

Case Study of Unemployment Insurance Reform in North Carolina

Marcus Hagedorn*

Fatih Karahan†

Iouri Manovskii‡

Kurt Mitman§

January 15, 2013

Abstract

In July 1, 2013 unemployed workers in North Carolina lost access to all federally financed unemployment benefit extensions. In this document we collect and describe available evidence on the performance of the labor market in North Carolina following this reform.

*University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Box 1095 Blindern, 0317 Oslo, Norway.

Email: marcus.hagedorn07@gmail.com

†Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 33 Liberty Street, New York, NY 10045.

Email: fatih.karahan@ny.frb.org

‡University of Pennsylvania, Department of Economics, 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia PA 19104. Email: manovski@econ.upenn.edu.

§University of Pennsylvania, Department of Economics, 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia PA 19104. Email: mitmanke@econ.upenn.edu.

1 Introduction

In February 2013, faced with the fifth-highest unemployment rate in the US and an accumulated unemployment insurance system debt to the federal government of over \$2 billion, North Carolina's legislature decided to reform its unemployment insurance system. It reduced the maximum benefit payout and the number of weeks residents can receive unemployment benefits. This reform violated the federal law, under which states whose residents receive federally-financed unemployment compensation after exhausting their state benefits are not allowed to reduce the benefit amount. As a consequence, on July 1, 2013 unemployed residents of North Carolina lost access to all (federally financed) unemployment benefit extensions.

This change attracted enormous attention in the press and from the academic and policy community because it might be helpful for assessing the consequences of the decision to not extend federal Emergency Unemployment Compensation program starting in January 2014. In this Note we describe the available evidence in the hope of informing this debate and helping to provide a more complete picture. A file with all the data described here is available on the authors' websites.

It is very important to recognize before proceeding any further, that one cannot derive definitive conclusions about the effects of unemployment benefit programs on the labor market from the analysis of the experience of a single state. Decisions of even a single large employer, which may be unrelated to the unemployment insurance reform, may have an impact on the statistics. It is also hard to isolate the impact of the reform from the impact of weather, other policy changes, changes in interstate migration decisions, changes in the determinants of the decisions to enter the labor force or retire, etc. Moreover, only a few months of data are available and sample sizes available in most data sets are too small to yield reliable predictions of month to month changes in variables such as employment, unemployment, etc. So the evidence provided below should be interpreted with extreme caution.

We provide evidence from three data sources containing relevant information.

1. Current Population Survey, CPS, also known as the Household Survey.
2. Current Employment Statistics, CES, also known as Establishment Survey.
3. Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) program.

It is important to assess the evidence in all these sources of data as they are known to diverge occasionally¹ and not independently of the business cycle conditions². Moreover, the recent data from the latter two sources is subject to future revisions, which are occasionally substantial.

¹See, e.g., Bowler and Merisi (2006), Abraham, Haltiwanger, Snadusky, and Spletzer (2009).

²See, e.g., Hall (2008), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2011).

2 Labor Force Statistics from the Household Survey (CPS)

Table 1: Labor Force Statistics from the Household Survey (CPS)

Date:	Unemp. Rate	Unemp. Level	Employment Level	Labor Force Level	Employment Polpulation Ratio	Labor Force Participation Rate
2012 11	10.1	474146	4216628	4690774	67.5	75.1
2012 12	10.3	464811	4062489	4527299	65.1	72.5
2013 01	11.2	497446	3934454	4431899	63.3	71.3
2013 02	9.7	419129	3921577	4340706	62.2	68.8
2013 03	9.6	420224	3948668	4368892	63.5	70.2
2013 04	9.3	405394	3957020	4362414	63.2	69.6
2013 05	9.2	405938	4020535	4426473	64.7	71.2
2013 06	8.1	361546	4098208	4459755	65.3	71.0
2013 07	8.1	359121	4085328	4444448	65.4	71.1
2013 08	7.3	327122	4150608	4477730	66.2	71.4
2013 09	7.8	349007	4143393	4492401	66.4	72.0
2013 10	7.9	365992	4259007	4624999	67.8	73.6
2013 11	7.1	328090	4284697	4612787	67.6	72.7
<i>Change from June 2013 to November 2013</i>						
	-1.0	-33457	186489	153032	2.3	1.7

Note - Authors' calculations from the Monthly Current Population Survey. Sample restricted to those aged 16-65. Data are seasonally adjusted with an X-12 ARIMA model.

Observations. Table 1 indicates that the implementation of the reforms was followed by:

1. A substantial decline in the number of unemployed workers and in the unemployment rate.
2. A substantial increase in the employment level and in the share of population that is employed.
3. A strong increase in the labor force (sum of employment and unemployment) and in the fraction of workers working or looking for work in the total population.

