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# **International Perceptions of US Nuclear Policy**

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## **INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF US NUCLEAR POLICY**

An Independent Research Project  
Performed Under Contract for

The Advanced Concepts Group  
Sandia National Laboratories

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### **Abstract**

The report presents a summary of international perceptions and beliefs about US nuclear policy, focusing on four countries – China, Iran, Pakistan and Germany – chosen because they span the spectrum of states with which the United States has relationships. A paradox is pointed out: that although the goal of US nuclear policy is to make the United States and its allies safer through a policy of deterrence, international perceptions of US nuclear policy may actually be making the US less safe by eroding its soft power and global leadership position. Broadly held perceptions include a pattern of US hypocrisy and double standards – one set for the US and its allies, and another set for all others. Importantly, the US nuclear posture is not seen in a vacuum, but as one piece of the United States' behavior on the world stage. Because of this, the potential direct side effects of any negative international perceptions of US nuclear policy can be somewhat mitigated, dependent on other US policies and actions. The more indirect and long term relation of US nuclear policy to US international reputation and soft power, however, matters immensely to successful multilateral and proactive engagement on other pressing global issues.



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

*The US seems to be sending a message across the world – do as we say, not as we do.*

-- Ghazala Yasmin, a Pakistani security scholar,  
writing about the 2001 US Nuclear Posture Review

This paper examines how various actors in the international community – including allies, developing states and potential adversaries – perceive US nuclear policy. It should be emphasized that the analysis presented here is not the “objective truth” about US nuclear policy, but a summary of international *perceptions and beliefs* about US nuclear policy. It fills a vacuum in the current debate about the future of US nuclear policy and the future of the US nuclear complex. It examines how various states responded to the *last* change in US nuclear posture, to see what lessons might be obtained for proposed future changes. Indications of the last change include the allegedly leaked version of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the Bush Administration’s decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the decision to ramp up the National Missile Defense (NMD) program, and the recently ratified nuclear energy deal between India and the United States. This paper points out a paradox: although the goal of US nuclear policy is to make the United States and its allies safer through a policy of deterrence, international perceptions of US nuclear policy may actually be making the United States less safe by eroding its soft power and global leadership position.

This paper examines international responses in four countries – China, Iran, Pakistan and Germany. These four countries were chosen because they span the spectrum of states with which the United States has relationships: (1) China is a declared nuclear weapons state in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and is often viewed by the US as an emerging peer competitor; (2) Iran is a “rogue state” that is allegedly trying to develop nuclear weapons, bucking the NPT; (3) Pakistan is a strategic partner for the United States in its “global war on terrorism,” and it possesses nuclear weapons outside of the NPT; and (4) Germany is a core European ally, under the US nuclear umbrella, which lacks nuclear weapons itself but could easily develop them if it chose.

### **China**

China is the only state in this analysis that is a declared nuclear weapons state under the NPT, and for this reason, we might expect it would be particularly concerned with US nuclear policy. In general, however, China views US nuclear policy as only one small part of the wider bilateral relationship. China views its own nuclear policy as holding the moral high ground, given its declared no first use (NFU) policy), and thus US nuclear policy is often viewed in contrast to the Chinese position. Given its self-identity as the “responsible” nuclear weapons state, China’s discourse about US nuclear policy has focused on the perception of double standards, as well as the perceived increase in the role of nuclear weapons in US security policy. Given its own reliance on nuclear weapons for retaliation, China appears to be most concerned with US plans for national missile defense, as a functioning NMD system could undermine China’s own

deterrence posture. Nonetheless, official Chinese reaction to recent changes in US nuclear policy has been relatively mild, probably because China does not want to jeopardize its focus on internal policies like economic development. Since China is dependent on other countries to help build up its economy, it believes it must conform to the will of the international community to avoid harming its overall interests. Thus, if international reactions to US nuclear policy have been muted, China appears to believe its own reactions should be mild as well.

## **Iran**

Iran's perception of the US nuclear posture is inseparable from its view of all other US international policies. Iran has felt victimized and persecuted by the US and its allies since its 1979 Revolution resulted in its relative global economic and diplomatic isolation. More recently, US policies in the Middle East – including the campaign against Iran's own nuclear program – have aggravated Iran's perception of the US as an untrustworthy, regional security threat, and as a specifically anti-Iranian troublemaker. Iran thus views US nuclear posture through this lens of persecution. US nuclear policies are seen as hypocritical and a permanent threat to Iran's security. Tehran claims that US nuclear policy is hypocritical and that it implements a double standard when it comes to nuclear dealings with friends or "rogues." This double standard is cited in US nuclear-related interactions with Israel, India, and in view of the NPT agreements.

## **Pakistan**

Because it does not compete directly with the United States as China and Iran do, Pakistan views US nuclear policy through a different lens – one that is always conscious of the strategic rivalry between Pakistan and India. Pakistan views US nuclear policy as hypocritical. In fact, US hypocrisy and double standards are its most common references to US nuclear policy. While Iran's concern with the double standard focuses on the US' behavior towards nuclear friends (such as Israel and India) versus nuclear foes (such as North Korea and Iran), Pakistan's concern with the double standard focuses on the United States' *own* nuclear policies. In other words, Pakistan is most upset by its perception of US nuclear policies as demonstrating that the United States believes itself powerful enough – and thus exceptional enough – to behave independently of international norms. Pakistan also believes that US actions are undermining its stated goals for global nuclear non-proliferation.

## **Germany**

Germany provides an interesting counterpoint to the other countries considered here, because it is both one of the United States' closest allies and a non-nuclear weapon state. Defenders of the current US nuclear posture often argue that Germany would seriously consider renouncing its non-nuclear status if the nuclear umbrella is weakened beyond its present state, but the evidence presented here does not support that argument. Germany takes pride in its identity as a non-nuclear weapon state and as a steward of international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. This identity accords with Germany's wider worldview which values multilateral, institutional solutions to global problems including arms control. It is not surprising that Germany is critical of US nuclear policies. But like the other countries examined here, Germany



does not view US nuclear policy in a vacuum. Thus, despite their differences of opinion on a variety of issues, Germany acknowledges the importance of its friendship with the United States, which often leads Germany to try to influence US policy from *within* the relationship and their common institutional networks. In other words, there is a tension for Germany between its dual identities as a leading non-nuclear state and as a member of a nuclear-based alliance, NATO. These dual identities provide the filter through which it perceives US nuclear policy.

Although nuclear policy is arguably an important signaling device in the international system, this analysis finds that:

- Each of these states views US nuclear policy through the prism of other aspects of its bilateral relationship with the United States, as well as the prism of its *own* nuclear posture.
- US nuclear policy is relatively unimportant *by itself*. Instead, US nuclear policy is just one factor in how these states perceive and respond to the United States. Moreover, US nuclear policy cannot be separated from historical and current political contexts.
- US nuclear policy, by itself, only seems to matter if it directly affects another state's regional security and stability. For example, the US nuclear energy deal with India matters greatly to Pakistan, because from Pakistan's perspective, it has altered the strategic balance of power in the region.
- Most importantly, US nuclear policy is not seen in a vacuum, but as one piece of the United States' behavior on the world stage. These states generally argue that the United States is hypocritical in its nuclear policy, and that the nuclear realm is simply one more area where the United States exhibits exceptionalism in the international system.

Despite the differences in these four states – in terms of their respective relationships with the United States as well as their own nuclear postures – all four appear to agree on some basic beliefs about the United States. The evidence in this paper suggests that these states believe that the United States is hypocritical and that its actions demonstrate double standards – one set for the US and its allies, and another set for all others. This perception of hypocrisy has eroded US soft power and the legitimacy of US global leadership.

This finding has three implications, and these implications point out the difference between material and perceptual effects. Material effects are tangible and measurable; they manifest changes in the physical world. Perceptual effects are not tangible and measurable in the physical world in the *short* term, but if left unattended over the longer term, they will create material effects. In other words, a change in the perceptual relationship will eventually *materialize* as a change in the material relationship.

With this in mind, there are three implications of the findings presented above. First, because these states do not treat US nuclear policy in a vacuum, it is unlikely that small changes in US nuclear policy will have a drastic *material* effect on US relations with these states, unless the policy changes are perceived as being *congruent* with other US policies and actions. Put another way, a change in nuclear policy with a change in the same “direction” (more cooperative or more confrontational) of policy in another issue area could manifest as a material change in the relationship. Otherwise, nuclear policy is unlikely to lead to a material change by itself. Second,

the evidence suggests that US nuclear policy would matter even less – in terms of the *material* relationships with other states – if it was perceived to diverge from other policies or actions.

Perceptual relationships, however, are another matter. The third implication of this research is that nuclear policy matters immensely for the United States' international reputation. Such reputation effects can have significant impact in terms of gaining international cooperation in addressing global issues that require multilateral solutions – and given the interdependent nature of the world today, most issues fall into this category. In contrast to a state's "hard power" (military and economic might), "soft power" (a state's culture, values and institutions) provides an indirect way to influence others. Soft power is an invaluable asset to: (1) keep potential adversaries from gaining international support and winning moderates over to their causes; (2) influence neutral and developing states to support US leadership; and, (3) convince allies to support and share the international security burden. The United States needs soft power assets (including "the moral high ground") to solve these problems multilaterally and proactively.

For example, one of the "wicked problems" (problems having complex, adaptive, unpredictable components) that US nuclear policy and posture is trying to address is global proliferation of WMD. Yet, WMD proliferation is not a problem that the United States can address effectively alone. To address global proliferation concerns, the United States needs the rest of the world to participate in the process. Given how complex the WMD proliferation problem is, this requires not only other international actors to commit to solving the "problem" with us but that they have a similar understanding of what the "problem" *is*. This common problem definition is not possible when the rest of the world has negative perceptions of the United States, when US policies and actions (in the nuclear and non-nuclear arenas) are perceived as unilateral and hypocritical. Indeed, this paper suggests that many international actors appear to view US policy and actions as one of the *contributors* to the WMD proliferation problem. In other words, US actions actually affect how other states define the problem, and how they define the problem affects what they believe the "right" solution is. Given their different understanding, it is not surprising that the "wicked" problem becomes even thornier to address.

In short, how other international actors perceive US policies and actions matters a great deal in their decisions about how much they will cooperate on the US policy goal of non-proliferation. The tragic irony is this: US nuclear policy and actions, which have the objective of trying to "solve" the global proliferation problem, may actually be making other international actors feel less secure. Their increased sense of insecurity lessens international security overall and reverberates back to the US as a heightened insecurity as well.

Although this analysis suggests that the four nations studied view US nuclear policy specifically (and its international behavior more generally) as hypocritical, it is neither possible – nor recommended – for the United States simply to take these criticisms to heart and unilaterally disarm. Indeed, it would be incredibly imprudent to simply bow down to what everyone else wants. Instead, this analysis has three benefits.

First, it allows US policymakers simply to *know and understand* what everyone else wants, which creates the space for negotiation. If other states did not receive the message we were intending to send, we still need to know what message they did receive. This will allow us to

send our message more clearly in the future. This paper recommends that the US needs to do a better job at articulating US nuclear policy, so that other actors are not left to draw their own conclusions, or worse, so that other actors cannot articulate US policy for us through the lens of their own agendas.

Yet, this is not to imply that the US is simply being misunderstood and if it were to send the message more clearly, all of the disagreements would evaporate. From the perspective of these other countries, US hypocrisy and double standards are not just a matter of perception, but is also conditioned by logic and their own national interests. For example, why is it acceptable to build light water reactors in North Korea but not Iran? Why does the US sanction Pakistan's weapons program only when it is convenient for the US? Why doesn't the US press Israel, widely believed to have nuclear weapons, to become party to the NPT? Why is the US overturning 30 years of nonproliferation policy to sell nuclear technology to India, which doesn't have to eliminate nuclear weapons, sign the CTBT or accept full-scope IAEA safeguards? Some legitimate disagreements do exist, and the US needs to respond to these disagreements appropriately – if only to agree to disagree.

Therefore, the second benefit of this analysis is to help US policymakers understand where other states are coming from with more clarity, in order to illuminate places of common interest and create opportunities for cooperation. By seeking to narrow gaps between the US' and other states' positions, US policymakers can buy "breathing room" for those areas where US vital interests cannot be compromised. At the very least, sustained strategic dialogue with allies and potential adversaries can sow the seeds for new perceptions of the US as being willing to listen to others.

Finally, this analysis helps policymakers understand how (mis)perceptions of US nuclear policy may lead states to adopt countermeasures, which can create unanticipated consequences and harm the US ability to promote these and other policies abroad. As explained above, US nuclear policy and actions, which have the objective of trying to "solve" the global proliferation problem, may actually be making other international actors feel less secure. Strategic dialogue with these actors could help to reduce their uncertainties about US intentions, while simply acknowledging some of their concerns about perceived hypocrisy could help to rebuild US soft power. Both actions could improve US security immeasurably.



## INTRODUCTION

For a decade following the end of the Cold War, the US nuclear posture was largely neglected. What once had been high policy was relegated to the back burner, an inevitable result of the reduced threat from Russia, the emergence of other pressing security issues, and the complexity of reevaluating the purpose of the nuclear arsenal in a new threat environment. With the Moscow Treaty, the US and Russia agreed to limit the deployment of strategic nuclear warheads. During the last decade, the US has emphasized maintaining the reliability and safety of its legacy stockpile without underground testing, particularly via the creation and implementation of the stockpile stewardship program. However, over the same time, the facilities and skilled personnel needed to develop, produce, test, operate and maintain nuclear weapons began to atrophy.

Although the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) allegedly set forth in 2001 a major change in the broad direction of strategic policy, attention to strategic forces at high levels of government has been scant and sporadic. Following the NPR, the Bush Administration proposed several new initiatives, including enhanced test readiness, exploratory development of a new nuclear earth penetrator, a program to explore advanced weapons concepts and a modern plutonium pit production facility. None of these initiatives have been well received by Congress. The one initiative that has survived is the concept of a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), emphasizing greater reliability and surety, ease of maintenance, broader design margins, and use of safer materials. Congress has been amenable to allowing a study of RRW design concepts, but has specifically limited the allowed scope to existing military capabilities and missions.

In the last two years, there have been two outside panels to examine the current US nuclear posture and the nuclear weapons complex: the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities and the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board's Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force. Both reports made broad recommendations about the need to refocus attention on the nuclear mission and overhaul the nuclear complex to revitalize the stockpile and adjust to the post Cold War threat environment. With those reports as backdrop, and in consultation with the Department of Defense (DoD), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has just issued its own Complex 2030 strategic vision for stockpile and Complex transformation. NNSA has established an Office of Transformation to invigorate such changes, while two competing designs for the RRW are awaiting a green light for further development. These efforts have also been joined by a recent flurry of conferences and workshops calling attention to the languishing nuclear policy arena.

What has been lacking among all of these efforts is any systematic or rigorous attempt to think through what the international response to any of these proposed changes to the stockpile or the nuclear complex might be. Indeed, the deeper issue of how allies, neutral states and potential adversaries look at and will respond to US moves to reduce or reconfigure the stockpile, overhaul the Complex or begin new initiatives had not been examined until very recently, with a study commissioned by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).<sup>1</sup> With

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<sup>1</sup> Lewis A. Dunn et al, *Foreign Perspectives on US Nuclear Policy and Posture: Insights, Issues and Implications*, DTRA Report TI-18-05-21 (4 December 2006). The project's products include a short essay about the implications of the analysis and a long Power Point briefing report.

the important exception of this project, there is virtually no analysis about how other countries perceive US nuclear policy. This is a crucial oversight, since one of the most – if not *the* most – important roles that nuclear weapons play in the international system today is that of signaling device.

This paper attempts to fill this void. Obviously, any discussion of how states would react to proposed future changes in US nuclear policy would be purely speculative. Therefore, this paper will examine how various actors in the international community – including allies, developing states and potential adversaries – responded to the *last* change in US nuclear policy, to see what lessons might be obtained for proposed future changes. For the purposes of this analysis, the last change includes the allegedly leaked versions of the 2001 NPR, the Bush Administration’s decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the decision to ramp up the National Missile Defense (NMD) program.<sup>2</sup> In addition, where data exist, this paper examines responses to the proposed reliable replacement warhead and the recently ratified nuclear energy deal between India and the United States, in which the United States will provide access to its nuclear technology for the Indian civilian nuclear program, in exchange for India opening its civilian program to monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

This paper examines responses in four countries – China, Iran, Pakistan and Germany. These four countries were chosen because they span the spectrum of states with which the United States has relationships: (1) China is a declared nuclear weapons state in the NPT, and is often viewed by the US as an emerging peer competitor; (2) Iran is a “rogue state” that is allegedly trying to develop nuclear weapons, bucking the NPT; (3) Pakistan is a strategic partner for the United States in its “global war on terrorism,” and it possesses nuclear weapons outside of the NPT; and (4) Germany is a core European ally, under the US nuclear umbrella, which lacks nuclear weapons itself but could easily develop them if it chose.

Although nuclear policy is arguably an important signaling device in the international system, this analysis finds that:

- Each of these states views US nuclear policy through the prism of other aspects of its bilateral relationship with the United States, as well as the prism of its *own* nuclear policy.
- US nuclear policy is relatively unimportant *by itself*. Instead, US nuclear policy is just one factor in how these states perceive and respond to the United States. Moreover, US nuclear policy cannot be separated from historical and current political contexts.
- US nuclear policy, by itself, only seems to matter if it directly affects another state’s regional security and stability. For example, the US nuclear energy deal with India

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<sup>2</sup> This paper has only relied on the unclassified allegedly leaked versions of US 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and public reporting on the allegedly leaked versions. See, for example, “Nuclear Posture Review excerpts,” (8 January 2002), available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm>; US Department of Defense, “Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review,” news transcript (January 9, 2002), available at <http://defenseink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi>; and Amy F. Woolf, “Nuclear Weapons and US National Security: A Need for New Weapons Programs?” *Congressional Research Service Report RS21619* (September 15, 2003). The author has not seen or read the classified version of the NPR.

matters greatly to Pakistan, because from Pakistan's perspective, it has altered the strategic balance of power in the region.

- Most importantly, US nuclear policy is not seen in a vacuum, but as one piece of the United States' behavior on the world stage. These states generally argue that the United States is hypocritical in its nuclear policy, and that the nuclear realm is simply one more area where the United States exhibits exceptionalism in the international system.

This finding is very similar to the conclusions of the DTRA study cited above, which examined foreign responses from a broader perspective. In their survey of nearly 50 countries, the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) study team – led by Lewis A. Dunn – found that “other countries view US nuclear policy through the lens of an overall perception of US foreign and defense policies, widely viewed as entailing US unilateralism as well as a US pursuit of absolute security and military primacy.”<sup>3</sup> The DTRA report's findings will be discussed in more detail in this paper's conclusion. Here, it is important to note how complementary these two projects are: the SAIC study team chose breadth, while this paper chose a more narrow focus to examine fewer cases in depth. The fact that these two studies, with very different analytical methodologies, reached similar conclusions gives us confidence in the finding's robustness.

This finding has four implications, and these implications point out the difference between material and perceptual effects. Material effects are tangible and measurable; they manifest changes in the physical world. Perceptual effects are not tangible and measurable in the physical world in the *short* term, but if left unattended over the longer term, they will create material effects. Perceptual effects are often discounted because they cannot be seen, and as a result, observers tend to think events happen at one single moment rather than as a build-up or trend over time. Yet the perceptual effects are real and cumulative, and will eventually manifest as material effects if unchecked. For example, in the case of a person with a disease, anti-bodies are present in that person's body over time, but it is only after a certain point that physical symptoms are observable. This does not mean the person was healthy before the gross symptoms were present; it means, instead, that the observer was not aware of the smaller changes occurring over time that lead to the gross manifestations of the disease.

Thus, a change in a material relationship between two states would be measurable as a change in the behavior of either or both of the states in the short term, while a change in the perceptual relationship between two states might not register as changed behavior in the short term, but is likely to lead to changed behavior over the long term. In other words, a change in the perceptual relationship will eventually *materialize* as a change in the material relationship.

With this in mind, there are four implications of the findings presented above. First, because these states do not treat US nuclear policy in a vacuum, it is unlikely that small changes in US nuclear policy will have a drastic *material* effect on US relations with these states, unless the policy changes are perceived as being *congruent* with other US policies and actions. For example, if the US were to announce it was building new nuclear weapons, and that policy change occurred simultaneously with other threatening policies or actions – such as blocking Chinese exports to the US or publicly increasing support for Taiwanese independence – then it is

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<sup>3</sup> Dunn et al, “Executive Summary,” p. 2.

possible the relationship between the two countries would degrade materially. In the same way, if the US were to take steps towards shrinking its stockpile, and that change occurred simultaneously with other cooperative policies, then it is possible the relationship between the two countries would improve. Otherwise, however, nuclear policy by itself is unlikely to affect the *material* relationship between the two countries. Put another way, a change in nuclear policy with a change in the same “direction” (more cooperative or more confrontational) of policy in another issue area could manifest as a material change in the relationship. Otherwise, nuclear policy is unlikely to lead to a material change by itself.

Second, the evidence suggests that US nuclear policy would matter even less – in terms of the *material* relationships with other states – if it was perceived to diverge from other policies or actions. For example, if the US were to take positively perceived steps towards shrinking its stockpile, yet simultaneously enacted other negatively perceived policies such as aggravating the conflict in the Middle East, increasing the size of its conventional military force or blocking an international agreement on global warming, other states would respond negatively to these other actions.

Perceptual relationships, however, are another matter. The third implication of this research is that nuclear policy matters immensely for the United States’ international reputation. Such reputation effects can have significant impact in terms of gaining international cooperation in addressing global issues that require multilateral solutions – and given the interdependent nature of the world today, most issues fall into this category. As the remaining global superpower, the United States is often held to a higher standard in most issue areas, including its responsibilities under Article VI and commitments made at the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT.<sup>4</sup> Thus, given the remarkable agreement among the views of the four countries examined here, it is likely that any small changes in US nuclear policy that are perceived as moving away from disarmament will be judged harshly in the international community as hypocritical and increasing global nuclear danger. Sadly, even small US actions towards disarmament may only earn international respect if they are matched by cooperative policies in other issue areas. In sum, the United States is unlikely to win the perceptual game as long as some of its policies and/or actions are perceived as unilateral and aggressive.

Viewed another way, the “wicked problem” (a problem having complex, adaptive, unpredictable components) that US nuclear policy and posture is trying to address is global proliferation of WMD.<sup>5</sup> Yet, WMD proliferation is not a problem that the United States can

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<sup>4</sup> Article VI of the NPT states that “Each of the Parties of the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” At the 2000 Review Conference, the nuclear weapons states (including the United States) agreed to 13 “practical steps” including: ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); full implementation of START II, conclusion of START III, and strengthening of the ABM Treaty; unilateral and irreversible reduction in nuclear arsenals; increased transparency regarding nuclear weapons as a voluntary confidence-building measure; unilateral reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons; reduction of the operational status of nuclear weapons; and a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies.

<sup>5</sup> A wicked problem is one in which an attempt to create a solution changes the understanding of the problem. Thus, problem definition evolves as new possible solutions are considered and/or implemented. As a result, a wicked problem cannot be solved in a traditional linear fashion – it is a



address effectively alone. To address global proliferation concerns, the United States needs the rest of the world to participate in the process. Given how complex the WMD proliferation problem is, this requires not only other international actors to commit to solving the “problem” with us but that they have a similar understanding of what the “problem” *is*. This common problem definition is not possible when the rest of the world has negative perceptions of the United States, when US policies and actions (in the nuclear and non-nuclear arenas) are perceived as unilateral and hypocritical. Indeed, this paper suggests that many international actors appear to view US policy and actions as one of the *contributors* to the WMD proliferation problem. In other words, US actions actually affect how other states define the problem, and how they define the problem affects what they believe the “right” solution is. Given their different understanding, it is not surprising that the “wicked” problem becomes even thornier to address. How the United States and other actors define the problem affects which solution strategies will be considered. Thus, perceptions can have important strategic consequences.

In short, how other international actors perceive US policies and actions matters a great deal in their decisions about how much they will cooperate on the US policy goal of non-proliferation. This finding also accords with the SAIC study, which reported that US allies argue that “a greater US readiness to engage on nuclear disarmament issues would pay off in increased support from other third parties in pursuing US non-proliferation objectives.”<sup>6</sup> The tragic irony is this: US nuclear policy and actions, which have the objective of trying to “solve” the global proliferation problem, may actually be making other international actors feel less secure. Their increased sense of insecurity lessens international security overall and reverberates back to the US as a heightened insecurity as well. Thus, if the US is trying to reduce proliferation in the world, it will not succeed by using its nuclear policies as its only lever. Cooperative nuclear policies will have to be matched by cooperative policies in other areas, if the US wants “credit” for leading the world towards a reduced nuclear danger.

Finally, the implications of this analysis could be good or bad news for the US nuclear complex. The bottom line is that US nuclear policy by itself is relatively unimportant, when viewed through the perspective of other international actors. Thus, small changes in the US nuclear posture, such as transforming the complex or improving US weapon surety, are unlikely to create a huge international outcry, especially if they are counter-balanced by cooperative US policies in other issue areas. The good news is that the US nuclear complex could “fly under the radar screen” with new nuclear initiatives, as long as the United States were acting cooperatively in other issue areas. Alternatively, because US nuclear policy by itself (short of unilateral disarmament or escalated deployments) is relatively unimportant in US relations with other states, US policymakers may decide that spending political capital in this area is not worth the price. In this case, the bad news is that US policymakers may view changes in nuclear policy as having steep domestic political costs (judging by Congressional resistance to existing initiatives) and providing very little benefit in relations with other states, and thus decide to leave the Complex to languish.

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complex, adaptive system with unpredictable outcomes. For more on wicked problems, see H Rittel and M. Webber; “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 4, (Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, 1973), pp. 155-169.

<sup>6</sup> Dunn et al, “Executive Summary,” p. 3.

This paper consists of six sections and a conclusion. The first section grounds the analysis about international responses to US nuclear policy within a wider theoretical discussion about international cooperation and “wicked” problems. The second section provides an overview of the methodology of analysis. The next four sections examine responses to US nuclear policy in the four countries of interest – China, Iran, Pakistan and Germany. The conclusion suggests some common themes from the four countries and offers implications for the US nuclear complex.

## US NUCLEAR POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES: SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

There has been much debate in policy circles about the effect of US nuclear policy on global nuclear proliferation. Some observers, such as Ashton Carter and Keith Payne, argue that US nuclear policy has no effect on other states' decisions to acquire nuclear weapons. Rather, they argue, states decide to proliferate for domestic political or regional security reasons. The problem with this argument is that US actions could have prompted or exacerbated the "regional security reason," which suggests that there are very few "pure" regional reasons. For example, the United States' decision to include Taiwan under its extended deterrence nuclear umbrella affects China's nuclear and conventional security posture in the Taiwan Straits. Similarly, as will be discussed in the section on Pakistan below, the United States' civilian nuclear deal with India significantly changes Pakistan's calculus in the South Asia.

Others argue that US decisions lead other states to be more inclined to acquire their own nuclear weapons. These observers argue that US nuclear policy creates the perception of hypocrisy in light of the United States' responsibilities towards eventual disarmament under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This view has most recently been espoused by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, chaired by Hans Blix, the former chief United Nations weapons inspector. In his introduction to the June 2006 commission report, *Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms*, Blix argued that American unwillingness to cooperate in international arms agreements, its failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and its missile defense program are undermining efforts to curb nuclear weapons. Treaty-based disarmament is being set back by "an increased US skepticism regarding the effectiveness of international institutions and instruments, coupled with a drive for freedom of action to maintain an absolute global superiority in weaponry and means of their delivery." The report drew a direct link between the rise of individual action and the decline of cooperation, and thus "nuclear weapons states no longer seem to take their commitment to nuclear disarmament seriously." Blix clearly placed the blame at the feet of the United States: "If it takes the lead, the world is likely to follow. If it does not take the lead, there could be more nuclear tests and new nuclear arms races."<sup>7</sup>

This debate about the effects of US nuclear policy on other nations' willingness to cooperate with international non-proliferation regimes is a subset of a wider debate about cooperation in international relations. On the one hand, realists argue that cooperation between states is always ephemeral, because the international system lacks an overarching world government to enforce agreements and states have to take care of themselves, by accumulating economic and military power. In this zero-sum world, any attempts at international cooperation will always fail, because states can never trust other states to uphold their end of the bargain. Thus, even though all states would be better off if they could cooperate with each other, each individual state has an incentive to defect from the agreement first to gain a relative advantage

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<sup>7</sup> The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, *Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms* (June 2006). Blix quotes from Chairman's Preface, pp. 13-15.

over its competitors.<sup>8</sup> Thus, realists would advise carrying a big stick and going it alone, since any attempts at multilateral cooperative policies are doomed to fail over the long run.

In contrast, liberal institutionalists argue that cooperation among states is possible, despite the lack of a world government to enforce agreements. These scholars argue that states are less concerned with relative power gains over potential adversaries and more concerned with absolute gains in power. To capture the potential gains from cooperation, states have created a number of institutions and regimes that increase transparency in the international system, lower transaction costs, make defection less likely through increased “audience costs”<sup>9</sup>, make reciprocity easier, and allow states to share the burden of providing security for themselves, thus freeing resources to be used in other ways.<sup>10</sup> This cooperation is possible, these scholars argue, because states take a longer view of the future than realists acknowledge. States realize that with repeated interactions, cooperation is possible, because over time, states are most likely to respond with a “tit for tat” strategy – to treat other states as they are themselves are treated.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, if one side cooperates, the most rational and most likely response by the other side is to cooperate back.

Liberal institutionalists also differ from realists in their understanding of power. While realists view power more narrowly in terms of “hard power” (military and economic might), liberal institutionalists also look at a state’s “soft power” (a state’s culture, values and institutions). Hard power can be used to incite others to change their positions through inducements or threats; in other words, hard power is coercive. Soft power provides a more indirect way for a state to achieve the outcomes it desires by attracting other states to it and getting those states to want what it wants. With soft power, others want to follow it, because they admire its values, emulate its example and aspire to its level of prosperity and openness. In other words, soft power is co-optive.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, PA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics*, vol. 30, no. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214.

<sup>9</sup> “Audience costs” are the international and domestic political costs that leaders face when they stake their reputation or credibility on a particular policy course. If the leaders change course or back down from the policy, their reputation suffers and often leads to negative effects in domestic policies.

<sup>10</sup> Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations,” *International Organizations*, vol. 40, no. 1 (Winter 1986), pp. 1-27; Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Keohane and Nye, “Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction,” *International Organization*, vol. 25, no. 3 (Summer 1971), pp. 329-349; Keohane and Nye, “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,” *World Politics*, vol. 27, no. 1 (October 1974), pp. 39-62; Keohane and Nye, “Two Cheers for Multilateralism” *Foreign Policy*, no. 60 (Autumn 1985), pp. 148-167; Keohane and Nye, “Globalization: What’s New? What’s Not? (And So What?)” *Foreign Policy*, no. 118 (Spring, 2000), pp. 104-119; Keohane and Lisa Martin, “The Promise of Institutional Theory,” *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-51; Martin and Beth Simmons, “Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions,” *International Organization*, vol. 52, no. 4 (Autumn, 1998), pp. 729-757.

<sup>11</sup> Kenneth Oye, ed. *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

<sup>12</sup> For a longer discussion of soft power, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 8-10; Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), Chapter 2. Nye builds on what Peter Bachrach and Morton

The foundation of US soft power is the values that the United States expresses in its culture and projects at home and abroad. US soft power flows from the classical liberal values and institutional structures expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution – freedom, tolerance, a respect for an open society, and individual rights and equality before the law. US soft power is embodied in the checks and balances and participatory nature of its democratic government and the openness of its market economy. US soft power is embodied in its history as the only nation to win a world war and use its wealth and predominance to rebuild the defeated powers as open societies and to create and nurture a network of inclusive international institutions, including the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the precursor to the World Trade Organization. Most of all, it is embodied in the mythic sense of the United States as “The City on the Hill,” a moral beacon and refuge that has drawn people for centuries in search of The American Dream. It is US soft power that is captured in Emma Lazarus’ poem mounted on the Statue of Liberty:

Give me your tired, your poor,  
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,  
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,  
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,  
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!

Seen in light of this wider debate about cooperation and power in international relations, US nuclear policy can be framed in terms of its effects on US soft power rather than just traditional hard power framing. Obviously, US nuclear policy aims to strengthen US hard power, but it also has effects on soft power. This analysis suggests that US nuclear policy undermines US soft power abroad. Given its status as a nuclear weapons state in the NPT, and its commitment in that treaty to eventual disarmament, the United States is faulted by other countries when its nuclear policies are perceived to be at odds with this disarmament goal. For example, many states view the United States’ decisions not to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty to develop a national missile defense program – while simultaneously trying to block other states from developing nuclear programs – as very hypocritical. The US hypocrisy is perceived to extend to other policy areas as well, including (for example): agriculture, pharmaceuticals, relations with authoritarian leaders, and treatment of detainees.

Perceptions about all of these US actions have corroded US soft power. These perceptions have made other states – including allies – less inclined to cooperate with the United States. These actions also appear to provide a basis for adversaries and others to call the American commitment to freedom and peace into doubt. In other words, these actions as they are perceived abroad appear to demonstrate that the United States believes it is powerful enough – and thus exceptional enough – to behave independently of international norms. As a Pakistani

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Baratz called “the second face of power” in “Decisions and Non-decisions: An Analytical Framework,” *American Political Science Review* (September 1963), 632-642.

security scholar, Ghazala Yasmin, argued in an article about the US NPR, “The US seems to be sending a message across the world – do as we say, not as we do.”<sup>13</sup>

How important is soft power, anyway? Given its vast conventional military power, does the United States even need soft power? Some analysts argue that US military predominance is both possible and desirable over the long term, and thus soft power is not important. But a growing consensus disagrees. These analysts argue that soft power is critical for four reasons. First, soft power is invaluable for keeping potential adversaries from gaining international support, for “winning the peace” in Afghanistan and Iraq, and for convincing moderates to refrain from supporting extremist terrorist groups. Second, soft power helps influence neutral and developing states to support US global leadership. Third, soft power is also important for convincing allies and partners to share the international security burden.<sup>14</sup> Finally, and perhaps most importantly, given the increasing interdependence and globalization of the world system, soft power is critical for addressing most security threats the United States faces today. Most global security threats are impossible to be countered by a single state alone. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, failed and failing states, conflicts over access to resources, are not confined to any one state. In addition, disease, demographic shifts, environmental degradation and global warming will have negative security implications as well.<sup>15</sup> All of these potential threats share four traits: (1) they are best addressed proactively, rather than after they develop into full-blown crises; (2) they require multi-lateral approaches, often under the umbrella of an international institution; (3) they are not candidates for a quick fix, but rather require multi-year, or multi-decade solutions; and, (4) they are “wicked” problems. Given these four traits, soft power is critical for helping to secure the international, multi-lateral cooperation that will be necessary to address such threats effectively.

If soft power is important in today’s security landscape, how important for regaining the “moral high ground” and repairing its soft power is a perceived US commitment to the non-proliferation regime? How do international actors perceive US nuclear policy and changes to that policy?

Because of the nature of the weapons themselves, United States’ nuclear policy cannot be directed at just one actor or group of actors. Any changes in US nuclear policy will send signals to multiple actors in the international system. The actors most often considered are potential adversaries, including emerging peers, rogue states and non-state violent extremists. However, the US posture also sends strong signals to allies, neutrals and other states in the system that may be considering acquiring nuclear weapons. Depending upon its congruence with the NPT

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<sup>13</sup> Ghazala Yasmin, “Bush Administration’s Nuclear Weapons Policy,” *Strategic Studies* (Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad), vol. 24, no. 3 (Autumn 2004), available at [http://www.issi.org/journal/2004\\_files/no\\_3/article/6a.htm](http://www.issi.org/journal/2004_files/no_3/article/6a.htm).

<sup>14</sup> For example, the United States has been having a difficult time convincing NATO allies to send more troops to Afghanistan. See “Poland to Send 1000 Troops to Aid NATO in Afghanistan,” *The New York Times* (September 15, 2006), p. A10.

<sup>15</sup> Peter Chalk, *Non-Military Security and Global Order: The Impact of Violence, Chaos, and Disorder on International Security* (London: MacMillan, 2000);, Richard Matthew and George Shambaugh, “Sex, Drugs, and Heavy Metal,” *Security Dialogue*, vol. 29(June 1998), pp. 163-175; Michael Klare and Daniel Thomas, eds. *World Security: Challenges for a New Century* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994).

(especially Article VI), US nuclear policy also sends signals about US credibility in upholding other international agreements and acting as a global leader in international institutions. Each of these reactions occurs simultaneously and interacts with each other, in turn affecting how the US responds to those reactions. The strategic interaction is complex and incredibly difficult to model.

For example, French President Jacques Chirac's January 2006 speech, memorializing the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of French nuclear weapons, provides a glimpse into the complexity of addressing multiple international (as well as domestic) audiences simultaneously. In this speech, Chirac suggested France would now target states that support terrorism and states that would consider the use of WMD. The wording was arguably vague, but the speech spawned a variety of reactions and created a debate within France itself. Some observers, especially in Middle Eastern states, took this to mean that France is adopting a preventive war doctrine similar to that of the Bush Administration. (Some conservatives in the United States agreed with this assessment, arguing that the Muslim riots in Paris suburbs had the same impact on French strategic thinking as 9/11 had on the US.) Observers in Iran took this to mean that they were being targeted directly, albeit not by name. European observers criticized French grandstanding and were especially upset about the timing of the speech, given EU attempts to ameliorate the Iranian nuclear stand-off with the IAEA. In short, the speech was perceived differently by multiple audiences, and the different reactions fueled further international and domestic debate about French nuclear doctrine.<sup>16</sup>

As this example suggests, international reaction to changes in US nuclear policy, and the US response to these reactions, are all symptomatic of a "wicked problem." From the US perspective, we do not understand our "nuclear posture problem" until we have developed a solution, yet as we commit to a solution, we are already changing the problem. This is inherent in any strategic interaction. Yet is it particularly poignant in the nuclear arena, because of the "Catch 22" nature of the nuclear weapon decades-long development timeline: we cannot learn about the problem without trying solutions, yet every solution we try is expensive and locks us into decades of unintended consequences which are likely to spawn new wicked problems.

