



















of Chicago, Boston University, the University of Wisconsin, Western Reserve College,<sup>32</sup> and the University of Pittsburgh all fielded programs that were attended by hundreds of civil affairs officers.<sup>33</sup> The Army did not design these schools to be mere replicas of the Charlottesville program. Although the universities had to adhere to the basic tenets of military instruction and focus on specific countries, the program directors found themselves free to create their own schedules, assignments, teaching



The SOMG trained students to interface effectively with the local population.

methods, and even student policy.<sup>34</sup> This made the learning environment more malleable than traditional military education. The schools also focused more on the abilities of the individuals as opposed to any rank, which created a different

dynamic than the usual hierarchy of the military. At Charlottesville, the importance of rank was greatly diminished in favor of the collegiality not only between students, but even among professors, who often found themselves similar in age and background to those they taught. The civilian universities took this one step further, allowing the students to select their own group leaders by vote instead of appointment by seniority.<sup>35</sup>

The Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS),<sup>36</sup> as the Army dubbed them, were far less concerned with the high-level regional and national planning for which the SOMG graduates one day would be responsible. Instead, the civilian-run program would focus its curriculum more on the day-to-day work of running an occupied city or town; therefore, the students spent more time studying the individual nations that the United States expected to occupy and their characteristics. Although the students eventually ranged in rank from second lieutenant to lieutenant colonel, most held junior grades and all were expected to be given assignments as specialists and technicians in the field instead of staff assignments, for which Charlottesville provided training. The CATS graduate was expected to deal directly with the people in occupied areas; the Charlottesville graduate primarily with his own and allied staffs.<sup>37</sup> At its inception, the most attractive aspect of CATS was its ultimate expandability, since its faculties could provide courses in many fields on short notice, and when training demands increased, additional universities could be brought into the program.<sup>38</sup>

Training, Tab 19, in Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington, DC: U.S. Center of Military History), 80.

32. Western Reserve College federated in 1967 with Case Institute of Technology and became Case Western Reserve University.

33. Records of these schools can be found at NARA, Entry A1 442, Record Group 389, Stack 290, Row 33, Compartment 34, Shelf 05-, Box 738. Box 739 holds the lecture material from the first course. Box 740 lists the biographies of civil affairs trainers. Box 741-752 lists all the information on students and course materials for the first seven classes of trainees.

34. Representatives of Harvard University, "Summary of Sessions of the University Conference at the School of Military Government," (Charlottesville, Virginia, 16 and 17 April 1943), NARA Record Group 389, Entry 442, Box 806.

35. Fred Eggan, "Conference on Training Requirements for Military Government Specialists," (16-18 April 1943), NARA Record Group 389 Entry 442, Box 806, Folder 337.

36. The program itself was called the Civil Affairs Training Program (CATP), whereas the schools were referred to as CATS.

37. U.S. War Department Bureau of Public Relations, "Civil Affairs Training Program," 13 February 1944, in PMG, MG Division, decimal file 000.7; MG Gullion, memorandum for the Chief of Staff, sub: Training of Civil Affairs Officers, 13 September 1943, in PMG, MG Division, decimal file 353, in Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the occupation of Germany*.

38. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the occupation of Germany*.

The value of the readily expandable program was proved sooner than anyone expected. In August 1943, the impending Italian surrender increased the requirements for Military Government (MG) trained officers, and by September the planning for the invasion of France, plus the possibility that the German defeat might come sooner than previously anticipated, raised the prospect of vastly increased demands in the near future.<sup>39</sup> At Charlottesville, the classes were increased to 175 students and the course reduced to twelve weeks. The CATS took in 450 students per month; in the last four months of 1943, Charlottesville and the CATS schools together turned out more than 2,000 graduates, thereby nearly filling the estimated wartime European requirements.

In addition to graduating hundreds of officers in a short period of time, the program also institutionalized these concepts by creating doctrine. The Army's Office of the Provost Marshall, which oversaw the school, prepared a number of reference manuals.<sup>40</sup> These references provided a common body of knowledge for both military governance specialists and combat soldiers. Furthermore, the U.S. Army developed a vast number of detailed training publications for civil affairs: Bank Accounting and Operations in Japan, Government Finance, Technical and Economic Troops in Occupied Europe, and Field Protection of Objects of Art and Archives, to name a few.<sup>41</sup> The level of detailed preparation for the World War II occupations reflects a remarkable grasp of both the nature and magnitude of the challenges of stability operations.<sup>42</sup>

## Evaluating its Effectiveness

Allied Military Government has earned the gratitude of the United Nations for a distinct and important contribution to the winning of the war.

Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark,  
Commanding General, Fifth Army, 1944

Although the curriculum and what occurred at the school itself are informative, the performance of the graduates is even more illustrative in evaluating the school's effectiveness. Those who graduated from the SOMG as well as CATS were assigned throughout the European theater in vast numbers. They brought with them many of the lessons they learned in Charlottesville and at the various universities they attended. While it is difficult to determine exactly what individuals retained from the lectures and group work, it seems that many officers looked back on their time with some conscious appreciation of the information they learned, as demonstrated through many postwar memoirs and publications.<sup>43</sup>

The tactical commander's appreciation of the value of military government has been nicely stated by Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, Commanding General of the Fifth Army, in a letter to the Senior Civil Affairs Officer of the Fifth Army, dated 9 November 1944:

*On the occasion of the first anniversary of the establishment of the Allied Control Commission in Italy, I should like to express my appreciation of the work which has been*

39. Ibid.

40. NARA Record Group 389, Stack 290, Row 34, Compartment 2, Shelf 4–6, Entry A1 443, Boxes 867–884.

41. Checklist of Civil Affairs Handbooks, Office of the Provost Marshall General, Military Government Division, Liaison and Studies Branch, 25 August 1944.

42. Russell R. Hula, "Stability Operations and Government: An Inherently Military Function," in *Short of General War: Perspectives on the Use of Military Power in the 21st Century* (Carlisle, PA: Department of the Army, 2010).

43. Raymond Joseph Parrott, "An Education for Occupation: Army Civil Affairs Training And Military Planning for Postwar Germany" (thesis, University of Virginia, 2008).

done during the past year ... Throughout the entire period of the Fifth Army's service in Italy, Allied Military Government (AMG) has been one of its integral parts ... The plans made by the AMG personnel at Fifth Army Headquarters have proven sound and their execution efficient. The Army Command has never had to concern itself with problems of civil government, which would have inevitably been a serious burden had AMG failed. Thus AMG has played an important part in the successive advances of the Fifth Army. In the cities of Salerno, Naples, Rome, Siena, Pisa, Florence, Lucca and Pistoia, in turn, as well as in numerous smaller cities and towns, the Fifth Army's AMG has created effective government. All of these cities had known the ravages of war and the destruction caused by a ruthless foe. The inhabitants were, as a rule, all but starving; public utilities were wrecked; banks and courts were closed; political unrest was widespread; educational institutions were either ruined or closed. So effective have been the efforts of AMB that these conditions were corrected in a remarkably brief time.<sup>44</sup>

The greatest impact by those trained at the school pertains to the postwar treatment of Germany. The Army created a "Basic Handbook for the Military Government of Germany" as well as numerous Civil Affairs guides in the summer of 1944, advocating a relatively progressive administration of Germany through the implementation of social, political, and economic recovery measures. The military's approach was a stark contrast to many of the punitive policies proposed in Washington. The majority of the team who wrote these manuals were SOMG and CATS graduates. Despite President Roosevelt's criticisms of the manual, which suggested relatively rapid rejuvenation of German industry, it became the unofficial policy in the American occupied zone.

General Lucius Clay was assigned to serve as the deputy military governor in Germany in 1945 and subsequently as the military governor. Upon taking up his position, he found himself

surrounded by graduates and instructors associated with the various MG training schools. Former SOMG director Cornelius Wickersham was his predecessor as deputy military governor and was responsible for much of the planning and creation of the staff that Clay inherited. Even some of the civilian advisors to the military governor had worked with the armed forces through stints as instructors in the various schools.



The economic impact of war on civilian society is as profound now as it was in postwar Germany, yet there is currently no trained cadre of professional nation builders equipped to operate in the early stages of post-conflict occupation.

