Mobilizing Public Will For Social Change

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I. Introduction

Why do politicians, media gatekeepers and vast segments of the population care about and devote their energy and attention to some social problems but not others? Why do some exotic but seemingly trivial social problems vault quickly into the public consciousness, while other, more egregious problems labor in obscurity for years? Why are some social problems defined in terms of "poor behavioral choices" of individuals while other problems are blamed on the unhealthy business practices of companies that manufacture harmful products or the governmental agencies that regulate them?

These questions have long occupied the attention of generations of political scientists, sociologists, communication researchers, and public health specialists. Their answers tend to rest less with the objective characteristics of social problems themselves and more with the power, resources and skills of those who seek to mold public sentiment about them. This conclusion, which is somewhat unsettling in terms of classical democratic theory, explains such anomalies as why a disease that affects relatively few people can generate more public concern than a disease that affects far more; why an unhealthy condition without a name or face can persist and continue to adversely affect the health of individuals and communities until it is defined and promoted strategically through the use of potent political symbols; and why individuals are so often blamed for merely choosing from harmful, yet legally sanctioned, alternatives in their environment.

The process of mobilizing the public will has been variously articulated in different academic disciplines, though never before integrated into one coherent framework. For example, sociologists describe a social constructionist process in which claims makers define and "typify" various social conditions as worthy of social-problem status in the eyes of the public, media gatekeepers and politicians. Political scientists describe an agenda-building process in which initiators capitalize on both planned and serendipitous issue "triggers" to influence public and media perceptions of the legitimacy and viability of a social problem. Communications scholars describe models of opinion formation and change, while offering implications for proponents of various social causes. Social marketers outline processes of change within individuals and communities alike. And cutting across all of these disciplines is the concept of framing, which refers to the manner in which social problems are initially defined and subsequently redefined by advocates and opponents in public policy disputes.

This paper, the third in a series sponsored by the Communications Consortium Media Center, is the first to compile a broad range of theories relevant to the design, implementation and evaluation of public will campaigns. As such, it does not address the topic of individual-change-behavior campaigns except where such efforts are employed to raise public awareness or influence social norms as a component of public will initiatives. The paper begins with an overview of the philosophy of public will campaigns, followed by a few observations regarding issues and challenges that public

will campaigners will face in their quest to influence public sentiment and, ultimately, public policy. With this foundation in place, we will then review models and theories germane to public will campaigns, describe several case studies, and conclude with a discussion of evaluation approaches. The overall purpose of the paper is to provide a rich inventory of concepts, models, and ideas for use in influencing the public will.

II. The Philosophy of the Public Will Campaign

"Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment nothing can fail; without it, nothing can succeed. Consequently he who molds public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes statutes or decisions possible or impossible to be executed."

--Abraham Lincoln, 1858

Public will campaigns can be defined as organized, strategic initiatives designed to legitimize and garner public support for social problems as a mechanism of achieving policy action or change (Henry and Rivera, 1998; Coffman, 2002). The goal of public will campaigns is to alter the policy potential of a social problem in such a way that it moves from having a relatively low profile on the unstructured and somewhat amorphous public agenda to a much higher profile on the more structured and concrete policy agenda. There it is likely to at least have its moment in the sun, an opportunity to attract a network of sponsors, economic resources and political resolution. Public will campaigns can seek to influence policy makers directly or through an indirect path of mobilizing key groups of constituents to take political action.

The public will campaign strategy is hardly a new one, though it has a far more extensive history in the realm of politics than public health. Early efforts in the American colonies to stir up resentment against England, win popular support for the independence movement, and mobilize citizens to action were among the most sophisticated and successful efforts of public will communication in the nation's history (Paisley, 1981). Similarly, public will campaigns in the early Twentieth Century were credited with convincing an apathetic and isolationist nation that America should intervene in a remote European war in the first place, and then convincing a divided nation of immigrants that the English, rather than the Germans, deserved America's support. This remarkable feat is well chronicled in the works of such communications pioneers as Edward L. Bernays (1952), the nephew of Sigmund Freud and a founder of the discipline of public relations, and George Creel (1920), the primary architect of public will campaigns before and during World War I. Bernays, in particular, was particularly prescient in his understanding of how communicators were becoming increasingly able to shape and then mobilize the public will, calling this phenomenon the "engineering of consent."

"We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes are formed, our ideas suggested largely by men [sic] we have never heard of. This is a logical result of the way in which our democratic society is organized....The sound practitioner takes into account not merely of the individual, or even of the mass mind alone but also and especially of the anatomy of society, with its interlocking group

> *formations and loyalties. [The individual is] a cell organized into the social unit.*
> *Touch a nerve at a sensitive spot and you get an automatic response from certain*
> *specific members of the organism" (Bernays, 1928:9-10).*

More recent wars such as those in Vietnam and Iraq similarly demonstrate the importance of the public will—by either its absence or presence—in the formulation of public policy. All wars require sacrifice and commitment, but they are magnets for political attention and economic resources if they have popular support. It is no coincidence that domestic "wars" have been declared on such social problems as poverty, drugs and AIDS, thus elevating these particular problems to an exalted status in the constellation of societal ills. Preceding and buttressing each of these initiatives were public will campaigns that laid the groundwork for popular support and political mobilization.

The growing use of public will campaigns in public health is in direct response to perceived shortcomings of individual-change-behavior approaches. Ryan's (1976) seminal work on "blaming the victim" pointed out the shortcomings of blaming persons *with* problems *for* their problems. The "blaming the victim" line of thinking has led to such stereotypes as poverty being the result of an individual's laziness or sexual assault being the consequence of a woman's poor judgment about how to dress or where to walk at night. By extension, many diseases have been considered the result of individuals' poor health-related choices and inappropriate health-related behaviors. In contrast, Ryan and others have demonstrated that many social problems emanate from social conditions, and must be addressed through social- rather than individual-level change strategies. Indeed, considerable data points to the fact that the strongest predictor of health is social class, a relationship that cannot be modified merely through individual-change-behavior campaigns but rather only through shifts in social arrangements and public policy.

Increasingly, the public health community has turned to efforts to modify the environment rather than merely the individual. The rise of the community-based intervention, particularly those in North Karelia (Finland), California, Minnesota and Rhode Island, is in part based upon the recognition that changing the individual is futile unless his or her social and physical environment changes as well. The particular significance of these interventions is that they redefined "community" from intervention *site* to intervention *mechanism*. That is, the strategy used was to mobilize every sector of a community to participate and take ownership of the intervention—even sectors not traditionally associated with responsibility for health—and to build internal capacity that would endure well beyond the efforts and funding of outside agencies. Extending this approach, recent international efforts in participatory communication for social change have emphasized the importance of community involvement, mobilization and empowerment in realizing social change, all dimensions of the public will campaign approach. In addition, the groundbreaking development of the media advocacy philosophy and approach has been influential in exposing the shortcomings of the individual-change-behavior strategy and stressing the importance of the media's role in shaping the public will (Wallack et al., 1993).

Influencing the public will cannot occur within a single level of analysis or through the principles of a single theory of social change. Instead, it involves:

> *"…choice behaviors in the context of structural opportunities and constraints. Choices are made within such opportunities and constraints and choices interacting with structural opportunities and constraints can also alter or create structural opportunities and constraints. These processes necessarily shift between the macrostructure and the microstructure." (Lin, 2001:xi)*

III. Challenges for Public Will Campaign Planners

A. Beyond the Ideology of Individualism

In spite of growing support for strategies that go beyond merely changing behaviors of individuals, planners of public will campaigns may face certain obstacles and challenges. As Sylvia Tesh (1988) has noted in her work on political ideology and disease prevention policy, one of the more pervasive principles operating throughout the history of the United States, and indeed most Western societies, has been that of individualism. Individualism rests at the base of the cherished "one-person, one-vote" tenet of democracy, and has long served as the rationale for the pervasive use of individual-behavior-change campaign strategies described earlier in this series of papers (see Coffman, 2002). Under this ideology, the responsibility for health rests with the individual, and thus such public health threats as AIDS, smoking, premature heart attack and cancer historically have been viewed as individual-level problems. Because of the compatibility between the underlying cultural ideology of individualism and the public health construction that individuals are responsible for their health, the individual-behavior-change campaign strategy has long been used and considered an appropriate and apolitical solution to social problems.

One barrier facing proponents of public will campaigns, therefore, is that their efforts may be criticized and delegitimized as rooted in politics or partisanship. Efforts to change individuals are viewed as apolitical, whereas efforts to change powerful industries or government (and other environmental influences on health) are viewed quite differently. But of course, neither strategy is any more or less political than the other in absolute terms, only within the dominant ideology of a particular culture. The use of an individual-change-behavior strategy, rooted in the cherished ideology of individualism, can be seen as every bit as political as the use of public will strategies in that it:

> *…supports a politically conservative predisposition to bracket off questions about the structure of society—about the distribution of wealth and power, for example—and to concentrate instead on questions about the behaviors of individuals within that (apparently fixed) structure…. [I]ndividualistic ideology politicizes categories beyond the individual level (Tesh, 1988:161).*

Thus by seeking to institute change beyond the individual level, public will campaigns may be viewed with suspicion or greeted with accusations of "politicizing" otherwise "scientific" issues. The underlying cultural ideology favors the use of individual-level approaches to addressing social problems, often-burdening proponents of public will

campaigns with the need to explain and justify their goal of trying to change the system. This structural condition has implications for the campaign's goals and evaluation criteria.

B. 'Effective' Public Opinion

The late sociologist Herbert Blumer is perhaps best known for his scathing yet insightful critique of the public opinion industry for its confusion in attempting to study public opinion by merely refining the technique of survey research,   Most significantly, he noted that:

> *In any realistic sense, public opinion consists of the pattern of the diverse views and positions on the issue that come to the individuals who have to act in response to the public opinion. Public opinion which was a mere display, or which was terminal in its very expression, or which never came to the attention of those who have to act on public opinion would be impotent and meaningless as far as affecting the action or operation of society is concerned (Blumer, 1948).*

In offering this definition, Blumer emphasized that meaningful, or what he labeled "effective" public opinion, is much more than the sum of individuals' preference or attitudes, which is the definition used in survey research. Effective public opinion is more than widespread awareness of a social problem, more than desire for change, more than a planned demonstration on a busy street corner designed to draw the attention of otherwise uninterested passers by. Instead, effective public opinion is that expression of sentiment that actually reaches the systematic agenda of political decision-makers. This may be achieved either directly through lobbying and other forms of direct communication, or indirectly through publics motivated to mobilize for political action. In this view, public opinion is a dynamic process with a desired goal of policy change, rather than a static snapshot of individuals' opinions, many of which will never even be actualized. Public opinion is action, not apathy. Adopting this frame of reference, the goal of public will campaigns must be more than to generate awareness or influence public opinion as defined in terms of individuals' attitudes. Instead, the goal must be to ensure that an organization's efforts to define a social problem and its solution reach the ears and eyes of those with power to allocate resources and choose policy alternatives. This is a much higher standard and criterion for campaign success, with clear implications for campaign evaluation.

