotiation system we took the whole issue space and identified the initial bargaining positions by document analysis. Again we used several synopses simultaneously: Pipenscheider (1996), Griller et al. (1996) as well as the report of the European Parliament<sup>17</sup> and the CD-documented synopsis of Weidenfeld (1998), in order to ensure a maximum of coding validity and reliability. The identified 'starting positions', i.e. the member states' most preferred options as declared publicly, were located within the issue space in order to identify the intergovernmental preference constellations (see below, chapter 5.3).

Next, we identified member states' formal organization structures of European policy-making and of the preparation of the IGC 1996 in order to identify top-level bureaucrats for our interviews. For this survey, we applied a snowball procedure for the identification of the involved actors at the level of the ministries. We first (re)contacted delegation members, now at the level of the European capitals, and asked them to identify the formal organizational structure of the preparation and to name those ministries and their personnel actively involved in the preparation of the IGC 1996 negotiation positions (cf. chapter 3.3). On the basis of their answers we contacted all these bureaucrats inside the involved ministries and arranged interview dates in the respective national capitals. The surveyed bureaucrats delivered the most preferred option of their ministry for each single issue. In most ministries only a few experts were involved in the process of position formulation and interministerial coordination. Combined with the juridical accurate options of the questionnaire, we don't face the problem of representativity of elite survey (cf. Mair 2001: 15). Additionally, we asked for informal coordination relations between the actors. Due to the high validity of empirical derived network data we gain insights into informal coordination structures. Interviewing took place from May 2000 to March 2001.

Only after our fieldwork we recognized that the machine-readable document collection of Weidenfeld (1998) offered a very useful tool for the identification of the chronological sequence of bargaining during the IGC. Drawing from Raiffa's notion of a 'negotiation dance', we identified issue-specific proposals as made by the presidency and member states additionally characterized by the point in time they were made and by the most preferred option proposed.

Despite relying on standardized interview techniques there was always the opportunity for open-ended questions and discussions were possible. In order to improve data quality and to ensure validity, reliability and replicability we will report the decisions and processes by which our data have been generated.

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<sup>17</sup> White paper on the 1996 IGC, Vol. II: Summary of positions of the member states of the EU with a view to the 1996 IGC.

Therefore, within all chapters we give an introduction with the following structure: First, we present the theoretical starting point, central questions and core concepts. Then we provide the operationalization of these concepts as well as measurement instruments. Technical questions like the algorithms used for the network analyses are given. Third, and if necessary, we offer additional information as data collection process and sources are concerned. Fourth, tabulated as well visualized data are shown.



## **2. The Agenda: Notes, Issues, and Issue Groups**

### **2.1. The (Re)Construction of a Negotiation Space**

The analysis of decision making processes in general and of negotiations specifically has to start with the issues that actors are dealing with (Keeney/Raiffa 1993). Policy analysis considers issues as objects of joint orientation/coorientation specifying the boundaries of the set of actors involved and therefore the negotiation system considered (Windhoff-Héritier 1987, Pappi et al. 1995). Therefore, it is of crucial importance to make sure that the analysis exhaustively comprises the set of issues.

More generally, multi-attributive decision theory (Keeney/Raiffa 1993) systematically derives a concept of issue stemming from the conception of goal-oriented actors. In order to support as well as to reconstruct decision-making processes, goals have to be measured via operational attributes. Attributes allow the assessment of the goal achievement as resulting by the chosen strategies. Attributes concretize what actors mean by the respective goals and objectives, i.e. they give operational definitions that are – idealiter – intersubjectively understandable and accepted. As a rule, operational attributes are constructed in a hierarchical procedure: Global, very encompassing objectives are separated into more specific subobjectives, i.e. into objectives that represent partial aspects of the main goal: “Specification means subdividing an objective into lower-level objectives of more detail, thus clarifying the intended meaning of the more general objective. These lower-level objectives can also be thought of as the means to the end, the end being the higher level objective” (Keeney/Raiffa 1993: 41). Lower-level objectives facilitate the operationalization via attributes. An example may clarify the relevance for the topic of this book: the global goal of the IGC 1996 was the reform of the institutions. However this encompassing objective is rather abstract and fuzzy. Even more concrete lower-level objectives like ‘Reforming the Commission’ or ‘Streamlining the legislative decision making’ which constitute parts of the reform can be connected with differently preferred means in order to reach these goals. Abbreviating, we call such lower-level objectives negotiation issues henceforth. Actors can weight issues differently such that a respective share of interest is allocated to every issue according to its relative importance for an actor. All means that are proposed and discussed for reaching an issue are called issue-specific options in the following.

### **2.2. Operationalization and Data Collection**

As a result of prenegotiations between delegates of the member states, the Westendorp report (SN520/1/95/REV1) was handed over to the Council's Secretary. For the assistance and support of the EU presidencies, which took the chair of the negotiation meetings, the Councils' Service Juridique had to process these documents. Whereas the Westendorp report consisted of an enumeration of rather global goals and fuzzy directions where the EU has been considered to move (or to stay, respectively) in order to reform for enlargement, these preparatory documents – so-called ‘Notes’ or ‘Fiches’ – as provided by the Service Juridiques' lawyers offered separated, concrete negotiation

issues with precise options. As a rule, each of the negotiation issues included at least two options arrayed from the (most often explicitly named and described) status quo to the most far-reaching option. These notes were distributed to the national responsible ministries/units. In the following we present, first, the exhaustive list of these notes (CONF 3801/96 to CONF 3830/96, table 1).

**Table 1: List of Notes (CONF 3801/96 to CONF 3830/96) as provided by the Council's Secretariat**

<b>Note</b>	<b>Subject</b>	<b>Note</b>	<b>Subject</b>
1	Citizenship of the Union (CONF 3801/96)	16	QMV-Threshold – Weighting of Votes / Dual Threshold
2	Fundamental Rights (...)	17	Functioning of the Council
3	JHA: Objectives – Scope – Modes of Action	18	Commission: Membership – Powers
4	JHA: Decision-making Process – Instruments - Implementation	19	Court of Justice
5	JHA: Judicial Control	20	Other Institutions and Bodies
6	Employment	21	Enhanced Cooperation – Flexibility
7	Environment	22	External Economic Relations
8	Community Policies	23	CFSP: Objectives – Conception – Preparation of Decisions
9	Subsidiarity	24	CFSP: Decision-making Procedures
10	Transparency / Opening up the Council's Proceedings	25	CFSP: Implementation – Operation – Solidarity
11	EP: Composition – Electoral Procedure	26	Financing the CFSP and the JHA
12	EP: Legislative Function	27	Legal Personality for the EU
13	EP: Non-Legislative Functions	28	Common Defence Policy and Common Defence (Art. J.4 TEU)
14	Role of National Parliaments	29	Relations with the WEU
15	QMV and Unanimity	30	The Armaments Question

Because some of the notes included more than one topic, our translation into a standardized questionnaire representing the whole negotiation space resulted into 46 negotiation issues as listed below.<sup>18</sup> Each of these issues is considered to constitute a one-dimensional Euclidean negotiation space with ordinal arrayed options.

<sup>18</sup> Contrary, issues of minor importance, e.g. the organizational reform of the ECJ, that have not been discussed at all, were eliminated.

**Table 2: List of One-dimensional Negotiation Issues as Included in the Questionnaire**

<b>Issue</b>	<b>Subject</b>	<b>Issue</b>	<b>Subject</b>
1.1	Citizenship of the Union	4.3	Decision-making in the Council: Unanimity and QMV
1.2	Procedure for adding Art. 8 (citizenship) without revision of the Treaty	4.4	Decision-making in the Council: QMV-Threshold
1.3	Introducing fundamental rights to the Treaty	4.5	Decision-making in the Council: Weighting of votes in the case of enlargement
1.4	Monitoring observance of fundamental rights	4.6	Decision-making in the Council: Dual majorities
1.5	Principle of subsidiarity	4.7	Composition of the Commission
1.6	Review of compliance with the principle of subsidiarity	4.8	Enhanced cooperation: Introducing flexibility
1.7	Transparency: opening up the Council's proceedings	4.9	Enhanced cooperation: Conditions for flexibility
1.8	Legal personality for the European Union	5.1	European Parliament: Right for drafting proposals
2.1	CFSP: Responsibility for planning	5.2	European Parliament: Procedures
2.2	CFSP: Decision-making procedures	5.3	Scope of the Legislative Procedures
2.3	CFSP: Responsibility for the implementation	5.4	European Parliament: Election of the President of the Commission
2.4	Financing the CFSP	5.5	European Parliament: Budget Power
2.5	CFSP: Art. J.4.: common defence policy	5.6	Role of the national parliaments
2.6	CFSP: The Union's relations with the WEU	5.7	Power of the Commission
2.7	CFSP: The armaments question	5.8	Power of the Court of Justice
3.1	JHA: Objectives and scope within JHA	5.9	Power of the Committee of the Regions
3.2	JHA: Modes of action within JHA	5.10	Power of the Economic and Social Committee
3.3	JHA: Decision-making procedures	6.1	Employment Chapter
3.4	JHA: Democratic Control	6.2	Monitoring Employment Policies
3.5	JHA: Judicial control within JHA	6.3	Environment
3.6	Financing the JHA	6.4	Stricter rules on environmental policy by Member States
4.1	Composition of the European Parliament	6.5	Community policies: new policies (energy, civil protection, tourism)
4.2	Uniform electoral procedure for the EP	6.6	External economic relations

The assignment of notes to negotiation issues is provided in table 3.

**Table 3: Overview: Assignment of Notes to Issues**

Note	Issue	Note	Issue	Note	Issue
1	1.1, 1.2	11	4.1, 4.2	21	4.8, 4.9
2	1.3, 1.4	12	5.1, 5.2, 5.3	22	6.6
3	3.1, 3.2	13	5.4, 5.5	23	2.1
4	3.3, 3.4	14	5.6	24	2.2
5	3.5	15	4.3	25	2.3
6	6.1, 6.2	16	4.4, 4.5, 4.6	26	2.4, 3.6
7	6.3, 6.4	17	-	27	1.8
8	6.5	18	4.7, 5.7	28	2.5
9	1.5, 1.6	19	5.8	29	2.6
10	1.7	20	5.9, 5.10	30	2.7

These Notes have been the basis for the construction of two standardized questionnaires, one for the interviews of the ministries (see below, chapter 3.1), and a reduced one for the so-called ‘final game’ which was used for the interview of delegation members in Brussels just after the Amsterdam negotiations (see below, chapter 5.2). As a rule, we kept the order of options as proposed by the Service Juridique.

The Westendorp report differentiated between three topics: (1) ‘The citizen and the Union’ including policy areas to be transferred to the TEC and global concepts like subsidiarity and transparency, (2) ‘An efficient and democratic Union’, consisting of the core of the intended institutional reform, and (3) ‘External action of the Union’ dealing with the future of the CFSP. The first single negotiation text as proposed by the Irish presidency with Dublin II (CONF 2500/96), as well as the Amsterdam Draft (CONF 4000/97) and the unconsolidated version of the Amsterdam Treaty (CONF 4001/97) already had a more detailed structure, adding a separate titles as ‘An area of freedom, security and right’ and ‘Enhanced cooperation and flexibility’. Systematizing these broad classifications categorization and for practical reasons (‘filtered interviewing’, see below) we classified our 46 issues into six groups of homogenous issues which we call Issue-Groups (IGs) henceforth. The labels of the groups and the number of issues per group are provided in table 4.

A first guiding classification criterion was to differentiate between the institutional questions, the issues regarding the second (IG2) and the third pillar (IG3), and the policy-issues of the first pillar. Within the institutional questions we distinguish between ‘decision-making within the institutions’ (IG4) containing those issues separating smaller and larger member states. The group ‘power between the institutions’ (IG5) covers the issues regarding the future institutional balance of the Union. All issues with fundamental legal aspects – no matter which topic they cover – were grouped together into IG1. Policy

areas to be envisaged to be transferred to the TEC were combined into IG6. In order to take into account of ministries being only partly involved into the negotiations because of issue-specific competencies, we further differentiated between four sub-groups, which mirror national jurisdictions (IG6.1 to IG6.4).

**Table 4: Issue-Groups**

IG	Substance	N <sub>Issues</sub>
1	Fundamental Legal Questions	8
2	Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)	7
3	Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)	6
4	Collective decision-making within the institutional bodies of the EU	9
5	Balance of power between the institutional bodies of the EU	10
6	Transferring further competences to the TEC	6
6.1	employment	
6.2	environment	
6.3	energy, civil protection and tourism	
6.4	external economic relations	

### 2.3. Translating Notes into One-dimensional Issues

Meanwhile, the Notes are official EU-documents. They are accessible to the public and can be requested directly at the Secretariat General of the Council. They are also documented on the CD-ROM in Weidenfeld (1998). Therefore, we content ourselves with presenting only one Note: Note No. 7 (Environment), in order to exemplify the translation into the surveys' issues in a paradigmatic way. As a rule, Notes consist of a short introduction. Sometimes the introduction makes reference to the problem (see subdivision 3) to be solved and the goals to be reached. For subdivisions one and two the note contents itself by proposing how to structure the negotiation problem, followed by respective subdivisions with options. Often, options include the explicit naming of the status quo and it's description. Sometimes, selected options are discussed in more detail. Annexes provide drafting suggestions and additional documents.

Note No. 7, first differentiates between objectives and procedures. In international law, the declaration of common objectives is a first step towards institutionalizing cooperation. Even the explicit consensus of objectives can exhibit numerous fine graded nuances for expressing different degrees of explicitly committing cooperating parties to such an objectives as can be seen in the first chapter. Subdivision 2 goes even further in proposing concrete procedures for the production of collectively binding decisions in the field of environmental protection. Since we argue that 'objectives' and 'procedures' can be arrayed along one and the same one-dimensional space reflecting the increasing degree of

institutionalization/constitutionalization of European cooperation, we combined them into one issue. Whereas subdivision III, too, intends an institutionalization of environmental policy-making, the goal is different and independent from subdivision one and two insofar, as a regulation of standards is envisaged.

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### **Note No. 7: Environment**

CONF/3807/96 LIMITE

Brussels, 2 April 1996

*The amendment or strengthening of the Treaty provisions on environmental protection can be considered from the point of view of **objectives, procedures and the interrelationship between Community powers and those of the Member States.***

#### **I. OBJECTIVES**

*Strengthening the objectives of environmental policy can be envisaged at three levels:*

*A. General objectives of the Union (Article 2 TEC); this would involve making protection and improvement of the quality of the environment one of the Union's general objectives [see text in point 1 of the Annex].*

*B. Objectives of environmental policy as such: this would mean supplementing/detailing the objectives in Article 130r of the TEC (for example by referring to some of the Rio objectives).*

*C. Objectives of other policies: this would involve referring explicitly to the environmental dimension, particularly the "precautionary principle", in certain sectoral policies such as agricultural policy, transport policy, major networks etc.; this reference could be accompanied by an obligation on the Commission to ensure that its sectoral proposals were systematically accompanied by assessments of their environmental consequences [see text in point 2 of the Annex].*

#### **II. PROCEDURES**

*The main options are:*

*A. Extension of qualified majority voting to all or some of the areas of environmental policy currently subject to unanimity under Article 130s(2), namely:*

- (a) provisions primarily of a fiscal nature;*
- (b) measures concerning town and country planning and land use;*
- (c) measures affecting Member States' energy supply.*

*B. Application of the co-decision procedure (instead of the cooperation procedure) to the legislative areas which are – or will be – subject to qualified majority voting. [NB: At present, co-decision is confined exclusively to the adoption of general action programmes; see Article 130s(3)]*

### III. INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMUNITY POWERS AND THOSE OF THE MEMBER STATES

*At the moment, Article 100a(4) of the TEC allows Member States, under certain conditions, to introduce rules which are stricter than the Community rules; the question is whether it is appropriate:*

*A. to restrict the possibility thus afforded Member States, chiefly on the grounds that at the Community's present stage of development the principle of a single market should take precedence over the harmonization of rules (which could perhaps be regarded as having gone far enough);*

*B. to extend Member States' scope for introducing stricter rules:*

*(a) by extending the procedure laid down in Article 100a(4) to acts adopted by the Commission under a "committee procedure" (at the moment this possibility only exists for acts adopted by the Council); [see text in point 3 of the **Annex**]*

*(b) by introducing a general "**environmental clause**" enabling a Member State to take measures at national level (either temporary or definitive) whenever it considers the level of protection afforded in the European Union to be inadequate; on what conditions? should there be a **safeguard mechanism to avoid distortions of competition**? [see Article 130t of the TEC];*

*(c) by mentioning environmental protection among the criteria in **Article 36 of the TEC**.*

### **ANNEX**

#### **ENVIRONMENT** (Drafting suggestions)

##### 1. Article 2

*instead of*

*"sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of economic performance, a high level of employment ..."*

*read*

*"sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of convergence of economic performance, preservation, protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, a high level of employment ..."*

2. - Add a subparagraph (d) to Article 39(2) on the objectives of the common agricultural policy:

*"(d) the need to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment."*

- Add a sentence at the end of Article 75(1) on the objectives of the common transport policy:

"The provisions referred to in this paragraph shall be adopted taking into account the need to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment."

- Add at the end of the last subparagraph of Article 129c(1) concerning trans-European networks:  
"and the need to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment."

3. Add the following sentence at the end of the first subparagraph of Article 100a(4):

*"This procedure shall also apply in all cases where the amendment of a harmonization measure may have the effect of reducing the level of protection of the working or natural environment."*

This note has been translated into the following issues and options for the standardized questionnaire as shown below. The ordering of the options follows the logic given in the note. Concluding, we state that by using the Council's Secretariat's Notes, we have been enabled to avoid open-ended interviews as well as the use of 'subjective attribute scales' (Keeney/Raiffa 1993: 40). EU lawyers have arrayed our data, therefore they fulfil, the assumption of, at least, an ordinal measurement of options.

**Issue 6.3 as translated from Note No. 7**

<b>Environment</b>		mark
(A)	Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Strengthening the objectives by integrating protection and improvement of the quality of the environment as general objectives in the Treaty	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Strengthening the objectives of environmental policy by supplementing the objectives in Art. 130r TEU	<input type="checkbox"/>
(D)	Strengthening the objectives by referring explicitly to the environmental dimension in certain sectoral policies (e.g. agricultural policy, transport policy)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(E)	Extension of qualified majority voting to certain areas of environmental policies	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- Provisions primarily of a fiscal nature	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- Measures concerning town and country planning and land use	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- Measures affecting Member States' energy supply	<input type="checkbox"/>
(F)	Application of the co-decision procedure	<input type="checkbox"/>



**Issue 6.4 as translated from Note No. 7**

<b>Stricter Rules on Environmental Policy by Member States</b>		mark
(A)	Restricting this possibility (because of the single market)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Extending this possibility by extending the procedure laid down in Art. 100a(4) to acts adopted by the Commission under a committee procedure	<input type="checkbox"/>
(D)	Extending this possibility by mentioning environmental protection in Art. 36 TEC	<input type="checkbox"/>
(E)	Extending this possibility by introducing a general environmental clause	<input type="checkbox"/>

**2.4. The 46 Issues**

In the following we list all other 44 issues of the standardised questionnaire containing all options as presented to the interview partners in the national ministries. We asked them to mark the most preferred option.

*Issue 1.1: Citizenship of the Union*

(A)	Clarifying that citizenship of the Union shall not take the place of national citizenship	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Status Quo: no further clarification or enriching of Art. 8	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Grouping together all rights and obligations which appear in other parts of the Treaty	<input type="checkbox"/>
(D)	Adding certain rights	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- civic and political rights	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- socio-economic rights	<input type="checkbox"/>
(E)	Adding certain obligations (e.g. humanitarian service / civil protection)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(F)	Redrafting certain articles to give them direct effect (e.g. Art. 8a on the right to move and reside)	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 1.2: Procedure for Adding Art. 8 (Citizenship) Without Revision of the Treaty*

(A)	Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Replacing the requirement of unanimity within the council by a super-qualified majority	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Replacing the requirement of unanimity within the council by a qualified majority	<input type="checkbox"/>
(D)	Replacing it by the co-decision procedure	<input type="checkbox"/>
(E)	Replacing it by the assent procedure	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 1.3: Introducing Fundamental Rights to the Treaty*

(A)	Status Quo: Art. F(2) TEU	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Definition of some specific principles (e.g. a general nondiscrimination clause)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Accession by the Union to the European Charter of Human Rights (ECHR)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(D)	Including a catalogue of rights or „Charter“ limited on those rights recognized by all Member States	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- In an Annex	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- In the Preamble	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- In the body of the Treaty	<input type="checkbox"/>
(E)	Including a catalogue of rights or „Charter“ including all rights recognized by at least one Member States	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- In an Annex	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- In the Preamble	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- In the body of the Treaty	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 1.4: Monitoring Observance of Fundamental Rights*

(A)	Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Enabling individuals to act directly before the Court of Justice of the EC	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Introducing control of the actions of the Unions Institutions by the ECHR referred by the Court of Justice of the EC	<input type="checkbox"/>
(D)	Introducing control of the actions of the Unions Institutions by the ECHR referred by individuals	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 1.5: Principle of Subsidiarity*

(A)	Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Incorporation of the present Edinburgh Declaration into an annexed Protocol	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Incorporation of an adjusted form of the Edinburgh Declaration into an annexed Protocol	<input type="checkbox"/>
(D)	Inserting an explicit provision regarding the need to avoid over-regulation	<input type="checkbox"/>
(E)	Inserting a provision requiring the Commission to have regard to the principle of subsidiarity	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 1.6: Review of Compliance With the Principle of Subsidiarity*

- |     |  |                          |
|-----|--|--------------------------|
| (A) | Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (B) | External political review by using the COSAC   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (C) | External political review by setting up a special body (consultative committee)                          | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (D) | Extended judicial review by a right of referral to the Court of Justice for national parliaments         | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (E) | Extended judicial review by a right of referral to the Court of Justice for the Committee of the Regions | <input type="checkbox"/> |

*Issue 1.7: Transparency: Opening up the Council's Proceedings*

- |     |  |                          |
|-----|--|--------------------------|
| (A) | Status Quo: no integration of the principle of transparency as a general principle of the Union                | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (B) | Integration of the principle of transparency as a general principle of the Union                               | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (C) | Laying down the right to access to documents in an implementing regulation to be adopted by the Council by QMV | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (D) | Laying down the right to access to documents in the Council's Rules of Procedure (adopted by QMV)              | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (E) | Referring to the opening up the Council's proceedings in its Rules of Procedures (adopted by QMV)              | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (F) | Referring to the opening up the Council's proceedings in the Treaty itself                                     | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (G) | Giving the Council the possibility to decide to hold public debates  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (H) | Obligation for the Council to hold public debates unless decides otherwise by QMV                              | <input type="checkbox"/> |

*Issue 1.8 Legal Personality for the European Union*

- |     |   |                          |
|-----|---|--------------------------|
| (A) | Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (B) | Establishing a streamlined, fast track procedure for the conclusion of international arrangement by the Member States | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (C) | No legal personality, but conferring explicitly on the Union's limited international capacity                         | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (D) | Giving the EU an explicit legal personality by inserting a new article in the TEU                                     | <input type="checkbox"/> |

*Issue 2.1 CFSP: Responsibility for Planning and Preparation*

- |     |   |                          |
|-----|---|--------------------------|
| (A) | Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (B) | Placing forward planning and preparation facility under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the Council    | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (C) | Placing forward planning and preparation facility under the responsibility of a political figure (Mr. CFSP)           | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (D) | Placing forward planning and preparation facility under the joint responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission | <input type="checkbox"/> |

*Issue 2.2: CFSP: Decision-making Procedures*

- |     |  |                          |
|-----|--|--------------------------|
| (A) | Status Quo: requirement of unanimity to define matters on which decisions are to be taken by QMV                           | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (B) | Inserting specific provisions for closer cooperation   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (C) | Introduction of a „constructive abstention“  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (D) | Introduction of an opt-out   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (E) | Inserting a general clause for the possibility for closer cooperation between some MS by unanimous decision of the Council | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (F) | Adaption of joint action with a requirement less than unanimity  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - application of QMV under a unanimous decided framework action  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - application of a super-qualified majority  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - general application of QMV (except military means)   | <input type="checkbox"/> |

*Issue 2.3: CFSP: Responsibility for the Implementation*

- |     |  |                          |
|-----|--|--------------------------|
| (A) | Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (B) | The Presidency, strengthened by an extended term of office   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (C) | The Presidency, strengthened by increased power  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (D) | Mr. CFSP: the Secretary-General of the Council   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (E) | Mr. CFSP: an independent political figure appointed by the European Council  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (F) | A Presidency / Commission tandem   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (G) | A sort of „Executive Council“, (composed of the Troika, Mr. CFSP, the Commission and possibly a representative of the WEU) | <input type="checkbox"/> |

*Issue 2.4: Financing the CFSP*

(A)	Status Quo: requirement of unanimity for operational expenditures to be charged to the EC budget	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Introducing an augmented qualified majority for operational expenditures to be charged to the EC budget	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Introducing a qualified majority for operational expenditures to be charged to the EC budget	<input type="checkbox"/>
D)	Operational expenditures are in principle automatically charged to the EC budget	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- save: when the council decides otherwise by qualified majority	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- save: when the council decides otherwise by unanimity	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- save: use of military means	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 2.5: Art. J.4.: Common Defence Policy*

(A)	Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Including defence policy within the CFSP by deletion of the word „eventual“ (Art. J.4.(1))	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Replacing „possibility of a common defence“ with by „objective of a common defence“ (Art. J.4.(1))	<input type="checkbox"/>
(D)	Specifying the WEU'S contribution to the framing of a common defence policy (Art. J.4.(1))	<input type="checkbox"/>
(E)	Introducing the possibility for QMV by deleting Art. J.4.(3)	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 2.6: The Union's Relations With the WEU*

(A)	Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Reinforcing the partnership between an autonomous WEU and the EU without amendment of the Treaty	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- Integrating the Petersberg tasks	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- „Back to back“ summits of the European Council and the WEU Summit	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- Introducing closer working links	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- Union participation in the financing of common costs	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Towards EU/WEU institutional convergence	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- by introducing non-binding general European Council guidelines for the WEU	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- by introducing EU instructions to the WEU	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- by introducing a legally binding link between the EU and the WEU	<input type="checkbox"/>
(D)	Integration of the WEU into the Union	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- by adopting a Defence Protocol annexed to the TEU	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- by integrating European defence within the CFSP	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 2.7: The Armaments Question*

(A)	Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Amending Art. 233 (b)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Inclusion outside the Treaty (e.g. declarations or Notes of the Conference) for a more detailed rule	<input type="checkbox"/>
(D)	Including it in the intergovernmental part, namely among the general objectives of the CFSP	<input type="checkbox"/>
(E)	Including it among the security objectives of the CFSP	<input type="checkbox"/>
(F)	Including it generally into Art.4 about security	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 3.1: Objectives and Scope within JHA*

(A)	Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Fix the objectives among the general objectives of the Union in Art. B (TEU)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Fix the objectives in Art. K (TEU - JHA)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(D)	Extend the matters of common interest in Art. K.1 on	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- The approximation of crime-fighting policies	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- The approximation of rules on conflict of law and jurisdiction	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 3.2: Modes of Action within JHA*

(A)	Status Quo: intergovernmental	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Use a crossover procedure between intergovernmental and cooperation and EC sphere (Art. K.9)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Increase the cooperation on the basis of the EC method	<input type="checkbox"/>
(D)	Bringing certain subjects under the Community	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- Visa policy in general	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- Asylum policy	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- External border control	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- Immigration policy	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- Freedom of movement for third-country nationals legally resident in one MS	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- Combating drug addiction	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- Combating fraud	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- Customs cooperation	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- Judicial cooperation civil matters	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- Judicial cooperation criminal matters	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 3.3: Decision-making Procedures*

