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One size fits all? Tailored integration policies for migrants in the European Union

Elizabeth Collett

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MULTICULTURAL EUROPE



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Foreword by Antonio Missiroli

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Foreword

by Antonio Missiroli

Europe's modern history is full of migrants and migrations: people have criss-crossed the continent for centuries to flee war, persecution or misery, mostly bringing benefits to their host countries and enriching their economies, societies and cultures. Since the discovery of the Americas, European migrants have also fled the old continent in search of a better life and new opportunities, contributing to the building of a unique 'multicultural' society.¹

Until 1989, the European Union experienced either internal migration² or specific and mostly 'controlled' flows of economic migrants from outside, although the latter, in particular, slowed significantly from the early 1970s. Some countries also hosted relatively small numbers of refugees and asylum seekers.³

Since then, however, two phenomena have fundamentally altered the nature and perception of migration in Europe: the collapse of the Soviet Empire, and the revolution in travel and communications across the world.⁴

Coupled with the income gap, as magnified through the lens of worldwide television broadcasts, these have triggered new, and at times massive, waves of immigration into an EU where the demand for certain categories of workers is on the rise,⁵ thus gradually reopening the gates closed in the 1970s.

In this paper, which was conceived within the framework of the European Policy Centre's programme on *Multicultural Europe*, Elizabeth Collett analyses the changing nature of such migrations, especially over the past decade, and highlights the different approaches taken by the Member States and (where applicable) the EU itself.

She rightly underlines that these new migrants are too often considered as all being of one and the same kind, and are dealt with accordingly, whereas they are, in fact, a mixed bunch which defies 'one-size-fits-all' categorisations and policies. She argues that their diversity – in terms of background, status, motivation and ultimate goals – must be taken into account in order to formulate appropriate integration policies.

Temporary migrants, in particular, pose distinct challenges and opportunities, and thus require tailored responses. Instead, as Elizabeth Collett points out, current policies are still responding to an outdated vision and perception of immigration and integration.

Furthermore, important differences exist even among temporary migrants: seasonal workers, international students and migrants from the new Member States of central and eastern Europe (EU-8) do not share the same expectations and needs.

As a consequence, she concludes, national integration policies should phase in dedicated provisions and entitlements in order to favour the most appropriate degree of functional integration and participation in the host society. In this context, the EU should act as a facilitator and a standard-setter, mainly by establishing (and monitoring) common codes of conduct and by supporting relatively homogeneous training and educational schemes.

This is, in many ways, the other side of the integration problem in Europe, as distinct from – but occasionally overlapping with and complementary to – the one analysed by Mirjam Dittrich in a separate EPC Working Paper on *Muslims in Europe* published in March this year.

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Endnotes

1. See the pioneer work by L.Page Moch (1992) *Moving Europeans: Migration in Western Europe since 1650*, Bloomington; and also S.Sassen (1999) *Guests and Aliens*, New York, (orig: Frankfurt a.M., 1996). More recently, K.J.Bade (2003) *Migrations in European History*, Oxford (orig.: Muenchen, 2000). The reference work for the contemporary debate on 'multi-culturalism', as revived first in Britain and then in Germany, is J.Rex (1985) *The Concept of a Multi-Cultural Society*, Warwick. For a comparative overview cf. M.A.Burayidi (ed.) (1997) *Multiculturalism in a Cross-National Perspective*, Lanham.
2. F.Romero (1991) *Emigrazione e integrazione europea 1945-1973*, Rome.
3. For a detailed analysis see A.Geddes (2003) *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe*, London.
4. P.Stalker (2000) *Workers Without Frontiers: The Impact of Globalisation on International Migration*, Boulder-Geneva.
5. For an accurate assessment by country and a (transatlantic) comparison, see J.Niessen, Y.Schibel (eds.) (2005) *Immigration as a Labour Market Strategy: European and North American Perspectives*, Brussels, Migration Policy Group.

I. Introduction

By Elizabeth Collett

As media articles, academic papers and policy reports on the subject have pointed out, immigration to Europe has become more copious, diverse and complex than ever before, with migrants hailing from different cultural, economic and social backgrounds and from all corners of the world.

They can be highly skilled or unskilled, temporary or permanent, and their motives and intentions are equally diverse. Reflecting this, immigration policies to manage the flow of migrants into the European Union have also become more complex in the last decade, at both the national and supranational level.

Yet, despite government recognition that immigration and integration policies should be developed hand in hand, there is little evidence that the latter are being framed with as much attention to detail as the former.

This paper looks at current national and EU integration policies, and compares existing policy parameters with the integration needs of some often-overlooked migrant populations within Europe, such as temporary migrant workers, international students and migrant workers from the EU-8 (the countries of central and eastern Europe which joined the EU in May 2004).

This paper recommends that policy-makers take a more nuanced approach to integration, developing policies tailored to address the full range of migrant needs. It focuses on integrating newly-arrived migrants into Europe, and on the distinction that Member States make between those who arrive intending to settle and those who do not.

An increasing proportion of foreign nationals arriving in Europe do not come through permanent channels and, more often than not, they are excluded from integration strategies and introductory programmes. This paper proposes a basic level of integration for all newcomers to ensure that they can be self-sufficient, regardless of what type of migrant they are or how long they intend to stay.

The bulk of integration policy development and implementation rightly takes place at the local level. National and supranational institutions cannot supplant the vital role played by non-governmental actors – employers,

educational facilities, migrant associations and other civil society organisations at the regional and community level – in the integration process, nor match the value they offer.

However, with integration a declared priority of The Hague Programme for 2005-10, EU policy-makers have an opportunity to improve the integration of migrants by setting standards and guidelines for national and regional policies, and funding capacity-building for introductory programmes and language courses at the local level. The intention is to ensure that all non-nationals in Europe receive a basic introduction into their host society.

II. Migration in Europe

II. 1. Changing migration flows in Europe

Large-scale immigration to Europe has a comparatively short history. While New World countries such as Australia and the United States were conceived – and strongly identify themselves – as countries of immigration, European states have taken a very different approach. Indeed, it has been said that while EU countries have very different flows and stocks of immigrants, they share one common feature: a basic non-acceptance of immigration.¹

Until recently, most migration in Europe was either local – as workers moved from the southern Mediterranean states to north western Europe – or was linked to the colonial history of former European empires. Examples include the migration to the UK from the Caribbean and south Asia, and the movement of people from north and Francophone African states to France and Belgium. However, many EU-15 countries – such as Spain, Portugal and Greece – remained countries of emigration, and the last country to move from emigration to net immigration was Ireland in 1996. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, many of the new EU Member States have also themselves been experiencing inward flows of migrants, from both east and west.

Migration flows in Europe have changed in several ways over the past three decades. First, there has been an increase in intra-EU mobility. The creation of an area of free movement within the Union has deregulated migration within the EU-15 and separated discussions on this type of mobility from the larger, more contentious, national immigration debates.

The concept of ‘EU citizenship’ has contributed to the sense of normality surrounding movements from one Member State to another. There is also a sense that the lifting of regulatory barriers has removed many of the social obstacles that migrants once faced when moving to a new country. However, this change in attitude towards European migrants does not yet apply to those coming from the new members of the Union, with most still encountering a number of transitional restrictions. Despite this, migration from the EU-8 region remains strong.²

Second, there has been a rapid increase in the diversity of migrants as a result of a more interconnected world, yet with continuing economic disparities. At the inter-regional level, most migration flows are from

developing countries in Asia and Africa to industrialised countries, particularly in Europe. Currently, non-EU nationals make up at least 4% of the EU-15 population.³ The increase in the number of ‘sending’ countries has resulted in a new ‘super-diversity’ in Europe, with many disparate communities composed of small groups of many different nationalities.

This poses new challenges for integration. In addition to dealing with more established communities of second- and third-generation migrants, policy-makers must devise ways to integrate smaller and sometimes more fragmented communities of newcomers.

Finally, the flow of migrants has become more complex, both in terms of their movements and their legal status. ‘Return’ and ‘circular’ migration have become more commonplace, with cheaper travel and communications encouraging greater mobility. An increasing proportion of the migrant population is ‘transnational’, working in one country while maintaining a family and social life in another. In addition, the number of legal categories into which migrants fall has proliferated – labour, humanitarian, family reunion and study are just some of them – and migrants often switch from one category to another.

An example of this complexity can be seen in the UK government’s 2006 proposal for a new, five-tiered approach to its system for managing immigration. The aim of the reform is to simplify the existing structure under which there are 50 different ways for potential migrants to apply to work or study. Multiply this complexity by 25 Member States and the problems associated with a Byzantine structure of legal status, rights and entitlements for migrants to the EU are obvious.

As well as posing problems for any attempt to harmonise immigration policy across Europe, this also raises questions as to how far homogenous integration policies can address such a wide range of groups and needs.

