People & Politics
in America's Big Cities

A critical conversation about the implications of the profound demographic transformation now under way in our city

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Preface

"AS THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE CITY CHANGE, by the time he is ready to run (for mayor), he figures he will need only one percent of the white vote, adding 'So I don't need to worry too much about getting white folk to vote for me.'" So said the final paragraph of a July 2002 *New York Times* profile on Charles Barron, New York City Council member and former Black Panther.

Sea changes in the extent and nature of demographic patterns in New York and other large American cities pose provocative and complex questions. In a diverse metropolis, the benefits or drawbacks of group political hegemony may well be in the eye of the beholder.

Spanning over four centuries of history, political contest, and economic dominance, New York City, the nation's largest urban center, rightly enjoys the rich reputation of being America's pre-eminent port city. From the days of its first European settlement, when the vernacular was Dutch, to the ever-busy arrivals gate at JFK International Airport with its polyglot chatter, New York is nothing if not the theater for the continuing saga of ethnic and racial arrival and striving, contest and succession.

Nearly as populous and venerable, Los Angeles (its full name: La Ciudad de Nuestra Senora, Reina de los Angeles) has come, at least linguistically, full circle. It is, and has been, a port for old New Yorkers, Asians, and land-traveling Mexicans, as well as airborne Latinos from Central and South America.

John Logan, of the Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research, and **John Mollenkopf**, of the Center for Urban Research of City University's Graduate Center, examine the people and politics in our largest two cities. New York and Los Angeles couldn't be farther apart geographically or in "temperament"; so at first blush, a comparison might seem counterintuitive.

But New York and Los Angeles, as laboratories, share social and economic characteristics. Above all, they are similar with respect to demographics and the political crossroads they now tread. They also are in the vanguard of America's other large cities, which, with varying degrees of success, are mediating profound demographic, political, and economic change.

Recent (2001) municipal elections in these two biggest American cities—as well as in Houston, Texas, for example—were raucous and hard fought. But ultimately they were divided along racial, ethnic, and class lines, the very lines defined by emerging communities competing for the right to access and participation in the political and economic marketplaces.

> **"History teaches us that we are all better off when the political and economic leaders of the metropolis acknowledge problems emerging within our democracy and actively engage in steps to resolve them."**

The authors refer not only to the past of too many central cities that were engulfed in the self-destructive flames and rioting of the frustrated late 1960s, but forward, to the challenges of the gaps in representation in cities undergoing significant demographic change.

The histories of these cities—contest and competition, peaceful and not-so-peaceful—fill volumes. When times and demographic shifts were perhaps less complicated and monochromatic (but no less contentious), political accommodation was fairly straightforward. Political leaders absorbed and assimilated newcomers to be part of well-oiled urban

political organizations. These newcomers worked their way up in New York, Chicago, Detroit, Newark, and Los Angeles. They became indispensable vote-getting and favor-dispensing machines. And when their group numbers (and electoral potential) warranted, they became candidates for office themselves. Once upon a time, "balanced tickets" were all the rage. There also was a strong correlation between political and economic ascendancy. Let's call this "macropolitics."

But as new and more racially and geographically diverse immigrant populations arrived, the very nature of urban politics was transformed. Larger and more easily identifiable racial and ethnic groups have become more fragmented. Inter- and intra-group contests are becoming commonplace. The political rules of the game have shifted as well. Today, political success is not as simple as constructing "balanced tickets," as the mechanics of political and governmental representation have changed, too. Thus, the process of building the older and more predictable multi-ethnic coalitions in order to achieve "due considera-tion of minority interests within the political process" is challengingly complex. Call this "micropolitics."

The consequences of ignoring these contemporary urban political and population challenges will pose serious problems for "enhanc(ing) the functioning of our democratic system, (and) the ability of our cities to develop solutions to their problems that are broadly embraced by their entire populations."

In these moments of change and challenge, New York and Los Angeles can draw heavily on the experiences of other large and diverse American cities. Will Los Angeles follow the inclusive social and economic model of Atlanta? Will New York eventually emulate the contentious and ultimately self-defeating model of Detroit in the 1970s?

This is a challenge not only for politicians, social scientists, and government, but for the business community, as well. If there is any overarching lesson from the history of cities, it is that economic movement sooner or later follows on the heels of political movement.

Fernando Ferrer
President, Drum Major Institute for Public Policy

Executive Summary

People & Politics in America's Big Cities:
The Challenges to Urban Democracy

THE STUDY

Urban democracy is at the crossroads. The profound demographic changes under way in America's largest cities have resulted in a growing "representation gap" between elected officials and those they represent.

The political and economic costs are too great to ignore. Cities that did not recognize and ameliorate the widening gap created by demographic change in the 1960s and 1970s paid a heavy price. The urban riots of the 1960s and the subsequent racial polarization, white flight, and economic disinvestment took a heavy toll on cities like Detroit and Newark. Cities that collaborated to bridge this political gulf fared far better.

"People and Politics in America's Big Cities" is a critical investigation into the impact of the profound demographic transformation under way in New York and Los Angeles. Written by two leading experts on urban politics—John Logan and John Mollenkopf— the paper traces black-to-white succession in big cities and its political consequences. It shows how immigration has altered that pattern, producing new racial and ethnic con- tours in metropolitan America, and particularly in New York and Los Angeles. Analyzing the 2001 mayoral and city council elections, it explores the growing gaps in representation between the populations and elected officials of these cities and asks what might be done to address them.

THE IMPACT OF CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS ON POLITICS

- **From black vs. white to native vs. immigrant:** Racial diversity used to be understood in terms of black and white. Now, Latinos and Asians are increasingly prominent, and immigration has diversified all racial and ethnic categories. The emergence of new immigrant minority groups modifies the competition for urban power from one that pits native minorities against whites to one that pits new immigrants not only against whites, but also against native minorities.

- **New York and Los Angeles—Laboratories of this transformation:** New York and Los Angeles are laboratories of the great change under way in our nation's largest cities. Together, they are home to two-fifths of the immigrants in America. These immigrants, and their children, have joined African Americans and earlier white immigrants in forging a new kind of urban society.

- **Diversity citywide, segregation in the neighborhoods:** Segregation levels between whites and all three minority groups in New York and Los Angeles are significantly above the national average, especially in New York. New York has markedly higher

black-Latino, black-Asian, and Latino-Asian segregation than the national average. This degree of separation may hinder communication and cooperation between and among different groups, creating a foundation for balkanized politics at the neighborhood and city level. It also may serve as a launching pad for multi-ethnic coalitions, created out of necessity.

- **Transforming the cleavages of urban politics:** New immigrant populations have blurred and transformed, without erasing, the older racial cleavages that character- ize urban politics. Their presence has complicated the process of constructing multi-ethnic coalitions seeking minority empowerment. They also have introduced challenges for white incumbents, who must seek new ways to construct a political majority.

- **The future of white political power is in coalition or fragmentation:** The ability of white political leaders to sustain their electoral majorities in the face of continuing decreases in the white population will depend on their ability either to keep all non-white groups fragmented and divided or to forge cross-racial or cross-ethnic coalitions of their own.

- **Mayoral elections reveal strain in multi-racial coalitions:** The changing com- position of the populations and electorates of New York and Los Angeles created difficulties for the coalition among blacks, Latinos, and liberal whites that previ- ously had elected black mayors in the two cities. The steady increase of minority populations and the decline of white populations coincides with an increased tendency among white Democrats in New York to eschew Democratic nominees supported by minority voters in favor of a white alternative, even one nominated by Republicans. Similarly, in Los Angeles, white voters have supported white mayoral candidates against opponents with a greater minority base. In the 2001 primary elections, white voters in both cities did not support the first Latino candidate perceived to have a good chance of winning the mayoralty, exposing a potential white-Latino divide. Coalitions between blacks and Latinos cannot be taken for granted, especially if African Americans fear that their declining numbers and a rapidly growing Latino population might put their political power at risk.

THE TWENTY-YEAR REPRESENTATION LAG

- Whites hold political office in both cities at far higher rates than their population share and blacks hold offices at about parity with their population or a little more, but Latinos and Asians hold much less representation than their population share. Indeed, their current level of representation matches their much smaller population share twenty years ago.

- Reasons for the gap:

  Demographic: New immigrants have lower rates of citizenship and a smaller percentage of them are of voting age. They are less likely to register and vote, and therefore are less appealed to by candidates and parties, only perpetuating their lack of desirability as potential voters. New immigrants are less likely to affiliate with a party; they have fewer resources and therefore are less likely to have what it takes to run credible campaigns as candidates, especially in Los Angeles, with its non-partisan elections and larger districts.

  Political: Political parties and native minority voters tend not to support candidates from new immigrant groups so as not to undermine the arrangements that brought them to power; black, Latino, and Asian voters tend not to support each other's candidates automatically; white politicians may have more organizational experience and political resources than other groups to put together electoral majority coalitions.

  Racial: Persistence of racial polarization in neighborhood composition and urban politics.

- How do we overcome it?
  Reform the electoral system to promote new immigrant political representation; allow non-citizen voting in municipal elections and instant runoff voting in multi-candidate primaries; make greater efforts to inform and involve citizens who speak languages other than English; encourage political parties, unions, and community organizations to make conscious attempts to develop leadership in new communities.

CONCLUSION

It surely will be difficult to negotiate this new stage of urban politics, but doing so not only will enhance the functioning of our democratic system, it will enable cities to develop broadly embraced solutions to their most pressing problems. This is a key to cities' future prosperity, just as racial discord was often poisonous in the past. New York and Los Angeles may provide helpful lessons about how to make this transition. Similarly, the experience of other large cities in mediating the impact of changing demographics on electoral politics may offer useful lessons for New York and Los Angeles.

Why undertake this study?

Over the past several decades, immigration, along with suburbanization, internal migration, and the aging of the native born population, has dramatically changed the overall composition of the American population and the ways in which new groups replace older ones in American cities. Immigration has had an especially strong impact on the central cities of six key states that loom large in the Electoral College: California, New York, Texas, Illinois, Florida, and New Jersey. Just as these cities received migrants from the South to the North and from the East to the West between 1940 and 1980, and just as many of them received European migration between 1880 and 1924, today they are absorbing newcomers from Mexico, elsewhere in Latin America, the Caribbean, East and South Asia, and indeed Europe, the Middle East, and the rest of the globe. Though the mix varies from city to city—with Mexicans, Central Americans, and East Asians predominating in Los Angeles, while Dominicans, West Indians, Chinese, and South and East Asians have come to New York and Cubans and Haitians to Miami—immigration has rapidly and profoundly changed these and other immigrant-receiving cities.

> When cities failed to appreciate the importance of such gaps,
> they paid a heavy price.

THE NEW YORK AND LOS ANGELES METROPOLITAN areas epitomize this change. They are laboratories in which all the many implications of this great change are being worked out. Together, they hold two-fifths of the immigrants in America. These immigrants and their children have joined African Americans and earlier white immigrants in forging a new kind of urban society. While no single group is as large in New York as Mexican immigrants are in Los Angeles, both areas have drawn new residents from virtually every part of the globe. The diversity in these cities, and a number of others, is historically unprecedented. They serve as "leading indicators" of what this transformation will mean for the rest of urban America as immigration continues to affect all American cities. The current wave of immigration has two especially important consequences: it complicates the process of racial and ethnic succession in urban areas and opens up a new "representation gap" between the ethnic background of elected officials and those they represent. Although public opinion, the press, and academia have paid a good deal of attention to how immigration has pro-moted increasing urban diversity, they have paid much less attention to the increasingly profound problem of political inequality that stems from it.

The major story of American politics between 1950 and 1980 was the African American and native Latino strug-gle to achieve parity with white Americans in the exer-cise of basic political rights and the achievement of

political influence commensurate with their numbers. The northward and westward migration of native-born blacks and Puerto Ricans and the emergence of native-born Mexican-American populations in the Southwest provided the social base for this struggle. As these groups became increasingly predominant in urban and metropolitan populations, a generation of civil rights activism, protest, and electoral mobilization ensued. While these efforts did not produce political equality for these subordinated groups, or indeed equality on other key dimensions, few would argue that they did not lead to a great deal of progress on these fronts.

NOW, HOWEVER, IMMIGRATION IS MOVING AMERICA from an historical period in which racial diversity was understood mainly in terms of black and white to a period in which Latinos and Asians are increasingly prominent, but in which immigration has diversified all the basic racial and ethnic categories, including black and white. As immigration has complicated racial and ethnic succession, it has opened up a new chapter in the struggle for civil rights and political equality. Today, demographic change is not propelling one or another group into a new urban majority. Instead, as urban areas have become less white, they have become more diverse, producing new kinds of political strains. New groups have emerged that often do not fit easily into the black/white dichotomy, blurring older racial bound-ary lines. The growth of these groups has caused the racial and ethnic makeup of urban populations once

more to become steadily more different from that of their elected officials. While this gap may take the form of white incumbents representing new immigrant minority groups, it can also take the form of native-born minority incumbents representing them.

When cities failed to appreciate the importance of such gaps, or failed to try to close them, they have paid a heavy price in the past. Cities that did not recognize and act against the widening gap between black and Latino populations and white power-holders in the 1960s and 1970s suffered heavy costs, while cities that collaborated to bridge this political gulf suffered far less. The urban riots of the 1960s and the subsequent racial polarization, white flight, and economic disinvestment took a heavy toll on cities such as Detroit and Newark. The alienation and anger left on both sides of the racial divide made subsequent efforts to build a bi- or multi-racial consensus far more difficult. On the other hand, some black-governed cities such as Atlanta not only achieved that status with less hostility between black political leaders and white economic elites, but also achieved considerable cooperation between them. This cooperation promoted both the expansion of the

black middle class and more rapid metropolitan growth, in a clear contrast to the Detroit model. While the current political distance between new immigrant minority groups and the political and economic leadership of their cities may not lead to 1960s-style rioting, it clearly has the potential to exact heavy costs. History teaches us that cities are better off when all segments of their population acknowledge emerging problems and collaborate on steps to resolve them.

This report uses New York and Los Angeles as case studies to explore the political consequences of demographic change in urban America. First, it traces the pattern of black-to-white racial succession in big cities and its political consequences. It then shows how immigration has been altering that pattern, producing new racial and ethnic contours in metropolitan America, and particularly in New York and Los Angeles. Using the 2001 mayoral and city council elections in the two cities, it then explores the causes and meaning of the growing gaps in representation between the populations and elected officials of these cities and asks what might be done to address them.

The first phase: native blacks and Latinos succeed whites in urban America

Table 1 shows how immigration has altered the racial and ethnic composition of America's metropolitan areas over the past twenty years. Though the white population grew by 14 million people, it dropped from over three-quarters to less than two-thirds of the metropolitan total. The black population also grew by

9 million, increasing its share slightly. Most of all, the table highlights the increase of the Latino population by 19 million and the Asian population by 8 million, with both groups becoming much larger shares of the total. Latinos now outnumber blacks.[1]

Table 1 : Metropolitan Population in the United States, 1980-2000

	1980	%	2000	%
Total Population	174,259,765		225,981,477	
White	135,044,462	77.5	149,115,432	66.0
Black	21,618,796	12.4	30,523,639	13.5
Latino	13,044,438	7.5	32,173,941	14.2
Asian	3,228,036	1.9	11,285,768	5.0

SOURCE: U.S. CENSUS 1980, 2000.

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[1] In this report, the terms white, black, and Asian exclude those who classify themselves as Hispanic. It groups together all Hispanics, regardless of race, and uses the term Latino to describe them. Blacks include all non-Hispanic blacks, but African American refers to native-born blacks with native-born parents, while Afro-Caribbean refers to non-Hispanic blacks born in the Caribbean or whose parents were born in the Caribbean.

PRIOR TO 1980, THE TYPICAL PATH OF DEMOGRAPHIC change in urban America was for blacks to replace whites. By 1980, many large cities, including Atlanta, Richmond, Gary, Washington, Detroit, Newark, Birmingham, New Orleans, and Baltimore had reached black majorities. Similarly, by 1980, Latinos became a majority in Miami and four Texas metropolitan areas, Brownsville, McAllen, El Paso, and San Antonio. In all of the Texas cities except for San Antonio, Latinos also became a majority or substantial plurality in the suburbs. These outcomes are shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Metropolitan Areas with the Largest Black and Latino Populations, 1980

	Metropolitan Population	Central City Black %	Suburban Black %	First Minority Elected Mayor
Atlanta, GA	2,072,258	65.9	13.3	Maynard Jackson 1973
Richmond-Petersburg, VA	761,244	56.9	17.2	Henry Marsh 1977
Gary, IN	642,651	56.5	1.6	Richard Hatcher 1967
Washington, DC	3,321,340	55.9	16.4	Walter Washington 1975
Detroit, MI	4,387,682	55.1	3.3	Coleman Young 1973
Newark, NJ	1,966,132	54.3	12.0	Kenneth Gibson 1970
Birmingham, AL	815,164	53.8	15.0	Richard Arrington 1979
New Orleans, LA	1,250,214	53.5	13.4	Ernest Morial 1978
Baltimore, MD	2,173,136	53.4	8.4	Clarence Burns 1987
	Metropolitan Population	Central City Latino %	Suburban Latino %	
Brownsville, TX	209,712	79.6	70.2	Not identified
McAllen, TX	283,214	74.3	86.4	Leo Montalvo 1997
El Paso, TX	479,899	60.7	79.3	Not identified
San Antonio, TX	1,071,925	50.5	19.9	Henry Cisneros 1981
Miami, FL	1,625,695	50.1	30.7	Xavier Suarez 1985

SOURCE: U.S. CENSUS 1980, MUMFORD CENTER

AS BLACKS AND LATINOS BECAME MAJORITIES, or near majorities, first in the neighborhoods and then in entire cities, minority candidates began to challenge white incumbents for city council and other legislative seats and later for mayoralties. By the late 1960s, Gary, Indiana, and Newark, New Jersey, had elected their first black mayors. As other majority-black cities emerged, black insurgencies ruptured old arrangements and put new leadership in place. In Atlanta, blacks had combined with liberal whites to elect Sam Massell mayor in 1969, but this alliance broke down when blacks became a majority in 1970 and elected Maynard Jackson mayor in 1973. Similarly, in Detroit, liberal bi-racial coalitions elected Jerome Cavanaugh and Roman Gribbs as mayor, but this arrangement broke down when Coleman Young was elected the first black mayor in 1973. Later, as black populations became large, but not necessarily a majority, in other cities, bi- or multi-racial coalitions elected black mayors in them as well. This process continued into the 1980s, with the election of Tom Bradley as Los Angeles' first black mayor in 1973, Harold Washington as Chicago's first black mayor in 1985, and David Dinkins as New York's first black mayor in 1989. By 1980, all the black-majority cities in Table 2 except Baltimore had elected black mayors. (Baltimore did not do so until 1987.)

Latino progress along this same path was much slower. Despite a long-time Latino majority, San Antonio did not elect a Latino mayor until Henry Cisneros's victory in 1981. Miami elected its first Cuban mayor, Xavier Suarez, in 1985. And McAllen, Texas, already three-quarters Latino in 1980, did not elect its first Latino mayor until 1997. Many other cities where Latinos are now the largest minority group have yet to elect a Latino mayor, including New York and Los Angeles. In these cities, Latino political empowerment has been restricted to legislative office. These black and Latino achievements did not result automatically from demographic change, but were accomplished through the interplay of minority protest and the formation of new electoral coalitions generally led by the biggest minority group with support from the second largest minority group and liberal whites.

The process by which cities elected their first black or Latino mayor predominantly on the basis of the arrival of a black or Latino population majority may now largely be at an end. Indeed, most cities that first elected a black mayor in the late 1960s or early 1970s now face the question of how the older, civil rights-era generation that first consolidated power will transfer it to a younger generation. In cities without a black majority, but in which bi- or multi-racial coalitions put an African American into city hall, such as New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, these coalitions were unable to sustain their hold on politics and those cities have subsequently elected whites to the mayoralty. These cities pose the question of whether or how such coalitions might be reconstituted under conditions of demographic change. Finally, some "first black mayors" won office in cities with relatively small black populations, such as San Francisco or Seattle, and did not predicate their success on mobilizing their own group as the key building block of a political majority, even in coalition with other groups. In short, the political momentum provided by the emergence of new racial majorities has subsided since the 1970s and 1980s. While earlier efforts achieved a great deal, their ultimate impact was perhaps more limited than their advocates had initially hoped or anticipated.

New trajectories of metropolitan demographic change have contributed to this development. Instead of whites being succeeded by native blacks or native-born, immigrants now provide the most new arrivals in "gateway cities." Their white populations continue to decline, but are being supplanted by many different groups, not just one or two. With the exception of Cubans in Miami, no single immigrant group seems likely to become the kind of dominant majority that African Americans became in the 1950-1980 period. Indeed, though blacks and Latinos have retained the majority status in many central cities listed in Table 2, immigration has even diversified their minority populations (i.e., Washington, Atlanta, Newark, and Miami).

