

Modelling the Common Agricultural Policy. General equilibrium effects of the 2014-2020 budget agreement

Pierre Boulanger¹, George Philippidis²

¹ European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC), Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS), Agriculture and Life Sciences in the Economy Unit, Edificio Expo. c/ Inca Garcilaso, 3, 41092 Seville, Spain - pierre.boulanger@ec.europa.eu

² European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC), Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS), Agriculture and Life Sciences in the Economy Unit, Edificio Expo. c/ Inca Garcilaso, 3, 41092 Seville, Spain - george.philippidis@ec.europa.eu



**Paper prepared for presentation at the EAAE 2014 Congress
'Agri-Food and Rural Innovations for Healthier Societies'**

August 26 to 29, 2014
Ljubljana, Slovenia

Copyright 2014 by Boulanger and Philippidis. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.

Modelling the Common Agricultural Policy. General equilibrium effects of the 2014-2020 budget agreement

Pierre Boulanger
George Philippidis¹

Abstract: This paper presents methodological development of MAGNET, a sophisticated agricultural variant of the well-known GTAP computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for representing the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Using original data on EU domestic support, it examines some likely macroeconomic effects in the European Union (EU) of the expected budget over the period 2014-2020. Results suggest that agreed budget cuts, in constant price, have limited impacts on EU and world markets, given the broadly non-distortive representation of present CAP policy.

Keywords: CGE, CAP, domestic support, EU28

1. Introduction

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) remains one of the central tenets of the European Union (née European Economic Community) project, which consists of over 500 million consumers, contains more than one-third of its land area classified as 'rural' and is a key player on world agri-food markets. Established in 1957 under the auspices of the Treaty of Rome, the *raison d'être* of the CAP has evolved in the ensuing period. Since the 1992 CAP reform there was a sharp shift away from price to coupled, and then decoupled support, with a view toward the reduction of market distortions, greater provision of 'public goods' and an easing of the burden of targeting and, monitoring said payments. Alongside incremental policy changes, CAP expenditures constitute approximately 40 per cent of the EU budget nowadays, against 70 per cent in early 1970's.

The allocation of CAP expenditures is subject to European objectives, regardless of the beneficiary member states. It is the financial corollary from the adoption of a common policy for EU agriculture. Notwithstanding, the 1984 Fontainebleau European Council's decision to insert a rebate mechanism on the United Kingdom's net contribution to the European budget as well as resulting retroactive correction mechanisms for other member states runs against this principle of solidarity. As a consequence, budgetary return becomes the sticking point around the negotiating table when dealing with CAP reform, especially for those EU members that receive rebates, large contributors such as Germany or large CAP recipients such as France.

Taking a more holistic approach, some commentators (Le Cacheux, 2005) argue that the CAP budget should not be merely treated as a financial zero sum game, especially when considering the non-pecuniary advantages of European policies and integration. Notwithstanding, Boulanger (2011) observes that in times of high national public deficits and gross debt, political expediency tends to exacerbate member states' budgetary return stance within the negotiations. As an example of this, in June of 2013, a hard fought political agreement between member states was reached for the next seven year CAP budgetary

¹ The authors are indebted to Arnaldo Caivano for data support, to Robert M'barek, Sophie H elaine, Hans van Meijl and the MAGNET team at LEI, and Alexandre Gohin for helpful suggestions. Any errors remain the responsibility of the authors whose on-going research aims at further refining the data and modelling work. The views expressed are purely those of the authors and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the European Commission.

allocation – the so-called multiannual financial framework (MFF). This deal contemplates a decrease in CAP expenditures for the 2014-2020 MFF.

There is a lack of published modelling literature examining the impacts of CAP budget reform. One example is Nowicki et al. (2009), who explicitly model the CAP budget mechanism and analyse (inter alia) the effect of a 75% budgetary reduction in real terms (55% in nominal term). This reduction is achieved via elimination of pillar 1 support (market measures and direct payments) and increases in pillar 2 support (rural development measures) by 100%. The liberalization scenario also anticipates the removal of trade measures. Results suggest that except for livestock, cuts in direct payments have little effect on European agricultural production but significant impacts on agricultural income and the number of farms. Although this paper offers interesting insights, it does not provide a comprehensive representation of pillar 2 rural development payments. This common omission in modelling studies is largely due to the heavy data demands of including these payments as well as the heterogeneity in implementation strategies across national/regional borders (Psaltopoulos et al, 2012).

The current paper employs a multi-sector market model approach to estimate the welfare, macro and sectoral impacts of the current political agreement on CAP budget cuts. To significantly improve the assessment, a rich dataset of pillar 2 payments is employed; a highly detailed baseline scenario is implemented capturing actual payment changes to specific member state EU agricultural sectors under the CAP Health Check reforms (including the re-coupling of support payments, i.e. article 68); and an account of the CAP budget 'own resources' mechanism to track both payments to, and from, member states originating from the CAP budget. The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section two discusses the methodology. Section three analyses effects of the 2014-2020 CAP budget political agreement on welfare, trade, factors and product markets. Section four provides some concluding remarks.

