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Title/Desc: B PLANT & WESF SUSPECT COUNTERFEIT PARTS IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM

Pages: 236



## ENGINEERING DATA TRANSMITTAL

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8. Originator Remarks: This document describes a susp inspection program required by	9. Equip./Component Nc.: N/A	
With Internal Memo 16710-94-DW Nansen, B Plant Suspect/ Count May 24, 1994.	10. System/Bldg./Facility: B Plant/WESF	
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BD-7400-172-2 (04/94) GEF097

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# **B Plant/WESF Suspect/Counterfeit Parts** Identification Program

D.W. Mertz Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA 99352 U.S. Department of Energy Contract DE-AC06-87RL10930

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Abstract: This document describes a suspect/counterfeit parts inspection program required by DOE conducted in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/ Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994. The program included: physical inspection of all spare parts inventories within the plant; screening of installed B Plant/WESF systems for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences; and a physical inspection based upon this screening.

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A-6400-073 (10/95) GEF321

WHC-SD-WM-IP-009, Rev.0

# B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT PARTS

# INSPECTION PROGRAM

	RECORD OF REVISION	(1) Document Number			
		WHC-SD-WM-IP-009, Rev O Page ii			
(2) Title					
<u>B_Plan</u> t	:/WESE_Suspect/Counterfeit_Parts_Identificatio	<u>Program</u>			
	CHANGE CONTROL RECORD				
(3) Revision	(4) Description of Change - Replace, Add, and Delete Pages	Authori: (5); Çøg. Engr.	zed for Release (6) Cog. Mgr. Date		
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A-7320-005 (08/91) WEF168

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### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The B Plant/Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) complex conducted a verification program to protect against critical system failures due to suspect/counterfeit parts. The program included risk evaluation, documentation reviews and physical inspections to identify any suspect or counterfeit parts which could potentially impact plant safety or operations.

An initial inspection of spare parts inventories, conducted in December 1994, identified suspect fasteners (graded stainless steel bolts). These fasteners were removed from the plant; the discovery of suspect parts was reported on Occurrence Report RL--WHC-BPLANT-1994-0042.

Installed plant systems were inspected in January 1996. This check revealed suspect items, including electrical circuit breakers, and fasteners (graded bolts) in some piping, ventilation systems and B Plant crane reel lights. These suspect items were listed on Nonconformance Reports (NCRs).

Based upon technical evaluations, many of the suspect bolts were replaced. The circuit breakers and the remainder of the bolts were determined to be acceptable. The NCRs were used to document the disposition of all suspect parts identified in the inspection. The Occurrence Report was updated to reflect the latter discovery of suspect fasteners.

## BACKGROUND

Counterfeit and improperly marked items were recognized as a widespread problem during the 1980s. Various parties, particularly in Asia, found it easy to produce inferior look-alike copies of items such as high-strength fasteners and electrical devices. Lacking critical characteristics of the genuine parts, many of these inferior items failed, sometimes resulting in accidents and injury or death.

In response to a Department of Energy request, Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) developed an action plan to address potential impacts of counterfeit or suspect parts on the Hanford site. B Plant issued its own action plan (see Appendix 1) in May 1994.

#### APPROACH

The verification program provided a systematic approach to ensure that systems or equipment which could affect safety or operation within the plant would be checked. The inspection program included 4 major elements:

- Inspection of spare parts inventories
- Coordination of suspect parts verification programs
- Screening and inspection of installed plant systems
- Awareness training and procedure changes

## RESULTS

The verification actions listed in the B Plant action plan were completed on January 12, 1996.

- 1. Inspection of spare parts inventories.
  - a. Maintenance personnel conducted a 100% inspection of bulk fasteners in the tool crib. Suspect fasteners were identified, listed on a Nonconformance Report (NCR) and removed from the plant. Occurrence Report (OR) RL--WHC-BPLANT-1994-0042 was issued to report the discovery of suspect items at the facility.
  - b. Materials which have already been staged in warehouses or material storage areas will be checked for potential suspect fasteners at the time of installation, as prescribed by WHC-CM-8-9, Workmanship Standards.
- 2. Coordination with supporting organizations to ensure that adequate suspect/counterfeit prevention programs are in place.
  - a. Procurement quality assurance provides inspection for suspect/counterfeit items when new materials are brought on site.
  - b. The ICF Kaiser Hanford (ICF KH) Hoisting and Rigging group, which performs inspections on portable hoisting and rigging equipment includes checks for suspect/counterfeit fasteners in their inspection program.
  - c. The Heavy Equipment/Railroad Maintenance Garages have a program in place. Individual equipment which has been checked is marked with a "B" sticker. The B Plant maintenance manager verified the presence of "B" stickers on the material handling equipment used at the facility.
- 3. Screening and inspection of installed plant systems.
  - a. System cognizant engineers performed screens of each system against the following criteria:
    - Maintenance work or item replacement since 1981
    - Equipment/components present of types listed in QA Bulletins
    - Significant safety/operational implications
  - b. Inspection plans were developed for items which met the screening criteria. Verification was accomplished either by physical inspection or verification of Quality Assurance (QA) records. System screening results and inspection plans are attached as Appendix 2.

- c. Physical inspections were performed, and results documented. Suspect fasteners (graded bolts) were found in several plant systems, including some piping, ventilation systems and B Plant crane reel lights. Suspect circuit breakers (based on model number) were found in various panels. These suspect items were listed on Nonconformance Reports (NCRs).
- d. Based upon technical evaluations, many of the suspect bolts were replaced. The circuit breakers and the remainder of the bolts were determined to be acceptable. The NCRs were used to document the disposition of all suspect parts identified in the inspection. The Occurrence Report was updated to reflect the latter discovery of suspect fasteners.
- 4. Awareness Training. Plant engineering, craft and material procurement personnel were trained to recognize suspect parts, and on the importance of doing so. Everyone who performed the above inspections attended the training.

## CONCLUSION

The actions completed as part of the B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Action Plan have provided a reasonable assurance against serious safety or operational impacts caused by suspect/counterfeit parts. Long term activities will continue, including employee awareness training, procurement quality control and verification of parts upon installation, in order to protect against future problems caused by suspect/counterfeit parts.

Appendices:

- 1. B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan
- 2. Screening and Inspection Results

WHC-SD-WM-IP-009, Rev. 0

# APPENDIX A

# Westinghouse Hanford Company

Internal Memo

From:	Facility Engineering	16710-94-DWM-048
Phone:	372-0359 S6-81	
Date:	May 24, 1994	
Subject:	B PLANT SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT PARTS ACTION PLAN	

To:

.

J. N	l. Nansen	N1-71
cc:	C. L. Hoover J. C. Lo D. D. McAfee D. W. Mertz J. A. O'Brien	S6-25 S4-69 S6-81 S6-81
	DWM File/LB	S6-81

References:

- (1) Letter, R. A. Holten, R1 to President, WHC, "Suspect Parts", 9100974B, dated February 14, 1992
- (2) Quality Assurance Bulletin, QAB 92-01, dated February 14, 1992; QAB 92-02, August 21, 1992, and Revision September 17, 1992; QAB 93-002, April 28, 1993; and QAB 93-03, dated May 20, 1993
   (2) Description of the second second
- (3) Procurement and Operational Assessment of the Impact of Suspect Circuit Breakers on Facilities Operated by the Westinghouse Hanford Company SD-MP-TA-001, dated March 20, 1989

Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) has received direction/guidance from the U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Field Office (RL) relative to suspect parts (Reference 1, Attachment 3). The B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan (Attachment 1) with a proposed schedule of completion (Attachment 2) is being issued to address the concerns. Quality Assurance Bulletins (Reference 2, Attachment 4) list the suspect fasteners, electrical components and mechanical components to be investigated.

If you have any questions on the plan, please contact D. W. Mertz at 372-0359.

Jao Bone

J. A. O'Brien, Manager Facility Engineering

gaa

Attachments

A-1

Attachment 1 Page 1 of 3

## **B-PLANT**

## SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT PARTS ACTION PLAN

#### INTRODUCTION

In response to Internal Memo 38000-92-024 and DOE Letter 9200979B, this document provides the action plan requested for inspection/surveillance of "suspect parts" by B-Plant. Suspect electrical materials and suspect piping materials will also be examined in addition to the suspect bolts/fasteners addressed by the referenced correspondence. These categories are defined in QAB 92-01, 92-02, 93-002 and 93-03. This plan indicates a phased approach prioritized by the safety hazard classification which is reflected in the schedule for the systems that will be examined during subsequent walkdowns. The intent is to strive to replace suspect/counterfeit parts with qualified parts as required. Testing and evaluation of suspect/counterfeit parts are additional permitted methods of qualification which might be used.

#### SUSPECT PARTS INSPECTION

Suspect fasteners from foreign suppliers could have been introduced as early as 1981, therefore only system modifications, repairs and construction from 1981 on need to be evaluated. Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) evaluated circuit breakers for suspect/counterfeit parts in 1989 (Reference 3). Circuit breakers installed prior to this date should be evaluated. The B-Plant Facility will be examined for suspect parts using a graded approach in each of the facility areas. Work packages, NCR's or similar documentation will be used to compile findings for each of the facility areas.

Suspect parts to be addressed:

- Fasteners: Listed in QAB 92-01, 92-02, and 93-002. Grade 5, Grade 8 and ASTM A325 high strength bolts, and cap screws.
- Electrical Components: Circuit breakers, transformers, fuses and relays per the listing in QAB 92-01.
- Piping Components: Fittings, flanges, valves, couplings, plugs, spacers and nozzles per the listing in QAB 92-01 and 93-03.

A-2

Attachment 1 Page 2 of 3

Inventories: 100% visual inspection. Inspect a sample chosen in accordance with military standard MIL-STD-105E if the size of the lot will not permit 100% visual inspection. A bolt shall be considered suspect if it bears a head mark matching one of those on the suspect headmark list attached to QAB 93-002. Electrical or piping components are identified in QAB 92-01, 92-02 and 93-03. An annual or other periodic inspection of inventory may be required.

Procurement: This is a company wide issue. B-Plant facility control has been implemented. All parts and materials with a suspect/counterfeit potential per attached QA Bulletins shall be procured to approval designator Q, and in accordance with procurement clauses E 33 and E 34.

The suspect parts shall be dispositioned in the following categories:

Non-Critical Applications: Suspect bolts, circuit breakers and other components as listed in the attached QA Bulletins which are judged to be used in an application in which a failure will not compromise personnel safety or result in equipment damage or system failure may be dispositioned as acceptable and require no further action.

Critical Applications: Suspect bolts, circuit breakers and other components as listed in the attached QA Bulletins which are judged to serve a pre-determined critical function in most cases will be replaced. The decision not to replace items in critical applications will be supported by engineering evaluation.

The following have been identified as minimum requirements to be inspected under critical applications and dispositioned as such.

General Plant Safety Equipment: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, manlifts, forklifts, elevators, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, storage/equipment racks, service platforms, rollup doors/installation, breathing air system and any additional items identified during the plant walkdown.

Process/Support Systems Safety: Radiation monitoring equipment, canyon supply and exhaust fans, HEPA Filter equipment and structures, stack monitoring, canyon doors, 480 VAC MCC's, instrument air, stack exhaust fans and any additional items identified during plant walkdown.

Systems, equipment and components not accessible for visual examination may require an audit of design and procurement records. An evaluation should be made for accepting the system as-is provided the design requirements are met.

Attachment 1 Page 3 of 3

#### TRACKING AND WORK CONTROL

The work (initial evaluation) will be initiated by work plan/packages and tracked by the Job Control system (JCS) for the B Plant Facility. Packages will be issued for each type of suspect parts: bolts/fasteners, electrical materials, and piping materials. If other categories of suspect parts are later identified, they will also be inspected for and tracked by the JCS. Where possible, suspect parts will be segregated, identified with a hold tag, and documented on a Nonconformance Report (NCR) and an occurrence report (OR) written.

Proper disposal of suspect parts will be accomplished in accordance with QAB 93-02.including notification of cognizant buyers. The facility will track completion of the action plan and provide traceability and accountability of the completion of the actions identified.

### DOCUMENTATION

The walkdown verification recorded in the field shall be included in a supporting document for permanent record keeping. Reporting and disposition of suspect/counterfeit items should be in accordance with QAB'S 92-01, 92-02, 93-002, 93-03, MRP 5.14, Occurrence Reporting, (DOE Order 5000.3b), NCR's, and corrective action per WHC-CM-4-2, QR 16.0 and QI 15.6. Upon receipt of a dispositioned Non-Conformance Report and a copy of the Occurrence Report, the WHC Suspect/Counterfeit Items Coordinator will file the appropriate reports.

Attachment 2 Page 1 of 1

# **B-PLANT SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT PARTS ELIMINATION SCHEDULE**

TASK DESCRIPTION	CY 1994		CY 1995					
	1QTR	2QTR	SOTR	4QTR	1QTR	20TR	3QTR	4QTR
Identify B Plant new and modified systems from 1981 to present								·
Identify general safety systems and equipment for walkdown and inspection								
Identify Process/Support Systems Safety for walkdown and inspection								
Perform B Plant Inventory Assessment (If necessary)						-		
Perform B Plant walkdown, evaluation and remediation								
Document findings, i.e., NCR's and OR's and		<u></u>						·
issue supporting document								

## DISTRIBUTION COVERSHEET

Attachment 3 Page 1 of 2

WHC-SD-WM-IP-009. Rev. 0

Author Incoming Correspondent ..... Addressee RA Holten/RL President/WHC 9200979B Subject Suspect Parts Internal Distribution Approval Date Name Location w/arr Correspondence Control A3-01 X President's Office RJ Bliss X SL Bradley \*\*\*\*\*\* AJ Fisher JC Fulton R3-56 CA Jensen KR Jordan (Level [/Assignee) JC Midgett S6-15 'JH Hansen L6-35 7 JA Peltier S1-51 WG Ruff I JM Staffen : N1-40 X EP Vodney PRogram Support Center (2) A3-84 X RECEIVED FEB 14 1992 1001 J. N. NANSEN A-6 · DISTRIBUTION CORRECTIONS: MARIAN CRAM - Ph. 6-4123 MSIN: A3-01

or co:Mail

14-4000-117 (09/88)


Attachment 3 Page 2 of 2 92009798 WHC-SD-WM-IP-009, Rev. 0



## Department of Energy

Richland Operations Office P.O. Box 550 Richland, Washington 99352

FEB 11 1992



President Westinghouse Hanford Company Richland, Washington

Dear Sir:

SUSPECT PARTS

This supplements the direction that was provided by letter dated May 24, 1991, on the same subject. At that time, specific direction for EM facilities had not been received from HQ. Since that time, direction from EM has been received and an alternative approach submitted to EM. That approach is shown in the attached flow chart diagram which is essentially the same approach that you were directed to take on DP and NE funded work.

Please advise C. K. Kasch when the inspections of EM facilities and/or activities have been completed in accordance with the attached process.

If you have any questions, please call C. K. Kasch of my staff at 6-5183.

Sincerely,

A-7

R. A. Holten, Director Technical Support Division

A THATLE COPY

RECEIVED

FEB 1 4 1992

J. N. NAMOEN

120:CXX

Attachment

Attachment 4 Page 1 of 37

# QUALITY ASSURANCE BULLETINS

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# QUALITY ASSURANCE BULLETIN

QAB #92-01 Page 1 of 3 February 14, 1992

## Control and Procurement of Suspect Parts

#### INTRODUCTION

Millions of bolts, improperly marked as high strength, high temperature Grade 5, Grade 8 and ASTM A 325 bolts, have been procured and installed in a broad variety of applications in the United States. These bolts are currently in stock of distributors and others who purchase and resell these parts; they have also been found in storage locations at a number of Management and Operations Contractors (M&O's), and installed in equipment, vehicles and systems. The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) first identified that the problem existed in the commercial nuclear industry in 1985. Asian firms probably started manufacturing these substandard counterfeit fasteners during 1979-1980. The delay represents the time it took to permeate the U. S. Market. Only recently, at a March 1991, Department of Energy (DOE)-sponsored workshop, have listings (Attachment 1) of actual suspect bolts become available. The problem was originally thought to be limited to hightemperature applications (greater than 500 degrees F). However, this assumption is now being questioned, due to the poor controls on the heat treating process used by the Asian manufacturers.

The Industrial Fasteners Institute (IFI), a Cleveland-based trade association of bolt makers, warns us to be on the lookout for an increase in suspect fasteners during 1992 as a result of a Quality Fastener Act (H.R. 3000) enacted by Congress in late October of 1990. These bolts are being hastily dumped on the market by fastener distributors reacting to this Act. The law requires that Grade 5 and higher bolts with a diameter greater than 1/4-inch be tested by a certified laboratory before the resold.

## DISCUSSION

Westinghouse Hanfard Company (WHC) put in place a plan of action addressing measures to deal with the suspect parts issue in June of last year. To date, our inspections have incovered over 20,000 suspect fasteners. Likewise, receiving inspection continues to find new orders coming in with suspect fasteners in them. This clearly falls in line with IFI's estimates that there will be a continued problem in this country. With this in mind, we are initiating controls up front in the engineering and procurement process to prevent re-infestation of our fastener stocks and engineered systems and components related to safety.

EST AVAILABLE COPY

QAB #92-01 Page 2 of 3 February 14, 1992

As a reminder of continued awareness and training, the U. S. Customs Suspect Fastener Headmark list is attached (Attachment 1) for your information and use. By now, these posters should not be news to you and should already have been posted in strategic locations on site. Also attached (Attachment 2) is another poster with fourteen common characteristics to help us in the identification of other misrepresented vendor products dealing with electricaland piping system components. Although this bulletin deals for the most part with fasteners, there continues to be a problem with certain electrical and piping components as well. Attachment 3 details the information known to date that has been extracted from Nuclear Regulatory Information Notices and Bulletins.

#### GUIDANCE

#### Fastener Headmark Identification

Interpretation of the headmark list has led to some confusion in some instances. Any fasteners which match any of those on the list are to be considered suspect. For example, if you find a bolt that has a manufacturer's mark that is not centered on the bolt head or does not line up with the radial grade identification lines but otherwise looks like those on the list, the bolt is still considered suspect. The grade identification marks, whether 3 or 6, must be equally spaced as shown.

WHC has just received an additional headmark listing (Attachment 4) from one of our fastener vendors that was published by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NTSA). This listing is consistent with the one published by the U. S. Customs and does not incorporate any new ones. The main difference between the two is that this list shows the manufacturer's name that is associated with the headmark. It also addresses the issue noted above about placement of the manufacturer's mark on the bolt head and shows some examples where they are not placed exactly in the center.

#### <u>Reporting of Suspects</u>

Suspect/counterfeit parts are a reportable item in accordance DOE Order 5000.3A, Occurrence Reporting (OR). It is expected that when found, they will be reported on an OR. Only one OR needs to be reported per facility. If additional suspects are found at a later date, the OR can be updated. When found, they should be segregated and identified with a hold tag and documented on a Nonconformance Report (NCR). These fasteners are not to be thrown away. <u>buried or sent to excess</u>. To reiterate previous messages, they should be sent to: 100 Area, 1723 Building; 200 Area, 2101M Building; and south of the Wye Barricade, 4732A Building. Storage arrangements can be made by calling 6-5604. The vendors should not be contacted directly but should be referred to the cognizant Buyer.

QAB #92-01 Page 3 of 3 February 14, 1992

#### Procurement

- I. All specification type fasteners and bolting materials (i.e. SAE Grade 5, 5.2, 8, 8.2, ASTM, ASME & ANSI) shall be procured to Impact Level 3 as a minimum. In addition to these requirements, these fasteners must be procured as controlled items requiring receipt inspection. Requisitioners and quality assurance personnel shall ensure that the receipt inspection block is marked "yes" on the purchase requisition. These fasteners are referred to as graded or specification fasteners.
- 2. All existing and new Store Stock Requisitions and Spare Parts orders should include these requirements. On an interim basis, existing store stocks and spares should be reviewed to ensure that there are no suspects.
- 3. Purchase requisitions and attachments or ordering data shall contain the following statement: Sellers will ensure that any fasteners with headmarks matching those shown on the attached U. S. Customs Fastener Headmark list are not utilized on this contract. These fasteners are not acceptable and will cause rejection of the fasteners or systems/components or spare parts that they are used in.

Note: This constitutes a portion of a new QA Procurement Clause that has been proposed for incorporation into WHC-CM-4-2, Quality Assurance Manual.


4. Engineering and maintenance engineering organizations when specifying fasteners for engineered components, systems, equipment, and maintenance and modification work packages, shall ensure that proper controls are taken to control them. Likewise, radioactive and hazardous materials shipping containers and packaging and their methods of transport (such as rail tank cars and other prime movers) shall be reviewed for proper controls.

## Awareness And Training

The awareness and training initially launched at WHC was aimed at ensuring that all inspection, crafts, and warehousing personnel were trained in the identification of suspect fasteners. The attached posters have been distributed widely on site. Phase two of this training should now focus on the engineering groups and those who specify and requisition fastener and bolting materials. Two video cassettes are available for this training and can be scheduled by calling 6-7021.

A. J. Fisher


Manager, Quality Assurance



If any of these fasteners are located, contact your QA representative \_\_\_\_\_\_ for instructions

or J. N. Nansen.

# Help Stamp Out Suspects/Counterfeits



39106121 .1 FH

Attachment 2 to QAB #92-01

Attachment 3 to QAB #92-01

WHC-SD-WM-IP-009, Rev. 0

Attachment 3

# ELECTRICAL SUSPECT MATERIALS LIST

		Page 1 c	)Ť /			
Type of Eaut	pment	Manufacturer	Part No.	Information Source		
Relays		Potter & Brumfield	MDR-138-8 MDR-173-1 MDR-134-1 MDR-142-1	NRC 90-57 "		
Consider all	MDR types	relays from Potter	& Brumfield to be	suspect.		
VENDORS:	Spectronics Mobile, AL	, Inc.	NUTHERM Internati Mount Vernon, IL	onal		
	Stokely Ente Norfolk, VA		The Martin Co. Chesapeake, VA			
These relays may also be used in original electrical equipment						
Metal Clad Breakers		GE	AKF-2-25	NRC 89-45		
Used	for low volt	age applications (	less than 600V)			
VENDORS:	Satin Ameri	ca Corp.	Circuit Breaker S	ystems		
Overcurrent Device	trip	GE	EC-1 EC-2A	NRC 89-45 Supp 1		
		of the GE AKF-2-25 987 time period	Metal Clad Breake	r and was used		
VENDORS:	Satin Ameri	ca Corp.	Circuit Breaker S	ystems		
Low-voltage Switchgear		Westinghouse	DB-25	NRC89-45 Supp 2		
VENDOR:	Satin Ameri	ca Corp.				
Circuit Brea	akers	Various	Various"	NRC88-46 Supp 2 12/30/88		
VENDOR:	Many <sup>®</sup> -	See Attachment 1				

## Page 1 of 7

# ELECTRICAL SUSPECT MATERIALS LIST

## Page 2 of 7

<u>Type of Equ</u>	ipment	<u>Manufacturer</u>	Part No.	Information Source
Circuit Brea	akers	GE	THEF 136050	NRC 88-46 Supp 3 06/08/89
VENDOR:		n's Control & Supply A/Lake Forest, CA		
Shunt Trip	Coil	Westinghouse	2609D39624	NRC 88-46 Supp 4 09-11-89
Frames		n	LA2600F	R .
		M	LA3600F	
		π	MA2800F	•
Trip Units		Westinghouse	HLA 21250TM HLA 2400TM	NRC 88-46 Supp 4 09/11/89
		•	HLA 3600T	<del>• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • </del>
		n	HLB 3200T	
			HMA 3600T	
			HMA 3700T	
		<b>N</b>	HKA 3225T	
		7	HNB 2700T	
VENDOR:	Molded Case	e Circuit Breakers	Co. (MCCB)	

Temple City, CA

## ELECTRICAL SUSPECT MATERIALS LIST NRC BULLETIN 88-046 SUPPLEMENT 02

#### SUPPLIER<sup>1</sup> PART NUMBER MANUFACTURER TYPE OF EQUIPMENT ROSEN NO AK2A25 Circuit Breaker GΕ CAL BKR KA 36200 SD Circuit Breaker CAL BKR 0J2B200 Circuit Breaker ITE GEN BKR GE **TEC 360S0** Circuit Breaker GEN BKR GE THED 136100WL Circuit Breaker GEN BKR THED 136050WL Circuit Breaker GΕ GEN BKR THED 136045WL GΕ Circuit Breaker with Shunt Trip THFK 236070WL CAL BKR Circuit Breaker GE ATS EF 38070 ITE Circuit Breaker HLC Elec H EH 2020 Circuit Breaker HLC Elec FA 3035 W Circuit Breaker EH 2050 HLC Elec Ľ Circuit Breaker GEN BKR H. EH 2070 Circuit Breaker EH 2070 HLC Elec , Circuit Breaker HLC Elec EH 2050 Circuit Breaker Unknown MCCB Circuit Breaker FA 2100 HCL Elec. **Circuit Breaker** . FA 2050 HCL Elec **Circuit Breaker** 10177H13 AAKER Circuit Breaker CH CH 10177H21 AAKER Heaters AAKER СН 10177H32 Heaters Heaters СН 10177H1036 N/A CH 10177H1049 N/A Heaters

#### Page 3 of 7

A-16

# ELECTRICAL SUSPECT MATERIALS LIST

# Page 4 of 7

TYPE OF EQUIPMENT	MANUFACTURER	PART_NUMBER	SUPPLIER <sup>1</sup>
Circuit Breaker	FED Pacific	2P125	MIDWEST
Starters	W. The second se	A200MICAC	HLC Elec
Circuit Breaker	٠ -	HFB3050	HLC Elec
Circuit Breaker	GE	TE122070	AAKER
Circuit Breaker	ITE	EH 313015	GEN BKR
Circuit Breaker	W	JA 2225	MCCB
Circuit Breaker	ITE	JL3B070	МССВ
Starters	W	6268187G17 6268187G13	ROMAC
Circuit Breaker	ITE	JL3B150	GEN BRK
Circuit Breaker	ITE	E43B015	GEN BKR
Circuit Breaker	GE THED	136150WL	CAL BKR
Circuit Breaker	GE	THED136150	MCCB
Circuit Breaker	GE THED	124015WL	CAL BKR
Circuit Breaker	GE	TF136090	VOYTEN
Circuit Breaker	Unknown	50DHP250	VOYTEN
Circuit Breaker	GE	AK-3A-25	NSSS
Circuit Breaker	W	JL3-B125 JL3-8070 JL3-B150 JL3-B200 JL3-B090 JL3-B100	NSSS
Circuit Breaker	W	HFA,HFB&FA	SPECTRUM TECH
Motor	Sieman Allis	INP 143T	ROSEN
Motor	Sieman Allis	10 HP 215T	ROSEN

# ELECTRICAL SUSPECT MATERIALS LIST

# Page 5 of 7

TYPE OF EQUIPMENT	MANUFACTURER	PART NUMBER	SUPPLIER <sup>1</sup>
Transformer	Jefferson	75KVA XFMR	ROSEN
Gauge Glasses	Siemen Allis	PN 00-737-637-118	ROSEN
Circuit Breaker	W -	HLM3800T	MCCB
Circuit Breaker	ITE	1193 60 amp	PANELBD
Circuit Breaker	W	F3100N	PANELBD
Circuit Breaker	ITE	EF2-B030	ROSEN
Circuit Breaker	W	MA3500	ROSEN
Circuit Breaker	W	EH2015	LUCKOW
Circuit Breaker	W	EH2015	LUCKOW
Circuit Breaker	Superior 246U-3	N/A	ROSEN
Circuit Breaker	ITE	N/A	ROSEN
Circuit Breaker	ITE	EF2-B030	ROSEN
Circuit Breaker	GE	TF361050WL	ROSEN
Circuit Breaker	W	LA3200 WL	MCCB
Circuit Breaker	W	HLA3200T	MCCB
Shunt Trip	W	2602D58U9	MCCB
Circuit Breaker	W	HLB3200T	MCCB
Shunt Trip	W	2602156G19	MCCB
Circuit Breaker	GE	TED 113020	MCCB
Aux Contact	W	EHB2100	N/A
Circuit Breaker	W	EHB2100	MCCB
Aux Contact	W	N/A	N/A
Circuit Breaker	W	HL3800T	MCCB
Circuit Breaker	GE	TED 1360 OWL	MCCB
Circuit Breaker	SD	999330	MCCB

## ELECTRICAL SUSPECT MATERIALS LIST

### Page 6 of 7

- 1. ATS ATS Circuit Breakers, Inc.
  - CAL BKR California Breakers, Inc.
  - ECD Electro Components Distributors

GEN BKR - General Circuit Breakers and Electrical Supply, Inc.

GEM MAG - General Magnetics/Electrical Wholesale

HLC - HLC Electric Supply Co.

AC BKR - AC Circuit Breaker - Electrical Supply

LUCKOW - Luckow Circuit Breakers

MCCB - Molded Case Circuit Breakers

MIDWEST - Midwest Co.

ROSEN - Rosen Electric Equipment

ROMAC - Romac Supply Co.

NSSS - NSSS, Inc.

PANELBD - Panel board Specialties

VOYTEN - Voyten Electric Co.

# PIPING COMPONENT SUSPECT MATERIALS LIST

# Page 7 of 7

Type of Equipment	<u>Manufacturer</u>	Part No.	Information Source
4", 1500 PSI Pressure Sealed Crane Valves	Southern California Valve Maintenance Company (SCV)	None	NRC 91-09
Counterfeit Valve Replacement Parts, Plug stem, stem to plug anti-rotation pin, seat ring, valve plugs, bushings cages, and packing box components.	Sample-Webtrol Controls, Inc. (S-W) as secondary source such as Cor-Val or Contro Valve Specialists Inc. (CVS)	۱ <u>.</u>	NRC 88-97 Suppl. 1
Vogt 2" valves, 3" & 6" pacific globe valves, 24" Crane- Chapman check valves, "Pacific" check valves, 8" Krotect valves,	Western Valve Co., CMA International	SW13111	NRC 88-48, Suppl. 1 & 2
6" Lankenheimer, 20" Lankenheimer		Mod. 1542 Mod. 3013	
gate valve, 2" Vogt globe valve Henry, 5" Crane valves		Mod. SW-1023	

partment of Energy from COMME IAL CARRIER JOURNAL Reprinted by U.S. WHC-SD-WM-IP-009, Rev. 0 Copyright Chilton Co. February 1990.

Exclusive to CCJ

# NHTSA warns manufacturers of counterfeit bolts

#### By RICH CROSS Senior Technical Editor

Washington, D.C. - The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) last December started an aggressive campaign to eliminate the use of counterfeit and substandard bolts by vehicle and component manufacturers.


NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation has compiled a list of suspect fasteners which charts the maker's mark of each bolt for easy identification (see chart on this page.) That list was distributed to approximately 50 vehicle and component manufacturers whose names were obtained from customer lists seized by the U.S. Customs Service in shipments of counterfeit and/or substandard Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Grade 5 and Grade 8 bolts.

Counterfeit and substandard bolts have been implicated in a number of vehicle accidents and two recalls by heavy truck manu-facturers Peterbült and Freightliner of Canada, Substandard "KS" SAE Grade 8.2 bolts caused Peterbül's 1988 recall of 556 tractors for steering assembly failures while Freightliner of Canada recalled 364 tractors last year. KS bolts have been blamed for the death of at least one truck driver.

CCJ has obtained a copy of a confidential letter of warning, written by NHTSA on December 18, 1989, that urges against the use of bolts identified in the list and cautions manufacturers never to purchase SAE Grade 5 or SAE Grade 8 bolts lacking a maker's mark. Included in the confidential mailing was a questionnaire to which manufacturers were required to respond within 30 days. "Failure to respond promptly and fully to this letter may be con-

- 1

strued as a violation," wrote Mi-16 COMMERCIAL CARRIER JOURNAL Frommer 1990



chael B. Brownlee, director of NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation - Enforcement Division.

wan,Yugoslavia

Ten specific questions relating to bolt use and quality of inspection policies are summarized here: What precautions, if any, are tak-en to protect against installation of counterfeit and/or substandard A-21

bilist pattern. "KS" SAE Grade 8.2 bolts are appended to NHTSA's list because they've resulted in recalls by Peterbilt and Freightliner Canada when applied to steering assemblies.

bolts in vehicles and/or vehicular components?

If you have any listed bolt in in-

ventory, who supplied it? • If you have used any listed bolt for vehicle or component assembly, which applications, makes, models and production dates are involved?

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# QUALITY ASSURANCE BULLETIN

LASALLE, FRANK R

R1-30

QAB #92-02 Page 1 of 4 August 21, 19<u>92</u>

H3220000

#### Control and Procurement of Suspect Parts

#### Introduction

Since the last Quality Assurance Bulletin (QAB), #92-01 was issued, relating to suspect parts, progress has been made in developing procurement clauses to protect against their purchase, and additional information has been obtained regarding interpretation of bolt headmarks. This bulletin is intended to provide you with additional information or clarification where it is needed. Additionally, recent Department of Energy, Richland Field Office (RL) surveillances have pointed out some areas that need additional attention. The issue of suspect parts continues to receive increased visibility within the DOE complex. Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) can expect a great deal of attention on this issue in the weeks and months to come.

This QAB is supplemental to, and should be read in parallel with, QAB #92-01. If you are not familiar with QAB #92-01, a copy can be obtained by calling 16-7022.

## Procurement

On July 24, 1992, the WHC clause committee approved a fastener procurement clause-(E34) for the general procurement of fasteners. A second clause (E33) is being revised, and will provide for more stringent control over the procurement of graded fasteners used in safety applications or those fasteners requiring traceability control. The E34 clause should now be used in lieu of the guidance that was provided in item No. 3 under <u>Procurement</u> in QAB #92-01. This clause can be used <u>immediately</u> in your requisitions for fasteners. Until the guidance the <u>Procurement</u> section of OAB #92-01. The verbatim text of the approved E34 clause is as follows:

## Clause E34 - General Procurement of Fasteners

### Instructions

This clause shall be applied to all general equipment, components, assemblies, and orders for other fasteners not covered in Clause E33. This clause will be included in all written purchase orders, but is also applicable to oral orders as well.

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QAB #92-02 Page 2 of 4 August 21, 1992

## <u>CLAUSE</u>

In addition to, and without waiver of, any and all warranties, rights, or obligations set forth elsewhere in this Order, Seller warrants that all products, components, parts and assemblies (hereinafter referred to as "Materials") furnished under this Order are genuine and match the quality, test reports, markings and/or fitness for use represented or implied by the Materials themselves or their use by Seller as component parts.

WHC reserves the right to question Seller and require Seller to certify and/or furnish proof regarding the quality, authenticity, application or fitness for use of the Materials supplied by Seller under this Order. Any Materials furnished as part of this Order and which have been previously found by WHC, the Department of Energy, the Department of Commerce, or the U. S. Customs Service to be counterfeit or which are listed by the Department of Commerce or U. S. Customs Service as suspect will be deemed, without more proof, to be subject to the above requirement of further proof or certification. WHC also reserves the right to question the circumstances and make available a report of any such review to the Government.

Further references about suspected or counterfeit parts and products should be obtained directly from the U. S. Customs Service or the Department of Commerce.

To ensure that vendors and suppliers are aware of WHC's concern about receiving suspect parts and to alert them to these clauses, Procurement on July 22, 1992, issued a letter (attachment 1) to all suppliers that have been actively used over the past year for acquisition of these types of parts. This general letter will also be sent to any new supplier that is proposing to do business with WHC. This also applies to oral orders as well.

### Fastener Headmark Identification

Confusion relating to correct interpretation of the U. S. Customs headmark list still exists. In the last bulletin, guidance was given relating to placement of the manufacturer's mark on the bolt head. Attachment 2 reinforces that guidance and illustrates some examples of instances where the headmark is not centered on the bolt head. As before, these bolts should be considered suspect.

An additional clarification point is offered relating to the headmark list. There has been some very limited confusion on interpretation of the parenthetical statement for the Grade 8 Hollow Triangle bolt. Some have understood the statement, (Greater than 1/2 inch dia.) which appears to the right of the hollow triangle headmark, to be applicable for all grade 8 bolts shown on the list. <u>THIS IS INCORRECT!</u> This statement only applies to the bolt with the hollow triangle headmark (see Attachment 1, Page 3).

QAB #92-02 Page 3 of 4 August 21, 1992

## External Surveillances

A recent RL surveillance pointed out an instance where a Nonconformance Report (NCR) for suspect bolts was dispositioned accept-as-is because the bolt head did not look exactly like the picture on the Customs list (the headmark on the actual bolts was not centered on the bolt head). This specific problem was identified and corrected by WHC before the RL surveillance was performed - a second NCR was written, based on the information provided in QAB #92-01.

Although we did find and fix this particular instance, it is possible that there are other cases where either no NCR was written (because non-centered headmarks may not have been considered suspect), or an NCR was dispositioned accept-as-is (for the same reason).

In response to the RL surveillance, WHC will conduct a review of our previous actions regarding suspect fasteners. What follows is a summary of the actions being requested by separate correspondence. A review of the criteria utilized in the inspections that were made previously on Safety Class 1 and High Hazard applications should be made. Where the possibility exists to accept suspect fasteners due to misinterpretation of the headmark criteria or, where the more stringent criteria spelled out in QAB #92-01 were not used, a reinspection should be performed. An interview of people who conducted the inspection should also be performed and documented, to verify what criteria were used. These re-evaluations should be documented, with the aid of your counterpart QA organizations, utilizing the standard WHC Inspection Surveillance Report (ISR) form. Where there are conditions that are now found to be nonconforming, these should be documented using an NCR.

### DOE Suspect Equipment Reporting Database

The DOE maintains a Safety Performance Measurement System, which includes a Suspect Equipment Reporting (SER) database. This database is intended to be a repository of information on suspect parts identified across the DOE complex. WHC has access to the SER database (both read and write capability) through ESQ/SAI. I recently sent a letter to WHC senior management, forwarding a copy of the then-current information in the SER, and summarizing its contents. The database contains a wide range of information: re-statements of NRC Information Notices, descriptions of what other sites have done to dispose of suspect parts, and ongoing investigations of specific instances of suspect parts. In some cases, suppliers are mentioned by name - for example, Platt Electric Supply Company is mentioned in two separate inputs from different DOE sites. This does not mean that the company has done anything wrong, and in fact such suppliers may now have better controls in place, having gone through their experience with suspect parts. While the SER may suggest a sensitivity to additional checks of parts and components provided by such companies, the information must be used very carefully.

QAB #92-02 Page 4 of 4 August 21, 1992

#### Scope of Suspect Parts Control Program

The scope of the suspect parts problem is not limited to suspect fasteners, although because of the existence of the headmark list for bolts, it is easy to focus on fasteners. Following is a brief description of other existing controls that go beyond suspect fasteners:

- 1. The QA Manual, CM-4-2; QI 16.4, "Review and Processing of External Reports," is a primary mechanism for circulating relevant information within WHC (e.g., NRC Bulletins and Information Notices, vendor notices) which is not contained in other DOE databases. Some of this information has to do with suspect parts found in commercial nuclear and other applications. Your response to requests for applicability of the information in these documents to your areas of responsibility is an integral and essential part of our control program.
- 2. There are a number of characteristics common to substandard or falsified items. It is important to be aware of these characteristics, not only during receipt, but at other times. See Attachment 2 of the QAB #92-01 for a summary listing of examples.

WHC-CM-4-8, QAI 7.1, "Receiving Inspection," contains a more complete listing of characteristics common to substandard or fraudulent items. This listing was also distributed to WHC senior staff in my recent letter summarizing the content of the SER database.

3. QAI 7.1 also contains a listing of parts found to have been falsified, taken primarily from NRC source references. In these cases, the items were typically genuine components from reputable suppliers, which had been altered or re-furbished and sold as new, by companies other than the original manufacturer (liquidators and other purchasers or excess items have been involved in some cases).

### Training and Awareness

The DOE is sponsoring the development of QTRC-based training modules on the subject of suspect parts. It is expected that these modules will be ready next year.

A. J. Fisher Manager, Quality Assurance

# WHC-SD-WM-JRB0092-Bev. 0 Attachment 1 Page 1

# CORRESPONDENCE DISTRIBUTION COVERSHEET

Author R. J. Utley

Addressee

Correspondence No. PMM-JHS-78

Subject: COUNTERFEIT FASTENERS AND COMPONENTS

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION						
Approval	Date	Name	Location	w/att		
		A. Y. Dingle	G1-50			
XGH	7/23/92	G. A. Edmiston	B3-15			
		R. J. Meyer	G1-56			
		J. N. Nansen	L6-35			
		J. H. Smith, Jr.	G1-56			
x Rytie	They 7/22/92	R. J. Utley	G1-25			
		C. L. Volkman	X1-80			



54-6000-117 (9/88) (EF) WEF008 Distribution Coversheet



P.O. Box 1970 Richland. WA 99352 July 22, 1992

Dear Sir/Madam:

COUNTERFEIT FASTENERS AND COMPONENTS

Please be aware that we at Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) are most concerned about receiving counterfeit fasteners or components. Accordingly, the following Clause will be incorporated into any future purchase orders for equipment, materials, fasteners, or components:

In addition to, and without waiver of, any and all warranties, rights, or obligations set forth elsewhere in this Order, Seller warrants that all products, components, parts and assemblies (hereinafter referred to as "Materials") furnished under this. Order are genuine and match the quality, test reports, markings and/or fitness for use represented or implied by the Materials themselves or their use by Seller as component parts.

WHC reserves the right to question Seller and require Seller to certify and/or furnish proof regarding the quality, authenticity, application or fitness for use of the Materials supplied by Seller under this Order. Any Materials furnished as part of this Order and which have been previously found by WHC, the Department of Energy, or the Department of Commerce to be counterfeit or which are listed by the Department of Commerce as suspect will be deemed, without more proof, to be subject to the above requirement of further proof or certification. WHC also reserves the right to question the circumstances and make available a report of any such review to the Government.

Further references about suspected counterfeit products should be obtained directly from the Department of Commerce or U.S Customs Service.

This Clause will be included in all future written purchase orders but is also applicable to oral orders for fasteners, components or equipment delivered to WHC.

Included herewith for your reference is a copy of the list we have been provided by the Department of Energy and are currently using to identify suspect fastners.

Very truly yours,

8) Titley


R. J. Utley, Manager Essential Materials/Spares Procurement


Enclosure: Suspect Fastener Headmark List

4

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QAB #º2-G2 Attachment 2 Page 1 WHC-SD WM-IP-009, Rev. 0 SEDT 17-1992 FROM J. NANSEN S

# QUALITY ASSURANCE BULLETIN

QAB 93-002 Page 1 of 4 April 28, 1993

#### Revised U.S. Department of Energy Guidance Relative to Identification of Suspect/Counterfeit Graded Fastener Headmarks

#### INTRODUCTION

Since the last Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) Quality Assurance Bulletin (QAB) 92-02 was issued, relative to suspect/counterfeit parts, revised guidance has been received from The U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL), which includes a revised Suspect/Counterfeit Headmark List. This list contains fewer headmarks than the one previously provided and issued by WHC in QAB 92-01.

#### GUIDANCE

The specific differences between the original list and the revised U.S. Department of Energy - Headquarters (DOE-HQ) list are as follows:

> Grade 5 Fasteners—The revised DOE-HQ list only identifies three headmarks as being suspect/counterfeit: "," "KS," and those that do not exhibit a manufacturers' headmark, (the original list identifies 12 separate manufacturer's headmarks). deleted the majority of the Grade 5 fasteners from the revised list.

Grade 8 Fasteners--All fastener headmarks listed en the original list, are also listed on the revised DOP-HQ list.

Other Suspect Graded Fasteners (Not 270 duced by Manufaced res within the United States) The revised life does not address THYACO"/ "INFASCO," "University asteners," Tawrence Engineering Supply, Inc.," or their respective headmands, although they were not uded on the original life.

0.51

What has happened ar build DOE-HQ has not been able to substantiate the information on these methods were on the original list. The list that WHC received from RL in 1991 was a composite list generated by the DOE Nevada Operations Office using several sources.

Only those fasteners that exhibit headmarks matching those listed on the revised Suspect Headmark List, published by RL Environment, Safety & Health Bulletin 92-4, (see attached) are to be considered suspect/counterfeit and processed in accordance with direction provided in QAB 92-02.

WHC-SD-WM-IP-009, Rev. 0

QAB 93-002 Page 2 of 3 April 28, 1993

Based upon this guidance, line and support organizations can potentially expect to see graded fasteners, which exhibit headmarks matching those on the original list in loose lots and incorporated in equipment released by Procurement Quality Support and stores personnel.

#### PROCUREMENT

To establish WHC compliance with this new DOE-HQ guidance, the revised DOE-HQ Suspect Headmark List must be used as the attachment to procurement clauses E33 and E34, in place of the original list, and be referenced in all suspect fastener correspondence with WHC suppliers.

#### REPORTING AND DOCUMENTATION

All suspect/counterfeit items will continue to be reportable items in accordance with DOE Order 5000.3B, "Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information," regardless of the reporting thresholds established therein, in accordance with DOE-HQ guidance.

Based upon a recent DOE-HQ sponsored suspect/counterfeit parts training workshop in Atlanta, Georgia, the RL is requesting that "suspect/counterfeit items" be the standard entry in Block 13 of the occurrence report (OR) form.

Open ORs and nonconformance reports (NCRs) that document headmarks not shown on the revised list may be closed out at the originator's discretion. New ORs/NCRs should not be initiated for headmarks other than those shown on the revised list.

It is recommended that existing posters, as well as badge-sized aids, previously distributed to WHC personnel, be removed and discarded to prevent confusion. New posters and badge-sized aids (see attached) will be provided which coincide with the revised list. For additional copies, contact J. N. Nansen (6-8393) or C. R. Hoover (2-3625).

#### DISPOSAL

Future disposal of suspect/counterfeit graded fasteners will require DOE-HQ concurrence, in accordance with the new DOE-HQ guidance. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to reaffirm the instructions for processing suspect/ counterfeit fasteners previously addressed in QAB 92-01 with the additional requirement that fasteners must be maintained in their original packaging, if at all possible, to facilitate traceability to the vendor who supplied them.

QAB 93-002 Page 3 of 4 April 28, 1993

#### TRAINING

The following courses have been developed and are being presented through the Quality Training and Resource Center to enhance personnel awareness of suspect/counterfeit items:

- Module 1-- "Overview." This class is designed as an overview of the suspect/counterfeit parts problem. Students will learn "how" to identify, "what" to do with, and "who" to report to when suspect/counterfeit items are found. Inspection techniques, equipment identification, and reporting methods are covered. Course materials are presented by lecture, video, and hands-on exercises.
- 2. <u>Module 2--"Design and Specification Prevention Tools."</u> This class is geared to those who design and write specifications and demonstrates the use of clear technical requirements in specification and material requisitions. The "tools" presented concentrate on establishing characteristics critical to product function, as well as critical functions. Students will learn how to reduce reliance on paper certification by understanding the necessary links between product specification and product acceptance methods.
- 3. <u>Module 3--"Procurement Prevention Tools.</u> This class is geared to those who procure products and administer contracts. This course will assist the purchaser in developing vendor relationships and help make the vendor the first line of defense against suspect/counterfeit items. This is done through a variety of "tools" a person can use to continually increase their knowledge and ability to prevent suspect/counterfeit items from being procured.

Module 1 is presented during the first half of the day. Module 2 and 3 are presented concurrently during the second half of the day, with a one hour discussion involving the participants of both modules at the end of the day.

As a reminder, the fastener video cassettes provided by ABC and NBC News and the Industrial Fastener Institute are still available by contacting K. C. Redfield on 6-7021.

#### PROCEDURE

The entire process of identifying, controlling, reporting, and disposing of suspect/counterfeit items is being consolidated into a new Quality Instruction that will be included in the Quality Assurance Manual, WHC-CM-4-2. This new procedure will be coming out for WHC review shortly.

QAB 93-002 Page 4 of 4 April 28, 1993

In conclusion, the information presented in this bulletin must be disseminated to all line and support personnel as soon as possible to minimize confusion and avoid documentation of graded fasteners not identified as suspect/ counterfeit by DOE-HQ.

For further information, contact J. N. Nansen (6-8393) or C. R. Hoover (2-3625) of my staff.

 $\mathcal{C}$ 

A. J. Fisher Manager, Quality Assurance

## ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY & HEALTH



Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety & Health . U.S. Department of Energy . Washington, D.C. 20585

DOE/EH-0266

issue No. 92-4

August 1992

# **DOE Quality Alert**

## **Counterfeit Parts**

This Bulletin provides a summary of information that has been disseminated by various organizations within the Department of Energy (DOE) to alert the DOE community that some vendors have sold substandard bolts and circuit breakers to its contractors. Such sales can be a crime, in certain cases, suppliers of these substandard parts may also be subject to the civil penality enforcement provisions of the Price Anderson Amendments Act of 1988. DOE contractors have reported in excess of 1,000,000 suspect/counterfeit bolts and over 700 suspect/counterfeit circuit breakers to the Department.

#### Counterfeit/Substandard High-Strength Bolts

Counterfeit bolts have been found in military and commercial aircraft, surface ships, submarines, nuclear weepon production facilities, bridges, buildings, and the space shuttle. These bolts often do not possess the capabilities of the genuine bolts they counterfeit and can threaten the reliability of industrial and consumer products, National Security, or fives. At Congressional hearings in 1987, the Army testified that they had purchased bolts that bore the headmarks of Grade 8 high-strength bolts but that were actually interfor Grade 8.2 bolts. The International Fasteners institute (IFI) reported finding substandard, mismarked, and/or counterfeit, high-strength Grade 8 bolts in the United States commercial marketplace, in 1988, IFI reported that counterfeit medium-strength Grade 5 bolts had also been found.

Foreign bolts dominate the American marketplace due to their price advantage, and the majority of suspect/counterfeit bolts are imported, identifying, testing, and replacing these bolts has proven expensive and difficult, both mechanically and lechnically. Not finding and replacing these bolts, however, has proven fatal in some instances.

## **Fatalities From Substandard Bolts**

A Report of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the U.S. House of Representatives entitled The Threat from Substandard Fastaners: Is America Losing Its Grip? dated July 1988 stated the following under the heading "Saturn Corporation, Tennessee";

A death has occurred, in part, because a bolt, ...broke as an iron worker was tightening it. The iron worker lost his balance and fell, missing the safety net. The bolt, manufactured in Mexico or Spain, was substandard.

The Los Angeles Times printed a story under the headline "Counterfelts Now Nuts, Botts issue" in January 1989, which included the following:

Several people have died in crashes involving private planes that officials determined were caused by defective fasteners...the nuts, bolts and screws that hold together an aircraft. The National Transportation Safety Board's computer database indicated there were 51 aviation accidents between 1984 and 1987 caused by bad fasteners. How many of those fasteners were counterfeited is just now being investigated.