C. Community as the Mechanism of Change

The notion of "community" has long been central to campaigns of all types, and has usually referred to the geographic site of a change effort. Increasingly, however, an emerging paradigm is treating community as the actual mechanism, rather than mere location, of change (Bracht, 1999). This line of thinking conceptualizes community in social-psychological rather than geographic terms, and focuses on such notions as networks, mobilization, participation, involvement, and sustainability.

At the heart of this view is the recognition that individuals may make choices, but they do so from options determined by their environments. To the extent that restaurants, local media, grocery stores, churches, schools, voluntary associations, government offices and other community institutions are actively involved in a change effort and shaping environmental health-related options, individuals' choices will necessarily be affected correspondingly. On the other hand, if these same institutions are not participating, not reinforcing campaign themes and desired choices, efforts to mobilize the public will are unlikely to be successful. This in turn suggests that community institutions are not static or immutable, but rather malleable and capable of being mobilized in unified and coordinated fashion to shape individuals' social, political and economic environments. This is not to say that changing institutions is an easy task, but rather that it is possible and usually essential if a public will campaign is to have its desired effect.

IV. Interdisciplinary Models and Theories for Public Will Campaigns

With this foundation in place, we next review theories and models from allied fields that can help inform designers of public will campaigns.

A. Social Problem Construction

Public will campaigns begin with a social problem that needs to be addressed. Most people would agree that "drug abuse," "violence," and "racism" are examples of social problems. But what, exactly, are these problems, and why is there so much social consensus about their importance? These are the types of questions addressed within the burgeoning literature on social problem construction.

Zastrow (2000:4) posits that a social problem exists when "an influential group asserts that a certain social condition affecting a large number of people is a problem that may be remedied by collective action." The key term in this definition is "asserts," for the prevailing view of social problems comes from the constructionist perspective, which focuses on the communication activities of "claims makers," i.e., influential individuals and/or groups that make claims that certain objective conditions constitute problems worthy of social attention and political remedy. In other words, "…our sense of what is or is not a social problem is a product, something that has been produced or constructed through social activities" (Best, 1989a:xviii) as opposed to the objective conditions themselves.

For example, consider the occurrence of young, poor, unmarried women having babies (Best, 1989a:xix-xx). To some, this objective condition is not inherently problematic but rather a fairly routine and expected biological outcome; indeed, it is an outcome that has occurred for centuries across all cultural and geographical contexts. It becomes known as a social problem only in the context of a particular chronological era and social structure when some influential individual or group (a) provides a label to the phenomenon and (b) claims that the condition is indeed a social problem. Thus a religious claims maker might label this outcome as a problem, one that reflects a moral decline in society and the need for stronger religious institutions. A public health claims maker might argue that the outcome reflects the failure of sex education programs in schools. A child psychologist might define the outcome as a social problem from the

perspective of the child, who will be born into a perpetual cycle of poverty. A feminist scholar might define this outcome as a failure of a patriarchal infrastructure that routinely ignores the plight of women and children. And an economist might define the outcome as a social problem because of the burden that it places on welfare rolls and government subsidies in capitalist societies. Viewed from the constructionist lens, the study of social problems does not result in a focus on objective conditions per se, but rather on values, labels, strategies and the interests of claims-making individuals and groups, the goal of which is to influence the public will in hopes of garnering political resources to remedy the social condition defined as problematic. Furthermore, the process of social problem construction is highly competitive, as competing claims-makers seek to have their problem definition—rather than that of a competitor—accepted by the media and political decision makers.

Central to the claims-making process is the naming of a social condition. Terms such as "child abuse," "elder abuse," "missing children," "learning disabilities," or "domestic abuse" did not even exist prior to the second half of the Twentieth Century, and hence those conditions were not generally recognized as social problems. This is not to say that there were no instances of children being abused by parents or women being battered by male partners; indeed, there were likely tens of thousands of such cases across the previous twenty centuries. But these instances became social problems only when claims makers defined individual incidents in terms of social patterns, assigned causes, provided labels, and constructed arguments about solutions.

It is in this sense that it can be said that public will campaigns "created" battered wives, so to speak. Wife battering was known to occur but believed to be a rare event, thus it was perceived as an individual problem rather than a social problem. On the heels of the civil rights movement, advocates for battered women first raised the issue as affecting a significant portion of the population. Research data were cited to demonstrate the pervasiveness of wife battering. Activists rallied around the issue and, through collective action, brought about significant policy changes. Public will campaigns helped to elevate the status of a negative social issue into a social problem and trigger social change (See exemplar section on "No Excuse for Domestic Violence" campaign). Public will campaigns also have been used in attempts to redefine the problem of "battered wives" into a more generic problem of "spouse abuse," "domestic abuse" and other variants.

Students of social problem construction have identified a rich inventory of strategies used by claims makers in public will campaigns to define and frame social problems. The first strategy is typification, or defining a social problem and offering examples that have potential to influence the public will (Best, 1989a). For example, the social problem of "missing children" was constructed in the early 1980s and typified in terms of children being abducted by strangers and/or murdered (Best, 1989b). The problem catapulted into prominence following several public will campaigns that used such untraditional media as milk cartons and utility bills to increase public awareness and concern. Part of the reason the problem achieved such attention was that the typification (abduction/murder by a stranger) was powerful and frightening to parents of all strata of society. However, this typification of the problem was only one of many possible candidates; with a different typification, such as the case of a devoted divorced parent seeking to be reunited with a son or daughter, the issue of missing children might not

have received half of the attention that it did. The point of this case is not to minimize the trauma of the event to either the children or adults involved, but rather to illustrate that the definitions of all social problems are constructed rather than inherent in the condition itself.

The issue of abortion similarly provides some excellent illustrations of the principle of typification. For example, supporters of the "pro-choice" position are likely to justify the need for legal abortions because of cases of pregnancy due to rape or incest. At the same time, supporters of the "pro-life" position are likely to justify their position on the basis of cases of late-pregnancy abortions. Both sides select cases that are not necessarily representative of all abortions in a statistical sense, but which are likely to generate the greatest amount of support for their position. The result is that attempts to influence abortion policy are based upon the depiction of dramatic incidents that become representative of the issue positions in a symbolic, albeit not statistically accurate, sense.

A second strategy involves the use of numbers and statistics to demonstrate that a social condition affects many people and hence is worthy of serious political attention. Where possible, claims makers cite official statistics, because these numbers tend to have legitimacy in the eyes of media gatekeepers. Further, claims makers use "big numbers" where possible, for the greater the incidence of a social problem, the more worthy the problem is in terms of public and political attention. Returning to the example of missing children, estimates of the magnitude of this problem ranged from 50,000 to 400,000 cases per year (Best, 1989b). As with most such social problems, there is no single authoritative and universal definition, and so different agencies involved in the missing children movement used different definitions, generated different estimates, and publicized different statistics. In the case of missing children, broad definitions used by claims makers included cases of children missing less than twenty-four hours, children abducted by a divorced parent, and the type of case used to typify the problem: children actually molested or murdered. Influenced by anecdotal reports and frightening statistics that made the problem to be a huge one, the media and government gave the issue considerable attention. Early on, this strategy worked; but eventually, the discrepancy in estimates of the problem's incidence led investigative reporters to more closely examine the claims and statistics behind the social movement. Their Pulitzer Prize winning research concluded that the number of children abducted by strangers was "fewer than the number of preschoolers who choke to death on food every year" (Best, 1989b:24). Big numbers alone are not guarantees of a social problem's success in gaining attention. For example, more people die in the U.S. from cancer or cardiovascular disease in a typical year than from AIDS. Nevertheless, AIDS claims makers have been far more successful in mobilizing public will about their disease. Early on, AIDS activists were successful in making the argument that, in spite of relatively small number of cases (compared to cancer or CVD), the disease nevertheless merited more attention and research dollars than other social problems because of the potential for a widespread epidemic in the general population. In this case, it was the potential for big numbers—rather than the actual incidence of big numbers—that was successful in influencing the public will.

A third strategy in social problem construction is using the typification of a problem to imply an obvious solution. For example, defining a social problem of violence in society in terms of violent content in films and TV programs automatically

defines its solution: regulation of media content. Through typifying a problem in a particular way, a claims making group often does not have to reveal its agenda explicitly, as it can let the media and policy makers draw the conclusion regarding the most appropriate policy outcome. Related to this, typification of a problem also can be used to imply the sector of society that is optimally suited to address it. For example, defining alcoholism as a disease automatically medicalizes it and empowers the medical community to proscribe its favored solution to this problem.

In summary, social problem construction is a necessary condition for the organization of a public will campaign. At the same time, the construction of a social problem involves the use of public will campaigns to define and typify the conditions that a claims making group contends are problematic and to raise public awareness and eventually gain the attention of influentials.

<u>B. Agenda Building</u>

This body of theory, drawn from political science (Cobb and Elder, 1983; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1995; Stone, 1997), focuses on explaining the process through which some issues emerge and gain prominence in the media, court system and/or legislatures, whereas other issues never achieve public prominence. Agenda building has obvious implications for public will campaigns by its emphasis on strategies that can be used to gain access to the public and systemic agendas.

The theory is predicated on two fundamental concepts: scarcity and subjectivity. By their nature, institutional agendas tend to have severe structural limitations (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). Newspapers have only a certain amount of space allocated to news; the Supreme Court has time to listen to only a small subset of possible cases that it could hear; Congress is in session only certain months of the year and cannot possibly contend with every possible problem facing American society. This first principle, scarcity, is at the basis of agenda building theory. In order to gain access to one of the limited and highly cherished slots on some institutional agenda, groups must attempt to gain a competitive edge over rivals. The second principle, subjectivity, suggests that the meaning of an issue is not inherent, but rather intentionally defined and redefined by groups seeking to make their issue more "marketable" or attractive to the gatekeepers who control access to institutional agendas. For example, a prominent diabetes scientist once remarked to one author of this paper that his goal was to find some medical link between mad cow disease and diabetes. Although the comment was made somewhat in jest, it does speak to the tendency of media gatekeepers to seek out stories about exotic or sensationalistic diseases that may afflict relatively few, while ignoring the less exotic chronic diseases that afflict far more.

The most enduring description of the agenda building process is offered by Cobb and Elder (1983). Their process starts with recognition of some conflict (analogous to a social problem in sociological literature) involving differences of opinion regarding policy options, allocation of scarce resources, interpretations of scientific information or other disagreements. Conflicts can be categorized in terms of three dimensions: scope, intensity, and visibility. Scope refers to the number of persons initially involved, as well as other individuals and groups subsequently drawn in as the conflict unfolds. Intensity refers to the degree of involvement that participants have in the conflict. Visibility refers

to the number of persons and groups that become aware of the conflict. In general, conflicts that have greater scope and intensity usually have the potential for greater visibility. From a public will standpoint, scope and intensity can be created through effective use of communication campaigns to make issues more personally relevant and involving. This approach was central to the work of the National AIDS Information and Education Program, which was charged by the U.S. Congress to raise the salience of AIDS with the American public (Noble et al., 1991). The disease was originally diagnosed in gay males, then detected in Haitians and persons undergoing blood transfusions. Because of this, the scope and intensity of debates about the need for additional funding and research on this disease were initially limited. When the disease was repositioned in terms of its ability to infect the entire nation, it was treated differently in the press and in public discourse.

