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EMPOWERING THE POOR?
CIVIC EDUCATION AND LOCAL LEVEL PARTICIPATION
IN RURAL TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA

by

SATU RIUTTA

Under the Direction of William M. Downs

ABSTRACT

This study examines the effects of civic education (CE) on local level participation among the rural poor. There is little extant knowledge of civic education's effects among this group, although it represents the majority of citizens in many developing countries. It is important to understand what kinds of effects this little researched tool of democracy promotion has so as to know whether investments in it are worthwhile. Does raising awareness about rights increase citizens' democratic participation—whether at village meetings, community groups, or in contacting their local representative? Are effects greater on collective or individualized participation? Who benefits the most? Are effects mediated by civic awareness and/or democratic attitudes (efficacy, political interest, and trust in politicians), or are there (also) direct effects on participation? Having gathered novel data of rural masses' democratic dispositions, the study will be useful for practitioners needing information about the level of civic awareness among this group, and about how civic education may be used to promote this group's inclusion and empowerment as democratic participants in society.

Data consist of semi-structured oral interviews of 280 adult citizens in five villages and one rural town in peripheral areas in Tanzania and Zambia during election year.

The study corroborates CE's positive effects on knowledge—particularly of “first generation” rights and responsibilities—political interest, and some forms of participation. Most affected are contacts with the local elected representative (Ward Councilor) and involvement in community groups—both important for building a democratic (civil) society. Both cognitive and behavioral effects are greatest among women--a reason for optimism for those desiring to enhance women's public role. Practitioners could thus use civic education to promote communication between citizens and elected representatives and people's involvement in associations. They could utilize the radio—the most relied upon mass medium in these contexts--and target community leaders, the most sought-after individuals in community related problems. Civic educators should also seek ways to strengthen efficacy and interpersonal trust which were found to significantly promote aggregate participation, with the latter also increasing active involvement at community meetings—likely the first venue of participation for most rural citizens.

INDEX WORDS: Civic education, Participation, Local level, Rural, Rights, Tanzania, Zambia, Democracy, Democratization, Aid

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SATU RIUTTA

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

2007

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Office of Graduate Studies
College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University
May 2007

DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to Zhulea Mohamed of Mbae Village and the future generations of Africans whom she represents. This Tanzanian girl who at the time of field research was 10 years old came to sit next to our chairs every day, always smiling and eagerly observing every interview. One day she pointed to a water bottle less than half full, and was very happy when it was given to her. It is hoped that the “bottle” will one day be full for all Africans and people everywhere who live in poverty, and that this study will in a small way contribute toward a better future for them.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AVAP	Anti-Voter Apathy Project
CBO	Community Based Organization
CCM	Chama cha Mapinduzi (Party of Revolution)
CE	Civic Education
CHAWATA	A Tanzanian NGO for the disabled
CJF	Community Justice Facilitation
COBET	Complementary Basic Education in Tanzania
CRAIDS	Community Response to AIDS
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSDP	Child Survival and Development Programme
DDJP	Department of Development, Justice, and Peace
DFID	Department for International Development
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FAWEZA	Forum for Advancement of Women in Education in Zambia
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
FODEP	Foundation for Democratic Progress
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
HSF	Hanns Seidel Foundation
IRDP	Integrated Rural Development Program
LGRP	Local Government Reform Programme
LRF	Legal Resources Foundation
MANGONET	Masasi NGO Network
MDWDA	Mansa District Women Development Association
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MVC	Most Vulnerable Children
NAEP	National Assessment of Educational Progress
NFE	Nonformal Education
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NGOCC	Non-Governmental Organisations Co-ordination Committee
NEC	National Election Committee
ODA	Overseas Development Administration
OVC	Orphans and Vulnerable Children
PEDP	Primary Education Development Plan
PORALG	President's Office Regional Administration & Local Government
PCB	Prevention of Corruption Bureau
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
REO	Regional Education Officer
REPOA	Research on Poverty Alleviation
RIPS	Rural Integrated Project Support
SACCORD	Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes

SES	Socioeconomic status
SWAAZ	Society for Women and AIDS in Zambia
TAMWA	Tanzania Media Women's Association
TANU	Tanganyika (later: Tanzania) African National Union
UDP	United Democratic Party
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VEO	Village Executive Officer
WEO	Ward Executive Officer
WILDAF	Women in Law and Development in Africa
ZAMSIF	Zambia Social Investment Fund
ZCEA	Zambia Civic Education Association
ZEC	Zanzibar Election Committee

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Many transitional countries today are in need of a “jump start”¹ to restore stalled democratization processes--similar to the shock therapy that is sometimes prescribed for struggling economies. Although the “third wave” was heralded by its inventor² as the most important political phenomenon of the late twentieth century, welcomed (understandably) by many people, and deciphered with enthusiasm in scholarly circles, the political development that took place during it has not continued in much of the developing world. In February 2007 Freedom House reported that although “freedom was on the march” for much of the past thirty years, democracy’s expansion has come to a standstill, with the “proportion of countries designated as free” remaining stagnant for the past nine years.³ In fact already by 2002 most of the ““transitional countries’ . . . ha[d] entered a political gray zone,” in which one characteristic is “low levels of political participation beyond voting” (Carothers 2002, 9). For example, Carothers has spoken of the former Soviet Union as a “democratic wasteland,” concluded that South America was experiencing a “crisis of democracy”; and observed that “[d]ozens of African countries have seen once-promising democratic openings deliver only weak pluralism at best” (2004, 412).

Why didn’t the third wave last? Though reasons are many, clearly one of the missing components in many transitional⁴ countries’ attempts at democratic

consolidation⁵ is the existence of an active citizenry participating in the conduct of public affairs. Except for brief interludes of popular uprising and the “people power” associated with transitions, in few places have people really gained the power and position to be regularly (i.e., not only at election time) included as meaningful participants in their societies with a real say in public affairs. So a crucial question for the prospects of consolidation seems, How could the masses—the poor--be better included and empowered?

Many past studies of democratization have focused on macro-level processes including international influences, domino effects, and transitions in general; on the other hand their focus has been on the elites. But these approaches alone do not promote a wholesome understanding of consolidation or well-rounded scholarship, as can be concluded from Geddes’ persuasive remarks:

Among the methodological practices that most impede the development of a body of theoretical knowledge in comparative politics, I argue, is our standard approach to explaining these big, complicated outcomes [such as democratization, economic development, ethnic conflict]. I suggest an alternative approach. When trying to get some theoretical leverage on compound outcomes (otherwise known as big questions), it is often more useful to divide the big question into the multiple processes that contribute to it and propose explanations for the separate processes rather than the compound outcome as a whole. [In other words:] Outcomes such as democratization, the collapse of empires, and revolution result from the convergence of a number of different processes, some of which may occur independently of others (Geddes 2003, 23, 37).

One implication of this is that the compound outcomes such as democratization and democratic consolidation should be examined on the micro level. Geddes continues:

In order to unpack these mechanisms [in processes contributing to the “big” phenomena], we need to focus on the fundamental unit of politics, in most cases individuals. We need to break up the traditional big questions into more precisely defined questions about what individuals do in specific situations that recur often enough to support generalizations about them A carefully

constructed explanatory argument built up from fundamentals usually has multiple implications, at least some of which are testable (2003, 38).

In the research on democratic consolidation, this question of “what individuals do” is most neglected when it comes to the role of the masses. What do individuals on the grassroots level do—or what could they do—to contribute to democracy? This study tackles the question of how to enhance rural masses’ local level participation, especially with regard to the role that civic education (CE) might play in it. How, if in any way, does this little-researched tool of democracy promotion boost citizen participation in new democracies? To what extent does educating citizens of their democratic rights and obligations actually empower them as participants in democracy? Does civic education increase civic awareness and/or elicit a change in democratic attitudes like efficacy, trust, and interest in politics, and patterns of behavior?

These questions are asked and answered at the local, community, level—the only arena in which, it is probably safe to say, the majority of the rural poor will ever really be involved. It is on this level that a foundation for a civic culture is built. By examining the effects of rights education on local level participation in five villages in Tanzania and Zambia, this study thus contributes to the “emerging literature on the effects of civic education in new democracies” (Bratton et al. 2005, 40). The two countries are prototypes of the “hybrid”⁶ regimes that occupy the gray area between authoritarianism and democracy. But in a major difference to previous studies, this study examines civic education’s effects among the rural poor, a population which most extant studies have neglected. As suggested, it is especially the democratic orientations (or disorientations) of the (rural) masses that really matter for lasting democracy and stability. Also, while other

studies have only considered the impact on overall civic knowledge, the present one analyzes what kind of knowledge civic education promotes—and who specifically within the rural poor benefits the most from civic education. It is important to know how civic education (as any act of democracy promotion) affects different groups of people so as to know whether the consequences are likely to equalize or reinforce existing inequalities among them. Findings suggest that civic educators have more reason for optimism in this sense than what many previous studies have led us to expect. Indeed, results strongly suggest that civic education can help facilitate the inclusion of those that are most disadvantaged among the rural poor, such as women.

In dissecting these questions the study thus represents a contribution to our understanding about the cognitive and attitudinal changes that are necessary for democratic consolidation. Democracy requires a cognitively aware citizenry capable of critically evaluating policies and political representatives and holding the government to account. The study also relates to democracy aid, insofar as civic education is a part of it. The remainder of this introduction will elaborate on the implications the study has for democracy and the actors involved in its promotion. It reiterates why it is important to understand the effects of civic education, and why it is crucial to understand the participation of the poor in particular. The discussion proceeds from implications of the study for democracy, to those for donors, and domestic actors in developing countries. Following that, the main concepts—civic education and participation—are defined. The chapter concludes by laying out the parameters and organization of the study.

A Question for Democracy

Understanding civic education's effects on participation is a question for democracy because broadening participation beyond elites is a prerequisite for democracy's survival. But solutions on how to do so are wanting. According to Bratton et al.: "[a]bsent mass participation, the door is open for autocrats or embezzlers to seize power or, at best, for nonelected technocrats to assume responsibility for governance and economic management. . . . In truth, the institutions of democracy and markets are likely to flourish only if people actually use them" (2005, 130). And in the words of Chaligha et al., "Democracy can only survive and mature where citizens take an active role in the governance of their country, for example by voting, contacting representatives, and taking part in community affairs" (2002, 29). People need to express their preferences because, as Verba and his colleagues put it (citing Lord Lindsay), "only the wearer of the shoe knows if it is pinched," (1978, 302-303). No society can be a democracy if it is only based on the preferences of those *not* wearing the "shoes" of the rural majority. As Ndegwa stresses, "empowering the masses is the surest way to sustain democracy and development" (1996, 17).

The inclusion of the masses is especially challenging in Africa, due to a combination of widespread corruption among the elites and poverty of the masses. Though the wave of democratization swept over several countries on the continent in the early 1990s—beginning in Zambia—by the mid-1990s the wave had come to a standstill, including in Zambia. Since then, many African countries have experienced retrenchment (Carothers 1999; Schraeder 2003; Youngs 2001).⁷ A "distressingly large number" of

them “ha[s] lapsed into civil war, coups d’etat, or resurgent strongman rule” (Carothers 1999, 16).

But lack of inclusion, or “departicipation,” has been a problem in African countries ever since independence (Hyden 1983; Weiner 1987), with some countries suffering from it more than others. In a recent Afrobarometer report the authors note, “half of the Africans . . . interviewed were psychologically disengaged from politics” (Mattes and Bratton 2003, 25), and in Mali, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and Zambia “the electorate is seriously disengaged from politics” (Bratton et al. 2005, 144). This does not only apply to participation between elections; even “voter turnout has declined across sub-Saharan Africa between founding and subsequent elections” (Bratton et al. 2005, 144). Thus, while participation has understandably been less meaningful in single-party regimes, its absence continues to plague the continent’s electoral democracies today. There is thus considerable grounds for democracy promoters, whether indigenous or foreign, to strive to deepen democracy in Africa. Solidifying citizen participation would be vital for the future of democracy, so as to ensure democracy’s survival in economic conditions even as dismal as those of Zambia, one of the very few countries whose Human Development Index (HDI) today is lower than it was in the 1970s.

To be sure, there are no easy or quick solutions to empowering the poor, especially in absence of economic prerequisites for democracy’s survival (Przeworski et al. 2000). But certainly, any attempts at consolidation need to be accompanied by efforts to ensure the basic level of understanding among the population about citizens’ rights and responsibilities—or else other attempts will likely not bear much fruit. Without such basic awareness, individuals cannot express their preferences, and thus participate

meaningfully. In the words of Verba et al., “[t]he democratic function of participation is to communicate the preferences of the population” (1978, 305).

The civic education scholarship is still too young to have created the kind of understanding about effects that is needed for effective utilization of civic education by practitioners. Indeed, the empirical evidence accumulated through research on the consequences of civic education on participation and other democratic attributes in emerging democracies, particularly Africa, is very limited (Finkel and Ernst 2005; Torney-Purta 2000). In particular, while school-based civic education has been researched more, the effects of adult education are vastly underresearched (Kuenzi 2005; Milner 2002; Torney-Purta 2000)—not to mention those on the rural poor. And even the processes involved in civics taught at school are not understood: “while there is abundant evidence for the existence of a strong positive relationship between educational attainment and a variety of civic orientations and behaviors . . . how schooling does it remains an enigma” (Ichilov 2002, 82). Therefore, “while we can point to a number of excellent studies on civic education and civic engagement over the past 4 decades,” note Dudley and Gitelson, “we still know relatively little about what knowledge, both qualitatively and quantitatively, is necessary and desirable for an informed and active citizenry” (2002, 180). Thus, there is an “absence of hard international data” (Milner 2002, 119), that is, understanding about the mechanisms involved in civic education and its connection to (the attributes linked to) participation.⁸

A Question for Donors

This lack of understanding also affects the prospects of international development aid, of which civic education often is a part. In fact most funds for the activity come from donors, who, especially since the early 1990s, have funded civic education as part of the democracy aid (though in a broad sense civic education has been a part of aid projects for much longer in an attempt to secure ownership of donors' projects by local people and ensure aid's sustainability).⁹ As reported by Finkel and Ernst about the sources of funds for civic education,

Many such programs are supported with contributions from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other U.S. and European donors in efforts to help the process of democratic consolidation by inculcating knowledge and supportive values among citizens who previously had little exposure to pro-democratic socializing agents¹⁰ (2005, 334).

Indeed, as these authors too stress, “we know little about the conditions under which civic education may influence democratic development or about whether such programs are ‘worth’ the investment made by international donors” (2005, 335). This study seeks to uncover whether indeed funds allocated to civic education are a worthwhile investment. Or would they be better spent on, say, supporting parliaments, constitutional engineering, or, simply economic aid?

Lack of understanding of the effects of civic education programs is symptomatic of the lack of understanding of what democracy aid, in general, achieves (Blair 2004). As noted in an evaluation study by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency: “there are no generally accepted theories or models of exactly how different types of activities in fact do stimulate D/HR [democracy/human rights] development” (Sida 2000, 6). Though Biekart is right in suggesting that the expected role of aid is

small—foreign aid “can only claim to contribute marginally to the longer term impact of civil society building interventions” (1999, 300)—we need to understand what contribution aid makes, such as through investments in civic education.¹¹ If the effects of the processes which international actors fund are not understood, “donors will continue to apply discredited ideas likely to undercut their purposes” (Kasfir 1998, 138). Such points serve as the overall justification for the present study.

A Question for Domestic Actors in Developing Countries

Although the provision of civic education is conditioned by resources from, and even agendas of, developed countries—civic education, like the supply of democracy in general—is first and foremost a question for the domestic actors in developing countries. Of the two arenas of domestic actors—the state and civil society—the state, while having the resources and being usually more able than others to reach all corners of a developing country, may not necessarily have the motivation to provide civic education. The problem, as emphasized by several observers in both Tanzania and Zambia, is that participation is all about power, and those in power do not want to share it.¹² Therefore those in high offices will avoid actions which would mean they will have to share power with others. This, of course, is true not only for Tanzania and Zambia but virtually all transitional countries (and beyond).

And so, although international aid is increasingly given in the form of budget support—in which donors pool their resources to support the government’s own plans—donors could well continue to play a role in the provision of civic education in the future. Despite the disincentives for the state to conduct civic education, “there must be a clearly

defined role for the state,” as a Tanzanian academic stressed.¹³ According to him, it is in the long run dangerous for power holders not to provide the right kind of civic education: “If you don’t provide people with civic education, your enemy will. And, the more you delay providing civic education with the right content, the more you create a perception of real or imaginary social and political instability. This is because the people will see power holders, for example, driving ministerial vehicles, which does not square with the fact that they say ours is a poor country.”¹⁴

Understanding the effects of civic education is also of importance to NGOs, the agents that most often deliver civic education messages in practice. Local NGOs in rural areas are normally in the closest contact with communities, and thus have a crucial role to play in successful civic education. According to the literature, the kinds of groups that are more likely to foster genuine participation are development groups rather than the more political groups involved in, for example, advocacy. This is because the latter tend to be narrowly based elite groups with sometimes little connection to the grassroots (Carothers and Ottaway 2000). As Carothers and Ottaway stress, groups other than advocacy groups “often play important roles in political transitions” (2000, 11-12). NGOs’ important role in the communities and democratic mobilization is also evident in the following:

Even without explicit political maneuvers, NGOs are well placed to further democratization through grassroots empowerment within their development activities. Through projects that enhance the political capacities of local communities—from mundane socioeconomic projects to more political undertakings, such as civic education campaigns—NGOs may be able to mobilize citizens and influence the direction of political change toward greater participatory democracy and accountable government in Africa (Ndegwa 1996, 117).

As will be shown below, observers in Tanzania and Zambia concur that NGOs are the most important providers of civic education. The education given by political parties is not adequate because the objective of civic education is to provide someone with a wider perspective.¹⁵ Yet NGOs alone cannot ensure adequate provision of civic education; rather, other actors and all levels, including the police and magistrates should also be involved.¹⁶ Also, a major obstacle to NGOs' reaching of communities and providing civic education is lack of resources. Nevertheless, these points about the involvement of donors, NGOs, and to a lesser extent, the state, serve to demonstrate that a better understanding of civic education's effects would affect several actors' contributions to the lives of the rural poor.

Civic Education Defined

How is civic education defined? According to the conventional definition it is that education which promotes recipients' understanding of the political system, their own interests, and options to contribute to government (Niemi and Junn 1998), or citizens' rights and obligations (Kanaev 2000). Civic education may also involve "exposing students to central and political traditions of the nation" and teaching them "moral sentiments" (Janowitz 1983, 194, quoted in Kanaev 2000, 17). Because this study deems knowledge of rights and responsibilities more relevant (than, for example, names of political representatives) in influencing one's participation, it defines civic education with reference to teaching people about their rights and responsibilities. Certainly, it is important to know who one's political representatives are—but it is argued that as a more personal type of civic knowledge, knowing one's rights is the first step, or a prerequisite, for participation.

However, operationalization of the concept is not unproblematic, especially in rural areas in developing countries. To understand findings properly, it is worth elaborating why defining the phenomenon properly and accurately is so challenging in these contexts. To ensure a relevant definition, one needs to ask what are the most important sources of civic education in each research site—though in doing so one also needs to make sure the definition is measurable and manageable. In rural parts of the developing world, most citizens have not been formally schooled (via which they would get at least some exposure to civics), nor have they necessarily attended any out-of-school civic education programs. Yet this does not mean that they have not been exposed to civic education messages. In fact, as Finkel’s description of civic education in emerging democracies reveals, beyond school based civics and “programs that provide instruction about the society and political rights of women, [or] voter education programs, [there are] neighborhood problem-solving programs that bring individuals in contact with local authorities for purposes of promoting collective action to benefit local communities” (2002, 994-5).

Indeed, community meetings can be arenas for learning civic knowledge.¹⁷ There, villagers discuss their rights, responsibilities, and topics of importance to the community. In these contexts, what is shared and learnt is “Mode 2” knowledge (Gibbon et al. 1994, cited in Field 2005), which is application oriented civic knowledge, as opposed to the more abstract information taught at school. “Mode 2” knowledge is “a form of knowledge that . . . is created by and through groups rather than by isolated individuals; its origin lies in collective attempts to solve problems, and its meaning is only realized through application in an organizational setting” (Field 2005, 4). This is a good

description of what learning and civic education may most often be in practice in developing countries.

Another source of civic information for many people is the media, and particularly the radio. How should the media's role be taken into account? Whether civic knowledge originates at school, in government, NGOs, donor programs, or the media, one needs to resolve how intentional civic education needs to be for it to be considered civic education. How aware must "educators" be that they are conducting civic education? And, what about the timeframe? What is the length of time that should have lapsed before one assesses effects?

The prevalence of civic—or rights—education in emerging democracies is further demonstrated by comments made by this study's interviewees. According to a government employee in Southern Tanzania, "Every organization is trying to participate in civic education."¹⁸ And as expressed by a Tanzanian academic, "In societies in transition people are constantly bombarded with information on what is and is not expected of them."¹⁹ Among other things, people are targets of health campaigns and "how-to-avoid-corruption" campaigns (ibid). Even research on civic education, such as the present one, may constitute civic education.

The point in referencing these sources of rights knowledge is to underline that civic education, like participation, needs to be contextualized.²⁰ This is what this study does, when it—in contrast to past studies—does not examine specific (donor funded) programs but adopts a more contextual approach. In this approach, it is acknowledged that civic knowledge is transmitted by multiple channels, with each respondent's exposure to rights information determined by him- or herself, based on what (s)he

determines to have been a relevant source in his or her life. A contextual approach to analysis has been called for by students of both civic education (e.g., Torney-Purta 2000) and international aid (Seppälä 2000). Because it is argued that focusing on certain formal CE programs would not capture the relevant sources of civic awareness of rural populations, the contextual definition adopted in this study has the potential of better representing the civics information ever received by most of the rural poor. That is, while the study reviews the most important formal civic education programs in the research sites, it does not examine these programs individually but only if they feature in respondents' answers about who they say has taught them about their rights.

Participation Defined

There also exists a standard set of acts normally considered in studies of political participation, involving voting (and voters' registration), party and campaign work, community activity, contacting officials, protesting, and communicating (Milbrath and Goel 1977). These participatory acts--with the exception of voters' registration, campaign work, and protest activity²¹—are also a part of this study's definition of participation. In particular, the study focuses on interelection activity on the local level, which consists of involvement in community groups, participation at community meetings, joining others to raise development issues, and contacting the Ward Councilor (that is, local elected representative). Thus participation refers to both “communing” and “contacting,” concepts used quite extensively in the literature. As was true for the choice to examine local as opposed to national level participation, it is argued that interelection participation is more relevant to the rural poor than electoral activity.

In fact, in light of the extant research one should not expect to find much correlation between civic education and voting. As Dalton (1996) points out, voter turnout does not reflect citizens' interest in politics but organizational capacity of political groups. Also, voting is an activity engaged in by the majority of citizens (Milbrath and Goel 1977)²² anyway; thus data on voter turnout contain little variance to explain. This is especially true for rural areas, which generally have higher voting rates (Bratton et al. 2005). Further, Africans—respondents in this study--tend to overreport their involvement in voting, for which reason it does not make sense to put too much emphasis on voting when examining the effects of civic education.

In turn, the reason this study's definition excludes protest activity is because most rural respondents do not have any experience in it. In examining Afrobarometer data, Bratton et al. (2005) found attending a demonstration to be relatively infrequent (applying to 12 percent of respondents),²³ among respondents coming from *both* urban and rural areas. But overall, they conclude, “[p]olitical protesting is an urban phenomenon” (300).

Finally, a note on how the study treats interest in politics and political discussion. While some scholars (for example, Milbrath and Goel, 1977) seem to consider political discussion a form of participation (in which citizens express their political opinions to others), others (including Verba et al. 1978 and Bratton et al. 2005) do not. Instead, Verba et al. call such things “psychological involvement,” while Bratton et al. label them “cognitive engagement.” In line with Verba et al. (1978) and Bratton and his colleagues (2005), this study does not regard political interest or discussion as acts of participation.²⁴

Parameters and Plan of the Study

This study is located at an intersection of multiple disciplines. Though civic education is inherently political (that is, a question of power), it is obviously a subject matter in the field of education, but also intersects with sociologists' interest in social inequalities. It is furthermore related to anthropology, the discipline that houses most studies on the impact of development interventions.

The theoretical debate within which the study is located is that between institutionalists and culturalists: in which dimension is the impact of civic education likely to be the greatest? Does civic education influence relatively more recipients' institutional affiliations, such as voting, party membership, and participation in community groups, or their psychological (i.e., cultural) orientations (manifested in political interest and other attitudes)? Understanding this would enable development actors to utilize the information in, for example, mobilizing citizens.

The study is organized the following way. Chapter 2 summarizes findings from extant civic education studies, with the goal to identify the primary debates about civic education's effects on cognition and behavior. It demonstrates the lack of scholarly agreement about whether, to what extent, and how civic education can be expected to promote awareness or cause attitudinal or behavioral change. Following this, the chapter reviews a distinct literature, summarizing the primary explanations for democratic participation. This is done so as to analyze the role of civic education in explaining participation in its proper context (that is, the broader explanatory framework), thereby ensuring that claims made about the contribution of civic education remain realistic.

Chapter 3 evaluates and joins the scholarly debates, presenting the study's expectations about CE's effects through six hypotheses. These are divided into the immediate effects—that is, on awareness and attitudes—and the (indirect) effects on participation. This division does not constitute a formal proposition that effects are always mediated by awareness and attitudes, but it does symbolize the logical order or path along which effects of civic education are likely to proceed in promoting democratic dispositions. While agreeing with past studies that the immediate effects are likely highest in awareness, the chapter points to a general shortcoming in them. That is, by failing to distinguish between different categories of civic knowledge, extant studies are not getting at the whole picture. It is not enough (or necessary) that citizens can correctly identify certain factual information about office holders. Rather, for knowledge to be translated into action, citizens need to understand the various types of rights to which they are entitled. Do they know that they have a right to express their opinions or be treated equally by authorities? The study hypothesizes that civic education affects relatively more the knowledge of civil, human, and political than socioeconomic rights: the former have a more logical connection with civic education. It is in the nature of civic education to promote self-expression and participation. The chapter also hypothesizes that though more difficult to achieve, attitudinal change is possible, with expected change most likely in efficacy. If civic education does boost one's sense of political efficacy, this would be important for participation, especially among the disadvantaged and discriminated segments of the population. In comparison to efficacy, trust and political interest are expected to be impacted less, and possibly negatively.

Finally, with regard to effects on participation the study again hypothesizes about previously overlooked aspects of impact: first, beyond the distinctions between electoral and interelection participation, and communing and contacting, what type of participation is most likely to be affected? Second, who stands to benefit most from civic education *among the masses*?²⁵ It is argued that effects will be relatively larger on those participatory acts which rely on individual initiative (that is, active participation at community meetings and contacting the Councilor), while having less impact on those participatory acts consisting of group activity (participating in community groups and raising issues with others). If corroborated, this finding would speak to the relevance that civic education has for the formation of a democratic orientation and identity based on individualism.

How these expectations are tested is the topic of Chapter 4, which explains and justifies the study's contextual and subjective approach to analyzing civic education, and describes research methodology. It describes gathering of data through semi-structural oral interviews of altogether 280 adult citizens (140 per country) in Tanzania and Zambia, done at one point in time during an election year.²⁶ Because timing of data gathering coincided with voter education in both places, it is expected that results will represent the most that civic education can achieve. It should be noted that primary analysis of cause-and-effect relationships will be done within countries, not cross-nationally.²⁷ In this sense the study utilizes two samples, one from Tanzania and another from Zambia. The chapter also explains the logic of selecting respondents—while that of case selection²⁸ is described in the subsequent chapter on the research context. Although Chapter 4 makes references to the research sites and civic education programs, these

topics are formally introduced and explained in the subsequent chapter. In describing the study's approach, methodology, and samples, Chapter 4 also compares these to choices made in past studies, emphasizing that differences between the studies affect the extent to which findings can be compared. It then outlines operationalization of variables through survey questions.

Chapter 5, then, describes in detail the types of contexts that Tanzania and Zambia (and the research sites within them) represent for testing the hypotheses. The chapter shows that although at first glance, these two countries are probably more or as similar as any two countries in sub-Saharan Africa, important differences remain in variables that are crucial for participation. As mentioned above, these refer to different patterns of (and opportunities for) participation; one region being primary pro-government while the other is more or less hostile to it; and cultural factors including religion. In describing similarities and differences in participation, the chapter refers to national level Afrobarometer data. This chapter also summarizes the most important sources of civic education to which people living in the respective sites may have been exposed. It also presents aggregate demographic and other data from the five villages, giving the reader an idea of the kinds of communities in which respondents' participation is assessed.

Finally, Chapters 6 and 7 present research findings, with the former dealing with the immediate effects on cognition and the latter explaining results on CE's effects on participation. A comparison of data from the two countries reveals how very different the levels of cognizance and participation can be among the rural poor. This also supports the expectation that civic education will have varying impact on different individuals within

the same socioeconomic strata. Findings strongly suggest that civic education does indeed contribute to empowering the poor, though not always in ways expected. Results are most encouraging in that rights education seems to boost relatively more the participation of those that stand to gain the most from it, the disadvantaged. This suggests that civic education can help level the disparities within the population—and is good news for those seeking to broaden democratic participation and help jump-start consolidation where it has stagnated.

Chapter 2

THEORIZING CIVIC EDUCATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

In a study attempting to understand the effects of civic education on participation it is necessary to review two distinct literatures: that on civic education and that on political participation. Therefore this section asks, What have scholars found, generally speaking, to be the impact of civic education, in both developed and developing countries? And, What factors affect an individual's level of democratic participation?

Though this literature review is divided into sections on civic education and participation, the connections between the two are discussed throughout both sections. This is because the posited immediate effects of civic education—on, most importantly, awareness and attitudes—are the logical link between exposure to civic education and participation. Thus in this chapter, in discussing the impact of civic education, special attention is paid to what the civic education literature argues about CE's consequences for participation; conversely, in the discussion of the determinants of political participation, special attention is paid to what role education may play in it. Though these two sections are complementary, it was decided to handle them separately so as to, first, get a more comprehensive picture of what kinds of effects civic education may have on the recipient. Second, in light of the fact that civic education is often quite limited both temporally and in terms of content, and because political participation is a function of many things and subject to various influences—i.e., not only one's education—it was determined that it is best to compare the competing theories of political participation so

as to put civic education in perspective. The purpose of this section is not only to understand the factors affecting civic education's impact and political participation, but to identify that debate between the major theoretical schools explaining participation, in which this study's research question will be placed.

Civic Education

In reviewing the literature on civic education, and analyzing its relevance for the present study, the reader needs to keep in mind that the various pieces of extant literature have different foci. They examine different facets of civic education (e.g., whether school based or adult education, basic literacy or more political education, industrialized versus developing countries) and have different dependent variables (e.g., whether a sense of identity, attitude, knowledge, or behavior). Therefore one should exercise caution in comparing the studies with each other and drawing conclusions for the present study. However, extant literature does give us clues as to what one can expect civic education to achieve, how, why, and in which contexts. The review begins by an outline of the historical evolution in the study of civic education (much of which has taken place in the global North). Following that, the main findings of previous studies are summarized, with the discussion divided into effects on civic knowledge, democratic attitudes, and political participation. Also, the relevant control variables identified by the literature are introduced. The discussion references studies on both developed and developing countries though it focuses on findings from the developing world.

Evolution in the Study of Civic Education

The study of civic education has evolved in both scope and the value that scholars place on civic education. An important part of this scholarship is adult education or adult learning.²⁹ Field writes, “[T]he relationship between active citizenship and adult learning has been a common theme in the scholarly literature” (2005, 11). Analyzing the early 20th century, “European historians have been particularly interested in the role of popular social movements in providing and demanding adult education” (ibid, 11). These movements included the free churches, and temperance and labor movements, among other ones (ibid). Bron (1995, 21) “describes these movements as ‘schools for democracy’, training their members in the principles of civic association while offering a more general education to underpin their claim for citizenship” (cited in Field 2005, 11). Over time, however, the focus of social movements expanded to involve things other than education for democracy. For example:

In Western Europe and Australasia, adult education movements developed from the 1920s onwards that were less concerned with democratic citizenship and collective advance than with leisure and sociability. Inevitably, this also affected those adult education movements that had been established to promote political and social change. If anything, it was accelerated following the creation of a growing welfare state – and something that many of the major social movements had worked towards, and whose achievement they hailed as a landmark in the twin processes of modernisation and democratisation (Field 2005, 12).

If one then turns to the modern study of civic education, (s)he notices that this scholarship experienced its first boom from the late 1950s through the 1970s, generating “considerable research” on political socialization “and on the related topic of civic or citizenship education” (Torney-Purta 2000, 88). During this time studies focused on the global North, and the United States in particular. As Torney-Purta writes, “Much of this

research was conducted by political scientists who were concerned about tracing partisanship from generation to generation, or about assessing the sources of diffuse support for the national political system,³⁰ or about understanding the roots of student protest³¹” (ibid, 88). Also, “[T]he faded question that guided so much of the early work [was]: ‘Which agent is most important – the family, the school or the media?’” (ibid, 94). It is evident from the literature that much of the early, and current, research on civic education has focused on effects on (civic) knowledge, values, and attitudes (e.g., Dudley and Gitelson 2002; Finkel and Ernst 2005; Torney-Purta 2002). Also, most of the early studies³² were quite unanimous in arguing that civic education has at most minimal overall effects. Dudley and Gitelson summarize the early scholarship:

The common wisdom for some time now has been that civic courses make no difference. This unanticipated finding first surfaced in 1968 when Langton and Jennings (1968) used self-reports of the number of civics-related courses that the students had taken to explain political knowledge. Their unequivocal conclusion was that there was no evidence that civics instruction is “even a minor source of political socialization” (1968, p.865) (Dudley and Gitelson 2002, 179).

But the early pessimism about the effects of civic education has recently given way to some positive findings. After a dearth of studies during 1977-82 there has been a renewed interest in “roots of civic engagement” (Dudley and Gitelson 2002, 176). This has been so especially since the 1990s, and following Niemi and Junn’s (1998) study of the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) in which they found recent civics course work alone to increase political knowledge by four percent. “Contrary to over 30 years of research on these questions, Niemi and Junn concluded that ‘the civics curriculum has an impact of a size and resilience that makes it a significant part of political learning’ (p.145)” (Dudley and Gitelson 2002, 179). The four-percent effect that

the authors detected constitutes an important finding in contrast to those who have found absolutely no connection between civic education was and civic outcomes. Finkel and Ernst stress the importance of this finding by stating that the “significant revision” since the 1990s to the pessimism of the early studies is “owing largely to the reassessment of previous literature and the novel empirical findings reported by Niemi and Junn (1998)” (2005, 336).

Along with this evolution in the understanding about the value of civic education, the recent studies have brought about a widened scope of studies, including, importantly, those on developing and transitional countries. These countries include Zambia (Bratton et al. 1999; Carothers 1999), Guatemala (Carothers 1999), Kyrgyzstan (Kanaev 2000), Bosnia-Herzegovina (Soule 2000), Dominican Republic (Finkel 2002, 2003; USAID 2002; Blair 2003), South Africa (USAID 2002; Finkel 2002, 2003; Blair 2003; Finkel and Ernst 2005), Poland (USAID 2002; Blair 2003; Finkel 2003), Mexico (Levinson 2004), and Senegal (Kuenzi 2005).³³ The expansion of studies beyond the United States is largely due, undoubtedly, to the global and national changes that have occurred since the late 1980s, including the collapse of Communism and the changes it caused for new and transitional countries; European unification, including questions of identity and the problem of democratic deficit; globalization; and the “third wave” democratization (Huntington 1991) and the consequent rise in democracy aid, of which civic education programs are a part.³⁴ Indeed Kanaev stresses that “civic education is closely linked to the developments of the society in general, and therefore subject to constant changes” (2000, 17). Therefore it is “more visible in periods of drastic economic and political transformations” (ibid, 17). Referring to Janowitz’s book, *The Reconstruction of*

Patriotism Education for Civic Consciousness (1983), Kanaev gives an example from the United States where the civics course content has shifted following, for example, the Great Depression and the Vietnam war.

It should be noted that not all the findings in the new studies replace the pessimism of the earlier literature; for example, Carothers' (1999) conclusion of USAID efforts at civic education in primarily Zambia and Guatemala is that "results are often disappointing" (232). However, it is not at all clear what Carothers' dependent variable is as he only makes reference to "public belief in democracy" (232). Again, it is important to keep in mind that different studies focus on different effects that civic education may have.

The Immediate Effects of Civic Education

1. Civic Knowledge

As regards the impact of civic education on civic knowledge, there is some variance in scholars' findings. In their study on Zambia, Bratton et al. found that civic education has "consistently greater impact" on knowledge and values than on political behavior (1999, abstract). This also seems to be the conclusion of Finkel and Ernst (2005) who utilize 1998 data on students in South Africa. Comparing effects on knowledge to that on attitudes, they say: "[E]xposure to civic training has weaker attitudinal than pure knowledge effects and . . . it is more difficult to impart values and political orientations in the classroom than simple factual information (Langton & Jennings, 1968; Ehman, 1980^[35]; Niemi & Junn, 1998)" (351). They state that this confirms previous research. In

fact they found civic education to have twice as large an effect on political knowledge than what Niemi and Junn (1998; above) found:

That is, civic education matters in predicting students' level of political knowledge as much as their exposure to the mass media, their age and grade level, whether they come from a family that discusses politics often, and whether other members of their family are politically active. These other factors are important determinants of knowledge, but civic education exposure is at least their rival in magnitude (Finkel and Ernst 2005, 351).

Yet in another study Finkel (2002) had come to a different conclusion, arguing that civic education does not have much impact on knowledge, at least when compared to local-level participation.

2. Democratic Attitudes

Understandably, extant studies are in greater disagreement about the impact of civic education on attitudes than on knowledge. Attitudinal change requires much more than mere absorption of factual knowledge. But findings exist to validate both sides of the debate. Early on, Almond and Verba (1963) argued that “education is the most important determinant of political attitudes” (Kuenzi 2005, 224). Studying nonformal education (NFE) in Senegal, Kuenzi (2005), though focusing on classes teaching citizens basic literacy and numeracy skills (rather than more political issues), finds that attitudes are affected. She compares formal and nonformal education and finds that “[f]ormal education appears to have a stronger effect on the support for democratic attitudes than NFE” (234). Yet “[n]onformal education works much the same as formal education in instilling democratic attitudes” (240). Therefore, and because “the citizenry’s acceptance

of democratic values is considered a requisite for the consolidation of democracy,” she argues that “both NFE and formal education could play important roles in the consolidation process in Senegal and Africa, more generally” (240). Kuenzi also refers to the literature³⁶ according to which “NFE increases self esteem” (227). One may expect a rise in self-esteem also to cause changes in political attitudes.

On the other hand, the findings of Finkel (2002), USAID (2002), and Finkel and Ernst (2005) suggest that civic education has little effect on attitudes. (Finkel was one of the collaborators in the USAID document.) According to the USAID “lessons learnt” report on civic education in the Dominican Republic, Poland, and South Africa, “civic education programs appear to have little effect on changing democratic values, such as trust in political institutions” or political tolerance (2002, 1). Finkel’s (2002) findings on the Dominican Republic and South Africa are congruent. According to him, attitudes such as tolerance, trust, and efficacy are affected little. In a study with Ernst, he found confirmatory evidence to this from South Africa (Finkel and Ernst 2005).³⁷ In fact Finkel and Ernst found that “[c]ivic education exposure has *absolutely no impact* on students’ levels of civic duty, tolerance, institutional trust, or civic skills, once other variables such as family political discussion and the student’s own level of media exposure and prior political interest are taken into account” (2005, 351; emphasis added).

That there seems to be less disagreement among scholars on the impact of civic education on knowledge than on values is logical. Possessing knowledge requires much less than changing one’s attitude. Attitudinal change then supposedly facilitates the ultimate change, change in behavior. Citing a study by Torney, Oppenheim, and

Farnen,³⁸ Kanaev (2000) suggests that political socialization goes through these kinds of stages. First, in his words, there is the “primary level,” where

there is a vague understanding of social institutions, a ‘sheltered’ view where the firmly established patterns of social authority and obedience predominate, with little attention to or awareness of the social conflicts. It is followed by the stage of growing awareness of the different societal components, conflicts and institutional role, the ‘realistic view stage’, and finally, the ‘critical outlook stage’ with an emphasis on discordant functions of social institutions that follow a sufficient level of understanding of the way they work (Kanaev 2000, 10).

According to these authors, it is through the critical outlook stage that a person normally develops a motive for participation. On this basis, to influence participation it would not be enough to transmit knowledge; but something like encouragement to independent and critical thinking would also be needed.

3. Behavior (Participation)

The rather unanimous finding that civic education increases a person’s knowledge level is also contrasted with competing findings on whether civic education promotes participation, or more fundamentally, whether knowledge promotes (or is necessary for) participation. If we start with this fundamental question, there are many that would answer it in the affirmative, extending the implications even onto the macro level. For example, in their seminal study explaining democracy by individual dispositions, Almond and Verba (1963) linked active participation with political awareness. Also, Bratton and Liatto-Katundu point out, “Democratic theorists have long argued that accountable governance requires an educated and well-informed citizenry” (1994, 545).³⁹ This could be through the fact that well-informed citizens “take the trouble to express their views so

that government is directed to do what the well-informed citizenry want” (Halpern 2005, 188-189). Being well informed is also what Delli Caprini and Keeter (1996)⁴⁰ emphasize. Studying the American context, they “have demonstrated that it is not just years of education but the amount of political knowledge possessed that predicts political participation. Those most knowledgeable are most likely to participate in politics” (cited by Dudley and Gitelson 2002, 178). Referring to the quality of the knowledge possessed, Bratton and Liatto-Katundu stress, “In order to participate *intelligently* in discourse over public policy, citizens require a *thorough understanding* of their national political system and of their own civil rights and responsibilities” (1994, 545; emphases added).

Besides participating in governance, civic awareness can be needed for (intelligent) voting, too. Explaining local-level turnout in 16 industrialized countries, Milner (2002) argues that it is rather civic literacy, not associational membership, interpersonal trust, or anything else that “makes democracy work” (enables and inspires citizens to participate). He draws an example from Popkin and Dimock (1999, 142) who argue that in America nonvoting—one type of participation—is due largely to “lack of knowledge of what government . . . is doing and where parties and candidates stand” (44). But as suggested above, awareness or knowledge may not be sufficient for, or even always correlated with, all types of participation, as Torney-Purta reports from a cross-national study among students:

Some countries whose students do very well on the measure of civic knowledge have students who seem relatively disengaged from civic participation. Conversely, students from some of the poorly performing countries (according to their civic knowledge scores) say they are willing to become engaged in political activities as adults. Although knowledge is important, other factors can also motivate participation (2002, 139-140).

In turn, the arguments made specifically about the effects of civic education on participation include both “pro” and “con,” with more mentions in favor of such effects. In an example from a developed country, Field cites a 1958 dataset of 33-42 year-olds in Britain, which suggests that adult learning is connected to participation:

Overall, the analysis found that the apparent effects of taking one or two courses at this stage of life included significant growth in levels of racial tolerance and in memberships of civic associations, as well as smaller but marked growth in levels of political interest and electoral participation, and some decline in political cynicism and authoritarianism (Bynner and Hammond, 2004, p 167)⁴¹ (Field 2005, 108).⁴²

Thus according to this finding, the types of participation affected by adult learning include memberships in associations and voting behavior. Field adds, “Learning appears to affect not simply someone’s decision whether or not to participate, it also gives them access to information concerning the opportunities and likely results of participation, and equips them with specific sets of skills and understanding associated with citizenship” (109). This again refers to the fact that understanding, beyond mere knowledge, is an important part of how exposure to education can result in participation. Like analysts of the British dataset, Kuenzi finds in Senegal that those exposed to NFE “also usually began to join village associations and are recruited into other development projects” (2005, 227).

Those that explicitly compare whether the effects of civic education are larger on behavior than on knowledge/attitudes, or vice versa, have come up with slightly different findings. As mentioned above, Finkel (2002) and USAID (2002), dealing with largely the same data, find effects on participation to be higher than those on knowledge/attitudes, a finding that some might find surprising. After having stated that civic education has

“little effect” on values, the USAID report notes, “[C]ivic education appears to contribute to significantly greater rates of political participation among program participants, especially at the local level” (1). And Finkel (who analyzed the Dominican Republic and South Africa) found the same thing, stressing that when compared to “local-level participation,” the effects of civic education on all other domains—including tolerance, trust, knowledge, efficacy, and support for the law—are meager (2002, 1016). But, as suggested in the section on knowledge, Bratton et al. had diametrically opposite findings—that “civic education has consistently greater impact on citizens’ knowledge and values than on their political behavior” (1999, abstract). Yet in another study on Zambia, Bratton concluded the opposite: “Although the present data cannot conclusively establish a direct link from civic education to political participation, they strongly imply such a connection” (1999, 574). These kinds of results thus suggest that there is an ongoing debate as to whether civic education affects citizen participation, and if so, how, to what extent, and in which conditions. That findings are this inconclusive, again, is a function undoubtedly in part of the fact that extant studies analyzed different kinds of civic education programs among different groups of participants in different countries. Nevertheless, such an unresolved debate demonstrates that there is need for further study and to understand whether or what kind of civic education programs are worth investing in as tools for promoting democratic participation.

Control Variables

1. Who Conducts Civic Education and How

Finkel (2002) and Finkel and Ernst (2005) have made useful points about what in the conduct of civic education affects its effectiveness. First, Finkel discusses the issue of what kind of group conducts the education. He says the effect on participation “in developing democracies is intimately bound up with processes of group mobilization, as advocacy NGOs [i.e., important mobilizing agents] utilize civic education as a means for stimulating individuals to participate in group activities” (2002, 997). Further:

[T]he advocacy NGOs themselves may differ in the extent to which they directly encourage political participation among their members, as some groups place greater emphasis on other issues such as economic development, labor, or women’s and family rights (Carothers 1999). We may therefore expect that the stance of the group regarding the desirability of participation should be an important determinant of the subsequent political behavior of the individuals they train through civic education (Finkel 2002, 997).

Second, regarding the means by which to most effectively promote participation, Finkel finds that “a combination of ‘formal indoctrination’ and direct political experience; that is . . . both curricular instruction *and* group-related mobilization processes . . . appears to be highly capable of effecting substantial short-term change in individual behavior” (ibid, 1016, emphasis in original). This suggests that both formal education and adult civic education are needed for ensuring participation by citizens in community activities and public affairs in general. In a later piece, he and Ernst (2005) discuss more specifically about what kind of civic education works. It may be surprising that they found that classroom discussion per se (open atmosphere for an exchange of

views) makes no difference; rather, attitudinal and behavioral change requires hands-on experimental learning. They say,

What matters is mainly whether students engage directly in democratic role-playing, simulations, and the like, whether they participate actively in group projects, and whether they are taught by instructors whose perceived credibility, knowledge, and likeability facilitates the acceptance of the democratic messages contained in the civic curriculum (Finkel and Ernst 2005, 355).

The authors also note that this finding applies not only to students but that participation in, e.g., mock elections, mock trials, or dramatization of civil liberties disputes is important also for effective transmission of civic awareness and skills outside schools:

Such findings have been shown consistently for the effects of civic education among *adults* in developing democracies, as workshops that use more active, participatory teaching methods, and programs that emphasize community decision making and group problem solving exert significantly greater impact on individual attitudes and subsequent political participation than more traditional “chalk and talk” instructional programs (Finkel, 2002, 2003)(Finkel and Ernst 2005, 339-340; emphasis in original).

Thus, Finkel and Ernst emphasize both the methods used, and teacher qualities. “[I]f done ‘correctly,’ . . . civic education has the potential to be a vital resource in the democratization process” (ibid, 360). And the authors are not alone in emphasizing that *how* civic education is conducted has a crucial role to play in the results achieved--with hands-on, applied, training having larger effects than more theoretical, classroom based instruction.

2. Recipient Characteristics

In terms of how recipient characteristics (or recipients' background) influence the effects of civic education, extant studies seem to agree that the most important attributes are one's level of education and status in society. However, they do not agree on what kind of influence these attributes have. For example, both Bratton et al. (1999) and Finkel (2002, 2003) find that the "privileged elements in society" (Bratton et al., abstract) benefit most from civic education programs in that they are able to "translat[e] . . . mobilization messages into actual behavior" (Finkel 2002, 1013). Being privileged usually implies not only higher education but also membership in civil society groups, including churches, trade unions, and clubs (Finkel 2003; also Bratton et al. 1999). Finkel expresses concern about whether the higher impact among the well-off thereby has the desired overall effects: "[C]ivic education can and does affect the political participation of resource-poor individuals, but the greater effects seen among the resource-rich tends to exacerbate the existing 'stratification of participation' in developing democracies" (ibid, 1017). That is, civic education may widen existing disparities in level of participation between the rich (the well-to-do, with most education) and the poor (those with little education).

However, the USAID (2002) report and Blair (2003) have contrasting findings. According to the USAID report, "in more cases than not, the less educated benefited more from civic education than their more highly educated counterparts The implication is that civic education, when well managed, can help overcome some of the political advantages enjoyed by better educated citizens" (2002, 19). In Blair's words: "Civic education, when well done, can help non-elites to catch up somewhat with elites"

(2003, 64). Two additional variables discussed by the USAID study are gender and age. The study found that “men tended to receive greater benefit from civic education than women and that, while women showed gains in a number of important areas, civic education tended to reinforce gender disparities in the political realm” (1). Yet the Bratton et al. study on Zambia found women to be “equally receptive to civic education messages, even despite having enjoyed fewer educational opportunities than men” (1999, 11⁴³). Regarding age, the USAID study found civic education to have a weaker effect on students than on adults. This last finding may be surprising as young people are often thought of as being more receptive to new ideas and practices than adults.

Yet another recipient characteristic affecting the kinds of consequences that civic education has (though this could also be discussed as part of the context) is media exposure. The media are an important source of civic awareness (e.g., Agenda Participation 2000 2005; Bratton et al. 1999; White 1996).⁴⁴ In fact, according to one study, it is *the* most important source of civic awareness in Tanzania:

[I]t does not seem that information or campaigns from the local authorities have contributed to the citizens['] awareness When asked where they have received information on various government policies, such as tax policy, HIV/AIDS control policy, health policy, education policy, the local government reform etc., radio is by far the media the majority of the respondents refer to. Newspaper and other forms of information dissemination used by the local authorities seem to play a minor role (Braathen et al. 2005, 12).

Kuenzi’s findings on the importance of the radio in Senegal are very similar, and they can be applied to most rural areas in Africa: “Because of the low literacy rate and relatively high cost of newspapers, very few people in rural areas read the newspaper. Most of the

villages where interviews were conducted did not have electricity, and television ownership is rare” (2005, footnote 44).

3. Context

Finally, whether or not civic education has positive effects hinges on what type of context in which those exposed to civic education live. This refers to such issues as family, community, and—especially in transitional societies or new democracies—the broader society (Arthur and Davison 2002; Kanaev 2000). For example, Levinson who has examined the new civic education program initiated in Mexican schools in 1999 notes that one concern about the program’s effectiveness is “the cultural and political immaturity of the broader society to sustain whatever democratic habits and attitudes the school manages to develop in students” (2004, 270). A principal in a Mexican secondary school interviewed by Levinson praised the new program but lamented “that family and community life, not to mention the media, often directly contradict . . . the positive message of the program” (ibid, 280). Kanaev has identified the same problem, and stresses its deleterious implications: “A mismatch between what is taught in the classroom and the realities of everyday life can have an extremely negative influence upon the learning process, and civic education” (2000, 44). USAID too found this, emphasizing the impact of a country’s political culture: “Recent studies by USAID and others indicate that traditional approaches to civic education have met with limited impact. These studies suggest the difficulty of teaching civic education in environments where those democratic behaviors being taught in the classroom are not found in a country’s political culture” (2003, 15).

It is interesting to note that in his study of Kyrgyz pupils, Kanaev found that pupils tend to see the school's role more as a provider of factual information, whereas the impetus to applying the learnt information comes from mass media and peers:

In general, the different roles of the school, surroundings and mass media are quite clearly divided. The role of the school is predominantly viewed as providing theoretical basic knowledge about the rights and duties of a citizen Mass media and friends act as a primary source of information about the real utilization of the theoretical knowledge of the functioning of social mechanisms.^[45] Although it is impossible to assume that there is a strong disparity between the theoretical information and its practical implementation, the example of the school, for instance, shows that respondents tend to view these two dimensions as different (Kanaev 2000, 125).

In sum, though the features and methods of the civic education program are important, it is also important that one understands the attitudes of the recipients, as well as beliefs, customs, and norms found in their culture.

Participation

Contrary to the literature on civic education in developing countries, there exists an extensive literature on political participation. It seeks to explain variations in different modes of citizen participation both cross-nationally (e.g., Verba et al. 1978) and within nations (e.g., Bratton 1999). For example, within Africa scholars have paid attention to variation in voter turnout in founding elections in the early 1990s, despite similar pre-election developments and socio-economic conditions. Also, as Milbrath and Goel (1977) report, there is quite a lot of variation in levels of active membership in community organizations between countries like Austria, India, and Japan on the one hand (low participation), and Nigeria and the United States on the other (higher participation).⁴⁶

This section draws the main conclusions from this literature for this study. The section is organized by the three main explanatory factors for political participation: socio-economic, institutional, and cultural (Bratton 1999). Though most authors generally acknowledge the explanatory power of each of these, different authors give different weight to each explanation. For example, whereas Verba et al. (1978) focus on the interplay of socio-economic and institutional factors, Bratton's (1999) analysis suggests the main debate in explaining participation is between institutions and culture. He finds that though institutions (i.e., individuals' linkages to "organized bodies of formal rules") "are more important than cultural values in explaining participation,"⁴⁷ the two groups of factors work in tandem, and thus, democratic consolidation "is best conceived as a process of reciprocal codetermination between institution building and cultural change" (1999, 549, 554). "Therefore," Bratton stresses--defending this dualistic explanation for political participation--"we must recognize the false dichotomy posed by theorists who would have us choose between institutional and cultural modes of analysis" (583).

Explanatory Variables

1. Socioeconomic Status (SES)

The socioeconomic explanation, in which a person's level of education, income, and occupation determine much of his or her level of participation, has been widely confirmed. One can argue that the statement made by Verba et al. holds, generally speaking, everywhere: "The economically and socially better-off dominate politics" (1978, 2). As an unfortunate consequence, "Government policy . . . maintains and reinforces the position of those who are better off" (ibid, 2). However, in their intricate

study, Verba et al. condition the positive relationship between SES⁴⁸ and participation in several ways. Though they argue that the individual forces deriving from SES operate the same way in every nation, they recognize that “group motivations,” manifested in different kinds of institutions, intervene to modify the more or less linear relationship between SES and participation. An example is voting, which on the one hand is less subject to socioeconomic variation than many other modes of participation (as voters cannot, for example, choose the timing of participation; *ibid*; Milbrath and Goel 1977). On the other, voting has been more strongly correlated to SES in some countries (the United States) than others (Britain; Bratton 1999). Verba et al. also make a distinction between the effects of SES on local and national level: education, according to them, is not as related to participation on the community level as it is on the national level. This is interesting as one can question whether this also means that *civic* education has varying effects on participation on national and community level.

There exists a wide agreement that education normally promotes participation. Citing several studies, Milbrath and Goel say, “Persons of higher [SES], especially higher education, are more likely to become highly involved psychologically in politics than persons of lower status” (1977, 47).⁴⁹ Further, citing Campbell (1962, 20), they add: “Perhaps the *surest* single predictor of political involvement is number of years of formal education” (48; *emphasis added*). In explaining how and why education promotes participation, they refer in length to Almond and Verba (1963), with arguments including the higher awareness among the educated about the impact of government decisions; more frequent following of politics and election campaigns; possession of a wider range of opinions; higher likelihood of considering themselves “capable of influencing the

government”; and higher likelihood of being a member “in some organization” (Milbrath and Goel 1977, 99-100).

However, as implied above, education is less correlated to voting behavior than other modes of participation. This also supports expectations of this study that civic education too will correlate less with voting than with interelectoral participation. One explanation for lower propensity to vote among the educated, proposed by Milbrath and Goel, is that

in some countries higher levels of education do not lead to more patriotism, system-affection, political happiness, and a feeling that voting is a civic obligation. Data from India and Japan show that the more informed and knowledgeable citizens are also more hostile to the system and less patriotic (1977, 101).

2. Institutions

In explaining individual-level variation in participation within the same nation-state, one needs to define institutions in a micro sense—as has been done by Verba et al. (1978), Bratton (1999), and Bratton et al. (2005). This refers to “citizen affiliations with organized bodies of formal rules” (Bratton 1999, 554). Bratton’s description of micro level institutions, the process(es) linking people to them, and their effect on participation is worth quoting in full:

Citizens obtain institutional affiliations when they register as voters or when they join political parties or voluntary associations. Because people can exercise a measure of choice in deciding on their own portfolio of affiliations, institutional linkages vary across individuals and constitute a promising basis for distinguishing active from nonactive citizens. At the same time, institutions themselves vary in the extent to which their rules are compulsory. At one extreme, voter registration is a universal legal requirement for casting a ballot (in Zambia for persons older than 18 years); at the other, membership in voluntary associations is almost always optional (except for closed-union shops, which in Zambia employ a mere 2% of the workforce). One would expect that any institutional effects on political participation would vary according to the nature

of the affiliation rule, with compulsory affiliations causing greater impacts than voluntary ones

Affiliations with voluntary associations seem more consistently to increase participation (Almond & Verba, 1963). Groups organized around community, workplace, or religion provide opportunities for individuals to sharpen citizenship skills including public speaking, running meetings, and communicating with outside agencies (Brady et al., 1995) (Bratton 1999, 554).

Such skill sharpening is not a new phenomenon: “[f]rom Toqueville onward, voluntary associations and interest groups have been seen as training grounds for democratic citizenship and as way stations on the road to broader forms of political participation” (Bratton et al. 2005, 39). Both Bratton (1999) and Verba et al. (1978) consider political parties and voluntary organizations the most important institutions explaining citizen participation. This is because “[t]hey represent the major institutional links between the citizen and his government, links by which the preferences of citizens are communicated upward to political leaders” (Verba et al. 1978, 81). Political parties in particular are influential as they aggregate individual preferences and mobilize citizens (Bratton 1999; Milbrath and Goel 1977). According to Bratton et al., “[p]eople who identify with a political party are almost 17 percent more likely to vote than those who are unaffiliated” (2005, 299).⁵⁰ Also Milbrath and Goel note, “It is clear from many studies that those who are organizationally involved participate in politics at rates far greater than citizens who are not so involved” (1977, 110).⁵¹ Beyond party activism, scholars have found participation in organized religion to be “especially conducive to political activism, especially if it is organized congregationally rather than hierarchically” (Bratton et al. 2005, 40).⁵²

3. Culture

Similarly, when explaining individual level differences within single countries, “culture” must be defined in a micro sense. It includes such factors as the “psychological orientations and subjective preferences of individual political actors” (Bratton 1999, 553) and one’s relationship with elites (position in patronage networks) (Bratton et al. 2005).⁵³ Of such factors, the most widely discussed seems to be interest in politics. Though interest in politics, and political participation, seem to be almost tautological, Verba et al. (1978) point out that it is possible to be interested, yet inactive, and conversely, not interested and still participating. Such disjunctions are according to these authors a result of “institutional interference” (291). But most of the time, level of interest coincides with participation (Bratton 1999; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Verba et al. 1978). In Bratton’s dataset, “interest in politics was the only attitude that consistently helped to explain overall political participation and each of its modes. This variable clearly belonged in any ecumenical explanation” (568). He also found “[r]ural residence, age, and male gender [to be] all positively and significantly related to this variable in simple correlation tests” (568).⁵⁴ As regards the types of participation affected, interest is reported to relate “more strongly to campaign, community and protest activities and less strongly to voting and contacting” (Milbrath and Goel 1977, 46⁵⁵).

Another set of psychological-cultural factors relevant to political participation is “political efficacy feeling.” This entails such subjective feelings as self-esteem and self-confidence. Milbrath and Goel (1977) report that many studies have found political efficacy feelings—e.g., a sense that “I *can* influence decisions made”—to increase participation. This is so especially with regard to the more active forms of participation

like campaigning and community involvement. According to the authors, “women have been found to feel less competent than men” (60). It would thus seem that if civic education boosts democratic attitudes--in particular, efficacy--women would stand the most to gain, in that also their level of participation is usually lower than that of men.

Control Variables

1. Citizen Characteristics

Indeed, the variable that surfaces perhaps most often in the literature as a condition and predictor of participation is sex. Men are widely reported to be more active in politics than women (Bratton 1999; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Verba et al. 1978). In fact Milbrath and Goel point out, “The finding that men are more likely to participate in politics than women is one of the most thoroughly substantiated in social science” (1977, 116). Bratton finds that “gender is a better demographic predictor of participation than socioeconomic status”; overall, men are “significantly more likely to participate” politically than women (1999, 565). This is in part because men spend more time in environments that have political stimuli than women do (Milbrath and Goel 1977). Only in voting is there less of a gap between the sexes (Verba et al. 1978).

Another control variable is age. Milbrath and Goel note, “Many studies the world over have found that participation increases steadily with age until it reaches a peak in the middle years, and then gradually declines with old age” (1977, 114).⁵⁶ In turn, Bratton finds age to be positively correlated only with voting: “notably, beyond voting, age played no part whatever in influencing participation” (1999, footnote 22).

2. Context

Finally, serving to reinforce the point that the rural poor are in greatest need of a boost to their participation, one of the most important contextual correlates with participation is whether an individual resides in the center (that is, urban areas) or periphery (countryside). According to Milbrath and Goel, “One of the most thoroughly substantiated propositions in all of social science is that persons near the center of society are more likely to participate in politics than persons near the periphery” (1977, 89). Yet the authors’ subsequent comment suggests that this may not be as “thoroughly substantiated” a proposition after all:

At least two distinguishable trends can be seen in the literature. One version holds that urban living, as compared to rural, is conducive to higher involvement in politics The alternative perspective on urban-rural differences has shown, in a variety of studies, that there either is a lack of or a somewhat negative association between urban living and political activity, especially voting” (ibid, 106-7).

In fact Verba et al. (1978) found community participation to be greater in rural areas—due to communities there being smaller and people knowing each other. This, however, certainly does not apply to all geographical contexts or participatory acts, as this study too will demonstrate.

In a brief recapitulation of the two literatures reviewed, one can conclude that where the civic education literature meets that on political participation is in the debate between institutions and culture. That is, civic education studies seeking to understand effects on participation can uncover how institutional affiliations come to exist in the first place, and how they change. And they can contribute to the cultural debate by analyzing civic education’s effects on attitudes (i.e., culture). Are expected effects greater on

institutions or culture? At the outset, cultural factors (attitudes) would seem more amenable to manipulation than institutional affiliations (behavior). However, this question is not as easy to answer when attitudes are examined individually, with reference to efficacy, political interest, and trust. As the following chapter will argue, attitudes are indeed not always positively affected by civic education—and this makes the prediction about the relative effects on attitudes and institutional affiliations difficult. Beyond this debate, the next chapter will hypothesize civic education's effects on civic knowledge, in aspects not considered by past studies.

Chapter 3

EXPECTED EFFECTS OF CIVIC EDUCATION ON KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDES, AND PARTICIPATION

A review of the literature demonstrated that the debate about the effects of civic education on its recipients concerns less its quantity than quality. This simply means that the relatively brief periods of exposure to civic information that civic education normally involves are expected to play a small role in determining overall levels of participation, in comparison to factors like socioeconomic status. But it does not mean that civic education cannot make an important contribution, perhaps by equipping recipients with such knowledge, skills, and/or confidence that will make the scale tip in favor of participation, or encourage people to more actively participate in their communities.

Instead, the debate about the effects of civic education has to do with which aspects of cognizance--knowledge or attitudes—are affected more, or even whether participation can be influenced by civic education. It needs to be reiterated here that although this study focuses on effects on participation, such effects cannot be properly understood without also understanding effects on knowledge and attitudes, which logically serve as a backdrop and stimuli for participation. Therefore, the study hypothesizes on each of these three areas. The presentation of hypotheses is divided into those on the “immediate effects” on knowledge and attitudes, and “indirect effects” on participation. After presenting the hypotheses, the chapter outlines the proposed relationships between *each area of cognition* (i.e., knowledge, efficacy, political interest,

and trust) and *each act of participation*. These are not hypotheses, but rather provide partial justification for them. Also, following this, expected paths from civic education exposure to cognition, and onto participation, are outlined in Figure 3.1. The purpose is to demonstrate the linkages existing among the variables. Finally, the chapter concludes by summarizing the extent to which each hypothesis can be generalized to other contexts.

Immediate Effects on Cognition

Although there is not much disagreement about the effects of civic education on knowledge, the scholarship provides limited information of what *kind* of knowledge civic education boosts. To raise awareness in hopes of promoting participation, one needs to know which type of information is likely to encourage or enable people to participate. This study argues that in this sense, not all knowledge is of the same value. In particular, whether recipients can correctly identify certain facts about their political system or name certain office holders is of lesser value than their knowing their rights. Therefore, does civic education promote understanding of rights? This study expects that it does, and—due to the nature and typical content of civic education—it expects civic education to particularly boost the knowledge of civil and political rights, as opposed to socioeconomic rights.⁵⁷ Thus:

H1. Civic education promotes knowledge of civil, human, and political rights, but it does not promote knowledge of socioeconomic rights.

Gathering of the data required to test this hypothesis is important because it will allow one to know the extent to which poor people understand their rights to include those that go *beyond* their immediate physical needs. To be sure, knowing both kinds of rights is important. But participation is likely affected more by the knowledge of “first generation” (i.e., civil, human, and political) rights than “second generation” (socioeconomic) rights. This is because to participate, people first need to know that they can come together (that is, freedom of assembly), voice their opinions (freedom of expression), and evaluate government performance (right to hold the government accountable), before they can pursue their socioeconomic rights. According to the literature, the need for raising awareness of civil and political rights is high in, for example, Africa, where “people . . . need special help in understanding that they can demand political accountability from elected leaders, a right they have just begun to realize” (Bratton et al. 2005, 351-352).

Concerning the effects of civic education on attitudes, the literature disagreed about which attitudes are affected and how. While Kuenzi (2005) finds adult education to increase self-esteem, Finkel (2002) suggests that efficacy is affected little; also, while Finkel (2002) and Finkel and Ernst (2005) argue that civic education affects neither tolerance nor institutional trust much, USAID (2002) and Bratton et al. (2005) find evidence of a negative impact on institutional trust. Yet another important attitudinal factor, though not addressed much in the civic education literature but considered a prerequisite for “effective citizenship,” and therefore part of this study, is interest in politics (Bratton et al. 2005, 41).⁵⁸ The problem is, no scholar seems to have engaged in a systematic comparison of the relative effects of civic education on the various attitudinal

factors, particularly as regards efficacy. Therefore, program designs are based on inadequate understanding about program effects.

If one, however, speculates about the attitudinal factor on which civic education is likely to have the most positive effect, the logical answer is efficacy. This is because participation in a civic education program is likelier to uplift and empower people, than it is to elevate institutional trust,⁵⁹ or raise their interest in politics. Participants in civic education programs, which usually can only accommodate a limited number of people, may feel privileged and excited about the opportunity to participate; also, learning about such important things as their rights, responsibilities, the political system, and/or government policies likely boosts their sense of confidence in being able to tackle the challenges facing them or their communities. Therefore it is hypothesized:

H2. Civic education increases efficacy.

In contrast, for the above reason, it is quite clear why some (though not all) scholars expect civic education to affect trust in government/state institutions negatively: it often reveals unflattering information about the government and its representatives and “rais[es] the standards to which citizens hold public institutions” (Bratton et al. 1999, 813). The literature review mentioned Bratton et al.’s finding about the tendency of civic education to impart “healthy skepticism” toward leaders (2005, 250). Along these lines, this study expects:

H3. Civic education decreases trust in politicians.

Though not specifically hypothesized in this study, the most important question is what kinds of consequences this lack of trust has. By imparting distrust in politicians, does civic education do more harm than good by deepening the gulf between the masses and elites? Also, “Will this mistrust lead to enhanced motivation to participate in, monitor or improve government, or is it likely to result in alienation from engagement?” (Torney-Purta et al. 2001, 96). It should be noted that although Putnam (1993) found that *interpersonal* trust and participation in civic organizations go together, this is not evidence of causation (Peters 1998). Also, whether *institutional* trust⁶⁰--or lack thereof--is likely to promote various kinds of participation has been studied less.

Finally, the cognitive element on which the effects of civic education are most uncertain is interest in politics. In the absence of clues from the literature, it is conceivable that civic education could be as likely to reduce one’s political interest as to raise it. On the one hand, those exposed to civic education may become more interested in politics because they learn more about it and as they come to understand better the options they have in resolving their problems. But on the other, increased awareness of such problems in politics as inefficiency and corruption may diminish participants’ interest toward politics. Yet perhaps an increase in political interest is more likely.⁶¹ It is hypothesized:

H4. Civic education increases interest in politics.

On whom are these effects likely to be largest? When one wants to understand the participatory patterns of the rural poor, it is not enough to know whether civic education

has greater effect on the educated or the less educated. One also needs to know if other factors besides education are related to how much individuals learn and can benefit from civic education. The study argues that effects are relatively larger among the underprivileged. The underprivileged have more to gain from what civic education has to offer because, as less privileged, even discriminated, members of their communities, their opportunities to be exposed to information—such as through participation in various activities—are limited. It is hypothesized:

H5. Civic education has the greatest positive effect on the cognition and behavior of the relatively disadvantaged.

Thus, although this proposition is listed here under the immediate (i.e., cognitive) effects of civic education, it also applies to expected effects on participation. Thus the group whose level of participation civic education is expected to influence the most is the disadvantaged—for example, women. Therefore hypothesis 5 differs from the other hypotheses in that it will be tested in both Chapter 6 (dealing with cognition) and Chapter 7 (on effects on participation).

(Indirect) Effects on Participation

In addition to influencing the various cognitive elements and groups of people differently, civic education is expected to affect various participatory acts differently. Not all participation requires the same cognitive skills and dispositions. Because CE's sphere of influence is individuals' cognitive skills and dispositions, civic education is expected

to have a greater effect on participatory acts requiring these cognitive skills and dispositions than on those not requiring them. In particular, the former types of acts include contacting officials and participation at community meetings, while those of lesser expected impact include the mobilized acts--voting and mere attendance at community meetings. The former require more individual initiative than the latter. Therefore, they are considered “individualized” forms of participation. Beyond the mobilized participatory acts, civic education is also expected to have a lesser impact on group activities, such as participating in community groups and joining others to raise development issues.⁶² Therefore, with reference to the above six acts, it is hypothesized:

H6. Civic education boosts the individualized forms of participation more than it boosts mobilized or group acts.

