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AMERICAN ARMS SALES TO IRAN AND POWER POLITICS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

THESIS

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By

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This thesis examines and evaluates the questions involved in American arms sales to Iran and Egypt. The first two chapters outline the historical background and present detailed analyses of Iran's political situations prior to 1968 and United States policy toward it in that period of time. Chapter Three considers the American policies towards Egypt and the United States arms sales to that country.

The main argument of the thesis appears in chapter Four which explains the objectives of Iran's government in buying American arms and the United States government's objectives in selling arms to Iran. Conclusions on the study comprise the fifth chapter.

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INTRODUCTION

American foreign policy toward the Middle East has had both successes and failures, with the policy toward Iran exhibiting a sense of continuity and success while that toward the other important nation-state anchor, Egypt, has shown a fluctuation from failure to success in the course of the thirty-seven years from 1940 to 1977.

Characterizing the American policy's success with Iran, Marvin Zonis of the University of Chicago stated that Iran is exactly where the United States wants it to be, a very important country which has a close relationship with the United States.¹ This relationship has several valuable features.

(1) As a strong country, Iran not only can defend its borders and interests but it also can provide stability for the region, i.e., the Persian Gulf, which is vital for Iran, and United States and the West as well.

(2) The Persian Gulf region contains about two-thirds of the non-Communist world's proved oil reserves. Iran's economy is largely dependent on its oil revenues, which account for more than 80 percent of its government revenue.

¹Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, New Perspectives on the Persian Gulf, (Washington, D.C., 1973), p. 64.

(3) Providing for the security of the region and the oil shipments going to the United States, Western Europe and Japan, Iran's stability as a powerful, oil-rich, and friendly nation relieves most of the tensions that would exist were it not there.

(4) Iran can also be a counterweight against both indirect Soviet activities and Communist movements in Iran's neighboring countries. To some extent it presses against the Soviet naval build-up in the Indian Ocean. Both sides of the American-Iranian arena of power also know that there are other countries eager to sell arms to Iran; with these elements in view it is a matter of great benefit to the U.S. in economic, strategic and political terms that it is able to provide military equipment to Iran.

This thesis examines the above-mentioned situations and demonstrates in five chapters the complex interactions that have occurred. Chapter One deals with Iran's historical experience in international politics. The movement toward modernity presents some problems that remain in part. Chapter Two examines in depth Iran's changing policies as she has sought to find stability and security. The third chapter presents the role of American arms relations with Egypt and the Middle East. The fourth chapter continues the probe of policy and changes as a result of the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. Conclusions of the study are presented in the fifth chapter.

Present U.S. involvement in Iran goes back to the early nineteenth century. From that time and up to World War II, U.S. interests were limited to the protection of American lives and properties. During this period, the rapid industrialization of the West created a demand for raw materials while seeking a new market for manufactured products. The United Kingdom and Russia were competing with each other to acquire different commercial concessions in Iran, and from the very beginning, oil was among them. To limit the expansion of influence by these two countries within Iran, Iranian policy makers sought to establish close relations between Iran and a "distant and disinterested" power, hoping to utilize it as a counterweight to the Anglo-Russian rivalry.² The U.S. in 1910-1911 and 1921-1927, Germany between 1927-1941, and again the U.S. after the American entry into World War II played such a "counterweight" role.

After two American advisory missions (the Shuster Mission in 1911 and the Millspaugh Mission of 1922-1927), from 1927 to World War II the various advisory positions in Iran had been filled by Germans. The Germans brought numerous kinds of financial, economic, military, capital, and technical German "know-how" to Iran. With the outbreak of World War II in 1939, Iran adopted a policy of neutrality, and the German advisors remained until Germany attacked

²Rouhollah K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500-1941 (Charlottesville, 1966), p. 203.

the Soviet Union in June of 1941. The British government decided to assist the Soviet Union and pass munitions and military supplies to that country through the Persian Gulf and Iran. The security of the oil supply, which was under British developmental control, provided another major reason for British action.

