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The Power of the State by S.G. Gorshkov

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that in this area "no force pushes strongly for maintaining independence of the spouses' economic interests."¹⁴ It is also true that for millions of people what matters is pension rights and claims against the state, not succession rights.

In the final chapter¹⁵ Professor Glendon sets the developments she has described in a broad historical context. After the verve of the preceding chapters I found the historical part of the final chapter rather slow, but that probably says more about my preferences than about the chapter's merits. The book picks up speed again at the end when Professor Glendon sums up her arguments and reaches some general conclusions. The main one is that "the present period of change can only be seen as a downward curve of *de-juridification* and *deregulation*, a return to forms of social control other than legal rules concerning the formation, dissolution and organization of married life."¹⁶ (emphasis in original). I find this thesis totally convincing. It does not mean, of course, as Professor Glendon makes clear, that the state is keeping clear of intervention within the family circle. Indeed the reverse could be said to be the case. Precisely because the state no longer erects a wall around the legal family circle it is more willing than ever before to step inside it to protect *individuals* from abuse, exploitation and deprivation.

It is impossible within the confines of a review to do justice to the richness of this book. It must be read by anyone interested in family law. For me, its significance is that it establishes a new advanced base for consideration of the subject. There is plenty of work still to be done in the foothills but, at the conceptual level, where do we go from here? Perhaps toward a general theory of the law on human groups.

14. GLENDON, *supra* note 2, at 288.

15. *Id.* ch. 7.

16. *Id.* at 321.

JAMES CARLISLE REGAN*

THE SEA POWER OF THE STATE. BY S. G. GORSHKOV. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979, 284 pp. cloth.

Recent events in Iran and Afghanistan have reawakened American concerns over the real and threatened diminutions of our national security which result from conflict in an area remote from our shores. Our Navy has recently disclaimed its ability to guarantee the nation's security in the Atlantic Ocean,¹ while more distant waters have become the center of our strategic focus.² Our

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1. See Middleton, *Navy Sees Limit on Ability in Atlantic War*, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1980, at 6, col. 4.

2. *E.g.*, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1980, at 1, col. 2 (United States forces being dispatched to Arabian Sea); N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1980, at 1, col. 6 (possibility of new United States bases on the Indian Ocean).

attention is frequently directed to the maneuvers of the Soviet Navy which appear to span the globe.³ As we scrutinize the capacity of our resources to reach and apply force in the Persian Gulf, we cannot neglect the abilities of our rival. These are circumstances which make the comments of this internationally recognized naval authority worthy of careful scrutiny.

From a unique perspective, Admiral Gorshkov presents a comprehensive and historically conscious treatment of several interrelated economic and political concerns which is reminiscent of the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan on an abridged scale.⁴ Although the detail and polemics which one expects to find are present,⁵ they do not detract materially from the value that this study possesses for those sharing any of the author's several interests. Here the veteran Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy unveils his view of the world situation. While it is not a body of astounding revelations, it is all that one would expect from its author and more. Gorshkov has made this book intellectually satisfying for those not versed in Naval Science.

Gorshkov's success as a naval officer and manager⁶ is partially due to his appreciation for the fundamental elements of state interest. In his scheme, military goals are a component of political objectives. The Fleet, coordinate in the military sphere with the Army, is an element of communications and a deterrent force⁷ which is best able to serve the state's interests away from its territorial boundaries.⁸ It is a link of equal dignity within a comprehensive system of state resources. This conception, not unusual in itself, includes a peculiarly Soviet way of viewing economic and military interests as unified. He has been a practitioner of the classic 'grand strategy' of moving on the 'World Ocean' in order to enhance the prestige, power, and prosperity of the Soviet State.⁹ He does not perceive these actions as directly hostile to other

3. *See, e.g.*, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1979, at 18, col. 2 (Soviet guided missile cruiser in Sea of Japan); N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1979, at 11, col. 1 (Soviet warships denied request to visit the Philippines); N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1979, at 6, col. 2 (Soviet warships by-pass Cuba and head into the Atlantic). *See also* N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1979, at 4, col. 3 (Soviets stage mock attack on American ships in the Black Sea).

4. *E.g.*, A. MAHAN, THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER ON HISTORY, 1660-1783 (1890); A. MAHAN, THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE, 1793-1812 (1898).

5. *E.g.*, A. GORSHKOV, THE SEA POWER OF THE STATE 250-52 (1979) [hereinafter cited as GORSHKOV].