Moreover, the US "nuclear posture problem" dovetails into the broader "wicked" problem of global WMD proliferation. As discussed in the introduction, WMD proliferation is not a problem that the United States can address effectively alone. To address this problem

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<sup>16</sup> For an overview of the debate in many countries and in France, see "Deterrence: What did Jacques Chirac Really Mean?" *Voltaire, International Edition* (February 9, 2006), available at <http://www.voltairenet.org>; For other articles, see "Chirac's nuclear threat," *Arab News* (21 January 2006); Jamey Keaton, "Update 3: Chirac Nuclear Comments Draw Ire in Europe," Associated Press (January 20, 2006); Emmanuel Serot, "Chirac threatens nuclear weapons against 'terrorist' states," *Agence France-Presse* (January 19, 2006); "Iranian envoy reportedly warning West against threatening gestures," *Wiener Zeitung* (Vienna Austria) (January 20, 2006); "Nuclear warning to 'rogue' regimes," *The London Times* (January 20, 2006), p. 45; Julio Godoy, "Chirac Rattles the Nuclear Sabre," *Paris Inter Press Service* (January 20, 2006); Ingrid Bazinet and Michel Sailhan, "Chirac's Nuclear warning a signal to US," *Agence France-Presse* (January 20, 2006); "Chirac claims right to go nuclear against terrorism," *Deutsche Press-Agentur* (January 19, 2006); "Iranian speaker calls Chirac's remarks 'shame for French nation'," *Deutsche Press-Agentur* (January 22, 2006); "German defense minister raps Chirac on nuclear threat," *Agence France-Presse* (January 22, 2006); "Afghanistan cautions on Chirac nuclear threat," *Agence France-Presse* (January 22, 2006).

effectively requires not only other international actors to commit to solving the “problem” with us but that they have a similar understanding of what the “problem” *is*. This common problem definition is not possible when the rest of the world perceives US policies and actions (in the nuclear and non-nuclear arenas) as unilateral and hypocritical. As the analysis below will show, many international actors even appear to view US policy and actions as one of the *contributors to* the WMD proliferation problem. In other words, US actions actually affect how other states define the problem, and how they define the problem affects what they believe the “right” solution is. The tragic irony is that US nuclear policy and actions, which have the objective of trying to “solve” the global proliferation problem, may actually be making other international actors feel less secure. Their increased sense of insecurity lessens international security overall and reverberates back to the US as a heightened insecurity as well.

After a quick explanation of the methodology of this analysis, the paper will turn to international responses to recent changes in US nuclear policy, with the goal of evaluating the effect that such policy shifts have had on US soft power, its claim to the moral high ground, and its resulting ability to lead non-proliferation efforts around the world.



## METHODOLOGY

This section will briefly explain the research design for this paper. As outlined in the introduction, this paper will examine how four actors in the international community responded to recent changes in US nuclear policy. In these changes, I include the allegedly leaked versions of the 2001 NPR, the Bush Administration's decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, and the decision to ramp up the NMD program. In addition, where data exist, this paper examines responses to RRW and the recent nuclear energy deal between India and the United States. By examining these responses to recent changes, we can see what lessons might be obtained for proposed future changes, and thus address the question of how important US nuclear policy is for US soft power more generally.

This paper examines international responses in four countries – China, Iran, Pakistan and Germany. Such case selection is very appropriate for a first probe into international responses to US nuclear policy, for two reasons. First, the United States perceives these states as falling into different categories in the international system, which affects how it relates to each of them. They span the spectrum, from the US perspective, from potential adversary to ally. Second, there is significant variation in the nuclear policies of each of these states, both in terms of nuclear weapons possession and their status with regard to the NPT.

The analysis for these four states consisted of an English-language (and, where available, German-language) review of the following source types:

- News and media reports from each target state
- Journal articles and commentaries by scholars, scientists and government officials of each target state
- Public statements by each target state's government
- Public opinion polls
- News and journal articles by international observers about the target states and their perceptions of the United States

Relying on English translations may have limited the information available for the analysis, which has the potential to bias the results of the research. First, as one scholar noted with regard to Iran, "The main sources of information for Western media are the statements and photographs that come from Iranian state media, or other Western journalists who go to Iran but cannot work freely in the face of government controls."<sup>17</sup> A similar remark could be made about China and Pakistan, as well. Furthermore, relying on English translations may have increased the propaganda potential of the sources. Many of these articles may have been deliberately constructed for domestic and international audiences. For example, both the Chinese and Iranian governments have cracked down on their respective media such that most published materials must support the "party line." In these cases, the news seems to be designed primarily to shape public opinion more than reflect it. Fortunately, major newspapers in Iran and Pakistan publish a large number of articles in English as well as in Farsi and Urdu, facilitating digestion by

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<sup>17</sup> Khalaji, Mehdi, "Ahmadinezhad's Popularity One Year On," *Policy Watch No. 1125* (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 20, 2006), available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2490>

international sources. Finally, the number of articles discussing US nuclear policy specifically was small, especially when compared with the number dealing with US policy more generally, such as current events in the Middle East.

Despite these limitations, there are reasons to believe the research has not been unduly biased or limited by language constraints. Through the research, we discovered that articles written only in Farsi, Mandarin and Urdu, and translated by the CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS/Open Source) or BBC Monitoring International Reports, voiced attitudes toward the US and its policies similar to those in the English- and German-language articles. The inclusion of journal and newspaper articles about the four countries by international observers, some of whom have relied on a more diverse set of sources in the respective native languages, may have limited the impact of government-sanctioned propaganda in the analysis. These checks provide confidence that the analysis has not been overly biased by the English- and German-language research limitation.

The next four sections of this paper examine the perceptions of the United States and its nuclear policy, from the perspective of the four target states. For each country, the analysis proceeds as follows. First, it briefly outlines the respective state's general perceptions of the United States, followed by an overview of its nuclear policy, where appropriate. A lengthier discussion of each state's general perceptions of the United States, as well as an overview of its foreign policy, is included in the four appendices. Second, it presents what evidence is available about the respective state's position on US nuclear policies. In this analysis, it examines responses to the allegedly leaked versions of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Bush Administration's decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the decision to ramp up the National Missile Defense program. In addition, where data exist, it examines responses to the proposed reliable replacement warhead and the recently ratified nuclear energy deal between India and the United States. Finally, teasing out the implications of these responses to recent changes in US nuclear policy, the analysis considers potential reactions in the respective state to proposals for future changes in US nuclear policy.

Admittedly, the empirical analysis in these next four sections is looking at perceptions of US nuclear policy out of context. The very structure of this paper is putting international responses to US nuclear policy in a vacuum, even though (as explained above) these other states do not look at US nuclear policy that way. Obviously, focusing exclusively on international perceptions of US nuclear policy runs the risk of making nuclear policy look extremely important. Yet, with the space constraints of this paper, it is only possible to look at this one issue area. Therefore, it will be helpful to keep in mind each target state's general perceptions of the United States as much as possible when reading their more specific perceptions of US nuclear policy.

## CHINA

China is the only state in this analysis that is a declared nuclear weapons state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and for this reason, we might expect it would be particularly concerned with US nuclear policy. In general, however, China views US nuclear policy as only one small part of the wider bilateral relationship. As will be explained below, China views its own nuclear policy as holding the moral high ground, given its declared no first use (NFU) policy, and thus US nuclear policy is often viewed by the Chinese in contrast to the Chinese position. Given its own declared reliance on nuclear weapons for retaliation, China appears to be most concerned with US plans for national missile defense, as a functioning NMD system could undermine China's own deterrence posture.

Admittedly, China's history of belligerence and suppression of domestic dissent does make the Chinese "moral high ground" assertion ring somewhat hollow. While there is no evidence to contradict that China is a "responsible nuclear power," this could just be propaganda written by academics who work for state-run universities. Moreover, this spin could simply be making virtue of necessity, because China does not believe itself to be in a position to challenge US predominance at this time. In other words, the Chinese self perception as the "responsible" and "moral" nuclear weapons state, in contrast to the United States, could be conditioned by its realpolitik interests. Yet, even with these caveats, the Chinese perception of the United States as hypocritical and unilateral still exists, and that perception still has strategic consequences for the bilateral relationship.

### Chinese Perceptions of the United States

China holds a realistic view about the United States' power in the international system. Chinese leaders also recognize that their country is still relatively weak by comparison, and thus they are willing to accommodate the hegemon – it is a pragmatic strategy that has been paying off while China focuses internally on economic development and domestic stability. Yet the prevailing conviction is that the United States is deliberately using its power to destabilize the international system, as well as China's domestic stability and rise to great power status. As Singapore scholar Kishore Mahbubani puts it, China realizes that "although there is almost nothing that China can do to disrupt the political stability of the United States, the United States can do plenty to destabilize China."<sup>18</sup>

There is a growing conviction among Chinese policymakers that the United States is bent on curtailing China's rise and looking for opportunities to destabilize China. Observers cite at least four examples. First, many Chinese remain convinced that the US missile attack on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the 1999 Kosovo War was deliberate.<sup>19</sup> Second, Chinese leaders view American support of Taiwan as trying to thwart China's highest foreign policy priority – reuniting Taiwan with the mainland. Even though Washington officially opposes Taiwan's independence and recognizes Taiwan and the mainland as one China, Chinese tend to view US policy towards Taiwan with suspicion – especially US arms sales to Taiwan, the

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<sup>18</sup> Kishore Mahbubani, "Understanding China," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 85, no. 5 (September/October 2005), p.50.

<sup>19</sup> Mahbubani, p. 50.

promise of protection under the US nuclear umbrella, and the US promise to intervene.<sup>20</sup> Third, Chinese point to US sanctions of China after the 1989 pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square – as well as more recent American support of dissidents and religious groups, such as Falun Gong – as examples of intervening in China’s domestic affairs and upsetting its political stability. Finally, China views US unilateralism in its foreign policy as very dangerous. The Chinese were profoundly troubled by the American use of NATO forces to attack Serbia in the 1999 Kosovo War, as well as the unilateral US invasion of Iraq in 2003. In both situations, the US effectively bypassed the UN Security Council and intervened in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Given its own history of ethnic tensions with Tibetans and the Uighers of Xianjiang province, China is upset by the precedence for intervening in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, fearing that the United States might consider similar actions on behalf of these minorities in China.

Nonetheless, Chinese scholars have also noted that there is an upside for China to all of the United States’ destabilizing international behavior. For example, Wang Jisi, the dean of Peking University’s School of International Affairs, has argued that the United States’ “soft power has been weakened” since 2001, resulting in “international isolation” from allies, Islamic countries and other great powers. He concludes that this is good news for China: “As long as the United States’ image remains tainted, China will have greater leverage in multilateral settings.”<sup>21</sup> Or as Chong Zi argues, “The resistance against the US-led invasion of Iraq and the strong opposition to the war worldwide show us that the Big Stick is not always a magic wand in handling the [sic] international conflicts.”<sup>22</sup>

China is transitioning to great power status, and its foreign and nuclear policy is aligned with this goal. In practice, this means that China is focused internally on economic development, domestic political security and military modernization, and its external relations are focused on helping to achieve this internal transformation. This priority on internal policies means that China appears willing to accommodate the United States, as it realizes that a good working relationship with the US is important for its domestic focus. To reduce widespread apprehension about the potential impact of China’s “rise,” Beijing has also engaged in a wide range of multilateral activities designed to demonstrate that China is a “responsible” member of the international community.

China is intent on achieving great power status, but has a long-term strategy to avoid having its rise prove overly costly or contentious.<sup>23</sup> The Chinese recognize that the United States currently has a preponderance of conventional and nuclear military power and so view direct confrontation with the US as ill-advised, if not suicidal.<sup>24</sup> There is a widespread belief

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<sup>20</sup> For a more detailed discussion of Sino-US relations regarding Taiwan, see Kerry Dumbaugh, “China-US Relations: Current Issues and Implications for US Policy,” *CRS Report RL 32804* (July 14, 2006), pp. 7-12.

<sup>21</sup> Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for Stability with America,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 84, no. 5 (September/October 2005), pp. 39-48.

<sup>22</sup> Chong Zi, “US Policy Reeking of Unilateralism,” *China Daily* (April 1, 2003).

<sup>23</sup> Sergei Luzianin, Elena Safronova, and Alexei Sveshnikov, “Some Results of the PRC’s Foreign Policy Activity in 2005,” *Far Eastern Affairs*, vol. 34, no. 2 (2006), p. 26.

<sup>24</sup> Keir A. Lieber and Daryl Press, “The Rise of US Nuclear Primacy,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006).

among the Chinese elite that the arms race is what caused the Soviet Union to collapse and they are keen to avoid a similar fate.<sup>25</sup> Chinese leaders are eager to emphasize moderation and accommodation with the United States while preserving their core interests, because they recognize China as a relatively weak power vis-à-vis the US at this time.<sup>26</sup> There appears to be a consensus within the Chinese foreign policy elite, military as well as civilian, that a good working relationship with the US is essential. It provides flexibility and it has worked.<sup>27</sup> As Wang Jisi has written,

The United States is currently the only country with the capacity and the ambition to exercise global primacy...this means that the United States is the country that can exert the greatest strategic pressure on China....Yet the United States is a global leader in economics, education, culture, technology and science. China, therefore, must maintain a close relationship with the US if its modernization efforts are to succeed.<sup>28</sup>

### **Chinese Nuclear Policy**

Turning more specifically to Chinese nuclear policy, China has a strategy of what Americans would call “minimal deterrence” or “minimum deterrence,” with nuclear forces to be used in retaliation only. China views itself as taking the moral high ground in the realm of nuclear weapons, and often refers to itself as “the responsible nuclear weapons state.” This “responsible” self-identity appears frequently in contrast to the United States, which is set up as the “irresponsible” foil.

Chinese nuclear weapons are an important part of China’s foreign policy, albeit primarily as defensive weapons to prevent undue foreign pressure or influence. This limited role for nuclear weapons has held true for the last several decades. The Chinese are quick to assert that they decided to acquire nuclear weapons only as a response to repeated US and Soviet attempts to blackmail them with the possibility of nuclear attack. Under Mao, China realized that it needed a nuclear retaliatory capability to maintain freedom of action. In Mao’s words, “we must have this thing if we don’t want to be bullied by others.”<sup>29</sup> Nuclear weapons are viewed as primarily a political instrument to be used at the level of grand strategy, not as a tool for actually winning military operations. The military and political doctrines governing the use of nuclear force and preparation for nuclear conflict focus on prevention of and response to nuclear aggression, but there do not appear to be any plans for actually winning a nuclear battle. Although information on Chinese plans and intentions are inherently limited by the lack of transparency, uncertainty about the size and placement of China’s nuclear arsenal is considered critical to effectiveness of their retaliatory threat. Nonetheless, China has always maintained a

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<sup>25</sup> Ted McKenna, “US DoD Ponders China Threat,” *Journal of Electronic Defense* (September 2005), p. 33; Warren I. Cohen, “China’s Power Paradox,” *The National Interest* (Spring 2006), p. 129.

<sup>26</sup> Andrew Nathan and Bruce Gilley, *China’s New Rulers: The Secret Files* (New York: New York Review of Books, 2002), p. 227; Robert Sutter, “China’s Good Neighbor Policy and Its Implications for Taiwan,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 13, no. 41 (November 2004), pp. 717-731.

<sup>27</sup> Cohen, “China’s Power Paradox,” pp. 132-3.

<sup>28</sup> Wang, “China’s Search for Stability with America.”

<sup>29</sup> As quoted in Yao Yunzhu, “Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence,” *Strategic Insights*, vol. 4, no. 9 (September 2005), available at <http://www.ccc.nps.mil/si/2005/Sep/yaoSep05.asp>.

small arsenal, focusing much of its research on ensuring a small, but survivable, second-strike capability.<sup>30</sup> (Unofficial estimates of the Chinese arsenal were recently downgraded to 130 operational warheads, with an additional 70 in storage.<sup>31</sup>) China is modernizing and expanding its nuclear arsenal, but most Chinese scholars argue that this is not to acquire an offensive capability but rather to improve obsolete weapons in order to maintain the current nuclear balance.<sup>32</sup>

China views itself as taking the moral high ground in renouncing the policies of deterrence and extended deterrence (a nuclear umbrella over allies). The Chinese draw a distinction between “Western deterrence” and their policy of nuclear retaliation. One scholar at a university in Shanghai explained that this is partially due to the aggressive meaning of the Chinese characters used to translate the word “deterrence.” But China sees its policy as purely defensive, and thus always had a no-first-use (NFU) policy and a policy of no-use against a non-nuclear weapons state. While a stated NFU policy could easily be overridden during a crisis, the vast majority of scholars and officials interviewed by Joanne Tompkins in 2002 “rejected the possibility of ever abandoning the pledge because they feel it gives China a great deal of political capital in the international community.”<sup>33</sup>

China’s nuclear policy has been remarkably consistent since it became a nuclear weapon state in 1964. This policy has consisted of five points: no first use (NFU); security assurance to non-nuclear states and promotion of nuclear free zones; limited development of second-strike capabilities; opposition to extraterritorial weapons deployment; and, advocacy of complete nuclear disarmament.<sup>34</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China affirms that China remains committed to the “complete prohibition of and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.” China has also signed a variety of protocols for nuclear weapons free zones in different regions and issued guarantees to specific countries, such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan, to get them to sign onto such agreements.<sup>35</sup>

China has also committed itself to international arms control and non-proliferation regimes. It has ratified the NPT and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and agreed to adhere to the basic tenets of the Missile Technology Control Regime. In 1996, China unilaterally adopted a moratorium on nuclear testing and was one of the strongest supporters and first signatories of the CTBT. Although the CTBT was submitted for ratification in 1999, the National People’s

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<sup>30</sup> Yao, “Chinese Nuclear Policy.”

<sup>31</sup> Jeffrey Lewis, “The Ambiguous Arsenal,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 61, no. 3 (May/June 2005), p. 52.; Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2006,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 62, no. 3 (May/June 2006), p.60.

<sup>32</sup> Joanne Tompkins, “How US Strategic Policy is Changing China’s Nuclear Plans,” *Arms Control Today* (January/February 2003), available at [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003\\_01-02/tompkins\\_janfeb03.asp](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_01-02/tompkins_janfeb03.asp); Norris and Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2006,” p. 60.

<sup>33</sup> Tompkins, “How US Strategic Policy is Changing China’s Nuclear Plans.”

<sup>34</sup> Sun Xiangli, “Analysis of China’s Nuclear Strategy,” *China Security*, no. 1 (Autumn 2005), pp. 23-27; Yao, “Chinese Nuclear Policy”; “Fact Sheet: China: Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of,” available at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zjzg/jks/cjjk/2622/t93539.htm>.

<sup>35</sup> “Fact Sheet: China: Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of.”

Congress has not yet done so.<sup>36</sup> (Despite this, China has begun construction of 12 International Monitoring System stations and has been active on the Preparatory Commission of the CTBT.<sup>37</sup>) China strongly opposes militarization of space and missile defense systems because it claims the resulting shift in the global strategic balance will lead to arms races, including a nuclear weapons race. It sought to include language in the 2005 review of the NPT that would condemn missile defense programs<sup>38</sup> and put pressure on the United States and Russia to drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals.<sup>39</sup> China sees itself as upholding international non-proliferation agreements better than the other declared nuclear weapons states, and sees its NFU policy as coming closest to meeting the “spirit” of the NPT. Perhaps for this reason, in response to North Korea’s recent nuclear test, China has even said it would support appropriate “punitive actions” against its isolated ally, which is a harsher step than it has been willing to take in the past.<sup>40</sup>

China self-identifies as a “responsible” nuclear weapons state with a defensive nuclear posture and a commitment to international non-proliferation objectives. As Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui has argued, China’s policy in this regard “is consistent, firm and definitely not of an expedient nature.”<sup>41</sup> This identity is often created in opposition to their perception of US behavior and policy. For example, Pan Zhenqiang, a Chinese National Defense University professor, has argued that

China is the most responsible nuclear weapons state while the United States is perhaps the least responsible. Note the following facts:

- China has consistently been self-committed to NFU, while the US has consistently rejected it even in the post Cold War era when it enjoyed unprecedented conventional capability.
- China has offered negative security assurances to all the non-nuclear weapons states, while the US threatens to use nuclear weapons against states if it feels threatened by ... weapons of mass destruction.
- China has never deployed its nuclear weapons abroad while the US still deploys tactical nuclear weapons on the soil of European allies ...
- China has called for effective measures to prevent the weaponization of outer space, while the US has refused even to discuss the matter lest it hinder its efforts to develop missile defense and a new space capability for military purposes.

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<sup>36</sup> There is a two-stage process for international treaties to come into force – signature and ratification. When signed, a state is expected to honor the spirit of the treaty. Ratification codifies the treaty into domestic law.

<sup>37</sup> “Fact Sheet: China: Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of”

<sup>38</sup> “Working Paper submitted by China: On the Issue of Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of the Danger of Nuclear War,” para. 7. Available at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/cjkk/2622/t93869.htm>

<sup>39</sup> “Working Paper submitted by China: On the Issue of Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of the Danger of Nuclear War,” para. 4.

<sup>40</sup> John O’Neil and Choe Sang-Hun, “China Shows Willingness to Punish North Korea for Test,” *The New York Times* (October 10, 2006).

<sup>41</sup> For a detailed description of the Chinese position, see Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui, “International Security Situation, China’s Policy on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation,” *Qiushi* (October 1, 2005).

- China has urged the international community to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime through a multi-lateral cooperative and comprehensive approach, including the fulfillment of balanced obligations by all member states as stipulated in the NPT, while US non-proliferation policy is characterized by unilateralism, a disdain of international organizations and double standards.<sup>42</sup>

Similarly, echoing the theme of the US as the “destabilizing hegemon,” Chinese Col. Yao Yungzhu – who teaches at the PLA’s Academy of Military Science and translated China’s 2004 National Defense white paper into English – has argued that if the US and other nuclear weapons states

...want to share some regional and global security, peace and stability, they have to share a certain degree of insecurity first. And that means accepting some vulnerability by pledging to a NFU policy, so as to form a multilateral deterrent relationship among the ‘haves’ and offering more security assurance to the ‘have nots’.<sup>43</sup>

In sum, Chinese scholars agree that China’s NFU policy is important for China’s international reputation, because – as Chinese scholar Shen Dingli argues – “it provides China with a less immoral image among all nuclear weapons states.... The NFU divides the ‘nuclear haves’ into two classes: a more moral group with no-first-use policies and a less moral group with first-use or conditional no-first-use,” and China is the only declared NWS in the first category.<sup>44</sup> Or as Western scholar Bruce Blair concludes, China “set an example of moderation and prudence on the moral high ground, and seemingly proved its theory that small defensively oriented arsenals at once provided deterrence, reassurance and stability.”<sup>45</sup>

### **Chinese Reactions to US Nuclear Policy**

Given its self-identity as the “responsible” nuclear weapons state, China’s discourse about US nuclear policy has focused on the perception of double standards, as well as the inferred increase in the role of nuclear weapons in US security policy. China’s largest concern appears to be US plans to build national missile defense, as this creates the greatest risk for China’s policy of minimal deterrence. Nonetheless, official Chinese reaction to US nuclear policy has been relatively mild, probably because China does not want to jeopardize its focus on internal policies like economic development.

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<sup>42</sup> Pan Zhenqiang, “China Insistence on No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons,” *China Security*, no. 1 (Autumn 2005), pp. 5-9, at 8-9.

<sup>43</sup> Yao, “Chinese Nuclear Policy.”

<sup>44</sup> Shen Dingli, “Nuclear Deterrence in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” *China Security*, no. 1 (Autumn 2005), pp. 10-14, at 11.

<sup>45</sup> Bruce G. Blair, “General Zhu and Chinese Nuclear Preemption,” *China Security*, no. 1 (Autumn 2005), pp. 15-22, at 16.



## The US Decision to Withdraw from the ABM Treaty and Build National Missile Defense

China has expressed strong opposition to the US decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and build a national missile defense program. In China's view, NMD would no doubt cause a reduction in China's deterrent effects against US nuclear use. China's concerns about the treaty withdrawal and NMD are related, although the criticisms highlight different things.

Chinese scholars and officials have depicted the US decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty as a "destabilizing action" that will encourage regional arms races. Moreover, they view the ABM Treaty withdrawal decision as another example of US willingness to ignore or structure international arms control agreements for its own strategic interests, as with the decision not to ratify the CTBT and the 2002 Moscow Treaty.<sup>46</sup> Indeed, some Chinese analysts believe China was duped into signing the CTBT before the US initiated its missile defense programs.<sup>47</sup>

Regarding the parallel to the Moscow Treaty, while Chinese experts in Shanghai view this as a positive step towards global arms control, the Beijing national security community holds a more cynical view. They dismiss it as "merely symbolic with no substantial meaning" because it does not reduce the nuclear arsenals irreversibly, but merely "rearranges" them. As Jin Yanan notes, "The motivation for this was very clear: If one day they required them, these withdrawn nuclear warheads and their launch vehicles could be brought back at any time and redeployed."<sup>48</sup> Tompkins argues that the Beijing community was quick to criticize the Treaty "for being only 500 words long; for containing no destruction or verification clauses; and for stretching the timeline for the reductions so far as to make them insignificant."<sup>49</sup> Some scholars have also suggested that Russia got the poor end of the bargain, because it will not have the capacity to store the excess weapons, as the US can.<sup>50</sup>

Most importantly, from the Chinese viewpoint, the "real reason" for US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty is that it opens the way for the US to begin the weaponization of space, not to pursue a missile defense program as the Bush Administration has claimed. As Tompkins discovered in her interviews with Chinese officials, some Chinese analysts believe this will give the United States "the ability to control the whole world through collection and control of economic information."<sup>51</sup> Beijing scholars also point to the Rumsfeld Commission Report on the organization of space and reports from American think tanks as reinforcing their suspicion

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<sup>46</sup> Zhu Feng, "NMD Jeopardizes International Arms Control – Further Comment on Bush Administration's NMD Policy," *Jiefangjun Bao* (February 19, 2001).

<sup>47</sup> Evan Madeiros and Jing-dong Yuan, "The US Nuclear Posture Review and China's Responses," Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies (April 1, 2002), available at <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020401.htm>.

<sup>48</sup> Jin Yanan, "What is the destination of US-Russian Nuclear Disarmament?" *Jiefangjun Bao* (May 27, 2002).

<sup>49</sup> Tompkins, "Influences on Chinese Nuclear Planning," Stimson Center unpublished report (Summer 2002), p. 12. Available at <http://www.stimson.org/inchina/pdf/InfCNPTtompkins.pdf>.

<sup>50</sup> Tan Weibing, "Nuclear Disarmament: Why did Russia make large concessions, can the US-Russian Offensive Strategic Weapons Treaty Agreement really make the world 'more peaceful'?" *Liaowang* (May 20, 2002).

<sup>51</sup> Tompkins, "Influences on Chinese Nuclear Planning," p. 13.

that the Bush Administration seeks the broader goal of controlling space.<sup>52</sup> As a commentary in the Beijing paper *Jiefangjun Bao* argued,

It is no exaggeration to say that today, outer space is full of smoke from gunpowder. The increasingly aggravating arms race in outer space will inevitably lead to the use of outer space for military purposes on a large scale....When the weaponization of outer space develops to a certain degree, the missile defense system of the superpower will reach a perfect degree, and will form a 'heaven shield' in real terms. Then it will be freer to launch a war whenever and wherever it likes.<sup>53</sup>

Turning specifically to national missile defense, Chinese analysts and officials have focused on four criticisms. First, observers have argued that if US national missile defense works, it would radically shift the strategic balance and the nuclear deterrent would be severely weakened. Since China's current nuclear strategy relies on survivable retaliatory capability, the fact that a US missile defense system could eliminate a Chinese second strike means that China could be completely defeated. As Col. Yao has argued, "This very defensive shield – when used against the only flying dagger the opponent throws at it before taking the deadly blow – would be very offensive in nature...China has to think how to maintain a guaranteed retaliatory second strike capability in the face of a US BMD [ballistic missile defense] system."<sup>54</sup> Zhu Feng argues that US national missile defense is "an out-and-out Cold War mentality" that undermines international arms control and the positive direction of US-Russian nuclear disarmament.<sup>55</sup>

Second, the Chinese are convinced that US NMD is targeted at them. Tompkins argues that "very few Chinese scholars interviewed believe US assurances that the missile defense system is not targeted at China. At best, they maintain, this is merely a declaratory policy that can be reversed at will."<sup>56</sup> The Chinese point out that North Korea does not have enough long-range missiles to warrant a system that has 100 interceptors. The Americans are spending too much money to build a system aimed just at Pyongyang and other rogue states. As an editorial in the Beijing paper *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi* notes, "The number of interceptor missiles to be deployed in the first batch is exactly the same number of strategic missiles it thinks China may have."<sup>57</sup> Moreover, after North Korea's unsuccessful Taepodong-2 missile tests in July 2006, Qiu Yongzheng argued that the United States "can no longer use the 'DPRK long-range missile threat' as an excuse" for building NMD.<sup>58</sup>

Third, China is also sensitive to any missile defense systems covering Taiwan, which the Chinese perceive as potentially emboldening the Taiwanese separatist movement. As Yao argues, even a limited missile shield "would relieve Americans of possible Chinese nuclear retaliation, permitting them to intervene more readily...it could encourage Taiwan to take more

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<sup>52</sup> See *Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization* (January 11, 2001), available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/space20010111.html>.

<sup>53</sup> "Calls for International Treaty banning space weapons," *Jiefangjun Bao* (June 13, 2001).

<sup>54</sup> Yao, "Chinese Nuclear Policy."

<sup>55</sup> Zhu, "NMD Jeopardizes International Arms Control."

<sup>56</sup> Tompkins, "How US Strategic Policy is Changing China's Nuclear Plans."

<sup>57</sup> Lu Qichang, "NMD-Centered International Struggle," *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi* (April 20, 2001).

<sup>58</sup> Qiu Yongzheng, "Why did the US not intercept DPRK missiles?" *Qingnian Cankao* (July 7, 2006).

provocative moves...[and] would signify semi-alliance relationship” between Taiwan and the US.<sup>59</sup> Similarly, Shanghai scholar Chen Hongshou argues that this is creating a “paramilitary alliance” between the US and Taiwan.<sup>60</sup> Tompkins also found in her interviews that some analysts view the transfer of advanced missile capabilities to Taiwan as a “form of foreign intervention” in China.<sup>61</sup> Similarly, China has felt threatened by the possibility of a future joint deployment of missile defense between the US and Japan. For example, some Chinese observers argue this is a way for Japan to increase its regional hegemony and become the “Far East England” with a tighter alliance with the United States.<sup>62</sup> Overall, the US joint development and deployment of theater missile defenses with its East Asian allies “will inevitably lead” to missile proliferation in the region.<sup>63</sup>

Finally, Chinese observers see significant parallels between China’s current situation and the Soviet overreaction to the US Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars). As noted above, China attributes the fall of the Soviet Union to the arms race that was prompted by the Soviet response to the Star Wars program. Therefore, many Chinese observers view the US national missile defense program as a trick to convince China to spend more on defense and thus bankrupt China as it did the Soviet Union in the 1980s.<sup>64</sup> As a commentary in the Beijing paper *Jiefangjun Bao* argued, “a new arms race cannot be avoided...[and] a space arms race based on high technology will require huge amounts of money.”<sup>65</sup> Or the commentary in the Beijing paper *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi* opined,

This will undoubtedly trigger off another round of the arms race. This will fit in exactly with the United States’ wishes. Some US strategists believe it was the arms race deliberately evoked by the US in the cold war period and especially the “Star Wars Plan” launched by the Reagan Administration in the 1980s that lured the Soviet Union into spending huge amounts of money on the endless arms race with the United States which caused the economic collapse and political disintegration of the Soviet Union. Now, the United States wants to play the same trick.<sup>66</sup>

Chinese observers in this group point to the fact that NMD will not work, because US testing has not simulated realistic scenarios and that tests from 1999-2005 had “elements of false claims” in their list of successful hits.<sup>67</sup> The Chinese media have also reported extensively about European

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<sup>59</sup> Yao, “Chinese Nuclear Policy.”

<sup>60</sup> Chen Hongshou, “How Farther can the US Policy Towards Taiwan Go?” *Hong Kong Zhongguo Pinglun* (September 1, 2002), pp. 78-81. Wang Weixing makes a similar point in “The United States and China start a quasi-military alliance,” *Shijie Zhishi* (July 1, 2002), pp. 10-12.

<sup>61</sup> Tompkins, “Influences on China’s Nuclear Planning,” p. 22.

<sup>62</sup> Shen Hung and Liang Yu-Kao, “Japan seeks hegemony under pretext of ‘missile defense,’” *Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao* (July 6, 2006).

<sup>63</sup> Tan Han and Zhao Qinghai, “New Challenges to International Arms Control and Disarmament,” *Guoji Wnti Yanjiu* (January 13, 1999).

<sup>64</sup> Tompkins, “Influences on China’s Nuclear Planning,” p. 23.

<sup>65</sup> “Calls for International Treaty banning space weapons.”

<sup>66</sup> Lu Qichang, “NMD-Centered International Struggle,” *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi* (April 20, 2001).

<sup>67</sup> Qiu, “Why did the United States Not Intercept the DPRK Missiles?”

criticism of the US NMD system, especially its technical problems.<sup>68</sup> Therefore, they argue, China should not invest large resources to counter the system.

Without question, the US national missile defense program is having a significant impact on the internal Chinese debate about modernizing China's nuclear arsenal. While the majority of scholars and government and military leaders favor maintaining the status quo of minimal deterrence, there is a small minority that advocates ignoring the changing strategic environment and an even smaller minority that is arguing for a massive push towards parity with the United States.<sup>69</sup> Although this last group is quite small, and may even be discounted as the radical fringe, it has become increasingly vocal in the past few years. For example, Shen Dingli of Shanghai's Fudan University has vehemently advocated expanding China's nuclear deterrent and abandoning the NFU policy.<sup>70</sup>

Despite these public comments by a handful of leaders, the prevailing strategy remains one of minimal deterrence. China openly opposed the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and has continued to express muted concern about the policy shift towards building national missile defense, but has done very little to try to balance the deterrence ledger. Official reaction has been mild.<sup>71</sup> Despite this seemingly vital threat, China did not take drastic steps, such as a crash course in missile development or even preemptive action against the US or its allies. Instead, China appears to have acknowledged its dependence on the US for accomplishing its domestic economic development goals, and decided that the ability to accomplish internal goals is more important. As the Chinese proverb suggests, "when you are weak, swallow your bitter medicine and prepare to be strong."

#### The 2002 US Nuclear Policy Review and 2001 National Security Strategy

In its response to the NPR, the Chinese government accused the United States of "nuclear blackmail" and vowed not to bow to foreign nuclear threats.<sup>72</sup> The Chinese Foreign Ministry also demanded that the United States provide an explanation of its targeting policy.<sup>73</sup> Some Western analysts, like Joanne Tompkins, argue that Chinese believe the NPR was only a "think piece" and thus not representative of official US doctrine.<sup>74</sup> Nevertheless, the NPR generated a lot of commentary in the Chinese press, and due to space constraints, only a small sampling can be included here. Chinese concerns with the NPR appeared to focus on five things.

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<sup>68</sup> Huang Yong, "Differences still exist between Europe and the United States on the Missile Defense Issue," *Beijing Xinhua* (May 4, 2001); Gao Jie, "Let's see the new hegemonism of the United States," *Renmin Ribao* (April 1, 2001); Lu Qichang, "NMD-Centered International Struggle," *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi* (April 20, 2001).

<sup>69</sup> Tompkins, "Influences on China's Nuclear Planning," pp. 23-26.

<sup>70</sup> "US And China Stoke Fears Of Nuclear Tension," *Financial Times* (London) (June 2, 2006).

<sup>71</sup> James Kynge, "US-Japan Defence Proposal Worries China," *Financial Times* (London) (December 20, 2002).

<sup>72</sup> "China Bluntly Rebukes US over Nuclear Policy," *The New York Times* (March 17, 2002); "Nation prompts US to explain nuke report," *China Daily* (March 13, 2002).

<sup>73</sup> Madeiros and Yuan, "The US Nuclear Posture Review and China's Responses."

<sup>74</sup> Tompkins, "Influences on Chinese Nuclear Planning," p. 2.