Of these, the mobilized acts will receive less attention in this study. This is primarily because, as mentioned in Chapter 1, voter turnout has little variance to explain, with the majority of people engaging in it.⁶³ Also, compared to the other acts, it is less relevant, with opportunities for participation in most cases arising only once in a few years. But for comparative purposes, it is included in the following table, which juxtaposes each area of cognition with each act of participation. The purpose of Table 3.1. is to give a rough⁶⁴ indication of the likely relationships between cognitive elements and participatory acts.⁶⁵ The purpose of the table is to present some support for H6: why is it, through the expected effects on cognition hypothesized in H1-4, that civic education should have its greatest effects on the individualized acts of participation?⁶⁶ Note,

however, that the table does not facilitate a comparison of the magnitude of each relationship; thus H6 is not completely derivable from data presented in the table.

Table 3.1. Expected Relationships between Cognition and Various Participatory Acts

	Individualized Participation		Group Activity	
	Active Participation at Meetings	Contacting Local Officials	Raising Issues with Others	Memberships in Community Groups
Civic Knowledge	<p>POSITIVE</p> <p>Knowledgeable citizens are likely to contribute to the discussion more actively than those with less knowledge.</p>	<p>POSITIVE</p> <p>“Well informed citizens take the trouble to express their views so that government is directed to do what the well-informed citizenry want” (Halpern 2005, 188-9).</p>	<p>POSITIVE</p> <p>Knowledgeable persons are expected to take the initiative in various development questions because they are probably more likely than others to think of solutions to them.</p>	<p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>There is no reason that civic knowledge should promote memberships in community groups: knowledgeable citizens could rather feel that they do not need the support and “wisdom” provided by the groups but can instead manage their lives on their own.</p>
Efficacy	<p>POSITIVE</p> <p>Efficacious persons are likely to contribute actively to discussion at community meetings because they feel that they have something useful and worthwhile to say.</p>	<p>POSITIVE</p> <p>Efficacious citizens are more likely to approach their representatives than those that do not possess the confidence to approach the (usually) better educated and knowledgeable government officials.</p>	<p>POSITIVE</p> <p>Efficacious persons are likely to initiate issues because they feel that they can do something to improve the circumstances in the community. A piece of research on Costa Rica to which Bratton et al. refer¹ found that “a subjective sense of self-confidence propels people to . . . contribute to community development projects” (2005, 41).</p>	<p>POSITIVE</p> <p>Seligson’s study¹ identified “join[ing] voluntary organizations” as another consequence of self-confidence (referenced by Bratton et al. 2005, 41).² One can also expect efficacious persons to be more likely to seek leadership positions within these organizations.</p>

Table 3.1. Expected Relationships between Cognition and Various Participatory Acts (Continued)

	Individualized Participation		Group Activity	
	Active Participation at Meetings	Contacting Local Officials	Raising Issues with Others	Memberships in Community Groups
Trust in Politicians	<p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>There is no reason to expect that those who trust more in politicians would more actively contribute to discussion at community meetings.</p>	<p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>On the one hand, those trusting politicians may contact local officials more because they believe that such action will have positive consequences, but on the other, trust may also cause passiveness, even apathy (as a trusting person would rely on the fact that politicians will take care of things without his/her involvement). And it could be that it is rather distrust (or discontent) that propels a person to contact officials.</p>	<p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>Trust in politicians may make a person more likely to join others in raising issues in the community (especially if these issues also involve local politicians) but it is not necessarily related to such acts.</p>	<p>NEUTRAL</p> <p>As with raising issues with others, trust in politicians does not necessarily affect one's involvement in community groups: for example, in villages located relatively far from where the politicians are, people may rather join self-help groups <i>because</i> they do not trust that they will be helped by politicians.</p>
Interest in Politics	<p>POSITIVE</p> <p>Those interested in politics are likelier to participate actively in community meetings than those with no such interest.</p>	<p>POSITIVE</p> <p>Though Milbrath and Goel (1977) suggest that political interest does not impact the decision to contact officials as much as it influences some other acts of participation, it is not logical why this should be so. Therefore, the expected relationship here is positive.</p>	<p>POSITIVE</p> <p>Milbrath and Goel (1977) suggest that a person's interest in politics promotes his/her participation in "community activities" to a greater extent than it does, for example, his/her propensity to contact officials. It is expected that those interested in politics are more likely to initiate development issues in their community than others.</p>	<p>POSITIVE</p> <p>Bekkers (2005) found that interest in politics promotes associational memberships. This is logical as associations may be an effective avenue for seeking to influence political outcomes.</p>

Table 3.1. Expected Relationships between Cognition and Various Participatory Acts (Continued)

Mobilized Participation		
	Voting	Attendance at Community Meetings
Civic Knowledge	<p style="text-align: center;">NEUTRAL</p> <p>As mentioned in the literature review, voting is the mode of participation which is least affected by education (a proxy for knowledge). Instead, voting has more to do with institutional factors. Also in corrupted societies educated people may shun away from polls because they are more likely to recognize and be repelled by the flaws in the electoral system.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">NEUTRAL</p> <p>Knowledgeable persons may not sense the need to attend community meetings because they may be aware of other, more efficient, avenues for taking action, such as through contacting various leaders individually.</p>
Efficacy	<p style="text-align: center;">NEUTRAL</p> <p>Referring to Seligson's study of Costa-Rican peasants,¹ Bratton et al. mention "vot[ing] in national and local government elections" as another consequence of "a subjective sense of self-confidence" (2005, 41). Perhaps this is because confidence makes a person feel (s)he has more influence in the elections than what is really the case.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">NEUTRAL</p> <p>Like knowledgeable persons, efficacious persons may choose to abstain from attending community meetings because they feel they can influence issues through some other means by themselves.</p>
Trust in Politicians	<p style="text-align: center;">POSITIVE</p> <p>Those exhibiting trust in politicians probably vote more because they trust that votes are counted correctly and that in general, elections are conducted fairly.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">NEUTRAL</p> <p>There is no reason to expect that trust in politicians will increase a person's likelihood in attending community meetings: rather, a person may attend meetings because the community is not receiving help from politicians and thus community members feel they need to seek solutions by themselves.</p>
Interest in Politics	<p style="text-align: center;">POSITIVE</p> <p>Those interested in politics probably exercise their suffrage more often than others.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">POSITIVE</p> <p>Those interested in politics probably attend community meetings more than others.</p>

Notes:

¹ Seligson, Mitchell. 1980. "Trust, Efficacy and Modes of Political Participation: A Study of Costa Rican Peasants." *British Journal of Political Science* 10: 75-98.

² Bratton et al. also emphasize the reverse linkage, that is, the role that membership in associations plays in enhancing self-esteem: "Can the development of personal self-confidence be attributed to the experience of associating with others in an institutional setting? We think so, at least in one limited respect: our data indicate that members of associations are significantly more likely to express an efficacious understanding of the way that government works" (2005, 254).

Table 3.1. suggests that the area most amenable to manipulation by civic education—that is, civic knowledge—does not necessarily play a large role in promoting associational memberships, which according to the literature is one of the most important determinants of participation. Figure 3.1. drafts the paths through which civic education may affect overall participation. Notice that this figure is only intended to give a bigger picture of the linkages among civic education, the various cognitive factors, and participation. Although the study does not hypothesize about these paths,⁶⁷ Figure 3.1. suggests some routes by which civic education likely connects with participation, through the cultural (i.e., cognitive) and institutional determinants of participation. The figure depicts, for example, that the primary determinants of participation are political interest and institutional factors.⁶⁸ Notice that there is also a strong linkage between efficacy and participation (including membership in associations), which is an established finding in the literature (e.g., Cohen et al. 2001).




Figure 3.1. Expected Paths from Civic Education to Participation, via Effects on Civic Knowledge and Attitudinal Factors

Notes:

¹ Denotes awareness raising about citizens' rights and responsibilities

² Denotes democratic participation, especially on the local level

³ Notice that unlike the other areas of cognition, this is expected to have a negative relationship with civic education

- All the arrows in the figure describe an expected positive relationship in the direction shown; however, the arrow from lack of trust in politicians to participation could be either positive or negative (both trust and distrust may drive participation).

- Thickness of the arrows depicts the rough strength of the expected relationship (there are 4 thickness levels in the figure).

- The dotted arrows stand for an indirect relationship. For example, if a person increases his/her knowledge of rights and responsibilities, that may increase his/her belief in, and effective actions toward, getting a better job (and thus climbing the socio-economic ladder).

- The arrows from SES to civic knowledge and efficacy are derived from Cohen et al. (2001) who found that the effects of SES on participation are mediated by these variables.

- As Bratton et al. (2005) point out, attitudes are also a consequence, not only cause, of participation; thus in reality arrows run in more directions than what this figure suggests.

From Civic Education to Political Participation

If one looks at the thickness of the arrows running from civic education to participation, Figure 3.1 also suggests that the path of greatest influence would run through attitudinal change (rather than an increase in civic knowledge). But certainly, in practice a change in awareness and attitudes probably often go together.

The figure also suggests that a key link in boosting participation is associational membership. Thus an important question is, Does civic education influence a person's likelihood to join, and/or his/her extent of involvement in, voluntary associations? Though it was hypothesized in H6 that civic education has its greatest influence on the more individualized acts like active participation at community meetings and contacting local officials, there is no reason to argue that civic education could not also influence associational memberships positively. This will be tested in regression analyses. Further, does civic education promote relatively more the associational memberships of the disadvantaged groups?

The testing of these six hypotheses will contribute to understanding about civic education's link to participation—especially as regards the role of cognition and cognitive elements' relationship with associational membership. In which ways do the expectations about what makes people participate differ from findings of extant studies? One difference is the importance attributed to attitudes and in particular a person's self-esteem (i.e., efficacy).

Generalization

To which “universe of cases” (Geddes 2003, 97) are the hypotheses applicable? The only “universe” to which all six propositions could apply is poor transitional countries—which is the intended realm of application here—though half of them could well apply to consolidated democracies too. Among those applicable only to poor transitional countries are the first three hypotheses on the immediate effects of civic education: H1 and H2 are likely true only in poor countries where universal education is not yet reality, which is why there, civic education has higher informative value (H1) and higher attitudinal impact on efficacy (H2) than it probably does in rich countries which have comprehensive and good quality education systems. In turn, civic education is only likely to reduce trust in politicians (H3) in transitional countries because in them (a) problems like corruption and inefficiency among power holders and government institutions are severe enough to cause, when revealed, a decline in such trust, and (b) problems like these (obviously) get more attention in civic education campaigns as opposed to civic awareness campaigns in consolidated democracies.⁶⁹

In turn, H4 is likely to be applicable to mature democracies too. In these polities, what hinders participation is probably often citizens’ perception of the lack of relevance of politics to their lives, which civic education could help prove to be inaccurate. Also, it is logical that also in mature democracies the individuals most likely to benefit would be the disadvantaged (H5)—that is, the less educated or the less well off, but also those who are in general detached from their political system. Finally, there is no reason that the effects on the type of participation would not be similar in consolidated democracies:

there too civic education is likely to boost skills and dispositions which are more usable in individualized participatory acts such as contacting one's local representative.

But *as a whole*, this study of the impact of civic education on participation applies only to poor transitional countries—countries with populations that, due to the lack of reach of formal education in their countries, are in great need of civic awareness, and that have mostly not yet realized their democratic right of participation in practice. Even so, the study is not applicable to entire populations in poor transitional countries; indeed elites (the better-off citizens) are largely excluded from it. Thus, by not extending the research to the better off—which would thereby ensure more variation in one important determinant of political participation (i.e., a person's socio-economic level)—the study is not a general inquiry of participation. Yet the findings will be important in helping development practitioners and governments understand how and why poor people participate, even when their socio-economic circumstances would predict otherwise, and therefore what are the most fruitful means to empowering the masses as participants of democracy in poor transitional countries.

What, then, are some of the practical implications of the study's arguments to those devising civic education programs as instruments to boost participation? Though this is an issue that will be tackled at the end of the study, some implications can be suggested here. One is: if civic education does have its greatest effect on increasing knowledge, how could the increased knowledge be harnessed in such a way that it contributes positively to attitudinal change, by promoting people's sense of efficacy and empowering them to participate? In general, how could civic education and other development programs be conducted in such a way as to increase recipients' self-esteem?

Another challenge—arising from the determinants of participation—is: since community associations are often important mobilizing agents, how could civic education be conducted in such a way as to promote participation in these associations? In turn, what should be community groups' role in the planning and implementation of civic education?

The next chapter will describe how this study sets out to test the hypothesized effects of civic education. It will explain the approach, methodology, and sampling used. In so doing it outlines how and why some choices made differ from those made by other studies, describes how the various concepts are operationalized, and what types of challenges are entailed in using a survey questionnaire--a relatively little utilized research instrument in the African context.

Chapter 4

APPROACH AND METHODS

In studying civic education's effects on participation, this study's approach is unique in two ways: on the one hand with regard to considering civic education contextually—in the aggregate—and on the other by utilizing a subjective assessment (by research participants) of participants' exposure to civic education. Such an approach takes into account both resource and attitude based explanations to individuals' political participation, as advocated recently by, for example, Bekkers (2005). In her research on voluntary associations, Bekkers argued that participation should be understood by combining the explanations provided by psychology (personality), sociology (resources, i.e., human capital and social capital) and political science (values and attitudes).⁷⁰ The present study adopts such an interdisciplinary approach. It also heeds the advice of Geddes who has called for comparativists to pay more “[e]xplicit attention to the psychological and cognitive mechanisms that underlie individual action” (2003, 222).

This chapter first explains what is meant by its contextual approach; this applies to civic education in particular but also to analysis in general. This is followed by a summary of what is meant by “subjectivity”—a unique approach used to determine civic education exposure. Next, the chapter describes methodology, including the structure of and questions found in the survey instrument.⁷¹ Then, some issues to keep in mind when evaluating results obtained from this (and other) survey based research are outlined. The

chapter ends by explaining the logic of selecting respondents, and describes the samples with regard to some demographic data. The logic of selecting the target countries is explained in the following chapter.

Context Sensitivity

Indeed, civic education is understood in this study contextually, with a view to activities in the regions as a whole in which the research took place. That is, the study does not evaluate civic education programs of particular donor(s) or organization(s) but tries to understand the provision of civic education in the target regions as a whole. The goal is to take into account the multiplicity of sources for rights information that residents may have. By doing so it adopts a “situated view” of civic education, purporting to be more context sensitive than previous studies (Torney-Purta 2000, 94).⁷²

Adopting a contextual approach also refers to the attempt to avoid in the study what according to Gould is “the weakly contextualized analysis of much contemporary political science, international relations or geography” (2004b, 268). It means taking into account the historical experiences, domestic and international configurations of power, and other factors in the research sites (Koponen 2004; Seppälä 2000). This concurs with Seppälä’s (2000) “decentred” or “arena” model of evaluating development aid (of which civic education is often part). In it, “the aid project is pushed away from the central position. Instead the existing social processes in the given location are placed in focus, and aid is analysed only in relation to these on-going processes” (ibid, 17).

Proponents of such an approach urge analysts of aid’s impact to situate their research within the research context, not the other way around. This means the starting

point should be the context, not the aid intervention. A Tanzanian academic agrees, indicating that what this means is that researchers should start their inquiry by uncovering people's concerns and pressing needs, and seeing which part civic education may have in helping resolve them.⁷³ One could ask, "Where do people's 'irritations' come from—for example, do they come from hospitals, interaction with the police, schools, courts, or something else?"⁷⁴ The implication of this is that in Tanzania and Zambia where health concerns predominate (Bratton et al. 2005),⁷⁵ the significance of civic education could be understood by analyzing whether civic education has enabled people to seek and find solutions to their health related problems, due to, for example, people knowing more about their rights and/or avenues for redress.

The Challenge of Attributing Causality

But when one examines civic education with a commitment to context sensitivity, it is all the more difficult to tell apart the role of various agents and identify real causal factors. For example, when civic education is given as part of participatory development aid, it is very difficult to differentiate the role of the aid intervention from what the indigenous actors and institutions do. The Rural Integrated Project Support (RIPS) Programme in southeastern Tanzania illustrates this: it aimed to support the functions and agendas of local government institutions, especially so as to enhance the interaction between the local government and citizens.⁷⁶ In the words of the program manager of RIPS:

It's impossible [to distinguish aid's role] because the local [government] reform program started in the year 2000 and they've had a big impact on . . . democratization processes on the village level through to the Council . . . I mean, government and donor funded programs have been promoting similar things since

about 2000; it's just that RIPS came earlier. [It's] picking a needle out of a haystack.⁷⁷

She continued, “The question as I see it is how RIPS got involved in developing people’s livelihoods. So it’s not as much them getting involved in RIPS as RIPS getting involved in their processes.”

In his study of aid in rural Tanzania Seppälä (2000) too notes this inseparability of aid from local processes and institutions. He notes that the social setting for the possible partnerships in rural Tanzania includes the following six groups of actors: (1) donor agency and its local projects, (2) central government presence, (3) local government authority, (4) civil society organizations, (5) private entrepreneurs, and (6) ordinary citizens. Then he says,

I am primarily interested in the relationship between the first and the last actor: the donor agency and the citizens. However, their relationship is mediated by the four other actors. In any local setting, a donor agency needs to work through intermediaries. It needs to define an appropriate role for itself, for the four intermediaries and for the citizens.

The simple list of actors hides a complex and dynamic set of interests and social relationships. Each of the six actors has an active relationship with the five others, making a total of thirty relationships. If we transfer the level of analysis from abstract categories to actual social actors, the number of relevant actors at any given sub-national context can be counted in dozens and the number of social relationships in hundreds (Seppälä 2000, 16).

In the case of civic education, it is difficult to separate, in particular, the roles and influences of donors versus NGOs: aid given by donors is usually implemented by NGOs (though in the case of RIPS, for example, certainly also by the local Council). Thus in his study of aid’s impact on NGOs’ advocacy work, Blair concluded: “It makes sense, then, to view the present effort to assess advocacy impact as an analysis of donor programmes

as well [as] CSO [Civil Society Organization] efforts” (2004, 86). These are points that need to be taken into account in this study as well. Indeed a Tanzanian professor emphasized similarly that one needs to exercise caution when attributing causality; in his view, “civic education cannot, should not, be used as an independent variable.”⁷⁸ He compared civic education to an exercise of climbing Mount Kilimanjaro: civic education may provide the climber the motivation to climb the mountain but by itself it does not enable him to conquer it. In other words, in the final analysis one probably cannot attribute too much to civic education.

Finally, context sensitivity also means that the opportunities for citizen participation in each locale (that is, village or town) are taken into consideration. For this purpose the study acquired data about the frequency of village (or sub-village) meetings and elections as well as development projects in the village. After all, if community meetings are not held (as an interviewee in Tanzania indicated is often the case),⁷⁹ the significance of participation is different than if they were held regularly. In principle, as the following chapter will show, opportunities for participation at community meetings are more frequent in Tanzania (with statutory rules about frequency of village meetings) than Zambia (where village meetings are more ad hoc). Similarly, if there are no development projects, people cannot participate fully.

Subjectivity

The approach is subjective in that exposure to civic education and respondents’ level of participation is determined largely based on information given by respondents. That is, while in Tanzania each person’s exposure to civic education is cross-checked

against village government records,⁸⁰ the primary means of determining whether respondents have received civic education was by asking them. Also, while some aggregate data were gathered (that is, on attendance at community meetings and community members' contributions to development projects), most participation data consist of respondents' subjective evaluation of how and how much they have participated. Though not perfect, self-assessment is important and arguably the only way to really get at what civic education means for each respondent and how respondents see their participation in the community.

Yet this kind of subjective approach needs to be accompanied by awareness that often, those interviewed have a stake in continued funding, and thus tend toward positive comments to questions posed by foreigners (Carothers 1999). Recognizing such factors—as well as the researcher's own “positionality” (Gould 2004b)—is important. If the researcher thinks of development aid as essentially “good” and improvable, then this will impact findings and recommendations to be made. “Positionality” and assumptions held are often hidden, but can have significant consequences: “Consciousness acts selectively on a great mass of stimuli, sorting out ‘what is and what is not worth noticing, what is important and valuable and what is insignificant and valueless’” (Sadler 1981, 125, quoting Najder 1975, 5). According to Gould, “Aid has no empirical objectivity irrespective of the position of the observer” (2004a, 6). In fact, he stresses: “How one deals with normative positionality – and above all with the way one relates to the normative rhetoric of development agents – can be decisive for the success of the research venture as a whole” (Gould 2004b, 277).

Survey Instrument and In-Depth Interviews

As its main research instrument, this study uses a semi-structured questionnaire, administered in the respondents' own language as a one-on-one oral interview.⁸¹

Interviews were oral because both countries have an oral communication culture and because many respondents were illiterate. They took place in respondents' home village (or town), in an outdoor public place to which respondents had been asked to gather. The interviewer in most cases was a male, but about 15 interviews were conducted in the Zambian village of Mabumba with the help of a female interpreter.⁸² The interviewer posed the questions orally, and marked respondents' answers on the questionnaire. Each interview lasted 25-45 minutes.⁸³ Data were only gathered at one point in time.⁸⁴

The questionnaire was administered to "treatment" and control groups—which has been the most common strategy adopted when studying the effects of civic education.⁸⁵ However, as pointed out, one way that this study differs from most other studies is with regard to the target group: whereas others have analyzed data on students (e.g., Finkel and Ernst 2005; Levinson 2004), or focused on elites (Blair 2003; Bratton et al. 1999), this study was restricted to the rural poor. In fact, in Bratton et al.'s (1999) Zambia study—which used "quasi-experimental" interview methodology--most respondents were educated and 80 percent lived in urban areas. The authors found that "none of the civic education messages germinated" among those with low education and no media exposure—that is, the bulk of respondents in this study (817)! The exception to this is Kuenzi (2005) whose study in Senegal exclusively involved rural citizens 18 years of age or older. However, Kuenzi's study analyzed programs on basic literacy and numeracy skills, and therefore it also is not directly comparable with the present one.

In their analysis, all these studies, including the present one, utilize OLS multiple regression methodology.⁸⁶ More specifically, this study uses hierarchical (or stepwise) regression, in which groups of variables are entered into the model in “steps,” determined on theoretical grounds. This will enable one to assess the unique contribution by various explanatory groups (i.e., social structure, cognitive awareness, institutional influences, democratic attitudes). It will thereby facilitate answering the question of whether institutions matter more than culture—defined as personal cognitive and attitudinal factors. Although the sample has little variance on socioeconomic factors, the role of structural factors can be assessed with reference to variables designed to measure “class” differences among the rural poor. A summary of the variables included in the models can be found in Appendix F.⁸⁷ Otherwise, operationalization of concepts, in the form of survey questions, is discussed below, with details on the questions provided in Appendix E.

An additional research tool--although not a systematic part of analysis—was to conduct in-depth interviews of key observers so as to enhance understanding of the context and enable a more accurate interpretation of results. The interviews were conducted among NGO staff, (local) government officials, donor representatives, church and community leaders, and others in district and national capitals. Lessons learnt from these interviews are incorporated especially in the next chapter describing the research context.⁸⁸

Survey Structure and Questions

The survey consisted of roughly 50 questions,⁸⁹ including many standard questions measuring political participation as used in extant studies, as well as demographic questions and other control variables utilized in civic education studies (for example, Finkel and Ernst 2005). Borrowing questions from other studies will facilitate at least some comparison with them.⁹⁰ Ideas for questions also came from a 2005 joint research report on citizen experiences and satisfaction with decentralization in Tanzania (Braathen et al. 2005). This report analyzed data on the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP), including local authorities' ability to provide services and the Programme's impact on citizens and their participation in governance.⁹¹

The questions appeared in the following order: demographic questions; questions on media exposure; attitudinal, behavior, and awareness questions in a mixed sequence; and finally, questions about exposure to civic education.⁹² The bulk of the questions dealt with participation. Civic education was intentionally left as the last section, so as not to emphasize in the very beginning that the survey's purpose was to analyze civic education's effects on participation. If the civic education section had been included in the beginning, it is likely that answers to those questions, as well as questions on participation, would have been inflated. Below, demographic and media exposure questions are briefly described first, followed by a somewhat more detailed discussion of the questions used, and variables measuring, civic education exposure, cognition, and participation.

The demographic questions sought information on respondents' sex, age, marital status, family and household size, residential mobility, education, occupation, and

religion. The questions were asked in this order. All of them have a bearing on respondents' opportunities, incentives, and/or ability to participate in community affairs. For example, age may influence participation in such a way that although they may be motivated, the youth is not always allowed to participate (due to cultural norms); similarly women often have the least time to participate due to family responsibilities. Family and household size also likely affect the opportunity to participate. These items were uncovered by two questions, first, by the number of biological children ("children of your own")⁹³ and second, by the total number of children under the respondent's care. In Africa there can often be a notable difference in answers to these two questions, as people often also look after children of extended family and/or the community's orphans. In turn, the question about residential mobility—"How long have you lived in this village?"—was included so as to understand whether the respondents have acquired their knowledge and experiences recorded in the survey in their village or elsewhere (such as in a town from which they came). In the latter case the respondent is likely less bound by village tradition and norms, and most likely also to have received his/her schooling elsewhere. This is important when analyzing civic education's effects.

Education was inquired about by asking respondents about the highest level of education they have attained, with the answer options being "no formal education," "primary school (partial or completed)," "secondary school (partial or completed)," and "post-secondary school." When we encountered respondents who had (additionally) been to college or vocational school, a category integrating these answer options was added. However, as pointed out by a missionary in Tanzania,⁹⁴ attendance at a vocational school does not mean that the person has finished secondary school. Therefore, for those that

have attended vocational school, information was also collected on whether they had finished secondary school. In analyzing the question on education, one should bear in mind that in the majority of cases, level of education is more an indicator of affluence than intelligence⁹⁵: due to the cost of tuition, uniforms, books, and other things, many among the poor cannot attend or complete secondary school. When coding this question, the level of education for those that went to school during colonial times was converted to the current system so that “Standard 5” and above in Tanzania, and “Standard 6” and above in Zambia, refer to partial secondary school.⁹⁶ It is admitted that the way education was operationalized in the survey is not optimal; a better operationalization would have referred to the “number of years of education received”—so as to yield a continuous (numerical) as opposed to an ordinal variable.⁹⁷

The next question about respondents’ occupation⁹⁸ acts as a proxy for income.⁹⁹ The answer choices cover the main lines of work found in the target villages: agriculture, fishing, small business, artisan work, and wage employment.¹⁰⁰ Data from this question were afterwards converted to farmers and non-farmers, used as a type of “class” measure in regression analyses.¹⁰¹

The last demographic question, on religion, will not be as amenable to analysis as would be desirable because in both country samples, there is very little variation in religion. Therefore, any differences between Christians’ and Muslims’ cognition and patterns of participation will also be differences between Zambians and Tanzanians, and so it is impossible to know which variable (religion or context) is driving the results. In both countries, if respondents identified themselves as Christians, they were also asked to identify their denomination. One reason is that Catholics are generally considered more

active than those in other denominations (Huntinton 1991; Weigel 1989). Though the survey did not ask respondents about their frequency or extent of involvement in the church, mosque, or other religious activities,¹⁰² it is believed that some light on this will be shed by the question on respondents' membership(s)/leadership(s) in community groups, which include religious groups (see below).

Finally, the reason that four (later five) questions about media exposure were included is that, as noted in the literature, the media is an important source of civic information, and should therefore be controlled for. First, in an open-ended question the survey asked respondents about their source of national news (the concept was clarified by saying “news from Mbeya [i.e., a sizeable town in southwest Tanzania] or Dar es Salaam” or something similar). Second, to complement this, in the middle of the research in Tanzania a question about the source of *local* news was added.¹⁰³ With “local,” the question meant village level news and news from adjacent areas. Next, three questions were asked about whether (and if so, how often) respondents obtained national news from radio, newspapers, and television. Each was a multiple choice question, with the answer choices being “no,” “every now and then,” “every week,” and “every day.” During the course of data gathering, it became evident that the Kiswahili translation for “every now and then” was problematic. That is, it turned out that *mara kwa mara* (literally: free to access whenever one wants) overlapped with another answer option, i.e., “every day.” The overlap was problematic in case the respondent felt that (s)he had free access to radio/newspapers/tv every day. Therefore, the “every day” came to have a literal meaning in Tanzania. Also, it turned out that, after having completed about 120 interviews, a category “occasionally” had to be added.¹⁰⁴

Civic Education Exposure

As suggested above, exposure to civic education was determined with a very inclusive question on whether the respondent has ever been taught/told by anybody about his/her rights. The question was meant to capture not only organized civic education workshops or other similar training, but also purported to give respondents the opportunity to identify any other sources of rights education that they deemed relevant (even including family and friends). Therefore it is believed that this question captures all relevant sources of civic education in respondents' lives. If the respondent answered "yes" to this question, it was followed by questions about what the occasion was, and who taught him/her. Some respondents were also asked when the training took place and what the duration of the training was (and sometimes also the rough number of participants and why the respondent participated or why (s)he thinks (s)he was selected as a participant). However, because the latter information was not obtained from everyone, it cannot be utilized very well statistically. [Finally, in Zambia respondents were asked what in their opinion is the best method to teach villagers about their rights— remove, if I don't have time to analyze this variable.]

One should note that contrary to some previous studies, in this study civic education exposure is not quantifiable to a greater extent than, in most categories, whether a person participated or not (i.e., yes or no). The exception is training events conducted by government staff and/or NGOs, which the respondents in some cases quantified beyond yes/no, as reported above. This type of crude measurement of exposure is quite unavoidable in a context-based approach in which written records of participants

in training events are not kept and measurement of exposure is based on recollection of respondents, most of whom are illiterate and may have received the training a while back. Therefore, in regression analyses, exposure to civic education will not be represented by a single continuous measure but by a number of binary variables of the various types of training.

Civic Knowledge

Data on civic knowledge was gathered from six different questions, in which respondents were asked to identify all (1) government's policies, (2) citizen's rights, (3) women's rights, (4) children's rights, (5) citizens' responsibilities, and (6) government's responsibilities, respectively, that they knew.¹⁰⁵ Data are analyzed both in the aggregate, and with reference to various types, as required by hypothesis 1. These types referred to the kinds of rights and responsibilities mentioned by respondents, with analysis involving tallying answers into civil, human, and political ones on the one hand, and socioeconomic ones on the other.¹⁰⁶

However, answers were also tallied according to other clusters that the data contained. Of particular interest were the subtypes of civil, human, and political rights. In addition to the knowledge of the "first generation" rights in general, are there specific rights and responsibilities within this category, the knowledge of which would be conducive to being promoted by civic education? One could expect that civic education could enhance the expression of such awareness that has to do with rights and responsibilities related to "expression and initiating" and those concerning participation.

All this survey's questions on civic knowledge are open ended. Therefore identification of rights, responsibilities, and government policies really requires pre-existing knowledge of them. The potential sources of such information for villagers (outside of school) include village meetings, other events organized in the village (including civic education sessions), visits by the Councilor,¹⁰⁷ and the media, which may inform people of the rights and responsibilities as stipulated in the constitution, Council policies, party policies, and/or village bylaws.¹⁰⁸ In the words of a UNICEF representative in Tanzania, "NGOs and CSOs have done wonderful work in terms of explaining rights and responsibilities" to people, being well able to penetrate into communities.¹⁰⁹

Notice that measuring civic knowledge with reference to awareness of rights and responsibilities means it is virtually impossible to judge the correctness of answers, like other studies have done. That is, because "rights" like "responsibilities" is a very broad and inclusive concept—indeed, almost anything can be expressed as a right!—it is not possible to judge the correctness of respondents' answers, except in clear cases of error.¹¹⁰ An example is a respondent mentioning something as a children's right which clearly is only adults' rights.

Efficacy

Efficacy is measured primarily by responses to the following questions: (1) "Do you feel you can adequately influence the decisions made in your family?" and (2) "Do you feel you can adequately influence the decisions made in your community?" The answer options are "yes," "no," and--"if not, why do you think not?"¹¹¹ In addition, *lack*

of efficacy was measured for a subset of respondents—those who said they did not participate in an act¹¹² with their answer as to “why not” containing reference to lack of efficacy. Appendix E contains full description of how efficacy and lack of efficacy were measured.

Trust

In turn, trust in politicians is operationalized by a question evaluating district leadership: “Does the leadership of this District care about people’s questions and concerns?” with answer options being “yes,” “no,” “fifty-fifty,” and “don’t know.” It is acknowledge that this question also taps into performance satisfaction so it is used only as a general measure of trust. Also, as with efficacy, a measure of *lack* of trust was constructed for those who referred to it their answers; these were the same questions as what was used to measure lack of efficacy, that is, on why the respondent did not participate.¹¹³ Trust could also be a part of some respondents’ answer as to why they were not satisfied with the discussion(s) they have had with their local Councilor (those that had had such a discussion). Did the respondent mention something about the Councilor’s/government’s trustworthiness or honesty? Also, was this kind of reasoning expressed by those respondents that say they are not interested in politics, or do not like discussing politics?

Interest in Politics

The final attitudinal variable, interest in politics, was operationalized by questions, (1) “Generally speaking, are you interested in politics?” with answer options being “no,” “somewhat,” “very,” and “don’t know,” and (2) “Do you enjoy discussing politics with others?” with answer options being “yes, every now and then,” “yes, once in a while,” and “no, I don’t.” In Zambia, if respondents said they were not interested in politics, they were asked why not,¹¹⁴ with these data used, when relevant, to contribute to the “lack of efficacy” or, more often, “lack of trust” measures.

Participation

The survey asked respondents about six areas of participation: two individualized acts, two group acts, and two mobilized acts. One of the individualized acts was active participation at community meetings--the extent to which the respondent participates at meetings.¹¹⁵ There were five answer options and respondents could select as many as were applicable: listen to what is being said, ask questions, express one’s opinion, participate in organizing the meeting, and other, what? Each way to participate was coded as a dummy variable (yes/no), and the sum of the “yes” answers (with the exception of listening) formed a “total active participation at community meetings” variable, with a range of scores from 0-4.¹¹⁶

The second individualized form of participation—contacting the Councilor—was operationalized by a question on whether, and if so, how many times the respondent had ever contacted the Ward Councilor in matters pertaining to development. According to the Tanzanian research assistant who conducted the interviews, contacting the Councilor

is quite a common thing to do in Tanzania. Therefore, asking respondents about contacting this particular official will yield valid information about how much respondents are in touch with their representatives.¹¹⁷

In turn, the first measure of group participation—expected to be an important determinant of other forms of participation—was respondents' memberships in community groups.¹¹⁸ Respondents were asked if they have been a member or a leader in any (village) committee, cooperative, association, or another group, and if so, which one(s). The question was worded in such a way that all groups existing in the community would be included, including political parties, cooperatives, village organs, self-help (economic) groups, religious groups, school based groups (e.g., parent-teacher associations), and others.¹¹⁹ The answers were analyzed by counting the number of groups, whether the respondent was involved as a member or a leader in them, and what types of groups they were.

The basis for categorizing the groups was the classification used by the Afrobarometer.¹²⁰ However, these categories were complemented and/or modified according to what groups the answers contained, and how they clustered. Thus, with theory as the guidepost, typologies arose from the data, with the aim being to form typologies that, to the extent possible, were applicable to both Tanzania and Zambia. Such an approach has been emphasized by Montgomery and Crittenden (1977) who caution against forcing data to fit preconceived categories.¹²¹ The data-driven categorization of variables was also utilized for other data obtained in the survey through open-ended questions.

This method yielded 19 separate variables for types of community groups, which were grouped under seven main categories: political parties, village government organs, farmers' and other cooperatives, church groups, women's groups, other community groups (including health groups, HIV/AIDS specific groups, nutrition groups, groups looking after the vulnerable members of the community, crime prevention groups, cultural expressional groups, educational groups, and youth groups), and finally, other groups. Therefore, notice that the typology is very inclusive, including not only community groups but also political parties and village government organs. After coding, a "total participation in community groups" variable was created by multiplying each leadership position with 1.5 and adding their sum to a sum of memberships. This was because leadership arguably requires a higher level of participation than mere membership.

The second measure of group participation was the number of times the respondent has joined others to raise an issue of importance to the community. If respondents said they had done so at least once, they were also asked which issues they had raised. This question was asked to get an understanding of the issues that are important to respondents, but by itself, it did not form a variable measuring participation.

Finally, respondents were asked about mobilized forms of participation: voting in the most recent national and community elections (yes/no). If the respondent said (s)he did not vote, (s)he was asked why not. Voting data will be checked against publicized figures for national turnout. This will help the analyst to determine whether the survey's voting data are inflated. As Bratton et al. (2005) found, Africans tend to overreport their voting—especially Malians and Tanzanians, but also Zimbabweans and Zambians. Mali

and Tanzania are in the lead because there, “political cultures put an extraordinarily high premium on conformity with prevailing social norms or partisan loyalties” (ibid, 146). The authors also note, “The residents of these two countries report the highest levels of political fear in the Afrobarometer” (endnote 23, p. 424).¹²²

Finally, in analyzing participation, the study also used two aggregate measures used extensively in the literature. First, a “communing and contacting” index was constructed from the above variables by summing up the following: “total participation in community groups,” multiplied by 2, “total active participation at community meetings,” multiplied by 2, “number of times raised issues with others,” and “number of times contacted the Ward Councilor.” The reason that the first two items were multiplied by 2 is that otherwise, memberships in community groups and the ways in which the respondent actively participates at community meetings (such as by asking questions) would have received the same weight as each occurrence of raising an issue with others or contacting the Councilor. This would have devalued participation in groups and community meetings, and overvalued raising issues with others and contacting the Councilor. Membership/leadership in an organization is clearly more “valuable” than one time raising an issue or contacting the Councilor. Similarly, a habit of actively participating at community meetings (such as by expressing one’s opinion) requires a bigger input than just one time joining others to raise an issue or seeking out the Councilor.

Note on the Survey Instrument

A few points should be stressed about the character of the survey utilized in this study. First, the reader should keep in mind that the small total number of questions (i.e., 52) means that this study is not as in depth as, for example, the Afrobarometer surveys (and those of some donors, including the World Bank). The Afrobarometer and most other big budget studies cover many more geographical areas, include many more respondents, and employ many more survey administrators. For example, the 2001 Afrobarometer survey for Tanzania had 101 questions, many of which were further divided into components of A, B, C, and so on.

But a comparative advantage of the present survey is that it includes several open ended questions.¹²³ Open ended questions are more likely to uncover respondents' authentic thoughts and experiences. According to Verba et al. (1978), this is especially true in situations when the bulk of the respondents are illiterate (such as in this study). If presented with set choices, illiterate respondents may be likelier to select one of the choices even if none of them were applicable. Also, open ended questions facilitate answers that may have never occurred to the researcher when designing the survey. Open ended questions will be analyzed by dividing answers to categories in such a way as to "obtain maximum information" (Newton and Rudestam 1999, 17).

Challenges in Survey Research

One should also keep in mind that survey based research entails special challenges, especially in contexts drastically different from one's own. One of them has to do with different meanings that various concepts take in different environments, and

even in the minds of different respondents. Though questions were presented to everyone in the same way, sometimes a respondent needed clarification on, for example, a particular concept before (s)he knew what exactly the question meant. One such concept was “household.” It was explained as the group of people with whom the respondent lives—though this undoubtedly leaves the door wide open to including an unlimited number of relatives or others who live under the respondent’s roof. And though clarifications introduced some variation into survey administration, it was felt that providing them was necessary. As Fioramonti found in his research on grassroots organizations in South Africa, even as unambiguously sounding a concept as “influence on government” can be understood in several different ways, including lobbying, service provision “on behalf of local institutions,” and “receiving funds from government departments” (2004, 747). So, no matter how context specifically survey questions are expressed, there is always room for misunderstanding. Yet if a respondent did not request for clarification when (s)he was asked a question, it was not given to him/her.

Another example of a difficult concept—in the sense that its meaning varies by location—is “politics.” In Tanzania, *siasa* is often associated with the village government; also, as the Tanzanian research assistant noted, Nyerere (whom many people still regard very highly) associated it with cheating or “getting people to appreciate what you are talking about.”¹²⁴ In turn, in Zambia many respondents equated political interest with involvement in politics. (Thus in that case we had to clarify what was meant by “being interested.”) To be sure, in both countries, politics is often associated with corruption, lies, and bad morals—something that Bratton et al. (2005) find to be true of many respondents in the Afrobarometer countries in general.

Another challenge had to do with survey administration: how to conduct the interviews in such a way as to uncover the true feelings, opinions, and experiences of respondents. The culture of conformity and reverence for not only authority but also outsiders means that most respondents try to answer the questions in a way that they think is desired by the interviewer. For example, an employee at the Mtwara-Mikindani Municipal Council said, “People in Tanzania are very ‘polite.’ They will say they attended a village meeting even if they didn’t.”¹²⁵ Also, they try to answer so that there would be no negative consequences for them (such as when asked whether they think the leadership of their district cares for people’s questions and concerns).¹²⁶ After realizing this, the interviewer started to emphasize (i.e., spend more time explaining) the fact that the survey is confidential, that there are no right and wrong answers, and that the respondents should really express what is in their hearts, that is, how they really feel about each issue. It seemed that emphasizing these things did help to get the respondents speak more freely and openly.

In contrast, another precaution which Bratton et al. suggest one should bear in mind—that is, self-censorship to appear *politically* correct—did not seem to be a major concern in this study as questions inquired about people’s experiences in the community and assessed their knowledge, instead of asking them to evaluate, for example, government performance. Additionally, the question about government responsibilities was phrased in an objective way, rather than asking respondents to judge whether the government has fulfilled those responsibilities. Therefore, though survey methodology has its weaknesses, with questions being susceptible to misunderstanding and with the survey not always providing a way to identify less than truthful answers, it is one of the

few means available to obtain data on the subjective experiences and opinions of the rural poor.

Selection of Respondents

Finally, when it came to selecting the respondents among whom the survey would be administered, the starting point was to obtain a representative sample of villagers with approximately half being those that have been exposed to civic education,¹²⁷ and another half that haven't. However, in the course of the research it became apparent that it would not be an easy task to divide respondents to the "exposed" and the "not exposed" with regard to any of the civic education programs—and this served as a confirmation to the decision to utilize the contextual and subjective approach to civic education. This is because most of the time, there do not exist written records of who participated in the various workshops or other training events. And even oral accounts (such as by village leadership and the respondents themselves) were many times conflicting. This was a problem in both countries, although village data, for example, seemed better kept and retrievable in Tanzania. Indeed, even in Mbae Village in Tanzania—where it seemed that whether or not a person had been exposed to a particular civic education training was the clearest of all study sites—it was only possible to obtain a rough measure of involvement of the respondent (i.e., involved or not involved), not how long the person was involved, what specifically (s)he was taught, and how.

The specific respondents to be interviewed were selected by sub-village leaders according to certain criteria given to them in advance. That is, before the interviews were begun, the village leadership and/or other contact persons had been requested to summon

about 10 respondents per day, such that, in addition to the above criterion, respondents—roughly half of whom would be women—would all be over the age of 18, representing various age groups. The village leadership/contact persons were also asked to invite some respondents that had more than primary education, an occupation other than farming, and/or—in Tanzania—were non-Muslims. In Tanzania, following the prevailing protocol, the village leadership had been sent an introductory letter prior to our visit by the local Council; the village had also been visited by a Community Development Officer who explained the purpose and practical requirements of this study.¹²⁸

During the research in each village, respondents were also asked why they thought that the village leadership had invited them to participate in the study. Clearly the most frequent response had to do with respondents' abilities and/or habits. That is, respondents were chosen because they were literate, able to understand and narrate issues (basically, to express themselves), active in village meetings and development activities, and/or held a position of a sub-village leader. Therefore this means that the levels of civic awareness and democratic participation recorded by the study in the target villages represent the high end. Demographic data on the sex and age of respondents are provided in Tables 4.1. and 4.2.

Table 4.1. Sex and Age of Respondents, Tanzania

	Mbae Village (N=63)	Mtawanya Village (N=58)	Shangani Ward (N=19)	Total (N=140)
Men	51	50	63	53
Women	49	50	37	47
Age range	18-77	19-68	19-56	18-77
Average age	40 ¹	37 ²	27	37 ³
Median age	39 ¹	38 ²	23	37 ³

Notes:

¹ Excludes one person who did not recall his age (“the year of the thunderstorm”). Also, one person said he was born during the small-pox epidemic. Because such an epidemic occurred, according to village leaders, in both 1948 and 1952, this person’s birth year was taken to be the average of these, that is, 1950.

² Excludes two persons who could not recall their age (“don’t remember,” “during colonial rule”)

³ This reported average is somewhat lower than the real average age, due to the exclusion of three elderly respondents (see notes 1 and 2).

Table 4.2. Sex and Age of Respondents, Zambia

	Chamalawa Village (N=32)	Makasa Village (N=37)	Mabumba Village (N=71)	Total (N=140)
Men	50	46	49	49
Women	50	54	51	51
Age range	26-71	21-70	18-74	18-74
Average age	45	41	42	42
Median age	46	41	44	43

Are these sex and age characteristics representative of the villages, districts, regions, or countries in question? Should they be? The answer to the second question is: not necessarily. Although African populations are generally speaking very young,¹²⁹ participants in civic education programs are not necessarily so. An example is the civic education sessions by the Anti-Voter Apathy Project (AVAP) in Chamalawa and Makasa in Zambia, in which most participants have usually been middle-aged (and women).¹³⁰ This explains the relatively high average age in both countries. In fact, as Bratton et al.

write, African “rural populations are disproportionately female and elderly” (2005, 167). Of their 12 country cases, Zambia is one of the four in which it is specifically true that “rural areas have been largely abandoned by young adults and serve mainly as a refuge for older people” (ibid, 167-8). Also, more than half of rural Zambians are female (Bratton 1999). In the Tanzanian data, the average age of 37 is appropriate as it is also very close to the average age of the sample surveyed by the Afrobarometer researchers (that is, 36), thus making comparison with Afrobarometer data appropriate (Chaligha et al. 2002).

The next chapter will demonstrate, however, that the national level data provided by the Afrobarometer do not adequately enable one to understand the democratic dispositions and participatory patterns in the specific research sites. One needs to be as intimately aware of his/her research context as possible when trying to understand research participants’ attitudes and behavior. This includes examination of, for example, culture on the local level, and not only the national level. Understanding the context is also vital when drawing conclusions from the kinds of effects that civic education has. Why did civic education “work” or didn’t work? Therefore, a detailed account is provided in Chapter 5 of the national and sub-national contexts, summarizing the historical-political, economic, and cultural environments in which the respondents in the two countries live. In so doing it demonstrates why Tanzania and Zambia were selected as the research sites: they have important similarities which facilitate some cross-national comparison, but they are also sufficiently different to necessitate most of the causal analysis to be conducted within countries. Also, the chapter describes the most important civic education programs conducted in each research site, thereby outlining those CE

programs to which participants may have been exposed. But, as emphasized in this chapter, CE exposure itself was determined subjectively by the participants.

Chapter 5

UNDERSTANDING THE RESEARCH CONTEXT: TWO “HYBRID” COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION WITH DIFFERENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR AND PATTERNS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

This chapter provides a detailed account of the context and data involved in the study—that is, countries, regions, and villages included, and civic education examined. The purpose of the chapter—which focuses on those factors that bear upon citizens’ civic awareness and opportunities and incentives for democratic participation—is to explain the logic of case selection, and provide the reader with enough background information to understand how the countries/regions/villages selected could affect conclusions made.

As will be elaborated below, the choice of Tanzania and Zambia is based in the first place on them being typical examples of “hybrid”¹³¹ countries in transition—those located roughly in the middle of authoritarianism and democracy. This means there is sufficient freedom for citizens to participate, but on the other hand the polities suffer from low levels of participation endemic to hybrid regimes—which likely hinders deepening of democracy. Thus in Tanzania and Zambia there is both the possibility and need to increase citizen participation. The countries thus represent potentially fruitful ground for strengthening the participation of the poor; the commonalities between the countries also make it possible to, at least to an extent, compare findings cross-nationally.

Yet, though the countries exhibit roughly a similar need and opportunity for increased participation, and although they have very similar historical experiences,

political systems, state-society relationship, economic and educational challenges, cultures, and although in both countries NGOs are generally speaking the most important providers of civic education, there are also important differences between Tanzania and Zambia. These have to do with citizens' attitudes, opportunities for and patterns of participation, (local) government's involvement in civic education, and some cultural characteristics. For example, although both countries are very poor, according to Afrobarometer data citizen attitudes toward market reform have been more positive in Tanzania. This may have a bearing on the likelihood of citizen involvement in socio-economic issues.¹³² Also, the same data indicate that Tanzanians are generally speaking more interested in politics and have a higher sense of efficacy. This would suggest that they are more likely to participate—although some cultural features in Tanzania would point to the opposite conclusion.

As regards the different opportunities for participation in Tanzania and Zambia, these originate from the different degrees to which participation has been promoted in the countries' history and the countries' different stages of decentralization. Therefore government is likely more accessible in one country. Indeed, Afrobarometer survey data finds quite marked differences in the patterns of citizen participation in the two countries, with Tanzanians being more active in the more mobilized and politicized forms of participation, while Zambians are somewhat more likely to participate in more individualized forms of participation (Bratton 1999; Bratton et al. 2005; Chaligha et al. 2002; Lolojih and Chikwanha 2006; Mulenga et al. 2004; Mutesa and Nchito 2005; Simutanyi 2002). Does this make Zambians more receptive to civic education, hypothesized to influence the individualized acts of participation more? Finally, that

(local) government has been more involved in citizen sensitization (civic education) in Tanzania is an important difference between the countries. For these kinds of reasons, this study is that of two different samples. Therefore, though some general cross-national comparison will be made, the main comparative analysis will be made *within* countries on the sub-national level.

Below, this chapter first outlines the similarities and differences between Tanzania and Zambia, as regards issues relevant to citizen awareness and participation. The chapter compares the ways in which Tanzanians and Zambians participate in public affairs. This is followed by a discussion of the logic of selecting particular regions within the countries, and the most important civic education programs provided in these areas. Then, the chapter outlines the logic and process of selecting certain villages, followed by a mentioning of the significance of the timing of the study. It ends with a brief summary conclusion.

Similarities between Tanzania and Zambia

Regime Type and Characteristics

Tanzania and Zambia, classified by Diamond in 2002¹³³ as no longer liberalized autocracies but not yet electoral democracies either, can be argued to be typical “hybrid regimes” (Bratton et al. 2005).¹³⁴ They belong to the large number of countries in the “political gray zone” whose transitions are more or less stalled (Carothers 2002, 9; Rakner and Svåsand 2005). They have other labels, too: “dominant-power systems” (Carothers 2002), effectively one-party states (Burnell 2001; Carothers 1999; Geddes 2003), or “semi-authoritarian” countries (Carothers 1999; Youngs 2001). In both

Tanzania and Zambia, there is a single dominant party. Despite more than ten years since the first multiparty elections,¹³⁵ the opposition in both countries has difficulties garnering support (Bauer and Taylor 2005). In fact one Zambian interviewee said about the upcoming general elections¹³⁶ that the “opposition has no chance.”¹³⁷ This, according to him, is not only due to the fragmentation of the opposition but also because of the way the Constitution and the Electoral Act are designed. Similarly, preceding Tanzania’s December 2005 general elections, an article discussing the elections opened by saying, “While Tanzania stands out as a stable democracy in a region that has witnessed some of the most vicious civil conflicts in Africa, it can be said that 15 years after the introduction of multiparty politics the ruling party, *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (CCM), still behaves as if the country were a one party state” (Rajab 2005, 26).¹³⁸ Also, despite “free and fair” elections, Zambia experienced “growing authoritarianism” in the 1990s; and, though charging his predecessor with corruption, sitting President Mwanawasa too has been implicated in some financial irregularities (Bauer and Taylor 2005, 61). These kinds of realities may obviously dampen popular participation.

These kinds of “dominant-power systems” also typically have a strong presidency (executive), weak parliament (Gould and Ojanen 2003), and weak (that is, politically influenced) courts (Bauer and Taylor 2005; Gloppen 2003; USAID/Tanzania 1996). The executive branch also interferes heavily in civic society, especially in Tanzania (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2004; Hossain et al. 2003; Michael 2004; Tripp 2000). Indicative of the power of the Zambian presidency, for example, is the fact that in the 1996 constitutional review process, then-President Chiluba single handedly rejected 80 percent of the changes proposed by the review commission (Mwale 2005). Indeed, as

Mulenga et al. write, the 1996 constitutional review was a failure in that “most of the state’s power [was] left in the presidency, just as it was during the era of the one-party state” (2004, 2). In both countries, presidents also have strong appointment powers of judges (Gloppen 2003; Hossain et al. 2003).

Parliaments are often considered rubber stamps in the sub-Saharan region as a whole.¹³⁹ Demonstrating its sidelining in an important issue, the Tanzanian parliament played no role in the drafting of the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy; instead, only “key donors, top civil servants and a few handpicked representatives of civic society” participated in its drafting (Gould and Ojanen 2003, 93).¹⁴⁰ Also, parliamentarians in Tanzania are largely uninformed about important policies (ibid).

In turn, as concerns courts’ roles, though there are examples of cases in which judges have ruled against top officials, the judiciary in both Tanzania and Zambia is quite weak and subject to political control. In Tanzania, as Gloppen writes, “Despite notable recent developments, the overall assessment must be that the Tanzanian courts have not been able to significantly limit executive dominance or the ‘hyper-presidential’ nature of Tanzanian politics” (2003, 118). Similarly, “During the 38 years of independence, Zambian courts have rarely delivered decisions that significantly inconvenience the sitting government” (ibid, 118). This is at least partly because in Zambia “[t]he president approves pay rises and adjustments” for judges (ibid, 126). According to Gloppen, Zambian high courts are perceived as more politicized than their Tanzanian counterparts, at least in part due to the fact that, despite chief justices “formally serving for life or until retirement age, [they] have in practice changed with every new president” (ibid, 133). In Tanzania chief justices have outlived governments (ibid). Perhaps most important for

ordinary citizens, the lower courts—branches of the judiciary with which citizens are most often in contact—are poorly equipped and highly corrupt (ibid; Bauer and Taylor 2005). Just like the meager competition between political parties, citizens' low faith in the lower courts probably serves to dampen citizen involvement (participation) and their claiming of their rights.

Political History and the Influence of the Founding Fathers

Tanzania and Zambia are former British colonies that gained independence in the same year: 1964.¹⁴¹ The concurrence of the independent struggles is not a coincidence: Zambia (along with Kenya, Malawi, the Seychelles, and Comoros) “drew support for their independence from Tanzania” (Msabaha 1995, 164). In some other aspects, too, Zambia imitated Tanzania's choices, certainly not the least because the founding fathers, Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere, respectively, were good friends.¹⁴² Following independence, both countries enjoyed a few years of multipartyism before instituting a one-party system (Bauer and Taylor 2005), which happened earlier in Tanzania (1965) than Zambia (1972).¹⁴³ Indeed, Tanzania's one-party constitution of 1965 was “the first systematic one-party constitution in the Commonwealth . . . provid[ing] a model for other African states including Zambia” (Read 1995, 131).

Nyerere has significantly shaped the Tanzanian nation and also others, with equality and the African version of socialism, *ujamaa*,¹⁴⁴ as the hallmarks of his ideology (Huddleston Cr. 1995). This “socialist experiment” was launched in 1967 with the Arusha Declaration (Chaligha et al. 2002, 4). Nyerere's concept of equality included the notion that all Tanzanians have equal rights. Mulenga writes, “In a very important paper,

‘The African and Democracy’ (1961), Nyerere argued that human equality was deeply ingrained in traditional African society. Everyone within the community had equal rights, and no one was treated as a lesser human being” (2001, no page number). Mulenga suggests that Nyerere believed the state had an important role to play in promoting rights; its duty was to “prevent the exploitation of the less fortunate” and to provide everyone “fair” access to rights (ibid).¹⁴⁵

An integral part of *ujamaa*, “villagization” (1973-76)—“the largest resettlement effort in the history of Africa” (Read 1995, 133)¹⁴⁶—purposed not only to promote development but also “to prevent the spread of independent initiatives . . . since these were regarded as a possible source of local resistance against state power” (Seppälä 1998, 16). Thus the policy did not necessarily always promote the kinds of effects Nyerere was looking for. For example, land disputes emerged because the customary land ownership rules were in conflict with the land rights accorded to the new village settlements (Koda 1998). Also, “villagization seriously disrupted the social fabric in the villages” (Seppälä 1998, 17).

Besides the promotion of equality, another area in which Nyerere had “immense” and “far-reaching” influence was education (Ishumi and Maliyamkono 1995, 58; also Mulenga 2001). This includes, first, primary school enrolment, which under Nyerere almost tripled from 25 percent of the age group in 1960 to 72 percent in 1985, “despite rapidly increasing population” (Read 1995, 127). According to one interviewee for this study, “Nyerere was pushing for the fundamentals.”¹⁴⁷ Second, evident in Mulenga’s description, Nyerere’s view of education was based on an integration of school and society. For example, he advocated that each school should operate a farm so that the

school could not only satisfy its own needs but also provide for the wider society (ibid). Similarly, he advocated an active and central role for the teacher, and “argued that the teacher can neither afford to be 'distant' from the community, nor be value neutral” (ibid).¹⁴⁸ Third, and most importantly for this study, Nyerere also placed high value on adult or civic education, especially in the 1970s.¹⁴⁹ Mmari elaborates on Nyerere’s philosophy:

Nyerere has always insisted on keeping people informed through various means, including political education.^[150] People, he said, should not work like robots; they should understand the reasons behind whatever they are called upon to do, as well as the reasons why certain things could not be done at certain times

The whole nation was turned into a large class of seminars; radio broadcasts and public meetings were all used to inform, educate, and involve the population. Critics have described this as a case of indoctrination and have not been slow to point out that despite such efforts incidents of disloyalty and disaffection occurred (1995, 181-2).

Statements like this serve to illustrate how civic or political education is not new to Tanzanians. In contrast, in Zambia there are fewer accounts of the contribution of the country’s founding father to education. In fact Mulenga suggests that Tanzania has played a leading role in this area, and “is rightly recognized among the postcolonial nations as having made substantial strides in adult education” (2001, no page number).

But one thing both Nyerere and Kaunda are known for is their successful promotion of peaceful interethnic relations, which suggests that low levels of participation are probably not in general explainable by ethnic discrimination. Nyerere promoted interethnic amity by practicing the policy “that no group must be given too much power, and that all groups ought to be included.”¹⁵¹ As a result, Tanzanians “have not resorted to mobilization on the basis of ethnic or religious lines.”¹⁵² Also, Nyerere forged unity by instituting a common language, Swahili, for the country’s approximately

120 ethnic groups (Chaligha et al. 2002; Hyden 1999; Omari 1995); as a consequence, “Even though Tanzania is a very diverse society, its citizens exhibit high levels of national identity and low levels of ethnic consciousness. Most Tanzanians define themselves in terms of occupation rather than tribe, language or religion” (Chaligha et al. 2002, 2). Similarly, Kaunda “discouraged ethnic discourse [by] develop[ing] a system of governance which included ‘tribal balancing’ as one of its cardinal principles” (Duncan et al. 2003, 21-2; also Bratton and Liatto-Katundu 1994). According to Bratton and his colleagues, Kaunda succeeded in implementing the policy, and thereby “bequeathed to his countrymen a strong sense of national unity” (2005, 191). And after Kaunda was forced to step down during the transition in 1991, Chiluba and Mwanawasa have “for the most part . . . followed Kaunda’s practice of ethnic balancing” (Bauer and Taylor 2005, 53). In both countries, low level of ethnic consciousness has contributed to stability and to the fact that neither country has experienced a civil war—a rare situation in the Great Lakes Region, Central Africa, and even Africa as a whole. Tanzania and Zambia have also accommodated large numbers of refugees from neighboring countries.

Transition: An *Exception* to the Similar Historical Experiences of Tanzania and Zambia¹⁵³

Despite the similar historical experiences during the one-party era, the countries’ transitions to multiparty democracy were very different. Zambia’s transition (1991)—the first of them all in sub-Saharan Africa—represents the “bottom-up” kind typical of Africa, which followed mass protests by civil society against the ruling elites. Protests were led by a constellation of civic groups, students, churches, trade unions, and business

groups, with Frederick Chiluba's Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) emerging from this era as the new protagonist of popular will and multipartyism (Bratton and van de Walle 1992; Carothers 1999). So strong was popular pressure that Kaunda was "forced to accept a popular call for multiparty elections" (Bratton and van de Walle 1992, 40). Also in general, the level of defections was high among Zambian state elites (ibid). Overall, Zambia's transition was "abrupt and unexpected" (Carothers 1999, 72).

In contrast, Tanzania's transition (1992-) was "relatively smooth" and managed from above (Chaligha et al. 2002; Hossain et al. 2003, 84; Hyden 1999; Kweka 1995). It was initiated by the ruling party (CCM) as a response to the economic crisis that had worsened in particular in the 1980s, the collapse of communism, and donors' requirements concerning democracy and human rights (Hossain et al. 2003). "[I]n the middle of 1990 the party launched a restricted public debate over whether a multi-party state should be permitted and for the first time allowed the state-controlled media to discuss the limitations of press freedom in the country" (Tripp 1992, 239). One may wonder why the mode of transition was so different in the two countries, especially as it can be argued that the *ACP-EU Courier's* remark that "Tanzanians are unaccustomed to demonstrating in order to achieve change" (1999, 10) applies equally well to the Zambian political culture.

To what extent is popular participation in today's Tanzania and Zambia likely to be determined, on the one hand, by similar pre-multiparty experiences, and on the other by different types of transitions? One could argue that the former factor is more important: not many years after the founding elections the political landscapes in the two countries had largely converged. By that time MMD had essentially become the new

“single” party in Zambia. In that sense, the Zambian polity by the mid-to-late 1990s and onward was similar to the CCM dominated Tanzanian polity—although the share of votes cast for MMD in Zambian elections has been much lower than those cast for CCM in Tanzania. But in both countries the dominant party’s position has been reinforced by the first-past-the-post electoral system (Bauer and Taylor 2005; Chaligha et al. 2002).

Tanzania and Zambia provide us with the opportunity to observe how the effectiveness of civic education and promotion of participation have differed—and how, potentially, prospects for expansion of political participation differ--in these countries with similar histories, but with varying paths taken in the more recent past.

State-Society(-Donor) Relations

In fact there are both similarities and differences in the state-society(-donor) relationships in Tanzania and Zambia; but they are discussed here, under “similarities,” because in the two polities the overall (im)balance between these three groups, and challenges faced by the civil society, are similar. That is, even though the Zambian civil society is clearly more vibrant and plays a more prominent role in public affairs (Bauer and Taylor 2005; Bwalya et al. 2004; Gloppen 2003)¹⁵⁴, the state and donors clearly determine policy in both countries. Also, civil society has come under attack from the government in both countries.¹⁵⁵ One example is the NGO Act (of 2002) in Tanzania which “seems to curtail the freedom of association” (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2004, 10). Though this likely affects urban populations more than rural ones, it has potential implications for how civic education can affect participation in all parts of the country. In Tanzania NGO activity is hindered, for example, by restrictions on NGOs’

registration, and requirements that they obtain permission to hold meetings, rallies, and celebrations (Tripp 2000). In turn, one analyst of Zambian society interviewed for this study held that there has been a lot of government intervention and manipulation of NGOs in Zambia, *especially in civic education and election monitoring*, which are political processes.¹⁵⁶ This is significant for this study, and demonstrates that whether, how much, and what kind of civic education is provided to citizens is not only or foremost determined by its need but rather by power relations, and consequently the interest that those in power (political office) have in providing it. That “the government has no interest in civic education,” and “those in power don’t want to share power” were the kinds of comments widely held by respondents in this study in both Tanzania and Zambia.¹⁵⁷

But if the relationship between the government and NGOs/citizenry is not very open and fair, it is also true that NGOs do not always enjoy the support of the masses either. In both countries many NGOs have been criticized for elitism—that is, for failing to represent the masses, which they claim to represent (Gould and Ojanen 2003; Shivji 2004), and for being mere “briefcase” NGOs existing for the sole purpose of claiming donor money (Mercer 2003; Michael 2004). For example, in Zambia FODEP (Foundation for Democratic Progress)—a very well known, large NGO—has been criticized for using donor money for high “per diems” and other such things (Carothers 1999), and in general for being “the product of a system of donor-supported political pluralism with virtually no social roots” (Ottaway 2000, 82). Similarly, according to a well known Tanzanian lawyer Issa Shivji, Tanzanian NGOs are “perhaps . . . more accountable to [their] donors than to [their] members, much less to [their] people” (2004,

689). These kinds of issues may influence the incentives for citizens to participate (for example, in some NGO organized activities), if they do not trust the groups bringing in the development programs.¹⁵⁸

Regarding the *differences* in state-society relations in the two countries, the reason that Tanzanian civic activism is not as vibrant as Zambia's is partly that under *ujamaa*, there was no need for civic activism outside the party (i.e., TANU, which in 1977 became CCM),¹⁵⁹ as the party co-opted the voluntary associations, mutual aid societies, and various kinds of self-help organizations and networks, which were many (Tripp 1992). And since the liberalization of parties, the Tanzanian government has kept civil society quite heavily under control—more so than the Zambian government (Hossain et al. 2003; Tripp 1992, 2000). Also, foreign NGOs are replacing indigenous Tanzanian organizations in negotiations with the government: “domestic advocacy groups [are] being ‘crowded out’ of policy debates due to the superior resources and readiness of transnational agencies, which are becoming a surrogate representatives of Tanzanian civil society in the state-donor partnership” (Gould and Ojanen 2003, 8). A prominent example of this is the process associated with the drafting of the Poverty Reduction Strategy in which Tanzanian civil society was largely sidelined (ibid).¹⁶⁰

In contrast, reports on the Zambian civil society indicate that the drafting of Zambia's Poverty Reduction Strategy involved civil society to a much higher degree. In fact, according to Bwalya et al., “Zambian civil society appears to have been more influential in the formulation process than what has been the case elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa” (2004, 26). The authors go as far as to say, “From our observations, the PRSP process seems to have created a partnership between the civil service and Zambian

civil society” (ibid, 23). In addition, of course, Zambia’s civil society played a key role in the country’s transition, while Tanzania’s did not. Further, Zambian civil society became well known for shooting down the sitting president’s (i.e., Chiluba’s) third-term bid in 2001 (Bauer and Taylor 2005). When asked to evaluate her country’s civil society since 2001, one Zambian NGO employee interviewed for this study said, “Civil society has really changed. It’s very radical.”¹⁶¹ In addition to preventing Chiluba’s bid for the third term, this respondent referred to the tension that currently¹⁶² exists between civil society and President Mwanawasa. This factor would predict a higher likelihood for Zambians to participate in civic associations and activities organized by them.

Lack of Economic Development

Both Tanzania and Zambia are heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC)¹⁶³ with a low ranking in the Human Development Index¹⁶⁴ and a low per-capita income.¹⁶⁵ Though Zambia has a slightly higher per-capita income, its residents suffer from concrete manifestations of poverty at least as much as Tanzanians do. For example, as shown in Table 5.1., Zambians lack access to almost everything more often than Tanzanians. However, despite the recent economic upswing in Tanzania (discussed below), it seems that “lived poverty” has increased also in Tanzania (REPOA 2006).¹⁶⁶

Table 5.1. Poverty in Tanzania and Zambia

	Tanzania			Zambia		
	2001	2003	2005	1999	2002	2005
Food	47	45	53	61	78	71
Drinking water	52	49	62	50	46	71
Medical treatment	48	54	55	69	73	75
Cash	77	73	84	80	87	89
Electricity/fuel*	87	30	32	64	50	57
Per Capita Income**	\$696			\$986		

“In the past year, how often, if ever, have you gone without _____? (percent responding “always,” “frequently/many times/several times,” or “occasionally/once or twice”)

* The 1999 (Zambia) and 2001 (Tanzania) figures refer to electricity; other figures refer to “enough fuel to cook your food” (Bratton et al. 2004, 11)

** Defined in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in 1999 US\$ (GNI per capita). Source: Freedom House Annual Survey, 1999

Sources: Bratton et al. (2004), Chaligha et al. (2002), REPOA (2006)

Low Levels of Education and Civic Awareness

Despite some good past attempts, in particular by Nyerere, to elevate his nation’s level of education, both Tanzania and Zambia have low levels of education, with less than 70 per cent of the population literate.¹⁶⁷ This is caused by, in the first place, poor access to education and lack of resources, including buildings, textbooks, and teachers. According to Duncan et al., Zambia has a “chronic crisis in the education system” (2003, 23). An opinion piece in *The Post*, Zambia’s leading opposition newspaper, is descriptive of this crisis:

Most children especially in rural areas don’t go to school either because the parents can’t afford, the school is very far maybe 40 kms or there is no school at all I was once showed a structure called a classroom for Grade 12 pupils, tears almost rolled over my [cheeks]. It can be equated to a piggery and I was told it was the best in that area.¹⁶⁸

A further problem—compounding the lack of resources—is attitudinal: at least in some Tanzanian villages parents do not encourage their children to go to school because it is their experience that the educated youth become detached from the adults and their communities (Swantz 1998). In the words of Swantz, “When youths return from the school, the parents feel that they have been alienated from their children in terms of their values and ways of acting. There is no sense of them having become grown-up members of the village society. On the contrary, there is a wide gap between them and the older generations” (1998, 178).

Also, the extensiveness and appropriateness of the civic education curricula in Tanzanian and Zambian schools can be questioned. According to a government education official in Tanzania, “civics in schools happens in isolation,” meaning that what is taught at school is not retained or applied in practice because what is taught to pupils in their communities is different.¹⁶⁹ For example, if washing of hands is not practiced in family, it will not help much that a pupil learns to wash his/her hands at school.¹⁷⁰ Indeed, both Tanzania and Zambia have an exam oriented curricula, rather than one emphasizing knowledge application (Brown 1995; Ishumi and Maliyamkono 1995; Mulenga 2001).¹⁷¹ Brown suggests that such orientation toward exams “block[s Tanzanian students’] way from primary school to university,” with only about 13 percent of those finishing primary school reaching the secondary school level (1995, 15). According to a government official in Mtwara, Southern Tanzania, many teachers concern themselves with exam pass rates—“how many children they have managed to send to secondary school.” Consequently, Tanzania’s is an “education system that tends to value the cognitive part of the learning process more highly than either the affective or the psychomotoric, and

which responds to the immediate demands of school tests and examinations before anything else” (Ishumi and Maliyamkono 1995, 53).