2. Methodology

2.1 Modelling framework

For advanced applied trade policy analysis, the GTAP toolkit (Hertel, 1997) constitutes an important point of departure. Notwithstanding, additional modelling and data work are necessary in state-of-the-art CGE applications to fully explore the policy question at hand. As a first step, the paper employs a GTAP model variant known as the Modular Agricultural GeNeral Equilibrium Tool (MAGNET).² A key strength of the MAGNET model is that it allows the user to choose a la carte those sub-modules of relevance to the study. In the context of the current work aims, additional modules are 'activated' to capture the specificities of agricultural factor and product markets. Thus, modifications to the nesting structures characterise the heterogeneity of land usage by agricultural activity; a regional endogenous land supply function; the sluggishness of capital and labour transfer between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors with associated wage and rent differentials; the inclusion of substitution possibilities between feed inputs in the livestock sectors; and additional behavioural and accounting equations to explicitly characterise EU agricultural policy mechanisms (that is, production quotas, single farm payment, pillar 2 payments). In addition to the standard MAGNET model, further in-house refinements to the GTAP data and MAGNET model structure are included to improve the precision of the study.

² MAGNET is part of the integrated Modelling Platform for Agro-economic Commodity and Policy Analysis (iMAP) hosted by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (M'barek et al., 2012). For a fuller description of the MAGNET model see Woltjer and Kuiper (2013).

2.2 EU domestic support allocation

The treatment of the CAP budget in MAGNET calculates total CAP expenditures to each EU member state by adding up all subsidies on primary factors employed in agriculture. Importantly, all decoupled payments are calibrated to the land factor assuming equal subsidy rates across all agricultural sectors. This representation of decoupled support assumes that the single farm payment (SFP) is production neutral, excludes cross commodity effects and capitalises the entire SFP into the value of land. This modelling assumption has important implications. A sensitivity analysis on support allocations would be required to better capture potential market distorting effects of domestic support, especially SFPs.³

The numerous pillar 2 initiatives are aggregated to five categories, i.e. agri-environmental, least favoured area, physical capital, human capital and other investment mechanisms. Pillar 2 payments on agro-environmental schemes and least favoured areas are tied to the land factor following Nowicki et al. (2009). Additional pillar 2 expenditures on physical capital, human capital and other investment mechanisms are captured within the CAP budget, but are not calibrated to any subsidy wedge. Importantly, since domestic support values are included within ad valorem subsidy rates, then CAP support values change in response to price and quantity changes, NOT policy driven decisions. Ideally, in a market model, CAP support should be fixed. Consequently, the CAP accounts module adjusts subsidy rates such that changes in CAP support remain fixed (either in nominal or real terms). Pillar 2 subsidies are assumed to affect productivity (i.e., output and input augmenting technological change). More specifically, in level terms, output augmenting technical change (OA) in each of the ‘j’ agricultural sectors follows an ad hoc endogenous specification (dropping the regional subscripts):

$$\begin{aligned}
 OA_j = & \Theta \left[\frac{HK}{\sum_{k \in AGRIC} VO A_k} \right] + \Phi \left[\frac{PK}{\sum_{k \in AGRIC} VK_k} \right] + \\
 & \Xi \left[\frac{OTH}{\sum_{k \in TRAD} VO A_k} \right] \quad j \in AGRIC
 \end{aligned} \tag{A.1}$$

where Θ , Φ and Ξ are technical parameters with respect to changing CAP budget expenditures on human capital (HK), physical capital (PK) and other investment schemes (OTH) (where the latter are not specific to agriculture). Thus, the marginal change in output augmenting technical change is the technical change parameter multiplied by the ratio of CAP pillar 2 expenditure to the value of output or agricultural physical capital which corresponds to each pillar 2 payment type. The parameterisation of euro payments into productivity changes is taken from the literature and expert opinion, i.e. 'human capital' = 0.4; 'physical capital' = 0.3; 'other investment' = 0.1; 'agri-environmental schemes' = -0.05 (Woltjer and Kuiper, 2013).⁴ To carry out sensitivity analyses appears here critical in order to endorse accuracy of these parameters.

In the non-primary agricultural sectors, output augmenting technical change is assumed to respond to changing OTH expenditures only (dropping the regional subscripts):

³ Urban et al (2012) stresses this point and proposes alternative allocation of support related either on (i) factor usage, (ii) 50% on land, 25% on labour, 25% on capital, or (iii) 100% on land. The paper concludes on the need to test econometrically degrees and modes of coupling if one wants to model accurately SFPs.

⁴ Evenson (2001) estimates a rate of return of 40% for human capital investments; Nowicki et al. (2009) estimates a rate of return of 30% for physical capital investments based on Wolff (1996) and Gittleman, ten Raab & Wolff (2006). Productivity effects of other investments and agri-environmental schemes are based on expert opinions. There is no deadweight loss, i.e. 100% of the payment is effective (Woltjer and Kuiper, 2013).

$$OA_j = \Xi \left[OTH / \sum_{k \in \overline{TRAD}} VOA_k \right] \quad j \in NAGRIC \quad (A.2)$$

Finally, agro-environmental pillar 2 payments are calibrated as subsidies on the land factor and also have negative productivity effects. The rationale is that this class of payments reward farmers for the provision of land use changes which fulfil agro-environmental criteria. Consequently, these payments reduce agricultural efficiency on the existing intensity of non-land factors below what would be the case in their absence. Intuitively, the reduction in agro-environmental payments results in positive productivity effects. In levels terms, the endogenous specification for changes in (non-land) factor augmenting technical change (FA) in agricultural sectors is given below (dropping the regional subscripts):

$$FA_{f,j} = \Psi \left[AE / \sum_{i \in NLAND} \sum_{k \in AGRIC} EVFA_{i,k} \right] \quad f \in NLAND \quad j \in AGRIC \quad (A.3)$$

2.3 Budget resources and rebates

From a modelling perspective, the MAGNET treatment of the CAP budget does not include an ‘own resources’ component. Thus, additional accounting and behavioural equations are inserted to complete the accounts of the CAP budget. At the outset, only the CAP component of the EU budget is modelled, where the CAP expenditure share of the EU budget share is falling (exogenously) over time employing financial framework projections data and own calculations (see scenario design). This CAP expenditure share is employed to estimate those resource costs from member states which correspond to the CAP component of the EU budget.

