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Are Europeans Really from Venus? A Comparative Study of War-making and State-Making in the US and EU.

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Are Europeans Really from Venus?

A Comparative Study of War-making and State-Making in the US and EU

by

Michael David Shea

Under the Direction of Dr. Jelena Subotic

ABSTRACT

With regard to making war, the European Union (EU) is either characterized as being “from Venus” or as having made the transition from “garrison state” to “civilian state.” Drawing on the work from Charles Tilly, this thesis will show that neither characterization provides an accurate depiction of European behavior where the use of coercive force is concerned. To best understand the behavior of the EU it is necessary to conceive of it as a certain kind of state, and to highlight the ways in which peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions serve the same purposes as classical war-making. This thesis will use the examples of interventions in the former Yugoslavia and Iraq as case studies.

INDEX WORDS: European Union, United States, War, Sovereignty, Legitimacy.

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Michael David Shea

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts in Political Science

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2013

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1 INTRODUCTION

“For the field of battle is the place of life and death and war the road to survival and ruin.” – Sun Tzu

“War is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.” - Carl von Clausewitz

“Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.”¹ Robert Kagan wrote this now (in)famous sentence in 2002 in an essay for the Hoover Institutions *Policy Review* in which he argued that Europeans were transitioning into a “post-historical paradise” beyond their historical preoccupation with war and hard power.² This transition, Kagan wrote, had its roots in the same philosophical vein as the 1960’s *Otopolitik* which turned away from militarism in light of the tragedy wrought by two World Wars which raged across the European continent, consuming empires in their conflagrations. As the United States (US) grew stronger in the capacity to wage war during and after the Cold War, developing into what the French foreign minister would go on to call a hyperpower, political differences between Europe and the United States grew.³ In international affairs, the states of the European Union (EU) developed what some termed “the strategy of the weak,” attempting to constrain American power abroad without exerting more power themselves.⁴ Kagan’s piece is often criticized as being a sort of neo-conservative apologetics for the cowboy diplomacy of Bush-era unilateralism, but Kagan was not the only person to articulate an understanding of the difference in the way Americans and Europeans perceive and use military power. And even if much of the ideology behind Kagan’s Project for the New

¹ Kagan 2002.

² Ibid.

³ Safire 2003.

⁴ Kagan 2002.

American Century has been disproven by the debacle that was the illegal invasion of Iraq, it remains true that up until now the EU has been either unwilling or unable to challenge American military hegemony.

The cartoonist Pat Oliphant penned an image after the 2006 World Cup in which he commented on the differences in the American and European psyches where force and power were concerned. In a move reminiscent on George Carlin's "Baseball vs. Football," Oliphant contrasts perceptions of European soccer and American football (Figure 1). The European soccer players are depicted as slim, effete and feminized as they prance gleefully across the grassy field clutching their man-purses. The American footballers, conversely, are portrayed as dumb, hulking brutes stoically hacking each other to bits in a medieval pile-on of carnage and mayhem. While the cartoon is certainly more a comment on how Americans and Europeans perceive each other rather than on the reality behind these perceptions, it helps to remember that the differences between the US and the EU in the capacity to wage war and the willingness to use it were and are very real. But, is the EU a product of a new kind of thinking brought about in response to the grotesque bellicosity of a Westphalian/realist international system, or is this an inaccurate understanding of its nature?




Figure 1.1: In the Wake of the World Cup by Pat Oliphant.

Is it correct to assume that Europeans have given up their preoccupation with force altogether – that they really are from Venus? Consider that Europe still accounts for a full 20% of the World’s military spending and that the states that make up the EU spend about the same percentage of their GDPs on the military as does China, India, Pakistan or South Korea – states not normally thought of as having given up their claims to use force.⁵ France and the United Kingdom (UK) still possess nuclear weapons while Belgium, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and Turkey maintain nuclear weapons sharing agreements through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).⁶ It cannot be denied that the EU is a product of a new kind of politics on the European continent – one that views with a mix of shame and dread its imperial past. But if the EU is also an experiment in social, political and economic integration, what kind of entity is the EU? And more importantly, how can we expect the EU to behave in the realm of international affairs in light of this understanding? These are the question that must be answered if one is to make any meaningful comparison between the United States and the EU.

1.1 Literature Review

James Sheehan writes that the European idea as embodied in the EU is one born of a commitment to abandon the obsession with antagonism and hard power characterized by its warlike past and instead focus on the economic, social and cultural needs of its citizens. In this transition from “garrison state” to “civilian state” the military aspirations of European states were subordinated to diplomats who valued compromise over violence.⁷ This phenomenon could be witnessed in everything from the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 to the transformative power of the appeal of freedom and prosperity that finally vanquished the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe. Dissidents in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary transformed their societies not with bombs and guns but by “living within the truth” and refusing to accept the moral emptiness of the repressive regimes that

⁵ CIA World Factbook 2013

⁶ Harrell 2010

⁷ Sheehan 2008

sought to deny them their basic rights and freedoms.⁸ The fall of the Iron Curtain thus should be seen as a triumph of Kantian liberal peace that even Gorbachev was forced to acknowledge when he declared in 1988 that "force and the threat of force . . . should not be instruments of foreign policy."⁹ For Western Europeans in particular, the end of empire freed their states to focus on more prosperous and liberal societies and as these societies transformed, so too did their expectations of the manner in which the state was to behave in the realm of international affairs. Indeed, the largest demonstration in European history was held to protest war and the protest across the continent were marked by their conspicuous lack of violence and the degree to which the crowds were filled with ordinary families rather than masked anarchists.¹⁰

The shift in policy preferences among Europeans necessitated the death of an institution which had long been used to glorify not only the state but also violence as well – the conscript army. Conscript armies had fought in both World Wars, but as integration across the continent continued through the second half of the twentieth century, Europeans began to demand their governments focus on different priorities like universal health care and education.¹¹ Belgium ended its draft in 1992, The Netherlands ended their in 1993 and France ended its draft in 1996.¹² Indeed, the only EU states which currently enforce conscription are Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Greece and Norway.¹³ The US also ended its conscription in 1973 but this was not the result of a philosophical shift in priorities along European lines but rather because Americans expect the hard power obligations of foreign policy to be carried out by “a relatively small portion of the population, whose sacrifices are honored but not shared by the larger so-

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., 194

¹⁰ Sheehan 2008

¹¹ Sheehan 2011

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Deutsche Welle 2008. German conscription ended in 2011 after both Sheehan’s article and the Deutsche Welle piece were written.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/world/europe/01germany.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

ciety.”¹⁴ In this sense, Sheehan argues that the US is also a kind of civilian state, albeit one with extensive military obligations and different expectations where the use of coercive force are concerned.¹⁵

However, unlike the US, the EU will never be a superpower because of a lack of willingness on the part of Europeans to support increased spending, the lack of effective decision making institutions capable of organizing a unified and coherent security policy and the fact that membership in the EU is conceived of in terms of rights and privileges rather than in terms of obligations and commitments.¹⁶

But Sheehan concedes that most Europeans want the EU to be a superpower capable of balancing the power of the US and creating what Samuel Huntington referred to as a truly multipolar world.¹⁷

As a civilian state thus described by Sheehan (itself a concept introduced by Lasswell in 1937) the EU has relied on the US, through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to provide for its defense. However, member states of the EU have at times expressed a desire to build an independent military capacity, as realized in the creation of the European Battle Groups and the references in treaties to rapid reaction forces and a European security and defense policy.

