

The Second Generation in New York City: A Demographic Overview

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Paper presented at the Population Association of America Annual Meeting. New York City.

March 25, 1999

Based on research supported by the Russell Sage Foundation, Mellon Foundation, Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation and the National Institute of Child Health and Development Grant Number R01HD36886..

We have only begun to understand the experiences of the 15 million immigrants who settled in the U.S. after 1965. While many studies have examined specific immigrant groups or considered the policy implications of the new immigration, fewer have analyzed how the new immigrants are helping to reweave the economic, social, and political fabric of American cities. In particular, research is only now beginning to focus on the crucial second generation coming of age. Yet their experience will determine how the new groups, especially those deemed "non-white" by traditional North American racial definitions, will be incorporated into U.S. society, how that incorporation compares to earlier immigrants, whether the children of relatively successful immigrants will remain in ethnic niches or will branch out, and how the new immigration will affect our social, political, and cultural institutions and identities.

Initial reflections on their fate give cause for concern. Gans (1992) speculates that second generation immigrants who are restricted to poor inner city schools, bad jobs, and shrinking economic niches will experience downward mobility. Portes and Zhou (1993) postulate a "segmented assimilation" in which some second generation youth hold on to an immigrant identity in order to avoid being classified with American blacks or Puerto Ricans, while others face racial discrimination and develop an "adversarial stance" toward the dominant society. Rumbaut (1997) tells us that as second generation immigrants become more American, they watch more television and do less homework, eat more junk food and become less fit, resent "old country" parental strictness and become entangled in the dangers of the streets. We do not know the longer term meaning of these trends or whether they truly describe the trajectory of the new immigrant second generation.

We therefore believe the time has come to undertake a detailed study of the school experience, labor market outcomes, and social incorporation of the leading edge of the second generation as it enters adulthood. Specifically, we are now in the middle stages of study which will include a) a large scale telephone survey, b) in-depth, open-ended, in-person follow-up interviews with a subsample of survey respondents, and c) strategically positioned

ethnographies. We are studying young adults aged 18-32 born to post-1965 immigrant parents in the United States (the second generation) or who were born abroad but arrived in the U.S. by age 12 and mainly grew up here (the so-called "1.5 generation"). We focus on the largest groups from four major streams of immigration: Anglophone West Indians, Dominicans, Chinese and Russian Jews. For added analytic power we compare the Dominican sample with one of young adults from Colombian, Ecuadoran, and Peruvian backgrounds, and we oversample the Chinese so as to insure the representation of both those whose parents came from mainland China and those with whose parents emigrated from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and elsewhere in East Asia. We compare the five second generation groups with native born white, black, and mainland born Puerto Rican young adults born to native parents. We chose a lower age limit of 18 as the practical minimum for leaving school and entering the labor force and an upper limit of 32, the oldest a native child born of post-1965 immigrants could be in 1997 (when we originally planned to begin the survey).

Our study will provide data to test the following hypotheses raised by the scholarship on immigrant incorporation, assimilation, and the new second generation:

1. Economic restructuring has had differential effects on the labor market opportunities for second generation and native born young adults, controlling for race; groups where parental educational attainment and economic position have been higher and social networks stronger will produce better outcomes for the second generation.
2. Systematically different levels of human, social, and cultural capital, and neighborhood contexts will also differentially affect the school experiences of the native and second generation groups. Parental and second generation participation in economic or cultural "ethnic enclaves" forestalls some negative aspects of assimilation and sustains

"immigrant advantages" for the second generation.

3. Racial discrimination will differentiate the way various second generation groups construct self-identification and civic inclusion. "Assimilation" into "black America" or "Latino America" will produce different educational, labor market, and cultural outcomes than for those who are not so classified.
5. Changing gender relations have a differential affect on individual outcomes among the second generation. Second generation women will have an easier time than second generation men in "becoming American" while maintaining ethnic ties.
6. Concentrated urban poverty and societal disinvestment in urban education will have a differential negative impact on second generation young adults growing up in poverty neighborhoods.

In the wake of dramatic changes to family form, women's labor force participation, the economy, and the labor market, evidence gathered by this study will enable us to understand how this crucial cohort will define the meaning of immigrant assimilation in the twenty-first century.

Until recently, scholarly work on the children of post-1965 immigrants was largely speculative (i.e. Erie 1988, Gans 1992). However, an emerging body of work has sought to extrapolate future adult patterns of incorporation from the experiences of second generation children and teenagers (Gibson 1989, Portes and Zhou 1993, Fernandez-Kelly and Schauffler 1996, Portes and Schauffler 1996, Zhou and Bankston 1996, Rumbaut 1995, 1996a, 1996b,

1997a). Qualitative and ethnographic studies have also been made of second generation young adults that highlight generational transitions within immigrant communities (see Waters 1996a,b, Bacon 1994, 1996, Suarez-Orozco 1995, Smith 1994, Grasmuck and Pessar 1993). Several quantitative analyses of the second generation have been made on the basis of the 1990 census (Hirshman 1996, Jensen and Chiose 1996, Landale and Oropesa, 1995). Kao and Tienda (1995) studied immigrant youth and the second generation, using the NELS longitudinal data set. (For an overview of these studies see also Zhou 1997). What this emerging literature lacks, and indeed what could not have taken place until the present, is a comparative study of second generation young adults as participants in higher education, the labor force, and the community.

In this paper we use the Current Population Survey data to paint a broad picture of the demography of the second generation and the importance and distinctiveness of New York as a strategic research site to examine them. We then describe the geographic distribution of the second generation in New York and its suburbs and discuss the choices we made in devising a sampling plan to study the young adult second generation. Finally, we describe the current state of the project and our methodological and substantive findings from the pilot stage of the study.

A Demographic Overview of the Second Generation

The March 1998 Current Population Survey tells us that 26.3 million of the nation's 268.3 million residents (or 9.79 percent) are immigrants, the highest percentage in many decades.¹ Of equal significance, as Table 1 shows, 28.1 million more individuals (or 10.5

¹ The March 1998 Annual Demographic Supplement of the CPS provides the most recent data available on overall national population and labor force characteristics, but does not ask about political participation. This foreign born total excludes approximately 2.4 million people

percent of the U.S. total) were born in the U.S. but had at least one foreign-born parent.² Put another way, second generation immigrants constitute 12.2 percent, or one out of every eight people, of all those born within the U.S. The combined first and second generation--the immigrant stock--make up one-fifth of the nation's total population. The components of the immigrant stock population will continue to rise, as immigration remains at a high level, more immigrants become naturalized citizens, the relatively high level of immigrant fertility results in more native born children, and the young second generation comes of age. The growth of the new immigrant second generation will be offset only by the passing of older, white first and second generation individuals who arrived just before after World War II or whose parents arrived at the end of the last wave of migration or around World War II. (Approximately 12.4 percent of the current foreign born population arrived before 1965.)

Were they considered a single group, the nation's immigrant stock population would far exceed the size of the nation's native stock black and Hispanic populations, which together amount to about 15 percent of the national population. Moreover, their present and future influence on the nation's cultural and political development is magnified by their concentration in six states that loom large in popular culture and the electoral college (California, Illinois, Florida, New York, New Jersey, and Texas). Within these states, they are further concentrated in the largest metropolitan areas. Table 2 shows that first and second generation immigrants make up 42.1 percent of the population in metropolitan New York, 51.6 percent of metropolitan Los Angeles, 40.1 percent of the Bay Area, and almost 60% of Miami. Even in large metropolitan areas with relatively low immigration, such as Chicago, they make up more than a quarter of the population. Indeed, these eleven CMSAs contain one-third of the national population, but

born abroad to U.S. citizen parents, who are counted in the tables as native stock.

2 The CPS total population figure excluded members of the military and people living in group quarters, such as prisons, hospitals, and college dorms.

58.6 percent of the immigrant first and second generation. Within these metropolitan areas, first and second generation immigrants are further concentrated in the central cities. .