II. 2. Migration policy at the EU level

These changes have occurred alongside a growing acceptance that migration is here to stay – and is necessary – in 21st century Europe. A rapidly-ageing society, combined with declining fertility, means that Europe’s labour force is set to shrink, with the European Commission predicting a 20 million fall in the number of workers over the next 25 years.⁴

Immigration is seen as a partial, but not complete, solution to the demographic problem. Highly-skilled workers have always been welcome, but the need for low-skilled workers – particularly in the construction, agriculture and service sectors – is largely unacknowledged in many, if not all, Member States. In addition, the sector-specific skills shortages in IT, healthcare and engineering that have emerged in recent years have led many Member States to create specific immigration policies to attract workers in these areas.

While European Council conclusions and European Commission communications have repeatedly acknowledged the need for migration to the EU, there has been little agreement on how to achieve this. Member States' priorities and needs vary widely, as do national policy-makers' responses to the increasing complexity of the issue.

Countries such as Spain and Ireland have, until now at least, been happy to accept large numbers of low-skilled migrant workers, recognising the role they have played in these Member States' recent economic prosperity. Other countries, such as Germany and the UK, have focused on attracting highly-skilled migrant workers through specially-designed programmes and incentives, while placing more stringent controls on low-skilled migrants.

To date, EU immigration legislation has imposed few positive obligations on Member States. Directives on the entry and stay of third-country nationals who are long-term residents in EU countries (2003/109/EC), and the right to family reunification (2003/86/EC), established minimum standards which simply reflected existing national legislation. Indeed, Antonio Vitorino, the former European Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, expressed his disappointment at the 'diluted' terms of the Family Reunification Directive.⁵ Moreover, common conditions for admitting international students were only agreed in December 2004 after lengthy negotiations in the Council.

Predictably, least progress has been made in the most sensitive area for Member States. A Commission proposal to create a single, simplified entry procedure for migrant workers (COM(2003)386) never got off the ground and, following a call from the European Council in 2004 for an open debate on immigration, the Commission published a new, less ambitious proposal for legal migration (COM(2005)669) in December 2005.

Instead of including entry and residence rights for *all* migrants within its scope, only a few are covered: namely, the highly-skilled, seasonal workers,

employees sent by their companies to work temporarily in another Member State (Intra-Corporate Transferees) and paid trainees.

These are uncontentious and, in some cases, marginal flows of migrants, and the Commission offers no opinion on the more controversial issue of low-skilled migrant labour. The general framework overlaying these specific directives does not address entry and residence conditions, but rather guarantees a framework of rights for migrants without long-term residence status who have already been admitted into the EU. In this way, the Commission neatly dodged the question of reconciling Member States' varying policy positions on importing low-skilled labour.

Thus we can see that despite strong rhetoric about the need to review immigration policy at the supranational level, little substantive action has been taken – or is likely to be taken in future. Even the proposed EU 'Green Card', which is intended to attract the brightest and best highly-skilled workers (the least contentious category) to Europe, remains a nebulous concept. Details such as the procedures and conditions for issuing such visas, the associated rights and even how the system should be administered have yet to be decided.

II. 3. Integration policy in Europe

Integration policy in Europe suffers from the same malady, and possibly in a worse form. Although all Member States repeatedly declare that it is essential to integrate migrants and ethnic minorities, the philosophy, content and level of development of such programmes vary widely from country to country. This lack of convergence is reflected at the European level, for both good and bad reasons.

The European Commission's 'Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment' (COM(2003)336) defines integration as "a two-way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally-resident third-country nationals and the host society which provides for full participation of the immigrant". It also states that an "incremental approach" towards integration is needed, with the balance between rights and obligations developing over time. However, it goes on to state that "measures should be available to all third-country nationals as early as possible after their arrival and in any case as soon as their stay acquires a degree of permanence and stability".

The basic rationale for integrating migrants is that everyone is entitled to the same fundamental human rights and freedoms regardless of their nationality, ethnic association or race, as set out in the European Convention of Human Rights.⁶ The equal rights of all members of a community are reflected in policies that promote equal opportunities and combat discrimination.

However, other motives have also been voiced in the political debate. The Commission itself noted that “the successful integration of migrants is both a matter for social cohesion and a prerequisite for economic efficiency”.⁷

Member State governments recognise that the emergence of socially-excluded communities across Europe, particularly in urban areas, has far-reaching consequences for their countries’ social fabric. The violence which erupted in Paris and spread across France in late 2005 was a sign of this.

Employment rates among third-country nationals are consistently lower than for the rest of the EU population,⁸ and strategies aimed at improving their labour market participation, as part of the Lisbon Agenda to spur European productivity and growth, have highlighted the need to address social exclusion issues.

The new security environment has also affected the integration agenda, with the terrorist attacks in Spain and the UK, as well as increased tension in the Netherlands, raising fears that failing to integrate migrants and minorities will lead to further violence.

The prominence of this new security agenda could have negative effects on the way in which integration issues are addressed. Although social exclusion has been highlighted as a potential factor in the radicalisation of terrorists, it is vital that integration policies are not pursued out of a narrow fear of terrorist violence but rather from a broader understanding that social exclusion should be avoided in any community.

a. National approaches

There is a consistent rationale for pursuing integration, despite the vast differences in the size of migrant populations, their origins and how long their communities have been established in each Member State.

These differences have, however, had a significant impact on how integration policies have been developed. Approaches differ not only in philosophy and method, but also in sophistication.

EU countries which have only recently experienced large-scale immigration are facing the integration policy challenge for the first time, and some have yet to respond. In Ireland, for example, integration services only deal with refugees: the Reception and Integration Agency does not have a mandate to handle the many labour migrants and their families who have arrived in the last few years. Instead, these are forced to rely on support from a network of under-resourced non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and immigrant associations which operate with little government support.

Portugal, another relative newcomer to immigration, has only begun developing programmes in the last decade. In 2003, the government created a High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities and a National Immigrant Support System. This established an infrastructure for integrating legal migrants,⁹ with support centres designed to help migrants with everything from gaining access to health services and education to employment. This is supplemented by a network of municipal partnerships with NGOs, immigrant associations and parish councils, known as Local Immigrant Support Centres.

The underlying aim is to make the Portuguese state “the principal source of help for the integration of immigrants”, while creating an environment of “welcome and tolerance”. The programme is so new that it is difficult to assess its success, but it is a proactive approach that takes advantage of the existence of civil society organisations which are able to carry out these activities.

Other Member States have a much longer history of immigration, yet have only recently begun to address the need for integration. Germany is an example of this. Its migrant population has grown steadily over the past few decades, but it was only officially recognised as a country of immigration at the turn of the 21st century.

In 2001, the Süssmuth Commission, set up to review Germany’s immigration laws and ascertain migrants’ future needs, criticised the lack of any comprehensive integration plans. For the first time, new immigration regulations which came into effect in January 2005 provide a legal basis for integrating migrants, and detail how the financial burden should be shared between federal and state government. Previous integration policies had only applied to ethnic Germans returning to their ‘homeland’.

Some of the more experienced Member States are also reviewing their approaches. The Netherlands has traditionally had a strongly multicultural,

open attitude towards immigrants, with tolerance for different cultures as the presiding philosophy. However, in recent years, the success of this policy has been questioned and to some extent abandoned. The high-profile murder of film-maker Theo van Gogh heralded this change in perspective, although it is underpinned by a broader awareness that *laissez-faire* policies have failed to prevent the social exclusion of first- and second-generation migrants.

As a result, the Dutch government has tightened control of integration through the 2005 Integration of Newcomers Act, which introduced language tests and mandatory courses. The emphasis now is on making migrants more responsible for their own integration.

In the UK, the integration of migrants is placed in the wider context of anti-discrimination and race relations – an approach more in line with that in the United States. Integration policies focus on ensuring that migrants are included in British society by promoting equal opportunities, rather than on emphasising their specific needs.

UK policies make little distinction between British-born ethnic minorities and immigrants. However, the London bombings of July 2005, perpetrated by British-born young men, have provoked a debate about whether this multicultural strategy is sufficient. Trevor Philips, Chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality (the UK's independent race relations monitoring agency) has warned that Britain is "sleepwalking towards segregation" and urgently needs to rethink its policies.¹⁰

Finally, in France, following widespread violence in the suburbs of Paris and other French cities, a debate is raging over whether, and if so how, to tackle social exclusion among first- and second-generation migrants. To date, the French government's approach has been to assimilate migrants: all are equal before the law and no ethnicity or nationality (apart from French) is recognised. As a proud secular republic, France has had trouble incorporating some communities into society, as the controversy and resentment generated by the decision to ban headscarves and other religious symbols in schools showed. Despite the emphasis on equality, this and other decisions have fostered a sense of marginalisation within France's Muslim community.

There are few policies in France to counter social inequality through measures to promote migrants and ethnic minorities. However, in the wake of riots reflecting migrant youngsters' frustrations at being unable to find jobs or break out of their socio-economic 'prison', new approaches are now being considered.

On the one hand, affirmative action – such as anonymous job applications and positive discrimination policies in universities – is being considered to redress the serious barriers to employment which minorities face. On the other hand, French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy unveiled new immigration proposals in February 2006 designed to select entrants more carefully on the basis of skills, and introduce a “contract of welcome and integration” for those who wish to stay longer. The French response to the perceived integration crisis is thus to limit future migration to those considered easiest to integrate.