The next two ingredients in Cobb and Elder's model of agenda building are triggers and initiators. A trigger is some unforeseen event that an initiator links to a conflict in an effort to gain visibility. Examples of potential triggers can include things like a death of a celebrity due to AIDS (such as Arthur Ashe or Rock Hudson), a train wreck, an act of terrorism, a hurricane, a strike or an auto accident. Examples of initiators are public health champions who seek to promote the public interest rather than some personal gain, interest group advocates who seek a redistribution of resources, or political figures intent on getting re-elected. It is this interaction of conflict, trigger and initiator that launches the agenda building process, potentially converting a small, localized disagreement into some national controversy that could end up on the docket of the U.S. Supreme Court—or forgotten the next day.

The most important point to remember in this discussion is that the expansion potential of conflicts is not inherent, but rather is defined and redefined by adversarial groups attempting to achieve contradictory goals. One group is attempting to define the conflict in such a way as to expand it from its original small scope, intensity and visibility. This group has hopes of gaining the attention of the national media and drawing the attention of an increasingly broader cross-section of society. At the same time, another group is attempting to define the same conflict in very different terms, hoping to make it appear trivial or localized so that national media will ignore it and cross-sections of society will not pay attention to it. The product of these two opposing goals and efforts creates the dynamics of the agenda building process, which is resolved when either one group is successful in expanding the conflict to a significant portion of the population and, correspondingly, to some ultimate decision-making forum or the other group is successful in burying it.

Skillful agenda builders know that the raw materials of a conflict are malleable and subjective rather than fixed. That is, an issue is what someone defines it to be. Indeed, some of what turn out to be the most compelling issues of the day begin with a modest, sometimes trivial, local conflict that is artfully redefined by partisan groups. The primary tools of agenda building, as conceptualized by Cobb and Elder (1983) are comprised of five dimensions of an issue's definition that an initiator can control, five levers that can be manipulated. First, an issue can be defined either abstractly or concretely; the degree of *specificity* is totally up to the initiator. In general, issues defined abstractly—often using such terminology as freedom or equality—have greater potential for expansion than do issues defined concretely and narrowly. Thus public will

campaigns intending to eliminate racism from public libraries will tend to be more successful than pub lic will campaigns specifying titles of books to be banned. *Social significance* refers to the number of persons impacted by an issue. In general, issues that can be made to seem more socially significant have greater expansion potential than do those tha t are viewed as more limited. For example, the argument has been made that the turning point in the anti-smoking movement was the emphasis on second-hand smoke. What had been a health issue affecting only smokers was transformed into a health issue that affected vulnerable non-smoking populations as well, broadening the scope of the issue. *Temporal relevance* refers to the extent to which an issue has short- or long-term consequences; in general, issues constructed as having long-term consequences for a society will tend to attract more attention than those viewed as ephemeral. This type of issue characteristic is frequently manipulated in issues involving nuclear waste disposal, where policy decisions have consequences for the public that will last literally thousands of years. A fourth dimension, *complexity*, refers to how technical and complicated, or simple and easily understood, an issue will be defined. In general, issues defined as highly technical will get bogged down in debate and jargon, whereas issues defined in more simple terms will continue to move along the agenda building process. The use of this characteristic is familiar to anyone who studies scientific disputes, such as the relationship between electrical powerlines and cancer, the effects of violent media content on children, or the dangers of living near nuclear power plants. The more technical a policy debate becomes, the less accessible it is to the general population and the less susceptible the issue is to dramatic, emotional message appeals. Finally, the fifth dimension of *precedence* refers to how new or old an issue is made to seem. In general, the more an issue is depicted as new and extraordinary, the more attention it will attract; in contrast, the more an issue is depicted as old and routine, the more it will be ignored. Thus, mad cow disease and mysterious, emerging strains of pneumonia will always attract more attention than will the familiar chronic diseases.

As an example of the agenda building process, consider the issue of bioterrorism preparedness. Since 1988, if not earlier, when members of a religious cult contaminated Oregon salad bars with salmonella, U.S. governmental agencies have been cognizant of the potential for a widespread chemical or biological attack on American soil. But the issue of bioterrorism preparedness languished in obscurity for the next seven years, ignored by most media organizations and politicians alike. Following the Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995, some political leaders and public health organizations again attempted to capitalize on an attack as a trigger to elevate the issue's visibility, an effort that at least led to low-level reporting of some political conflict. On one side were those favoring increased spending on surveillance and detection systems in an attempt to minimize the damage from a biological attack. On the other side were political leaders who opposed these spending increases, arguing instead for other social priorities or pointing out the apparently miniscule chances of such attacks occurring. This conflict over allocation of scarce resources rarely received any media attention, and was known to a very small segment of the U.S. population over the next six years. It probably would have stayed this way for years without the trigger of September 11 and subsequent anthrax attacks in several Eastern cities. Within days, the conflict over spending on bioterrorism preparedness gave way to universal consensus, as this previously obscure issue catapulted onto the front pages of newspapers and dockets of

legislatures throughout the world. Supporting efforts to promote spending on bioterrorism defense, the issue seemed to come out of nowhere (had little precedence), had long term consequences for the nation (temporal relevance), had the potential to affect many (high social significance) and lent itself to the use of abstract symbols that resonated with the public (was not presented with great specificity).   If diagrammed, the trajectory of this issue would appear as flat for seven years following the first potential trigger incident, with a slightly positive slope for the next six after a second potential trigger, and steeply sloped within a matter of days after the ultimate trigger incident September 11.

C. Framing

The literature on framing has mushroomed since the early works of Goffman (1974), Gitlin (1980), and Tversky and Kahneman (1981). In the context of media practices and effects, framing refers to "persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation and presentation, of selection, emphasis and exclusion, by which symbol handlers routinely organize discourse," whether verbal or visual (Gitlin, 1980:7). Framing is not a theory in and of itself, but rather an area of study with many interdisciplinary applications. In terms of its relation to theory considered in the present paper, framing is analogous to "typification" in social problem construction and a close cousin of "issue characteristics" in agenda building: all of these concepts refer to the use of symbols to represent an issue or social problem, with the goal of maximizing influence on the public will. Framing is central to the media advocacy approach created by Wallack et al (1993). This approach opened new vistas for public health professionals and offered a counterpoint to the familiar individual-change behavior strategies of the time. Wallack et al (1993) describe the importance of framing both for access as well as for content. Framing for access refers to designing advocacy materials in such a way that they are desirable to media gatekeepers and hence more likely to be accepted for publication or broadcast. Framing for access includes the use of such tactics as: tying a news story with some anniversary of an historical event; touting a new breakthrough or discovery; linking a news story with a celebrity; finding an ironic twist in an issue; identifying a local angle to an otherwise national story; or linking a story to a holiday or seasonal event (Wallack et al., 1993). In general, the strategies and tactics of media advocacy mirror the news values of news organizations. Thus, media advocates are trained in this approach to conceptualize their audience as media gatekeepers/decision makers as well as members of the general public, and to frame their stories accordingly.

Framing for content involves the power to define. More importantly for public discourse, framing establishes the parameters in which individual choice and public policy occur from a pre-ordained array of alternatives (Salmon, 1989; Salmon, 1990). Framing begins with the terminology used to label a social problem or advocacy group. Once an advocacy group establishes its jargon and arguments, it frequently attempts to get the media and policy makers to accept its terminology rather than the terminology of an opposing group. For example, one advocacy group might label a social practice as "female circumcision," while another might label the same practice as "female genital mutilation." Each group would attempt to get the media to use its terminology, thereby putting its opponent at a substantial disadvantage in subsequent policy debates. It is one

thing to defend female circumcision as a cultural or religious practice, but quite another to defend mutilation; conversely, it is one thing to oppose mutilation, but quite another to oppose long-standing cultural and religious rites. In the abortion debate, no group seems to want to be known as "anti" anything; instead, the two main opposing camps both refer to themselves as "pro": choice and life. These two main groups strive for the widespread adoption of either the term "fetus" or "child," knowing full well that the subsequent choices available to policy makers will be circumscribed by whichever term is used as the basis for policy debates. Turning to another realm of public health, the term GRID (Gay Related Immune Deficiency) was an early label for what is now known as AIDS, but with tremendously different connotations and public policy implications. All of these examples speak to the importance of framing as a definition weapon in policy disputes.

Beyond terminology, framing plays an indispensable role in problem construction. Is the problem of tobacco use, for example, best defined in terms of adult individuals consuming cigarettes, or should it be defined in terms of underage teens gaining access to tobacco products? Does the problem result from an advertising industry that profits from glamorizing unhealthy behaviors, or movie-star role models puffing on cigarettes in popular films? Is tobacco use a problem due to federal government subsidies to tobacco growers, or the lack of economically attractive alternatives to farmers willing to grow crops other than tobacco? Or is the "problem" of tobacco best defined by the frame promulgated by the tobacco industry: as the infringement by government on the rights of individuals? Each frame refers to the same general social condition, but casts it in completely different terms with correspondingly different policy interpretations.

Similarly, the problem of automobile fatalities can also be framed in diverse ways, but most commonly as the fault of individuals who fail to "buckle up for safety." But what if it is defined in terms of automobile manufacturers who have the technological means to make safer automobiles, but do not? Or as a problem of state and federal governments pouring dollars into road construction rather than systems of mass transportation? Or of highway planners for failing to engineer safer roads through innovative designs and construction techniques? Each framing implies that the problem emanates from a particular sector of society, has a particular cause and must be addressed through a corresponding particular solution. Definitions that cast the problem in terms of individual behaviors will endorse the deployment of individual-change-behavior campaigns, such as well-known efforts to encourage individuals to wear seat belts, say 'no' to drugs or use condoms. In contrast, definitions that portray the problem in terms of structural or environmental influences will typically require the use of public will campaigns. Initiatives, such as the creation of a smoke-free society, relied on a sophisticated integration of lobbying, public awareness, community-based programs and legal challenges to industry practices.

Framing influences the perceptions and interpretations of media consumers and politicians alike. Experimental manipulations of the framing of news stories have been found to result in "priming" effects, i.e., to cause people to infer different conclusions about whether a particular social problem is the fault of individuals or of the social structure (Iyengar, 1991). In a classic study, Iyengar showed subjects film clips of terrorist acts, such as the hijacking of an airplane. When the news was shown in episodic fashion, i.e., as an event-centered "case study," subjects attributed the act to the personal

qualities of the terrorists, and were more likely to support punishment as a solution to the problem. However, when the news was shown in thematic fashion, i.e., a report with background and context, subjects were more likely to attribute the act to society. Similar experiments on news about poverty yielded essentially the same results: episodic reports led to attributions of individual responsibility, whereas thematic reports led to laying the blame on society. Given that broadcast news is overwhelming episodic in nature, these findings show that the media can have powerful effects on individuals' beliefs about the causes of various social problem, and in particular, hold individuals, rather than society, accountable.

