



TranState Working Papers

WHY DO THEY WANT THE UN
TO DECIDE?
A TWO-STEP MODEL OF PUBLIC SUPPORT
FOR UN AUTHORITY

MATTHIAS ECKER-ERHARDT

No. 171

Universität Bremen • University of Bremen
Jacobs Universität Bremen • Jacobs University Bremen
Universität Oldenburg • University of Oldenburg

Staatlichkeit im Wandel • Transformations of the State
Sonderforschungsbereich 597 • Collaborative Research Center 597

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No. 171

Sfb597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ – “Transformations of the State“

Bremen, 2013

[ISSN 1861-1176]

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(TranState Working Papers, 171)

Bremen: Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“, 2013

ISSN 1861-1176

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Diese Arbeit ist im Sonderforschungsbereich 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“, Bremen, entstanden und wurde auf dessen Veranlassung unter Verwendung der ihm von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft zur Verfügung gestellten Mittel veröffentlicht.

Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft

DFG

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ABSTRACT

Why do citizens support or reject the idea of global authority? The paper addresses this question by examining individual attitudes about UN authority in a comparative perspective. According to the main argument put forward in this paper, we may think of the formation of citizens' support for international authority as a two-step process. First, the paper theorizes the formation of global attitudes about the UN according to a process of cognitive mobilization. Using data from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (2005-2007), I find strong empirical support for the role of individual attention to public cues for the relevance of the UN in rising global awareness of UN authority. In the second step, the paper examines how cognitively mobilized citizens use available information to make up their minds about UN authority. The analysis shows that global public support for UN authority largely depends on a cosmopolitan understanding of global interdependence and moral universalism. However, the analysis of contextual variables also suggests that a "particularist" calculus of national costs and benefits explains citizens' support for (and rejection of) UN authority to a remarkable extent.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Why do some citizens support the idea of the UN as a global political authority? Why do others want political authority to be placed solely at state or regional level? These questions become increasingly pressing as some international institutions begin to acquire political authority, that is, as states and non-state actors more and more recognize these institutions' capacity to significantly shape binding decisions in world politics (Cooper et al., 2008). It is widely held, that states have shifted authority to the international level through delegation as in the case of international courts or centralized monitoring agencies, and through pooling resulting from the introduction of majority voting (Zürn et al., 2012). The United Nations is a prominent case in point: since the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council has increasingly approved Chapter VII measures, including military intervention to resolve conflicts, which “now seems well within the Security Council's legitimate authority” (Philpott, 1999: 588). The Council has established international criminal courts and transitional administrations that are widely held to exercise “a degree of authority over the domestic arrangements in post-conflict societies that is unprecedented in the history of the United Nations” (Zaum, 2006: 455). With respect to agenda setting and monitoring, states and publics alike recognize various UN agencies and actors like the Secretary General, the High Commissioners for Refugees (UNHCR) or Human Rights (UNHCHR) as important authorities and treat them as among the most credible sources of information on major international political matters (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2010).

One outcome of these shifts has been that international governance in general and the UN in particular are said to be politicized, that is, the subjects of increasing public awareness, scrutiny, and contestation (Schmitter, 1969; Zürn et al., 2012). Growing public expectation that international institutions will be able to solve pressing political problems as well as the increasingly feared costs of abdicating national sovereignty are thought to play a crucial role in the formation of public attitudes (Hooghe and Marks, 2009; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012). However, empirical accounts of what citizens think about international institutions and why they do so are rare, at least with respect to global institutions like the UN (but see Millard, 1993; Machida, 2009; Gravelle, 2011; Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2011).

This paper aims to contribute to this issue by examining, on a comparative basis, the distribution of individual attitudes toward UN authority. It theorizes the formation of public attitudes toward international authority as a two-step process. In the first step, citizens are stimulated to become aware of international institutions like the UN. This occurs as their general interest in political matters increases and as they begin to learn more about specific international institutions. In this way, public awareness of UN authority is theorized as a product of

what has been termed cognitive mobilization (Inglehart, 1970) and the result of a so-called global skill revolution (Rosenau, 2003); it is ascribed to increased levels of education, media exposure, and associated cues from political elites.

In the second step, citizens are thought to form specific attitudes towards international institutions, according to the type of information they receive in the public realm. Here, my discussion focuses on two competing perspectives on international institutions—political cosmopolitanism and what I tentatively call particularism—expecting, that citizens might use available information to make up their minds along similar lines of reasoning.

According to a cosmopolitanism perspective, political problems have become increasingly transnational in scope due to functional interdependencies fostered by globalization and normative duties engendered by a commonly shared universalist morality (e.g. Held, 1995; Habermas, 1998; Archibugi, 2004). Nation states, this perspective holds, fail to tackle such global problems adequately, because of structural obstacles to regulating cross-border social transactions. International institutions are presumed to do better at managing global tasks and problems, and political cosmopolitanism has suggested ways to build a just and efficient global order that distributes political authority at various levels including the global one—typically by strengthening the UN. Cosmopolitanism may therefore be a promising starting point from which to think about why citizens think favorably about UN authority.

Nevertheless, holding a cosmopolitan worldview to a greater or lesser extent may be neither necessary nor sufficient as a condition for supporting the idea of global authority. Following a more particularist line of reasoning about international institutions (e.g. Krasner, 1991; Grieco, 1997), public opinion may be more narrowly focused on national (or even individual) costs and benefits of shifting authority to the global level. Policy preferences and perceived power asymmetries in the current make-up of global order may therefore play a decisive role in how citizens position towards global authority.

These alternative explanations are tested using data from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (2005-2007). I find strong empirical evidence for the cognitive mobilization approach and the role of public cues signaling the political relevance of the UN, thus making citizens aware of the issues and stakes, and even supportive of UN authority. Empirical evidence also supports the notion that a favorable public attitude toward UN authority is significantly linked to a cosmopolitan worldview. The extent to which citizens believe that nation states fail to properly address pressing global political matters is strongly linked to public support for UN authority as expected. This is good news for all proponents of political cosmopolitanism that seek social legitimacy for its basic constitutional principles, and desire a forceful and empowered UN as the core of a future cosmopolitan democracy (e.g. Held, 1995; Archibugi, 2004). Nevertheless, there is ample empirical evidence that a particularist logic drives citizens' attitudes toward the idea of UN authority as well. Citizens seem to heavily

weigh their own benefits from and costs of past UN action when they make up their mind about UN authority at present. Most remarkably, citizens of powerful states much more favor UN authority than do those from weaker states—a strong signal that UN authority is expected to further privilege the former to the disadvantage of the latter.

2 THEORY: COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION, COSMOPOLITANISM, AND SOME REALIST OBJECTIONS

2.1 Cognitive mobilization and public cues

There is widely shared skepticism about the role of citizens in international affairs; public opinion is believed to be superfluous and volatile because citizens are thought to be generally ignorant about what happens outside their own domestic realms. Following what has been termed the “Almond Lippmann consensus” on foreign issues (e.g. Holsti, 1992), international institutions can be said to be “waltz[ing] before a blind audience” (cf. Aldrich et al., 1989). This refers to the supposition that most citizens seem to lack the information necessary to form factually based opinions about processes that are typically criticized for their lack of transparency (Florini, 2005; Lloyd et al., 2008). But, contrary to this supposition, a raft of studies has shown that European institutions have already become widely accessible objects of public attention (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995; Weßels, 2007). A similar conclusion can be drawn from studies that use survey evidence to prove that public attitudes on global institutions like the UN are consistently structured according to theoretical expectations (Furia, 2005; Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2011; Gravelle, 2011).

Even when existing survey research convincingly demonstrates that many citizens seem to hold consistent sets of attitudes toward international institutions, there remains nevertheless a remarkable portion of them who signal a low level of awareness in the subject matter, for example, by not responding to related survey questions at all (Millard, 1993; Gravelle, 2011). To ignore this lack of awareness is unfortunate, because we lose sight of how international institutions become part of the political game in virtue of heightened public attention (Schmitter, 1969; Ruggie, 2004; Zürn et al., 2012). What is more, the process of raising citizens’ awareness might also determine to a significant degree the substance of public opinion. “Waking the sleeping giant” (Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004) could ultimately lead to a different distribution of problem perceptions as well as public preferences for or against addressing political problems at a global level. For both reasons, a theory of public opinion formation on global authority should first address the more basic question of what drives public awareness of international institutions.