It is clear that Europe is reaching a turning point in terms of addressing integration. Just as migration flows are becoming increasingly complex, so too the question of how to integrate those populations seems to have no simple answers.

b. A common agenda?

These differences in philosophy have limited efforts to create a common EU-level integration policy. Although there are a number of programmes in place which have an impact on the integration of migrants, such as the European Employment Strategy, there is little in the way of harmonised legislation or common rules.

One exception is the package of EU anti-discrimination directives adopted in 2000, which were designed to eliminate inequalities on a number of grounds, including gender, age and race. However, even here, there is a gap between legislation and implementation. Other efforts to foster coherence, such as the creation of National Contact Points on Integration in 2003 and the development of a Handbook on Integration in 2004, have focused on promoting information exchange and best practice rather than on creating concrete common standards.

The first edition of an annual report by the Commission’s Directorate-General for Freedom, Security and Justice on migration and integration, giving details of relevant policies in Member States and outlining the state of play in the EU, was published in 2004 (a second, follow-up report has yet to be released). The Commission has also played a role in capacity-building at regional and local level through various dedicated funding programmes, including EQUAL, INTI and the European Social Fund.

The most substantial achievement – and the centrepiece for the new common agenda – was the adoption, in November 2004, of 11 Common

Basic Principles (CBPs) to “underpin a coherent framework on integration of third-country nationals”.¹¹ These principles outline the priorities which any integration policy should address, including employment, education and access to services. In particular, principle four states that “basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history and institutions is indispensable to integration” and that “enabling migrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration”.

Since then, the Commission has produced its agenda for a common policy on integration (COM(2005)389). This uses the CBPs as a ‘cornerstone’ and outlines a series of measures which Member States can use as a ‘check list’ to improve their integration programmes.

Some of the most relevant examples for this paper are listed on the next page to demonstrate the link between principle and action. The basic problem with this approach is that, to accommodate the policy diversity among Member States, the principles are broad statements with little substantive content.

While some EU countries, such as Sweden, pursue centrally-controlled policies which are implemented primarily through government agencies, others, such as Portugal, use the expertise of civil society organisations.

This, combined with the fact that governments’ integration priorities and objectives vary substantially, means the Union needs to take a ‘scatter-gun’ approach that encompasses all the Member States’ integration strategies to build on these principles.

However, by proposing so many scattered, though useful, initiatives under each principle, the Commission risks compromising the coherence of its framework. Many of the initiatives are vague, and offer little tangible ‘guidance’ to Member States, while suggested actions at EU level are limited to ‘supporting’, ‘stimulating’, ‘encouraging’, ‘monitoring’, ‘promoting’ and ‘fostering’.

In addition to these suggestions, the Communication looks at ways to improve the monitoring and evaluation of Member States’ activities in this area, and suggests creating an ‘integration website’ to disseminate information, an ‘integration forum’ to bring relevant stakeholders together and an ‘integration fund’ for the new financial period beginning in 2007. However, the Communication remains vague as to how, and within what timescale, all this is to be achieved.

Common Basic Principle	Suggested action at national level
Integration is a dynamic two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States.	Enhance the role of private bodies in managing diversity.
Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union.	Emphasise civic orientation in introduction programmes and other activities for newly arrived third-country nationals so that they understand, respect and benefit from common European and national values.
Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society and to making such contributions visible.	Support the training capacities of small companies, business organisations and trade unions in sectors of the economy that employ many migrants.
Basic knowledge of the host society's language, history and institutions is indispensable for integration; enabling migrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration.	Organise introductory programmes and activities for newly arrived third-country nationals to give them basic information about language, history, institutions, socio-economic features, cultural life and fundamental values.
The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in formulating integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration.	Build migrants' associations as sources of advice to newcomers, and include their representatives in introduction programmes as trainers and role models.
Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and public services is an important consideration in public policy formulation and implementation.	Ensure that integration is an important element of economic migration policy.
<p>Selected suggested measures for implementing the Common Basic Principles, as listed in the 'Communication for a Common Agenda for Integration', (COM(2005)389).</p>	

A key question for the Commission is whether, and if so how, to promote an integration framework that goes beyond monitoring, information exchange and setting guidelines and standards for Member States. Since integration is a hugely-sensitive subject for governments (and their citizens), and following the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, it is unlikely that a detailed ‘hard law’ framework for integrating socially-excluded populations will be established.

The most recent Commission Communication notes that the legal framework governing the admission and stay of third-country nationals prescribes equal treatment and attendant rights for certain categories of migrants, and appears to consider this an adequate legal basis for an integration policy when coupled with the EU’s anti-discrimination legislation.

Nevertheless, there is scope at EU level for setting targeted guidelines, laying down the basic responsibilities of the state towards certain, often ignored, categories of migrants. Thus this paper will focus on what is achievable: namely, creating soft-law guidelines and standards for the *functional integration* of newcomers into a country.

c. Types and targets of integration policies

It is important to distinguish between different forms of integration policy, the different targets, and the different levels and means by which these can be delivered.

The integration model typically has three dimensions:

- *Legal-political*: This relates to the legal status of migrants and their ability to participate in political life. The question of whether they have access to citizenship is included within this bundle.
- *Cultural-religious*: This relates to the extent to which migrants can organise themselves along cultural, religious and ethnic lines, and is the dimension which has attracted most public attention in recent years. Assimilationist policies, such as those used in France, are less inclined to accommodate this aspect of integration.
- *Socio-economic*: This covers migrants’ access to housing, health, education, and employment; in short, their ability to function in society on a day-to-day basis.

Each dimension can be addressed at a variety of levels and by a multitude of actors. It is generally accepted that most integration work takes place at the local level, within communities, and is carried out by local actors such as municipal and parish councils, NGOs, charities or, most importantly, immigrants themselves. However, regional and national governments play a key role in setting the philosophies, priorities and frameworks for integration policies; in disseminating information and capacity-building at the local level; and in financing initiatives.

In some countries, such as in France, the framework is established at the national level, with a strong top-down approach. Other EU Member States, such as Germany and Spain, have devolved much of the competence for this – including the budgeting – to regional authorities.

The role NGOs play in implementing integration policies depends on whether such policies are designed to give migrants access to mainstream public services such as health or education, or to tackle migrants' specific needs, such as language and introductory programmes. In some cases, NGOs play a dominant role out of necessity, filling the gaps that government policies fail to address. Countries in the middle of developing their own approaches to migrants are now realising that considerable expertise already exists at the local level.

For the purposes of this paper, the most relevant distinction is between the different types of migrants these policies are aimed at.

There are two broad categories of migrants typically covered by integration policies: new arrivals, and established second- and third-generation migrant communities. While the needs of these two groups diverge considerably, the packages of measures designed to cater for each group may merge or overlap over time. Integration is a process and the dimensions of that process change with time.

New arrivals face specific problems – such as language difficulties, lack of familiarity with the host culture and institutions, and the need to find housing and access vital social services such as healthcare and education – which do not apply to established, second-generation immigrants. Conversely, issues of political participation, cultural identity and long-term social exclusion, while of paramount importance to settled migrant communities, are less relevant to newcomers.

If the needs of the newcomers are not addressed, this will affect their ability to participate politically, economically and socially further down the line, but the question of whether they can vote in local elections is rarely their top priority during their first weeks in a new country. In the same way, a newly-arrived migrant is likely to find life more difficult if the social network of immigrants which he or she joins is poorly integrated into society.

Most European countries' integration policies have recognised this dichotomy, and provide introductory and orientation programmes for newcomers alongside long-term measures to address social and economic exclusion. Those countries where immigration is an entirely new phenomenon have yet to address the long-term problems of social inequality and exclusion, but are keenly watching the impact of measures designed to tackle social unrest within immigrant communities in neighbouring countries.

It seems, however, that while the strategies themselves may be comprehensive, they are targeted at a very narrowly-defined section of the population. The remainder of this paper focuses on integration policies for newcomers and, more specifically, on the scope of introductory programmes designed to provide them with the basic tools to function in their new society.

The majority of national programmes have their origins in the 1990s. One exception is Sweden, which has run orientation programmes for newcomers since the 1970s, although the low level of Swedish immigration has made it relatively easy to implement these programmes.

Such programmes typically include some level of language training, vocational support (to help migrants to integrate into the labour market), and orientation courses to familiarise them with their host society, its norms, institutions and laws, and to help them become self-reliant.

This is seen as an essential first step in the integration process. Although these programmes are not only directed towards those who arrive intending to settle (see table on page 22), the ability of migrants to gain permanent residence and citizenship rights is increasingly linked to their successful completion of such courses. Conversely, the exclusion of non-permanent immigrants from these programmes appears to be based on the rationale that they should not be encouraged to settle permanently thanks to the skills and knowledge they might acquire through migrant support programmes. As they are expected to leave after a set period of time, they are not considered to be worth the social investment.