In summary, framing is an indispensable element of public will campaigns, and straddles the entire process of campaign design and implementation. Framing is also a competitive enterprise, as groups regularly seek to impose their frames, their definitions on others, and to win acceptance of their frames in the minds of the public and policy makers alike.

D. Mass Communication and Social Perceptions

The field of communication research enjoyed a Renaissance in the early 1970s, following a decade in which some of its leading scholars somewhat pessimistically concluded that the media seemingly had little empirically verifiable impact on individuals and society. In response to this belief, a new generation of communication researchers began asking different questions and exploring different outcomes, resulting in several rich new bodies of theory and research. Two such theories are particularly germane to the study of public will campaigns: agenda setting and the spiral of silence.

1. Agenda setting

Conceding that the social scientific research community had failed to demonstrate evidence that powerful media effects could persuade armies of individuals to adopt particular attitudes, political scientist Bernard Cohen (1963:13) once observed that "the press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about." That is, at the time, the silver lining in the media research cloud was that the press at least was thought to have a profound ability to raise awareness about an issue in spite of its well-documented (at the time) failure to persuade people to adopt a particular attitude about that issue. Building on this observation, Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw built their model of agenda setting.

Agenda setting research initially focused on the relationship between media coverage of issues and perceptions of issue importance among the general public. This type of research has since become known as public agenda setting. A second wave of research, known as policy agenda setting, has borrowed from the agenda building literature and examined the relationship between media coverage and issue agendas of political bodies. A third type of research, media agenda setting, has borrowed from the literature on gatekeeping to determine the editorial processes of defining and selecting issues for inclusion in mass media content (Kosicki, 1993). Common to all is the shared dependent variable of "issue salience," which refers to the perceived importance of one issue vis-à-vis others collectively comprising a public, policy or media agenda.

In the first thirty years of research on this model, scholars have published well over 200 articles on agenda setting processes. The bulk of this research has focused on public agenda setting and has documented the degree to which the press's depiction of the world and its problems is transferred to its readers. Indeed, in McCombs' and Shaw's research program, the authors have found a robust correlation of as much as .96 between the rank ordering of issues covered in the press and the rank ordering of public concerns (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). But this is not to say that media coverage will automatically and immediately dictate the public agenda. Agenda setting appears to be more pronounced at the national than local level, and television has been found to have a stronger agenda setting effect than print media on the public agenda of national, but not local, issues (Palmgreen and Clarke, 1977). Agenda setting effects tend to be highly issue specific (Eaton, 1989), but are particularly pronounced when individuals are highly involved with particular issues. The timelag between media coverage and perceptions that an issue is salient varies by issue and by methodology in which this relationship is studied. Overall, it appears to take 5-7 weeks of news coverage of an issue to affect the composition of the public agenda, though changes in the perceived salience of a single issue can occur much more rapidly (McCombs et al., 1995; Eaton, 1989).

Studies of policy agenda setting are far less common, but are viewed with ever-increasing importance among scholars working in this area. There is a growing amount of evidence, both anecdotal and systematic, that media attention to a social problem significantly influences political leaders to respond (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). Further, there is some evidence that policy makers assume that their constituents care about issues that are highly publicized in the media, i.e., that the media agenda reflects the public agenda (Linsky, 1986). In any case, media coverage of an issue tends to draw the attention of public officials to that issue, especially those officials who are in elected, rather than appointed, positions of government.

Studies of media agenda setting tend to focus on public relations practices of corporations and government agencies and their influence on news coverage of particular issues. For example, Turk (1986) found that 51% of news releases and handouts from state agencies eventually were accepted and used in news stories. Perhaps more importantly, news stories emanating from these materials tended to adopt the frames used by the agencies in defining issues in the news. Other studies of media agenda setting have focused on the influence of certain prestigious media outlets on setting the agenda of other media outlets. For instance, studies have often found that the New York Times in many ways sets the agenda for much of the nation's press (e.g., Reese & Danielian, 1989).

In the context of public health, the agenda setting model has been applied to a wide range of health-related issues, including AIDS, drugs, breast cancer, tobacco farming and drunk driving.

2. Spiral of Silence

Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, a leading German pollster, had long been fascinated with the relationship between trends in voting preference and perceptions of which political party seemed to be gaining ground. In studying more than a decade of such results, she turned to the theoretical ruminations of Ferdinand Tonnies for explanation. From his perspective, public opinion was very unlike what was being described in the

United States—as the aggregation of individual opinions in a public opinion poll. Instead, he argued, public opinion is a social force, and a mechanism of social control. He further noted, "Public opinion…demands consent or at least compels silence, or abstention from contradiction (Tonnies, 1922:138). Starting from this foundation, Noelle-Neumann developed her own elaborate theory of public opinion as a form of social control, in which the mass media were seen as having a key role (Noelle-Neumann, 1993). The media, in her words, are both ubiquitous and consonant, i.e., they are pervasive and their content is relatively uniform within any given society. This combination creates the conditions for opinion "climates" that envelope individuals and offer a largely homogeneous depiction of social reality.

One of the most important functions of the media, in this model, is their role in serving as the predominant source of cues regarding majority opinion (Noelle-Neumann, 1993). The media become a primary source of information about social roles, customs and practices, and a powerful socializing agent for children and adults alike. Because most individuals have what Noelle-Neumann terms an "innate fear of isolation," they monitor their environment—often in the form of exposure to media messages—to gauge what ideas, fashions, behaviors, or points of view are "in" or "out," "popular" or "unpopular." If individuals perceive that their opinion on a controversial topic is shared by a majority or is gaining momentum in the public sphere, they will feel confident expressing it in public. On the other hand, if individuals perceive that their opinion is held only by a minority or is discredited or unpopular, they may be reluctant to express it publicly. Over time, one opinion tends to build more steam as individuals hear it expressed in more contexts. The opposing view eventually disappears from public discourse, as individuals increasingly are reluctant to express it in public conversations. Public opinion, thus refers to an opinion that can be expressed safely "in public" without a fear of social ostracization or criticism.

Noelle-Neumann's theory is quite controversial, in part because of her personal background and politics (Simpson, 1996) as well as the inconsistency of research verification (Salmon and Kline, 1985; Salmon and Glynn, 1996). Nevertheless, it offers several useful concepts and methodologies that can further our understanding of public will campaigns. First, in her role as political consultant, Noelle-Neumann has frequently counseled interest groups to go out of their way to publicly voice and otherwise display their opinion. The public expression of an opinion reassures others that the opinion is popular or is gaining ground or that it can be expressed publicly without fear of censure, even when it actually may not be any of these things in a statistical sense. This philosophy is at the basis of so many protest campaigns in which individuals protest, demonstrate, or barrage legislators with telephone calls, emails, telegrams, etc. Noelle-Neumann understands that both the public and political decision makers are sensitive to the symbolic environment, and the symbol of thousands of supporters rallying, demonstrating and otherwise intensely communicating can be a powerful one indeed.

Noelle-Neumann has offered some highly innovative ways of assessing the climate of opinion in the context of public health and safety. In one such study, she asks individuals to imagine that they are sitting in a train compartment with one other traveler, who opens the conversation with the observation that "It seems to me that smokers are terribly inconsiderate by forcing others to inhale their health-endangering smoke. What do you think?" Noelle-Neumann has studied the responses to this question, often varying

the conditions of the conversation; sometimes, other passengers are included, some sympathetic to smokers, others not (Noelle-Neumann, 1993). In general, she finds that individuals are sensitive to their social environment to some degree or another, and that it is the rare individual who consistently will speak out in the face of a hostile and widespread majority opinion. It is relevant here to note that the climate of opinion about smoking has changed dramatically over the past twenty years. Whereas non-smokers used to feel self conscious and even insecure about asking a nearby smoker not to smoke in a public setting, today it is more likely the smoker who feels self conscious in the same setting. This is precisely the type of outcome predicted and explained by the spiral of silence model.

A second methodological approach continues this line of thinking. Noelle-Neumann will show individuals a car with a bumper-sticker and slashed tire, and then ask whether the bumper sticker is for, or against, nuclear power. Alternatively, she will tell individuals that a speaker was lecturing about nuclear power the night before and was booed off the stage. Was he speaking for, or against, nuclear power? In both cases, individuals draw on their perceptions of the opinion climate, influenced mightily by mass media. Noelle-Neumann argues that this leads the individual to speculate about which opinion seems to be popular or in vogue and which does not. From a methodological perspective, one interesting footnote is that most people do at least have an assessment of what the majority opinion is (as opposed to saying "I don't know." At times, their assessment is inaccurate as individuals assume that others think as they do (the "looking glass" phenomenon) or are just wrong (pluralistic ignorance). Nevertheless, whether right or wrong, or how ever powerful or insignificant as forces of conformity, these perceptions appear to be linked to media content to some degree, and thus influencing media content must be considered a necessary component of public will campaigns.

The process of mobilizing the public will for social change cannot be diagrammed in a series of linear events but rather a complex set of interrelated factors. The next two sections will focus on tools for mobilizing public will for social change: social capital and social marketing. While the former is not a strategy of mobilizing the public will per se but rather a theory about the organization of social relationships, social capital can be strategically utilized as a tool for social change. Social marketing will also be discussed as a strategy for mobilizing the public will.

E. Social Capital

Little more than a decade ago, the notion of social capital was relatively unknown on the academic scene, save in a few circles. Currently, it dominates the social sciences as an exciting intellectual debate about the causes and consequences of social relations, structure, processes, change, and capital. If public will campaigns positively affect negative social conditions from the standpoint of social constructions, then underlying processes such as information exchange and control of resources must become the focus. To this end, it is necessary to address the role of social capital in public will campaigns.

Lin (2001:19) defines social capital as "an investment in social relations with expected returns in the marketplace." While it is worth noting the considerable debate regarding the definition of social capital, Lin's general definition is consistent with other well-cited versions (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1990; Flap, 1994; Erickson, 1996; Portes,

1998). Even though there is some dispute about definitions, the core idea is that actors are linked and have the potential of communicating and exchanging resources of all kinds. Using a colloquial example, consider that Bob and Carol are friends and that Carol's car needs repair. Bob's arranges for his brother, a mechanic, to repair Carol's car. In discovering that a corporation has plans to fill a wetland near his house, Bob asks Carol, who is the head of a local environmental action group, to get involved in the wetland issue. Carol agrees to launch a public relations campaign, and begins by contacting her brother, who also happens to play golf with the CEO of the corporation that has designs on the wetland. Relying on this line of thinking, we see social capital as a resource in the form of informal networks, and a means to influence the public will.

Communities affect people's ideology. Individuals tend to go along with the public will when they are invested. Examples of community organizations where members are invested would be churches, neighborhoods, and door-to-door campaigns. Environmental issues, such as preserving water cleanliness or air quality controls, receive greater support in the communities affected by such issues. The social capital framework demonstrates that people with less financial capital and more social capital can make powerful strides in social change regardless of financial status. Factors such as grassroots involvement, personal networks among activists and media professionals, and coalition building can compensate for meager financial resources if community residents understand the shared benefits of social change. Making a community the mechanism, rather than mere site, of change requires the management of social capital in the form of activating important, yet often informal, social networks and identifying win-win situations for the parties involved.