In 1984 the Western European Union (WEU) was revived for the purposes of creating an independent “European identity in the areas of security and defense.”¹⁸ Taken over by the EU in 1999, the goal is to create a rapid reaction force of 100,000 troops, 400 aircraft and 100 naval vessels with a reserve support of between 120,000 and 200,000 which could be deployed within 60 days for up to one year and which would execute the Petersburg tasks of “humanitarian and rescue missions; peacekeeping duties; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”^{19,20} In 2003, the European Security Strategy (EES) was adopted in December and formed the framework for the Common

¹⁴ Sheehan 2011, 119

¹⁵ Sheehan 2011

¹⁶ Sheehan 2008

¹⁷ Huntington 1999

¹⁸ Barry, Kay and Spero 2001

¹⁹ Ibid., 130

²⁰ Helsinki Headline Goals 2003

Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).²¹ The EES identified five key threat elements the response to which would be within the purview of this European rapid reaction force: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime.²²

This change in a European willingness to embrace a robust defense and security policy was nowhere more dramatic than in London – long the home of the most strident Euroscepticism – in 1998 when Tony Blair embraced the adoption of what would become the EES.²³ Twin European failures in Bosnia and Kosovo were widely recognized as a major impetus for renewed support for militarizing the EU in the UK, France, Germany and other EU states.^{24,25} In fact, in the decade from 1994-2004, European states doubled the number of troops deployed abroad, including those involved in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.^{26,27} However, despite heavy involvement of EU member states' armed forces in UN and NATO peacekeeping missions as well as Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the EU as such remains incapable of deploying a military force capable of conducting long-term combat operations.²⁸ The paradox is that a majority of Europeans believe that the EU is the proper authority to be invested with the power to make decisions regarding the CSDP.^{29,30} Additionally, even though Europeans have rejected the use of force for imperial gain, the military remains the institution in which they have the highest confidence.³¹ The idea that Europeans are from Venus cannot account for these paradoxes. Indeed, elites and political leaders in the EU have come to realize that should a 9/11-type attack occur on European soil, the EU would be unable to respond militarily without heavy US support and this dependency on the arbitrary power of a foreign entity is perhaps as great a threat to continued EU security as terrorism, organized crime or a resurgent Russia.³²

²¹ Haine 2003 and Europa.eu

²² ESS 2003

²³ Gordon 2000

²⁴ Gordon 2000

²⁵ Giegerich and Wallace 2003

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Golino 2002

²⁸ Cirovski and Pistor 2010

²⁹ European Commission 2004

³⁰ European Commission 2008

³¹ European Commission 2000

³² Morgan 2005.

The explanation for the drive for a rapid reaction force and a coherent CSDP is better understood if it becomes possible to more accurately characterize the EU itself. Charles Tilly famously remarked that wars make states and states make war.³³ This relationship between war-making and state-making is mutually reinforcing as political elites seek to concentrate capitalizing and/or coercive powers within a central authority. Tilly relies on a Weberian conception of the state, that being a “coercion wielding organization that [is] distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise[s] clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories”³⁴ The reason why war and preparation for war are important for state formation is because it involves elites “extracting the means of war from others” who are reluctant to give up their resources without either being compelled or compensated (or both).³⁵ As states change overtime, they pass through four phases of extraction:

1. Patrimonialism: the feudal/tribal era;
2. Brokerage: the era of the mercenary;
3. Nationalization: the era of mass armies; and,
4. Specialization: the era of specialization and division of labor.³⁶

Tilly also divides states up into one of three categories, each of which calibrates the balance coercive and capitalizing power differently:

1. Coercion-intensive states: elites compel, through coercion, their population into providing the means to make war;
2. Capital-intensive states: elites bargain with others to provide the means to make war – also called systems of fragmented sovereignty; and
3. Capitalized-coercion states: elites interact with holders of capital in a way which mutually reinforces the authority of each – coercive power is concentrated in the state but the state answers to the desires of the holders of capital.

Tilly argues that over time, the states adopting the capitalized-coercion mode came to dominate European affairs, with a few notable exceptions like the Dutch Republic. States which did so are called na-

³³ Tilly 1990

³⁴ Tilly 1990, 1

³⁵ Tilly 1990

³⁶ Ibid.

tional states, or states which Tilly defines as, “states governing multiple contiguous regions and their cities by means of centralized, differentiated and autonomous structures.”³⁷

National states, like France and Spain, grew to dominate continental Europe because they were able to adopt forms of warfare that temporarily crushed all rivals on the continent and then replicated these forms of government abroad in the form of colonial empires.³⁸ In yet another paradox of European political reality, the dominance of the national state through war actually led to the civilianization of European states because the building up of large military apparatuses requires large bureaucracies staffed by civilians who then act as agents of the states to bargain with elites to obtain capital and resources for effective war-making while participants in the war effort acquired claims on the state and the waging of wars led to an increase in debt which encouraged state intervention in national economies.³⁹ Thus, as national states continued to excel in the waging of war, their populations, bearing the burden of the war effort, saw an increase in political capital which gave them power to demand services of the state while elites used their power as holders of capital to impose limitations on state power or even advance an agenda through the coercive power of the state. To put this another way, the waging of war leads to the creation of national states and the civilianization of government and politics for the following reasons:

1. The effort required to build and sustain military forces requires the creation of bureaucracies staffed by civilians which later come to constrain the military;
2. Bureaucrats acting on behalf of the state bargain with civilian groups that hold the resources necessary for war-making, which gives these groups enforceable claims on the state;
3. Expansion of state capacity during wartime becomes permanent, leading to the expansion of the power of the bureaucracy;
4. Participants in the war effort acquire claims on the state which are deferred during wartime but which are renewed following war; and,

³⁷ Tilly 1990, 2-3

³⁸ Tilly 1990

³⁹ Ibid.

5. Debt incurred during war leads to creation of new bureaucracies created to service the debt, which then act as agents of the state capable of intervening in national economies.⁴⁰

Parkinson's Law tells us that the work of the state expands so as to fill the time available for its completion.⁴¹ State-making is an ongoing process. If war is the engine that drives the state, then legitimacy is the gasoline that fuels the engine. The most commonly accepted definition of legitimacy is one that prioritizes the consent of the governed. However, Tilly defines legitimacy as the "probability that other authorities will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority."⁴² If the authority in question has a monopoly on the use of force, the elites, as other authorities, will generally act to confirm the decisions of the state out of fear of retaliation but also in order to maintain an environment of stability which will preserve the power and privilege built up by elites. Thus, external war-making on the part of the state serves internal state-making purposes because the legitimacy of the actions taken by the state are confirmed domestically by powerful elites whose positions are then enhanced by the state, either through internal coercive means or by the granting of ever greater influence in the decision making process (what public policy scholars might call a form of agency capture).⁴³ But legitimacy can also be conferred internationally as well by other states or by international institutions like the UN or international courts.

If the EU, then, can be treated as a state according Tilly's typology and it is possible to discern the type balance currently struck along capitalizing-coercive continuum, then it becomes much more possible to compare it to other states, like the US, and draw conclusions based on that comparison. The objection could be raised that comparing the EU and the US are like comparing apples and oranges as the EU is far too heterogeneous and decentralized in nature to ever be a state. The response to this crit-

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Tilly 1985

⁴³ Tilly 1985

icism is that the states that make up the EU are not themselves heterogeneous and yet they have functioned for centuries, waging wars, forming coalitions and winning and losing empires more effectively than any proper nation-state:

Within Europe itself, perhaps twentieth-century Portugal, Albania, Greece, Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark all approached the mark [of nation-state] at one moment or another - and even in those countries such regions as Lapland and Macedonia introduce significant heterogeneity. Despite much myth-making to the contrary, such large states as France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Spain all hosted visibly, vigorously heterogeneous peoples.⁴⁴

As for being decentralized, Tilly's conception of a state does not require the degree of centralization seen in modern national states. Indeed, the Dutch Republic remained a state of fragmented sovereignty in the brokerage phase during its entire golden age and managed to create the Dutch East India Company which ran a trading empire which encompassed the whole of the Indonesian Archipelago and held additional trading ports across coastal India and Sub-Saharan Africa. This it did while renting its armies and navies and striking bargains with formally independent elites in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and other commercial cities.⁴⁵ Additionally, and as well be detailed below, the US began its post-colonial history as a non-homogeneous, capital-intensive state in the brokerage stage of extraction.

