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THE EFFECT OF STATE CAPACITY ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND THE SURVIVAL OF NEW DEMOCRACIES

by

DANIEL KUTHY

Under the Direction of Charles Hankla

ABSTRACT

This dissertation investigates the effect of state capacity on the probability for democratic transition and the survival of democracies. I seek to answer these quesitons through the use of both quantitative and qualitative analysis. In my statistical models, I make use of Cox Proportional Hazard Models. These are supplemented by two case studies involving South Korea and the Philippines. My expectation, which is supported by the results presented in this study, is that higher levels of state capacity will make authoritarian regimes more stable and thus make democratic transitions less likely, but if democratic transitions take place, higher levels of state capacity will make new democratic regimes more likely to survive.

INDEX WORDS: State capacity, Democratization, Democratic surival, Authoritarian regimes, Regimes

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by

DANIEL KUTHY

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

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Georgia State University

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DEDICATION

To Anna; without her I wouldn't be who I am today.

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1 Introduction

Human history has been one of struggles and triumphs, successes and failures. Nowhere is this more clear than in the area of governance, which has been plagued at times by failure and unintended consequences from the most idealistic, and horror and oppression by those whose goals were less noble. To a degree that is greater than at any time in history, most people agree that those who are ruled have a right to be consulted in how they are to be ruled. This demand lies at the heart of democracy, a form of government that has gained greater acceptance gradually over the course of the past two centuries. While it remains an imperfect, sometimes bewildering form of government, few advancements in human civilization have done as much to promote basic human dignity. Today, the majority of countries around the world are ruled by some form of democratic government.

Although this march of democracy spread across the world like wildfire in the last quarter of the twentieth century, some parts of the world were left untouched. However, as the Arab revolutions of 2011, with their calls for democracy and freedom have shown us, the overall trend has not ground to a halt yet. In addition to the issue of resiliency of some authoritarian regimes, some countries that transitioned to democracy in this era saw their democratic regimes fall, either by authoritarian actions of democratically elected leaders or outside parties toppling these democratic regimes. Therefore, it falls to us as investigators of political phenomena to seek to understand what causes some authoritarian regimes to survive while others fail, what causes some countries to democratize while others do not, and what makes some new democratic regimes survive while others fail.

This dissertation addresses an important part of these three questions. It looks at how state capacity affects the probability of authoritarian regimes to fail and/or transition to democracy, as well as how state capacity affects the likelihood of new democratic regimes to survive. While these questions have been discussed, debated and investigated to some degree, the relationship has not been tested directly in a rigorous manner. This project adds to that broader project by testing the influence of state capacity directly on regime failure and transition. In addition, it employs an approach that uses multiple elements of state capacity to test their independent effects on these processes by application of data that has not yet been utilized for testing this particular relationship.

In this study, I argue that higher levels of state capacity will tend to make democratic transition less likely, but if a democratic regime is established, higher levels of state capacity will tend to make it more stable and thus less likely to fail. State capacity is essentially the resources available to a state and the quality and effectiveness of its policy implementation mechanisms. Higher levels of state capacity will tend to make both democratic and non-democratic regimes more stable and thus will make regime transition less likely. Lower levels of state capacity are likely to make democratic transition more likely because it will allow for the collapse of the authoritarian regime in power, which will make democratization reasonably likely in the modern era. Higher state capacity increases regime stability by giving rulers better tools for providing public goods, which will tend to increase support among the general population, pleasing key groups who might overthrow the rulers, and through helping to deal with contextual problems that could potentially challenge regime stability.

In new democracies, much of the population does not distinguish between the government and the regime. Therefore, dissatisfaction with government performance can potentially transfer to indifference toward democracy, which makes it easier for non-democratic rulers to take over, either from outside of the government or from within. In addition, by satisfying those who might act as veto players through effective management of the country, new democracies can avoid potential challenges. Non-democratic regimes can potentially build public support through effective provision of public goods, making their rule easier to maintain. In addition, they can turn an effective state apparatus on the population to intimidate and disrupt potential opposition groups through the use of surveillance and coercive measures. In both cases, the rulers in attempting to govern well or simply maintain power can strengthen the regime in general. Leaders do not always choose to take advantage of higher state capacity to provide public goods and deal with problems that can lead to the downfall of the regime. However, if the leaders find themselves in charge of a high capacity state, they at least have the potential to use it in such ways, whereas those in charge of a weak state apparatus will face greater problems in the area of regime stability regardless of their intentions.

This dissertation is divided into six sections, each of which I will describe below. The first chapter discusses the existing literature on the issues of regime stability and democratization, especially with regard to state capacity in order to explain how these literatures contribute to the project and how this study fits into the broader context. The second chapter outlines the hypotheses that I develop and test in this project, and it explains the theoretical basis for these hypotheses. The third chapter lays out the methodological framework that I will use in testing and evaluating the hypotheses that are developed in the previous chapter. It explains the structure and logic of both the quantitative and qualitative tests that are used. The fourth chapter

presents the results of the statistical tests that are performed in order to test the validity of my hypotheses in general. This is followed in the fifth and sixth chapters with case studies that look at how state capacity contributed to the relative stability and transition of regimes in the Philippines and South Korea since the end of World War II. Finally, in the seventh chapter, I conclude this study by drawing together the insights gained through the quantitative and qualitative studies in order to assess what this study has revealed, as well as what future research would help to shed more light on this issue.

In the first section, I review the relevant literature in order to do a number of things. First, I look at existing scholarship to determine how state capacity is viewed in the field of political science, along with what has been written regarding the effects of state capacity, especially on authoritarian stability, democratization, and the survival of democratic regimes. With this examination, I assess the areas that have been addressed and what questions have been answered in order to demonstrate the work that has not yet been done. Next, I address how this project fits within the framework of the field and how it seeks to address unanswered questions.

In the following chapter, I discuss the theoretical framework that informs both my quantitative and qualitative investigation of the effects of state capacity on regime failure and transition. For the sake of this project, state capacity is understood as essentially the resources that the state has at its disposal and the effectiveness and efficiency with which it implements its policies. I work on the basic logic that higher levels of state capacity tend to make regimes more stable and thus less prone to failure. While the mechanisms through which state capacity vary somewhat between authoritarian regimes, they share some common characteristics. Whether a regime is democratic, authoritarian, or something in between, effective management of the

country and provision of public goods can help to build legitimacy, support or acceptance among the population. In addition, it helps to alter the calculations of key groups that might potentially have the ability to overthrow the regime, making them more likely to support or at least accept the regime.

In new democracies, state capacity is vital for dealing with contextual problems that might threaten the survival of the regimes, including war, economic crisis or other disasters and crises. In such situations state capacity plays a vital role in allowing the government to have tools to keep the state together and maintain support of the population. Even in normal situations without exogenous shocks, state capacity is critical to giving the state the resources and ability to implement its policies effectively and efficiently, especially in the area of public good provision, whether it is simple law and order, contract enforcement or the provision of various social goods. While in established democracies, failure to govern effectively will typically result in another candidate or party being elected, in new democracies, the distinction between the regime and the particular set of people in power is not always made. In new democracies, people do not always distinguish between the government in power and the regime in general. As such, dissatisfaction with the performance of the government can at times lead to ambivalence toward democratic rule, as basic economic issues often take precedence over what some would see as the virtues of democracy. This means that, especially in the early years of a democratic regime, effective governance increases the probability for the regime to succeed in the long-term, as the early years are critical, with most democratic failures happening well within a decade of democratization.

Authoritarian regimes can also use the apparatus of the state to stay in power through the use of coercive measures. While democratic regimes have access to these same mechanisms, they are relatively restrained in the degree to which they can use them without ceasing in effect to be democracies. Democratic regimes must use the coercive mechanisms of the state to maintain law and order and to protect the country in situations of invasion, but if they turn these mechanisms on their population in general in a systematic way, the regime would cease to be democratic.

Authoritarian regimes have the ability to use the security apparatus of the state to intimidate, deter, monitor, and potentially eliminate members of the opposition or people who might potentially seek to bring down the regime. Dictatorships have used such tools as political police who use a number of tactics to protect the regime, including surveillance and spy networks, prisons to contain opponents, torture to extract information and frighten the population, forced disappearances, and even murder. In addition, these authoritarian regimes can use the military as a powerful force to crush the opposition. Through the use of the police and the military, large protests can be dispersed, and the government can use these institutions to fight any who rise up with arms to challenge their authority.

In this chapter, I also lay out my theoretical assumptions about state capacity and how it affects governance and regime stability. I explain my central hypotheses that I test in this study and show how I came to these theoretical formulations. I expect that higher levels of state capacity will tend to make authoritarian regimes less likely to fail and less likely to transition to democracy. Also, I expect that higher levels of state capacity will make it more likely for new democratic regimes to survive. Following an extensive discussion of state capacity and its role in

regime stability and democratic transition, I explain from a theoretical perspective how each of the elements of state capacity that I examine is likely to affect stability of both democratic and authoritarian regimes.

The variables that I use in this study are state revenue, bureaucratic quality, law and order, and corruption. Although these variables are very different, each one gets at some aspect of state capacity. Revenue and bureaucratic quality are both relatively direct measures of the resources that state have, and in the case of bureaucratic quality of the effectiveness and efficiency with which policies are implemented. Law and order does not directly measure state capacity, but rather it is an outcome measure that provides a good clue as to how well the state is doing in providing the most basic public good to its people: law and order. This is a central function of government in the most authoritarian or democratic regime.

Finally, I use a measure of corruption to infer agency loss in the implementation of public policy. While corrupt countries can have various levels of state capacity, corruption limits both the resources and effectiveness of the state. Essentially corruption hurts state capacity in both denying certain resources to the state that it would otherwise have, and it hurts the effectiveness of policy implementation as it takes a back seat to bureaucrats and politicians trying to take advantage of their position of authority to make inappropriate gains, even if it hurts the outcomes for the public.

Following the section that explains the hypotheses and their theoretical basis, I discuss the methods that are used in order to test them. In this project, I use a mixed methods approach, including both quantitative and qualitative methods. In the quantitative realm, I make

use of Cox Proportional Hazard models in order to test the effect of state capacity on regime failure in both authoritarian and democratic regimes. I test these samples separately because I have strong theoretical reasons to believe that state capacity works differently, at least in some ways, in these two samples. Democracies are more constrained in their ability to use coercive measures in order to maintain power. In addition, I test the effect of various indicators of state capacity on the probability of authoritarian rule to fail in a country in general. In this section, I also discuss the logic that I used in selecting two case studies to complement the statistical portion of the study. I use these two cases that look at the Philippines and South Korea in order to better be able to see the elements that I study in the abstract at work. In addition, studying them allows me to see how various factors interact in producing what are in reality complex processes and outcomes.

In the next chapter, I present the results of the statistical tests that I conducted in order to test my hypotheses. I examine the years from 1984 to 2004 (restricted to these years due to data availability) in order to test these hypotheses. I conducted three separate tests, using Cox Proportional Hazard Models, in order to test the effect of state capacity on three distinct phenomena: failure of authoritarian regimes, transition from non-democratic rule to democratic rule, and the survival of new democratic regimes. While the results show some support for the general hypothesis that higher levels of state capacity affect stability in a positive direction, they show especially strong support for the idea that higher state capacity will tend to make new democratic regimes more stable.

The statistical section is followed by two case studies. In the fifth chapter, I examine the Philippines, primarily focusing on the period since it gained independence in 1946. While the

Philippines had a relatively strong state and effective bureaucracy at the time of independence, these both deteriorated as the new state could not fund itself to the same level that the United States government had. In addition, the bureaucracy gradually became less effective and more corrupt over time. Although there were some efforts to combat these problems, most notably under President Magsaysay during the 1950s, the effects were not permanent. The Third Republic fell in part because of the state's weakness. Marcos, who was elected president, seized power and set up an authoritarian state in the Philippines.

Marcos increased the capacity of the state in some ways, but he did not forge the country into a high capacity state. Marcos increased the ability of the military to fight insurgents, and he increased the ability of the government to combat crime. However, the state revenues did not increase long-term, and the state was still undermined heavily by corruption. Marcos and his close allies amassed large fortunes during his tenure through corrupt activities, including embezzlement, kick-backs, and other practices that diverted public funds into their own private bank accounts. These practices were so wide-spread that the Philippine state itself had low levels of spending power in relation to the amount of money that it took in through taxes, loans, and other mechanisms. This undermined any attempts for the regime to build legitimacy for itself domestically. Ultimately, with the large debts incurred under the Marcos regime, along with the loss of support among its political base domestically and that of its key ally, the United States, the regime was unable to avoid collapse in the face of a very large, well-organized opposition.

Since democratic rule returned to the Philippines under the Fifth Republic, democratic elections have been regularly held, and there have been numerous peaceful, democratic trans-

fers of power. Despite this, the stability of the democratic regime is not strong. Low levels of state capacity in the country contribute to this, as the state has relatively low levels of resources, has high levels of corruption and has difficulty in the provision of many basic public goods. While favorable circumstances have allowed the regime to survive, its weakness is shown by such events as the occasional worries about a military coup or the soft coup that removed President Estrada from office after the Senate refused to try him for corruption charges. While the current democratic regime has survived in the Philippines for a quarter century, it remains unstable. Stability will be advanced if government revenues can be increased, a higher quality bureaucracy can be built, if corruption can be better controlled, and if overall the level of state capacity can be increased such that the state can carry out its duties, implement policies effectively and efficiently, and lose less money and effort in the process of implementing projects and performing its basic duties.

South Korea presents a different story that is also instructive in the study of how state capacity affects regime stability and transition. At its founding, the Republic of Korea had very low levels of state capacity. It was one of the poorest countries in the world, had a weak bureaucracy, high levels of corruption, and many of the institutions of state power were highly ineffective. The First Republic was never truly strong aside and had few effective state institutions aside from the military.

In 1948, at the founding of the new republic, the state had no truly effective institutions. During and after the Korean War, the military improved in its ability and competence, but following the war, this was the only truly effective apparatus of state power in the country. Rhee was unable to build state capacity effective, and he lost the support of the population and even-

tually that of key actors whose support was necessary for him to rule: the South Korean military and the government of the United States. He relied heavily on these two groups in order to maintain power, and when he lost their support, Rhee lost power. The Second Republic was a short-lived democratic regime in South Korea from 1960-1961. It had a difficult job from the beginning due to the weak state that Rhee had left it. The civilian leadership never truly had control of the military, and it was not able to govern effectively in its short life. Much of the military leadership lost trust that the democratic government under Prime Minister Chang, who would never be able to marshall the resources of the country to direct it along a path of long-term development. Within a year of its establishment, the Second Republic was overthrown by a military coup.

The government of South Korea under the regime of General, and later President Park Chung Hee proved to be more stable overall. It worked on a broad plan aimed at the development of a competent and effective state to lead the economic development of the country. Under Park's rule, there was significant success in improving the quality of the bureaucracy, decreasing corruption, and increasing the level of wealth in the country and thus the level of resources at the government's disposal. The state was effective in promoting a strategy of guided economic development with strong partnerships between the state and private entrepreneurs, while providing assistance to make sure that South Korea was in a strong position agriculturally as well. In addition, the state managed a great expansion of education opportunities in the country at all levels, including a quality university system. Even with Park's death in 1979, the system essentially stayed in place under Chun.

The Park/Chun regime eventually fell, but it took a far greater effort to bring down this regime than it did to take down the First Republic. The Cold War was thawing, international norms of democratic rule were beginning to gain greater support, and the United States had begun to shift its foreign policy to be less likely to be supportive of allies who denied legitimate demands of their people for democracy. Despite these favorable factors for a democratic transition, it took widespread protests that spanned the country both geographically and across class lines in order to bring about a transition to democracy.

The more organized and capable South Korean state made the transition to democracy smoother than it might otherwise have been. The mechanisms of the state essentially stayed in place, and the professional bureaucracy was able to serve the new regime well and enabled greater stability during the transition well. Once it was set up, the Sixth Republic benefited from the high state capacity that it inherited by allowing it to deal relatively well with exogenous shocks (such as the 1997 financial crisis) and manage the provision of public goods well and gain and maintain the support of the general population and key groups within society that could act as potential veto players (the military and/or *chaebols*).

Following the case study chapters, the concluding chapter ties together the quantitative and qualitative sections into a single framework. The goal of this chapter is to assess what has been learned from this study. I compare the data gained through this study against the theory and hypotheses developed in the earlier parts of this project in order to explain the findings. Furthermore, I tie together the findings and explain how both the quantitative and qualitative sections support the hypotheses on the whole. In addition, I point to some issues revealed by

the case studies showing intricacies in the relationship between state capacity and regime stability that cannot be captured in the statistical models.

To conclude the final assessment, I discuss the degree to which this study was successful in addressing some holes in the literature in order to highlight the contribution that it makes to the study of state capacity, regime survival and democratization. In addition, I assess how the results of this project can be used in order to promote the goal of easing the transition to democracy and helping new democratic regimes to survive long enough to become consolidated democracies. Recognizing the limited nature of any single study in the field of social science, I address the limitations of this study in order to point to some areas for future research that can build upon it. These observations indicate what projects I might undertake to extend the line of inquiry begun in this dissertation, as well as how others can use it in order to contribute to the academic field as well as practical applications.

2. Literature Review

The areas of democracy, democratic transition, and governance have received a significant degree of attention from both the academic and policy communities due to the profound effect that these issues have on the lives of people. With the great number of democratic transitions in the past thirty years, the urgency of these concerns has become only more pressing. Because of the interactive nature of these matters, they are often talked about together. After all, they affect and are affected by one another. Scholars who study the interaction of democratization and state capacity generally agree that these two affect one another, but they disagree on the direction of effect. While there are many valid arguments on both sides, we must consider that it is likely that the effect flows in both directions. While democratic transition certainly has the potential to weaken state capacity (see: Ulfelder and Lustick 2005; Schmitter et al. 2005; Bäck and Hadenius 2008), higher levels of wealth increase the likelihood of survival of new democracies (see: Przeworski et al. 2000, Huntington 1968; Bernhard and Reenock 2004; Acemoglu 2005; 2008) or that of non-democratic regimes as well.

This project seeks to expand the literature on democratization and state capacity by looking at the effect of state capacity on democratic transition and survival of new democracies. It examines two causal relationships between state capacity and democratic transition on one hand, and between state capacity and survival of new democracies on the other. Scholars to date have paid some attention to those relationships but have not systematically tested them in the manner that I do in later chapters. This study bridges the gap in explaining state capacity's effect on both democratic transition and the survival of new democracies.

I argue that, while higher levels of state capacity make authoritarian collapse and democratic transition less likely, if a transition takes place, higher levels of state capacity make new democratic regimes more likely to survive. While previous works have inferred the effect of state capacity from seeing the effects of per capita wealth or colonial legacy on survival of new democracies, no study to date has directly tested the relationship between state capacity and democratic survival in a systematic way. In addition, while some studies have looked at the effects of various factors in supporting authoritarian rule, none have systematically tested this relationship. In addition, rather than simply discussing how aspects of state capacity contribute to authoritarian stability, I place these components of the state within the broader conceptual framework of state capacity. This study contributes to the field of democratization by testing these relationships generally. In addition, it examines the surprising finding that the same factor that discourages transitions from autocracy to democracy (high levels of state capacity) is also important to the survival of new democratic regimes. While previous studies have examined how various factors, including elements of state capacity affect authoritarian survival, democratic transition, or the survival of new democracies, this dissertation ties the concept of state capacity to each of these processes, both in how it affects them similarly in places and how it functions differently in promoting stability of democratic and authoritarian regimes.

This chapter provides an overview of the literature regarding the state, democratization and democratic survival in order to lay the groundwork for building a theory regarding the interaction of these factors in democratic transition and survival of new democracies. First, I discuss the definitions of the state and state capacity. Second, I focus on the concepts and dynamics of democratization and democratic survival, which, then, leads to the examination of the relation-

ship between state capacity and democratization, and state capacity and survival of new democracies.

In this chapter, I review the current literature on a relationship between state capacity and these two processes, as well as which elements of state capacity specifically affect the likelihood of these dynamics the most. While Huntington (1991) argues for a positive relationship between state capacity and democratic survival, and Przeworski et al. (2000) assume that states with greater per capita wealth display the higher survival odds after democratic transition, they do not test this relationship. This project fills this gap by testing this theory through statistical tests supported by case studies and applying the same logic of regime durability to authoritarian states.

This chapter begins with a definition of the state as understood in the field, as well as a review of the literature regarding the relationship between state and society, aimed at giving the background for the orientation of this project. A definition of state capacity, its role and elements, follow. Next, this paper approaches the question of how state capacity affects governance generally. Following this, it outlines the debates on the causes of democratization and democratic survival. The final section covers the literature that exists specifically relating to the effect of state capacity on these two processes.

The State and State Capacity

The definitions of state and state capacity as well as the relationship between the state and its various parts are not always clear or well agreed upon. Especially, the relationship between the state and society is often debated, including the degree to which the state is contin-

gent on society as a whole, and whether it is a competitive, cooperative, or an employer-employee relationship. This section, therefore, begins with a brief overview of definitions and goes into a more detailed discussion on variations in understanding of the relationships between the main concepts used here.

Let us begin with the definition of the state. While the government is an important aspect of the state, this paper primarily examines the strength of the organs through which the state implements its policies and the resources it has at its disposal. Even though the decisions that a government makes are certainly important, this study focuses on the capacity of the state and all of its apparatuses to formulate and implement policies. These organs of the state include, among other things, the decision-making apparatus as it is constructed, the bureaucracy, the legal system, and the revenues of the state.

Early conceptions of the state were intertwined with the sovereign, or ruler of a kingdom. Louis XIV of France understood that "the state is me," which was uncommon prior to the modern era. As bureaucracies, democracy, and the modern institutions of democratic and non-democratic states developed, this understanding evolved. In one of the earliest systematic examinations of the state and its organs of operation, Max Weber (1918, as cited in Breiner 1996) defined the state as a political entity that exercised a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a territory. In other words, the state must gain this monopoly on the use of force through a process of legitimization. He said that states that fail to maintain control over the use of coercive force to a large degree cease to be functioning states, or what we would call today failed states (Rotberg 2007). Weber's definition still remains the baseline for most understandings of states today, even those that disagree with it. Waltz (1979) expands this understanding

of a state, listing characteristics that a state must have: people, territory, government, economy, military and sovereignty. Rueschmeyer et al. (1985) emphasize the ability of the state to act as an autonomous actor from society to a certain degree, thus somewhat breaking up the concepts of the state, the society, and the country. In his state-in-society approach, Migdal (2001) defines the state as "a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts" (Migdal 2001, 16).

Traditionally, states are considered to be strong if decision-makers within those states are 1) insulated enough from society to formulate policies and deal with the multiplicity of groups in society; and 2) are well organized enough to implement policies in a coherent and effective manner (Doner 1992). Earlier works, including Skocpol (1979) and Levi (1981) saw state insulation from society as providing it with the ability to effectively formulate and implement policies, thus helping to ensure its goals are pursued. Evans et al (1985) broke apart these two distinct processes of decision-making and policy implementation in examining the state more closely. Evans (1995) extends this to the effectiveness of policies once implementation has taken place by looking at the results relative to intention. Just because governments can implement chosen policies does not mean that they will be effective at achieving policy goals desired or being effective (Weiss 1998). After all, if we were to simply look at insulation of decision-makers as leading to higher levels of state capacity, we would find democracies to generally be among the lower capacity states, while the record would not provide support for these conclusions.

Researchers have understood the state differently over time, as well as its relationship with society. Easton (1957) and Almond and Verba (1963) saw the state as a black box that took in demands from various societal actors and, as a result of these demands, it made policies to address the issues facing the country. Evans, Rueschmeyer and Skocpol (1985), on the other hand, argue for an approach that looks at the state as an actor itself. In this case, the state can potentially be measured and examined in an attempt to explain outcomes, as Nettl (1968), Herbst (2000) and others have argued. Migdal (2001), on the other hand, argues for more of a state in society view that sees the state as a variable that we should pay attention to, but he sees it as difficult to examine separate from its societal context.

This leads us to the concept of state capacity. While state capacity is often discussed among academics and practitioners, there is some debate over its definition and meaning. This may be due to the fact that as Weiss (1998) points out, state capacity is impossible to clearly and completely define in the abstract because states are not monoliths. They are complex and multifaceted structures with many different parts that do not act in unison. They lack systematic coherence and are factionalized within their structures as well (Weiss 1998). However, state capacity is, first and foremost, critical for protecting the citizens of a state and providing a system of rules. While the utility of different elements of state capacity will differ somewhat between democratic and non-democratic regimes, there is greater similarity than difference. The ability to obtain resources, as well as to effectively implement policies in a relatively efficient manner is critical to the survival of any regime, regardless of type. The 1997 World Development Report refers to state capacity as: "the ability of the state to undertake collective actions at least costs to society. This notion of capacity encompasses the administrative or technical capacity of state officials, but it is much broader than that. It also includes the deeper institu-

tional mechanisms that give politicians and civil servants the flexibility, rules, and restraints to enable them to act in the collective interest (World Bank, 1997, p. 77, as quoted in Cummings and Norgaard 2004)."

Cummings and Norgaard (2004) conceptualize state capacity as an umbrella that combines ideational, political, technical and implementation capacity. Political state capacity is what makes for an effective governmental structure, both among groups and departments within the government. In addition, state capacity also encompasses the ways in which these governmental individuals and departments relate to society more broadly. Technical state capacity is a state's organizational and intellectual resources in terms of expertise and experience of those within the state structures, indicated by the level of education and professional training of its bureaucrats among other things. Implementation state capacity is the ability of the state to implement its decisions and carry out policies that it chooses. In terms of ideational capacity, the authors see it as the degree to which the state is legitimized and embedded within the institutions of the state. Cummings and Norgaard point to the fact that in order to achieve a high level of ideational state capacity, a state must achieve some degree of both elite and mass legitimization. According to Cummings and Norgaard (2004):

> Ideational state capacity can therefore be conceived in the following way:
> (i) cognitively, the more that functions and policies are perceived to be alleviating collective problems, the greater the popular and political support and the stronger the ideational capacity (the instrumental role of ideas);
> (ii) cognitively, the better the ideas fit officials' sense of their role and their identity, the greater the ideational capacity (the constitutive role of ideas);
> (iii) normatively, the more the ideas are regarded as legitimate by the public and/or are manipulated to fit them, the more the officials will endorse them and the higher the ideational capacity. (688)

According to Skocpol and Feingold (1982), administrative organization and quality of these institutions are absolutely critical to the successful implementation of policies that governments choose to pursue. This causality holds true regardless of the government type or policy choice. Mann (1984) divided the elements of state capacity into two categories: despotic and infrastructural.

Infrastructural capacity is the ability of the state, through its infrastructure, to penetrate society and implement policy on the ground. This varies greatly across political systems, but at the least, it involves such actions as making laws and enforcing them. This includes the multitude of areas covered by governance, from revenue collection to enforcement of basic law and order (Gill 2003).

Despotic state capacity involves the ability to make decisions insulated from the pressures of society broadly. State capacity relies on a certain degree of legitimacy, or at least acquiescence from society. According to Cummings and Norgaard (2004), "the state needs to act with both elite and mass legitimation and participation (687)". Achieving this support of both the elites and masses is extremely helpful to achieving an effective state along with all of its trappings. This soft state capacity is the ability of the state to rule without major contention in policy implementation, is absolutely critical to state strength.

In his study on the state, Migdal (1988) focuses on the state's ability to exert what he calls social control. This does not mean the ability of the state to control all aspects of public life, but rather that it has the ability to make rules and have the final say where there is a conflict in rules or authority. These rules can range from criminal code to business regulations, tax

laws, to setting the standards of measure. Primarily this involves the ability of the state to set rules and enforce them to keep order, promote the goals of the government, maintain the integrity of the political regime, and extract the necessary resources to run the necessary tasks of government (Migdal 1988). While Migdal's interpretation on state capacity is quite accurate, and it represents the fundamental elements of state capacity, other authors have broken this down further in order to examine this critical piece of governance and regimes more closely.

Palidano (2000) further breaks down the elements of state capacity into three categories. He defines public sector capacity according to three elements: policy capacity, implementation authority and operational efficiency. Policy capacity is the ability of states to effectively formulate policy decisions in a systematic and well-thought out manner. For this, governments rely in part on the state apparatus which provides great resources in terms of knowledge and planning. Implementation authority is the ability of the state to see that its policies are enforced, including the use of whatever coercive force is necessary and allowed under the political system of the country. Operational efficiency is best described as the cost-effectiveness and timeliness of policy implementation. This can be hurt by inexperienced or unprofessional bureaucracy, bloated government employment roles, corruption, or a number of other factors (Palidano 2000).

Przeworski (1999) uses principal-agent relationship to look at government-bureaucracy relationship. In this structure, one of the major concerns is the issue of agency loss. Low-quality bureaucracy or high levels of corruption, among other factors, can create higher agency loss in the implementation of government policies, thus making the state less efficient, and decreasing

the ability of the government to use the state apparatus to implement policies, resulting in decreased state capacity.

The definition of a state, and its relationship with society, are still debated today. However, one thing that is held in common across these different understandings is that the state generally refers, at least in part, to the governing institutions in a country. Studies thus far have shown that states sometimes hold a tenuous hold on control within their countries, and higher levels of state capacity or governance capacity seem to increase the solidity of this hold on power, both for democratic and authoritarian governments and regimes. Poor resources hamper the ability of states to successfully implement policies, whether they are aimed at improving the lives of the population or controlling the population so that rulers can remain in power. The same can be said about the efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation. Such things as corruption, low-quality bureaucracy, or poor planning can all hurt the policy effectiveness of these states, which can in turn both make things materially worse within a country and hurt the ability of either a government or a regime to stay in power.

For the sake of this study, state capacity is understood as the financial and human resources at the government's disposal and the efficiency and effectiveness with which it implements policy. The mechanisms of the state are at the disposal of the government in power to implement its policies. Higher levels of state capacity allow those in power to do more and have greater chances of success in terms of policy outcomes. This directly affects the stability of not only the government but also potentially of the regime. The section below discusses what factors affect regime survival or failure in an attempt to highlight the role that state capacity plays in regime stability of both autocracies and democracies.

Transition to Democracy and Democratic Survival

The topic of political regimes has occupied a great amount of attention in comparative politics since the dawn of the discipline. After all, the individuals and institutions that make decisions in the government and the process in which those decisions are made profoundly affect the daily lives of ordinary citizens. Sometimes, these decisions are even a matter of life and death. Therefore, it matters a great deal what shape political regimes take; at times this comes down to the fundamental question of whether people serve the state or the state serves the people in a given country. Democratic governments have a fundamental reason to serve the people—namely, that their job security is dependent upon it. Regardless of their desires in terms of policy, they must attend to the needs of the people to a satisfactory degree in order to stay in power. While authoritarian regimes still must pay attention to the popular will to a certain degree, at the least, they do not have the same degree of urgency in this area as democratic leaders.

One way that state capacity functions to promote stability in both authoritarian and democratic regimes is by pleasing the government's selectorate. According to Buena de Mesquita et al. (2003), the selectorate is the group in society that chooses the leadership in a country. In order to stay in power, the government must manage to gain a large enough portion of that selectorate in order to form a winning coalition. For democracies, the selectorate is the general voting public, while in an autocracy, the selectorate will vary widely, from a royal family to key groups of military officers, business groups, the ruling party, or other key groups within society. However the selectorate might be composed in a society, the leaders must win over enough of it to maintain power (Buena de Mesquita et al. 2003).

As Wintrobe (1998) argues, the decisions on repression and extraction and distribution of resources within society are driven by rational calculations and that they are driven at least in part to make sure that the rulers maintain their power. In making these decisions, the autocrats must make the necessary payoffs to key groups for their support or at least acquiescence of the ruling government. Even authoritarian regimes though, as he points out, must make some of these payments to the population broadly in order to avoid such a high level of dissatisfaction that it could challenge the dictator's rule (Wintrobe 1998).

Wintrobe divides the strategies that dictators use to stay in power into two classes: repression and loyalty. Repression encompasses a number of different activities, including restrictions on basic civil liberties as well as political rights. Some authoritarian leaders even ban opposition parties or other organizations and associations that are not specifically sanctioned by the government. In addition to these restrictions, the leadership also sets up instruments to monitor the population and impose sanctions on those who disobey its wishes. The fear that the repression is intended to generate is aimed not only at the general population but also potential challengers both within and outside of the regime. These sanctions include prisons, torture, and execution. According to Wintrobe, loyalty can be gained through the distribution of rents, either narrowly or widely, and it can include both particularistic goods as well as public ones. In addition, some authoritarian leaders work to indoctrinate the population in a particular ideology or cult of personality of the leader in an attempt to increase willing public support of the regime.

Wintrobe argues that dictatorships must find the proper balance between these two strategies of repression and loyalty if they are to maximize the stability of the regime. This is

due to both limitations in resources as well as diminishing returns. In other words, too much repression can be as problematic as too little repression, and while too little loyalty toward the regime is problematic, but loyalty can only be purchased to a certain extent and projects in pursuit of it are often not cheap. If a dictator represses the population too much, the individuals are more likely to decide that the risks of opposition are preferable to their current state of being. Essentially, it is better to be loved than feared as a leader, but some degree of fear among the population supplements regime stability. After all, if the people have no fear of an authoritarian regime, they are better able to organize and replace it (Wintrobe 1998).

Democratic Transitions

This section begins with an overview of the literature on the definitions of democratization and democratic survival. The discussion on the relationship between state capacity, democratization, and democratic survival follows. While some scholars have looked to structural or institutional factors to explain democratization, others have focused on cultural or behavioral components. Some look at the combination of these factors, along with international support for democracy to explain both particular cases of democratization or general trends for or against democracy. Lipset (1959) found that modernization played a key role in providing the necessary components for democratization, including wealth, education, urbanization, and the creation of a sizeable middle class, which has enough education and stake in society to demand a greater voice in running the affairs of their country. Huntington, in numerous works, pointed to certain cultural tendencies toward democratization, including a lack of rigid overarching societal authority structures or cultural values that emphasized order and obedience over individual responsibility for improving one's situation in this life.

