



On the Right Track to Safer Communities: Steering California's Juvenile Offenders Away from Lives of Crime

A report from FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS *California*

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FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS *California* is a nonprofit, bipartisan, anti-crime organization led by California's sheriffs, police chiefs, district attorneys and crime victims dedicated to reducing crime by promoting public investments in programs proven to keep kids from becoming involved in crime. FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS *California* is part of the national FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS organization.

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*Hundreds of Police Chiefs, Sheriffs,
District Attorneys, other Law Enforcement
Leaders, and Violence Survivors
Preventing Crime and Violence*

Dear California Readers:

The more than 350 sheriffs, police chiefs, district attorneys and crime survivors who lead FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS *California* are determined to put dangerous criminals behind bars. But we also know that no amount of punishment after the fact can undo the tragedy and agony caused by crime.

We are committed to taking a hard-nosed look at what really works to steer kids away from crime. Public safety requires that some young offenders be incarcerated. But this report highlights community and family interventions for many other young offenders and their families that are proven to cut repeat arrests by as much as half. Besides preventing repeat crimes, these interventions will save taxpayers money.

California has begun to invest in these community-based interventions, but much more can and needs to be done to keep today's troubled teens from becoming tomorrow's career criminals.

Rigorous research, years of experience, and plain common sense compel this verdict: Making high-quality, intensive interventions available to more troubled youths and their families is crucial to an effective, balanced anti-crime strategy. It is a strategy that will reduce the risk of crime and violence striking families across California.

We urge California policymakers to make access to proven interventions for troubled youths a high priority.

Sincerely,

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Executive Summary

On the Right Track to Safer Communities: Steering California's Juvenile Offenders Away from Lives of Crime

Each year, there are over 200,000 arrests of juveniles in California. While the majority of kids brought before a court for the first time learn their lesson and do not come back, too many serious offenders commit crime after crime. For example, approximately 70 percent of juveniles leaving state custody—which is generally reserved for the most serious offenders—are re-arrested within three years. These repeat offenders pose a significant threat to public safety.

Proven intensive family therapies for serious and chronic offenders cut repeat arrests in half

There is now solid evidence from a growing number of rigorous studies showing that community-based interventions keep young offenders from committing more crimes. In particular, intensive family therapies give parents the tools they need to regain control of their kids and steer them away from crime, while giving troubled teens the tools they need to behave responsibly. Randomized control trials prove these programs work:

- Functional Family Therapy (FFT)—Serving repeat offenders, FFT cut re-arrests in half.
- Multisystemic Therapy (MST)—Serving other repeat offenders—some of whom were even more troubled—MST cut re-arrests for a violent offense in half.
- Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC)—Serious offenders who had to be removed from their homes and were placed with specially-trained families were six times more likely to have no new arrests than boys placed in group homes.

New California research shows promising state-funded interventions also can work before juveniles become serious or chronic offenders

In addition to intensive family therapies, California is successfully investing in early interventions to keep troubled youth from becoming serious or chronic offenders in the first place. According to new data:

The Repeat Offender Prevention Program (ROPP) targets young offenders who, upon their first conviction, are identified as being at high risk of becoming repeat offenders. In Monterey County, similar youths not served by this program were twice as likely as participating youths to be arrested for a new crime.

Ventura County's Early Intervention program provides assessments and treatment plans for youths who are arrested, but not brought before a court. Compared to participants, similar youths who were not enrolled in the program were twice as likely to be arrested again and eight times more likely to be incarcerated.

Day Reporting Centers provide a range of comprehensive services for youths sentenced to probation and/or youths transitioning from county custody back into their communities. In Sacramento County, compared to Day Reporting Center participants, juveniles in a similar group not receiving these services were four times more likely to have a felony arrest.

Similar youths left out of San Diego County's Truancy Supervision Program were more than three times as likely to be arrested as program participants.

California has begun to fund successful community-based interventions

Established in 2006, the Juvenile Mentally Ill Offender Crime Reduction (MIOCR) program supports proven interventions such as intensive family therapies. Thirteen of the 20 counties awarded Juvenile MIOCR grants were funded to provide FFT, MST or MTFC.

Counties use Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA) funding for both proven interventions like FFT and MST, and for a variety of promising locally-designed interventions before juveniles turn into serious or chronic offenders. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger's Administration credits JJCPA with "curbing juvenile crime" and deterring "countless thousands" of juveniles from ending up in custody. State-collected data released in 2006 show that at-risk youths not in JJCPA programs were 33 percent more likely to be arrested than participating youths.

Many California juvenile offenders are still not receiving needed interventions

Despite the success of many interventions at preventing crime, not nearly enough juveniles are being served through these programs. For example:

Based on data released in April 2007, intensive family therapies serve just 4 percent of more than 20,000 juvenile offenders in California who are obvious candidates for these programs because they are either at home under intensive supervision (rather than in regular probation), in foster care or group homes, or in aftercare following custody.

Demand for funding for juvenile interventions is high. For example, in 2006 the state rejected over \$14 million in Juvenile MIOCR applications due to lack of funding, including several applications that would have funded proven intensive family therapies.

Despite a recent funding increase, JJCPA is still below its original funding level, while spending for Corrections has increased 77 percent. Many valuable JJCPA programs have been forced to shut down entirely, cut services, or place troubled youths on waiting lists.

Quality community-based interventions save lives and money

Interventions like intensive family therapies are not only relatively inexpensive compared to state custody—which now costs approximately \$175,000 per youth annually—they are also cost-effective. For example, every dollar invested in intensive family therapies saves the public as much as \$14 and produces net savings of \$18,000 to over \$75,000 for each juvenile offender served. If California provided these interventions to all eligible youths, it could save taxpayers and crime victims over \$700 million.

The more than 350 members of FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS *California* support investments in proven community-based interventions that steer troubled youth away from crime. In order to build on its successes, California needs to increase funding for the Juvenile Mentally Ill Offender Crime Reduction program and the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act.

On the Right Track to Safer Communities: Steering California's Juvenile Offenders Away from Lives of Crime

Introduction

FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS *California* is a bipartisan, anti-crime organization led by more than 350 law enforcement leaders—sheriffs, police chiefs and district attorneys—and survivors of crime. Many of the survivors are parents of murdered children.

Crime cannot be ignored. To keep families and their communities safe, young offenders committing serious or repeated crimes may need to be placed in custody. A range of minor to more serious sanctions may suffice for other crimes.

Along with punishment, research shows that troubled teens will need help to stop their aggression, substance abuse or other anti-social behaviors. Sanctions that include strict and effective interventions can direct anti-social and dangerous juveniles onto a different path that will better protect California communities.

The problem

Law enforcement is working hard to address juvenile crime and make sure dangerous juveniles are taken off the streets—there are over 200,000 arrests of California juveniles every year.¹ The most dangerous of these young offenders are locked up, as they should be.

The problem—one with disastrous consequences for public safety—is that police officers and sheriffs find themselves arresting

some of the same kids again and again, and district attorneys are forced to prosecute the same kids over and over. As juveniles' criminal records pile up and offenses get more serious, locking them up becomes necessary to protect public safety.

The state is also spending a lot of money. The cost for a juvenile placed in the custody of the state's Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ, formerly known as the California Youth Authority) is approximately \$175,000 per year.² In addition, repeat crimes lead to massive costs in enforcement, loss of property, and loss of life.

Who is committing most of the crimes?

Any consideration of juvenile crime in California must begin with the understanding that:

- **Most juveniles arrested are not likely to become serious offenders.**

Nationally, six in ten juveniles brought before a juvenile court for the first time will not return to court on another charge.³

- **Most juvenile crimes are committed by relatively few juveniles, many of whom continue committing crimes as adults.**

Approximately 70 percent of juvenile offenders held in state custody—which is generally reserved for the most serious

offenders—are arrested again within three years,⁴ which shows that more needs to be done, as early as possible, to identify the juveniles who are most likely to commit more crimes and to help them before they become enmeshed in a life of crime.

The first-hand experience of law enforcement and academic research confirms that serious violence is confined to a small minority of young people.⁵

A window of opportunity to steer troubled youth back on track

Public safety requires that many of these serious juvenile offenders be locked up. But with the help of proven or promising community-based interventions, others can be steered back on track before they become such a danger to the public that they need to be locked up, or after they have been released from custody. (This report generally does not address how to reform state- or county-level secure facilities and services for youths in those facilities in order to reduce repeat crime.)

Most young offenders remain at home after being arrested, providing a window of opportunity to intervene with them and their families before secure custody is required. Only about one in ten juvenile arrests in California results in placement in secure local or state custody after the juvenile court equivalent of a trial.⁶ While many juveniles are detained temporarily in juvenile halls prior to trial, according to a one-day snapshot released in

“Most young offenders remain at home after being arrested, providing a window of opportunity to intervene with them and their families before secure custody is required. Only about one in ten juvenile arrests in California results in placement in secure local or state custody.”

April 2007, only one in eight juvenile offenders under county probation or state supervision is in secure custody in a local juvenile hall, “camp” or “ranch” or in the state’s facilities.⁷

Another window of opportunity exists when those young offenders who wind up in custody are released and transitioning back into their communities. Many repeat offenders cycle in and out of custody with regularity. The average stay in a county camp or ranch, after all, is just four-and-a-half months.⁸ It is clear that nearly all juveniles who are locked up—even many with serious offenses—will sooner or later rejoin our communities. Juvenile offenders do not disappear.

To protect our communities, California can and should do much more to cut re-offending by the minority of juvenile offenders who are on the way to becoming serious or chronic offenders.

Chapter 1

Preventing Crime by Intervening with Serious and Chronic Juvenile Offenders Before They Need to Be Locked Up

There are times when the nature of the crime or crimes committed simply demands that a juvenile be sentenced to state or county custody following trial. In other situations, though, court-ordered sanctions that do not include custody may actually work better to reduce future crime. If in addition to the usual punitive measures such as fines, community service and curfews, a judge also orders participation in a carefully-structured intervention, juveniles can be taught to avoid crime by adopting new social skills, attitudes and beliefs.

The wisdom of using scientifically-tested interventions

The best way to ensure that our streets will be safer is to rely on sanctions and interventions proven by careful, scientific testing. The most reliable method for testing whether an intervention really delivers results is the same rigorous method used by medical science to test new medicines: randomly assign half the juveniles to receive the intervention and the other half to receive the typical services being delivered to delinquent juveniles. Then carefully measure the results.

Solid evidence emerging from a growing number of such randomized control trials shows what works to help young offenders avoid committing further crimes. In particular, community-based intensive therapies for youths and their families have had great

success in directing youths toward productive lives instead of reckless involvement in more crime.

An approach that works—Training families to control their delinquent children

Intensive family therapies give parents the tools they will need to regain control of their kids and steer them away from crime, while also giving troubled teens the tools they will need to behave responsibly. Family therapy is a very broadly-used term that includes marriage counseling and various other interventions. But a more specific range of targeted intensive family therapies has proven results with young—usually repeat—offenders, including those with aggression and/or substance abuse problems.