New immigrant populations thus have blurred and transformed, without erasing, the older racial cleavages that characterize urban politics. Their presence has complicated the process of constructing multi-ethnic coalitions seeking minority empowerment or even achieving due consideration for minority interests from established political leaders. They also have introduced new challenges for white incumbents, who must also seek new ways to construct a political majority.

The arrival of black pluralities or majorities in the older northern cities created a serious gap between the racial backgrounds of elected officials, especially mayors, and those whom they governed. African Americans engaged in a long political struggle to reduce that gap. The new immigration has once again widened the racial and ethnic difference between elected officials and those whom they represent and serve. In cities like New York and Los Angeles, the white share of the population has declined to a third, but whites still make up half the active eligible electorate, hold half the city council positions, and the mayoralty. Ironically, however, black political successes have also sometimes put African Americans in a similar position. Black elected officials may also represent districts in which African Americans are a minority and new immigrant groups are the majority.

Political succession in these increasingly diverse cities will have to take a very different path from that followed in cities that became majority-black or majority-Latino a generation ago. Most cities that will ever become majority-black or majority-Latino have already done so, and, as Table 2 has shown, most elected their first minority mayor long ago. The rapid growth of Latino immigration means that Latino political empowerment must be built on an increasingly diverse base. As a result, the future of minority political empowerment in many of America's big cities will rest more on the ability of minority political lead-

ers to forge successful alliances across ethnic bound-
aries than on simply riding the crest of a growing
black or Latino population. Similarly, the ability of
white political leaders to sustain their electoral
majorities in the face of continuing decreases in the
white population will depend on either their ability
to keep all non-white groups fragmented and divided
or their ability to forge cross-racial or cross-ethnic
coalitions of their own. In short, while the underlying
black-white racial differences continue to have great
significance for the urban political landscape, growing
ethnic diversity within and between whites, blacks,
Latinos, and Asians has made the process of building
political power far more complicated.

The current phase: immigrants succeed native-born groups

WHERE ARE THE MOST DIVERSE METROPOLITAN AREAS?
Table 3 lists the five metro areas where blacks, Latinos,
and Asians were all present in the highest proportions
in 2000.[2] They are Los Angeles-Long Beach, Jersey City,
New York, Houston, and Oakland. Whites make up less
than half the metropolitan population in any area,
ranging from 47.7 percent of the Oakland MSA down to
31.1 percent in Los Angeles. All have become substantial-
ly more diverse since 1980, except Los Angeles, which
was already diverse. The white share of the New York
MSA dropped from 56 to 40 percent between 1980 and
2000. Though its black population gained two percent-
age points, its Latino and Asian populations each
gained seven percentage points. Oakland's and
Houston's profiles were similar to New York's in having
more blacks than Latinos in 1980, but more Latinos
than blacks in 2000. Clearly, the growing diversity of
these areas resulted mainly from the expansion of their
Latino and Asian populations. Blacks are no longer the
largest minority group in any of them. In Los Angeles-
Long Beach and Jersey City, Latinos were already the
largest minority group in 1980 and now are double the
size of the black population, even outnumbering whites
in these metro areas. Though Asians are the largest
minority group only in Oakland, the Asian percentage
doubled or tripled in all five metro areas.

Table 3: Composition of Five Most Diverse Metropolitan Areas, 2000

	White	Black	Latino	Asian	First Minority Mayor
New York MSA	39.6	23.8	25.1	9.8	David Dinkins 1989
Los Angeles-Long Beach MSA	31.1	10.0	44.6	12.9	Tom Bradley 1973
Jersey City MSA	35.3	12.8	39.8	10.0	Glenn Cunningham 2001
Houston MSA	46.1	17.6	29.9	5.6	Lee Brown 1997
Oakland MSA	47.7	13.4	18.5	18.8	Lionel Wilson 1977

Source: U.S. Census 2000, Mumford Center

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[2] The term "metropolitan area" refers to the U.S. Census Bureau's "metropolitan statistical area" or MSA, which is a county containing a
central city of 50,000 or more and any adjacent counties where at least half the population lives in the urbanized area that surrounds this
central city. In large urbanized areas such as New York and Los Angeles, several component MSAs may aggregate into a larger "consolidated
metropolitan statistical area," or CMSA, but we do not employ that unit of analysis here. The New York MSA contains New York City and
Westchester, Putnam, Rockland, and Orange Counties, while the Los Angeles MSA is Los Angeles County.

CENTRAL CITIES ARE THE MOST RACIALLY and ethnically diverse part of American metropolitan areas, and that is where we expect to see the first political consequences of these dramatic changes. The first minority mayors elected in these diverse metro areas have all been black, starting with Tom Bradley's victory in Los Angeles in 1973 and continuing to Glenn Cunningham's victory in Jersey City in 2001. All received support from broad multi-racial coalitions that included white and Latino as well as black voters. On the whole, however, these diverse central cities were slower to elect their first minority mayors than those described in Table 2. Although whites became less than half the populations of these cities, they continued to be the single largest group until recently. Oakland elected its first black mayor in 1977, but now has a white mayor, Jerry Brown. New York did not elect its first minority mayor until 1989, but he served only one term. Houston elected its first black mayor only in 1997, and Jersey City finally elected a black mayor in 2001, despite having a larger Latino than black population. (Houston's Lee Brown won a close reelection race against a Latino challenger in 2001 and leaves office this year due to term limits.)

The growing diversity of these areas has taken place within a framework of persistently high residential segregation. Racial and ethnic minorities have established large and distinct neighborhoods in these five central cities, just as blacks did in Atlanta and Detroit and Latinos did in San Antonio and Miami. Using the Index of Dissimilarity, Table 4 compares the level of segregation between pairs of the major racial groups for all the diverse central cities, two majority black cities, two majority Latino cities, and the national

average of central cities.[3] It shows that the average central city has very high levels of white-black and Asian-black segregation, while black-Latino, white-Latino, and Asian-Latino segregation levels are more moderate and white-Asian segregation is lower but still substantial.

The table also shows that the segregation levels between whites and all three minority groups in America's biggest highly diverse cities, New York and Los Angeles, are significantly above the national average, especially in New York. Additionally, New York City has markedly higher black-Latino, black-Asian, and Latino-Asian segregation than the national average. In other words, growing diversity can be consistent with persistently high levels of segregation. This degree of separation may hinder communication and cooperation between and among different racial and ethnic groups, creating a foundation for balkanized politics at the neighborhood and city level. *Relatively few neighborhoods in either of these cities will have the kind of diversity characteristic of the city as a whole.*

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[3] This index ranges from 0 (where groups are evenly intermixed) to 100 (where groups are completely separated). Social scientists generally interpret values over 55 to be high or extreme segregation and values between 40 and 55 to be moderate segregation.

Table 4: Segregation by City Type, 2000

	White-Black	White-Latino	White-Asian	Black-Latino	Black-Asian	Latino-Asian
Diverse Cities						
New York	82.9	66.9	49.2	57.1	79.3	57.7
Los Angeles	67.5	64.5	45.4	49.7	61.7	48.0
Jersey City	62.1	36.9	43.2	48.1	56.0	36.2
Houston	70.4	55.6	45.3	56.8	67.0	59.7
Oakland	63.3	65.2	40.9	35.3	53.9	47.9
Black Majority Cities						
Atlanta	81.6	57.8	48.0	62.5	78.1	50.7
Detroit	72.8	60.0	48.5	80.9	71.6	67.1
Latino Majority Cities						
San Antonio	48.9	50.7	26.6	50.9	42.2	56.9
Miami	79.3	49.6	23.3	80.6	75.7	45.1
National Average	64.9	52.7	39.9	53.3	62.8	49.5

Source: Mumford Center calculations of 2000 U.S. Census data

To some degree, segregation may enable each group to gain political representation because its electoral strength is concentrated in particular places. It is certainly easier to draw majority-minority districts when groups are segregated and concentrated. But the experience of New York and Los Angeles, discussed at length below, shows that whites, and to a lesser degree blacks, may benefit from this more than Latinos and Asians, because they are more highly segregated, and that these benefits may come at the disadvantage of Latinos and Asians. At present, whites hold political office in both cities at far higher rates than their population share and blacks hold offices at about parity with their population or a little more, but Latinos and Asians hold much less representation than their population share. Indeed, their current level of representation matches their much smaller population share of two decades ago. They thus experience a substantial "representation gap."

As we will show, this gap may have many different sources, beginning with the disproportionately greater age, citizenship, and turnout among whites compared to other groups. Other potential sources, however, concern the growing differentiation among blacks, Latinos, and Asians in terms of national origin, culture, and social class. As these differences grow within a neighborhood political structure where an older native minority group has already established itself, new political fissures may result. These new fissures in turn affect the political strategies of both challengers and established politicians, including native white and black politicians seeking to retain hold on their offices. New York and Los Angeles provide ample evidence of these trends.

The impact of growing diversity on New York City

THE NEW YORK METROPOLIS EXEMPLIFIES growing metropolitan diversity in America and its central city, New York, is even more closely divided among the major racial/ethnic groups. Table 4 shows how its population has evolved over the past twenty years, with the white population declining from a majority to just over a third, while it gained more than 750,000 Latinos, 600,000 Asians, and 350,000 blacks. In each case, immigration was a major factor in these increases. Indeed, were it not for the arrival of more than 100,000 immigrants from the former Soviet bloc after 1990, New York's white population would have plummeted even faster. These changes also gradually are altering the dynamics both of citywide and neighborhood-level politics in the city.

Table 5 shows that, despite the decline of the white population, whites have continued to hold a disproportionate share of the City Council seats. Presently, just over half of the fifty-one City Council members are white, a figure that is sixteen percentage points higher than the white population share. Even if we look only at voting-age citizens, recognizing that many Latino and Asian residents are under age eighteen or are immigrants who have not naturalized, the white share of council seats is still 9.9 percentage points higher than the white share of voting-age citizens. The current white share of council seats is more like their population share twenty years ago. In 1982, in the first post-reapportionment election, thirty-five persons were elected to district seats on the New York City Council. Only nine were members of minority groups: six blacks and three Latinos. At that time, the city was just over half white, but whites held three-quarters of directly elected seats. Today, this advantage in the "representation gap" persists, though it has diminished somewhat over the past twenty years as blacks managed to achieve parity, while Latinos and Asians continue to lag behind. Their share of seats on the council today is what their population was *twenty years ago*.

Table 5: New York City Population by Race, Citizenship, and Office Holding, 1980-2000

	Population	White	Black	Latino	Asian
1980	7,071,529	3,668,865	1,694,107	1,406,014	231,501
%		51.9	24.0	19.9	3.3
1990	7,322,564	3,163,125	1,847,049	1,783,511	512,719
%		43.2	25.2	24.4	7.0
2000	8,008,278	2,801,267	2,050,764	2,160,554	849,468
%		35.0	25.6	27.0	10.6
2000 Voting-age Citizens	4,671,332	2,099,496	1,202,144	981,438	335,623
%		44.9	25.7	21.0	7.2
City Council 1982	35	27	6	3	0
%		77.1	17.1	8.6	0.0
City Council 2003	51	26	14	10	1
%		51.0	27.5	19.6	2.0

SOURCE: U.S. CENSUS 1980, 1990, 2000, MUMFORD CENTER AND CENTER FOR URBAN RESEARCH

The delay in the ability of new groups to assume a full role in urban governance is not surprising, given that political parties are complex organizations that are often slow to adapt to changes in their environment and incumbents are rarely inclined to yield their positions to newcomers. New groups also need time to develop their political skills. Given the passage of time, however, can we expect that New York City will ultimately close the representation gap by electing a City Council with nineteen Latino and Asian members rather than eleven? We return to these questions below.

Figure 1: Black, Latino, and Asian neighborhood concentrations in NYC, 2000

Neighborhood type
- Black
- Hispanic
- Asian
- Asian-Hispanic
- Asian-Black
- Black-Hispanic

Persistently high rates of segregation shape neighborhood change in New York City

PERSISTENTLY HIGH LEVELS OF RESIDENTIAL segregation mean that racial and ethnic transitions will occur first in specific neighborhoods and then percolate upward into citywide results. To see how these demographic changes are sorting out groups across neighborhoods in New York, a recently developed spatial analysis technique, Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA), is used to identify where groups are present at significantly high levels.[4] The ethnic neighborhoods thus identified may not have a majority of residents from a particular group and other groups are sometimes just as large within a given area. But the group in question is most heavily concentrated in these places.

Figure 1 shows a map of black, Latino, and Asian concentration zones for New York City in 2000. They are strikingly separate from one another. Most of the "minority" neighborhoods of the city can be identified easily with-

in one or another of these areas. Most often, they have a substantial majority of black or Latino residents. As a result, their politics often resemble what we might find in a majority-black or majority-Latino city: candidates of a given race can win with a majority of the votes based on their own group and do not need to build a coalition across racial or ethnic boundaries. However, Asians are typically less than half the population of the Asian zones and their areas are likely to be among the most diverse in terms of group composition, which may bring about a different political dynamic. Another difference among these neighborhoods concerns their income levels, which vary a good deal. For each group, some neighborhoods have high levels of poverty and deprivation while others are more middle class, matching or even exceeding the average income level of the city. This reminds us that the city tends to be divided by class as well as race.

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[4] This method detects local clusters of contiguous census tracts that have significantly higher or lower values of a given attribute than expected by calculating their LISA (local indicator of spatial association) statistic. The result is similar to what one might see in a normal thematic map, but is based on an objective statistical foundation.

THE FOUR MAJOR BLACK SETTLEMENT ZONES, listed by the size of their black population, are in Brooklyn (an area including Bedford-Stuyvesant, Flatbush, and East New York), Queens (Jamaica and adjacent areas in the southeast part of the borough), Manhattan (Harlem), and the Bronx (in the northeast section that includes Williamsbridge and Eastchester).

- Brooklyn's extended black neighborhood includes a total population of nearly 1 million, of whom 80 percent are black (see Appendix Table 1). More than a third of residents are foreign-born (predominantly from Afro-Caribbean countries). With a median household income of only $30,700, it is poorer than the city average, and more than a quarter of residents fall below the poverty line.

- Jamaica is over 85 percent black, with over a quarter million black residents. This is by far the most affluent black area, with a median income of nearly $50,000 and nearly two-thirds of households owning homes. Like Brooklyn, its black population includes many Afro-Caribbeans and the foreign-born share is nearly 30 percent.

- Harlem, New York's traditional black community, is 73 percent black. Though its black population has fallen since 1990, it still has more than 125,000 black residents. It is by far the poorest black neighborhood, with a median income of under $21,000 and a poverty rate above 35 percent. It has a substantial foreign-born population, of whom nearly half arrived after 1990, but they tend to be Latinos, not Afro-Caribbeans.

- Finally, the Williamsbridge/Eastchester neighborhood has a black population of 105,000. The area is 73 percent black and midway between Brooklyn and Jamaica in economic standing (a median income of nearly $39,000). Like Brooklyn's black neighborhood, it has a large share of foreign-born (38.5 percent), predominantly Afro-Caribbeans.

THE LARGEST LATINO NEIGHBORHOODS are located in the Bronx (including most of the South and Central Bronx), but there are also substantial Latino settlements in Washington Heights (Manhattan), Jackson Heights (Queens), and East Williamsburg/Bushwick (Brooklyn). Comparing these neighborhoods, we find high concentrations of Latinos, but some variation between those that have more Puerto Rican and those with more immigrants and non-citizens. These neighborhoods also have somewhat different class composition.

- The Bronx is by far the largest Latino zone, with more than 560,000 Latinos. This area is 62 percent Latino. It is quite poor, with a median income of $22,300 and 38 percent of the residents living below the poverty line. Nearly 20 percent of the labor force is unemployed. Some 64 percent speak a language other than English at home, but only 30 percent of the population is foreign-born and only 22 percent are non-citizens, reflecting the strong concentration of Puerto Ricans here.

- The East Williamsburg/Bushwick section of Brooklyn has over 150,000 Latino residents, who form just over two-thirds of the population. The area is comparable to the South Bronx in class composition (35 percent poor and 16 percent unemployed). Just over a third are foreign-born and 27 percent are non-citizens.

- Washington Heights has nearly 200,000 Latino residents, over 75 percent of the total population of the area. It is nearly as poor as the South Bronx, with a median income of about $26,000 and 32 percent of residents in poverty. A majority of residents are foreign-born, reflecting immigration from the Dominican Republic. Fully 40 percent are non-citizens, and nearly 80 percent speak a language other than English at home.

- Jackson Heights, Queens, also accounts for nearly 200,000 Latinos in a zone that is over 60 percent Latino. This is, however, a much more affluent area, with a median income of $36,800 and only 20 percent below the poverty line. As many as 25 percent of residents are home owners. But like Washington Heights, this is an immigrant district, with two-thirds of residents foreign-born, and more than 50 percent non-citizen.

FINALLY, NEW YORK HAS FOUR MAIN ZONES OF ASIAN concentration. By far the largest is centered in Flushing (Queens), but extends as far east as the Nassau County line and as far south as Richmond Hill. The second has its geographic center in Elmhurst (Queens), but also includes Jackson Heights and Astoria to the west and Rego Park and Forest Hills to the south. The third is in Brooklyn, where Chinese were concentrated in Sunset Park in 1990 but now extend as far as Kensington and Bensonhurst. Finally, the traditional Chinatown zone is located in Lower Manhattan. Except for Chinatown, Asians are well under a population majority (between 30 percent and 40 percent) in these neighborhoods and may be outnumbered by whites or Latinos in some.

- Flushing is the largest, with 217,000 Asian residents, just under 40 percent of the population. Household incomes are high (median $45,800), the poverty rate is below 15 percent, and nearly half of the households own their homes. The zone has an immigrant majority (54 percent) and 43 percent are non-citizens.

- Elmhurst and adjacent Asian areas have nearly 150,000 Asian residents, 34 percent of the total population. Whites are the largest group in this zone, but the area is also about 20 percent Latino and 10 percent black. The neighborhood is more affluent than any of the Latino neighborhoods listed above (median income nearly $40,000), but it is less affluent than Flushing and has a higher share of immigrants (63 percent) and non-citizens (51 percent) among its residents.

- Sunset Park is the third largest Asian neighborhood by size, with just over 100,000 Asians, 33 percent of the total population. This is an economically more modest neighborhood, with a median income of about $32,000 and nearly a quarter of residents below the poverty line, although 28 percent are homeowners. Most (53 percent) are foreign-born and many (45 percent) are non-citizens.

- Finally, the original center of New York's Asian community is Chinatown, nearly 70 percent Asian. But it is smaller than the other three, with only 61,000 Asian residents, almost all of whom are Chinese. It is by far the poorest Asian neighborhood with a median income of only $24,300 and 30 percent of residents living in poverty. It has a very large share of immigrants (60 percent), and nearly half (47 percent) are non-citizens.

THIS DISCUSSION HAS HIGHLIGHTED THE SEPARATION between New York's black, Latino, and Asian neighborhoods. (White neighborhoods are actually the most segregated, although Latinos and Asians have moved into some of them. They tend either to be upper middle class professional neighborhoods in Manhattan and Brownstone Brooklyn or ethnic enclaves toward the outer edges of the city.) Though minority neighborhoods contain a mix of groups and a few neighborhoods actually overlap, most are distinct. This divides the city into spheres of influence in which one group has a large majority (in the case of the black and Latino neighborhoods) or plurality (as in most Asian neighborhoods). Even at the level of these broad racial categories, however, the neighborhoods clearly vary in terms of ethnicity, income, and citizenship. Some black neighborhoods are more African American, others more Caribbean. Puerto Ricans dominate some Latino neighborhoods, but Dominicans or South Americans outnumber them in others. There is even greater variation among Asians.

Table 6 breaks down New York City's population by specific groups. It divides the black population into Afro-Caribbeans (based on ancestry in a predominantly black, non-Spanish speaking nations such as Haiti and Jamaica), Africans (born in a Sub-Saharan African country), and African Americans (the remainder). The African American share of the black population has dropped and is about 70 percent. The table classifies Latinos based on the 2000 Census "Hispanic question" as allocated by the Mumford Center to specific Latino groups. Puerto Ricans fell from nearly half the Latino total in 1990 to less than 40 percent and also declined in number. Dominicans and South Americans together now outnumber Puerto Ricans, and Mexicans are the fastest growing Latino group. Asians also show increasing diversity, reflecting the rapid growth of the Asian Indian population, which doubled in the 1990s. Chinese are now just over 40 percent of the Asian total, Indians 23 percent, Koreans 10 percent, and Filipinos 7 percent.

Table 6: Major Ethnic Groups in New York City, 2000

	1990	%	2000	%
Total	7,322,564		8,008,278	
White	3,163,125		2,801,267	
Black	1,847,049		2,037,887	
African American	1,405,519	76.1	1,445,181	70.9
Afro-Caribbean	372,931	20.2	524,107	25.7
African-born	29,168	1.6	68,599	3.4
Latino	1,783,511		2,160,554	
Puerto Rican	867,908	48.7	830,123	38.4
Dominican	339,946	19.1	579,269	26.8
South American	226,200	12.7	341,218	15.8
Mexican	56,193	3.2	196,310	9.1
Central American	104,356	5.9	145,553	6.7
Asian	512,719		889,642	
Chinese	238,919	46.6	374,321	42.1
Indian	94,590	18.4	206,228	23.2
Korean	69,718	13.6	90,208	10.1
Filipino	43,229	8.4	62,058	7.0

SOURCE: U.S. CENSUS 2000, MUMFORD CENTER ESTIMATES OF LATINO GROUPS.