To start with, we may assume that a more general attentiveness to politics may increase the likelihood that people learn something about the existence and political relevance of internati-

onal institutions. Education is said to play a key role in this regard by increasing citizens' "capacity to receive and interpret messages" about international affairs in general and international institutions in particular (Inglehart, 1970: 47). Moreover, as a potentially important channel for information (e.g. Hainmüller and Hiscox, 2006) education can conceivably lead to new generations being more knowledgeable about world affairs than preceding ones (Norris and Inglehart, 2009). Similarly, James Rosenau (2003) emphasized the role of education for an ongoing "skill revolution" which he plausibly expected to expand "people's horizons on a global scale" (pp. 52, 232 ff; Inglehart, 1997).

Beyond education, mass media communication has a prominent place in the cognitive mobilization literature (Rosenau, 2003). Even if world politics is not in the focus of the "mediated message" (Shoemaker and Reese, 1991) most of the time, empirical research has shown convincingly that relevant information is often communicated alongside domestic news and so-called infotainment (Baum, 2004). Therefore, mass media exposure is a second prime candidate for directing citizens' attention to international institutions.

Nevertheless, the impact of mere exposure to the political discourse can be expected to vary depending on differences in content, for instance, alternative school or university curricula as well as differing journalistic frames and media selection-process standards (see Bennett et al., 2004). First, content should increase overall public awareness as citizens receive more cues about the political relevance of international institutions. Not too surprisingly, an early study conducted by Millard (1993: 93) found that those countries directly affected by UN missions are also those with a comparably high level of observed awareness of the UN. Other research suggests that journalists send strong signals to their audiences that the UN is an important authority on complex global issues like humanitarian crisis (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2010). Accordingly, we may expect such cues to significantly focus public attention on the UN and to facilitate the formation of attitudes with regard to what role the UN should play in world politics accordingly.

Second, the primary mechanisms of cognitive mobilization—education and mass media exposure—may also foster public preference for or against shifting political authority to the global level, depending on what kind of information is provided (see Zaller, 1992; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Díez Medrano and Braun, 2011). Assuming that the citizenry received predominantly positive cues from textbooks, the media, and political elites, Inglehart (1970) expected mobilization to increase the likelihood that individuals would hold positive attitudes towards international institutions (in this case, the European communities). Similar arguments have been made for related issues such as free trade (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006) and regional integration beyond the European context (e.g. Kwon, 2010). But such expectations are probably less intuitive today than they were in the past, given that numerous groups in the public realm have started to regularly contest regional and global international institutions

(Zürn et al., 2012). While a variety of studies has indeed suggested that more educated individuals tend to lend greater support to international institutions (Inglehart, 1970, Furia, 2005; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006), others have disputed these results on empirical grounds (e.g. Janssen, 1991; Gabel, 1998; Tallberg and Dellmuth, 2011).

To sum up, a focus on cognitive mobilization can be expected to capture a great deal of how citizens form attitudes toward global governance. Mobilization mechanisms like education and mass media exposure should direct citizens' attention to the available information on UN policies and procedures in the public realm. Individual attentiveness to and comprehension of political discourse should have substantial explanatory power; so, too, should the degree to which public discourse contains strong cues that lead citizens to assume the UN is politically relevant. The impact of cognitive mobilization on specific preferences can be expected to be more complex, because different types of available information are likely to lead to conflicting attitudes toward UN authority. Assuming that the public discourse about UN action and procedures is still more often positive than not, I expect cognitive mobilization and public discourse to foster substantial public support of UN authority. The following hypothesis attempts to capture this line of thought about the important but largely contingent role of the cognitive mobilization mechanism for the formation of public attitudes toward UN authority.

H1.1: Citizens are aware of UN authority the more they are (a) cognitively mobilized and (b) publicly exposed to information that suggests the political relevance of the UN.

H1.2: Citizens support the idea of UN authority the more they are (a) cognitively mobilized in general and (b) publicly exposed to public discourse.

2.2 Cosmopolitan reasons for supporting global authority

If citizens become aware of UN authority and start to use available information to form and revise their attitudes toward it, then how could information lead them to support it? A good starting point here would be to consider the school of thought that presumably favors global authority the most, namely, political cosmopolitanism (e.g. Held, 1995; Habermas, 1998; Beck, 2004; Archibugi, 2004, Cabrera, 2004). Echoing almost century-old ideas from earlier writings in international relations (IR) theory and economics (see Keohane and Nye, Jr., 1977; Baldwin, 1980), cosmopolitan writers claim that the need for international institutions derives primarily from *functional interdependence* caused by globalization, that is, “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (Giddens, 1990: 64). The plethora of risks and opportunities brought on by globalization gradually transforms national communities into a plurality of transnational “communities of fate” (Held, 2003). Citizens have become vulnerable to the costs imposed by globalization, because national

governments are incapable of regulating it unilaterally. Political cosmopolitans therefore typically assume that globalization not only defines the agenda of public issues, but also compels and propels the “creation of political organizations and mechanisms that would provide a framework of regulation and law enforcement across the globe” (Held, 2003: 523).

The inability of individual nation states to regulate global problems efficiently is just one reason for political cosmopolitans to argue for the redistribution of regulative power from the national to the international level; a second is *moral interdependence*. Drawing upon a broader tradition of cosmopolitan thinking, they acknowledge “some notion of common humanity that translates ethically into an idea of shared or common moral duties toward others by virtue of this humanity” (Lu, 2000: 245). It is for this shared sense of humanity that all sorts of human suffering should be of concern to everyone who is aware of them, irrespective of whether or not one has any particular ties to those suffering (Nussbaum, 1994; O'Neill, 2000; Singer, 1972).

Regarding transnational politics, the moral significance of similar or related obligations has been the starting point for a variety of humanitarian as well as development agencies and large-scale private donorship (Linklater, 2007). Therefore, we can expect the cosmopolitan notion of an “obligation to assist” to be of some public significance; but, by itself, this obligation fails to address the broader issue of an unfair or unjust international order. This is a major concern, for instance, of those who identify strongly with the global justice movement (della Porta, 2007) and others who consider themselves to be cosmopolitan proponents of global institutions (e.g. Pogge, 2002). Because state dominated international politics has led to a plethora of injustices worldwide, it is argued that a global authority is highly desirable because it would be in a better position to promote and implement human rights, to fulfill our obligation to assist those in need, and to establish fairness in international trade (e.g. Beitz, 1979; Cabrera, 2004).

In accordance with this line of thinking, we may expect cosmopolitan derived support for global authority to be linked to two types of beliefs. The first type leads citizens to define salient political problems as inherently global and may rest on functional interdependence, but also on a strong normative appeal to universalism in terms of global solidarity and justice. The second type of beliefs is about the inefficacy of nation states in tackling global problems; that is, that there is a political authority vacuum at the global level, which only global institutions would be able to fill. The cosmopolitan model of public support for global authority has observable implications that can be tested. The following three hypotheses are assumed to capture the most important ones in order to determine whether public opinion follows the cosmopolitan line of reasoning about global authority in any significant way.

H2.1: *Citizens support the idea of UN authority the more global (i.e. driven by global functional interdependence) they perceive the salient political problems to be.*

H2.2: *Citizens support the idea of UN authority the more they commit themselves to norms of global solidarity and justice.*

H2.3: *Citizens support the idea of UN authority the less capable they perceive their own nation state to be in solving salient political problems.*

2.3 Particularist reasons for (and against) supporting global authority

Public opinion might not “tick” cosmopolitan at all. First, citizens may not as strongly be in favor of global authority as most proponents of political cosmopolitanism might wish. Second, citizens might come to favor or reject global authority for “non-cosmopolitan” reasons, which can be subsumed tentatively under the label of “political particularism.” For example, as realists have claimed for decades (Krasner, 1991), advocates of international institutions tend to obscure their distributional consequences in terms of power as well as policy outcomes. Political cosmopolitans have rejected the criticism on normative as well as empirical grounds (Archibugi, 2004). However, any attempt to theorize public support for global authority has to account for citizens’ “particularism” in reasoning about international politics. In any case, we would need to know how much of current support for global authority (or lack thereof) is due to particularistic reasoning if we are to believe that empirical evidence for cosmopolitan support of global authority is not simply an artifact produced by omitting particularist variables from the analysis.