In Zambia, the civic education curriculum is presently being reformed. While civic education has so far only been taught on eighth and ninth grades, it is now being introduced at the high school level. The problem with the civic education taught on eighth and ninth grades is that “most of the concepts may be a bit too heavy for the cognitive capability of those students” (because of their age); also, the present kind of civic education is “conformist.”¹⁷² Therefore, the desire now is to “take away education that makes pupils conform” and instead, develop their critical thinking ability.¹⁷³ In addition, the present civic education is too factual: “Rather than knowing the name of the president, it is more important to know the process of bringing in the president.”¹⁷⁴ In the view of Zambia Civic Education Association Executive Director, current civic education curriculum is too theoretical.¹⁷⁵ As a result, there is no ownership of the issues¹⁷⁶; and according to the view of a teacher at Kitwe Boys High School, school leavers’ quality of participation “in the political affairs of the country” is “poor” (Chibale 2004, 11). “For instance very few school leavers, if at all any, have participated in the constitutional review process currently underway in the country due to lack of understanding of what a constitution of the nation is all about” (ibid, 11). The ZCEA Executive Director stressed that civic education in Zambia is at the cognitive level but not at the pragmatic level: “People know what they’re supposed to do but will they do anything about it? No! They’re expecting somebody else to do it, not themselves.” She calls this a “laid back” attitude, or inertia, lack of willingness to do anything about the problems.¹⁷⁷ Consequently, within the education system, the reform of the civic education curriculum

also entails development of new, more activity oriented textbooks.¹⁷⁸ According to the donor representative cited above, the issue of introducing civic education at high school level has been around even before 1999; but the implementation has been slowed by political opposition (and sometimes even resistance from the schools themselves).¹⁷⁹ Now, the issue has been decided on policy level; the only remaining question is whether the subject should be compulsory or not.¹⁸⁰

Due to the problems in both countries with access to and appropriateness of education, many Tanzanians and Zambians have low levels of civic awareness. In Ngware's words, "It is no secret that the average Tanzanian suffers from a total ignorance of basic legal rights" (1997, 246). Many Tanzanians have not even seen the country's constitution.¹⁸¹ Also, Tanzanians have poor knowledge of their political leaders, especially on the national level—although they rank second highest in their own confession of political understanding among Afrobarometer countries (Chaligha et al. 2002).¹⁸² According to early 2000s data, "Tanzanians' awareness of local and national political leaders is average or below average when compared with other Afrobarometer countries" (ibid, 28). Moreover, in a comparison of nine countries, Tanzanians are the least aware people when it comes to the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP): only 24 percent had ever heard about this program (ibid).¹⁸³ In turn, in Zambia almost twice as many (42 percent) had heard of the SAP (ibid).

At the same time Zambians too have been found quite ignorant about civic issues. In the early 1990s, according to Bratton and Liatto-Katundu (1994), Zambians had very low knowledge of government functions, and quite a low level of knowledge of civil and political rights. Also, according to Afrobarometer data describing the situation some

years later, Zambians are not really more knowledgeable of their political leaders than Tanzanians, except of one leader category: parliamentarians (Chaligha et al. 2002).¹⁸⁴ A few years later, Zambians continued to lack understanding about the division of labor between the central and local government: “half of all . . . Zambians . . . think that central and local government are ‘the same thing’” (Bratton et al. 2005, 244).¹⁸⁵ Another problem, demonstrating the need for civic education, is that “the majority of citizens interviewed seemed to think that political participation begins and ends with voting. While most respondents vigorously asserted their right to vote, few understood that they could also hold their representatives to account between elections” (Bratton and Liatto-Katundu 1994, 561). And even when exercising their right to vote, people are susceptible to manipulation. As one Zambian government employee interviewed for this study lamented, “The election year is the saddest year because that is when you see how the population is vulnerable to all sorts of political lies. There are no issues involved at all, just a bag of mealie meal or a tin of beer,” for which people sell their votes.¹⁸⁶

Moreover, there is a lack of civic awareness and capacity at the leadership level. For example, Councilors in Tanzania “and other elected leaders” often have “very low” education and professional qualifications (Mwaipopo 2004, 14). Consequently, Zambians complain about the “ignorance among councilors about their proper duties” (Bratton and Liatto-Katundu 1994, 553). Further, according to a Zambian NGO staff member, “sometimes Councilors have very scanty information about human rights.”¹⁸⁷ Training of these local leaders is needed also because, according to a FODEP training manual for Councilors, “those who run for public office as Councilors come from different backgrounds, and have different ideas and motives of becoming Councilors, and . . .

some of the aspirations of the new Councilors might not be in the best interest of the community” (FODEP, no date, 9). These kinds of problems with awareness, understanding, and motives obviously hinder both people’s and policymakers’ capability to participate in a manner that best contributes to development and democracy.

At the same time it should be noted that there is considerable donor money available for education in Zambia, “even to the point of congestion.”¹⁸⁸ Also, the Zambian government has increased its allocations to education.¹⁸⁹ Therefore, the financial prospects for education and civic education should not be dismal. According to a donor representative, donors also coordinate quite effectively in the education sector, adapting to the fact that the Zambian government has expressed preference to have fewer donors per sector, with a lead donor in each sector; it also prefers each donor to be involved in fewer sectors.¹⁹⁰ Aid to education used to take the form of project support (such as building of high schools) but since 2003 donors have tried to use basket funding whereby the funds go to sector programs, financing governments’ priorities and plans, not the donors’. Therefore the sector (as development assistance in general) is moving “from donor-led to government-led,” suggesting that in the future, donors’ role in civic education may diminish.

NGOs: The Most Important Civic Educators

Although Tanzania and Zambia differ in one important respect in the provision of civic education--in that in Tanzania the (local) government has been involved in it while in Zambia it hasn’t (see below)--in both countries NGOs (or CSOs, Civil Society Organizations) have been the most important civic educators. In both countries,

academics too are actively involved. According to one NGO employee in Tanzania, civic education is provided by NGOs because they are the only ones with the necessary resources and impartiality.¹⁹¹ For example, many interviewees said the state does not have the motive to provide civic education. And poverty further reduces government allocations to civic education: “If you are a poor country, how much will you allocate to civic education?”¹⁹² Therefore, the interviewee who posed this question emphasized, “Don’t arrive at a conclusion that ‘they [Tanzanians] give low priority to civic education.’”¹⁹³ But the reality is that, even though the Tanzanian law stipulates voters’ education to be the task of the National Election Committee (NEC) and Zanzibar Election Committee (ZEC),¹⁹⁴ these bodies have not fulfilled this task.

Also, the impartiality required by effective civic education is something political parties do not possess. Political parties cannot provide the right kind of civic education “because the objective of civic education is to give someone a wider perspective.”¹⁹⁵ In the 2005 election campaign such a wider perspective was missing; instead, parties used a lot of abusive language to discredit each other, and “there [was] no party which [was] selling the party manifesto to people.”¹⁹⁶ This demonstrates the hybrid status of Tanzania between authoritarianism and democracy: elections are held but not necessarily democratically. Tanzanian non-state actors at large have lamented the “minimal efforts by political parties to publicize their manifestos to the larger public so that their election plans are known. Instead, candidates resort to statements that are aimed at slandering and causing social disharmony and political anarchy” (Agenda Participation 2000 2005, 24). According to an election observer, even President Mkapa said that other parties are “fools.”¹⁹⁷ According to him, President Mkapa further said that “if I were to act like other

presidents, they [opposition members] would all be in prison.” A development worker said similarly, “Last week . . . our president . . . kept repeating over and over in the radio . . . ‘Be careful about some donors who are engaging in financing civic education and voters’ education They want a certain person [in the office] and therefore they are financing to get [things] changed . . .’ I think he is not feeling [good] over that.”¹⁹⁸

In addition to the involvement of academics, NGOs, and NGOs’ umbrella organizations, civic education in both countries is provided and/or funded by a host of other actors. These include (1) foreign or international NGOs (INGOs), such as the Irish based Concern Worldwide, CARE, and Transparency International; (2) political party foundations such as the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), which in Tanzania has been involved in voters’ education, and also helped found Agenda Participation 2000 (an organization active in civic and voters’ education); (3) foreign governments and multilateral organizations (such as Denmark, USAID, UNDP, UNICEF, and the World Bank); (4) community based organizations (CBOs); and (5) churches and church related organizations such as the Catholics’ CARITAS and the Justice and Peace Commissions found in Zambia. Although this is a varied group of actors, the bulk of civic education on the ground is given by/channeled through NGOs and churches, entities that often are the only ones, in addition to some media outlets, able to reach unschooled citizens in rural areas. These actors cooperate with various groups in community, such as women’s groups, or village leadership to get their messages through.

Culture: Passivity, Avoidance of Conflict, Corruption, Status of Women

As pointed out, the cultural contexts of Tanzania and Zambia (and the specific research sites within them) have important differences which affect propensity and means of participation. However, there are also cultural characteristics relevant to this study that Tanzania and Zambia share, and these will be discussed first.¹⁹⁹ The first shared characteristic is a sense of apathy or passivity, found especially in rural areas. This is a remnant of the one-party era, during which citizens came to see the government as the source of all development (or lack thereof). For example, in Zambia in the early 1990s, “people still thought that ‘the government’, rather than themselves, were responsible for providing employment and other development benefits” (Bratton and Liatto-Katundu 1994, 562). But even today—though they do know their rights, according to one NGO employee²⁰⁰—Zambians have a “laid back” attitude towards claiming their rights. Thus Zambians are at the cognitive but not yet pragmatic level concerning their rights.²⁰¹ And similarly, one interviewee in a 1999 *ACP-EU Courier* article said, “Tanzanians are living in the past. They still believe that all they need will fall from the sky” (11). According to a government employee, some Tanzanians even expect that someone will tell them whom to vote for.²⁰² And one village leader said that in his village, people do participate in village meetings and development planning but when it comes to implementation, people do not respond, thinking that the “government is supposed to do everything.”²⁰³ United Democratic Party (UDP) leader John Cheyo compares Tanzanians to others: “Tanzanians have tended to be spectators. Unlike in some neighboring countries, they are not quick to demonstrate. They are used to suffering in silence” (*ACP-EU Courier* 1999, 26-7).

Related to this sense of passivity, people do not easily criticize the government or their superiors—when speaking of the two nations as a whole. This emanates from avoidance of conflict, reverence toward power holders, and lack of understanding (of the system and how to criticize).²⁰⁴ As one development worker expressed it, “Tanzanians avoid criticizing others, sometimes to the detriment to themselves.”²⁰⁵ They would rather seek consensus.²⁰⁶ In Zambia as a whole, there is similarly a reluctance to criticize the government (Bratton and Liatto-Katundu 1994). In particular, as an NGO employee expressed it, “It is not the culture of Zambia to speak against authority *as individuals*. Instead, [people] do it through agents like the church and NGOs. Therefore it is difficult to find significant individual voices.”²⁰⁷ Individual action is discouraged by the fact that “[l]eaders do not expect to be criticized by the people . . . view[ing] criticism as an insult to the political leadership” (Duncan et al. 2003, 29).²⁰⁸ Due to the fact that criticism is not easily expressed, it is likely difficult for a researcher to find out the true motives for people’s participation. And Bratton and Liatto-Katundu’s writing suggests that it is because of avoidance of criticism, coupled with a sense of passivity, that the authors “are led to conclude that contemporary political culture in Zambia is quite contradictory, sometimes undergirding and sometimes undercutting efforts at democratization” (1994, 562). These demonstrate that civic education faces a challenging task in promoting participation in such contexts.

Another shared characteristic, here categorized as part of culture, is the pervasiveness of corruption. Corruption undoubtedly has a severe impact on opportunities and incentives for participation as well as its effectiveness. In the case of Tanzania, donors identify this as one of the primary obstacles of development: “The

country . . . suffers from widespread corruption, which penetrates all levels of society and hampers the development of the economy” (EU’s Directorate General for Development²⁰⁹). According to USAID/Tanzania, “The *most* serious problem facing the country is corruption at all levels of government” (1996, 66; emphasis added). Similarly, “Zambia’s track record regarding financial rectitude is unambiguously poor” (Bauer and Taylor 2005, 56). The country’s newspapers (in particular *The Post*) often feature articles dealing with corruption, with comments like, “There should be no sacred cows in the fight against corruption because it’s a reality that there is corruption in government.”²¹⁰ So far, “There is very little change in the fight against corruption in this country [i.e., Zambia]. The efforts we have been making appear to be haphazard.”²¹¹ And even though in both countries sitting presidents (at the time of field research) have embarked upon an anti-corruption agenda, neither is free from charges of mismanagement themselves (Bauer and Taylor 2005).²¹²

In fact in many African countries such as Tanzania and Zambia corruption and patronage politics are so entrenched that they can be spoken of as institutions.²¹³ In his work, Hyden (1983, 2005, 2006) refers to the “economy of affection,” which is a major impediment to development, keeping people dependent on favors from those in power, whether on the basis of family, ethnic, or religious ties. Such a situation is especially pertinent in an environment of subsistence agriculture (ibid, 1983) in which many Tanzanians and Zambians, too, live. Nevertheless, according to Hyden the economy of affection affects also other parts of Tanzania (his country of specialization), being “present not just in villages but also in the urban areas and there not only in the slums but also in high offices” (2005, 17). For this reason he has said that “the creation of social

capital through civic education is an especially tough challenge in societies like Tanzania” (ibid, 8). Further, according to a government employee interviewed for this study, the situation has worsened in Tanzania lately, with the “affective kinds of relations” having become more entrenched (in the dominant party).²¹⁴

Finally, the low status of women in both Tanzania and Zambia is a cultural factor that significantly affects the participation of at least one group--women.²¹⁵ Can civic education help empower women, as hypothesized? In 1999 Hyden wrote about the “continuing weakness of [Tanzania’s] human rights regime,” in which “the greatest shortcomings exist in the protection of the rights of disadvantaged groups, notably women” (152). In both countries some of the best known violations of women’s rights have to do with inheritance and land rights, with the infamous “property grabbing,” affecting widows, as perhaps the most commonly cited example (Izumi 2007; Swantz 1998). The most violated groups are younger and older women, who are targets of female circumcision, and can be suspected and even killed for witchcraft.²¹⁶ Also, marrying off young girls takes place in both countries.²¹⁷ Consequently, girls drop out of school earlier than boys.²¹⁸ But often, rights violation remains concealed because, as a long-time missionary to Tanzania said, “Tanzania’s is a ‘culture of concealing’: On the outside, you cannot detect that wives are being battered. [Yet they are.] And personally, I don’t know any man that does not have extramarital children.”²¹⁹

With regard to the kinds of burdens and constraints on rights that women have in their daily life, Killian’s (1998) description from coastal Swahili villages in Southern Tanzania is worth quoting in some length:

When it comes to agricultural work, both women and men work, although women work more hours compared to men. I personally noted that while a husband and his wife go to the farm in the morning, the wife goes back again in the evening and leaves the man either at home or at the *pombe* shop (local beer club). On top of this, women are responsible for taking care of children and all domestic chores. At the same time it is the husband who takes a larger share of the income within the household. In this case, women's role in decision-making is very limited. On the crops produced, for example, they can only make independent decisions on how to use the harvest either from vegetables or other insignificant crops. Any crops stored in a big quantity within the house are men's property, who are the ones to decide on how to use them. Women had the following to say on the issue of decision-making in the household, "*Kama mpunga ni ndani siwezi kuchota kupika hadi mume wangu aniruhusu, hasa wakati huu wa njaa*". ("If there is rice stored in our house, I cannot just take it and cook without my husband's permission. And this is so particularly during these times of food shortages.") (150-151).

Such a status of women, inferior to that of men, manifests itself not only within the family but also in the community. Killian continues on the above villages, "One of the most conspicuous aspects in the life of these villagers is the limits imposed upon women from actively taking part in public occasions Traditionally, men and women held separate meetings when deciding on issues which affected the community" (150). Thus women indeed have more to gain from civic education, when aiming to promote recipients' inclusion and participation in public affairs.

The comments heard from interviewees for the present study are consistent with Killian's description. For example, a Tanzanian development worker described the reality that women face with regard to attending community meetings:

The village chairman arranged the meeting to be held at the market. . . Everyone sitting in the chairs were men so we asked, "Where are the women?" Then we saw women coming to listen, but they went to hide. . . I went around, and found some of them, and when I went back to the meeting. . .

[Interviewer:] *You brought the women with you?*

I didn't bring them, because . . . first time, you must not bring them. You have to talk to the men. So I went to the men; I said: "You know, my husband, he loves me very much. But he [lets] me come here, to talk with you, work with you. Why don't you let your women sit with you here? Or at least sit somewhere else...[e.g., under] a tree nearby, so that the women can sit there".... [Then] they [the women] came.

So in the end the women did come?

There were not very many, like men, but those who were eager to come, they came. And I had to apologize, "Please – for these women who have come here, Mr. Chairman, please protect them, so that they are not beaten [by] their husbands because they came." . . . So you have to joke and say [something like] this...²²⁰

Civic education has tackled these kinds of problems, but, as one Tanzanian NGO employee recalls about civic education efforts on women's rights, "in the beginning it was a horrific task because the men . . . were so harsh."²²¹ Similarly, a Zambian NGO employee noted that men are very resistant to incorporate women into decision-making.²²² Therefore, "there is a need to intensify civic education to change the mindset of people."²²³

Differences between Tanzania and Zambia

Different Economic Trends and Attitudes toward Economy

As emphasized in this study, both exposure to civic education and the level of participation are influenced by the contexts in which people live and the attitudes they hold. Beyond the overall condition of poverty in Tanzania and Zambia, people's attitudes are affected by the economic trends which they have seen in the past, and which they expect to characterize the future. Does the economic outlook encourage or discourage participation? Although poverty casts impediments to citizen participation in both Tanzania and Zambia, economic trends have been even worse in Zambia, having

negatively impacted Zambians' attitudes. In fact, as a result of a long and continuous decline in the economy, Zambians "remain the most gloomy [of 12 nations studied by the Afrobarometer] – only 28 percent think that economic life is better in their inflation-sapped economy, with 57 percent seeing it as worse than under the old order – to the point where some people have given up hope that any political or policy regime can bring about a recovery in living standards" (Bratton et al. 2005, 237). One Zambian NGO employee interviewed for this study stressed how difficult it is to make people interested in participating in the electoral process because "the past 15 years have been more disastrous to the people [than the period preceding it]. They have lost the little faith they had."²²⁴ Because of increased poverty, civic education in Zambia is now an "uphill battle."²²⁵ There has been a great loss of jobs due to industrialization, a factor that a student of Zambian politics calls the "single most important factor in Zambian politics."²²⁶

Zambia's economic problems started already at independence. Thus even though there was a lot of optimism for great success, Kaunda failed to diversify the economy, building it almost solely on the promise of the copper industry (Bauer and Taylor 2005). And the actions of President Chiluba in the 1990s only added to the country's problems.

As Bauer and Taylor say,

If Kaunda had brought Zambia to the brink, politically and economically, then Chiluba can be (dis)credited with overseeing Zambia's descent into an antidemocratic kleptocracy in the 1990s. In many respects the country was in a much worse position at the end of Chiluba's rule than it had been a decade earlier, thus continuing the pattern of decline begun in the 1970s (2005, 47).

Indeed, Zambia's per capita income has declined continuously since at least 1970, with a drastic—a 7.2-percent—drop in the 1990s (Republic of Zambia 2004a). "In the Human

Development Index (HDI), Zambia was the *only* one of the 101 listed countries for which the HDI value in 1998 was lower than in 1975” (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001, 39; emphasis in original). In fact, emphasize Mutesa and Nchito, ”the country’s ranking in terms of HDI closely resembles that of countries that are either in, or emerging from, conflict” (2005, 14).²²⁷ Descriptive is also Zambian children’s poor situation: ”Zambia has the highest proportion of children under 15 years that are orphaned” (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001, 40). The high share of orphans is mainly due to high incidence of deaths from AIDS; in fact, ”over 50% of hospital beds are occupied by people with HIV/AIDS-related diseases” (ibid, 40).

A major cause for the negative developments lay in the way market reforms were implemented:

[T]he MMD government embarked on a vigorous implementation of the SAP during the 1990s that saw the closure, liquidation or privatization of major state companies. The introduction of a market-oriented economy affected the livelihoods of many people as pricing was liberalized making food expensive, and jobs were lost through retrenchment, dismissals, or occasionally early retirement. The new market environment required people to adjust to situations that Zambians were not used to (Simutanyi 2002, 2).

To be sure, although Tanzania was also affected by market reforms, the trends in the economy there have been much more positive. In fact, according to an Afrobarometer briefing paper, Tanzania’s “macroeconomic achievements of recent years have been impressive, especially since the second half of the last decade. In 2004, GDP growth reached 6.7%, the average inflation rate declined from 27% in 1995 to 4%, domestic revenue collection increased threefold between 1995 and 2004, and the value of exports increased by 18% in 2004 alone” (REPOA 2006, 1).²²⁸

In light of this it is not surprising that Tanzanians in general have had a much more pro-market reform attitude than Zambians (Chaligha et al. 2002).²²⁹ This refers to the issues of user fees, restructuring of public service, market pricing, and privatization. In fact, in Round 1 of the Afrobarometer surveys, Tanzanians topped the list of 12 countries when asked about their support for user fees in education²³⁰ and restructuring the public service.²³¹ They were the second most supportive nation when it comes to market pricing²³² and privatization.²³³ In fact, in 1999 “solid majorities of Tanzanians accept[ed] three out of four core economic reform policies. . . . Only with regard to privatisation [was] opinion equally divided between market and statist views” (ibid, 26). Therefore, analyzing the situation in 1999, Chaligha et al. say, “Tanzanians have the most consistently pro-reform attitudes of any country included in the Afrobarometer” (ibid, 26).²³⁴

How are such attitudinal differences likely to affect participation? One might expect that, due to their more critical stance, Zambians would be more likely to attack economic policies, while Tanzanians may be more likely to remain passive, or then mobilize support around the reforms. Chaligha et al. (2002) advance two possibilities to explain Tanzanians’ clear pro-reform position in 1999: either they reacted against memories of the “empty shops” of the 1980s, or they are

”uncritical citizens,” who passively accept the top-down policies supplied by their leaders. Just as they once accepted *ujamaa*, now they accept adjustment. Because they have not developed the habit of questioning official decisions, especially in the arcane arena of macroeconomic policy, they may simply go along with the orthodoxy of the day. Not wanting to appear to be out of step with their leaders, they may simply take refuge in easy expressions of satisfaction with market policies when survey researchers happen to ask their opinions (26).

Later in their report, Chaligha et al. add an important statement describing Tanzanians' attitudes in general, not only vis-à-vis macroeconomic policy: "Because ordinary people have never been in the lead in making demands for change, the population at large has not yet developed the healthy skepticism about authority, the independence of preferences, and the courage to take action that are the life blood of functioning democratic and market systems" (ibid, 49). This thus serves to demonstrate that the kind of actively participating population vital for democratic consolidation does not exist in Tanzania.

The generally uncritical acceptance of government policies in Tanzania is logical with the fact that "Tanzanians apparently still feel nostalgic about the previous political regime,"²³⁵ during which they accepted policies handed down by leadership (Chaligha et al. 2002, 36). In fact "Tanzanians' relatively benign memories of life under one-party rule . . . were confirmed by [a] World Values Study survey. [In that survey] [o]f 771 respondents, 43 percent said that the one-party system was a good or very good system of government, while just 22 percent rated it as bad or very bad" (ibid, 36).²³⁶ This means that "Tanzanians remain highly patriotic and willing to sacrifice for the greater good of the country" (REDET 1997, vii).

Meanwhile, Zambians espouse "little nostalgia for the former one-party regime" (Simutanyi 2002, vi). And unlike Tanzanians, they do have the experience of being "in the lead in making demands for change," most importantly at the time of transition. Therefore, although in both nations people are generally speaking uncritical and want to avoid conflict, Zambians view their government more critically than Tanzanians (Chaligha et al. 2002), especially in the region in which this study was conducted (see

below). Therefore they are more likely to voice opinions in opposition to the government, with their more critical stance also likely affecting the extent to which they contact their Ward Councilor (and engage in other acts of participation). Is a critical outlook more or less likely to encourage contacts with officials and promote other forms of participation?

Different Citizen Disposition toward Politics and Sense of Efficacy

But though Zambians are in this sense more inclined to “take it to the streets,” Tanzanians are relatively more predisposed to participate based on their interest in politics and their sense of efficacy. Indeed, citizens’ interest in politics is higher in Tanzania—probably due to having had a more mobilizing and politicized type of single-party rule (Chaligha et al. 2002).²³⁷ While 36 percent of Tanzanians say they are very interested in politics, only 22 percent of Zambians say so (ibid).²³⁸ In fact, comparing all the Afrobarometer countries, Chaligha et al. note that Tanzanians have “some of the highest levels of interest in politics” (2002, vi). This is significant as several studies, as noted, have found political interest to be an important determinant of political participation. Consequently, Tanzanians also discuss politics more often than other Afrobarometer nations, with the exception of Ugandans.²³⁹

And at least based on the Afrobarometer, they feel more efficacious than Zambians, with as many as six in ten (61 percent) believing that “in discussion with friends and neighbors, I can influence the opinions of others” (Chaligha et al. 2002, 27). “Turning to another indicator of efficacy, over three-quarters (78 percent) believe that ‘as a community, we are generally able to make our elected representatives listen to our problems,’ while just 13 percent say ‘we are usually unable to make our elected

representatives listen to us” (ibid, 27). Yet when asked a different way, efficacy levels do not seem that high: in the second round of the Afrobarometer, 48 percent of Tanzanians agreed with the statement that “the way the government operates sometimes seems so complicated that I cannot really understand what is going on” (ibid, 27), with this share remaining essentially the same in the latest survey round in 2005.²⁴⁰

Though it is possible that the question on efficacy was not asked the same way in Zambia, according to the Afrobarometer Zambians come across as being less efficacious. Noticeably, while the report on Tanzania stresses Tanzanians’ efficacy, the one on Zambia emphasizes Zambians’ self-reported lack of understanding and skill: “A majority of respondents feel they do not have enough information about politics (63 percent), and an even larger number cannot understand what goes on in politics and government (73 percent). Just over half also feel that they are not able to speak their minds freely about politics (52 percent)” (Simutanyi 2002, 5). However, there are also alternative sources according to which Zambians’ level of efficacy is not as poor as the Afrobarometer indicates. For example, through a focus group method, Bratton and Liatto-Katundu (1994) found Zambians to generally feel able to influence the course of politics in their country. According to them, “their [i.e., Zambians’] attitudes of competence are a major resource for consolidating democratic institutions” (561). Bratton also refers to Zambians as “commonly profess[ing]” a sense of political efficacy (1999, 560). But what is clear is that in both countries there are those with low efficacy levels—and it will be important to examine whether civic education could be a tool in raising those levels. This, it is expected, would be a prerequisite for the masses’ effective participation.

Different Opportunities for Participation

The differences in individuals' disposition need to be understood in light of Tanzania's stronger legacy of participation. As Tripp writes about the single-party era, "Unlike most African states . . . Tanzania had adopted from the outset an approach that saw political participation of people as vital to the success of the nation's development plans" (1992, 228). In this, Nyerere played a key role; his ideology was that "people are given a positive role, not only in electing their representatives but also in controlling them and initiating policies The individuals participate in the process of governing themselves; they think about and discuss politics with other individuals in the community" (Kweka 1995, 63).²⁴¹ At the time of Nyerere, though, it was the state (party) that co-opted and coordinated all participation (ibid; Tripp 1992).²⁴² Party "[l]eaders and experts were required to ensure that the villagers participated in considering, planning and implementing their development plans" (Kweka 1995, 72). This kind of participation imposed from above also refers to how Tanzanian village councils²⁴³ were established in the mid-1970s (Killian 1998; Kweka 1995). TANU also organized the elections for village councils, as it did for co-operatives and mass organizations (Kweka 1995). In contrast, in Zambia (at least in our research sites) village committees (governments) only came into being in the mid-1990s, thereby according Zambian citizens a shorter experience with participating in village governance.

Another reason that there is a better preparedness for participation in Tanzania is that the country is further along in implementing the process of decentralization.²⁴⁴ Even though both Tanzania and Zambia inherited from the colonial masters a "dual system of administration" (Republic of Zambia 2003, 10) whereby the locals were governed

through “Native Authorities” (Mwaipopo 2004, 2), Tanzania has been quicker to turn this system into one with more concrete content (one in which the local government has more authority), making government more accessible to people. In fact, in the words of Work, “Tanzania has always seen decentralisation as an ideal approach to rural and urban development” (2002, 13). In particular, Nyerere “consistently favoured decentralization of accountability and responsibility” (Green 1995, 87).²⁴⁵ But a constitutional change in 1977 was the first real push for the country’s decentralization efforts, and the process culminated, with pressure from donors, in the 1999 launching of the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP; Gould and Ojanen 2003). By 2004, “responsibility for development ha[d] formally been devolved from the federal government . . . to the local government structures,” (Michael 2004, 8). In this process particularly the district level government has been strengthened at the cost of “once-powerful” regional level (Gould and Ojanen 2003, 105).

Compared to Tanzania, the coining of Zambia’s decentralization policy dates later, 2003, with implementation scheduled to start only in 2006 (Republic of Zambia 2003). Therefore, in Zambia the process of decentralization has not yet had the opportunity to increase citizen-government interaction. Also, unlike in Tanzania, in Zambia the central government has a much more visible presence and plays an active role in the district level. For example, in Mansa District (chosen as research site, see below), the local Council’s jurisdiction only covers the urban area in Mansa Town, while the central government is responsible for development in the villages.²⁴⁶ Furthermore, Zambia’s decentralization policy document interestingly emphasizes (as does the 1996 Constitution of Zambia) Zambia’s character as a unitary state,²⁴⁷ suggesting that the

devolving of authority to the local level is more problematic in Zambia. In fact according to some interviewees²⁴⁸ Zambian politicians only pay lip service to decentralization, a point that Schmidt (1997) cites as a common phenomenon in countries embarking on this process. A government employee²⁴⁹ held that Zambia, having had such a peaceful past, should have *led* the process of decentralization in her part of Africa. According to him, “this country has been ready for decentralization for a long time. [For example] Councils have existed for a long time, and Council staff has been trained.”²⁵⁰ “But politicians have seen decentralization as a loss of power” and therefore have not really done anything. He added, “Our president will make very big pronouncements—but they will only be implemented after he is gone.” This respondent stressed that the extent to which decentralization is carried out hinges mainly on political will (see also Mukwena, no date).

As a result of the stronger legacy of participation and greater progress in decentralization, Tanzania has more institutionalized structures for village-level citizen participation and interaction with local government representatives. For example, the development officers working with communities in Tanzania are usually based in the local Council, while the development workers stationed in some villages (chiefdoms) in Zambia work under the central government. Indeed, the local Council usually does not have much interaction with Zambian villages. Also, at least in principle, villages have greater interaction with the Council in Tanzania because according to Tanzanian policy, all villages must make their own development plans.²⁵¹ The village plans are forwarded to the ward level, which then delivers them to the Council. The Council’s task is to compile all village plans into a district development plan (Mwaipopo 2004).²⁵²

Different Patterns of Participation

Yet the fact remains that both countries suffer from low levels of citizen participation. For example, according to the Government of Zambia, the period 1991-2000 was one with “[I]ack of involvement of communities in development programmes. [This is because t]he current administrative system does not provide for the establishment of sub-structures at sub-district level to enable local communities [to] participate effectively in their development activities and local affairs” (Republic of Zambia 2003, 17). In fact, as the Afrobarometer report notes, “little has been done [by the state] to enhance political participation of the citizenry since Zambia reverted to a multiparty political system” (Mulenga et al. 2004, 2).²⁵³ Yet an NGO employee was of the opinion that participation has “definitely changed” along the introduction and institutionalization of multipartyism, but that the subsequent and current discontent with the performance of the economy has dampened people’s interest toward participation.²⁵⁴ Another NGO employee similarly said, “We have a big problem in making people interested in participating in the electoral process,” especially, and understandably so when people do not see development taking place in their areas.²⁵⁵ Also, though more institutionalized, participation is similarly deficient in Tanzania, especially among some groups, including women--as emphasized by the UNDP Resident Representative/UN Resident Coordinator in Tanzania at a launch of a voters’ education program in 2005:

Recent research points to three groups in Tanzanian society who have been less engaged in electoral processes and in civic participation than any other sector – and these are young people between the ages 18 and 26, women, and those with a lower level of education. These are indeed alarming findings in terms of long-

term democracy-building. We also know that the disability community has also been very much on the outside of civic engagement for a long time (Hendra 2005, 5).

Nevertheless, greater institutionalization of participation and involvement of the Party in people's lives in Tanzania has meant that citizen participation follows different patterns in the two countries. First, village meetings are more routinized in Tanzania, whereas in Zambia they are rather ad hoc.²⁵⁶ According to rules governing village meetings in Tanzania, stipulated in Council documents, both the village council and residents in sub-village areas are supposed to meet once a month; in turn, the village assembly (consisting of all adult villagers) is supposed to meet four times a year. Also, at village assembly meetings, villagers are supposed to record attendees and minutes, and then send these records to the ward level.²⁵⁷ In contrast, there are no set rules about the frequency of village meetings in Zambia. Also, "there are no meetings which villagers are obliged to attend, except those called by the chief."²⁵⁸ In addition, it is true that villagers in Zambia may request that a meeting be held, by approaching the village headperson.²⁵⁹ However, normally it is the chairperson of a development group who may do so.²⁶⁰

As a result, attending a village meeting is more common in Tanzania than many other African countries,²⁶¹ although Afrobarometer data suggest that attendance rates have doubled in Zambia in the past few years (see Table 5.2.). Although attendance at community meetings is not hypothesized, it is useful to know the different status these meetings have in Tanzanian and Zambian communities.²⁶² High attendance in Tanzania "reflects the process by which community problems are first discussed at village assembly meetings and hamlet^[263] meetings before they are forwarded to the Local

Authority Council” (Chaligha et al. 2002, 30). Table 5.2. compares data on attendance at community meetings as well as other acts of participation in Tanzania and Zambia. These data are then described and explained below, beginning with those participatory acts in which Tanzanians have been relatively more active.

Table 5.2. Democratic Participation in Tanzania and Zambia

	Tanzania			Zambia		
	2001	2003	2005	1999	2002	2005
1. Attendance at Community Meetings	75	83*	81*	31	62*	65*
2. Joining with Others to Raise an Issue	60	70*	70*	39	48*	42*
3. Turnout in presidential elections ¹	77 (1995), 84 (2000), 72 (Dec. 2005)			45 (1991), 58 (1996), 68 (2001), 71 (Sept. 2006)		
4. Affiliation with Political Party ²	79	69	76	36	39	52
5. Contacting Government Officials	8* ³	43* ⁴	29* ⁴	22* ³	n/a	n/a
6. Affiliation with Local Associations						
Church/Mosque	82**	77**	61**	73* ⁵	n/a	66**
Trade Union/Farmers Association	16**	23**	26**	7* ⁶	n/a	10**
Women's Group	11	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Sports/Recreation	7	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Educational Group	6	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Professional/Business Group	6**	9**	9**	16* ⁷	n/a	5**
Community Development Group	6**	22** ⁹	20** ⁹	31* ⁸	n/a	11** ⁹
Environmental Group	6	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Human Rights/Pro-Democracy	3	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Notes:

Percent of respondents saying they have participated in the activity at least once in the past 5 years (except when defined differently, below).

* Percent of respondents saying they have participated in the activity at least once in the past year

** Percent of respondents saying they are an "official leader" or "active member"

¹ Percentage of actual voters of registered voters in chronological order in all general elections during multipartyism. Figures are rounded to the full percent.

² Percent saying they feel close to some political party

³ Based on implication in Simutanyi (2002), this refers to state officials in general.

⁴ Contacting the Ward Councilor

⁵ Percent saying they have attended a meeting of a church group (for other than religious services).

⁶ Percent saying they have "attended a trade union meeting at least a few times" (Simutanyi 2002, 5)

⁷ Percent saying they have "gone to a meeting of a local commercial organization" (Simutanyi 2002, 5).

However, one should note that this question subsumes two groups of associations which in the Tanzanian survey are asked about separately: business groups and farmers association. That is, the question in the Zambian survey is as follows, "Over the past year, how often have you attended meetings of a local commercial organization such as a business group or a farmers' association?" (Cho 2002, Afrobarometer Codebook).

⁸ Percent saying they have "attended meetings of a group concerned with local matters such as schools, housing or rates" (Simutanyi 2002, 5). However, this statistic is problematic because the Zambian 1999 survey also asked two other similar questions, that is, about respondents' attendance at meetings of (a) a

local self-help association “such as stokvel, burial association, or neighbourhood watch” and (b) “[g]roup that does things for the community” (Cho 2002, Afrobarometer Codebook). Simutanyi reports that the combined percentage of people reporting attendance at these (that is, “a community self-help group or a group concerned with community issues”) “at least a few times” is 23 (2002, 5).

⁹ Refers to community development group or self-help association

“n/a” denotes either that data is not available, or that inferring the information from the data that exist is difficult

Sources: Afrobarometer (2006), Bratton (1999), Bratton et al. (2005), Chaligha et al. (2002), Lolojih and Chikwanha (2006), Mulenga et al. (2004), Mutesa and Nchito (2005), and Simutanyi (2002)

Beyond attending village meetings, Tanzanians are also more active than Zambians in joining other people to raise an issue that they consider important. While 70 percent of Tanzanians in 2005 said they have done so within the past year, the equivalent percentage in Zambia was only 42 (Afrobarometer 2006; Lolojih and Chikwanha 2006). It is interesting, and worth noting, that Mulenga et al. attribute the rise in both Zambians’ attendance at community meetings and proclivity to join others to raise an issue to civic education—though the authors do not elaborate as to why this may be so:

These improvements can largely be attributed to the civic education programs that have been introduced by such non-governmental organizations as the Civic Education Association and the Anti-Voter Apathy project, to mention just a few. The civic education programs have focused on encouraging people to participate in politics. Many have also learned the value of cooperating through participation in self-help schemes for housing provision (see Bratton et al., 1999) (Mulenga et al. 2004, 14).

Third, though not hypothesized in this study, Tanzanians have also tended to vote more actively than Zambians. Only in the most recent national elections have turnout levels equaled, as shown by Table 5.2. That Zambians have voted less may be at least in part due to the distrust that many Zambians have toward elections as a fair way to select leaders (Mulenga et al. 2004; Simutanyi 2002). In fact, “nearly one-quarter (22 percent)

[of Zambians] [are] willing to consider alternative means of selecting political leaders because they feel that elections are fraught with many problems” (Mulenga et al. 2004, v). Low electoral participation was a problem already at the beginning of the multiparty era: although “[a]n overwhelming percentage of respondents (94 per cent) acknowledged a civic duty to vote” (Bratton and Liatto-Katundu 1994, 546), turnout in 1991, at approximately 45 percent, was at an internationally low level (Bratton 1999; Mutesa and Nchito 2005). However, as Table 5.2. shows, it has since risen--first to 58 percent (1996), then to 68 percent (2001), and in September 2006 to 71 percent.

Fourth, connected to Tanzania’s history of higher turnout rates as well as the stronger position of TANU/CCM --than that of UNIP²⁶⁴ or MMD in Zambia--party affiliation is much higher in Tanzania (Bratton et al. 2005). As Table 5.2. indicates, 76 percent of Tanzanians “feel close to any political party,” while 52 percent of Zambians do (Afrobarometer 2006; Bratton et al., 258; Lolojih and Chikwanha 2006).²⁶⁵ In both countries, most of those feeling close to some party identify with the dominant party—in Tanzania “the overwhelming majority” of mainlanders identify with CCM (Bratton et al. 2005, 258), while in Zambia “[t]he bulk” (64 percent) identify with MMD (Mulenga et al. 2004, 15). That party membership is so low in Zambia may be surprising in light of post-1991 proliferation of parties (Bratton and Liatto-Katundu 1994). But Bratton (as well as Bratton and Liatto-Katundu, 1994) explains this as Zambians’ reaction “against compulsory institutional rules” instead of which they now enjoy “the rediscovered freedom not to belong to any political body” (1999, 561). Zambians’ current shunning away from party politics is significant because, as Bratton found in his study,

Zambians who carried the membership cards of political party were consistently more likely to participate in national politics, in all its multiple dimensions [In fact] political party membership had a much more consistent effect (across all modes of participation) than any other institutional variable. And the effect was broadly civic rather than narrowly partisan, holding regardless of which political party—MMD or UNIP—was considered (1999, 569).

This evidence from Zambia thus gives credence to the institutional explanation of political participation established in the literature. Party membership is important also because, as Bratton found, it “more extensively” contributes to an individual’s interest in politics than registering to vote or joining an association (1999, 580).

But, fifth, even though the interaction between communities and local government may be more institutionalized in Tanzania, Tanzanian villagers, or individuals in general, do not appear to contact their government officials as much as Zambians. In fact, shown by Table 5.2., a much larger share of Zambians contact their government officials.²⁶⁶ In Afrobarometer Round 1, while 22 percent of Zambians reported to having contacted government officials, only 8 percent of Tanzanians had done so (Chaligha et al. 2002; Simutanyi 2002). This, Chaligha et al. (2002) suggest, is indicative of the mobilized form of political participation typical in Tanzania, whereby attending community meetings and election rallies, and joining others to raise an issue is more common than engaging in more individualized forms of participation, such as contacting government officials or joining community organizations.²⁶⁷ This means that participation in Tanzania is often directed from above, by political party/parties or perhaps village leadership, rather than being spontaneous (ibid). Thus in Tanzania civic education would appear to have a greater hurdle to overcome in inducing individualized participation.

Finally, consistent with these differences in patterns of participation, the other arena in which Zambians participate more actively than Tanzanians is local associations (such as voluntary civic organizations).²⁶⁸ In fact, Simutanyi suggests that “they [Zambians] are the most active in civic associational life” in all of Southern Africa (2002, 2). In Bratton’s dataset, as many as “four out of five Zambians claimed some sort of affiliation with a community-based organization” (1999, 569). And “the most common form of organization to which the majority of Zambians belong is the church” (Duncan et al. 2003, 28). It was especially during the 1980s that associational life in Zambia expanded, when, “[i]n the context of growing political dissatisfaction, the churches and unions provided protected space within civil society for citizens to associate freely and for opposition political leaders to articulate a critique of the old regime” (Bratton 1999, 561). In the post-1991 social transformation, it was the church that was the biggest agent of change.²⁶⁹ In contrast, before that time, “Zambia was . . . intolerant of political dissent and permitted little autonomous societal organization” (Bauer and Taylor 2005, 13). Although in Tanzania “independent forms of association” were similarly suppressed during the single-party rule (Mercer 2003, 748), Tanzania has been slower in reviving its associational life since then. As a consequence, “[a]ssociational life in Tanzania is quite weak, even by African standards” (Hyden 1999, 149).²⁷⁰ This means that “[f]or the most part, the density of voluntary and civic organizations is sparser in Tanzania than in other African countries” (Chaligha et al. 2002, 31). The only exception is church or mosque membership: “[b]esides religious group membership, membership in other types of civil society groups is the lowest in any country where Afrobarometer surveys have asked similar questions” (ibid, 31).²⁷¹ This suggests that, as associations are important

mobilizing agents, it may be easier to mobilize Zambians than Tanzanians by utilizing these groups.

Different Role for Government in Civic Education

An important difference in civic education provided in Tanzania and Zambia is that in Tanzania government has been more involved in it. To be sure, in both countries decentralization policy stipulates citizen sensitization. In Tanzania, government initiated training has primarily covered the decentralization process and good governance (Mwaipopo 2004), targeting leaders, through whom the lessons learnt are subsequently supposed to trickle down to ordinary citizens. For example, in 2001-02 there was a program as part of the Local Government Reform Programme which trained village level elected leaders, reaching all (10,000+) village councils in Tanzania and more than 70,000 people.²⁷² It included three days of training about local leaders' roles, responsibilities, and basic administrative skills, and utilized simple syllabi. Trainers were primarily community development officers (i.e., local government personnel) and ward education officers.²⁷³ In 2003-04 the LGRP implemented another training program, of local Councilors, consisting of four modules in residence and also guided long-distance training by "selected adult educators."²⁷⁴ It reached over 3,400 Councilors from all wards in each Council area.²⁷⁵ Yet, as Mwaipopo points out regarding Tanzania, "the level of awareness of reforms at community level is still very low" (2004, 7).

Zambia's decentralization policy too suggests that civic education has an important place in the implementation of the policy (Republic of Zambia 2005). The first in the list of ten components of the policy in the Table of Contents is titled,

“Sensitisation, Civic Education and Consolidating a Democratic Culture.”²⁷⁶ And one of the elements in the “principal focus of Government” will be “carrying out intensive sensitization of the population of the implications and obligations of decentralized governance so as to entrench the broad based support already demonstrated for the policy, and ensure the active participation of the population in the building of a democratic culture at all levels of our society” (ibid, 5). Of course, one should note that in Zambia’s case the majority of this sensitization is still forthcoming and so it cannot be considered a part of the civic education whose impact this study examines. In fact one of the government representatives interviewed for this study noted that “some time this year training for Councilors will start”²⁷⁷ (whereas this is something that has already taken place in Tanzania). In this sense the situation in Tanzania and Zambia is very different: while in Tanzania the local government (Council) has not only received training but has also—at least in our study sites—been involved in educating citizens, this has not been the case in Zambia. A Zambian government employee emphasized that “there is not even one Council in Zambia that could boast on doing civic education.”²⁷⁸ Instead, “it is the NGOs that are doing that—but: who are funding the NGOs?”²⁷⁹ He added, “Maybe civic education is not yet a priority here I have a feeling that politicians tend to enjoy ignorant crowds. . . .Because once the population is knowledgeable about how that which is important to them should be brought to them, it will be three-quarters of our politicians [that will fail to get through elections].” He continued,

The more people know their rights, they’ll demand equal distribution of wealth, downward pulling of resources, retention of certain resources in their areas, development of certain industries in their areas. So at the end of the day, people will be empowered and not easily bribed by others. People will not be poverty

stricken They will be able to control resources in their communities. If people are aware that you need them [then they are empowered].²⁸⁰

Nevertheless, it should be noted that civic education as an activity is not new in Zambia, although its contents have changed along with the introduction of multiparty politics. As Bratton describes the single-party era:

[A]ll the selected associations considered here operated programs of civic education aimed at raising the awareness of their members about the rights and duties of citizenship: The cooperative movement taught cooperative principles and democratic self-management; the labor unions sponsored worker's education on workplace rights and collective bargaining; and the Catholic Church, through its national network of justice and peace committees, proselytized on behalf of universal human rights (1999, 573-574).

After the single-party era, of course, the contents of civic education have broadened and the focus has changed. As the Executive Director of the Zambia Civic Education Association (ZCEA) explains, along the end of the single-party era, the “masters” changed: whereas before the masters (those with power) had been the state and politicians, now it was citizens.²⁸¹ According to her, the founder of ZCEA in the early 1990s realized that in Zambia there was a lack of understanding about multipartyism and the power that citizens have in it. Therefore, the founder wanted to contribute to educating people on their rights and responsibilities, and their role in multiparty democracy.

Not surprisingly, having been exposed to the media and other sources of information, people in both nations have begun demanding civic education. In the words of a Tanzanian government official, “Civic education is now discussed a lot in Tanzania; it is seen by people as very important.”²⁸² An employee of a Tanzanian NGO said: “We need civic education at all cost.”²⁸³ Also, already in the early 1990s, Bratton and Liatto-

Katundu reported: “The selected groups of Zambians we spoke to repeatedly expressed a strong demand for civic education” (1994, 560).

Cultural Differences: Religion, Traditional Authority, Trust

Although on the national level Tanzania and Zambia can be considered similar culturally (due to their similar historical experiences), they have at least three important cultural differences as well. First, while Tanzania’s population is quite equally divided into adherents of two religions (Christianity and Islam), Zambian population is almost entirely Christian.²⁸⁴ Further, Tanzania and Zambia differ in the extent to which people define themselves in religious terms. As Afrobarometer finds, “religious identity is most widespread in Zambia” of all countries in the survey (Bratton et al. 2005, 189). As many as 36 percent of Zambians define themselves this way, “more even than feel themselves members of an occupation or class (25 and 23 percent respectively). Almost all these Zambians profess a Christian soul – whether Protestant, Catholic, African independent, evangelical, or Jehovah’s Witness – though a handful are Muslim or Hindu” (ibid, 189). In contrast, only five percent of Tanzanians define themselves in religious terms, while 76 percent of them, more than any other Afrobarometer nation, define themselves in occupational terms (Chaligha et al. 2002). Such a difference in how a person defines his or her identity may mean that generally speaking, Zambians are more likely than Tanzanians to mold their behavior according to their religious beliefs.

Also, religious affiliation may be related to a person’s level of education and awareness. This affects results in Tanzania, as Muslims are generally speaking less likely to educate their children than are Christians.²⁸⁵ “Muslims ha[ve] historically lagged

behind other groups in the secular education system” (Omari 1995, 26). In part this is because Muslims in Tanzania see education as a western and Christian institution.²⁸⁶ In fact, Christian missions were the first to establish schools in Tanzania, “long preced[ing]” the efforts of the colonial administration on education (Ishumi and Maliyamkono 1995, 47). And according to a development worker, today two-thirds of secondary education in Tanzania is run by religious (Christian) organizations, with also the law on compulsory education being modeled after Christian principles.²⁸⁷ In terms of awareness and action, different religions can have different effects. For example, while faith based organizations in general have improved “a lot” Tanzanians’ civic awareness—with these organizations having helped people understand the “fundamentals of humanness,” including the right to life²⁸⁸--there may also be inherent differences in the political advice given in churches and mosques. For example, while elders in the mosques in coastal Tanzania “critically oppose the youth’s support of multipartyism” (Swantz 1998, 153), many church leaders from various Christian denominations in Northern Zambia seemed to encourage members’ going to the polls, albeit only after having cautiously evaluated the candidates whom they consider voting for.²⁸⁹ There are also differences among Christian denominations, with Bratton having found that “[a]mong churchgoers [in Zambia], Catholics were much more likely to be politically mobilized than Protestants (including Evangelicals) or adherents of independent African churches” (1999, 569). This is significant as about one-fourth of Zambians are Catholic (Duncan et al. 2003).

Second, in addition to religion, traditional authority plays a bigger role in Zambia than Tanzania. This suggests that opportunities for democratic participation in Zambia are fewer: participation depends to a larger degree on the chief’s acceptance/actions.

According to one development worker, Zambian chiefs are very influential, especially those in peripheral areas.²⁹⁰ Their role is to be “the custodian of land and the upholder of tradition” (Mickels-Kokwe and Kokwe 2004, 23). However, chiefs do “discuss . . . all matters of importance with the council of elders” (ibid, 23). Also, there are those that emphasize that chiefs’ authority depends on the person and the tradition of the chieftaincy in the particular location. Duncan et al. write:

It is difficult to make generalisations about the usefulness of chiefs as drivers of pro-poor change in Zambia, in good part because they vary enormously in legitimacy and authority throughout the country. The chiefs with the highest status are those, such as the Litunga of the Lozi, the Chitimukulu of the Bemba, and the rulers of the Ngoni and Lunda peoples, who are the lineal descendants of the rulers of strong pre-colonial states. There are many other parts of the country, such as the Southern, Central, and Lusaka Provinces, where many of the chieftaincies were created and imposed as part of the colonial policy of Indirect Rule. In such areas the influence of chiefs is largely dependent on the personalities of individual chiefs and chieftainesses, and on their levels of education. There are some areas of the country where development, and pro-poor change, would be difficult, or even impossible, without the support of the local chief. There may also be areas where the support of the chief is irrelevant to progressive change, and where the chief may be an obstacle to such change: there are parts of the country for instance in which there are conflicts and tensions between traditional leaders and civil society organizations (2003, 46).

The influence of chiefs thus varies by location, although outside local communities, “[t]he chiefs as a whole have exercised remarkably little political power on the national scale in Zambia” (ibid, 46). Bratton adds that in Zambia,

[c]hieftaincy and headmanship are undergoing revival and reinvention as channels of political representation, especially insofar as they are well placed to address the popular demand for face-to-face contact with political leaders. In this respect, Zambia is an exemplar of the modern African phenomenon of dual authority, marked by the coexistence of “the realm of state sovereignty and the realm of traditional government; both systems effectively govern the same communities of citizen-subjects (Sklar, 1993, p.87) (Bratton 1999, 572-573).

In contrast, in Tanzania traditional rule has clearly had a lesser influence, with Nyerere having abolished traditional rule (to foster national identity; Chaligha et al. 2002). In fact during the massive villagization campaign of the 1970s,

the traditional rulers (Mwene and Mamwene) continued to be members of villagized communities and even commanded some respect from their clan members. Their recognized rights were, however, generally confined to religious and ritualistic roles. Those who wished to regain their previously granted status as community leaders, had to go through the electoral system, which was characteristic of the new mode of choosing leadership (Koda 1998, 208).

Probably due to such change in traditional leaders' position, today more Tanzanians (89 percent) reject traditional rule (as a form of governance) than people in the other Afrobarometer countries (Bratton et al. 2005). According to Bratton et al., the "Tanzanian result is understandable in terms of the central government's systematic campaign to discredit the indigenous authority structure and replace it with a network of ten-house cells and party cadres" (2005, 80).

Third, with regard to trust, extant studies seem to agree that institutional trust (a proxy for trust in politicians) is very high in Tanzania, while in Zambia it is low. But there does not seem to be the same kind of agreement in the literature about the level of interpersonal trust in Tanzania. Bratton et al. refer to Tanzanians' high trust in the state, while Chaligha et al. (2002) speak of "extraordinarily high levels of trust in government" (2002, 6). One piece of evidence of this could be that Tanzanians are "willing to wait for [economic] reform to produce results" (ibid, 24). What makes the high level of institutional trust significant is that it coexists with "widespread perceptions of corruption" (ibid, vi). In fact the Afrobarometer analysts write that "Tanzania is the only country where we have seen widespread perceptions of corruption co-exist with even

more widespread expressions of trust” (ibid, 2). These authors also find that “Tanzanians express extremely high levels of trust in each other” (ibid, 3). However, Bratton et al. find Tanzanians much less trusting, ranking only ahead of the citizens of Lesotho among 11 Afrobarometer countries,²⁹¹ causing the authors to refer to “low level of interpersonal trust in Tanzania” (2005, 194). Hyden, too, is of the opinion that “in Tanzania . . . social as well as political trust is low” (2005, 18).

In contrast, Zambians place fourth highest in the cross-national comparison of interpersonal trust, following Malawians (who rank highest), Namibians, and South Africans.²⁹² Bratton et al.’s explanation for Tanzanians’ low placement is that villagization forced relative strangers to live in “close residential proximity” (195). With regard to how trust influences participation, these authors quote a study by Widner and Mundt²⁹³ who found “levels of trust [to] exert independent influence on some forms of political participation” (1998, 4; Bratton et al. 2005, 196). In accordance with Putnam’s (1993) findings about social capital, Bratton et al. also “find a slight positive relationship between the index of group membership and the likelihood that an individual will express a sense of generalized trust in other people” (2005, 253).²⁹⁴ For the purposes of this study, however, the consequences of institutional trust²⁹⁵ are more relevant, as the study did not hypothesize on interpersonal trust.

In contrast, while perceptions of corruption are roughly as high in Zambia as they are in Tanzania, “Zambians have very low levels of trust in their political institutions” (Simutanyi 2002, 2). In particular, Zambians distrust politicians (Bratton and Liatto-Katundu 1994). Thus if the hypothesized relationship between civic education and trust is corroborated, in Zambia civic education would be likely to worsen the situation in that

trust in politicians would diminish from an already low level, while in Tanzania civic education might help bring excessive levels of trust down to a “healthier” level.²⁹⁶

Selecting Regions within the Countries

Next, moving from the general discussion of the historical-political, economic, and cultural contexts in the two countries to the sub-national level, this chapter will describe the selection of regions included in the study. The selection began in Tanzania, the first site of field research. The question that was asked was, In which location in Tanzania has civic education been given to such an extent that its effects could be examined? Because the majority of Africans still live in rural areas—in Tanzania 77 percent, and in Zambia 65 percent (United Republic of Tanzania 2002; Republic of Zambia 2004a)—it was decided to focus on rural villages. Furthermore, as Bratton et al’s research suggests, attitudes may no longer be that different between rural and urban areas, due to “population movements and other trends” causing social homogenization (2005, 168). Therefore today it is more likely that attitudes of rural dwellers do not differ as markedly from those of urbanites as they used to. In fact Bratton et al. say, “Because urban and rural areas are no longer as socially distinct as they once were, residential location *hardly* influences the formation of political attitudes” (ibid, 168; emphasis added), a determinant of political behavior. The area within Tanzania that stood out in the sense of having had exposure to civic education was the Mtwara and Lindi Regions in the southeastern corner of the country—the site of Tanzania’s first major area based participatory development cooperation program, that is, the RIPS (Rural Integrated Project Support) Programme.²⁹⁷ Civic education was an important part of this program

aiming to empower rural citizens and enhance their relationship with the local government. In the language of a program report, “[t]he overall objective of the Programme is to improve the capacity and transparency of Local Government administration, and strengthen the capacity of civil society to actively and democratically participate in its own development” (Scanagri Finland Oy 2004, i). “RIPS deliberately focuses on the software [i.e., the democratic capacity of civil society and local government] rather than the hardware [i.e., physical infrastructure projects] to promote empowerment and avoid the risk of dependency. This is in contrast to most other area-based programmes” (RIPS Programme 2004, 3). But surely, also other donors’ programs with civic education components have been implemented in these regions. Therefore, having “witnessed a number of developmental interventions during its history” (Seppälä 1998, 8), Mtwara and Lindi Regions also accord us an opportunity to observe donors’ role in providing and/or funding civic education. However, the activities conducted as part of RIPS were the major reason for selecting Mtwara Region as the target region within Tanzania.²⁹⁸ The contents, coverage, and methods of RIPS and other programs entailing civic education in this region (and in the Zambian region selected) will be discussed in detail below.

In addition to having had exposure to civic education, Mtwara Region is one of Tanzania’s least developed areas and very remotely located (see Figure 5.1.). Because of poverty and the region’s distance from the nation’s capital (and other significant urban areas), one can expect civic education to face particular challenges there in promoting citizen participation. Therefore, if civic education is found to contribute to increased participation in Mtwara, it is likely able to do so also elsewhere in Tanzania. In turn, the

selection of a region in Zambia was based on the goal of finding a region as similar as possible to Mtwara Region, so as to facilitate at least some comparison of Tanzanian and Zambian results. Below, we describe further the relevant characteristics of Mtwara Region and its Zambian “counterpart,” Luapula Province.



Figure 5.1. Map of Tanzania

Source: www.cia.gov

Mtwara Region

In terms of land mass, Mtwara Region is the third smallest of Tanzania's 26 regions (after Kilimanjaro and Dar es Salaam), and it has about 1.2 million of the country's approximately 35 million people (RIPS Programme 2005²⁹⁹). The region has about twice as high a population density as Tanzania as a whole; yet its population growth rate, at 1.7 percent, is only about a half of the national average (2.9 percent; *ibid*).

Also, Mtwara families are on average smaller (with 3.8 persons) than the average Tanzanian family (4.9 persons; *ibid*). Thus, Mtwara is relatively densely populated, but one with small and slowly growing families. Part of the reason for this is relatively fast out-migration.³⁰⁰ Also, Mtwara Region has a very high child mortality rate: 212 of 1,000 children.³⁰¹ The region is composed of five districts which have a total of 651 villages (*ibid*). The regional capital is Mtwara town, which is located on the coast of the Indian Ocean, only about 40 km from the Mozambican border.

The Region's remoteness (at least 10 hours by car from Dar es Salaam³⁰²) and poverty combine to make Mtwara a challenging site for promoting political participation. The remoteness is perpetuated by the poor road network, the negative image of Mtwara as a "punishment post" for civil servants, and the fact that all of Mtwara's neighbors are poor as well (Issae 2005; Wembah-Rashid 1998). So remote is its location, and backward its reputation, that some people even talk about Mtwara as an island (it is very difficult to get out of the area).³⁰³ Its reputation as a punishment post means that for a long time, "[c]ivil servants who misbehaved elsewhere in the country were sent to this region as a disciplinary measure" (Wembah-Rashid 1998, 55). Unfortunately for the residents of Mtwara, "[t]his had an effect on the behaviour of these officers in their interaction with the inhabitants: they were either harsh to them or completely uninterested in their work" (*ibid*, 55). Also, "[Swantz] argues that the Mozambican war [1975-94] has induced [Mtwara's] isolation. The effect of the war was very concrete and decisive: it meant that the area was declared an emergency area where all travel was severely restricted. Interaction with the outer world was thus legally curtailed" (Seppälä 1998, 15). Indeed, Mtwara and Lindi "bore the brunt of Tanzania's determination to help the liberation

struggle in Southern Africa particularly Mozambique” (Mesaki and Mwankusye 1998, 59). To bolster security in this then sparsely populated area, villagization started earlier – and was more extensive -- in Southern Tanzania than elsewhere (Koda 1998; Voipio 1998); In Koda’s words, villagization was “systematically and more dynamically” implemented there (1998, 205). And as mentioned, the villagization process often disrupted prevailing social structures and therefore may not have created the most conducive environment for cooperative citizen participation in public affairs.

Poverty is extreme in this region: “statistically registered incomes reveal that most inhabitants of the Lindi and Mtwara regions of South-eastern Tanzania earn less than 0.15USD per day” (Voipio 1998, 79). This is significant as the internationally recognized level of extreme poverty is 1USD per day.³⁰⁴ However, poverty is not necessarily a factor differentiating rural and urban dwellers, at least in Tanzania, as analysts of Afrobarometer data find:

The usual pattern throughout Southern Africa is to find much higher levels of poverty in rural than urban areas. Tanzania flies in the face of this pattern, reflecting many of the egalitarian legacies of the socialist period. Urban dwellers go without water, medical treatment, and schooling for children at the same rates as rural folk. There are slight differences with respect to food and a cash income. The major urban-rural difference on these measures is in access to electricity; 81 percent in rural areas have no access, whereas the proportion is just 42 percent in towns and cities” (Chaligha et al. 2002, 12-13).

Therefore, in this sense, selecting rural areas for this study does not necessarily mean that the same kinds of attitudes (influenced by poverty) would not be found in urban areas.

In terms of their occupation, most residents of Mtwara are involved in smallholder agriculture (RIPS 2005). This is representative of the general population in “Tanzania, where most people engage in self-employment in agriculture” (Bratton et al.

2005, 131).³⁰⁵ It is also notable that the majority of the 85 percent of Tanzanians who live off the land to a greater or smaller degree are peasant women (Koda 1998). Another common occupation in the coastal areas is fishing. In addition to cashew nuts and sesame, which are the main cash crops, cultivated crops include cassava, rice, maize, coconuts, sorghum and pigeon peas (RIPS 2005). Keeping livestock is rare due to presence of tsetse flies and poisonous plants, as well as poor grazing areas (Killian 1998). In fact ownership of livestock is an indicator of wealth (ibid).

Culturally, one of the area's most distinctive features is that it is traditionally matrilineal. This is because the main ethnic group, the Makonde—which is the third largest of Tanzania's approximately 120 ethnic groups (Seppälä 1998)—is matrilineal.³⁰⁶ According to Mihanjo and Luanda (1998), the Makonde constitute 90 percent of the population in Newala district (which is inland) and 86 percent of the population in Mtwara district on the coast.³⁰⁷ However, the literature also points out that due to villagization, migration, the Mozambican war, and intermarriage, the region is increasingly mixed ethnically (RIPS 2005; Seppälä 1998). As a result—and due to the influence of religion—the region is no longer as matrilineal as it used to be, especially on the coastal areas (Koda 1998; RIPS 2005; Swantz 1998; Wembah-Rashid 1998). Whereas lineage may still be matrilineal, property rights are patrilineal (Seppälä 1998). This means that matrilineal patterns are followed only in issues such as in marriage, with the husband usually moving to live in the area from which the wife comes; also, in case of divorce, children remain with the mother.³⁰⁸ However, as a missionary interviewed for this study said, if her husband dies, a woman is worth “nothing,” and the husband's relatives will come and take all of her possessions.³⁰⁹

Another cultural issue is that much of the region is Islamic. As Seppälä notes, Christianity in Southern Tanzania is “localized,” with the influence of the Anglican church largely confined to Masasi (an inland district) and Catholicism found in “several places including . . . Mtwara [town]” (1998, 29). According to Wembah-Rashid (1998), while Muslims have tended to educate only the select few (males), both Anglicans and Catholics have been active in promoting education in the region.³¹⁰ But while Anglicans “put much of their resources in mass education . . . the most ‘educated natives’ deserted the villages,” and so the benefits of the Anglicans’ efforts could not be retained in these areas (ibid, 51). In Wembah-Rashid opinion, the Catholic centers in the area are the “best examples in the region” of “Western-development influence” (ibid, 51).

Mtwara Region is also known as a stronghold for the dominant party. This is explained by “the historical strength of TANU/CCM as a culturally accepted form of patronage organization (even if people view it ironically in terms of efficiency and transparency)” (Seppälä 1998, 29). Therefore, and as was evident also in the field research for this study, residents in Mtwara Region view the dominant party as the upholder of peace, and consequently, opposition party activism as a “call for chaos” (ibid, 29). As Seppälä describes the popular sentiment, “The need for peace overrides the need for political change” (ibid, 29). Another reason for extensive support for CCM is that many of the nation’s leaders and civil servants (most of whom belong to it) have come from Southern Tanzania (Swantz 1998),³¹¹ including President Mkapa (1995-2005). Many of them have been educated at the area’s/nation’s mission schools (Swantz 1998).

But when it comes to residents in Mtwara Region, clearly most of them have not been educated. According to Mtwara Regional Education Officer (REO), the region has

about 40-45 percent illiteracy rate, which is higher than in the country as a whole.³¹² In particular, the number of secondary schools and enrolment in them is low; so is academic performance (Issae 2005). A major reason for this, as well as “low school retention rates and hence low completion rates, high pregnancy rates [in primary schools!], and scant community contributions in the implementation of schools’ development plans,” is that “[c]ommunity [a]wareness towards [e]ducation is still low” (ibid, 5). For example, “[t]he low pace in the construction of Day Secondary Schools is a direct result of low [c]ommunity contribution to development activities” (ibid, 5). But in contrast, according to the REO, *primary* school enrolment and academic performance has improved considerably in Mtwara, with a “dramatic improvement in girls’ performance” (Issae 2005, 2).³¹³ This, according to him, is not only due to the contribution of RIPS, and other donors’ programs, but also because of the government’s (and development partners’) five-year Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP), the goal of which is to ensure good quality primary education for all children aged 7-10 by year 2006 (United Republic of Tanzania 2003). Another program, Complementary Basic Education in Tanzania (COBET) aims to improve (access to) education for children older than 10 years (ibid). Of course, these programs do not affect the results of this study which examines adults’ knowledge, attitudes, and participation, but they are mentioned here to suggest what kinds of challenges the Tanzanian government faces in education, and what kinds of obstacles civic education therefore also faces when it comes to the youth’s formal education.

Finally, residents in Mtwara (and Lindi) region have the reputation of being apathetic (more so than people in other parts of the country), a characteristic which most

likely affects also people's likelihood of participating in public affairs. As Wembah-Rashid describes sentiments in this area,

[W]hen the majority of the people in a region are marginalized, isolated and inward oriented, they develop a behaviour best described as apathy. This includes feelings that they cannot succeed or do better even if they embarked on some project; they have not seen anybody succeed in their vicinity. This last statement may not be true today, but these are feelings which have persisted among members of the older generation (1998, 45-46).

Similarly, according to a government official, "people's consciousness to contribute to development is very, very low in Mtwara. They think finances should come from the government—that communities should only contribute labor. It is not like this in, for example, Kilimanjaro."³¹⁴ This kind of disposition toward political participation and negative feelings about the future likely make civic education very challenging in Mtwara Region.

Luapula Province

In Zambia the area that most closely resembles Mtwara Region in Tanzania was determined to be Luapula Province. One of the country's nine provinces, it has about eight percent (i.e., approximately 853,000) of Zambia's 11 million inhabitants (Republic of Zambia 2004a). It is one of the least populated provinces, with only Western Province and North Western Province having fewer inhabitants, while the Copperbelt, with 16 percent of the nation's population, is the most populated one (ibid). Regarding population density, Luapula is slightly more densely populated (15.3 people per square km) than Zambia as a whole (13.1; Republic of Zambia 2004b). In terms of household size, Luapulan families too are on average smaller than Zambian families in general (just like

families in Mtwara are smaller than those of Tanzania as a whole); yet family size in Luapula (i.e., 5.0) is larger than in Mtwara, and relatively closer to the national average, 5.4 (Republic of Zambia 2004a). But population growth in Luapula is clearly higher than in Zambia in general (and this is something that distinguishes Luapula from Mtwara), with a 3.2-percent provincial growth rate (against the national growth rate of 2.5 percent), which is even higher in rural areas: 3.5 percent (Republic of Zambia 2004b³¹⁵). Because death rate is also higher in Luapula than elsewhere in the country--with 14.6 percent of respondents saying they have experienced death in their household in the past 12 months (as opposed to the national average of 8.9 percent)—this suggests that without the high death rate Luapulan families would be even larger than the 5.0 persons mentioned above (Republic of Zambia 2004a).³¹⁶ Indeed, in the 1980s Gould wrote that “Luapula is reported to have the highest natural fertility rate in Zambia” and in fact “one of the highest population growth rates on the continent” (1989, 28, 45).³¹⁷ Just like Mtwara Region, Luapula Province is close to an international border (border with Congo is only about 30km away). There is thus migration into Luapula, as well as out of it, although the “voluminous labor migration” (Gould 1989, 25) to the mines of the Copperbelt has recently receded, with migration activity now being at par with other Zambian provinces (Republic of Zambia 2004a). The provincial capital, Mansa, is the administrative center of seven largely rural districts, with the whole province being 85 percent rural. A comparison of demographic and other characteristics in Luapula Province and Mtwara Region is provided in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3. Demographic and Other Characteristics of Mtwara Region and Luapula Province

	Mtwara Region (2002)	Luapula Province (2000/ 2002-03)
Population	1.2 million (i.e., 3.4% of national population)	853,000 (i.e., 7.8% of national population)
- of whom rural	80% (nation: 77%)	85% (nation: 65%)
- of whom younger than 15 years	37% (nation: 44%)	46% (nation: 46%)
- of whom female	53% (nation: 51%)	51.6% (nation: 51%)
Population growth	1.7% (nation: 2.9%), 1988-2002	3.2% (nation: 2.5%), 1990-2000
Population density (people/km ²)	67; in 2005: 73 (nation: 39)	15.3 (nation: 13.1)
Distance from capital (by car)	10 hours	8 hours
Household size	3.8 (nation: 4.9)	5.0 (nation: 5.4)
Incidence of poverty	“Most people” live on less than 0.15 USD/day (Voipio 1998)	“Extreme” poverty: 47% (nation: 46%)
Main livelihoods	Small-scale agriculture, fishing	Small-scale agriculture, fishing
Adult literacy (those over 15 years)	56%	61.5%
Kinship	Traditionally matrilineal, but increasingly patrilineal	Traditionally matrilineal, but increasingly patrilineal
Main religion(s)	Islam and Christianity	Christianity
Share of votes for dominant party’s presidential candidate in most recent elections	79% (nation: 80%), Dec. 2005	34% (nation: 43%), Sept. 2006

Sources:

- Mtwara Region: 2002 Population and Housing Census (i.e., United Republic of Tanzania 2002); Issae (2005); National Electoral Commission of Tanzania (www.nec.go.tz)
- Luapula Province: Living Conditions Monitoring Survey Report 2002-2003 (i.e., Republic of Zambia 2004a); 2000 Census (i.e., Republic of Zambia 2004b); The Electoral Commission of Zambia (www.elections.org.zm)

Also, like Mtwara Region, Luapula Province is located far from the nation's capital, with Mansa town about an eight-hour drive from Lusaka (see Figure 5.2). And like Mtwara, Luapula is isolated, suffering from "poor access to markets because of the province being situated far from the main consumption centres and lacking adequate infrastructure in terms of roads, agro processing facilities and market intermediaries" (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001, 76). Further, Luapula is one of the poorest Zambian provinces, though data on this vary considerably, depending in part on how poverty is defined. According to Mutesa and Nchito (2005, citing the 1998 Living Conditions Survey), Luapula is the second poorest province,³¹⁸ with only Western Province being poorer.³¹⁹ Luapula also ranks second lowest when considering mean per capita income (with only Northern Province having a lower per capita income; Republic of Zambia 2004a). In turn, according to an evaluation report on Finnish-Zambian development cooperation, "[t]he most recent data on the incidence of poverty . . . show that the province ranks third from the bottom among the provinces of Zambia," with Western and Northern Provinces ranking lower (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001, 76). In terms of access to clean and safe water, Luapula is placed last, while the incidence of "extreme" poverty does not seem to be any larger in Luapula than elsewhere in the country (see Table 5.3.; Republic of Zambia 2004a). Also, Luapulans' self-assessment of their level of poverty seems to be national average (ibid). Moreover, Gould (1989) stresses that in some sense, Luapula is not poor at all: it has a lot of fish, labor, cassava, groundnuts, beans, and hardwoods—though this situation has undoubtedly worsened in the past 15 years, with, for example, overfishing and loss of nutrients in the soil. Also, Mtwara Region too can be considered rich in various natural resources; yet its

population has suffered heavily from poverty and lack of opportunities. What is important is that both Mtwara and Luapula have a history of negligence and “political disinterest” on the part of national leadership, even colonial administration, as a result of which both areas have remained relatively isolated, backward, and “dependent” (Gould 1989, 153).