The geographic distribution of this second generation population lies in between that of first generation immigrants and the native stock population, but closer to the former. Immigrants are highly concentrated in the New York metropolitan area and five other “gateway cities,” Los Angeles, San Francisco, Houston, Chicago, and Miami. Within these metropolitan areas, they are also heavily concentrated in the central cities. On the other hand, native born people with native born parents overwhelmingly reside outside these metropolitan areas. As Table 3 shows, 17 percent of first generation non-citizen immigrants live in the New York metro area, with 35 percent more in the five other gateway metro areas, for a total of 52 percent, while only 5 percent of the native stock population lives in New York and only 10 percent in the gateway CMSAs, for a total of 15 percent. Meanwhile, New York City has 6 percent of the nation’s second generation immigrants, the remainder of its metropolitan area another 8 percent, the gateway cities hold 9 percent, and their surrounding metropolitan areas 15 percent, for a total of 38 percent. As William Frey and others have noted, the U.S. is undergoing a sorting process in which the native born population is distancing itself from the immigrant urban centers, but it is also undergoing a process in which the second generation is also slowly diffusing away from the zones of initial immigrant settlement.

New York is an excellent site to study the second generation both because of the large concentration of foreign stock, but also because of the heterogeneity of origins of New York’s immigrant population. Table 4 shows that only about 40% of New York’s 7.5 million residents are native stock, while more than a third are foreign born and almost a quarter are second generation. While this combined foreign stock total of 60 percent is well shy of the 78 percent reached in 1900, it is a larger fraction than at any time since 1930. Befitting the city’s role as ground zero for previous waves of immigration, the city’s first and second generation immigrants are racially diverse: 31 percent white, 20 percent black, 14 percent Asian, and 35 percent Hispanic. In other words, each racial group, including whites and blacks, have

substantial shares of first and second generation immigrants. Indeed, blacks, at only 53.5 percent native born, are the most “American” of New York City’s minority groups. .

When we look only at the “new” second generation, however, we get a somewhat different picture. This group is defined as descendants of those who migrated to the U.S. after the reform of immigration laws in 1965. Such a “new” second generation person could therefore be only 32 years old in 1998. As Table 5 shows, just over half (54 percent) of the total second generation falls into this “new second generation category” and they are overwhelmingly still in their pre-adult years. About one out of every eight second generation individuals are in the baby boom age group, suggesting that their parents came to the U.S. just before or after World War II, while one out of five are aged 65 or older, suggesting that their foreign born parents arrived, probably as youngsters, in the turn-of-the-century wave of migration. Clearly, in analyzing the current second generation, we want to focus on the “new second generation” now entering early adulthood and exclude the older second generation who represent previous waves of immigration and who faced a substantially different opportunity structure in their early adulthood.

The new second generation has a significantly different racial make-up and spatial distribution than the older second generation. Four out of five of the old second generation are non-Hispanic whites and more than half come from European backgrounds; while less than one-third of the new second generation are white and only about one in ten comes from a European background. Conversely, almost half (45 percent) of the new second generation are Hispanic another 16 percent are Asian, while 7 percent are black. As one might expect, Table 6 shows that the new second generation remains in and around the current centers of first generation immigration, while the old second generation is disproportionately located in the suburbs of New York City, a major magnet for the last waves of migration, and outside the five

current immigrant gateway cities (where seven out of ten of the old second generation are to be found).

Turning to the new second generation comprised of people who are 32 years old or younger in 1998, we find some 16 million people, almost half (44 percent) of whom are located in the five big immigrant gateway metropolitan areas. Within these metropolitan areas, they are roughly evenly split between the central cities and suburbs (see Table 6), which means they are more suburbanized than their first generation parents but still far less suburbanized than natives, especially native born whites. It is interesting to note, in Table 7, that the racial make-up of the new second generation in the New York metro area, though more black, otherwise roughly approximates that of the U.S. as a whole, while that of the other gateway cities is substantially more Hispanic and less white than the national total. The New York metro area, with 7.5 percent of the U.S. population, is home to 13.2 percent of the new second generation. Table 8 shows that the new second generation resident in the New York metro area is somewhat better educated than that of the other gateway cities or the rest of the U.S., while Table 9 shows that the new second generation in metropolitan New York is both somewhat poorer and somewhat richer than in the rest of the country. Tables 8 and 9 both show a sharper difference between central city and metropolitan second generation residence on education and income than is characteristic of either the gateway cities or the nation as a whole.

Thus we concluded, based on these demographic characteristics, that a study of the second generation in New York City could include groups from all four of the major racial/ethnic groups present in today's immigrant streams--Hispanic, Black, White and Asian. We also concluded that the study needed to include both central city and suburban residents in order not to only include lesser educated and lower income respondents.

Geographic Characteristics of the Second Generation in New York

One of the most important reasons for undertaking this study is that the Census and other published sources tell us much more about the foreign-born than about their offspring. The Census stopped asking people about their parents' birthplace in 1970, substituting a question on ancestry that was essentially an attitude variable. We do know that a large number of foreign born have migrated to the region since 1965; in 1990, 3.8 million of the 27 county consolidated metropolitan statistical area's 19.8 million residents were foreign born; in New York City, the concentration was substantially higher. Almost three out of four had arrived since 1965.

We also know that the children of these immigrants constitute a large population. Some were born in the home country and remained there for varying lengths of time before joining their parents or other family members here. Many others were born here. The 1990 Public Use Microdata Sample file (PUMS) allows us to examine the native born children living with at least one foreign-born parent. (As they age and move out of their parents' homes, the statistical system loses the ability to identify them as members of the second generation.) The region's total population of 1-17 year olds was 4.549 million in 1990; of these, 815 thousand, or almost one fifth, were born in the 50 states but lived with at least one foreign-born parent. Another 152 thousand were foreign born but grew up mostly in the U.S., making for a 1-17 year old second generation of almost one million.

Among the region's 3.960 million 18-30 year olds, 214 thousand were native born individuals still living with their foreign born parents. In addition, 151 thousand had arrived in the U.S. by age 12, had lived here ten years, and thus could be identified as the 1.5 generation,

for a combined total of 8.48 percent of the 18-30 cohort. Since more native born 18-30 year olds live outside their families of origin than inside, there are presumably another 200 thousand or so second generation 18-30 year olds living away from their foreign born parents, leading to a combined second generation of roughly 565 thousand people in 1990, or 14.2 percent of the total cohort, or one in seven.

Everything we know about the new immigration suggests that the experience of this second generation will vary strongly by region of origin, as well as by gender, race, class, and other important dimensions of the social structure. At the same time, one or two groups do not dominate the immigrant second generation in metropolitan New York. The single largest ethnic group, Dominicans, accounts for only 9.5 percent of the combined second and 1.5 generation 18-30 year olds; Jamaicans constitute 6.4 percent, while all Anglophone West-Indians together constitute 18.2 percent. Mainland Chinese are 8.6 percent and the children of all foreign-born Chinese (including those from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and elsewhere) are 12.1 percent. In addition we are surveying Russian Jews and Colombians, Ecuadorans and Peruvians. Together, these groups represent 39 percent of combined second and 1.5 generation population of those aged 18-30.

These groups vary in theoretically important ways. West Indians, an English speaking immigrant group, are generally classified as "black" by U.S. standards. One of the two Spanish speaking groups, the racially mixed Dominicans, is the region's largest and poorest single immigrant nationality. We compare them to South Americans who, during the immigrant generation, have more European ancestry, have lighter skin tones, and who have geographically and economically differentiated themselves from darker and poorer Dominicans. The Chinese constitute by far the largest Asian group in the region and include a wide variety of human and economic capital levels in the immigrant generation. Immigrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan generally arrive with much higher levels of English proficiency and education, whereas many immigrants from the Peoples Republic of China come from peasant

backgrounds and with far lower levels of formal education. This group constitutes the clearest example of an "ethnic enclave" in New York. They thus have much to tell us how the presence of enclaves effects the second generation.