Most troubled young people, even if they go into custody, will return to their families. Families play an influential role, either positive or negative, in their children's aggression or substance abuse. Many parents, who may have made many unwise decisions themselves, do not want their children to make the same mistakes. They may be poorly-trained, however, in how to keep their children out of fights and away from drugs, especially if they live in high-crime neighborhoods.

Effective family therapy typically begins by convincing families that change is possible. It usually involves teaching families how to stop

arguing with each other. Then parents are taught how to keep better track of their children's behavior and set clear limits. For teens who react positively, parents can use positive reinforcement, such as giving their children increased autonomy by allowing, for example, additional unsupervised time with positive peers. For teens who continue to misbehave, parents learn to provide appropriate discipline.


Once parents have been given the right tools, the professionals help them practice until they are getting results on their own. Others are brought into the process, such as extended family members, teachers, positive peers and service providers. They can increase the quantity and quality of positive influences in troubled teens' lives, and help strengthen the parents' ability to manage their children's behaviors. Together, this extended network helps embed the juveniles in a positive environment that keeps them away from drugs and crime.

A number of family therapy interventions have been repeatedly evaluated using randomized control trials. These interventions typically incorporate individualized cognitive behavioral therapy—another proven approach that teaches teens to modify their troubled behaviors by learning and practicing alternative ways of responding to interpersonal problems.⁹ The body of research shows that—when properly implemented—high-quality intensive family therapies can reduce repeat crimes.

Functional Family Therapy (FFT)

Functional Family Therapy (FFT) is for moderate- to high-risk teens with delinquency, aggression and/or substance abuse problems. FFT can be used for at-risk youth and juveniles facing probation, being considered for custody, or returning to their families from custody. It is delivered over a period of eight to 30 hours by trained providers, who range in background from para-professionals to mental health professionals.¹⁰

FFT cut re-arrests by participants in half,



compared to a control group in one randomized study (50 percent for control group youths vs. 26 percent for FFT participants), and reduced out-of-home placements by three quarters in another study (72 percent vs. 18 percent).¹¹

In California, FFT also has delivered promising results. FFT participants in **Sutter County** were 73 percent less likely to get arrested after entering the program.¹²

Multisystemic Therapy (MST)

Similar to FFT, Multisystemic Therapy (MST) serves moderate- to high-risk teens, though MST often serves some teens who are more serious or violent offenders than those served by FFT. MST typically involves 60 hours of professional interventions over four months. The staff members are on call, if need be, around the clock.¹³ One MST study followed juvenile offenders and a randomized control group until they were, on average, 29 years old. Individuals who had not received MST were 62 percent more likely to have been arrested for any offense (81 percent vs. 50 percent), and more than twice as likely to have been arrested for a violent offense (30 percent vs. 14 percent).¹⁴

Los Angeles County's MST program has demonstrated positive outcomes. Similar juveniles who did not receive MST services were 43 percent more likely to be arrested than MST participants.¹⁵

Out-of-home placements with specially-trained foster families—Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC)

While the intensive family therapies mentioned above are for juvenile offenders who can remain at home, another intensive family therapy is proven to reduce future crime for youths where home placement is not a viable option. Already, on a given day, close to 4,000 juvenile offenders in California are placed in group homes or foster care, both with generally lower levels of security than most county or state facilities. This compares with the over 6,000 juvenile offenders who are placed in county camps and ranches or in state custody.¹⁶


An alternative for many of these young offenders in group homes or foster homes would be individual placement in a Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC) home where they will not mix with other delinquent juveniles. Individualized foster care may sound like a "soft" sanction for juvenile offenders. But for teens who are often used to running the streets, and who may see a month in custody as just another chance to hang out with delinquent friends and learn new criminal behaviors, this approach creates a highly-controlled environment that is, in many ways, a tougher intervention than placement in a group home.

The MTFC foster parents are carefully chosen and trained and usually only work with one child at a time. When juvenile offenders come into the foster homes, the youngsters are initially not allowed to leave their foster parents' sight during waking hours. They must earn the right to be alone those first few days. Then they must attend school regularly, carrying a card each day for their teachers to

sign. Teachers from every period must sign the card, noting whether the students showed up and behaved. Eventually, the youngsters can earn opportunities to interact with positive peers outside of school, but negative behaviors quickly result in the loss of those privileges. Meanwhile, a professional trains each teen in the social skills needed to avoid fights or situations that can lead to further crime.

Participation of parents or guardians is still integral to this program. While the youngsters are living in the very controlled environment of a foster home for six months to a year, their parents or guardians are being trained to take over and establish the same rules and expectations when their children return home.¹⁷

MTFC works much better than placement in a group home. Randomized control group research shows the MTFC approach successfully cuts the average number of arrests for seriously delinquent juveniles in half (5.4 arrests for control group vs. 2.6 arrests for MTFC youths). According to the same study, boys placed in MTFC homes were six times more likely to have no new arrests than boys placed in group homes (41 percent vs. 7 percent).¹⁸



MTFC also can be an option for juvenile offenders re-entering their communities after state or county custody if they do not have stable homes to return to. At an MTFC home, young offenders leaving custody can learn the skills they will need to stay out of trouble as they return to school or seek employment. And their parents will receive the training they need to continue this process once their children transition fully back home.

Community-based interventions instead of custody can work for many offenders—Lessons from Ohio and San Francisco

Community-based interventions have been shown to reduce crime, not just in individual tests of programs, but also in broader citywide and statewide efforts.

Ohio

Evidence from a statewide effort in Ohio to shift juvenile offenders from state custody suggests that, while there are very high-risk offenders who need to be locked up, public safety often will be best served if lower-level

offenders receive community-based interventions instead of custody.

“RECLAIM Ohio” diverted low-, moderate-, and in some cases even high-risk juveniles, to community sanctions with a range of interventions (though not including proven intensive family therapies) in place of state or county custody. Research on RECLAIM Ohio by Christopher Lowenkamp and Edward Latessa showed that, if low- to moderate-risk offenders were placed in custody and not in a community-based intervention, they returned to custody upon release at five to seven times the rate of juveniles receiving interventions.²⁰

It is important to note that Ohio’s approach was not appropriate for the very highest-risk offenders. The RECLAIM researchers found that the very highest-risk juveniles—teens with a combination of current felonies, prior felonies and at least three referrals to the courts starting before age 14—end up committing more crime if not locked up in custody.²¹ These offenders may need to be locked up but can still receive other effective interventions while in custody or after leaving custody. But for low-, medium-, and even some high-risk offenders, RECLAIM

High-quality interventions and effective staff produce the best results


Researchers have found that the success of interventions for juvenile offenders depends on both the design of the intervention (whether or not it is based on past scientific research and development, which was then carefully tested) and whether or not a well-trained, experienced staff was implementing the program. Research by Mark Lipsey and his team at Vanderbilt University of a broad number of interventions to prevent juvenile delinquency found that interventions that were both strongly-designed and well-staffed had nearly twice the impact as interventions that were either strongly-designed but poorly-staffed, or weakly-designed but well-staffed. Not surprisingly, the researchers also found that a weak intervention with ineffective staff does not reduce repeat crimes any more effectively than typical juvenile justice interventions.¹⁹

What works (and doesn't work) to reduce repeat crimes by juveniles	A weakly-designed intervention	A strongly-designed intervention
A poorly-trained and ineffective staff	No reduction in repeat crimes compared to typical services	24% reduction in repeat crimes
A well-trained and effective staff	24% reduction in repeat crimes	46% reduction in repeat crimes

Dennis, 2005 & Lipsey, 1997

Ohio's RECLAIM Community-Based Interventions Cut Re-Offending Among Most Juvenile Offenders

Percent of juvenile offenders returning to custody



Note: while the data in this graph only refers to diversions from local custody, similar results were achieved by diverting youth from state custody.

Lowenkamp & Latessa, 2005

reduced crime more effectively by placing them in community-based interventions instead of in custody.

San Francisco

California has its own proof that this approach works. San Francisco's Detention Diversion Advocacy Project (DDAP) serves juvenile offenders facing secure confinement. If DDAP officials determine that the juveniles are not a high risk to their communities and would show up for court, they petition the judge to direct the juveniles instead into the DDAP program, which provides close supervision coupled with efforts to help the youths and their families to avoid future crime. Youths are directed, based on individual needs, to community services such as tutoring, drug counseling and family counseling. DDAP also helps parents of offenders, if needed, to secure employment, drug counseling, food stamps, etc. Meanwhile, street-wise workers keep close track of the youths and ensure they receive the needed interventions.

A study of this program yielded impressive results: Juveniles not receiving DDAP were

twice as likely as program participants to be referred to juvenile court again on a new offense.²²

Risk assessments are essential

The Ohio and San Francisco results clearly show the wisdom of taking into account a juvenile's risk of repeat crimes. Decisions on where offenders will serve their sentences and what services they need to avoid future crime should be carefully informed by scientifically-valid risk assessments, which consider not only the number and nature of crimes committed, but also each juvenile's own personal history and support systems. More than a dozen California counties already are using validated risk assessments to help identify the appropriate interventions for juvenile offenders, although more counties need to move in that direction.²³

Based on the experiences of Ohio and San Francisco, it is clear that California has a tremendous opportunity to improve public safety by making a commitment to effective community-based interventions.

Chapter 2

California Has Succeeded in Initial Efforts to Fund Proven and Promising Interventions

Several California counties are already taking steps to prevent crime by serious offenders by implementing tested community-based interventions, including those described in Chapter 1. In addition, many counties are using state funding to support a variety of promising interventions that attempt to prevent serious and repeat crimes by intervening before youths become serious or chronic offenders. The two major sources of state funding are the Juvenile Mentally Ill Offender Crime Reduction program and the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act.

Juvenile Mentally Ill Offender Crime Reduction (MIOCR) program

In 2006, California established for the first time a Juvenile Mentally Ill Offender Crime Reduction (MIOCR) program. The 2006-2007 budget funded Juvenile MIOCR with \$22.3 million.

“13 of the 20 counties awarded Juvenile MIOCR grants were funded to provide one of the proven intensive family therapies—Functional Family Therapy, Multisystemic Therapy and Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care.”

MIOCR funding directly supports a variety of evidence-based programs for young offenders with mental disorders. In fact, 13 of the 20 counties awarded Juvenile MIOCR grants were funded to provide one of the proven intensive family therapies—Functional Family Therapy (FFT), Multisystemic Therapy (MST) and Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC)—described in Chapter 1.²⁴

Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA)

Enacted in 2000, the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA) provides a dedicated funding stream for local juvenile justice programs designed to reduce juvenile crime. These include intensive family therapies, programs for offenders convicted for the first time, gang and truancy prevention, job training, after-school programs, and diversion programs. JJCPA currently supports 168 programs in 56 participating counties, and serves over 105,000 at-risk and delinquent youths annually.²⁵ It is currently funded at \$119 million.

California recognizes JJCPA funding as an integral part of a balanced anti-crime strategy. It is linked dollar-for-dollar to the Citizens' Option for Public Safety (COPS) program, which funds local law enforcement agencies for front-line public safety services.