(A)	Status Quo: unanimity		<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Streamline the preparation of decisions: abolition of the K.4 Committee and Steering Group		<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Introducing flexibility in cases where unanimity continues		<input type="checkbox"/>
	- by adjusting Art. K.7 to provide the possibility of a role for EU institutions	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	- by the incorporation of the Schengen arrangements	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	- by entry of a flexibility clause (unanimous decision with the possibility to opt out and join later)	<input type="checkbox"/>	
(D)	Introducing wider use of majority voting (qualified or augmented) for joint measures		<input type="checkbox"/>
(E)	Introducing wider use of majority voting (2/3 of the contracting parties) for conventions		<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 3.4 JHA: Democratic Control*

(A)	Status Quo: unanimity		<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Strengthening democratic control: areas covered by title VI (TEU)		<input type="checkbox"/>
	- by an increased role of the national parliaments	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	- by an increased role of the EP (consultation)	<input type="checkbox"/>	
(C)	Strengthening democratic control (areas brought under EC control) by using the codecision procedure		<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 3.5: Judicial Control within the JHA*

(A)	Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)		<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Compulsory jurisdiction over all conventions drawn up on the basis of Art. K.3.(2).(c)		<input type="checkbox"/>
	- with no derogations allowed	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	- with any Member State having the right to choose not to accept jurisdiction	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	- unless the Council decides otherwise by qualified majority	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	- unless the Council decides otherwise by unanimity	<input type="checkbox"/>	
(C)	Further Extension of the optional jurisdiction		<input type="checkbox"/>
	- to interpret the provisions of and the measures implementing conventions	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	- for joint positions and joint action	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	- for any new type („joint measures“)	<input type="checkbox"/>	
(D)	Further Extension of the compulsory jurisdiction		<input type="checkbox"/>
	- to interpret the provisions of and the measures implementing conventions	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	- for joint positions and joint action	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	- for any new type („joint measures“)	<input type="checkbox"/>	

*Issue 3.6: Financing the JHA*

(A)	Status Quo: requirement of unanimity for operational expenditures to be charged to the EC budget	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Introducing an augmented qualified majority for operational expenditures to be charged to the EC budget	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Introducing a qualified majority for operational expenditures to be charged to the EC budget	<input type="checkbox"/>
D)	Operational expenditures are in principle automatically charged to the EC budget	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- save: when the council decides otherwise by qualified majority	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- save: when the council decides otherwise by unanimity	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- save: use of military means	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 4.1: Composition of the European Parliament*

(A)	Status Quo: using the current formula	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Retaining the current formula, but fixing the number of MEP	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- at 700	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- at 600	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- at 500	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Balancing better between the number of MEP and the population in each Member State and fixing the number of MEP	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- at 700	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- at 600	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- at 500	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 4.2: Uniform Electoral Procedure for the European Parliament*

(A)	Status Quo: maintaining the national procedures, which are in force	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Fixing a deadline in Art. 138(3) for adopting a decision introducing a uniform procedure in all Member States	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Replacing unanimity in Art. 138(3) with augmented majority	<input type="checkbox"/>
(D)	Abolishing the ratification requirement in Art. 138(3)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(E)	Replacing Art 138(3) by laying down detailed rules for a uniform procedure in the Treaty	<input type="checkbox"/>



*Issue 4.3: Decision-making in the Council: Unanimity and QMV*

(A)	Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Establishing an augmented qualified majority	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- 90 %	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- 80 %	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	QMV on the basis of certain criteria	<input type="checkbox"/>
(D)	QMV for specific areas covered by the TEC (see issue-list)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(E)	QMV for all issues covered by the TEC except for specific areas of national interest	<input type="checkbox"/>
(F)	QMV for all issues covered by the TEC	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 4.4: Decision-making in the Council: QMV-Threshold*

(A)	Ioannina Agreement: 74,7% (65 out of 87)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Status Quo: 71,2% (62 out of 87)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	2/3 majority	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 4.5: Decision-making in the Council: Weighting of Votes in the Case of Enlargement*

(A)	Extrapolation of the present weighting	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Status Quo in real terms: correct the number so that the relative position of the group of the more populous Member States remains unchanged	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Introducing a weighting more closely related to population	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 4.6: Decision-making in the Council: Dual Majorities*

(A)	Status Quo: no dual majorities	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Introducing a qualified majority of votes and a given percentage of the Union's population	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Introducing a blocking minority in terms of votes and at least three MS representing more than 100 million inhabitants	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 4.7: Composition of the Commission*

(A)	Equal number of members and Member States	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Creating two types of Commissioners (full Commissioners and deputy Commissioners without portfolio)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(D)	Setting a maximum number of members, irrespective of the number of MS	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- 15	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- 12	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- 10	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 4.8: Enhanced Cooperation: Introducing Flexibility*

(A)	Status Quo: some possibilities to opt out	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Introducing a flexibility clause to the TEC	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Integrate a flexibility clause to the TEU (CFSP, JHA)	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- ad hoc flexibility, valid at the level of each single decision	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- by structured cooperation in specific sectors, pre-defined by the TEU	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- by a sectoral enabling clause	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- by a general enabling clause	<input type="checkbox"/>
(D)	Integrate a general flexibility clause for TEU and TEC	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 4.9: Enhanced Cooperation: Conditions for Flexibility*

(A)	Status Quo: unanimity in the Council to authorize enhanced cooperation between certain Member States	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Introducing a strengthened majority in the Council to authorize enhanced cooperation	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 5.1: European Parliament : Right for Drafting Proposals*

(A)	Status Quo: No right	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Introducing a right for drafting proposals, which can be rejected by the Commission	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Introducing a genuine right of initiative	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 5.2: European Parliament : Procedures*

(A)	Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Abolishing the cooperation procedure	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Simplification of the remaining procedures	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- the codecision procedure	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- the assent procedure	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 5.3: Scope of the Legislative Procedures*

Codecision		
(A)	Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	All acts which previously came under the cooperation procedure (if this is abolished)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Extension on a case-by-case basis	<input type="checkbox"/>
(D)	All acts governed by qualified majority in the Council with the exception of certain areas (e.g. common trade policy)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(E)	All legislative acts	<input type="checkbox"/>
Assent		
(A)	Limit to certain international agreements and accession	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Extending the scope	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- on other categories of international agreement	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- on own resources of the EP	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- on the revision of Treaties	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 5.4 European Parliament: Election of the President of the Commission*

(A)	Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(B)	Election of the President and confirmation by the governments of the Member States, by common accord	<input type="checkbox"/>
(C)	Election of the President on the basis of a list drawn up by common accord by the governments of the Member States	<input type="checkbox"/>
(D)	Approval by the EP of the President of the Commission (absolute majority of members)	<input type="checkbox"/>
(E)	Approval by the EP of the President of the Commission (absolute majority of votes)	<input type="checkbox"/>

*Issue 5.5: European Parliament: Budget Power*

- |     |  |                          |
|-----|--|--------------------------|
| (A) | Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (B) | Giving the EP a right of inspection concerning the revenue section of the budget               | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (C) | Giving the EP a power of decision over a certain percentage of the non obligatory Expenditures | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (D) | Giving the EP also a power of decision over obligatory Expenditures                            | <input type="checkbox"/> |

*Issue 5.6: Role of the National Parliaments*

- |     |   |                          |
|-----|---|--------------------------|
| (A) | Status Quo: no role   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (B) | Widening the direct role of national parliaments            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (C) | Increasing the role of COSAC                                | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (D) | Creating a Second Chamber representing national parliaments | <input type="checkbox"/> |

*Issue 5.7: Power of the Commission*

- |     |   |                          |
|-----|---|--------------------------|
| (A) | Diminishing the power of the Commission                       | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (B) | Status Quo  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (C) | Raising the powers by vesting the Commission with             | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - the right of initiative in CSFP and JHA                     | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - the extension of its implementing powers                    | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - the role of guardian of the Treaty (e.g. propose penalties) | <input type="checkbox"/> |

*Issue 5.8: Power of the Court of Justice*

- |     |   |                          |
|-----|---|--------------------------|
| (A) | Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (B) | Extension of the possibility of application to the Court  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - by the EP   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - by the ESC and the Committee of the Regions   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - by individuals  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (C) | Recognizing explicitly the Court's power to limit the retroactive effects of its judgments                                | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (D) | Introducing the option for the Court of limiting the liability of Member States in cases of infringement of Community law | <input type="checkbox"/> |

*Issue 5.9: Power of the Committee of the Regions*

- |     |  |                          |
|-----|--|--------------------------|
| (A) | Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (B) | Alignment on the current status of the ESC   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (C) | Extension of compulsory consultation on further areas (e.g. CAP, transport, indirect taxation, social field, consumer policy, development cooperation) | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (D) | Access to the Court of Justice to bring actions regarding its prerogatives and the principle of subsidiarity   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (E) | Transforming the Committee into an institution   | <input type="checkbox"/> |

*Issue 5.10: Power of the Economic and Social Committee*

- |     |  |                          |
|-----|--|--------------------------|
| (A) | Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (B) | Getting information on the broad guidelines of economic policies / multilateral surveillance             | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (C) | Cooperation with the Commission by compulsory opinions in preparation of proposals                       | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (D) | Increasing the autonomy (e.g. determine the allowance of its members itself)                             | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (E) | Increasing its consultative role (e.g. areas of free movement of persons, new citizens' rights, culture) | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (F) | Access to the Court of Justice to bring actions regarding its rights and prerogatives                    | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (G) | Transforming the Committee into an institution   | <input type="checkbox"/> |

*Issue 6.1: Employment*

- |     |  |                          |
|-----|--|--------------------------|
| (A) | Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (B) | Including the objective of the promotion of employment                                       | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (C) | Including the objective of the achievement of full employment                                | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (D) | Specifying the objective of employment   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - by a reference in sectoral policies as a factor to be taken in consideration               | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - by a reference in the chapter on economic policy   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - by a specific article obliging the institutions to take it into account in all EC policies | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (E) | Introduction of a specific chapter   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - with mere obligation to discuss and consult on employment policies within the Council      | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - with the obligation to coordinate national policies  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - with the obligation to compulsory coordination to converge applicable economic policies    | <input type="checkbox"/> |

*Issue 6.2: Employment Committee*

- |     |  |                          |
|-----|--|--------------------------|
| (A) | Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)                        | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (B) | Introduction of a common instrument for analysis and observation | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (C) | Setting up an Employment Committee                               | <input type="checkbox"/> |

*Issue 6.3 and Issue 6.4: see Chapter 2.3*

*Issue 6.5: Community Policies: New Policies*

- |     |   |                          |
|-----|---|--------------------------|
| (A) | Status Quo (Art 3(t) TEC)   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (B) | Inserting specific legal basis in the Treaty for future new spheres | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (C) | Replacing the requirement of unanimity by a qualified majority to   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - Energy  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - Civil protection  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - Tourism   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (D) | Introducing the application of the co-decision procedure to         | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - Energy  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - Civil protection  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - Tourism   | <input type="checkbox"/> |

*Issue 6.6: External Economic Relations*

- |     |  |                          |
|-----|--|--------------------------|
| (A) | Status Quo (ante the Treaty of Amsterdam)  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (B) | Commission acts following a decision of the Council by QMV to guarantee consistency of the EU's external actions | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (C) | Giving the EU exclusive competence to act in the following areas of external economic relations                  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - services   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - investments  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - industrial property  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|     | - intellectual property  | <input type="checkbox"/> |

### 3. The Intranational Game

#### 3.1. A Theory of the Governmental Organization

How could we conceive the intranational governmental organization in general and the process of preparing foreign policy positions more specifically in order to produce new insights that are relevant for both theorists as well as practitioners? Whereas books on cabinet organization (Blondel/Müller-Rommel 1993) have the advantage of presenting comparable case studies, the information delivered is produced according to traditional concepts of government studies. Newer studies emphasize network-based governance concepts in order to capture new styles of policy-making (Rhodes/Dunleavy 1995, Marin 1990, Scharpf 1997). However, this new school contents itself with concept-building and terminological distinctions and has not (yet) guided systematic quantitative/empirical investigations<sup>19</sup>. Formal analyses of the governmental decision-making process<sup>20</sup>, on the other hand produce insightful, mathematically robust results within given model set ups. They reduce the overarching complexities to first principles where a more empirically oriented work can start. For example, Laver/Shepsle's model set up of dictator-ministers within precisely bounded jurisdictions are not only useful for deriving general propositions, but can also be considered as neatly constructed ideal types where the assumptions can be successively and transparently relaxed in order to approach real decision-making.

Following approaches of policy-making within organizational economics (Dixit 1996) we conceptualize the governmental decision making process according to organization theory *stricto sensu* (Milgrom/Roberts 1992, Kieser/Kubicek 1992, Picot et al 1997). Like the classical study of Allison (1971) we consider the preparation of foreign policy making first and foremost as a bureaucratic process, i.e. a process channeled by organizational structures. However, as this visionary book already accentuated, the decision-making processes do not always follow codified rules, so-called standard operating procedures, but there are political conflicts, struggles and negotiations under the shadow of hierarchy leading to complexities and often non-intended consequences that are a challenge for an analytical reconstruction. As a rule, actors seek to take advantage of the non strategy-proofness of each and every organizational/institutional design<sup>21</sup>. In this view, an organization constitutes only a 'legal fiction', which serves as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals (Jensen/Meckling 1976). Therefore, formal and informal authority structures may diverge (Weber 1922, Aghion/Tirole 1997). Whereas formal authority structure defines the institutionalized, most of the time legally codified competencies of actors, actors vested with informal authority derive their power from other resources like networks, strategic coalitions and informational advantages etc.. Note, that informal coordination structures may completely follow formal ones and parallel them. Then,

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<sup>19</sup> For a detailed discussion cf. Thurner/Stoiber 2002.

<sup>20</sup> For the case of presidential systems we refer ourselves, *pars pro toto*, to the study of Milner (1997), for the case of parliamentary systems to Laver/Shepsle 1996).

<sup>21</sup> Cf. the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for the non-existence of strategy-proofness (Gibbard 1973, Satterthwaite 1975).

they support the formal structure. In order to identify formal as well as informal structures, network analysis is appropriate because it allows us to contrast actual behavior with behavior to be expected by formal prescriptions. In the following, we take up key concepts from Allison's 'bureaucratic approach' as well as from new organizational economics approaches (Milgrom/Roberts 1992 Picot et al 1997, Dixit 1996) and translate them into empirically operational concepts in order to describe the actual governmental process in a more realistic way than other studies hitherto.<sup>22</sup>

According to empirical organization analysis we selected several key concepts in order to answer the following questions:

- The preparation of an Intergovernmental Conference is temporarily limited. Do member states implement specific project organizations, each with specific incentive problems (cf. Picot et al. 1997, Thurner/Stoiber 2002)? Which form of project management has been implemented during the IGC 1996? (**Formally implemented project management**)
- How was the allocation of competencies/responsibilities with regard to the IGC's issues? Can we observe issue-specific interdependencies – contrary to Laver/Shepsle's ideal typical model set up – because of overlapping ministerial responsibilities? (**Formal assignment of issue-specific competencies/responsibilities**)
- Which ministries have been actively involved during the preparation of the IGC 1996? (**Actual Involvement**)
- Have there been bilateral pre-coordinations between ministries for the aim of exchanging information (Henning 2000), avoiding negative externalities (Scharpf 1997) ex-ante consensus-building and/or strategic coalition building (Grofman 1982)? (**Bilateral ex-ante coordination relations**)
- Have there been perforations of the formal boundaries of the member states governmental organization by transnational pre-coordination of equivalent ministries (Wessels/Rometsch 1996, Thurner/Stoiber 2002) ? (**Transnational coordination networks**, see chapter 4)
- Which of the actors has been perceived, ex-post, as especially powerful in getting through their most-preferred negotiation positions in each of the homogenous groups of issues (Pappi/Kappelhoff 1984). (**Perceived ex-post influence power / prestige**)? Conceiving the assignment of perceived ex-post-influence on every issue as sign of the connectedness of actors via issues and issues via actors, respectively, which affiliation networks do result (Thurner/Stoiber 2002)? (**Bipartite actor-issue networks, as derived from IG-specific control dependencies**).

In the following, we provide operationalizations for each of these concepts.

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<sup>22</sup> A farsighted early precursor in this aim is Mayntz/Scharpf (1975) and Scharpf (1977).



## 3.2. Operationalization

### 3.2.1. The organization of the governmental preparation process

#### **Organizational Charts**

Following organizational theory (e.g. Laux/Liermann 1997, Picot et al. 1997) as confronted with results of the descriptive literature on the coordination of EU-policy (e.g. Kassim et al. 2000, Wessels/Rometsch 1996) we identified four relevant organizational attributes/variables in order to characterize the formal coordination of the preparation of the IGC 1996 (cf. Stoiber 2002, Thurner/Stoiber 2002):

- Existence and location of a coordination unit: Has a special coordination unit been set up or has the ministry been in charge that was already responsible for coordinating the every-day EU-policy-making?
- Competences of the coordination unit as project manager: According to management literature (Laux/Liermann 1997), four different functions with increasing empowerment are distinguished. On the lowest level, information distribution and communication management is discernible. Next, the right to set the agenda and to serve as an arbitrator would be superseded by the right to set guidelines, within which the ministries had to formulate the proposals. The most powerful competence would be the formal authority over every ministry's European section.
- Number and hierarchical level of institutionalised coordination committees: We distinguish how many committees were formally implemented, on which level (political or administrative) they were located and who headed the committee.
- Decentralization: Which actors outside the cabinet were formally involved? According to their constitutional rights presidents, parliaments and/or regions may have been involved. Interest groups may also have been formally included on the level of the coordination committees.

For each member state, these attributes are simultaneously visualized with organizational charts. They consist of all involved actors and committees, as well as the relations between them.

#### *Actors and Committees*

All charts include the Prime Ministers' Office (PO) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) as the central actors of the system with their actual span of supervision concerning European policy-making. Other ministries are abbreviated as 'functional ministries' with an idealised internal structure. For each governmental actor, three hierarchical levels were identified: the political leadership, where the existence of a special Minister of European Affairs is depicted. The highest level is called differently in the Member States (department, section, directorate, division). For reasons of comparability, the

entities of this level are labelled for all Member States in the style of the British system as 'Directorates' (*Abteilungen*). The executive administrative entities below are labelled as 'Divisions' (*Referate*). All regular divisions are represented by rectangles, whereas staff units (e.g. the special coordination units or the personal cabinets of the ministers) are depicted as ellipses.

Formally involved actors outside the cabinet (presidents, parliaments, regional entities or interest groups) – identified by the attribute 'decentralisation' - are also depicted as rectangles. Institutions on the state level are represented on the same level as the cabinet, whereas regional bodies are located sideways to the hierarchical organisation of the government. Additional actors are located on the level of their involvement. The national Permanent Representation in Brussels is included additionally, if it was explicitly involved on the national level.

Coordination committees for the institutionalised coordination are visualized as ellipses. They are labelled by their national official titles or by the hierarchical level of their location. Additionally, the organizational affiliation of the chair of the respective committee is mentioned. If a committee is set up on an ad-hoc basis, the ellipse is encircled by dashes.

#### *Relations*

We do not distinguish informational relations because we assumed a completely connected network of information exchange. Continuous lines depict the divisionalized structure of direct supervision within the government. The relations between the coordination unit and the coordination committees are depicted according to the rights of the unit as follows:

- : right to set guidelines
- : arbitration / agenda-setting
- ..... : coordination (communication and information exchange)

Membership of the actors in the diverse committees is represented as:

- : membership

Additionally, veto-rights of parliaments and/or federal entities are included:

- : veto-rights

Arrows represent the formal mandate given to the national negotiation delegation.

### **Formal (Ministerial) Jurisdictional Competencies**

Within each Member State we identified the involved actors' formal competencies with regard to each of the Issue Groups. As a source for the respective classification we used the constitutions and/or, if available, formal rules of procedure and/or the contracted assignment of ministerial responsibilities, usually laid down at the beginning of a government. Additionally, organizational charts of the ministries were used where existing.<sup>23</sup> We distinguish between four different formal competencies. Whereas the first and the second assigns issue-specific competencies to actors, the third and fourth constitute global competences as assigned to actors.

- Original Responsibility (OR): The ministry, which has the lead in formulating the initial proposal in respective issue areas is 'originally responsible' (*Federführung*). With regard to issue 6.1 (Employment), e.g., Ministries of Labour are vested with the original responsibility in all Member States.
- Responsibility (R): Because of interdependencies and overlapping jurisdictions with regard to issues, it is possible that actors 'share' responsibilities (*konkurrierende Zuständigkeit*). As soon as there is at least one section within a ministry that shares a jurisdiction with another ministry, without being in charge of formulating the initial proposal, we call that competing responsibility.
- Prime Ministerial Power: The competence to set policy guidelines (CPG). In several EU Member States it is constitutionally stipulated that the Prime Minister has the right to set policy guidelines (*Richtlinienkompetenz*). If a constitution does not provide the Prime Minister with this power we nevertheless consider him at least as equivalent to a responsible minister due to her/his position as a negotiator at the European Council.
- Project management (P): Actors vested with the responsibility of coordinating the preparation of national negotiation positions.

The Tables "Formal Ministerial Responsibilities According to Jurisdictional Competence" in chapter 3.4 exhibit for each intranational actor the respective competence for each Issue Group. The last row provides the number of actors sharing competencies within an Issue Group ( $N_{Comp}$ ).

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<sup>23</sup> Organizational charts were investigated on the www-pages of many ministries or in the respective governmental handbooks.

## Network Analysis of the Coordination Process

### The Identification of Actually Involved Actors

For each member state the second table presents the actually involved actors as identified by our interviews (see below). We distinguish, whether an actor was fully involved in the complete coordination process or just partially involved in up to two issue groups.

### Ex-ante coordination

Did actors try to pre-coordinate themselves bilaterally in order to enter the intranational coordination process with a joint position? By this question we try to find out whether argumentations as put forward by authors like Scharpf (1997) are valid. Scharpf argues that in the process of 'negative coordination' small subsets bilaterally try to avoid negative externalities. Other theoretical approaches highlight the process of proto-coalition building (Grofman 1982, Laver/Schofield 1990) of single-minded actors. We asked each of the involved actors to indicate all those other actors, with which they tried to formulate a joint position ex-ante.<sup>24</sup>

In order to determine the relative centrality of each of the actors with regard to the network of ex-ante coordination we decided to determine the so-called betweenness-centrality, indicating the relevance of an actor for the connection of other actors in a system. This index shows whether and to which extent an actor is a broker between other actors and thus controlling the flows of information and of other resources between them. It is calculated by the relative frequency of an actor operating as a broker when using the shortest path between two other actors. We focus exclusively on directed, asymmetrical relations in order to take into account the selective character of such network choices.<sup>25</sup>

On the basis of the concept of betweenness-centrality<sup>26</sup> it is possible to visualize the ex-ante-network. It should be clear that network drawing is not an end in itself. Instead, the visualization has to be concept-driven and theoretically legitimated. Thus, the substantial question should become clear by means of illustration (Brandes et al. 1999: 85) and facilitate the comparison of network patterns under

<sup>24</sup> The question reads as follows: "During the preparation of the IGC 96: Do you remind one or several ministries, with which you cooperated particularly close in order to elaborate / bring in a joint position into the coordination process already from the beginning. Could you please indicate those ministries or institutions?"

<sup>25</sup> Note that, ex-ante coordination may have different meanings for different actors and the threshold to indicate a relation may differ actor-specifically. Whereas some actors may consider a phone call already as ex-ante coordination, others would not recall this in an interview. Especially the project management (most of the time located at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or at the Premiers' Office) may take another view than the functional ministries. Functional departments normally restrict their bilateral relations on few actors, whereas the project management has multiple contacts to all other actors. From their perception the threshold of indicating a 'formulating a joint proposal' should therefore be higher. Employing only symmetric networks would control for such subjective biases.

<sup>26</sup> The calculation of the betweenness-centrality follows Freeman (1979):

$$C_b(j) = \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{k=1}^m \frac{g_{ik}(j)}{g_{ik}}, \text{ for } i \neq j \neq k$$

For asymmetric selections the betweenness-centrality of actor j depends on how often the actor j constitutes the shortest path between actor i and k.

varying settings. Contrary to traditional visualizations being based on multidimensional scaling we position the actors according to their relative betweenness-centrality.<sup>27</sup> The sociogram of the ex-ante-network is based on the values of betweenness-centrality, normalized between 0 and 1. The most central actor is located in the center of the network. The other actors are depicted according to their decreasing values on concentric circles around the center. All actors beyond the dashed circle take the value zero. All directed choices are depicted by arrows. Bi-directional arrows represent symmetrical ex-ante coordination. A unilateral offering of or demand for cooperation is depicted as a single arrow. Circles represent actors, at least as long the number of indegrees and outdegrees are identical. The more indegrees as compared to outdegrees, the flatter the ellipse of an actor in vertical direction, the more outdegrees as compared to indegrees, the flatter the ellipse of an actor in horizontal direction. The size of the ellipse/circle grows with the overall number of degrees. The exact position of an actor with his given distance from the center is undetermined by the software. We tried to rearrange the actors in such a way, that crossing of relations is minimized, that relations between two actors don't go through third actors and that related actors don't find themselves on opposite positions.

#### *Perceived ex-post power (Status)*

We applied the network analytical concept of influence power reputation (cf. Laumann/Pappi 1976, Knoke et al. 1996) in order to confront the formally assigned competencies with the perceived distribution of power inside a given system. We asked all actors, which actors they perceived *ex-post*-facto as having been influential in determining the national negotiation position. This so-called reputation question<sup>28</sup> was asked for each of the first five issue groups and for the four policy fields of Issue Group 6.<sup>29</sup> The attribution of influence of an actor  $j$  on an issue Group  $i$  can be understood as issue group-specific, partial 'power of influence'. The identified system of all attributions of power is called issue group-specific reputation network and could be again visualized. However, for practical reasons we decided to present tables that indicate varying degrees of ascribed influence using the network concept of status/rank prestige. This concept is based on directed relations and takes into consideration which actor is directly or indirectly selected by the number of other actors (Wassermann/Faust 1994: 206). Such it is able to take into account for the accumulation of power. The rank prestige  $RP_j$  of an actor  $j$  is calculated as the sum of all selections  $s_{kj}$  each weighted with the prestige  $PR_k$  of actor  $k$  ( $j$  are the actors in the column,  $k$  the actors in the row,  $j = k$ ):

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<sup>27</sup> These sociograms were produced with VISIONE. We thank Ulrik Brandes, who provided a preversion of the software.

<sup>28</sup> The question reads as follows: "Using the structuring notes as prepared by the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, we have classified their 30 issues into six different groups of issues. For each of the groups of issues: would you please indicate those ministries or institutions that stood out as especially / outstanding influential in the process of finding the final negotiation position?"

<sup>29</sup> For practical reasons, again, we restricted survey question with regard to issue groups instead of issues.

$$RP_j = \sum_{k=1}^n s_{kj} \cdot RP_k \quad (\text{cf. Wasserman/Faust 1994: 206}).^{30}$$

In the last column of these tables we always present the perceived over-all power of each actor by adding up all nine reputation-matrices and determining the rank prestige on the basis of this valued matrix.

*Affiliation Networks (actor-IG control dependencies)*

Conceiving the attribution of ex-post perceived power in an issue group as a clue that the respective actor participated in determining the negotiation position in this issue group, it is possible to identify the interdependencies between actors and issue groups, as well as the (in)direct accessibility of actors and issue groups via the concept of affiliation matrices. It is the first time that both possible affiliation matrices are combined within the same visualization by representing actors and issue groups as nodes and the attribution of influence power as valued relations between actors and issue groups. For this aim a quadratic matrix (cf. Table 5) was built up, in which actors and issue groups are listed as cases in columns as well as in rows. In each cell, we determined the number of times an actor was perceived influential in an issue i. Analogously, for each IG i the number of choices of actor j is listed. Thus only the quadrants actors\*IGs, and IGs\*actors, include the number of choices, while the quadrants actors\*actors and IGs\*IGs are filled up with structural zeros.