The proposed sample groups build upon Census ancestry and birthplace designations. Although Census categories reference nation states, these designations often poorly capture "nationality" and ethnicity as New Yorkers understand them. (In the Dominican case, however, ethnicity and nationality closely coincide this group is sufficiently large to allow efficient sampling on its own.)

We define "West Indian" to include all people descended from those born in the Anglophone Caribbean: the thirteen Caricom member nations (including the mainland countries of Guyana and Belize), Caribbean British colonies, the Dutch Caribbean islands where most people speak English and are descended from immigrants from the British West Indies (i.e. Aruba but not Suriname), and English speaking Panamanians descended from British speaking West Indians (the Panamanian census estimates that 14.5% of its population is West Indian, but they have long been over represented among immigrants to New York). We do not include English speaking West Indian minority immigrants from predominantly Hispanic nations, such as the East Coast Creoles from the Blue Fields area of Nicaragua, Garifuna from around Livingston in Guatemala, and the descendants of Jamaican immigrants from Limon in Costa Rica, etc.) because it is too difficult to separate them from their more numerous Hispanic countrymen.

While there are cultural differences among these nationalities, there is good reason to see them as a larger group in New York. West Indian immigrants tend to define themselves this way, even if they would not all use the term "West Indian." They also tend to differentiate themselves from both Hispanic Caribbeans and Haitians. They share an "Afro-Creole" culture as well as a heritage of British colonialism. Many parents of today's second generation came

from places that were politically united at the time of their immigration, even if they are now separate nations. In New York, they live in the same neighborhoods, share similar niches in the occupational structure, and intermarry. Taken together, West Indians are the largest immigrant group in New York.

The "South American" group of Colombians, Ecuadorians, and Peruvians is a more problematic category. These groups share occupational and residential niches in New York and have more in common with each other than with Caribbean Hispanics (or for that matter with Mexicans or Central Americans), but there are also considerable historical and cultural differences among them. Our pilot data indicate that second generation children of immigrants from these nations have some feeling of being a single group, albeit one lacking a clear sense of boundaries or even a clearly articulated name. Most often these young people would describe themselves as Hispanic or Spanish, yet they generally differentiated themselves from either Puerto Ricans (particularly New York born Puerto Ricans) or Dominicans. We link them to achieve large enough population to sample, to enhance the chances of finding eligible households in given areas, and to provide a theoretically interesting comparison with Dominicans and Puerto Ricans. We exclude other South American groups because they are culturally and linguistically different groups as Brazilians and Argentineans, many of whom are Jews of European extraction in New York.

We include the Russian second generation to get the view of a "white" group. As well-educated Caucasians with ties to a well established native ethnic group, we expect this groups to have a far less problematic transition compared to minority second generation groups.

While the immigrant first generation are geographically concentrated, the second generation is somewhat more dispersed. Maps 1 and 1a show that the 18-30 year old cohort makes up from 13.8 to 36 percent of the population of the 152 public use microdata areas

(PUMAs) in metropolitan New York, with the median about 21.5 percent. PUMAs are geographically large and diverse areas, including at least 100 thousand residents, so concentration ratios of most groups beside basic racial distinctions will remain fairly low. At the block-group level, we can expect to find much higher levels of concentration among the second generation and a better, if not easy, chance to locate them for the survey sample. Maps 2 and 2a show that the immigrant second generation ranges from 1.5 percent to 26.7 percent of the 18-30 total, with the greatest concentration coming in the southern and eastern zones of the West Indian community of Flatbush. Of the 152 Public Use Microdata areas in metropolitan New York, those containing large concentrations of households with second generation members (three percent or more) are concentrated in New York City and the inner suburban counties, including most of New York City (except the East Side, South Brooklyn, and Staten Island), Hempstead in Nassau County, White Plains and Mt. Vernon in Westchester, and Teaneck-Hackensack, Paterson, the Oranges, Newark, Jersey City, and Elizabeth in New Jersey.

Native-born 18-32 year old whites tend to live on the region's periphery, far away from native minorities and the second generation. Their highest incidence (above 15 percent) is farthest away from the central city; in suburbs where the second generation can be found, their incidence is lower. Still, as the largest group in the metropolitan population, native born whites can be found at feasible sampling levels, more than five percent of all households, even in these areas. Households with native born blacks aged 18-30 are concentrated in the central cities and mirror the pattern of whites. Households with mainland born Puerto Rican 18-30 year olds are diffused through the areas between concentrations of whites and blacks. Nowhere do these households reach a particularly high incidence (3.9 percent is the maximum, compared to 26.3 percent for whites and 21.5 percent for native blacks), but the highest incidence areas may be found in the South Bronx, Bushwick, and Sunset Park. Lower concentrations are found in

the inner ring suburbs.

Since the immigrant second generation target groups are smaller and less concentrated than the native comparison groups, their incidence rates are lower even where they are most concentrated. Maps 4 and 4a show the West Indian concentrations. The West Indian second generation is the most segregated of the target second generation populations; the highest West Indian second generation incidence is 17.2 percent in Flatbush in Brooklyn. It is also found at fairly high concentrations throughout central Brooklyn, Southeast Queens, the northern Bronx, and in Hempstead and Jersey City.

Maps 6 and 6a show the Dominican concentrations. The highest concentration of the Dominican second generation, 10.2 percent, occurs in Washington Heights, where the first generation is also most concentrated. They live at lower concentrations (but still above one percent) in the Lower East Side, Sunset Park and Bushwick in Brooklyn, and Elmhurst and Jackson Heights in Queens. Maps 3 and 3a show the ranges for the Chinese, with the maximum PUMA-level concentration being 11.3 percent, found in Manhattan's traditional Chinatown. The Chinese second generation is concentrated in Chinatown, where it reaches 7.8 percent of all households, and is present at the one- to three-percent range in South Brooklyn and Corona, Elmhurst, and Flushing in Queens. Maps 7 and 7a show the Colombian-Ecuadorian-Peruvian concentrations. The Colombian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian second generation is most concentrated (3.8 percent) in Queens, with other concentrations in Jersey City.

Two-Wave Telephone Sampling Strategy

Based on the experience of the pilot survey, we undertook the telephone survey through

a two-stage sampling methodology. In the first stage, we used random digit dialing (RDD) to screen 30,000 households within the designated sampling area. Survey firms can determine in advance which banks of telephone numbers are active; to a considerable degree, especially outside New York City, telephone numbers cluster by geography, enabling us to select a given geographic area as a sampling frame. Within the sampling area, this large scale screening will provide us with an accurate overall picture of the distribution of households containing 18-32 year olds by race, ethnicity, nativity, and nativity of parents. One major virtue of this approach is it includes low-incidence cases of each group. We will know the overall incidence of households containing the various specific 18-32 year old groups we wish to study as well as their specific geographic concentrations. If properly structured, this screening should provide sufficient eligible cases to complete interviews with the native born comparison groups and the largest second generation group (West Indians). It will also lead to completed interviews with lesser numbers of the other target groups. Finally, the first wave will identify telephone numbers of eligible second generation households from which to conduct the second phase. As of March 1999 we have completed the first phase, and are about to begin the targeted phase of calling.

In the second wave of screening, we will make screening calls using random permutations of the last three digits of the telephone numbers of those already determined to be eligible. The number of screens for each group will be determined by the number of interviews which remain to be completed and the completion ratio obtained in the first round. This second round of screening calls will yield eligible cases in a pattern that mirrors the underlying concentration of the target second generation group. If a group is relatively geographically concentrated, the yield from the second round of screening calls will be substantially higher than the first. The first wave of screening interviews will tell us how to weight each of these cases in the final analysis. To limit the cost exposure to making many

fruitless second-stage screening calls from telephone numbers of those who happen to live in low incidence areas, we will review the “productivity” of the different screening numbers after one-third of the second round screening has been done and eliminate numbers that are producing few or no eligible cases. In this way, the second round of screening calls and interviews will be more targeted on the remaining groups and allow us to complete the required number of interviews.