1.2 Expected Results

If Tilly's claim that wars make states and states make wars is correct, then a careful comparison of the war-making activities of the US and the EU will yield new insight into the character of the EU as a state and an understanding as why the EU functions as it does and to the possible future of European integration. His Excellency Joao Vale De Almeida, Ambassador and Head of Delegation of the European Union to the United States, remarked that Europe today is a community united around ideas like peace, tolerance, democracy and human rights; but that in twenty years' time or so, perhaps defense will be-

⁴⁴ Tilly 1994, 137

⁴⁵ Tilly 1990

come the “new frontier of European integration” as individual member states will no longer be able to afford to compete military powers like China and the US.⁴⁶ There is perhaps no one in a better position to make this assertion than Ambassador De Almeida. If he is indeed correct and it is possible that the headline goals of the ESS will someday be realized, then a more thorough understanding of the EU as a state should yield some understanding as to the shape and character of that frontier. Tilly’s theory suggests that the relationship between war-making and state-making dictates how states function, and if the behavior of the EU in war conforms to expectations of a capital intensive state in the brokerage phase of extraction then one possible explanation for the current structure and functioning of the EU will have been provided.

2 EXPERIMENT

The central theory to be tested here is that wars make states and states make war. War is a means of “attacking rivals outside the territory already claimed by the state.”⁴⁷ States engage in war to achieve compliance in order to gain some advantage deemed valuable, be it security, money, goods, access to resources or to establish “buffer zones” against perceived threats.⁴⁸ The typology of the state, the phase of extraction and the character of the rival all determine the type of warfare that will be employed. The external interests of the state’s dominant classes also obviously determine whether or not and how the state chooses to engage in war-making.^{49,50} If states are defined as coercion wielding organizations, then for the purposes of this thesis war is the means by which the state uses its military power to coerce other actors, usually states, into compliance for some end. The states tested theoretically will be the EU and the US. If the theory is correct, the EU should prove to be a capital-intensive state in the brokerage

⁴⁶ World Affairs Council of Atlanta 2013

⁴⁷ Tilly 1990

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Tilly 1985

⁵⁰ Tilly 1990

phase of extraction while the US should prove to be a capitalized-coercion state in the specialization phase of extraction.

The academic value of this thesis will be that Tilly's central theory, including his typology of states and phases of extraction theories, has yet to be applied to compare manners of war-making of the EU and the US. Furthermore, while Tilly's work concerned itself mainly with the kinds of warfare that dominated the last millennia on the European continent, this thesis will attempt to update the theory by including peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions in the operationalization of war-making. In so doing, a better understanding of the nature of the EU should be achieved as well as insight into possible future scenarios concerning European integration and the fate of the EU. Finally, if the theory can be supported, then the ground will have been laid for future work on war-making engaged in by other states like India, China or Russia and for an expansion of the theory to address the relationship of war-making and identity creation, which Tilly was also concerned with in other works not cited here.

2.1 Research Design

This thesis will employ a most-similar systems design using case studies to determine the relationship between the dependent variable, state-making, and the dependent variable, war-making. Tilly's central hypothesis, that wars make states, will be examined through case-studies of war-making operations engaged in by the EU and the US, and the hypothesis will either be supported or rejected. Tilly's conclusion, that national states are most successful because they are better at making war, will be examined to the degree that this conclusion may provide some insight as to the future of European integration. To avoid the problems inherent in comparing cases across time, war-making operations from 1992-2012 only will be considered. The cases selected will be war-making operations undertaken in the following theaters:

1. The Former Yugoslavia (1993-2004)
 2. Afghanistan, and by extension Pakistan (2001-2012*)
- *Operations in Afghanistan remain ongoing as of the writing of this thesis.*

The cases selected above have been included because both the EU and the US undertook war-making operations in each against the same rivals but differed in the means by which they made war. If the theoretical framework governing war-making decisions laid out by Tilly is correct, then the type of coercive measures applied should match up with the typology and extractive phase of each state.

The EU, as a capital intensive state in the brokerage phase of extraction, should exhibit a fragmented and decentralized decision-making process with a great deal of control exerted at the sub-state level while military force should be rented or purchased in some way and war-making should be undertaken only under the limitations imposed by elites acting independently of state control. The US, as a capitalized-coercive state in the specialization phase of extraction, should exhibit a highly centralized decision-making process with a great deal of control exerted at the state level while military force should be specialized and nationalized and war-making should be undertaken where the interest of the elites are in concert with the interest of the state.

In subsequent sections of this thesis, the reader will note that an interview with an EU official is referenced on several occasions. This interview was arranged through His Excellency Joao Vale De Almeida, Ambassador and Head of Delegation of the European Union to the United States after the World Affairs Council Luncheon which took place on June 27th. The interview was conducted by phone on August 3rd with a specialist in EU defense and security policy who spoke on condition of anonymity. A copy of the questions asked during this interview is included in the appendix (Appendix B).

2.1.1 A defense of the EU-US comparison

For the purposes of this thesis, the EU will be treated as a state. Article One of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of the State says that, "The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) gov-

ernment; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”⁵¹ The EU maintains a monopoly on coercive means through the application of the Lisbon Treaty, which amended the Treaty on European Union, by stipulating that member states shall commit to providing military and civilian assets necessary to the operational capacity of the EU with regard to the CSDP and CFSP while adding the caveat that war-making operations shall be entered into on condition of unanimity.⁵²⁵³ So, while members of the EU maintain separate defense forces and private armies which can act independently of the EU, none can claim to take war-making action on behalf of the whole nor can any one member bring to bear the coercive force of the EU for its own ends or engage in war-making for interests contrary to or in conflict with the interests of the EU. Furthermore, no member may take undertake war against another member.⁵⁴ Indeed, security and defense has been rendered a community competency by treaty; however, all decision making with regards to the use of joint European forces requires unanimity within the European Council – a fact which perhaps explains why the headline goals have never been met and why European battle groups have never been deployed.⁵⁵

However, the EU started as the ECSC in 1951, which was nothing more than an economic alliance designed to prevent rather than enable war. As integration across Europe widened and deepened, members formed the European Economic Community (EEC) which was designed as an international organization to facilitate trade and create a common market.⁵⁶ At this point what would become the EU still had no means of extracting the means for coercive war – it was not until the signing of the Treaty on European Union in Maastricht that a unifying (albeit loosely) political framework was created and NATO was established as the primary provider of defense for the continent, thus making the EU a capital-

⁵¹ Yale 2008

⁵² Treaty on European Union 1992

⁵³ Treaty of Lisbon 2007

⁵⁴ Treaty on European Union 1992

⁵⁵ Shea 2013

⁵⁶ Treaty of Rome 1957

intensive state in the brokerage phase of extraction.⁵⁷ For these reasons, the EU qualifies as a capital-intensive state for the purposes of this thesis. NATO will be treated as the coercive force utilized by the EU because the EU lacks a unified military force of its own while 21 member states as of 2012 shared membership in NATO (28 states) and the EU (27 states). Furthermore, the NATO-EU Declaration on European Security and Defense Policy as ratified in 2002 and affirmed (and reaffirmed) by treaty.