**Table 5: Affiliation-Matrix : Actors\*IGs, based on control dependencies**

		Actor			IG		
		j=1	...	j=n	i=1	...	i=m
Actor	j=1	0	...	0	$n_s$	...	...
	...	...	0	...	...	$n_s$	...
	j=n	0	...	0	...	...	$n_s$
IG	i=1	$n_s$	...	...	0	...	0
	...	...	$n_s$	...	...	0	...
	i=m	...	...	$n_s$	0	...	0

For the visualization of these affiliation networks, the so-called ‘Spring Embedder’ algorithm was applied.<sup>31</sup> This algorithm is based upon the path distances between the nodes, but unlike multidimensional scaling, some additional criteria are applied, e.g. a node repulsion, distributing the

<sup>30</sup> Eigenvectors for this index were calculated with Mathematica.

<sup>31</sup> We applied the network-visualization software NetDraw, cf. <http://www.analytictech.com/>.

nodes more evenly in the space (cf. Brandes et al. 1999). The actors are represented as circles, while the IGs are pictured as triangles. The thicker the line between an actor *j* and an IG *i*, the larger the number of the respective network choices for an actor *j* in the IG *i*. Such it is possible to identify the interdependence between specific issue areas of the negotiations and the actors simultaneously. Taking up a notion as put forward by Rhodes/Dunleavy (1995) we proposed to call the central actors around central issues the ‘**core executive**’ with regard to the preparation of the IGC 1996 (cf. Thurner/Stoiber 2002).

### 3.2.2. Intranational Preference Constellations

Having reconstructed the intranational organizational embedding<sup>32</sup> we are now in a better position to assess intranational preference constellation. Recall that actually involved actors are vested with varying formal competencies and actual power. In chapter 3.5 we present for all 46 issues the respective intranational preference constellation. Every table presents the most preferred options of each typical actor in every Member State. For reasons of comparability we had to distinguish between types of functional equivalent ministries/actors across the Member States. It proved to be rather easy to label the Prime Minister’s Office (PO), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Justice (MJ), the Ministry of the Interior (MI), the Ministry of Environment (MEnv), the Ministry of Defence (MDef), and the President’s Office (PresO). The classification of the types: Ministry of Finance (MF), Ministry of Economy (MEco), Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTrInd) as well as Ministry of Labour (MLab) and Ministry of Social Affairs (MSoc) turned out to be not as straightforward. We found at that time separate MFs and MEcos in eight member states (cf. Table 6), whereas in France, Spain, and Sweden only one ministry existed (Ministry of Economy and Finance – MEcoF), combining both jurisdictions. The Irish and the Finish MF have been charged with functions of a MEco. In contrast, in Great Britain and Italy the MTrInd have been functionally equivalent with the MEco in the other EU Member States. The situation is similar for the differentiation between the types MLab and MSoc. In nine member states separate ministries were established (cf. Table 6). In Germany, France and the Netherlands, a joint Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MLS) existed. The Austrian MSoc was also responsible for labour-policy. Only in Luxemburg and Greece no specific MSoc was established at that time.

#### **Positions**

In all tables, most preferred options of each actor are listed. For the coding of the options the reader should refer to chapter 2.4. Non-existent actors (if a special type, f.i. the Ministry of Social Affairs doesn’t exist in the respective Member State) or not-involved actors are marked with ‘\_’. We assume, that if an actor has no interest in the respective issue, he also has no position. These cases are marked with ‘.’. If an actor had one explicit most preferred option, this option is listed in the table. If the actor responded, that he had more than one most preferred option, this range is listed (X,Y,Z or X-Z). Sometimes the interviewees declared also their ‘second best’ option. In such a case, the most

preferred option is listed first and the alternative option follows after a ‘;’. If an interviewee didn’t remember the actor’s position or refused to mark the most preferred position, this is indicated with a ‘m’.

### **Relative Weighting (Salience)**

The follow-up table comprises the relative weightings of the respective issue as indicated by the actors. Since we postulate that we exhaustively identified the set of issues, we are able to elicit relative weights as attributed to each issue. In a hierarchical elicitation we asked our experts, first to distribute 100 points over all issue groups. Then, inside each issue group (IG) and as long as an issue group exhibited some positive share, we asked again to distribute 100 points, this time over all issues of the respective issue group. Mapping these weightings to the unit interval and multiplying them, it is possible to calculate the relative weighting of each single issue  $i$   $W(i)$  for actor  $j$ :

$$W(i)_j = w(i)_j * w(IG)_j \quad , \quad \sum W(i)_j = 1$$

Inside the cells of the weighting tables we present the value in percentage.

### **3.3. Data Collection**

Using the list of all members of the national delegations at the IGC (see chapter 5.2) we identified the person who was in charge for coupling the national negotiation delegation to the national interministerial coordination process. This person had to answer a standardized questionnaire (see annex 1), which included questions on the formal coordination structure of the project management with regard to the IGC 1996 and the ministries actively involved<sup>33</sup>. These persons had to indicate top bureaucrats within each actively involved ministry charged with preparing the IGC. These high-level ministerial bureaucrats were contacted and face-to-face interviews were arranged in all Member States. The topics of these standardized interviews included the concepts as discussed in this chapter as well as in the chapter ‘Transnational Networks’.<sup>34</sup> Interviews took between 60 to 120 minutes. Despite or as we assume: just because of the standardized format, the questions offered the opportunity to discuss very openly these formerly highly sensitive issues and to gain more and more an overall, objective picture of this conference and its intranational preparation.

For a complementary ‘realistic boundary specification’ of the coordination systems, we used the reputation item in order to identify additional influential ministries or actors as perceived by the actors of the first step. These actors were interviewed, too, as soon as they were named by at least two actors of the first boundary specification. If these actors were perceived influential in more than two Issue Groups we arranged a face-to-face interview, otherwise a reduced survey by fax and phone was

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<sup>32</sup> As transnational networks are concerned we refer the reader to chapter 4.

<sup>33</sup> Where ‘actively involved’ means at least the contribution of written proposal, cf. our questionnaire (Annex 2).



conducted covering only the respective issue area of importance. Altogether 131 national actors were identified and 124 interviews could be realized. Additionally the positions of 11 involved parliaments and federal entities had to be coded from documents<sup>35</sup>. An overview of all actors involved in the preparation for the IGC 1996 is presented in Table 6.

## Preview

Chapter 3.3 presents the respective data in the following sequence. For each member state (1 to 15) we show:

1. Formal Organization Governments
  - a) Organizational Chart
  - b) Formal Ministerial Responsibilities qua Jurisdictional Competencies (table)
2. Informal Coordination
  - a) Actually Involved Ministries (table)
  - b) Ex-Ante-Coordination Network (sociogram)
  - c) Ex-Post Perceived Influence Power (table)
  - d) Affiliation Network (sociogram)

Chapter 3.4 presents the respective data in the following sequence. For each issue 1.1 to 6.6 we show:

1. Most preferred positions of all intranational actors mirroring the intranational preference constellations (table)
2. Relative weights of the issues as allocated by each intranational actor (table)

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<sup>34</sup> Further items with regard to the perceived coordination style of the project management are not included in this book.

<sup>35</sup> Most positions are available in Piepenschneider (1996), but we analyzed also some additional original documents.

Table 6: overview data collection

Land	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MEnv	MDef	MAGR	MInd	Other	PresO	FS	EU-C
BEL	V	V	V	V	V	T	V	V	T	T*	-	/	/	/	D	D
DK	V	V	V	V	T*	V	V	T	V	T	-	T	/	/	/	D
D	V	V	V	V	V	V	T	V	T	T	V	V	/	-	V	D
FIN	V	V	V	V	V	/	-	V	T	T	-	V	/	V	/	D
F	V	V	T	T	T	V	T	-	-	-	-	-	T	-	-	-
GR	V	V	T	V	V	V	T	-	T*	T	-	V	/	-	/	D
GB	V	V	V	V	V	/	V	T*	T	T	-	V	/	/	/	-
IRL	V	V	/	V	V	/	T	T	T*	-	-	/	/	-	/	-
IT	V	V	V	V	V	/	-	-	-	T	-	V	/	-	/	-
LUX	V	V	-	V	V	-	V	-	V	-	-	/	/	/	/	-
NL	V	V	V	V	V	V	T	-	T	-	-	/	/	/	/	-
AUT	V	V	V	V	V	T	/	V	T	T	-	/	/	-	D	D
POR	-	V	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	/	-	/	-
SWE	V	V	/	V	V	/	T	V	V	V	-	T*	/	/	/	D
SP	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	T	T	-	T*	T*	/	D	D


V = full interview  
T = partial interview  
\* = derived or estimated preferences  
D = preferences coded from documents  
- = actor not involved  
/ = actor not existent

### 3.4. Formal and informal coordination structures

#### 3.4.1. Austria

##### Formal Organization of Government

##### Organizational Chart



##### Formal Ministerial Responsibilities According to Jurisdictional Competence


Actor	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4
<b>PO</b>	R, P	R, P	R, P	R, P	R, P	R, P	R, P	R, P	R, P
<b>MFA</b>	OR, P	OR, P	P	OR, P	OR, P	R, P	R, P	R, P	OR, P
<b>MI</b>	R		OR	R	R			OR	
<b>MJ</b>	R		OR		R				
<b>MF</b>		R	R		R	R			
<b>MEco</b>				R				OR	R
<b>MSL</b>				R	R	OR			
<b>MDef</b>		R							
<b>MEnv</b>							OR		
<b>FS</b>	R				R			R	
<b>EU-C</b>	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
<b>Sozpa</b>						R			
<b>N<sub>comp</sub></b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>

## Informal Organization

### Actually Involved Ministries

Actor	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MSoc	MEnv	MDef
Full involved	x	x	x	x	x		x		
Partially involved						x		x	x


### Ex-Ante-Coordination Network



Ex-Post Influence Power (Rank Prestige)

	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4	Total RP
<b>PO</b>	0,4	0,321	0,185	0,4	0,273	0,252	0,333	0,341	0,375	0,304
<b>MFA</b>	0,4	0,321	0,246	0,4	0,273	0,252	0,333	0,341	0,375	0,306
<b>MI</b>	0	0	0,246	0	0	0	0	0,114	0	0,049
<b>MJ</b>	0	0	0,246	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,028
<b>MF</b>	0	0	0,061	0	0,114	0,063	0	0	0	0,030
<b>MEco</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,091	0,125	0,034
<b>MSoc</b>	0	0	0	0	0,023	0,168	0	0	0	0,025
<b>MDef</b>	0	0,214	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,024
<b>MEnv</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,333	0	0	0,039
<b>FS</b>	0,2	0	0	0	0,148	0	0	0,114	0	0,047
<b>EU-C</b>	0	0,143	0,015	0,2	0,170	0,013	0	0	0	0,045
<b>Sozpa</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0,252	0	0	0,125	0,069
<b>N<sub>infl</sub></b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Σ 1,0</b>


Affiliation Network Issue Groups - Ministries



### 3.4.2. Belgium

#### Formal Organization of Government

##### Organizational Chart



##### Formal Ministerial Responsibilities According to Jurisdictional Competence


Actor	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4
<b>PO</b>	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
<b>MFA</b>	OR,P	OR,P	P	OR,P	OR,P	P	P	P	OR,P
<b>MI</b>	R		OR					OR	
<b>MJ</b>	R		OR		R				
<b>MF</b>		R	R			R			
<b>MEco</b>						R	R	OR	R
<b>MLab</b>						OR			
<b>MSoc</b>	R					R			
<b>MDef</b>		R							
<b>MEnv</b>							OR		
<b>MFTTr</b>									OR
<b>FS</b>	R				R			R	R
<b>EU-C</b>					R				
<b>N<sub>Comp</sub></b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>

## Informal Coordination

### Actually Involved Ministries

Actor	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MEnv	MDef
Full involved	x	x	x	x	x		x	x		
Partially involved						x			x	x


### Ex-Ante-Coordination Network



Ex-Post Influence Power (Rank Prestige)

	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4	Total RP
PO	0,242	0,333	0,25	0,4	0,222	0,137	0,143	0,154	0,222	0,220
MFA	0,242	0,333	0,25	0,4	0,222	0,274	0,429	0,231	0,222	0,259
MI	0,101	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0,154	0	0,053
MJ	0,242	0	0,25	0,2	0,111	0	0	0	0	0,069
MF	0	0	0	0	0	0,075	0	0	0,111	0,030
MEco	0	0	0	0	0	0,103	0	0,231	0,222	0,087
MLab	0,040	0	0	0	0	0,274	0	0	0	0,036
MSoc	0	0	0	0	0	0,137	0	0	0	0,026
MDef	0	0,333	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,022
MEnv	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,429	0	0	0,033
FS	0,134	0	0	0	0,222	0	0	0,231	0,222	0,132
EU-C	0	0	0	0	0,222	0	0	0	0	0,032
<b>N<sub>Infl</sub></b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>Σ 1,0</b>

Affiliation Network Issue Groups - Ministries






### 3.4.3. Denmark

#### Formal Organization of Government

##### Organizational Chart



##### Formal Ministerial Responsibilities According to Jurisdictional Competence


Actor	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4
<b>PO</b>	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
<b>MFA</b>	OR,P	OR,P	P	OR,P	OR,P	R,P	P	P	R,P
<b>MI</b>			OR					OR	
<b>MJ</b>	R		OR		R				
<b>MF</b>		R	R		R	R			
<b>MEco</b>				R	R	R	R	R	R
<b>MLab</b>						OR			
<b>MSoc</b>	R					R			
<b>MDef</b>		R							
<b>MEnv</b>							OR	OR	
<b>MInd</b>							R		OR
<b>EU-C</b>	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
<b>N<sub>Comp</sub></b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>

## Informal Coordination

### Actually Involved Ministries

Actor	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MEnv	MDef	MInd
Full involved	x	x	x	x		x	x		x		
Partially involved					x			x		x	x


### Ex-Ante-Coordination Network



Ex-Post Influence Power (Rank Prestige)

	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4	Total RP
PO	0,3	0,391	0,222	0,323	0,3	0,284	0,236	0,226	0,25	0,260
MFA	0,3	0,391	0,222	0,323	0,3	0,085	0,236	0,226	0,25	0,242
MI	0	0	0,167	0	0	0	0	0,142	0	0,037
MJ	0,2	0	0,222	0,04	0,2	0	0,030	0,023	0,028	0,075
MF	0	0	0	0	0	0,071	0,039	0,019	0,007	0,030
MEco	0	0	0	0,152	0	0,142	0,044	0,023	0,167	0,074
MLab	0	0	0	0	0	0,142	0	0	0	0,027
MSoc	0	0	0	0	0	0,036	0	0	0	0,004
MDef	0	0,043	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,009
MEnv	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,236	0,151	0	0,054
MInd	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,118	0,094	0,16	0,037
EU-C	0,2	0,174	0,167	0,162	0,2	0,239	0,059	0,095	0,139	0,150
N <sub>Infl</sub>	4	4	5	5	4	7	8	9	7	Σ 1,0


Affiliation Network Issue Groups - Ministries



### 3.4.4. Finland

#### Formal Organization of Government

##### Organizational Chart



##### Formal Ministerial Responsibilities According to Jurisdictional Competence


Actor	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4
PO	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
MFA	OR,P	OR,P	R,P	OR,P	OR,P	R,P	R,P	R,P	OR,P
MI	R		OR	R				OR	
MJ	R		OR		R				
MF		R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
MLab						OR			
MSoc	R					R			
MDef		R							
MEnv							OR		
MTrIn							R	OR	R
PresO	R	R		R	R				
EU-C	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
N <sub>Comp</sub>	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5

## Informal Coordination

### Actually Involved Ministries

Actor	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MLab	MSoc	MEnv	MDef	MTrIn	PresO
Full involved	x	x	x	x	x		x			x	x
Partially involved						x		x	x		


### Ex-Ante-Coordination Network



Ex-Post Influence Power (Rank Prestige)


	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4	Total RP
<b>PO</b>	0,185	0,234	0,124	0,185	0,204	0,107	0,073	0,089	0,101	0,150
<b>MFA</b>	0,274	0,248	0,208	0,247	0,251	0,107	0,22	0,239	0,292	0,224
<b>MI</b>	0,055	0,058	0,249	0,124	0,094	0	0	0,239	0	0,081
<b>MJ</b>	0,274	0,015	0,249	0,185	0,183	0	0,066	0,056	0,067	0,116
<b>MF</b>	0	0,05	0,035	0,072	0,068	0,291	0,089	0,048	0	0,083
<b>MLab</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0,318	0	0	0	0,054
<b>MSoc</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0,154	0,013	0	0	0,014
<b>MDef</b>	0	0,142	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,015
<b>MEnv</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,22	0	0	0,034
<b>MTrIn</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,163	0,239	0,281	0,059
<b>PresO</b>	0,142	0,248	0,083	0,082	0,086	0	0,009	0	0,011	0,075
<b>EU-C</b>	0,069	0,004	0,052	0,103	0,114	0,022	0,146	0,089	0,247	0,095
<b>N<sub>infl</sub></b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>Σ 1,0</b>

Affiliation Network Issue Groups – Ministries



### 3.4.5. France

#### Formal Organization of Government



#### Formal Ministerial Responsibilities According to Jurisdictional Competence


Actor	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4
<b>PO</b>	R		R	R	R	R	R	R	R
<b>MFA</b>	OR,P	OR,P	R,P	OR,P	OR,P	R,P	R,P	R,P	R,P
<b>MI</b>	R		OR						
<b>MJ</b>	R		OR						
<b>MEcoF</b>		R	R	R	R	R	R	R	OR
<b>MDef</b>		R							
<b>MLS</b>						OR			
<b>MEnv</b>							OR		
<b>MInd</b>								OR	R
<b>MTour</b>								OR	
<b>PresO</b>	R	OR	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
<b>N<sub>Comp</sub></b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>

## Informal Coordination

### Actually Involved Ministries

Actor	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	M/EcoF	PresO
Full involved	x	x				x
Partially involved			x	x	x	

### Ex-Ante-Coordination Network






Ex-Post Influence Power (Rank Prestige)

	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4	Total RP
<b>PO</b>	0,35	0,25	0,193	0,3	0,333	0,273	0,273	0,273	0,273	0,258
<b>MFA</b>	0,35	0,375	0,193	0,3	0,333	0,273	0,273	0,273	0,273	0,267
<b>MI</b>	0,049	0	0,193	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,057
<b>MJ</b>	0,049	0	0,193	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,057
<b>MEcoF</b>	0,029	0	0,032	0,1	0	0,273	0,273	0,273	0,273	0,139
<b>PresO</b>	0,175	0,375	0,193	0,3	0,333	0,182	0,182	0,182	0,182	0,221
<b>N<sub>Infl</sub></b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Σ 1,0</b>


Affiliation Network Issue Groups – Ministries



### 3.4.6. Germany

#### Formal Organization of Government

##### Organizational Chart



##### Formal Ministerial Responsibilities According to Jurisdictional Competence


Actor	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4
<b>PO</b>	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG
<b>MFA</b>	OR,P	OR,P	R,P	OR,P	OR,P	R,P	R,P	R,P	R,P
<b>MI</b>	R		OR	R	R			OR	
<b>MJ</b>	R		OR		R				
<b>MF</b>		R	R		R	R			
<b>MEco</b>	R	R		R	R	R	R	OR	OR
<b>MLS</b>				R	R	OR			
<b>MDef</b>		R							
<b>MEnv</b>				R			OR		
<b>MAgr</b>				R			R		R
<b>MTech</b>								R	
<b>FS</b>	OR		R	R	R			OR	
<b>EU-C</b>	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
<b>N<sub>Comp</sub></b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>

## Informal Coordination

### Actually Involved Ministries

Actor	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MEnv	MAgr	FS	MLS	MDef
Full involved	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
Partially involved										x	x


### Ex-Ante-Coordination Network



Ex-Post Influence Power (Rank Prestige)

	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4	Total RP
<b>PO</b>	0,145	0,4	0,149	0,280	0,199	0,214	0,182	0,192	0,279	0,200
<b>MFA</b>	0,182	0,4	0,205	0,280	0,199	0,146	0,256	0,290	0,286	0,232
<b>MI</b>	0,152	0	0,223	0,088	0,028	0,053	0	0,041	0,057	0,078
<b>MJ</b>	0,182	0	0,223	0,118	0,161	0	0	0	0	0,089
<b>MF</b>	0,068	0	0,056	0,092	0,042	0,142	0,040	0,099	0,014	0,076
<b>MEco</b>	0,152	0	0,037	0,140	0,168	0,094	0,157	0,245	0,286	0,153
<b>MSL</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0,248	0	0	0	0,031
<b>MDef</b>	0	0,2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,020
<b>MEnv</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,256	0	0	0,023
<b>MAgr</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,051	0	0	0,004
<b>FS</b>	0,120	0	0,107	0	0,124	0,086	0,057	0,133	0,076	0,079
<b>EU-C</b>	0	0	0	0	0,077	0,017	0	0	0	0,015
<b>NInfl</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>Σ 1,0</b>


Affiliation Network Issue Groups - Ministries



### 3.4.7. Great Britain

#### Formal Organization of Government

##### Organizational Chart



##### Formal Ministerial Responsibilities According to Jurisdictional Competence


Actor	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4
<b>PO</b>	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG
<b>MFA</b>	OR	OR	R	OR	OR	R	R	R	R
<b>MI</b>	R		OR	R				OR	
<b>MJ</b>	R		OR		R				
<b>MF</b>		R	R		R	R	R		R
<b>MLab</b>						OR			
<b>MSoc</b>	R					R			
<b>MDef</b>		R							
<b>MEnv</b>							OR	R	
<b>MTrInd</b>						R		OR	OR
<b>EU-Sec</b>	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
<b>EU-C</b>					R				
<b>N<sub>Comp</sub></b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>

## Informal Coordination

### Actually Involved Ministries

Actor	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MLab	MSoc	MEnv	MDef	MTrInd
<b>Full involved</b>	x	x	x	x	x	x				x
<b>Partially involved</b>							x	x	x	


### Ex-Ante-Coordination Network



Ex-Post Influence Power (Rank Prestige)

	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4	Total RP
<b>PO</b>	0	0	0,095	0,071	0,03	0	0	0	0	0,032
<b>MFA</b>	0,237	0,278	0,212	0,177	0,204	0,204	0,254	0,25	0,267	0,214
<b>MI</b>	0,237	0,056	0,212	0,137	0,165	0,034	0,051	0,188	0	0,104
<b>MJ</b>	0,133	0	0,212	0,133	0,095	0,023	0	0	0	0,068
<b>MF</b>	0,074	0,093	0	0,167	0,087	0,115	0,186	0,063	0,267	0,111
<b>MLab</b>	0,069	0,056	0,044	0,031	0,023	0,15	0,051	0,05	0	0,056
<b>MSoc</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0,123	0	0	0	0,048
<b>MDef</b>	0	0,222	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,035
<b>MEnv</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,254	0	0	0,042
<b>MTrInd</b>	0,012	0	0	0,061	0,116	0,181	0	0,25	0,267	0,088
<b>EU-Sec</b>	0,178	0,222	0,168	0,146	0,157	0,17	0,203	0,2	0,2	0,159
<b>EU-C</b>	0,059	0,074	0,055	0,077	0,124	0	0	0	0	0,042
<b>N<sub>infl</sub></b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Σ 1,0</b>


Affiliation Network Issue Groups – Ministries



3.4.8. Greece

Formal Organization of Government

Organizational Chart



Formal Responsibilities According to Jurisdictional Competence

Actor	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4
<b>PO</b>	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG
<b>MFA</b>	OR,P	OR,P	R,P	OR,P	OR,P	R,P	R,P	R,P	R,P
<b>MI</b>			OR					OR	
<b>MJ</b>	R		OR		R				
<b>MF</b>		R	R		R				
<b>MEco</b>				R		R		R	OR
<b>MLab</b>						OR			
<b>MDef</b>		R							
<b>MEnv</b>							OR		
<b>MInd</b>								OR	
<b>MPubO</b>	R		OR						
<b>MMMar</b>			R						
<b>N<sub>Comp</sub></b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>




## Informal Coordination

### Actually Involved Ministries

Actor	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MEnv	MDef	MInd	MPub
Full involved	x	x		x	x	x				x	
Partially involved			x				x	x	x		x


### Ex-Ante-Coordination Network



Ex-Post Influence Power (Rank Prestige)

	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4	Total RP
<b>PO</b>	0,261	0,2	0,067	0,375	0,5	0,02	0	0,024	0	0,120
<b>MFA</b>	0,261	0,4	0,226	0,375	0,5	0,294	0,5	0,366	0,5	0,328
<b>MI</b>	0,109	0	0,137	0	0	0	0	0,122	0	0,069
<b>MJ</b>	0,261	0	0,226	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,084
<b>MF</b>	0	0	0,053	0	0	0,098	0	0	0	0,023
<b>MEco</b>	0	0	0,008	0,25	0	0,294	0	0,122	0,5	0,097
<b>MLab</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0,294	0	0	0	0,039
<b>MDef</b>	0	0,4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,033
<b>MEnv</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,5	0	0	0,049
<b>MInd</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,366	0	0,067
<b>MPubO</b>	0,109	0	0,216	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,065
<b>MMMar</b>	0	0	0,067	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,026
<b>N<sub>infl</sub></b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>Σ 1,0</b>


Affiliation Network Issue Groups – Ministries



### 3.4.9. Ireland

#### Formal Organization of Government

##### Organizational Chart



#### Formal Ministerial Responsibilities According to Jurisdictional Competence


<b>Actor</b>	<b>IG1</b>	<b>IG2</b>	<b>IG3</b>	<b>IG4</b>	<b>IG5</b>	<b>IG6.1</b>	<b>IG6.2</b>	<b>IG6.3</b>	<b>IG6.4</b>
<b>PO</b>	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
<b>MFA</b>	OR,P	OR,P	R,P	OR,P	OR,P	R,P	R,P	R,P	OR,P
<b>MJ</b>	R		OR		R				
<b>MF</b>				R	R	R	R		R
<b>MLab</b>						OR		R	
<b>MSoc</b>	R					R			
<b>MEnv</b>							OR		
<b>AttGen</b>	R								
<b>MDef</b>		R							
<b>MTouT</b>								OR	R
<b>MTE</b>								OR	
<b>N<sub>Comp</sub></b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>

## Informal Coordination

### Actually Involved Ministries

Actor	PO	MFA	MJ	MF	MLab	MSoc	MEnv
Full involved	x	x	x	x			
Partially involved					x	x	x


### Ex-Ante-Coordination Network



Ex-Post Influence Power (Rank Prestige)

	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4	Total RP
<b>PO</b>	0	0,5	0	0,308	0,308	0,17	0,167	0	0	0,183
<b>MFA</b>	0,381	0,5	0,5	0,308	0,308	0,255	0,333	1	1	0,351
<b>MJ</b>	0,19	0	0,5	0,077	0,077	0	0	0	0	0,109
<b>MF</b>	0	0	0	0,308	0,308	0,255	0,167	0	0	0,162
<b>MLab</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0,255	0	0	0	0,042
<b>MSoc</b>	0,048	0	0	0	0	0,064	0	0	0	0,020
<b>MEnv</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,333	0	0	0,038
<b>AttGen</b>	0,381	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,094
<b>N<sub>Infl</sub></b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>Σ 1,0</b>


Affiliation Network Issue Groups – Ministries



3.4.10. Italy

Formal Organization of Government

Organizational Chart




Formal Ministerial Responsibilities According to Jurisdictional Competence

Actor	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4
<b>PO</b>	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
<b>MFA</b>	OR,P	OR,P	R,P	OR,P	OR,P	R,P	R,P	R,P	OR,P
<b>MI</b>	R		OR	R	R				
<b>MJ</b>	R		OR		R				
<b>MF</b>		R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
<b>MDef</b>		R							
<b>MTrl</b>					R			OR	OR
<b>MEnv</b>				R			OR		
<b>MSoc</b>	R				R				
<b>MLS</b>	R			R	R	OR			
<b>NComp</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>