The untimely presence of the large German fifth column in Iran could sabotage British plans, and the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union demanded from the Iranian Government the dismissal of the German advisors. Iran did not comply, and the Anglo-Russian armies at the dawn of August 25, 1941, invaded the country.³

With the occupation by Soviet and British troops, Iranian policy makers once again turned toward the United States, hoping that its policy of anti-colonialism could help to secure independent status for Iran. The expectation was that the involvement of Americans in advisory roles would spill over to other areas, and the Truman Doctrine, designed to contain communist expansion, transformed the United States from being a "distant and disinterested" power to becoming that of a distant and interested power in Iran and for the first time a major power in the region.

As a result of many factors, Iranian policy makers began to ameliorate the consequences of the Anglo-Russian occupation

³Ibid., p. 259.

of 1941 to 1946 by reducing their influence in Iran. The Majlis, Iran's lower house of parliament, took a stand when it rejected a Russian oil agreement that was presented to it on October 22, 1947.

Four years later on March 15, the Majlis, and then on March 20, the Senate, approved the principle of oil nationalization for Iran. Then, the Majlis recommended to the Shah in April of 1951, that Mohammad Mossadegh be appointed as Prime Minister. The reaction of the British government toward this unilateral decision by Iran was hostile. The British company ordered its employees to leave the Abadan refinery. By the end of July of 1951, this refinery was closed down and Iran was left without oil exports. Moreover, upon the United Kingdom's request, British and American oil companies embargoed Iranian oil.

The result was the virtual bankruptcy of the country, a condition which could have meant the victory of Iran's communist party (the Tudeh) in the near future. To some, this threat meant a possible transformation to being a satellite tied to Moscow with the turning of the flank near the Arabian Peninsula, the area of American oil interest. The United States policy at the time sought to preserve the status quo.⁴

⁴Henry C. Atyeo, "Political Development in Iran, 1951-1954," Middle Eastern Affairs, V (August-September, 1954), 258.

At the time the Shah was involved in his struggle with Prime Minister Mossadegh, who thought the Shah should reign but not govern. The Shah needed American support. The Shah's need for a close relationship with the United States, along with the United States's definition of its interests in the region, brought both parties together. The result was the downfall of Mossadegh's government and the clear-cut ascendancy of the United States in Iran over both the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.

Following the unseating of Mossadegh, policy-making in Iran was more and more concentrated in the hands of the Shah, and the United States began to pour large amounts of economic and technical aid into Iran.

The United States decided to erect a wall against Soviet pressure directed at the Middle East by promoting the formation of a Middle Eastern defense pact. Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey, countries on the southern periphery of the Soviet Union, favored the idea of a pact and, with the United Kingdom, formed the Baghdad Pact in 1955. Although the United States was sponsor of the Pact, it did not adhere to it because it did not want to stimulate any new Soviet movement in the Middle East region. As a result of the formation of the Pact, Iran finally became a formal ally of the United States.

In 1958, because of a military coup in Iraq, a radical and anti-monarchical regime came to power. Iran's view was

one of alarm for the future changes that might occur in the region. In response to this coup, the Shah, who worried that a similar coup could take place in Iran, decided to strengthen his military forces.

As a result of Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact after the coup and Iran's open insistence, the United States initiated negotiations with Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. In March of 1959, the United States signed three separate executive agreements concerning defense arrangements. The United States undertook to help in the defense of the three countries in the event of communist acts of aggression or subversion. The Baghdad Pact was renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

From the downfall of the Mossadegh government to the early 1960's, the main objective of Iranian policy makers was both to stabilize the Shah's regime and to protect Iran's independence by allying with the West.

Beginning in the 1960's, Iran's foreign policy underwent significant changes, and its "Independent National Policy" marked the reduction of dependence on the United States and increased ties with the Soviet Union. Internal political and economic problems in Iran and the new policy of the Kennedy administration brought about these changes.

From 1957, the Shah himself promoted a two-party system in Iran with both parties pledging loyalty to him. Both

parties entered the Majlis without any major differences in their approaches to solve the country's political and economic problems. The opposition to the regime reached its peak in May 1961 with a teachers' strike in Tehran and demonstrations by students. The Imami government was dismissed.