Figure 5.2. Map of Zambia

Source: <http://travel.yahoo.com>

Another similarity of Mtwara Region and Luapula Province is that these areas are heavily dependent on agricultural activity, with most residents deriving their livelihood from it (in addition to fishing). This occupation is typical of the Zambian poor at large: “The majority of Zambia’s poor and very poor people live in rural areas and are at least nominally engaged in small-scale agriculture” (Duncan et al. 2003, 62). And in fact it is not only the poor that are involved in agriculture: in seven of Zambia’s nine provinces at least 70 percent (and often much more) of the people are engaged in agricultural activities; in Luapula this percentage is 93 (Republic of Zambia 2004a). The most cultivated crops in Luapula are maize, cassava, groundnuts, sweet potatoes, sorghum,

finger millet, vegetables and fruits (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2001; Gould 1989). And like in Mtwara, very few residents own cattle; in fact only in the urbanized Copperbelt Province do fewer agricultural households own livestock than in Luapula Province (Republic of Zambia 2004a). As in Mtwara, this is because of the presence of the tsetse fly (Gould 1989).

Also, culturally, Luapula Province is similar to Mtwara Region in that its kinship lineage is traditionally matrilineal (Gould 1989). “This means that descent and inheritance is primarily determined in the maternal line. Traditionally, marriage takes place outside one’s maternal clan and husbands leave their parents to reside with their wives’ families. The social system is thus based on the mobility of males” (ibid, 25). This means that “[i]n contrast with patrilineal societies of the West, a son is not heir to his father, but rather to his maternal uncle (mother’s brother)” (ibid, 87). However, as in Mtwara, the observance in practice of matrilineal lineage is decreasing, and this is especially noticeable in the many cases of “property grabbing.” Another similarity with Mtwara is low education levels (though literacy rate in Luapula is somewhat higher; see Table 5.3.). Luapula too has struggled with low enrolment rates, especially for girls, though enrolment has recently increased, thanks in part to the government’s “Go Girl” initiative, funded by UNICEF.³²⁰ One hindrance for girls’ schooling is early marriages, which is encouraged by parents; this is because according to tradition, the in-law will start working for them. Interestingly, according to the District Planning Officer at the Mansa District Education Board, it is particularly the mothers whom are difficult to convince about letting their daughters go to school.³²¹

In contrast, the greatest differences between Mtwara Region and Luapula Province seem to be found in religion and political attitudes. Whereas Mtwara Region is quite equally split into Muslims and Christians, there are virtually no non-Christians in Luapula. And whereas apathy may be said to characterize Mtwara residents, Luapulans are more politically “enlightened” (as are people in Northern Province and the Copperbelt).³²² In the words of a Luapula Councilor, “politically this place [i.e., Luapula] is quite alert and people are quite aware of their rights and ready to participate in political affairs of the country.”³²³ But when asked again about the awareness and participation of Luapulans compared to others, this same Councilor said, “I wouldn’t say that there’s any major difference to other parts of the country [as] all Zambians today are politically mature and keen to participate.” Knowing what we know about the lack of awareness and participation in Zambia from other sources, this kind of statement should, of course, be taken with a grain of salt. Perhaps more accurate is another interviewee’s statement--that Luapulans can better communicate in English and are not dominated by such a strong “culture” (tradition) as people in, for example, Southern Province.³²⁴ And while most leaders in the former regime came from Luapula,³²⁵ support for the dominant party today is much lower in Luapula than it is in Mtwara (see Table 5.3.). In fact, analysts of two Luapulan districts (i.e., Mansa and Samfya) say that because of the lack of development activities and unfulfilled promises, there is “a hostile climate against government” in these districts (Mutesa and Nchito 2005, 22). And according to an interviewee, political change often starts in Luapula.³²⁶

But yet—and this is another difference between Mtwara and Luapula--Luapula Province does not seem to have received as much foreign aid, whether civic education or

more traditional aid, as Mtwara Region. In the words of the Deputy District Commissioner for Mansa District, “we don’t have many foreign donors.”³²⁷ The donors that he does mention having had projects in the district are all INGOs—such as Plan International or Family Health International—or multilateral agencies, such as FAO or the EU, which had a multiyear micro-projects program.³²⁸ The only bilateral development agency he mentions is Finnida, which is the former name for the Finnish development cooperation agency. Although Finland had a multi-year development program in Luapula from 1980-2000, this program did not have the kind of civic education component that RIPS in Tanzania had³²⁹; rather, it was almost exclusively agricultural aid.³³⁰ But another interviewee also mentioned MS Zambia (from Denmark), also involved in agricultural work, and USAID, which focuses on HIV/AIDS work.³³¹ Other development programs in Luapula have been sponsored by the Zambian government; of these, probably the most significant ones are ZAMSIF (Zambia Social Investment Fund),³³² and, as part of it, CRAIDS (Community Response to AIDS), which funds community proposals about AIDS education and prevention. Both the EU’s micro-projects program and ZAMSIF were originally established to finance physical infrastructure such as schools, health centers, and roads.³³³

Civic Education Provided

Mtwara Region: Mtwara Urban District

It is extremely difficult to map exhaustively the civic education that has been given in a certain area in rural Africa—due to the nebulousness and ubiquity of “rights education,” as well as the dearth of written records of activities. Indeed, civic education is given not only at schools and through community programs but also through the media; civic awareness is learnt even from informal discussion with family and friends. And as mentioned in a previous chapter, “every organization is trying to participate in civic education”—though on the other hand some organizations do not even know they are involved in civic education.³³⁴ Indeed, “in societies in transition people are constantly bombarded with information on what is and what is not expected of them.”³³⁵

Nevertheless, it is possible to obtain a rough idea of the most important sources of civic education in a given area by asking, for example, local government officials about that. Some of these officials are in close contact with communities. We also consulted literature on Southeastern Tanzania. It became evident that several bi- and multilateral donors, (I)NGOs, and religious organizations have been or still are involved in civic/rights education in Mtwara Region—including, among others, Finland, the UK (ODA/DFID), Denmark (DANIDA), UNICEF, the World Bank, Concern Worldwide (Ireland), Action Aid (UK), and the Catholic and Anglican churches (Killian 2003; Seppälä 2000; Voipio 1998).³³⁶ Yet it became apparent that five of them have been more significant than others, whether in terms of the length and/or geographical coverage of their programs, or then that they have reached the villages that were chosen for this study (see below). These civic education programs and their providers are: general civic

education given by RIPS, child rights promoting programs by UNICEF, rights-based development projects by Concern Worldwide, good governance projects by Hanns Seidel Foundation, and voters' education given by CHAWATA.³³⁷ However, because the Concern Worldwide projects have not been implemented in the district chosen for this study (i.e., Mtwara Urban District), this organization is not discussed here.

1. RIPS

Though the RIPS Programme operated in Mtwara region in 1988-2005, aiming to empower citizens and promote their democratic participation, it was only from 2000 onward that civic education was an explicit part of RIPS activities.³³⁸ Civic education was given both in community outreaches and workshops held in 2002-03 in townships. With regard to community programs, over 360 villages in Mtwara and Lindi Regions were reached with messages focusing on both villagers' and their leaders' rights and responsibilities (RIPS Programme 2005). One former RIPS employee said,

In all the processes, civic education was seen as the entry point. We used to say that civic education is the entry point of any process from planning to implementation. You have to start with the rights and obligations. Are they aware of their rights? If you want them to be involved in the planning process, are they aware that this is their right? Participation—it is their right. So they have to be aware of that.³³⁹

In turn, there were a total of five workshops held in townships in the two regions (RIPS Programme 2005). The idea was to first train the Council staff (Community Development Officers and others) who would in turn train community leaders. The community leaders would then share the information with ordinary villagers.³⁴⁰ However, as one former RIPS employee said, civic education was also taken up by NGOs which sought funding from RIPS.³⁴¹ “Of course civic education then went beyond the rights and

responsibilities. It . . . also involved the awareness of other issues, cross-cutting issues like HIV/AIDS and environmental conservation.”³⁴²

Workshops on work ethics and other ethical issues were also given to NGOs, CBOs, police, courts, and the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB; RIPS Programme 2005). Some of these workshops were facilitated by faculty from the Philosophy Department at the University of Dar es Salaam. The workshops extended and applied the “theoretical” notion of civic education, pointing out that

Our aim is to move from more technical civic education to ethical and philosophical reflection on what are the skills we need as citizens and how we can best develop and use these skills in order to participate in the development of our communities, neighbourhoods and societies at large. In order words, we want to train you to use your citizenship actively (Hellsten and Lwaitama 2003, 5).

Here, reflection entails honest self-evaluation: “None of us can make demands to our governments if we ourselves break the same rules constantly and treat people close to us unjustly or violently” (ibid, 7). At the same time, the training manual stresses that all people have loyalties toward many groups, aiming to “help all citizens to understand their role as members of various social collectives, such as family, community, particular profession or line of work, nation and state” (ibid, 7). But also and in particular, the purpose of the workshops was to help participants (leaders) understand why it is that the population is disenchanted,³⁴³ and thereby learn to be better leaders.

In discussing democracy, the training manual emphasizes equality—“[t]he main value of democracy is therefore equality” (ibid, 19)—which is defined as a situation in which “everybody has the same changes to *participate* in government and same changes to *express their views*: everybody has the *same position in front of law*” (21; emphases in original). The manual also points out that voting is not enough “to maintain democracy”

or fulfill people's need and desire for participation; it is possible that elected leaders do not fulfill their obligations (23). Therefore, people's participation in civic associations and other such groups should be encouraged (ibid). Democracy entails different functions for different actors, and the civic ethics manual identifies some of these

[L]ocal government and local democracy deals with local issues and needs – they cannot all be taken into care in the centres of power – that is part of democratic participation. . . . We have **regional and local government** [which] is there to organize people locally in order to inform people and to execute state policies locally; to take a leadership in making sure that policies fit the local needs and benefit various circumstances; it is also there to pass on information on the local needs and problems of the people to the state level; communication channel between people and government. [In turn,] [n]on-governmental organizations (NGO) are there to help the people to participate in implementing both - the state policies as well as local initiatives on grass-root level. The duty of **the people, the citizens** themselves is then to look out for themselves and to take initiative – it is your right as a citizen to be part of decision-making process in your country by for instance choosing the local representatives. At the same time it is also your responsibility to contribute at least to the development of your own community; this is why local participation is so important, you may not be able to affect directly the country wide policies or solve the issue of poverty or education as a whole, but you can improve your local surroundings (ibid, 25-6; emphases in original).

Finally, by speaking to the importance of such encouragement, the manual addresses the problem of apathy endemic among Tanzanians and in particular residents in the South:

Without some push or encouragement; material, educational and leadership support people do not realize and actualise the power that is theirs. While we often condemn authoritarianism and complain about patronizing or paternalistic policies; the fact is that people often like to be led by authorities, because it is easier to be told what to do and how to do it than think for yourself and take initiative or try alternative ideas than what you have believed or used to do before; the problem is that once no one is there to give orders, the initiative dies, people are passive recipients of ideas and orders; not actively participating agents who decide for themselves – then there is no democracy – no matter what the constitution may say (2003, 25)!

In addition to the Civic Ethics Manual, training material utilized by RIPS include the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Tanzanian Constitution of 1977 (especially Chapter 3 concerning rights and responsibilities),³⁴⁴ and the PORALG guidelines stipulating the duties of village leadership and Councilors.³⁴⁵ RIPS also educated people on how to remove elected officials.³⁴⁶ In addition to the importance of knowing their rights, the procedures to claim them, and what the various government organs are supposed to do, the RIPS Programme educated people on statutory community meetings, and how often people are supposed to attend them.³⁴⁷

There are both positive and negative accounts of RIPS as a development program and sponsor of civic education in Southeastern Tanzania. For example, one development worker interviewed for this study was of the opinion that the civic education given to the grassroots has really changed village governance for the better in the region.³⁴⁸ He said,

In most villages, leadership was a problem; people never knew how to change the leadership. But when they were given the civic education, they knew their rights, and the way how to get rid of unwanted leadership. And they did it. And now they're having very . . . dynamic leadership in those villages. . . . For example, in Lengo village in Newala [District], people were not participating well in village activities. [But] when they were given civic education, now there's a tremendous change: the leadership changed. And later, this dynamic leadership has brought some very, very, very big changes in the normal day-to-day activities of the village.

Two other development workers were also of the opinion that civic education given as part of RIPS has bolstered people's confidence to claim their rights—to “demand things.”³⁴⁹ They also know what the local government is supposed to do. For example, when constructing a “go-down” in a village in Masasi District, residents knew what they were supposed to get from the Council. When villagers were then given material by the Council which was different from what the go-down construction required, they rejected

the Council's shipment.³⁵⁰ Also, an official in Mtwara's regional government pointed out that RIPS did help increase people's contribution of their labor to development projects.³⁵¹

Yet the legacy of RIPS in Southeastern Tanzania is not solely a positive one. For example, the above government official criticized RIPS for lack of transparency—"secretive administrative procedures"—and excessive use of expatriate staff, questioning the democratic nature of the program itself. In terms of viewpoints on the ground, the efforts of RIPS (and other civic education programs) were and are often perceived as supporting the opposition.³⁵² This may affect their effectiveness. Also, RIPS has been heavily criticized by development workers, government officials, and even Finns involved in it for the program's abrupt ending, with funding being withdrawn when many activities and groups would still have needed the "push-factor" that it provided.³⁵³

2. UNICEF

UNICEF, too, has had a rights-based program operating in Mtwara Region since 1988 (having had a presence in the area since the late 1970s). Its Child Survival and Development Programme (CSDP) aims to enforce, and train people about, children's rights in the areas of survival, education, protection, and participation.³⁵⁴ The program is a response, among other things, to the AIDS problem, which "has given birth to many groups caring for orphans" (Swantz 1998, 192). In fact, the Office of the Regional Commissioner for Mtwara states that "[i]n some communities 40 percent of the children are orphaned" (Office of Regional Commissioner 2004, 17). This is serious, as "[s]tudies and village assessments have revealed that there is a remarkably strong correlation

between vulnerability and exploitation – including child labour, abuse, neglect, homelessness and poor learning outcomes – and orphanhood” (UNICEF/Government of Tanzania 2001, 2).

In two of Mtwara Region’s five districts, the Most Vulnerable Children program—a part of CSDP—is now in “full swing.”³⁵⁵ UNICEF itself does not have any personnel in the Regions; rather, as a program between the Tanzanian government and UNICEF, it is administered by government officials in the area. Select community members are being trained in sessions of what is called Community Justice Facilitation (CJF), in which they learn how to identify the most vulnerable children (MVC) in their communities and how to ensure that those children are cared for. As in the RIPS Programme, those trained are supposed to share and implement the lessons learnt in their communities. Often, participants in the program are volunteers, as were the 25 participants in the November 2005 CJF conducted in Mtwara Town (though they were also chosen by the community leadership).³⁵⁶ So far, in Mtwara Urban District the training has been provided to all village chairpersons, VEOs (Village Executive Officers), and *vitongoji* (that is, sub-village) leaders.³⁵⁷ The site of the training has been two training/community centers located in Mtwara Town.

As with the RIPS Programme, the CSDP is both criticized and praised. In the late 1990s (i.e., before the implementation of the CJF workshops under review in this paper) Voipio wrote,

The UNICEF-funded Child Survival and Development Programme (CSDP) in Mtwara region has had serious accountability problems. But it has also had remarkable success in promoting a spirit of shared responsibility and integration among local government officers from various sectors who have made up joint

task forces to promote basic UNICEF-messages about mother and child welfare in the villages (1998, 98).

3. Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF)

Hanns Seidel Foundation is a German based organization which has sponsored training on good governance and accountability to community leadership. As is evident at the organization's website, civic (or political) education occupies an important place in the organization's mission:

Former German Federal President Roman Herzog once said that "education towards democracy" was the "permanent and real responsibility of political foundations". He stated that this education helped "citizens of an open society to participate in the developmental process of a democracy with as much knowledge as possible".

The understanding of a democracy must be newly acquired in each generation.

Political connections must be made very clear – especially to young people. Only then can they be motivated to commit themselves and to take on responsibility. To make it short: democracy requires political education (www.hss.de).

In contrast to RIPS and UNICEF's rights based work, HSF sponsored civic education has been project work as opposed to a multiyear program. It is the practice of HSF that "[a]ll projects are designed in such a way that the countries or partner organisations can take them over themselves in the course of time" (ibid). In Tanzania in particular, HSF has supported decentralization by strengthening local government (www.hanns-seidel.or.tz). According to the organization,

Tanzania can only achieve democratic and economic development and fight poverty successfully when grass root leaders, government functionaries and all members of the society work closely together. The training programmes are aimed at increasing the political awareness of the people and at improving the knowledge and skills of political leaders and administrators at district, ward and village level (ibid).

As with the UNICEF training, in Mtwara Urban District the HSF grassroots training on good governance (i.e., transparency, accountability, responsiveness), as well as rule of law and business development,³⁵⁸ has extended to all village chairpersons, VEOs, and *vitongoji* leaders.³⁵⁹ HSF also started women's leadership training in Mtwara in 2004.³⁶⁰ The good governance training has been conducted by Council staff, coordinated/supervised by a person from HSF, and held at two training/community centers in Mtwara Town.³⁶¹ According to a Community Development Officer, the training took place in 2003-04.³⁶² One of the achievements of the program has been the establishment of "suggestion boxes" at the Council, where people can drop off suggestions/questions about their pressing concerns.³⁶³

4. CHAWATA

CHAWATA, a Tanzanian organization for the disabled, is the organization that implemented voters' education in Mtwara--and seven other regions in Tanzania--for the December 2005 general elections.³⁶⁴ This was in part because the UNDP basket fund, from which the finances came, sought to promote the participation of the disabled community in Tanzania, and thus also commissioned the organizations of the disabled to conduct some of the voters' education (Hendra 2005).³⁶⁵ The process was initiated when CHAWATA, as one of "[w]ell over 350 NGOs" responded to UNDP's call (in the newspapers and NGOs' email networks) for NGOs to conduct voters' education for that year's election (ibid). After the participating NGOs were selected, UNDP sponsored training to "core trainers who in turn taught the civic education curriculum to nearly 800

locally engaged community based educators from the funded NGOs” (UNDP, no date, page 2).

According to the voters’ educator in Mtwara Urban District, the theme of the voters’ education was ”true democracy,” in which people were explained such things as their right to vote, the importance of voting, meaning of citizenship, and the contents of the Constitution.³⁶⁶ ”When you take the time to vote, you prepare the government which will be accountable to the people; in that sense you are the government’s employer,” he described his teaching. He said there were two ways of training—informal (to those without education), in which the materials used were posters, and formal (to those who have gone to school), which utilized a special training manual.³⁶⁷ Workshops sites—four villages in three of the district’s 13 wards-- were selected (recommended by) the Municipal Director; they were such that had many opposition supporters living in them.³⁶⁸ Then, participants in the workshops were selected by VEOs and Ward Executive Officers (WEOs) from among the various political parties and special groups such as women, youth, the disabled, and the elderly.³⁶⁹

In sum, of the four main providers of civic education in Mtwara Urban District, the work of Hanns Seidel Foundation and of CHAWATA seems to have been more seasonal (shorter in duration) and geographically limited compared to the efforts of RIPS and UNICEF.

Luapula Province: Mansa District

The most notable difference in out-of-school civic education provided in Luapula Province compared to Mtwara Region is the absence in Luapula of local government

involvement. As was seen above, in Mtwara the local Council was involved in all of the listed civic education programs/projects except the voters' education workshops by CHAWATA, although even there, the Council staff was involved in selecting implementation sites. In Luapula Province virtually all civic education has been conducted by non-governmental actors. But when trying to map out the civic education conducted in Luapula/Mansa District, it was still difficult to obtain a clear answer to the "who-are-the-most-important-civic-educators-here" question. Nevertheless, the answers given by government officials and staff in NGOs indicated that the most significant sources of civic education are the Anti-Voter Apathy Project (AVAP), Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), various women's organizations, the Catholic Church (or its development organization, CCJDP),³⁷⁰ Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD), and the Legal Resources Foundation. Yet the FODEP representative, as well as some other people, pointed out that FODEP has not really been that active in the district (due to lack of funds). Most importantly, FODEP has not had any activities in the villages selected for this study. Therefore it is not discussed here.³⁷¹ SACCORD is similar: we did not come across any mention of workshops or other activities organized by SACCORD in our study areas; therefore, SACCORD is not discussed below.

1. AVAP

AVAP is a 10-year-old national NGO whose primary goal is to increase citizen participation in the electoral process.³⁷² However, it also works with the Constitution and "other issues bordering on civic awareness."³⁷³ Thus, though AVAP focuses on elections,

it works year-round, with the general idea to “teach people how they can lobby for their own development.”³⁷⁴ With the Irish government’s development agency as its main funder, AVAP has, for four years now, concentrated its field work on three provinces (Northern, Luapula, and Eastern). One of the activities for which AVAP is well known is maintaining Democracy Information Centres in which citizens can stop by to ask questions, or read newspapers and other materials that the center holds. It also organizes various activities, including village and school visits, monthly discussion forums, and live programs on the community radio station.³⁷⁵ In the monthly discussion forums, invited politicians, council staff, NGO personnel, political party members, and church leaders debate topical issues with local residents. According to AVAP Provincial Coordinator in Mansa, AVAP also invites on average about 10 people from each surrounding village to attend these forums.³⁷⁶

At the time of this research, the voter education campaign was just starting, with the organization’s weekly radio programs to start featuring the upcoming elections in February 2005, and lasting for 13 weeks.³⁷⁷ The organization has had radio programs on the community radio since March 2004.³⁷⁸ According to AVAP, these radio programs have been successful, in terms of residents’ response:

Apart from phoning in a large section of residents have been writing letters to the programme as well as the democracy information centres bringing out their concerns especially in areas of governance and development. In their airing of grievances they have been mostly tak[ing] their leaders to task demanding for attention in areas they have been citing. This has strengthened the zeal for advocacy in that concerned offices have been getting demands from the general public directly through the media which have made it difficult for them to sit on and ignore.³⁷⁹

Also, according to a representative of a women’s umbrella organization, AVAP does “a tremendous job” in voter awareness raising and good governance.³⁸⁰

However, what is limiting AVAP's effectiveness is lack of resources. For example, when doing outreaches to nearby communities (whether villages or schools), AVAP staff is limited to sites within walking distance from the AVAP office. This is due to lack of resources, such as bicycles.³⁸¹ This imposes difficulties for staff as they often have to skip lunch in order to reach a village a bit further away (and still get back to town before sunset).³⁸² During the village visits--such as the two-hour visit made in January 30, 2006 to Chitakwa Village, about a one-hour walk from Mansa Town--AVAP staff holds a public meeting in which they stress the importance of responsible leaders, and carefully thinking about whom one votes for. In its work, AVAP also coordinates with village headpersons and church leaders, such as in getting access to take its civic education to churches.

2. Women's Organizations

In Zambia women's groups seem to be more active and influential than in the Muslim dominated coastal Tanzania. In Luapula/Mansa there is a multitude of women's organizations that periodically hold workshops on women's rights and various issues and/or go to communities to educate people there. These organizations include at least the Non-Governmental Organisations Co-ordinating Committee (NGOCC)—an umbrella body for women's organizations—one of whose members is Mansa District Women Development Association (MDWDA); Women for Change; and Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF). Others are Women's Lobby, Society for Women and AIDS in Zambia (SWAAZ), Forum for Advancement of Women in Education in Zambia (FAWEZA), and Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia.³⁸³ Participants for the

workshops are summoned/selected by village headpersons and/or chief; they include not only women, but also men and the youth.³⁸⁴

Examples of civic education activities organized by the women's groups include at least the following: (1) WiLDAF held a workshop in Mansa in November 2005, sensitizing women on their rights.³⁸⁵ (2) Women for Change held a workshop for village headmen in Mansa in February 2006.³⁸⁶ This training involved civic awareness, HIV/AIDS, and other issues.³⁸⁷ (3) MDWDA organizes activities in support of women's self-reliance economically, politically, culturally, and socially with the objective of reducing women's dependence on men.³⁸⁸ One of their strategies is initiating sustainable income generating activities.³⁸⁹ They train women on leadership skills, business management, functional literacy, cross-cutting issues like HIV/AIDS, and civic awareness. They have also started a legal education program.³⁹⁰ For example, in October 2005 MDWDA organized a seven-day seminar for 25 women—one from each of the district's area organizations—training them on the upcoming elections. MDWDA organizes such trainings approximately four times a year, with attendees implementing the lessons learnt in their home villages. In Luapula, this kind of a women's development association on the district level exists in Mansa District only; elsewhere (Eastern and Southern Province) the women's development associations operate on provincial level.³⁹¹

3. The Catholic Church & the Radio

Often known for its active involvement in social issues, the Catholic Church has assumed in Luapula, too, an active role in defending human rights and promoting civic

education. As two persons interviewed at the DDJP (Department of Development, Justice, and Peace)—a branch of the national CCJDP—said,

As a church, we are very much involved in civic education to make our people aware Civic education empowers citizens: once they know their legal rights, they know when they [the rights] are taken away and are ready to defend them and prevent the abuse of political power. . . . Some churches don't even touch upon human rights; they leave it to politicians. But we base our teaching on the Bible and justice. That's why some churches always think that Catholics have taken up politics.³⁹²

The DDJP gives out information (in print and on the radio), organizes workshops, and advises people in their personal legal problems. In addition to giving voter education (in election year), the organization educates people on corruption (what it is, its forms and consequences, and how to fight it), and tells them about those “pieces of legislation that people should know about,” such as that dealing with sexual crimes, land distribution, and property grabbing.³⁹³ According to the DDJP representatives, sexual crimes are happening because the majority of the people do not know the law against them; the law on sexual crimes was amended just last year. The Mansa office has three staff members, but it is assisted by six teams in the various parishes in the province. Its funding comes mainly from CARITAS Norway and CORDAID.³⁹⁴ In Mansa the DDJP also cooperates with many NGOs including AVAP, NGOCC, and the Legal Resources Foundation (see below). This is particularly through the church's Yangeni radio station which has a coverage area of 89 km. Although the radio (and TV) are generally speaking not important sources of civic education in rural areas due to coverage problems,³⁹⁵ radio programs are important for this study as the target villages all fall within coverage area.

4. Legal Resources Foundation (LRF)

The Legal Resources Foundation is an NGO providing legal aid, promoting human rights, and litigating public interest, mostly on behalf of the vulnerable, that is, the poor.³⁹⁶ Since 2002 it has had an office in Mansa as one of nine LRF offices nationwide. It is funded mainly by Norway, Finland, and USAID. It normally receives citizens in its office, though it occasionally also does community outreaches. However, some of the outreaches—such as the prison visits program and mobile clinics—were curtailed in 2004 due to lack of funds. The most common problems for which citizens seek help deal with police brutality, wrongful arrests and detentions, delayed trial, and labor disputes. The majority of the clients are men, though “we do promote women’s rights in our outreach programs.” The LRF interviewees point out that their office cooperates with MDWDA; “I think they’ve benefited from our assistance [as in] emphasizing and reminding them about their [i.e., women’s] strength and that equally they can make decisions and contribute to the welfare in their homes, group, and society”

Selecting Villages

Tanzania

The initial logic in selecting villages for this study was to choose one village in which participatory approach to development has been rather successful (as determined by development workers, government employees), and another where it has not worked so well. Of course this presents a dilemma of prejudgment³⁹⁷ but in the course of the research it indeed turned out to be the case that awareness and participation seems to have been much lower in one village (i.e., Mtawanya) than in the other (Mbae). This is

despite the fact that both villages have been targets of participatory aid. Another criterion was to select one village closer to town (Mbae)—with the idea to also analyze the influence of proximity to a semi-urban area—and the other a bit further from town. Logistics set the boundaries for how far from the town the villages could be located: research would be conducted by making day trips to the villages. Mbae is the smallest of the six villages in Mtwara Urban District, while Mtawanya is the second biggest one.³⁹⁸ Also, so as to have an adequate number of certain types of respondents in the sample we ended up adding a third site, Shangani Ward in Mtwara town, in which a few more interviews were conducted.³⁹⁹ Some descriptive information about these sites—and of civic education conducted in them—is provided in Table 5.4.

Table 5.4. Characteristics of, and Civic Education Given in, the Tanzanian Research Sites

	Mbae Village	Mtawanya Village	Shangani Ward
<i>N</i>	63	58	19
Location	App. 3 km from Mtwara Town	App. 7 km from Mtwara Town	In Mtwara Town
Population (2004)	1,321 (of which those up to 17 years of age: 389, or 29%)	1,989 (of which those under 18 years of age: 758, or 38%)	15,600
Sub-village/ sub-ward areas	4	4	17
Facilities	Dispensary, mosque, no schools (though there is both a primary and a secondary school in another village, 1.5-2 km away)	Dispensary, 2 mosques, 2 churches (both are Roman Catholic), 2 primary schools (though one is several km away) and a vocational school (carpentry, masonry). Both primary and secondary schools are currently being constructed.	Hospital, dispensaries, mosques, churches, primary schools, at least one secondary school (and a Shangani secondary school under construction), vocational school; services of a town, including Internet cafes
Education	Only 1 female has secondary educ. (she is currently at school); in addition some boys are attending secondary school; only one male resident has finished (Form 4 of) secondary school	Data n/a	Data n/a
Civic education:			
1. RIPS	Yes (2003-04: participatory development— Council staff urged villagers to join community groups; app. 16 people)	Yes (2003-04, app. 25 people)*	Data n/a
2. UNICEF	Yes (leadership)	Yes (leadership; pilot village)	Yes (11 days in Oct.-Nov. 2005)
3. HSF	Yes (2004, leadership: app. 6 people)	Yes (2003, leadership)	Data n/a
4. CHAWATA	Yes (June 5, 2005, in Mbae: 20 participants; Sept.23, 2005, elsewhere: app. 12 participants from Mbae)	No	No
Interview dates (2005)	Oct. 4-7, 15, 19	Oct. 11-14	Nov. 5-6

* The Mtawanya Village Executive Officer pointed out that this training was for the previous village leadership, which is no longer there.

1. Mbae

Due in part to its proximity to Mtwara town, quite a number of development projects/programs have been carried out in Mbae, including those with civic education components listed in Table 5.4. Also, many respondents indicated that Council staff (such as Community Development Officers) visit Mbae more often than, for example, Mtwawanya. Therefore, the general view expressed by, e.g., government staff was that in Mbae people are probably more aware of their rights and participate more readily in development projects than residents in many other villages. For example, according to a Community Development Officer, women in Mbae are more active than those in Mtwawanya in terms of their contribution to village meetings and business activities.⁴⁰⁰ Also, she said in Mbae residents' "plans are moving faster"; for example, due to both men's and women's efforts, the construction of the village government building has been brought to completion.⁴⁰¹

Table 5.4. provides the parameters of civic education given in Mbae village. To this it could be added that the two dates mentioned by civic education by CHAWATA refer to two voter's education workshops which had participants from Mbae.⁴⁰² The first one was held on June 5, 2005, lasted three days, and involved 20 participants. Villagers requested more training and so on September 23 another workshop was held, lasting four hours on a single day, and involving 117 participants from Mbae and nearby villages. The training, according to the trainer, was that short due to budget constraints. Participants included both leaders (from political parties, religious groups, and village government) and ordinary villagers (including the disabled). More than half of them were women, with the largest age group being 15-35 year-olds. Both the educated and the uneducated were

in the same class; choice of training material (i.e., poster or manual) was based on whether there were more uneducated or educated participants. Though overall, the training seems to have received good feedback, one Community Development Officer pointed out that participants had had a problem with the issue of citizenship; they were not happy that they were asked the question, “Who are the real citizens of Tanzania?”⁴⁰³ This is because Mtwara has many immigrants from Mozambique who are often discriminated against.

Also, the Ufukoni Theatre Group, which performs plays to promote civic and social awareness in the district, and which in fact originated in Mbae (2001), has performed in Mbae a total of six times.⁴⁰⁴ The last time was in 2004. Though a group member’s estimate of the average number of people reached by each performance—“more than 1,000”⁴⁰⁵—may be exaggerated, the group may very well have an impact on awareness due, for example, to the methods (play, dance, song) that it uses. The 15-member group has been professionally trained, including at a 12-day workshop at a local hotel in 2001 and two-week training in Arusha, Northern Tanzania, in 2002. In these training sessions performers learnt how to use the stage effectively and convince the audience of the group’s message.⁴⁰⁶ Much of the group’s funding has come from RIPS; for example, RIPS sponsored the group’s going to some other districts in the region so as to train other theatre groups.⁴⁰⁷ Currently, however, the group does not have any sponsor.⁴⁰⁸

2. Mtawanya

With the exception of the voters' education given by CHAWATA, Mtawanya Village has been the recipient of the same main civic education programs as Mbae Village. All these three programs have operated on the same idea: to train the village leadership and have them transmit the lessons learnt to other villagers. In fact, as Mtawanya was the pilot village for UNICEF's Community Justice Facilitation, it probably received special attention from the facilitators in the program. Though only about five Mtawanya leaders were trained in CJF, more than 100 residents have been educated on how to identify and look after the most vulnerable children in Mtawanya village. According to a Community Development Officer, despite its pilot status, Mtawanya Village has not yet made any plans on vulnerable children.⁴⁰⁹ In turn, the Ufukoni Theatre Group has only performed in Mtawanya once (that is, in 2004).⁴¹⁰

3. Shangani Ward

Shangani Ward, which was only added to the study to complement the sample, has been the site of the most recent civic education program in this study—that is, UNICEF's CJF which ended just days before participants were interviewed. Shangani differs in many ways from the two Tanzanian villages, with respondents being in general younger and more educated; also, a larger share of them professed the Christian faith than among our respondents in the villages.

Zambia

In Zambia this same logic for selecting villages was followed as in Tanzania: one village should be closer to the provincial capital, and another a bit further. Yet the primary concern in Zambia was to ensure that at least some residents in those villages had been exposed to civic education—as provision of civic education has been much less systematic in Zambia. In fact we ended up selecting two villages closer to town—Chamalawa and Makasa--because they are right next to each other (almost inseparable). The third village, Mabumba, is further, 20 km from Mansa, but still next to the Mansa-Samfya road on which also the two other villages are located. Therefore, though Mabumba is further from town than its “counterpart” in Tanzania, it is not really isolated due to being located next to the main road. Village data are not as systematically recorded in Zambia as they are in Tanzania—therefore the table below (Table 5.5.) with Zambian data is not as detailed (e.g., vis-à-vis population) as Table 5.4. In both Tanzania and Zambia villages are divided into sub-sections, each of which has a set of elected leaders.

Table 5.5. Characteristics of, and Civic Education Given in, the Zambian Research Sites

	Chamalawa & Makasa Villages		Mabumba Village
<i>N</i>	32	37	71
Location	App. 3 km from Mansa Town		App. 20 km from Mansa Town
Chiefdom	M a b u m b a		Mabumba
Population	800-900	700-800	App. 3,000
Sub-village areas	4	5	2 (though until 2000: 4)
Facilities	One basic school (grades 1-9) located close to Makasa, closest secondary school in Mansa, no court (closest court in Mansa), no clinic (closest clinic in Mansa; another: 4.5 km away), several churches		One basic school, one secondary school, court, clinic, several churches, no police post
Civic Education: AVAP	Yes (several times since 2003; e.g., Nov. 2005: 18 participants from both villages—i.e., total: 36)		No
Interview dates (2006)	Feb. 20-25		Feb. 6-11

1./2. Chamalawa & Makasa

According to the Chamalawa village secretary, AVAP is the only organization that has conducted civic education in Chamalawa and Makasa.⁴¹¹ As suggested by Table 5.5., AVAP has held a number of public meetings in the two villages since 2003.

According to the village secretary, these meetings have been held every two to three months, and they have been announced at churches. In addition to elections and voting, topics have included women's and children's rights, and the roles of Members of

Parliament, Councilors, and Ministers. More women than men attend; of attendees, more are middle-aged than younger persons.⁴¹²

Also, in October 2005 AVAP organized a meeting between a ward Councilor and the area's residents; this is significant because two of this study's target villages (i.e., Chamalawa and Makasa, below) are located in this Councilor's ward. Thus it is possible that some residents from those villages also attended. Further, when asked about whether any NGOs have visited communities in his ward, ward Councilor Chipamina indicated that in 2004, the organization Women for Change "came to conduct meetings...but unfortunately I was not invited."⁴¹³ It is not clear whether any residents from Chamalawa and/or Makasa villages attended these meetings.

3. Mabumba

Compared to Chamalawa and Makasa, Mabumba Village is large and, as mentioned, much further from town. Also, Mabumba chief—who is chief to all these three villages—resides in Mabumba Village; this may affect residents' motivation and/or opportunity for participation in meetings involving the chief or other events. Another significant difference is that Mabumba Village has had more development programs than Chamalawa and Makasa. It has also been more exposed to various projects and programs than most other villages in the chiefdom.⁴¹⁴ This is partly because in addition to the chief, the Mansa Mayor resides in Mabumba village; so do many retired civil servants.⁴¹⁵ Of development programs implemented in the area, the chief mentioned CRAIDS, IRDP (Integrated Rural Development Program), and the sponsors Sida and Finnida--all of which programs (with the exception of CRAIDS) have been agriculture related.⁴¹⁶ Being

further from Mansa town, Mabumba also has more services within the village—including a secondary school (which is one of only four secondary schools in Mansa District outside Mansa Town), a clinic, and a court—and in that sense provides residents more opportunities to seek information and/or redress.

Nevertheless, with the absence of AVAP (and other NGO programs), and the long distance from the village to workshops in town, civic education seems to have been more haphazard in Mabumba than the two other villages. It seems that there are very few of those that are “sent” from Mabumba to attend workshops in town; also, workshops are not held often. One of the few workshops that have been held in Mabumba include a NGOCC initiated two-day training in 2003/04 as part of the “Women in Public Life” project.⁴¹⁷ Also, as recalled by one respondent, in workshops held in 2004 about 30 villagers—men, women, and some high-school kids—were educated about HIV/AIDS, women’s and children’s rights, and general development. But in the view of the Community Development Officer (who has lived and represented the central government in Mabumba chiefdom for two years), “we haven’t had any workshops to sensitize people on their rights.”⁴¹⁸ She does, however, give advice to community groups herself; for example, she encourages women’s groups to be self-reliant (and start businesses). According to her, women in Mabumba are eager to participate and be involved in the development of their area.

Instead, some awareness raising is being done at churches, such as that on HIV/AIDS by the clinical officer and other staff from Mabumba clinic. For example, the clinical officer spoke about these topics at the Catholic and Seven Day Adventists’

churches in August 2005.⁴¹⁹ He and his staff also regularly discuss health related issues with the headmen; they also do community outreach every Thursday.

Timing of the Study

Finally, when analyzing research results it is important to bear in mind the timing of this study. In both countries surveys were conducted in election year, although in Tanzania this was done closer to the general election than in Zambia. That is, whereas data collection in Tanzania ended on November 6, 2005—about 1.5 months before elections⁴²⁰--Zambian data were collected about 7 months before the Zambian elections. Nevertheless, this means that in both countries (certainly in Tanzania) respondents had had recent exposure to voter's education; also, because of the proximity of elections, civic awareness and interest toward political participation should have been at its highest. This reinforces the expectation that this study's results should reflect the high end of the range of civic awareness and participation in the study sites.

Conclusion

Thus, the picture that emerges about the national, regional, and village level contexts of this study is that although there are a lot of similarities between Tanzania and Zambia—perhaps more than between any other two Sub-Saharan African countries—there are also enough differences to lead us to expect different kinds of results in these countries. Most importantly, people's disposition toward politics, and opportunities for and patterns of participation differ; in these respects one should perhaps expect Tanzanians to be more active politically. Among the factors affecting citizens'

opportunities for participation, the extent to which the decentralization process has been implemented is greater in Tanzania. Also in our study sites Tanzanians have been more systematically exposed to civic education—with the local government being more involved in it. Nevertheless, the Tanzanian sample would probably be more likely to possess certain cultural characteristics unfavorable to democratic participation; among these is a sense of dependency on government, passivity, and even apathy. It does seem that Zambians would more readily criticize the government for wrongdoings and punish it electorally. Certainly, the Zambian civil society as a whole is much more active and aggressive than its Tanzanian counterpart. Therefore, it is difficult to predict which of the two countries represents more fruitful ground for promoting democratic participation by civic education.

Indeed, the chapter will have made it clear that because of the multiplicity of factors involved in explaining civic awareness, attitudes, and participation, it is difficult to make any predictions without conducting deeply contextual multivariate statistical analysis on what kinds of effects, if any, civic education is likely to produce. Tanzania and Zambia provide an interesting set of similar-yet-different contexts for observing and attempting to understand the role of civic education in promoting participation. Due to poverty and the isolated location of the selected regions within Tanzania and Zambia, making the “case for civic education” will be challenging. The timing of this study (proximity of elections) means that results should reveal the “most” that civic education can achieve in these types of contexts—as respondents should be as interested in public affairs and participation as they ever will be (all other things equal). Therefore, if civic education is to have an effect on rural citizens’ propensity to participate in Southeastern

Tanzania or North(western) Zambia, it should be during the time that data for this study were collected. The extent to which data demonstrate connections between civic education exposure and the various cognitive factors is uncovered and explained in Chapter 6, with linkages between civic education and participation examined in Chapter 7.

Chapter 6

EFFECTS OF CIVIC EDUCATION ON COGNITION

To understand the contribution that civic education makes to participation, one first needs to uncover its effects on cognition—that is, the likely mediating factors. This chapter presents the study’s findings on civic knowledge, efficacy, trust, and interest in politics. In so doing it tests Hypotheses 1-4. The chapter begins by outlining how prevalent (or not) exposure to civic education has been among respondents. Then, it examines the role that civic education has had in shaping respondents’ cognition. Discussion proceeds from describing data to explaining patterns in them, with the descriptive sections presenting both univariate data (on distribution of and mean values for each variable) and bivariate correlation of each cognitive factor with civic education exposure. All areas of cognition are also dissected by sex (and, when relevant, age), facilitating an evaluation of hypothesis 5: do the disadvantaged (in this case women) receive a disproportionate benefit from civic education, or are they left in as disadvantaged a position after receiving civic education as they were before it?⁴²¹ Regression results are presented for civic knowledge and democratic attitudes separately. They will reveal whether any impact of civic education survives a multivariate context--the presence of competing explanations and control variables.⁴²² The competing and control variables include various forms of participation, as cognition could well be shaped by one’s interaction with others, and experiences gained through participation.

Notice that in this chapter regression results are presented graphically only for those dependent variables which have an adequate relationship (i.e., about or above a .25 correlation) with any CE variable *and* a CE variable is statistically significant in the multivariate regression.⁴²³ This means the reader can conclude that civic education does *not* have a discernible impact on those cognitive dimensions that are not presented in tables—that is, when using this study’s definitions, methods, and samples.

Civic Education Exposure

As is to be expected considering this study’s contextual approach (that is, one not based on analyzing certain civic education programs), in both countries there are more respondents that have not been exposed to formal civic education than those that have. Recall that exposure to civic education was measured primarily based on respondents’ subjective assessment (“Has anybody ever told you about your rights?”)⁴²⁴ although village records were also consulted for information about respondents exposure to civic education. However, village data of civic education participants only existed in Mbae Village in Tanzania (in oral form), and in Chamalawa and Makasa Villages in Zambia, but only with regard to civic education conducted by AVAP.⁴²⁵ The information obtained from the leadership of Mtawanya, i.e., the second village in Tanzania, was too patchy to include in statistical analyses, while also that from Mbae and Chamalawa/Makasa proved incompatible with the information given by respondents themselves. For example, while Mbae leadership indicated that 21 respondents in their village had been exposed to training by Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF), only two respondents self-reported this training (of N = 63 in the whole village). Similarly, of the 49 respondents in Chamalawa

and Makasa, who according to village records had participated in AVAP training, only 12 self-reported this training. These discrepancies may be simply because respondents do not recall all the events in which they had participated (rather than village leadership giving false information) but it serves to reinforce the importance that civic education studies should place on respondents' own assessment of exposure to training. It can be argued that important training events should be remembered by their recipients. Due to the discrepancies, only self-reported exposure is analyzed here. And because the share of respondents that reported exposure to each of the main civic education programs conducted in the research sites (that is, RIPS, HSF, CJF, and CHAWATA in Tanzania, and AVAP in Zambia) was low, analysis will be differentiated also with reference to the *type* of source from which respondents reported having learnt about their rights.⁴²⁶ Figure 6.1. displays the share of respondents saying that they have been told about their rights (i.e., "overall" exposure), those who indicated they learnt about them from a formal source, and those who mentioned any of the following formal sources of rights awareness: school, government staff, or NGO.




Figure 6.1. Self-Reported Exposure to Rights Education (I): Overall, Formal, and Three Types of Formal Sources

The displayed percentages refer to those that mentioned having been exposed to each type of training at least once.⁴²⁷ The figure shows that in the Zambian sample, many more respondents (49 percent) reported exposure to rights education than respondents in Tanzania did (33 percent). It also shows that Zambians' self-reported exposure to civic education has been higher with regard to all sources of education except that conducted by government staff. These findings are not surprising; on the contrary, that the local government has been more involved in civic education in Tanzania was to be expected

based on the country's higher level of decentralization and involvement of Council staff in the lives of villagers.

Beyond formal rights education, respondents reported informal sources, which are displayed in Figure 6.2.




Figure 6.2. Sources of Self-Reported Exposure to Rights Education (II): Informal, Political Representatives/Party, and Five Types of Informal Sources

Again, Zambian respondents reported much more often exposure to informal rights education.⁴²⁸ This could be because they really have learnt about their rights from

informal sources more than Tanzanians,⁴²⁹ but it is also possible that the difference is indicative of a different connotation the survey question produces in Kiswahili and Bemba—despite the fact that care was taken to translate the question as similarly as possible, in an all-inclusive way. Beyond those shown in the figure, reported informal sources include village leadership (Tanzania, 2 percent of respondents, Zambia, 4 percent), and religious organizations/church, which was mentioned by no-one in Tanzania but 6 percent of respondents in Zambia. This is in line with the important role that church plays in the lives of Zambians on the one hand, and on the other, that perhaps a limited amount of rights information is given at mosques in Tanzania. With regard to the media, radio is an important source of information for Tanzanians, too, but they did not identify it as such in their responses to this question. In case an answer referred to two types of sources (such as “government programs on the radio”), only the primary source was coded (e.g., radio) Sources of rights information other than those mentioned here were relegated to the “other” category, referring to items such as “Botswana Health Life Education,” “political officers within the army,” and “various law trainings.” This category captured responses of five persons (4 percent) in Tanzania and two persons (1.4 percent) in Zambia.

Also, it will be important to know who the civic education recipients are—most importantly for this study, are rights taught equally to men and women? If civic education exposure is disaggregated by sex, data demonstrate that in Tanzania women are disproportionately *non*-participants. In contrast, in Zambia they are roughly equally male and female. Figure 6.3. displays these data.⁴³⁰ The difference in exposure levels in Tanzania is significant⁴³¹ regardless of whether training refers to overall or formal rights

education. In contrast, in Zambia the small difference between the sexes in levels of exposure is not significant. This suggests that in Tanzania civic education is more selective, being given relatively more to men. This is not surprising given that the research area is Muslim dominated in which women's participation in various kinds of fora, including education and training, has been more restricted. This suggests a first conclusion: for civic education to reduce any inequalities between the sexes, opportunities to receive civic education should be provided equally to women and men (or disproportionately to women).




Figure 6.3. Self-Reported Exposure to Formal Rights Education by Sex

Civic Knowledge

The first cognitive factor examined here is that in which most observers expect effects to be greatest—awareness. Analysis utilizes two measures: an aggregate civic knowledge measure which sums up all (1) government's policies, (2) citizen's rights, (3) women's rights, (4) children's rights, (5) citizens' responsibilities, and (6) government's responsibilities that each respondent mentioned.⁴³² Though not hypothesized, it is useful to understand levels of aggregate civic knowledge for comparative purposes. However, too much emphasis should not be placed on the aggregate data alone as different items mentioned as part of the answers are not necessarily comparable. For example, while some respondents identified broader rights, responsibilities, or government policies (for example, government health policy), others stated something more specific (for example, government policy to build a new clinic). Also, sometimes a respondent identified the same set of rights for citizens', women's and children's rights. Therefore, the number of rights included in the aggregate civic knowledge measure (below) does not necessarily reflect the number of *distinct* items identified by respondents. Nevertheless, this aggregate measure gives a rough idea of awareness levels among respondents.

Second, to test Hypothesis 1 on the type of knowledge promoted by civic education,⁴³³ the content of respondents' answers was analyzed⁴³⁴ with reference to civil, human, and political rights and responsibilities on the one hand, and socioeconomic ones on the other.⁴³⁵ To get a more thorough understanding of how Tanzanians and Zambians understand their rights, answers were also categorized based on the subtypes within these categories.


Remember that when defining civic knowledge with regard to rights and responsibilities, it is not really possible to judge the correctness of respondents' answers. Yet there were a few answers that clearly belonged to the "erroneous civic knowledge" category. An example is when a male respondent said women have the "right" to cook for men. Other answers that fell in this category include such items as voting when mentioned as *children's* right, and "organizing a peaceful demonstration," when mentioned as a citizen's *responsibility*. The almost all-inclusiveness of the correct answers means that when analyzing the data, it will be especially alarming if a respondent cannot identify a single right, responsibility, or government policy.⁴³⁶

Aggregate Civic Knowledge


Assessing civic knowledge in the aggregate yields a clear difference in this type of knowledge in the two countries: Zambians are considerably more knowledgeable,⁴³⁷ being able to identify almost double the number of items. This is depicted in the histograms of the distribution of scores in Figures 6.4. and 6.5. Another difference is that, while men are more knowledgeable in both countries, there is a much larger difference between men's and women's knowledge in Tanzania (means: 11.58 and 8.05, respectively) than in Zambia (16.01 and 14.51). Also, in Tanzania this difference is significant,⁴³⁸ while in Zambia it is not. This suggests that as with the opportunity to receive civic education, in Tanzania women are at a disadvantaged position. This could be due to a number of things, with men having greater access not only to civic education but to education in general, perhaps to mass media, and other sources in which information about rights, responsibilities, and government policies can be obtained. Thus

further analysis needs to be conducted to know why Tanzanian women know so much less than their male compatriots.

Number of Respondents

**Figure 6.4. Aggregate Civic Knowledge: Tanzania**

Number of Respondents

**Figure 6.5. Aggregate Civic Knowledge: Zambia**

How does age affect knowledge? For example, do the youth possess greater amounts of it (as they have greater access to education) or are those higher in age more knowledgeable (possibly due to a larger amount of information accumulated over lifetime)? In Tanzania the latter holds true: the most knowledgeable group is the oldest one (65-77 year-olds), though this does not necessarily indicate any broader pattern as there are only three respondents in this group.⁴³⁹ And, the difference in knowledge between the oldest group and others is not significant. Interestingly, distribution of civic knowledge among the rest of the age groups⁴⁴⁰ in Tanzania is quite equal. But in Zambia, where the most knowledgeable age group is the 25-34 year-olds, the difference between the mean scores for them (17.41) and others (14.73) *is* significant.⁴⁴¹ Among the other age groups, in Zambia too, civic knowledge is almost equally distributed. This suggests that knowledge in Zambia is concentrated among younger respondents than in Tanzania—although multivariate analysis will be needed to understand whether other factors like education account for this.

How does exposure to civic education “correlate” with aggregate civic knowledge? In the literature, civic knowledge was the area in which there was the most agreement about the positive impact of civic education. Results displayed in Figure 6.6. are consistent with previous findings, giving initial support for CE’s positive impact. Importantly, the differences in means between those exposed to civic education and those not exposed to it are significant.⁴⁴² This applies also when considering *overall* self-reported rights education.




Figure 6.6. Aggregate Civic Knowledge by Self-Reported Exposure to Formal Rights Education

Civic Knowledge by Type

In turn, when aggregate civic knowledge is broken down to different categories (or types) of knowledge, some interesting comparative data emerge. Before uncovering respondents' knowledge of civil, human, and political rights and responsibilities on the one hand, and socioeconomic ones on the other, it is useful to look at the components making up the aggregate measure in more detail. For example, are there differences in respondents' knowledge of citizens' versus women's rights? Or are all groups' rights and responsibilities equally well known? Figure 6.7. shows how awareness differs by category and country. Zambians score noticeably higher in all areas of quantitative civic knowledge except one: children's rights. In this area Tanzanians have slightly better

knowledge. Similarly, with the sole exception of children's rights, there are more Tanzanians than Zambians in each area of knowledge who cannot identify a single item.⁴⁴³




Figure 6.7. Civic Knowledge by Category: Government Policies, Rights, and/or Responsibilities

The finding about Tanzanians' knowledge of children's rights is striking because one of the most extensive, recent—and ongoing—civic education programs in the Tanzanian research sites has dealt with children's rights. This is the Community Justice Facilitation (CJF) program by UNICEF, which trains and equips communities to ensure the survival and livelihoods of the communities' most vulnerable children. In fact, Tanzanians' awareness of children's rights is almost twice the magnitude of their awareness of any other right. In Zambia, awareness of the three types of rights is more

equal. One similarity among the samples is that in both countries, children's rights are the best known rights. This is quite logical as children everywhere have to be taken care of by adults, and so adults have to know what children need and what they have a right to be given. Another similarity in the samples is that women's rights are the least known rights—although the difference compared to awareness of citizen's rights is small.⁴⁴⁴ Interestingly, analysis by sex reveals that in both countries, men identify more women's rights than women do; perhaps this is due to women expressing these rights only in relation to how they judge the rights to have been realized in practice.⁴⁴⁵

There is no reason to expect that any of the formal civic education programs conducted in the research sites, with the exception of children's rights, would have promoted some of the above types of knowledge more than others. But importantly, when awareness of children's rights is juxtaposed with exposure to formal civic education, fascinating differences emerge: in both countries those exposed to civic education are significantly more aware of children's rights.⁴⁴⁶ Such differences, depicted visually in Figure 6.8., suggest that perhaps the CJF program has played a role in promoting Tanzanians' awareness of these rights. However, it is too early to draw this conclusion as many other factors could also be at play.




Figure 6.8. Identification of Children's Rights by Self-Reported Exposure to Formal Rights Education

Next, the second way by which to qualitatively analyze civic knowledge—with regard to “first generation” versus “second generation” rights and responsibilities—was not quite as straightforward. Even though it was easy to tally answers based on the main categories, it was not always easy to relegate the “first generation” rights and responsibilities into those concerning “expression and initiating” or those concerning participation. For example, sometimes it was not clear what a respondent meant with “involvement”—whether participation, inclusion in decision-making, or something else. Therefore such answers were evaluated based on consultation of other data about the respondent, such as his or her demographic profile and/or answers to other survey

questions. Did these other data make it clearer what the respondent meant with a particular expression?

In the end, the categories analyzed were: (1) civil, human, and political rights, (2) rights and responsibilities related to “expression and initiating,” (3) rights and responsibilities related to “participation and voting,” and (4) socio-economic rights and its two subcategories: (5) specific material rights, and (6) ownership rights.⁴⁴⁷ These groups arose from the data. See Appendix E for details on the types of items that fall under each category. Figures 6.9. and 6.10. present these data visually.




Figure 6.9. “Non-Material” Civic Knowledge: Aggregate “First Generation” Rights and Two Subtypes on Rights and Responsibilities




Figure 6.10. Knowledge of Socioeconomic Rights

The figures reveal a clear contrast between the type of civic knowledge held by respondents in Tanzania and Zambia: while Zambians are more knowledgeable of “non-material” rights and responsibilities, including civil, human, and political rights, Tanzanians know more socioeconomic rights. The differences between the group means are statistically significant in all “non-material” categories plus the category subsuming all socioeconomic rights.⁴⁴⁸

Many of the non-material items in whose knowledge Zambians excel have to do with self-expression (for example, freedom of expression). This is in line with expectations. However, in contrast to the analysts of the Afrobarometer (e.g., Bratton et al. 2005), the present study found that rights dealing with self-expression are *not* the only rights identified by Africans: Africans do also refer to socioeconomic rights. This is demonstrated in Figure 6.10. and further detailed in Appendix E.⁴⁴⁹ Although Zambians certainly mentioned many more “first generation” than “second generation” rights, they also did mention socioeconomic rights. Moreover, the stark difference in the type of knowledge held by Tanzanian and Zambian respondents suggests that one cannot speak of any “African” conception of human rights.

Also, knowledge levels are not uniform across the sexes. In line with what was found above, Tanzanian women clearly lag behind their male compatriots in awareness of the “first generation” rights,⁴⁵⁰ which is noteworthy as the knowledge of these rights is arguably linked to participation more than is the knowledge of socioeconomic rights. While Tanzanian men identify on average 2.59 “first generation” items, women mention only 1.48.⁴⁵¹ And in rights and responsibilities dealing with participation and voting, men can name 0.73 rights while women can name 50 percent less, 0.36.⁴⁵² Interestingly, in

socioeconomic rights Tanzanian women are almost as knowledgeable as men⁴⁵³— perhaps because of their responsibilities at home and roles as caretakers. In contrast, in Zambia there is no large or significant difference in men’s and women’s awareness in *any* of the six areas of knowledge, providing another support for why the country samples need to be analyzed separately for cause-and-effect relationships. Indeed, in Zambia women’s level of knowledge is almost that of men in every area, and in fact women know more of “specific material rights,”⁴⁵⁴ although the difference with men is not statistically significant.

When these data are correlated with exposure to formal⁴⁵⁵ civic education, very interesting but expected results obtain: there is a considerable and statistically significant difference in knowledge levels within both country samples between those exposed and those not exposed to civic education. This applies to both the aggregate measure of “first generation” rights and each sub-type, while statistically significant differences are absent in all categories concerning knowledge of socioeconomic rights.⁴⁵⁶ These findings are presented visually in Figures 6.11 and 6.12.




Figure 6.11. “Non-Material” Civic Knowledge by Self-Reported Exposure to Formal Rights Education




Figure 6.12. Knowledge of Socioeconomic Rights by Self-Reported Exposure to Formal Rights Education

The figures (and statistical testing) demonstrate a couple of things. First, as suggested above, those exposed to civic education have a meaningfully and statistically higher level of knowledge in all areas of non-material knowledge than those not exposed to it.⁴⁵⁷ This gives preliminary support to Hypothesis 1, suggesting that civic education promotes knowledge of civil, human, and political rights (and responsibilities), such as freedom of expression, freedom to attend all meetings, right to vote, and right to change leadership through voting--although causal relationships will need to be explored in a multivariate context. Second, and in contrast, civic education does not promote knowledge of socioeconomic rights. In particular, the level of awareness of specific material rights and ownership rights is almost equal among those exposed to civic education and those not exposed to it, while ownership rights are actually referenced more in both countries by those that say they have not received formal civic education. But do these preliminary findings survive regression analyses? Also, how does civic education compare to other explanations for civic knowledge?

Regression Results

Regression analysis indicates, consistent with previous studies, that civic education plays a positive role in promoting civic knowledge. If one first observes aggregate civic knowledge (depicted in Table 6.1.⁴⁵⁸), one can see that civic education impacts Tanzanians' knowledge levels more than that of Zambians, as only in Tanzania is civic knowledge significantly related to exposure to any type of civic education. But importantly, in the Tanzanian case, much more (44 percent versus 24 percent) of civic knowledge is explained by the variables in the model. In this sense the findings about

Table 6.1. Explaining Aggregate Civic Knowledge: Civic Education and Other Factors Compared

	Tanzania		Zambia	
	Beta	R ² (block)	Beta	R ² (block)
Social Structure		.280		.099
Position in community	.241*		-	
Farmer	.006		.054	
Sex	.196*		-	
Rural	-		-.210*	
Cognitive Awareness		.121		.065
Education	.273*		.219*	
Media exposure	.115		.020	
Institutional Influences		.012		.005
Active participation at meetings	-		.091	
Communing	.099		-	
Democratic Attitudes & Discussion		-		.069
Lack of efficacy	-		-.160	
Like discussing politics	-		.182*	
Civic Education		.025		-
Overall rights education	.214*		-	
Government staff	-.060		-	
Constant	4.261		14.833	
Full Model		.439		.238

Notes:

* p<.05.

A dash means the variable was not in the model. Only included were variables with sufficient correlation with the dependent variable (i.e., usually >.3). Organization of the variables is adapted from Bratton et al. (2005). N = 140 per country.

Tanzania are all the more important. Notably, the contribution of civic education is almost as large as education in general,⁴⁵⁹ or respondent's position in the community. Also, civic education is a more important explanation than sex, meaning that although being a woman has a negative effect on one's civic knowledge, it is not as influential an explanation as civic education exposure. For civic educators seeking to empower women, this is encouraging.

What is the magnitude of the impact? According to the "R² block" value, civic education exposure explains 2.5 percent of variation in aggregate civic knowledge in Tanzania, *above and beyond* the effects of structural factors, cognitive awareness, institutional influences, and democratic attitudes.⁴⁶⁰ This is not a small percentage since the impact of such influential variables as education and media exposure, among others, are already filtered out. In the Zambian case, while a major part of variance in the dependent variable is explained by factors other than those in the model, civic knowledge appears to be much less explainable by structural factors in Zambia than in Tanzania. For example, in Zambia one's position in the community does not even correlate with civic knowledge enough to be included in the model. This suggests that knowledge is more clearly determined by structural factors in Tanzania, while in Zambia knowledge appears to be more equally available for the rural poor.

But aggregate data by itself does not explain much when one wants to know whether civic education promotes some types of knowledge more than others. Recall that Hypothesis 1 proposed: "Civic education promotes knowledge of civil, human, and political rights, but it does not promote knowledge socioeconomic rights." Do data corroborate or invalidate this hypothesis? If one starts with the latter half of it, one can

easily corroborate it, as already the bivariate juxtaposition of civic education exposure and knowledge of socioeconomic rights showed that there is no relationship between civic education and knowledge of these rights. In neither the Tanzanian nor the Zambian samples was there a significant difference in the knowledge of socioeconomic rights between those exposed and those not exposed to civic education. Using another indicator, no CE variable correlates to a notable degree with knowledge of socioeconomic rights: In Tanzania, the highest correlation (.125) is found with civic education gained through “other” sources; in Zambia the highest correlation (.120) exists with radio as a source of rights information. Thus civic education—at least among these 280 respondents—does not contribute to a person’s awareness of, for example, right to education, work, or social services.

The same is true for children’s rights, which, although not hypothesized, were expected to be related to civic education based on the descriptive data. However, that a significant relationship was not found in regression analyses between CE exposure and knowledge of children’s rights is probably due to the fact that in the Tanzanian sample there were only 19 respondents who reported having participated in CJF.⁴⁶¹ Thus due a small number of such respondents, participation in CJF turns out insignificant in the whole sample. It could still be, however, that CJF has made a significant contribution in that participants may have simply shared the lessons they learnt with others—which has been the intention of the program. If so, it is only natural that CJF does not appear as significant in regression explaining such knowledge. Indeed, something must explain Tanzanians’ relatively high knowledge of children’s rights compared to other types of civic knowledge. It probably is not coincidental that an extensive child rights program

has been conducted in the research area. Of course, a conclusion about the connection between the child rights program and knowledge of children's rights could only be drawn by comparing data from the villages in Mtwara to data from such Tanzanian villages that have *not* been within the reach of CJF (or another children's rights promoting program).

Returning to H1, tests for the first half of this hypothesis are provided in Table 6.2. below. A quick look at the civic education variables across the columns suggests that civic education indeed makes a statistically significant contribution to "first generation" civic knowledge. With regressions also run for each dependent variable by sex, the table indicates that women in both countries are more susceptible to learning about this kind of civic knowledge through civic education.⁴⁶² This is consistent with interviews conducted as part of the study in which several observers (especially in Tanzania) indicated that women are more receptive to civic education. This lends support to Hypothesis 5 which expected benefits to accrue disproportionately to women. Much of the rest of the data in Table 6.2. also provide support for both H1 and H5.

For example, if one moves in the table from left to right, and first observes "first generation" knowledge as a whole, one can observe that civic education has its greatest effects on *Zambian* women.⁴⁶³ That is, even though the model as a whole explains a larger share of variance in the dependent variable in Tanzania,⁴⁶⁴ the civic education variables explain a clearly larger portion of this type of knowledge in Zambia (15 percent)⁴⁶⁵ than in Tanzania (8 percent). Also, the relationship that the two significant CE variables in Zambia—i.e., "overall" and AVAP—have with the dependent variable is in the expected direction (i.e., positive), while in Tanzania CJF has a negative impact on

Table 6.2. Explaining Qualitative Civic Knowledge: Civic Education and Other Factors Compared

	Civil, Human, and Political Rights				Rights and Responsibilities on Expression & Initiating		Rights and Responsibilities on Participation and Voting					
	Tanzania		Zambia (w)		Tanzania (w)		Tanzania		Tanzania (w)		Zambia	
	Beta	R ² (block)	Beta	R ² (block)	Beta	R ² (block)	Beta	R ² (block)	Beta	R ² (block)	Beta	R ² (block)
Social Structure		.320		.084		.203		-		.109		.116
Age	-		-.093		-		-		-		-	
Position in community	.174*		-		.462**		-		-.158		-	
Farmer	.012		-		-.244*		-		-		-.025	
Rural	-.111		-		-		-		-		-.243*	
Cognitive Awareness		.141		.100		.110		.077		-		.049
Education	.218*		.295*		-		-		-		.149	
Vocational school	-		-		.332**		-		-		-	
Media exposure	.228*		-		.051		.178		-		-	
Institutional Influences		.008		-		.093		.050		.028		.035
Total group affiliations	-		-		-		-		-		.204*	
Active participation at meetings	-		-		-.120		.097		.031		.050	
Communing	.054		-		-		-		-		-	
Communing and contacting	-		-		-		-		.032		-	
Voted in last community el.	-		-		-.204*		-		-		-	
Democratic Attitudes & Disc.		-		.068		-		-	-		-	-
Lack of efficacy	-		-.196*		-		-		-		-	
Civic Education		.083		.153		.410		.141		.494		.040
Overall rights education	.133		.253*		.202		.084		.223*		-	
School	.129		-		-		-		-		.243*	
Government staff	.366*		-		-.312*		-		-		-	
RIPS	-		-		.145		.150		.534**		-	
CJF	-.315*		-		-		-		-		-	
CHAWATA	-		-		-		.275*		.276*		-	
AVAP	-		.244*		-		-		-		-	
Informal sources	-		-		.619**		-		-		-	
Constant	.460		3.485		.360		.098		.171		1.218	
Full Model		.552		.405		.817		.268		.631		.240

*Notes:** $p < .05$ ** $p < .001$

(w) refers to women; otherwise data refer to the full sample. A dash means the variable was not in the model. Only included were variables with sufficient correlation with the dependent variable (i.e., about or $> .3$). Organization of the variables into explanatory groups is adapted from Bratton et al. (2005). N = 140 for full country samples; for women: N = 66 (Tanzania)/72 (Zambia).

“first generation” knowledge. However, when one recalls the type of program that CJF is—one promoting children’s rights—the negative relationship is in fact not that surprising. Indeed, focusing primarily on the material conditions in which children live, CJF draws participants’ attention to material things needed by children, such as food and clothes. Thus it is quite logical that CJF participants would not express, relatively speaking, many civil, human, and political rights.

But the Tanzanian data too provide support for H1 in that the civic education by government staff⁴⁶⁶ turned out to be the most important predictor of overall “first generation” knowledge in Tanzania *of all the variables in the model*, including formal education and exposure to mass media. This is very strong support for H1 indeed, and suggests that civic education given by, primarily, RIPS, CJF, and HSF--indeed, even CJF—together has had a positive impact on Tanzanians’ knowledge of these rights. This is logical as RIPS was a program promoting “first generation” rights, seeking to strengthen cooperation between villagers and the local Council, villagers’ participation, and inclusion of their plans in Council policies and actions. In turn, HSF sought to enhance good governance and accountability especially among village leadership, many of whom were respondents in this study. The reason that neither RIPS nor HSF by themselves exerts a significant influence in this regression probably has to do with the low relative number of respondents who indicated exposure to either program.⁴⁶⁷ And in Zambia, the influence of AVAP is not surprising: the purpose of the organization is to enhance citizens’ electoral participation, which clearly is part of political rights.

Data in Table 6.2. also provide support for H5 in that women feature prominently in the “expression and initiating” subcategory of civil and political rights: Tanzanian

women are the only group among whom any type of civic education makes a significant impact on knowledge level. Remarkably, the civic education variables explain 41 percent of variance in a model which in turn explains 82 percent of variance in the dependent variable. In this model, curiously, the type of civic education which above was so influential—that is by government staff—here has a negative impact on the dependent variable. This means that learning one’s rights from government staff makes one less likely to express such rights that have to do with expressing oneself or initiating something. This does not necessarily mean that civic education is doing more damage than good but just that Tanzanian women do not draw this type of knowledge from government run programs. And interestingly, the strongest predictor in the whole model is informal rights learning. This means that learning rights from such sources as village leadership, other people, and the media together have a strong impact on women’s awareness of these types of rights. Perhaps Tanzanian (Muslim) women—who are clearly more disadvantaged than men when it comes to participation in public affairs—learn best in informal setting which maybe do not exert as much social pressure on them as formal settings. This regression is the “best fit” when it comes to explaining any of the dependent variables in the study,⁴⁶⁸ giving support to three important expectations—first, that of the various areas of cognition and participation, civic education has its greatest effects on knowledge,⁴⁶⁹ second, that it promotes the knowledge of “first generation” rights and responsibilities, and third, that it specifically promotes such awareness among women.