Operating from a social capital framework, activism can involve developing human connections with the politically and economically elite rather than opposing them directly. Developing personal connections may be more effective in changing political and economic forces than working through bureaucracy. An example would be Erin Brockovich who, working on a personal level, was able to mobilize her community, and subsequently the government, by relying on principles of social capital. Social capital techniques a la Erin Brockovich may be more than just effective ways to change public will; they may in fact be essential to public will campaigns. Based on Lin's (2001:20) decomposition of why social capital works, we can extrapolate these findings into why it is essential to changing the public will. Embedded resources in social networks may enhance the outcomes of public will campaigns through the following mechanisms: (1) communication and education; (2) influence and power; (3) credentials and networking; and (4) reinforcing awareness.

First, social ties can provide an individual with useful information about opportunities and choices that was not previously available to an individual. Erin Brockovich fulfilled just such a role. By becoming familiar with the families of the community, she was able to inform them of the environmental and legal news that affected them most. Similarly, the local SAFE KIDS coalitions across the nation serve to educate their local communities about preventing childhood injury. These local coalitions have a greater affect on their communities than a nationally focused campaign would (see exemplar on SAFE KIDS).

Second, social ties may exert <u>influence</u> on the agents who play a critical role in decisions. Some social ties, due to their strategic locations and positions, carry more

valued resources and exercise greater power. Thus certain individuals or groups carry more weight in an individual's decision-making process. The late 1980s campaign against Alar in apples was championed by Meryl Streep, a highly respected actress and mother. Her support of the issue encouraged the general public to join the fight. Another example would be a religious authority prescribing certain actions; if a church takes a political stance on a certain issue, then those that follow the religion are likely to be influenced by this stance.

Third, just as a person's influence affects decision-makers, his or her reputation can affect the organizations working for change. The social capital of an individual is his or her accessibility to resources through networks and relationships. If an organization perceives a higher degree of social capital in a person, they will be more willing to work with that person. Standing behind individuals with these ties reassures the organization that the individual can provide resources beyond the individual's personal capital, some of which may be useful to the organization. An example of this is the alliance between Americans for Gun Safety (AGS) and Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman. The social capital (or credentials) of the two senators helped to establish AGS as a national force in the gun safety movement. Another example: when nonsmokers' advocates began organizing a movement for a cigarette tax increase in California, one of their first contacts was California Assembly Member Lloyd Connelly. Connelly helped forge connections between new groups, lobbyists, and influential individuals. It was partially due to this networking that the Coalition for a Healthy California was created.

Fourth, social relations are expected to <u>reinforce</u> identity and recognition. Issues with a long-term agenda can fade from public awareness without this regular reinforcement. For mental health campaigns, reinforcing awareness is essential to maintaining resources. Muscular Dystrophy is another example; to raise funds for research and treatment, Muscular Dystrophy advocates run high-publicity media campaigns every year. The environment is another example that benefits from reinforced awareness. As most people take their environment for granted, these issues might easily be swept under the rug were it not for the groups who work to maintain environmental awareness.

In sum, within structural constraints, personal choices can have meaningful impacts and even alter structural conditions. Public will campaigns must access resources embedded in social relationships, or social capital, to achieve desired outcomes. Social capital is ingrained in social relations and, at the same time, facilitated and constrained by them. Within such structural opportunities and constraints, action makes a difference, and must be considered in attempts to influence the public will.

<u>F. Social Marketing</u>

Social marketing has been defined as "the application of marketing technologies developed in the commercial sector to the solution of social problems where the bottom line is behavior change." (Andreasen, 1995:3). As is the case with other theories and models outlined above, social marketing is a tool for mobilizing the public will, though it operates quite differently. Social marketing is not really a theory, but rather a mindset and a process. It is a mindset in its emphasis on consumer needs and corresponding preoccupation with segmentation and research. Social marketers are advised to think of

people as "customers" rather than campaign "targets"; to think of being able to fill a customer's need rather than of having a great product or lifestyle to sell. Social marketers are advised to interpret intervention failure as evidence of a lack of understanding or inadequate research on their part rather than the fault of "chronic know nothings" or "obstinate audiences" (two actual terms found in the annals of campaign literature). It is a process in its description of how marketers can control and modify aspects of the "4 P's" to induce change. To promote condom use, for example, a social marketer might make modifications to the *product* (condom) itself, producing it in different colors, shapes, sizes, flavors and textures in order to meet various customer needs. The marketer might next augment *places* in which condoms are made available to consumers, venturing well outside the traditional pharmacy and into environments that are both more convenient and less threatening to the customer. The marketer could also manipulate *price*, either by simply reducing the financial cost to the consumer or by mitigating the psychological cost that a consumer must pay in changing relationship behaviors with a long-time partner. Finally, the marketer could always rely on new and exotic *promotions*, in the form of slick advertising campaigns, publicity, point-of-purchase displays, or promotional giveaways.

Since its earliest articulation a half-century ago (Wiebe, 1952), social marketing has been the subject of considerable scholarly interest and writing, and it has been described in significant detail in other monographs in this series (and hence is not described in detail herein) In the present paper, the key question is how this popular approach to social change, which has been criticized for its emphasis on individual-change-behavior (see Wallack, 1993), relates to the public will. First, as was noted in the section on social capital, social change does not occur solely at the macro level, but is ultimately rooted in the behaviors of individuals. Second, social marketing can be harnessed to alter social norms, collective decision making processes and other structural characteristics essential to social change.

The case of the National Women, Infants and Children (WIC) Breastfeeding Promotion Project illustrates the relevance of social marketing to public will. The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for WIC was created to provide health and social services to economically disadvantaged women. Research studies conducted in the 1980s and 90s indicated that the rate of breastfeeding was lower among economically disadvantaged women than in the general population, the findings of which led to a social marketing program conducted in ten pilot states. Drawing on three of the "4 P's" described above, the social marketers identified "price" as a barrier to breastfeeding in the form of embarrassment and conflicts with active lifestyles. To reduce this emotional price that women were not prepared to pay, the program identified several "places" in which to focus its change efforts, and used "promotion" to increase awareness and influence behavior. Altogether, the program used media and grassroots advocacy, community-based organizational recruitment, professional training and education, peer counseling, lobbying, and direct marketing and advertising (Social Marketing Institute, 2003). As such, the program mobilized the community and galvanized the attention of healthcare professionals and politicians, all through the use of a social marketing framework for analyzing barriers to change in the form of price, product, promotion and/or place.

In closing this section, three caveats should be noted. First, not all social marketing programs are concerned with public will. Some focus solely on modifying individual-level behaviors without addressing public policy or other macro-level factors, and thus this approach is often considered in the domain of individual-level approaches to change. Second, the translation of commercial marketing techniques to the public sector is an imperfect one at best. For example, McDonald's and Coca-Cola likely have more to spend on marketing and marketing research in one day than many community-based health organizations are capable of raising in a year. Thus the ability of a health organization to fully embrace the marketing philosophy may be rather limited. Third, key philosophical differences exist between commercial and social marketing that must be understood before expecting the same results that commercial marketers achieve. For example, consider the case of a commercial marketer who identifies a cluster of consumers who have no interest in a product, no foreseeable means to purchase it, or no intention to every adopt it. The commercial marketer will often choose to ignore this segment because of the low expected return on any investment of time and resources needed to change this group. Now consider a social marketer who identifies a cluster of individuals with no interest or intention to adopt a healthy behavior. Instead of ignoring this segment, the social marketer will often make it the centerpiece of an intervention— and indeed may be ethically mandated to do so—in spite of an equally low expected return on investment.

In sum, the social marketing approach offers many useful and relevant concepts, as well as a well-defined process that emphasizes strategic planning and research. Furthermore, its power can be harnessed to achieve social-level as well as individual-level change. Nevertheless, this approach—as actually practiced—is not always central to the mobilization of public will because of constraints and limitations on public health organizations and the multi-level goals of their change efforts.

V. Exemplars

In this section, we offer several cases that illustrate elements of the previously described theoretical frameworks.

A. The Fall and Rise of Alar

Before Meryl Streep's activism, before the apple boycotts, there was Alar. Alar, the commercial name for the growth hormone daminozide, was used to keep apples on trees longer, allowing growers more time to harvest the crop. Alar was first sold in the U.S. in 1968; five years later, the *Journal of the National Cancer Institute* reported that Alar caused cancer in mice. As the apples sprayed with Alar are processed, then digested, a product called UMDH is produced. UMDH was proven, in 1973, 1977, 1978, and 1979 to cause cancer in mice, rats, and hamsters. More disturbing, Alar was shown to decompose into UMDH in the human digestive system as well (Meadows, 1997). Alar was found in several foods, including apple juice, baby food, and applesauce. The EPA estimated that Alar would cause 50 cancers in every 1 million people; that estimate was later adjusted to 23 cancers for every 1 million people. *Consumer Reports*, conducting an independent test, found that the cancer risk ranged anywhere from 5 to 50

out of 1 million. These estimates, however, were measured for adults; children are more sensitive to carcinogens.

Several companies voluntarily stopped using Alar-treated apples; however, the EPA still did not ban the chemical. In 1987, citizen's groups, pediatricians, and lobbyists began a suit against the EPA to ban Alar and thereby enforce their own laws regarding carcinogen consumption. Meanwhile, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) began studying Alar and its effects. The NRDC published its findings in 1989. They did not focus on Alar in particular, but looked at the effects of many common pesticides and other chemicals on both adults and children. Their recommendation was to ban Alar immediately.

To help spread the word, NRDC hired a public relations firm, Fenton Communications, to help garner public support. This public will campaign, designed to build public awareness and arouse public outrage, utilized the familiar "forbidden fruit" imagery to drive home the anti-Alar message. Print ads appeared with a skull and crossbones superimposed over an apple. The Garden of Eden, Snow White, Adam and Eve – media was awash in the evil apple. Meryl Streep became a spokeswoman for the cause, appearing on talk shows, before Congress, and at media events. The television program *60 Minutes* aired not one, but two reports on the dangers of Alar. The cover of *Time Magazine* featured an apple with a bar across it – reminiscent of the "no smoking," or "no parking" signs. The Alar explosion in the media can be understood through media agenda setting. A reputable news program highlighted Alar, other media outlets picked up the story and ran with it. That Alar posed a potential threat to everyone helped raise its social significance, also helping to spur media exposure.

The campaign worked: mothers poured apple juice down the drain; apples and applesauce were no longer school lunch staples; school boards banned the use of Alar-tainted apples. Apple growers from coast to coast lamented their losses – apple sales were down and even those growers who never used Alar were affected. Uniroyal, the company with rights to sell Alar in the U.S., suddenly chose to no longer sell in the United States. In late 1989, the EPA finally banned Alar due to its "unacceptable risks to public health." The goal had been achieved: Alar was no longer a risk to the general population. To obtain this goal, however, scientists and other experts needed the support of the general public. Research and statistics regarding cancer risk were simply not enough to bring about change.