In this year, John F. Kennedy took office as president of the United States. President Kennedy emphasized the need for basic socio-economic reform in Iran. On American insistence, Ali Amini was appointed as the new Prime Minister after Imami. President Kennedy, who was against the United States' sponsorship of military governments, ended the United States' thirty million dollar annual payment to defray the cost of maintaining some part of Iran's army.

America's reluctance to grant sufficient military and financial aid to Iran, along with the perceived threat of Nasserism and other radical movements in the Persian Gulf region, resulted in moves for improved relations with the Soviet Union. In September of 1962, Iran pledged to the Soviet Union that no foreign rocket base would be established on the soil of Iran.

This move by Tehran was one step towards detente with Moscow. And the Soviet government, which before 1962 directly or indirectly encouraged opposition to the Shah's regime, after this pledge condemned the opponents of the Shah. The relaxation of relations with the Soviet Union made it

possible for the Shah to turn away from his country's northern neighbor, and the center of attention became Iran's internal problem and the broadening of the base of the Shah's power. To do this, the Shah enunciated the principles of the "White Revolution," a six-point plan of reform in January of 1963. This socio-economic reform sought to strengthen the peasant class, whose members supported the traditional patterns; these were brought into closer contact with the Iranian political elite.⁵

During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations the U.S. military aid and grants shifted towards military sale. The improvement of the Iranian economy, a by-product of the socio-economic reforms put underway by "White Revolution" as well as increased oil revenues, enabled it to buy American weapons. Further, as a result of U.S. policy towards Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, Iran's arms dealing with the United States was accelerated.

The British decision, announced on January 16, 1968, to withdraw from the Persian Gulf convinced the Shah that the time for the rapid modernization of his army had come. The British decision meant that the United Kingdom would terminate its special treaties with Bahrain, Qatar, and the seven Trucial States. Under these treaties the United

⁵James A. Bill, "Modernization and Reform from Above," Journal of Politics, XXXII (February, 1970), 28.

Kingdom was responsible for these states' defense and foreign policies. Thus, as a result of the above decision, by 1971, the United Kingdom would withdraw its operational military forces, which were charged with carrying out these British obligations. This British decision resulted from three important factors: (1) a strategic shift in the United Kingdom's international position; (2) the British balance of payments crisis; (3) the British desire not to engage in local conflicts in the Persian Gulf region.

The Nixon administration decided ". . . not to try to replace Britain with a United States military presence [in the region]." ⁶ Instead, the stated policy has been to promote regional collective security efforts, especially Iranian and Saudi cooperation without outside interference. ⁷ This American policy was compatible with the Shah's policy in the Persian Gulf, which was ". . . to prevent any big power to replace Britain." ⁸

To pursue this policy, the U.S. began to pour the most sophisticated weapons into Iran and to a lesser extent into Saudi Arabia. The United States wanted Iran to become strong enough both to fill the vacuum left by the British and to assure the stability of the Persian Gulf region.

⁶Staff Report about U.S. Military Sales to Iran, to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate (Washington, D.C., 1976), p. 5.

⁷New Perspectives on the Persian Gulf, p. 7.

⁸U.S. News and World Report, January 27, 1969, p. 49.

Stability of the region means to the United States continued access to the oil supplies of the region, which produces about 86 percent of the non-Communist world's crude oil. United States' arms support generates pro-United States policies that are grouped around the oil supply but which go beyond. Oil and its availability, concern over radical movements in the southern part of the Persian Gulf region, as well as the indirect Soviet activities in the neighboring states--Afghanistan, India, Iraq, and Pakistan--form the background of the entire United States foreign policy in the area. From the United States' point of view, Iran has a major role to play in providing security for all of these factors. To date, the policy has been effective and the relations have been cooperative and generally cordial.

* * * * *

Systematic study about the Middle East in general and Iran in particular by American scholars began shortly after World War II. Before this time there were few books about Iran. The authors of those books were mostly those persons who had somehow worked in that country. Morgan Shuster, the head of the first American advisory mission in Iran in 1911, wrote a book about the Iran's political situation at that time and his mission, which he called The Strangling of Persia (Greenwood Press). Another book was written by Arthus C. Millspaugh, the head of the second American

advisory mission to Iran: Americans in Persia (Brookings Institution).