That effects are greatest among women is also supported by the regression analysis depicted in the last column of Table 6.2. That is, the greatest amount of

knowledge of rights and responsibilities relating to participation and voting is explained by a model on, again, Tanzanian women. In it, 63 percent of variance is explained by six variables, making it quite parsimonious. Conspicuously, as much as 49 percent of the variance is explained by three civic education variables, which is more than in any model tested by this study. Thus there is a clear connection between women's exposure to civic education and their expression of those citizens', women's, and/or children's rights, and/or citizens' responsibilities that have to do with participation and voting. In fact in explaining Tanzanian women's knowledge of these items, civic education variables are the *only* significant variables and ones with clearly the strongest coefficients. The specific civic education programs to which this applies, in addition to overall exposure to rights, include RIPS and CHAWATA. CHAWATA's influence is commonsensical, as this is the organization that conducted voters' education in the Tanzanian village of Mbae a few months before data collection. Also, as suggested above, RIPS was a program which specifically sought to strengthen villagers' participation in their own development, including inclusion in Council plans and programs. Therefore the observed impact is of the kind that is expected and hoped for by development practitioners—and also the expected kind in this study. That there is such a clear connection between women's exposure to civic education and their expressing these rights provides justification for utilizing civic education to help strengthen such awareness among women, and also to help them see these rights be realized in practice.

Democratic Attitudes

Are the encouraging findings about civic education's role in promoting knowledge—especially among women—matched by civic education's effects on attitudes? The second half of this chapter tackles the question of how, if in any way, civic education promotes democratic attitudes. As with civic awareness, the chapter first describes the distribution and mean values for each attitudinal factor, and explores connections to civic education exposure through bivariate analysis. It then puts the preliminary findings into test in multivariate regressions.

Efficacy

First of these attitudes, efficacy was measured primarily with reference to two questions--regarding respondent's satisfaction with his or her level of influence on decision-making in the family and in the community. However, the first measure had to be excluded from analysis due to virtually no variance in data.⁴⁷⁰ Therefore, measurement of efficacy (for the whole N = 280) came to rely on a sole question, on satisfaction on one's perceived influence on community decision-making. However, data on *lack* of efficacy, available for a sub-sample, were analyzed to complement analysis of efficacy.⁴⁷¹

Comparing data on the two countries, there is virtually no difference between Tanzanian and Zambian efficacy levels. That is, while 84 percent of Tanzanians think they adequately influence community decision-making, 85 percent of Zambians think so.⁴⁷² As discussed in the previous chapter, the Afrobarometer (Chaligha et al. 2002 and Simutanyi 2002) would lead us to expect higher level of efficacy in Tanzania, though this

expectation is not necessarily compatible with what was found above about Zambians' higher knowledge levels, nor with what some other sources have found about Zambia.⁴⁷³

Also, efficacy does not seem to be related to sex (at least when our measure is used) in either country.⁴⁷⁴ The same is true for lack of efficacy. However, in Zambia efficacy varies by age: there is a significant⁴⁷⁵ difference between the youngest age group (least efficacious) and others. That is, while the 18-24 year-olds⁴⁷⁶ have a mean level of 1.10 (on a scale from 0-2) on satisfaction with their level of influence on community decision-making, that of all others is 1.81, with efficacy being highest and almost equal among the three age groups between 35-64 year-olds. It should be kept in mind that because the measure used here also (or in actuality) assesses satisfaction, one should not draw the conclusion that the youth are the least efficacious Zambians. It could be that community decision-making is the "property" of older people. Also, because younger adults in Zambia were found to be the most knowledgeable and interested in politics (see below), it does not make much sense that they would be the least efficacious group. In turn, in Tanzania there are no significant differences in efficacy levels among age groups.

When the measure of efficacy is contrasted with exposure to formal civic education, interesting findings emerge. First, only in Tanzania do those exposed to formal civic education report higher levels of satisfaction with their level of influence on community decision-making (group means: 1.94 and 1.60).⁴⁷⁷ In Zambia the higher satisfaction among those *not* exposed to civic education (1.81 versus 1.47)⁴⁷⁸ indicates either that this variable does not measure efficacy, that the type of satisfaction it does measure is not affected by civic education, or that civic education actually decreases

one's level of satisfaction in perceived influence on community, perhaps by heightening awareness about problems in the community.

Second, an expected kind of relationship is found to exist between civic education and lack of efficacy. The relationship is negative, with those exposed to civic education scoring lower in lack of efficacy (i.e., higher on efficacy). Indeed, as Figure 6.13. shows, civic education recipients do not exhibit lack of efficacy nearly to the extent that those not exposed to civic education do. In Tanzania the differences in means (0.03, N = 36, and 0.23, N = 104) are statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level, while the Zambian difference in means (0.12, N = 43, and 0.27, N = 97) "barely misses" significance.⁴⁷⁹ But again, keep in mind that these data come from a small sub-sample, with lack of efficacy scores obtained for just 21 Tanzanians and 24 Zambians.⁴⁸⁰ Regression results for efficacy will be presented below after a descriptive discussion of the other democratic attitudes.




Figure 6.13. Level of *Lack* of Efficacy by Self-Reported Exposure to Formal Rights Education

Trust

Initially, the study set out to collect data on trust only vis-à-vis politicians. The measures have the same characteristics as those for efficacy: one is applicable to the whole sample, while the other only to a subset.⁴⁸¹ The main measure inquired respondents about whether they think the leadership of their district cares about people's questions and concerns, while the one for the sub-sample assessed *lack* of trust. However, during the process, data were also obtained for a sub-sample on lack of *interpersonal* trust.⁴⁸² This was as a byproduct of data collected for other questions. The measure consisted of a sum of all negative references to other people in the community as reasons

for not participating in various acts.⁴⁸³ Because interpersonal trust likely has a high bearing on one's participation in the community, it will be analyzed.

Findings on trust in politicians are consistent with previous studies, which have found Tanzanians more trusting in their institutions, while Zambians have exhibited much lower levels of this trust. There is a very large difference between Tanzanians' and Zambians' trust in politicians. In fact, while the majority (61 percent) of Zambians say that the leadership of their district does not care about people's questions and concerns, in Tanzania the same share (60 percent) say that the leadership *does* care about these things (Figure 6.14). Similar comparative data are obtained when the "lack of trust in politicians" measure is used, with Zambians exhibiting *four* times higher distrust (mean: 0.36) than Tanzanians (0.09)!⁴⁸⁴ But again, note that these data were obtained from a sub-sample—in Tanzania only 12 respondents, and in Zambia 50 respondents.




Figure 6.14. Trust in Local Politicians: Does Leadership of the District Leadership Care about People's Questions and Concerns?

The differences in level of trust in politicians are consistent with Tanzanians' general submissiveness to their leaders, and passive acceptance of government's policies—which of course is likely higher in this study's research site, a government stronghold. In either country, levels of such trust do not vary by sex (there is no significant difference in means). However, according to a bivariate examination, age has a peculiar relationship with trust in politicians, with the youngest group (i.e., 18-24 year-olds) in Zambia being much more trusting than others (difference in means: 1.00 versus 0.44).⁴⁸⁵ One potential explanation is that young adults have the least direct experience in dealing with politicians and therefore exhibit higher trust than the older adults who have more (negative) experiences of politicians. In Tanzania, in contrast, it is the 55-64 year-olds who exhibit the highest trust (1.85 versus others' 1.40),⁴⁸⁶ which could, in turn, derive from a sense of affinity they may feel with local politicians who often are of approximately the same age.

With regard to interpersonal trust, there were no clear expectations about cross-national differences as studies have not agreed on the level of interpersonal trust in the two countries. But according to findings in this study, Zambians not only trust local politicians less; they are also much less trusting in other people in their community—or at least they express this distrust more readily. However, although differences in group means are significant,⁴⁸⁷ this finding should be taken with caution due to the very limited variance in data.⁴⁸⁸ And most importantly, bivariate correlations of trust in politicians with exposure to formal civic education reveal no significant differences between those that have received such civic education and those that have not. This is in contrast to the expectation that civic education *reduces* trust in politicians. However, there could still

exist such a relationship, when in multivariate contexts, the effects of civic education are examined by type of civic education, and when data are broken down by sex. Results of these regressions will be outlined below.

Interest in Politics

The final democratic attitude, interest in politics, is a vital part of any study seeking to explain participation. Knowing the strong relationship that exists between political interest and level of participation, influencing this attitudinal factor would arguably have the surest return on participation. Based on other studies, Tanzanians are expected to possess higher levels of interest: according to Afrobarometer data, 36 percent of Tanzanians are very interested in politics, while in Zambia the equivalent share is only 22 percent (Chaligha et al. 2002). In addition, as many as 33 percent of Zambians are “not at all” interested in politics (Bratton 1999). The difference is at least partly explained (and likely to be maintained) by the higher level of political party affiliations in Tanzania: Bratton found that party membership “more extensively” contributes to an individual’s interest in politics than associational membership, a form of participation prevalent in Zambia (1999, 580). In this sense Zambians are at a disadvantage.

Appendix E describes how political interest was measured. It also describes measurement of political discussion—another item making up “psychological engagement.” Data show that Tanzanians are indeed more psychologically engaged, as they possess higher levels of political interest and also express more enjoyment in political discussion. These differences are depicted in Figures 6.15. and 6.16.




Figure 6.15. Interest in Politics

(“Are you interested in politics?”)
N = 140 per country




Figure 6.16. Political Discussion

(“Do you enjoy discussing politics with others?”)
N = 140 (Tanzania); 139 (Zambia)

The differences in means between Tanzanians and Zambians are statistically significant, both in political interest (2.39 and 1.82, respectively)⁴⁸⁹ and political discussion (1.32 and 1.09).⁴⁹⁰ In both dimensions of psychological engagement, there are about twice as many Zambians as Tanzanians who are not (at all) engaged. That Tanzanians are so interested in politics means therein lay the potential for expanding democratic participation in Tanzania. Curiously, differences between the nations are more pronounced when it comes to political interest, as Zambians are more likely to discuss politics than be interested in it. This seeming incompatibility is due at least in part to the way some Zambians interpreted what “being interested” in politics means, equating or at least associating it with involvement. To be associated with politics is not something many Zambians want as they consider politics a dirty and dishonest enterprise. In contrast, they may regard “discussion” as a more neutral activity, and thus a safer option.⁴⁹¹

The relationship between political interest and sex is very different in the two countries. In Tanzania it is in the expected direction with men (mean: 2.42) being more interested than women (2.35), though among the Tanzanian sample this difference differs from other areas of cognition in how *small* it is. That is, it is in their levels of political interest that Tanzanian women appear to be most at par with men. In Zambia, surprisingly, women are *more* interested in politics than men (1.97 versus 1.66). Although none of these differences are statistically significant, the data are encouraging in that they suggest that despite all the obstacles and even opposition that women face in participating in public affairs, they maintain levels of interest which should make their mobilization and inclusion easier.

In turn, when political interest is correlated with age, one finds that an increase in age tends to increase interest in Tanzania, while it seems to do the opposite in Zambia. Figure 6.17. shows that in Tanzania the biggest difference in interest levels is between the 18-24 year-olds and others, with the difference in means between the youngest group (1.94, N = 31) and the 25-64 year-olds (2.50, N = 103) being statistically significant.⁴⁹² In Zambia, while political interest is highest among those 44 years or younger (and the 55-64 year-olds), their level of interest is still roughly comparable to that of the *least* interested respondents in Tanzania. This is noteworthy--and a reason for optimism among the otherwise politically disengaged Tanzanians, as the next chapter on participation will show.




Figure 6.17. Political Interest by Age

Finally, when contrasted with exposure to civic education, there is *not* a noticeable difference in level of political interest between those exposed to civic education and those not exposed to it. Although this study expected a positive relationship between interest and CE exposure, it was also suggested that the relationship could logically go in either direction. Indeed, in both countries the level of political interest is about the same for those reporting exposure to formal civic education and those reporting no exposure.⁴⁹³ Yet this does not necessarily mean that CE exposure does not exert a significant impact on this attitude when variables (instead of groups) are examined and when all the various types of civic education are taken into account. This will be done below.

Regression Results on Democratic Attitudes

Regressions were initially conducted on all the attitudinal variables discussed above for both full samples and each sex separately. However, it was decided that results for lack of efficacy and lack of interpersonal trust should not be presented because the only regressions on these variables in which a CE variable was significant—that is, those on Tanzanian men and Tanzanian women, respectively—were based on data gathered from an unacceptably low number of respondents.⁴⁹⁴ Therefore, Table 6.3. below presents results from all regressions on attitudes in which a CE variable was significant, *except* these two. With this in mind, a quick look at the table reveals that civic education only had a significant effect on attitudes in Zambia. This means, for example, that the significant difference found in Tanzania in efficacy levels⁴⁹⁵ between those exposed and

Table 6.3. Explaining Democratic Attitudes in Zambia: Civic Education and Other Factors Compared

	Efficacy (Satisfaction with Influence on Community Decision-Making)				Interest in Politics			
	Zambia		Zambia (m)		Zambia		Zambia (m)	
	Beta (block)	R²	Beta (block)	R²	Beta (block)	R² (block)	Beta (block)	R² (block)
Social Structure		.174		.216		-		.194
Multiparty generation	-.054		-.036		-		-	
Farming	-		.006		-		-	
Number of children (care)	.166		.169		-		-	
Rural	-		-		-		-.316*	
Cognitive Awareness		.021		-		-		.093
Education	-.075		-		-		-	
Vocational school	-		-		-		-.304*	
Institutional Influences		.019		.042		-		-
Contacting the Ward Councilor	-		.155		-		-	
Communing & contacting	.062		-		-		-	
Democratic Attitudes & Discussion		.069		.026		.117		-
Influence community	-		-		.222*		-	
Lack of trust in politicians	-		-		-.236*		-	
Lack of interpersonal trust	-.267*		-.129		-		-	
Civic Education		.024		.054		.053		.065
School	-.197*		-.328*		-		-	
AVAP	-		-		.232*		.273*	
Constant	1.720		1.563		1.342		3.192	
Full Model		.308		.338		.170		.352

Notes:

* $p < .05$

(m) refers to men; otherwise data refer to the full sample. A dash means the variable was not in the model. Only included were variables with sufficient correlation with the dependent variable (i.e., usually $> .3$). Organization of the variables is adapted from Bratton et al. (2005). $N = 140$ for full sample, $N = 68$ for regressions with men.

those not exposed to civic education did not survive a multivariate context. This indicates that Tanzanians' satisfaction with their level of influence in their community is more ingrained (caused by other factors) than brief interludes of civic education exposure. That civic education turns out to be a relatively marginal determinant of attitudes in the study as a whole is not surprising in light of the known difficulty to change adults' attitudes--although the study's findings are also conditioned by some limitations in the survey questions used to gather data on efficacy and trust.

But what *do* the findings on attitudinal effects in Zambia--where civic education played a statistically significant role in four regressions—reveal? First, with regard to efficacy (H2), CE exposure turns out to have a *negative* influence on efficacy. This was not expected--though the finding does have a logical explanation, when considering what type of civic education it refers to (that is, school based), and how efficacy was defined (that is, as satisfaction with one's influence on community decision-making). Therefore, instead of being descriptive of the effect that civic education has on efficacy per se, this negative relationship may rather be an indication of the frustration that many relatively educated villagers feel in trying to influence decisions in their community--the majority of whose residents are unschooled.⁴⁹⁶ This was the observation made during data collection.

In turn, as indicated by what is *not* included in Table 6.3., the study finds that a CE variable was not significant in explaining trust. Therefore H3 is *not* corroborated. However, it is useful to understand the reasons for the relatively high number of Zambians (N = 50) who made reference to distrust toward politicians as their reason for, primarily, not participating in various activities; this is important especially if Chapter 7

reveals that (dis)trust drives participation. If exposure to civic education has not made Zambians distrustful, what has? Although a regression model composed of four variables⁴⁹⁷ only account for 18 percent of variance in distrust, it is instructive to identify these variables, all of which are statistically significant. That is, the variables increasing distrust in politicians are position in community governance and contacting the Ward Councilor, while variables decreasing this distrust are membership in a church group and interest in politics. Thus village leaders and those contacting the Councilor are relatively likely to distrust politicians (perhaps due to disappointment in interacting with the Councilor), while members of church groups and those interested in politics are more likely to trust politicians. This suggests that attitudes (here, trust in politicians) are linked to participation (including contacting the Councilor), though their role in explaining participation can only be explored when the participatory acts are placed as a dependent variable, which will be done in the next chapter.

Finally, as Table 6.3. shows, findings on CE's effects on political interest (H4) were of the expected kind. That is, in Zambia—both in the full sample and among men—exposure to civic education by AVAP promotes interest in politics. Thus in this sense AVAP's efforts to enhance citizens' electoral participation are likely having the intended effect: an increased interest in politics probably makes a person likelier to vote.⁴⁹⁸ It is possible that the two regressions would have explained a much larger share of variance in the dependent variable if those who, according to village leadership, have attended AVAP events—but who did not indicate it themselves--would have been coded as AVAP participants. But although explaining relatively little of the overall variance, the two regressions are parsimonious since in both only three variables explain the outcome.

Therefore they can tell us something useful about what explains interest in politics. Beyond participation in AVAP's programs, as Table 6.3. shows, the political interest of Zambian men has been determined by place of residence⁴⁹⁹--with those living in Mabumba village being less interested in politics—and attendance at a vocational school, which, interestingly, is negatively related to political interest. This could be because the kind of practical skills taught in vocational school do not expose students to information which could stimulate their political interest. In turn, political interest in the Zambian sample as a whole is explained, beyond AVAP, by lack of trust in politicians—which, logically, is negatively related to political interest—and efficacy. Thus those who are satisfied with how they influence community decisions are more interested in politics, which is logical as both of these attitudes are probably linked to a person's extroverted disposition—toward active engagement in public affairs.

Conclusion: Does Civic Education Affect Cognition?

Summing up the findings in this chapter, results reveal that even in this sample in which the majority of respondents indicated they had never been taught their rights by anyone, civic education had many expected kinds of effects on cognition. That is, although hypotheses on effects on efficacy and trust were not corroborated, those on civic education's effects on civic knowledge (H1), political interest (H4), and women (H5) were,⁵⁰⁰ with robust findings. The robustness refers to the fact that in regression analyses the known competing explanations were all controlled for, including participation. Thus civic education enhances civic knowledge, particularly among women, while also promoting political interest in Zambia (particularly among men), *above and beyond* the

positive effects that participation in various fora is expected to have on knowledge and interest. This is striking as one could expect that the amount of civic knowledge that one possesses would be determined much more by the extent to which (s)he engages with other people in various forms of participation—with this participation likely involving exchange of information—than by brief and, usually, infrequent periods of exposure to civic education. Findings on the positive effects of civic education on awareness are consistent with previous studies—also in the sense that these effects were larger than impact on attitudes. However, to get a better understanding of the attitudinal impact, scholars should continue to analyze the relationship that exists between exposure to civic education and the various attitudes, using different operationalizations of efficacy and trust.

Beyond the general positive contribution of civic education on knowledge, results also revealed that indeed, civic education boosts the knowledge of civil, human, and political rights while not impacting the knowledge of socioeconomic rights (H1). And second, consistent with H5, these effects were greater among women than men in both countries. Third, the hypothesis on CE's positive effect on political interest (i.e., H4) was confirmed in Zambia, especially among men, but also in the full sample. That civic education was found to boost political interest specifically in Zambia is important in that there, interest in politics was much lower to begin with. Thus in Zambia an empowerment of the masses requires just such a boost. In contrast, Tanzanians do not lack political interest—rather the question there is how to harness this interest so as to empower the poor. Also, in Tanzania the area of cognition in which civic education could make its greatest contribution is civic awareness—an area in which, as shown, results should also

be the easiest to realize. Tanzanian women have already proven capable of taking advantage of exposure to civic education. Therefore, civic education appears to be useful in helping to overcome the respective cognitive limitations for democratic participation in Zambia and in Tanzania.

Thus based on findings in this chapter, those seeking to utilize civic education to empower the masses can quite safely take it as a starting point that civic education boosts awareness. They can also expect their efforts to enhance citizens' understanding of their "first generation" rights, as well as help level the cognitive disparities that exist between men and women. Results further indicate that it is possible to use civic education to promote participants' level of interest in politics. But outstanding questions include: Do these cognitive gains also help the poor participate more? And: does civic education exert any independent effect on participation? The purpose of this chapter has been to lay a foundation for understanding civic education's effects on participation, though already the findings presented here--particularly on the positive effects on "first generation" civic knowledge and on women's awareness—provide reason for optimism for those desiring to utilize civic education to produce such democratic participants among the rural poor who have an understanding of their civil, human, and political rights.

Chapter 7

DOES CIVIC EDUCATION PROMOTE PARTICIPATION?

In preparation to assess the effects of civic education on participation, Chapter 6 established the extent to which learning about one's rights induces a cultural (i.e., attitudinal) change. This chapter uses this information and compares whether civic education promotes democratic participation primarily through such a cultural change, or whether effects are more direct, with civic education inducing changes in individuals' institutional affiliations. Thus the chapter compares the placement of civic education vis-à-vis these two primary explanations for participation: culture and institutions.

While continuing to test Hypothesis 5 on whether civic education is likely to benefit the disadvantaged (i.e., women) the most, the chapter tests Hypothesis 6: is the expected boost on participation greatest on individualized forms of participation? Is teaching people about their rights more likely to encourage them to actively contribute at community meetings and contact the Ward Councilor, than it is to promote membership in voluntary associations or raising development issues with others? According to the logic behind H6, civic education by its nature promotes self-expression, being therefore more likely to promote participation in those acts which facilitate, encourage, and even depend on such expression.

Although this chapter is built on the same logic as the previous one—proceeding from univariate and bivariate description of data to explanation—regression results are discussed here in more detail. That is, while for cognition only those regression results

were presented in which a civic education variable was statistically significant, here all full sample regressions are discussed, regardless of whether a civic education variable is significant in them. This enables one to grasp what *does* explain participation, whether cultural, institutional, or structural factors—and/or what role cognitive awareness plays. It assists in knowing which domain(s) civic education should seek to influence in order to promote participation. Also note that because all regressions also control for cognitive effects, a statistically significant CE variable suggests a direct effect on participation. Beyond the full country samples, results are presented for those samples by sex in which a civic education variable is significant. The variables included in all these regressions were the same as those in the models explaining cognition.⁵⁰¹ Results are discussed separately for aggregate, individualized, and group based participation. The chapter concludes by summarizing Hypothesis 5 and briefly recapitulating findings on the research question: what role does civic education play in promoting local level participation? These findings and in particular their implications will be more thoroughly discussed in the concluding chapter.

Recall that local level participation was measured by five variables. These consisted of two acts of individualized participation (i.e., active participation at community meetings and contacting the Ward Councilor⁵⁰²), two group based acts (joining others to raise development issues and memberships in community groups), and one mobilized act (voting in community elections). Analysis will not be conducted on voting—for reasons already mentioned.⁵⁰³ Although the study did not specifically hypothesize about the effects of civic education on overall participation--for the very reason that civic education is not expected to have the same kind of effect on all

participatory acts—analysis begins with a summary of aggregate participation. This is so as to obtain (1) a general understanding of levels of participation in the research sites (and what explains it), and (2) a reference point for the discussion on CE's effects on each type of participation. Following this, CE's effects on individualized and group participation, respectively, are evaluated.

Aggregate Participation

The aggregate measures of participation were “communing and contacting” and “communing,” with the latter being otherwise the same as the former but not including contacts with the Ward Councilor. Although one needs to be careful when interpreting data on communing and contacting for Zambia (as reliability of this index in Zambia was fairly low),⁵⁰⁴ for comparative purposes results will be presented for both countries for both of these indices. First, data on communing and contacting reveal that despite having had less institutionalized opportunities for participation, Zambians participate on the local level more than Tanzanians. The range of scores obtained for this index is indicative: while in Tanzania it is 0-28, in Zambia it is 0-37. The distribution of scores is depicted visually in Figures 7.1. and 7.2.




Figure 7.1. “Communing and Contacting” in Tanzania




Figure 7.2. “Communing and Contacting” in Zambia

The data demonstrate that the mean level of activity is considerably higher in Zambia (13.4) than Tanzania (9.72).⁵⁰⁵ Also, in Tanzania there are many more respondents in the zero category. That is, 26 respondents (19 percent) are characterized by all of the following: they are not a member in any community group, do not participate at community meetings (beyond listening to what is being said), have never joined other people in raising a development issue, and have never contacted their Ward Councilor. In Zambia, there are only three (or 2 percent of) such respondents. Thus, while in Tanzania participation seems divided (in that some participate while others do not), Zambian respondents as a whole “commune and contact” more actively. Second, also when this index is stripped of contacts with the Councilor, the pattern is very similar: the Zambian mean for “communing” (11.17) is much higher than that for Tanzania (7.83),⁵⁰⁶ and has much fewer respondents in the zero category.⁵⁰⁷ The range of scores—0-20 for Tanzania and 0-28 for Zambia—also indicates that Zambians commune more, though it is only eight Zambians who score above 20. Thus the distribution is dragged upward by these most actively participating respondents.

It is noteworthy that the acts of participation included in these indices clearly correlate to a much higher degree in Tanzania than Zambia. Even when examining all participatory acts together—thus also including the two items on voting⁵⁰⁸—the reliability score yielded for Tanzania⁵⁰⁹ is considerably higher than that for Zambia,⁵¹⁰ suggesting that the variables are related much more in Tanzania than Zambia. In other words, the various aspects of local level participation “go together” to a much higher extent in Tanzania, meaning they are engaged in by largely the same people. In contrast,

as suggested above, participation seems more equally distributed in Zambia. There, the group of individuals that contacts the Councilor, for example, are not necessarily the same as those who participate actively at community meetings. What does this mean for democracy? What causes these patterns? Are these differences simply a matter of culture, with, for example, participation being the reserve of a select few in Islamic communities, while in largely Christian communities more individuals are involved? What role, if any, does civic education play?

In turn, what is the intervening influence of an individual's sex on his or her level of participation? Figure 7.3. shows an expected kind of difference between men and women: men participate more in both countries.⁵¹¹ However, in Tanzania the disparity between men and women is larger.⁵¹² Note that due to Zambia's higher level of participation, Zambian women participate almost as much as Tanzanian men do. Following the figure on men and women, Figures 7.4., and 7.5. demonstrate how participation varies by age.




Figure 7.3. “Communing and Contacting” by Sex




Figure 7.4. "Communing and Contacting" by Age




Figure 7.5. "Communing" by Age

Figures 7.4. and 7.5. reveal that participation generally increases with age. However, with regard to Tanzania one should note that although the highest age group seems to be the most active, there are only three respondents in this category.⁵¹³ Therefore, the pattern displayed for Tanzania may not be truthful, with the 65-77 not being the most active group in the population as a whole. But according to these data, in Tanzania the level of participation clusters by three age groups, while in Zambia it clusters by two (especially if considering communing). In the former there is a significant difference in level of communing and contacting between the 18-24, 25-64, and 65-77 year-olds.⁵¹⁴ In Zambia, especially with regard to communing, a more meaningful contrast is between the 18-34 year-olds on the one hand, and those 35 years or above on the other. The lower level of participation among the under-35-year-olds is statistically significant vis-à-vis both dependent variables.⁵¹⁵ Comparing across countries, the youngest cohort seems to be relatively more disengaged in Tanzania.

How does civic education affect overall participation? In Tanzania those exposed to civic education⁵¹⁶ score significantly higher than those not exposed to it, both in regard to communing and contacting, and communing alone, while in Zambia in none of these cases is the slightly higher score of those exposed to civic education statistically significant. Figure 7.6. gives an indication of this by demonstrating data for exposure to formal rights education. On this basis one could expect civic education to only affect participation in Tanzania.




Figure 7.6. “Communing and Contacting” by Self-Reported Exposure to Formal Rights Education

Regression Results

The bivariate juxtaposition of civic education and aggregate participation was instructive in that multivariate regressions, reported in Table 7.1., reveal civic education to be significant only in Tanzania, and more specifically among Tanzanian women.⁵¹⁷ In fact only CHAWATA—the Tanzanian NGO which implemented voters’ education in Mbae Village a few months before data for this study were collected—has significantly impacted aggregate participation. But, note, this is not a small impact as all local level participation is considered—and as CHAWATA’s input was just two brief sessions of voters’ education. Also, the model explaining Tanzanian women’s aggregate

Table 7.1. Explaining Aggregate Participation: Civic Education and Other Factors Compared

	Communing and Contacting						Communing			
	Tanzania		Tanzania (w)		Zambia		Tanzania		Zambia	
	Beta	R ² (block)	Beta	R ² (block)	Beta	R ² (block)	Beta	R ² (block)	Beta	R ² (block)
Social Structure		.368		.401		.337		.315		.459
Age	.186*		.144		.090		-		.043	
Position in community	.248*		.497**		.330**		.287*		.459**	
Sex	.144*		-		-		.181*		-	
Number of children (care)	-		-		.194*		-		.197*	
Rural	-		-		-		-		-.280**	
Cognitive Awareness		.032		.048		-		.037		-
Media exposure	-		-		-		-.010		-	
Aggregate civic knowledge	.131		-		-		.137		-	
Knowledge of civil, human, and political rights	-		.190		-		-		-	
Knowledge of rights and responsibilities concerning participation and voting	-		-.084		-		-		-	
Institutional Influences		.066		.086		.078		.113		-
Dominant party	.206*		.314*		-		.252**		-	
Member in “another” community group	-		-		.230*		-		-	
Contacting the Ward Councilor	-		-		-		.030		-	
Democratic Attitudes & Discussion		.115		.056		.088		.080		.024
Influence community	.144*		-		-		.127		-	
Lack of efficacy	-.195*		-		-		-.182*		-	
Lack of interpersonal trust	-		-		-.223*		-		-.167*	
Like discussing politics	.176*		-		.192*		.171*		-	
Psychological engagement	-		.099		-		-		-	
Civic Education		.030		.053		.006		.016		-
Overall rights education	.153		.241		-		.145		-	
Government staff	.013		-.207		.086		.010		-	
RIPS	.081		-.206		-		-		-	
CHAWATA	-		.296*		-		-		-	
Constant	-4.850		-1.201		5.940		-0.347		13.434	

Full Model	.611	.644	.508	.561	.481
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Notes:

* $p < .05$

** $p < .001$

(w) refers to women; otherwise data refer to the full sample. A dash means the variable was not in the model. The only variables included in the model were those with sufficient correlation with the dependent variable (i.e., usually $> .3$). Organization of the variables is adapted from Bratton et al. (2005).

participation only has three statistically significant variables, one of which is this voters' education. Furthermore, of all the regressions on aggregate participation, the one on Tanzanian women explains the greatest amount of variance: 64 percent, of which 5.3 percent is uniquely explained by the CE variables.⁵¹⁸ However, the study expects that this is not the only instance in which civic education boosts participation—but it expects that the other instances can only be observed when participation is broken down into the different types. But before the rest of the chapter does so, it is important to note what factors, if not civic education, explain overall participation. Are cultural or institutional variables more important? Most of the results outlined below are consistent with expectations in the literature and/or observations made during field research.

The most powerful explanations for participation are those that apply across contexts. In this study there are two cross-national explanations for overall participation. Table 7.1. demonstrates that of these, the only one that significantly affects overall participation in all five regressions depicted is structural: one's position in community. It has a considerable and positive effect on participation in every instance. In practical terms, this means that leaders participate more than others. This is intuitive: leaders are normally in charge of, for example, community meetings, and so their higher level of input is natural. Another variable that boosts participation in both countries⁵¹⁹ is discussing politics: those that discuss politics participate more. This is in line with the literature in which interest in politics, a proxy of which is political discussion, is an important determinant of participation.

Then there are those variables that explain participation in one country but not in the other. This suggests that explanations for participation vary by context; consequently,

civic education is expected to affect participation differently in different contexts. Of the variables that explain aggregate participation only in Tanzania, the first is sex: being a man significantly increases one's participation. This is in accordance with not only the literature but also previous knowledge about women's lower level of inclusion in public affairs in Mtwara. Therefore the finding that civic education promotes participation among just this group is encouraging for those desiring to increase women's public role. Another variable which is only significant in Tanzania is affiliation with the dominant party, which promotes participation.⁵²⁰ This is logical as the Tanzanian research site was a government stronghold. Therefore, it is logical that affiliation with CCM promotes one's overall participation, increasing his or her leverage in, for example, decision-making at community meetings. In contrast, those affiliated with the MMD in the Zambian research sites do not enjoy such a status—although they were too few in the sample (N = 3) to allow for testing whether affiliation with dominant party has *negative* effects on participation in these areas. Third, lack of efficacy only influences communing and contacting negatively in Tanzania while it is not significant in Zambia. It is commonsensical that those with a lower sense of efficacy would be less involved in public affairs, and the fact that this is not the case in Zambia is a little surprising. But one has to remember that the data for this variable were not drawn from the whole sample (but a small subset); therefore, in Zambia this subset is likely too small to facilitate detecting a significant relationship with participation. In Tanzania the importance of efficacy for participation is further corroborated by the fact that one's satisfaction with the level of his or her influence on community decision-making positively covaries with communing and contacting.⁵²¹

In turn, there are three variables which explain participation only in Zambia. Perhaps the most unsurprising is respondents' participation in "other" community groups—which refers to associational memberships *beyond* political parties, organs of community governance, and church groups.⁵²² This variable boosts other forms of participation that are part of communing and contacting. While in Tanzania the most important institutional determinant of participation was affiliation with the (dominant) party, in Zambia it is this measure of associational membership. This is clearly in line with expectations: associational activity is known to be much more common in Zambia. Another significant variable, exerting negative influence, is lack of interpersonal trust. Indeed, as observed during field research, the rationale provided for nonparticipation by those in Zambia who did not participate in a particular activity often had to do with trust: rejection or mistreatment by others in the community. That is, those who have experienced mistreatment by others do not participate on the local level as much. Finally, the most surprising finding was that the number of children, a variable used to control for family size, was found to *increase* participation in Zambia—whether communing and contacting, or just communing. One possible explanation is that, as pointed out by the Zambian research assistant, many families in Mansa District look after some of the community's orphans. This may make them more inclined to seek help and/or justice for the orphans through community meetings and/or other fora.

A couple of things can be deduced from these findings on aggregate participation. First, findings suggest that indeed, civic education has its greatest effects on participation among women. However, understanding aggregate participation alone does not allow one to know to which participatory act(s) these effects refer. It also does not facilitate an

understanding of whether civic education in some cases could also boost men's participation. Second, results suggest that beyond CHAWATA's influence among Tanzanian women, participation is explained by social structure (leadership position, sex, and number of children⁵²³), institutional influences (political party and associational memberships), and attitudes ((lack of) efficacy, interpersonal trust, and discussing politics). Therefore, third, attitudes are an important part of these explanations, as expected in Chapter 3. It is unfortunate that the measurements in the study did not allow a full blown examination of civic education's role in influencing attitudes. But if one wants to affect participation, targeting trust and efficacy seems crucial. Therefore, these are areas to which development programs should pay more attention. Finally, according to these findings awareness does not affect participation. Therefore, is this area of the greatest cognitive impact of civic education irrelevant for participation? In one sense, it is not surprising that a discernible impact cannot be seen, as structural, institutional, and cultural factors are clearly the primary competing explanations for participation.⁵²⁴ It is argued that cognitive awareness *is* significant—but that explanations for aggregate participation disguise this, as they do for the impact of other potentially important variables, therefore allowing only a very rudimentary understanding of local level participation. To get a better understanding, especially of the role of civic education in participation, one needs to disaggregate participation by type. This is done below.

Individualized Participation

Active Participation at Community Meetings

The first form of individualized participation examined in the study is active participation at community meetings. This measure thus goes beyond mere attendance at meetings. Although the role of civic education cannot be analyzed vis-à-vis attendance,⁵²⁵ it is imperative that the opportunities in each research site for attending community meetings are understood. Chapter 5 suggested that community meetings are generally more frequent in Tanzania (because there, they are more institutionalized). But due to question wording,⁵²⁶ the frequency of these meetings is not observable in the data, resulting in extremely high recorded attendance rates in both countries.⁵²⁷ In reality, average attendance rates are much lower: 60 persons⁵²⁸ in Mbae Village in the last five village assembly meetings preceding data collection, and 107 persons⁵²⁹ in Mtawanya Village in the last four village assembly meetings prior to data gathering.⁵³⁰ In Zambia attendance levels are even lower—for example, 30-40 persons in Mabumba West section when residents are not busy (such as when working in the fields), and about 20-30 persons at a time when they are busy.⁵³¹ For Mabumba East, despite approximately double the population of Mabumba West, attendance in the last meeting prior to data gathering⁵³² was similar: between 35-50 villagers. Due to different measurements, it is difficult to compare these attendance levels to the Afrobarometer.⁵³³ Using the past year as a reference point, it records Tanzanians' attendance at community meetings to be 81 percent, while that for Zambians is lower, 65 percent.

Thus, because the measure on attendance rates was not very useful, the study assessed participation at meetings with reference to people's *active* contribution in them.

As Figures 7.7. and 7.8. show, Zambians appear to participate at community meetings much more actively, which is in accordance with Tanzanians' known tendency to submit to and revere authority (such as those community members conducting the meeting). Appendix E shows the share of respondents at each level of participation in each country.




Figure 7.7. Tanzanians' Level of Active Participation at Community Meetings




Figure 7.8. Zambians' Level of Active Participation at Community Meetings

In fact, according to this measure, Tanzanians' modal category is zero, which means that almost half of the respondents only listen to what is being said when they attend community meetings. But when the mean is calculated, Tanzanians on average contribute to meetings in one active way, whether by asking questions, expressing their opinion, organizing the meeting, or doing something else. In contrast, Zambians participate on average in two active ways, with over half of respondents engaging in two or three ways to contribute.⁵³⁴ It is also noteworthy that while in Zambia men and women contribute to meetings equally (respective means: 2.11 and 2.09), in Tanzania men participate almost three times (!) as actively as women (means: 1.41 and 0.58).⁵³⁵ Initial observation might attribute at least a part of this to the Muslim culture of southeast Tanzania (in which a public role for women is not encouraged). Unfortunately, these

findings have no reference point as neither the Afrobarometer nor other studies on Africa have assessed citizens' level of contribution at community meetings.




Figure 7.9. Active Participation at Community Meetings by Sex

Logically, one can expect civic education to have an effect on precisely the type of participation measured by this variable, as hypothesized in H6. And if civic education is found to boost one's contribution at meetings, the boost would be especially needed by women in Tanzania—and other countries in which women are discouraged from attending and participating in public meetings. The bivariate relationship between exposure to civic education and contribution at meetings is depicted in Figure 7.10.⁵³⁶

Mean Active Participation at Meetings




Figure 7.10. Active Participation at Community Meetings by Self-Reported Exposure to Formal Rights Education

The figure reveals that in Tanzania there is a considerable—and significant⁵³⁷-- difference in participation levels between those that report exposure to rights education and those that do not, while in Zambia this is not the case.⁵³⁸ In Tanzania, those that report exposure to rights education participate more than twice as actively at meetings that those without exposure to rights education. This suggest either that rights education promotes skills, motivation, and/or confidence that one can utilize in actively participating at community meetings, or then that those that participate actively at meetings also attend civic education. The direction of the causal path (or even whether there is a causal path among the two) cannot be known before conducting multivariate

regression analysis. In turn, in Zambia the *lack* of a significant difference in means may indicate that it is customary for Zambians to actively participate at meetings, and thus rights education does not have much impact on this.

Contacting the Ward Councilor


The second measure of individualized participation was the number of times the respondent has contacted the Ward Councilor in a development issue. In both countries contacting the Councilor is a fairly common thing to do as he is the first politician that most people would contact. Chapter 5 mentioned that Zambians are more critical of the government; they are also critical of their Councilors, complaining about these local officials' ignorance of their duties (Bratton and Liatto-Katundu 1994).⁵³⁹ Zambians were also mentioned as the gloomiest nation of those included in the Afrobarometer when it comes to the state and prospects of the economy (Bratton et al. 2005). This may affect their frequency of contacting the Councilor—that is, if they think the Councilor is related to their economic condition. According to data in this study, this participatory act is the one in which there is the least difference between Tanzania and Zambia: in both countries the same share of people, a majority (65 percent in Tanzania and 64 percent in Zambia), have never contacted the Councilor. Also in both countries the same share (15 percent in Tanzania, 16 percent in Zambia) has contacted him often.⁵⁴⁰

However, due to some differences in how respondents are distributed among the categories between these extremes, Zambians have a somewhat higher mean score for contacting the Councilor (2.26) than Tanzanians (1.91).⁵⁴¹ Although the Afrobarometer does not have comparable data for Tanzania and Zambia on contacting government

officials in general, findings in this study are in the same *direction* with the data that the Afrobarometer does have. In the first round of Afrobarometer, Zambians (1999) were almost three times as active as Tanzanians (2001) in contacting their elected representatives. However, more recent data (2005) on contacting the Councilor, only available for Tanzania, indicate that 29 percent of Tanzanians have contacted their Ward Councilor once, a few times, or often in the past year. This sounds like a high number.⁵⁴²

How is contacting this local representative related to a respondent's sex? Data reveal that in both countries, men are about twice as active in contacting the Councilor (see Figure 7.11). In Tanzania, they score on average 2.54, while women score only 1.18.⁵⁴³ In Zambia, while the population generally speaking contacts the Councilor more often, the relative difference between the sexes is about as large (men's average: 3.04, women's: 1.51).⁵⁴⁴ Why is it that while Zambian women contribute as actively as men at community meetings, they contact the Councilor so much less than men? A possible answer is that women's participation is more readily accepted and even expected *within* the community (i.e., at community meetings), whereas their participation is not encouraged in such public and "political" forms of participation as contacting the Councilor. Of course it can also be that for women, who are less mobile and whose time has usually more demands than that of men, it is physically more difficult to contact the Councilor than participate at community meetings. Nevertheless, that women are so much less in contact with their elected representatives in both countries suggests that those desiring to empower women should pay particular attention to this area.

Mean Number of Times* That Has Contacted the Councilor

**Figure 7.11. Contacting the Ward Councilor by Sex**

* Note: The numbers indicated by the figure do not translate exactly to actual numbers. See Appendix E for details on how the variable was measured.

How much does civic education affect a person's frequency of contacting the Councilor? Could it help women close the gap vis-à-vis men? On the one hand, as hypothesized in H6, civic education is expected to strengthen the kinds of skills and/or confidence that are required for contacting the Councilor. As part of this, civic education may increase awareness of the procedure for contacting the Councilor. But on the other hand, it may also increase such information that decreases the recipient's trust in the

system or the Councilor, thereby making him or her believe that seeking out the Councilor would be a waste of time. In such a case, therefore, the impact of civic education on contacting one's local representative would be explained by effects on trust. Although data in this study did not allow confirming the hypothesis on trust, other studies should explore CE's effects on trust. Here, Figure 7.12. provides initial clues about CE's effects on contacting the Councilor. The figure suggests that in both countries those exposed to formal civic education contact their local representative more. But, as was the case with active participation at community meetings, a significant difference in means between these two groups exists only in Tanzania.⁵⁴⁵




Figure 7.12. Contacting the Ward Councilor by Self-Reported Exposure to Formal Rights Education

* Note: In both figures the numbers indicated do not translate exactly to actual numbers. See Appendix E for details on how the variable was measured.

Regression Results

When individualized acts of participation are analyzed by multivariate regressions, is Hypothesis 6 supported? Does civic education enhance active participation at community meetings and promote contacting the Ward Councilor? According to results in Table 7.2., civic education variables significantly affect one type of individualized participation (that is, contacting the Councilor) but not the other (participating actively at community meetings). Thus a part of the hypothesis is supported. But rather than end the discussion here, it is important to understand what the significant explanations for each form of participation are, in order to also understand why civic education did not promote active participation at meetings. A potential explanation is that community meetings are “collectively controlled” for which reason civic education faces greater obstacles in promoting one’s participation there. In contrast, contacting the Councilor is a more individual act, in that it is free from the pressure caused by other community members’ presence.

1. Contacting the Ward Councilor

In contacting the Councilor, CE variables have been more influential in Tanzania. That is, while civic education was significant in both the Tanzanian sample as a whole and among women alone, in Zambia it only explained men’s contacts with the Councilor. In all of these one CE variable is significant, and always in expected (i.e., positive) direction. Overall it is quite remarkable that civic education does influence the frequency of contacting the Councilor, considering that the model includes so many “bigger” explanatory variables, including structural and institutional factors.

Table 7.2. Explaining Individualized Participation: Active Participation at Community Meetings and Contacting the Councilor

	Active Participation at Community Meetings				Contacting the Councilor				Contacting the Councilor by Sex			
	Tanzania		Zambia		Tanzania		Zambia		Tanzania (w)		Zambia (m)	
	Beta	R ² (block)	Beta	R ² (block)	Beta	R ² (block)	Beta	R ² (block)	Beta	R ² (block)	Beta	R ² (block)
Social Structure		.423		.261		.119		.098		.200		.163
Age	-		-		.279*		-		-		-	
Multiparty generation	-		-		-		-.139		-.190		-.153	
Position in community	.288*		.085		-		-		-.016		.086	
Sex	.102		-		-		.166*		-		-	
Rural	-		-.379**		-		-		-		-	
Cognitive Awareness		.082		-		-		-	-		-	
Media exposure	.222*		-		-		-		-		-	
Aggregate civic knowledge	.081		-		-		-		-		-	
Institutional Influences		.140		.037		.165		.039		.083		.061
Total group affiliations	.127		.214*		-		.178*		.108		-	
Affiliated with political party	-		-		-		-		.215		-	
Position in community governance	-		-		.103		-		-		-	
Active participation at meetings	-		-		.288*		-		.074		-	
Raising issues with others	.286**		-.030		-		.048		-		-	
Contacting the Ward Councilor	.183*		-		-		-		-		-	
Voted in last national election	-		-		-		-		-		.254*	
Democratic Attitudes & Discussion		.002		.025		-		.062		-		.029
Influence community	-.007		-		-		-		-		.165	
Lack of efficacy	-.056		-		-		-		-		-	
Lack of trust in politicians	-		-		-		.246*		-		-	
Lack of interpersonal trust	-		-.167*		-		-		-		-	
Interest in politics	-		.019		-		-		-		-	
Civic Education		.010		.000		.049		.017		.175		.072
Overall rights education	.070		-		-		-		-		-	
Government staff	-.128		-		-		.137		.175		.303*	
RIPS	.096		-		-		-		-.033		-	
CHAWATA	-		-		.230*		-		.411*		-	
Radio	-		.018		-		-		-		-	

Constant	-298	3.012		-2.812	.306	.666		-751
Full Model	.657	.324		.332	.215	.458		.324

Notes:

* p<.05

** p<.001

(w) refers to women; (m) refers to men; otherwise data refer to the full sample. A dash means the variable was not in the model. Only included were variables with sufficient correlation with the dependent variable (i.e., usually >.3). Organization of the variables is adapted from Bratton et al. (2005).

In Tanzania it is again the voters' education by CHAWATA that has made the significant impact. In a way this is not surprising since CHAWATA's was one of the most recent civic education programs in the area, having taken place only weeks before data collection.⁵⁴⁶ Also, voters' education has a more logical connection to contacting the Councilor (as it could encourage citizens to call on their representatives to answer their questions about upcoming elections and/or other issues)--while its boosting contributions at community meetings is less intuitive.

Also, once again, civic education has clearly had its greatest impact among Tanzanian women. This conclusion is drawn because, first, CE variables explain a much larger share of variance in this group's contacts with the Councilor—17.5 percent--than that of others. Second, the model on Tanzanian women explains a noticeably larger share of the dependent variable—that is, 46 percent--than the other models do. And third, whereas civic education is the *only* significant variable in explaining Tanzanian women's contacts with the Councilor, among other groups other variables are also influential. This lends support to Hypothesis 5 which suggests that civic education benefits women relatively more than men. The hypothesis is corroborated even though in Zambia civic education only promoted men's contacts with the Councilor. That is because Zambian women are relatively more equal with men--possessing levels of awareness and participation which are in some cases equal to or above that of men. The comparison of Tanzanian and Zambian women will be discussed further at the end of the chapter.

Among the other explanations for contacting the Ward Councilor, one which strikes with its *absence* is position in community. This variable is not significant in either country. Thus, whereas this structural factor was the most important explanation for

aggregate participation (in that it was the only significant predictor of participation in all five regressions presented), it does not determine one's contacts with the Councilor. This highlights the fact that different forms of participation have different causes. Perhaps civic education is better able to promote contacts with the local representative, as suggested above, *because* that form of participation is less structurally determined. That is, individuals can more freely decide whether or not to contact the Councilor than how much they contribute at community meetings. Indeed, the two individualized acts in Table 7.2. differ in this important respect.

In turn, of the variables that *are* significant in explaining contacts with the Councilor *none* applies to both countries. This again underscores the importance of analyzing the countries separately. In the full Tanzanian sample, the strongest predictor is—active participation at meetings. Thus in Tanzania the two individualized acts are linked. This suggests that the acts require at least some of the same attributes. The second strongest predictor of contacting the Councilor in Tanzania is age, with these two variables having a positive relationship. This concurs with what was found above about the relationship of age and participation in general.

In Zambia, explanations for contacts with the Councilor are very different. In the full sample, the *strongest* predictor is lack of trust in politicians. Thus, those who do not trust and/or are dissatisfied with politicians contact the Councilor. Juxtaposing trust in politicians with that in other people, it is noteworthy that while in Tanzania respondents appear to trust both their government and each other, in the Zambian sites there is widespread distrust in both. While lack of interpersonal trust among Zambians hinders participation, lack of trust in politicians fuels it. In turn, the second significant

explanation for contacting the Councilor in Zambia is also familiar: associational memberships. Those who participate in associations are more likely to contact their Councilor. This supports the institutionalists' view that involvement in associations begets other types of participation.⁵⁴⁷ Finally, contacting the Councilor is explained in Zambia by sex: men contact him more. It is interesting that while sex was a significant predictor of overall participation in Tanzania, but not in Zambia, it is a significant predictor of particular participatory acts⁵⁴⁸ only in Zambia, but not in Tanzania. This again demonstrates that explaining aggregate participation alone facilitates limited understanding of what makes people participate.

2. Active Participation at Community Meetings

Although both contacting the Councilor and active participation at community meetings can be considered individualized forms of participation, explanations for these acts are actually quite different. Beyond the fact that civic education only explained the former, these differences include a greater role for structure in the latter, as already suggested. This is suggested by the larger "R² block" values for structural explanations for participation at meetings than those for structural explanations for contacting the Councilor. Contributions at community meetings are in this sense really more predetermined than is contacting the Councilor. Therefore the former is also less amenable to manipulation by civic education. Another difference in explanations for these two participatory acts is that among other things, participation at meetings in Tanzania is influenced by cognitive awareness, most importantly media exposure. Those with greater access to the media contribute more actively at meetings. Finally, while the

overall weight of institutional factors is similar between the two acts, in Tanzania participation at meetings, unlike contacts with the Councilor, is linked to the level at which a person participates at raising issues with others. This suggests that raising issues with others leads, or is at least connected, to other forms of participation in Tanzania, while in Zambia this is not the case. Therefore one institution promotes participation in one context, but not necessarily in others.

In Zambia, the most important predictors of participation at meetings—not surprisingly—are associational memberships and interpersonal trust. Therefore affiliation with local associations begets other forms of participation. In fact, while associations are a stronger predictor than *interpersonal* trust for this activity, they are not as powerful an explanation as trust in *politicians* for contacts with the Councilor. In this sense, associational activity drives community participation, but trust drives extra-community participation. This suggests that while institutions explain some forms of participation better, attitudes are better able to explain others.⁵⁴⁹ Therefore when promoting participation, civic education should seek to influence both associations and democratic attitudes—in particular by strengthening interpersonal trust.

Group Participation

Associational Memberships (Group Affiliations)

The latter half of H6 suggested that compared to individualized participation, civic education should have a smaller effect on group based participation. The first of the two forms of group participation analyzed in the study is associational memberships. It was measured by asking respondents whether they are or have been a member or a leader

in any community group (yes/no), and if so, in which groups.⁵⁵⁰ The answers were categorized based on typologies used by the Afrobarometer, but the typologies were modified and/or complemented according to patterns in the data. The “total participation in community groups” variable (created by multiplying each leadership position with 1.5 and adding their sum to a sum of memberships) was used as an aggregate measure of involvement in groups. The scores for this variable ranged from 0-4 in Tanzania and 0-7 in Zambia, initially confirming previous knowledge about Zambians’ higher level of participation in community groups.⁵⁵¹ Level of participation by country is displayed in Figures 7.13. and 7.14.

Number of Respondents




Figure 7.13. Total Group Affiliations: Tanzania

Note: The variable is calculated by summing up all memberships and leaderships, with the latter multiplied by 1.5.

Number of Respondents




Figure 7.14. Total Group Affiliations: Zambia

Note: The variable is calculated by summing up all memberships and leaderships, with the latter multiplied by 1.5.

The figures confirm, for example with reference to the mean, that participation in community groups is much more common in Zambia than in Tanzania. Whereas in Tanzania each respondent is on average a member in at most one group, in Zambia each respondent is on average a member in 1.5 groups (or a leader is one). Another indicator is the share of respondents in the zero (i.e., no memberships) category, which for Tanzania is the modal category but for Zambia it is not. That is, whereas about 18 percent of Zambians (N =25) are not a member in any group, in Tanzania this is true for more than half of respondents (51 percent, N = 71).⁵⁵²

Do men participate in groups more than women do? Figure 7.15. indicates that they do, with the difference between the sexes being more pronounced in Tanzania. There, the difference between men's mean participation in groups (0.986) and that of women (0.583) is significant.⁵⁵³ In Zambia the difference between the sexes (1.521 and 1.838, respectively) is not significant. The figure also demonstrates well how in this participatory act Tanzanians' and Zambian's patterns of participation differ—more than in any other act considered in the study.

Mean Group Affiliations




Figure 7.15. Group Affiliations by Sex

In turn, the four main types of groups with which respondents have affiliation are displayed in Figure 7.16. The figure also shows share of respondents affiliated with the dominant party—a variable proven to be important in explaining aggregate participation in Tanzania.




Figure 7.16.: Affiliation with Political Party, Community Government, Religious Group, or Another Community Group

Note: Share of respondents affiliated with a political party combines members (Tanzania, 7 percent; Zambia, 3 percent) and leaders (13 and 4 percent, respectively). In Tanzania, party leadership position most often refers to the *balози*, who are CCM members each of whom are in charge of a 10-household unit. In turn, affiliation with “community government” refers to position either in village or sub-village government (in Tanzania: *vitongoji*, and in Zambia: village sections).

The figure clearly shows the dichotomy between Tanzanian and Zambian group affiliations: whereas more Tanzanians are active in parties (especially the dominant one) and village governance, Zambians’ involvement in groups centers on the church and other community groups. This is compatible with not only the fact that Mtwara Region is a government stronghold, but, as posited by previous studies, that Zambians are taking advantage of the opportunity *not* to belong to any political party. Instead they participate

in church groups, including groups tending for the vulnerable in the community: orphans, the elderly, and the sick. One should note, however, that levels of party affiliation in both countries fall well below those reported in the Afrobarometer,⁵⁵⁴ though probably, this is simply because in this study respondents were not specifically asked about their affiliation with a political party—but only involvement in community groups. Therefore, people did not necessarily mention their affiliation with a political party. The same likely applies to the Tanzanian data on affiliation with religious groups. Whereas the Afrobarometer (2005) indicated that 61 percent of Tanzanians are either an active member or official leader in a church/mosque, this is not evident in this study's data.⁵⁵⁵ Also, in Tanzania the level of participation in other community groups (11 percent) falls below that reported in the Afrobarometer (19 percent), while in Zambia (25 percent) it exceeds that reported by the Afrobarometer (11 percent). On the one hand, the kind of difference in Tanzanian data is logical as overall participation is likely lower in Mtwara than in the nation as a whole (on which the Afrobarometer reports); but on the other, level of participation measured by this study's "another community group" should be relatively high as the category also includes groups for cultural expression and educational purposes.

Is group membership more common among those who have received civic education than those who haven't? The two variables are correlated in Figure 7.17. The figure shows that this form of participation is the only one in which the difference between those having been exposed and not exposed to civic education are larger in Zambia than in Tanzania. Also, the difference in means is significant only in Zambia.⁵⁵⁶ Does this mean that learning about one's rights from a formal source does promote

associational memberships in Zambia, but not in Tanzania? The question will be answered below following an overview of data on the second group based participatory act.




Figure 7.17. Group Affiliations by Self-Reported Exposure to Formal Rights Education

Raising Development Issues with Others

Raising development issues with others differs from all other acts of participation considered in the study in that Tanzanians have actually been more active in it than Zambians.⁵⁵⁷ This concurs with expectations: it is the most mobilized form of participation, a type prevalent in Tanzania. In fact, according to the Afrobarometer, Tanzanians are almost twice as active as Zambians in raising issues with others. Results in this study are in the same direction: Tanzanians have a higher mean (4.46) than Zambians (3.85).⁵⁵⁸ The way this translates to actual numbers is that Tanzanians have raised issues with others between two and three times, while Zambians have done so about twice. Either way, this is not a very high number--though it is reasonable when considering the large number of relatively young respondents in the sample. One should also note the way this participatory act is distributed among respondents: although there are many more Tanzanians (44 percent) than Zambians (29 percent) that have raised a development issue with others, there is also a larger share of Tanzanians (31 percent) than Zambians (24 percent) that have *never* done so. Raising development issues thus follows the pattern uncovered for participation as a whole, in which participation is more equally distributed among Zambian while in Tanzania there is a clearer division between those that participate and those that do not. This can be seen graphically in Figures 7.18. and 7.19. Following them Figure 7.20. shows that women's participation in the two countries is approximately equally low when compared to that of men.

Number of Respondents




Figure 7.18. Number of Times that Has Raised a Development Issue with Others: Tanzania

Number of Respondents




Figure 7.19. Number of Times that Has Raised a Development Issue with Others: Zambia

Mean Number of Times That Has Raised an Issue




Figure 7.20. Raising Issues with Others by Sex

How is civic education related to raising issues with others? While hypothesis 6 did not predict an effect on this activity, what do the data indicate? According to Figure 7.21., in Tanzania those that report having been exposed to formal civic education are more likely to join others in raising issues,⁵⁵⁹ while in Zambia this is not the case. In Tanzania, this means either that civic education promotes one's involvement in raising issues with others or then that those who are active in one forum (raising issues) are also active in another (participating in civic education).




Figure 7.21. Raising Issues with Others by Self-Reported Exposure to Formal Rights Education

Regression Results

Regression results on group based forms of participation, presented in Table 7.3., provide support for both H5 and H6. That is, as the table evidences, civic education has had a significant impact only on the participation of Tanzanian women (H5), which at the same time means that individualized acts of participation were affected to a greater extent as among them, effects also extended to Zambia (H6). But within both the individualized and group based acts, only one act was affected: in the former case, contacting the Councilor, and in the latter, memberships in community groups. Also, it may be surprising that civic education turned out to exert a significant boost in Tanzania and not Zambia: in Zambia a bivariate correlation had indicated a bigger difference in

Table 7.3. Explaining Group Participation: Memberships in Community Groups and Raising Issues with Others

	Group Affiliations						Raising Issues with Others			
	Tanzania		Tanzania (w)		Zambia		Tanzania		Zambia	
	Beta	R ² (block)	Beta	R ² (block)	Beta	R ² (block)	Beta	R ² (block)	Beta	R ² (block)
Social Structure		.291		.456		.319		.093		.310
Age	-		-		.070		.097		-	
Multiparty generation	-.070		-		-		-		-.038	
Position in community	.352**		.581**		.409**		-		.122	
Sex	-		-		-		-		.249*	
Number of children (biol.)	-		-		.140		-		-	
Number of children (care)	-		-		-		-		.194*	
Rural	-		-		-		-		-.130	
Cognitive Awareness		.010		.005		-		.061		-
Aggregate civic knowledge	.064		-		-		.014		-	
Knowledge of civil, human, pol. rights	-		.010		-		-		-	
Institutional Influences		.284		.278		.072		.154		.007
Total group affiliations	-		-		-		.046		.050	
Identifies with dominant party	.449**		.425**		-		-		-	
Position in community governance	-		-		-		-.032		-	
Active participation at meetings	.177		.128		.250*		.343*		-	
Raising issues with others	-.004		.055		-.009		-		-	
Contacting the Ward Councilor	-.014		.082		.075		-		.042	
Voted in last community election	.092		-		-		-		-	
Democratic Attitudes & Discussion		.013		.018		.044		.040		.032
Influence community	-		-		-		.133		-	
Lack of efficacy	-		-		-		-.129		-	
Trust local politicians	-		-		-		-		-.161*	
Lack of interpersonal trust	-		-		-		-		-.135	
Like discussing politics	.126		.114		.224*		-		-	
Civic Education		-		.035		.002		.017		.019
Overall rights education	-		.259*		-		.139		-	
School	-		-		-		-		-.056	
Government staff	-		-.278*		-.046		.015		.148	
Constant		-.224		-.111		-.385		1.418		3.647

Full Model	.599	.791	.437	.365	.368
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Notes:

* $p < .05$

** $p < .001$

(w) refers to women; otherwise data refer to the full sample. A dash means the variable was not in the model. Only included were variables with sufficient correlation with the dependent variable (i.e., usually $> .3$). Organization of the variables is adapted from Bratton et al. (2005).

associational affiliations between those exposed and those not exposed to civic education. On the other hand, though, the result is *not* surprising in that H5 has argued all along that civic education has its greatest effects among the disadvantaged—and the most disadvantaged group in this study are Tanzanian women.

1. Group Affiliations

The impact that civic education has on Tanzanian women's associational affiliations is important when one considers how structurally determined this form of participation is. One's position in the community is clearly the most important predictor, with a large coefficient (.581), significant at the $<.001$ level. Participation is also institutionally determined with dominant party affiliation being another strong predictor. These two variables indeed determine much of participation in Mtwara. In addition to these variables, only civic education explains group affiliations. However, while one CE variable (i.e., "overall") exerts expected kind of effect (i.e., positive), civic education received from government staff⁵⁶⁰ actually has a negative impact. Why does this kind of civic education make one less likely to join associations? It is not necessarily that it discourages associational activity but it seems that it does not encourage this either, probably instead promoting other avenues for participation. In the case of CJF, at least, these other avenues include community meetings in which solutions for the conditions of the community's most vulnerable children are sought. Also, that civic education does not necessarily promote group affiliations is consistent with H6 which expected lesser impact on group based activities anyway. Notably, the regression explaining Tanzanian women's affiliations in groups explains a larger share of participation (that is, 79 percent) than any

other regression presented in this study.⁵⁶¹ Therefore, these results are important—especially when one keeps in mind how others have found associational membership to play an important role in promoting other types of participation.

Beyond Tanzanian women, the other two regressions on group affiliations corroborate the importance of leadership position in explaining these affiliations. In Tanzania's case, the regression on the full sample also confirm the influence of identifying with the dominant party. And in the case of Zambia, the linkage established above between active participation at meetings and group affiliations is again displayed. This thus means that in Zambia, not only does membership in a community group make one likelier to raise his or her voice at community meetings, but the causal chain also works in the reverse, with active participation at meetings making a person likelier to join associations. There is thus a mutually reinforcing linkage between local associations and community meetings. Data recorded in Appendix E indicates that these are in fact the main means of local level participation in Zambia: there is a smaller percentage of respondents who are *not* involved in either of these forms of participation, than there are of those who have not participated in either of the other two acts—i.e., raising an issue with others or contacting the Councilor. Finally, when one considers the role that civic education could play in boosting associational memberships, the Zambian results indicate that the only cognitive factor with a significant (positive) impact on these memberships is whether one enjoys discussing politics. Therefore, civic education could boost participation (whether aggregate or associational) by promoting interest in politics (manifested in discussing politics). As Chapter 6 demonstrated by reference to data on Zambia, this is indeed an area in which civic education can make a positive contribution.

2. Raising Issues with Others

In contrast to Zambia, in Tanzania the most “resorted to” form of participation is raising issues with others—if one determines this based on the share of respondents saying they have never participated in a particular form of participation.⁵⁶² However, Table 7.3. shows that the variables in the regressions do not explain as large a share of variance in this participatory act in either country as they do in explaining group affiliations. In Tanzania, the only significant variable is active participation at meetings, which demonstrates the connection that community meetings have to other forms of participation. The importance of community meetings, as has been seen, also applies to Zambia. Thus, if local associations beget other forms of participation, so do participation at community meetings. This is only natural because often, issues discussed at community meetings, are then pursued further through other fora, including community groups. In the model explaining raising issues in Zambia, the most notable finding is the negative relationship that trust in politicians has also with this activity. Those that distrust politicians are more likely than others to raise development issues. Thus, distrust in politicians promotes not only the individual act of contacting the Councilor but also group activity. Beyond distrust, Zambians again participate more actively in raising issues with others if they take care of large families. Perhaps having a large number of children makes Zambians more conscious of and aggressive about the needs of children, and therefore join others to seek ways in which to provide for those needs. However, as Table 7.3. shows, being a man also makes one more likely to raise issues with others. In fact, it is more often the men with large families than women that join others to raise

issues.⁵⁶³ Women's participation in community affairs is still constrained more than that of men by the amount of household chores and other responsibilities.

Conclusion on Hypothesis 5

From this and the previous chapter one can quite clearly draw the conclusion that Tanzanian women have been the biggest beneficiaries of civic education in this study. With the exception of democratic attitudes (in which a CE variable was only significant in Zambia), CE variables always explained more of the awareness and participation of Tanzanian women than of any other group. This supports the hypothesis that civic education has the greatest positive impact on the most disadvantaged—such as those who are relatively unaware of their rights and excluded from participation. However, as demonstrated most importantly by findings of the level of active participation at community meetings—in which Tanzanian (or Zambian) women did not draw a significant benefit from civic education—civic education cannot always enable one to overcome the impediments to participation caused by, most importantly, structure and culture (tradition).⁵⁶⁴

A comparison with their sisters in Zambia accentuates the relative advantages that particularly Tanzanian women have received. While civic education has significantly boosted Tanzanian women's cognitive capabilities and/or participation in five areas analyzed in the study, among Zambian women it has done so once.⁵⁶⁵ Additionally, in this study's analyses, Tanzanian men never get a particular boost to their level of cognition and/or participation, while Zambian men get this boost thrice. That Zambian men have been positively affected does not invalidate Hypothesis 5 as Zambian women

have been in a better position to begin with, with many of their cognitive attributes and level of participation almost at par with that of men.⁵⁶⁶ Indeed, it has been in Tanzania where women have been at a more disadvantaged position. Therefore, them being the group which has received more benefits from civic education (that is, in more areas of cognition and participation) than anybody else substantiates the proposition that civic education benefits most the relatively disadvantaged.

Civic Education and Local Level Participation

This chapter has demonstrated that civic education does promote local level participation among the rural poor but that there are several qualifiers, including most importantly the act of participation in question and the group of individuals in question. This conclusion has been arrived at based on analyzing what determines participation on the one hand, and how civic education affects those determinants of participation on the other. In this section these two areas of investigation are briefly summarized—facilitating the understanding of what are the linkages through which civic education is likely to affect local level participation. These issues are returned to in more length in the final chapter.

To be sure, even though the sample only consisted of the rural poor, there was enough variation in the study's structural determinants of participation, including one's status in community, for the study to confirm the primacy of socioeconomic factors in explaining participation. In addition to status in community, the significant structural variables were sex, age, and number of children.⁵⁶⁷ Structural factors, it is obvious, are the least likely to be affected by civic education.

Beyond structure, did institutions or culture explain more of participation?

Because several types of participation were examined, it is difficult to conclude which was overall a more important explanation, although it seems that institutional affiliations—or the various types of participation—were more influential than attitudes. If so, this would mean that participation promotes participation more than attitudes do. Those active in one form of participation are likely to be active in others. This was the case particularly in Tanzania, where it seemed that the same group of respondents (leaders, CCM members) participates in various fora, while in Zambia participation as a whole seemed to be more equally distributed among citizens. In Tanzania's case, the most important institutional explanation was links with the dominant party, which significantly explained aggregate participation and group affiliations. In Zambia the crucial institution was local associations which made members significantly more likely both to contact the Councilor and participate actively at community meetings. Indeed in Zambia associations appear to be birth places for other forms of participation. Such findings are consistent with expectations about participatory patterns based on, for example, the Afrobarometer. The supremacy of institutions in explaining participation is not a surprise, but it should be stressed that attitudes too were found influential. The institutions-culture debate, as well as the role of awareness, will be returned to in the following chapter which will elaborate on how civic education fits into these explanations of participation.

Chapter 8

CONCLUSION

To understand the effects of civic education on citizen participation and empowerment, it is imperative to understand just how disempowered the poor in the developing countries are. This refers not only to the level of participation by the poor but also to their cognitive preparedness for participation. Therefore, this Conclusion will begin by a description of data acquired during field research on levels of cognition and participation; this helps justify why this kind of study and empowering of the poor are needed. It also demonstrates what kinds of challenges--lack in civic awareness and obstacles to participation--civic educators and other development agents are up against. This is followed by a heart of this chapter: a summary of findings on the effects of civic education on the cognitive and behavioral dispositions of the poor. It will show that half of the hypotheses on cognition were corroborated (with the non-corroboration of some attitudinal effects having to do at least partly with survey design), while hypotheses on participation were supported to a large extent. Civic education was found to exert a positive impact on participation, although this general finding is conditioned by the act of participation in question and the group of people in question. Indeed it was expected that civic education does not affect all participatory acts or all people the same way. The chapter compares findings to previous studies and outlines outstanding questions and challenges for future ones. Throughout the discussion, implications are suggested for those conducting civic education and development agents in general. Towards the end,

implications for democratic consolidation and some further suggestions for development actors are laid out. What can those in position to allocate development funds take home from this study? Should they continue to invest in civic education, or would these funds be better spent on some other activities aimed at consolidating democracy and/or producing well-being for the poor?

Level of (Dis)empowerment among the Poor

Social and political empowerment necessitates paying of attention to three distinct realms: awareness, self-esteem, and participation. Logically, they build on each other, though as the study found, participation is not necessarily mediated by knowledge or attitudes. Though this study has focused on what stimulates participation, one should bear in mind that awareness and a healthy self-image too are characteristics of an empowered person. In this study, awareness referred to that of rights, responsibilities, and government policies—while in addition to self-esteem (or efficacy), the *democratic* attitudes examined included interest in politics and trust in politicians. These elements together make up democratic empowerment. According to the literature (though not all scholars), they are areas in which civic education can have an effect. Also, some of these areas (that is, attitudes and participation, or differently put, culture and institutions) are the most important explanations of democratic participation. Participation is of course also affected by a person's socioeconomic standing, which, however, was not that relevant in this study analyzing participatory patterns *among* the rural poor.

Although this study spent less time describing just how disempowered the poor in the two target countries are (in part because their lack of empowerment is common

knowledge), a descriptive summary is included below so as to help the reader understand among what kind of a group—and in how challenging a context—civic education had the discovered effects. Expressive data from the field and statements of the poor themselves should help convey a sense of the poor’s cognitive (un)preparedness and level (of lack) of participation.