With regard to the appropriateness of comparing the EU with the US, the US was once also a capital-intensive state with fragmented sovereignty. Parallels between this European state-making and the American state-making immediately come to mind. When Americans revolted in 1775 they were far from a unified national state, to inject Tilly's terminology, but rather a collection of disunited states which had temporarily set aside their individual sovereign interests and sectional alliances in order to fight a common enemy in Great Britain.⁵⁸ The former colonies would hardly have qualified as a national state even after gaining independence since, far from unifying Americans, the Revolutionary War amplified or accentuated already existing differences and rivalries between the newly independent states.⁵⁹ The US, like the EU's forerunners the ECSC and the EEC, began as an "experiment of international cooperation" intended to stave off war between the sovereign parties involved and protect them from encroaching external threats.⁶⁰

As pointed out by Tocqueville, the Constitution that resulted from the cooperation between the plenipotentiaries of the sovereign states in 1787 was alone inadequate to forge anything resembling a national state among Americans previously subjected to British rule.⁶¹ The American response to Shays' Rebellion where reminiscent of those coercive and capitalistic responses of early Western European states as they moved from patrimonialism to specialization, however, the state-making process begun at

⁵⁷ Treaty on European Union 1992

⁵⁸ Hendrickson 2003


⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 257

⁶¹ Murrin 1987

the Constitutional Convention in the aftermath of Shays' Rebellion would not begin to enter its specialization phase until after the conclusion of the Civil War and the US would not emerge as a capitalized-coercive or national-state until after.⁶²⁶³

Indeed, it was the US' drive towards expansion after the Civil War, culminating in the imperialistic phase of US foreign relations, that finally marked the transition of the US into that of a national state, when the interests of the decision-making dominant classes were expressed as much in terms of "the redemption of the world" and the "repression of barbarism" as in the securing of new ports, strategic resources, or protection against European rivals.⁶⁴ Therefore, as the US, like the EU, is a heterogeneous state (as shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2) that has moved through the various phases of extraction and through the various stages of Tilly's typology, the comparison is appropriate.



Source: <https://figures.boundless.com/4ff32b9c246b709a9cd78fc2/raw/census-2000-data-top-us-ancestries-by-county.svg>

Figure 2.1: Heterogeneity of the US (Language and Ethnicity in the US)

⁶² Parker 1991

⁶³ Moore 1966

⁶⁴ Hendrickson 2009, 266-269



Source: <http://www.eurominority.eu/version/maps/map-native-people-europe.asp>

Figure 2.2: Heterogeneity of the EU (Language Groups in Europe

2.1.2 A defense of peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions as war-making

In examining the cases previously listed, EU peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions will be compared with US military operations and humanitarian interventions. This thesis argues that peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions are comparable to war-making within the theoretical framework previously outlined since they serve the same purposes as war, namely in either coercing an outside rival to acquiesce to the will of the state making war or in satisfying the strategic needs of the state, and because they involve a level of military deployment that reinforces the state-making mechanisms outlined in Tilly's theoretical approach.

NATO's involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo are both expressed in terms of providing security, an end desired by dominant classes within the EU for the very simple reason that a destabilized Balkan region threatens the security of surrounding EU member states and can serve as a hub for Islamic terrorists and

inspiration for global jihadist. Indeed, the architect of the Dayton Accords was quoted in 2005 as saying that the Bosnian mujahedeen were linked to al Qaeda in Afghanistan and that a destabilized Balkan region would serve as a recruiting ground for terrorists while also destabilizing southern Europe.⁶⁵ Indeed, failure on the part of western powers to respond to the genocide in Bosnia in a timely manner led to an influx of Muslims from North Africa and Arab states in the Middle East who went to Bosnia to fight against the Serbs.⁶⁶ Many of these mujahedeen would later use the skills and battle-experience they learned in Bosnia against Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Even the United Nations (UN) has come to characterize peacekeeping in terms of force – making war to create the peace. To quote the Brahimi Report, “Furthermore, as the United Nations has bitterly and repeatedly discovered over the last decade, no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in particular, is to succeed.”⁶⁷ Within the framework of this thesis peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions are war-making operations carried out to further the interests of the state taking action, as defined by the dominant class or elites and the operations undertaken will vary depending on the character of the rival, namely whatever group or entity is targeted by the military arm of said operation.

2.2 Case Selection

For each case, this thesis will examine:

1. What coercive means were employed by the state;
2. How these means were legitimated either from within or outside the state; and
3. How war-making facilitated state-making in each state.

This thesis will not concern itself with evaluating the effectiveness of the action for the purposes of proving or disproving the hypothesis. The effectiveness of each war-making action will be considered when drawing conclusions as to the future of the EU as a state in the previously referenced typology only insofar as they advanced the state-making capacities of the state in question.

⁶⁵ PBS 2005

⁶⁶ ICTY 2006

⁶⁷ United Nations 2000

3 RESULTS

3.1 Military Operations

3.1.1 Former Yugoslavia

All peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions in the former Yugoslavia, until 2004, were carried out under the auspices of NATO. Securing external legitimacy, from global powers and/or international institutions allowed NATO to maintain a monopoly on the use of force in the Balkans, an important accomplishment which allowed operations in some cases to last for years.

Table 3.1 US and EU Operations in Former Yugoslavia

NATO (EU/US)					
Theater of Operations	Mission	Year(s)	Forces Contributed	Rival	Result
Bosnia Herzegovina	Operation Deliberate Force	1995	400 aircraft and 5000 military personnel	Republika Srpska	Seige of Sarejevo Lifted, Dayton Agreement reached
Kosovo	Operation Allied Force	1998-1999	1031 aircraft	FR Yugoslavia	Independence for Kosovo (after UN governance under UNSCR 1244)
Macedonia	Operation Essential Harvest	2001	4800 military personnel	Albanian NLA	Ceasefire and disarmament of the NLA

Sources: US Department of Defense (2000); NATO (2002) and Hendrickson (2005)

Operation Deliberate Force was conducted between August 30th and September 14th with the US, UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Turkey all contributing forces to a humanitarian intervention conducted almost entirely by air. Targets included Serbian heavy weapons installations involved in the siege of Sarajevo and command and control structures of the Serb supported Republika Srpska. In just over two weeks, NATO forces flew 3515 sorties dropping of 1026 bombs at 338 individual targets during the length of the operation (Table 3.1).⁶⁸ Contributing NATO states agreed upon the operational goal of securing a safe-haven for Bosnian Muslims, however US policy in the region was to shift the balance of power in the former Yugoslavia towards Croatia, the most obvious indication of this being that Croatian intervention in the war in Bosnia was never criticized by Washington in the way that Serbian involvement in the war was, even though Croatian forces were also guilty of commit-

⁶⁸ Owen 2001

ting atrocities against the Muslim and Serbian populations in Bosnia.⁶⁹ That NATO forces in this case can be argued as acting as US “mercenaries” brokered as coercive force providers for the European states is supported by an examination of the force breakdown of coercive air power involved in Operation Deliberate Force (Table 3.2).

Here American and European interests, while being different, were not in conflict. Europeans wanted stability in the Balkans and security for Eastern Europe. Americans wanted to bring a balance to the region and “level the playing field” as Richard Holbrooke put it.⁷⁰ The operation was legitimated internationally by UN Security Council Resolutions 816 and 836 which authorized the military action.⁷¹ The action was legitimated by vocal and public support of the dominant political classes in NATO member states, like France’s Jacques Chirac, the UK’s John Major and the US’s Bill Clinton.

Table 3.2: NATO as a Brokered Power in Former Yugoslavia

Operation Deliberate Force: Breakdown of Air Power		
Nation	Total Sorties	Percentage of Total
France	84	3%
Germany	59	2%
Italy	35	1%
Netherlands	198	6%
Spain	12	0%
Turkey	78	2%
UK	326	10%
US	2318	72%
NATO (NAEW)	96	3%
TOTAL*	3206	100%
*Indicates Combat Sorties only		
Sources: Owens, 2000; Owens 2001; Global Security.org		

Operation Allied Force likewise worked to satisfy both the goals of the US and the EU. At the start of the operation, US and NATO leaders said that the action was intended to stop the killing in Ko-