Country	Target	Temporary migrant	Student	EU	Content
Austria	TCNs* on permanent residence track	X	?	X	Language tuition, civic instruction
Belgium	TCNs with permission to reside for more than three months	X	X	X	Language tuition, social and institutional orientation
Denmark	Legal immigrants & refugees who fall under scope of law	?	? ¹²	X	Language tuition, social orientation, vocational guidance
Finland		?	X	?	Language tuition, social orientation, vocational training, supplementary education
France	Legal newcomers with a prospect of permanent residence	X	X	X	Language tuition, social orientation
Germany	Regular & independent workers, family reunification & refugees with a perspective of long-term residence	X	X	X	Language tuition, social orientation
Netherlands	Recognised refugees & residence permit holders (except for employment purposes)	X	?	X	Language tuition, vocational training
Sweden ¹³	Refugees. While in theory introductory programmes are open to all, this depends on regional and municipal governments' resources	X	X	X	Individual integration plan, education & training, language tuition, vocational guidance, introduction to society
<p>Introductory programmes for migrants in selected European countries¹⁴ *TCN = third-country nationals; (x = specifically excluded; ? = not specifically targeted, or unknown)</p>					

Given the wide array and complexity of legal migration channels into Europe, and the increasing mobility of migrants, it would be foolish to ignore the growing proportion who arrive without any initial intention to settle. Yet it is striking that, to date, governments have taken a one-size-fits-all approach towards integrating migrants into Europe.

What tailoring does occur is largely negative: for example, certain categories of migrants (undocumented or temporary workers, or asylum seekers) are prevented from integrating for conceptual and largely political reasons. Indeed, current policies which single out certain migrants – for example, the controversial decision in several German *Länder* to introduce questionnaires for Muslim migrants – alienate rather than integrate.

This chapter has highlighted the many challenges facing national governments in dealing with a moving, multi-faceted, many-sectored immigrant population. The next chapter highlights three increasingly significant types of migrant who are, for the most part, excluded from European integration strategies. It then suggests that there is a middle way to offer social support to all new arrivals which does not undermine longer-term integration strategies, while accepting that migrants' intentions may change over time.

III. Forgotten migrant populations

This paper argues that current integration policies are responding to an outdated paradigm,¹⁵ as they are based on the premise that migration is a one-time event, where families arrive intending to settle and adopt the host country as their permanent home.

In many instances, this is still the case. However, settler migration now constitutes a rapidly-diminishing proportion of the total migration flow. Increasingly, migrants move with the intention of staying for only a few years or commuting between countries (although some of them may later decide to settle permanently).

These migrants face considerable barriers to integration, either because they are not considered worth the investment or in need of integrating or because the authorities do not want to encourage them to stay.

This paper takes three migrant populations which are likely to increase in size over the next few decades in Europe and are, for the most part, considered beneficial to the host country's economy, and assesses whether they need integration services. If they do, what are those needs and what kind of policies should be pursued?

The three categories below are not an exhaustive list of 'forgotten' migrants – other groups such as undocumented migrant workers also merit consideration.

III. 1. Temporary migrant workers

Temporary Migration Programmes (TMPs) have been used to address labour shortages in Europe in two broad cycles.

The first, post-war 'guest-worker programmes' were introduced between 1945 and the early 1970s, and largely involved intra-European migration from poorer Mediterranean countries to northern Europe.

This generation of TMPs imported low-skilled labour into a variety of sectors, including construction and agriculture, to help rebuild Europe following World War II. National programmes took a variety of forms. In France,

temporary labour migrants were recruited through bilateral agreements (1945-1975) and government policies stemmed partly from a desire to foster cultural ties with North Africa and former colonies. Germany also used bilateral agreements with a number of countries, although the *Gastarbeiter* Programme (1955-1973) was solely a labour market policy tool. At the peak of this programme, migrants represented 12% of salaried workers.¹⁶

Various reasons were given for phasing out these programmes. One was the onset of economic recession and higher unemployment in receiving countries; another was a realisation among host governments that ensuring migration remained temporary was more difficult than they had originally envisaged. Certainly, a desire to control the number of migrants was a significant factor as countries across Europe closed their doors to both temporary and permanent arrivals.

The second generation of TMPs in Europe are more diverse, both in composition and objectives. In the 1990s, European governments and employers became aware of specific sectoral shortages in the labour market, and sought to use temporary and seasonal labour to tackle them. Western European countries are thus devising multiple micro-programmes aimed at filling these particular gaps.¹⁷

In some cases, unskilled workers are needed to make up for shortages in the service, agriculture and construction sectors. For example, in Spain, the majority of work permits for non-EU workers are issued for the service sector.¹⁸ In the UK, there are shortages of both low-skilled workers (in hospitality and food processing) and highly-skilled employees (in engineering, health and IT). Given these needs, policy-makers are revising immigration programmes in an effort to attract more of the world's highly-skilled workforce.

In addition to specific temporary migration schemes, many countries issue time-restricted work permits as a more general – and politically acceptable – tool of immigration policy. Ireland, for example, currently issues one-year work permits which are renewable indefinitely.

The recent European Commission Communication on transitional arrangements for EU-8 workers highlights the extent to which migration in Europe has become temporary: in France, 74% of work authorisations in 2004 were for seasonal work, 11% for temporary work and just 5% for permanent work; in Germany, 95% of work permits issued included time restrictions.¹⁹ It is, however, difficult to collect precise comparable data

on temporary migrant schemes across Europe, given the number of such programmes and their complexity.

Assessments of how effective temporary migration programmes in Europe have been have focused on the benefits for the host country and on whether the programme's initial objectives have been achieved. They examine, in particular, whether the 'temporary' aspect of these programmes has been successful – and the majority conclude that it has not. (The most oft-cited example of this is Germany's *Gastarbeiter* programme. Even though the majority of workers who arrived under the scheme eventually returned home, many did not.)²⁰

The lesson for policy-makers from the first wave of programmes was that a proportion of those arriving under any TMP are likely to become permanent.

It is worth briefly outlining the differences between the first and second generation of temporary migrants.²¹

First, those now arriving under temporary migration schemes – and immigrating generally – are more ethnically diverse than before. Although many countries still operate through bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries, Europe's need for particular skills has led it to cast its migration net wider.

Second, because the immigrant population (some of whom arrived under the previous generation of TMPs) is much larger than before, new temporary workers are entering a far more diverse social environment. Globalisation has created more deregulated labour markets that are capable of responding more flexibly to changes in the economy. It has also made it easier for people to travel the world. A job is no longer for life and there is an increasing trend toward circular, and more frequent, migration, as opposed to permanent settlement.

These differences have implications for the success of these programmes. The ease of international travel and flexibility in the labour market make migrants more likely to move on once they have completed a job. In addition, specific shortages in certain sectors of the host country's labour market suggest that employers may become increasingly dependent on the external labour supply.

The major preoccupation for those designing TMPs has been to ensure that this migration remains short term, rather than to consider the potential social problems which might arise if migrants are not properly integrated.

Martin Ruhs has argued that the draconian policies required to ensure that all temporary migrants return home may not be compatible with the norms and values of a liberal democracy.²² Instead, governments have taken a more passive approach to the problem by limiting certain rights, such as those to family reunification, access to social welfare, and the ability to legitimately switch to permanent immigration tracks. Some countries have proposed more innovative responses to encourage migrant workers to return home, such as requiring them to pay a bond which is only refunded when they leave, or transferring part of their wages to an account in their home country.

The idea of linking migrants' rights to their length of stay is neither new nor contentious, and the Commission supports this 'incremental approach'.²³

This paper does not propose offering the full panoply of integration measures and social support to migrants immediately on arrival. However, the failure of governments to provide basic introductory programmes for all migrants to familiarise them with the host country's laws, institutions and society seems short-sighted. Should there be a basic level of integration for migrants on temporary work permits?

a. Should temporary migrants be integrated?

As noted above, the primary rationale for deciding not to integrate temporary migrants is that doing so might deter them from returning home.

Certainly there are some 'benefits', such as political and voting rights, which do not apply to transitory workers. Furthermore, migrants might not wish, or need, to uproot their families for a short period of time (although they would almost certainly reconsider this if their work permits were repeatedly renewed).

Furthermore, the hottest debate in Europe about multiculturalism and religious integration relates mainly to settled migrant communities (although it is worth noting that many of them originally arrived as temporary workers).

The lack of any measures to integrate these workers socially risks creating a second-class, expendable labour force, particularly among seasonal and unskilled workers. Without an adequate understanding of the host country's employment system, migrant workers may be left unaware of their employment rights or unable to access the appropriate mechanisms to redress any grievances.

Without adequate support to find decent housing, they rely on word of mouth and on their employers to find accommodation. This can often result in large numbers of them living clustered in one area, in poor conditions and with little interaction with the broader community. Without adequate knowledge of the host language, or the public service structure, they may have difficulties accessing health or social support services.

