



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All Together Now?

African Americans, Immigrants and the Future of California



Manuel Pastor
Juan De Lara
Justin Scoggins

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This report is the result of many hands, many eyes, and many voices. While the three main authors are more than willing to take the responsibility for any miscues or misstatements, we are hesitant to take too much credit for any insights we might offer. For that, we thank the wide range of community leaders who have inspired us over the years with their commitment to multiracial organizing, and the somewhat smaller but no less inspirational circle that agreed to speak with us in the process of this research.

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In 1971, Marvin Gaye inspired a generation by blending Motown rhythms with political consciousness. In his signature song, "What's Going On?" he wrote:

Mother, mother
There's too many of you crying
Brother, brother, brother
There's far too many of you dying
You know we've got to find a way
To bring some lovin' here today

In a world of economic distress and widening disparities, there are still too many crying and dying. While some may seek to divide our nation by more and more slices, we are healthier when we bridge across difference and reject the polarization of communities by race, nativity, or any of a series of other markers of difference. We are, in short, better together than apart – and there is a way to embrace the challenges we face in coming together as simply growing pains on the way to a common future. We hope this report contributes to that spirit and that future.

For a copy of this report as well as a longer version with more methodological details, visit:
<http://csii.usc.edu/publications.html>.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

California is often on the cutting edge of demographic change. Between 1980 and 2000, the state experienced an ethnic transformation in which we became the first large “majority-minority” state – exactly what is projected for the U.S. between now and 2050. In hindsight, our bumpy ride through that change foreshadowed politics elsewhere in the nation: our 1994’s Proposition 187 highlighted our conflict about undocumented immigration in ways echoed in Arizona’s 2010 law, SB1070, and in restrictionist policies being considered and passed in other states.

California is also a harbinger of the social dynamics soon to sweep other parts of the nation as a result of this demographic change. While most analysts have focused on the shrinking white (once-) majority, another important story has been the growing proximity of African Americans and the state’s immigrants. Increasingly, immigrants, particularly Latinos, have moved into traditionally Black neighborhoods, transforming (and often revitalizing) the urban landscape with new businesses, new churches, and new ways of living – but also generating a palpable sense of loss as the *hood* has become the *barrio* and Black political and cultural influence has eroded.

Adding to this are economic concerns in a state economy shaken not just by the current bout of high unemployment but also by longer-term processes of deindustrialization and dislocation. In this context, immigrants have helped to prop up sagging businesses, providing new consumer demand as well as loyal and often less expensive labor. But while immigrant employees have revitalized California’s economy and labor movement, some residents have rightfully worried about the negative impacts on native-born employment and wages, particularly of less-skilled and less-connected Black workers.

As African Americans and immigrants increasingly bump up against each other in their neighborhoods and the economy, the media has focused on the tensions and conflicts. The targeting of Blacks by immigrant gang members, the hostility of older African American residents to newcomers, and the loss of Black political power as Latinos gain ground all make for spectacular reporting. But missing in that portrayal are the daily accommodations in our neighborhoods and schools, the common struggles

to reduce disproportionate incarceration, and the organizing around housing, jobs and the environment that has crossed the boundaries of race. Missed is the story of collaboration in the face of conflict.

This report tries to get at just that – how to build strong African American-immigrant alliances that honestly deal with points of tension and build towards a stronger, more just California. Here, we synthesize the results of a much longer multi-year study in which we offer an empirically-grounded analysis of the good and the bad of these demographic and economic changes, honestly exploring the challenges and possibilities of living together, working together and organizing together. Our basic findings are straight forward:

First, living together is common but complex:

- *Many African American neighborhoods have experienced a sharp increase in immigrant residents, some with the Black populations remaining relatively stable, some experiencing a sharp decline. These latter communities may be especially important to understand and assist as there is often a mismatch between existing African American community institutions and new immigrant populations.*
- *Black and immigrant presence have increased in a series of neighborhoods – much like in the American South. One set of both populations is moving to older suburban areas for better school opportunities. Another set moved to the suburban fringe where Blacks and immigrants found cheaper housing but are now stranded amongst foreclosures and unemployment.*
- *Finally, the immigrants mixing it up with African Americans are not just Latino. Asians make up a sizable share of immigrants in California, and in neighborhoods where African Americans and immigrants live together. This is especially true in neighborhoods where both populations are newly arrived, but also in places where there has been a historical presence of African Americans.*

Second, economic competition cannot be denied but it is not the main story:

- *Despite the differences in neighborhood types, communities are actually more united than divided by the facts of high need, significant disadvantage,*

and lower opportunities. This, as well as the general condition of African Americans and immigrants in the California polity, suggests many reasons for a common agenda.

- *A common agenda might be forged on the economic front.* State and national evidence indicates either mixed or positive effects from immigration on the native-born, even lesser-skilled African Americans. For those who are more educated, there also seems to be some evidence of immigrants “bumping” better educated Blacks up the occupational ladder and toward higher wages.
- *A more occupationally-specific analysis does show some displacement of African Americans by immigrants.* Those seeking to build alliances ignore this at their peril – this is a real lived experience and it feeds tensions and resentments. On the other hand, African Americans can gain from education and job mobility – and promoting this should be part of the immigrant-Black agenda in California.

Third, pulling communities together requires dialogue and a forward-looking agenda:

- *A number of community-based organizations have developed new mechanisms to both manage tensions and build towards a common ground* – both in the neighborhoods we explore and

elsewhere. Leadership development is key but the first step is creating the space for new and honest dialogue about what is shared and what is different.

- *Seemingly specific issues can be effectively connected to both populations.* The criminalization of Black (and Latino) youth has its parallel in the excess enforcement of a broken immigration system; the racial profiling embodied in Arizona’s 2010 law echoes an experience all too familiar to African Americans. If we pursue economic opportunity and fair treatment for all residents, the initial cacophony of difference can give way to a concert of common interest.
- *A common and unifying agenda should be based on a vision of “everyday social justice.”* “Everyday” means three things: the need to address daily needs around education, the economy, and the social and physical environment; the need to ensure that dialogues go beyond a more comfortable middle-class and multi-ethnic elite and reach grassroots participants; and the need to realize that this will require effort every day and over the very long haul.

A number of key organizations and institutions are working to build this more nuanced common ground. Labor unions, now frequently powered by immigrant mobilization, have created special



programs to organize African American workers. Youth organizers have created new coalitions of youth that tackle both the need for English language instruction and the end of “zero-tolerance” policies that disproportionately impact young African Americans. Meanwhile, parents – sometimes eyeing each other warily across the chasms of language and culture – have understood that they will only make education work if they, in fact, work together. Faith-based institutions are calling on traditions of dialogue and justice – ready to remind their parishioners to heed their better angels – and contributing to both the one-on-one meetings and the larger community actions that help people recognize common cause.

The broad range of experiments in California suggest some lessons for those seeking to support immigrant-Black alliances. They include the need for patient relationship-building; the need to strengthen both immigrant and Black infrastructure in rapidly changing neighborhoods; the need for developing policy agendas that serve multiple constituencies; the need to understand that groups sometimes must organize separately before they organize together; the need for special attention to youth, parent, and faith-based leadership; and the need to continue supporting research that can inform the field.

Also critical is a new frame or story that can tie groups together. Black-immigrant alliances are too often perceived as a way of securing African American support for comprehensive immigrant reform. But this is a notion of alliances that is transactional, not transformational. It is an approach that tries to figure out what to trade and whom to trade with rather than where and how we can and should stand together.

Looking at the commonality of the neighborhoods and the shared experience of economic distress, we believe that there is ground for a broader and more mutual strategy, one based on the notion of “everyday social justice” and reliant on the community-building and grassroots organizing that it will take to make that notion a reality. Such an approach would be rooted in America’s long struggle to realize the promise of democracy and human rights. It would stress the notion of common interests and common destinies, emphasizing the way in which African Americans have laid the groundwork for America’s commitment to equality and fairness, insisting that immigrant rights will be insecure as long as African Americans remain vulnerable to racial profiling and economic despair, and arguing that the nation will be hard-pressed to address social inequalities as long as it maintains nearly twelve million undocumented residents in a limbo of insecure rights and inadequate protections.

This is not a novel idea. Martin Luther King, in his famous “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” called on us to understand that we exist in “an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny.” In our urban areas, our older suburbs, and even in some of our far-flung exurbs, African Americans and immigrants are living together, working side-by-side, and praying, hoping and struggling for a better future for themselves and their children.

A better California is possible. But it will require that we get beyond the hype of racial tension – that is too often a political cover for structural inequalities – and act as one state and one people with one future.

INTRODUCTION

When the popular media pays attention to the relationships between African Americans and immigrants in California, it is generally to offer a splashy story about gang conflicts, political competition and job displacement. What is missing in the picture are the daily interactions, accommodations, and coalitions that are taking place all across the Golden State.

This report tries to look at the story beneath the story, building on several years of research examining the residential trajectories of immigrants and African Americans in California, exploring the extent of competition in the state's labor markets, and uncovering and cataloging best practices and promising strategies for building interethnic ties.

We find that there are indeed reasons for worry – many neighborhoods that have experienced rapid demographic transformation have a mismatch between populations and institutions, and there does seem to be some degree of occupational displacement of Blacks by immigrants.

At the same time, there are also reasons for hope: African Americans and immigrants share a wide range of common concerns with regard to employment and education, the degree of overall economic competition seems to be limited while the range of economic complementarity is wide, and there are a series of innovative and inspiring efforts to bring communities together under a banner of mutual dialogue, mutual understanding, and mutual interests.

Acknowledging the very real difficulties wrought by demographic change, but also correcting the all too common picture of intractable racial tension is critical not just to California but to the American future. As usual, what happens in California does not stay in California – much as our overall demographic shift to “majority-minority” between 1980 and 2000 prefigured what the U.S. will experience in the years 2000 to 2050, California's underlying transformations and negotiations involving African Americans and immigrants will be an important part of the American story going forward.

Indeed, one standard measure of segregation, the residential dissimilarity index, shows that the shifts toward living together were most pronounced in the nation's top metros for Blacks and Latinos between 1980 and 2000 – and the shifts in residential proximity were especially strong in California. In the past decade, the South has become a new destination area for many immigrants even as Blacks are also returning in a

reversal of the Great Migration of the early twentieth century. Pointing to the ways in which new organizing efforts in California overcome tensions and build ties between African Americans and immigrants will be of use beyond our own state borders.

This report uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis to address these issues. The first section examines the changing demographics of California's diverse communities. Using a novel index to measure the residential exposure of African Americans to immigrants, we demonstrate that Blacks have seen the sharpest increase of any U.S.-born ethnic group in proximity to immigrants in the last few decades – and that the exposure is more concentrated (i.e., in fewer neighborhoods) than for any other U.S.-born group in California.

The pattern is, however, not a matter of African Americans moving to immigrant neighborhoods but of immigrants increasingly gaining ground in what were once nearly all-Black areas of the state. For example, the historically Black neighborhoods that contained around 20 percent of California's Black population in the 1980s now rank in the highest 2 percent of the state in terms of Black proximity to immigrants. While some of these neighborhoods also saw an increase in African Americans, most experienced a rapid decline in the Black population, creating a palpable sense of displacement and loss.

But the actual picture is more complicated than it appears. Those neighborhoods with the most dramatic decline in Black residents also grew at a much slower rate than the rest of California, suggesting that immigrants may have replaced households that chose to move elsewhere. Moreover, there are quite a few neighborhoods where both the African American and immigrant presence have increased, particularly in the far-flung “exurbs” of Stockton, Vallejo and the Inland Empire but also in nearer suburbs where both groups have moved for better schools and improved opportunities.

Unfortunately, both old and new African American and immigrant neighborhoods tend to have lower incomes, poorly performing schools, and concerns about neighborhood safety and security – suggesting a common interest in improving education, economics, and the environment.

However, a perceived sense of economic competition often stands in the way of finding common ground. We take this issue up in the second major section

of this report and present a more complex picture of the economics: despite the occasional cry that immigrants are severely constraining Black advancement – often voiced by those who have no history of caring about this topic – researchers have found very little national or state-level evidence of negative labor market impacts on African Americans, even for those with modest levels of education.

Of course, people do not really live and work in states or nations – they live in neighborhoods and work in regional labor markets. So to parallel our neighborhood-based analysis of residential proximity, we examine whether a rising presence of immigrants in California’s regional labor markets helps or hurts African Americans (as well as other groups) in those same labor markets.

Our results generally resonate with past research: there are some limited negative impacts on unemployment for lesser-educated African Americans but also positive impacts on wages, particularly for those African Americans with more than a high school education. Interestingly, undocumented workers – supposedly the most worrisome of competitors – do not exhibit a significant impact on Black unemployment but do present a positive wage effect for more educated African Americans (the sharpest negative impacts from the undocumented are actually on U.S.-born Latinos, not a group usually clamoring for more border enforcement).

But what about those spectacular cases familiar to so many observers of the labor market – the transformation of janitors and hotel workers from a significant Black workforce to one that is mostly immigrant? To get at this, we construct an occupational exposure index (similar to the residential measure) and find that there is indeed a high level of occupational displacement (although there also seems to be a positive effect on relative wages for those who stay in the occupation).

While the two stories – little displacement in regions, some displacement in occupations – may seem at odds, they are not. Many of those who no longer mop floors have gone on to better jobs, often helped by the buoyancy of an economy kept afloat with immigrant labor. In fact, the best remedy for any negative effects on less educated African Americans is actually just more education. At the same time, the complexity of effects suggests that those who ignore the economic realities in favor of simple calls for “coming together” do so at their political and organizing peril.

Our third main section turns to community organizing efforts, in which residents, workers, students, and parents have reached across the lines of language and race to secure living wages, enhance economic development, and revamp education. We cover a variety of examples, from union-based campaigns to youth-centered education initiatives to faith-based attempts to bring together communities by building inter-faith traditions and aspirations.



We draw from this research a series of lessons, including the importance of long-term relationship building, social movement infrastructure, and policy agendas that can work across multiple constituencies. We also stress the need to acknowledge the balance between meeting separately and organizing together – finding common ground does not erase difference and sometimes the best way to build an alliance is to first strengthen a group’s own understanding of its history and issues. At the same time, we suggest that this should be a first step toward collaboration.

We close the report with two shorter sections, one that offers a series of recommendations

to funders – this was a funded report, after all! – and one that offers an argument that is aimed more at organizers and other change agents: We need a new framework – not one that is designed to lure African Americans to support immigrants but rather one that builds on shared traditions of and commitments to social justice as a way of creating uncommon alliances.

We call this framework “everyday social justice,” arguing that this concept embodies the idea of shared interests in a better future by stressing the way in which African Americans have laid the groundwork for America’s commitment to equality and fairness, and by forcing the realization that immigrant rights will be insecure as long as Black communities remain vulnerable to racial profiling and economic despair. Likewise, this approach also holds that African Americans will suffer from economic insecurity as long as a shadow population lives in limbo without the rights or recognition wrought by a broken immigration system.

Two caveats are in order before we proceed. The first is simply to acknowledge that we are building on a series of excellent reports on Black-immigrant conflicts and coalitions, including *Building Black-Brown Coalition in the Southwest: Four African American-Latino Collaborations* (Alvarado & Jaret, 2009), *Crossing Boundaries, Connecting Communities: Alliance Building for Immigration Rights and Racial Justice* (Black Alliance for Just Immigration, 2010), and *African American-Immigrant Alliance Building* (Grant-Thomas, Sarfati, & Staats, May 2009).

Each of these reports has profiled organizations across the United States and has found some emerging practices for building coalitions between African Americans and immigrants/Latinos that are quite relevant to the Golden State, including the United Congress of Community and Religious Organizations in Chicago (working to bring together Blacks, Muslims, and Latinos), the Miami Workers’ Center (bringing together African Americans with Haitian and Latin American immigrants) and the efforts of the NAACP and Casa de Maryland (an immigrant rights group), among many, many others.

We contribute something unique, we hope, in the depth of the demographic and economic profile we offer prior to examining such practices, as well as in the specific focus on California, a place where both the demographic changes

and political possibilities have made the Black-immigrants alliance especially important.

The second caveat involves the limits of what we cover in this report. Established in 2008, the Center for the Study of Immigrant Integration (CSII) has continually stressed the importance of elevating the needs of the African American community as part of a fuller immigrant integration agenda, partly because Black neighborhoods are where immigrants often settle, partly because African Americans are key allies in the pursuit of immigration reform, and partly because no integration agenda can succeed without including everyone.

Because this is a long-term focus for us, there are some reports we have already done (for example, a study of neighborhood demographic change conducted for Second Baptist Church in Los Angeles that we highlight in a text box below) and many areas left to explore. As a result, some important issues are not tackled in this report, including neighborhood safety, gang competition, and even the specific role of Black immigrants in urban areas. We ask for patience; as Jesse Jackson famously said at the 1984 Democratic Convention, “God is not finished with me yet.”

But this report – focusing as it does on neighborhood change, economic competition, and alliance-building to pursue the common good – is a first analytical step. After all, demographic projections tell us that African Americans and immigrants will surely play an important role in the economic and political future of California’s major cities and changing suburban regions. Still, demography is not necessarily destiny. In the absence of a real policy agenda, growing population counts will not be enough to curb the history of disenfranchisement and marginalization that have plagued African Americans and immigrants in the past.

Access to new opportunities for both groups will require a movement for social justice that builds capacity and leverages assets and insights from many sources. Community-based organizations, labor unions, business associations, faith-based initiatives, civic leaders and many others will all play key roles. Just as important will be the new and mutual understanding that comes from those one-on-one grassroots conversations that create a sense of each others’ histories and needs. And a better California will result when we realize that we are one state and one people with one future.

I understand that there's a feeling of 'wait, my community has changed' ... And immigrants who are coming into the community don't know how hard African Americans fought to be in those places ... [against] the restrictive covenants ... [and] not to provide that information creates a situation in which there's a heightened level of tension.

–Angelica Salas, Coalition for Humane Immigration Reform, Los Angeles (CHIRLA)

The changing demography of South L.A. and older inner ring suburbs like Compton has produced a flurry of stories in newspapers and magazines, many focused on tensions in schools or struggles over political power on city councils. But anecdotes are not the same as data and while the squeakiest wheel – the neighborhood with the most publicized conflicts – might get the media grease, this does not necessarily provide us with a full and inclusive picture of the areas where change is occurring.

Demographer John Iceland (2009) has tracked immigrant integration in American neighborhoods, laying a foundation for thinking about how race shapes residential assimilation. This research is especially important as places like the South, where the color line is more entrenched, become new immigrant destinations (Alvarado & Jaret, 2009). His work uses non-Hispanic whites as the group against which integration is tracked. He finds that white immigrants are integrating the most, Asians and Latinos integrating moderately, and Black immigrants the least.

While this is of interest, there is still a startling gap in the literature: there is virtually nothing written on the shifting residential integration of U.S.-born Blacks – that is, African Americans – with immigrants. The studies that come closest to this topic focus on Latinos and African Americans, often through the prism of

neighborhood change and ethnic succession (Clark, 1996; Denton & Massey, 1991; Lee & Wood, 1991).

But despite some of the popular perceptions, not all Latinos are immigrants and not all immigrants are Latinos. And in California, the share of Latin Americans in the immigrant population (about 55 percent) actually declined slightly during the 2000s, after growing between 1990 and 2000. In any case, an expanded demographic analysis on this topic – specifically on U.S. Blacks and all immigrants – has been wanting.

Heading where others have seemingly feared to tread, we sought to construct a measure to identify areas where immigrants and African Americans are getting the most face time – congenial or not. To do this, we developed a neighborhood-level “Black Immigrant Proximity Index” (BIPI), modeled on a standard measure of group interaction known as the “exposure index,” which is regional in scope. The exposure index is commonly used in the fields of sociology and demography, and essentially measures the likelihood that members of one group (in this case, African Americans) might encounter a member of another group (in this case, immigrants) in their neighborhood, for a given region or state. Because the exposure index is designed to measure the exposure of one group to another for a large area (e.g., just one number for the

entire state!), it does not shine any light on which neighborhoods are driving that exposure. Hence the need for a BIPI – which essentially measures how much each neighborhood (census tract) in California contributes to the statewide exposure of African Americans to immigrants


– captured by the exposure index, with a higher BIPI meaning higher exposure.

Other measures of regional group interaction exist that could have been employed, but seemed less appropriate to the task at hand. For example, one standard in the sociological literature on residential segregation called the “dissimilarity index” measures the percent of a group that would need to move to a different neighborhood to be equally distributed with another group in a metropolitan area or region. Broadly speaking it measures the opposite of exposure

Blacks did not establish their civil rights successes all by themselves. It always takes a coalition of people in this country to make something work. I think that Browns have to realize that getting up there by yourself is not a very good place to be at – that as a nation, as a people, as humans, we owe something to each one, no matter what our color is.

– Rev. Norman Copeland, Fifth District, African Methodist Episcopal Church

Figure 1: Exposure to Immigrants for the U.S.-born by Race/Ethnicity in California



and could theoretically be reversed (or inverted) to get at exposure, but is problematic for our purposes because it treats each group in a parallel fashion rather than focusing on the experience of *one* group relative to another (i.e., exposure of *African Americans* to immigrants rather than the exposure of immigrants to African Americans, with the former more salient because the patterns of movement are asymmetrical).

Before delving into what our analysis of the neighborhood-level BIPI tells us, it is useful to look at what its parent, the exposure index, says about overall exposure of African Americans to immigrants in California. When we do (in Figure 1), it is easy to see why giving attention to Black-immigrant interaction is so important. As of 2005-2009, U.S.-born Asian Americans and U.S.-born Latinos (perhaps unsurprisingly) still had the highest degree of exposure to immigrants, about 15 percent higher than the measure for African Americans. *But* Black exposure to immigrants was nearly 40 percent higher than that experienced by whites – and increases in exposure by African Americans to immigrants between 1980 and 2005-2009 had actually outpaced the growth in that measure for all other groups by a substantial margin, including U.S.-born Asian Americans and Latinos.

This suggests that African American-immigrant interaction has been growing rapidly and is particularly

salient at this time because sudden change often provokes higher levels of social discomfort. Still, the problem with a broad statewide exposure measure is that it misses the asymmetry and neighborhood specificity of the increasing interaction. The reality is not that there is a high and increasing immigrant presence in all neighborhoods that African Americans call home, but rather a significant increase in immigrants in certain neighborhoods where African Americans dominate (or dominated) such as Watts, East Oakland, and West Fresno.

The BIPI helps us get at this neighborhood-level dynamic. For the neighborhood unit in this analysis, we began with the census tract. Census tracts are drawn by the U.S. Census Bureau to approximate neighborhoods. They usually have between 2,500 and 8,000 residents and when their boundaries are drawn, they are constructed to bring together communities that are socio-economically similar. We conducted the initial examination using data and geographies from the 2000 Census, then updated the work with tract-level information on nativity, income and other key variables from the 2005-2009 pooled American Community Survey (ACS). We did not use the most recent 2010 Census because that count includes only race, age, and ethnicity and does not allow the nativity and socioeconomic data we needed for community comparison (see the full report for a more detailed

explanation of this and numerous other detailed calculations – we guarantee fun as well as insight for all those who, like us, love the nerdy details).