And just last summer, three different military planes at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma experienced engine failure as a result of defective boits that may have been counterfeit....

The Houston Post ran a story with the headline, "Fatal Navy fire blamed on faulty bolt" on March 15, 1992, which stated the following:

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A Feb. 22 fire aboard a Navy destroyer that killed two sailors and injured four was caused by a faulty bolt in the ship's engine room. . . . the fire broke out aboard the steam-powered vessel after a stainless steel bolt connecting a high-pressure steam line sheared. . . a closer analysis of the bolt. . .showed it hadn't been sold to the Navy by any known domestic company, and sources speculate that it might have been a foreign-made fastener.

## **Fastener Quality Act**

Congress has passed legislation aimed at curbing future bolt counterfelling. The Fastener Quality Act was passed by Congress in November 1990 to impose sanctions upon those who sell untraceable fasteners or bolts. However, the Act has not been implemented. When tasting laboratories and regulations are established by the Department of Commerce, the Senior Nuclear Managers Group (SNMG) will amend the guidance issued March 12, 1992.

DOE contractors have reported suspect/counterfeit bolts in several different ways. Some have weighed bolts and reported them in pounds, and others have counted the bolts and reported the actual numbers. As of June 1992, DOE contractors have reported finding in excess of 1,000,000 suspect/counterfeit bolts.

## Indicators - Headmarks

There are several consensus organizations that have published standards for the properties of fasteners. One of these is the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE). The SAE grade or alleged grade of a bolt is indicated by raised or indented radial lines on the bolt's head, as shown in Figure 1. These markings are called *headmarks*. DOE is currently concerned with two different grades of fasteners: one has three equally spaced radial lines on the head of a bolt which indicate that it should meet the specifications for a Grade 5 bolt; the other has six equally spaced radial lines which indicate a Grade 8 bolt. Letters or symbols on the head of a bolt indicate the manufacturer.

Figure 1 is a suspect/counterfeit Headmark List that was prepared by the United States Customs Service after extensive testing of many samples of boils from around the nation. Any boils anywhere in the DOE community that are currently in stock, in bins, or installed that are on the Customs Headmark List should be considered suspect/ counterfeit. The headmarks on this list are those of manufacturers that have often been found to have sold botts that did not meet the indicated consensus standards. Sufficient testing has been done on the bolts on this list to presume them defective without further testing.

## **Posters and Headmarks**

Figure 1 may be removed and photocopied as needed for use as a poster and handy reference to known suspect fastener headmarks. Bolts with the headmarkings shown have a significant likelihood of being found to be interior to standards. Generally, the cost of replacement of these bolts is less than the cost of chemical, hardness, and tensile strength testing. Note also that counterfelt bolts can be delivered with counterfelt certificates---documentation alone is insufficient to demonstrate compliance with standards.

The Fastener Quality Act of 1990 will require the registration of the headmarks of manufacturers, and it also will require everyone in the distribution chain to ensure bolt traceability.

## **Current Activities**

SNMG took action in December 1990 to disseminate information for substandard material to field activities. Subsequently, the group developed a plan of action with two purposes, viz., (1) to determine the scope of the problem and to take immediate corrective actions as appropriate, and (2) to provide guidelines for strengthening the procurement process so as to preclude the acceptance of counterfeit parts in the future.

Consistent with SNMG guidance, each site should:

- Continue inspection of inventories and systems for suspect/counterfeit parts,
- Continue review and revise procurement and quality assurance procedures so that the problem does not recur, and
- Continue to detect any new attempts by unscrupulous vendors to supply substandard parts.

## Precautions

The following precautions should be recognized when addressing the issue of suspect/countertelt parts;

- 1. Selective Testing—Some lacilities perform selective testing of sample bolts rather than have an independent testing laboratory run all the tests required by consensus standards. In many cases, a new counterfeit bolt has roughly the same physical strength as the graded bolt it mimics, but does not have either the chemical composition or the heat treatment specified by the consensus standards. As a result, it will stretch, exhibit metal fatigue, or corrode under less harsh service than the genuine bolt. Simple tensile strength tests cannot be used to identify substandard high-strength fasteners and should not be solely relied upon in performing acceptance tests.
- 2. Using Suspect/Counterfeit Grade 5 Bolts in Grade 2 Applications—Some sites use suspect/ counterfeit Grade 5 bolts in applications that only call for Grade 2 bolts. Eventually the suspect/counterfeit Grade 5 bolts will be used in an application that requires a genuine Grade 5 bolt and that application may fail. In some cases, cheap imported graded bolts have been purchased in place of ungraded bolts because the small price differential made the extra quality seem to be a bargain. Given the expense of removing suspect bolts for any application should be stopped.
- 3. Keep Bolts In Original Packages—All bolts purchased should be kept in the original packages, not emptied into bins. The packages should have labels or other markings that would permit them to be associated with a particular procurement action and a specific vendor. Approved vendor lists should be checked to assure that fastener vendors on that list have been audited for adequacy of their quality programs recently.

### Disposition

Consistent with SNMG guidance:

 Segregate and retain all suspect/counterfeil bolts including those found with headmarks that match those on the U.S. Customs Service Headmark List shown in Figure 1. The Office of Inspector General and the Office of Nuclear Safety should be notified when suspect/counterfeit boits are being retained. These should be retained as potential evidence until specifically released by the Office of Inspector General and the Office of Nuclear Safety for Price Anderson Enforcement. Boits on the Headmark List may only be disposed of when the above organizations no longer need them as evidence.

- 2. Report all suspect/counterfeit bolts. Regardless of use or lest results, it is imperative that all suspect/ counterfeit bolts be reported to ORPS in accordance with DOE 5000.3A, Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information, Attachment I, "Categorization of Reportable Occurrences." The reports should include Identification of the particular headmark, the number of bolts found with that headmark, and the supplier.
- Report to the Office of Inspector General cases where there are indications that suppliers knowingly supplied items and services of substandard quality.
- Witness and document the mell down of ali suspect/counterfeit boits when approval is given for disposal as discussed in No. 1 above.

As appropriate, DOE contractors should also report on the SPMS which provides more detailed information. To obtain a password for access to this system, contact Rick Edwards (208) 526-1099. Suspect Equipment Reports (SER) can be found in the Supplier Evaluation and Suspect Equipment (SESE) data base on the ES&H News menu of the SPMS. Only SER representatives can enter data into SER. If there is no SER representatives at your site, or If you wish to have data entry access, contact Janet Macon (301) 903-6096.

### Refurbished Molded-Case Circuit Breakers

Investigations thus far of electrical components at DOE facilities uncovered over 700 suspect/counterfeit molded-case circuit breakers that were previously used, refurbished and sold to DOE contractors.

The following factors should be recognized regarding suspect or refurbished circuit breakers,



- The quality and safety of refurbished molded-case circuit breakers is questionable since they are not designed to be taken apart and serviced or refurbished. There are no electrical standards established by Underwriters Laboratory (UL) for the refurbishing of molded-case electrical circuit breakers, nor are there any "authorized" refurbishers of moldedcase circuit breakers. Therefore, "refurbished" molded-case circuit breakers should not be accepted for use in any DOE facility.
- One source of refurbished molded-case circuit breakers is from the demolition of old buildings. Some refurbishers are junk dealers who may change the amperage labels on the circuit breakers to conform to the amperage ordered and then merely clean and shine the breakers.

This situation was brought to DOE's attention by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which, in turn, had been informed of the practice by the company that manufactures circuit breakers. In early 1988, a sales representative identified "refurbished" circuit breakers at Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. A subsequent investigation confirmed that circuit breakers sold to the power plant as new equipment were actually refurbished. The managers of the two firms that refurbished and sold these breakers have been convicted of fraud and have paid a substantial fine.

- 3. NRC published Information Notice No. 88-46 dated July 8, 1988, on the investigation findings and circulated it to all applicable government agencies, including DOE. On July 20, 1988, DOE notified all field offices that refurbished circuit breakers may have been installed in critical systems. Shortly thereatter, DOE established the Suspect Equipment Notification System (SENS), a submodule of ES&H Events and News on the Safety Performance Measurement System (SPMS). SENS has since been replaced by the Supplier Evaluation and Suspect Equipment (SESE) submodule which includes Suspect Equipment Reports.
- Some of DOE's older sites have circuit breakers in use that are no longer manufactured. According to the

Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC), examples of such breakers are Westinghouse breakers with frames E, EA, F and FA. If a DOE contractor has an electrical box that requires a breaker with one of these frame sizes, that contractor would not have been able to purchase it from Westinghouse for several years, if the contractor were to order a replacement breaker from an authorized Westinghouse dealer, the dealer could not get a new replacement breaker from the manufacturer. To fill the order, the dealer had to turn to the secondary or refurbished market.

Dealing with an authorized distributor does not preclude ending up with returbished circuit breakers. Westinghouse has announced that it is considering satisfying this market by manufacturing circuit breakers that will fit in these applications.

The solution, as recommended by NUMARC, is not to locus on the credentials of the distributor but on the locus on the credentials of the distributor but on the locusability of the circuit breaker itself. A purchaser can be assured of having a new circuit breaker only if the breaker can be traced back to the original manufacturer.

## Indicators of Refurbished Breakers

Typically, refurbished circuit breakers sold as new equipment have one or more of the following characteristics:

- 0 The style of breaker is no longer manufactured.
- 0 The breakers may have come in cheap, generic-type packaging instead of in the manufacturers' original boxes.
- Refurbished circuit breakers are often bulk-packaged in plastic bags, brown paper bags, or cardboard boxes with handwritten labels. New circuit breakers are packed individually in boxes that are labeled with the manufacturer's name, which is usually in two or more colors, and are often date stamped.
- O The original manufacturer's labels and/or the Underwriters Laboratory (UL) or Factory Mutual (FM) labels may have been counterfelled or removed from the breaker. Refurbishing operations have been

larown to use copying machines to produce poor quality copies of the original manulacturer's and the certifying body's isbels.

- Breakers may be labeled with the refurbisher's name rather than the label of a known manufachmet.
- ୦ ିମାକ ମାଛମାଏଛସୋଏକଂ ୨ ଚଖା (୦୩୧୦ ଲାଗା)/ସେଠାବେ) ଛଙ୍ଦରସ୍ଥ ଆକ two haives of the case of the breaker is broken ରଂ ଲାଇଛାନ୍ସ
- Wire lugs (connectors) show evidence of lampering.
- O The surface of the circuit breaker may be nicked or scratched yet have a high gloss. Refurbishers often coat breakers with clear plastic to produce a high gloss that gives the casual observer the impression that the breaker is new. The plastic cases of new circuit breakers often have a dull appearance.
- 9 Some rivels may have been removed, and the case may be held together by wood screws, metal screws, or nuts and bolts.
- O Contradictory amperage ratings may appear on different parts of the same refurbished breaker. On a new breaker, the amperage rating is stamped into, raised from, or machine-painted on the handle of the traised from, or machine-painted on the handle of the hard-to-find rating, refurbishers have been known to file down the surface of the handle to remove the original rating and hand-paint the desired amperage original rating and hand-paint the desired amperage rating.

### PritzeT

In a news release dated February 6, 1989, the National Electrical Manutachners Association (NEMA) amounced the cancellation of its Publication AB-2-1984 entitled, "Procedures for Field Inspection and Performance Venification of Molded-Case Circuit Breakers used in Commercial and Industrial Applications," and stated the following:

These procedures were intended for use with breakers that had been originally tested and calibrated in accordance with NEMA Standards Publication AB 1 or Underwiters Laboratories Standard UL 4.99, and not

subsequently opened, cleaned or modified..... Therefore the Standards Publication contained none of the destructive test procedures...necessary to verify the product's ability to withstand such conditions as full woltage overhoad or short circuit. Without such tests, even if a rebuilt breaker had passed the tests specified in AB-2. there would be no assurance that it would not fait under overhoad or short circuit conditions. It is NEMS a position inal regardless of the results of electrical testing, refurbished electrical circuit breakers are not reliable and should not be used.

## 2noitus5919

Follow these precautions regarding suspect or refurbished circuit breakers.

- Require that molded-case breakers be new and unaltered. Proof that they are new and unaltered requires the vendor to show traceability back to the original manufacturet.
- 2. Do not refy completely on desiring with authorized desires for protection from purchasing refutbished molded-case circuit breakers.
- Approve formal procedures for inspecting circuit breakers that are received and installed according to the indicators of refurbished breakers listed above.
- 4. Contact the original manufacturer II any indication of misrepresentation is encountered. There are many original manufacturers of molded-case circuit breakers whose products are being refurbished and sold as new. These manufacturers have the most specific information about how to assure that their products have not been refurbished.

## Disposition

1. Segregate and retain all circuit breakers found with indications that they may be returbished. These will be indications that they may be returbished. These will be retained as potential evidence until specifically reteased by the Office of Inspector General and the Office of Nuclear Safety for Price Anderson Office of Nuclear Safety for Price Anderson Enforcement. Circuit breakers that may be refurbished insy only be disposed of when the above organizations no longer need them as evidence.



- Report suspect electrical components to ORPS and as appropriate to the Suspect Equipment Reports (SER) on SPMS. The ORPS categorization group should be identified as "Cross-Category Items, Potential Concerns or Issues." The description of cause section in the ORPS report should include the text "suspect counterfeit parts."
- Witness and document the destruction of all suspect/counterfeit circuit breakers when approval is given for disposal as discussed in No. 1 above.

## **Additional Information**

The Office of Nuclear Energy has the responsibility for resolving the suspect/counterteit parts issue in the Department. Further guidance as It is developed will be disseminated to the Field Offices.



This Bulletin is one in a series of publications issued by EH to share occupational safety information throughout the DOE complex. To be added to the Distribution List or to obtain copies of the publication, call (615) 576-3482.

For additional information regarding the publications, call Barbara Bowerz, Salety Parlormance Indicator Division, Office of Environment, Salety and Health, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington DC 20585, (301) 903-3016.

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	Wesnghouse Hanford Compa	
All Grade 5 and Grade 5 tasteners of foreign of planet into the planet into th	Help Stamp Out Suspects/Counterfeits	
manufacturers' headmarks:	Suspect Fastener Headmark List	
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Grade 3 Lusteners with the following Manufacturer       Mark		
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A       Asani Ngf (JP)       rs       rS       Kostskorpo(JP)         NF       Nipon Fasteners (JP)       NT       Tread Ltc (JP)         H       Hinomoto Metal (JP)       FM       Fastener Coord Japan (JR)         H       Hinomoto Metal (JP)       FM       Fastener Coord Japan (JR)         H       Hinomoto Metal (JP)       FM       Fastener Coord Japan (JR)         H       Hinomoto Metal (JP)       FM       Fastener Coord Japan (JR)         H       Minamida Sieybo (JP)       Tread at the Open former of the Coord Japan (JR)         H       Minamida Sieybo (JP)       Tread at the Open former of the Coord Japan (JR)         H       Minamida Sieybo (JP)       Tread at the Open former of the Coord Japan (JR)         H       Minato Kogyo (JP)       Tread at the Open former of the Coord Japan (JR)         Tread a 2.2 fasteners with the following hadmatet:       Mark       Manufacture (JR)         Mark       Manufacture (JR)       Mark       Manufacture (JR)         Type 1       Tread at 2.5 (SE conset (Op Coord (JR))       Mark       Manufacture (JR)         Mark       Manufacture (JR)       Mark       Manufacture (JR)       Mark         Type 1       Tread at 2.5 (SE conset (Op Coord (JR))       Mark       Mark       Manufacture (JR)	Grade 8 fasteners with the following Manufacturers headmarks:	
NF       Nippon Fasteners (JP)       R       TT       TRALLE (JP)         H       Hinomoto Metal (JP)       FH       FX       Essential Cool Bean (UP)         H       H       Minamica Sieybo (JP)       FX       Kycel Mits (JP)         H       Minamica Sieybo (JP)       FX       Kycel Mits (JP)       FX         H       Minamica Sieybo (JP)       FX       Kycel Mits (JP)       FX         H       Minamica Sieybo (JP)       FX       Kycel Mits (JP)       FX         H       Minato Kogyo (JP)       FX       Kycel Mits (JP)       FX         F       Daiei (JP)       FX       Kycel Mits (JP)       FX         F       Daiei (JP)       FX       Kycel Mits (JP)       FX         F       Daiei (JP)       FX       FX       Kycel Mits (JP)         F       Daiei (JP)       FX       FX       Kycel Mits (JP)         F       Daiei (JP)       FX       FX       FX       FX         F       Daiei (JP)       FX       FX       FX       FX       FX         F       Daiei (JP)       FX       FX       FX       FX       FX       FX         Grade A325 fasteners (Gennett Darvet tarestonly) will the following h	Mark Manufacturer Markst Manufacturer	
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Image: Second	(-NF-) NF Nippon Fasteners (JP) (-RT-), RT - Takal Ltd (JP)	
MS       Minato Kogyo (J?)         MS       Minato Kogyo (J?)         Mollow       Infrasco (CA, TV, J?, YU) (Greater than 1/2-inch diameter Grade & Holicow Triancite only)         MS       Date (J?)         MS       Date (J?)         Mark       Manufacturer         Mark       Manufacturer         MS       Kristo Kogyo (JP)         Mark       Manufacturer         MS       Mark         MS       Kosaka Kogyo (JP) Fit/A         MS       Kosaka Kogyo (JP) Fit/A         Mark       Manufacturer         Type 1       Mark         Mark       Manufacturer         Type 2       Mark         Type 3       Mark         Mark       Mark         Type 3       Mark         Mark       Mark         Mark       Mark         Mark       Mark         Mark       Mark	(-H-) H Hinomoto Metal (JP) - FM-Fastener Co. of J	apan (JP) St. 2014
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# QUALITY ASSURANCE BULLETIN

QAB 93-03 Page 1 of 3 May 20, 1993

#### SUBSTANDARD CHINESE PIPE FLANGES

#### INTRODUCTION

In September 1992, the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors (NBBI) issued a "Special Bulletin" to alert the construction industry of a potential safety and plant operation hazard. A year-long investigation revealed that certain flanges and fittings are being fraudulently manufactured, in China, as meeting specific American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standards. These products not only fail to meet the chemical or physical requirements of ASTM, but the manufacturing practices employed are potentially deadly to the end user.

The subject of substandard Chinese pipe flanges was previously discussed in a Lessons Learned distributed to Facility Management in December 1992.

Kaiser Engineers Hanford (KEH) discovered three (3) quest/onable 8" blind flanges, which were manufactured in China, at 100K Area in March 1993. Subsequent investigation has revealed these flanges were produred and accepted through the Westinghouse system in August 1992, prior to receipt of the NBBI Special Builetin. Independent analysis of one of the Tlanges revealed that the process of manufacture was not forging, as required by the overning

specification, but rolled plate 

GUIDANCE

In an effort to assure that no more of these products are currently in the possession of Westinghouse Haward company (WHC) all facilities that where material is staged, stored, or used should be to viewed to assure that none of these to the possession of these to the possession of these to the possession of the posses of the possession of the possessio these verses is present.

Furthermole and Procurement and Materials, tangement personnel sbor aware that these accurcts are unacceptable and that, if received from suppliers, they will be rejected. Te made

If flanges with any of the following identification are found, they should be immediately segregated, identified, and documented in accordance with WHC-CM-4-2, QI 15.1 (Nonconformance Report) and MRP 5.14 (Occurrence Report).

#### WELD NECK FLANGES

Size 4", Raised Face, 1501b.(est.) Markings: DSI 4-150 RF-A105N W/N STD 075 China

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- Size-Unknown, Rating & Configuration Unknown Markings: B-16.5 072 LEO STD TMI 454 China
- Size 4", Raised Face, 1501b. (est.) Markings: LEO 4" 150 RFWN STD B-16 A-105 TB-511 China
- Size 4", Configuration Unknown, 150lb. (est.) Markings: 4" 150 N B-16 A-105 DZ44 GJ China
- Size 4", Configuration Unknown, 3001b. (est.) Markings: 4" 300 STD A105 57 China
- Size 6", Raised Face, 1501b. (est.) Markings: A-105 LEO 6 I50 RFWN STD B-16
- Size 4", Raised Face, 3001b.(est.)
   Markings: 4 300 STD B-16 Al05N W/N 58 China
- Size 4", Raised Face, 3001b. (est.) Markings: 4-300 B-16 A105N W/N STD 4-I China WW

#### SLIP-ON FLANGES

1

- Size 4", Raised face, 1501b. (est.) Markings: LEO 4-150 RFSO B-16 A105N T MI-300 China
- 14", Raised face, 3007b.
   Marking: 14 300 SO RF B16.5 A105 848 CHINA 02F
- Size Large, (est. min 12"), Flat face, Rating (unknown) Markings: B16.5 105N SO 81D 1-406 China USC
- Size Large, (est. min 12"), Raised Face, 1501b.
   Markings: 18 2 150 RFS0 B16 A105 109MI 292 China
- Size 14", Raised face, 1501b. Markings: SXH A105 B16.5 ISO SO RF 14 B913725 China

#### BLIND FLANGES

- Size 8", 1501b.
   Markings: QD China 150 A105 90-610 B16.5
- Size Large, (est. min 8", 8 bolt pattern) Markings: PF 105 B16.5 012 China BL

## APPENDIX B

B PLANT/M		PECT/COUNTERFEIT C	OMPONE	NTS SCREENING Pa	ge 1 of 1
1. System Number:	2. System				
B12 Systems		ical Distribution Sys	stems		
3. Purpose. This form provides a subsequent potential failure of su to facilitate the performance of p N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counter	spect/count hysical ins	erfeit parts could have crit pections in accordance with	ical conseq Internal Me	uences. The purpose of the s	creening is
4. Instructions:					
a. Complete one screening form for	r each plan	t system.			
b. Identify system components who	se failure (	could have critical conseque	nces by app	lying the screening criteria	in Block 5.
<ul> <li>List in Block 6 those component consequences.</li> </ul>	ts identifi	ed in step b, along with the	functions	whose failure would have crit	ical
d. List or describe in Block 7 the	ose componer	nts or items which were eval	uated but do	o not meet the screening crit	eria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items liste	ed in Block 6. Obtain QA co	ncurrence.		
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved p	lan and record results on th	e Inspection	n Record.	
9. If any suspect/counterfeit iter follow up with a list of deficience Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and	ies and prop	posed disposition. The info	rmation will	l be consolidated on one or m	ineer will ore
<ul> <li>File copies of this form, along package.</li> </ul>	g with the	Inspection Plan, inspection	records and	any resulting NCRs in the JC	S work
5. Screening Criteria:					
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Count</u> 1981 or later which are listed in ( 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) added items listed in these bullet	and 94-02	urance Bulletins (QABs) 92-0 (10/18/94). If no modificat	1 (02/14/92) ion or repai	), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 ( ir has been performed which w	04/28/93)
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protect</li> <li>Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders,</li> </ul>	ive equipmen , catwalks,	nt and items whose failure c lifting/moving devices, rol	ould direct lup doors, b	ly result in serious injury. preathing air systems	Examples:
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u> release/spread. Examples: Canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs;</li> </ul>	doors; car	nyon supply/exhaust fans; HE	monitor oper PA filters a	rational accidents or contami and instrumentation; air and	nation radiation
d. Equipment with Programmatic Imp resulting equipment damage or nonav					
6. Components/Functions Requiring V	erification	1:			
A. All 240V and 480V breakers - 240	IV and 480V	breakers are listed in the	DAB, and are	a personnel safety concern.	
B. Other components (Aux Contacts,					tions:
<ol> <li>Ventilation Exhaust fans</li> <li>Cranes/Elevators/Trolleys/Koi</li> <li>Air Compressors</li> </ol>					
C. Remote starting equipment for it	ems in Bat	oove.			
D. Switchgear, Substations, Transfo	ormers and Q	Gage glasses - They are list	ed on the QA	в.	
7. Other Components/Functions:					
A. Relays and motors will not be in knowledge of the Plant by Electrici	ans and Eng	cause installed equipment is gineers that those component:	not the typ s do not exi	es listed on the QAB. This is st at our facility.	based on
B. Other electrical components (Aux will not be verified.	Contacts,	Heaters, Starters, and Trip	Devices) id	entified for non critical app	olications
C. System components of types other	than ident	ified on QABs will not be v	erified.		
D. Bolts will not be inspected - Th	ere are no	requirements for high stren	jth.		
8. Alexanda Cog Engineer	9. 1/8/96 Dave	10 Jan Cog Hanager	17. ( <u> 8 96</u> Date	12. <u>R. Nernande</u> Screen Preparer	13. //8/9/ Date

SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN Page 1 of 3 a granter and the part of the state of the Sector 1 1. System Number: C12 C12B, C12D, C12F thru P Systems 20 System Title: Electrical Distribution Systems e Asidno maysingesi ethogen. 3. Instructions: a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification. b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below. d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected. 4. Component/function grequiring verification: A. 480V Breakers. 5. Proposed inspection method: 6. Action completed/comments: Α. - 100% visual inspection of 480V breakers, Ð complete make/model numbers and compare information to OAB 92-01. Done - Record make/model number. If data matches an item on the suspect 37 breakus identifies list then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) Les NCR 057124 and identify as such on inspection form. - If any item is suspect after inspection han Darla is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form. B. 240V breakers. Β. - Review drawings and identify any 240V breakers for ampacities listed in QAB which need to be inspected. Perform visual inspection for the identified breakers. - Record make/model number. - If data matches an item on the suspect None identified list, then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify as such on inspection form. If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form.

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SUSI	PECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PL	AN Page 2 of 3
<ol> <li>Component/function requiring verification:</li> </ol>	5. Proposed inspection method:	6. Action completed/comments:
C. Other components in MCCs for critical applications.	C. -Review drawings and identify any components associated with critical applications (see block 6b of screening form).	Dom
	<ul> <li>Perform visual inspection of auxiliary contacts, heaters, starters and trip devices identified.</li> </ul>	Done
	- If data matches an item on the suspect list, then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify on attached list with breaker and identify as such on inspection form.	None identified
	<ul> <li>If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form.</li> </ul>	Non contilied
D. Remote starting equipment for items in critical applications.	D. -Review drawings and identify any components associated with critical applications (see block 6b of screening form).	Done
	- Perform visual inspection of auxiliary contacts, heaters, starters and trip devices identified.	Done
	- If data matches an item on the suspect list, then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify on attached list and identify as such on inspection form.	1 starter identified see NCR 05/124
	<ul> <li>If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form.</li> </ul>	None declared
E. Switchgear and substations and gage glasses.	E. - Review drawing, CVI or perform visual inspection of switchgears, substations and gage glasses for components on QAB.	Done
	- If data matches an item on the suspect list, then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify on attached list and identify as such on inspection form.	None identified
	- If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form. B-3	None identified

SUS	PECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PL	AN Page 3 of 3
4. Component/function requiring verification:	5. Proposed inspection method:	6. Action completed/comments:
F. Transformers	<ul> <li>F.</li> <li>Review drawings and identify any transformers for KVA listed in QAB which need to be inspected.</li> <li>Perform visual inspection for the identified transformers.</li> <li>If data matches an item on the suspect list then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify as such on inspection form.</li> <li>If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form.</li> </ul>	Done None identified None identified None identified
	Inspection plan by: QA Concurrence: <u>R. Hernarde 1/9/96</u> Signature/Date J/9/96 Signature/Date	Cognizant Manager/Date

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING			
1. System Number: B15 2. System Title: Communications (BISA, BISB BISD)			
5. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J W. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.	is		
. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.			
. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5	5.		
. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.	•		
. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.			
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.			
. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.			
9. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more lonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.			
n. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work backage.			
5. Screening Criteria:			
Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.	in		
<u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems			
:. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.			
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.			
. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:			
The Communications Systems, PAX, evacuation siren and radio contain no parts which have been identified as suspect in the QABs identified above.			
The electrical supply components were covered with the Electrical System (B12). No suspect components were identified. See the section on Electrical Distribution for details.			
. Other Components/Functions:			
The bolts used in the assembly of the Communication Systems are not required to be nardened or otherwise treated.			
9. / 10. 11. 11. 12. 13. 13. 1.5/90 og Engineer Døte Zog Hanager Døte Screen Preparer Døte	6		
B-5 (01/02)			

B PLANT/M	/ESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number: B20	2. System Title: RAW WATER
subsequent potential failure of su to facilitate the performance of p	record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and spect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is hysical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. feit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.
4. Instructions:	
a. Complete one screening form fo	r each plant system.
b. Identify system components who	se failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those component consequences.</li> </ul>	ts identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 the	ose components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
follow up with a list of deficienc	ns are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will ies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, alon package.	with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:	
1981 or later which are listed in ( 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94)	terfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in Duality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have ins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protect Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders	ive equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: , catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u> release/spread. Examples: Canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs	Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation ; instrument air.
	pacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to vailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.
6. Components/functions Requiring	/erification:
NONE	
7. Other Components/Functions:	
SYSTEM INSTALLED PRIOR TO CONCERNING FIRE PROTECTIO (SYSTEM ヨンクヨ).	1981 WITH NO ADDITIONAL MODIFICATIONS DONE EXCEPT FOR THOSE N WHICH WILL BE INSPECTED PER FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION PLAN.
8. 11 Must	9. 10 14/96 DMan 11. 17 Date Log Manager Date Screen Preparer Date Date

(01/02/96)

B PLANT/W	VESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number: B20A	2. System Title: RQW WATER SUPPLY FOR PROCESS
subsequent potential failure of su to facilitate the performance of p	record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and spect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is hysical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. feit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.
4. Instructions:	
a. Complete one screening form fo	r each plant system.
<ul> <li>b. Identify system components who</li> </ul>	se failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those component consequences.</li> </ul>	ts identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 th	ose components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
follow up with a list of deficienc	ms are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will ies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, alon- package.	g with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:	
1981 or later which are listed in ( 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94)	terfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have ins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protect Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders	ive equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: , catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u> release/spread. Examples: Canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs	Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation; instrument air.
	pacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to vailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring	Verification:
NONE	
7. Other Components/Functions:	
SYSTEM INSTALLED PRIOR TO WALKDOWN REVEALED NO NEW	1981 AND DEACTIVATED EXCEPT FOR CELLS 25.26.27.AND 28 OF WHICH A MODIFCATIONS AFTER 1981.
8. Autor	9. 10. Hang 11. 12. 13. 14.496 Date Cog Manager Date Seveen Preparer Date

(01/02/96)

		SPECT/COUNTERFEIT	COMPON	ENTS SCREENING	
1. System Number: B20B	2. System Title: RAW WATER SUPPLY FOR FIRE				
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.					
4. Instructions:					
a. Complete one screening form for					
<ul> <li>Identify system components whose</li> </ul>	se failure	could have critical consequ	lences by ap	plying the screening crite	ria in Block 5.
<ul> <li>List in Block 6 those component consequences.</li> </ul>	ts identifi	ied in step b, along with th	he functions	whose failure would have	critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 the	ose compone	nts or items which were eva	aluated but	do not meet the screening	criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items list	ed in Block 6. Obtain QA o	concurrence.		
f. Perform the inspection per the					
9. If any suspect/counterfeit item follow up with a list of deficienci Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and	one Occurr	ence Report (OR) will be su	ubmitted for	the entire facility.	or more
<ul> <li>h. File copies of this form, along package.</li> </ul>	with the	Inspection Plan, inspection	records and	d any resulting NCRs in the	e JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:					
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Count</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Q 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) added items listed in these bulletin	and 9/02	(10/19/0/) 16	01 (02/14/92	, 92°02 (U8/21/92), 93-00	ems procured in 12 (04/28/93), 14 would have
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protectin Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders,</li> </ul>	ve equipmer	nt and items where failure	+ + +		y. Examples:
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> release/spread. Examples: Canyon o monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs;	Equipment	t relied upon to prevent or			amination nd radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic impa</u> resulting equipment damage or nonava	<u>acts:</u> Equi ailability	ipment whose failure could h Examples: Cranes, fire g	nave a serio protections	us impact on the plant mis	sion due to
6. Components/Functions Requiring Ve					
NONE					
7. Other Components/Functions:					
INSPECTION OF RAW WATER SY PROTECTION.	STEM FO	R FIRE WILL BE PERFO	DRMED PER	INSPECTION PLAN FO	OR FIRE
8 1 4					
tog Engineer	9./ / <u>4/<i>c</i>./</u> . Date	Log Manager	11 14/96 Date	12. Mart	13. 1/-1/91
			T pare	Screen Preparer	(01/02/96)

B PLANT/WE	SF SUSF	PECT/COUNTERFEIT C	OMPONENTS	SCREENING	
1. System Number: B2OC, B2OE, <del>B2OK</del> fel 1112196	2. System WATER S	Title: HIGH RISK COOL STREAM / C <del>OOLING WATE</del>	ING WATE ER SUBHEA	R STREAM / LOW RISK C DER PEA 1/12/96	OOL ING
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a subsequent potential failure of subsequent potential failure of plat facilitate the performance of plan. Nansen, 8 Plant Suspect/Counter</li> </ol>	spect/counte hysical insp	erfeit parts could have crit pections in accordance with	ical consequ Internal Men	vences. The purpose of the s	creening is
4. Instructions:					
a. Complete one screening form for	r each plant	t system.			
b. Identify system components who			nose hu spol	lying the concentre exitence	in Dlack 6
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those component consequences.</li> </ul>	(s_identifie	ed in step b, along with the	TUNCTIONS 1	whose failure would have crit	Ical
d. List or describe in Block 7 the	ose componer	nts or items which were eval	uated but do	o not meet the screening crite	eria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items liste	ed in Block 6. Obtain QA co	ncurrence.		
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved pl	lan and record results on th	e Inspection	n Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit iter follow up with a list of deficienc Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and	ies and prop	posed disposition. The info	rmation will	be consolidated on one or ma	
h. File copies of this form, along package.	with the I	Inspection Plan, inspection	records and	any resulting NCRs in the JC	S work
5. Screening Criteria:					
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Count</u> 1981 or later which are listed in ( 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) added items listed in these bullet	and 94-02 (	urance Bulletins (QABs) 92-0 (10/18/94). If no modificat	1 (02/14/92) ion or repai	), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (1 ir has been performed which wo	4/28/93)
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems					
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.					
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.					
6. Components/Functions Requiring	verification	n: NONE			
7. Other Components/Functions: The 1981, therefore inspectio				ines were installed p	rior to
8. <u>Restansife</u>	9.15/56	10 Herry	14. 15/96 Date	12. N/A	13.
			Dake	Screen Preparer	Date (01/02/96)

			WHC-SU-WH-IP-009, KeV.
B PLANT/WE	SF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT	COMPONENTS	SCREENING
1. System Number: B20D	2. System Title: 221BA HIGH	RISK MONITOR	·
subsequent potential failure of su	spect/counterfeit parts could have sysical inspections in accordance w	critical consequence ith Internal Memo 1	d for applications where the use and es. The purpose of the screening is 6710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J.
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for	r each plant system.		
b. Identify system components who	se failure could have critical cons	equences by applyin	g the screening criteria in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those component consequences.	ts identified in step b, along with	the functions whos	e failure would have critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 the	ose components or items which were	evaluated but do no	t meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items listed in Block 6. Obtain 9	A concurrence.	
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved plan and record results o	n the Inspection Re	cord.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit iten follow up with a list of deficienci Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and	ies and proposed disposition. The	information will be	
<ul> <li>h. File copies of this form, along package.</li> </ul>	with the Inspection Plan, inspect	ion records and any	resulting NCRs in the JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:			
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Count</u> 1981 or later which are listed in C 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) added items listed in these bulleti	uality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modif	92-01 (02/14/92), 9 ication or repair h	rts applies only to items procured in 2-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), as been performed which would have t is required.
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protecti Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders,	ive equipment and items whose failu catwalks, lifting/moving devices,	re could directly r rollup doors, brea	esult in serious injury. Examples: thing air systems
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u>: release/spread. Examples: Canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs;</li> </ul>	doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans	or monitor operati ; KEPA filters and	onal accidents or contamination instrumentation; air and radiation
d. Equipment with Programmatic Impresulting equipment damage or nonation			
6. Components/Functions Requiring V	verification: NONE		
7. Other Components/Functions:		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	

Procedures are in place to provide backup coverage of system in the event of a system outage and until the system can be restored to normal operation. Therefore, inspection of this system is not required.



				WNC-SU-WM-IP-U	09, Nev.
B PLANT/WI	ESF SUS	PECT/COUNTERFEIT (	OMPONENT	S SCREENING	
1. System Number: B20F	2. System	Title: 221BG LOW RIS	MONITOR	SYSTEM	
3. Purpose. This form provides a subsequent potential failure of su to facilitate the performance of p N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counter	spect/count hysical ins	erfeit parts could have cri pections in accordance with	tical conseq Internal Me	wences. The purpose of the se	reening is
4. Instructions:					
a. Complete one screening form fo	r each plan	nt system.			
b. Identify system components who	se failure	could have critical consequ	ences by app	lying the screening criteria i	n Block 5.
<ul> <li>List in Block 6 those componen consequences.</li> </ul>	ts identifi	ed in step b, along with th	functions	whose failure would have criti	cal
d. List or describe in Block 7 th	ose compone	nts or items which were eva	luated but d	o not meet the screening crite	ria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items list	ed in Block 6. Obtain QA c	oncurrence.		
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved p	lan and record results on t	ne Inspectio	n Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit ite follow up with a list of deficienc Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and	ies and pro	posed disposition. The inf	prmation wil	t be consolidated on one or mo	neer will re
h. File copies of this form, alon package.	g with the	Inspection Plan, inspection	records and	any resulting NCRs in the JCS	work
5. Screening Criteria:					
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Coun</u> 1981 or later which are listed in 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) added items listed in these bullet	Auality Ass and 94-02	urance Bulletins (QABs) 92- (10/18/94). If no modifica	)1 (02/14/92) tion or repa	), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (0 in has been performed which wo	4/28/93)
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protect Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders	ive equipme , catwalks,	nt and items whose failure a lifting/moving devices, ro	could direct lup doors, l	ly result in serious injury. breathing air systems	Examples:
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u> release/spread. Examples: Canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs</li> </ul>	doors; ca	nyon supply/exhaust fans; Hi	monitor ope: PA filters a	rational accidents or contamin and instrumentation; air and r	ation ediation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Im</u> resulting equipment damage or nona					
6. Components/Functions Requiring	Verification	n: NONE			
7. Other Components/Functions:			•	<u> </u>	
	+		6		
Procedures are in place outage and until the syst this system is not requir	em can b	be restored to norma	or system   operati	on. Therefore, inspec	stem tion of
8. Rystenseight	9. 1/5/96 Date	10 Aug	114 15/96	12. N/A	13.
	VELE	Trog Hanager	vare	Screen Preparer	Date

Date (01/02/96)

HIC-SD-NH-IF-009, Rev.
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number: B20G 2. System Title: 207B POND/VALVING STATIONS
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.
4. Instructions:
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.
5. Screening Criteria:
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE
7. Other Components/Functions:
Original 207B pond inlet electric valves were removed and replaced with manually operated butterfly valves before 1981. The outlet valves remain as original equipment and were also installed prior to 1981. Therefore, inspection of this system for suspect/counterfeit parts is not required.

8.	9.	10/ 4	17.	12.	13.
Cog Engineer	1 <u>/5/96</u> Date	tog Manager	<u>  5 96</u> Date	N/A Screen Preparer	Date

(01/02/96)

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			WHC-5D-WM-1P-009, Rev. 0
B PLANT/WE	SF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT	COMPONENTS	SCREENING
1. System Number: B20H	2. System Title: 207BA CBC S	AMPLER SYSTEM	
3. Purpose. This form provides a r subsequent potential failure of sus to facilitate the performance of ph N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterf	<pre>pect/counterfeit parts could have ysical inspections in accordance was </pre>	critical consequence with Internal Memo 1	for applications where the use and es. The purpose of the screening is 6710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J.
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for	each plant system.		
b. Identify system components whos	e failure could have critical cons	sequences by applying	g the screening criteria in Block 5.
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those component consequences.</li> </ul>	s identified in step b, along with	1 the functions whose	e failure would have critical -
d. List or describe in Block 7 tho	se components or items which were	evaluated but do no	t meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items listed in Block 6. Obtain G	A concurrence.	
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved plan and record results of	on the Inspection Re	curd.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit item follow up with a list of deficienci Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and	es and proposed disposition. The	information will be	conso dated on one or more
h. File copies of this form, along	with the Inspection Plan, inspect	tion records and any	resulting NCRs in the JCS work
package			
5. Screening Criteria:			
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Count</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Q 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) added items listed in these bulleti	uality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modif	92-01 (02/14/92), 93 fication or repair ha	as been performed which would have
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protecti Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders,			
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> release/spread. Examples: Canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs;</li> </ul>	doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans		
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Imp</u> resulting equipment damage or nonav			
6. Components/Functions Requiring V	erification: NONE		
The sampling pump base w the four bolts securing t fasteners.	as inspected on January 1 he pump to the base plate	12, 1996 and it e were identifi	: was confirmed that two of ed as Grade 5/KS
7. Other Components/Functions:		······································	
Procedures are in place outage and until the system operation of this system function.	em can be restored to non	rmal operation.	Therefore, continued

En Thursefel	9., 1/12/96 Date	Redusail	111. 12/96 Date	12 Ristussifel Screen Preparet	13. 1 <u>][2]</u> 96 Date
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B PLANT/WE	SF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT	COMPONENTS SCREENING				
1. System Number: B20J	2. System Title: 216-B-59 RE	TENTION BASIN				
subsequent potential failure of sus	spect/counterfeit parts could have hysical inspections in accordance w	m has been screened for applications where critical consequences. The purpose of the ith Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. 9 4, 1994.	screening is			
4. Instructions:						
a. Complete one screening form for	r each plant system.					
b. Identify system components whos	se failure could have critical cons	equences by applying the screening criteria	a in Block 5.			
c. List in Block 6 those component consequences.	ts identified in step b, along with	the functions whose failure would have cri	itical			
d. List or describe in Block 7 the	ose components or items which were	evaluated but do not meet the screening cri	iteria.			
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items listed in Block 6. Obtain Q	A concurrence.				
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved plan and record results o	n the Inspection Record.				
	ies and proposed disposition. The	D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Er information will be consolidated on one or submitted for the entire facility.				
<ul> <li>h. File copies of this form, along cackage.</li> </ul>	g with the Inspection Plan, inspect	ion records and any resulting NCRs in the J	CS work			
5. Screening Criteria:						
1981 or later which are listed in G 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94)	a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.					
b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems						
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation imonitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.						
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.						
6. Components/Functions Requiring V	Perification:	,1 mg	the com			
Manually operated valve stem sheared at/near connection to valve assembly. Repairs were initiated in late 1980's early 1990's. Failure of component could plant#mission. Inspection requires entry into interior of non-permitted confined space. Inspect bolt securing valve extension to valve stem for suspect part.						
7. Other Components/Functions:	tion of flanges and fasts		in not			
Inside valve pit, inspection of flanges and fasteners securing flanges to valve is not required as this equipment was installed prior to 1981.						
Butunifly . Cog Engineer	) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )	114 12. 114 12. Date Screen Prepared	13. .//96 Date			
			(01/02/96)			

SUSP	ECT/COUNTERFEIT	COMPONENTS	INSPECTION P	LAN
1. System Number: B20J	2. System Title: 216	5-B-59 RETENTI	ION BASIN	•
<ul> <li>3. Instructions:</li> <li>a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit C</li> <li>b. List the items and functions</li> <li>c. Identify the inspection/verif bolts", or "review of procurement</li> <li>d. Perform and document the veri who performed the verification and records, etc. It must be possible</li> </ul>	requiring verification of ication method to be use records for vendor pack fication as specified in d date. Records may inc e to tell whether a part	from Block 6 of the ed in Block 5. For age". h Block 5. Documer lude marked up dra ticular item in the	e screening form in example, "100% vis station should indic wings, inspection o	Block 4 below. sual inspection of pipe hanger sate clearly what was inspected, checklists, copies of QC
4. Component/function requiring verification: a) Inside the 216-B- 59 manual valve diverter pit, inspect bolt securing valve extension pipe to valve stem.	5. Proposed inspection a. Perform a 10 bolt securing th the valve stem f	0% visual ins e valve exten	sion pipe to	6. Action completed/comments: INPREAME borg by DN CATENSION. Nein 4-C SUSPECT. RICH 1/11/96
	Inspection plan by: Rutursuff '/I Signature/Date	QA Concurre	re 9 1/11/95	Cognizant Engineer/Date

(8 Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

	VESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING					
1. System Number: B20K	2. System Title: COOLING WATER SUBHEADER					
to facilitate the performance of p	3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.					
4. Instructions:						
a. Complete one screening form for	r each plant system.					
b. Identify system components who	se failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.					
	ts identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical					
d. List or describe in Block 7 the	ose components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.					
	items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.					
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.					
	ns are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will ies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.					
<ul> <li>File copies of this form, along package.</li> </ul>	with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work					
5. Screening Critería:						
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Count</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Q 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94)	<u>erfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in Huality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have ns since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.					
b. General Plant Safety. Protecti	ve equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems					
c. Process/Support Systems Safety:	Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination					
d. Equipment with Programmatic Imp resulting equipment damage or nonav	acts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to ailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.					
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NUNE						
7. Other Components/Functions:						
SYSTEM INSTALLED PRIOR TO 1981 WITH NO ADDITIONAL MODIFCATIONS DONE AFTER 1981.						
B. M. Mart Cog Engineer	9/ 10. 11. 11. 14.96 Screen Preparer Date					

(01/02/96)

			·····		
B PLANT/V	VESF SUSP	ECT/COUNTERFEIT	COMPONE	NTS SCREENING	
1. System Number: B21, B Z I A	2. System T SANITARY	itle: WATER	•		
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a subsequent potential failure of su to facilitate the performance of p N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counter</li> </ol>	spect/counter hysical inspe	feit parts could have cr ctions in accordance wit	itical conse h Internal Mu	quences The purpose of the	corection in
4. Instructions:					
a. Complete one screening form fo	r each plant :	system.	_		
b. Identify system components who	se failure co	uld have critical conseq	uences by app	olying the screening criteria	in Block 5.
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those componen consequences.</li> </ul>	ts identified	in step b, along with t	he functions	whose failure would have cri	tical
d. List or describe in Block 7 th	ose component:	s or items which were eva	aluated but d	to not meet the screening cri	teria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items listed	in Block 6. Obtain QA	concurrence.		
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved plan	n and record results on	the Inspectio	on Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit iter follow up with a list of deficienc Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and	es and propos	sed disposition. The in	formation wil	i he consolidated on one on	gineer will more
h. File copies of this form, along	g with the Ins	spection Plan, inspection	n records and	any resulting NCRs in the J	CS work
package. 5. Screening Criteria:			·····.		
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.					
b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems					
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.					ination radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.					on due to
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:					
NONE					
7. Other Components/Functions:					
SYSTEM INSTALLED PRIOR TO 1981. IN ADDITION, FAILURE OF SYSTEM WILL NOT HAVE A PROGRAMMATIC AFFECT, AFFECT PROCESS/SUPPORT SYSTEM SAFETY, OR AFFECT GENERAL PLANT SAFETY.					T SAFETY.
8. fill. Mut	9./ 1/4/96 Date	10 Jan	11	13ml	13.
Cog Engineer	Date	Cog Manager	//////////////////////////////////////	Screen Preparer	Date
					(01/02/96)

B-17

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING	
1. System Number: B21B 2. System Title: SANITARY SEWER SYSTEM	
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use a subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.	ı is
4. Instructions:	
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.	
b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block	5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.	
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.	
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.	
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer wi follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.	ll
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.	
5. Screening Criteria:	
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procure 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would hav added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.	),
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Example Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	s:
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiatio monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.	n
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.	
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE	
7. Other Components/Functions:	
This system was screened for applications where the use of and subsequent failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. This system is not considere critical, therefore inspection is not required of this system.	ed
8. Construction 2/5/96 20 Hanger 11./ 12. 13. Cog Engineer Date 200 Hanger Date Screen Preparer Date	

#### B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: 821	c
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2. system Title: Deionized Water Supply System

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:

a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.

b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.

c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.

d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.

e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain 9A concurrence.

f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.

g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.

h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:

a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.

b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems

c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.

d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u>: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavoilability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Critical Components/Functions:

None

-	Noncritical	<b>A</b>	
	NARCELEAR		7 FI MOTIONC -

<i>A</i> +	TK-SP-III ·	- Pump	211B-PSD-1,	piping,	flanges,	and	valves.


Deionization system (2718 358 Floor AMV) - all components

Failure of system components will not result in a safety hazard and would not impact plant mission. System does use hazardous chemicals or high pressures

8. Mitch Baron	9. 1/4/96 Date	10, Cog Hahager	11. //4/96 Date

B PLANT/M	B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING					
1. System Number: B21D	2. System SAFETY	Title: SHOWERS				
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWN-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.						
4. Instructions:						
a. Complete one screening form fo	r each plant	t system.				
b. Identify system components who	se failure d	could have critical conseque	nces by appl	lying the screening criteria	in Block 5.	
c. List in Block 6 those componen consequences.	ts identifie	ed in step b, along with the	functions w	whose failure would have cri	tical	
d. List or describe in Block 7 th	ose componer	nts or items which were evalu	uated but do	o not meet the screening cri	tería.	
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items liste	ed in Block 6. Obtain QA co	ncurrence.		E .	
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved pl	lan and record results on the	e Inspection	n Record.		
g. If any suspect/counterfeit iter follow up with a list of deficienc Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and	ies and prop	posed disposition. The info	rmation will	be consolidated on one or	gineer will more	
<ul> <li>h. File copies of this form, alon package.</li> </ul>	g with the 1	Inspection Plan, inspection	records and	any resulting NCRs in the J	CS work	
5. Screening Criteria:						
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Coun</u> 1981 or later which are listed in 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) added items listed in these bullet	Quality Assu and 94-02 (	urance Bulletins (QABs) 92-0 (10/18/94). If no modificat	1 (02/14/92) ion or repai	), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 ir has been performed which	(04/28/93)	
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protect Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders	ive equipmer , catwalks,	nt and items whose failure co lifting/moving devices, rol	ould directl lup doors, b	ly result in serious injury. Dreathing air systems	Examples:	
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u> release/spread. Examples: Canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs	doors; car	nyon supply/exhaust fans; HEI	monitor oper PA filters a	rational accidents or contam and instrumentation; air and	ination radiation	
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Im</u> resulting equipment damage or nona				· ·	1	
6. Components/Functions Requiring	Verification	ר:				
NONE						
7. Other Components/Functions:						
SYSTEM INSTALLED PRIOR TO 1981 AND DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY COMPONENTS ON SUSPECT LIST PER WALKDOWN INSPECTION BY M J GUNDERSON						
8. Jul. Mest	9. 14/91	10. Juny	11 1/4/96 Dáte	12.11	17:1/9-6	
Eog Engineer	Date	Cog Manager	Date	Screen Preparer	Date	

WHC-SD-WM-IP-009, Rev.
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number:     2. System Title:       B22/C22     B-PLANT/WESF STEAM SYSTEM
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each 8 Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, 8 Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.
4. Instructions:
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.
5. Screening Criteria:
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
The following areas on the steam system shall be checked for suspect flanges and bolts:
• The exposed flanges on east pressure reducing station located at cell 15 in the pipe gallery. Some flanges have bolts and some have stud stock. Stud stock is not suspect. The exposed flanges with bolts requiring inspection are on valve 16P-710-10 and the strainer just before the southeast PRV. DO NOT REMOVE INSULATION.
• The two isolation valves in the electrical gallery (36E-700-6 and 35E-700-1).
The above areas need to be inspected because of the potential for personnel injury if equipment failed.