Awareness

First, the round of oral one-on-one interviews in five villages and one rural town in peripheral areas in Tanzania and Zambia confirmed that the level of knowledge and understanding of the poor of their rights and responsibilities is often very low. This can be established *despite the fact that the study did not utilize such a measure of knowledge which would enable one to judge answers either correct or incorrect*; indeed, rights and responsibilities—and even government policies—are by nature such that one cannot objectively determine their correctness. Almost anything can be expressed as some form of a right, responsibility, or government policy—even if it was not expressly stipulated as such in some written document. Importantly, the all-inclusiveness of correct answers means that the share of respondents who cannot identify a single knowledge item, or who can only identify one or two items, is indicative of a real deficit in citizen understanding. It is clear that a person who can identify no right, responsibility, and/or government policy in the open-ended questions used in the survey is seriously lacking in understanding of the society and polity in which (s)he lives.

Such respondents were alarmingly numerous especially in Tanzania. There, more than half (52 percent) of respondents (N = 140) could not name a single government

policy, despite the fact that the question used such a word for policy (*sera*) which according to local observers is very common in, for example, popular radio programs to which most people have access. The study accepted statements like “building a new clinic” as a government policy; thus it was not required that respondents reference the actual names of the policies. Mentioning a subject area was enough. In light of this, not being able to identify (any) policies is truly significant. Respondents who fell in this category made statements like, “I don’t know even one,” and, “I don’t understand.” These serve to demonstrate the perceived difficulty of these issues to some citizens, and possibly a sense of distance they feel from things related to the government.

Beyond government policies, another area of low awareness was citizens’ rights: one-third of Tanzanians could not identify a single right. Recorded comments include, “I don’t know because I am illiterate,” and “I don’t know because our leader hasn’t told us.” Yet another set of rights which was poorly known--in both countries--was women’s rights: in Zambia respondents were the *least* aware of these rights, when considering the share of respondents who could name no, or only one, right. Such a finding probably speaks to both genuine lack of knowledge and respondents’ judgment of the extent to which women’s rights are realized in practice. It would be logical (and the study’s expectation) that unawareness of one’s rights will hinder (effective) participation while knowing one’s rights would make a person more likely to do something to claim them. However, as regards (1) *level* of participation, the study did *not* find it to be positively and significantly affected by awareness (as will be elaborated below). Yet it is clear that low civic awareness cannot be helpful either, such as for the (2) *effectiveness*, or consequences, of participation (not examined in the study).

Responsibilities were poorly known, too. This clearly has implications for democratic empowerment: citizens cannot play their role in society fully unless they know what role they are supposed to play. In Tanzania almost half of the respondents (45 percent) could identify no or only one citizens' responsibility. In Zambia awareness was higher, although still a quarter of respondents were similarly unaware of their obligations. The rural poor were most aware of the obligation to work: in Tanzania 54 percent and in Zambia 40 percent mentioned this obligation in one form or another. It is logical that working was the most frequently cited obligation: most people have to work in order to survive. In many village contexts residents have the experience that most of the time, development—such as building a school or a clinic—requires their input: infrastructure usually does not simply appear as a gift from the government.

In Tanzania no other obligation was mentioned by nearly as many respondents but in Zambia there was one as frequently cited obligation: 41 percent said helping other people was their duty. This is a significant piece of information for civic educators to keep in mind: if so many people consider it their duty to help others, then raising awareness of rights and obligations—and other areas of civic knowledge—should not be difficult as citizens would likely be willing to teach, and be taught by, each other. This should make reaching the masses with civic education messages easier than in contexts where people are not that used to advising or receiving advice from each other. Willingness to assist others would seem supportive of democracy, too, helping to build such a civil society in which people pull together. In contrast, in both countries few people referenced standard democratic obligations in the question about citizens' rights. These include voting (7 percent of Tanzanians, 6 percent of Zambians), participation at

community meetings or in other ways (4 percent in both countries), expressing one's opinion or advising leaders/government (4 percent of Tanzanians, 10 percent of Zambians), reporting problems to authorities (no Tanzanian, 6 percent of Zambians), and paying taxes (only 2 respondents, both in Tanzania). Because many of these have to do with self-expression--a building block of democracy—the relatively low awareness of these obligations suggest that citizen understanding of their responsibilities in these countries with roughly 15 years of experience with formal democracy is not yet consolidated.

On the other hand, although expressing oneself was not recognized as a citizen responsibility, Zambians identified it as a right about which they have learnt through civic education. In answering the question on the utility of exposure to rights education, the largest share (that is, 23 percent of 140 respondents in Zambia) mentioned that they learned about freedom of expression, choice, and/or redress. This suggests that where cognitive awareness of rights and responsibilities is relatively low, civic education *can* boost awareness of them.

In addition to citizens' responsibilities, the other types of responsibilities of which citizens in democracies should be aware are those of the government. Citizens should know both their own and the government's role. What do the rural poor expect the government to do for them? Though it is not necessarily possible to judge whether the answers that were given are in conformity with democracy—because it is difficult to sometimes determine whether a respondent rightly reflects knowledge of government's responsibilities or rather his or her dependency on government—it is instructive to outline some rural residents' expectations. Among these, the government's obligation to

provide for people materially--whether in the form of food aid, agricultural inputs, infrastructure, or other things—is understandably the most often cited duty.⁵⁶⁸ But a few respondents also mentioned some “democratic” obligations—such as to involve people in development (planning; 5 percent of Tanzanians, 3 percent of Zambians) and ensure people’s rights (4 percent in both countries); they also expressed the standard expectation that government ensures law, order, peace, and/or harmony (mentioned by 28 percent of Tanzanians and 33 percent of Zambians).

Attitudes

Compared to their awareness—particularly of policies and rights--the rural poor are not as unequivocally disempowered when it comes to their attitudes. That is, in some cases they have attitudes favorable to democratic participation—for example, the high level of interest in politics in Tanzania--while in others it is not easy to assess whether a certain attitude has a negative or positive effect on democratic participation. An example is trust. As stated in the literature, there can be a healthy level of distrust—or skepticism—enabling a person to critically evaluate leaders and/or participate in society. According to data, distrust in politicians is quite prevalent in the Zambian sample—which has served to fuel contacts with the local Ward Councilor. Interpersonal trust also appeared quite low, having had the effect of reducing participation in community.⁵⁶⁹ In the extremes, however, very high distrust in politicians probably makes citizens more passive, stifling participation, while excessive trust (prevalent in the Tanzanian sample) may have this same effect.

In turn, self-esteem (or efficacy)--an important attitude not only for participation but for wholesome empowerment in general—did not characterize a large segment of the sample. Such a conclusion is not based on survey data, but on observations made during interviews as well as comments recorded. For example, in both countries, typical explanations for why a person had never joined others to raise a development issue included, “I don’t have experience,” “I don’t have the ability to formulate the issue (which can be forwarded for discussion),” and “I am shy.” And reasons that a person was not satisfied with his or her level of influence in community decision-making were similar: “I don’t have confidence to speak in front of people,” “Others cannot listen and consider my suggestions,” and “I don’t have the ability to argue.” Such comments were especially prevalent among women, but also those in the youngest and oldest age groups. Lack of efficacy was also evident in the comments that some respondents made at the end of the interview when they were asked if there was anything else they wanted to say. Comments included, “Because I am illiterate, I failed to answer some of the questions,” and “I am ready to receive instructions from my government because I didn’t attend school.”⁵⁷⁰ The content and tone of voice in these statements implies lack of self-confidence. Civic education programs would do well to address the areas mentioned in these comments—for example, literacy skills and public speaking. Of course, ability to speak in public is not only dependent on one’s skills but also the structural conditions in which a person finds him or herself—that is, whether the community and the larger context encourages or discourages such participation.

Yet another attitudinal characteristic, related to the above one, but conducive to democratic empowerment, is that most respondents in both countries were very open and

receptive to civic education. The study recorded dozens of statements by the respondents about how the government or NGOs should make sure to teach people about their civic and human rights. Even so, one academic's comment that "to a poor person, everything is a priority"⁵⁷¹ needs to be borne in mind. Nevertheless, the desire among respondents to receive further information and training about their rights and responsibilities was common. The expressed rationale included ability to defend oneself and not to be oppressed. For example, many women expressed--as both a utility of the civic education they have received and a reason for desiring more of it--that civic education helps them fend for themselves if, for example, their husbands mistreat them. One person in Tanzania said that civic education has helped her "realize that if my husband commits adultery, I can divorce him and take him and his new wife to court." Also, another Tanzanian is representative of many when (s)he said that receiving civic education means (s)he knows "who to ask for anything and what to do if I'm not assisted." In Zambia, comments were very similar. One person said, "The government and NGOs should empower us with more human rights so that we would [know] where to go as it is in this case of property grabbing." Another woman said that "the government/NGOs [should] teach married women, divorced and widowed about their human rights because these are the people who are most oppressed." Therefore, respondents in the study seemed to value and desire civic education, with their comments suggesting that women in particular would benefit by being empowered with information.

Participation

Finally, in terms of participation, the study found the rural poor to be generally disempowered. This is with the exception of electoral participation: voting turnout among respondents was as high or higher in both community and national elections as it is in most developed countries. But in all other areas of participation, the level of participation by the rural poor in local public affairs is low. This was especially so in the Tanzanian sample where a large share of respondents had never participated in various acts. For example, 65 percent had never contacted the Ward Councilor in matters pertaining to development and 51 percent was not (nor had ever been) affiliated with any community group. Thus a majority was completely detached from their local elected representative and excluded from local groups which the study found to be spring boards for further participation, especially in Zambia. Participation was low also in the other areas, with 31 percent of Tanzanians having never joined others to raise a development issue, and 42 percent participating passively at community meetings (that is, merely listening to what other people say).

In Zambia participation was generally speaking higher, though in three of the four above areas there was still quite a large share of respondents who do not participate. This is especially so with regard to contacts with the Ward Councilor. The share of those who had never participated in the above forms of participation (or participate passively in the last one of them), are: 64 percent, 18 percent, 24 percent, and 9 percent, respectively. Therefore, while Zambians are clearly more active in community groups (many of which center on the church) and in community meetings, they are equally detached from their elected representative and almost as passive when it comes to raising development issues

with others. This suggests that the area in which the rural poor are most disempowered is in communication with their representatives—in other words interaction between state and society. This is despite the fact that Ward Councilors (usually) reside in the same geographic area. But the above also demonstrates that many rural residents are disengaged from decision-making in their communities; therefore, civic education faces the challenge of how to promote both intra- and extra-community participation.

Findings and Their Comparison to Previous Studies

In light of this evidence of the poor's cognitive and behavioral (dis)empowerment, was civic education found to promote participation and dispositions conducive to democracy? Table 8.1. provides a summary of the results for each hypothesis tested in the study. Following the table, these results are explained, first briefly those concerning the immediate effects on cognition and then in more detail those on the effects on participation. The latter is framed in terms of the institutions-versus-culture debate: does participation (that is, institutional influences) promote further participation more than attitudes (that is, culture) do? How is civic education linked to these two most important sets of explanations for participation?

Table 8.1. Results of Testing of Hypotheses

Corroborated in at least one country:

H1: Civic education promotes knowledge of civil, human, and political rights, but it does not promote knowledge of socioeconomic rights.

H4: Civic education increases interest in politics.

H5: Civic education has the greatest positive effect on the cognition and behavior of the relatively disadvantaged.

Partly corroborated:

H6: Civic education boosts the individualized forms of participation more than it boosts mobilized or group acts.

Not corroborated:

H2: Civic education increases efficacy.

H3: Civic education decreases trust in politicians.

Immediate Effects on Cognition

Findings clearly indicated that civic education has a positive effect on knowledge—an effect on which scholars normally do not disagree. More specifically, as posited in *Hypothesis 1*, civic education was found to increase knowledge of “first generation” rights, that is, civil, human, and political rights (which the study also anticipated to be positively linked to participation). In contrast, the study did not expect civic education to affect knowledge of socioeconomic rights—an expectation which was corroborated. Socioeconomic rights were never significantly impacted by a CE variable.

Beyond awareness, the study hypothesized CE’s effects on democratic attitudes. Of these, *Hypothesis 4* was confirmed in that civic education was found to boost political

interest especially among Zambian men. It was noted that in Zambia in particular political interest has been lacking, at least when compared to Tanzania. A positive impact on political interest is significant as it is a major determinant of participation. Meanwhile, the survey design (that is, wording and/or another limitation in certain questions) did not produce adequate data to allow for a proper testing of effects on efficacy and trust in politicians (*Hypotheses 2 and 3*, respectively). Therefore, a CE variable was not significant in explaining respondents' level of efficacy and trust. The inconclusiveness of testing these two hypotheses means that it was not possible to determine whether CE's effects are greater on culture (attitudes) or institutions—although the institutions-culture debate can and will still be analyzed in terms of which has a greater bearing on participation.

In contrast, *Hypothesis 5* was corroborated—in that civic education was found to have its greatest positive effects on the relatively disadvantaged, in this case women. This applies to both cognition and participation, and represents a key finding of the study. While in this study the disadvantaged were women, in other contexts they could be another group—the relatively uneducated, for example. Indeed, here the greatest benefit accrued to Tanzanian women, the most disadvantaged group in the study. Exposure to information about rights made them significantly more likely to contact their Ward Councilor and join community groups. Therefore civic education has the potential of leveling disparities between men and women, who in developing countries often suffer from great injustices. That women are more receptive to civic education—a conclusion concurred with by many civic educators—probably derives from their exclusion: when an opportunity arises to participate in civic education, they are more motivated to

participate, and learn more from it. Additionally, they are more active in putting the lessons they have learnt into practice within their community (that is, by joining voluntary groups) and outside of it (contacting their local representative). Results therefore strongly suggest that civic education *can* be used to empower the poor, particularly the disadvantaged among them.

In this sense, findings are a cause of greater optimism for those seeking to use civic education to correct for social disparities than findings of many other studies have been. They are in line with studies which have found that “non-elites can benefit more from such programs” (Blair 2003, 53). And as shown below, civic education was found to have significant effects on participation, and this was among such previously neglected group—the rural poor—whose participation is often considered the most difficult to promote (due to poverty). Indeed, this study was a test case of effects of civic education among the rural poor, many of whom are illiterate farmers. Whether civic education can empower them to participate locally is an important question due to the limited extant understanding of the effects of civic education on democratic socialization in such contexts. Also, it is imperative to understand what stimulates participation among this group in general—which represents a large share of the population in the developing world.

Effects on Participation: The Institutions-Culture Debate and Role of Awareness

Considering how small a factor CE is, that civic education was found to exert *direct* influence on participation in several instances is striking. This refers to (1) aggregate participation of Tanzanian women, (2) contacting the Councilor (by

Tanzanians as a whole, Tanzanian women, and Zambian men), and (3) group affiliations by Tanzanian women. This means that *Hypothesis 6* was partly corroborated: while one form of individualized participation--contacting the Councilor—was boosted by civic education, the other--active participation at community meetings--was not. Conversely, one form of group participation—involvement in associations and other groups—was significantly increased by exposure to CE. This means that civic education is capable of influencing both individualized and group participation. Interestingly, the particular forms of participation being most promoted by civic education are the same ones in which Tanzanians' (and in part Zambians') participation is the lowest. Therefore civic education seems to have boosted just those areas of participation in which the rural poor participate the least.

From the above summary and the regression analyses conducted, it appears that of all the participatory acts examined, civic education has its biggest direct effect on promoting linkages between citizens and their local representatives (the Ward Councilor). Promoting communication between citizens and their elected representatives especially in transitional countries plagued with corruption can have positive consequences both for the quality of the supply of democracy and the masses' further inclusion. This would seem especially important in such distant rural outposts as Mtwara Region in Tanzania and Luapula Province in Zambia, in which citizens are largely cut off from (national) politics, and where citizens were found to be disconnected from their local elected representative. Development planners should take advantage of this piece of information and utilize it especially in places where citizens have a limited or problematic relationship with their representatives. Obstacles to overcome when promoting contacts

with elected representatives include difficulty of access (cited by 20 percent of Tanzanians, and 27 percent of Zambians, as reason for not contacting the Councilor), dissatisfaction with the Councilor's performance/character (12 percent of Zambians), respondent's lack of efficacy (8 percent of Zambians), and not knowing how to locate the Councilor (6 percent of Zambians).⁵⁷² The Councilor's performance/character/attitude was also cited by 19 percent of Zambians as the reason that the respondent was not satisfied with the discussion(s) (s)he had had with the Councilor. Improved communication between citizens and representatives would therefore require actions on both sides: for example, informing citizens of how to contact the Councilor and continuing to sensitize Councilors of their responsibility to perform their duties and be available to citizens.

Beyond the specific effects of civic education, the study found institutional affiliations to be significant explanations for participation. In Tanzania's case participation was boosted particularly by identification with the dominant party, which significantly explained aggregate participation and group affiliations. In Zambia the crucial institution was local associations which made members significantly more likely both to contact the Councilor and participate actively at community meetings. Such findings are in line with previous studies about the importance of political parties and associations for other forms of participation. How can civic education programs take advantage of this information? In the case of political party affiliation, civic education is less likely to exert an impact—and it is not even the task of civic education to promote memberships in particular parties. But as was seen above in the case of Tanzanian women, civic education *does* seem able to boost associational activity. It is a strong

support for H5 that civic education promotes this important form of participation specifically among the most disadvantaged group in the study, Tanzanian women. Boosting associational memberships is therefore concluded to be the most fruitful avenue for civic education to influence participation--in addition to promoting political interest, a cultural factor discussed next.

It is an established finding in the literature that political interest is a strong predictor of participation. For this reason institutions and culture will continue to compete as explanations for participation. Chapter 6 found civic education to boost political interest (in Zambia), while Chapter 7 uncovered a linkage between political *discussion* and participation. While discussing politics is a proxy for political interest, the reason that political interest itself did not appear a significant explanation for participation has two obvious reasons. First, in Tanzania, most people are interested in politics, so the limited variance in political interest is unable to explain variance in participation. Second, in Zambia, variance is similarly limited (though not quite as much)--though not because of people's interest but their disinterest in politics. This stems from the image of politics as a dirty and dishonest enterprise. For this reason, the fact that civic education appeared able to positively influence political interest in Zambia is good news for those wanting to strengthen political participation in that country. But of course, for civic education to maximize its potential in enhancing interest in politics in places in which politics is tarnished by corruption, actions on the "supply side" are also required—most importantly by politicians who are guilty of engaging in corrupt practices. Therefore, it should be emphasized, civic education alone is unlikely to change people's attitudes or patterns of participation.

Of the other attitudinal (i.e., cultural) explanations of participation, both efficacy and trust were found to exert significant influence on aggregate participation, and in expected direction. Regarding the former, efficacy boosted participation, while lack thereof suppressed it--both in Tanzania. With regard to trust, lack of *interpersonal* trust reduced participation (in Zambia). Beyond the aggregate measures, trust was also a significant explanation for several forms of participation in Zambia, with distrust in *politicians* fueling participation. Therefore, the neutral relationship suggested by Table 3.1. for trust in politicians and most forms of participation could at least in some cases be changed into a negative relationship. Also, this table could be complemented to include a reference to an expected relationship between participation and interpersonal trust, which should read, "positive."

The study's findings on trust and efficacy do not concur with those of some previous studies. Important among these is Bratton's study, interestingly also conducted in Zambia, in which, "trust in government was *positively* related to contacting political leaders" (1999, 566, emphasis added). As suggested above, in the present study trust in politicians was negatively related to contacting the Ward Councilor. Also, Bratton found efficacy *not* to affect participation, while here, efficacy had a positive effect on participation in Tanzania. To be sure, many past studies have identified a link between efficacy and participation. That findings are this inconclusive (especially when conducted in a single country) mean that future studies should continue to analyze the role of attitudes in stimulating participation among the poor.

Finally, beyond its direct (i.e., institutional) and attitudinal-cultural linkages with participation, does civic education promote participation by enhancing civic knowledge,

the area in which its effects are arguably⁵⁷³ the greatest? Though not an actual hypothesis, the study expected that the knowledge of “first generation” rights boosts participation more than the knowledge of socioeconomic rights. However, though it may still be true, such an impact was not detectable in the regressions explaining participation—nor was civic awareness in general a significant explanation of participation. In fact, it is not necessarily logical to expect civic awareness to have a detectable impact, as knowledge is not one of the main determinants of participation. And any impact it does have is overshadowed in multiple regression analyses by structural, institutional, and attitudinal variables—as well as the civic education variables themselves.

Nevertheless, this study’s findings are in contrast to those of the Afrobarometer, according to which cognitive awareness is the second most important explanation for participation (following institutional influences; Bratton et al. 2005; Mattes and Bratton 2003). In coming to this conclusion, analysts of the Afrobarometer compared almost the same set of explanations as the present study⁵⁷⁴--that is, structure, culture, civic awareness, institutional influences, and performance evaluations--although the specific variables within these groups of explanations varied somewhat. Different findings in the Afrobarometer and the present study are probably due in part to the sample: it could be that while cognitive awareness promotes participation in urban areas or among the better off (areas and groups covered by the Afrobarometer), it does not do so among the rural poor. Perhaps knowledge is a commodity with greater applicability in urban settings? However, one also needs to keep in mind the different definitions of civic knowledge used: whereas the Afrobarometer (Bratton et al. 2005) found *knowledge of leaders* and *awareness of SAP* to explain protesting and “communing and contacting,” respectively,

in the present study civic knowledge was defined as the knowledge of (1) government policies; (2) citizens', (3) women's, and (4) children's rights; and (5) citizens' and (6) government's responsibilities. It is possible that the difference in findings compared to the Afrobarometer stems from the fact that in the present study almost all answers to the civic knowledge questions were deemed correct. This may have broadened the operationalization of civic knowledge excessively, blurring the distinction between objective knowledge and a more subjective expression of various items in the language of rights. If so, then this may also explain the absence of an observed linkage between the knowledge of "first generation" rights and participation.

Generalization of Findings

To what universe of cases do the findings apply? The first question that must be answered is: can they be applied to the rest of Tanzania and Zambia, especially as the particular research sites were relatively isolated, and had a peculiar relationship to the governing party (having a population either overly supportive or very critical of it)? In one sense, Tanzania's results are better generalizable than those of Zambia, because the study's regressions almost always explained a greater share of variance in participation in the former than in the latter.⁵⁷⁵ With regard to CE's cognitive impact, Tanzanian data *always* explained a greater share of variance. Although this refers to variance in the dependent variable within the samples, it can also be argued to represent a better basis for generalization beyond them. In Zambia's case, results are generalizable to other parts of the country at least in the sense that everywhere in Zambia voluntary associations play a

central role in local level participation; thus the influences on, and those caused by, these associations are relevant all over this country.

Second, can findings be applied to cases beyond Tanzania and Zambia? It is argued that they can: one or both of the two types of contexts examined in the study can probably be found in every “hybrid” country. Every country falling into the hybrid category likely has population groups which compare to those in Mtwara and Luapula—being either rather passive and supportive of the government, or critical of the sitting government, respectively. In this sense the findings could be applicable in other hybrid countries, and beyond. In particular, the corroborated H1 about the greater effect on the knowledge of “first generation” rights than on knowledge of socioeconomic rights⁵⁷⁶ is applicable in and relevant for transitional countries without comprehensive and good quality education systems. In these countries most citizens do not learn about their political rights at school, nor are political rights necessarily such that people are likely to learn them, in contrast to socioeconomic rights, as part of their daily routines. Therefore it would appear that “first generation” rights would be more likely to be learnt through specific programs or even civic education provided through mass media. Transitional countries will also likely have groups of people who have a low sense of efficacy, and who would therefore *need* a boost to it. Therefore any findings on efficacy would be relevant to such contexts. Note, however, that as stated above, the hypothesis on efficacy (H2) was *not* corroborated, nor that on trust (H3)—likely due to a large extent to survey design (which did not facilitate a measurement of these attitudes adequately in the full sample). In turn, the corroborated hypothesis on a positive effect on political interest (H4) can apply to many contexts: if CE is able to increase interest in politics in deeply

corrupted societies, it is likely able to do so also in contexts in which corruption is less of a problem, with the challenge being rather how to convince (lethargic) citizens that politics is relevant to their lives.

Furthermore, the established positive impact of civic education on the relatively disadvantaged (H5)—here, women—is something of which civic educators could take advantage in all systems suffering from social inequality. Finally, that civic education was found to boost certain types of participation (H6) can arguably be applied to all contexts, although the specific types of participatory acts that need a boost vary by context. Everywhere, there is probably a need to improve communication between citizens and their local representatives. Generally, civic education is likely to promote such participatory acts the most which are the least structurally determined.

Suggestions for the Study of Civic Education

In this study it was argued that rather than examining specific (donor-funded) programs and effects on participants in those programs, it is more instructive to examine the impact of civic education from a regional point of view—taking into account all civic education sources in a particular area. This ties in with the argued superiority of a subjective definition of exposure to civic education. In this approach the researcher is not the one to decide who has been exposed to civic education and who has not; rather, each respondent determines his or her level of exposure. Obviously, this presents some problems for methodology and operationalization of the treatment and control groups—but it also, unlike a focus on certain programs, enables one to study CE's effects on the majority of the population who have not necessarily participated in any specific civic

education program. Such an approach also facilitates an understanding of whether community leaders—who most often are the ones trained—managed to train others like they were supposed to. Did other community members learn about their rights and responsibilities this way? Bratton et al. (1999) are right about the importance of first training the opinion leaders; many Zambian respondents' in this study⁵⁷⁷ concurred that the best way to inform people about their rights is through community leaders. This is elaborated below.

It is argued that studies have focused too much on the impact on the actual participants of civic education programs, as these represent the elites (leaders) in their respective circles. To be sure, this study has not presented a perfect research design to investigate an indirect impact of civic education (whereby civic education reaches the masses through community leaders) though it has taken the preliminary step by broadening (and diluting) the operationalization of who is a “civic education recipient.” The reality in developing countries is that it is impossible to train everyone, and therefore civic education will likely continue to be targeted at community leaders. But at the same time, it is irrelevant to only test whether civic education promotes participation among them, as community leaders already participate the most, as was seen in the study. Therefore, to capture the true consequences of civic education, as it is given in rural areas, the above kind of a subjective approach is necessary.

Implications for Democratic Consolidation

The study relates to democratic consolidation because it examined explanations for individuals' participation at the local level—a starting point for broader democratic

participation. Also, civic culture—important for democracy (Putnam 1993)—is first created at the local level. As indicated, the study found civic education to have a direct impact on citizens' involvement in voluntary associations and their contacting the Councilor. Local voluntary associations form the bedrock of civil society, the task of which is to hold governments accountable. And communicating with the local representative has the same purpose: to hold representatives accountable, and thereby ensure the supply of democracy with its freedoms and equality. Via this link civic education contributes to democracy. Increasing citizen contact with local representatives is especially needed in Africa where narrow patronage networks have meant that generally only a few select people contact their representatives (Bratton et al. 2005).

Theoretically, knowing how citizens link with their community and local governance is important because, as Schmidt has said, absence of the local level's role is an important "missing link" in theories of transition (1997, 37). Therefore, not only is local level participation necessary for consolidation but it can also affect transitions. Understanding the local level's link to democratization and consolidation essentially means understanding why people do (not) participate. According to Dalton, this involves analysis of people's "political abilities":

Debates about the political abilities of the public remain one of the main controversies in political behavior research. This controversy involves normative assumptions about what level of sophistication is required for democracies to fulfill their political ideals, as well as evaluating empirical evidence (2002, 13).

This relates to the question of what level of knowledge and understanding is required for participation. According to Dalton: "For voters to make meaningful decisions, they must understand the options on which they are deciding. Citizens also need sufficient

knowledge of the workings of the political system if they intend to influence and control the actions of their representatives” (ibid, 13).

It would seem logical that to fully participate in democracy, such an understanding and sophistication is required. But while knowledge of the workings of the political system is vital for one’s effectiveness of participating in national politics and calling on the central government, it is not necessary for participation at community meetings, contacting (or requiring responsiveness from) the Ward Councilor, or raising issues locally with other community members. Rather, it is argued that the process of including the poor in public decision-making in developing countries *begins* with ensuring that citizens know their basic rights and responsibilities—which is necessary for their understanding that they have the right to participate in the first place. Then, as citizens become more regular participants in democracy over time (thus obtaining the relevant sophistication through participation), and as civic education becomes an effective part of formal education systems in which all citizens can participate, citizens can be expected to participate more effectively. Throughout the learning process, the important thing—as expressed by a good governance advisor in Lusaka—is that citizens are taught not what democracy is (facts) but what it can do for them (process, entitlement).

Therefore, while the present study only evaluated explanations for *level* of participation, future studies should assess what role civic education and other factors play in explaining the *effectiveness* of participation. Indeed a distinction should be made between the quantity and “quality” (or consequences) of participation.

Implications for Donors

Inasmuch as civic education is donor funded, this study's finding about the relatively larger positive effects on the disadvantaged among the rural poor is good news for those donors who have invested in civic education as part of rural participatory development programs. Therefore, while donors have been often accused of supporting the elites—with their programs benefiting, for example, “briefcase NGOs” or playing to the hands of autocrats, there are actions that donors can take to counter such an image and undesired effects. As Blair—who also found civic education to benefit the non-elites—has described various development interventions:

Many development strategies tend to reinforce the hand of already dominant elites. Decentralization, for instance, has had a long track record of benefiting locally dominant elements at the expense of the average citizen, a legacy that democratization support initiatives often must take extra efforts to avoid repeating. Strengthening the rule of law can provide more benefits to elites with greater access to legal remedies than to more ordinary people lacking such connections. It would not be surprising, then, if civic education tended to have similar effects. That at least in some circumstances it does not is worth remarking (2003, 65).

That civic education is found to have positive effects on cognition and participation among the rural poor suggests that it thereby has potential to equalize social disparities, not only between men and women but also between rural and urban dwellers: “rural dwellers are disadvantaged in all areas of cognition” (Bratton et al. 2005, 298).

However, with international aid moving away from donor-led projects toward government-led and centrally administered support systems, donors will have fewer opportunities at their disposal in the future to support civic education through such direct area-based programs like the RIPS program in Southeast Tanzania. But as one official

stressed that “governments listen to the donors, not their people,” donors may be able to use their leverage to push for funds to be used for civic education. In addition, they can continue to support NGOs engaged in civic education. Through this donors could learn from some of the suggestions made by Zambian respondents when asked about how best to inform people about their rights. The overwhelming majority—three-fourths—think that the best arena is the village, with the specific sources and/or methods of information including village leadership (28 percent), “sincere/educated villagers/individuals” (22 percent), village workshop or seminar (21 percent), and community groups (6 percent). This reiterates that Zambians are willing to learn both from the community leaders and each other, and so a donor strategy to continue to train community leaders would be justified. This recommendation is based not only on these data but also in-depth interviews conducted among people other than the survey respondents.⁵⁷⁸ Donors should therefore continue to target community leaders in civic education programs; this is also because the study found that community leaders are the most sought-after individuals in community related problems. In both countries, the village (or community) chairperson is the first point of contact for most people in problems relating to community; this applies to as many as 59 percent of Tanzanian, and 71 percent of Zambian, respondents. Thus traditional leaders--though continuing to play a role in village governance in Zambia—are not as sought-after contact persons as elected village leadership are. In Tanzania donors should also train the sub-village leaders who also command respect and are trusted by residents as first line of contact in community related problems: 22 percent of Tanzanians cited the sub-village leaders as their first such point of contact. Therefore, it would appear a good strategy for donors to continue to work through village leadership,

but also create follow-up and incentive mechanisms to ensure that civic education messages are relayed from leadership on to the general rural population. Also, with some respondents suggesting that village leadership is not always reliable (but rather corrupt), development agents should not rely solely on training the leadership when aiming to empower the rural population as a whole.

Another useful channel would appear to be the radio, the most relied upon mass medium in rural contexts. Of respondents in Zambia, 19 percent said the radio would be the best channel for informing people of their rights. In fact, many of those who said they had not been taught their rights by anyone (or had not attended any particular CE program) explained that the reason they knew about their rights was because of certain radio programs. These programs had educated them on, for example, local government structure, citizenship, and the importance of obtaining a birth certificate. Further, radio is overwhelmingly the most important source of national news in both countries, with 81 percent mentioning it in Tanzania and 87 relying upon it in Zambia. No other medium comes close to the radio as source of national news. Development agents should bear this in mind, and help ensure access to radio (both to the airwaves and hardware). In fact, most of those who said they do not listen to national news on the radio, or who listen only rarely, said this is because they do not own a radio or cannot afford to buy batteries.

Another medium which civic educators could utilize are magazines and other printed outlets—though this is not likely to reach as large a share of the rural poor due to two main reasons. Although 20 percent of Tanzanians and 26 percent of Zambians said they read national news in the newspapers and magazines, it may be difficult to expand this share if the cost of newspapers and illiteracy levels remain high. Thirty-five percent

of Zambian respondents cited high cost as the number one reason for not reading newspapers, with 28 percent referring to inability to read (in English). Therefore, literacy programs should be coupled with printing of literature in the vernaculars.

In contrast to those recommending village leadership and/or the radio as channels of civic education, fewer respondents suggested other means of civic education. For example, possibly because of low access to formal education, only 12 percent of Zambians thought the school would be the best place to learn about rights. NGOs were specifically mentioned by 13 percent, and the church was mentioned by 11 percent. But interestingly, Zambians do not mind learning about their rights from a government originated source, with 17 percent saying that “the government should send someone to teach us/organize workshops,” 4 percent mentioning the Councilor, and 2 percent mentioning the Member of Parliament. However, rather than these respondents particularly preferring a government/political source, these statements may be indicative of a sense of dependence on the government, prevalent in rural areas.⁵⁷⁹

Beyond these sources, several interviewees mentioned drama, sketches, and/or dance as an effective means to bring home the teaching--methods already in use quite a bit at village meetings and other public gatherings. Finally, a civics teacher recommended that school or youth groups be used in teaching the communities: the youth are enthusiastic and therefore likely effective. Therefore, there are several venues and means by which civic education could be brought to rural communities, and civic literacy boosted among the poor. Donors could select the most appropriate one(s) for them and each context, provided that the cooperating partner(s) on the ground agree. It should be noted, however, that although the study makes these recommendations on the means of

delivering civic education messages, it did not empirically test the effectiveness of different methods in teaching civics. These issues have been studied by others, having (unsurprisingly) found that hands-on learning and likeable instructors provide the best settings for learning (Finkel and Ernst 2005).

In sum, because civic education was found to enhance both the cognitive capabilities and democratic participation of the rural poor—in two quite different contexts--the study feels quite confident in recommending that development actors continue to fund civic education. Positive effects, as indicated, were particularly clear in raising awareness; because cognitive empowerment in and of itself is worth investing in, civic education should already on this basis be continue to be funded. Indeed, empowerment does not only constitute a certain (high) level of participation but also such awareness, self-esteem, and other attitudinal dispositions that enable a person to make informed decisions and have a sense of satisfaction about his or her role as a citizen and member of his or her community. Yet additionally, beyond a certain level of participation, empowerment implies at least some desired consequences from participation—a possible topic for future studies. Also, if assessable, future studies should compare whether investments in civic education yield a better return than some other activities of democracy promotion—that is, for example, whether supporting “what individuals do” (Geddes 2003) is a more effective means to democratic consolidation than are activities aimed at influencing what institutions do and what they are like.

Implications for Domestic Actors in Developing Countries

Lastly, the options that were suggested above for donors are of course open for the state and NGOs to use when conducting civic education--although these actors' respective challenges in providing civic education lay in lack of motivation and lack of resources. The issue of power is central to state reluctance to provide civic education, as civic education is ultimately a question of power. As Pye has noted, "Since the play of politics almost invariably favors some people and hurts others, it therefore easily stimulates suspicion and distrust" (1997, 246). Nevertheless, the most important task for the state is not the provision of civic education, but rather the removal of barriers to citizen participation—for example, those preventing citizens from claiming their rights. As the Zambia Civic Education Association Executive Director suggested, Zambians in general do know their rights, but the problem is that cognition is not translated into action. The same was suggested by findings in this study.

According to interviews conducted, the most important obstacles in the way of citizens claiming their rights are poverty, lack of faith in the system and/or public officials, fear of repercussions, and traditional beliefs or custom. The state could seek to alleviate the first two. That is, by investing in development and adopting a stricter approach to corruption, the government could help enable and encourage citizen participation. The remaining two obstacles—cultural issues--are more difficult to overcome. Citizens, especially women, fear repercussions if they, for example, turn in an abuser on whom they are also financially dependent. According to tradition in Africa, there can be an excessive reverence toward older people, resulting in the fact that rights violations by these individuals are not reported. Therefore, not only is the provision of

civic education a question of power, but participation too is affected by power relations—whether those in the family, community, or beyond. Who gets to participate? Is it only community leaders and/or only men? This study found that despite structural and cultural hindrances to participation, the brief injections of knowledge, skills, and/or confidence provided by civic education sessions amazingly help individuals overcome the obstacles in some instances, facilitating greater inclusion of the poor in local political processes and empowering women in particular.

NOTES

¹ The expression is borrowed from Blair (2003).

² Samuel Huntington (1991)

³ Article originally appearing in *National Post* (Canada), February 20, 2007 (and referenced at www.freedomhouse.org), Jennifer Windsor and Arch Puddington

⁴ It is appropriate to question—as Carothers (2002) does—whether “transitional” is an accurate concept to use with reference to each “not-yet-fully-democratic” country. He says, “Many countries that policy makers and aid practitioners persist in calling ‘transitional’ are not in transition to democracy, and of the democratic transitions that are under way, more than a few are not following the model. Sticking with the paradigm beyond its useful life is retarding evolution in the field of democratic assistance and is leading policy makers astray in other ways. It is time to recognize that the transition paradigm has outlived its usefulness and to look for a better lens” (6).

⁵ “Consolidation” is another ambiguous concept, at least when one looks at how broadly it is used in the literature (Schedler 2001). According to Schedler’s review of data from Latin America, the concept’s behavioral operationalization is more commensurate with reality than either structural or attitudinal operationalization.

⁶ Larry Diamond (2002)

⁷ According to Freedom House, in 1995-2000 the percentage of democracies in Africa declined from 19 to 17 (cited in Schraeder 2002). Nevertheless, in general Tripp prefers not to speak of “reversals” of democratic gains in Africa: “[I]t appears premature to talk about ‘reversal’ in many African countries when it is not clear that substantial gains were ever made beyond the holding of multiparty elections. Clearly, military takeovers of civilian regimes as in Niger and Gambia constitute reversals. But in much of Africa the main problem is not that democratic rights have deteriorated qualitatively after the holding of multiparty elections, but rather that the process has not moved much beyond the holding of elections. The patterns of neopatrimonial rule, personal rule, and state-based clientelism remain intact and are simply manifesting themselves in a multiparty context” (2000, 212).

⁸ Factors that may link civic education to political participation include, for example, increased institutional affiliation of those exposed to adult learning (Finkel and Ernst 2005), and changed values (White 1996). In White’s words, “[D]emocracy does not live by procedures alone. As important as procedures are the values underpinning them and the sentiments and dispositions of the citizens implementing the procedures and living by them. Democratic citizens need, for instance, self-respect, self-esteem, and courage” (1996, 8).

⁹ Civic education has also been part of support for decentralization, a process underway and accompanying democratization in many developing countries, including Tanzania and Zambia.

¹⁰ “According to one recent estimate, the total investment in civic education activities in the 1990s reached over \$230 million (USAID Office of Budget, 2000)” (Finkel and Ernst 2005, footnote 1).

¹¹ Yet because civic education is almost always conducted by (domestic) NGOs, it is not plausible or justifiable to examine the impact of foreign donors per se, especially as the dependent variable is effects on the cognition and behavior patterns of individuals in rural areas with whom the NGOs come into contact. That is, what NGOs do in practice on the ground is particularly in the rural areas far removed from the question of where funds used by these organizations come from.

¹² Personal interview of, for example, Executive Director of the Zambia Civic Education Association, January 16, 2006

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Personal interview of an NGO employee, November 10, 2005

¹⁶ Personal interview of another observer, November 10, 2005

¹⁷ Personal interview of a development worker in Southern Tanzania, October 15, 2005

¹⁸ Personal interview, November 3, 2005

¹⁹ Personal interview, October 27, 2005

²⁰ This point was emphasized by Tanzanian professor Suleiman Ngware (personal interview, October 27, 2005).

²¹ Refers to boycotts, strikes, and demonstrations

²² In Milbrath and Goel's seven-nation study, voting was "the only behavior which the majority of the citizens utilize. Most other political acts are engaged in by a fraction of the population, often a very small fraction" (1977, 24).

²³ Compare this to 47 percent that said that they have "sometimes" or "often" attended a community meeting during the last five years, or 44 percent that said that they have attended an election rally, or a similar number that has joined a lobbying effort (ibid, 148).

²⁴ Regarding terminology, a third alternative is adopted here, with political interest and discussion referenced as "psychological engagement." This term is chosen because the word "engagement" better conveys the fact that political interest and discussion are distinct from actual acts of participation than does the word "involvement." Also, "psychological" is adopted in place of "cognitive" because the study uses the term "cognitive awareness" to refer to other concepts, such as civic awareness, education, and media exposure.

²⁵ This thus does *not* refer to relative effects on the elites and those of lower socioeconomic status—an issue that is analyzed by others.

²⁶ October-November 2005 in Tanzania and February-March 2006 in Zambia

²⁷ This is due to important differences in the research sites vis-à-vis: (1) participatory patterns (with, for example, community meetings being more institutionalized in Tanzania); (2) context (the Tanzanian research sites are a government stronghold, with the Zambian respondents being rather hostile to the government); and (3) culture (an overwhelming majority of Tanzanian respondents were Muslims while 99 percent of the Zambian sample is Christian).

²⁸ That is, of countries, regions, and villages

²⁹ This is relevant to the present study as much of civic education in developing countries has to do with teaching adults the basics of democracy, as well as rights and responsibilities.

³⁰ Easton, David, and Jack Dennis. 1969. *Children in the Political System*. New York: McGraw Hill.

³¹ Barnes, Samuel H., and Max Kaase. 1979. *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

³² For example, Langton, K., and M. K. Jennings. 1968. "Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 62: 862-867.

³³ The countries referred to in Finkel (2002, 2003), Blair (2003), and USAID (2002) are the same (with the exception that Finkel (2002) does not examine Poland) because at the time Finkel and Blair, along with some other authors, collaborated on the USAID (2002) project.

³⁴ These developments as an impetus for increased emphasis on (studies on) citizenship and civic education are discussed, for example, in Cogan and Derricott (2000), Kanaev (2000), and Torney-Purta et al. (2001).

³⁵ Ehman, L. H. 1980. "The American School in the Political Socialization Process." *Review of Educational Research* 50: 99-199.

³⁶ Moulton, Jeanne. "Formal and Nonformal Education and Empowered Behaviour: A Review of the Literature," prepared for the Support for Analysis and Research in Africa (SARA) Project, funded by USAID/AFR/SD, 1997.

³⁷ One should note, though, that it is dubious to compare Finkel's (2002) and Finkel and Ernst's (2005) results because the studies had different target groups: whereas the 2002 study dealt with adult education programs with civics content, the 2005 findings concerned 600 high school students.

³⁸ 1975, p.319

³⁹ The authors refer to John Dewey's "classic exposition," *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* (1916).

⁴⁰ Delli Caprini, M. X., and S. Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

⁴¹ Bynner, J., and C. Hammond. 2004. "The Benefits of Adult Learning: Quantitative Insights." In Schuller, T., J. Preston, C. Hammond, A. Brassett-Grundy, and J. Bynner, eds., *The Benefits of Learning: The Impact of Education on Health, Family Life and Social Capital*. London: Routledge Falmer.

⁴² Field does not make much claims about causation in the direction of adult learning to participation, because his primary focus is the reverse—or more specifically to understand the effect of social capital (which includes some type of participation) on persons' attitude toward adult formal learning.

⁴³ The page number refers to that on the online version of the article.

⁴⁴ However, the NGO Agenda Participation 2000 stresses that in providing civic education, “profit concerns limit the media’s objectivity and role” (2005, 23).

⁴⁵ However, when asked what—family, friends, mass media, or school—has the greatest influence on their views, pupils overwhelmingly said family (males: 62%, females: 48%; Kanaev 2000).

⁴⁶ As their source they use Verba and Nie’s “Political Participation,” in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975).

⁴⁷ In also the more recent cross-national study that Bratton undertook with Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi the authors find that “political participation is mostly a product of institutional mobilization” (2005, 10).

⁴⁸ Or as they call it, socioeconomic resource level (SERL)

⁴⁹ Participation is likelier also for those with “higher *occupational* status” (ibid, 102; emphasis added).

⁵⁰ However, in places like Africa the limited capacity of most political parties reduces parties’ influence, and is the “major reason” to low voter turnout in, for example, Zambia (ibid, 313).

⁵¹ But in contrast to these authors, Milner’s (2002) study, as a sole study among those we reviewed, concludes that organizational membership is *not* linked to participation, which he defines as voting in local elections.

⁵² However, some religious groups in fact “have a norm favoring *noninvolvement* in politics (Jehovah’s Witnesses is an example)” (Milbrath and Goel 1977, 111, emphasis added).

⁵³ Bratton et al. (2005) suggest that generally only people with such relationships contact their elected leaders.

⁵⁴ In a similar vein, Torney-Purta et al. (2001) found male youth to be more interested in politics than female youth.

⁵⁵ Citing Verba, Nie, and Kim (1971), and Buffalo Survey (1968)

⁵⁶ This may be because the elderly often have less education (ibid).

⁵⁷ The logic is explained below.

⁵⁸ The literature review evidences that of the studies reviewed, only Field’s mentioned something about the impact of “adult education” on political interest; citing Bynner and Hammond’s 2004 study of the 1958 data set of 33–42 year-olds in Britain, he noted that such education promotes relatively small “but marked growth in levels of political interest” (Field 2005, 108).

⁵⁹ Or trust in politicians

⁶⁰ Or trust in politicians

⁶¹ Much depends on how “politics” is defined, and what kind of information is given out during civic education.

⁶² In the literature, the various participatory acts are characterized similarly, with slight differences to how they are categorized in this study. For example, the Afrobarometer (Chaligha et al. 2002) speaks of associational membership as an individualized act. This is concurred with in that participation in associations can certainly involve “individualized” activity. Much depends on what that participation is actually like. However, *compared* to active participation at community meetings and contacting local officials, associational activity is argued to be less individualized.

⁶³ Especially in rural areas in Africa

⁶⁴ That is, each relationship is only evaluated based on whether it is likely to be neutral or positive. This is a very preliminary juxtaposition. In many cases, the relationship could go either way.

⁶⁵ The expected relationships presented in the table are based on information found in the literature and logical reasoning.

⁶⁶ Notice that Table 3.1. presents the expected relationship between the presence of trust in politicians, whereas civic education was expected to promote lack of this trust. (For all the other cognitive elements included in the table civic education is likely to have a positive effect.)

⁶⁷ It would be a topic for another study.

⁶⁸ Though the figure only depicts associational memberships, institutional factors also include membership in political parties.

⁶⁹ In turn, in authoritarian countries—if meaningful civic education is even conducted there—power holders are not likely to allow the conducting of such civic education that could reveal issues that could endanger citizens’ loyalty and obedience to the state.

⁷⁰ Note that one way that expectations in sociology (and psychology and economy) about civic engagement differ from those in political science is that while political scientists expect those higher up on the socio-economic ladder to participate more actively, sociologists expect an increase in income (hourly wages) to *decrease* participation because it “increase[s] the opportunity costs for participation” (Bekkers 2005, 443). This is the “low-cost hypothesis” (ibid). In fact some statements made by civil society activists for this study lend support to this hypothesis: according to them, those higher on the SES scale tend to participate less in politics. For example, an employee of a women’s organization in Zambia noted that the most difficult groups to reach and mobilize with civic education are the upper classes, the “bourgeoisie”—because they do not have the time to participate (personal interview, January 16, 2006). In contrast, the “common people” tend to react in such a way that “as soon as they hear some noise somewhere, they gather” (ibid).

⁷¹ While key variables and their measurement are described in this chapter, a summary of variables included in regression analyses is provided in Appendix F.

⁷² The downside of the contextual approach is that one cannot analyze civic education interventions in the same level of detail as studies analyzing specific programs. For example, this study cannot evaluate how such factors as quality of instruction and “teacher likeability” (Finkel and Ernst 2005) condition effects of civic education.

⁷³ Personal interview, Dar es Salaam, October 2005

⁷⁴ Ibid. The same way development work in general ought to be targeted at people’s immediate problems: “The best ways of achieving progress in both development and democratization . . . often involve appealing to people’s pressing concerns in their daily lives” (Golub 2000, 137).

⁷⁵ According to Bratton et al., “[I]n Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, among other places, health care has displaced education as people’s premier social priority” (2005, 101).

⁷⁶ Indeed, the purpose of the RIPS Programme in 1999-2005 was to “facilitate the institutionalisation of participatory approaches and democratic principles among authorities and civil society to support the objectives of the Local Government Reform Programme [LGRP]” (RIPS Programme 2005, ii). The aim of both RIPS and LGRP was/is to enhance democratization by building the capacity of local government, decentralization, and empowerment of local people.

⁷⁷ Personal interview, September 3, 2005

⁷⁸ Personal interview, Dar es Salaam, October 2005

⁷⁹ Personal interview of an employee of Mtwara-Mikindani Municipal Council, October 15, 2005

⁸⁰ In Zambia such records are not kept (or only kept about one civic education provider in Chamalawa and Makasa villages).

⁸¹ The languages are Kiswahili in Tanzania and Bemba in Zambia. In a few cases in Zambia, due to time constraints, some interviews were conducted in English, in which case the questions were translated into Bemba by an interpreter. See Appendices A-D for the full text of the questionnaire in each language with English translations.

⁸² An educated, English speaking resident of the village. Another instance in which an interpreter was used was in the Zambian villages of Chamalawa and Makasa where the Chamalawa village “publishing secretary” interpreted my questions; see previous note.

⁸³ Variance in the length of the interviews is due to some respondents giving longer answers and/or thinking about their answers longer and/or requesting more clarification to the questions than others. Also, many of the longer interviews were those in Zambia that involved English-Bemba translation.

⁸⁴ Though not possible within the parameters of this research, it would be ideal to examine civic education’s effects by conducting over-time analysis of respondents’ cognitive characteristics and level of participation. On the one hand, such an approach would be ideal because it could indicate, for example, whether potential changes brought about by civic education last (or perhaps whether they only emerge after some time). For example, the Executive Director of the Zambia Civic Education Association (ZCEA) pointed out that because civic education deals with the mindset (which usually does not change quickly), it is not easy to concretize achievements in the short run (personal interview, January 16, 2006). In the words of a Tanzanian academic, “Do not plant today and expect to reap tomorrow” (personal interview, October 27, 2005). “But we do have ‘case studies,’” the Zambian ZCEA Executive Director emphasized, referring to examples of success which can demonstrate what civic education can achieve. And, although a long term

perspective is ideal, it is extremely difficult for the analyst to separate the effects of civic education from other factors if respondents are surveyed long after exposure to civic education.

⁸⁵ This is despite the fact that, as Chambers (1997) rightly points out, utilizing and administering questionnaires tend to accentuate power differences between the researchers (often, Northerners) and respondents (Southerners). According to him, questionnaires “distort peripheral realities and fit them into centrally pre-set frameworks The concerns, concepts, categories, and question are . . . those of the ‘North’, of the uppers, not those of the ‘South’, the lowers” (1997, 93). And, in administering the questionnaire, the problem is that “power and initiative lie with the interviewer. Questionnaires are ‘administered’, like oaths or drugs; they are something that is done to people, the person interviewed. The interviewee is a ‘respondent’, a person who replies or reacts. The Latin *respondere* means to return like with like. The questions and categories are those of the interviewer who also records the ‘responses’” (ibid, 94).

⁸⁶ Data are analyzed with the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).

⁸⁷ The choice of the independent and control variables was made based on evaluating those used by others—especially Bratton (1999), Bratton et al. (1999), Bratton et al. (2005), Finkel and Ernst (2005), and Niemi and Junn (1998).

⁸⁸ Furthermore, in Zambia two cases of “direct observation” were part of learning, including a civic education lesson given at an elementary school in Zambia, and a brief session of voter education in a village from which data were otherwise not gathered.

⁸⁹ “Roughly,” because a few questions were added during the course of the research

⁹⁰ To facilitate comparison of results from Tanzania and Zambia, survey questions were kept the same to the extent possible. Only when a certain answer category, for example, was not applicable to the Zambian context (as questions were first written and surveys administered in Tanzania), it was modified to make it relevant to Zambian respondents. Keeping the questions the same is important because “if groups are to be compared, it is imperative that differences between them cannot be ascribed to differences in the questions that were asked or the way in which they were asked” (Sapsford 1999, 119).

⁹¹ One survey question (the last of them all) came from yet another source, that is, Sapsford’s (1999) book on survey research. The question read: “Is there ‘anything else that should have been asked [in this study] or that the researcher needs to know or anything that [you] would like to say about the topic or [this] questionnaire?’” (ibid, 132).

⁹² Although Sapsford (1999) advises against beginning a survey with demographic questions, it was determined that beginning with the demographic questions may in fact help make the respondent feel at ease as these questions can function as an introduction between the respondent and the researcher.

⁹³ Or, as the literal Swahili translation reads, “children to whom you have ‘given birth’”

⁹⁴ Personal interview, October 15, 2005

⁹⁵ In addition to the missionary (see previous note), this was pointed out by a few other interviewees.

⁹⁶ As pointed out by the research assistants in Tanzania and Zambia, it was not possible for Africans in the colonial era to receive higher than Standard 6 education. That is, it was not possible to complete secondary school. For this reason the options of “completed secondary school” and “post-secondary school” were not applicable to the elderly respondents in the study.

⁹⁷ See Appendix E for the distribution and mean values for education in the sample.

⁹⁸ “What is your main source of income?”/“What do you do?”

⁹⁹ Obtaining numerical values (for income) would be difficult because most respondents are self-employed (engaged in small-scale agriculture) and therefore do not earn a salary.

¹⁰⁰ Also included are options “student” and “unemployed.”

¹⁰¹ See Appendix F.

¹⁰² A Tanzanian development worker suggested that asking people this would be intrusive.

¹⁰³ This means that only 7 respondents in the Tanzanian village of Mbae were asked this question.

¹⁰⁴ In contrast, in Zambia the option “occasionally” was not needed—as the Bemba translation of “every now and then” is roughly similar in meaning. Instead, in Zambia the option “rarely” was added. Also, because it was realized that additional information about respondents’ media consumption would be useful, those respondents in Zambia that said they did not access a medium at all or accessed rarely were asked why that was the case.

¹⁰⁵ See the specific questions and data in Appendix E.

¹⁰⁶ See Appendix E for what specific rights and responsibilities in respondents' answers fall under each category.

¹⁰⁷ These sources were mentioned by an employee at the Mtwara-Mikindani Municipal Council, personal interview, October 15, 2005

¹⁰⁸ Personal interview of Mtwara-Mikindani Municipal Director, September 28, 2005

¹⁰⁹ Personal interview, November 10, 2005. Such large national-level organizations include Tanzania Media Women's Association (TAMWA), Haki Elimu (working on education), Haki Ardi (active in land rights), Red Cross, Oxfam, World Vision, and umbrellas like MANGONET (Masasi NGO Network; *ibid*).

¹¹⁰ Such answers were categorized as "erroneous civic knowledge."

¹¹¹ In Zambia, the challenge with this question was that people often understood it to mean, "Do you influence..." rather than "Are you satisfied with your level of influence..." (whatever that level may be). The research assistant pointed out that this may be because it is difficult to know the level of influence that a person has in community affairs: the procedure is such that the village headperson may collect views from, or listen to, villagers, and then present the views to the chief as his own. Due to this process, the level of influence of particular villagers may be difficult to identify.

¹¹² See Appendix E for details on items included in the "lack of efficacy" variable.

¹¹³ See Appendix E for details.

¹¹⁴ The idea of asking this only occurred to the analyst when data in Tanzania had already been gathered.

¹¹⁵ Notice that this is different from mere attendance at meetings. Attendance at meetings was not analyzed because question wording ("have you *ever* attended a community meeting") led to minimal variance in data. See Appendix E for details.

¹¹⁶ "Other" ways to participate included recording meeting minutes, presiding as a judge over villagers' cases, supervising decision-making and/or implementation, and performing sketches.

¹¹⁷ In contrast to some other surveys, the present one thus did not ask respondents about contact with any other officials besides local Councilors.

However, this study did additionally ask respondents about another contact: which person they will most likely contact in case of a (a) personal problem, (b) problem having to do with the community. This question is important because, as Bratton et al. have found, "the Africans we interviewed are much more likely to take their problems to influential people in the community rather than to approach public officials associated with the state" (2005, 151). Thus not contacting the local Councilor does not mean that respondents do not take their concerns to any "decision-maker." The answer choices to this question were: the village chairperson (in Zambia: headperson); the *kitongoji/mtaa* (i.e., sub-village/sub-town) leader (in Zambia: chief); the Ward Councilor; the District Executive Director/Municipal Director (in Zambia: Mayor); religious leaders; representatives of NGOs/CBOs in the area; other citizens in the area; family; other (specify); don't know. This question is further relevant because, as Bratton et al. note, "key aspects of political behavior take place informally"; thus it is important to take into account "individuals' engagement in community affairs and their contacts with patrons – like traditional leaders, religious figures, or business leaders" (2005, 144). However, one should note, as one "chief retainer" suggested, that contacting the chief in Zambia is not straight forward: rather than contacting the chief directly, villagers should first contact their village headperson who then approaches the chief.

It should be noted that although people in rural areas are further away from government and many services than urban residents, it is in fact the rural residents that have better support networks ("a system of protection"), in the sense that they can contact the chief or headman or other local leaders (personal interview of ZCEA Executive Director, January 16, 2006). In contrast, such leaders are lacking in urban areas. Therefore, and in the absence of other people to turn to, urban residents, when they have a problem, take their cases and each other to the police and courts even though these entities are not supposed to handle civil cases (*ibid*).

¹¹⁸ The answer options were "yes/no," and if yes, how many?

¹¹⁹ Notice: respondents were not asked of their level (e.g., frequency) of participation, but only about their present or past membership/leadership.

¹²⁰ See the categories discussed in conjunction with national level data on Tanzania and Zambia in the next chapter.

¹²¹ They discuss the challenges posed by, and possible solutions to, analyzing open-ended questions.

¹²² Another thing that may inflate the voting data has to do with the question's placement in the questionnaire. That the question was the first one to follow the questions on citizens' rights and in particular responsibilities may have such a consequence that few people are willing to reveal their lack of voting. Therefore, a better placement for the question on voting would have been before the questions on rights and responsibilities, following the other questions on participation.

¹²³ Also, when administering the survey, the multiple choice questions initially took the form of an open ended question as the interviewer only read out loud the question; only when the respondent did not know how to answer were the different answer choices read out loud for him/her.

¹²⁴ Research assistant Anthony Nyange in Tanzania

¹²⁵ Personal interview, October 15, 2005

¹²⁶ According to the Tanzanian research assistant, this question would be answered in the affirmative more often in the rural areas where people are less exposed to information and education (than in urban areas) and more dependent on the government for their wellbeing.

¹²⁷ Based on the formal civic education programs conducted in the area (see the next chapter)

¹²⁸ It was during the round of interviews conducted in Mtawanya Village, Tanzania, that it was determined that the Tanzanian sample should include more respondents with secondary education and those exposed to civic education. This is because otherwise the number of educated respondents would be too low to use education as a control variable; also, more respondents were needed that had been directly exposed to civic education. All kinds of unexpected things happened such as planned respondents falling sick and having to cancel their participation, for which reason the number of those that had received formal civic education was getting too low. This is the reason that an additional 19 volunteer respondents (from a pool of 50 persons) from Shangani Ward were added to the sample; see data on the research sites in the next chapter. These respondents from Shangani had just undergone civic education training (that is, Community Justice Facilitation by UNICEF) while the research was taking place in Tanzania.

¹²⁹ Refer, for example, to Table 5.3.

¹³⁰ Refer to the next chapter.

¹³¹ Diamond (2002) speaks of "hybrid regimes," a term subsequently adopted by others, including Bratton et al. (2005).

¹³² However, in his study of political participation in Zambia, Bratton in fact found that "advocates of economic or political reform were just as likely to participate in politics as those whose attitudes identified them as defenders of the status quo" (1999, 567).

¹³³ See Table 2. Diamond's classification is presented in an adopted form in Bratton et al. (2005).

¹³⁴ Freedom House rates them "partly free," with Tanzania scoring 4 and 3 for political rights and civil liberties, respectively, and Zambia scoring 4 and 4 (1 denotes "free").

¹³⁵ Zambia had its first multiparty elections in 1991 and Tanzania had its in 1995.

¹³⁶ Held on September 28, 2006

¹³⁷ Personal interview, January 20, 2006

¹³⁸ By the "15 years" (after the introduction of multiparty politics) the article is referring to the Constitutional change in 1992 which allowed multipartyism in Tanzania; the first multiparty elections did not take place until three years later.

¹³⁹ Aili Tripp, address at a panel at American Political Science Association (APSA) Annual Meeting in Philadelphia, PA, September 1st, 2006.

¹⁴⁰ Gould and Ojanen describe the lack of input that the Tanzanian parliament has in the budget cycle: "Parliament has three major weakness in the budget process, in addition to its administrative lack of capacity. First, unlike in neighboring Uganda, Parliament cannot get involved in the prioritization of expenditure during the preparatory stages of the budget. 'Technical' information such as expenditure and revenue estimates is not open to parliamentary scrutiny and amendment. The budget session itself is hurried and misses crucial levels of debate on macroeconomic planning, sectoral priority choices and the evaluation of currently running or past programs (World Bank Institute and Parliamentary Centre 2000: 29-30). Second, the Finance and Economic Affairs Committee is not allowed to increase expenditure beyond sectoral ceilings outlined in the MTEF [Medium-Term Expenditure Framework]. The third handicap is that

Parliament is not Constitutionally empowered to initiate bills with financial implications (Msekwa 2000)” (2003, 96).

¹⁴¹ Tanganyika had become independent a few years earlier (that is, in 1961), but it was in 1964 that Tanzania was born, as a result of Tanganyika’s unification with Zanzibar.

¹⁴² In fact Kaunda “named one of his sons after Nyerere” (Ishumi and Maliyamkono 1995, 57)

¹⁴³ The one-party periods ended in the two countries about the same time—in Zambia in 1991 and Tanzania in 1992, with Kaunda staying in power until that date but Nyerere having stepped down from the presidency in 1985. Tanzania’s one-party system ended in constitutional change, while Zambia’s concluded at multi-party elections.

¹⁴⁴ See Msabaha (1995) and Legum (1995) for good descriptions of *ujamaa*. In short, “[t]he philosophy of *ujamaa* is a distinctive African assertion of the necessity for socialist revolution, but different from the Marxist concept of socialist revolution. First, whereas orthodox Marxist theory depends on revolutionary consciousness as a result of excessive exploitation and excessive alienation, Nyerere’s concept relies on national planning by a ruling elite which must voluntarily renounce its privileges” (Msabaha 1995, 166). Legum adds, “In its literal translation *ujamaa* means ‘familyhood’; its concept is the involvement of all members of a family unit (the family being the whole village community) in co-operative work as well as co-operative living. Many of Nyerere’s critics, especially in the West, confuse *ujamaa* with collectivisation, harking back to the failure of the Soviet system. It is anything but that. The question we are left with is whether the idealism of *ujamaa* is practical in a peasant society infected with materialism” (1995, 190).

¹⁴⁵ But even though Nyerere based his leadership on ethical principles, morals of human freedom and equality—and though also Nyerere’s party TANU [Tanganyika, later Tanzania, African National Union] emphasized human rights—during his era Tanzania saw a number of government Acts that violated those principles (for example, the Preventive Detention Act; Read 1995). Also, it was only during Nyerere’s last terms that the Bill of Rights was enacted (1984, going into force four years later; *ibid*; Gloppen 2003).

¹⁴⁶ Citing Goran Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry* (1980)

¹⁴⁷ Personal interview, November 10, 2005

¹⁴⁸ However, Mulenga (2001) emphasizes that what was actually achieved in education in practice fell short of Nyerere’s (and others’) idealistic policy pronouncements.

¹⁴⁹ See note 17. Also, Nyerere was in fact elected the first president of the International Council of Adult Education (ICAE; Mulenga 2001).

¹⁵⁰ This was different from the priorities of the Government of Tanzania as a whole, which according to USAID, “operated . . . in a closed manner, never assuming responsibility for informing the public of its actions” (USAID/Tanzania 1996, 72).

¹⁵¹ Personal interview of a student of Tanzania, July 19, 2005

¹⁵² *Ibid*. Hyden elaborates, “Of course, people often elect representatives from their own communities, but appeals to tribal or ethnic values do not work in Tanzanian politics” (Hyden 1999, 151). According to Omari, “Nyerere’s approach was novel in sub-Saharan Africa during the colonial period . . . [as] [m]any emerging national leaders used the ethnicity base for the development of political power. Nyerere used the ethnicity base for the development of a nation, using his experience in leading TAA [Tanganyika African Association] and TANU to recruit and mobilize potential leaders from ethnic clubs and associations for the development of a territorial political consciousness which cuts across ethnic lines” (1995, 25).

¹⁵³ Though this section represents an exception to the general pattern of similar historical experiences politically in the two countries, it is placed here (under “similarities”) because it is a logical continuation of the discussion of the countries’ political histories.

¹⁵⁴ This was also the view of representatives of a Leuven (Belgium) based NGO working with civil society in Africa (personal interview, May 20, 2005) and a longtime student of Tanzania (personal interview, August 11, 2005). In fact Michael also states that “[c]ivil society has far fewer players in Tanzania than in many other African countries. In post-independence Tanzania, the role of labour movements and religious organizations . . . has been circumscribed by government and is now modest” (2004, 79, citing Qorro 1993 and Meena 1997).

¹⁵⁵ In Zambia especially in the latter half of the 1990s (e.g., Ottaway 2000).

¹⁵⁶ Personal interview, April 5, 2005

¹⁵⁷ For example, personal interviews in Tanzania of an academic (October 27, 2005) and a leader of a local NGO (September 22, 2005), and in Zambia a leader of a national NGO (January 16, 2006) and a local government leader (February 14, 2006).

¹⁵⁸ The role of trust will be discussed further below, under “Cultural Differences.”

¹⁵⁹ Personal interview of a student of Tanzania, August 11, 2005

¹⁶⁰ However, some Tanzanian NGOs in fact wanted to stay away from the PRS process, seeing it as too political (ibid). Many Tanzanian NGOs do not want to be associated with criticizing the government or making demands to it, for fear of “being labeled as the ‘opposition’ group” (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2004, 10).

¹⁶¹ Personal interview, January 11, 2006

¹⁶² In January 2006

¹⁶³ See, for example, Bigsten, Arne, Jörgen Levin, and Håkan Persson, “Debt Relief and Growth: A Study of Zambia and Tanzania,” A Paper Prepared for the WIDER Development Conference on Debt Relief, Helsinki, 17-18 August, 2001.

¹⁶⁴ Tanzania ranks 164th and Zambia 166th (www.undp.org)

¹⁶⁵ Tanzania’s Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is \$320 and Zambia’s is \$400 (2004; www.worldbank.org). GNI refers to “the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad” (www.worldbank.org). According to Afrobarometer data, poverty levels are such that 80 of Tanzanians report a joint household income of USD 60 per month (Chaligha et al. 2002).

¹⁶⁶ However, Bratton et al. stress that one should be cautious when comparing the results of one Afrobarometer survey to another—i.e., sources referenced here: “Given a partial lack of questionnaire standardization in Round 1, as well as lessons learned from fieldwork about optimal question wording, there are unavoidable differences between the Round 1 and Round 2 survey instruments. It is therefore not always easy or accurate to make exact comparisons between Round 1 and Round 2 results, even on similar questions. Sometimes, therefore, comparisons over time from the two surveys must be handled cautiously” (2004, 4).

¹⁶⁷ The adult literacy rate in 2004 was 69.4 and 68.0 respectively (www.worldbank.org). According to Alexander Baum, “without corrective action, the estimate is that [the Tanzanian literacy rate] will continue falling at a rate of roughly 2% per annum” (*ACP-EU Courier* 1999, 16). He points out that it has been decreasing ever since the late 1970s, when it was 90 per cent, and Tanzania was “considered an exemplary model in Africa” (ibid).

¹⁶⁸ November 20, 2005, p.6/Comment

¹⁶⁹ Personal interview, November 2, 2005

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Also personal interviews of a government official in Tanzania, November 2, 2005, and an NGO leader in Zambia, January 16, 2006

¹⁷² Personal interview of a donor representative, formerly a Zambian civil society activist (March 7, 2006)

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Personal interview, January 16, 2006

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ At the same time she notes that in her view, cognition is higher in Zambia than elsewhere in Southern Africa. Also, when she monitored elections in Zanzibar, she “could not believe the level of ignorance among most of the electorate there If you talk to them one on one . . . there’s less knowledge of even the electoral act, and especially among the women.” But she added, “However, what I respected about the Zanzibaris [was that] . . . the people sat attentively at the rallies, like they were in church – that I don’t see in this country [i.e., Zambia].”

¹⁷⁸ ZCEA Executive Director, January 16, 2006

¹⁷⁹ Personal interview, March 7, 2006

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ This was pointed out by two government officials (personal interviews, October 15 and November 2, 2005) and one NGO employee (personal interview, October 31, 2005). However, Ngware's statement about Tanzanians' "total ignorance of basic legal rights" would be challenged by Gloppen, according to whom "there is an increasing awareness of the constitution in Tanzanian society, and particularly of rights issues: human rights, civil rights, even political rights" (2003, 130).

¹⁸² That is, as much as 46 percent of Tanzanians (i.e., only 1 percent less than Ugandans who are most confident about their political understanding) agree more with the statement, "I can usually understand the way that government works" than with the statement, "The way the government operates sometimes seems so complicated that I cannot really understand what is going on." In Zambia this self-reported confidence is much less, 18 percent, which means Zambians are positioned ahead of only Lesotho (15 percent) and South Africa (12 percent; *ibid*).

¹⁸³ Only in South Africa had fewer people (13 percent) heard about that country's Growth, Employment and Redistribution program (*ibid*).

¹⁸⁴ Whereas only 8 percent of Tanzanians could name their Member of Parliament in 2001, 44 percent of Zambians were able to name theirs in 1999 (*ibid*). And, by 2005, Zambians' knowledge of the name of their MP had risen to 63 percent (Lolajih and Chikwanha 2006).

¹⁸⁵ "This perception is especially widespread in former one-party states" (*ibid*, 244). Nevertheless, by Round 3 (that is, the most recent collection) of Afrobarometer data, awareness had improved in that the share of Zambians equating central and local government had almost halved, to 27 percent (Lolajih and Chikwanha 2006). Yet people also often confuse government in general and (the dominant) political party, both in Zambia and Tanzania (Bratton and Liatto-Katundu 1994; Green 1995). But here, too, Zambians' awareness has improved: while 38 percent of Zambians equated the two in 2002, this figure had dropped to 28 percent in 2005 (Lolajih and Chikwanha 2006; Mulenga et al. 2004).

¹⁸⁶ Personal interview, February 14, 2006

¹⁸⁷ Personal interview, January 30, 2006

¹⁸⁸ Personal interview of a donor representative, January 13, 2006

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid*.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid*.