Although the aforementioned testimonies provide evidence of the effectiveness of the schools, these impacts did not extend beyond the post-World War II reconstruction because the SOMG was disbanded and many of the MG/CA lessons were forgotten. This happened for several reasons. First of all, since its inception, the controversial nature of military government has made it equally objectionable in civilian and military communities. Second, in an attempt to clearly define civil-military control and fix responsibilities and requirements following the occupations during World War II, the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947 created the National Security Council with the initial purpose to serve as a mechanism to coordinate political and military questions.<sup>45</sup> In reality, this shifted

44. *History of the School of Military Government.*

45. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "History of the National Security Council," available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html>.

the responsibility for leading complex political-military challenges away from the military.<sup>46</sup> Third, the U.S. military quickly adjusted its strategies, doctrine, and capabilities to those based heavily on deterrence during the Cold War.<sup>47</sup> Demobilization pressures, in addition to the dwindling requirement for trained military government officers in the wake of successes in Japan and Germany, led to the contraction of training, resources, and infrastructure, leaving only a civil affairs shell with its capabilities predominantly in the reserves to play supporting roles in CMO.<sup>48</sup>

### Relevance to the Current U.S. Experience

The United States and the international community cannot shy away from the difficult task of pursuing stabilization in conflict and post-conflict environments. In countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, building the capacity necessary for security, economic growth, and good governance is the only path to long term peace and security.

National Security Strategy,  
White House, 2010

Revisiting this historical example is particularly relevant today since over the past decade, the United States has become more deeply involved in nation building than at any point since World War II.<sup>49</sup> Commanders today face problems similar to U.S. historical experience with nation building: they are forced to maintain order between mutually antagonistic tribes, create an indigenous security

apparatus, and foster economic growth, education, and law. The Philippines campaign of the early 1900s is such an example: while officers built schools, roads, clinics, markets, and courtrooms, they also scoured the country for guerillas and other rebels. Villages and provinces that accepted pacification received better roads to waterborne trade, schools, markets, and a number of other benefits. Those who collaborated were given most of the powers they had fought for as insurgents.<sup>50</sup> The current focus on nation building similarly is tied to counterinsurgency, yet some degree of nation building is essential to any transition from war to peace.

Furthermore, since the majority of current conflicts do not enjoy uniform security, governance, or economic conditions, there is a strong case for a corps of professionals who have experience in and extensive training for restarting governments, spurring economic growth, and creating indigenous security forces. The Three Block War concept, described by U.S. Marine General Charles Krulak, suggests that soldiers on the modern battlefield may be required to conduct full scale military action, peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian aid within the span of three contiguous city blocks.<sup>51</sup> This serves as an instructive example at the micro level of what an entire country may look like at a discrete point in time, with different cities and provinces having distinctly unique economic, governance, and security challenges. If the United States is to succeed in transitioning an occupied territory to a nation with a trajectory of economic growth, capable of governing its own people, the government needs to have professional nation-builders on call with real-world skills.<sup>52</sup> The School of Military Government and the Civil Affairs Training Program of the 1940s offer a methodology for training personnel in the tasks associated with military government and civil affairs in occupied territories.

46. Hula, 269.

47. Troy Thomas, "Control Roaming Dogs: Governance Operations in Future Conflict," *Military Review* (January–February 2006): 79.

48. Hula, 269.

49. Manuals such as U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations* and FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, both discuss at length governance and economic considerations as vital to a successful military campaign.

50. Brian McAllister, "Batangas: Ending the Philippines War," in *Between War and Peace*, ed. Colonel Matt Moten (New York: Free Press, 2011).

51. Gen. Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marines Magazine* (January 1999).

52. Nathan Hodge, *Armed Humanitarians: The Rise of the Nation Builders* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2011).

## Addressing the Issue of Contractors

The United States is severely handicapped by its undersized and underresourced civilian planning and operational capacity for preventative security, stabilization and reconstruction ... the U.S. military will require its own capabilities to meet security cooperation goals, abide by the Law of War during combat and ensure U.S. capability for reconstruction and stabilization in less permissive environments or sectors.

Kathleen Hicks,  
Center for Strategic and  
International Studies, 2010

By early 2003, nearly six in ten of the personnel running USAID's overseas missions were contractors.

Special Inspector General  
for Iraq Reconstruction,  
*Hard Lessons*, 2009

Although the military always has relied on contractors to support military operations, over the past ten years reliance on contractors has greatly increased, resulting in an expeditionary workforce that at times has comprised significantly more contracted than uniformed personnel.<sup>53</sup> While contractors are widely viewed as being vital to U.S. efforts in the region, their use does raise concerns of transparency and accountability. In particular, the use of contractors in the conduct of foreign policy-related tasks suggests that a SOMG is required to prepare the military, or government civilians, for nation-building tasks.