Examples of this can be found across Europe. In Ireland, the exploitation of migrant workers has been a key concern for trade unions and NGOs. Under the current system, migrant workers may drop out of the work permit system without realising it because they rely on employers to renew their work permits annually. Those who are employed illegally, who work too many hours or are paid below the minimum wage, have to rely on trade unions and others to explain their rights to them, and this only happens, all too often, if they complain. Many do not do so out of fear that they will be sacked and deported if they speak up. Lack of knowledge has disempowered many workers and left many of them vulnerable to exploitation.²⁴

In France, Spain and other countries, both legal and illegal seasonal workers also have to rely on employers to find them accommodation, and this is frequently substandard.²⁵ In addition many of them try to live cheaply as possible so that they can send a considerable proportion of their income home. Discovering that they will not get much government support even though they have a work permit is surely a disincentive for them to maintain their legal status, even if they know how to or are able to do so.

The European Commission's 'First Annual Report on Migration and Integration'²⁶ stressed that basic language skills are vital if people are to participate effectively in their community, and particularly in the workplace. However, few countries ensure that temporary migrants are given these skills. In his study of agricultural labour migration in the United States, Philip Martin has noted that some large employers have resorted to hiring bilingual managers in order to communicate with a largely migrant workforce.²⁷ While this may be a rational and economic solution for employers, it leaves many workers isolated and unequipped to deal with life outside the workplace.

Marginalised communities, often composed of a mixture of permanent, temporary and illegal workers, are taking root in many European cities. It is clear that the temporary migrant workforce would benefit from integration

support, in the form of an introductory programme, as this would enable them to stand up for their rights. While this would not solve the problems of marginalisation *per se*, it would minimise some of the temporary labour force's inherent vulnerabilities.

So are governments' fears that integration turns temporary migrants into permanent ones justified? This will inevitably happen sometimes and policy-makers need to be realistic about this – and recognise that it is not necessarily negative, either economically or socially.

As sectors such as agriculture, construction and the service industry become more reliant on unskilled migrant labour, temporary workers may become long-term – a phenomenon known as 'distortion and dependence'. A constantly-rotating workforce in sectors which rely on temporary workers places a heavy burden on employers to comply with the current regulations. This has fostered a trend towards outsourcing labour supply to private recruitment companies, which can ensure a steady stream of labour but often in a largely unregulated environment.²⁸

In the absence of new workers, employers are keen to retain those already in place. An example of this occurs in Ireland, where the work permit system is employer-driven and allows for unlimited renewals. In 2004, more than twice as many renewals were issued as new permits (23,246 renewals, 10,020 new permits), reflecting an enduring demand for labour in certain sectors.²⁹ However, these temporary workers enjoy *de facto*, but not *de jure*, permanent status, as they do not have the option of taking up long-term residence. As a result, their integration is delayed indefinitely, which could lead to serious social exclusion problems in the future.

In the absence of adequate permanent channels of entry into Europe, TMPs will inevitably continue to be abused by those who wish to stay for as long as possible. The terms of some of Europe's temporary migration policies hardly encourage workers to remain temporary.

For example, the UK's recent effort to attract low-skilled temporary workers through the Sectors-Based-Scheme can be classed as a failure.³⁰ Under the terms of the scheme, workers – in particular Bangladeshis – were paying a great deal of money for permits and travel to the UK in order to take up minimum-wage positions. As they were unable to recoup the initial costs of the venture before their temporary permits expired, they stayed on and continued working illegally.³¹

In Spain, irregular migrants already in the country were offered temporary work permits under an ‘amnesty’ policy in an effort to scale back the ‘shadow’ economy. It has yet to be seen whether they will return home or revert to irregular status when their visas expire. It is notable that Canada attributes the success of its own temporary labour programmes to the fact that permanent channels are open to potential migrants. Those who arrive intending to settle generally come via the permanent track, and the two channels are kept separate.

An introductory programme *per se* is unlikely to encourage a worker to stay permanently. Indeed, the number of migrants who participated in the post-war TMPs and became permanent despite an overt policy of non-integration suggests that the desire to remain permanently may have less to do with integration policies than with the offer of a good job and a solid network of friends and family. As Philip Martin has pointed out, “migrants are people whose aspirations and goals change with experience”.³² In short, life happens, irrespective of policy.

b. How can temporary migrants be properly integrated?

As the above discussion suggests, temporary migrants’ main needs are to obtain adequate information about their host country and their rights, and to learn to speak the language. This mirrors the content of the current introductory programmes in a number of European countries. While many Member States provide websites and pamphlets where migrants can get information, experience suggests that a more proactive approach is needed to ensure that all the relevant information reaches its target audience.

The emphasis should be on *functional integration*, so that any newcomer is given the knowledge and skills to be self-reliant in the host society. Key aspects of this include basic language training; vocationally-oriented, practical information on employment and immigration rights; guidance on government and community institutions; and advice on how to gain access to essential services.

What is the best way to deliver these programmes? A constant theme in the political debate is the question of who pays for them. It is clear that employers and private recruiters play a key role in the welfare of their migrant workers and are likely to invest more in highly-skilled employees, recognising that their productivity is linked to their welfare and happiness. Neither employers nor governments consider low-skilled workers worthy of

the investment, so they often ignore their social needs. Thus it tends to fall to NGOs, trade unions and immigrant networks to provide support, and they are often overstretched and under-resourced.

There are, however, rare examples of employers providing such services: Fusion Personnel, a supplier of casual labour (gangmaster) in the British agricultural sector, has developed a training scheme with a local college that provides language tuition. In the Netherlands, an In-House Integration Project offers migrant workers language, vocational and communication training, plus guidance for managers.³³ These programmes suggest that there is scope (though little incentive) for employers and recruiters to provide basic introductory programmes for migrant workers who arrive under temporary programmes.³⁴

This paper proposes that a government which wishes to introduce TMPs could insist that employers are only given access to migrant workers if they agree to provide those workers with introductory programmes. Larger companies could implement these in-house, while a variety of other actors – regional and local government and NGOs – could provide programmes for smaller businesses.

As integration services are provided on a different basis from country to country, this should be left to national and regional discretion, although there is a role for the EU in setting standards.


A link could be made between issuing work permits and ensuring that migrants are properly integrated by requiring potential employers of foreign workers to sign up to a code of conduct outlining their obligations and setting minimum standards of integration. This would not only ensure that migrants receive some pastoral care in the workplace, but could also help to minimise the risk of employers exploiting their workforces by creating positive obligations. Finally, making employers responsible for initial orientation programmes would reduce public-sector costs while ensuring proper provision.

III. 2. International students

The movement of people for academic reasons is often overlooked as a source of migration. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the international market in education services is estimated at more than 30 billion US dollars³⁵ and

Europe is a major player, with the EU hosting approximately 47% of the world's international students.³⁶

Although in 2003 around 28% of these were EU citizens studying in another Member State, there were approximately 750,000 third-country nationals studying in Europe. France, Germany and the UK are the biggest receivers of international students, but other countries are catching up: currently ten of the EU's 25 Member States are net exporters of education services; i.e. they are welcoming more foreign students than they are sending abroad.³⁷



The programmes developed to attract international students after World War II had a cultural and social rationale. However, over the last two decades, European countries have begun to appreciate the economic benefits of increasing foreign enrolment in tertiary education. Universities in a number of countries have reaped direct financial benefits from this by increasing tuition fees for non-EU nationals, effectively subsidising higher education for national students.

In addition, as shortages for skilled workers have become more acute, governments have recognised the advantages of attracting bright and

motivated individuals to study and train within the country, as this creates a potential supply of highly-skilled workers. Hence, a number of countries have adjusted their visa policies to allow non-EU students to enter the labour market after graduation.

In Germany, new immigration legislation which came into effect on 1 January 2005 allows foreign students to apply for a one-year job-seekers permit after they graduate. If they manage to find work, they can then apply for a work and residence visa and eventually join the permanent residence track. In the UK, a programme which allows graduates in physical sciences, engineering and mathematics to apply for one-year extensions to their visas (and an eventual switch to the highly-skilled migrant programme) demonstrates how easily the foreign student population can be 'strained' to select those with the most essential skills.

a. Marketing education services

Many European countries have created national agencies to market their universities abroad and boost overseas demand for their education services.³⁸ There have also been a number of initiatives at European level to harmonise higher education provision.

The most influential of these has been the Bologna Process to establish a European Higher Education Area (EHEA) by 2010. This process is under way in more than 40 countries and aims to harmonise quality assurance systems, get agreement on the mutual recognition of qualifications across borders, and create a degree system based on two cycles (undergraduate and graduate).

A key objective, as spelt out in the most recent ministerial *communiqué*, is to promote mobility within the EHEA and enhance its attractiveness relative to other parts of the world.³⁹ The European Commission, which has been closely involved in this process, is part of the follow-up group that is monitoring progress, with the Directorate-General for Education and Training playing a coordinating role with national authorities, student and university associations.

Although national governments retain regulatory powers over education, the Commission is taking a keen interest in the development of the education sector because education and training are seen as a vital part of the Lisbon Agenda to promote economic growth and competitiveness.

However, despite the desire of governments and universities to promote education services among foreign students, they appear to have overlooked the social dimension of the process. Students are seen as consumers of a service rather than as migrants in a new and demanding environment.