We recognize that a telephone survey is biased against non-telephone households and over represents households with more than one telephone line. We will address both problems by asking each household if they have more than one line and whether a non-telephone household regularly uses their telephone. We seek to interview these latter households at that telephone, at another time when they can call in, or in person. In addition to obtaining a more representative sample, this information will help us to weight cases appropriately. In the pilot phase, one South American and two Dominican households out of those screened reported that another household used their phone because they lacked one of their own. In general, this two-stage approach will provide a sample of the entire second generation and our specific study groups that will represent the entire range of concentration and neighborhood circumstances in which they live. We also believe, based on our experience in the pilot study, described below, that it will provide better quality data.

We considered four alternative geographies from which to construct our sample: A) the 27 county metropolitan area, B) the 13 county inner metropolitan area (New York City, Rockland, Westchester, and Nassau counties, and the five northeastern New Jersey counties), C) the 47 Public Use Microdata Areas where the target group incidence was three percent or more, and D) New York City minus Staten Island plus the eight suburban PUMAs where the

target group incidence was three percent or more. .

We chose alternative D for several reasons. Of the two options, it retains a larger share of both the target populations and the native minority groups. It overcomes the problem that it is difficult to target telephone numbers geographically within New York City, since people can take their telephone numbers with them when they move and PUMA and zipcode boundaries overlap less. Finally, many low concentration PUMAs in New York City are adjacent to second generation concentrations and may have received more of them since the 1990 Census, now seven years old.

Opting for alternative D and a first wave of 30,000 screening calls has yielded sufficient eligible cases to complete the white, black, and West Indian samples. (Our goal is to sample 400 cases of all of the groups, except 800 Chinese and 300 Russian Jews³). It will also give us a substantial start on the Puerto Rican cases. Since the second round of seed calls will eliminate all the sampling units (PUMA) that produced no eligible cases in the first round, its yield will be substantially higher for the remaining groups. In addition, as discussed above, we will eliminate unproductive seed numbers after a third of the second screening has been completed. As a result, we estimate that the second round screening will achieve a concentration level that averages the first round concentration levels and those of the three most concentrated PUMAs for each group as given in the 1990 Census. This allows us to estimate the number of additional screening calls needed for each group so that we can budget the telephone survey.

³ Ideally we would have liked to sample 400 Russian Jews but we only received funding for 300 interviews.

Potential Sample Bias

Narrowing our sample frame in this way introduces the obvious possibility of biasing our sample to some degree. To determine whether this might occur, we used the 1990 PUMS data to examine how our three native born groups and five second generation groups differ within the two geographies (inside the proposed sample frame versus outside the sample frame). We note that the vast majority of the immigrant second generation lives within the proposed sample frame, ranging from a low of 71.9 percent of the Colombians, Ecuadorans, and Peruvians, to a high of 88.9 percent of Dominicans. The proposed sample frame will thus necessarily encompass the great bulk of the second generation experience. It also captures the bulk of the native black and Puerto Rican experience, though not the native white experience.

As might be expected, those who live outside the sample frame tend to live in households with higher incomes. Yet the divergence is not large. The mean household incomes inside the sample area are four-fifths of those outside for whites and blacks and seventy percent or more for Puerto Ricans, West Indians, and South Americans. There is no difference for Haitian second generation young adults. The differences are most pronounced for Dominicans and Chinese, but even for these groups, those in the sample area live in households that, on average, earn two-thirds as much as those who live outside. (Remember that relatively few of these second generation groups live outside the sample area.)

Table 10 shows household income distribution by group. Predictably, a few percentage points more second generation individuals inside the sample area live in low income households than outside, with the greatest disparity among Puerto Ricans and Dominicans. Ten to twenty percentage points fewer second generation individuals live in high income households inside the sample area compared to those outside, with the disparities being largest for Chinese, Dominicans, and South Americans. Somewhat surprisingly, the household income disparities are consistently smaller for the native born groups. To put these figures in perspective, consider that for Chinese, where the disparity is greatest, approximately 7,600 second generation young adults inside the sample area live in households with incomes of \$60,000 or more, while about 3,100 second generation Chinese outside live in such households. The proportion of the latter is higher than for the former, but the underlying population is much smaller. Hence, we will capture the upper income experience among the Chinese second generation within the sample area, but it will be slightly under represented.

Consistent with the income patterns, Table 11 shows that all groups inside the sample area are more likely to live in female headed households and all but one are less likely to be in the labor force than those outside the sample area. Except for Dominicans and Puerto Ricans, however, the disparities are relatively modest. Put another way, the likelihood of living in a

female headed household outside the sample area is surprisingly high. For the low income Hispanic groups, native or immigrant, it appears our sample frame will somewhat under represent two-parent families. To the extent that family form drives second generation outcomes, our analysis must be mindful of this potential bias when comparing the Hispanic groups to the others. It should not, however, undermine comparisons among the three Hispanic groups, because all three have similar differentials. (Blacks have high levels of female headship outside as well as inside the sample area, while Chinese have low levels in both.)

Finally, Table 12 examines educational outcomes. Surprisingly, some disparities are not in the expected direction and the differences are generally small. South Americans inside the sample area are actually more likely to have graduated from high school, while native whites, native blacks, Dominicans, and only for Dominicans does the high school graduate rate disparity enter double digits, and none of the groups do for the college graduation rate. On this perhaps most crucial of all outcomes, the potential for sample bias appears to be modest at best.

We conclude from this analysis, then, that our sample frame will slightly over represent respondents living in poor, female-headed households and slightly under represent respondents in high income households. This bias is differentially large across groups primarily for Puerto Ricans and Dominicans living in female-headed, low-income households. Where our analysis focuses on these factors and seeks to draw conclusions about these groups, it needs to be qualified with an explicit recognition that the twelve to twenty-five percent of the Dominican second generation and Puerto Rican young people who live outside the sample area are differentially less likely to live under these conditions. Otherwise, especially for the crucial issue of educational attainment, we do not believe our recommended sample frame will introduce significant distortions into our conclusions. Indeed, even for native whites, most of whom are excluded from our sample frame, those living within the sample area are evidently remarkably similar to those living outside, at least on the dimensions examined here.

The Suburban Sample

The Mellon Foundation has awarded us funding specifically for adding a “far-suburban” sample of the second generation. This sample has been added to the phone survey because

of a concern that the experiences of second generation young adults who live in non-immigrant areas differ markedly from those who live within the more frequently studied immigrant neighborhoods. This allowed us to gather data from respondents who are growing up within the same broad economic context as their inner city or inner-suburb compatriots. They will vary in theoretically important ways, however, because they will be much more exposed to people who are not their co-ethnics, and more generally to native born Americans. According to the March 1997 CPS sample, these sampling areas have a predominantly native-born white population: native blacks make up about 10 percent of the proposed suburban sampling area, and native Hispanics 5.5 percent. Overall, about 1.26 percent of the 18-32 year old individuals will be second or 1.5 generation persons from our target study groups. We identified potential Chinese, Dominican, and Colombian-Ecuadoran-Peruvian individuals through the listed telephone numbers of households where the customer has a distinctively Chinese or Hispanic name. We identified West Indians by calling in towns where the 1990 Census PUMS and STF4 files show significant numbers of West Indian households. The suburban sample, which has been completed but not yet analyzed included 670 additional respondents.

The Pilot Study

Beginning in July 1996, the project team fielded a pilot study that administered an extensive closed-ended instrument to respondents from all target groups and followed them up with in-depth, open-ended interviews. This pilot study had several purposes: I) to develop and refine instruments for screening eligible households, obtaining life histories, and testing a short telephone version of the survey; ii) to develop and refine a protocol for in-depth, open-ended follow-up interviews, iii) to test the validity of our sampling approach and explore alternatives to it, iv) to get experience with the difficulty and cost of securing completed interviews with the

target and comparison populations, and v) to uncover other problems likely to arise when the full study was implemented. We sought to complete 270 interviews with the closed-ended instrument and 70 in-depth follow-up interviews with the open-ended instrument.