Thus, in line with EU law, 75% of tariff revenue is collected (the remaining 25% is assigned to administrative costs), whilst GTAP data on value added tax contributions is incomplete and consequently not employed in the CAP budget module. The difference between member state receipts (i.e., from pillar 1 and 2) and member state contributions from import tariffs multiplied by a CAP budget expenditure share, gives an aggregate EU resource cost. This shortfall is met by an EU-wide uniform GDP contribution rate by each member state. Thus, whilst the EU budget balances, at the member state level a region may be a net contributor (regional income < regional expenditure) or a net beneficiary (regional income > regional expenditure).

Further accounting equations are inserted to consider the UK rebate and subsequent corrections to other member states in response to this distorting mechanism. In accordance with the EU budgetary agreement, the UK recovers 66% of its net contribution (if in deficit). From 2014, Denmark also receives an annual lump sum payment. Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden only pay 25% of their GDP share contribution, whilst the latter two also receive an annual lump sum compensation payment. In the 2007 benchmark, the CAP budget only applies to the EU27 regions. Additional exogenous dummy variables are employed to incorporate Croatia both within the CAP budget own resources, the UK rebate and subsequent member state correction mechanisms (in line with 2013 MFF Agreement).

2.4 Aggregation, baseline and scenario design

For the purposes of this work, the GTAP data is aggregated to 21 tradables, of which 17 are agri-food related, and 28 countries or regions (Box 2). In terms of the regional disaggregation, those European countries which benefit from budget rebates are separated, (i.e. United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, and Denmark). As significant recipients of CAP funding, France, Spain and Italy are disaggregated, whilst Poland and

Romania represent large recipient new member states from the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, respectively. The remaining EU countries are aggregated into 'Other EU15' and 'Other EU12'. Lastly, as the 28th EU member state from July 1st, 2013, Croatia is treated separately. To examine third country impacts from CAP budget reform, non EU regions are grouped into either 'large players' on global agri-food markets or impoverished partners. All residual trade and output flows are captured within a Rest of the World (ROW) region.

In terms of the model closure, all policy variables (ad valorem taxes and tariffs) are assumed exogenous. An exogenous region specific technical change variable is shocked to meet targeted real GDP projections, whilst exogenous land productivity shocks are also contemplated. Additional output- and input-augmenting technical changes in relation to pillar 2 expenditures are treated endogenously. As in the standard GTAP model, all primary factor endowments (except land) are exogenous. Labour projections follow changes in regional population, whilst capital endowment shocks are equal to regional real GDP forecasts (i.e., fixed capital-output ratio). Data on GDP and population are sourced from USDA (2013) whilst land productivity data is from IMAGE (Bruinsma, 2003).

Box 2: GTAP data aggregation

- **Sectoral disaggregation** (21 GTAP sectors)

Wheat; Other grains; Oilseeds; Raw sugar; Vegetables, fruits and nuts; Other crops; Cattle and Sheep; Pigs and Poultry; Raw Milk; Wool; Red Meat; White Meat; Dairy; Sugar Processing; Other Food Processing; Beverages and Tobacco; Energy; Extraction; Manufacturing; Services.

- **Regional disaggregation** (28 GTAP regions)

United Kingdom; Netherlands; Sweden; Denmark; Germany; Austria; France; Italy; Spain; RoEU15; Poland; Romania; RoEU12; Croatia; EFTA; USA; Canada; Mercosur; Russian Federation; Eastern Partnership; China; India; Japan; Australia & New Zealand; Middle East & North Africa; Everything But Arms; Rest of South Saharan Africa; Rest of the World.

It is assumed that regional investment demand is allocated such that expected rates of return across regions are equated subject to exogenous projections of regional capital stocks. Moreover, the MAGNET model variant used here employs a recursive dynamic treatment of investment behaviour which ensures that investment distribution across regions is consistent with exogenous shocks in capital over time periods. The standard neoclassical macro closure ensures that withdrawals (i.e., savings and imports) equal injections (i.e., investment and exports) such that the balance of payments is zero. In this modelling work, this is modified to include additional injections and withdrawals arising from CAP budget receipts and payments to/from each member state.

The baseline (Box 3) is implemented over two time periods (2007-2013-2020) which coincide with the MFF and Croatia's accession to the EU. The baseline consists of an array of macro projections, envisaged trade policy shocks and CAP policy shocks. Within this time horizon, additional multilateral (i.e., Doha) and some bilateral (i.e., USA, Canada, Mercosur, Japan, etc.) trade shocks are not contemplated due to the uncertainty of a firm timetable for agreement. In addition, the baseline includes detailed pillar 1 and 2 expenditure shocks based on 2011 financial year's real expenditure (not ceiling limits) changes to specific member state EU agricultural sectors under the CAP Health Check reforms. Given the co-financed nature of pillar 2 support, additional nationally funded pillar 2 expenditure shocks are also implemented in the first period based on European Commission's CATS (DG agri) database.⁵

⁵ We use also CATS database (Clearance of Account Trail System) to recalibrate existing EU domestic support for the 2007 benchmark (Jensen, 2010), allowing a more comprehensive representation of pillar 2 accounts, and a re-representation of pillar 1 payments. CATS database collects detailed information submitted by the member states to the Commission about CAP individual payments, for auditing and statistical purposes.