The Bologna Process Follow-up Group argued in 2003 that “it is necessary to introduce and maintain social support schemes for students, including grants, portable as far as possible, loan schemes, healthcare and insurance, housing and academic and social counselling”.⁴⁰ Unfortunately, this has not been reflected in the subsequent work programme.

Both the National Union of Students in Europe (ESIB) and the European University Association (EUA) have criticised governments’ failure to address the social needs of the general student population. While academic and educational system reforms are seen as national and supra-national concerns, the social dimension of education remains largely *ad hoc* and is determined on a university-by-university basis.

b. The international student and social integration

There is little policy-oriented research on the social needs of international students in Europe, particularly on the difficulties they face in integrating into local society. However, there is considerable research on the problems they face in adapting to a new culture, learning the language, coping with the loss of social support systems, establishing new social networks, and dealing with racial discrimination, housing and financial difficulties, and academic stress.

A survey by the UK Council For International Education (UKCOSA) of international student experiences found that a key concern for many was how to integrate with UK students and residents.⁴¹ The majority of respondents (59%) said most of their friendships were with co-nationals and other international students, and Asian students were far less likely to have British friends than EU nationals. Students found mixing with local communities particularly difficult. However, they said the overall experience had been positive, although the UK’s National Union of Students believes that foreign nationals in higher education experience greater problems than the UKCOSA survey suggests.

Much of the research makes recommendations to academic institutions and professional counsellors on ways to offer greater support to international

students. However, very little of this addresses the role governments might play. Although international educational exchanges are seen as a useful tool in promoting inter- and multiculturalism, much less is said about the very real needs of exchange students at national or international level and how to respond to them.

c. Policies

A study of Australian students concluded that economic and social support for international students was provided by “a fragmented complex of institutions, agencies and support networks”.⁴²

A similar situation exists in Europe. Government integration strategies appear to have neglected international students, even though they constitute a significant and increasing flow of third-country nationals to Europe. This may be because many governments do not regard students as migrants and the International Labour Organization (ILO) specifically excludes them from its definition of a migrant.

Other governments exclude foreign students from integration policies on the basis that they only plan to stay in the country for the duration of their course, which might only last a few months. While it may not be necessary to offer comprehensive support for students on short, intensive language courses, undergraduate courses typically last for 3-4 years and postgraduate courses even longer. In addition, as noted above, European countries now recognise the value of recruiting foreign graduates as part of their strategies for obtaining highly-skilled labour.

In this context, it is foolhardy to ignore the social needs of international students simply because they are only temporary, not least because this could ultimately inhibit their successful absorption into the national employment market.

There are, however, some support and integration services for international students. Universities and independent organisations offer a wide range of services, such as orientation programmes, housing and financial advice, language courses and counselling, most of which are provided through the university network.

As part of their pastoral duty to all students, universities also offer some mainstream support, but the level of specialised support for

international students may depend on the number of foreign nationals enrolled at each institution.

Some universities, particularly in countries with small populations, rely on international students to subsidise and augment academic programmes and are therefore geared up to cater for a culturally-diverse population. Smaller, publicly-funded institutions with only a small percentage of overseas students are more likely to provide services on an *ad hoc* basis. As a result, the level of support these students receive depends on the level of enthusiasm and resources available at each university and college.

Foreign students receive little off-campus support aside from that provided by governmental and non-governmental agencies, which provide distant (telephone and web-based) advice and support, and handbooks on particular issues. Independent agencies also play a crucial advocacy role in protecting international students' interests. In some cases, however, the main role of government-operated agencies (such as the Netherlands Organisation for International Cooperation in Higher Education) appears to be to market education services to prospective students rather than to offer them impartial advice and support.

In essence, integration and support services for students are not regulated nationally. Although there are some professional associations for educators of international students which provide guidelines, training and codes of ethical conduct, there is no official mechanism for setting standards and monitoring compliance.⁴³

d. How can international students be properly integrated?

If education services are to be attractive to foreign students, it is vital that these students are guaranteed social welfare during their courses. This is particularly important as host countries show an increasing tendency to cherry pick the brightest and best from among the ranks of foreign graduates for their own labour markets.

Given the efforts to harmonise education services both through the Bologna Process and through the EU itself, it would be appropriate to establish a pan-European mechanism for monitoring the provision of basic integration and social support.

So how can governments ensure that they receive the necessary social support

during their studies? New Zealand provides a good example of best practice. Even though it has a population of only 4 million, the country is host to more than 100,000 foreign students and the market is increasing rapidly.⁴⁴ During the academic year 2003/4, it was worth over 2 million New Zealand dollars (1,110,000 euros) and it is seen as a vital 'export' industry.

Given the commercial importance of international education, the New Zealand government has taken steps to address the social dimension. In 2003, the Ministry of Education established a Code of Practice for the Pastoral Care of International Students to provide a framework for educational institutions.⁴⁵ All university staff and agents offering education are now subject to the code and an independent public agency – the International Education Appeals Authority – monitors and rules on students' complaints about alleged breaches.

The code covers a number of areas, such as the provision of information to prospective international students and a range of support services, including:

- an orientation programme;
- assistance for students who face difficulties adapting to a new cultural environment;
- advocacy procedures to ensure students are aware of their rights;
- information on accommodation;
- advice on driving laws, courses, welfare facilities (including personal and mental health services);
- information on national laws, especially discrimination and harassment legislation;
- linguistic preparation.

The areas covered by the code are politically uncontroversial. It is arguable that since many universities already provide most of these services to their students, the code merely ensures that all institutions conform. Introducing a similar code at European level – perhaps as part of the Bologna Process – would fill the current regulatory gap in relation to the integration of foreign students, as well as making it more attractive to institutions and governments which wish to increase their share of the education market.

III. 3. EU-8 migrant workers

Creating an area of free movement has had repercussions for official European integration policies. Although all EU nationals enjoy the rights

associated with citizenship, it is frequently forgotten that some may face just as many problems in terms of language, social support and knowledge of their host institutions as their non-EU counterparts do.

EU nationals are excluded from the majority of introductory programmes set up for newcomers in recent years (see table on page 22). The implications of this become clear when one considers the movement of workers from central and eastern Europe over the past decade. Though these workers are now officially EU citizens, they still face many of the same social barriers as they did before May 2004.

Country	Type of Data	EU-10	
		Number	% working age population
Austria	Work permit	68,449	1.2
Belgium	Residence permit	12,918	0.2
Denmark	Residence permit	4,911	0.1
Germany	Work permit	497,298	0.9
Greece	Residence permit	3,711	0.1
Finland	Residence permit	1,651	0.0
France	Work permit	9,916	0.0
Ireland	Registered EU-8 (May-Dec)	53,829	1.9
Italy	Work auth. application	26,324	0.1
Netherlands	Work permit	24,424	0.2
Portugal	Residence permit	43	0.0
Spain	Residence permit	11,255	0.0
Sweden	Residence permit	3,514	0.1
UK	Registered EU-8 (May-Dec)	134,530	0.4

Residence/work permits to EU-10 nationals in absolute numbers and as percentages of the destination country's working age population aged 15-64, in 2004.

Source: European Commission, Report on the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements set out in the 2003 Accession Treaty, COM(2006)

a. Post-accession movement of workers from central and eastern Europe

When ten new countries joined the Union in May 2004, just three of the 'old' EU-15 Member States allowed unrestricted access to their labour markets: Ireland, Sweden and the UK. Others – including Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and Spain – have continued to treat these new EU citizens as third-country nationals, taking advantage of the permitted 'transitional period' of up to seven years. A third group of countries – Austria, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal – have maintained pre-existing immigration regimes, but created quotas for workers from the new Member States.

Despite these restrictions, there have been significant flows from central and eastern Europe to EU-15 countries (see table on page 38 for figures). In the first year following accession, the UK welcomed 175,000 EU-8 workers, Ireland 85,000 and Sweden nearly 22,000 – and even though Germany maintained its national system, nearly half a million EU-8 workers worked within its borders in 2004.⁴⁶

Polish workers are by far the largest EU-8 population abroad. The most recent figures from the UK, for example, show that they now account for 131,300 (57%) of the 231,500 registered EU-8 workers.⁴⁷ Germany granted some 680,000 work permits to Polish workers in 2004 and the first half of 2005.

New Member State workers find jobs in a wide range of sectors. While the majority of these are unskilled – in hospitality, construction, agriculture and factory work – the stereotype of the 'Polish plumber' reflects the growing demand for skilled labourers (including electricians and carpenters) from central and eastern Europe in the construction industry.

New Member States are developing special training programmes for highly-skilled workers and are tailoring their higher education towards 'exporting' some of their graduates: for example, a training course for dentists in Warsaw teaches potential emigrants about the British National Health Service and offers vocational language training.⁴⁸

The significant number of EU-8 workers in the EU-15, especially in those countries where transitional measures are in force, suggests that there is still strong demand for labour from central and eastern Europe. However, the support these workers are offered on arrival is weak because, as mentioned

above, EU nationals are explicitly excluded from introductory programmes in countries such as Austria, Belgium and Denmark.⁴⁹

b. Are Polish migrants more integrated than Ukrainian migrants?