Almost immediately after 60 Minutes became involved with the campaign to stop the use of Alar, the apple industry began its own campaign to influence public will. To minimize the losses from 1989's anti-Alar media blitz, the apple industry mounted a counter attack – labeling the previous public will campaign a mere "hoax." Suddenly, the news referred to the embarrassing "apple scare" and "media panic." The research behind NCRD's report was called into question, and the media portrayed apple growers as victims of faulty science.

A group known as the American Council on Science and Health (ACSH) worked diligently to change public perceptions of the Alar controversy and combat pesticide control agenda building. The ACSH was funded in large part by the agricultural industry and by Uniroyal – the company with rights to sell Alar. This campaign followed the same techniques as the anti-Alar campaign: influential spokeswoman and plenty of media exposure. And it was just as successful. The apple industry paid Hill & Knowlton, a

prominent public relations firm, more than $1 million for an advertising campaign. Hill & Knowlton worked closely with ACSH to wage a public will campaign to clear Alar's reputation. The president of ACSH, Elizabeth Whelan, became the colorful and influential spokeswoman for the apple industry. She made herself available to the media, always ready to give an interview for her cause. Frequent press briefings helped to spread the word: Alar was not harmful at all.

The media accepted the message and ran with it. The campaign to redeem Alar continued for years; as late as 1998, a *New York Times* article characterized the Alar controversy as one of the "greatest unfounded health scares of the last five decades" (Brody, 1998). They were not alone.

> *"The media have accepted this legend without question.* The New York Times*, October 26, 1996: 'Alar -- a scare that turned out to be overblown.'* The San Jose Mercury News*, November 14, 1996: 'In 1989 the Alar scare cost apple growers an estimated $100 million.'* The Richmond, Virginia, Times-Dispatch*, March 31, 1996: 'the bogus Alar scare of 1989.' An article by Elliot Negin in* Columbia Journalism Review *cites 160 references to Alar in 80 different articles published in 1995. 'All but a handful present the Alar affair as much ado about nothing'"* (Meadows, 1997).

Through the media campaign, Alar was redeemed in the eyes of the public. By 1991, a poll indicated that nearly 70% of the population believed that the Alar controversy was merely hype. Eighty-six percent of the population reported confidence in the safety of agricultural products. Additionally, at least a dozen states have adopted new laws to prevent another "Alar scare" from repeating (Environmental Working Group, 1999). These laws, known as "food libel" laws, allow food growers and producers to sue individuals and groups who damage their sales.

B. Americans for Gun Safety

Gun control has long been a controversial issue in the United States. The debate has been polarized between those who support gun rights and those who support gun regulation. In July 2000, Andrew McKelvey formed a group focused on finding a logical compromise to the two sides. This group, Americans for Gun Safety (AGS), supports the right to own a gun, but they believe that "with gun rights, come gun responsibilities." Their major objectives as described in their web site (www.americansforgunsafety.com) are: to close America's gun show loophole, to improve the quality of background checks in every state, to enforce current laws, and to educate the public on gun safety.

Early on, AGS focused its efforts and resources to support legislation for gun safety. To help promote the McCain-Lieberman bill to close the "gun show loophole," AGS created a series of advertisements that ran in print, on the radio, and on television. The purpose of this campaign was to spread public awareness of the McCain-Lieberman bill and to stimulate public activism regarding the issue. Advertisements encouraged the public to contact Congress and tell them to vote for the McCain-Lieberman bill. The Brady bill, approved years earlier, forced all licensed gun dealers to do background checks before the sale of a firearm. However, unlicensed, independent dealers run most gun shows and they do not have to run background checks. The McCain-Lieberman bill would close this loophole, forcing all gun dealers to run background checks.

The campaign conveniently coincided with the post-September 11th crackdown on terrorism. Using this to its advantage, AGS created a series of ads connecting gun shows to terrorist attacks. The McCain-Lieberman bill, the advertisements stated, would "strengthen homeland security" and close "dangerous loopholes" that currently allow criminals and foreign terrorists to obtain weapons. Playing on the fear-appeal theory, these advertisements attempted to use the post-September 11th fear of terrorism to its advantage.

Another series of advertisements focused on a "common-sense" approach. The message, "With Guns Come Responsibility" appeared in print and on television. Senators McCain and Leiberman urged Washington to "stop playing politics with guns." The background check would be "simple, quick, and effective" promised the Senators in one such ad. The AGS web site posted a listing of common myths regarding background checks. Gun owners are reassured by the ads that law-abiding citizens would have nothing to fear by a background check.

Did it work? The McCain-Lieberman bill has not yet been passed; a national budget crisis and potential war with Iraq have replaced gun safety on the national agenda. The timing simply was not right. Meanwhile, AGS is working at the state level to address the gun show loophole and to improve the quality of background checks. This may not be a bad strategy; AGS has helped to pass historic ballot measures in both Colorado and Oregon. The strategy of AGS – targeting both gun control activists *and* gun owners to encourage responsible use – is gaining acceptance among gun control activists. The term "gun control" is being phased out and "gun violence prevention" and "gun safety" are now in (Birnbaum, 2001). By reframing the issue in terms of safety, rather than control, Americans for Gun Safety has the potential to reach a broader audience and gain more support.

<u>C. Click It or Ticket</u>

In 1985, only 26% of North Carolina's population wore seatbelts. In less than a decade, over 80% of the population chose to wear their seatbelts regularly. This drastic change was brought about by a massive public will campaign led by North Carolina's government.

In 1979, the state of North Carolina could not even pass laws on child safety seats, much less legislate adult seatbelt usage (NHTSA, n.d.). Although the House Highway Safety Committee tried to bring child safety seat legislation to the state, the prevailing attitude in Congress valued individual rights, parental rights, and governmental non-interference. Seat belt safety was framed as an individual problem. Safety experts from across the state rallied together to reframe traffic safety as a public health issue. With millions of dollars in preventable health and insurance costs, they argued, the state had a vested interest in promoting seatbelt use.

Safety leaders knew that they would have an uphill battle. To increase seatbelt usage, they would have to work incrementally, garnering more and more support with every small success. The first legislation that was approved was targeted at children. Classifying the problem as a public health issue rather than "parental choice," legislators were able to pass a child restraint law (NHTSA, n.d.). Many North Carolinians who resisted the idea of mandatory seatbelt laws felt that the child safety law was an

acceptable compromise. This law included a provision requiring that the law be evaluated regularly to judge its impact upon child safety.

With a small battle won, safety leaders were encouraged but knew that there was more work to be done. Several legislators, academics, and citizen lobbyists joined together to create public will for seatbelt safety. These groups enlisted the support of the Governor, the House and the Senate – depicting seatbelt safety as a truly bipartisan issue. In the spring of 1985, a statewide seatbelt law was finally passed. After the law was passed, seatbelt use increased from 26% to 78%. When the law was evaluated, results showed that there were over 10,000 deaths and injuries prevented and about $500 million in savings. Gains were short-lived, however; by 1990, seatbelt use was down to only 60% (NHTSA, n.d.). The need for public will was apparent: the general public was losing interest in seatbelt safety.

To create public will, the Governor and several seatbelt and safety advocacy groups came together to form the Governor's Highway Safety Initiative (GHSI). With the Governor's enthusiastic support, the "Click It or Ticket" campaign was born. This campaign is a high-visibility, massive enforcement effort to reduce seat belt law violations. Through television, radio, newspapers, and public appearances, the Governor and the GHSI spread the "Click It or Ticket" message. The GHSI worked to set the media agenda, and the media was quickly saturated with messages of seatbelt safety – and warnings of zero tolerance for law violators.

The media campaign served several purposes:
- Remind the general population about seatbelt laws.
- Inform the public about the benefits of increased seatbelt usage (i.e. reduced expenses, fewer injuries, saved lives).
- Gather support for seatbelt safety issues.
- Warn the public about the upcoming seatbelt checkpoints.

The seatbelt checkpoints systematically stopped vehicles and provided incentives (coupons, vouchers, etc.) for those who were wearing seatbelts and fined those who were not. The incentives proved ineffective, but the possibility of a $25 fine was proven to be effective in increasing seatbelt use. Additionally, law enforcement agencies were actively involved throughout the campaign and were given incentives for participating.

The Click It or Ticket Program resulted in an increase in seatbelt use to 82%. The North Carolina program has been an inspiration to other states who follow the "Click It or Ticket" model. Click It or Ticket was evaluated through surveys given to the general public and to law enforcement agencies. The campaign succeeded not only in altering public opinion, but also encouraged the public to act for policy change. North Carolina's incremental approach to strengthening seatbelt laws have worked. In July of 2000, a law was passed to increase the penalty for drivers who drive with unrestrained children under the age of sixteen. No longer just a monetary fine, the driver is punished with 2 points on their license. Currently, the state is debating increasing the penalty for adults who drive unrestrained. On top of the $25 fine, they could potentially receive 1 point on their license.

Additionally, benefits were found in other areas: from 1993-1999, North Carolina's enforcement blitzes resulted in the discovery of 56,800 criminal offenses, including firearm violations, felony drug violations and stolen vehicles (State of North Carolina, n.d.). Every penny of the $25 fine charged to seatbelt law violators goes toward

local schools, thereby further benefiting the community. Due to the success of North Carolina's program, other states across the nation now take part in similar programs. Many states follow the North Carolina model, most states show marked improvement in seatbelt usage.

<div align="center">D. Smoking - California Initiatives</div>

As recently as the early 1970s, smoking was still considered an acceptable practice in most public establishments. Grassroots organizations that felt smoking posed a public health concern found "little support from the mainstream health organizations like the American Cancer Society, American Heart Association, and American Lung Association" (Glantz, 2000). The lack of support stemmed from the common acceptance of smoking as an individual behavioral problem.

> *The nonsmokers' rights activists viewed smoking and the tobacco industry as a social, environmental, and political problem; in contrast, the medical establishment – including most of the voluntary health organizations – viewed smoking as a medical problem in which individual patients (smokers) were to be treated (by telling them to stop smoking) (Glantz, 2000:7).*

For the activists to achieve their goal, they constructed smoking and second-hand smoke as a social problem. While smoking had long been considered a problem, albeit an individual problem, second-hand smoking was not. By constructing second-hand smoke as a social problem, the nonsmokers rights activists stood a chance of gaining support from a larger segment of the population.

In 1988, Californian voters approved the California Tobacco Tax and Health Promotion Act (Proposal 99). This legislation was the first of its kind; it increased the cigarette tax by 25 cents per pack (with similar increases on other tobacco products). The money was allocated specifically for health care, education, research, and the environment. One of the main goals of this campaign was "to change social norms around tobacco use." (CDHS, 1998). However, to get to this point, nonsmokers' rights activists waged an extensive social campaign against big tobacco.

In 1986, an environmentalist suggested to his friend at the American Lung Association that tobacco taxes be increased, with revenue supporting environmental programs. This plan underwent some basic changes, and became the beginnings of Proposition 99. With the support of California Assembly Member Lloyd Connelly and from groups as diverse as the California Teachers Association, the Senate Revenue and Taxation Committee, and the California Medical Association, the fledgling tax effort gained momentum and attention. These groups and others compromised The Coalition for a Healthy California. Connelly was a respected politician with considerable social capital and influence; his suggestion was to make the cigarette tax increase a voter initiative – it would never get through the Legislature, given the strength of California's tobacco lobby.

