

CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS



Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting

The Cost of Failure in Somalia

John Norris and Bronwyn Bruton September 2011

A Joint Report from the Center for American Progress and One Earth Future Foundation

Center for American Progress



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Piracy Problems



Average ransom paid
to Somali pirates per
released ship in 2010

\$5.4 million¹

an increase of

100%²

since 2009



Number of hostages
taken by Somali
pirates in 2010

1,181³

Number of Somali
pirates on or awaiting
trial in 2010

750⁴

0⁵

Number of ships
with armed guards
hijacked (to date)

Minimum number of
companies providing
maritime security in
the region

24⁶



Political Upheaval

22

Number of years
Siad Barre was in
power



11.9⁸
months

Average term length
of a Somali prime
minister since 2000

Months Somalia was with-
out a prime minister from

88⁷ May 1993




\$70 to \$100

million
Al Shabbab's annual
revenue, according to
the United Nations

Number of surface-to-
air missiles delivered in
Somalia since the mid-
1970's



450¹⁰



Demographic Challenges

Chance that a Somali is either a refugee or an internally displaced person

1 in 4¹¹

1 in 7.4¹²

Odds that a child in Somalia will die before his or her fifth birthday



Odds that a Somali girl between ages 14 and 24 is literate

1 in 4¹³

6.3¹⁴



Average number of births per Somali woman



Difference in life expectancy between a citizen of Japan and Somalia

32.2 years¹⁵





Humanitarian Crises

\$600¹⁶

Somali GDP per
capita (2010)



3.2 million ¹⁷ Number of Somalis who needed humanitarian assistance in 2010

Growth in that number since January 1, 2011

1 million ¹⁸

Number of refugees fleeing Somalia every day

3,500



Introduction and summary

Major financial costs of Somalia since 1991

Humanitarian and development aid **\$13 billion**

Remittances **\$11.2 billion**

Peacekeeping, military responses, military aid, counterterror, and diplomacy **\$7.3 billion**

Piracy **\$22 billion**

International crime and illicit financial flows **\$2 billion**

Total since 1991 **\$55.3 billion**

Major human costs of Somalia since 1991

Deaths **450,000 to 1.5 million**

Refugees **more than 800,000**

Internally displaced people **more than 1.5 million**



AP PHOTO / FARAH ABDI WARSAMEH

The disastrous famine in Somalia is the worst the world has seen in 20 years, and it again casts a harsh spotlight on the situation in that country. With millions of people now at risk of starvation, and appalling stories of human hardship dominating the evening news, the name “Somalia” once again conjures images of crisis and despair—a famished, suffering country peopled by pirates, terrorists, and warlords.

Somalia is best known for the civil war and famine of the early 1990s, which killed some 250,000 people and triggered a massive, U.S.-led humanitarian intervention that culminated in the infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident of 1994. More recently, the rise of indigenous Islamist movements in southern Somalia has rekindled fears that the anarchic territory could—or has—become a safe haven for Al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist movements.

Western and regional efforts to reduce the terror threat by establishing a central government in Somalia have failed to improve governance. A recent confidential audit of the Somali government suggests that in 2009 and 2010 some 96 percent of direct bilateral assistance to the government had simply disappeared, presumably into the pockets of corrupt officials.¹⁹ The repeated failure of international efforts to produce positive change in Somalia has generated fatigue among donors at a time when Somalia's needs have never been greater.

“An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” is rightfully a well-worn adage. Yet in the world of foreign policy it is an exceedingly difficult credo to translate from convenient talking point into practice. As much as policy experts and others, including the U.S. secretary of defense, call for sensible investments in crisis prevention, international development, and expanded diplomatic capabilities, the default setting of the U.S. government and its partners in the international community is to scrimp on crisis prevention while pouring money into crisis response and containment. By and large, the U.S. government ends up spending far more time and money responding to crises or tinkering with tactical responses than preventing crises or nurturing effective peacebuilding efforts. This paper explores the staggeringly high cost of this approach by looking at the case of Somalia.

This research tries to determine—using a variety of official and unofficial sources and some educated guesswork—a reasonable estimate of the financial cost of Somalia's conflict since 1991. We tried to be as exhaustive as possible in determining the money spent on Somalia by the international community, regional actors, and the Somali diaspora, regardless of the specific intentions of spending and whether these expenditures were sensible and effective or not. It is our hope that the data explored in this paper can provide the foundation for a useful cost-benefit analysis of what has and has not worked in Somalia. We welcome any additional insights into our methodology and findings.

The profound lack of reliable data and the enormous variance in the economic and political standing of Somalia's regions complicated our efforts. Statistics from the relative success story of Somaliland are conflated with the catastrophic figures from southern Somalia. (So, for example, the absence of development funding to the south is partially obscured by recent, significant increases in funding to the relatively stable, democratic northern enclave of Somaliland.) Extrapolations based on partial or unreliable data are noted in the text, and unless otherwise indicated all statistics given in this paper reflect data from southern Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland.

Our research also makes no attempt to calculate the indirect costs or the possible “benefits” of state failure in Somalia. We can assume that Kenya and Ethiopia, among other states, have suffered a reduced gross domestic product as a result of the ongoing disorder in Somalia. But they also may have accrued certain benefits.

For instance, Somalis annually purchase half a billion dollars of *khat* (a highly addictive narcotic plant native to East Africa) imports from Ethiopia and Kenya, and the Eastleigh neighborhood of Nairobi has seen a tremendous economic boom as a result of Somali diaspora investment. Kenya also has profited from humanitarian traffic through its ports and its status as an international development hub.

These benefits would to some extent offset the costs of state failure in Somalia. Future iterations of the research will attempt to better capture these dynamics.

Despite the shortcomings in available data, however, a useful snapshot of the total funding dedicated to Somalia since 1991 emerges. And it reveals a number of compelling and sometimes surprising trends that should begin to shape policy approaches. Additionally, this accounting makes clear that Western policymakers are wildly uneven in their approach to Somalia. They are willing to spend vast sums in some areas such as dealing with piracy, while in other areas they take an approach bordering on malignant neglect.

Somalia is fairly modest in size, its territory equivalent to an area slightly smaller than Texas. Its population, estimated at just more than 10 million people, is slightly larger than Michigan’s, and its estimated annual gross domestic product is smaller than that of Togo, Guam, or the Faroe Islands. Yet since Somalia became one of the world’s premier examples of a country seemingly in permanent crisis in 1991, the international community has poured enormous resources into this small patch of land, and no end is in sight. Indeed, the humanitarian needs of Somalia’s population are escalating sharply, and the dire situation in that country could again trigger some kind of extraordinarily expensive major international intervention beyond the scope that we have seen to date.

The cost of Somalia’s ruin is nothing short of staggering. There is certainly a heavy human toll: Between 450,000 to 1.5 million Somalis have died due to violence or hunger in the ongoing conflict, and more than 2.3 million Somalis are still refugees or displaced. But the cost of international humanitarian aid, peacekeeping forces, responding to piracy, and myriad other interventions have steadily accumulated year after year.

In what is a conservative estimate the international community, including the Somali diaspora, has collectively spent just over \$55 billion responding to Somalia since 1991. These costs have grown far higher and manifested themselves in ways that few would have imagined when the crisis truly began to unravel in 1991 and 1992.

Before turning to the data we need to make several fundamental points.

First and foremost, none of this research is to argue that we should no longer assist Somalia with its pressing humanitarian needs. Indeed, if anything, the data compiled here indicate the need for long-term development, defensive, and diplomatic strategies to mitigate Somalia's long-running tragedy.

In many ways the pattern of international intervention in Somalia has long remained in the unhappy middle: insufficiently robust or well designed to resolve the country's conflicts but far too heavy handed and frequent to allow the country to resolve its own problems. Many of the interventions in Somalia were so badly planned and implemented that they made the overall situation far worse in the long run.

Second, this report recognizes that the conditions within Somalia vary widely by region. Somaliland and other parts of the north have achieved a far greater degree of stability and self-governance than the south. These divergent conditions on the ground lead some to question the viability of Somalia's borders as currently constructed. Somaliland has long sought international recognition as an independent state.

Other key considerations arising from our research include:

Failed states are rare but incredibly expensive and disruptive

“Failed state” is a loaded term, and it's clear that there are only a handful of countries around the globe in which the government has broadly collapsed. Numerous commentators point out that warnings of potential failed states happen far more often than they actually occur, and many weak states never actually collapse.