So has EU accession made integration any easier? In countries which have opened up their labour markets to the new Member States, EU citizenship has given EU-8 workers a bundle of employment and social rights. However, some countries – such as Ireland and the UK – have limited EU-8 workers' access to some social welfare benefits, while in others, they only enjoy some citizenship rights, such as the ability to 'export' their pensions and aggregate their social security contributions.⁵⁰

Reports suggest that migrant workers from the new Member States in the UK and Ireland remain in a vulnerable position. An *exposé* in a leading UK newspaper in January 2005 revealed that, even though they are working legally, EU-8 workers are still being exploited by employers who pay unlawfully low wages and force them to live in squalid conditions.⁵¹ They work alongside undocumented migrants from non-EU countries such as Afghanistan, and many are not legally registered with the government and are threatened by their employers if they attempt to contact the authorities.

This does not only apply to workers from new Member States. There have been similar reports of Portuguese workers being abused in south east England.

A key factor is that new arrivals often do not speak the host country language, are unaware of their employment rights, and have little knowledge of whom to contact and how. An even-more worrying report from Ireland's Homeless Agency shows that a small but increasing number of citizens from the new Member States are being forced to seek help from Dublin's homelessness services.⁵² Many of those interviewed had been insufficiently prepared for their journey and did not have the appropriate language skills.

In terms of their knowledge, culture and language skills, the integration needs of EU nationals such as Poles or Latvians are similar to those of migrant workers from third countries such as Romania or Ukraine. EU citizenship and freedom of movement have conferred no special 'powers' on them, and they remain vulnerable.

It appears that workers from the EU-8 countries living in Ireland do actively try to enforce their employment rights. However, whether they succeed or

not depends on their knowledge, language skills and access to appropriate institutions. Here, NGOs and trade unions have played a vital role in empowering them.

With transitional arrangements for the movement of workers from central and eastern Europe due for review in May 2006, it is essential to address their integration needs as soon as possible. A number of EU-15 Member States – including Finland, the Netherlands, Greece, Portugal and Spain – have indicated that they may relax immigration restrictions later this year. If they do, they will also need to ensure that workers who arrive under the new arrangements are capable of functioning in their host community.

c. How can EU-8 migrant workers be properly integrated?

There is clearly a need for an EU-wide policy on introductory measures for EU-8 workers, and the Union has the competence to do this. The right to free movement within the EU means that the Union should draw up standards for social support. The needs of EU-8 workers and other EU nationals are no different from those of other new arrivals.

Introductory programmes are one element of this. However, as its title suggests, the Commission's 'Communication for a Common Agenda on Integration for Third Country Nationals' does not cover EU citizens who work and live in another Union country. Regardless of this, a more comprehensive proactive information programme for potential migrants should be adopted within the EU.

2006 is the European Year of Workers' Mobility (EYWM). According to the Commission, 1.6% of EU-25 citizens live and work in a Member State other than their own, and the Commission's Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs is encouraging the European workforce to become more mobile.⁵³ At the EYWM launch conference in February 2006, British MEP Jean Lambert stressed the importance of ensuring that the social needs of the mobile workforce are not forgotten.


Although linguistic ability has been highlighted by the EYWM as essential for job mobility in Europe, the Year's focus is on informing potential migrants about job opportunities in other countries through job fairs and the EURES job portal. This portal offers information about the practical side of living and working in each Member State, but provides little information about social support following a move.

EYWM is an ideal opportunity to address the need for introductory programmes for EU workers living and working in other Member States, and to take a more proactive approach towards supporting them.

IV. Tailoring integration policies

To date, integration policies in Europe have mainly focused on those who arrive intending to settle permanently in the host society, and it is frequently suggested that integrating temporary migrants is inherently contradictory.

This need not be so. While core integration policies, including rights of citizenship and family reunification, should be developed for those who intend to stay permanently (and those who decide to settle at a later stage), there should be a broader orientation and introduction policy for all new arrivals in a host country, regardless of their status and length of stay.



The fact that European governments increasingly recognise that naturalisation and citizenship are valuable elements of integration for those who wish to settle permanently is to be welcomed, but it does not necessary follow that these should be the goals of all integration strategies.

If governments saw integration as a broader process of orientation and a way of giving migrants the means to function effectively in society irrespective of how long they intend to stay, they would be able to target a wider range of migrant groups.

These policies should be based on a dual acceptance that a) migration is increasingly temporary and circulatory, but b) a proportion of migrants are always likely to become permanent either because of a change in their personal circumstances or because the host country's needs and policies change. To ignore a substantial foreign population in the hope that social exclusion will encourage them to return home is, at best, irresponsible and, at worst, will cause even greater difficulties for long-term integration strategies.

Most integration takes place at the local level. This should not mean, however, that the sole role of national and EU policy-makers is to establish broad, homogenous policy guidelines. They can also play a vital role in focusing efforts locally and highlighting the particular contribution that employers, institutions and more permanent migrant communities can make.

IV. 1. A role for the European Union

The first question to ask is why should codes of conduct to integrate new arrivals be developed at EU level? Most obviously, this would promote homogeneity. The Hague Programme mandated the Commission to create a European framework for integration and noted the need for national policies to converge in a number of areas, including "basic skills for participation in society".⁵⁴

The prominent role played by employers in introducing new arrivals to European society makes codes of conduct ensuring minimum standards in orientation policies, advice and language-learning opportunities vitally relevant to the Lisbon Agenda. Migrants who have a secure status and a good understanding of their host country's institutions, laws and society are likely to be more productive and of greater economic benefit.

Turning to the three categories of migrant identified above – temporary migrant workers, international students and EU-8 migrant workers – there are clear reasons for a common approach.

First, Member States are competing for skilled and (increasingly) unskilled workers, not just between themselves but also with North American and other industrialised states. In order to attract the best to Europe, Member States need to offer *all* migrants good conditions, including those who only come for a short time. The same reasoning applies to attracting international students and, here, the work of the Bologna Process demonstrates the value of a supranational

approach. Finally, with respect to EU-8 workers' mobility, the Union has an obligation to ensure that EU nationals have the tools to function effectively in any Union country. Although the EU's competence in the area of integration policy is limited to third-country nationals, it is clear that some EU citizens need similar strategies and support.

The second question is how to create common guidelines and standards for effective introductory programmes. The 'Communication for a Common Agenda for Integration' proposed an integration forum to bring together representatives of all stakeholders in the integration process at the EU level. This would be an appropriate forum for employers, universities, national, regional and local government, NGOs and immigrants themselves to develop a series of codes of conduct which could then be applied at national level. The EU could then use its role as the monitor and facilitator of information-exchange to promote better practices among Member States.

These codes should not be designed to regulate service delivery, since a comparison of Member States' integration infrastructures shows that some are better at providing a broad government integration structure, while others use the expertise of existing NGO support services.

The key here is to ensure that migrants do not fall victim to their location, legal status and circumstances. As has already been explained, they often depend on their local community's resources and enthusiasm – whether at parish council, employer or local government level – to provide social support. Codes of conduct would provide a basic homogenous benchmark of services which migrants could expect to receive when they enter the host society, regardless of how long they intend to stay or where they intend to live.

IV. 2. Ways ahead

In conclusion, there are a number of policy recommendations which should be considered:

- 1) Member States should introduce integration programmes for all newcomers from day one, irrespective of the migrant's intended length of stay in the host country.
- 2) Minimum standards should be set for introductory programmes. These need not be provided directly by the government, but should conform to

some basic standards of delivery. All newcomers should have the opportunity to participate in programmes provided locally, although they should not be obliged to do so. Language courses should be geared towards vocational and practical skills to make migrants self-sufficient in their host community. Well-honed orientation programmes should be provided which give an overview of public services, host cultures and community structures, and explain how to obtain further government assistance and information.

3) The European Commission should thoroughly research the roles that employers, trade unions, recruitment agencies, universities and other organisations receiving migrants play in the initial introduction of migrants into the host community. In doing so, it should draw on best practice – where it exists – within these organisations across Europe, and identify key areas for responsible action by these players.

4) The Commission should take the lead in working with stakeholders to develop codes of conduct to standardise the services offered to temporary migrants, foreign students, EU workers (with particular attention paid to those coming from the new Member States), and other categories of migrants who are typically excluded from integration strategies for political reasons. The development of codes of conduct should build on the European Handbook on Integration and the Common Basic Principles. The proposed Integration Forum and the network of National Contact Points on Integration are the ideal mechanisms for bringing together representatives at the EU level. In turn, having a concrete programme of work would ensure that the Integration Forum becomes more than just another talking shop.

5) The proposed Integration Fund should make local capacity-building in Member States a priority, to ensure that introductory programmes and language courses are made available to all newcomers. The capacity to provide these services currently varies from state to state – for example, countries with less experience of migration have fewer established networks – and there is a heavier burden on Member States with higher annual inflows of foreign nationals. The availability of funding could be linked to the willingness of applicants to implement the standards enshrined in codes of conduct and the Common Basic Principles.