Actually Involved Ministries

Actor	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MDef	MTrInd
Full involved	x	x	x	x	x		x
Partially involved						x	


Ex-Ante-Coordination Network



Ex-Post Influence Power (Rank Prestige)

	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4	Total RP
<b>PO</b>	0,273	0,333	0,077	0,439	0,375	0,143	0,143	0,2	0,091	0,214
<b>MFA</b>	0,273	0,333	0,308	0,429	0,375	0,429	0,429	0,6	0,364	0,384
<b>MI</b>	0,182	0	0,308	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,055
<b>MJ</b>	0,273	0	0,308	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,060
<b>MF</b>	0	0	0	0,143	0,25	0,429	0,429	0,2	0,182	0,159
<b>MDef</b>	0	0,333	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,041
<b>MTrl</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,364	0,087
<b>N<sub>Infl</sub></b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Σ 1,0</b>

Affiliation Network Issue Groups – Ministries






### 3.4.11. Luxembourg

#### Formal Organization of Government

##### Organizational Chart



##### Formal Ministerial Responsibilities According to Jurisdictional Competence


<b>Actor</b>	<b>IG1</b>	<b>IG2</b>	<b>IG3</b>	<b>IG4</b>	<b>IG5</b>	<b>IG6.1</b>	<b>IG6.2</b>	<b>IG6.3</b>	<b>IG6.4</b>
<b>PO</b>	CPG,P	CPG,P	CPG,P	CPG,P	CPG,P	CPG,P	CPG,P	CPG,P	CPG,P
<b>MFA</b>	R,P	OR,P	P	OR,P	OR,P	R,P	R,P	R,P	OR,P
<b>MJ</b>	R		OR		R				
<b>MF</b>		R	R			R	R		
<b>MLab</b>						OR			
<b>MEnv</b>							OR		
<b>MDef</b>		R							
<b>MI</b>	R		R						
<b>MEco</b>							R	R	R
<b>MEner</b>								OR	
<b>MTour</b>								OR	
<b>NComp</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>

## Informal Coordination

### Actually Involved Ministries

Actor	PO	MFA	MJ	MF	MLab	MEnv
Full involved	x	x	x	x	x	x
Partially involved						


### Ex-Ante-Coordination Network



Ex-Post Influence Power (Rank Prestige)

	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4	Total RP
<b>PO</b>	0,5	0,5	0,4	0,5	0,5	0,308	0,222	0	0	0,388
<b>MFA</b>	0,5	0,5	0,2	0,5	0,5	0,205	0,444	1	1	0,449
<b>MJ</b>	0	0	0,4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,057
<b>MF</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0,179	0	0	0	0,021
<b>MLab</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0,308	0	0	0	0,051
<b>MEnv</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,333	0	0	0,033
<b>N<sub>Infl</sub></b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>Σ 1,0</b>


Affiliation Network Issue Groups – Ministries



3.4.12. The Netherlands

Formal Organization of Government

Organizational Chart



Formal Ministerial Responsibilities According to Jurisdictional Competence


Actor	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4
PO	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
MFA	OR,P	OR,P	R,P	OR,P	OR,P	R,P	R,P	R,P	R,P
MI	R		OR	R	R			OR	
MJ	R		OR		R				
MF		R	R		R	R		R	R
MEco				R		R	R	OR	OR
MSL				R	R	OR			
MEnv				R			OR		
MDef		R							
MTran								R	
N <sub>Comp</sub>	4	4	5	6	6	5	4	6	4

## Informal Coordination

### Actually Involved Ministries

Actor	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MSL	MEnv
Full involved	x	x	x	x	x	x		
Partially involved							x	x


### Ex-Ante-Coordination Network



Ex-Post Influence Power (Rank Prestige)

	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4	Total RP
<b>PO</b>	0,158	0	0,158	0,5	0,5	0,087	0,179	0,138	0,167	0,160
<b>MFA</b>	0,421	1	0,421	0,5	0,5	0,108	0,265	0,238	0,333	0,344
<b>MI</b>	0,21	0	0,21	0	0	0	0	0,215	0	0,083
<b>MJ</b>	0,21	0	0,21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,063
<b>MF</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0,322	0,053	0,113	0,167	0,093
<b>MEco</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0,322	0,238	0,295	0,333	0,157
<b>MSL</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0,161	0	0	0	0,053
<b>MEnv</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,265	0	0	0,048
<b>N<sub>Infl</sub></b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Σ 1,0</b>


Affiliation Network Issue Groups – Ministries



### 3.4.13. Portugal

#### Formal Organization of Government

##### Organizational Chart



##### Formal Ministerial Responsibilities According to Jurisdictional Competence

Actor	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4
<b>PO</b>	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG
<b>MFA</b>	OR,P	OR,P	OR,P	OR,P	OR,P	OR,P	OR,P	OR,P	OR,P
<b>MI</b>	C		C					C	
<b>MJ</b>	C		C		C				
<b>MF</b>		C	C			C			C
<b>MEco</b>						C		C	
<b>MLS</b>	C					C			
<b>MDef</b>		C							
<b>MEnv</b>							C		
<b>N<sub>Comp</sub></b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>

## Informal Coordination

### *Actually Involved Ministries*

<b>Actor</b>	<b>MFA</b>
<b>Full involved</b>	x
<b>Partially involved</b>	

*No Ex-Ante Coordination Network*

*No Ex-Post Reputation Networks*


*No Affiliation Network*



3.4.14. Spain

Formal Organization of Government

Organizational Chart



Formal Ministerial Responsibilities According to Jurisdictional Competence


Actor	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4
<b>PO</b>	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG	CPG
<b>MFA</b>	R,P	OR,P	R,P	OR,P	OR,P	R,P	R,P	R,P	R,P
<b>MI</b>	R		OR					OR	
<b>MJ</b>	R		OR		R				
<b>MEcoF</b>		R	R	R	R	R	R	R	OR
<b>MLab</b>						OR			
<b>MSoc</b>	R					R			
<b>MDef</b>		R							
<b>MEnv</b>							OR		
<b>MInd</b>								OR	
<b>MTour</b>								OR	
<b>FS</b>	R				R				
<b>EU-C</b>					R				
<b>N<sub>Comp</sub></b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>

## Informal Coordination

### Actually Involved Ministries

Actor	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MEcoF	MLab	MSoc	MEnv	MDef	MInd	MPub
<b>Full involved</b>	x	x	x	x	x	x	x				
<b>Partially involved</b>								x	x	x	x


### Ex-Ante-Coordination Network



Ex-Post Influence Power (Rank Prestige)

	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4	Total RP
<b>PO</b>	0,229	0,143	0,25	0,364	0,263	0,11	0,143	0,048	0,333	0,192
<b>MFA</b>	0,229	0,429	0,25	0,364	0,263	0,273	0,286	0,238	0,333	0,270
<b>MI</b>	0,14	0	0,25	0	0	0	0	0,238	0	0,094
<b>MJ</b>	0,14	0	0,25	0	0,066	0	0	0	0	0,060
<b>MEcoF</b>	0	0	0	0,136	0	0,273	0,286	0	0,333	0,074
<b>MLab</b>	0	0	0	0,136	0	0,273	0	0	0	0,035
<b>MSoc</b>	0,048	0	0	0	0,044	0,068	0	0	0	0,026
<b>MDef</b>	0	0,429	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,037
<b>MEnv</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,286	0	0	0,035
<b>MInd</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,238	0	0,059
<b>MTour</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,238	0	0,045
<b>FS</b>	0,127	0	0	0	0,146	0	0	0	0	0,037
<b>EU-C</b>	0,089	0	0	0	0,219	0	0	0	0	0,036
<b>N<sub>Infl</sub></b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Σ 1,0</b>


Affiliation Network Issue Groups – Ministries



3.4.15. Sweden

Formal Organization of Government

Organizational Chart



Formal Ministerial Responsibilities According to Jurisdictional Competence


Actor	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4
<b>PO</b>	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
<b>MFA</b>	OR,P	OR,P	P	OR,P	OR,P	P	P	P	OR,P
<b>MJ</b>	OR		OR	R	R				
<b>MF</b>		R	R			R	R		R
<b>MLab</b>	R					OR			
<b>MSoc</b>	R								
<b>MDef</b>		R						OR	
<b>MEnv</b>							OR		
<b>MInd</b>								OR	R
<b>EU-C</b>	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
<b>N<sub>Comp</sub></b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>

## Informal Coordination

### Actually Involved Ministries

Actor	PO	MFA	MJ	MF	MLab	MSoc	MEnv	MDef	MInd
Full involved	x	x	x	x		x	x	x	
Partially involved					x				x


### Ex-Ante-Coordination Network



Ex-Post Influence Power (Rank Prestige)

	IG1	IG2	IG3	IG4	IG5	IG6.1	IG6.2	IG6.3	IG6.4	Total RP
<b>PO</b>	0,125	0,333	0,107	0,111	0,111	0,1	0,15	0,139	0,087	0,149
<b>MFA</b>	0,375	0,333	0,320	0,444	0,444	0,3	0,35	0,419	0,435	0,373
<b>MJ</b>	0,375	0	0,349	0,303	0,303	0	0	0	0	0,135
<b>MF</b>	0	0	0,087	0,061	0,061	0,3	0,1	0	0,348	0,106
<b>MLab</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0,3	0	0	0	0,048
<b>MSoc</b>	0	0	0,058	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,003
<b>MDef</b>	0	0,333	0	0	0	0	0	0,093	0	0,050
<b>MEnv</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,4	0	0	0,045
<b>MInd</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,349	0,130	0,060
<b>EU-C</b>	0,125	0	0,078	0,081	0,081	0	0	0	0	0,032
<b>N<sub>Infl</sub></b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Σ 1,0</b>

Affiliation Network Issue Groups – Ministries



## 3.5. Intranational Preference Constellations

## Issue 1.1: Citizenship of the Union

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	Other	FS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	B	B	–	C	–	–	A,C,D	D2,F	–	–	.	.	–	D1,2
<b>D</b>	A	B	D	–	–	A	B	.	–	–	.	–	–	–
<b>DK</b>	A	A	B	B	–	–	–	B	–	–	–	.	.	–
<b>F</b>	B	B	B	B	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	B	.	.
<b>FIN</b>	–	B	F	A	B	.	D2	D2	–	A	–	–	.	B
<b>GB</b>	m	A,B	A	–	–	.	B	B	–	–	–	.	.	–
<b>GR</b>	D	D	A	D	–	–	D2	.	–	–	–	D	.	.
<b>I</b>	D1,2	D1,2	D;A,C	D1,2	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	–	B	.	–	–	.	–	B	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	A	B	.	C	–	.	–	.	–	–	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	–	–	A	B	D2,F	m	.	D2	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	B	B	C	–	–	–	.	–	–	B	.	.	–	–
<b>P</b>	.	C	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	D1	D1	A	D	.	–	–	B	.	–	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	B	B	.	–	–	.	B	A	–	–	–	.	.	–

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	Other	FS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	2,0	2,5	5,0	1,5	0,0	0,0	4,2	10,0	0,0	0,0			0,0	2,0
<b>D</b>	1,7	0,9	3,9	0,0	0,0	0,8	5,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>DK</b>	3,0	2,3	7,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	25,0	0,0	0,0	0,0			0,0
<b>F</b>	0,8	0,6	4,0	3,3		0,0						0,7		
<b>FIN</b>	0,0	0,0	1,0	2,1	2,0		7,5	3,0	0,0	6,7	0,0	0,0		2,9
<b>GB</b>	3,1	1,4	4,0	0,0	0,0		2,0	20,0	0,0	0,0	0,0			0,0
<b>GR</b>	2,1	3,2	10,0	2,0	0,0	0,0	12,5		0,0	0,0	0,0	4,0		
<b>I</b>	2,9	2,0	8,0	1,7	0,0				0,0		0,0			
<b>IRL</b>	0,0	1,2		0,0	0,0		0,0	25,0		0,0				
<b>LUX</b>	3,3	1,1		6,9	0,0		0,0			0,0				
<b>NL</b>	0,0	0,0	3,3	1,2	0,5	1,3		10,0		0,0				
<b>AUT</b>	1,0	1,6	5,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	3,0			0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		4,0												
<b>SP</b>	1,7	1,7	10,0	6,2		0,0	0,0	20,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	1,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		4,0	5,0	0,0	0,0	0,0			0,0

## Issue 1.2: Procedure for Adding Art. 8 (Citizenship) Without Revision of the Treaty

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>		A	–	A	–	–	D	–	–	–	.	.	–
<b>D</b>	m	A	A	–	–	A	–	.	–	–	.	–	–
<b>DK</b>	A	A	–	A	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	.	–
<b>F</b>		A	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	–	.
<b>FIN</b>		–	–	A	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
<b>GB</b>		A	A	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	–
<b>GR</b>		–	–	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	.
<b>I</b>		–	–	–	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.
<b>IRL</b>		–	.	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>		m	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	–	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>		–	A	A	A	–	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	A	m	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	–
<b>P</b>		C	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	m	m	A	A	.	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>		–	.	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	–

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	0,0	1,3	0,0	1,5	0,0	0,0	2,1	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>D</b>	1,7	0,0	2,0	0,0	0,0	0,8	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>DK</b>	0,0	0,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>F</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0						0,0	
<b>FIN</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,1	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>GB</b>	0,0	1,4	1,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>GR</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	0,0	0,5	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	0,0	0,3		0,0	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	0,0	0,0	1,7	1,2	0,5	0,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	1,0	0,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		1,0											
<b>SP</b>	0,0	0,8	10,0	6,2		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0



## Issue 1.3: Introducing Fundamental Rights to the Treaty

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>	
<b>B</b>	D3	D3	–	D3	–	–	B,C,E2	D3	–	–	.	.	–	B,C
<b>D</b>	–	A	A	B,E3	–	A	A	.	–	–	.	D	–	D
<b>DK</b>	A	A	–	B	–	–	A; C	C	–	–	–	.	.	D
<b>F</b>	A	A,C	A	A	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	D	.	.
<b>FIN</b>	–	B,C	–	B	–	.	C	C	–	B	–	B,D1	.	C
<b>GB</b>	m	A	A	A	–	.	A	A	–	–	–	.	.	–
<b>GR</b>	E3	E3	D3	D3	–	–	D3	.	–	–	–	D3	.	.
<b>I</b>	C	C	C,D3	C	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	C	C	.	A	–	.	C	C	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	B,C	C	.	B	–	.	–	.	.	C	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	C	C	B	A	A	m	.	C	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	B,C	D2,3	–	B,C	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	–	C
<b>P</b>	.	E	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	C	C	–	C;D	.	–	–	C	.	–	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	C	B	.	A	–	.	C	A	–	C,E	–	.	.	B,C

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>	
<b>B</b>	3,0	2,5	0,0	4,5	0,0	0,0	5,3	40,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	2,0	
<b>D</b>	0,0	0,9	3,9	5,0	0,0	1,5	5,0		0,0	0,0		2,0	0,0	6,1
<b>DK</b>	0,0	0,9	0,0	0,5	0,0	0,0	20,0	25,0	0,0	0,0	0,0			4,4
<b>F</b>	1,5	0,6	4,0	3,3		0,0						0,7		
<b>FIN</b>	0,0	2,5	0,0	3,2	0,0		17,5	3,0	0,0	6,7	0,0	2,0		5,7
<b>GB</b>	3,1	1,4	3,0	5,0	0,0		2,0	20,0	0,0	0,0	0,0			0,0
<b>GR</b>	2,1	3,2	2,5	14,0	0,0	0,0	12,5		0,0	0,0	0,0	12,0		
<b>I</b>	2,9	2,0	2,0	1,7	0,0				0,0		0,0			
<b>IRL</b>	4,0	2,4		10,0	0,0		10,0	25,0		0,0				
<b>LUX</b>	2,5	0,3		6,9	0,0		0,0			2,0				
<b>NL</b>	3,0	1,9	1,7	5,9	1,1	1,3		10,0		0,0				
<b>AUT</b>	2,5	2,6	0,0	2,5	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0			0,0	10,0
<b>P</b>		5,0												
<b>SP</b>	1,7	0,8	0,0	1,5		0,0	0,0	80,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	4,0	4,2		1,5	0,0		16,0	40,0	0,0	9,0	0,0			7,7

## Issue 1.4: Monitoring Observance of Fundamental Rights

	<i>PO</i>	<i>MFA</i>	<i>MI</i>	<i>MJ</i>	<i>MF</i>	<i>MEco</i>	<i>MLab</i>	<i>MSoc</i>	<i>MDef</i>	<i>MEnv</i>	<i>MInd</i>	<i>othersFS</i>	<i>EU-C</i>	
<b>B</b>		F	–	F1	–	–	F1	–	–	–	.	.	–	F,G
<b>D</b>		A	A	–	–	A	–	.	–	–	.	m	–	–
<b>DK</b>	A	A	–	C-F1	–	–	A	–	–	–	–	.	.	–
<b>F</b>	C	F1	–	F1	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	–	.	.
<b>FIN</b>		–	–	D	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	–	.	–
<b>GB</b>		A	A	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	–
<b>GR</b>	F	F	–	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	.	.
<b>I</b>	E2	E2;F2	–	–	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>IRL</b>		–	.	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	m	B-F	.	C	–	.	–	.	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	A	A	F1	A	–	C	.	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	E1,F1	m	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	–	–
<b>P</b>		F	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>		–	–	A	.	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>		–	.	A	–	.	–	m	–	B,E	–	.	.	–

	<i>PO</i>	<i>MFA</i>	<i>MI</i>	<i>MJ</i>	<i>MF</i>	<i>MEco</i>	<i>MLab</i>	<i>MSoc</i>	<i>MDef</i>	<i>MEnv</i>	<i>MInd</i>	<i>othersFS</i>	<i>EU-C</i>
<b>B</b>	0,0	0,6	0,0	3,0	0,0	0,0	4,2	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	2,0
<b>D</b>	0,0	0,9	3,9	0,0	0,0	0,8	0,0		0,0	0,0		1,3	0,0
<b>DK</b>	0,0	0,5	0,0	0,5	0,0	0,0	10,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>F</b>	1,5	3,2	0,0	3,3		0,0						0,0	
<b>FIN</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,1	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>GB</b>	0,0	1,4	1,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>GR</b>	2,1	2,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	0,0	1,0	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	0,8	1,1		2,8	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	3,0	0,6	1,7	5,9	0,0	1,3		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	2,5	1,6	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0			0,0
<b>P</b>		3,0											
<b>SP</b>	1,7	0,0	0,0	6,2		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	0,0	0,0		1,5	0,0		0,0	5,0	0,0	1,0	0,0		0,0

## Issue 1.5: Principle of Subsidiarity

	<i>PO</i>	<i>MFA</i>	<i>MI</i>	<i>MJ</i>	<i>MF</i>	<i>MEco</i>	<i>MLab</i>	<i>MSoc</i>	<i>MDef</i>	<i>MEnv</i>	<i>MInd</i>	<i>other</i>	<i>FS</i>	<i>EU-C</i>
<b>B</b>	A	A	–	A	–	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	C	–
<b>D</b>	B,E	E	E	C	C	C,E	–	.	–	m	.	B-C	C,D,E	B-E
<b>DK</b>	A	B	B	E	–	A	C,D,E	–	–	–	–	.	.	B-E
<b>F</b>	C	C	C	D	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	D	.	.
<b>FIN</b>	–	–	–	A	A	.	–	A	–	–	–	B	.	C
<b>GB</b>	m	B,C, D,E	C	–	–	.	m	–	–	–	C	.	.	B-E
<b>GR</b>	m	A	A	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	.	.
<b>I</b>	B	B	–	–	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	E	E	.	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	B,C	B	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	A	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	C	C	C	A	B-E	B	.	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	B	E	–	D,E	–	–	.	–	–	B	.	.	D,E	D,E
<b>P</b>	.	A	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	A	A	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	D,E	–
<b>SWE</b>	A	A	.	A	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	A

	<i>PO</i>	<i>MFA</i>	<i>MI</i>	<i>MJ</i>	<i>MF</i>	<i>MEco</i>	<i>MLab</i>	<i>MSoc</i>	<i>MDef</i>	<i>MEnv</i>	<i>MInd</i>	<i>others</i>	<i>FS</i>	<i>EU-C</i>
<b>B</b>	3,0	2,5	0,0	1,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0			15,0	0,0
<b>D</b>	3,3	2,6	2,0	1,0	16,0	4,5	0,0		0,0	2,5		2,0	8,0	6,1
<b>DK</b>	3,0	1,4	3,0	0,5	0,0	10,0	4,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0			4,4
<b>F</b>	3,1	1,9	4,0	3,3		0,0							4,0	
<b>FIN</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,1	4,0		0,0	4,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,0		2,9
<b>GB</b>	5,2	3,5	3,0	0,0	0,0		10,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	12,5			12,5
<b>GR</b>	2,1	1,6	5,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		
<b>I</b>	2,9	1,0	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0			
<b>IRL</b>	2,0	4,7		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0				
<b>LUX</b>	2,5	1,1		1,4	0,0		0,0			3,0				
<b>NL</b>	3,0	1,9	1,7	1,2	1,6	1,3		0,0		0,0				
<b>AUT</b>	0,5	1,6	0,0	1,3	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	5,0			25,0	7,0
<b>P</b>		1,0												
<b>SP</b>	1,7	0,8	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	20,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	1,0	0,0		3,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0			7,7

## Issue 1.6: Review of Compliance With the Principle of Subsidiarity

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.	.	E D
<b>D</b>	E	A	A	-	A	A	-	.	-	-	.	A	E -
<b>DK</b>	A	A	-	-	-	-	D	-	-	-	-	.	-
<b>F</b>	-	D	C	C	.	-	.	.	.	.	.	B	.
<b>FIN</b>	-	-	-	A	.	.	-	-	-	-	-	-	A
<b>GB</b>	m	B	A	-	-	.	-	-	-	-	A	.	B
<b>GR</b>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	-	.
<b>I</b>	A	A	-	-	-	.	.	.	-	.	-	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	-	-	.	-	-	.	-	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	-	m	.	-	-	.	-	.	.	-	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	-	-	A	A	D	-	.	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	B	D, E	-	-	-	-	.	-	-	m	.	.	E B-E
<b>P</b>	.	A	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	E	E	-	-	.	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	E -
<b>SWE</b>	-	-	.	-	-	.	-	-	-	-	-	.	-

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		15,0	2,0
<b>D</b>	1,1	1,7	2,0	0,0	4,0	4,5	0,0		0,0	0,0		2,0	2,0
<b>DK</b>	0,0	0,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	4,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>F</b>	0,0	1,3	4,0	3,3		0,0						4,0	
<b>FIN</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,1	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,9
<b>GB</b>	1,0	2,1	2,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	6,3		12,5
<b>GR</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	0,0	1,0	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	0,0	0,3		0,0	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	0,0	0,0	1,7	1,2	1,6	0,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	0,5	1,6	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	2,0		25,0	7,0
<b>P</b>		1,0											
<b>SP</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	20,0
<b>SWE</b>	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0

## Issue 1.7: Transparency: Opening up the Council's Proceedings

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	H	G	–	E	–	–	E	–	–	–	.	.	B-F
<b>D</b>	B,G	B	m	m	–	B	–	.	–	B	.	G	G
<b>DK</b>	B,C, F,H	B-G	B-G	B,D	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	.	G
<b>F</b>	A	A	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	A	.
<b>FIN</b>	H	B,E	–	C,F	B,E	.	–	B	–	C	–	B	D,F
<b>GB</b>	m	B,D, E,G	B	–	–	.	B	–	–	–	E	.	–
<b>GR</b>	B	B	B,G	B,G	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	B	.
<b>I</b>	H	H	–	–	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	B	B,E	.	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	B	B	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	C,G	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	H	H	B	B	m	–	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	B,G	B	–	D,G	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	–
<b>P</b>	.	B	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	A;B	A;B	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	B,D,F	B,D,F	.	B,C	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	–

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	1,0	1,3	0,0	1,5	0,0	0,0	3,2	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	2,0
<b>D</b>	2,2	1,7	0,8	1,0	0,0	0,8	0,0		0,0	2,5		2,0	6,1
<b>DK</b>	7,5	1,8	3,0	0,5	0,0	10,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		4,4
<b>F</b>	2,3	0,6	0,0	0,0		0,0						0,7	
<b>FIN</b>	9,0	4,2	0,0	7,5	4,0		0,0	4,5	0,0	3,3	0,0	3,0	5,7
<b>GB</b>	1,0	2,8	3,0	0,0	0,0		6,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	6,3		0,0
<b>GR</b>	2,1	1,6	2,5	2,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	2,0	
<b>I</b>	2,9	1,5	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	4,0	3,5		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	0,8	0,6		1,4	0,0		0,0			5,0			
<b>NL</b>	3,0	2,5	3,3	1,2	0,0	0,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	1,0	0,5	0,0	1,3	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		1,0											
<b>SP</b>	1,7	0,4	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	3,0	16,7		21,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0

## Issue 1.8: Legal Personality for the European Union

	<i>PO</i>	<i>MFA</i>	<i>MI</i>	<i>MJ</i>	<i>MF</i>	<i>MEco</i>	<i>MLab</i>	<i>MSoc</i>	<i>MDef</i>	<i>MEnv</i>	<i>MInd</i>	<i>othersFS</i>	<i>EU-C</i>
<b>B</b>	D	D	–	D	–	–	A	–	–	–	.	.	–
<b>D</b>	–	C	A	D	–	A	–	.	–	–	.	B-D	–
<b>DK</b>	A	A	A	B	–	–	A	–	–	–	–	.	–
<b>F</b>	A	A	–	A	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	–	.
<b>FIN</b>	–	D	C	D	.	.	–	–	–	–	–	D	A
<b>GB</b>	m	A	A	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	–
<b>GR</b>	D	D	–	D	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	D	.
<b>I</b>	D	D	–	D	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	–	–	.	A	–	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	–	m	.	C	–	.	–	.	.	–	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	D	D	D	A	–	–	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	C	m	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	–
<b>P</b>	.	A	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	D	D	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	C	C	.	C	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	–

	<i>PO</i>	<i>MFA</i>	<i>MI</i>	<i>MJ</i>	<i>MF</i>	<i>MEco</i>	<i>MLab</i>	<i>MSoc</i>	<i>MDef</i>	<i>MEnv</i>	<i>MInd</i>	<i>othersFS</i>	<i>EU-C</i>
<b>B</b>	1,0	1,9	0,0	1,5	0,0	0,0	1,1	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>D</b>	0,0	0,9	3,9	3,0	0,0	1,5	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,7	0,0
<b>DK</b>	1,5	1,8	7,0	8,0	0,0	0,0	2,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>F</b>	0,8	0,6	4,0	3,3		0,0						0,0	
<b>FIN</b>	0,0	3,3	4,0	3,2	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	3,0	2,9
<b>GB</b>	3,1	1,4	3,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>GR</b>	2,1	2,4	0,0	2,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	2,0	
<b>I</b>	2,9	0,5	0,0	1,7	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	0,0	0,0		10,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	0,0	0,3		2,8	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	3,0	1,3	1,7	2,4	0,0	0,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	1,0	0,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		1,0											
<b>SP</b>	1,7	0,8	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	1,0	4,2		3,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0