In the event, our survey firm completed 98 closed-ended interviews with six immigrant groups (20 Chinese, 21 West Indians, 2 Koreans, 12 South Americans, 27 Dominicans, and 17 Haitians) and 74 with three native born comparison groups (25 white, 25 black, and 24 Puerto Rican), for a total of 173. Project team members conducted 54 in depth, open-ended interviews with second generation respondents and 53 with the native comparison groups, for a total of 107. Although we completed fewer closed-ended interviews than initially planned, owing to various difficulties in the field, the pilot phase did an excellent job helping us to create and test instruments, identify problems, and develop solutions to them. It also provided us with an initial data base from which to think about the issues raised in the study and further refine our research instruments.

Methodological Lessons

Both the closed-ended and in-depth survey instruments worked well, but our effort to identify and interview eligible respondents, which was based on in-person approaches to households in Census tracts where the first generation groups lived in high concentrations, survey encountered a series of difficulties. Certain smaller groups proved too difficult to locate, notably Koreans and Haitians . Koreans who were located refused to agree to an interview despite our concerted efforts. As a result we dropped Haitians and Koreans as possible groups.

Our initial strategy of targeting high concentration Census tracts also proved

problematic. The 1990 Census was sometimes a poor guide to actual residents in 1997. For example, though the 1990 Census indicates East Harlem to be highly Puerto Rican, we encountered mainly recent Mexican and Central American immigrants in the target census tracts. (Indeed, the CPS estimates that since 1990 the Mexican ancestry population of New York City has skyrocketed six-fold to 306,000.) Even where it was accurate, our sampling method was prone to selection bias. We did not discover many low incidence cases of the target second generation groups as “crossover” samples, and when we did, such as the young white Lubavitcher who lived in a West Indian neighborhood, they were of questionable value. Our sample also seemed biased toward younger (18-23) respondents.

The direct approach to individuals’ households was also inefficient. People were reluctant to open their doors to strangers. It was often difficult even to gain admission to a point from which to ring a doorbell. Field supervision was also difficult. Such problems led the project team to shift from in-person screening to telephone screening. We had already been screening households in target tracts by telephone where the numbers could be identified. We extended this to making random digit dialing calls from telephone numbers of eligible households. Although RDD screening produced fewer eligible cases per residential telephone answered than did households contacted in person, we could attempt many more screening calls in the time it took to contact one household in person. Refusal rates among eligible households were about the same for both methods. In the final analysis, our survey firm completed 77 interviews from in person approaches in the target tracts, 22 from telephone screening in the target tracts, and 74 from random digit dialing. Data quality was good across all three methods of screening.

We concluded that we should screen all households by telephone in the full version of the survey. Not only was this more economic, but it would produce a far more random and

representative sample, not one restricted to high incidence Census tracts. Sample quality could also be enhanced through supervision of a central phone bank, handing off potentially eligible households to an appropriate language speaker where necessary.

From there, it was a short step to deciding to conduct the entire closed-ended interview by telephone. A number of factors prompted this decision. First, it is efficient to complete a survey by phone as soon as an eligible person is identified. We felt that we could get good quality data in a telephone survey since we had already had success with such an instrument in the pilot survey. It collected the bulk of the behavioral or experiential data at the core of the long form instrument, mainly sacrificing detailed data on the respondent's life situation at birth, age 6, age 12, and age 18, as well as certain attitudinal batteries. Finally, we could better collect sensitive information, and get more nuanced responses, in in-depth follow-up interviews.

Substantive Lessons

The pilot study interviews also gave us a wealth of insight about what is currently happening with the second generation. While we did not do enough of these interviews to justify statistical analysis, they highlight issues that will be central to the final analysis.

Some aspects of the labor market experiences of the various first generation immigrant groups seem to continue into the second generation, in the sense that in groups where the first generation brings social and human capital into the market place, the second generation has more favorable opportunities for employment. In other ways, however, the various second generation groups seem more like each other, and like native working class New Yorkers, than like their immigrant parents. Only for the Chinese does the ethnic enclave play a positive role,

but there is evidence that the second generation will avoid the lower rungs of the enclave if at all possible.

All groups express a strong belief that education, not job experience or "connections," is the key to success in today's economy. Virtually everyone reports that their parents stressed the importance of education, but what the meaning of educational "success" varies greatly across the groups. For some, doing well was simply a matter of graduating from high school; for others, it meant getting consistently good grades and going to college. For West Indians, a certain amount of discounting of the efficacy of education took place. For native whites and blacks, private and parochial schools often made a key difference in their educational outcomes. Those who attended parochial schools were less likely to "fall through the cracks" or pay a heavy penalty for mistakes than those who attended public schools. Parents who took education seriously and spent time and energy fighting an indifferent educational bureaucracy were credited with saving the educational careers of many respondents.

Asians respondents made the best use of the resources of the New York City public schools compared to other groups, including whites. None of the Chinese respondents attended private or parochial schools, but half had attended an elite magnet high school (Stuyvesant, Bronx Science and Brooklyn Tech) and the rest attended the better New York City public high schools (i.e.. Cardozo, LaGuardia, Midwood). Chinese parents seem to have better access to information regarding high schools, which is partially transmitted through ethnic networks. On the other hand Chinese respondents also benefitted from being less residentially segregated than other groups. In sharp contrast to other immigrant groups and to native blacks and whites, many Asian respondents remembered their high school years fondly and noted that their friends were more racially and ethnically diverse in high school than in college or since.

The educational picture for the Haitian, West Indian and Dominican respondents, like that of native blacks and Hispanics (and, to a considerable degree, working class native whites) is less bright. With few exceptions these respondents attended segregated public or parochial schools with their co-ethnics, or with native minorities. Although some had applied to specialized high schools, none of those we interviewed had been admitted. Even those who had been enrolled in honors classes in High School and went on to college often found themselves unprepared for college work. Many "1.5" generation students reported having been placed in the wrong grade when they arrived.

A typical pattern was that a good student who received awards in elementary school or junior high became a mediocre student in high school. Many respondents graduated from vocational programs and a number participated in a cooperative work training program where students attend school for two days and work the other three.

These groups had a complicated attitude towards education. On the one hand, almost all of them stressed the positive value of education, which they reflexively affirmed as the surest route towards upward mobility. Indeed, if we had only conducted the closed-ended survey, we would have concluded that all respondents believed strongly in education, with little variation across groups. Yet, when probed, West Indian, Haitian, and Dominican respondents revealed considerable skepticism about the true value of educational credentials in the face of a racially divided job market.

Except for the Chinese, educational attainment varied markedly by gender among all groups. Women consistently attain higher levels. All the women respondents had graduated high school and most had attended college. By contrast, several eighteen and nineteen-year-

old men were still in high school and many were overage for their grade when they graduated or left school.

There are several possible explanations for this difference. It may be that in many immigrant communities (as in working class native white communities) education is considered to be more important for women, or that educational success is seen as "feminine." Overcrowded inner city public and parochial schools may also reward traditionally "feminine" traits such as cooperativeness, compliance and passivity. Young minority women may face less overt discrimination than young men and may cope with discrimination and ethnic conflict in less self-destructive ways.

Many respondents offered the paradoxical explanation that young women are more closely tied to the home. Family arrangements where a single mother (the most common family form among the Caribbean groups) is working six or seven days a week reinforces the gendered division of labor in domestic chores among siblings. A young woman growing up in this environment may have to assume adult responsibilities for younger siblings at an early age. While such arrangements undoubtedly take time away from studies, respondents felt these they also helped their school work by forcing maturity on young women and keeping them away from the temptations of the "street." Boys were generally exempt from such responsibilities and were often encouraged to be more independent, but that independence was often counter-productive for school work. Many immigrant families feel a strong need to "protect" girls, particularly from early sexual activity and pregnancy, but also from violence. While boys are, in fact, more likely to be the victims of violence, they are generally felt not to need such protection:

The academically successful Dominican, West Indian and Haitian students resembled Asian students. Like Asians, they sought out the best public or parochial schools. Yet

residential segregation made this more difficult, as the "zoned" schools where these respondents lived were almost always inferior. Catholic schools were often the best option for the academically oriented, even among non-Catholics (a pattern we also saw among native blacks).