Nevertheless, the costs to the world of those states that do fall into ruin are immense and long lasting. Policymakers show a disturbing tendency to view such weak or failed states first and foremost as a threat to national security because they can become a hotbed of terrorist activity—as has often been argued in Somalia

and Afghanistan. Yet the figures in this study make clear that the reverberations of a state unraveling are felt well beyond specific security concerns about counterterrorism and can play out in everything from making regional conflicts more likely to rising insurance rates for companies trying to conduct business within the general vicinity of a failed state.

A surprisingly wide number of actors bear these costs

Somalia and its misery were distant from the minds of most Americans or Europeans until the onset of the recent famine. But there would be a far greater cry for effective diplomacy and policy approaches if people understood the wide variety of actors who ultimately bear the brunt of Somalia's failure. Because the costs of Somalia are diffused across many actors, no one group of actors has "owned" the crisis, and interventions have been piecemeal.

Indeed, as these numbers make clear everyone from the Department of Defense to insurance companies and humanitarian relief organizations to law enforcement officials end up pouring resources into dealing with Somalia that could be used for far more productive and lasting benefit if Somalia could emerge from its failed state status. Sadly, it is equally important to understand the motivations and interests of those actors who benefit from Somalia's continuing misery and statelessness, including arms traders, smugglers, local warlords, and others.

Somalia needs the right kind of aid

Somalia's history makes clear that not all international aid is sensible or effective. If we hope to avoid future failed states we need to be much more principled and effective in how we deliver aid.

The U.S. government generously contributed to the Siad Barre regime in Somalia during the 1980s. Barre's government was widely recognized as horrible when it came to democracy and human rights, but aid was showered upon Barre because he was seen as an important Cold War ally and a bulwark against Soviet expansionism in the region.

Today, the United States, in pursuit of its modern counterterror objectives, provides continuous indirect financial and military support to Somalia's Transitional Federal Government despite its proven record of corruption, rampant and admitted use of

child soldiers, and frequent inability to maintain control of territory.²⁰ In fact, the TFG's record of governance is probably worse than Siad Barre's in many regards.

The Cold War is over, but governments in North America and Europe still deliver aid to governments that remain slow to embrace democracy and reform their institutions. The TFG has consistently pushed for more aid in recent years, but it won't make much sense to do more in Somalia beyond humanitarian relief unless the world figures out how to approach its interventions more wisely.

Failed states need comprehensive and locally appropriate solutions

Helping a country emerge from its status as a failed state is incredibly laborious and can take years of patient and hard-nosed diplomacy. This also means that the most successful efforts to turn around a situation like Somalia will be built upon effective international coordination, the constructive involvement of the private sector, and a willingness to make hard long-term choices.

This is quite a departure from current practice. Too often the international response to the situation on the ground in failed states is to lunge toward quick "fixes" that fail to and may actually exacerbate the dynamics of conflict. While U.S. counterterrorism efforts have led to the death or capture of a number of high-value targets, the country's primary extremist group, Al Shabbab, retains a worrying capacity to attract international recruits and to launch terrorist attacks in the region.

U.S. support for the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia—which generated wide public support for Al Shabbab—remains a particularly egregious example of an ill-advised tactical approach to Somalia that yielded disastrous long-term results.

Before delving into the costs, however, readers unfamiliar with the country's history may benefit from some background on Somalia's conflicts, which we turn to in the next section.

Background: A brief history of the Somalia conflict

The Somali Republic was founded in 1960 from territory contained in the colony of Italian Somaliland and the British protectorate Somaliland. In 1969, after nine years of democratic government, Somali military officer Siad Barre seized power via a military coup and declared Somalia a socialist state. Somalia was initially a client state of the Soviet Union, but President Barre flipped allegiance to the United States after Somalia invaded the contested Ogaden region of Ethiopia in 1977. The United States proffered aid despite President Barre's poor human rights record, and clan divisions within Somalia sharpened under his corrupt rule.

Clans opposed to President Barre toppled the government in 1991 and seized the capital city of Mogadishu. After deposing Barre, the warlord-led clan factions quickly descended into intense internecine battles, plunging Somalia into a violent civil war. The lawlessness helped compound a devastating famine as large numbers of refugees fled to neighboring countries.

Effective national governance has never been restored despite multiple efforts by Somalis and the international community.

In December 1992 the United States in conjunction with the United Nations implemented a series of missions—UNOSOM, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II—to protect food aid from looting. By most accounts the initial international interventions were quite effective in meeting their humanitarian goals. Yet things turned considerably for the worse when U.S. forces became engaged in an open-ended effort to oust Mohammed Farah Aideed, who was at the time the most powerful warlord in Mogadishu.

Somali militias shot down two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters over Mogadishu in October 1993 as Aideed resisted efforts to be ousted. Nineteen American servicemen were killed and hundreds of Somalis lost their lives in the ensuing battle. After the American public's sharply negative response to this incident, the United States withdrew from Somalia by March 1994. The United Nations followed suit in early 1995.

Northwest Somalia, which declared itself the independent Republic of Somaliland in 1991, established a democratically elected government and remained largely stable since the early 1990s. But it has never achieved international recognition.

Repeated attempts at peace talks were largely stillborn as low-level conflict between warlords and other militia groups continued throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. In 2004, however, peace talks resulted in the formation of a transitional federal government, or TFG. It was hoped that the TFG could be developed as a government of national unity. But it represented a narrow swathe of interests and clans in Somalia, and it has often been seen as lacking basic legitimacy and competence among much of the public.

By 2006 a loose alliance of Somali businessmen and local Islamic courts, known as the Islamic Courts Union, emerged as the TFG's most serious opposition. In June 2006 the union was propelled to power by a public uprising against a U.S.-backed coalition of warlords, and it secured control of Mogadishu and much of southern Somalia.

While the Islamic Courts Union established a degree of stability in areas under its control, both the United States and Ethiopia remained implacably opposed to the group because of its links to Islamist extremists and militant groups seeking to overthrow the Ethiopian government that were backed by long-time Ethiopian rival Eritrea. Indeed, Somalia has frequently served as a proxy battlefield for Ethiopia and Eritrea who remain mired in a long-standing border dispute.

Ethiopia invaded Somalia in December 2006, with the TFG on the verge of military defeat by Islamic Courts Union forces. The United States provided intelligence and military support for the Ethiopians, who quickly took over substantial territory while unfortunately reinforcing the notion that the TFG was more of a foreign creation than a local one.

An African Union peacekeeping mission, AMISOM, was established in early 2007 to support the TFG. The opposition to the TFG and the occupying Ethiopian army evolved into a complex mosaic of Islamic and secular militias, and more than 400,000 people were driven from their homes in Mogadishu during 2007 as fighting continued. The TFG continued to be riven by internal tensions in addition to widespread accusations of corruption and incompetence.

A U.N.-brokered peace accord was reached between the TFG and a key opposition militia in June 2008. But more extremist groups, including a hardline Al Qaeda-linked splinter faction called Al Shabbab, resisted peace talks. Despite the peace accord, Al Shabbab came to control increasingly large parts of southern Somalia. TFG and AMISOM peacekeepers were able to largely protect the TFG leadership, but struggled to exert broader control.

Somalia again faced a growing humanitarian crisis in 2008 and 2009 as more than 1 million people were displaced from their homes because of renewed fighting. In 2008 there was also a sharp spike in piracy along the coast of Somalia that has continued to this day in operations that remain extremely lucrative for the pirates. Pirate groups have operated primarily in the better-governed northern and central districts of Somalia and largely avoided the political and military struggle between the TFG, Al Shaabab, and other militias.

In the summer of 2011 a major famine again hit East Africa with Somalia faring the worst because of its protracted violence and instability. Delivering relief supplies has remained especially difficult because Al Shabbab has denied aid workers access to key parts of the country, and the United States has imposed restrictions on the delivery of aid fearing that it would be diverted to Al Shabbab.

Al Shabbab withdrew from Mogadishu in August 2011 in a move that took most observers by surprise, ceding the city to TFG and AMISOM forces. The extremist group still retains considerable force strength and resources, however. The United Nations and others cite Al Shabbab as playing an increasingly instrumental role in fomenting Islamic extremist groups in the region despite continued targeted attacks on Al Shabbab and its senior leadership by both Ethiopia and the United States.

We now turn to the costs these conflicts have imposed on Somalis and the international community since 1991.

The human toll of Somalia's conflicts



Between **450,000–1,500,000 excess deaths** caused by Somalia's intermittent conflicts

More than **800,000 current refugees**; average of more than 581,000 refugees every year since 1991

More than **1,500,000 current internally displaced**; average of more than 772,000 internally displaced every year since 1991

AP PHOTO/JEROME DELAY

First and foremost, Somalia continues to be a human disaster of immense proportions. This was true even before it was again battered with famine. The country's ongoing conflicts and profound dysfunction have exacted a very steep cost on Somalis for years.