Portions of the literature have cited strategic interactions of various actors, both within a country and outside of the country as critical to understanding when and how democratic transitions take place. O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986) examine the choices that different types of authoritarian regimes make in the face of public demands for democratization. This makes an important contribution, because even though the public can potentially rise up and overthrow the government directly, the decisions of the autocratic rulers make a significant difference in how easily this happens and on its probability of success. Leaders can potentially negotiate a transition and either leave the government or find accommodation for themselves within a new democratic framework. For example, they find that personalist regimes have the greatest trouble finding accommodation in a new regime and thus are less likely to allow the transition to happen easily unless they have little choice. Military regimes, on the other hand, have greater ability to find a place for themselves in the new regime, because the country most likely will still need a military, and if the leaders remain as military officers, the new leaders will be hesitant to move against them due to fear of a coup (for example: Argentina). Geddes attributes this to the idea that military officers on the whole are more likely to value the capacity and unit of the military as an institution than they value necessarily holding office or power over the governing regime (Geddes 1999). Single-party regimes have some ability to find a new place in a democratic regime as one of the parties competing for power (O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986). For example, in a number of Central and Eastern European countries, former communist party leaders formed socialist parties and competed for power in democratic elections, such as in the case of Poland, where Kwasniewski and a number of former Communist Party officials competed for and even won elections.

In looking at Soviet-bloc transitions, Bunce (2003) finds that democratic transitions are more likely to be successful and result in long-lasting, consolidated democracies when during the initial stages of protests against the authoritarian regime, there is already a strong opposition group in place, there is cooperation of at least part of the existing government, and there are mass protests in support of democratization. In addition, she claims that transitions are much less certain where the military is actively involved in the transition, or where the mass mobilizations do not focus on democracy. She argues that these factors affect the level of uncertainty surrounding the transition, survival and consolidation, and when there is higher uncertainty, successful transition to and survival and consolidation of resulting democratic regimes is less likely (Bunce 2003). In their study of democratic transitions in Africa, Bratton and van de Walle (1997) find that autocratic leaders are motivated by calculations of their own political survival, and that they will resist opening the political system as long as they think that they can reasonably do so and survive. These calculations are driven in large part by the level of opposition that they face from society at large. Mainwaring (1999), in his study of Latin American democratization, stresses the importance of international support from key actors in aiding democratization. Specifically, he credits the warming, then ending of the Cold War and the US shift in its behavior with regard to democracy abroad in the mid-1980s with playing a large role in supporting democracy in the region in both transitions and survival of the new regimes.

Other authors have found that the specific authoritarian regime sub-type plays an important role both in the probability of regime failure, democratic transition, and in the likelihood that such a transition will lead to a long-lived, stable democracy. Geddes (1999) makes a number of findings in her study of 165 authoritarian regimes from 1945-1994. First, she finds that military regimes are the most likely to collapse in a five-year period (35% probability) compared

to personalist regimes (20% probability) and single-party regimes (8% probability). In addition, she found that transitions from military regimes were more likely to result in democracies, both short-lived and long-lived. In her study, 43% of transitions from military rule ended in short-lived democracies and 31% resulted in long-lived democracies. Transitions from personalist regimes, on the other hand, only led to long-lived democracies 16% of the time. She claims that this is partly because military regimes are more likely to step down prior to events reaching a crisis (Geddes 1999). This is consistent with the study by O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986) that studies authoritarian regimes and transitions to democracy in Latin America. In this study, they observed that military regimes do not find themselves existentially challenged in the same way by potential democratic transitions, and that they have greater potential than personalist regimes to negotiate a place for themselves within the new arrangements. After all, most democratic societies also employ militaries, which do not necessarily have to change in the wake of a regime transition, such as in the case of Argentina (O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986).

Brownlee (2009) finds that, somewhat contrary to the findings of Geddes, authoritarian regimes with larger selectorates are more likely to democratize than authoritarian regimes with very restricted circles of power. His results show that authoritarian regimes that allow some degree of multi-party elections and governance, even if it is flawed or rigged, are more likely to transition to democracy than authoritarian regimes that do not allow political parties or dissident parties to participate in the legislature (Brownlee 2009). This could potentially be attributed to the role that this plays in allowing opposition groups to form around elections. In addition, even fraudulent elections can increase popular participation and help to build popular expectations of government responsiveness and that they might be able to affect their govern-

ment. Also, as we have learned, fraudulent elections provide a potential point of protest for opposition groups. Especially in situations where the opposition is well-organized and united, mass protests can lead to the toppling of the regime (for example, see: McFaul 2005; Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Howard and Roessler 2006; Kuzio 2005).

In looking at the cases of authoritarian regimes in post-Soviet states, Way (2008) finds that the strength of the ruling party, a well-funded coercive apparatus, and state discretionary control over the economy lead to greater regime stability. These tools give the regimes greater tools to punish and suppress opposition groups and to discourage the defection of key allies. Essentially, he finds that when authoritarian regimes collapse, it is often the result of regime weakness more than it is due to opposition strength (Way 2009). Although opposition strength is important, weak state capacity both increases the chances that a strong opposition will form, and it increases their odds of success if they take action in the form of popular protests against the regime. Way points to the fact that the level of mobilization in protests is a poor predictor of success, thereby leading to the conclusion that, although the protests are necessary for toppling authoritarian regimes in many cases, they are most likely to be successful in countries with comparatively weak state capacity.

Democratic Survival

Scholars have looked at various factors in understanding the durability or failure of democracy. Structural, cultural and institutional factors, as well as international support for democracy have been shown to influence the survival of democracy. Przeworski et al. (2000) find that, while countries democratize at various levels of per capita wealth, richer states will be more likely to see democracy survive in their countries. Inglehart (2003) and Carothers (2003) stress the importance of civil society and a strong and vibrant civic culture and popular support

for democracy in both the quality and the survival of democracy, especially in new democracies. After all, while democracy can be imposed from the top to some degree, for it to be truly effective and high-quality, it must achieve the support of society broadly in order to succeed. At the least, as long as popular backing of democracy is tepid, any democratic regime will always remain vulnerable to exogenous shocks, such as war or economic crisis.

As both early thinkers on democracy (Montesquieu 1751; Federalist 10, 1790) and modern experience show, the design of political institutions plays an important role in the prospects for democratic survival, including division of power within the government and not allowing one individual to gain too much power within the system, which can potentially lead to authoritarian practices (for example: Peru under Fujimora; Zambia under Chiluda; the Philippines under Marcos; Germany under Hitler). As one can clearly see though, democratic transition and democratic survival, while distinct conceptually, are heavily intertwined, and thus they are both affected positively by some of the same factors. Some factors, such as popular support for democracy and previous experience with democracy support both the probability of democratic transition and survival. However, state capacity, which is often critical to the survival of new democracies, can also potentially work to frustrate the potential for a transition from autocratic to democratic rule.

Scholars began their study of democratic transitions by examining what factors cause some countries to be democratic and others to be nondemocratic. Many scholars have found that levels of economic development, distribution of income within society, democratic civic culture, and social capital have all correlated positively with democracy's presence in countries and with the likelihood that states will democratize (Almond and Verba 1963; Lipset 1959; Van-

hannen 1992 and 2003). Early modernization theory was premised on the idea that in order for a country to democratize successfully, it must first build wealth and a large and vibrant middle class, which was thought to be critical to the success of democracy (Lipset 1959). Vanhannen found that in a statistical analysis of 170 countries, the degree of resource distribution accounted for more than seventy percent of the variation in democratization. The high correlation between these two factors makes it compelling to at least consider this in any policy of democracy promotion. According to this study, the wider resource distribution is in a society that is not democratic, the higher the possibility is that it will democratize. Thus it suggests that one could best strengthen the social base necessary for democracy through policies of increasing educational opportunities, land reforms to further the establishment of family farm systems, and more liberal, market-based economic policies (Vanhannen 2003).

Contrary to the expectations of Lipset that wealth was a trigger to democratization, Przeworski and Limongi (1997), as well as Przeworski et al. (2000) argue that the relationship between these factors and democratic transition is not as strong as was previously thought. Przeworski et al. (2000) find that democratization happens at varying levels of economic development, and that wealthier countries are not significantly more likely to democratize. In fact, they argue that such transitions are statistically random with regard to the level of economic development, contradicting classic modernization theory. However, they find that countries at higher levels of development (which they operationalize in terms of per capita wealth) that democratize are more likely to see their new democratic regimes survive. Similarly, Londregan and Poole (1996) found that high levels of poverty greatly increased the probability of a democracy failing and the country returning to authoritarian rule.

In addition to structural factors, great attention has been paid to the role of culture in democratization and democratic survival. From de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* to Almond and Verba's (1963) work and beyond, scholars of democracy have looked at the role of civic culture and active citizen engagement in public life as critical to the success of democracy (see: Muller and Seligson 1994; Inglehart 2003; Putnam 1993). The combination of institutions and culture are absolutely critical to democracy in any meaningful or sustainable sense. Without citizen education, belonging and participation in public life, democracy is simply not possible, and with a weak civic culture, democracy, especially in relatively new regimes, will remain tenuous.

In addition to contributing the regime's ability to deal with contextual problems, higher levels of state capacity can give rulers the ability to build this support for democracy. After all, in new democracies, dissatisfaction with governance is sometimes related to dissatisfaction with democracy. If these nascent democratic regimes are better able to administer their tasks of providing public goods effectively and efficiently, they are more likely to build support for both themselves and democratic rule in general. Higher levels of state capacity, including greater resources and a well-trained, professional bureaucracy, aid greatly in effective governance to alleviate the collective problems of a society.

The development of political parties and nongovernmental organizations that promote and/or oversee democracy in fledgling or potential democracies has been promoted as a key element in democracy promotion policies, both by practitioners and some scholars. A vibrant civil society plays an important role in holding governments accountable, and some claim that civil society is a base upon which a democratic culture can be built (Carothers and Ottaway

2005). While this civil society can help with the building of a civic culture, it cannot force it. The relationship is often phrased as backwards from its reality. A civic culture is necessary in order for civil society programs to work. Civic or political culture consists of the "attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the self in the system." (Almond and Verba 1963, p. 3) While the steps of building up civil society are certainly important in the promotion of democracy, they cannot function in a vacuum. Democracy and civic culture promotion policies by the United States can only be effective if the desire for democracy is within the people. Civil society does no good without an effective civic culture within the society. This involves primarily initiatives aimed at political education at all levels of schools and beyond. People must be educated so as to understand their political system, as well as one's responsibilities and rights as a citizen. Most importantly and least easily though, people must be convinced that they have a role in this system. This is not transmitted solely by schools, but is learned through general socialization and interaction with family, peers, school, work, and the political system itself (Almond and Verba 1963). This is often difficult in places where most individuals have been historically marginalized from the political process and have learned not to trust the system. One observer, remarking on democracy in Latin America in 1993 said that, "Today, the greatest threat to democracy comes not from the military, not from domestic radicals, not from foreign interventions, but from the potential loss of faith in the process by a nation's own population." (Hillman 1994, p. 152) This potential loss of trust among the general population that democracy will bring them a better life is a real threat in any new democratic regime, because in such countries, democracy is still seen as one option of governing regime rather than the only one (as in consolidated democracies). A full and true democracy is built from the ground up, and it cannot function if the people do not have faith in the system. Without this foundation, democracy will always be fragile and the society will be susceptible to relapse into authoritarian-

ism. George Bernard Shaw once said that, "Democracy is a device that ensures we shall be governed no better than we deserve." As such, the people of a country must be both able and willing to govern themselves effectively, or else democracy will not succeed in meeting a society's needs.

The Role of State Capacity

Throughout modern history, we have seen a rise and fall of waves of democracy (Huntington 1991). Over the past two hundred years, most democratic regimes that have been established ended in failure. In the twenty-first century, there are an unprecedented number of democracies, most of which have been established within the past thirty years. While this serves as great cause of optimism for supporters of democratic rule, it also makes the issue of democratic survival more pressing than ever, because despite these great successes, there have been reversals of democracy in some of these countries already. Figuring out why newly established democratic regimes fail, therefore, is of great importance to the success of these third and fourth waves of democratization. The fact that there are waves of democratization points to the influence of systemic factors on the process of democratization. While these systemic elements certainly are important, whether we are talking about the international distribution of power, preferences of the most powerful actors, trends of wealth worldwide, or trends in democracy, these factors are difficult if not impossible for states to control. In addition, these systemic factors do not tell the entire story, and although they are important, they fall outside the scope of this study. This project focuses instead on factors within the governance of a country that can be accounted for more easily and controlled to a certain extent.

While few studies have directly examined the relationship between state capacity and democratic survival, they indicate that strong state capacity likely increases the probability of

democratic survival. Fukuyama (2004) laid out the framework for this relationship, arguing that well-governed polities were a necessary prerequisite to the "end of history." While Fukuyama lays out the rational imperative for building state capacity as a prerequisite for pushing for democratic governance, Etzioni (2006) goes farther, claiming a moral duty to promote security before democracy. He argues that basic security is a necessary precondition for democratization to start, be successful and survive. Some level of state capacity is necessary in order to provide basic security to people within a country. Without the capacity to fulfill this basic responsibility of government, any regime, democratic or non-democratic, runs an increased risk of failing. Acemoglu (2005) argues that in overly weak states, leaders will not invest sufficiently in public goods. This neglect of public goods will likely be detrimental to the society at large and the impact will be felt directly in the lives of both society at large and in key societal groups that the government counts on for support for or at least acquiescence to its rule. Because of the critical role that legitimacy plays in the support for the regime, neglect of these public goods in the long-term can be detrimental to the long-term survival of the government.

According to Svolik (2008), democracy can survive in a country for two reasons. Either a country can become a consolidated democracy, and thus have a negligible chance of an autocratic reversal, or democracy can survive in a country because of favorable circumstances, even if it has not consolidated. He argues that democratic survival and democratic consolidation may be driven by different factors and processes (Svolik 2008). Therefore, with regard to the role of state capacity in new democracies, one might ask two separate questions. First, how does state capacity affect democratic survival in these states? and second, how does state capacity affect democratic consolidation? These two processes, survival and consolidation are obviously interconnected. Until democracy has become consolidated within a country, the regime will be vul-

nerable to potential failure, because the citizenry will still see democracy as one type of rule, rather than the unquestioned rule in the political regime. Wiarda (2005) notes dangerously low levels of support for democracy and its institutions in many Latin American countries today. In many polls, nearly and sometimes more than half of individuals favor "strong government" over democracy as priorities. According to Wiarda, much of this disenchantment with democracy is associated with the ability of the governments to effectively provide services and help their citizens obtain a good standard of living (Wiarda 2005).

State capacity is fundamentally important to pleasing the electorate in a country by providing the basic governmental services that the citizens demand. In states that have made recent transitions in their form of government, the citizenry does not always make the distinction between the government and the regime. Therefore, disapproval of the government in power can potentially translate to disapproval of democracy in general in newly democratic countries, potentially leaving the door open for an actor to overthrow the democratic regime, either from within the regime or from outside the regime (such as from the military). Because state capacity plays an important role in satisfying the demands of the people, and because doing this can increase the likelihood that democracy will survive in a country, I expect that countries with stronger overall state capacity will be more likely to see recent democratic transitions survive. Effectively, the increased state capacity brings an improved ability to govern and meet the needs and demands of the citizenry. However, different dimensions of state capacity can potentially have different effects on the fate of democracy in these newly democratic countries.

According to Huntington (1991), contextual problems (such as insurgencies, communal conflict, regional antagonisms, poverty, socioeconomic inequality, inflation, external debt, or

low rates of economic growth) represent one of the greatest threats to democratic survival. State capacity is critical in a government's attempts to meet the needs of its people and to meet these problems. It fundamentally determines whether most citizens will approve of their government. In states with recent governmental transitions, citizens often do not make the distinction between the government and the regime. Therefore, in society at large, negative citizen views of the government will mean negative views of democracy in countries that have made recent transitions to democratic rule. Even though democratic regimes sometimes fall to military takeovers, this is highly unlikely if the regime overall has the support of the country's citizenry. Therefore, state capacity will play an important role in determining the survival of a democratic regime.

Bunce (2003) finds that the level of uncertainty is an important factor with regard to the success of regime transformations. She finds that lower uncertainty works to create a stronger break from the past regimes. In addition, she finds that nationalist movements that do not recognize the legitimacy of the central state can greatly threaten democratization. Stronger state capacity can help to deal with both of these problems by creating a greater sense of certainty and permanence among the population if the government is able to assert itself and effectively provide services to the people in a predictable manner. In addition, if the state is able to do this, then it gives potential dissident groups greater incentive to buy into the central government as legitimate, thus helping to alleviate a potential threat to democracy.

Increasingly, the pitfalls of political institution reform in weak states became apparent because of the potential for instability that such reforms could bring. As a result, more and more scholars and practitioners have advocated for institutional reforms and strengthening of

non-political state structures in democratic and in non-democratic states.[1] They argued that strong state capacity is critical to providing a more stable environment that improves citizens' standard of living in the short-term and increases the stability and viability of democratic regimes in both the short and long-term.

Bäck and Hadenius (2008) find that there is a J-shaped relationship between democratization and state capacity. While they theorize that the level of democracy drives the level of state capacity in a country, they simply test the correlation between these factors. In other words, they find that strongly authoritarian states have higher administrative quality than states with moderate levels of democracy, but that states with high levels of democracy, on average, have higher quality state administrations than weak democracies or strong authoritarian states. Goldstone and Ulfelder (2004) find a similar relationship between democracy and stability. They credit this, in large part, to the quality of the political institutions in a country. While it may be the case that countries that are at moderate levels of democracy have relatively weak state structures, the ability of these states to solidify these structures will help to determine whether or not the democratic regime survives in these countries. State capacity is critical to the government's attempts to build support and deal with problems that face the country, whether they are temporary or endemic.

While state capacity is likely to decrease when a democratic transition takes place (Schmitter et al. 2005), it should be expected that at least certain elements of state capacity would suffer in the wake of any regime change. State capacity plays a crucial role in stabilizing a regime and determining its prospects for survival. This relationship should function similarly in

[1] For example, see: Tilly (2007); Fukuyama (2004); Paris (2004); Ulfelder and Lustick (2005)

both non-democratic regimes and new democratic regimes, because the willingness of people to accept a regime's rule is contingent on the regime providing certain services, especially in areas that are the domain of governments, such as public security and the rule of law.

Tilly (2007) argues that democracy and state capacity both exist on continuums that do not have to be at similar levels but that democracy and state capacity can be mutually reinforcing. He argues that in order for states to become more democratic, they must include social networks, decrease inequality in society (especially along identity-based lines), and limit the coercive power of non-state actors. Because of the importance of state capacity in meeting these tasks from a governmental standpoint, Tilly argues that states cannot achieve high levels of democracy without at least relatively high levels of state capacity. High levels of state capacity can help to make authoritarian regimes more stable.

Regime changes are often unstable and uncertain periods in a country. This applies to such transitions regardless of their direction or type. Therefore we should not find it surprising that states in the process of democratization are found to be more prone to international conflict (Mansfield and Snyder 2002) and internal collapse (Goldstone and Ulfelder 2004). However, political science as a field has found that certain factors, such as higher levels of development (Przeworski et al. 2000) and higher quality of governmental institutions left by a country's former colonial rulers (Bernhard and Reenock 2004), can potentially help to alleviate these risks.

Huntington (1968) made the argument that a strong state is critical to the success of democratization, because, he argued, a strong state is important to dealing with the inclusion of new groups, which is necessary for the survival of the new democratic regimes. Without the

existence of a strong state to hold society together, Huntington argues that the strain of elections can potentially lead the collapse of the regime. The initial peace treaty in the Angolan civil war provides evidence of this, as an electoral loss by the rebel group quickly led to a resumption of violence within the country. Huntington's understanding of the role of the state in democratization led to the conclusion among many policy makers and modernization theorists that the rule of law and high state capacity should be prioritized as prerequisites to democracy. While a number of countries with relatively weak state capacity have proven to be successful in their democratic transitions, they are more prone to relapse and stagnation. Paradoxically though, these traits that modernization proponents identified accurately as important to democratic survival, when strengthened, gave many authoritarian regimes greater ability to retain power and prevent democratization from even taking place.

In a study of post-colonial legacies and democratic survival, Bernhard, Reenock and Nordstrom (2004) find that the British colonial legacy is the most favorable to democratic survival. They credit this, in large part, to the fact that former British colonies were left with stronger state capacity and less dysfunctional state-society relations than the colonies of other European powers. Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that weak central governments make insurgency more attractive and feasible. This can create a significant threat to the survival of both democratic and non-democratic regimes. Ulfelder and Lustick (2005) argue that the positive relationship between economic development and democratic survival, as found in Przeworski et al (2000), is driven by the fact that wealthier states generally have stronger state structures. While economic strength and state structures may correlate highly, state strength does not necessarily follow from wealth. Schmitter et al (2005) show that Wagner's Law, which states that more developed countries will spend more on public goods, is essentially correct, but only explains

about two thirds of the variation on state spending. Taking state spending as one indication of state strength, state strength is a variable that is not completely dependent on the level of economic development, even though the resources necessary for higher state capacity tend to increase with higher levels of economic development (Schmitter et al. 2005). Therefore, state capacity is worth considering as a separate variable from levels of economic development.

The existing literature indicates that state capacity is important in effective governance and regime survival. Although the logic of this connection is sound, the scholarship lacks sufficient systematic attempts to measure the effect of this relationship, with regimes in general or of any specific type. Works examining state capacity find that resources are important, but they do not tell the full picture of state capacity. Efficacy and efficiency make a significant difference in the capacity of a state to implement policy choices on the ground. By accounting for these elements of state capacity we can gain a better and fuller picture of how state capacity functions and affects the prospects for democracy in a country.

Beyond the Existing Literature

I seek to position this dissertation within two separate, yet connected, literatures on democracy. The first group focuses on transitions to democracy, while the second deals with the survival of new democracies. While the scholars active in the first body of literature mentioned examine the questions of how and why countries make the transition to democracy, this paper falls among those studies that look at the "why" questions. I contribute to this area by examining, in a systematic and broad manner, the effect of state capacity on the likelihood of democratic transitions. This approach fills a gap in the literature on the factors that contribute to democratic transition. While most studies of this sort have focused on elements that directly

contribute to democracy, this study looks at state capacity as a permissive factor that, when low, allows greater possibilities for democratic transition. In addition, it tests this relationship in a statistical model that looks at the effects of multiple elements of state capacity on the likelihood of authoritarian regimes to transition to democracy.

This project builds on existing literature to expand our understanding of the specific effect of state capacity on the survival of authoritarian regimes, democratic transition and the survival of new democracies, while understanding and observing the link between the two interrelated phenomena. The argument that I lay out seems on its face troubling to the prospects of democratization—namely that the same factor can make democratic transitions less likely plays a critical role in the ability of new democratic regimes to build internal legitimacy and deal with contextual problems that might lead to the failure of the new regime. While countries with low state capacity are more likely to transition to democracy, this does not mean that new democratic regimes with this low state capacity are doomed to failure.

In regards to the group of literature outlined above pertaining to democratic survival, scholars primarily look at what factors affect the likelihood of democratic regime survival. While a number of authors have examined the impact of state capacity on democratic survival, they have often done so indirectly or in a qualitative manner. Although these studies have strong merit and have made strong contributions to the field, this project effectively uses the insights of the authors outlined above to go one step farther. There has been no study to date that directly examines the effect of various indicators of state capacity in a comprehensive statistical study on democratic survival. Given this gap, the methodology utilized in this study comple-

ments the existing literature and expands the social scientific investigation into the causes of regime failure.

This project contributes the burgeoning literature on governance, especially in transitional democratic systems. It seeks to find out both the degree to which state capacity affects transitions to democracy and survival of new democratic regimes, as well as which elements of state capacity are particularly important to survival of these regimes. In addition, it helps to answer the question of the degree to which state capacity supports the stability and survival of remaining authoritarian regimes. Among other questions within this line of inquiry will be the role that resources versus organization play in regime survival. While it is difficult to measure the effect of legitimacy on regime durability, I will account for this through indirect measures, because legitimacy provides an important element of soft state capacity. This makes an important addition to the existing literature by accounting for legitimacy not simply as an independent factor, but rather as a part of state capacity.

3. Theory Section

One of the dominant trends in the past few decades has been a move by many states towards democracy. In the post-WWII period, and especially with the end of the Cold War, active democracy promotion has become an important part of the foreign policy agenda for many governments. In light of these developments and trends in international relations and policy making, as well as academic fields dealing with democracy promotion and democratization, it is imperative to effectively understand the circumstances contributing to regime change and regime survival. Furthermore, in the field of governance, perhaps no two issues are more pressing and closely interrelated than the form of government and its effectiveness. Therefore, a deeper analysis of the role of state capacity in the transition to democracy and survival of new democratic regimes can provide critical insights for both the academic field on democratization and the practical field of democracy assistance programs.

Recognizing the importance of this relationship, this project looks at the connection between a country's political regime type and the capabilities and effectiveness of its state mechanisms. State capacity, critical for dealing with contextual problems and building legitimacy for regimes, is vital to explaining the survival of regimes. My expectation is that higher levels of state capacity will tend to make regimes more stable, regardless of the regime type. More specifically, I posit two hypotheses:

H1: Higher levels of state capacity will make non-democratic countries less likely to transition to democracy.

H2: Higher levels of state capacity will increase the probability that new democratic regimes will survive.

In other words, higher levels of state capacity will make transitions to democracy less likely in the first place, but if such a transition takes place, higher state capacity will make the survival of the new democratic regime more likely.

To explain the causal link in the relationship between state capacity and transitions to democracy, I argue that with a stronger state capacity, the government can better control its territory and more effectively build its legitimacy though the provision of public goods. In addition, good governance or direct distribution of rents (both made easier by strong state capacity) can alter the rational calculations as to the utility of the regime in the eyes of key actors whose support or acquiescence is important to the stability of the regime. Furthermore, higher repressive capacity provides a non-democratic government with effective mechanisms to stay in power, even if it is relatively unpopular. In addition, effective repression of political dissidents can help to limit the degree to which the flaws of the regime are known and the degree to which opponents of the regime can effectively organize. While this chain of logic directly examines the probability of failure for authoritarian regimes, this is important to democratic transition for two reasons. First: if an authoritarian regime fails, this at least creates the opportunity in most cases for democratic transition. Second: in the modern era, and specifically in the time period covered in this study, failures of authoritarian regimes typically result in at least some attempt at democracy. The argument that I make is based on the fact that lower levels of state capacity make democratic transitions more likely because they increase the likelihood of failure for authoritarian regimes.

State capacity also critically contributes to the stability of newly democratic regimes and their subsequent survival. In these new democracies, higher state capacity increases the likelihood that the new democratic regime will survive, because states with greater resources, and more effective and efficient in implementing policy, will be better able to deal with the problems that face them and will have a greater ability to build support for the regime among the public and key groups in society whose support is important to the survival of a new regime.

I begin this chapter by discussing the general role of state capacity in the stability and survival of democratic and non-democratic regimes, as well as the relationship between state capacity and governance. Next, I show how state capacity affects the survival of new democratic regimes, followed by an examination of certain elements of state capacity in detail, along with their operationalization. This section is followed by a discussion of the way and degree to which state capacity affects the likelihood of transitions from non-democratic regimes to democratic ones. Afterwards, I talk about state capacity's effects on the probability of survival for new democratic regimes. Finally, I review my hypotheses and the general logic behind them.

Despite a general global trend toward democracy in the past few decades, the success of democratic transitions and their subsequent survival have shown mixed results. Although a greater percentage of countries can be called democracies today than at any point in history, two major facts point to an incomplete victory for proponents of democracy: first, the prevalence of non-democratic forms of government in many countries; and second, the failure of some attempts at democratic transitions. After the original transition, a number of countries have slid back into less democratic forms of governance or have remained relatively low-quality

democracies. For this reason, both academics and policy makers have tried to understand how various factors affect the move towards democracy, the likelihood of states to remain democratic following the initial transition, and the consolidation of democracy in those countries.

Increasingly, the pitfalls of political institution reform in weak states became apparent because of the potential for instability that such reforms could bring. As a result, more and more scholars and practitioners have advocated for institutional reforms and strengthening of non-political state structures in democratic and in non-democratic states.[2] They argued that strong state capacity is critical to providing a more stable environment that improves citizens' standard of living in the short-term and increases the stability and viability of democratic regimes in both the short and long-term.

This project adds to the field by specifically examining the degree to which state capacity affects democratization and by analyzing the precise elements of state capacity that affect these processes. Furthermore, this project extends previous works in the field of authoritarian stability, democratization and democratic survival to evaluate arguments made for the importance of state capacity to democratic transitions and to the success of new democratic governments. In this project, I argue that on one hand, higher levels of state capacity hinder transitions to democracy by increasing stability of authoritarian regimes, but on the other hand, stronger state capacity makes new democratic regimes more likely to survive. Tying together this connection of state capacity both in the potential for transition to democracy and the survival of new democracies, along with systematic tests of these relationships distinguish this project.

[2] For example, see: Tilly (2007); Fukuyama (2004); Paris (1997); Ulfelder and Lustick (2005)

The Role of State Capacity

Higher levels of state capacity make the survival of democratic regimes more likely, but this same factor also makes transitions to democracy less likely. For the sake of this project, state capacity is conceptualized in terms of financial resources at the government's disposal, as well as the effectiveness and efficiency with which policies are implemented. In other words, state capacity is the state's ability, both in terms of resources and competency, to effectively implement policies. This ability is critical to whatever actions a government seeks to take, whether it is providing basic security, public goods, or oppressing dissidents. Furthermore, the state's ability to implement policies can be either helpful or harmful to society at large. For example, higher levels of state capacity make it easier for a state to provide public goods to its people, such as good roads or social services, but it can also use this capacity to spy on or oppress dissident groups and even large portions of the general population. Therefore, high levels of state capacity are not always beneficial to the welfare of the citizenry, but they tend to positively affect the stability of a regime.

Higher state capacity makes regimes more stable in multiple ways. Financial resources and competent and effective administrators provide the state with the capacity to meet challenges and increase its stability. These features provide those in power with better tools to provide public goods or particularistic ones. By doing this, the regime can either build legitimacy or at least alter the rational calculations of key actors and veto players or the general public. In addition, higher levels of state capacity allow authoritarian regimes to build stronger coercive mechanisms to disrupt or destroy those who might seek its destruction.

Some of the ways that state capacity can contribute to regime stability are shared by both democratic and non-democratic regimes, while others are specific to particular regime

types. In other words, the ways that democratic and non-democratic regimes can use state capacity to promote their stability vary somewhat due to the nature of the regime types. Resources—namely monetary resources are important and even necessary to effective governance, regardless of regime type. These funds are important to the government's ability to effectively implement policy and provide government services, which provide key actors in society, as well as the general population, with incentives to not oppose the government or regime.

Aside from the general population, the key actors necessary for overthrowing the ruling regime might include the military, powerful business or civic groups, or dissident groups of any type if they have the potential incentive, support and means to rebel. Who the relevant groups are depends on the particular characteristics of the country. If the government is effectively providing services, such as contract enforcement, important social services, or managing economic growth, these groups might see maintaining the current regime as in their interest. In other words, by effectively providing these services, the government has the ability to either change the calculations of key actors or individual citizens directly, and by doing so, it works to build legitimacy for the government and regime. For example, by managing strong economic growth and ensuring public safety and law and order, the government of Singapore has built a degree of legitimacy among its people and major players within society. In Chile following the transition to democracy, the new democratic regime avoided serious challenges from the military or other allies of the Pinochet regime in part through effective governance, which was aided by the resources of the Chilean government, both economic and in terms of a highly skilled bureaucracy. After all, downfall of the government outside of the institutional rules typically means the fall of the regime. Therefore, this theory does not assume that rulers must have the best interests of the country or the broader regime at heart or even have good judgment.

Rather, stronger state capacity at least provides the rulers with the tools to strengthen the stability of their own rule and that of the regime in general. Certainly some leaders will choose to simply line their pockets with proceeds from the national economy. However, both honest and corrupt rulers will have greater tools to pursue the stability of their own rule and the regime if they have higher levels of state capacity at their disposal in order to build support from both the general public and societal elites. With these resources at least comes the ability to use them to the benefit of both the rulers and the regimes. Whatever the source of this wealth, it provides rulers with the ability to spend money to provide public services, may pay-offs for support, or build a high-quality bureaucracy to aid in implementing their policies.

One way to think of the ability and likelihood of the general population or key actors in society to attempt to achieve the toppling of a regime is within a risk/reward framework. Scholars of protests against fraudulent elections or unpopular authoritarian regimes have found that the likelihood of people participating in such actions is affected by both the level of grievance, the likelihood of success of the protests and the perceived risks in terms of individual safety (For example: Van de Walle 2006; Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Tucker 2007; Way 2009). Higher levels of state capacity allow the government to affect all of these factors. Lower levels of grievance against the government decrease the incentive to protest the regime for normal individuals or specific groups that might have the resources to topple the government, such as the military. Higher levels of state capacity give authoritarian regimes better ability to fund coercive arms of the state, including the police and military, which can be used both to discourage protests and to combat them if they happen. Higher levels of state capacity decrease the probability of success for protests or other actions to topple the regimes because it can work to decrease the portion of the public that will join the protests, and it furnishes the government with better tools

for dealing with the protest, either through coercion or promises of programs or rents to satisfy those involved. While higher state capacity does not guarantee the survival of the regime, it provides better chances of survival.

In order to stay in power, any political leadership must satisfy its selectorate, or the group of people that select the leaders. In the case of democratic regimes, the selectorate is made up of the voting public. For non-democratic regimes, the selectorate varies widely, and it can be a party, a family, a key group of military officers, or another set of individuals, depending on the nature of the regime. The leader or leaders must satisfy a high enough percentage of their selectorate if they wish to remain in power, which is a crucial important goal. In a manner of speaking, leaders in both democratic and non-democratic regimes need to please a winning coalition within their selectorates in order to maximize the probability that they will stay in their positions of authority.

In some cases, the regime's survival is also at stake in addition to that of the government. The winning coalition is the portion of the selectorate whose support the leadership must maintain in order to stay in power (Buena de Mesquita 2003). For democratic regimes, elections play the role of visibly transferring the votes of a winning coalition to choose the leaders, either directly or indirectly. In authoritarian regimes, this process can be more complicated and often more opaque.