When the Azarbaijan crisis (1946) was over, George Lenczowski published his book about Russian and Western rivalry in that country: Russia and the West in Iran (Cornell University Press, 1949). The nationalization of the oil industry in Iran in 1951 and two years later the downfall of the Mossadegh's government caused Iran to become the focus of the attentions of the interested scholars in political science. Since then, many studies about Iran have been written by American scholars and by Iranians who have graduated from the United States universities. The following are some of the authors whose contributions to the study of the political aspects of Iran have been helpful.

James A. Bill (The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes, and Modernization, Charles E. Merrell, 1972); Bill and Carl Leiden (The Middle East Politics and Power, Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1975); Bill and Robert W. Stookey (Politics of Petroleum, King's Court Communications, Inc., 1975); R. M. Burrell (The Persian Gulf, Library Press, 1972); Burrell and Alvin J. Cottrell (Iran, the Arabian Peninsula and the Indian Ocean, National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1972); Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih (The Foreign Relations of Iran, University of California Press, 1974); Richard

W. Cottam (Nationalism in Iran, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964); George Lenczowski (The Middle East in World Affairs, Cornell University Press, 1952); Lenczowski (Soviet Advances in the Middle East, American Enterprise Institute for Public Research, 1972); Rouhollah K. Ramazani (The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500-1941, University Press of Virginia, 1966); Ramazani (Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973, University Press of Virginia, 1975); Sepehr Zabih (The Communist Movement in Iran, University of California Press, 1966); Marvin Zonis (The Political Elite of Iran, Princeton University Press, 1971).

CHAPTER I

THE HISTORICAL SETTING AND IRAN'S PAST POLITICAL EXPERIENCE

Since the end of World War II, American involvement has increased in Iran because America's attitude toward the world after the war shifted from optimism to open hostility toward communism. The United States hoped that Iran, an anti-communist country with its vital strategic location in the south of the Soviet Union, could help to contain communism in the Middle East.

The basic elements of Iran's foreign policy during and after the war were derived from two major objectives. On the one hand, the government was actively trying both to save the independence and integrity of the country that was under the occupation of allied forces and to restore its control over Azarbaijan, which with the support of the Soviet Union had proclaimed autonomy. On the other hand, Iran sought to eradicate the influence of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, which for more than one century were competing with each other in Iran to obtain different commercial concessions. America's objective to contain communism and Iran's objectives to eradicate the Anglo-Russian influence in that country and to save its independence are subject of inquiry in this chapter.

Truman Doctrine

Iran's past policy to prevent the expanding influence of Russia and the United Kingdom was to establish a close relationship with a "distant and disinterested" power that could be utilized as a counterweight against the Anglo-Russian rivalry.¹ To pursue this policy, the United States from 1910-1911 and 1921-1927 and once again after the outbreak of the World War II was selected as the outside third power. With American involvement limited to advisory capacities, Iran did not have active American political support.² The policy that was followed by the United States almost from the beginning of the Republic up to the end of World War II was isolationism or ". . . to stand aloof from the quarrels and vicissitudes of the Old World,"³ though there were some exceptions, such as the American participation in two world wars.

The expansion of communism after World War II brought about a drastic change, not only in the traditional interests

¹Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973 (Charlottesville, 1975), p. 70.

²During the 19th century and up to the 1940's, America concerned itself with protection of American lives and their properties. They for the first time went to Iran in the 1830's as missionaries. The presence of these missionaries in Iran opened the door for diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran. Diplomatic relations between the two countries began with the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, signed at Constantinople in December, 1856.

³Cecil V. Crabb, American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age (New York, 1960), p. 221.

but also in the traditional policies and attitudes of the United States.⁴ The expansion of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe that was followed by Soviet revisionist policy toward Iran, Turkey, Greece, and China provoked American reaction.⁵ The political situation in Greece was critical because for almost two years British troops had supported the Greek government against the communist-led rebels who sought to seize power.