First, on a particularist account, citizens might expect *direct material benefits* from empowered institutions. In the case of the UN, observers have argued that the least developed countries of the so-called global (political) South have benefited much more directly from what is for global (political) North only an abstract idea of global authority (Duffield, 2005; Jäger, 2007). Aid agencies, for example, in parts of the global South have benefitted directly from regular funding of UN programs. Similarly, citizens of countries that host large UN peacekeeping missions are probably more likely to view UN authority as beneficial in terms of security, rather than detrimental in terms of sovereignty costs. We may therefore expect those societies for which the UN is an important source of badly needed aid or security to favor UN authority.

Second, citizens’ support may derive from their *country’s success in pushing for its agenda and policy preferences* in the UN system that fosters a public perception of the UN as being a like-minded (and therefore fertile) environment for global cooperation (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004: 143). Conversely, citizens might receive information about political initiatives that have been blocked or resolutions that run counter to citizens’ own preferences; this should lead

them to perceive the UN as a potentially “dangerous place” (Moynihan, 1976) of political marginalization. Consequently, perceptions of the UN as a like-minded environment can be expected to foster public support for a shift of authority to the global level, while perceptions of the UN as politically hostile can be expected to lead to strong public opposition to such an authority shift.

A third proposition is based on the notion of *power asymmetries*. Citizens can be assumed to have some intuitive understanding of the “sovereignty costs” for national political systems implied by shifting political authority to global institutions. At the same time, they might favor such shift the more they can expect to control such new centers of global authority. For example, some realists have argued that less powerful countries are tempted to support international institutions to exploit *voice opportunities* (Grieco, 1997). Citizens of these weaker countries, on this view, should prefer the imposed sovereignty costs implied by shifting authority to global institutions to allowing their countries to be dominated by major powers under conditions of pure anarchy. But global governance is widely held to suffer from a low degree of legitimacy because it is perceived by its critics to be dominated by the highly developed global North with its institutional privileges, and its economic and military advantages (Strange, 1989; Jäger, 2007; Zürn et al., 2012). Institutionalized privileges like a permanent seat on the UN Security Council may be a strong case in point (Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2011). Beyond tangible institutionalized privilege, however, we can assume a diffuse understanding of power asymmetries in global politics that may shape citizens’ attitudes toward UN authority to a significant extent. For example, such understanding could be based on more or less “educated” guesses about how economic power and military strength translates into an advantageous position in controlling global authority’s agenda and decisions. Observable implications of such non-cosmopolitan shaping of public opinion on UN authority should be revealed in at least three broad empirically verifiable relationships.

H3.1: Citizens support the idea of UN authority the higher the benefits of UN membership in terms of financial or military aid for their country through UN programs and missions.

H3.2: Citizens support the idea of UN authority the more they perceive other states to behave like-mindedly in UN bodies.

H3.3: Citizens support the idea of UN authority the more they perceive power asymmetries in global politics to be in their country’s favor.

3 DATA AND VARIABLES

To examine the impact of various factors influencing attitude formation on UN authority, I use data from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (2005-2007)¹. I test hypotheses, using various sets of explanatory variables and controls, by regressing information on awareness of and preferences for UN authority. Each of the measures used are discussed in turn (descriptive statistics are reported in table 1).

Attitudes regarding UN authority are measured by responses to the following question:

Some people believe that certain kinds of problems could be better handled by the United Nations or regional organizations rather than by each national government separately. Others think that these problems should be left entirely to the national governments. I'm going to mention some problems. For each one, would you tell me whether you think that policies in this area should be decided by the national governments, by regional organizations, or by the United Nations?

Responses used refer to international peacekeeping (V179), protection of the environment (V180), aid to developing countries (V181), refugees (V183), and human rights (V184). The aggregate measure AWARENESS OF UN AUTHORITY is 0 if a respondent refused to answer all of the five questions and otherwise 1. To measure the strength of an overall preference for UN authority PREFERENCE FOR UN AUTHORITY is calculated that counts the number of issue areas for which the respondent chose the UN as preferred locus of decision-making.

Concerning the explanatory variables, a first set of indicators is used to test for *cognitive mobilization*. To measure the *individual attentiveness* of respondents to available public information, I use three sets of variables. The first of these, POLITICAL INTEREST, is based on responses to the question “How interested would you say you are in politics?” (V95). POLITICAL INTEREST ranges from 0 (“not at all interested”) to 3 (“very interested”).

Second, the inclination among citizens to learn about the UN and form attitudes on UN authority is expected to increase in direct proportion to the time respondents have spent in the public educational system. This expectation is tested using the variable EDUCATION, a 9-point scale in the WVS data set, ranging from “no formal education” (1) to “university level with degree” (9).

Third, I use items on respondents’ intensity of political communication activities. They were asked to indicate whether they used a specific source last week “to learn what is going on in their country and the world.” Information on respondents’ use of daily newspapers (V223), news broadcasts on radio or TV (V224), printed magazines (V225), in depth reports on radio

¹ Technical information on the Fifth Wave of the World Values Survey can be found on <<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>>.

or TV (V226), internet/email (V228) and discussions with friends or colleagues about political issues (V229) all refer to possible channels through which respondents may acquire information on the UN. Answers are aggregated in the index POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, which ranges from 0 (none used last week) to 6 (respondents claimed to have used all six sources).

A second set of indicators is used to measure the public *availability* of information that signals political relevance of the UN to citizens. Information availability in mass media communication is measured by the variable UN HEADLINES. The variable equals the percentage of newspaper articles that mention the UN in the headlines, published over the five years preceding the survey. Estimates are based on key word searches in the World News Connection (WNC) archives (cf. Leetaru, 2010). Only those countries are included in the analysis for which at least 1000 articles were translated and provided by the WNC. Because the focused coverage of UN action by an article already signals its political relevance (“the UN makes headlines”), I assume UN HEADLINES measures the degree to which media content contains cues—signals to the public—that the UN is politically relevant.

The measure PARTY INTERNATIONALISM derives from data on party manifesto content provided by the Comparative Party Manifesto Project (Klingemann et al., 2006). The project coded party manifesto content according to a system that uses two codes for “internationalism” (per107, per109). These codes capture all favorable and unfavorable mentions of international cooperation and institutions:

international cooperation; need for aid to developing countries; need for world planning of resources; need for international courts; support for any international goal or world state; support for the UN (per107, per109).

The variable PARTY INTERNATIONALISM equals the percentage of manifesto content for parties that took part in one or more elections for the respective countries during the 5 years preceding the survey. Again, I assume that PARTY INTERNATIONALISM measures the degree to which the political discourse contains cues by party elites signaling the UN political relevance.

Lastly, benefits from UN activities “on the ground” ought to increase public awareness and support for UN authority. To test this expectation, the variable UN FLOWS measures per capita aid provided by the World Bank over last five years preceding the survey. The additional variable UN MISSION measures the maximal number of UN personnel per thousand inhabitants in a specific country over last five years preceding the survey, as provided by the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations.

Regarding *cosmopolitan variables*, I measure the scope of major political problems using a set of related variables on environmental problems. The question reads as follows:

Now let's consider environmental problems in the world as a whole. Please, tell me how serious you consider each of the following to be for the world as a whole. Is it very serious, somewhat serious, not very serious, or not serious at all?

Answers were solicited on global warming (V111), loss of plant and animal species (V112), and pollution of rivers, lakes, and oceans (V113). These variables were used to construct the index GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS, which is assumed to measure issue salience through the cumulative responses in z-standardized form (Cronbach's α 0.81).

Two sets of items from the WVS questionnaire seem to plausibly tap on *cosmopolitan definitions of universal obligations*, including the more demanding variants of justice that reach beyond a mere obligation to assist. The first indicator for cosmopolitan morality, MILLENNIUM GOALS, is based on a set of items related to the priority respondents believe that their own country's leaders should give to global poverty (V170), education (V171), child mortality (V172), HIV (V173), and housing (V174)—the core list of the UN Millennium Development Goals.

I'm going to read out a list of global problems, and goals that world leaders have set to reduce them. Indicate for each of these goals how high a priority your own country's leaders should give to it.

The index MILLENNIUM GOALS is an aggregate variable constructed from the cumulative responses to all five items in z-standardized form (Cronbach's α 0.80).