First, China believes the NPR represents a fundamental change in the principles guiding US use of nuclear weapons. Specifically, Chinese argue that the NPR raises the profile of nuclear weapons by lowering the threshold for nuclear weapons use, creating new war-fighting roles for the weapons and advocating the development of new types of weapons. They argue that the new weapons under consideration will blur the line between conventional and nuclear weapons. As Chinese commentator Xin Benjian argues, the NPR

not only regarded nuclear weapons as instruments for making diplomatic threats and launching ‘preemptive strike’, but also lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, with the result that the likelihood of the United States using...nuclear weapons in future war has greatly increased.<sup>75</sup>

On another occasion, Xin argued more pointedly that the NPR elevated US “nuclear strategy from deterrence to actual deployment.”<sup>76</sup> Similarly, Tang Shiping, at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, asserts that the NPR “shows clearly that there have always been some figures in the United States that believe that nuclear weapons are not just for strategic deterrence, they are also for tactical use.” As a result, he continues, “possibly mankind is not moving farther away from a nuclear doomsday, but rather closer and closer.”<sup>77</sup>

Second, there is concern that the NPR undermines international arms control agreements and non-proliferation goals.<sup>78</sup> As Tompkins concluded from her interviews of Chinese officials and analysts in the summer of 2002, “The Chinese feel there can be no realistic expectation of nuclear disarmament as long as the US government continues to place such importance on nuclear weapons...The aggressive posture outlined in the NPR was seen as sending a message that the US places little value on foreign lives.”<sup>79</sup> As Liu Changhong quipped, “If a country finds itself unwelcome to Washington, what is the first thing it may do? Go get nuclear weapons!”<sup>80</sup> Thus, argues Shi Yinhong, a professor at the Chinese People’s University, the NPR leads to a “near subversion of the international arms control system.”<sup>81</sup> Similarly, Zhou Rong argues that

This change in US nuclear strategy has severely poisoned the international political atmosphere. It has made the United Nations and all other international organizations which protect world peace look pale and weak. It also encourages certain regional powers which are appendages to the United States to wreak havoc and run wild with arrogance. And what is most serious of all is that it will leave

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<sup>75</sup> Xin Benjian, “The High-handed US Nuclear Policy,” *Renmin Ribao* (May 27, 2005).

<sup>76</sup> Xin Benjian, “Pentagon Expanding Influence,” *China Daily* (June 25, 2004).

<sup>77</sup> Tang Shiping, “China’s Peripheral Security Environment in 2010-2015 – Decisive Factors, Trends and Prospects,” *Zhanlue yu Guanli* (October 1, 2002), pp. 34-45.

<sup>78</sup> Gu Guoliang, “China’s Arms Control Strategy in Response to Bush Government’s Arms Control Thought, Policy Adjustment and Changes,” *Zhanlue yu Guanli* (August 1, 2002), pp. 77-83; Tompkins, “How US Strategic Policy is Changing China’s Nuclear Plans.”

<sup>79</sup> Tompkins, “Influences on Chinese Nuclear Planning,” p. 16.

<sup>80</sup> Liu Changhong, “The Nonproliferation treaty is currently faced with challenges,” *Jiefangjun Bao* (April 22, 2002).

<sup>81</sup> Shi Yinhong, “The Arms Control Mechanism and Nonproliferation Issues in East Asia: Current Status and Dangers,” *Zhanlue yu Guanli* (October 1, 2002), pp. 29-33.

many countries without a sense of security, thus leading to more and more countries researching, developing and testing nuclear weapons.<sup>82</sup>

Third, some Chinese commentators viewed the combination of the NPR with the US National Security Strategy as extremely aggressive. Coupled with the preemption doctrine in the US National Security Strategy, they argue the NPR revealed a “totally different rationale” for the weapons, because “it contemplates their actual use on the same terms as conventional weapons.”<sup>83</sup> For example, Chen Zhou, a researcher at the Academy of Military Sciences, argues that the NPR and the NSS can only mean “the US is seeking absolute superiority rather than absolute security.”<sup>84</sup> Similarly, Hu Hsin argues that “the pursuit of unilateralism has always been regarded by the United States as the ideal international order following the Cold War,” and these policies allow the US to achieve that pursuit. In his view, the NPR “only sought to carry out the doctrine of ‘preemptive action’ in the context of nuclear strikes; now the Bush government wants to apply this to conventional warfare” as well.<sup>85</sup> Chinese commentator Gu Guolinang suggests that the real reason the United States is pursuing this policy is that “Americans harbor an exceptional superiority complex, they feel they should have technological superiority and that they should unilaterally exercise ‘freedom of action.’”<sup>86</sup> Or, as Mei Zhou, expressed it more tersely: the United States wants to be a “nuclear overlord.”<sup>87</sup>

Fourth, Chinese critics of the NPR believe the policy increases the likelihood of resumed nuclear tests, especially because it outlines the need for a shorter time to prepare for a test resumption.<sup>88</sup> As noted above, China has signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty but has not yet ratified it, largely because of the US Senate’s rejection of the treaty in 1999. Some in the Chinese government support ratification because China has already stopped testing and could claim the moral high ground on this global arms control issue. Others, however, argue ratification would prevent China from resuming testing in response to a new round of US tests. A growing number of Chinese analysts believe that the US will start testing again to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons, as outlined in the NPR.<sup>89</sup> As Evan Madeiros and Jing-dong Yuan argue, “If the US resumes testing, China will almost certainly follow suit.”<sup>90</sup> (Indeed, much of the recent discussion in China about the US Reliable Replacement Warhead program has focused on this issue. As Fan Jishe, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Science,

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<sup>82</sup> Zhou Rong, “Can a new nuclear strategy guarantee US security?” *Shijie Zhishi* (May 1, 2002), pp. 20-21.

<sup>83</sup> Quoted in Jing-Dong Yuan, “Chinese Media discusses US Nuclear Superiority,” *WMD Insights* (May 2006), p. 16.

<sup>84</sup> Chen Zhou, “Military Observers,” *Guangming Ribao* (December 10, 2002).

<sup>85</sup> Hu Hsin, “US Doctrine of Preemptive Action Destroys Global Stability,” *Hong Kong Kuang Chiao Ching* (October 16, 2002).

<sup>86</sup> Gu Guoliang, “China’s Arms Control Strategy in Response to Bush Government’s Arms Control Thought, Policy Adjustment and Changes,” *Zhanlue yu Guanli* (August 1, 2002), pp. 77-83.

<sup>87</sup> Mei Zhou, “The world does not need a nuclear overlord,” *Renmin Ribao* (March 19, 2002).

<sup>88</sup> Mei Hao, “US, Russia to Resume Nuclear Testing?” *Renmin Ribao* (May 15, 2002).

<sup>89</sup> Lu Qiang, Zhao Chunxia, and Fu Yongjue, “PRC: US Wants to Develop Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons,” *Zhongguo Guofang Bao* (May 20, 2003); Zhu Qiangguo, “US Seeks Absolute Military Superiority,” *China Daily* (March 13, 2002); Zhou Jianguo, “Nuclear Strategy of Bush Administration Moving Gradually from Deterrence to Actual Combat,” *Jiefangjun Bao* (March 18, 2002).

<sup>90</sup> Madeiros and Yuan, “The US Nuclear Posture Review and China’s Responses.”

has argued, RRW “would probably lead to a new round of arms race,” because “experiments will have to be carried out for testing before the warheads are generally loaded.”<sup>91</sup>)

Finally, China was alarmed to see Taiwan listed as a contingency for possible nuclear use.<sup>92</sup> According to the allegedly leaked versions of the NPR, a military confrontation over the status of Taiwan is one of the scenarios that could lead Washington to use nuclear weapons against China.<sup>93</sup> Beijing has long suspected that the US has nuclear targeting and contingency planning aimed at China; as Tompkins notes, many Chinese experts “acknowledge[e] that this has been the case for many years.”<sup>94</sup> (As a commentary in Shanghai’s *Jiefang Ribao* argued about China’s place on the NPR target list, “the China threat theory has once again staged a comeback in US political and economic circles” because the United States “has suffered from ‘enemy deficiency syndrome.’”<sup>95</sup>) Yet, they were very surprised to see Taiwan listed as a scenario. This reinforces Chinese concerns about a high likelihood of US military intervention in the event that China uses force to resolve the Taiwan issue.<sup>96</sup> As Chinese scholar Qiu Huafei argued, the NPR

...implied that if a war breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, the United States will not rule out the possibility of employing nuclear weapons. The US has also attempted to place Taiwan under the protection of its Theater Missile Defense system. After this nuclear umbrella is established, it will greatly reduce China’s proper function in strategic nuclear deterrence.<sup>97</sup>

Similarly, Wang Weixing argues that “the United States plays a very bad role” in this situation: “No matter what the true US intention is, ‘pro-Taiwan independence’ elements believe that the United States has opened a strong ‘nuclear umbrella’ for them. This will undoubtedly have a strong provocative effect.”<sup>98</sup> Chinese scholar Yao Yunzhu was even more pointed in his criticisms. In his view, “nuclear weapons ha[ve] no role to play in civil war scenarios” (as China views the Taiwan situation to be). Indeed, he argues, “so far, China has never – in any government statements or official documents – threatened nuclear use in the cross-strait

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<sup>91</sup> Fan Jishe, “Super Nuclear Powers Should Perform their Duties,” *People’s Daily* (June 21, 2006), p. 7.

<sup>92</sup> Wu Yixue, “Weapons Purchase won’t help island,” *China Daily* (April 15, 2003); See also William Arkin, “Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable,” *The Los Angeles Times* (March 10 2002); Michael R. Gordon, “US Nuclear Plan Sees New Weapons and New Targets,” *The New York Times* (March 10, 2002); Jean Du Preez, “The Impact of the Nuclear Posture Review on the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” *The Nonproliferation Review* (Fall-Winter 2002), pp. 67-81 at 71.

<sup>93</sup> The language in question, according to the allegedly leaked version, is: “current examples of immediate contingencies include...a military confrontation over Taiwan” and “...China is a country that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency.”

<sup>94</sup> Joanne Tompkins, “How US Strategic Policy is Changing China’s Nuclear Plans.” For China’s official reaction, see “China ‘Deeply Shocked’ over Pentagon Secret Report: FM Spokesman,” (March 11, 2002), available at <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/26489.html>.

<sup>95</sup> Zhu Ming, “Sino-US Relations: The Stage must be repaired, not dismantled,” *Jiefang Ribao* (July 19, 2002).

<sup>96</sup> Qin Zhilia, “Continuation of New-Style Hegemonism,” *Xuexi Shibao* (January 24, 2005); Madeiros and Yuan, “The US Nuclear Posture Review and China’s Responses.”

<sup>97</sup> Qiu Huafei, “The Development Trend in Sino-US Strategic Relations in the New Century,” *Shanghai Shehui Kexue* (February 20, 2006), p. 23.

<sup>98</sup> Wang Weixing, “The United States and China start a quasi-military alliance,” *Shijie Zhishi* (July 1, 2002), pp. 10-12.

conflict...The issue of Taiwan has forced the Chinese to face up to the possibility of military conflict with the United States.... However, such conflict should have been assumed nuclear-irrelevant, but for the issuance” of the NPR.

Partly in response to the leaked US policy, in a discussion about a hypothetical conflict over Taiwan, People’s Liberation Army Major General Zhu Chenghu warned in July 2005 that “if the Americans draw their missiles and position-guided ammunition [sic] on the target zone on China’s territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons.”<sup>99</sup> The US Defense Department noted in its 2006 annual report to Congress that “this is not the first time Zhu, or others, have threatened the United States with nuclear strikes in the context of conflict of Taiwan.”<sup>100</sup> Some China scholars in the United States argue that Western journalists misconstrued Zhu’s comment and that it was simply intended as a warning about Taiwan’s importance for China.<sup>101</sup> Pan Zhenqiang, the professor at the PLA’s National Defense University, agreed and argued that this is simply another case of American media overreaction, echoing the general Chinese perceptions of the US as “destabilizing hegemon” and “irresponsible” nuclear weapons state.

Why so much fuss about this small event? The answer may be that there are people in the United States who are only too willing to see the dark side of China. What they forget is that, to date, China so far has been the only acknowledged nuclear weapon state that solemnly maintains a commitment to NFU. Why do so few criticize the first-use policy of other nuclear weapons states in the Western media?...Is there a double standard regarding nuclear weapons policy for different countries, particularly for China?<sup>102</sup>

Other scholars argue that the comments were “motivated by a frustration – widely felt by civilian and military analysts – at American unilateralism demonstrated in the post 9/11 era.”<sup>103</sup> Following international criticism of the comment, the Chinese government formally disavowed General Zhu’s remarks, stating that they reflected a personal opinion and that China continues to adhere to its no-first use policy.<sup>104</sup>

### The US-India Nuclear Deal

There has been relatively little written about the Chinese reaction to the US-India nuclear deal. Understandably, as the “responsible nuclear weapons state,” the official Chinese government response has focused on the implications of the deal for the NPT. As the Chinese Foreign Ministry has said, “China hopes that activities some countries conduct in peaceful use of

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<sup>99</sup> Austin Ramzy and Joyce Huang, “China Goes Ballistic,” *Time International* (July 25, 2005), p. 17.

<sup>100</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006*, pp. 1-2.

<sup>101</sup> Interview with Kristen Gunness, Center for Naval Analyses, July 22, 2006; Blair, “General Zhu and Chinese Nuclear Preemption,” p. 17.

<sup>102</sup> Pan, “China Insistence on No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 8.

<sup>103</sup> Eric Hagt and Chen Yali, “Editor’s Notes: Opening the Debate on US-China Nuclear Relations,” *China Security*, no. 1 (Autumn 2005), pp. 2-3.

<sup>104</sup> Yao, “Chinese Nuclear Policy,” footnote 11.



nuclear energy are conducive to maintaining the authoritativeness and effectiveness of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) mechanism.”<sup>105</sup>

In addition to the concern about the future of the NPT, “unofficial” responses have focused on two things. First, Chinese commentators have discussed the double standard of the US placing its own strategic interests ahead of global non-proliferation concerns. For example, Hu Shisheng commented in the official English-language *China Daily*,

The United States' making an exception to accommodate India, driven by geo-political considerations, has, however, sent repercussions through the international non-proliferation infrastructure. The double standards will very likely complicate the nuclear issues of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea all the more. Moreover, US-Indian nuclear co-operation might encourage other nuclear powers to have nuclear co-operation with their partners, which might trigger a chain reaction of nuclear-technology proliferation. Now the international community is presented with a big question: How can the effectiveness and binding power of the non-proliferation system be guaranteed?<sup>106</sup>

Fu Xiaoqiang, a researcher at the China Institutes of Contemporary Relations, struck a similar theme in the *World News Journal*: “The US sacrificed the international non-proliferation system to pull a potential ally over to its side. This will seriously damage the current system...will cause more confrontation between the US and the Islamic world...[and] will provoke a new arms race in South Asia.”<sup>107</sup> Or, as the pro-PRC Chinese language *Macau Daily News* remarked in an editorial: “Such an agreement will obviously undermine the efforts of stopping the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons because the US has adopted a double standard in dealing with the Indian nuclear issues and Iran or the DPRK nuclear issues.”<sup>108</sup>

Second, the Chinese perceive the purpose of the US-India nuclear deal to balance against China. As Tang Yong and Chen Jihui suggested in the official Communist Party international news publication *Global Times*, “India has the strategic potential to balance China. This is the main motive [of the nuclear deal]...Using India to balance China is far more important to the US than the India-Pakistan balance.”<sup>109</sup> Similarly, Yu Shengjun argued that the nuclear deal “is due to mutual geo-political interests and needs: stabilizing South Asia and balancing China...The China factor is the main reason behind Bush’s visit to India.”<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> “China hopes peaceful use of nuclear energy conducive to NPT mechanism,” *Xinhua News Agency* (March 2, 2006); “China hopes US-India nuclear cooperation abides by non-proliferation rules,” *Xinhua News Agency* (July 29, 2006).

<sup>106</sup> Hu Shisheng, “Strategic Gains at Heart of Bush South Asia Trip,” *China Daily* (March 7, 2006), available at [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-03/07/content\\_527458.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-03/07/content_527458.htm). Also see Yuan Ying Dong, “Beijing Still Quiet on US India Deal,” *Taipei Times* (March 16, 2006), available at <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2006/03/16/2003297653>.

<sup>107</sup> Fu Xiaoqiang, “What’s the Major Compromise of US Diplomacy?” *Shijie Xinwenbao* (World News Journal) (March 6, 2006).

<sup>108</sup> “US-India Agreement Sets a Bad Example,” *Macau Daily News* (March 4, 2006).

<sup>109</sup> Tang Yong and Chen Jihui, “Bush’s Visit Consolidates South Asian Strategy,” *Huanqiu Shibao* (Global Times) (March 6, 2006).

<sup>110</sup> Yu Shengjun, “Bush’s Trip to India has Created a Geo-Political Earthquake,” *Guoji Xianqu Daobao* (International Herald Leader) (March 2, 2006).

International academic consensus seems to be that the US-India nuclear deal may not be overly threatening to China, but is not a pleasant development.<sup>111</sup> While there has not been an overt response, there is concern that one may still be coming. For example, “beyond supporting its Pakistani proxy, China may also choose to fortify its nuclear arsenal, potentially prompting a regional arms rivalry.”<sup>112</sup> It appears China has been assisting Pakistan increase its nuclear arsenal by cooperating in the construction of a heavy water reactor at Khushab.<sup>113</sup> However, this project began in 2000 and Chinese nuclear assistance to Pakistan has been stepped up since April 2004, so this is not necessarily a response to the new US-Indian relationship.<sup>114</sup>

### **China’s Potential Reactions to Proposed Future Changes in US Nuclear Policy**

As this analysis has suggested, China views US nuclear policy within the larger context of the bilateral relationship between the two countries. China views itself as a rising power that needs to maintain a good working relationship with the United States to accomplish its internal objectives. US nuclear policy plays only a very small role in that wider relationship. US nuclear policy appears to matter in two ways. First, because China styles itself as “the responsible nuclear weapons state,” US nuclear policy provides a convenient foil to help make China’s case in the international community. Second, China appears to be concerned most by national missile defense, which has the potential to completely undermine China’s retaliatory capability.

Therefore, if China’s reactions to the recent changes in US nuclear policy are any guide, China appears unwilling to divert resources to a nuclear arms race it does not believe is desirable or winnable. China is much more interested in developing its economy than attempting to reach nuclear parity. The guiding logic behind Chinese policy has remained very stable over the last several decades and it is not likely that minor changes in the US posture would effect a radical shift, when the massive arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War did not. For this reason, it appears very unlikely that development of low-yield, earth-penetrating or other smaller nuclear weapons by the United States would induce a major shift in Chinese strategic thinking. The one exception to this might be that China would reconsider its commitment to the moratorium on nuclear testing.

### **IRAN**

Much has been written trying to decipher the Iranian motivation and intent to acquire and use nuclear technology. Fewer scholars, if any, have looked at the view from Iran looking back

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<sup>111</sup> Teresita Schaffer and Henry Sokolski, “Online Debate: The US-India Nuclear Deal: The Right Approach?” Council on Foreign Relations (May 22-26, 2006), available at [http://www.cfr.org/publication/10731/usindia\\_nuclear\\_deal.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10731/usindia_nuclear_deal.html).

<sup>112</sup> Shehzad Nadeem, “The Regional Implications of the US-India Nuclear Agreement,” *International Relations Center Foreign Policy in Focus* (April 29, 2006), available at <http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3248>.

<sup>113</sup> Randeep Ramesh and Julian Borger, “Pakistan launches huge nuclear arms drive: Satellite images reveal major building site US and China embroiled in buildup of rival arsenals,” *The Guardian* (July 25, 2006); Saibal Dasgupta, “Pak gets China's help on reactor,” *The Times of India* (July 26, 2006).

<sup>114</sup> “Pak plutonium is an old Chinese Story,” *Hindustan Times* (July 25, 2006).

at the US and its nuclear policies. This analysis shows that Iran's perception of the US nuclear posture is inseparable from its view of all other US international policies. Iran has felt victimized and persecuted by the US and its allies since its 1979 Revolution resulted in the countries' global economic and diplomatic isolation. More recently, US policies in the Middle East – including the campaign against Iran's own nuclear program – have aggravated Iran's perception of the US as untrustworthy, a security threat, and as a specifically anti-Iranian troublemaker. Iran thus views the US nuclear posture through this lens of persecution. US nuclear policies are seen as hypocritical and a permanent threat to Iran's security.

### **Iranian Perceptions of the United States**

Iranian perceptions of the United States are colored by the country's historic political and economic humiliation and isolation. Multiple betrayals by the US, England, Germany, and Russia throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> Century have been well-characterized by scholars.<sup>115</sup> This history contributes to an Iranian government perception of the United States as a betrayer, an untrustworthy regional bully and as a specifically anti-Iranian troublemaker. In contrast, the Iranian people have generally been more supportive of the United States and American culture and democratic values, yet they also felt shunned and disappointed after the United States ignored Iran's offer of assistance after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

In characterizing the US as a betrayer, Iranians generally point to three things. First, the Islamic Iranian government perceives the US as having propped up the regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, against the wishes of the people, in order to have access to Iranian oil. The Islamic Republic of Iran perceives that it has been shunned by the US since its accession to power during the 1979 Revolution when the Shah was overthrown. Second, the US influenced its European allies to withdraw support for Iran's (ostensibly) civilian nuclear power program. Third, during Iran's war with Iraq from 1980-1988, the US supported Iraq overtly and covertly; much of Iran's military was purchased from the US and their ability to fight atrophied in part from lack of access to spare and replacement parts.<sup>116</sup> Iran believes that the US and its allies sanctioned Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons against Iranians during the war, in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.<sup>117</sup>

Iran perceives the United States as "interventionist" in the Middle East, and feels the US presence there is destabilizing for the region and particularly for Iran's security. Iran feels especially threatened by US support for Israel, and gets a great deal of political mileage from highlighting this support of the "Zionist" regime.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> Fariborz Mokhtari, "No One Will Scratch My Back: Iranian Security Perceptions in Historical Context," *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 59, no. 2 (Spring 2005), pp. 209-229; Caroline Ziemke, "The National Myth and Strategic Personality of Iran: A Counter Proliferation Perspective," in *The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, US Interests and World Order*, ed. Victor A. Utgoff (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Kenneth M. Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America* (New York: Random House, 2004).

<sup>116</sup> Farideh Farhi, "To Sign or Not to Sign? Iran's Evolving Debate on Nuclear Options" in *Iran's Bomb: American and Iranian Perspectives* (The Nixon Center, March 2004).

<sup>117</sup> Mokhtari, "No One Will Scratch My Back," p. 211.

<sup>118</sup> "Iran: Defence minister discusses regional security, defence policy, US threats," *IRNA* (February 8, 2003).

In addition to the historical betrayals and regional security threat that they believe the US poses in the Middle East, Iranians are especially offended by what they perceive to be selected targeting by American rhetoric and policy. For example, despite Iran's offer of assistance following 9/11 and Iran's cooperation during the 2001 Afghanistan campaign against the Taliban, President Bush put Iran on the "axis of evil" list.<sup>119</sup> Since then, President Bush has designated Iran as a "rogue state" based primarily on its support of the Hezbollah in Lebanon and its "civilian" nuclear program. Iranian media deem Bush's theory "obnoxious."<sup>120</sup> Thus, the US-led campaign to discredit and eliminate the "legal" and independent Iranian nuclear power program becomes not a facet of US nuclear policy abroad, but a symptom of a larger anti-Iranian attitude. The US rhetoric regarding the Iranian nuclear program is seen merely as "propaganda" aimed to undermine Iran.

Given its history of humiliation, betrayal and isolation, it is not surprising that the review of source literature showed Iran's sense of voicelessness in the international community. Thus, one of Iran's major foreign policy goals appears to be gaining voice in the international community and resuming its "rightful" place as regional hegemon in the Middle East. This quest for hegemony is driven by the desire to force Western (US) power out of the region and to establish a more "natural" regional balance that extends Iranian influence. Iran does not believe that regional security and stability are possible as long as the United States retains a military presence in the Persian Gulf, and thus has promoted regional security cooperation under UN auspices, to minimize US influence.<sup>121</sup>

### **Iranian Nuclear Policy**

This desire for regional and global respect appears to be a major motivation for the Iranian government's belief in its right to develop nuclear technology. Although the Iranian regime has publicly disavowed any interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, their exposed clandestine actions may suggest that acquiring nuclear weapons is indeed its objective. There are three reasons why acquiring nuclear weapons would make sense for the Iranian regime. First, it feels insecure in its region, with historically "bad neighbors" – Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq – and its 20<sup>th</sup> century memory of being invaded and marginalized by other powers.<sup>122</sup> Possessing nuclear weapons – partnered with its ballistic missile capabilities – could provide Iran with the ultimate deterrent against Israel and other potential threats.<sup>123</sup>

Second, a nuclear program in general – and a nuclear weapons capability in particular – could provide Iran with prestige, ensuring it status as a regional, if not a global power.<sup>124</sup> In this

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<sup>119</sup> Mokhtari, "No One Will Scratch My Back."

<sup>120</sup> "Iran: Daily on foreign minister's meeting with British prime minister." *Keyhan International* (February 6, 2003).

<sup>121</sup> Kamal Kharrazi (Iranian foreign minister), "The View from Tehran," *Middle East Policy*, vol. 12, no. 1 (Spring 2005), pp. 25-30.

<sup>122</sup> Ray Takeyh, "Iran Builds the Bomb," *Survival*, vol. 46, no. 4 (Winter 2004-2005), pp. 51-64.

<sup>123</sup> Patrick Clawson, "Proliferation in the Middle East: Who Next after Iran?" in *Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats*, ed. Henry Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, June 2006), p. 30.

<sup>124</sup> Ziemke, "The National Myth and Strategic Personality of Iran."

regard, North Korea and India provide important examples. From Tehran's perspective, North Korea's presumed nuclear capability has not only obviated a preemptive invasion, but actually generated potential security and economic benefits,<sup>125</sup> while India has been accepted by the international community into the circle of nuclear powers, most recently with the US-India civilian nuclear power deal (more on that below). It also reinforces the Iranian belief in Persian superiority. "Iranians' [sic] want their country to become technologically advanced and acquiring nuclear expertise and technology is part of the modernization process. No power can stop Iran's steady march toward development."<sup>126</sup>

Clearly, the Iranian nuclear program plays into Iran's sense of being a victim of double standards. The overwhelming majority of Iranians naturally support their country's right to master nuclear technology. Most Iranians believe this entitlement is both a natural right of a sovereign state as well as an important factor in becoming an advanced player in the modern world. They resent the apparent discrimination of "haves" and "have-nots."<sup>127</sup> From Iran's perspective, international exhortations that having so much oil and gas underground means Iran does not need nuclear energy are self-serving and hypocritical. Iranians consider their oil a finite resource, and the advice to burn it off and not seek an alternative energy source, appears to them as dishonest. As Iranian scholar Fariborz Mokhtari notes sardonically, "Iran, after all, is not the only country with rich oil and gas reserves to consider nuclear energy."<sup>128</sup> Or as Ali Muhammad Besharati, a former interior minister and deputy foreign minister, said, "If we backed down on the nuclear issue, the US would have found fault with our medical doctors researching stem cells. What they would like to see us do is plant corn, make tomato paste and bottle mineral water. They do not want to see us get high-tech."<sup>129</sup> Taking advantage of these sentiments, President Ahmadinejad has framed the stand-off between Iran and the international community as an effort by "a few countries that are armed with various types of weapons" to impose "a kind of scientific apartheid and nuclear monopoly in the world."<sup>130</sup>

As Ahmadinejad's quote suggests, the regime is using the nuclear program to play the nationalist card, in an effort to shore up the regime's legitimacy – the third reason for Iran's motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. The stagnation of Iran's command economy – with its double-digit inflation and unemployment rates, bloated bureaucracy, industrial decay and cumbersome subsidies – provides a strong incentive for the Iranian regime to try to distract the Iranian population with nationalist cries for nuclear weapons. This situation is only likely to get worse, for Iran is creating only 400,000 new jobs each year for the million job seekers who enter the market annually.<sup>131</sup> The nuclear program seems to be providing some legitimacy.

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<sup>125</sup> Takeyh, "Iran Builds the Bomb," p. 54.

<sup>126</sup> "Iran: IAEA should not apply double standards." *Tehran Times* (February 28, 2004).

<sup>127</sup> John Daniszewski, "Iranians Defend Nuclear Rights," *The Los Angeles Times* (March 7, 2006); Mahan Abedin, "Iranian Public Opinion and the Nuclear Stand-off," *Mideast Monitor*, vol. 1, no. 2 (April/May 2006).

<sup>128</sup> Mokhtari, "No One Will Scratch My Back," p. 226.

<sup>129</sup> Quoted in Michael Slackman, "An Ex-Official Offers Glimpse of Iranian Views of US," *The New York Times* (August 28, 2006), p. A9.

<sup>130</sup> Quoted in Michael Herzog, "Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Program: An Asset for the International Community," *Washington Institute for Near East Policy Focus #56* (June 2006), p. 1.

<sup>131</sup> Takeyh, "Iran Builds the Bomb," p. 57.

According to an Iranian Students Polling Agency poll conducted at the end of January 2006, 85 percent of the Iranian population supported resuming the nuclear program.<sup>132</sup>

The nuclear program certainly provides some legitimacy for the regime, although this support may not be as overwhelming as the conventional wisdom would suggest. Michael Herzog has argued that the regime usually speaks of a peaceful nuclear energy program, or blurs the distinction between the energy and weapons programs, and almost all public opinion polls fail to ask questions that consider the difference between the two.<sup>133</sup> In the IPSA poll cited above, for example, the level of public support for the program dropped to 74 percent if the IAEA referred the Iran case to the UN Security Council; 64 percent if economic sanctions were imposed, and 56 percent if Iran were to face military action.<sup>134</sup> Trita Parsi's analysis agrees with Herzog; she concluded that Iranians distinguish between weaponization and access to nuclear technology, and "the vast majority of Iranians argued that going nuclear [militarily] would make Iran less, rather than more safe."<sup>135</sup> Iranian demonstrators are now regularly playing on the regime's slogan of nuclear "indisputable rights" by invoking other "indisputable rights" – such as permanent employment, higher wages, and an elected leader (a reference to the unelected Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei).<sup>136</sup>

## **Iranian Reactions to US Nuclear Policy**

Iran views US nuclear policy through the lens of all other US-Iranian interactions. Tehran claims that the US nuclear policy is hypocritical and that it implements a double standard when it comes to nuclear dealings with friends or "rogues." This double standard is cited in US nuclear-related interactions with Israel, India, and in view of the NPT agreements. The Iranian reaction to official pronouncements of US nuclear policy such as the 2001 National Security Strategy (NSS) or 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was limited to a few criticisms.

### The US Double Standard: Nuclear Friends and Nuclear Foes

Numerous articles in Iranian news media allege hypocrisy in US nuclear policy in the Middle East. The *Tehran Times* regularly accuses the US of maintaining a double standard toward the various new or near-nuclear powers. Most galling to Tehran is US support for Israel despite its suspected nuclear status. As one Iranian journalist put it succinctly, "The West's policy of ignoring Israel's nuclear weapons program while raising unjustified concerns about Iran's peaceful nuclear activities has shown Muslim nations that the West applies double standards toward Islamic countries."<sup>137</sup> Further, news sources imply that there is an international consensus on Israel and its suspected nuclear status: "It is obvious that Israel cannot comment on

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<sup>132</sup> Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) Poll in January 2006, at <http://www.ispa.ir/en/MorePage.aspx?tName=ANews1&pType=ANInXML&Id=2>, accessed June 11, 2006.

<sup>133</sup> Herzog, "Iranian Public Opinion," p. 2.

<sup>134</sup> ISPA Poll in January 2006.

<sup>135</sup> Trita Parsi, "Tharwa Feature: Iranian Public Opinion and Tehran's Nuclear Program," *Tharwa Project* (April 4, 2005), available at <http://www.tharwaproject.com/node/1902>.

<sup>136</sup> Herzog, "Iranian Public Opinion," p. 4.

<sup>137</sup> "Iranian daily says resumption of nuclear research 'national decision'," *Tehran Times* (January 14, 2006).

the nuclear activities of other countries from the legal point of view because the international community regards it as a rouge [sic] nuclear power...”<sup>138</sup> The US double standard is also evident elsewhere in the world: US tacit acceptance of and eventual support for Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons versus its vitriol and commitment to undermining any nuclear capability in Iran, Iraq or North Korea.<sup>139</sup>

Iran views the NPT as the primary vehicle for US hypocrisy. The NPT is an inherently-discriminatory document that divides the world into the nuclear weapons states (those that had the bomb prior to 1968) and the non-nuclear weapon states (those who agreed not to pursue weapons in exchange for nuclear power technology). However, the US-India nuclear technology exchange deal, which occurred despite India’s having never signed the NPT, has undermined Iranian tolerance of criticism for its own “legal” nuclear program. As the moderate newspaper *Mardom-Salary* commented:

The fact that nuclear energy has been localized in the region [through the US-India deal] creates a good opportunity for Iran to do its best in order to reach such technology similar to India and Pakistan who now are security poles of the region. All of us know that Pakistan and India have not signed the NPT; however they are supported by America and the European countries. Now there is a question of why America and the European countries oppose Iran’s nuclear activities while Iran is a signatory of the NPT?<sup>140</sup>

The Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council and chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani’s response to the US-India nuclear deal was even more pointed. Comparing US behavior towards Iran, which does not yet have nuclear weapons, with its behavior towards India, which does, he noted that, “This dual standard is detrimental to international security.”<sup>141</sup> Iran also relies on other international voices, such as the director general of the IAEA, to support its position: “Mohammed El-Baradei said that the United States cannot tell the international community that nuclear weapons are good for the USA and bad for other countries.”<sup>142</sup> Neither Iran nor the US has ratified the CTBT, but Iran views the American refusal as an implicit promise to build and test new nuclear weapons while abandoning its commitment under the Article VI of the NPT to work towards complete disarmament. Furthermore, Iran claims that the US violated Article I of the NPT under the 2005 Energy Policy Act, a law that allows the sale of enriched uranium to military facilities at specific countries.<sup>143</sup>

The US double standard works in two ways for Iran. First, Iranian statesmen can take the high road by touting the fact that it signed the NPT and has made efforts to meet its requirements: “In fact, Iran’s opposition to the complete stopping of enriching uranium is an

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<sup>138</sup> “Iran: Daily denounces US, Israeli “campaign” against Iran’s nuclear activities,” *Tehran Times* (June 11, 2003).

<sup>139</sup> “Iran press: Article views recent nuclear developments as NPT “burial,” *Tehran Times* (April 20, 2006).

<sup>140</sup> “A good opportunity for Iran,” *Mardom-Salary* (March 7, 2006), as quoted in US Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *Foreign Media Reaction Issue Focus: US-India Nuclear Accord* (March 13, 2006).

<sup>141</sup> As quoted in “Iran: India Reacts with Caution,” *The Hindu* (January 18, 2006).

<sup>142</sup> “USA sending “wrong signals” over nuclear tests – Iranian daily,” *Tehran Times* (December 15, 2003).

<sup>143</sup> “Iran press: Article views recent nuclear developments as NPT ‘burial’,” *Tehran Times* (April 20, 2006).

indication of the Islamic Republic of Iran's adherence to the Geneva Convention Charter, the NPT, the IAEA regulations and articles 73 and 77 of Iran's agreement with the NPT."<sup>144</sup> Ali Larijani used Iran's apparent NPT compliance to paint his country as cooperative and rational:

The Iranians do not want anything more than other countries in this respect. They expect the same rights considered for Japan, South Korea, Brazil and India, as well as other countries, in terms of nuclear technology to be considered for Iran as a member of the agency [IAEA]. We are not making strange demands. We believe that any suspension in this respect should be logical.<sup>145</sup>

Second, Iran can use what it sees as blatant US hypocrisy to further its innocent victimhood. The Iranian response to the United Nations' nuclear negotiation package presented on June 6, 2006 claimed that the US tried to undermine Iran's attempt at engagement with the international community: "certain governments, with no justification, prompted a negative campaign, declared a part of the package as prerequisite to any negotiation, and unilaterally broke the negotiations."<sup>146</sup>

#### The 2002 US Nuclear Policy Review and 2001 National Security Strategy

Iranian reactions to the release of official US nuclear strategy in the 2002 NPR and 2001 NSS were hard to discern. Media reporting was limited and no scholarly articles were found that addressed either document specifically. The few that did reference the NSS made no mention of the NPR, although the concept of new nuclear capabilities was discussed. This is surprising, given that international press coverage of the allegedly leaked version of the NPR mentions Iran as a country against which nuclear weapons could be used in certain contingencies.<sup>147</sup> One exception was the Iranian deputy foreign minister, speaking at the 2002 Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, who criticized the US decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and proceed with national missile defense. As quoted in a Pakistani newspaper, the deputy foreign minister pointedly stated that "while the international community was calling for multilateralism, cooperation and dialogue, one single voice talked about the escalation of war and unilateralism."<sup>148</sup>

In his response to the NSS, Iranian Foreign Minister Seyyed Kamal Kharrazi commented that, "Despite the fact that there are a number of new points, most of what has been delineated in this new strategy is not new. In fact, it sets out the strategy that America formulated in the aftermath of 11 September to resolve its problems."<sup>149</sup> One interpretation of this statement is that the Iranian government did not wish to bring further attention to the NSS or have the public

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<sup>144</sup> "Iran: Paper praises Iran's achievement in reaching nuclear agreement," *Tehran Times* (October 22, 2003).

<sup>145</sup> "Iran top negotiator down plays Israeli nuclear threat," *IRNA* (December 5, 2005).

<sup>146</sup> Islamic Republic of Iran's Response to the Package (Presented on June 6, 2006). Available at: <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/iranresponse.pdf>

<sup>147</sup> For example, see "Indian Writer Says Iran's Case Reveals Operational 'Contradiction' in NPT," *The Asian Age* (October 11, 2005).

<sup>148</sup> Editorial, "US nuclear duplicity," *The Frontier Post* (Pakistan) (March 31, 2002).