But reaching the voters would prove to be difficult. The tobacco lobby waged a skillful and calculated campaign to stop Proposition 99. Tobacco had deep pockets, while the supporters of Proposition 99 funded their campaign out of pocket and from small donations. To attract attention to their cause, the Coalition attempted to pass a tax

increase similar to Proposition 99 through the Legislature. Although the Coalition had little faith in its success, they felt it was necessary to test their arguments and to spread public awareness. The initiative failed in the Legislature, but helped gain public support. By January 1987, a public opinion poll indicated 73% of those polled would support a tax increase (Glantz, 2000). The Coalition took the opportunity of this poll to test their arguments on individuals. The most successful arguments were later used in the statewide campaign.

Lacking money, the Coalition utilized as much free press as possible. Press conferences and media events were staged. Perhaps most importantly, the Coalition took advantage of a recent law, The Fairness Doctrine, which forced media outlets to broadcast both sides of the issue regardless of ability to pay. Volunteers and grassroots organizations helped to spread the word. When it was time for signatures to be collected, some "signatures were delivered in ambulances" to attract media attention (Glantz, 2000).

Polls indicated that Proposition 99 would do better if the public viewed it as a non-political public-health issue. Because of this, language became an important tool to earn the support of the public. The campaign was titled the Health Protection Act; campaigns were carefully worded to not offend potential voters. Arguments focused on the money allocated toward health care and education and reduced illness and death caused by smoking. In retaliation, the tobacco lobby described Proposition 99 as a means for doctors and HMOs to make more money.

Throughout the campaign, the Coalition had achieved surprisingly high public support. This support was bolstered by a report released less than a week before the election. The report released by the Department of Health Services included an "examination of the financial cost of smoking and smoking-related deaths in California in 1985" (Glantz, 2000). The total cost to Californians soared above $7 billion. The tobacco industry countered with accusations of suspect statistics and manipulation.

In November 1988, Proposition 99 passed with 58% of the vote. The grassroots, small budget campaign of the Coalition for a Healthy California worked to defeat one of the largest and most powerful industries in the nation. The campaign was overwhelmingly effective. The energy and momentum of the Coalition was now focused into creating tobacco education and health programs from the new tax revenue. Following upon some of the basic lessons learned from the Proposition 99 campaign, advocates stuck with their small-is-better campaign.

Even though the law was passed, it was important to evaluate public opinion regarding smoking as a public-health issue. This was determined through both surveillance and program evaluation. Surveys measured tobacco-related knowledge, attitudes, and behavior; local and state policies were monitored, and health outcome data were collected. Evaluation efforts measured school programs, local programs, media campaigns, and industry activity. Results have consistently showed that the programs funded by Proposition 99 have been successful in reducing smoking and in changing public perceptions of tobacco and the tobacco industry. By 2001, per capita cigarette consumption had fell 55%, compared with a 30% decline nationally.

E. Violence Against Women Act

The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) was passed in 1994, the result of four years of lobbying and decades of activism. VAWA was the first of its kind, comprehensively addressing the physical and sexual assault of women in public, at home, and in the justice system. This legislation also set aside money for research and statistical reporting on crimes against women, to help bring what was once a hidden problem into the light.

The women's rights movement in the 1970s "publicized the issue of domestic violence so well that it seemed to be a new phenomenon" (Felter, 1997). This grassroots movement of former battered women, feminists, and other activists gained momentum on the heals of the civil rights movement. Through protests, marches, rallies, and the media, the women's rights movement spread its message. By 1977, two national domestic violence bills had been proposed, though defeated, on Capital Hill. The Domestic Violence Assistance Act of 1978 followed and was also defeated. Although these early political attempts to curb domestic violence appeared to be unsuccessful in terms of policy outcomes, they succeeded in drawing more attention to the issue. President Jimmy Carter created the Office of Domestic Violence in 1979, thereby acknowledging the need for legal and social reforms. Although President Reagan subsequently closed the Office of Domestic Violence in 1981 and several bills designed to further criminalize domestic violence were defeated, the grassroots movement continued to grow and gain acceptance at local levels. From 1982 to 1989, the number of shelters for victims of domestic violence quadrupled and states began taxing marriage certificates to fund these shelters (Felter, 1997).

In 1990, Senator Biden introduced VAWA, the product of two previous failed pieces of legislation. "The reasons behind the initiation of the legislation are unclear. Senator Joseph Biden's (D-Del.) office drafted the legislation and introduced it to the Senate without offering specific reasons for deciding to take action on the issue" (Brooks, 1997: 65). While VAWA may have appeared new to the general public, activists in the battered women's movement had been working for years (with mixed successes) to raise awareness and change social norms regarding the acceptance of domestic violence.

VAWA proposed to create penalties for gender-related violence and give states grant money to formulate programs to combat domestic violence and sexual assault. Among these grants were the STOP grants, designed to train law enforcement and prosecution staff to recognize and stop domestic violence. States would also be given federal money if they instituted a mandatory arrest policy in domestic violence cases. Women's shelters, operating for years with private or local funding, would be funded with federal dollars. VAWA was the first attempt to comprehensively address domestic violence through education, financial incentives, and criminalization (Meyer-Emerick, 2001).

Changing public opinion and influencing issue awareness were considered essential to the eventual passage of the Act, which took four years in Congress (Brooks, 1997). More than one thousand groups and many more individuals expressed their support of the Act through letters and phone calls to their senators and representatives. Advocacy groups such as the National Organization for Women (NOW) and the Family Violence Prevention Fund (FVPF) lobbied heavily for the bill's passage. In 1994, VAWA was

finally passed. In 1999, efforts to reauthorize and improve VAWA began. On September 26, the Violence against Women Act of 2000 (VAWA II) passed by a vote of 415-3 in the House and 95-0 in the Senate.

F. The Susan J. Komen Race for the Cure

Breast cancer is the second-most deadly form of cancer for women. Nearly 40,000 women die from breast cancer yearly. For years, however, breast cancer had been kept hidden - women wouldn't talk about it; doctors screened for it at their own discretion, and public awareness was non-existent. After Nancy Brinker lost her sister to breast cancer, she formed an organization dedicated to saving lives and raising breast cancer awareness. That organization, the Susan G. Komen Foundation, has grown and developed over the years. Today, it is viewed as one of the most well-known, powerful, and respected organizations for promoting breast cancer awareness and policies. The Komen Foundation's efforts have lead to increased diagnosis, public acceptance, and a movement toward standardized medical practices.

> *When my sister faced breast cancer, information designed for patients was few and far between, and Suzy's lack of awareness kept her from fully participating in most treatment decisions.* (Brinker, 2002).

The Race for the Cure is a major part of the Komen Foundation's efforts to increase breast cancer awareness. Across the nation, local groups organize 5k runs; as a whole, they attract over 1 million participants. In the beginning, it was just a small run in Dallas, attracting about 800 participants in one local race. As of 2003, over 115 races existed throughout the nation and all over the world (Susan G. Komen Breast Cancer Foundation, n.d.). Breast Cancer's scope is tremendous; tens of thousands of women die from it yearly and millions more are affected by breast cancer in one way or another. The intensity of those involved has grown over the years to record numbers. These two factors combine to give the issue a high amount of visibility.

Race for the Cure is highly publicized, relying on both a national advertising campaign as well as local media to get the message out. Money is gathered through donations and registration fees. Seventy-five percent of the money earned stays in the local community, earmarked for breast cancer awareness programs and research. A large portion of this money is used for breast cancer detection and treatment programs for individuals without the resources for their own medical care. The remainder of the money goes to support the Susan J. Komen Foundation programs, research, and lobbying. Since its inception in 1983, the Komen Foundation has raised over $250 million through programs such as The Race for the Cure.

> *The cumulative knowledge, awareness and progress in breast cancer today amaze me. Women used to suffer alone, but now doors have been opened so that those who face a breast cancer diagnosis have better screening and treatment options, and a better quality of life. They also have a vast and growing support network.* (Brinker, 2002).

The Race for the Cure has resulted in numerous spin-off programs devoted to raising money and awareness of breast cancer. One of these programs, Champions for the Cure, encourages individuals to support public policy for breast cancer. Working through the same grassroots organizations as The Race for the Cure, the Komen foundation issues a call for action, utilizing public will to create better public policy - both on the local and national level. Public policy priorities are to increase funding to breast cancer detection programs, increase Medicare reimbursement on mammography, pass a Patients Bill of Rights, and most importantly, improve access to quality treatment.

The National Breast and Cervical Cancer Early Detection Program (NBCCEDP) is a program supported by the Komen Foundation. Unfortunately, there was little money for this program to operate. Komen Foundation members spread the word through Internet, media, and local groups. People were encouraged to contact their congressperson and stress the importance of funds for the NBCCEDP. Meanwhile, the Komen Foundation lobbied for more money. In the middle of a national budget crisis and against expectations, the Komen Foundation's tactics worked: $200.383 million was allocated for the NBCCEDP in 2003. Their tactics are simultaneously powerful and polite: when victories are won, the Komen Foundation encourages people to send thank you notes to legislators.

Judging by the Komen Foundation's many victories, the campaign has been a success. Public awareness in the issue has increased. In the case of the Komen Foundation, that awareness almost always translates into action. Constantly working on both a national and grassroots level, the foundation has achieved great measures of success, including increased funding, standardized medical recommendations, and innovative programs.

G. The National SAFE KIDS Campaign

The number one killer of children is unintentional injury (a.k.a., accidents). In 1999, 5,834 children died from unintentional injuries. In 2000, almost 7 million children ended up in emergency rooms because of unintentional injury. The cost to society soars above $3 billion. To solve this, Dr. Martin Eichelberger and Herta Feely formed the National SAFE KIDS Campaign with the sponsorship of Johnson & Johnson and the Children's National Medical Center (SAFE KIDS, n.d.).

The National SAFE KIDS Campaign is a comprehensive campaign to protect children from unintentional injury. SAFE KIDS believes that there are no "accidents," only unintentional injury. The SAFE KIDS campaign utilized social problem construction techniques to create the issue of unintentional injury. The campaign, formed in 1988, aims to change public perception of the issue, to change policy, and to prevent unintentional injuries. The strategy of the SAFE KIDS Campaign is:
1. To conduct media outreach and create public awareness
2. To encourage grassroots activity through local coalitions
3. To gain support for injury prevention public policy

The National Campaign is made up of hundreds of local coalitions that, through the support of the national agency, work to build awareness in their communities. Working on the local level to garner attention for a national cause has proven effective for the SAFE KIDS campaign. Local coalitions are armed with information about unintentional

injuries and what the best prevention strategies are. National programs are tailored by the local coalitions to fit community needs. The coalitions cultivate social ties between health professionals, law enforcement, families, local businesses, and children.