Figure 2: African American and Afro-Caribbean neighborhood concentrations in NYC, 2000

Neighborhood type

■ African American
■ Afro-Caribbean
■ Both groups

0   4   8
miles

Figure 2 shows the location of African American and Afro-Caribbean residential clusters. African Americans and Afro-Caribbeans share three large areas with only slightly different boundaries: Brooklyn, Jamaica, and the North Bronx. African Americans outnumber Afro-Caribbeans in these areas by approximately 60 percent to 40 percent. But Harlem and the South Bronx have only few Afro-Caribbeans. Though both groups are black, they have different ethnic and class characteristics, particularly in Brooklyn and Jamaica, where the Afro-Caribbean zones have higher incomes than the remainder. These differences easily could create the potential for political rivalry.

Figure 3 shows the Puerto Rican and Dominican neigh-borhoods. Though Puerto Ricans greatly outnumber Dominicans citywide, Dominicans make up the majority of Latinos in Washington Heights and Corona. Elsewhere in the city, Puerto Rican and Dominican settlements tend to overlap. The Dominican population of the South Bronx has grown substantially over the past twenty years and now has more Dominicans than Washington Heights (156,000 vs. 150,000). In the "Dominican" portion of the South Bronx, they are 22 percent of residents, approaching the Puerto Rican share of 29 percent.

Figure 3: Puerto Rican and Dominican neighborhood concentrations in NYC, 2000


SOME ASIAN NEIGHBORHOODS CAN BE IDENTIFIED with a specific national-origin group (see the Appendix Maps for neighborhoods of each group). This clearly is true of Manhattan's Chinatown (nearly 60,000 Chinese) and Brooklyn's Sunset Park (more than 90,000 Chinese), both of which have only moderate numbers of non-Chinese Asian residents. The largest Asian Indian neighborhood extends from Richmond Hill (known in part for Asian Indians who immigrated from Guyana) across the southern edge of Flushing, and beyond the Nassau County line. This is the south-ern half of what was identified as the Flushing Asian neighborhood above.

Even in areas in which one Asian group predominates, all Asians together do not constitute a majority of the population. The Brooklyn Chinese zone is only 25 per-cent Asian and remains more than half white, reflect-ing the historical concentrations of Jews in Boro Park and Italians in Bensonhurst. Chinatown is nearly half Asian, but is also about 25 percent Latino and 25 per-cent white. The Indian/Filipino neighborhood running through the center of Queens is about one-quarter Asian, one-quarter Latino, 12 percent black, and a third white.

Other Asian neighborhoods in Queens have a rich mix-ture of Asian groups. Aside from the predominantly black section of Jamaica, this borough is blanketed with neighborhoods that can be identified as Chinese, Indian, Korean, and/or Filipino. It also has substantial Latino and white immigrant settlement areas, making the areas around Flushing and Jackson Heights the city's most ethnically diverse areas. To depict this com-plexity, Figure 4 shows the borough of Queens with the Asian national-origin neighborhoods in the panel on the left, and the Latino national-origin neighbor-hoods on the right.

Figure 4: Neighborhoods of various Asian and Latino groups in Queens, NYC, 2000

Neighborhood type
- Chinese
- Korean
- Asian Indian
- Two or more groups

Neighborhood type
- Puerto Rican
- Dominican
- South American
- Two or more groups

0 2 4
miles

Detailed analysis of census data reveals no large class differences among the groups in these adjacent neighborhoods. They are relatively affluent areas whose white, black, Latino, and Asian residents earn similar incomes. It is an area, though, in which whites' much higher likelihood of citizenship gives them a particular electoral advantage. There are few Puerto Ricans among Latinos, who are mostly Dominican or South American, with a low share of citizens. Asians, too, include many newcomers who are not yet citizens.

The impact of growing diversity on Los Angeles

The City of Los Angeles has important similarities with New York City. As Table 7 indicates, even though whites have dropped from half the population in 1980 to only 30 percent in 2000, they have, as in New York, retained more than half of the seats on the city council. The black share of the population in Los Angeles is lower than in New York and has been falling slowly, but their share of council seats, at 20 percent, is also much higher than their 11.4 percent population share. Latinos have grown rapidly, but, as in New York, their city council representation (four of fifteen seats) more closely resembles their population share twenty years ago (27.5 percent) than in does the current population share (46.5 percent). No Asian currently serves on the Los Angeles City Council, despite the fact that Asians make up 10.8 percent of the city's population.

Los Angeles did elect an African American mayor far earlier than did New York City, although New York had black members of the City Council and State Legislature long before that happened in Los Angeles. Tom Bradley became the first black City Council member in 1963 and was elected mayor in 1973. But even when he won a landslide reelection to a third term in 1981, the City Council still did not have a Latino member. Here, as in New York, the political representation of minority groups seems to lag at least twenty years behind their population growth. Earlier established groups' share of the population may decline, but they retain disproportionate shares of city council seats. At present, newer groups hold a level of representation that at best reflect their population share twenty years before.

A special feature of the Los Angeles situation is that some of the largest minority neighborhoods are located outside the City of Los Angeles, but within Los Angeles County, while others sprawl across city and county lines. Though blacks and Central Americans, mostly Salvadorans and Guatemalans, tend to live within the city, the largest Mexican and Asian settlements are outside the city. Our neighborhood analysis is thus based on Los Angeles County as a whole.

Table 7: City of Los Angeles Population by Race and Office Holding, 1980-2000

	Total	White	Black	Latino	Asian
1980	2,966,836	1,419,402	495,722	816,075	196,017
%		47.80	16.70	27.50	6.60
1990	3,485,398	1,299,604	454,289	1,391,411	341,807
%		37.30	13	39.90	9.80
2000	3,694,820	1,099,188	422,819	1,719,073	398,888
%		29.70	11.40	46.50	10.80
Council Members	15	8	3	4	0
%		53.3	20.0	26.7	0.0

SOURCE: U.S. CENSUS 1980, 1990, 2000, MUMFORD CENTER

Figure 5: Black, Latino, and Asian neighborhood concentrations in Los Angeles, 2000

The residential concentrations of blacks, Latinos, and Asians in Los Angeles County are mapped in Figure 5. A single black zone extends from close to Beverly Hills in the northwest, through Watts at the edge of the city, and beyond into suburban Los Angeles County. Historically known as South Central, this area includes half a million black residents in a zone that is more than 40 percent black. However, a growing Latino presence has made that group 46 percent of the residents. The differential in citizenship between the two groups is likely to be consequential, however, since almost all of blacks, but barely half of Latinos, are citizens.

For Latinos, one sprawling zone stretches from South Central toward East Los Angeles, but lies mainly outside the city limits. Another is in the northeastern section of the San Fernando Valley. The map also shows numerous Asian settlement areas, mostly outside the city, except for Koreatown, in Pico-Union. The largest Asian zone is Monterey Park. Asians are almost half the population, and Chinese are by far the predominant Asian group. Latinos are the second-largest group, though at 30 percent, Asians substantially outnumber them.

The black neighborhoods of Los Angeles, unlike those in New York, are almost entirely African American. Mexicans are far larger than any other Latino group and are still growing, but Central American populations are also growing rapidly. Figure 6 distinguishes the Mexican and Central American neighborhoods. One Central American cluster is located within the larger Mexican zone toward East Los Angeles, outside the city limits. Here, about 1.4 million Mexicans make up most of the 1.6 million Latinos living in an 80 percent Latino area. In the San Fernando Valley, the two groups' neighborhoods are more distinct. Mexicans live to the north around San Fernando City, where they make up most of an 80 percent Latino population. Central Americans are clustered to the south around Sepulveda and Sun Valley. The main Central American zone, however, with nearly 200,000 Central American residents, is centered around Pico-Union, west of downtown Los Angeles. This area is now 24 percent Central American and they are beginning to challenge Mexicans (35 percent) in group size.


Figure 6: Mexican and Central American neighborhood concentrations in Los Angeles, 2000

Figure 7: Chinese, Korean, and Filipino neighborhood concentrations in Los Angeles, 2000

The Asian zones show more diversity, being divided among Chinese, Filipino, and Korean concentrations. As noted above, Chinese predominate among the Asians of Monterey Park (east of downtown Los Angeles). Figure 7 shows several Filipino neighborhoods scattered throughout the region. They tend to be next to Korean areas, but there is relatively little overlap among the three groups' neighborhoods.

Koreatown is especially interesting because it is located near, and partially overlaps with, Latino neighborhoods. Its 50,000 Asian residents make up 40 percent of the population. Of these, more than half are Korean. Somewhat more residents of the area are Latino and they are about equally divided between Mexicans and Central Americans in the Pico-Union area. Less than half these Asians and Latinos are citizens. The first-generation immigrant character of the neighborhood is indicated by the foreign birth of nearly two-thirds of residents and the fact that almost 80 percent speak a language other than English at home. The poverty rate is high, but the proportion of residents with college education is also high, in fact much higher than in many other neighborhoods described above. This probably reflects the socioeconomic bifurcation of the neighborhood between relatively poor and undereducated Latinos and more affluent, better-educated Asians.

The political implications of demographic change

This review of demographic trends has shown that a sharp disjuncture has emerged between growing new immigrant minority populations and their representation at city council and citywide levels. It has taken other groups decades to close similar representation gaps in the past. It also has shown that, while both New York and Los Angeles are marked by broad patterns of persistent residential segregation that have led to distinct spheres of influence for whites, blacks, and Latinos, the component parts of these spheres are becoming dramatically more diverse, setting up the potential for competition between the established leadership of these areas and the emerging new groups within them. It is clear that both cities are characterized by substantial over-representation of whites and by emerging differences between incumbent native minority and white office-holders and the compositions of the districts they represent. It is less clear what significance these patterns hold for the larger balance of political power in the two cities or what factors have been most important in causing these representation gaps to grow. Among the causes that might be at play are these:

- *New immigrants have differentially lower rates of citizenship and voting age*

- *New immigrant citizens are differentially less likely to register and vote*

- *The political system may be organized in ways that do not encourage minority participation*

- *Political parties tend not to support candidates from new immigrant groups*

- *Native minority voters do not support new immigrant candidates*

- *Black, Latino, and Asian voters tend not to support each other's candidates*

- *New immigrant political leaders fail to build coalitions with native-born groups*

- *New immigrants in New York have less access to elected office when they do not register as Democrats, since the electorate is overwhelmingly Democratic and the Democratic nominee usually wins the general election*

- *New immigrants in Los Angeles have less access to elected office because they lack the resources to run credible campaigns in non-partisan elections in comparatively large districts*

- *White politicians may have more organizational experience and political resources than other groups to put together electoral majority coalitions*

- *New immigrant groups feel comfortable with being represented by established political leaders*

IN THE FOLLOWING PAGES, WE EXAMINE THE POLITICAL experiences of New York and Los Angeles in 2001 to explore what they say about these questions and what larger significance the answers may have for the functioning of urban democracy in New York, Los Angeles, and other diverse cities.

As we have noted, the widening of representation gaps is nothing new for these or other big cities. It took both the white immigrant groups of the late-nineteenth century and the native minority groups of the 1950s many decades between their initial emergence in sizable numbers and the period in which they began to wield genuine citywide influence. The struggle for black and Latino empowerment remains far behind the level of white ethnic assimilation into political power. We therefore safely can predict that the new immigrant groups face a long, difficult road even

to achieve an initial level of political representation, much less equal representation. Nevertheless, we also can predict that the emergence of new immigrant minority groups as claimants for political representation will modify the competition for urban power from one that pits native minorities against native whites to one that may pit new immigrant minorities not only against whites, but against native minorities.

It surely will be difficult to negotiate this new stage of urban politics, but doing so will not only enhance the functioning of our democratic system, it will enable cities to develop broadly embraced solutions to their most pressing problems. This is a key to our cities' future prosperity, just as racial discord was often poisonous in the past. New York and Los Angeles may provide helpful lessons about how to make this transition.

Demographic barriers to immigrant political empowerment: age, citizenship, voter registration

At present, a disproportionate share of the new immigrant groups described in the previous sections cannot meet the formal requirements for political participation: being a U.S. citizen age eighteen or older, registering, and voting. Because the new immigrant groups tend to have a younger age distribution and are far less likely to be citizens than native whites and blacks, these factors magnify the political influence of native whites and blacks while reducing those of the new immigrants. Tables 8 and 9 outline the first two factors for the larger ethnic and racial groups in New York and Los Angeles.

Table 8: Estimated Political Eligibility for Major Ethnic Groups, New York City, 2000-2001

	Population	% of Population	% of Group that is Voting Age	% of Group Voting Age Citizens	Estimated Voting Age Citizens	% of All Voting Age Citizens
Whites	2,801,267	35.0	73.2	70.2	1,966,000	43.0
African Americans	1,445,181	18.0	69.5	66.1	955,000	20.9
Afro-Caribbeans	524,107	6.5	75.5	50.5	265,000	5.8
Puerto Ricans	829,519	10.4	85.7	69.7	578,000	12.6
Dominicans	576,742	7.2	72.8	34.5	199,000	4.4
Colombians, Ecuadorans, Peruvians	288,800	3.6	75.8	33.5	97,000	2.1
Mexicans	196,171	2.4	64.5	5.0	9,800	0.2
Chinese	374,321	4.7	86.3	59.2	222,000	4.8
Indians	206,228	2.6	77.9	20.6	42,000	0.9
Koreans	90,208	1.1	76.9	32.4	29,000	0.6
Total	8,008,278	100.0	75.8	57.1	4,573,000	100.0

SOURCES: POPULATION FROM 2000 CENSUS WITH MUMFORD ESTIMATES OF HISPANIC GROUPS. AFRICAN AMERICANS ARE BLACKS MINUS WEST INDIANS AND AFRICANS. VOTING AGE AND CITIZENSHIP FROM MARCH 2001 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY. ETHNIC GROUPS INCLUDE SECOND GENERATION.

Table 9: Estimated Political Eligibility for Major Ethnic Groups, City of Los Angeles, 2000-2002

	Population	% of Population	% of Group that is Voting Age	% of Group Voting Age Citizens	Estimated Voting Age Citizens	% of All Voting Age Citizens
Whites	1,099,188	29.7	84.0	76.0	835,000	46.9
African Americans	390,588	10.6	67.9	64.5	251,000	14.1
Mexican Americans	1,180,642	32.0	63.4	23.5	277,000	15.5
Central Americans	430,201	11.6	76.0	26.8	115,000	6.5
Filipino	113,793	3.1	84.2	47.8	54,000	2.6
Koreans	95,106	2.6	79.8	29.6	28,000	1.4
Chinese	69,668	1.9	NA	NA	NA	NA
Total	3,694,820	100.0	72.4	48.2	1,781,000	100.0

SOURCES: POPULATION FROM 2000 CENSUS WITH MUMFORD ESTIMATES OF HISPANIC GROUPS. AFRICAN AMERICANS ARE BLACKS MINUS WEST INDIANS AND AFRICANS. VOTING AGE AND CITIZENSHIP FROM MARCH 2001 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY. ETHNIC GROUPS INCLUDE SECOND GENERATION. CHINESE SAMPLE IS TOO SMALL FOR RELIABLE ESTIMATION. VOTING AGE AND VOTING AGE CITIZEN SHARES CALCULATED FROM CENTRAL CITIES OF LOS ANGELES METRO AREA, WHICH INCLUDE LOS ANGELES AND LONG BEACH.

These tables reveal several patterns. In New York City, whites are only a third of the population, but they remain nearly half the voting age citizens. Since they also are disproportionately likely to register and vote, they probably constitute an even larger share of the active electorate. Similarly, the African American share of voting age citizens is several percentage points higher than their population share. While they get a smaller boost than whites, it is similar in proportion to their population share. Finally, Puerto Ricans also comprise more voting age citizens than the population. By contrast, the Afro-Caribbean share of the electorate declines several points compared to its population share and all the other immigrant groups lose even more. Considering that voting age citizen immigrants are less likely to register and vote than non-immigrants, the impact on the active electorate is even greater. Dominicans may be a partial exception. Though youth and non-citizenship reduce their share of voting age citizens to 4.4 percent from their 7.2 percent population share, their recent political awakening has increased voter registration and turnout.

These same trends are even more pronounced in Los Angeles. Whites are only three-tenths of the population, but almost half of the voting age citizens, a 17.2 percentage point boost in potential influence. The increase is also large for African Americans, who go from 10.6 percent of the population to an estimated 14.1 percent of the voting age citizens, a 3.5 percentage

point gain. The relative youth and lack of citizenship among Mexican Americans, now the largest single group in Los Angeles, greatly reduces their share of the voting age citizens and the reductions are large for every other measurable immigrant ethnic group. In short, age and citizenship magnify white and black electoral power in both cities, relative to that of Latinos and Asians. (Similar disparities can be seen when comparing the racial backgrounds of elected officials to the populations of the two cities.)

At the same time, the composition of the electorate is steadily changing in both cities as their native stock white and black populations age and depart for more suburban settings, while the Latino and Asian populations become larger. Table 10 shows this for New York. The biggest percentage gains took place in the city's majority Asian election districts, with majority Latino election districts showing the second largest gain. Because majority white election districts had the lowest increase, their share of registered voters fell, though they still hold 42.6 percent of them. Looking at specific areas of the city shows that the largest Afro-Caribbean neighborhood had a 27.7 percent increase, Washington Heights had a 23 percent increase, the neighborhood with the most Mexicans grew 39.6 percent, and the Jackson Heights area grew 26.8 percent. Clearly, new immigrant areas of New York are growing into its political mainstream.

Table 10: Voter Registration by Ethnic Makeup of Election District
New York City, 1994-2001

Ethnic Makeup	Registered Voters 1994	Registered Voters 2001	Percent Increase
Majority Latino	484,121	620,179	28.1
Plurality Latino	150,300	189,475	26.1
Majority White	1,413,120	1,579,862	11.8
Plurality White	189,984	230,125	21.1
Majority Black	728,167	868,291	19.2
Plurality Black	82,913	101,313	22.2
Majority Asian	45,066	60,802	34.9
Plurality Asian	45,200	59,919	32.6
Total	**3,138,871**	**3,709,966**	**18.2**

SOURCE: CENTER FOR URBAN RESEARCH, NYC BOARD OF ELECTIONS

Political barriers to immigrant political empowerment:
the political and electoral systems

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS ARE NOT THE ONLY BARRIER to immigrant political mobilization. Neither city is doing a good job of mobilizing immigrant citizens who are eligible to register and vote. Mobilizing agents like candidates, political parties, labor unions, and advocacy organizations focus their activities on "prime voters" over new voters, on party members over those who are unaffiliated, and on neighborhoods with proven turnout and voting patterns over those with low turnout. Since immigrant voters are typically new, often first-time voters, and since many have not affiliated with a political party, they are often overlooked.

The voter registration system also may deter would-be immigrant voters, a problem that could be exacerbated by the recently passed Help America Vote Act. Immigrant advocates have long taken issue with the extent to which the New York City Board of Elections and the City and County Clerks offices in Los Angeles reach out to immigrant communities, promote or deter registration, and provide voters with educational materials in their own language and assistance at the polls. The new federal election law requires registrants to provide a driver's license or Social Security number, or assign a unique identifier to the registrant. Since immigrants are less likely to have a driver's license, this may have a chilling effect. In addition, first time voters in a federal election who register by mail must provide identification with the registration form or at the polls. New immigrant citizens may be less likely to have this identification.

The nature of a city's larger political system also has an impact. New York and Los Angeles have very different political systems. Although New York elections have low turnout by national standards, its partisan political system evidently does better than the non-partisan, "reformed" system of Los Angeles in drawing voters, including minority and new immigrant voters, to the polls. While further analysis is required to understand exactly why, the partisan system of New York, combined with its campaign finance program, evidently draws more minority and immigrant candidates as well as voters into the political process than do the larger districts of Los Angeles, which evidently have a higher cost of entry. Since the Democratic nominee wins most legislative elections in New York, and since native-born and immigrant minorities make up a greater share of Democratic registered voters than total registered

voters, New York's partisan political system multiplies the political impact of minority voters. In Los Angeles, the nonpartisan nature of the electoral system does not provide the same enhancement.

New York City government also delivers virtually all the major public services within its municipal boundaries, while the City of Los Angeles is only a "partial" government, delivering mostly property-related services, with the County of Los Angeles delivering most social services and independent authorities providing other key services. For example, the Los Angeles Unified School District has a separately elected board and independent taxing authority. New York City is one, large, centralized, comprehensive jurisdiction. Though it does have five separate county party organizations, mayoral elections seem to catch everyone's attention. The vast majority of funds for all public services flows through the city's budget. Though New York does have important independent agencies, particularly the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the real action is at City Hall. Mayoral appointees even direct some agencies deemed to be non-mayoral, like the Health and Hospitals Corporation and the New York City Housing Authority.