		WHC-SD-WM-IP-009, F					
SUSPE	SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN						
I. System Number: B22/C22	2. System Title: B-PLANT/WESF STEAM SYSTEM						
3. Instructions:							
	a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.						
b. List the items and form in Block 4 below.	functions requiring verification from Bl	ock 6 of the screening					
c. Identify the inspect "100% visual inspection vendor package".	tion/verification method to be used in E of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of pr	Block 5. For example, ocurement records for					
d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.							
The following areas on the steam system shall be checked for suspect flanges and bolts:	5. Proposed inspection method:	6. Action completed/comments:					
• The exposed flanges on east pressure reducing station located at cell 15 in the pipe gallery. Some flanges have bolts and some have stud stock. Stud stock is not suspect. The exposed flanges with bolts requiring inspection are on valve 16P- 710-10 and the strainer just before the southeast PRV. DO NOT REMOVE INSULATION.	100% visual inspection of exposed bolts and flanges. DO NOT REMOVE INSULATION TO INSPECT BOLTS OR FLANGES.	<u>RKKerr</u> <u>HS-96</u> Inspector Date Inspectors Initials <u>RFK</u> Lucated no Suspect bolts on Flanges.					
<ul> <li>The two isolation valves in the electrical gallery (36E- 700-6 and 35E-700-1).</li> </ul>		flanges.					
The above areas need to be inspected because of the potential for personnel injury if equipment failed.	100% visual inspection of exposed flanges and bolts.	Inspectors <u>MAK</u> Initials <u>MAK</u> Located NO Suspect bolts or Hanges					
	Inspection plan by: QA Concurrence:	Cognizant Engineer/Date					
	I-:=ail     Signature/Date       Signature/Date     M.A. HILL	Cognizant Hanager /Date					

(B'Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

				WM-IP-009, Rev.		
B PLANT/W	ESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT	COMPONENTS	SCREENING			
1. System Number: B22B, B22C, B22D, B22E	2. system Title: B PLANT STE BASIN, 216-B-55 CRIB,			ETENTION		
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.						
4. Instructions:						
a. Complete one screening form fo	er each plant system.					
b. Identify system components who	se failure could have critical cons	sequences by appl	ying the screening c	riteria in Block 5.		
c. List in Block 6 those componen consequences.	its identified in step b, along with	the functions a	whose failure would h	ave critical		
d. List or describe in Block 7 th	ose components or items which were	evaluated but do	not meet the screen	ing criteria.		
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items listed in Block 6. Obtain (	A concurrence.				
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved plan and record results of	on the Inspection	Record.			
g. If any suspect/counterfeit ite follow up with a list of deficienc Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and	ies and proposed disposition. The	information will	be consolidated on			
<ul> <li>h. File copies of this form, alon package.</li> </ul>	g with the Inspection Plan, inspect	tion records and	any resulting NCRs i	n the JCS work		
5. Screening Criteria:						
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.						
b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems						
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.						
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.						
6. Components/Functions Requiring	Verification: NONE					
7. Other Components/Functions:						
These system was screened for applications where the use of subsequent failure of the suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences . These systems are inactive and not considered critical, therefore inspection is not required of these systems.						
8. Rushensicht	9. 1/5/960 D/Jean	115/96	12. ~ <i>JA</i>	13.		
Cog Engineer	Date Cog Manager	Date	Screen Preparer	Date		

B PLANT/W	/ESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING				
1. system Number: B23, B23A, AND B23B	2. System Title: COMPRESSED AIR. INSTRUMENT AIR, AND PROCESS AIR SYSTEMS				
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM+048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.					
4. Instructions:					
a. Complete one screening form for	r each plant system.				
b. Identify system components whos	se failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block	k 5.			
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those component consequences.</li> </ul>	ts identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical				
d. List or describe in Block 7 the	ose components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.				
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.				
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.				
follow up with a list of deficienci	ns are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer wi ies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.	ill			
h. File copies of this form, along package.	g with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work				
5. Screening Criteria:					
1981 or later which are listed in G 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94)	<u>terfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procure Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93 and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would hav ins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.	5			
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protecti Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladcers,	ive equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Example , catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	es:			
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> release/spread. Examples: Canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs;</li> </ul>	Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiatio; instrument air.	n			
	pacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to vailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.	)			
6. Components/Functions Requiring V	verification:				
INSTRUMENT COMPRESSOR AND ONE COMPRESSOR WILL NOT A HAVE ANY PROGRAMMATIC IMP.	BUTION SYSTEM(PIPING) INSTALLED PRIOR TO 1981. ONLY THE THE TWO PROCESS COMPRESSORS INSTALLED LATER. HOWEVER, FAILURE FFECT GENERAL PLANT SAFETY, PROCESS/SUPPORT SYSTEMS SAFETY, OR PACT. THREE COMPRESSORS ALONG WITH A STANDBY PORTABLE COMPRESS IS SERVE AS BACKUPS AS NEEDED IN EVENT OF ANY ONE COMPRESSOR				
8 / 1					
Cog Engineer	$\begin{array}{c c} 9.\\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ \hline Date \end{array} \begin{array}{c c} 10.\\ \hline Date \\ \hline Date \\ \hline \\ B-25 \\ \hline \end{array} \begin{array}{c c} 11\\ 1 \\ 1 \\ \hline \\ Date \\ \hline \\ Screen Preparer \\ \hline \\ \\ Screen Preparer \\ \hline \\ \hline \\ 011 \\ \hline \end{array} \begin{array}{c c} 13_{4}\\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ \hline \\ 0 \\ ate \\ \hline \end{array} \end{array}$	76			

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING							
1. System Number:     2. System Title:       B23C     MOBILE COMPRESSOR							
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.							
4. Instructions:							
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.							
b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.							
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.							
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.							
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.							
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.							
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.							
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.							
5. Screening Criteria:							
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.							
b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems							
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.							
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.							
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:							
NONE							
7. Other Components/Functions:							
SYSTEM FAILURE WILL NOT AFFECT GENERAL PLANT SAFETY, PROCESS/SUPPORT SAFETY, OR PROGRAMMATIC IMPACTS IN THAT TWO OR MORE BACKUP AIR SOURCES EXIST							
8. A. 1 in t 9. 11 10. 11. 12. 1 13.							
8. 11. 12. 13. 14. 14. 14. 14. 14. 14. 14. 14							

	<u> </u>					
B PLANT/V	VESF SUS	PECT/COUNTER	FEIT COM	IPONEN	ITS SCREENING	
1. System Number: B23D	2. System BREATHI					
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a subsequent potential failure of su to facilitate the performance of p N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counter</li> </ol>	spect/counte hysical insp	erfeit parts could h Dections in accordan	ave critica ce with Int	l consequ ernal Men	ences. The purpose of the	screening is
4. Instructions:						
a. Complete one screening form fo	r each plant	: system.				
b. Identify system components who	se failure c	could have critical	consequence	s by appl	ying the screening criteria	in Block 5.
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those componen consequences.</li> </ul>	ts identifie	ed in step b, along	with the fu	nctions w	hose failure would have crit	ical
d. List or describe in Block 7 th	ose componer	nts or items which w	ere evaluat	ed but do	not meet the screening crit	teria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items liste	d in Block 6. Obta	in QA concu	rrence.		
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved pl	an and record resul	ts on the li	nspection	Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit ite follow up with a list of deficienc Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and	ies and prop	bosed disposition.	The informa	tion will	be consolidated on one or m	jineer will wre
<ul> <li>h. File copies of this form, alon package.</li> </ul>	g with the J	nspection Plan, ins	pection rec	ords and	any resulting NCRs in the JC	S work
5. Screening Criteria:						
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Coun</u> 1981 or later which are listed in 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) added items listed in these bullet	Quality Assu and 94-02 (	irance Bulletins (QA) (10/18/94), If no m	Bs) 92-01 (1 odification	02/14/92) or repai	, 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 ( r has been performed which w	04/28/931
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protect</li> <li>Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders</li> </ul>	ive equipmen , catwalks,	nt and items whose f lifting/moving devi	ailure could ces, rollup	d directl doors, b	y result in serious injury. reathing air systems	Examples:
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u> release/spread. Examples: Canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs</li> </ul>	doors; can	yon supply/exhaust	vent or moni fans; HEPA f	itor oper filters a	ational accidents or contami nd instrumentation; air and	nation radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Im</u> resulting equipment damage or nona						
6. Components/Functions Requiring NONE	Verification	:				
7. Other Components/Functions:						
THE PORTABLE COMPRESSOR L INSPECTION BY M J GUNDERS		NO SUSPECT COM	PONENT(F	ASTENEI	RS/VALVES) PER EXTER	IOR
8. J. Mit Cog Engineer	9. //4/9(. Date	10. Junited Story	1 6	1. /4/9/2 ate	12 Screed Preparer	13. //4/46 Date
						(01/02/96)

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING	
1. system Number: B24, B24A, B24B, 2. system Title: Chemical Storage and Hand	ling
B24G, B24M 211B, 271B AMV, Scale Tanks,	2768
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications wher subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of th to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.	e the use and
4. Instructions:	
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.	
b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criter	ia in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have c consequences.	ritical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening c	riteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.	
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant E follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.	Engineer will ^ more
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the package.	JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:	
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to ite 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.	1 /0/ /30 /075
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury Cranes, hoists, handrails; ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	. Examples:
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or conta release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air an monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.	mination d radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant miss resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equip	ion due to
6. Critical Components/Functions:	
Scale tanks 24A and 25A outlet piping cross connection ,	
flanges, and fasteners.	ping
Scale tanks contain hazardous chemicals - potential leak	could
cause personel injury,	
7. Noncritical Components/Functions: Components in 2118, 2718 AMV, and 2768	
tanks, pumps, chemical transfer piping, instrumentation, a	and
electrical have been upgraded (1991) but never have be	
plan to be placed in service.	
8. mith Baron 9. Cog Engineer Date PLOG Manager	11. 1/5/96
	(12/29/95)

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY** 

SUSPECTICOUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN	etic		
3. Instructions: 4. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification. 5. List the trans and functions requiring verification from Block & of the screening form in Block & below. 5. List the inspection/verification method to be used in Block & of the screening form in Block & below. 5. List the inspection/verification as beerification in Block & of the screening form in Block & below. 5. John for the inspection/verification as beerification is Block & S. for example, "HODS visual inspection of plan happen 6. Perfore and documents the verification as beerification is Block and the verification of plan happen requiring verification: 5. Proposed inspection method: 5. Proposed inspection method: 5. Scale Tank 24A and 100% visual Inspection of 2. Action requiring verification: 5. Proposed inspection method: 5. Proposed inspection method: 5. Proposed inspection of Fifth verification: 5. Proposed inspection method: 5. Proposed inspection method: 5. Proposed inspection method: 5. Proposed inspection of Fifth verification: 5. Proposed inspection method: 5. Proposed inspection method: 5. Proposed inspection of Fifth Scale research with the verification construction of Fifth verification: 5. Proposed inspection of Fifth Scale research verification construction of Fifth Scale research verification plan by: Fifth Scale research verification plan by: Fifth Scale research verification plan by: Fifth Scale research verification construction of Fifth	1. System Numbers - C. o. i.		
<ul> <li>Instructions:         <ul> <li>Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening from to Identify items requiring workfaction.</li> <li>List be the and functions requiring workfaction from Slock &amp; 6 if the screening form in Block &amp; below.</li> <li>Identify the Inspection/verification method. The Busk &amp; S. for sample, "DOS visual Inspection of pipe hanger:</li> <li>Perform and document the workfice in a specified in Block S. Conventention should indice clearly what was provered.</li> <li>Component/function in the workfice in a specified in Block S. Conventention should indice clearly what was provered.</li> <li>Component/function</li> <li>Propried impaction method:</li> <li>Propried impaction method:</li> <li>Propried impaction and the screening form to a plant indice a plant workfice.</li> <li>Propried impaction method:</li> <li>Propried impaction of file in the screening form to a plant indice in the screening.</li> <li>Propried impaction method:</li> <li>Proprint method:</li> <li>Propr</li></ul></li></ul>		2. system Title: Chemical storage and - Operating Gallery Scal	Handling e Tanks
<ul> <li>D. Lit the trens and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.</li> <li>D. Lath the histogeticing verification are back to be used in Block 5. For example, MIOX visual inspection of pipe hanger and occupant records any include records.</li> <li>A. Perform and document records any include in Block 5. Documentation should redicate the screen whether and and the screening inspection method:</li> <li>A. Concountion and and the Bacoris any include inspection of the linest concertainty in the back of the screening. Inspection of the linest concertainty in the back of the screening. Inspection of the linest concertaints: and the back of the screening. Inspection method:</li> <li>S. Proposed inspection method:</li> <li>S. Proposed inspection method:</li> <li>S. Proposed inspection method:</li> <li>S. Proposed inspection method:</li> <li>A concertainty verification:</li> <li>S. Proposed inspection method:</li> <li>S. Proposed inspection method:<td></td><td></td><td></td></li></ul>			
<ul> <li>D. Lit the trens and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.</li> <li>D. Lath the histogeticing verification are back to be used in Block 5. For example, MIOX visual inspection of pipe hanger and occupant records any include records.</li> <li>A. Perform and document records any include in Block 5. Documentation should redicate the screen whether and and the screening inspection method:</li> <li>A. Concountion and and the Bacoris any include inspection of the linest concertainty in the back of the screening. Inspection of the linest concertainty in the back of the screening. Inspection of the linest concertaints: and the back of the screening. Inspection method:</li> <li>S. Proposed inspection method:</li> <li>S. Proposed inspection method:</li> <li>S. Proposed inspection method:</li> <li>S. Proposed inspection method:</li> <li>A concertainty verification:</li> <li>S. Proposed inspection method:</li> <li>S. Proposed inspection method:<td>a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit</td><td>Components Screening form to identify items requiring verifica</td><td>ation</td></li></ul>	a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit	Components Screening form to identify items requiring verifica	ation
Bottaky, Officient of proceedings in a bot of the last 5. For example, #100% visual inspection of pipe hanger G. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. For example, #100% visual inspection of pipe hanger discussion of the verification and date. Records may include marked to proceed records, etc. It must be possible to tell wather a particular item in the plant has been inspected. 4. Composent/Martinon requiring verifications: Scale Tank 24A and 25. Proposed inspection method: Connection pipins, Figer, sind fasteners. Figer, sind fasteners. Figer, and fasteners. Figer, and fasteners. Figer, and fasteners. Figer, and fasteners. Figer, sind fasteners. Figer, sind fasteners. Figer, figer, figer, and fasteners. Figer, and fasteners. Figer, figer, figer	D. List the items and functions	requiring verification from Block 6 of the screeping form in	
G. Perform and decliment the verification as specified in Blood 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected.         records, etc. It must be possible to tell wrether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.         1. component/function         records, etc. It must be possible to tell wrether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.         1. component/function         records, etc. It must be possible to tell wrether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.         1. component/function         records, etc. Item and decliment the plant has been inspected.         1. component/function         records, etc. Item and decliment the plant has been inspected.         1. component/function         repairing vertification:         S. Proposed inspection method:         100% visual       Enspection of         Pipe, flanges, and Pasteners.         Pipe Supperts.         Pipe Supperts.         Pipe Supperts.         Inspection plan by:         Mith B anon 1/s/s         Superture plant         Mark B anon 1/s/s         Superture/back         Superture/back         Mark B anon 1/s/s         Superture/back         Superture/back         Mark B anon 1/s/s         Supatourspace	bolts", or "review of procuremen	fication method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% vis t records for vendor package".	ual inspection of pipe hanger
4. Component/struction: requiring verification: S. Proposed inspection method: Scale Tank 24A and 25A outlet cross Connection piping, filanges, and fasteners Files Supports. All items inspected Ro Suspects. Pipe Supports. All items inspected Ro Suspects. Pipe Supports. All items inspected Ro Suspects. Pipe Supports. All items inspected Ro Suspects. All items inspected Ro Suspects. All items inspected Ro Suspects. Pipe Supports. All items inspected Ro Suspects. Pipe Supports. All items inspected Ro Suspects. Pipe Supports. All items inspected Ro Suspects. All items inspected Ross inspected All items inspected Ross inspected	d. Perform and document the ver- who performed the verification ar	ification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indic	ate clearly what was t
Scale tank 24A and 25A outlet cross Connection pipins, flanges, and fastences Pipe , flanges, and Fasteners. Pipe Supports. Pipe Supports. All items inspected no suspects. Pipe Supports. All items inspected no suspects. Pipe Supports. All items inspected no suspects. All items inspected All items ins	4. Component/function	5. Proposed inspection method:	pected.
Flanges, and fasteness Pipe Supports. Inspection plan by: MAL Baron Usfay Signature/Date Jake	Scale tank 24A and	100% visual Exception of	completed/comments:
Flanges, and fasteness Pipe Supports. Inspection plan by: MAL Baron Usfay Signature/Date Jake	25A outlet cross	Pipe, flanges of Pt	All items inspected
Insection plan by: MAL B and Usface Signature/Date MAL B and Usface Signature/Date	- /		Supress.
Mith Baron 1/5/96 Signature/Date /96 Signature/Date /15/96 Signature/Date /15/96	+langes, and fasteners		
Mith Baron 1/5/96 Signature/Date /96 Signature/Date /15/96 Signature/Date /15/96			
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Mith Baron 1/5/96 Signature/Date /96 Signature/Date /15/96 Signature/Date /15/96		Spection plan by:	
Signature/Date Signature/Date Signature/Date ///			MFI Romitsla
Signature/Date / 10/96		nith Baron 1/5/ MK 1/ 1. K. C.	Cognizant Engineer/Date
Cognizant Manages (here	51	gnature/Date /9 Signature/Date /10	h Men 11
			Cognizant Hanager/Date

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(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

B PLANT/W	ESF SUS	SPECT/COUNTERFEIT	COMPONENT	TS SCREENING	
1. System Number: B24C	2. Syste	m Title: B PLANT CHEM	ICAL SEWE	R STREAM	
3. Purpose. This form provides a subsequent potential failure of su to facilitate the performance of ; N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counter	uspect/coun physical in	terfeit parts could have c spections in accordance wit	itical conse h Internal M	supposes. The purpose of the	concentre in
4. Instructions:					
a. Complete one screening form fo	or each pla	nt system.			
b. Identify system components who	ose failure	could have critical consec	uences by ap	plying the screening criteria	in Block 5.
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those componer consequences.</li> </ul>					
d. List or describe in Block 7 th	iose compone	ents or items which were ev	aluated but a	do not meet the screening cri	teria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items list	ted in Block 6. Obtain QA	concurrence.		
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved p	plan and record results on	the Inspectio	on Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit ite follow up with a list of deficienc Nonconformance Reports (NERs), and	les and pro	DOSED disposition . The in	formation uil	be concolidated on one	gineer will more
<ul> <li>File copies of this form, alon backage.</li> </ul>	g with the	Inspection Plan, inspectio	n records and	d any resulting NCRs in the J	CS work
5. Screening Criteria:					<u> </u>
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Coun</u> 1981 or later which are listed in 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) added items listed in these bullet	and 94-02	Urance Bulletins (DABs) 92 (10/18/94). If no modifie	01 (02/14/92	2), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002	10/ 100 1075
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protect Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders	ive ecuiome	nt and items whose failure	could direct	ty peoule in annious interest	Examples:
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u> release/spread. Examples: Canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs.	doors: ca	nvon sunniv/exhaust fane. )	monitor ope EPA filters	rational accidents or contam and instrumentation; air and	ination rediation
d. Equipment with Programmatic impresulting equipment damage or nonation	d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.				
6. Components/Functions Requiring V	Verificatio	n: NONE			
7. Other Components/Functions:		<u> </u>		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
This system consists of portions of this piping n	etwork w	as replaced with RT	RP resin	nine (non-motallic)	
Applications where use of applicable. Therefore, in	the sus	pect/counterfeit na	nts could	have been used are	not 🔒
			595	Cent.	
8. La Sherni Il	9. , 15/0.	10/ Aug	11/2/01	12.	13.
Cog Engineer	Date	Log Manager	/ <u>/5/76</u> /Date	Screen Preparer	Date

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B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number: B24D 2. System Title: EG HEADERS, SUMP PUMPS, & ALARMS
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Nemo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.
4. Instructions:
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.
5. Screening Criteria:
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Granes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE
7. Other Components/Functions:
This system was screened for applications where the use of and subsequent failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The electrical gallery headers associated with this system were either installed prior to 1981, or the materials are non-metallic (PVC). In addition, failure of one sump pump and/or its alarm system to activate would not go undetected for a duration sufficiently long enough to constitute a programmatic issue or an unrecognized plant safety issue as additional sump pumps are adjacent to each other and procedures are in place to provide routine surveillance of the electrical gallery. Therefore an inspection is not required on this system.

8. R. Shussingely	"13/96 18 Juan	14. 12.	N/A 13.	
Cog Engineer	Date 7Cog Manager	Date Scre	en Preparer Date	

				WAC-SD-WM-	-IP-009, Rev.
B PLANT/W	ESF SUS	PECT/COUNTERF	EIT COMPONENT	S SCREENING	
1. System Number: B24E, B24F	2. System	Title: 2904EA	MONITOR SYSTEM	, 216-B-63 SAMPLI	NG SYSTEM
3. Purpose. This form provides a subsequent potential failure of su to facilitate the performance of p N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counter	spect/count shysical ins	erfeit parts could pections in accord	have critical conse ance with Internal M	quences. The purpose of	the acception is
4. Instructions:					
a. Complete one screening form fo	or each plan	t system.			
b. Identify system components who	ose failure	could have critica	i consequences by ap	plying the screening crit	eria in Block 5.
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those componen consequences.</li> </ul>	its identifi -	ed in step b, alon	g with the functions	whose failure would have	critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 th	iose compone	nts or items which	Here evaluated but	do not meet the screening	criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items list	ed in Block 6. Ob	tain QA concurrence.		
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved p	lan and record res	ults on the Inspectio	on Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit ite follow up with a list of deficience Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and	ies and pro	posed disposition.	The information wi	I be consolidated on one	t Engineer will or more
h. File copies of this form, alon package.	g with the	Inspection Plan, i	nspection records an	d any resulting NCRs in th	ie JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:					
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Coun</u> 1981 or later which are listed in 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) added items listed in these bullet	and 94-02	urance Bulletins ( (10/18/94), If no	ABs) 92-01 (02/14/92 modification or repu	2), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-( air has been performed whi	02 10/ 128 1075
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protect</li> <li>Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders</li> </ul>	ive equipment, catwalks,	nt and items whose lifting/moving dev	failure could direct vices, rollup doors,	tly result in serious inju breathing air systems	ny. Examples:
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u> release/spread. Examples: Canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs	doors; car	ועסה Supply/exhaus	revent or monitor ope fans; HEPA filters	erational accidents or cor and instrumentation; air	tamination and radiation
d. Equipment with Programmatic Im resulting equipment damage or nona	<u>pacts:</u> Equi vailability.	ipment whose failur . Examples: Cran	e could have a seric s, fire protections	ous impact on the plant mi systems which protect equ	ssion due to ipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring	Verification	1: NONE			
7. Other Components/Functions:					
These systems are inacti used are not applicable.	ve. Appl Therefor	ications wher e, inspection	e use of suspect of these syste	ct/counterfeit part ems are not require	s could be
8. Restherseight	3. 15/96	10 Jan	15/26	12. N/A	13.
Cog Engineer	Date	Cog Manager	Date	Screen Preparer	Date
					(01/02/96)

B PLANT/WE	SF SUSI	PECT/COUNTERFEIT	COMPONENTS	SCREENING	
1. System Number: B24H	2. System	Title: UTILITY PIT	S _		
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a subsequent potential failure of subsequent formance of plant facilitate the performance of plant. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counters</li> </ol>	spect/count sysical ins	erfeit parts could have pections in accordance w	critical conseq ith Internal Me	uences. The purpose of the s	creening is
4. Instructions:					
a. Complete one screening form for	each plan	t system.			
b. Identify system components who	se failure (	could have critical cons	equences by app	lying the screening criteria	in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those component consequences.	ts identifi	ed in step b, along with	the functions w	whose failure would have crit	ical
d. List or describe in Block 7 the	ose compone	nts or items which were	evaluated but de	o not meet the screening crit	eria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items list	ed in Block 6. Obtain Q	A concurrence.		
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved p	lan and record results o	n the Inspection	Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit iter follow up with a list of deficience Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and	ies and proj	posed disposition. The	information will	be consolidated on one or m	ineer will ore
h. File copies of this form, along package.	with the	Inspection Plan, inspect	ion records and	any resulting NCRs in the JC	S work
5. Screening Criteria:					
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Count</u> 1981 or later which are listed in G 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) added items listed in these bullet	and 94-02	urance Bulletins (QABs) (10/18/94). If no modif	92-01 (02/14/92) ication or repai	), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 ( ir has been performed which w	04/28/93).
	b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems				
release/spread. Examples: Canyon	c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.				
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Imp</u> resulting equipment damage or nonav					
6. Components/Functions Requiring N	/erification	n: NONE			
7. Other Components/Functions:		······			
These pits are concrete supports for the pit cove could be used in critical systems are not critical.	rs. App applica	lications where t	he use of s	uspect/counterfeit pa	irts
8. Bithinsight. Cog Engineer	9. 1 <u>  5   9</u> 6 Date	D. J. an Cog Hanaget	- 11/5/96 Date	12. VIA Screen Preparer	13. Date

B PLANT/WE	SF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT	COMPONENTS	
1. System Number: B24J	2. System Title: TK-900		
subsequent potential failure of sus	<pre>spect/counterfeit parts could have sysical inspections in accordance we spections in accordance we spections in accordance we spections in accordance we spections in accordance we spection in a spection in a special spectrum in a spection in a spectrum in a spection in a spectrum in a spect</pre>	critical consequenc ith Internal Memo 1	for applications where the use and es. The purpose of the screening is 6710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J.
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for	each plant system.		
b. Identify system components whos	e failure could have critical cons	equences by applyin	g the screening criteria in Block 5.
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those component consequences.</li> </ul>	s identified in step b, along with	the functions whos	e failure would have critical -
d. List or describe in Block 7 tha	se components or items which were	evaluated but do no	t meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items listed in Block 6. Obtain Q	A concurrence.	
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved plan and record results o	n the Inspection Re	cord.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit item follow up with a list of deficienci Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and	es and proposed disposition. The	information will be	consolidated on one or more
<ul> <li>h. File copies of this form, along package.</li> </ul>	with the Inspection Plan, inspect	ion records and any	resulting NCRs in the JCS work
5. Screening Criteria: a. <u>Potential for Presence of Count</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Q 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) added items listed in these bulleti	uality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modif	92-01 (02/14/92), 9 ication or repair h	as been performed which would have
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protecti Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders,			
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u>; release/spread. Examples: Canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs;</li> </ul>	doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans	or monitor operations and the stand of the s	onal accidents or contamination instrumentation; air and radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Imp</u> resulting equipment damage or nonav	<u>acts:</u> Equipment whose failure cou ailability. Examples: Cranes, fi		
6. Components/Functions Requiring V	verification: NONE		
7. Other Components/Functions:			
Tank B and associated pi installed by ICF KH in 19 documentation provides th Jones. Tank and discharge under project W-007H. The	94 under design provided e necessary traceability. piping was non-metallic.	by project W-C Tank A was f Inlet piping	DO7H. The project QA installed in 1988 by JA g to Tank A was modified

			WHC-SD-WM-IP-009, Rev.
B PLANT/WE	SF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT	COMPONENTS	SCREENING
1. System Number: B24K	2. System Title: 221-271B FL	OOR DRAINS/PIF	PING
subsequent potential failure of su	spect/counterfeit parts could have hysical inspections in accordance w	critical consequence with Internal Memo 1	d for applications where the use and tes. The purpose of the screening is 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J.
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for	r each plant system.		
b. Identify system components whos	se failure could have critical cons	equences by applyin	g the screening criteria in Block 5.
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those component consequences.</li> </ul>	ts identified in step b, along with	the functions whos	e failure would have critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 the	ose components or items which were	evaluated but do no	t meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items listed in Block 6. Obtain Q	A concurrence.	
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved plan and record results o	n the Inspection Re	cord.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit item follow up with a list of deficienci Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and	es and proposed disposition. The	information will be	consolidated on one or more
h. File copies of this form, along package.	with the Inspection Plan, inspect	ion records and any	resulting NCRs in the JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:			
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Count</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Q 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) added items listed in these bulleti	uality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) ( and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modif	92-01 (02/14/92), 93	as been manfarmed which would have
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protecti Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders,</li> </ul>	ve equipment and items whose failu catwalks, lifting/moving devices,	re could directly re rollup doors, breat	esult in serious injury. Examples: thing air systems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> release/spread. Examples: Canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs;	doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans;	or monitor operation; HEPA filters and i	onal accidents or contamination instrumentation; air and radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Imp</u>	acts: Equipmer whose failure coul	ld have a serious in	mpact on the plant mission due to
resulting equipment damage or nonav	ailability. Examples: Cranes, fir	e protections syste	ems which protect equipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring V	erification: NONE		

### 7. Other Components/Functions:

Floor drains and piping were installed prior to 1981. Applications where the use of suspect/counterfeit parts could be used in critical applications are not applicable. Therefore, inspection of this system is not required.

8. ashersaile	9. 1/5/96 D. Hay	11/5/16	12.	13.
Cog Engineer	Dare Zóg Ránago	Date	Screen Preparer	Date

	B PLANT/WESF SUSP		RFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING	
1. System Number:	B24L	2. System Title	= 211BA Chemical Server Ne Facility	autralization
subsequent potential to facilitate the pe	failure of suspect/counter	rfeit parts could actions in accord	system has been screened for applications when have critical consequences. The purpose of th ance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. May 24, 1995.	e screening is
4. Instructions:				:
a. Complete one scr	eening form for each plant	system.		
b. Identify system	components whose failure co	ould have critical	l consequences by applying the screening criter	ia in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 consequences.	those components identified	l in step b, along	g with the functions whose failure would have c	ritical
d. List or describe	in Block 7 those component	s or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening c	riteria.
e. Prepare an inspe	ction Plan for items listed	l in Block 6. Obt	tain QA concurrence.	
f. Perform the insp	ection per the approved pla	in and record rest	ults on the Inspection Record.	-
follow up with a lis	t of deficiencies and prope	sed disposition.	ege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant The information will be consolidated on one o ill be submitted for the entire facility.	Engineer will r more
h. File copies of t package.	his form, along with the Ir	spection Plan, ir	nspection records and any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work
5. Screening Criteri	a:			
1981 or later which 93-03 (05/20/93), 94	are listed in Quality Assur -01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (1	ance Bulletins (G 0/18/94). If no	or suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to it DABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-00 modification or repair has been performed which aspection of the component is required.	2 (04/28/93)
b. <u>General Plant Sa</u> Cranes, hoists, hand	<u>fety.</u> Protective equipment rails, ladders, catwalks, i	and items whose ifting/moving dev	failure could directly result in serious injur vices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	y. Examples:
release/spread. Exa	<u>Systems Safety:</u> Equipment mples: Canyon doors; cany ; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument	on supply/exhaust	revent or monitor operational accidents or cont c fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air a	amination nd radiation
			e could have a serious impact on the plant mis s, fire protections systems which protect equip	
6. Critical Componen				
			re screened separately	
Fasteners -	- Facility, eq Building strue		<sup>3.</sup> // <del>/////</del>	
Failure of	structure	during	seis mic event could	result
in injury				
7. Noncritical Compo				
Neartraliza	ation tanks			
151 pumps				
System p				
chemical st	orage tanks			
		- compon	ents that meet criteria	of
8. Mitch Baro Cog Engineer	<u></u>	9. 1/4/96 Date	10. Juny Pog Hanager	11./ //4/96 Date/

SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN 1. System Number: B24L 2. System Title: 211 BA chemical Sewer Neautralization Facility Instructions: Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification. a. b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below. c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package". d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected. Component/function requiring verification: 5. Proposed inspection method: 6. Action completed/comments: 211BA Structural 100 % visual inspection OK SLD 1/5/96 fasteners of building frame fasteners. Note: misc. other fasteners also inspected No suspects. mg 1/5/96 Inspection plan by: QA Concurrence: 15/96 1/5/96 Signature/Date Cognizant Manager/Date

# **B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING**

1. System Number: B25, B25B, and B25C

2. system Title: HVAC 221B/271B and Outbuildings, 291B stack exhaust fans, and steam turbine

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:

a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.

b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.

c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.

d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.

e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.

f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.

g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.

h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:

a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.

b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems

c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.

d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.


6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

Exhaust duct connection between the 291B filters and the exhaust fans. All visible bolt connections, non visible areas were installed prior to 1980

Exhaust duct connection between the exhaust fans and the main stack. All visible bolt connections, non visible areas were installed prior to 1980

2918 electric canyon exhaust fans. Fan motor starters Over load trips Relays for stopping the fans and closing the block dampers All Bolt connections

291B Steam turbine Relays for starting the steam turbine <u>All bolt connect</u>ions



## SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

2. System Title: HVAC 221B/271B and Outbuilding, 291B exhaust fans B25. 1. System Number: B25B, and B25C and steam turbine 3. Instructions: a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification. b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below. c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package". d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected. 4. Component/function requiring verification: 5. Proposed inspection method: 6. Action
completed/comments: Above ground portion of exhaust duct connections between the 2918 filter and 100 % visual inspect all bolts in areas identified on attached drawing for the electric exhaust fans, steam turbine and duct connections to include: ALL BOLFS the exhaust fans. Above ground portion of duct and connection OREXCERT Fan housing Above ground portion of Fan housing anchors exhaust duct connections Fan motor between the exhaust fans and madistro Actuator mounting the 2918 stack. Steam turbine - Inspect all valves and flanges from where steam enters the building to supply the steam zìΓ 291B electric canyon exhaust fans turbine, the turbine, through where the steam exhaust stack exits the building. instrument Fan motor starter Over load trips Relays Electrical panel and miscellaneous supports i pane All bolt connections Instrument air panel supports Electrical control panel supports 291B Steam turbine Transmitter supports 24 Relays All Bolt connections US The circuit breakers, motor starters and overload relays were inspected as part of the electrical system. See section on B12, Electrical distribution. The motors used ar not identified as suspect part in the QABs. accorte PPA A 02415 Inspection plan by: QA Concurrence 173 114AU nizant/Epgineer/Date 1.8.56 Signature/Date U.A.HICL Cognizant Manager/Date

# **B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING**

#### 1. System Number: B25A

2. System Title: Canyon Supply Fans

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995. Instructions: a. Complete one screening form for each plant system. b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5. c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences. d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria. e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence. f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRS), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work h. package. 5. Screening Criteria: a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Guality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required. b. <u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwaiks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination ċ. release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air. d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment. 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: None. 7. Other Components/Functions: Inlet Filters Fans Any failure of these items due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired. Block dampers - Installed after 1994 on project W-007, all of the material was inspected to prevent the installation of suspect/counterfeit bolts 8. 0 10. 5 Sung 11. 0 90 1/5 1<u>I</u> 15/46 Cog Engineer Cog Manager Date / Date

### **B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING** 1. System Number: B25D, B25E, B25F and B25G 2. System Title: A, B, C, and D filter. 3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995. 4. Instructions: Complete one screening form for each plant system. a. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5. 5 List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical C. consequences. d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence. e. f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the inspection Record. g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility. h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package. 5. Screening Criteria: a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required. b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air. d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment. 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NOND 7. Other Components/Functions: <u>A Filter - Not in service (retired)</u> Filter housing located in 291B area Instrumentation located in 291BB B Filter - Not in service (retired) Filter housing located in 291B area Instrumentation located in 291BB C Filter - Not in service (retired) Filter housing located in 291B area Instrumentation located in 291BC D Filter - Active Filter housing located in 291B area Instrumentation located in 291BF These filters and instrumentation were all installed prior to 1980, the only modifications completed after 1980 were to instrumentation. Any failure of this instrumentation due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired in a timely manner. 9. 10. 11. He (/4/95 OD S 14 Cog Engineer Date/ Cog Manager B-42 (01/02/96)

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/CO	UNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING	
1. system Number: B25H, and B25J	2. System Title: E, and F filters	
subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit part	Int/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use is could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screeni accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien h, dated May 24, 1995.	ing is
4. Instructions:		
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.		
b. Identify system components whose failure could have	critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Blo	ick 5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step consequences.	b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical	
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or item	is which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.	
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block	6. Obtain QA concurrence.	
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and rec	ord results on the Inspection Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed dispo Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report	E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer is sition. The information will be consolidated on one or more (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.	will
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection package.	Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work	
5. Screening Criteria:		
1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bull	ncern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procu etins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/9 If no modification or repair has been performed which would ha ailed inspection of the component is required.	931
b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment and item Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/mo	s whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Exampl ving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	les:
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied up release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.	on to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination /exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiati	ion
	e failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due t : Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.	to
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: $\mathcal{NO}$	ne.	
7. Other Components/Functions:		
E Filter - Filter currenetly active Filter housing located in 291 procured and installed as saf	B area - The filter and filter housing were	
Instrumentation located in 29	DIBG	
F Filter - Filter inactive/Filter loaded into filter fram Filter housing located Instrumentation located	in 291B area	not
Any failure of the instrumentation due to personnel or process safety, or have a pr	a failure of a suspect part will not compromi ogrammatic impact before it can be repaired.	ise
R. Cog Engineer	9., 9., 10. 10. 11. /. Date 4.2 Cog Manager Date	196

## B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B25K

2. System Title: Sand Filter

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Nemo 16710-94-DUM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:

a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.

b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.

c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.

d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.

e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.

f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record,

g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.

h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:

a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (DABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.

b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems

c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.

d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Chanes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

None.

7. Other Components/Functions:

The sand filter building - Installed prior to 1980.

Exhaust duct between the wind tunnel and the sand filter inlet. Exhaust duct between the sand filter outlet and the wind tunnel. This items were installed on project B-625 as safety class 1 equipment.

10 11. 15/96 Chan  $\alpha \alpha$ h g Engineer Date Cog Manager

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number: B25L, and B25M 2. System Title: Gallery Supply Fans and Gallery Exhaust Fans
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each 8 Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.
4. Instructions:
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5. c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or O. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.
5. Screening Criteria:
a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE.
7. Other Components/Functions:
Gallery Supply fans: Inlet Filters Duct work The Fan Fan motor and electrical controls Steam heating coils Evaporative cooler Gallery Exhaust Fans: Filters and filter frames Duct work The Fan Fan Motor and electrical controls These fans do not service an airborne contamination area. Any failure of these items due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired in a timely manner.
Bog Engineer 2. Date 2. Sog Hanager 10. 11. 11. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number: B25N, and B25P 2. System Title: 221BB and 221BF Exhaust fans
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.
4. Instructions:
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan.for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work
package.
5. Screening Criteria:
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE.
7. Other Components/Functions:
221BB Exhaust Fans 221BF Exhaust Fans
The inventory has been removed from this buildings, any failure of these items due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired in a timely manner.
9.     10     11.       0.     11.     1.       0.     1.     1.       1.     1.     1.       1.     1.     1.       1.     1.     1.       1.     1.     1.       1.     1.     1.       1.     1.     1.       1.
(01/02/96)

7. Other Components/Functions:

Exhaust duct connection between 221B and the 291B filters - Installed prior to 1980.

271B air distributions ductwork

The Heating and ventilation system for the following outbuildings, note equipment in each building will be screened for the system it is associated with this screening only applies to the heating and ventilation system for each building.

207B Change trailer 207BA CBC sampling building 211B Chemical tank farms 217B Demineralizer building 218B Emergency equipment storage building 219B Emergency equipment storage building 221BA 15 inch sewer monitor facility 221BB Condensate building for LLW concentrator 221BC SWP change house 221BD Laundry storage 221BE Fork lift storage 221BG 24 inch sewer monitoring facility 272B Electrical shop 272BA Maintenance material storage building 291BB A/B filter instrumentation building 291BC C filter building (manipulator storage building) 291BD C filter instrumentation building 291BF D filter instrumentation building 291BG E filter instrumentation building 291BJ F filter instrumentation building 291BK E/F filter Process Control Unit (PCU) building 2711B Breathing air compressor house 2715B Paint and oil storage building 2716B RR cut laundry storage building

Any failure of these ventilation systems or the 271B air distribution ductwork due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired.

 $\sim$ 8. 10 GA Cog Engineer Date And Manage (01/02/96)

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B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number: B25T, and B25U 2. System Title: 271B Supply Fan and 271B Exhaust Fans
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.
4. Instructions:
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain GA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.
5. Screening Criteria:
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u> : Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE.
7. Other Components/Functions:
271B Supply Fan Steam heating coils Evaporative cooler Fan Fan motor and motor controls 271B exhaust fans
These fans do not service a contamination area, any failure of these items due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired.
8 20 0 11. Cog Engineer De la con de la participation de la parti
(01/02/96) (01/02/96)

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING				
1. System Number: *826	2. System Title	: Fire Protection		
i subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter	ctions in accorda	system has been screened for applications where have critical consequences. The purpose of the ance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. May 24, 1994.	correction in	
4. Instructions:				
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.			
<ul> <li>b. Identify system components whose failure components</li> </ul>	uid nave critica.	consequences by applying the screening criteri	a in Block 5.	
<ul> <li>List in Block 5 those components identified consequences.</li> </ul>	in step b, along	g with the functions whose failure would have or	itical	
d. List or describe in Block 7 those component	s or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening cr	iteria.	
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	l in Block 6. Obt	tain QA concurrence.		
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	n and record resu	ults on the Inspection Record.		
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and propo Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurren	sed disposition.	The information will be consolidated on one on	ngineer will more	
n. file copies of this form, along with the in package.	spection Plan, 17	spection records and any resulting NCRs in the .	JES WORK	
5. Screening Criteria:				
<ul> <li>a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u></li> <li>1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assur</li> <li>93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (1</li> <li>added items listed in these bulletins since 198</li> </ul>	ance Bulletins (Q 0/18/94). If no	ABS) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 mcGification of repair has been performed which	10/ 109 103 1	
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safery</u>. Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, nandrails, ladders, catwalks, l</li> </ul>	and items whose ifting/moving dev	failure could directly result in serious injury. rices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	Examples:	
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.				
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equip resulting equipment damage or nonavailability.				
6. Components/Functions Reduiring Verification:				
* System 526 will include the wet pipe sprinkler system in building 2215 and the beinge system in building 2768 and the wet pipe sprinkler system in building 2128 including the sway (earthquake) bracing. Pipe hangers used directly for sprinkler systems will not be inspected. Sprinkler system hangers contain no components that are considered suspect. They are installed with all-thread rod, nuts and/or UL listed hangers. None of these parts are considered suspect. In addition failure of a pipe hanger will not severely impact system performance.				
The building 2218 wet pipe sprinkler system was installed prior to 1981. No documentation can be found to indicate that modifications to this system involving bolts or any items that may be counterfeit have taken place since 1981, however a limited inspection should take place. The only components that are considered critical and could potentially contain suspect/counterfeit components would be the riser components and the sway (earthquake) bracing. These require verification that no suspect fasteners were used. There are no other critical components in this system.				
Building 2128 contains a small wet pipe sprinkler system. This system was install after 1981. The only component in the system which could potentially contain suspect components is valve 83-5. There are no other critical components in this				
System.				
7. Other Components/Functions: Building 276B contains a deluge system. This sy makeup facility. The deluge system was installe facility and preparations are underway to deact that is critical to the operation and support of warranted.	ed to suppress an ivate the deluge :	organic fire. Organic material has been removed system. There is currently no equipment in build	d from the ding 2768	
8. Jul Mert	9. /-a-7/ Date	10. Juni	11.	
		969 Manager 0	Date	

WHC-SD-WH-IF-009, KEV.			
SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN			
1. System Number: B26	2. System Title: Fire Prote	ction	
3. Instructions:	F		
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit (	Components Screening form to ic	dentify items requiring verificat	ion.
b. List the items and functions	requiring verification from BL	ock 6 of the screening form in B	lock 4 below.
c. Identify the inspection/verify bolts", or "review of procurement"	fication method to be used in B : records for vendor package".	llock 5. For example, "100% visu	al inspection of pipe hanger
<ul> <li>d. Perform and document the veri who performed the verification ar records, etc. It must be possible</li> </ul>	io date, kecords may include m	Warked up drawings, inspection ch	eckligte conject of OC
<ol> <li>Component/function requiring verification:</li> </ol>	5. Proposed inspection metho	pd:	6. Action completed/comments:
<ul> <li>All riser valves and other riser components.</li> </ul>	a. Perform 100% visual inspe	ection of all riser valves and	INSPECTION COMPLETE NO JUSPECT CIMPONENTS
	other riser components locate items are shown on drawing H-	ed in building 2218. These	NO JUSPECT
b. All sway (earthquake) bracing	that potentially contain susp	pect parts on the spection Record" with results.	
	SDFINKLEF system swav (eartho	ection of all the 221B wet pipe	IDENTIFIED
	Items that potentially contai	n suspect parts on the spection Record" with results.	JU, 11 115119
			3
		-	
	Inspection plan by:		1
	Par + 11		MW. Mith Islan
	Signature/Date	MA.Sul 1.5.96	Cognizant Engineer/Date
		Signature/Date	5/Juny 1/5/96
			Cognizant Manager/Date

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN					
1. System Number: B26	2. System Title: Fire Prot	ection (Building 212B)			
3. Instructions:					
		dentify items requiring verificat			
b. List the items and functions					
c. Identify the inspection/verif bolts", or "review of procurement	records for vendor package".				
<ul> <li>d. Perform and document the veri who performed the verification an records, etc. It must be possibl</li> </ul>	a aster Kecolas may include	Walked UD Drawinds, inspection ch	ecklists conject of DC		
4. Component/function requiring verification:	5. Proposed inspection meth		6. Action completed/comments:		
Wet pipe sprinkler system riser vleve 83-5.	Perform 100% visual inspecti	on for suspect fastemers on the	INSPECTION COMPLETE		
valve	building 212B wet pipe sprin	ikier system riser valve 83-S.	NO JUSPECT		
1. 4.96		1.9.96			
		l − r	IDENTIFIED,		
			CIMPONENTS IDENTIFIED AWM 1/5/96		
		,			
		,			
·		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
	Inspection plan by:	QA Concurrence	<u></u>		
	A		M. Whit , 14/92		
	W. When Islas	MARIA 1.4.96	Cognizant Engineer/Date		
	Signature/Date	Signature/Date	Them 1/5/06		
			Cognizant Manager/Date		

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING				
1. System Number: B26A, B20B*	2. System Title:	: Fire Foam System, Raw Water Supply for Fire		
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Nemo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.				
4. Instructions:				
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.			
b. Identify system components whose failure co	uld have critical	consequences by applying the screening criteria	a in Block 5.	
c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.	in step b, along	with the functions whose failure would have cr	itical	
d. List or describe in Block 7 those component	s or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening cr	iteria.	
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed		-		
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla				
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and propo Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrent	notify P. E. Roe sed disposition.	ge or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Er The information will be consolidated on one or	ngineer will more	
h. File copies of this form, along with the In	spection Plan, in	spection records and any resulting NCRs in the .	JCS work	
package 5. Screening Criteria:				
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.				
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, l	and items whose ifting/moving dev	failure could directly result in serious injury. ices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	Examples:	
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; cany monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument</li> </ul>	on supply/exhaust	event or monitor operational accidents or contan fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and	nination d radiation	
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equip resulting equipment damage or nonavailability.				
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:				
The inspection of the foam fire system for su (System BZOB).	spect fasteners w	ill also include inspection of the Raw Water Sup	oply for Fire	
Inspect the following in the foam fire system for suspect components: a. Inspect all piping components located at or near cell 21 in pipe gallery. b. Inspect the piping and component modifications depicted on ECN's 613491 and 613494. b. Inspect flanges and bolts on the foam system supply valves to their respective cells (10, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30). c. Inspect all sway (earthquake) bracing. d. The tie-in to the raw water system is depicted in ECN 613491. Inspection of this tie-in satisfies the requirement for inspection of system B20B (Raw Water Supply for Fire, for the foam fire system supply only).				
7. Other Components/Functions:				
All fire alarm and relay panels including those components that are considered suspect, (see sc			in any	
~				
8. <u> <del> <u> </u> <del> <u> </u> <del> </del> <del></del></del></del></u>	9. 19. Date	10. Shine Coo Manager	11. 15/96	

SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN				
1. System Number: B26A, B20B 2. System Title: Fire Foam System, Raw Water Supply For Fire				
<ul> <li>3. Instructions:</li> <li>a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.</li> <li>b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 5. for example, "100X visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or freview of procurement records for verdor package".</li> <li>d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. for example, "100X visual inspection of pipe hanger records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected. records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.</li> <li>4. Components/function requiring components and data inspection of all piping components incoments and the pipe gallery. List those inspected in CMAPLETE 5. Proposed inspection of all piping components incoments into potentially contain suspect parts on the form for system.</li> <li>a. All piping and component models.</li> <li>b. All piping and component models.</li> <li>c. All piping and component models.</li> <li>b. All piping and component models.</li> <li>c. All piping and solution the form to Visual inspection of all piping components and the potentially contain suspect parts on the form form support parts on the form form support parts on the form form support parts on the form support values to their respective cells (cells 10, 26, 7, 78, 29, and 30).</li> <li>c. All space (sits (cells in the potentially contain suspect parts on the form form support parts on the form form support values to their respection of all support and the second with results.</li> <li>c. perform 100X visual inspection for all son fire system to the fam fire system 100X visual inspection for all son fire system to the fam fire system 200 kits on their respection of all support for the fam water supply values to their respection form form support and support parts.</li> <li>c. All space son the fam fire system 100X visual inspection for all support parts and your fire form to the</li></ul>				
	Inspection plan by:	QA Concurrence: 5-0-15/55 MA: 1.6.96 Signature/Date	Cognizant Engineer/Date	