Most native minority respondents and the large majority of the Haitian, West Indian and Dominican respondents had lived in some form of "non-traditional" family before the age of 18. Only the South American respondents tended to have a full time, "stay at home" mother for a significant portion of their childhood. In many cases, family trajectories were too complicated to be picked up even in a survey instrument designed to capture them. Marriages broke up and came back together, half siblings and fictive kin were common in some groups, other related adults joined and left immigrant households, etc. Families immigrated in stages, with some children remaining with relatives "back home" while others came to the U.S. The in-depth interviews proved better at capturing this complexity.

Among the native groups, family-of-origin structure explain little of the respondent's outlooks and trajectories. Respondents seemed more concerned with the quality of relationships within the family. For themselves, most native respondents viewed egalitarian marriages as the ideal, but few were sanguine about the possibility of meeting this standard. Most have high standards of what constitutes a "good" marriage and many would rather "go it alone" and even raise children alone than be confined to an unhappy relationship.

Asian and South American immigrants had more traditional ideas about marriage. Most were raised in two parent families and many thought a strict division of labor within the family, particularly concerning child care, made sense. Traditional ideas seem to be breaking down, however. Few Asian respondents were, in fact, married and most reported being in no hurry to

do so. Most Asian women had established independent careers. South American respondents were the most likely to be married. Here, too, women wanted to be more independent than their mothers had been (although this seems more an ideal than a fact.)

West Indian and Haitian respondents combine traditional notions about male and female roles with a strong assumption that women should be able to fend for themselves. Many women expressed a desire to avoid premature child-rearing, although this may reflect the ideal more than the practice. For Dominican second and 1.5 generation respondents, desires to avoid premature child-bearing often come into conflict with seeing having children as a rite of passage into adulthood. While the traditional household of a working father and a child-rearing mother is clearly the ideal among this group, most doubt they will obtain for themselves. A number of the Dominican respondents had had children outside of marriage.

While most immigrant respondents pointed to clear difference between their culture of origin and that of the U.S. mainstream, they generally had little clear conception of "American" as a distinct culture. Indeed, they used the word "American" as a contrast to their parent's culture, not a meaningful cultural category in its own right. "American" ways were often seen as the absence of culture! When asked what makes an "American," most respondents spoke in narrow legal terms about the rights of citizenship and, in a few cases, of civic participation. Many felt comfortable seeing themselves as part of their parent's community but legally and politically "American."

Almost all second generation respondents saw a clear difference between how children are raised and family issues dealt with in their parent's culture as contrasted with the "American" approach. Many said their parent's culture placed a higher priority on education than did American families. West Indian respondents in particular consistently emphasized the

"discipline" of West Indian families as opposed to the moral laxity of American households:

While the pilot interviews lend some support to the notion that poorer, minority second generation individuals will adopt the putatively "oppositional" culture of poor native African Americans and Puerto Ricans, our interviews with the native white comparison group suggest that working class whites can also have what might be seen as a self-destructive "oppositional" culture. Many such attitudes and behaviors, including drug use and drug dealing, devaluing formal education, the use of violence, strong peer group orientation, and disrespect for formal authority were common among the native whites we interviewed. Until recently, however, working class whites had access to decent jobs despite these attributes, a fact that might lead us to question causal role of "oppositionalism" per se.

In discussing ethnic stereotypes and their experiences of discrimination, respondents consistently reported the greatest hostility between groups that are relatively closely positioned in residential space and labor market position. West Indians report conflicts with Haitians and African Americans, for example, and South Americans with Puerto Ricans.

When Black and Latino immigrant respondents discussed white and Asian prejudice, it was highly specific to employers and, most often, store owners. The experience of face to face prejudice may be more common among better off respondents. We were initially surprised at how few of the poorer and younger males reported having been the victims of discrimination. However, the in depth interviews made clear that this was due to a lack of contact with whites.

It has been widely argued that the maintenance of transnational ties may have important consequences for the second generation. Some speculate that we are seeing the creation of sustained, multi-generational transnational communities. The pilot data, however, does not

support this view. Many second and 1.5 generation respondents had visited their parents' homelands, but in most cases only for short visits. Members of all groups saw visiting the "home" country as an enjoyable experience and most spoke about these visits with nostalgia. Yet few wanted to live there on a sustained basis. Many disparaged the lack of amenities in the home country.

To summarize, the pilot phase data, while inconclusive in some cases, points strongly to the importance of parental experiences, the social and cultural resources of the national groups, and the structural context of reception. All clearly shape the incorporation of the various second generation groups. High rates of parental self-employment and co-ethnic employment seem to have had positive effects for the second generation Chinese, but more as a step into the mainstream economy than as a sustained, multi-generational "ethnic enclave." Few second generation Chinese seem interested in entering "Chinese" industries. Moderate rates of self-employment and high participation in the ethnic economy had little effect on the often downwardly mobile Dominicans. Young people in all groups, including the native groups, have seen their life chances profoundly shaped by the changes in the urban economy. Service sector employment predominates across the board, even among groups whose parents were largely concentrated in blue collar industries. This has increased the importance of educational credentials and perhaps of cultural capital.

Those groups unambiguously defined as "black" in the North American context (i.e. West Indians and many Dominicans) seem to have less access to both job and educational opportunities and to many public institutions. This is due, at least in part, to the racially segregated housing market. The second generation is often keenly aware of racial discrimination, yet modes of coping with discrimination vary markedly by gender. Gender also has a huge impact on educational outcomes, and possibly on ethnic identity. The ambiguous

position of Dominicans with regard to native whites and New York's Puerto Rican community, merits further exploration. While there is some evidence of an emergent pan-Latino consciousness, the variation between Latino groups leads us to question the usefulness of the "Latino" category for social analysis. Ethnic conflict among the various second generation groups and with native minorities has had at least as powerful an impact on young people's daily lives as discrimination by native whites, with whom members of many groups have little daily contact.

The second generation groups vary widely in family structure. Yet ideas about family and family obligations seem remarkably consistent across the second generation groups and contrast sharply with those of the native respondents. While natives often expressed fear and regret about being "a disappointment" to their families, it was usually because, the respondent had not "achieved" enough to justify parental sacrifice. Among the second generation, however, the young people often felt that they were sacrificing for the family. Many had turned down opportunities for individual upward mobility in order to fulfill family obligations.

The Current and Future Phases of the Project

We have completed the 670 far suburban phone interviews and will begin analyzing them soon. We have completed the first 30,000 screening calls and completed all 400 interviews with the native whites, blacks, Puerto Ricans and West Indians and we have substantial numbers of completed interviews with the remaining second generation groups. We are therefore about half way through completing the 3,500 structured telephone interviews in the city and near suburbs. Since October we also have had a team of ten graduate students doing in depth interviews with people who have completed the phone interview. By the end of

the summer of 1999 we will complete in-person, open-ended, in-depth follow-up interviews with 480 respondents. These life history interviews will capture the ways in which the subjects construct the narrative of their educational careers, work histories, ethnic consciousness, and the like. Conducted over several hours, they will enable us to elicit detailed information about intergroup relations and conflicts, experiences with schools and employers, interactions with parents, and sensitive issues such as involvement with drugs or drug dealing. It is difficult, if not impossible, to capture these issues successfully in a closed-ended telephone interview.

Our open-ended instrument parallels the closed-ended questionnaire but is designed to elicit the subject's own words about such complex issues as life aspirations or situational identities. In-depth interviews allow us to discover the processes that link causes and effects found in the larger survey. For example, while the telephone survey asks respondents about their present job and how they found it (i.e. "Through an add in the newspaper," "Through friends," etc.), the open-ended interview asks for a verbatim narrative of this process, with room for whatever information the subject perceived to be important to understanding these events.