To better interpret these findings, in Figures 1 through 4 we plot the key series for a longer time period and also for two states bordering North Carolina: South Carolina and Virginia. This helps isolate the effect of the reform from other potentially confounding factors, such as shocks to a region's economy. The evidence in the figures suggests that North Carolina stands out among its neighbors in the improvement in its labor market performance since its unemployment insurance system was reformed.




Figure 1: Unemployment Rate from Household Survey (CPS).




Figure 2: Employment from Household Survey (CPS).




Figure 3: Employment to Population Ratio from Household Survey (CPS).




Figure 4: Labor Force Participation Rate from Household Survey (CPS).

3 Labor Force Statistics from the Establishment Survey (CES)

Table 2: Nonfarm Payroll Employment from the Establishment Survey (CES)
(Thousands of Employees)

Date:	Total	Total Private	Goods Producing	Service Providing	Service Providing Private	Government
2012 11	4,027.3	3,310.6	617.7	3,409.6	2,692.9	716.7
2012 12	4,032.3	3,317.6	618.5	3,413.8	2,699.1	714.7
2013 01	4,046.4	3,330.8	623.9	3,422.5	2,706.9	715.6
2013 02	4,048.9	3,332.1	623.6	3,425.3	2,708.5	716.8
2013 03	4,048.5	3,332.7	618.4	3,430.1	2,714.3	715.8
2013 04	4,047.8	3,331.4	616.5	3,431.3	2,714.9	716.4
2013 05	4,042.7	3,328.2	613.7	3,429.0	2,714.5	714.5
2013 06	4,045.4	3,331.5	616.2	3,429.2	2,715.3	713.9
2013 07	4,054.0	3,344.2	617.7	3,436.3	2,726.5	709.8
2013 08	4,056.9	3,352.7	616.5	3,440.4	2,736.2	704.2
2013 09	4,064.8	3,355.9	614.9	3,449.9	2,741.0	708.9
2013 10	4,090.6	3,375.3	617.0	3,473.6	2,758.3	715.3
2013 11	4,084.1	3,370.3	615.3	3,468.8	2,755.0	713.8
	<i>Change from June 2013 to November 2013</i>					
	38.7	38.8	-0.9	39.6	39.7	-0.1

Observations.

1. Evidence from the establishment survey confirms a substantial increase in employment in North Carolina following the unemployment insurance reform.
2. The increase in payroll employment reported by the sample of North Carolina employers is smaller than the increase in employment reported by workers in the household survey.
3. The increase in employment driven by the private service sector.
4. A comparison of the growth in employment between North Carolina and the adjacent states in Figure 5 reveals a similar growth in the post-reform period between the two Carolinas, which is much faster growth than in Virginia.
5. Results in Table 3 reveal a mild tendency toward higher weekly hours post reform and little change in wages and earnings.




Figure 5: Nonfarm Payroll Employment from the Establishment Survey (CES).

Table 3: Nonfarm Private Payroll Hours and Earnings from the Establishment Survey (CES)
(Not Seasonally Adjusted)

Date:	Average Weekly Hours	Average Hourly Earnings	Average Weekly Earnings
2012 11	34.5	21.77	751.07
2012 12	34.8	22.10	769.08
2013 01	34.0	21.92	745.28
2013 02	34.4	21.84	751.30
2013 03	34.5	21.75	750.38
2013 04	34.4	21.64	744.42
2013 05	34.3	21.55	739.17
2013 06	34.9	21.68	756.63
2013 07	34.2	21.53	736.33
2013 08	34.6	21.53	744.94
2013 09	35.0	21.71	759.85
2013 10	34.4	21.57	742.01
2013 11	34.7	21.71	753.34

Change from June 2013 to November 2013

-0.2 0.03 -3.9

Note - Series id: SMU37000000500000002, SMU37000000500000003, SMU37000000500000011.

4 Labor Force Statistics from the BLS LAUS program.

Table 4: Labor Force Statistics from the BLS LAUS program.

Date:	Unemployment Rate	Unemployment Level	Employment Level	Labor Force Level
2012 11	9.4	444702	4308420	4753122
2012 12	9.4	447033	4320201	4767234
2013 01	9.5	453425	4322922	4776347
2013 02	9.4	446828	4318025	4764853
2013 03	9.2	434546	4307301	4741847
2013 04	8.9	419016	4302496	4721512
2013 05	8.8	416171	4303455	4719626
2013 06	8.8	416314	4292251	4708565
2013 07	8.9	418228	4278652	4696880
2013 08	8.7	409178	4275100	4684278
2013 09	8.3	390298	4287928	4678226
2013 10	8.0	371749	4294465	4666214
2013 11	7.4	343611	4314502	4658113
		<i>Change from June 2013 to November 2013</i>		
	-1.4	-72703	22251	-50452

Note - Series id: LASST37000003, LASST37000004, LASST37000005, LASST37000006.

Observations.