It is assumed that both the co-finance rates and the allocation of pillar 2 expenditures within member states in the second period remain the same as in the first period.

In addition to all of these baseline shocks, a CAP budget scenario is explored in the second period. Both exogenous pillar 1 and 2 expenditure reductions and exogenous CAP expenditure share reductions of the EU budget are implemented assuming that the non-agricultural spending concepts remain unchanged. Budget cuts reflect the political agreement reached on June 27, 2013, with 13% and 18% cuts in pillar 1 and pillar 2 expenditures, respectively (European Council, 2013) in comparison to the 2020 baseline. These cuts in constant price have been approved by the European Parliament on November 19, 2013, and European Council on December 2, 2013.

It should be made clear that the analysis does not account for member states' possibilities to transfer up to 15% of their envelopes between pillars and any further redistribution of decoupled payments among and between them. Thus no changes in decoupling schemes (regional, historical, hybrid) are assumed for the next period. Also agreed ceiling are respected during the 2014-2020 period, i.e. no financial discipline mechanism is activated.

Box 3: Assumptions shaping the baseline scenario

| I. Baseline shocks (2007-2013 period) | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| I.a. Projections | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Skilled and unskilled labour, capital, natural resources, population, and real GDP |
| I.b Trade Policy Shocks | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non reciprocal EU tariff eliminations with the Everything But Arms countries |
| I.c Agricultural Policy (including 2008 Health Check reforms) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Phasing in of decoupled payments for 2004 and 2007 accession members • Removal of specific pillar 1 coupled support: arable crops, olives and hops to be fully decoupled from 2010; Seeds, beef and veal payments (except the suckler cow premium) decoupled by 2012, Protein crops, rice and nuts will be decoupled by 1 January 2012, Abolish the energy crop premium in 2010 • Re-coupling of support under the article 68 provision • Pillar 2 payments to the EU27 under the financial framework • Cumulative shocks for milk quotas rise of 1 per cent annually from 2009 to 2013 • Projected reduction in CAP expenditure share of the EU budget • Change in Swedish and Dutch rebates corresponding to CAP expenditure share of EU budget |
| II. Baseline shocks (2013-2020 period) | |
| II.a Projections | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Skilled and unskilled labour, capital, natural resources, population, and real GDP |
| II.b Trade Policy Shocks | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accession of Croatia to the EU, included adoption of common external tariff and trade policy • Non reciprocal EU tariff eliminations with MENA, Eastern Partnership and Sub-Saharan Africa • Removal of all export refunds |
| II.c Agricultural Policy | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CAP budget envelope remains the same as in 2013 as well as pillar 2 co-finance rates • Adoption of CAP by Croatia, including pillar 2 payments extended to Croatia • Phasing in of decoupled payments for Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia • Abolition of raw milk (2015) and raw sugar (2017) quotas • Projected reduction in CAP expenditure share of the EU budget • Change in Swedish, Dutch and Danish lump sum rebates corresponding to CAP expenditure share in EU budget. UK rebate is maintained. Croatia incorporates rebate mechanism |

3. Results

3.1 CAP budget scenario

In this section, estimates are presented in comparison with the baseline (status quo) scenario. The complexity of the CGE model framework renders a full discussion of all the model results as unwieldy. Thus, the focus is on the CAP budgetary and welfare effects, as

well as the impacts on trade, factors, output and prices. To understand the driving mechanism behind the results, a useful starting point is the representation of the revenues and costs corresponding to the CAP budget at the end of the baseline period 2007-2013 (top of Table 1). The first row shows CAP receipts of €52,340 million accruing to the EU member states. This total is split between pillars 1 and 2 amounting to €41,114 million and €11,222 million, respectively. Of the former, decoupled payments total €38,435 million and remaining coupled payments sum to €2,684 million. These costs are met by member state CAP budget contributions in the form of tariff revenues and GDP, which are scaled according to the CAP share of the EU budget. The rebate row accounts for the net impacts on EU members of both the UK rebate and retroactive correction mechanisms to other member states. The net position shows that most of the EU15 is a net contributor to the CAP budget, whilst the newer member states are net beneficiaries. This underlies the redistributive nature of the CAP. Although France is a large recipient of CAP budget funding, it does not receive special dispensation such that it remains a net contributor.

The Austrian rebate (in the form of reduced GDP contributions), on the other hand, renders this country as a small net beneficiary from the CAP. As expected, Spain and the RoEU15 (including Greece and Portugal) are net beneficiary Member States from CAP budgetary funding. As a percentage of GDP the largest contributors are Germany and the Netherlands (0.18% and 0.15% respectively) despite the fact that both receive partial rebates. Moreover, even with a sizeable rebate, the UK is still a net contributor to the CAP portion of the EU budget (-€1,733 million or 0.08% GDP). The newer member states typically receive net support which amounts to between 0.6 to 0.8% of GDP.

On the basis of these estimates, a CAP budget cut would benefit (detriment) net contributors (net beneficiaries) in the form of a taxpayer saving (loss). In the model, income changes feedback to each economy as an increase (decrease) in expenditure and savings. This effect is demonstrated in the lower part of Table 1.

3.2 Impacts on welfare

As an initial observation, results of CAP budget decrease are consistent in terms of the comparative magnitudes across Member States and the signs of the estimates. Notice that the expected EU CAP budget cut implies relatively small adjustment costs with the largest gainer (loser) being Germany (Poland) with an monetary gain (loss) of €589 million (-€356 million).