Parts of Somalia remain in such dire conditions that it is challenging to arrive at clear figures regarding its population. The U.N. Development Program usually does not even rank Somalia on its Human Development Index—its annual barometer of country-by-country development levels—simply because basic data on the country are lacking. Making matters worse, increasingly large parts of Somalia are now suffering a major famine aggravated by the inability of international relief agencies to deliver aid in territory controlled by Al Shabbab—an inability that stems both from Al Shabbab's threats and from restrictive U.S. government counterterrorism laws that seek to prevent aid from falling into Al Shabbab's hands.

The data that are available make clear the impact of Somalia's conflict upon its own citizens. Between 450,000 and 1.5 million people have died in Somalia's conflict or directly due to hunger since 1991.²¹ This total reflects excess mortality, or the difference between the actual deaths in Somalia and the number of deaths

that we would expect for a peaceful, decently governed country with the same demographics. The huge variation in the mortality numbers only underscores the general weakness of the Somali state and its institutions.

The number of fatalities, however, is likely on the high side of this range given that the United Nations estimated 300,000 deaths in 1991 and 1992 alone and the recent sharp spike in mortality due to hunger and disease, particularly among children.²² The U.N. humanitarian coordinator for Somalia noted in July 2011: “In the last few months, tens of thousands of Somalis have died as a result of causes related to malnutrition, the majority of whom were children.”²³

In addition, more than 25 percent of the country’s entire population is currently a refugee or internally displaced person, or IDP (someone driven from his or her home who has not crossed an international border). The United Nations estimates that more than 800,000 Somali refugees are in neighboring states, and more than 1.5 million Somalis are currently displaced. (see chart) An April 2011 statement from the United Nations also notes: “The number of Somali refugees arriving to neighboring countries during the first quarter of this year has more than doubled in comparison to the same period in 2010.”²⁴ As of July 2011 some 3,500 people per day were pouring out of Somalia into refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia, with 80 percent of those people being women and children.²⁵

The numbers of refugees and displaced are even more striking when we look at the historical trends. Over the last two decades the numbers of refugees and displaced have gone up and down by large numbers at various junctures. This makes clear that Somalia not only suffers from large numbers of people that are refugees or displaced for a considerable period of time but also continues to endure wave after wave of new fighting that triggers new refugees and newly displaced persons.

Significant numbers of IDPs and refugees have returned to their homes and communities in periods during the last 20 years. But that does not mask the fact that Somalia’s chronic insecurity meant that very large numbers of citizens were forced to flee


Forced to flee their homes

Somali international refugees and internally displaced, 1991–2011

| Year | Number of refugees | Number of displaced |
|------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1991 | 700,000 ²⁶ | 1,500,000 ³⁶ |
| 1992 | 1,000,000 ²⁷ | 2,000,000 ³⁷ |
| 1993 | 575,000 ²⁸ | 1,600,000 ³⁸ |
| 1994 | 631,000 | 500,000 ³⁹ |
| 1995 | 639,000 | 300,000 ⁴⁰ |
| 1996 | 637,000 ²⁹ | 250,000 ⁴¹ |
| 1997 | 608,000 | 200,000 ⁴² |
| 1998 | 558,000 | 250,000 ⁴³ |
| 1999 | 525,000 | 350,000 ⁴⁴ |
| 2000 | 476,000 | 300,000 ⁴⁵ |
| 2001 | 440,000 | 400,000 ⁴⁶ |
| 2002 | 432,000 | 300,000 ⁴⁷ |
| 2003 | 402,300 | 350,000 ⁴⁸ |
| 2004 | 389,300 | 375,000 ⁴⁹ |
| 2005 | 396,000 | 400,000 ⁵⁰ |
| 2006 | 395,000 ³⁰ | 400,000 ⁵¹ |
| 2007 | 1,000,000 ³¹ | 1,000,000 ⁵² |
| 2008 | 476,000 ³² | 1,277,000 ⁵³ |
| 2009 | 530,000 ³³ | 1,550,000 ⁵⁴ |
| 2010 | 600,000 ³⁴ | 1,410,000 ⁵⁵ |
| 2011 | 800,000+ ³⁵ | 1,500,000+ ⁵⁶ |

Sources of data include the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, Forced Migration Online Research Guide to Somalia, the Norwegian Refugee Council, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, U.S. Agency for International Development, and ReliefWeb. See endnotes for full citations. Numbers have been rounded to the nearest thousand.

Somali refugees in the region as of April 2011



Sources: UNHCR Offices, Various IDP assessments including the Somalia IASC PMT project Global Insight digital mapping © 1998 Europa Technologies Ltd.

* Total IDP figures are estimates. They are based largely on data obtained from the Population Movement Tracking System, which is not designed to calculate cumulative population data, only population movement trends.

** April 2011 refugee figures for Eritrea are currently unavailable. March 2011 figures were used.

Figures on Somali refugees comes from UNHCR Offices in neighboring countries. The data shown on this map was provided primarily in March-April 2011.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

their homes during any given year. Indeed, if one averages the trends over the last 20 years, Somalia had more than 581,000 refugees and more than 720,000 displaced every single year for more than two decades. (see chart)

Further, the influx of Somali refugees in neighboring states places additional stresses on already fragile countries including Kenya (more than 430,000 Somali refugees), Ethiopia (more than 158,000 Somali refugees), and Yemen (home to close to 200,000 Somali refugees). (see map)

U.N. High Commission for Refugees spokesperson Melissa Fleming said on April 29, 2011 regarding the Somali refugees arriving in Yemen: “Some of the new arrivals told us that they were unaware of the political and social upheaval in Yemen, but many coming from Somalia said they had no other option but to flee. For these Somali refugees the situation in Yemen was still, by comparison, much safer than the one back home.”⁵⁷

Meanwhile, the recent stories of Somali refugees fleeing into Kenya and Ethiopia are devastating. Mothers are frequently forced to abandon their children literally by the side of the road.

These are just some of the many indicators that make clear that the instability that emanates from within Somalia affects a surprisingly broad swathe of countries and interests across the region and beyond.

Finally, Somalia suffers a staggeringly high mortality rate for children under age 5—225 of every 1,000 children die before they reach their fifth birthday.⁵⁸ This means that tens of thousands of children under the age 5 die every year in Somalia from preventable causes. Still more alarming, these estimates are from before the famine began, which makes it almost certain that Somalia now has the highest under-five mortality rate in the world in addition to the highest malnutrition rates in the world.

Not only does Somalia continue to suffer today but capacity and hope are steadily being robbed from future generations. Primary school enrollment is shockingly low at 36 percent for boys and only 24 percent for girls.⁵⁹ These indicators are likely to plunge further given recent events. These children will probably require more humanitarian assistance, be less economically productive, and more likely to be drawn into continued conflict or piracy because they have few other alternatives.

Somali civil society activist Ahmed Dini observed of Somalia's youth:

This is a group of people who have never known anything other than conflict and violence. They have never had stability in their lives; they moved from one displacement to another with little possibility of getting an education or any other opportunity to earn a decent livelihood. Some join the violence by being recruited into the fighting groups; others find drugs, such as khat and narcotics, as a way out; while others undertake very dangerous sea journeys to Europe or the Gulf Arab states. If we don't find a solution to the youth problem, Somalia's problems will continue into the next 20 years.⁶⁰

Humanitarian and development spending on Somalia

More than **\$9.2 billion total humanitarian and development aid** in Somalia since 1991, an average of more than \$439 million annually

More than **\$3.2 billion total caring for Somali refugees** in other countries. That is more than \$152 million annually

\$682 million in arrears to the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank that will likely need to be written off



AP PHOTO/JOHN MOORE

Humanitarian assistance has provided an essential lifeline to millions of Somalis given the enormous numbers of refugees and displaced in Somalia accompanied by the general collapse of Somali state institutions. Most development funds in recent years were directed to the north of Somalia rather than the south simply because security in the south is so poor that most international NGOs and contractors are unable to operate on the ground.

Historically the United States was the largest donor of humanitarian aid to Somalia, though recent restrictions on the delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance to Somalia have cast sharply into doubt continued American leadership in aid. Indeed, Al Shabbab's repugnant and continued efforts to block humanitarian relief workers, coupled with U.S. restrictions designed to ensure that aid does not flow to Al Shabbab as an organization, have made Somalia's famine one of the most difficult access challenges the international community has faced in decades.