## Issue 2.1: CFSP: Responsibility for Planning and Preparation

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	D	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.	.	D
<b>D</b>	C	B	-	-	-	m	-	.	C	-	.	-	m
<b>DK</b>	A	B	-	-	-	A	-	-	-	-	-	.	B
<b>F</b>	-	C	-	-	.	-	.	.	.	.	.	C;B	.
<b>FIN</b>	B	B	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	-	-	B	B
<b>GB</b>	B	C	-	-	-	.	-	-	B	-	-	.	m
<b>GR</b>	C	D	-	-	-	-	-	.	C	-	-	-	.
<b>I</b>	C	C	-	-	-	.	.	.	-	.	-	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	B	A	.	-	-	.	-	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	C	C	.	-	-	.	-	.	.	-	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	B	B	-	-	-	-	.	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	B	C;B,D	-	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	.	.	-
<b>P</b>	.	B	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	C	C	-	-	.	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	-
<b>SWE</b>	C	C	.	-	-	.	-	-	B,C	-	-	.	B-C

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	4,5	1,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	4,0
<b>D</b>	6,0	3,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,0	0,0		4,2	0,0		0,0	4,0
<b>DK</b>	0,0	2,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		4,4
<b>F</b>	0,0	3,4	0,0	0,0		0,0						1,3	
<b>FIN</b>	3,3	3,8	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	3,0	2,9
<b>GB</b>	2,5	2,4	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	11,1	0,0	0,0		5,0
<b>GR</b>	5,5	2,6	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		10,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	2,9	3,2	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	2,5	1,6		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	0,4	1,5		0,0	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	1,7	1,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	4,4	4,6	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		2,8											
<b>SP</b>	3,3	3,3	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	3,3	1,3		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	8,0	0,0	0,0		7,7

## Issue 2.2: CFSP: Decision-making Procedure

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	F3	F2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.	.	F2
<b>D</b>	C,F1	F1	-	-	-	C,D	-	.	C	-	.	-	m
<b>DK</b>	A	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.	A-C
<b>F</b>	-	F1	-	-	.	-	.	.	.	.	.	E;C,D	.
<b>FIN</b>	F1	C;F1	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	-	-	B	A
<b>GB</b>	A	B	-	-	-	.	-	-	A	-	-	.	m
<b>GR</b>	F3	E,C	-	-	-	-	-	.	F3	-	-	-	.
<b>I</b>	F3	F3	-	-	-	.	.	.	F3	.	-	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	C	A;C	.	-	-	.	-	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	F3	F3	.	-	-	.	-	.	.	-	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	F1	F1	-	-	E	-	.	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	F1	C;A, B,E	-	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	.	.	-
<b>P</b>	.	F1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	F1	F1	-	-	.	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	-
<b>SWE</b>	A;C	A	.	-	-	.	-	-	A;C,D	-	-	.	A;F1

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	2,3	3,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	4,0
<b>D</b>	9,0	3,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,0	0,0		4,2	0,0		0,0	4,0
<b>DK</b>	1,5	3,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		4,4
<b>F</b>	0,0	2,7	0,0	0,0		0,0						2,5	
<b>FIN</b>	8,3	3,8	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	9,0	5,7
<b>GB</b>	6,3	5,9	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	22,2	0,0	0,0		5,0
<b>GR</b>	5,5	10,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		20,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	2,9	5,4	0,0	0,0	0,0				10,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	5,0	4,7		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	1,7	3,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	1,7	0,5	0,0	0,0	1,3	0,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	6,7	4,6	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		3,8											
<b>SP</b>	3,3	1,7	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	6,7	1,3		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	8,0	0,0	0,0		7,7



## Issue 2.3: CFSP: Responsibility for the Implementation

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	D	D	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.	.	F
<b>D</b>	E	D	-	-	-	-	-	.	D	-	.	-	m
<b>DK</b>	C,D	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.	C
<b>F</b>	-	E	-	-	.	-	.	.	.	.	.	E	.
<b>FIN</b>	D	C,D	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	-	-	-	A
<b>GB</b>	A	A	-	-	-	.	-	-	A	-	-	.	m
<b>GR</b>	E	F	-	-	-	-	-	.	F	-	-	-	.
<b>I</b>	E	E	-	-	-	.	.	.	-	.	-	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	A;B,C	A;C,F	.	-	-	.	-	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	F	F	.	-	-	.	-	.	.	-	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	F;G	F;G	-	-	D	-	.	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	C	E;F,D	-	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	.	.	-
<b>P</b>	.	D	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	E	E	-	-	.	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	-
<b>SWE</b>	D	A	.	-	-	.	-	-	D-E	-	-	.	-

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	2,3	1,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	4,0
<b>D</b>	6,0	3,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		4,2	0,0		0,0	4,0
<b>DK</b>	0,8	1,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		4,4
<b>F</b>	0,0	3,4	0,0	0,0		0,0						2,5	
<b>FIN</b>	3,3	2,5	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,9
<b>GB</b>	3,8	2,4	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	11,1	0,0	0,0		5,0
<b>GR</b>	5,5	3,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		10,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	2,9	3,2	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	5,0	1,6		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	0,4	1,5		0,0	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	1,7	1,9	0,0	0,0	0,7	0,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	4,4	4,6	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		2,8											
<b>SP</b>	3,3	3,3	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	3,3	1,3		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	28,0	0,0	0,0		0,0

## Issue 2.4: Financing the CFSP

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>		D	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.	.	-
<b>D</b>		D	-	-	A	m	-	.	D2	-	.	-	-
<b>DK</b>	A	D2,3	-	-	-	A	-	-	-	-	-	.	D
<b>F</b>		A	-	-	.	-	.	.	.	.	.	A	.
<b>FIN</b>		A	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>GB</b>		A	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	-	-	.	-
<b>GR</b>	D	-	-	-	A	-	-	.	-	-	-	-	.
<b>I</b>	D	D	-	-	-	.	.	.	-	.	-	.	.
<b>IRL</b>		D3; D1,2	.	-	-	.	-	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	m	D1	.	-	-	.	-	.	-	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	D1	D1	-	-	A	-	.	-	-	-	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	D3	m	-	-	A	-	.	-	-	-	.	.	-
<b>P</b>		A	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	A	A	-	-	.	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	-
<b>SWE</b>		A	.	-	-	.	-	-	-	-	-	.	-

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	0,0	0,8	0,0	0,0	10,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>D</b>	0,0	3,8	0,0	0,0	10,0	1,0	0,0		4,2	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>DK</b>	0,8	1,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	4,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		4,4
<b>F</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0						1,3	
<b>FIN</b>	0,0	3,8	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>GB</b>	0,0	1,2	0,0	0,0	5,3		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>GR</b>	1,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	20,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	2,9	2,2	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	0,0	1,6		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	0,4	0,8		0,0	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	1,7	0,9	0,0	0,0	3,3	0,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	6,7	4,6	0,0	0,0	5,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		0,9											
<b>SP</b>	3,3	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	0,0	1,3		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	4,0	0,0	0,0		0,0

## Issue 2.5: Art. J.4.: Common Defence Policy

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	D	D	-	-	-	-	-	-	D	-	.	.	D
<b>D</b>	B,C	D	-	-	-	-	-	.	D	-	.	-	m
<b>DK</b>	A	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	A	-	-	.	A
<b>F</b>	-	D	-	-	.	-	.	.	.	.	.	B	.
<b>FIN</b>	A	-	-	-	-	.	-	-	A	-	-	C	A
<b>GB</b>	A	D	-	-	-	.	-	-	A	-	-	.	m
<b>GR</b>	C,D	C,D	-	-	-	-	-	.	D	-	-	-	.
<b>I</b>	E	E	-	-	-	.	.	.	D	.	-	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	A	A	.	-	-	.	-	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	D	C,D	.	-	-	.	-	.	.	-	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	D	D	-	-	-	-	.	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	D	D,C	-	-	-	-	.	-	D	-	.	.	-
<b>P</b>	.	C	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	B,C,D	B,C,D	-	-	.	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	-
<b>SWE</b>	D	D	.	-	-	.	-	-	D	-	-	.	A

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	3,0	3,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	30,0	0,0		0,0	4,0
<b>D</b>	3,0	3,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		33,7	0,0		0,0	4,0
<b>DK</b>	6,0	4,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	50,0	0,0	0,0		4,4
<b>F</b>	0,0	2,0	0,0	0,0		0,0						2,5	
<b>FIN</b>	8,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	33,3	0,0	0,0	9,0	2,9
<b>GB</b>	6,3	5,9	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	22,2	0,0	0,0		5,0
<b>GR</b>	5,5	7,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		30,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	2,9	2,2	0,0	0,0	0,0				40,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	7,5	6,3		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	0,4	3,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	1,7	0,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	8,9	3,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	50,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		2,8											
<b>SP</b>	3,3	5,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	3,3	12,5		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	8,0	0,0	0,0		7,7

## Issue 2.6: : The Union's Relations With the WEU

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	D1	C2	–	–	–	–	–	–	C2,3	–	.	.	C3
<b>D</b>	C2	C2	–	–	–	–	–	.	D2	–	.	–	m
<b>DK</b>	A	A	–	–	–	–	–	–	A	–	–	.	A
<b>F</b>	–	C	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	C	.
<b>FIN</b>	B1,2	B1	–	–	–	.	–	–	B1	–	–	C3	B1
<b>GB</b>	B1	B1,3,4	–	–	–	.	–	–	B1,2	–	–	.	m
<b>GR</b>	D2	D	–	–	–	–	–	.	D	–	–	–	.
<b>I</b>	D2	D2	–	–	–	.	.	.	D2	.	–	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	B1	A;B1	.	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	C	D1	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	–	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	D	D	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	–	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	C2	C1,2; B1,3,4	–	–	–	–	–	.	B1,C1	–	.	.	–
<b>P</b>	.	D	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	B1,3, C2,3, D2	B1,3, C2,3, D2	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	B1	B1,2	.	–	–	.	–	–	B1	–	–	.	B1

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	3,0	5,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	70,0	0,0		0,0	4,0
<b>D</b>	3,0	3,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		21,1	0,0		0,0	4,0
<b>DK</b>	6,0	4,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	50,0	0,0	0,0		4,4
<b>F</b>	0,0	2,0	0,0	0,0		0,0						1,3	
<b>FIN</b>	8,3	10,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	66,7	0,0	0,0	9,0	2,9
<b>GB</b>	6,3	1,2	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	33,3	0,0	0,0		5,0
<b>GR</b>	5,5	3,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		30,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	2,9	4,3	0,0	0,0	0,0				50,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	5,0	6,3		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	1,7	4,5		0,0	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	1,7	1,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	6,7	3,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	50,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		3,8											
<b>SP</b>	3,3	3,3	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	6,7	6,3		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	8,0	0,0	0,0		7,7

## Issue 2.7: The Armaments Question

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>		D	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.	.	-
<b>D</b>	m	C	-	-	-	-	-	.	F	-	.	-	-
<b>DK</b>	A	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.	-
<b>F</b>		A	-	-	.	-	.	.	.	.	.	A	.
<b>FIN</b>	A	A	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>GB</b>		A	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	-	-	.	-
<b>GR</b>	m	-	-	-	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	-	.
<b>I</b>	D-F	D-F	-	-	-	.	.	.	-	.	-	.	.
<b>IRL</b>		A	.	-	-	.	-	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>		E	.	-	-	.	-	.	.	-	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>		-	-	-	-	B	.	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	A	A	-	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	.	.	-
<b>P</b>	.	-	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>		-	-	-	.	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	-
<b>SWE</b>	A	B	.	-	-	.	-	-	A;E	-	-	.	-

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	0,0	0,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>D</b>	3,0	1,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		12,6	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>DK</b>	0,0	1,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>F</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0						1,3	
<b>FIN</b>	1,7	1,3	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>GB</b>	0,0	1,2	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>GR</b>	1,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	2,9	3,2	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	0,0	1,6		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	0,0	0,8		0,0	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	5,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	2,2	1,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		0,0											
<b>SP</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	1,7	1,3		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	16,0	0,0	0,0		0,0

## Issue 3.1: Objectives and Scope within JHA

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C	
<b>B</b>	D1	D1	B	C	–	–	D1	–	–	–	.	.	D1	–
<b>D</b>	B,D1,2	D	D	C	–	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	B,C,D1	D2
<b>DK</b>	C	B,C	A	A	–	–	A	–	–	–	–	.	.	–
<b>F</b>	D1	D1	A	C	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	C	.	.
<b>FIN</b>	–	m	C, D1	C	–	.	–	B	–	–	–	–	.	D1
<b>GB</b>	A	A	A	A,C, D2	A	.	A	–	–	–	–	.	.	D1
<b>GR</b>	D1,2	D1,2	C,D1	B,C, D1,2	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	D1	.	.
<b>I</b>	D1,2	D1,2	D1	C,D1	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	C	C	.	A	–	.	–	.	–	–	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	m	m	.	D	B	.	–	.	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	D	D	C	A(B,C)	C	–	.	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	D1,2	B,D1,2	C,D2	A	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	–	D1
<b>P</b>	.	C	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	C,D1,2	C,D1,2	C,D1	D1,2	.	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	C	A	.	C	B	.	–	C	m	–	–	.	.	–

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C	
<b>B</b>	4,5	2,5	8,0	6,0	0,0	0,0	0,5	0,0	0,0	0,0			3,3	0,0
<b>D</b>	10,5	1,0	5,7	6,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	6,0	6,2
<b>DK</b>	0,8	4,3	11,4	3,8	0,0	0,0	1,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0			0,0
<b>F</b>	3,5	6,1	16,0	8,9		0,0						2,5		
<b>FIN</b>	0,0	1,5	26,0	9,1	0,0		0,0	5,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		2,9
<b>GB</b>	2,1	0,8	6,0	27,0	4,2		1,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0			25,0
<b>GR</b>	2,5	3,1	18,0	6,7	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	12,0		
<b>I</b>	2,9	2,7	10,0	18,0	0,0				0,0		0,0			
<b>IRL</b>	4,5	4,7		11,9	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0				
<b>LUX</b>	0,5	1,8		5,1	4,0		0,0			0,0				
<b>NL</b>	6,0	8,2	20,0	25,0	1,3	0,0		0,0		0,0				
<b>AUT</b>	2,0	2,4	18,0	24,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0			0,0	7,0
<b>P</b>		2,1												
<b>SP</b>	3,8	16,7	28,0	40,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	4,5	2,0		15,8	6,6		0,0	4,0	2,5	0,0	0,0			0,0

## Issue 3.2: Modes of Action within JHA

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	D1-6, 8	D1-6, 8	D1-5	D1-4, 6	–	–	B,C,D 1-3,10	–	–	–	.	.	D1-4 D1-10
<b>D</b>	C,D1,6,7,10	D1-5, 7-9	D1-5	D9,10	–	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	C,D1, 9 D1-5
<b>DK</b>	A	A	A	A	–	A	A	–	–	–	–	.	A
<b>F</b>	D6,9	A	A	A	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	D1,3	.
<b>FIN</b>	–	D1-5, 8,9	C,D1, 2,4,5,6	C	–	.	–	A	–	–	–	–	D1-4, 6,7
<b>GB</b>	A	A	A	A,C	A	.	A	–	–	–	–	.	–
<b>GR</b>	D	D1-10	D1-4, 8	B,C,D 1-4,6-9	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	D1-4, 6-8	.
<b>I</b>	D1-10	D1-10	D1-5,9	D9	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	D2,4	D2,4, 6,7	.	A	–	.	–	–	.	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	D	D	.	D1-4	–	.	–	.	.	–	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	D1,2,4, 5,7-9	D1,2,4, 5,7-9	A	A	D7,8	C	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	D1,3, 6-9	D1-4, 8-10	C, D1-4	A	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	D
<b>P</b>	.	D1-5, 8,9	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	D1,2, 4,6-10	D1,2, 4,6-10	A	D9	.	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	C	A	.	A	–	.	–	A	m	–	–	.	D

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	4,5	3,8	40,0	21,0	0,0	0,0	1,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		3,3	5,0
<b>D</b>	9,0	4,8	5,7	18,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	6,0
<b>DK</b>	12,0	7,1	28,6	48,8	0,0	2,0	1,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		4,4
<b>F</b>	4,7	4,9	8,0	17,8		0,0						4,4	
<b>FIN</b>	0,0	6,0	19,5	6,5	0,0		0,0	5,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,9
<b>GB</b>	10,4	2,4	12,0	27,0	2,1		1,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>GR</b>	3,3	3,1	18,0	6,7	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	18,0	
<b>I</b>	2,9	2,7	10,0	18,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	4,5	4,7		15,8	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	2,0	3,6		20,2	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	6,0	20,5	5,0	12,5	1,3	1,4		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	2,0	4,7	36,0	24,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	7,0
<b>P</b>		5,3											
<b>SP</b>	3,8	2,8	7,0	16,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	4,5	2,0		13,5	0,0		0,0	3,0	2,5	0,0	0,0		7,7

## Issue 3.3: Decision-making Procedures

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>	
<b>B</b>	D	D	D	C	–	–	C1,2	–	–	–	.	.	D	E
<b>D</b>	C2,D	B,C 1-3,D	A	D	–	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	C	–
<b>DK</b>	A	A	A	C1	–	–	A	–	–	–	–	.	.	B
<b>F</b>	D,B1	D,E	A	A	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	D	.	.
<b>FIN</b>	–	m	C3	B	–	.	–	D	–	–	–	–	.	A
<b>GB</b>	A	A,C	A	A,B	m	.	A	–	–	–	–	.	.	–
<b>GR</b>	D,E	D	B	B,C2, D	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	D	.	.
<b>I</b>	D	D	C1	B,C	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	D	D	.	A	–	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	D	C	.	A	A	.	–	.	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	C2,3	C2,3	C	A; B,C2	D,E	–	.	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	A	C2, 3,D,E	B,C2, D	B; A	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	–	–
<b>P</b>	.	A	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	A,C2	A,C2	A	D	.	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	A,B	A	.	B	–	.	–	A	m	–	–	.	.	–

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>	
<b>B</b>	2,0	2,5	10,7	8,0	0,0	0,0	0,7	0,0	0,0	0,0		2,2	6,7	
<b>D</b>	6,0	1,3	3,8	12,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	4,0	4,1
<b>DK</b>	0,5	3,8	15,3	10,0	0,0	0,0	0,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		2,9	
<b>F</b>	3,9	4,0	26,7	23,7		0,0						2,1		
<b>FIN</b>	0,0	1,0	13,0	4,3	0,0		0,0	6,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,9	
<b>GB</b>	7,0	1,6	8,0	18,0	1,4		0,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0			
<b>GR</b>	2,2	2,0	12,0	4,4	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	12,0		
<b>I</b>	1,9	1,8	13,3	12,0	0,0				0,0		0,0			
<b>IRL</b>	3,0	3,1		10,5	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0				
<b>LUX</b>	0,7	1,8		6,7	2,7		0,0			0,0				
<b>NL</b>	4,0	10,9	6,7	1,7	0,9	0,0		0,0		0,0				
<b>AUT</b>	1,3	2,1	6,0	10,7	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0			0,0	
<b>P</b>		2,8												
<b>SP</b>	2,5	1,9	9,3	5,3		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	8,3
<b>SWE</b>	3,0	1,3		4,5	0,0		0,0	2,0	1,7	0,0	0,0		0,0	



## Issue 3.4: JHA: Democratic Control

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	B2	B2	B2	B1	–	–	B2	–	–	–	.	.	B1, 2
<b>D</b>	C	B2,C	A	B2	–	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	B1, 2, C
<b>DK</b>	A	A	A	B1,2	–	–	A	–	–	–	–	.	–
<b>F</b>	–	B1	A	A	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	–	.
<b>FIN</b>	–	m	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	–	A, B1, B2
<b>GB</b>	A	A	A	A	m	.	A	–	–	–	–	.	–
<b>GR</b>	–	C	B1,2	B1,2, C	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	B2	.
<b>I</b>	–	–	B1,2	B2	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	–	–	.	A	–	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	–	–	.	A	A	.	–	.	.	–	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	B1,2, C	B1,2, C	–	A; B2,C	–	–	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	A	B1,2	–	B2; A	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	–
<b>P</b>	.	A	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	A	A	A	–	.	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	B1
<b>SWE</b>	A	A	.	–	–	.	–	A	m	–	–	.	–

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	1,0	1,3	5,3	4,0	0,0	0,0	0,3	0,0	0,0	0,0		1,1	3,3
<b>D</b>	3,0	0,6	1,9	6,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	2,0
<b>DK</b>	0,3	1,9	7,6	5,0	0,0	0,0	0,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		1,5
<b>F</b>	1,9	2,0	13,3	11,8		0,0						1,0	
<b>FIN</b>	0,0	0,5	6,5	2,2	0,0		0,0	3,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,0
<b>GB</b>	3,5	0,8	4,0	9,0	0,7		0,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		
<b>GR</b>	1,1	1,0	6,0	2,2	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	6,0	
<b>I</b>	1,0	0,9	6,7	6,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	1,5	1,6		5,3	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	0,3	0,9		3,4	1,3		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	2,0	5,5	3,3	0,8	0,4	0,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	0,7	1,1	3,0	5,3	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0			0,0
<b>P</b>		1,4											
<b>SP</b>	1,3	0,9	4,7	2,7		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	4,2
<b>SWE</b>	1,5	0,7		2,3	0,0		0,0	1,0	0,8	0,0	0,0		0,0

## Issue 3.5: Judicial Control within the JHA

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>	
<b>B</b>	D	D	D	D	–	–	B4,C2, D2	–	–	–	.	.	–	D
<b>D</b>	–	B1	m	D	–	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	–	B-D
<b>DK</b>	A	A ;C1	A	B4	–	–	A	–	–	–	–	.	.	–
<b>F</b>	D	A	A	A	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	m	.	.
<b>FIN</b>	–	D	B1, D1	D	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	–	.	A
<b>GB</b>	A	A	A	A;B	m	.	A	–	–	–	–	.	.	–
<b>GR</b>	m	D	B,C	B2	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	B	.	.
<b>I</b>	m	m	A	B	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	A	m	.	A	–	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	D	D	.	B	–	.	–	.	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	D	D	m	A; B,D2	–	–	.	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	B1	D	B2; A	B,D2, 3	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	–	–
<b>P</b>	.	D	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	D	D	A,B4	D	.	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	A	A	.	A	C	.	–	–	m	–	–	.	.	–

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	3,0	2,5	16,0	21,0	0,0	0,0	2,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	5,0
<b>D</b>	1,5	1,4	3,4	18,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	6,2
<b>DK</b>	0,8	1,4	11,4	3,8	0,0	0,0	1,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>F</b>	3,5	1,2	8,0	17,8		0,0						1,9	
<b>FIN</b>	0,0	4,5	0,0	6,5	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,9
<b>GB</b>	2,1	2,4	4,0	9,0	2,1		1,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>GR</b>	1,7	3,1	6,0	15,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	12,0	
<b>I</b>	2,9	0,7	5,0	6,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	1,5	1,2		19,7	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	1,5	1,8		15,2	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	6,0	12,3	5,0	7,5	0,0	0,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	3,0	4,7	18,0	16,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		4,3											
<b>SP</b>	3,8	2,8	14,0	16,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	1,5	2,0		6,8	6,6		0,0	0,0	2,5	0,0	0,0		0,0

## Issue 3.6: Financing the JHA

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	-	-	-	-	-	-	A	-	-	-	.	.	-
<b>D</b>	-	B	m	-	A	-	-	.	-	-	.	-	A
<b>DK</b>	A	D2	m	D1,2	-	A	-	-	-	-	-	.	-
<b>F</b>	-	A	A	A	.	-	.	.	.	.	.	A	.
<b>FIN</b>	-	D2	-	C	A	.	-	-	-	-	-	-	.
<b>GB</b>	.	A	A	-	A;D2	.	-	-	-	-	-	.	.
<b>GR</b>	D	-	-	B	A	-	-	.	-	-	-	-	.
<b>I</b>	D	D	C	-	-	.	.	.	-	.	-	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	-	D	.	A	-	.	-	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	-	-	.	B	D1	.	-	.	.	-	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	D1	D1	A	D2	C,D	C	.	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	D3	m	C	-	A	-	.	-	-	-	.	.	-
<b>P</b>	.	A	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	A	A	A	A	.	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	-
<b>SWE</b>	-	A	.	A	A	.	-	-	-	-	-	.	-

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,5	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>D</b>	0,0	0,5	1,7	0,0	10,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	2,0
<b>DK</b>	0,8	1,4	5,7	3,8	0,0	3,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>F</b>	0,0	0,0	8,0	0,0		0,0						0,6	
<b>FIN</b>	0,0	1,5	0,0	3,9	10,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>GB</b>	0,0	0,4	6,0	0,0	10,6		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>GR</b>	1,7	0,0	0,0	15,0	20,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	0,0	0,7	5,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	0,0	2,3		11,9	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	0,0	0,0		5,1	2,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	6,0	4,1	10,0	2,5	1,3	3,6		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	1,0	0,8	9,0	0,0	5,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		1,1											
<b>SP</b>	0,0	2,8	7,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	0,0	2,0		2,3	6,8		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0

## Issue 4.1: Composition of the European Parliament

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>	
<b>B</b>	B1	m	–	B1	–	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	–	B1/C1
<b>D</b>	B,C	C1	C	–	A	B1	–	.	–	–	.	C	C	–
<b>DK</b>	B1	B1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	B1
<b>F</b>	–	C	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	B	.	.
<b>FIN</b>	B	B1	–	B	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	–	.	–
<b>GB</b>	A	B2,C3	A	–	A	.	–	–	–	–	A	.	.	–
<b>GR</b>	A	B1	B1	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	.	.
<b>I</b>	C1	C1	–	–	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	B1	A,B1	.	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	A	B1	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	B1	B1	–	–	–	B1	.	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	B1	B1; C	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	–	–
<b>P</b>	.	B1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	C	C	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	C1-3
<b>SWE</b>	–	B1	.	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	B

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>	
<b>B</b>	1,3	2,1	0,0	3,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	3,3	
<b>D</b>	1,8	1,6	2,6	0,0	1,4	1,7	0,0		0,0	0,0		5,5	2,0	0,0
<b>DK</b>	0,0	1,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0			4,4
<b>F</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0						1,5		
<b>FIN</b>	1,2	2,0	0,0	3,4	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>GB</b>	0,7	1,0	1,5	0,0	2,1		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	3,5			0,0
<b>GR</b>	2,5	2,2	5,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		
<b>I</b>	2,9	2,3	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0			
<b>IRL</b>	1,3	3,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0				
<b>LUX</b>	3,6	2,3		0,0	0,0		0,0			0,0				
<b>NL</b>	2,5	0,6	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,5		0,0		0,0				
<b>AUT</b>	1,7	1,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0			0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		1,8												
<b>SP</b>	2,8	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	12,5
<b>SWE</b>	0,0	0,5		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0			7,7

## Issue 4.2: Uniform Electoral Procedure for the European Parliament

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>		B-E	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.	.	-
<b>D</b>	m	m	E	-	-	B	-	.	-	-	.	-	m
<b>DK</b>	B	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.	-
<b>F</b>		-	-	-	.	-	.	.	.	.	.	-	.
<b>FIN</b>		-	B	A	-	.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>GB</b>	A	A	A	-	m	.	-	-	-	-	-	.	-
<b>GR</b>		-	-	-	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	-	.
<b>I</b>		-	-	-	-	.	.	.	-	.	-	.	.
<b>IRL</b>		A	.	-	-	.	-	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	B-E	-	.	-	-	.	-	.	-	-	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	A	A	-	-	-	-	.	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	A	-	-	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	.	.	-
<b>P</b>		B	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>		-	-	-	.	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	E
<b>SWE</b>		A	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	0,0	2,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>D</b>	0,6	0,8	3,3	0,0	0,0	1,7	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	2,0
<b>DK</b>	0,0	0,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>F</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0						0,0	
<b>FIN</b>	0,0	0,0	1,0	1,1	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>GB</b>	0,7	1,0	3,0	0,0	2,1		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>GR</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	2,9	0,8	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	0,0	1,5		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	1,2	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	0,0	0,6	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	0,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		0,9											
<b>SP</b>	2,8	0,0	1,5	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	12,5
<b>SWE</b>	0,0	0,5		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0