Decomposition of the real income (equivalent variation (EV)) changes for a selection of regions is presented in Table 2. Measured in per capita income terms, the impacts are small owing to the localised nature of the incremental shocks (i.e., restricted to EU agriculture). In the EU, the largest per capita real income gains accrue to the net contributors, the Netherlands and Germany. This is consistent with the CAP budget cost as a percentage of GDP statistic reported in Table 1. Under a similar line of reasoning, the biggest per capita income losers are the new member states, especially Romania (-0.2%). The EV results suggest that the EU28 does not undergo a zero sum gain owing to the larger EV losses accruing to the 'new' EU member states (EUN13) vis-à-vis the EV gains of the 'old' EU member states (EU15). This result is driven by the endowment and technology effects (see below).

Decomposing EV into money metric measures within the EU, the dominating driver is the CAP budget effect (CAP), resulting in EV gains for the UK, the Netherlands, Germany and France and concomitant losses in Spain, Poland and Romania. Elsewhere, EU members generally realise allocative efficiency (Alloc) gains due to the contraction in agricultural activities; increased imports of tariffed manufactured goods; and output rises in domestic services sectors.

Table 1: The CAP Budget in 2013 and 2020 (€millions, 2007 prices)

| CAP budget in 2013 | UK | NL | SE | DK | DE | AT | FR | IT | ES | Rof15 | PL | RO | Rof12 | HR | EU28 |
|--------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|------|-------|------|------|-------|------|-------|
| 1. CAP receipts | 3671 | 1228 | 930 | 964 | 6410 | 1242 | 8390 | 5084 | 6096 | 6708 | 4359 | 1816 | 5443 | 0 | 52340 |
| Pillar I: decoupled support | 3013 | 1115 | 654 | 888 | 5177 | 622 | 6888 | 3752 | 4352 | 4633 | 2744 | 1018 | 3579 | 0 | 38435 |
| Pillar I: coupled support | 62 | 43 | 10 | 21 | 88 | 80 | 728 | 250 | 761 | 510 | 27 | 43 | 61 | 0 | 2684 |
| Pillar 2: LFAs | 54 | 1 | 41 | 1 | 157 | 126 | 292 | 105 | 72 | 419 | 243 | 109 | 289 | 0 | 1909 |
| Pillar 2: agri-environmental | 348 | 22 | 149 | 27 | 364 | 272 | 218 | 341 | 392 | 510 | 241 | 112 | 524 | 0 | 3521 |
| Pillar 2: physical capital | 73 | 12 | 26 | 5 | 288 | 56 | 120 | 413 | 303 | 340 | 278 | 135 | 475 | 0 | 2526 |
| Pillar 2: human capital | 20 | 1 | 12 | 8 | 4 | 15 | 71 | 103 | 90 | 157 | 403 | 53 | 105 | 0 | 1044 |
| Pillar 2: other investment | 96 | 34 | 37 | 14 | 332 | 70 | 73 | 123 | 127 | 138 | 423 | 346 | 409 | 0 | 2222 |
| 2. CAP contribution | 8458 | 2537 | 1487 | 953 | 10822 | 1152 | 7708 | 5933 | 4055 | 4925 | 1635 | 605 | 2070 | 0 | 52340 |
| 3. Rebates | 3054 | 431 | 89 | -96 | -325 | -37 | -932 | -697 | -471 | -532 | -190 | -70 | -224 | 0 | 0 |
| 4. Net position | -1733 | -878 | -468 | -85 | -4737 | 53 | -250 | -1546 | 1571 | 1251 | 2534 | 1141 | 3149 | 0 | 0 |
| % of GDP | -0.08 | -0.15 | -0.12 | -0.04 | -0.18 | 0.02 | -0.01 | -0.10 | 0.16 | 0.11 | 0.63 | 0.76 | 0.66 | 0.00 | |
| CAP budget cut vs. baseline in 2020 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. CAP receipts | -507 | -163 | -134 | -128 | -891 | -188 | -1129 | -716 | -842 | -950 | -646 | -253 | -574 | -65 | -7187 |
| 2. CAP contribution | -1199 | -336 | -204 | -132 | -1439 | -157 | -1050 | -760 | -539 | -674 | -260 | -96 | -312 | -28 | -7187 |
| 3. Rebates | -445 | -36 | -6 | 6 | 40 | 5 | 128 | 90 | 64 | 75 | 31 | 11 | 35 | 3 | 0 |
| 4. Net position | 246 | 137 | 64 | 10 | 589 | -26 | 49 | 135 | -239 | -202 | -356 | -146 | -228 | -33 | 0 |

Note: see body of the text for aggregate specification (*section 2*). Source: MAGNET results

Table 2: Decomposition of effects on real income (equivalent variation) vs. baseline in 2020 (€millions, 2007 prices)