We are currently in the process of choosing six ethnographers to begin work in September of 1999 in six strategic sites in the city and suburbs. The proposed research program will build on the survey results by giving close and extended examination to the settings in which second generation immigrants live, work and come to understand their lives. By sensitizing researchers to the contexts in which the immigrants function, carefully crafted ethnographic work can help us make sense of the survey data, add texture to our analysis, and raise and address issues which lie beyond the reach of survey research.

While the ethnographies will deal with the same populations studied in the survey, they will focus on the social and spatial settings for interactions among individuals rather than on

individuals per se. In settings such as workplaces, neighborhoods, political organizations, and schools, researchers will explore how the issues raised in the survey play out in everyday life, especially how the second generation interacts with first generation immigrants and with natives. The unit of analysis will be nodes of interaction rather than populations. Such studies will allow us to go beyond the second generation's own understanding of its experience and contextualize these understandings within a broader field of social action.

TABLE 1

Race by Immigrant Status

Resident Population, United States, 1998

(row percents except for right total column, which is column percent)

	Foreign Born Noncitizen	Foreign Born Citizen	Second Generation	Native Stock	TOTAL
NH White	3,314,484	3,396,923	15,340,682	169,625,637	191,677,726
	1.7%	1.8%	8.0%	88.5%	71.4%
NH Black	1,086,494	687,507	1,263,759	30,568,278	33,606,038
	3.2%	2.0%	3.8%	91.0%	12.5%
NH Native Am	40,879	23,432	114,162	1,860,540	2,039,013
	2.0%	1.1%	5.6%	91.2%	0.8%
NH Asian	3,367,449	2,735,247	2,796,144	1,350,039	10,248,879
	32.9%	26.7%	27.3%	13.2%	3.8%
Hispanic	8,620,182	2,986,537	8,581,125	10,533,772	30,721,616

	28.1%	9.7%	27.9%	34.3%	11.5%
TOTAL	16,429,488	9,829,646	28,095,872	213,938,266	268,293,272
	6.1%	3.7%	10.5%	79.7%	100.0%

Source: Annual Demographic Supplement, March 1998 Current Population Survey, Final Weights

TABLE 2

Immigrant Status of Total Population

Eleven Largest Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 1998

(row percents except for right total column, which is column percent)

CMSA	Foreign Born Noncitizen	Foreign Born Citizen	Second Generation	Native Stock	TOTAL
New York	2,798,676	1,844,695	3,822,126	11,650,636	20,116,113
	13.9%	9.2%	19.0%	57.9%	7.5%
Los Angeles	3,182,029	1,522,847	3,449,492	7,650,973	15,805,341
	20.1%	9.6%	21.8%	48.4%	5.9%
Chicago	679,107	417,619	1,183,421	5,947,001	8,227,148
	8.3%	5.1%	14.4%	72.3%	3.1%
Wash DC/Balt	503,862	323,169	679,132	5,697,503	7,203,666
	7.0%	4.5%	9.4%	79.1%	2.7%
San Francisco	831,662	609,226	1,214,911	3,956,203	6,612,002
	12.6%	9.2%	18.4%	59.8%	2.5%
Philadelphia	232,562	160,971	633,452	4,982,887	6,009,872
	3.9%	2.7%	10.5%	82.9%	2.2%
Detroit	186,465	173,270	675,073	4,619,501	5,654,309
	3.3%	3.1%	11.9%	81.7%	2.1%
Boston	329,453	183,177	849,464	4,127,195	5,489,289
	6.0%	3.3%	15.5%	75.2%	2.0%
Dallas-Ft Worth	357,015	151,417	485,677	4,213,293	5,207,402
	6.9%	2.9%	9.3%	80.9%	1.9%
Houston	428,992	251,926	492,297	3,118,027	4,621,212
	9.3%	5.5%	10.7%	74.6%	1.7%

Miami	805,786	614,091	795,380	1,507,037	3,722,294
	21.6%	16.5%	21.4%	40.5%	1.

Source: see above

Table 3

Race by Immigrant Status, New York City Residents, 1998

	Foreign Born Noncitizen	Foreign Born Citizen	Second Generation	Native Stock	TOTAL
NH White	437,578	308,668	657,228	1,218,156	2,621,629
	16.7	11.8	25.1	46.5	34.9
NH Black	351,903	245,376	317,787	1,052,075	1,967,141
	17.9	12.5	16.2	53.5	26.2
NH Asian	295,658	199,819	122,237	1,819	619,532
	47.7	32.3	19.7	0.3	8.2
Hispanic	672,167	294,550	610,991	729,668	2,307,376
	29.1	12.8	26.5	31.6	30.7
TOTAL	1,762,231	1,048,413	1,708,243	3,001,718	7,520,603
	23.4	13.9	22.7	39.9	100.0

Source: Annual Demographic Supplement, March 1998 Current Population Survey,
Final Weights

TABLE 4

Region of U.S. by Immigrant Generation Status

U.S. Civilian Noninstitutionalized Population, 1998

Region of U.S.	Immigrant Generation			Native Stock	Total
	FB Noncitizen	FB Citizen	Second Generation		
New York City	176223	104841	1708242	3001717	7520603
	23.4%	13.9%	22.7%	39.9%	100.0%
	10.7%	10.7%	5.8%	1.4%	2.8%
Rest of NYCMSA	103644	796282	2232987	8529816	12595530
	8.2%	6.3%	17.7%	67.7%	100.0%
	6.3%	8.1%	7.6%	4.0%	4.7%
Other Gateway Cities	286333	130913	2695230	7077619	13945314
	20.5%	9.4%	19.3%	50.8%	100.0%
	17.4%	13.3%	9.2%	3.3%	5.2%
Rest of Gateway CMSAs	294405	208610	4477283	14483997	23991435
	12.3%	8.7%	18.7%	60.4%	100.0%
	17.9%	21.2%	15.2%	6.8%	8.9%
Rest of U.S.	782343	458971	18246869	17958037	21024039
	3.7%	2.2%	8.7%	85.4%	100.0%
	47.6%	46.7%	62.1%	84.4%	78.4%
TOTAL U.S.	164294	982964	29360611	21267352	26829327
	89	8		6	4

Region of U.S.	Immigrant Generation				100.0%
	6.1%	3.7%	10.9%	79.3%	
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Annual Demographic Supplement, March 1998 Current Population Survey, Final Weights

TABLE 5

Immigrant Generation by Age Categories

U.S. Civilian Noninstitutionalized Population, 1998

Age	Immigrant Generation Status				Total
	FB	Second	Native		
	Noncitizen	FB Citizen	Generation	Stock	
1 to 17	2303063	352982	11515826	57495981	71667852
row	3.2%	.5%	16.1%	80.2%	100.0%
column	14.0%	3.6%	39.2%	27.0%	26.7%
18 to 32	5875832	1719774	4410010	43475795	55481411
	10.6%	3.1%	7.9%	78.4%	100.0%
	35.8%	17.5%	15.0%	20.4%	20.7%
33 to 52	6005104	4103945	4638366	66530724	81278139
	7.4%	5.0%	5.7%	81.9%	100.0%
	36.6%	41.8%	15.8%	31.3%	30.3%
53 to 64	1304829	1753412	2390936	22291401	27740578
	4.7%	6.3%	8.6%	80.4%	100.0%
	7.9%	17.8%	8.1%	10.5%	10.3%
65+	940660	1899534	6405474	22879624	32125292
	2.9%	5.9%	19.9%	71.2%	100.0%
	5.7%	19.3%	21.8%	10.8%	12.0%
TOTAL	16429488	9829647	29360612	212673525	268293272
	6.1%	3.7%	10.9%	79.3%	100.0%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Annual Demographic Supplement, March 1998 Current Population Survey, Final