⁶⁹ Owen 2000

⁷⁰ Owen 2000

⁷¹ UNHCR 2013

sovo and compel Milosevic to accept the political settlement negotiated at Rambouillet.⁷² Russia was understandably opposed to the operation because it represented an attack against a traditional ally in Serbia as well as an increase in NATO's coercive power on the continent – having set a precedent for future operations ever closer to Russia's historical sphere of influence.⁷³ However, Russia was politically, economically and militarily unprepared to confront the US and NATO over the issue. Russia did however suspend its ties with NATO in protest over Operation Allied Force.⁷⁴ This time, however, the US pressed its NATO allies to act without UN backing – a move which further alienated Russia and China. That a Serbian dominated former Yugoslavia would present an obstacle to NATO's eastward enlargement (and thus US geopolitical aims in the region) was understood in Moscow and Beijing.⁷⁵ The operation was legitimated internationally when The European Court of Human Rights refused to hear cases brought against NATO for the bombing of the Serbian radio and television station *Radio Televisija Srbije* in Belgrade and other action in which over 500 civilians were killed in attacks on known non-military targets in spite of the fact that groups like Amnesty International labeled the attacks war crimes.⁷⁶⁷⁷ That the operation was dominated again by American military interests is clear when viewing the force breakdown of Operation Allied Force, the US having flown a total of 60% of all strike missions.⁷⁸ Operation Essential Harvest was an instance in which US and EU goals were allied in that neither wanted to see a civil war in Macedonia as this would certainly threaten to reignite violence in the Balkans. The operation was authorized as an extension on the Kosovo Force (KFOR) under UN Security Council Resolution 1244.⁷⁹⁸⁰ The target in this case was the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army, which was closely associated with the Kosovo Liberation Army. The Macedonian government attempted to increase the

⁷² Gallis 1999

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Smith 208

⁷⁵ Perry 2000

⁷⁶ Amnesty International 2000

⁷⁷ Amnesty International 2009

⁷⁸ Peters et al. 2001, Figure 2.1

⁷⁹ BBC 2001

⁸⁰ CNN 2001

intensity of US and British involvement under the guise of a rise in Islamist militancy linked to Al Qaeda in Skopje but these incidents were later dismissed by the US State Department as fabrications.⁸¹

In the above listed cases, NATO serves a dual purpose as an arm of US interest in the region and as “brokered power” for the EU. For the US, NATO operations conform to expectations of a national state’s behavior in the specialization phase of extraction exerting coercive force to achieve specific military ends. In the case of the EU, NATO operations conform to expectations of a capital-intensive state’s behavior in the brokerage phase of extraction of one allows that NATO operations in this theater, predominantly staffed and funded by the US military were undertaken to strengthen NATO and increase its credibility in the realms of humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping and “vindicate US leadership”.⁸²⁸³

The operations served state-making purposes in both the US and the EU, but because in both cases US military forces were the primary means for exercising coercive force, the operations served those purposes in different ways and to different degrees. Public pressure in the US to cut debt, draw down US military involvement abroad and increase government accountability was manipulated by the Republican Party in 1994 to win back control of Congress. As part of their *Contract with America* Republican Congressional leaders proposed the National Security Restoration Act of 1995 (HR 7) which made several demands on the Department of Defense and President Clinton, including that American forces would never be placed under foreign command and would only be deployed where US security interests were at stake.⁸⁴ Anticipating the popularity of the act, which passed the House but failed the Senate, President issued a Presidential Decision Directive 25 which placed certain criteria on deciding whether or not to deploy American military forces in peacekeeping operations, including that the mission must

⁸¹ BBC 2002

⁸² Williams and Devroy 1994

⁸³ Drozdiak 1999

⁸⁴ PBS 1995

have the support of American allies – politically, financially and operationally; advance U.S. interests; result from a threat to international peace and security; and have clear, realistic objectives.⁸⁵⁸⁶

In an attempt to win public support for military operations in the former Yugoslavia, President Clinton and his allies in Congress and the American media began likening the genocide in Bosnia to crimes perpetrated by the Nazis and the deployment of American forces in the war-torn Balkans to the American occupation of Germany following World War II.⁸⁷ Opponents likewise likened American involvement in the former Yugoslavia to the quagmire in Vietnam.⁸⁸ Failing to win a mandate for military action, President Clinton conducted American operations in Bosnia and Kosovo through the use of Executive Orders, rendering the War Powers Resolution a “dead letter” by putting Congress in the position of defunding an ongoing American military operation – never a popular move.⁸⁹ Incidentally, this expansion of American presidential power to make war was later cited as justification for several controversial actions in the War on Terror. Most of the soldiers called up to serve in the Balkans as peacekeepers were reservists and national guardsman – civilian soldiers – and the Department of Defense, in recognition of the new claims these civilians would have for benefits, rendered veterans of operations in Bosnia and Kosovo eligible for healthcare and other benefits under Veterans Administration.⁹⁰⁹¹ Operations within the former Yugoslavia through 2004 cost roughly \$9.566 billion, which was paid for through supplemental appropriations added to the federal budgets for each year of operation and thus adding to the US debt (Table 3.3).

European state-making as a result of the war in the Balkans was very different. The beginning of European involvement in the Balkans came with the London Conference in 1992 which cited UN Security

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ White House 1994

⁸⁷ Michelson 1998

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Yoo 1999, 1674

⁹⁰ Department of Veterans Affairs 2005

⁹¹ Cornell Law School 2013

Council Resolution 771 and others in calling for international armed intervention in Bosnia – which would later be taken up NATO per UN Security Council Resolution 743, which created the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).⁹²⁹³ At the time, European public opinion supported an intervention by a bare majority but favored the United States or NATO taking the lead role in operations.⁹⁴ As European military capacities in conducting international peacekeeping operations were severely limited, American forces conducted the bulk of operations. Operations in Kosovo were unique in that NATO took unilateral action in defiance of the UN and the US, with the support of major European allies, again conducted the bulk of operations in Kosovo.⁹⁵ At the height of the operations in Kosovo, NATO leaders used the opportunity presented by the 50th annual NATO Summit to launch the foundations of the Berlin Plus Agreement which would allow EU member states to draw on NATO military capabilities during operations.⁹⁶ Additionally, the EU continues to bargain for US support in Kosovo against Russian interests by allowing for UN, NATO, OSCE and EU cooperation in post-conflict reconstruction efforts.⁹⁷

An EU representative who spoke on condition of anonymity confirms that member states of the EU, while from time to time expressing a desire for increased autonomy, are happy continuing to rely on NATO to provide security and defense capabilities for Europe and that defense might, in twenty years' time or so, be an area where members of the European Council might be willing to entertain an alteration to that arrangement.⁹⁸ The Stabilization and Association Agreement was launched in 1999 with the stated goal of preparing the western Balkan states for eventual NATO and EU membership, resulting in Slovenia's membership in NATO in 2004 and Croatia's membership in NATO in 2004 and the EU in

⁹² The Independent 1992

⁹³ United Nations 1996

⁹⁴ Sobel and Shiraev 2003

⁹⁵ Roberts 1999

⁹⁶ NATO 1999

⁹⁷ Dursun-Ozkanca 2009

⁹⁸ Shea 2013

2013.⁹⁹¹⁰⁰ Since operations in the Balkans were taken over EUFOR Althea with NATO support, many joint statements on the need for continued EU-NATO partnership have been issued, referencing the Balkans specifically and reiterating a commitment to “preserve stability and to support the reforms needed to move the region forward on its path to Euro-Atlantic integration.”¹⁰¹ As the US by itself contributes 25% of NATO’s overall budget and as only three other states meet their contribution targets, responsibility for debts incurred for operations in the former Yugoslavia is bourn mainly by the US¹⁰²¹⁰³.