Respondents were asked in addition about their support for official development aid. This is measured two-fold, beginning with the following question.

In 2003, this country's government allocated x% of the national income to foreign aid—that is, \$y per person. Do you think this amount is too low, too high, or about right? (V175)

In the event that respondents chose “too low,” a second question was posed wherein they were asked to indicate how much more foreign aid the country should contribute (V176). The constructed variable MORE AID translates both answers into a scale of factors by which current aid should be multiplied to meet future need and satisfy the respondents' desire for a more appropriate sum. The range is from 0.5 to 5, where “too high” is coded as 0.5, “about right” as 1, “one-and-a-half as much” as 1.5, “twice as much” as 2, etc., up to “more than four times as much” which is coded as 5.

To test for varying degrees to which citizens are confident in the nation state's capacity to solve important political problems, I use answers about how confident the respondent is in the armed forces, the police, the justice system, parliament, government and civil services.. Items have been z-standardized and aggregated into an index on STATE CONFIDENCE (Cronbach's α 0.86).

Concerning *particular interests*, the explanatory power of realist intuitions about what might drive respondents to support UN authority or hold them back from doing so is tested using four type of information. As already mentioned, one possible source for particular interests would be direct benefits from UN action as measured by the variables UN FLOWS and UN MISSION.

Table 1: Descriptives

| Variable | Obs. | Mean | Std.Dev. | Min. | Max. |
|-------------------------------------|-------|-------|----------|-------|-------|
| AWARENESS OF UN AUTHORITY | 68188 | .94 | .24 | 0 | 1 |
| PREFERENCES FOR UN AUTHORITY | 63561 | 2.07 | 1.55 | 0 | 5 |
| POLITICAL INTEREST | 66719 | 1.38 | .97 | 0 | 3 |
| POLITICAL COMMUNICATION | 65897 | -.01 | .60 | -2.68 | 1.60 |
| EDUCATION | 67680 | 5.20 | 2.53 | 1 | 9 |
| UN HEADLINES | 36746 | 4.64 | 2.41 | .42 | 9.16 |
| PARTY INTERNATIONALISM | 26709 | 2.86 | 1.79 | .83 | 7.45 |
| GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS | 63754 | -.02 | .87 | -3.78 | .76 |
| STATE CONFIDENCE | 67229 | .05 | .79 | -1.95 | 1.90 |
| MORE AID | 14464 | 1.56 | 1.09 | .50 | 5.00 |
| MILLENNIUM GOALS | 22027 | -.01 | .75 | -3.30 | .87 |
| UN FLOWS (\$ per 100 inhab.) | 64957 | .07 | .15 | .00 | .65 |
| UN MISSION (N staff per 1000 inh't) | 68188 | .06 | .23 | .00 | 1.59 |
| UNGA LIKE-MINDEDNESS | 64897 | 77.97 | 10.58 | 34.17 | 89.94 |
| UNSC PERMANENT MEMBER | 68188 | .05 | .21 | 0 | 1 |
| UNSC MEMBER | 68188 | .45 | .50 | 0 | 1 |
| MILITARY EXPENDITURES (\$, logged) | 67185 | 14.73 | 2.06 | 9.21 | 20.02 |
| GDP (per capita, logged) | 67937 | 41.79 | 16.57 | 15.00 | 98.00 |
| MALE | 68092 | .48 | .50 | 0 | 1 |
| POSTMATERIALISM | 64699 | 1.78 | .63 | 1 | 3 |
| UN CONFIDENCE | 59421 | 1.47 | .91 | 0 | 3 |
| INCOME | 61438 | 4.65 | 2.28 | 1 | 10 |
| POPULATION (logged) | 64957 | 17.30 | 1.59 | 13.61 | 20.98 |

A second test of particularism focuses on fears of being outvoted and politically marginalized in an empowered UN system. Similar to Koenig-Archibugi's measure of "policy conformity" (2004: 143), UNGA LIKE-MINDEDNESS is generated from roll-call data for the UN General Assembly provided by Voeten and Merdzanovic². The measure is constructed by gathering

² Erik Voeten and Adis Merdzanovic, "United Nations General Assembly Voting Data," <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/12379>
UNF:3:Hpf6qOkDdzvXF9m66yLTg== V1.

information for every vote that took place over the last ten years before the WVS was conducted. The variable UNGA LIKE-MINDEDNESS equals the mean percentage of states that voted in accordance with the respondent's country in this 10-year span.

Third, to account for interests that derive from institutionalized power asymmetries in the UN decision-making system, I use the variable UNSC PERMANENT MEMBER that indicates a permanent seat and veto power on the UN Security Council (0/1). Similarly, UNSC MEMBER refers to countries that served as elected Council members in the 10-year period leading up to the survey. Fourth, to account for more diffuse beliefs on the distribution of power at global level, I use data on the absolute amounts of national MILITARY EXPENDITURES as provided by the Correlates of War (COW) and countries' GDP PER CAPITA as provided by the World Bank.

To control for variances in overall confidence in the UN, I introduce the variable UN CONFIDENCE, which is based on respondents' answers about the extent to which they feel confident in the UN. Additional controls include survey information provided by the original WVS data set on income (INCOME, 9-point scale), postmaterialism (POSTMATERIALISM, 4-item version), gender (MALE), age (AGE) and the absolute size of the population (POPULATION) as provided by the World Bank.

4 ANALYSIS

The hierarchical structure of the data suggests that the analysis would best be served by applying multilevel statistics. Individual respondents are embedded in different sociopolitical contexts. The theories outlined above suggest that factors at both levels—individual and country-level—may be important for the formation of citizens' attitudes towards UN authority. I therefore start with a set of two-level logistic regression models that allow us to test the explanatory power of individual and country-level variables for respondents' AWARENESS OF UN AUTHORITY (table 2). A country-specific random intercept is included, to account for the unobserved heterogeneity among respondents of the same country. This random intercept can be thought of as the combined effect of context-specific covariates omitted from the analysis, which can cause some respondents to show more awareness of UN authority than others (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2004: 247).³ Note that some of the context variables are missing or constant for many countries, with insufficient overlap to allow for joint testing of hypotheses accordingly (see table A.1 in the appendix for details on countries included in the various models).

³ For all models presented in table 2 the likelihood-ratio test for testing the assumption that the intraclass correlation (ρ) is zero suggests that the inclusion of a random intercept is appropriate.

Table 2: Multilevel Logistic Regression Analysis of Respondents' Awareness of UN authority

| Dependent Variable: Model: | Awareness of UN authority (0/1) | | | |
|---|---------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.4 |
| <i>Cognitive Mobilization</i> | | | | |
| POLITICAL INTEREST | 0.37*** (0.02) | 0.37*** (0.02) | 0.33*** (0.03) | 0.37*** (0.05) |
| COMMUNICATION | 0.74*** (0.04) | 0.71*** (0.04) | 0.88*** (0.06) | 0.89*** (0.08) |
| EDUCATION | 0.17*** (0.01) | 0.16*** (0.01) | 0.17*** (0.01) | 0.15*** (0.02) |
| <i>Public Cues</i> | | | | |
| UN FLOWS (\$ per 100 inhab.) | | 3.35* (1.67) | | |
| UN MISSION (N staff per 1000 inh't) | | 15.9* (0.77) | | |
| UN HEADLINES | | | 0.34* (0.15) | |
| PARTY INTERNATIONALISM | | | | 0.36*** (0.11) |
| <i>Controls</i> | | | | |
| AGE | -0.01*** (0.00) | -0.01*** (0.00) | -0.01*** (0.00) | -0.01** (0.00) |
| MALE | 0.37*** (0.04) | 0.37*** (0.05) | 0.38*** (0.06) | 0.65*** (0.08) |
| INCOME | 0.11*** (0.01) | 0.10*** (0.01) | 0.07*** (0.01) | 0.10*** (0.02) |
| GDP (per capita, logged) | | 0.28* (0.14) | -0.02 (0.25) | -0.22 (0.14) |
| POPULATION (logged) | | -0.12 (0.13) | -0.57* (0.29) | -0.06 (0.14) |
| CONSTANT | 2.18*** (0.21) | 0.80 (2.95) | 10.40* (4.92) | 3.30 (2.30) |
| S.D. OF RANDOM INTERCEPT (σ_v) | 1.18 | 1.01 | 1.25 | 0.61 |
| INTRAClass CORRELATION (ρ) | 0.30 | 0.24 | 0.32 | 0.10 |
| LOG LIKELIHOOD | -8558.69 | -8143.89 | -5084.64 | -2849.19 |
| WALD χ^2 | 1742.48** * | 1626.48** * | 1144.25** * | 636.34*** |
| BIC | 17206.35 | 16430.86 | 10294.10 | 5818.48 |
| AIC | 17134.63 | 16315.02 | 10194.53 | 5722.37 |
| N RESPONDENTS | 57822 | 54761 | 29673 | 22231 |
| N COUNTRIES | 44 | 41 | 20 | 19 |