The City of Los Angeles, by contrast, is one of eighty-eight municipalities in Los Angeles County. Its city charter gives the mayor far less direct authority than in New York. Appointed boards stand between the mayor and the senior managers of many departments. Moreover, the City of Los Angeles does not perform many critical functions, like providing education or water. Both the Los Angeles Unified School District and the Metropolitan Water District have budgets approaching that of the City of Los Angeles. More important, the County of Los Angeles, with only five supervisors representing ten million people, delivers key social services in health, welfare, and many other areas. Government does not, as sometimes alleged, spend less for basic municipal functions in Los Angeles than in New York. Instead, these expenditures are spread across many more levels of government. In essence, the City of Los Angeles carries out property-related services, while Los Angeles County carries out people-related services. This may mean that property interests tune in to the politics of the city, while those concerned with human services pay more attention to the county. These differences are illustrated in Table 11.

**Table 11: Voter Participation, 2001 Mayoral Elections
New York City, City of Los Angeles**

	New York	Los Angeles
General election votes	1,519,517	469,037
Registered voters	3,737,533	1,537,787
General turnout (rv)	40.7	30.5
Primary election votes*	780,401	394,998
Primary registered voters*	2,532,773	1,537,787
Primary turnout (rv)*	30.8	25.7
Voting age citizens (est)	4,805,698	1,999,095
Voting age population	6,040,079	2,712,172
CVAP percent registered	77.8	76.9

*Democratic primary only for New York. 66,531 out of 475,058 registered
 Republicans (14 percent) participated in the Republican mayoral primary.*

SOURCE: CENTER FOR URBAN RESEARCH, BOARD OF ELECTIONS, U.S. CENSUS, 2000

Strains in the formation of multi-racial political coalitions

THE CHANGING COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATIONS and electorates of New York and Los Angeles has created growing difficulties for forging the type of coalitions among blacks, Latinos, and liberal whites that elected black mayors in the two cities. Certainly, the steady increase of minority populations and the decline of white populations coincided with an increased tendency among white Democrats in New York to defect from Democratic nominees supported by minority voters in favor of a white alternative, even one nominated by Republicans. Similarly, in Los Angeles, white voters have supported white mayoral candidates against opponents with a greater minority base. In the past, white Democrats defected from white or black Democratic mayoral nominees who had strong black support. In the 2001 primary elections, white voters in both cities did not support the first Latino candidate perceived to have a good chance of winning the mayoralty. Demographic change has also triggered more competition between native white, black, Chicano, and Puerto Rican incumbents and candidates from new immigrant ethnic groups.

These trends were on ample display during the mayoral and city council elections held in the two cities in 2001. Most notably, even though both cities had once elected African American mayors, the black leadership in neither city was able to field a strong black contender, or even any black contender, for the mayoralty, which was an open seat in both cities due to the impact of term limits. Instead, both elections featured a number of white candidates and, for the first time, Latino contenders who were able to mount strong campaigns and were generally credited with having a chance to win.

In New York, four candidates—a Latino, two Jews, and a white Catholic—ran in an primary originally scheduled for September 11, 2001, ultimately held on September 25. Fernando Ferrer, the Bronx borough president, and Public Advocate Mark Green became the leading candidates. In the primary, Ferrer, who campaigned on the need for greater attention to "the other New York" and the need to build an alliance between blacks and Latinos, edged out the liberal activist and consumer advocate Green, who previously had served as a commissioner in the Dinkins administration and had received strong African American support in his earlier campaigns. Between the primary and a runoff election on October 10, Ferrer effectively increased his already substantial black support and won an endorsement of one of his primary opponents, Speaker Peter Vallone, while the fourth primary candidate, Comptroller Alan

Hevesi, endorsed Green. As Ferrer gathered minority support, Green was left to search for votes in the white ethnic neighborhoods that had supported Vallone and Hevesi in the primary and the sitting mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, in previous elections. Green managed to win the runoff by the slim margin of 16,000 votes, but the two primaries left the Democratic electorate deeply divided. A considerable level of acrimony persisted between the Green and Ferrer camps.

When the general election took place three weeks later, on November 6, Green lost to Republican Mike Bloomberg by 35,489 votes out of 1.5 million cast. African American Democrat William Thompson also won office to succeed Alan Hevesi as comptroller, the city's second highest office. Bloomberg, a former investment banker who pioneered the provision of proprietary information to financial services firms through new technologies, recently had changed his registration from Democratic to Republican in order to bypass the Democratic primary and ensure himself a place on the general election ballot. He spent the unprecedented sum of $73 million on his campaign, inundating the airwaves toward election day. In the final analysis, Green got a larger share of the general election vote in many white neighborhoods than Ruth Messinger did in her 1997 race against Mayor Giuliani, but Bloomberg did better than Giuliani in black and Latino neighborhoods. Many of the white neighborhoods whose increased support for Green had enabled him to win the runoff election proceeded to shift their votes toward the Republican candidate in the general election. Given the high level of division among Democrats, the lingering disappointment among minority voters, especially in the Bronx, the Bloomberg campaign's vast spending, and the shift in public concern from social policy issues toward the imperative to rebuild the city's economic and physical fabric, it is remarkable that Mark Green came so close to winning. While Mayor-elect Bloomberg made significant efforts to develop a rapprochement with disaffected Democrats after the election, he remains a stalwart, if newly minted, Republican. Meanwhile, the potential coalition among blacks, Latinos, and white liberals in New York remained fragmented. Certainly money, personality, and above all September 11 had an enormous impact on this election, but its racial and ethnic dimensions were also profound.

The specific contours of the Los Angeles mayoral election in 2001 were somewhat different, but the outcome was similar. The initial mayoral primary, open to all voters regardless of party affiliation, featured six white candidates from a range of neighborhoods and ethnic

backgrounds and two Latino candidates, but, as in New York, no prominent African American. City Attorney James Hahn was one relatively liberal white candidate. The son of a former long-time Los Angeles County supervisor with strong roots in the city's Jewish and black communities, Hahn sought to defeat the more conservative Steve Soboroff, who was endorsed by departing mayor Richard Riordan, a Republican, whose main base of support was in the San Fernando Valley. The white political leadership of that part of Los Angeles also was mounting a campaign to secede from the rest of the city. The Latino candidates were former California Assembly speaker Antonio Villaraigosa and Congressman Xavier Becerra, who came from competing wings of the East Side Mexican American political establishment. Villaraigosa assembled a vigorous grass-roots campaign with strong support from the Los Angeles County Labor Federation and community-based organizations.

In the primary election on April 10, Villaraigosa emerged with about a third of the vote and Hahn with a quarter. Between the primary and general election, Hahn sought to add Soboroff's more conservative white base to his previous support among moderate whites and African Americans, while Villaraigosa sought to secure enough black support to build his Latino-white liberal base into a new progressive majority. In the closely fought June 5 general election between the two, Hahn combined conservative and liberal white and black support to narrowly edge Villaraigosa. Hahn edged Villaraigosa by only 40,000 out of half a million ballots cast. While Mayor Hahn is a liberal Democrat with strong support among African Americans, and thus more in a position to consolidate a liberal coalition reminiscent of that which supported former Mayor Tom Bradley, he angered many black leaders by firing Los Angeles' African American police chief and hiring former New York police commissioner William Bratton, who had led the Giuliani administration's charge to reduce crime rates in the early 1990s. The great majority of liberal whites, especially outside the San Fernando Valley, also backed Villaraigosa, not Hahn. Yet in the same election that Villaraigosa narrowly lost, Rocky Delgadillo, also a Mexican-American, won the city attorney's office. Meanwhile, former police chief Bernard Parks and Antonio Villaraigosa both subsequently won City Council seats on March 4, 2003. In Los Angeles as well as New York, therefore, the potential black-Latino-liberal white progressive coalition remains unconsolidated and divided.

The basic racial contours of turnout and the candidates favored in these two mayoral races are given in Tables 12 through 15. In New York, turnout among registered voters tends to be highest in white neighborhoods and lowest in Asian neighborhoods, with black and Latino neighborhoods in between, with black neighborhoods usually somewhat higher than Latino neighborhoods (Table 12). The pattern is similar in Los Angeles, except that majority black neighborhoods have enjoyed the highest level of turnout (Table 13). The two reasons explaining this pattern include demographic differences in age, income, education, voting age citizen population, home-ownership, and the like, on the one hand, and candidate ethnicity and appeal on the other. Since prominent Latino candidates generated enthusiasm among Latin primary voters in both cities, turnout in Latino neighborhoods was higher than usual in both cities.

In New York, Ferrer's success in the primary increased the turnout in the subsequent runoff election among voters in both Latino and white neighborhoods. Turnout in Latino neighborhoods then subsided in the general election, which featured two white candidates. In the Los Angeles primary, the Villaraigosa and Becerra candidacies engendered comparatively high turnout levels in Latino neighborhoods. Remarkably, turnout in Latino neighborhoods was higher than in white neighborhoods and second only to majority black neighborhoods. The chance to elect a candidate who promised to continue the Bradley legacy, even a white candidate, evidently elicited a high level of turnout in black neighborhoods, indeed higher than anywhere else in Los Angeles. The final race between Hahn and Villaraigosa did not generate similar enthusiasm in white neighborhoods, where turnout in the general election was actually below the citywide average. Clearly, the Green-Bloomberg race elicited much higher levels of interest in white neighborhoods in New York, where turnout surged.

Tables 14 and 15 show how the racial groups lined up in these elections. In New York, Fernando Ferrer began with the makings of a black-Latino coalition in the primary and clearly consolidated that in the runoff election, where he got four-fifths of the vote in Latino areas and two-thirds in black areas. He also gained ground in Asian neighborhoods. Essentially, Ferrer picked up all the non-Green votes in predominantly minority neighborhoods, while Green picked up the non-Ferrer votes in predominantly white neighborhoods. The tables turned in the general election, as voters in minority neighborhoods that had supported Ferrer swung toward the Democratic nominee, Green, while voters in white

neighborhoods that had overwhelmingly supported Green in the runoff swung toward the Republican nominee, Mike Bloomberg. Had Green been able to win more support from black and Latino voters, who normally give Democratic candidates higher levels of support, he would have won. Similarly, if he had suffered less defection in white neighborhoods that had previously supported him, he also would have won. Clearly, the divisiveness of the primary and runoff election had cost him support on the first count, while Bloomberg's massive campaign, including a timely endorsement by incumbent Mayor Rudy Giuliani, then enjoying overwhelming popularity for his role in steadying the city after the September 11 attack, cost him support among whites.

In Los Angeles, the story is quite straightforward. Villaraigosa began with strong support among voters in Latino neighborhoods, and strengthened that support considerably in the general election by inheriting neighborhoods that had voted for his Latino opponent, Congressman Xavier Becerra. Meanwhile, James Hahn increased his support substantially in black neighborhoods between the primary and general, going from a level of 60–73 percent to 68–80 percent. He also gained ground in Asian neighborhoods, which also have a substantial number of Latino residents, but did not get a majority of the vote in these neighborhoods. Hahn, however, picked up the votes of the other white candidates, well more than tripling his share of the vote in white neighborhoods. Given the advantage in registration enjoyed in this area, Hahn's ability to win substantial majorities in white, black, and even Asian neighborhoods enabled him to defeat Villaraigosa's base in Latino neighborhoods.

Normally, the most important kind of racial polarization in big city elections takes place between whites and blacks. Certainly, blacks did vote differently than whites in the New York City primary and general elections, and the two groups differed in the Los Angeles primary, though they became more aligned in the general election. The two mayoral elections, however, do demonstrate the potential for two other kinds of inter-group polarization. One is between blacks and Latinos. In New York, black voters joined Latino voters in favoring Ferrer over Green, but the situation was markedly different in Los Angeles. There, blacks and whites both favored Hahn over Villaraigosa in the primary and general election. When presented with a white candidate with ties to the African American community, black voters in Los Angeles seemed to prefer him strongly over a fellow minority Latino candi-

Table 12: New York City 2001 Primary, Runoff, and General Election Turnout by Ethnic Composition of Election District

Composition	Primary	Turnout %	Runoff	Turnout %	General	Turnout %
Majority Latino	135,357	28.8	141,822	30.1	177,469	28.6
Plurality Latino	37,625	28.8	38,249	29.3	66,139	34.9
Majority Black	209,232	29.5	206,898	29.2	303,129	34.9
Plurality Black	21,699	28.8	22,891	30.3	35,812	35.4
Majority Asian	8,615	25.1	8,096	23.6	22,586	37.2
Plurality Asian	9,501	27.4	8,579	24.7	22,901	38.2
Majority White	307,654	33.8	316,190	34.7	786,724	49.8
Plurality White	44,899	30.7	42,013	28.7	95,297	41.4
Total	774,582	30.8	784,738	31.2	1,510,057	40.7

Source: Center for Urban Research, New York City Board of Elections, U.S. Census 2000

date. New York experienced the contrary pattern: blacks strongly supported the Latino candidate in the 2001 primary and runoff elections. The Los Angeles example suggests that a coalition between blacks and Latinos cannot be taken for granted, especially if African Americans fear that their declining numbers and a rapidly growing Latino population might put their political power at risk.

The two cities also reveal a second pattern of polarization between whites and Latinos. Historically, this urban political cleavage has been less pronounced, and much less commented upon, than the black-white cleavage. Yet white voters in both cities clearly strongly favored white candidates over Latino candidates. In New York, this might be explained by the strong black support that Ferrer attracted, and thus subsumed under the black-white cleavage. At the same time, Borough President Ferrer's political career had been squarely in the mainstream, notwithstanding his emphasis on "the other New York" during the campaign. He cannot reasonably be described as a racial agitator or ideological firebrand. Moreover, as a Catholic, he could potentially appeal to the white Catholic base of such supporters as former City Council Speaker Peter Vallone. Thus the degree of polarization between white voters and the Latino candidate in the primary, runoff, and general election in New York was noteworthy. Similarly, except for those who live in the Jewish West Side of Los Angeles, white voters tilted strongly away from

Villaraigosa's candidacy in Los Angeles. This raises questions about the potential for Latino candidates and voters to be a political bridge between whites and blacks. It shows, once again, that candidates seeking to build a multi-racial coalition walk a difficult line: if they appeal too strongly for minority votes, white voters will defect, but if they appeal too strongly for white votes, minority voters may be turned off.

Table 13: Los Angeles 2001 Primary and General Election Turnout by Ethnic Composition of Precinct

	Primary	Turnout %	General	Turnout %
Majority Latino	129,012	26.3	159,191	32.5
Plurality Latino	26,063	24.0	31,162	28.7
Majority Black	31,237	29.2	37,525	35.1
Plurality Black	4,243	24.4	5,098	29.4
Majority Asian	3,136	22.3	3,746	26.7
Plurality Asian	3,926	21.9	4,673	25.8
Majority White	166,461	25.7	191,189	29.6
Plurality White	30,683	22.9	36,231	27.0
Total	39,4761	25.7	468,815	30.5

Source: Center for Urban Research, New York City Board of Elections, U.S. Census, 2000

Table 14: New York City 2001 Primary, Runoff, and General Election Vote by Ethnic Composition of Election District

	Green Primary %	Ferrer Primary %	Ferrer Runoff %	Green General %
Majority Latino	14.8	70.9	81.6	57.0
Plurality Latino	24.6	50.2	65.4	52.1
Majority Black	35.6	46.5	66.8	75.1
Plurality Black	31.3	46.1	63.3	61.7
Majority Asian	31.7	26.6	40.4	47.5
Plurality Asian	27.1	31.3	49.8	42.7
Majority White	36.2	11.6	10.9	34.9
Plurality White	31.2	30.2	43.7	45.7
Total	31.1	35.7	48.9	47.8

Source: Center for Urban Research, New York City Board of Elections, U.S. Census, 2000

Table 15: Los Angeles 2001 Primary and General Election Vote by Ethnic Composition of Precinct

	Soboroff Primary %	Hahn Primary %	Villaraigosa Primary %	Villaraigosa General %
Majority Latino	8.1	21.4	45.1	63.1
Plurality Latino	16.5	23.6	34.6	49.9
Majority Black	2.3	73.1	15.3	20.5
Plurality Black	4.9	58.3	23.1	32.1
Majority Asian	17.3	29.6	29.8	40.8
Plurality Asian	15.9	30.6	32.6	45.3
Majority White	32.1	16.7	25.9	41.6
Plurality White	21.7	19.5	33.9	48.5
Total	19.5	24.1	32.6	48.2

Source: Center for Urban Research, Los Angeles City Clerk, U.S. Census, 2000

But how did the growing diversity of minority communities affect these basic patterns of racial and ethnic cleavage? Tables 16 and 17 break down the broader categories of "black," "Latino," and "Asian" into specific national origin groups and, for New York, the ethnically distinct parts of the specific neighborhoods discussed earlier. In New York, voters in the Afro-Caribbean neighborhoods strongly resemble those in African American neighborhoods, at least in this mayoral contest. If anything, they were slightly more likely to turn out in these elections. Like African Americans, they shifted steadily in favor of Ferrer's candidacy. But Table 16 does show some interesting variation: Afro-Caribbeans in the Bronx, who were most familiar with Ferrer as their borough president, most strongly favored him, while the much larger Afro-Caribbean community in Brooklyn, at some considerable geographic and political distance from the Bronx, was noticeably less enthusiastic, moving from 40.4 percent support for Ferrer in the primary to 59.4 percent in the runoff, compared to comparable figures of 61.9 percent and 75.4 percent in Bronx Afro-Caribbean neighborhoods.

GEOGRAPHY AND ETHNICITY PLAY A ROLE for other groups as well. Voters in Dominican Washington Heights matched the enthusiasm of Ferrer's home base among Puerto Ricans in the Bronx, turning out in even higher numbers and giving him almost as much support. Only the Dominican neighborhood of Sunset Park, Brooklyn, gave him a low level of support. In Corona, Queens, initial support in Dominican neighborhoods for Ferrer was also relatively low, but it surged to nearly the same level as in Washington Heights, the city's largest Dominican neighborhood. In the general election, Dominicans outside of the Bronx were apparently somewhat more supportive of the Green candidacy than either Puerto Ricans or Dominicans in the Bronx who, dismayed at the loss of their leader, turned out at lower rates and gave the Democratic nominee less support. Within other types of Latino neighborhoods, especially those with more recent immigration from Mexico or South America in Queens, turnout levels, support for Ferrer, and support for Green in the general election were markedly lower. This suggests that while Dominicans have joined Puerto Ricans as mainstays of the Democratic Party in New York, that process is still in a much earlier stage, or may even not be developing, for newer Latino immigrant groups. Finally, voters in all of the various Asian neighborhoods provided comparatively low levels of support for Ferrer in the primaries and Green in the general election. There also are markedly different kinds of political behavior taking place in Manhattan's Chinatown (which includes some Puerto Rican residents among the Chinese) as compared to other Chinese and Asian neighborhoods. Chinese and other Asian voters are less likely than other minority groups to register as Democrats, although half still do, and many do not designate a party choice.

Table 16: New York City 2001 Primary and General Election Vote by Ethnic Neighborhood

	Primary	Turnout	Ferrer %	Runoff	Ferrer %	General	Turnout	Green %
Brooklyn Afro-Caribbean	68,811	29.1	40.4	67,120	59.4	103,388	35.2	73.7
Jamaica Afro-Caribbean	39,358	28.7	42.5	38,423	69.2	61,292	35.9	72.4
Bronx Afro-Caribbean	9,849	31.1	61.9	11,303	75.4	13,942	35.3	70.9
Brooklyn African American	27,628	27.5	42.4	26,772	63.4	38,898	31.3	75.4
Jamaica African American	2,121	27.2	41.1	2117	69.2	2,924	30.8	79.2
Harlem African American	15,101	31.3	45.2	15,369	64.4	19,379	33.5	76.2
Bronx Puerto Rican	24,741	31.6	58.6	26,233	67.1	38,676	34.9	45.4
Sunset Park Puerto Rican	5,318	31.3	34.2	4,688	55.2	8,549	36.8	63.8
Bronx Dominican	2,290	32.7	58.1	2,659	63.7	3,422	36.3	53.2
Washington Hts Dominican	26,280	35.2	56.5	26,098	66.4	37,474	38.1	57.6
Corona Dominican	2,365	30.9	40.3	2,475	63.5	3,636	36.1	65.2
Queens Mexican	2,841	29.9	31.2	3,415	49.2	6,118	49.5	42.2
Bushwick Mexican	944	28.6	27.4	519	42.8	1,708	35.7	42.6
Flushing Chinese	1,045	32.8	7.8	917	16.5	2,263	45.4	34.1
Elmhurst Chinese	4,223	32.7	8.8	4,465	16.4	11,659	47.7	31.2
Sunset Park Chinese	19,179	26.8	9.0	18,816	15.7	53,697	42.2	27.9
Chinatown	7,773	30.0	30.8	7,865	39.7	15,403	38.0	57.1
Flushing Asian	4,962	32.3	23.5	4,632	37.2	11,176	44.7	40.6
Elmhurst Asian	5,194	31.6	13.7	5,042	21.9	11,993	43.9	38.5
Richmond Hill Asian	5,689	23.4	37.5	5,570	52.9	13,665	33.6	39.3
Flushing Korean	8,570	33.8	7.4	8,446	17.3	24,414	51.1	29.2

SOURCE: CENTER FOR URBAN RESEARCH, NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF ELECTIONS, U.S. CENSUS, 2000

LOS ANGELES PRESENTS A DIFFERENT PICTURE. In that city, the tendency of Latinos and Asians to live nearby, and even intermixed with, one another, seems to have led to a political affinity. Villaraigosa received strong support from voters in Chinese and Korean neighborhoods, though slightly less support from the largest Asian group in Los Angeles, Filipinos (Table 17). As in New York, the Latino and Asian populations are growing rapidly, while the white and native black populations are declining. This pattern of electoral support suggest the possibility for forging a more durable coalition.