Further, international spending per capita on Somali's displaced population (as compared to the country's refugees) remains far lower than in many other situ-

A lifeline for millions

Humanitarian and development assistance funding to Somalia by year⁶¹

| Year | Humanitarian and development funding | Private individuals and donors (20 percent) | Total |
|--------------|--------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|
| 1991 | \$185,800,000 | \$37,200,000 | \$223,000,000 |
| 1992 | \$652,900,000 | \$130,600,000 | \$783,400,000 |
| 1993 | \$889,800,000 | \$178,000,000 | \$1,067,900,000 |
| 1994 | \$535,000,000 | \$107,000,000 | \$642,000,000 |
| 1995 | \$187,700,000 | \$37,500,000 | \$225,300,000 |
| 1996 | \$88,100,000 | \$17,600,000 | \$105,700,000 |
| 1997 | \$80,900,000 | \$16,200,000 | \$97,000,000 |
| 1998 | \$80,400,000 | \$16,100,000 | \$96,400,000 |
| 1999 | \$114,700,000 | \$23,000,000 | \$137,600,000 |
| 2000 | \$101,000,000 | \$20,200,000 | \$121,200,000 |
| 2001 | \$147,700,000 | \$29,600,000 | \$177,300,000 |
| 2002 | \$146,800,000 | \$29,400,000 | \$176,200,000 |
| 2003 | \$173,700,000 | \$34,700,000 | \$208,400,000 |
| 2004 | \$198,700,000 | \$39,700,000 | \$238,400,000 |
| 2005 | \$237,000,000 | \$47,400,000 | \$284,300,000 |
| 2006 | \$391,000,000 | \$78,200,000 | \$469,100,000 |
| 2007 | \$384,100,000 | \$76,800,000 | \$461,000,000 |
| 2008 | \$762,200,000 | \$152,400,000 | \$914,600,000 |
| 2009 | \$661,700,000 | \$132,300,000 | \$793,400,000 |
| 2010 | -- | -- | \$750,000,000 estimate ⁶² |
| 2011 | -- | -- | \$1,250,000,000 estimate |
| Total | | | \$9,222,200,000 |

This data is drawn from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's International Development Statistics on Somalia. The column on private and individual donors is extrapolated from the Official Development Assistance, or ODA, and Other Official Flows, or OOF, totals, with it being reasonably estimated that private charities and other sources not captured by the Official Development Assistance totals gave a sum equal to 20 percent of the official total for any given year. Numbers have been rounded to the nearest \$100,000.

ations around the globe. This forces many of these populations to adopt other coping mechanisms in order to survive.

In addition to the considerable costs of humanitarian assistance and development aid spent within Somalia, we should also consider the costs of caring and feeding Somali refugees in other countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and Yemen as an underlying cost of Somalia's long conflict. Large numbers of Somali refugees also have begun fleeing to Ethiopia trying to escape not only conflict but a worsening drought in their home country.

Using the total number of refugees over 21 years listed in chart above, and conservatively estimating that the international community spent \$185 per refugee annually, the world has spent \$2.2 billion since 1991 aiding Somali refugees—more than \$106 million annually. Additionally, the international community will likely spend another \$1 billion in 2011 aiding the surging number of refugees in neighboring states according to recent appeals from the United Nations and others. This brings those annual costs of assisting refugees to over \$152 million annually.

Worryingly, the cost of aiding these refugees on a per capita basis has begun to rise sharply in recent years as food and fuel prices have spiked. This suggests that the international community and refugees may be in the unenviable position of seeing more and more money spent with the amount of actual aid delivered remaining flat or even declining.

Most of the aid spending on Somalia from international financial institutions is reflected in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development data cited earlier in this section. But there is another cost: As of August 2010, Somalia was in arrears to the International Monetary Fund \$365.7 million, the World Bank \$231.3 million, and the African Development Bank \$85 million for a total of \$682 million in arrears.⁶³ It is highly unlikely that these arrears will be repaid (some of Somalia's arrears date back to the mid-1980s) and most of the country's central financial institutions have long since collapsed, so we can assume that they will be written off and can thus be considered a legitimate cost of Somalia's continued conflict. Somalia's arrears account for 17 percent of the total arrears owed to the IMF. As a result of Somalia's instability a declaration of its ineligibility to access IMF resources has been in place since 1988.⁶⁴

The World Bank also established a Reconstruction and Development Program for Somalia budgeted at \$2.2 billion U.S. dollars in January 2008 after a joint needs

The cost of caring for refugees

Estimated international spending per Somali refugee by year, 1994 to 2009

| Year | Spending per refugee |
|------|----------------------|
| 1994 | \$114 |
| 1995 | \$117 |
| 1996 | \$133 |
| 1997 | \$149 |
| 1998 | \$149 |
| 1999 | \$188 |
| 2000 | \$181 |
| 2001 | \$173 |
| 2002 | \$212 |
| 2003 | \$255 |
| 2004 | \$231 |
| 2005 | \$268 |
| 2006 | \$243 |
| 2007 | \$237 |
| 2008 | \$240 |
| 2009 | \$311 |

Jeremy Konyndyk of Mercy Corps prepared this analysis, and he acknowledges the challenges of arriving at a fully accurate cost. His estimates generated an approximate figure for per capita Somali refugee spending in 2006, calculating from U.S. contributions toward UNHCR and the World Food Program for Somalia-specific activities and extrapolating from the average U.S. share of those agencies' budget to estimate a total global figure. This 2006 base figure is then adjusted to estimate other years' levels based on year-by-year shifts in overall U.S. per capita global refugee funding to arrive at the global figures cited in the. The ultimate figures are not intended to be precise but should be indicative of likely cost levels.

assessment with the United Nations Development Program, or UNDP.⁶⁵ But only those funds currently expended are totaled in this report.

Perhaps most frustratingly, the more than \$13 billion total spent on humanitarian and development assistance for Somalia and on Somali refugees since 1991 did not lead to enduring and sustainable improvements in Somalia and its capacity. Lives were indeed saved and protected, but the absence of more effective approaches to reaching a durable peace agreement, shoring up weak institutions, or addressing security concerns means that Somalia's cycle of conflict and despair remains unbroken and is indeed currently intensifying.

Without a real change in approach the international community could well continue spending billions of dollars every year to treat symptoms of Somalia's long crisis, such as its refugee population, without making any strategic gains or taking any real steps toward resolving the conflict.

Remittances from the Somali diaspora

Somalis abroad have sent more than **\$11.2 billion in remittances** back to their country—an annual average of \$533 million



AP PHOTO/RADU SIGHETI

Remittances are a key feature of the landscape in many developing countries. But in Somalia they consistently help the population survive.

While considerable attention naturally focuses on what the international community spends on Somalia's myriad problems it is essential to underscore the fact that the Somali diaspora are one of the most consistent and generous donors in trying to help their friends and relations survive. The U.S. State Department currently estimates that around \$2 billion a year is directed toward Somalia in remittances, and the World Bank estimated at different junctures that Somalia is one of the most remittance-dependent countries in the world with remittances making up more than 70 percent of the country's gross national product in 2006.⁶⁶

This incredible level of support from expatriate Somalis does much to explain the country's resiliency despite repeated calamities and long periods of relative neglect by the international community. The World Bank argues that "the major inflow of 'aid' has come from Somalis themselves."

It is crudely estimated that Somalia has received some \$17.3 billion in remittances since 1991. Sixty-six percent, or \$11.2 billion, of this total can be reasonably estimated as spending that has been directed toward costs imposed by the impact of Somalia's largely collapsed national institutions on its own citizens.⁶⁷ The 66 percent total derives from World Bank estimates that note that two-thirds of all remittances

in Somalia are usually directed toward consumption on basic needs including food, education, and health costs—spending that would not have to be directly underwritten by Somalis overseas if it were not for Somalia’s continuing conflict.

Remittances continue to be overwhelmingly directed to main towns and urban areas versus rural areas in Somalia, and they remain the main source of income for many families struggling to survive.

A 2008 report by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development notes: “Over 1 million Somalis live and work abroad (out of a total population of 9 million) and sending money back home has become a focal point in their lives. Substantial sacrifices are often made by those who send money home and most Somalis remit to numerous people.”⁶⁸

The report continues: “Remittances have a significant effect on the standard of recipients and often make the difference between whether a family survives or not.”

In short, Somalis themselves continue to pay enormous financial and personal costs for their country’s collapse.