As noted above, the BIPI tells us not about the overall *level* of exposure (that is the job of the exposure index), but rather how much each census tract in the state contributes to that overall level of exposure (the distribution of exposure across neighborhoods). This allows us to identify which census tracts (neighborhoods) are contributing the most and have the highest level of exposure of African Americans to immigrants, as we do below. Before we do, however, it is worth noting how the distribution of exposure to immigrants across neighborhoods is distinctly different for African Americans as compared to other groups.

Despite its name, the novel Black Immigrant Proximity Index (BIPI) can be applied (with the appropriate name change) to other U.S.-born racial/ethnic groups to see how exposure to immigrants is distributed across census tracts and thereby better understand how spatially concentrated neighborhood-level interactions with immigrants are in California. Comparing the Immigrant Proximity Index – the IPI, if you will – across groups, we find a telling, straightforward conclusion: Black exposure to immigrants is concentrated in fewer tracts than for any other group. In 2005-2009, the 10 percent of tracts in California that experienced the highest levels of *Black* local-level exposure to immigrants accounted for about 55 percent of the total exposure. In comparison, the 10 percent of tracts statewide that experienced the highest

A FAN OF MAN

Del Paso Heights, a neighborhood within the city of Sacramento, has undergone a transformation.

In a neighborhood where about 30 percent of the residents are African American, 30 percent are Southeast Asian, and about 20 percent Latino – a big change from when it was 70 percent African American in the 1960s to 1980s – it was rare to see individuals of these different ethnic groups engage with one another. Today, these interactions are commonplace throughout Del Paso Heights and it has made the neighborhood a better place to live, said Richard Dana, executive director of Mutual Assistance Network (MAN), a Sacramento-based nonprofit focused on making Del Paso Heights a socially-active and economically viable community.

However, the change toward not just living together but actually talking together did not happen overnight. It took strategic concerted effort and a lot of patience.

Dana, who worked for MAN for four years before becoming its leader in 2000, said his organization identified many issues in Del Paso Heights that contributed to the segregation of the ethnic communities. The main problem, he said, was that there were not many opportunities for these groups to interact. This was actually a problem that MAN contributed to by having programs targeted to specific populations.

So in 2003, the service provider shut down all its programs that were geared toward targeted communities, like African Americans, foster youth, and the elderly. Instead, MAN created programs for the community as a whole. MAN also created spaces where members of different ethnic groups were sure to cross paths.

Del Paso Heights did not have a sports league for children; MAN created one. The neighborhood lacked healthy food choices; MAN opened a produce market in which they procure produce from local Hmong gardeners and sell it to residents. Most of those purchasing the produce are African Americans, Dana added.

The neighborhood also now has active and integrated walking clubs, dance classes, art workshops, summer camps and afterschool programs.

“We believe that the worst thing that you can do is to create an activity or program or service that is designed toward one ethnicity, one group, one income level ... it has to be for all,” Dana said.

In creating these programs, MAN ignored actual and perceived tensions that existed between the different ethnic groups. The idea was to create a positive space for people to engage and be socially active and let relationships develop naturally. Their first action plan was to create programs for children because through these programs, parents would be involved as well.

It worked.

So every baseball season, African American, Hmong and Latino parents sit side-by-side cheering for their team, one team.

Source: Author interview with Richard Dana of Mutual Assistance Network

levels of *white* local-level exposure to immigrants accounted for only 25 percent of the exposure.

While the derivation may be complex, the message is not: native-born Blacks have the highest *concentration* of exposure to immigrants (i.e., their statewide exposure index to immigrants is a result of fewer tracts or neighborhoods), partly because native-born Black residents are far more geographically concentrated than any other group. While this is followed closely by native-born Asians (who are probably more exposed to their foreign-born ethnic counterparts), even U.S.-born Latinos have less concentrated exposure and U.S.-born Anglos have significantly less concentration in their exposure. In short, if there are neighborhoods where populations are bumping, it is occurring much more for African Americans and much more in particular locations. This clearly has the makings for intense interactions – including a potential sense of displacement or loss – and we look at the different sorts of neighborhoods below.


SHARING SPACE

What type of spaces and neighborhoods are being shared? Using a methodology that can be found in a longer report, we identified 87 distinct communities that ranked most highly in the state for African

American exposure to immigrants in the year 2000. These communities often consisted of single census tracts but sometimes involved adjoining census tracts we combined using distinct “neighborhood” definitions taken from the real estate website, Zillow.com (reflecting California’s obsession with housing, Zillow has one of the best sets of such definitions), community planning documents and other materials. While we also included in our analysis the latest neighborhood demographic data – from the pooled, five year, tract-level 2005-2009 ACS – we built the community definitions using geographically consistent data from 1980 to 2000, as this was the period of most change and set the terrain for the organizing that we explore in the qualitative section of this report.

The vast majority of the neighborhoods with a high exposure of African Americans to immigrants are in the Los Angeles region which boasts 38 such communities. This is followed by the Bay Area with 22, the Sacramento area with eight, and the Inland Empire with six; the remainder are scattered throughout the Central Valley (Bakersfield, Fresno, and Stockton areas), with one community in the Salinas/Monterey Bay area (in the city of Seaside), a few in Vallejo, and a few in the San Diego region. Figure 2 shows the numbers of neighborhoods by metropolitan region (or what is called in the literature “Core Based Statistical

Figure 2: Number of Communities with High African American Exposure to Immigrants by Metropolitan Area




Areas”); Table A1 in the Appendix offers a full list along with the categorization we explain below).

Taking advantage of a “natural break” in the data, we classified all communities in the list that were at least one-third African American in 1980 as “historic” African American communities. These communities – which were soon to witness a dramatic transformation through the entry of immigrants such that they would eventually rank high on our Black Immigrant Proximity Index – contained more than 20 percent of the state’s Black population in 1980.

There were, of course, other communities that emerged to eventually rank high in 2000 on the proximity index but were less than one-third African American in 1980 (actually 34 percent, as that was the “natural break” in the data). These areas contained only about 1 percent of the Black population in 1980 – but their share of the state’s Blacks tripled by 2000 (remarkable given the general desegregation and deconcentration of African Americans over the time period) and all experienced extraordinarily rapid increases in the African American presence – indeed, the population weighted average for growth was a startling 261 percent! We generally term these areas “emerging” in the analysis below.

However, for the purposes of the mapping and discussion in this section, it is useful to distinguish between two groups within this category of emerging areas: those “not historically Black but growing” and “rapidly emerging African American” communities. The dividing line we draw here also follows a natural break between those communities that had less than two-thirds growth in the Black population between 1980 and 2000, and those that had more (generally much more). The “not historically Black but growing” (or “slowly emerging”) areas are a small minority of the emerging group – indeed, just eight of 24 – but they are generally much different than the “rapidly emerging” areas.

For example, East Carson in the L.A. area and the Allendale and Dimond communities in Oakland just missed the “historic” mark (i.e., they were less than one third Black in 1980) and experienced moderate Black population growth of around 10 percent for Carson and 25 percent for the Oakland areas over the 1980-2000 period, followed by a slight decline in 2005-2009 (with the Black population more or less retaining its share of the overall population; see Table A1 for details on this and other locations and see Figure 3 for a “cheat sheet” diagram on how we characterized the neighborhoods).



But this is surely different than the explosive growth of the African American population in “emerging neighborhoods” within Stockton. Here, the Black population tripled between 1980 and 2000, and then continued to grow another 27 percent between 2000 and 2005-2009 – or the even more dramatic changes in the emerging neighborhoods in Fontana, Rialto, Victorville and Moreno Valley (all in the Inland Empire) which grew sixfold between 1980 and 2000, and another 21 percent in the stretch leading up to 2005-2009.

Sacramento is a particularly complex case. Several of its neighborhoods fall into the “not historically Black but growing” group: Avondale’s Black population grew by only 10 percent between 1980 and 2000 while neighborhoods like Glen Elder and Parkway South posted gains on the order of 60 percent, albeit not enough to raise the Black share much given an even faster rise in the numbers of immigrants; between 2000 and 2005-2009, the numbers in Parkway South continue to grow slightly while they actually fell in Glen Elder and were virtually unchanged in Avondale. None of these neighborhoods were more than 22 percent Black in 1980 and that percent ranged between 11 and 18 percent in 2005-2009.

On the other hand, South Sacramento also had two “rapidly emerging” neighborhoods, as well as one neighborhood that was historically Black and grew in numbers (even as the share of African Americans fell – that is West Del Paso Heights and its environs) and a South Sacramento neighborhood that was historically Black and experienced a moderate decline in the number of African Americans. Sacramento, in short, is both the capital of California and has nearly every type of Black-immigrant experience one can imagine – and a significant part of the residential interaction is with Asian immigrants, providing further diversity to the mix (see the text box, “A Fan of MAN”). Indeed, other researchers voice their struggle to find examples of Asian-Black alliances (Grant-Thomas, Sarfati, & Staats, 2009) – and while it is true that the preponderance of examples tend to be Latino-Black, one of the many advantages of studying California is exactly the diversity reflected in Sacramento.

Aside from Carson, Los Angeles had one other area that was “not historically Black but growing:” St. Mary’s in Long Beach where Black population *growth* was just over 50 percent from 1980 to 2000 but the *percent* Black fell slightly. However, the real action was in the rapidly emerging neighborhoods in Gardena, Hawthorne, Lawndale and East Westchester, places where the Black population grew more than fivefold between 1980 and 2000

as a broad movement west from South L.A. gained steam. Interestingly, all of these places saw a subsequent decline in the number of Blacks after 2000, with declines on the order of 20 percent.

As suggested, this growth in places like Gardena and Hawthorne seems to have been accompanied by a rapid decline in the number of Blacks in the nearby historically African American communities of South L.A. Statewide, there were three different sorts of experiences for historically Black areas. Once again we took advantage of “natural breaks” in the data to consider three categories: (1) those historically Black neighborhoods that saw more than a 30 percent decline in the Black population between 1980 and 2000; (2) those historically Black communities that saw a more moderate decline in the Black population between 1980 and 2000 of less than 30 percent; and (3) those historically Black communities that actually saw an increase in the Black population between 1980 and 2000 (in some cases, this increase came with a decrease in the share of Blacks but the absolute number grew). We call these various communities “rapidly declining,” “moderately declining,” and “growing,” respectively.

While change has taken place since 2000, the classifications are still valid in relative terms. Considered as a whole (that is, adding up the populations in all the communities in each category), the historically Black and “growing” areas experienced a 15 percent decrease in the Black population between 2000 and 2005-2009, the historically Black and “moderately declining” area experienced a nearly identical 15 percent decline in the Black population over the same period, and the “rapidly declining” areas experienced a 16 percent decrease in the Black population. The pattern suggests a continuing deconcentration of the African American population – and also signals that the changes were roughly similar across the categories.

This decamping to greener (or at least other) pastures was not completely even across the specific neighborhoods, of course, but very few neighborhoods would have jumped categories – say, from “moderately declining” to “rapidly declining,” if we had used the whole 1980 to 2005-2009 period (and adjusted the breaks accordingly) rather than the 1980-2000 demarcation. The two historically Black but “growing” San Diego communities posted slight declines and so would have shifted to the moderately declining camp. A redrawn line between the “moderate” and “rapidly declining” categories – 45 percent to account for the additional decline in the 2000s – would have led to a few swaps within the categories. The most surprising of these switches are North Watts and East Palo Alto,


both of which staged partial recoveries in the Black population between 2000 and 2005-2009. Still, it is best to think of even these cases as having grappled with the political and social tensions of “rapid decline” given the very sharp patterns of changes over the 1980s and 1990s, and that that is the dynamic to which organizers were responding in the “best practices” discussion below.

Figures 4 and 5 show where many of these various historic communities (as well as the “not historically Black but growing” and “rapidly emerging African American” communities) are located. To conserve space, we confine our attention in the maps to the Bay Area, Sacramento, and Stockton on the one hand, and Los Angeles and the Inland Empire on the other. As for the other areas, we noted earlier that two San Diego communities with a high BIPI actually grew their African American populace slightly between 1980 and 2000 (the Lincoln Park community and the eastern areas of Valencia Park, Emerald Hills and Alta Vista). However, the sharp

“And one of the ways we are able to bring different ethnicities together is the underlining theme is improving the quality of life. It is a common goal that everyone is striving towards.”
 – Rev. Brenda LaMothe

increase in immigrants has led to a big decline in the Black *share* of the population (from 62 percent of these neighborhoods combined in 1980 to 35 percent in 2000); in the 2000s, the African American population actually fell slightly as did its share of the overall population. Meanwhile, rapid decline for Blacks was the pattern for Bakersfield, Fresno and the Salinas area (there the driver is the Seaside community, where the African American population has declined along with the jobs at the now shuttered Fort Ord).

Several patterns seem clear. The first is that many Black communities in both the Bay Area and Southern California have experienced a sharp to moderate decline in the African American presence as immigrants moved in. In no other areas of the state is this more pronounced than in the heart of Los Angeles County, along the spine of South Los Angeles. The pattern of decline is also present, however, in parts of San Francisco, Oakland, Richmond and



East Palo Alto. Moderate decline is seen in parts of Sacramento, Stockton, and San Bernardino.


These historically Black neighborhoods were left to deal with the legacies of inequality – poor-performing schools, high unemployment rates, and lower earnings – at the same time that a growing immigrant population created new demands on chronically underfunded social institutions. Helping Black-run social service and organizing institutions make the transition to adjust to a new population requires good data, financial and other resources, and a new approach (see the text box, “A Changing Community, a Continuing Mission”).

But what is equally striking about the pattern are the places where the number of both African Americans and immigrants have grown – often at the far-flung edges of metros (such as Vallejo and Stockton in the north and Rialto, Fontana and Moreno Valley in the south) but also in places well within the metro area that are slightly better off. In these places, where both populations may have been seeking relatively better schools for their children (like the cities south of Oakland, like San Leandro and Hayward, and the cities west of South L.A.).

We realize that this approach can miss some important facets of the lived experience of both African Americans and immigrants. It is, for example, a rather Black-centric definition with regard to immigration – but we are attempting to locate the places where the African American exposure to immigrants is high. Clearly, it is the case that immigrants have spread elsewhere, as well. Still, this starting point makes sense as the residential change we have been witnessing in California has generally been of immigrants moving into neighborhoods well-established by African Americans and not the other way around.

It is also true that we are missing areas where both groups moved but not to the same neighborhoods. For example, Palmdale and Lancaster went from having nearly non-existent African American and immigrant populations to being significant hubs for both groups. However, immigrants and African Americans are actually relatively segregated from each other in those locales and so they fall short on our neighborhood proximity measure (although they may still be engaged in city-level political and other interactions).

It is also the case that this approach – requiring that the neighborhood have a relatively high value for the



contemporary Black exposure to immigrants – could miss areas, such as the eastern part of South Los Angeles, where such a dramatic shift occurred before 2000 that there were few African Americans left and so the exposure index was low. We explore this issue in detail in the appendix and show that while including those locations would have allowed us to examine a larger share of the experience of California’s Black population after 1980, most of those neighborhoods were proximate to the areas we do examine – and given that our focus is on contemporary alliance-building and not passages of the past, our geographic approach is reasonable, representative, and appropriate.

Finally, there are places where Blacks have increased in numbers but immigrants have not. However, if we rank neighborhoods based simply on the number of Black residents, the vast majority are adjacent to or in very close proximity to communities that were identified by looking at the African American exposure to immigrants. This residential proximity suggests that changes are headed to those areas as well – that is, this analysis suggests that the future of Black California is increasingly wrapped up with the future of immigrant California.

THE DEMOGRAPHY OF THE NEIGHBORHOODS

In the longer version of this report, we drill down and present an extensive analysis of the neighborhood types using a wide range of Census data and information about schools (some of that demographic analysis is available in Table A2 in the Appendix). Here, we opt to offer just a few highlights that are key to understanding the nature of the communities and the possibilities for tensions and alliances.

To make matters simple, we collapse the “not historically Black but growing” and “rapidly emerging African American communities” into one “emerging” category (mostly because there are so few “not historically Black but growing” communities that separation – while analytically useful for the maps and need for the discussion above – would result in very uneven categories). We wind up with 28 historically Black communities experiencing rapid decline, 28 historically Black communities experiencing moderate decline, seven communities that were historically Black and posted modest gains in the numbers of African Americans between 1980 and

A CHANGING COMMUNITY, A CONTINUING MISSION

Founded in 1885, the Second Baptist Church has been a pioneer in the struggle for civil rights in Los Angeles. Located near Central Avenue, the former heart of African American L.A., it was the home congregation to pioneering activist Charlotta Bass and during the civil rights movement, Martin Luther King, Jr. preached from its pulpit.

In the last several decades, the neighborhood around the church has changed dramatically – once nearly all Black, it is now 88 percent Latino (more than half of whom are immigrants), with the remainder being African American. The new residents often struggle with issues of both working poverty and achieving a voice in civic affairs – exactly the challenges that faced an earlier generation of African American migrants who came from the South to Los Angeles to find new opportunities.


While most members of this historically African American church now live elsewhere in Los Angeles, they remain invested (figuratively and financially) in the neighborhood. And like an increasing number of similar churches, Second Baptist is figuring out how to adapt its legacy of community service and social justice to today’s circumstances.

To take initial steps in that direction, Second Baptist commissioned a report that came to be titled “Celebrating the Legacy, Embracing the Future: A Neighborhood Study for Second Baptist Church.” Over 600 community surveys and extensive neighborhood census data were collected to sketch a picture of the needs of the neighborhood. One of the research partners who did the work, Esperanza Community Housing Corporation, is a mostly immigrant-serving institution. As a result, the research process itself helped to create new bridges and ties; and the Church is committed to moving this forward, considering study recommendations such as holding a church-wide forum, collaborating with local workforce development organizations, and connecting with regional social movement organizations.

By collaborating to define its most productive role in a changing neighborhood, Second Baptist is demonstrating leadership not just for the community in which it is located but for other communities going through similar transitions and tribulations. But this is no surprise. With the civil rights movement in its institutional DNA, Second Baptist is now working to address the social justice and community building imperatives of the 21st century.

For the full report, visit <http://csii.usc.edu>.

Figure 6: Population Growth and Racial Distribution by Community Type



2000 (the least populated of our categories), and 24 communities considered to be emerging (whether rapidly or more slowly).

As it turns out, the main finding is that among the different community types with high African American-immigrant exposure, the commonalities far outweigh the differences when they are contrasted with the state as a whole. For example, the African American communities we depict are almost twice as likely to experience various social challenges – such as the percent of people falling below poverty, the unemployment rate, or the share of working age people with less than a high school degree – as the rest of California.

There are, however, interesting differences in terms of population growth. Figure 6, for example, shows both the sheer population growth and the demographic composition for our various community types. To

understand the trends, however, it is useful to realize that the overall growth rate in California between

1980 and 2005-2009 was 53 percent. In this context, the areas of rapid and moderate Black decline were actually growing much slower than the average for the state, suggesting not displacement but replacement by immigrants; the historically Black but growing areas, which often had stable or slightly declining

Black shares, grew slightly faster than the rest of the state; and the emerging Black areas grew more than twice as fast as the rest of the state, attracting immigrants and African Americans alike.

As for the ethnic composition of the various community types, a few trends stand out. First, the historically Black but rapidly declining communities saw the fastest growth in the Latino population, with an increase from 15 percent in 1980 to 56 percent in 2005-2009; this is why Black-Brown issues are of

“I think there’s a whole series of things that we can point to that have led to this crisis and led to massive disinvestment of urban communities, disinvestment of public infrastructure. And why the solution is not blaming other communities of color. The solution is developing a pro-active economic justice strategy that can benefit all working class communities ... as we develop thoughtful, proactive strategies for developing multi-racial alliances.”
 – Kent Wong, UCLA Labor Center

special importance in those places. Second, among the *historic* African American neighborhoods, those that grew had the lowest share of African Americans to begin with – the share fell even further, from 53 to 37 percent in the time period pictured - suggesting that African Americans have chosen to move into areas with a lower Black concentration. Finally, while the emerging Black communities experienced the fastest growth of African Americans (in both numerical and percentage terms), Latinos actually grew faster, jumping 29 percentage points in the 1980 to 2005-2009 time period while the increase for Blacks in the same era was only 7 percentage points.

Meanwhile, immigrants grew from 12 percent of the total population to 37 percent in the rapidly declining areas. But we should compare these figures to the rest of the state, where the immigrant share increased from 15 percent in 1980 to 27 percent in 2005-2009 – that is, the immigrant share in areas where the Black population rapidly declined definitely surpassed statewide levels but not by an excessive amount. When we look at all other community types with high exposure of African Americans to immigrants, the increase in the immigrant share was roughly parallel to that of the state as a whole. One thing to note is that the most recently arrived immigrants tended to settle in moderately declining (not rapidly declining) neighborhoods.

Where did these immigrants come from? While it is not surprising that Mexican immigrants represent a majority of the foreign-born population in historic and emerging African American communities, what may be surprising is that immigrants from Southeast Asia represent a sizable presence in the growing and emerging communities; they surpass Central Americans, who make up a larger share in the declining communities. This has implications for the sort of cross-cultural dialogue and education that would need to take place in order to build a common agenda. While immigrants in the rapid and moderate declining communities are more heavily Latino and thus some progress could be made under a more bi-racial/bi-cultural leadership structure, it seems that an effective coalition may need to be substantially broadened in the growing and emerging communities.

These areas with high African American exposure to immigrants are also much younger communities – but this is largely driven by the immigrants themselves. In emerging African American communities, Blacks appear to be much younger (and household sizes much larger) than in the other community types, a likely result of families with children moving to these areas in search of a better domestic situation (e.g.

schools, housing, and environment). The median age of African Americans is highest in the declining communities – perhaps because more elderly and less mobile populations have tended to stay behind. This could also have specific implications for organizing, particularly the need – and opportunity – to build intergenerational as well as interracial ties between Black and immigrant residents.

INCOME, EDUCATION AND COMMUNITY

Demography is important but economic well-being is crucial. As might be expected, all the identified communities had significantly lower incomes than California as a whole. In 2005-2009, for example, median household income was between \$15,000 and \$26,000 lower than the state median depending on community type, suggesting that economic distress was a key commonality. Within the various community types, household income was lowest in moderately and rapidly declining African American communities and highest in growing and emerging African American communities, with the household income difference being even larger for just the Black residents of both communities. This supports the notion that such communities were taking shape due to slightly better-off residents with aspirations of homeownership.