¹⁹¹ Personal interview, November 10, 2005. However, NGOs surely also lack resources, especially the small national ones.

¹⁹² Personal interview of an academic, October 27, 2005

¹⁹³ At the same time he pointed out that "there must be a clearly defined role for the state" (*ibid*).

¹⁹⁴ Personal interview of an NGO employee, November 10, 2005

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid*.

¹⁹⁶ Personal interview of a Tanzanian election observer, October 20, 2005

¹⁹⁷ See the previous note.

¹⁹⁸ Personal interview, September 22, 2005

¹⁹⁹ The differences will be discussed in the next section.

²⁰⁰ Personal interview, January 16, 2006

²⁰¹ *Ibid*.

²⁰² Personal interview, November 2, 2005

²⁰³ Personal interview, October 14, 2005

²⁰⁴ This was pointed out by research assistant Anthony Nyange in Tanzania.

²⁰⁵ Personal interview, November 10, 2005

²⁰⁶ Personal interview of a donor representative, November 10, 2005

²⁰⁷ Personal interview, January 11, 2006

²⁰⁸ Yet the above NGO employee pointed out that "a lot more people today feel freer to speak out against the government than 5 or 10 years ago" (*ibid*).

²⁰⁹ DG Development website: "Country Overview," EU Relations with Tanzania, last updated on September 8, 2006

²¹⁰ Transparency International/Zambia (TIZ) president Professor Alfred Chanda, in the article by George Chellah, "Prof Chanda urges ACC [Anti-Corruption Commission] to pursue corrupt leaders," *Sunday Post*, November 20, 2005, p.2/Home News

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² But one donor representative did suggest that corruption has *decreased* in Zambia: “If people engage in corruption today, they’re doing it differently than before. Now people are obliged to follow the procedures regarding transparency.” This respondent also saw external funding as propelling government to move in the direction “everybody wants it to go”; also there is more “donor will” (funding) against corruption, with money really going toward projects on the ground, such as roads construction (personal interview, January 13, 2006).

²¹³ “The line between institution and culture . . . therefore, is much less clear-cut than our mainstream theories assume Formal institutions, although limited in their longevity, reflect culture as much as informal institutions do” (Hyden 2006, 7).

²¹⁴ Personal interview, November 10, 2005

²¹⁵ As a consequence both countries have a multitude of women’s organizations (Hossain et al. 2003; Michael 2004; Tripp 2000). For example, “about 80 percent of all CSOs in Tanzania are gender based, engaged in the political and economic empowerment of women” (Hossain et al. 2003, 98). In line with this, the Afrobarometer finds that “[t]he level of gender consciousness (9 percent) is . . . higher [in Tanzania] than in any other survey, approached only by Uganda (6 percent)” (Chaligha et al. 2002, 10).

²¹⁶ Personal interview of a Tanzanian development worker, November 10, 2005

²¹⁷ Personal interviews of a Tanzanian NGO employee, October 31, 2005, and a Zambian NGO employee, January 16, 2006

²¹⁸ Ibid (January 16, 2006), and a personal interview of a Tanzanian government employee, November 2, 2005

²¹⁹ Personal interview, September 16, 2005

²²⁰ Personal interview, September 20, 2005

²²¹ Personal interview, September 27, 2005

²²² Personal interview, January 16, 2005

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Personal interview, March 14, 2006

²²⁵ Ibid, but interview on January 20, 2006

²²⁶ Personal interview, April 5, 2005

²²⁷ And in 2004 Zambia was one of only seven African countries that had a current account deficit greater than 10 percent of GDP (UN Economic Commission for Africa 2005).

²²⁸ Nevertheless, as shown above, many Tanzanians continue to live in poverty; thus, “macroeconomic achievements have not translated into micro level poverty reduction” (REPOA 2006, 6).

²²⁹ However, the difference in Tanzanian and Zambian attitudes has recently decreased.

²³⁰ That is, 82 percent of Tanzanians agreed more with the statement, “It is better to raise educational standards, even if we have to pay for school fees,” than the statement, “It is better to have free schooling for our children, even if the quality of education is low.” The corresponding figure in the country ranking second, Ghana, was 77 percent. Zambians came far behind, with only 52 percent supporting the statement favoring user fees, and only Namibia and Malawi having fewer such respondents (Chaligha et al. 2002).

²³¹ That is, 59 percent of Tanzanians agreed more with the statement, “The government cannot afford so many public employees and should lay some of them off” than the statement, “All civil servants should keep their jobs, even if paying their salaries is costly to the country.” In the second ranking country, Zimbabwe, the equivalent figure was 51 percent. Zambia ranked fourth, with 36 percent supporting restructuring the public service (ibid).

²³² That is, 70 percent of Tanzanians agreed more with the statement, “It is better to have goods available in the market, even if the prices are high” than the statement, “It is better to have low prices, even if there are shortages of goods.” Only Ghanaians supported market pricing more (72 percent). In Afrobarometer Round 1, Zambia placed fourth, with 60 percent supporting market pricing (ibid).

²³³ That is, 45 percent of Tanzanians agreed more with the statement, “It is better for the government to sell its businesses to private companies and individuals” than say that “The government should retain ownership of its factories, businesses, and farms.” Only in Botswana this figure was higher (49 percent). In Afrobarometer Round 1, Zambians’ thinking was very much the opposite, with only 29 percent supporting

the former statement, thus placing the country second to the last in the Afrobarometer list. Only Malians were more anti-privatization than Zambians (*ibid*).

²³⁴ However, Tanzanian attitudes have since changed, at least if one takes cues from the 2005 Afrobarometer data. According to these data, a clear majority (56 percent) has now come to support free education, even if it means lower quality (REPOA 2006). At the same time, though, Zambians too have become more anti-reform, so that now the same share of Zambians as Tanzanians are against user fees (even if means lower quality of education; Lolojih and Chikwanha 2006). But with regard to the restructuring of public service, Zambians are still clearly more anti-reform than Tanzanians. That is, even though over a half of Tanzanians (58 percent) would now “let civil servants keep their jobs even if paying their salaries is costly to the country” (REPOA 2006, 7), in Zambia as many as 71 percent would do so. Therefore, even with lessened support for pro-market reform, Tanzanians are still more market oriented than Zambians.

²³⁵ This is evident from the fact that in 1999 only 62 percent would have rejected a one-party regime (Chaligha et al. 2002).

²³⁶ The authors refer to Gasper Munishi, “Changing Values of Tanzanians Following the Liberalizing Policies: Preliminary Comments,” paper presented to the World Values Survey Conference, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa, 17-20 November, 2001, p.7.

²³⁷ This will be elaborated below.

²³⁸ And importantly, 33 per cent of Zambians are “not at all” interested in politics (Bratton 1999).

²³⁹ That is, 30 percent of Tanzanians say they often discuss politics and government with other people. The corresponding figure for Uganda is 37 percent, and for Zambia—placed tenth—14 percent (Chaligha et al. 2002). In fact, as much as 44 percent of Zambians say that they “‘never’ talk about politics with their friends” (Simutanyi 2002, 4).

²⁴⁰ That is, 47 percent of Tanzanians (46 in rural areas) agreed or strongly agreed with a slightly modified statement, “[P]olitics and government sometimes seem so complicated that [I] can’t really understand what’s going on” (Afrobarometer 2006, 10).

²⁴¹ To be sure, also Kaunda called for *participatory* democracy (de Jong and van Donge 1983)—though his promotion of “people’s participation” does not seem to have been as extensive as Nyerere’s.

²⁴² As a consequence, as one development worker interviewed for this study said, the word “participation” has a special ring in Tanzania: it is associated with something that the government wants people to do (personal interview, September 3, 2005).

²⁴³ Also called village governments

²⁴⁴ In the words of Work, “Decentralisation can be defined as the transfer of responsibility for planning, management and resource raising and allocation from the central government and its agencies to the lower levels of government. Decentralisation is closely linked to the concept of subsidiarity, which proposes that functions (or tasks) be devolved to the lowest level of social order that is capable of completing them” (2002, 5). Besides the transfer of power and resources, decentralization “has not only an administrative aspect, but also a participatory component,” which is why “[f]rom time to time, scholars use terms like ‘democratic decentralisation’ or ‘political decentralisation’” (Schmidt 1997, 33). Although decentralization “came to the forefront of the development agenda” in the 1980s, the concept is older than that (Work 2002, 5). “The term attracted attention in the 1950s and 1960s when British and French colonial administrations prepared colonies for independence by devolving responsibilities for certain programmes to local authorities. . . . Today both developed and developing countries are purs[u]ing decentralisation policies” (*ibid*, 5).

²⁴⁵ In contrast, while discussing Tanzania’s (and some other countries’) experience with decentralization, Work does not make any reference to Zambia.

²⁴⁶ Personal interview of the Director at Department of Development Planning, Mansa Municipality, March 1, 2006

²⁴⁷ “Councils will be given more authority and a higher degree of autonomy while maintaining sufficient linkages with the center as demanded in a unitary state” (Republic of Zambia 2003, 42).

²⁴⁸ Such as a government employee (personal interview, February 14, 2006)

²⁴⁹ See previous note.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid*.

²⁵¹ Personal interview of a student of Tanzania, August 11, 2005. Village-initiated planning is part of the government's policy called Opportunities and Obstacles for Development (O&OD), which "has been developed to institutionalize the local government reforms in line with the government aspirations to devolve decision-making powers to the communities"

(www.pmoralg.go.tz/programmes/view_programmes.php?intItemID=5).

²⁵² No such procedure exists in Zambia.

²⁵³ The authors continue, "The Public Order Act, for example, which prohibits public meetings and protests not sanctioned by the police, which has been left on the statute books since the era of the colonial government still remains in place, despite clear rulings by the judiciary to the effect that it has no place in a democratic society. Not surprisingly, levels of citizen participation in political, economic and social affairs leave a lot to be desired" (ibid, 2).

²⁵⁴ Personal interview, January 11, 2006

²⁵⁵ Personal interview, March 14, 2006

²⁵⁶ This was pointed out to me by a development worker interviewed on January 20, 2006.

²⁵⁷ Personal interview of an employee at Mtwara-Mikindani Municipal Council, October 15, 2005

²⁵⁸ Personal interview of a development worker, January 20, 2006. Therefore the extent of participation depends to a large extent on the chief (personal interview of a development worker, January 30, 2006). In one of the villages included in this study, one resident estimated that the chief calls a meeting only about once a year (personal interview, January 31, 2006).

²⁵⁹ At least this pertains to Mabumba village (personal interview of a Community Development Officer, Mabumba, February 11, 2006).

²⁶⁰ Personal interview of a Community Development Officer, Mabumba, February 11, 2006

²⁶¹ According to Afrobarometer data from 2001, three-quarters of Tanzanians report having attended a community meeting at least once in the last five years—a figure that in that round of Afrobarometer surveys was surpassed only by Ugandans (81 percent; Chaligha et al. 2002).

²⁶² This will facilitate a better understanding of the type of participation which *is* hypothesized—that is, the extent to which people participate actively in discussion at these meetings—something previous studies have not considered.

²⁶³ That is, sub-village level

²⁶⁴ That is, the Zambian single party until 1991

²⁶⁵ In fact in the earlier rounds of the Afrobarometer surveys, of the 12 countries observed by Bratton et al., only one (Malawi) surpassed Tanzania in the extent of party affiliation, and only one (Uganda, a "no-party" state) was behind Zambia (Bratton et al. 2005). So persistent is people's affiliation with the dominant party in Tanzania that especially in rural areas, "they all view opposition as bringing chaos" (personal interview of an NGO employee, Dar es Salaam, October 31, 2005).

²⁶⁶ Unfortunately, post-1999 information is not available for Zambia.

²⁶⁷ Note that in slight difference to how Chaligha et al. label the participatory acts, in this study participation in community organizations is considered a group activity, and thus not as individualized a form of participation as contacting officials.

²⁶⁸ This is not evident in Table 5.3. due to different definitions used by different Afrobarometer surveys.

²⁶⁹ Personal interview of an NGO employee, January 11, 2006

²⁷⁰ As one reason for this, Hyden (1999) mentions poor infrastructure, which makes contact with other people difficult. Yet another factor is lack of interpersonal trust (ibid; see further below). In turn, Tripp (2000) emphasizes lack of associational autonomy as a cause for weakness of civil society. That associations do not enjoy autonomy probably derives from the fact that Tanzania's transition was state-led (ibid), as well as from "three decades of political monopoly during which independent organization was discouraged" (Chaligha et al. 2002, 32).

²⁷¹ It should be noted that involvement in local associations and self-help groups is also a survival strategy, especially for rural residents. As Swantz points out, "[u]pholding communal supports and interdependence is a necessity in conditions of poverty since without them survival would be threatened" (1998, 158). She suggests that women in particular have taken advantage of the comparative advantage provided by groups: "Women . . . state clearly that their reason for group ownership [of, for example, a goat] is to secure their own income which the husband cannot get [a] hold of" (ibid, 190).

²⁷² Personal interview of a government official, November 10, 2005

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ However, the policy document notes a few pages later that the ten components are no listed in order of importance.

²⁷⁷ Personal interview, February 1, 2006

²⁷⁸ Personal interview, February 14, 2006

²⁷⁹ Ibid, implying that the answer is donors.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Personal interview, January 16, 2006

²⁸² Personal interview, October 15, 2005

²⁸³ Personal interview, September 22, 2005

²⁸⁴ According to Duncan et al. (2003), about 90 percent of Zambians are Christians. Carmody's (2003) figure is lower, 70 percent, with 1 percent of the population being Hindu, Muslim, and Jews, and the rest (i.e., 29 percent) traditionalists. Nevertheless, in 1996 a statement declaring Zambia as a "Christian nation" was added to the Preamble to the Zambian Constitution (Constitution of Zambia 1996)—though there has subsequently been a lot of controversy about the accuracy of such a statement and the appropriateness of it being in the Constitution.

²⁸⁵ Personal interview of a development worker (November 4, 2005) and a missionary in Tanzania (September 16, 2005)

²⁸⁶ See previous note. Also, as Swantz puts it, "Early islamization [of coastal areas in Southern Tanzania] prevented participation of the population at large in education because education was based on western models and thus had a Christian colour to it. The anti-education spirit hit women especially hard, because of Islam's tendency to keep women out of the public eye" (1998, 172).

²⁸⁷ Personal interview, August 31, 2005

²⁸⁸ Personal interview of a UNICEF representative, November 10, 2005

²⁸⁹ Personal interviews of a Catholic Father (February 13, 2006), a Training Chaplain in the Anglican Church (February 16, 2006), and a Pastor at United Church of Zambia (February 28, 2006). The Zambian Catholic Church, for example, though advocating the separation of church and state, is clear about its expectations that Christians vote: "The Church does not and will not tell Christians how they are to vote. What it will do is to encourage everyone to use their vote in order to bring about what is genuinely good. It is the serious responsibility of all Christians and all people of good will to cast their votes unless they are genuinely hindered from doing so" (CCJP 1996, 26).

²⁹⁰ Personal interview, January 20, 2006

²⁹¹ According to these data, ten percent of Tanzanians say that most people can be trusted (ibid).

²⁹² Of Zambians, 19 percent say that most people can be trusted (ibid).

²⁹³ Widner, Jennifer, and Alexander Mundt, "Researching Social Capital in Africa," *Africa* 68, I (1998): 4.

²⁹⁴ They continue, "This suggests two things: either individuals feel the need to develop confidence in prospective fellow members before making a commitment to collective action or, by belonging to a group, people learn to trust one another" (196).

²⁹⁵ Or trust in politicians

²⁹⁶ Interestingly, through their focus group method, Bratton and Liatto-Katundu found rural dwellers to be more trusting than urbanites in government institutions; also, "[r]ural folk place more trust in remote national institutions than familiar local institutions. In general, the less people know about any given political institution, the more they are likely to blindly trust it; conversely, the more information they have, the more they come to doubt an institution's integrity" (1994, 552-553).

²⁹⁷ The RIPS Programme (1988-2005) was a development cooperation program between the governments of Finland and Tanzania, and involved Mtwara and Lindi Regions. It was one of the biggest (if not the biggest) development cooperation program that Finland has had with any country. Also it was significant for Mtwara and Lindi Regions. Voipio says, "Though a minor donor in Tanzania as a whole, Finland has long been the most important donor in Mtwara and Lindi" (1998, 78). Though it began as a more traditional aid program, RIPS took a completely different form after 1993, focusing on participatory development and

since 1999 on supporting democratic development and strengthening civil society organizations. Voipio indicates that RIPS got its inspiration in part from the World Bank, as at that time, "[i]n the international community, the World Bank was particularly active and influential in promoting the new policy of integrated rural development" (ibid, 86).

²⁹⁸ In contrast to the neighboring Lindi Region, Mtwara Region was selected as the region in which this study would be conducted simply because of logistical opportunities provided by Mtwara town, the capital of the region. These include the fact that Mtwara town is the site of the major regional airport, government agencies, NGOs, accommodation facilities, and other services.

²⁹⁹ Data are based on the 2002 Population and Housing Census.

³⁰⁰ On the other hand, the region experiences extensive in-migration from Mozambique (Swantz 1998).

³⁰¹ Personal interview of a government official, November 3, 2005

³⁰² The road is impassable during the rainy season.

³⁰³ Personal interview of a missionary, September 16, 2005

³⁰⁴ However, according to income figures, poverty has *decreased* in Mtwara in recent years. In 2002, the GDP per capita in Mtwara Region was the third highest in mainland Tanzania (Issae 2005). This was due in large part to increased cashew nut sales, the area's main cash crop (ibid; and personal interview of a development worker, November 4, 2005). However, this rise in income is not yet reflected in the living standards of most of the area's residents.

³⁰⁵ Bratton et al.'s figure for agriculture as respondents' *main* occupation is 54 percent, whereas some other sources put the share of Tanzanians involved in smallholder agriculture higher, even at 80 percent.

³⁰⁶ Other ethnic groups in the region are Makua, Yao, Mwera, Ngindo and Matumbi (RIPS 2005).

³⁰⁷ This is the same ethnic group that lives in Northern parts of Mozambique.

³⁰⁸ Personal interview of a missionary, September 16, 2005

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ Interestingly, he also mentions that Anglicans and Catholics have often been in conflict with each other.

³¹¹ Also personal interview of a development worker, November 4, 2005

³¹² Personal interview, November 2, 2005

³¹³ According to a development worker, the level of education (both primary and secondary) in Mtwara has increased "tremendously" (personal interview, November 4, 2005).

³¹⁴ Personal interview, November 2, 2005

³¹⁵ These data are based on the 2000 census, and reflects growth rate from 1990-2000.

³¹⁶ Already in the 1980s, Luapula had "the nation's highest rate of mortality" (Gould 1989, 29). Also, according to the 2000 census, infant mortality rate is much higher in Luapula (138 per 1000 births) than in Zambia as a whole (110; Republic of Zambia 2004b).

³¹⁷ "Luapuluan women produce an average of 7.6 children in their lifetimes" (ibid, 28).

³¹⁸ Overall poverty is 81 percent, and "extreme" poverty is 69 percent.

³¹⁹ Overall poverty is 89 percent, and "extreme" poverty is 78 percent (ibid).

³²⁰ Personal interview of the District Planning Officer at Mansa District Education Board, February 7, 2006

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² Personal interview of an NGO staff member in Lusaka, January 16, 2006

³²³ Personal interview, February 23, 2006

³²⁴ Personal interview of an NGO staff member, January 16, 2006

³²⁵ Personal interview of an NGO staff member, January 11, 2006

³²⁶ Personal interview of an NGO staff member/donor representative, January 20, 2006

³²⁷ Personal interview, February 1, 2006

³²⁸ The program ended in 2002.

³²⁹ Although it did include participatory extension and research

³³⁰ Personal interview of a Finnish development worker, January 20, 2006

³³¹ Personal interview of Director of Development Planning, Mansa Municipality, March 1, 2006

³³² ended in December 2005

³³³ Personal interview of the Deputy District Commissioner for Mansa District, February 1, 2006. In both Mtwara Region and Luapula Province, this study chose to be limited on one district—that in which the provincial capital is located. One way this should affect findings is that due to vicinity of a (semi-)urban

area, residents in Mtwara Urban District and Mansa District probably have more access to information—and thus have higher awareness of rights and duties—than residents living further away from town. In fact Mansa District in Luapula is the only district in the province covered by radio frequency. One should note, however, that Mtwara and Mansa are still relatively small towns, with Mtwara Town having approximately 60-70,000 inhabitants (93,000 in Mtwara Urban District as a whole). Mansa Town has a similarly sized population, 50-60,000, although a much larger population in the district as a whole: 220,000. (This figure is a projection from the 2000 census which recorded 187,000 inhabitants; personal interview of a government officer in district, December 1, 2006).

³³⁴ Personal interview of an academic, University of Dar es Salaam, October 27, 2005

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ Also personal interview of a development worker (September 3, 2005), and government official (November 2, 2005)

³³⁷ In addition, one could argue that the Ufukoni Theatre Group has reached a significant number of people in the villages near Mtwara Town with their performances about citizens' rights and duties, as well as about topical issues (such as HIV/AIDS, abortion, and marijuana use by the youths), in a language and format that is understandable to listeners (personal interviews on October 5 and 19, 2005).

³³⁸ Personal interview of a government official/NGO employee, October 15, 2005

³³⁹ Personal interview, September 19, 2005

³⁴⁰ Personal interview of a former RIPS employee, October 15, 2005

³⁴¹ Personal interview, September 19, 2005

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ Personal interview of Lwaitama, October 27, 2005

³⁴⁴ However, even the 1977 Constitution did not have a Bill of Rights until 1984, which did not go into effect until 1988 (Gloppen 2003; personal interview of a government official/NGO employee, October 15, 2005). Further, the Bill of Rights is problematic, containing "certain clauses and controversial principles which in themselves can allow human rights violation or nullify their own authority in the protection of human rights" (Hellsten and Lwaitama 2003, 60). Moreover, "the Tanzanian attempt to combine both individualistic and communitarian approaches to human rights within a single legal document has . . . created some self-contradictory principles within the Bill itself, between the Bill of Rights and the rest of the Constitution as well as between the Constitution and the national laws" (ibid, 59).

³⁴⁵ Personal interview of a government official/NGO employee, October 15, 2005

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ Personal interview, September 22, 2005

³⁴⁹ Personal interviews, November 3 and 4, 2005

³⁵⁰ Ibid (November 3, 2005).

³⁵¹ Personal interview, November 2, 2005

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ Ibid.

³⁵⁴ Personal interview of a UNICEF representative in Mtwara Region, November 3, 2005

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ Council development official, November 5, 2005

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ These were listed as the issue areas in their HSF training by the Mbae Village leadership (personal interview, October 3, 2005)

³⁵⁹ Personal interview of a Community Development Officer, November 7, 2005

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

³⁶¹ Ibid.

³⁶² Personal interview, September 30, 2005

³⁶³ Ibid.

³⁶⁴ Other NGOs implemented it in other parts of Tanzania.

³⁶⁵ Contributions to the fund came from ten donor countries plus UNDP (ibid).

³⁶⁶ Personal interview, October 3, 2005

- ³⁶⁷ Ibid. Teaching materials were all in Swahili and they were funded by USAID (Hendra 2005).
- ³⁶⁸ Ibid.
- ³⁶⁹ Ibid.
- ³⁷⁰ Other churches are undoubtedly also important in spreading the “rights” message; however, the churches’ input is very difficult to define and measure.
- ³⁷¹ But it should be mentioned again that FODEP has organized training for ward Councilors; and according to the FODEP representative in Luapula, it also organizes conflict resolution workshops for political parties, and supports drama groups going out to communities and carrying out civic education through song, dance, and plays (personal interview, January 30, 2006).
- ³⁷² Personal interview of AVAP Programmes Manager, Lusaka, January 20, 2006
- ³⁷³ Ibid.
- ³⁷⁴ AVAP Programmes Manager, March 14, 2006
- ³⁷⁵ Ibid.
- ³⁷⁶ Personal interview, January 27, 2006
- ³⁷⁷ Ibid. However, voter education activities would be stopped a few months before the elections to prevent voter education from being confused with political parties’ election campaigns (AVAP Programmes Manager, January 20, 2006). This is the same idea that Agenda Participation 2000 in Tanzania follows in its voter education work.
- ³⁷⁸ AVAP proposal to Development Cooperation Ireland about planned activities in 2006-07, p.4.
- ³⁷⁹ Ibid.
- ³⁸⁰ Personal interview, February 14, 2006
- ³⁸¹ AVAP Provincial Coordinator, January 27, 2006
- ³⁸² AVAP civic educator, January 30, 2006
- ³⁸³ These organizations were mentioned by a NGOCC representative, Mansa (personal interview, February 14, 2006)
- ³⁸⁴ Ibid.
- ³⁸⁵ Ibid.
- ³⁸⁶ Ibid.
- ³⁸⁷ Personal interview of a donor representative, March 7, 2006
- ³⁸⁸ Personal interview of four MDWDA representatives, February 13, 2006
- ³⁸⁹ Ibid.
- ³⁹⁰ Ibid.
- ³⁹¹ Ibid.
- ³⁹² February 14, 2006
- ³⁹³ Ibid. The organization also does research.
- ³⁹⁴ Ibid.
- ³⁹⁵ Personal interview of AVAP Programmes Manager, January 20, 2006
- ³⁹⁶ Personal interview of two paralegals at LRF, February 22, 2006 (all information in this paragraph comes from these interviewees)
- ³⁹⁷ One development worker said it is difficult to determine in advance (i.e., before consulting people in each location) where the participatory approach has worked, and where it has not worked so well.
- ³⁹⁸ Personal interview of a government official, October 15, 2005
- ³⁹⁹ Further explanation for adding Shangani Ward will provided below where respondent selection is described.
- ⁴⁰⁰ Personal interview, September 30, 2005
- ⁴⁰¹ Ibid.
- ⁴⁰² Personal interview of the CHAWATA civic educator, October 3, 2005. All information in this paragraph, up until the next note, is from him.
- ⁴⁰³ Personal interview, September 30, 2005
- ⁴⁰⁴ Personal interview of the chairman of the theatre group, October 19, 2005
- ⁴⁰⁵ Personal interview of a member of the theatre group, October 5, 2005
- ⁴⁰⁶ Chairman of the theatre group, October 19, 2005
- ⁴⁰⁷ Member of the theatre group, October 5, 2005

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁹ Personal interview, September 30, 2005

⁴¹⁰ Chairman of the theatre group, October 19, 2005

⁴¹¹ Personal interview, February 14, 2006. Though this may be his opinion only, we could not identify any other civic education projects/programs either. The Councilor for the ward in which Chamalawa and Makasa are located did mention that in early 2004 the organization called Women for Change did come and conduct meetings in the ward; however, it is unclear whether residents from Chamalawa or Makasa attended these meetings.

⁴¹² Ibid.

⁴¹³ Personal interview, February 23, 2006

⁴¹⁴ Personal interview of a Community Development Officer, February 11, 2006

⁴¹⁵ Personal interview of Director of Development Planning, Mansa Municipality, March 1, 2006

⁴¹⁶ Meeting with the chief, February 2, 2006. Mabumba also has Peace Corps volunteers working on, fish pond and/or agricultural projects (ibid).

⁴¹⁷ Personal interview of a NGOCC representative, Mansa, February 14, 2006

⁴¹⁸ Personal interview, February 11, 2006

⁴¹⁹ Personal interview of the clinical officer, February 28, 2006

⁴²⁰ though the primary data collection (in Mbae and Mtawanya villages) had ended about 2 weeks earlier

⁴²¹ Hypothesis 5 will also be tested in conjunction with participation in the next chapter. Thus an overall assessment on hypothesis 5 will be provided at the end of Chapter 7.

⁴²² See Appendix F for a list of all explanatory and control variables.

⁴²³ The only exception is Table 6.1. on aggregate civic knowledge in which data on Zambia have been included as a point of reference—even though in it, a civic education variable was not significant.

⁴²⁴ It is important that the question about civic education exposure was phrased with reference to rights, as at least in Tanzania, when people hear “civic education” they often think of political parties (personal interview of Concern Worldwide representatives, September 29, 2005).

⁴²⁵ This information existed in written form.

⁴²⁶ See Appendices E and F.

⁴²⁷ Unlike most other sources of rights information, civic classes at school, of course, cannot be quantified with reference to the number of times a person has been exposed to training. Thus, one needs to be aware that the categories indicating overall (as well as formal) exposure refer to sources of rights information which are unequal in quantity and intensiveness. In most cases, respondents identified school-based civic education as a source of rights information (and thus this information is included in overall exposure). However, a few respondents indicated that they had not received rights information from any source, but then added that they have just learnt about their rights at school! In such cases (as with all similar incidents), the respondent’s answer was not included as part of the statistic of overall exposure while it was included in the statistic on the source of rights information in question.

⁴²⁸ Political representatives are not regarded as informal sources, but rather as a category that falls between formal and informal sources.

⁴²⁹ Where this and the next chapter refer to “Tanzanian(s)” and “Zambian(s),” what is meant is the study’s samples, drawn from geographically limited areas. Thus it is not argued here that findings apply to all of Tanzania or Zambia. This will be discussed more later.

⁴³⁰ A graph depicting *overall* rights education exposure would look very similar, with women’s share being somewhat closer to that of men in both countries (with 33% of such respondents being women in Tanzania, and 49% being women in Zambia).

⁴³¹ T-test: <.05

⁴³² See data in Appendix E.

⁴³³ “Civic education promotes knowledge of civil, human, and political rights, but it does not promote knowledge of socioeconomic rights.”

⁴³⁴ This refers to questions on rights and responsibilities, but not the question on government policies.

⁴³⁵ See Appendix E for what specific rights and responsibilities fall under each category.

⁴³⁶ Data for the “erroneous civic knowledge” variable are not discussed separately, as it suffices to mention that, unlike in most other aspects of civic knowledge, Zambians actually did worse here: 16 percent of

Zambians mentioned at least one erroneous item of civic knowledge, whereas in Tanzania 10 percent did. (See Appendix E for details.) Most of these data consist of respondents mentioning responsibilities as rights, or vice versa. In part, this was due to some respondents confusing rights and responsibilities. Therefore, as pointed out in the chapter on methods, understanding of various concepts is tied to the context—both language and culture. As Etounga-Manguelle describes “African” culture: “The concept of individual responsibility does not exist in our hypercentralized traditional structures. In Cameroon, the word ‘responsible’ translates as ‘chief.’ Telling peasants that they are all responsible for a group initiative is to tell them therefore that they are all chiefs—which inevitably leads to endless interpersonal conflicts” (2000, 71). Because it turned out during the research, that in the Bemba language there is not a clear distinction between rights and responsibilities, special attention was paid in Zambia to explaining to the respondents what the questions referring to these concepts meant.

⁴³⁷ Range of scores: 4-30 (versus that for Tanzanians: 0-27)

⁴³⁸ T-test: <.001

⁴³⁹ Their mean civic knowledge: 13.33; others’: 9.94

⁴⁴⁰ That is, 18-24 year-olds, 25-34 year-olds, 35-44 year-olds, 45-54 year-olds, and 55-64 year-olds

⁴⁴¹ T-test: <.05

⁴⁴² T-test for Tanzania: <.001; Zambia: <.05

⁴⁴³ This is not shown by the figure but is shown in Appendix E.

⁴⁴⁴ See Appendix E for details.

⁴⁴⁵ The difference in the average number of women’s rights identified by men and women is only significant in Tanzania (T-test: $p < .001$). There, men identified on average 1.93 women’s rights, while women identified 1.20. (Respective figures for Zambia: 2.37 and 2.13).

⁴⁴⁶ T-test: <.05 for both countries. Results would be similar when replacing formal with overall self-reported CE exposure, with the exception that in Zambia the higher level of knowledge of those exposed to civic education would not be significant.

⁴⁴⁷ In addition, Appendix E reports data on the couple of respondents who mentioned obeying/listening to/following/respecting government as a citizen’s responsibility. Even though this “knowledge” type is not part of analysis, it is instructive to note that Tanzanian respondents mention items falling under this category more often.

⁴⁴⁸ T-test: <.001

⁴⁴⁹ These results therefore also contrast with the finding by Inglehart and Baker (2000) that people in lower GNP-per-capita countries tend to refer to economic survival when asked to rate the importance of various things, while those in richer countries refer more to self-expression. Of course, the present study and that of Inglehart and Baker are not comparable as this study’s survey did not ask respondents to rate the importance of rights, but it is nevertheless indicative that responses can be so different in two countries with roughly equal levels of per-capita income.

⁴⁵⁰ This is with the exception of the “expression and initiating” category in which, although lower (0.12), women’s scores are not significantly different than men’s (0.19).

⁴⁵¹ Significant at the <.05 level

⁴⁵² Significant at the <.05 level

⁴⁵³ With the exception of ownership rights; however, even in this differences are not significant

⁴⁵⁴ Women’s mean score: 0.93; men’s: 0.85

⁴⁵⁵ This type of self-reported civic education was chosen to be utilized here simply because it is arguably the most relevant one (with the “overall” type also including family, friends, media, and others).

⁴⁵⁶ The only exception to this is the “expression and initiating” category in which there was no significant difference between those exposed to civic education and those not exposed to it *within the Zambian sample*. According to a t-test, the significance levels for group mean differences in each of the categories where the differences were significant in Tanzania and Zambia, respectively, were: (1) Total civic knowledge: <.001, <.05; (2) all civil, human, and political rights: <.001, <.001; (3) expression and initiating: <.05 (Tanzania); and (4) participation and voting: <.05, <.001.

⁴⁵⁷ This, as mentioned above, is with the exception of the Zambian data on “expression and initiating,” within which group mean differences were not significant.

⁴⁵⁸ In regressions reported in these and all other tables, missing cases have been excluded “pairwise”; thus cases which had a missing value on some variable were still included in analyses of relationships between other variables.

⁴⁵⁹ Although notice that the overall measure of civic education exposure includes those who said they have learnt about their rights at school

⁴⁶⁰ In contrast, the same cannot be said by referring to the “R² block” values for social structure, cognitive awareness, and institutional because each of these scores only refers to the contribution that the explanatory group in question makes beyond the variables listed above it. For example, the .121 value for cognitive awareness means that education and media exposure explain 12.1 percent of variance in the dependent variable when only the structural factors are controlled for. Note: in all tables in this and the next chapter, civic education variables were added to the regression as the last block; therefore, the block R² value for CE variables will always refer to the distinctive contribution to the R² made by CE variables *after controlling for all other factors*. For this reason any relationships found between the CE variables as a whole and the various outcomes will be important, reflective of the unique contribution of civic education in explaining them.

⁴⁶¹ That is, the UNICEF program in which children’s rights were taught

⁴⁶² This can be inferred from the fact that data on men did not make it to the table.

⁴⁶³ Other possible sub-samples—such as Tanzanian women or the full Zambian sample—are not included because in them, a civic education variable did not correlate sufficiently with the dependent variable to make it to the model, and/or make a statistically significant contribution once in the model. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, this was the rule followed in the presentation of all regressions in this chapter (with the exception of data on aggregate civic knowledge).

⁴⁶⁴ that is, 55 percent, versus 41 percent in Zambia’s case

⁴⁶⁵ “R² block” value

⁴⁶⁶ Which most of the time refers to Council civic servants

⁴⁶⁷ See Appendix E.

⁴⁶⁸ This refers to the R² value.

⁴⁶⁹ This is suggested, not proven.

⁴⁷⁰ See Appendix E.

⁴⁷¹ But notice that because for this variable, data came from a sub-sample, the variable does not a measure lack of efficacy in the sample as a whole; therefore, one needs to be careful when interpreting data.

⁴⁷² See Appendix E for details.

⁴⁷³ Refer to the previous chapter.

⁴⁷⁴ Any differences are not statistically significant.

⁴⁷⁵ T-test: <.05

⁴⁷⁶ N = 20

⁴⁷⁷ Significant at the p<.001 level

⁴⁷⁸ Significant at the p<.05 level

⁴⁷⁹ With p = .069

⁴⁸⁰ All other respondents were imputed a zero for this variable.

⁴⁸¹ See Appendix E.

⁴⁸² This was from responses to some “why not” questions (mainly on participation). See Appendix E for details.

⁴⁸³ See Appendix E for details.

⁴⁸⁴ Statistically significant at the p<.001 level.

⁴⁸⁵ Statistically significant at the p<.05 level

⁴⁸⁶ Statistically significant at the p<.05 level

⁴⁸⁷ At the p<.05 level

⁴⁸⁸ See Appendix E.

⁴⁸⁹ T-test: <.001.

⁴⁹⁰ T-test: <.05.

⁴⁹¹ In analyzing differences in levels of psychological engagement it is indeed important to know how “politics” is viewed by different groups of people. While politics has a rather dirty name in Zambia,

interestingly, it is viewed--according to Tanzanian research assistant Anthony Nyange—similarly by many in Tanzania, though it is also commonly associated with things related to the village government.

⁴⁹² T-test: <.05

⁴⁹³ In Tanzania the means for the two groups are 2.42 and 2.38, respectively, while in Zambia they are 1.86 and 1.80.

⁴⁹⁴ That is, for lack of efficacy on 7 Tanzanian men, and lack of interpersonal trust on 2 Tanzanian women!

⁴⁹⁵ That is, one's satisfaction with the level of influence (s)he has on decision-making in the community

⁴⁹⁶ This is also indicated by the negative coefficient for education in the full Zambian sample (although the coefficient is not significant).

⁴⁹⁷ See all the variables considered in Appendix F.

⁴⁹⁸ Though, as suggested, causes for voting turnout are difficult to test in an environment in which most citizens vote anyway—an outcome expected also in this study

⁴⁹⁹ That is, the variable “rural”

⁵⁰⁰ With corroboration of H4 referring to Zambia

⁵⁰¹ See Appendix F.

⁵⁰² Thus mere attendance at community meetings is excluded.

⁵⁰³ that is, inadequate variance. But data on voting in both community and national elections are reported in Appendix E.

⁵⁰⁴ See Appendix E.

⁵⁰⁵ According to a t-test, the difference is significant at the $p < .001$ level.

⁵⁰⁶ In that index, too, the difference in means is statistically significant at the $p < .001$ level.

⁵⁰⁷ That is, 4, or 3 percent, versus 33, or 24 percent, respectively

⁵⁰⁸ But excluding attendance at community meetings

⁵⁰⁹ Cronbach's Alpha = .631

⁵¹⁰ Cronbach's Alpha = .455

⁵¹¹ The differences in mean between the sexes are significant (t-test for Tanzania: $<.001$; Zambia: $<.05$).

Though Figure 7.3. refers to communing and contacting, the same results (that is, significance of differences in means, as well as the relative differences between the countries) apply to communing.

⁵¹² Visual expression of men's and women's levels of participation would look very similar if communing alone was used as the dependent variable. This indicates that the extent to which women participate less than men is not dependent on whether one uses a broader measure involving contacts with the Councilor, or only the measure including intra-community activities.

⁵¹³ In the Zambian sample there are 10 respondents in this category.

⁵¹⁴ The significance ($<.05$ in one-way ANOVA) applies to the comparison of each two-group set. However, significance is “barely missed” when analyzing differences in these groups' mean scores for communing alone.

⁵¹⁵ T-test: $<.001$

⁵¹⁶ Whether reporting overall exposure or exposure to formal sources

⁵¹⁷ This refers to communing and contacting.

⁵¹⁸ Again, remember that the 5.3 percent refers to CE's contribution to the model's R^2 *after the contribution of all other variables has already been filtered out.*

⁵¹⁹ In three of the five regressions

⁵²⁰ One should also note that the coefficient for affiliation with the dominant party would likely have been higher if the survey had asked respondents directly about what party they support, rather than assessing level of party affiliation based on data from the open-ended question on group affiliations in the village.

⁵²¹ When communing is the dependent variable, this measure of efficacy is not significant.

⁵²² However, when analyzing the level of participation by Zambian women alone, membership in church groups is another type of group affiliation which significantly boosts communing.

⁵²³ And in some cases also age and distance from the nearest town, as suggested by Table 7.1.

⁵²⁴ To be sure, the category on awareness also subsumes education, which has been found to significantly influence level of participation (positively). However, in this study the share of educated respondents was too low to facilitate detecting the influence of education. This is not problematic as the whole idea of the study was to understand patterns of participation among the relatively uneducated.

- ⁵²⁵ Due to very limited variance in data, caused by question wording: “Have you *ever* attended a community meeting?”
- ⁵²⁶ See previous note.
- ⁵²⁷ 92 percent for Tanzania and 95 percent for Zambia
- ⁵²⁸ Out of about 1,000 adult villagers
- ⁵²⁹ Out of about 1,200 adults
- ⁵³⁰ In principle, all adult villagers are required to attend village assembly meetings.
- ⁵³¹ The number of adults in each of Mabumba’s two village section is not known.
- ⁵³² that is, February 2006
- ⁵³³ The Afrobarometer measures attendance “at least once in the past year.”
- ⁵³⁴ In the figures, the smaller than N = 140 sample size per country stems from the fact that a total of 18 respondents (11 in Tanzania and seven in Zambia) said they have never attended a village meeting.
- ⁵³⁵ This difference is significant at $p < .001$. The extent to which Zambians participate at community meetings is the only activity in this study in which women’s level of participation is equal to that of men.
- ⁵³⁶ A figure on *overall* exposure to rights education would look very similar.
- ⁵³⁷ T-test: $< .001$
- ⁵³⁸ This finding applies to both overall and formal (pictured) rights education.
- ⁵³⁹ That is probably one reason that Zambian Councilors have received civic education (though they have also received it in Tanzania).
- ⁵⁴⁰ See Appendix E.
- ⁵⁴¹ Note that considering the scale used this means that Zambians on average have contacted their Councilor between “rarely” and 2-3 times, while Tanzanians have contacted theirs between one time and rarely. However, the difference in Zambians’ and Tanzanians’ level of contact with their Councilor is not statistically significant.
- ⁵⁴² Also, the figure is in fact 2 percent higher for rural Tanzanians.
- ⁵⁴³ The difference is significant at the $< .05$ level. See Appendix E for details on the scale.
- ⁵⁴⁴ Significant at the $< .05$ level
- ⁵⁴⁵ Significance: $< .05$
- ⁵⁴⁶ The other recent one has been CJF.
- ⁵⁴⁷ Another institutional explanation for contacts with the Councilor is found in the model explaining the behavior of Zambian men: in that model voting in the past national election was the only significant predictor of contacts with the Councilor, beyond civic education given by government staff.
- ⁵⁴⁸ Beyond contacting the Councilor, this refers to raising issues with others (see below).
- ⁵⁴⁹ Interpersonal trust is a particularly powerful predictor of Zambian *men*’s participation at meetings (not displayed). In a regression explaining as much as 61 percent of these men’s participation at meetings, lack of interpersonal trust had a coefficient of $-.353$, being significant at the $p < .001$ level.
- ⁵⁵⁰ See specifics in Chapter 4.
- ⁵⁵¹ Differences in means for the country samples (t-test) is significant at the $p < .001$ level.
- ⁵⁵² See Appendix E for more details on extent of participation in groups.
- ⁵⁵³ T-test: $< .05$
- ⁵⁵⁴ See Chapter 5.
- ⁵⁵⁵ In Zambia the equivalent share is 66 percent (2005 Afrobarometer).
- ⁵⁵⁶ T-test: $< .05$
- ⁵⁵⁷ As will be shown below, this also applies to a comparison of Tanzanian and Zambian men and women, respectively.
- ⁵⁵⁸ However, the difference in means is not significant.
- ⁵⁵⁹ Significant at the $< .05$ level
- ⁵⁶⁰ This refers to RIPS, CJF, and HSF.
- ⁵⁶¹ It also explains almost as large a share of variance as the “best fit” regression in the whole study: that explaining Tanzanian women’s knowledge of rights and responsibilities related to expression and initiating (see Table 6.2.), which regression explained 82 percent of variance.
- ⁵⁶² See Appendix E.

⁵⁶³ This is suggested by a much higher correlation among Zambian men than Zambian women between family size and raising issues with others (Pearson's $r = .424$ and $.251$, respectively).

⁵⁶⁴ To be sure, another instance in which civic education did not boost Tanzanian women's level of participation was in raising issues with others; but this being a group based act, a positive impact for civic education was not necessarily expected either.

⁵⁶⁵ Refer to the regression results in both this and the previous chapter.

⁵⁶⁶ Also—and in an important area of cognition—Zambian women's level of interest toward politics was higher than that of men, as seen in Chapter 6.

⁵⁶⁷ Although the variable “farmer” was also included—it did not turn out to significantly determine participation. That is, against expectations non-farmers were not more knowledgeable nor did they participate more actively.

⁵⁶⁸ Such a role was cited by 53 percent of Tanzanians and 82 percent of Zambians.

⁵⁶⁹ These are further discussed below.

⁵⁷⁰ Both comments are from Tanzania.

⁵⁷¹ Personal interview, October 27, 2005

⁵⁷² Note that these percentages are of all respondents, that is, not only of those who have not contacted the Councilor. Therefore if these were expressed as share of those who have not contacted the Councilor, percentages would be much larger.

⁵⁷³ It is very difficult to make a definite assessment of the relative magnitude of the impact on knowledge, attitudes, and participation as these impacts are spread throughout several regressions.

⁵⁷⁴ Indeed this study borrowed from the Abrobarometer.

⁵⁷⁵ The only exception is the last regression presented in Table 7.3., which explained raising issues with others. In that case Zambian data explain a tiny bit more of variance than data from Tanzania.

⁵⁷⁶ In fact as mentioned, there was *no* detected effect on knowledge of socioeconomic rights.

⁵⁷⁷ Tanzanians were not asked about this.

⁵⁷⁸ The interviewees—in both countries—also emphasized that to be effective, civic education needs to be continuous, and not a one-off exercise, done only at election time.

⁵⁷⁹ This was pointed out by the Tanzanian research assistant Anthony Nyange.

REFERENCES

Personal Interviews

Note: Only the persons' affiliation at the time of interview is mentioned here, though in some cases--such as when interviewees have only recently taken up their current positions--the interviewees' contribution to this study was based more on their experience and lessons learnt in previous organizations/institutions/posts than in the current ones.

Tanzania

Agenda Participation 2000 (AP2000; DSM) Kulaba, Moses, Executive Secretary

CHAWATA (Mtwara)	Chiwaula, Abdallah
Concern Worldwide (Mtwara)	Magembe, Mustapha S.; Mwalewela, Clement
Embassy of Finland (DSM)	Santala, Satu, Counsellor & Deputy Head of Mission
European Commission Delegation (DSM)	Kolb, Henriette, Programme Officer, Rural Development & Governance; Veller, Ingeborg, Programme Officer, Rural Development
Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission (Mtwara)	Heino, Olavi; Heino, Riitta
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (DSM)	Lwehabura, Claire, Project Officer
Kepa (Service Center for Finnish Development NGOs; DSM)	Kukkamaa, Tiina, Liaison Officer
Local Government Reform Programme (DSM)	Glynn, Brendan, Human Resources & O. D. Adviser
MEDI (Mtwara)	Mpini, A.; Ndedya, Elizabeth
MRENGO (Mtwara)	Mkopoka, Allan
MSEDA (Mtwara)	Milanzi, Elizabeth

Mtukwao Community Media (Mtwara)	Kinyero, Orestus; Swallah, Swallah S.
MTUWETU (Mtwara)	Mleche, Eddah
Mtwara-Mikindani Municipal Council	Mhecha, Eliya Oswald, Municipal Economist; Msalya, Bright, Agricultural Municipal Solicitor, Legal Department; Mwanache, Sylvia, Community Development Officer; Ntakabanyula, Fredrick M., Municipal Director; Nyange, Anthony, Community Development Officer
Mtwara Region	Issae, Wahab, Regional Education Officer & Assistant Administrative Secretary for Social Services; Mbila, Alhaj Yahya F., Regional Administrative Secretary; Pangisa, Smythies E., Assistant Administrative Secretary; Shirima, Isidore L., Regional Commissioner
Namayanga Primary School	Swalehe, Mussa, Teacher
Pensioners Union of Tanzania (DSM)	Sarakikya, Eva, Secretary General
Scanagri Finland Oy (DSM)	Äikäs, Unto, Regional Director, East Africa Operations
SNV Tanzania, Netherlands Development Organisation (DSM)	Adkins, Julie
TEMCO (Mtwara)	Karugendo, Fr. Privatus
Ufukoni Primary School	Sualehe, Suleiman Nangomwa, Teacher
Ufukoni Theatre Group (Mtwara)	Mohammed, Matola; Thomas, Msafiri
UNICEF (DSM)	Gulleth, Mohamed
University of Dar es Salaam	Lwaitama, Azaveli, Professor, Philosophy Unit, Department of Political Science;

Ngware, Suleiman S. A., Professor of
Development Studies, Institute of
Development Studies (IDS);
Swantz, Marja-Liisa (also University of
Helsinki; retired)

1. Mbae Village

Amri, Abdallah
Nakuhwa, Ahmad H.

Village Chairman
Village Executive Officer (VEO)

Abdala, Abdukahari
Abdala, Mayimuna
Abdala, Mohammed
Abdalah, Salima
Abdallah, Feruz
Bakali, Amina
Bakali, Habiba
Bakari, Ali
Bakari, Hasani
Bakili, Suwanina
Bilali, Saidi
Chingiulumwali, Fatu Hamisi
Dadi, Pili
Hamisi, Rashidi D.
Hasani, Ahamadi
Hassani, Ally
Hassani, Mohammedi
Issa, Fatuma
Juma, Somoe
Kasiyano, Barinaba
Kelebwe, Jafora
Kulaga, Mohamedi S.
Kunoja, Isa
Manueli, Aginesi
Masudi, Salima
Mawazo, Hawa S.
Mkohola, Fatu
Mkutano, Josefu
Mkwavila, Aly M.
Mohammed, Ali
Mohammedi, Ashura
Mohammedi, Mwanahamisi
Mpepe (Mzee)
Mtanga, Mustafa

Mtuli, Asham
 Mtungata, Hamisi
 Mtungata, Yusufu Ali
 Mussa, Fatuma
 Mussa, Lukia
 Musuway, Agata
 Mwenge, Hasani Selemani
 Mwiidini, Jahaya
 Namnyamba, Bakali Isa
 Papodile, Dadi
 Rafeli, Adulesi
 Sadiki, Amina
 Saidi, Halima
 Saidi, Mwanahawa
 Saidi, Mwashabani
 Saidi, Sada
 Saidi, Sadi
 Salumu, Fatuma
 Salumu, Hamidu
 Samuli, Nulu
 Shaibu, Salumu
 Shomari, Simama
 Silimu, Abdalah S.
 Silimu, Fatu S.
 Silimu, Hawana S.
 Stefano, Leonadi
 Tunole, Suwanina

2. Mtawanya Village

Bakiri, Abdalah Hasani
 Likoma, Ismaeli Ali

Village Chairman
 Village Executive Officer (VEO)

Abdallah, Hassani
 Abdallah, Hawa
 Abdrehmani, Tatu
 Ahamadi, Zakia
 Alimakame, Mohamedi
 Alois, Agnestina
 Aluwisi, John
 Amili, Ali
 Athumani, Mwanahamisi
 Bakari, Asha
 Bakari, Athumani
 Bushiri, Abdrehmani

Darusi, Mazaliwa
Hamisi, Somoe
Juawewe, Issa Hamza
Juawewe, Lukia Abdallah
Jumbe, Ali Mussa
Kasanga, Eliah A.
Kasiki, Ali Swalehe
Kasiki, Zakia
Leba, Damiani
Licholonjo, Amida Hassani
Likamtubya, Esha
Lilembo, Mussa Selemani
Makolo, Asha
Makolo, Mussa Abdallah
Maulidi, Jafari
Mbango, Amina Mohamedi
Mbwana, Salimu
Mchanama, Mohamedi
Mchoma, Zakaria Mbwana
Mdachi, Asia
Mdengi, Asha Issa
Mdodo, Halima Bakari Dadi
Mikidadi, Hadija Hamisi
Mikidadi, Sharifa
Mkaluma, Saidi
Mkanda, Sofia Ismaili
Mkanjela, Saidi Bakari
Mnayove, Ali Salim
Mohamed, Issa
Mohammed, Zainabu
Mpuai, Bakari Muhammed
Mrope, Maiku
Mrope, Makosa H.
Msafiri, Mahmudi Saidi
Mtandu, Teodori
Mwinyialawi, Makini Bint
Nangavanti, Mohamedi M.
Panjapi, Zainabu
Saidi, Somoe
Salimu, Fatu
Salimu, Sharifa
Seifu, Josefina
Seifu, Sharifa
Selemani, Mahmoudu

3. Shangani Ward

Amri, Saidi
 Abdalah, Husna
 Ayoub, Samwel
 Chingvile, David
 Chirumba, Rehema
 Chiwango, Francis
 Hassan, Issa
 Kapanda, John
 Kiwike, Primo
 Mellah, Zainabu
 Millumba, Benedict
 Mohammed, Zuhura
 Mpahi, Rehema
 Mussa, Jaza
 Mwalimu, Hussein
 Mwera, Victor
 Nassoro, Biasha (Mohammed)
 Phiri, Rosemary
 Twalibu, Rashidi

Zambia

Anglican Diocese of Luapula (Mansa)	Tembo, Fr. Erwin, Training Chaplain
Anti-Voter Apathy Project (AVAP)	Bwalya, Lombe, Civic Educator (Mansa); Kabunda, Martin, Civic Educator (Mansa); Masumbuko, Janet, Provincial Coordinator (Mansa); Mulubwa, Brian, Civic Educator (Mansa); Mushitu, Derick, Programmes Manager (Lusaka); Mwelaisha, Hope, Information Officer (Mansa); Phiri, Ernest, Civic Educator (Mansa)
Catholic Diocese (Mansa)	Mpansa, Fr.
Christian Missions to Many Lands (CMML), Mansa Chapel	Chungu, Nelson, Youth Leader
Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR, Lusaka)	Mwambwa, Savior, Programme Office Capacity Building & Networking

Department of Development, Justice, and Peace (DDJP; Mansa) (part of the Catholic Centre for Justice, Development; CCJDP)	Mulenga Chansa, Henry, Paralegal Officer; Kalusa, Francis Michael, Governance Coordinator
Development Cooperation Ireland (Embassy of Ireland, Lusaka)	Yezi, Abdon, Good Governance Manager/Advisor
Embassy of Finland (Lusaka)	Kanene, Anne, Programme Officer; Ndhlovu, Elizabeth, Sector Advisor (in education and forestry)
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO; Mansa)	Seketeni, Daisy, National Technical Training Officer (Institutions/Participation), Luapula Food Security Nutrition Action and Communication Project [Also socio-economic planner in Luapula provincial planning office]
Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP, Mansa)	Charles Mutale, Provincial Treasurer
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES, Lusaka)	Sikombe, Kathryn, Programme Coordinator
Legal Resources Foundation (LRF, Mansa)	Chanda, Everisto, Paralegal Officer & Supervisor; Yumba, Gilbert, Paralegal Officer
Luapula Provincial Government	Ng'ambi, Mwifwa, Assistant Secretary General
Mabumba Rural Health Centre	Tembo, Ignatius, Clinical Officer
Mansa District Education Board	Njamu, Samuel, District Planning Officer; Zimba, Robert, District Education Board Secretary
Mansa District Women Development (MDWDA)	Chibela, Margaret K., Executive Association Secretary; Kabwe, Roda S., Treasurer; Kapansa, Roydah, Board Secretary; Kunda, Myness G., Senior Committee Member; Mushili, Elizabeth C., Vice Chairperson
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives	Simbeye, Ayson, Block Supervisor

(Mansa)	for Mansa Central Constituency
Ministry for Community Development and Social Services	Chileshe, Mary, Community Development Officer (Mabumba); Simute, Monica, Community Development Officer (Mansa)
Municipal Council of Mansa	Chipamina, Albert Mwansa, Councilor for Chilyapa Ward (MMD); Kapumpa, Bwanga K., Town Clerk & Chief Executive Officer; Katwishi, Dominic, Mayor & Councilor for Chansungu Ward (MMD); Sondala, Martin, Director, Department of Development Planning
Office of the President (Mansa)	Makwaya, Mpasa C., District Administrative Officer & Deputy District Commissioner
Programme for Luapula Agricultural and Rural Development (PLARD, of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Unit for Southern Africa; Lusaka)	Mickels-Kokwe, Gun, Chief Technical Advisor
Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) Church, North Zambia Field (Mansa)	Sinyangwe, Samuel, Pastor
Saint Clement's High School (Mansa)	Chuba, Lilian, Teacher; Yamba, Jonathan, Teacher
Traditional Authority (Mansa District)	Chishala, John, Secretary for Headman Sebastian Chilambe Nkomanga (Mabumba); Chief Mabumba; Kunda, Davies, Headman (Makasa) Mulubwa, Theresa, Headwoman (Chamalawa)
UNICEF (Lusaka)	Anttila, Päivi, Assistant Project Officer, Child Protection; Kamwendo, Annie, Project Officer, Child Protection
United Church of Zambia (UCZ, Mansa)	Tandawika, Lucky, Pastor & Elder

University of Zambia (UNZA, Lusaka)	Momba, Jotham, Professor, Department of Political and Administrative Studies; Mutesa, Fredrick, Professor, Department of Development Studies
Zambia Civic Education Association (ZCEA, Lusaka)	Mulenga, Judith M. A., Executive Director
Zambia Community Schools Secretariat (ZCSS, Lusaka)	Chileshe, Priscilla, Vice Board Chairperson & Acting Executive Secretary
Zambia National Women's Lobby (ZNWL)	Ngosa, Felix, Programme Officer, Documentation and Research (Lusaka); Sikombe, Christine, Board Member of Luapula Province (Mansa)

1. Chamalawa Village

Mulubwa, Theresa	Headwoman
Chileshe, Mwenya Molton	
Chilufya, Handford	
Chiposo, Lazarus Chibesa	
Chisenga, Lazarous	
Chola, Justine	
Chushi, Beauty	
Kambobe, Felistus	
Kapapi, Rhodah	
Kapesa, Angelah	
Kasuba, Rosemary	
Lindasho, Christine	
Lindasho, James	
Mabula, Loveness	
Malama, Lizzy	
Meleki, Fales	
Mulenga, Given	
Mulenga, Sarah	
Mumba, Francis	
Mumba, James Zacchariah	
Musonda, Andrew	
Musonda, Florence	
Mwaba, Joseph	
Mwansa, Alfonsina	
Mwansa, Mulenga	

Mwansa, Patrick Kalwashi
 Mwape, Esther
 Mwape, Frida Kasongo
 Mwape, Juster
 Ndakala, David
 Nguso, Phillies
 Tembah, Chola Simon

2. Mabumba Village

Lwanika, Gabriel	Chairman of Mabumba West section
Nkomanga, Sebastian Chilambe	Chairman of Mabumba East section

Bwalya, Belinda
 Bwalya, Ruth
 Bweupe, Eddie Mwandwe
 Chalwe, Emeldah
 Chalwe, Hildah
 Chama, Brenda
 Chanda, Dickson
 Chilambe, Florence
 Chilufya, Able
 Chilufya, Persweeden
 Chipata, Alexandra
 Chishala, Johnny
 Chishimba, Alfonsio
 Chiwamine, Vernatius
 Chonganya, Dyness
 Chonganya, Mannix
 Drake, Lenox Lwanga
 Emmanuel, Peter Lwanika
 Evans, Mumba
 Haggai, Mwaba
 Kabaso, Harriet
 Kalaba, Cecilia
 Kalaba, Felix
 Kalaba, Jennifer
 Kalaba, Joseph
 Kalaba, Joseph Dimas
 Kalengule, Emmanuel
 Kapindi, Levy Mwansa
 Kaputula, George
 Kaputula, Peter Katebe
 Kapya, Judith
 Kashiya, Alex

Kasongo, Given
 Kunda, Beatrice
 Kunda, Lazarous
 Lapsen, Sashi
 Lombe, Musonda
 Lungu, Cecilia
 Lwando, Charles
 Lwanika, Joseph
 Malelo, Ernest
 Mambwe, Brian
 Mpemba, Susan
 Mpemba, Violet
 Mponda, Vernatio
 Mponda, Violet Chipulu
 Mukobe, Rachael Semba
 Mulamba, Raphael
 Mulima, Christinah Kunda
 Mulubwa, Albina
 Mupeta, Maureen
 Musaila, Asa
 Musamba, Petronellah
 Musuku, Albertina
 Mwaba, Fabian
 Mwandama, Francis
 Mwansa, Jennet
 Mwansa, Wilson
 Mwape, Bernadeta M.
 Mwape, Hildah
 Mwenya, Deophister
 Mwila, Evans
 Nambeye, Idah
 Nambeye, Everlyn
 Nanzowa, Linda
 Ngosa, Jacqueline
 Pandwe, Patrick Semba
 Simbeye, Judith
 Tomas, Mulubwa

3. Makasa Village

Kunda, Davies

Headman

Bwalya, Catherine
 Chikwanda, Mayble
 Chilawa, Evans

Chilufya, Davies
 Chilufya, Francis
 Chilufya, Violet
 Chimembesi, Albertina Mununga
 Kaimbi, Jonas
 Kalaba, Mumba
 Kaluba, Petronellah
 Kasonga, Elipet
 Kataya, Prisca
 Katebe, Moses
 Kunda, Leontina
 Kunda, Maggie Chola
 Matanda, Albert
 Matanda, Christinah
 Mazimba, Dorcas
 Msebo, Christine
 Mulubwa, Cosmas Chama
 Mumba, Beatrice
 Mumba, Francis
 Mumba, Grace
 Mumba, Joyce Phiri
 Mumba, Michael
 Mumba, Oliver Malama
 Muntebe, Mpandika R. N.
 Muselela, Theresa Chifokola
 Muselera, Evans
 Musongo, Boniface
 Mwange, Victoria
 Mwepwe, Anthony Lottie
 Mwewa, Sarah
 Nkonde, Hildah
 Ponde, Boniface
 Shalo, Brendah

Interviews Conducted as Part of Exploratory Stages of the Study

1. Brussels (& Leuven)

ActionAid International	Maycock, Joanna, EU Representative
Aprodev	Sohet, Karine, Policy & Information Officer
DG Development	Bangma, Pieter, Civil Society and NGO Liaison;

	Boucey, Mark, Desk Officer, Kenya & Tanzania;
	Ortiz de Zúñiga, Francisco, Desk Officer, Zambia;
	Pascual, Alfonso, Policy Desk Officer
DG External Relations	Whiteley, Charles, Policy Desk Officer – Human Rights and Democratisation
ECDPM	Bossuyt, Jean, Programme Coordinator; De Tollenaere, Marc, Senior Programme Officer
EuropeAid	El-Kum Molina, Susana, Programme Officer; Johansson, Eva, Geo Coordinator, Tanzania & Uganda; Marion, France, Evaluation Officer – Evaluation Manager; Nagoda, Jeremy, EuropeAid, Member of Commission Staff; Riehm, Adolf, Geo Coordinator, Zambia
European Parliament	Van Hecken, Guido, Secretariat for Committee on Development (also ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly)
South Research (Leuven)	Marleyn, Oscar; Van Esbroeck, Dirk
Vredeseilanden (Leuven)	Akoyi, Teopista, Manager, Country Programs
World Bank	Laryea, Guggi, Consultant
2. <u>Other</u>	
Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Helsinki)	Eräpohja, Sakari, Director, Division for Evaluation and Internal Auditing; Ruohomäki, Olli, Advisor, Department for Development Policy
Institute of Cultural Affairs (International)	Okrah, Lambert, Secretary General

MWENGO (Harare)	Mbogori, Ezra, Executive Director
Scanagri Finland Oy (Vantaa)	Lundström, Tor, Managing Director
UNDP, Civil Society Organizations Division (New York)	Kane, Thierno, Director
University of Helsinki, Institute of Development Studies	Gould, Jeremy, Professor; Koponen, Juhani, Professor
University of Jyväskylä, Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy	Laakso, Liisa, Professor

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Appendix A

SURVEY USED IN TANZANIA (IN KISWAHILI)

UTAFITI UNAOHUSU MAONI YA WANAKIJI JUU YA USHIKISHAJI NDANI
YA JAMII NA KATIKA SIASA*Utangulizi*

Habari za leo? Mameamkaje/Mmeshindaje? Jina langu ni _____.

Nitawahoji wananchi wa kijiji hiki kwa niaba ya Ms. Satu Riutta ambaye ni mwanachuo katika Chuo Kikuu cha Georgia, mjini Atlanta, Marekani Kaskazini (USA). Ni raia a Finland na yuko hapa kijijini kama mgeni wa shirika la MEDI Mtwara. Yeye anafanya utafiti huu kama sehemu ya masomo yake ya shahada ya juu (yaahi PhD). Tunasisitiza kuwa hatujatumwa hapa na serikali, chama au mfadhili yeyote, ila kwa heshima tunapenda kupata maoni ya wakaaji wa mikoa ya Mtwara na Lindi. Tunapenda kusikia maoni ya wanakijiji juu ushirikishaji ndani ya jamii na katika siasa, pamoja na kusikia jinsi gani mmewahi kushiriki katika maswala haya ya jamii. Lengo moja la utafiti huu ni kujua kwa sababu gani watu wanashiriki shughuli za maendeleo ya jamii zao. Utafiji wa namna hii unaweza kusaidia katika kuweka baadaye mipango mipya ya maendeleo katika vijiji vyetu.

Wewe umechaguliwa katika mahojiano haya kwa sababu ndiwe mwanakijiji wa umri wa mtu mzima katika kijiji kimojawapo cha Mikoa ya Mtwara na Lindi. Utahojiwa ukikubali kwa hiari yako tu. Usipopenda kuhojiwa una haki ya kukataa. Tena ukikubali kuhojiwa una haki ya kuacha kujibu maswali fulani ukiona ni vigumu kuyajibu. Tunaheshimu majibu yako, kila jibu lako ni sahihi, ujibu tu kwa kufuata maoni yako ya moyoni. Kwa heshima yote tunapenda kujua maoni yako uliye raia wa Tanzania na mwanakijiji wa kijiji hiki cha _____.

Majibu utakayotoa yatatunzwa na mfanya utafiti, hakuna mtu mwingine atakayepata kujua umejibu nini. Majibu yako yatumika kwa ajili utafiti tu, katika utafiti huu huu na labda utafiti mwingine utakaofanywa na mhusika huyu huyu.

Sasa. Uko tayari kwa mahojiano? Hebu, tuanze, basi!

Ili Tupate kuelewa maoni yako tunapenda kujua habari zako zaidi.*1. Jinsi:*

- | | |
|---|------|
| 1 | Mume |
| 2 | Mke |

2. Umezaliwa mwaka gani? _____

3. Hali ya ndoa:

- | | |
|---|---------------------|
| 1 | Nimeoa/nimeolewa |
| 2 | Mjane |
| 3 | Nimeachika/nimeacha |
| 4 | Sijaoa/sijaolewa |

4. Umezaa watoto wangapi? _____

5. Sasa hivi una watoto wangapi kwa kutunza? _____

6. Umeishi kijiji hiki kwa muda gani? _____

7. Umefikia kiwago gani cha elimu?

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1 | Sikusoma |
| 2 | Elimu ya msingi (sikumaliza – nilimaliza) |
| 3 | Elimu ya secondari (sikumaliza – nilimaliza) |
| 4 | Elimu ya juu |
| 5 | Elimu ya chuo |

8. Kwa sasa unashughulika na nini?

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1 | Ni mwanafunzi |
| 2 | Mkulima |
| 3 | Biashara |
| 4 | Ufundi: _____ |
| 5 | Nimeajiriwa, wapi? _____; Una ajira gani? _____ |
| 6 | Sina ajira |

9. Wewe ni muumini wa dini gani?

- | | |
|---|------------------------------|
| 1 | Mwislamu |
| 2 | Mkristo, dhehebu gani? _____ |
| 3 | Sina dini |

10.1. Unapata wapi habari mbalimbali zinazoto kea hapa kijijini? _____

10.2. Unapata wapi habari zinazo husu nchi yetu Tanzania? _____

11. Je, una sikiliza redio kwa ajili ya habari za nchi ya Tanzania?

- 1 Hapana
- 2 Mara kwa mara
- 3 Kila wiki
- 4 Kila siku

12. Je unapendelea kusoma habari za nchi yetu katika magazeti?

- 1 Hapana
- 2 Mara kwa mara
- 3 Kila wiki
- 4 Kila siku

13. Una nafasi ya kufuata habari za nchi yetu katika Televisheni (TV)?

- 1 Hapana
- 2 Mara kwa mara
- 3 Kila wiiki
- 4 Kila siku

* * *

Sasa nauliza maswali machache jinsi unavyoshiriki katika siasa na shughuli za jamii.

14. Kwa jumla, unavutwa na habari za siasa?

- 1 Hapana
- 2 Kidogo
- 3 Sana
- 4 Sijui kujibu

15. Je, kwa jumla, unapenda kushiriki shughuli za jamii yako?

- 1 Hapana
- 2 Kidogo
- 3 Sana
- 4 Sijui Kujibu

16. Umewahi kuwa mjumbe au kiongozi katika kamati, kikundi, chama cha ushirika wowote hapa kijijini?

- 1 Ndiyo
- 2 Hapana

17. Jibu lako kama ni ndiyo, taja kamati, kikundi, chama cha ushirika na wajibu wako:

18. Katika kaya yako kuna mtu yo yote mwingine aliyewahi kuwa mjumbe au kiongozi katika kamati, kikundi, chama cha ushirika wo wote hapa kijijini?

- | | |
|---|--------|
| 1 | Ndiyo |
| 2 | Hapana |

19. Jibu lako kama ni ndiyo, taja ni nani na kamati, kikundi, chama cha ushirika na wajibu wake: _____

20. Serekali yetu ina sera mbalimbali kwa ajili ya kuboresha maisha ya wana nchi. Taja sera za taifa unazozifahamu:

- | | |
|---|-------|
| 1 | _____ |
| 2 | _____ |
| 3 | _____ |
| 4 | _____ |
| 5 | _____ |
| 6 | _____ |
| 7 | _____ |
| 8 | _____ |

21. Unapenda kushiriki majadiliano yanayohusu siasa?

- | | |
|---|-----------------------|
| 1 | Ndiyo, mara kwa mara |
| 2 | Ndiyo, mara moja moja |
| 3 | Hapana, sipendi |

22. Ukijibu ndiyo, una zungumzia maswala gani? _____

23. Je umewahi kuhudhuria mikutano ya kijiji?

- | | |
|---|--------|
| 1 | Ndiyo |
| 2 | Hapana |

24. (A) *Kama jibu lako ni ndiyo mchango wako ulikuwa wa namna gani?* [Interviewer: **circle all that apply**]

- 1 Nimesikiliza mazungumzo
- 2 Niliuliza maswali
- 3 Nilitoa maoni yangu
- 4 Nilishiriki katika kuandaa Mkutano
- 5 Mengineyo: _____

(B) *Kama jibu lako ni hapana, hukuhudhuria kwa sababu?* [Interviewer: **circle all that apply**]

- 1 Sikuwa na haja
- 2 Sikuwa na muda
- 3 Sikuwa na usafiri
- 4 Sikuwa na taarifa ya mkutano
- 5 Nimekatishwa tamaa
- 6 Niliona sina mchango wo wote
- 7 Mikutano haifanyiki

25. *Je umewahi kushirikiana na wengine kujenga hoja ya jambo ulilodhani ni muhimu kwa jamii?*

- 1 Ndiyo
- 2 Hapana

26. (A) *Kama jibu lako ni ndiyo, mara ngapi?* _____ *Na katika mambo gani?* _____

(B) *Kama jibu lako ni hapana, kwa nini?*

27. *Je unayo nafasi ya kutoa mawazo wako katika maamuzi yanayofanywa na familia yako?*

- 1 Ndiyo
- 2 Hapana

28. Kama jibu lako ni hapana unafikiri ni kwa sababu gani? _____

29. Je unafikiri unayo nafasi ya kutoa mawazo wako katika maamuzi yaliyofanywa na jamii?

- 1 Ndiyo
- 2 Hapana

30. Kama jibu lako ni hapana unafikiri ni kwa nini? _____

31. Katika shida, unatafuta msaada kutoka kwa nani? **[Interviewer: If the respondent is not sure what “problems” refer to, then ask him/her whom (s)he would first contact in (a) private matters, and (b) community matters.]**

- 1 The village chairperson
- 2 The mtaa/kitongoji leader
- 3 The ward Councilor
- 4 The DED/MD/CD
- 5 Religious leaders
- 6 Representatives of NGOs/CBOs [Community Based Organizations] in this area
- 7 Other citizens here in this area/neighborhood
- 8 Family
- 9 Other (specify) _____
- 10 Don't know

[Note: Question 31 is partly in English because it was added after translation of the questionnaire. But since the interviews were conducted orally, the question was still asked in Kiswahili.]