Peacekeeping, military responses, military aid, antiterrorism, and diplomacy costs

Peacekeeping missions

| | |
|---|------------------------|
| UNITAF, UNOSOM I and II, and USFOR SOM | \$4.4 billion |
| African Union Peacekeeping Mission, AMISOM | \$798 million |
| AMISOM Trust Fund | \$39 million |
| Arms transfers | \$735 million |
| Military and police training | \$145 million |
| Military involvement of Ethiopia, Uganda, Burundi, and Djibouti | \$444 million |
| Drone strikes, surveillance, and counterterrorism efforts | \$495 million |
| U.N. office on Somalia and other diplomatic efforts | \$193.7 million |
| Cash payments to warlords | \$105 million |
| Total since 1991 | \$7.3 billion |



AP PHOTO/MOHAMED SHEIKH NOR

Peacekeeping, military aid, counterterror efforts, and even predator drone attacks are all part of the international community's approach to containing and mitigating Somalia's crisis.

In some cases this military involvement is direct, such as through the U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations in the early 1990s or the launch of predator drone attacks on suspected terrorists. Other times, Somalia serves as a proxy battleground where military assistance from the United States and others is funneled to Ethiopia, Uganda, and Burundi for their role in trying to shore up weak governments in Somalia.

Because weapons transfers and other assistance are sometimes covert, it is impossible to arrive at exact figures in this arena. But solid estimates are indeed possible.

Some analysts also note that the period from 1995 to 2006 when the international community provided relatively scant military assistance to Somalia was also one of the more peaceful periods within the country. This poses something of a chicken-and-egg question: Does the world only pay attention to Somalia when violence flares or are some of the interventions from the international community actually playing a role in escalating violence?

What follows are some of the most obvious costs in these arenas:

U.N. and U.S. military operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II, and UNITAF)

The United Nations Operation in Somalia, or UNOSOM I, was established in 1992 to “provide protection and security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies.”⁶⁹ UNOSOM I’s mandate was expanded in August 1992 to deal with areas throughout Somalia. Then a coalition of some 30 nations known as the Unified Task Force, or UNITAF, was established in December 1992 to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

UNOSOM II took over UNOSOM I and UNITAF in 1993 to continue securing the supply of humanitarian assistance, including through enforcement measures. The United States led UNOSOM II, and at one point it provided 28,000 troops to the operation. Through disarmament and reconciliation projects, repatriation of refugees, political reconciliation, peacebuilding, and mine-clearing it was mandated to complete the task UNITAF initiated. UNOSOM II was withdrawn in March 1995.⁷⁰ (see chart for mission costs)

What it costs to keep boots on the ground in Somalia

Military costs of UNOSM I, UNOSM II, and U.S. forces in Somalia, or USFORSOM

| | |
|---|-----------------------------|
| U.S. costs for all military operations | \$2 billion ⁷¹ |
| UN Costs: UNOSOM I | \$400 million |
| UN Costs: UNOSOM II | \$1.6 billion ⁷² |
| Additional direct costs, U.S. and U.N. combined | \$400 million ⁷³ |
| Total | \$4.4 billion |

This chart is reproduced from: Mike Blakely, “Somalia.” In Andrea Kathryn Talentino, editor, *Military Intervention after the Cold War: The Evolution of Theory and Practice* (Ohio University Press, 2006).

The U.S.-led military intervention was an initial success in dramatically reversing the humanitarian situation in Somalia. But the effort dissolved into an unsuccessful and muddled attempt at state building and pursuit of individual warlords that culminated in the infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident where several dead U.S. servicemen were dragged through the streets after a protracted and deadly gun battle in downtown Mogadishu.

The poor handling of these interventions left Somalia chaotic and the international community badly wary of becoming

directly involved on the ground—not only in Somalia but in Africa as a whole. Black Hawk Down has frequently been blamed for the United States’s tragically slow response to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

African Union Mission to Somalia, AMISOM

The African Union Mission to Somalia, or AMISOM, was launched by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council in January 2007 with an initial six-month mandate. AMISOM’s mission is to support the structures existing under the transitional federal government, or TFG; support a new national security plan; train Somali security forces; and protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The mission continues to be renewed approximately every six months and is ongoing.

While making some important gains on the ground, AMISOM is still unable to control any territory outside of the capital city. The TFG remains troubled and largely ineffectual, and Al Shabbab, though weakened, still maintains considerable resources.

In terms of cost, the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly has appropriated some \$798 million for AMISOM since July 2008 according to the U.N. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. The United States and European Union are the leading donors to AMISOM. The United States has provided over \$185 million in training, logistics, and equipment between 2007 and 2010.⁷⁴ The European Union gave \$297 million between 2007 and 2011.⁷⁵ (see chart)

Nations also fund the U.N. Trust Fund that supports AMISOM.⁸⁰ The Trust Fund was initiated by Security Council Resolution 1863, which called for financial assistance to AMISOM in accordance with the 2008 Djibouti Agreement that established a ceasefire between the TFG and an armed opposition group. The endowments to the Trust Fund for 2010 and 2011 are shown below:⁸¹

In many ways AMISOM represents an effort by Western powers to manage security on the cheap. Rather than deploy an effective and genuinely robust international peacekeeping presence with a mandate to protect the Somali population, the West instead

A costly mission

Total U.N. Security Council and General Assembly spending on AMISOM, July 2008 to June 2012

| Year | Expenditure |
|--|-----------------------------|
| July 2008 – June 2009 | \$75,642,000 ⁷⁶ |
| July 2009 – June 2010 | \$213,580,000 ⁷⁷ |
| July 2010 – June 2011 | \$205,221,000 ⁷⁸ |
| July 2011 – June 2012 | \$303,912,000 ⁷⁹ |
| Total AMISOM financing 2008 -2011 | \$798,355,000 |

All figures are from the United Nations. Figures have been rounded to the nearest \$ thousand.

Individual country contributions to AMISOM

Donor funding for AMISOM Trust Fund, 2009 to 2011

| Donor | Year | Expenditure |
|---|-------------|----------------------------|
| Australia | 2009 – 2010 | \$383,000 |
| Czech Republic | 2009 – 2010 | \$150,000 |
| Japan | 2009 – 2010 | \$9,000,000 |
| Republic of Korea | 2009 – 2010 | \$500,000 |
| Malta | 2009 – 2010 | \$13,000 |
| Turkey | 2009 – 2010 | \$500,000 |
| United Kingdom | 2009 – 2011 | \$20,815,000 ⁸² |
| Germany | 2009 – 2010 | \$3,647,000 |
| Saudi Arabia | 2010 – 2011 | \$2,000,000 |
| Denmark | 2010 – 2011 | \$1,800,000 |
| Total Trust Fund Financing 2009 – 2011 | | \$38,808,000 |

All figures are from the United Nations. Figures have been rounded to the nearest \$ thousand.

chooses to use regional militaries, periodic high-tech interventions, proxy military assistance, and indirect support to private security contractors as a way to be able to reach out and strike at specific terrorist targets on the ground.

It is no wonder that this strategy is often been likened to the children's game of "Whac-a-Mole." It is a repetitious and neverending process of pursuing terrorists without fundamentally altering the environment that allows them to flourish.

AMISOM is able to defend the TFG from being overwhelmed by Al Shabbab's forces. But it is not effective in helping the TFG stand on its own. Despite being mandated as a "peace-

keeping mission," AMISOM offers little protection to the civilian population, and worse, it is even widely accused of indiscriminate fire that may have killed hundreds if not thousands of Mogadishu's citizens.

Arms transfers

External actors were more than willing over the years to direct military supplies and training to Somalia's combatants. This support has been incredibly varied in its sources and aims, including everything from bilateral support for police training to back-channel funds directed toward terrorist cells operating out of Mogadishu. A full and accurate account of such spending is impossible. But we can ascertain some of the largest likely costs involved in this effort.

The amount of weapon transfers to and within Somalia is staggering even though Somalia has been under different degrees of U.N. arms embargoes since 1992. Such transfers tend more toward light weaponry than heavy weaponry, and the trends in arms traffic drifted up and down over the last two decades.

The United Nations offers some insight into this trend:

The volume of arms flows has not been constant. In 1991 the collapse of the previous government released the stocks of the former armed forces into the internal

market. Between 1992–94 there were significant arms acquisitions from Central Europe. After 1994 it is believed that the volume of arms flowing in was low as the amount of arms already in the country was very high. The volume is said to have increased in the period 1997–2000 as a side effect of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. From late 2001 there is said to have been another rise in the level of arms coming into Somalia as a part of the competition between Somali groupings in advance of the anticipated conference of concerned parties in Nairobi under the auspices of the IGAD. [IGAD, or the Inter-governmental Authority on Development, is an organization of six East African countries focused on development and drought control.]⁸³

A subsequent spike in arms transfers occurred again with the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia and the proxy battles waged in Somalia both between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the United States and various armed opposition groups.