On the other hand, median household income actually grew between 1980 and 2005-2009 in historically Black but “rapidly declining” areas (only), mostly because immigrant households with more earners arrived. Median household income fell on the order of 9 to 13 percent in the other high BIPI communities, with the fall actually greatest in the “emerging” areas, perhaps because the lower- to mid-income African Americans and immigrants that entered these neighborhoods were hard (and early) hit by the recession. Since, as noted, household income can be propped up by more earners in the same household, another important pattern is the poverty rate (which adjusts for household size). Figure 7 shows that poverty rates are clearly highest in the two declining categories, but rates actually did fall in the historically Black and rapidly declining areas, rose somewhat in the historically Black and moderately declining areas, and rose most sharply in the historically Black and growing and the emerging communities. Those communities have, in short, been brought closer to the front in a race that no one wants to win.

Part of the income gap, of course, has to do with much lower levels of education in these communities. Figure 8 shows the percentage of population with a bachelor’s degree. Three trends stand out. First, the

Figure 7: Percentage of People Below Poverty Line





Figure 8: Percentage of People with a Bachelor's Degree or Higher



average California resident is two to three times as likely to have a bachelor's degree or higher than a resident in one of the communities examined. Second, the education level in the growing areas is slightly higher – and even higher than in the emerging areas, suggesting that the really high growth areas attracted more working class individuals than professional elites. Third, while all areas posted improvements in the percent of the population with a B.A., progress was much lower than in the state as a whole, suggesting continuing – and indeed worsening in relative terms – disadvantage in a labor market that has been generating increasing rewards to education.

As for those currently in school, we used geographic information systems (GIS) strategies to determine proximate high schools and then analyzed these by community type. Several trends emerge; the first of which is demographic. We should note, however, that the data does not allow us to break out immigrant students, except indirectly by those learning English. This is not a perfect marker since many students may be immigrant and English-proficient, while others may be U.S.-born but not English-proficient because they are growing up in immigrant households. We therefore focus here just on ethnicity and scores, with Figure 9 illustrating that the high schools in

these communities already had a student body that was largely non-white in 1981-82; by 2009, the high school students in all of the community types identified were more than 90 percent students of color, compared to California's 70 percent.

However, there were important changes within this “new majority” demographic. First, all three historic African American community types saw around a 30 percentage point decline in the share of African American students over the period, taking them from between 50 and 60 percent African American in 1981 to only 20 to 30 percent African American in 2008. Decline also occurred in the emerging communities but it was less severe, falling from around 33 percent to 21 percent. Second, while there was a modest increase in the share of Asian American students in the growing and emerging communities, virtually all the slack was created by the declining Black (and Anglo) shares.

In terms of preparation for the future, the high schools in the various communities profiled all underperform compared to the state. For example, while there have been important improvements in the past decade, the high school-level Academic Performance Index (API) – an index compiled by the California Department of Education based on a variety of standardized tests –





Figure 10: Mean Academic Performance Index, 1999-2009



scores in these communities lags the state by between 12 to 17 percent, depending on the community type (see Figure 10; in calculating the percent gap above, we adjusted the scores to account for the fact that 200 is the lowest score possible). Educational improvement is an imperative for these communities.

We also compared the API scores for just Blacks and Latinos in these areas to the California-wide API for white students as well as to the California-wide API score for co-ethnics. In general, African Americans and Latinos have lower scores than whites in the state, with African Americans 26 percent lower and Latinos 18 percent lower. However, both groups do even worse in these areas of high African American-immigrant exposure. Blacks have been doing worse in the rapid and moderately declining areas and Latinos have been doing worse in the moderately declining and historically Black but growing areas. Both fare best in

the emerging areas, suggesting one reason why they are headed there – but even in those locations, they still underperform compared to the state by a wide margin.

Poorer, less educated and less educating – the communities where African American and immigrants are cohabiting are not positioning either group well for the future. While the abundance of need and the scarcity of resources can create tensions and problems, there are significant commonalities and important opportunities for organizing across generations and ethnicities. Often standing in the way, however, is the sense that one group’s progress necessarily comes at the expense of another – and there are few realms where this sense of zero-sum competition is felt more sharply than in the economy.

There is a perceived competition between African American workers and Latino workers. The successful organizing of janitors in Los Angeles is heralded as a major breakthrough for the American labor movement. But the reality is that previously that was an African American unionized workforce that was transformed into a Latino immigrant non-union workforce. The same is true in the hotel industry; previously, it was predominantly African American unionized workforce that went from a Latino immigrant non-union workforce, and now it is has been re-organized, but with very few African American workers in either of those industries.

– Kent Wong, UCLA Labor Center

At the macro-level, economists generally agree that immigration is a plus for the U.S. economy. Immigrant labor, it turns out, is both a substitute and a complement to native-born workers and the complementary effect – increasing the pool of labor and keeping industries alive in the U.S. – tends to dominate, yielding positive employment and income gains for the native-born as well for the overall economy. But it is also clear that saying this is a bit like telling someone who is unemployed that the recovery is gaining ground – it just does not feel quite real, particularly to low-skill workers who have seen the immigrant share in their own job category rise even as wages and employment prospects have shrunk.

To get at these more micro-effects, economists have tried to estimate the impacts of immigrants on high school dropouts, the idea being that these are the workers most susceptible to the substitution effect. One prominent researcher, George Borjas of Harvard, has estimated that the increase in immigrant workers in the U.S. caused about a 5 percent decline in real wages for natives without high school diplomas over a 20 year period (1980-2000; see Borjas, Grogger, & Hanson, 2010). However, when Borjas accounts for how immigrant labor may grow the economy, the negative wage effect falls to 2.4 percent over that 20 year period. Meanwhile, Giovanni Peri (2006) of UC Davis suggests a negative impact on the unskilled in California of around 1 percent and Lisa Catanzarite (2004) has argued that those who may most strongly feel the competition

from immigrants are U.S.-born Latinos in very similar occupations and industries as the newly arrived.

Of course, whatever the national or state econometric studies tell us, the real effects are the ones most directly felt by African Americans in particular places at particular times. Research that aggregates across geography can sometimes mask extremes, especially for groups who disproportionately fall in the lower-skilled segments of the labor market. Studies of certain service professions and construction sectors suggests that immigrant Latinos have indeed displaced African American workers (Stoll, 2006; Waldinger, 1997). On the other hand, Pastor and Marcelli (2004) offer a statistical overview of substitution effects in California and suggest that undocumented workers are actually bumping native workers into better jobs.

To get to the bottom of this, we need to drill down into the data and figure out how education, occupation, and regional difference affect immigrant and African American job outcomes. Those with higher levels of education are more likely to experience the positive economic effects of immigration – more labor, more business, and more product consumption – because they may be shielded from direct competition with immigrants due to their unique degrees or skills. When it comes to occupations, immigrants of a similar skill level may not generate increased competition if they are working in different occupations. Consider, for example, the construction industry where the employment possibilities for, say, plumbers' work might be enhanced by more basic immigrant labor helpers (Peri, 2007a, 2007b).

Finally, regions matter because they provide the geographic scale of the labor market for most job seekers and because they affect immigrant settlement patterns. For example, immigrants are more likely to move to places with strong regional economies that can harness their labor. Additionally, there are positive effects on native-born workers that are directly related to the underlying regional economy. More importantly – given our focus on competition – what seem to be negative consequences on other workers from less skilled immigrant labor may actually be the result of regional factors, including the changing composition of industry (Raphael & Ronconi, 2007). Accounting for regional effects is critical.

Below, we take an approach similar to past studies in that we make use of regional variation in changes in the immigrant composition to assess economic outcomes for African Americans *but* we also consider different

Figure 11: Regional Geographic Definitions Used



skill groups, as defined by educational attainment. We also analyze the impacts on other native-born racial/ethnic groups to see whether the experience of African Americans is any worse or better than that of other native-born workers. Finally, we separate out the impact of unauthorized Latino immigrants – those that are supposed to most undercut less-skilled native-born Blacks – and examine their specific impact.

We then go beyond the education measure to look at the effects in specific occupations. We do so for several reasons. First, a simple breakdown by race and education can miss the changes experienced by particular workers – even if an ex-janitor eventually finds a better job, this is still a process worthy of attention and concern (and it is certainly of concern to that janitor). Second, occupations matter to pay levels. While we would expect a certain degree of homogeneity in the education levels among all parking lot attendants, we would not expect that a parking lot attendant with a master’s degree will necessarily earn more than one with a high school diploma (and, in this recent recession, way too many recent master’s graduates have figured this out).

Third, while occupation is partly determined by education, there are some occupations that immigrants are excluded from for other reasons (such as English language ability or discriminatory practices), just as there are some occupations from which African Americans find themselves excluded. Moreover, there can be specific skills associated with a job that are unrelated to education or years of general work experience (e.g., having a class A license enabling the operation of a tractor-trailer). Finally, we tackle occupation partly because there have been many well-publicized cases of a whole occupation seeming to turn immigrant. Squaring this lived and real experience with what often seem like muted effects at a macro level seemed crucial in the current political context.

The data we use in our analysis are “micro-data” – that is, the individual answers to the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses, as well as a pooled sample of the individual data from the 2005, 2006, and 2007 American Community Surveys (we use these years rather than more recent versions because the 2008 and 2009 Surveys do not include the hours worked variable we need accurately calculate wages). A unique feature of the microdata is that while persons who were employed at the time of the survey report their primary

occupation, those who were unemployed or not in the labor force at the time of the survey also report an occupation – their most recent occupation – as long as they held a job at some point in the previous five years. Thus, we are not missing those who might have been recently displaced from an occupation when we are trying to examine the correlation of African Americans with the share of immigrants in the occupation.

As with any methodology to tease out effects of immigration on African American employment and wages, ours has limitations. First, while it is good to have a high level of occupational detail, it also means that some occupations have a small sample size. We attempt to sidestep this issue by focusing on the occupations with the greatest number of Black workers, and thus those which are most important to the group overall. This allows us to capture only part of the picture – though one that we would argue is the big and important part. Second, by relating the potential effect of immigrants to detailed occupation, we are assuming that workers do not change occupations frequently. Finally, we are not really looking at causal factors here – that has already been largely addressed by previous research in California – but rather providing a more contextual view of the specific occupations and regions in which such shifts in Black economic fortunes have taken place and how immigrants fit in.


“I’m constantly reminding them, you gotta make sure that you don’t leave one group behind; they have to go together. If they can’t go together, they don’t go at all.”
–Rev. Brenda LaMothe

WHO’S WORKING WHERE

The ten regions we include in our analysis are those which surfaced in our residential proximity analysis above – those metropolitan areas that contained neighborhoods in which African Americans find themselves living amidst large shares of immigrants. The regions are depicted in Figure 11. The Salinas area is a bit problematic in that San Benito is not included in 1980 and 1990 due to technical difficulties explained in the longer report. However, the other areas are consistent groupings of whole counties and familiar to those who study the California economy and society.


All of the regions saw a substantial change in the demographic composition of the labor supply between 1980 and 2005-2007. This “universe” is all persons ages 18-64 not living in group quarters – that is, jails, military quarters, dorms, etc. As Figure 12 illustrates, all regions saw a substantial increase in the immigrant

Figure 12: Change in Race and Immigrant Composition of Labor Supply by Region, California: 1980 & 2005-2007



Universe: Working age persons (18-64) not in group quarters.

Figure 13: Change in Education Levels of Labor Supply by Race and Immigrant Status California, 1980 & 2005-2007



Universe: Working age persons (18-64) not in group quarters.

share of the workforce. The increase in the immigrant share of the labor supply in each region has been accompanied by a large decline in the native Anglo share, increases in the shares of native Latino, APIs and Others, and a mix of changes (up and down) in the share of native Blacks. Interestingly, each region grew their share of immigrants in a roughly proportional way – both in share and ethnicity – from 1980. While we and others might have expected the more buoyant parts of the state to be more attractive to immigrants, immigration has actually not been focused on only particular regions of the state and has not been only from Mexico – it has affected every region and come from multiple countries of origin.

Of course, these immigrants bring very different levels of education to their positions in the labor force. Figure 13 gives the statewide picture: despite great progress made since 1980, native Blacks and Latinos are still far less likely than native whites and Asians to be armed with a college degree when navigating the competitive waters of the labor market. Asian immigrants have both the highest levels of college completion and a high school dropout problem that rivals that of African Americans. Latino immigrants are by far the least educated which is partly why the worries about competition with less-skilled African Americans have centered on them; adding to that, of course, is the

residential proximity demonstrated above and hence the immediate jostling in very localized labor markets.

Of course, there might be minimal negative impacts – or even positive impacts – if immigrants and natives in the low education labor pool tend to sort into different occupations. While some natives in increasingly “immigrant occupations” would bear the brunt of the new competition, such occupations could be complementary to others that provide employment for native, low-educated workers (recall the example of plumbers and general labors). To examine this dynamic in broad strokes, we turn now to a regional analysis that looks first at race and education, then turns to specific occupations.

EDUCATION, WAGES, AND THE IMMIGRANT IMPACT

A common approach used in looking for evidence of labor market competition between natives Blacks and immigrants nation-wide is to examine the relationship between African American employment and wages and the share of immigrants by metro area. A more sophisticated approach would consider the ways in which immigrants can follow the demand for labor

Figure 14: U.S.-born Black Labor Force Participation Rate and Percentage Immigrant by Region and Year, California, Decadal* Changes: 1980 to 2005-2007




Figure 15: U.S.-born Black Unemployment Rate and Percentage Immigrant by Region and Year, California, Decadal*





Figure 16: U.S.-born Black Wage and Percentage Immigrant by Region and Year, California, Decadal* Changes: 1980 to 2005-2007



and natives can flee a saturated labor market – either of which would mitigate the effect immigration might otherwise have had on the structure of wages and employment in a region (Ottaviano & Peri, 2005). However, recent studies have found that the measured impacts of immigrants on native workers using the simpler approach are actually quite similar to the results from more complex efforts that control for in- and out-flows of natives and immigrants (Raphael & Ronconi, 2007) – and we take the simpler approach in this exploratory exercise.

We begin by comparing decadal changes in various labor market outcomes – labor force participation, unemployment rates and median wages – for native Blacks. We examine by decadal changes in the immigrant share of the labor supply across decades between 1980 and 2005-2007 (with the last period not capturing a full decade, obviously; the results are the same as if we used annualized rates and therefore controlled for the varying lengths). We look at “change” in order to avoid misrepresenting impacts. Consider, for example, that the Bay Area has the highest median wage for African Americans and among the highest immigrant shares of labor – thus, a “snapshot” approach in any particular year would make it look like there was a positive relationship between immigrants and native Black economic outcomes even if Black wages were declining slightly over time. A “change” approach will better capture these dynamics.

We illustrate the relationships between decadal changes in native Black labor market outcomes and immigrant shares of the labor supply in Figures 14 through 16 on the previous pages. Each scatterplot includes a trend line and value for a “correlation coefficient,” which tells the direction of the relationship (in a subsequent table, we discuss the strength of the relationship; knowing that this will be read by both academic and non-academic readers, we are moving one step at a time in the analysis). Judging from the relationships shown, it appears that an increase in the immigrant share of the labor supply in a region is associated with a decline in native Black labor force participation (which, as we will see, is not statistically significant), an increase in native Black wages (which is statistically significant), and no particular relationship with native Black unemployment rates, one way or the other.

The graphs suggest that immigrants might do more good than harm for native Blacks, particularly given that the positive relationship with Black wages is statistically significant while the negative relationship with labor force participation is not. However, since

education levels are an important factor when determining which labor pool a worker enters, it could be that overall Black wage gains mask negative impacts on native Blacks with lower levels of educational attainment. Moreover, since unauthorized immigrants are often central to the debate about whether immigrants harm native Blacks economically, it is useful to estimate the impacts from just unauthorized workers. And since it is not just African Americans who are impacted by immigrants but also native-born Latinos and whites, it makes sense to see if the effects on those groups are similar or different.

That is a lot at one time and we try to capture these various aspects, as well as a comparison with the effect on native-born whites and Latinos, in Table 1. To follow the action, note that the three graphs above are summarized neatly in the first three rows of the first column. That is, for all African Americans, the correlation (the r measure) is -0.18 for labor force participation, 0.00 for unemployment, and 0.42 for real wages, with only the last being statistically significant (and thus getting a few asterisks to both signify significance – and draw your attention). The rest of the table tracks similar effects for various segments of the labor market, and then also considers the impacts of just undocumented Latino immigrants on other labor market segments.

One may wonder how we can identify the undocumented when the government appears to have so much trouble doing the same. In a paper released last year (Pastor, Scoggins, Tran, and Ortiz, 2010), we discuss how to estimate this population based on coefficients supplied to us by our colleague Enrico Marcelli – essentially using information from on-the-ground surveys to attach probabilities of being undocumented to individuals in the census, and then checking to make sure the totals we come up with are similar to government and other estimates. They are and so we apply this method here to generate separate estimates of those undocumented workers for 1990, 2000 and 2005-2007 (using coefficients from two separate surveys, with the survey chosen for each estimate being that one conducted nearer the time of the respective census sample).

While our focus here is on African Americans, a quick look at the results for native Latinos and whites provides a good benchmark. Latinos, for example, experience the most negative effects from immigrant competition, with labor force participation rates declining at all levels of education, wages falling for those least educated, and unemployment rising for those with only a high school diploma. Meanwhile, native-born whites seem to be big gainers, with

Table 1: Correlations Between Decadal Changes in Economic Indicators for Natives and Changes in the Share of the Labor Supply Composed of Immigrants and Unauthorized Latinos

	<u>Native Blacks</u>				<u>Native Latinos</u>				<u>Native Anglos</u>			
	Immigrants		Unauthorized Latinos		Immigrants		Unauthorized Latinos		Immigrants		Unauthorized Latinos	
	r	sig.	r	sig.	r	sig.	r	sig.	r	sig.	r	sig.
All Education Levels												
Labor Force Participation Rate	-0.18		0.02		-0.25	-0.46 **	0.34 *	0.13				
Unemployment Rate	0.00		-0.10		0.01	0.28	-0.27 #	-0.37 #				
Real Median Wage (% change)	0.42 **		0.40 *		0.03	-0.03	0.38 *	0.19				
Less than a high school degree												
Labor Force Participation Rate	-0.14		0.20		-0.29 #	-0.29	0.47 **	0.61 ***				
Unemployment Rate	0.34 *		-0.07		0.00	0.13	0.08	0.21				
Real Median Wage (% change)	-0.01		0.17		-0.37 *	-0.31 #	-0.20	-0.14				
High School Diploma												
Labor Force Participation Rate	-0.25		0.11		-0.43 **	-0.45 *	0.04	-0.34 #				
Unemployment Rate	0.21		0.25		0.20	0.44 *	-0.05	-0.04				
Real Median Wage (% change)	0.13		0.24		0.03	0.22	-0.02	-0.12				
Some College												
Labor Force Participation Rate	-0.09		-0.22		0.02	-0.35 #	0.30 #	-0.02				
Unemployment Rate	-0.23		-0.30		-0.17	0.06	-0.31 #	-0.45 *				
Real Median Wage (% change)	0.34 *		0.48 **		0.08	-0.23	0.48 ***	0.45 *				
College Degree or Higher												
Labor Force Participation Rate	0.28 #		0.26		-0.09	-0.51 **	0.31 #	0.01				
Unemployment Rate	-0.01		0.21		-0.19	-0.29	-0.47 **	-0.63 ***				
Real Median Wage (% change)	0.40 **		0.43 *		0.18	-0.12	0.38 **	0.19				

*** = p < .01; ** = p < .05; * = p < .10; # = p < .20

Note: No symbol indicates statistical insignificance.

labor force participation rising for the least educated (think established Anglo carpenters partnering with immigrant laborers on a construction site) and big wage gains and unemployment declines for the most educated (think corporate executives and other professionals able to sustain their livelihood through a larger and more productive workforce). What the table suggests, in short, is not all that surprising: co-ethnic natives with the lowest levels of educational attainment are closer “substitutes” with immigrants (or vice-versa) and face some degree of labor market competition with immigrants, while those with higher education levels and separate market niches – for whom immigrants tend to be “complements” – see some labor market benefits.

For African Americans, a rising immigrant presence is correlated with increases in unemployment for the less educated although interestingly this effect disappears when we consider the impacts of unauthorized Latinos separately (certainly not what popular press would have you believe but perhaps this has to do with market niches for each group). Native-born Blacks in the labor force with just a high school education experience a rise in unemployment but that result is not significant even as the correlation analysis suggests a positive

(and also not significant) impact on wages. As we climb up the educational ladder we find more positive impacts on all measures: labor force up, unemployment down, and wages rising, with statistical significance found for African Americans with at least some college (i.e., community college and up) from both all immigrants and unauthorized Latino immigrants.

While the results suggest immigration may have an adverse impact on the ability for native Black job seekers with less than a high school diploma to land a job, contrary to popular rhetoric, it does not appear to be undocumented Latinos who are to blame (as evidenced by the insignificant – and actually negative – correlation between a change in the unauthorized Latinos share of the labor supply and native Black unemployment rates for those with less than a high school diploma (Table 1, fifth row, second column). Indeed, it appears that it is documented immigrants, likely with more time in the U.S., who are closer to “substitutes” for native Black workers with less than a high school diploma (see also Orrenius & Zavodny, 2003).

A caveat here is that our measurement of the effects of all immigrants includes the period 1980 to 1990,

as well as 1990 to 2000, and 2000 to the current period. However, because we cannot estimate the undocumented Latino population in 1980, we cannot consider that earlier period. This could imply that we missed some important impacts of the undocumented in the 1980s – and that therefore our analysis of the effects of the undocumented on African Americans and others may be understated. However, it is also important to recall that the 1980s was the period in which a mass amnesty turned the vast majority of unauthorized immigrants into legal residents, implying that simply looking at the change in all immigrants for that period is actually reasonable.


The upshot is that strategies to enhance cooperation between Blacks and immigrants must make central the improvement of educational outcomes for native Blacks. While the idea that immigrants must start at lower tiers of the labor pool can be readily justified, an economic and societal structure that funnels native Blacks to the same waters is more apt to stir controversy and criticism. Education can reposition native Blacks so that they can benefit from new immigration. But, as discussed below, occupation-based policies that ensure native Blacks access to lower skill jobs that are increasingly filled by immigrants is also important, particularly for those who face greater barriers to higher education.

OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE AND CHANGE

The results above suggest that native Blacks (and Latinos) with low levels of education may experience some limited negative labor market outcomes from a rising immigrant presence, with unemployment up for less educated African Americans and labor force participation and wages down for less educated Latinos. To gain a better sense of the degree to which U.S.-born Blacks and immigrants are competing for the same jobs, and whether such competition is shared by other native-born groups, we examine the “occupational exposure” to immigrants.