Note: Multilevel logistic regression with random intercept. Standard errors are given in parenthesis. See appendix for countries included in the respective models. # p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Turning to specific estimates, the results are largely consistent with expectations and suggest the *cognitive mobilization* approach has significant explanatory power (H1.1). Estimated coefficients for the variables POLITICAL INTEREST, POLITICAL COMMUNICATION and EDUCATION are all positive and highly significant. To expand on the interpretation I turn directly to predicted probabilities in table 3. Using estimates of models 2.2 to 2.4, the predicted probabilities are simulated for minimum and maximum values of key variables, assuming the random intercept to be zero and holding all other variables at their mean values. Predictions indicate that the probability of finding respondents aware of the UN authority issue (as measured by a willingness to answer the respective survey questions) is about .03 higher for the most politically interested respondents compared to those least interested. A similarly moderate increase of about .04 is estimated if one compares those with no formal education to respondents with a university degree. In line with theories that stress the role of political communication in cognitive mobilization, the respective difference between respondents is about .14 if one compares those who frequently use a wider range of communication channels—personal discussion, newspapers, books, internet etc.—with those who do not. Taken together, these individual-level variables can account for a more substantial change in probability of about .33 according to these estimates. The results for individual attentiveness to political discourse therefore strongly suggest that cognitive mobilization is an important source of citizens' awareness of UN authority (H1.1a).

As argued above, AWARENESS OF UN AUTHORITY is also expected to vary with the degree to which citizens are publicly exposed to information signaling the political relevance of the UN. Regarding such contextual factors, results again strongly support expectations (H1.1b). Estimated coefficients in table 2 suggest a significant and positive effect for UN FLOWS, UN MISSION, PARTY INTERNATIONALISM, UN HEADLINES—all variables used to measure the public density of such cues available to citizens in their respective political environments. Predicted probabilities for respondents from countries that had not recently hosted a UN mission is about .04 lower compared to respondents from Cyprus, for example, with about 1300 peacekeepers in that country (equal to .16 peacekeeper per capita, the sample maximum for the variable UN MISSION). Similarly, probabilities differ by almost .04 between respondents of a country receiving no UN aid compared to those from Rwanda (with a value of .65 US dollars per capita, the sample maximum for UN FLOWS).

Both media and manifesto salience are also significantly related to AWARENESS OF UN AUTHORITY, although substantive impact varies. Regarding PARTY MANIFESTO INTERNATIONALISM, that is, the degree to which political parties refer to international issues in their party programs, the estimated differences in predicted probabilities between minimum and maximum values of “internationalism” is again moderate (.05); but the estimated increase

in probability over different degrees of media salience (UN HEADLINES) is about .11, that is, more than twice as large.

Table 3: Impact of change in independent variables on the predicted probability of awareness

| | Predicted Probability of Awareness (0-100) | | Difference (min to max) |
|---|--|----------------|----------------------------|
| | ... at minimum | ... at maximum | |
| ... POLITICAL INTEREST | .94 | .98 | +03 |
| ... POLITICAL COMMUNICATION | .85 | .99 | +14 |
| ... EDUCATION | .94 | .98 | +04 |
| ... UN FLOWS | .95 | .99 | +04 |
| ... UN MISSION | .96 | .98 | +04 |
| ... PARTY INTERNATIONALISM | .95 | .99 | +05 |
| ... UN HEADLINES | .88 | .99 | +11 |
| Joint impact of changes in... | | | |
| ... INTEREST & COMMUNICATION & EDUCATION | .67 | 1.00 | +33 |
| ... INTEREST & COMMUNICATION & EDUCATION & UN FLOWS & UN MISSIONS* | .61 | 1.00 | +40 |
| ... INTEREST & COMMUNICATION & EDUCATION & PARTY INTERNATIONALISM | .63 | 1.00 | +37 |
| ... INTEREST & COMMUNICATION & EDUCATION & UN HEADLINES | .38 | 1.00 | +62 |

Note: Estimated initial differences in predicted probability, assuming the random intercept to be zero and holding all other variables at their mean. Estimates are based on models presented in table 2.

* Estimated for Rwandan respondents, with UN MISSIONS=.068 and UN FLOWS= .652 the most extreme combination of values of these variables in the sample.

Taken together, contextual variables add substantially to the explanatory power of the various models (table 3). When conditions are most conducive to finding unawareness—if we take citizens who are politically disinterested, have little or no formal education, do not regularly communicate about politics, and also live in a society where the UN makes almost no headlines like the Ukraine (with UN headlines in less than .50 percent of all coded headlines)—then the predicted probability of finding aware citizens drops from 1.00 to .38 percent. In sum, these findings yield substantive support for H1.1, according to which citizens are most likely to be aware of UN authority the more politically attentive and publicly exposed they are to discourse suggesting that the UN is a politically relevant institution.

Turning to the question of why citizens support the idea of UN authority, I use multilevel ordered logistic regression with a random intercept to test competing explanations. I ran a series of (single-level) Heckman selection models before for testing whether results are biased by a non-random selection of observations. However, the estimated rho coefficients of these

Table 4: Multilevel Ordered Logit Regression Analysis of Preferences for UN authority (1)

| Dependent Variable: Model: | N of issue areas for which respondents prefer UN authority (0-5) | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 4.6 |
| <i>Cognitive Mobilization</i> | | | | | | |
| POLITICAL INTEREST | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.02 (0.02) | 0.04# (0.02) | -0.00 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.03) |
| POLITICAL COMMUNICATION | 0.10** (0.03) | 0.09* (0.04) | 0.01 (0.05) | 0.08* (0.03) | 0.02 (0.06) | 0.07 (0.05) |
| EDUCATION | 0.06*** (0.01) | 0.06*** (0.01) | 0.05*** (0.01) | 0.05*** (0.01) | 0.06** (0.02) | 0.05*** (0.01) |
| <i>Public Cues</i> | | | | | | |
| UN HEADLINES | | 0.08# (0.05) | | | | |
| PARTY INTERNATIONALISM | | | 0.15*** (0.03) | | | |
| <i>Cosmopolitanism</i> | | | | | | |
| GLOBAL PROBLEMS | | | | 0.12*** (0.03) | 0.14*** (0.04) | 0.15*** (0.04) |
| MORE AID | | | | | 0.10* (0.04) | |
| MILLENNIUM GOALS | | | | | | 0.11** (0.03) |
| STATE-CONFIDENCE | | | | -0.18*** (0.03) | -0.14* (0.07) | -0.21** (0.07) |
| <i>Controls</i> | | | | | | |
| MALE | 0.12*** (0.02) | 0.11*** (0.03) | 0.12*** (0.03) | 0.13*** (0.02) | 0.12** (0.04) | 0.12*** (0.03) |
| AGE | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00* (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| POSTMATERIALISM | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.03 (0.03) | 0.11*** (0.03) | 0.00 (0.02) | 0.06# (0.03) | 0.01 (0.04) |
| UN CONFIDENCE | 0.14*** (0.03) | 0.13*** (0.02) | 0.24*** (0.04) | 0.19*** (0.03) | 0.33*** (0.07) | 0.18*** (0.04) |
| <i>Constants</i> | | | | | | |
| CUT1 | -0.95*** (0.12) | -0.39# (0.21) | -0.23 (0.17) | -0.91*** (0.13) | -0.30# (0.18) | -1.12*** (0.17) |
| CUT2 | -0.01 (0.13) | 0.56* (0.23) | 0.79*** (0.19) | 0.03 (0.13) | 0.62*** (0.19) | -0.16 (0.16) |
| CUT3 | 1.03*** (0.14) | 1.58*** (0.25) | 1.78*** (0.22) | 1.08*** (0.14) | 1.64*** (0.23) | 0.92*** (0.16) |
| CUT4 | 2.08*** (0.16) | 2.58*** (0.28) | 2.81*** (0.25) | 2.15*** (0.16) | 2.68*** (0.26) | 2.03*** (0.17) |
| CUT5 | 3.03*** (0.19) | 3.49*** (0.34) | 3.74*** (0.31) | 3.10*** (0.19) | 3.65*** (0.33) | 2.93*** (0.22) |
| S.D. OF RANDOM INTERCEPT | 0.61 | 0.66 | 0.54 | 0.60 | 0.72 | 0.62 |
| INTRAClass CORRELATION (ρ) | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.12 | 0.09 |
| BIC | 179536.91 | 96133.02 | 74094.47 | 176843.52 | 44249.71 | 59578.45 |
| AIC | 179421.47 | 96017.34 | 73982.59 | 176710.51 | 44159.76 | 59453.72 |
| LOG LIKELIHOOD | -89697.73 | -47994.67 | -36977.30 | -88340.25 | -22067.88 | -29710.86 |
| N Respondents | 53116 | 28644 | 21678 | 52439 | 13301 | 17956 |
| N Countries | 46 | 24 | 20 | 46 | 12 | 19 |