The U.N. Group of Experts, which has done some of the most authoritative reporting on Somalia's conflict, details numerous arms embargo violations over the years as well as the flow of weapons permitted under exemptions to the embargo. The United Nations notes that Ethiopia, Yemen, Eritrea, Uganda, the United States, and other countries were all important sources of weapons in Somalia, including ammunition, assault rifles, rocket launchers, missiles, grenades, helicopters, and antitank weapons.⁸⁴ Ammunition appears to be the most pressing need in the conflict, which is a sad testament to the saturation of weapons across the country.

A 2004 U.N. report noted that commercial imports, mainly from Yemen, were considered the most consistent source of arms for Somali opposition and criminal groups.⁸⁵ The lack of scanners and port security along the border makes such trade difficult to control. While this trade was curbed for a period of time it may again become more pronounced with recent disturbances in Yemen.⁸⁶ Most of these arms transfers have been from nonstate actors in Yemen rather than the government of Yemen.

A U.N. report from 2007 notes: “Arms have been either openly brought into Somalia, as in the case of the Ethiopian and African Union forces, or brought in through clandestine channels, as in the cases of the Eritrean conduit and the Bakaraaha Arms Market, for example, and variously distributed to the Shabbab, clans, warlords and others.”⁸⁷

The arms market remains a major part of Somalia's fractured economy. Al Ittihad extremists, one of the many armed opposition groups operating in Somalia, are

strongly involved with the arms market and weapon transfers. There is obviously a strong correlation between the cycle of violence and the ready availability of arms through the large and pervasive Somali arms market.⁸⁸

But the United States also plays a role in bringing weapons into the country. In May 2009 the U.S. government applied for an embargo exemption to supply \$2 million in cash to TFG forces to purchase weapons, which came in part from Somali arms markets.⁸⁹ Then, in August 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pledged military support for the TFG that included at least 40 tons of military weaponry and equipment.⁹⁰ Arms included assault rifles, machine guns, grenades, and mortars.⁹¹ Uganda also delivered some 94 tons of weapons to Somalia in 2009 and 2010 with the United States reimbursing Uganda for these deliveries.⁹²

A U.N. Group of Experts report in 2008 cited frequent breaches of the arms embargo by the Somali Police Force. It suggested that the force purchased weapons inside and outside of Somalia as it became increasingly militarized.⁹³ Appallingly, the U.N. Group of Experts estimates that 80 percent of Somali trainees from the government security forces either deserted or defected, often with their weapons, uniforms, and equipment. This implies that the arms and other material supplied to the TFG frequently is diverted on to the black market.

Both Ethiopia and Eritrea are key players in shipping arms to Somalia, too. Somalia often serves as a proxy battleground between these two states. The United Nations notes that Ethiopia frequently supplied weapons to its allies in Somalia even though it did not apply for exemptions from sanction to do so.⁹⁴

Based on investigations in 2010 the Government of Eritrea provided political, diplomatic, financial, and military assistance to armed opposition groups in Somalia. These groups included ARS-Asmara, Hizbul Islam, and Al Shabbab. Cash transfers were also sent through Eritrean embassies in Kenya, Djibouti, and Dubai. They were typically about \$40,000 to \$60,000 at a time for each group in addition to funds for specific operations.⁹⁵

This support goes back several years. The U.N. Monitoring Report in 2007 said that Eritrea provided significant political, financial, and material support to opposition groups.⁹⁶ And in 2008 an investigation found that arms were being shipped to the Al Shabbab from Eritrea to Mogadishu. The arms included grenades, detonators, pistols, rifles, and machine guns.⁹⁷ The government of Eritrea helped Hassan Dahir Aweys return to Somalia in April 2009 to lead Hizbul Islam, yet another armed opposition faction.

Eritrean support for armed opposition groups has lessened in response to international pressure, but it has not gone away entirely. Recent reports indicate that Eritrea continues to send arms to Somalia in small boats.⁹⁸

There are also credible indications that Iran and Al Qaeda have direct links with Al Shabbab. It's entirely possible that this includes operational training and financing. Iran also provided funding to the TFG in the past.⁹⁹ What's more, according to information revealed in the Wikileaks imbroglio, Algeria sent some 30 tons of arms to the TFG in 2009 or 2010.¹⁰⁰ Finally, weapons looted from Libyan stocks during that country's civil war may now be finding their way to Somalia according to background discussions by the authors with international diplomats covering Somalia.

All told, the authors conservatively estimate that more than \$35 million annually in illegal arms have flowed into Somalia over a period of 21 years—accounting for \$735 million in arms costs, though this figure is obviously speculative.

Training of Somali police and military

A variety of other countries and intergovernmental organizations have also trained Somali police and military.

The head of the TFG's armed forces said in October 2009 that more than 3,000 Somali military and police forces were being trained in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Uganda.¹⁰¹ In 2009 the European Union pledged to pay 72 million euros for security in Somalia, and 12 million were for training the police force and building its capacity. Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, and the Arab League also pledged money in 2009 toward Somali's security sector.¹⁰² Unfortunately much of the police training mentioned above does not adhere to international human rights standards.

The United States, too, has sponsored extensive training for Somali security forces at bases outside of Somalia, and there has been an active debate about the degree to which the United States is actively assisting the TFG with logistics and intelligence support.¹⁰³

A conservative estimate for international training of Somalia's police and army is \$145 million based on available data.

Ethiopia, Uganda, Burundi, and Djibouti military involvement

Ethiopia has spent considerable sums of money—and suffered extensive casualties—in its multiple interventions in Somalia. It occupied significant parts of Somalia from 2006 to 2009 with troop levels estimated to be between 8,000 to 15,000 personnel. The Ethiopian force was equipped with tanks, helicopters, heavy artillery, and considerable logistical support.

These were costly affairs. Given Ethiopia's annual defense budget of \$390 million it is reasonable to estimate that the Somalia intervention consumed some 20 percent of the military budget between 2006 and 2009 (or \$234 million over those three years), 10 percent of Ethiopia's military budget in 2010 and 2011 (or \$78 million), and at least 5 percent of Ethiopia's military budget from 1991 to 2005 (or \$97.5 million.)¹⁰⁴ This makes for a total of \$409.5 million of Ethiopian military spending directed toward Somalia in some fashion.

U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia is driven in no small part by that country's willingness to serve as a proxy force in Somalia. The United States has provided Ethiopia with more than \$50 million in assistance since 2002, and at least 20 percent of that total or \$10 million should be reflected as supporting Ethiopian activities in Somalia given that the United States has encouraged Ethiopia's role.¹⁰⁵

Thus we see that as a conservative total Ethiopia has spent some \$419.5 million on its military posture related to Somalia.

Uganda and Burundi, for their part, have deployed a total of 9,200 soldiers to support the TFG as part of the AMISOM mission. Both countries are largely reimbursed by the African Union and other international donor mechanisms for their troop contributions.

Western powers appear content to keep these peacekeeping forces in Somalia in perpetuity despite the considerable expense. But some voices in Uganda and Burundi question the wisdom of these deployments.

Wafula Oguttu, spokesman for Uganda's opposition Forum for Democratic Change party, has pushed for his government to pull Ugandan peacekeepers from Somalia. He noted in July 2010: "There is no peace to keep in Somalia. We're just sacrificing our children for nothing."¹⁰⁶

Djibouti's involvement is of a lesser extent, and it is largely not kinetic. But it includes military support such as radio programs and publications against Al Shabbab.

So, all told, we could estimate that Ethiopia, Uganda, Burundi, and Djibouti have spent some \$444 million on Somalia.

International peacekeeping casualties

Casualties for peace missions in Somalia continue to mount.

UNITAF suffered 8 killed and 24 wounded during its five-month deployment in Somalia. Ten additional staff were killed in accidents.¹⁰⁷ During UNISOM I and II some 300 U.N. troops were killed and approximately 461 wounded.¹⁰⁸ The likely number of AMISOM and Ethiopian casualties are much higher. AMISOM has suffered approximately 750 fatalities since January 2007, and Ethiopian military casualties were perhaps as high as 100 per week by the end of its occupation according to experts familiar with AMISOM speaking on background to the authors.

Drone strikes, surveillance, and counterterrorism efforts

Since the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the United States has pursued a wide range of counterterrorism objectives in Somalia.