Counties not only use JJCPA funding for proven interventions like FFT and MST for serious and chronic offenders,²⁶ they also use it

to intervene early to keep at-risk young people from ever becoming serious or chronic offenders in the first place.

Types of JJCPA programs

JJCPA's diverse programs target youths at different stages of involvement with the juvenile justice system. Generally, programs focus on one of the following stages (although some programs may cover youths at more than one stage):

1. *Pre-arrest/prevention* programs target youths who have not yet entered, but are at risk of entering, the juvenile justice system.
2. *Post-arrest/intervention* programs serve youths who already have been arrested. Some of these programs divert offenders from the traditional juvenile court, while others provide services to youths after a court has sentenced them to probation or custody. Individual programs may focus on specific levels of juvenile offenders, ranging from first-time, low-level offenders to serious, chronic offenders. Most JJCPA programs are intervention programs.
3. *Post-custody/aftercare* programs provide services for youths who are transitioning from custody back into society.

JJCPA programs often provide a range of services, many of which may be appropriate for youths at any stage of the juvenile justice system. Some of the services provided by JJCPA programs include:

- Comprehensive assessments of individualized needs
- Mental health services, including individual, group and family counseling
- Substance abuse treatment
- Gang prevention and intervention
- Anti-aggression training
- Employment and vocational training


- Community service activities
- Life skills training
- Academic assistance

By offering a variety of services, JJCPA programs often can be tailored to meet the individualized needs of participating youths.

Positive statewide outcomes for JJCPA

Because counties are required to monitor crime-related outcomes for each JJCPA program and to report those results back to the state each year, JJCPA can document a strong track record of positive outcomes that have been fairly consistent year after year.²⁷ In 2006, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation reported that:

- Youths in JJCPA programs attended school more frequently, were suspended and expelled less often, and had higher GPAs than similar youths not in JJCPA programs.
- JJCPA youths were 21 percent more likely to complete probation and 24 percent more likely to complete court-ordered community service.



- Finally, at-risk youths not in JJCPA-funded programs were 33 percent more likely to be arrested and 23 percent more likely to be incarcerated than participating youths.²⁸

“Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Administration credits JJCPA with ‘curbing juvenile crime’ and deterring ‘countless thousands’ of juveniles from ending up in custody”

chronic running away, or gang membership.

ROPP combines intensive probation supervision with a range of services for the youths and their families, depending on their needs and the services available in

In light of results like these, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Administration credits JJCPA with “curbing juvenile crime” and deterring “countless thousands” of juveniles from ending up in custody.²⁹

Promising new outcomes from individual JJCPA programs

Several counties across California have recently reported impressive results from JJCPA programs, although generally not including randomized control groups. For example:

- **Repeat Offender Prevention Program/“8% Solution”**

The Repeat Offender Prevention Program (ROPP), sometimes referred to as the “8% Solution,” was originally developed in **Orange County**, inspired by local research showing that just 8 percent of young offenders are responsible for the majority of repeat juvenile crimes. While FFT, MST and MTFC typically target repeat and serious juvenile offenders, ROPP targets young offenders early in their criminal careers—the first time they are convicted.³⁰

These early offenders are screened to determine whether they have risk factors that indicate they are the most likely to go on to commit more crimes. ROPP serves offenders 15-and-a-half years of age or younger who exhibit problems in at least three of these four areas: school behavior and performance problems; family problems; substance abuse problems; or high-risk behaviors such as stealing,

each county. For example, Orange County’s program, known as Youth and Family Resource Centers, provides transportation to and from the program each weekday, a full day of school, and a variety of substance abuse, counseling and family services.

In 2002, the state released an evaluation of the program in seven counties: **Fresno, Humboldt, Los Angeles, Orange, San Diego, San Mateo** and **Solano Counties**. Nearly 1,800 juveniles were randomly assigned to either the program or a control group in that evaluation.


Overall, ROPP produced improvements that were statistically significant in school attendance and performance, and in reductions in the number of juveniles who tested positive for drugs. Most important for protecting communities, juvenile offenders left out of the program were 29 percent more likely to commit felonies than program participants. The results were stronger in some counties than others. For example, nearly twice as many similar youths who did not participate in these programs were arrested for felonies in **San Diego** and **Fresno Counties**, and 41 percent more were arrested for felonies in **Orange County**.³¹

While not including randomized control groups, new data from several JJCPA-funded ROPP programs continue to demonstrate positive outcomes.

In **Monterey County**, similar youths were twice as likely as ROPP youths to be

Monterey County's Repeat Offender Prevention Program Cut Arrests by More than Half

Percent of youths arrested for a new crime



Monterey County Probation Dept., 2006

arrested for a new crime.³²

In **Ventura County**, similar youths were 45 percent more likely to be incarcerated.³³

And in **Kern County**, ROPP youths' outcomes improved as they spent more time in the program. Participating youths were 33 percent less likely to be arrested in their last six months of the program than during their first six months.³⁴

- **Early assessments and services for lower-risk offenders**

With the help of JJCPA funds, several California counties offer programs that screen youths for risks and provide services to keep them out of custody but also away from crime. These programs are generally less intensive than ROPP and may target relatively low-level offenders.

Ventura County's Early Intervention program targets youths on "informal probation" (arrested, but not brought before a court) or under age 15, who are identified as being at risk of continued delinquency. It provides assessments and treatment plans and focuses on increasing

family bonding, positive peer association, good work experience, and resistance to drugs. Compared to program participants, similar youths who did not enroll in the program were more than twice as likely to be arrested and more than eight times more likely to be incarcerated.³⁵


Shasta County's Juvenile Assessment Center targets first-time misdemeanor offenders. A probation officer conducts an assessment of each offender and works with the family to identify needs and appropriate referrals. Compared to over 400 juvenile offenders who were assessed, similar youths not in this program were twice as likely to be arrested.³⁶

- **Day Reporting Centers**

Several counties utilize JJCPA funding for Day Reporting Centers, which may serve youths sentenced to probation and/or youths transitioning from county custody at a camp or ranch back into their communities. Day Reporting Centers generally provide a range of comprehensive services that can include not only activities and services after school, but also an on-site school for youths who have not done well in a

Ventura County's Early Intervention Program Cut Incarceration Dramatically

Percent of youths incarcerated



Ventura County Probation Dept., 2006

regular school setting.

Sacramento County's Day Reporting Center collected data showing that, compared to program participants, juveniles in a similar group not receiving services were four times more likely to have a felony arrest.³⁷

Monterey County's Silver Star Day/Rancho Cielo program found that youths not in the program were twice as likely as participating youths to be arrested for a new crime.³⁸

Ventura County's Aftercare Day Reporting Center cut the number of incarcerated youths by more than half.³⁹

- **Coordinated custodial/aftercare services**


Some JJCPA programs provide a continuity of services during and following custody in order to prepare offenders for, and ease, their transition back into their communities.

Santa Barbara County's Aftercare Services Program begins when a juvenile offender enters into custody. Probation officers meet with juveniles and their families to outline behavioral and academic expectations and plans for free-time programming. Approximately four weeks prior to a juvenile's release from custody, the probation officer and aftercare staff begin to establish aftercare plans, which the aftercare staff then monitors. The program cut the number of arrests for participating juveniles nearly in half, relative to a similar group.⁴⁰

Orange County's Sobriety Through Education and Prevention (STEP) program serves girls in court-ordered commitment. It offers assessment and treatment services for both mental health and substance abuse, along with individualized academic plans, gender-specific programming (including job-shadowing and women's issues discussion

Youths Left Out of Sacramento County's Day Reporting Center Four Times More Likely to Commit Felony

Percent of youths arrested for a felony



Sacramento County Probation Dept., 2006

groups), and intensive aftercare supervision. Girls left out of the program were 72 percent more likely to be arrested than program participants.⁴¹

- **Drug treatment**

Research shows that drug dependence should be treated as a chronic problem, where relapses are, unfortunately, common. Many JJCPA programs focus on drug treatment, with promising results. JJCPA funds, for example, several drug courts, which generally provide regular drug testing, court appearances and counseling, as well as intensive supervision. While a meta-analysis of research on juvenile and adult drug courts showed that the adult courts produced more positive outcomes,⁴² data collected for a number of California's juvenile drug courts are showing strong results.

In **Orange County**, similar youths were 70 percent more likely to be incarcerated than drug court participants.

In **Monterey County**, similar youths were nearly four times more likely to be arrested for a new crime.⁴³

- **Gang prevention**

Sonoma County's Gang Risk Intervention and Suppression program serves youths affiliated with and/or actively involved in gang activity. In addition to being closely supervised, youths participate in weekly group sessions for 12 to 24 weeks, where they learn about gang culture and risks, alternative choices and behaviors, and tools to become positive contributing members of the community. A Family Advocate works directly with parents and/or caregivers to identify needs and obtain resources in each community. Youths left out of this JJCPA-funded program were more than twice as likely to be arrested as program participants.⁴⁴


- **Anti-truancy programs**

Anti-truancy programs target youths who are chronically absent from school. While many truants may not have been arrested, truancy is an important risk factor for future crime.⁴⁵ These programs can include comprehensive services for truant youths, and some include potential prosecution of youths and their families to ensure that the families take regular school attendance seriously.

San Diego County's Truancy Supervision Program, for example, recently reported

Truants Left Out of San Diego County's Anti-Truancy Program More than Three Times as Likely to Get Arrested

Percent of youths arrested



San Diego Association of Governments, 2006

that youths not participating in this JJCPA-funded program were more than three times as likely to be arrested as program participants.⁴⁶

Thanks to funding from MIOCR and JJCPA, which is often matched with other federal, state and local funding, counties across California offer proven and promising interventions to protect the public from repeat offenders. Yet increased investments in interventions are still sorely needed.

Chapter 3

Many California Juvenile Offenders Still Are Not Receiving Needed Interventions

Despite the fact that many community-based interventions for at-risk youths and juvenile offenders have proven to be successful at preventing crime, not nearly enough youths are being served through these programs. For example, intensive family therapies serve very few youths statewide, and the demand for funding for juvenile interventions through the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA) and the Juvenile Mentally Ill Offender Crime Reduction (MIOCR) program is considerably higher than available funding. Furthermore, JJCPA's volatile funding history has led many counties to abandon or scale back programs, leaving youths without the critical services they need to help steer them away from crime.


Intensive family therapies serve only a small fraction of eligible youths

According to new data released in April 2007, on any given day, there are more than 20,000 juvenile offenders in California who are obvious candidates to receive Functional Family Therapy (FFT), Multisystemic Therapy (MST) or Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC). These juveniles are either at home under intensive supervision (as opposed to regular probation), in foster care or group homes, or in aftercare following custody.⁴⁷ Placing these juveniles in one of these three proven intensive family therapies would drastically cut future crime.