In addition to achieving a winning coalition within the selectorate, regimes must at least achieve acquiescence of other key groups. For democratic regimes, these include potential spoiler groups, such as the military, key business interests, or other groups in society that have the

potential to destabilize or topple the regime. For authoritarian regimes, these spoiler groups can include potentially powerful groups that do not have a place in the selectorate. This can include the general population, the military or ethnic groups within the country that are not within the selectorate. State capacity is a critical factor in giving leaders the tools in order to gain the support of their selectorates along with at least the acquiescence or obedience of other important groups.

Although rare, some authoritarian leaders may genuinely have the interests of their people at heart. However, they must stay in power in order to pursue their goals, whether they are policy-oriented or motivated by greed and pride. According to Ronald Wintrobe, dictators have two general strategies that they must balance in order to maximize their ability to stay in power. Dictators can seek to increase the loyalty of their population, and they can repress the population in order to instill fear and raise the penalties and difficulties of organizing against the regime. These two strategies must be carefully balanced both because of limited resources and the diminishing and even counterproductive returns if one or the other strategy is over-utilized. Gifts to supporters and the general population have diminishing returns. In other words, at a certain level of gifts, whether in the form of particularized or public goods, the amount of return in terms of loyalty lessens per dollar spent. In addition, efforts to build legitimacy through ideological indoctrination or cult of personality can only be pushed to a certain extent before they cease to be more effective with more effort (Wintrobe 1998).

To repress the population, authoritarian regimes use various methods, including surveillance, torture, imprisonment and execution, often through the use of political police organizations, sometimes called secret police, whose primary job is to protect the regime. In some re-

gimes, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, the state security structures aimed at protecting the regime even include specific military organizations whose goal is to protect the revolution, including the Revolutionary Guard and the Besiege. Too little effort in repressive activities can potentially be dangerous to an authoritarian regime, even if it is not unpopular with the population. After all, once the costs of opposition become lower, the probability of individuals choosing to oppose the regime increases, especially in periods of time when the regime is less popular. However, if a dictatorship represses its population too heavily, this can be counterproductive to stability, as it can increase the discontent of the population to a dangerously high level where they are willing to brave the consequences of opposing the regime. In some circumstances, the dictator can lose control of his country if he orders the police or military to fire on the protestors and they refuse. Examples of exactly this happening include Iran in 1979, Romania in 1989, Tunisia in 2011 and Egypt in 2011. All of these cases included authoritarian regimes that fell when the security apparatus of the state turned against leaders who went too far in their repression and murder of civilians. Therefore, dictators who wish to stay in power must find the proper balance in the strategies of repression and loyalty that best supports stability given the particular characteristics of their country and the relationship between the dictator and the population (Wintrobe 1998). While good judgment plays a crucial role in any dictator's attempts to maximize stability of the regime, high levels of state capacity are crucial to their ability to effectively utilize the strategies outlines by Wintrobe.

The leader or group in charge of a country can appease a large enough portion of the selectorate through the effective provision of public goods, which is greatly aided by stronger state capacity (both in terms of financial resources and a high quality bureaucracy). For authoritarian rulers, staying in power can often be a matter of life and death. Regardless of the shape

of the regime, they also must either gain acquiescence, capitulation, minimalization or destruction of key groups that can contribute to the fall of the regime. The ability of autocrats to accomplish these goals is greatly aided by financial resources and high quality state institutions, such as the bureaucracy and coercive mechanisms. For example, the stability of the regime in China is greatly aided by a well-trained bureaucracy to implement policies. Some of these policies include things such as the building of a new rail lines and highways across the country, establishment of new universities. Others include effective mechanisms to keep order, limit access to information and limit the effectiveness of dissident groups.

In addition to altering direct calculations, effective provision of services builds legitimacy for the regime. Legitimacy is critical to the rulers' ability to govern with less opposition than they might otherwise face (For example, see: Acemoglu 2005; Cummings and Norgaard 2004; Bunce 2003). Both authoritarian and democratic regimes can build legitimacy through effective governance and by basically doing the job that citizens expect of them, which includes to a large degree the provision of public goods, such as security, economic regulation, or other duties that typically fall within the realm of the state. Acemoglu (2005) argues that in weak states, leaders are more likely to neglect investments in public goods, which will most likely be detrimental to society. This neglect of public goods has the possibility of undermining the regimes legitimacy in the eyes of the public and the view of its utility among key actors whose support is important to the regime's survival. Democratic regimes also build legitimacy by obeying the rules of the democratic game in that country. For authoritarian regimes, increases in popular legitimacy will generally lower the costs of coercive measures that might be necessary in order to convince key actors or the population in general that they are better off non-actively opposing the regime. In

both cases though, the states' ability to bring tangible results to their citizens plays an important role in building support or at least encouraging acquiescence among the general population.

In addition to providing public goods effectively to society broadly speaking, authoritarian regimes might choose to pay off groups whose support is critical for their rule by distributing rents. While some democracies can do this to a certain extent in situations of vast natural resources and small populations, it is far easier for dictatorships, since they do not necessarily have to "pay off" the population at large in order to gain support for their rule. Public good will or acceptance can be bought to a certain extent through effective provision of public goods, which are for the most part non-excludable, but direct distribution of particularistic goods to the broad portions of the population is very difficult to achieve. Gandhi and Przeworski (2006), for example, point to rent distribution to key groups as a tool that dictators use to help themselves stay in power. This includes handing out a portion of the government revenue, either in cash or goods to certain groups in order to gain their support. This tradition stretches at least as far back as ancient Rome and the idea of gaining the population's support through bread and circuses (Wintrobe 1998). This is possible especially for countries with significant wealth in highly valuable natural resources, such as diamonds or oil. For example, the Saudi government has funded the projects of some conservative Wahabi groups within the country to build schools promoting their ideology outside the country as part of an agreement to gain their acquiescence to the rule of the Saud family.

Strong state capacity is important for maintaining basic order necessary for society to exist in any country, both democratic and authoritarian. For authoritarian regimes, repressive aspects of state capacity are especially important for the survival of the regime. Democratic

governments, however, are more limited in their ability to use repressive elements of state capacity. While they must use a certain degree of police powers to maintain order, if they use these powers in order to ensure the survival of their government, they run the risk of ceasing to be democratic, thus ensuring the fall of the regime, even if those governing remain the same.[3]

The state's capacity to meet challenges that it faces is not simply structured and affected through formal mechanisms but through informal ones as well. As Helmke and Levitsky (2006) aptly observe, there is often a certain gap between the formal rules and design of political institutions and how they actually function. While informal institutions can fill this gap through practices that can complement the functioning of the state, through this gap we can also see the weakening of state capacity through such mechanisms as corruption. A number of informal practices such as corruption weaken the state's efficiency and effectiveness in policy implementation by essentially creating agency loss. In other words, we can see in authoritarian regimes and especially in democratic ones weakened long-term through widespread practices of corruption. This is not to say that corruption in of itself is a sign of state weakness in an absolute sense but in a relative sense. In other words, both democratic and authoritarian states can be strong despite a relatively high level of corruption, but high levels of corruption make states weak relative to what they would be with lower levels of corruption. For example, in Rwanda we have seen government effectiveness and efficiency increase at least in part due to serious efforts to tackle corruption within the country.

[3] For example: President Putin used the state's apparatus to suppress journalistic freedom and the ability of the opposition to organize. Although his regime was legitimately popular in Russia, these acts caused Russia to be seen as less democratic. President Banda in Zambia used the apparatus of the state in similar ways. President Fujimori in Peru suspended a number of civil liberties under emergency powers. All of these leaders were chosen in democratic elections, but their actions while in office caused their countries to no longer be recognized by much of the world as democracies.

Both democratic and authoritarian regimes face the potential for collapse due to a number of factors. Their leaders can employ certain strategies in order to increase their probability of survival, but these strategies are limited both by the structural factors of the countries themselves, as well as the capacity of the state. While the manner in which their leaders pursue office and attempt to ensure the survival of both themselves and the regime may vary, higher levels of state capacity provide both types of regimes with greater tools to combat whatever issues might threaten the stability of the regime. In the section below, I discuss various aspects of state capacity and how each one affects the probability of survival for political regimes.

State Capacity and Authoritarian Survival

Overall, I expect that higher levels of state capacity mean that democratization is less likely in a country, because non-democratic states with higher state capacity have greater tools at their disposal to more effectively implement policies and provide government services that increase their legitimacy and affect the calculations of key groups in society to not oppose the regime. In addition, higher state capacity in some areas is used in order to repress the population and maintain power where necessary.

High state capacity makes transitions to democracy less likely for three reasons. First, high state capacity plays an important role in effectively providing basic government services and meeting the needs of a country's citizens. Doing so builds the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the people and alters their view of the utility of the current regime and the costs or removing it. When the government works to perform these tasks, and people are more satisfied, they are less likely to protest or seek to change the regime, including groups that are critical to the regime maintaining power directly, potential spoiler groups in society, and the popula-

tion in general. Second, greater resources give governments the ability to purchase support from necessary groups through distribution of rents. Third, higher state capacity enables the government to better use the mechanisms of state to maintain power. This includes, among other things, using the security apparatus of the state against dissenters.

This study assumes that people, both individually and collectively, will tend to respond in a rational manner to the incentive structures that they face. Genuine transitions in a political regime to democracy rarely come from the top without either an overthrow of the existing government or a real change in the calculations of those in power, making democratic transition an appealing policy to pursue. Government overthrow or pressure on the government is not likely to take place unless enough people have strong reason to oppose the government and are willing to do so. An authoritarian government can prevent this either through mechanisms of cooptation or coercion.

Through cooptation, the government offers incentives to key groups or the general public to alter their calculations in favor of the status quo, either directly or indirectly, through payoffs, either in terms of policy considerations, money, or material goods. Cooptation practices include setting up corporatist networks to co-opt potential societal rivals. Loyalty or coalescence of either key actors or the broader population can also be gained through good governance potentially. In other words, if the government does a good job of providing expected public goods, the potential gain from a change in governance can either lessen or disappear altogether. Higher state capacity gives a government the tools to pursue all of the above policies, and, therefore, decreases the potential for democratic transition in a country by increasing the stability of the regime.

Any authoritarian government relies on a certain group of people to maintain power and select the leadership. Weaker state capacity decreases the ability of the government to meet the demands of the groups that are critical to the maintenance of power by making it more difficult to dole out spoils, as well as to implement desired policies and provide expected order and other services that are expected. In contrast, strong state capacity gives a government the necessary tools in order to implement policies that it desires with relatively high efficiency and efficacy. Even an authoritarian government must be able to implement policies to maintain power in the long term and please those that are critical to its survival, because even though bribes and side payments can work for quite a while, effective policy measures are ultimately necessary for a regime to survive in the long-term.

Through coercion, an authoritarian government uses the tools of the state in order to provide a disincentive for those who either oppose or might potentially oppose it. This can primarily be done through the use of police and military forces, and it includes arrests and imprisonment of dissidents, executions, forced disappearance, torture, or other reprisals. The police play an especially important role in authoritarian regimes, and these forces often include various forms of political police, whose job is to protect the regime. They do so through a variety of methods, including surveillance and monitoring of the population; torture; political prisons; executions; or "disappearances" where individuals are executed without record (Brooker 2009). Through coercion and repression, the government seeks both to remove those who threaten its survival and to alter the calculations of those who might oppose it. By imposing certain penalties and communicating what will happen to violators, the government raises the risk side of the risk/reward calculation. For example, if people know they might be imprisoned or killed if they

attend a protest or spread pro-democracy messages, they are less likely to do so. Some people take these risks regardless of the potential consequences, but the calculation of the government is that by using the effective coercive methods, they lessen the likelihood that the opposition can garner enough support to pose any serious danger to the survival of the regime. In addition, they can use these tools to disrupt the ability of any opposition groups to organize.

In some cases, countries with high state capacity still transition to democracy for a number of reasons, including long and successful social movements or exogenous shocks. In perhaps the most prominent example of democratization among states with relatively high levels of state capacity, many Soviet-bloc states transformed their regimes in the quickest and broadest waves of democratization in history. In this case, a number of states that would likely have been democratic, if the Soviets did not intervene and impose a different political system, were able to change their regimes without external meddling. This group includes a number of countries, such as Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic states at the least.

State Capacity and Democratization

My expectation is that higher levels of state capacity will make democratization less likely. This is primarily due to the fact that higher state capacity will tend to make authoritarian regimes more stable. Low state capacity does not directly cause democratization, but allows for opportunities in which it often occurs. While in the past, the collapse of authoritarian regimes did not typically lead to democratization, in the past three decades, this has changed. Typically, when an authoritarian regime fails in a country, there is at least an attempt at establishing a democratic regime. However, in the modern era, the vast majority of authoritarian regime failures result in a democratic regime, although some of these turn out to be relatively short-lived.

The direct link between state capacity and democratization may be a bit muddled, but my general expectation is that higher levels of state capacity will tend to make democratic transition less likely.

State Capacity in New Democracies

I argue that the success of governance plays a critical role in the survival of new democratic regimes. While exogenous shocks, such as economic crises, wars or famines still play an important role in the failure or survival of a new regime, the state's capacity to govern effectively empowers leaders to deal more effectively with any situation. My expectation is that higher levels of state capacity will make democratic survival more likely because state capacity is critical to providing basic government functions and services that citizens might expect. In new democratic regimes, democratic consolidation has not yet taken place. In other words, democracy is not the unquestioned rule of the game. Furthermore, in emerging democratic regimes, citizens often do not make the distinction between the government in power and the regime, or democracy in general. As has been shown by a number of polls, including Latino Barometer, dissatisfaction with the government and dissatisfaction with democracy are often conflated. Therefore, by effectively providing services and helping to improve the lives of the general population, the government builds popular support for not only the leaders in power but democracy in general. In addition, higher state capacity insulates the country from contextual factors that might otherwise make democratic failure more likely by avoiding certain elements that increase the probability for regime failure, such as low income levels, high crime rates, insurgencies, or poor government reach throughout the country. Higher levels of state capacity provide governments with better tools to combat these potential threats to stability. For example, a higher quality bureaucracy enables better economic regulation to increase the odds for eco-

nomic growth, and greater financial resources allow governments to spend more money on security measures to improve law and order in society and to better combat potential insurgencies.

As to my second hypothesis, a high level of state capacity is fundamentally important to preserving democracy for multiple reasons. First, state capacity plays a critical role in pleasing the electorate in a country, because it is critical to implementing policies providing the basic governmental services that the citizens demand. Second, state capacity plays an important role in persuading potential spoiler groups that either 1) they have a stake in the current system, and, thus, should not work to undermine or overthrow it; or 2) the risk/reward calculations have been altered such that it is either too risky and/or not potentially beneficial enough for them to work against the regime or to overthrow it. These spoiler groups might include the military, strong business interests, or other key groups. Third, state capacity is crucial to the government's attempts to deal with contextual issues that might lead to the fall of democratic regimes.

In states that have made recent transitions in their form of government, the citizenry does not always make the distinction between the government and the regime.[4] Therefore, disapproval of the government in power can potentially translate to disapproval of democracy in general in newly democratic countries, leaving the door open for an actor to overthrow the democratic regime, either from within the regime or from outside the regime (such as from the military). Because state capacity plays an important role in satisfying the demands of the people, and because the satisfaction of citizens increases the likelihood that democracy will sur-

[4] While citizens rarely make the distinction between regime and government directly, in older democratic regimes that are considered to be "consolidated," democracy is generally considered to be the only game in town (Linz and Stepan 1996).

vive in a country, I expect that countries with stronger overall state capacity will be more likely to see recent democratic transitions survive. Effectively, the increased state capacity brings an improved ability to govern and meet the needs of the citizenry (Haggard and Kaufman 1995). However, different dimensions of state capacity potentially have different effects on the fate of democracy in these newly democratic countries.

In new regimes, the citizens often do not distinguish between the government and the regime. Therefore, a weak performance of the government has the potential to contribute to public disillusionment with democracy, making it easier for politicians or military leaders to implement authoritarian rule or policies. In addition, state capacity plays a crucial role in providing both resources and structures for governments to implement their policies. The effective implementation of these policies increases the stability of the government and the new regime in general.

Bunce (2000) observes that the state is critical to the survival and consolidation of new democracies. In new democracies, there is often a significant gap between formal political institutions and informal political institutions. These informal practices can potentially undermine the health of democracy through mechanisms such as clientelism and corruption (O'Donnell 1998; Bunce 2000; Levitsky and Way 2006; Helmke and Levitsky 2006). Bunce points to a strong state as a guarantor of democracy. The oldest democracies in the world have this factor in common: capable state structures that serve the government and people in a variety of ways. First and foremost, these institutions are critical to the establishment of the rule of law, both in terms of basic order in society as well as predictability and accountability of the enforcement and legal arms of the state. Without rule of law, democracy cannot survive in the long term. At

the least, the promise of democracy cannot be fully realized without it. As Bunce very aptly points out, uncertain results (of elections) and certain procedures are the two critical components for democracy. A strong state with well-established rule of law and bureaucratic structures plays a key role in delivering the second feature (Bunce 2000).

While state capacity is not the primary driver of democratic consolidation, it affects this process in both direct and indirect ways. Strong legal and bureaucratic structures work to make processes within government more transparent to the public, and they also bind the government's actions by making rules that can be difficult to break. By doing so, strong bureaucratic and legal structures help to limit informal institutions that run counter to democratic government. Indirectly, the increased stability provided by state capacity gives greater opportunity for a vibrant civic culture to take root in a country, helping to ensure democracy in the long term and achieve high-quality, consolidated democracy.

Strong state capacity empowers governments to combat many issues that contribute to the failure of democracy directly or indirectly. For example, it allows the government to keep better order within the country, both in terms of day-to-day crime and insurgencies that hurt the lives of civilians. After all, it takes fewer resources to combat crime or rebellions if a government does not need to worry about democratic processes or civil liberties associated with many forms of democracy. This temptation has led some states in crisis to revert to non-democratic forms of rule.

In addition, strong state capacity gives the government greater tools to promote economic growth, including the ability to provide a safe environment for business and to effectively

regulate the economy, as well as to administer programs aimed at economic growth or assistance. It also allows the government greater reach throughout the country to make its presence known to the citizens and to deal with problems that might potentially arise, including crime, insurgency, underdevelopment; etc. Higher state capacity also lowers the probability that another state might seek to meddle in a state's internal affairs, or even potentially invade in the most extreme circumstances. Stronger government capacity increases the chances for a democratic regime to survive in the short-term at least, until democracy is widely accepted as the only legitimate form of government within society. Once consolidated, democracy will face far less of a threat from society, as both the general population and potential spoiler groups have accepted that political competition primarily takes place within the democratic framework.

State Capacity: Before and After Transitions to Democracy

Considering that this study discusses regimes in transition, we must ask what happens to state capacity during the time of transition. As a number of scholars point out (see: Ulfelder and Lustick 2005; Schmitter et al. 2005; Bäck and Hadenius 2008), state capacity generally declines in the wake of a transition to democracy. This is not surprising, considering that much of the state structure is tied in with regimes. However, the state will not be a completely different entity, even in the wake of a major regime transition. Well-trained bureaucracies, for example, do not simply vanish in the wake of most regime transitions. In most cases at least, after a transition, we are still talking about the same state, albeit a diminished version of that state in terms of its capacities in many cases.

While, as Schmitter et al. (2005) aptly observe, state capacity is likely to suffer in the wake of a regime change, certain aspects are likely to survive, at least in part. The results of this

will vary widely, but elements of state capacity are unlikely to completely crumble in the wake of a democratic transition. Bureaucratic structures do not typically vanish in the wake of a democratic transition, especially in the case of a smoother change. In most cases, the vast majority of bureaucrats are likely to remain in the same jobs at least initially, as any government will need to keep performing certain duties for which the current staff is already trained. The same could be said for much of the legal and law enforcement apparatus.

Levels of corruption do not change quickly in the wake of a transition if at all. While state capacity will likely be diminished in the wake of a democratic transition, in most cases a state will at least retain some of the capacity from the previous regime. There are, however, some notable exceptions to the general tendencies. In the case that a transition is brought about through a very violent transition, much of the state structure will crumble. While much of the physical infrastructure might remain, the human infrastructure of the state might flee or abandon its post for a number of reasons. The state bureaucracy might be heavily dismantled on purpose through the choice of a new revolutionary regime or due to moves to rid the state of traces of the old rulers, or people within the bureaucracy might flee due to concerns of physical insecurity.

In cases of a peaceful transition to a democratic regime, much of the state will remain intact to be used, reformed or purged by the new government. Such structures give the new government strong tools to meet the problems that they face now that they are in power. Resources of all types (monetary and human) are critical to governing and addressing the collective problems of society. Competent and effective bureaucracies are useful instruments for implementing the chosen policies of the new rulers. In situations where these structures remain in-

tact from the previous rulers, they give the new regime a strong advantage in addressing contextual problems that could lead to its collapse and in building support of the public through effective governance. The degree to which a country will find itself this lucky varies from situations where the new democratic regime is quite literally rebuilding its country from the rubble of war to smooth transitions where the instruments of the state are not fundamentally altered.

Conceptualizing the Key Variables

This project tests two relationships involving democracy and state capacity: the connections between state capacity and democratic transition, and state capacity and democratic survival. To reiterate my hypothesis briefly, first I argue that higher state capacity makes it less likely that non-democratic regimes will transition to democracy; and second I posit that higher state capacity will increase the likelihood for new democratic regimes to survive following their transition to democracy. Because of the different expectations of how various elements influence these processes (transition and survival), and because this project specifically focuses on new democracies, the two groups (authoritarian and newly democratic regimes) are examined separately. Below, I outline how authoritarian and democratic regimes are conceptualized within this study, as well as various elements that can be used to measure or infer the levels of state capacity in a country.

Let us begin this discussion with the definition of democracy, which then serves as the framework for analysis of state capacity and its relationship to the process of democratization and democratic survival. Democracy, for the sake of this project, is defined in terms of both institutional structures and political competition. Przeworski et al. (2000) understand democracy primarily in terms of contestation. This concept of democracy requires three things: ex-ante

uncertainty of election results; ex-post irreversibility of the decision of the people; and repeatability of elections. In other words, the contest must be legitimate, the results must be respected by the group in power, and elections must be held again. For the value of this conceptualization, it leaves out institutional structures that work to make the functioning of a country more democratic. For the sake of this paper, I am using the POLITY IV measure of democracy in order to classify whether or not countries are democracies. This measure uses a definition and classification of democracy that primarily involves measures of the competitiveness and democratic quality within the political institutions of a country (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). While civil liberties, civic culture and civil society are critical to a high-quality, fully functional democracy, I do not focus on these areas in my study; rather, I simply look at whether a country is democratic. While these features are critical to the survival or at least the quality of a democracy, I use a relatively minimal definition of democracy for this project. Even though the issue of democratic quality has great importance, it is simply outside of the scope of this study.

In the framework of democracy as identified above, state capacity serves as the resources that are at the disposal of the government, and the effectiveness and efficiency of state agencies in implementing government policies. When we discuss state capacity, we are ultimately talking about the state's ability to do certain tasks. A number of different mechanisms are important to state capacity, including the bureaucracy, the courts, mechanisms of law, and the military, among others.

State capacity is an important concept in the study of governance, but its operationalization presents some difficult problems. First, what factors do we look at as indicating higher or lower levels of state capacity? We can examine either direct measures, outcome measures or

other factors that we think give us some idea of the capability of a state. Second, we must consider the problem of how reliable various data are and how well they measure the concepts that we wish to examine.

As Hendrix (2010) points out, state capacity is a theoretical concept that is difficult to measure. The study of state capacity presents a number of problems in terms of conceptualization and measurement. Hendrix examines a number of indicators that have been used in studies of state capacity to determine which are the strongest in terms of construct validity and empirical validity. The issue of construct validity deals with the question of whether the dimensions used actually are measuring state capacity. As the result of the evaluation of fifteen measures of state capacity, Hendrix comes to the conclusion that no single measure can completely capture the concept of state capacity, which is not surprising due to the complexity of the concept itself. Therefore, he suggests a multivariate approach to measuring state capacity, using multiple measures (Hendrix 2010).

State capacity here is meant to describe the ability and capacity of the government of a country to carry out tasks and implement policies. In order to understand state capacity, we must break it down into its component parts by asking what particular functions are important to a state. Below, the following elements are discussed, as well as their affects on regime stability: government revenue; bureaucratic quality; corruption; and law and order. I discuss conceptually how each of these factors indicates state capacity to some degree, as well as how they contribute to the stability of both authoritarian and democratic regimes. While no single variable described below completely captures the concept of state capacity, each one indicates a piece of the picture regarding the capability of the state.

First and foremost, all states must have some income in order to carry out their policies. Government spending per capita gives a direct measure of the resources available to the state in order to carry out its various duties. The revenue that a state collects is a source of potential power. These funds are necessary in order to implement government policies, whether they focus on repression, the provision of public goods or distribution of rents in other ways. This is conceptually different than measures of per capita wealth. While measures of GDP per capita indicate the overall level of development, and give some idea of the revenue that a state might collect, it does not provide a direct measure of what resources the state has at its disposal. Overall, I expect that governments with higher levels of spending per capita will be more stable, because this revenue gives the governments the financial resources with which to provide public goods and combat problems that might arise to challenge the regime.

Next, state structures that are used in order to implement government policies can be seen relative to the government in terms of a principal-agent relationship. The bureaucracy is the agent for the implementation of state policies. This type of state capacity, namely administrative capacity, affects how well a state carries out many of its most basic tasks and responsibilities. A higher quality bureaucracy means that the government's policies are generally implemented more efficiently and more effectively than would be the case with a lower quality bureaucracy.

Whether the government's role is expansive or limited, the quality of its bureaucracy, including among other factors the quality of its training and its effectiveness, plays an equally critical role in strong and weak states' success at governance. A low quality bureaucracy detracts

from the state's ability to implement its policies. Whether the state aims for an expansive role or a more limited one, the quality of its bureaucracy plays a critical role in its success at governance, because a more effective bureaucracy affects the efficiency and effectiveness with which policies are implemented, thus affecting the probability of success for government programs. Since effective provision of public goods can affect the probability of regime survival, bureaucratic quality should have an effect on the stability of the regime. Higher quality bureaucracies make delivery of good more effective and thus increase regime stability.

Corruption, while not a direct measure of state capacity, plays a role in the effectiveness of state structures by creating agency loss in the above-mentioned relationship. High levels of corruption carry the potential to cause great inefficiencies in the implementation of policy and in the general effective management of a country. Corruption can exist in both strong and weak states, but in both it decreases the efficiency with which the government can implement its policies. More corrupt states are not necessarily completely ineffective, but they are less effective than they would be at lower levels of corruption. In addition to the issues of legitimacy that it creates, corruption makes official government institutions less efficient. High levels of corruption decrease the government's ability to collect taxes, because it encourages the growth of the informal economy due to the high costs and unpredictability of unofficial payments necessary to run official businesses in a corrupt country (World Bank 2007). In addition to undermining regime legitimacy, corruption can hurt the implementation of government policies, thereby undermining governance in general. Therefore, countries with lower levels of corruption should tend to have more stable regimes. According to You (2005) if corruption reaches high enough levels, then the state loses its autonomy as an independent entity and simply serves the particularistic interests of the privileged. In these cases, kleptocrats either siphon off large amounts of

state resources into their own private bank accounts. These resources could otherwise have been used toward other functions that would promote the stability of the state, whether they would be distributive or oppressive in nature.

The quality of law and order within a country demonstrates the ability of a regime to maintain order and provide basic security to its citizens, which is one of the fundamental roles of a state. In fact, security is one of the defining features of government capacity, if not the most important one (Tilly 1985, as cited in Schultzke 2010). In addition to basic security functions, predictable rule of law is vital to providing the perception among citizens that the state is not simply a predatory body and that there is some degree of fairness in its institutions. While this is not only the case in democratic polities, it should be one of the fundamental expectations of a highly functional democratic state. High levels of crime are potentially problematic for any regime, and the fairness of the legal system is particularly important to both the survival and consolidation of democratic regimes. Even though the quality of law and order is an outcome-based measure of state capacity, it gives some indication of how well a state is managing one of its most basic functions. Law and order tend to be stronger in countries with higher levels of state capacity. While different societies may be in different places with regard to law and order due to other social factors, the efforts of governments to improve its quality will vary greatly. Establishing law and order is a vital function that any government will work to improve, whatever type of regime it may operate under. At the least, countries with relatively high levels of state capacity will tend to have better quality law and order systems than they would have had with lower levels of state capacity.

This study investigates the effect that the indicators outlined above have on regime stability in both authoritarian regimes and newly democratic regimes. It does so through the use of both statistical models in order to test correlation and case studies that probe the causal mechanisms and understand how they function in actuality. Below I go into greater depth outlining the paths of how state capacity affects both the probability of democratic transitions from authoritarian regimes and the survival of new democratic regimes.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the importance of state capacity in the survival of regimes, both democratic and non-democratic. While high levels of state capacity make transitions to democracy less likely, if such a transition takes place, higher levels of state capacity make new democratic regimes more likely to survive. Whereas state capacity functions similarly in both types of regimes, there are some fundamental differences. In new democratic regimes, state capacity is critical to both dealing with contextual problems, such as war or economic crises in order to keep the state intact and retain the support of the population. In less drastic situations, though, state capacity is critical to the effective and efficient implementation of policies designed at providing public goods, from basic security to effective economic regulation and contract enforcement to providing social services where the government chooses. Whatever the policy preferences of the new governments, higher levels of state capacity provide the tools necessary to give policies the best chances of success. While in established democratic regimes, failure to provide such services would simply result in the current government losing power, in new democracies, there is not always a distinction among much of the public between the government and the regime. In such cases, dissatisfaction with the current government can be

translated to dissatisfaction with or indifference towards democracy. Therefore, effective governance in the short-term increases the probability of democracy to succeed in general.

Authoritarian regimes also benefit in terms of stability from higher levels of state capacity. Similarly to democratic regimes, effective provision of public goods helps to build legitimacy of the regime or at least gain acquiescence from the general population. While repressive instruments also benefit from high state capacity, and they can be an effective in helping authoritarian regimes retain control, there is a limit to these methods. At any rate, some level of support from the population makes it easier, cheaper, and more certain for an authoritarian regime to stay in power. In addition to satisfying the population in general, effective policy implementation and providing certain goods and services are important to satisfying the selectorate within an authoritarian regime, as well as preventing the rise of potential veto players. In the event of a democratic transition, the level of state capacity is likely to decline on average, but in most cases, at least some semblance of the structures of the state will remain and play a role in the survival of the new democratic regime.

This project tests these conclusions through a mixed-methods approach. In the following chapter, I discuss the statistical models that are used in order to test these two relationships, between state capacity and democratic transition, on one hand, and between state capacity and the survival of new democracies on the other. In addition to the statistical methods, I will discuss the purpose, reason and function of the case studies of South Korea and the Philippines that I use to examine how the mechanisms of state capacity affect regime stability and transition. After explanation of the operationalization of the study, I report the results of the statistical tests that I ran in order to test the causal relationships outlined above. After discussion of

the overall results of these tests, I examine two case studies that illustrate the causal links outlined above and investigate how the theorized mechanisms laid out above function in real life. Following the case study chapters, I will conclude by tying together the lessons learned through the quantitative and qualitative sections of this project in order to place the contribution of this study in the broader context of governance, democratization and regime stability.

4. Methods Section

The purpose of the project is to test the effect of state capacity on regime durability and transition. While other works have hypothesized, hinted at and inferred this relationship from other examinations, this project works to directly test this relationship in a methodical manner. I test the relationship between state capacity and democratic transition on one hand, and between state capacity and survival of new democratic regimes on the other hand. Based on the logic laid out in the previous chapter, I expect that higher levels of state capacity will make authoritarian regimes more stable and thus make transitions to democracy less likely. However, if countries do transition to democracy, higher levels of state capacity will make the new democratic regimes more likely to survive. Higher levels of state capacity contribute to building legitimacy for the regime both among the general population and among key groups. In addition, high state capacity equips authoritarian regimes with greater tools to repress dissident groups that might pose a challenge to their rule.

In order to do these hypotheses, I use a mixed methods approach. In the statistical portion of this project, I use a duration model, specifically a Cox Proportional Hazard Model, in order to test the relationship between state capacity and the survival of authoritarian regimes, as well as the probability of democratic transition. In addition, I use this method to test the relationship between state capacity and survival of new democratic regimes.

Duration models, or event history analyses, are used in order to measure the probability of a given event happening over time. Therefore by necessity, event history analysis must involve questions where the dependent variable is binary in nature. In addition, the question must involve an event that at least has the potential to be affected by the passage of time. Du-

ration models have been applied to the study of such phenomena as: disease survival rates, recidivism in the criminal justice system, or the length of tenure for an individual on a Congressional committee (Beck 1999). The use of duration models is more appropriate for the sake of this study because they are better suited to the study of dependent variables with non-standard distributions. In addition, duration models are better able to account for left-censored data. In particular, for the sake of the study of authoritarian regimes in this study, there are a number of regimes that had been in power for many years prior to the sample covered in this study.