The National SAFE KIDS Campaign distributes injury prevention information to the coalitions and to the media. Media outreach is instrumental in gaining public support on a broad-scale. Through press releases, educational materials, and brochures, the SAFE KIDS Campaign has delivered important safety messages to the public. Local coalitions work alongside the national campaign to reinforce these messages. Press releases and brochures follow the same model: Statistics and information about unintentional injuries, followed by tips and strategies to avoid unintentional injury, followed by a call to action in a local SAFE KIDS campaign or other local safety group. Press releases and brochures are adapted for specific injuries, (i.e. falling, bicycling, water, and poison).
After awareness has been achieved, policy becomes the top priority. The Campaign takes an active role in politics, testifying before Congress, improving legislation, and giving their support or opposition to new policy. They have supported legislation for safer playgrounds, helmet laws, handgun injury prevention, crib safety, and motor vehicle safety (SAFE KIDS, n.d.). Lobbyists work on local, state, and national levels to meld safety policies with public policies. Since its inception, the SAFE KIDS Campaign has been a remarkable force in child safety legislation.

> *Ten years ago, when the Campaign was founded, only one state had a bicycle helmet law. Today 19 states, the District of Columbia and many communities require youngsters to strap on a helmet while biking -- and America now boasts a 40 percent reduction in the bicycle injury death rate.* (SAFE KIDS, n.d.).

With partners such as Johnson & Johnson and the Children's National Medical Center, the SAFE KIDS campaign has significant social capital. Johnson & Johnson is a name that many parents trust and rely upon. The Children's National Medical Center has earned a prestigious reputation for its achievements in infant and child health care for over 125 years. In addition, the widely respected former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop serves as the Chairman of the Campaign.

The program has been evaluated on the local level by several of the coalitions. Michigan, for one, found that the programs created by the National SAFE KIDS Campaign helped to raise awareness in nearly 1 million people, statewide. Michigan's programs follow the national SAFE KIDS model. Based on their evaluations, the Michigan SAFE KIDS program has been a success. Nearly one half million residents received educational materials; over 10,000 child safety seats were checked at 177 Car Seat Check Up Events; over 11,000 smoke detectors were distributed free of charge (Michigan SAFE KIDS, 2001). On the National level, the campaign's success can be measured by the reduction in unintentional injuries and an increase in policy devoted to increasing safety.

VI. Evaluating Social Change

Social change involves the transformation of collective behavior, culture, public policy, or social institutions over time. In designing evaluations to measure social change, it is important to remember that social problems are complex, culturally embedded, and multi-factorial; thus, evaluations should reflect these intricacies. Further,

multi-pronged campaigns addressing many facets and root causes of a social problem require multiple methods for evaluation. The types and means of relevant evaluation research approaches are thoroughly covered in the previous papers in this series and will not be duplicated here. But several comments are in order.

There are no magic formulae for evaluating public will campaigns. The potential threats to validity are familiar to anyone who has attempted to evaluate macro-level outcomes and/or cause-and-effect relationships in naturalistic settings. Evaluators who use a monitoring paradigm (Flay and Cook, 1989) and track instances of policy change may find little evidence of intervention effects within the specific window of time in which they are conducting their evaluation. From this they might conclude, erroneously, that the intervention has not been successful. Further, through their focus on policy endpoints, they may underestimate the magnitude of intervention effects by failing to detect changes earlier in the causal chain. In contrast, evaluators who use an advertising paradigm (Flay and Cook, 1989) and focus on intermediate outcomes such as changes in awareness and behavioral intention may overestimate the magnitude of intervention effects. By doing so, they fail to take into account the attenuated effects fallacy (McGuire, 1989) and assume that changes at the individual level will translate into policy outcomes.

For assessing more micro-level outcomes, such as individuals' attributions of responsibility for a social problem as a function of the manner in which the problem is framed, experimental studies are potentially useful. These studies will likely be subject to the usual concerns regarding external validity and the naturalness of the setting and conditions in which the experiments occur. However, for assessing macro-level outcomes, such as changes in public policy or community mobilization, case studies and quasi-experimentation are more appropriate approaches. As is the case for most quasi-experimental designs, finding appropriate comparison groups (communities/states) may be problematic, thus introducing possibility for bias. This is especially true for assessing macro-level outcomes at a national level, in which case there is often no appropriate comparison group for a nation such as the United States. Phased rollouts constitute one way of evaluating national campaigns, though the use of this approach has engendered concerns about the ethics of providing a treatment of information to one population segment before providing it to others. This was especially true in the early days of AIDS campaigns, when disseminating information at differential rates in different regions of the country or to different population segments was considered to be of dubious ethics.

Secular trends constitute a major problem in evaluating public will campaigns. That is, changes in public policy, public opinion and public health outcomes can occur serendipitously or as the result of regional or national trends, even in the absence of a specific intervention sponsored by an organization seeking social change. These trends render evaluation problematic in at least two ways. First, they make it more difficult to isolate the impact of a specific intervention within a treatment community because of the interaction of the intervention with the secular trend. Second, by altering the dynamics and/or structure within comparison communities, the trends may result in underestimates of actual effects in treatment communities.

In spite of these potential pitfalls—or perhaps because of them—public will campaign planners should adhere to the following evaluation principles. First, systematic and rigorous research, in the form of formative, process, efficacy and outcome

evaluation, needs to be done. Formative research will lead to the development of message appeals and strategies that have the greatest potential for resonating with selected audiences and reaching intended objectives. Process evaluation will provide information about campaign efficiency and the costs and benefits of various communication strategies. Efficacy evaluation can be used to determine the maximum potential of campaign messages under ideal conditions, which is helpful in terms of developing realistic expectations for campaign success. And outcome evaluation will determine whether objectives are met in one campaign while providing information for subsequent communications efforts in the next.

Secondly, the outcome measures of success must be based on the theoretical underpinning of the campaign itself. Simply stated, theories are explanations of why things occur. In the desire to trigger social change and resolve social problems, it is necessary to understand change mechanisms and likely outcomes of communication campaigns. For example, in the case of reducing teen pregnancy, all groups might agree that a system-level measure such as reduction in actual births to teen mothers would constitute success. However, success may actually be determined by the manner in which the outcome was achieved rather than the outcome itself. For example, an intervention that achieved reduction in births through promoting condom usage or abortion might be evaluated as a failure to an organization that promotes abstinence.

In addition to helping understand the manner or mechanism through which a desired change occurs, theories also provide inventories of likely intermediate outcomes that should be measured in comprehensive evaluations. Turning to the specific theories reviewed in this paper, several specific outcomes can be measured, the accumulation of which can shed light on the overall effectiveness of a public will campaign. To organize these outcomes, we can start with the desired endpoint and work backwards through a hypothetical causal chain. First, evaluators can monitor policy change, albeit with the caveats mentioned above. Policy change may take a period of years, and, due to political compromises, may not occur exactly in the form desired by the sponsor of a public will campaign. But to many campaign planners using the monitoring paradigm, policy change is the most important indicator of success or failure.

Related to this outcome, campaigns relying on social capital theory should examine such outcomes as degree of social connectedness, changes in network structures within a given social system, and durability, or the extent to which an intervention and/or policy change endures once funding and resources end. This suggests the need for both short- and long-term assessment of public will campaign outcomes. Other macro-level outcomes may include the formation of new social coalitions, community boards and task forces, the modification of social norms, and the degree of organizational participation in system-level initiatives (such as grocery stores, restaurants, churches, schools, unions participating in a community-based campaign designed to reduce the incidence of cancer).

Continuing backwards in a hypothetical causal chain, campaigns using agenda setting theory to induce changes should evaluate issue salience, either through tracking a specific issue or in the context of some multidimensional scaling of competing issues. Such research would typically be done through the use of survey research and random or purposive (such as political elites or individuals at high risk of a particular disease) samples of subjects.

Drawing on a different unit of analysis, public will campaigners can use content analysis to ascertain how media and political decision makers are framing issues, the visual and verbal symbols being used to typify social problems, and the inventory of solutions legitimized as viable by opinion leaders. This technique can be used also to gauge the intermediate success of media advocacy campaigns in garnering earned media space, with the caveat that placement in a newspaper does not necessarily translate into exposure, attention, information gain, attitude change or a host of other possible campaign outcomes. This research on framing and social problem construction can be extended to assess priming, i.e., the impact of news frames on individuals' attributions of social problems. This priming research could be done formatively to identify which frames are likely to be most effective in media advocacy campaigns, or summatively to identify the relative impacts of episodic or thematic frames employed in actual news stories.

Campaigns based on spiral of silence theory should assess the climate of opinion regarding an issue and individuals' willingness to publicly express their views about it. Willingness could in turn be linked to behavioral intentions about actively getting involved in political processes. Related to this, evaluators could assess "pluralistic ignorance" to gauge the degree to which individuals are accurate or inaccurate in assessing the opinions of friends and neighbors. Depending upon the interests of the campaign planner, accurate or inaccurate perceptions could represent either advantageous or disadvantageous outcomes.

Finally, campaigns drawing on social marketing theory should assess individuals' knowledge, awareness, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behaviors and link them to perceptions of product, price, promotion and place pertaining to social problems and their proposed remedies.

The point is that each theory may provide a path to policy change, yet each theory predicts very different intermediate outcomes along the way. Assessing these intermediate outcomes is important for two particular reasons. First, if some ultimate, desired policy change does occur following implementation of a campaign, evaluation of intermediate outcomes can provide evidence of whether the change occurred as a result of the campaign or as a result of other factors (such as secular change). On the other hand, if some ultimate, desired policy change does not occur, then evaluation of intermediate outcomes can determine whether the campaign had any impact at all. Change takes time, and thus it is potentially very useful to learn whether a campaign led politicians to think of a social problem differently or to view one social problem as more salient than in the past—even if evidence fails to show that the campaign actually led to policy change in the timeframe covered by the evaluation.

Third, after the evaluation has been designed, research parameters set, and outcome measures finalized, there must be a means for looking at the social change ramifications, both intended and unintended. For example, a community in Michigan attempted to reduce domestic violence through a social marketing campaign. To this end, a community coalition was developed, agencies networked, criminal justice and social service policies and procedures changed, and laws that specifically address domestic violence were implemented in this ten state demonstration project. These were judged to be intended and desirable effects of the intervention. Nevertheless, there were several unintended outcomes of this intervention as well, such as the implications of newly

promulgated mandatory arrest laws. Mandatory arrest laws were designed to arrest the suspect and separate the batterer from the victim. Unexpectedly, the laws resulted in a dramatic increase in the arrest of battered women. In more than 90% of the cases, women being battered will defend themselves, and police ended up arresting them as a result of the change in laws. Another unintended consequence was that women were less likely to contact the police when they were being beaten because their partner would face jail and prosecution if the incident were reported. Thus, these new policies drove much of the abuse underground. Measuring unintended effects is quite a challenge, for by virtue of their being unintended they are usually unanticipated as well, and thus are challenging to even think of measuring through pretest-posttest designs.

VII. Conclusion

Public will campaigns have tremendous potential to influence effective public opinion, social norms, community structures, networks, individuals' perceptions of their political environment, and ultimately to achieve social change. This paper has offered an inventory of theories, models and concepts from which to draw in designing and evaluating such campaigns. Although they are often challenging to implement and complicated to evaluate—by virtue of simultaneously operating on multiple levels of analysis and focusing on multiple outcomes—they are likely to be essential for inducing meaningful, substantive and enduring social change.

VIII. References

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