Interestingly, a significant difference does emerge between by far the largest group, Mexican Americans, and voters living in neighborhoods dominated by Los Angeles' second largest Latino group, Salvadorans. While the latter ended up giving Villaraigosa a slim majority of their votes, they were nowhere near as enthusiastic as voters living in Mexican neighborhoods. This suggests that, as in New York, bigger and better established Latino groups have not yet established a common bond with newer groups from Latin America.

Table 17: Los Angeles 2001 Primary and General Election Vote by Ethnic Neighborhood

	Primary	Turnout %	Hahn %	Villaraigosa %	General	Turnout %	Villaraigosa %
Mexican	47,036	27.8	14.4	52.4	59,079	34.9	72.9
Salvadoran	49,349	26.3	31.5	36.9	59,310	31.6	52.3
Filipino	11,998	27.1	16.6	37.0	14,694	33.2	52.6
Korean	14,396	23.3	25.0	42.0	17,262	27.9	48.8
Chinese	3,597	23.2	12.6	46.7	4,202	27.1	67.0

SOURCE: CENTER FOR URBAN RESEARCH, LOS ANGELES CITY CLERK, U.S. CENSUS 2000

IF THERE IS SOME DEGREE OF INTER-ETHNIC COOPERATION among racial and ethnic minority neighborhoods in citywide politics, it does not follow that this also will operate for local elected offices, especially City Council seats, where candidates from different ethnic groups may be directly pitted against each other. The 2001 elections in New York provide a particularly good cross-section of this type of inter-group competition. Drawing on the neighborhood analysis of the previous section, we can identify the following council elections as having particular interest:

• Alan Gerson's victory over several Asian American candidates in Manhattan District 1, which includes the traditional Chinatown. Asians are a plurality of this district, but whites make up the predominant share of the registered voters.

• The victory of Maria Baez, a Puerto Rican, in District 14 in the Bronx, the heavily Latino area of the western side of the South Bronx shared by Dominicans and Puerto Ricans. The district has more Dominicans, but Puerto Ricans predominate in the electorate, which also has a substantial native black component.

• The victory of John Liu, the council's first Chinese-American, in Queens District 20. This is the Flushing Asian area described above, and though the district's population is a quarter Chinese, they make up only 17 percent of its registered voters. The district also has substantial white and Latino populations.

• The victory of Hiram Monserrate, a Puerto Rican, in Queens District 21. This is part of the heavily Latino district described above, where Puerto Ricans make up only 3.4 percent of the district's population, while Dominicans, Ecuadorans, Colombians, and Mexicans make up the bulk of it.

• The victory of Helen Sears, a white, in Queens District 25, which is only 18.3 percent white, but a third Latino and a third Asian. It, too, covers part of the highly diverse area Queens described above.

• The victory of Diana Reyna, a Dominican, in Brooklyn District 34, a mixed Latino area where Puerto Ricans substantially outnumber Dominicans.

• The victory of Caribbean-American Yvette Clarke in Brooklyn's District 40, where Afro-Caribbeans comprise 41.6 percent of the population and African Americans about 32.5 percent.

• The victory of Kendall Stewart, also an Afro-Caribbean, in Brooklyn District 45, which has an Afro-Caribbean population of 46.2 percent and an African American population of 34.7 percent.

Similarly, in Los Angeles, two council districts included heavily immigrant areas of interest:

• The victory of Ed Reyes, a Mexican American, against another Mexican American, David Sanchez, and a Japanese-American candidate, Fumio Nakahiro, in the First District, which includes the heavily Latino and Korean areas of Pico Union west of downtown but stretches to Lincoln Heights and part of Mt. Washington to the east of Dodger Stadium.

• The victory of Jan Perry, an African American, who ran second in a six-candidate primary that included a Latino candidate, and later won a runoff election against Carl Washington, another African American, in the Ninth District, which includes part of South Central, the historically black neighborhood that is becoming increasingly Latino.

Neighborhood politics in the diverse neighborhoods of New York City

First, we examine the city council districts encompassing the highly diverse neighborhoods described above. Table 18 presents the ethnic makeup of these districts.

Table 18: Population Composition by Council District, New York City

District	1	14	20	21	25	34	40	45
Population	143,210	159,985	160,026	182,556	165,722	141,755	137,081	149,964
White	38.4	3.5	26.6	7.8	18.3	9.4	4.8	6.5
Black	4.1	24.5	3.8	9.9	7.0	22.1	74.1	80.9
Asian	42.2	3.0	47.2	12.1	33.2	3.6	3.1	1.8
Latino	12.4	66.3	18.6	67.6	37.4	62.1	13.7	7.2
West Indian	0.5	4.7	1.6	3.4	1.9	3.7	41.6	46.2
Chinese	38.1	0.4	23.2	5.6	12.1	2.5	0.9	0.4
Puerto Ricans	5.4	21.4	2.7	3.4	2.9	29.6	3.4	2.6
Dominicans	2.5	23.6	1.6	14.2	3.0	11.0	1.6	0.5
Mexicans	0.6	3.1	0.7	10.9	5.7	6.3	2.4	0.7
Ecuadorans	0.2	1.2	1.1	10.6	4.8	2.8	0.2	0.1
Colombians	0.2	0.2	3.4	7.3	7.0	0.4	0.2	0.1
Registered Voters	73,776	57,604	56,849	50,183	53,841	72,266	55,475	65,253
Democrats	64.4	77.6	57.4	70.1	59.9	77.8	79.6	81.3
No Party	21.4	13.9	22.3	17.0	21.6	13.6	5.5	12.2
Republicans	5.6	2.1	17.1	10.3	15.3	5.8	4.4	4.6
Latino	7.2	50.8	12.3	40.6	22.7	27.1	8.6	5.9
Chinese	11.1	0.2	16.9	3.9	9.1	1.2	1.1	0.8

Source: Center for Urban Research, New York city Board of Elections, U.S. Census, 2000.
Latino groups as reported in the census, not the Mumford Center estimates. "Other Hispanics" are not reported here.

District 1

District 1 includes the bottom tip of Manhattan, stretching from Chinatown on the east around to Battery Park City on the west. As with many council districts, it is a study in contrasts: Chinatown is a dense, working class, immigrant community, while the soaring luxury apartment buildings of Battery Park City house some of the highest-income families in New York City. The district also includes Puerto Rican and Dominican families living in the southern part of the Lower East Side. As Table 18 shows, the resident population is highly diverse; Asians constitute a slight plurality, but because they are much less likely to be citizens, the voting power in the district is primarily concentrated in its white neighborhoods. The district was constructed initially in 1991 on the theory that it would provide the possibility for the election of a Chinese member of the City Council and that cross-racial support for a Chinese candidate would be more likely to come from white voters than from Latino voters. (An alternative redistricting plan for the area would have placed Chinatown and the Latino Lower East Side in the same district.) The 1991 Districting Commission was persuaded by the Asian Americans for Equality's argument that white voters were more likely to support an Asian candidate than were Latinos, especially if a Latino was running against an Asian. As a result, the Districting Commission sought to draw two districts separating Chinese from Latino residents. Subsequent elections in 1997 and 2001 were tests of this proposition. In the first post-redistricting, a white candidate won office against several Asian candidates.

"It's a good thing so many are running, but if your platform is about empowerment,
then you ought to be able to unite."

— the director of the Chinese American Planning Council, as told to Andrew Hsiao of the *Village Voice*

District 1 has frustrated many Asian Americans since it was created in 1991. At that time, many hoped that the new contours of the area would produce the first Asian American representative to the City Council in New York City history. It didn't happen. Part of the reason is that the district includes the wealthy white neighborhoods of Battery Park City, Soho, and Tribeca, along with the much poorer Chinatown. The area is also ethnically diverse: Asians are the plurality, but there are many whites as well as some Latinos and blacks. Only 24 percent of registered voters in it are of Asian descent. These factors have made every City Council race an East/West, Asian/white split. Another part of the reason was that several Asian candidates might split the Asian vote.

Although incumbent Kathryn Freed had beaten Asian American opponents in the past, when term limits forced her out in 2001, public funding for campaigns led to new hope among Asians that they could elect one of their own in 2001. Nonetheless, the dynamics that had hampered Asians in the past once more coalesced to enable a white candidate, Alan Gerson, to win.

Three white men (one of whom was openly gay), one white woman, two Asian American men, and one Asian American woman ran for the seat. Given that whoever gets a plurality of the votes wins the primary, and given that Democratic nominees generally win the general election, Asian American voters might have determined the outcome if they had voted in force and in unison.

Since there were three Asians in the race, it seemed clear that this would not happen. Each Asian candidate had a significant base, but also hoped to extend his or her support beyond that base. The pattern of endorsements suggest that whites were divided, too. For example, despite the presence of a gay candidate, Brad Hoylman, Assemblywoman Deborah Glick, a lesbian, endorsed John Fratta. Other major gay political groups and elected officials endorsed Alan Gerson. Manhattan's African American borough president, C. Virginia Fields, endorsed Gerson as well. The Working Families Party, a pro-labor, progressive group, endorsed Rocky Chin, despite the presence of Kwong Hui, a labor activist.

In the end, Alan Gerson won the Democratic primary with 3,310 votes, with another white candidate, Brad Hoylman, coming in second. Rocky Chin came in third, Margaret Chin fourth, and Kwong Hui a distant last. As the director of the Chinese American Planning Council told Andrew Hsiao of the *Village Voice*, "It's a good thing so many are running, but if your platform is about empowerment, then you ought to be able to unite." Council Member Gerson's political consultant saw it as a contest between Gerson and Hoylman from the beginning. He believes that the Chinese candidates were not competitive because many Chinese voters do not enroll in the Democratic Party, that the Chinese candidates all came from left ideological backgrounds while Chinese Democrats are more focused on service delivery, and that only Gerson campaigned in all parts of the district. During the campaign, Gerson had said, "If they elect me, my name is Gore Are Lun," and the Chinese characters for his name were displayed on his campaign literature.

IN 2001, THREE ASIAN AMERICAN CANDIDATES RAN: Margaret Chin, an official of Asian Americans for Equality who had been instrumental in the initial design of the district, Rocky Chin, a lawyer with the city's Human Rights Commission (no relation to Margaret), and Kwong Hui, a labor activist. Four native white candidates also ran, with Alan Gerson, the eventual winner, being most prominent. (See sidebar story.) The Chinese candidates together received 5,849 votes, the white candidates 8,973. Thus though votes were spread across all candidates, Gerson, with a mere 3,199 votes, bested several runner-ups, including another white candidate with 2,584 votes and Rocky Chin, with 2,510 votes. If Rocky Chin and Margaret Chin had not divided their constituency, it is likely that one or another of them might have won more votes than Gerson.

The emergence of two relatively strong Chinese candidates undercut the ability of Chinese voters to combine their limited electoral power behind one of their own. Multivariate analysis reveals a highly negative relationship (partial correlation of -.850) between the white proportion of the population in a given election district and the vote share going to one of the Chinese candidates.[5] A separate analysis shows that, conversely, the voters living in election districts with more Chinese residents were highly likely to support one of the Chinese candidates (partial correlation of .826), while voting in election districts with higher Latino shares was also moderately positive (partial correlation of .196). Support from Latino areas was substantially stronger for Rocky Chin than Margaret Chin, possibly owing to Rocky Chin's service as a lawyer on housing discrimination issues, while support from Chinese areas was slightly stronger for Margaret Chin than Rocky Chin. In this instance, the competition between two candidates from the same background was reinforced by white-Asian racial polarization in the electorate. The Rocky Chin campaign's success in gaining Latino support gave some credence to the idea that those groups might form a compatible district together, although a head-to-head race between Chinese and Latino candidates might show polarization between the groups at the same level as between whites and Asians. Whites certainly did not appear inclined to support a Chinese candidate over one of the white candidates. Further-

more, since new Chinese voters often do not designate a party membership when they register, as was the case for 21.4 percent of the district's voters, this undercuts their potential influence in a Democratic primary.

District 14

THIS DISTRICT ON THE WESTERN SIDE OF THE SOUTH BRONX contains many Puerto Rican and African American residents, but it has also been experiencing a steady influx of Dominicans from Washington Heights, just across the East River in Manhattan, a process described in the earlier section on Latino neighborhoods. As Table 18 shows, its population is highly diverse: a quarter black and two-thirds Latino, with substantial populations of Dominicans as well as Puerto Ricans. The former slightly outnumbered the latter in the 2000 Census, but Puerto Ricans, as citizens, wield the larger share of the Latino registered vote. It is one of the most heavily Democratic districts anywhere in New York City in terms of registration.

In 2001, four Puerto Rican and one black candidate ran for the Democratic nomination. None of the Latino candidates ran on a platform of mobilizing the Dominican voters as a distinct ethnic block of voters. (It does not appear that the Puerto Rican candidates made an issue of their ethnicity, nor do we know that Dominican voters would have preferred voting for a Dominican candidate, but in any case no such candidate stepped forward.) The leading candidate was Maria Baez, a district leader, a former chief of staff for a senior Bronx city councilman, and clerk of the Bronx office of the Board of Elections. She had the support of the Bronx County Democratic Organization. Also running for the office were Israel Ruiz, a former council member who had given up his seat in an unsuccessful bid to become borough president, and Charles Williams, an African American supported by another Bronx Democratic faction headed by Pedro Espada. In the event, Baez received 4,460 votes, Ruiz 3,138, and Williams 1,954. Here, the most interesting questions were whether voters in Dominican election districts joined those from Puerto Rican areas in supporting Baez and whether blacks lined up behind the black candidate. Multivariate analysis reveals that the presence of a Dominican pop-

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[5] In the following analyses, the proportion of the vote going to a candidate was the dependent variable in a regression equation using the racial and ethnic components of the population as independent variables, with the white population share as the omitted reference group. When white voting is described, the regression analysis omits all other groups. The partial correlation is the standardized coefficient, akin to the usual correlation coefficient, except in this case it is "partial" in the sense that other populations have been controlled and the coefficient measures only that part of the causal influence attributed to the given factor. Except where noted, all these coefficients are statistically significant at the .05 level or better and all the regression equations are significant at the .01 level or better. Only election districts with twenty or more votes cast were included in the analysis to prevent small size from skewing the percentage distributions.

ulation was even more strongly associated with the Baez vote (partial correlation of .337) than the Puerto Rican population (.149, not significant), owing to the fact that Puerto Ricans showed support as well for Ruiz, but he got little support from Dominican areas. Blacks also gave Baez some support (.099, not significant), while giving the black candidate moderately strong support (.480). In this case, the capacity of the Bronx Democratic organization to shape the outcome is quite clear and was bolstered by the willingness of Dominican voters to back the Puerto Rican candidate.

District 20

DISTRICT 20 COVERS THE SECTION OF FLUSHING, QUEENS, that has received substantial immigration from China, Taiwan, Korea, and elsewhere in East Asia. A middle class neighborhood of apartment buildings and detached homes, its business district along Main Street is a testament to the vibrancy of the Asian ethnic enclave. With a substantial minority of the population being the middle-class whites who once dominated the area, it is now approaching majority Asian, among whom Chinese are the predominant group, along with a substantial Latino population. Previously, the neighborhood was represented by a white woman who had made remarks to a *New York Times* reporter disparaging the congestion and dirtiness of public spaces she thought had been brought on by the new immigrants, saying it was "an invasion, not assimilation." Because of term limits, the seat was open in 2001 and provided the opportunity for the city to elect its first Chinese-American council person. (See sidebar.) The Democratic primary featured candidates born in China, Taiwan, and Korea, as well as an Italian-American. The leading candidate, John Liu, is from a family of Taiwanese bankers in New York City, was well educated, raised the maximum amount of funding, and received the endorsement of the Queens County Democratic Organization. His chief rival, Ethel Chen, had a long history of community activism in the neighborhood.

It appears that white voters, who make up the majority of the electorate despite being only a quarter of the population, favored Liu over the other Asian candidates, though some voted for the white candidate, Richard Jannaccio. (The partial correlation between the Liu vote share and the white population share was .389.) Voters living in Taiwanese neighborhoods, who make up the bulk of the Chinese, also favored him (partial correlation .208), while voters in neighborhoods populated by mainland Chinese voted against

him (partial correlation of -.275), as did voters living in Latino neighborhoods (-.329). People living in neighborhoods where mainland Chinese predominated favored Chen, while voters in Korean neighborhoods favored the Korean candidate, Terence Park. In this case, support from a specific Chinese ethnicity, Taiwanese, combined with white support stemming from county party support and the fragmentation of other Asian national origin groups behind their own candidates enabled one Asian candidate to pull slightly ahead of the others and soundly defeat the native white candidate. Liu received 202 votes more votes than Chen, gaining 27,59 out of a total of 8,928 ballots cast.

District 21

UNTIL 2001, THIS HEAVILY IMMIGRANT LATINO DISTRICT was represented by Helen Marshall, an African American former state assembly member who became Queens borough president in 2001. Marshall drew strong support from the long-time black community in Corona that, though a relatively small share of the district population, is a middle-class enclave with a long history of political activity. In the 2001 Democratic primary, four Latinos made it onto the ballot: Hiram Monserrate, a Puerto Rican former police officer and district leader; Angel Del Vilar, a Dominican lawyer and community activist; Aida Gonzalez-Jarrin, a former district leader and cultural affairs officer for the borough president; and Luis Rosero, an Ecuadoran former staff member to Congresswoman Nydia Velazquez. (See sidebar.) Monserrate received the endorsement of the Queens County Democratic organization and led in fund-raising, but Borough President Claire Schulman endorsed her staff member Gonzalez-Jarrin, while the *New York Times* and *Newsday* endorsed Rosero.

Monserrate won the primary with 3,718 of the 9,042 votes cast, with Rosero coming in second with 2,459 and the other two candidates splitting the remainder. The vote did not seem to break down strongly along ethnic lines. Multivariate analysis shows that voters in Dominican neighborhoods did support the Dominican candidate, Del Vilar (partial correlation of .549) over Monserrate (.005, not significant), but voters in election districts with more Puerto Rican residents evidently split their votes across Gonzalez-Jarrin, Rosero, and Monserrate. Del Vilar also received substantial support in black areas (partial correlation of .549). Monserrate's success thus did not stem from his ability to mobilize the Puerto Ricans of the district, nor to draw voters in Dominican areas away from the Dominican candidate.

"This is probably the most high-profile council race in all of New York City right now," said candidate Luis Rosero. "We're talking about the changing demographics not only of Queens but also of the city and the Democratic Party itself."

NEWSDAY, AUGUST 8, 2001

Luis Rosero, a Democratic primary candidate in the race for City Council in the "Hispanic heartland of Queens," wasn't exaggerating. The 2001 campaign to succeed Helen Marshall, now Queens borough president, in District 21 amply illustrates the complicated impact of changing demographics on local politics.

Though the race began with eleven candidates, it narrowed down to four in the primary, all competing to represent the Jackson Heights, East Elmhurst, and Corona neighborhoods of Queens, just south of LaGuardia Airport. Despite the fact that more than half of its residents are Latino, the district had never elected a Latino to the City Council B nor had any other in the entire borough of Queens.

So it was noteworthy enough that the district was likely to elect Queens' first Hispanic council member. But the art of campaigns lies in establishing difference, and since all four candidates were Latino, it was necessary for each to get even more specific. Since they had few differences on policy issues, the focus turned to country of origin, and the candidates were as diverse as the district itself. Hiram Monserrate, a former police officer and district leader, was Puerto Rican. Angel Del Vilar was a Dominican who co-founded the Dominican-Hispanic Congress for Community Empowerment. Both Luis Rosero and Aida Gonzalez-Jarrin were Ecuadoran.

The tensions among the candidates about their nationality illustrates the relativity of politics. Although Puerto Ricans still have not attained as much political representation as whites and African Americans, newer immigrant groups see them as the entrenched power. So Monserrate's opponents felt that the Queens Democratic Party's support of his campaign reflected its lack of concern about the diversity of the Latino population in the district. "The Queens machine, they still believe that everyone that speaks Spanish is Puerto Rican, and that's not true," Angel Del Vilar told Ron Howell of *Newsday*. Monserrate's other opponents portrayed him, according to Howell, as someone "brought in by [a] Bronx Puerto Rican [Democratic] machine" trying to extend its influence, thereby ignoring new immigrant communities from the Dominican Republic, Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru. They even accused him of attempting to portray himself as a Dominican.