<sup>149</sup> "Iran: Foreign minister says nothing new in Bush's national security strategy," *IRNA* (September 20, 2002).



interpreting the document for themselves. Another interpretation is that it did not take the NSS seriously. Most likely, it seems Iran was taken aback by the honest description of the Bush Administration's pre-emptive policy that Tehran had already identified and the press publicized. Interestingly, the press devoted an entire article to denounce French President Jacques Chirac's January 2006 speech announcing a change in France's nuclear strategy. This article argued that the new policy – that France would consider using weapons of mass destruction against countries that it believed were sponsors of terrorist acts – was influenced by the US.<sup>150</sup>

Although the press did not call specific attention to the NPR, numerous media references were found to Washington's doctrine of pre-emptive warfare and "mini-nukes." Iranian newspaper articles reiterate the role of the international community and the IAEA in pressuring the US to adhere to international law and to give up its low-yield nuclear weapon plans. When President Bush in 2003 appropriated \$15 million for low-yield nuclear weapons, the *Tehran Daily* stated that such a move would no less than "shift the balance of power in the world." Iran framed its disapproval as allied with the rest of the world: "The international community in general and officials from many countries in particular have protested against this decision." The article was quick to point out that these weapons would be used specifically as "bunker busters." It reiterated that the US "intends to mass produce such weapons" and that it "will most likely use them in a limited nuclear war in the future."<sup>151</sup> During the UN General Assembly meeting in New York in September 2006, President Ahmadinejad also expressed his disapproval for new US nuclear weapons:

Some powers proudly announce their production of second and third generations of nuclear weapons. What do they need these weapons for? Is the development and stockpiling of these deadly weapons designed to promote peace and democracy? Or, are these weapons, in fact, instruments of coercion and threat against other peoples and governments?<sup>152</sup>

Tehran seems to identify US nuclear policy through governmental statements and US actions more than any "official" policy as outlined in the NPR or NSS. For example, on June 19, 2006, President Bush stated at the US Merchant Marine Academy that US engagement in direct talks with Iran regarding its nuclear program could not occur until "the Iranian regime fully and verifiably suspends its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities."<sup>153</sup> Although diplomatic channels are always used to communicate during sensitive negotiations, such public statements also are part of the message received by Iran, especially with the US policy decision not to communicate bilaterally with the Iranian government.

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<sup>150</sup> "Tehran Times rejects Chirac's 'dangerous nuclear doctrine'," *Tehran Times* (January 23, 2006).

<sup>151</sup> "USA sending "wrong signals" over nuclear tests – Iranian daily."

<sup>152</sup> Address by H.E. Dr. Mahmood Ahmadinejad, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, before the Sixtieth Session of the United Nations General Assembly New York (17 September 2006). Available at <http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/60/statements/iran050917eng.pdf>

<sup>153</sup> Seymour Hersh, "Last Stand: The Military's Problem with the President's Iran Policy," *The New Yorker* (July 10, 2006).

## **Iran's Potential Reactions to Proposed Future Changes in US Nuclear Policy**

Although the literature review indicates that Iran does have opinions about US nuclear policy, the number of articles that address other US policies, both in the Middle East and towards Iran specifically, greatly overshadow the nuclear dimension. This should not be taken to mean that US nuclear policies are not important, but rather that when weighing the impact of its nuclear policy on a “rogue” state, the US should consider the multitude of other messages that are sent. Those messages are sent via public speeches, news media sources, Internet, and “official” policy, but most importantly, they are sent through US actions.

The net assessment is that the official US nuclear posture is only one factor in its relations with Iran. Thus, Iran's response to changes in US nuclear policy would likely be diluted by the other US policies that have larger implications for their immediate security situation. Changes in the quantity or type of US nuclear weapons might be viewed as a specific attack on Iranian interests and security but Iran would likely view these changes through the lens of the existing diplomatic and economic climate between the two countries.

## **PAKISTAN**

While Chinese and Iranian views about US nuclear policy appear to be filtered through each state's perceptions of all US international policies more generally, for Pakistan, US nuclear policy by itself seems to be quite important. US nuclear policy has a significant independent effect on the wider bilateral relationship between the two countries, which is quite different from the other states examined in this paper. There are three possible reasons for this difference. First, Pakistan relies heavily on its own nuclear policy as the cornerstone to its national security, and thus may give more weight to other states' nuclear policies than most countries do. Similarly, unlike the other states examined here, Pakistan is an undeclared nuclear state that has not signed the NPT, and thus may be more sensitive to nuclear policies than most states due to its undeclared status. Finally, because Pakistan's fate – and its foreign policy – is so wrapped up in its relations with India, the US-India nuclear deal obviously affects Pakistan's sense of security very directly. At least this dimension of US nuclear policy has great effect for Pakistan.

As a result, everything with regard to Pakistan's views of nuclear weapons and US declaratory nuclear policy must be analyzed in relation to how these issues interact with Pakistan's strategic competition with India. Whereas the United States forms a large part of Chinese and Iranian threat perceptions, it does not for Pakistan (or Germany). Because it does not compete directly with the United States as China and Iran do, Pakistan views US nuclear policy through a different lens – one that is always conscious of the strategic rivalry between Pakistan and India.

## **Pakistani Perceptions of the United States**

An understanding of the historical and current sources of Pakistan's perception of the US is critical to understanding why, to Pakistan, US nuclear policy is simply more evidence of its

duplicity and untrustworthiness. This section describes Pakistan's perception of the US, historically and in relation to current events. In ways that are similar to Iran, Pakistan's historic narrative is replete with "a sense of wrongdoing and injustices, betrayals of trust and treaties, abandonment by allies, and victimization due to religion, race and color."<sup>154</sup> In this narrative, the United States is the cause for most of this abandonment, earning it the epithet of "fair weather friend"<sup>155</sup> – one that pursues its own interests irrespective of other considerations.

Pakistan believes that, throughout its history, it has been used by the United States and then abandoned when those interests were served. In a relationship that swings like a pendulum, Pakistan has drifted from being "the most allied ally" in the 1950s, to "the ignored ally" in the 1960s and 1970s, back to "the most allied ally" in the 1980s, to the most sanctioned ally in the 1990s, and finally to "the most suspected ally" from 2001 until the present. Understandably, such perceived fickleness on the part of the United States does not leave an endearing impression in the mind of most Pakistanis.<sup>156</sup>

At the onset of the Cold War, Pakistan aligned itself with the United States by joining two regional defense pacts, the South East Asia Treaty Organization and the "Baghdad Pact." As a result of these alliances, Pakistan received nearly \$2 billion in US assistance from 1953 until 1961, a quarter of this in military aid, thus making Pakistan one of America's most important security partners of the period, "the most allied ally."<sup>157</sup> The relationship declined apart during the 1970s, as new strains arose over Pakistan's efforts to respond to India's 1974 nuclear test by seeking its own nuclear capability. With the 1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, US priorities shifted again, and Pakistan was again viewed as a frontline ally in the effort to block Soviet expansionism. In 1981, the Reagan Administration offered Islamabad a five-year, \$3.2 billion aid package, and turned a blind eye to Pakistan's nuclear program – even waiving specific sanctions mandated by law (discussed further below).<sup>158</sup> Although Pakistan disclosed in 1984 that it could enrich uranium and revealed in 1987 that it could assemble a nuclear device, the US continued to certify Pakistan's non-nuclear status until 1990. In exchange, Pakistan became a key transit country for arms to the Afghan resistance.

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan's strategic importance for the United States waned again, and in the 1990s, the US shifted towards India in terms of economic and strategic interests, while choosing to overlook India's nuclear history. During the same time, Pakistan was isolated internationally, and the United States again suspended aid because of Pakistan's nuclear program.

After more than a decade of alienation, US-Pakistan relations were transformed anew after September 11, 2001. The US once again returned to Pakistan as a pivotal ally, this time in the

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<sup>154</sup> Feroz Hassan Khan, "Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan," *Strategic Insights*, vol. 4, no. 10 (October 2005), p.2.

<sup>155</sup> An apt description cited from Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).

<sup>156</sup> For a detailed discussion of the vacillating relationship between Pakistan and the United States, see Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001).

<sup>157</sup> Alan Kronstadt, "Pakistan-US Relations," *CRS Issue Brief for Congress*, IB94041 (March 6, 2006), p. 3.

<sup>158</sup> Kronstadt, "Pakistan-US Relations," p. 3.

global war on terrorism. To reward Pakistan for its cooperation with US military action in Afghanistan, the US waived nuclear specific sanctions and coup sanctions on Pakistan, and extended significant economic incentives to the Musharraf regime.

Given this history of perceived American fickleness, it is not surprising that Pakistani views of the US have been consistently low for some time. Since 1999, public opinion polls have consistently shown negative views about the United States, with less than a quarter of the population holding a “favorable opinion” of the US. The lowest poll was in 2002, when only 10 percent of the population held favorable views.<sup>159</sup>

In sum, Pakistan views the United States as a “fair weather friend,” and it resents how it has been, as it believes, used by the United States and then abandoned when those interests were served. Pakistanis see themselves as having been allies with the US and having made many sacrifices for American interests, but not having received the follow through or support they feel they deserve. Part of its resentment may also be the sense of powerlessness it feels, because although it sees the United States as fickle, Pakistan continues to need the relationship.

Although Pakistan does not feel a direct military threat from the United States, as Iran does, it is vulnerable to the United States in other ways – strategically, militarily and economically. Strategically, Pakistan is vulnerable to the US in regard to India and Afghanistan. From Pakistan’s perspective, the US also has the potential to upset the balance of the conflict in Kashmir. Militarily, Pakistan depends on the US for equipping and supplying its military.<sup>160</sup> Economically, Pakistan is heavily supported by US assistance.<sup>161</sup> Thus, while the US does not pose a direct security threat to Pakistan, these other dynamics of US-Pakistani relations assure Pakistani dependency on US policies and actions in more subtle, but still important ways, and Pakistanis are well aware of this.

### **Pakistani Nuclear Policy**

The genesis of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program was in direct response to its defeat in the Bangladesh War and India’s nuclear test in 1974. These two events provided Pakistan with evidence of its insecurity in regard to both its sovereignty and its inability to deter possible Indian aggression. Nuclear weapons were seen as an “equalizer,” making up for Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth and conventional asymmetry. Pakistan’s development of the nuclear option is the result, at least in part, of its lack of success in its competition with India.<sup>162</sup> Accordingly, nuclear weapons have always formed the centerpiece in Pakistan’s search for “strategic equality” with India, which has deep historical roots stretching back to the partition of the two countries in 1947.<sup>163</sup> India continues to be the almost singular focus of Pakistan’s security and nuclear

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<sup>159</sup> Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 13, 2006. <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252>

<sup>160</sup> For more details about US-Pakistan security cooperation, see Kronstadt, “Pakistan-US Relations,” pp. 11-12.

<sup>161</sup> Kronstadt, “Pakistan-US Relations,” p. 20.

<sup>162</sup> Timothy D. Hoyt, “Strategic Myopia: Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine and Crisis Stability in South Asia,” in *South Asia’s Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan and China*, ed. Lowell Dittmer (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2005), pp. 113-115.

<sup>163</sup> Farzana Shaikh, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Non-proliferation Regime,” *International Affairs*, vol. 78, no. 1 (January 2002), p. 44.

doctrines.<sup>164</sup> As Pakistani scholar Feroz Hassan Khan suggests, from a broader strategic cultural viewpoint,

Pakistan refuses to acquiesce to Indian military might, and remains determined to find ways to equalize or balance. Preservation of national sovereignty is thus the primary objective, and in pursuance of national security, all tools – including the use of an asymmetric strategy – are justified.<sup>165</sup>

One such tool is Pakistan's first use policy, with the explicit statement that its nuclear weapons "are aimed solely at India."<sup>166</sup> This policy has not been clearly articulated, but in ambiguous terms, Pakistan has always reserved the right to use nuclear weapons, even in the case of responding to a conventional attack. The first use policy and its ambiguity are designed to achieve maximum deterrence value.<sup>167</sup> It can be attributed to Pakistan's lack of conventional parity with India, lack of strategic depth and a weak economy that cannot sustain a large nuclear arsenal.<sup>168</sup> As Khan argues, "Nuclear weapons are critical to Pakistan and an assurance for national survival. There is no constituency in Pakistan that believes otherwise."<sup>169</sup> The Pakistani historical narrative focuses on Pakistan's ingenuity and defiance of India (and the international community) to create self-reliance through nuclear weapons.<sup>170</sup>

Pakistan views the NPT as a "discriminatory" and "self-defeating instrument" because it legitimizes nuclear weapons for the nuclear weapons states, while not doing the same for others, and because it has not lived up to the principles laid out in 1968.<sup>171</sup> Therefore, in its current form, the NPT is seen for some Pakistani observers as "irrelevant" and for others as "a foreign policy tool of both US & NATO."<sup>172</sup> Pakistan's original position with regard to the NPT was that it would accede as a non-nuclear power – but only if India did the same. On numerous occasions, Pakistan asked India to accede simultaneously, but to no avail.<sup>173</sup> In recent years,

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<sup>164</sup> Shireen M. Mazari, "Understanding Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine," *Strategic Studies* (Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad), vol. 24, no. 3 (Autumn 2004). Available at [http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2004\\_files/no\\_3/article/1a.htm](http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2004_files/no_3/article/1a.htm).

<sup>165</sup> Khan, "Comparative Strategic Culture," p. 4.

<sup>166</sup> General Kidwai as quoted in Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Matellini, "Landau Report on Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan," available at <http://www.mi.infn.it>

<sup>167</sup> Michael Quinlan, "How Robust is India-Pakistan Deterrence," *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 4 (Winter 2000-2001), pp. 149-50.

<sup>168</sup> See Smruti S. Pattanaik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Strategy," *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 27, no. 1 (Jan-Mar 2003).

<sup>169</sup> Khan, "Comparative Strategic Culture," p. 9.

<sup>170</sup> This historical narrative also praises A.Q. Khan as a hero, the father of a nuclear capability that the rest of the world was trying to block. Thus, when the A.Q. Khan proliferation ring was discovered, Pakistanis viewed the black market activity less as a matter of concern than as a symbol of defiance of the West.

<sup>171</sup> Moazzam Tahir Minhas, "NPT and Flawed Convention," *The Nation* (Pakistan) (May 7, 2005).

<sup>172</sup> Mazari, "Understanding Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine;" Minhas, "NPT and Flawed Convention."

<sup>173</sup> Pakistani proposals include: "(i) Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South Asia endorsed by the UN since 1974 (ii) India and Pakistan should issue a joint declaration renouncing the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapon in 1978, (iii) to put all nuclear installations in India and Pakistan under inspection of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (iv) 1979- bilateral inspection of all nuclear facilities on reciprocal basis (v) 1979-simultaneous acceptance of IAEA safeguards by Pakistan and India on all nuclear facilities (vi) 1979-simultaneous accession to NPT (vii) 1987-regional test ban treaty (viii) 1987

however, Pakistan has reversed course and stated that it would still like to join the NPT, but as a recognized nuclear power.<sup>174</sup> In a quote typical of Pakistani views about whether it might consider signing the NPT, Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz in 1999 said,

There is no question of it because we cannot join NPT as a non-nuclear power and in the present shape of NPT, only five countries are nuclear powers and they do not accept others... Therefore, either they amend the treaty and allow us entry as nuclear power, then we may join. But the signing of NPT is not under debate as yet.<sup>175</sup>

In sum, everything with regard to Pakistan's views of nuclear weapons and US declaratory nuclear policy must be analyzed in relation to how these issues interact with Pakistan's strategic competition with India and its historic sense of the United States as a "fair weather friend."

### **Pakistani Reactions to US Nuclear Policy**

Like the other states in this analysis, Pakistan views US nuclear policy as hypocritical. In fact, Pakistani references to US nuclear posture typically describe US hypocrisy and double standards. Many analysts write that the US wants to maintain an extraordinary, very robust nuclear weapons position, while at the same time dictating to others what they can and cannot do. While Iran's concern with the double standard focused on the US' behavior towards nuclear friends (such as Israel and India) versus nuclear foes (such as North Korea and Iran), Pakistan's concern with the double standard focuses on the United States' *own* nuclear policy. In other words, Pakistan is most upset by its perception of US nuclear policy as demonstrating that the United States believes itself powerful enough – and thus exceptional enough – to apply different standards of behavior to itself versus others. Pakistan also believes that US actions are undermining its stated goals for global nuclear non-proliferation.

### The US Double Standard: Non-Proliferation Taking a Back Seat to US Strategic Interests

Pakistani analysts and policymakers argue that there is a large gulf between US stated objectives about nuclear non-proliferation and its actions. They point to a perceived lack of US commitment to the NPT, the US failure to ratify the CTBT, US double standards with respect to Israel, and US behavior in South Asia, which only enforces non-proliferation sanctions when other US strategic interests have been met.

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convening a conference on nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia under the auspices of the UN. See Brigadier Naeem Ahmad Salik, "Pakistan and the Future of Non-Proliferation," *IPRI Journal*, vol. 6, no. 1 (Winter 2006), pp. 27-30; Smruti S. Pattanaik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Strategy," *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 27, no. 1 (Jan-Mar 2003), p. 25, available at <http://www.idsa.in/publications/strategic-analysis/2003/jan/Smruti.pdf>

<sup>174</sup>Mazari, "Understanding Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine;" "NPT Signing only if Pakistan Recognized as Nuclear Power: Sartaj," *The News* (February 24, 1999).

<sup>175</sup>As quoted in "Signing of NPT Not Under Debate: Sartaj Aziz," *Associated Press of Pakistan* (February 25, 1999), available at <http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1999/990225-appday.htm>.

First, Pakistan views US commitment to Article VI of the NPT as non-existent. At the 2000 Review Conference, the US committed itself to concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament and reducing and eliminating the role of nuclear weapons in US security policy. These commitments, however, are seen as completely baseless in light in the 2002 NPR and the Bush Doctrine (as discussed below). For many, the US commitment to the “NPT and disarmament [is] a hoax and nothing more.”<sup>176</sup>

Second, analysts cite the US failure to ratify the CTBT as indicative of double standards and problematic for trying to produce peace in South Asia. Many opponents to the CTBT in Pakistan cited US failure to ratify the Treaty as evidence not to accede, saying that “for all practical purposes the treaty is dead.”<sup>177</sup> Pakistan’s Foreign Minister framed the problem more subtly: “the prospects of the treaty entering into force have dimmed because the US has rejected ratification.”<sup>178</sup> As a result, some Pakistanis believe that the US rejection reduces the burden of responsibility for Pakistan to sign the treaty.

Third, Pakistanis believe that US support for non-proliferation policies differs for different countries, based on other US strategic interests. Analysts especially point to the blind eye that the United States apparently turns to Israel’s alleged nuclear arsenal. As Shireen Mazari argued, “In the field of non-proliferation... the whole focus is on a country-by-country approach rather than one based on accepted international principles. So one can safely assume that there will be no US pressure on Israel with regard to WMD.”<sup>179</sup>

Perhaps most importantly, for many Pakistani observers, US behavior regarding sanctions enforcement in South Asia is rather confusing and ineffective for achieving the US stated goal of nuclear non-proliferation. Writing about US non-proliferation efforts in South Asia, Pakistani scholar Samina Ahmed stresses the concern that,

Although declared US policy has emphasized nuclear nonproliferation goals, other perceived political, commercial and strategic interests have more often taken precedence over nonproliferation and arms control objectives. Nonproliferation sanctions were insubstantial and were rarely sustained; inducement strategies were inappropriate and unconditionally extended.<sup>180</sup>

Ahmed views US nuclear non-proliferation goals in South Asia within the historical context of the United States as a “fair weather friend” – arguing that the US often made decisions that led to increased nuclear danger in South Asia. In her view, the post-September 11<sup>th</sup> environment is simply a continuation of that context: “Nonproliferation, formerly a centerpiece of US policy towards both India and Pakistan, has taken a back seat to the expediencies of the war on terrorism.”<sup>181</sup> In her estimation,

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<sup>176</sup> Minhas, “NPT and Flawed Convention.”

<sup>177</sup> Salik, “Pakistan and the Future of Non-Proliferation,” p. 37.

<sup>178</sup> Salik, “Pakistan and the Future of Non-Proliferation,” p. 38.

<sup>179</sup> Shireen M. Mazari, “Expanding parameters of US preemption,” *The News* (December 18, 2002).

<sup>180</sup> Samina Ahmed, “Countering Nuclear Risks in South Asia,” *Paper for The Council for a Livable World Education Fund* (December 2001), p. 5.

<sup>181</sup> Ahmed, “Countering Nuclear Risks in South Asia,” Executive Summary.

US nonproliferation concerns and arms control objectives have receded into the background as counterterrorism strategies take primacy over all other US political, economic and strategic interests in South Asia....and Pakistan's military regime has become a major beneficiary of these changed US priorities.<sup>182</sup>

Ahmed details how the US, since 2001, has waived nuclear-specific sanctions on Pakistan to reward Islamabad for its cooperation with US military action in Afghanistan. These include:

- The Symington Amendment (1976), which prohibits most US economic and military assistance to any country delivering or receiving nuclear material not safeguarded by the IAEA;
- The Pressler Amendment (1985), which bars most economic and military assistance to Pakistan unless the US President can certify on an annual basis that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device; and
- Military Coup Sanctions (1988), which prohibit most US assistance to any country whose elected head of government is deposed by a military coup (as Pakistan's was in 1999, after Gen. Pervez Musharraf ousted the democratically elected prime minister, Nawaz Sharif).

In addition, to assuage Indian concerns about a renewed military relationship with Pakistan and acknowledge a continued US interest in a strategic relationship with India, the United States has also eased all Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act sanctions on India, including restrictions on military sales and prohibitions on high technology.<sup>183</sup>

In sum, Pakistan's own experience with the United States suggests that US non-proliferation goals will always take a back seat to other strategic interests, and this makes the United States' non-proliferation policy seem hypocritical.

#### The 2002 US Nuclear Posture Review and 2001 National Security Strategy

From the Pakistani perspective, the most important way that the United States' stated nuclear non-proliferation goals are undermined in the world is through recent changes to its own nuclear policy – including the 2002 NPR, the related decisions to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and build a National Missile Defense program, and the pre-emption doctrine outlined in the 2001 NSS. Pakistan considers these changes to US nuclear policy aggressive and hypocritical. The most negative Pakistani reactions have focused on the possible development of new nuclear weapons, such as “mini-nukes” and earth penetrating weapons. And, like the Chinese, Pakistani observers regard the 2002 Moscow Treaty, which stipulated the reduction of deployed nuclear arsenals in the US and Russia, to be hollow.

Many Pakistani analysts believe that recent changes in US nuclear policy are the single most threatening influence on international non-proliferation efforts today. As an Islamabad-based security analyst argued, “When the Cold War ended, it was believed that the end of the Soviet Union would also bring an end to the nuclear threat....Ironically, that threat has grown in

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<sup>182</sup> Ahmed, “Countering Nuclear Risks in South Asia,” p. 11.

<sup>183</sup> Ahmed, “Countering Nuclear Risks in South Asia,” p. 10.



the recent years, mainly due to the weapons policy being pursued by the current Bush administration, in which the nuclear arsenal remains a driving force.”<sup>184</sup> This analyst, Ghazala Yasmin – a research fellow at the Institute for Strategic Studies – argues that the NPR enunciates “an aggressive combination of unilateral military action in support of US interests, and the abandonment of long-pursued disarmament and non-proliferation policies.” She concludes that

the administration’s weapons policies are violating its international arms control and disarmament obligations and, in the process, are damaging the non-proliferation regime...the US is, thereby, creating further insecurity and instability across the world as the main cause of proliferation by fueling an arms race world wide.<sup>185</sup>

Similarly, an editorial in *The Nation* (Pakistan) comments:

There has been a reduction in the number of weapons after the Cold War ended, but nuclear weapons remain integral to the strategic doctrines of all the nuclear five. The US has on the other hand taken measures that have started a new arms race. Despite its having developed into the mightiest military power in history which no country in the world is in a position to challenge, it is developing a new generation of nuclear weapons, more maneuverable and destructive than the older ones. At the same time it is seeking to build a national missile defense system to provide it immunity from any possible nuclear attack, thus forcing some of the major powers who feel the need for deterrence to develop new delivery systems and smaller warheads capable of penetrating the American defensive shield. While the members of the nuclear club maintain that terrorists taking recourse to low intensity warfare constitute the greatest threat to their security, they continue to add new warheads to their nuclear arsenal while advising those outside the exclusive club to adhere to the NPT. This is sheer hypocrisy.<sup>186</sup>

An oft cited example of such hypocrisy is the US prosecuting a preventive war in Iraq and demanding that Iran halt all nuclear activities, while at the same time putting forth proposals for new weapons in the NPR. As an editorial in Peshawar’s *Frontier Post* noted,

While the US is persisting with its erroneous pursuit of nuclear hegemony, it has been leveling accusations of nuclear proliferation against every country that provokes its ire. For example it has been accusing China of facilitating shipments to Pakistan in order to help build its ballistic missiles. And as if to give further proof of its duplicity, it has been looking the other way to implicitly permit India to pursue its missile plans. Similarly, it has been repeating accusations of Iraq being [sic] going ahead with its nuclear program with the aim of using this as a pretext to impose a new war on that country. The fact of the matter is that the US is creating hurdles in the way of nuclear non-proliferation in the world.<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>184</sup> Yasmin, “Bush Administration’s Nuclear Weapons Policy.”

<sup>185</sup> Yasmin, “Bush Administration’s Nuclear Weapons Policy.”

<sup>186</sup> Editorial, “Nuclear Hypocrisy,” *The Nation* (Pakistan), May 5, 2005.

<sup>187</sup> Editorial, “US nuclear duplicity,” *Peshawar Frontier Post* (March 31, 2002).

Pakistanis express particular concern about the seeming renewed emphasis in US security policy on using nuclear weapons, especially against non-nuclear weapons states. Writing in *Dawn* after elements of the NPR were leaked in March 2002, Ashfak Bokhari argued that, “the Bush administration has brought the world much closer to the actual use of nuclear weapons...The key significance of these changes is to transform nuclear bombs from the “last resort” into weapons which can be used at will.” This decision has “signalled an end to the universally accepted notion, on which the international security regime rested, that a nuclear weapon is a deterrent, not a weapon for use.” Bokhari also highlighted that Muslims, in particular, should take note of this shift, especially in light of talk among individuals in the US of “nuking” Mecca and supporting “a new version of the medieval Crusades.” Furthermore, Bokhari emphasized the oft-repeated claim of US double standards stressing that “had any other country been seen planning to develop a new nuclear weapon and contemplating pre-emptive strikes against certain non-nuclear powers, Washington would have declared that state a ‘dangerous rogue state’.”<sup>188</sup>

Writing on the same day in *The News*, Shireen Mazari presented a similar reaction, framing the NPR in terms of the US making “a concerted effort to legitimize the use of nukes... The US is now telling the world that it will use nuclear weapons as and when it sees fit.” Mazari, like Bokhari, speculates that this shift may be directed toward the Muslim world, stating that “all in all, given the new obsession of the US – actually an old one revived – with destroying regimes, even states it dislikes, one should expect covert destabilizing activities in many parts of the world – especially the Muslim world.”<sup>189</sup>

Similarly, Yasmin argued that “the picture that seems to be emerging is that...a regime not to the US liking is also cause for a nuclear attack.” Yasmin’s analysis focused extensively on the NPR alleged list of potential targets of a US nuclear attack – China, Russia, Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya and Syria. Noting that five of these states do not possess nuclear weapons, she criticized the fact that the US might strike non-nuclear states, “a drastic departure from the policy that the US has pursued for decades, by which it pledged never to launch a nuclear attack on non-nuclear states.” In her view, “the current US policy seems to make nuclear weapons no longer weapons of last resort, but rather instruments of coercion that may be used in fighting wars, even against non-nuclear weapons states.”<sup>190</sup>

In tandem to its negative reaction to the NPR, Pakistan has criticized the US decisions to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty and build a national missile defense program. Both are viewed as “go-it-alone” decisions that undermine collective security for “arbitrary and uni-dimensional approaches to security.”<sup>191</sup> Some articles suggested that NMD would not work, highlighting its “staggering” costs and a “highly scripted, unrealistic test environment.” As

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<sup>188</sup> Bokhari, Ashfak, “Which is a rogue State?” *Dawn* (March 29, 2002), available at <http://www.dawn.com/2002/03/29/op.htm>.

<sup>189</sup> Shireen M. Mazari, “Making Nuclear Weapons Kosher Again,” *The News* (March 27, 2002).

<sup>190</sup> Yasmin, “Bush Administration’s Nuclear Policy.”

<sup>191</sup> Editorial, “US nuclear duplicity.”

Yasmin argued, the Bush “administration’s present confidence in the effectiveness of the BMD is, therefore, misplaced.”<sup>192</sup>

Like the Chinese, Pakistani observers regard the 2002 Moscow Treaty, which stipulated the reduction of deployed nuclear arsenals in the US and Russia, to be hollow. The few articles that discussed the treaty note that it does not require either nation to destroy any warheads, but merely remove them from active deployment. In Yasmin’s words, “SORT, in fact, eliminates nothing....in effect the treaty is just a whitewash for the aggressive nuclear weapons policies being pursued” by the US.<sup>193</sup>

Finally, there is also great Pakistani hostility to the doctrine of preemption as outlined in the 2001 National Security Strategy (the Bush Doctrine). Many analysts find the links between the preemption doctrine and the NPR to be especially dangerous.<sup>194</sup> Unlike Iran, which feels itself to be a target of this pre-emptive doctrine, the Pakistani hostility toward preemption is usually stated in general terms – focusing on its violation of international law, creating instability and setting a dangerous precedent of unilateralism. As one Pakistani scholar noted:

The new US policy is a dangerous and a provocative one... the US wants to fight against terrorism on its own terms with little regard for international law...A dangerous divide between the US and the rest of world can be seen as taking shape. While the world looks to the provisions of the UN Charter for a civilising role in the conduct of international affairs, the prevailing view in Washington draws its inspiration from the same Charter’s emphasis on the sovereignty of nation states. For the US, this means that its status as the sole superpower must not be challenged in its drive to build a new world order based entirely on American notions.<sup>195</sup>

Some Pakistani scholars also worry that the US doctrine of preemption will also be adopted by India and (on the assumption that its suspected nuclear arsenal is real) Israel.<sup>196</sup>

Finally, many Pakistanis see the Bush Doctrine as unjust and directed against Muslim countries. Many sympathize with their coreligionists, especially in Iran and Iraq, which are seen as being dictated to and under attack by the US.<sup>197</sup> In these observers’ eyes, the doctrine of preemption and the US prosecution of its war on terrorism are simply two sides of the same coin. As Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister wrote in 2003, “the war on terrorism is widely perceived

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<sup>192</sup> Yasmin, “Bush Administration’s Nuclear Policy.”

<sup>193</sup> Yasmin, “Bush Administration’s Nuclear Policy.”

<sup>194</sup> Yasmin, “Bush Administration’s Nuclear Policy;” Editorial, “US nuclear duplicity;” Bokhara, “Which is a rogue state?;” Mazari, “Expanding Parameters of US preemption,” *Islamabad News* (December 18, 2002); Mazari, “US claims nuclear first strike,” *Islamabad News* (September 14, 2005).

<sup>195</sup> Najam Rafique, “9/11, A Year After: Appraising US Regional Strategies,” *Journal of the Institute of Strategic Studies*, vol. 22, no. 3 (Autumn 2002), available at [http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2002\\_files/no\\_3/article/1a.htm](http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2002_files/no_3/article/1a.htm).

<sup>196</sup> See especially Mazari, “Expanding parameters of US preemption.”

<sup>197</sup> Noor Ul Haq, “Unipolarism and Pak-US Relations,” *IPRI Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Winter 2006), pp. 93-115.

as a war against Islam.” On the same day, Kurshid Ahmad, Senator and Chairman of the Institute of Policy Studies in Islamabad, wrote that the war on terror is

a vicious campaign against one religion and its adherents. Islam and the Muslim countries are being singled out as the source and abode of all terrorism. Muslims in America and abroad are at the suffering end. The fair name of Islam is being maligned in a systematic manner.<sup>198</sup>

Similarly, Shireen Mazari, Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, asserted that, “All in all, it is clear that the direction adopted by the US is spreading instability all across Asia – especially the Muslim World.”<sup>199</sup>

In sum, the changes to US nuclear policy enshrined in the NPR, including the related decisions to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty and proceed with a national missile defense program, have only received negative responses from Pakistan. These policies are seen to be aggressive, hypocritical, and undermining international non-proliferation efforts. As Yasmin asserts, “The new US policies violate the basic principles of the [NPT] treaty and expose double standards of the world’s leading power. The US seems to be sending a message across the world – do as we say, not as we do.”<sup>200</sup>

### The US-India Nuclear Deal

Pakistani reaction to the 2006 proposed US-India nuclear deal has been negative, to say the least. The deal is considered by many to be exceptionally “discriminatory” and hence “unacceptable.” It has reinforced the perceptions of the US as a “fair weather friend,” as well as reinforced perceived US hypocrisy in putting its own strategic interests ahead of its stated nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The official Pakistani government statement released after President Bush’s trip to the region in March 2006 stresses the instability such a deal will create in the form of an arms race in South Asia. In addition, it emphasizes how this deal will undermine international non-proliferation efforts.<sup>201</sup> These views are widely accepted; as the

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<sup>198</sup> Prof. Kurshid Ahmad, “September 11: Two Years Later,” *Dawn* (September 11, 2003), available at <http://www.dawn.com/2003/09/11/op.htm>.

<sup>199</sup> Shireen M. Mazari, “Expanding Parameters of US Preemption,” *News*, December 18, 2002.

<sup>200</sup> Yasmin, “Bush Administration’s Nuclear Policy.”

<sup>201</sup> The full text is as follows: “The US Administration has sought a waiver from the US Congress for the implementation of US-India Agreement on Civilian Nuclear Cooperation. The grant of the waiver as a special case will have serious implications for the security environment in South Asia as well as for international non-proliferation efforts. The objective of strategic stability in South Asia and the global non-proliferation regime would have been better served if the United States had considered a package approach for Pakistan and India, the two non-NPT Nuclear Weapons States, with a view to preventing a nuclear arms race in the region and promoting restraints while ensuring that the legitimate needs of both countries for civilian nuclear power generation are met.

The history of the nuclear development in South Asia shows that Pakistan had pursued the nuclear option only after India tested a nuclear device in 1974. Pakistan needed to restore the disturbed balance and was compelled to respond when India again tested in 1998. By establishing nuclear deterrence, Pakistan has ensured peace and stability in South Asia as was proven by subsequent events especially in 2002. Following the resumption of the Composite Dialogue in 2004, it remains Pakistan’s objective to avoid arms race, promote restraints, reduce risk and maintain the nuclear deterrent at the minimum credible level.

Federal Minister for Information and Broadcasting in Pakistan has expressed it, “surely, 100 percent people are against this. There is [sic] not a single one percent people who are supporting this issue.”<sup>202</sup> The Pakistani response is negative, for four reasons.

First, as explained above, Pakistan’s security revolves around strategic competition with India. The US-India nuclear deal is seen as upsetting the balance that has prevailed in recent years and effectively consigning “the smaller countries in South Asia to Indian hegemony.”<sup>203</sup> As Rashid Rahman, Editor of the *Post* Newspaper, explained,

The insecurity that Pakistan feels in a more enhanced manner now, because of this Indo-US nuclear deal, I think they will increase. And I think Pakistan will take steps. There is very much a real threat of a new arms race, and even more alarmingly, a nuclear arms race on the subcontinent. I don't think this deal helps.<sup>204</sup>

Lt. General Talat Masood (retired) has stressed that the deal would have “severe implications for the issue of Kashmir, arms race in South Asia and regional stability.”<sup>205</sup> In more succinct terms, the Pakistan Muslim League General Secretary, Senator Mushahid Hussain, has said that the US -India civil nuclear agreement “will lead to the start of cold war in the region.”<sup>206</sup>

Pakistan believes that if the US supplies India with nuclear fuel, India will be able to divert its domestic supply to the production of nuclear weapons forcing Pakistan to respond in kind. An editorial in the Urdu-language paper *Jang* argued that the

US offer of civilian nuclear technology to India has created apprehensions in Pakistan, as there is a very thin line between civilian and military uses of nuclear technology. And India has a very bad track record of fulfilling its commitments.<sup>207</sup>

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The proposed exception for India will not be helpful to the shared objectives of stability in South Asia and a strong global non-proliferation regime. The Agreement, which keeps a large number facilities and reactors including breeder reactors outside safeguards, would only encourage India to continue its weapons programme without any constraint or inhibition. On its part Pakistan would not accept any discriminatory treatment. While we will continue to act with responsibility in maintaining minimum credible deterrence and to avoid an arms race, we will neither be oblivious to our security requirements, nor to the needs of our economic development which demand growth in the energy sector including civilian nuclear power generation.

Pakistan’s civilian nuclear power reactors are totally covered by the IAEA safeguards including the spent fuel produced by these reactors. Our future nuclear power generation reactors will also be under safeguards. We expect all the NSG member countries to be sensitive to Pakistan’s energy needs and extend cooperation in the civilian nuclear sector.” Press Release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, Pakistan (March 17, 2006), available at <http://www.embassyofpakistan.org/news187.php>.

<sup>202</sup> Philip Reeves, “Pakistan Uncertain About Relationship with US,” *NPR Morning Edition* (April 4, 2006), available at <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5321713>.

<sup>203</sup> Editorial, “Left High and Dry,” *The Nation* (Pakistan) (June 30, 2005).

<sup>204</sup> Reeves, “Pakistan Uncertain About Relationship with US.”

<sup>205</sup> “Public Talk on ‘Indo-US Nuclear Deal’ Held,” *The Pakistan Newswire* (March 21, 2006).

<sup>206</sup> “US-India Nuclear Deal to Start Arms Race,” *Frontier Post* (March 4, 2006).

<sup>207</sup> Editorial, “President Bush’s Visit to South Asia – Popular Apprehensions and Expectations,” *Jang* (March 3, 2006).