Note: Multilevel Ordered Logit (Random intercept proportional odds model). Robust standard errors clustered over countries are given in parenthesis. See appendix for countries included in the respective models. # p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

models are all insignificant.⁴ While I argue for theorizing a two-step process of public opinion formation vis-à-vis UN authority, results suggest that these steps can be empirically modeled as two independent stages of such a process.

Table 5: *The Impact of change in independent variables on the predicted probability of preferring UN authority for more than two (of five) issue areas*

| | Predicted probabilities | | Difference (min to max) |
|---|-------------------------|----------------|----------------------------|
| | ... at minimum | ... at maximum | |
| <i>Cognitive mobilization and public discourse</i> | | | |
| ... POLITICAL COMMUNICATION | .36 | .43 | +08 |
| ... EDUCATION | .36 | .45 | +09 |
| ... UN HEADLINES | .33 | .46 | +13 |
| ... PARTY INTERNATIONALISM | .32 | .54 | +22 |
| Joint impact of changes in... | | | |
| ... COMMUNICATION & EDUCATION | .31 | .48 | +17 |
| ... COMMUNICATION & EDUCATION & HEADLINES | .24 | .54 | +31 |
| ... COMMUNICATION & EDUCATION & PARTY INTERNATALISM | .28 | .59 | +31 |
| <i>Cosmopolitanism</i> | | | |
| ... GLOBAL PROBLEMS | .31 | .42 | +12 |
| ... MILLENNIUM GOALS | .36 | .46 | +10 |
| ... MORE AID | .41 | .52 | +10 |
| ... STATE CONFIDENCE | .49 | .33 | -16 |
| Joint impact of changes in... | | | |
| ... PROBLEMS & STATE NONCONFIDENCE* | .24 | .51 | +26 |
| ... PROBLEMS & STATE NONCONFIDENCE* & MORE AID | .26 | .60 | +35 |
| ... PROBLEMS & STATE NONCONFIDENCE* & MILLENNIUM GOALS | .19 | .59 | +40 |

Note: Estimated first differences in predicted probabilities assuming the random intercept to be zero and holding all other variables at their mean. Estimates are based on models presented in table 4.

* In line with H2.3 probabilities in the “at minimum” (“at maximum”) cell are estimated combining the maximum (minimum) of CONFIDENCE IN STATE with other variables at their minimum (maximum).

As outlined above, the dependent variable in the respective models presented in tables 4 and 6 is PREFERENCE FOR UN AUTHORITY counting the number of issue areas for which respondents

⁴ Since my dependent variable in the second stage is assumed to be ordinal, a standard Heckman model is presumably inconsistent and biased per se. I therefore recoded the variable PREFERENCES FOR UN AUTHORITY to a set of dummy variables (indicating a preference for UN authority in at least one, two, three, or four issue areas respectively) and employed a number of a modified Heckman selection models with a probit estimator in both stages. I could not find any evidence that the presented results are significantly biased.

chose the UN as the preferred locus of political decision making (as opposed to their national governments or regional institutions).

Starting with estimates for the *cognitive mobilization and public salience* variables—including POLITICAL INTEREST, POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, and EDUCATION—the results are mixed (tables 4 and 5). As expected, EDUCATION is positively and significantly related to PREFERENCE FOR UN AUTHORITY (H1.3a) in all models, which suggests that education indeed increases the likelihood of citizens' support for UN authority. However, estimates for the other two variables commonly held to measure aspects of cognitive mobilization are less robust. Coefficients for POLITICAL INTEREST switch signs and are not statistically significant in five of six models in table 4. Estimated coefficients for POLITICAL COMMUNICATION are consistently positive but also vary substantially in size and significance across alternative specifications. Overall, the results for theoretically related variables on the public salience of the UN in the media (UN HEADLINES) and party manifestos (PARTY INTERNATIONALISM) are, again, in line with expectations (H1.3b).

To further interpret the results I turn to simulated changes in the predicted probabilities, now of preferring UN authority for more than two (of five) issue areas (table 5). According to the estimates in model 4.6, we see that the simulated probabilities increase substantially by about .17 over respondents who show extreme values both in POLITICAL COMMUNICATION and EDUCATION (while keeping all other variables at their mean values). If we include the extreme values for the public discourse variables UN HEADLINES and PARTY INTERNATIONALISM in the calculations, then we find even more substantial change in the simulated probability—about .31. That is, if we simulate the joint impact of cognitive mobilization and political discourse variables the probability that respondents prefer UN authority (for more than two issue areas) more than doubles from .28 to .59.

If public discourse makes such a significant imprint on individual attitudes, what kind of meaning is given to the UN to make the idea of global authority more or less appealing to citizens? We lack detailed information about UN related public discourse on a global scale, but WVS data provides us with information about individual attitudes that allows us to test alternative narratives found in the literature.

Regarding *cosmopolitanism*, the results consistently suggest that cosmopolitan attitudes all play a significant and substantial role in explaining citizens' preferences. Respondents support the idea of UN authority more strongly the more important they think global environmental problems are (table 4). Changes in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS alone causes a shift in expected probabilities (that respondents prefer UN authority for more than two issue areas) of about .12 (table 6). This is in line with my first “cosmopolitan” hypothesis, according to which citizens support the idea of UN authority the more global (i.e. driven by global functional interdependence) they perceive the salient political problems to be (H2.1). The relevance

Table 6: Multilevel Ordered Logit Regression Analysis of Preferences for UN authority (2)