It was ironic that despite the district's Latino majority, candidates focused much of their campaign on whites and African Americans because of their higher voter turnout. Angel Del Vilar told the *New York Times* that he went after African Americans in East Elmhurst because "They come out to vote 95 percent in the primary. It's the only group like that in this district." Aida Gonzalez-Jarrin also appealed to the "shrinking white and black populations" by committing to "work for and protect their institutions." Monserrate dispatched Assemblyman Ivan Lafayette to campaign for the votes of Jews in Jackson Heights.

Ultimately, Monserrate won the primary with 41 percent of the vote. But the tensions did not go away even after the votes had been tallied. An April 2002 article in *Resumen*, a Queens Spanish-language publication, critiqued Monserrate for everything from fraud to ignoring drainage problems to not having hired a cleaning service for his office. It also accused him of having manifested "aggression against Dominican people" during his campaign against Del Vilar, the third place finisher. Today, Monserrate co-chairs the City Council's Black, Latino, and Asian Caucus and is readying himself for the re-election campaign.

SOURCES: RON HOWELL, "EXPERIMENT IN THE POLITICS OF COMMUNITY DISTRICT SEEN AS "'LAB' OF POLITICAL SHIFT," *NEWSDAY*, AUGUST 8, 2001, P. A25.
JONATHAN P. HICKS, "RACE FOR CITY HALL: QUEENS: FOUR-WAY CONTEST FOR COUNCIL IN BOROUGH'S LATINO HEARTLAND," *NEW YORK TIMES*, SEPTEMBER 6, 2001.
SETH KUGEL, "NEIGHBORHOOD REPORT: NEW YORK ELECTIONS; CANDIDATES' FIELD GUIDE; FINDING THE REAL VOTERS," *NEW YORK TIMES*, SEPTEMBER 9, 2001.
BOLIVAR BALCACER, "FOR DOMINICANS IN QUEENS, A DIM VIEW OF COUNCILMAN HIRAM MONSERRATE," *RESUMEN*, APRIL 18, 2002.

Instead, he got strong support from voters in black neighborhoods (partial correlation of .431) and neighborhoods with Colombians, Ecuadorans, and Peruvians (.851). While many white voters evidently followed the lead of Borough President Schulman by supporting Gonzalez-Jarrin, some also voted for Monserrate. He thus won the election not on the basis of his own ethnic group, but because he got support from the African Americans who had previously supported Helen Marshall, the most middle-class Latino group, and some white support. The other candidates had neither intense enough support from their own group, nor came from a sufficiently big group, to compete against this coalition. This outcome had less to do with ethnic mobilization or polarization and more to do with access to party support and campaign financing.

District 25

DISTRICT 25 IS JUST WEST OF DISTRICT 21 IN QUEENS and it houses the other, more Asian half of the emerging multi-cultural immigrant mix described above as perhaps the most diverse part of New York City, or even the United States. Whites and blacks together comprise only a quarter of the district, while Asians and Latinos each provide more than a third. Chinese are the single largest immigrant ethnic group and they tend to come from the mainland as opposed to the Taiwanese who are more prevalent in Flushing. However, as Table 18 shows, Latino registered voters outnumber Chinese registered voters by more than two to one. The Asian registered voters of the district are less likely to affiliate with the Democratic party, and thus less eligible to vote in the Democratic primary. The district also reaches from Jackson Heights, Elmhurst, and East Elmhurst through part of Corona down to Rego Park, a middle class white neighborhood. Even though whites make up only 18 percent of the population, they are nearly all voting age citizens who have long been active in city politics. Quite probably, they comprise a majority of the Democratic primary electorate and the district has elected white candidates since redistricting in 1991.

In 2001, one Chinese candidate, community school board member Louisa Chan, and four white candidates ran for the Democratic nomination. Chan came in last, while Helen Sears, a district leader and community affairs administrator at Elmhurst Hospital who was supported by the County Organization, won 2,705 of the 8,571 votes cast, followed by runner-up Jimmy Van Bramer, a white gay candidate, and Rudolph Greco, an Italian American attorney and Jackson Heights neighborhood activist, who each got several times more

votes than Chan. Chan's total was undoubtedly depressed by the fact that the County Organization successfully challenged her petitions and she was reinstated only shortly before the contest. In this race, Chan got very strong support from voters in Chinese areas (partial correlation .896), as well as some support from black and Latino voters, but white and black voters much more strongly favored Sears rather than the other white candidates.

District 34

THIS DISTRICT STRETCHES FROM THE LATINO neighborhoods of Williamsburg eastward through Bushwick toward Ridgewood, a neighborhood just across the Brooklyn-Queens border. It includes not only some of the poorest census tracts in New York City and the traditionally Puerto Rican neighborhoods that expanded across the Williamsburg Bridge from Manhattan's Lower East Side, but also an increasing population of Latino immigrant populations. Though Puerto Ricans remain dominant among the district's Spanish speakers, Dominicans, Mexicans, and Ecuadorans have all moved into the neighborhood in recent years. Where it abuts Bedford-Stuyvesant, it also includes a significant black population, many living in large public housing projects.

The main political force, especially in the eastern part of the district, is Vito Lopez, the area's assemblyman, founder of the Ridgewood Bushwick Senior Center, and patron of many other local social service organizations. For the open council seat, he backed his second generation Dominican chief of staff, Diana Reyna, who also was the executive director of the Lopez political club. The main competition came from Juan Martinez, the Puerto Rican president of School Board 14, who was backed by Congresswoman Nydia Velazquez and several other local political clubs. Martinez had been removed from his school board position by a previous chancellor concerned about malfeasance in the district, but he was subsequently reinstated. Ed Norman, an African American candidate, was brother of Assemblyman Clarence Norman, the head of the Kings County Democratic Party.

The primary attracted only 13,898 of the district's 56,223 Democrats. Reyna edged out Martinez by 6,351 to 5,780 votes, with Norman taking only 1,767. While Reyna's base of support was only somewhat defined by ethnic factors, those of Martinez and Norman were strongly so. Martinez attracted strong support from voters in Puerto Rican and Mexican areas (partial

correlations of .336 and .244), while voters in the Dominican and Ecuadoran neighborhoods clearly leaned away from him (partial correlations of -.291 and -.288). The black share of the population was strongly negatively related to the Reyna vote, and weakly but insignificantly negatively related to the Martinez vote. The Reyna vote was a mirror image of this, gaining strong support in Dominican and Ecuadoran areas, with less support from voters in Puerto Rican areas (-.131, not significant). Conversely, the Norman vote was strongly positively related to the black population (.737) and negatively related to the Puerto Rican population (-.230).

This election therefore shows signs of significant ethnic polarization, with black voters strongly favoring the African American candidate, Puerto Rican voters favoring the Puerto Rican candidate, and Dominican voters favoring the Dominican candidate. Since the district's black population is relatively small, the Norman candidacy effectively took the black vote out of play in deciding the race between Reyna and Martinez. Since Puerto Rican voters outnumber Dominican voters in the district, how then did Reyna narrowly defeat Martinez, especially as she got more opposition in black neighborhoods? Part of the answer is that Reyna got moderately positive support from the small remaining white population of the district (partial correlation of .161, not significant). More important was the fact that support from the Lopez organization kept all of the other groups, except blacks, from polarizing sharply against her, even though they mainly favored other candidates. As a result, when combined with support from places where Dominicans and Ecuadorans live, she was able to win.

District 40

DISTRICT 40 ENCOMPASSES THE HEART of the West Indian neighborhood of Flatbush, Brooklyn. In the last thirty years, Brooklyn's Afro-Caribbean community pushed steadily southward from its initial point of settlement in Crown Heights into Flatbush, the fabled neighborhood where Barbra Streisand, Woody Allen, and Alan Dershowitz grew up. A middle-class area of apartment houses on the avenues and detached homes on the side streets, Flatbush represented a definite step on the ladder of upward mobility not just for the Jews who settled there between the 1940s and the 1970s, but also for Afro-Caribbeans who subsequently moved in. By 2000, as Table 18 shows, the area was three-quarters black and 40 percent West Indian. Flatbush and Nostrand Avenues, main commercial thoroughfares for this community, run through the

center of the district. It is not surprising that the district produced one of the first of two West Indian members of the City Council, Una Clarke, after the 1991 redistricting.

In the 2001 election, with Clarke leaving office owing to term limits, six candidates from varying Afro-Caribbean backgrounds sought to replace her. Chief among them was her daughter, Yvette Clarke, who was born in Brooklyn, educated at Oberlin College, and worked as an economic development administrator in the Bronx. Being the daughter of a popular and articulate incumbent certainly gave Clarke a considerable advantage. Other candidates included Alithia Alleyne, a second generation Barbadian/Panamanian government affairs specialist at the Brooklyn Museum, and former Clarke staff member; Frances Purcell, a real estate broker born in Curacao; Edward A. Roberts, a Trinidadian attorney and former housing official; Wellington Sharpe, a West Indian businessman; and Jean Vernet, a Haitian rights activist.

The election showed some ethnic polarization. The proportion of votes received by the Haitian candidate, Jean Vernet, was strongly correlated (partial .324) with the Haitian share of the population. As the front runner, however, Clarke attracted votes from many different West Indian groups (except for Haitians) as well as African Americans. Out of 11,262 votes cast, Clarke received 4,076, with the other five candidates splitting the remainder. The second place candidate, Frances Purcell, received 1,958 votes, drawing more support from the district's Panamanians and other Central Americans (Panama has a significant West Indian-origin population). Since all the candidates beside Vernet shared an Anglophone West Indian background, they each drew not only from voters connected with their home islands (which gave the advantage to Clarke, who is from a Jamaican background) but from other West Indian voters.

District 45

TO THE SOUTH AND EAST OF CLARKE'S FLATBUSH district is District 45, southern Flatbush and East Flatbush. This is the most recent, most middle class part of the West Indian expansion into South Brooklyn. Detached, owner-occupied housing predominates in the neighborhood. As the older Jewish and Italian households departed, upwardly mobile West Indian families moved in. Since their households typically contained several workers, while the departing whites were often retired people, racial transition was accompanied by an increase in household incomes over recent decades.

"We made history tonight. We are in a new era, where all the people of New York City will finally have equal representation. I do realize that I am breaking a barrier....There will be very high expectations, a lot of responsibilities to fulfill, and I'm ready for it."

John Liu (Associated Press, November 6, 2001)

City Council District 20 is another of the epicenters of demographic change in New York City, propelled by immigration and naturalization, particularly from Taiwan and Korea. By now, the district, centered around Flushing, Queens, is close to half Asian. New York City as a whole is one-tenth Asian. But this is only the most recent of many waves of immigrants for District 20. At different times, the neighborhood has been Irish, Italian, and Jewish. As with Asians today, every new group has had to endure discrimination and hostility. The previous council representative, Julia Harrison, remarked to *New York Times* reporter Somini Sengupta, that Asians were "colonizers" causing "high crime, low wages, and high real estate prices." She subsequently apologized.

Despite the district's many Asian Americans residents, less than half the adults are registered voters. And until 2001, no district had elected an Asian to the City Council. The 2001 Democratic primary and general elections featured eight candidates from four parties. Four were Asian Americans: two Tawianese, one Chinese, and one Korean. Three Asian candidates ran as Democrats, while the Korean candidate ran as a Green Party candidate. The other Green candidate was Italian-American, the Republican candidate was white, and the Independence Party candidate was Puerto Rican. Hopes ran high that an Asian would finally emerge as a City Council member.

The primary election was so close that the Board of Elections took several days to certify it. It came down to a horse race between Ethel Chen and John Liu. Ultimately, Liu, a PricewaterhouseCoopers consultant and community leader, won the primary by 200 votes and went on to win the general election easily, thus passing a milestone for Asian American political empowerment.

Success did not come quickly for Liu. In 1997, as an insurgent candidate against the incumbent Julia Harrison, he lost. When term limits barred Harrison from running again in 2001, Democratic Party support coupled with ample campaign funds, much of it from Chinese-American developers, enabled Liu to mount a stronger campaign. This time, however, Harrison chose to campaign for another Asian candidate, Ethel Chen.

Both before and after the election, Liu worried about political apathy among Asian American voters, which he told *InvAsian Journal* explained the lack of adequate Asian political representation in the city. While trying to get Asians more involved in the political process, Liu also argued that Asians must must forge coalitions to achieve political power. He told *InvAsian* that the state of inter-minority relations was "decent," but went on to say, "I think we need a lot of improvements, though. I think there's a generation gap also, even within the Asian community. With the younger generation, there's certainly a lot more coalition building going on with other ethnic and racial groups. The older generation, we're still a bit insular in the commu-nity. And a lot of it has to do with language gaps or differences in cultural behavior and approach. But I think we're heading in the right direction." Earlier, on election day, perhaps reflecting on the diverse makeup of the district, he had observed to the Associated Press, "There is no Puerto Rican or Chinese or Italian way to pick up the garbage or pick up the snow....The issues facing this district affect us all, and we will solve these issues together."

Sources:

Steven Johng, "The Rock in the River: New York City's First Asian American Councilmember Speaks on Race, Bridging Gaps," *InvAsian Journal*, Issue 2.

Somini Sengupta, "Campaigning for City Hall: The Council; In Flushing, a Chance to Make History," *The New York Times*, September 7, 2001, p. B7.

Jonathan P. Hicks, "Vote Results in Contests for Council are Certified," *The New York Times*, October 5, 2001, p. D8.

This district elected Lloyd Henry, the other of the City Council's first two West Indian members after the 1991 redistricting. As with Una Clarke, he was forced out by term limits. In 2001, this open seat, too, attracted many candidates from a variety of immigrant backgrounds.

The eventual winner was Kendall Stewart, a podiatrist who had run unsuccessfully for the seat in 1997. He was originally from St. Vincent. As a Democratic district leader, he received support from Brooklyn's two African American congressmen, Major Owens and Ed Towns, as well as State Senator John Sampson, another West Indian who also represents the area. Other candidates were from Barbados and Trinidad. One, Kevin Parker, was a young African American aide to then-State Comptroller Carl McCall pursuing a Ph.D. in political science at the CUNY Graduate Center. (Parker subsequently won office as a state senator from this area.)

The primary election attracted 15,243 voters, a comparatively large number. Stewart managed strongly to mobilize his base in West Indian neighborhoods (partial correlation .619) while also attracting a significant degree of support from voters in African American neighborhoods (.173, not significant) and white neighborhoods (partial correlation .339). He received 3,179 votes, with the other candidates bunched fairly closely behind him. The runner-up, Samuel Palmer, received 2,577 votes, but his base was less defined by ethnic boundaries. Parker, the African American candidate, did not mobilize the vote in African American neighborhoods (partial correlation -.140, not significant), while the West Indian population clearly lined up against him (partial correlation -.390). In this case, Stewart benefited from mobilizing his ethnic base, but also gained support from African Americans despite the presence of an African American candidate in the race.

Neighborhood politics in the diverse neighborhoods of Los Angeles

	District 1	District 9
Population	221,891	240,579
White %	5.5	2.7
Black %	2.6	20.9
Asian %	15.3	2.7
Chinese %	7.7	0.6
Korean %	2.9	0.9
Latino %	75.4	72.7
Mexican %	46.7	51.1
Salvadoran %	6.1	4.3
CVAP*	86,033	94,553
Registered Voters	53,530	64,674
Primary Turnout %	27.7	29.9
General Turnout %	35.6	29.6

SOURCE: CENTER FOR URBAN RESEARCH, LOS ANGELES CITY CLERK, U.S. CENSUS, 2000

*Citizen Voting Age Population

INSIGHTS CAN ALSO BE DRAWN FROM TWO MULTI-ETHNIC council districts in Los Angeles. The First District includes part of the highly diverse Pico Union area west of downtown and stretches to the Mexican American area to the east. The Ninth District stretches from the northern end of traditionally black, now increasingly Latino South Central through downtown. Table 19 shows their demographic profiles. Both are predominantly Latino, with the First District having small white and black populations and a larger Asian minority, while the Ninth District has a larger black minority and a smaller Asian population and its large Latino population is more solidly Mexican. In 2001, a Latino candidate was victorious over an Asian opponent in the First District, but an African American soundly defeated a Latino opponent in the Ninth District.

The First District

ED REYES WON JUST OVER HALF the 14,825 votes cast in this highly diverse council district primary. He had served as chief of staff to the previous council member from the district. The runner-up, Robert Nakahiro, a Boyle Heights community activist endorsed by the Los Angeles Democratic Party, received 4,152 votes. David Sanchez, a community college instructor, trailed with 2,955 votes. This turned out to be a significantly racially polarized election. The small white population voted strongly in favor of Nakahiro (partial correlation .621) and against Reyes (partial correlation -.450). All the minority groups voted against Nakahiro, led by voters in Mexican precincts (-.954) and the Salvadoran precinct (-.613), but also including the largest Asian group, Chinese (-.596). Given the extreme diversity of the district, racial polarization, in the form of support in white neighborhoods, was not enough to help Nakahiro, while the polarization of the other groups against him undercut his chances.

Not surprisingly, given Reyes' ties to the incumbent and his ability to raise campaign funds, Reyes took many more votes than his fellow Mexican American, Sanchez, although both drew votes from similar places. Among voters in Latino and Asian areas, Reyes drew support not just from voters in Mexican and Salvadoran neighborhoods (partial correlations of .574 and .395) but from those in Chinese areas as well, Chinese being the largest Asian group (partial correlation of .713). In this particular case, the Mexican-American candidate not only won his own large ethnic group and other Latinos, but crossed boundaries to win Chinese votes against an Asian candidate.

The Ninth District

THE NINTH DISTRICT STRETCHES FROM THE NORTHERN part of the South Central neighborhood, Los Angeles' earliest black neighborhood, up through the downtown area and into Lincoln Heights. In recent decades, these areas have become significantly less black and more Latino, and in particular Mexican. The district has few Asian or white residents. In the primary, two African American candidates, Jan Perry and Carl Washington, took the majority of the votes, with Perry receiving 5,158 and Washington 6,081 out of the 19,330 cast. Perry was the chief of staff to the area's departing council member, while Washington had served several terms in the State Assembly, from which he was also dislodged by term limits. Perry also received an endorsement from previous mayor Richard Riordan, while Washington was backed by the ACORN political action effort, which also campaigned on behalf of Villaraigosa for mayor. Alexander Gomez, the only Latino candidate, trailed with only 2,488 votes. (The other three candidates were also black. In the general election, Perry went on to defeat Washington by 12,164 votes to 9,076.)

In the primary, Perry clearly won much more solidly among black voters (partial correlation .239) than did Washington (partial correlation .126, not significant). Perry also did much more strongly among the relatively few white voters (partial correlation .961 compared to Washington's -.831). Finally, Perry did much better in the various Latino areas of the district than did Washington (the partial correlations for Perry with the Mexican and Salvadoran populations were .038, not significant, and .593, while Washington's were -.254 and -.185, both not significant). Gomez, a retired Los Angeles Police Department sergeant from community relations, did manage to attract strong support from voters in the Mexican American neighborhoods (partial correlation .609), but it is evident that, despite the fact that the district's Latino population is much larger than its black population, African Americans still make up a disproportionate share of its eligible voters. The eventual impact of term limits on Perry combined with an ongoing process of the growth of the Mexican and Salvadoran population of the district and their gradual naturalization may mean that a Latino candidate could make a stronger run for this office in 2009.

Conclusion

We can now return to the questions raised above about what factors have helped to drive the growth of a representation gap in America's increasingly diverse urban areas and what significance this gap has for the functioning of urban democracy and the future of these cities. The possible causes of this gap can be sorted into three categories: barriers arising from the specific characteristics of the operation of the electoral systems in the two cities, barriers arising from the potential for conflict and competition among native and immigrant minority groups, and barriers arising from the larger patterns of racial inequality in urban political systems. Let us consider each in turn.

Electoral systems

There is no denying that immigrants' relative youth and lack of citizenship make it more difficult for them to become politically active and win elected office. Barriers to exercising the right to vote lie at the foundation of the political inequality that has emerged in the increasingly diverse central cities of the United States. Differences in eligibility to vote account for a considerable part of the representation gap that has emerged. Mounting more and better campaigns to convince new immigrants to become American citizens and allowing adult non-citizens to vote in municipal elections both should be considered as possible ways to overcome this barrier to civic participation. Certainly, federal legislation in 1994 and 1996 considered to be inimical to immigrants' interests, together with state ballot propositions against providing services to illegal immigrants or supporting bi-lingual education in California, produced a spike in applications among immigrants eligible to become citizens. On the other hand, older immigrants retain a bond with their country of origin, and many consider returning. To the extent that acquiring American citizenship undercuts immigrants' rights in their home counties, a barrier to naturalization will remain. Ultimately, it will be the children of immigrants who grow up in the United States, the new second generation, who will have the biggest political impact.