6) Training courses should be developed for employers, university staff, and other providers of integration and introduction programmes to support new arrivals in accordance with the terms of the codes of conduct described above.

Endnotes

1. Rinus Penninx (2004) *Integration of Migrants: economic, social, cultural and political dimensions*, background paper for United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) European Population Forum.
2. EU-8 refers to the newest members of the European Union from central Europe: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
3. It should be noted that there is great variance within the EU. Foreign-born persons (including nationals of other EU Member States) in Finland make up just 2.5% of the population, and many of these are from neighbouring Scandinavian countries and the Russian Federation. Meanwhile in Luxembourg, migrants make up almost one third of the population. Other states with significant foreign-born populations include Germany (12.5%), Belgium (10.7%), and Ireland (10.4%). Source: Jean-Christophe Dumont and Georges Lemaître (2005) *Counting Immigrants and Expatriates in OECD Countries: A New Perspective*, OECD.
4. European Commission 'Communication on immigration, integration and employment', (COM(2003)336).
5. EUBusiness *EU finally agrees directive on family reunification*, 27 February 2003, www.eubusiness.com/Living_in_EU/104455.
6. Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
7. European Commission 'Communication on immigration, integration and employment', (COM(2003)336).
8. For detailed analysis of the labour force participation of third country nationals, see EUMC (2003) *Migrants, Minorities and Employment*.
9. For details, see the government website: www.acime.gov.pt.
10. Trevor Phillips *After 7/7: Sleepwalking to Segregation*, 22 September 2005. A speech given to the Manchester Council for Community Relations. The text can be found at www.cre.gov.uk.
11. For a critique on the Common Basic Principles, see EPC Issue Paper 27, *Beyond the Common Basic Principles on Integration: the next steps*, April 2005, available at www.theepc.be.
12. Given that introductory programmes last for an average of three years, it is unlikely that temporary migrants and students fall within the target group.
13. Email correspondence with Swedish Integration Board, February 2006.
14. Information taken from Ines Michalowski (2004) *An Overview on Introduction Programmes for Immigrants in seven European Member States*, and ICMPD (2005) *Integration Agreements and Voluntary Measures*.
15. This section draws on discussion during an EPC-KBF-GCIM organised conference, 'Can temporary migration solve Europe's labour crisis?' 29 November 2005. A report of the event is available at www.theepc.be.
16. Philip Martin (2003) *Managing labour migration: temporary worker programmes for the 21st Century*, International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva.
17. Ibid.
18. Nieves Ortega Pérez (February 2003) *Spain: Forging an Immigration Policy*, Migration Information Source.
19. European Commission 'Report on the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements set out in the 2003 Accession Treaty (period 1 May 2004-30 April 2006)', (COM(2006)).
20. Martin Ruhs (2005) *The potential of temporary migration programmes in future international migration Policy*, Global Commission on International Migration.
21. This section draws on a presentation made by Cristiane Kuptsch, Senior Research Officer at the International Institute for Labour Studies (based at the ILO), at an EPC-KBF-GCIM organised conference, 'Can temporary migration solve Europe's labour crisis?' 29 November 2005. A report of the event is available at www.theepc.be.
22. Martin Ruhs (2005) *The Return of the Guest Worker?* COMPAS (Centre on Migration, Policy and Society).
23. European Commission 'Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment', (COM(2003)336).
24. For a discussion of some of the problems faced by migrant workers in Ireland see: Immigrant Council of Ireland (2003) *Labour Migration into Ireland*.
25. European Civic Forum (2002) *The Exploitation of Migrants in Europe*.
26. European Commission 'The First Annual Report on Migration and Integration', 16 July 2004, (COM(2004)508) Final.
27. Philip Martin (1986) *Illegal immigration and the colonisation of the American labour market*, Center for Immigration Studies.

28. This can leave workers vulnerable to exploitation as the recruiter plays an intermediary role between worker, employer and the government, and the line between legal and illegal working, smuggling and even trafficking has become blurred. For more information about private recruiters, see Philip Martin (2005) *Merchants of labour: agents of the evolving migration infrastructure*, ILO Discussion Paper.
29. Statistics available at the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment website, www.entemp.ie.
30. Comments made by Martin Ruhs at EPC-KBF-GCIM organised conference 'Can temporary migration solve Europe's labour crisis?' 29 November 2005.
31. Philip Martin (2003) *Managing Labour Migration*, International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva.
32. Ibid.
33. Sarah Spencer and Anna Di Mattia (2004) *Introductory Programmes and Initiatives for New Migrants in Europe*, prepared for the Ministerial Conference on Integration, Groningen.
34. Ibid.
35. OECD (2003) *Internationalisation and Trade in Higher Education: Opportunities and Challenges*.
36. 2003 data taken from OECD (2005) *Education at a Glance*, supplementary table C3.7a (web only). Figures do not include foreign students in Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia.
37. Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
38. See for example the Netherlands Organisation for International Cooperation in Higher Education (Nuffic), EduFrance, Guide to Academic Training and Education in Germany (GATE), the British Council, and the Swedish National Agency for Higher Education.
39. See the Bergen *Communiqué* 'The European Higher Education Area – Achieving the Goals', adopted at the Conference of European Ministers responsible for Higher Education, 19-20 May 2005, available at www.bologna-bergen2005.no/.
40. Bologna Follow-up Group (2003) 'Exploring the Social Dimensions of the European Higher Education Area'. Conclusions from Bologna Follow-up Seminar.
41. UKCOSA (2004) *Broadening Our Horizons: International Students in UK universities and colleges*, available at www.ukcosa.org.uk/survey/index.htm.
42. Ana Deumert, Simon Marginson, Chris Nyland, Gaby Ramia, Erlenawati Sawir (2005) *The Social and Economic Security of International Students in Australia: Study of 202 student cases*, Monash Institute for the Study of Global Movements.
43. The Association for International Student Advisors, an offshoot of UKCOSA, is an example of a voluntary professional association that seeks to ensure some minimum standards in service provision.
44. Between 2002 and 2003, the number of foreign students enrolled in New Zealand higher education institutions increased by 49%.
45. The text of the Code can be found at: www.minedu.govt.nz/index.cfm?layout=index&indexid=6666&indexparentid=6663.
46. European Citizen Action Service (2005) *Who's afraid of EU enlargement: report on the free movement of workers in the EU-25*.
47. UK Home Office Accession Monitoring Report: May 2004-June 2005.
48. European Citizen Action Service (2005) *Who's afraid of EU enlargement: report on the free movement of workers in the EU-25*.
49. Ines Michalowski (2004) *An overview on introduction programmes for immigrants in seven European Member States*. Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs, the Netherlands.
50. European Citizen Action Service (2005) *Who's afraid of EU enlargement: report on the free movement of workers in the EU-25*.
51. The Guardian (2005) *Polish workers lost in a strange land find work in UK does not pay*. The article can be found at: www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,1387248,00.html.
52. Homeless Agency (2006) *Away from Home and Homeless*, Dublin.
53. See Commission website: http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/workersmobility2006/index_en.htm.
54. Presidency Conclusions of the European Council (November 2004). Annex I: The Hague Programme.

Executive summary

In the past few decades, migration to Europe has undergone a sea change in its complexity and composition.

‘Migration’ is no longer seen as a once-only movement of people who intend to settle in a new country. It now encompasses a much broader concept of mobility, covering those who move countries for work, study, social or humanitarian reasons.

Policies to manage these flows of people have also become more complex, and there has been a proliferation of legal categories of migrants, each with a broad range of rights and entitlements. Although most European countries recognise how important integration policies are – and that they need to be designed in concert with immigration policies – there is little sign that they are being broadened to take account of the new realities created by international mobility.

This paper addresses three categories of international migrants who are becoming more visible in Europe: temporary workers, international students and those who move from the new EU-8 Member States to the older EU-15. These three groups are vital for Europe’s continued economic success, but their social needs have been largely overlooked.

Most integration strategies and introduction programmes are targeted at people who arrive intending to settle permanently. Temporary workers, students and EU workers have to depend on the enthusiasm and resources of their local community – employers, universities or civil society organisations – for an introduction into their host society and help in integrating. When no such support is forthcoming, they risk becoming socially excluded, are less able to defend their rights and are more vulnerable to exploitation at the hands of unscrupulous employers.

Integration strategies should be targeted at all non-nationals, not just third-country nationals, and should begin on day one. They should foster a *functional* level of integration so that all migrants have the opportunity to become self-sufficient in their host society, regardless of how long they intend to stay. They need introductory programmes which include basic language tuition and practical information on public services, the host culture and community structures, as well as advice on access to housing, education and employment.

Since integration takes place on a number of levels and through a variety of actors, these programmes should be implemented as flexibly as possible.

The European Commission is well placed to play an essential role, by creating Europe-wide standards – or codes of conduct – for introductory programmes for all new arrivals. These guidelines should ensure that programmes to integrate non-nationals into Europe begin on the day they arrive, regardless of how these programmes are organised or who carries them out.

As well as encouraging labour migration to support Europe's economic needs, the European Year of Workers' Mobility should also emphasise how important it is to meet migrants' social needs.

Mission Statement

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