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

B PLANT/WESF SUSP	ECT/COUNTE	RFEIT COMPONE	NTS SCREENING	
1, System Number: B26B, B20B*	2. System Title	: 271B Automatic Spr	inklers, Raw Water Supply	For Fire
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a record that e subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspe N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Ac</li> </ol>	ctions in accorda	nave critical consequ nce with Internal Men	ISSARS The summer of the	
4. Instructions:				
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.			
b. Identify system components whose failure co	uld have critical	consequences by appl	ying the screening criter	ia in Block 5.
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.</li> </ul>				
d. List or describe in Block 7 those component	s or items which	were evaluated but do	not meet the screening c	riteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Obt	ain QA concurrence.		
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	n and record resu	lts on the Inspection	Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and propo Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurren	Sed disposition	The intermetion unit	be concelidated as	Engineer will r more
h. File copies of this form, along with the In- package.	spection Plan, in	spection records and	any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:		<u> </u>		
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assuri 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10 added items listed in these bulletins since 1980	1/18/94) If no r	NBS) 92-01 (02/14/92) Andification on tensio	, 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002	
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment</li> <li>Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, l</li> </ul>	and items whose t	ailure could directly		. Examples:
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument a	In SUDDLY/exhaust	vent or monitor operations; HEPA filters and	ational accidents or conta nd instrumentation; air an	mination d radiation
<ul> <li><u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u>: Equipment damage or nonavailability.</li> </ul>	ment whose failure Examples: Cranes	could have a serious	s impact on the plant miss <u>ystems wh</u> ich protect equip	ion due to ment.
<ol> <li>Components/Functions Requiring Verification: *The 271B sprinkler system inspection will inclusupplied from the 10" raw water header located in</li> </ol>	de the Raw Water in the building 22	Supply for Fire (Syst 18 Operating Gallery.	tem B20B). The 271B sprin	kler system is
The 271B sprinkler system was installed prior to 1981. No documentation can be found to indicate that modifications to this system have occurred since that date. However an inspection will be performed to ensure that no suspect parts are present. Sprinkler system pipe hangers do not require inspection since they do not contain any potential suspect parts. Sprinkler system hangers are installed using all-thread rod and a UL listed hangers. No potential suspect fasteners are used in sprinkler system hangers. The 271B sprinkler system inspection shall include the following components. b. The sprinkler system tier valves and other components. b. The sprinkler system tier in to the 10" raw water header. This inspection shall include valves, and any flanged connections where suspect fasteners could potentially be used. c. All sway (earthquake) bracing.				
7. Other Components/Functions:				
8. ////	9. 1/5/7.5 Date	10 Juny		11.
		Cog Manager		Date
				(01/02/ <del>9</del> 6)

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SUS	RECTICOUNTERFEIT COI	MPONENTS INSPECTION PL	AN & MYZETANTA
As to stand the second se	21' System Titlet 2718 Auto Lines Clark and the Course of	Anti-Anti-Anti-Anti-Anti-Anti-Anti-Anti-	y for Fire
3. İnstructions:			
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit	Components Screening form to i	identify items requiring verificat	tion.
		Block 6 of the screening förm in B	
	fication method to be used in	Block 5 For example U1007 view	
<ul> <li>d. Perform and document the ver who performed the verification as records, etc. It must be possib</li> </ul>	no date. Records may include	marked up drawinds, inspection ch	ecklists coming of Ac
4. Component/function	5. Proposed inspection met		
requiring vehification:			6. Action completed/comments:
<ul> <li>a. Sprinkler system riser valves and other components.</li> </ul>	a. Perform a 100% visual ins system riser valves and othe	spection on the 271B sprinkler	INSPECTION COMPLETE
valves and other components.	components as shown on drawn	ing H-2-36895, Detail I. List / contain suspect parts on the	NO SUSPECT
	"Counterfeit/Suspect Part Ir	spection Record" with results.	COMPONENTS
b. Sprinkler system tie-in	b. Perform a 100% visual ins	pection on the bolted tie-in	IDENTIFIED JUAN 1,596
bolted connection to the 10" main raw water header, the 3"	10" inch raw water header.	nkler system water to the main Inspect the 8 <sup>n</sup> isolation valve	1000 1,595
fire water header isolation valve bolted connections and	connection and the downstrea parts. All these items are	m boiled components for suspect shown on H-2-36896 and ace	
other components downstream of the isolation valve that	located in the operating gai those items that potentially	lery of building 2218. List	
contain bolted connections.	"Counterfeit/Suspect Part In	spection Record" with results.	
c. All sprinkler system sway			
bracing bolted connections.	associated fasteners for the	pection of all sway bracing and 2718 sprinkler system. List	
	the sway bracing on the "Cou Inspection Record" with resu	nterfeit/Suspect Part	
	Inspection plan by:	QA Concurrence:	Airing to 11
	Add lippert 1/5/94	MAN	Cognizant Engineer/Date
	Signature/Daye	Signature/Date	1
		Signature/Date	DEra 1/c/91
			15/16

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

<ol> <li>System Humber: 526:</li> <li>System Titl: In Cell Hest Detection</li> <li>Purpose. This form provides a record chat each 8 Plant/NEST system has been screened for applications where the subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is all suspect/counterfeit parts action plan, dated May 22, 1005. ArX: All Society of the screening of physical in procession of the screening of physical in procession of physical in procession. A suspect/counterfeit parts action plan, dated May 22, 1005. ArX: All Society of the screening criteria in Block in Block is these components identified in step b, slong with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Bloc in Block is those components identified in step b, slong with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>List or describe in Block / those components identified in step b, slong with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>Perform the inspection per the sproved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>If any suspect/counterfeit isses are found posing dipart flogs on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>If any suspect (Counterfeit isses are found posing dipart flogs of the screening it is considired on one or more for files on the Inspection provide spring the screening former for spring formation of the screening formation on the screening formation and eccurrence septime to intermative of the screening flogs of divary to be screening form and eccurrence septime to intermation of the screening or the screening formation and screening formation and eccurrence septime to a supert/counterfeit parts action and any resulting kits in the US work and any resulting kits and any resulting kits in</li></ol>	B PLANT/WESF SUSPE	ECT/COUNT	ERFEIT COMPONENTS SCRE	ENING
<pre>to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accompanies with the three total consequences. In Purpose of the screen N. Manaen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated Way 22, 3008. Nrv. June 1916;</pre>	1. System Number: 826C	2. System Tit	Le: In Cell Heat Detection	
<ul> <li>4. Instructions:</li> <li>a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.</li> <li>b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Bloc List in Block 5 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.</li> <li>f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the inspection Record.</li> <li>g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Rege or D. W. Merz immediately. The Cognisant Engineer follow Up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be constant </li> <li>f. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work parkage.</li> <li>5. Screening Criteria:</li> <li>a. <u>Petential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procuring instructions of the component is required.</li> <li>b. <u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment and items whose failure could interctiv repair has been performed which work is required.</li> <li>b. <u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment and items whose failure could interctive and intervention in serious injury. Examples: Cannes, NoisSt, NoisSt, NoisSt, Screening Lister in required.</li> <li>c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u>. Coupment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination monitoring equipment, the part systems is for a relies of protections systems which protect equipment.</li> <li>c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u>. Coupment via Samples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.</li> <li>c. <u>Compo</u></li></ul>	to facilitate the performance of physical inspec	tions in accor	dance with Internal Name 1(710 of	purpose of the screening i
<ul> <li>b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Bite c. List in Block 5 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.</li> <li>f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, northy P. E. Reege or D. U. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer follow up with a bits of KRS3, and one Occurrence Report (QR) will be submitted for the entire facility.</li> <li>h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.</li> <li>5. Screening Criteria:</li> <li>a. <u>Botential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procurded disposition or equipation or equipation. Note the component is required.</li> <li>b. <u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Example: and divers, howits; handraits, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems</li> <li>c. <u>Procees/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination mentation; strument air.</li> <li>d. <u>Equipment 400 VAC MCS; Bouldons; Caunos sploy/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air ad radiation; with a serious indury. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air ad radiation deve treading equipment. All single mentation: the detectors for cells 10, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30 are critical equipment, however they do not contain an component is reported. All snows theread disposition are filt</u></li></ul>				
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain 0A concurrence.</li> <li>f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the inspection Record.</li> <li>g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. U. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCR3), and one Occurrence Report (DV Will be submitted for the entire facility.</li> <li>h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.</li> <li>S. Screening Criteria: <ul> <li>a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procuring 109/2000/2007/2000, 200-000 (DV/26/2000, 200-000) (DV/26/200, 200-000 (DV/26/2000, 200-000) (DV/26/2000, 200-000 (DV/26/2000, 200-000) (DV/26/2000, 200-000 (DV/26/2000, 200-000) (DV/26/2000, 200-000) (DV/26/2000, 200-000 (DV/26/2000, 200-000) (DV/</li></ul></li></ul>	a. Complete one screening form for each plant sy	ystem.		
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain 0A concurrence.</li> <li>f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the inspection Record.</li> <li>g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. U. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCR3), and one Occurrence Report (DV Will be submitted for the entire facility.</li> <li>h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.</li> <li>S. Screening Criteria: <ul> <li>a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procuring 109/2000/2007/2000, 200-000 (DV/26/2000, 200-000) (DV/26/200, 200-000 (DV/26/2000, 200-000) (DV/26/2000, 200-000 (DV/26/2000, 200-000) (DV/26/2000, 200-000 (DV/26/2000, 200-000) (DV/26/2000, 200-000) (DV/26/2000, 200-000 (DV/26/2000, 200-000) (DV/</li></ul></li></ul>	b. Identify system components whose failure could	ld have critic	al consequences by applying the sc	reening critoria in Rlack F
<ul> <li>e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain OA concurrence.</li> <li>f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.</li> <li>h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the UCS work package.</li> <li>5. Screening Criteria:</li> <li>a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procurd did of 05/20/39, 94-01 (08/23/4C) and 94-02 (10/16/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would he added items listed in these builterins since 1900, no detailed inspection of the component is required.</li> <li>b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examp Cranes, holdst, handralls, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing alcidents or contamination releases/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation informations Required.</li> <li>c. Process/Support 5/300 (06/23/56) instrument air.</li> <li>d. Equipment, 430 VA MCCs; instrument air.</li> <li>d. Equipment, With Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious inpact on the plant mission due to result in serious inpacts. First and radiation of the components/functions Requiring Verification: J. J. O. K. 27, 28, 29, and 30 are critical equipment, however they do not contain an ortifical equipment. Preparations are underway at this time to determined (see screens, for engine 1826) that no norvasile associated with fire protection at a slobe that determined (see screens) of the secons of the system Backage.</li> </ul>	c. List in Block 6 those components identified i	in step b, alo	ng with the functions whose failur	e would have critical
<ul> <li>e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain OA concurrence.</li> <li>f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NERs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.</li> <li>h. file copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the UCS work package.</li> <li>S. Screening Criteria:</li> <li>a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procurded (37/4/22), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93/03/05/26/93), 94-01 (08/23/96), and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would headed items listed in these builterins since 1900, no detailed inspection of the component is required.</li> <li>b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Example: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation in frequenced. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation in resulting equipment; 480 WA MCCS; instrument air.</li> <li>d. Equipment, With Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to result in systems softex; instrument air.</li> <li>d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to result and and ertification: <i>MONC</i></li> <li>f. Other Components/Functions Requiring Verification: <i>MONC</i></li> <li>f. Other Components/Functions are underway at this time to detecting these detectors. These detectoris also do not contain an orti</li></ul>	d. List or describe in Block 7 those components	or items which	h were evaluated but do not meet ti	he screening oniechin
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Monconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility. h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package. 5. Screening Criteria: a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfait Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procuring 10(d) claster which are listed in quality Assurance Bulletins (ABBS) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (05/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 94-01 (08/22)/93, 04-01 (08/22)/93, 04-01 (08/22)/91, 04 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or fair has been performed which would his addited in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required. b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> , Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: <u>Canyon doors</u> ; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radisti monitoring equipment; 400 VA MCS; instrument air. d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u> : Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due t resulting equipment; 400 VA MCS; instrument air. d. Components/Functions Requiring Verification; <i>MONNE</i>	e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed i	in Block 6. D	btain QA concurrence.	te ser centing of ice ia.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Monconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility. h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package. 5. Screening Criteria: a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procur 1981 of later which are listed in Quality Assumance Bulletins (QARS) 92-01 (Q2/14/92), 92-02 (QB/21/92), 93-002 (QA/28/ 3-03 (Q5/20/93), 94-01 (Q8/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would hi added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required. b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> , Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examp informations, hoists, handrails, ladders, catualks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u> : Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Caryon doors; caryon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiati monitoring equipment; 400 VAC MCS; instrument air. d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impects</u> : Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due t resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment. 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: <i>MOAVE</i>				
<ul> <li>h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.</li> <li>5. Screening Criteria: <ul> <li>a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procure 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABS) 92-01 (Q2/14/92), 92-02 (QB/21/92), 95-002 (Q4/28/) 93-03 (Q5/20/93), 94-01 (Q8/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would his added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.</li> <li>b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Example: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems</li> <li>c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiati delignment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due t resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.</li> <li>6. Components/Functions:</li> </ul> </li> <li>7. Other Components/Functions:</li> <li>The dual cell heat detectors for cells 10, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30 are critical equipment, however they do not contain an components that are considered suspect. Atl single element heat detectors located in the many of the non-organic cells not critical equipment. Preparations are underway at this time to deactivate these detectors. These detectors also do contain any components that are considered suspect. It has also been determined (see screening for system S260) that no panels associated with fire protection at B Plant contain any components considered suspect. Therefore in perfor</li></ul>	g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, r follow up with a list of deficiencies and propose	notify P. E. Ro	pege or D. W. Mertz immediately. T	The Cognizant Engineer will dated on one or more acility.
<ul> <li>a. <u>Patential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procure 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28// 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would hild ded items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.</li> <li>b. <u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Example cranes, hoists, handralis, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems</li> <li>c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.</li> <li>d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u>: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due tresulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.</li> <li>6. Components/Functions:</li> </ul> The dual cell heat detectors for cells 10, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30 are critical equipment, however they do not contain an components that are considered suspect. All single element heat detectors located in the many of the non-organic cells contain any components that are considered suspect. It has also been determined (see screening for system E&D) that non-organic cells contain any components that are considered suspect. It has also been determined (see screening for system E&D) that no panels associated with fire protection at B Plant contain any components considered suspect. Therefore inspection of the many of the ron-organic cells contain any components that are considered suspect. It has also been determined (see creening for	h. File copies of this form, along with the Insp			
93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have a detectors for cells 10, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30 are critical equipment, however they do not contain an components that are considered suspect. It has also been detectors. These detectors also do in the subjection of the many of the non-organic cells also do panels associated with fire protection at B Plant contain any components that are considered suspect. It has also been determined (see screening for systems that are considered suspect. It has also been determined the fire detectors at the fire detectors also been determined to repair has been performed which would have a serious in the many of the non-organic cells do contain any components that are considered suspect. It has also been determined (see screening for system subject) thas also been determined there for the repair these detectors. These detectors also do in the fire also been determined to repair these detectors. These detectors also do the fire also been determined to repair these detectors also do in the fire also been determined to repair these detectors. These detectors also do the fire also been determined to repair these detectors also do the fire also been determined there are repair these detectors also do the fire also been determined to repair these detectors also do the fire also been determined there are repair these detectors also do the fire also been detectors are underway at this time to deactivate these detectors. These detectors also do panels associated with fire protection at B Plant contain any components considered suspect. The plant contain any components that are considered suspect. The subject these detectors also do to the detector is warranted. The fire alarm panels which protect which fire protection at B Plant contain any components considered suspect. The plant contain any	5. Screening Criteria:			
<ul> <li>b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Example Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems</li> <li>c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiati monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.</li> <li>d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.</li> <li>6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: <i>MONE</i></li> <li>7. Other Components/Functions:</li> </ul>	93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/	18/0/\ 14	WABS) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/	21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93),
<ul> <li>c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiati monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.</li> <li>d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due tresulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.</li> <li>6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: <i>NONE</i></li> <li>7. Other Components/Functions:</li> <li>The dual cell heat detectors for cells 10, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30 are critical equipment, however they do not contain an not critical equipment. Preparations are underway at this time to deactivate these detectors. These detectors also do not contain any components that are considered suspect. It has also been determined (see screening for system S26) that no panels which fire protection is warranted. The fire alarm panels which is upply power to these detectors are supported.</li> </ul>	. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment a	nd items whose		
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: MONE 7. Other Components/Functions: The dual cell heat detectors for cells 10, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30 are critical equipment, however they do not contain an components that are considered suspect. All single element heat detectors located in the many of the non-organic cells not critical equipment. These detectors also do that are considered suspect. It has also been determined (see screening for system B26D) that no cell heat detection is warranted. The fire alarm panels which fire protection of the components considered suspect.	- <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment re release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors: canyon	lied upon to p		
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE 7. Other Components/Functions: The dual cell heat detectors for cells 10, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30 are critical equipment, however they do not contain an components that are considered suspect. All single element heat detectors located in the many of the non-organic cells not critical equipment. Preparations are underway at this time to deactivate these detectors. These detectors also do location any components that are considered suspect. It has also been determined (see screening for system B26D) that no panels associated with fire protection at B Plant contain any components considered suspect. Therefore inspection of the cell heat detection is warranted. The fire alarm panels which supply power to these detectors are equipment in the fire alarm panels which supply power to these detectors are equipment.	<ol> <li>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment esulting equipment damage or nonavailability.</li> </ol>	nt whose failu xamples: Cran	re could have a serious impact on - es, fire protections systems which	the plant mission due to
7. Other Components/Functions: The dual cell heat detectors for cells 10, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30 are critical equipment, however they do not contain an components that are considered suspect. All single element heat detectors located in the many of the non-organic cells not critical equipment. Preparations are underway at this time to deactivate these detectors. These detectors also do in contain any components that are considered suspect. It has also been determined (see screening for system B26D) that no panels associated with fire protection at B Plant contain any components considered suspect. Therefore inspection of the cell heat detection is warranted. The fire alarm panels which supply power to these detectors are equipment with				protect equipment.
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not critical equipment. Preparations are underway at this time to deactivate these detectors. These detectors also do contain any components that are considered suspect. It has also been determined (see screening for system B26D) that no cell heat detection is warranted. The fire alarm panels which supply power to these detectors are equipment with a site of the supply power to these detectors are equipment.	. Other Components/Functions:			
	ot critical equipment. Preparations are underway ontain any components that are considered suspect anels associated with fire protection at B Plant ell heat detection is warranted. The fire alarm	y at this time t. It has also contain any co panels wheih s	to deactivate these detectors. The been determined (see screening for Amponents considered suspect. The SUDDLY power to these detectors are	the non-organic cells are nese detectors also do not pr system B26D) that no
8. 9. 10, 10, 11, 11, 12, 12, 10, 11, 11, 12, 12, 10, 11, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12	by Engineer 52	1/3/76- ate	B Skan	11 1/4/96 Date

B PLANT/WESE SU			
		ERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING	
1. System Number: 826D		le: Fire Detection	·
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a record that subsequent potential failure of suspect/count to facilitate the performance of physical ins N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts</li> </ol>	spections in accor	F system has been screened for applications when Id have critical consequences. The purpose of the rdance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. Ed May 24, 1995. 1994 June 1-3-70	re the use and he screening is . O'Brien to J.
4. Instructions:			<u></u>
a. Complete one screening form for each plan	nt system.		
b. Identify system components whose failure	could have critic	at consequences by applying the screening criter	in in Black 5
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identifi consequences.</li> </ul>	ed in step b, alo	ng with the functions whose failure would have c	ritical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those compone	nts or items whic	h were evaluated but do not meet the screening c	riteria
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items list	ed in Block 6. O	btain QA concurrence.	
f. Perform the inspection per the approved p	lan and record re	suits on the Inspection Record.	
Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurre	ence Report (OR)		r more
h. File copies of this form, along with the package.	Inspection Plan,	inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:			
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Part</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assu 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 ( added items listed in these bulletins since 19	(10/18/0/) 16	for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to ite (AABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 o modification or repair has been performed which inspection of the component is required.	ems procured in 2 (04/28/93), 1 Would have
	at and items where		/. Examples:
C. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment	relied upon to p	prevent or monitor operational accidents or conta t fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air ar	mination Monadiation
d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equi resulting equipment damage or nonavailability.	pment whose failu Examples: Cran	re could have a serious impact on the plant miss les, fire protections systems which protect equip	ion due to
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification			
NONE			
-			
7. Other Components/Functions:			
for the proper operation of the detectors as we detectors themselves and the fire papels do not	ell as the associa	tors and all the circuity from the detectors back IB, 221B and 291B) are considered critical equips ated suppression systems. Investigation has rever ponents considered suspect. This was verified by fire panels in question. Therefore, no inspection	ment necessary
8 / 1			
1.W. Mest	9.	10 Gran	11. Jular
Cog Engineer	Date	Cog Managen/	Date

l

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE 7. other Components/Functions: System B27 covers the activity of waste handling: physical facilities are included in subsystems: B27A. Canyon Railroad - The railroad was constructed prior to 1981. and would not contain any suspect items listed on the above QABs. The railroad tunnel roll-up door was covered under system B99K. Canyon Doors. B27B. Cell 4 - The 221B process cells were built prior to 1981. Further, there is nothing in the cell whose failure would have a serious safety or operational impact. B27C. Hazardous Waste Pad - This concrete does not contain any fasteners, valves or other items of a type listed in the QABs. 9. <u>18/9</u> 10 Juny 11/2 12 13. 13. <u>15. June</u> 13. June 10 June 12 June 13. June 13. June 13. June 13. June 13. June 14. June	B PLANT/WESF	SUSPE	CT/COUNTE	RFEIT	COMF	ONENTS	SCREENI	NG
<pre>to secilitate two spreamers of publications cold part of the content is the</pre>		2. Syste	m Title: Solid	Waste	landling			
4. Instructions: a. Complete one screening form for each plant system. b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical condequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5. c. Litt in Block 6 these components identified in step b, slong with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences. c. Litt in Block 6 these components identified in step b, slong with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences. c. Litt in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria. e. Prepare an inspection plan for items listed in Block 6. dobuin 04 concurrence. T. Perform the inspection par the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. g. Performation is a start form, a cong with the inspection. The information will be consolidated on one of ore than blist of derivation elevant on the use on some of ore than a start form, a cong with the inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting KCs in the .CS work package. 3. Screening Criteria: a. Protectiat form, a cong with the inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting KCs in the .CS work package. b. General Plant Safety. Protective exclusions and blief derive presents and list of derive Conference or plant bases for presenting Criteria: a. Protectiat of Presents of Conterfair Parts. The concern for descondance for presents being strenge Conference or plant bases for presents of the concern to records and any resulting KCs in the .CS work package. b. General Plant Safety. Conterfair Parts. The concern for desceptorent is regulared in the work of the concern to a strenge present and its of a start for the concernent is regulared. b. General Plant Safety. Conterfair Parts. b. General Plant Safety. Conterfair Parts. b. General Plant Safety. Conterfair Parts. c. Process/General Safety. Expenses testice of the concernent is regulared. c	to facilitate the performance of	physical in:	spections in accord	nave cri ance with	fical conse Internal M			
<ul> <li>b. Identify system components whole failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.</li> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>e. Prepare an inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain GA concurrence.</li> <li>f. Perform the inspection pr the bapproved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>g. If any supperformateriation with the inspection intermation with Be consolidated on one or more work operational is produced disposition. The intermation with Be consolidated on one or more work operational is form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work concerning Criteria:</li> <li>a. Patential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items produced in Social on the series of this of the series of 2000 (00/20/3), 940-01 (08/20/30, 940-01 (0</li></ul>								
<ul> <li>b. Identify system components whole failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.</li> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>e. Prepare an inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain GA concurrence.</li> <li>f. Perform the inspection pr the bapproved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>g. If any supperformateriation with the inspection intermation with Be consolidated on one or more work operational is produced disposition. The intermation with Be consolidated on one or more work operational is form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work concerning Criteria:</li> <li>a. Patential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items produced in Social on the series of this of the series of 2000 (00/20/3), 940-01 (08/20/30, 940-01 (0</li></ul>	a. Complete one screening form f	or each plar	nt system.					
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences. d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria. e. Prepare an Inspection par the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. f. Perform the inspection par the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. f. Perform the inspection par the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. f. Perform the inspection par the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. f. Perform the inspection par the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. F. File Cooles of this form, along with the Inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work backage. S. Screening Griteris: a. Patentia for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applied by 2000 (Cd/20/20), 2000 (Cd/20/2			•	consequ	ences by an	plying the correc		
<pre>e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain 0A concurrence. f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Reege or D. U. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of organizant Engineer will be information will be ensoled on one or more whondorthormance Reports tWESS, and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility. h. File codies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting WERs in the JCS work package. S. Screening Criteria: a. Battial for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items produced in 00000 failed and the subjective could and the subjective could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, noiss, handralit, ladders, catualks, liftingmoving devices, rollid dors, presult on series or containation mentation device Sustems Eastery. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitoring equipment; 480 vac MEC; instrument ar: d. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE C. Components/Functions: System B27 covers the activity of waste handling: physical facilities are included in subsystems: E27A. Canyon Railroad - The railroad was constructed prior to 1981, and would not contain any subspect items failer would have a serious impact. Here is nothing the cell whose failure would bave a serious impact and would not contain any subspect items failer and series and series systems unich protect equipment. E27A. Canyon Railroad - The railroad was constructed prior to 1981, and would not contain any subspect items failure would have a serious impact. where items is nothing the cell whose failure would have a serious impact. Would not contain any subspect items failer of a series safety or operational impact. E27A. Canyon Railroad - The railroad was constructed prior to 1981, and would not contain any subspect items failure would have</pre>	c. List in Block 6 those component							
<pre>e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain 0A concurrence. f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Reege or D. U. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of organizant Engineer will be information will be ensoled on one or more whondorthormance Reports tWESS, and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility. h. File codies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting WERs in the JCS work package. S. Screening Criteria: a. Battial for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items produced in 00000 failed and the subjective could and the subjective could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, noiss, handralit, ladders, catualks, liftingmoving devices, rollid dors, presult on series or containation mentation device Sustems Eastery. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitoring equipment; 480 vac MEC; instrument ar: d. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE C. Components/Functions: System B27 covers the activity of waste handling: physical facilities are included in subsystems: E27A. Canyon Railroad - The railroad was constructed prior to 1981, and would not contain any subspect items failer would have a serious impact. Here is nothing the cell whose failure would bave a serious impact and would not contain any subspect items failer and series and series systems unich protect equipment. E27A. Canyon Railroad - The railroad was constructed prior to 1981, and would not contain any subspect items failure would have a serious impact. where items is nothing the cell whose failure would have a serious impact. Would not contain any subspect items failer of a series safety or operational impact. E27A. Canyon Railroad - The railroad was constructed prior to 1981, and would not contain any subspect items failure would have</pre>	d. List or describe in Block 7 th	iose.compone	ents or items which	were eval	uated but a	do not meet the		
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. g. If any suspect/counterfet items are fund, notify 9, 6: Roege or 0, W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will workerdownee Reports (NDRS), and one Occurrence Report (ORS) will be submitted for the entire facility. h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package. S. Screening Criteria: a. <u>Description of Commerfet Parts</u> . The conterm for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in performed which would have a serious informed in the submitted for Pagin near Been (DE/2007), 92-03 (DE/2007							screening crit	eria.
a. If any suscest/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will Nonconformance Reports (Werk), and one Courrence Report (OK) will be examited and the entire facility. h. File cooles of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package. S. Screening Criteria: a. <u>Detation for the colored of the conterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items produced in factors and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package. b. File cooles of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package. b. Screening Criteria: a. <u>Detatial for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items produced in the duality Assumance Bulletins (CABS) V2-01 (CC/4/72), 92-02 (CM/22) V31, 92-002								
Dataset         S. Screening Criteris:         a.         a.         Dotatial for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in and store which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (DABS) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (08/28/93), added items listed in these bulletins ince 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.         b.       General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handraits, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, torentaing air systems         c.       Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/Support Systems Safety: Gaupont relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor prevent or monitor on a tensity for motion due to resulting equipment; 480 VAC MCGs; instrument whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems upich protect equipment. Components/Functio	g. If any suspect/counterfeit ite follow up with a list of deficience	ms are foun	nd, notify P. E. Roe	ge or D:	W. Mertz in	mediately. The		ineer will ore
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1081 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (Quality (2021), 92-02 (08/21/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 92-00	h. File copies of this form, alor package.	g with the	Inspection Plan, in	spection	records and	any resulting !	NCRs in the JC	S work
93-03 (05/20/93), 92-03 (08/23/94) and 94-02 flatter by Verification or repair has been performed which would have a serious structed prior to 1981. Further, there is nothing in the eability of the above contain any fasteners, valves or other it the serious solution of the contain any fasteners, valves or other it the eability of th	5. Screening Criteria:							<u>-</u> .
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, noists, handralls, ladders, catualks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems C. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air. d. <u>Equipment damage or nonavailability.</u> Examples: Carnes, fire protections systems which protect equipment. S. Components/Functions: System B27 covers the activity of waste handling; physical facilities are included in subsystems: B27A. Canyon Railroad - The railroad was constructed prior to 1981, and would not contain any suspect items listed on the above QABs. The railroad tunnel roll-up door was covered under system B99K. Canyon Doors. B27B. Cell 4 - The 221B process cells were built prior to 1981. Further, there is nothing in the cell whose failure would have a serious any fasteners, valves or other terms of a type listed in the QABs. B27C. Hazardous Waste Pad - This concrete does not contain any fasteners, valves or other terms of a type listed in the QABs. B27C. Hazardous Waste Pad - This concrete does not contain any fasteners, valves or other terms of a type listed in the QABs. Canyon Baileroad - The rail operations are to the does not contain any fasteners, valves or other 13. <u>Manage Baam</u> <b>14. Manage Baam</b> <b>14. Manage Baam</b> <b>15. Manage Baam</b> <b>15. Manage Baam</b> <b>16. Manage Baam</b> <b>16. Manage Baam</b> <b>17. Manage Baam</b> <b>18. Manage Baam</b> <b>17. Manage Baam</b> <b></b>	93-03 (05/20/93) 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94) 16 and 94-02 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93),							
<ul> <li>Monitoring equipment; 480 vac WCGs; instrument air.</li> <li><u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u>; Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.</li> <li>Components/Functions Requiring Verification:</li> <li>NONE</li> <li>To other Components/Functions: System B27 covers the activity of waste handling; physical facilities are included in subsystems:</li> <li>B27A. Canyon Railroad - The railroad was constructed prior to 1981. and would not contain any suspect items listed on the above QABs. The railroad tunnel roll-up door was covered under system B99K. Canyon Doors.</li> <li>B27B. Cell 4 - The 221B process cells were built prior to 1981. Further, there is nothing in the cell whose failure would have a serious safety or operational impact.</li> <li>B27C. Hazardous Waste Pad - This concrete does not contain any fasteners. valves or other items of a type listed in the QABs.</li> </ul>	b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items where failure could discontinue to the second							
Testicing edupanent damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.         6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:         NONE         7. Other Components/Functions: System B27 covers the activity of waste handling; physical facilities are included in subsystems:         B27A. Canyon Railroad - The railroad was constructed prior to 1981. and would not contain any suspect items listed on the above QABs. The railroad tunnel roll-up door was covered under system B99K. Canyon Doors.         B27B. Cell 4 - The 221B process cells were built prior to 1981. Further, there is nothing in the cell whose failure would have a serious safety or operational impact.         B27C. Hazardous Waste Pad - This concrete does not contain any fasteners, valves or other items of a type listed in the QABs.         Pummary Barman       1/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2/2								
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE 7. other Components/Functions: System B27 covers the activity of waste handling: physical facilities are included in subsystems: B27A. Canyon Railroad - The railroad was constructed prior to 1981. and would not contain any suspect items listed on the above QABs. The railroad tunnel roll-up door was covered under system B99K. Canyon Doors. B27B. Cell 4 - The 221B process cells were built prior to 1981. Further, there is nothing in the cell whose failure would have a serious safety or operational impact. B27C. Hazardous Waste Pad - This concrete does not contain any fasteners, valves or other items of a type listed in the QABs. 9. <u>18/9</u> 10 Juny 11/2 12 13. 13. <u>15. June</u> 13. June 10 June 12 June 13. June 13. June 13. June 13. June 14. June	resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.							
7. Other Components/Functions: System B27 covers the activity of waste handling; physical facilities are included in subsystems: B27A. Canyon Railroad - The railroad was constructed prior to 1981. and would not contain any suspect items listed on the above QABs. The railroad tunnel roll-up door was covered under system B99K. Canyon Doors. B27B. Cell 4 - The 221B process cells were built prior to 1981. Further, there is nothing in the cell whose failure would have a serious safety or operational impact. B27C. Hazardous Waste Pad - This concrete does not contain any fasteners, valves or other items of a type listed in the QABs. Muma JBum 9.18/95 10 Juny 11/8/16 12 June 13. June Footback								
B27A. Canyon Railroad - The railroad was constructed prior to 1981. and would not contain any suspect items listed on the above QABs. The railroad tunnel roll-up door was covered under system B99K. Canyon Doors. B27B. Cell 4 - The 221B process cells were built prior to 1981. Further, there is nothing in the cell whose failure would have a serious safety or operational impact. B27C. Hazardous Waste Pad - This concrete does not contain any fasteners, valves or other items of a type listed in the QABs. Mana HBlam 9.48/96 10 Mana 1/8/96 12 Jack 13. Mana HBlam	NONE							
B27B. Cell 4 - The 221B process cells were built prior to 1981. Further, there is nothing in the cell whose failure would have a serious safety or operational impact. B27C. Hazardous Waste Pad - This concrete does not contain any fasteners, valves or other items of a type listed in the QABS. Mana Beam 2.48/96 10 Mary 11/18/16 12 12 13. 18/16 12 12 13. 18/16	7. Other Components/Functions: S facilities are included i	ystem B2 n subsys	7 covers the a tems:	ctivity	/ of was	te handling;	physical	
B27C, Hazardous Waste Pad - This concrete does not contain any fasteners, valves or other items of a type listed in the QABS. Manas HBeam 9.48/96 10 Juny 11/ 12 - 13. 13. 13. 18/96 12 - 14 13. 18/96 12 - 14 13. 18/96 12 - 14 13. 18/96 12 - 14 13. 18/96 13.		un une a	oad was constr bove QABs. Th	ucted e rail	prior to road tun	1981. and v nel roll-up	would not door was	contain covered
Juanas JBlam 2. 18/96 10 Juan 11/ 12/1/2 13.	B27B. Cell 4 - The 221B p in the cell whose failure	rocess c would h	ells were buil ave a serious	t prio safety	r to 198 or oper	1. Further ational impa	, there is act.	nothing
	B27C, Hazardous Waste Pad items of a type listed in	- This d the QAB	concrete does s.	not coi	itain an	y fasteners	, valves o	r other
							$\gamma$	
	8 Juanas IBlam Cog Engineer	9. 48/96 Date	10 Juni		11/ 18/96 Date	12 2. 14		

(<u>96/6Z/ZL)</u>

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## B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

2. System Tide: Secondary Containment

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:

1

. Complete one screening form for each plant system.

b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the acteening criteria in Block 5.

c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, slong with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.

d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.

e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain OA concurrence.

f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.

g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz inmediately. The Cognizent Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be conso∺dated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.

h. File copies of this form, slong with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

S. Screening Cristeria:

Cog Engineer

a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Perts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1987 or later which are listed in Quality Resurance Bulletins (QRS) 92-07 (02/14/92), 92-02 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-07 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.

b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Granes, hoists, handreils, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems

с. <u>Ргосезс/Support Systems Sefery</u>: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors: canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.

d. <u>Equipment with Programmetic Impects</u>: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment demage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Critical Componenta/Functions: None, Box 5 Screening Criteria, item a. does not apply

7. Noncritical Components/Functions: None, Box 5 Screening Criteria, item a. does not apply 8.0.7.15 8.0.7.15 11.7.

B PLANT/WESF SU	ISPECT/COUNT	ERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING			
1. System Number: B28A	2. System Title:	Cell Drain Header	-		
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B P potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could hav physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.	e critical conseque	nces. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the	performance of		
4. Instructions:					
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system	n.				
b. Identify system components whose failure could he	ve critical consequ	ences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.			
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step	b, along with the f	unctions whose failure would have critical consequence	5.		
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or ite	ms which were evi	lusted but do not meet the screening criteria.			
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block	6. Obtain QA con	currence.			
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and re	cord results on the	Inspection Record.			
g. If any suspect/counterfait items are found, notify P. deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.	. E. Roege or D. W. will be consolidat	. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow ad on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), ar	v up with a list of ad one Occurrence		
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection P	lan, inspection rec	ords and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.			
5. Screening Criteria:					
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.					
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and iter handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rol	ms whose failure c llup doors, breathin	ould directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes g air systeme	, hoists,		
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u> : Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.					
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire prot			ulting equipment		
6. Critical Components/Functions: None, Box 5 Screen	ing Criteria, item a.	does not apply			
-					
-					
7. Noncritical Components/Functions: None, Box 5 Scr	eening Criteria, iter				
8. D.B. Kutech Cog Engineer	9. <u>1-5-90</u> Date	10. Landren Cog Manager	11, 15/96 Onte		

	WHC-SD-WM-IP-009, Rev. (
B PLANT/WESF SU	SPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number: B28B	2. System Title: Cell 10
potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have	Nant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent e critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of 9 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts
4. Instructions:	
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system	1.
b. Identify system components whose failure could ha	ve critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step	b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or ite	ms which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteris.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block	6. Obtain QA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and re	cord results on the Inspection Record.
	. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection P	lan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.
5. Screening Criteria:	
listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02	ncern for suspect/counterfeit parts spplies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are /14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and n performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>, Protective equipment and iter handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rol</li> </ul>	ms whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, lup doors, breathing air systeme
	upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. ; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC
d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire pro	whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment tections systems which protect equipment.
6. Critical Components/Functions: None, Box 5 Screen	ing Criteria, item a. does not apply
· <del>-</del>	
-	
7. Noncritical Components/Functions: Cell 10, contains a single waste collection tank that is defined in box 5, but are supported by other systems to form that applies to that system.	fed by gravity drains. This cell and equipment does not contain critical components as hat contain these components. These other systems will be evaluated on the screening

B.B	Kutiel
Cog Engi	





1. System Number: B28C

2. System Title: Hot Pipe Trench

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each 8 Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 15710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:

a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.

b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.

c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.

d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.

e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.

f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the inspection Record.

g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.

h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:

a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfait Parts</u>. The concern for suspect/counterfait parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.

b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems

c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u>: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.

d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u>: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Critical Components/Functions: None, Box 5 Screening Criteria, item a. does not apply because the piping system and support racks were constructed or modified before 1981.

7. Noncritical Components/Functions: None



		ERFEIT COMPONENTS		
1. System Number: B28D	2. System Title:	In Cell Leak Detection		
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could hav physical inspections in accordance with Internal Mem Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.	ve critical conseque	nces. The purpose of the so	reening is to facilitate the	nerformance of
4. Instructions:				
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system	m.			
b. Identify system components whose failure could h	ave critical consequ	iences by applying the screer	ning criteria in Block 5.	
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step	b, along with the f	unctions whose failure would	i have critical consequence	38.
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or its	eme which were evo	aluated but do not meet the a	creening criteria.	
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block	6. Obtain QA con	currence.		
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and r	ecord results on the	Inspection Record.		
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify F deficiencies and proposed disposition. The informatio Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.	P. E. Rosge or D. W. n will be consolidat	. Mertz immediately. The Co ed on one or more Nonconfor	gnizant Engineer will follov mance Reports (NCRs), ar	v up with a list of Id one Occurrence
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection I	Plan, inspection rec	ords and any resulting NCRs i	n the JCS work package.	
5. Screening Criteria:				
<ul> <li><u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The co- listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been inspection of the component is required.</li> </ul>	2/14/92). 92-02 (08	1/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93),	93-03 (05/20/93) 94-01	108/23/94) and
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment and ite handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, ro</li> </ul>	ms whose failure c illup doors, breathin	ould directly result in serious g air systeme	injury. Examples: Cranes	, hoists,
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fan MCCs; instrument air.</li> </ul>	upon to prevent or s; HEPA filters and	monitor operational accident instrumentation; air and radia	s or contamination release tion monitoring equipment	/spread. ; 480 VAC
d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire pro	t whose failure could tections systems w	d have a serious impact on th hich protect equipment.	e plant mission due to res	ulting equipment
6. Critical Components/Functions: None, Box 5 Screen	ving Criteria does no	t apply. The in cell leak dete	ction system is inactivated	
· -				
-				
				i -
7. Noncritical Components/Functions: None				
8. Bruter Cog Engineer	9. <u> -8-96</u> Date	10. Thurs Cog Meneger		11./ <u>/</u> 96

B PLANT/WESF SU	SPECT/COUNTE	RFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING	
1. System Number: B31 Low Level Waste Handling B31A.Cell 9 B31D Cell 24 B31E Cell 25 B31P Cell 39	2. System Title: L	ow level Waste handling, Cell 9, Cell 24, Cell 25, a	nd Cell 39
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B P potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could hav physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.	e critical consequen	ces. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate th	e performance of
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system	η.		
b. Identify system components whose failure could he	ive critical conseque	ences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.	
c. List in Block $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ those components identified in step	b, along with the fu	nctions whose failure would have critical conseque	C88.
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or ite	ms which were eva	luated but do not meet the screening criteria.	
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block	6. Obtain QA conc	urrence.	
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and re	cord results on the	inspection Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.			
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection P	lan, inspection reco	rds and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work packag	
5. Screening Criteria:			
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The co listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has bee inspection of the component is required.	/14/92), 92-02 (08	/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-	01 (08/23/94) and
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment and its handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rol</li> </ul>			es, hoists,
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u>; Equipment relied Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exheust fan MCCs; instrument air.</li> </ul>			
d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Crenes, fire pro	whose failure could tections systems w	have a serious impact on the plant mission due to this protect equipment.	esulting equipment
6. Critical Components/Functions: None, Box 5 Screen	ing Criteria, item a.	does not apply.	
7. Noncritical Components/Functions: The Low Level Waste handling system including cells S other systems that contain these components. These			
8. B. Kuter Cog Engineer	9. 1-5-96 Data	10 Jun Dan Managari	11. 15596
			(12/29/95)

B PLANT/W	ESF SUS	PECT/COUNTERFI	EIT C	OMPONENT	S SCR	REENING		
1. system Number: B31H, B31J, B31K, B31L	2. System CRIB	n Title: B PLANT	PROCES	S CONDES	ATE, 22	21BB, 23	21BF,	216-B-62
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a subsequent potential failure of su to facilitate the performance of p N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counter</li> </ol>	spect/count hysical ins	erfeit parts could pections in accord	have crit ance with	ical conseq Internal Me	uences. T	The purpose	of the s	creening is
4. Instructions:								
a. Complete one screening form fo	r each plan	t system.						
b. Identify system components who	se failure	could have critica	l conseque	nces by app	lying the	screening	criteria	in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those componen consequences.	ts identifi	ed in step b, along	with the	functions	whose fail	lure would	have crit	ical
d. List or describe in Block 7 th	ose compone	nts or items which	were eval	uated but d	o not meet	t the scree	ning crit	eria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items list	ed in Block 6. Obt	tain QA co	ncurrence.				
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved p	lan and record resu	ults on th	e Inspection	n Record.			
g. If any suspect/counterfeit iter follow up with a list of deficienc Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and	ies and pro	posed disposition.	The info	rmation will	l be conso	olidated on	one or m	ineer will ore
<ul> <li>h. File copies of this form, along package.</li> </ul>	g with the	Inspection Plan, in	spection	records and	any resul	ting NCRs	in the JC	S work
5. Screening Criteria:								
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Coun</u> 1981 or later which are listed in ( 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) added items listed in these bullet	Ouality Assi and 94-02 (	urance Bulletins (G (10/18/94). If no	ABs) 92-0 modificat:	1 (02/14/92) ion or repai	), 92-02 ( ir has b <del>ee</del>	(08/21/92), n performed	93-002 (	04/28/93)
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protect Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders,	ive equipmen , catwalks,	ht and items whose lifting/moving dev	failure co rices, rol	ould directi lup doors, b	y result preathing	in serious air systems	injury. S	Examples:
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.								
d. Equipment with Programmatic Imp resulting equipment damage or nonat	p <u>acts:</u> Equi vailability	ipment whose failur . Examples: Crane	e could ha s, fire pi	ive a seriou rotections s	us impact o systems wh	on the plar	nt mission equipment	n due to nt.
6. Components/Functions Requiring \	/erification	n: NONE						
-								
						-		
7. Other Components/Functions:								
These systems are not ac suspect/counterfeit parts Therefore, inspection of	could b	be used in cri	tical a	pplicati	here th ons are	ie use of not app	f olicabl	e.
8. ashersijel	9. 1/5/9/	10 Jun		11/5/96		, Α		13.
Log Engineer	Oate 6	Cog Hanager		Date	Screen P	reparer		Date
								(01/02/96)

PLANT/WESF
SUSPECT/COUN
TERFEIT
COMPONENTS
SCREENING

1. System Number: B31M

2. System Title: WESF Transfer

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:

a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.

b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.

c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.

d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.

e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.

f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.

g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.

h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:

\_

a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.

b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, holets, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems

c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u>: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.

d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u>; Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonevailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Critical Components/Functions: None,

7. Noncritical Components/Functions: None, This system represents a procedure or activity and not directly responsible for equipment so the screening criteria in box 5 does not apply. The equipment used in this procedure/activity will be evaluated on the screening form that applies to that system.

".D. Kitert
Cog Engineer





1. System Number: B31N

2. System Title: Canyon Samplers

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:

a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.

b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.

c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.

d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.

e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.

f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the inspection Record.

g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.

h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:

•

a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bullatins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.

b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing sir systems

c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u>: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.

d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment demage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Critical Components/Functions: None, Box 5 Screening Criteria, item a. does not apply.

7. Noncritical Components/Functions:

Canyon samplers do not contain critical components as defined in box 5, but are supported by other systems that contain these components. These other systems will be evaluated on the screening form that applies to that system.