6. Gorshkov was in command of the Black Sea Fleet by the end of the Second World War. Since 1956 he has been Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Fleet and a Deputy Minister of Defense of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In 1962 and again in 1967 he received promotions in his formal Naval rank. He is also a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. *See* EUROPA PUBLICATIONS LTD., THE INTERNATIONAL WHO'S WHO 621 (42d ed. 1978-79). *See also* B. LEWITYZKYJ & J. STROYNOWSKI, WHO'S WHO IN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 189 (1978); THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE U.S.S.R., PROMINENT PERSONALITIES IN THE U.S.S.R. 194 (1968).

7. GORSHKOV, *supra* note 5, at 178.

8. *Id.* at xii.

9. For a general view on the concept of state interests, *see, e.g.*, L. HENKIN, HOW NATIONS

states, nor is his tone threatening, but it is apparent that the valued deterrent capability of his naval arsenal is derived in part from its offensive potential. More than once he refers to America escaping from the horrors of the last two World Wars due to the ocean's shield,¹⁰ but since exposed because the oceans have become its weakest defensive link.¹¹

The book is designed to serve the author's several purposes in a concise and occasionally subtle way. The Kremlin's budgetary decision-makers are undoubtedly impressed. The book is intended to impress British and American Naval Officers as well. This is clear from the Foreword to the English language edition.¹² Here the Admiral mixes protestation of peaceful Soviet intentions with his praise for the Anglo-American maritime tradition, criticism of 'Imperialism', and recollections of the Alliance in the last war. Ultimately, however, the message to the West is of the inevitable success of the Soviet State in the attainment of its objectives.

Gorshkov never precisely articulates the objectives of the Soviet State. He is careful to give assurances that the objectives are reasonable and in accord with the destiny of his nation. The Admiral's reading of history tends to focus ominously on certain strategic points and the "Black Sea Straits" is mentioned on more than one occasion.¹³ A general point on which he is more explicit, however, is that his nation possess a major, legitimate role on the seas. He thus vehemently rebuts Western and "treasonous Czarist propaganda" which, he complains, has wrongly portrayed Russia as a land-oriented state. He unabashedly compares the length of the Soviet coast to the coastline of the traditional maritime states in support of this position.¹⁴

His underlying strategic thesis begins with the proposition that the Western nations cause world tensions by working to frustrate the destiny of his country. This he attributes in part to the nature of the Western political economies, *i. e.*, 'imperialistic'. This proposition he views as inseparable to another of more specific interest to him. The Western nations are essentially 'maritime powers', each having achieved its position of influence in the world as a result of having achieved strength at sea.¹⁵ Superiority of political economy is equated with superiority at sea. In one of his few directly Marxist allusions, he relates the story of the Anglo-Dutch rivalry of the seventeenth century to support this proposition. The ascendancy of English sea power over Dutch sea

BEHAVE (2d ed. 1979). With regard to Soviet behavior in competing for world influence, *see, e.g.*, C. HOLBRAAD, SUPERPOWERS AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT (1979).

10. *E.g.*, GORSHKOV, *supra* note 5, at 60.

11. *Id.* at 61. *See generally* P. NITZE, L. SULLIVAN & THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL WORKING GROUP ON SECURING THE SEAS, SECURING THE SEAS (1979); J. NATHAN & J. OLIVER, THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES NAVAL POWER (1979).

12. Here he refers to the 'Big Three' of the Second World War and praises the British and Americans for their 'valiant struggle . . . waged in distant seas'. GORSHKOV, *supra* note 5, at vii.

13. *E.g.*, *id.* at 76, 248.

14. *Id.* at 67-69.

15. *Id.* at 59-60.

power corresponds with the subordination of mercantile to industrial capital in the Marxian view.¹⁶ On this point the Admiral seems to feel he cannot improve on Marx.

He never attempts to prove a Marxist thesis even though there are other references to Marx. This suggests that such allusions may merely be prudence on his part. Instead he proficiently demonstrates the significance of maritime prowess to national security and development through conventional historical and strategic argument. His historical consciousness serves him well. He relates Peter the Great's remark that a potentate with a land army "has only one hand, while one with a fleet has two" in a way which gives the metaphor persuasiveness.¹⁷ The judicious inclusion of facts, such as the Fleet's participation in thirty-one of thirty-three wars¹⁸ in the two hundred years prior to the First World War, is convincing argument for the proposition that the maritime element had long been significant for the Russian State.