Yet these intensive family therapies serve just


a small number of these juveniles and their families. On any given day, these programs serve fewer than 900 total juvenile offenders statewide. Functional Family Therapy (FFT) serves 601 juvenile offenders, Multisystemic Therapy (MST) serves 217, and Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC) serves just 16.⁴⁸

California, therefore, is serving only approximately 4 percent—one in 25—of juvenile offenders who could benefit from these programs. And this does not even include



**Demand for
Juvenile Mentally Ill Offender
Crime Reduction Program
60% Higher than Available Funding**

Grant funding in 2006



CA Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2006

many of the more than 10,000 youths held in county detention facilities, camps or ranches,⁴⁹ for whom placement in one of these proven programs might more effectively cut their involvement in future crime.⁵⁰

It appears from this data that these proven intensive family therapies could serve 25 times more juvenile offenders than they currently serve and still not reach all those they should be serving.

County-by-county data on the number of juvenile offenders served by each of the intensive family therapies and the number of juvenile offenders eligible for these programs are in Appendix A.

High demand for interventions for juvenile offenders

Demand for interventions for juvenile offenders far outpaces the supply of available funding. For example, the Juvenile MIOCR program, which most grantees are using to fund intensive family therapies, had a highly competitive grant process in 2006. Demand was 60 percent higher than available funding,


and the state rejected \$14 million in applications due to lack of funding,⁵¹ including several applications that would have funded Functional Family Therapy or Multisystemic Therapy.⁵²

The demand for Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA) funding is more difficult to measure because virtually every county relies on a consensus process for JJCPA funding, rather than competitive applications. A local coordinating council in each county generally decides how to distribute JJCPA funds based on its assessment of service gaps and where the greatest need lies in the community. As a result, there is no statewide data comparable to MIOCR showing the extent of demand for JJCPA funding.

San Francisco, however, does conduct a competitive application process, in which community organizations apply to receive JJCPA funding. And if San Francisco's experience is any indication, demand for JJCPA funding is quite high. In 2006, \$4.9 million in funding was requested, but only \$2.4 million was available.⁵³ As a result, half of the funding requested had to be turned down.

**Half of JJCPA Funding Requested
in San Francisco Turned Away, Due to
Lack of Funding**

Grant funding in 2006



San Francisco Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice, 2006

State JJCPA funding still below original funding level

JJCPA funding is not only inadequate, it also has been unstable. Given repeated proposed and actual cuts, county officials are often in doubt over whether they will have enough money to continue their programs. Originally funded at \$121 million in 2000-2001, JJCPA funding fell to \$100 million.

Even after the recent budget restored \$19 million to raise funding to \$119 million, JJCPA is still funded below its original funding level—without even taking into account the increased cost of living and increases in salaries for probation officers and others who staff JJCPA programs. Just to restore JJCPA to its true 2000-2001 level, so that it could buy the same level of services, would require a boost to close to \$150 million.⁵⁴

JJCPA's decline in funding is particularly striking, given overall increases in state spending during the life of JJCPA. Since 2000-2001, not only has the cost of living increased by 20 percent, K-12 funding has increased by

35 percent, and adult and youth Corrections funding has soared by 77 percent.⁵⁵ Yet in the same time frame, JJCPA funding has fallen 2 percent.

By shortchanging JJCPA despite its strong track record, California is failing to fully pursue the balanced crime-fighting strategy that public safety requires.

“By shortchanging JJCPA despite its strong track record, California is failing to fully pursue the balanced crime-fighting strategy that public safety requires.”


Local impact of JJCPA funding cuts

As a result of state-level cuts, counties have been forced to eliminate many JJCPA programs altogether or scale them back significantly.⁵⁶ While the recent funding increase

may restore some of these programs, it is still not enough to fully repair the damage from past cuts.

To get a more in-depth understanding of the impact of JJCPA funding cuts on counties, FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS contacted over 20 county probation departments, primarily from California's largest counties, in order to identify where they had to cut back, as well as what interventions and services they would provide if more funding were available.

JJCPA Funding Lags Far Behind Other State Spending, Still Below Original Level



Legislative Analyst's Office, 2002 and 2007; California Consumer Price Index

Below are some powerful examples of how the reduction in JJCPA funding has impacted counties, juvenile offenders and public safety across the state:

- **Valuable JJCPA programs have been eliminated**

Sacramento County, for example, eliminated JJCPA funding for five programs, even though it reports that all five programs were producing good outcomes.⁵⁷

San Diego County put its Repeat Offender Prevention Program on hold—despite its success in cutting felony arrests nearly in half—following cuts to JJCPA funding in 2003-2004.⁵⁸

- **Other JJCPA programs serve fewer youths or offer reduced services**


Some program cutbacks were directly tied to the fact that the cost of living (and thus, the cost of paying staff and probation officers' salaries) has increased, while funding for JJCPA has not.

Orange County had to cut four of its six Youth and Family Resource Centers, even though this pioneer 8% solution/Repeat Offender Prevention Program had been found to reduce felonies significantly.⁵⁹ While one of the four shut-down sites is reopening with county funding in 2007, the others are still closed. As a result, the county does not have the capacity it needs to serve all eligible juvenile offenders: Over 20 juveniles each month are denied access because of the lack of programs in their local communities.⁶⁰

San Joaquin County's Crossroads program has experienced a 60 percent decline in the number of youths it serves due to funding cuts, resulting in nearly 700 fewer youths being served. Crossroads is a prevention program that targets "out of control" youths who have not yet been adjudicated as delinquent. It provides counseling and other direct services, as

San Joaquin County Forced to Cut 700 Kids from Crossroads Prevention Program

Number of youths served



San Joaquin County Probation Dept., 2007

well as referrals for participating youths and their families.⁶¹

San Luis Obispo County has scaled back its Intensive Community Diversion Program, in part due to budget cuts and lack of a cost-of-living adjustment. It cut back the number of sites and also had to cut many on-site services, such as free drug and alcohol treatment. The county now refers youths to treatment programs that their families may not be able to afford, and which may have waiting lists. This diversion program provides community-based services as an alternative to court-ordered services for some young offenders. Although this program has suffered cutbacks, the county has somewhat compensated for the decline in funds thanks to its increasing experience in operating the program.⁶²

- **Countywide expansion plans are being sidelined, leaving many youth unserved**

Fresno County, for example, provides an after-school prevention program inspired by the "8% solution." This JJCPA-funded program, Students Targeted with

Opportunities for Prevention (STOP), provides a wide range of services to youths ages 10 to 14 years who are assessed as at risk of entering the juvenile justice system. The county hopes to expand its STOP program to reach all middle schools in the county and serve four times as many youths (a total of 2,000), but funding is not available.⁶³

- **Youths are on waiting lists for vital services**

Several JJCPA-funded Day Reporting Centers have been unable to deliver timely services, which is especially detrimental because Day Reporting Centers often provide critical, time-sensitive services to help youths transition from custody back into their communities.

Many youths wait to enter or are turned away from **Sacramento County's** Day Reporting Center;⁶⁴ youths in **San Diego County** must wait several weeks before getting into the Day Reporting Center;⁶⁵

Solano County's Day Reporting Center has a waiting list;⁶⁶ and **Ventura County's** Aftercare Day Reporting Center is in need of additional therapists, resulting in youths waiting up to three weeks to receive therapy.⁶⁷

- **Parents—who are crucial for keeping kids out of trouble—are being ignored**

Orange County's Probation Department conducted an assessment of the unmet needs among juvenile offenders and highlighted the need for more parental involvement.⁶⁸

Solano County's Day Reporting Center had to cut several case manager positions, resulting in decreased family involvement because there were not enough staff members to encourage families to participate.⁶⁹

- **Specific services that are needed, including gang-prevention, aftercare and gender-specific programs for girls,**

Success Story

Jessica, Ventura County

When Jessica was growing up, her dad was addicted to drugs. Though her dad was at home, she says he was “not in the right state of mind.” Jessica’s mom worked in the evenings as a nurse so Jessica took on many of the responsibilities for raising her four siblings at a young age. But she also “acted out” and “was in fight after fight.”

After committing a residential burglary at the age of 15, Jessica entered the Repeat Offender Prevention Program (ROPP). “I didn’t plan on going to jail. I mean, I was a cheerleader ... received straight As, was on Honor Roll.” In ROPP, she participated in various activities, including individual and family counseling, and teen empowerment and victim impact classes.

Jessica says ROPP gave her the chance to turn her life around. In 2005, Jessica graduated from high school with honors. The program even had a positive impact on her father. After attending family counseling through the ROPP program and observing Jessica’s successes, her father decided to seek help for his addiction. Today, Jessica has a “great relationship” with her dad, who has been “clean” for three years. Jessica, now 20 years old, is married and has a son. She works as a teller at Wells Fargo Bank and attends classes at Santa Barbara Business College, where she is earning a paralegal certificate. Jessica explains, “The law is fun if you’re on the right side of it.”

Success Story

Larry Seta, Monterey County

When Larry reached his teenage years, he says he “started messing up”—he smoked marijuana heavily and never listened to his parents. He frequently got arrested and sent to juvenile hall, primarily due to using drugs and driving without a license.

When Larry first heard about Rancho Cielo (Monterey County’s Silver Star Day Reporting Center), he was hesitant to go. However, once in the program, he enjoyed it so much that he participated for two-and-a-half years, despite the fact that his probation requirements mandated less. At Rancho Cielo, Larry learned how to control his anger and to think before acting. He also participated in various activities like basketball, fishing and golf. Larry said he liked “everything” about the program.

The staff at Rancho Cielo helped Larry get a job working for Salinas Steel Builders. Larry, now 18 years old, has been saving money in order to start his own business and aspires to one day build houses. He no longer uses drugs because he doesn’t “want anything to jeopardize my job.” He points out that Rancho Cielo “taught me how to grow up.”

are often not receiving funding

Many counties are interested in doing more to address gangs, improve aftercare services, or establish programs tailored for girls with JJCPA funding, but those plans are on hold without additional funding (see endnote for specific examples).⁷⁰

California can and needs to do far more to meet the increasing need for effective community-based interventions to steer youth away from crime. Failing to provide these interventions to juvenile offenders who need them not only increases crime, it also costs taxpayers money.

Cutting Crime Saves Money

The average cost of placing a juvenile offender in state custody for a year following trial is substantial, approximately \$175,000 per youth.⁷¹ By contrast, the typical one year's tuition at a California State University is about \$3,200 a year.⁷²

Naturally, compared to the price of locking up juveniles, it is a lot less expensive for youths to stay at home and receive services for themselves and their families. For example, Multisystemic Therapy (MST) costs \$4,264 per youth, while Functional Family Therapy (FFT) costs just \$2,325 per youth.⁷³

But cheaper is not necessarily more effective. The real test of whether interventions produce long-term savings—or actually end up costing society more—will be whether they successfully reduce repeat crimes. Each high-risk juvenile prevented from adopting a life of crime could save the country between \$1.7 million and \$2.3 million.⁷⁴

Intensive family therapies save from \$18,000 to \$75,000 per offender—and could save California over \$700 million

Research confirms that interventions like intensive family therapies are not only relatively inexpensive compared to custody, they are also cost-effective because they are better at reducing future crime. Steve Aos and his team at the Washington State Institute for Public Policy confirmed that impressive savings

are possible with their October 2006 review of more than 571 interventions. Typically, the studies Aos and his team looked at compared the new intervention with the services youth would regularly receive. Out of that comprehensive review of what works, they produced a cost-benefit analysis. Many interventions tested did not produce reductions in repeat crimes or savings, and a few, such as Scared Straight, made things worse. Far too often, good intentions were not enough. But Aos and his team found that some well-tested interventions delivered very strong results.