| Dependent Variable: Model: | N of issue areas for which respondents prefer UN authority (0-5) | | | | |
|---------------------------------|--|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | 6.1 | 6.2 | 6.3 | 6.4 | 6.5 |
| <i>Particularism</i> | | | | | |
| UN FLOWS (\$ PER 100 INH'S) | -0.73*** (0.13) | | | | 1.70*** (0.16) |
| UN MISSION (SIZE AS %INH'S) | -0.31*** (0.04) | | | | -0.18*** (0.05) |
| UNGA LIKE-MINDEDNESS | | 0.01*** (0.00) | | | 0.04*** (0.00) |
| UNSC PERMANENT MEMBER | | | -0.05 (0.03) | | 0.41*** (0.09) |
| UNSC MEMBER | | | 0.14*** (0.04) | | 0.08# (0.05) |
| MILITARY EXPENDITURES (\$, LOG) | | | | 0.03 (0.06) | 0.10*** (0.01) |
| DEVELOPMENT (GDP P.C.) | | | | 0.03 (0.09) | 0.20*** (0.02) |
| <i>Controls</i> | | | | | |
| POLITICAL INTEREST | -0.00 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) |
| COMMUNICATION | 0.08* (0.03) | 0.07* (0.03) | 0.07* (0.03) | 0.08* (0.03) | 0.06# (0.03) |
| POLITICAL EDUCATION | 0.05*** (0.01) | 0.05*** (0.01) | 0.05*** (0.01) | 0.05*** (0.01) | 0.06*** (0.01) |
| MALE | 0.13*** (0.02) | 0.13*** (0.02) | 0.13*** (0.02) | 0.13*** (0.02) | 0.14*** (0.02) |
| AGE | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| POSTMATERIALISM | 0.00 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.03) |
| UN CONFIDENCE | 0.18*** (0.03) | 0.19*** (0.03) | 0.19*** (0.03) | 0.19*** (0.03) | 0.19*** (0.03) |
| STATE CONFIDENCE | -0.18*** (0.03) | -0.18*** (0.03) | -0.18*** (0.03) | -0.18*** (0.03) | -0.20*** (0.03) |
| GLOBAL ENVIRON'L PROBLEMS | 0.12*** (0.03) | 0.12*** (0.03) | 0.12*** (0.03) | 0.12*** (0.03) | 0.13*** (0.03) |
| <i>Constants</i> | | | | | |
| CUT1 | -0.98*** (0.12) | -0.00 (0.18) | -0.68*** (0.09) | -0.28 (0.64) | 4.65*** (0.30) |
| CUT2 | -0.04 (0.12) | 0.93*** (0.20) | 0.26** (0.10) | 0.66 (0.65) | 5.58*** (0.31) |
| CUT3 | 1.02*** (0.14) | 1.99*** (0.22) | 1.31*** (0.11) | 1.72** (0.65) | 6.64*** (0.34) |
| CUT4 | 2.08*** (0.15) | 3.05*** (0.24) | 2.37*** (0.13) | 2.78*** (0.65) | 7.72*** (0.37) |
| CUT5 | 3.03*** (0.19) | 4.01*** (0.27) | 3.33*** (0.16) | 3.73*** (0.66) | 8.67*** (0.40) |
| S.D. OF RANDOM INTERCEPT | 0.61 | 0.52 | 0.32 | 0.61 | 0.52 |
| INTRACLASS CORRELATION (ρ) | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.09 | 0.07 |
| BIC | 167041.92 | 166634.34 | 176976.14 | 167041.55 | 160859.28 |
| AIC | 166892.12 | 166493.38 | 176825.39 | 166891.75 | 160666.22 |
| LOG LIKELIHOOD | -83429.06 | -83230.69 | -88395.69 | -83428.87 | -80311.11 |
| N Respondents | 49607.00 | 49518.00 | 52439.00 | 49607.00 | 47818.00 |
| N Countries | 43 | 44 | 46 | 43 | 42 |

Note: Multilevel Ordered Logit (Random intercept proportional odds model). Robust standard errors clustered over countries are given in parenthesis. See appendix for countries included in the respective models. # p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

of a cosmopolitan morality can be read from the estimates as well (H2.2). The more the respondents adhere to a cosmopolitan ethic and want their political leaders to address global inequalities (MILLENNIUM GOALS) the more they want the UN to be in charge. The same holds for the estimated effects of preferred levels of foreign aid (MORE AID). The more that the respondents want the share of their respected national incomes that goes for foreign aid to be increased, the more we observe that they prefer UN authority. Comparing respondents with minimal and maximal values for one of these two variables, results in a change in the simulated probability of finding strong preference for UN authority of about .10 (table 6).

Finally, a lack of confidence in national political institutions such as governments, parliaments, and courts as measured by STATE CONFIDENCE significantly increases the likelihood that we will observe preference for UN authority. This matches the third cosmopolitan hypothesis according to which citizens support the idea of global authority more, the less capable they perceive their own nation state to be in solving salient global political problems (H2.3). To evaluate the overall explanatory power of cosmopolitanism regarding the formation of supportive attitudes towards UN authority, predicted probabilities show changes of .26, .35, and .40 for different combinations of extreme values in cosmopolitanism variables. This is strong support for my expectation that the cosmopolitan narrative is an important ideological context underlying public support for UN authority worldwide.

These results are consistent but do not rule out the possibility that a substantial share (or lack) of public support for UN authority is due to *particularism*. To test for this, however, means that we have to fall back on contextual information because we lack individual level data on respective attitudes or perceptions. Moreover, important variables are strongly correlated to each other (see table 8 in the appendix). While the full model presented in table 6 (model 6.5) shows some signs of multicollinearity (variance inflation factor of 3.47), results of partial models (6.1-6.4) warn us that omitting some of these variables from the equation leads to strongly biased results.

Given this significant handicap, there is nevertheless substantial empirical evidence that particularism might explain a great deal with respect to citizens' support for UN authority. In line with expectations (H3.1), results for UN FLOWS suggest that financial aid administered by UN agencies significantly increases the mean level of support for UN authority in a given society, at least when controlling, for example, for DEVELOPMENT (“full” model 6.6). Estimates for change in predicted probability is, again, substantial (+.24).

Even if the financial benefits from UN membership seem to work in the expected direction, estimates also suggest a reversed—albeit moderate—effect for UN Peacekeeping (UN MISSION). The more UN peacekeepers per thousand inhabitants a country has had to host, the less one finds support for UN authority within its citizenry. The predicted probability of having a preference for UN authority in more than two (of five) issue areas only moderately

increases by .07, if one compares the sample maximum case, Cyprus (1.59 peacekeeper per thousand inhabitants), with countries that hosted no UN mission over 10-year period preceding the survey. What one may read from these estimates is presumably that UN peacekeeping is more often perceived as a cost than a benefit. This reflects an unexpected, but no less particularist, way of reasoning about UN authority.

In the case of estimates for UNGA LIKE-MINDEDNESS, results match expectations according to which citizens would tend to support the idea of UN authority the more they perceive that their own governments have successfully pushed for their positions in the UN General Assembly (H3.2). That is, the likelihood that we would find citizens more supportive of UN authority is significantly higher in states that have been less frequently outvoted than others in UN roll calls. The simulated effect of LIKE-MINDEDNESS is impressive, suggesting an increase in the probability of a strong preference for UN authority of about .44.

The last set of particularism variables is designed to test whether *power asymmetries* in global politics can explain the variance in how citizens think about UN authority (H3.3). Regarding a seat on and veto power in the UN Security Council as measured by the dummy variables UNSC MEMBER and UNSC PERMANENT MEMBER, estimates are not stable over different specifications of the models. However, if we assume the full model 6.5 to adequately control for important alternative factors (and model 6.3 to be severely biased because it omits them), we do find strong empirical support that *institutional power asymmetries* in the UN system itself motivate citizens to favor UN authority.

Table 7: The impact of change from a particularist view, on the predicted probability of preferring UN authority for more than two (of five) issue areas

| | Predicted probabilities of preferring UN authority for more than two (of five) issue areas | | |
|---|--|----------------|-------------------------|
| | ... at minimum | ... at maximum | Difference (min to max) |
| ... UN FLOWS | .52 | .76 | +.24 |
| ... UN MISSION | .55 | .49 | -.07 |
| ... LIKE-MINDEDNESS OF UNGA | .21 | .65 | +.44 |
| ... DEVELOPMENT (GDP p.c.) | .40 | .68 | +.28 |
| ... MILITARY EXPENDITURES (logged) | .42 | .67 | +.26 |
| ... UNSC PERMANENT MEMBER (0/1) | .55 | .64 | +.09 |
| * Joint impact of changes in “power” variables | | | |
| DEVELOP’T & MIL’Y EXPENDIT’S & UNSC PERM’T MEMBER | .35 | .83 | +.49 |

Note: Estimated initial differences in predicted probability assuming the random intercept to be zero and holding all other variables at their mean. Estimates are based on models presented in table 6.

*Estimated for values in Burkina Faso and the US, the most extreme combination of values in the sample.

Similarly, the estimates for DEVELOPMENT and MILITARY EXPENDITURES suggest a much broader mechanism to be at work here that links citizens' perceptions of whether they belong to the powerful or the weak in global politics to their attitudes for or against UN authority. The effects of both variables are estimated to be positive and statistically significant. That is, citizens seem to support the idea of UN authority the more they perceive power asymmetries in global politics to be in their country's favor, be it in terms of belonging to the highly developed global North or being militarily strong (H3.3). The overall impact of the "power" variables is remarkable (table 7). Simulating the predicted probability for different combinations of extreme values in these variables suggests that the difference between citizens from most powerful and least powerful countries is about .49.