For instance, the U.S. military conducted several aerial strikes against high-value terrorist targets operating within Somalia, and in 2011 launched its first drone strike in Somalia. *The Washington Post* reports that the total cost of a drone strike is more than \$1 million apiece.¹⁰⁹ And in addition to the cost of the aerial strikes themselves we can reasonably assume that each attack required extensive satellite surveillance and attention from senior intelligence and military analysts.

Further, recent reports suggest U.S. intelligence operatives and contractors are active on the ground in Somalia and that the United States maintains one or more secret detention facilities in the country.¹¹⁰ U.S. intelligence agencies also lent considerable support and training to their TFG counterparts, and TFG officials called for further expansion of this support.

The ongoing cost of aerial attacks, intelligence tracking, and intelligence agency assets operating on the ground is likely well in excess of \$495 million using a fairly conservative estimate of \$45 million in annual spending for a period of 11 years.

It's true that this heavy U.S. counterterrorism presence in Somalia led to the successful targeting of some high-level Al Shababb and Al Qadea affiliated figures. Yet the continued failure to establish an effective central government in Somalia coupled with Al Shabbab's considerable financial assets suggests that the United States may be winning the battle but losing the war even with Al Shabbab's retreat from Mogadishu in the summer of 2011. There are increasing signs that Somalia is serving as a regional hub for extremism, the country's famine is placing an enormous burden on neighboring states trying to cope with refugees, and there are no indications that Somalia's role in undermining regional security and stability will end any time soon—nor will the often destructive adventurism of neighboring states in Somalia.

Diplomacy

The U.N. Political Office for Somalia, or UNPOS, has been in operation since 1995 following the withdrawal of UNOSOM II. The relatively small office located in Nairobi tracks political developments within Somalia and tries to encourage peace processes. The 2010 budget for UNPOS was \$17 million in 2010, and approximately \$136 million has been spent on this office since its inception.¹¹¹

The United Nations also established a panel of experts in 1992 that was succeeded by a Monitoring Group to track the political situation in Somalia as well as monitor the arms embargo. Average annual expenditures for these efforts, including staff time in New York, is likely in the range of \$700,000 annually for a total of \$15.7 million, by extrapolating from the rough data made available by the United Nations.

There have been numerous attempts at convening peace talks and conferences on Somalia over the years, including the 1993 Conference on National Reconciliation, the 1997 National Salvation Council, the 1997 Cairo Peace Conference, the 2000 Somalia National Peace Conference, the 2002 Somali Reconciliation Conference, the 2003 National Reconciliation Conference, the 2004 Nairobi Conference, the 2007 National Reconciliation Conference, and the ongoing Djibouti process. A very rough estimate of costs for these respective efforts by the authors is \$42 million.

The costs of maintaining normal diplomatic relations with Somalia, such as the Somalia unit at the U.S. embassy in Kenya, are not counted as an extraordinary cost of Somalia's conflict.

The grand total of all these diplomatic efforts is \$193.7 million.

Cash payments to Somali warlords

Last but not least, the CIA made payments to Somali warlords totaling “hundreds of thousands of dollars” in an effort to capture suspected terrorists believed to be hiding in Somalia.¹¹² As noted, the Ethiopians, Eritreans, Al Qaeda, and even Iran also engaged in providing their favored warlords with financial support.

This figure is probably the most difficult of all to ascertain. But even a modest \$5 million a year in payments over the course of the conflict would suggest that \$105 million has been expended in cash payments. Actual figures are likely higher.

Piracy




Piracy cost more than **\$22 billion** from 2005 to 2011

More than **154 ships** were attacked in the first half of 2011; 21 were successfully hijacked

AP PHOTO/U.S. NAVY, PETTY OFFICER 2ND CLASS JASON R. ZALASKY

Growing Bolder

Attempted and successful piracy attacks off the Horn of Africa, 1997 to 2010



Source: ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annual Reports 1997-2010, Compiled by One Earth Future Foundation.

Somali piracy is a serious problem that is getting worse. Countries are increasingly forced to spend billions on ransoms, insurance premiums, re-routing ships farther out to sea, naval forces, and other expenditures as attempts and attacks rise.

Somali pirates attacked over 154 ships in the first half of 2011. Twenty-one ships were successfully hijacked with a total of 362 hostages on board.¹¹³ The graph at left shows the increase of piracy attacks off the Horn of Africa between 1997 and 2010.

These attacks cost tens of billions. One Earth Future Foundation, or OEF, published a comprehensive report on the costs of Somali piracy at the end of 2010. It echoed previous reports from the United States Institute of Peace¹¹⁴ and Chatham House.¹¹⁵ OEF estimates that in 2010 the costs of Somali piracy to the global economy ranged between \$7 billion and \$12 billion.¹¹⁶ These figures include the costs of ransoms, excess insurance premiums for ships traveling through the Gulf of Aden, re-routing ships to avoid high-risk regions, security costs, naval forces, prosecution of Somali pirates in foreign courts, piracy deterrent organizations, and the impact on regional economies. (For purposes of this report we have used the low end of all of OEF's estimates.)

The costs are broken down below:

What we paid for piracy last year

Total costs of maritime piracy, 2010

| Cost factor | Details | Value (dollars) |
|--------------------------------|---|------------------------------|
| Ransoms: excess costs | Ransoms paid to pirates have increased from an average of \$150,000 in 2005 to \$5.4 million in 2010. The total cost of piracy only includes the excess cost of ransoms since the cash value paid is encompassed under insurance premiums (see below). Excess costs of ransom emerges for multiple reasons such as delivery of the ransom (often by helicopter or private plane), ships being held and out of service, and trauma counseling. | \$176 million ¹¹⁷ |
| Insurance premiums | This is assessed through the two main excess premiums related to piracy: kidnap and ransom, and war risk premiums. | \$460 million |
| Re-routing ships | OEF estimates that at least 10 percent of ships re-route their voyages to avoid high-risk piracy regions. | \$2.4 billion |
| Security equipment | Companies often attempt to protect their ship by using security equipment and/or armed guards. | \$363 million |
| Naval forces | The cost of naval deployments off the Coast of Somalia is accounted for through: (1) the cost of each naval vessel deployed; and (2) the logistical budgets of each of the big three naval operations: EU's Operation Atalanta, NATO's Operation Ocean Shield, and the multinational Combined Task Force 151 operation. | \$2 billion |
| Prosecutions | Over 750 Somali pirate suspects were either tried or awaited trial in more than 11 countries in 2010. | \$31 million |
| Piracy deterrent organizations | Multiple intergovernmental organizations and trust funds are dedicated to finding a solution for maritime piracy. | \$19.5 million |
| Cost to regional economies | Somali piracy has ripple effects on economies of East Africa and beyond, affecting trade, investment, and stability. | \$1.2 billion |
| Total estimated cost | | \$7 billion |

Source: One Earth Future Foundation

What we paid for piracy in previous years

Total costs of maritime piracy, 2005 to 2010

| | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Cost of ransoms | \$80,000 | \$90,000 | \$240,000 | \$44 million | \$104 million | \$237.6 million |
| Insurance premiums | | | | \$120 million | \$459 million | \$459 million |
| Cost of re-routing ships | | | | | \$2.3 billion | \$2.3 billion |
| Security costs | | | | | \$368 million | \$368 million |
| Cost of naval efforts | | | | \$1 billion | \$2 billion | \$2 billion |
| Cost of prosecutions | | | | | | \$31.3 million |
| Piracy deterrent organizations | | | | | | \$19.5 million |
| Loss to regional economies | | | | \$322 million | \$1.1 billion | \$1.3 billion |
| Total cost | \$80,000 | \$90,000 | \$240,000 | \$1.4 billion | \$6.3 billion | \$6.7 billion |
| Total cost of piracy, 2005-2010 | | | | | | \$15 billion |

Source: One Earth Future Foundation

It's difficult to locate exact data on the costs of piracy for previous years. But some OEF estimates between 2005 and 2010 are shown above. Note that a number of the costs do not kick in until about 2008 when the shipping industry, insurance companies, and navies were forced to adapt their operations and charges to respond to the increasing threat of piracy.

Data are not yet available to assess the costs of piracy in 2011. We can, however, predict that the costs will likely increase from the costs in 2010 due to a number of developments related to piracy including the classification of the entire Indian Ocean as a war risk zone (meaning ships transiting through the region are subject to excess premiums); increasing use of deterrence mechanisms on board ships, such as citadels (safe rooms) and private armed security; and the increasing region being attacked by pirates.

We can therefore assume that piracy will cost at minimum \$7 billion in 2011. If we add this figure to the total costs between 2005 and 2010 we can estimate that Somali piracy has cost the global economy at least \$22 billion between 2005 and 2011.