1. Large decline in unemployment following the implementation of the reform. The decline is larger than is found in the household survey. Over longer periods, the dynamics of unemployment in LAUS is comparable to that observed in the household survey.³
2. The increase in employment is sizable but smaller in magnitude than is observed in either household or establishment surveys.
3. LAUS program estimates a large decline in the labor force following the reform. This stands in sharp contrast to the direct observations in the household survey. We could not establish the reasons for this discrepancy based on our conversations with the BLS.
4. Figures 6 through 9 indicate that in LAUS data trends in employment, unemployment, and labor force are fairly similar between North and South Carolinas. Both states handily dominate Virginia with respect to growth of employment and decline in unemployment. Labor force declined only marginally in Virginia.

³Unemployment in LAUS data is less volatile as it is smoothed using an econometric model. Publicly available detailed description of the procedure can be found in "Local Area Unemployment Statistics Program Manual," U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, March 13, 2003.




Figure 6: Unemployment Rate in BLS LAUS Data.




Figure 7: Unemployment in BLS LAUS Data.




Figure 8: Employment in BLS LAUS Data.




Figure 9: Labor Force in BLS LAUS Data.

5 Some Tentative Conclusions

The weight of the evidence reported here seems to point to several conclusions. As discussed in the Introduction, these have to be interpreted with caution as preliminary data describing a few months' experience of a single state is not sufficient to draw scientifically definitive conclusions.

1. Claim in the economic policy publications:⁴

...positive effects on aggregate demand of UI and EUC are ... the key channel through which EUC can aid economic growth and the recovery.

The direct effect of cutting off the inflow of federally financed benefits is a sizable decline in disposable income for North Carolina. Indeed, the payments to unemployed workers financed by the federal government declined by hundreds of millions of dollars. North Carolinians are still on the hook for servicing the federal debt. In case of an **inadequate level of aggregate demand**, one might expect this to lead to a decline in employment. Yet, the **evidence** to date is **not supportive** of this idea and instead appears to support the findings in Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, and Mitman (2013) and Mitman and Rabinovich (2013) that the negative effects of unemployment benefit extensions on job creation decisions of employers dominate any potential stimulative effect that some ascribe to such policies.

The evidence on the relative unimportance on the stimulus to aggregate demand in North Carolina becomes even more striking when the sectoral composition of post-reform employment growth is considered. One would expect a decline in the aggregate demand in North Carolina to affect most severely the non-tradeable service sector within the state. In contrast, all of the employment growth in North Carolina was in services, according to the CES.

2. Claim in the popular press:⁵

Cutting unemployment insurance apparently hasn't encouraged the unemployed to look harder for work: It has caused them to drop out of the labor force altogether. To get unemployment insurance, you have to actively search for work and prove that you're doing so. The drop in the labor force suggests that this incentive was effective. Without it, more people just give up.

Such assertions are not grounded in economic theory and are not supported by available empirical evidence. If unemployed were actually searching and that search was productive,

⁴"The Economic Benefits of Extending Unemployment Insurance," report by the Council of Economic Advisers and the Department of Labor, December 2013.

⁵Evan Soltas, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-17/north-carolina-shows-how-to-crush-the-unemployed.html>

stopping their search must have led to a *decline* in employment, at least relative to the other states. On the contrary, **employment has risen** according to all available sources of data. Moreover, the size of the labor force declined in South Carolina, just as it did in LAUS data for North Carolina. At the minimum, this suggests that at least a sizable part of the decline in the labor force observed in LAUS data for North Carolina might not be related to the reform of the unemployment insurance system. Finally, the decline in the labor force in North Carolina apparent in the current release of BLS LAUS data (subject to future revisions) is in sharp contrast to the *increase* in the labor force in North Carolina measured directly in the household survey.

Are the **new jobs** created in NC somehow **inferior**? We see no evidence for that in the data on hours, employment and wages.

Bibliography

- ABRAHAM, K. G., J. C. HALTIWANGER, K. SNADUSKY, AND J. SPLETZER (2009): “Exploring Differences in Employment between Household and Establishment Data,” Working Paper 14805, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- BOWLER, M., AND T. L. MERISI (2006): “Understanding the Employment Measures from the CPS and CES Survey,” *Monthly Labor Review*, 129(2), 23–38.
- HAGEDORN, M., F. KARAHAN, I. MANOVSKII, AND K. MITMAN (2013): “Unemployment Benefits and Unemployment in the Great Recession: The Role of Macro Effects,” NBER Working Paper 19499.
- HAGEDORN, M., AND I. MANOVSKII (2011): “Productivity and the Labor Market: Co-Movement over the Business Cycle,” *International Economic Review*, *Forthcoming*.
- HALL, R. (2008): “Cyclical Movements along the Labor Supply Function,” in *Labor Supply in the New Century*, ed. by K. Bradbury, C. L. Foote, and R. K. Triest, pp. 241–278. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- MITMAN, K., AND S. RABINOVICH (2013): “Do Changes in Unemployment Insurance Explain the Emergence of Jobless Recoveries?,” mimeo, University of Pennsylvania.