In sum, for particularism, even if the analysis is based only on a contextual measurement, the estimates nevertheless suggest that the impact of non-cosmopolitan motives for (and against) UN authority is substantial and statistically significant. Expectations of direct costs (peacekeeping) and benefits (aid) seem to play a role, as do perceptions of a like-minded policy environment at the UN level and power asymmetries enhanced by UN authority to one's advantage or disadvantage.

5 CONCLUSIONS

According to the proposed two-step approach to public opinion formation on global authority, citizens first become cognitively mobilized to think about the UN as they increasingly develop an interest in political matters in general and as they are cued through education and by the media and political elites to believe in the political relevance of this institution. The analysis of data from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey provided strong evidence for the substantial role of cognitive mobilization and contextual cues for raising citizens' awareness of UN authority. People form measurable attitudes about UN authority and these tend to be more positive the more educated they are, the more they share a broader interest in political matters and communication, and the more they are exposed to information in the media and election platforms that suggest the political relevance of the UN. A further factor influencing attitudes toward UN authority is whether people live in societies that receive UN aid or host UN missions.

The analysis also offered important insights into what kind of reasons lead citizens to become favorable or unfavorable of UN authority in the second step. One way that citizens have been shown to "tick" is largely cosmopolitan in nature. Public support for UN authority is significantly linked to an individual's having a cosmopolitan worldview according to which pressing political problems are of a global scope owing to functional interdependencies and universal normative obligations. The extent to which the citizens perceive themselves as ha-

ving been left vulnerable by the nation state seems to play an important role as well. Thus, a cosmopolitan narrative of why global authority is desirable empirically matches why many citizens come to support UN authority.

From a normative perspective the results have enormous implications. As stressed at the beginning of this article, the creation of political authority beyond the national level is already underway (Philpott, 1999; Cooper et al., 2008). In light of this trend, political cosmopolitanism argues that democratic procedures are needed in order to uphold normative aspirations such as autonomy, non-domination, or consent (Held, 1995; Archibugi, 2004). It is nevertheless reasonable to suppose that democratic procedures alone cannot prevent the growth of an autocratic world order if a global citizenry is not present, who is willing and able to take charge and hold empowered institutions accountable (Falk, 1995; Grant and Keohane, 2005). Thus the idea of democratizing global governance ultimately requires a significant level of global public awareness for global issues. It also needs public consensus on the basic rationale of a cosmopolitan order, including the idea that such salient global problems need authoritative global institutions to be properly addressed. The empirical results of this study call into question the stereotype of a seemingly elitist cosmopolitan project that lacks a real-world constituency to make a cosmopolitan democracy legitimate at all (Calhoun, 1995). The results in fact provide some initial evidence that a cosmopolitanism order has already got a supportive constituency, as regards some of its basic underlying principles, and this is a compelling standard for calling a political order “socially legitimate” (Beetham, 1991). Assuming that the process of globalization and cognitive mobilization continues, the results suggest that increasing awareness of global interdependencies may even lead to further growth among those societal groups that expect global authority to more effectively manage global problems, thus placing calls for a cosmopolitan democracy on sounder footing for the future.

This study has also showed how particularism explains important parts of citizens’ attitudes towards UN authority. Particular interests have substantial explanatory power if we consider the direct benefits accruing or costs incurring from UN actions, or if take into account the degree to which the UN General Assembly constitutes a like-minded body in a shared policy environment. Beyond that, global power asymmetries are also consistently linked to citizens’ attitudes towards UN authority. Citizens of powerful nations—in terms of institutional privilege, economic development, and military might—view UN authority much more favorably than those of weaker countries. Thus there is ample evidence of a particularist logic behind at least some part of public support for and rejection of UN authority. This aspect must also be taken into account to guarantee a more balanced view of the social legitimacy of current global order.

The results are normatively significant because they match a more critical perspective on power-based global governance. According to this view, the institutional design of global

governance more often than not reflects “the ability of great powers to establish international institutions and arrangements to further or preserve their interests and positions of advantage into the future, even as they do not directly or fully control those future arrangements” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 58; Krasner, 1991). Following this line of reasoning, citizens are indeed well advised to mistrust acts of delegation or pooling of authority on the international level—all the more so if they perceive themselves to be marginalized in current global politics. That people do indeed respond in this way should serve as a warning to current apologists of global order that social legitimacy is already in short supply. It should inform global governance architects that any attempt to simply “upload” authority to existing institutions is likely to lead to further politicization of global institutional arrangements, if matters of institutional inequality and skewed distribution of power are not convincingly addressed. After all, global institutions would soon become even more “dangerous places” (Moynihan, 1976) the more they begin to look like new centers of global authority.

This said, the empirical findings are deficient in a number of ways and therefore point to some important directions for future research. Studies will have to clarify the extent to which elite cues work as a mechanism behind measured correlations between contextual factors as mentioned above. Future research should also focus on a more comprehensive set of institutions—preferably including a variety of local, national, and regional organizations—evaluated by citizens for their problem-solving capability and set in the context of citizens’ perceptions of currently pressing societal problems as well as their particular interests in policy outcomes.

Finally, public preferences for or against global authority are presumably related to different legitimacy criteria and varying perceptions of the degree to which current global institutions actually meet these criteria. Growing awareness of and expectations from global authority do not preclude existing institutions like the WTO, IMF, or UNHCR from becoming the objects of widespread criticism because of their lack of transparency, inclusiveness or accountability. On the contrary, growing beliefs in the effectiveness of internationalized governance will probably lead to a significant increase in citizens’ expectations of prudent policy on the output side as well as a democratic control on the input side (Scharpf, 1997; Machida, 2009; Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2011; Zürn et al., 2012). In some cases it has already done so. Hence, future research should help us to understand the degree to which the emergence of new centers of political gravity on the global level spawns a desire for control by those affected, and sets the stage for a far more comprehensive theory of public legitimacy of global institutions.

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APPENDIX

Table 8: Bivariate Correlations between contextual variables (N=44, listwise deletion)

| | UN FLOWS | UN MISSION | UNGA LIKE-MINDED'S | UNSC PERM'T MEMB'R (VETO) | UNSC MEMBER | DEVELOPMENT (GDP P.C.) |
|-----------------------------|----------|------------|--------------------|---------------------------|-------------|------------------------|
| UN MISSION | .14 | | | | | |
| UNGA LIKE-MINDEDNESS | .10 | -.08 | | | | |
| UNSC PERMAN'T MEMBER (VETO) | -.10 | -.06 | -.38* | | | |
| UNSC MEMBER | -.24 | -.24 | -.25 | .23 | | |
| DEVELOPMENT (GDP P.C.) | -.63*** | .003 | -.53*** | .10 | .34* | |
| MILITARY EXPENDITURES | -.63*** | -.25 | -.39** | .43** | .38* | .55*** |

p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Table 9: Countries included in the analysis

| | Table 4 (awareness models) | | | | | | Table 6 (preference models) | | | | |
|-----------------|----------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 6.1 | 6.2 | 6.3 | 6.4 | 6.5 |
| Andorra | X | | | X | X | X | | X | X | | |
| Argentina | X | X | | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Australia | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Brazil | X | X | | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Bulgaria | X | X | X | X | | | | X | X | | |
| Burkina Faso | X | | | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Canada | X | | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Chile | X | | | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| China | X | X | | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Cyprus | X | | | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Egypt | X | X | | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Ethiopia | X | | | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Finland | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Georgia | X | X | X | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Germany | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X | |
| Ghana | X | X | | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| India | X | X | | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Indonesia | X | X | | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Iran | X | X | | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Italy | X | | X | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Japan | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Jordan | X | X | | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Mali | X | | | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Mexico | X | X | X | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Moldova | X | | X | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Morocco | X | | | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Norway | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Poland | X | X | X | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Romania | X | X | X | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Rwanda | X | | | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Serbia | X | X | | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Slovenia | X | X | X | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| South Africa | X | | | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| South Korea | X | X | | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Spain | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Sweden | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Switzerland | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Taiwan | X | X | | X | | | | | X | | |
| Thailand | X | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Trinidad-Tobago | X | | | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Turkey | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Ukraine | X | X | X | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| United States | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Uruguay | X | | | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Vietnam | X | | | X | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Zambia | X | | | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| N countries | 46 | 24 | 20 | 46 | 12 | 19 | 43 | 44 | 46 | 43 | 42 |

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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