A duration model is different from a normal regression in that it reports hazard ratios, rather than coefficients. In addition, it accounts for both length of time and whether or not a failure occurred in the dependent variable. The hazard ratios report how a given variable increases or decreases the risk of a certain event occurring. Hazard ratios range from 0 upwards and are based around one. They essentially report how the proportional likelihood of a given event is affected by the independent variables. If the hazard ratio reported for an independent variable is below 1, then this means that variable lowers the risk of the event happening. In other words, where the hazard ratio is less than one the hazard, or risk of failure, decreases as the coefficient of the covariate increases. On the other hand, in situations where the hazard ratio that is over 1, an increase in the covariate increases hazard. The closer a hazard ratio of an independent variable is to 1, the weaker the effect of that variable on the probability of survival (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). For example, if a variable has a significant effect but a hazard ratio or .99, the size of the positive effect of the variable on survival is small in magnitude, whereas a variable with a hazard ratio of .2 has a strong positive effect on the probability of survival. A hazard ratio of 1.5 means that the variable makes the event 150% as likely to happen than it would have otherwise been or compared to the mean if the variable is conti-

nuous or compared to observations when the variable is not present if it is dichotomous (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

I chose to use Cox Proportional Hazard Models versus more standard, fully parametric duration models because certain advantages that the Cox model offers. Standard duration models are very useful under certain circumstances. Kaplan-Meier plot models are only useful in situations where there is a clear control group and one can compare two groups within a binary variable, such as in medical studies where one group is administered a certain drug and the other is given a placebo (Beck 1999). While there are other duration models that allow for the use of continuous independent variables, these fully parametric models operate under the assumption that we can expect some sort of normal distribution in the duration times (Box-Steffensmeir and Jones 2004). However, in the case of regime survival and transitions, there is no reason to assume a normal distribution. In addition, there is no reasonable way to calculate a baseline hazard rate as would be necessary for a parametric duration model. "The primary advantage of the Cox model is simple: the relationship between the covariates and the hazard rate can be estimated without having to make any assumptions whatsoever about the nature and shape of the baseline hazard rate (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, p. 88)." For this reason, Cox models are more appropriate than many other types of duration models for research questions in the social sciences (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

Beyond the statistical portion of this project, I utilize two case studies, looking at the cases of South Korea and the Philippines to shed further light on the concepts discussed above. While the statistical tests can give some idea of what the general correlation is between state capacity and regime durability and transition, the cases studies can be used in order to test

these relationships more closely. The cases serve the purpose of tracing the processes and looking closer at the cause and effect relationships in order to confirm at least the plausibility of the hypothesized relationships beyond simple statistical correlation. These cases are appropriate and useful to the study of the effect of state capacity on democratic transition and regime survival. Both countries have instances in their relatively brief history of democratic and authoritarian rule since independence. They also have variation in their relative levels of state capacity over time, which makes it possible to compare how changes in state capacity affected stability and transitions. Both the Philippines have a number of factors in common. Both are in the general East Asian region, both became independent shortly after the end of the Cold War,[5] both countries gained independence under the tutelage of the United States, although under different conditions, and both were client states of the United States during the Cold War generally speaking.

This chapter explains the design of this study in order to set up the structure and justification for the tests that are conducted in the following three chapters. I give explanation for why I chose to use Cox Proportional Hazard Models instead of logistic regressions other MLE tests. I explain the three models that I run, including the expectations, sample size, data sets, dependent variables, independent variables and control variables. Following the explanation of the models, I discuss the cases studies including their structure and purpose, as well as justification for why I chose the specific cases that I study. Essentially, this chapter explains the study that I conduct in this dissertation in detail to provide structure and the basic explanation so that the tests themselves are clearer.

[5] The Philippines gained independence in 1946, whereas the Republic of Korea was officially established in 1948.

Model 1: Authoritarian survival

Authoritarian regimes face the potential for collapse due to a number of factors. Their leaders can employ certain strategies in order to increase their probability of survival, but these strategies are limited both by the structural factors of the countries themselves, as well as the capacity of the state. High levels of state capacity provide regimes with greater tools to combat whatever issues might threaten the stability of the regime. In the section below, I discuss various aspects of state capacity and how each one affects the probability of survival for political regimes.

This study looks at all authoritarian regimes in the years from 1984-2004. The unit of analysis is country-year. The sample limitation is driven by limited availability of the data, especially that which deals with a number of the measures of state capacity that I use (the International Crisis Risk Guide data). Of the 62 instances of regime failure within the sample collected, 50 of the transitions resulted in a democracy. Therefore, in over four-fifths of the cases within the sample, countries that saw a collapse of an authoritarian regime transitioned to democracy. In order to test the difference between, any authoritarian regime failure on one hand, and transition to democracy specifically, I run two separate hazard models. The first model will test the survival of any particular authoritarian regime, looking at how various elements of state capacity affect the probability for regime failure.

Dependent Variable: Regime Survival

Regimes are classified using the Wright (2008) data and the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). Regimes are classified as non-democratic if they appear in the Wright dataset

and have a Polity score of 5 or lower.[6] They are considered to have transitioned if the regime classification has changed according to the Wright (2008) classification of authoritarian regime types or if the country drops from the authoritarian regime classification (meaning that the country is no longer considered to have an authoritarian regime). I dropped any country-years from the sample if the Polity score reaches a level of 6 or higher, meaning that the country has become democratic. In addition, I checked the various countries in question and, looking briefly through the historical data, I coded the regime as having changed in cases where the regime might have changed even though the regime type did not. For example, in some cases, one personalist dictator will replace another outside of the regime's processes, changing the rules of politics within the country. There were only a few instances of such occurrences. I also looked through the examples where there was a change from one type of authoritarian regime to another according to the Wright data, coding regimes as not transitioning if the same people stayed in power, such as if a military regime transferred to a personalist regime under the same leadership (such as Pakistan under President Mushaarraf).

Independent Variables: Indicators of State Capacity

State capacity here is meant to describe the resources available to the state and the ability and capacity of the government of a country to carry out tasks and implement policies. In order to understand state capacity, we must break it down into its component parts by asking what particular functions are important to a state, and what factors affect a state's ability to successfully implement and carry out its policies. State capacity is measured by looking at a plethora of variables, including government spending per capita (calculated from data in the Penn

[6] There are some exceptions. If a country is considered democratic with a Polity score of 6 or higher, its score must drop to at least 4 in order to be no longer considered democratic. The goal of this exception is to avoid the possibility of relatively small fluctuations causing democratic regimes to be no longer considered as democratic. Therefore, countries in such situations would not be considered to have authoritarian regimes.

World Tables); bureaucratic quality on a four point scale (according to the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset); corruption on a six point scale, with six as the least corrupt (ICRG); a law and order measure that assesses both the strength and impartiality of the legal system, as well as the level of crime in the country on a six point scale (ICRG). All of the independent variables are lagged by one year in order to test the effect of the variables in one year on the survival of the regime in the next year.

First and foremost, all states must have some income in order to carry out their policies. Resources are an important factor in government effectiveness, regardless of what policy preferences those in power might have. Higher revenues allow governments to tackle pressing problems and also allow them to provide bureaucracies with the resources they need in order to implement policies. Government spending per capita gives a clear, if somewhat crude measure of resource levels of the government. Even though this is affected by the overall levels of wealth within the country, it represents a more direct measure of the resources actually at the government's disposal, since some governments choose to have lower tax rates or have less success in collecting predicted tax revenues.

Financial resources play an important role in any government's ability to implement policies. They allow for the purchase of materials, payment of the bureaucracy and police, and they are fundamentally necessary to one degree or another for any policy's implementation. For authoritarian regimes, these resources can also be used in order to purchase support from members of the selectorate, pay off key groups, or for wealthy enough countries, to purchase the good will of the general citizenry. I use a measure for government spending per capita that

is drawn from the Penn World Tables data. It is calculated by multiplying government spending as a percentage of GDP times GDP per capita in constant prices.

Although spending per capita is obviously correlated somewhat with GDP per capita, they are distinct measures. Even though wealthier countries tend to spend more money per capita, this does not explain government spending levels entirely. In addition, by adding this variable, I can test directly the claim by Przeworski et al. (2000) that state capacity and higher government spending are the mechanisms that cause wealth to have such a strong effect on the survival of new democratic regimes. In addition, it tests the overall claim by Przeworski and Limongi (1997) that in wealthier countries, higher levels of state capacity increase the ability of democratic regimes to stick once they are implemented.

The quality of bureaucracy is an important aspect of state capacity. Having skilled bureaucrats to carry out their specified duties makes implementation of government policies more effective and efficient. While this does not guarantee success of government policies, it increases the probability that the government's programs will achieve their desired goals. This plays an important role in regime stability, because the government's ability to successfully provide public goods and services contributes to the satisfaction of the general public and key groups for maintaining its rule.

The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) variable of bureaucratic quality provides a useful measure of bureaucratic quality that has been taken from in-country assessments of over 130 countries for over twenty years. While it not a perfect measure, it gets at a fundamentally important issue, which is the quality of the unelected officials within government whose job it is

to implement policies made by decision-makers. The relative quality of the bureaucracies within countries can greatly influence both the efficiency and effectiveness with which policies are implemented. The ICRG measure defines the quality of bureaucracy as its "ability to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services," (ICRG Codebook as quoted in Baëk and Haddeinus 2008). This scale has a number of increments within the numbers ranging from 0 to 4. A score of 0 indicates the lowest quality and a 4 indicates the highest quality bureaucracy.

The quality of law and order within a country demonstrates the ability of a regime to maintain order and provide basic security to its citizens, which is one of the fundamental roles of a state. In addition, predictable rule of law is vital to providing the perception among citizens that the state is not simply a predatory body and that there is some degree of fairness in its institutions. While this is not the case only in democratic polities, it should be one of the fundamental expectations of a highly functional democratic state.

While authoritarian regimes may simply choose not to establish rule of law, most high capacity states will have at least some semblance of tangible and predictable laws, even if the government is not fully bound by them. High levels of crime are potentially problematic for any regime, and the fairness of the legal system is particularly important to both the survival and consolidation of democratic regimes. While the rule of law can build legitimacy for authoritarian regimes among the population, it is absolutely fundamental to democracy.

The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) measure of law and order provides a good basis for looking at the quality of the system of law and order within a country in a given year.

This measure is made up of two parts, which are not broken apart in the researcher data set that is available. The two parts are: quality of the legal system and a measure of order in society. The measure is a six-point scale, ranging from 0 to 6, not limited to whole numbers. A score of 6 represents the highest quality of law and order in society on the scale, whereas 0 would represent the weakest level.

Corruption affects state capacity by creating agency loss in the process of converting government resources into material outcomes. While high levels of corruption do not directly indicate low levels of state capacity, corruption makes the implementation of government policies less effective and less efficient than it would otherwise be. For a measure of corruption, I use the International Crisis Risk Guide (ICRG) measure of control of corruption, because it gives an advantage in terms of the number of years covered over other measures (such as Transparency International or World Bank), while using a consistent methodology across the years. In this measure, control of corruption is measured on a six-point scale, with six as the best control of corruption in a country and zero as the worst. In other words, a score of zero would represent a highly corrupt country (such as Zaire under Mobutu), whereas a score of six would represent a country with a very low level of corruption (such as Finland).

Control Variables

Levels of economic development can have significant impact on the stability of regimes. Development theorists have traditionally argued that higher levels of economic development would eventually contribute to democratic development. On the other hand, countries with low levels of economic development tend to be among those that are more likely to see regimes fail. In addition, a number of countries with high levels of development have maintained stable authoritarian regimes for many years. In order to test these competing expectations, I include a

measure of GDP per capita as a control variable in order to test the relationship between wealth and the stability of non-democratic regimes.

Economic stability affects the stability of regimes profoundly. While this is influenced by government policies, economic shocks pose a problem for any government and for the stability of both authoritarian and new democratic regimes. As Geddes (1999) observes, regime transitions are more likely to occur during economic downturns. Therefore, I include a measure of the percentage change in GDP from the previous year to provide a measure of broad economic stability with the expectation that countries with failing economies are more likely to revert to authoritarianism. For similar reasons, a measure of the change in exchange rate from the previous year is included. The data for the measure of percentage of change in GDP from the previous year, along with the measures in exchange rate variation comes from the Penn World Tables. All of these control variables are lagged by one year in order to see how the economic situation in one year affects the regime stability and the likelihood of transition in the subsequent year. My expectation is that more prosperous and stable economic times will tend to make regimes more stable. Therefore, I expect that high levels of inflation and economic contraction will make transitions more likely.

Model 2: Democratic Transition

The second model will test the resiliency of authoritarianism in general within a country, looking at how state capacity affects the probability that a country will transition to democracy. This relationship is also tested using a Cox Proportional Hazards Model, because the same logic applies to testing the likelihood of democratic transition. My expectation is that higher levels of state capacity will make it less likely that democratic transitions will occur.

Dependent Variable: Democratic Transition

The dependent variable in this model is a simple dichotomous variable that looks at whether country with a non-democratic regime transitions to democracy. In other words, the dependent variable measures whether non-democratic rule in general survives in a country. The variable is coded as 0 if there is not a democratic transition in the given country year, and it is coded as 1 if there is a democratic transition in that country year. A country is considered to have a non-democratic regime if it has a Polity IV score of below 6, except in situations where the country is considered democratic in one year and its Polity score then drops to 5. A country is considered to have transitioned to democratic rule if it achieves a Polity score of 6 or higher.

Independent Variables: Indicators of State Capacity

State capacity is measured by looking at the same variables that are used in the model of authoritarian survival, including government spending per capita (Penn World Tables); bureaucratic quality on a four point scale (according to the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset); corruption on a six point scale, with 6 as the least corrupt (ICRG); a law and order measure that assesses both the strength and impartiality of the legal system, as well as the level of crime in the country on a six point scale (ICRG).

Control Variables

In addition to my primary variables for state capacity, I use some basic control variables, including exchange rate fluctuation, GDP per capita and GDP growth (Penn World Tables). I use the same structural control variables used above in Model 1. I also use a set of dichotomous variables that report the authoritarian regime sub-type. These are the same regime sub-types that were used in the authoritarian survival model (Model 1), and they are described above.

Brownlee (2009) finds that authoritarian regimes with larger selectorates are more likely to democratize, especially multi-party authoritarian regimes. In order to account for this conclusion of Brownlee, I omit the multi-party authoritarian regime sub-type in order to compare the others against it. All variables are lagged in order to account for how conditions in a given year affect the likelihood of democratic regime failure in the subsequent year.

Model 3: Survival of new democracies

For the sake of this paper, I am using the POLITY IV measure of democracy in order to classify whether or not countries are democracies. This measure uses a definition and classification of democracy that primarily involves measures of the competitiveness and democratic quality within the political institutions of a country. While civil liberties and civic culture and civil society are critical to a high-quality, fully functional democracy, I do not focus on these areas in my study; rather, I simply look at whether a country is democratic. While these features are critical to the survival of a democratic state, they do not represent elements of state capacity.

Dependent Variable: Democratic Survival

The dependent variable in this model is democratic survival, which will be measured in the following way: democracy is deemed to have "survived" as long as the POLITY score for a given year does not drop below the level of 5 (1 below the level considered necessary to be considered as a democracy). This will decrease the likelihood that a slight change in the polity score will be considered as a failure of democracy in a country. I will run a Cox Proportional Hazard model instead of a normal MLE, partially because in the case of democratic survival, we cannot expect a normal distribution. If a country that is classified as a democracy ceases to qualify as a democracy, it is dropped from the model for subsequent years and this observation is consi-

dered to be a case of democratic failure. It only returns to the model if its POLITY score returns to a level of 6 or higher, and it does so as a separate observation, since this is a separate case of a new democratic regime. For the sake of the hazard model that examines the effect of state capacity on democratic survival, the failure variable is set as democratic survival as described above, whereas the time variable is simply the age of the democratic regime in years.

This model assesses the effect of state capacity on the survival of new democratic regimes. All countries that have made transitions to democracy (according to the POLITY IV dataset) from 1984-2004 are included in the sample. The sample size is driven by data limitation in measures of state capacity, which are only available beginning in 1984 from the ICRG dataset. I consider countries with a POLITY score of 6 or higher to have a basic level of electoral democracy. Transitions to democracy that took place prior to 1984 are only included in this model if the country remained democratic in 1984 and its transition was not later than 1974. Any country that transitioned to democracy between 1974 and 2004 is included in the sample. This gives us a sample of 58 democratic transitions during this time period and 11 democratic reversals.

Independent Variables: Indicators of State Capacity

In order to test the relationship between state capacity and the probability of survival for new democratic regimes, I use a number of factors that indicate relative levels of state capacity either directly or indirectly. For indicators of state capacity, I use the same variables that were used in the other two models. These include: government spending per capita, quality of bureaucracy, a law and order variable, and control of corruption. The government spending measure is drawn from the Penn World Tables, whereas the other three measures are drawn from the ICRG data, and they are the same ones that are explained in the previous models.

Control Variables

In order to control for a number of other factors that might also affect regime durability, I include a number of control variables in the statistical models. Przeworski et al. (2000) find that the level of wealth in a country affects the probability of survival for democratic regimes. They find that countries that are wealthier on a per capita basis are more likely to see democratic regimes survive, and at a certain level of wealth, the risk of failure for democratic regimes is reduced to nearly zero. As a result, I include a measure of GDP per capita, which accounts for the level of wealth and development in a country, which is likely to have an effect on not only the general stability of the regime, but also the level of education, which is said to be an important factor in the development of a democratic society that can effectively participate in political life. The measures for GDP per capita that I use come from the Penn World Tables. My expectation is that higher levels of GDP per capita will make democratic regimes more stable on average.

In addition to the general control for wealth, I include two general macroeconomic variables. Economic growth is both a sign of economic stability and an increase in prosperity of the country. Exchange rate variation gives us a good indicator of economic stability and the real buying power of money in a country. Therefore, I include a measure of the percentage change in exchange rate relative to the dollar from the previous year. The role of a government in providing macroeconomic stability is important, and it has come to be seen as a key public good that they are expected to at least make an attempt to provide. My expectation is that greater economic instability will make regimes less stable, because it is more likely in such situations that they will lose the support of the general population and potentially of key groups such as the military and societal elites with power. Higher levels of economic growth will make regimes

more stable, as both individuals and powerful groups such as large businesses will see this as good government performance, and it will increase the probability that they will support it.

In addition to general structural controls that are mentioned above, we must control for history, culture and political institutions to the best of our ability. Therefore, I include a categorization of the authoritarian regime type that was present in the country prior to democratization. I use a series of dummy variables for regime type with four different types of regimes: personalist, military, single-party and multi-party authoritarian regimes. I include this categorization for previous authoritarian regime type in the model of democratic survival because, as Geddes (1999) points out, transitions from different types of authoritarian regimes have vastly different probabilities to form long-term, stable democracies. She finds that when military regimes collapse, if a democratic regime is established, it will be much more likely to last for a longer period of time compared to other regime types.

In the model that tests the risk of authoritarian regime failure, I omit the military regime variable in order to test Geddes's (1999) hypothesis that these are the most likely to fail. In the model testing the probability of democratic transition, I include the variables outline above, I omit the multi-party regime variable in order to test Brownlee's (2009) hypothesis that multi-party regimes are more likely to democratize than other democratic regimes. For the model of new democratic regimes, I omit the military regime variable to test the assumption by Geddes (1999) that transitions from military regimes create the most favorable circumstances for long-lasting democratic regimes to take hold in a country.

As Huntington (1991) points out, democracies often do not survive and backslide into authoritarian rule. However, these experiences, even if they do not yield a long-lived, stable democracy, can contribute indirectly. During these democratic episodes, certain expectations, practices, and structures (such as political parties) are built. Even if a democratic regime ultimately fails, the country will be more likely to succeed in democratic efforts it might have in the future, because the democratic forces, including institutions, culture and practices will have been built to some degree already in the public memory and in terms of social organizations that are necessary to support democracy. Therefore, I include a control for if the country has had previous experience with democracy. I use a simple dichotomous measure, coded 1 if a country has some past experience with democracy and 0 if it does not. I coded this variable using the Polity IV data. A country is coded as having past experience with democracy if it has past experience with even a semi-democratic form of government. The countries are coded as having this past experience with democracy if there is at least one previous year in which the country had a Polity score of 1 or higher. My expectation is that previous experience with democracy makes the survival of democracy within a country more likely.

Case Studies

The statistical portion of this study will be supplemented with case studies to examine whether the causal links that I propose can be found in specific cases. I will look two countries, both within the general East Asia region: South Korea and the Philippines. In the examination of these cases, I seek to understand how different types of state capacity described in this paper have impacted the process of failure of authoritarian regimes and transition to democratic rule in the individual countries. In addition, these cases are used to investigate how state capacity in

general, and different elements of it in particular, affect the stability of both authoritarian regimes and new democratic regimes.

According to King, Keohane and Verba (1994), cases studies are essential for describing how causal mechanisms function in social scientific studies. The description of events within case studies allows the researcher to be more precise and systematic, and it can serve as a good complement to even well-structured quantitative studies. These cases are meant to be descriptive case studies and are primarily meant to serve as plausibility probes of the general relationships that I hypothesize and test in this study. The purpose of using these cases, beyond testing the general proposed relationships and providing examples, is to answer questions of how and why the relationships proposed in this study and tested in the statistical portion of this project operate, as well as whether the causal links that I suggest are accurate or spurious correlations.

These case studies provide the opportunity to examine causal chains between state capacity and regime stability and transition. Elman, argued in his 1997 book that, "generalizations about the democratic peace are fine—we have many of them—but now is the time to explore via comparative case studies the causal chains, if they exist (Elman 1997, as quoted in George and Bennett 2005, 45)." Similarly, by using these case studies, I can move beyond the correlations in the large-n study that I conduct in the statistical section and attempt to understand causal mechanisms in action in order to assess how they function. By doing this, I can better evaluate whether the findings that I present in the statistical section are representative of true causal links or if the findings are driven by other factors.

One important advantage of using these cases studies is that they provide the opportunity to assess the degree to which factors that I could not include in the statistical model affect both the probability of regime survival and transition. These include both data that was not available across enough countries and years in order to be included in the model as well as factors that cannot accurately be measured in a quantitative manner, such as general cultural factors, the actions of individuals in leadership roles, the role of civil society in the countries, as well as the quality of its civic culture. This will allow me, at least in these cases, to better evaluate the role that factors, such as those mentioned above, played in democratic transition, survival and stability. These factors may have played an independent or interactive role with factors of state capacity in regime durability. In addition, I can better examine what caused authoritarian regime failures in these cases to result in democracies specifically, rather than another authoritarian regime.

I chose South Korea and the Philippines in order to study the effect of state capacity on the stability, survival and failure of democratic and authoritarian regimes in these countries over time. I selected these cases using a most similar systems approach. Through this approach, drawn from Mill's method of difference, researchers select cases to compare that have great variation on the primary independent variables being examined but have relatively low variance on other variables. This approach has been applied by many researchers, including Barrington Moore, in political science (Moore 1966). The most similar systems design allows for more accurate estimation of the relationship between variables because it controls the number of extraneous variables (Lijphart 1971). Przeworski and Teune (1970) point out that the most similar systems design has some drawbacks, including the difficulty in generalizing from the cases. This is not a serious problem in the case of this study though, since these cases are primarily be-

ing used in order to complement and expand on theories that are tested in a large-n statistical study. The case studies probe the plausibility of the theorized relationships that I propose, as well as helping to refine the theory, expand on it, and shed some light on the details of exceptions.

While South Korea and the Philippines have quite a number of differences, they have many factors in common. Both gained their independence in the post-World War II era. Both were U.S. client states through much of the Cold War. Both countries show instances in the modern era of relatively long-lasting democratic and authoritarian regimes. The Philippines and South Korea were former colonies that became independent, from the United States and Japan respectively, in the years immediately following World War II. In addition, both states had democratic regimes that failed prior to their current democratic regimes.[7] South Korea and the Philippines are both in the general region of East Asia and have had similar influences from the United States since independence, as governments in both countries relied on the US to some degree for security assistance. However, these two countries have significant differences in elements of state capacity. When the two states were created as independent and self-standing entities in the post-World War II era, South Korea had very low levels of state capacity, as opposed to the Philippines, which had a relatively strong state at the time. Both countries also saw variation in the strength of state capacity over time, as the South Korean state grew in its capacity over time, while that of the Philippines came to be weaker than in its early years.

[7] I am referring here to the Third Republic in the Philippines roughly from independence until the second term of President Ferdinand Marcos. During his second term, which began in 1969, Marcos seriously undermined democracy and then eliminated it altogether with a declaration of martial law in 1972. In the case of South Korea, I am referring to the short-lived Second Republic, which began in 1960 and was overthrown by a military coup in 1961.

While the Republic of the Philippines was democratic in its early years, South Korea had a solidly authoritarian government under Syngman Rhee. While South Korea had a brief episode of democracy in the early 1960s, it otherwise remained more or less authoritarian until its transition in the 1987. The Philippines, however, came to be ruled by an authoritarian regime under Ferdinand Marcos, who declared martial law in 1972, and the same government stayed in power until it was toppled by massive public pressure in 1986. Democratic regimes have sustained in both countries since their transitions in the 1980s. While South Korea has had a relatively stable democratic regime since its transition, the one in the Philippines has suffered from scandals, coup attempts, and has been comparatively less stable.

I approach the cases using the structured, focused comparison method. This method involves a structured approach to answering general questions in the context of specific aspects of historical cases in the broader context of addressing broader research project (George and Bennett 2005). Within each of the two cases, there are sub-cases in which I examine the hypotheses outlined earlier in this chapter. Both countries have periods of both authoritarian and democratic rule. While I consider them in the overall context of the country, I look at each period separately in order to assess how state capacity and other factors affected the relative stability and failure or survival of the regimes. In the authoritarian periods in each country, I look at how various elements of state capacity, as well as other factors directly contributed to the relative levels of regime stability over time, as well as the eventual transitions to democracy. The portions of the cases that take place during democratic periods examine how these same factors affected by relative stability of the democratic regimes over time, as well as their survival and/or ultimate failure.

Conclusion

My expectation is that higher levels of state capacity will make transitions to democratic regimes more likely, but if such transitions happen, higher state capacity will increase the chances for new democratic regimes to survive. My expectation is that the common element between these two is the idea that higher state capacity makes regimes more stable in general. Therefore, authoritarian regimes with better equipped state resources and mechanisms will be better able to build support for and acceptance of their rule, thus making it less likely that the general public or key supporters will seek to replace the existing regime. It is only when these regimes falter that democratic transition can potentially take place. In most cases in the modern era, countries that see authoritarian regimes fail will at least make some attempt at a democratic regime, even if is ultimately unsuccessful. However, since authoritarian failure and democratic transition are distinct phenomena, I run two separate duration models in order to test both the effect of state capacity on the survival of the particular authoritarian regime on one hand, and its effect on the durability of authoritarian rule in the country in general.

With regard to my expectation that higher levels of state capacity make it more likely for new democratic regimes to survive, I expect that this is the case because state capacity is critical to providing basic government functions and services that citizens might expect. In new democratic regimes, democratic consolidation has not yet taken place. In other words, democracy is not the unquestioned rule of the game. In new democracies, citizens often do not make the distinction between the government in power and the regime, or democracy in general.

As has been shown by a number of polls, including Latino Barometer, dissatisfaction with the government and dissatisfaction with democracy are often conflated. Therefore, by effectively providing services and helping to improve the lives of the general population, the gov-

ernment can help to build popular support for not only the leaders in power but for democracy in general. Doing so also alters the calculations of key veto players in society to make it more costly to oppose the current regime than to either support or at least acquiesce to the new regime. In addition, higher state capacity insulates the country from contextual factors that might otherwise make democratic failure more likely by lessening or avoiding certain factors that increase the probability for regime failure, such as low income levels, high crime rates, insurgencies, or poor government reach throughout the country.

In the next section, I report the results of statistical models that will test the hypothesized relationships outlined above. In order to do so, I make use of Cox Proportional Hazard Models, which measure the relative hazards of event failure given certain circumstances. The review of these results will aim to draw some general conclusions as to the degree to which state capacity affects the durability of authoritarian regimes and democratic regimes, as well as the probability of democratic transition. Following an analysis of the results of these tests both individually and in conjunction with one another, the next two chapters will cover case studies that are designed to evaluate the role of state capacity in stability and change in both democratic and authoritarian regimes over the course of the past six decades or so in South Korea and the Philippines. Based on the results of these statistical tests and case studies, I will make a final evaluation on the relationship between state capacity and democratic transition and survival.

5. Quantitative Results

This section reports the results of the statistical models that I ran as described in the section above and assesses the meaning of these results. To summarize briefly, I ran three hazard models testing the effect of state capacity on the survival of new democracies, the survival of authoritarian regimes, and the probability of authoritarian regimes to transition to democracy. In addition, I ran two separate tests for authoritarian regimes because I wanted to find out how the same factors that affect regimes stability affect the probability that an authoritarian regime will transition to democracy. The three tests are presented below, and they shed some light on the questions that have been asked in this study.[8]

The tests below generally supported the hypotheses that I developed in the earlier part of this project. There is strong evidence to support the hypothesis that higher levels of state capacity make regimes more likely to survive. This is particularly the case for new democracies. The results also support the idea that higher levels of state capacity will tend to make authoritarian regimes more stable. While there is some link between state capacity and democratization, it is somewhat limited and only provides support for the idea that authoritarian states that are able to establish effective law and order systems are less likely to see a transition to democracy. The data, which I provide below breaks down the analysis of the different indicators of state capacity and how they affect survival of authoritarian and democratic regimes, as well as how they affect the probability for democratic transition. Although higher state capacity makes authoritarian regimes more stable, making it less likely for them to see transitions to democracy, if a

[8] For a description and discussion of the structure of these statistical tests, please see the previous section. It contains description and justification for the choice in statistical methods, the sample size, data sets that are used, structure of the dependent variables, independent variables that are used as indicators of state capacity, and control variables.

democratic transition occurs, higher levels of state capacity make the new democracies more likely to survive in the long run.

Prior to the presentation of the results, I provide the descriptive statistics for the variables used in each model. For the first two models, authoritarian survival and democratic transition, I use the same sample: authoritarian regimes from 1984 to 2004 for which data is available from the International Country Risk Guide. The second sample is recently democratized countries in the years 1984-2004. Because these populations are fundamentally different, I provide descriptive statistics separately for each. This method of reporting is necessary because in duration models that make use of continuous independent variables, hazard ratios are always expressed in relation to the variable's mean within the population.

Authoritarian Survival

Before discussing the descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables, it is useful to understand the context in which they operate. The table presented below shows the duration and failure variables that form the dependent variable. These statistics present the overall picture of how likely authoritarian regimes are to fail in general.

Table 1: Authoritarian Duration and Failure

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.
Regime Age	2223	23.497	17.429
Regime Failure	2223	0.034	0.181

The table above presents the general statistics on the durability of authoritarian regimes from 1984-2004. It shows that in a given year, there is on average, a 3.4% chance of regime fail-

ure for authoritarian regimes in the sample. Although this percentage may seem to indicate a low rate of failure, what this statistic means is that approximately one in thirty observations (country years) within the sample results in a failure of the regime. In order to convert the time and failure variables presented above into the form necessary to run the hazard model, I ran the function "stset regime age, regime failure" in Stata in order to format the survival data into a useable format for the hazard model testing the relationship between state capacity and the failure of authoritarian regimes.

The table below shows the descriptive statistics for the covariates for the sample of authoritarian regimes that is used in the study. This gives a baseline for discussing the hazard ratios that are presented in Table 3, since hazard ratios for continuous variables are given in relation to the variable's mean.

Table 2: Authoritarian Regimes

Variable		Expected Effect on Stability	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.
Bureaucracy	0-4 (ICRG)	Positive	1212	1.571	0.979
Law & Order	0-6 (ICRG)	Positive	1212	3.089	1.327
Corruption Control	0-6 (ICRG)	Positive	1212	2.585	1.091
Govt. spending per capita (in $100s)	Penn World Tables (Govt. spending as % of GDP * GCP/capita	Positive	2188	10.103	13.946
GDP per capita (in $100s)	Penn World Tables	Positive	1841	26.888	54.661
GDP Growth (%)	Penn World Tables	Positive	1899	0.918	7.319
Military Regime	Wright data set (2008)	Negative	2220	0.308	0.462
Multiparty Authoritarian Regime	Wright data set (2008)	Negative	2220	0.346	0.476
One-party Regime	Wright data set (2008)	Positive	2220	0.323	0.468
Personalist Regime	Wright data set (2008)	Positive	2220	0.038	0.191

Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the covariates in the models that look at the effect of state capacity on the likelihood of authoritarian regimes to fail and/or transition to democracy. The average authoritarian regime in the sample has relatively low levels of state capacity. The mean levels of bureaucratic quality and control of corruption are below the mid-point on their respective scales, whereas the mean score for the law and order variable is very near to the mid-point on the scale. The average GDP per capita for a country in a given year in the sample is just under $2700. Among the regime variables, there are roughly the same number of military, multiparty authoritarian and single-party regimes for the country years reported. These statistics give us a baseline for comparison, which is very important due to the nature of hazard

models. Hazard models report the hazard ratios for continuous variables in relation to the average of the sample, rather than reporting coefficients.

The table below shows the results of the hazard model that tests the effect of state capacity on the probability of survival for authoritarian regimes in the period from 1984-2004. All of the independent variables are lagged in order to show the effect of these variables on the survival of the regimes in the following year. The results show support for my general hypothesis that higher levels of state capacity will tend to make authoritarian regimes more durable. The table below shows that higher quality bureaucracies and systems of law and order tend to make authoritarian regimes more stable. In addition, it shows support for the idea that more institutionalized authoritarian regimes, whether they are single-party regimes or dominant party multi-party authoritarian regimes, will tend to be more stable than military authoritarian regimes. In addition, the results below show that authoritarian regimes tended to be more stable during the Cold War era.

Table 3: State Capacity and Authoritarian Survival

Log-likelihood: -236.03 Prob>chi2= 0.000

n=960

Variable	Hazard Ratio	Std. Err.	P>z
Bureaucracy	**0.770**	**0.176**	**0.056**
Law and order	**0.534**	**0.089**	**0.000**
Corruption control	.995	0.175	0.976
Govt. spending per capita 100	0.966	0.038	0.381
GDP per capita 100	0.981	0.015	0.952
GDP Growth	0.991	0.021	0.673
Exchange Rate Variation	0.999	.000	0.784
Multiparty	**0.446**	**0.189**	**0.057**
One party	**0.305**	**0.157**	**0.021**
No party	1.098	1.195	0.278
Cold War	**0.513**	**.211**	**0.091**

The results show significance for two of the main indicators of state capacity: bureaucratic quality and law and order. Multiparty and one-party authoritarian regimes are both significantly less likely to fail than military regimes. In addition, the dichotomous Cold War variable has a significant effect on the probability of failure for authoritarian regimes. The test yielded no significant effects for the macroeconomic controls. Overall, this table provides support for the hypothesis that higher levels of state capacity tend to make authoritarian regimes more stable.