| | UK | NL | DE | FR | ES | PL | RO | EU15 | EU13 | EFTA | USA | MERC | AUSNZ | CHN | IND | JAP | LDC |
|-----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| EV | 299 | 182 | 593 | 14 | -346 | -723 | -321 | 482 | -1525 | -11 | 103 | 141 | 26 | -30 | -4 | -8 | 54 |
| <i>per cap U (%)</i> | <i>0.01</i> | <i>0.03</i> | <i>0.02</i> | <i>0.00</i> | <i>-0.03</i> | <i>-0.15</i> | <i>-0.20</i> | <i>0.00</i> | <i>-0.12</i> | <i>0.00</i> | <i>0.00</i> | <i>0.01</i> | <i>0.00</i> | <i>0.00</i> | <i>0.00</i> | <i>0.00</i> | <i>0.00</i> |
| Decomposition: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Alloc | 19 | 14 | 91 | 32 | -11 | -39 | -34 | 241 | -63 | -9 | 1 | 23 | 2 | -11 | 36 | -3 | 6 |
| ToT | 24 | 41 | 53 | 20 | -39 | -77 | -95 | 27 | -218 | -5 | 72 | 89 | 19 | -19 | -16 | -6 | 27 |
| Endw | 3 | -7 | -89 | -61 | -12 | -65 | -13 | -323 | -149 | 3 | 16 | 17 | 1 | -25 | -22 | 1 | 8 |
| Tech | 4 | -4 | -42 | -28 | -38 | -194 | -42 | -213 | -352 | 0 | 8 | 7 | 2 | 23 | -3 | 0 | 8 |
| Pop | 6 | 3 | -4 | 1 | -8 | 4 | 3 | -4 | 11 | 0 | 6 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 4 |
| CAP | 243 | 135 | 585 | 49 | -238 | -353 | -141 | 754 | -753 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Note: see body of the text for acronyms' specification (*section 3*). Source: MAGNET results

In Spain, Poland and Romania, although subsidised agricultural activity contracts (i.e., allocative efficiency gain), manufacturing imports and domestic services output also fall relative to the baseline resulting in net allocative efficiency falls. As the unit price ratio of exchange between exports and imports, the terms of trade (ToT) impact within the EU is the net result of (i) increasing agri-food prices from partial elimination of agricultural support and (ii) falls in the real exchange rate (i.e., factor prices). The endowment effect (Endw) measures incremental real income impacts through changes in factor usage. This value is reported as negative within the EU due to the idling of agricultural land under the CAP budget cuts and is an explanatory factor for the fall in EU28 EV.

The technology measure (Tech) captures the money metric equivalent from improvements in output or input augmenting technical change. Under the budget cuts, reductions in pillar 2 investments in human and physical capital in agriculture; as well as other regional payments; generate further productivity losses in agricultural and (to a lesser extent) non-agricultural sectors. This negative effect is particularly pronounced in Poland. In contrast, the UK and Austria witness small positive technological EV gains at the margin with agricultural support reductions. This is because approximately 60 per cent of UK and Austrian pillar 2 expenditure (including co-financed support) fund agri-environmental extensification measures i.e. imply a negative land productivity effect. Outside the EU, per capita real income impacts are negligible due to the largely non-distortionary nature of EU agricultural policy. Notwithstanding, the results clearly show that agricultural net exporters (e.g., USA, MERC, AUSNZ) gain, with concurrent reductions in net importing regions (EFTA, China, India, Japan). This reflects the slight increase in agricultural export prices which has a beneficial (detrimental) ToT impact for agricultural net exporters (importers).

3.3 Trade impacts

In policy terms, for net CAP budget contributors, real income rises are accompanied by rises in the marginal propensity to import, resulting in trade balance deteriorations. The opposite effect applies in the case of the net beneficiary EU Member States with falling EV under the budget cuts. The EU28 agriculture and food trade balances deteriorate -€410 million and -€260 million, respectively. As expected, non-EU28 agri-food trade balances undergo small improvements in the agricultural net exporting regions (e.g., USA, MERC & AUSNZ). It is worth noting, however, that since most CAP budget support is decoupled, it is assumed production neutral such that the distortive impacts on trade and world prices are minimal.

Under the current political agreement for CAP budget reform, the EU15 trade balance deteriorates by -€681 million, whilst the EUN13 trade balance improves €1,528 million. Since the EV loss for the EUN13 exceeds the EU15 EV gain, the EU28 trade balance consequently improves €847 million. Under the general closed system of global accounting equations, an improved EU28 net trade balance is accompanied by a corresponding (minor) deterioration in non-EU region trade balances. Across the EU's non agri-food sectors, the trend follows that of the macro trade balance. Thus, in the EU15, with a rising propensity to import (and higher income elasticities for non-food products), the trade balances deteriorate in manufacturing and services by -€278 million and -€12 million, respectively. In the EUN13, the reverse occurs leading to corresponding estimates of €1,501 million and €269 million.

3.4 Impacts on factors and product markets

In Table 3 are shown output and price impacts in selected Member States.⁶ As expected the rise in agricultural market prices, which is driven in large part by marginal cost increases in

⁶ Corresponding simulation estimates in the non-EU regions are not shown since the results are negligible.

land rents paid by the farmer (row 2, Table 3), is positively related to the magnitude of the CAP support cuts.⁷

Table 3: Market price and output effect vs. baseline in 2020 (% changes)