Weights

TABLE 6

Region of Residence by New versus Old Second Generation

U.S. Second Generation Population, 1998

	Second Generation Status		
	New	Old	Total
New York City	1169693	538549	1708242
Row	68.5%	31.5%	100.0%
Column	7.3%	4.0%	5.8%
Rest of NYCMSA	944926	1288061	2232987
Row	42.3%	57.7%	100.0%
Column	5.9%	9.6%	7.6%
Other Gateway Cities	1946543	748687	2695230
Row	72.2%	27.8%	100.0%
Column	12.2%	5.6%	9.2%
Rest of Gateway CMSAs	2930549	1546735	4477284
Row	65.5%	34.5%	100.0%
Column	18.4%	11.5%	15.2%
Rest of U.S.	8934125	9312743	18246868
Row	49.0%	51.0%	100.0%
Column	56.1%	69.3%	62.1%
Total	15925836	13434775	29360611
Row	54.2%	45.8%	100.0%
Column	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Annual Demographic Supplement, March 1998 Current Population Survey, Final

Weights

TABLE 7

Region of Residence by Race and Hispanic Origin

U.S. New Second Generation Only

	Race by Hispanic Origin				Total
	NH White	NH Black	NH Asian	Hispanic	
New York City	201777	283572	118323	566020	1169692
Row	17.3%	24.2%	10.1%	48.4%	100.0%
Column	4.0%	25.5%	4.7%	7.9%	7.3%
Rest of NYCMSA	440124	115136	145761	243906	944927
	46.6%	12.2%	15.4%	25.8%	100.0%
	8.7%	10.4%	5.8%	3.4%	5.9%
Other Gateway Cities	291817	47478	302677	1302230	1946542
	15.0%	2.4%	15.5%	66.9%	100.0%
	5.8%	4.3%	12.1%	18.2%	12.2%
Rest of Gateway CMSAs	621562	112302	528525	1656515	2930549
	21.2%	3.8%	18.0%	56.5%	100.0%
	12.3%	10.1%	21.2%	23.1%	18.4%
Rest of U.S.	3518304	553779	1402557	3400284	8934125
	39.4%	6.2%	15.7%	38.1%	100.0%
	69.3%	49.8%	56.2%	47.4%	56.1%
Total	5073584	1112267	2497843	7168955	15925835
	31.9%	7.0%	15.7%	45.0%	100.0%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Annual Demographic Supplement, March 1998 Current Population Survey, Final

Weights

TABLE 8

Region of Residence by Educational Attainment

U.S. New Second Generation Only

	Educational Attainment						Total
	18 or Younger	Less Than HS	HS Degree	Some College	College Degree	Advanced Degree	
New York City	752203	125397	46488	177072	50123	18409	1169692
Row	64.3%	10.7%	4.0%	15.1%	4.3%	1.6%	100.0%
Column	7.4%	5.9%	4.3%	9.8%	7.6%	10.8%	7.3%
Rest of NYCMSA	597214	83511	70257	106812	73764	13368	944926
	63.2%	8.8%	7.4%	11.3%	7.8%	1.4%	100.0%
	5.9%	3.9%	6.5%	5.9%	11.2%	7.8%	5.9%
Other Gateway Cities	1332994	257634	100549	163449	70664	21253	1946543
	68.5%	13.2%	5.2%	8.4%	3.6%	1.1%	100.0%
	13.2%	12.2%	9.4%	9.1%	10.7%	12.5%	12.2%
Rest of Gateway CMSAs	1936451	357058	191489	307397	108906	29248	2930549
	66.1%	12.2%	6.5%	10.5%	3.7%	1.0%	100.0%
	19.2%	16.8%	17.8%	17.1%	16.5%	17.2%	18.4%
Rest of U.S.	5484120	1296788	664628	1044716	355740	88134	8934126
	61.4%	14.5%	7.4%	11.7%	4.0%	1.0%	100.0%
	54.3%	61.2%	61.9%	58.1%	54.0%	51.7%	56.1%
Total	10102982	2120388	1073411	1799446	659197	170412	15925836
	63.4%	13.3%	6.7%	11.3%	4.1%	1.1%	100.0%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Annual Demographic Supplement, March 1998 Current Population Survey, Final

Weights

TABLE 9

Region of Residence by Household Income Categories

U.S. New Second Generation Only

	Household Income Categories					Total
	\$1-14,999	\$15-34,999	\$35-59,999	\$60-74,999	\$75,000+	
New York City	300843	294069	258474	108883	207425	1169694
	25.7%	25.1%	22.1%	9.3%	17.7%	100.0%
	12.0%	6.6%	6.2%	7.0%	6.5%	7.3%
Rest of NYCMSA	68870	185251	247522	115387	327896	944926
	7.3%	19.6%	26.2%	12.2%	34.7%	100.0%
	2.7%	4.1%	5.9%	7.4%	10.2%	5.9%
Other Gateway Cities	425753	686370	417545	116814	300060	1946542
	21.9%	35.3%	21.5%	6.0%	15.4%	100.0%
	17.0%	15.3%	10.0%	7.5%	9.3%	12.2%
Rest of Gateway CMSAs	352471	732749	748360	326885	770083	2930548
	12.0%	25.0%	25.5%	11.2%	26.3%	100.0%
	14.0%	16.3%	18.0%	21.0%	24.0%	18.4%
Rest of U.S.	1361467	2590650	2489752	887743	1604514	8934126
	15.2%	29.0%	27.9%	9.9%	18.0%	100.0%
	54.3%	57.7%	59.8%	57.1%	50.0%	56.1%
Total	2509404	4489089	4161653	1555712	3209978	15925836
	15.8%	28.2%	26.1%	9.8%	20.2%	100.0%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Annual Demographic Supplement, March 1998 Current Population Survey, Final

Weights

Table 10

Household Income Distribution Inside and Outside the Proposed Sample Area

Persons 18-30	In Households With Income		In - Out	In Households With Income		In - Out
	Under \$15,000			Over \$60,000		
Group	Inside	Outside	Pct pts	Inside	Outside	Pct pts
NH NB Whites	4.5	1.4	3.1	56.4	66.7	-10.3
NH NB Blacks	18.3	9.6	8.7	25.9	35.9	-10.0
Puerto Ricans	29.0	12.7	16.3	13.8	26.6	-12.8
West Indians	8.5	3.0	5.5	33.9	51.0	-17.1
Dominicans	22.4	7.5	14.9	13.1	33.9	-20.8
Chinese	12.7	2.8	9.9	26.0	53.7	-27.7
CPE	10.5	5.0	5.5	23.7	44.4	-20.7

Source: 1990 Census. Public Use Microdata.

Table 11

Household Form and Labor Force Status Inside and Outside the Proposed Sample Area

Persons 18-30	In Female Headed Households		In - Out	Not In Labor Force		In - Out
	Inside	Outside	Pct pts	Inside	Outside	Pct pts
NH NB Whites	27.2	16.9	10.3	24.6	19.8	5.8
NH NB Blacks	60.3	46.6	13.7	35.6	28.3	7.3
Puerto Ricans	42.6	23.3	19.3	37.9	26.4	11.3
West Indians	36.2	21.2	15.0	29.2	24.3	4.9
Dominicans	47.7	24.7	23.0	38.1	23.7	14.4
Chinese	11.7	8.4	3.3	39.8	40.6	-0.8
South Americans	30.8	18.7	12.1	26.3	21.7	4.6

Source: 1990 Census. Public Use Microdata.

Table 12

Educational Attainment Inside and Outside the Proposed Sample Area

Persons 18-30 Group	High School Grad			College Grad		
	Inside	Outside	In - Out Pct pts	Inside	Outside	In - Out Pct pts
NH NB Whites	30.5	31.5	-1.0	21.8	19.2	2.6
NH NB Blacks	32.6	38.0	-5.4	7.0	6.2	0.8
Puerto Ricans	28.5	33.6	-5.1	5.7	7.2	-1.5
West Indians	31.2	29.1	-2.1	10.8	14.6	-3.8
Dominicans	24.6	36.5	-11.9	5.2	5.1	0.1
Chinese	23.0	26.4	-3.4	21.0	28.8	-7.8
CPE	28.6	27.4	1.2	8.8	12.1	-5.3

Source: 1990 Census. Public Use Microdata.

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