8 B. K. Hells Cog Engineer	9. <u>1-8-96</u> Dete	10 DHC3 Cog Mandger	11 1/8/96 Date

B PLANT/WESF_SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT_COMPONENTS_SCREENING					
1. System Number: B31P	2. System Title:	Canyon Samplers			
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.					
4. Instructions:					
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system	<b>n.</b>				
b. Identify system components whose failure could he	eve critical consequ	ences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.			
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step	b, along with the f	unctions whose failure would have critical consequence	D <b>C.</b>		
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or ite	me which were eve	lusted but do not meet the screening criteria.			
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block	6. Obtain QA con	currence.			
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and re	acord results on the	Inspection Record,			
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.	2. E. Rosge or D. W. n will be consolidat	. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow ad on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), an	v up with a list of d one Occurrence		
h. File copies of this form, slong with the Inspection F	lan, inspection rec	ords and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.			
5. Screening Criteris:					
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The co listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has bee inspection of the component is required.	2/14/92), 92-02 (08	/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01	(08/23/94) and		
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment and ite handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rol</li> </ul>	ms whose failure c llup doors, breathin	ould directly result in serious injury. Exemples: Cranes g air systems	, hoists,		
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u>: Equipment relied Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans MCCs; instrument air.</li> </ul>	upon to prevent or s; HEPA filters and	monitor operational accidents or contamination release instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment	n/spread. ; 480 VAC		
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment damage or nonevailability. Examples: Cranes, fire pro			ulting equipment		
6. Critical Components/Functions: None,					
-					
		-			
7. Noncritical Components/Functions: The canyon same box 5 items b, c, or d.	plers may have the	potential for the presence of counterfeit parts but failu	re will not impact		
8. ORTHAN	9.	10/ 4	11./ ./.		
Cog Engineer	<u>/-5-96</u> Date	Cog Manager	1/5/2/6 Date		
	B	69	(12/29/95)		

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING				
1. System Number: B32G (B32) 2. System Title: AIR DILUTION				
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Nemo 16710-94-DLM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.				
4. Instructions:				
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.				
b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening crit	ania ia Olash F			
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have	critical			
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening	critaria			
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.				
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the inspection Record.				
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizan follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.	or more			
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the package.	ne JCS work			
5. Screening Criteria:				
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed whi added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.	items procured in DD2 (04/28/93), ch would have			
b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious inju Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	ry. Examples:			
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or con release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.	tamination and radiation			
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u> : Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mi resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment damage or nonavailability.	ssion due to			
6. Critical Components/Functions: His Dilutions Susseries Court				
THE HUID VALUES SUCCEST				
THESE COMPONENTS TO NOT MEET CRITERION 5.0				
7. Noncritical Components/Functions: NONE.				
En Halle 9. 1/2/96 10.	11.			
Dete Dete Log Hanager	1496			

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING				
1. System Number: B32H(B32) 2. System Title: CELL 26				
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each 8 Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Nemo 16710-94-DWN-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated Nay 24, 1995.				
4. Instructions:				
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.				
b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5,				
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.				
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.				
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.				
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.				
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.				
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting MCRs in the JCS work package.				
5. Screening Criteria:				
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.				
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems				
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.				
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Granes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.				
6. Critical Components/Functions: NO COMPONENTS MEET ORITERION 5.9.				
7. Noncritical Components/Functions: NONE.				
8. 5. 5. 5. 5. 5. 5. 5. 5				

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING					
1. system Number: B32J (B32) 2. system Title: CELL27					
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Nemo 16710-94-DUM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated Nay 24, 1995.					
4. Instructions:					
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.					
b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.					
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.					
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.					
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.					
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.					
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. V. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.					
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.					
5. Screening Criteria:					
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.					
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems					
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.					
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.					
6. Critical Components/Functions: NO COMPCNIENTS MEET CRITERICIN 5.4					
7. Noncritical Components/Functions:					
8. <u>9.   3/96</u> 10. <u>11. 11. 11. 11. 11. 11. 11. 11. 11. 1</u>					
Cog Engineer Dete Cog Hanager Date Date					

B PLANT/WESF SUS	SPECT/COUNTER	FEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING	
1. System Number: B32K (B32)	2. System Title:	CELL 28	
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that subsequent potential failure of suspect/count to facilitate the performance of physical ins N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts	pections in accordan	ave critical consequences. The purpose of ce with internal Nemo 16710-94-DUM-048 J	
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for each plan	t system.		
b. Identify system components whose failure	could have critical (	consequences by applying the screening crite	pie im Black C
		with the functions whose failure would have	
d. List or describe in Block 7 those component	nts or items which we	ere evaluated but do not meet the screening	criteria
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items list			61125118.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved p			
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found follow up with a list of deficiencies and prop Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurre	d, notify P. E. Roege	or D. W. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant	Engineer will or more
h. File copies of this form, along with the package.			e JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:			
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Part</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assu 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 ( added items listed in these bulletins since 19	10/18/9/3 14 ma ma	\$) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-0	
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>, Protective equipmen Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks,</li> </ul>	+ and itama chase fo		γ. Examples:
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; can monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument	relied upon to preve		amination and radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equi resulting equipment damage or nonavailability.	pment whose failure c Examples: Cranes,	could have a serious impact on the plant mis	sion due to
		S MEET CRITERION 5.9.	
-		-	
7. Noncritical Components/Functions:			
NCA	JE		
8. Era Julla Cog Engineer	9. // 10 /B/9.6 Date 25	S. Star	11. 14/26

1

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number: B32L(B32) 2. System Title: CEL 30
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Nemo 16710-94-DWN-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated Nay 24, 1995.
4. Instructions:
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, along with the inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work
package.
5. Screening Criteria:
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. <u>Examples:</u> Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; KEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC NECs; instrument air.
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u> : Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Granes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.
6. Critical Components/Functions: NO COMPONENTS MEET CRITERION 5.4
7. Noncritical Components/Functions: (NICNE
8. Even Haffer Cog Engineer Date P. 10. 11. 1/3/96 Date Date Date
Cog Engineer Date Cog Hanager Date

B PLANT/WESF SUSP	ECT/COUNTE	RFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING	
1. System Number: B36A (B36)	2. System Title	· VV #1 SYSTEM	
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that a subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspe N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Ac	feit parts could ctions in accords	have critical consequences. The purpose of the Ince with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A.	e screening is
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.		
b. Identify system components whose failure co	uld have critical	consequences by applying the screening criteri	ia in Block 5.
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.</li> </ul>	i in step b, along	with the functions whose failure would have cr	itical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those component	s or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening cr	iteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Obt	ain GA concurrence.	
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	n and record resu	its on the Inspection Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with c list of deficiencies and propo Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurren	sed disposition.	The information will be consolidated on one or	
h. File copies of this form, along with the In package.	spection Plan, in	spection records and any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:			
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assur 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (1 added items listed in these bulletins since 198	ance Bulletins (Q 0/18/94). If no :	A8s) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 modification or repair has been performed which	(04/28/93),
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment</li> <li>Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, l</li> </ul>	and items whose ifting/moving dev	failure could directly result in serious injury ices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	. Examples:
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; cany monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument</li> </ul>	on supply/exhaust	event or monitor operational accidents or conta fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air an	mination d radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equip resulting equipment damage or nonavailability.			
6. Critical Components/Functions: VALVE TIRESE	5 FLANGES Pizovide Air	AND ASSOCIATED FASTENED TO OPERATE THE SYSTEM.	2 <u>5,</u>
	1 HE PROCES	S AIR SYSTEM (B32B) IS ALS	Ś
-		O OPERATE THIS SUSTERA	
	ATTACHED		
PUTLINED COMPONENTS ON	s ATTACHED	PARE WERE TAUSPECTED - NO SUSPECT PARE	5 EUNID,
7. Noncritical Components/Functions:	onie.		
8. <u>Era Haffa</u> Cog Engineer	9. 1/3/96 Date	10. June	11./ 1/5/96 Date

SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN				
1. System Number: B36A	2. System Title: V (/	#1 SYSTEM		
<ul> <li>3. Instructions:</li> <li>a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.</li> <li>b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.</li> <li>c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger</li> </ul>				
bolts", or "review of procurement d. Perform and document the veri who performed the verification an records, etc. It must be possibl	fication as specified in Block d date. Records may include ma		ecklists, copies of QC	
4: Component/function requiring verification: VESSEL VENT, AIR SUPPLY & ISONATION (SEE ANACHED REFION OF IFFD)	5. Proposed inspection metho	d:	6. Action completed/comments:	
VALVE # 220-E00-1 220-E00-2	Visual		CRANE, 2" GATE CRANE, 2" GATE	
220-800-3	VISUAL		CRAKE, 2", GATE MASCNEILAN, 2", DOV	
220-800-4	Visual	CRANE, 2", GATE		
220-710-10	(INSULATION PREVENTS INSPECTING FLANGES		(RANE 2", GATE	
220-800-17	Visual		<u> </u>	
	Voual		CRANE, 2", CHECK	
N/A	VISUAL	,	2", GHECK, @ WIN 22-54	
FLANGES	Visual		NONE OF THE JUSPECTARIE FLANGES WERE HADE IN CHINA	
FASTENERS			BOLTS ARE NLY USED. AU OF THE FASPECTABLE TASTENERS ARE STUDS WITH MITS CONCLUSIONS NO SUSPECT COMPONENTS	
	Inspection plan by: <u>Fraitfulle</u> 1/5/95 Signature/Date	QA Concurrence: Whithered 1/9/96 Signature/Date	Ea Hofla 1/5/96 Cognizant Engineer/Date	

(8 Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

B PLANT/WESF SU	SPECT/COUNTE	ERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number: 336 B (836)	2. System Titl	VV # 2. SYSTEM
subsequent potential failure of suspect/coun	terfeit parts could spections in accord	F system has been screened for applications where the use and d have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is clance with Internal Nemo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. d May 24, 1995.
4. Instructions:		
a. Complete one screening form for each pla	nt system.	
b. Identify system components whose failure	could have critica	al consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5:
<ul> <li>List in Block 6 those components identif consequences.</li> </ul>	ied in step b, alon	ng with the functions whose failure would have critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those compon	ents or items which	h were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items lis	ted in Block 6. Ob	btain QA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved p	olan and record res	sults on the Inspection Record.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are four follow up with a list of deficiencies and pro Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurs	posed disposition.	oege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will . The information will be consolidated on one or more will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, along with the package.	Inspection Plan, i	inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:		
1 1981 of later which are listed in Quality Ass	urance Bulletins (4 (10/18/94). If no	for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in (GABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), o modification or repair has been performed which would have inspection of the component is required.
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipme Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks,	nt and items whose lifting/moving de	e failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: evices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipmer release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; ca monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrumer</li> </ul>	nyon supply/exhaus	prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination st fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equ resulting equipment damage or nonavailability	ipment whose failu . Examples: Cran	are could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to wes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.
6. Critical Components/Functions: NO	NE.	
-		
7. Noncritical Components/Functions:	STEM IS	5 INNACTIVE. FURTHERMORE,
5/5 (15)	stem Has	NO IDENTIFIED FUTURE
8. Even Hafler	9. 1/2/96 Date	10. 11. 11. 11. 11. 14. 14. 14. 14. 14. 14

B PLANT/WESF SUS	PECT/COUNTE		NTS SCREENING		
1. System Number: 336C (336)	2. System Title	" CEU 22			
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Namo 16710-94-DWN-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.					
4. Instructions:					
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.				
b. Identify system components whose failure c	ould have critica	l consequences by appl	lying the screening criter	ia in Block 5.	
c. List in Block 6 those components identifie consequences.	d in step b, alon	g with the functions w	hose failure would have c	ritical	
d. List or describe in Block 7 those componen	ts or items which	were evaluated but do	o not meet the screening c	riteria.	
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items liste	d in Block 6. Ob	tain GA concurrence.			
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pl	an and record rest	ults on the Inspection	n Record.		
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found follow up with a list of deficiencies and prop Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurred	osed disposition.	The information will	be consolidated on one o	Engineer will r more	
h. File copies of this form, along with the In package.	nspection Plan, in	nspection records and	any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work	
5. Screening Criteria:					
<ul> <li>a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Part: 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assu 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 ( added items listed in these bulletins since 190</li> </ul>	rance Bulletins (6 10/18/94), If no	ABs) 92-01 (02/14/92) modification or repai	, 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-00 'r has been performed whic	2 (04/28/93).	
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks,</li> </ul>	t and items whose lifting/moving dev	failure could directl vices, rollup doors, b	y result in serious injur meathing air systems	y. E <u>xampies</u> :	
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; cany monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument</li> </ul>	on supply/exhaust	revent or monitor oper t fans; HEPA filters a	ational accidents or cont nd instrumentation; air a	amination nd radiation	
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equip resulting equipment damage or nonavailability.			· · ·		
6. Critical Components/Functions: No	COMPONEN	ITS MEET GR	ATERION 5.G.		
•					
7. Noncritical Components/Functions: ND	NE				
8. Even-Haple Cog Engineer	9. 13 96 ERH	10 Hung		11/ 1/4/96	

B PLANT	WESF SUSPECT/COUNT	ERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING	
1. System Number:		2. System Title: Inactive process cells	
-B38 Misc. Cells -B38A Cell 5 -B38B			
∽B38D Cell 7			
-B385 Cell 40 -B38U Cell 35 -B38V			
-B31G Cell 29 -B32A Cell 36 -B32B			
B32D Cell 8 B32E Cell 17 B32F (	Cell 13 B32		
potential failure of suspect/counterfeit part	a could have critical conseque	has been screened for applications where the use and nces. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the 048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Co	performance of
4. Instructions:			
c. List in Block 6 those components identi d. List or describe in Block 7 those compo e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items list f. Perform the inspection per the approved g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are fou	ure could have critical conseq fied in step b, along with the f ments or items which were ev ted in Block 6. Obtain QA cor I plan and record results on th nd, notify P. E. Roege or D. W p information will be consolidated		w up with a list of
h. File copies of this form, along with the	Inspection Plan, inspection rec	ords and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.	
5. Screening Criteria:			
listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs	) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (0)	counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 8/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-0 n would have added items listed in these bulletins since	1 (08/23/94) and
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipm handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving</li> </ul>		could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Crane og air systems	s, hoists,
<ul> <li>c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equip Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/e MCCs; instrument sir.</li> </ul>	oment relied upon to prevent o exheust fans; HEPA filtere and	r monitor operational accidents or contamination releas instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipmer	e/spread. nt; 480 VAC
d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: damage or nonavailability. Examples: Crar		id have a serious impact on the plant mission due to re which protect equipment.	sulting equipment
6. Critical Components/Functions: None			
-			
7. Noncritical Components/Functions: Inactive process cells containing vessels an These cells and equipment are supported by the systems have been inactivated they are	y piping and electrical systems	quipment that has been shutdown with no future plans that have the potential for containing suspect/counter systems.	for restart. feit parts. Since
8. D.B. Kutoch Cog Engineer	9. <u> -5-96</u> Date	10/ Jun- Cog Manager	11, 7,5,26 Date (12/29/95)

B PLANT/WESF SUSF	PECT/COUNTE	RFEIT COM	PONENTS	SCREENING		
1. System Number: B387	2. System Title	: 212B	Cask	Station		
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a record that e subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspense. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action 2015</li> </ol>	feit parts could actions in accord	have critical ance with Inte	consequence rnal Memo 16	s. The purpose of the	screening is	
4. Instructions:						
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.					
<ul> <li>Identify system components whose failure co</li> </ul>	ould have critica	consequences	by applying	the screening criteri	a in Block 5,	
<ul> <li>List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.</li> </ul>	l in step b, along	with the fun	ctions whose	failure would have cr	itical	
d. List or describe in Block 7 those component	s or items which	were evaluate	d but do not	meet the screening cr	iteria.	
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	l in Block 6. Ob	ain QA concur	rence.			
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	n and record resu	ilts on the In	spection Rec	ord.	•	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and propo Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrer	sed disposition.	The informat	ion will be	consolidated on one or	ngineer will more	
h. File copies of this form, along with the In package.	spection Plan, in	spection reco	rds and any	resulting NCRs in the	ICS work	
5. Screening Criteria:					· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assur 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (1 added items listed in these bulletins since 198	ance Bulletins (G 0/18/94). If no	ABs) 92-01 (0 modification	2/14/92), 92 or repair ha	-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 s been performed which	(04/28/93),	
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment</li> <li>Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, l</li> </ul>	and items whose ifting/moving dev	failure could dices, rollup	directly re doors, breat	sult in serious injury hing air systems	Examples:	
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; cany monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument</li> </ul>	on supply/exhaust	event or moni fans; HEPA f	tor operatio ilters and i	nal accidents or contar nstrumentation; air and	nination radiation	
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equip resulting equipment damage or nonavailability.						
6. Critical Components/Functions:	,					
Truck port roll-up door fa	steners					
Hand rails		m.B.	/4/96		i.	
pp-instruments DPI-CS-Land	APA CS	~				
potential safety hazard if fasteners fail. Truck	during se	ismic e	vent		peration	
7. Noncritical Components/Functions:						
Electrical - Power dist. a.	+ Crotra	c				
Piping Systems - FIRE: WET PIPE & PRINKLER system inspection plan.						
Facility structure						
Handrails - INSPECTED ON STRUCTURAL INSPE	crim plan.					
DP instruments						
No modifications or maintenance	since 198	0. Facili	ty not	active,		
8. Mitch Baron Cog Engineer	9. 1/4/96 Date	10. Log Manager	m		11. // 4/96 Date	

(12/29/95)

	PECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION	
1. System Number: B387	2. System Title: 212B Cask Station	
3. Instructions:		
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit i	Components Screening form to identify items requiring verific	cation.
D. List the items and functions	requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in	
bolts", or "review of procurement	fication method to be used in Block 5. For example, #100% vi records for vendor package".	sual inspection of pipe hanger
d. Perform and document the veri who performed the verification ar	fication as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indi	Cate clearly what was
	e to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been in	checklists, copies of QC spected.
<ol> <li>Component/function requiring verification:</li> </ol>	5. Proposed inspection method:	6. Action
Truck port	100% Visual inspection of	completed/comments:
rollup door	anchor bolts and load	0.K. 5LD 1-4-96
fasteners	bearing fasteners.	
	J · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
		<u>,</u>
-		-
		-
١r	spection plan by: QA Concurrence	
	and the mich.	Mitch Baron 115/76
Sĩ	mitch Baron 15/96 MASul 1.5.96	Cognizant Engineer/Date
		5 hay 1/11/96.
		Cognizant Manager/Date

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

1. System Number: B41A, B41B, and B41D and B41	2. System Title Crane Camer	e 221B Canyon Crane, Crane Opticș a System	, and			
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a record that e subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspe N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Ac</li> </ol>	feit parts could ctions in accorda	have critical consequences. The purpose of the ance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A.	screening is			
4. Instructions:						
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.					
b. Identify system components whose failure co	uld have critical	consequences by applying the screening criteri	a in Block 5.			
c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.	in step b, along	g with the functions whose failure would have cr	itical			
d. List or describe in Block 7 those component	s or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening cr	iteria.			
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Obt	tain QA concurrence.				
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	n and record resu	ults on the Inspection Record.				
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and propo Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurren	sed disposition.	The information will be consolidated on one or	ngineer will more			
h. File copies of this form, along with the inpackage.	spection Plan, ir	spection records and any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work			
5. Screening Criteria:						
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assur 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10 added items listed in these bulletins since 1980	ance Bulletins (Q D/18/94). If no	MBs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 modification or repair has been performed which	(04/28/93)			
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, l	and items whose ifting/moving dev	failure could directly result in serious injury rices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	Examples:			
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.						
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.						
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: Auxiliary monorail trollies - The unit during the 1980s these are th high grade bolts.	auxiliary mo	norail trollies were replaced as an on the crane that might require the	n entire ne use of			
7. Other Components/Functions:						
Original Canyon Crane - The Vendor grade bolts by any standard were in the early 1940s. The original ASM other standards may have been used specifications are given on the VI it will be assumed that the crane of bolts.	dentified. E A325 bolt prior to th and conside	The B Plant canyon crane was insta standard was published in 1964, how is date. Because no additional ring the time period the crane was	lled in vever designed			
Crane Optics Crane camera system						
Any failure of these items due to personnel or process safety, or have timely manner.	a failure of ve a programm	a suspect part will not compromise matic impact before it can be repai	red in a			
8. Cog Engineer	9.  4/96 Date	10 Harry Eog Managge	11. 			

SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN						
1. System Number: B41A 3412	2. System Title: Canyon Crane Aux. Trolley					
3. Instructions: D41D, B4	+1	······································				
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit (	Components Screening form to identify items requiring verificat	ion.				
b. List the items and functions	requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in B	lock 4 below.				
c. Identify the inspection/veri bolts", or "review of procurement	fication method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visu t records for vendor package".	al inspection of pipe hanger				
who performed the verification ar	ification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicand date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection ch	ecklists, copies of QC				
records, etc. It must be possibl	e to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been insp	ected.				
4. Component/function requiring verification:	5. Proposed inspection method:	6. Action completed/comments:				
Aux. Trollies on B Plant canyon Crane	100 % visual inspect for all bolts on the aux. monorail trollies & MONORAIL CONNECTIONS TO MAIN GROLE.	All bolts ok except for 4 bolts located on each cable real supplying power to the impact wrenches, Bolts were grade 5 Stamped with KS. These bolts will be accepted see NCR 05-1124				
	inspection plan by:	Cognizan: Engineep/Date				

(8 Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

6

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING         1. System Number:       B41C       2. System Title:       Elevators         3. Purpose.       This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 15/10-94-DM-048, J. A. O'Brien to W. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.         4. Instructions:       a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.         b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5         c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.         d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.         e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.         f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.         g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition: The information will be consolidated on one or more wnonconformance Reports (WCRs), and one Occurrence Report (CR) will be submitted for the entire facility.         b. file copies of this form, along with the Insection Plan, inspection records
<ol> <li>Burpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/MESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DUM-048, J. A. O'Brien to A. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.</li> <li>Instructions:         <ul> <li>Complete one screening form for each plant system.</li> <li>Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5</li> <li>List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain GA concurrence.</li> <li>Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition: The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.</li> <li>File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work cackage.</li> </ul> </li> </ol>
<ul> <li>Subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DuM-048, J. A. O'Brien to</li></ul>
<ul> <li>a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.</li> <li>b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5</li> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain 9A concurrence.</li> <li>f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer with follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition: The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.</li> <li>h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5</li> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.</li> <li>f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (CR) will be submitted for the entire facility.</li> <li>h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.</li> <li>f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition? The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (CR) will be submitted for the entire facility.</li> <li>h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>consequences.</li> <li>d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.</li> <li>f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition: The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (CR) will be submitted for the entire facility.</li> <li>h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.</li> <li>f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition: The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (CR) will be submitted for the entire facility.</li> <li>h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.</li> </ul>
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition: The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (CR) will be submitted for the entire facility. h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition: The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (CR) will be submitted for the entire facility. h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.
Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (CR) will be submitted for the entire facility. h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.
package.
5. Screening Criteria:
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured i 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting eduipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
All load Beaing parts on elevator at east end of 271B.
7. Other Components/Functions:
Non load beraing parts.
Non person carring elevators.
Any failure of these items due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired in a timely manner.
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CO1/02/5

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SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN					
1. System Number: B41C	2. System Title: B Plar	nt Elevator			
		dentify items requiring verificat lock 6 of the screening form in B			
c. Identify the inspection/verif bolts", or "review of procurement	fication method to be used in A t records for vendor package".	Block 5. For example, "100% visu	al inspection of pipe hanger		
<ul> <li>d. Perform and document the veri who performed the verification ar records, etc. It must be possible</li> </ul>	nd date. Records may include m	marked up drawings, inspection ch	ecklists, copies of QC		
4. Component/function requiring verification:	5. Proposed inspection meth	od:	6. Action completed/comments:		
B Plant elevator at east end of 2718	head markings on the B Plant will include the following: the hoist motor cabl located in the penth the caple attachment	e attachments and sheaves House	None found		
	Inspection plan by: 2000 1/3/22 Signature Date	DA Concurrence: MAHill Marth 18.91 Signature/Date	Cognizant Erigheer/Dece		

(8 Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

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## **B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING** 1. System Number: B41H/C41H 2. System Title: Chain Hoists and Rigging Equipment 3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995 4. Instructions: a. Complete one screening form for each plant system. b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria. d. e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence. f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the inspection Record. g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package. 5. Screening Criteria: a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required. b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air. d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment. 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: None. 7. Other Components/Functions: All miscellaneous chain hoists and rigging are inspect for suspect/counterfeit bolt by site crane and rigging. 8 Gre 10 1/8/9 ì 00 C). 8/96 Cog Engineer Cog Manager Date (01/02/96)

1. System Number: B93 (A, B) 2. System Title: Process Instrumentation and Control

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:

a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.

b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.

c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical

d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.

e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.

f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.

g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.

h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work

5. Screening Criteria:

a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.

b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems

c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.

d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u>: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

Failure of the controllers, gauges, relays and similar equipment used in the Process Instrumentation and Control System can produce critical consequences to the facility. The equipment used in this system are not identified as suspect parts on the above identified QAPs.

The electrical supply components were covered with the Electrical System (B12). No suspect components were identified. See the section on Electrical Distribution for details.

7. Other Components/Functions:

The bolts used in the assembly of the Process Instrumentation and Control System are not required to be hardened or otherwise treated.

B PLANT/WESF SU	ISPECT/COUNTE	RFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING	
1. System Number: B93D	2: System Title:	Jet Gang Valves	
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B i potential failure of suspect/ocunterfelt parts could hav physical inspections in accordance with internal Memo Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.	e critical consequer	noss. The purpose of the adreaning is to facilitate	the performance of 🦾
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system	TI.		
b. Identify system components whose failure could h	eve critical consequ	ences by applying the screening enteria in Block S	•
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step	b, along with the fi	unctions whose failure would have critical consequ	ences.
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or its	ms which were eve	lusted but do not meet the screening criteria.	
e. Préparé an inspection Plan for items listed in Block	6. Öbteln QA éón	surrenicë.	
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and re	ecord results on the	Inspection Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.	. E. Roege or D. W. n will be consolidati	Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will f ad on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs	ollow up with a list of ), and one Occurrence
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection f	Plan, inspection reco	ords and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work packs	age.
5. Screening Criteria:			
<ul> <li>a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The co listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been inspection of the component is required.</li> </ul>	2/14/92), 92-02 (08	/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 9	4-01 (08/23/94) and
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment and ite handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, ro</li> </ul>			anes, hoists,
<ul> <li>c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u>: Equipment relied Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fan MCCs; instrument air.</li> </ul>			
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire pro	t whose failure could tections systems w	d have a serious impact on the plant mission due to hich protect equipment.	o resulting equipment
<ol> <li>Critical Components/Functions: Jet gang valves deli the flanges and bolts where the steam and air enter ar</li> </ol>	ver air and steam to id exit the valves.	b liquid transfer jets in the process cells. The critic The only active jet gang valves are as follows.	al components are
JGV 9-9B-1 JGV 9-9B-2 JGV 9-9C-1 JGV 9-9C-2 JGV 9-9C-3 JGV 10-10A-1 JGV 10-10A-2 JGV 10-10A-3 JGV 10-10B-1 JGV 10-10B-2 JGV 10-10B-3 JGV 10-10C-1			
7. Noncritical Components/Functions: All other jet ga	ng valves are consid	dered noncritical because they are inactive.	
8 DB. Kutan Cog Engineer	9. <u>1-5-96</u> Dete	10.	11./ 1/5/96 Dete

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W-C-SS-WY-LITHING, MANY -

SUSPECT/COU	INTERFEIT CO	MPON	ENTS INSP	ECTION PL	ÂN
1. Systèm Number: B93D	2. System Title				
3. Instructions: a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components S	Screening form to identif	y items requi	iring verification.		
b. List the items and functions requiring verifi-				elow,	
<ul> <li>Identify the inspection/verification method t procurement records for vendor package".</li> </ul>					er bolts", or "review of
d. Perform and document the verification as s the verification and date. Records may include whether a particular item in the plant has been	pecified in Block 5. Doc marked up drawings, in inspected.	umentation ( spection che	should indicate cla acklists, copies of	erly what was insp QC records, etc. it	ected, who performed must be possible to tell
4. Component/function requiring verification:	5. Proposed inspectio	on method:	6. Action comp	leted/comments:	
Jet Gang valve assemblies are made up of 4 globe valves mounted to a common manifold, See drawing HW-73123. Inspect the bolts and flanges of the air and steem globe valves for the following list of jet gang	100% visual inspectio flanges and bolts.	n of pipe	Inspector initial	indicates bolts and obe valve are not s	d flanges mating with uspect/counterfeit. . Date5 576-
valve assemblies, reference drawing W- 73676. The air and steam globe valves are the outer 2 valves, or the 2 farthest away from the panel board			Gang valve	Globe Valve	Date <u>, 1570</u> . Inspector initial
JGV 9-9B-1			JGV 9-98-1	Air	, ), <del>,</del>
JGV 9-98-2			JGV 9-98-2	Stearn Air	Initial $\frac{1-1}{12}$
JGV 9-9C-1			JGV 9-9C-1	Steam Air	Initial <u>121773</u>
JGV 9-9C-2			JGV 9-9C-2	Stearn Air	Initial <u>1175</u>
JGV 9-9C-3			JGV 9-9C-3	Steam Air	Initial
JGV 10-10A-1			JGV 10-10A-1	Steam Air	Initial <u>121/15</u>
JGV 10-10A-2			JGV 10-10A-2	Steam Air	Initial <u>191, 18</u>
JGV 10-10A-3			JGV 10-10A-3	Steam Air	Initial
JGV 10-10B-1			JGV 10-10B-1	Steam Air	Initial <u>12415</u>
IGV 10-10B-2 -			JGV 10-10B-2	Air Steam Air	Initial <u> </u>
IGV 10-10B-3			JGV 10-10B-3	Steam	Initial <u>IRIJE</u>
GV 10-10C-1			JGV 10-106-3	Air Steam Air	Initial $\underline{I(D)}$
				Steam	Initial <u>[[]]</u>
Inspection DB	Kun30 1-5-96	QA Concur	1.5.96	Cognizant	Kuba 1-5-96 Engineer/Date
Śigneture,	/Dete	Signature/D			

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

B PLANT/WESF	SUSPE	CT/COUNTERFEIT	COMP	ONENTS SCREEN	ING	
1. System Number: B96 $(A - \varepsilon)$	2. System	Title: Radiation Mon	itoring			
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a subsequent potential failure of subto facilitate the performance of plant Suspect/Counter</li> </ol>	spect/counte hysical insp	erfeit parts could have crit pections in accordance with	ical conseq Internal Me	uences. The purpose of the	screening is	
4. Instructions:						
a. Complete one screening form for	r each plant	t system.				
b. Identify system components who	se failure c	could have critical conseque	nces by app	lying the screening criteri	a in Block 5.	
c. List in Block 6 those component consequences.						
d. List or describe in Block 7 the	ose componen	nts or items which were eval	uated but de	o not meet the screening cr	iteria.	
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items liste	d in Block 6. Obtain QA co	ncurrence.			
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved pl	an and record results on th	e inspection	n Record.		
g. If any suspect/counterfeit iter follow up with a list of deficienc Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and	ies and prop	posed disposition. The info	rmation will	be consolidated on one or	ngineer will more	
<ul> <li>h. File copies of this form, along package.</li> </ul>	g with the I	nspection Plan, inspection	records and	any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work	
5. Screening Criteria:						
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Count</u> 1981 or later which are listed in ( 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) added items listed in these bullet	and 94-02 (	10/18/94). If no modificat	ion or renai	r has been performed which	ms procured in (04/28/93), would have	
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protecti Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders,</li> </ul>	ive equipmen , catwalks,	it and items whose failure c lifting/moving devices, rol	buid directi Lup doors, b	y result in serious injury preathing air systems	. Examples:	
release/spread. Examples: Canyon	c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC NCCs; instrument air.					
d. Equipment with Programmatic Imp resulting equipment damage or nonav	d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.					
6. Components/Functions Requiring V	/erification	:				
The equipment (detectors, monitors, indicators and interconnecting wire) associated with the Radiation Monitoring System is critical to the safety of personnel within the facility. The equipment used in this system are not identified as suspect parts on the above QABs.						
The electrical supply com suspect components were i details.	ponents dentifie	were covered with th d. See the section	e Electr on Elec	ical System (B12). trical Distribution	No for	
7. Other Components/Functions:						
The bolts used in the assembly of the Radiation Monitoring System are not required to be hardened or otherwise treated.						
8. <u>A. Kernande</u> <u>Cog Engineer</u>	9. 1/6/96 Dáte	10. Him Log Manager	11. / 0.996 Date	12 MASS	13, 1/5-/96	

(01/02/96)

1. System Number: 197 2. System File: Slack Monitors 3. Purpose. This form provides a record that such & Plant/LESE system has been screening for applications where the use and to dedite the performance of the screening is to dedition on score of physical inspections in score main Memo 16/101-96-DM-064. I. A. O'Brien to J. A. Annan, & Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994. 4. Jointify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5. 2. List in Stock 4 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences. 5. Perform the Impection Plant for tesm listed in Block 5. 5. Joint in Direct 4 these components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences. 5. Perform the Impection Plant for tesm listed in Block 7. Disting Mark 1997. The Compilant Engineer will form a step of the screening criteria. 5. Perform the Impection Plant for tesm listed in Block 7. Disting Mark 1997. The Compilant Engineer will follow go the list of deficiencies and proved plan and record results on the Impection Plant in the disting Mark 1997. The Compilant Engineer will follow go the list of deficiencies and proved plan. Incomparison Plant, inspection Plant, inspection Plant, inspection Plant, inspection Plant, Mark 2007. State 1000 Plant Plant,	B PLANT/WESF, SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
<pre>subsequent potential failure of support/Gouterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The properties of the screening is to failitized the performance of physical impections in the concentre with informant News 15/10-34 publics. J. A. other in to J. A. Anders, B Plant Support/Gouterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1902.</pre> 4. Instructions: 5. Complete one screening form for each plant system. 5. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5. 6. List in Block 6 these components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5. 6. List in Block 7 these components in terms which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria. 6. Prepare an Inspection Plan for item listed in Block 6. Obtain GA concurrence. 7. Prepare an Inspection pet the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. 7. If any subpertycounterfeit items are found, metify P. E. Reege or D. W. Nerts immediately. The Compitant Engineer will block of this form, along with the Inspection Plan for item listed of finiteness and proceed fignosition. The information will be consolidated on each or wore Noncompare accenter and the screening criterias. 7. Screening Criterias 7. Screening Screenis Screening a	1. System Number: B97 2. System Title: Stack Monitors
<ul> <li>a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.</li> <li>b. identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.</li> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>d. List or describe in Block 7 these components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>e. Prepare an Impaction Plan for laws listed in Block 6. Obtain 84 concurrence.</li> <li>f. Perform the inspection per the Approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>g. if any subpect/countries it them are found, notify P.E. Roege or D. W. Nert immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more wonce wonce theory (500 Will be babbing of the factor on an or more wonce apports (1852) and on Bochrinee Report (1851) will be babbing to a proposed in the subpection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NDs in the JCS work and the a list of concerning in matrix the submarkee Application or repair has been performed which would have added terms listed in these Marker equipment and them whose failure could directly result in serious (njury. Examples: Cranses, Noisk, Instrument self allows those failure potely fails in the strain of relation or repair has been performed which would have added them listed in these sharper found directly result in serious (njury. Examples: Cranses, Noisk, Instrument self allow to prevent or monitor operations) actions in and reduction monitor interventation in relation evaluated to more submy objections are contained to relation for submyond doors; actually allow possible and interviews and interviews and and reduction for submyond borne actions are critical to the facility operation. The endipment where temperity series failment whose failure could have a series in</li></ul>	subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Nemo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J.
<ul> <li>Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.</li> <li>List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>If or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain GA concurrence.</li> <li>Perform the impection per the approved plan and record results on the inspection Record.</li> <li>If any subpect/counterfeit listem are found, motify 0. E. Roeps or 0. U. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow phythes of the form the inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting WGRs in the JGS work pactage.</li> <li>Screening Criteria:         <ul> <li>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1001 of later Which are listed in duality Assumence Bulleting (ARS) 92-02 (00/21/92), 99-02 (00/28/93), 94-03 (00/28/93), 94-02 (00/28/93), 94-03 (00/28/93)</li></ul></li></ul>	4. Instructions:
c. List in Block & these components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences. d. List or describe in Block 7 these components or items which were avaluated but do not meet the screening criteria. e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain GA concurrence. f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. g. If any supper/counterfail tends are found, notify P. E. Rogge or D. U. Mett2 immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed dipassition. The information will be consolidated on one or more wonconformance Reports (ACRS), and one Occurrence Apport (DA) will be submitted for the entire facility. h. File components (ACRS), and one Occurrence Apport (DA) will be submitted for the entire facility. h. File components (ACRS), and one Occurrence Apport (DA) will be submitted for the entire facility. b. File components (ACRS), and one Occurrence Apport (DA) will be submitted for the entire facility. b. File components (ACRS), and the Inspection Plan, inspection necords and any resulting MCRs in the JCS work package. S. Parenting Griteria: c. Parenting for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items presured in foll of later which meet listed in these builts in since 1980, no detailed inspection or regain these builts into which were advantation of the cound direct section and the unspectify the devices, rolling doors, breating air systems for present we public applies. Content is any part is and relation and introduced apprentiation or the protein a counter for any support. The medicine and introduced apprentiation and the instrumentation in thises Systems Counter and supple devi	a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
consequences.         d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not neet the screening criteria.         e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain GA concurrence.         f. Perform the Inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.         g. If any suspect/counserfeit lemas are found, notify P. E. Bogge or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Oppigate Engineer will ending the approach dispection. The information will be submitted for the entire facility.         h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NRs in the JCS work package.         5. Screening Criteria:         a. <u>disting for Prepares of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in Datify Assumes Bulleting (ABSS) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/22/92), 93-002 (04/26/92), 92-02 (08/22/92), 93-002 (04/26/92), 92-02 (08/26/92/92), 92-02 (08/26/92), 92-02 (08/26/92), 92-02 (08/2	b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
<ul> <li>Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain 6A concurrence.</li> <li>Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>If any suspect/counterfeit temms are found, notify P. E. Rospe or D. U. Kertz immediately. The Complant Engineer will encodermate Reports (CER), and one Occurrence Report (CER) will be submitted for the entire facility.</li> <li>File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work mackage.</li> <li>Screening Criteria:         <ul> <li>Distribution of Counterfeit Parts.</li> <li>The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in Nackage.</li> <li>Screening Criteria:             <ul> <li>Distribution of the concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in Nackage.</li> <li>Screening Criteria:                 <ul> <li>Distribution of the component is required.</li> <li>Objective application of the component is required.</li> <li>Objective application of the component is required.</li> <li>Distribution of the component is required.</li> <li>Concers/Apponent Sustem Solution: Equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: cranse, Nists, handralis, indefer, approximate failed upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination related protocol operations apply/enhaust famp; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and realation monitoring equipment; and you for a contamination of the components/functions Requiring Verification:</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li>Components/Fun</li></ul></li></ul>	
<pre>f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more ware mononformatic Reports (VERS), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility. h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package. 5. Screening Criteria: a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The contern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 198 of Graphy and index of Action and the Counter for Suspection of the component is required. b. General Flant Safety. Protective equipment and inspection of the component is required. b. General Flant Safety. Protective equipment and the provide dispection of another operations accidents or contamination c. General Flant Safety. Exclosed applications in the Safety Exclosed support down applies and property down applies for the entite a since integers c. Processful Report Systems Safety Exclosed support down applies and properties and instrumentation are and addition monitoring equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment. c. General with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment used in the Stack Monitors are critical to the facility operation. The equipment in this system are not identified as suspect parts on the above identified QAPs. The electrical supply components were covered with the Electrical System (B12). No suspect components/Functions: The bolts used in the assembly of the Stack Monitors are not required to be hardened or otherwise treated.  a. Attended b. Att</pre>	d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
<ul> <li>g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more moneomore means Reports (NESS), and one Octurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.</li> <li>h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NERs in the JCS work package.</li> <li>S. Screening Criteria:         <ul> <li>a. Pattential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1091 of later union are listed in duality Assumance Bulleting (ORS) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/23/92), 94-01 (08/23/94). If on modification of regain the base performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.</li> <li>b. <u>General Plant Safty</u>. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cannot obsci canyon supply/exhaust fans; NEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 WC NCCs; instrument air.</li> <li>c. <u>Concents/Functions Requiring Verification:</u></li> </ul> </li> <li>The equipment used in the Stack Monitors are critical to the facility operation. The equipment in this system are not identified as suspect parts on the above identified QAPs.</li> <li>The electrical supply components were identified. See the section on Electrical System (B12). No suspect components/Functions:</li> <li>The bolts used in the assembly of the Stack Monitors are not required to be hardened or otherwise treated.</li> <li>a. <u>Mammadian Many Many Many Many Many</u>. <u>Many Many</u>. <u>Many Many</u>. <u>Many</u>. /li></ul>	e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
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Deckage.         S. Screening Criteria:         a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1080 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 52-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (08/28/93), 93-03 (05/28/93), 93-03 (05/28/93), 94-01 (08/28/95), 93-02 (08/28/95), 93-02 (08/28, 93-02), 93-02 (08/28, 93-02), 93-02 (08/28, 93-02), 93-02 (08/28, 93-02), 93-02, 93-02 (08/28, 93-02), 93-02 (08/28, 93-02)	follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more
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<ul> <li>1981 or later which are listed in duality Assumance Bulletins (GABS) 92-01 (02/14/2), 92-02 (GB/21/92), 93-002 (GB/22/92), 93-002 (GB</li></ul>	5. Screening Criteria:
Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catualks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u> : Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/Systems. Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air. d. <u>Equipment with Programmetic Impacts</u> : Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment. 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: The equipment used in the Stack Monitors are critical to the facility operation. The equipment in this system are not identified as suspect parts on the above identified QAPs. The electrical supply components were covered with the Electrical System (B12). No suspect components were identified. See the section on Electrical Distribution for details.  7. Other Components/Functions: The bolts used in the assembly of the Stack Monitors are not required to be hardened or otherwise treated.  8. <u>A.M.mondk</u> 9. <u>JsfM</u> 10. <u>JJSM</u> 11. <u>JsfM</u> 13. <u>Mathemeter</u> 13. <u>Mathemeter</u> 13. <u>Mathemeter</u> 14. <u>Mathemeter 14. <u>Mathemeter</u> 14. <u></u></u>	1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have
release/spread.       Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.         d.       Equipment with Programmetic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.         6.       Components/Functions Requiring Verification:         The equipment used in the Stack Monitors are critical to the facility operation. The equipment in this system are not identified as suspect parts on the above identified QAPs.         The electrical supply components were covered with the Electrical System (B12). No suspect components were identified. See the section on Electrical Distribution for details.         7. Other Components/Functions:         The bolts used in the assembly of the Stack Monitors are not required to be hardened or otherwise treated.         8.       9.         9.       10.         9.       10.         9.       10.         11/8/91       22.         13.       15.	b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Granes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.         6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:         The equipment used in the Stack Monitors are critical to the facility operation. The equipment in this system are not identified as suspect parts on the above identified QAPs.         The electrical supply components were covered with the Electrical System (B12). No suspect components were identified. See the section on Electrical Distribution for details.         7. Other Components/Functions:         The bolts used in the assembly of the Stack Monitors are not required to be hardened or otherwise treated.         8. Mammadk       9. /s/96         9. /s/96       10. May and 11/s/95       12. 13. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 13. 15. 13. 13. 15. 13. 13. 15. 13. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 13. 15. 13. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 13. 15. 13. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 13. 15. 13. 13. 15. 13. 13. 15. 13. 13. 15. 13. 13. 15. 13. 13. 15. 13. 13. 15. 13. 13. 15. 13. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 15. 13. 15. 15. 15. 15. 15. 15. 15. 15. 15. 15	release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation
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The bolts used in the assembly of the Stack Monitors are not required to be hardened or otherwise treated. <b>B.</b> Kennede $\frac{9.1/96}{1.5/96}$ 10. Hung $\frac{11}{1.8/96}$ 12. 13. 13. 15/96	suspect components were identified. See the section on Electrical Distribution for
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Neurande 1/5/96 Destay 1/8/96 mptt 1/5/96	The bolts used in the assembly of the Stack Monitors are not required to be hardened or
	Neurande 1/5/96 Detun 1/8/96 mptt 1/5/96

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number: B97A 2. System Title: 291-B-1 Stack Monitors
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.
4. Instructions:
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work
package.
5. Screening Criteria:
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Granes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u> : Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE
7. Other Components/Functions:
291-B-1 Stack monitoring
Any failure of these items due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise
personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired in a
timely manner.
$\begin{array}{c} 8. \\ \hline \\ Cog Engineer \end{array}$

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. system Number: B97B, B97C, and B97D 2. system Title: 296-B-5 Stack Monitors, 296-B-13 Stack monitors, and 296-B-14 Stack Monitors.
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Wansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.
4. Instructions:
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
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f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.
5. Screening Criteria:
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: $\mathcal{NONE}$ .
7. Other Components/Functions:
296-B-5 Stack monitoring 296-B-13 Stack monitoring 296-B-14 Stack monitoring - Not in service
Any failure of these items due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired in a timely manner.
8 9. 10. 11 Côg Engineer Date Date Date
(01/02/96)

B PLANT/WESF SU	SPECT/COUNTE	ERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING	
1. System Number: B99 B99A B99B B99C B99D B99E B99F	2. System Title: General Plant Su Sign Painter Gen Painter General F Millwright General Pipefiter General Carpenter General Lagger General P	eral Plant Support Plant Support al Plant Support Plant Support al Plant Support	
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B P potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.	e critical consequer	nces. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate ti	a performance of
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system	۱.		
b. Identify system components whose failure could ha	ve critical consequ	ences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.	
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step i	b, along with the fu	unctions whose failure would have critical conseque	nces.
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or iter	ns which were eva	lusted but do not meet the screening criteria.	
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block (	6. Obtain QA cond	currence.	
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and re	cord results on the	Inspection Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.	E. Roege or D. W. will be consolidate	Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will fo ad on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs),	llow up with a list of , and one Occurrence
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection P	lan, inspection reco	ords and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work packag	ja
5. Screening Criteria:			
<ul> <li><u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The cor listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/ 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been inspection of the component is required.</li> </ul>	(14/92), 92-02 (08	/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-	-01 (08/23/94) and
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment and iten handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, roll</li> </ul>	ns whose failure co up doors, breathing	puld directly result in serious injury. Examples: Crai g air systems	nes, hoists,
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u>: Equipment relied Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans MCCs; instrument air.</li> </ul>	upon to prevent or ; HEPA filters and i	monitor operational accidents or contamination rele instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipm	ase/spread. ent; 480 VAC
d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire prot	whose failure could ections systems wi	d have a serious impact on the plant mission due to hich protect equipment.	resulting equipment
<ol> <li>6. Critical Components/Functions: None. This system is areas/systems in which it is contained.</li> </ol>	e for general minor	work. This work will be inspected as required as p	art of the
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
7. Noncritical Components/Functions: None.			
8. BRutech Cog Engineer	9. 	10. Rithingful Cog Menager	11, 1/12/96
		Coft wisungles	Date (12/29/95)

			WHC-SD-WM-IP-009, R
B PLANT/WESF SUS	PECT/COUNT	ERFEIT COMPONENTS SCR	EENING
1. System Number: B99G	2. System Titl	e: Sample Truck	
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that a subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical insp N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts A	ections in accord	ance with Internal Memo 16710-94	Purpose of the screening is
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.		
b. Identify system components whose failure components	ould have critica	l consequences by applying the so	reening criteria in Block 5.
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.</li> </ul>	f in step b, alon	g with the functions whose failur	e would have critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those component			he screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed			
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla			
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and prope Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrent			
h. File copies of this form, along with the In package.	spection Plan, i	nspection records and any resulti	ng NCRs in the JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:			
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Guality Assur 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (1 added items listed in these bulletins since 198	0/18/94) If no	Rds) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08	/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93),
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handraiis, ladders, catwalks, l</li> </ul>	and items whose ifting/moving dev	failure could directly result in vices, rollup doors, breathing ai	serious injury. Examples: r systems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u> ; Equipment release/spread. Examples: Canyor doors; cany monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCor instrument		revent or monitor operational acc fans; HEPA filters and instrument	idents or contamination ntation; air and radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u> : Equip	ment whose failur	e could have a serious impact on	the plant mission due to
resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:	Examples: Crane	s, fire protections systems which	protect equipment.
NUNE			
7. Other Components/Functions:			
The Sample truck is not considered critical equivarranted.	ipment and is no	longer located at 8 Plant. There	fore an inspection is not
8. Willing	9. ip/71.2	10. Guing	11/1/91
	Dáte	Cog Manager /	Date

(01/02/96)

			P-009, Rev.
B PLANT/WESF SUSP	ECT/COUNTE	ERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING	
1. System Number: B99J	2. System Titl	e: Canyon Cover Blocks	
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that e subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspe N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Ac	ctions in accord	ance with Internal Memo 16710-94-pine 0/2	te the use and te screening is O'Brien to J.
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system,		
		I consequences by applying the screening criter	ia in Rlock 5
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.</li> </ul>			
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components	s or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening c	riteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed			
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan	n and record res	ults on the Inspection Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and propose Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence			Engineer will r more
h. File copies of this form, along with the Ins package.	spection Plan, in	nspection records and any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:			
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assura 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10 added items listed in these bulletins since 1980	1/18/94 If no	modification an area been been been been been been been be	ems procured in 2 (04/28/93), 1 would have
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment</li> <li>Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, li</li> </ul>	and items whose fting/moving dev	failure could directly result in serious injury vices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	. Examples:
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment r release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyo monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument a		revent or monitor operational accidents or conta t fans; HEPA filters and instr <b>umen</b> tation; air an	mination d radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u> : Equipm	ent whose failur	re could have a serious impact on the plant miss	ion due to
resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:	Examples: Unane	es, the protections systems which protect equip	ment.
LUNE			
			1. 
7. Other Components/Functions:			
The Canyon cover blocks contain no components th	at are considere	d suspect.	
8. /// internet	9. //3/c <sub>l2</sub> Date	10. <i>J. Him</i> Cog Manager	11, 14/91_

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B PLANT/WESF SUS	PECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING			
1. System Number: B99K	2. System Title: Canyon Doors*			
subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter	each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where rfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the ections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. ction Plan, dated May 24, 1994	screening is		
<ol> <li>Instructions:</li> <li>a. Complete one screening form for each plant</li> </ol>	svetem.			
	ould have critical consequences by applying the screening criteri	a in Block 5.		
	d in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have cr			
d. List or describe in Block 7 those componen	ts or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening cr	iteria.		
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items liste	d in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.			
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pl	an and record results on the inspection Record.			
follow up with a list of deficiencies and prop	, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant E osed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or nce Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.	ngineer will more		
h. File copies of this form, along with the I package.	nspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work		
5. Screening Criteria:				
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/2B/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.				
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipmen Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks,	t and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	. Examples:		
	relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or conta yon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and air.			
	pment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant miss Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equip			
<ol> <li>Components/Functions Requiring Verification</li> <li>*Included in the inspection will be all canyor</li> </ol>	and overhead doors at B Plant, WESF and 2128.			
Inpsect all B Plant, and WESF rollup, bifold a	nd elevator doors. Also inspect the building 2128 rollup door.			
7. Other Components/Functions:				
System B99K also includes personnel access doors. These doors will not be inspected because they do not contain any components that are considered suspect. The bifold doors at building 212B were also not inspected. These doors are rarely used and a visual inspection by the cognizant engineer indicates that the original hardware on these doors has not been changed. The doors were installed prior to 1981.				
8. Ju Mint	9. 15/94 Date / Cog Manager	11/ 1/5/96 Date		

sus	PECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION P	
1. System Number: B99K	2. System Title: Canyon Doors *	LAN
3. Instructions:		
	Components Screening form to identify items requiring verifica	
b. List the items and functions	requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in a	tion.
c. Identify the inspection/veribolts", or "review of procurement"	fication method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visit records for vendor package".	Block 4 below.
	ification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicand date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection charter to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been insp	ite clearly what was inspected, ecklists, copies of QC ected
<ol> <li>Component/function requiring verification:</li> </ol>	5. Proposed inspection method:	6. Action
*Included in the inspection will be all canyon and		completed/comments:
overhead doors at B Plant, WESF and 212B.	Perform 100% visual examination of the canyon doors and the associated hardware. List each door on the "Counterfeit/Suspect Part Inspection Record". If suspect parts are identified provide information of	INSPECTION COMPLETE
Inspect all of the following	specified on the "R Plant/USER outmation on the parts as	NO SUSPECT PALTS
doors and associated mechanical hardware for suspect components,	& Disposition Report".	NO SUSPECT PARTS IDENTIFIED MUM 1/5/96
1. 271B tool crib overhead		
door at B Plant 2. 271B railroad tunnel overhead door at B Plant		
3. North overhead door at WESF 4. West overhead truckmost		
5. 212B gyerhead door		
6. Bifold truckport door at WESF (225B). 7. WESF (225B) upper elevator		
8. WESF (225B) lower bifold		
doors		
•		
In	spection plan by: QA Concurrence:	1
	in much 1-lac Michael, and	Ognizant Engineer/Date
	gnature/Date Signature/Date	
	M.A. HILL	Mun 15/96.

B PLANT/WESF SUSF	PECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number: B99L, C99K	2. System Title: B Plant Structural, WESF Structural
subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter	each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and rfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is ections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. ction Plan, dated May 24, 1994.
4. Instructions: a. Complete one screening form for each plant	
	system. ould have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
	d in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical
c. List in Block & those components identified consequences.	
	ts or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	an and record results on the Inspection Record.
follow up with a list of deficiencies and propo	, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will osed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more nce Report (DR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
	nspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work
package	
5. Screening Criteria:	
1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assur 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (1	s. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in rance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have 80, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, l	t and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; cany monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument	relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination yon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation air.
	pment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.
6, Components/Functions Requiring Verification:	
items are personnel safety related and will req	ect of "structural" are permanently installed handrails and ladders. These quire an inspection for suspect fasteners. The ladders and handrails that have "Suspect/Counterfeit Components Inspection Plan". The remaining structural dressed in Block 7 below.
will be inspected. The majority of the handra criteria. The criteria are the amount of use, compromised due to the presence of suspect part	ll be inspected under the same inspection plan. Not all handrails and ladders ails and ladders selected for inspection have been selected based on two and the risk to personnel safety if the subject ladder or handrail is ts. The remaining handrails and ladders to be inspected have been randomly ng the inspection of any of the selected ladders or handrails, inspection of e necessary.
7. Other Components/Functions:	
constructed prior to 1981. No documentation ca changes made to these structures after 1981 inv identified. There is currently a roof inspection the safety inspections for the roofs (inspection	WESF facilities do not require an inspection. These structures were an be found (work packages, ECN's) to indicate that modifications or design volve suspect fasteners. No structural deficiencies have been previously ion program for Hanford facilities. Documentation is available to verify that on plan WHC-SD-GN-ER-30012) of all major buildings at B Plant and WESF are
current.	