| | Market price effect | | | | | Output effects | | | | |
|--------------------------|---------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | UK | DE | FR | PL | EU28 | UK | DE | FR | PL | EU28 |
| Land (owner) | -5.80 | -3.76 | -4.97 | -3.15 | -4.06 | -0.07 | -0.82 | -0.54 | -0.45 | -0.51 |
| Land (farmer) | 2.35 | 6.91 | 4.98 | 2.81 | 4.34 | -0.07 | -0.82 | -0.54 | -0.45 | -0.51 |
| Wheat | 0.17 | 0.33 | 0.24 | 1.01 | 0.29 | 0.06 | -0.24 | -0.18 | -1.42 | -0.29 |
| Oil grains | 0.08 | 0.38 | 0.26 | 1.45 | 0.46 | 0.22 | -0.18 | -0.07 | -0.87 | -0.24 |
| Oil seeds | 0.20 | 0.39 | 0.35 | 1.02 | 0.39 | 0.00 | -0.23 | -0.18 | -1.41 | -0.29 |
| Raw sugar | 0.01 | 0.54 | 0.45 | 3.08 | 0.56 | 0.08 | -0.12 | -0.07 | -0.10 | -0.04 |
| Vegetables, fruits, nuts | 0.10 | 0.23 | 0.21 | 1.13 | 0.30 | 0.06 | -0.09 | -0.15 | -1.43 | -0.17 |
| Cattle, sheep and goats | 0.23 | 0.31 | 0.97 | 1.22 | 0.72 | 0.12 | -0.01 | -0.35 | -0.98 | -0.26 |
| Pigs and poultry | 0.11 | 0.33 | 0.28 | 1.24 | 0.44 | 0.14 | -0.21 | -0.11 | -1.04 | -0.25 |
| Raw milk | 0.01 | 0.60 | 0.37 | 2.54 | 0.59 | 0.11 | -0.26 | -0.03 | -0.34 | -0.14 |
| AGRICULTURE | 0.12 | 0.38 | 0.36 | 1.32 | 0.43 | 0.12 | -0.21 | -0.15 | -1.06 | -0.22 |
| Red meat | 0.11 | 0.17 | 0.32 | 0.27 | 0.24 | 0.00 | -0.11 | -0.39 | -0.53 | -0.32 |
| White meat | 0.08 | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.46 | 0.15 | 0.18 | -0.28 | -0.12 | -0.98 | -0.22 |
| Dairy | 0.01 | 0.19 | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.11 | 0.12 | -0.31 | -0.03 | -0.11 | -0.11 |
| Sugar | -0.01 | 0.09 | 0.04 | -0.01 | 0.01 | 0.09 | -0.16 | -0.08 | -0.08 | -0.04 |
| Vegetable oils and fats | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.16 | -0.12 | -0.10 | 0.06 | -0.32 | -0.45 | 0.36 | -0.07 |
| FOOD | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.15 | 0.07 | 0.03 | -0.10 | -0.05 | -0.36 | -0.08 |
| NAT. ENERGY | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.06 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.00 |
| MANUFACTURING | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.09 | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.02 | 0.00 | 0.17 | 0.01 |
| SERVICES | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.12 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.07 | 0.00 |

Note: Output effects on land do not differentiate owner and farmer. Source: MAGNET results

Rising agricultural prices are transmitted to downstream processors, whose prices are also positively related to the size of support cuts. Given this loss of competitiveness, agriculture and food production falls in the EU, although the relative impact is less than 1% for the EU28. On the one hand, this is because most agricultural support is production neutral. Indeed, even in those Member States (e.g., France, Spain) which employ recoupling policies under the auspices of article 68, decoupled support still constitutes the majority of pillar 1 (90% and 85%, respectively). Moreover, given the medium run modelling assumption regarding the restricted movement of capital and labour to, and from agriculture, as well as the restrictions on land use changes, agricultural supply responsiveness is expected to be inelastic.⁸ The larger price rises and production falls in Polish agriculture reflect the observation above regarding the loss of relatively greater productivity inducing pillar 2 investment payments. Applying a similar logic, UK agricultural activity increases slightly from CAP budget cuts since the reduction in its relatively large agri-environmental payments implies that UK agriculture becomes less extensive.

In the EU28 land market, falls in aggregate demand result in (marginal) land abandonment of about -0.5%. Due to the inelastic nature of the land supply curves, EU28 landowner rents (row 1, Table 3) fall more sharply, averaging -4%. In policy terms, this represents the lost capitalisation of land rents from reductions in the single farm payment.

⁷ Decoupled payments (i.e., land subsidy) are calibrated to the land factor and therefore drive a wedge between the rent that the landowner receives (who may, or may not be the farmer) and the lower rental price of land paid by the user (i.e., farmer). Removing *partially* this support (or land subsidy) implies that the seller's rental rate falls relative to the users rental rate – or in other words, there is a lost capitalization of the land rental price to the landowner.

⁸ Compared with the standard GTAP model, in this paper agricultural labour (mainly unskilled) and capital accept larger wage or rent falls before moving to other sectors

In the services sector, there is a greater intensity of ‘skilled labour’ so it is less affected by sectorally trapped agricultural unskilled labour. Moreover, the import dependency ratio for services within the EU is considerably below that for manufacturing (i.e., less import competition). Thus, in those Member States where real income improves from CAP budget cuts (e.g., UK, Germany, France), services output rises slightly due to real income induced domestic demand increases. Using a similar logic, in Member States where real income falls (e.g., Poland), services output also contracts. In the UK, since the services industry is relatively prominent as a proportion of GDP, real income rises, leading to real growth improvement and concomitant real exchange rate rises in labour and capital factors (not shown).

4. Concluding remarks

This paper presents methodological improvement of MAGNET, a sophisticated agricultural variant of the well-known GTAP computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for representing the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Using original data on EU domestic support, it examines the potential trade and welfare implications arising from a reform to the CAP budget. A main finding is that the cuts in the CAP budget have relatively limited impacts on third countries, or indeed EU agricultural output. To a large extent, this is to be expected owing to the modelling representation of the decoupled payments. In the literature, there are a number of possible channels coupling farmer production decisions to decoupled payments (Moro and Sckokai, 2013). Owing to the degree of empirical uncertainty regarding the appropriate ‘coupling factor’, this analysis only contemplates production neutral behaviour. Consequently, the main production effects arise from changes in pillar 2 expenditures and their associated productivity effects in EU Member States. Undertaking sensitivity analysis with alternative allocation of support to factors would be needed.