This “occupational exposure index” is exactly analogous to the residential exposure index used previously. However, rather than measuring the likelihood of encountering an immigrant in one’s census tract, it attempts to measure the likelihood of finding an immigrant in one’s specific occupation. The statewide trend in occupational exposure for various native groups is depicted below in Figure 17. As can be seen, exposure to immigrants at the occupational level has increased dramatically for all groups, and while native-born Blacks tend to have a higher concentration of immigrants in their particular occupations than native

Figure 17: Occupational Exposure to Immigrants by Race/Ethnicity, California: 1980 to 2005-2007



whites and Asian Americans, exposure to immigrants is highest for native Latinos.

The generalized rise in Black occupational exposure to immigrants can and should be broken down by region. After all, many of the low-wage service sector jobs occupied by less educated Blacks and immigrants tend to require that the worker be in close proximity to the job itself (i.e. no telecommuting for janitors or hospitality workers) and so the regional – or metropolitan area – is an appropriate unit of analysis. Figure 18 shows these regional occupational measures. Los Angeles has the highest rates as of 2005-2007 (with the Bay Area not far behind) but the rate of increase is higher nearly everywhere else.


A similar breakdown of exposures to unauthorized Latino immigrants shows that native-born Latinos have the highest level of exposure followed by African Americans. But what is perhaps most striking in that analysis – not depicted here – is that the occupational exposure of African Americans to unauthorized Latinos in Los Angeles has actually fallen since 1990 and

“Our hope is, rather than being combative towards one another, that we find that we can build more together than we can apart; that we can have more successes together than we can apart; that we’re not natural enemies to one another; that we have more good than bad going on in our communities.”

– Reverend Norman Copeland, Fifth District, African Methodist Episcopal Church

increased very slowly in most other locations (with Vallejo and Bakersfield being notable exceptions). While some of this may reflect African Americans having already exited the occupations where undocumented immigrants have gained a foothold, it also means that, contrary to the popular view, the current jostling of immigrants and Blacks in the labor market seems to involve more established immigrants.

Of course, just as residential exposure to immigrants is largely driven by a relatively small set of densely populated neighborhoods in which both African Americans and immigrants reside, occupational exposure to immigrants is a function of a set of particular jobs. To better understand the breadth and nature of these jobs, we decomposed the statewide occupational exposure index into the contribution made to it by each individual occupation. The result is an occupational exposure value for each occupation that is simply equal to the number of native Blacks in the occupation multiplied by the percentage immigrant in the occupation. We then ranked all 330 occupations



by that exposure value and found that the top 25 (less than 8 percent of all occupations) account for about half of the overall occupational exposure index.

These 25 occupations appear in Table 2 below, along with the components of the exposure values, the changes in them since 1980, and the median wage of the occupation. The jobs topping the list in terms of African American exposure to immigrants are janitors, cashiers, cooks, laborers, security guards, and other lower-skill occupations. However, there are also some occupations that may be less expected, including managers, supervisors of sales jobs, registered nurses, accountants and auditors, computer analysts, licensed practical nurses, and salespeople. These higher wage occupations tend to have a lower share of immigrants, despite the typically large increase seen since 1980 and are generally characterized by growth in native Black employment.

Equally of interest, only five of the 25 occupations have seen a net decline in native Black employment since 1980, suggesting that job growth may have mediated some of the increased competition from new immigrants. Of the five occupations where Black employment fell, three are among the lowest in terms of wages and highest in terms of the immigrant share. The most dramatic example is janitors, an occupation in which the number of native Black jobs was just about cut in half between 1980 and 2005-2007 while the percentage immigrant increased from about 25 percent to 61 percent. In terms of regional variation (not depicted in the table), job losses were more severe in these more competitive, lower wage occupations in Los Angeles than in the Bay Area, clearly presenting an image and a reality of Black displacement.

To get more at this possible issue of displacement, we calculate occupation-specific unemployment

Table 2: Top Jobs in Terms of Native Black Exposure to Immigrants, California: 2005-2007

Occupation	Black-Immigrant Exposure, 2005/07	Black Employment, 2005/07	Change in Black Employment Since 1980	Percent Immigrant in Occupation, 2005/07	Change in Percent Immigrant Since 1980	Median Wage 2005/07 (\$2007)
Top 25 Occupations with Greatest Black-Immigrant Occupational Exposure						
Nursing aides, orderlies, and attendants	13,243	27,074	8,754	48.9%	31.7%	\$10.09
Truck, delivery, and tractor drivers	11,116	24,459	5,999	45.4%	33.4%	\$15.13
Janitors	8,079	13,342	-12,938	60.5%	35.4%	\$10.75
Cashiers	7,556	20,325	9,945	37.2%	23.4%	\$8.54
Managers and administrators, n.e.c.	6,482	26,710	5,150	24.3%	11.8%	\$31.83
Cooks, variously defined	5,948	9,191	-1,149	64.7%	32.4%	\$9.67
Child care workers	5,892	13,695	4,415	43.0%	28.8%	\$8.20
Retail sales clerks	5,726	21,303	20,883	26.9%	13.9%	\$11.42
Customer service reps, investigators and adjusters, except insurance	5,531	24,066	20,986	23.0%	12.4%	\$14.67
Supervisors and proprietors of sales jobs	5,189	17,390	12,330	29.8%	16.2%	\$19.50
Laborers outside construction	4,892	11,995	3,255	40.8%	14.0%	\$10.73
Guards, watchmen, doorkeepers	4,633	18,747	10,387	24.7%	13.8%	\$12.22
Registered nurses	4,311	12,049	4,549	35.8%	18.1%	\$36.23
Stock and inventory clerks	4,010	12,250	6,550	32.7%	19.0%	\$10.52
Accountants and auditors	3,694	10,433	5,173	35.4%	18.7%	\$26.07
Secretaries	3,645	20,410	3,110	17.9%	8.9%	\$17.30
Bus drivers	3,422	11,437	3,217	29.9%	22.5%	\$15.23
General office clerks	3,377	13,413	-6,467	25.2%	11.3%	\$14.12
Construction laborers	3,261	5,495	1,515	59.3%	37.0%	\$13.11
Housekeepers, maids, butlers, stewards, and lodging quarters cleaners	2,898	3,532	-2,768	82.1%	39.1%	\$8.60
Teachers, n.e.c.	2,885	12,727	11,367	22.7%	12.7%	\$13.68
Computer systems analysts and computer scientists	2,785	9,488	8,248	29.4%	17.9%	\$29.51
Gardeners and groundskeepers	2,698	3,769	469	71.6%	42.0%	\$10.09
Licensed practical nurses	2,504	6,839	119	36.6%	23.3%	\$20.17
Salespersons, n.e.c.	2,499	11,402	-8,558	21.9%	11.6%	\$22.09

rates – something that is possible partly because the underlying survey data allows even those who are unemployed at the time of the survey to report their most recent occupation (as long as they held a job at some point in the previous five years). We also look at median wages by occupation for the group for whom we are trying to understand the effect of an increased immigrant presence.

Note that because the occupations we examine are very detailed, in this particular exercise we take a “snapshot” approach – that is, drawing comparison at distinct points in time – rather than looking at decadal changes as we did for the regional analyses above. One reason is that we are trying to gauge the unemployment impacts – and we can only do that for the previous five years. Moreover, given the level of detail at which the occupational data is observed, changes in occupation-specific unemployment rates and wages over time (and the associated response of workers in terms of switching occupations) is likely to be highly sensitive to factors unrelated to a rise in the share of immigrants. Thus, it makes more sense to consider the static relationship between occupation-specific outcomes for natives (e.g. unemployment rates and wages) and immigrant concentration in the occupations at various points in time.

Since we are interested in the impacts on native-born, we do not rank the occupations by exposure

to immigrants but rather by the importance of that occupation to a particular native-born group. Specifically, we first selected the top occupations in terms of labor supply for each group (U.S.-born Blacks, Latinos, and whites) that accounted for 80 percent of their total labor supply in *any* of the years under examination (1980, 1990, 2000 or 2005-2007). This resulted in 85 occupations for native Blacks, 114 for native whites, and 100 for native Latinos.

Figure 19 helps visualize the relationships being examined for one group and one year – native Blacks in 2000. The figure is called a “bubble chart” – something that we realize only economists could love but that we hope the reader will like (or at least understand). A “bubble chart” is similar to a scatter plot but the points plotted have an area that is proportional to a third variable or dimension (in this case, the proportion of the total native Black labor force in the occupation). Bubble sizes are also used as weights in calculating the size of the effects – what statisticians call “coefficients.” We can see that there was a distinctly positive relationship in 2000 between native Black unemployment rates and the immigrant share of the occupation. The final device in the figure is the dashed lines indicating the average percent immigrant and Black unemployment in the labor force. So the occupations in the right- and top-most quadrant are those in which job competition may be most sharply experienced.





Figure 20: Relative Native Black Unemployment Rate and Percentage Immigrant by Occupation, California: 2000



The chart seems to provide evidence of labor market competition between the two groups. But because we are taking a “snapshot” for 2000, it is also possible that what looks like evidence of competition – more immigrants, higher Black unemployment – is simply the fact that immigrants tend to concentrate in low-wage occupations. Because all low wage workers – immigrant or native-born – tend to have higher unemployment rates, a high concentration of immigrants in an occupation may just be a telltale sign of an occupation with high turnover and unemployment generally, rather than Black-immigrant competition per se. So another, and perhaps better, way to get at this competition effect is to ask whether native Blacks in occupations with higher immigrant concentrations have higher unemployment rates (or, say, lower wages) *relative* to the unemployment (and wages) in the occupation overall.

This is depicted in Figure 20 which keeps the percent immigrant on the horizontal axis, but swaps in the relative native Black unemployment on the vertical axis (again, figured as the ratio of the native Black unemployment rate in each occupation to the overall unemployment rate for the occupation). The relationship remains positive, though its strength is less, as indicated by the slope of the trend line and associated correlation coefficient (*r*-value). The indication is that it is not just differences in overall unemployment rates across occupations

that was driving the relationship seen above; even compared to the occupation overall, native Blacks tended to experience greater unemployment in more immigrant-heavy occupations, at least in 2000.

Once again, we jump from an easy-to-understand graph (we hope!) to a table summarizing the full set of occupationally-based, relative relationships that would be depicted by 52 graphs – too many for even an economist’s PowerPoint presentation. Note, for example, that the trend line in Figure 20 is now but one number in Table 3 (third row, first column). The rest of the numbers tell a story that is more than a bit worrisome. In general, we see positive and significant correlations between the occupation-level relative unemployment rates of all native groups shown and both the immigrant and unauthorized Latino immigrant shares of the labor supply. However, these correlations are generally not significant until 2000 – perhaps because the impact on native unemployment from increased immigrant competition in an occupation is not measurable until a certain threshold or “tipping point” in terms of immigrant concentration is reached, and the immigrant share in many occupations increased steadily over the time period examined.

According to our results, the effect of immigrant competition on relative unemployment hit native Blacks hardest in 2000, followed by native whites, and with no apparent effect on native Latinos (except

for an impact from the undocumented). By 2005-2007 however, all native groups were implicated with a similar effect on relative unemployment rates as measured by the correlation coefficients. For Blacks, the impact of unauthorized immigrants was much sharper than the impact of all immigrants, and that severity was different than for the other groups. This may also be understating the occupational impact. For example, there could be displacement of native Blacks due to immigrant competition in an occupation with the unemployment rate for those remaining in the profession not rising dramatically. Of course, our figures generally capture those who were not able to find employment elsewhere and gravitating out of these occupations can explain the generalized positive wage impacts by skill seen above.

Indeed, the story around wages, even within occupations, is more positive, though not entirely so. First, the bad (but expected) news: though not shown in the table, occupations in which immigrants and unauthorized Latinos make up a large share tend to be ones in which native wages are lower as compared to the wages of similar natives in other occupations. That, however, is basically a function of the fact that wages vary greatly by occupation and tend to be lowest in highly immigrant occupations. When we examine relative wages (shown in Table 3), we find consistently positive and significant

correlations, implying that natives who are able to maintain employment in immigrant-heavy occupations earn higher wages relative to the occupation overall, perhaps because they move up within occupation hierarchy – or perhaps because those who are able to maintain relatively higher wages are the last to part with their occupation. In any case, this looks like a somewhat complementary effect.

How, then, can it be that in the earlier comparative regional analysis we found less competition, with some pain for less educated African Americans but real employment and wage gains for those more educated? To understand the mix of results, recall that this occupational analysis can only measure competition – it is generally difficult for two workers in the same detailed occupation to be complementary labor. This analysis, in short, essentially forces a consideration of the competitive effects of immigration while ignoring most of the positive complementary affects. In the earlier comparative regional analysis, the expression of complementary effects was enabled and showed strongly for more educated native workers, who are likely in different detailed occupations than those in which immigrants tend to concentrate. And even for the least educated workers, a complementary relationship was possible given the extent to which occupational profiles can differ between immigrants and the native-born population.

Table 3: Correlations between Relative Occupation-Specific Economic Indicators for Natives and the Share of the Occupational Labor Supply Composed of Immigrants and Unauthorized Latinos

	<u>Native Blacks</u>				<u>Native Latinos</u>				<u>Native Anglos</u>			
	Immigrants		Unauthorized Latinos		Immigrants		Unauthorized Latinos		Immigrants		Unauthorized Latinos	
	r	sig.	r	sig.	r	sig.	r	sig.	r	sig.	r	sig.
Relative Unemployment Rate												
1980	-0.03		--		0.13		--		0.19	**	--	
1990	0.11		0.01		0.00		0.08		0.12	#	0.11	
2000	0.35	***	0.32	***	0.12		0.18	*	0.25	***	0.19	**
2005-07	0.34	***	0.46	***	0.43	***	0.48	***	0.44	***	0.49	***
Relative Median Wage												
1980	0.50	***	--		0.46	***	--		0.12		--	
1990	0.56	***	0.62	***	0.63	***	0.66	***	0.45	***	0.57	***
2000	0.41	***	0.53	***	0.52	***	0.56	***	0.49	***	0.62	***
2005-07	0.45	***	0.58	***	0.46	***	0.54	***	0.49	***	0.61	***

*** = p < .01; ** = p < .05; * = p < .10; # = p < .20

Note: The reported Pearson's r values are for correlations between occupation-specific measures when considering all occupations in the sample for the particular native group being examined (see text for details). All correlations are weighted by either the total labor supply of the native group (in the case of unemployment rate correlations) or total respondents with imputed wages (in the case of median wage correlations).

To recap, the following are our main findings from this workforce analysis:

- From the geographical analysis, we saw that immigrant settlement is not concentrated in any one part of the state and that shares of Asian immigrants are significant – though often better educated.
- From the comparative regional analysis, we saw that as native-born Black education levels rise and there is an immigrant presence, labor force participation rates increase, unemployment decreases, and wages rise. Even for Black workers with the lowest education levels, it appears that undocumented workers have different niches (thereby having modest effects on native labor), and documented immigrants, over time, have more of a substitution effect.
- From the occupational analysis, we saw that 25 occupations account for half of the occupational exposure of native Blacks to immigrants, that changes in the demographic composition within occupations are often connected to how that occupation is itself changing, and that some displacement has likely happened in a set of occupations that tend to be more low-wage, low-skill.

In short, this analysis explains why we can have rather spectacular anecdotes about occupational displacement (see, for example, Waldinger, 1997) and still find an overall positive effect from immigration on most African Americans in the California labor market. Indeed, it is exactly mobility that allows for immigration to have such a positive impact. Increased competition in certain occupations brought on by immigrants could make those jobs less desirable and/or harder to get, creating a greater incentive to enhance one's skills and move up the occupational staircase – or at least to a job with certain characteristics that make it less

able to be filled by immigrants (English language requirements, authorized work status, etc.).

Any real approach to addressing the Black economic crisis and building better bridges of communication between African Americans and immigrants must consider this set of facts. It must stress that the overall impact of immigrants is positive but it should – as in the neighborhoods – acknowledge that there are real pains of displacement and change. It must note the importance of promoting education and mobility but it should realize that there are still some who are being left behind. And it must acknowledge that immigration has indeed played a role in the problems facing Black workers – but it should forcefully note that there are much larger issues and dynamics that have led to a challenge for immigrant and native-born workers alike.



I think part of it has to do with bringing people into a room and getting them to know each other, on the level that they don't know each other, in terms of personal stories, in terms of the broader framework and in terms of the commonalities that they have. So building community is basically what it comes down to.

– Gerald Lenoir, Black Alliance for Just Immigration

Historically, if you'll take a look at the record, Blacks did not get to those places by themselves. The Jewish community, and white Christians, and people who had common values and justice fought in the civil rights issues. Some of them died fighting against those issues. Blacks did not establish their civil rights successes all by themselves.

– Reverend Norman Copeland,
Fifth District, African Methodist
Episcopalian Church

As the demographic analysis above suggests, part of California's future will be shaped by how African Americans and immigrants negotiate the shared spaces that they now call home. They live in the same neighborhoods, go to the same schools, and share many of the same challenges. Despite the evidence of some geographic and economic displacement, many work together and a growing number of African Americans and immigrants are also sharing homes and family, as more and more enter into personal relationships.

But if you have ever seen the (overdramatized) film *Crash* – or just lived somewhere in interethnic California – you know that living in the same communities does not automatically result in new alliances. In fact, some think that proximity builds tension rather than alleviates it. Briggs (2004), for example, suggests that because of the demographic concentration of the Black community, immigrants cause direct competition and conflict around

housing and social services. This bubbles up to the political arena which, when elections are framed (unnecessarily) as a zero-sum competition between African Americans and immigrants, escalates tensions (Franklin & Seltzer, 2002; Meier, McClain, Polinard, & Wrinkle, 2004). As a result, Briggs (2004), and Shulman and Smith (2005) argue that any notion of a “rainbow coalition” is mistaken and urge the Black political elite to speak up against what the authors think are the negative effects of immigration.

Of course, it is not just a question of African Americans extending (or not) their hand. Vaca (2004) confidently writes that as Latinos grow in numbers they will not be impelled to form coalitions. Others suggest that coalitional possibilities are more rhetoric than reality, a sort of temporary extension of an olive branch (Kaufmann, 2003). With the emergence of a certain sense of Latino “triumphalism” in politics, particularly as the demographics change, voting rolls expand and electoral victories accrue, it is easy to worry that we are headed not to a rainbow at all but rather to a political shipwreck of epic proportions.

The traditional answer within political theory is that one should instead form coalitions around positive

FROM HATE TO HOPE

In June 2011, federal authorities indicted 51 members of a Latino gang that had engaged in racially motivated attacks on Black residents in the struggling suburban community of Azusa, California. Between 1996 and 2001, at least eight families saw their houses firebombed – and in 2000, a young Black nurse named Ge'Juan Salle was gunned down as he strolled out of an auto parts store with his cousin.

While the daunting events caused some African Americans to leave, others stayed as the City formed a hate crime task force that eventually became a Human Relations Commission. The commission sponsors an annual youth conference to address issues of race and difference and the City now hosts a Hands Across Azusa celebration the Sunday before Martin Luther King.

As for the now-indicted gang, one former member commented, “We were all brainwashed. Some of us got to realize it and some of us didn't . . . Maybe the cycle will be broken now and future generations will not see color.”

See Abby Sewell, “Hate-crime arrests bring up memories,”
Los Angeles Times, June 19, 2011.

sum issues – in which everyone clearly wins – like higher wages, better education, improved health care, and anti-discrimination policies (Meier, et al., 2004; Mindiola Jr, Flores Niemann, & Rodriguez, 2002). Such appeals are based on ideas of mutual self-interest and rooted in a vision in which deals are made, alliances created, and benefits shared.

We do not doubt that this is a useful start – and many of the actual policy directions we propose are quite consistent with this. But as we have argued elsewhere (Pastor et al., 2010), such coalitions of interest can be both fragile and episodic – and less sustainable than those ties based on shared values, continuing engagement, and social movement organizing. Such organizing does not avoid the conflicts, including the economic displacement we have documented above, but instead finds “uncommon common ground” based on deeply held precepts and continuing dialogue.

We need, in short, an approach based not in transactions but transformations – and we label the glue that we think will bring people together “everyday social justice.”

After all, while some African Americans may think that they bear the brunt of immigration’s consequences, the Black community also strongly upholds values of fairness and justice – resulting in nuanced and complex views on immigration (Diamond, 1998). And while immigrants may have special concern about immigration policy, they are generally interested in exactly what African Americans want – better jobs, better education, and a better future.

More fundamentally, many leaders and activists recognize that the mass presence of immigrants in our society is, in fact, due to the civil rights pioneers and the way in which their movement for justice eventually forced a change in immigration law in 1965, relaxing national quotas and generating an influx of migrants from Latin America and Asia. It was fundamental American values of fairness that brought us mass immigration; fairness should be a guiding principle as we deal with the impacts.

Below, we try to sketch out this argument, starting first with the need for dialogue, then with the possibility of a new policy agenda, and finally with a suggestion about the sort of organizing infrastructure that needs to be in place to better bring together these populations. While others have written about the barriers that limit the efficacy and creation of coalitions (Alvarado & Jaret, 2009; Grant-Thomas, et al., May 2009), we choose to focus here on what works. The ideas below reflect our own thinking, but we also draw on a set of reports by others, including Alvarado and

Jaret (2009), the Black Alliance for Just Immigration (2010), the Kirwan Institute (May 2009), and more importantly, from a range of 25 interviews in which we talked with leaders and organizers working at the interface of African Americans and immigrants. We hope that we distill this wisdom with some degree of accuracy and adherence to the thoughts of the many leaders that were kind enough to spend time with us.

CAN’T WE ALL JUST GET ALONG?

On the 18th anniversary of the 1992 Los Angeles uprising – April 29th, 2010 – African American and Latino church leaders led their congregants in a joint worship service that placed their faith as their primary common ground. The product of at least two years of intentional collaboration, facilitated by Clergy and Laity United for Economic Justice (CLUE), 1,500 Latino and African American church members began their service at Iglesias de Restauracion, marched four blocks down Crenshaw Boulevard, and completed their service at West Angeles Church of God.

The large churches have been neighbors for over two decades – and yet this was the first major meeting of the congregations. Better late than never – and better together than apart. After all, churches have played a key role in social justice movements, with the African American church creating a key platform for the civil rights movement and the Catholic church – and increasingly, the evangelical church – emerging as an important voice for immigrant rights. Moreover, the shared experience of faith gives people a solid reason to see the “other” as they see themselves and to act with compassion, grace, and openness.

Such bridge-building need not be confined to faith communities. We talk below about other innovative efforts. But staying in this realm for just a moment drives home a key point that applies across all realms of organizing. Just as the famous March on Washington – in which Martin Luther King declared that “I have a Dream” – was the result of years of quiet organizing, so too the march down Crenshaw reflected a long period of building ties and understanding.

The story began with a small group of pastors who started to have breakfasts together where they shared their stories, broke bread, prayed, and, even, worshipped — Black and Brown, together. According to Dr. Juan Martinez, Associate Dean at Fuller Theological Seminary, worship and storytelling “has been the best bridge for breaking down barriers.” The numbers support his statement – there are now more than 120 members of this pastoral group. A collaborator in this effort, Reverend Norman Copeland of the African

Methodist Episcopal Church, also stresses the importance of “dialogue to take the next serious step towards building a relationship between the Brown and Black community.”