International crime and illicit financial flows

Drug interdiction costs **\$1.05 billion**

Illicit financial flows since 1991 **\$804 million**

Law enforcement investigations and trials **\$405 million**

Total cost **\$2 billion**



AP PHOTO/MOHAMED SHEIKH NOR

Given Somalia's relatively lawless state in many areas the country continues to be an attractive base area not only for terrorist organizations and arms traffickers but for a range of other illegal activities as well, including drug trafficking. Costs in these areas are particularly challenging to track with a high degree of accuracy. But several areas are worth particular mention and we can estimate some broad stroke costs.

Drug interdiction

The United Nations notes that a country like Somalia "is attractive to international drug trafficking syndicates as they are quick to exploit non-existent or ineffective border (land, sea, and air) controls, limited cross border and regional cooperation as well as serious deficiencies in the criminal justice systems."¹¹⁸ Somalia has only become a more active transit point for narcotics with the spike in piracy in recent years.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, or UNODC, notes that there were very few major seizures of drug shipments in Somalia between 1995 and 2006. But UNODC also makes clear that this is not good news. Instead, the lack of seizures is more a reflection of the ability of drug traffickers to operate from Somalia with relative impunity.

Antonio Maria Costa, the head of UNODC, commented on Somalia's growing status as a hotbed for illegal activity in 2009: "Mainly because of the dramatic situation in Somalia, the region [East Africa] is becoming a free economic zone for all sorts of trafficking drugs, migrants, guns, hazardous waste and natural resources, in addition to having the world's most dangerous waterways because of piracy."¹¹⁹ Costa suggested that some 30 to 35 tons of heroin from Afghanistan alone flow into East Africa each year, and Somalia is at a convenient nexus between Asia, Africa, and Europe for drug traffickers.

Somalia is also the world's largest per capita consumer of the narcotic plant *khat* and a key transit center for that drug. *Khat* is highly addictive, but it is legal in much of sub-Saharan Africa while outlawed in Europe and North America.

Much of the drug is grown in Ethiopia and Kenya, and *The Washington Post* estimated that Kenya was exporting \$250 million of khat annually in 2006 with much of that headed for Somalia for domestic consumption or shipment abroad. *The Post* noted: "Dozens of flights leave Nairobi's two major airports every day, transporting burlap sacks filled with khat to Somalia in a trade that is worth about \$300,000 a day, according to Kenya's National Agency for the Campaign Against Drug Abuse."¹²⁰

Here in the United States the Customs Service seized 3,000 kilos of khat from airports around the country during a two-month period in 2002.¹²¹ In July 2006 the Drug Enforcement Administration, working with other organizations, coordinated the takedown of a 44-member international narcotics trafficking organization responsible for smuggling more than 25 tons of khat worth more than \$10 million from Somalia to the United States.¹²²

Not only is the drug trade itself troubling, but the revenue directly benefits some of those most opposed to peace including pirates, warlords who control airstrips and docks, and terrorist groups.¹²³ It can be conservatively estimated that Somalia's continuing drug trafficking adds some \$25 million annually to the costs of enforcement in both North America and Europe. This cost ranges across coast guards, customs agents, law enforcement officials, the judiciary, and others. (Indeed, that is very likely a low-end estimate.)

This would suggest that Somalia's continued drug trade has imposed \$1 billion in costs on the international community since 1991.

Law enforcement investigations

It is clear that law enforcement officials, courts, and other investigators in the United States and Europe are investing enormous resources in both investigating terrorist incidents that already occurred in Somalia and were linked to Somalia, while spending even more energy, time, and money trying to prevent future attacks from occurring. These investigations span multiple law enforcement agencies across multiple continents ranging from the FBI to Interpol to the Minneapolis Police Department.

A series of recent events underscore Somalia's frequent use by international terrorist groups as a safe haven and the increasing radicalization of some Somalis living in the United States.

- In October 2008, after a Somali-American teenager from Minnesota, Shirwa Ahmed, committed a suicide bombing in Somalia, the FBI began investigating if he was radicalized by a Somali Islamic group in the United States.¹²⁴ This was believed to be the first instance of a U.S. citizen participating in a suicide attack.
- The FBI then began following the trail of over a dozen young men missing from Somali communities in many U.S. cities, including Minneapolis, Boston, and Columbus, Ohio, to investigate whether young men from Somali enclaves in the United States were returning to their parents' country to fight on the side of radical Islamic terrorist organizations.¹²⁵
- In May 2009 the FBI stepped up investigations of Somalis living in the Washington, D.C. area, claiming that these men held "militant" anti-American views and sympathized with Al Qaeda.¹²⁶
- In April 2011 the FBI went into Somalia and arrested Mohammad Shibin, the man who was allegedly in charge of the ransom negotiations of four Americans held hostage and subsequently killed by pirates.¹²⁷
- In June 2011 the FBI announced that one of two suicide bombers who attacked a TFG checkpoint in Mogadishu, Somalia on May 30 was another Minnesota man who had returned to Somalia to fight for Al Shabbab.¹²⁸
- In July 2011 the Obama administration announced that it would bring Ahmed Warsame, a senior Al Shabbab official, to the United States for trial. Warsame

allegedly played a key role as a middle man between Al Shabbab and Al Qaeda, and he tried to arrange weapons deals between the two.

Intelligence and law enforcement officials widely agree that individuals involved in the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Mombasa and Nairobi transited through Somalia after the attacks. And the latest U.N. monitoring report notes that Al Shabbab is playing an increasingly important role in serving as a hub for jihadist groups operating throughout the region.

Law enforcement agencies do not compile their budgets based by origin of threat. It is conservatively estimated by the authors that international law enforcement agencies have spent \$45 million annually over the last decade responding to enforcement and investigative challenges arising from Somalia for a total of \$450 million. Somalia’s neighbors—particularly Uganda since the July 2010 Al Shabbab-directed terror attacks at two nightclubs in Kampala—are also dedicating significant and growing resources to tracking and monitoring Al Shabbab networks and sympathizers.

Illicit financial flows

Since the beginning of Somalia’s civil war to the present, \$804.4 million has left the country in illicit capital outflow according to the watchdog group Global Financial Integrity.¹²⁹ This is capital that could have been put to better use developing infrastructure and stimulating economic opportunity within Somalia.

These illicit financial flows include a broad range of proceeds from bribery and theft by government officials to resources generated through drug trafficking, racketeering, counterfeiting, and commercial tax evasion.

Data in the table below highlight the illicit financial flows by year. The trend suggests that the amount of illicit capital outflow has increased almost every year since 1991—with the exception of 1991-1992 and 1997-1998—with no signal of slowing anytime soon.

Dirty money leaving Somalia

Illicit financial flows by year, 1991-2008

| Year | Illicit financial flows |
|--------------|-------------------------|
| 1991 | \$12.4 million |
| 1992 | \$11.5 million |
| 1993 | \$13 million |
| 1994 | \$14.6 million |
| 1995 | \$17.8 million |
| 1996 | \$26 million |
| 1997 | \$30.1 million |
| 1998 | \$26.6 million |
| 1999 | \$28.1 million |
| 2000 | \$32.9 million |
| 2001 | \$35.5 million |
| 2002 | \$38.5 million |
| 2003 | \$48.8 million |
| 2004 | \$64.6 million |
| 2005 | \$73.2 million |
| 2006 | \$90.4 million |
| 2007 | \$112.3 million |
| 2008 | \$128.1 million |
| Total | \$804.4 million |

Source: Global Financial Integrity.

Conclusion

Somalia remains a tragic case study of the international community getting it wrong repeatedly. From propping up the brutal regime of Siad Barre in the 1980s to greenlighting the disastrous Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006, the United States in particular shows an almost willful disregard for sensible diplomacy or the kinds of patient, grassroots engagement that might have helped Somalia achieve a greater level of stability at different junctures.

Sadly, an entire generation of Somalis now view the “state,” whether it is the TFG or Al Shabbab, as a largely predatory institution that should be feared. This makes a lasting peace all the more difficult.

What’s more, the estimate of the more than \$55 billion spent by the international community on Somalia since 1991 is assuredly on the low side particularly given that the impact on Somalia in terms of lost economic opportunity and growth across the Horn of Africa would likely dwarf all the costs detailed in this report.

At a time when the fiscal climate in Washington is extraordinarily difficult—and it is highly likely that the United States in particular will reduce its commitment to both diplomacy and development around the globe—it is all the more vital that we approach conflicts like Somalia with sensible long-term strategies rather than knee-jerk responses. The cost of any other approach is simply too high.

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