The measure of bureaucratic quality is significant in the expected direction, suggesting that higher quality bureaucracies tend to make authoritarian regimes more stable. Higher scores of the bureaucratic quality measure make authoritarian regimes significantly more stable. A hazard ratio of .77 indicates that for each unit increase in bureaucratic quality over the average score of 1.571, authoritarian regimes will on average be approximately 23% less likely to fail in a given year. This finding supports the expectations laid out in previous sections. It means that authoritarian regimes with higher quality bureaucracies are more likely to survive. A higher quality bureaucracy provides governments with the ability to more effectively and efficiently implement their policies. Doing so and proving that effective governance and strong state capability improves the chances for rulers to stay in power for a number of reasons. Depending on the country, this could be because the rulers are able to more effectively provide public goods and build legitimacy among the general population and/or key actors or because they are able to use an effective state apparatus to better disrupt the potential for opponents to organize through a variety of coercive measures.

The measure of law and order especially is significant in the expected direction, indicating that higher scores on the law and order measure make authoritarian regimes significantly

less likely to fail. With a hazard ratio of .595, we can see that for each unit increase in law and order over the average for the sample that is reported above at 3.089, authoritarian regimes are approximately 40.5% less likely to fail in a given year. This supports the expectation that regimes that do a good job of fulfilling the most basic expected functions of government will be more likely to survive. While law and order can at times be advanced through draconian measures in authoritarian regimes, the presence of this characteristic is a sign that the state is able to effectively exercise some degree of control.

While most of the control variables proved not to be significant in this model, some reported significance. The Cold War dummy variable is significant in the expected direction. This shows essentially that authoritarian regimes were more stable during the Cold War than they have been since then. While we know this just from general knowledge, the Cold War is an important factor in the international environment that affected not only politics among states but also within many of them. While some autocratic regimes were installed by outside powers, others were simply better able to find patron states to fund their operations and help them survive during the Cold War. For whatever reason, authoritarian regimes were significantly more stable during the Cold War than after its end. A hazard ratio of .513 tells us that authoritarian regimes were 48.7% less likely to fail during the Cold War compared to the time since its end.

Two of the regime control variables showed a significant effect on the probability for an authoritarian regime to fail. According to the results, both multiparty and one-party regimes are significantly less likely to fail than military regimes. This finding coincides with that of Geddes (1999). A hazard ration of .446 means that multiparty authoritarian regimes are approximately 55.4% less likely to fail in a given year than military regimes, whereas single-party regimes, with

a hazard ratio of .305 are about 69.5% less likely to fail in a given year than military regimes of similar qualities otherwise.

Overall, the model of authoritarian survival provides some support for the hypothesized relationship between state capacity and the survival of authoritarian regimes, even though it is not as strong as the relationship between state capacity and democratic survival. Two measures of state capacity have an effect on the probability for survival of authoritarian regimes. Bureaucratic quality, and especially law and order, have a significant effect on the ability of authoritarian regimes to survive. This might lead us to look at these two specific aspects of the state apparatus in appraising the relative stability of an authoritarian regime.

While the first statistical model looks generally at how state capacity affects the stability of authoritarian regimes, the second statistical model shows the results of testing the relationship between state capacity and the probability of authoritarian regimes to transition to democracy. The collapse of an authoritarian regime is a prerequisite for democratization to happen, but it does not guarantee it. Although we see attempts at democracy in most countries where we see a failure of the authoritarian regime, such things are not guaranteed. Even though authoritarian stability is an important issue in its own right, it does not directly get at the question of how state capacity affects the probability that authoritarian regimes will transition to democracy. Below, I report the results of the hazard model looking at the effect of state capacity on the survival of authoritarianism in general, or the probability of a non-democratic country to transition to a democracy.

Democratic Transition

Table 4 below displays the summary statistics for the time and failure variables for the model testing the effect of state capacity on the likelihood of democratic transition. The time variable listed is the age of the non-democratic regime in power. A failure event is when non-democratic rule in general fails, or when a country changes such that it is now categorized as a democracy under the criteria specified in the previous section. A country is deemed to have transitioned to democratic rule or seen a "failure" of authoritarian rule in general in this model if its score on the Polity IV scale reaches six or higher. In other words, a failure event for this variable means a transition to democracy.

Table 4: Democratization

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.
Regime age	2223	23.498	17.429
Democratize	2223	0.027	0.161

The table above shows that, while the probability of democratization is lower than that of authoritarian regime failure, there is still approximately a 2.7% chance for a non-democratic regime to give way to a democratic one in a given year. This model, which tests the effect of state capacity on the probability of democratic transition, uses the same sample and the same independent variables as the previous mode, which tests the durability of specific authoritarian regimes. Therefore, please refer to the summary statistics for the independent variables listed in Table 2 to establish the averages against which hazard ratios are compared below. The sample and independent variables are the same for the two models. The only difference is in the nature of the dependent variable. Whereas the model presented in Table 3 tests the survival of each individual authoritarian regime, the model shown in Table 5 tests the durability of non-democratic rule in general, or the likelihood of a country to replace a non-democratic regime

with a democratic one. The model presented in Table 3 includes failure events if an authoritarian regime is replaced with another authoritarian regime as well. The table below reports the results of the Cox proportional hazard model that tests the relationship between state capacity and the probability of countries with authoritarian regimes to transition to democracy. It shows less support for my hypothesis than the test of authoritarian regime stability, but the results are nonetheless useful. The results presented below reveal certain things about pressures for democratic transition that are independent from the phenomenon of the failure of authoritarian regimes.

Table 5: State Capacity and Democratic Transition

Log-likelihood: -203.521 Prob>chi2= 0.0001

n=960

Variable	Hazard Ratio	Std. Err.	P>z
Bureaucracy	0.760	0.174	0.230
Law and order	**0.613**	**0.111**	**0.007**
Corruption control	1.113	0.212	0.573
Govt. spending per capita 100	0.982	0.001	0.575
GDP per capita 100	0.999	0.001	0.250
GDP Growth	0.987	0.024	0.596
Exchange Rate Variation	0.999	0.000	0.906
Military Regime	1.597	0.664	0.231
One party Regime	**0.422**	**0.204**	**0.074**
No party	1.818	1.992	0.585
Cold War	0.745	.317	0.490

As we can see in the table above, only one of the variables included in the previous test has a significant effect on the likelihood of a transition to democracy. The quality of law and order has a significant effect on the likelihood of a democratic transition. The variable is highly significant and has a hazard ratio of .53. This means that for each unit level increase in the law

and order measure compared to the average level of 3.089 means that a country is approximately 47% less likely to transition to democracy.

While this is the only significant variable in the test, it yields an important finding. Democratic transitions are more likely to happen when the quality of law and order is lower. This is primarily due to the fact that strong systems of law and order tend to make regimes more stable. This finding leads us to the conclusion that the reason that low levels of state capacity (especially in terms of law and order) exist in new democracies is because new democracies are more likely to arise from situations in which these factors are already weak. Therefore, the conclusions by certain authors (such as Bäck and Haddenius 2008 and Lustick and Ulfelder 2005) that state capacity is likely to be weak following a transition is at least partially driven by the conditions that caused the previous regime to fail in the first place. Following the transition to democracy, it takes some time for state capacity to recover.

Only one of the regime control variables was significant in this model. According to this test, single-party authoritarian regimes are significantly less likely to democratize than multi-party authoritarian regimes. A hazard ratio of .422 means that single-party authoritarian regimes are approximately 57.8% less likely to democratize than authoritarian regimes that allow for multiple political parties to compete in elections. This provides some support for Brownlee's (2009) claim that authoritarian regimes that allow for some limited multi-party competition are more likely to democratize.

As we can see from the results discussed in Table 3 and Table 5, state capacity has a greater effect on the failure of authoritarian regimes in general than on the probability that they

will transition to democracies. This is likely because state capacity increases stability of regimes in general. Although lower levels of state capacity might have some positive effect on the likelihood of authoritarian regimes to democratize, this is primarily due to the fact that lower levels of state capacity make authoritarian regimes more likely to fail. In fact, while lower levels of state capacity make the survival of authoritarian regimes less likely, wealthier states, which are more likely to have higher levels of state capacity, might be more likely to democratize if their authoritarian regimes collapse. It could very well be for this reason that forces that could potentially be contradictory are making it so that other variables show no significance as well. It may very well be that very different factors cause authoritarian failure and democratization directly. The section below gives results for the examination of the effect of state capacity on the survival of new democracies.

Democratic Survival

Below I discuss the statistical model that I constructed in order to test the effect of state capacity on the survival of new democratic regimes. Tables 6 and 7 discuss the descriptive statistics, while Table 8 reports the results of the Cox proportional hazard model that tests the relationship in order to evaluate my hypothesis that higher levels of state capacity make the survival of new democratic regimes more likely.[9]

Table 6: Democratic Survival

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.
Age of Democracy	1035	10.483	7.684
Democratic Failure	1035	0.020	0.141

[9] A detailed discussion of the dataset, sample, and variable construction can be found in the previous chapter.

The table above provides the general descriptive data for the average failure rates and age of new democratic regimes in the sample. As we can see above, the failure rate for new democracies is much lower than that for authoritarian regimes. In a given year, a new democratic regime in the sample has roughly a 2% chance of failing, or one out of fifty country years in the sample will result in a democratic failure. The table below shows the descriptive statistics for the variables that are used to test the hazard rates of these variables on the failure of new democratic regimes.

Table 7: New Democratic Regimes

Variable	Coding	Expected effect on stability	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.
Bureaucracy	0-4 (ICRG)	Positive	776	1.975	0.988
Law & Order	0-6 (ICRG)	Positive	776	3.439	1.271
Corruption Control	0-6 (ICRG)	Positive	776	3.025	0.996
Government Spending per capita ($100s)	Penn World Tables (Govt. spending as % of GDP * GCP/capita	Positive	918	11.648	8.661
GDP per capita ($100s)	Penn World Tables	Positive	919	29.323	30.093
GDP growth (%)	Penn World Tables	Positive	918	1.498	5.459
Previous Military Regime	Wright data set (2008)	Positive	969	0.322	0.467
Previous Multiparty Authoritarian Regime	Wright data set (2008)	Negative	969	0.512	0.500
Previous Single-party Regime	Wright data set (2008)	Negative	969	0.266	0.442
Previous Personalist Regime	Wright data set (2008)	Negative	969	0.012	0.111
Cold War	Classified as Cold War until 1990	Negative	1035	.235	.498
Previous Democratic Experience	Coded using Polity IV data (2009). Coded 1 if a country had previous democratic experience.	Positive	1035	0.686	0.464

Table 7 reports the descriptive statistics for the covariates in the model that looks at the effect of state capacity on the survival of new democracies. On average, new democracies do

not have terribly high levels of state capacity. This observation agrees with the results of other studies that say state capacity sometimes weakens following transitions to democracy or in new democracies (see: Bäck and Haddenius 2008; Ulfelder and Lustick 2005).

Overall, the average scores for the ICRG measures that I use to measure or infer state capacity tend to be around the middle of the possible range of the scores. Of the country years in the sample, about half transitioned from multi-party authoritarian systems, whereas about one-third transitioned from military regimes, and about one-quarter transitioned from single-party authoritarian systems.[10] Over two-thirds of the country years in the sample show that the countries had some sort of previous democratic experience. The descriptive statistics regarding the temporal distribution of the sample show the vast expansion of democracy since the end of the Cold War. Less than a quarter of the new democracy country years in the sample are located in the years of the Cold War.

The table below shows the results of the Cox model that tests the relationship between state capacity and the survival of new democracies. Overall, it shows strong support for the hypothesis that higher levels of state capacity will make new democratic regimes more likely to survive.

[10] It should be noted that the number represented here is slightly over 100% because Wright's (2008) classification of authoritarian regimes allows for a regime to potentially be classified as more than one type. For example, a country could be considered to be a multi-party, military authoritarian regime.

Table 8: State Capacity and Democratic Survival

Log-likelihood: -41.357 Prob>chi= 0.000

n=700

Variable	Hazard Ratio	Std. Err.	P>z
Bureaucracy	**0.258**	**0.152**	**0.022**
Law and order	**0.296**	**0.154**	**0.020**
Corruption control	1.993	1.282	0.284
Govt. spending per capita (in $100s)	**0.509**	**0.130**	**0.008**
GDP per capita (in $100s)	.950	0.042	0.244
GDP Growth (% change)	0.897	0.071	0.168
Exchange Rate Variation	0.999	0.001	0.821
Previous Multi-party Authoritarian Regime	2.120	2.423	0.511
Previous One-party Regime	**46.061**	**71.062**	**0.013**
Previous Personalist Regime	**92.964**	**199.849**	**0.035**
Cold War	0.302	0.376	0.337
Previous Democratic Experience	**13.912**	**13.378**	**0.006**

We can see that the results of the model shown above indicate support for the hypothesis presented in this project. The model as a whole has proven to have a significant effect on the probability of survival for new democratic regimes. Of the four indicators of state capacity used in this test, three proved to be significant. The law and order variable has a significant effect on the survival of new democratic regimes. Higher quality and more effective legal systems are critical to pleasing key groups that might act as veto players, building legitimacy among the population and combating a number of issues that might threaten the stability of the regime. This finding provides support for the logic presented by Bunce (2000) that the rule of law is a critical component to both the short and long-term stability of democracy. The quality of the system of law and order within a country provides an outcome measure of the quality and strength of state institutions. We can see that not only is law and order significant, but it has a

strong effect on the risk of regime failure. The hazard ratio of .296 shows that for each unit increase in law and order on the six-point scale compared to the average, the chances of a new democratic regime failing in a given year decreases by about 70.4%. In other words, for each increase of 1 on the scale above the average of 3.44, a new democratic regime is 70.4% less likely to fail in a given year. Using the ICRG data to test the effect of the quality of law and order in a country on the survival of new democratic regimes, this study has produced support for one of the mechanisms through which state capacity can be translated into policy outcomes and regime stability.

In addition to the law and order measure, the test shows support for the hypothesis that higher quality bureaucracies contribute positively to the stability of new democratic regimes. The measure of bureaucratic quality has a significant effect on the hazard of failure for new democratic regimes. The Cox model reports a hazard ratio of .258 for the measure of bureaucratic quality, meaning that for each unit increase in bureaucratic quality on the four-point ICRG scale compared to the average, a new democratic regime is about 74.2% less likely to fail. Since the mean measure of bureaucratic quality in the sample is approximately 1.975, for each increase of 1 on the scale above 1.975 would result in a reduction of the failure risk by 74.2%. This finding provides strong support for the hypothesis that a well-trained, effective bureaucracy plays an important role in effectively implementing government policies. The successful and efficient implementation of these policies and provision of services increases the stability of a regime in multiple ways. In addition, stronger and more formalized bureaucratic institutions increase predictability in interactions between the government and the public, building legitimacy for the state, and helping to decrease the strength of many undemocratic informal institutions in the long-term.

While the test yielded no support for the hypothesis that corruption weakens regime stability, aggregate levels of government spending per capita had a significant effect on the likelihood of new democratic regimes to survive. While the government spending variable is not as significant as the other measures mentioned above, it at least suggests a relationship between this variable and democratic regime survival. With a hazard ratio of approximately 0.509, we can see that higher levels of government spending likely decrease the hazard of failure for new democratic regimes. For each $100 spent by the government per capita over the average amount of approximately $1165 per capita, the risk of regime failure is decreased by approximately 49.1%. This provides support for the claims that state capacity, with wealth as a driving force, has a significant effect on survival on new democracies. While government spending per capita is a distinct measure from that of overall wealth per capita, wealthier countries are better able to collect the money to spend within the governmental framework. Therefore, this finding provides some support for the causal mechanism proposed by Przeworski et al (2000) to explain the effect of wealth on the survival of new democratic regimes—namely that the reason that wealthy countries are more likely to see democratic transitions survive is because they tend to have higher levels of state capacity, which allows for more effective governance.

Among the control variables used, previous democratic experience, whether the previous regime was personalist in nature, and the single-party regime variable for the previous regime were significant. According to the results presented above, countries that have had previous democratic experiences are more likely to see their new democratic regimes fail. With a hazard ratio of 13.912, countries that have recently transitioned to democracy and have previous democratic experience are nearly 14 times as likely to see democracy fail in their coun-

tries. This result is surprising and runs contrary to the normal expectations. This result may be due to a number of reasons. I considered a country to be democratic if the country has experience with even a semi-democratic form of government in the past with a polity score above 0. In addition, this sample size covers a relatively small period of time due to data availability issues. In a wider sample, perhaps these same results would not repeat.

Among the control variables used, two of the dummy variables for the previous authoritarian regime type (personalist and one-party) and previous democratic experience proved to be significant. New democracies where the preceding regime was personalist in nature are significantly more likely to fail than new democracies that were preceded by a military regime. A hazard ratio of 49.58 indicates that democracies that were preceded by personalist regimes are far more likely to fail in any particular year than new democracies that were preceded by military authoritarian regimes. This supports the findings of Geddes (1999) in which she found that when personalist regimes transitioned, they were the least likely to form long-lasting democracies. On the other hand, the hazard ratio is especially high, and it may be due to the low number of regimes preceding democratic regimes that are classified as personalist under the Wright data. Whether the previous authoritarian regime was a one-party regime also has a significant effect. With a hazard ratio of 9.08, new democracies that were preceded by one-party regimes are approximately nine times more likely to fail than those that were preceded by a military-led authoritarian regime.

Overall, this model provides strong support for my initial hypothesis that higher levels of state capacity increase the probability of survival for new democratic regimes. Three of the four main indicators of some aspect of state capacity proved to be significant: bureaucratic quality,

law and order, and government spending per capita. This indicates that, overall, new democracies that have effective bureaucratic and legal mechanisms and do a reasonably good job on maintaining law and order within the country stand a better chance seeing democracy survive in their countries. In addition, we find support for the hypothesis that financial resources matter. Countries with higher levels of government spending per capita are significantly more likely to see new democratic regimes survive.

The findings presented in Table 8 suggest that state capacity plays a much larger role in the survival of democratic regimes than in the survival of authoritarian regimes or the probability of authoritarian regimes to transition to democracy. This may be because the state is more likely to be used for the public's benefit in a democracy. Whereas authoritarian regimes with strong states may use the state to provide public goods, they can also turn the state on their own people. Democratic regimes are far more limited in their ability to do this without ceasing to be democratic. This means that democratic regimes are far less likely to have taken actions that would lead people to oppose them even if the government is performing well.

Conclusion

The tests presented above provide support for my hypotheses that are outlined in the previous sections. While support for my expectation that higher levels of state capacity make democratic transition is relatively weak, there is strong support for my claim that higher levels of state capacity make the survival of new democratic regimes more likely. There is moderate support for the idea that high state capacity makes the failure of authoritarian regimes more likely, but there is less support for it affecting democratic transition.

The models above show some support for the idea that high levels of state capacity make the survival of authoritarian regimes more likely to survive. Both the quality of law and order in a country, as well as the quality of bureaucracy affect the relatively stability of authoritarian regimes. Higher quality bureaucracies and more effective systems of law and order make authoritarian regimes more stable. Model 5, which tests the relationship between state capacity and democratic transition, does not show strong support for my hypothesis that higher levels of state capacity will make democratic transitions less likely overall. However, it supports the idea that a state's ability to fulfill its most basic task, that of establishing law and order, plays a strong role in stability. This model suggests that what effect it has on democratic transition can be primarily explained by how it affects the stability of authoritarian regimes. In other words, there is nothing about state capacity that directly makes democratization more likely. Rather, it contributes indirectly to increasing the likelihood of democratic transition by weakening the stability of the existing authoritarian regimes. While the weakness and failure of authoritarian regimes is not sufficient to cause democratization to occur in of itself, it is a necessary condition for it to happen. As I previously pointed out, while not all authoritarian regimes failures will lead to democratic regimes, it does so at least in a high percentage of cases.

Model 8, which tests the relationship between state capacity and the survival of new democratic regimes, shows strong support for my initial hypothesis that higher levels of state capacity make the survival of new democratic regimes more likely. The model shows support for the idea that better funded state mechanisms with more effective bureaucracies and systems of law and order will tend to make regimes significantly more stable. State capacity contributes to the stability of new democratic regimes by helping the new governments to more effectively deliver public goods, including basic law and order. Doing so alters the calculations of

both key veto players, such as the military or economic elites, as well as the population in general in favor of them supporting or at least accepting the new regime. In addition, these higher levels of state capacity give the government greater tools for dealing with contextual problems that can contribute to a regime's failure.

The statistical tests have contributed to this project by revealing many things as described above. State capacity has a strong effect on the probability of survival for new democratic regimes. While state capacity has some effect on the survival of authoritarian regimes, it is not nearly as strong or pervasive. As mentioned in the discussion of the results presented in Table 8, this could simply be because democratic regimes are likely to be overthrown if they perform poorly and/or if key actors in society with the capability to over throw them feel that their well-being would be significantly advanced by such actions.

Higher levels of state capacity provide states with greater tools (financial and technical) to provide public goods effectively to the population, whether it is law and order, effective economic regulation or social goods. This directly impacts public perceptions of the utility of democracy in the early years as there is often little distinction between democracy and general and the particular government in new democracies. In addition, groups that could potentially overthrow the democratic regime will not do so if the government in the new regime is effectively managing the state and providing basic structure and public goods that they as well benefit from. This makes it far more likely that they will at least accept the new regime and not challenge it.

Authoritarian regimes have a far greater danger to their survival in that the roots of challenges to their authority are far more likely to be normative, and in such situations it is less likely that effective governance alone can bolster the regime against such threats. Especially where the public has come to resent repressive measures taken by a strong state, the state's capacity to respond may not help. In such situations, genuine concessions may need to be made in some situations, which can mean an end to the regime. Therefore, while both types of regimes are vulnerable to threats from state weakness, authoritarian regimes are much more vulnerable to threats to the regimes that can occur in situations where the state is highly capable.

In the following two chapters, I examine two cases in order to complement the statistical portion presented above and in order to delve into how the mechanisms of state capacity tested above work in reality. I look at the Philippines and South Korea in the periods from their independence in the post-World War II era until the early twenty-first century. Within these cases, I assess how state capacity affected the relative stability of both democratic and authoritarian regimes in different periods, as well as what role state capacity played in transitions of regimes in both of these countries. These two cases are helpful in that they both have multiple instances of regime transitions. The goal of these case studies is to probe the plausibility of the findings that are presented above in order to find out whether the findings represent a causal relationship that bears some weight in reality or whether the relationships that I hypothesized are merely spurious correlations.

6. The Philippines: Struggling for Stability

The examination of the Philippines offers a good opportunity to examine how state capacity has affected the stability of both democratic and authoritarian regimes over time. The history of the Philippines since its independence, sixty-five years ago, has seen two democratic regimes and one authoritarian regime. It has seen the failure of both types of regimes, and all three of the regimes existed for extended times, which provides the opportunity to examine how state capacity affected the relative stability of the regimes over time. While levels of state capacity have varied somewhat over time in the Philippines, the country has suffered for most of its history from weakness in at least some elements of state capacity. The instability in the current democratic regime in the Philippines, as well as certain factors contributing to the fall of the Third and Fourth Republics demonstrates how weak state capacity can undermine regime stability, even in cases where the regime manages to survive. This provides some useful insights because, even though the statistical tests dealt with regime survival, the ultimate substantive issue is regime stability. While statistical studies have difficulty in measuring stability directly other than indirectly through regime age or regime failure, this case study as well as the next one, can examine stability more directly.

The case study on the Philippines looks at four distinct periods within the scope of the chapter. This chapter begins with a general overview of the history of the Philippines in order to provide the context in which the events examined took place. In this section, special attention is paid to how the colonial history of the Philippines affected the state structures that were in place at the time of independence, as well as the relationship between the state and society. The next section covers the period of the Third Republic, which spanned from independence until the democratic regime gave way to authoritarian rule under Marcos in the Fourth Republic.

In this section, I look at factors that affected the relative stability and instability of the regime, including the variance in the level of state capacity over time. In the third section, I examine how state capacity and other factors varied and affected the stability of Fourth Republic under Ferdinand Marcos. The fourth section looks at the Fifth Republic in the Philippines, which spans approximately the past twenty-five years. This section evaluates how state capacity has affected the relative stability and instability of the current democratic regime over the past quarter century.

Introduction to the Philippines

The Philippines is a country located in Southeast Asia between Indonesia, Taiwan, and the Asian Mainland. It is an archipelago comprising of hundreds of islands and a diverse population in terms of ethnic and linguistic groups. Today, approximately 101.8 million people live in the Philippines, making it the twelfth most populous country in the world. There is no single group that makes up anywhere near a majority of the population. The Philippines today is made up of approximately 28% Tagalog, 13% Cebuano, 7.6% Bisaya, 7.5% Hiligaynon Ilonggo, 6 % Bikol, 3.4% Waray, and about 25% spread among over a dozen other ethnic groups. While the Philippines is primarily Roman Catholic (about 80%), there is a sizeable Muslim minority (about 5%), which is mostly focused geographically in the south of the country, especially among the Moro people. The country has typically been somewhat low in terms of per capita income. The estimated GDP per capita is approximately $3500 and an unemployment rate of 7.3% as of 2010 ("The Philippines" CIA World Factbook 2011). Although the country is not heavily underdeveloped in the aggregate, the income distribution is heavily concentrated in the hands of a relatively small portion of the population.

Today, the Philippines functions as a constitutional republic with a presidential system of the government. The president serves as the head of state and government, commander-in-chief, and appoints and presided over the cabinet, elected by popular vote for 6 year term with a one term limit. The Philippines has a bicameral Congress, made up of the Senate (upper house) and the House of Representatives (lower house). The Senators are elected at large for 6 year term and the Representatives through sectoral representation for 3 year term.

The Philippines has been influenced by a wide variety of outside cultures and powers over time, including those from the Asian mainland, other Pacific islands, the Spanish, and the United States. The idea of the Philippines as a single entity was imposed from the outside, initially by the Spanish colonizers. The colonial authorities, especially under the United States, established a relatively strong state structure to rule over the colony. The United States ruled over the Philippines from 1898 until independence was formally established. While the Philippines had a degree of self-rule under most of the period of American rule, the country did not gain full independence until 1946.

Although the Philippines had relatively high levels of state capacity in the early years of its independence, this was gradually diminished through a mixture of a lack of resources, poor management and corruption. While the regime that was established at the time of independence was effectively democratic, the effectiveness of the state, including public support and legitimacy for the regime eroded over time. The democratic quality of the Philippines greatly weakened in the late 1960s, and the country ultimately ceased to be democratic in 1972, when President Marcos declared martial law in the country. His non-democratic rule was eventually toppled by a popular movement that sought a return to democracy, which happened with free,

democratic elections in 1986. While the democratic regime established in the 1980s has survived in the Philippines to this day, it has remained fragile, with concerns at times of potential military coups, as recently as the past decade.

The Philippines in the Making: The Making of the Modern Philippine State

The Philippines is a diverse country whose character has changed over time as outsiders came from Northeast and Southeast Asia, as well as Europe and the United States. These outside influences, along with the dispersed geographic nature of this archipelagic nation, brought about a heterogeneous nation that has struggled both with the outside world and within itself over time. The experience under Spain and the United States varied between two extremes in terms of external relations and the internal workings of the government. The colonial experience of the Philippines has often been described as "three centuries in a Catholic convent and fifty years in Hollywood (Karnow 1990, p. 9)".

The first experience of the Philippines with Europeans started with the arrival of Ferdinand Magellan in 1521 on his trip to circumnavigate the globe. Spanish colonization of the Philippines began in the second half of the sixteenth century and ultimately covered the set of islands that we consider to be the Philippines today. Prior to the Spanish colonization of the Philippines, the set of islands was a wide mix of religions, ethnic and national groups. The Spanish rule unified all of these diverse groups politically, and the activities of Roman Catholic missionaries across the islands ended up eventually converting a large majority of the population. Under Spanish colonial rule, the Philippines became relatively sealed off from the outside world. It was not until more liberal trade policies of Spanish kings in the late nineteenth century that the islands became more open to foreign trade (Karnow 1990).

The 19th century, with intensified trade and movement of people, opened up government positions which were traditionally held by *peninsulares* (Spaniards born in the Iberian Peninsula or descended from these individuals), and introduced the ideas of revolution. The first revolt, a precursor to the Philippine Revolution, began in 1872 when three priests were accused of sedition by the colonial leaders and executed. Their execution ignited movements in Spain and in the colonies for independence of the Philippines from Madrid, resulting in the Philippine Revolution of 1896.

As the Spanish-American War began and spread to the Philippines, in 1898 the Philippines declared independence, establishing the First Philippine Republic in 1899. However, in the 1898 Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the islands to the US. The US refused to recognize the independence of the First Philippine Republic, which resulted in the Philippine-American War. The United States eventually defeated the forces of the Philippine Republic, which ceased to exist as an independent country, and the Philippines became an American colony.

After the war, the US controlled the islands as a colony until 1935 when the Philippines became a self-governing commonwealth. While U.S. entities were still present in the islands, they gradually played a lesser role in the governing of the territory. Under President Quezon, the Philippines was supposed to become an independent country in 1945 after a ten-year transition period. This process was somewhat derailed by the Japanese occupation, which started in 1942 and continued with the installation of a puppet government—the Second Republic of the Philippines, which never was able to gain popular support. The brutal Japanese occupation inflicted great suffering on the population of the Philippines. Over a million Filipinos died during

World War II, many of whom were civilians. After a joint effort of the Philippine and American forces, the Islands were freed from Japanese control, and they gained independence in 1946 (Karnow 1990).

The Spanish colonial rule over the Philippines gradually brought about the conception of the islands as a single entity. Over the course of three centuries, they conquered the various peoples and kingdoms that existed across the archipelago. Although many within the country never truly accepted this proposition, most came to think of Filipino as a meaningful identifier. While the Spanish colonial structures did not establish a strong state, they resulted in a degree of centralization and the establishment of some bureaucratic structures in the country. The United States established a more extensive bureaucracy in the Philippines during its colonial rule of the islands. During the colonial period, the United States established a relatively high quality bureaucracy, which was generally well-trained and had high enough salaries to discourage wide-spread corruption. During the commonwealth period, the United States assisted the Philippines in building a state with relatively high levels of state capacity, with good levels of government funding, a high quality bureaucracy, a relatively effective system of law and order and relatively low levels of corruption. However, many of these state structures were dependent in part on American funding. Therefore, as the Philippines became independent and the U.S. funding mostly went away, it became clear that without this funding and influence, the relatively high state capacity in the Philippines would not last in all areas of state authority.

The Third Republic: Weak State Capacity and Regime Fragility

The Republic of the Philippines formally gained its independence on July 4th, 1946. The first president of the newly independent country was Manuel Roxas. He oversaw the transition

from American rule, but he died in 1948, just two years into his term. The constitution that was in place as the Philippines gained independence had a democratic system that was relatively similar to that of the United States, with a bicameral legislature, a Supreme Court, and a strong president, who was popularly elected and could serve up to two four-year terms.

The first five postwar presidents of the Philippines were Manuel Roxas (1946-48), Elpidio Quirino (1948-53), Ramon Magsaysay (1953-57), Carlos Garcia (1957-61), and Diosdado Macapagal (1961-65). Although they varied greatly in personality, they were all strongly committed to a plan of national economic development that was based in large part on utilizing close ties with the United States. With a troubled past of insurgencies that were largely driven by peasant demands, they pledged to improve the quality of life for the peasantry. Although the five presidents occasionally subverted the rules of the political game at the margins, all of them adhered generally to the rules of democratic governance as were established under the Commonwealth era (Abinales and Amoroso 2005).

In the first decade of its de facto independence, the government of the Philippines faced great challenges, including widespread poverty and a domestic communist rebellion, which desperately needed the attention of an effective government. "The islands of 'state strength' began to appear inside the postcolonial Philippine state. At the same time, however, the institutional and social limits on state building became abundantly clear (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 167)." The rebellion, led by the Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP) and what became its military arm, the Hukbalahap (or Huk), proved to operate as a highly effective guerilla army. During the Japanese occupation, it gained significant experience in fighting against Japan's military and acting as a de facto state in many parts of the country. Following World War II, the

Huks came to fight against the Philippine Constabulary and local elites who tried to control the countryside. While the Huks were a serious threat to the authority of the central government in parts of the country, their potential to take over the state and the strength of their support among peasants were often vastly overestimated (Abinales and Amoroso 2005). The central reason that the Huks were seen as a grave threat was not so much due to their own strength. Rather, it was because the Philippine state under Roxas and Quirino was highly ineffective, allowing the Huks to pose a larger threat than they would have otherwise.

There were some examples of professional governance under the Third Republic though. The National Economic Council, the Budget Commission, and the Central bank were effective mechanisms of the state that worked well to promote economic stability and in coordinating economic development under the new strategy of import substitution. Strong state controls on imports and exchange rates laid the foundation for the development of a viable manufacturing sector in the Philippines. This reduced the country's dependence on imports and promoted job creation and growth. Despite these successes of governance, low government revenues, a bureaucracy that was declining in quality, and rampant corruption worked to undermine many of the best efforts by Filipino politicians and bureaucrats (Abinales and Amoroso 2005).

Although corruption and graft were rampant in the Philippines under the Spanish colonial rule, the bureaucratic system that was set up under the American rule was much cleaner. This was in large part due to the fact that bureaucrats under this system were paid relatively high salaries, and those civil servants who were found to be corrupt were prosecuted (Quah 2004). However, with the American withdrawal following World War II, the bureaucracy in the

Philippines suffered from "low prestige, incompetence, meager resources, and a large measure of cynical corruption" (Corpusz 1957, as quoted in Quah 2004, p. 62). Often, executive initiatives became extraordinarily costly due to graft and corruption that swarmed to these new opportunities (Abinales and Amoroso 2005). The lack of resources and increased corruption gradually led to a decrease in the quality of Filipino bureaucracy (Quah 2004). According to Stanley Karnow, "While the United States left a more durable imprint on the Philippines than the Europeans did on their colonies, the impact was only superficial. Nevertheless, both Americans and Filipinos have diligently clung to the illusion that they share a common public philosophy–when, in reality, their values are dramatically dissimilar" (Karnow, 1990).