1/2/96     1/2/96     1/8/96       Cog Engineer     Date     Eog Manager	Cog Engineer	9. 1/5/96 Date	10 Hen Log Manager	11. //8:/96 Bate
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SUSI	PECT/COUNTERFEIT CON	PONENTS INSPECTION PL	AN
1. System Number: B99L, C99K	2. System Title: B Plant St	ructural, WESF Structural	
3. Instructions:			
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit (	Components Screening form to id	dentify items requiring verificat	ion.
b. List the items and functions	requiring verification from Bl	ock 6 of the screening form in B	lock 4 below.
<ul> <li>c. Identify the inspection/verif bolts", or "review of procurement</li> </ul>	Fication method to be used in B records for vendor package".	Block 5. For example, "100% visu	al inspection of pipe hanger
d. Perform and document the veri who performed the verification ar records, etc. It must be possible	kidate. Records may include m	marked up drawings, inspection ch	ecklists, copies of QC
4. Component/function requiring verification:	5. Proposed inspection method	od:	6. Action completed/comments:
The following permanently installed ladders and handrails shall be inspected. (System B99L is B Plant ladders of handrails, System C99K is WESF ladders or handrails).	Perform a 100% visual inspec anchor the permanantly insta listed. List each ladder an each on the "Counterfeit/Sus and recored results of inspec	lled ladders and handrails nd handrail and the location of Dect Part Inspection Record"	INSPECTION COMPLETE, NO SUSPECT COMPONENTS IDENTIFIED ALM 1/9/96
1. B Plant 2718 roof ladder			111h 1/9/96
<ol> <li>B Plant railroad tunnel access</li> <li>WESF East lower roof access</li> </ol>			
4. WESF South lower roof access 5. WESF West upper roof access			
<ul> <li>6. East Crane Access</li> <li>7. West Grane Access</li> <li>8. B Plant R-13 Roof access ladder</li> <li>9. B Plant building 2128 upper roof access.</li> <li>10. B Plant building 2128 lower roof access</li> <li>11. WESF transmitter room #2 access</li> <li>12. WESF transmitter room #1 access</li> <li>13. WESF pool cell Handrail</li> <li>14. WESF pool cell catwalk handrail</li> <li>15. B Plant #11 inside stairwell handrails</li> <li>16. B Plant #13 inside stairwell at entrance</li> <li>17. B Plant #13 outside stairwell handrails</li> <li>18. B Plant #13 outside stairwell at entrance</li> </ul>			
	Inspection plan by:	QA Concurrence: M. J. 1. 3. 96 Signature/Date M. A. Hill	Li Wi 11/hat 1/3/96. Cognizant Engineer/Date AD- for BUG 1/12/96

B PLANT/WESF SUSP	ECT/COUNTE	RFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING	<u> </u>			
1. System Number: 899M	2. System Title	e: Expansion Joints				
subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspe	3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-0WM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995. (1994) https://doi.org/10.00000000000000000000000000000000000					
4. Instructions:						
a. Complete one screening form for each plant :	system.					
b. Identify system components whose failure co	uld have critical	l consequences by applying the screening criteri	a in Block 5.			
c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.	in step b, along	with the functions whose failure would have cr	itical			
d. List or describe in Block 7 those component:	s or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening cr	iteria.			
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Obt	ain QA concurrence.				
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	n and record resu	ilts on the Inspection Record.				
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and propose Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrent	sed disposition.	The information will be consolidated on one or	ngineer will more			
h. File copies of this form, along with the Ins	spection Plan, in	spection records and any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work			
package.						
<ol> <li>Screening Criteria:</li> <li>a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u></li> <li>1981 or Later which are listed in Quality Assura</li> <li>93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10</li> <li>added items listed in these bulletins since 1980</li> </ol>	ance Bulletins (Q 0/18/94). If no	MABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 modification or repair has been performed which	(04/28/93)			
b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, l	and items whose ifting/moving dev	failure could directly result in serious injury vices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	. Examples:			
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment n release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument a	on supply/exhaust	event or monitor operational accidents or contar fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and	mination d radiation			
d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment damage or nonavailability.						
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:						
NONE						
7. Other Components/Functions:						
Expansion joints cont no components that are con	nsidered suspect.	Therefore an inspection is not warranted.				
8. Milling	9. //3/7.0- Date	10 Cog Manager /	11. 1/4/96-			

(01/02/96)

<ul> <li><u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have or since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.</li> <li><u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: ranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems injury. Examples: elease/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation Equipment with Programmatic Impacts; Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to sulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.</li> </ul>					
Spring Title: Compressed Gas Storage     Subsequent potential	B PLANT/WESF SU	ISPECT/CO			
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/VESF system has been screened for applications where the use and to facilitate the performance of puperticing interventing the screening is accordance with Intervent end. Consequences. The purpose of the ispectro.         4. Annee, B Plant Suppert/Counterfeit Paris Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.         4. Instructions:         a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.         b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.         c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical         c. List in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.         c. List in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.         c. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain GA concurrence.         g. if any supper/Counterfeit items are doroposed plan and record results on the Inspection Record.         g. if any supper/Counterfeit items are doroposed plan, inspection records and any resulting MCRs in the JCS work.         c. Screening Criteria:         a. Screening Criteria:         b. Screening Criteria:         b. Screening Criteria:         s. Screening Criteria:         c. Screening Criteria:         c. Screening Criteria:         b. Screening Criteria:         c. Screening Crit	1. System Number: 899P	2. Syste		ONENTS SCREENING	3
4. Instructions:         a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.         b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.         c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step D, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.         d. List or describe in Block 7 those components on items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.         e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.         f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.         g. If any subsect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. c. Sager or D. u. Metti immediately. The Cognizant Engineer with Nonconformance Reports (MGRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) with be subsitied of the entire facility.         h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work         5. Screening Criteria:         8. Potencial for present of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items provide in duality Assurance Bulleting inclusion or regain has been performed which works of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit in serious injunct on the serient is replice.         9. Grant Line Griteria:         8. Screening Criteria:         8. Scr	7 0				
4. Instructions:         a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.         b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.         c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step D, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.         d. List or describe in Block 7 those components on items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.         e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.         f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.         g. If any subsect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. c. Sager or D. u. Metti immediately. The Cognizant Engineer with Nonconformance Reports (MGRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) with be subsitied of the entire facility.         h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work         5. Screening Criteria:         8. Potencial for present of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items provide in duality Assurance Bulleting inclusion or regain has been performed which works of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit in serious injunct on the serient is replice.         9. Grant Line Griteria:         8. Screening Criteria:         8. Screening Criteria:         8. Screening Criteria:         8. Screening Criteria:         9. Otoncial for present of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for s	5. Purpose. This form provides a record that subsequent potential failure of suspect/count to facilitate the performance of physical indication.	t each B Plan terfeit parts	t/WESF system has been could have critical (	) screened for application	75 Where the
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system. b. Identify aystem components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5. c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences. d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria. e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence. f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. g. If any supperf/counterfait items are found, notify P. E. Reege on D. V. Nertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will be for deficienties and proposed disposition to information will be consolidately. The Cognizant Engineer will be consolidated to an or more analyze the strate of the strate strate plane to the strate strate of the strate t stratested in the stratest stratested stra	4. Instructions	Action Plan,	accordance with Interr dated May 24, 1995.	nal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048,	of the screening is J. A. O'Brien to J
<ul> <li>Description of the serven of th</li></ul>					
<ul> <li>d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.</li> <li>f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>g. If any subject/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Reage or D. V. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will hold of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more money that a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more markage.</li> <li>S. Screening Criteria:         <ul> <li>a. Patential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/conterfeit parts applies only to itams procured in 203 (05/21/4/22), 92-00 (08/21/</li></ul></li></ul>	U. Identity system components whose failure				
<ul> <li>d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.</li> <li>f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>g. If any subject/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Reage or D. V. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will hold of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more money that a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more markage.</li> <li>S. Screening Criteria:         <ul> <li>a. Patential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/conterfeit parts applies only to itams procured in 203 (05/21/4/22), 92-00 (08/21/</li></ul></li></ul>	<ul> <li>List in Block 6 those components identification</li> </ul>	could have cr	itical consequences by	applying the screening of	riteria in Block F
<ul> <li>Prepare an Inspection Plan for items Listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.</li> <li>F. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>JI any suspect/counterfeit items are found provided plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>JI any suspect/counterfeit items are found provided plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>JI any suspect/counterfeit items are found provided plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>JI any suspect/counterfeit items are found provided plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>JI any suspect/counterfeit items are found provided plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>JI any suspect/counterfeit items are found provided plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>JI any suspect/counterfeit plants.</li> <li>Screening Criteria:</li> <li>Screening Criteria:</li> <li><u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in Dispection of the component is required.</li> <li>JI of Dispective which are listed in Duality Assurance Bulletins (DABS) 92:01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (02/28/93), 94-01 (08/28/94), and 94.02 (10/28/94), 10 and 94.02</li></ul>	d. List or describe in Block 7 these	in step b,	along with the functi	ons whose failure would h	ave critical
9. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege on D. W. Mert2 immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more wonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility. In ackage. 5. Screening Criteria: a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in addition of 100/23/963, 92-01 (02/23/93), 92-01 (02/23/962), 92-000 (02/23/962), 92/962), 92-02 (02/23/962), 92/962, 92/	e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items lists	its or items w	which were evaluated b	ut do not meet the screen	
Nonconformance Reports (NCRS), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility. The Cognizant Engineer will be consolidated on one or more the factor of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work. 5. Screening Criteria: a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in Plan or (1972), 92-02 (02/14/92), 92-02 (02/14/92), 92-02 (02/14/92), 92-02 (02/14/92), 92-02 (02/14/92), 92-02 (02/21/92), 93-002 (02/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (03/23/94), and 94-02 (10/18/92). If no modification or nepain has been performed which would have failure since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required. a. <u>General Plant Safety</u> protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: elass/spread, Examples: Campon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; NEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation supplices on non-availability. Examples: could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to Components. Failure of a fastener in the components/functions Requiring Verification: components/functions Requiring Verification: components/functions Requiring Verification: components/functions Requiring Verification: process/support Systems Safety: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to Components/functions Requiring Verification: e. Components/functions Requiring Verification: components/functions Requiring Verification: processed gas storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the dication in which they are used is extremely unlikely.	the inspection per the approved at			se.	
package.         5. Screening Criteria:         a.       Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in Quality Assurance Building (QABS) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (06/28/93), 93-002 (06/28/9	9. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of definitions are found.	notify p r	results on the Inspec	tion Record.	
package.         5. Screening Criteria:         a.       Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in Quality Assurance Building (QABS) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (06/28/93), 93-002 (06/28/9	Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrer	osed disposit ice Report (OF	ion. The information Will be submitted (	immediately. The Cogniz Will be consolidated on o	ant Engineer will
a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit Parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-003 (04/28/93), 94-01 (05/28/93), 94-01 (05/28/93), 94-01 (05/28/93), 94-01 (05/28/93), 94-01 (05/28/93), 95-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 95-03 (05/28/93), 94-01 (05/2	package.	spection Plan	, inspection records	or the entire facility.	ic of more
General Plant Safety.       Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples:         ranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems       Series/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination nonitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.         Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:       Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to component systems which protect equipment.         Components/Functions Requiring Verification:       Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.         re       Other Components/Functions:       Protective equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the listent of					
Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation prices and requipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to components/Functions Requiring Verification:         ne         Other Components/Functions:         compressed gas storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the intervent of plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the figure.         Mathematical and the series of the series		, no detai(ec	inspection of al	poir nas been performed	items procured in -002 (04/28/93), hich Weyld base
Denitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.       Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to sulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.         Components/Functions Requiring Verification:       0         Other Components/Functions:       0         optimized gas storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the list they are used is extremely unlikely.         Margineer       9.//1.9L         Deniter       10         Margineer       11//	Designed and the second	fting/moving	se failure could direc	tly result in serious in	
Subject       With Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to sulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.         Components/Functions Requiring Verification:         ne         Other Components/Functions:         compressed gas storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the lication in which they are used is extremely unlikely.         Mammature         9.       10         Mammature       11/	phitoring equipment; 480 VAC Mrrs; instantion	supply/exhai	prevent or monitor op	erational accidents	
Defining verification: Defining verification: Other Components/Functions: compressed gas storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the dication in which they are used is extremely unlikely. Defining the storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the Defining the storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the Defining the storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the Defining the storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the Defining the storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the Defining the storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the Defining the storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the Defining the storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the Defining the storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the Defining the storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the storage racks are not co	sulting equipment damage or nonavailability of	nt whose fail	ure could have a serie		and radiation
Other Components/Functions: compressed gas storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the lication in which they are used is extremely unlikely.	Components/Functions Requiring Verification	Xamples: Cra	nes, fire protections	systems which protect equ	ission due to
compressed gas storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the discation in which they are used is extremely unlikely. $\frac{9}{10}$ $\frac{10}{10}$ $\frac{11}{11}$	ne				
Pare 10 Juny 11/	Other Components/Functions:				
Pare 10 Juny 11/	Compressed gas storage racks are not considere	d coition			
Engineer 11/94 Stan 11/	is extremely un	likely.	urpment for plant open	ation. Failure of a fast	ener in the
Engineer 11/94 Stan 11/					
Engineer 11/96 Star		/ /	10 //		
Date		11/96 te	Destan		11/1/91
					Date

B PLANT/M	VESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING Page 1 of 1				
1. System Number: Cl2,Cl2B,Cl2D,Cl2F thru P	2. System Title: Electrical Distribution Systems				
subsequent potential failure of sus to facilitate the performance of ph	record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and spect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is hysical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. feit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.				
4. Instructions:					
a. Complete one screening form for	r each plant system.				
	se failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.				
c. List in Block 6 those component consequences.	ts identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical				
d. List or describe in Block 7 the	ose components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.				
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.				
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.				
follow up with a list of deficienci	ns are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will ies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.				
<ul> <li>File copies of this form, along package.</li> </ul>	g with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work				
5. Screening Criteria:					
1981 or later which are listed in © 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94)	terfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in Auality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have ins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.				
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protecti Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders,	ive equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: , catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems				
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> release/spread. Examples: Canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs;	Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation; instrument air.				
	<u>cacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to vailability. Examples: Granes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.				
6. Components/Functions Requiring W	/erification:				
A. All 240V and 480V breakers - 240	DV and 480V breakers are listed in the QAB, and are a personnel safety concern.				
<ol> <li>Ventilation Exhaust fans</li> </ol>	<ul> <li>B. Other components (Aux Contacts, Heaters, Starters, and Trip Devices) in NCCs for the following critical applications:</li> <li>1. Ventilation Exhaust fans</li> <li>2. Cranes/Elevators/Trolleys/Hoisting Equipment/Doors</li> <li>3. Air Compressors</li> </ul>				
C. Remote starting equipment for it	cems in B above.				
D. Switchgear, Substations, Transformers and Gage glasses - They are listed on the QAB.					
7. Other Components/Functions:					
A. Relays and motors will not be inspected because installed equipment is not the types listed on the QAB. This is based on knowledge of the Plant by Electricians and Engineers that those components do not exist at our facility.					
8. Other electrical components (Aux Contacts, Heaters, Starters, and Trip Devices) identified for non critical applications will not be verified.					
C. System components of types other than identified on QABs will not be verified.					
0. Bolts will not be inspected - Th	nere are no requirements for high strength				
8. mpt	9. 10. 10. 10. 11. 12. 12. 11. 13. 1/2 13. 1/2				
Cog Engineer	Date Log Manager Date Screen Preparer Date				

SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN Page 1 of 3					
1. System Number: B12 Systems	2. System Title: Electrical Distribution Systems				
3. Instructions:					
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit	Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification	tion.			
	s requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in I				
<ul> <li>c. Identify the inspection/ver bolts", or "review of procurement</li> </ul>	ification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visu nt records for vendor package".	wal inspection of pipe hanger			
	fification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indice and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection ch ole to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been insp	ACK ISTS CODIES OF OC			
4. Component/function grequiring verification: A. 480V Breakers.	5. Proposed inspection method: A.	6. Action completed/comments:			
	~ 100% visual inspection of 480V breakers, complete make/model numbers and compare information to QAB 92-01.	Done			
	Record make/model number.	Dave			
	- If data matches an item on the suspect list then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify as such on inspection form.	32 briskers identified. see NCR 1051124			
	- If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form.	Hresher destile			
B. 240V breakers.	B. - Review drawings and identify any 240V breakers for ampacities listed in QAB which need to be inspected.	Done			
	<ul> <li>Perform visual inspection for the identified breakers.</li> </ul>	Done			
	- Record make/model number.	Done.			
	<ul> <li>If data matches an item on the suspect list, then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify as such on inspection form.</li> </ul>	Done None identified None identified			
	<ul> <li>If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form.</li> </ul>	None identified			

SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN Page 2 of 3				
4. Component/function requiring verification:	5. Proposed inspection method:	6. Action completed/comments:		
C. Other components in MCCs for critical applications.	C. -Review drawings and identify any components associated with critical applications (see block 6b of screening form).	Done		
	- Perform visual inspection of auxiliary contacts, heaters, starters and trip devices identified.	Done		
	- If data matches an item on the suspect list, then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify on attached list with breaker and identify as such on inspection form.	None destified		
	<ul> <li>If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form.</li> </ul>	None de tified		
D. Remote starting equipment for items in critical applications.	D. -Review drawings and identify any components associated with critical applications (see block 6b of screening form).	Done		
	<ul> <li>Perform visual inspection of auxiliary contacts, heaters, starters and trip devices identified.</li> </ul>	Done		
	- If data matches an item on the suspect list, then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify on attached list and identify as such on inspection form.	None dentified		
	<ul> <li>If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form.</li> </ul>	None identified		
E. Switchgear and substations and gage glasses.	E. - Review drawing, CVI or perform visual inspection of switchgears, substations and gage glasses for components on QAB.	Done		
	- If data matches an item on the suspect list, then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify on attached list and identify as such on inspection form.	None identified		
	<ul> <li>If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form.</li> </ul>	Nou identified.		
	B-104			

SL	SPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION P	LAN Page 3 of 3
4. Component/function requiring verification:	5. Proposed inspection method:	6. Action completed/comments:
F. Transformers	F. - Review drawings and identify any transformers for KVA listed in QAB which need to be inspected.	Dore
	- Perform visual inspection for the identified transformers.	None identified
	- If data matches an item on the suspect list then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify as such on inspection form.	Done None identified None identified None identified
	- If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form.	None identified
	Inspection plan by: QA Concurrence: R. Neuron 1/9/96 Withereff 1/9/96	MICH 1/9/96. Cognizant Engineer/Date
		6 Jan 1/9/96 Cognizant Manager/Date

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

		SPECT/COUNTERFEIT		ENTS SCREENING	
1. System Number: C12E	2. Syste	m Title: EMERGENCY 480 VAC (	DIESEL		
3. Purpose. This form provides a subsequent potential failure of s to facilitate the performance of N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counte	physical in	spections in accordance with	Internal N		
4. Instructions:					
a. Complete one screening form f	or each ola	nt system.			
b. Identify system components who					
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those component consequences.</li> </ul>					
d. List or describe in Block 7 th					
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for					
f. Perform the inspection per the					
g. If any suspect/counterfeit ite follow up with a list of deficience Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and	ms are four	nd, notify P. E. Roege or D.	W. Mertz i	mmediately. The Cognizant Eng	jineer will more
h. File copies of this form, alor package.	g with the	Inspection Plan, inspection	records an	d any resulting NCRs in the JC	S work
5. Screening Criteria:					
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Cour</u> 1981 or later which are listed in 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) added items listed in these bullet	and 04.02		1 (02/14/9/	c), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (	procured in 04/28/93), ould have
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protect Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders</li> </ul>	ive equipme , catwalks,	nt and items whose failure o lifting/moving devices, rol	ould direct	ly result in serious injury. breathing air systems	
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u> release/spread. Examples: Canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCS	; instrumen	t air.	PA TILLERS	and instrumentation; air and	radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Im</u> resulting equipment damage or nona	o <u>acts:</u> Equ vailability	ipment whose failure could h . Examples: Cranes, fire p	ave a serio rotections	us impact on the plant mission systems which protect equipment	n due to nt.
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:					
The equipment mentioned below is located in the diesel generator building. The diesel generator and related components are Safety Class 2 according to WHC-CM-4-46, Safety Analysis Manual. The diesel generator is required by the Operational Safety Requirement, 11.4.2. WESF Ventilation Systems, in the Waste Encapsulation & Storage Facility (WESF) Safety Analysis Report (SSR), SD-WM-SAR-005. The diesel generator functions as a backup electrical power source to critical systems in the event of loss of normal power to those systems. The bolts which secure the following shall be visually inspected for suspect/components according to the QABs mentioned above: 1) the engine to the generator and both units to the floor, 2) the diesel engine cooling system electric fan motor to the mounting device and this device to the floor, 3) the battery charger to the wall, 4) the Automatic Transfer Switches (ATSs) and their cabinets to the wall or floor, 5) the electrical distribution panel to the wall, 6) the unit heater to the top of the ATS cabinet, 7) the electric loads sequencer panel to the wall,					
The 120 volt electrical relays and 480 volt circuit breakers in the diesel generator control cabinet, the electric load sequencer panel, and the automatic transfer switches cabinets shall be visually inspected to verify they are not counterfeit per the QABs mentioned above. The engine cooling system 480 volt motor and its thermal trip heaters are of a type not specified on the QABs above.					
7. Other Components/Functions:					
The 120 volt circuit breakers in the diesel generator lighting panel distribute power to the lighting, the engine water and bil heaters, the battery charger, and the fuel line heat trace. These circuit breakers were not inspected, since there are no 120 volt circuit breakers specified as suspect/counterfeit components on the GABs identified above.					
8. MP	115/96	10 Jaco	11/1/96	12 Ben Schurcha	13. /-5-96
	Date	Cog Manager	Daté	Screen Preparer	Daté

SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN					
1. System Number: C12E 2. System Title: EMERGENCY 480 VAC DIESEL					
<ul> <li>3. Instructions:</li> <li>a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.</li> <li>b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.</li> <li>c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".</li> <li>d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.</li> </ul>					
4. Component/function requiring verification:	5. Proposed inspection method:	6. Action completed/comments:			
The bolts which secure the following shall be inspected for head markings: 1 the engine to the generator and both units to the floor, 2 the diesel engine cooling system electric fan motor to the mounting device and this device to the floor, 3 the battery charger to the wall, 4 the Automatic Transfer Switches (ATSs) and their cabinets to the wall or floor, 5 the electrical distribution panel to the wall, 6 the unit heater to the top of the ATS cabinet, 7 the electric loads sequencer panel to the wall,	The bolts shall be visually inspected. The actual bolt head markings will be compared with the illustrations on the QABs to determine if they are suspect.	Inspection of bolts completed. No suspect bolts found.			
The 120 volt electrical relays in the diesel generator control cabinet, the electric load sequencer panel, and the automatic transfer switches cabinets shall be visually inspected.	The relays shall be visually inspected. The manufacturer and model will be compared with the types identified on the QABs to determine if they are suspect.	Inspection of relays completed. No suspect relays found.			
The 480 volt circuit breakers in the diesel generator control cabinet and the automatic transfer switches cabinets shall be visually inspected.	The circuit breakers shall be visually inspected. The manufacturer and model will be compared with the types identified on the QABs to determine if they are suspect.	Inspection of circuit breakers completed. No suspect circuit breakers found. Since visual inspection did not provide desired results, the vendor			
The cooling fan motor shall be inspected.	The motor shall be visually inspected. Compare the make and model of the motor to the vendor information and the types identified on the QABs to determine if they are suspect. Inspection of motor completed. The mot not suspect/counter				
	Inspection plan by: Perfuence Signature/Date M.A. Hill	Man 15/96 Cognizant Engineer/Date			

<sup>(8</sup> Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING				
1. System Number: C15 /A/C	2. System Title: Communications			
subsequent potential failure of susp to facilitate the performance of phy	ecord that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the pect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the scr ysical inspections in accordance with Internal Nemc 16710-94-DUM-048, J. A. 0'Br eit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.	reening is		
4. Instructions:				
a. Complete one screening form for	each plant system.			
b. Identify system components whose	e failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in	n Block 5.		
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components consequences.</li> </ul>	s identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critic	cal -		
d. List or describe in Block 7 thos	se components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criter	ría.		
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for i	items listed in Block 6. Obtain 9A concurrence.			
f. Perform the inspection per the a	approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.			
follow up with a list of deficiencie	s are found, notify P. E. Roege or C. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engir es and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or mor one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.	neer wîil Te		
h. File copies of this form, along package.	with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS	work		
5. Screening Criteria;				
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counter</u> 1981 or later which are listed in QL 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) a	<u>erfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items p wality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04 and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which wou has since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.	178/031		
b. <u>General Plant S</u> afety. Protectiv	re equipment and îtems whose failure could directly result in serious injury. E catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	xamples:		
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> release/spread. Examples: Canyon d monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs;</li> </ul>	Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamina loors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and ra instrument air.	tion distion		
	<u>icts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission iilability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment			
6. Components/Functions Requiring Ve	rification:			
The Communications Systems been identified as suspect	;, PAX, evacuation siren and radio contain no parts which ; in the QABs identified above.	have		
The electrical supply comp suspect components were id details.	conents were covered with the Electrical System (B12). No lentified. See the section on Electrical Distribution fo	r		
7				
7. Other Components/Functions: The bolts used in the asse hardened or otherwise trea	mbly of the Communication Systems are not required to be ted.			
8. mptt	9. 1/5/96 10. 1/8/96 mptt	13. 1/ <i>5/96</i>		
Cog Engineer	Date Cog Manager/ Date Screen Preparer   R-108	Date		

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B PLANT/WESF SUSP	B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING			
1. System Number: C20 C20A C20B B20L	2. system Title: RAW WATER RAW WATER SUPPLY FOR PROCESS RAW WATER SUPPLY FOR FIRE EMERGENCY BACKUP WELLS (282B AND 282BA)			
i subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter	ach B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and feit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is ctions in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-0WM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. tion Plan, dated May 24, 1995.			
4. Instructions:				
a. Complete one screening form for each plant :	system.			
b. Identify system components whose failure co	uld have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.			
c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.	in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical			
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components	s or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.			
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Obtain OA concurrence.			
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plar	n and record results on the Inspection Record.			
I TOLLOW UP WITH a LIST of deficiencies and propos	notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will sed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more se Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.			
<ul> <li>h. File copies of this form, along with the Ins package.</li> </ul>	spection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work			
5. Screening Criteria:				
981 or later which are listed in Quality Assura 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10	The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in ance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), D/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have D, no detailed inspection of the component is required.			
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, li	and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: fting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems			
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument a	relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination on supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation vir.			
<ul> <li><u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u>: Equipm resulting equipment damage or nonavailability.</li> </ul>	ment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.			
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: System use: pool cell cooling, proc	cess fire sprays (OSR)			
Components requiring verification: Bolts (including piping supports),	flanges, valves			
7. Other Components/Functions:				
	1 1_1LB			
8. Bar Bar T	9. 10. Alerian ilu 96. 2445 Cog Manager Date Date			
	(01/02/96)			

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SUSF	SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN				
1. System Number:       2. System Title:         C20       RAW WATER         C20A       RAW WATER SUPPLY FOR PROCESS         C20B       RAW WATER SUPPLY FOR FIRE         B20L       EMERGENCY BACKUP WELLS (282B AND 282BA)					
3. Instructions:			an a		
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit C	components Screening form to id	entify items requiring verificat	ion.		
b. List the items and functions	requiring verification from BL	ock 6 of the screening form in B	lock 4 below.		
c. Identify the inspection/verif bolts", or "review of procurement	ication method to be used in B records for vendor package".	lock 5. For example, "100% visua	al inspection of pipe hanger		
<ul> <li>d. Perform and document the veri who performed the verification an records, etc. It must be possible</li> </ul>	d date. Records may include m	arked up drawings, inspection ch	ecklists, copies of QC		
4. Component/function requiring verification: Bolts (including those holding structural piping supports, and to assemble valves and	5. Proposed inspection metho Walk down and visuall listed in column 4 f in all areas of WESF or in high radiation areas.	y inspect all items for the raw water line which are not buried	6. Action completed/comments:		
valve operators)	- pool cell are	a j	BUTS FOUND ON TSPLINE		
Flanges	– operating gal	lery	REALIST LOOPER C24		
Valves	– cold manipula	tor shop	04		
	- AMU		RLS VALUE ON HETE REPORTS UNDER CZY		
	- Manipulator r	epair shop	OK		
	- East transmit	ter room	or		
	– West transmit	ter room	υIC		
	- 225BC		OK		
	- Service galle	ry/truck port	SIER ATTACHED		
	- outside south	wall of 225B	NA .		
	- HVAC room		N/A, FIRESTS OK		
	- 2828		0 K		
	and process cells A - results of above insp	anyon, A cell air lock G will be made after ections (ALARA). ed to assemble valves	٥K		
	Inspection plan by: QA Concurrence:				
	Signature/Date	W Withered 1/12/96 Signature/Date	Cognizant Engineer/Date		

(8 Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

B PLANT/WESF SUSF	PECT/COUNTE	RFEIT COMPONENTS SCR	EENING	
1. System Number: C21 C21A <u>C21B</u> / GrC 1/12/96 C21C	2. System Title SANITARY WA SANITARY WA <del>SANITARY SE</del> SAFETY SHOW	NTER NTER SUPPLY WER Pen 11/2/96		
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a record that e subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspense N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action</li> </ol>	feit parts could ections in accorda	have critical consequences. Th ance with Internal Memo 16710-94	e purpose of the	screening is
4. Instructions:				
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.			
b. Identify system components whose failure co	uld have criticai	consequences by applying the s	creening criteri	a in Block 5.
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.</li> </ul>	l in step b, along	, with the functions whose failu	re would have cr	itical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those component	s or items which	were evaluated but do not meet m	the screening cr	ít <del>e</del> ria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Obt	ain QA concurrence.		
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	in and record resu	ults on the Inspection Record.		
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and propo Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurren	used disposition.	The information will be consoli	idated on one or	ngineer will more
h. File copies of this form, along with the In package.	spection Plan, in	aspection records and any result	ing NCRs in the .	JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:				
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assur 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (1 added items listed in these bulletins since 198	ance Bulletins (0 0/18/94). If no	ABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08 modification or repair has been	8/21/92), 93-002 performed which	(04/28/93),
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, l				Examples:
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; cany monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument</li> </ul>	on supply/exhaust	event or monitor operational acc fans; HEPA filters and instrume	ridents or contam entation; air and	ination radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equip resulting equipment damage or nonavailability.				
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: USE: fire sprays (OSR), safety sho	wers			
Components requiring verification: Bolts (including piping supports),		lves		
7. Other Components/Functions:				
8. WK Sham Cog Engineer	9. <u>1-4-76</u> Date	10. Define		13.
		Log Hanage		0até (01/02/96)

SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN						
1. System Number: CZICZIA,CZIC	1. system Number:     2. system Title:       C21 C21A, CZIC     Sanitary Water					
3. Instructions:						
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.						
b. List the items and functions	requiring verification from BL	ock 6 of the screening form in B	lock 4 below.			
c. Identify the inspection/verif bolts", or "review of procurement	fication method to be used in B t records for vendor package".	llock 5. For example, "100% visu	al inspection of pipe hanger			
<ul> <li>d. Perform and document the veri who performed the verification and records, etc. It must be possible</li> </ul>	nd date. Records may include m	warked up drawings, inspection ch	ecklists, copies of QC			
4. Component/function requiring verification:	buried or in high rac	f WESF which are not	6. Action completed/comments:			
Bolts (inclulding those holding	borne areas.					
structural piping supports)	- pool cell are	2a	oK-			
Flanges	- operating gal	lery	c K			
Valves	- cold manipula	ator shop	or			
	– AMU		ok_			
	- Manipulator r	repair shop	dýA-			
	- East transmit	ter room	ЦА			
	– West transmit	ter room	NA			
	- 225BC		0 K			
	- Service galle	ery/truck port	٥K-			
	- outside south	wall of 225B	NIA			
	- HVAC room		OK			
	- 282B		₩ <b>₩</b>			
	- 282BA		HA-			
	Decision to inspect c and process cells A - results of above insp					
NOTE: Check bolts used to assemble valves						
	Inspection plan by: QA Concurrence:					
	Signature/Date	W Witherell 1/12/96 Signature/Date	Cognizant Engineer/Date			

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

			<u>_</u>		-JJJ, KeV. 
B PLANT/V	VESF SUSPEC	T/COUNTERFEIT C	OMPONE	NTS SCREENING	
1. System Number: C21B	2. System Title Sanitary Se				
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a subsequent potential failure of su to facilitate the performance of p N. Nansen, 8 Plant Suspect/Counter</li> </ol>	spect/counterfeit hysical inspectio	t parts could have crit ons in accordance with	tical conseq Internal Me	uences. The purpose of the	e screening is '
4. Instructions:					
a. Complete one screening form fo	r each plant syst	· .			
b. Identify system components who	se failure could	have critical conseque	nces by app	lying the screening criteri	ia in Block 5.
<ul> <li>List in Block 6 those component consequences.</li> </ul>	ts identified in	step b, along with the	functions (	whose failure would have c	itical
d. List or describe in Block 7 th	ose components or	items which were eval	uated but do	not meet the screening c	iteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items listed in	Block 6. Obtain QA co	ncurrence.		
f. Perform the inspection per the	approved plan an	d record results on th	e Inspection	n Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit iter follow up with a list of deficienc Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and	ies and proposed	disposition. The info	ormation will	be consolidated on one or	
h. File copies of this form, alon package.	g with the Inspec	tion Plan, inspection	records and	any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:					
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Cour</u> 1981 or later which are listed in 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) added items listed in these bullet	Quality Assurance and 94-02 (10/18	Bulletins (QABs) 92-0 9/94). If no modificat	11 (02/14/92) ion or repai	), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 In has been performed which	(04/28/93).
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protect Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders	ive equipment and , catwalks, lifti	litems whose failure c ng/moving devices, rol	ould directl lup doors, b	y result in serious injury preathing air systems	• Examples:
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u> release/spread. Examples: Canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs	doors; canyon s	upply/exhaust fans; HE	monitor oper PA filters a	ational accidents or conta and instrumentation; air an	mination d radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impresulting equipment damage or none</u>					
6. Components/Functions Requiring T	/erification:				
•					
7. Other Components/Functions:					
No inspection required.					
This system drains the change rooms and water from none contaminated areas. The majority of this system is imbedded in concrete or buried.					
8.1 save Borg	2.14/96 MM	Mum	11. <i>I-4-8</i>	12. NA	13.
Cog Engineer	Qate Cóg	Manager	Date	Screen Preparer	Date

B-113

	CT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number: C23 C23A C23B C23C	2. System Title: COMPRESSED AIR INSTRUMENT AIR PROCESS AIR BREATHING AIR
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that e subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspe N. Nansen, 3 Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Ac	each 8 Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and rfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is ections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. ction Plan, dated May 24, 1995.
4. Instructions:	
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	
b. Identify system components whose failure co	puld have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.	d in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components	is or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Obtain GA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plar	in and record results on the inspection Record.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and propos Nonconformance Reports (NGRs), and one Occurrence	notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mentz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will used disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more the Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
<ul> <li>File copies of this form, along with the Inspackage.</li> </ul>	spection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:	
<ul> <li><u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>.</li> <li>1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assura</li> <li>93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10</li> <li>added items listed in these bulletins since 1980</li> </ul>	. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in ance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 0/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have 0, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. General Plant Safety Protective equipment	and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: ifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment n release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument a	relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination on supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation air.
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment damage or nonavailability.	nent whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:	
Components requiring verification: Bolts (including piping supports).	flanges, valves
7. Other Components/Functions:	
8. Aller Cog Engineer	9. 4-9. 10. 10. 11. 11. 19. 11. 19. 11. 19. 11. 19. 11. 19. 11. 19. 11. 19. 11. 19. 11. 19. 19

SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN			
1System Number: C23 C23A C23B C23C	2. System Title: COMPRESSED AIR INSTRUMENT AIR PROCESS AIR BREATHING AIR	······································	
3. Instructions:			
	Components Screening form to identify items requiring verificat		
	requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in B		
bolts", or "review of procurement			
who performed the verification ar	fication as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicand date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection ch the to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been insp	ecklists, copies of QC	
<ol> <li>Component/function requiring verification:</li> </ol>	5. Proposed inspection method:	6. Action completed/comments:	
Bolts (including those holding structural piping supports)	Follow lines in all WESF areas listed which are not bkuried on in high radiation areas on air borne areas.	compreted/comments:	
Flanges	- 22580	ok-	
Valves	- 225BF		
	- HVAC ROOM	CK.	
	- OPERATING GALLERY	oku	
	- AMU	6K-	
	- MANIPULATOR REPAIR SHOP		
	- EAST TRANSMITTER ROOM		
	- WEST TRANSMITTER ROOM		
	- SERVICE GALLERY/TRUCK PORT	OK	
	- POOL CELL AREA	free brok	
	Decision to inspect conyom, A cell air lock and process cells A - G will be made after result of above inspections (ALARA).	support Bolts Accepted per NCR 051124	
	NOTE: Check bolts used to assemble valves		
	Inspection plan by: QA Concurrence:	Willhow 1/2/96	
	W/////////////////////////////////////	Cognizant Engineer/Date	

(8 Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

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B PLANT/WESF SUSP	ECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING				
1. System Number: C24 C24A	2. System Title: COLD CHEMICAL WESF AMU				
subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter	ach 8 Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the u feit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the scree ctions in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brie tion Plan, dated May 24, 1995.	ning is			
4. Instructions:					
a. Complete one screening form for each plant :	system.				
b. Identify system components whose failure co	uld have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in B	lock 5.			
c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.	in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical				
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components	s or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria				
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.				
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	n and record results on the Inspection Record.				
follow up with a list of deficiencies and propo	notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Enginee sed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more ce Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.	๓ พill			
h. File copies of this form, along with the In- package.	spection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS wo	rk			
5. Screening Criteria:					
1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assum 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (1	a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.				
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, l	b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems				
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment of release/spread, Examples: Canyon doors; canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument of the second se	relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contaminati on supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radi air.	on ation			
	ment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission du Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.	e to			
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: This system (C24) includes the che C24A is for the AMU area in genera	mical and deionized distribution lines in WESF. S	ystem			
Components requiring verification:	Bolts for all uses and valves.				
7. Other Components/Functions:					
No flanges exist in these systems/	area which are currently on the suspect list.				
8. Balans	9.//9./ 10.//an 1/4/9./ 10.//an Date Cog Manager // 5	elos			

		-C-SD-WM-IP-009, Rev. 0
SUSI	PECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PL.	4.N
1. System Number: C24 C24A	2. System Title: COLD CHEMICAL WESF AMU	
3. Instructions:		
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit C	components Screening form to identify items requiring verificat	ion.
	requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in B	
c. Identify the inspection/verif bolts", or "review of procurement	ication method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visu records for vendor package".	al inspection of pipe hanger
who performed the verification ar	fication as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indica d date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection ch e to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been insp	ecklists, copies of QC
<ol> <li>Component/function requiring verification:</li> </ol>	5. Proposed inspection method:	6. Action completed/comments:
Bolts (including those holding structural piping supports, and	100% visual inspection of all bolts in areas not requiring "whites" nor can not be inspected without a lift device or scaffolding.	- / 2
to assemble valves and valve operators)	AMU	SEE ATTINGTED LB NCR OSTIZY AND NCROSIIZS LB 1/10/10
Valves ( only location of valves with sizes	Pool Cell	ex cB ,/s/16 -
matching those on suspect list is in AMU	Operating gallery	0x LB 1/5/96
by TK-210)	The results of the above inspections will determine if other areas will be inspected.	POOL CELL - IN ITTAL INSPECTING DID NOT INCLUDE ALL BOLT TYPES. REWSHARD REVIEWED RESULTS OF ATTACH INSPECTION RECED. 28 BOLTS
	Inspection plan by: Apper Bros- 14/96 Signature/Date M.A.Hill	Cognizant Engineer/Date

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
C25 HVAC 225B AND OUT BUILDINGS
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B. Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening i to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.
4. Instructions:
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
g. If any suspect/counterfait items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (OABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Franes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
:. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to esulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.
. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
his system is a general catch all for the C25* systems. All necessary inspections will be covered in each of the other systems with this base number.
LL "OUT BUILDINGS" WILL BE CHECKED AS PART OF OTHER SYSTEMS.
Other Components/Functions:
9. 10
9. 10. <u>JEngineer</u> <u>JIS/96</u> <u>Date</u> <u>Date</u> <u>Date</u> <u>Date</u> <u>Date</u> <u>Date</u> <u>Date</u> <u>Date</u> <u>Date</u> <u>Date</u> <u>Date</u> <u>Date</u>
Valc
(01/02/96)

B PLANT/WESF SUSPE	CT/COUNT	ERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREE	VING	
1. System Number: C25A	2. System Titl K1 SUPPLY	e: SYSTEM	······································	
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.				
4. Instructions:				
a. Complete one screening form for each plan				
		al consequences by applying the screening criter		
<ul> <li>List in Block 6 those components identifier consequences.</li> </ul>	ed in step b, alor	ng with the functions whose failure would have c	ritical	
d. List or describe in Block 7 those componer	nts or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening c	riteria.	
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items liste				
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pl				
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found follow up with a list of deficiencies and prop Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurre		ege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant The information will be consolidated on one of ill be submitted for the entire facility.	Engineer will r more	
<ol> <li>File copies of this form, along with the I package.</li> </ol>	nspection Plan, i	nspection records and any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work	
5. Screening Criteria:				
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Part</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Guality Assu 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 ( added items listed in these bulletins since 19		or suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to ite QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 modification or repair has been performed which nspection of the component is required	ems procured in 2 (04/28/93), a would have	
	t and items where		. Examples:	
c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment	relied upon to p	revent or monitor operational accidents or conta t fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air an	mination d radiation	
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equi resulting equipment damage or nonavailability.	pment whose failu Examples: Cran	re could have a serious impact on the plant miss es, fire protection systems which protect equipm	ion due to	
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:				
None				
7. Other Components/Functions:				
All components. The K1 supply sy for radiological contamination. For facility.	ystem provide Failure of th	s fresh air to WESF areas with a p is system would not have a critica	otential 1 impact	
Sudden loss of airflow would result in a short-term reduction in the ambient pressure within the K1 ventilation zones, but this would not significantly increase the risk of contamination spread.				
Other functions include heating and cooling, whose failure would not have a critical safety or operational impact.				
8 2	9.	10 02	11	
Cog Engineer	<u> 1/5/96</u> Dáte	WR Branno- Cog Hanager	11. <u>1/5/96</u> Dáte	
	R-11	A	(01/02/96)	

	x-C-SD-xM-DP-009, Rev.
B PLANT/WESF SUSPEC	T/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number: C25B	2. System Title: K2 SUPPLY SYSTEM
	each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and rfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is ections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. ction Plan, dated May 24, 1995.
4. Instructions:	
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.
b. Identify system components whose failure co	buld have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
	in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those component	s or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	n and record results on the Inspection Record.
I TARIAN AD MILLI A LISE OF AETICIENCIES AND DEDDO	notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will used disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more use Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspectage.	spection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:	
93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10 added items listed in these bulletins since 1980	The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in ance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 0/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have 0, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
and a second star and a second star and second star and second star and second star and second second star and s	and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: ifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment r release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyo monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument a	relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination on supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation

d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

NONE

7. Other Components/Functions:

All components. The K2 supply system provides fresh air to uncontaminated areas within Failure of this system would not have a critical impact on facility. WESF.

Sudden loss of airflow would result in a short-term reduction in the ambient pressure within the K2 ventilation zones, but this would not significantly increase the risk of contamination spread.

Other functions include heating and cooling, whose failure would not have a critical safety or operational impact.

8. 9. 11 Tom (man 115/96 1/5/96 ~11 Cog Engineer Date

B PLANT/WESF SUSPEC	CT/COUNT	ERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREE	NING	
1. System Number: C25C	2. System Tit K3 SUPPLY	e: SYSTEM		
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each 8 Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.				
4. Instructions:				
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.			
b. Identify system components whose failure c	ould have critica	al consequences by applying the screening crite	eria in Block 5.	
c. List in Block 6 those components identifie consequences.				
d. List or describe in Block 7 those componen	ts or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening	críteria.	
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items liste	d in Block 6. Ok	stain QA concurrence.		
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla				
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found follow up with a list of deficiencies and prop Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrent			Engineer will or more	
h. File copies of this form, along with the In package.	nspection Plan, i	nspection records and any resulting NCRs in th	e JCS work	
5. Screening Criteria:				
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assur 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (1 added items listed in these bulletins since 198		WABS) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-0		
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, t	and items whose		ry. Examples:	
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u> ; Equipment release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; cany monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument		revent or monitor operational accidents or con t fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air o	tamination and radiation	
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.				
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:				
NONE				
7. Other Components/Functions:				
All components. The K3 supply sy WESF. Failure of this system woul	stem provide d not have a	s fresh air to contaminated areas critical impact on facility.	within	
Sudden loss of airflow would result in a short-term reduction in the ambient pressure within the K3 ventilation zones, but this would actually tend to decrease the risk of contamination spread by increasing a favorable pressure differential (increasing the vacuum in the canyon and process cells).				
)ther functions include heating and cooling, whose failure would not have a critical safety or operational impact.				
B. <u>Tom Cruiny</u> Cog Engineer	9. <u>1/5/96</u> Date	10. UR Shennon	11.	
		Cog Manager	Date	
	B-1	21	(01/02/96)	

B PLANT/WESF SUSPEC	T/COUNTE	RFEIT COMPONENTS SCREEN	ING
1. System Number: C25D	2. System Title K4 SUPPLY S	YSTEM	
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a record that essubsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspenient. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action</li> </ol>	feit parts could ctions in accorda	have critical consequences. The purpose of the new with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. (	screening is
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for each plant :	system.		
b. Identify system components whose failure co	uld have critical	consequences by applying the screening criteria	a in Block 5.
<ul> <li>c. List in Block</li></ul>	in step b, along	with the functions whose failure would have cr	itical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components	s or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening cri	iteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Obt	ain QA concurrence.	
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	n and record resu	lts on the Inspection Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and propo Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurren	notify P. E. Roe sed disposition.	ge or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Er The information will be consolidated on one or	ngineer will more
h. File copies of this form, along with the In- package.	spection Plan, in	spection records and any resulting NCRs in the .	JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:			
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assur 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (1 added items listed in these bulletins since 198	ance Bulletins (Q 0/18/94). If no	A8s) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 modification or repair has been performed which	(04/28/93),
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, l</li> </ul>	and items whose ifting/moving dev	failure could directly result in serious injury. ices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	Examples:
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u> : Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.			
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to <u>resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.</u>			
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:			
NONE			
7. Other Components/Functions:	<u> </u>		
All components. The K4 supply system provides fresh air to the capsule storage area (Pool Cells), an uncontaminated area within WESF. Failure of this system would not have a critical impact on facility.			
Sudden loss of airflow would result in a short-term reduction in the ambient pressure within the capsule storage area, but this would not significantly increase the risk of contamination spread.			
Other functions include heating and cooling, whose failure would not have a critical safety or operational impact.			
8. <u>Tom Gawing</u> Cog Engineer	9. <u>1/5/96</u> Dáte	10. 2/ Rannon Cog Hanager	11. 1/5/76

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING					
1. System Number: C25E	2. System Title K1 EXHAUST	e: SYSTEM			
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.					
4. Instructions:					
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.				
		l consequences by applying the screening criter			
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.</li> </ul>	d in step b, alon	g with the functions whose failure would have c	ritical		
d. List or describe in Block 7 those component	ts or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening c	riteria.		
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	d in Block 6. Ob	tain QA concurrence.			
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla					
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found follow up with a list of deficiencies and propo Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrent	SEC CISDOSITION.	The information will be concelidated on one -	Engineer will r more		
<ul> <li>File copies of this form, along with the Ir package.</li> </ul>	nspection Plan, in	nspection records and any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work		
5. Screening Criteria:	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.					
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, l	and items whose	failure could directly population position in the	y. Examples:		
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.					
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.					
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:					
The important function of the K1 exhaust system is to prevent hydrogen buildup in the capsule storage area. In order to ensure continued exhaust function, the duct must remain intact from the capsule storage area to the fans. The duct downstream of the capsule storage area is underground, and therefore, would not fail due to substandard fasteners.					
Components requiring inspection: Exhaust fans and exhaust duct immediately upstream of the fans. Specific potential suspect items include: Bolts located in duct connections and fan housing, and in the supporting structure.					
The pool cell air dilution line will be inspected as required as part of System C31C.					
7. Other Components/Functions: Ductwork inside the building. Because K1 services only potentially contaminated areas, a failure of one or more bolts could cause inleakage to the duct, but would not result in any spread of contamination. (See additional discussion in Block 6).					
8. <u>10m Gaury</u> Cog Engineer	9. 1/5/96 Date	10. <u>2/R Shanne</u> Cog Manager	11. <u>1-5<sup>-</sup>-92</u> Date		

(01/02/96)

## SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

1. System Number: C25E	2. system Title: K1 exhaust system		
3. Instructions:			
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit (	components Screening form to identify items requiring verification	ion,	
b. List the items and functions	requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Bl	lock 4 below.	
c. Identify the inspection/verif bolts", or "review of procurement	ication method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual records for vendor package".	al inspection of pipe hanger	
who performed the verification ar	fication as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicated date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection chere to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.	ecklists, copies of QC	
4. Component/function requiring verification:	5. Proposed inspection method:	6. Action completed/comments:	
requiring verification: K1 Exhaust fans and exhaust duct immediately upstream of the fans (between K1 filters and fans). Specific potential suspect items include: Bolts located in duct connections and fan housing, and in the supporting structure.	100% visual inspection of hex head bolts in duct connections. fan housing. fan mounting, and supporting structure for duct and dampers. If any nead markings correspond to those listed in QA Bulletins #93-02 and 94-01, then mark the bolts for later disposition and identify their locations on an attached sheet.	completed/comments: <i>VC: FINDING</i> 5	
	Inspection plan by: QA Concurrence: Signature/Date Signature/Date A Concurrence:	Cognizant Engineer/Date	

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B PLANT/WESF SUSPEC	T/COUNT	ERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREE	NING
1. System Number: C25F	2. System Titl K2 EXHAUST	e: SYSTEM	
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a record that e subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspe N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Ac</li> </ol>	ections in accord	dance with Internal Memo 16710-94-04M-048 1 A	re the use and he screening is . O'Brien to J.
4. Instructions:			······································
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.		
b. Identify system components whose failure co	uld have critica	al consequences by applying the screening criter	ria in Block 5
c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.			
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components	s or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening o	riteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed			
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	n and record res	ults on the Inspection Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, foilow up with a list of deficiencies and propose Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence			Engineer will or more
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspackage.	spection Plan, i	nspection records and any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:			
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assura 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10 added items listed in these bulletins since 1980		CABS) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-00	
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, li	and itoms where	for the second of the second	y. Examples:
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment r release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyo monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument a		revent or monitor operational accidents or conta t fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air an	amination nd radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipm resulting equipment damage or nonavailability.	ent whose failur Examples: Crane	re could have a serious impact on the plant miss as, fire protection systems which protect equipm	sion due to
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:			
NONE.			
7. Other Components/Functions:			
Failure of this system will not have a critical impact on facility. The K2 system services only uncontaminated areas of the facility. therefore, loss of the K2 exhaust system will not cause a loss of contamination control.			
I m (miny	9. <u>1/5/96</u> Date	10. <u>9 R. Shanna</u> Cog Manager	11. <u>1/s-/9</u> Date
			(01/02/96)

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B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number:       2. System Title:         C25G       K3 EXHAUST SYSTEM (INCLUDES PROCESS CELL)
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections to accordance with Internal Nemo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.
4. Instructions:
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.
5. Screening Critería:
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u> : Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
The K3 exhaust system provides for contamination control by maintaining a differential pressure between contaminated and uncontaminated areas of WESF.
Components/functions requiring verification include:
a. Exhaust airflow - K3 fan function (power and control) and integrity of the ductwork between the canyon and process cells and the fans. Also, function of the K3 exhaust steam jet.
b. Confinement - Integrity of ductwork upstream of the K3 filters where it passes through uncontaminated areas (truck port).
Potential uses of counterfeit parts include:
a. Bolts in ductwork connections, duct supports and fan housing.
b. Valves, bolts and flanges installed in the steam and air piping of the steam jet.
c. Electrical components and bolts installed in the power and control panels which support exhaust fan operation.


## SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

1 Svotem Number					
1. System Number: C25G	2. system Title: K3 Exhaust system				
3. Instructions:					
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.					
b. List the items and functions	requiring verification from 9	Block 6 of the screening form in	8lock 4 below.		
c. Identify the inspection/veri bolts", or "review of procuremen	fication method to be used in t records for vendor package".	Block 5. For example, "100% vis	ual inspection of pipe hanger		
d. Perform and document the ver who performed the verification as records, etc. It must be possib					
4. Component/function requiring verification:	5. Proposed inspection met		6. Action completed/comments:		
The K3 duct in the truck port which is exposed.	fianges. If any hea to those identified on 94-01, mark the b	on of bolted K3 duct d markings correspond in GA Builetins #93-02 olts for laten tify their locations on	completion		
K3 exhaust fan area. including ductwork from the K3 filter building to the fan inlets, fan housings, supports for duct and dampers.	100% visual inspecti- connections, fan hou damper supports. If correspond to those Bulletins #93-02 or 9 for later disposition locations on an attac	Found Eus Bott on Fam Bas - Completed as			
K3 steam jet, including steam line from ground level to the jet, air duct from ground level to the jet, and the steam jet itself.	100% visual inspection of bolted duct and piping connections and valves. If suspect components listed in the referenced bulletins are found, mark them for later disposition and identify their locations on an attached sheet.		Reg Completed 23 Reg. Dispannen NER 051125 To be replaced		
	Inspection plan by: 	QA Concurrence: <u>MANU 1.5.86</u> Signature/Date	Cognizant Engineer/Date		

Jek 6 (continued) WHC-SD-WM-IP-009, Rev. 0 Notes: 1. Function of the fan controls and canyon differential pressure control (HVAC control panels) are covered by system C93, instruments. Power for exhaust fans is covered by system C12, electrical distribution. The K3 filters are system C25K 2. 7. Other Components/Functions: The HEPA filters in the process cells and the canyon act as prefilters to the K3 exhaust filter; they are not critical to the prevention of contamination spread. Ductwork in the canyon only serves to control the airflow pattern within the canyon. It does not affect the differential pressure required to prevent contamination spread. Underground duct between Bldg 225B and the K3 filters is encased in concrete; its integrity does not rely on bolts. Ductwork downstream of the fans is not critical to the function of the fans (maintaining differential pressures), non to confinement ;;<u>;</u> ;]<u>5</u>]96 8. φ. Tom Gran 1511 11-131 Cog Manager Cog Engineer Date

(01/02/96)

	T/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number: C25H	2. System Title: K5/K6 SYSTEM
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a record that e subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspe- N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Ac</li> </ol>	ach B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and feit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is ctions in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. 0'9rien to J. tion Plan, dated May 24, 1995.
4. Instructions:	
a. Complete one screening form for each plant s	system.
b. Identify system components whose failure cou	uld have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
	in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components	s or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan	n and record results on the Inspection Record.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and propos Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence	notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will sed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more se Report (CR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, along with the Ins package.	spection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:	
93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10	The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in ince Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), /18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have , no detailed inspection of the component is required.
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment of Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, life</li> </ul>	and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: fting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyor monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument a	elied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination n supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation ir.
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipme resulting equipment damage or nonavailability.	ent whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:	
NONE	
7. Other Components/Functions:	
	ter system and cooling tower. The chilled water system reas served by K1. K2 and K3 ventilation systems. The r for the chillers. A loss of space cooling would not al impact.
into the pool cells would contaminat and costly cleanup. However, this	a serious operational consequence would be a leak in l cell area. A leak of propylene glycol-water mixture te the demineralized water and require a time-consuming section of the line is insulated with asbestos: it is since original construction (prior to 1981).
No inspection will be performed at t	this time.



			WHC-SD-WM-IP-009,
1. System Number: C25J	SUSPECT/COU	VTERFEIT COMI	PONENTS SCREENING
	K1 F1I T	FRS	
Subsequent potential failure of sus to facilitate the performance of phy N. Nansen, 8 Plant Suspect/Counterfe 4. Instructions:	ecord that each B Plant/ Dect/counterfeit parts c vsical inspections in ac	WESF system has been scr ould have critical conse cordance with (ptopped)	eened for applications where the use a quences. The purpose of the screening emo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to
4. Instructions:	Plan, d	ated May 24, 1995.	emo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to
a. Complete one screening form for	each plant system.		
System components whose	6-11	ical concerns	lying the screening criteria in Block
consequences.	identified in step b, a	long with the former	lying the screening criteria in Block
d. List or describe in Block 7 those			whose failure would have critical
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for it f. Perform the inspection per the any	ems listed in Block (	ch were evaluated but do	) not meet the screening criteria
the inspection per the are	· ·	e ence.	
Nonconformance Reports (NCRs) and the	and proposed disposition	Roege or D. W. Mertz imme	ediately the a
h. File copies of this form, along wi package.	th the inspection Plan	will be submitted for th	be consolidated on one or more will be entire facility.
5. Screening Criteria:		mapertion records and a	ny resulting NCRs in the JCS work
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfe</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Quali 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and added items listed in these bulletins s o. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective ed Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catw c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u> : Equ elease/spread. Examples: Canyon doors onitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; inst . <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u> : esulting equipment damage or nonavailable Components/Functions Requiring Verific	uipment and items whose valks, lifting/moving dev ipment relied upon to pr ; canyon supply/exhaust rument air.	failure could directly r failure could directly r vices, roilup doors, brea event or monitor operati fans; HEPA filters and	nt is required. result in serious injury. Examples: athing air systems ional accidents or contamination
Other Components/Functions:			
e K1 filter system provides the event of a contamination uld be detected either by sur essures) or annual filter eff lter failure would constitute en then, the consequences wou rough the stack.	two independent b two independent ld be minor, sinc	A contamination detectable failure the contaminated	spread coincident with a solution of the probability.
red upon to provide that out	er confinement bou	indary.	y suspect parts are
physical filter building is ied upon to provide that out	er confinement bou	undary.	y suspect parts are

B PLANT/WESF SUSPEC	T/COUNTE	RFEIT COMPONENTS SCREE	NING
1. System Number: C25K	2. System Title K3 FILTERS		
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a record that a subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspense. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Advised to the performance of the perfo</li></ol>	rfeit parts could ections in accorda	have critical consequences. The purpose of t nce with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A	the screening is
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.		
b. Identify system components whose failure co	ould have critical	consequences by applying the screening crite	ria in Block 5.
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.</li> </ul>	d in step b, along	with the functions whose failure would have	critical _
d. List ar describe in Black 7 thase component	ts or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening	criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	d in Block 6. Obt	aín QA concurrence.	
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	an and record resu	lts on the Inspection Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found follow up with a list of deficiencies and prop Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrent	osed disposition.	The information will be consolidated on one	Engineer will or more
h. File copies of this form, along with the In package.	nspection Plan, in	spection records and any resulting NCRs in th	e JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:			
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assu 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 ( added items listed in these bulletins since 196	rance Bulletins (9 10/18/94). If no	ABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-0 modification or repair has been performed whi	02 (04/28/93),
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipmen Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks,</li> </ul>	t and items whose lifting/moving dev	failure could directly result in serious inju ices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	ıry. Examples:
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u>: Equipment release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; can monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument</li> </ul>	yon supply/exhaust	event or monitor operational accidents or con fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air	tamination and radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipresulting equipment damage or nonavailability.			1
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification	:		
NONE			
-			
7. Other Components/Functions:			
The K3 filters were built to Safe are located in Project B-455 file precludes the potential for suspe	ty Class 1, N s. This trac ct parts.	QA-1 standards. Quality assurance eability of the construction mate	ce records erials
8.	9.	10. 0/	11., ,
Cog Engineer	<u>1/5/96</u> Dáte	WRALonno Cog Aanager	1/5/9/ Date
			(01/02/96)

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B PLANT/WESF S	SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number: C26, C26B, C266	2. System Title: FIRE PROTECTION, DETECTION AND AUTOMATIC SPRINKLERS
I Subsequent Dutential Failure of Suspect/c	hat each 8 Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and ounterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is inspections in accordance with Internal Nemo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. Its Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.
4. Instructions:	
a. Complete one screening form for each p	lant system.
b. Identify system components whose fail.	re could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
	ified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those comp	onents or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
	isted in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the approve	d plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
TORIGHT OF HILLI A LISE OF DEFICIENCIES AND	ound, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more urrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, along with t package.	ne Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:	
93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-	Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), D2 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have a 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equi	xment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: s, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipr release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument; 480 VAC MCCs;	ent relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation ent air.
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic impacts:</u> E resulting equipment damage or nonavailabili	quipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to ty. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verificat System use: WESF Fire detection	ion:
Components requiring verificati All sanitary water piping, flan	on: ges and supports
7. Other Components/Functions: Components not requiring inspec	tion include: FACP, and detection devices. The bolts used ection system are not required to be hardened or otherwise
8. Cog Engineer	9. 11. 11. 11. 11. 11. 11. 11. 1
	(01/02/96)

			,	
SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN				
1. System Number: C26, C26B, C26C	2. System Title: FIRE PRO SPRINKLERS	DTECTION, DETECTION AN	D AUTOMATIC	
3. Instructions:			╽╽┇╶╴┈╻╵═╘╽╬┇ <sup>┿</sup> ╺╊┺┱╴ <sub>┥</sub> ╝┽∦ <u>╒</u> ┫╺┈═╄ <sub>╝</sub> ┪╴╇╸╼╍	
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit (	Components Screening form to ide	entify items requiring verifica	ition.	
b. List the items and functions				
c. Identify the inspection/verit bolts", or "review of procurement	fication method to be used in Bl records for vendor package".	lock 5. For example, "100% vis	ual inspection of pipe hanger	
d. Perform and document the veri inspected, who performed the veri of QC records, etc. It must be p	fication and date. Records may	/ include marked up drawings, i	nspection checklists, copies	
4. Component/function requiring verification:	5. Proposed inspection method:	:	6. Action Completed/comments	
<ul> <li>A. Sprinkler system riser, valves components.</li> <li>B. Sprinkler system tie in to the sanitary header, and all bolted connections downstream of the isolation valve.</li> <li>C. All sprinkler system sway bracing bolted connections</li> </ul>	Perform a 100% visual fire sprinkler system valves and fire dept in the 225B fan room n List those items that suspect parts on the part inspection record 100% Visual inspection connections for mounti panel mounting. List potentially contain su "counterfeit/Suspect p record. 100% Visual inspection connections for mounti panel mounting. List potentially contain su "counterfeit/Suspect p record. 100% Visual inspection connections for mounti panel mounting. List potentially contain su "counterfeit/Suspect p record. ALL DISCREPANCIES SHAL ATTACHED SUSPECT/COUNT INSPECTION RECORD AND ATTACHED IDENTIFICATIO	including the riser connection, located north wall. potentially contain "counterfeit/Suspect d. n of bolted ing instruments and those items that uspect parts on the part inspection h of bolted ing instruments and those items that uspect parts on the part inspection L BE NOTED ON THE ERFEIT PART IDENTIFIED ON THE	Documented y Systim C 21, C21t, C 21C	
	REPORT. Inspection plan by: Men 1-iz 46 Signagure/Date	QA Concurrence: <u>W Withouel 1/12/96</u> Signature/Date	Cognizant Engineer/Date A Da 1/12/4 U A Da 1/12/4 U Cognizant Manager/Date	

(8 Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

B PLANT/WESF SUSP	ECT/COUNTE	RFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING	
1. System Number: C26A	2. System Title 2258 PROCES	: S CELL DETECTION AND FIRE FOG	
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a record that e subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspe N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Ac</li> </ol>	feit parts could ctions in accorda	have critical consequences. The purpose of t nce with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A	he screening is
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.		
b. Identify system components whose failure co	uld have critical	consequences by applying the screening crite	ria in Block 5.
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.</li> </ul>	in step b, along	with the functions whose failure would have	critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those component	s or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening i	criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Obt	ain QA concurrence.	
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	n and record resu	lts on the Inspection Record,	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and propo Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrent	sed disposition.	The information will be consolidated on one of	Engineer will or more
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inpackage.	spection Plan, in	spection records and any resulting NCRs in the	e JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:			
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assur- 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (11 added items listed in these bulletins since 1980	ance Bulletins (Q 0/18/94). If no	ABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-00 modification or repair has been performed whic	02 (04/28/93),
b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, l			ry. Examples:
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment i release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyo monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument;	on supply/exhaust		
<ul> <li><u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u>: Equip resulting equipment damage or nonavailability.</li> </ul>		e could have a serious impact on the plant mis s, fire protection systems which protect equip	
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:			
System use: WESF process cell fire	suppression	system (OSR).	
Components requiring verification: Bolts (including piping supports),		lves, switches, relays.	
7. Other Components/Functions: NONE			
8. Welhouro	9. 1-8-95	10. Jule	11. 1-8-56
Cog Engineer	Date	Cog Manager	Date
			(01/02

SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN							
1. System Number:     2. System Title:       C26A     225B PROCESS CELL DETECTOR AND FIRE FOG							
3. Instructions:							
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit (	Components Screening form to identify items requiring verificat	tion.					
b. List the items and functions	requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in B	llock 4 below.					
c. Identify the inspection/verif bolts", or "review of procurement	fication method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visu t records for vendor package".	al inspection of pipe hanger					
who performed the verification ar	fication as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indica ad date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection ch the to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been insp	ecklists, copies of QC					
4. Component/function requiring verification:	5. Proposed inspection method:	6. Action completed/comments:					
Bolts (including those holding structural piping supports) Valves	Walk down and visually inspect 100% of items listed in column 4 for the raw water supply line which supplies the fire fog system for all process cells except F cell.						
Flanges	The visual inspection will include the areas of WESF listed below.						
Relays	- Operating Gallery	complete					
Switches	- G Cell Air Lock	ų					
	- Service Gallery	сt.					
	Walk down and visually inspect 100% of items listed in column 4 for the deionized water supply line which supplies the fire fog system for F cell.						
	- Service Gallery	complete					
-	All discrepancies shall be noted on the attached suspect/counterfeit part inspection record and attached identification and disposition report.	NO ITEMS FOUND DURING CRAFT MSARCTION (B1/11/96					
	Inspection plan by: 24 Concurrence 1-8-96 Signature/Date M.H.H.U	Cognizant Engineer/Date WHA ///96 Cegnizant Hanager/Date					

(B Plant/WESF 01/02

			-WM-IP-009, Rev.
B PLANT/WESF SUSP	ECT/COUNTE	RFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENIN	IG
1. System Number: C27 and C27A	2. System Title Solid Waste	: Handling and Transfer Cask	
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that e subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspe N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Ac	feit parts could ctions in accord	have critical consequences. The purpo ance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-04	se of the concentration
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for each plant			
b. Identify system components whose failure co		consequences by analying the conserie	e esiteria in Direk C
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.</li> </ul>			
d. List or describe in Block 7 those component:	s or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the scr	eening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed			
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	n and record resu	ilts on the Inspection Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and propo- Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrent	sed disposition.	The information will be consolidated	on one or more
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspectage.	spection Plan, ir	spection records and any resulting NCR	s in the JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:			
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assure 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10 added items listed in these bulletins since 1980	ance Bulletins (9 0/18/94), If no	ABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92 modification or repair has been perfor	), 93-002 (04/28/93),
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, li	and items whose ifting/moving dev	failure could directly result in serio ices, rollup doors, breathing air syst	us injury. Examples: ems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment n release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument a	on supply/exhaust	event or monitor operational accidents fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation	or contamination n; air and radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u> : Equipment damage or nonavailability.	ment whose failur Examples: Crane	e could have a serious impact on the p s, fire protections systems which prot	lant mission due to ect equipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: Solid waste handling is performed to as the vertice of the second to the second to the structurally has no componentin 1994. Failure of the chain criteria.	waste cask. cask cavity. ts meeting t	The cask functions by usinc Cask in service prior to I his criteria. The chain hoi	a chain hoist 981 and st was replaced
7. Other Components/Functions:			
Cask chain hoist failure would have is a direct replacement through off	e no impact f the shelf	on facility safety or progra procurement.	ms. Chain hoist
8.	9. <u>15/54</u> Date	10.	11. <u>[-8-76</u> Date

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENT'S SCREENING				
1. System Number: C30A-G, C30A-J, C31A-J, C93, _ <del>C95A-C, G96F, C96G,</del> ≇D	2. System Title VARIOUS TIT	LES	· · · · ·	
subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter	feit parts could ections in accorda	system has been screened for applications where have critical consequences. The purpose of the ance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. May 24, 1995.	e screening is	
4. Instructions:				
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.			
b. Identify system components whose failure co	ould have critica	l consequences by applying the screening criteri	ia in Block 5.	
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.</li> </ul>	in step b, along	g with the functions whose failure would have cr	ritical	
		were evaluated but do not meet the screening cr	riteria.	
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed				
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	in and record resu	ults on the Inspection Record.		
	used disposition.	ege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant E The information will be consolidated on one or ill be submitted for the entire facility.		
h. File copies of this form, along with the Ir package.	nspection Plan, in	nspection records and any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work	
5. Screening Criteria:				
1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assur	ance Bulletins (G 0/18/94). If no	or suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to ite DABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 modification or repair has been performed which aspection of the component is required.	(04/28/93),	
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, l	and items whose ifting/moving dev	failure could directly result in serious injury vices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	. Examples:	
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.				
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.				
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: System use: pool cell, hot cell, a	ind ventilati	on instrumentation (OSR)		
Components requiring verification: Instrumentation, instrumentation s	supports incl	uding panel mountings hardware.		
7, Other Components/Functions:				
none				
8. A Dan	9. 1-10-96	10. Nixelfun	11.	
Cog Engineer	Date	Cog Manager	Date	

(01/02/96)

SUSPI. WPF

## SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

1. System Number: C30A-G, C30A-J, C31A-J, C93, C96A-C, C96F, C96G, 2. System Title: VARIOUS INSTRUMENTATION PANELS (K PANELS, A-G PANELS, M PANELS, S PANELS, HVAC PANELS)

3. Instructions:

a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.

b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.

c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".

d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

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nor

4. Component/function requiring verification: K-1 PANEL, 🖉 K-2 PANEL Could (ind K-3 PANEL GK K-4 PANEL OK K-2A PANEL OK X-3A PANEL ъK HVCP-1 PANEL (INACTIVE) HVCP-2 PANEL &  $\mathcal{O}$ RP-1 PANEL A PANELS (4) B PANELS (4) \$ 6 C PANELS (4) 1,005-D PANELS (2) 3 E PANELS (2) C05 No F PANELS (2) cher G PANELS (4) M-1 PANEL K 6 6 M-2 PANEL M-3 PANEL  $\mathcal{O}$ M-4 PANEL S-1 PANEL س در ک S-2 PANEL No S-3 PANEL S-4 PANEL

100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. No dentital bolts 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. No identiful bolts No dutched port 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING Not INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. Ns 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. No No , Juniful both 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. No , sulf faits No inspection required No, Selfit bills No inspection required 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. No , halfed palls 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING COST NOT INSpect INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. could not inspert 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. Could not , man Could not in 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. ۲. 10 Could not imp 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. A Could not my 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. Could not ing 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. No i derlifed polt 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. No, Lealif bolt 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. No ideilife balls 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. could not inspe 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING 10 INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. Costol not mase COUNT chel 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. Could int sought 100% VISUAL INSPECTION OF BOLTED CONNECTIONS FOR MOUNTING INSTRUMENTS AND PANEL MOUNTING. ALL DISCREPANCIES SHALL BE NOTED ON THE ATTACHED SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT PART INSPECTION RECORD AND ATTACHED IDENTIFICATION AND DISPOSITION REPORT.

Inspection plan by: AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA	QA Concurrence: W Withersell 1/1494 Signature/Date	Affan I-11-46 Cognizant Engineer/Date Affan I-11-46 Cognizant Manager/Date
		(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96

	ECT/COUNTE	REFIT COMPONENTS SCOULINING				
		B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING				
1. System Number: C30J	2. System Title	: Closed Loop Cooling System				
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a record that ensubsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspect. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Activity</li> </ol>	feit parts could ctions in accorda	have critical consequences. The purpose of the ince with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A.	screening is			
4. Instructions:						
a. Complete one screening form for each plant s	system.					
b. Identify system components whose failure components	uld have critical	consequences by applying the screening criteri	a in Block 5.			
c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.	in step b, along	with the functions whose failure would have cr	itical			
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components	s or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening cr	iteria.			
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Obt	ain QA concurrence.				
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan	n and record resu	ilts on the Inspection Record.				
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and propos Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrent	sed disposition.	The information will be consolidated on one or	ngineer will more			
h. File copies of this form, along with the Ins	spection Plan, in	spection records and any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work			
package.			<u></u>			
5. Screening Criteria:						
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.						
b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems						
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment n release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument a	on supply/exhaust					
d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipm						
resulting equipment damage or nonavailability.	Examples: Crane	s, fire protections systems which protect equip	ment			
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:						
System shut down after the comple	etion of ces	ium and strontium encapsulation.				
7. Other Components/Functions: System removed from service.						
8. Ja 12	9. 14/96	10. Dan	11. 1-10-96			
Cog Engineer	Date	Cog Manager	Date			
	B-14	\$1	(01/02/96)			

(01/02/96)

## B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: C3OK

2. System Title: WESF Hot Cell Windows.

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:

a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.

b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.

c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.

d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.

e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.

f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.

g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (DR) will be submitted for the entire facility.

h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:

a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.

b. <u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems

c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.

d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u>: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to <u>resulting equipment damage or nonavailability</u>. <u>Examples</u>: <u>Cranes</u>, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

System has no parts or components as discribed by QA bulletin 92-2 or 94-1.

7. Other Components/Functions:  $N \, / \, A$ 

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to the	1/4/94	Allen	1-10-26
Cog Engineer	Date	Cog Manager	Date

B PLANT/WESF SUSF		RFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING	
1. System Number:C30Mc 3.3 4.	2. System Title	Manipulators	
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a record that a subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspension. N. Namsen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action 2015</li> </ol>	feit parts could ctions in accord	have critical consequences. The purpose of the ance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A.	a corponion in
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	svstem.		
<ul> <li>Identify system components whose failure components</li> </ul>		consequences by applying the screening criter	ia in Block 5.
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those comporents identified consequences.</li> </ul>			
d. List or describe in Block 7 those component	s or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening o	riteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Obt	tain QA concurrence.	
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	n and record resu	ults on the Inspection Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and propo Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurren	sed disposition.	The information will be consolidated on one of	Engineer will r more
h. File copies of this form, along with the In package.	spection Plan, ir	nspection records and any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:			
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assur 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (1 added items listed in these bulletins since 198	ance Bulletins (0 0/18/94). If no	AABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-00 modification or repair has been performed whic	2 (04/28/93).
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, l</li> </ul>	and items whose ifting/moving dev	failure could directly result in serious injur vices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	y. Examples:
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; cany monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument</li> </ul>	on supply/exhaust	revent or monitor operational accidents or cont t fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air a	amination nd radiation
<ul> <li><u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u>: Equip resulting equipment damage or nonavailability.</li> </ul>			
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: Screening Criteria for Manip Programmatic Impacts.		eneral Plant Safety, D. Equipment	with
on the manipulators which wo Quality Control at the time inspection for suspect or co manipulators are routinely i used to cinch the monorail t	uld be subje of installat unterfeit pa nspected ar o the ceilin	ictions in hot cells. Replacement ect to this criteria are verified from that they are lock tight but erts. Monorails used to support to part of preventive maintenance. Of are not inspected for suspect of installed early 1970's. Modific	by facility there is no ransfer of Fasteners r
7. Other Components/Functions:			
None.			
8	9.	10./10	11./
Cog Engineer	9. 1/12/94 Date		1,9/9-6
			(01/02/96)

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SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN				
1. System Number: C30M C33A	2. System Title: Manipulators			
3. Instructions:				
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit C	omponents Screening form to identify items requiring verification.			
b. List the items and functions	requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.			
c. Identify the inspection/ver fication method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".				
d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC				
records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.				

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4. Component/function requiring verification: Manipulator structural integrity	5. Proposed inspection metho Representative sampli inspection of fastene If any head markings identified in QA Bull mark the bolts for la document as required, location on attached	ing for visual ers on manipulators. correspond to those etins #93-2 or 94-1, iter disposition, and identify their	6. Action completed/comments: NO Engent Esoty Identiful day ungestin
Monorail system (225B Operating Gallery/Cold Shop) structural integrity	Representative sampling for visual inspection of head markings on bolts connecting structural members of the monorail: If any head markings correspond to those identified in QA bulletins #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition, document as required, and identify their locations on attached inspection record.		No Suspect Hotos I dent, fiel during Inspection
Monorail system (225B Hot Shop) structural integrity	Representative sampling for visual inspection of head markings on bolts connecting structural members of the monorail. If any head markings correspond to those identified in QA bulletins #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition, document as required, and identify their location on attached inspection record.		Do suspect bolts ident. Fit during inspection
Monorail system (225B Manipulator Repair Shop) structural integrity	Representative sampling for visual inspection of head markings on bolts connecting structural members of the monorail. If any head markings correspond to those identified in QA bulletins #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition and identify their location on attached inspection record.		No Signa bott iday. Kat loving inspector .
	Inspection plan by:	QA Concurrence: Whitheref 1/12/96 Signature/Date	Cognizant Engineer/Date

<sup>(</sup>B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

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	ECT/COUNT	ERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING	<b></b>
1. System Number: C31	2. System Tit 225B POOL	CELLS .	
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a record that e subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspe- N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Ac</li> </ol>	ctions in accord	dance with Internal Memo 16710-00 purpose of	nere the use and the screening is A. O'Brien to J.
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for each plant s			
b. Identify system components whose failure components	uld have critica	al consequences by applying the screening crit	eria in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.	in step b, alor	ng with the functions whose failure would have	critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components	s or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening	criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Ob	otain QA concurrence.	
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan			
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and propos Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence	e Report (OR) w	ill be submitted for the entire facility.	or more
h. File copies of this form, along with the Ins package.	pection Plan, i	nspection records and any resulting NCRs in th	ie JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:			
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.			
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment a Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, life	and items where		ry. Examples:
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment re release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyor monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument ai	elied upon to pr n supply/exhausi ir.	revent or monitor operational accidents or con t fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air	tamination and radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipme resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. E	xamples: Crane	es, fire protections systems which protect equ	ssion due to ipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: This system will be used to screen	general ite	ms in the pool cell area.	
Components requiring verification:	Check hand	rails and grating supports for su	spect bolts
7. Other Components/Functions:			
All other systems (items) will be in area as required by each of those sy	nspected as ystems.	part of each of the other system	s in the
B. / //			
WARKET DRESS	9. 14/96 Date	10. Jay Log Manager	11. 18/96 Date

SUSI	SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN		
1. System Number: C31	2. System Title: 2258 Pool Cells		
3. Instructions:			
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit C	components Screening form to identify items requiring verificat	ion.	
b. List the items and functions	requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in B	lock 4 below.	
<ul> <li>c. Identify the inspection/verif bolts", or "review of procurement</li> </ul>	ication method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visu records for vendor package".	al inspection of pipe hanger	
who performed the verification an	fication as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indica d date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection ch e to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been insp	ecklists, copies of QC	
4. Component/function requiring verification:	5. Proposed inspection method:	6. Action completed/comments:	
Pool cell railings	100% visual inspection of handrails for suspect bolts.	No SUSPECT PARTS (BOLB) FOUNDO LB 1/4/96	
Pool cell grating supports	100% visual inspection of grating supports for suspect bolts.	NO SUSPECT BOLTS FOUND DLB 1/4/96	
	Inspection plan by: QA Concurrence:	Cognizant Engineer/Date	
	Signature/Date M.A. HILL	Cognizant Manager/Bate	

(8 Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

	WHC-SD-WM-IP-009, R
	SPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number: C31A	2. System Title: POOL CELL WEIGHT FACTOR
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a record that e- subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspe- N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Ac-</li> </ol>	each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and erfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening pections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to . Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.
4. Instructions:	
a. Complete one screening form for each plant s	t system.
b. Identify system components whose failure cou	could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5
c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.	ed in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components	nts or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	ed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan	
Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence	d, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will posed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more ence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, along with the Ins package.	nspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:	
93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10	S. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured i rance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have 80, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment	t and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment re release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyor monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument ai	relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination. yon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation air.
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u> : Equipme resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. E	oment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: System operates by measuring the di	
Components requiring verification:	bolts (holding supports, transmitter assymbly).
	signal is transmitted will be covered under any
7. Other Components/Functions:	
LARXY DRIS	9. 14/96 Date 10. 14/96 11./ 1/8/96
	Date Cog Manager Date

			WHL-SD-WM-IP-009, Rev
SUS	SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN		
1. System Number: C31A	2. System Title: pool cell weight fac	tor	
3. Instructions:			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit (	Components Screening form to i	dentify items requiring verificat	ion.
b. List the items and functions	requiring verification from B	lock 6 of the screening form in Bl	lock 4 below.
<ul> <li>c. Identify the inspection/verif bolts", or "review of procurement</li> </ul>	ication method to be used in a records for vendor package".	Block 5. For example, "100% visua	al inspection of pipe hanger
who performed the verification an	nd date. Records may include	k 5. Documentation should indicat marked up drawings, inspection che r item in the plant has been inspe	ecklists, copies of QC
4. Component/function requiring verification:	5. Proposed inspection meth		6. Action completed/comments:
Weight factor	100% visual inspecti	on for suspect bolts on	NO ITEMS FORDD
transmitters and tubing	anchors, supports, t	ransmitter assembly.	L Barss 1/5/95
	-		
•			
	Inspection plan by:	QA Concurrence:	
	Lang Berlike	MSL 1.8.92	Cognizant Engineer/Date
	Signature/Date	Signature/Date	6 Gen 1/8/96

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

1. System Number: 2. System Titler POOL CELL TEMPERATURE 2. System States 2. System Titler POOL CELL TEMPERATURE 2. Suppose This form provides a record that and B Plann-Zight System has been screened for applications where the use and to facilitate of paperanes of thysical impactions in accordance with international Memo 1910-20-140-026, A, DBrian to J N, Namen, B Plant Super/Counterfeit Patra Action Plan, dated May 2., 1992. 4. Instructions: 3. Complete one screening form for each plant system. 3. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5. C. List in Block 6 these components of team which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria. 4. If or describe in Block 7 these components or lease which were valuated but do not meet the screening criteria. 5. Argona file inspection Plan for item listed in Block 6. Obtain OA concurrence. 5. Perform the inspection Plan for item Signed in Block 6. Dotain OA concurrence. 5. Screening form and the inspection Plan, along with the inspection Record. 5. Screening formation and preod recults on the inspection state do in the original action of an original plant and record results on the Inspection plant and an originate screening of the inter builty. 5. Screening Criteria: 6. Screening Criteria: 7. Screening Screening Screening and team and screening screening in a system 7. Screening Criteria: 7. Screening Criteria: 7. Screening Screening Screening Screening and team and screening screening in screening in a system 7. Screening Scr	B PLANT/WESF SUSF	PECT/COUNTE	RFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING		
<pre>subsequent potential silure of supperformant for a parts could have critical consequences. The purpose or the screening is to facilitate or paysical impetitions in accordance with internal Hemo 107(0-94-044-044-044-044-044-044-044-044-044</pre>					
<ul> <li>Complete one screening form for each plant system.</li> <li>Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in block 5.</li> <li>List in Block 6 those components identified in step 0, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>Itst or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>Prepare an inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain 0A concurrence.</li> <li>Perform the inspection pr the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>If any subpecticoursering items are found, notify P. E. Reege on D. V. Nert: genediately. The Cognizant Engineer will related but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>File copies of this form, along with the "hypection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NGRs in the US work package.</li> <li>Screening Griteria:</li> <li><u>Protorial for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern ion suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or jater whose failure could directly vesult in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, holist, holista, holista, indived counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or jater whose failure could directly vesult in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, holist, hardraits, ladder, casaviks, lifting/nov ng device, rollup dod's, breathing all system?</li> <li><u>Components/Functiones Stepsy</u>, capaviks, lifting/nov ng device, rollup dod's, breathing all system?</li> <li><u>Components/Functions</u>: Reparts these solution: Bolts used for mounting or support of equipment.</li> <li><u>Components/Functions</u>: Receive nguipment reliad uponent as the protection is prevent on components and may resulting or the system of constant and record results in the response of counterfeit parts.</li> <li><u>Components/Functions Recordstore stepsy or the semplets:</u> Cranes, fire protections instem ac</li></ul>	subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspe	feit parts could ctions in accord	have critical consequences. The purpose of the ance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. (	screening is	
<ul> <li>Dentify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.</li> <li>List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>Itor describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>Prepare an inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain GA concurrence.</li> <li>Perform the inspection par the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. S. Reege or D. U. Mertz immediately. The Conjugant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and orgobed disposition. The information ultit be constituted on one or more wonce Reports (MCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.</li> <li>File copies of this form, along with the impection Plan, inspection records and any resulting WCRs in the JCS work package.</li> <li>Screening Criteria:         <ul> <li><u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern for subpect/counterfeit parts applied which would have added items listed in these bulleting size in your the submitted in the component is required.</li> <li><u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern for subpect/counterfeit parts applied which would have added items listed in these bulleting size in your passent procured in the component is required.</li> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective exulpment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Concerns, fire portentions gained exclosed examples: concentration released examples tanget examples in the inspection system. Safety, columptions, and realistion monitoring equirement; 460 kut MCS; instrument air.</li> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective exulpment and items whose failure could have a serious i</li></ul></li></ul>	4. Instructions:			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
<ul> <li>List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteris.</li> <li>Prenare an Inspection plan for items listed in Block 5. Obtain 0A concurrence.</li> <li>Ferform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>If any suspect/counterist items are found, notify P. E. Boege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Compare in one of more whole a list of deficiencies and incomposed dispection. The information will be consolidated on one of more whole officiencies and incomposed dispection. The information will be consolidated on one of more whole officiencies and incomposed dispection. Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work parkage.</li> <li>S. Scheming Criteria:</li> <li><u>Patchila for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern ion suspect/counteries parts applies only to irone proceed in the solid for the dist of device in Subject in Subject in Counterfeit Parts. The concern ion suspect/counteries applies only to irone proceed in the solid for and the dist of device in Subject in Subject in Subject in Subject Parts. The concern ion suspect/counteries applies only to irone proceed in the Subject in Subject Parts.</li> <li><u>S. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and terms whose failure could directive result in sectors or concentration released spires. Another Safety: Schulden for item whose failure could have a serious inpact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment 4. So devices, for post of equipment.</u></li> <li><u>General Plant Safety: Reputeries: Canon dones: canons and spires for mounting or support of equipment.</u></li> <li><u>C. Process/Appresid. Examples: Canon dones: canons and protection system which protect equipment.</u></li> <li><u>Components/Functions:</u> Th</li></ul>	a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.			
<ul> <li>List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteris.</li> <li>Prenare an Inspection plan for items listed in Block 5. Obtain 0A concurrence.</li> <li>Ferform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>If any suspect/counterist items are found, notify P. E. Boege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Compare in one of more whole a list of deficiencies and incomposed dispection. The information will be consolidated on one of more whole officiencies and incomposed dispection. The information will be consolidated on one of more whole officiencies and incomposed dispection. Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work parkage.</li> <li>S. Scheming Criteria:</li> <li><u>Patchila for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern ion suspect/counteries parts applies only to irone proceed in the solid for the dist of device in Subject in Subject in Counterfeit Parts. The concern ion suspect/counteries applies only to irone proceed in the solid for and the dist of device in Subject in Subject in Subject in Subject Parts. The concern ion suspect/counteries applies only to irone proceed in the Subject in Subject Parts.</li> <li><u>S. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and terms whose failure could directive result in sectors or concentration released spires. Another Safety: Schulden for item whose failure could have a serious inpact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment 4. So devices, for post of equipment.</u></li> <li><u>General Plant Safety: Reputeries: Canon dones: canons and spires for mounting or support of equipment.</u></li> <li><u>C. Process/Appresid. Examples: Canon dones: canons and protection system which protect equipment.</u></li> <li><u>Components/Functions:</u> Th</li></ul>	b. Identify system components whose failure co	uld have critical	consequences by applying the screening criteri	a in Block 5.	
<ul> <li>e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for itema listed in Block 6. Obtain GA concurrence.</li> <li>f. Perform the inspection par the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>g. If any susceet/counterfait lemms are found, notify D. E. Roege or D. V. Mert2 immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and oneposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more wonce of more woncentramed teports (WERS), and one docurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.</li> <li>h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.</li> <li>S. Streaming Criteria:         <ul> <li><u>Rotential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern for suspect/counterfait parts applies only to items produced in 1981 for latter which are listed in buality Assumance Bulletins (ABBS) 92-01 (02/14/72), 92-02 (08/21/72), 94-02 (08/21/72</li></ul></li></ul>	c. List in Block 6 those components identified				
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the inspection Record. g. If any suspect/counteries i items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consultated on one or more knoconformance Reports (KRS), and one decurrence Reports (KR) will be submitted for the entire facility. h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, Inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package. S. Screening Criteria: <ul> <li>a. Patential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</li> <li>The Concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items produced in 1981 or later which are listed in Duality Assumance Builterins (CABS) 92-01 (00/21/42), 92-002 (00/21/82), 93-002 (00/20/20), 53-00 (00/22/93).</li> <li>G. Gancal Diata Staty. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Crames, Duals, Hard E. Cannos, Cannos, Cannos, Cannos, Cannos, File Could are serious injury. Examples: Crames, Duals, Hard E. Examples: Crames, Parts, Stress, Stress, Cannos, Cours, Cannos, Stress, Hard E. Examples: Crames, Duals, Cannos, Fire protections systems which protect equipment are released for mounting or support of equipment.</li> </ul>	d. List or describe in Block 7 thase component	s or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening cr	iteria.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. V. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will Follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be constituated on one or more Monocohormance Reports (RER) and no decurrence Reports (RER) will be submitted for the entire facility. h. File copies of this form, along with the inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package. 5. Screening Criteria: <ul> <li>a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1980 of later which are listed in Dukity Assurance Builtetine (DARS) 92-01 (02/14/22), 92-02 (03/21/22), 93-032 (04/28/93), 93-032 (04/28/93), 94-01 (03/23/94), and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items builtetins inter 1980, no items (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items (Support Systems Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, holists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breating air systems softex; Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitoring equipment.</li> <li>c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents on contamination release/spread. Examples: Charpets: Carnon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and rediation monitoring equipment/dange or nonavailability. Examples: Carnos, fire protections systems which protect equipment.</li> <li>c. Gumponents/Functions: This system does not contain any electrical parts currently identified as suspect. The panel where the signal is displayed will be inspected per the requirements of system C93</li> </ul>	e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Obt	tain QA concurrence.		
<pre>follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Moncohormance Report (NCRs), and one docurrence Report (RCRs) in the acceler Report (RCRs) in the</pre>	f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	n and record resu	ults on the Ins <del>pe</del> ction Record.		
package	follow up with a list of deficiencies and propo	sed disposition.	The information will be consolidated on one or	ngineer will more	
<ul> <li><u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Duality Assumance Bulletins (0ABS) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (02/21/92), 93-032 (02/28/95),</li></ul>		spection Plan, ir	nspection records and any resulting NCRs in the .	JCS work	
<ul> <li>1981 or later which are listed in Duality Assurance Bulletins (0ABS) 92-01 (02/14/92), 93-002 (04/28/95), 93-002 (04/28/95), add4-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no crtailed inspection of the component is required.</li> <li>b. <u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catualks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems</li> <li>c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination menitoring equipment; 480 VAC WCS; instrument air.</li> <li>a. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.</li> <li>c. Components/Functions: Requiring verification: Bolts used for mounting or support of equipment.</li> <li>c. Other Components/Functions: This system does not contain any electrical parts currently identified as suspect. The panel where the signal is displayed will be inspected per the requirements of system C93</li> <li>a. <u>Haven Berss</u></li> <li>y. <u>Haye</u></li> <li><u>Haye</u></li> </ul>	5. Screening Criteria:				
Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/mov ng devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCS; instrument air. d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u> : Equipment whose failute could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment. 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: Components requiring verification: Bolts used for mounting or support of equipment. 7. Other Components/Functions: This system does not contain any electrical parts currently identified as suspect. The panel where the signal is displayed will be inspected per the requirements of system C93 8. Ameur Bars 9. 11/2/36. 11. 12/36. 11. 12/36. 11. 12/36. 11. 12/36. 11. 12/36. 12. 12. 12. 12. 12. 12. 12. 12. 12. 12.	1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assur 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (1	ance Bulletins (G 0/18/94). If no	MBs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 modification or repair has been performed which	(04/28/93).	
release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC WCCs; instrument air.         d. Equipment, 480 VAC WCCs; instrument air.         d. Equipment, 480 VAC WCCs; instrument whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.         6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:         Components requiring verification:         7. Other Components/Functions:         This system does not contain any electrical parts currently identified as suspect. The panel where the signal is displayed will be inspected per the requirements of system C93         8./	b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, l	and items whose ifting/mov ng dev	failure could directly result in serious injury. vices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	. Examples:	
resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.         6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: Components requiring verification: Bolts used for mounting or support of equipment.         7. Other Components/Functions: This system does not contain any electrical parts currently identified as suspect. The panel where the signal is displayed will be inspected per the requirements of system C93         8./	release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; cany	release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation			
Components requiring verification: Bolts used for mounting or support of equipment. 7. Other Components/Functions: This system does not contain any electrical parts currently identified as suspect. The panel where the signal is displayed will be inspected per the requirements of system C93 8. Areas Brass 9. 14/96 10 Mar 11. 18/96					
This system does not contain any electrical parts currently identified as suspect. The panel where the signal is displayed will be inspected per the requirements of system C93 8. $\frac{9.}{1496}$ $\frac{10}{14876}$ $\frac{11.}{1876}$	6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: Components requiring verification:	Bolts used	for mounting or support of equipmen	nt.	
This system does not contain any electrical parts currently identified as suspect. The panel where the signal is displayed will be inspected per the requirements of system C93 8. $\frac{9.}{1496}$ $\frac{10}{14876}$ $\frac{11.}{1876}$					
8. Bate 2. 10 Many 11. 18/96 Cog Engineer Log Manager	This system does not contain any e	lectrical pa d will be in	rts currently identified as suspect spected per the requirements of sys	t. The stem C93	
8. 8. 9. 10 11. 11. 11. 11. 11. 11. 11. 11. 11.			$\sim$		
8. ARXY Dets Cog Engineer 9. 10 11./ 1./96 Date 10 11./ 11./ 11./ 11./ 1./8/96 Date 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1				•	
	8. ARXY BASS	9. 1/4/9/ Date	10 Man Xog Manager	11./ 1/8/96 Oate	

SUS	PECT/COUNTERFEIT COMP	SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN		
1. System Number: C31B	2. System Title: Pool cell temperature			
3. Instructions:				
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit (	components Screening form to iden	tify items requiring verificati	on.	
b. List the items and functions				
c. Identify the inspection/verif bolts", or "review of procurement	ication method to be used in Bloo records for vendor package".	ck 5. For example, "100% visua	l inspection of pipe hanger	
<ul> <li>d. Perform and document the veri who performed the verification an records, etc. It must be possible</li> </ul>	d date. Records may include mark	ked up drawings, inspection che	cklists, copies of QC	
4. Component/function	5. Proposed inspection method:		6. Action	
requiring verification: Inspect any bolts used to assemble or mount the temperature measurement system.	100% visual inspection mount or anchor this ed	of any bolts used to	completed/comments: INSTRCTIM BENEARCED NO ITEMS ON SUSTRCT LIST. LIS INSTRC	
	war Bost tor	M Concurrence: Millie 1. 8.91 Signature/Date M.A. HILL	Cognizant Engineer/Date	

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

\*-6-80-\*\*\*=009, Rev. 0

B PLANT/WESE		
	COMPONENTS SCREENING	
<u>C31C</u>	2. System Title: POOL CELL LEAK DETECTION	
N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Par	that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications	where the use a of the screening J. A. C'Brien to
4. Instructions:		
a. Complete one screening form for each p	lant system.	
b. Identify system components whose failu	re could have critical concernance	
c. List in Block 6 those components ident consequences.	ified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would ha	riteria in Block
d. List or describe in Block 7 those come	Poorta an in	ave critical
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items li	onents or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screeni	ng criteria.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved	plan and record results on the Inspection Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are fo	und notify p. c. p.	
	und, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cogniz, roposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on or rrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.	le or more
package.	e Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in	the JCS work
. Screening Criteria:		
General Plant of C	erts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to surance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed wi 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.	hich would have
ranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks	ent and items whose failure could directly result in serious ini	iury. Examples:
Process/Support of the	nt relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or co anyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air	
Equipment with Programmatic Income		
Components/Functions Requiring Verificatio	<pre>ipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant m . Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equ n:</pre>	ission due to uipment.
inspection required.		
other components/Functions: e leak detector probe assembly	flange rests on the riser flange. If the bold	
ticed until the probes were to at studs are used to hold this		ts used to ot be it is known
	range in prace.	
0		
next Jaco	9. 14/95 10. 14/95 Star	11. Jalar
	Date Cog Manager	Date Zate

B PLANT/	WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number: C31D	2. System Title: Pool cell air dilution
to facilitate the performance of p	record that each 8 Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use an uspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to rfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.
4. Instructions:	
a. Complete one screening form fo	pr each plant system.
b. Identify system components who	ose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those componer cansequences.</li> </ul>	nts identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 th	ose components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
	approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and	ms are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will ies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
<ul> <li>h. File copies of this form, along package.</li> </ul>	g with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:	
93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/04)	terfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured i Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have ins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. General Plant Safety Protecti	ive equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: , catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
C. Process/Support Systems Safety	Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination
d. Equipment with Programmatic Imp resulting equipment damage or nonav	acts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to vailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring V	erification:
This system consists of fasisted of the system consists of fast side, a valve and a flow restricted of the system	abricated duct connecting each of the pool cells on the west meter instrumentation.
Components requiring inspected cell 1 and for instrumenta	ection: Bolts holding duct flanges together, the valve by pool ation supports.
7. Other Components/Functions:	
Lover Bais	9. 14/00 10. 14/00 11/ 12/ Rome 13/ 6/
Cog Engineer	1495 Aufflum 11.096 Linger Delta 11.496 Date Cog Manager Date Screen Preparer Date
	(01/02/9

SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN			
1. System Number: C31D	2. System Title: Pool cell air dilution	-	
3. Instructions:			
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit (	Components Screening form to identify items requiring verificat	ion.	
b. List the items and functions	requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in B	lock 4 below.	
<ul> <li>c. Identify the inspection/verify bolts", or "review of procurement</li> </ul>	fication method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visu t records for vendor package".	al inspection of pipe hanger	
who performed the verification ar	ification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicand date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection chieves to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been insp	ecklists, copies of QC	
4. Component/function requiring verification:	5. Proposed inspection method:	6. Action completed/comments:	
Bolts	Walk down and perform 100% visual inspection of items in column 4 for suspect	NO SUSPRET PARTS (BOITS OR FLAGES) FOUND.	
	items.	ALL FLANGE JOINS ON DUCT	
Flanges	Note: This is from where the air dilution	ARE MADE FROM DULT METAL AND BOLTED TO GREAT	
	duct begins at the north end of the pump trench and ends at the south wall.	LB 1110/96	
	the south warr.	L1 - 1110196	
· ·			
•			
	Inspection plan by: QA Concurrence:	$\beta \beta $	
	Loren Bers, 15/96 W Withereld 1/10/96	Cognizant Engineer/Date	
	Signature/Date	Welliam 1/15/96	
		Cognizant Manager/Date	

(B Plant/WESF 01702/96)

В Р. САМТАНСКЕТ SUSPECT/COUNTERFET COMPONENTS SCHERING         Пр. П. С. П. С.	8-I22	
CSTE 2014 The State of the State State of the State of	95-1-1 Coo wayage	
(2)16 Constant of the set of any strain files. Constant for the set of the		
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(2)16 Constant of the set of any strain files. Constant for the set of the	The sea materia and betreaging ad [[iw s[ensq M edt no	o sfortnoo ant to noitoaqani bariupar yu
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C31E C. S. System filte:	serve trapection of the component is required.	to deneral plane of the second length of
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C31E S. System Title: 3. System Title: 5. System Title: 5. System Title: 5. System Title: 5. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use is subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts ould have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DW-046, J. A. O'Brien to to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DW-046, J. A. O'Brien to to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DW-046, J. A. O'Brien to to facilitate the performance of physical inspection plan, dated May 24, 1995. A. Instructions: b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block consequences. C. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences. b. Identify system components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences. C. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria. e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Slock 6. Obtain AA concurrence. f. Perform the inspection plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain AA concurrence. 9. If any support on the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.	sposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more will be consolidated on one or more ort (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.	h. File contact Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Repo
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C31E C31E C31E C31E C31E C31E C31E C31E	b viant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use an parts could have critical consequences. The issues and	to facily potential failure of suspect/counterfait to facilytate the performance of physical inserting
	NIMATHON , CONTAMIN	3. Purpose. This form provides a record that
P PLANT/WEST SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING	telit metsys	1 C31E
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600-dI-W-dC-20W	мнс-SD-MM~IP-009, Rev	

WHC-SD-WM-IP-009, Rev. 0				
1. System Number: C3IE	2. System Title: POOL CELL WATER ADD./CONTAMIN	PLAN		
<ol><li>Instructions:</li></ol>				
<ul> <li>c. Identify the inspection/ver boits", or "review of procurement</li> <li>d. Perform and document the very who performed the very ()</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.</li> <li>c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of minimum of minimu</li></ul>			
4. Component/function requiring verification	ification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should ind and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection off to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been in 5. Proposed inspection method:	icate-clearly what was inspected, checklists, copies of QC nspected.		
holding structural piping supports, and to assemble valves and valve operators) Flanges	Walk down and perform 100% visual inspection of all items listed in column 4 for items listed as suspect. This inspection will be in the pool cell area and will include the deionized water line and the waste water removal lines (used when the pool cell sumps are jetted after testing of the leak detectors). Note: a pre inspection walk down found suspect bolts holding the two halves of the diaphram operator together. Check and document the extent of these bolts.	G SUSPECT BATS FOUND ACCEPT AS		
	A Concurrence: A Concurrence: MA Concurrence: MA Concurrence: 1.8.94 Signature/Date Signature/Date	Lacer Bros 1/8/96 Cognizant Engineer/Date		
	M.A. HILL	W Plante 1/9/96 Cognizant Manager/Date		

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

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B PLANT/WESE SUSE	ECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING			
		<u></u>		
1. System Number: C31F	2. System Title: POOL CELL ION EXCHANGE SYSTEM			
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.				
4. Instructions: a. Complete one screening form for each plant	EV/2 Pom			
	uld have critical consequences by applying the screening criteri	n in Dlack F		
	in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have cr			
consequences.				
	s or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening cr	iteria.		
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed				
<ol> <li>Perform the inspection per the approved pla.</li> </ol>	n and record results on the Inspection Record.			
follow up with a list of deficiencies and propo	notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant E sed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or ce Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.	ngineer will more		
h. File copies of this form, along with the In- package.	spection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the .	uCS work		
5. Screening Criteria:				
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.				
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment</li> <li>Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, l</li> </ul>	and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. ifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	Examples:		
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment is release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument a	relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contam on supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and air.	nination radiation		
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipm resulting equipment damage or nonavailability.	ment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant missi Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipm	on due to lent.		
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:				
Components requiring inspection: f	langes, valves and bolts.			
7. Other Components/Functions: Any required inspection of the controls on the M panels will be inspected per system C93				
8. Briter	9. 10 1/4/86 Date Cog Manager	11.		