As Foreign Minister Mahmud Kasuri explained in an interview with *Die Welt*, a German newspaper, “The US offer for cooperation with India in the area of civilian nuclear technology enables India to acquire additional fissionable material and to use it for a strategic program. This will lead to a strategic imbalance that jeopardizes peace.”<sup>208</sup> Indeed, a July 2006 report claimed that Pakistan is in the midst of constructing a major heavy water nuclear reactor. Upon completion, the 1,000 megawatt reactor might boost Pakistan’s weapons-grade plutonium production capabilities to more than 200 kilograms per year, or enough for up to 50 nuclear weapons.<sup>209</sup>

In a related issue, many Pakistanis believe the nuclear deal “will also provide opportunity to India to back out from the gas pipeline deal with Iran and Pakistan.”<sup>210</sup> The pipeline, originally proposed in 1989-1990, is planned to extend from Iran through Pakistan and on to Delhi and requires cooperation from all three countries. Estimated to cost \$7 billion, the pipeline would stretch 2,100 kilometers, bringing 90 million cubic standard meters of natural gas to India every day. The deal has suffered several setbacks, including staunch opposition from the US and US pressure on India and Pakistan to drop the deal. For Pakistan, the US-India nuclear deal provides simply one more way the US is trying to undermine the pipeline. Pakistan, however, expecting to profit from the transit of the natural gas, has said that it will go through with the plan, with or without India.

Second, the deal is seen as hypocritical and based on a double standard of American strategic interests, as opposed to a genuine non-proliferation effort that would fairly include Pakistan. First, the deal is seen as elevating India to the position of a nuclear power. “Although India, like Pakistan and Israel, has refused to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the deal amounts to de facto acceptance of India as a legitimate nuclear weapons state.”<sup>211</sup> Similarly, an editorial in *Pakistani News* noted, “Not long ago, the US State Department spoke of ‘poor Indian commitment to non-proliferation.’ But now India has [citing a more recent State Dept. quote] an ‘impeccable record on the question.’”<sup>212</sup> Moreover, Pakistan has the same energy needs as India, if not more, and American reasons for excluding Pakistan are seen as baseless. As a public radio talk show commented, “Like India, Pakistan also has energy needs, and access to peaceful nuclear energy is its dire need, and this option should be open for all.”<sup>213</sup> Tasnim Aslam, Foreign Office spokesperson, has said that “Pakistan has the same claim and expectation for international cooperation under safeguards for nuclear power generation, especially because Pakistan is a fossil fuel deficit country and has a significant and fully safeguarded nuclear power generation program.”<sup>214</sup> In addition,

Pakistan and India are nuclear weapons states which are not part of the NPT and, instead of making exception for one, it would have been better for the US to work

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<sup>208</sup> “Pakistani Foreign Minister Urges Participation in Indo-US Nuclear Deal,” *Die Welt* (April 26, 2006).

<sup>209</sup> Kronstadt, “Pakistan-US Relations,” p. 2.

<sup>210</sup> “US-India Nuclear Deal to Start Arms Race.”

<sup>211</sup> Shehzad Nadeem, “The Regional Implications of the US-India Nuclear Agreement,” (Silver City, NM & Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, April 28, 2006), p. 2.

<sup>212</sup> A.S. Muhammad, “India’s Impeccable N-Record,” *Pakistani News* (March 2, 2006).

<sup>213</sup> “Public Talk on ‘Indo-US Nuclear Deal’ Held.”

<sup>214</sup> As quoted in Qudssia Akhlaque, “Islamabad Expects Similar Concessions,” *Dawn* (March 3, 2006).

out a package deal that would take care of energy requirements of the two countries, the strategic stability in this region and would also take into account the non-proliferation effort.<sup>215</sup>

Foreign Minister Kasuri has said more pointedly, “We demand equality of treatment and we’ll continue to pursue it. We have a large population and a fast-growing economy. If the Indian deal goes through there are some things we will do.”<sup>216</sup> This final comment seems to be about building the new nuclear reactor, as well as aligning Pakistan more closely with China, which will be discussed below.

Third, for Pakistanis, the US-India deal also raises serious questions about US commitment to the NPT and international non-proliferation efforts. For many years, the US stressed the need for non-proliferation in South Asia and this deal is seen as undermining all the rhetoric of the past. In terms of non-proliferation, the deal is seen as “a violation of NPT and American laws and proof of a double standard of American leaders.”<sup>217</sup> Shireen M. Mazari believes that “the deal totally undermines the NPT, and would have severe implications for international non-proliferation regime... such a deal would assist and encourage India to develop nuclear weapons.”<sup>218</sup> She also pointed out that the deal undermines Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines and the objectives of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones. According to Foreign Minister Kazuri,

The whole nuclear non-proliferation treaty will unravel. It's only a matter of time before other countries will act in the same way... Nuclear weapons are the currency of power and many countries would like to use it. Once this goes through the NPT will be finished. It's not just Iran and North Korea. Brazil, Argentina and Pakistan will all think differently.<sup>219</sup>

Pervez Hoodboy, a well respected Pakistani physicist, has stated more tersely, “the NPT is dead after this if this nuclear deal does go through.”<sup>220</sup> Or as Iftikhar Ahmad wrote in *The Nation* (Pakistan),

If the NPT becomes ineffective and the United States also abandons the goal of nuclear disarmament (against commitment to “the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament”) it will make the global village a more dangerous place than ever before. It is therefore the moral duty of the United States lawmakers to look into the implications of the US-India nuclear deal before final approval is granted.<sup>221</sup>

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<sup>215</sup> “Pakistan Rejects Nuclear Disparity,” *The News* (March 21, 2006); Qudssia Akhlaque, “Islamabad Not Fully Informed on N-Deal,” *Dawn* (April 11, 2006).

<sup>216</sup> As quoted in “US-India Deal to Collapse NPT,” *PakTribune* (March 18, 2006).

<sup>217</sup> “Russia, Pakistan against use of force in Iran N-issue: Mushahid,” *The News* Available at [http://www.thenews.com.pk/top\\_story\\_detail.asp?Id=648](http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=648).

<sup>218</sup> “Public Talk on ‘Indo-US Nuclear Deal’ Held.”

<sup>219</sup> Farhan Bokhari, Guy Dinmore, and Jo Johnson, “Pakistan Warns on India-US Nuclear Deal,” *Financial Times* (March 17, 2006), p. 5.

<sup>220</sup> Reeves, “Pakistan Uncertain About Relationship with US.”

<sup>221</sup> Ifkitar Ahmad, “Moral Duty of US Lawmakers,” *The Nation* (Pakistan) (March 21, 2006), as quoted in the US Department of State, *Foreign Media Reaction Early Report* (March 22, 2006).

Finally, from the Pakistani perspective, the US-India nuclear deal is simply the latest episode in US fickle behavior towards its loyal ally, Pakistan. In March 2006, President Bush traveled to India and then on to Pakistan with the message that, “Pakistan and India are different countries with different needs and different histories. So as we proceed forward, our strategy will take in effect those well-known differences Pakistan took this as a slap in the face, as a few quotes make clear:

- The Foreign Ministry spokesman: “There has been a perception in Pakistan, at the public level, that the US is not reliable friend. They see this deal as one more evidence of that.”<sup>222</sup>
- The Federal Minister for Information and Broadcasting: “We have sacrificed hundred and hundreds our soldiers. We have delivered the Khalid Sheik. We have sent in our 70,000 troops on the Afghan border. And I believe that due to this decision, the Pakistani nation is in shock.”<sup>223</sup>
- Dr. Tahir Amin, political analyst: “They feel embarrassed and alienated. They feel that somehow the United States has let them down. You could see the reversal of the peace process anytime.”<sup>224</sup>
- An editorial in *The Nation*: “The US-India strategic agreement has given birth to a perception that Pakistan has been left high and dry.”<sup>225</sup>
- An editorial in *Pakistan Observer*: “It’s frustrating because Pakistan is the United States’ traditional ally and has always remained a willing partner in the pursuit of the US agenda in the South Asian region.”<sup>226</sup>
- An article in *Dawn*: “There was a feeling of dismay and betrayal in Islamabad. But that is the stuff of which US-Pakistan relations are made. Recently.”<sup>227</sup>

Overall, Pakistanis appear to believe that the United States will use Pakistan for the global war on terrorism and then abandon it again. So many observers naturally question how much help Pakistan should really be giving the US.

This lack of trust in the US, in the wake of the US-India nuclear deal, has led many in Pakistan to call for closer relations with China. Foreign Minister Kasuri has cautioned that “the US should be conscious of the sentiments of this country...Public opinion sees things in black and white. They compare the US to China and feel it has not been a constant friend the way China has.”<sup>228</sup> The Minister for Information and Broadcasting seconded this view, by arguing that “our commitment with the China and friendship will be more strengthened, and people in Pakistan saying openly in the media that China is the only friend to whom we can trust.” An editorial in *The Nation* remarked that “under the circumstances, while maintaining good relations with Washington, Pakistan should develop closer ties with China and improve relations with

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<sup>222</sup> Reeves, “Pakistan Uncertain About Relationship with US.”

<sup>223</sup> Reeves, “Pakistan Uncertain About Relationship with US.”

<sup>224</sup> Reeves, “Pakistan Uncertain About Relationship with US.”

<sup>225</sup> Editorial, “Left High and Dry,” *The Nation* (Pakistan) (June 30, 2005).

<sup>226</sup> Editorial, “Bush’s Visit: Cynicism Persists,” *Pakistan Observer* (March 8, 2006).

<sup>227</sup> Mohammad Waseem, “Implications of the Bush Visit,” *Dawn* (March 7, 2006).

<sup>228</sup> As quoted in “US-India Deal to Collapse NPT,” *PakTribune* (March 18, 2006).



Russia. As a step in this direction, it should concentrate on gaining the membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).<sup>229</sup> Similarly, an editorial in *Khabrain* warned that if the US did not extend a similar deal to Pakistan, “Pakistan would have no other option but to talk with other countries for its security requirements.”<sup>230</sup>

### **Pakistan’s Potential Reactions to Proposed Future Changes in US Nuclear Policy**

As the previous section highlights, changes in the current US nuclear posture to implement the proposals leaked in the NPR would be viewed very negatively by Pakistan. If the US builds new weapons or resumes testing, Pakistan would likely view this as a signal for others to do likewise. As a report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace states, “if the United States pursues new types of nuclear weapons, then others—Russia, China, India, and Pakistan, for example—are likely to do the same, to the extent they can. At the very least, they will be less supportive of nonproliferation and more resistant to US calls for them to forgo building up their own nuclear forces.”<sup>231</sup> The result could have severe implications for South Asia. Specifically, these types of changes in US nuclear policy could trickle down and incidentally spark even more competition and conflict between India and Pakistan.

Although Speed and May argue “the change in US declaratory nuclear policy does not seem to have had an impact on Pakistan”<sup>232</sup> in *material* terms, the analysis above certainly suggests that the recent changes in US nuclear policy have had very strong negative impact in *perceptual* terms. All of these changes have reinforced the more general view in Pakistan that the United States is both a “fair weather friend,” ready to abandon Pakistan when its strategic interests dictate, and a duplicitous hypocrite in the realm of nuclear non-proliferation. Given that its nuclear weapons program is central to its own security policy, Pakistan – more than the other countries examined in this paper – seems to place great credence in US nuclear policy by itself, in addition to its reactions to other US international policies. Therefore, the way that US nuclear policy and actions appear to contribute to the global WMD proliferation problem – especially the NPR and the US-India nuclear deal – appear especially poignant to Pakistan. This is definitely a place where two countries have differing views of what the “proliferation problem” is and thus have very different perspectives about how to “solve” it.

For some Pakistani observers, the implications for Pakistan of US nuclear policy are clear. As Mazari argues, “Pakistan needs to keep all of its nuclear options open” and review its relationship with the US, focusing instead more on “cooperative strategic frameworks with allies in the region” such as Iran and Saudi Arabia.<sup>233</sup>

As far as actual reductions in the US nuclear stockpile or reversal of the policies laid out in the NPR and NSS, these would be welcome changes to Pakistan. However, such changes seem unlikely to most Pakistanis. Even if such changes do occur, the possibility that such

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<sup>229</sup> Editorial, “Left High and Dry.”

<sup>230</sup> Editorial, “Bush-Musarraf Press Conference and Democratic Process in Pakistan,” *Khabrain* (March 6, 2006).

<sup>231</sup> Roger Speed and Michael May, “Dangerous Doctrine,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 61, no. 2 (March/April 2005), pp. 38-49, available at [http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art\\_ofn=ma05speed](http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=ma05speed).

<sup>232</sup> Speed and May, “Dangerous Doctrine.”

<sup>233</sup> Mazari, “Making Nuclear Weapons Kosher Again.”

changes in US nuclear policy would lead to reductions in the Pakistani stockpile or a change in Pakistani doctrine is unlikely. As the Carnegie report argues, “Pakistan will not give up its weapons if India does not, India will not if China does not, and China will not if the US and Russia do not. Therefore, Pakistan will only give up its nuclear weapons through “a process of reciprocal global nuclear disarmament.”<sup>234</sup>

The net assessment, then, is that short of some type of global nuclear disarmament, a reduction in the *number* of US nuclear weapons would elicit almost no response from Pakistan. Conversely, as currently posed, potential physical changes in US nuclear weapons as well as changes in the *doctrine* associated with they how the weapons might be used would both elicit a negative response from Pakistan, with rather uncertain ramifications depending on how India responds, as well.

## GERMANY

Germany provides an interesting counterpoint to the other countries considered here, because it is both one of the United States’ closest allies and a non-nuclear weapon state. Defenders of the current US nuclear posture often argue that Germany would seriously consider renouncing its non-nuclear status if the nuclear umbrella is weakened beyond its present state. As Harald Mueller has argued, Germany often serves as “the pet bogeyman of nuclear pundits to defend the status quo.”<sup>235</sup> This section examines that argument within the wider context of Germany’s views about recent changes to US nuclear policy and finds that the evidence does not support it. Instead, Germany takes pride in its identity as a non-nuclear weapon state and as a steward of international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regimes – an identity that accords with Germany’s wider worldview that values multilateral, institutional solutions to global problems.

Given how much it values multilateral, institutional efforts towards arms control, it is not surprising that Germany is critical of US nuclear policies. But like the other countries examined here, Germany does not view US nuclear policy in a vacuum, but rather within the context of the wider German-US relationship and other US international policies. Thus, despite their differences of opinion on a variety of issues, Germany acknowledges the importance of its friendship with the United States, which often leads Germany to try to influence US policy from *within* the relationship and their common institutional networks.

In other words, there is a tension for Germany between its dual identities as a leading non-nuclear state and as a member of a nuclear-based alliance, NATO. Indeed, Germany itself could be perceived as hypocritical: it enjoys the NATO nuclear umbrella, yet complains about it and does not always pull its weight to counter proliferation. These dual identities provide the filter through which it perceives US nuclear policy.

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<sup>234</sup> George Perkovich et al, *Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March, 2005), pp. 44 and 160.

<sup>235</sup> Harald Mueller, “A View from Germany,” in *The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-Alerting of Nuclear Weapons*, ed. Harold A. Feiveson (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), p. 341.

## German Perceptions of the United States

If the difference in worldview between Germans and Americans had to be boiled down to one sentence, it would be this: while most Germans attribute an increasing importance and potential to solve global problems in multilateral institutional arrangements, they believe that most Americans do not. This bothers Germany, because it recognizes that the institutional framework within which it is so embedded was created by the United States after World War II. Germans are critical of the United States' increasing unilateralism for two reasons. First, they believe this undermines their ability to influence the United States through NATO and other multilateral institutions. Second, they believe this unilateralism is destabilizing for international security.

Germany perceives a power imbalance with the United States, partly because it perceives the US as acting with more dominance and less compromise. In particular, Germans appear to resent the lack of consultation that they have been receiving from the US. As an ally, they believe that they deserve US policymakers' candor and an opportunity to discuss US policy decisions that will affect them – before those decisions are implemented. As Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder argued about US policy towards Iraq in a September 2002 *New York Times* interview,

Consultation cannot mean that I get a phone call two hours in advance only to be told 'we are going in.' Consultation among grown-up nations has to mean not just consultation about the how and the when, but also about the whether.<sup>236</sup>

There is also a concern that even when the US has engaged in “consultation,” it has been for show, without any real dialogue or compromise.<sup>237</sup> Thus, most Germans view their country as no longer an equal partner with the United States; in a 2002 poll, 73 percent described the US as having a dominating role, while 26 percent still considered Germany an equal partner.<sup>238</sup> Equally understandably, Germans no longer count on the United States as their most important ally in international issues. Transatlantic Trends polling data from 2003 show that France is now seen as Germany's most important partner, and France is also considered a more reliable partner. The preference for France is part of a wider “Europe first” orientation that has emerged out of frustration with US foreign policy.<sup>239</sup>

Underneath these poll results, it appears that Germans are upset that the strategic change in US foreign policy – with a preference for “coalitions of the willing” and unilateralism – is “choking off” one of the main avenues for German multilateralism, NATO. This also contributes to the German sense of the US as not listening to its allies.

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<sup>236</sup> Steven Erlanger, “German Leader's Warning: War Plan is a Huge Mistake,” *The New York Times* (September 5, 2002).

<sup>237</sup> Uta Zapf's Plenary Remarks from the 2001 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, as recounted in Joanna Spear, “Organizing for International Counter-proliferation: NATO and US Non-proliferation Policy,” in *Ultimate Security: Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction*, ed. Janne E. Nolan, Bernard I. Finel, and Brian D. Finlay (New York: Century Foundation Press, 2003), p. 228.

<sup>238</sup> Poll results from *Der Spiegel*, cited in Peter Rudolf, “The Myth of the ‘German Way’: German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations,” *Survival*, vol. 47, no. 1 (Spring 2005), pp. 133-152, at 139.

<sup>239</sup> Transatlantic Trends polling data cited in Rudolf, “Myth of the German Way,” p. 139.

Germany embodies the European strategic cultural preference for multilateral, institutional and cooperative approaches to security problems. Multilateralism involves a lot of diplomatic activity, an area where most European policymakers pride themselves on good performance. Europeans believe that the way forward is to engage problem states and find solutions to underlying problems, not merely to contain these states and freeze the situation into a hostile status quo. Europeans favor diplomatic and political solutions over intrusive, unilateral and coercive ones. Germans, in particular, embody this European strategic culture, perhaps in an effort to compensate for its aggressive, unilateral 20<sup>th</sup> century history.

Germans perceive the United States as unskilled in diplomacy and too quick to write off some regimes as “beyond repair.”<sup>240</sup> In their view, the US tendency to name and blame “rogue states” often creates self-fulfilling prophecies.<sup>241</sup> Thus, it is not surprising that 74 percent of Germans “highly disapprove” of the axis of evil rhetoric.<sup>242</sup> Germans also have a different perspective on the threat from WMD proliferation and terrorism than the United States does.<sup>243</sup> These different perspectives translate into different preferences for how to address the problem. For example, as German security analyst Peter Rudolf argues, “the preferred measures to combat terrorism lie – to a greater extent than among Americans – in the economic realm: in helping poor countries to develop their economies.”<sup>244</sup>

Germany tends increasingly to see America deploying its power unilaterally and in pursuit of narrow interests. German scholars have criticized American “disdain” for international law and multilateral organizations. They cite the “obvious disregard for the Geneva Conventions” in the Bush administration’s opinions about torture, the US rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and the Treaty banning landmines. These scholars argue that US behavior has not only eroded US soft power, but by extension, is eroding Western European soft power as well.<sup>245</sup> Moreover, German public opinion has consistently been highly critical of concrete US actions that are perceived as unilateral and self-interested, such as the war in Iraq, opposition to the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol.<sup>246</sup> Thus, in Peter

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<sup>240</sup> Francois Heisbourg, “American Hegemony? Perceptions of the US Abroad,” *Survival*, vol. 41, no. 4 (Winter 1999-2000), p. 10.

<sup>241</sup> Lawrence Freedman, “Europe and Deterrence,” in *Nuclear Weapons: A New Great Debate*, ed. Burkard Schmitt, Chaillot Paper no. 48 (Paris: Western European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, July 2001), p. 100.

<sup>242</sup> Statistics quoted in Peter Rudolf, “Mutual perceptions,” *German Institute for International and Security Affairs Working Paper FG 4* (September 2002), p. 2.

<sup>243</sup> Spear, “Organizing for International Counter-proliferation,” p. 218.

<sup>244</sup> Rudolf, “Mutual perceptions,” p. 2.

<sup>245</sup> See, for example, Johannes Thimm, “What Really Matters in Transatlantic Relations,” *Diskussionspapier Deutsches Institut fuer Internationale Politik und Sicherheit* (September 2005), p. 5; Josef Braml, “Rule of Law or Dictates By Fear: German Perspectives on American Civil Liberties in the War Against Terrorism,” *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, vol. 27, no 2 (Summer/Fall 2003), pp. 115-140; Johannes Thimm, “Farewell to the Laws against Torture?” *German Institute for International and Security Affairs*, Comment 12 (March 2005).

<sup>246</sup> Karen Donfried, Senior Director for Policy Programs, German Marshall Fund of the United States, testimony before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats (November 9, 2005).

Rudolf's estimation, unilateralism – “not the predominant power” of the US, “but the way this power is used” – is “the main factor” in that more negative view of the US overall.<sup>247</sup>

For example, in a June 2005 poll, when asked how desirable it is that the US exert strong leadership in world affairs, 60 percent of Germans said it was undesirable and 39 percent, desirable. These numbers were almost exactly reversed in 2002, when 68 percent said US leadership was desirable and 27 percent called it undesirable. Opinions about President Bush specifically were even more critical: 83 percent disapproved of Bush's handling of foreign policy (up from 62 percent in 2002), while 16 percent approved (down from 36 percent in 2002).<sup>248</sup>

## German Nuclear Policy

Germany emerged from World War II deprived of the right to conduct any (civilian or military) nuclear activities. Although the first post-war chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, renounced the production of nuclear weapons on German soil in a protocol to the 1954 Brussels Treaty, in which Germany acceded to the Western European Union, he expected this was a temporary setback. His government tried to conclude a secret agreement with France and Italy to produce nuclear weapons together, but this project fell through when French President Charles DeGaulle was elected in 1958. Then, in the early 1960s, under State Department pressure, Germany supported a US proposal of a NATO multilateral nuclear fleet, but that idea was eventually scuttled by President Johnson in the face of a general lack of support and because the Soviet Union refused to go forward with the NPT as long as it was on the table. Adenauer's party, the Christian Democrats, even blocked Germany's signing of the NPT when it was first written in 1968; it took a new government to sign the treaty in 1969, and Germany did not ratify the NPT until 1975. Indeed, until the mid-1970s, Germany was “rather a brake on nuclear arms control. Adenauer [and the Christian Democrats more generally] did not want to give any concessions to Moscow because such signs of weakness could encourage Soviet ventures.”<sup>249</sup>

Starting in the mid-1970s, however, Germany became more active and favorable towards nuclear arms control. It embraced an identity as a leading non-nuclear weapons state, an identity which has colored its behavior ever since. Part of the reason for embracing this view is that because of the dense network of security institutions outlined above, “nuclear weapons are even more marginalized.”<sup>250</sup> Mueller argues that, “Today, non-nuclear status, multilateral security policy, and support for arms control as an integral part of that policy have become part of the German identity and are doubted or criticized by very few.”<sup>251</sup> As the following list of events suggests, there has been a steady evolution of the German attitude in a more and more non-nuclear direction – both in terms of nuclear weapons and civilian nuclear energy.<sup>252</sup> The

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<sup>247</sup> Rudolf, “Mutual perceptions,” p. 2.

<sup>248</sup> Transatlantic Trends poll data, cited by Donfried in her testimony before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats (November 9, 2005).

<sup>249</sup> Mueller, “A View from Germany,” p. 345.

<sup>250</sup> Mueller, “A View from Germany,” p. 344.

<sup>251</sup> Mueller, “A View from Germany,” p. 347.

<sup>252</sup> For an overview of the evolution of German views towards nuclear energy, see Ernst Ulrich von Weizsaecker, “German Nuclear Policy,” in *Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats*, ed.

German government has even affirmed a position of phasing out nuclear energy (*der Austieg*) in Germany, and thus has been critical of the Bush Administration's Global Nuclear Energy Program (GNEP) as well.<sup>253</sup>

Thus, Germany has a long history advocating a response to non-proliferation problems based on treaties and international agreements.

- In 1987, during negotiations to eliminate all US and Soviet intermediate range nuclear systems, then Chancellor Helmut Kohl – “with the applause of a vast majority of the German public and all parties, including his own” – facilitated the agreement by offering up the Pershing IA.
- In 1989, Germany persuaded the United States to renounce the modernization of the Lance missile.
- In 1990, Germany reinforced its non-nuclear status as a reunified country in the 2+4 Treaty that ended the four-power responsibilities for Germany and restored the country's full sovereignty.<sup>254</sup>
- In 1993, then Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel set out a robust ten-point non-proliferation initiative, which asserted the importance of the NPT and other nonproliferation regimes and advocated disarmament of all existing nuclear arsenals – including the five NWS – through multilateral arms control.<sup>255</sup>
- In 1994, the Bundestag *unanimously* voted for an indefinite extension of the NPT.<sup>256</sup>
- In 1998, Germany tried to move NATO to renounce its first-use doctrine, which caused significant friction within the alliance.<sup>257</sup> Germany has also fought within NATO to ensure that the alliance remains strongly supportive of the various WMD nonproliferation regimes.<sup>258</sup>

Most recently, in the run-up to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the left-leaning Liberal Party called on the German government to urge the Americans to withdraw the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Germany, “to strengthen the credibility of the non-proliferation regime and as a sign that the disarmament obligations of the nuclear weapons states are being taken seriously.”<sup>259</sup>

But the tension inherent in the dual identities of leading non-nuclear weapons state and member of a nuclear-armed military alliance is also apparent in German positions on nuclear matters. For example, in 1995, Germany protested French and Chinese nuclear tests. Yet, then-

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Henry Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, June 2006), pp. 151-160.

<sup>253</sup> Helmut Stoltenberg, “Bush Rekindling Germany Nuclear Dispute,” *DDP news* (Berlin), (July 12, 2006).

<sup>254</sup> Mueller, “A View from Germany,” p. 346.

<sup>255</sup> “Ten Point Initiative on Non-Proliferation,” in *Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/6985*, p. 85ff., cited in Spear, “Organizing for International Counter-proliferation,” p. 211.

<sup>256</sup> Mueller, “A View from Germany,” p. 346.

<sup>257</sup> William Drodziak, “Bonn Proposes that NATO Pledge No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons,” *Washington Post* (November 28, 1998), p. A16.

<sup>258</sup> Spear, “Organizing for International Counter-proliferation,” p. 211.

<sup>259</sup> As quoted in Oliver Meier, “Tied in nuclear knots,” *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* (January/February 2006), p. 16.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl – trying not to create too much distance with his French ally – acknowledged that the French tests were a “sovereign decision.”<sup>260</sup> More recently, many Germans were very critical of French President Chirac’s 2006 speech about French nuclear policy, in which he threatened “terror states” with retaliation in “non-conventional ways.” Some German Bundestag members and the German defense minister warned that this would “militarize” the controversy over the Iranian nuclear program and perhaps spark a “nuclear arms race.” Simultaneously, Chancellor Angela Merkel refused to speak against Chirac, perhaps trying to square the circle with France – as Kohl did after the 1995 French nuclear tests.<sup>261</sup>

The tension between the two identities is also evident in German views about the continued basing of US nuclear weapons on German soil.<sup>262</sup> These weapons became a point of contention in the week before Germany’s September 18, 2005 national elections, when reports of an updated US nuclear doctrine – the draft “Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations” – hit prime-time German news. (The doctrine will be discussed further below.) As presented in German news, the doctrine contains a wide-ranging list of scenarios in which the US might be prepared for nuclear first-use, which “contradicts NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept, which states that ‘the fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political’.” During the election run-up, Claudia Roth, chair of the leftist Green Party, declared: “For us it is absolutely unimaginable that the German armed forces continue to prepare for the use of nuclear weapons or that a nuclear weapons mission [could be] initiated from German soil.”<sup>263</sup> Shortly thereafter, the Christian Democrats, a traditionally right-leaning, pro-transatlantic party, called for a discussion of the draft doctrine within NATO. (The Christian Democrats are now the only party in the Bundestag that supports the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Germany and NATO’s nuclear posture. According to the party’s defense spokesman, they support this because it “guarantees political influence on the use or non-use of nuclear weapons.”<sup>264</sup>) German scholars argue that having these nuclear weapons in Germany is not in German strategic interests, either. As Klaus-Dieter Schwarz argues, these weapons “are not very compatible with the new partnership with Russia and provide Moscow with an excuse to maintain its arsenal of tactical weapons.”<sup>265</sup>

German security analysts opine that it is unlikely that Angela Merkel’s “grand coalition” government will make removing the US weapons from Germany or rethinking NATO nuclear policy an immediate priority. Although three smaller opposition parties (the pro-disarmament Greens, the free-market Liberals, and the left-wing socialists) openly favor withdrawal of US

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<sup>260</sup> “Kohl comments on French nuclear tests,” *Hamburg DPA* (July 13, 1995); “Government Criticizes China for Nuclear Test,” *Berlin ADN* (May 15, 1995).

<sup>261</sup> “German Greens official warns against nuclear arms race,” *DDP News Agency* (January 26, 2006); “Chirac claims right to go nuclear against terrorism,” *Deutsche Press-Agentur* (January 19, 2006); “Iranian speaker calls Chirac’s remarks ‘shame for French nation’,” *Deutsche Press-Agentur* (January 22, 2006); “German defense minister raps Chirac on nuclear threat,” *Agence France-Presse* (January 22, 2006).

<sup>262</sup> Oliver Meier, “News Analysis: An End to US Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe?” *Arms Control Today* (July/August 2006), available at [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006\\_07-08/NewsAnalysis.asp?print](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_07-08/NewsAnalysis.asp?print)

<sup>263</sup> As quoted in Meier, “Tied in nuclear knots,” p. 14.

<sup>264</sup> Meier, “New Analysis.”

<sup>265</sup> Klaus-Dieter Schwarz, “Die Zukunft der Abschreckung,” *SWP Studie* (June 2005), p. 16. (Where sources are cited in German, translations were made by this report’s author).

nuclear weapons from European soil, the two larger parties in the “grand coalition” – Merkel’s Christian Democrats and the left-of-center Social Democrats – are likely to shy away from a confrontation with the Bush Administration. As Oliver Meier argues, Merkel will “probably follow the line of her predecessor, Gerhard Schroeder, who was quoted in the daily paper *Tageszeitung* as declaring that he was ‘not going to have a row with the Americans just because of those 20 ‘thingamies’ ...”<sup>266</sup> Moreover, German defense officials tend to view US nuclear weapons deployed in Germany “not as a military asset but as a communication channel” – in other words, having the weapons deployed there is one way Germany can keep some influence on US and NATO nuclear policies.<sup>267</sup>

## **German Reactions to US Nuclear Policy**

Given its self-identity as a leading non-nuclear state and its belief in the effectiveness of multilateral institutions to solve security problems, it is understandable that German reactions would focus most on the ways that US nuclear policy appears to undermine various international non-proliferation regimes. Like Iran and Pakistan, Germany worries about perceived double standards and hypocrisy in US positions, but Germany does not take those double standards as personally as those other states do. Instead, Germany worries most that US behavior “signals an abandonment of the various non-proliferation regimes, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby such regimes become ineffective because the United States assumed they were.”<sup>268</sup> In other words, Germans are upset because they believe that the current US approach is destabilizing the status quo that has been so beneficial for their security.

### US Decisions Seen as Undermining Non-Proliferation Regimes

From the German perspective, US behavior severely undermines various non-proliferation regimes – including the CTBT, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the 1972 ABM Treaty and the NPT and the protocols from its review conferences. Germany, as a leading non-nuclear weapons state, sees itself as a guardian of these regimes.

Germans criticize the US decisions not to ratify the CTBT and the BTWC verification protocols. Before the US Senate vote on ratifying the CTBT, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder – together with French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair – bought a full-page advertisement in the *New York Times* that warned that a US failure to ratify would “expose a fundamental divergence within NATO.”<sup>269</sup> When the treaty was ultimately rejected by the Senate, this was viewed by these leaders “as a slap in the face” because they had very publicly laid their credibility on the line in its support. Earlier, after European leaders had invested a lot of effort negotiating verification protocols to the 1972 BTWC, they viewed the US as “torpedoing” their efforts and felt betrayed.<sup>270</sup>

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<sup>266</sup> Meier, “Tied in nuclear knots,” pp. 14-15.

<sup>267</sup> Mueller, “The View from Germany,” p. 349.

<sup>268</sup> Spear, “Organizing for International Counter-proliferation,” p. 225.

<sup>269</sup> Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder, “A Treaty We All Need,” full-page advertisement, *The New York Times* (October 8, 1999).

<sup>270</sup> Spear, “Organizing for International Counter-proliferation,” p. 225.



Most Germans were also highly critical of the US decision to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty and proceed with building a national missile defense program. US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in June 2002 is seen as a repudiation of arms control in general and an open invitation to other states (particularly Russia and China) to respond by building more offensive nuclear weapons.<sup>271</sup> For example, Stefan Kornelius argued in the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, although the treaty has little “practical value” today, the US decision to unilaterally terminate it “signal[s] indifference with respect to arms policy. The treaty is associated with a spirit of trust, understanding and mutual control. Anyone who willfully withdraws from the rules of arms control destroys this spirit.”<sup>272</sup> The lone German voice found in the literature review arguing the other perspective was Oliver Thraenert, a security analyst at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Thraenert supported the US decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, arguing that the treaty “belonged to a different age of ‘mutual assured destruction’ and can no longer be the basis in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.”<sup>273</sup> (The missile defense program will be discussed below.)

Finally, Germans argue the United States has backtracked from its commitments as a signatory of the NPT, and especially from the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive implementation of Article VI, that it signed at the 2000 Review Conference. In addition to the “unequivocal undertaking” by nuclear weapons states to eliminate their arsenals, these 13 steps include ratification of the CTBT; the principle of irreversibility as applied to nuclear disarmament and related arms control and reduction measures; full implementation of START II and conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM treaty; increased transparency regarding nuclear weapons capabilities; concrete measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; and a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies.

German analysts point to the ways that the United States no longer considers itself bound to all of these commitments:<sup>274</sup>

- The US has not ratified the CTBT.
- Although the US and Russia signed the Moscow Treaty, the treaty does not require the destruction of any nuclear weapons, but only limits deployed delivery systems, which contradicts the principle of “irreversibility” for arms control and nuclear disarmament.
- Rather than strengthening the ABM Treaty, the US has withdrawn from it.

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<sup>271</sup> Steven Erlanger, “Bush’s move on ABM Pact gives pause to Europeans,” *The New York Times* (December 13, 2001).

<sup>272</sup> Stefan Kornelius, “Not a Sword, Not a Shield,” *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (February 17, 2001).

<sup>273</sup> “It may take a catastrophe to rouse Europe from its current slumber: A discussion on proliferation,” Aspen Institute Berlin (June 2005), available at <http://www.aspenberlin.org>.

<sup>274</sup> See, for example, Roland Heine, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is Being Dismantled,” *Berliner Zeitung* (April 26, 2003); Goetz Neuneck, “Die Vereinigten Staaten und Internationale Ruestungskontrollabkommen,” *Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy Working Paper 7* (July 2005), pp. 4-5; Oliver Thraenert, “Die Zukunft des Atomwaffensperrvertrags,” *SWP Studie* (August 2004), pp. 18-21; Harald Mueller and Stephanie Sohnius, “Intervention und Kernwaffen: Zur neuen Nukleardoktrin der USA,” *Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung Report 1* (2006), pp.30-32.

- By promoting a qualitatively improved nuclear arsenal and the development of new types of weapons systems such as earth penetrators, the NPR appears to increase the role of nuclear weapons in US security policies.
- The NPR does not mention the NPT at all.

In addition to these actions, top US officials have also suggested that the United States is reassessing its commitments made at the 2000 Review Conference. John Bolton, then under secretary of state for arms control and international security, told *Arms Control Today* in March 2002 that “we take our obligations under the NPT very seriously.” But at the same time, he implied that the United States might no longer support all 13 practical steps: “In terms of what was said at the 1995 and 2000 NPT conferences, we’re reviewing all of that in the context of our preparation for the 2005 Review Conference.”<sup>275</sup> The following month, then US ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament Eric Javits, speaking to the 2002 NPT Preparatory Committee, said the Bush administration only “generally agrees” with the conclusion of the 2000 Review Conference and that “we no longer support some of the conclusions” in the final document from that conference.<sup>276</sup>

German security analyst Goetz Neuneck argues that US behavior has “completely undermined” all 13 practical steps signed at the 2000 Review Conference, and he cites the final report of the United Nations High Level Panel on Threat, Challenges and Change, which warned that “we are nearing the point of no return in the hollowing out of global nonproliferation regimes, which could create a further cascade of proliferation.”<sup>277</sup>

Similarly, from the German perspective, the United States’ support of undeclared nuclear weapons states also undermines the NPT. As Oliver Thraenert argues (assuming like many others that Israel’s alleged nuclear arsenal is real),

The fact that three nuclear weapons states – India, Pakistan and Israel – remain outside the NPT is a heavy burden on the treaty. None of these three have made any move to suggest that they would give up their nuclear weapons. Furthermore, they are all important partners for the United States. Therefore, Washington puts no pressure on them to join the NPT....The situation is seen as unjust by many non-nuclear weapons states. Therefore, there exists a danger that an increasing number of these states can no longer be persuaded to take an active part in the NPT process or, perhaps, to accept the expanded modern verification procedures.<sup>278</sup>

In response to the US unilateral actions listed above, German analysts call for Europeans to step up to strengthen multilateral non-proliferation regimes and support disarmament, even in situations where the United States refuses to cooperate. As Meier and Neuneck argue, “Europe

<sup>275</sup> “Expounding Bush’s Approach to US Nuclear Security: An Interview with Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton,” *Arms Control Today*, vol. 32 (March 2002), at [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002\\_03/boltonmarch02.asp](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_03/boltonmarch02.asp)

<sup>276</sup> Ambassador Eric Javits, US Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, “Statement at the 2002 PrepCom for the 2005 NPT Review Conference,” New York (April 12, 2002).