Table 3.3: War-making as State-Making in the Former Yugoslavia

War-making as State-making in Former Yugoslavia		
Civilianizing Step	US State-making	EU State-making
Bureaucracy Creation	National Security Reform Act/Presidential Decision Directive 25	London Conference (Bosnia)/NATO Decision in Kosovo
Bargaining	Attempts by elites to influence public opinion	Public opinion favors US/NATO involvement; UN, NATO, OSCE and EU cooperation for rebuilding Kosovo
Bureaucratic Expansion	Expansion of war powers through Executive Order	Stabilization and Association Agreement/50th NATO Summit
Claims Honored	Title 38, United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 1710(e)(1)(D) and VHA Directive 2005-20, among others	Joint Statements honoring EU-NATO partnership
Economic Expansion	US DOD \$9.566 Billion (1998-2004)	US single largest contributor

Sources: PBS 1995, White House 1994, Michelson 1998, Yoo 1999, Department of Veterans Affairs 2005, Cornell Law School 2013, Bowman 2003; The Independent 1992, UN 1996, Sobel and Sheraev 2003, Roberts 1999, NATO 1999 and 2013

3.1.2 Afghanistan

US operations in Afghanistan and by extension Pakistan conform precisely with the expectations of the behavior of a national state in the specialization phase of extraction. American military force is brought to bear to achieve specific ends and the size of the operations is consistent with war-making on scale of occupation to achieve those ends (Table 3.4). The stated goals of the US regarding the invasion of Afghanistan were as follows: providing a retaliatory response to the terrorist attacks of September 11,

⁹⁹ NATO 2013

¹⁰⁰ Europa.eu 2013

¹⁰¹ Ibid. 2011

¹⁰² Ek 2012

¹⁰³ Shea 2013

2001 as justified under international law; to remove the Taliban from power; to bring to justice those responsible for planning the 9/11 attacks; and, to establish a democratic regime in the Middle East.¹⁰⁴¹⁰⁵

Operations towards these goals were legitimized internationally by citing Article 51 of the UN Charter, which states that, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”¹⁰⁶ It should be noted however that no specific UN Security Council resolution was ever adopted explicitly authorizing US operations in October of 2001 when the invasion was initially launched and there is debate as to the legality of the war in Afghanistan.

There is also speculation that the invasion of Afghanistan had been planned as far back as 1998 when plans to build the Unocal Pipeline through Afghanistan were halted following a series of attacks carried out against terrorist training camps supported by the Taliban¹⁰⁷. US officials were quoted as having expressed a desire for a pro-Western government in Afghanistan as early as 1998 at a Congressional hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and The Pacific of The Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives:

Mr. BEREUTER. Switching geography slightly, what is the status of proposals by Unocal and others to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan?

Mr. GEE. Perhaps the Unocal witness can give you more detail. I do understand that they do have an agreement with the government of Turkmenistan. They have also been in discussions with the various factions within Afghanistan through which that proposed pipeline would be routed. The U.S. Government's position is that we support multiple pipelines with the exception of the southern pipeline that would transit Iran. The Unocal pipeline is among those pipelines that would receive our support under that policy. I would caution that while we do support the project, the U.S. Government has not at this point recognized any governing regime of the transit country, one of the transit countries, Af-

¹⁰⁴ Washington Post 2001

¹⁰⁵ Creighton 2012

¹⁰⁶ UN Charter 1945

¹⁰⁷ Reeve 1998

ghanistan, through which that pipeline would be routed. But we do support the project.¹⁰⁸

Speculation that 9/11 was merely a pretext for the projection of US coercive power in Afghanistan was further fueled by reports that the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, long-standing enemies of the Taliban, had been supported by the US and Indian militaries during several skirmishes in the Bamyán province against Pakistan-supported Taliban forces.¹⁰⁹ Whether US operations in Afghanistan were motivated by the need to eliminate a threat to security after 9/11 or whether 9/11 was the justification the American public needed to support already conceived battle plans to serve the interests of the holders of capital is of little consequence to this thesis, it is merely pointed out that either possible explanation fits the theoretical model proposed.

Operations in Pakistan, though not normally tied to the US war in Afghanistan, are also linked to either set of competing interests. In the first scenario, targeting militants from Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other jihadist organizations who have sought refuge beyond the theater of operations of Operation Enduring Freedom serves the goals of ensuring that the Taliban do not return to power and to protect the fragile democracy developing in Afghanistan. In the second scenario, targeting militants would continue to erode Pakistani influence in the region thus clearing the way for American capitalists to pursue interests in the region in an updated Great Game for the 21st century.

¹⁰⁸ US 105 Congress 1998

¹⁰⁹ Howenstein and Ganguly 2009

Table 3.4: The Long Reach of the Hyperpower

US Operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan					
Theater of Operations	Mission	Year(s)	Forces Contributed	Rival	Result
Afghanistan	Operation Enduring Freedom	2002	5200	Taliban and Al Qaeda	Combat Ongoing
		2003	10400		
		2004	15200		
		2005	19100		
		2006	20400		
		2007	23700		
		2008	30100		
		2009	50700		
		2010	63500		
		2011	63500		
		2012	63500		
			Average		
Theater of Operations	Mission	Year(s)	Drone Attacks Conducted	Rival	Result
Pakistan	Drone War**	2004	1	"Militants"	2146 "militants" killed; 282 civilians killed; 270 persons of "unknown" status killed; Osama bin Laden killed
		2005	3		
		2006	2		
		2007	4		
		2008	36		
		2009	54		
		2010	122		
		***2011	73		
		2012	48		
			Total		

Sources: Belasco 2009 and New American Foundation 2013

* Combat ongoing

** Pakistan's "Drone War" is considered here to be an extension of operations in Afghanistan

*** The attack on Bin Laden's Compound occurs during this time

Whether or not drone warfare is the most effective way to serve either set of these interests is again not the focus of this thesis. But the actions, albeit of dubious legal character, have been legitimated by a lack of strong UN condemnation in this area – while UN inspectors criticized the US as being the largest perpetrator of targeted killings in the world and faulted the US for failing to take adequate steps to safeguard civilian lives they nevertheless indicated that the attacks might be justified under international law as self-defense.¹¹⁰ Similarly, while the killing of Osama bin Laden on Pakistani soil accomplished the long-standing and publicly stated goal of bringing the mastermind of the 9/11 and US embassy bombings to justice, it violated Pakistan's sovereignty, again in contradiction to international law but was widely supported by European leaders, thus legitimating the action.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ Cloud 2010

¹¹¹ NPR 2011

As before in the former Yugoslavia, EU involvement in Pakistan has been through the UN created International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) (Table 3.5). The goals of the ISAF are “to enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and develop new Afghan security forces to ensure Afghanistan can never again become a safe haven for terrorists.”¹¹² ISAF total strength as of 2012 was 87,207 military personnel¹¹³. Also, similarly to operations in the former Yugoslavia, EU member states represented in NATO do contribute to ISAF forces but nowhere near as substantially as does the US (Table 3.5). ISAF operations in Afghanistan have continued to receive support from the EU. IN 2005, a joint declaration issued by the EU and Afghanistan stated:

The European Union and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan are committed to a secure, stable, free, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan as laid out in the Afghan Constitution adopted on 4 January 2004 [14 Dalwa 1383]. Both parties wish to see Afghanistan play a full and active role in the international community and are committed to building a prosperous future free from the threats of terrorism, extremism and organized crime.¹¹⁴

In an accompanying press release, the Council of the European Union spoke of the continued need to fight international terrorism and narcotics trafficking and to continue disarming militant groups, obviously at least in large part through continued efforts of the ISAF as Afghanistan’s own security forces were not yet adequate to assume sole responsibility for the tasks at the time the declaration was announced. Domestic elites in the EU stood to gain much from fighting terrorism in Afghanistan. Other than the obvious security concerns, as previously indicated Afghanistan stood to be a major transit point for oil and natural gas from the Caspian Sea, allowing the EU to lessen its dependence on Russian oil and natural gas. Indeed, completion of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, proposed by the Asian Development Bank and referred to as a new “Silk Road”, would open up possibilities for exploitation of Caspian Sea fossil fuels that would circumvent Russia’s influence in the region.