32. Unaonaje, uongozi wa wilaya wanajali maoni na shida za wananchi?

- 1 Ndiyo
- 2 Hapana
- 3 Nusu, nusu
- 4 Sijui kujibu

33. Je umewahi kupata nafasi ya kujadiliana na diwani wako juu ya maswala ya maendeleo?

- 1 Ndiyo
- 2 Hapana

34. Kama jibu lako ni ndiyo, mara ngapi? _____

35. Je katika mazungumzo yako na diwani uliridhika?

- | | |
|---|--------|
| 1 | Ndiyo |
| 2 | Hapana |

36. Kama jibu lako ni hapana, kwa nini? _____

* * *

Katika sehemu inayofuata tunauliza maswali kuhusu haki na wajibu wa wananchi.

37. Wewe kama raia wa Tanzania una haki gani? _____

38. Je unafahamu kuwa wanawake na watoto wana haki zao?

- | | |
|---|--------|
| 1 | Ndiyo |
| 2 | Hapana |

39. Kama jibu lako ni ndiyo taja haki za watoto na wanawake: _____

40. Wewe kama raia wa Tanzania una wajibu gani kwa jamii yako na nchi yako kwa ujumla?

41. Serekali ya Tanzania ina wajibu gani kwa raia wake: _____

42. Je ulishiriki katika uchaguzi uliopita katika mtaa/kitongoji/kijiji?

- | | |
|---|--------|
| 1 | Ndiyo |
| 2 | Hapana |

43. Kama jibu lako ni hapana, kwa nini? _____

44. Je ulishiriki katika uchaguzi wa kitaifa mwaka 2000?

- 1 Ndiyo
- 2 Hapana

45. Kama jibu lako ni hapana, kwa nini? _____

46. Je utashiriki katika uchaguzi mwaka huu?

- 1 Ndiyo
- 2 Hapana

47. Kama jibu lako ni hapana, kwa nini? _____

* * *

Maswali ya mwisho yanahusu mafunzo ya elimu ya uraia.

48. Zaidi ya kujua haki yako ya kupiga kura, umewahi kupata mafunzo juu ya haki na wajibu wa uraia kwa ujumla?

- 1 Ndiyo
- 2 Hapana

49. Kama jibu lako ni ndiyo, mafunzo hayo uliyapata wapi? _____

50. Mafunzo haya ya elimu ya uraia yalitolewa na nani? _____

51. Mafunzo juu ya haki na wajibu wako na wa serekali yamekuwa na manufaa gani kwako?

* * *

Swali la muisho ni juu ya utafiti huu na maswali yakee.

52. Unafikiri kuna swali ambalo ungeulizwa na hukuulizwa? Una neno lo lote kuhusu dodosa hili?

Asante sana!

Appendix B

SURVEY USED IN TANZANIA (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)

STUDY ABOUT VILLAGERS' VIEWS TOWARD, AND EXPERIENCES IN,
PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS & POLITICS

Interviewer's introduction: Good day. My name is _____. I am doing this interview to assist Ms Satu Riutta, who is a university student from Georgia State University in Atlanta, the USA. She is doing this research as part of her PhD degree. We do not represent the government, any political party, or donor. We are studying the views of villagers in Mtwara and Lindi Region toward participation in community affairs and politics, and also their experiences in participation. One goal is to understand what makes people participate in the development activities of their communities. Such information may be important in future development planning.

You were selected to participate in the study because you are an adult villager in Mtwara/Lindi Region.

Your participation in this study is voluntary. You have the right to refuse to be in this study. If you decide to participate, you may skip questions if you wish.

Please also know that your answers will be treated confidentially. This means that you will not be identified personally in any published results. Your responses will only be used for this (and future) study by the researcher.

Are you ready? Let's begin!

For us to understand your views better, we would like to know something about your background.

1. Sex:

- | | |
|---|--------|
| 1 | Male |
| 2 | Female |

2. Which year were you born? _____

3. What is your marital status?

- 1 Married
- 2 Widower
- 3 Divorced
- 4 Never married

4. How many children have you given birth to? _____

5. How many children are you currently taking care of? _____

6. How long have you lived in this village/community? _____

7. What is the highest level of formal education you have attained?

- 1 No formal education
- 2 Primary school (partial or completed)
- 3 Secondary school (partial or completed)
- 4 Post-secondary school (university)
- 5 Vocational school

8. What do you do?/Where do you get your living from?

- 1 Student
- 2 Farming
- 3 Trade & commerce [literally: small businesses]
- 4 Artisan: _____
- 5 Wage-employee, where? _____; Task: _____
- 6 Unemployed

9. What is your religion?

- 1 Islam
- 2 Christianity, church: _____
- 3 I don't have a religion

10.1. What is your source of local news? _____

10.2. What is your source of national news? _____

11. *Do you listen to national news on the radio?*

- 1 No
- 2 Every now and then
- 3 Every week
- 4 Every day

12. *Or do you prefer reading national news in the newspapers?*

- 1 No
- 2 Every now and then
- 3 Every week
- 4 Every day

13. *Do you have a chance to follow national news on TV?*

- 1 No
- 2 Every now and then
- 3 Every week
- 4 Every day

* * *

Now I will ask you a few questions about your participation in political and community affairs.

14. *Generally speaking, are you interested in politics?*

- 1 No
- 2 Somewhat interested
- 3 Very interested
- 4 Don't know

15. *Generally speaking, are you interested in your community's affairs?*

- 1 No
- 2 Somewhat interested
- 3 Very interested
- 4 Don't know

16. *Have you been a member or a leader in any (village) committee, group [e.g., cooperative], or community?*

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

17. If yes, please state the committee(s), group(s), and/or communities: _____

18. Has anybody else in your household been a member or a leader in any (village) committee, group [e.g., cooperative], or community?

- 1 Yes
2 No

19. If yes, please state the committee(s), group(s), and/or communities: _____

20. The government has various policies (to improve the lives of citizens). Please state those policies that you are aware of:

1 _____
2 _____
3 _____
4 _____
5 _____
6 _____
7 _____
8 _____

21. Have you ever discussed politics with others [literally: do you enjoy discussing politics]?

- 1 Yes, every now and then
2 Yes, once in a while
3 No, I don't

22. If yes, which issue(s) have you discussed [do you enjoy discussing] with them? _____

23. Have you ever attended a village meeting?

- 1 Yes
2 No

24. (A) *If yes, how have you participated in these meeting(s)?* [Interviewer: circle all that apply]

- 1 Listened to what was being said
- 2 Asked question(s)
- 3 Expressed my opinion
- 4 Participated in organizing the meeting
- 5 Other, what? _____

(B) *If not, why not?* [Interviewer: circle all that apply]

- 1 Not interested [literally: no need]
- 2 No time
- 3 No transportation to the meeting
- 4 Didn't know that a meeting took place
- 5 Was discouraged from attending
- 6 Felt that could not contribute
- 7 The meetings are not held.

25. *Have you ever joined others to raise an issue that you thought needed attention in your community?*

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

26. (A) *If yes, how many times?* _____ *And which issue(s)?* _____

(B) *If not, why not?* _____

27. *Do you feel you can adequately influence the decisions made in your family?*

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

28. *If not, why do you think not?* _____

29. *Do you feel you can adequately influence the decisions made in your community?*

- 1 Yes
 2 No

30. *If not, why do you think not?* _____

31. *When you have a problem, where do you first seek help from?*

- 11 The village chairperson
 12 The mtaa/kitongoji leader
 13 The ward Councilor
 14 The DED/MD/CD
 15 Religious leaders
 16 Representatives of NGOs/CBOs [Community Based Organizations] in
 this area
 17 Other citizens here in this area/neighborhood
 18 Family
 19 Other (specify) _____
 20 Don't know

32. *Does the leadership of this district care about people's questions and concerns?*

- 1 Yes
 2 No
 3 Fifty-fifty
 4 Don't know

33. *Have you ever contacted your Ward Councilor in matters pertaining to development?*

- 1 Yes
 2 No

34. (A) *If yes, how often?* _____
 (B) *If not, why not?* _____

35. *Were you satisfied with the outcome of your contacting the Councilor?*

- 1 Yes
 2 No

36. *If not, why not?* _____

* * *

In the next section we will ask questions that concern citizens' rights and responsibilities.

37. *What are the rights of citizens in Tanzania?* _____

38. *Are you aware that women and children have some rights of their own?*

- 1 Yes
 2 No

39. *If you answered yes, please list some rights of women and children:* _____

40. *What are the responsibilities of Tanzanian citizens toward their community and country?* _____

41. *What responsibilities does the government of Tanzania have toward citizens?*

42. *Did you vote in the last mtaa/kitongoji/village (i.e., "suburb"/sub-village/village) elections?*

- 1 Yes
 2 No

43. *If not, why not?* _____

44. *Did you vote in the last national elections in 2000?*

- 1 Yes
2 No

45. *If not, why not?* _____

46. *Do you intend to vote in the upcoming national elections?*

- 1 Yes
2 No

47. *If not, why not?* _____

* * *

Our final questions have to do with civic education.

48. *Have you ever been taught about rights and responsibilities, other than those that have to do with voting?*

- 1 Yes
2 No

49. *If yes, where?* _____

50. *Who taught you?* _____

51. *What utility has being so educated (about your rights and responsibilities) had for you?* _____

* * *

The last question has to do with your opinion on this interview.

52. Is there anything else that should have been asked in this study or that the researcher needs to know or anything that you would like to say about the topic or this questionnaire? _____

Thank you very much for participating!

Appendix C

SURVEY USED IN ZAMBIA (IN BEMBA)

UKUSAMBILILA PA FYO ABAKELA MUSHI BATONTONKANYA NO
KUPITAMO MU KUISANSHA ATEMWA UKUITUMPWA MU MILIMO NA
MASHIWI YA FIKANSA AYA MU MUSHI

Ubulondoloshi bwa kwa Kepusha: Mwapoleni Mukwai? Nga Balishani Mukwai? Ishina lyandi nine _____. Mu kwipusha kwandi ndeiminako ba Satu Riutta, abo ababa abekashi ba calo ca Finland kabili abasambi pesukulu likalamba ilitwa Georgia State University mu Atlanta, mu calo ca United States of America. Tuli nabena kuno pakuti tufwailishe ifishinka fimo fimo ifyo filekabilwa ukubomfiwa (a) pakuti fingafwilisha mukuleta ubuyantanshi kuli ino incende, elyo (b) nokwafwilisha ba Satu abo balekabila ukufisenda ku Amerika nokuyafibomfya mu masambililo ya PhD. Mu milimo yesu iyi, tatuleiminina ko ulubali lwa buteko atemwa akabungwe ka fikansa akali konse, atemwa utubungwe utwafwilisha mu ndalama atemwa mu fyuma fimbi. Mumucinshi mukwai twishile mukusambililako kubekashi ba mumushi mwa _____. Ifyo baitumpa mumilimo iyalekanalekana pamo namashiwi yafikansa aya muno mushi. Umulimo wesu uukalamba kwishiba bwino icilenga abekalamushi ukuitumpa mumashiwi nemilimo yabuyantanshi iya mumushi muno. Ifi fishinka tulefwailisha fyakwafwilishako ubuyantanshi kuntanshi.

Mukwai mwaliisontwa ukuti tulanshanye nenu pamashiwi aya yene pantu mulibamo pabakalamba abamumushi mwa _____.

Mukwai tulelomba ukuti nganabakwata akashita akanono twingalanshanyako pamashiwi ayayene. Kuti twatemwa sana ngachakuti mwasumina ukumipushako amepusho panono. Kuti mwayasuka amepusho yonse, ayo tamulefwaya kuti yena mwayasha ukwabula ukwasuka. Mukwai ubwasuko bwenu bonse bukankala elyo mwasuke amepusho ngomo mulefwaila mwebene.

Amashiwi tulelanshanya nemwe tuleyasunga munkama, teyakusansanya panga yonse nifwe fwekatukayabomfya mumusambililo yaba Satu. Kabili neshina lyenu tatwakalilete pabwelu, nelyo ifi fishinka fingakabilwa ukubomfiwa mukuleta imilimo imo iyabuyantanshi mu ncende ino.

Bushe mukwai baletusuminisha ukuti tubepushoko amepusho?

Pakuti twishibe bwino imyasukile yenu, katubale twishibe ubumi bwenu ubwakumyaka yakunuma.

1. Nibani:

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| 1 | Baume |
| 2 | Banakashi |

2. Mwafyelwe mumwaka nshi? _____

3. Bushe

- 1 Mwalyupa/Ukupwa
- 2 Muli bamukamfwilwa
- 3 Mwalilekana nabena mwenu
- 4 Tamwaupapo/Tamwaupwapo

4. Muli nabana benu banga abakuifyalila? _____

5. Bushe bana banga musunga? _____

6. Mwaikala imyaka inga muli uno mushi? _____

7. Mumasambililo bushe mwafikile mu grade shani?

- 1 Nshayapo kusukulu
- 2 Ku Primale school (1-7)
- 3 Ku Sekondale school; gledi 9 (fomu 3): _____/gledi 12 (fomu 5): _____
- 4 Ku masambililo ayakalamba ayapamulu (university)
- 5 Ku koleji kukusambilila imilimo yakuminwe;

Amasambililo ya ku koleji ayalenga imwe ukubomba incito nangu ukwikala bwino

Bukafundisha _____

Bu nasi ubwakubomba mufipatala _____

Incito iya kulolesha nokusambilisha pafya bulimi _____

Incito yakuminwe, iya bu kapenta elyo nefya kupanga
panga _____

Incito iyafyamakwebo/elyo nefya bukalemba _____

Nashimbi incito ishishilumbwilwe pamulu _____

8. Milimo nshi mubomba iyo muyisungilamo?

- 1 Ndasambilila; mu gledi _____
- 2 Ndalima
- 3 Nine shimakwebo
- 4 Ndabombe milimo yakuminwe iya _____
- 5 Ndabombe imilimo yamalipilo yapamweshi ku _____
Momba ncita ya _____
- 6 Nshibomba
- 7 Ndimulondo wesabi

9. Mupepa kwisa

- 1 Ku Islam
- 2 Ku calichi ca bena kristu ica _____
- 3 Nshipepa

10.1. Bushe ilyashi lyamumushi mulyumfwila ukufuma kwisa? _____

10.2. Ilyashi lya calo mulyumfwila kwisa? _____

11. Bushe mulomfwako ilyashi lyacalo ukufuma kufilimba?

- 1 Awe, cinshi cilenga? _____
- 2 Limo limo
- 3 Cilamulungu
- 4 Cilabushiku
- 5 Patali patali, cinshi cilenga? _____

12. Nakalimo mulabelenga ilyashi lya calo mumapepala ya calo?

- 1 Awe, cinshi cilenga? _____
- 2 Limo limo
- 3 Cilamulungu
- 4 Cilabushiku
- 5 Patali patali, cinshi cilenga? _____

13. Bushe mulakonka ilyashi lyacalo pamulabasa wafikope?

- 1 Awe, cinshi cilenga? _____
- 2 Limo limo
- 3 Cila mulungu
- 4 Cila bushiku
- 5 Patali patali, cinshi cilenga? _____

* * *

Mukwai nalamwipusha amepusho palwakitumpa kwenu mu mashiwi ayalekanaleka namashiwi ya fikansa aya mumushi wenu.

14. Bushe mwalisendamo lubali mufikansa fyacalo?

- 1 Awe, cinshi cilenga? _____
- 2 Panono
- 3 Sana
- 4 Nshishibe bwino

15. *Bushe mwalitemwa ukuposako amano ku filecitika mumushi?*

- 1 Awe, cinshi calenga? _____
- 2 Panono
- 3 Sana
- 4 Nshishibe bwino

16. *Bushe mwalibapo bamembala atemwa intungulushi yacilonganino icili conse ica muno mushi (Ichapala kopaletive nangu cimbi)?*

- 1 E mukwai
- 2 Awe, ninshi yalenga? _____

17. *Nga mwasumina mukwai landeni amashina ya ifilonganina nangu utubungwe, nemilimo mubomba atemwa mwalebomba. _____*

18. *Bushe kwaliba umo munganda mummyenu uwabapo membala atemwa mubutungushi bwacilonganino atemwa akabungwe akalikonse mumushi?*

- 1 E mukwai
- 2 Awe, ninshi yalenga? _____

19. *Ngamwasumina mukwai landeni amashina yafilonganino nangu utubungwe babamo, nemilimo babomba atemwa balebomba. _____*

20. *Ubuteko bwalikwata amafunde atemwa imilimo iingi iyakutwala ubuyantanshi bwabekala calo pantanshi. Lumbulenipo amafunde atemwa imilimo iyabuteko iyabuyantanshi iyo mwaishiba.*

- 1 _____
- 2 _____
- 3 _____
- 4 _____
- 5 _____
- 6 _____
- 7 _____
- 8 _____

21. Bushe mwalitemwa ukulanda pelyashi lya fikansa fya calo?

- 1 Limo limo
- 2 Patali patali
- 3 Awe, nshesha; cinshi calenga? _____

22. Nga mwasumina, malyashinshi mwatemwa ukulandapo? _____

23. Mwalitala mwasangwako ku cilonganino atemwa mitingi ya mushi ilifye yonse?

- 1 E mukwai
- 2 Awe

23.1. Niisa mitingi? _____

24. (A) Nga mwasumina, nimbalinshi mwasendeleko mu mitingi? [**Interviewer: circle all that apply**]

- 1 Kumfwakofye ifyalelandwa
- 2 Kwipusha amepusho
- 3 Ukulandapo ifya kumutima wandi
- 4 Ukwafwilishako ukupekanya mitingi
- 5 Fimbi, balumbule _____

(B) Ngabakana, balande ico tabasangilwako kumitingi atemwa ukulongana kwa mumushi? [**Interviewer: circle all that apply**]

- 1 Nshifwayafye nshantemwafye
 - 2 Nshakwata inshita
 - 3 Nshakwata transport yakuila ku mitingi
 - 4 Nshishiba ilya baletaka ama mitingi
 - 5 Balimfupula mukulongana
 - 6 Namona kwati tapali ifyo ningaposapo
 - 7 Takuba ba mitingi. Cinshi calenga ati ba mitingi belabako? _____
- _____

25. Pamo nabantu bambi, mwalitala mwaimyapo ilyashi ilyo mwamwene ukuti likankala ku bekala mushi lifwile ukulandwapo?

- 1 E mukwai
- 2 Awe

26. (A) Nga mwasumina, miku inga mwaimishepo ilyashi? _____ Lyashinshi
mwaimishe? _____

(B) Nga mwakana, ninshi tamwimisha ilyashi lyakulandapa fimikumine? _____

27. Bushe mulamona ukuti mulapindulula sana amafunde ayapangwa pa nganda
pamwenu?

- 1 E mukwai
- 2 Awe

28. Ngamwakana, ninshi mwakanina? _____

29. Bushe mulamona ukuti mulapindulula sana amafunde ayapangwa mumushi mu
mwenu?

- 1 E mukwai
- 2 Awe

30. Ngamwakana, ninshi mwakanina? _____

31. Ngamwasanga ubwafya ubuli bonse, bushe nibani muyako kubwafwilisho. [**Kepusha:**
Ngacakuti kasuka tomfwikishe umo 'ubwafya' bulolele, bepusheni umuntu
bengabutukilako (a) ilyo bali nobwafya ububakumine beka atemwa (b) ilyo
balinobwafya ubukumine umushi.]

- 1 Mwine Mushi
- 2 Imfumu
- 3 Ba ward Councilor
- 4 Ba Mayor
- 5 Intungulushi shaku Church
- 6 Abeminishi batubungwe tushili twabuteko (NGOs and CBOs)
- 7 Abena mupalamano
- 8 Abalupwa
- 9 Bambi (balumbule amashina) _____
- 10 Katwishi

32. Bushe intungulushi shamu district shilasakamana kumepusho ne fintu fikumine
atemwa ifilesakamika abantu?

- 1 E mukwai
- 2 Awe
- 3 Panono
- 4 Katwishi

33. *Mwalitala mwakumanyapo atemwa mwaipushapo ba Councilor pamulandu wabuyantanshi?*

- 1 E mukwai
- 2 Awe

34. *Ngamwasumina, miku inga? _____*

35. *Bushe mwalisekelemo pakulanshanya mwalanshenye naba Councilor?*

- 1 E mukwai
- 2 Awe

36. *Ngamwakana, ninshi mwakanina? _____*

* * *

Mucipande cala konkapo, twalamwipusha pamulandu was nsambu ne milimo yabekala calo.

37. *Bushe ninsambunshi mwakwata ngabekashi bacalo ca Zambia? _____*

38. *Bushe mwalishiba ukuti banamayo nabana banono bali ikwatila nabo insambu shabo beka?*

- 1 E mukwai
- 2 Awe

39. *Ngamwasumina, lumbulenipo insambu shimo ishabanamayo nabana abanono:*

40. *Nga bekashi bacalo ca Zambia, milimo nshi mwakwata atemwa mubombela umushi wenu ne calo cenu?*

41. *Ngo buteko, bushe milimo nshi bwakwata ku bekala calo? _____*

42. *Bushe mwalisendeleko ulubali mukusala kwa kulekelesha kwa chikaya ukwa ma sections na ma wards ilyo ba Ward Councilor basalilwe?*

- 1 E mukwai
- 2 Awe

43. *Nga tamwasendeleko lubali cinshi calengele?* _____

44. *Bushe mwalisendeleko ulubali mukusala kwa kulekelesha kwa chinkumbawile ukwa calo ukwa mumwaka wa 2001?*

- 1 E mukwai
- 2 Awe

45. *Nga tamwasendeleko lubali, cinshi calengele?* _____

46. *Bushe muli namapange yakusendako ulubali mu kusala uku ku leisa uno mwaka?*

- 1 E mukwai
- 2 Awe

47. *Nga mwakana cinshi mwakanina?* _____

Mukwai amepusho ayakulekelesha yakumine ku misalile ne misabankanishishe yelyashi ya bwikashi bwabantu (Civic education).

48. *Mwalishiba insambu shenu ishakusala. Mwalitala amupokelelapo atemwa ukufundwapo pansambu ne milimo ya bekala calo?*

- 1 E mukwai
- 2 Awe

49. *Ngamwasumina, nikwisa bamifundile?* _____

50. *Nibanani bamifundile?* _____

51. *Fintu nshi fyatumbukamo atemwa mwasangamo mu kusambillila pansambu ne milimo yenu, pano nensambu ne milimo yabuteko?* _____

* * *

Ilipusho lyakulekelesha lili pamitontonkanishe yenu fye mweka.

52. *Bushe pali ifi fyonse pafyo tumwipwishe atemwa ifyo tatumwipwishe ifyo mwingatemwa twaishiba palyashi na mepusho twacilalandapo?* _____

53. *Ninshilanshi nangula intuntuko iyo imwe mwingamona ukuba iisuma mukubomfya pakusambilisha abantu palwa nsambu shabo elyo nemibombele yabo?* _____

Twatotela sana mukwai pa kashita twalanshanya nenu.

Appendix D

SURVEY USED IN ZAMBIA (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)

STUDY ABOUT VILLAGERS' VIEWS TOWARD, AND EXPERIENCES IN,
PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS & POLITICS

Interviewer's introduction: Good day. How are you? My name is _____.
I am interviewing the residents of this village on behalf of Ms Satu Riutta, who is a national of Finland and a university student at Georgia State University in Atlanta, USA. We are here to collect information that will be used to (a) evaluate the prospects for any future development projects in this area, and (b) for the PhD research of Ms Riutta who will take the results to the USA for further study. We do not represent the government, any political party, or donor. We would respectfully wish to learn about the views of villagers in _____ toward participation in community affairs and politics, and also their experiences in participation. One of our goals is to understand what makes people participate in the development activities of their communities. Such information may be important in future development planning.

You were selected to participate in the study because you are an adult villager in _____.

Your participation in this study is voluntary. You have the right to refuse to be in this study. If you decide to participate, you may skip questions if you wish. We respect your answers. Every answer is correct. Therefore, please answer the way you really feel about each question.

Please also know that your answers will be treated confidentially. This means that you will not be identified personally in any published results. Your responses will only be used for this (and future) study by the researcher, and when evaluating the need for any development projects in this area.

Are you ready? Let's begin!

For us to understand your views better, we would like to know something about your background.

1. Sex:

- 1 Male
- 2 Female

2. Which year were you born? _____

3. What is your marital status?

- 1 Married
- 2 Widower
- 3 Divorced
- 4 Never married

4. How many children of your own do you have? _____

5. How many children are you currently taking care of? _____

6. How long have you lived in this village? _____ years/months

7. What is the highest level of formal education you have attained?

- 1 No formal education
- 2 Primary school (partial or completed)
- 3 Secondary school; Grade 9 (Form 3): _____ / Grade 12 (Form 5): _____
- 4 Post-secondary school (university)
- 5 Vocational school;

Professional training:

Teacher's: _____

Nursing: _____

Agricultural: _____

Trades, e.g., carpentry: _____

Commercial/secretarial: _____

Other, what? _____

8. What do you do? (What is your main source of income?)

- 1 Student; Grade level: _____
- 2 Farming
- 3 Trade & commerce [small businesses]
- 4 Artisan: _____
- 5 Wage-employee, where? _____; Task: _____
- 6 Unemployed
- 7 Fisherman/-woman

9. *What is your religion?*

- 1 Islam
- 2 Christianity, church: _____
- 3 I don't have a religion

10.1. *What is your source of local news?* _____

10.2. *What is your source of national news?* _____

11. *Do you listen to national news on the radio?*

- 1 No, why? _____
- 2 Every now and then
- 3 Every week
- 4 Every day
- 5 Rarely, why? _____

12. *Or do you prefer reading national news in the newspapers?*

- 1 No, why? _____
- 2 Every now and then
- 3 Every week
- 4 Every day
- 5 Rarely, why? _____

13. *Do you have a chance to follow national news on TV?*

- 1 No, why? _____
- 2 Every now and then
- 3 Every week
- 4 Every day
- 5 Rarely, why? _____

* * *

Now I will ask you a few questions about your participation in political and community affairs.

14. *Generally speaking, are you interested (do you want to know what is happening) in politics?*

- 1 No, why? _____
- 2 Somewhat interested
- 3 Very interested
- 4 Don't know

15. *Generally speaking, are you interested in your community's affairs?*

- 1 No, why? _____
- 2 Somewhat interested
- 3 Very interested
- 4 Don't know

16. Have you been a member or a leader in any (village) committee, cooperative, association, or another group?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No, why? _____

17. *If yes, please state the committee(s), cooperative(s), association(s), and/or other group(s), and your role in them:* _____

18. *Has anybody else in your household been a member or a leader in any (village) committee, cooperative, association, or another group?*

- 1 Yes
- 2 No, why? _____

19. *If yes, please state the committee(s), cooperative(s), association(s), and/or other group(s), and their role(s) in them:* _____

20. *The government has various policies (to improve the lives of citizens). Please state those policies that you are aware of:*

- 1 _____
- 2 _____
- 3 _____
- 4 _____
- 5 _____
- 6 _____
- 7 _____
- 8 _____

21. Do you like discussing politics?

- 1 Yes, every now and then
- 2 Yes, once in a while
- 3 No, I don't; Why? _____

22. If yes, which issue(s) do you generally discuss with others? _____

23. Have you ever attended any village meeting (or meeting in the village)?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

23.1. If yes, which one(s)? _____

24. (A) If yes, how have you participated in these meeting(s)? [**Interviewer: Circle all that apply**]

- 1 Listened to what was being said
- 2 Asked question(s)
- 3 Expressed my opinion
- 4 Participated in organizing the meeting
- 5 Other, what? _____

(B) If not, why not? [**Interviewer: Circle all that apply**]

- 1 Not interested [literally: no need]
 - 2 No time
 - 3 No transportation to the meeting
 - 4 Didn't know that a meeting took place
 - 5 Was discouraged from attending
 - 6 Felt that could not contribute
 - 7 The meetings are not held. Why are they not held? _____
-

25. Have you ever joined others to raise an issue that you thought needed attention in your community?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

26. (A) If yes, how many times? _____ And which issue(s)? _____

(B) If not, why not? _____

27. Do you feel you can adequately influence the decisions made in your family?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

28. If not, why do you think not? _____

29. Do you feel you can adequately influence the decisions made in your community?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

30. If not, why do you think not? _____

31. In case of any (a) personal problem, who do you first seek for assistance? In case of any (b) problem having to do with the community, who do you first seek for assistance?

- 1 The village headperson
- 2 The chief
- 3 The ward Councilor
- 4 The mayor
- 5 Religious leaders
- 6 Representatives of NGOs/CBOs [Community Based Organizations] in this area
- 7 Other citizens here in this area/neighborhood
- 8 Family
- 9 Other (specify) _____
- 10 Don't know

32. Does the leadership of this district care about people's questions and concerns?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Fifty-fifty
- 4 Don't know

33. *Have you ever contacted your Ward Councilor in matters pertaining to development?*

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

34. (A) *If yes, how many times?* _____

(B) *If not, why not?* _____

35. *Were you satisfied with the discussions you had with the Councilor?*

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

36. *If not, why not?* _____

* * *

In the next section we will ask questions that concern citizens' rights and responsibilities.

37. *What kinds of rights do you have as a citizen of Zambia?* _____

38. *Are you aware that women and children have some rights of their own?*

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

39. *If you answered yes, please list some rights of women and children:* _____

40. *What kinds of responsibilities do you as a citizen of Zambia have toward your community and country?* _____

41. *What responsibilities does the government of Zambia have toward citizens?*

42. *Did you vote in the last local elections (on village level)?*

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

43. *If not, why not?* _____

44. *Did you vote in the last national election in 2001?*

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

45. *If not, why not?* _____

46. *Do you intend to vote in the upcoming national elections?*

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

47. *If not, why not?* _____

* * *

Our final questions have to do with civic education.

48. *You are aware of your right to vote. Have you ever received any other information/education about citizens' rights and responsibilities (Has anybody ever told you about your rights)?*

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

49. *If yes, where?* _____

50. *Who taught you?* _____

51. *What utility did your being informed/educated about your rights and responsibilities have for you?*

* * *

[The following two questions were asked in reverse order – i.e., first Question 53., and then Question 52.]

The last question has to do with your opinion on this interview.

52. *Is there anything else that should have been asked in this study or that the researcher needs to know or anything that you would like to say about the topic or this questionnaire?*

53. *What do you think could be the best way/source of information about your rights and responsibilities?(What do you think is the best way to inform people about their rights – and who should do it? ___*

Thank you very much for participating!

Appendix E

DETAILS ON SURVEY ITEMS

This appendix provides details on the distribution and mean values for key survey items: civic education exposure, participation, civic knowledge, and democratic attitudes. It also provides data on all variables that have been assembled by combining two or more survey questions, thus adding media exposure to the above list of variables. Also, data on education are presented. The terminology used—“construct” for variables combining two survey items, and “index” for those with multiple items—borrows from Bratton et al. (2005). Notice that in the tables, reported figures are percentages. Also, unless otherwise noted, in tables on all respondents (referenced as “full sample”), $N = 280$, while in those with data from Tanzania and Zambia, $N = 140$ per country. Percentage of missing cases, when applicable, is noted in parentheses.

CIVIC EDUCATION*Self-Reported Exposure to Civic Education*

		Tanzania		Zambia	
		No	Yes	No	Yes
Overall Exposure	Has anybody ever told you about your rights? (If so, who?)	67	33	51	49
Sources of “Rights Education” Mentioned	<u>Formal</u>	74	26	69	31
	School	92	8	84	16
	Government staff	80	20	94	6
	- RIPS	97	3	n/a	n/a
	- Community Justice Facilitation	86	14	n/a	n/a
	- Hanns Seidel Foundation	98.6	1.4	n/a	n/a
	NGOs	96	4	90	10
	- CHAWATA	97	3	n/a	n/a
	- AVAP	n/a	n/a	91	9
	<u>Informal*</u>	96	4	54	46
	Village leadership	98	2	96	4
	Church/religious organization	100	0	94	6
	Other people	99	1	69	31
	Media	98	2	80	20
	- radio	98.6	1.4	83	17
<u>Political Representatives/Party</u>	95	5	91	9	
<u>Other</u>	96	4	96	4	

Note: Data on civic education exposure were also collected from village leadership. However, they are not reported here, nor analyzed, due to substantial discrepancies with the self-reported data. * The “informal sources” variable used in regression analyses was not binary in that it measured the *number* of informal sources mentioned. However, in most cases this number was 1.

PARTICIPATION**(I) COMMUNING AND CONTACTING***Communing and Contacting, Full Sample (Index)*

		0	1	1.5	2-2.5	3-4	4.5-7	Mean (0-5) **	Std. Dev. **
Number of Combined Memberships and Leaderships in Community Groups, Past or Present	Have you been a member or a leader in any (village) committee, group, cooperative, or community?*	34	27	16	10	10	3	1.44	1.453
		0 (only listens)	1	2	3	4	Missing	Mean (0-4)	Std. Dev.
Number of Ways in Which Actively Participates in Community Meetings	How have you participated in community meetings: listened to what was being said, asked question(s), expressed your opinion, participated in organizing meeting, and/or other?	25	13	34	19	3	(6)	1.57	1.162

		0	1	Rarely	2-3	4-6 & Non- Specif.	Many	Missing	Mean (0-5) ***	Std. Dev. ***
Number of Times that Has Joined Others to Raise a Development Issue in Community	(If you have ever joined others to raise an issue that you thought needed attention in your community,) how many times have you done so?	28	9	1	15	8	37	(3)	2.80	2.117

		0	1	(Very) Rarely	2-3+	4-6++	Many/ Often/All The Time	Mean (0-5)	Std. Dev.
Number of Times that Has Contacted the Ward Councilor	(If you have contacted the Ward Councilor in matters pertaining to development,) how many times have you contacted him?	65	5	4	8	4	16	1.28	1.941

Notes:

* The item was calculated by summing up number of memberships and leaderships, with leaderships multiplied by 1.5 so as to give them more weight.

** Mean for a more detailed measure with .5 point intervals: 1.236 (std. dev.: 1.312), suggesting that the average level of memberships/leaderships for the sample as a whole is lower than that reported in the table, that is, between 1 and 1.5 memberships.

*** Mean for a more specific, 9-category measure: 4.15 (std. dev.: 3.423), suggesting that the actual average number of times that respondents in the full sample have raised a development issue in their community is higher, between 3 and 4 times.

+ Includes 2 non-specific responses: “when he visits,” and “every time the Councilor organizes a meeting”

++ Includes 1 non-specific response: “6+”

Notice that when using a more detailed 10-category measure, the mean for contacting the Councilor is 2.09, with a standard deviation of 3.406, which means that the mean of contacting the Councilor falls between “(very) rarely” and 2-3 times.

The index has a decent reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .603), suggesting that there is covariance among the four participatory acts in the sample. (N = 255)

Attendance at Community Meetings, Full Sample (Not Part of the Index)

	No	Yes
Have you ever attended a village meeting/ meeting in the village?	6	94

Note: This item cannot be included in the index because, due to question wording (“have you *ever* attended”), it has very little variance. In fact, SPSS excludes it when calculating the Cronbach’s Alpha reliability score for the index. For the same reason, the item is also not used in regression analyses.

Communing and Contacting, Tanzania (Index)

	0	1	1.5	2-2.5	3-4	4.5-7	Mean (0-5) **	Std. Dev. **
Number of combined Memberships and Leaderships in Community Groups, Past or Present	51	21	14	9	4	-	0.95	1.189

	0 (only listens)	1	2	3	4	Missing	Mean (0-4)	Std. Dev.
Number of Ways in Which Actively Participates in Community Meetings	42	14	27	8	<1	(8)	1.03	1.082

		0	1	Rarely	2-3	4-6 & Non- Specif.	Many	Missing	Mean (0-5) ***	Std. Dev. ***
Number of Times that Has Joined Others to Raise a Development Issue in Community	(If you have ever joined others to raise an issue that you thought needed attention in your community,) how many times have you done so?	31	4	1	11	4	44	(4)	2.90	2.237

		0	1	(Very) Rarely	2-3	4-6	Many/Often All The Time	Mean (0-5)	Std. Dev.
Number of Times that Has Contacted the Ward Councilor	(If you have contacted the Ward Councilor in matters pertaining to development,) how many times have you contacted him?	65	5	7	6	1	15	1.19	1.869

Notes:

* The item was calculated by summing up number of memberships and leaderships, with leaderships multiplied by 1.5 so as to give them more weight.

** Mean for a more detailed measure with .5 point intervals: .796 (std. dev.: .9743), suggesting that the average level of memberships/leaderships for Tanzanians in the sample is lower, clearly less than 1 membership.

*** Mean for a more specific, 9-category measure: 4.46 (std. dev.: 3.629), suggesting that the average number of times that respondents in the Tanzanian sample have raised a development issue in their community is between 2 and 3 times.

Notice that when using a more detailed 10-category measure for “contacting the ward Councilor,” the mean is 1.91, and standard deviation 3.280, which means that the average value for Tanzanians contacting the Councilor falls between 1 time and “(very) rarely.”

The index has a relatively good reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .687), suggesting that in Tanzania, these four participatory acts indeed covary. If “contacting the Councilor” is dropped, reliability for the remaining items (i.e., the “communing” index) increases (Cronbach’s Alpha = .695). (N = 123)

Attendance at Community Meetings, Tanzania (Not Part of the Index)

	No	Yes
Have you ever attended a village meeting/ meeting in the village?	8	92

Note: As in the full sample, this item cannot be included in the index in the Tanzanian sample because, due to question wording (“have you *ever* attended”), it has very little variance. In fact, SPSS excludes it when calculating the Cronbach’s Alpha reliability score for the index. For the same reason, the item is also not used in regression analyses.

Communing and Contacting, Zambia (Index)

	0	1	1.5	2-2.5	3-4	4.5-7	Mean (0-5) **	Std. Dev. **
Number of combined Memberships and Leaderships in Community Groups, Past or Present	18	32	17	11	15	6	1.93	1.530

		0	1	2	3	4	Missing		Mean	Std.
		(only							(0-4)	Dev.
		listens)								
Number of Ways in Which Actively Participates in Community Meetings	How have you participated in community meetings: listened to what was being said, asked question(s), expressed your opinion, participated in organizing meeting, and/or other?	9	11	41	29	4	(5)		2.10	0.984
		0	1	Rarely	2-3	4-6 &	Many	Missing	Mean	Std.
						Non-			(0-5)	Dev.
						Specif.			***	***
Number of Times that Has Joined Others to Raise a Development Issue in Community	(If you have ever joined others to raise an issue that you thought needed attention in your community,) how many times have you done so?	24	14	-	20	12	29	(<1)	2.71	1.998
		0	1	(Very)	2-3	4-6	Many/Often		Mean	Std.
				Rarely			All The Time		(0-5)	Dev.
Number of Times that Has Contacted the Ward Councilor	(If you have contacted the Ward Councilor in matters pertaining to development,) how many times have you contacted him?	64	4	-	9	6	16		1.37	2.012

Notes:

* The item was calculated by summing up number of memberships and leaderships, with leaderships multiplied by 1.5 so as to give them more weight.

** Mean for a more detailed measure with .5 point intervals: 1.675 (std. dev.: 1.454), suggesting that the average level of memberships/leaderships for Zambians in the sample is lower, but still closer to 2 (than 1) memberships.

*** Mean for a more specific, 9-category measure: 3.85 (std. dev. 3.196), suggesting that as in Tanzania, the average number of times that respondents in the Zambian sample have raised a development issue in their community is between 2 and 3 times.

Notice that when using a more detailed 10-category measure, the mean for contacting the Councilor is 2.26, and standard deviation 3.531, which means that the mean (number) of contacting the Councilor falls between “(very) rarely” and 2-3 times.

The index has a lower reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .534) than in Tanzania, but still acceptable; yet this lower value suggests that the acts of communing and contacting are less related in Zambia than in Tanzania. (N = 132)

Also, when “contacting the Councilor” is removed from the index—thus assessing “communing” alone—reliability improves (Cronbach’s Alpha = .539), suggesting that in Zambia, contacting the Councilor does not measure the same thing as participating actively in the community (i.e., “communing”). (N = 132)

Attendance at Community Meetings, Zambia (Not Part of the Index)

	No	Yes
Have you ever attended a village meeting/ meeting in the village?	5	95

Note: As in the full and Tanzanian samples, this item cannot be included in the index in the Zambian sample because, due to question wording (“have you *ever* attended”), it has very little variance. In fact, SPSS excludes it when calculating the Cronbach’s Alpha reliability score for the index. For the same reason, the item is also not used in regression analyses.

*Types of Self-Reported Group Affiliations on Local Level**

	Tanzania					Zambia					
	0	1	2	Mean	Std. Dev.	0	1	2	3	Mean	Std. Dev.
Political Party**	80	7	13	0.33	0.694	94	3	4	-	0.10	0.403
Dominant Party (no/yes)	81	19	-	0.19	0.390	98	2	-	-	0.02	0.145
Community Government (no/yes)***	77	23	-	0.23	0.421	85	15	-	-	0.15	0.358
Religious (Church) Group	99	1	-	0.01	0.085	44	48	7	1	0.64	0.647
Another Community Group	89	11	-	0.11	0.310	75	22	3	-	0.28	0.510

* These are in response to the question, “Have you been a member or a leader in any (village) committee, group, cooperative, or community?” That is, affiliations reported reflect only the extent to which the respondent brought up the affiliation him-/herself, as the survey did not directly ask respondents, for example, “Are you a member of a political party?”

** In this item, “0” refers to not affiliated, “1” refers to member, and “2” refers to leader.

*** This can be either on community (i.e., village) or sub-community (i.e., sub-village) level.

(II) VOTING

Voting, Full Sample

	No	Yes	Missing (too young at the time/ doesn't belong to village register)
Voted in Last National Election	11	77	(12)
Voted in Last Community Election	13	83	(4)

Note: Cronbach's Alpha value is too low (.293) to warrant the usage of these items as a construct. Thus, based on this sample, it is not the same people that vote in national and community elections.

Voting, Tanzania

	No	Yes	Missing (too young at the time)
Voted in Last National Election (2000)	9	76	(15)
Voted in Last Community Election (2004/2005)	12	85	(3)

Note: As in the full sample, Cronbach's Alpha value is too low (.235) to warrant the usage of these items as a construct.

Voting, Zambia

	No	Yes	Missing (too young at the time/ doesn't belong to village register)
Voted in Last National Election (2001)	14	77	(9)
Voted in Last Community Election (2004/2005)	14	80	(6)

Note: Here too, Cronbach's Alpha value is too low (.305) to warrant the usage of these items as a construct.

CIVIC KNOWLEDGE**(I) AGGREGATE**

Aggregate Civic Knowledge: All Government Policies, Rights, and Responsibilities Identified; Full Sample (Index)

		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7-9	Missing	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number of Gov't Policies (or Policy Areas) Identified	The gov't has various policies (to improve lives of citizens). Please state the ones you know.	28	14	18	17	9	9	4	2	-	2.16	1.926
Number of Citizens' Rights Identified	What rights do you have as a citizen of TZ/Zm?	19	16	28	22	10	5	<1	-	-	2.06	1.443
Number of Women's Rights Identified	What rights do women have?*	13	23	28	22	9	1	-	-	5	1.93	1.205
Number of Children's Rights Identified	What rights do children have?*	6	9	28	38	10	4	1	1	10	2.57	1.258
Number of Citizens' Responsibilities Identified	What responsibilities do you have as a citizen of TZ/Zm toward your community and country?	8	27	41	20	4	-	-	-	-	1.85	0.961
Number of Gov't Responsibilities Identified	What responsibilities does the government of TZ/Zm have toward citizens?	5	29	29	23	11	4	<1	<1	-	2.21	1.276

* This question was only asked if, preceding it, the respondent had answered in the affirmative to, "Are you aware that women and children have some rights of their own?" N = 280 (except in women's and children's rights, which had a total of 10 missing cases).

The index has a high reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .785). Therefore, the civic knowledge items in the index measure similar type of awareness.

Aggregate Civic Knowledge: All Government Policies, Rights, and Responsibilities Identified; Tanzania (Index)

		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7-9	Missing	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number of Gov't Policies (or Policy Areas) Identified	The gov't has various policies (to improve lives of citizens). Please state the ones you know.	52	16	17	11	1	2	-	-	-	0.99	1.252
Number of Citizens' Rights Identified	What rights do you have as a citizen of TZ?	33	15	22	16	9	4	-	-	-	1.67	1.515
Number of Women's Rights Identified	What rights do women have?*	20	26	26	14	6	1	-	-	7	1.58	1.206
Number of Children's Rights Identified	What rights do children have?*	4	6	26	46	8	3	1	-	5	2.62	1.042
Number of Citizens' Responsibilities Identified	What kinds of responsibilities do you have as a citizen of TZ toward your community and country?	14	32	36	17	1	-	-	-	-	1.59	0.951
Number of Gov't Responsibilities Identified	What responsibilities does the government of TZ have toward citizens?	8	40	33	12	6	1	-	1	-	1.74	1.153

Notes:

* This question was only asked if, preceding it, the respondent had answered in the affirmative to, "Are you aware that women and children have some rights of their own?" N = 140 (except in women's and children's rights, which had a total of 12 missing cases).

As in the full sample, this index has a high reliability in the Tanzanian sample, with Cronbach's Alpha = .794.

Aggregate Civic Knowledge: All Government Policies, Rights, and Responsibilities Identified; Zambia (Index)

		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7-9	Missing	Mean	Std. Dev.
Number of Gov't Policies (or Policy Areas) Identified	The gov't has various policies (to improve lives of citizens). Please state the ones you know.	4	11	19	23	18	15	7	-	-	3.33	1.765
Number of Citizens' Rights Identified	What rights do you have as a citizen of Zambia?	4	17	33	28	11	6	-	1	-	2.46	1.254
Number of Women's Rights Identified	What rights do women have?*	6	20	30	29	12	1	-	-	2	2.25	1.117
Number of Children's Rights Identified	What rights do children have?*	9	11	29	29	11	4	2	1	3	2.53	1.440
Number of Citizens' Responsibilities Identified	What kinds of responsibilities do you have as a citizen of Zambia toward your community and country?	2	22	46	23	7	-	-	-	-	2.11	0.903
Number of Gov't Responsibilities Identified	What responsibilities does the government of Zambia have toward citizens?	1	17	26	33	16	6	-	1	-	2.67	1.226

Notes:

* This question was only asked if, preceding it, the respondent had answered in the affirmative to, "Are you aware that women and children have some rights of their own?" N = 140 (except in women's and children's rights, which had a total of 5 missing cases).

Reliability of index (Cronbach's Alpha) = .706.

Erroneous Civic Knowledge: Full Sample, Tanzania, and Zambia Compared

	0	1	2	Mean	Std. Dev.
[Number of rights and/or responsibilities mentioned, which clearly are <i>not</i> rights/responsibilities]					
Full Sample	87	11	2	0.15	0.402
Tanzania	90	9	1	0.11	0.362
Zambia	84	14	2	0.18	0.437

(II) QUALITATIVE

Content Analyzed Civic Knowledge: Rights and Responsibilities, Full Sample (Items Treated Separately)

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10-12	Mean	Std. Dev.
<u>Civil, Human, and Political Rights</u> [Sum of all intangible (i.e., non-material) citizens', women's, and children's rights identified—for example, right to life, freedom of association]*	15	15	9	13	16	12	9	4	3	3	2	3.38	2.559
Expression and Initiating [Sum of all rights and responsibilities related to the topic—for example, expressing opinion, initiating development projects]**	52	21	14	9	4	<1	<1	-	-	-	-	0.94	1.216
Participation and Voting [Sum of rights and responsibilities related to the topic—including, for example, participation in community meetings]***	54	23	15	6	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	0.79	1.046
<u>Socioeconomic Rights</u> [Sum of all tangible (i.e., material) citizens', women's, and children's rights identified—for example, right to work, education, government services, "good care"]+	15	14	17	18	15	9	6	3	1	<1	1	2.94	2.222

Subset 1: Specific Material Rights [Sum of all specific material rights—for example, clothes, food—identified among citizens', women's, and children's rights]	52	18	18	8	3	1	1	<1	-	-	-	0.99	1.308
Subset 2: Ownership Rights [Sum of rights related to ownership—for example, owning a house—identified among citizens', women's, and children's rights]	85	11	3	<1	<1	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.20	0.529

Notes:

* Other types of rights falling under this category include: right to security, shelter, peace; freedom of expression/speech, choice, thought (including religion), movement; right to be valued/considered, informed; right to equality; right to participation and voting; family related rights (such as right to choose whom to marry, right to “control” husband); and right to sue someone.

** This includes: right to express oneself (as citizen's/women's/children's right); citizen's responsibility to: “advise” the government or leaders (including complain to it/them), express one's views (including report problems to authorities), and take initiative in the community (including initiate development programs/projects, contribute to development planning, and set development priorities).

*** This includes: citizen's, women's, and children's rights associated with assembly/association, participation in politics/development/community/decision-making, contesting for leadership positions, being a leader (of any group)/rule, and voting/changing national or community leadership; and citizen's responsibilities associated with attending community meetings, participating in politics, being available for leadership positions, voting, and encouraging others to vote wisely.

+ Other types of rights falling under this category include: have one's needs met, good living, access to/be considered for, small loans; specific material rights including food, clothes, health (care); and ownership related rights, including owning assets/property, land, house. however they were classified as tangible (material) because they still closely relate to a person's physical wellbeing.

Content Analyzed Civic Knowledge: Rights and Responsibilities, Tanzania (Items Treated Separately)

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10-12	Mean	Std. Dev.
<u>Civil, Human, and Political</u> Rights	29	23	11	14	11	6	4	1	1	1	-	2.07	2.073
Expression and Initiating	87	10	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.16	0.437
Participation and Voting	66	19	11	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	0.56	0.947
Obeying Government*	92	7	0.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.09	0.305
<u>Socioeconomic</u> Rights	11	10	14	19	15	13	8	5	2	1	2	3.49	2.331
Subset 1: Specific Material Rights	50	18	17	9	4	1	1	1	-	-	-	1.09	1.417
Subset 2: Ownership Rights	86	9	4	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.21	0.606

Notes:

* This consists of responsibilities related to obeying and/or respecting the government or leadership, and/or defending government (decisions). See data on the full sample for description of each item.

Content Analyzed Civic Knowledge: Rights and Responsibilities, Zambia (Items Treated Separately)

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10-12	Mean	Std. Dev.
<u>Civil, Human, and Political</u> Rights	2	8	6	12	21	19	13	8	5	4	3	4.68	2.330
Expression and Initiating	16	33	24	18	7	1	1	-	-	-	-	1.71	1.248
Participation and Voting	43	26	19	9	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.01	1.093
Obeying Government*	98	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.145
<u>Socioeconomic</u> Rights	19	19	20	16	15	5	4	1	1	-	1	2.40	1.970
Subset 1: Specific Material Rights	54	19	18	6	3	-	1	-	-	-	-	0.89	1.186
Subset 2: Ownership Rights	84	14	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.19	0.442

Notes:

* This consists of responsibilities related to obeying and/or respecting the government or leadership and/or defending government (decisions). See data on the full sample for description of each item.

DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDES**(I) (LACK OF) EFFICACY***“Efficacy”*

		Tanzania					Zambia				
		No	Fifty- Fifty/ Non- Specif.	Yes	Mean (0-2)	Std. Dev.	No	Fifty- Fifty/ Non- Specif.	Yes	Mean (0-2)	Std. Dev.
Influence on Family Decisions*	Do you feel that you adequately influence decisions made in your family?	1.4	-	98.6	1.97	0.238	5	0.7	94.3	1.89	0.444
Influence on Community Decisions**	Do you feel that you adequately influence decisions made in your community?	16	-	84	1.69	0.730	14	1	85	1.71	0.705

Note: The reason that here efficacy is in quotation marks is that the survey did not measure efficacy in the conventional way, with reference to the statement like, “government sometimes seems so complicated that I cannot really understand what is going on” (Bratton 1999, 566). Instead it was measured simply by reference to the questions in this table.

* The percentages quite clearly show that this item did not elicit truthful answers, probably due to socially desirable answering. This was the case especially among Tanzanian women (according to observations made about the hesitancy with which some of them answered this question).

** This item is a more accurate measure of efficacy, though it was not without problems. For example, when posed this question, some respondents particularly in Zambia pondered on how much they actually influence, rather than merely assessed whether they are satisfied with the extent to which they (think they) influence, community decisions. Hence this item will be used with caution in regression analysis.

Lack of Efficacy

	Tanzania						Zambia						
	0	1	2	3	Mean	Std. Dev.	0	1	2	3	4	Mean	Std. Dev.
(A) Level of <i>lack</i> of efficacy (same questions in both countries)*	85	13	1.4	0.7	0.18	0.469	87	10	0.7	0.7	-	0.14	0.419
(B) Level of <i>lack</i> of efficacy (based on a broader battery of questions—asked only in Zambia)**	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	83	14	1.4	0.7	0.7	0.22	0.576

Note that lack of efficacy was measured indirectly, with data extracted from various open ended questions throughout the survey. And these open ended questions were only posed to those who did *not* participate in the activity in question (or did not answer in the affirmative questions like “Are you interested in politics?”) Also, since percentages reported here are those with the whole sample (N = 140 per country) as a reference point, this table should not be taken to reflect the level of lack of efficacy in the whole sample (i.e., what the percentages would be if everyone’s level of (lack of) efficacy had been assessed).

* Calculated as a sum of all references to lack of efficacy as the respondent’s explanation to his/her lack of: (1) identifying any government policies, (2) joining others to raise a development issue, (3) belief that (s)he adequately influences family decisions, (4) belief that (s)he adequately influences community decisions, and (5) contacting the Ward Councilor. The higher the number, the higher the respondent’s lack of efficacy.

** Calculated as a sum of all references to lack of efficacy as the respondent’s explanation to the above items *and* to lack of: (1) interest in politics, (2) desire to discuss politics, and (3) membership in any community group. The higher the number, the higher the respondent’s lack of efficacy.

(II) (LACK OF) TRUST*

Trust in Politicians on Local Level

	Tanzania					Zambia				
	No	Fifty-Fifty/ Don't Know	Yes	Mean (0-2)	Std Dev.	No	Fifty-Fifty/ Don't Know	Yes	Mean (0-2)	Std. Dev.
Does the leadership of this district about people's questions and concerns? **	14	27	60	1.46	0.723	61	26	13	0.52	0.714

* In this and the following item, "trust" is understood broadly, although it is acknowledged that the question in this table (and data displayed in the next table) also likely tap into performance evaluation.

** Understanding of "leadership of this district" was left to the respondent. Based on observations during interviews, respondents took it to refer primarily to local Councilors, local government officials, and/or party officials.

Lack of Trust in Politicians, Councilors in General, and/or the Respondent's Councilor

	Tanzania				Zambia				Mean	Std. Dev.
	0	1	Mean	Std Dev.	0	1	2	3		
(A) Level of <i>lack</i> of trust in politicians (same questions in both countries)*	91	9	0.09	0.281	65	34	1.4	-	0.36	0.512
(B) Level of <i>lack</i> of trust in politicians (based on 2 additional questions--asked only in Zambia)**	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	64	32	2	1.4	0.41	0.610

Note: As with lack of efficacy, lack of trust was measured indirectly, with data being extracted from various open ended questions throughout the survey. And as these were the same questions as those from which data on lack of efficacy were extracted, they were only posed to those who did *not* participate in the activity in question (or did not answer in the affirmative questions like “Are you interested in politics?”) Also, as with the data on lack of efficacy, percentages reported here are those with the whole sample (N = 140 per country) as a reference point; therefore, this table should not be taken to reflect the level of lack of trust in politicians in the whole sample (i.e., what the percentages would be if everyone’s level of (lack of) trust had been assessed).

* Calculated as a sum of all references to lack of trust in/satisfaction with, politicians/Councilor(s) as the respondent’s explanation to his/her lack of: (1) contacting the Ward Councilor, (2) satisfaction with the discussion(s) the respondent has had with the Councilor, and (3) voting in the last national elections [note that explanation (2) only applies to three Tanzanians (but 27 Zambians!), and explanation (3) applies to no Tanzanians and only two Zambians]. The higher the number, the higher the respondent’s lack of trust in/satisfaction with, politicians.

** Calculated as a sum of all references to lack of trust in/satisfaction with, politicians/Councilor(s) as the respondent’s explanation to the above items *and* to lack of: (1) interest in politics, and (2) desire to discuss politics. The higher the number, the higher the respondent’s lack of trust in/satisfaction with, politicians.

*Lack of Interpersonal Trust**

	Tanzania				Zambia			Mean	Std. Dev.
	0	1	Mean	Std. Dev.	0	1	2		
(A) Level of <i>lack</i> of trust in other people (same questions in both countries)**	97	3	0.03	0.167	90	10	-	0.10	0.301
(B) Level of <i>lack</i> of trust in other people (based on 2 additional questions—asked only in Zambia)***	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	85	14	0.7	0.16	0.384

* Here, lack of trust primarily refers to other people’s non-cooperative attitude (i.e., rejection or discrimination by others in the community, and/or past negative experience in dealing with them). Trust in other people, too, was measured indirectly, with data extracted from various open ended questions throughout the survey. And as these were the same questions as those from which data on efficacy and trust in politicians were extracted, they were only posed to those who did *not* participate in the activity in question (or did not answer in the affirmative questions like “Are you interested in politics?”) Thus respondents were not asked any particular question about trust in other people. And as with the data on lack of

efficacy and lack of trust in politicians, percentages reported here are based on the whole sample (N = 140 per country); therefore, this table should not be taken to reflect the level of lack of interpersonal trust in the whole sample (i.e., what the percentages would be if everyone's level of trust had been assessed).

** Calculated as a sum of all references to lack of trust/satisfaction with other people in explaining respondent's lack of: (1) joining other people to raise a development issue, and (2) belief that (s)he adequately influences decisions made in the community. The higher the number, the higher the respondent's lack of trust.

*** Calculated as a sum of all references to lack of trust/satisfaction with other people in explaining the above *and* in explaining respondent's lack of: (1) interest in community affairs, and (2) membership in any community group. The higher the number, the higher the respondent's lack of trust.

(III) INTEREST IN POLITICS*

Psychological Engagement, Full Sample (Construct)

		No	Don't Know	Somewhat	Very	Mean (0-3)	Std Dev.
Interest in Politics	Are you interested in politics?	17	<1	39	44	2.10	1.054
		No	Once In A While (TZ)/ Rarely (Zm)	Every Now And Then	Missing	Mean (0-2)	Std Dev.
Political Discussion	Do you enjoy discussing politics with others?	20	38	41	(<1)	1.21	0.759

Notes: Interest in politics and political discussion are adequately correlated (Pearson's $r = .494^{**}$) and reliable (Cronbach's Alpha = .638) to validate using this construct. (N = 279)

* Here, data on this is presented as part of the "psychological engagement" construct.

Psychological Engagement, Tanzania (Construct)

		No	Don't Know	Somewhat	Very	Mean (0-3)	Std Dev.
Interest in Politics	Are you interested in politics?	11	1	26	62	2.39	0.971
		No	Once In A While	Every Now And Then		Mean (0-2)	Std Dev.
Political Discussion	Do you enjoy discussing politics with others?	14	39	46		1.32	0.712

Notes: Interest in politics and political discussion are strongly correlated (Pearson's $r = .610^{**}$) and reliable (Cronbach's Alpha = .735) to validate using this construct.

Psychological Engagement, Zambia (Construct)

		No	Don't Know	Somewhat	Very	Mean (0-3)	Std Dev.
Interest in Politics	Are you interested in politics?	22	-	51	26	1.82	1.061
		No	Rarely	Every Now And Then	Missing	Mean (0-2)	Std Dev.
Political Discussion	Do you enjoy discussing politics with others?	26	37	36	(<1)	1.09	0.788

Notes:

Compared to the full and Tanzanian samples, in Zambia the correlation between the two items in this construct is weaker (Pearson's $r = .365^{**}$) and less reliable (Cronbach's Alpha = .518). (N = 139). However, this is within acceptable range for two-item scales.

MEDIA EXPOSURE**Media Exposure, Full Sample (Index)*

	None	Rarely	It Depends	Occasion-ally	Every Week	“Whenever I Want [Even Daily]” (TZ only)	Every Day	Mean (0-6)	Std Dev.
Radio	8	14	1	7	1	26	42	4.26	2.139
Newspapers	45	15	-	23	5	6	7	1.71	1.976
Television	65	7	-	7	3	6	13	1.44	2.263

Notes:

How often do you listen/read/watch national news?

Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha) = .608. In regression analyses, “average media exposure” (total media consumption divided by 3) is used.

Media Exposure, Tanzania (Index)

	None	Rarely	It Depends	Occasion-ally	Every Week	“Whenever I Want” [Even Daily]” (TZ only)	Every Day	Mean (0-6)	Std Dev.
Radio	6	17	2	5	1	52	16	3.99	1.978
Newspapers	38	15	-	21	4	11	10	2.14	2.166
Television	73	1	-	3	3	13	7	1.29	2.213

Notes:

Question as above. Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha) = .701. In regression analyses, “average media exposure” (total media consumption divided by 3) is used.

Media Exposure, Zambia (Index)

	None	Rarely	It Depends	Occasionally	Every Week	“Whenever I Want [Even Daily]” (TZ)	Every Day	Mean (0-6)	Std Dev.
Radio	10	11	-	9	2	-	68	4.54	2.261
Newspapers	53	14	-	24	5	-	4	1.29	1.668
Television	57	12	-	11	2	-	18	1.60	2.310

Notes:

Question as above.

Index reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha) = .535. Although this is quite a bit below the .7 threshold, the index will be maintained because removing any item would in fact lower the Cronbach’s Alpha score. In regression analyses, “average media exposure” (total media consumption divided by 3) is used.

* *Average* media exposure was calculated by summing up the score of each item (i.e., ranging from 0-6), divided by three.

EDUCATION*Highest Level of Formal Education Attained*

	No Formal Education	Partial Primary School*	Complete Primary School	Partial Secondary School**	Vocational School***	Complete Secondary School	Post- Secondary School	Mean (0-8)+	Std. Dev.
Full Sample	11	19	40	22	1	6	0.4	2.81++	1.782
Tanzania	19	11	56	6	1	7	-	2.64++	1.836
Zambia	4	27	24	38	-	6	1	2.98++	1.715

Notes:

* Includes those who did not identify whether they had completed primary school

** Includes those who did not identify whether they had completed secondary school

*** Vocational school is placed here between partial and complete secondary school because completion of secondary school is not (necessarily) a prerequisite for attending vocational school.

+ The range includes the seven main categories presented in this table, plus two intermediary categories: primary school (not specified whether partial or complete) and secondary school (not specified whether partial or complete).

++ The mean is derived from the 0-8 range (see above).

Appendix F

VARIABLES USED IN REGRESSION ANALYSES

This appendix summarizes the explanatory, control, and dependent variables used in regression analyses. The control and independent variables are grouped into those concerning social structure, institutional influences, cognitive awareness, democratic attitudes, and cultural values. The range of the scores for each variable is noted in parentheses.⁵⁸⁰

*(I) Self-Reported Civic Education Exposure*Tanzania

- (1) Overall rights education (0-1)
- (2) School (0-1)
- (3) Government staff (0-2)
- (4) RIPS (0-1)
- (5) Community Justice Facilitation (CJF; 0-2)
- (6) CHAWATA (0-1)
- (7) Informal rights education (0-1)
- (8) Village leadership (0-1)
- (9) Political representatives/party (0-1)
- (10) Other sources (0-1)

Zambia

- (1) Overall rights education (0-1)
- (2) School (0-1)
- (3) Government staff (0-1)
- (4) Anti-Voter Apathy Project (AVAP; 0-1)
- (5) Informal rights education (0-2⁵⁸¹)
- (6) Village leadership (0-1)
- (7) Church (0-1)
- (8) Other people (0-1)
- (9) Radio (0-1)
- (10) Political representatives/party (0-1)
- (11) Other sources (0-1)

*(II) Social Structure*Variables Concerning the Individual

- (1) Age (in years at the end of the year of interview, i.e., in Tanzania 2005 and Zambia 2006) (Tanzania: 18-77; Zambia: 18-74)

- (2) Multiparty generation—a variable utilized by Bratton et al. (2005) who argued that it is not only age which affects attitudes and level of participation but the time period in which the respondent reached adulthood, that is, whether before or after the introduction of multiparty politics.⁵⁸² (0-1)
- (3) Leadership position in community.⁵⁸³ This measures status, and is utilized in the absence of class divisions. The categories included are: “rank-and-file” member in village government; leader in village government (Tanzania)/village committee (Zambia); and village chair or VEO (Tanzania)/village headperson (Zambia).⁵⁸⁴ (0-3)
- (4) Farmer. Since farming is engaged in by 95 percent of respondents in Tanzania, and 97 percent of those in Zambia, being a “non-farmer” (or engaging in non-farming activities) implies a status difference. Thus this measure complements the above measure of status in community. (0-1)
- (5) Time in community (how long the respondent has lived in the community: 2 years or less, 3-6 years, 7-10 years, or 11 years or more). The variable is intended to capture, on the one hand, the influences that newcomers may have obtained from elsewhere, and on the other, the status and position that those who have stayed longer in the village may have obtained. This likely affects participation. (0-3)
- (6) Sex (male) (0-1)

Family

- (7) Family size—measured as the number of children of whom the respondent is currently caring (Tanzania: 0-9; Zambia: 0-16)
- (8) Number of biological children (another measure of family size; 0-12)
- (9) Family political participation—measured as the total number of memberships/leaderships that the respondent says household members have had or currently have⁵⁸⁵ (Tanzania: 0-2.5; Zambia: 0-6)
- (10) Family political party activity—none, member, or leader (0-2)

Location

- (10) “Rural”—measured by ranking the research sites’ distance from the nearest town and/or major road: Shangani: 0, Chamalawa and Makasa: 0.5, Mbae and Mabumba: 1.0, and Mtawanya: 2.0. (i.e., 0-2)

(III) Cognitive Awareness

- (1) Average media exposure⁵⁸⁶ (0-6)
- (2) Total civic knowledge (Tanzania: 0-27; Zambia: 4-30)
- (3) Knowledge of children’s rights (Tanzania: 0-6; Zambia: 0-7)
- (4) Knowledge of civil, human, and political rights (Tanzania: 0-9; Zambia: 0-12)
- (5) Knowledge of rights/responsibilities related to expression and initiating (Tanzania: 0-2; Zambia: 0-6)
- (6) Knowledge of rights/responsibilities related to participation and voting (Tanzania: 0-5; Zambia: 0-4)

- (7) Knowledge of socioeconomic rights (0-11)
- (8) Education (Tanzania: 0-7; Zambia: 0-8)
- (10) Vocational school—whether has attended vocational school. This is analyzed because vocational training too exposes a person to information (i.e., of the practical type). (0-1)

(IV) Institutional Influences

- (1) Total group affiliations⁵⁸⁷ (Tanzania: 0-4; Zambia: 0-7)
- (2) Political party affiliation—none, member, or leader (0-2)
- (3) Affiliation with the dominant party. This refers to CCM in Tanzania and MMD in Zambia. (0-1)
- (4) Position in community governance. This refers to either village or sub-village level. It differs from the “status in community” variable in that it also includes past positions in community governance. (0-1)
- (5) Membership in church group (Tanzania: 0-1; Zambia: 0-3)
- (6) Participation in another community group (Tanzania: 0-1; Zambia: 0-2)
- (7) Active participation at community meetings⁵⁸⁸ (0-4)
- (8) Raising issues with others⁵⁸⁹ (0-8)
- (9) Contacting (the Ward Councilor)⁵⁹⁰ (0-9)
- (10) Voted in the last national election (of those that were of voting age) (0-1)
- (11) Voted in the last community election (of those that were of voting age and belonged to village register) (0-1)

(V) Democratic Attitudes & Discussion

Efficacy

- (1) Influence community (satisfaction of one’s level of influence on community decision-making) (0-2)
- (2) Lack of efficacy (Tanzania: 0-3; Zambia: 0-4)

Trust

- (3) Trust in local politicians (0-2)
- (4) Lack of trust in politicians (Tanzania: 0-1; Zambia: 0-3)
- (5) Lack of interpersonal trust (Tanzania: 0-1; Zambia: 0-2)

Interest in Politics and Community; Political Discussion

- (6) Interest in politics (0-3)
- (7) Like discussing politics (0-2)
- (8) Interest in community affairs (0-3)

(VI) Cultural Values

- (1) Catholicism—included because of the generally stronger social involvement of Catholics⁵⁹¹ including in Zambia, where the Catholic Church is also involved in providing civic education (0-1)

⁵⁸⁰ If the range for the two countries varies, this is noted; otherwise the range applies to both countries.

⁵⁸¹ In addition, there is one person who identified five informal sources.

⁵⁸² In fact they also utilized the variable, “postcolonial generation,” which, however, was not significant in their model.

⁵⁸³ In the regression tables: “position in community”

⁵⁸⁴ In the Zambian village of Mabumba also the headpersons of village sections were included in this highest category because in actuality, these two persons are equivalent to village headpersons. This is because the chief resides in Mabumba village, which is why the village does not have a formal headperson.

⁵⁸⁵ The value of memberships versus leaderships is weighed the same way as for the respondent; see Appendix E.

⁵⁸⁶ See Appendix E for details.

⁵⁸⁷ See the methods chapter and Appendix E. Note: this variable is also examined as part of the “communing” and “communing and contacting” indices, which also consist of active participation at community meetings, raising issues with others, (and contacting the Ward Councilor), below. See Appendix E for measurement. Scores for the first index run from 0-20 for Tanzania and from 0-28 for Zambia, and for the second index from 0-28 for Tanzania and from 0-37 for Zambia.

⁵⁸⁸ See the methods chapter.

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁹¹ See, for example, Huntington (1991) or Weigel (1989).