<sup>277</sup> Neuneck, “Die Vereinigten Staaten und Internationale Ruestungskontrollabkommen,” p. 5.

<sup>278</sup> Thraenert, “Die Zukunft des Atomwaffensperrvertrags,” p. 33.

should demonstrate its own multilateral approach more confidently and should try to encourage rulings which strengthen security whenever possible, even without American support.”<sup>279</sup> More specifically, Thraenert suggests that, “as a non-nuclear weapons state, Germany has traditionally had considerable interest in maintaining and strengthening the NPT.” Moreover, “as the largest non-nuclear weapons state, Germany has an important role to play within the EU” on disarmament policy. Therefore, he argues, Germany should work on improving the treaty and pressing Israel, India and Pakistan to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. He recognizes that “this demand may have taken on the form of a ritual, but sometimes, it is better to cling to a ritual than to abandon it, for renouncing it would probably have graver consequences.”<sup>280</sup>

### The 2002 US Nuclear Policy Review and 2001 National Security Strategy

Germany has been critical of the NPR, for five reasons. First, the NPR is viewed as undermining the NPT and the agreements reached at both the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. In this view, not only does the NPR put into question the indefinite extension of the treaty and the nuclear weapon states’ commitment to implement Article VI in good faith, it also amounts to an “unequivocal rejection” of most of the 13 practical steps agreed to at the 2000 Conference.<sup>281</sup> Because of the NPR and NSS, Thraenert argues,

Nuclear weapons are experiencing a general renaissance and again becoming a ‘normal’ instrument of security policy....The United States makes it clear that nuclear weapons will still have a prominent role in US national defense strategy. Thus, the fulfillment of the NPT’s disarmament pledge recedes further into the distance.<sup>282</sup>

More specifically, Germans believe that the US is breaching its NPT obligations and commitments made at the 1995 NPT Review Conference by targeting non-nuclear states. In this view, targeting non-nuclear states with nuclear arms undermines US negative security assurances and threatens the foundation of multilateral arms control. For Germans, the grand bargain behind the NPT is that non-nuclear weapons states forswear nuclear arms in return for assurances that they will not be attacked by nuclear arms. If the US reneges on the second part of the bargain, some countries may decide to renege on the first. For this reason, German Deputy Foreign Minister Ludger Volmer reacted to the NPR by saying that “such a strategy could endanger the disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.” He called US plans to retaliate with nuclear arms against non-nuclear states that use chemical or biological weapons “extremely questionable.”<sup>283</sup>

Second, Germans argue that the NPR and the draft Doctrine on Joint Nuclear Operations could motivate other states to develop or build weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Ottfried Nassauer, the head of the Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic

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<sup>279</sup> Oliver Meier and Goetz Neuneck, “In der Defensive: Europas Politik der Nichtverbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen,” in *Friedensgutachten 2006*, pp. 198-207, at 207.

<sup>280</sup> Thraenert, “Die Zukunft des Atomwaffensperrvertrags,” quotes on p. 33, 21, and 11.

<sup>281</sup> Du Preez, p. 74.

<sup>282</sup> Thraenert, “Die Zukunft des Atomwaffensperrvertrags,” p. 19.

<sup>283</sup> As quoted in Du Preez, p. 71.

Security, argued in 2003 that the NPR “runs counter to our efforts for arms control. The deployment threshold for nuclear weapons is being lowered, and it encourages other countries to also further develop nuclear weapons.”<sup>284</sup> Gernot Erler, an influential Social Democrat and member of the Bundestag, told German n-tv that “the conclusion is clear: [a nation that] forgoes nuclear weapons is without protection against US pressure.”<sup>285</sup> Analysts argue the US decision to build new weapons shows a “double standard” to Third World countries, which are told they cannot acquire nuclear weapons.<sup>286</sup> As Thraenert puts it,

In giving up nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear weapons states as a rule assumed that the difference between the nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states would not continue for eternity but would be abolished in the not too distant future...the implementation of modern verification procedures will only be acceptable to many non-nuclear weapons states if the nuclear weapons states take nuclear disarmament seriously and not...assign nuclear weapons a key role in their national defense strategy.<sup>287</sup>

Third, Germans also have expressed concern that the NPR’s call for developing a new generation of low-yield, earth-penetrating tactical weapons blurs the boundary between conventional and nuclear weapons. In the past, nuclear weapons were used for deterrence, but this blurred line will move the nuclear weapons “into the ‘normal’ arms arsenal” and thus make them more usable, according to Nikolas Busse, writing for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. Interviewing German defense officials and security analysts, Busse summarizes two additional criticisms of the new weapons proposed in the NPR. First, these “tactical” nuclear weapons could increase the “nuclearization” of US security policy. More importantly, the earth-penetrating weapons may not be effective. “Military officials” interviewed for the article point to the US B61-11, which was designed for underground targets but can only explode about six meters below the surface – far short of underground bunkers being built today at depths greater than 100 meters. In Busse’s words, “it is technically very difficult to construct a nuclear weapon that will explode only after it has drilled down many meters...therefore it is unrealistic to dream of a bomb that will not have any [radioactive] contamination.”<sup>288</sup>

Another analysis of the low-yield earth penetrating weapons argues astutely that the policy was designed for US domestic political reasons. Klaus-Dieter Schwarz, writing about earth penetrating “mini-nukes”, as well as the RRW program, suggested in a footnote that “one gets the impression that these projects are primarily designed to find new tasks for the nuclear military-industrial complex.”<sup>289</sup>

Fourth, similar to their concern about national missile defense, Germany worries new military capabilities in the nuclear arena could widen the capability gap between the US and its NATO allies. As Jean du Preez argues,

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<sup>284</sup> Quoted in Harro Albrecht, “Subterranean Nuclear Warfare,” *Die Zeit* (Hamburg) (January 23, 2003).

<sup>285</sup> As quoted in Meier, “Tied in nuclear knots,” p. 15.

<sup>286</sup> Nikolas Busse, “Verschiebungen in der Bedrohungsanalyse: Amerika passt seine Militaerplanung einer veraenderte Weltlage an,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (March 12, 2002), p. 5.

<sup>287</sup> Thraenert, “Die Zukunft des Atomwaffensperrvertrags,” p. 20.

<sup>288</sup> Busse, “Verschiebungen in der Bedrohungsanalyse,” p. 5.

<sup>289</sup> Schwarz, “Die Zukunft der Abschreckung,” p. 16 (FN 39).

The NPR and the US National Security Strategy thus puts NATO countries in the position of either living with a shift of the balance of power further towards the United States or committing themselves to new expenditures in order to keep their arsenals relevant.... Some European leaders fear that the US nuclear doctrine, seen in conjunction with the current administration's preference for unilateral action in conflict situations, could make European members of NATO 'irrelevant' as military allies.<sup>290</sup>

In a similar manner – echoing more general German perceptions of the US discussed above – some Germans were concerned that the NPR was adopted by the United States without any consultation with its allies, simply “leaving them behind,” as an editorial in the *Berliner Zeitung* put it. Given how destabilizing the NPR and NSS may be for German security, this caused much resentment.<sup>291</sup> As Meier argues, the non-nuclear members of NATO, including Germany,

participated in nuclear sharing – a policy that was developed during the Cold War to deepen US-European military ties and to create a forum where Europe could have its say on Washington's nuclear policies. But times have changed, and nuclear sharing no longer gives Europeans any influence on US nuclear thinking.<sup>292</sup>

Finally, and most importantly, Germany is concerned that the new US nuclear doctrine could have profound implications for NATO nuclear policy and German security. In other words, Germans are worried about what political scientists call alliance “chain ganging” – when one state engages in aggressive behavior that pulls its ally into a situation against the ally's own best interests.<sup>293</sup> For example, Uwe Vorkoetter argues that “NATO's security policy credibility will be seriously shaken if its leading power acts differently from what the alliance partners are saying.”<sup>294</sup> German analysts scoff at the argument that the United States NPR, NSS and the 2005 draft Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations are US-only national policy documents that have no bearing on NATO's nuclear policy. Calling this argument a “half-truth,” Meier argues:

US nuclear doctrine has profound implications for NATO's nuclear posture: What if the White House ordered the use of nuclear bombs deployed in Europe to destroy a suspected biological weapons cache in a Mideast country? Allies might expect Washington to consult NATO in advance, but the only way they could prevent an actual deployment would be to deny overflight rights for US aircraft carrying nuclear weapons to their intended targets.<sup>295</sup>

Similarly, Harald Mueller and Stephanie Sohnius have warned German foreign policymakers that German armed forces could be drawn into a US-initiated nuclear exchange if

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<sup>290</sup> Du Preez, pp. 71-72.

<sup>291</sup> Uwe Vorkoetter, “Amerikas neu Doktrin,” *Berliner Zeitung* (March 14, 2002).

<sup>292</sup> Meier, “Tied in nuclear knots,” p. 14.

<sup>293</sup> Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” *International Organization*, vol. 44, no. 2. (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168.

<sup>294</sup> Vorkoetter, “Amerikas neu Doktrin.”

<sup>295</sup> Meier, “Tied in nuclear knots,” p. 15.

they were part of a NATO deployment abroad. In an article titled, “The New US Nuclear Doctrine: a dangerous mistake,” they argue that the draft joint doctrine lists several scenarios in which a US regional commander may request presidential approval for use of nuclear weapons – without ally consultation – including a situation in which a nuclear weapon might be necessary to ensure “success of US multinational operations.”<sup>296</sup> In another monograph, Mueller and Sohnius argue further that the NPR “conventionalizes” nuclear weapons use, which goes against the NATO “de-emphasis” of nuclear weapons put forth in the 1991 NATO nuclear policy.<sup>297</sup>

### US National Missile Defense Program

In addition to their criticism of the US decision to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty, discussed above, Germans are critical of the US national missile defense program. Nonetheless, German discussion about the US NMD program provides an excellent demonstration of the fine line that Germany walks between its dual identities as a leading non-nuclear weapon state and an ally of the United States and member of the nuclear-armed NATO alliance. The government changed its position on NMD, eventually muting its criticism to strengthen relations with the new Bush Administration.

First, Germans believe that NMD is destabilizing for international security. German leaders have said that they view the US national missile defense program as an incentive to proliferate WMD, undermining rather than reinforcing security.<sup>298</sup> As Patrik Schwarz argued in the *Berliner Tageszeitung*, NMD is

militarily aggressive...it gives the United States the aura of invulnerability. Even if this is technically illusory, a dangerous effect develops. Potential enemies feel all the more provoked, because they suspect an American grasping for world power; the Americans themselves will be enticed into military adventurism.<sup>299</sup>

Similarly, Stefan Kornelius argued in the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* that “subliminally America may dream of invulnerability...the America of a George W. Bush is inspired with the notion of being internally strong so that it can pursue its external mission.” As a result, NMD could be “the breeding place for a new distrust, for a new escalation of armament, and for confrontation and the formation of camps.”<sup>300</sup> Some Germans also worried that the planned upgrade to US military capabilities that the NMD program will entail “could widen the gap between the military-technological capabilities of the United States and its European allies.”<sup>301</sup>

Second, many analysts questioned whether the system would even work. *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* quoted a NATO official as saying that the Bush Administration’s NMD “is like selling us [allies] a new car without a guide, a sample, or a blueprint.” *Handelsblatt* pointed out that if

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<sup>296</sup> Harald Mueller and Stephanie Sohnius, “Die neue amerikanische Nuklearstrategie: Ein gefaehrlicher Irrweg,” in *Friedensgutachten 2006*, pp. 208-216.

<sup>297</sup> Mueller and Sohnius, “Intervention und Kernwaffen,” p. 29.

<sup>298</sup> Frank Bruni, “France and Germany caution Bush on missile defense plan,” *The New York Times* (June 14, 2001).

<sup>299</sup> Patrik Schwarz, “Peace Movement Urgently Sought,” *Berliner Tageszeitung* (February 20, 2001).

<sup>300</sup> Kornelius, “Not a Sword, Not a Shield.”

<sup>301</sup> Du Preez, p. 71.

the United States intercepts a target missile during the middle or latter stage of its flight, it is akin to “staking everything on a single throw.” Moreover, because those who fire the missile can launch decoys, “it is too easy for the defenders to be deceived.”<sup>302</sup>

Given such comments, it is perhaps not surprising that in a poll shortly after Bush was inaugurated in 2001, 64 percent of Germans feared that missile defense could trigger a new arms race, and 73 percent called on the German government not to participate in the system. Moreover, 44 percent believed that the German-American relationship would be permanently impaired by the NMD program, whereas 41 percent believed that it would remain good.<sup>303</sup>

The official German government stance on US NMD provides another example of the tension in Germany’s different identities. Given such negative public opinion, it is understandable that German politicians were very critical of the proposal. The Free Democratic Party questioned whether the program would ever be technologically feasible and pointed to its huge costs. The Green Party argued that it would hurt international arms control efforts.<sup>304</sup> Of all the major political parties, only the right-center Christian Democrats supported Germany participating in the US NMD program and called on the government to formulate a missile defense policy in coordination with NATO.<sup>305</sup>

Even Chancellor Schroeder and his Social Democrat Party (SPD) were initially very critical, although eventually their position changed to accept the US program. Gernot Erler, the deputy chairman of the SPD in the Bundestag, said in an interview that NMD would only protect against a fraction of the dangers facing the United States and thus “reduces to one singular problem, in an irresponsible manner, the catalogue of pending security policy issues and their possible responses.”<sup>306</sup> Schroeder, in a televised interview in early February 2001, argued that the discussion with the United States about NMD was not being conducted “in a manner he felt was appropriate” and argued that the program “could lead to a renewed arms race and different levels of security within NATO that may even affect the alliance’s cohesion.”<sup>307</sup>

A few weeks later, however, Schroeder had shifted his position, emphasizing instead that Germany had an interest in participating in the development of the technology necessary to implement the system. As Guenther Bannas observed, Schroeder’s “intention clearly was to ease the dialogue with the new Bush administration, which seems determined to go ahead with NMD.”<sup>308</sup> This muted criticism makes strategic sense, given the tension in German foreign policy between staunch support of non-proliferation initiatives and the desire to maintain amicable transatlantic relations. Yet it opened Schroeder to serious domestic criticism. For

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<sup>302</sup> Quoted in Huang Yong, “Differences still exist between Europe and the United States on the missile defense issue,” *Beijing Xinhua News Service* (May 4, 2001).

<sup>303</sup> Klaus-Peter Schoepner, “Germans not frightened by Bush’s Hawks – Large Majority wants self-confident foreign policy,” *Die Welt* (February 21, 2001).

<sup>304</sup> Hans-Juergen Leersch, “Growing Resistance to US Missile Plans,” *Die Welt* (February 23, 2001).

<sup>305</sup> “CDU/CSU in favor of participation in missile defense system,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (March 15, 2001).

<sup>306</sup> Leersch, “Growing Resistance to US Missile Plans.”

<sup>307</sup> Guenther Bannas, “Schroeder shifts position on US missile shield,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (February 28, 2001).

<sup>308</sup> Bannas, “Schroeder shifts position on US missile shield.”

example, in an article in *Der Spiegel* magazine, titled, “It Just Amazes You,” Juergen Hogrefe and Alexander Szandar highlighted the hypocrisy in the German government’s flip-flop:

It is now clear to the Chancellor that stubborn rejection of the NMD plan will not get him any further. He does not doubt the new US president wants to have the high-tech defense developed at all costs. So it seems more sensible to him to quickly jump on the bandwagon instead of sulking in a corner. It was ‘completely right’ to strictly oppose NMD, as long as one was dealing with a hesitating government on the other side of the Atlantic [the Clinton Administration], which apparently itself did not fully support the NMD program, as it is said at Joschka Fischer’s Defense Ministry. The current version of the Chancellor’s cooperation is nothing but an ‘organic development’ of the position in a ‘changing landscape.’ After all, the federal government has always demanded to share in the technology of the new armament program.<sup>309</sup>

As with the NPT, German analysts argue that Germany should play a leading role in helping the United States to change its position on national missile defense and reintegrate its actions within the nonproliferation regime. As German academics Joachim Krause and Oliver Thraenert argued in a 2001 editorial in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*,

America’s allies should make it their priority to point out that missile defense alone cannot be a politically effective strategy. It can only be useful in terms of comprehensive security policy, particularly effective non-proliferation policy, if it is integrated within the overall security policy system. In particular, the opportunities for far-reaching measures towards nuclear disarmament must be improved.<sup>310</sup>

### The US-India Nuclear Deal

Germany has been less outspoken about the US-India nuclear deal than other states examined in this analysis. Overall, however, German commentary has been critical of the deal, for many of the same reasons cited by China, Pakistan and Iran. Most importantly, German observers worry that this reinforces a double standard, in which American allies are allowed to have undeclared nuclear weapons while other states are not. Karl Grobe pessimistically concluded in the *Frankfurter Rundschau*: “With this, Bush officially turned the Non-Proliferation Treaty into waste paper....To move Iran’s Ayatollah’s to renounce their suspected nuclear arms program will now become more difficult.”<sup>311</sup> Similarly, Frank Harold in the *Berliner Zeitung* opined that,

Contrary to Iran, India has never signed the NPT and has no intention to do so. Promises to use the US technology for peaceful purposes only are non-binding and can be taken back at any time. The agreement cannot be controlled because

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<sup>309</sup> Juergen Hogrefe and Alexander Szandar, “It Just Amazes You,” *Der Spiegel* (March 5, 2001).

<sup>310</sup> Joachim Krause and Oliver Thraenert, “Missile Defense and Nuclear Disarmament Belong Together,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (February 14, 2001).

<sup>311</sup> Karl Grobe, “The End of the NPT,” *Frankfurter Rundschau* (March 3, 2006).



India is moving beyond international control systems. The US therefore wants to include bilateral control mechanisms in the contract. This is not a way out, but sets a dangerous precedent. If India is granted an exception, why should not Iran and North Korea get the same? In the current efforts to get both countries to refrain from nuclear weapons, an Indian-American nuclear treaty would be completely unproductive. Moreover, it could motivate other developing countries to be less reserved.<sup>312</sup>

In addition, some German analysts stressed that this deal demonstrated that the United States was more motivated by its own strategic interests than by international non-proliferation goals. For example, Sven Hansen, in the *Berliner Tageszeitung*, argued that,

Given the American-Indian agreement, Iran and North Korea will view the US criticism of their nuclear programs as pure hypocrisy and believe that the US threats are just power politics. Tehran and Pyongyang will come to the conclusion that if they get hold of nuclear weapons by pursuing tricky policies, Washington will have to accept these realities. This is the dangerous message of yesterday's agreement. It further weakens the international non-proliferation regime...The new agreement is also tomorrow's US power politics....It is regrettable that the agreement came with a high political price tag.<sup>313</sup>

Yet some Germans also see an upside, in that the International Atomic Energy Agency will finally get oversight of the civilian part of the Indian nuclear program. For example, as Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger argued in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*,

Given the current conflict over Iran's nuclear program, a country that unlike India signed the NPT, the American-Indian civil nuclear agreement has far-reaching significance. Critics are wrong to view it as a danger that sets a bad precedent and counteracts international non-proliferation efforts...Are double standards applied here? Of course, Bush's concessions are in part realpolitik and have to do with international coalitions as well as the rise of China. If the dangerous development cannot be reversed, it should at least be controlled. That is the reason why the IAEA welcomed the agreement. It will get overseeing powers it did not have before.<sup>314</sup>

Such views notwithstanding, from a German perspective the US-India nuclear deal is another example of US hypocrisy, by choosing to place its own strategic interests ahead of its stated global non-proliferation goals.

### **Germany's Potential Reactions to Proposed Future Changes in US Nuclear Policy**

It is unlikely that Germany will change course and decide to pursue a nuclear weapons program. It values its non-nuclear identity and the multilateral institutional frameworks that

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<sup>312</sup> Frank Harold, "Bush's New Friend in Asia," *Berliner Zeitung* (March 2, 2006).

<sup>313</sup> Sven Hansen, "Traacherous US Nuclear Policy," *Die Tageszeitung* (Berlin) (March 3, 2006).

<sup>314</sup> Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger, "Double Standards?" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (March 5, 2006).

undergird its security policy too much. As Mueller argues, the non-nuclear attitude of the German public “would make it suicidal for any serious politician to make a political platform out of this subject.” In his estimation, this would only change if there were an “extraordinary” change in events, such as:

The security situation must deteriorate, with a fully reemerged and ostentatiously hostile Russia pushing westward once more; the institutional framework must unravel, with NATO dissolved and the European Union breaking down under a fatal German-French divorce; and the internal balance of political forces must give way to a landmark shift to the far right.<sup>315</sup>

The likelihood that this combination of circumstances will occur is highly unlikely.

Germany would likely support any US moves towards reducing the stockpile, eliminating kinds of weapons or de-alerting. As Mueller argues, “one can expect that a majority of people and the elite would welcome such steps and strongly support it.”<sup>316</sup> At the same time, Germany is likely to be highly critical of changes in US nuclear policy that appear destabilizing for international nonproliferation regimes and seem to reinforce the NPR’s trend towards unilateralism. But US nuclear policy is not viewed in a vacuum by Germans; they look at all US behavior across policy areas. Thus, the United States could balance behavior in the nuclear arena that destabilized international regimes with behavior in another policy area that enhanced international cooperation. For example, the United States could throw its support behind international efforts to overhaul the UN Security Council to make it more effective.

Such trade-offs could be made within the nuclear policy area as well. For example, given that the central German concern with the US national missile defense program is, as they see it, its effect of scuttling the ABM Treaty and weakening existing nonproliferation regimes, one way to mollify the Germans would be for the United States to make a parallel investment in the surviving regimes. As Joanna Spears argues, “If the United States moved from being a block on these regimes to supporting what they were trying to achieve (and recognizing their role as one element in a web of deterrence), it would reap some further security benefits and would ease tensions with its transatlantic partners.”<sup>317</sup>

As the discussion of the shifting official German view of the US national missile defense program suggests, Germany may mute its criticisms of US nuclear policies in an effort to minimize tensions between the allies. But the United States would be imprudent to assume that Germany will always behave that way, or to push Germans into that position frequently. Instead, the US could gain valuable points by trying to meet Germany halfway through investing in other cooperative measures.

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<sup>315</sup> Mueller, “The View from Germany,” p. 347.

<sup>316</sup> Mueller, “The View from Germany,” p. 350.

<sup>317</sup> Spear, “Organizing for International Counter-proliferation,” p. 226.

## CONCLUSIONS

This paper has examined how various actors in the international community – including allies, developing states and potential adversaries – perceive US nuclear policy. As such, it fills a vacuum in the current debate about the future of US nuclear policy and the future of the US nuclear complex. It examines how various states responded to the *last* change in US nuclear posture, to see what lessons might be obtained for proposed future changes. The purpose of this paper was to present data that is not easily accessible or frequently summarized for US decision makers, to help inform the current conversations about the future of the US nuclear complex.

As discussed in the literature review, there has been much debate in policy circles about the effect of US nuclear policy on global nuclear proliferation. Some observers argue that US nuclear policy has no effect on other states' decisions to acquire nuclear weapons. Rather, they argue, states decide to proliferate for domestic political or regional security concerns. An alternate view, which is supported by the data presented here, is that US decisions do matter and can lead other states to be more inclined to acquire their own nuclear weapons. As Tom Sauer argues,

It is very unlikely that states like Iran or North Korea, or even India and Pakistan, would have tried to acquire nuclear weapons, had nuclear weapons never been invented. It was the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the US that forced the USSR to produce nuclear weapons. The latter was a major incentive or at least a major justification for France and the UK to build nuclear weapons... This does not mean that the elimination of nuclear weapons by one state would automatically mean the elimination of the other nuclear weapons arsenals. The point is that the longer the nuclear weapons states do not fulfill their obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons as agreed upon in the NPT and as clarified in the NPT Review Conferences later on, the more non-nuclear weapon states will get nervous and may start acquiring nuclear weapons as well.<sup>318</sup>

As this quote suggests, as the remaining global superpower, the United States is often held to a higher standard in most issue areas, including its responsibilities under Article VI and commitments made at the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Thus, any small changes in US nuclear policy that are perceived as moving away from disarmament are judged harshly in the international community as increasing global nuclear danger.

Nonetheless, the importance of US nuclear policy should not be oversold. Although the analysis presented here indicates that the four states do have opinions about US nuclear policy, the number of articles surveyed that address other US policies greatly overshadow the nuclear dimension. This should not be taken to mean that US nuclear policies are not important, but rather that when weighing the impact of its nuclear policy on other states, the US should consider the multitude of other messages that are being sent at the same time. Those messages are sent via public speeches, news media sources, Internet, and “official” policy, but most importantly, they are sent through US actions. US political, economic and defense activities in the region

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<sup>318</sup> Tom Sauer, *Nuclear Inertia: US Nuclear Weapons Policy After the Cold War* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 163.

around a target country need to be considered when trying to predict how that state will react to new developments.

Therefore, although nuclear policy is arguably an important signaling device in the international system, this analysis finds that:

- Each of these states views US nuclear policy through the prism of other aspects of its bilateral relationship with the United States, as well as the prism of its *own* nuclear posture.
- The US nuclear posture is relatively unimportant *by itself*. Instead, the US nuclear posture is just one factor in how these states perceive and respond to the United States. Moreover, US nuclear policy cannot be separated from historical and current political situations.
- US nuclear policy, by itself, only seems to matter if it directly affects another state's regional security and stability. For example, the US nuclear energy deal with India matters greatly to Pakistan, because from Pakistan's perspective, it has altered the strategic balance of power in the region.
- Most importantly, the US nuclear posture is not seen in a vacuum, but as one piece of the United States' behavior on the world stage. These states generally argue that the United States is hypocritical in its nuclear posture, and that the nuclear realm is simply one more issue area where the United States exhibits exceptionalism in the international system.

It is especially striking that despite the differences in these four states – in terms of their respective relationships with the United States as well as their own nuclear postures – all four appear to agree on some basic beliefs about the United States. The evidence in this paper suggests that these states believe that the United States is hypocritical and that its actions demonstrate double standards – one set for the US and its allies, and another set for all others. For the US, these states cite the US determination to maintain nuclear weapons and a perceived increased role for nuclear weapons in US security policy as inconsistent with US calls for global non-proliferation. For US allies, they cite US support for undeclared (India, Pakistan) or alleged (Israel) nuclear weapons states while censuring “rogues” for similar behavior. In this regard, the recently ratified US nuclear energy deal with India raised the greatest critiques, for it appears to exemplify the Bush Administration's non-proliferation policy as supporting what George Perkovitch has characterized “democratic bombs.” In this view, nuclear weapons are not the problem, non-democratic regimes are.<sup>319</sup> This perception of hypocrisy has eroded US soft power and the legitimacy of US global leadership.

This finding is very similar to the conclusions of the SAIC study, which examined foreign responses from a broader perspective. Like this paper, in its survey of nearly 50 countries, SAIC found that:<sup>320</sup>

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<sup>319</sup> George Perkovitch, “Bush's Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Nonproliferation,” *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2003), pp. 2-8.

<sup>320</sup> Dunn et al, “Executive Summary,” pp. 2-3.

- Other countries view US nuclear policy through a wider lens of US foreign policy more broadly, and that policy entails US unilateral action and “a US pursuit of absolute security and military primacy.”
- There is a “widespread perception” that the US is “placing heightened emphasis on nuclear weapons as part of overall US defense posture, shifting from a posture of nuclear deterrence to one of nuclear war-fighting if not nuclear preemption, while intentionally or unintentionally lowering the threshold of nuclear weapons use.”
- US missile defenses are “increasingly welcomed” by allies, but “still a concern” for Russia and China.
- The US is “widely perceived to be seeking to escape from deterrence relationships with new adversary nuclear powers” (such as North Korea and Iran).
- US allies and friends “oppose US development of new, tailored, low-yield nuclear weapons as unnecessary, potentially dangerous, politically divisive and adversely impacting non-proliferation.”
- There are “widespread concerns among US allies and friends (not simply among the traditional disarmament activists)” that US nuclear policy and posture are “giving nuclear weapons a heightened security role,” with “possible adverse non-proliferation impacts.”
- Close US allies argue that “a greater US readiness to engage on nuclear disarmament issues would pay off in increased support from other third parties in pursuing US non-proliferation objectives.”

The fact that these two studies, with very different analytical methodologies, reached similar conclusions gives us confidence in the finding’s robustness.

This finding has three implications, and these implications point out the difference between material and perceptual effects. First, because these states do not treat US nuclear policy in a vacuum, it is unlikely that small changes in US nuclear policy will have a drastic *material* effect on US relations with these states, unless the policy changes are perceived as being *congruent* with other US policies and actions. Second, the evidence suggests that US nuclear policy would matter even less – in terms of the *material* relationships with other states – if it was perceived to diverge from other policies or actions.

Perceptual relationships, however, are another matter. The third implication of this research is that nuclear policy matters immensely for the United States’ international reputation. Such reputation effects can have significant impact in terms of gaining international cooperation in addressing global issues that require multilateral solutions – and given the interdependent nature of the world today, most issues fall into this category. In contrast to a state’s hard power, soft power provides an indirect way to influence others. Soft power is an invaluable asset to: (1) keep potential adversaries from gaining international support and winning moderates over to their causes; (2) influence neutral and developing states to support US leadership; and, (3) convince allies to support and share the international security burden. The United States needs soft power assets (including “the moral high ground”) to solve these problems multilaterally and proactively.

As stated at the outset of this study, it is important to recognize that the analysis presented here is not the “objective truth” about US nuclear policy, but a summary of international *perceptions and beliefs* about US nuclear policy. If the data about international perceptions rankle, they help us to be aware of our *own* biases, especially about the interaction between hard and soft power. This analysis suggests that both hard and soft power is important. To accomplish its own objectives most effectively in the world, the United States needs both kinds of power operating in tandem.

Although this analysis suggests that the four nations studied view US nuclear policy specifically (and its international behavior more generally) as hypocritical, it is neither possible – nor recommended – for the United States simply to take these criticisms to heart and unilaterally disarm. Indeed, it would be incredibly imprudent to simply bow down to what everyone else wants. Instead, this analysis has three benefits.

First, it allows US policymakers simply to *know and understand* what everyone else wants, which creates the space for negotiation. If other states did not receive the message we were intending to send, we still need to know what message they did receive. This will allow us to send our message more clearly in the future. Like the SAIC study, this paper recommends that the US needs to do a better job at articulating US nuclear policy, so that other actors are not left to draw their own conclusions, or worse, so that other actors cannot articulate US policy for us through the lens of their own agendas.

Yet, this is not to imply that the US is simply being misunderstood and if it were to send the message more clearly, all of the disagreements would evaporate. From the perspective of these other countries, US hypocrisy and double standards are not just a matter of perception, but is also conditioned by logic and their own national interests. For example, why is it acceptable to build light water reactors in North Korea but not Iran? Why does the US sanction Pakistan’s weapons program only when it is convenient for the US? Why doesn’t the US press Israel, widely believed to have nuclear weapons, to become party to the NPT? Why is the US overturning 30 years of nonproliferation policy to sell nuclear technology to India, which doesn’t have to eliminate nuclear weapons, sign the CTBT or accept full-scope IAEA safeguards? Some legitimate disagreements do exist, and the US needs to respond to these disagreements appropriately – if only to agree to disagree.

Therefore, the second benefit of this analysis is to help US policymakers understand where other states are coming from with more clarity, in order to illuminate places of common interest and create opportunities for cooperation. As close US allies advised in the SAIC study, “If you want other countries to help work your issues [non-proliferation], then you need to help them work their issues [public-political support for a nuclear disarmament process].”<sup>321</sup> By seeking to narrow gaps between the US’ and other states’ positions, US policymakers can buy “breathing room” for those areas where US vital interests cannot be compromised. At the very least, sustained strategic dialogue with allies and potential adversaries can sow the seeds for new perceptions of the US as being willing to listen to others.

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<sup>321</sup> Dunn et al, “Foreign Perspectives on US Nuclear Policy and Posture – Key Findings and Themes,” briefing slides, slide 16.

Finally, this analysis helps policymakers understand how (mis)perceptions of US nuclear policy may lead states to adopt countermeasures, which can create unanticipated consequences and harm the US ability to promote these and other policies abroad. How other international actors perceive US policies and actions matters a great deal in their decisions about how much they will cooperate on the US policy goal of non-proliferation. The tragic irony is this: US nuclear policy and actions, which have the objective of trying to “solve” the global proliferation problem, may actually be making other international actors feel less secure. Their increased sense of insecurity lessens international security overall and reverberates back to the US as a heightened insecurity as well. Strategic dialogue with these actors could help to reduce their uncertainties about US intentions, while simply acknowledging some of their concerns about perceived hypocrisy could help to rebuild US soft power. Both actions could improve US security immeasurably.





## APPENDIX 1: CHINA

### Chinese Perceptions of the United States

China holds a realistic view about the United States' power in the international system. Chinese leaders also recognize that their country is still relatively weak by comparison, and thus they are willing to accommodate the hegemon – it is a pragmatic strategy that has been paying off while China focuses internally on economic development and domestic stability. Yet the prevailing conviction is that the United States is deliberately using its power to destabilize the international system, as well as China's domestic stability and rise to great power status.

#### America: The Destabilizing Hegemon

In the beginning of the 1990s, the prevailing view among Chinese analysts was that American power was declining and the emergence of a multipolar system was imminent. By the middle of the decade, however, much to their dismay, it was apparent the US was growing stronger. As Warren Cohen has argued, "China had no choice but to attempt to achieve its goals in an American-dominated unipolar world... This is why Deng Xiaoping had advised his comrades to hide China's capabilities, to build national power patiently."<sup>322</sup> This prompted a pragmatic effort by the Chinese to reduce tensions between the countries and accommodate US hegemony. China recognizes that it must maintain its close relationship with the United States if its modernization efforts are to succeed. As Singapore scholar Kishore Mahbubani puts it, China realizes that "although there is almost nothing that China can do to disrupt the political stability of the United States, the United States can do plenty to destabilize China."<sup>323</sup>

The United States and China view China's current status very differently. From the US perspective, the current Chinese government is a relic of the Cold War communist era, and that China would be much better off as a democracy. If China were to throw off its "oppressive" communist rule and allow freedom to ring, the country would flourish. Therefore, many Americans believe that the United States should be pursuing measures to plant the seeds of democracy in China as soon as possible.

In contrast, China views this American thinking as interventionist, arrogant and, most importantly, very destabilizing. "From Beijing's point of view, China's recent rise marks the end of a century of internal convulsions, civil wars and foreign humiliations. The Chinese feel that after having climbed a treacherous slope... their great future has finally arrived."<sup>324</sup> Many Chinese believe the United States does not give China enough credit for the progress it has achieved. As Beijing University scholar Jia Qingguo wrote, "Despite all the progress China has made over the years, there is little sign the US public has appreciated it or will ever be disposed to do so. Instead, one hears endless vicious allegations and condemnations from those Americans with ulterior motives." Commenting on the frequency of negative stories in the US media about China's human rights abuses and government oppression, he continues:

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<sup>322</sup> Cohen, "China's Power Paradox," p. 129.

<sup>323</sup> Mahbubani, "Understanding China," p. 50.

<sup>324</sup> Mahbubani, p. 51.

To an average Chinese, it is incredible and highly depressing to hear so many hostile as well as ill-founded allegations against China. It appears to them that many Americans are so hostile to China that they only want to look at the bad things about China, and if they cannot find enough of them, they will simply fabricate some. ...China has been trying very hard to tackle the many problems it is facing, including making genuine efforts to improve its human rights situation. Under the circumstances, why are there more criticisms and condemnations of China from the US? Why can't the Americans leave the Chinese alone? Many Chinese cannot help but feel that the real answer to such questions is that despite all the apparent lofty pretensions like democracy and freedom, what some Americans really want is to keep China down. They simply cannot tolerate that some Chinese people, members of the yellow race, aspire to the same level of economic affluence and human dignity to which Americans have been accustomed.<sup>325</sup>

Many Chinese analysts believe that the US sense of priorities for China – human rights and democracy now – would be destabilizing, and they resent that the United States assumes that it could know better than the Chinese about what the Chinese need and how they could best get it. China was especially wary of the Clinton Administration's engagement policy, because it watched Clinton sell it to the American people as a way to change China according to US priorities.<sup>326</sup>

Given their country's 20<sup>th</sup> century experiences with anarchy and corruption, Chinese leaders value domestic stability – even if that means a slower trajectory towards economic development and political freedom. The rapid modernization process and the transformation of the centrally planned economy into a market economy created a great deal of social and political tension. As Jia argues, “most Chinese believe that their interests lie in political stability, economic development and territorial integrity, with political stability as the first priority. Without political stability, China cannot develop its economy or defend its territory, let alone expand freedoms and develop democracy.”<sup>327</sup>

For these perceptual reasons, there is a growing conviction among Chinese policymakers that the United States is bent on curtailing China's rise and looking for opportunities to destabilize China. Observers cite at least four examples. First, many Chinese remain convinced that the US missile attack on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the 1999 Kosovo War was deliberate. As Mahbubani argues, “pointing to the sophistication of US surveillance technology, they hold on to the belief that the attack was intended as a message to China: beware of US power.”<sup>328</sup>

Second, Chinese leaders view American support of Taiwan as trying to thwart China's highest foreign policy priority – reuniting Taiwan with the mainland. The 2004 Chinese

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<sup>325</sup> Jia Qingguo, “Frustrations and Hopes: Chinese perceptions of the engagement policy debate in the United States,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 10, no. 27 (2001), pp. 321-330, at 327.