## Issue 4.3: Decision-making in the Council: Unanimity and QMV

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C	
<b>B</b>	D	E	–	D	E	D	E	–	–	D	.	.	E	F
<b>D</b>	C	E	E	D	A	C	D	.	C	E	.	F	B,C	E
<b>DK</b>	D	D	–	A	–	A	D	D	–	C	D	.	.	D
<b>F</b>	A;D	E	–	–	.	A	.	.	.	.	.	E	.	.
<b>FIN</b>	E	C	C	C	D	.	–	C; D	–	D	D,E	C	.	D
<b>GB</b>	A	A,B	A	–	D	.	A	–	–	–	E	.	.	–
<b>GR</b>	E	E	–	E	–	D	–	.	–	–	–	E	.	.
<b>I</b>	E	E	E	E	D	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	D	D	.	–	A	.	D	D	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	E	D	.	D	E	.	D	.	.	E	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	C	C	D	C,D	A	C	.	E	.	E	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	E	C; B	–	A	D	–	.	–	–	D	.	.	–	D-E
<b>P</b>	.	E	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	D	D	–	–	.	E	D	–	.	–	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	E	D	.	E	–	.	–	D	–	–	–	.	.	E

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C	
<b>B</b>	5,0	2,7	0,0	2,0	10,0	20,0	3,0	0,0	0,0	10,0		4,0	3,3	
<b>D</b>	3,0	4,1	2,0	10,0	4,3	10,0	15,0		4,2	21,8		2,8	2,0	6,2
<b>DK</b>	4,5	3,8	0,0	1,0	0,0	6,0	2,5	10,0	0,0	3,8	10,0			4,4
<b>F</b>	7,6	6,5	0,0	0,0		13,3						4,0		
<b>FIN</b>	6,1	5,9	3,0	4,5	6,7		0,0	14,0	0,0	13,3	20,0	6,0		2,9
<b>GB</b>	3,3	4,1	3,0	0,0	4,2		5,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	7,0			0,0
<b>GR</b>	4,2	2,2	0,0	6,0	0,0	33,3	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	10,0		
<b>I</b>	2,9	3,8	10,0	7,5	20,0				0,0		0,0			
<b>IRL</b>	5,0	3,0		0,0	16,0		20,0	20,0		0,0				
<b>LUX</b>	4,8	6,8		4,0	24,0		0,0			20,0				
<b>NL</b>	2,5	2,3	1,9	10,5	6,6	6,0		10,0		7,5				
<b>AUT</b>	3,3	4,9	0,0	5,0	18,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	5,0			0,0	7,0
<b>P</b>		4,4												
<b>SP</b>	2,8	2,8	0,0	0,0		8,0	20,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	5,6	1,0		5,0	0,0		0,0	22,5	0,0	0,0	0,0			7,7

## Issue 4.4: Decision-making in the Council: QMV-Threshold

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	B	B	–	–	B	–	A	–	–	–	.	.	–
<b>D</b>	B	B	m	–	–	B	–	.	B	–	.	–	–
<b>DK</b>	B	B	–	–	–	–	A	–	–	B	–	.	–
<b>F</b>	B	B	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	B	.
<b>FIN</b>	m	–	B	B	–	.	–	B	–	–	–	B	.
<b>GB</b>	B	m	–	–	B	.	B	–	–	–	B	.	–
<b>GR</b>	B	A	–	B	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	.
<b>I</b>	B	B	–	B	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	B	B	.	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	B	B	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	C	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	B	B	B	–	A	B	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	B	B	–	m	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	–
<b>P</b>	.	B	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	A	A	m	–	.	A	–	–	.	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	B	B	.	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	–

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	2,5	1,6	0,0	0,0	2,5	0,0	3,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>D</b>	1,8	1,6	1,3	0,0	0,0	10,0	0,0		1,1	0,0		11,1	0,0
<b>DK</b>	0,0	1,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,3	0,0	0,0	3,8	0,0		0,0
<b>F</b>	1,5	2,2	0,0	0,0		0,0						4,0	
<b>FIN</b>	2,4	0,0	2,0	2,3	0,0		0,0	6,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>GB</b>	0,7	3,1	0,0	0,0	4,2		1,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	7,0		0,0
<b>GR</b>	2,5	0,7	0,0	4,5	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	2,9	1,5	0,0	7,5	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	1,3	1,5		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	6,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			5,0			
<b>NL</b>	2,5	1,8	1,9	0,0	5,0	4,5		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	0,8	1,9	0,0	1,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		0,0											
<b>SP</b>	2,8	5,6	1,5	0,0		3,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	1,1	1,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0

### Issue 4.5: Decision-making in the Council: Weighting of Votes in the Case of Enlargement

	<i>PO</i>	<i>MFA</i>	<i>MI</i>	<i>MJ</i>	<i>MF</i>	<i>MEco</i>	<i>MLab</i>	<i>MSoc</i>	<i>MDef</i>	<i>MEnv</i>	<i>MInd</i>	<i>others</i>	<i>FS</i>	<i>EU-C</i>
<b>B</b>	A	A	–	–	A	–	A	–	–	–	.	.	–	–
<b>D</b>	C	C	C	C	C	C	–	.	–	–	.	C	–	–
<b>DK</b>	A	A	–	A; B	–	–	B	–	–	B	–	.	.	A
<b>F</b>	B	C	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	C	.	.
<b>FIN</b>	A	A	–	A	–	.	–	–	–	A	–	C	.	A
<b>GB</b>	C	C	B	–	B	.	C	–	–	–	A	.	.	–
<b>GR</b>	A	A	–	A	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	.	.
<b>I</b>	C	C	–	–	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	A	A	.	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	A	A	.	–	–	.	–	.	–	–	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	C	C	C	–	C	C	.	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	B	C	–	A	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	–	A
<b>P</b>	.	A	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	C	C	m	–	.	C	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	A	A	.	–	–	.	–	m	–	–	–	.	.	–

	<i>PO</i>	<i>MFA</i>	<i>MI</i>	<i>MJ</i>	<i>MF</i>	<i>MEco</i>	<i>MLab</i>	<i>MSoc</i>	<i>MDef</i>	<i>MEnv</i>	<i>MInd</i>	<i>others</i>	<i>FS</i>	<i>EU-C</i>
<b>B</b>	3,8	2,1	0,0	0,0	2,5	0,0	3,0	0,0	0,0	0,0			0,0	0,0
<b>D</b>	0,0	3,3	2,0	5,0	2,9	1,7	0,0		0,0	0,0		11,1	0,0	0,0
<b>DK</b>	2,3	2,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,3	0,0	0,0	1,3	0,0			4,4
<b>F</b>	4,6	10,8	0,0	0,0		0,0						4,0		
<b>FIN</b>	6,1	4,9	0,0	1,1	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	4,4	0,0	6,0		2,9
<b>GB</b>	2,7	4,1	3,0	0,0	2,1		2,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	7,0			0,0
<b>GR</b>	4,2	2,9	0,0	4,5	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		
<b>I</b>	2,9	3,8	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0			
<b>IRL</b>	5,0	2,3		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0				
<b>LUX</b>	4,8	6,8		0,0	0,0		0,0			0,0				
<b>NL</b>	2,5	2,3	1,9	0,0	6,6	6,0		0,0		0,0				
<b>AUT</b>	3,3	3,9	0,0	1,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0			0,0	7,0
<b>P</b>		2,6												
<b>SP</b>	2,8	8,3	2,0	0,0		3,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	3,3	1,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,3	0,0	0,0	0,0			0,0



## Issue 4.6: Decision-making in the Council: Dual Majorities

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	A	A	–	A	A	–	B	–	–	–	.	.	A B
<b>D</b>	B	B	m	–	B	B	–	.	–	–	.	B	B B
<b>DK</b>	A	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	m	–	.	A-B
<b>F</b>	A	B	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	A	.
<b>FIN</b>	m	A	–	A	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	A	B
<b>GB</b>	A	m	A	–	A	.	–	–	–	–	A	.	–
<b>GR</b>	A	A;B	–	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	.
<b>I</b>	B	B	–	–	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	A	B;A	.	–	–	.	–	.	–	–	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	B	A	.	–	–	.	–	.	–	–	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	A	A	–	–	A	A	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	B	B	–	m	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	–
<b>P</b>	.	C	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	B	B	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	A	A	.	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	–

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	2,5	2,7	0,0	2,0	2,5	0,0	1,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		4,0	3,3
<b>D</b>	0,6	4,1	2,0	0,0	2,9	1,7	0,0		0,0	0,0		11,1	2,0
<b>DK</b>	2,3	1,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,3	0,0		4,4
<b>F</b>	3,1	2,2	0,0	0,0		0,0						0,0	
<b>FIN</b>	2,4	0,0	0,0	2,3	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,9
<b>GB</b>	0,7	2,0	1,5	0,0	2,1		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	3,5		0,0
<b>GR</b>	0,0	1,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	2,9	2,3	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	2,5	2,3		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	4,8	2,3		0,0	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	2,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	3,3	2,9	0,0	1,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		2,6											
<b>SP</b>	2,8	5,6	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	1,1	1,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0

## Issue 4.7: Composition of the Commission

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	A	A	–	A	A	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	A, C
<b>D</b>	D1	D	m	–	D	D	–	.	–	–	.	D	D1
<b>DK</b>	A	A	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	A	–	.	A
<b>F</b>	D	D	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	D3	.
<b>FIN</b>	A	A	–	A	A	.	–	–	–	A	–	A	A
<b>GB</b>	B	B	–	–	D1	.	B	–	–	–	A	.	–
<b>GR</b>	A	A	–	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	.
<b>I</b>	D	D	–	–	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	A	A	.	–	B,A	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	A	A	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	–	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	A;D3	A;D3	A	–	D	A	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	A	A	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	–
<b>P</b>	.	A	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	D1	D1	–	–	.	D	–	–	.	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	A	A	.	–	–	.	–	A	–	–	–	.	–

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	5,0	2,7	0,0	3,0	7,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		4,0	3,3
<b>D</b>	0,6	3,3	2,6	0,0	1,4	1,7	0,0		0,0	0,0		2,8	2,0
<b>DK</b>	4,5	3,8	0,0	2,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,5	0,0		4,4
<b>F</b>	1,5	10,8	0,0	0,0		0,0						9,0	
<b>FIN</b>	6,1	5,9	0,0	5,6	3,3		0,0	0,0	0,0	4,4	0,0	6,0	2,9
<b>GB</b>	1,3	2,0	0,0	0,0	4,2		2,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	3,5		0,0
<b>GR</b>	3,3	2,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	2,9	3,1	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	7,5	3,8		0,0	16,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	4,8	18,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	2,5	1,2	1,9	0,0	3,3	6,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	3,3	4,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		4,4											
<b>SP</b>	2,8	2,8	0,0	0,0		2,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	4,4	2,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	2,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0

## Issue 4.8: Enhanced Cooperation: Introducing Flexibility

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C	
<b>B</b>	D	D	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	B4	B4
<b>D</b>	B,C3	C	D	–	D; B	A	–	.	D	A	.	C	–	–
<b>DK</b>	A	A	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	A	–	.	.	A
<b>F</b>	D	D	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	D	.	.
<b>FIN</b>	m	B,C4,D	B,C4	A	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	C4	.	B-D
<b>GB</b>	A	A	A	–	A	.	–	–	–	–	A	.	.	–
<b>GR</b>	D	A	–	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	.	.
<b>I</b>	D	D	–	–	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	B	A,C,D	.	–	A	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	C	D; B,C	.	C4	C2	.	–	.	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	D	D	D	A	C	C4	.	–	.	D	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	A	C2; D	–	C	D;C	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	–	–
<b>P</b>	.	D	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	B,C4	B,C4	–	–	.	B	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	B	A	.	–	–	.	–	m	–	–	–	.	.	B-D

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C	
<b>B</b>	2,5	2,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0			4,0	3,3
<b>D</b>	2,4	2,5	3,3	0,0	4,3	3,3	0,0		2,6	2,7		2,8	0,0	0,0
<b>DK</b>	0,8	2,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	6,3	0,0			4,4
<b>F</b>	4,6	6,5	0,0	0,0		3,3						3,8		
<b>FIN</b>	3,7	2,9	2,0	1,1	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	6,0		2,9
<b>GB</b>	3,3	4,1	1,5	0,0	12,6		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	3,5			0,0
<b>GR</b>	1,7	2,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		
<b>I</b>	2,9	3,8	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0			
<b>IRL</b>	1,3	3,0		0,0	4,0		0,0	0,0		0,0				
<b>LUX</b>	2,4	6,8		4,0	3,0		0,0			0,0				
<b>NL</b>	2,5	1,8	1,9	2,3	5,0	6,0		0,0		3,8				
<b>AUT</b>	1,7	2,9	0,0	1,0	6,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0			0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		2,6												
<b>SP</b>	2,8	1,4	0,0	0,0		2,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	2,2	1,5		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,3	0,0	0,0	0,0			7,7

## Issue 4.9: Enhanced Cooperation: Conditions for Flexibility

	<i>PO</i>	<i>MFA</i>	<i>MI</i>	<i>MJ</i>	<i>MF</i>	<i>MEco</i>	<i>MLab</i>	<i>MSoc</i>	<i>MDef</i>	<i>MEnv</i>	<i>MInd</i>	<i>othersFS</i>	<i>EU-C</i>	
<b>B</b>	A	B	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	A	A
<b>D</b>	B	B	B	–	m	B	–	.	B	m	.	–	–	–
<b>DK</b>	A	A	–	A	–	A	–	–	–	A	–	.	.	–
<b>F</b>	B	B	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	B	.	.
<b>FIN</b>	m	A	B	A	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	B	.	A
<b>GB</b>	A	A	A	–	A	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	–
<b>GR</b>	B	A	–	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	.	.
<b>I</b>	B	B	–	–	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	A	A	.	–	A	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	B	A	.	A	A	.	–	.	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	B	B	B	A	B	A	.	–	.	B	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	A	A	–	A	A	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	–	–
<b>P</b>	.	B	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	A	A	–	–	.	B	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	A	A	.	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	–

	<i>PO</i>	<i>MFA</i>	<i>MI</i>	<i>MJ</i>	<i>MF</i>	<i>MEco</i>	<i>MLab</i>	<i>MSoc</i>	<i>MDef</i>	<i>MEnv</i>	<i>MInd</i>	<i>othersFS</i>	<i>EU-C</i>	
<b>B</b>	2,5	2,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		4,0	3,3	
<b>D</b>	1,2	2,5	3,3	0,0	2,9	3,3	0,0		2,6	5,5		2,8	0,0	0,0
<b>DK</b>	0,8	2,3	0,0	7,0	0,0	4,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	6,3	0,0			0,0
<b>F</b>	4,6	6,5	0,0	0,0		3,3						3,8		
<b>FIN</b>	4,9	1,0	2,0	1,1	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	6,0		2,9
<b>GB</b>	3,3	3,1	1,5	0,0	8,4		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0			0,0
<b>GR</b>	1,7	2,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		
<b>I</b>	2,9	2,3	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0			
<b>IRL</b>	1,3	3,0		0,0	4,0		0,0	0,0		0,0				
<b>LUX</b>	2,4	2,3		3,0	3,0		0,0			0,0				
<b>NL</b>	2,5	1,8	1,9	2,3	5,0	0,0		0,0		3,8				
<b>AUT</b>	1,7	2,9	0,0	1,0	6,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0			0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		2,6												
<b>SP</b>	2,8	1,4	0,0	0,0		2,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	2,2	1,5		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0			0,0

## Issue 5.1: European Parliament : Right for Drafting Proposals

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	A	–	–	A	–	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	A C
<b>D</b>	–	A	m	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	.	C	–
<b>DK</b>	A	A	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	A	–	.	–
<b>F</b>	A	A	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	A	.
<b>FIN</b>	A	A	–	A	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	A
<b>GB</b>	A	A	A	–	A	.	–	–	–	–	A	.	–
<b>GR</b>	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	.	.
<b>I</b>	A	A	–	–	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	–	A	.	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	A	–	.	–	–	.	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	–	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	A	B	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	–
<b>P</b>	.	A	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	A	A	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	–	A	.	A	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	–

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	0,0	0,8	0,0	2,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		3,0	2,5
<b>D</b>	0,0	1,2	2,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		6,0	0,0
<b>DK</b>	0,8	1,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	3,8	0,0		0,0
<b>F</b>	2,6	1,1	0,0	0,0		0,0						1,6	
<b>FIN</b>	1,1	0,0	0,0	1,4	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,9
<b>GB</b>	0,4	1,7	1,5	0,0	1,6		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>GR</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	0,0	2,2	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	0,0	1,4		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	3,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	3,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	0,0	1,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		1,5											
<b>SP</b>	2,2	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	0,0	0,5		0,8	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0

## Issue 5.2: European Parliament : Procedures

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>	
<b>B</b>	–	–	–	C1,2	C1	–	C1	–	–	–	.	.	–	C1,2
<b>D</b>	B,C1,2	B,C1	B	–	A	B,C1	–	.	–	B,C1	.	B,C	B,C	B,C
<b>DK</b>	B; C1	C1	–	–	–	–	C1	–	–	C	–	.	.	B,C1
<b>F</b>	A	C	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	A	.	.
<b>FIN</b>	C	B,C1	B,C	B,C1	C	.	–	C1	–	C	–	–	.	B
<b>GB</b>	C1	C2	–	–	B,C1	.	–	–	–	–	C1	.	.	–
<b>GR</b>	m	C	–	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	.	.
<b>I</b>	B,C1	B,C1	–	B,C1	–	.	.	.	–	.	C1	.	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	C1	C1;A	.	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	B,C	B,C	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	C	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	B,C	B,C	C	C1	A	C1	.	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	C1,2	C1	–	–	C1	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	–	C1
<b>P</b>	.	B,C	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	B,C	B,C	m	–	.	B,C1	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	B
<b>SWE</b>	C1	A	.	C1	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	B

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>	
<b>B</b>	2,0	1,7	0,0	1,5	5,0	0,0	3,8	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	2,5	
<b>D</b>	2,7	3,6	1,9	0,0	3,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	8,0		6,0	4,0	6,2
<b>DK</b>	3,0	1,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,3	0,0	0,0	2,5	0,0			4,4
<b>F</b>	2,6	0,6	0,0	0,0		0,0						1,6		
<b>FIN</b>	1,1	3,0	4,0	4,2	9,0		0,0	6,0	0,0	5,0	0,0	0,0		2,9
<b>GB</b>	0,4	1,7	0,0	0,0	0,8		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	10,0			0,0
<b>GR</b>	4,2	1,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		
<b>I</b>	2,9	3,2	0,0	2,0	0,0				0,0		10,0			
<b>IRL</b>	3,0	1,4		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0				
<b>LUX</b>	6,1	4,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			12,0				
<b>NL</b>	3,0	1,4	3,3	10,0	1,1	1,0		0,0		0,0				
<b>AUT</b>	2,0	1,2	0,0	0,0	4,6	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0			0,0	7,0
<b>P</b>		2,3												
<b>SP</b>	2,2	3,3	2,5	0,0		2,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	12,5
<b>SWE</b>	1,7	0,3		1,5	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0			7,7

## Issue 5.3: Scope of the Legislative Procedures

	<i>PO</i>	<i>MFA</i>	<i>MI</i>	<i>MJ</i>	<i>MF</i>	<i>MEco</i>	<i>MLab</i>	<i>MSoc</i>	<i>MDef</i>	<i>MEnv</i>	<i>MInd</i>	<i>othersFS</i>	<i>EU-C</i>	
<b>B</b>	E	D	–	D	D	–	D	–	–	–	.	.	–	E
<b>D</b>	D,B	E	A	–	C	C	C	.	–	D	.	A	C,D	D,E
<b>DK</b>	C	C	–	B	–	–	C	C	–	C	C	.	.	–
<b>F</b>	A	A	–	–	.	A	.	.	.	.	.	A	.	.
<b>FIN</b>	D	C;E	D	C;A	C	.	–	D	–	C	D	D,B	.	D
<b>GB</b>	A	A	A	–	D	.	–	–	–	–	C	.	.	–
<b>GR</b>	m	D	–	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	C	.	.
<b>I</b>	E	E	–	–	D	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	D	C;E	.	–	C	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	D	C	.	–	C	.	C,D	.	.	B	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	D	D	D	–	A;C	B;C	.	D	.	D	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	E	D	–	A	D	–	.	–	–	C	.	.	–	–
<b>P</b>	.	C	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	C	C	–	–	.	D	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	D
<b>SWE</b>	C	C	.	C	–	.	–	D	–	E	–	.	.	–

	<i>PO</i>	<i>MFA</i>	<i>MI</i>	<i>MJ</i>	<i>MF</i>	<i>MEco</i>	<i>MLab</i>	<i>MSoc</i>	<i>MDef</i>	<i>MEnv</i>	<i>MInd</i>	<i>othersFS</i>	<i>EU-C</i>	
<b>B</b>	5,0	5,0	0,0	4,5	7,5	10,0	5,3	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	2,5	
<b>D</b>	2,0	4,8	4,8	0,0	3,0	2,0	5,0		0,0	9,0		6,0	4,0	6,2
<b>DK</b>	3,0	2,5	0,0	0,8	0,0	0,0	2,5	10,0	0,0	5,0	10,0			0,0
<b>F</b>	6,5	1,7	0,0	0,0		6,7						1,6		
<b>FIN</b>	4,6	3,0	4,0	4,2	3,0		0,0	9,0	0,0	11,7	20,0	6,0		2,9
<b>GB</b>	1,6	3,4	4,5	0,0	1,6		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	10,0			0,0
<b>GR</b>	4,2	3,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	10,0		
<b>I</b>	2,9	5,4	0,0	0,0	10,0				0,0		0,0			
<b>IRL</b>	4,5	1,4		0,0	8,0		0,0	0,0		0,0				
<b>LUX</b>	6,1	4,0		0,0	30,0		10,0			14,0				
<b>NL</b>	3,0	1,4	3,3	0,0	4,4	6,0		10,0		5,0				
<b>AUT</b>	2,0	1,6	0,0	1,7	18,2	0,0		0,0	0,0	10,0			0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		3,9												
<b>SP</b>	2,2	3,3	0,0	0,0		5,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	25,0
<b>SWE</b>	3,3	0,3		1,5	0,0		0,0	15,0	0,0	10,0	0,0			0,0

## Issue 5.4: European Parliament : Election of the President of the Commission

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.	.	C
<b>D</b>	m	B	m	-	-	D	-	.	-	-	.	-	B-E
<b>DK</b>	A	A, B	-	m	-	-	-	-	-	A	-	.	-
<b>F</b>	A	B	-	-	.	-	.	.	.	.	.	A	.
<b>FIN</b>	m	-	-	B	-	.	-	-	-	-	-	B	.
<b>GB</b>	A	A	-	-	D	.	-	-	-	-	-	.	.
<b>GR</b>	-	C	-	-	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	-	.
<b>I</b>	B	B	-	-	-	.	.	.	-	.	-	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	-	A	.	-	-	.	-	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	B	m	.	-	-	.	-	.	.	-	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	B	B	-	-	-	m	.	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	A	B	-	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	.	.	-
<b>P</b>	.	B	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	A	A	-	-	.	-	-	.	-	-	-	-	-
<b>SWE</b>	A	A	.	B	-	.	-	-	-	-	-	.	.

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	2,5
<b>D</b>	2,0	2,4	1,0	0,0	0,0	2,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		2,0	0,0
<b>DK</b>	0,8	0,5	0,0	0,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,3	0,0		0,0
<b>F</b>	2,6	0,6	0,0	0,0		0,0						1,6	
<b>FIN</b>	1,1	0,0	0,0	1,4	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	9,0	0,0
<b>GB</b>	0,8	1,7	0,0	0,0	0,8		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>GR</b>	0,0	3,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	0,0	3,2	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	0,0	0,5		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	1,5	4,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	0,0	0,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	0,0	0,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0			0,0
<b>P</b>		0,8											
<b>SP</b>	2,2	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	0,8	0,5		1,5	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0



## Issue 5.5: European Parliament : Budget Power

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	-	-	-	-	A	-	-	-	-	-	.	.	D
<b>D</b>	-	A	m	-	A	A	-	.	-	-	.	A	-
<b>DK</b>	A	A	-	A	-	A	-	-	-	A	-	.	-
<b>F</b>	A	A	-	-	.	A	.	.	.	.	.	A	.
<b>FIN</b>	A	A	-	A	A	.	-	-	-	-	-	A	.
<b>GB</b>	A	A-B	A	-	C	.	-	-	-	-	-	.	-
<b>GR</b>	-	A	-	-	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	-	.
<b>I</b>	D	D	-	-	-	.	.	.	-	.	-	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	-	A	.	-	A	.	-	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	C,D	-	.	-	-	.	-	.	-	-	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	-	-	-	-	A	A	.	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	A	m	-	-	C	-	.	-	-	-	.	.	-
<b>P</b>	.	A	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	A	A	m	-	.	A	-	-	.	-	-	-	D
<b>SWE</b>	-	-	.	-	-	.	-	-	-	-	-	.	-

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	2,5
<b>D</b>	0,0	2,4	1,0	0,0	12,0	2,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		4,0	0,0
<b>DK</b>	0,0	0,5	0,0	0,8	0,0	5,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,3	0,0		0,0
<b>F</b>	2,6	0,6	0,0	0,0		3,3						1,6	
<b>FIN</b>	1,1	1,5	0,0	1,4	9,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	9,0	0,0
<b>GB</b>	0,4	1,7	2,3	0,0	4,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>GR</b>	0,0	1,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	2,9	3,2	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	0,0	1,4		0,0	12,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	3,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	6,6	2,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	0,0	0,4	0,0	0,0	18,2	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		1,5											
<b>SP</b>	0,0	0,0	2,5	0,0		2,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	12,5
<b>SWE</b>	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0

## Issue 5.6: Role of the National Parliaments

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>	
<b>B</b>	B	–	–	–	B	–	B	–	–	–	.	.	B	B
<b>D</b>	C	A	A	–	–	A	–	.	–	–	.	–	–	B
<b>DK</b>	B	B	–	B	–	B	–	–	–	A	–	.	.	B
<b>F</b>	D	D	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	C;B	.	.
<b>FIN</b>	B	A	–	A	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	A	.	A
<b>GB</b>	B	B,C	B	–	C	.	C	–	–	–	A	.	.	B
<b>GR</b>	–	B	–	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	.	.
<b>I</b>	A-B	A-B	C	–	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	B	C	.	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	B	–	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	B	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	–	–	B	–	D	–	.	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	B,C	B	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	–	B-C
<b>P</b>	.	A	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	A	A	–	–	.	–	–	.	.	–	–	–	–	C
<b>SWE</b>	A	A	.	A	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	–

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	2,0	1,7	0,0	0,0	2,5	0,0	1,5	0,0	0,0	0,0		4,5	2,5
<b>D</b>	1,3	1,2	2,9	0,0	0,0	2,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	6,2
<b>DK</b>	7,5	2,0	0,0	0,8	0,0	3,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	6,3	0,0		4,4
<b>F</b>	5,2	2,8	0,0	0,0		0,0						10,0	
<b>FIN</b>	2,3	0,0	0,0	1,4	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,9
<b>GB</b>	1,6	1,7	2,3	0,0	1,6		2,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,3		25,0
<b>GR</b>	0,0	0,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	2,9	1,1	9,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	3,0	0,9		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	3,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			8,0			
<b>NL</b>	3,0	0,4	3,3	0,0	2,2	0,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	1,0	1,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	7,0
<b>P</b>		0,8											
<b>SP</b>	2,2	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	12,5
<b>SWE</b>	2,5	1,3		1,5	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0