Under the administration of President Elpidio Quirino from 1948 to 1953, corruption spread to the point that it "permeated the entire gamut of the Philippines bureaucracy, extending from the lowest level of the civil service to the top, excepting the president himself (Alfiler 1979 as quoted in Quah 2004, p. 62-63)." Although many committees and agencies were created to fight corruption during the 1950s and 1960s, these were not ultimately successful in fighting this blight upon the civil service system.

Ramon Magsaysay was elected president in 1953 in a lopsided defeat of Quirino, who was tarnished by corruptions charges and was seen as the prototypical traditional politician. Magsaysay, on the other hand, had worked brilliantly to gain the backing of many key groups in society and build an image as a reform-minded, non-traditional politician. This image was bolstered by his success as Defense Minister in fighting the Communist insurgencies. After taking office, Magsaysay pursed reform with great vigor. With great personal popularity, majority control by his party of both houses of Congress, and American support, he was able to increase the

powers of the president and the executive branch overall. He embarked on an ambitious national economic development plan, and he was also effective at harnessing the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to fight the Communists indirectly through programs aimed to improve the livelihoods of rural residents through development programs and other government assistance programs for farmers.

While Magsaysay was successful in strengthening the state somewhat, his personalization of the office of the presidency had some disadvantages. Chief among them was that, although the executive agencies were relatively successful under his term, the fact that so much of the executive branch's success and effectiveness centered on him meant that the added strength of these institutions did not extend to the institutions beyond his presidency (Abinales and Amoroso 2005). This quickly became evident under the presidency of Garcia who followed him.

In May of 1957, Magsaysay was killed in a plane crash. Carlos Garcia, who was vice president at the time, became president, and later that year was elected to serve his own term as president of the Philippines. Garcia did not have Magsaysay's charisma, and he was not as reform-minded. He felt more comfortable with the traditional patronage politics, more in line with the old guard of the *Nacionalistas*, such as Quezon. He strongly promoted his "Filipino First" policy, which included strong government controls on imports in order to strengthen domestic industries. While this was successful in greatly increasing the percentage of new investments that were owned by Filipinos and it led to the expansion of urban centers and industry in the country, it did little to decrease economic inequalities in the country, primarily benefiting the elites (Abinales and Amoroso 2005).

While some state mechanisms remained independent and effective during this period, such as the Central Bank and the Monetary Board, corruption was still rampant. Corruption, including bribery, favoritism, and fraudulent transactions were rampant in many state agencies, such as the National Development Corporation.

> The mixture of plunder and professionalism made the state look like a quilt: Small patches of good governance adjoined larger patches of corruption and inefficiency. Unfortunately, as in the Quirino period, the latter overwhelmed the "islands of strength." Scandals piles up—malversation of funds allotted to the National Marketing Corporation, favoritism in the disbursement of Japanese reparation funds, the privatization of public lands, the private use of government retirement accounts (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 184).

Garcia ran for another term as president in 1961, but he was beaten badly by Diosdado Macapagal, the Liberal party candidate, who pledged to improve state capacity, especially in the area of economic development, fight corruption, and open the economy of the Philippines to international markets. One important measure that he took was to replace the National Economic Council, which had ceased to function as an independent planning body as it had fallen under the control of corrupt politicians. He replaced it with a new agency (the Program Implementation Agency), which was insulated from particularistic interests and composed of apolitical technocrats who were on board with his economic plan. While there were some successes early on in this initiative, its early momentum quickly fizzled. Macapal lost the support of Congress, and he was ultimately unsuccessful in combating corruption as many individuals within his administration and even Macapal himself were accused of corruption (Abinales and Amoroso 2005).

In the Third Republic, the Philippines suffered from issues with corruption that have faced many new democracies across the world. According to You (2005):

> Although democracy theoretically is supposed to provide checks against corruption, cross-national empirical studies have found differing results. Treisman (2000) concluded that democracies are significantly less corrupt only after 40 years. Montinola and Jackman (2002) demonstrated that partial democratization may increase corruption, but that once past a threshold, democracy inhibits corruption (You 2005, p. 19).

Even prior to the Marcos era, democracy in the Philippines was ridden with corruption, and the election process was marred by electoral violence and accusations (often accurate) of electoral fraud. On one hand, there were strong signs of a healthy electoral democracy from the procedural side. Elections were regularly held in a predictable fashion. These elections saw high rates of participation from a wide variety of strong political parties that had broad popular participation among their membership. In addition, while the elections were seriously flawed, their outcome was not pre-determined, the results were generally respected by the public at large, and the elections allowed for the democratic transfer of power across different political parties. In fact, the rate of political turnover was so high that no president was reelected for a second term from 1946 to 1969 when President Ferdinand Marcos was reelected for a second term as president (Schultzke 2010).

Despite the strong record of the Philippines regarding procedural democracy under the Third Republic, the country remained in some ways substantively undemocratic. The country was badly divided, and political violence, which surged at election times, was rampant. There were a number of insurgencies across the countries from communists and other groups, and a number of powerful individuals and groups maintained private armies. Violent crime was a se-

rious problem in the Philippines during this era, and it surged during periods surrounding elections. The 1969 reelection of Marcos set a record for political violence in the country, with over 200 people killed and even more wounded (Schultzke 2010).

Although the Third Republic inherited a relatively high capacity state from the commonwealth era, this did not last. Without American funding, the government could not afford to pay as high of salaries to the bureaucracy, which gradually contributed to declining quality and increased corruption within many state institutions. This undermined the effectiveness and efficiency of policy implementation. A relatively democratic regime survived for quite some time under these circumstances. Although some presidents fought to increase state capacity and decrease corruption, successes in these areas were short-lived. The state's inability to promote economic development and basic law and order sufficiently in the broader scope led to great public frustration. When President Marcos gradually subverted democracy and eliminated it with the declaration of martial law and enacting a new constitution, he took advantage of this frustration with the ineffectiveness of government in order to gain a genuine degree of support among the masses for a time.

Low State Capacity and the Collapse of the Marcos Regime

The Fourth Republic of the Philippines, as it was termed by President Ferdinand Marcos, was a period in which the country ceased to be democratic by any reasonable qualification of the term. Marcos was democratically elected as the tenth president of the Philippines in 1965, and he was reelected in 1969. Through his declaration of martial law and his replacement of the constitution, Marcos replaced a fragile and flawed democracy in the Philippines with an authoritarian regime. When Marcos wanted to extend his power, he used the arguments of exagge-

rated threats of communism and Muslim insurgencies (Mendoza 2009). Although increasing the strength of the state security apparatus built increased support among some due to improved security and shielded the regime by cracking down on opponents, the overuse of security forces to rule made the stability Fourth Republic tenuous through much of its duration.

Amidst worsening security conditions, including growing threats from Communist insurgents and from the Moro National Liberation Front, President Marcos suspended habeas corpus in August of 1971. This was restored in January of the following year in response to massive public protests. However, using the rhetoric of security, Marcos limited the freedom of the press, closed down media offices, closed down the Congress, and he ordered the arrests of opposition leadership and civil rights activists. On September 21, 1972, through the issuance of Proclamation number 1081, Marcos imposed martial law to create a new social and political order. The martial law was not lifted until January 1981 (Brands 1992).

While in office, President Marcos gained the power to rule by decree, therefore eliminating the need to pass laws through the Philippine legislature. With these new powers, Marcos severely curtailed civil liberties, including the freedom of the press and criminal protections. While there was initially some support for the declaration of martial law in the face of the unrest that was facing the Philippines, whatever support existed initially faded with time. With his new powers, President Marcos chose to replace the Constitution of the Philippines, which established the Fourth Republic. In 1973, replacing the 1935 constitution, a new constitution went into effect, changing the form of government from presidential to parliamentary, which also allowed for Marcos to stay in power beyond his second term (Mendoza 2009).

Katz (2003) observes that in many situations, the support of the military is critical to the survival of authoritarian regimes and the potential for them to transition to democracy. He argues that

> The decision by the armed forces not to protect an authoritarian regime is not the result of a democratic conversion on the part of the military as a whole, but instead results from an overwhelming desire to prevent conflict within the military. Thus, if even a small number of key commanders defect to the democratic opposition this can neutralize the armed forces as a whole even though most military leaders may be wary of, or even hostile to, democratization. But if these key defections to the democratic opposition do not occur and the military remains unified, it is able to crush the democratic revolutionaries easily (Katz 2003, 1-2).

In the case of the Philippines, the military has played a critical role in the survival of democratic and authoritarian regimes. While Marcos was elected into the office, in 1971, however, he declared martial law and ruled through the military control for the next 15 years or so. The military benefited tremendously from Marcos rule, so it also supported him strongly, providing him with a strong tool of control. By the mid-1980s, the country was experiencing serious economic problems, combined with Islamist insurgencies and Marxist ideologies. The middle class and the Catholic Church also withdrew their support for Marcos. Because of the politically driven promotions within the military, favoring the ROTC over the elite Philippine Military Academy for the high ranking officer positions, over time the military also was alienated (Katz 2003).

Parallel to the disenchantment with the Marcos government, among the civilian population, the People's Power democratic movement driven by Corazon Aquino was taking place, while among the military the reformist movement (RAM—Reform the Armed Forces Movement) was taking hold. RAM was the group that planned a military coup against Marcos, but called it

off in January of 1986 before the "special election" when Marcos ran against Aquino for the office of the president. Aquino won the election (Katz 2003).

Highly ranked and popular General Ramos and Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile defected into Aquino's camp, leading into effective immobilization of the armed forces. Marcos' military supporters under the leadership of General Ver, tried to suppress the rebellion, but his troops refused to fire on the civilians supporting Aquino and the military on her side. The corrupt practices of the Marcos regime undermined support for him among much of the officer corps. Many of these officers had grown resentful of Marcos's practices of favoring his cronies within the ranks of the military over professional, non-political offices for senior positions of leadership within the military. This disgust among many of the officers, as well as a number of individuals even within the government leadership, allowed the democratic revolution to succeed. Although the popular uprising of the people power movement was necessary to topple Marcos in 1986, it may not have been successful if Marcos had retained the support of the officers. After Marcos had lost control over the armed forces entirely, he departed Manila for Hawaii with the help of the US (Katz 2003, 3-4). In the case of military support for authoritarian regimes,

> [j]ust a few military defections to the democratic opposition can have a cascading and/or immobilizing effect…. As a result of just a few key military defections, a democratic revolution can occur even if the bulk of the armed forces do not undergo a democratic conversion. Continued hostility toward democratization, though, can have negative long-term implications. In the summer of 2003, the Philippines experienced yet another in a string of attempted military coups that have taken place ever since the "people power" revolution of 1986…. On the other hand, the absence of the key military defections which allows for the suppression of a democratic revolution at one point in time does not preclude democratic revolution from ever happening (Katz 2003, 9-10).

The case of Marcos and the military support for him was no different. In addition to his loss of popular support, Marcos left himself vulnerable by losing support among key groups within society, including much of his own party and ultimately the military. After the declaration of martial law in 1972, rather than keeping the Nacionalista Party intact, he disbanded the party and kept only his closely trusted group of political associates around him. This action alienated many of the long-time leaders of the Nacionalista Party and allowed for the political opposition to his rule to grow well beyond the political left of the Philippines. Had Marcos kept the Nacionalista Party around, he could have greatly benefited from the existing party institutions that could have afforded him useful tools in managing and negotiating disputes with many important societal elites who once were in the party. This action by Marcos enabled the opposition movement that ultimately brought him down to have much wider breadth in society. Because Marcos has disbanded his Nacionalista Party and the Liberal Party, elite rivalries that would otherwise have been contained within the party erupted in public. Many of these disgruntled elites joined the opposition, which successfully united to oust Marcos and topple his regime in 1986 (Brownlee 2008).

The fall of President Marcos was the result of a complex set of factors. According to Jason Brownlee,

> Rather than viewing elite behavior retrospectively through the prism of an unfolding political crisis that spurred action, an institutional approach considers elite behavior in light of the availability or absence of organizational inducements on leaders' preferences. Institutional variations during "normal" (non-crisis) circumstances shape whether regime affiliates are likely to continue supporting the ruler or realign to the opposition's side—even at a time when the challenger appears unlikely to oust the incumbent. Where parties hold the ruling coalition together, such influential partners tend not to emerge, opting instead to continue supporting a system that provides them influence over the national agenda. In the context of weakening parties, however, regime suppor-

> ters realign. Driven by pragmatism as much as by principle, they back the opposition and pursue their interests by challenging the status quo (Brownlee 2008, p 97).

In addition to problems with elite cohesion, the Marcos regime suffered from high levels of corruption. When in office, the Marcos regime was rife with corruption, nepotism, political repression, and human rights violations. In addition, elements of the regime carried out targeted political assassinations, including that of the opposition leader, Benigno Aquino, Jr. Marcos and his wife Imelda embezzled billions of dollars from public funds (Abinales 2000). Large sums of public money were known to have been funneled into the private accounts of Ferdinand Marcos himself, as well as those of many in the top levels of the government. In 1985, Marcos was accused of personal use of US aid with which he and his family bought property in the Philippines, the US, Great Britain, and Italy. As a result of these allegations, 56 Assembly members signed a resolution for impeachment (Blitz 2000). Through mechanisms of graft and corruption, the Philippine state was weakened through a loss of resources that would otherwise have been available for public purposes, including the provision of public goods, from social services to law and order.

Over the period of his rule, Marcos borrowed large sums of money internationally to finance development. While much of this money was overspent in order to buy support for the Marcos regime through the distribution of rents and public goods to supporters and Philippine society broadly, significant portions of this money also went to line the pockets of Marcos himself. Between 1962 and 1986, the Philippine external debt increased from $360 million to $28.3 billion (Boyce 1993). This ballooning of public debt in the Philippines hampered the ability of the state to raise and spend money. This extensive borrowing made the Philippines over time

the most indebted country in Asia. While most of the money went into the economic development, a large portion of it was embezzled by the Marcos family (Hutchcroft 1998).

Marcos offered incentives to foreign investors. Those incentives included tax exemptions and profits in foreign currencies. After the assassination of Aquino, however, the Philippine economy was in decline and foreign investment dried out, along with foreign bank loans to the Marcos government. In lieu of an economic recovery program, Marcos entered into negotiations with IBRD, WB, and IMF to restructure the foreign debt of the Philippines. As a result, he cut government spending. Despite his efforts, beginning in 1984, the Philippines was declining economically, characterized by negative economic growth (Orbeta 1996).

When Marcos' rule ended in 1986, he was replaced by Corazon Aquino after snap elections and a "people power" movement called EDSA (people power revolution) forced him out. This election too was characterized with massive electoral fraud, intimidation, coercion, and violence. As Marcos declared himself to be the winner, Aquino called for rallies and urged the people to protest. People were tired of Marcos's authoritarian rule, domestic elites and foreign governments did not support Marcos, and even the Catholic bishops in the Philippines criticized the election (Kalaw-Tirol 2000). What tipped the scales, however, was the defection of the Defense Minister under Marcos, Juan Ponce Enrile, and General Fidel V. Ramos from the Marcos camp and their support for Aquino as the legitimate winner of the election (Karnow 1990).

While the state had higher capacity under Marcos, this capacity was focused heavily in the coercive mechanisms. The bureaucracy was low quality overall during this period. While international loans and aid from the United States helped to prop up the Marcos regime, much

of this money was either focused in the military or went to line the pockets of the Marcos family and their cronies. Although the increase in the capacity of the police and military led to an increase in the state's control over much of the country and improved law and order, these gains were limited and temporary. In addition, they were offset in the utility that they brought to the public by repressive measures that were taken in order to frighten potential opponents and exclude the opposition from public life as much as possible. Therefore in its overall profile, the state in the Philippines still had relatively low levels of state capacity under Marcos. Because Marcos was not effective in also providing public goods to a significant degree, he was not able to build legitimacy for his rule.

In reference to Wintrobe's (1998) study on authoritarian stability, Marcos relied too heavily on strategies of repression while not working well enough to build the loyalty of at least large sectors of the population. The weak capacity of the Philippine state, partially self-inflicted through outright theft, made it difficult for the government to effectively provide public goods, including economic development and stability. The ineptitude made many who had once supported Marcos, even after the declaration of martial law; lose faith in the regime that he had established. This ineffectiveness, partly due by weak state capacity, caused Marcos to lose support among key groups that were necessary for him to stay in power, such as the military and other key supporters. While outrage over Marcos's rule played an important role in his ouster, the weakness of the state under Marcos made this much easier.

The Fifth Republic: Survival under a Weak State

The Fifth Republic returned a democratic form of government to the Philippines, at least from a procedural perspective. While public participation in elections has generally been high,

many have lost faith in the institutions and dynamics of the democratic process in the Philippines over time (Paul 2010). Politics is largely dominated by a relatively narrow class of elites within society in the Philippines. Many of those who control power have used this position to enrich themselves, often at the expense of the general population and the capacity of the state (Abinales and Amoroso 2005). According to Erik Paul, "[d]emocratic gains made by the people's power movement have been neutralized by a weak state" (Paul 2010, 83).

Furthermore, by the estimation of Francisco Nemenzo, the state in the Philippines "is too weak to protect its citizens and enforce its own laws (Nemenzo 2007, as quoted in Paul 2010, 84). The weak state capacity has not only undermined the quality of democracy in the Fifth Republic but it has hurt its stability as well. Rampant corruption has damaged the public perception of the state, as well as its actual effectiveness at implementing policies and the ability of the government to satisfy key actors in society who might undermine its stability. While the military has not taken over the government, it in effect carried out a behind the scenes coup of President Estrada when the Senate refused to examine evidence of his corruption that would likely have led to his removal from office in an impartial process (Paul 2010). While this event did not bring down the Fifth Republic, it exposed its weakness as well as anything. While the weak state capacity in the Philippines has not brought down the state, it has also the stability and quality of the democratic regime in the country. In the quarter century since the fall of the Marcos regime, the Philippines has suffered from instability in its government. Weak state capacity, undermined by the actions of many of its leaders, has contributed to this substantially.

While politics in the Philippines are open to the general public formally, in reality they are primarily elite contests, and public offices are only really open to small group of people. In

the Philippines, from the early years of independence to the early Fifth Republic, only, "sixty families control the Philippine economy. They have also dominated the political scene from the start of the US colonial era to the Aquino government. Despite their Americanized hoopla, elections are actually contests between rival clans, and the "showcase of democracy" is a façade that only transparently refused to surrender its privileges (Karnow 1990)."

Re-democratization of the Philippines began when Ferdinand Marcos was forced from power in 1986 by a mix of a popular uprising and defections from within the regime. Marcos was forced to accept the true results of the presidential election; he stepped down from office and turned over the office of the presidency to Corazon Aquino. After a relatively peaceful transition of power, the first few months of Aquino's presidency brought about radical changes towards democratic reforms. Soon after taking office, she created the Presidential Commission on Good Government, tasked with investigation of Marcos's amassed wealth. Furthermore, she abolished the 1973 constitutions signed under Marcos and created a new Constitutional Commission which was supposed to draft a new constitution. The final draft of the new constitution was done in October 1986 and was approved by referendum in February 1987. The new constitution emphasized human rights, social equality, and increased civil liberties. The same year, the national election for Congress was held, and in 1988, the local elections followed. Given her movement in the direction of democracy, the confidence of foreign investors in economy increased, bringing back the money and development (Bernas 1995).

In lieu of administrative changes in the direction of democracy, Aquino initiated the restructuring of the executive branch of government and decentralized governmental powers by moving a number of the national government powers to the local governments. This democrat-

ic decentralization restored sub-national governments in the Philippines to meaningful units of government. In the arena of local self-rule, local governments got more control over taxation, and they got a larger share of national revenue. Aquino also restructured the Supreme Court to restore its independence that had been lost under Marcos (*Lawyers League v. President Aquino, G.R. No. 73748*, Supreme Court of the Philippines 1986-05-22).

Despite her restructuring of the governmental institutions to introduce legitimacy and transparency, the rule of Aquino was plagued by multiple coup attempts from the right wing military opposition and left wing communists. Political and economic stability were hampered by government corruption, national debt, communist insurgency, and Islamic separatism. On the positive side, she pushed for a new constitution limiting the powers of the president. Furthermore, she emphasized human rights and civil liberties. In regards to economy, she focused on recovery based on free-market economy and social responsibility.

After the rule of Marcos, the Philippines had high levels of international debt, and the government was bankrupt. In terms of economic policy, Aquino began by dismembering the monopolies created by Marcos. She also decided to honor all the debt acquired by Marcos—not a popular decision, but it made the Philippines more trustworthy, regaining the foreign investors' confidence. However, she also borrowed money from international lenders, increasing the total debt of the Philippines by $5 billion by 1992. On the positive side, she brought about fiscal discipline with limited government spending (Manila Plan to Cut Debt 1992).

On average, the economy grew under the President Aquino. During her first year in office, the Philippines registered a positive economic growth of 3.4%, which lasted until 1989.

That year, the Reform the Armed Forces Movement staged a coup attempt against Aquino. While it was ultimately unsuccessful, one of the effects of the coup was economic stagnation. The return of the image of political instability and potential for military takeover pushed the international investors out, slowing down the flow of foreign direct investment and international loans. In 1991, inflation in the Philippines was at 17% and unemployment at 10% (Encyclopedia of the Nations).

In 1992, Fidel Ramos was elected as president. The 1992 elections were characterized again by vote rigging, but nothing on a large scale has been proven. Ramos won with only 23.58% of the vote, which was the lowest plurality in the Philippine history (Zaide and Zaide 2004). The Ramos government did achieve a certain reputation for efficiency and 'professionalism', in a number of areas. Ramos too was focused on free market economy, so his reforms encouraged private business, invited more domestic and foreign investment, and reduced corruption.

Under Ramos, the Philippines experienced an increase in political stability and progress in economic reforms. Also, the confidence in the Philippine economy was restored, contributing to economic development. In regards to political stability, the national government was able to forge major agreements with Muslim insurgency leaders, communist opposition leaders, and military rebels. Although the economy was hampered to some extent by the 1997-1998 East Asian financial crisis, economic growth under the Ramos administration went from 0.5% in 1991 (the year before Ramos took office) to 7% in 1998 when he left (Dalpino, 2004). While President Ramos and his advisors, who drew heavily from technocratic roots, were able to establish relatively steady growth in the 1990s, this growth was not sufficient to bring substantial portions of

the population out of poverty and unemployment. Although there was some level of progress made, much of the structural inequalities within the Philippine economy remained (Reid 2006).

During the time when Ramos took office, the Philippines was experiencing power outages due to increased demand for electricity caused by economic development and outdated nature of the infrastructure and technology. Under the request from Ramos, the Congress created an Energy Department and gave Ramos special emergency powers. Ramos designated independent businesses to invest in power plants, which backfired later during the Asian Financial Crisis, when the demand for electricity declined significantly and pesos lost half of its value—which also pushed away foreign investment again (Zaide and Zaide 2004).

In reference to the aforementioned 1997 Asian financial crisis, it is important to mention that although it felt some pain, the Philippines was not as affected and the accompanying weather-related contraction in agricultural output as its neighbors. This is partially because, at the time, the Philippines was getting a lot of money from remittances and it had little foreign debt (Philippines Profile 2006). While the situation of the Philippines was not as bad as that faced by Indonesia and other countries, these events were enough to bring about temporary contraction in the country's economy.

By 1998, renewed economic problems, combined with opposition to Ramos' attempts to extend his rule, resulted in a majority of the electorate voting for the opposition's presidential candidate. Estrada—a 1970s era movie star—cultivated a 'pro-poor' facade to his administration and established a 'rainbow cabinet' that embraced select personalities from the 'civil

society sphere'. Estrada's victory was significant, however, in that his main base of support was in the poorer so-called 'level D and E' sectors (Reid 2006).

In 1998, Joseph Estrada was elected as president, winning by a wide margin in the vote. His administration was marked by an impeachment trial on corruption charges and a return of "people power" (EDSA 2). Estrada started out as a Mayor of San Juan, where he focused on improving elementary education, relocating squatter and homeless families. Then, he moved into a Senate seat as a member of the Grand Alliance for Democracy. When in the Senate, he was the Chairman of the Committee on Public Works and Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Urban Planning and the Committee on Health, Natural Resources and Ecology. He won the Vice-Presidency as the running mate of Eduardo Conjuangco, Jr., even though Conjuangco lost the Presidency to Ramos in the 1992 election. The story of Estrada, yet again, shows the limitations of the Philippine political offices to a small group of political elites (Zaide and Zaide 2004).

Estrada took the Presidency in the midst of the Asian Financial Crisis. On top of that, the economic growth was slowed down by agricultural problems. Over the first year of his Presidency, the economy recovered and in 1999, the economic growth was recorded at 3.4% and in 2000 at 4%. Early expectations regarding social reform initiatives were frustrated as President Estrada did not succeed in implementing any substantial policies. In addition, renewed conflict with Moro separatist groups in the south hurt the government's already failing popularity. Finally, the public revelations that Estrada had been involved with corrupt payments from Juegeng gambling syndicates destroyed what remained of his credibility in much of Philippine society (Reid 2006).

In November 2000, the House of Representatives launched an impeachment process against President Estrada. Among the accusations, Estrada was charged with taking bribes from the tobacco farmers. His trial caused civil unrest, with widespread protests by those demanding Estrada's resignation, as well as counter-demonstrations by Estrada supporters, which sometimes turned violent. As vice president, Arroyo had joined the opposition when Estrada was charged with corruption. In the early 2001, the military leadership in the person of Angelo Reyes, the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Armed forces withdrew his support for Estrada in favor of his Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Philippine National Police also withdrew their support of the embattled president. Subsequently, Estrada resigned, and Arroyo came to power with the support of a popular movement that had emerged in response to revelations of Estrada's involvement in corruption (Department of National Defense).

In January 2001, Estrada was succeeded by Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who served as his Vice-President and replaced him when he resigned. She entered Presidency when the Philippines was rather unstable politically and economically. The impeachment of Estrada was rather a messy affair, with many of the senators walking out of the proceedings after the envelope with evidence of bank records was not opened. With the walkout of many senators and the eventual resignation of Estrada, the impeachment process was never concluded because Estrada resigned under broad popular pressure. The initial stages of the transition were a chaotic and controversial matter for the political institutions in the Philippines. The scandal had tainted the office of the presidency and exposed corruption that has been a major part of politics in the country. Furthermore, Estrada's lawyers challenged the legitimacy of Arroyo's presidency in the Supreme Court, because he claimed he had not resigned. However, the Supreme Court ultimately upheld Arroyo's legitimacy as the new president of the Philippines (Mydans, 2000).

The transition period from Estrada's to Arroyo's presidency was characterized by economic stabilization and growth. Under Arroyo's administration, the Philippines experienced the fifth largest economic growth in Asia at 4.5% in 2003 (Dalpino 2004). Despite the improved economic picture, Arroyo's government faced a number of very serious threats that gradually increased in intensity.

Very soon after her administration took office, supporters of the ousted former president Estrada staged their own massive demonstrations in May 2001 to protest against president Arroyo and the process by which Estrada was removed from office. Although Arroyo survived this test, and the uprising eventually lost its steam, by July 2002 President Arroyo began to make a variety of statements that indicated somewhat of a drift towards authoritarianism. Notably, government statements increase the use of the rhetorical framework of the 'Strong Republic,' in the framework of discussing its policies. This ideological orientation contained a number of components. Two in particular deal with the dual threats that were posed to Philippine security in the form of 'terrorism' and general lawlessness. This rhetoric was aimed primarily at the Abu Sayaf group, but it also was aimed at mainstream secessionist groups, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (and armed separatist group in the south) (Reid 2006).

Despite the fact that she said she was not going to run for another term, Arroyo ran for presidency in 2004. Although she initially took the office through succession, she was elected for a full six-year term as president in 2004. A year after winning elections, she was accused of electoral fraud (Conde 2005). There were massive protests throughout Arroyo's term, and a number of her cabinet members resigned under scandals. The president herself also came un-

der pressure to resign. Later that year, there was impeachment complaint filed against her in the House of Representatives (Davis 2005). The 2005 motion for impeachment and another one in 2006 were both defeated in the House of Representatives. Under Arroyo's term as president, there were many corruption scandals, but the economy overall did well and was not impacted as heavily as many countries by the 2008 financial crisis, continuing expansion while many economies were retracting (Yap, Reyes and Cuenca 2009).

By late 2002, increasing unease had grown with regard to the Arroyo government. The president responded by announcing sweeping reform proposals, which she said the rest of her term would focus on implementing. These included tax reform, electoral reform, and a renewed anti-poverty campaign. In addition, she promised that she would not stand for re-election in the presidential elections that were slated for 2004. Few had high expectations that these reform efforts would be carried out, let alone yield serious results. In addition, many were disenchanted by serious and high-level instances of corruption that were exposed but not prosecuted (Reid 2006).

Despite overall strong economic growth, the uneven performance of the Philippine economy began to affect many different sectors of the population in a negative way. While both exports and the country's GDP had strong growth rates in 2004, actual earnings of workers did not increase substantially, and there was no reduction in unemployment levels. In addition, rising oil prices and dependence on foreign oil imports resulted in significant price increase throughout most sectors of the economy, which placed financial strain on much of the population. Spending by most households surveyed across the country reported increases in spending on transportation and fuel as a percentage of their total expenditure. These surveys also

showed that most of the economic benefits of the overall growth in the country were focused on the higher income households. In addition, price increases in basic necessities reduced the positive effect of increased incomes. (Reid 2006)

By March of 2005, this mixed economic situation began to seriously affect the popularity of the Arroyo government. At this time, the president began to record net negative approval ratings in public opinion surveys. Public approval of the president continued to decline over time. These ratings were especially poor among lower-income groups within society. Discontent with President Arroyo was exacerbated when allegations surfaced that her husband and son had illegally colluded and worked with Jueteng crime syndicates. The resulting crisis and the Senate investigation of these charges served as a serious blow to the prestige of the government, especially with Arroyo initially coming to power on the back of public outrage over corruption in the Estrada administration. Given this background and the Arroyo's emphasis on anti-corruption measure, these accusations were especially damaging (Reid 2006).

Among the scandals that broke, perhaps the most important were allegations that Arroyo had been involved in vote-rigging during the presidential election of 2004. Arroyo's victory in the election over Poe was very slim, and many observers identified suspicious voting patterns. In early June, the former deputy director of the National Bureau of Investigation went public with a recording of a phone conversation between President Arroyo and the former electoral commissioner. While Arroyo did not respond immediately to the recording, pressure mounted as important figures, including the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines started to question the government's credibility. Street protests by opposition groups began to escalate and key supporters of Arroyo from important civil society groups started to distance themselves

from the government. As a result of these events, it appeared that the Arroyo government was on the verge of collapse (Reid 2006).

The momentum of poplar opinion against President Arroyo did not decline, even once she finally addressed the recording. Although she apologized for talking to an election official soon after the close of voting, she denied any interference with the vote itself. Her statement was not enough to keep seven of her cabinet members and three agency heads from resigning on July 8th. By late July, Arroyo's scandal was beginning to resemble the scenario that ultimately brought down President Estrada in 2001, when most of the cabinet resigned and the government effectively collapsed. Despite some rumors of a military coup, the military and police did not turn against Arroyo. While there were large-scale protests against the government, and opinion polls showed a majority of the population was in favor of Arroyo's resignation, the scale of popular mobilization against the government did not reach the scale that was necessary to topple the government in another EDSA-type scenario. (Reid 2006)

The Arroyo government was able to partially diffuse the crisis through a number of approaches. Arroyo initiated the process of constitutional reform in her State of the Nation annual address. These proposals involved decentralization of power and a move toward more of a parliamentary system. The idea behind this proposal was to end the often antagonistic relationship between the presidency and the legislature. These proposals received mixed reception from opposition figures, but they at least helped to shift the discussion away from Arroyo herself (Reid 2006). While the proposals did not result in any substantial changes in the government of the Philippines, they helped President Arroyo to change the subject from the scandals and salvage what remained of her presidency.

Having weathered the political scandals and containing the damage caused by them, the Arroyo administration instituted a campaign of intensified repression against the large, ongoing protest movements against her rule. The policies imposed under this effort included efforts to stifle the opposition movements, such as a 'no permit; no rally' rule. President Arroyo authorized the Philippine National Police to disperse any 'illegal' gatherings. The government increasingly used rhetoric that placed the rallies as plans to destabilize the regime. Even the president herself began to attack the opposition, claiming that they were attempting to overthrow the democratic and constitutional government of the Philippines in order to replace her with an unelected, anti-capitalist dictator (Reid 2006).

In the mean time, she increasingly promoted her own rhetoric of the strong republic. Among the anti-opposition initiatives advanced by the Arroyo government was a rule banning government officials from appearing at Senate hearings. Increasingly influential non-governmental groups, such as the Kakati Business club, began to voice their concerns that these policies represented a shift towards authoritarian rule. The measures imposed by President Arroyo culminated with a declaration of a state of emergency in February 2006 in response to an alleged coup threat. Arrest warrants were issued for many prominent members of left-wing parties, including some members of the House of Representatives. Although many of these arrest warrants were later voided by the Supreme Court, violence in this period intensified against left-wing organizations and journalists that were critical of the government. (Reid 2006, 1015)

Arroyo remained in office following the scandal until the end of her term as president. She attempted to contain the crisis with two government initiatives. The government imple-

mented its EVAT initiative with relatively little disruption, and she made an effort to placate opposition politicians and bring them into a government of national unity. While Arroyo was able to hold onto power, this grip on power remained tenuous. This was due, in large part, to the lack of unity in the formal opposition to Arroyo and her party. The political crisis continued beyond 2006, and it was eased only by time and economic growth in the Philippines in the following years (Reid 2006).

While the Philippines is on a strong path to development, its progress has been tempered by a number of factors. Despite strong economic growth for the most part in the past twenty years or so, the formal institutions of government still face a number of problems. Corruption scandals have plagued many administrations at different levels. In addition, the progress that has been made will be threatened until the government can deal with the country's numerous militant factions (Schultzke 2010, 320-321). The substantial improvement quality of the general bureaucracy is cause for optimism. However, high levels of corruption and crime are signs of a state still struggling to establish itself as strong and effective.