For example, every dollar invested in FFT resulted in more than \$14 in savings to taxpayers and crime victims; every dollar invested in Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC) resulted in \$12 in savings; and every dollar invested in MST resulted in \$5 in savings.⁷⁵ These figures only include savings from crime reduction, and they do not even take into account savings from lower welfare costs or increased income tax receipts from troubled teens who turn their lives around and become productive adults.

These proven interventions reduce repeat crimes so much that they produce net savings (after subtracting the cost of the intervention) of \$18,000 to over \$75,000 for each juvenile offender served.⁷⁶

While it would cost approximately \$85 million to provide these intensive family therapies to all of the more than 20,000

Community-Based Interventions that Reduce Crime Also Save Money

Proven intervention	Program costs	Savings to taxpayers and victims	Net savings to taxpayers and victims (subtracting cost of program)
Multisystemic Therapy (MST)	\$4,264	\$22,477	\$18,213
Functional Family Therapy (FFT)	\$2,325	\$34,146	\$31,821
Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC) ⁷⁷	\$6,945	\$84,743	\$77,798

Washington State Institute for Public Policy, 2006

unserved juvenile offenders in California who are obvious candidates for these programs, such an investment could save taxpayers and crime victims, after subtracting costs, over \$700 million.⁷⁸ County-by-county projections of potential savings are provided in Appendix A.

Promising interventions like many of those funded by the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act are likely to pay off in significant cost savings, even if they do not match the savings demonstrated by rigorously-tested, proven programs. For

Not only is investment in these interventions imperative from a public safety perspective, there is also a fiscal imperative to avoid future costs to taxpayers by investing wisely in these programs.

Other interventions also save money

Reducing pretrial detention saves money

One way that several JJCPA programs may save money is by safely redirecting young offenders who are not a serious threat to their communities away from detention prior to trial, and in its place, providing less costly supervision.

Santa Cruz County is one of four national model sites for over 75 jurisdictions nationwide that are part of the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI), a project of the Annie E. Casey Foundation.⁸¹ The county is experiencing a 95 percent success rate with home supervision and a 98 percent success rate with electronic monitoring in terms of offenders who show up for trial without having been arrested for any new crimes. Time spent in detention is down: The average length of stay in Santa Cruz County's juvenile hall is now fewer than nine days, compared to a state average of 27 days.⁸² This new approach did not result in increased crime; in fact, from 1997 to 2005, juvenile felony arrests in the county fell 48 percent and were declining at a much faster rate than statewide.⁸³

According to Santa Cruz County Probation officials, the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act has "boosted" its JDAI efforts.⁸⁴ For example, the JJCPA-funded Evening Center provides supervision and structure after school and on Saturdays to youths referred by the Juvenile Court in order to avoid detention and/or out-of-home placement. Youths generally participate for between 12 and 30 days. The program is used both pre-disposition (prior to trial) and as a post-disposition alternative for youths already on probation.

Savings from reduced pretrial detention can free up juvenile justice resources for proven interventions with the more serious and repeat offenders who are at greater risk of becoming career criminals.

Success Story

Jessie, Santa Cruz County

Jessie, age 17, was born in Mexico, and moved to California when he was a baby. He enjoyed middle school, but high school was different because his classmates started getting involved in gangs and drugs.

Jessie was referred to the JJCPA-funded Evening Center after getting into a fight and bringing a knife to school. He says, "At first I hated it ... and thought it was boring.... Then I stopped going high. [I] started playing games ... talking to staff. I just enjoyed it. [The center] kind of helps you stay out of trouble." Jessie did community service, participated in workshops on drugs and gangs, and spoke highly of group meetings, where he learned about "making positive choices." His favorite aspect of the center was meditation at the start of each day, which helped him "get into a good state of mind."

Jessie's behavior changed. He stopped being violent and getting high, explaining, "Slowly, I started thinking differently, and making wiser choices, too." In terms of his relationship with his parents, Jessie notes, "I don't scream.... Now [I] talk."

Jessie continues to attend the center, even though he already successfully graduated from the program. He recently gave a presentation to youth there on the dangers of tobacco. He points out, "It's fun ... a great environment.... You meet people ... and the food's pretty good, too." Jessie will graduate high school this June, and wants to go to college to study forensics.

example, Ohio's statewide commitment to community-based interventions translated into substantial savings, even though those interventions did not include intensive family therapies such as MST, FFT and MTFC. By reassigning moderate-risk juvenile offenders to community sanctions with strict interventions, Ohio's RECLAIM effort saved not only an average of \$28,000 in juvenile custody costs per youth, it also produced an average of \$19,000 in reduced crime savings. Total savings averaged \$47,000 per moderate-risk juvenile redirected to community-based interventions.⁷⁹

No doubt California's Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act also is yielding significant savings, given the promising crime-prevention outcomes reported and the Governor's conclusion that it is keeping "countless thousands" from being locked up.⁸⁰

The bottom line: Effective community-based interventions for troubled youth protect our communities while saving taxpayers money.

Recommendations from the Front Lines

The more than 350 members of FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS *California* support investing in proven and promising community-based interventions to steer youth away from crime. In order to build on California's successes, we call on California policymakers to:

- **Protect and increase funding for the Juvenile Mentally Ill Offender Crime Reduction program and the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act to support a range of proven and promising interventions.** These interventions include intensive family therapies for many juvenile offenders who are becoming increasingly involved in crime but do not yet need to be locked up, some offenders facing custody who can safely remain in their communities, and other offenders who are leaving custody and need help transitioning back into their communities.
- **If California moves forward with reform efforts to shift many juvenile offenders from state to county custody, encourage the use of proven and**

promising community-based interventions, where appropriate, out of state savings redirected to the counties.

- **Encourage the use of scientifically-valid risk assessments to identify the appropriate interventions for juvenile offenders.**
- **Encourage the use of proven intensive family therapies by supporting training for providers and monitoring program implementation to ensure there is strict adherence to the program models.**
- **Continue to systematically collect and use juvenile arrest data to hold programs accountable for successfully reducing crime.**

The members of FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS *California* are committed to supporting community-based interventions to steer young offenders away from crime, because they know that effective interventions will produce both huge savings and safer communities.

Appendix A:

County-by-County Analysis of Eligible Youths Served by Intensive Family Therapies and Potential Savings if All Served

County	Juvenile Offenders Served by Intensive Family Therapies				Eligible Juveniles	Percent Served	Potential Savings
	FFT	MST	MTFC	Total			
Alameda	-	30	-	30	477	6%	\$23,948,600
Alpine	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Amador	-	-	-	-	5	-	\$389,000
Butte	-	-	-	-	n/a	-	-
Calaveras	-	-	-	-	32	-	\$1,170,000
Colusa	-	-	-	-	24	-	\$917,100
Contra Costa	-	30*	3*	33	294	11%	\$12,064,400
Del Norte	-	-	-	-	70	-	\$2,279,000
El Dorado	11	-	-	11	22	50%	\$464,200
Fresno	20*	-	12	32	413	8%	\$15,887,500
Glenn	-	-	-	-	108	-	\$2,807,400
Humboldt	45*	-	-	45	122	37%	\$3,203,600
Imperial	-	-	-	-	25	-	\$1,945,000
Inyo	-	-	-	-	8	-	\$569,600
Kern	23	-	1	24	769	3%	\$30,093,000
Kings	-	-	-	-	694	-	\$18,206,300
Lake	-	-	-	-	118	-	\$4,007,600
Lassen	-	-	-	-	39	-	\$2,348,000
Los Angeles	220*	41	-	261	5,897	4%	\$211,560,100
Madera	-	-	-	-	103	-	\$3,737,900
Marin	30*	-	-	30	62	48%	\$1,704,800
Mariposa	-	-	-	-	9	-	\$489,100
Mendocino	-	-	-	-	107	-	\$3,943,600
Merced	20*	-	-	20	236	8%	\$6,164,900
Modoc	-	-	-	-	14	-	\$614,100
Mono	-	-	-	-	19	-	\$633,700
Monterey	15*	-	-	15	157	10%	\$5,456,000
Napa	-	-	-	-	188	-	\$6,233,800
Nevada	-	-	-	-	n/a	-	-

Chart continued on page 30.

County	Juvenile Offenders Served by Intensive Family Therapies				Eligible Juveniles	Percent Served	Potential Savings
	FFT	MST	MTFC	Total			
Orange	-	-	-	-	2,437	-	\$65,294,500
Placer	20	-	-	20	221	9%	\$6,106,300
Plumas	-	-	-	-	n/a	-	-
Riverside	-	-	-	-	n/a	-	-
Sacramento	29	25*	-	54	817	7%	\$34,367,200
San Benito	-	-	-	-	40	-	\$1,211,800
San Bernardino	30*	-	-	30	2,078	1%	\$65,281,600
San Diego	-	36*	-	36	1,083	3%	\$36,571,700
San Francisco	-	30	-	30	203	15%	\$8,385,100
San Joaquin	-	-	-	-	228	-	\$10,876,400
San Luis Obispo	-	-	-	-	66	-	\$3,076,200
San Mateo	50	-	-	50	684	7%	\$18,898,600
Santa Barbara	-	-	-	-	496	-	\$15,733,600
Santa Clara	-	-	-	-	362	-	\$12,539,700
Santa Cruz	-	-	-	-	207	-	\$5,811,900
Shasta	-	-	-	-	196	-	\$5,747,800
Sierra	-	-	-	-	5	-	\$389,000
Siskiyou	-	-	-	-	32	-	\$1,433,900
Solano	23*	-	-	23	203	11%	\$5,666,100
Sonoma	-	25*	-	25	n/a	-	-
Stanislaus	-	-	-	-	302	-	\$9,349,700
Sutter/Yuba	35	-	-	35	101	35%	\$1,993,600
Tehama	-	-	-	-	n/a	-	-
Trinity	-	-	-	-	81	-	\$2,395,800
Tulare	-	-	-	-	n/a	-	-
Tuolumne	-	-	-	-	n/a	-	-
Ventura	-	-	-	-	599	-	\$17,888,100
Yolo	30*	-	-	30	614	5%	\$18,945,000
Total	601	217	16	834	21,067	4%	\$708,801,900

* The estimate of juvenile offenders served in these counties includes juveniles projected to be served through Mentally Ill Offender Crime Reduction (MIOCR) grants awarded in late 2006.