<sup>326</sup> Jia, p. 328.

<sup>327</sup> Jia, p. 327.

<sup>328</sup> Mahbubani, p. 50.

National Defense White Paper argues that Taiwanese separatist activities have “increasingly become the biggest immediate threat to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” and promoting the reunification of Taiwan is listed as one of China’s five national security goals.<sup>329</sup> The PRC passed an anti-secession law on March 14, 2005, authorizing the use of force in response to a Taiwanese move towards independence. (Although this is widely viewed as inflammatory, the vast majority of the act is laying out means of improving relations through diplomatic and economic ties.)<sup>330</sup>

Even though Washington officially opposes Taiwan’s independence and recognizes Taiwan and the mainland as one China, Chinese tend to view US policy towards Taiwan with suspicion – especially US arms sales to Taiwan and the promise of protection under the US nuclear umbrella and its promise to intervene.<sup>331</sup> Chinese scholar Shen Dengli argues that the US arms sales from 1979-2000 amounted to more than \$40 billion, and that these arms sales “strengthen” the Taiwanese separatists. Consequently, the Chinese public has been “very dubious about the long-term US strategic intention over Taiwan.”<sup>332</sup> Similarly, the White Paper argues, these arms sales and promises “send a wrong signal to the Taiwan authorities. The US action does not serve a stable situation across the Taiwan Straits.”<sup>333</sup> In other words, China worries that these US actions provide Taiwan with a false sense of security, which could encourage Taiwan to seek independence. The Chinese view Taiwan as an internal matter, and they resent the support that Taiwanese separatists get from the United States, which in turn constrains China’s ability to interact with Taiwan.<sup>334</sup> As Chinese scholar Qiu Huafei argues,

This is a severe test for China’s future security strategy on how to raise the overall national strength and maintain domestic political stability in order to make its own careful decisions with security strategy significance, as to ‘when’ and ‘how’ to bring about national reunification, without outsiders making decisions on the issue of ‘whether’ it should reunify....The Taiwan issue touches on the core values of China; therefore, China must do its best to safeguard national territorial and sovereign integrity...The United States should understand the high degree of sensitivity of the Taiwan issue.<sup>335</sup>

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<sup>329</sup> PRC State Council Information Office, *China’s National Defense in 2004*, p. 4, available at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2004.html>. The other four national security goals include: safeguarding and promoting national development (i.e. economic development); shaping the international environment favorably in China’s interest; maintaining domestic public order and stability; and modernizing the PLA in line with the development of other militaries.

<sup>330</sup> “Text of China’s Anti-Secession Law,” *BBC News*, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4347555.stm>.

<sup>331</sup> For a more detailed discussion of Sino-US relations regarding Taiwan, see Dumbaugh, “China-US Relations,” pp. 7-12.

<sup>332</sup> Shen, “Nuclear Deterrence in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” p. 13.

<sup>333</sup> *China’s National Defense in 2004*, p. 4. Interestingly, the English translation differs from the Chinese version. US China scholars argue this is because culturally, the Chinese believe that by translating it differently, they will make it more accessible to English readers, but the scholars argue the translation is actually more obscure. The official translator is Yao Yunzhu, whose articles about Chinese nuclear policy have been quoted above.

<sup>334</sup> Shi, “The Arms Control Mechanism,” pp. 29-33; Wang, “China’s Search for Stability with America;” Tompkins, “Influences on Chinese Nuclear Planning,” p. 11.

<sup>335</sup> Qiu Huafei, “The Development Trend in Sino-US Strategic Relations in the New Century,” p. 23.

Third, Chinese point to US sanctions of China after the 1989 pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square – as well as more recent American support of dissidents and religious groups, such as Falun Gong – as examples of intervening in China’s domestic affairs and destabilizing its political stability.

Finally, China views US unilateralism in its foreign policy as very dangerous. The Chinese were profoundly troubled by the American use of NATO forces to attack Serbia in the 1999 Kosovo War, as well as the unilateral US invasion of Iraq in 2003. In both situations, the US effectively bypassed the UN Security Council and intervened in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Given its own history of ethnic tensions with Tibetans and the Uighers of Xianjiang province, China is upset by the precedence for intervening in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, fearing that the United States might consider similar actions on behalf of these minorities in China.

Thus, it is not surprising that Singaporean Mahbubani would conclude:

Chinese leaders are acutely aware that during the country’s transition toward a more open and representative political system, they will be moving on unsteady political ground, as if climbing up a mountain slope covered with rocks that, if suddenly loosened, could trigger an avalanche. As they clamber up this treacherous slope, they perceive the United States as throwing rocks at their feet. Although Washington assures them that it is not trying to destabilize China, they see it acting in ways – supporting dissidents, encouraging nationalist forces in Taiwan, lionizing the Dalai Lama – that could threaten China’s political stability.<sup>336</sup>

Nonetheless, Chinese scholars have also noted that there is an upside for China to all of the United States’ destabilizing international behavior. For example, Wang Jisi, the dean of Peking University’s School of International Affairs, has argued that the United States’ “soft power has been weakened” since 2001, resulting in “international isolation” from allies, Islamic countries and other great powers. He concludes that this is good news for China: “As long as the United States’ image remains tainted, China will have greater leverage in multilateral settings.”<sup>337</sup> Or as Chinese scholar Qiu Huafei has noted, China and the United States “have different value orientations on the understanding of soft power,” which has had the positive effect of increasing the common ground between China and European countries, at the expense of US-European cooperation.<sup>338</sup> Finally, as Chong Zi argues, “The resistance against the US-led invasion of Iraq and the strong opposition to the war worldwide show us that the Big Stick is not always a magic wand in handling the international conflicts.”<sup>339</sup>

China’s ambivalence about the United States appears to be mirrored in US policy towards China. For example, China is the United States’ third-largest trading partner and is the single

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<sup>336</sup> Mahbubani, pp. 54-55.

<sup>337</sup> Wang, “China’s Search for Stability with America.”

<sup>338</sup> Qiu Huafei, pp. 19-20.

<sup>339</sup> Chong Zi, “US Policy Reeking of Unilateralism,” *China Daily* (April 1, 2003).

largest owner of US debt,<sup>340</sup> and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review states that the US goal is for “China to continue as an economic partner and emerge as a responsible stakeholder and force for good in the world.” Yet the same document explicitly declared a “hedging” strategy against China, in case cooperative approaches might fail to preclude future conflict, because China “has the greatest potential to compete militarily” with the US.<sup>341</sup> Thus, Chinese leaders remain wary of US-led efforts to contain China. According to recently disclosed Chinese leaders’ deliberations, Chinese President Hu Jintao said:

[The United States has] strengthened its military deployment in the Asia-Pacific region, strengthened the US-Japan military alliance, strengthened strategic cooperation with India, improved relations with Vietnam, inveigled Pakistan, established a pro-American government in Afghanistan, increased arms sales to Taiwan, and so on. They have extended outposts and placed pressure points on us from the east, south and west. This makes a great change in our geopolitical environment.<sup>342</sup>

### **An Overview of Chinese Foreign Policy**

As the previous section suggested, China is transitioning to great power status, and its foreign and nuclear policy are aligned with this goal. In practice, this means that China is focused internally on economic development, domestic political security and military modernization, and its external relations are focused on helping to achieve this internal transformation. The official foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China asserts,

China unswervingly pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. The fundamental goals of this policy are to preserve China's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, create a favorable international environment for China's reform and opening up and modernization construction, maintain world peace and propel common development.<sup>343</sup>

This priority on internal policies means that China appears willing to accommodate the United States, as it realizes that a good working relationship with the US is important for its domestic focus. To reduce widespread apprehension about the potential impact of China’s “rise,” Beijing has also engaged in a wide range of multilateral activities designed to demonstrate that China is a “responsible” member of the international community.

China is intent on achieving great power status, but has a long-term strategy to avoid having its rise prove overly costly or contentious.<sup>344</sup> The Chinese recognize that the United States currently has a preponderance of conventional and nuclear military power and so view

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<sup>340</sup> Wayne Morrison, *China-US Trade Issues: CRS Report RL33536*.

<sup>341</sup> Christopher Bolkom, Shirley A. Kan and Amy F. Woolf, *US Conventional Forces and Nuclear Deterrence: A China Case Study: CRS Report RL33607* (August 11, 2006), pp. 14-15.

<sup>342</sup> Nathan and Gilley, pp. 207-208.

<sup>343</sup> PRC Foreign Ministry, “Independent Foreign Policy of Peace.” Available at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/>

<sup>344</sup> Luzianin, Safronova, and Sveshnikov, p. 26.

direct confrontation with the US as ill-advised, if not suicidal.<sup>345</sup> There is a widespread belief among the Chinese elite that the arms race is what caused the Soviet Union to collapse and they are keen to avoid a similar fate.<sup>346</sup> Chinese leaders are eager to emphasize moderation and accommodation with the United States while preserving their core interests, because they recognize China as a relatively weak power vis-à-vis the US at this time.<sup>347</sup> There appears to be a consensus within the Chinese foreign policy elite, military as well as civilian, that a good working relationship with the US is essential. It provides flexibility and it has worked.<sup>348</sup> As Wang Jisi has written,

The United States is currently the only country with the capacity and the ambition to exercise global primacy...this means that the United States is the country that can exert the greatest strategic pressure on China....Yet the United States is a global leader in economics, education, culture, technology and science. China, therefore, must maintain a close relationship with the US if its modernization efforts are to succeed.<sup>349</sup>

Thus, China is focused on developing its economic, political, and military capacity in a minimally threatening manner.

For China, the primary goal has been and remains developing the economy.<sup>350</sup> China is currently the third largest trading state and the second largest trading partner for both the US and EU.<sup>351</sup> Some estimates say that China's economy will surpass the United States in the next 35 years. GDP growth has been consistently around 9 percent for the last several years and was an impressive 9.2 percent last year, which was largely driven by a 27.7 percent growth in industry.<sup>352</sup> Another important indicator of economic growth is energy consumption. In the last decade and a half, China has gone from petroleum self-sufficiency to being the world's second largest importer of oil.<sup>353</sup> To ensure a stable supply of this precious commodity, the PRC has pursued good relations with a number of states that raise concerns in the West, including Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Venezuela, and Russia, among others.<sup>354</sup>

However, this economic development is not necessarily satisfactory for everyone, either domestically or internationally. Development has not been evenly distributed internally. China's east coast region accounts for 80 percent of the trade growth, whereas the rest of the

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<sup>345</sup> Lieber and Press, "The Rise of US Nuclear Primacy."

<sup>346</sup> McKenna, "US DoD Ponders China Threat," p. 33; Cohen, "China's Power Paradox," p. 129.

<sup>347</sup> Nathan and Gilley, p. 227; Sutter, "China's Good Neighbor Policy," pp. 717-731.

<sup>348</sup> Cohen, "China's Power Paradox," pp. 132-133.

<sup>349</sup> Wang, "China's Search for Stability with America."

<sup>350</sup> Abanti Bhattacharya, "Revisiting China's 'Peaceful Rise': Implications for India," *East Asia*, vol. 22, no. 4 (Winter 2005), pp. 59-61.

<sup>351</sup> Marvin J. Cetron and Owen Davies, "The Dragon vs. The Tiger: China and India Reshape the Global Economy," *The Futurist* (July/August 2006), p. 39.

<sup>352</sup> Neil C. Hughes, "A Trade War with China," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 84, no. 4 (July/August 2005); Cetron and Davies, p. 40.

<sup>353</sup> Charles E. Zeigler, "The Energy Factor in China's Foreign Policy," *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, vol. 11, no. 1 (Spring 2006), p. 1.

<sup>354</sup> Cohen, "China's Power Paradox," p. 129.

country, which is home to one billion people, enjoys only 29 percent of the growth.<sup>355</sup> This discrepancy has the potential to cause dissatisfaction that could undermine the regime. Meanwhile, many nations and international organizations complain about China's unfair trading and currency policies. The yuan is pegged to the dollar and is widely regarded as being undervalued, giving China a trading advantage. The trade deficit with the United States hovers around \$200 billion. On the other hand, devaluation of the yuan could very well lead to speculation that could radically destabilize China's economy. In 2004, the PRC restricted imports – ostensibly to prevent the economy from overheating, but some regard it as protectionism. Given the economic and political liabilities associated with free market capitalism, the Communist Party is being careful to follow Deng Xiaoping's policy of "crossing a river by feeling for each stone."<sup>356</sup> This cautious policy has certainly slowed reforms that could make China more efficient, but has allowed the CCP to retain control of the country.<sup>357</sup>

In addition to its economic development, China has been working to modernize its military. During the 1980s, China began to reassess its decision to neglect military modernization in favor of economic development. The overwhelming victory of the American-led coalition in the First Gulf War reinforced the need to reinvest in modern military technology. China is shifting from a continental orientation requiring large land forces for "in-depth" defense to a combined land and maritime force that requires a smaller, more mobile, and more technologically advanced "active peripheral defense" capability.<sup>358</sup> While manpower has been reduced, the defense budget has grown dramatically as China acquires new technology and more sophisticated training. A major focus of this modernization has been a professionalization of the PLA officer corps, with an increased emphasis on recruiting skilled officers with science and technology expertise (the "Strategic Project for Talented People").<sup>359</sup> In addition, one of the key areas of training and investment has been amphibious assaults, like those that would be necessary to pacify Taiwan.<sup>360</sup> While the Pentagon has estimated China's military spending at roughly \$60 billion, a RAND study puts it at \$31-35 billion.<sup>361</sup> Although the estimates of China's defense budget differ, some analysts note that the resources committed to defense modernization have "increased at a pace that is intended neither to undermine the attainment of

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<sup>355</sup> Dianne Feinstein, "Taiwan and the Sino-American Relationship: Thoughtful Management, Consistent Attention," *Chinese American Forum*, vol. 21, no. 4 (April 2006), p. 3.

<sup>356</sup> Hughes, "A Trade War with China,"

<sup>357</sup> For more on how much faster China could be growing, see Martin Wolf, "Why is China Growing So Slowly?" *Foreign Policy*, no. 146 (Jan/Feb 2005).

<sup>358</sup> For more detailed information about Chinese military modernization, see *China's National Defense in 2004*; David Shambaugh, *Modernizing China's Military* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004); Dennis J. Blasko, *The Chinese Army Today: Tradition And Transformation For The 21st Century* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2005); Harold Brown and Joseph W. Prueher, Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force, *Chinese Military Power* (2003); Anthony Cordesman and Martin Klieber, *Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2006); Kristen Gunness, "China's Military Diplomacy in an Era of Change," paper presented at the US National Defense University symposium on China's Global Activism (June 20, 2006). For a more hawkish perspective, see US Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2006," available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/china.html>.

<sup>359</sup> *China's National Defense in 2004*, p. 6.

<sup>360</sup> Dennis J. Blasko, "Chinese Army Modernization: An Overview," *Military Review*, (September/October 2005), p. 68.

<sup>361</sup> McKenna, "US DoD Ponders China Threat," p. 33.

essential civilian development priorities nor to unduly alarm both the peripheral states and the major powers and thus erode the generally benign threat environment facing China today.”<sup>362</sup>

To further these economic and military modernization goals, China has worked to develop friendly relations with a wide range of strategic partners. Moreover, it has begun to take a “less confrontational, more sophisticated, more confident, and at times, more constructive approach toward regional and global affairs.”<sup>363</sup> It has embraced much of the current constellation of international institutions, rules and norms as a means to promote its national interests, and has actively invested in building new institutions – such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization – where the existing ones do not meet their needs. In short, China is starting to see itself as a “responsible” great power and wants to demonstrate that commitment by binding itself into the international system. Among the many ways that China has engaged in multilateral relationships and institutions:<sup>364</sup>

- Following the Cold War, in just two years, it established diplomatic relations with 28 countries, including South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and South Africa.
- It has been establishing various levels of “partnership” with states, to facilitate economic and security coordination and offset the US system of regional alliances. For example, it has signed the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation with Russia in 2001, and signed similar agreements with South Korea and India.
- Since 1991, it has settled border conflicts with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Russia, Tajikistan, and Vietnam, often on less than advantageous terms.
- It has ramped up foreign aid to neighboring countries, as well as African countries that help with its strategic economic and energy needs, by investing in large infrastructure projects without the strings that are normally attached to loans from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the US or Japan.
- In 2000, it led the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Central Asia’s regional security and trade organization.
- It has initiated political dialogue and engagement with NATO, the European Union, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
- It has shown greater involvement in international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization and G-8. It has also increased its engagement with the UN Security Council and increased its participation in UN peacekeeping operations, supporting contingents in places such as East Timor and Congo.
- It has ratified several major arms control and non-proliferation accords, including the NPT and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and agreed to adhere to the basic tenets of

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<sup>362</sup> Swaine and Tellis, p. 128.

<sup>363</sup> Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2003).

<sup>364</sup> Evan Medeiros, “China’s Rise in the Asia Pacific,” in *China’s Rise: Diverging US-EU Perceptions and Approaches*, ed. Bates Gill and Gudrun Wacker (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, August 2005), pp. 48-55; Baijia, p. 38; Rebecca MacKinnon, “China and Russia: Mutual Trust, but no alliance” (November 10, 1997), available at <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9711/10/russia.china>; Medeiros and Fravel, pp. 24-28; Sutter, pp. 719-721; Guinness, “China’s Military Diplomacy;” Jane Perlez, “China Competes with West in Aid to Its Neighbors,” *The New York Times* (September 18, 2006), p. A1.



the Missile Technology Control Regime. (Although it has signed the CTBT, it has not yet ratified it.)

China's international engagement has been matched by a more institutionalized and decentralized foreign policy-making process, which is less dependent upon any single leader and more focused on information gathering and analysis. Szue-Chin Philip Hsu, a scholar who studies China's foreign policy apparatus, argues that the new CCP leadership "appears to be more open to international norms and rules" and that the increasing contact with international institutions has fostered among them "an understanding that an isolationist, non-cooperative grand strategy of foreign policy is not a viable option" for China. Hsu argues that one reason for China's willingness to engage multilaterally is that China is "indubitably the greatest beneficiary" of globalization, increased capital and technology flows and multilateral engagement in the international system.<sup>365</sup> Thus, promoting a multipolar international order, to constrain the "destabilizing" influence of the United States as well as to increase its own status in the international system, makes sense. In Qiu Huafei's words, "As far as China is concerned, developing a positive, cooperative relationship" with other countries, especially European countries, "can curb factors that give rise to a tense world-political situation and also help revive the weakening political foundation of Sino-US strategic relations."<sup>366</sup>

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<sup>365</sup> Szue-Chin Philip Hsu, "China's Domestic Politic and US-Taiwan-China Relations: An Assessment in the Aftermath of the CCP's 16<sup>th</sup> National Congress," *American Foreign Policy Interests*, vol. 25 (2003), pp. 43-51, at 47.

<sup>366</sup> Qiu Huafei, p. 21.



## APPENDIX 2: IRAN

### Iranian Perceptions of the United States

US nuclear policy is only one part of the face the United States presents to Iran. An understanding of the historical and current sources of Iran's perception of the US is critical to understanding why US nuclear policy is only a fraction of their concern. This section describes Iran's perception of the US, historically and in relation to current events. It shows an oppressed Iran suffering under the yoke of a United States they see as untrustworthy, as a regional bully and as a specifically anti-Iranian troublemaker. The section concludes with a discussion of whether or not the American "read" of Iran's views is accurate based on the cultural divide that separates the Persians from the West.

#### America: The Betrayer

The historical roots of Iran's view are based in the country's historic political and economic humiliation, rejection and isolation. Multiple betrayals by the US, England, Germany, and Russia throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> Century have been well-characterized by scholars.<sup>367</sup> More recently, Iran fell from US grace during the 1979 Revolution when the American-friendly Shah was overthrown and the theocratic Islamic Republic of Iran was established. The US influenced its European allies to withdraw support for Iran's (ostensibly) civilian nuclear power program. From 1980 to 1988, Iran fought a losing war with Iraq. During the war, the US supported Iraq overtly and covertly; much of Iran's military was purchased from the US and their ability to fight atrophied in part from lack of access to spare and replacement parts.<sup>368</sup> Iran believes that the US and its allies sanctioned Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons against Iranians during the war, in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.<sup>369</sup> As recently as June 25, 2005, Majlis Speaker Gholam-Ali Haddad Adel stated that the West had a hand in the Iraqi chemical weapons attacks on Iran.<sup>370</sup>

#### America: The Regional Terrorist

Throughout the 1980's and 1990's, Iran's deep mistrust of the US continued. The US invasion of Kuwait during the First Gulf War was viewed with mixed emotions by Tehran. Although it supported the reining in of its recent enemy Iraq for invading Kuwait, the increased US presence in the area was not welcomed. The successful demonstration of US military superiority did not go unnoticed by the Iranian military still recovering from the war with Iraq. Further, while Iran actually supported the US invasion of Afghanistan following the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks, the result was a semi-permanent American presence on the Eastern border of Iran.

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<sup>367</sup> Mokhtari, p. 209-229; Ziemke, "The National Myth and Strategic Personality of Iran;" and Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle*.

<sup>368</sup> Farhi, "To Sign or Not to Sign?"

<sup>369</sup> Mokhtari, p. 211.

<sup>370</sup> GlobalSecurity.org, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Iran: Doctrine." (Updated June 25, 2005). Available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/doctrine.htm>.

The perception of the US as the bully on the block was only exacerbated by the 2003 invasion of Iraq. According to the Commander of the Islamic Republic Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier-General Yahya Rahim-Safavi in 2003:

The occupation of Iraq by the Americans was the most significant contemporary global development next to the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran.... The Americans can be the harbingers of great revolutionary developments, and unprecedented changes in this whole region with their presence in Iraq.<sup>371</sup>

Continuing US support for the Zionist regime in “occupied Palestine” also is viewed as a regional security threat. Iran sees US policies throughout the Middle East as “interventionist.” As the Iranian Minister of Defense, Vice-Admiral Ali Shamkhani, stated in February 2003, “We should consider foreign intervention as a factor which contributes to growing instability... America’s quest for international hegemony was another threat to the security and national interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”<sup>372</sup> Iranian leaders get a great deal of political mileage by highlighting US support for Israel. As an article in the *Tehran Times* noted, “Of course, the US media, including influential papers like the Washington Post and New York Times and the television networks CNN and NBC, are controlled by Jewish investors who are part of the Zionist lobby.”<sup>373</sup>

The on-going US threat to Iran was perceived in the recent conflict in Lebanon and articulated by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei: “Today, everyone realizes that the attack on Lebanon was planned in advance, and was a Zionist-American operation - a first step towards taking control over the Middle East and over the [entire] Muslim world.”<sup>374</sup> The Iranian perception of the US as a regional security threat could also stem from US media. For example, Seymour Hersh’s article in *The New Yorker* in July 2006 claimed that military leadership was planning a bombing campaign against Iran and had considered (and rejected for primarily political reasons) using a nuclear device.<sup>375</sup> Other military policies such as the well-publicized US “revolution in military affairs” (RMA), which promises an even smarter, faster and more precise military force, also contributes to Iran’s sense that the US poses a long-term threat to the region.<sup>376</sup>

### America: The Troublemaker

In addition to the historical betrayals and regional security threat that the US poses in the Middle East, Iranians are especially offended by what they perceive to be selected targeting by

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<sup>371</sup> “Iran: Guards commander says Middle East’s fate intermingled with Iraq,” *IRNA* (September 15, 2003).

<sup>372</sup> “Iran: Defence minister discusses regional security, defence policy, US threats,” *IRNA* (February 8, 2003).

<sup>373</sup> “Iran: IAEA should not apply double standards,” *Tehran Times* (February 28, 2004).

<sup>374</sup> “Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei: ‘America Can Expect a Resounding Slap and a Devastating Fist-Blow from the Muslim Nation,’” *Special Dispatch-Iran, No. 1230* (Middle East Media Research Institute, August 4, 2006).

<sup>375</sup> Hersh, “Last Stand.”

<sup>376</sup> “Iran: Defence minister discusses regional security, defence policy, US threats.”

American rhetoric and policy. For example, despite Iran's offer of assistance following 9/11 and Iran's cooperation during the 2001 Afghanistan campaign against the Taliban, President Bush put Iran on the "axis of evil" list.<sup>377</sup> Since then, President Bush designated Iran as a "rogue state" based primarily on its support of the Hezbollah in Lebanon and its "civilian" nuclear program. Iranian media deem Bush's theory "obnoxious."<sup>378</sup>

Specifically, Iran sees the US as a "troublemaker" for Iran. In 2005, Ali Larijani, the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council and chief nuclear negotiator, stated:

As far as America is concerned, there are two problems. America's behaviour should be a criterion for us. America has created a trouble-making country in the region. Wherever we try to defend the Iranians' national interests, we realize that the Americans have created difficult conditions.... The people of Iran have witnessed America's coarse behaviour since the time prior to the revolution. This behaviour was felt by various groups after the revolution. They therefore cannot alter their views just because of the remarks made by an ambassador. Of course, the important point is to take real steps, and not for publicity purposes, so that it becomes obvious that they have abandoned the practice of creating obstacles against the Iranians' national interests.<sup>379</sup>

Likewise, in 2003, the Commander of the Islamic Republic Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier-General Yahya Rahim-Safavi stated that the Americans are

harbingering political change inside Iran through launching a psychological-diplomatic war from abroad, and this is a test-study for them... [They are r]uining the legitimacy of the revolution, creating a deep gap between the people and the system, instigating social unrest throughout the country, exerting outside pressure simultaneously with occasional troubles inside, and alienating Iran at the intentional scenes, and finally, if all those policies fail, probable military threat (sic) are in the US agenda for Iran.<sup>380</sup>

Thus, the US-led campaign to discredit and eliminate the "legal" and independent Iranian nuclear power program becomes not a facet of US nuclear policy abroad, but a symptom of a larger anti-Iranian attitude. The US rhetoric regarding the Iranian nuclear program is seen merely as "propaganda" aimed to undermine Iran. A recent IAEA complaint gives credence to this view. The IAEA has complained about an unclassified staff report from the US House Intelligence Committee, saying that it "contains erroneous, misleading and unsubstantiated information" about Iran's nuclear program and overstated aspects of the threat it posed.<sup>381</sup> Finally, articles regularly indicate that Iran perceives the US as able to "manipulate the world opinion against the Islamic Republic of Iran" as it tries to present an "extremist image of the Islamic Republic to the

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<sup>377</sup> Mokhtari, p. 209-229.

<sup>378</sup> "Iran: Daily on foreign minister's meeting with British prime minister."

<sup>379</sup> "Iran top negotiator down plays Israeli nuclear threat"

<sup>380</sup> "Iran: Guards commander says Middle East's fate intermingled with Iraq," *IRNA* (September 15, 2003).

<sup>381</sup> David E. Sanger, "Nuclear agency for UN faults report on Iran by US House," *The New York Times* (September 15, 2006), p. A3.

world.”<sup>382</sup> Iranian president Mahmood Ahmadinejad reiterated this feeling during his speech before the United Nations in September 2006:

The prevailing order of contemporary global interactions is such that certain powers equate themselves with the international community, and consider their decisions superseding that of over 180 countries. They consider themselves the masters and rulers of the entire world and other nations as only second class in the world order.<sup>383</sup>

### The Cultural Gap Question

There is some concern among scholars that understanding Iranians through their media may be hindered by a cultural gap.<sup>384</sup> It seems the published texts of Iran oscillate between the two poles of victimhood and arrogance. Some scholars have taken this to mean that Iran perceives the West as weak and this encourages it to continue to build its nuclear program in the face of international opposition.<sup>385</sup> Indeed, many scholars have noted the historical Persian hubris is deeply ingrained in the culture. For example, Iranian scholar Kamran Taremi notes that the country’s “desire for dominating the Gulf stems from national pride and an exaggerated perception of self-importance.”<sup>386</sup> However, a sense of victimhood and extreme arrogance are two sides of the same coin, and the reviewed literature suggests that Iran feels that its voice is not heard on the international stage or is not capable of building international consensus or affecting US policy.

Iran’s sense of voicelessness is visible in the collected literature of this review. Articles by Iranian scholars (as well as by scholars of Iran) mainly focus on explaining Iranian views of the world, suggesting that Iran feels misunderstood. These articles seem to be aimed at bridging the cultural gap and they take a much gentler line on the US and its policies than do the media.

### **An Overview of Iranian Foreign Policy**

Given this sense of voicelessness, it is perhaps not surprising that one of Iran’s major foreign policy goals is to be heard on the international stage. Throughout the news media, articles attempt to show how allies and international organizations support Iran. Through this technique of “bandwagoning” with its allies, Iran hopes that its opinions will balance against the more powerful Western states. Based on the available media, Iran believes that Russia, Iraq and other oppressed Arab countries, and occasionally the EU are its primary allies.

Regarding its neighbor and historic rival and foe, in February 2003, Tehran painted the picture of Iraq as an equally-oppressed ally: “Despite the fact that Iran was attacked by Iraq and suffered heavily during the eight-year war Tehran has been magnanimous enough to emphasize a

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<sup>382</sup> “Iran: Paper praises Iran’s achievement in reaching nuclear agreement.”

<sup>383</sup> Address by Ahmadinejad before the UN (September 17, 2006).

<sup>384</sup> Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle*.

<sup>385</sup> Robert Satloff, “The Rogues Strike Back,” *The Weekly Standard* (July 24, 2006).

<sup>386</sup> Kamran Taremi, “Iranian Perspectives on Security in the Persian Gulf,” *Iranian Studies*, vol. 36, no. 3 (September 2003), p. 383; Mokhtari, pp. 209-229.

non-military solution to the issue” (referring to the potential for illegal WMD in Iraq).<sup>387</sup> In 2005, the picture was largely the same:

About security issues in Iraq, Iraq is one of our neighbours and a natural ally. Improved security there will mean better conditions in this region. Iran wishes that a parliament is established in Iraq as soon as possible, an elected government established there, and its people relieved from the occupation rule in order to live a comfortable life as all other nations. We are prepared for all kinds of cooperation with the government of Iraq.<sup>388</sup>

Iran’s attitude towards its other Arab neighbors also is solicitous when trying to gain support to balance US interests in the Middle East.

Over the past three decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has always been a good neighbour of the small Arab states on the southern coast of the Persian Gulf, has defended their rights, and has never tried to attack them. In fact, Iran has always believed it has a common destiny with them. Therefore, if the Arab states on the southern coast of the Persian Gulf that currently believe that the United States is their security guarantee change their views, a new chapter can be opened in their security and defence cooperation with Iran. Therefore, the Persian Gulf littoral states should try to establish a common security system with Iran in order to guarantee regional security and the safe passage of ships in the Persian Gulf because a powerful and stable Iran is to the benefit of these countries.<sup>389</sup>

Iran also invokes its participation in the United Nations and IAEA to show how the country is a peaceful and cooperative world-citizen that complies with all international agreements. As Larijani stated in 2005, “Our cooperation with the IAEA will be within the frameworks of the NPT and Safe Guard Agreement. If we have allowed inspections to any site, it was because Mr. Al-Baradi’i requested and we agreed. We have done so for the sake of transparency. Otherwise, the norm is for us to cooperate only within the IAEA rules and regulations.”<sup>390</sup> Likewise, the language of the June 2006 Iranian response to the nuclear negotiations package repeats their intentions to cooperate, engage, and negotiate within the bounds of the IAEA.<sup>391</sup> During his speech before the UN General Assembly in September 2006, Iranian President Ahmadinejad recommended ways to redress the power imbalance caused by U.S. dominance of the Security Council: In his view, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the African continent should each have a representative as a permanent member of the Security Council, with veto privilege.

To further gain the favor of its international allies, Iranian leaders forgive them their failures by blaming US hegemony.<sup>392</sup> Dr. Kazem Jalali, of the Majlis Committee for National

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<sup>387</sup> “Iran: Daily on foreign minister’s meeting with British prime minister.”

<sup>388</sup> “Iran top negotiator down plays Israeli nuclear threat.”

<sup>389</sup> “Iran seeks common security strategy for Persian Gulf – Editorial,” *Tehran Times* (April 17, 2006).

<sup>390</sup> “Iran top negotiator down plays Israeli nuclear threat.” *I*

<sup>391</sup> Islamic Republic of Iran’s Response to the Package (Presented June 6, 2006).

<sup>392</sup> “Iran: Daily denounces US, Israeli ‘campaign’ against Iran’s nuclear activities;” “Iran: IAEA should not apply double standards,” *Tehran Times* (February 28, 2004).

Security and Foreign Policy told the Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA), that “the powerful countries of the world should not have allowed America to play around with the credibility of the UN and the Security Council.”<sup>393</sup> One editorialist in 2003 in the Tehran Times went further by attempting to rally Middle Eastern support by pointing out US international failures and accusing it of being a dog wagged by the “Zionist lobby” tail:

There is no doubt that the recent report by the IAEA stating that Iran has violated the Safeguards Agreement of the agency was influenced by Washington...It seems that this time the White House hawks need to start a new disinformation campaign to cover up their political failure in dealing with such issues as the Palestinian crisis, the North Korean nuclear arsenal, as well as the Iraqi and Afghan campaigns... This propaganda is engineered by the Zionist lobby...<sup>394</sup>

In addition to the goal of being heard, Iran would like to resume its “rightful” place as regional hegemon in the Middle East. This quest for hegemony is driven by the desire to force Western (US) power out of the region and to establish a more “natural” regional balance that extends Iranian influence. Iran does not believe that regional security and stability are possible as long as the United States retains a military presence in the Persian Gulf, and thus has promoted regional security cooperation under UN auspices, to minimize US influence.<sup>395</sup> Iran’s conciliatory gestures to its Arab neighbors, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iraq, appear to be trying to draw them away from their relatively close ties with the United States. Iran also continues to support Hezbollah and the Palestinian government, in an effort to balance against Israel. Yet Iran does not seem to have territorially expansionist ambitions; its desire is more to restore itself to a position of regional (and global) respect, that would, as Caroline Ziemke puts it, “inspire outsiders to leave it alone but would allow Iran to venture out and engage with the outside world at times and by means of its choosing.”<sup>396</sup>

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<sup>393</sup> “Iran will not accept a ‘win-lose game’, says prominent MP,” *ISNA* (July 31, 2006).

<sup>394</sup> “Iran: Daily denounces US, Israeli ‘campaign’ against Iran’s nuclear activities.”

<sup>395</sup> Kamal Kharrazi (Iranian foreign minister), “The View from Tehran,” *Middle East Policy*, vol. 12, no. 1 (Spring 2005), pp. 25-30.

<sup>396</sup> Ziemke, p. 16.



## APPENDIX 3: PAKISTAN

### Pakistani Perceptions of the United States

An understanding of the historical and current sources of Pakistan's perception of the US is critical to understanding why, to Pakistan, US nuclear policy is simply more evidence of its duplicity and untrustworthiness. This section describes Pakistan's perception of the US, historically and in relation to current events. In ways that are similar to Iran, Pakistan's historic narrative is replete with "a sense of wrongdoing and injustices, betrayals of trust and treaties, abandonment by allies, and victimization due to religion, race and color."<sup>397</sup> In this narrative, the United States is the cause for most of this abandonment, earning it the epithet of "fair weather friend"<sup>398</sup> – one that pursues its own interests irrespective of other considerations.

#### America: The Fair-Weather Friend

Pakistan believes that, throughout its history, it has been used by the United States and then abandoned when those interests were served. In a relationship that swings like a pendulum, Pakistan has drifted from being "the most allied ally" in the 1950s, to "the ignored ally" in the 1960s and 1970s, back to "the most allied ally" the 1980s, to the most sanctioned ally in the 1990s, and finally to "the most suspected ally" from 2001 until the present. Understandably, such perceived fickleness on the part of the United States does not leave an endearing impression in the mind of most Pakistanis.<sup>399</sup>

At the onset of the Cold War, Pakistan aligned itself with the United States by joining two regional defense pacts, the South East Asia Treaty Organization and the "Baghdad Pact." As a result of these alliances, Pakistan received nearly \$2 billion in US assistance from 1953 until 1961, a quarter of this in military aid, thus making Pakistan one of America's most important security partners of the period, "the most allied ally."<sup>400</sup> These security guarantees were found to have no utility when Pakistan faced Indian military forces in 1965 and 1971, as the United States pressured its ally through UN Security Council resolutions and withheld ammunition and spare parts for all of the weapons it had sold Pakistan in previous years.<sup>401</sup>

The relationship declined during the 1970s, as new strains arose over Pakistan's efforts to respond to India's 1974 nuclear test by seeking its own nuclear capability. The US has been reluctant to criticize the Indian program, because, through the lens of American strategic interest, India was seen as a democratic country and counterweight to China. Yet the failure to sanction the Indian program provided added impetus to Pakistan to pursue its own nuclear weapons.<sup>402</sup> President Carter responded to Pakistan's covert construction of a uranium enrichment facility in 1979 by suspending US aid.

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<sup>397</sup> Khan, "Comparative Strategic Culture," p. 2.

<sup>398</sup> An apt description is cited in Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*.

<sup>399</sup> For a detailed discussion of the vacillating relationship between Pakistan and the United States, see Kux, *The United States and Pakistan*.

<sup>400</sup> Kronstadt, *Pakistan-US Relations*, p. 3.

<sup>401</sup> Elizabeth A. Stanley, *Working out the Inevitable: Domestic Coalitions in War Termination* (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Harvard University, 2002), Part III and Appendix.

<sup>402</sup> Ahmed, "Countering Nuclear Risks in South Asia."

With the 1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, US priorities shifted again, and Pakistan was again viewed as a frontline ally in the effort to block Soviet expansionism. In 1981, the Reagan Administration offered Islamabad a five-year, \$3.2 billion aid package, and turned a blind eye to Pakistan's nuclear program – even waiving specific sanctions mandated by law (discussed further below).<sup>403</sup> Although Pakistan disclosed in 1984 that it could enrich uranium and revealed in 1987 that it could assemble a nuclear device, the US continued to certify Pakistan's non-nuclear status until 1990. In exchange, Pakistan became a key transit country for arms to the Afghan resistance.