Contractors working for the U.S. military, the State Department, or other government agencies during contingency operations are classified as noncombatants who have no combat immunity under international law if they engage in hostilities, and whose conduct may be attributable to the United States.<sup>54</sup> Contractors who commit crimes while deployed are subject to U.S. prosecution under criminal statutes that apply extraterritorially or within the special maritime and territorial



Broad use of contractors in lieu of uniformed military personnel raises questions of accountability and transparency, not to mention fiscal efficiency. In post-war Germany, American troops, many trained at the School of Military Government, were unquestionably the face of the reconstruction effort.

jurisdiction of the United States, or by means of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007 (P.L. 109-364) makes military contractors supporting the armed forces in Iraq subject to

53. Moshe Schwartz, *DoD Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis*, Congressional Research Service, August 2009.

54. Jennifer K. Elsea, *Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal Issues*, Congressional Research Service, January 2010.

court-martial jurisdiction.<sup>55</sup> Despite congressional efforts to expand court-martial jurisdiction and jurisdiction under MEJA, some contractors may remain outside the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, civil or military, for improper conduct overseas.<sup>56</sup>

In addition to the legal questions of the use of contractors, there also is the question of which private security functions are “inherently governmental” (vital to U.S. interests) in nature and therefore ought to be performed by public officials. This includes those actions that can “determine, protect, and advance United States economic, political, territorial, property, or other interests by military or diplomatic action, civil or criminal justice proceedings,” contract management, and functions that can “significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private persons . . .”<sup>57</sup> Inherently governmental actions include, among other things, conduct of foreign relations and the determination of foreign policy, and the direction and control of intelligence and counterintelligence operations.<sup>58</sup> This definition suggests many of the tasks and responsibilities that contractors are providing in Iraq and Afghanistan should be performed by government employees.

The justification for using contractors frequently has been heralded as a cost-saving measure, but

the numbers tell a different story. For example, individual private security contractors are paid between \$600 to upwards of \$1,000 per day. In contrast, a noncommissioned officer with twenty years of experience costs about \$150 per day. Although this disparity does not account for the expense of health care, retirement, and the education investment in the noncommissioned officer, the difference is still staggering. This is even more worrisome when one considers how the contractor received his or her training. Many of those contracted to perform such services are either former military or retired military. So, the ancillary costs may in some cases be borne by the military itself, through previous expenditures on training and/or retirement on top of paying the contract.<sup>59</sup> Finally, the method of contracting on a “cost-plus” basis<sup>60</sup> provides no incentive to minimize costs, since the contracting company has 100 percent of its expenses covered, plus overhead, plus a profit.<sup>61</sup> With the complicated layering of subcontractors, in many cases the fee for services can be as high as quadruple what the individual providing the service is being paid.<sup>62</sup>

If the reality of using contractors to provide inherently government functions actually is not providing cost savings, then the U.S. government should develop the capability to provide the services currently contracted. This paper does not

55. Elesa, 2010.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid. § 5(2) (B) (i), (ii), and (iii).

58. 48 C.F.R. 7.503.

59. According to a 2011 report by Rick Wrona at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “Currently, private military and security companies tout the cost effectiveness of their services, but they neglect to consider that the sunk costs regarding the training of many contractors has already been provided by the United States military. Maintaining the current situation—in which the United States Government pays hundreds of thousands of dollars to train an individual, then loses the individual to the private sector, then re-hires the same individual as a security contractor while, simultaneously, paying hundreds of thousands of dollars to train a replacement service member—is nonsensical.”

60. Cost-plus means the U.S. government pays all the company’s expenses, plus its costs, plus 2 percent profit on top.

61. The most illustrative examples of the astronomical costs of contracting are in the security contractor space. An article by Joseph Neff and Jay Price of *The News & Observer* describes the confusing cost structure of just one contract. For an individual hired to provide security, the salary was \$600 a day or \$180,000 per year. The contracting company, Blackwater (now Xe) in their example, added a 36 percent markup, plus its overhead costs, and sent the bill to a Kuwaiti company that ordinarily runs hotels. That company, Regency Hotel, tacked on its costs for buying vehicles and weapons and a profit and sent an invoice to a German food services company called ESS that cooked meals for the troops. ESS added its costs and profit and sent its bill to Halliburton, which also added overhead and a profit and presented the final bill to the Pentagon.