For the number of eligible offenders, see Hennigan, K., Kolnick, K., Poplawski, J., Andrews, A., Ball, N., Cheng, C. & Payne, J. (2007). *Juvenile Justice Data Project Phase 1: Survey of Interventions and Programs: A Continuum of Graduated Responses for Juvenile Justice in California. County by County Appendix*. Los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California, Center for Research on Crime. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from <http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/docs/JJDPSurveyFinalReportCountybyCountyAppendix.pdf>

Eligible offenders are based on a one-day snapshot that includes juvenile offenders either under intensive supervision (rather than regular probation), in a group home or foster home, or in aftercare following custody. Eight of California's 58 counties did not provide the relevant data.

For estimates of the number of offenders served by Functional Family Therapy (FFT), Multisystemic Therapy (MST) and Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC), the primary sources were: Personal communication with Todd Sosna. (2007, March 24). Todd Sosna is a Senior Associate at the California Institute for Mental Health; Personal communication with Keller Strother. (2007, February 27). Keller Strother is President of MST Services. Many coordinators of these programs in various counties were also contacted to verify exact numbers served. Consistent with the eligible offender data, the numbers served are also from a one-day snapshot, rather than the annual total number of youth served. These estimates do not include at-risk youth not on probation who also are served by many of these programs. These figures may overestimate the number of offenders being served because they include the number of juvenile offenders that new Mentally Ill Offender Crime Reduction grantees expect to serve in 2007 using these models, although many of these programs are not yet operational and are not yet officially recognized by the national organizations that developed the models (which would help ensure the fidelity to the program models that is crucial for ensuring positive outcomes).

For potential savings, the estimates are based on: Aos, S., Miller, M. & Drake, E. (2006). *Evidence-based public policy options to reduce future prison construction, criminal justice costs, and crime rates*. Olympia, WA: Washington State Institute for Public Policy. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from <http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/>

The projected savings are based on the assumption that all of the juvenile offenders in group or foster homes would receive MTFC, and the juvenile offenders under intensive supervision and in aftercare/released from county custody would be assigned to FFT and MST in roughly equal numbers. The potential savings are net savings (after subtracting the approximately \$81 million cost of the programs) and do not include any costs or savings related to offenders already being served by these intensive family therapies.

Endnotes

- ¹ Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2005). *Crime in the United States, 2005*. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_69.html
- ² California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (2007). *Summary fact sheet*. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from <http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/summaries.html>
The cost to house a ward at the Division of Juvenile Justice in 2006-2007 was \$175,616.
- ³ Snyder, H. & Sickmund, M. (2006). *Juvenile offenders and victims: 2006 national report*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
- ⁴ California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice. (2005, November 30). *Reforming California's juvenile corrections system, Farrell v. Hickman, safety & welfare remedial plan*. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/DivisionsBoards/DJJ/about/dec1report/4_safety_welfare.pdf
- ⁵ Kennedy, D.M. (1999, May 23). "A look at reacting to violence, but Boston proves something can be done" [Letter to the editor]. *The Washington Post*, p. B3. ("Even in dangerous neighborhoods, only a tiny minority, fewer than one percent of the juveniles and young adults were caught up in the violence. ... They were involved in drug dealing street groups and enmeshed in shooting disputes with other chronic offenders. Most of the violence was not about the drug business, but about respect, boy/girl matters and standing vendettas, the origins of which were unclear even to the participants.")
- ⁶ Hill, E.G. (2007). *California's criminal justice system: A primer*. Sacramento, CA: Legislative Analyst's Office. In 2005, there were 222,512 juvenile arrests. Approximately 20,000 of those arrests resulted in placement post-trial in secure custody, such as state custody in the Division of Juvenile Justice (formerly known as the California Youth Authority) or county "camps" and "ranches." Technically, youth charged with a crime have a delinquency hearing on the facts, not a trial, but the more commonly understood term, trial, is used in this report.
- ⁷ Hennigan, K., Kolnick, K., Poplawski, J., Andrews, A., Ball, N., Cheng, C. & Payne, J. (2007). *Juvenile Justice Data Project phase 1: Survey of interventions and programs: A continuum of graduated responses for juvenile justice in California*. Los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California, Center for Research on Crime. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from <http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/docs/JJDPSurveyFinalReport.pdf>
Of 108,332 juvenile offenders under county or state supervision, only 13,071 are in custody in county detention facilities, county camps and ranches, the state Division of Juvenile Justice, or the adult prison system.
- ⁸ Hennigan, K., Kolnick, K., Poplawski, J., Andrews, A., Ball, N., Cheng, C. & Payne, J. (2007). *Juvenile Justice Data Project phase 1: Survey of interventions and programs: A continuum of graduated responses for juvenile justice in California*. Los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California, Center for Research on Crime. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from <http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/docs/JJDPSurveyFinalReport.pdf>
- ⁹ Ross, R.R., Fabiano, E.A. & Ewles, C.D. (1988). "Reasoning and rehabilitation." *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology*, 32:29-35. As cited in Lipsey, M.W. & Landenberger, N.A. (2006). "Cognitive-Behavioral Interventions." In Welsh, B.C. & Farrington, D.P. (Eds.). *Preventing crime: What works for children, offenders, victims, and places*. Springer, Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
- ¹⁰ Alexander, J., Pugh, C., Parsons, B. & Sexton, T. (2000). "Functional Family Therapy." In D.S. Elliot (Series Ed.). *Blueprints for Violence Prevention: Book Three*. Boulder, CO: Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence. The website for Functional Family Therapy is: <http://www.fftinc.com/>
- ¹¹ Alexander, J., Pugh, C., Parsons, B. & Sexton, T. (2000). "Functional Family Therapy." In D.S. Elliot (Series Ed.). *Blueprints for Violence Prevention: Book Three*. Boulder, CO: Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence.
- ¹² Sutter County Probation Department. (2006). *2006 progress report for Functional Family Therapy program*. 66 percent were arrested within the six months prior to entering the program, versus 18 percent arrested within six months after entering the program.
- ¹³ Schaeffer, C.M. & Borduin, C.M. (2005). "Long-term follow-up to a randomized clinical trial of Multisystemic Therapy with serious and violent juvenile offenders." *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, 73(3), 445-453. The website for MST is: <http://www.mst-services.com/>
- ¹⁴ Schaeffer, C.M. & Borduin, C.M. (2005). "Long-term follow-up to a randomized clinical trial of Multisystemic Therapy with serious and violent juvenile offenders." *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, 73(3), 445-453.
- ¹⁵ Los Angeles County Probation Department. (2006). *LA JJCPA program description, Multisystemic Therapy program (MST)*. Within six months of entering the program, 17.46 percent of MST participants were arrested, compared to 25 percent of similar youth.
- ¹⁶ Hennigan, K., Kolnick, K., Poplawski, J., Andrews, A., Ball, N., Cheng, C. & Payne, J. (2007). *Juvenile Justice Data Project phase 1: Survey of interventions and programs: A continuum of graduated responses for juvenile justice in California*. Los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California, Center for Research on Crime. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from <http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/docs/JJDPSurveyFinalReport.pdf>; Hennigan, K., Kolnick, K., Poplawski, J., Andrews, A., Ball, N., Cheng, C. & Payne, J. (2007). *Juvenile Justice Data Project phase 1: Survey of interventions and programs: A continuum of graduated responses for juvenile justice in California*. County by county appendix. Los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California, Center for Research on Crime. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from <http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/docs/JJDPSurveyFinalReportCountybyCountyAppendix.pdf>
There are minor differences in data between the state cumulative data in the full report and the sum total of data in the county appendix. According to a one-day count, the number of juvenile offenders in group homes or foster care homes is either 3,896 (sum of county data) or 3,977 (state cumulative data), and state cumulative data show that 6,381 juvenile offenders are in county camps or ranches (3,991) or state custody (2,390).
- ¹⁷ Chamberlain, P. & Mihalic, S.F. (1998). "Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care." In D.S. Elliot (Series Ed.). *Blueprints for Violence Prevention: Book Eight*. Boulder, CO: Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence.
- ¹⁸ Chamberlain, P. & Mihalic, S.F. (1998). "Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care." In D.S. Elliot (Series Ed.). *Blueprints for Violence Prevention: Book Eight*. Boulder, CO: Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence.
- ¹⁹ Dennis, M. (2005, November). *State of the art of treating adolescent substance use disorders: course, treatment system, and evidence based practices*. Presentation given at the 2005 State Adolescent Coordinators (SAC) Grantee Orientation Meeting, November 28-30, 2005, Baltimore, MD; Lipsey, M.W. (1997). "What can you build with thousands of bricks? Musings on the cumulation of knowledge in program evaluation." *New Directions for Evaluation*, 76, 7-23.
- ²⁰ Lowenkamp, C.T. & Latessa, E.J. (2005, August). *Evaluation of Ohio's RECLAIM funded programs, community corrections facilities, and DYS facilities*. University of Cincinnati, Center for Criminal Justice Research. Retrieved on April 26, 2007 from <http://www.dys.state.oh.us/dysweb/Reclaim/DYSRECLAIMreportAugust17.pdf>
- ²¹ Lowenkamp, C. & Latessa, E. (2005, August). *Evaluation of Ohio's*

RECLAIM funded programs, community correctional facilities, and DYS facilities: Executive summary. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from http://www.uc.edu/criminaljustice/ProjectReports/Final_RECLAIM_Executive_Summary_2005.pdf

Though this research found that the very highest-risk offenders should probably be placed in custody instead of in community-based interventions, there are successful interventions not covered in this report that can be used with those youth while they are in custody, as well as intensive family therapies that may be appropriate once they are released from custody.

²² Sheldon, R.G. (1999). *OJJDP Juvenile Justice Bulletin*. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from http://www.cjcj.org/pdf/ojjdp_ddap.pdf The study compared 271 juvenile offenders receiving its programs to 271 similar juvenile offenders not in the program. The overall recidivism rate of the DDAP group was 34 percent, compared with 60 percent for the similar group. Controlling for any observable differences between the two groups did not remove the large differences in re-arrests between the two groups.

²³ Hennigan, K., Kolnick, K., Poplawski, J., Andrews, A., Ball, N., Cheng, C. & Payne, J. (2007). *Juvenile Justice Data Project phase 1: Survey of interventions and programs: A continuum of graduated responses for juvenile justice in California*. Los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California, Center for Research on Crime. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from <http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/docs/JJDPsurveyFinalReport.pdf> Currently, one-third of California counties are using validated risk assessments.

²⁴ California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Corrections Standards Authority. (2007). *Attachment C: Juvenile MIOCR projects training "Roadmap"*. Many of these programs are not yet operational and are not yet officially recognized by the national organizations that developed the models (which would help ensure the fidelity to the program models that is crucial for ensuring positive outcomes).

²⁵ California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Corrections Standards Authority. (2006). *Partnering to promote public safety: Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act: Annual report to the Legislature*. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/DivisionsBoards/CSA/cpa_2000_page.htm

²⁶ California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (2007). *Program descriptions and allocated funds*. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from http://www.bdcrr.ca.gov/cpa2000/program_description.asp Los Angeles County uses JJCPA funding for MST, and Sutter County uses it for FFT. Sonoma County uses JJCPA funding for an FFT-based model, but it is not officially recognized as an FFT provider.