Even when they are citizens, new Americans are less likely to register and vote than native-born ones. This may be because their lack of voting history does not qualify them as "prime voters" to be targeted by candidates and parties to receive direct mail, read campaign advertising in their ethnic newspapers, or hear news coverage in the English media. The New Americans Exit Poll conducted during the 2000 presidential election in New York City suggested that many immigrants were first-time voters who had not been contacted by anyone to come to the polls. Yet this was a sizable group, perhaps a quarter of all voters. Many immigrants come from countries with vigorous democratic traditions, such as the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, or India. But many also come from authoritarian or one-party regimes, where parties have a bad name. They are much less likely to join a party when they register here. As a result, party organizations do not seek to pull them to the polls and they may not participate in the most important party primary, that of the Democrats. Finally, when they live in districts represented by native white or minority incumbents, these incumbents often are not likely to try to appeal to these voters either.

Finally, neither New York City's nor Los Angeles County's political party organizations generally have sought to advance the political careers of new immigrant candidates. Their leaders got elected some time ago with support from native-born constituencies and they do not wish to undermine the arrangements that brought them to power. From the perspective of the new immigrant minority groups, the Democratic Party organizations have not provided particularly strong incentives for them to mobilize politically. Emerging Dominican and West Indian political leaders often see Puerto Ricans and African Americans as not being terribly interested in accommodating their political advancement. Certainly, the individual council races examined above suggest that established political leaders, most importantly the Democratic Party county leaders in the Bronx, Queens, and Brooklyn, often have favored native minority candidates over immigrant minority candidates. In primary elections with candidates from many different ethnic backgrounds, including multiple candidates from immigrant minority backgrounds, receiving the designation of the county organization, and gathering the funds and other organizational endorsements that flow from it, were mostly enough to enable those candidates to win small pluralities in low-turnout elections.

On the other hand, New York City offers two instances in which party leaders felt that supporting new immigrant candidates would help to build their political operations: support by the Vito Lopez organization in Puerto Rican Bushwick for its Dominican member, Diana Reyna, and support from the Queens County Democratic Organization for John Liu as the first

Chinese council member from Queens. In both cases, the chosen candidates were close to that political organization. Both also have made a point of saying that they are not representing a specific immigrant ethnic group, but rather a broad array of groups. Both also ran for open seats in districts where the pace of population change suggested that older racial and ethnic groups might have a difficult time holding sway. Party organizations have not supported immigrant minority insurgents against native minority incumbents. Instead, the sitting political establishment has supported native minority incumbents even when that group is a small fraction of the district's population and even when immigrant minority candidates are seeking the office.

Despite the importance of party support in sustaining native white or minority incumbents in immigrant districts, New York City's party primaries have proven to be an effective path for immigrant political mobility when one group becomes predominant within a district. Such cases have led to the election of two Dominican, two West Indian, and one Chinese City Council members. In Washington Heights and the two Flatbush districts, immigrant ethnic groups became the effective voting majority or plurality, enabling candidates to win office on the basic of an appeal to their group. All three districts were drawn in 1991 with that purpose in mind, although Brooklyn's District 45 also was drawn to give the then-white Canarsie some influence over which West Indian it would elect. These districts elected the first immigrant members of the City Council and continued to do so subsequently.

Los Angeles, on the other hand, has no representation from any immigrant group aside from Mexican Americans, who in an important respect are both a native minority group and an immigrant ethnic group. A major contributing factor to this difference is the large size of Los Angeles council districts in comparison to those in New York. New York's fifty-one council districts cover 8 million people, while Los Angeles' fifteen districts cover 3.7 million people. A New York City Council member thus represents about 157,000 people, while her Los Angeles counterpart represents 246,000. When combined with non-partisan elections, candidates in Los Angeles must mount a larger, wider, more expensive campaign, aimed at more diverse constituencies. Fewer entry-level positions are also available. It is notable that the New York City Council primary elections discussed above, even though they

all had relatively low turnouts, drew almost as many primary votes as the much larger districts described in Los Angeles.

New York City also provides many examples from 2001 in which a white or native minority candidate with better funding and organizational support was able to edge out immigrant minority candidates who split the district's immigrant voting base several different ways. In Los Angeles, if no candidate wins a majority, the two top candidates proceed to a runoff in the general election. New York City may wish to reconsider allowing candidates to win primaries by a simple plurality. A system of "instant runoff" voting would enable new immigrant voters to transfer their voting strength from one immigrant minority candidate to another, thus increasing their ability to elect a candidate of their choosing.

Political competition among and between native and immigrant minority groups

While candidates from new immigrant backgrounds have bumped up against native minority incumbents and competitors for the same office, the suggestion that the two groups have different political orientations and are fundamentally disinclined to vote for each other largely is not borne out evidence from the council district and mayoral elections. At the local level, districts with large immigrant populations are bound to produce competition between immigrant and native minority candidates, and that cropped up in many of the council districts profiled. Moreover, there is some ethnic polarization in these contests, as Dominicans voted for a Dominican candidate or Taiwanese voted for a candidate whose father was from Taiwan. It would be extremely surprising if this was not the case. But it was relatively rare for an immigrant candidate to square off against a native minority candidate in a way that produced a sharply ethnically polarized electorate. Instead, the more typical scenarios were a native white against multiple immigrant minority candidates, as in Manhattan's District 1, multiple immigrant candidates, as in the Brooklyn districts, or multiple native minority candidates, as in the West Bronx or Los Angeles' First District. For every case in which ethnic polarization occurred, one can point to a case where immigrant minority groups supported a native minority candidate, as when blacks and South Americans voted for Hiram Monserrate, or Dominicans in the Bronx voted

for Maria Baez. This suggests that, although some council districts may be zones of contestation between groups, others are greenhouses for growing new kinds of inter-group alliances. In broader, citywide terms, only in the Los Angeles mayoral election did native and immigrant minority groups come down on opposite sides. In New York, Afro-Caribbeans generally vote much like African Americans, Dominicans vote much like Puerto Ricans, and the black and Latino groups all vote more like each other than they do with whites. True, some cultural, geographic, and class differences exist among these groups and it is possible to activate political cleavages using them under the right circumstances. But the commonalities seem stronger than these differences and were certainly on display in the New York City and Los Angeles mayoral elections. In this sense, native minority political leaders, whether African American, Puerto Rican, or Mexican American, have a long-term stake in the growth of immigrant minority voting groups, for they will supply the long-term growth in population and voting power that will sustain such leaders. From the other side, while individual immigrant political leaders may complain that native minority incumbents do not pay enough attention to their communities or agendas, Afro-Caribbean voters do not seem to have any qualms about voting for a black candidate such as William Thompson and Dominicans had no reservations about voting for a Puerto Rican candidate, Fernando Ferrer. Indeed, the main obstacles seemed more to be those of geography and class: the Dominicans of more-distant Sunset Park knew much less about Bronx Borough President Ferrer, perhaps saw the world somewhat differently, and were less likely to vote for him than the Dominicans of the West Bronx.

Other immigrant minority groups occupy a much more ambiguous position. Latino immigrants from South America generally have higher educations and incomes than those from the Caribbean, and are less likely to have African ancestry. They have shown more willingness to align themselves with white candidates, particularly white Catholics. They might be candidates to follow a path toward political incorporation modeled on those of the white immigrants of the past century, as opposed to the racial minority path that seems more likely for Afro-Caribbeans or Dominicans. Similarly, Chinese, Koreans, Indians, Pakistanis, and people from other Muslim countries seem ambivalent about their political choices as well. These groups are least likely to designate the Democratic party when they register and most likely not to choose a party at all. They, too, often have higher rates of educational

attainment, higher incomes, more property ownership, and more self-employment than other immigrant groups. The council elections and mayoral races in New York and Los Angeles showed no evidence of the emergence of Latino-Asian alliances or cross-support, even though these groups tend to live near each other, or intermingled. Finally, immigrants from the former Soviet Union and the former Soviet bloc, several hundred thousand of whom arrived in New York in the 1990s, or from the former Soviet Union and Iran in the case of Los Angeles, also lean away from the Democratic party. Not all immigrants, then, are likely candidates for being incorporated into New York and Los Angeles politics through the Democratic Party minority empowerment model.

The larger pattern of racial inequality

Of all the factors that impede the closing of the immigrant minority representation gap, the persistence of racial polarization in urban politics may be the most important. The 2001 citywide and council district elections in New York and Los Angeles show that it continues to shape their mayoral politics. Even as the white share of the active electorate dwindled to the barest of majorities, white voters still were not inclined to support a bi- or multi-racial coalition of the kind that previously elected black mayors in both cities. In both cities, white voters swung sharply behind their preferred candidates. In non-partisan Los Angeles, liberal whites had in the past supported Tom Bradley, a black Democrat. In 2001, most whites supported a white Democrat, James Hahn, who also had strong black support. They may have felt comfortable doing so knowing that blacks would never be a political majority in Los Angeles. More importantly, except for West Side liberals, whites swung sharply against the Latino candidate, Antonio Villaraigosa. In New York, white Democrats repeatedly defect from Democratic mayoral nominees, white or black, when they have substantial black and Latino support, giving them many fewer votes than they give to other Democratic candidates for citywide, state, or federal office. This white polarization seems to operate mainly in mayoral elections, since New York City voters elected an African American, William Thompson, to be comptroller and Los Angeles voters elected Rocky Delgadillo, a Mexican American, to be city attorney. But the mayoralty is the most powerful office in both cities, especially in New York.

In both cities, the victorious white candidates added some minority support to a solid, if shrinking, white

base to construct a political majority. They obviously had to make appeal for this minority support on a different basis than "minority empowerment." Given that they would get few black votes, New York Republicans Mike Bloomberg and George Pataki recruited Latino support on the basis of racial, class, and religious affinities. Both also sought support from black immigrants. Bloomberg drew heavily not only in white Catholic neighborhoods (partial correlation of .650) that often vote Republican, but also from neighborhoods whose residents have ancestries reflecting the Jewish migration at the turn of the last century (partial correlation of .320), who typically vote Democratic. As noted, African Americans and Afro-Caribbeans voted for Green, but voters in African American neighborhoods were far more negative towards Bloomberg (partial correlation of -.665) than those in Afro-Caribbean neighborhoods (-.223). Although voters in Puerto Rican and Dominican areas both leaned Democratic, they did so much less than in black neighborhoods (partial correlations with the Bloomberg vote of only -.104 and -.178). Voters living in South American neighborhoods actually may have given Bloomberg more votes (partial correlation of .003, not significant). Bloomberg also got a significant share of the vote in Chinese, Korean, and Indian areas, although the Democratic candidate got slightly more. In the Democratic runoff, the polarization between voters in white and Latino neighborhoods was even deeper.

To the extent that the success of a multi-racial coalition in citywide elections is an essential ingredient for promoting immigrant political incorporation at the neighborhood and citywide level, those who seek to assemble it must consolidate the Latino-black alliance forged by Fernando Ferrer while reducing the propensity of white Democrats, especially liberal white Democrats, to defect from Democratic nominees with minority backing. It seems unlikely that appealing to racial or ethnic group membership or "identity politics" will achieve this end. The contrary is more likely. Such an alliance would have to be constructed instead on the basis of shared values or shared policy goals. Conversely, whites can only sustain their hold on the mayoralty, with all that means for maintaining the representation gap, through high levels of white/black polarization combined with some Latino and/or Asian support. Mayor Giuliani successfully positioned his administration in favor of immigrants' rights, which undoubtedly helped Republicans reach out to Latino and Asian immigrant communities. Mayor Bloomberg and Governor Pataki both campaigned in the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico and learned

enough Spanish to make campaign commercials in that language and say a few words at campaign appearances. Unfortunately for them, the perception among immigrants that the national Republican Party is against them will probably impede this effort. Since the 2001 elections once again revealed Dominicans and West Indians are highly Democratic, whites seeking new immigrant support will tend to look for it among South Americans, East Asians, and South Asians.

Whites are dwindling even more rapidly in Los Angeles than in New York, but their citizenship advantage over the immigrant minority groups is even greater. To the extent that African Americans in Los Angeles worry about losing their political power to Latinos and Asians, they may prove more ready allies of white candidates than the blacks of New York. Certainly, Antonio Villaraigosa was not able to forge the kind of black-Latino coalition that Fernando Ferrer and his colleagues assembled in New York City. African-Americans are more over-represented in the Los Angeles city council than in New York, and many are employed in local government. Similarly, blacks in Los Angeles are much more likely to be African Americans rather than black immigrants. These differences may lead the African-American voters of Los Angeles to ally with white candidates more than in New York, where African Americans and Afro-Caribbeans have shown themselves to be the most Democratic constituency in the city.

As things stand, therefore, whites have been able to coalesce against candidates preferred by divided minorities in both cities and prevail. In New York, two liberal whites with a history of minority support, Ruth Messinger and Mark Green, lost successive mayoral races. These white candidates were not as successful at leading a coalition among liberal whites, blacks, and Latinos as David Dinkins was in 1989. On the other hand, the minority candidacies of David Dinkins and Fernando Ferrer led middle-of-the-road and even liberal whites to defect to more conservative whites in 1989, 1993, and 2001, just as the candidacies of Ruth Messinger and Mark Green did in 1997 and 2001. Clearly, minority candidates must find new ways to increase their white support, or liberal whites must be more effective at mobilizing minority voters, for such a coalition to win. Given the composition of the Democratic primary electorate, the former seems more likely than the latter.

Next steps

What specific steps might be taken to improve political participation in both New York and Los Angeles, the epicenters of migration to America and harbingers of trends that will emerge in many other parts of the United States? Both cities might well begin a debate about political reforms that would promote new immigrant political representation. Among these reforms might be the introduction of non-citizen voting in municipal elections, the adoption of instant runoffs in multi-candidate primaries, and greater efforts to inform and involve citizens who speak languages other than English. It is easy for an outsider to suggest that Los Angeles should increase the size of its council to, say, twenty-four members, which would bring its district populations down to those of New York. In a recent charter reform campaign, however, the voters of Los Angeles turned down such a possibility, evidently because they did not want to support more politicians. It is also easy to suggest that the political parties, central labor councils, and community organizations of New York and Los Angeles actively debate how to develop more new leaders from immigrant backgrounds and help them to advance in their political careers. To some degree, especially in Los Angeles, the county labor federation and community organizations have already begun this process, since they were key agents behind the Villaraigosa campaign. In the main, however, these organizations have deep ties to the sitting political establishment, are uneasy with the idea of challenging it, and want new immigrant groups to "wait their turn."

Yet there are domains in both New York and Los Angeles where this new political leadership is now being born and growing. Its nurseries are the institutions shared by the new and old ethnic minorities, such as the public school system, the City and State Universities of New York, the California State University and University of California systems, the service sector labor unions, the Catholic parishes and Protestant churches, the immigrant advocacy and social service networks, and, yes, in the campaigns for political office that are emerging in both cities. It is also embodied in the coming of political age of the children of immigrants who, born and educated here, will provide the next generation of political leadership. Over time, out of such places, from such people, a new, multi-ethnic, better-functioning urban democracy will emerge.

Appendix

Appendix Table 1. Characteristics of New York City's non-Hispanic black neighborhoods, 2000

|	Brooklyn	Jamaica	Harlem	Williamsbridge
Number of tracts	285	136	46	48
Total population	972,164	328,318	185,091	152,550
Black population	747,673	272,545	125,587	105,394
African American population	49,2101	189,471	109,505	58,702
Afro-Caribbean population	24,3758	78,880	9,762	43,450
% white population	6.3	3.1	2.1	7.1
% black total	76.9	83.0	67.9	69.1
% African American	50.6	57.7	59.2	38.5
% Afro-Caribbean	25.1	24.0	5.3	28.5
% Hispanic total	13.7	8.2	28.1	19.8
% Asian total	2.4	4.0	1.4	2.9
% immigrants	37.2	31.9	20.3	37.8
% recent immigrants	34.1	28.4	45.1	33.9
% other language	26.4	18.8	28.5	24.3
% non-citizen, blacks	17.1	12.3	7.8	19.0
% home owners	23.8	65.4	6.3	38.5
% below poverty line	27.1	12.5	36.0	19.1
% college educated	14.3	17.4	13.9	16.9
% unemployed	15.3	10.0	19.2	10.8
Median income, total	$30,671	$48,837	$20,805	$37,991
Median income, white	$37,725	$37,164	$35,806	$33,821
Median income, black	$31,705	$50,064	$20,581	$40,662
Median income, Hispanic	$23,226	$47,711	$20,355	$30,459
Median income, Asian	$33,897	$51,185	$31,392	$46,673

1990

2000

Appendix Table 2. Characteristics of New York City's African American neighborhoods, 2000

|	Flatbush	Jamaica	Harlem	Williamsbridge
Number of tracts	253	127	53	37
Total population	876,699	294,767	211,351	119,338
Black population	678,890	255,506	134,641	88,680
African American population	467,262	180,980	117,777	49,341
Afro-Caribbean population	201,140	70,685	10,576	36,505
% white population	4.8	2.5	2.4	4.7
% black total	77.4	86.7	63.7	74.3
% African American	53.3	61.4	55.7	41.4
% Afro-Caribbean	22.9	24.0	5.0	30.6
% Hispanic total	14.9	7.0	31.9	17.7
% Asian total	2.0	2.5	1.4	2.4
% immigrants	31.40	29.5	20.6	36.9
% recent immigrants	34.9	28.8	44.7	34.1
% other language	24.8	16.6	30.2	23.4
% non-citizen, blacks	14.0	11.4	7.6	18.1
% home owners	20.6	64.6	6.0	38.2
% below poverty line	30.7	13.3	36.2	19.8
% college educated	13.0	16.8	13.5	16.7
% unemployed	16.9	10.4	19.0	11.4
Median income, total	$28,737	$48,524	$20,751	$38,190
Median income, white	$35,783	$36,237	$33,940	$26,937
Median income, black	$29,797	$49,668	$20,627	$40,968
Median income, Hispanic	$21,598	$45,683	$20,298	$28,878
Median income, Asian	$31,649	$42,770	$32,288	$45,775

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

2000

Appendix Table 3. Characteristics of New York City's Afro-Caribbean neighborhoods, 2000

|	Flatbush	Jamaica	Williamsbridge
Number of tracts	201	130	54
Total population	693,944	348,629	200,787
Black population	539,979	264,035	131,611
% white population	8.2	4.0	8.9
% black total	77.8	75.7	65.5
% African American	44.5	51.3	38.6
% Afro-Caribbean	32.1	23.3	25.0
% Hispanic total	10.4	10.0	21.8
% Asian total	2.8	7.5	2.6
% immigrants	48.5	37.0	37.8
% recent immigrants	33.0	27.6	33.5
% other language	29.3	23.1	24.7
% non-citizen, blacks	23.1	14.0	19.2
% home owners	28.2	67.0	39.8
% below poverty line	21.3	10.4	17.1
% college educated	15.7	18.8	17.6
% unemployed	12.7	9.0	10.4
Median income, total	$34,221	$49,382	$37,930
Median income, white	$39,298	$38,695	$30,296
Median income, black	$34,960	$50,971	$41,069
Median income, Hispanic	$27,564	$47,823	$32,484
Median income, Asian	$34,533	$52,511	$47,268

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

2000

Appendix Table 4. Characteristics of New York City's Latino neighborhoods, 2000

	Bronx	Washington Hts.	Jackson Hts.	Bushwick
Number of tracts	231	39	65	76
Total population	942,001	271,344	346,935	251,415
Hispanic population	563,982	192,639	191,726	154,846
Puerto Rican population	281,777	18,154	11,294	73,203
Dominican population	181,833	142,389	41,385	39,025
Mexican population	32,489	7,976	32,332	14,291
% white population	6.2	9.8	15.0	14.2
% black total	29.2	16.0	6.0	17.3
% Hispanic total	59.9	71.0	55.3	61.6
% Puerto Rican	29.9	6.7	3.3	29.1
% Dominican	19.3	52.5	11.9	15.5
% Mexican	3.4	2.9	9.3	5.7
% Asian total	3.7	2.6	23.1	5.4
% immigrants	30.3	53.6	66.3	35.7
% recent immigrants	46.4	40.7	50.2	49.4
% other language	63.8	78.2	82.7	72.6
% non-citizen, Latinos	22.7	40.1	50.6	27.4
% home owners	9.5	4.2	25.5	12.8
% below poverty line	38.2	32.1	20.0	35.4
% college educated	9.5	14.2	16.7	9.3
% unemployed	18.4	16.0	9.6	16.0
Median income, total	$22,823	$26,768	$37,143	$24,315
Median income, white	$26,866	$36,473	$38,605	$29,537
Median income, black	$23,661	$25,170	$38,597	$21,422
Median income, Hispanic	$21,214	$25,246	$36,387	$23,625
Median income, Asian	$36,654	$42,033	$38,782	$36,324