It is not always easy, particularly when change and transformation occur within a church. For example, tensions rose in Oakland when African Americans – who once made up 70 percent of the parishioners at Saint-Louis Bertrand Church – felt like they were losing “their” church to Latinos who now represent 70 percent of its members. But “spiritual underpinning can help to anchor alliance-building work” (Black Alliance for Just Immigration, 2010, p. 9). Church leaders invited organizers from the Black Alliance for Just Immigration (BAJI) to help mediate between Latinos who felt that their numerical majority gave them the right to have more control and influence in the church and African American church leaders who accepted their Christian duty to “welcome the stranger” but also felt that Latinos had “taken over our church and our community.” Working through – rather than ignoring – the loss and resentment helped to forge new understandings.

The Community Coalition (CoCo, as it is known) in South Los Angeles focuses on schools as places of convergence that lend themselves to broad-based organizing – as does Youth Together in Oakland, a group to which we turn later. CoCo’s youth program, called “SC-YEA,” includes about 50 leaders and a total of 250 youth who form High School Organizing Committees (HSOCs) in eight South L.A. high schools. Leadership training, political education and other activities help students develop a frame to understand what impacts and perhaps limits their opportunities – and to generate the skills they need to challenge those limits. The results of CoCo’s dialogue and action have included campaigns to improve access to college preparatory courses in all the local high schools and to establish an Architecture, Construction and Engineering Academy at one of them.

But another result has been the transformation of these young people. Organizers are explicit with youth that one of their goals is to build a community that unites Black and Brown residents. Indeed, there is a funny saying around the organizing world in Los Angeles – that person X is a Community Coalition Latino or a Community Coalition African American, shorthand for saying that they know how to work with others and that alliance-building is

A CADRE FOR CHANGE

In early 2006, CADRE began its “Call to Action” campaign, where staff and parent leaders of the organization set out to uncover the true cause of Los Angeles Unified School District’s low graduation rate, particularly in South Los Angeles high schools which primarily serves African American and Latino, often immigrant, students. The process involved getting parents together to talk about the issues. Those initial meetings were tense. Mistrust, apprehension and doubt filled the room. Black parents sat with Black parents, Latinos stayed with Latinos, neither ventured outside their comfort zones. Then, slowly people began to talk.

Despite their obvious differences, parents soon realized that the stories about their children and experiences with LAUSD were the same. That is when the tension was replaced with compassion and the realization that they must work together to compel change. Both Latino and African American students were being kicked out of class for little or no reason and forced to wait in a dean’s or counselor’s office for long periods of class with no academic instruction or support. CADRE learned that suspensions and other “push out” methods were often used as a first resort and was frequently given even for minor infractions. Parents told of how they were never notified that their child was suspended or of their right to file an appeal. “You could see the walls coming down as parents shared their stories with each other,” said CADRE Co-Founder and Executive Director, Maisie Chin. Meetings like this bonded the parents and helped mobilize them for the greater cause. CADRE’s mission is to improve parent leadership to ensure that all children are rightfully educated. Therefore, leaders choose to let the work build those relationships rather than let the building of those relationships be the work.

And after many months of these parents rallying, marching and crying together, they finally celebrated. On Feb. 27, 2007 the LAUSD Board of Education unanimously approved a district-wide “positive behavior support” discipline model that mandates schools to: teach school rules and social emotional skills; reinforce appropriate student behavior; use effective classroom management and positive behavior support strategies by providing early intervention for misconduct and appropriate use of consequences. To this day, CADRE parents continue to push LAUSD to better serve students in South Los Angeles and fully implement the positive behavior support discipline model.

Source: Author interview with CADRE staff

central to their own identity. The increasing mix of the youth populations seen at CoCo and in our data above is exceptionally real to anyone who works in these communities and witnesses young Latino and Asian immigrants embracing hip-hop and young Black teens sprinkling their language with the bits of Spanglish so familiar to (often frustrated) immigrant parents.

What this and other stellar youth programs point to is not just the importance of dialogues but also the key role of an institutional vehicle. Many older adults lack exposure to the types of everyday spaces – such as CoCo’s programs – that can provide opportunities for intentional conversations about African American and immigrant alliances. While the church clearly provides one venue, churches are often segregated. Filling the gap has been a series of social movement organizations, such as Strategic Concepts in Organizing and Policy Education (SCOPE) in South L.A., who have realized that they need to engage in intentional conversations around race, ethnicity and history in order to build the unity and momentum to move policy campaigns. Also critical: institutional anchors like the Mutual Assistance Network in Sacramento, a group that provides a combination of advocacy and social services and has made bringing people together a key part of its institutional DNA.

One challenge in this work is a mismatch between needs and resources. As noted above, the emerging communities with high exposure of African Americans to immigrants are often in outlying exurban areas, like the Central Valley and the Inland Empire, where the organizing infrastructure is weak and the dialogic attempts are few and far between.

Many of the organizations that we talked to in emerging communities are just beginning to think about strategic alliances between African Americans and immigrants, But these intentions often fall by the wayside as explosive population growth, bad economic conditions and the lack of human and financial capital overburden existing institutional capacity. Even in the historic core, with a rich history of civic engagement, it is often the case that some of the remaining institutions – such as Second Baptist Church in Los Angeles (see the earlier box) – are struggling to keep up as their communities transform around them.

What happens once these communities do manage to come together? How will they learn to talk to one another? After all, African Americans and immigrants may share similar challenges, but they will need to develop the skills, respect, and patience to have the tough conversations that may be necessary to arrive at shared aspirations and determine the strategies to realize their common dreams. Angelica Salas, executive director of the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights Los Angeles (CHIRLA) recalls a conversation she had with a prominent African American faith leader that reflected his skepticism about working on immigration issues:

He said, ‘I’m going to be honest with you, I don’t get it. When I have members of my congregation saying that they are taking our jobs, how am I supposed to respond?’ It was not an easy conversation. I explained and he listened and then he pushed back on me and said, ‘Don’t you think that people have the right to feel this way?’ Of course, they have the right to feel that way. But it was a very tense conversation over a lot of months...that’s part of what needs to occur to be frank about all the questions that people have, to push back on each other, but then at the end of the day to be open to the situation that we’re both in. – Angelica Salas, Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights, Los Angeles (CHIRLA)

Thus, while it is important to dismiss the hype of sensationalist accounts about Black-Brown racial tensions, such tensions are real and need to be addressed. Within the coalition building literature, making use of the commonality of racial oppression and historical ties is a common theme (Mindiola Jr, et al., 2002). Bonilla and Stafford (2000), for example, offer an important reminder that African Americans and Latinos have reached out to each other throughout history as they have encountered exclusion and subordination.

“The ideas of telling stories deeply with some meaning, tells the importance – so people see commonalities.”

– Steven Pitts,
UC Berkeley Center for Labor Research
and Education

Yet simple calls to the past can also be problematic. The emergence of a vibrant immigrant rights movement, embodied in the major marches that took place in several cities

throughout the country during 2006 and 2008 (and most recently in 2010 to protest Arizona’s anti-immigrant legislation) led some to draw comparisons between this new round of organizing and the African American Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, some have called immigrant rights the new Civil Rights Movement of our era.

Some African American leaders think the new moniker makes some sense. According to SCOPE’s executive director and former organizing director, Gloria Walton:

I think it’s useful to talk about it as civil rights . . . recognizing that this is not new . . . can hopefully open up the eyes of African Americans to understand that this is the same movement that we’re in here. It’s just a new age and era, it looks differently on the surface, but fundamentally it’s the same. Whether it’s

legally, with 3/5 of a human being, there are all these ramifications and implications that are in both stories. – Gloria Walton, Strategic Concepts in Organizing and Policy Education (SCOPE)

But some African Americans resent the appropriation of the civil rights metaphor, partly because the promise of civil rights has not yet been realized, and partly because they believe that some immigrant activists do not have a full appreciation of the history. As Gerald Lenoir notes:

The response we get [from African Americans] is, ‘Civil Rights? What about our Civil Rights? We still haven’t gotten our Civil Rights, what are you talking about?’ It’s coupled with this sense of loss. There is a sense that the African American Civil Rights Movement has been displaced by the immigrant rights movement as the key struggle in the United States...There is a sense that the civil rights of African Americans are being ignored, that there is a new minority on the block and there is not room for two. There is a sense of competition and loss and anger that our movement is not demanding our rights and that we’ve been displaced in the job market, in our communities, and we’ve been displaced as leading the movement around issues of justice. – Gerald Lenoir, Black Alliance for Just Immigration (BAJI)

This may grate on the ears of immigrant advocates and leaders, many of whom likely feel like they are not wielding any great power in the world, particularly after the failure of the DREAM Act to pass in late 2010. Nonetheless, immigrants do represent a growing political force, and any claim to the civil right legacy and to social justice more broadly brings with it a certain responsibility to use your new power to fight for the well-being of others. As one leader put it, “You may not feel like you are the most powerful, but be gracious with the power you have.” And in the end, African Americans along with others will benefit from the gains of an immigrant rights movement that is focused on social justice.

Sharing power graciously and gracefully will require a new frame and new language. One of the most important conversational tropes BAJI deploys for bringing people together is globalization. Much like the Miami Workers Center and its pioneering “Circles of Consciousness” (Pastor & LoPresti, 2007), BAJI links the migration experience to the pressures of the international economy even as it reminds African Americans about the ways in which global pressures shrank the U.S. industries that once provided working class Blacks with middle class lives. They similarly remind African Americans of how “the immigration issue is being used as a way to galvanize a white supremacist movement in this country, and how that is a threat to not just immigrants, but also African Americans,” said Gerald Lenoir (BAJI).

FROM BLACK AND BROWN TO GREEN

In October 2007, at a meeting intended to kick start a new “green jobs” initiative by Strategic Concepts in Organizing and Policy Education (SCOPE), a social movement organization in South L.A., the conversation started in an unexpected place. Rather than focus on environmental constraints, climate change, and workforce development, one of the authors of this report, Manuel Pastor, and Karen Bass (the founder of Community Coalition, the first African American female to be speaker of a state assembly, and now a U.S. Congressperson) led a group of SCOPE’s constituents through a discussion of Black-Brown tensions. With a crowd of 150 eager to engage, Bass and Pastor conducted a tag team presentation about South L.A.’s past and present, then opened it up to the audience.

The resulting questions and statements were heartfelt and sometimes jarring. One young man told the audience that he “used to like Mexicans, but I just don’t like these new Mexicans.” An older man suggested that “Latinos are taking jobs because these young Black guys don’t want to work.” This exchange, while sometimes unpleasant, was a necessary step in building a multiracial alliance in South Los Angeles.

The organizations and community members present that day were able to work through the tensions. Ultimately, SCOPE organized a broad coalition that successfully passed a city ordinance in April 2009 for the “green” retrofitting of city buildings. The ordinance gave priority to inner city buildings and communities by including policies that called for local hiring, the creation of career pathways, and the promotion of living wage jobs via Project Labor Agreements. While this is only one step on the road to economic revival and social justice, getting there will involve the sort of honest, frank, and forthright discussion that took place that October evening in South Los Angeles. In fact, these honest conversations SCOPE has modeled, are central to fortifying the Black-Latino alliance that is an important part of the rebirth of progressive politics in Los Angeles.

Source: Taken from Pastor (Forthcoming).

At the same time, it is critical that immigrant leaders – not just top-level activists but grassroots individuals – understand that the 14th Amendment, which guarantees the birthright citizenship of their children, flows from the struggle against slavery; that the education those children receive, regardless of documentation status, stems from the struggle of Mexican Americans, African Americans, and others for equal access; and that the future of those children as integrated immigrants will depend greatly on whether various communities of color can come together around a common and more inclusive agenda. This is precisely why a social justice framework is so important. The quest for an engaged citizenship begins with but does not end with the granting of legal rights. Rather, legal rights are simply an entry point to the everyday practice of citizenship and democracy, something that allows for and requires working across differences.

The message plays in reverse, too: much like the gains for all Americans that were won by a Black-led civil rights movement, immigrant-led efforts to improve education, living conditions and economic opportunities will have benefits that extend beyond the immigrant community. But all the work leading up to broader policy change must – if it is going to last – begin with personal stories that can be linked to shared experiences, and eventually, to broader social issues.

POLICY ACROSS DIFFERENCE

In 2006, UNITE-HERE, a union amalgam that represents hospitality workers, fought for and won a rather remarkable clause in their contracts with Los Angeles and San Francisco area union hotels: an explicit commitment to create a multi-company and multi-sector Diversity Task Force that would reach out, train and hire Black workers for the industry. The need for such a Task Force was obvious: the near disappearance of African Americans in California hotels, as indicated by the dramatic decline from around 15 percent of employment in the industry (in the occupations of cleaners, bartenders, and baggage handling) in 1980 to around 2 percent in 2009, needed to be addressed.

Bruce Gorelick, General Manager of the Renaissance Hollywood Hotel and Spa recognized how the hospitality industry was failing Black workers:

When it comes to hiring room attendants, banquet servers or front desk clerks, we, like many other L.A.-area hotels, seek to create an inclusive environment, representative of our city's diversity. But frankly, our policies on paper don't always reflect the reality. Whether the right applicants aren't applying or the recruitment

tactics aren't working, we aim for racially, ethnically and culturally diverse workplaces, but we haven't met our goals – especially among African-Americans. (Gorelick, 2009)

With the help of community college instructors and hotel human resources staff, union and business leaders stepped up and created the Hospitality Boot Camp program in 2009. The program is designed to train African Americans. The first camp attracted more than 100 applicants, 20 of whom were accepted and graduated from the five-day training with the hopes of finding a job in the industry. What may be one of the most remarkable features of this feel-good story is that, in part, the campaign was instigated by a union that has become largely Latino and immigrant in its membership.

The labor commitment to dealing with the real issues of Black displacement does not stop at the hotel lobby. One of the most remarkable organizing campaigns in recent years involved 4,000 security officers, mostly Black, who signed a contract in 2008 that called for a 40 percent pay increase over five years, health benefits, and job security (Bloom, 2010). Leading the charge was the Service Employees Union International (SEIU), a union that had become famous in Los Angeles for the Justice for Janitors campaign, an effort that was once again largely Latino and immigrant. Conducted against the backdrop of distrust – one former director of the L.A. Southern Christian Leadership Conference suggested that “African Americans pretty much felt that they had been pushed to the periphery in the labor movement” (Bloom, 2010, p. 170) – the security guard campaign was a remarkable bridging of the gap between African Americans and a set of union institutions immigrants had helped revive.

Bridging such gaps involves dialogue and a commitment to each other's interests over the long haul; it also requires a concrete policy agenda that can meet multiple needs. Our interviews revealed a set of everyday challenges and ongoing issues that are important to both the African American and immigrant communities with economic security, education, and access to the safety net being foremost on the policy agenda. One respondent, a leader of the Council of Mexican Hometown Associations in North America (Consejo de Federaciones Mexicanas en Norteamérica or COFEM), tied it all together as follows:

I think the most basic issue is the common economic fight...We believe that we have to bind together with communities, like the African American community, to ensure that living wage jobs stay in California, to ensure

that the type of government reform that can level the playing field is ensured, to ensure that we make sure our local schools in poor Black and Latino neighborhoods have equitable resources...Across the board we have a lot of common ground, a lot of common issues. The challenge comes in identifying all the common issues and making compromises and working together and working around one, two or three issues that we all can agree with.

– Arturo Carmona, Consejo de Federaciones Mexicanas en Norteamérica (COFEM)

Labor unions are not the only ones dealing with economic security issues. A growing number of African American and immigrant groups are organizing around issues having to do with raising wages and generating employment. For example, the Los Angeles Taxi Workers Alliance (LATWA) was formed in 2005 to organize and empower the 4,000 area taxi drivers in their struggle to rid themselves of taxi industry abuses and improve their wages, health and working conditions. Although the organization does not have a large population of African Americans, it does represent a majority of South Asian, Ethiopian and Latino immigrants. After months of organized events to build support for their cause, LATWA won two meter rate increases and the creation of a \$15 airport minimum fee, which resulted in more than \$22 million in additional annual income for the 4,000 drivers in Los Angeles. LATWA also beat back a lawsuit that seven taxi companies had filed to harass and intimidate drivers.

Another key issue – and point of potential common interest – is providing opportunities for small business. Often overlooked by progressives, the number of Black-owned businesses in California rose by 22 percent between 2002 and 2007 – slightly outpacing the overall growth rate of 18 percent – while the number of Hispanic-owned firms rose by 33 percent and the number of Asian-owned firms went up by 37 percent over the same period. The latter groups include non-immigrants, of course, but since immigrant self-employment is generally higher than non-immigrant self-employment for co-ethnics, it is more than likely that immigrants led the way in that growth (Blackwell, Kwoh, & Pastor, 2010). Appealing to the common desire to have both control and assets is one way to build economic alliances.

Still, the main issue for most of the respondents we interviewed was education. We saw earlier the dismal scores in the communities where immigrants and African Americans live in close proximity, evidence of a broader educational crisis whose ravages are particularly sharp for Black, immigrant, and Latino children. Any attempt to secure economic justice will need to improve educational outcomes for these communities. And leading the way to change will be both students and parents.

Organizations like Youth Together try to use the crisis of educational funding as opportunities to organize multi-racial social justice alliances. For example, at five high schools in Oakland and Richmond, Youth Together organizes with predominantly Black, Latino, and Asian American youth. Inter-ethnic school violence was the catalyst of their work which has since evolved into a campaign to fully fund urban schools (see the box, “Once Apart, Youth Together”). While researching the root causes of everyday tensions turning into racial violence, youth organizers found that overcrowding at Richmond High School – 2,000

It's JUST GOOD BUSINESS

Vivian Bowers, an African American owner of a dry cleaning shop, is head of the Central Avenue Business Association. Central Avenue is the historic heart of Black Los Angeles, but what may come as a shock is that Ms. Bowers was elected by a mostly Latino group of business owners.

The bonds Ms. Bowers shares with her Latino neighbors run deep and were formed in the everyday experiences of living – and surviving – in the same neighborhood. Ms. Bowers credits Virginia Zesati and Gerardo Carillo, Mexican immigrants who live behind her cleaning store and own a beauty shop in the neighborhood, with saving her cleaning store when it was set on fire during the 1992 Rodney King civil unrest. Her Latino neighbors, in turn, credit her with providing leadership and training in the confusing ways of business regulation – and with working with the Coalition for Responsible Community Development to form the Central Avenue Business Association and ensure that both African American and immigrant business owners have access to city funds available for storefront beautification.

Ms. Bowers is “great at speaking for all of us,” said Maria Palmas, owner of a small grocery. And in the words of salon owner Virginia Zesati: “We’re all in this together. Among us there are no differences of color.”

See Hector Tobar (2011, February 11). South-Central L.A.’s Black and Latino business owners join forces with hope for the future. *The Los Angeles Times*. Los Angeles, CA. Retrieved from www.latimes.com

students had to share one set of bathroom facilities – poor staffing, and inadequate conflict-resolution training were to blame. In 2009, they decided to build a regional campaign focused on understanding and educating the community on how changes in the tax system – like revamping Proposition 13 – could revolutionize the education system.

The example reminds us that youth have learned to negotiate the shared spaces of multi-racial communities and are capable of playing important roles as engaged citizens that seek to build everyday social justice. Equally important are the parents. Organizations like CoCo are complementing their youth work with opportunities for parent involvement. Another more tightly parent-focused effort, the Parent Organization Network, takes the shared space ideology seriously – a collaboration between the Asian Pacific American Legal Center, the Los Angeles Urban League, and Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, PON is a regional parent network that provides strategic support to the advancement of a grass-roots parent advocacy for institutional change in the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD). And anyone who has worked in one of these spaces has felt the power as parents – Black, immigrant, undocumented, or whatever – realize their common commitment to a better future for their children.

But the challenge is that an agenda of positive change – good for meeting the challenges of everyday life and good for bringing together parents and students in everyday conversation – involves recognizing the differences as well as similarities. Even establishing the base for academic performance can mean different things to different groups. For immigrants, it might mean more emphasis on increasing the pace for transforming English learners into English speakers, while for African Americans, it might mean more emphasis on tackling a zero-tolerance atmosphere in which young Black males are routinely targeted, expelled, and excluded from the school process (Kim, Losen, & Hewitt, 2010). Yet the increasing focus on English language learners – particularly in the areas we profiled above – has caused some in the African American community to question the distribution of shrinking educational resources.

“But if you take a closer look, at the Brown and Black coalition, we have more in common than not in common. Blacks want better education for children, so do Browns. Blacks want to retire with dignity, so do Browns. Blacks want health care for their children and families, so do Browns. Blacks want a safe community to exist in with less crime, so do Browns.”

– Rev. Norman Copeland, Fifth District, African Methodist Episcopal Church

For example, state mandates require funding for specific programs that target ESL students and interviewees revealed that African American parents in a number of schools have mobilized and raised concerns that their children are not receiving the same level of funding. They have also complained that the growth of immigrant, Latino, and Asian students has led to a decline in the overall educational experience – overcrowded classrooms, insufficient facilities, and unprepared teachers. As the head of one African

American organization pointed out, “There is a struggle around resources. People complain, ‘resources are going over here to Latinos for English as a Second Language,’ and ‘where are our resources, for our kids?’”

For example in 2009 at John Ritter Elementary in Watts, African American parents were angry when summer school classes were cancelled because of a shortage of funds but money was available

from separate sources for summer school classes that targeted English language learners. A similar tension over resources earmarked for English language learners (ELLs) developed in San Bernardino – but progressive Latino and African American school board members sought to defuse the tensions with matching funds to programs that targeted African American students and parent groups. As Elsa Valdez, board member for San Bernardino City Unified School District, told us, “We felt it was the right thing to do.”

While the bigger problem may be a shortage of funds for everyone, the challenge is that an everyday agenda also involves everyday compromises that build trust over time. While initiating a working relationship around non-controversial issues may grease the wheels (Grant-Thomas, et al., 2009), eventually “same struggle, same fight” becomes a nice slogan for the barricades but the daily world of difference means that nuanced understandings of commonality are key.

An example of this need for nuance – what some call “targeted universalism” (powell, 2009) – comes from the economy: while all groups share an interest in a buoyant economy, the way to get there as a set of communities, families and individuals is different. For African Americans, a main problem is joblessness and disconnection from the labor market; immigrants, particularly Latinos, have actually been hard-hit by the recent recession (given the overrepresentation in

construction and service industries) but traditionally the main issue was low wages at the jobs they did hold. This can imply different approaches to job training – one more long-term for Blacks, one more centered on nighttime classes, especially in English, for immigrants – but there is no reason why honest conversation cannot bring these different strategies into a single whole (Pastor & Carter, 2009).