Filipinos exist is a situation where almost all of the main parties of the government and the formal opposition are tainted with corruption. Disillusion and cynicism with the political sphere are at high levels. The endemic corruption also weakens the state by capturing resources that could be used to fund law and order measures or other public goods. The lack of an effective system of economic regulation has contributed to a record of unsteady and uneven economic growth. The state itself is hurt by the high levels of corruption both among politicians and the bureaucracy and relatively low levels of resources at its disposal. The democratic regime in the Philippines has survived in part due to favorable international circumstances and the

lack of a strong challenger domestically that wishes to seek political rule outside of the political process. However, the weakness of the state has contributed greatly to the tentative nature of democratic rule in the Philippines, which from time to time has faced the threat of military coups, even seeing President Estrada effectively being forced to leave office by unelected military officers. The Fifth Republic in the Philippines provides a prime example of both a state that is weak in many ways, yet has survived.

Conclusion

Over the course of its modern history, one of the problems that has plagued the Philippines is the complex relationship of interaction between state capacity and democracy. Tilly (2007) accurately outlined this complicated relationship, pointing out that

> state capacity is one of the primary influences on democratization, however, there is not simply a positive linear relation between capacity and democracy. The interaction between democracy and state capacity is complex, with extremes of high or low capacity contributing to de-democratization. Weak states are less likely to become democratic because they generally lack strong trust networks, must deal with social inequalities, and have to fight autonomous centers of power (Tilly, 2007; 175).

While a strong state is important to allowing a high quality democratic regime to develop, if those in power have too much power at their disposal, there is potential for them to use it to suppress the will of the people through rigged elections, suppression of dissent, or other activities. This is precisely what Marcos and the military did in the Philippines under martial law.

The lack of proper balance in the level of power in the Philippine state is a large part of the problem that the country faces in its quest to forge a lasting, stable democracy that can protect the rights of its citizens. This is particularly the case with regard to the attempts of govern-

ments in the Philippines to provide security, which is one of the fundamental features of state capacity and at the very heart of the Weberian definition of the state as a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a territory.

While the Philippines is in serious need of greater security, the period of martial law shows us that simply increasing the power and size of the military can actually prove counter-productive to the search for security, as the military itself can become a threat to the security of civilians within the country. Therefore, in addition to the need for stronger security institutions within the Philippines, rules governing such institutions also pose a serious problem. In other words, strong institutions are only helpful to individual security and democracy if these institutions serve the people. Therefore, in the context of security institutions, civil-military relations are an important component in this overall framework (Bland 2001). While poor civil military relations and weak civilian control are common in new democracies, few countries experience the complex interaction between military factions that we have seen in the Philippines (Schultzke 2010).

Threats to the stability of governments and regimes can take a number of different forms. They can include both high capacity and low capacity threats. While these threats may be distinct in some countries, in the Philippines they have tended to reinforce one another. Lack of order in society, including high levels of violent crime, as well as insurgencies, harm the civilian population, can give political leaders the opportunity to use it as an excuse to take on new powers and increase their control over certain areas. In some circumstances, democratic leaders have used such situations in order to consolidate power to the point that the country ceases to be democratic. This was the case in the Philippines, especially in the case of the fall of the

Third Republic. Marcos, the country's exemplar of misused executive power, was only able to declare martial law and retain his office because of the perceived threat from militant factions (McCoy 2009). Once martial law had been declared, however, this had the paradoxical effect of increasing the power of the country's insurgent groups.

Prior to the declaration of martial law, moderate opponents of the regime would have been able to compete through the formal political institutions. Because Marcos had dissolved Congress, ruled without elections, and had banned many political parties, these individuals no longer had this route through which to compete in the political arena. The practices of Marcos under martial law caused a large number of moderates who opposed the government to support guerillas groups in the country simply because these groups were the only real, organized opposition. As such, some moderates supported guerilla groups in order to endorse a group that was challenging the power of the state. In addition, the misuse of the Philippine military and police forces played a large role in increasing the support for these militant factions (Schultzke 2010).

Although the situation for the Philippines has improved in some elements of state capacity, it still faces great problems. While the quality of bureaucracy, according to ICRG (2007) data has increased substantially, corruption still remains a major problem. In addition, the country still faces serious insurgencies, widespread poverty, high levels of socioeconomic inequality, and high levels of external debt. Endemic violence has been fed by insufficient resources for police and military training (Schultzke 2010). This hurts the ability of the government to deal with the problems of both high capacity threats (such as insurgencies) and low capacity threats (such as high crime rates) to its authority.

No recent president in the Philippines can be said to have presided over a high-capacity government. They enter into office with low state capacity in a number of ways. Government revenues are relatively low, and tax collection mechanisms have a number of inefficiencies. In addition, the bureaucracy is not very high in terms of quality, and corruption is a common problem, which undermines its effectiveness. Even politicians with the best of intentions face a difficult task. Many exacerbate the problem though through their own corruption, which at times simply steals state resources directly, and other times it creates inefficiencies in the state and subverts it to tasks other than effective governance and the provision of public goods.

Marcos had the most power out of any president during the martial law period, but even then he could not disarm the private armies throughout the country or fully defeat the insurgent groups. Even Marcos essentially held enough power in the state mechanisms to defend patrimonial arrangements that he had set up largely for his own benefit, but he did not control all of the islands fully. While the Marcos government can be said to have relatively high capacity in comparison to others, the capacity was heavily concentrated within the coercive mechanisms of the state, using the threat of force and the exclusion of competitors from participation to maintain control. Therefore, the relatively high state capacity under Marcos did not achieve the benefits of stability and unity that one might expect from a strong authoritarian state.

Today, there are still a number of serious threats to security in the Philippines. Aside from relatively high crime rates in general, insurgencies in the country still create serious security problems in certain areas. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Moro National Liberation Front are insurgent groups based in the Muslim minority in a number of the southern isl-

ands. The power of these armed groups has gradually declined in the past decade or so, causing the Armed Forces of the Philippines to make combating these groups less of a priority in recent years. This leaves potential for these groups to linger and remain a threat to civilians and government workers in the southern islands (Schultzke 2010).

While communist insurgencies have declined in power significantly in the past decades, there are still organized groups that remain as threats today. Perhaps more troubling to the general security of the Philippines and the authority of the state are local officials who maintain their own forces. Because the national government has often been unable or unwilling to provide defense against guerilla groups, a number of governors and mayors have been forced to rely on private armed groups for protection. Politicians in many cases actually need armed supporters in order to be viable candidates for office. This has muddied the political process in many cases and resulted in high levels of election-related violence at times. While there may be some need for these private armies in order to provide local security for the general population, they have are often abused, and if the Philippines is to see completely fair voting in all parts of the country, they need to ultimately be eliminated. These private armies have declined in strength over the years as the result of many attempts that have been made over the years to suppress them. However, they still remain in many areas, and the reforms that have been made have not been successful in completely eliminating them. These groups continue today to be serious obstacles to the Philippines becoming a stable, high quality democracy, as members of the armed groups often are used to intimidate voters in elections and by certain businesses to dominate local economies (Schultzke 2010).

Democracy in the Philippines has a troubled history. Despite a strong record of procedural democracy for extended periods of time, democratic governance in the country always seems fragile. While no one factor can explain the failure of the Third Republic and the instability of the Fifth Republic, there are some common factors in the two that have weakened the stability of the democratic regimes in both cases. Rampant corruption in both the bureaucracy and in elected offices has undermined the efficiency and effectiveness of governments in implementing policies as well as hurting the legitimacy of both the specific governments and, in some cases, of the regime itself.

7. South Korea

For the second case study in this project, I look at South Korea. This case provides a good opportunity to study the effects of state capacity on the stability of both authoritarian and democratic regimes and on the likelihood of regimes to transition to democracy. Like the Philippines, this case provides multiple instances of both democratic and non-democratic regimes within the same country over time. I examine these different periods, looking for evidence of how state capacity affected regime stability and survival.

South Korea also has seen changes in the relative level of state capacity over time. Throughout its modern history, there has always been a segment within Korean society that has sought to promote democracy. This underlying force has, over time, stood ready to rise to great levels given the proper opportunities. Authoritarian leaders through South Korea's history have never enjoyed sustained period without significant challenge to the legitimacy of their rule. Over time, they dealt with and attempted to mitigate these challenges through a mixture of strategies, including both measures to build support for the regime through the provision of public goods and the use of coercive measures to suppress opposition activity and instill fear in those who might oppose the regime. The success of the regimes has been determined to a large degree by the rulers' ability to employ these strategies effectively.

I look at four distinct periods in the course of this chapter. The first section covers the general background as it relates to the establishment of the South Korean state, including the Japanese occupation, World War II, and the regime that was established after the war under Syngman Rhee. This section looks at the factors in place at the founding of the First Republic, what contributed to relative degrees of stability during its tenure, and what ultimately led to its

replacement. In the second section I will look at the brief experiment with democracy in South Korea under the Second Republic, including what factors caused democracy to be unsuccessful in this instance. The third section of this chapter looks at South Korea in the period from 1961-1987 under the rule of Park Chung-hee and the regime that he established.

In this section, I examine the factors that contributed to the relative stability of South Korea. Although the period includes two years of military rule, along with two different constitutions, there is continuity in this period under Park's leadership. Even after Park, under the Fifth Republic, the same set of people generally ruled the country. In addition to the relative stability of the South Korean regime for much of this period, I look at how the stability authoritarian regime in South Korea eventually began to decline, as well as what factors contributed to the ultimate failure of the non-democratic regime in South Korea and to the transition to democracy in the late 1980s. In the fourth section, I look at the Sixth Republic, which is the democratic regime that has been in place in South Korea since the late 1980s and how different factors have contributed to the relative stability of the regime. Throughout each of these sections, I examine the effect of state capacity on the stability of the different democratic and authoritarian regimes, as well as how state capacity affected the transition to democracy.

Introduction to South Korea

South Korea is located in Northeast Asia on the southern half of the Korean Peninsula. It has a highly homogenous population of over 48 million people. South Korea is a wealthy country overall, with a trillion dollar economy and a per capita income of approximately $30,000 in PPP terms ("South Korea" CIA World Factbook 2011). While today South Korea is a wealthy country, at its inception South Korea was a very poor country with low levels of state capacity.

It was not until the 1960s, under the rule of Park Chung-hee that this began to change as the country developed economically and a stronger state was established. Whereas the South Korean state early on relied on the military as the best mechanism of state power, the tools of state power became more multi-faceted over time. In the1950s, South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world, whereas today it is a wealthy, developed country.

Korea has a long history of organized states, stretching back to antiquity. At times, the people on the Korean Peninsula have been ruled by a collection of kingdoms, both internally and externally. Traditional accounts trace organized kingdoms in Korea back to over 4,000 years ago with Danggun Wanggeom, who is said to have been the founder of Korea. Historical records can at least trace the ancient kingdom of Choson back to the 7th century B.C. For much of its history, Korea faced occupation from outside powers and division internally into a number of different kingdoms. It has been occupied or subjugated, in whole or in part by a number of outside forces, including the Chinese, Mongols and Japanese empires. Korea was not really unified until the 7th century under Silla with the help of the Tang dynasty. In the 10th century, the territory of Korea was united into a single kingdom called Goryeo, which was later translated into English as Korea. Even after becoming a unified entity, Korea was forced to submit to become a subject of the Mongol empire in the thirteenth century. The Choson dynasty was established in 1392, creating a truly independent and unified country, ruling Korea until the modern era.

For much of its history, Korea was seen as a boundary state for the Chinese empire. While it was conquered about two thousand years ago under the Han Dynasty, Korea has been outside of direct Chinese rule since then, although the various kingdoms in Korea over the years had close relationships with China. In the interest of cooperation with the Chinese empire, Ko-

rean rulers accepted the demand that China be recognized as the central kingdom, thus becoming a tribute state. Formally, Korean rulers recognized the superiority of China, and the Chinese emperor bestowed upon them kingship as vassals of China. The tribute missions in truth camouflaged a thriving trade between the two countries, as tribute missions in the Chinese imperial system were two-way exchanges. Even though Korea effectively maintained full independence in its affairs, from the Chinese viewpoint, this arrangement, along with cultural similarity of the Koreans[11] suggested to them that Korea was not a threat and would eventually be fully integrated into the Chinese world system (Bedeski 1994, 11).

While Korea faced the specter of foreign invasion numerous times and was not always fully independent from foreign influence,[12] the Choson dynasty would rule Korea until Japan annexed Korea in 1910, even though it operated under the moniker of the Empire of Korea from 1897-1910. Korea found itself in the path of newly unified Japan's expansion in the sixteenth century, yet it managed to ward off the invasion. Korea's navy inflicted heavy losses on the invading Japanese fleet. The Japanese were nonetheless successful in landing and wreaking serious havoc on the Korean Peninsula, laying waste to large swaths of land, before ultimately being driven out. This created a lasting enmity toward Japan that was only exacerbated by the Japanese colonization in the twentieth century (Oberdorfer 1997).

The Japanese invasion, followed by a Manchu intrusion not long afterward encouraged the Korean rulers to establish a rigid policy against foreigners, with the exception of Chinese and a small enclave of Japanese people in Pusan. The imperial rulers of Korea established a government and social system that was modeled after Confucianism, including strictly regulated social

[11] Korea used the Chinese writing system, and it was heavily influenced by Confucian teachings.
[12] Most notably, Korea was a tribute state to the Qing dynasty from 1627-1895.

relations between different individuals in society (ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife; etc). The insular attitude that developed among Korea's rulers led to its being labeled the Hermit Kingdom, which would only open up to the outside when it was forced to do so in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (Oberdorfer 1997).

Ultimately, Korea was overtaken by the rising tide of Asian expansion by Western powers and a rapidly modernizing Japan during the late nineteenth century. In 1876, Japan forced reluctant Choson rulers to open their markets to Japanese trade under the terms of the Kandhwa Treaty. Following the Sino-Japanese War, which heavily involved Korea, it became clear that Japan was now the pre-imminent power in East Asia. In 1897, the Choson emperor declared that the kingdom was now the Korean Empire, and he attempted to modernize, especially militarily and economically, in order to preserve the Choson state's sovereignty which was under serious pressure. However, the emperor was unable to resist the rising Japanese tide. In 1905, Korea was forced to become a Japanese protectorate, during which period tens of thousands of Japanese troops were stationed in Korea, and in 1910, Japan officially annexed Korea. During the protectorate period, and even years after annexation, many Koreans resisted the Japanese occupation, both politically and militarily. At times, groups of thousands of armed Koreans would confront Japanese troops. Ultimately though, active and open resistance died out, although it did not do so for several years after 1910 (Robinson 2007).

The Japanese colonial period in Korea had some degree of "modernizing" effects on the country, especially in the expansion of the education system, the building and development of new infrastructure including roads, rail, and port facilities, and a great growth in light industry. However, the colonial regime, run by the governor general of Korea under a hand-picked gener-

al or admiral, was severely militaristic, harsh toward the Korean people, and arbitrary in its treatment of individual Koreans. Even compared to previous rulers, the Japanese colonial rule was the most despotic government in the history of Korea. After all, Korean rulers who had absolute power were tempered by the Confucian principle of virtue and the sense that these were indeed his people (Oh 1999).

Japan's colonial rule was a bitter experience for the Korean people as a whole during which the Japanese rulers practiced a program of cultural assimilation in which they effectively tried to make Koreans Japanese. Between this practice, sometimes called cultural genocide, and a generally brutal rule for many people in Korea, the occupation has left a dark mark on the relationship between Korea and Japan, one that has not completely died off even today. The Japanese rule over Korea was brutal, both physically and psychologically, as Japan tried to force cultural assimilation and build Korea up industrially. This included large scale murder and arrests of protestors, as well as forced labor of many Koreans and forced prostitution of many Korean women. As Bedeski (1994) wrote,

> the overlay of Japanese colonialism may have affected social and economic organization in Korea, and it no doubt stirred up Korean nationalism – but there was little transfer of social and political values. On the other hand, the Japanese work ethic, the drive to modernize, organizational skills, and military competence undoubtedly left their mark after the colonial period. (Bedeski 1994, 12)

At the Yalta conference in 1945, President Roosevelt proposed a shared U.S.-Soviet-Chinese trusteeship of Korea until it could become a fully independent state. Aside from this statement, there was little talk of Korea's fate and no solid agreement. Practical planning in Washington about the postwar future of the Korean Peninsula was lacking. It was not until the last week of the war that the United States gave any serious consideration to what it would do

regarding Korea. On August 10th, 1945, as the Soviets were entering the war against Japan and Japanese surrender was imminent, U.S. officials hastily cobbled together a plan for carving out a U.S. occupation zone in Korea. The plan was rushed and did not include any Korean experts. They decided that U.S. troops would occupy the area to the south of the thirty-eighth parallel, which was approximately halfway up the Korean Peninsula and just north of the capital of Seoul.

Following World War II and the defeat of Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union decided together that Korea was to be partitioned into two zones of occupation on this basis. While the occupation zones were supposed to be temporary in nature, as Cold War tensions deepened, the divisions grew, both between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the regimes that were being set up in North and South Korea. As such, it became clear that there would be no reunification to accompany independence on the Korean Peninsula (Oberdorfer 1997).

In the north, the Soviets set up a Stalinist socialist state, while the Americans with far less dedication set up a non-communist government. While the Soviets clearly saw Korea as being in their security interests, the United States was initially ambiguous about its intentions. In fact, many within the U.S. government saw the security of East Asian countries as being more or less outside the critical strategic interest of the United States. Under the guidance of U.S. military governor in charge of Korea, General John R. Hodge the Republic of Korea (ROK) was proclaimed on August 15, 1948. The Soviet-backed Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DRPK) was proclaimed in the north on September 9, 1948 (Oberdorfer 1997). As Gregory Henderson, former Foreign Service officer for the United States and noted Korean expert wrote in 1975:

> No division of a nation in the present world is so astonishing in its origin as the division of Korea; none is so unrelated to conditions or sentiment within the nation itself at the time the division was effected; none is to this day so unexplained; in none does blunder and planning oversight appear to have played so large a role. Finally, there is no division for which the U.S. government bears so heavy a share of the responsibility as it bears for the division of Korea (Gregory Henderson 1974, as quoted in Oberdorfer 1997, 7).

One result of Japanese colonization was the uneven development in the North and South of Korea when the countries emerged from the war. The northern part of Korea had greater amounts of the raw materials needed for industry. In addition, the southern part of the country had a climate and soils that were much more conducive to productive farming. Therefore, a high percentage of Japanese industrial investments were located in the northern part of Korea, whereas agricultural projects were focused more in the south. This meant that, following World War II, North Korea started out in a much stronger position than South Korea in terms of industrial capacity and overall level of development (Bedeski 1994).

Both Korean states have built nation states that could hold their own and resist intrusions from the outside (wary from lessons of late nineteenth-mid-twentieth century). However, in North Korea this resulted in a totalitarian state that has barely changed over the years, whereas South Korea has built political institutions that lacked long-term durability, but they make up for this with adaptation to a rapidly changing international environment (Bedeski 1994).

Korea under Syngman Rhee: Weak State, Weak Regime

The Republic of Korea that Rhee headed at the beginning of the First Republic was very weak in many ways. It had very limited budgetary power, in large part due to the poverty of the country in general. In addition, all of the state mechanisms were weak and suffered from high

levels of corruption. Even the coercive mechanisms of the state, including the police and military were initially very weak, as was shown by the near collapse of the South Korean military in the early stages of the Korean War. From early on, the Republic oof Korea was led by Syngman Rhee, who was the central figure in Korean politics as president since the founding of the Republic in 1948. He played a strong role in building up the South Korean state that could defend itself, but he has a mixed record. He had a negative record of corruption and he used force against opponents oftentimes, which damaged the chances for democracy under his rule. International sponsorship, especially by the US, was necessary for his survival and success. Rhee was elected president of ROK in 1948. He was a nationalist who had fought for Korean independence for decades under Japanese occupation. He did not think the ROK was ready for democracy, and he considered political parties divisive. He considered the North a major threat and pursued strong anti-communist measures (Bedeski 1994).

The Korean War erupted in June 25, 1950 as North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel. The war involved the United States, China, and to a lesser degree the Soviet Union. While millions of people died in the course of the war, it did not resolve the situation in Korea. Two republics remained, but tens of thousands of U.S. troops stayed behind in South Korea, and for quite a time, the United States military command in South Korea officially had command of the Korean military.[13] This cemented Rhee's dependence on the United States that would limit his ability to act as he chose while in power.

[13] In the early stages of the Korean War, the South Korean military was quickly overrun and nearly collapsed entirely. In this desperate situation, Rhee handed over command and control of the military to the United States relatively early in the war.

The Korean War had the effect of consolidating Rhee's power as the supreme leader and key spokesman of the Republic of Korea. He was successful in building up the military into a relatively effective mechanism of state power, but he was ineffective in building up the capacity of the state in general. Rhee built a regime that was heavily based around him personally, with the Liberal Party as a dominant party to support his rule. Eventually, in 1954, a constitutional amendment was passed to remove a two-term limitation on the president. The opposition unified into a single party, the Democratic Party in 1956. In the 1956 elections, they reduced the Liberal Party majority in the legislature and defeated Rhee's vice presidential candidate, even though Rhee himself was re-elected. They gained more seats in the 1958 mid-term elections. In 1960, Rhee's supporters blatantly rigged the elections. In response, there was a major public backlash with large-scale demonstrations by students and others who were fed up with the corruption and intimidation by the regime. Rhee lost support of both the United States and the South Korean military during this crisis. The government of the United States gradually had come to the conclusion that the protests were legitimate, and it pressured Rhee to make concessions to the demands for democracy (Foreign Relations of the United States 1960). In a desperate attempt to maintain control, Rhee ordered the South Korean military to fire onto the crowd, but the military refused to fire (Park 2008). At this point, his political power was effectively gone. Rhee resigned on April 26th, 1960. While he was never able to establish a strong state, one of Rhee's major legacies was a strong presidency that acted as a dominant force in Korean politics (Han 1980). This legacy of a strong presidency exists to today in South Korea. Every South Korean government except that of the short-lived Second Republic has had a strong presidential institution (Bedeski 1994).

The Rhee regime was weak from its inception, and it never really developed South Korea into a strong state. While the bureaucracy was theoretically a merit-based system, common corrupt practices within the government and bureaucracy negated any merit basis in the system. In addition to the grave inefficiencies that this endemic corruption caused in policy implementation, it reached a level that the hiring, promotion, firing and many other practices within the bureaucracy effectively ceased to operate within a system of meritocracy. This weakened the ROK state that was already rather weak due to a simple lack of resources. During this period, South Korea was a very poor country that could not draw significant resources from its own population, and while aid from the United States allowed for the Rhee regime to survive and for South Korea to survive as an independent country, it did not provide sufficient resources to build even a moderately strong state (You 2011). Rhee essentially relied on the United States and the military to stay in power. Once Rhee lost the support of the United States and his own military, the two supports that had propped up his regime, the regime was finished (Fowler 1999).

The examination of the First Republic shows a clear example of how low state capacity can undermine the stability of an authoritarian regime. The regime had a weak bureaucracy that was not well-trained or highly professional for the most part. It was relatively ineffective at implementing policies, and it was ridden with corruption, greatly decreasing its efficiency and the degree to which the primary job of bureaucrats was the implementation of policy. In addition, South Korea was very poor and did not have a great amount of funding for the government in the first place, greatly limiting its potential effectiveness, which was further harmed by rampant corruption by both politicians and bureaucrats, making the resources for actual governing even less. The only effective mechanism of the state was the military, in large part due to U.S.

funding during and after the Korean War. Rhee relied too heavily on this institution in order to stay in power, which hurt his image in the public. The ineffective governance by Rhee over time led many in the military to gradually doubt his rule. This set up Rhee for the situation that led to his loss of power—popular protests demanding his ouster coupled with the military effectively abandoning him. Therefore, the weak state capacity in South Korea contributed clearly to the shakiness of the First Republic through the years and ultimately to its demise in 1960.

Doomed Experiment: South Korea and Democracy under the Second Republic

The Second Republic arose from unified demands of large sectors of Korean society for democratic rule. It was fragile from the beginning, and the Second Republic never truly found its footing due to a number of factors. The deck was stacked against the regime from the start. South Korea was still a poor country with a weak state. The government did not have great resources at its disposal, and the bureaucracy was highly corrupt, and it was not well-trained or highly effective. There was almost immediate division within the former opposition who were only held together by their opposition to Rhee. Lastly, the two actors whose consent was critical to the rule of Rhee—namely the Korean military and the United States, were not strongly resolved to support the new regime. Within a year, a military coup replaced the civilian government and the democratic regime of the Second Republic. Although the military government that took over gave way to a civilian-led regime relatively soon, it would be over a quarter century until South Korea would see a true democratic regime again.

The new constitution of the Republic of Korea was drastically altered on June 15, 1960. Whereas the constitution of 1948 had set up a system that was heavily influenced by the American constitution, the new arrangement set up a parliamentary system, primarily to try and avoid

the abuse of powers by an overly strong executive, as was the case with Syngman Rhee (Bahr 1960). While there was still a president, he had to be elected by a two-thirds majority in the legislature, and the position was largely ceremonial, such as the president in Germany or Ireland. The National Assembly changed from being a unicameral legislature to a bicameral legislature. In addition to altering the institutional arrangements, the 1960 constitution dramatically expanded the individual rights of Korean citizens (Earl 1960). Most importantly, Article 13 of the new constitution stated clearly that "the people's press and publications freedom and the freedom of assembly and association shall not be restricted." Whereas the 1948 constitution had a similar clause, it was followed by "except as provided by law," giving the government wide powers to restrict free expression and assembly where it saw fit (Oh 1999, 44).

The Second Republic officially began after the legislative elections which were held on July 29, 1960. The Democrats won over a two-thirds majority, but without Rhee to oppose, their reason for unity quickly faded. Even before the National Assembly could form a government, these groups began to dissolve into different factions. Bitter in-fighting made it difficult for the legislature to make even the most basic and fundamental decision in electing a premier. The National Assembly only narrowly was able to choose Chang Myon as Prime Minister in August of 1960 (Bedeski 1994).

Although the former opposition groups were able to select Chang Myon as Prime Minister on August 19, 1960, governing proved difficult as the Democrat Party split into two main factions. A large portion of the party broke off and formed the New Democratic Party. This effectively led to political gridlock on nearly every issue of governance. The gridlock was especially dangerous at a time in South Korea's history where the government badly needed to act in or-

der to deal with a number of accumulated problems. The country was still impoverished with large portions of the population unable to obtain education or have modern utilities. In 1960, the GDP per capita in South Korea was only $79 (about $575 in today's dollars), which was one of the lowest in the world at the time. In addition, the Chang government had inherited a weak state with major problems including corruption and inefficiency in many areas (Oh 1999).

Chang's government represented a clear departure from the caesaristic tendencies of Syngman Rhee. Chang was much more deliberate and gentle in comparison to Rhee. While Chang was an intelligent and capable politician, he found himself facing a nearly impossible situation. He was faced with a wide array of urgent problems that needed rapid government attention, yet he faced a National Assembly that was sharply divided among the Democratic Party, the New Democratic Party, and the remnants of Rhee's Liberal Party (Earl 1960). While most Koreans had high hopes for the new government and expected quick solutions to the country's problems (many inherited from Rhee), Chang's government was nearly paralyzed by these divisions (Oh 1999).

It quickly became clear to the Chang government that the most pressing concerns of Koreans were not political concerns. Rather, the most urgent concerns and demands of most Korean people were economic in nature. A coordinated poll was conducted by ten universities in December of 1960. It asked approximately three thousand South Koreans what their most urgent requests would be to their government. The poll showed that of the concerns listed as the most urgent, only one concern that was stated as the most urgent by more than one percent of respondents was not directly economic in nature (crime control and maintenance of order, at 3.9%). The most urgent requests that were stated were: relief of unemployment (20.8%), price

stabilization (17.9%), adjustment of farm product prices (13.8%), liquidation of usurious loans to farmers and fishers (11.6%), crime and maintenance of order (3.9%), equitable taxation (3.1%), support for small and medium sized businesses (2.0%), and solution of housing problems 1.0%). These poll results clearly show that, while many Koreans were probably happy to see Rhee out of power, their primary concern was very clearly economic in nature. While the government under the Second Republic realized the urgency of these issues, addressing them was not an easy feat for the cash-strapped government of Prime Minister Chang (Oh, 46-47).

The Chang government, realizing it had meager resources with which to address these problems and manage the country overall, tried to reduce the size of the South Korean military in order to have more money to spend on social programs. This plan, seven years after the Korean War, met fierce resistance from the Korean military and from the United States. As such, it was quietly dropped. In December 1960, Chang unveiled his "Five-Year Development Plan," which included large public works projects, including road building, reforestation, land development and dam construction and electrification projects. It was largely modeled after the New Deal that was carried out by the FDR administration in the United States. The projects were to be started in the spring of 1961 with significant aid from the Kennedy administration. However, before the plan could really begin, a military coup removed the Chang government and ended the Second Republic in May of 1961 (Oh 1999).

The weak state that it inherited greatly impeded the Second Republic's chances for success and survival. The state had very low levels of funding due in large part to the poor economic situation of South Korea in general. The bureaucracy was not highly effective at the beginning of the Second Republic, and there was no significant chance for this to change. The primary

concerns of most citizens in the Republic of Korea were practical in nature; especially economic. The government was unable to gain traction quickly enough to win over the key actor whose support had been critical to Rhee's survival and eventual fall—the military. In part due to the inability of the Chang government to rule effectively, caused by low state capacity and political division, a group of military officers, led by Park Chung-hee, overthrew the democratically elected government.

Korea in Development: Democracy and Development under Park and Chun

With the fall of the Second Republic to a military coup, there was a brief period of military rule over South Korea. After this, the same general who was at the head of the military government, Park Chung Hee, resigned from the military and became president of the Republic of Korea with the founding of the Third Republic. This section covers the years from 1961 to 1987. Even though Korea was ruled under three constitutions during this period, the set of leadership remained the same, and the regime essentially did not change. During the twenty-six year period of rule under Park and Chun, Korea developed from one of the poorest countries on the planet to become a serious economic power (Bedeski 1994).

Following the brief life of the Second Republic, Park Chung Hee pursued policies aimed at promoting economic development while strengthening state institutions. He is credited with turning South Korea into a developmental state and performing what some have called an economic miracle. Park's policies were successful in lifting South Korea from its status as a war-torn, impoverished country to become a newly industrialized country. One key element in Park's plan for the development of South Korea was the establishment of an effective, professional bureaucracy. The civil service reform was a critical part of the development plan. The

South Korean leadership, similar to that of Taiwan (Republic of China) during this era, realized that the bureaucracy was a key part of carrying out any of their programs or initiatives. Even with the best leadership and planning, without the proper tools to implement policies, the success of their implementation decreases significantly (Cheng, Haggard and Kang 1998). Along with economic development, policies of promoting education both at the secondary and post-secondary level worked to build and expand the middle and upper classes in South Korea. In addition to heavily promoting industry Park launched what was known as the Saemaul program, which focused on the agricultural sector. In addition to retaining rural support for his rule, it helped to keep the agriculture sector from lagging too far behind the industrial sectors (Bedeski 1994).

Following the military coup on May 16, 1961, martial law was declared by the military rulers, and it remained in force until late 1963. Under the martial law, Park Chung Hee appeared to be the dominant general. While he retired from the military in order to become president, he still relied on it heavily in order to enact many of his policies. Park ruled Korea as its president for over a decade and a half during the Third and Fourth Republics. He normalized relations with Japan, even over vigorous protests within Korea that caused him to declare martial law in 1964 when the negotiations began. He succeeded in normalizing relations with Japan in 1965. The two pillars of Park's rule were the military and his Democratic Republican Party, which he used to carry out authoritarian rule and enact his policies (Bedeski 1994).

Under Park, Korea saw a massive expansion in the area of higher education. The Korean government under Park promoted and funded the country's universities as one of the key mechanisms that would contribute to the economic development. While this strategy was certain-

ly successful, it also indirectly helped to breed what would become many of the regime's fiercest opponents. The higher education system in South Korea produced graduates who had learned about democracy through their courses, university clubs, and living quarters, yet who saw more clearly as a result the authoritarian reality of South Korean society. While the university education that many Koreans received gave them the training for skilled office jobs, there were not adequate employment opportunities to meet the supply of qualified graduates, thus producing in many of them a sense of alienation, frustration, and opposition to the government (Bedeski 1994).

Under the third through fifth republics, corrupt and unfair practices by those who held power distorted those electoral competitions that were permitted by the regime. At times, opposition politicians were banned from political activity. Votes were often rigged (through practices such as ballot stuffing). The television was used by the government at times to distort the reporting on the different campaigns, making the government look better and making the opposition look worse, often through misleading reports. Government resources were also used at times to purchase support from large groups of voters. This also led to a higher degree of personalization in politics, with more of it being personality driven. Despite this, a high number of Koreans still engaged in political participation, both within political parties, as activists, and as voters. Candidates and parties who were critical of authoritarian rule in Korea often attracted significant support. For example: even though the Yushin constitution practically guaranteed Park a majority in the National Assembly through the power to appoint some members, the NDP (New Democratic Party, the main opposition party) still campaigned hard and received a plurality of the popular vote at times, even though their representation did not reflect this as their support was concentrated heavily in urban areas. Again, the opposition was very competitive in

elections under the Fifth Republic despite significant obstacles to true competition (Cotton 1989).

Although the ruling regime under Park clearly was dishonest in its control of elections, manipulating them to stay in power, this corruption did not spread to all levels of government. Under Park, the government built a professional, truly merit-based bureaucracy. This bureaucracy was built into a highly effective system that served the leadership well in instituting its policies, including improved economic regulation and a coordinated policy of export-oriented development. While some degree of corruption remained in the government, corruption within the government and especially in the bureaucracy was greatly reduced. The higher quality bureaucracy was effective in increasing the capacity of the South Korean state to promote growth and provide public goods. This built a degree of legitimacy for the regime among certain segments of the population. More importantly, this strong bureaucracy was a powerful tool for the Park and Chun governments, as well as the democratic regime under the Sixth Republic, to implement policies in a relatively effective and efficient manner (Cheng, Haggard and Kang 1998).