The United Kingdom was close to bankruptcy and in February of 1947 declared that because of domestic conditions in the United Kingdom, ". . . she could no longer sustain the Greek government against the communist rebels."⁶ The United Kingdom's decision to withdraw from Greece was a part of her new policy to reduce some of her overseas commitments. The United States was faced with two alternatives, ". . . assuming many of these commitments or accepting further communist intrusion into the free world."⁷

The victory of communists in Greece would have meant a Soviet base of operations, constituting a military threat

⁴Hans J. Morgenthau, "The American Tradition in Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy in World Politics, edited by Roy C. Macridis (New Jersey, 1974), p. 391.

⁵Crabb, American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age, p.225.

⁶Donald M. Hancock and Dankwart A. Rustow, editors, American Foreign Policy in International Perspective (New Jersey, 1971), p. 128.

⁷Cecil V. Crabb, Bipartisan Foreign Policy (New York, 1957), p. 57.

to the Mediterranean area and to the non-communist world at large. If the communists were to overthrow the Greek government, it would have been easier for the Soviets to penetrate Turkey and Iran. The communists also were strong in Italy and in France. A communist victory would have meant that Italy and France, too, might fall in the Soviet sphere of influence in their turn.

In response to the challenge of Soviet expansion and hostility toward non-communist countries, on March 12, 1947, President Truman enunciated his policy toward world affairs to a joint session of Congress. Although Truman's speech was specifically about Turkey and Greece, it was in a broad sense ". . . to support free people who are resisting subjection by armed minorities or outside pressures."⁸ By this new policy the United States committed itself ". . . to contain the Soviet Union and the Communist totalitarian expansionism around the world."⁹

This policy was compatible with the objectives of the Iranian government and brought about close cooperation between these two countries. During the Azarbaijan crisis, the United States government informed the Iranian government that it had the support of the United States against the Soviet threat and pressures.

⁸Raymond Dennet and Robert K. Turner, editors, Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol IX (Vermont, 1949), 7. 7.

⁹Ronald J. Stupak, American Foreign Policy (New York, 1976), p. 47.

Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Iran

Prior to and after the arrival of American missionaries, Russia and the United Kingdom were two forces of influence in Iran. Russia wanted access to warm-water ports and fought aggressive wars with Iran in 1796, 1800-1813, and 1826-1828. The main objective of British policy, however, was the protection of India.¹⁰ By the last decades of the nineteenth century, neither Russia nor the United Kingdom could advance further without risking a major war between them. Significantly, the growing industrialization of the West that was accompanied by demands for access both to raw materials and new markets for manufactured products meant the ". . . Anglo-Russian rivalry was expressed primarily in the economic realm."¹¹

In 1872, a British subject, Baron de Julious de Reuter, obtained the concession for exploiting Iran's mineral resources. Beginning with this grant, a race for concessions was underway in Iran. A year later this concession was withdrawn due to Russian pressure. Nevertheless, the government of Iran was obliged to give new concessions to the British as compensation for the loss of the mineral advantages. Iran, too, had to give a series of concessions to the Russians. As a result, by the end of the nineteenth

¹⁰George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran (New York, 1949), pp. 1-3.

¹¹Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh, 1964), p. 13.

century most of the country's resources were exploited by foreign interests. In addition both Russia and the United Kingdom had some degree of influence over the Shah and his ministers.

In 1906, Iranian history began a new era; a revolution was carried out by Iranian nationalists. The Shah, seeking a settlement, accepted the establishment of a new form of parliamentary government.

The appearance of Iranian nationalism presented a problem for both the Russians and the British. They did not want Iran to upset the delicate Anglo-Russian balance in the Middle East at a time when both were threatened by a challenge from Imperial Germany.¹² Without consulting Iran, they decided to compromise their claims to influence in Asia, and on August 31, 1907, they signed the Anglo-Russian Convention in St. Petersburg. The agreement divided Iran into three zones. The northern part of Iran, including the capital, was in the Russian sphere of influence. The southern part was in the British sphere of influence. Between these two, there was a neutral zone,¹³ and both agreed not to seek commercial or political concessions in the other power's sphere.¹⁴

¹²Ibid., p. 15.

¹³Peter Avery, Modern Iran (London, 1965), p. 134.

¹⁴Robert A. McDaniel, The Shuster Mission and the Persian Constitutional Revolution (Minneapolis, 1974), p. 3.