It is also the case that discrimination – while not unimportant for immigrants – is far more important as a mechanism for job exclusion for African Americans. Moreover, ethnic/immigrant hiring networks can work in ways that are discriminatory – while they may reduce the cost of a job search for workers and improve quality for employers (because networks members are likely to recommend someone reliable in order to preserve their own reputations as trusted employees), they can easily lead to a situation in which Black workers are effectively disenfranchised from certain companies and occupations. Progressive immigrant rights organizers recognize that some employers discriminate against African Americans in the hiring process – and work to fight it. Similarly, progressive Black organizers recognize the need for comprehensive immigration reform that will allow everyone to seek employment without fear of sanctions.

Indeed, this issue of enforcement and sanctions is one place where what looks like difference may actually be commonality. The over-criminalization and over-incarceration of African Americans has damaged the Black community in exactly the same way that workplace and residential raids by immigration authorities have sometimes ripped asunder the fabric of immigrant households and neighborhoods. Making the connection may seem like a stretch but as Angelica Salas, executive director of the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights, Los Angeles, asserts, “...it is a new way . . . of looking at our immigration policy as a punitive system, as a mass incarceration, mass detention system denying people rights, engaging in racial profiling.”

Indeed, the passage of the punitive SB 1070 legislation in Arizona law seems to have catalyzed support for immigrant rights in the African American community. As one prominent church leader commented, “...we say that the law in Arizona should be un-constitutional, because we’ve seen it before, the erosion of rights, and once those rights begin to erode in the Brown community, what’s to stop it from eroding in the Black community?” Freedom from punitive state actions – and the underlying freedom to work, to associate and to gather – is fundamental; and drawing the parallels between a broken criminal

justice system and a broken set of immigration laws may be key to building new understandings.

ONCE APART, YOUTH TOGETHER

Oakland-based Youth Together was founded in 1996 when racial violence led school authorities to shut down Richmond and Castlemont High schools in the East Bay.

While that particular shutdown was the result of Black-Latino violence, Asian immigrant students were no stranger to racial tension. Asian, particularly monolingual, students reported being picked on and robbed by Black students on the (very overcrowded) buses on the way to and from Skyline High School. Once at Skyline, they rarely interacted because they were often tracked into different classes.

Youth Together stepped in. Their staff organized a series of dialogues and mediations and what became apparent was how commonly conflict occurred on the buses. Overcrowding was believed to be the instigator especially since it was also learned that conflict was happening between all types of students. One of the ways the students responded was by campaigning at the local transit authority for more bus service.

They also committed to having a Week of Peace, Unity and Justice, focusing on multiculturalism within the student body. Cinco de Mayo and Asian New Year’s festivals were eclipsing celebrations of Black history month – so the organizers made a point of lifting up each culture equally. The week closed with a multiracial assembly that was so successful that the school has opted to continue with Peace, Unity, and Justice Week each year. Racial tension has eased between student groups as they have learned about each other and how to share space.

What Youth Together exemplifies: any alliance between African Americans and immigrants needs a policy agenda, but part and parcel to that work is working through racial/cultural tension.

Source: Author Interview with Prishni Murillo, Co-Executive Director, Youth Together

MAKING CHANGE: THE ROLE OF MOVEMENTS

By politicizing communities, connecting people, and promoting personal loyalties, social movements build the infrastructure not only of subsequent movements, but of a democratic society more generally.

– David Meyer (2003)

While a policy agenda is important, the only way that it will be realized is by the accumulation of sufficient community power to make change happen. And the old-fashioned and ultimately critical element in doing that is community organizing.

Of course, community organizing is not just one thing and there are many differences about the right approach. One key tension is about how best to bring Blacks and immigrants together. Some we interviewed believe that the right approach is to let the work drive the relationship – that is, pick an issue or policy position, labor together to achieve victory, and develop new understandings of the “other” along the way. Others believe that the relationships drive the work – that is, you need to bring communities together, allow them to develop new interpersonal ties, and the agendas for organizing will emerge.

While we and authors of other similar reports lean to the notion that the relationships need to be tended (Pastor, Ito, & Ortiz, 2010), we are also aware that dialogues can sometimes drag on to nowhere – and that action is a way to help people see the value in collaboration (Alvarado & Jaret, 2009; Pastor, et al., 2010). At the same time, part of what organizations

IN ALL CORNERS OF CALIFORNIA: FRESNO WEST

When you hear Fresno, many people’s minds immediately go to agriculture – while others instead remember signs seen during a long drive up highway 99. Others more versed in sociology and economics might know Fresno for another reason: in a 2005 report, the Brookings Institution noted that Fresno had the highest rate of concentrated poverty among large U.S. cities. But another story that should come to mind is graceful collaboration in the midst of changing demographics.

The city has long-had concentrations of African-American communities but many neighborhoods are increasingly home to Latino and Asian immigrant groups. In the midst of the churning, new alliances have formed.

One of the more remarkable has been between Fresno West Economic Development Corporation (FWEDC), with a mostly Black and increasingly Latino leadership and clientele, and the Fresno Center for New Americans, an effort to better serve Southeast Asian refugees, including Cambodians, Hmong, Lao, and Vietnamese (as well as more recently Russians). The groups collaborated for nearly a decade on California Works for Better Health, a foundation-supported program to enhance job prospects for both communities.

While the initial impulse for coming together was funding, one leader noted that:

... we evolved out of a forced collaboration based on funding; there was a conscious choice here to stay together and this evolved over time. The groups call each other up, involve each other in events and activities, and we did evolve into a true collaborative.

Lue N. Yang, executive director for the Fresno Center for New Americans, said the collaboration was a true learning experience that was difficult at times. Each organization had its own board and agenda so it took a lot of time for the groups to reach common ground. “It ended up good,” Yang said. “We met our goals and that’s what mattered.”

Keith Kelley, President and CEO of Fresno West, echoes the sentiment. Having grown up in the area, he has had a ringside seat to the neighborhood’s demographic change – and he has helped steer the organization into including Latino residents on its board and staff as well as working with the Center for New Americans. In his view, the key strategy is to be deliberative about building alliances and to find the consistent issues on which you can agree.

Among the many collaborative efforts: a landmark conference focusing on poverty in Fresno, a joint hosting of a mayoral debate, and the development of job training programs. It wasn’t easy but any observer can now see an easy – and honest – give and take between groups.

Or perhaps it is better put by Yang, who said, “It’s like we tie our legs together, so if one falls, we all fall.”

Source: Pastor et al. (2008); Author interview with Lue N. Yang and Keith Kelley

like the Black Alliance for Just Immigration (BAJI) are doing is simply building the base for further action. It seems that much more experimentation along both lines of work will need to take place and that the decision about which works best will not be made in an abstract academic setting but rather on the ground and on the front lines of social change.

Another key issue has to do with when to bring communities together. For example, one organizer, formally working with the Center for Community Change (CCC) on issues of immigrant-Black relations, has suggested that African American communities have been hard-hit by a sense of loss – from the sense of displacement in neighborhoods, the economy, and even the leadership of social justice efforts by immigrants – as well as a general fragmentation due to subpar education, a poor economy, and over-policing. His view: you can only build bridges with others when your own foundations are not fragile. And so, he has gravitated to a new project focused on creating “Black space” that is conducive to affirming culture, healing wounds, and building community.

Youth Together in Oakland, likewise, believes that African American students, especially in schools that have undergone a rapid demographic transition, need spaces where they can go for support. In the words of one organizer, “As much as we honor spaces that are multi-racial we also honor spaces that are Black

only and Latino only and it’s really to explore issues of identity” (for more on Youth Together, see the box, “Once Apart, Youth Together”). Meanwhile, some African American leaders claim that reclaiming Black identity is actually critical to embracing a broader human rights framework. Rev. Kelvin Sauls, a South African minister preaching in California’s African American community, notes that, “We need to reclaim

our Blackness but we must also make sure that we reclaim our humanity. ... This allows us to connect our experience with all de-humanized groups. My Blackness needs to lead to the humanization of others.” For CCC, Youth Together, and others, single-identity space is a key stepping stone to building strong coalitions.

Separate spaces do run the risk of fostering separatism. To curb this affect, part of the work is making sure that groups – even when on their own – continue to consider what it would mean “to have the other in the room.” For example, the UCLA Labor Center

executive director Kent Wong describes union training for immigrants and Blacks as follows:

[We made a] deliberate effort within the Spanish language union leadership school to address issues of the African American community and the African American workforce, and the history and the development of the Civil Rights Movement and how that directly contributed to the advancement of immigrant

REFUGEES FOR RICHMOND’S ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS

Low-income communities of color have been historically and disproportionately impacted by pollution generated from our fossil-fuel economy. In Richmond, California, where 17 percent of children and 46 percent of adults have developed asthma (Lopez, Cohen, Zota, & Morello-Frosch, 2009), it is no wonder a multi-ethnic alliance formed against Chevron, a multimillion dollar corporation which hoped to expand to refine heavier, dirtier crude oil. Communities for a Better Environment (CBE), Asian Pacific Environmental Network (APEN), and West County Toxics Coalition (WCTC) filed a lawsuit against Chevron’s expansion efforts in 2008.

While Richmond is a historically Black neighborhood, since refugees from Lao began arriving in the 1970s, the immigrant population has been rising. APEN’s Laotian Organizing Project (LOP) focuses on environmental justice, and so, was a natural coalition member with CBE and WCTC. Part of the campaign’s success was built on cross-organizational and therefore, cross-racial (Black-Latino-Asian), relationship building. In Richmond where 82 percent of the 100,000 residents are non-white, this type of alliance was unavoidable (Choy & Orozco, 2009).

In May 2009, the campaign went global. Representatives from Nigeria, Burma, Kazakhstan, Iraq, Alberta, Ecuador, and the Philippines of Chevron impacted communities joined in San Ramon, CA to tell Chevron shareholders the true costs of its global operations. Their efforts and local-global alliances proved fruitful. In April 2010, the California Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the united community and its health, stating that Chevron had failed to disclose a clear path to reducing greenhouse gases and properly establishing environmental and health impacts in their EIR – effectively halting Chevron’s expansion.

Sources: For more on the campaign, see <http://www.cbecal.org/campaigns/Chevron.html>. For more on LOP, see http://www.apen4ej.org/organize_lop.htm.

rights and communities of color. And also within the African American union leadership school, there's been a deliberative attempt to address some of the issues of Black-Brown relationships, of some of the challenges facing immigrant communities, and how historically there has been certain misunderstanding between African Americans and Latino immigrants, in part due to perceived economic competition. – Kent Wong, UCLA Labor Center

Labor, as an institution, is well cut out for this work of building alliances between African American and immigrant communities. In California, the labor movement has done a tremendous job at building ties on an everyday basis, especially through providing job training, apprenticeship opportunities, and living wage jobs to young African American and Latinos. Meanwhile, the Labor Centers at UCLA and UC Berkeley have

“We discuss ...the commonality that we have around issues of race and racism, the impact of globalization on our communities. So we go through how the immigration issue is being used as a way to galvanize white supremacist movement in this country, and how that is a threat to not just immigrants, but also African American.”

– Gerald Lenoir, BAJI

played a transformative role in building relationships between unions and immigrant worker centers, including sponsoring an initial meeting that led to a partnership between the National Day Labor Organizing Network and the Laborer's International Union. Often working closely with labor, community organizations and schools are other institutions where this type of organizing gets traction.

Another key institution – one we did not fully appreciate until we got in the field – is the faith-based community (well, actually one of our researchers, herself engaged in faith-based organizing, was pointing it out to us but principal investigators sometimes learn slowly . . .). We noted in the discussion of everyday dialogues the absolutely critical role of churches in bringing together first leaders, then parishioners from both African American and immigrant communities. Faith provides a kind of glue as well as a central message about welcoming strangers, supporting fair treatment, and building



understandings across differences. And it is absolutely essential to find a way to connect with the evangelical community where so many African American and immigrants find their spiritual sustenance.

This will require new resources. Many pastors, reverends, and lay people are volunteering their time to bridging the African American-immigrant gap – and organizations like the Black Alliance for Justice Immigration and Clergy and Laity United for Economic Justice have devoted staff time to these activities. But we were hard-pressed to find any church organization with staff devoted to this work and, with CLUE’s main Black-Brown organizer recently moving on and their lead organizer about to do the same, maintaining a consistent collaboration will be a challenge. For this work to mature – and our interviewees indicated both that it should and that it is still in its early stages – sustaining structures will need to be built so that it relies on more than just the personalities and capabilities of the instigating organizers.

Often better-resourced – but just barely – is an extraordinary set of social movement organizations that have increasingly become guideposts to a better and more inclusive California. No short list can do the field justice but in Los Angeles, African Americans and immigrants are being brought together under the rubric of economic and educational justice by groups like SCOPE and Community Coalition. While in the Bay Area, immigrants and African Americans find themselves both subject to disproportionate environmental hazards and blessed by dynamic environmental justice organizing by a network of groups that include Oakland’s Asian Pacific Environmental Network, Richmond’s West County Toxics Coalition, and the San Francisco Mission’s People Organizing to Demand Environmental and Economic Rights (PODER) (Pastor, Sadd, & Morello-Frosch, 2007). There are, of course, many, many more – and we have not even described the dynamic immigrants rights groups that have effectively built ties with African American constituencies and leaders.

All this organizing and institution-building needs to get beyond the coast and into the heartland of California. As we showed in our geographic and demographic analysis, many of the areas of rapid growth for both African Americans and immigrants are far-flung suburbs – Stockton, Vallejo, Fontana and Rialto among others. Both groups moved there to search for cheaper housing and better education and found themselves living in what has become ground zero for the foreclosure crisis. These new arrivals are now stuck – either because they are hanging on to a house losing values or because their children are in local schools – in locations with limited economic prospects, dwindling assets, and a startling gap in social services and social movement organizations. The social infrastructure that is the backbone of civic engagement in urban places like Oakland and Los Angeles is strong and could incubate efforts in these new places. But this will result from invitation not intrusion; leaders in these further flung areas are reasonably skeptical of outside efforts, so they ask for help as needed even as they build new organizations from the ground up.

Some examples of stellar collaboration and cooperation are already cropping up in inland California. For example, in Fresno, a Black-run community development corporation, Fresno West, has been engaged in a series of long-term collaborations with the Hmong-led Center for New Americans (see box, “In All Corners of California: Fresno West”). Together, they have helped shine a light on poverty in the Central Valley and worked to build new alliances to better connect both groups to workforce opportunities. Meanwhile in Sacramento, Mutual Assistance Network (MAN), a group based in the historically Black neighborhood of Del Paso Heights, has built ties with Asian Resources, Inc. around issues of job training, and created new programs that serve both African Americans and the more newly-arrived Hmong population (see box, “A Fan of MAN”). While the “city lights” of the urban coast may attract funder and other attention, there are many opportunities to invest in the Central Valley – and Inland Empire.

FILLING GAPS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR PHILANTHROPY

The support of alliance-building between African Americans and immigrants represents a crucial opportunity for philanthropy. But it requires understanding that supporting alliance-building is more than supporting episodic campaigns – alliance-building is “the coming together of two or more organizations to build power to affect broader change and transform systems of power” (Pastor, Ito, et al., 2010). This implies that funders need to have both a bigger vision and a longer view.

We are not alone in this belief. The Kirwan Institute’s report (2009) and BAJI’s report (2010) both specifically emphasize the need for relationship building, mutually-beneficial work, and long-term goals. Unfortunately, alliances are often underfunded, partly because of the time frame but also because alliances are not well understood and so are overlooked as philanthropic funds go to the organizations themselves (Pastor, et al., 2010).

While forging ties and making change is fundamentally the work of civic and community leaders, foundations and others can help with both their expertise and their resources. Drawing from the analysis above of neighborhood and economic change as well as the qualitative interviews undertaken for this project and the recommendations of previous reports (Alvarado & Jaret, 2009; Black Alliance for Just Immigration, 2010; Grant-Thomas, et al., 2009; Pastor & Ortiz, 2009), we identify the following lessons and opportunities for philanthropy (naturally in the form of a top ten list, although not in any particular order):

1. *The need to build new immigrant leadership in traditionally Black areas.* Arturo Ybarra from the Watts Century Latino Organization stresses that there is a sharp underdevelopment of Latino political and social infrastructure in areas that are historically Black and experiencing an influx of immigrants. This is equally true for immigrant Asian populations in places like Long Beach,

Fresno and Sacramento. As a result, new immigrants are often underrepresented in public debates and policies – their voices will only be heard if investments in new immigrant leadership are made.

2. *The need to help traditional African American institutions adjust to changing demographics.* Black churches, health clinics, and social service agencies traditionally headed by African Americans have seen their communities change around them. Yet often

their mission – helping those in distress and disadvantage – remains the same. These are not just relics of a recent past; they are important community assets – to African Americans and beyond - that should be bolstered. As Jackie Dupont Walker, president of Los Angeles-based Ward Economic

Development Corporation, told us, “Why is there an assumption that I can only serve people who look like me? ... If we’re willing to serve people, what the heck difference does it make?” But adjusting to the change requires special attention and resourcing – particularly given the sense of loss and displacement that is part of the process – and should be part of any full immigrant integration agenda.

3. *The need to be patient as relationships are built personally and organizationally.* Both our own research and previous reports have suggested the importance of relationship and trust-building, and the need to listen carefully (and perhaps quietly) in that process. Short-cuts may be handy but are ultimately unsuccessful in creating lasting alliances. Funders need to be willing to support this for the long haul, providing the resources for convenings, discussions, and meetings – and according to our interviews, even meals and cultural

WHY IT MATTERS, HOW IT MATTERS

“One of the things that made me want to be part of AGENDA was that when we would meet, and I would look around, I would see that it was a mixture of Brown and Black; and they taught us how to better communicate with each other so that when we were speaking and organizing around an issue, and how to make sure that everybody had an opportunity. And even for those where English was not their primary language, we learned how to respect that. We learned how to listen.”

– Brenda LaMothe, Los Angeles City Mayor’s Office

sharing – that are key to building strategic alliances (Pastor, et al., 2010). Remember: this is the glue that will hold people together through the ups and downs of whatever issue or campaign is at hand.

“The causes of the economic crisis, the causes of unemployment and underemployment, the causes of the high dropout rates among Black and Latino youth, are much bigger structural problems that have been created by a whole series of bad policies. ... The solution is not blaming other communities of color. The solution is developing a pro-active economic justice strategy that can benefit all working class communities.”

– Kent Wong, UCLA Labor Center

building. Staff that can do that is important – but so are the instances when immigrant rights groups hire Black organizers and traditionally Black organizations hire new immigrants to build bridges both external and internal to their groups. Funding that is tied to this sort of staff expansion is important and would promote institutional change.

4. *The need to build policy campaigns across difference.* One strategy for change involves discovering common issues and sticking with those – and some have recommended that this be at least an early component of Black-immigrant alliances (Grant-Thomas, et al., May 2009). While this is an important first step, it is also crucial to understand the nuance of needs – to see the importance of a less severe school environment for one group and English language classes for another. Funding for deriving and driving these more complex agendas – and having the conversations and organizing to make them real – is critical.
5. *The need to have dedicated staff.* One issue that came up in our interviews and in the BAJI report was the ways in which groups found it difficult to devote sufficient time to alliance-
6. *The need to invest in youth and parents.* While there are many other areas for leadership development, including in labor, business, and the faith community, we are most struck by the opportunities with youth and parents. As is typical, young people are the most open to a new perspective and more likely to be borrowing from each other culturally and interacting socially. Parents, meanwhile, are deeply concerned about their children’s life chances and willing to work in concert to make this happen. Funding in this arena can create a new generation – and style – of boundary-crossing leadership (Pastor, et al., 2010).
7. *The need to incorporate Asian and African immigrants.* For both African Americans and immigrants, coalitions should strive



towards inclusivity. Around immigration, Asian newcomers bring their agenda, too – including issues like the challenges of having overseas educational credentials recognized, the poverty faced by refugees and others, and a generalized need for English language skills. As for African immigrants, organizations like BAJI and the Priority Africa Network remind us that some immigrants experience the double challenge of being newcomers as well as being identified as part of the American minority group experiencing the most lingering forms of racial prejudice.

8. *The need to promote the right economic story.* We hope that we have made the case that “they’re stealing our jobs” is not just an overstatement – it is misleading. And yet, this is far and away the greatest concern in the African American community, and in a more subtle way, America at large. Of course, the real problem is an economy that has been underperforming for years even as it has delivered benefits to the top and challenges to the bottom. Jumpstarting a new economy will require a different approach – and building the Black-immigrant alliance will mean strategizing to determine, develop and distribute the right economic story.
9. *The need to fund appropriate curriculum.* Throughout our interviews, organizers nearly always came back to the need to educate both groups – immigrants about the African American struggle to secure rights and respect, and African Americans about the forces of globalization and the pains of immigration. Some institutions have already developed curriculum and models – UC Berkeley Labor Center, the Community Coalition, BAJI, and CHIRLA – so part of it will be dissemination, and another part of it will be continuing to strengthen what is already there.
10. *The need for more careful research.* You had to guess that was coming – we are, after all, a research shop. But while we understand that facts do not always win the day – if they did, comprehensive immigration reform would have happened a long time ago – a solid scaffold of research can dispel myths and clarify facts. Indeed, we hope that this report has contributed to that task,

showing the complexities of the changing demographics and impacts of immigrants on Black workers – and we thank our own funders for making that possible.

And at the risk of violating one of our writing rules – top ten lists should have just ten top things – we want to stress one final area of investment for both foundations and the organizations they support: efforts to thread together institutions. Unions are proving to be powerful advocates for immigrant and African American economic goals. Community organizations are skilled at building multi-ethnic coalitions that can organize and deliver on an array of social justice issues. Business groups can provide new sets of connections between energetic entrepreneurs and potential civic leaders. And churches provide the language about why it matters to be good neighbors, an everyday space to work that out, and a commitment to the spiritual renewal needed to hang in this work for the long haul.

These institutions and others contribute in unique ways, and efforts should be made to continue weaving them together. This is exactly the stuff of movement building – and parallel to our notion that the linkage between African Americans and immigrants may be a common commitment to social justice, we think the conversations and collaboration between the two groups often take place most fruitfully in the context of broader movements for justice, movements that make all of us strive to heed our better angels.

While the above list provides a set of directions for funders, it also provides some guideposts for exactly those coalitions and movement-builders who informed this research. We were indeed inspired by our interviews and research; the newspapers may be filled with stories of conflicts and tensions but the communities offer equally compelling – but usually untold – tales of collaboration and change.

Such collaboration is crucial. Frederick Douglass famously said, “Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and never will.” In contemporary California, one of the best ways to both develop and deliver demands is through the sort of social movement organizing that is occurring in the communities where we have documented such rapid demographic transformations. Forced to bridge differences in order to pursue policy, a range of organizations have forged immigrant-African American alliances on issues such as economic, environmental and even transportation justice. They deserve our admiration and our support.