This depth of historical understanding is impressive. It seems to be a useful element in his arsenal of talents. It serves as a reminder that we ought not allow the lessons of history to escape the attention of our military leadership.¹⁹

While Gorshkov covers a prodigious amount of material well, he is at times redundant and tedious. His attention to recent history, which strains to extol the Soviet Fleet's role in the Second World War and to denigrate the successes of the Allied fleet, is one example. The book's general value also suffers where he is given to excessive detail to naval operations. Such weaknesses, however, are not critical and may be viewed as professional indulgences.

In the first of the book's four parts the author ably expresses his view that economic and military interests are condign elements of concern to the rationally managed state. In this respect, his attention is on the commercial aspects of the 'World Ocean', and he employs the rhetoric of world peace.²⁰ His second and longest part is almost entirely devoted to maritime history. Anyone with an interest in history should have no difficulty appreciating this section, which is his best. Conversely, the third part, which is a concentration of post-war Naval history, comes close at times to deserving the characterization of Cold War polemics.²¹ This is his least effective effort, but the narrative still provides a degree of insight which is sufficient to hold the reader's interest. Finally, he devotes a section to the current state of naval art which aims at a more limited audience. Several of his major conclusions, such as the con-

16. *Id.* at 63.

17. *Id.* at xi.

18. *Id.* at 69.

19. Our service academics have been neglecting the study of history. This development has recently been noted and criticized. Record, *The Fortunes of War*, HARPER'S, Apr. 1980, at 19.

20. GORSHKOV, *supra* note 5, at 57.

21. *Id.* at 180-81.

tinued significance of the submarine and the growing importance of hydrofoil technology, have a memorable impact.

Our best analysts will undoubtedly plumb this book for every clue it might yield on the nature of Soviet strategic intentions. They are unlikely to be disappointed by what they find, but, as is usually the case in the intelligence contest, all clues must be taken cautiously. The Admiral's most obvious interests, *e.g.*, the case of the aforementioned Black Sea Straits, may be of no real concern in a prolonged period of more or less peaceful competition. Other more subtle, even subliminal, hints may provide the key to protecting our state interests while the Soviets seek to advance theirs.

In discussing the economic resources of the 'World Ocean', the presence of large coal deposits off the western coast of the United States, along with other commercially significant submarine assets, is specifically mentioned.²² This interest ties in with the arguments he advances concerning the currently evolving Law of the Sea and suggests that an important state interest may be involved. He clearly favors unrestricted access to the sea bed and quotes Grotius to support his position.²³ Thus, Soviet preoccupations with the free passage of straits and distant resources are revealed. They seem destined to conflict with United States interests.²⁴ In contrast, some of Gorshkov's remarks seem to suggest that certain topics are mentioned only for their propaganda value in continuing ideological skirmishes.

Cuba, which one might expect to be a major concern, is not often mentioned. When referred to, it is with the rhetorical name 'Island of Freedom'.²⁵ Perhaps this suggests that the Soviet interest in Cuba is more ideological than practical. Similarly he castigates the Western nations for polluting the seas with radioactive and general industrial wastes.²⁶ While this environmentalist pose is adopted sanctimoniously, it is notable that Soviet whaling activities are not mentioned. By not even raising a defense for this internationally controversial Soviet practice, the Admiral may be suggesting that agreement to police and preserve the ocean's ecological balance may be possible. Other insights and speculations may be derived from this book. These may be particularly valuable in the area of maritime technology. There the Admiral's discourse is comprehensible to laymen but probably more suggestive to those versed in Naval operations.

If Americans heed the admonition to know their rivals, they will welcome the English language edition of *The Sea Power of the State*. We too should learn

22. *Id.* at 7.

23. *Id.* at 49.

24. *Id.* at 52-53. For a view on the fundamental interests of the United States where the Law of the Sea is concerned, see R. ECKERT, *THE ENCLOSURE OF OCEAN RESOURCES* (1979).

25. *E.g.*, GORSHKOV, *supra* note 5, at 237.

26. *E.g.*, *id.* at 26.

from the lessons of history. It may do well to recall the consequences which might have followed from DeGaulle's pre-war reading of a German commander's classic treatise on armored warfare²⁷ if a sufficient number of other French Officers had taken its message seriously.

This is a superb, multi-dimensional book which is nearly as impressive as the career of the man who wrote it. Reading it is not so much a venture into a somber subject as it is a rational exercise. Certainly it will be appreciated by our Naval professionals. Laymen who give it their attention will find it rewarding as well.

27. H. GUDERIAN, *ACHTUNG! PANZER!* (1938).