(01/02/96)

## #PC-S2-₩M-12-009, Rev. 0

SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN				
1. System Number: C31F	2. System Title: Pool cell ion exhange system			
3. Instructions:				
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit (	components Screening form to identify items requiring verificat	ion.		
b. List the items and functions	requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Bl	lock 4 below.		
c. Identify the inspection/verif bolts", or "review of procurement	fication method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visua records for vendor package".	al inspection of pipe hanger		
who performed the verification ar	fication as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicated date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection chere to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.	ecklists, copies of QC		
4. Component/function requiring verification:	5. Proposed inspection method:	6. Action completed/comments:		
Bolts (including those holding structural piping supports, and to assemble valves and valve operators) Flanges Valves	<pre>Walk down and perform 100% visual inspection of all items listed in column 4 for items listed as suspect. Items in PC11 will be inspected during preparation for or during resin change. This space required fall protection and confined space permit for entry. This inspection will be in the pool cell area and will include the deionized water line and the waste water removal lines (used when the pool cell sumps are jetted after testing of the leak detectors).</pre>	NO ITTEMS FOUND LIB 1/5/96		
	Inspection plan by: A Concurrence: MARCA BATES Signature/Date 1/4/96 M.A. UTUL	Cognizant Engineer/Date		

ant/Manager/Date \_\_\_\_\_ (B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

B PLANT/WESF SUSP	ECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING			
1. System Number: C31G	2. System Title: POOL CELL COVER BLOCKS			
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each 8 Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, 8 Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.				
4. Instructions:		<u> </u>		
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.			
	uld have critical consequences by applying the screening criter	ia in Block 5		
	in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have c			
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components	s or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening c	ritería.		
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed				
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan	n and record results on the Inspection Record.			
FOLLOW UP WITH A LIST OF DEFICIENCIES and propos	notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant sed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one o ce Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.	Engineer will r more		
h. File copies of this form, along with the Ins package.	spection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work		
5. Screening Criteria:		·····		
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.				
b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment	and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury fting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	. Examples:		
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment r release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyo monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument a	elied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or conta n supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air an ir.	mination od radiation		
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.				
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:				
7. Other Components/Functions:				
No screening required.				
The cover blocks contain none of the items currently listed on the suspect lists (they contain rebar, angle iron, bail and concrete).				
8. Bats	9. 14/96 Jung Date Cos Manager/	11. 11. 11. 11. 11. 12. 12. 12.		

(01/02/96)

B PLANT/WESF SUSPE	CT/COUNTE	RFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING	
1. system Number: C31H	2. System Title POOL CELL V		
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a record that eac subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfe to facilitate the performance of physical inspect N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Acti</li> </ol>	eit parts could tions in accorda	have critical consequences. The purpos ance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048	e of the screening is
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for each plant sy	ystem.		
b. Identify system components whose failure could	ld have critical	consequences by applying the screening	criteria in Block 5.
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified in consequences.</li> </ul>	in step b, along	with the functions whose failure would	have critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components	or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the scree	ening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed i	in Block 6. Obt	ain QA concurrence.	
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan	and record resu	ults on the Inspection Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, r follow up with a list of deficiencies and propose Nanconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence	ed disposition.	The information will be consolidated or	) one or more
h. File copies of this form, along with the Insp package.	Dection Plan, in	spection records and any resulting NCRs	in the JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:			
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.			
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment a Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lif</li> </ul>			
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment re release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyor monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument ai	n supply/exhaust		
d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipme resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. E			
<ol><li>Components/Functions Requiring Verification:</li></ol>			
7. Other Components/Functions:			
No inspection required.			
This system is not critical to facility operation. This vacuum is a commercial swimming pool vacuum parts.			
8. August BRIED	9. //5/95 Date	10 Jay	11. 1/8-96 Date
			(01/02/96)

	B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING			
1. System Number: C31J	2. System Titl POOL CELL	e: CLOSED LOOP COOLING		
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.				
4. Instructions:				
a. Complete one screening form for each plan	it system.			
b. [dentify system components whose failure	could have critica	l consequences by applying the screening criteri	a in Block 5.	
c. List in Block 6 those components identific consequences.	ed in step b, alor	g with the functions whose failure would have cr	itical	
d. List or describe in Block 7 those compone	nts or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening cr	itería.	
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items list	ed in Block 6. Ob	tain QA concurrence.		
f. Perform the inspection per the approved p	lan and record res	ults on the Inspection Record.		
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are foun follow up with a list of deficiencies and pro Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurr	cosed disposition.	ege on D. W. Mentz immediately. The Cognizant Er The information will be consolidated on one on ill be submitted for the entire facility.	ngineer will more	
h. File copies of this form, along with the package.	Inspection Plan, i	nspection records and any resulting NCRs in the .	JCS work	
5. Screening Criteria:				
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.				
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipme Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks,</li> </ul>	nt and items whose lifting/moving de	failure could directly result in serious injury. vices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	Examples:	
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipmen release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; ca monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrumen</li> </ul>	nvon sucolv/exhaus	revent or monitor operational accidents or contam t fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and	ination I radiation	
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equ resulting equipment damage or nonavailability	ipment whose failu . Examples: Cran	re could have a serious impact on the plant missi as, fire protection systems which protect equipme	on due to nt.	
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: This system is misnamed in the JCS system at this time. This system is used for the cooling system for the pool cells (pool cell water recirculation and raw water).				
Components requiring verification: Bolts, flanges and valves on loop of pool cell water thru pump, heat exchanger and back into the pools (see inspection plan for items under water in the pool cells).				
7. Other Components/Functions: The raw water portion of this system will be verified using the raw water systems (C2O and C2OA).				
Procurement of the items for the new closed loop cooling system project W-252 will be done under a qualified QA program (construction is to start 1996).				
B. J. ARK ARON	9. 1/4/96 Date	10. Julian Lag Manager	11./ //8/76 Date/	

SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN			
1. System Number: C31J	2. System Title: Pool cell closed loop cooling		
3. Instructions:			
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit	Components Screening form to identify items requiring verifica	tion.	
b. List the items and functions	requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in (	Block 4 below.	
	fication method to be used in Block 5. For example, #100% view		
who bellouned the Aeristication at	ification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicand date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection chile to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been insp	recklists conjes of or	
4. Component/function requiring verification:	5. Proposed inspection method:	6. Action completed/comments:	
Bolts (including those holding structural piping supports, and to assemble valves and valve operators) Flanges valves	<pre>Walk down and visually inspect all items listed in column 4. This inspection will only cover the pool cell water which is recirculated thru the heat exchangers. perform for pool cells 1 thru 7 and 12. Note: Pool cell 2 does not have a heat exchanger or pump installed. Pool cell 1 has a cover block in place above the heat exchanger and will not be inspected. Note: if the flanges on the heat exchangers can not be verified and if any bolts can not be verified. The flanges and bolts on the dispersion headers at the bottom of the pool cells will not be inspected at this time (please note if these flanges are can be confirmed to be held together by studs)</pre>	NO THEMS FOUND. CAN NOT SEE BOTTOM OF FLANGE ON TOP OF FLANGE ON TOP OF BOTTOM FLANGE. (IF PRESSENT). ALL VISIBLE, SOF POSS J. FLANGESIN POOL USED OLLY STUDS WALVEST WARE THIS STOTE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING VALUES UNDER THIS STOTE THE OTTER TO SSIBLE LOCATON MON DHAVE BIEEN B MON TOPS FOR POOL CISUS LB 1/8/96 GS SUSPECT ISOLTS FOUND ON VALUE OFERATORS. NO OTHER SUSPECT PACTS FOUND ON VALUE OFERATORS. NO OTHER SUSPECT PACTS FOUND ON VALUE OFERATORS. NO OTHER SUSPECT PACTS FOUND ON VALUE OFERATORS. NO OTHER SUSPECT FOLLTS FOUND ON VALUE OFERATORS. NO OTHER SUSPECT PACTS FOUND ON VALUE OFFICE PACTORS. NO OTHER SUSPECT PACTS FOUND ON VALUE OFFICE PACTS FOUND ON VALUE P	
	Inspection plan by: A Concurrence: A Concure	Cognizant Engineer/Data	

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING					
1. System Number: C32	2. System Title: 1	WESF TK-100	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B P potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.	e critical consequer	nces. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the p	erformence of		
4, Instructions:					
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system	٦.				
b. Identify system components whose failure could he	ve critical consequ	ences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.	*		
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step	b, along with the fu	unctions whose failure would have critical consequence	- 18.,		
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or its	ms which were eve	lusted but do not meet the screening criteria.			
e. Prepare an inspection Plan for items listed in Block	6. Obtain QA cond	currence.	ſ		
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and re	acord results on the	Inspection Record.			
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.					
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection F	tan, inspection reco	ords and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.			
5. Screening Criteria:					
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.					
b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Crenes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems					
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u> : Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and rediation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.					
d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.					
6. Critical Components/Functions: None, Box 5 Screening Criteria, item a. does not apply.					
7. Noncritical Components/Functions: WESF TK-100 does not contain critical components as These other systems will be evaluated on the screenin			ase components.		
8. B. Kuteel Cog Engineer	9. <u>1-5-96</u> Dete	10 How Cog Manager	11. +5/7/-		
			(12/29/95)		

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C

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING 1. System Number: C33 & C99K 2. System Title: Micellaneous WESF Areas and Structural. 3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use a subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995. 4. Instructions: a. Complete one screening form for each plant system. b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block					
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use a subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.</li> <li>Instructions:         <ul> <li>Complete one screening form for each plant system.</li> </ul> </li> </ol>					
<ul> <li>a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.</li> </ul>					
4. Instructions: a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.					
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.					
•					
1 0. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block					
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.					
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.					
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.					
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.					
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer wi follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.					
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.					
5. Screening Criteria:					
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.					
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Example: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems					
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.					
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.					
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:					
Miscellaneous WESF areas includes stairwells, airlocks, roof and loading dock and other general areas not specifically covered under other systems. There have been no structural modifications to the WESF facility since construction.					
* CAAK COUERED UNDER B FLANT STRUCTURAL (SYSTEM BAAL)					
7. Other Components/Functions: None.					
8. <u>72</u> <u>Cog Engineer</u> <u>9.</u> <u>10</u> <u>10</u> <u>10</u> <u>10</u> <u>11.</u> <u>1-8-9</u> <u>Date</u> <u>10</u> <u>Date</u>					

B PLANT/WESF SUSF	ECT/COUNTE	RFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING	
1. System Number: C33B	2. System Title	: Compressed Gas Storage	
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a record that e subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspe N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Ac</li> </ol>	feit parts could ctions in accorda	have critical consequences. The purpose of the ance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A.	screening is
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.		
b. Identify system components whose failure co	uld have critical	consequences by applying the screening criteri	a in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.	l in step b, along	with the functions whose failure would have cr	itical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those component	s or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening cr	iteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Obt	ain QA concurrence.	
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	n and record resu	ilts on the Inspection Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and propo Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurren	sed disposition.	The information will be consolidated on one or	
h. File copies of this form, along with the In package.	spection Plan, in	spection records and any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:			
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assur 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (1 added items listed in these bulletins since 198	ance Bulletins (Q 0/18/94). If no	ABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 modification or repair has been performed which	(04/28/93),
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, l			. Examples:
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; cany monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument</li> </ul>	on supply/exhaust	event or monitor operational accidents or contar fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and	nination d radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equip resulting equipment damage or nonavailability.			
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:			
		nd of the WESF facility in the lat to counterfeit or suspect bolts.	<b>e 1980</b> 's.
7. Other Components/Functions:			
None.			
8.	9. 1/5/92	10. Men	11. 1-5-96

WHC-SD-WM-IP-009, Rev. 0					
SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN					
1. System Number: C33B	2. System Title: Compressed Gas Storage.	· ·			
<ol> <li>Instructions:</li> <li>a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit</li> <li>b. List the items and functions</li> <li>c. Identify the inspection/veribolts", or "review of procuremer</li> <li>d. Perform and document the veriwho performed the verification and set of the se</li></ol>	Components Screening form to identify items requiring verificats requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in	Block 4 below. Wal inspection of pipe hanger ate clearly what was inspected.			
	Inspection plan by: QA Concurrence A Concurrence Inspection plan by: QA Concurrence INSPECTION J. 8.9L Signature/Date M. A. HILL	Cogpizant Engineer/Date			

B PLANT/WESF SUSP	ECT/COUNT	ERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING	
1. System Number: C33D	2. System Titl	e: Truck Port	
	ections in accord	F system has been screened for applications wher d have critical consequences. The purpose of th dance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. d May 24, 1995.	
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for each plant :	system.		
b. Identify system components whose failure co	uld have critica	al consequences by applying the screening criter	ia in Block 5.
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.</li> </ul>	in step b, alon	ng with the functions whose failure would have c	ritical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components	s or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening c	riteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Ob	tain QA concurrence.	
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plar	n and record res	ults on the Inspection Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and propos Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence			ingineer will more
h. File copies of this form, along with the Ins	spection Plan, i	nspection records and any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work
package.			
<ol> <li>Screening Criteria:</li> <li>a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u></li> <li>1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assura</li> <li>93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10 added items listed in these bulletins since 1980</li> </ol>		ands) 72 01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002	ms procured in (04/28/93), would have
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, li	and items upose		. Examples:
C. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment r release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyo monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument a		revent or monitor operational accidents or conta t fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air an	mination d radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipm resulting equipment damage or nonavailability.	ent whose failur Examples: Crane	re could have a serious impact on the plant miss es, fire protections systems which protect equid	ion due to
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:			
impact both personnel safety	1980's. Fat	e ventilation and radiological cont lure of the doors has the potentia s.	rol of the l to
7. Other Components/Functions:			
8. Cog Epgineer	9. <u>  {{ 5}}</u> Date	10. Alan Cog Manager	11. 1-8-96

SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN         1. System Number: C33D       2. System Title: Truck Port.         3. Instructione:       4. Use the Suspect/ourterfeit Components Screening form to Identify items requiring verification.         b. List the Items and functions requiring verification from Black 6 of the screening form in Black 4 below.         c. Jointify the Inspection/verification method to be used in Black 5. For example, "HOX visual Inspection of pipe hange builds, of the verification and dec. Wered package."         d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Black 5. For example, "HOX visual Inspection of pipe hange builds, of the verification and dec. Records may Includes Bracked be dorings, inspecting, copies of OC records, etc. It was the possible to tall whether a particular item in the plant has wheth the objection.         d. Component/function requiring verification as specified in Black 5. For example, "HOX visual Inspection of the verification and dec. Mercord may Includes Bracked be dorings, inspection obsection, copies of OC records, etc. It was the possible to tall whether a particular item in the plant has wheth possible of OC requiring verification;         Bi-Fold Door.       5. Proposed Inspection of head markings on bolts will be of the obles for later disposible or example, "HOX visual inspection record, of the bolts for later disposition, document as requiring verification record.       5. String documents;         Bi-Fold Door.       100% visual inspection of head markings on document as requiring verification record.       5. String document document as requiring verification;         Bi-Fold Door.       100% visual in			N-U-	SD-WM-IP-009, Rev. 0
<ul> <li>3. Instructions:</li> <li>a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.</li> <li>b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.</li> <li>c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hange bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".</li> <li>d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspect who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of ac records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.</li> <li>4. Component/function requiring verification:</li> <li>Bi-Fold Door.</li> <li>5. Proposed inspection method:</li> <li>6. Action completed/comments:</li> <li>Bi-Fold Door.</li> <li>100% visual inspection of head markings on bolts used in installation of Bi-Fold door. If any head markings correspond to those identified in QA Bulletin #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition, document as required, and identify their</li> </ul>	SUS	PECT/COUNTERFEIT CON	MPONENTS INSPECTION PL	.AN
<ul> <li>a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.</li> <li>b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.</li> <li>c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hange bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".</li> <li>d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspect who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of at records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.</li> <li>4. Component/function requiring verification:</li> <li>Bi-Fold Door.</li> <li>5. Proposed inspection of head markings on bolts used in installation of Bi-Fold door. If any head markings correspond to those identified in QA Bulletin #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition, document as required, and identify their</li> </ul>	1. System Number: C33D	2. System Title: Truck	Port.	
<ul> <li>b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.</li> <li>c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hange bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".</li> <li>d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspect who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of qc records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.</li> <li>4. Component/function requiring verification:</li> <li>Bi-Fold Door.</li> <li>Bi-Fold Door.</li> <li>S. Proposed inspection of head markings on bolts used in installation of Bi-Fold door. If any head markings correspond to those identified in QA Bulletin #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition, document as required, and identify their</li> </ul>	3. Instructions:			
<ul> <li>c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hange bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".</li> <li>d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspect who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of ac records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.</li> <li>4. Component/function requiring verification:</li> <li>Bi-Fold Door.</li> <li>5. Proposed inspection of head markings on bolts used in installation of Bi-Fold door. If any head markings correspond to those identified in QA Bulletin #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition, document as required, and identify their</li> </ul>				
d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspect who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.         4. Component/function requiring verification:       5. Proposed inspection method:         6. Action completed/comments:       6. Action completed/comments:         Bi-Fold Door.       100% visual inspection of head markings on bolts used in installation of Bi-Fold door. If any head markings correspond to those identified in QA Bulletin #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition, document as required, and identify their				
records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspection4. Component/function requiring verification:5. Proposed inspection method:6. Action completed/comments:Bi-Fold Door.100% visual inspection of head markings on bolts used in installation of Bi-Fold door.6. Action completed/comments:If any head markings correspond to those identified in QA Bulletin #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition, document as required, and identify their		e records for venuor package".		
requiring verification:5. Action completed/comments:Bi-Fold Door.100% visual inspection of head markings on bolts used in installation of Bi-Fold door.Visual downed on 899KIf any head markings correspond to those identified in QA Bulletin #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition, document as required, and identify their0. Action completed/comments:	Ferrer Ferrer Ferrer Ferrer Ferrer	in deves records indy include	Marked UD drawinds, inspection c	peckliste comina of oc
If any head markings correspond to those identified in QA Bulletin #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition, document as required, and identify their		5. Proposed inspection meth	rod:	
	Bi-Fold Door.	bolts used in instal If any head markings identified in QA Bul mark the bolts for 1 document as required	lation of Bi-Fold door. correspond to those letin #93-2 or 94-1, ater disposition, , and identify their	Frequence downt
Inspection plan by: QA Concurrence:		2 m 1/8/91.		Cognizant Engineer/Date

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

B PLANT/WESF SUSPEC	T/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number: C41, C41B, and C41D	2. System fitle: Cranes, 10 ton Pool Cell Crane, and 15 ton Canyon Crane.
<b>] subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter</b>	each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and rfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is actions in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. ction Plan, dated May 24, 1995.
4. Instructions:	
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.
b. Identify system components whose failure co	ould have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.	d in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those component	ts or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	in and record results on the Inspection Record.
follow up with a list of deficiencies and propo	, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will ased disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more nee Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, along with the in package.	rspection plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:	
1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assur 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (1	5. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in rance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have 30, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment</li> <li>Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, l</li> </ul>	and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: . .ifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; cany monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument</li> </ul>	relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination yon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation air.
<ul> <li><u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u>: Equip resulting equipment damage or nonavailability.</li> </ul>	mment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:	
7. Other Components/Functions: Important functions include struct of the hoist system.	cural integrity of the crane and load bearing capability
part of WESF construction. None of replaced since the installation, efficient connections (original bolts were if replacement bolts received adequat None of the hoist components have The wire rope is not on the list of	on canyon crane were installed in the early 1970's as of the fasteners in the structural connection have been except for several bolts in the bridge girder end dentified in the PM as being too short). The ce procurement quality control to ensure traceability. been replaced except for the load brake and wire rope. of potential suspect parts. Failure of the load brake ces because there are redundant braking systems (eddy

Note: The cranes routinely under	<u>go monthly, c</u>	<u>uarterly, annual</u>	<u>and tri-annual</u>	inspections.
8. Zog Engineer	9. 1.15-194 Date	10. Manager Cog Manager		11. 1/5/96 Date

B PLANT/WESF SUSP	ECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number:C41A	2. System Title: Bi-Products Crane
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that ex subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspec N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Act	ach B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and feit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is ctions in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. tion Plan, dated May 24, 1995.
4. Instructions:	
a. Complete one screening form for each plant s	system.
b. Identify system components whose failure cou	Id have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.</li> </ul>	in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components	or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan	and record results on the inspection Record.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, if follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposi Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence	notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will ed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more e Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, along with the insp package.	pection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:	
93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/ added items listed in these bulletins since 1980,	The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in nee Bulletins (GABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), (18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have no detailed inspection of the component is required.
<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment a Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lif</li> </ul>	and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: ting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
C. Process/Support Systems Safety, Faulances	lied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination
d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipme resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. E	nt whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to xamples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:	
	Public Power and Supply System as excess material in ted in 1985.
Bolts – structural assemby	
Bolts - Gantry	
Bolts - handrails and ladders.	

7. Other Components/Functions: None.			
8. Cog Engineer	9. <u> /8/61</u> Date	10. Whom Cog Manager	- 11. 1-5-94 Date
			(01/02/96)

SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN				
1. System Number: C41A 2. System Title: Bi-Products Crane				
3. Instructions:				
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit C				
		ock 6 of the screening form in B		
c. Identify the inspection/verif bolts", or "review of procurement	records for vendor package".			
d. Perform and document the veri who performed the verification an records, etc. It must be possible	d date. Records may include m	arked up drawings, inspection ch	ecklists, copies of QC	
<ol> <li>Component/function requiring verification:</li> </ol>	5. Proposed inspection metho	d:	6. Action completed/comments:	
Crane Structural integrity	bolts connecting stru crane. If any head m those identified in C	on of head markings on actural members of the markings correspond to A Bulletins #93-2 or for later disposition, and identify their	No exepct both identified suring inspection 1/8/86	
Gantry integrity	location on attached		e wand both	
Handrails and ladders	bolts connecting gant components. If any h correspond to those i bulletins #93-2 or 94 later disposition, do and identify their lo inspection record.	No sugar both , dulified long inget 1/5-196		
	100% visual inspection bolts connecting gant and east end ladder an head markings corresp identified in QA bull mark the bolts for lan document as required, location on attached	ssemblies. If any ond to those etins #93-2 or 94-1, ter disposition, and identify their	No suged belts duty dung ingele 2/5/46	
·				
	Inspection plan by:	QA Concurrence: MASA I. 8. 54 Signature/Date M.A. HILL	Z 1/9/94 Cognizant Engineer/Date	

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING					
1. System Number: C41C 2. System Title: WESF Elevator					
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a record that a subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspe- N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Ac</li> </ol>	ections in accord	I nave critical consequences. The purpose of the functional definition of the second sec			
4. Instructions:		· may Ex. (775.	<u> </u>		
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	svstem.				
		l consequences by applying the screening criter	ie ie Otaal S		
<ul> <li>List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.</li> </ul>					
d. List or describe in Block 7 those component	ts or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening c	riteria.		
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Ob	tain QA concurrence.			
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	n and record res	ults on the Inspection Record.			
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and propo Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurren	1580 01900911100	The intermetion will be expectively as a second s	Engineer will r more		
h. File copies of this form, along with the In package.	spection Plan, in	nspection records and any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work		
5. Screening Criteria:			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assur- 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (1 added items listed in these bulletins since 1986	ance Butterins (L	ABS) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-00			
b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems					
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.					
<ul> <li><u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u>: Equipment cesulting equipment damage or nonavailability.</li> </ul>	ment whose failur Examples: Crane	e could have a serious impact on the plant miss s, fire protections systems which protect equip	tion due to ment.		
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:					
WESF elevator installed as p replacement of components ha	art of const s been perfo	uction during early 1970's. No up rmed since installation.	grades or		
7.Other Components/Functions: No safety or programatic issues are impacted by elevator availability. This is a freight elevator.					
B. Cog Engineer	9. 1/5/5 <u>2</u> Date	10. 21 Brannon Cog Manager	11. $1-5-96$ Date		

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B PLANT/WESF SUSP	ECT/COUNTE	RFEIT COMPONEN	TS SCREENING	
1. System Number: C41E	2. System Title	: In Cell Hoist.		
<ol> <li>Purpose. This form provides a record that e subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspe N. Nansen, 8 Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Ac</li> </ol>	feit parts could ctions in accorda	have critical conseque ance with Internal Mem	ences. The purpose of th	e screening is
4. Instructions:				
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.			
b. Identify system components whose failure co	uld have critical	consequences by apply	ying the screening criter	ia in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.	in step b, along	with the functions wh	nose failure would have c	ritical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those component	s or items which	were evaluated but do	not meet the screening c	riteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed	in Block 6. Obt	ain QA concurrence.		
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla	n and record resu	lts on the Inspection	Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and propo Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurren	sed disposition.	The information will	be consolidated on one of	Engineer will r more
h. File copies of this form, along with the In package.	spection Plan, in	spection records and a	any resulting NCRs in the	JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:				
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assur 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (1 added items listed in these bulletins since 198	ance Bulletins (Q 0/18/94), If no	ABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), modification or repair	, 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-00% has been performed which	2 (04/28/93),
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, l	and items whose ifting/moving dev	failure could directly ices, rollup doors, br	/ result in serious injury reathing air systems	y. Examples:
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; cany monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument	on supply/exhaust	event or monitor opera fans; HEPA filters ar	ntional accidents or conta nd instrumentation; air an	amination nd radiation
<ul> <li><u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u>: Equip resulting equipment damage or nonavailability.</li> </ul>				
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:				
The In Cell Hoist system in the BUSS cask for cesium shi system, which was an upgrade bed, bridge and 2 ton hoist. progamatic issues.	pments to co to the prev	mmerical irradia ious hoist, incl	tions facilties. uded installation	The hoist of rail
7.Other Components/Functions:				
8. Cog Engrneer	9. 1/5/94 Date	10. A. Jan Cog Manager	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	11. 1-8-56 Date

(01/02/96)

#+6-SD-#V-10-009, Rev. 0

SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN			
1. System Number: C41E	2. System Title: In Cell	Hoist	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
3. Instructions:			
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit (	Components Screening form to ic	dentify items requiring verificat	ion.
b. List the items and functions	requiring verification from BL	ock 6 of the screening form in B	lack 4 below.
c. Identify the inspection/verif bolts", or "review of procurement	ication method to be used in B records for vendor package".	llock 5. For example, "100% visu	al inspection of pipe hanger
d. Perform and document the veri who performed the verification ar records, etc. It must be possible	ki date. Records may include m	marked up drawings, inspection ch	ecklists, copies of OC
4. Component/function requiring verification:	5. Proposed inspection metho	od:	6. Action completed/comments:
Rail Bed Integrity	bolts used in install cell hoist. If any he to those identified i	on of head markings on lation rail bed for in ead markings correspond in QA Bulletin #93-2 or for later disposition, and identify their l inspection record.	NO suspent bolts I dont find during Inspection
Bridge Integrity	100% Visual inpspection of head markings on bolts connecting structural members of the bridge assembly. If any markings correspond to those identified in QA Bulletins #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition, document as required, and identify their locations on attached inspection record.		Do sosper polts , dent, fur dor-p 10 specie
2 Ton Hoist	bolts connecting hois markings correspond t	o those identified in 94-1, mark the bolts , document as y their locations on	NO 5 segai bolts , dad hil dung 12 spector
	Inspection plan by: 	QA Concurrence: MASSIE 1.8.56 Signature/Date M.A.Hill	Cognizant Engineer/Date Dom 1/12/26 Cognizant Manager/Date

(8 Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

B PLANT/WESF S	SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. System Number: С96 (А-Н)	2. System Title: Radiation Monitoring
subsequent potential failure of sus to facilitate the performance of ph	ecord that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and pect/counterfait parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is ysical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. eit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.
4. Instructions:	
a. Complete one screening form for	each plant system.
	e failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those component consequences.	s identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 tho	se components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for	items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
	approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit item follow up with a list of deficienci	is are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will es and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
<ul> <li>h. File copies of this form, along package.</li> </ul>	with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:	
1981 or later which are listed in Q 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94)	erfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in uality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have ns since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protecti Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders,	ve equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> release/spread. Examples: Canyon monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs;</li> </ul>	Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation instrument air.
	acts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to ailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring V	erification:
the Radiation Monitoring	monitors, indicators and interconnecting wire) associated with System is critical to the safety of personnel within the used in this system are not identified as suspect parts on the
The electrical supply com suspect components were in details.	ponents were covered with the Electrical System (B12). No dentified. See the section on Electrical Distribution for
7. Other Components/Functions:	
	embly of the Radiation Monitoring System are not required to be ated.
8. Martineer	9. $10.6 \frac{11}{1/5/96}$ 10.6 $\frac{11}{1/8} \frac{11}{96} \frac{12}{200} \frac{13}{1/5/96}$ 13. $1/5/96$

\*=5=55=\*V=12=009, Sev. 0 ≤usi2 &. wyiz

B PLANT/WESF SUSPEC	T/COUNT	ERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREI	ENING
1. System Number: C97/C97A	2. System Titl 296-B-10 S	e: TACK MONITOR (WESF)	
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that e subsequent potential failure of suspect/counter to facilitate the performance of physical inspe N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Ac	ctions in accord	Inave critical consequences. The purpose of ance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DuM-048. J.	
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for each plant	system.		
b. Identify system components whose failure co	uld have critica	l consequences by applying the screening crit	eria in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified consequences.	in step b, alor	g with the functions whose failure would have	critical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those component	s or items which	were evaluated but do not meet the screening	criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed			
f. Perform the inspection per the approved pla			
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, follow up with a list of deficiencies and propo- Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrent	ce Report (OR) w	The information will be consolidated on one ill be submitted for the entire facility.	or more
h. File copies of this form, along with the In: package.	spection Plan, i	nspection records and any resulting NCRs in th	ne JCS work
5. Screening Criteria:			
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assura 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10 added items listed in these bulletins since 1980	1/18/94 If pa	modification of repair bac been set (08/21/92), 93-(	
b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, li	and items whose ifting/moving dev	failure could directly result in serious inju vices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	ary. Examples:
c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyo monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument a	IN SUNNIV/AVBBUIG	revent or monitor operational accidents or cor t fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air	and radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment damage or nonavailability.	ent whose failu Examples: Crane	e could have a serious impact on the plant miss, fire protections systems which protect equ	ssion due to nigment.
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: System use: WESF SAFETY SYSTEM			
Components requiring verification:	None.		
7. Other Components/Functions:			
The monitor system is in service at a suspect part will not compromise impact before it can be repaired ir critical, therefore inspection is r	personnel o 1 a timelv m	r process safety, or have a progr anner. These systems are not cor	ammatia
s. And com-	9. 1-10-96 Date	19. Lik Sham Eog Hanager	11/1/91
			(01/02/96)

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## B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1.	System Number:	
	C97B	

2. System Title: K-1 AIR SAMPLERS (WESF)

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Nemo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:

a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.

b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.

c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.

d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.

e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.

f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.

g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRS), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.

h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:

a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.

b. <u>General Plant Safety.</u> Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems

c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.

d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: System use: WESF ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEM

Components requiring verification: None.

7. Other Components/Functions:

The monitor system is in service at WESF. Any failure of these items due to a failure of a suspect part will noot compromise personanel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired in a timely manner. There are no air sampler system applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. These systems are not considered critical, therefore inspection is not required of for this system.

8. Jai Cog Engineer	9. 1-11-96- Date	10. <u>A. E. Manager</u> Cog Manager	11. /- 4-91 Date

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B PLANT/WESF SUSPE	CT/COUNTERFEIT CO	MPONENTS SCREENING	
1. System Number: C97C	2. System Title: K-3 AIR SAMPLERS (W	ESF)	
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that easily subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterformance of physical inspect. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Act.	it parts could have critications in accordance with Int	il consequences. The purpose of the ernal Memo 16710-94-0WM-048, J. A. (	screening is
4. Instructions:			
a. Complete one screening form for each plant s	stem.		
b. Identify system components whose failure could	i have critical consequence	s by applying the screening criteri	a in Block 5.
<ul> <li>c. List in Black 6 those components identified consequences.</li> </ul>	n step b, along with the fu	nctions whose failure would have cr	itical
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components	or items which were evaluat	ed but do not meet the screening cr	iteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed i	n Block 6. Obtain QA concu	irrence.	
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan	and record results on the 1	nspection Record.	
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, of follow up with a list of deficiencies and propose Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence	d disposition. The informa	ition will be consolidated on one or	ngineer will more
h. File copies of this form, along with the Insp package.	ection Plan, inspection rec	ords and any resulting NCRs in the .	ICS work
5. Screening Criteria:			
a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assuran 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10, added items listed in these bulletins since 1980,	ce Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 ( 18/94). If no modificatior	02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 or repair has been performed which	(04/28/93),
b. <u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment a Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lin	nd items whose failure coul ting/moving devices, rollup	d directly result in serious injury. 0 doors, breathing air systems	Examples:
<ul> <li><u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u>: Equipment re release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyor monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MECs; instrument a</li> </ul>	supply/exhaust fans; HEPA	itor operational accidents or contam filters and instrumentation; air and	nination I radiation
d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic impacts:</u> Equipment resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. E		a serves inpute an the prent missi	
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: System use: WESF ENVIRONMENTAL SYST	M		
Components requiring verification:	lone.		
7. Other Components/Functions:			
The monitor system <u>not</u> in service a a suspect part will not compromise impact before it can be repaired in applications where the use and subs could have critical consequences. T inspection is not required of for t	personnel or process a timely manner. The equent potential fai nese systems are not	s safety, or have a program mere are no air sampler sys flure of suspect/counterfe	nmatic stem it parts
	7-4-96 10. ate Cog Manage	ymm	11. <u>1-4-96</u> Date

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<ul> <li>d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u>: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.</li> <li>6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:</li> <li>No inspection required.</li> <li>This system is for general minor work. This work will be inspected as required as part of the areas/systems in which it is contained.</li> </ul>	B PLANT/WESE SUSPEC			
General plant support         C994       SIGN PAINTER GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT         C996       MILLWRIGHT GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT         C997       MILLWRIGHT GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT         C996       MILLWRIGHT GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT         C997       LAGERS GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT         C996       LAGERS GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT         C997       LAGERS GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT         C998       LAGERS GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT         C999       LAGERS GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT         C990       TEMMAN CLEARAL PLANT SUPPORT         C991       LAGERS GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT         C992       LAGERS GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT         C994       LAGERS GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT         C995       LAGERS GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT         C996       MILLWRIGHT GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT         C997       LAGERS GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT         C998       Secontrain descretions in concording the second part support (Califord) descretions in concording the second part support (Califord) descretions in concording the second part support (Califord) descretion in Slock 5.         c. Canter in Block 7 those components identified in step b, along with the functins the c				
<pre>same submit point point stature of physical impactions in sectorance with internal monoity10-94-000+068, J. A. O'Brien to J. X. Maren, &amp; Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995. 4. Instructions: 4. Complete on screening form for each plant system. 5. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5. C. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences. 4. Present of the screening form for each plant system. 5. Identify system components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences. 4. List of describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria. 5. Preson an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain GA concurrence. 7. Perform the inspection par the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. 7. Ferform the inspection par the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. 7. Ferform the inspection par the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. 7. Ferform the inspection par the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. 7. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package. 7. Screening Criteria: 7. Patential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 7. State in Block 7. Along NCRS in the JCS 20/23/23/23/25/20 (08/21/23), 95-02 (08/22/23),</pre>	C99     G       C99A     S       C99B     P/       C99C     M       C99D     P       C99E     C/       C99F     C	eneral pla IGN PAINTE AINTER GEN ILLWRIGHT IPE FITTEF ARPENTER G AGGERS GEN	ant support ER GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT NERAL PLANT SUPPORT GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT R GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT	
<ul> <li>Complete one screening form for each plant system.</li> <li>Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.</li> <li>List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>Prefarm the inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain 0A concurrence.</li> <li>Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>Jenson the list of deficiencies are found, notify 9. E Anege or 0. V. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will Monconformance Reports (NKRs), and one depressed support (ON will be submitted for the entire facility.</li> <li>File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.</li> <li>Screening Criteria:         <ul> <li><u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1996. Joint 1997.</li> <li>Screening Criteria:             <ul> <li><u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1996. Joint 2406 (10/1472), 92-02 (00/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-002 (04/28/</li></ul></li></ul></li></ul>	to facilitate the performance of physical inspection	t parts could ons in accord	have critical consequences. The purpose of the ance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048. J. A	a anananing in
<ul> <li>b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.</li> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtsin 6A concurrence.</li> <li>f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or 0. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will Nonconformance Reports (NERs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be aubmitted for the entire facility.</li> <li>h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.</li> <li>5. Screening Criteria: <ul> <li>a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in NSP-00 (14/28/03), 000 (04/28/03), 039-</li></ul></li></ul>	4. Instructions:			
<ul> <li>List in Slock 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain GA concurrence.</li> <li>Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Reege or D. 4. Mertz Immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more wonceffect the screening Criteria:</li> <li>Screening Criteria:</li> <li< td=""><td>a. Complete one screening form for each plant syst</td><td>tem.</td><td></td><td></td></li<></ul>	a. Complete one screening form for each plant syst	tem.		
<ul> <li>List in Slock 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</li> <li>Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain GA concurrence.</li> <li>Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Reege or D. 4. Mertz Immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more wonceffect the screening Criteria:</li> <li>Screening Criteria:</li> <li< td=""><td>b. Identify system components whose failure could</td><td>have critical</td><td>l consequences by applying the screening criter</td><td>ia in Block 5.</td></li<></ul>	b. Identify system components whose failure could	have critical	l consequences by applying the screening criter	ia in Block 5.
<ul> <li>Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.</li> <li>F. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>J. If any suspect/counterfait items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (Will B submitted for the entire facility.</li> <li>h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.</li> <li>S. Screening Criteria: <ul> <li><u>a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or lister which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABS) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (06/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 92-03 (05/20/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 92-03 (05/20/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 92-03 (05/20/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 92-03 (05/20/93), 93-03 (05/20/94), no detailed inspection or the organic has been performed which would have added items is ince 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.</li> <li>b. <u>General Plant Sofery</u>. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handraits, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems</li> <li>c. <u>Process/Support Systems Sofery:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.</li> <li>d. <u>Sourineent with Programmatic Impacts</u>: Equipment protections systems which protect equipment.</li> <li>d. <u>Sourineent with Programmatic Impacts</u>: Equipment for suppley examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.</li> <li>d. <u>Sourineent with Programmatic Impac</u></li></ul></li></ul>	c. List in Block 6 those components identified in			
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C. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VKA MCCs; instrument air. d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment. 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: No inspection required. This system is for general minor work. This work will be inspected as required as part of the areas/systems in which it is contained. 7. Other Components/Functions: 8. <u>Arear Bar</u> 9. <u>14466</u> 10. <u>11.</u> 11. <u>74-94</u>	93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18)	1/94) If no.	MBS) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002	
Receiption       Examples: Lanyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.         d.       Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.         6.       Components/Functions Requiring Verification:         No inspection required.         This system is for general minor work. This work will be inspected as required as part of the areas/systems in which it is contained.         7.       Other Components/Functions:         9.       10.         11.       14.476         10.       11.         7.4.94	<ul> <li><u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment and Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting</li> </ul>	items whose ng/moving dev	failure could directly result in serious injury rices, rollup doors, breathing air systems	. Examples:
Pesultring equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.         6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:         No inspection required.         This system is for general minor work. This work will be inspected as required as part of the areas/systems in which it is contained.         7. Other Components/Functions:         NowE         8. Larger Barrow         9. Lifet         10. Larger Barrow         11. Turner         11. Turner	c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u> : Equipment relier release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon sumonitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.	linni V/exhaust	event or monitor operational accidents or conta fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air an	mination nd radiation
6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: No inspection required. This system is for general minor work. This work will be inspected as required as part of the areas/systems in which it is contained. 7. Other Components/Functions: NONE 8. Lacr Base 9. 14476 10. 11. COM Engineer 1. 1. 14476 10. 11. -4-94	d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:</u> Equipment resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Exam	whose failur mples: Crane	e could have a serious impact on the plant miss s, fire protections systems which protect equip	ion due to ment.
This system is for general minor work. This work will be inspected as required as part of the areas/systems in which it is contained. 7. Other Components/Functions: $NONE$ 8. Larr Brown 2. 10. 10. 11. 14.96	6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:			
The areas/systems in which it is contained. 7. Other Components/Functions: NONE 8. LART BODE 11. $14476$ Wolfhamm 11. $74-94$	No inspection required.			
8. LART BOD 9. 14/96 10. 11. 1/4/96 Wollarm 11. 194-94	This system is for general minor work the areas/systems in which it is cont	. This wo	ork will be inspected as required	as part of
8. LARET BER 9. 14/96 10 11. 1/4/96 Mollarm 11. 1-4-94	7. Other Components/Functions: NONE			
Date Dog Menager Date Date	8. LARET BERS	14/96	10 and Phym	11. J=4_91
	Cog Engineer Dat		Cog Menager	Date

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING           1. system Number:         2. System Title: COVER BLOCKS           3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the subsequent potential failure of subsect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening to facilitatist the performance of physical inspections where well internal Hemo 1670s.30:004/043, J. A. 0/Bri M. Naman, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.           4. Instructions:         a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.           b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical annequences by applying the screening criteria in c. List in Block 5 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.           d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria for the inspection par the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.           g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are fund, nority P. E. Roege or D. U. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engine follow up with a list of deficiencies and propaded dissolition. The information will be comparisonal till be comparisonal to ensore listed in the screening of the screening Criteria:           a. Screening Criteria:         a. Recent Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applied.           file copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCAs in the 2CS we parkage.           g. Screening Criteria:         a. Recent Counterfeit Parts. The concern	
C99H         COVER BLOCKS           3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each & Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the subsequences. The purpose of the screened facilitate the performance of purpose icon the screening content of auspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screened facilitate the performance of purpose icon the screening content of auspect/counterfeit parts action plan, dated May 24, 1995.           4. Instructions:         a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.           b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical sonsequences by applying the screening criteria in consequences.           c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whese failure would have critical consequences.           d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria in follow in purpose in the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.           g. If any suspect/counterfeit tems are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Merts immediately. The Cognizant Engineer Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.           h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection or records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS way.           g. Gatertial for Dresenes of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items proceed (92/30), 92/-01 (09/23/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/23/92), 93-002 (09/23/92), 93-000 (00/23/94), 94-01 (09/23/94), 94-01 (09/23/94), 94-01 (09/23/94), 94-01 (09/2	
<pre>to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance within thernal Nemo 16710-04-DNH-D48, J. A. O'Bri M. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995. 4. Instructions: a. Complete one screening form for each plant system. b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical sonsequences by applying the screening criteria in c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences. d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteri e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain 0A concurrence. f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engine Nonconformance Reports (NGRs), and one Occurrence Report (OA) will be submitted for the entire facility. h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NGRs in the JCS we package. 5. Screening Criteria: a. <u>Patentiat for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items pro 293-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would added trems listed in Guality Assurance Bulteting (OABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (0A/2 Craned, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems craned, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems craned, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCS; instrument air. d. <u>Equipment viel Programatic Impact</u></pre>	
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<ul> <li>b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical sonsequences by applying the screening criteria in</li> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</li> <li>d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criterie</li> <li>e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.</li> <li>f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engined follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more fonce whose of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS we package.</li> <li>5. Screening Criteria:</li> <li>a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items proved (10/21/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-00 (08/21/92), 93-002 (09/21/92), 93-00 (08/21/92), addecide inspection of the component is required.</li> <li>b. <u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Carpon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; hEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radii noting equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.</li> <li>d. <u>Equipment vith Programmatic Impacts</u>: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant</li></ul>	
<ul> <li>c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critica consequences.</li> <li>d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteri.</li> <li>e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain 0A concurrence.</li> <li>f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.</li> <li>h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS we package.</li> <li>S. Screening Criteria:</li> <li>a. <u>Patential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</u> The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items proved added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, on detailed inspection or repair has been performed which would added items listed in these bulleting since 1980, on detailed inspection of repair has been performed which would added items listed in these bulleting since 1980, on detailed inspection of the component is required.</li> <li>b. <u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radii and release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radii resulting equipment danges or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, hist protections Required.</li> <li>d. Genoral the Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission dware reports of the programmatic impacts.</li> <li>c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety</u>: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination inon</li></ul>	
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<ul> <li>e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain 9A concurrence.</li> <li>f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</li> <li>g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.</li> <li>h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS we package.</li> <li>5. Screening Criteria:</li> <li>a. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u>. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items proget items listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABS) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/2 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (101/8/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.</li> <li>b. <u>General Plant Safety</u>. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Exal Cranes, holists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems</li> <li>c. <u>Process/Support Systems Safety:</u> Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.</li> <li>d. <u>Equipment with Programmatic Impacts</u>: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.</li> <li>6. Components/Functions Required.</li> </ul>	•
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<ul> <li>g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engined follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.</li> <li>h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS we package.</li> <li>5. Screening Criteria: <ul> <li>a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.</li> <li>The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items proposed disposition or repair has been performed which would added items listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABS) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/2 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.</li> <li>b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems</li> <li>c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radii monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.</li> <li>d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission dua resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.</li> <li>6. Components/Functions Required.</li> </ul></li></ul>	
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6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: No inspection required.	e to
No inspection required.	
The cover blocks do not contain any items identified as being suspect.	
'	
7. Other Components/Functions:	
NONE	
og Engineer 91/4/96 10. 11. Date Cog Manager Date	96

B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING
1. SYSTEM NUMBER COOR BUSS CASK, 2. SYSTEM TITLE BENEFICIAL USES Shipping System
3 Pupper This factor
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each 8 Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, 8 Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, , Dated May 24, 1995.
4. Instructions:
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical conservations by a life of the second state of
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d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
r. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the toronality
isposition; and (2) Notify management immediately to submit or update an Occurrence Report (NCR) and determine the appropriate I. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, Inspection Record and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work
. Screening Criteria:
. <u>Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts</u> . The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Sulletins (QABs) 92-01 (Feb 14, 1992), 92-01 (Aug 21, 1992), 93-002 Apr 28, 1993) and 93-03 (May 20, 1993). If no modifications have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no
<u>General Plant Safety</u> . Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: anes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
elease/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon sucply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation initoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to sulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Granes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.
review of the (BUSS) Cask Safety Analysis Report for Packaging identified the (Lid Its) as the only BUSS Cask fastener that meets the above screening criteria. The lid Its are a high quality fastener made of A-286 corrosion resistant steel and traceable by eat code # AZK) to quality assurance records. The primary function of the bolts is to cure the cask lid to the cask body which provides shielding and confinement as well as pact, puncture, and thermal protection for its certified special form contents during ansport under both normal and accident conditions.
te: The Quality Assurance records for the lid bolts, (i.e, Certificate of Conformance and CMTR) are located in the BUSS Cask files located in MO-410 room F. Attached for your information is a copy of bolt material certification.
Ioncritical Components/Functions:
N/A
Jehn h. Caulat 1/03/96 9. 10
Lustodian Engineer
Date Date M.M. Perenza 1/02/96
3-121