As a further remark, the complex system of intra-community transfers via the budget mechanism implies that policy induced changes to CAP support have, at the margin, real income and trade balance implications. Compared to the aforementioned production impacts these income induced effects have a relatively greater outcome on resource reallocations across all sectors within the EU and, to a lesser extent, third country trade effects. Indeed EU budget net beneficiaries (e.g., Poland, EUN13 as an aggregate) will experience EV losses, whereas net contributors will benefit (e.g., Germany, EU15 as an aggregate).

Notwithstanding, as is the case in all empirical studies, a number of caveats should be observed. Firstly, no assumption is made regarding how, for example, potential taxpayer savings (losses) from CAP budget reductions are allocated within national economies. In the current analysis, this is manifested as a rise (fall) in savings and domestic demand. Other possibilities that could be explored, however, are the diversion of funds to research and development activities, or perhaps as a subsidy to labour. Alternative assumptions will clearly have different implications on economic performance. Secondly, the elasticity between pillar 2 expenditure changes and productivity changes is currently subject to qualitative expectation. Although further literature is emerging (Mary, 2013), additional research is necessary.

Related to this is the potential reverse ‘crowding out effect’ from withdrawal of EU pillar 2 investments. In other words, to what extent could substitute private investment mitigate lost productivity reductions, particularly those observed in the newer member states. Finally, the EU28 losses reported here are biased by the interpretation of the endowment effect. The productivity loss from removal of more marginal land is overstated since it is currently assumed that all land units have equal productivity. Additionally, whilst agricultural land which falls out of production registers as a loss to the economy, there is no mitigating mechanism for its possible uptake in non-agricultural uses.

5. References

- Boulanger, P. (2011). Quelle réforme pour la Politique agricole commune et le budget européen? *Politique étrangère* 76(2): 343-358.
- Bruinsma, J. (2003). World agriculture: towards 2015/2030: an FAO perspective. Earthscan and FAO, Rome. <http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/Y4252E/y4252e00.htm#TopOfPage>
- European Council, 2013. Conclusions (Multiannual Financial Framework), EUCO 37/13, 28.02.2013, Brussels.
- Hertel, T.W. (ed.) (1997). *Global Trade Analysis: Modeling and Applications*. Cambridge University Press.
- Evenson, R.E. (2001). Economic Impacts of Agricultural Research and Extension. In Gardner, B.L. and Rauser, G. (eds), *Handbook of Agricultural Economics*, Vol 1A, New York, North Holland: 574-628.
- Gittleman, M., ten Raab, T. and Wolff, E.N. (2006). The vintage effect in TFP-growth: An analysis of the age structure of capital. *Structural Change and Economic Dynamics* 17: 306-328.
- Jensen, H.G. (2010). Chapter 10.G: EU Domestic Support Data for GTAP 7.1 Data Base. In Narayanan, B.G. and Walmsley, T.L (eds) (2008) *Global Trade, Assistance, and Production: The GTAP 7 Data Base*, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University. <https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/5000.pdf>
- Le Cacheux, J. (2005). European Budget: the poisonous budget rebate debate. *Studies & Research n°41*, Notre Europe, Paris. <http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/etud41-n.pdf?pdf=ok>
- Mary, S. (2013). Assessing the Impacts of Pillar 1 and 2 Subsidies on TFP in French Crop Farms. *Journal of Agricultural Economics* 64(1): 133-144.
- M'barek, R., Britz, W., Burrell, A. and Delincé, J. (2012). An integrated Modelling Platform for Agro-economic Commodity and Policy Analysis (iMAP) – a look back and the way forward. JRC Scientific and Policy Report, EUR 25267, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. <http://ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/JRC69667.pdf>
- Moro, D. and Sckokai, P. (2013). The impact of decoupled payments on farm choices: Conceptual and methodological challenges. *Food Policy* 41 (August): 28–38.
- Nowicki, P., Goba, V., Knierim, A., van Meijl, H., Banse, M., Delbaere, B., Helming, J., Hunke, P., Jansson, K., Jansson, T., Jones-Walters, L., Mikos, V., Sattler, C., Schlaefke, N., Terluin, I. and Verhoog, D. (2009). Scenar 2020-II – Update of Analysis of Prospects in the Scenar 2020 Study – Contract No. 30-CE-0200286/00-21. European Commission, Directorate-General Agriculture and Rural Development, Brussels. http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/analysis/external/scenar2020ii/report_en.pdf
- Psaltopoulos, D., Phimister, E., Ratering, T., Roberts, D., Skuras, D., Bednarikova, Z., Espinosa, M., Gomez y Paloma, S., Mary, S., Nohel, F. and Santini, F. (2012). Ex-ante Spatial Policy Impact Analysis of the Rural Development policy in European Rural Areas (RURAL ECMOD). JRC Scientific and Policy Report, EUR 25238, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. <http://ftp.jrc.es/pub/EURdoc/JRC68412.pdf>
- Urban, K., Jensen, H.G. and Brockmeier, M. (2012). How Decoupled is the SFP in GTAP: Using a Sensitivity Analysis to Uncover the Degree of Coupling. Paper prepared for presentation at the 15th annual GTAP conference, Geneva, June 27-29. <https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/6014.pdf>
- USDA (2013). International Macroeconomic Dataset. Economic Research Service, USDA. accessed on 21.06.2013 <http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products.aspx>
- Wolff, E.N. (1996). The productivity slowdown: the culprit at last? *American Economic Review* 86 (5) December: 1239-1252.
- Woltjer, G. and Kuiper, M. (eds.), 2013. The MAGNET model, Module description. February, LEI, The Hague.