1990

2000

Appendix Table 5. Characteristics of New York City's Puerto Rican neighborhoods, 2000

|	Bronx	Bushwick
Number of tracts	231	76
Total population	942,001	251,415
Hispanic population	563,982	154,846
Puerto Rican population	281,777	73,203
Dominican population	181,833	39,025
Mexican population	32,489	14,291
% white population	6.2	14.2
% black total	29.2	17.3
% Hispanic total	59.9	61.6
% Puerto Rican	29.9	29.1
% Dominican	19.3	15.5
% Mexican	3.4	5.7
% Asian total	3.7	5.4
% immigrants	30.3	35.7
% recent immigrants	46.4	49.4
% other language	63.8	72.6
% non-citizen, Hispanics	22.7	27.4
% home owners	9.5	12.8
% below poverty line	38.2	35.4
% college educated	9.5	9.3
% unemployed	18.4	16.0
Median income, total	$22,823	$24,315
Median income, white	$26,866	$29,537
Median income, black	$23,661	$21,422
Median income, Hispanic	$21,214	$23,625
Median income, Asian	$36,654	$36,324

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
2000

Appendix Table 6. Characteristics of New York City's Dominican neighborhoods, 2000

|	So. Bronx	Washington Heights	Corona	Bushwick-Williamsburg	Woodhaven
Number of tracts	169	53	34	52	36
Total population	738,385	318,953	167,838	180,271	102,806
Hispanic population	452,932	208,040	104,775	121,074	54,061
Puerto Rican population	208,674	22,575	5,769	54,982	21,836
Dominican population	163,319	150,196	33,623	32,957	18,645
Mexican population	25,718	8,915	17,643	10,849	1,509
% white population	5.1	11.6	7.5	11.7	0.0
% black total	29.1	19.8	15.9	13.8	26.3
% Hispanic total	61.3	65.2	62.4	67.2	52.6
% Puerto Rican	28.3	7.1	3.4	30.5	21.2
% Dominican	22.1	47.1	20.0	18.3	18.1
% Mexican	3.5	2.8	10.5	6.0	1.5
% Asian total	3.5	2.8	13.5	6.0	9.4
% immigrants	34.2	52.9	63.5	37.8	41.3
% recent immigrants	48.0	40.8	50.7	48.7	39.0
% other language	65.4	77.3	80.6	75.5	61.6
% non-citizen, Hispanics	26.8	39.9	49.9	28.6	26.1
% home owners	6.8	4.3	26.3	12.6	35.6
% below poverty line	39.2	32.3	22.2	35.1	25.7
% college educated	9.4	14.5	10.7	9.2	9.1
% unemployed	18.5	15.9	11.2	15.5	13.5
Median income, total	$21,937	$27,405	$35,918	$24,435	$33,250
Median income, white	$26,955	$42,629	$30,934	$27,791	$32,792
Median income, black	$22,384	$23,664	$39,238	$25,503	$33,981
Median income, Hispanic	$20,486	$25,073	$35,478	$23,511	$31,391
Median income, Asian	$35,340	$40,690	$38,302	$34,767	$43,372

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

2000

Appendix Table 7. Characteristics of New York City's Mexican neighborhoods, 2000

	Jackson Hts.	Sunset Park	Bushwick
Number of tracts	98	48	44
Total population	409,483	188,575	132,501
Hispanic population	203,359	82,960	82,236
Puerto Rican population	13,413	34,247	35,051
Dominican population	40,232	12,871	18,620
Mexican population	38,277	18,797	11,716
% white population	19.8	30.4	16.3
% black total	5.0	4.8	12.7
% Hispanic total	49.7	44.0	62.1
% Puerto Rican	3.3	18.2	26.5
% Dominican	9.8	6.8	14.1
% Mexican	9.3	10.0	8.8
% Asian total	23.9	18.3	7.0
% immigrants	66.6	44.8	36.7
% recent immigrants	51.9	53.1	52.4
% other language	82.0	75.2	75.4
% non-citizen, Hispanics	52.3	32.1	30.8
% home owners	21.5	22.9	12.1
% below poverty line	20.9	28.0	36.8
% college educated	17.2	14.6	10.4
% unemployed	9.4	9.2	15.0
Median income, total	$36,401	$31,715	$26,179
Median income, white	$37,643	$34,137	$28,785
Median income, black	$37,331	$41,415	$30,646
Median income, Hispanic	$35,780	$30,115	$23,883
Median income, Asian	$37,243	$29,813	$34,496

1990

Bushwick

Jackson Heights

Sunset Park

2000

Appendix Table 8. Characteristics of New York City's Asian neighborhoods, 2000

|	Flushing	Jackson Heights	Sunset Park-Bensonhurst	Chinatown
Number of tracts	195	110	108	20
Total population	659,767	503,688	374,186	107,534
Asian population	217,444	143,621	100,356	61,277
Chinese population	67,276	49,360	74,130	57,358
Asian Indian population	73,528	32,311	8,714	1,149
Korean population	36,950	18,505	1,576	350
Filipino population	12,963	13,376	1,224	319
% white population	32.4	32.5	51.0	17.8
% black total	11.2	2.5	3.4	5.9
% Hispanic total	20.2	35.0	16.8	19.1
% Asian total	33.0	28.5	26.8	57.0
% Chinese	10.2	9.8	19.8	53.3
% Asian Indian	11.1	6.4	2.3	1.1
% Korean	5.6	3.7	0.4	0.3
% Filipino	2.0	2.7	0.3	0.3
% immigrants	53.5	63.4	52.6	60.2
% recent immigrants	39.9	47.0	52.1	46.0
% other language	59.7	76.4	70.6	78.5
% non-citizen, Asians	43.3	51.3	45.3	46.9
% home owners	47.4	27.9	28.2	8.2
% below poverty line	13.4	16.7	24.4	30.4
% college educated	26.9	27.6	17.9	15.5
% unemployed	6.5	7.6	7.8	10.1
Median income, total	$47,147	$39,788	$32,020	$26,569
Median income, white	$50,560	$42,510	$32,357	$45,448
Median income, black	$45,858	$38,252	$36,449	$28,157
Median income, Hispanic	$44,307	$37,928	$32,598	$23,749
Median income, Asian	$48,656	$40,720	$32,377	$22,149

1990

2000

Appendix Table 9. Characteristics of New York City's Chinese neighborhoods, 2000

|	Sunset Park-Bensonhurst	Flushing	Jackson Heights	Chinatown
Number of tracts	140	88	65	29
Total population	466,642	316,071	265,994	139,108
Asian population	114,583	122,137	89,303	64,555
Chinese population	90,460	57,344	36,032	59,387
Asian Indian population	7,899	14,976	18,058	1,469
Korean population	2,154	34,035	11,841	547
Filipino population	1,620	4,702	8,504	448
% white population	55.3	41.1	28.3	22.7
% black total	1.8	4.6	2.2	7.0
% Hispanic total	16.5	14.8	35.1	23.4
% Asian total	24.6	38.6	33.6	46.4
% Chinese	19.4	18.1	13.5	42.7
% Asian Indian	1.7	4.7	6.8	1.1
% Korean	0.5	10.8	4.5	0.4
% Filipino	0.3	1.5	3.2	0.3
% immigrants	51.7	55.0	63.9	59.7
% recent immigrants	50.8	39.0	46.0	45.6
% other language	69.7	68.3	76.9	78.3
% non-citizen, Asians	43.4	45.2	49.3	46.7
% home owners	31.5	47.8	33.7	8.2
% below poverty line	22.6	13.5	15.8	30.5
% college educated	18.0	30.5	28.2	15.4
% unemployed	7.5	5.5	7.7	10.1
Median income, total	$33,729	$48,301	$40,549	$28,685
Median income, white	$34,615	$52,844	$44,742	$49,850
Median income, black	$29,793	$43,416	$42,709	$25,057
Median income, Hispanic	$32,804	$46,535	$38,039	$22,420
Median income, Asian	$34,520	$45,353	$40,435	$22,338

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

2000

Appendix Table 10. Characteristics of New York City's Asian Indian neighborhoods, 2000

	Richmond Hill	South Flushing	Jackson Heights
Number of tracts	69	62	57
Total population	193,549	218,335	281,070
Asian population	46,604	57,232	88,719
Chinese population	3,208	7,438	29,662
Asian Indian population	33,455	31,033	22,218
Korean population	270	1,438	10,318
Filipino population	2,013	7,503	8,594
% white population	18.4	27.1	30.1
% black total	19.6	21.4	2.3
% Hispanic total	30.1	21.7	34.6
% Asian total	24.1	26.2	31.6
% Chinese	1.7	3.4	10.6
% Asian Indian	17.3	14.2	7.9
% Korean	0.1	0.7	3.7
% Filipino	1.0	3.4	3.1
% immigrants	54.8	48.3	65.8
% recent immigrants	44.5	37.1	48.7
% other language	43.6	50.1	79.5
% non-citizen, Asians	41.0	37.6	51.3
% home owners	50.9	54.2	26.9
% below poverty line	15.7	10.7	17.0
% college educated	12.7	27.1	28.3
% unemployed	8.7	6.7	7.8
Median income, total	$41,819	$48,631	$38,969
Median income, white	$40,709	$48,389	$40,518
Median income, black	$46,533	$46,957	$41,546
Median income, Hispanic	$39,259	$46,006	$37,602
Median income, Asian	$47,083	$58,119	$40,462

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2000

Appendix Table 11. Characteristics of New York City's Korean neighborhoods, 2000

|	Flushing	Jackson Hts.
Number of tracts	102	45
Total population	369,255	22,0119
Asian population	129,845	78,584
Chinese population	59,321	24,793
Asian Indian population	15,903	16,169
Korean population	39,653	14,316
Filipino population	3,973	8,127
% white population	47.4	26.8
% black total	3.0	1.7
% Hispanic total	13.8	35.0
% Asian total	35.2	35.7
% Chinese	16.1	11.3
% Asian Indian	4.3	7.4
% Korean	10.7	6.5
% Filipino	1.1	3.7
% immigrants	51.8	66.4
% recent immigrants	37.1	48.4
% other language	64.5	78.2
% non-citizen, Asians	46.3	55
% home owners	44.3	24.4
% below poverty line	13.2	17.5
% college educated	31.0	25.8
% unemployed	5.8	7.6
Median income, total	$49,330	$37,829
Median income, white	$54,454	$39,862
Median income, black	$40,769	$44,122
Median income, Hispanic	$46,742	$37,426
Median income, Asian	$45,170	$37,260

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
2000

Appendix Table 12. Characteristics of New York City's Filipino neighborhoods, 2000

	South Flushing	Jackson Hts
Number of tracts	50	41
Total population	167,450	200,426
Asian population	50,085	73,598
Chinese population	10,719	26,538
Asian Indian population	22,753	14,619
Korean population	1,346	10,805
Filipino population	7,308	8,220
% white population	100.0	100.0
% black total	19.6	2.8
% Hispanic total	18.9	41.7
% Asian total	29.9	36.7
% Chinese	6.4	13.2
% Asian Indian	13.6	7.3
% Korean	0.8	5.4
% Filipino	4.4	4.1
% immigrants	51.1	68.3
% recent immigrants	35.9	49.8
% other language	53.4	81.3
% non-citizen, Asians	35.3	53.7
% home owners	57.6	25.6
% below poverty line	9.8	18.2
% college educated	30.9	24.6
% unemployed	7.0	7.9
Median income, total	$52,122	$36,983
Median income, white	$51,603	$39,050
Median income, black	$48,721	$36,118
Median income, Hispanic	$50,408	$36,905
Median income, Asian	$61,685	$37,603

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
2000

Appendix Table 13. Characteristics of Los Angeles' South Central black neighborhood, 2000

Number of census tracts	266
Total population	123,0447
Black population	512,354
% white population	6.4
% black population	41.6
% Hispanic population	46.3
% Asian population	4.8
% homeowners	41.4
% below poverty line	27.2
% with college education	12.8
% unemployed	12.3
Median income, total	$31,941
Median income, white	$46,633
Median income, black	$31,931
Median income, Hispanic	$30,223
Median income, Asian	$45,993
% immigrants	31.3
% other language	48.5
% non-citizen, white	6.2
% non-citizen, black	2.3
% non-citizen, Hispanic	42.5
% non-citizen, Asian	27.6

South Central

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
Appendix Table 14. Characteristics of Los Angeles' Mexican neighborhoods, 2000

	East LA	San Fernando
Number of census tracts	414	54
Total population	1,973,296	263,730
Hispanic population	1,590,600	212,293
Mexican population	1,387,085	177,634
Central American total	154,828.9	28,038.5
Salvadoran population	78,772.1	16,473.6
Guatemalan population	38,235.8	6,653.8
% white population	7.6	10.2
% black population	5.5	4.2
% Hispanic total	80.6	80.5
% Mexican population	70.3	67.4
% Central American total	7.9	10.6
% Salvadoran population	4.0	6.3
% Guatemalan population	1.9	2.5
% Asian population	6.0	4.6
% homeowners	45.2	53.9
% below poverty line	24.1	21.5
% with college education	7.2	7.1
% unemployed	10.7	9.4
Median income, total	$34,718	$38,614
Median income, white	$41,258	$41,087
Median income, black	$27,225	$37,589
Median income, Hispanic	$34,456	$37,356
Median income, Asian	$46,422	$50,867
% immigrants	44.3	47.4
% other language	76.2	77.9
% non-citizen, white	5.0	5.9
% non-citizen, black	2.8	3.4
% non-citizen, Hispanic	36.0	39.1
% non-citizen, Asian	29.7	27.6

San Fernando

East Los Angeles

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
2000

Appendix Table 15. Characteristics of Los Angeles' Central American neighborhoods, 2000

|	Pico-Union	Sepulveda-Sun Valley
Number of census tracts	212	82
Total population	932,027	399,994
Hispanic population	573,895	250,069
Mexican population	323,271.2	162,430.2
Central American total	116,592.2	41,388.4
Salvadoran population	67,009.6	17,380.8
Guatemalan population	225,077.1	70,361.8
% white population	7.3	22.3
% black population	18.9	4.5
% Hispanic total	61.6	62.5
% Mexican population	34.7	40.6
% Central American total	12.5	10.4
% Salvadoran population	7.2	4.4
% Guatemalan population	24.2	17.6
% Asian population	11.6	8.9
% homeowners	20.0	36.9
% below poverty line	33.8	23.1
% with college education	12.6	14.8
% unemployed	12.9	9.4
Median income, total	$23,722	$33,944
Median income, white	$28,898	$38,523
Median income, black	$22,209	$35,393
Median income, Hispanic	$24,109	$31,107
Median income, Asian	$27,629	$47,646
% immigrants	52.3	50.5
% other language	71.7	72.7
% non-citizen, white	18.9	11.1
% non-citizen, black	4.7	6.4
% non-citizen, Hispanic	52.3	46.2
% non-citizen, Asian	47.3	34.4

**Appendix Table 16. Characteristics of Los Angeles' Chinese neighborhoods, 2000**

	Monterey Park	Hacienda Heights-Diamond Bar	Chinatown
Number of census tracts	118	42	18
Total population	545,653	198134	70611
Asian total	234,552	97362	23080
Chinese population	140,584	41532	15800
Asian Indian population	3,746	4462	248
Korean population	7,912	13907	419
Filipino population	11,209	14103	741
Japanese population	15,929	4563	522
Vietnamese population	28,032	2527	3021
% white population	21.6	23.1	6.1
% black population	1.5	3.7	1.2
% Hispanic population	35.3	25.4	61.4
% Asian total	43.0	49.1	32.7
% Chinese population	25.8	21.0	22.4
% Asian Indian population	0.7	2.3	0.4
% Korean population	1.5	7.0	0.6
% Filipino population	2.1	7.1	1.1
% Japanese population	2.9	2.3	0.7
% Vietnamese population	5.1	1.3	4.3
% homeowners	52.1	77.4	24.0
% below poverty line	14.8	8.4	30.6
% with college education	28.6	37.6	9.7
% unemployed	6.5	5.2	10.5
Median income, total	$46,527	$66,248	$25,302
Median income, white	$57,750	$72,664	$41,257
Median income, black	$40,992	$78,992	$39,749
Median income, Hispanic	$39,600	$62,066	$25,235
Median income, Asian	$48,292	$64,187	$21,196
% immigrants	45.7	43.6	56.8
% other language	65.5	61.2	85.3
% non-citizen, white	3.9	3.5	9.1
% non-citizen, black	6.8	2.5	4.4
% non-citizen, Hispanic	25.1	13.9	38.8
% non-citizen, Asian	32.1	32.4	35.4

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**Appendix Table 17. Characteristics of Los Angeles' Korean neighborhoods, 2000**

	Koreatown	La Canada-Flintridge	Cerritos	Hacienda Heights-Diamond Bar	Torrance
Number of census tracts	75	26	20	26	27
Total population	315,097	132,111	98,772	117,534	116,962
Asian total	8,4131	26,527	42,535	61,905	43,457
Chinese population	3,830	3,412	7,577	26,776	5,005
Asian Indian population	2,663	1,282	3,861	2,986	1,842
Korean population	52,874	13,093	13,071	11,079	10,303
Filipino population	15,526	4,885	9,628	6,507	4,153
Japanese population	3,648	2,019	2,269	2,873	17,919
Vietnamese population	1,204	452	1,309	1,375	1,581
% white population	14.0	64.6	25.9	23.5	36.8
% black population	6.9	1.0	6.5	3.1	6.4
% Hispanic population	52.1	10.6	24.6	22.1	19.7
% Asian total	26.7	20.1	43.1	52.7	37.2
% Chinese population	1.2	2.6	7.7	22.8	4.3
% Asian Indian population	0.9	1.0	3.9	2.5	1.6
% Korean population	16.8	10.0	13.2	9.5	8.8
% Filipino population	4.9	3.7	9.8	5.5	3.6
% Japanese population	1.2	1.5	2.30	2.4	15.3
% Vietnamese population	0.4	0.3	1.3	1.7	1.4
% homeowners	12.0	59.7	70.2	76.1	49.6
% below poverty line	30.0	7.8	7.9	8.8	9.7
% with college education	24.2	43.1	31.7	39.3	30.0
% unemployed	10.3	4.8	5.2	5.3	4.8
Median income, total	$27,293	$67,402	$60,031	$63,943	$51,327
Median income, white	$49,194	$70,042	$57,866	$73,007	$55,377
Median income, black	$25,444	$55,203	$52,581	$76,266	$36,533
Median income, Hispanic	$21,924	$59,746	$53,420	$60,118	$42,599
Median income, Asian	$28,534	$71,261	$66,707	$60,958	$56,522
% immigrants	60.7	38.2	41.2	46.1	31.8
% other language	76.2	48.2	57.2	63.1	43.2
% non-citizen, white	10.6	10.2	2.5	3.7	3.6
% non-citizen, black	10.2	3.7	3.3	3.0	2.4
% non-citizen, Hispanic	57.8	18.1	25.0	16.0	27.3
% non-citizen, Asian	49.4	33.6	29.6	33.6	30.5

Appendix Table 18. Characteristics of Los Angeles' Filipino neighborhoods, 2000

	Westlake-Eagle Rock	Carson	Walnut	Cerritos	Sepulveda
Number of census tracts	84	46	35	28	30
Total population	420,918	204,094	187,248	139,738	150,820
Asian total	95,652	49,855	66,648	47,252	22,706
Chinese population	8,175	2,407	23,231	7,871	1,148
Asian Indian population	2,716	982	2,938	4,341	1,233
Korean population	26,601	2,851	6,473	11,839	2,228
Filipino population	44,998	33,605	18,983	12,973	11,821
Japanese population	4,365	4,972	2,700	2,730	1,205
Vietnamese population	2,290	1,680	3,483	1,843	1,132
% white population	23.8	18.0	19.04	30.57	21.83
% black population	2.9	15.0	5.45	6.94	4.53
% Hispanic population	48.1	40.5	40.36	28.31	57.34
% Asian total	22.7	24.4	35.59	33.81	15.06
% Chinese population	1.9	1.2	12.41	5.63	0.76
% Asian Indian population	0.7	0.5	1.57	3.11	0.82
% Korean population	6.3	1.4	3.46	8.47	1.48
% Filipino population	10.7	16.5	10.14	9.28	7.84
% Japanese population	1.0	2.4	1.44	1.95	0.80
% Vietnamese population	0.5	0.8	1.86	1.32	0.75
% homeowners	25.0	61.8	73.17	68.86	55.00
% below poverty line	23.2	14.5	9.77	8.58	17.17
% with college education	23.4	18.2	28.10	27.118	16.25
% unemployed	9.6	8.2	6.27	5.61	8.93
Median income, total	$32,565	$46,738	$59,376	$58,592	$41,094
Median income, white	$36,450	$48,011	$62,701	$58,327	$46,320
Median income, black	$33,270	$48,029	$64,946	$52,582	$38,112
Median income, Hispanic	$28,749	$39,987	$54,001	$49,574	$38,130
Median income, Asian	$39,163	$58,108	$63,116	$67,250	$53,394
% immigrants	57.6	36.0	40.4	35.8	48
% other language	76.4	55.0	61.2	51.5	71.1
% non-citizen, white	21.0	2.6	3.8	2.3	8.8
% non-citizen, black	10.7	1.9	1.9	2.1	6.6
% non-citizen, Hispanic	44.1	30.6	19.2	24.7	40.4
% non-citizen, Asian	40.0	26.3	31.2	29.0	31.7

2000