I found that in any conversation as people actually sang with each other, stood next to each other, and started marching down Crenshaw together, then all of a sudden they started talking to each other, and started realizing that they lived in the same neighborhoods, that some of them had actually seen each other on the street, but always somewhat warily, and now we had at least a connection that said, 'At least I begin to trust who you are, so then we can begin to talk.'

– Dr. Juan Martinez, Fuller Theological Seminary

While we have covered much ground, the observant reader may note a startling omission. We have talked hardly at all about what many believe to be the central issue: comprehensive immigration reform. This is not because we think it is unimportant; we have argued elsewhere about the way in which it can improve the lives of all Californians (Pastor, et al., 2010) and we are also firmly convinced – as are more than two-thirds of Californians – that a DREAM Act that would provide a path to legalization for undocumented youth who have grown up in this country, is more than appropriate. Moreover, immigration status matters for building lasting coalitions; as one immigrant advocate put it, “... so here we are fighting for better jobs and training, etc., but then immigration status will sometimes impede the very people who need to get access to those benefits.”

But we have deliberately left immigration reform to one side because we believe that one major flaw in many strategies to improve understanding between African Americans and immigrants is that the call – and motive – is to persuade Blacks to support immigration reform. Immigrants both need and would welcome the support but we also think that approach fails to stress why empowering immigrants, often seen as economic and political competitors, will actually improve the chances of realizing the Black justice agenda. And it fails to stress that immigrants themselves should learn about the real history of African American struggles, and adopt Black empowerment issues as their own as they solidify an alliance for the long haul.

Outside of California, Casa de Maryland and the NAACP came together in just such a way. Previously working independently, an alliance was catalyzed when “the

police killed a Latino man and correctional officers killed an African American man” (Black Alliance for Just Immigration, 2010, p. 14) – something unfortunately familiar in our state as well. From here, the alliance began anti-racism work with committees comprised of members of both groups, focusing on relationship building through bi-cultural education. Only after this relationship building did immigration policy begin to enter the work and agenda of the alliance – although other issues like health care, housing, and police brutality remain central.

The Maryland case may be atypical. The usual approach to alliance-building is often instrumental rather than mutual – it is about transactions rather than transformations, about making deals versus making change. For our part, we think that the African American-immigrant alliance is critical to pushing a more positive approach to immigrant integration but we are mostly concerned because we think such a partnership is crucial to the broader mission of social justice. We cannot conceive of a world in which immigrant rights are protected if African Americans remain vulnerable to racial profiling and economic despair. We firmly believe that the African American voice in our civic life will be strengthened by recommitting to the human rights framework that drove the civil rights revolution. And we know America will be better when it is able to overcome the legacy of its original sin of slavery and fully embrace the welcoming spirit embodied in the notion of a “nation of immigrants.”

There are certainly particular issues that affect immigrants, including the rising wave of enforcement, the need for a path to legalization, and the tentative nature of rights (and access to social services) for those who are here either with papers or without. But most of the aspirations of the immigrant community are similar to those of African Americans – the need for better education for children, the desire to be free from excess policing, and the hope for access to high-quality employment. And it is in the grand tradition of the civil rights movement and its call for social justice and equal opportunity that we will be able to align and make progress for both groups.

We label this approach: working for everyday social justice. We mean everyday in three important senses. The first is merely that the sorts of issues that will bring people together are the ones that affect their daily lives: access to education, economic opportunity, affordable housing, clean air, and neighborhood safety. Example



As we have noted, funders and others can help in this effort in several ways. Support is needed for patiently building relationships and trust, for quietly strengthening immigrant and Black infrastructure in rapidly changing neighborhoods, and for collaboratively developing policy agendas that serve multiple constituencies. Basic research on the conditions and issues facing both groups and special attention to youth, parent, and faith-based leadership as well as inter-worker alliances will also be an important part of the puzzle.

after example shows that where these concerns are brought together – often with the careful weaving work of community organizers who help communities speak and act across difference – strong alliances are built.

We mean everyday in another sense: this bridging needs to happen with ordinary people. Too much attention is focused on how well leaders can get along – as though securing polite conversation and strategic alignment between well-placed and well-resourced middle-class professionals is an amazing achievement. More striking – and more critical – is when grassroots parents, working-class students, and once-distant neighbors are able to make connections, and then make change.

Finally, we mean everyday in the sense that this is a long haul – and will require daily work. The evidence we have reviewed suggests that African Americans and immigrants are the two communities coming into the most contact in California – and the 2010 Census data suggest that as goes California, so will go the nation. Alvarado and Jaret (2009), for example, are responding to a more recent transition as both immigrants and African Americans move to the South. As daily lives – and policy agendas – become increasingly intertwined, building relationships for the longer term will be critical.

And it is exactly the puzzle metaphor that may be needed. Victor Quintana, an organizer of rural farm workers in Sinaloa, Mexico, once commented that some leaders understand the world as a game of chess, others as a jigsaw puzzle. In chess, he noted, the pieces are black or white; in the jigsaw, the pieces are of many colors and a single piece can be multi-hued. In chess, some pieces are far more important than others; in the jigsaw, all are needed to complete the tapestry. In chess, the object is to knock others off the playing field until only your side is left standing; in the jigsaw, the object is put together the pieces such that you do not know where one ends and another begins.

Too many have treated the topic of Black-immigrant relations as chess, looking for who might be up, who might be down, and who is soon to leave the game. Instead of division, we need an approach that stresses what Martin Luther King, in his famous “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” called “an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny.” In our urban areas, our older suburbs, and even in some of our far-flung “exurbs,” African Americans and immigrants are living together, working side-by-side, and praying, hoping and struggling for a better California. It is time that their story is told as well, and we hope this report contributes to that fuller picture of their lives and of the future of the Golden State.

APPENDIX A. DATA, DATA TABLES, METHODOLOGY

This appendix describes our data sources, offers a few more detailed tables, and reviews some methodological issues along the way. As noted on occasion in the text, a longer version of this report offers an even fuller discussion.

The basic data for this report comes from the U.S. Census, with the tract-level data used to construct the Black-Immigrant Proximity Index (BIPI) taken from the summary files of the 2000 Census. The summary files of the decennial census were really our only choice given that the communities we have defined above were constructed from a very low level of geography – census tracts. To be consistent going backward over time, we utilized the Geolytics version of the 1980 and 1990 Census in which data from those years has been reshaped into the census tract geography of 2000. Fortunately, it is the same census tract geography used in the 2005-2009 tract level data from the American Community Survey (ACS).

This data formed the basis for our generation of community type in which we began with those communities with a very high BIPI in 2000, then cast backward over time to see what sort of processes brought them to that. Table A1 offers the range of community type and some of the basic demographic data; please note that Emerging (Slowly) refers to those neighborhoods that were not historically Black but grew slowly – by less than 66 percent – between 1980 and 2000. Emerging (Rapidly) refers to the rest of the neighborhoods that were not historically Black and evidenced much more rapid growth over that period.

We should note that in order to make the consideration in this exercise, a neighborhood needed to have a high BIPI in 2000 (or be close to one of the high BIPI areas). What, however, about neighborhoods that met the “historically Black” threshold in 1980, but in which the decline in Blacks since was so sharp that the BIPI threshold was not met? As we note, these are not places of central concern to this analysis – we are interested here in where the action is occurring now – but perhaps if they were included, the evidence would be more suggestive of displacement of Blacks by immigrants.

To look at this question, we examined all census tracts that were historically Black in 1980 and asked which we might have missed by working backwards from the BIPI threshold for 2000. Of those (446) tracts, many (105) were already caught in our analysis, others (55) saw no change or an increase in the Black population

between 1980 and 2000, and many (111) saw a decline in the Black population of less than 30 percent and so would not have been classified as in “rapid decline.” Such rapidly declining areas are the critical focal point here since the point is to see if these are places where change may have occurred so dramatically that a backward cast from the 2000 BIPI leads us to miss an important part of the Black-immigrant experience.

Of the (175) tracts that did see a rapid decline, about a third (58 tracts) saw relatively modest increases in the immigrant share of the population over the time period, indicating that it was not immigrants but likely rather pressures from gentrification that propelled the Black exodus. A handful of others (20 tracts) were less than 44 percent Black in 1980 – the minimum for the historically Black communities in “rapid decline” that were included in our analysis – indicating that they did not have a Black share of the population that was high enough initially to warrant the “rapid decline” categorization. That left 97 tracts that saw declines in the Black population along with increases in the immigrant share of the population between 1980 and 2000 that were in the range of those experienced by the “rapid decline” communities that were included in our analysis (but were not included, of course, because they failed to generate a BIPI in 2000 above the threshold of 650.33).

These 97 tracts meet four thresholds: their percent Black in 1980, immigrant share in 2000, increase in the percentage immigrant between 1980 and 2000, and decline in the Black population meet at least the minimum for these values among all the “rapid decline” communities previously identified by the BIPI analysis. This turns out to be about 12.2 percent of the total Black population in 1980.

While this would seem to be a sizeable share of the population and the experience, a visual inspection of these tracts using geographic information system (GIS) software suggests that they are generally proximate to the areas we do examine. The exceptions are Pacoima, Pomona, and the most traditional part of Black Los Angeles, Central Avenue near downtown (where Second Baptist Church is located; an example we profile in this report). The other areas “left out” by our cuts are south Inglewood (but we have north Inglewood), parts of Watts, and Grant Hill in San Diego. One nuance we must share is that these areas do seem to have experienced a more rapid growth in the population between 1980 and 2000, 36 percent versus

the 27 percent increase in the “rapid decline” areas identified by also having a BIPI threshold. While this would seem to offer some evidence of displacement, that growth rate is still lower than the 43 percent growth rate for the state as a whole over that period.

In any case, as we have noted, our focus in this report is on communities with a high degree of contemporary “face time” between Blacks and immigrants in the state, so including these additional tracts (and hence neighborhoods) would not work directly toward that goal. However, we have captured some of their experience since they are right nearby and we have included qualitative examples, including from the Central Avenue area and Watts. Given that some method must be chosen to focus the research, we believe our approach to be reasonable, representative, and appropriate to the task at hand.

In order to calculate socio-demographic measures at the community level (since these are sometimes combinations of tracts) our basic approach was to sum up, or take a weighted average of the data across the tracts contained in each community. In generating all averages and medians presented at the level of a community type, we were careful to apply the appropriate weights when bringing the data from the tracts up to the community level. For example, a different set of weights was used when figuring median household income (total households with income) than when figuring the poverty rate (total persons for whom poverty was determined) or the percentage population over 25 with less than a high school degree (total persons ages 25 and over). All community-level median values are the weighted averages of tract-level medians of the same variable, for all tracts in each community. All measures that were calculated at the community level were then summarized by community type using a procedure analogous to that described above (see Table A2).

Our data on school performance focused on high schools because they are more likely to have existed over the entire time period considered (1981-2009; there was a significant amount of elementary school construction over the period and a lot of shifting of students) and to have reported to the major school surveys in California – the California Basic Educational Data System (CBEDS). CBEDS collects student and staff demographics along with the schools’ Academic Performance Index (API) score, an index that came out of the state’s *Public Schools Accountability Act of 1999* and tracks performance and improvement of schools across a variety of academic measures. The schools included in our analysis were identified by selecting all active high schools within 2.5 miles of

each community (using a 2.5 mile buffer around the polygon representing each community) in a GIS system using shapefiles representing the identified communities and all active public schools in 2000. Four years of the CBEDS data (‘81-‘82, ‘91-‘92, ‘01-‘02, and ‘08-09 school years) and three years of the API data (‘98-99, ‘03-04, and ‘08-09 school years) were merged with the selection of schools, and all schools with data included in all years for each respective datasets were included in the analysis.

For the economic data, we relied on the microdata samples provided by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS; Ruggles et al., 2010) for the decennial censuses of 1980, 1990 and 2000, as well as the American Community Surveys of 2005, 2006 and 2007 pooled together to improve statistical reliability. We used the 2005 through 2007 IPUMS ACS rather than the most recent available years (2008 and 2009) because of a change in the way that the number of weeks worked during the year prior to the survey was tabulated, making for less accurate estimates of imputed hourly wages. The specific IPUMS samples used were the 1980 5 percent State sample, the 1990 5 percent State sample, the 2000 5 percent sample, and the 2005, 2006 and 2007 ACS one year samples; on the last three, sampling weights were adjusted appropriately for the three ACS samples such that weighted population values reflect the average total population across the three years. All this data has remarkable detail on occupation, making it an exceptional fit for the task at hand.

As will be recalled, we sought to focus on the appropriate geographic scale for which people are competing with each other for the same jobs – and since so much of the debate is about low-skill and low-wage jobs, that guided our thinking. Initially, we considered drawing regional boundaries that were significantly more compact than those that were eventually used. However, after an examination of data on where low-wage workers live and where they work for selected communities, using a tool provided by the U.S. Census Bureau called OnTheMap, it appeared lower-wage workers tended to work throughout the metropolitan area and not necessarily in close proximity to where they lived. Thus, it seemed that the regions defined by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approximated the appropriate geographic scale of low-wage labor market competition (and all labor market competition for that matter). The latest definition of regions from the OMB is referred to as Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs), same as the definitions that were used for our analysis, with some exceptions described below.

Because we were working with several years of the microdata, we cross-referenced the various levels of geography available in the samples of census microdata used for our analysis, and identified a set of regional boundaries that could be constructed in each of the samples. For the 1980 sample, the most detailed level of geography available in the microdata was the 1980 County Group; for the 1990 sample, it was the 1990 5 percent Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA); and for the 2000 and 2005-2007 samples, it was the 2000 5 percent PUMA. For most regions, these respective geographies for each sample could be grouped together to form the relevant CBSA. However, for certain regions they could not, and we thus had to define the region by finding the boundary that was “lowest common denominator” between the three

levels of geography. These regions included what we refer to as Vallejo, which is composed of both the Vallejo-Fairfield and Napa CBSAs; Salinas, which is composed of the Salinas CBSA only in 1980 and 1990, but the Salinas CBSA plus San Benito County in 2000 and 2005-2007; and the Inland Empire, which is composed of the Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario CBSA plus Imperial County. The others among the 10 regions identified in our analysis are consistent with the CBSA definitions across all years.

Another note for those interested in the details. For Figure 1 in the main text, “Exposure to Immigrants for the U.S.-born by Race/Ethnicity, California,” the data points for 1980 and 1990 had to be estimated because the census did not include tabulations of people by

Table A1, part 1: Community Classification

CBSA/Community Name	City	Black, 1980	%	Black, 2000	%	Black, 2005-2009	%	Immigrant, 1980	%	Immigrant, 2000	%	Immigrant, 2005-2009	%	Community Classification
Bakersfield CBSA														
Lakeview	Bakersfield	3,250	(76.7)	1,703	(29.8)	1,006	(17.6)	217	(5.1)	1,712	(30.0)	2,152	(37.6)	Rapid Decline
Oleander Sunset (eastern portion)	Bakersfield	3,504	(67.7)	2,104	(34.0)	2,066	(31.7)	179	(3.5)	1,644	(26.5)	1,713	(26.3)	Rapid Decline
Casa Loma	Bakersfield	2,332	(39.9)	1,980	(27.8)	1,541	(18.8)	459	(7.9)	1,754	(24.7)	2,397	(29.3)	Moderate Decline
Fresno CBSA														
The West Side (part)	Fresno	6,420	(79.9)	3,915	(40.0)	3,285	(33.9)	384	(4.8)	2,874	(29.4)	2,442	(25.2)	Rapid Decline
Los Angeles CBSA														
East Carson/Dolphin Park	Carson	1,638	(24.9)	1,808	(25.3)	1,594	(21.3)	1,192	(18.1)	2,215	(31.0)	2,546	(34.0)	Emerging (Slowly)
East Compton	Compton	3,424	(61.5)	1,531	(21.8)	1,276	(18.5)	1,115	(20.0)	3,000	(42.7)	2,942	(42.7)	Rapid Decline
Southeast Compton	Compton	8,192	(80.9)	4,470	(38.6)	3,508	(30.1)	822	(8.1)	3,841	(33.2)	3,668	(31.5)	Rapid Decline
Rosewood	Compton	7,380	(72.7)	4,591	(37.2)	3,957	(31.5)	1,547	(15.3)	4,050	(32.9)	3,807	(30.3)	Rapid Decline
Compton/Carson 40757	40757	6,451	(92.9)	4,040	(59.8)	3,409	(50.6)	58	(0.8)	1,463	(21.7)	1,378	(20.5)	Rapid Decline
Northwest Gardena	Gardena	7,404	(84.5)	6,454	(78.9)	6,313	(74.5)	442	(5.1)	980	(12.0)	1,170	(13.8)	Moderate Decline
Central Gardena	Gardena	1,087	(10.0)	4,260	(28.6)	3,924	(26.2)	2,722	(25.1)	5,285	(35.5)	4,941	(33.0)	Emerging (Rapidly)
North Hawthorne	Hawthorne	1,123	(13.4)	3,542	(27.7)	3,106	(23.6)	2,563	(30.7)	5,301	(41.5)	4,958	(37.6)	Emerging (Rapidly)
East Hawthorne	Hawthorne	2,140	(10.8)	14,926	(43.0)	12,716	(36.2)	4,458	(22.4)	11,047	(31.8)	12,769	(36.3)	Emerging (Rapidly)
Central Inglewood	Inglewood	6,572	(49.4)	7,380	(40.1)	6,910	(36.3)	2,332	(17.5)	6,079	(33.0)	6,160	(32.4)	Growing
North Inglewood (part)	Inglewood	8,259	(60.2)	12,453	(64.6)	11,246	(55.4)	2,088	(15.2)	4,109	(21.3)	4,946	(24.4)	Growing
Antelope Valley State Prison	Lancaster	32	(2.8)	1,804	(36.3)	1,505	(34.7)	64	(5.5)	1,373	(27.6)	597	(13.8)	Prison Community
Northeast Lawndale	Lawndale	208	(3.6)	1,591	(19.0)	1,158	(14.0)	1,542	(26.8)	3,454	(41.3)	3,611	(43.8)	Emerging (Rapidly)
Northwest Long Beach (part)	Long Beach	2,803	(47.7)	2,010	(24.4)	1,658	(19.9)	620	(10.6)	3,529	(42.9)	3,170	(38.0)	Moderate Decline
Saint Mary's	Long Beach	1,120	(23.8)	1,688	(18.9)	1,606	(19.6)	1,274	(27.0)	3,948	(44.3)	3,039	(37.0)	Emerging (Slowly)
Wrigley (part)	Long Beach	649	(14.2)	2,142	(29.4)	1,953	(25.3)	657	(14.4)	2,402	(32.9)	2,176	(28.2)	Emerging (Rapidly)
South LA, Slauson and 1-10	Los Angeles	10,289	(77.3)	5,281	(28.1)	3,846	(18.2)	1,906	(14.3)	8,160	(43.5)	9,466	(44.7)	Rapid Decline
West of Florence-Graham	Los Angeles	12,121	(86.9)	6,304	(32.3)	5,249	(24.7)	1,153	(8.3)	7,436	(38.0)	9,188	(43.2)	Rapid Decline
Across Vermont from USC	Los Angeles	3,215	(77.0)	1,751	(32.3)	1,561	(28.5)	670	(16.1)	2,234	(41.2)	2,212	(40.4)	Rapid Decline
North Watts	Los Angeles	3,057	(79.2)	1,758	(31.7)	2,284	(34.4)	557	(14.4)	2,061	(37.1)	2,216	(33.4)	Rapid Decline
Mid-City/Koreatown	Los Angeles	2,408	(54.3)	1,397	(23.0)	1,205	(20.5)	1,509	(34.0)	3,300	(54.4)	3,304	(56.1)	Rapid Decline
West Mid-City	Los Angeles	11,004	(80.3)	6,444	(37.0)	4,898	(27.5)	1,679	(12.3)	6,353	(36.4)	6,923	(38.9)	Rapid Decline
Northwest of East Compton	Los Angeles	3,514	(83.8)	2,076	(37.7)	1,257	(25.9)	391	(9.3)	1,824	(33.1)	1,691	(34.9)	Rapid Decline
Southeast Los Angeles of Florence	Los Angeles	23,260	(83.0)	14,160	(42.0)	12,949	(35.9)	2,405	(8.6)	11,152	(33.1)	12,496	(34.7)	Rapid Decline
Southwest Pico-Robertson	Los Angeles	3,286	(60.5)	2,164	(32.0)	1,679	(19.3)	819	(15.1)	2,715	(40.2)	2,730	(31.4)	Rapid Decline
Jefferson	Los Angeles	9,752	(73.6)	6,961	(41.4)	5,671	(31.8)	2,444	(18.4)	6,309	(37.5)	7,997	(44.8)	Moderate Decline
East Pico-Robertson	Los Angeles	3,873	(76.7)	2,792	(46.3)	1,735	(29.8)	626	(12.4)	1,682	(27.9)	2,134	(36.7)	Moderate Decline
Northwest of Willowbrook	Los Angeles	4,537	(93.5)	3,318	(56.2)	3,334	(47.7)	148	(3.1)	1,458	(24.7)	2,032	(29.1)	Moderate Decline
East West Adams	Los Angeles	3,770	(84.0)	2,817	(54.5)	2,202	(40.9)	530	(11.8)	1,561	(30.2)	1,873	(34.8)	Moderate Decline
North Hyde Park	Los Angeles	4,531	(87.0)	3,742	(69.6)	3,335	(63.0)	279	(5.4)	1,066	(19.8)	1,332	(25.2)	Moderate Decline
Central Mid-City	Los Angeles	8,316	(76.6)	6,882	(48.6)	5,654	(38.8)	1,376	(12.7)	4,754	(33.6)	5,098	(35.0)	Moderate Decline
Hyde Park (central)	Los Angeles	4,625	(82.9)	3,925	(55.6)	3,902	(55.7)	573	(10.3)	1,772	(25.1)	2,018	(28.8)	Moderate Decline
West Crenshaw	Los Angeles	9,228	(93.8)	8,029	(65.2)	8,314	(58.4)	530	(5.4)	3,100	(25.2)	4,646	(32.6)	Moderate Decline
Facility	Los Angeles	2,154	(33.1)	4,069	(37.5)	3,130	(35.4)	1,697	(26.1)	2,057	(19.0)	1,692	(19.1)	Prison Community
East Westchester/LAX	Los Angeles	324	(10.4)	2,764	(57.6)	868	(39.1)	681	(21.8)	1,199	(25.0)	748	(33.7)	Emerging (Rapidly)
North Central	Pasadena	11,778	(57.6)	7,625	(28.6)	6,074	(22.8)	3,611	(17.7)	9,872	(37.0)	8,607	(32.3)	Rapid Decline
West Athens	West Athens	5,128	(66.2)	4,446	(52.8)	3,848	(53.4)	1,513	(19.5)	2,507	(29.8)	2,027	(28.1)	Moderate Decline
North Westmont	Westmont	4,311	(81.5)	3,142	(50.9)	2,646	(43.2)	606	(11.5)	1,660	(26.9)	1,777	(29.0)	Moderate Decline
Central Westmont	Westmont	8,937	(79.6)	6,827	(49.8)	6,571	(48.7)	1,541	(13.7)	3,686	(26.9)	3,133	(23.2)	Moderate Decline

race and nativity in the summary files until 2000. Thus, we could not get, for example, the number of U.S.-born Blacks in a census tract for 1980 and 1990 – only the total number of Blacks (or non-Hispanic Blacks), inclusive of immigrants. If used to compute

an exposure index for exposure to immigrants, this would tend to overstate the level of exposure since there is some double counting. This is not particularly problematic for Blacks as the percentage of Blacks who are immigrants is relatively low in California – but it