62. This example is cited in “The Use of Private Contractors in Iraq proves costly,” by Joseph Neff and Jay Price, *Associated Press*, October 25, 2004, and is recounted again by Neff in “Private Military Contractors: Determining Accountability: The reliance on private contractors and a web of subcontractors can come with a staggering price,” *Nieman Reports*, Harvard University, Summer 2008, accessed March 26, 2011, <http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/100037/Private-Military-Contractors-Determining-Accountability.aspx>.

address the security force requirements per se, but the number of contractors required for inherently government functions should be dramatically minimized. The proposed school of military government would provide training and education for the skills currently required to fill the capability gap identified through the use of contractors. This paper is not suggesting that maintenance and/or food service functions should not be provided by contractors, but that where personnel are hired to



Civil Affairs officers are currently often tasked with designing and implementing education policy, a task for which SOMG graduates were much better prepared.

provide expertise that directly impacts the nation building of an occupied territory, those personnel should be government employees. Furthermore, those government employees should be adequately prepared for the endeavor on which they are about to embark. The school of military government would provide the body of knowledge and the outlet for government employees to provide the requisite skills in nation building.

## Refashioning a School of Military Government

Re-establishing an authentic School of Military Government could provide the foundational basis to once again allow trained commissioned and non-commissioned Army and Marine officers to “take charge” on the ground and utilize all available resources—military, non-military, U.S. and indigenous—to stabilize an area suffering from upheaval, both during combat or stability operations and in the critical weeks and months post hostilities.

Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Brent C. Bankus and James O. Kievit,<sup>63</sup>  
*Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 2008

There is a strong case to be made that recreating an educational institution that trains personnel for rebuilding societies after conflict or natural disaster is required. Nation building education and training does not exist in one central place within the current military structure. Many military educational programs touch on issues related to nation building tangentially or as a component of a broader curriculum. Civilians tasked with supporting the military also have inconsistent training and experience. The historical experience with the SOMG provides a possible model for educating a group of nation-builders to both implement and oversee the complexities of a postwar transition by the United States military. It should draw upon the expertise of those within academia, the private sector, and government to provide an educational curriculum and capability for analysis and assessment of ongoing nation-building efforts. Like its predecessor, the faculty would conduct research and publish manuals pertaining to the countries likely to require some form of nation building.

There are several reasons to reestablish a SOMG. First, it would provide civil affairs officers an educational program to properly prepare them

63. Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Brent C. Bankus and James O. Kievit, “Reopen a Joint School of Military Government and Administration?” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 1743-9558, 19, no. 1 (2008), 137–143.

for the critical and highly specialized roles they are expected to play. Secondly, there is a broader need for nation building expertise than civil affairs alone can provide. Intelligence officers and strategists also should be trained and educated in military government and civil affairs considerations so they can adequately advise military commanders throughout the war planning process. Establishing a school and a cadre of personnel for the purpose of military government and civil affairs provides a unique opportunity to draw expertise into and out of the military specifically to serve in niche roles that may not always be required. Civilians who have a specific expertise would potentially be put through the school and assigned a rank and position commensurate with their abilities and experience. This in turn would relieve the U.S. government of its overreliance on contractors and dramatically reduce the information asymmetry of purchasing an external capability. Finally, related to contractors, such a school has the potential to present a less expensive option than our current approach. The following section will address each reason in greater detail.

## Improving Civil Affairs Expertise

Our Civil Affairs (CA) operators are for the most part uneducated and untrained for the roles we ask them to fill. We need real expertise in power systems, transportation and distribution, fuels and energy (utilities), banking and finance, payroll operations, sanitation, water purification, communications (including mail, radio and television broadcasting, telephone, data and satellite operations), contracting and personnel management. CA officers and NCOs are currently pressed into jobs they might know something about, but too often we expect a reservist who works for a bank to know how to set up a banking system. It should be obvious that this does not work very well.<sup>64</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel Mark L. Kimmey,  
U.S. Army Reserve, Civil Affairs,  
*Army Magazine*, 2005

Although contemporary military doctrine places responsibility for civil-military operations on the shoulders of military commanders, civil affairs forces provide expertise to commanders in the interface with civil societies in the following areas: rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information.<sup>65</sup> In practice, however, there are few requirements to be qualified to serve in one of the aforementioned functional specialties. There are cases where reserve officers have a civilian career or an academic background in a particular functional area, but this is the exception rather than the rule. Even when civil affairs personnel possess expertise in a particular function, the type or level of expertise may be a mismatch. For example, a public school teacher may be identified to have a specialty in the area of public education, but be ill-suited to design a provincial or national-level school system.

64. Lieutenant Colonel Mark L. Kimmey, "Transforming Civil Affairs," Association of the United States Army's *Army Magazine*, March 2005.

65. U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*, September 2006.

