¹¹² NATO 2013

¹¹³ NATO 2012

¹¹⁴ Council of the European Union 2005

Table 3.5: NATO as Brokered Power in Afghanistan

EU Contributions to NATO ISAF (as of 2012)					
Theater of Operations	Mission	State	Troops Contributed	Rival	Result
Afghanistan	International Security Assistance Force	Belgium	180	Taliban and Al Qaeda	Combat Ongoing
		Bulgaria	416		
		Czech Republic	182		
		Denmark	317		
		Estonia	160		
		France	266		
		Germany	4400		
		Greece	3		
		Hungary	354		
		Italy	2825		
		Latvia	141		
		Lithuania	240		
		Luxembourg	10		
		Netherlands	400		
		Poland	1177		
		Portugal	165		
		Romania	1077		
		Slovakia	199		
		Slovenia	60		
		Spain	856		
UK	7700				
	Total EU	21128			
	Total US	60000			

Source: NATO 2012

The EU's *Energy Roadmap 2050* speaks to the need to “secure and diversify its supply of fossil fuels while at the same time develop cooperation to build international partnerships on a broader basis” and overdependence on Russian fossil fuels has long been viewed as a threat to EU energy security.¹¹⁵

In response to the terrorist attacks of 2001, US President George W. Bush took many steps to expand the bureaucratic power of the state. Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) three days after the attack with only with only one “nay” vote.¹¹⁶¹¹⁷ In October of that year, the PATRIOT Act was passed authorizing enhanced domestic security measures against terrorism.¹¹⁸ That same month, President Bush created the Office of Homeland Security, which later became

¹¹⁵ European Commission 2012

¹¹⁶ Findlaw 2013

¹¹⁷ Clerk of House 2001

¹¹⁸ Government Printing Office 2001

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).¹¹⁹ These acts were not without controversy. The AUMF was cited by the Bush Administration as legal justification for increased domestic wire surveillance as well as the creation of military tribunals capable of trying “enemy combatants” in military tribunals without the benefit of *habeas corpus* or due process.¹²⁰¹²¹ The PATRIOT Act has led to an expansion of government powers with regard to searches, as noted in *United States v. Jones*, in which federal agents placed a GPS device in Antoine Jones’ car without warrant and without his knowledge in an investigation unrelated to terrorism or the War in Afghanistan.¹²² The DHS has also come under fire for the elimination of collective bargaining rights for its employees, citing national security concerns.¹²³

As controversy mounted over these measures, the Bush Administration attempted to bolster public opinion by sending officials to friendly venues and media outlets in an effort win popular support and gain domestic legitimacy for the actions taken.¹²⁴ Vice President Cheney, in 2004, went on record on Fox News and said, “We use these tools to catch embezzlers and drug traffickers and we need these tools as well to hunt terrorists.”¹²⁵ Even after the election of Barack Obama, largely on the promise to curb perceived abuses at the hands of the AUMF and the PATRIOT Act, the US federal government continues to take steps to increase the power of the national security apparatus by continuing and expanding domestic surveillance and search capabilities, authorizing indefinite detention of “enemy combatants” as well as the assassination of American citizens abroad.¹²⁶ An average of 33,000 American troops per year have served in Afghanistan from 2002-2012. In an effort to honor the claims of these men and women, the Bush Administration passed the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008

¹¹⁹ Office of Homeland Security 2002

¹²⁰ Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 2006

¹²¹ ACLU v. NSA 2007

¹²² United States v. Jones 2012

¹²³ Barr 2008

¹²⁴ Lichtblau 2003

¹²⁵ Fox News 2004

¹²⁶ Greenwald 2012

which expanded benefits to combat veterans serving in active duty since 2001.¹²⁷ On occasions when public opinion has ebbed lowest with regard to national security measures or the cost of war, administration officials for both Presidents Bush and Obama have framed the issue as a choice between safety and strength and vulnerability and weakness. Operation Enduring Freedom has cost the US nearly \$642 Billion since 2002 – nearly 4% of the total national debt¹²⁸ (Table 3.6).

As before in the former Yugoslavia, EU member states deployed military forces in Afghanistan through NATO, this time authorized by the UN's creation of the ISAF. And again, as before, the US contributed the bulk of the force (Table 3.5). Heads of state in EU member states used the increased public fear of terrorism in the wake of 9/11 to win initial support for participation in ISAF deployed operations.¹²⁹ Clandestinely, the EU also began cooperating with illegal rendition programs carried out by US intelligence agencies and military personnel in which civilians were kidnapped and detained without due process and transported to secret facilities within EU member states where they were either tortured or transferred to other locations in North Africa, the Middle East or Central Asia where they would be tortured. (Figure 3.1).¹³⁰ While European heads of state were publicly condemning the practice of rendition, their governments secretly cooperated with the practice – only France, Luxembourg and The Netherlands declined.¹³¹ This represents bargaining on two levels: with the domestic populations of EU member states for political support and with the US for continued support of NATO despite pressure from an increasingly radicalizing right to disengage on the continent in favor of Middle Eastern and Eastern Asian concerns.¹³²¹³³

¹²⁷ Military.com 2013

¹²⁸ CSIS 2013

¹²⁹ European Commission 2002

¹³⁰ Council of Europe 2006

¹³¹ McCarthy 2013

¹³² Bandow 2009

¹³³ Bandow 2011

The Berlin Plus agreement was completed in December of 2002 which guaranteed access to NATO equipment, forces, planning capabilities and information to the EU but on the condition of “first refusal” – meaning that NATO had first to decline to intervene in a given crisis in order for the EU to take over – Concordia and Althea were both launched in the Balkans under the Berlin Plus framework.¹³⁴¹³⁵ And while the EU has shown occasional willingness to exercise autonomy from NATO, Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo being a notable example, heads of state of the EU remain satisfied with the terms of the Berlin Plus Agreement, which effectively outsources the bulk of EU defense and security to NATO.¹³⁶ A majority of Europeans (58%) remain satisfied with this arrangement as well.¹³⁷



Source: Council of Europe 2006 http://assembly.coe.int/committeedocs/2006/20060606_ejdoc162006partii-final.pdf.

Figure 3.1: EU Complicity in US Renditions

¹³⁴ Europa.eu 2009

¹³⁵ NATO 2009

¹³⁶ Shea 2013

¹³⁷ Trans-Atlantic Trends 2012

Table 3.6: War-making as State-Making in Afghanistan

War-making as State-making in Afghanistan		
Civilianizing Step	US State-making	EU State-making
Bureaucracy Creation	AUMF passed and signed into law, Patriot Act signed into law, DHS created	UN ISAF authorization
Bargaining	Attempts by elites to influence public opinion	Public denunciation of rendition; Simultaneous cooperation
Bureaucratic Expansion	AUMF cites justification for enhanced surveillance, erosion of civil liberties; federal employees in DHS stripped of collective bargaining rights	Berlin Plus Agreement
Claims Honored	Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008	EU-Afghanistan Joint Statement on ISAF
Economic Expansion	FY2002 - FY 2013: \$641.7 Billion	US single largest contributor

Sources: Findlaw 2013, Government Printing Office 2001, Office of Homeland Security 2002, New York Times 2003, NPR 2006, CSIS 2013, Council of Europe 2006, McCarthy 2013, Council of the European Union 2005, and NATO 2012


The previously referenced 2005 joint EU-Afghanistan statement on the ISAF is a demonstration of continued EU support for US-led NATO operations in Afghanistan despite increasing numbers of European citizens expressing a desire to see European troop level decreased.¹³⁸ As before, the US has contributed more to the ISAF in terms of money, troops and material than any other NATO ally.

3.2 Response to “Civilian State” Argument

As the evidence suggests, Europe hasn’t transitioned from garrison state to civilian state so much as it is contemplating a transition from brokerage to specialization. The member states of the EU already had their disastrous love affair with nationalization that saw the rise of conscript armies that waged bloody war across a continent, laying waste to empires. Sheehan and others are correct to suggest that Europe has left this phase of extraction far behind. But rather than juxtapose the EU and the US as being from Mars and from Venus – with or without the pejorative and chauvinistic implications of the analogy, it is much more accurate to point to a difference in method in using coercive force to achieve the desired ends of the state in relation to its rivals. The EU has certainly not given up violence, as even a glancing study of its defense spending outlays and weapons sales would indicate. The EU is still a nuclear power – France and the UK possess nuclear weapons and Belgium, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and Turkey have access to them and could deploy them under certain circumstances. What the EU has given

¹³⁸ Trans-Atlantic Trends 2012

up are classical wars of conquest. Rather than conquer its European rivals, it assimilates them through enlargement. Rather than engage in foreign wars of adventure, it uses NATO to pursue political, economic and security interests abroad, and these operations involve the use of coercive military force.