## Issue 5.7: Power of the Commission

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>	
<b>B</b>	C3	–	C3	C3	C3	–	C3,1	–	–	–	.	.	–	C3
<b>D</b>	C1	C3	A	–	B	B	–	.	A	–	.	B;A	–	–
<b>DK</b>	B	B	–	C3	–	B	–	–	–	B	–	.	.	–
<b>F</b>	B	m	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	B	.	.
<b>FIN</b>	C3,2	C3,2	–	C3	B	.	–	–	–	–	–	B	.	–
<b>GB</b>	A	A-B	A	–	B	.	A	–	–	–	C1	.	.	–
<b>GR</b>	m	C3,2,1	–	C3	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	.	.
<b>I</b>	C3	C3	C3,2,1	C3	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	C3	C	.	–	B	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	C3,2,1	C3,2,1	.	–	–	.	C	.	.	C2,1	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	C1-3	C1-3	C1	–	B	C1	.	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	B	C3,1	–	C3	B	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	–	C3
<b>P</b>	.	C3	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	B	B	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	B	B	.	C1	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	–

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	6,0	5,0	5,0	2,3	5,0	0,0	4,5	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	2,5
<b>D</b>	2,7	3,6	3,9	0,0	2,0	10,0	0,0		5,3	0,0		6,0	0,0
<b>DK</b>	0,0	0,5	0,0	1,3	0,0	2,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	5,0	0,0		0,0
<b>F</b>	1,3	1,1	0,0	0,0		0,0						0,0	
<b>FIN</b>	4,6	9,0	0,0	2,8	9,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	6,0	0,0
<b>GB</b>	1,6	3,4	2,3	0,0	0,8		2,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,3		0,0
<b>GR</b>	4,2	3,7	0,0	6,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	2,9	2,2	21,0	10,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	4,5	1,9		0,0	16,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	7,6	6,0		0,0	0,0		10,0			6,0			
<b>NL</b>	3,0	1,1	3,3	0,0	4,4	6,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	2,0	1,6	0,0	1,7	9,1	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	7,0
<b>P</b>		3,1											
<b>SP</b>	2,2	5,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	1,7	1,3		3,8	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0

## Issue 5.8: Power of the Court of Justice

	<i>PO</i>	<i>MFA</i>	<i>MI</i>	<i>MJ</i>	<i>MF</i>	<i>MEco</i>	<i>MLab</i>	<i>MSoc</i>	<i>MDef</i>	<i>MEnv</i>	<i>MInd</i>	<i>othersFS</i>	<i>EU-C</i>	
<b>B</b>		B3	B3	A	–	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	B2	–
<b>D</b>		–	B3	–	–	A	–	.	–	–	.	A	–	–
<b>DK</b>	A	A	–	A	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	.	–	–
<b>F</b>	C	A	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	A	.	.
<b>FIN</b>		A	–	A	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	–	.	–
<b>GB</b>	A	A;B	A	A;B	A	.	A	–	–	–	A	.	.	–
<b>GR</b>		–	–	B3	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	.	.
<b>I</b>	B	B	–	B	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>IRL</b>			.	A	–	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	A	A	.	A	–	.	–	.	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	C,D	C,D	m	–	C,D	m	.	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	A	m	–	B	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	B2	–
<b>P</b>	.	A	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	A	A	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>		A	.	A	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	–

	<i>PO</i>	<i>MFA</i>	<i>MI</i>	<i>MJ</i>	<i>MF</i>	<i>MEco</i>	<i>MLab</i>	<i>MSoc</i>	<i>MDef</i>	<i>MEnv</i>	<i>MInd</i>	<i>othersFS</i>	<i>EU-C</i>
<b>B</b>	0,0	0,8	5,0	4,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		7,5	0,0
<b>D</b>	0,0	0,0	2,9	0,0	0,0	2,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>DK</b>	0,0	0,5	0,0	1,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>F</b>	3,9	0,6	0,0	0,0		0,0						0,0	
<b>FIN</b>	0,0	3,0	0,0	2,8	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>GB</b>	1,6	4,3	2,3	5,0	3,2		6,8	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,5		0,0
<b>GR</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	9,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	0,0	1,1	0,0	8,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	0,0	1,9		5,0	4,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	4,6	2,0		11,1	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	0,0	1,4	3,3	0,0	2,2	3,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	2,0	1,2	0,0	1,7	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		16,7	0,0
<b>P</b>		0,0											
<b>SP</b>	2,2	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	0,0	1,0		3,8	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0

## Issue 5.9: Power of the Committee of the Regions

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	E	A	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	E C
<b>D</b>	D	B-D	A	–	–	A	–	.	–	C	.	A	C,D,E _
<b>DK</b>	A	A	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	.	–
<b>F</b>	–	A	–	–	.	–	.	.	.	.	.	A	.
<b>FIN</b>	–	B,C	C	A	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	C
<b>GB</b>	–	–	–	–	A	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	–
<b>GR</b>	–	–	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	.
<b>I</b>	B-D	B-D	–	–	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	–	A	.	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	A	–	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	–	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	A	B,C, D,E	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	.	.	C,D,E _
<b>P</b>	.	C	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	C,D,E	C,D,E	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	E _
<b>SWE</b>	–	–	.	A	–	.	–	–	–	–	–	.	–

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	3,0	1,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		15,0	2,5
<b>D</b>	1,3	3,6	1,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	1,0		0,0	12,0
<b>DK</b>	0,0	0,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>F</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0						1,0	
<b>FIN</b>	0,0	1,5	2,0	1,4	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,9
<b>GB</b>	0,0	0,4	0,0	0,0	0,8		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>GR</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	2,9	1,1	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	0,0	0,5		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	0,5	1,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0			33,4
<b>P</b>		1,5											
<b>SP</b>	2,2	5,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	40,0
<b>SWE</b>	0,0	0,0		0,8	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0

## Issue 5.10: Power of the Economic and Social Committee

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	A	-	-	-	A	-	-	-	-	-	.	.	-
<b>D</b>	-	B-E	-	-	-	A	-	.	-	E	.	B-F	-
<b>DK</b>	A	A	-	-	-	-	B-E	-	-	-	-	.	-
<b>F</b>	-	A	-	-	.	-	.	.	.	.	.	A	.
<b>FIN</b>	-	D	-	A	-	.	-	-	-	-	-	.	C
<b>GB</b>	-	-	-	-	A	.	A	-	-	-	-	.	-
<b>GR</b>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	-	.
<b>I</b>	B-F	B-F	-	-	-	.	.	.	-	.	-	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	-	A	.	-	-	.	-	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	A	-	.	-	-	.	-	.	.	-	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	.	-	-	-	-	-	.	-	.	-	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	A	-	-	-	-	-	.	-	-	-	.	.	-
<b>P</b>	.	E	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	A	A	-	-	.	D,E	-	-	.	-	-	-	-
<b>SWE</b>	-	-	.	-	-	.	-	-	-	-	-	.	-

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	2,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>D</b>	0,0	1,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	2,0		0,0	0,0
<b>DK</b>	0,0	0,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>F</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0						1,0	
<b>FIN</b>	0,0	1,5	0,0	1,4	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,9
<b>GB</b>	0,0	0,4	0,0	0,0	0,8		2,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0
<b>GR</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	0,0	1,1	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	0,0	0,5		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	0,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		1,5											
<b>SP</b>	2,2	0,0	0,0	0,0		1,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0

## Issue 6.1: Employment: Objectives and Employment Chapter

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>	
<b>B</b>	E	E3	–	–	D2	E2	E2	E	–	–	.	.	E3	E3
<b>D</b>	A	A	A	–	A	A	A	.	–	–	.	B,C	E2	–
<b>DK</b>	E	D,E	–	–	E1	E1,	E1-3; D1-3	E3	–	D	B;E1	.	.	E2
<b>F</b>	A	A	–	–	.	A	.	.	.	.	.	D2	.	.
<b>FIN</b>	m	E	E	–	B	.	E3	D3;B, C,E1	–	–	E1	–	.	–
<b>GB</b>	m	A	A	–	A	.	A(E3; E1,2, B)	A	–	–	A	.	.	–
<b>GR</b>	E2	E1	–	–	E1	E3	E3	.	–	–	–	–	.	.
<b>I</b>	E3	E3	–	–	E2	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	D3,E	E	.	–	E	.	E3	E	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	E2	E	.	–	A	.	E2	.	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	E	A(E)	–	–	A	A;D2	.	B,D3, E2	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	C,E2	C,D3, E2	–	–	B,E2,3	C,E2	.	C,E3	–	–	.	.	–	C,E2,3
<b>P</b>	.	E	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	E2	E2	–	–	.	D2	E	–	.	–	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	E2	C,E	.	–	D3,E1	.	E2,3	–	–	E	–	.	.	D-E

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>	
<b>B</b>	4,5	4,1	0,0	0,0	10,7	9,3	25,0	33,3	0,0	0,0		2,2	2,2	
<b>D</b>	1,8	2,2	0,6	0,0	5,3	3,3	46,7		0,0	0,0		0,7	9,7	0,0
<b>DK</b>	6,7	3,7	0,0	0,0	13,3	16,7	22,5	20,0	0,0	5,0	5,3			5,8
<b>F</b>	1,7	0,9	0,0	0,0		11,7						2,3		
<b>FIN</b>	1,1	0,3	0,7	0,0	13,3		40,0	16,0	0,0	0,0	4,0	0,0		1,9
<b>GB</b>	2,3	2,7	1,3	0,0	3,2		33,3	40,0	0,0	0,0	3,0			0,0
<b>GR</b>	2,5	2,7	0,0	0,0	20,0	22,2	50,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		
<b>I</b>	1,9	2,0	0,0	0,0	14,0				0,0		0,0			
<b>IRL</b>	3,3	2,1		0,0	6,7		28,0	20,0		0,0				
<b>LUX</b>	3,3	2,3		0,0	10,0		53,3			0,0				
<b>NL</b>	1,3	0,2	0,0	0,0	10,5	5,8		40,0		0,0				
<b>AUT</b>	3,2	7,0	0,0	0,0	4,0	6,7		66,7	0,0	0,0			0,0	13,3
<b>P</b>		1,8												
<b>SP</b>	1,3	2,6	0,0	0,0		14,0	53,3	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	5,3	6,7		0,0	48,0		53,3	0,0	0,0	2,7	0,0			5,1

## Issue 6.2: Employment Committee

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	C	C	–	–	B	C	B,C	C	–	–	.	.	–
<b>D</b>	A	A	A	–	A	A	A	.	–	–	.	–	–
<b>DK</b>	C	–	–	–	–	–	–	C	–	–	–	.	C
<b>F</b>	A	A	–	–	.	A	.	.	.	.	.	–	.
<b>FIN</b>	m	B	B	–	B	.	B,C	C	–	–	B	–	C
<b>GB</b>	m	A	A	–	A	.	A(C)	A	–	–	A	.	–
<b>GR</b>	B,C	B,C	–	–	–	B,C	B,C	.	–	–	–	–	.
<b>I</b>	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	–	–	.	–	A	.	B,C	.	.	–	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	C	A(C)	–	–	A	A	.	B,C	.	–	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	C	B,C	–	–	B	C	.	C	–	–	.	.	B
<b>P</b>	.	B,C	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	–	–	–	–	.	–	B,C	–	.	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	C	B,C	.	–	–	.	B,C	–	–	E	–	.	–

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C
<b>B</b>	2,3	2,0	0,0	0,0	5,3	4,7	12,5	16,7	0,0	0,0		1,1	1,1
<b>D</b>	0,9	1,1	0,3	0,0	2,7	1,7	23,3		0,0	0,0		0,3	4,9
<b>DK</b>	3,3	1,9	0,0	0,0	6,7	8,3	11,3	10,0	0,0	2,5	2,7		2,9
<b>F</b>	0,8	0,5	0,0	0,0		5,8						1,2	
<b>FIN</b>	0,5	0,2	0,3	0,0	6,7		20,0	8,0	0,0	0,0	2,0	0,0	1,0
<b>GB</b>	1,2	1,3	0,7	0,0	1,6		16,7	20,0	0,0	0,0	1,5		0,0
<b>GR</b>	1,3	1,3	0,0	0,0	10,0	11,1	25,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	1,0	1,0	0,0	0,0	7,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	1,7	1,1		0,0	3,3		14,0	10,0		0,0			
<b>LUX</b>	1,7	1,2		0,0	5,0		26,7			0,0			
<b>NL</b>	0,7	0,1	0,0	0,0	5,3	2,9		20,0		0,0			
<b>AUT</b>	1,6	3,5	0,0	0,0	2,0	3,3		33,3	0,0	0,0		0,0	6,7
<b>P</b>		0,9											
<b>SP</b>	0,7	1,3	0,0	0,0		7,0	26,7	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	2,7	3,3		0,0	24,0		26,7	0,0	0,0	1,3	0,0		2,6



## Issue 6.3: Environment

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C	
<b>B</b>	D	E1	–	–	A	D	–	–	–	E1	.	.	–	B-F
<b>D</b>	B	E1-3, F	m	–	A	A	–	.	–	B, E1,2,3, F	.	B	B,C,F	–
<b>DK</b>	D,E	E,F	–	–	B	B	D; C	–	–	D	B	.	.	E
<b>F</b>	B	A	–	–	.	A	.	.	.	.	.	D	.	.
<b>FIN</b>	m	D	m	–	B, E1	.	–	D	–	B,D, E1,F	D, E1	–	.	E,F
<b>GB</b>	m	A	–	–	A	.	–	–	–	B-D	A	.	.	–
<b>GR</b>	E	B-D	–	–	B-D	–	–	.	–	E	–	–	.	.
<b>I</b>	E	E	–	–	D	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	D,E, F	D	.	–	A	.	–	–	.	D,E	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	E1	B-E	.	–	A	.	–	.	.	D; E1,3;F	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	E	m	–	–	–	A	.	–	.	E1,2,3, F	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	B,C, D,F	–	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	D,F	.	.	–	B-E
<b>P</b>	.	D	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	A	A	–	–	.	A	–	–	.	B,C,D	A	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	D,E	B,D, E2,3	.	–	–	.	–	–	–	B,D, E1,3,F	–	.	.	B-E

	PO	MFA	MI	MJ	MF	MEco	MLab	MSoc	MDef	MEnv	MInd	othersFS	EU-C	
<b>B</b>	3,8	3,7	0,0	0,0	8,0	7,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	54,0		0,0	3,3	
<b>D</b>	1,3	1,0	3,7	0,0	4,0	2,5	0,0		0,0	27,0		4,0	7,3	0,0
<b>DK</b>	5,0	4,4	0,0	0,0	20,0	10,0	4,5	0,0	0,0	10,0	16,0			4,4
<b>F</b>	5,0	0,5	0,0	0,0		17,5							3,5	
<b>FIN</b>	1,6	1,0	1,0	0,0	12,0		0,0	6,0	0,0	17,8	6,0	0,0		5,7
<b>GB</b>	0,7	2,0	0,0	0,0	4,7		0,0	0,0	0,0	50,0	0,0			0,0
<b>GR</b>	2,2	2,0	0,0	0,0	30,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	60,0	0,0	0,0		
<b>I</b>	2,9	1,5	0,0	0,0	14,0				0,0		0,0			
<b>IRL</b>	2,0	2,1		0,0	4,0		0,0	0,0		66,7				
<b>LUX</b>	3,0	0,8		0,0	15,0		0,0			10,0				
<b>NL</b>	2,0	0,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	4,4		0,0		40,0				
<b>AUT</b>	1,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	45,0		0,0		7,0
<b>P</b>		1,8												
<b>SP</b>	2,0	0,3	0,0	0,0		14,0	0,0	0,0		50,0	20,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	3,0	10,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	48,0	0,0			7,7

## Issue 6.4: Stricter Rules on Environmental Policy by Member States

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	B	B	–	–	B	B	E	–	–	C	.	.	–
<b>D</b>	E	B	B	–	–	A	–	.	–	C,E	.	A	C,D
<b>DK</b>	C	C,E,D	–	–	C	C	D; E	–	–	C,E,D	C	.	C
<b>F</b>	B	B	–	–	.	B	.	.	.	.	.	B	.
<b>FIN</b>	m	C-D	–	–	–	.	–	–	–	C,D	C,E,D	–	C
<b>GB</b>	m	B	–	–	B	.	–	–	–	B	B	.	–
<b>GR</b>	m	–	–	–	–	–	–	.	–	m	–	–	.
<b>I</b>	–	–	–	–	–	.	.	.	–	.	–	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	m	m	.	–	B	.	–	–	.	B	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	C-D	–	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	D	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	C	B	–	–	–	B	.	–	.	C	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	D	–	–	–	–	–	.	–	–	C	.	.	–
<b>P</b>	.	B	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	B	B	–	–	.	B	–	–	.	B	B	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	C-D	B	.	–	–	.	–	–	–	C,D	–	.	–

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>
<b>B</b>	3,0	2,5	0,0	0,0	4,0	0,0	6,3	0,0	0,0	36,0		0,0	0,0
<b>D</b>	1,3	0,9	3,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	13,5		2,0	7,3
<b>DK</b>	10,0	4,4	0,0	0,0	20,0	10,0	2,3	0,0	0,0	17,5	8,0		4,4
<b>F</b>	1,2	0,0	0,0	0,0		7,0						2,3	
<b>FIN</b>	1,6	0,5	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	17,8	9,0	0,0	2,9
<b>GB</b>	0,7	2,0	0,0	0,0	1,6		0,0	0,0	0,0	40,0	3,0		0,0
<b>GR</b>	2,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	40,0	0,0	0,0	
<b>I</b>	2,9	0,7	0,0	0,0	0,0				0,0		0,0		
<b>IRL</b>	1,0	1,1		0,0	4,0		0,0	0,0		33,3			
<b>LUX</b>	2,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			10,0			
<b>NL</b>	2,0	0,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	4,4		0,0		32,0			
<b>AUT</b>	1,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	15,0		0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		0,9											
<b>SP</b>	2,0	0,3	0,0	0,0		7,0	0,0	0,0		50,0	10,0	0,0	20,0
<b>SWE</b>	2,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	24,0	0,0		0,0

## Issue 6.5: Community Policies : New Policies

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>	
<b>B</b>	—	C,D	—	—	A	A	—	—	—	—	.	.	A	C,D
<b>D</b>	m	A	m	—	A	A	—	.	—	C1,3, D1	.	—	A	—
<b>DK</b>	A	A	—	—	A	—	B	—	—	B	A	.	.	—
<b>F</b>	A	A	—	—	.	A	.	.	.	.	.	A	.	.
<b>FIN</b>	—	A	C,D	—	—	.	—	—	—	C,D	B,C,D	—	.	—
<b>GB</b>	m	A	A	—	C,D	.	—	—	—	A	A	.	.	—
<b>GR</b>	C	C,D	A	—	—	—	—	.	—	—	A	—	.	.
<b>I</b>	C,D	C,D	—	—	B	.	.	.	—	.	C1	.	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	—	—	.	—	—	.	A	—	.	—	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	—	—	.	—	—	.	—	.	.	D1,4	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	A	—	A	—	A	A	.	—	.	C1,D1	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	A	—	A	—	A	A	.	—	—	A	.	.	—	—
<b>P</b>	.	m	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	B	B	—	—	.	B	—	—	.	—	B	A	A	—
<b>SWE</b>	A	—	.	—	—	.	—	—	A,B	—	A	.	.	—

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>	
<b>B</b>	0,0	3,7	5,0	0,0	4,0	21,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		3,3	3,3	
<b>D</b>	0,7	0,1	1,9	0,0	6,0	10,0	0,0		0,0	4,5		0,0	7,3	0,0
<b>DK</b>	0,0	2,2	0,0	0,0	20,0	0,0	2,3	0,0	0,0	7,5	24,0			0,0
<b>F</b>	5,0	0,9	0,0	0,0		14,0						2,3		
<b>FIN</b>	0,0	0,5	8,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	4,4	18,0	0,0		0,0
<b>GB</b>	0,7	2,0	6,0	0,0	1,6		0,0	0,0	0,0	10,0	4,5			0,0
<b>GR</b>	2,2	4,0	15,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0		
<b>I</b>	0,0	2,9	0,0	0,0	21,0				0,0		18,0			
<b>IRL</b>	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		14,0	0,0		0,0				
<b>LUX</b>	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0			5,0				
<b>NL</b>	2,0	0,0	5,5	0,0	7,9	8,8		0,0		8,0				
<b>AUT</b>	0,5	0,0	5,0	0,0	3,0	30,0		0,0	0,0	15,0		0,0	0,0	
<b>P</b>		0,9												
<b>SP</b>	2,0	0,6	0,0	0,0		7,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	70,0	100,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	2,0	0,0		0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	10,0	0,0	66,7			0,0

## Issue 6.6: External Economic Relations

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>	
<b>B</b>	C1	C1	–	–	B	C1	B	–	.	–	.	.	A	–
<b>D</b>	–	C1-4	m	A	A	B	–	.	–	–	.	A	–	–
<b>DK</b>	A	A	–	–	A	C1	A	–	–	A	A	.	.	–
<b>F</b>	A	A	–	–	.	A	.	.	.	.	.	A,B	.	.
<b>FIN</b>	C	C1-4	–	–	B	.	A	–	–	m	C1-4	–	.	B
<b>GB</b>	m	A	A	–	A	.	–	–	–	–	B	.	.	–
<b>GR</b>	C1-4	A	–	–	–	m	–	.	–	–	–	–	.	.
<b>I</b>	C	C	–	–	B	.	.	.	–	.	B	.	.	.
<b>IRL</b>	B	C1-4	.	–	A	.	B	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>LUX</b>	–	C1,4	.	–	–	.	–	.	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>NL</b>	C	C1-4	–	A	A	B, C1-4	.	–	.	–	.	.	.	.
<b>AUT</b>	A	–	–	–	C	C	.	–	–	–	.	.	–	–
<b>P</b>	.	A	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
<b>SP</b>	A	A	–	–	.	A	–	–	.	–	–	–	–	–
<b>SWE</b>	B	B	.	A	B	.	–	–	–	A	B	.	.	–

	<b>PO</b>	<b>MFA</b>	<b>MI</b>	<b>MJ</b>	<b>MF</b>	<b>MEco</b>	<b>MLab</b>	<b>MSoc</b>	<b>MDef</b>	<b>MEnv</b>	<b>MInd</b>	<b>othersFS</b>	<b>EU-C</b>	
<b>B</b>	1,5	4,9	0,0	0,0	8,0	28,0	6,3	0,0	0,0	0,0		3,3	0,0	
<b>D</b>	0,0	4,3	0,9	15,0	2,0	7,5	0,0		0,0	0,0		3,0	3,6	0,0
<b>DK</b>	0,0	3,3	0,0	0,0	20,0	5,0	2,3	0,0	0,0	7,5	24,0			0,0
<b>F</b>	3,7	1,8	0,0	0,0		14,0						3,5		
<b>FIN</b>	4,1	2,5	0,0	0,0	8,0		15,0	0,0	0,0	4,4	21,0	0,0		2,9
<b>GB</b>	2,8	1,0	2,0	0,0	3,2		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	3,0			0,0
<b>GR</b>	2,2	4,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	33,4	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0		
<b>I</b>	2,9	1,5	0,0	0,0	14,0				0,0		72,0			
<b>IRL</b>	2,0	5,4		0,0	2,0		14,0	0,0		0,0				
<b>LUX</b>	0,0	0,8		0,0	0,0		0,0			0,0				
<b>NL</b>	2,0	3,5	0,0	5,0	7,9	8,8		0,0		0,0				
<b>AUT</b>	1,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,0	60,0		0,0	0,0	0,0			0,0	0,0
<b>P</b>		3,6												
<b>SP</b>	2,0	0,6	0,0	0,0		21,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
<b>SWE</b>	5,0	5,0		5,0	8,0		0,0	0,0	0,0	4,0	33,3			0,0

## 4. The Transnational Game

### 4.1. Practical and Theoretical Background

Within governments with multiple, complex and overlapping ministerial jurisdictions (cf. Thurner / Stoiber 2002) often there arise disagreements between ministries on issue priorities. In case of international cooperation, competition within national governments may be 'bypassed' by the strategic network formation of equivalent/homologous ministries of internationally cooperating nations. A possible consequence may be 'transnational coalitions' of ministries with similar political preferences (cf. Andreae/ Kaiser 1998: 43) acting against their own governments' common objectives.

As an example, Andreae/ Kaiser (1998) point to 'silent alliances' of EU member states' against their environmental departments: As a consequence of international cooperation in general, and the European Union Integration specifically, the authors expect a network of contacts, informal agreement and coalition building that evades traditional foreign policy and diplomacy channels.

External relations of ministries have been rarely researched<sup>36</sup>. This is surprising given the increasing literature on the decline of the territorially defined nation state (Herz 1957): notions like transnational relations (Kaiser 1969, Keohane/Nye 1973, Risse-Kappen 1995), interdependence (Cooper 1968), 'denationalization' (Zürn 1998), governance in spaces without frontiers (Kohler-Koch 1998) etc. are flourishing. Originally, transnational relations have been defined as "contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of governments" (p. xi) (Keohane/Nye 1973: xi). Whereas in the definition of this term, Keohane/Nye insist on the detail that at least one actor should not be an agent of a government or an intergovernmental organization (p. xii), later in they include also "... relations between governmental actors that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of their governments" (p. xv). As an example they point to the coalition building of EU member states' officials in the agrarian sector as described by Lindberg and Sheingold (1970). However, the original definition accented the bypassing of the national government by nongovernmental organizations for the promotion of their interests in open economies.

From the beginning, the question was on the effects of these processes. Optimistically, Keohane and Nye expected that these processes would "increase the sensitivity of societies to one another and thereby alter relationships between governments" (Keohane/Nye 1973: xvi). More skeptically, authors like Eberwein/Kaiser (1998: 2) argued that with foreign policy losing its function, the advantages of traditional hierarchies would fade away also resulting into more conflicts. Tradition formal competences of foreign ministries and the government in general have to be assessed anew. This implies that the coordination of all external relations of the departments is of crucial importance (Eberwein/Kaiser 1998: 3). The first discussion of this problem was delivered by Andreae/Kaiser

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<sup>36</sup> To our knowledge, the only article focused to these subject is Andreae/Kaiser (1998).

(1998) in an article called: 'The Foreign Policy of Ministries' asking for the implications of the increasing external relations of German ministries of a consistent national foreign policy<sup>37</sup> (1998: 30). In this context they provide a useful differentiation, closely following Keohane/Nye (1973):

"Angesichts dieser Lage ist eine wichtige begriffliche Unterscheidung zu beachten: 'Außenbeziehungen' umfassen die Gesamtheit der Auslandsbeziehungen der Fachministerien, während 'Außenpolitik' der Wahrnehmung der von den zuständigen Institutionen definierten gesamtstaatlichen Interessen dient. Die Außenbeziehungen können, müssen jedoch nicht Teil der Außenpolitik sein. Idealerweise sind sie es dann, wenn sie sich einbetten in die Interessen, die vom Kabinett, dem Bundeskanzler und von dem für die Ausführung verantwortlichen Auswärtigen Amt vorgegeben werden" (Andreae/Kaiser 1998: 31).

The reason behind incongruence between the ministries' external activities and the national policy respectively may be conflicts of competence between national departments resulting in transnational coalitions. However, it would be too pessimistic to assume all external relations of departments to serve 'conspirative' objectives only. Alternative interpretations argue that these external relations constitute a functional collaboration of ministries in their respective policy domains (Andreae/Kaiser 1998: 44). Authors like Wessels (2000) and Bach (1999) even expect a fusion of national bureaucracies.

## 4.2. Operationalization

Data for the reconstruction of transnational networks have been collected with the main questionnaire (cf. Annex 2) as applied to top-level bureaucrats of the ministries actually involved in the national preparation process.<sup>38</sup> Thus it was necessary to identify different types of functionally equivalent ministries/actors<sup>39</sup> across the member states.

Because of the innovative nature of this research question and the high sensibility of these data we decided to deliver two types of visualization: First, from a member states' perspective (Chapter 4.3) we show all transnational choices as indicated by the intranational ministries/actors. Second, from the perspective of functionally equivalent actors across political systems we present transnational networks between the member states' respective equivalent ministries/actors (Chapter 4.4).