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan's strategic importance for the United States waned again, and in the 1990s, the US shifted towards India in terms of economic and strategic interests, while choosing to overlook India's nuclear history. During the same time, Pakistan was isolated internationally, and the United States again suspended aid because of Pakistan's nuclear program. One of the notable results of the aid cutoff was the non-delivery of F-16 aircraft purchased by Pakistan in 1989.<sup>404</sup> Throughout the decade, the US considered declaring Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism and went as far as imposing four different sets of sanctions, in response to Pakistan's nuclear test in 1998 and the military coup in 1999. Pakistan turned to Islamic radicalism, by supporting the growing insurgency in Kashmir and the Taliban movement in Afghanistan.

After more than a decade of alienation, US-Pakistan relations were transformed anew after September 11, 2001. The US once again returned to Pakistan as a pivotal ally, this time in the global war on terrorism. As Pakistani scholar Samina Ahmed outlines,

Counter-terrorism objectives have taken precedence over all other US political, military and strategic objectives in South Asia, and Pakistan's military regime has become a major beneficiary of these changed US priorities. To reward Pakistan for its cooperation with US military action in Afghanistan, the United States has waived nuclear specific sanctions and democracy sanctions on Pakistan. To retain Pakistan's support, the United States and its allies have also extended substantive incentives to the Musharraf regime. These include the restoration of economic assistance by Pakistan's major donor, Japan, cash grants for budgetary assistance by the US and its allies, and the US-led coalition's support for debt relief and enhanced loans from international financial institutions to Pakistan. Against the backdrop of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in November 2001, President Bush announced a \$1 billion aid package to Pakistan.<sup>405</sup>

From the Pakistani perspective, the US focus on its own strategic interests above all else was apparent most recently in the US-India nuclear deal, as will be discussed further below.

Pakistani President Musharraf recently announced that the United States threatened to bomb his country if it did not cooperate with the 2001 American campaign against the Taliban in

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<sup>403</sup> Kronstadt, *Pakistan-US Relations*, p. 3.

<sup>404</sup> Kronstadt, *Pakistan-US Relations*, pp. 3-4.

<sup>405</sup> Ahmed, "Countering Nuclear Risks in South Asia," p. 11.

Afghanistan. In an interview with “60 Minutes” on CBS, Musharraf said that his intelligence director was told by Richard Armitage, then US deputy secretary of state, that if Pakistan did not cooperate with the United States, it should “be prepared to be bombed. Be prepared to go back to the Stone Age” – which Musharraf said “was a very rude remark.” The Bush Administration has said there would be no comment on a “reported conversation between Mr. Armitage and a Pakistani official.”<sup>406</sup> Armitage, however, denied making the threat.<sup>407</sup> Whether or not this threat is true, Musharraf’s recounting of it certainly affects how Pakistanis see the United States, and it certainly fits with the larger perception of the United States as using Pakistan to achieve its own strategic interests.

Given this history of perceived American fickleness, it is not surprising that Pakistani views of the US have been consistently low for some time. President Musharraf responded to a question about why this is the case by stating,

Before 1989, we were a strategic ally of the US and fought a war in Afghanistan for 10 years. Then we got left high and dry. The United States then started to have a strategic relationship with India, which was in the enemy camp. What would the man on the street think?<sup>408</sup>

Since 1999, public opinion polls have consistently shown negative views about the United States, with less than a quarter of the population holding a “favorable opinion” of the US. The lowest poll was in 2002, when only 10 percent of the population held favorable views.<sup>409</sup> As a senior US expert opined in January 2004 testimony before a US Senate panel, “Pakistan is probably the most anti-American country in the world right now, ranging from the radical Islamists on one side to the liberals and Westernized elites on the other side.”<sup>410</sup> The one exception to these low numbers occurred in 2005, when an earthquake devastated Pakistan and the US made considerable contributions for relief and aid. A poll conducted the month following the earthquake showed US favorability among Pakistanis had doubled from 23 to 46 percent, and 81 percent said that earthquake relief was important for them in forming their overall opinion of the United States.<sup>411</sup> By the following year, however, the favorability rating had dropped back to about a quarter of the population.

While these poll numbers suggest that anti-American sentiment is common in Pakistan, Islamist groups in Pakistan tend to be the most anti-American, “at times calling for ‘jihad’ against the existential threat to Pakistani sovereignty they believe the relationship with Washington entails.”<sup>412</sup> In the past, Pakistan’s politics were rather secular and extremist groups were isolated, but elections in 2002 gave 20 percent of the National Assembly to a coalition of

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<sup>406</sup> “Pakistan Tells of US Threat after 9/11, CBS Reports,” *The New York Times* (September 22, 2006), p. A12.

<sup>407</sup> Melissa Block, “Armitage Denies Making ‘Stone Age’ Threat,” *All Things Considered* (September 22, 2006), transcript available at <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6126088>

<sup>408</sup> Pervez Musharraf, “10 Questions for Pervez Musharraf,” *Time* (October 3, 2005).

<sup>409</sup> Pew Global Attitudes Project (June 13, 2006).

<sup>410</sup> As quoted in Kronstadt, *Pakistan-US Relations*, p. 16.

<sup>411</sup> Poll conducted by AC Nielsen between November 14-18, 2005. Available at: <http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/Pakistan%20Poll%20Report--updated.pdf>

<sup>412</sup> Kronstadt, *Pakistan-US Relations*, p. 10.

Islamist parties, in addition to substantial gains in provincial assemblies in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan.

In sum, Pakistan views the United States as a “fair weather friend,” and it resents how it has been, as it believes, used by the United States and then abandoned when those interests were served. Pakistanis see themselves as having been allies with the US and having made many sacrifices for American interests, but not having received the follow through or support they feel they deserve. Part of its resentment may also be the sense of powerlessness it feels, because although it sees the United States as fickle, Pakistan continues to need the relationship.

### America: The Bankroller

Although Pakistan does not feel a direct military threat from the United States, as Iran does, it is vulnerable to the United States in other ways – strategically, militarily and economically. Strategically, Pakistan is vulnerable to the US in regard to India and Afghanistan. Certainly, the US-India nuclear deal is the most obvious example of how the US could threaten Pakistan’s security. As will be explained in more detail below, the deal is seen as upsetting the balance of power in the region and allowing India to establish hegemony over its smaller neighbors. Because the United States is a party to the deal, and Pakistan feels threatened by the deal, the United States is perceived indirectly to be a cause of that threat. From Pakistan’s perspective, the US also has the potential to upset the balance of the conflict in Kashmir. In addition, US actions in Afghanistan threaten Pakistan’s strategic influence in the region. This point is not openly stated by Pakistani analysts or officials, but foreign analysts raise the critical point that, throughout the 1990s, Afghanistan under the Taliban was in many ways a client-state of Pakistan. US actions in Afghanistan have reduced Pakistan’s influence there considerably. They have also exacerbated Pakistan’s problems along its western border in the Baluchistan province – especially on occasions when US aerial drones have launched missiles on Pakistani territory.

Militarily, Pakistan depends on the US for equipping and supplying its military. The close US- Pakistan security ties of the cold war era — which came to a near halt after the 1990 aid cutoff — have been in the process of restoration as a result of Pakistan’s role in the US-led anti-terrorism campaign. In 2002, the United States began allowing commercial sales that enabled Pakistan to refurbish part of its fleet of American-made F-16 fighter aircraft, and in 2005, the US announced it would resume sales of F-16s to Pakistan after a 16-year hiatus. In June 2004, President Bush designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally of the United States. The US is training and equipping new Pakistan Army Air Assault units that can move quickly to find and target terrorist elements. There has been a direct US role in training the security detail of the Pakistani president and training and equipping Pakistan’s internal police forces.<sup>413</sup> This support is needed to ease Pakistani fears vis-à-vis its strategic competition with India.

Economically, Pakistan is heavily supported by US assistance. Pakistan’s cooperation after September 11, 2001 led to an inflow of US aid and assistance, a boost in trade and investment and an easing of its national debt, which has since significantly helped Pakistan’s

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<sup>413</sup> For more details about US-Pakistan security cooperation, see Kronstadt, *Pakistan-US Relations*, pp. 11-12.

economy with steady growth in GDP and stock market figures. The US is by far Pakistan's leading export market, accounting for about 20 percent of its total exports.<sup>414</sup>

Thus, while the US does not pose a direct security threat to Pakistan, these other dynamics of US-Pakistani relations assure Pakistani dependency on US policies and actions in more subtle, but still important ways, and Pakistanis are well aware of this.

### **An Overview of Pakistani Foreign Policy**

Though Pakistan has only been a nation state since 1947, it has had an extraordinary share of security challenges, including four wars with India. Its geopolitical neighborhood leaves it overshadowed by three large, relatively rich and powerful neighbors, China, India and Iran. Regular skirmishes with regional rivals on unsettled borders, as well as ethnic and sectarian clashes domestically, have fostered a security-intensive environment. Given its endemic sense of insecurity, it is not surprising that Pakistan's most robust institution is its military. The military has controlled the government for about half of Pakistan's existence, with numerous coups; the military prides itself as "guarantor of the state." A strong defense – from internal and external threats – is thus Pakistan's foremost priority. Stephen Cohen has argued that Pakistan's concerns over its ultimate survival create strong parallels with Israel (and his argument presupposes that the alleged Israeli nuclear arsenal is real):

Like Israel, Pakistan was founded by a people who felt persecuted when living as a minority, and even though they possess their own states (which are based on religious identity), both remain under threat from powerful enemies. In both cases, an original partition demonstrated the hostility of neighbors, and subsequent wars showed that these neighbors remained hostile. Pakistan and Israel have also followed parallel strategic policies. Both sought an entangling alliance with various outside powers (at various times Britain, France, China and the United States), both ultimately concluded that outsiders could not be trusted in a moment of extreme crisis, and this led them to develop nuclear weapons.<sup>415</sup>

The primary importance of India in Pakistan's foreign policy cannot be overstated. Pakistanis believe that India has never accepted the concept of Pakistan and has sought proactively to undermine Pakistan's existence. Given its self-identification as the South Asian Muslim state, Pakistan blames India for trying to "steal" Kashmir, a Muslim region that Pakistan believes should belong with its co-religionists. Pakistan also blames India for breaking up the country when India supported the Bengali insurgency in East Pakistan. In Pakistan's view, its defeat in the 1971 Bangladesh War was caused by "India's machinations and intervention that exploited Pakistan's vulnerability in order to humiliate it,"<sup>416</sup> not by Pakistan's own harsh treatment of the Bengali minority – excluding it from political institutions and then clamping down with military occupation and gross human rights abuses to prevent the province from seceding.

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<sup>414</sup> Kronstadt, *Pakistan-US Relations*, p. 20.

<sup>415</sup> Stephen Cohen, *India: Emerging Power* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 204.

<sup>416</sup> Khan, "Comparative Strategic Culture," p. 4.

During times of intense crises, Pakistan's external allies, China and especially the United States, showed that they were unwilling or unable to guarantee Pakistan's security. As a result, Pakistan has learned to rely on itself. Thus, besides its nuclear arsenal, another tool for self-reliance has been supporting ideological radicalism, especially in Kashmir and in Afghanistan. The influx of global aid, mercenaries and mujahideen fighters from all over the world to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan played an important role in Pakistan's foreign policy. This continued with Pakistan's support of the Taliban during the 1990s, when Pakistan was isolated by the international community. Unfortunately for Pakistan, the September 11, 2001 attack by al-Qaeda terrorists based in Afghanistan exposed the unintended consequences of encouraging ideological radicalism. Since then, Pakistan has effected a multi-dimensional strategic reorientation back towards the mainstream – supporting the US in its war on terrorism, rebuilding its external alliance with China, proactively seeking rapprochement with India and Afghanistan, and focusing on economic development and domestic issues.<sup>417</sup>

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<sup>417</sup> Khan, "Comparative Strategic Culture," p. 5.

## APPENDIX 4: GERMANY

### German Perceptions of the United States

If the difference in worldview between Germans and Americans had to be boiled down to one sentence, it would be this: while most Germans attribute an increasing importance and potential to solve global problems in multilateral institutional arrangements, they believe that most Americans do not. This bothers Germany, because it recognizes that the institutional framework within which it is so embedded was created by the United States after World War II. Germans are critical of the United States' increasing unilateralism for two reasons. First, they believe this undermines their ability to influence the United States through NATO and other multilateral institutions. Second, they believe this unilateralism is destabilizing for international security.

#### America: The Dominant Partner

In an old Cold War joke, the purpose of North American Treaty Organization (NATO) was threefold – to keep the US in, the USSR out, and Germany down. Germans unselfconsciously acknowledge the importance of the United States in helping Germany to repair relations with its neighbors after World War II, and thus Germans have always been enthusiastic supporters of the NATO alliance. Germany always believed it held a special place in the NATO alliance, as the majority of American troops overseas during the Cold War were stationed on German soil. Yet, Europe is no longer a primary theater for US strategic policy, and the US trend towards unilateralism has led it to invest less effort in coordinating policy with its old allies. It's no wonder that German security analyst Peter Rudolf has grieved, "The romance in the relationship is gone."<sup>418</sup>

Germany is more aware now of the power imbalance with the United States, partly because it perceives the US as acting with more dominance and less compromise. In particular, Germans appear to resent the lack of consultation that they have been receiving from the US. As an ally, they believe that they deserve US policymakers' candor and an opportunity to discuss US policy decisions that will affect them – before those decisions are implemented. While Germany understands that the United States is free to make any policy decisions that it chooses, Germany feels it has a right to be heard before US policy that affects both nations is announced. For example, in the case of Iraq, then Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder aired his frustration in a September 2002 *New York Times* interview, saying that

Consultation cannot mean that I get a phone call two hours in advance only to be told 'we are going in.' Consultation among grown-up nations has to mean not just consultation about the how and the when, but also about the whether.<sup>419</sup>

Schroeder's anger at not being consulted is easy to understand, given that Iraq was an issue with potentially far-reaching political and economic ramifications for the allies' interests. Therefore, he and the other allies felt justified that their views be taken into account. Schroeder also

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<sup>418</sup> Rudolf, "The Myth of the German Way," p. 135.

<sup>419</sup> Erlanger, "German Leader's Warning: War Plan is a Huge Mistake."

claimed a right to be consulted based on the fact that Germany had shown its solidarity in the 2001 Afghanistan war, and he had personally risked “his own political survival to get a coalition majority for German participation” in the war.<sup>420</sup> This theme was reinforced in a February 2006 speech by Chancellor Angela Merkel, who pushed for NATO to become “the most important consultation body for international security problems.” As German analyst Ulrike Guerot noted, “Her wording made it clear than consultation can not mean US guidance, and that common analysis does not automatically lead to common action in the end.”<sup>421</sup>

There is also a concern that even when the US has engaged in “consultation,” it has been for show, without any real dialogue or compromise. For example, Uta Zapf, then a Social Democratic member of the German Bundestag (legislature), recounted her experience with a senior Bush appointee: She and fellow Bundestag members were allowed one hour with the official; however, virtually all of that time was taken up by him talking “at them. There was no real discussion... The Bush team’s approach was resented and its message given less attention because of the preemptory manner of its delivery.”<sup>422</sup>

For these reasons, it is understandable that most Germans view themselves as no longer an equal partner with the United States. In 1993, when Germans were asked whether the US dominated German-American relations or whether Germany had become an equal partner, opinions were mixed. By 2002, in Rudolf’s words, the “the German public appears to have shed its illusions”: 73 percent described the US as having a dominating role, while 26 percent still considered Germany an equal partner.<sup>423</sup>

Equally understandably, Germans no longer count on the United States as their most important ally in international issues. Transatlantic Trends polling data from 2003 show that France is now seen as Germany’s most important partner, and France is also considered a more reliable partner. The preference for France is part of a wider “Europe first” orientation that has emerged out of frustration with US foreign policy. The overwhelming majority of Germans polled (82 percent) believe the US only pursues its interests without regard for the interests of European allies. For this reason, when asked whether the EU or the US were more important to German vital interests, 81 percent chose the EU (up from 55 percent in 2002). The same number believed that a common European stand on issues was more important for German foreign policy than close German-American relations. Finally, 70 percent (up from 48 percent the year before) wanted the EU to become a “superpower,” to balance against the United States and allow “a more independent European course in diplomatic and security affairs.”<sup>424</sup>

Interestingly, the preference for Europe over the United States has not damaged the image of NATO. A surprising 85 percent of Germans agree that NATO will be needed in the future (with only a minor difference between West Germans, 86 percent, and East Germans, 80

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<sup>420</sup> Peter Rudolf, “German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations,” *German Institute for International and Security Affairs Working Paper FG 4* (July 2004), p.12.

<sup>421</sup> Ulrike Guerot, “Background paper: Merkel’s Foreign Policy,” *Aspen Institute Conference on Transatlantic Dialogue* (February 2006), p. 2, available at <http://www.gmfus.org/publications>.

<sup>422</sup> Uta Zapf’s Plenary Remarks, as recounted in Spear, “Organizing for International Counter-proliferation,” p. 228.

<sup>423</sup> Poll results from *Der Spiegel*, cited in Rudolf, “Myth of the German Way,” p. 139.

<sup>424</sup> Transatlantic Trends polling data cited in Rudolf, “Myth of the German Way,” p. 139.



percent). Younger Germans are even more convinced of NATO's future importance.<sup>425</sup> Thus, NATO is seen less as an instrument of American foreign policy than as a part of Germany's foreign policy identity. These data may be the result of the Bush Administration's decreased attention to the alliance in its foreign policy.

Underneath these poll results, it appears that Germans are upset that the strategic change in US foreign policy – with a preference for “coalitions of the willing” and unilateralism – is “choking off” one of the main avenues for German multilateralism, NATO. This also contributes to the German sense of the US as not listening to its allies. Under the Bush Administration, NATO has lost its salience and, correspondingly, Germany has lost a lever of influence. In Thomas Risse-Kappen's view, NATO is no longer what it used to be – a “unique institutional framework for the Europeans to affect American policies with consultation norms and joint decision-making procedures as the underpinnings of Europe's influence on the United States.”<sup>426</sup> Or as Peter Rudolf argues,

The traditional premise of German foreign policy in the transatlantic setting – gaining influence by cooperation – has been put into serious doubt....Europe is no longer a primary theater for US strategic policy, and there will be no resurrection of the once unique German-American relationship. In this respect, one can speak of the ‘end of the transatlantic epoch.’<sup>427</sup>

#### America: The Unilateral Hegemon

Americans often find it hard to understand why Europeans are willing to accept multilateral, regime-based approaches to international security problems such as WMD proliferation, instead of robust military capabilities or other unilateral solutions. As Senator John Kyl has framed the debate, “Which would you trust, a missile or a piece of paper?” For many Americans, the answer is self-evident. Not so for Europeans. As British scholar Joanna Spear has argued,

What Americans often fail to acknowledge is that European security has long rested on pieces of paper – such as the Washington Treaty (which established NATO) – and that these have yielded good outcomes for Europe. Thus cooperative approaches to security have a positive resonance across the Atlantic.<sup>428</sup>

The European strategic culture prefers multilateral, institutional and cooperative approaches to security problems. Multilateralism involves a lot of diplomatic activity, an area where most European policymakers pride themselves on good performance. Europeans believe that the way forward is to engage problem states and find solutions to underlying problems, not merely to contain these states and freeze the situation into a hostile status quo. Europeans favor diplomatic

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<sup>425</sup> Polling data cited in Rudolf, “Myth of the German Way,” p. 140.

<sup>426</sup> Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 223.

<sup>427</sup> Rudolf, “Myth of the German Way,” p. 135.

<sup>428</sup> Spear, “Organizing for International Counter-proliferation,” pp. 220-221.

and political solutions over intrusive, unilateral and coercive ones. Germans, in particular, embody this European strategic culture, perhaps in an effort to compensate for its aggressive, unilateral 20<sup>th</sup> century history. Thus, during the Cold War, West Germany pursued a policy of *Ostpolitik* to engage with East Germany,<sup>429</sup> and more recently, Germany has adopted a process of “active influence” (*active Einwirkung*) with Iran.<sup>430</sup> Germans believe that this process has yielded benefits such as a decrease of Iranian terrorism in Europe, and see it as the best way to deal with the risk of unconstrained technology flows to Iran, especially from Russia.<sup>431</sup>

Given this strategic culture, it is understandable that Germans (and other Europeans) view the United States’ penchant for military, technological and unilateral solutions with some distaste. As German security analyst Peter Rudolf has argued, even when the United States attempts multilateralism,

...it is a pure instrumental notion of multilateralism, namely using international institutions and, more often, flexible ad-hoc coalitions, for the pursuit of national interests.....The United States behaves more and more as a world power using its preponderant resources for the pursuit of its national security interests instead of acting in its traditional role as ‘benign hegemon’ guided by a broader world order perspective suited to a globalizing world. This unilateral thrust has become even more prevalent as consequence of the ‘Bush Doctrine.’<sup>432</sup>

Similarly, according to Johannes Thimm, a German scholar of transatlantic relations, while Germans “have acknowledged an increasing importance and potential of global governance mechanisms...parts of the American political elite view them as a threat to national sovereignty.”<sup>433</sup>

Germans perceive the United States as unskilled in diplomacy and too quick to write off some regimes as “beyond repair.”<sup>434</sup> In their view, the US tendency to name and blame “rogue states” often creates self-fulfilling prophecies. Even the concept of “rogue states” is a problem, because “it risks stereotyping and, by suggesting that some states are beyond reasonable hope, precludes political measures designed to blunt their aggressiveness and bring them in out of the

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<sup>429</sup> Catherine M. Kelleher, *Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).

<sup>430</sup> For more information about German views of policy towards Iran, see Volker Perthes and Eva Wegner, “Enriching the Options: Europe, the United States and Iran,” *German Institute for International and Security Studies (SWP) Working Paper* (May 2006); Rudolf, “The United States, Iran and Transatlantic Relations: Headed for Crisis?” *SWP Comments* (September 2004); Olivert Thraenert, “Iran before the Security Council? German Perspectives and Goals,” *SWP Comments* (January 2006); Thraenert, “Ending Suspicious Nuclear Activities in Iran: Discussing the European Approach,” *SWP Working Paper* (November 2004); and Johannes Reissner, “Nuclear Issue instead of Iran Policy? Europe’s Difficult Position between Iran and the US,” *SWP Comments* (March 2005).

<sup>431</sup> Peter Rudolf, “Managing Strategic Divergence: German-American Conflict over Policy Towards Iran,” in *The Iranian Dilemma: Challenges for German and American Foreign Policy*, eds. Rudolf and Geoffrey Kemp (1997), available at <http://www.aicgs.org/publications>.

<sup>432</sup> Peter Rudolf, “Mutual Perceptions,” *German Institute for International and Security Affairs Working Paper FG 4* (September 2002), p. 2.

<sup>433</sup> Thimm, “What Really Matters in Transatlantic Relations.”

<sup>434</sup> Heisbourg, “American Hegemony?” p. 10.

cold.”<sup>435</sup> Moreover, German analyst Oliver Thraenert argues “the term ‘axis of evil’ [suggests] that all countries involved in proliferation can be dealt with in the same way.”<sup>436</sup> Thus, it is not surprising that 74 percent of Germans “highly disapprove” of the axis of evil rhetoric.<sup>437</sup>

Germans also have a different perspective on the threat from WMD proliferation and terrorism than the United States does. As Joanna Spear has argued about proliferation, Americans tend to view the problems caused by individual states or terrorist groups within a global framework. Thus, the issues are extracted from their regional setting, and “both the problem and possible solutions are decided at an abstract global level.” In contrast, Germans (and other Europeans) view these problems “in the context of regional security and do not necessarily single out weapons of mass destruction for special attention.”<sup>438</sup>

Similarly, while Germans are “almost as concerned as Americans about the threat of terrorist attacks” and 61 percent supported the war in Afghanistan, they “do not perceive the war on terror as a war against evil, a war against civilization.” The vast majority of Germans (85 percent) think the US is acting mainly in its own interests in the war on terror.<sup>439</sup> Given its long experience with domestic terrorism (i.e. the Baader-Meinhof Gang), Germans generally view terrorist threats within a domestic political context, rather than as an existential threat to world order, as many Americans view al-Qaeda. These different perspectives translate into different preferences for how to address the problem. Germany prefers to adopt existing domestic counter-terrorism solutions that focus on law enforcement at home and develop strategies that address underlying grievances, such as poverty, abroad. As German security analyst Peter Rudolf argues, “the preferred measures to combat terrorism lie – to a greater extent than among Americans – in the economic realm: in helping poor countries to develop their economies.”<sup>440</sup>

German analysts argue that 9/11 was a transformative moment for US foreign policy that accentuated some long standing structural problems in the transatlantic relationship. Rudolf argues the Bush Administration’s foreign policy after 9/11 demonstrated three things to Germany:

firstly, the structural asymmetry resulting from the huge disparity in military power on both sides of the Atlantic; secondly, the deeply rooted strategic divergence in the perception of security threats and the response to them; and thirdly, diverging perspectives on world order, leading to conflicts over the role of international institutions and the unilateral thrust of United States foreign policy.<sup>441</sup>

Rudolf draws a distinction between all Americans and the Bush neo-conservatives behind current US foreign policy. Writing in 2002, Rudolf quipped that “Americans and Germans do not live on different planets but those neoconservatives do.” In his view, “the more this neoconservative

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<sup>435</sup> Freedman, “Europe and Deterrence,” p. 100.

<sup>436</sup> “It may take a catastrophe to rouse Europe from its slumber.”

<sup>437</sup> Statistics quoted in Rudolf, “Mutual Perceptions,” p. 2.

<sup>438</sup> Spear, “Organizing for International Counter-proliferation,” p. 218.

<sup>439</sup> Rudolf, “Mutual Perceptions,” p. 2.

<sup>440</sup> Rudolf, “Mutual Perceptions,” p. 2.

<sup>441</sup> Rudolf, “Mutual Perceptions,” pp. 2-3.

wing of the Republican Party will shape American foreign policy, the more it will lead to a growing strategic divergence between the United States and Europe, especially with Germany.”<sup>442</sup> Similarly, Johannes Thimm argues that

Resistance to multilateral regimes is most of all an elite [American] phenomenon...It is a myth that the average American is afraid of a UN that will eventually come with black helicopters to take over the country. UN skeptics are mostly to be found within the political establishment.<sup>443</sup>

Germany tends increasingly to see America deploying its power unilaterally and in pursuit of narrow interests. German scholars have criticized American “disdain” for international law and multilateral organizations. They cite the “obvious disregard for the Geneva Conventions” in the Bush administration’s opinions about torture, the US rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and the Treaty banning landmines. These scholars argue that US behavior has not only eroded US soft power, but by extension, is eroding Western European soft power as well.<sup>444</sup>

Moreover, German public opinion has consistently been highly critical of concrete US actions that are perceived as unilateral and self-interested, such as the war in Iraq, opposition to the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol.<sup>445</sup> According to public opinion data in *Der Spiegel* magazine, in 2002, nearly two-thirds of Germans believed the US pursues only its own interests when it intervenes in the world’s crisis regions. In 1993, only 58 percent expressed that opinion. Even more significantly, a declining number view the US as “the guarantor of global peace and security” (only 48 percent in 2002, down from 62 percent in 1993).<sup>446</sup> Thus, in Peter Rudolf’s estimation, unilateralism – “not the predominant power” of the US, “but the way this power is used” – is “the main factor” in that more negative view of the US overall.<sup>447</sup>

Similar results about the depth of Germans’ negative feelings about US foreign policy were visible in poll results from Transatlantic Trends, a project of the German Marshall Fund and the Compagnia di San Paolo. In the June 2005 poll, when asked how desirable it is that the US exert strong leadership in world affairs, 60 percent of Germans said it was undesirable and 39 percent, desirable. These numbers were almost exactly reversed in 2002, when 68 percent said US leadership was desirable and 27 percent called it undesirable. Asked specifically about President Bush, the results were even more critical: 83 percent disapproved of Bush’s handling of foreign policy (up from 62 percent in 2002), while 16 percent approved (down from 36 percent in 2002).<sup>448</sup> Such data suggest that Germans have always been more skeptical about Bush foreign policy than about the US more generally, but the negative views have become more

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<sup>442</sup> Rudolf, “Mutual Perceptions,” p. 2.

<sup>443</sup> Thimm, “What Really Matters in Transatlantic Relations,” p. 6.

<sup>444</sup> See, for example, Thimm, “What Really Matters in Transatlantic Relations,” p. 5; Braml, “Rule of Law or Dictates by Fear,” pp. 115-140; Thimm, “Farewell to the Laws against Torture?”

<sup>445</sup> Donfried’s testimony before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats (November 9, 2005).

<sup>446</sup> Public opinion data from *Der Spiegel* (May 18, 2002), pp. 26-31.

<sup>447</sup> Rudolf, “Mutual Perceptions,” p. 2.

<sup>448</sup> Transatlantic Trends poll data, cited by Donfried in her testimony before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats (November 9, 2005).

generalized over time. In the view of Karen Donfried, director policy programs for the German Marshall Fund, “the data suggests that what we defined as anti-Bush sentiment during the first term has deteriorated into a broader anti-Americanism in the second term.”<sup>449</sup>

For these reasons, perhaps it is not surprising that Charles Kupchan, a US scholar of transatlantic relations, argued recently that cooperative security with Europe is waning, and that “balance of threat thinking is making a distinct comeback. Europe is not balancing against American power, but it is balancing against American behavior.”<sup>450</sup> Or as German scholar Johannes Thimm tersely concludes, “As long as there is fundamental disagreement on how to construct a world order, which helps us to achieve our common goals, there is more trouble ahead.”<sup>451</sup>

### **An Overview of German Foreign Policy**

Despite the relatively negative German perception of the United States, most analysts agree that “a functionally driven cooperative relationship” with the United States will remain a “cornerstone of German foreign policy culture,” albeit of lesser importance than in the past and perhaps posing more problems.<sup>452</sup> Relations with the United States are so interwoven with a variety of institutional networks, and the interactions on a variety of international issues are so dense and complex, that it would be impossible for Germany to completely sever ties, even if it wanted to. Instead, Germany is trying to find ways to use these common institutional networks to influence US policy away from unilateral efforts, as well as enhance European strength to interact more autonomously with the United States. In general, Germany prefers embedding its foreign policy into multilateral frameworks, striving for “civilized international order” through non-military means.<sup>453</sup>

Like other European countries, Germany’s foreign policy is undergirded and shaped by a network of multilateral, institutional frameworks. The first framework consists of the various arms control agreements that structure the security situation in Europe – the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the Vienna documents on confidence building, and global agreements such as the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). As Mueller commented, “These agreements contribute powerfully to the benign security situation, grant early warning long before any threat would become serious, and strengthen trust in the validity and perpetuity of the impossibility of major war.”<sup>454</sup>

The second framework consists of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, the North American Cooperation Council, and the NATO-Russian Council. These institutions offer chances to address grievances and emerging conflicts early, and to deepen cooperation between countries that could easily develop hostile relationships.

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<sup>449</sup> Donfried’s testimony.

<sup>450</sup> Charles Kupchan, “The Fourth Age: The Next Era in Transatlantic Relations,” *The National Interest*, no. 85 (September/October 2006), pp. 78-84, at 81.

<sup>451</sup> Thimm, “What Really Matters in Transatlantic Relations,” p. 8.

<sup>452</sup> Rudolf, “German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations,” p. 5.

<sup>453</sup> Rudolf, “The Myth of the German Way,” p. 145.

<sup>454</sup> Mueller, “A View from Germany,” pp. 343-344.

Finally, the third framework consists of alliances and institutions related to German security – NATO and the European Union. As was discussed in the previous section, Germany has traditionally regarded NATO as a primary channel for influencing the United States. Concurrently, Germany has been investing in the web of relationships in the European Union, which Mueller characterizes as “of pivotal importance to German security: it creates a network of common interests between Germany and those countries it has warred with throughout much of modern history, most of all France.”<sup>455</sup> Building the European Union, and its developing European Security and Defense Policy, is seen by Germany as an effort to lessen dependence in security matters on the United States. As Rudolf has argued, a major lesson that Germany learned from the 1999 Kosovo War was that “the European Union must increase its capability to act autonomously in the process of preventing and managing crises in Europe so that Europe gains real equity (*wirkliche Gleichberechtigung*) with the United States.”<sup>456</sup>

Despite this interest in promoting a common European identity, most German policymakers acknowledge that “a strong Europe cannot be built on the basis of opposition to the United States.”<sup>457</sup> The German defense policy guidelines of May 2003 reaffirm this traditional premise: “The transatlantic partnership remains the foundation of our security. Also in the future, there will be no security in and for Europe without the United States.”<sup>458</sup> Joschka Fischer, the former German foreign minister, made a special effort in 2003 to reassure Washington that the future Europe will not seek to rival the United States.<sup>459</sup>

Moreover, even though former Chancellor Schroeder was very vocal in his criticism of the United States policy in Iraq – for example, he made opposition to the war the centerpiece of his re-election campaign in the summer of 2002,<sup>460</sup> and he worked closely with France and Russia to mount a campaign to deny the United States the backing of the UN Security Council<sup>461</sup> -- much of it was for domestic consumption, given how unpopular the war was with the German public.

Indeed, for the most part, German policies have been quietly supportive of the US. First, the Schroeder government did nothing to restrain the US from using its military infrastructure in Germany during the Iraq war.<sup>462</sup> Moreover, German intelligence agents in Baghdad provided the US military with Saddam Hussein’s plan for the defense of Baghdad the month before the 2003 US invasion began.<sup>463</sup> (The German public’s response to this disclosure has been overwhelmingly negative, as they view it as a breach of the public trust, because of the German

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<sup>455</sup> Mueller, “A View from Germany,” p. 344.

<sup>456</sup> Rudolf, “German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations,” p. 8.

<sup>457</sup> Rudolf, “The Myth of the German Way,” p. 137.

<sup>458</sup> Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Defense Ministry), *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien fuer den Geschaeftsbereich des Bundesministers der Verteidigung* (Defense Policy Guidelines) (Berlin: May 2003), p. 22, as quoted in Rudolf, “The Myth of the German Way,” p. 138.

<sup>459</sup> John Vinocur, “Germany rejects a US rivalry,” *International Herald Tribune* (18 July 2003).

<sup>460</sup> Rudolf, “The Myth of the German Way,” p. 135.

<sup>461</sup> Kupchan, p. 82.

<sup>462</sup> Rudolf, “The Myth of the German Way,” p. 134.

<sup>463</sup> Michael R. Gordon, “German Intelligence Gave US Iraqi Defense Plan, Report Says,” *The New York Times* (February 27, 2006), p. A1.

government's implied promise that it would not be involved with US war.<sup>464</sup>) Third, Germany supported the US and its coalition partners in Iraq, including training Iraqi police and troops, albeit outside of Iraq, and writing off \$5 billion in debt owed to Germany by Iraq.<sup>465</sup> Fourth, Germany has deployed greater numbers of German troops to Afghanistan, and recently announced it would send troops to help police the Lebanon cease-fire, to help free up US soldiers.<sup>466</sup>

Analysts differ about how closely Chancellor Angela Merkel will align with the United States. On the one hand, Ulrike Guerot, a Berlin-based fellow at the German Marshall Fund, argues that the Merkel government coalition agreement includes a "clear commitment to improving relations with the United States" and a "strong reorientation towards NATO," which could leave the European Union's security initiatives "somewhat in the shadows."<sup>467</sup> On the other hand, Karen Donfried argues that the "Merkel government will need political capital to get through [economic] reforms that many Germans fear will threaten specific social welfare benefits." Given the "inescapable constraint" of anti-American public opinion in Germany, "the new government will likely be cautious in expending its limited capital on getting closer to Washington."<sup>468</sup> *The Economist* agrees with Donfried's perspective, arguing that "Americans overestimate what Ms. Merkel can deliver," given that Germany is unlikely to increase its defense spending, favors multilateralism and remains "un-persuaded by Mr. Bush's charm offensive." As Karsten Voigt, the German government's coordinator of German-American cooperation, argues, "the cold war is over, so Germany is inherently less dependent on America."<sup>469</sup>

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<sup>464</sup> Richard Bernstein, "Two German Roles: Opposing War and Aiding US," *The New York Times* (March 3, 2006), p. A12.

<sup>465</sup> Donfried's testimony.

<sup>466</sup> "Afghan angst: Germany and peacekeeping," *The Economist* (September 14, 2006); Mark Landler, "In Reversal, Germany will join Lebanon Force," *The New York Times* (September 21, 2006), p. A11; "Abroad by inches: Germany's armed forces," *The Economist* (July 27, 2006).

<sup>467</sup> Ulrike Guerot, "Merkel's fuzzy foreign policy agenda," *Europe's World* (Spring 2006), p. 52.

<sup>468</sup> Donfried's testimony.

<sup>469</sup> "Ready for a Bush Hug? German-American Relations," *The Economist* (July 6, 2006).





## APPENDIX 5: ACRONYM LIST

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BBC	British Broadcasting Company
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
BTWC	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EU	European Union
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
G-8	Group of Eight
GNEP	Global Nuclear Energy Program
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HIV	human immunodeficiency virus
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC	International Criminal Court
IRGC	Islamic Republic Guard Corps
ISNA	Iranian Students News Agency
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFU	no-first-use policy
NMD	National Missile Defense
NNSA	National Nuclear Security Administration
NPR	Nuclear Posture Review
NPT	Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
NSS	National Security Strategy
NWS	nuclear weapons state
PLA	China's People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
RRW	Reliable Replacement Warhead
SAIC	Science Applications International Corporation
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SDI	U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars")
SDP	Social Democrat Party
SORT	Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization



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