²⁷ California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (2007). *Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA)*. Retrieved April 23, 2007 from http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/DivisionsBoards/CSA/cpa_2000_page.htm; California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (2007). *Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act-Archives*. Retrieved April 23, 2007 from http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/DivisionsBoards/CSA/cpa_2000_archives.htm There have been four reports on JJCPA programs in which the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and its predecessor Board of Corrections have provided statewide outcomes. In the three preceding reports, the percentage that juveniles not in JJCPA programs were more likely to get arrested than participants varied from 28 percent (2003-2004) to 49 percent (2002-2003).

²⁸ California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Corrections Standards Authority. (2006). *Partnering to promote public safety: Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act: Annual report to the Legislature*. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/DivisionsBoards/CSA/cpa_2000_page.htm. This cumulative state data is for programs operating in 2004-2005. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation is expected to release its annual state cumulative JJCPA data for 2005-2006 later in 2007.

²⁹ California Department of Finance. (2007). *Governor's budget summary 2007-08*. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from <http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary.pdf>; California Department of Finance. (2007). *Corrections and rehabilitation*. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from <http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/GovernorsBudget/5210.pdf>

³⁰ Technically, the equivalent to a conviction in juvenile proceedings is for a court to adjudicate a juvenile as delinquent and declare the juvenile to be a ward of the court.

³¹ State of California Board of Corrections. (2002). *Repeat Offender Prevention Program: Final report*. Sacramento, CA; Personal communication with Shirley Hunt. (2007, April 2). Shirley Hunt is Manager of the Research Department with the Orange County Probation Department. Overall, 27 percent of the control group had felony arrests, compared to 21 percent of ROPP youth. In San Diego County, 40 percent of control group youth had felony arrests, versus 23 percent of ROPP youth; in Fresno County, 45 percent of control group youth had felony arrests, compared to 24 percent of ROPP youth; and in Orange County, 24 percent of control group youth had felony arrests, compared to 17 percent of ROPP youth. The outcomes of the ROPP study were not all positive, although some lesser outcomes may reflect the fact some ROPP programs were not yet implemented well, and/or that ROPP program youth were under more intensive supervision than control youth and thus more likely to be caught engaging in negative behavior.

³² Renaissance Resources West Management Consulting & Noyes Research and Consulting. (2007). *Monterey County Probation Department JJCPA evaluation report, FY 2005-2006*. 27 percent of ROPP youth were arrested for a new crime with one year of entering the program, compared to 66 percent of similar youth not in the program. Arrests for new crimes exclude arrests for violating probation.

³³ Ventura County Probation Department. (2006). *2006 progress report for HOPE*. HOPE is the name of Ventura County's ROPP. 47 percent of program participants were incarcerated within six months of entering the program, compared to 68 percent of similar youth.

³⁴ Kern County Probation Department. (2006). *2006 progress report for Repeat Offender Prevention Program*. 22.5 percent were arrested during the first six months after program entry, versus 15.1 percent in the second six months after program entry.

³⁵ Ventura County Probation Department. (2006). *2006 progress report for expansion of Early Intervention program*. 42 percent of similar youth were arrested and 17 percent were incarcerated, versus 19 percent and 2 percent of participating youth, within six months of entering the program.

³⁶ Shasta County Probation Department. (2006). *2006 progress report for Juvenile Assessment Center*. 12 percent of participating youth were arrested within one year after program exit, compared to 24 percent of similar youth.

³⁷ Sacramento County Probation Department. (2006). *JJCPA FY2005-06 program highlights: Day Reporting Center*. 6 percent of participating youth were arrested for a felony within six months of entering the program, compared to 24 percent of similar youth. Sacramento County's program serves youth on probation.

³⁸ Renaissance Resources West Management Consulting & Noyes Research and Consulting. (2007). *Monterey County Probation Department JJCPA evaluation report, FY 2005-2006*. 30 percent of participants were arrested for new law violation within one year of entering the program, versus 64 percent of similar youth.

³⁹ Ventura County Probation Department. (2006). *2006 progress report for Aftercare/Day Reporting Centers program*. 37 percent of participants were incarcerated within six months of entering the program, versus 82 percent of similar youth.

⁴⁰ Santa Barbara County Probation Department. (2006). *2006 progress report for Aftercare Services Program*. The average number of arrests for participants was 0.56 arrests within one year of entering the program, compared to 1.23 for similar youth.

⁴¹ Orange County Probation Department. (2006). *Orange County JJCPA progress report: Sobriety Through Education Prevention (STEP)*

Girls Program, JJCPA outcome results, FY2005-06. There was a 29 percent arrest rate for participating girls, versus 50 percent for similar girls, within six months following program exit.

⁴² Wilson, D.B., Mitchell, O. & MacKenzie, D.L. (2006). *A systematic review of drug court effects on recidivism* (in press).

⁴³ Orange County Probation Department. (2007). *Juvenile drug court*; Renaissance Resources West Management Consulting & Noyes Research and Consulting. (2007). *Monterey County Probation Department JJCPA evaluation report, FY 2005-2006*. The Orange County data is cumulative for five years of participants, from 2001 through 2006. 40 percent of participants were incarcerated within one year following program entry, versus 68 percent of similar youth. For Monterey County, 21 percent of participants were arrested for new law violations (not including arrests for probation violations), versus 78 percent of similar youth.

⁴⁴ Sonoma County Probation Department. (2006). *2006 progress report for Gang Risk Intervention and Suppression Program*. 30 percent of participating youth were arrested within seven months of entering the program, compared to 64 percent of similar youth.

⁴⁵ Hawkins, D., Herrenkohl, T., Farrington, D.P., Brewer, D., Catalano, R.F. & Harachi, T.W. "A review of predictors of youth violence." In Loeber, R. & Farrington, D.P. (1998). *Serious & Violent Juvenile Offenders: Risk Factors and Successful Interventions*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

⁴⁶ San Diego Association of Governments. (2006). *San Diego County Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act Evaluation Report*. 5.3 percent of participating youth were arrested within four months of entering the program, versus 18 percent of similar youth.

⁴⁷ Hennigan, K., Kolnick, K., Poplawski, J., Andrews, A., Ball, N., Cheng, C. & Payne, J. (2007). *Juvenile Justice Data Project phase 1: Survey of interventions and programs: A continuum of graduated responses for juvenile justice in California*. County by county appendix. Los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California, Center for Research on Crime. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from <http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/docs/JJDPsurveyFinalReportCountybyCountyAppendix.pdf>

According to a one-day count, there are a total of 21,067 juvenile offenders in either intensive supervision (9,861), a group home or foster home (3,896), or aftercare (7,310). This estimate is conservative because eight of California's 58 counties did not provide the relevant data.

⁴⁸ The total estimates of number of offenders served by FFT, MST and MTFC do not include at-risk youth not on probation who also are served by many of these programs.

These figures may overestimate the number of offenders being served because they include the number of juvenile offenders that new MIOCR grants expect to serve in 2007 using these models, although many of these programs are not yet operational and are not yet officially recognized by the national organizations that developed the models (which would help ensure the fidelity to the program models that is crucial for ensuring positive outcomes). For a breakdown of the number of offenders served in intensive family therapies by county, and a designation of which counties are using or planning to use MIOCR funding for FFT, MST or MTFC, see Appendix A.

⁴⁹ Hennigan, K., Kolnick, K., Poplawski, J., Andrews, A., Ball, N., Cheng, C. & Payne, J. (2007). *Juvenile Justice Data Project phase 1: Survey of interventions and programs: A continuum of graduated responses for juvenile justice in California*. Los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California, Center for Research on Crime. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from <http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/docs/JJDPsurveyFinalReport.pdf>

According to a one-day count, there are 10,366 juvenile offenders either in detention (6,375) or in custody at a county camp or ranch (3,991).

⁵⁰ Lowenkamp, C. & Latessa, E. (2005). *Evaluation of Ohio's RECLAIM funded programs, community correctional facilities, and DYS facilities: Executive summary*. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from http://www.uc.edu/criminaljustice/ProjectReports/Final_RECLAIM_Exec

[cutive_Summary_2005.pdf](#)

Based on the experience of RECLAIM Ohio, while secure facilities are more effective for the highest-risk offenders, community-based interventions may be more effective for large numbers of locked-up juvenile offenders who are lower-risk.

⁵¹ Personal communication with Marlon Yarber. (2006, December 13). Marlon Yarber is Deputy Director of the Corrections Planning and Program Division with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

⁵² FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS *California* reviewed all of the rejected MIOCR applications at the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation on February 14, 2007. Of 14 applications rejected, six proposed using intensive family therapies: Butte, Kern, Stanislaus and Trinity Counties proposed using Functional Family Therapy, and San Francisco and Santa Barbara Counties proposed using Multisystemic Therapy.

⁵³ Personal communication with Brenda Abrams. (2006, December 12). Brenda Abrams was Program and Policy Associate with the San Francisco Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice.

⁵⁴ California Department of Industrial Relations. (2007). *California Consumer Price Index (1955-2007)*. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from <http://www.dir.ca.gov/DLSR/CPI/EntireCCPI.PDF>. The estimated cost-of-living increase since 2000-2001 was calculated based on the Consumer Price Index for California. Between 2000 and 2006, the cost of living increase was 20 percent.

⁵⁵ For data on funding for adult and youth Corrections spending: Personal communication with Edgar Cabral. (2007, April 5). Edgar Cabral is a Fiscal and Policy Analyst with the Legislative Analyst's Office. For data on K-12 spending: Hill, E.G. (2007). *The 2007-2008 Budget: Perspectives and Issues*. Sacramento, CA: Legislative Analyst's Office (estimated 2006-2007 general fund spending); Hill, E.G. (2002). *The 2002-2003 Budget: Perspectives and Issues*. Sacramento, CA: Legislative Analyst's Office (actual 2000-2001 general fund spending).

⁵⁶ California Board of Corrections. (2003). *Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act: Annual report to the Legislature*. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/DivisionsBoards/CSA/cpa_2000_archives.htm; California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Corrections Standards Authority. (2006). *Partnering to promote public safety: Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act: Annual report to the Legislature*. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/DivisionsBoards/CSA/cpa_2000_page.htm In 2001-2002, there were 185 programs, and in 2004-2005, there were 168 programs.

⁵⁷ Personal communication with Nicole Woodman. (2007, January 24). Nicole Woodman is Juvenile Justice Programs Coordinator with the Sacramento County Probation Department. Of seven programs cut from JJCPA funding, some were shifted to different funding streams and may have been scaled back, and some were eliminated entirely. JJCPA funding was restored for two of the programs in 2006-2007.

⁵⁸ Personal communication with Vincent Iaria and Kim Broderick. (2006, October 23). Vincent Iaria is Chief Probation Officer and Kim Broderick is Probation Director with the San Diego County Probation Department; State of California Board of Corrections. (2002). *Repeat Offender Prevention Program: Final report*. Juvenile offenders left out of ROPP in San Diego County were almost twice as likely to be arrested for a felony.