Table A1, part 2: Community Classification

CBSA/Community Name	City	Black, 1980	%	Black, 2000	%	Black, 2005-2009	%	Immigrant, 1980	%	Immigrant, 2000	%	Immigrant, 2005-2009	%	Community Classification
Riverside-San Bernardino CBSA														
Adelanto/Victorville	Adelanto/Victorville	101	(4.0)	2,944	(12.1)	6,969	(16.4)	143	(5.7)	3,831	(15.7)	7,994	(18.8)	Emerging (Rapidly)
South Fontana	Fontana	15	(0.9)	2,670	(14.9)	2,840	(15.2)	109	(6.4)	4,565	(25.5)	5,789	(31.0)	Emerging (Rapidly)
Rialto	Rialto	3,278	(14.4)	10,587	(25.0)	8,743	(20.0)	1,257	(5.5)	9,692	(22.9)	12,365	(28.2)	Emerging (Rapidly)
Rialto/Colton	Rialto/Colton	178	(2.9)	2,887	(16.5)	2,179	(11.8)	457	(7.5)	4,597	(26.2)	6,558	(35.4)	Emerging (Rapidly)
California (just east of Rialto)	San Bernardino	2,858	(62.0)	2,810	(46.8)	2,121	(36.7)	246	(5.3)	1,152	(19.2)	1,693	(29.3)	Moderate Decline
South Moreno Valley	South Moreno Valley	180	(7.5)	4,251	(23.1)	7,412	(21.3)	121	(5.0)	3,650	(19.9)	8,203	(23.6)	Emerging (Rapidly)
Sacramento CBSA														
Meadowview (south)	Sacramento	2,421	(43.2)	1,839	(25.8)	2,049	(22.0)	578	(10.3)	2,124	(29.8)	2,890	(31.0)	Moderate Decline
Avondale	Sacramento	792	(20.5)	971	(11.6)	970	(11.1)	437	(11.3)	3,320	(39.6)	3,421	(39.2)	Emerging (Slowly)
West Del Paso Heights/Strawberry Manor/Oak Knoll/Norwood	Sacramento	1,573	(43.2)	2,024	(26.1)	1,717	(23.2)	132	(3.6)	2,391	(30.9)	1,927	(26.0)	Growing
Glen Elder/South East	Sacramento	750	(21.2)	1,187	(21.3)	996	(17.7)	302	(8.5)	1,878	(33.7)	2,068	(36.8)	Emerging (Slowly)
South City Farms/Parkway-South Sacramento (west)	Sacramento	696	(11.8)	1,129	(13.8)	1,177	(13.6)	1,000	(17.0)	2,840	(34.7)	3,465	(39.9)	Emerging (Slowly)
Parkway-South Sacramento (south of Lemon Hill)	Sacramento	1,038	(16.6)	1,725	(21.3)	1,324	(15.5)	379	(6.1)	1,927	(23.8)	3,043	(35.5)	Emerging (Slowly)
Parkway (north)	Sacramento	578	(13.5)	2,522	(36.6)	2,130	(34.1)	394	(9.2)	1,712	(24.8)	1,880	(30.1)	Emerging (Rapidly)
Valley High/North Laguna (part)	Sacramento	401	(10.2)	4,141	(27.2)	3,959	(26.1)	339	(8.6)	4,931	(32.4)	5,315	(35.0)	Emerging (Rapidly)
Salinas CBSA														
Seaside (between La Salle and Broadway)	Seaside	2,781	(47.6)	1,574	(26.7)	1,446	(27.0)	1,037	(17.7)	1,912	(32.5)	1,826	(34.1)	Rapid Decline
San Diego CBSA														
Lincoln Park	San Diego	1,811	(48.0)	1,995	(32.3)	1,499	(21.9)	786	(20.8)	2,358	(38.1)	2,440	(35.7)	Growing
Emerald Hills/Valencia Park/Alta Vista	San Diego	3,083	(70.4)	3,404	(36.0)	2,768	(26.9)	455	(10.4)	3,169	(33.5)	3,688	(35.9)	Growing
San Francisco CBSA														
East Palo Alto	East Palo Alto	7,258	(66.3)	4,169	(24.8)	4,611	(23.5)	1,891	(17.3)	7,043	(41.9)	7,179	(36.6)	Rapid Decline
Belle Haven	Menlo Park	3,322	(75.0)	1,792	(29.4)	1,276	(25.5)	610	(13.8)	2,639	(43.3)	2,210	(44.2)	Rapid Decline
Rancho San Antonio	Oakland	2,493	(44.6)	1,440	(18.3)	791	(11.4)	1,603	(28.7)	3,764	(47.8)	3,576	(51.4)	Rapid Decline
Lockwood-Tevis/Coliseum	Oakland	3,807	(86.6)	2,344	(45.3)	2,152	(40.9)	238	(5.4)	1,646	(31.8)	1,942	(36.9)	Rapid Decline
Highland Terrace	Oakland	2,210	(64.2)	1,384	(29.0)	683	(18.6)	503	(14.6)	2,039	(42.7)	1,555	(42.4)	Rapid Decline
Clinton	Oakland	3,121	(49.8)	2,092	(25.0)	1,624	(23.6)	1,017	(16.2)	4,181	(49.9)	3,260	(47.4)	Rapid Decline
Stonehurst	Oakland	3,046	(76.1)	2,300	(41.9)	1,947	(34.5)	383	(9.6)	1,675	(30.5)	1,973	(35.0)	Moderate Decline
Webster	Oakland	3,570	(84.7)	2,725	(52.1)	2,051	(35.7)	216	(5.1)	1,316	(25.1)	2,185	(38.0)	Moderate Decline
Harrington/Jefferson	Oakland	2,560	(40.1)	1,984	(23.7)	1,681	(21.3)	1,038	(16.3)	3,341	(39.9)	2,706	(34.2)	Moderate Decline
Arroyo Viejo	Oakland	3,732	(85.4)	2,948	(55.6)	2,038	(40.8)	264	(6.0)	1,464	(27.6)	1,495	(30.0)	Moderate Decline
Hoover/Foster	Oakland	3,605	(91.7)	3,059	(64.2)	1,770	(50.1)	77	(2.0)	1,126	(23.6)	1,097	(31.0)	Moderate Decline
Havenscourt/Hegenberger	Oakland	7,945	(76.3)	7,325	(57.5)	5,852	(46.2)	689	(6.6)	2,950	(23.2)	3,513	(27.7)	Moderate Decline
Fairfax/Fremont	Oakland	3,089	(56.7)	3,005	(45.0)	2,968	(42.7)	489	(9.0)	1,739	(26.0)	1,588	(22.8)	Moderate Decline
Allendale/Laurel	Oakland	1,407	(28.9)	1,742	(26.2)	1,792	(28.7)	868	(17.8)	2,687	(40.4)	2,687	(40.4)	Emerging (Slowly)
School/Dimond/Upper	Oakland	1,981	(33.4)	2,485	(31.8)	2,280	(30.0)	997	(16.8)	2,778	(35.6)	2,667	(35.1)	Emerging (Slowly)
Peralta Creek-Bartlett	Richmond	5,349	(91.6)	4,284	(67.7)	2,553	(43.5)	275	(4.7)	1,038	(16.4)	1,741	(29.7)	Moderate Decline
Santa Fe/Coronado	Richmond	4,787	(82.2)	3,870	(62.2)	2,918	(47.1)	183	(3.1)	1,146	(18.4)	1,251	(20.2)	Moderate Decline
Pullman/Park Plaza	Richmond													
Laurel Park/ Eastshore/ Parkway/ Panhandle Annex	Richmond	5,959	(79.0)	4,896	(67.5)	3,899	(62.4)	499	(6.6)	1,196	(16.5)	1,280	(20.5)	Moderate Decline
Iron Triangle/South	Richmond	6,197	(63.1)	5,475	(40.4)	4,536	(39.9)	1,225	(12.5)	4,419	(32.6)	3,717	(32.7)	Moderate Decline
Ocean View	San Francisco	10,693	(60.4)	5,623	(24.7)	4,153	(16.8)	2,424	(13.7)	9,654	(42.3)	11,096	(44.8)	Rapid Decline
Bayview	San Francisco	4,081	(64.3)	2,677	(29.4)	2,167	(25.7)	982	(15.5)	4,250	(46.7)	3,796	(45.1)	Rapid Decline
Western Addition (part)	San Francisco	3,868	(83.0)	2,633	(50.1)	2,364	(45.2)	463	(9.9)	1,662	(31.6)	1,719	(32.9)	Rapid Decline
Stockton CBSA														
Kennedy	Stockton	2,465	(39.2)	1,932	(24.3)	1,556	(19.9)	1,118	(17.8)	2,538	(32.0)	2,371	(30.4)	Moderate Decline
Van Buskirk Municipal Park	Stockton	714	(28.5)	1,293	(19.2)	1,227	(20.7)	753	(30.0)	2,319	(34.4)	2,136	(36.0)	Emerging (Rapidly)
Weberstown Park	Stockton	471	(12.1)	1,038	(14.1)	1,276	(19.7)	621	(15.9)	2,713	(36.9)	2,438	(37.7)	Emerging (Rapidly)
Valley Oak (south)	Stockton	9	(2.7)	1,124	(11.9)	1,880	(17.0)	24	(7.3)	3,278	(34.6)	3,827	(34.6)	Emerging (Rapidly)
Vallejo CBSA														
Lake Chabot (just south of the crest)	Vallejo	1,490	(37.5)	2,205	(38.1)	1,489	(29.2)	571	(14.4)	1,422	(24.6)	1,370	(26.9)	Growing
The Crest	Vallejo	3,431	(50.3)	5,154	(41.8)	3,685	(33.9)	873	(12.8)	3,507	(28.4)	3,602	(33.2)	Growing

is more problematic for Latinos and Asians given the much higher incidence of immigrants in those racial/ethnic groups (particularly in California). Thus, we needed to estimate what the exposure indices might

have been in 1980 and 1990 for the U.S.-born of each racial/ethnic group shown in the graph.

The exposure index values were estimated by first calculating an exposure index for each group

Table A2: Community Characteristics

Community Type (# of Communities)	Historic African American Communities												Emerging African American Communities				California				
	Rapid Decline (28)				Moderate Decline (28)				Growing (7)				Emerging (24)								
	1980	1990	2000	2005-2009	1980	1990	2000	2005-2009	1980	1990	2000	2005-2009	1980	1990	2000	2005-2009	1980	1990	2000	2005-2009	
Community Characteristics																					
Total population ('000)	274	318	346	356	188	211	228	229	50	70	79	80	145	237	310	346	23,638	29,760	33,872	36,309	
Growth over preceding decade/period	-	16%	9%	3%	-	12%	8%	1%	-	40%	14%	1%	-	64%	31%	12%	-	26%	14%	7%	
Age Distribution (%)																					
Under 18 years	34	33	34	30	33	33	34	31	29	33	35	31	29	33	36	34	27	26	27	26	
18-24	14	12	11	12	14	11	11	11	14	11	10	11	14	11	11	11	14	11	10	10	
25-64	43	46	46	49	45	47	47	49	47	49	48	49	48	50	47	49	49	52	52	53	
Over 64	9	9	8	8	9	9	8	8	9	6	7	8	9	7	6	6	10	10	11	11	
Race/Ethnicity (%)																					
Anglo	7	5	4	5	10	6	4	5	25	12	7	7	53	34	17	13	67	57	47	43	
African American	74	52	35	28	73	62	49	41	53	50	44	37	14	23	24	21	8	7	6	6	
Latino	15	35	50	56	14	26	39	46	14	26	33	43	20	26	40	49	19	25	32	36	
Asian Pacific Islander	4	8	9	9	3	5	5	5	8	12	13	11	11	16	15	13	6	9	11	12	
Other	0	1	2	2	0	1	3	2	0	1	3	3	0	1	4	3	1	1	3	3	
Immigrant (%)	12	29	37	37	10	20	28	31	15	25	29	30	16	24	30	31	15	22	26	27	
Black-Immigrant Exposure Index (BIPI)	426	841	780	651	370	701	815	777	327	718	808	718	119	419	715	900	44	82	98	108	
Per capita income (\$'000)	14.9	14.3	15.2	14.9	16.7	16.0	15.6	15.0	20.6	18.9	17.8	17.0	21.8	20.0	16.9	16.1	26.1	28.7	30.2	29.0	
Median household income (\$'000)	36.8	39.7	41.1	37.4	38.1	38.9	37.5	34.5	45.6	49.4	46.0	41.3	51.8	53.7	47.1	45.2	57.3	62.7	63.2	60.4	
Poverty rate (% persons)	27	27	29	25	24	28	30	28	16	21	25	23	13	18	22	20	11	13	14	13	
By Percent Federal Poverty Level (FPL)																					
Below 75% of FPL	17	19	21	17	15	18	22	19	10	14	18	15	8	12	16	14	8	8	10	9	
75%-124% of FPL	18	17	17	17	16	17	16	16	11	14	14	16	10	11	14	13	8	9	9	9	
125%-149% of FPL	8	7	7	9	7	7	8	8	6	6	7	6	5	5	7	7	5	4	5	5	
150%-199% of FPL	12	14	12	14	12	12	12	13	12	12	12	13	10	11	12	14	9	9	9	9	
200% of FPL and above	45	43	42	43	50	46	42	43	61	55	49	50	67	61	51	52	70	70	67	68	
By Race/Ethnicity																					
Anglo	21	23	19	15	21	26	22	20	11	14	19	30	11	13	14	13	9	9	8	8	
African American	27	26	29	27	24	27	31	28	18	21	23	18	20	19	25	23	22	21	22	20	
Latino	31	31	32	27	31	33	30	29	20	27	30	30	17	20	23	21	19	22	22	19	
Asian Pacific Islander	19	23	21	13	15	25	31	26	7	14	17	13	12	26	26	17	12	14	13	10	
Educational Attainment (% of persons age 25+)																					
Less than high school	44	47	49	41	37	39	41	35	28	32	33	28	30	29	34	31	27	24	23	20	
High school grad or GED	31	22	20	24	33	25	23	28	33	21	24	26	37	26	25	28	31	22	20	22	
Some college	19	23	22	22	22	27	26	26	26	33	31	32	21	33	30	29	22	31	30	29	
BA or higher	7	8	9	12	8	9	9	12	13	14	12	14	12	13	11	12	20	23	27	30	
In labor force (% of persons age 16+)	56	59	53	61	58	59	54	62	64	67	57	65	65	67	59	63	64	67	62	65	
Unemployment rate (%)	12	14	12	11	11	14	15	13	7	10	10	10	8	9	11	11	7	7	7	8	
Employment distribution by Industry (%)																					
Agriculture and mining	2	3	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	0	0	2	1	1	0	3	3	2	2	
Construction	4	6	6	9	4	5	7	10	3	5	5	6	5	6	5	9	6	7	6	7	
Manufacturing	21	19	15	12	19	15	11	8	23	15	10	9	24	19	14	11	20	17	13	11	
Wholesale trade	3	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	4	5	4	4	4	5	4	4	
Retail trade	13	15	10	11	13	14	10	12	12	14	10	10	16	17	12	13	17	16	11	11	
Transportation and Warehousing, communications and other public utilities	10	9	9	8	12	10	11	10	11	11	12	11	9	9	11	10	7	7	9	8	
Finance, insurance, real estate and rental and leasing	6	5	5	5	7	6	5	4	9	8	6	5	6	6	6	5	7	8	7	7	
Education, health and social services	19	15	17	20	18	17	20	20	17	16	21	21	13	14	19	17	15	15	19	20	
Public administration	6	4	3	3	8	7	5	4	8	7	6	5	8	7	6	5	5	4	5	4	
All other services	17	20	29	29	15	20	27	28	14	19	27	29	13	16	22	25	15	19	25	26	
Housing																					
Owner-occupied (%)	46	44	44	43	40	37	37	36	31	34	34	33	46	45	47	48	56	56	57	58	
Renter-occupied (%)	54	56	56	57	60	63	63	64	69	66	66	67	54	55	53	52	44	44	43	42	
Median housing value (\$'000)	134	218	227	433	142	194	182	389	187	221	178	358	182	218	153	316	230	323	255	479	
Median gross rent (\$)	611	871	789	801	615	848	762	808	780	1014	863	885	719	996	817	884	770	1029	958	1116	
Median gross rent as a percentage of household income (%)	-	32	33	40	-	32	33	39	-	31	30	37	-	30	30	36	-	29	28	32	

Notes: In 1990 and earlier, the census did not break out poverty by race and Hispanic origin (only for all Hispanics combined and groups defined by race alone, inclusive of Hispanics who can be of any race). In 2000, detail was provided for non-Hispanic whites but not for other non-Hispanic racial groups. Thus, the data reported above on poverty by race is inclusive of Hispanics, except for Anglos in 2000 where it is for non-Hispanic whites only. All reported median values by community type were calculated as weighted averages of the community level medians by community type. Median housing value is for all occupied non-condo housing units in 1980, but for all owner-occupied housing units in 1990 and 2000. In 1980, the "Other" group includes only Native Americans while in 1990 and 2000 it includes Native Americans, persons of an unspecified race and those who identified as multiracial; persons of an unspecified race and those who identified as multiracial were grouped with Asian Pacific Islanders in 1980. The Black Immigrant Proximity Index (BIPI) at the community level is figured as a population weighted average of the tract-level BIPI across all tracts in a community; an analogous procedure was used to get the BIPI by community type shown above. All reported dollar values are in inflation-adjusted 2009 dollars.

(inclusive of immigrants) to all immigrants, and then deflating (multiplying) that value by an adjustment factor calculated as follows:

$$Est(E_{iust}) = \left[\frac{E_{ius00}}{E_{iall00}} \right] + \left[\left(\frac{\%IMM_{i00} - \%IMM_{it}}{\%IMM_{i00}} \right) \left(1 - \frac{E_{ius00}}{E_{iall00}} \right) \right]$$

Where $Est(E_{iust})$ is the estimated exposure index (to immigrants) for the U.S.-born of racial/ethnic group i in time t (either 1980 or 1990), E_{ius00} is the actual exposure index for the U.S.-born of racial/ethnic group i in 2000, E_{iall00} is the actual exposure index for all (U.S.-born and immigrant) of racial/ethnic group i in 2000, $\%IMM_{i00}$ is actual the percentage immigrant of racial/ethnic group i in 2000, and $\%IMM_{it}$ is the actual percentage immigrant of racial/ethnic group i in time t . For understanding the formula, it is useful to keep in mind that when the percentage immigrant of a racial/ethnic group is zero, the adjustment factor should be one (i.e., no adjustment since there is no double counting). Essentially, the adjustment factor deflates the exposure index for each racial/ethnic group (inclusive of immigrants) in

1980 and 1990 by that group's ratio of the U.S.-born to total exposure index in 2000, adjusted downward or upward (slightly) by how much more or less immigrant the group was in that particular year.

Finally, the statement in the introduction about African Americans and Latinos experiencing the sharpest shift in living together is based on an analysis of the dissimilarity indices for various groups for the period 1980 to 2005-2009. As it turns out, Latino segregation from other groups in America's top 30 metros is on the rise for whites and Asians but falling for Blacks – and the decline in the dissimilarity index between Blacks and Latinos for 1980 to 2000 is greater than the fall for Blacks and whites, and the level is much lower as well (although since 2000, the trend seems to have tapered off). For the California analysis, we choose to weight the dissimilarity index by metro population (given the very different sizes of California CBSAs); again, the Black-Latino dissimilarity index is lower than for Blacks and whites, the decline in the dissimilarity index is sharper over the whole time period, and Latino segregation is rising except relative to Blacks.

APPENDIX B. INTERVIEWEES AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONS

Bill Camp, Executive Secretary
Sacramento Central Labor Council (SCLC)

Arturo Carmona, President
Consejo de Federaciones Mexicanas en Norteamérica
(COFEM)

Maisie Chin, Co-founder and Director
Community Asset Development Re-defining Education
(CADRE)

Rev. Norman D. Copeland, Presiding Elder
Southern California Conference of the African Methodist
Episcopal Church

Richard Dana, Director
Mutual Assistance Network of Del Paso Heights (MAN)

David De Luz, President
Greater Sacramento Urban League (GSUL)

Ahmed Dirie, Executive Director
Bay Area Somali Community (BASC)

Larry Frank, Deputy Mayor of Neighborhood and
Community Services
City of Los Angeles Mayor's Office

Rafael Gonzalez, Chief Service Officer
The City of Los Angeles

Rev. Brenda LaMothe, South Los Angeles Area
Representative
Neighborhood & Constituent Services
City of Los Angeles Mayor's Office

Gerald Lenoir, Director
Black Alliance for Just Immigration (BAJI)

Marqueece Harris Dawson, President & CEO
Community Coalition (CoCo)

Leon Jenkins, President (Los Angeles, CA Branch
National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP)

Keith Kelley, President & CEO
Fresno West Coalition for Economic Development (FWCED)

Hamid Khan, Executive Director (formerly)
L.A. Taxi Workers Alliance (LATWA)
South Asian Network

Rev. Dr. Juan Martinez
Associate Dean for the Center for the Study of Hispanic
Church and Community
Associate Professor of Hispanic Studies and Pastoral
Leadership
Fuller Theological Seminary

Prishni Murillo, Co-Executive Director
Youth Together

Steven Pitts, Labor Policy Specialist
UC Berkeley Center for Labor Research and Education
(Labor Center)
Institute for Research on Labor and Employment

Angelica Salas, Executive Director
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles
(CHIRLA)

Constance Slider, Operations Director
Coalition on Regional Equity (CORE)

Gloria Walton, Executive Director
Strategic Concepts in Organizing and Policy Education
(SCOPE)

Tim Watkins, President
Watts Labor Community Action Committee (WLCAC)

Lue Yang, Executive Director
Fresno Center for New Americans (FCNA)

Arturo Ybarra, Executive Director
Watts/Century Latino Organization

Kent Wong, Director
UCLA Labor Center

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Center for the Study of Immigrant Integration (CSII)

950 W. Jefferson Blvd., JEF 102
Los Angeles, CA 90089-1291

<http://csii.usc.edu>
csii@usc.edu

University of Southern California