### The Member States' Perspective

For the member states' perspective, all actually involved national actors are taken into account. We present exclusively the directed transnational relations from the point of view of the ministries/actors

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<sup>37</sup> According to the rules of procedure of the German government, cf. § 11 (2) GOBReg, external negotiations should only be carried with the consent and knowledge of the Foreign Ministry, cf. Andreae/Kaiser 1998: 32.

<sup>38</sup> Obviously, data are available only for those actors, with which interviews were accomplished (cf. Table 6). The item reads as follows: "Sometimes, it proves to be useful for a ministry, before the final national official position is taken, to come to an agreement with an equivalent ministry of another Member State. Could you indicate the Member States where you have practiced such an agreement building"

<sup>39</sup> For the construction of functionally equivalent ministries cf. chapter 3.2.2.

within each focal Member State towards other member states' equivalent actors. Therefore, the resulting sociogram constitutes a partial network. We have rearranged the spatial location.<sup>40</sup> National ministries/actors (circles) are placed at the edge of the sociogram, whereas member states (squares) are arranged in the middle. According to the number of directed choices by each national actor, the largeness of a circle is determined. Analogously, the larger the square representing a Member State, the more often it was addressed.

### Enhanced European Cooperation of Jurisdictions

In chapter 4.4 we present the transnational jurisdictional networks of: PO, MFA, MI, MJ, MF, MEco, MLab, MSoc and MEnv. In those member states, where one ministry performed the function of two jurisdictional types (MF and MEco or MLab and MSoc) this ministry was included in both transnational networks. If the German MLS, e.g., has chosen the British equivalent ministry, this could mean the MSoc or the MLab. Thus, this relation is included in the MSoc- as well as the MLab-network represented by a directed graph from the German MLS to the respective British counterpart.

However, not all types of ministries/actors can be visualized as transnational jurisdictional network. Only two presidents were involved in the preparation process, such that no network will be presented in this case. Analogously, Ministries of Industry (MInd) are not included in the MEco-network, because two out of four have not been contacted for a face-to-face interview due to their marginal involvement. As the MDef are concerned, only the Swedish and the German bureaucrats indicated transnational networks.


We decided to calculate betweenness centrality in order to determine the relative centrality of an actor as a broker within the transnational network (analogous to the intranational ex-ante coordination network, chapter 3.2.1). For the visualization as sociograms, again VISIONE was used.

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
<sup>40</sup> We applied the software VISIONE.

### 4.3. Transnational Networks: The Member States' Perspective

Austria




Belgium







Denmark




Finland




France




Germany




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Greece




Ireland



B D DK F FIN GR LUX P SP

MEco MLab MSoc MEnv


Italy



DK FIN GR IRL AUT P SP SWE

PO MJ MF


Luxembourg



DK FIN ITL GB GR IRL AUT P SP SWE

MF MEnv


The Netherlands




GR ITL IRL P SP

MJ

Spain




Sweden




#### 4.4. Transnational Networks: Enhanced European Cooperation of Jurisdictions

*Transnational Network of the Prime Minister Offices*




*Transnational Network of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs*






*Transnational Network of the Ministries of the Interior*




*Transnational Network of the Ministries of Justice*







Transnational Network of the Ministries of Finance




Transnational Network of the Ministries of Economy




*Transnational Network of the Ministries of Labour*



*Transnational Network of the Ministries of Social Affairs*



Transnational Network of the Ministries of the Environment



## 5. The International Game

### 5.1. Theoretical Background

According to neoliberal intergovernmentalism, it is the nation state, which drives international cooperation and integration. Constructivist approaches deny the existence of rational decision-making of actors, because agreements are assumed to result from non-strategic communication: Arguing is the key for understanding (international) cooperation (Risse 2000). We expect that adherents to this approach won't even accept our deconstruction of the member states as outlined in previous chapters, because inside nation states, again, we postulate goal-oriented decision-making of corporate actors. In the following, in order to legitimize our data collection of national preferences, we show that the claims of constructivist approaches can be easily refuted.

Following standard definitions negotiations can be understood as processes of joint decision-making for the aim of achieving gains (cf. Young 1991: 1). A negotiation problem arises when, despite a joint interest for cooperation, the division of gains is uncertain (cf. Muthoo 1999). Applying a game-theoretic perspective on negotiations requires a broad definition of negotiations: "Negotiation is the process by which two or more sides attempt by communication to influence each other's decision on matters that affect all negotiators ... A consequence of this view is that underlying any negotiation is a strategic conflict – an interactive decision problem in which each negotiator must choose one of two or more courses of action, and has an interest not only in its own choice, but also in the choices of others" (Kilgour/Laurier 2002: 1). 'Bargaining' – a concept which is less encompassing – includes the strategic sending and receiving of messages, where messages are defined as "...offers, statements, questions, and threats, can be explicit or implicit, precise or ambiguous. Bargaining may be governed by rules or constraints, as it is in formal negotiations and diplomacy, or may unrestrained, like haggling in a market" (Kilgour/Laurier 2002: 1, see also Muthoo 1999, Downs/Rocke 1995). Therefore, a communication/arguing based theory of negotiation does not constitute a theoretical problem for game-theory as long as the analyst is not forced to believe in the assumption of non-strategic actors: "A game model of the underlying conflict can be converted into a game model of the negotiation simply by including a communication component" (Kilgour/Laurier 2002: 2). However, messaging itself is costly, and prone to mislead. The crucial baseline assumption of rational choice theory is that actors strategically choose actions. The action set includes cooperative strategies. However, resourceful actors will not accept strategies to their own detriment. Preferences can be uncertain and fuzzy (Ragin 2000) depending on the informational prerequisites, which can be improved.

Unfortunately, IR literature – as social science in general – produced only few systematic insights into the processes and dynamics of complex international negotiations so far. Whereas case studies abound, they provide thick description without intending generalizations. Game theoretic approaches, (cf. Rubinstein 1982, Kreps/Wilson 1982, Brams 1994) sensitize for the fundamental principles of sequential bargaining (see also Fershtman 1990, Bac/Raff 1996, Raith/John 1999, 2001). However, the definition of the game, as a rule, is highly stylized such that an understanding of complex

dynamics is no more straightforward, because of unknown functional relationships. As soon as we observe more than two negotiation parties with varying internal and external restrictions, bargaining over more than one issue, then the sequence of negotiations is - potentially – undetermined and may result into non-intended consequences (Boudon 1980, Schelling 1960). As any practitioner knows, it is the specific form of interaction, which decides over success, or failure of negotiations. Even results of highly professionally prepared and supported negotiations turn out to be unstable/inefficient ex-post because they are not incentive compatible and are therefore not implemented and/or renegotiated (Boockmann/Thurner 2002).

There are only two studies providing a systematic overview of the state of the art with regard to international negotiation processes (Zartman 1978, Dupont/Faure 1991). Dupont and Faure accentuate the differentiability of negotiation phases:

“While some negotiations develop a distinctive pattern, it is often accepted by theoreticians, and generally observed in practice, that most negotiations can be broken down onto a number of phases that have definite functions. The process may be fuzzy, these phases may be of different duration, they may overlap or backtrack, and confusion may appear in the succession of events. Nevertheless, looking at the whole sequencing, one sees the process as distinctive and original” (1991: 42).

They distinguish prenegotiations from the actual negotiations, negotiations with one round from negotiations with several rounds (‘multistage negotiations’), etc. The authors admit themselves that these broad classifications are only a preliminary stage for theory building:

“The crucial problems consist of identifying the forces behind the dynamics observed, the reasons why such stages seem to be useful, their roles and functions, and the way in which they are instrumental in solving the basic challenge of negotiation to reach a joint decision.... Although no current theory pretends to have succeeded to decode the process entirely, most contributions show a preference for the identification of a few key factors” (Dupont/Faure 1991: 41)

Indeed, a crucial prerequisite for an understanding of negotiation dynamics are changes of actors, coalitions, positions/messages on issues and expectations on states, etc. over time. However, we have only a small number of rudimentary process analyses focusing on international negotiations. Raiffa (1982) and Sebenius (1984) present a process of negotiations – called negotiation dance – on the basis of single negotiation texts as proposed by negotiation partners over time “The chart appears to show the evolution of a genuine negotiation conducted by a single text procedure, once the bargaining range was suitably narrowed...” (Sebenius 1984: 55). Obviously, sequencing whole negotiation texts is too broad for quantitative studies and detailed insights into negotiation dynamics. In the following we present data that try to fill this gap.

We argue that after an internal coordination process (cf. Thurner/Stoiber 2002) governments officially declare/signal negotiation positions – so-called starting positions – for every issue on the agenda of the conference. These signals are addressed to their own electorate as well as to the other member

states (Downs/Rocke 1995). These publicly declared 'starting positions' may be consensual internally or they may be contested. They may be more or less fuzzy; they may even be missing (Thurner/Kroneberg/Stoiber 2002). Furthermore, starting positions may reflect the actual governmental preference (sincere position taking) or may be a strategically declared position (strategic position taking).

As a rule, declared positions always imply a range of uncertainty that has to be uncovered – by practitioners as well as by scientists. During negotiation rounds member states try to find out each others range of manoeuvre and of discretionary leeway in order to maximize their government's expected utility of a negotiation outcome without risking at the same time the failure of negotiations and the implied internal and intergovernmental reputation costs. Through bilateral and multilateral communication, through testing the public's sensitivity (Thurner 1998, 2002) negotiators try to find out simultaneously their internal as well as external restrictions. As a rule, these restrictions are not fixed and objective from the beginning, but evolving over time. This is not to say that actors don't have preferences, but to conceive them as learning and developing preferences only in interaction to evolving constraints. Only by carefully taking into account these evolving constraints governments are able to determine the actual bargaining set and to find out the manifold ways toward the Pareto frontier.

## **5.2. Data Collection and Operationalization**

### **a) Starting Positions**

Starting positions of Member States on every issue are reconstructed from the synopses of Piepenschneider (1996), Griller et al. (1996) and Weidenfeld (1998) and mapped into our issue scales. Every member state is assumed to take a) no position, b) or a detailed position, c) or a fuzzy position, represented by a range over at least two options. For each issue we present the international preference constellation graphically: on the horizontal axis the reader will find the options, ordered from A (as a rule represented by the Status Quo) on the left to the most far-reaching option as provided by the Westendorp group and the Service Juridique respectively on the right. The member states are located above the options according to their most preferred option declared. Only member states with a position are represented. In case of fuzzy positions, the respective range is depicted by a line under the member state, reaching from the lowest option on the left to the highest on the right. Additionally, we depict also the positions of the Commission (Kom) and the European Parliament (EP).

### **b) The Negotiation Dance**

The IGC 1996, as many negotiation systems, was neither a single meeting conference nor a 'closed rule' negotiation system, i.e. it took about 16 month and it was open to constant trials of 'amendments' as well as for organizational and substantial suggestions by the presidency, the member states as well EU institutions and non-governmental organizations. We will document this ongoing 'amendment process' for each of the issues addressed in the form of a negotiation dance (see chapter 3, below).

We provide all events where written proposals have been brought in. We deliver the authorship, the time of intervention and the negotiation issue concerned. The source for our encoding of the proposed options in each proposal is Weidenfeld et al. (1998).

We visualize these data as ‘negotiation-dances’. The horizontal axis is constituted by the ongoing time (months); the vertical axis represents the options of the respective issue. The actor has been located according to the date of intervention and the declared preference for an option. If the proposal covers a range, a line through the circle marks the size of the range. All intervening actors have been considered: Members States, the EP and the Commission, as well as proposals of the Presidency. The Dublin II document and the Amsterdam Draft are separately displayed on the vertical time axis. For an assessment of the negotiation process we also included the negotiation outcome in Amsterdam.

### c) The Final Game

In order to distinguish phases of negotiation we differentiated between the time before and after the first single negotiation text was presented by the Irish presidency. All issues that have not been settled at that time are considered to constitute the final game. Table 7 presents the list of these 15 dimensions.<sup>41</sup> The third column provides for each of the issue dimensions the corresponding issue of the international game at the beginning of the IGC. Interviews for this subset of issues were accomplished just after the summit in Amsterdam and carried out with delegation members. The interview focused only on preferences, i.e. ideal points and relative weightings. In Annex 2 a list of all delegation members can be found.

**Table 7: Dimensions of the final game and corresponding issues of the international game**

Dim.No.	Subject	Issue
1	JHA: Decision-Making Procedures (asylum, immigration, border control)	3.2 / 3.3
2	JHA: Decision-Making Procedures (police and judicial cooperation)	3.2 / 3.3
3	European Parliament: Scope of Co-decision	5.3
4	Qualified Majority Voting	4.3
5	Qualified Majority Threshold	4.4
6	Weighting of Votes	4.5
7	Dual Majority	4.6
8	Commission – Membership	4.7
9	Enhanced Cooperation / Flexibility	4.9
10	External Economic Relations	6.6
11	CFSP: Decision-Making Procedures	2.2
12	CFSP: Relations with the WEU	2.6
13	Employment: Objectives and Employment Chapter	6.1
14	Employment Committee	6.2
15	Employment: Labour Market Incentive Measures	-

<sup>41</sup> We use the term “dimension” not as an analytical term, but to differentiate the 15 issues of the final game from the 46 issues of the international game at the beginning of the IGC.

Most of the dimensions correspond exactly to one issue of the international starting game. Sometimes, some options were added or subtracted, and in a few cases new options were created (cf. Thurner/Kroneberg/Stoiber 2002). But Dimension 1 and 2 constitute an anomaly. Whereas issue 3.3 deals with the transfer of the various subjects from the third pillar to the Treaty of the European Community and issue 3.4 with the decision-making rules, the dimensions of the final game crosscut these lines. Each dimension deals with the decision-making rules of a specific part of the subjects independent of their location inside the treaties including new created options. Also Dim 15 is a specific case, because incentive measures were not discussed in the beginning of the IGC.

Preference constellations within the 15 dimensions of the final game are presented graphically, analogously to the starting positions. According to the synopsis of Table 7 the dimensions are presented after the corresponding issue of the international starting game. Captions below the graph allow comparing the options of the dimensions with the option of the corresponding issue.

For all issues we will present in chapter 5.3:


1. Conflict Constellations as Resulting from the Starting Positions (Figures)
2. Negotiation Dances (Figures)
3. Conflict Constellations as Taken during the Final Game (Figures)




### 5.3. The Positions of the Member States

#### Issue 1.1: Citizenship of the Union

##### a) Conflict Constellation



b) Negotiation Dance




## Issue 1.2: Procedure for Adding Art. 8 (Citizenship) Without Revision of the Treaty

### a) Preference Constellation


No national positions

b) Negotiation Dance




## Issue 1.3: Introducing Fundamental Rights to the Treaty

### a) Preference Constellation




### b) Negotiation Dance




## Issue 1.4: Monitoring Observance of Fundamental Rights

### a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance






## Issue 1.5: Principle of Subsidiarity

### a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance




## Issue 1.6: Review of Compliance With the Principle of Subsidiarity

### a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance




## Issue 1.7: Transparency: Opening up the Council's Proceedings

### a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance




## Issue 1.8: Legal Personality for the European Union

### a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance








b) Negotiation Dance




Issue 2.2: CFSP: Decision-making Procedure


a) Preference Constellation



b) Negotiation Dance




c) Endgame Dimension 11: Preference Constellation




Issue 2.3: CFSP: Responsibility for the Implementation

a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance




## Issue 2.4: Financing the CFSP

### a) Preference Constellation






b) Negotiation Dance






b) Negotiation Dance




Issue 2.6: The Union's Relations With the WEU


a) Preference Constellation



b) Negotiation Dance




c) Endgame Dimension 12: Preference Constellation




## Issue 2.7: The Armaments Question

### a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance






### Issue 3.1: Objectives and Scope within JHA

#### a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance




Issue 3.2: Modes of Action within JHA

a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance




### Issue 3.3: Decision-making Procedures


#### a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance



c) Endgame Dimension 1: JHA – Decision-Making Process (Asylum, Immigration, Border Control): Preference Constellation




Endgame Dimension 2: JHA – Decision-Making Process (Police and Judicial Cooperation) - Preference Constellation






### Issue 3.4: JHA: Democratic Control

#### a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance




## Issue 3.5: Judicial Control within the JHA

### a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance




## Issue 4.1: Composition of the European Parliament

### a) Preference Constellation




### b) Negotiation Dance




## Issue 4.2: Uniform Electoral Procedure for the European Parliament

### a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance






Issue 4.3: Decision-making in the Council: Unanimity and QMV


a) Preference Constellation



b) Negotiation Dance




c) Endgame Dimension 4: Preference Constellation




## Issue 4.4: Decision-making in the Council: QMV-Threshold

### a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance






## Issue 4.5: Decision-making in the Council: Weighting of Votes in the Case of Enlargement

### a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance






c) Endgame Dimension 6: Preference Constellation




## Issue 4.6: Decision-making in the Council: Dual Majorities


### a) Preference Constellation



### b) Negotiation Dance




c) Endgame Dimension 7: Preference Constellation




## Issue 4.7: Composition of the Commission


### a) Preference Constellation



b) Negotiation Dance




c) Endgame Dimension 8: Preference Constellation




Issue 4.8: Enhanced Cooperation: Introducing Flexibility

a) Preference Constellation






b) Negotiation Dance




## Issue 4.9: Enhanced Cooperation: Conditions for Flexibility


### a) Preference Constellation



b) Negotiation Dance




c) Endgame Dimension 9: Preference Constellation




## Issue 5.1: European Parliament : Right for Drafting Proposals

### a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance






b) Negotiation Dance






## Issue 5.3: Scope of the Legislative Procedures


### a) Preference Constellation



b) Negotiation Dance




c) Endgame Dimension 3: Preference Constellation




## Issue 5.4: European Parliament : Election of the President of the Commission

### a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance




## Issue 5.5: European Parliament : Budget Power

### a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance




Issue 5.6: Role of the National Parliaments

a) Preference Constellation






b) Negotiation Dance




## Issue 5.7: Power of the Commission

### a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance




## Issue 5.8: Power of the Court of Justice

### a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance




## Issue 5.9: Power of the Committee of the Regions

### a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance




## Issue 5.10: Power of the Economic and Social Committee

### a) Preference Constellation






b) Negotiation Dance




Issue 6.1: Employment: Objectives and Employment Chapter


a) Preference Constellation



b) Negotiation Dance




c) Endgame Dimension 13: Preference Constellation






b) Negotiation Dance






c) Endgame Dimension 15: Labour Market Incentive Measures - Preference Constellation






Issue 6.3: Environment

a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance




Issue 6.4: Stricter Rules on Environmental Policy by Member States

a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance




Issue 6.5: Community Policies : New Policies

a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance




## Issue 6.6: External Economic Relations

### a) Preference Constellation




b) Negotiation Dance





c) Endgame Dimension 10: Preference Constellation



## 6. Constitutional Ratification Requirements

### 6.1. Conceptionalization, Data Collection and Operationalization

The ratification of international treaties is a crucial national restriction for international negotiations. The effects of this restriction have been extensively discussed within the two-level game literature. However, most of these analyses ignore the role of political institutions, or at least assume oversimplified institutional structures. In the following we take up recent requests for a systematic combination of comparative politics approaches and international relations themes (Milner 1998). We propose a theory-guided approach in order to capture the varying involvement of actors in different systems as well as the various resulting processes, therefore overcoming the predominant focus on presidential systems of previous analyses. Additional to the distribution of seats in the national parliaments, a multitude of conditions determine the possible win-sets of international negotiations, which are neglected so far. In the following, the national ratification procedure for each country will be presented according to the constitutional provisions in the EU Member States. In order to reduce the complexity of the voting and decision paths, they are represented as agenda trees. Each decision node represents the occasion for a vote or a decision of a particular actor. For the identification of involved actors and requirements for passing an international agreement we rely on a) the respective constitutional provisions collected in Hrbek (1997: 369–375), b) the collection of national constitutions in Kimmel 1996<sup>4</sup>, c) in the case of Portugal: on the revised constitution of 1997, d) on information provided in the internet, e.g. on <http://library.tamu.edu/govdocs/workshop/>). The following figures display the pathways ratification can take within a system. Bold arrows and letters highlight the actually chosen ratification pathway.

In order to illustrate our procedure, we use our first case, Austria, for describing in detail the sequential agenda trees. The Austrian government possess a leeway to determine the legal basis of the parliamentary ratification to be followed. According to Art. 50 of the Federal Constitution, international political treaties have to be ratified by assent of the *Nationalrat* (National Chamber) in a second step and, in case of competences of the *Länder* are concerned, in a third stage the *Bundesrat* (Federal Chamber) has to approve them with simple majority. However, in presenting the Treaty, the government argued, that it would imply an extension of the legislative powers of the EC and a modification of the constitutional provisions as fixed on the occasion of Austria's entry into the EU. As a consequence, ratification had to be carried out by a constitutional amendment, which, according to Art. 44 (1), which must be approved by both the *Nationalrat* and the *Bundesrat* (second and third stage) with a 2/3 majority.<sup>42</sup> The constitutional amendment was introduced into the *Nationalrat* on 16 April 1998 and passed on 12 May. The *Bundesrat* approved it on 4 June. The 2/3 majority was attained due to the grand coalition government providing the required majority in each of the chambers.


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<sup>42</sup> Enclosures to the protocols of the Nationalrat (XX. GP), No. 1152.


According to Art. 44 (3) of the constitution, 1/3 of the members of both chambers are required for submitting a constitutional amendment bill to a referendum, before the final signature of the president. However, the large majority of the government voted down this option. In this possible forth stage, the parliamentary chambers are given the power to involve the electorate in a fifth stage. The Austrian constitution provides the president with no real power to refuse the signing of the ratification law.

## 6.2. Ratification Trees


### Austria




### Belgium




Denmark




Finland




France: Constitutional Amendment




France: Ratification




Germany




Great Britain




Greece




Ireland




Italy




Luxembourg



The Netherlands




Portugal






Spain



Sweden



## Annex 1: Questionnaires

### Survey for the identification of the involved actors and the formal coordination structure

#### Question 1

##### **Ministries involved in the formulation process**

For each ministry we differentiate between two modes to be involved in the position finding process. First, to actively follow and monitor the information as provided by the responsible ministries (**Information Monitoring**). Second, to present proposals to be included in the position finding in the respective issues under consideration (**Proposal Writing**). We are interested in the ministries of the second category.

Please mark the ministries on the following list belonging to the **Proposal Writing** category.

#### Question 2

##### **Coordination unit for information exchange**

Has there been established a central coordination unit or secretary with the special charge for steering the information exchange between the involved ministries?

If yes, please indicate the name of the unit and the place of the housing ministry or other institution.

#### Question 3

##### **The formal structure of the coordination process**

Consider the coordination process below the cabinet level. Which formal committee(s) was/were charged with the coordination of the ministerial positions in the respective issues under consideration?

Please quote the name of this/these committee(s), the hierarchical level of the participating members (e.g. state secretaries, departmental heads, ...) and the name of the chairing ministry.

#### Question 4

##### **The formal composition of these committees**

Please mark the participating ministries for each of the installed committees.

Question 5

**Formal non-ministerial members of the coordination committees**

Members of these committees may not always be ministerial representatives, but be delegated by other institutions (e.g. representatives of the regional authorities).

Please quote the institutional affiliation of these members for each of the coordination committees.

Main Survey: The informal structure of the coordination

Question 1

**Identification of the most influential actors**

Using the structuring notes as prepared by the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, we have classified their 30 issues into six different groups of issues. For each of the groups of issues: would you please indicate those ministries or institutions that stood out as especially / outstanding influential in the process of finding the final negotiation position?

Question 2

**Enhanced cooperation between ministries**

During the preparation of the IGC 96: Do you remind one or several ministries, with which you cooperated particularly close in order to elaborate / bring in a joint position into the coordination process already from the beginning. Could you please indicate those ministries or institutions?

Question 3

**Position formulation inside the ministry**

As a rule, ministries as political actors always have to bear in mind the legitimate interests of other institutions, organizations and groups, as well as the sensitivity of the electorate. On the other side, ministries are expected to offer proposals by their own.

Reconsider the IGC and the preparation of your ministries positions: Could you please give us the relative proportions of taking up external demands versus proposals autonomously elaborated by your ministry for the issues you have been responsible for? Please distribute 100 points according to the relative importance of every category.

Question 4

**The role of the coordination unit / style of coordination**

Now we would like to get some information about the specific role of your interministerial coordination unit. Following organizational studies we identified different fields of activity where such units can differentially specialize on.

Could you please tell us on which fields of activity your interministerial coordination unit placed more or less priority? Please mark the fitting category.

**Annex 2: List of Delegation Members**

<b>Land</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>NAME</b>	<b>Position</b> <b>Delegation Head</b>
Belgium	Permanent Representation	1	<b>Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent</b>	Permanent Representative
	Indep. Expert	1	Franklin Dehousse	
	MFA	3	Frans van Daele Paul Rietjens Xavier Demoulin	
Denmark	MFA	3	<b>Niels Ersboll</b> Friis Arne Petersen Susanne Isaksen	ex-Department Head MFA
	PO	1	Sten Frimodt Nielsen	
Germany	MFA	3	<b>Werner Hoyer</b> Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz	Minister of State
	Permanent Representation	1	Reinhard Silberberg Peter Tempel	
Finland	Permanent Representation	1	<b>Antti Satuli</b>	Permanent Representative
	MFA	4	Eikka Kosonen Heidi Kaila Marko Kainen Antti Sierla	
France	MFA	4	<b>Michel Barnier</b> Pierre Sellal Pierre Lepetit	Minister for Europe
	Permanent Representation	1	Gilles Briatta Pierre de Boissieu	
Greece	MFA	3	<b>Stelios Perrakis</b> Spyros Georgiles Constantin Papadopoulos	Universityprofessor at the MFA
	Permanent Representation	2	Pavlos Apostolides Maria E. Micheloyannaki	
Great Britain	Cabinet Office	1	<b>Brian Bender</b>	Head EU-Secretariate
	MFA	1	Doug Henderson	
	Permanent Representation	3	Stephen Wall Lynn Parker Philip Hall	
Ireland	MFA	4	<b>Noel Dorr</b> Bobby McDonagh Clare O'Flaherty	ex-Department Head MFA
	Permanent Representation	1	Michael O'Toole Adrian McDaid	

Italy	Permanent Representation	2	<b>Silvio Fagiolo</b>	Permanent Representative
	MFA	3	M. Calvetta Gianfranco Verderame Maurizio Massari Luigi Cavalchini	
	MFA	3	<b>G. Schwinniger</b> Georges Friden Nicolas Schmit	Department Head MFA
Luxemburg	Permanent Representation	2	Jean-Jacques Kasel Marc Ungeheuer	
	MFA	3	Michiel Patijn Tom de Bruijn Carmen Gonsalves	
Netherlands	Permanent Representation	1	Jaap de Zwaan	
	MFA	1	<b>Manfred Scheich</b>	Permanent Representative
Austria	Permanent Representation	1	Stefan Lehne	
	MFA	1	Michael Morass	
Portugal	PO	1	<b>Francisco Seixas da Costa</b>	Minister of State
	MFA	3	Josephina Carvalho de Almeidae Miguel Sousa Maria Paula Conceicao Silva	
Sweden	Permanent Representation	1	<b>Gunnar Lund</b>	Department Head
	MFA	3	Sven-Olof Petersson Anders Hagelberg	MFA
Spain	Permanent Representation	4	Javier Elorza Fernando Alvargonzalez Christobald Gonzales Aller José Maria Muriel	Permanent Representative
	MFA	1	Alfonso Diez Torres	
Kommission		6	Marcelino Oreja Aguirre David Williamson Jean-Louis Dewost Carlo Trojan Michel Petite Ricardo Gosalbo	

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