⁵⁹ Personal communication with Colleene Preciado. (2006, November 6). Colleene Preciado is Chief Probation Officer with the Orange County Probation Department; Personal communication with Shirley Hunt. (2007, April 2). Shirley Hunt is Manager of the Research Department with the Orange County Probation Department (juveniles left out of ROPP in Orange County were 41 percent more likely to be arrested for a felony, in 2002 study).

⁶⁰ Orange County Probation Department. (2005). *Youth and Family Resource Center*.

⁶¹ Personal communication with Larry King. (2006, November 9).

Larry King is Assistant Deputy Chief Probation Officer with the San Joaquin County Probation Department; San Joaquin County Data Cooperative. (2007). *2005/2006 annual juvenile probation report for Crossroads*. Up to 1,100 kids were served in the past, down to 429 in 2005-2006.

⁶² Personal communication with Kim Barrett and Jim Salio. (2006, November 29). Kim Barrett is Chief Probation Officer and Jim Salio is Division Manager of Juvenile Probation Services with the San Luis Obispo Probation Department.

⁶³ Personal communications from September, 2006 through February, 2007 with: Linda Penner, Chief Probation Officer and Phil Kader, Director of Juvenile Probation Services, Fresno County Probation Department. Other counties that specifically mentioned the need to expand programs countywide include: Alameda County (after-school activities): Sheila Foster, Assistant Chief Probation Officer, Deb Swanson, Deputy Chief Probation Officer, Neola Jones, Management Analyst, Alameda County Probation Department; Contra Costa County (School Probation Officers): Todd Billeci, Probation Manager, Contra Costa County Probation Department; Los Angeles County (School Probation Officers): Felicia Cotton, Chief of the Juvenile Special Services Bureau, Los Angeles County Probation Department; Orange County (Drug Court): Colleene Preciado, Chief Probation Officer, Orange County Probation Department; Sacramento County (Day Reporting Center): Mike Sarment, Supervising Deputy Probation Officer, Sacramento County Probation Department; Solano County (Day Reporting Center and Drug Court): Isabelle Voit, Chief Probation Officer, Bruce Lillis, Program Services Manager, Donna Robinson, Program Services Manager, Solano County Probation Department; Tulare County (Neighborhood Accountability Board): Janet Honadle, Chief Probation Officer, David Parbst, Probation Division Manager, Louie Thomas, Supervising Probation Officer, Tulare County Probation Department; Ventura County (Early Intervention Program): Patricia Olivares, Division Manager of Juvenile Probation Services, Mary Mall, Supervising Deputy Probation Officer of West County Youth Services, Ventura County Probation Department.

⁶⁴ Personal communication with Nicole Woodman. (2007, January 24). Nicole Woodman is Juvenile Justice Programs Coordinator with the Sacramento County Probation Department.

⁶⁵ Personal communication with Vincent Iaria and Kim Broderick. (2006, October 23). Vincent Iaria is Chief Probation Officer and Kim Broderick is Probation Director with the San Diego County Probation Department.

⁶⁶ Personal communication with Isabelle Voit, Bruce Lillis and Donna Robinson. (2006, December 1). Isabelle Voit is Chief Probation Officer, Bruce Lillis is Program Services Manager, and Donna Robinson is the current Program Services Manager with the Solano County Probation Department.

⁶⁷ Personal communication with Cosette Reiner. (2006, November 27). Cosette Reiner is Supervising Deputy Probation Officer with the Ventura County Probation Department.

⁶⁸ Personal communication with Colleene Preciado. (2006, November 6). Colleene Preciado is Chief Probation Officer with the Orange County Probation Department.

⁶⁹ Personal communication with Isabelle Voit, Bruce Lillis and Donna Robinson. (2006, December 1). Isabelle Voit is Chief Probation Officer, Bruce Lillis was Program Services Manager, and Donna Robinson is the current Program Services Manager with the Solano County Probation Department.

⁷⁰ Gang prevention/intervention:

* Monterey County needs more funding for gang prevention/intervention programs. Personal communication with Manuel Real and Joe Grammatico. (2007, January 26). Manuel Real is Chief Probation Officer and Joe Grammatico is Manager of Probation Services with the Monterey County Probation Department.

* Sonoma County would like to expand their gang prevention/intervention services, with greater separation of more-involved/less-involved youth, in order to focus on their specific needs. Personal communication with Leo Tacata. (2007, January 31). Leo Tacata is

Department Analyst with the Sonoma County Probation Department.

* Like other counties, Sutter County is seeing a rise in gang activity, and would like to address the increase in violent gang activity. They would also like to provide a program to specifically address the needs of Latino youth. Personal communication with Christine Odom. (2007, January 4). Christine Odom is Chief Probation Officer with the Sutter County Probation Department.

* Ventura County would develop gang-specific programming for their Aftercare Day Reporting Center program and their Repeat Offender Prevention Program (ROPP). Personal communication with Cosette Reiner. (2006, November 27). Cosette Reiner is Supervising Deputy Probation Officer with the Ventura County Probation Department.

* With additional funding, Yolo County would expand their programs to deal with specific gang issues. Personal communication with Don Meyer and Shaunda Cruz. (2007, January 30). Don Meyer is Chief Probation Officer and Shaunda Cruz is Supervising Probation Officer/Program Coordinator with the Yolo County Probation Department.

Gender-specific services for girls:

* Alameda County would like to expand their gender-specific program in order to serve girls throughout the entire county. Personal communication with Sheila Foster, Deb Swanson and Neola Jones. (2006, September 6). Sheila Foster is Assistant Chief Probation Officer, Deb Swanson is Deputy Chief Probation Officer, and Neola Jones is Management Analyst with the Alameda County Probation Department.

* Solano County would like to expand their Girls Intensive Program to serve girls countywide. Personal communication with Isabelle Voit, Bruce Lillis and Donna Robinson. (2006, December 1). Isabelle Voit is Chief Probation Officer, Bruce Lillis was Program Services Manager, and Donna Robinson is the current Program Services Manager with the Solano County Probation Department.

* Ventura would add a girls component to the Aftercare Day Reporting Center program. Personal communication with Cosette Reiner. (2006, November 27). Cosette Reiner is Supervising Deputy Probation Officer with the Ventura County Probation Department.

* Orange County would like to significantly expand its aftercare program. Personal communication with Colleene Preciado. (2006, November 6). Colleene Preciado is Chief Probation Officer with the Orange County Probation Department.

* Santa Clara County would like to increase the availability of after-care services, specifically for youth leaving juvenile hall. Personal communication with James Hill. (2007, February 5). James Hill is Supervising Group Counselor at the Multi-Agency Assessment Center with the Santa Clara County Probation Department.

* Sutter County would like to use an aftercare model to address the needs of heavy substance abusers. Personal communication with Christine Odom. (2007, January 4). Christine Odom is Chief Probation Officer with the Sutter County Probation Department.

⁷¹ California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (2007). *Summary fact sheet*. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from www.cdcr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/summaries.html

The cost to house a ward at the Division of Juvenile Justice in 2006-2007 was \$175,616.

⁷² California State University Budget Office. (2006). *CSU fee history*. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from http://www.calstate.edu/budget/FeeEnrll_Info/FeeInfo/Fee_History_Info/Fee_History_90-07.pdf

⁷³ Aos, S., Miller, M. & Drake, E. (2006). *Evidence-based public policy options to reduce future prison construction, criminal justice costs, and crime rates*. Olympia, WA: Washington State Institute for Public Policy. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from <http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/>. The cost of these interventions may be higher in California.

⁷⁴ Cohen, M.A. (1998). The monetary value of saving a high-risk youth. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 14(1), 5-33.

⁷⁵ Aos, S., Miller, M. & Drake, E. (2006). *Evidence-based public*

policy options to reduce future prison construction, criminal justice costs, and crime rates. Olympia, WA: Washington State Institute for Public Policy. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from <http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/>. FFT cost savings are specifically for participating youth on probation.

⁷⁶ Aos, S., Miller, M. & Drake, E. (2006). *Evidence-based public policy options to reduce future prison construction, criminal justice costs, and crime rates.* Olympia, WA: Washington State Institute for Public Policy. Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from <http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/>

⁷⁷ The costs for MTFC are marginal above what would already be spent. Because all juveniles eligible for the MTFC program were to be placed out-of-home, the cost of MTFC reported here is only the additional cost beyond what it would cost to place the juvenile offenders in a group home.

⁷⁸ The estimated net savings (minus approximately \$81 million in costs) would be approximately \$708 million. The projected cost and savings are based on the assumption that all of the 3,896 juvenile justice youth in group or foster homes could receive MTFC, and the 17,171 youth under intensive supervision and in aftercare/released from county custody would be assigned to FFT and MST in roughly equal numbers. The estimates do not include any savings related to offenders already being served by these programs. In practice, it is unlikely all would be diverted to these programs, but we believe most could be, and, with proper screening, additional offenders in other forms of custody might also qualify for these programs. Also, the breakdown between FFT and MST would depend on which intervention local officials believe is more appropriate on an offender-by-offender basis, and whether the county has greater capacity to deliver one or the other. In addition, MTFC, which has the greatest net cost savings, could potentially be used as an alternative for some of the youth who we assume in this estimate would receive FFT or MST, particularly for youth in aftercare. The total cost to the state initially would actually be less than \$81 million due to available federal contributions for MediCal-eligible youth. In subsequent years, the cost should be even less given that, if these programs were more widely available, more juvenile offenders would participate in them earlier in the process than aftercare, resulting in fewer aftercare youth needing these programs.

⁷⁹ Lowenkamp, C.T. & Latessa, E.J. (2005). *Evaluation of Ohio's RECLAIM funded programs, community correctional facilities, and DYS facilities: Cost-benefit analysis supplemental report.* Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from www.dys.state.oh.us/dysweb/Reclaim/DYSCostBenefit121205.pdf This evaluation was prepared as part of an Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention grant from the United States Department of Justice.

⁸⁰ Department of Finance. (2007). *Corrections and rehabilitation.* Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from <http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/GovernorsBudget/5210.pdf>

⁸¹ Annie E. Casey Foundation. (2006). *Juvenile Detention Alternative Initiative.* Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from <http://linux1900.dn.net/initiatives/jdai/sites.htm>

⁸² Rhoads, J.P. (nd). *Juvenile detention reform in Santa Cruz County.* Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from http://www.cjcj.org/pjdc/detention_reform.pdf; Personal communication with Fernando Giraldo. (2007, April 13). Fernando Giraldo is Assistant Probation Division Director with the Santa Cruz County Probation Department (average length of stay in Juvenile Hall was 8.6 days).

⁸³ State of California, Office of the Attorney General. (2007). *Statistics by city and county.* Retrieved on April 23, 2007 from <http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/datatabs.php>. Felony arrests statewide were down 26 percent.

⁸⁴ Santa Cruz County Probation Department. (2006). *Santa Cruz JJCPA Evening Center program, program description FY 2005-06.*





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