Source: CIA World Factbook 2013, Graphic from Visual Economics.com

Figure 3.2 Civilian State or “Mars Rising”?

4 CONCLUSIONS

The evidence gathered from analyzing operations in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan have shown the US to behave as a national state in the specialized phase of extraction. This finding is not unanticipated nor is it ground-breaking. However, the evidence also demonstrates that the EU behaves as a capital-intensive state in the brokerage phase of extraction. In both cases, the EU relied on a predominantly foreign force – NATO, operationally dominated by the US – to execute peacekeeping operations.

In both cases, the EU relied on outside entities, the UN, the US, the European Court of Human Rights, to legitimate its actions thus refusing to act unilaterally or independently. In both cases, state-making mechanisms actually devolved power away from Brussels, as seen in the 50th NATO summit which led to the Berlin Plus Agreement and EU support of rendition arrangements. And while interests of EU elites were certainly served by both operations, making way for EU enlargement in the Balkans and reducing security threats from international terrorism, these interests were served at the cost of autonomy and independence for the EU. As indicated previously by the interviewed EU official and public opinion data, Europeans actually want this arrangement. If Moravcsik's theory on liberal intergovernmentalism is correct, then it is not unrealistic to assume that the operational dominance of NATO by the US would translate into increased influence by the US over EU security and defense policy under the current arrangement. This finding is important because it provides insight as to how the EU behaves in the realm of international relations: it is neither garrison state nor civilian state nor are Europeans "from Venus." The EU has outsourced its war-making capabilities to the US through NATO.

If the EU were too fall victim to a terror attack on the scale of 9/11, it would be incapable of launching a military response on the scale of the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 without the help of NATO. This reality has not been lost on political elites and the dominant classes within the EU who continue to support and advocate for a more robust and independent military capability. Like the founders of the US at the Constitutional Convention of 1789, leaders in the EU are faced with the reality that continued fragmented sovereignty within the EU may be a threat to continued security for Europe. The evidence provided by case study indicates that the EU fits the model of a capital-intensive state in that it maintains a monopoly on the coercive use of force abroad – i.e. war-making –but that such a use of force depends on the approval of NATO, an organization operationally dependent on the US. That peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions can serve the same purposes as classical war-making has been demonstrated, as they are conducted only when the needs of the dominant elites are met by the

operation in question, either directly or indirectly. To assume otherwise would be to fall victim to what terms a “serious delusion of benevolence.”¹³⁹

What this can indicate about the future of European integration lies in an analysis of the fates of Venice or the Dutch Republic – both of which succumbed in rivalries with coercive intensive or national states and nationalized phases of extraction. But even if the EU does not succumb to some external rival in the classical sense, a resurgent Russia for example, the transition to national state and the specialization phase of extraction are crucial to state building because this transition has the paradoxical benefit of concentrating decision making authority within a centralized hierarchy while also making that hierarchy more accountable to civilian elites who are able to exert control over the state through political means. It is thus both more robust and more accountable simultaneously. Lessons from the American example abound – the inadequacy of the US under the Articles of Confederation to deal with the Barbary Pirates, Shays’ Rebellion and Great Britain between 1778 and 1789 can serve as instructive for the EU. Perhaps Europe’s experience with the horrors of empire will make it a more responsible global power.

Tilly’s theory as applied to the EU does make one thing clear: the analogy between the EU of today and the US under the Articles of Confederation may be an accurate one. The EU cannot form a cohesive and unified defense and security policy while unanimity is required for decision-making in these competencies. This would be like the US requiring the planning input, permission and operational support of all 50 governors before launching a military operation. Additionally, Tilly’s theory demonstrates that for western states, war-making actually reduced democratic deficit by making the state dependent on and accountable to domestic elites and eventually populations. And while states may circumvent popular authority from time-to-time, as seen in the use of Executive Orders to launch operations in the former Yugoslavia, large disapproval can lead to policy changes and even electoral defeat for those deaf to popular will, as evidenced by Senator McCain’s presidential defeat in 2008 in part because of his re-

¹³⁹ Gibbs 2007

fusal to discuss drawing down operations in Iraq. Ambassador De Almeida may well have been correct when he asserted that defense could be the next frontier of integration in the EU for a number of reasons, including that centralizing and specializing war-making capabilities within the EU could lead to a more civilianized state, perhaps even realizing the dreams of Victor Hugo and Winston Churchill in finally creating a United States of Europe.

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APPENDICES

Appendix

M.D. Shea

Interview Conducted 8/3/2013 12:00pm EST

Questions for EU Official, Washington DC:

May I have your permission to put my phone on hands free so that I may type notes during our conversation?

Yes

May I have your permission to cite relevant parts of this conversation in my research?

Yes, but as a non-attributable source

For the purposes of citation, what is your name and title?

An EU Official who spoke on condition of non-attribution

Questions:

1. If the European Union can be conceived of as a state, how would you characterize it? Would it be fair to draw an analogy between the modern Union and the Dutch Republic of the 16th and 17th centuries or the United States under the Articles of Confederation in the 18th Century (most revenue comes from GNI of each member state – UK rebate an example of state power)?

Some characteristics associated with states. Trade policy, defense policy (community competence). Sui generis organization. Unique organization – flag, anthem, treaties, bill of rights, etc., single legal personality (per treaty) which are all characterized as state behavior . . . There may be academic literature on this and some have made this analogy but I am not qualified to comment on this.

2. In 2012, Miliband said, “As the Balkans wars in the 1990s demonstrated, unless Europe can develop its own capabilities, it will be consigned always to wait impotently until the US and NATO are ready and able to intervene.” Under what scenarios can you imagine the European Union meeting the Headline Goals and creating a unified military capable of fulfilling all of the Petersburg Tasks, including so-called high end combat operations?

Targets have not been met – headline goals have come and gone. Battle groups on call. EU reserves the right to conduct high-intensity combat tasks, but these have not been undertaken. In these cases, NATO is often recognized as the institution which best meets coercive force needs (former Yugoslavia). See Saint Malo Declaration . . . EU military capabilities are distinct from NATO but more or less complementary. There is not a desire among EU member states to do away with NATO, most countries look to NATO to provide defense. Territorial defense is still very much NATO’s prerogative.

3. How does European reliance on NATO (per NATO-EU Declaration on European Security and Defense Policy, Treaty of Lisbon 2,49,c,7 for example) for defense make the establishment of a European military more or less likely?

“Risky business to trade in identity through institutions.” Legitimacy creates institutions not the other way around. See previous. Capability building at the state level and then these assets are put to the disposal of NATO. See European Defense Agency for addressing European collective defense needs. Statistics on this on European Defense Agency website. US has a preponderance of influence in NATO and this is not a bad thing.

4. It is hard to imagine a hypothetical EU Army engaged in empire building or wars of foreign adventure. However, as the EU is built on ideas like “peace, tolerance, democracy and human rights,” is it possible that peacemaking and/or humanitarian intervention under Responsibility to Protect could fall under the purview of this future hypothetical EU Army? What might these operations look like and under what circumstances would they be undertaken?

CSDP doesn’t rely on a standing military force per se. Rapid Reaction Force (battle groups 1,000 – 2,000). They have never been used. This requires political will and unanimously through European Council. Typically been in Africa, East Timor, Balkans and these have been civilian missions where NATO has not typically been active. (For EU missions see Concordia, Althea, etc.). Division of labor between EU and NATO.

5. How would the existence of a unified EU Army effect future enlargement?

Harmonizing defense capabilities first and priorities. Berlin + Agreement, member states would have to “beef up the Brussels structures” first. National veto still with regard to military capabilities – while NATO operates on a consensus rule. These are high politics issues and this would require another treaty and there is not an appetite for another treaty in Brussels at the moment.