In the leadup to the 1967 election, the opposition unified under the banner of the New Democratic Party (NDP). However, in the 1967 elections, Park won by a large margin in the presidential election, and his party won 130 out of 175 seats in the National Assembly. Park won re-election again in 1971, 53%-45%. In the December 1971 legislative elections, the NDP made serious gains. Park proclaimed martial law again in October 1972, and the government suspended the constitution, banned political activity, and imposed strong censorship on the press (Bedeski 1994). Park claimed this was necessary for the sake of unity during the talks with the North. He also justified the constitutional revision that was taking place on the basis of in-

ternational factors, including US-PRC rapprochement, Sino-Japanese normalization, and deterioration of the situation in Vietnam. In addition, the U.S. withdrew the seventh division with 20,000 military personnel. The new, Yushin constitution, which founded the Fourth Republic, allowed the President to serve an indefinite number of six-year terms, chosen by the National Conference for Unification, from which members of political parties were banned. This body also had the power to nominate one-third of the National Assembly. In addition, under the new constitution, the president had the power to dissolve the National Assembly. The constitution was approved by 92% of voters in a referendum. Park then lifted the martial law, and he was re-elected as President. This effectively made Park dictator for life. (Bedeski 1994)

Public opposition to Park's rule grew over time. In the 1978 elections, the opposition made major gains in the National Assembly. Opposition leader Kim Young Sam hoped to eventually challenge Park's leadership. To this end, he said that he wanted to meet with Kim Il Sung to open re-unification talks and met with President Carter on his visit to Korea in hopes of challenging Park's rule. The government put forth a court case against Kim, alleging voting irregularities, and he was expelled from the National Assembly in October 1979. In protest, all opposition legislators resigned from the National Assembly. This triggered violent demonstrations by students and unemployed workers along with political activists. These demonstrations grew and spread to different parts of the country.

Park's control of the country was clearly declining. The protests against his rule were growing, and the leaders of the opposition were becoming increasingly emboldened. Park was assassinated by the leader of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. While his motives are not clearly known, some speculate that he was afraid Park would remove him from his post due to

dissatisfaction with his performance. The head of the KCIA, Kim Jae Kyu, was arrested by the army and he was executed. Following Park's murder, Choi Kyu Ha, the Prime Minister, took over the presidency under the terms of the constitution, and he declared martial law. After taking office, Choi, sensing the popular pressure, promised to hold democratic elections and to replace the Yushin constitution with a more democratic one. While the Carter administration tried to nudge the Korean leadership in the direction of democracy, it was quickly realized that the United States no longer had nearly the same degree of influence that it once had on the South Korean government. Whereas in 1960, the United States was able to exert strong pressure on Rhee to resign, it no longer had nearly as much influence, because South Korea had grown into a relatively wealthy middle power who no longer was a recipient of foreign aid from the United States (Oberdorfer 1997).

In a referendum on October 22nd, 1979 a new constitution was approved with 91.6% of the vote with 95.5% voter turnout. This created the Fifth Republic. On December 6th, Choi was chosen as president of the Republic of Korea. On December 12th, a group of generals, led by Chun Doo Hwan, quickly moved to take over key positions, arresting the martial law commander and other key leaders, using force in order to depose the military authorities. The takeover of power was quick and decisive, resulting in few firefights or casualties. Chun quickly replaced many of the top commanders in the ROK military with trusted allies (Oberdorfer 1997).

The coup, which was accompanied by a declaration of martial law, resulted in violent demonstrations renewed throughout the country, demanding the repeal of martial law, democratic elections, and an end to authoritarian rule. On May 17th, 1980, the government in turn imposed 'extraordinary' martial law in response. The government removed many opposition

leaders from politics and re-imposed press censorship (closing down over a hundred newspapers). In response to these repressive measures, wide-scale protests broke out across the country, but none were as intense as those in the city of Kwangju, in which a popular uprising took control of the city, driving out the police and military forces. Ultimately though, those involved were crushed by the Korean military as units were called in from outside of the city. They crushed the uprising decisively by the end of May 27th, killing over 100 civilians, although accurate figures are not available. This incident became known as the Kwangju Massacre, especially among members of the South Korean opposition. The government arrested and tried many of those involved in the events. Chun's popularity was forever marred by the incident, and Kwangju would serve as a rallying cry for the opposition for years to come. Nonetheless, following the events of May 27th, the protests against Chun's rule gradually died down, and calm returned to the country (Fowler 1999).

On January 24th, 1981 Chun declared an end to the martial law, but he reminded Koreans that stability was a critical necessity, now as much as ever. Shortly after martial law ended, elections were held for the Electoral College, president, and the National Assembly. Many new parties participated in these elections. Chun easily won election to become the fifth president of the Republic of Korea in an election that few consider to have been free or fair. While politics were relatively stable for the first half of Chun's rule, there were occasional strikes and demonstrations.

The 1985 elections showed a return of real opposition in South Korean politics, which had been to a large degree absent since the country came out of martial in 1981. It became clear to the various opposition groups that the longer Chun remained in power, the more likely

it would be that the DJP (Democratic Justice Party) would produce a successor to him to stand in the 1988 elections. To avoid this, the opposition launched a petition campaign in February of 1986 to introduce a new constitution that included the direct election of the president. While the government was initially hostile to this proposal, its popularity, along with the example of the Marcos regime's demise in the Philippines convinced Chun to drop his initial insistence that the presidential selection rules remain the same, at least for his successor. At the time, violent rallies rose up both in support of the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP), but also some that were anti-American in nature. Chun made the decision to deal with the NKDP rather than risk chaos (Cotton 1989).

A special committee of the National Assembly was convened to consider the question of constitutional revision. This was a contentious issue, and it involved a long and tense period of political negotiations. The DJP leaders didn't want to put the question to a popular referendum as the opposition wanted. After it became clear that there was a permanent impasse in the negotiations, the NKDP decided to boycott the committee's deliberations on September 30th, 1986. A division gradually grew within the opposition on whether the president absolutely must be directly elected. This created a split in which two of the main opposition leaders, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam withdrew from the NKDP, along with their followers in March 1987, and they formed a new group, the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP). Chun saw this as giving him the opening to scrap the negotiations and return to his original plan to select his successor (Roh) through the old mechanisms of presidential selection (Cotton 1989).

This decision by Chun set off a massive popular uprising against his rule as an unprecedented coalition formed that challenged the regime. The struggle extended from an unprece-

dented struggle within the large industrial conglomerates between labor and management, which threatened the government's corporatist strategy of labor relations. Also, major spokesmen of various religious groups in the country called on Chun to return the country to a path of democratization in very vocal and public manners. In addition, increasing numbers of individuals from the professional and managerial classes in Seoul and other major cities joined the student-led protests. These protests gradually grew in size, scope and intensity. The greatest challenge though came as the hopes for Chun and Roh to use the economic record of the DJP to carry the middle ground in Korean public opinion (Cotton 1989).

Many Koreans and observers expected that the uprising would have horrific results as the government cracked down on the protestors, as had happened in the Kwanju Massacre of May 1980. Unexpectedly to many, Roh Tae-woo, Chun's hand-picked successor, made an announcement during a press conference in June 1987 that he was ready and willing to compromise with the opposition. Roh stated that he would accept the main demands of the opposition, including many democratic reforms (Freedman 2006). He presented an eight-point plan for democratization, which included the release of political prisoners, the restoration of Kim Dae-jung's civil rights, removing restrictions on press freedom, and the promise to carry out free and fair direct elections for the president by the year's end (Cotton 1989).

Essentially, Roh saw the tide turning, and over Chun's objections, gave into the demands in order to survive politically. To avoid further national turmoil, international condemnation, and potentially lose or tarnish the 1988 Olympic games, Roh did not want to crack down on the protestors, especially with much of the military being very hesitant about such a move in this particular environment (Cotton 1989).

Park Chung Hee was highly effective in building up the South Korean state. He successfully implemented civil service reform that was successful in greatly improving the quality of the bureaucracy and reducing corruption within it. This allowed the government to implement its policies far more effectively and with less loss in the policy implementation process. The benefits of these improvements ranged from better economic coordination and regulation to overseeing massive infrastructure investments and improvements to improving the effectiveness of the tax collection system and many other areas of policy. While the economic development that took place in South Korea in the 1960s and 1970s was not the result of a centralized state-run economy, the government played a strong role in coordinating, leading, and overseeing the development in partnership with private firms. While Park is a highly controversial figure in South Korea today, he was effective in building the state and promoting economic development in the country.

South Korea at the time that it transitioned to democracy had a relatively high level of state capacity. This did not prevent the fall of the Fifth Republic or cause a transition to democracy. However, it posed a larger obstacle to the transition in the first place, and it made the transition process much smoother than it might otherwise have been. While high levels of state capacity make the fall of authoritarian regimes and democratic transition less likely, they do not preclude the possibility all together. Greater effort and more favorable circumstances are necessary for an authoritarian regime to fall when the state's capacity is relatively high. In June of 1987 in South Korea, broad spectrums of society joined together in protests to support a well-organized and coordinated opposition in demands for democratic elections. In addition, the shifting international arena was highly favorable to democratization at the time, as was demon-

strated by the events in the Philippines in the previous year. The United States, who still had some degree of influence in South Korea, had shifted into a stronger position of supporting democratic movements where clear demands were made by the people. In addition, the specter of what had happened in Kwangju during the 1980 uprising made the government hesitant to repeat the same mistakes by using the military to break up the protests. On top of these factors, the demonstrations in 1987 were spread widely across the country and across sectors of society, some of whom the government relied upon for support (such as the professional classes, of whom many had joined the protestors).

As I will discuss in the following section, higher levels of state capacity were rather advantageous to the stability of the Sixth Republic once it was established under the 1987 constitution. Another effect of the high levels of state capacity that were present in the Fifth Republic was that the transition was very orderly. Certainly other factors were at work, including the fact that the government had a political party that could still participate in the government through elections, but the fact that the bureaucracy did not have to be overhauled and could be counted on to still perform many of the day to day tasks of the state, made the transition much easier and more orderly. As we can see from the South Korean example, not only are higher levels of state capacity advantageous to new democracies, but if a transition to democracy takes place, it will typically be less disruptive than in a weaker state.

Korea under the Sixth Republic: High State Capacity and Regime Stability

In 1987, South Korea became the second most powerful democracy in East Asia, behind only Japan. It had a peaceful transition to democracy that involved many actors in society. It was driven by civil society, international pressure, and elite negotiation. Following the transi-

tion, South Korea enjoyed a relatively stable decade politically with strong economic growth, causing many, especially in the West, to consider it to be a model for democracy and prosperity in East Asia (Diamond and Shin 2000).

South Korea's transition to democracy was relatively stable in comparison to the experiences of many other countries. Following Roh Tae Woo's announcement that he would compromise on democratic reforms, negotiations with opposition leaders produced a number of reforms, including a new constitution. This new constitution, which founded the Sixth Republic, included strong guarantees on individual and press freedoms, free and fair multi-party elections, amnesty for Kim Dae Jung and many other political prisoners, democratic decentralization, and measures to improve social programs and anti-corruption efforts. Following the writing and approval of a new constitution, free and relatively clean elections were held to directly elect the president and members of the legislature (Freedman 2006).

As happens in many cases after the incumbent rulers are overthrown, the opposition quickly fractured into different parties without the common goal of ending authoritarian rule in South Korea to unite them. The two main opposition figures, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung formed new political parties to compete in the December elections: the Reunification Democratic Party and Peaceful Democratic Party, respectively. Roh ran as a candidate for the ruling DJP party, and he was elected as president with only about 36% of the vote, primarily due to Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung splitting the opposition vote. The opposition parties did, however, take control of the South Korean legislature. In an attempt to overcome potential obstacles from a divided government, Roh formed a grand conservative party in order to govern the country. This party was named the Democratic Liberal Party, and it comprised Roh's Democratic Jus-

tice Party, former DJP member Kim Jong Pil's Democratic Republican Party, and surprisingly to many, Kim Young Sam's Reunification Democratic Party (Freedman 2006).

Despite his past as a leading member of the authoritarian regime under the Fifth Republic, Roh, at the head of a grand coalition, managed to oversee the passage of many new laws that institutionalized and protected the new democratic freedoms that had recently been won in South Korea. Kim Young Sam won the next presidential elections, and later, Kim Dae Jung did the same in 1997. Over time, the authority of civilian leaders over and independence from the military became established more clearly. However, the bond between the government and large corporations that led Korea's industrialization remained strong much longer. While corruption controls gradually improved, the necessity to raise money for political campaigns in Korea is at least partially tied to lingering problems with corruption today among politicians (Freedman 2006).

The Sixth Republic benefited significantly from the relatively high level of state capacity that had been built under the previous regimes, as well as the fact that it remained intact due to the smoothness of the transition. The bureaucracy did not undergo any immediate overhaul, and it was not immediately or drastically impacted by the transition. In addition, the improvement of Korea's economic situation in the previous quarter century granted the state with more resources with which to implement policies on a broader scope and with better effectiveness. One area in which state capacity was lacking was in that of economic regulation. Lee (2000) pointed to the immediate causes of Korea's financial crisis as being the result of: "the mismanagement of foreign exchange liquidity, a failure in maintaining the soundness of financial institutions, and a failure to regulate the expansion of the chaebol when their financial condition

was already weak (Lee 2000, 119)." However, the capacity of the Korean government to implement policies aimed at adjusting the crisis prevented a major financial setback from becoming a financial catastrophe. Although economic growth was temporarily harmed by the financial crisis, South Korea has continued to grow economically, meaning that the negative impact was not permanent.

Conclusion

This examination of South Korea in the modern era has provided some useful examples of how state capacity can affect the relative stability of both democratic and authoritarian regimes. The regimes of the First and Second Republics were weak in terms of state capacity, and this made both weak from the beginning. The reason that the First Republic only lasted as long as it did due to the exogenous shock of the Korean War, which with the U.S. support had the paradoxical effect of making his regime more stable within the country rather than weaker. In addition, Rhee effectively used the military, at least for a while, to disrupt opposition. However, just seven years after the end of the Korean war—the national emergency that led many to accept his rule temporarily—Rhee's regime fell to protests that, while large, were nothing close to the scale of those that brought down the Fifth Republic. The Second Republic was weak from the beginning, having inherited a weak state from Rhee. It was ultimately doomed by both its inability to convince the military that it had more to gain by keeping the Second Republic in power.

Under the regime established by Park following the coup, South Korea grew in wealth and state capacity grew as well as it had greater spending power. In addition, a more professional bureaucracy and some relatively successful efforts to fight corruption helped to increase

the efficiency and effectiveness with which the state implemented the government's chosen policies. This provided the regime with an increased degree of stability as the major potential veto players were either incorporated into the government or sufficiently satisfied with the government's actions. Ultimately though, even this regime fell to massive popular uprisings demanded an end to the authoritarian regime.

The Sixth Republic has benefited greatly from the strong state that was built under the authoritarian regime under Park and Chun. In fact, the capacity of the state to respond to the economic crisis in 1997 demonstrated the ability of the South Korean state to respond effectively to a serious crisis that might have toppled other weaker regimes (Erdogdu 2002). While the preferences of the South Korean people are certainly not to be neglected, the high levels of state capacity in the modern South Korean state have contributed to a relatively high degree of regime stability.

The South Korean government under Syngman Rhee was never very stable, and the state under Rhee's rule was not very strong. While most Koreans tolerated his rule during the Korean War as a necessity, after the armistice was signed, opposition to his rule, which was still present during the war, grew rapidly. The Korean government was highly corrupt at all levels, including the military, politicians, and a great many bureaucrats. Between this and the low level of resources that was available to South Korea as a very poor country meant that Rhee presided over a weak state. The only area of the state that had a reasonably high degree of capacity was the military, which was propped up to a large degree by the military presence of and direct military funding by the United States. This meant that Rhee had to rely increasingly on repressive measures to maintain his grip on power.

The leaders of the Second Republic found themselves in a difficult situation to begin with. They had inherited a weak state from Syngman Rhee. The state had low levels of financial resources at its disposal, and the only element of the state with a relatively high degree of capacity was the military. Unfortunately though, Prime Minister Chang did not truly have control over this institution, as the May 1961 coup showed. At the time of the coup, the general Korean population was certainly not in a state of uprising against the government, but most people urgently wanted the government to address concerns that directly affected their lives, which were primarily economic in nature. The Second Republic government was not able to adequately satisfy key groups within the Korean military who ultimately overthrew it.

The Chang government had great difficulty in accomplishing its goals due to limited resources among other things. Though Chang dropped his earlier plans to cut the size of the military to allow more funds for economic and social projects, this attempt worried many in the military who saw themselves as the bulwark against a potential North Korea invasion, which was a very real threat less than a decade after the Korean War. Finally, ambivalence from the United States toward the coup in its initial stages was the nail in the coffin of the democratic regime in Korea. While the fall of the Second Republic was not simply the result of low state capacity, it was certainly a contributing factor in the demise of democracy in Korea.

Like Rhee before him, Park Chung Hee ruled South Korea effectively for some time through a successful marriage between the civilian leadership and the military. However, unlike Rhee, Park did not rely on the coercive capacity of the military and the police to maintain power to the same degree. In order to strengthen the country and build support among the Korean

people for his rule, Park embarked on a policy of economic development with the state as an important actor but not the only one. This allowed him to magnify the power of the weak state that he inherited. Economic growth provided a greater tax base and more resources for the Korean government, thus increasing its capacity to spend money on programs to facilitate economic growth and provide social services to the Korean people, including public works, public education and health services among other things.

While the government under Park used their power in a corrupt manner to maintain their rule, they increased efficiency and effectiveness in policy implementation by improving the quality of the bureaucracy. They did so by punishing corrupt practices of bureaucrats to a higher degree and through more rigorous enforcement of the meritocratic selection, promotion and firing criteria that existed only in theory under Rhee. These practices boosted the capacity of the state by making policies cheaper, quicker and easier to implement, not to mention more effective.

Although the South Korean government under Park was successful in improving state capacity to build a degree of legitimacy among large parts of the Korean public, Park certainly used the repressive capacity to maintain the regime's place as well. He was careful to maintain strong mechanisms in the military and the police that could be used by the government to maintain its own power, and he did so at many times, including only a few examples that I have mentioned above. He used the capacity of the state effectively to insure a tight grip on power through jailing of dissidents, banning and punishing dissident political activity and forcefully breaking up protests at times. Using the coercive capacity of the state provided Park and later Chun with a powerful tool that they could use to maintain power. In 1987 ultimately though,

these tools were not enough to prevent a transition to democracy, as the government, in the face of a veritable uprising, gave into the demand of the opposition to end their regime and transition the country to democracy.

Through the policies and events under the Third through Fifth Republics, as well as actions of South Korean leaders under the Sixth Republic, a strong state has been built in South Korea. The current incarnation of democracy has been blessed with a number of favorable factors that contributed to its stability and survival in addition to high state capacity. First, in 1987, with the Cold War thawing, the United States was becoming less willing to support authoritarian regimes in allied countries, especially when there were legitimate, popular demands for democracy. Just the previous year it had supported the People Power Movement in the Philippines over Ferdinand Marcos, an autocratic leader but staunch ally of the United States. The Reagan administration communicated to the South Korean government that a brutal crackdown would not be seen favorably. Nonetheless, U.S. had little to do directly with the events of June 1987. Chun and Roh must have clearly seen that the United States would not look the other way or at least accept a brutal crackdown as it had done at times in the past. While the U.S. could not have stopped determined actions of the South Korean government, its support was seen as useful at least. In addition, the 1988 Summer Olympiad was to be held in Seoul, and a harsh government crackdown against pro-democracy protestors would have soured this coming out party for South Korea.

High levels of state capacity played an important role in supporting the new democratic regime in the early years of the Sixth Republic. The strong state was able to effectively provide social services, maintain law and order to a reasonable degree and manage strong economic

growth in its first decade (Marsh 2006). While the 1997 Asian economic crisis could have posed a serious challenge to the regime, the government prevented a disaster. While the economic downturn probably cost Kim Young Sam re-election to the office of president, it did not bring down the regime. The early governments were not only successful at further entrenching support for democracy among the public, but they were successful in managing the country such that potential veto players (such as major business leaders and especially the military) at least were accepting of the new democratic regime. While environmental factors, both internationally and domestically, were also more favorable to the success and stability of the Sixth Republic, a relatively high level of state capacity has at least enabled the rulers to build support for the regime and satisfy key groups within society whose support the Second Republic sorely lacked.

In conclusion, it seems clear that low levels of state capacity were at least contributing factors in the fall of the First Republic of Syngman Rhee. Along with low levels of government resources, corruption was high, and the bureaucracy was not well-trained, professional or highly effective. This limited the scope of policies that the government could promote. In addition, this meant that efficiency and effectiveness in the implementation of policies was seriously undermined. What meager resources the government had to spend on the provision of public goods was siphoned off to a high degree by corruption that was prevalent at nearly all levels. Due in large part to the weakness of the South Korean state, Rhee's grip on power depended to some degree on the consent of the United States. Thus, when the U.S. refused to support Rhee in the face of the 1960 opposition protests, it became very difficult for him to remain in power. The only mechanisms of the state that were fairly effective were the coercive mechanisms of the state, especially the military. The effectiveness of the military for remaining in power was limited, and when this key actor turned against Rhee, his regime was effectively over. The

Second Republic was short-lived, and it was at a great disadvantage due to the weak state that was left to it by Rhee. The inability of the state to effectively implement policies and begin to address pressing problems that were facing South Korea contributed to the military's decision to take power.

Under Park Chung Hee, South Korea grew greatly in wealth and other indicators of development. In addition, the bureaucracy was professionalized, and while corruption was not eliminated, it was greatly reduced. Under his reign, South Korea enjoyed a degree of stability. While the Fifth Republic had relatively high levels of state capacity, it was ultimately unable to stay in power against the rising tide of public opposition, which was far greater than the one that had toppled the First Republic. The Sixth Republic has benefited greatly from the high level of state capacity that it has inherited from the authoritarian regime that preceded it. The state's ability to effectively provide public goods and respond to shocks to the system has built confidence among the people, business leaders, and the military in South Korea that the democratic regime can be effective and provide what they need from the central state. The Korean state is generally well-resourced and thought of as relatively competent with effective bureaucratic mechanisms to support it. The legacy of an effective state that was built under the rule of Park and Chun served South Korea well by making the transition much smoother than it might otherwise have been and by supplying the new democratic regime with greater tools to meet the need of its people following the transition.

The examination of the South Korean case provides a number of useful insights into the effects of state capacity on regime stability and transition, in terms of both general effect and more specific mechanisms. Whether the development of state capacity in the Republic of Korea

was the result of a long process that began under Rhee's rule or whether it is one that was instituted primarily by reforms under the leadership of Park, it is clear that at least in its early years, the country had a weak state. It was burdened by low levels of income as well as a corrupt bureaucracy that was effectively not selected and promoted on merit-based criteria. These factors left the state with few resources to bring to bear in combating the problems that the country faced or in providing public goods to the population.

As the level of state capacity increased in South Korea, as the result of increased income, lower levels of corruption, and an increasingly well-trained and professional bureaucracy, the level of the regime's stability increased. While the stability in the Park/Chun era was not absolute and did not endure forever, the end of the regime demonstrates how higher levels of state capacity mean that a stronger effort and/or more favorable circumstances are necessary in order to overthrow a high capacity authoritarian regime. In addition, in such situations the transition is likely to be more stable because much of the state apparatus will be able to serve the new regime and will thus not fight the transition. Once the new democratic regime is in power, high levels of state resources, low levels of corruption and a highly trained and professional bureaucracy will serve the new democratic regime well, as was the case in South Korea. Nearly a quarter of a century since its democratization, South Korea stands as an example of a successful and relatively smooth transition to democracy in a high capacity state.

8. Conclusions

This dissertation examines the effects of state capacity on the survival of authoritarian regimes, as well as the probability for democratic transition and the survival of new democracies. Through it, I have found solid support for the general idea that high levels of state capacity positively affect regime stability, especially in the case of new democratic regimes. This finding not only contributes to the existing literature on governance and the process of democratization, but it provides some useful findings for those who are trying to build stable, democratic regimes.

This study has used a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to examine how state capacity affects regime transition and survival. Both the statistical tests and the case studies have provided strong evidence that low levels of state capacity make the failure of new democratic regimes more likely. There is also some support for the hypothesis that high levels of state capacity make authoritarian regimes more stable as well. For the hypothesis that lesser levels of state capacity make democratic transitions more likely, the support is rather tepid. These effects are only due to the fact that lower levels of state capacity can contribute to regime stability overall. What relationship exists between state capacity and the probability for democratic transition is probably only due to the effect of state capacity on the stability of authoritarian regimes.

The second chapter of this dissertation has examined the existing literature in the field in a systematic way to find an area that has not been fully addressed in the field of political science. A review of the broad collections of academic work served as basis to build upon existing theories to construct a theoretical framework through which to understand how state capac-

ity affects regime stability. Subsequently, in the third chapter of this work, I have developed a set of hypotheses regarding the relationship between these factors. I then set out to test these claims using both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. The findings of these tests have yielded new insights and have provided some support for the hypotheses that I laid out at the beginning of this project.

This study addresses some significant gaps in the literature. First, it has directly tested the effect of state capacity on authoritarian stability, democratization, and the survival of new democratic regimes. A number of studies have inferred or assumed that higher levels of state capacity make the survival of new democratic regimes more likely, but these relationships have not been tested before statistically using the specific indicators of state capacity that I have used. In addition, I link the common factor of state capacity to the relative levels of stability in authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, I systematically point out the similarities and differences in the ways that higher levels of state capacity tend to promote regime survival and stability in both of these types of regimes.

The statistical portion of this project made use of three models in order to test three relationships: between state capacity and the probability of failure for authoritarian regimes; between state capacity and the probability of democratic transition; and between state capacity and the likelihood of survival for new democratic regimes. I tested these hypothesized causal relationships using three separate Cox Proportional Hazard Models in order to assess and measure the effect of various indicators of state capacity on the probability of regime failure, transition and survival.

The hazard model that tested the survival probabilities of authoritarian regimes showed support for the idea that the state's ability to establish an effective system of law and order, as well as the quality of its bureaucracy, significantly affects regime stability. Authoritarian states with effective law and order and high quality bureaucracies are significantly less likely to see their regimes fail. This indicates that a more effective state stands a better chance of seeing their regimes survive. Higher state capacity gives authoritarian leaders the opportunity to increase the stability of their regimes both through mechanisms designed at discouraging opposition as well as through those aimed at inspiring loyalty.

A higher capacity state can more effectively and efficiently repress the population through surveillance, imprisonment of opponents, and the use of force to disperse protests. The regime can also use this more capable state to provide goods and services that are aimed at gaining the support or acquiescence of both the general population, as well as key groups who either are within the selectorate or could potentially challenge the regime. An effective authoritarian regime uses a mixture of policies that are aimed at instilling fear in those who might choose to oppose it with policies whose goal is to encourage loyalty to those in power. Weaker authoritarian regimes often rely too heavily on the state's repressive capabilities to maintain power, which tends to make their regime less stable, especially in the long-term.

The Marcos regime in the Philippines and the Rhee regime in South Korea are good examples of this causal mechanism. Especially Rhee found himself in the position, having a very weak state with only one somewhat effective mechanism (the military). While he implemented some policies that were oriented to serving the public, he relied too heavily on the use of coercive tactics to stay in power. Marcos found himself in a similar situation, though to a far lower

degree. In both situations, the rulers relied too heavily on coercive measures to maintain power. Due in part to ineffective governance, including corruption, both leaders lost power when they were abandoned by the military, which was one of the main coercive mechanisms on which they relied in order to stay in power.

The hazard model that tested the relationship between state capacity and the probability of a country to transition to democracy shows limited support for the hypothesis that higher levels of state capacity make democratic transitions less likely. Of the four indicators of state capacity, only the law and order variable was significant. While this variable was significant in the expected direction, the other variables do not offer support for the hypothesis. This indicates that what relationship exists between state capacity and democratization is due to the effect of state capacity on authoritarian failure, which does not ensure democratization, even though it makes it likely.[14]

The hazard model that tested the effect of state capacity on the survival of new democratic regimes shows strong support for my hypothesis that state capacity plays an important role in promoting democratic survival. In this test, three of the indicators of state capacity reported significance: bureaucratic quality, law and order, and government spending per capita. This indicates that well-resourced states are better able to implement policies and provide goods and services to the general population. The existence of a high quality bureaucracy is certainly aided by high levels of resources, but it also plays a significant role in and of itself. Even with high levels of state resources, an ineffective bureaucracy will make policy implementation less effective and less efficient than it would otherwise be, thereby decreasing the effect of

[14] Of the instances of authoritarian regime failure in the sample, over 80% of them resulted in democratic transition.

money that is spent to promote a certain agenda goals. The establishment of a high quality system of law and order represents the provision of perhaps the most essential service to a society. Establishment of an effective system of law and order plays a significant role in improving the chances for a new democratic regime to survive.

In established democracies, general dissatisfaction with government performance will simply lead to a change in the political party or parties that rule the country. However, new democracies effective governance is vital to the survival of the new regime for multiple reasons. First, in a new democracy, citizens do not always make the distinction between dissatisfaction with the particular people or party in government and democracy in general. Therefore, poor government performance in new democracies can potentially lead to disenchantment with and indifference toward democracy. While this alone will not topple a democratic regime directly, it makes it easier for other groups to do so.

Second, in new democracies the democratic norms have not been internalized by all major actors in society. Therefore, in new democracies there may be certain veto players whose acceptance of democracy is important to its survival. Effective governance, advanced by state capacity, makes these groups more likely to accept the new democratic government. Third, higher levels of state capacity provide new democracies with greater tools to deal with contextual problems that they might face, such as high levels of poverty, economic instability, communal conflict, insurgencies, or other problems.

The case studies illustrate some of the causal mechanisms that were hypothesized in the theory chapter and tested in the quantitative chapter. Both cases give examples of weak demo-

cracies that experienced problems in part because of low levels of state capacity. The Third Republic of the Philippines and the Second Republic of South Korea both found themselves in problematic situations, though to varying degrees. The Third Republic began with a relatively high level of state capacity, but with the loss of American funding, the quality of the bureaucracy, once high, gradually declined. In addition, corruption gradually increased. The inability of the governments under the Third Republic to deal with a number of basic issues, including law and order and effective provision of public goods decreased public support for democratic rule, and it allowed Marcos, on a populist platform, to have a true degree of popular support as he consolidated power and overthrew democracy from within the government. The Second Republic, on the other hand, inherited a weak state, and it was never able to correct for this in its short time. Its inability to deal with the contextual problems that it inherited was part of the force prompting the military to overthrow it.

Under Park during the Third and Fourth Republics, as well as Churn under the Fifth Republic, the military/dominant party authoritarian regime was successful in building up state capacity in South Korea. The leadership during this period was successful in guiding South Korea's economic development, which created greater wealth for the population and in turn generated greater revenues for the government. In addition, the government was successful in establishing and effective, merit-based bureaucracy that had a much lower level of corruption. This enabled greater levels of stability than the First Republic ever saw, but there were still occasional and significant periods of protest, one of which, in 1987, was ultimately successful in bringing an end to the regime. While this episode demonstrates some limits in how state capacity can contribute to authoritarian stability, the higher level of state capacity made the transition to democracy smoother than it might otherwise have been. In addition, many of the previous re-

gime members managed to find places in the future of South Korea's government. Most notably, Roh was elected as president under the new constitution.

The Sixth Republic of South Korea has benefited greatly from the high levels of state capacity that it inherited from the authoritarian regime that preceded it. This allowed its leaders greater resources to govern effectively and combat problems that arose. The relatively weak state that the Fifth Republic in the Philippines inherited contributed to a degree of instability, part of which lingers to this day. Weak state capacity has hurt the quality of democracy and negatively affected stability in the country as the government has not been able to protect its citizens and enforce its own laws at times. While democracy has survived in the Philippines, corruption and government ineffectiveness have led to high levels of public distrust of the government.

The cases of the Philippines and South Korea have contributed to the study by demonstrating the plausibility of the causal mechanisms that I have proposed in this project. They have illustrated how state capacity interacts with other factors in order to affect the relative stability of authoritarian and democratic regimes. In addition, the transition to democracy in South Korea in the 1980s offered an opportunity to consider the question of what might affect transitions to democracy from relatively high capacity states, which do happen from time to time. Overall, the case studies have complemented the statistical study well by allowing for more in-depth probing and targeted analysis of the same general questions that the quantitative portion aimed to address.

While few studies are ever truly complete or final, this one has made a solid contribution to the advancement of knowledge and understanding in the fields of governance and democratization. It has shown that higher levels of state capacity make new democracies more likely to survive. This work is also useful in categorizing and testing certain aspects of state capacity and their effects. In particular, the establishment of a higher quality bureaucracy and an effective system of law and order increase the stability of a new democratic regime. Resources also clearly matter as one might expect. The overall level of government spending per capita has a significant effect on the probability of new democratic regimes to survive.

In addition to the academic contribution of this study, it has powerful implications for policy as well. Despite the great amount of focus and effort that states and individuals have put into democratic transitions, some new democratic regimes fail to survive. The answer to why some new democracies survive while others fail is one of great importance. This project contributes to addressing this question by systematically testing how some indicators of state capacity affect the probability of survival for new democracies. The results point to the importance of state capacity in the survival of new democracies. This includes the quality of the bureaucracy, quality of the law and order system, and government spending levels per capita. Funding state mechanisms and building an effective bureaucracy within a country can greatly increase the chances for a new democatic regime to survive.

This research project can be built upon in future work to deepen our knowledge of how state capacity affects the stability of regimes, both authoritarian and democratic. For instance, future studies might look at how relative levels of state capacity affect transition itself, including the ease and quality of the transition. Also, a direct examination of how state capacity affects

that probability of a country to democratize given that an authoritarian regime has failed would be a useful contribution. It may be that if an authoritarian regime fails, democratization is more likely in countries with relatively high levels of state capacity, wealth, or other factors. While this study has advanced the study of how certain general indicators of state capacity affect regime stability, future studies that probe the effect of specific government apparatuses would be very useful. For example, studies could look into questions of the degree to which various parts of the law and order system or specific bureaucratic mechanisms contribute to regime stability. In future projects, both I and other researchers will have numerous opportunities to build upon this work.

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