The reaction of the Iranian nationalists was hostile. And although Russia and the United Kingdom had agreed not to violate the integrity and independence of Iran, nationalist protests mounted but did not have any effect, and outside interference in Iranian affairs continued.

In 1910, Iran tried to bring order to its financial situation. The Majlis authorized the hiring, to borrow Morgan Shuster's words, of,

. . . finance administrators from the United States in the hope that officials who were free from any European influence would be able to accomplish some practical results in the reorganization of the archaic and chaotic treasury of Persia. ¹⁵

With the recommendation of the United States State Department, Morgan Shuster, a financial expert, was chosen, and with some colleagues, arrived in Iran in May of 1911. Although Shuster and his colleagues in no way had any connection with the American government (at the time when they signed the contract with Iran) and were instead private citizens employed by Iran, they had to leave Tehran on January 11 1912, under Russian pressure and without achieving any reform.¹⁶ The elimination of the Shuster Mission resulted in the consolidation of Russian and British control over Iran.¹⁷

¹⁵Morgan W. Shuster, The Strangling of Persia, 2nd ed. (New York, 1968), p. 3.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 224-225.

¹⁷Abraham Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations (New Jersey, 1956), p. 131.

When World War I broke out, the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 was the basis of Russian and British actions in Iran.¹⁸ Immediately after the outbreak of the war, Iran announced a policy of neutrality but soon became a Russo-Turkish battlefield, and Russia was in actual control of much of the country.

After the war, the Iranian government was in total paralysis. Revolts against the Iranian government broke out in Gilan, the Kurdish areas, and in Azarbaijan. In Khuzistan in the South the British protected one Sheikh Khazal, who enjoyed semi-autonomy from Tehran.

Meanwhile, the Russian revolution ended the Anglo-Russian friendship. In the years of civil war and instability immediately after the revolution, the Soviet leaders endeavored to secure the Soviet Union's southern approaches by cultivating the good will of Iran. They helped the Iranians combat British influence.¹⁹ They also thought Iran could serve as a vanguard of the revolution in the east. So, the first official steps to prepare Iran to accept the Soviet philosophy were designed. To win Iran's friendship, in 1918, the Soviet Union declared invalid the 1907 agreement, and later the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship of February of 1921 was signed. The treaty was an important development in Soviet-Iranian relations.

¹⁸ Rouhoullah K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500-1941 (Charlottesville, 1966), p. 114.

¹⁹ Nadav Safran, From War to War (New York, 1969), p. 94.

Under the terms of the treaty, the Soviets waived all claims arising from Czarist loans to Iran, annulled Iranian concession to Russia, ceded the Port of Enzeli (now Pahlavi) on the Caspian Sea to Iran, and relinquished all rights over Russian-built roads and telegraph lines in Iran.²⁰

Further, the Soviet Union and Iran undertook to prohibit the formation or presence of any organizations or groups of persons whose objective was to engage in acts of hostility against either Iran or Soviet Union. They also undertook to prevent a third party nation-state from stationing military forces in either country or importing material which could be used against either of them.

As the Shah put it down, ". . . In the midst of these friendly discussions, the Soviets committed an astounding act of aggression."²¹ The Soviets had considered ways and means of exploiting a rebellion led by Kuchik Khan Jangali that was taking place in Gilan. When the Jangali forces were fighting Iranian troops in May of 1920, the Soviet Caspian Fleet made a landing at the Iranian Port of Enzeli. And, with help of the Red Army, the Soviet Republic of Gilan with Kuchik Khan as its president was proclaimed. The revolutionary government extended its influence to the province of Mazanderan, another northern state as well.

²⁰Günter Nollau and Hans Jürgen Wiehe, Russia's South Flank (New York, 1963), p. 4.

²¹Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mission For My Country (New York, 1961), p. 113.

Following repeated Iranian protests, Soviet troops were withdrawn on September 8, 1921. The rebellion was brought to an end by the Iranian Army under the leadership of Reza Khan.

However, when the Soviet Union, with new policy, tried to influence Iran, a secret agreement was signed by the British government and Iran that made British advisors responsible for the Iranian treasury, army, and some other departments.

The Coup of 1921

It was a time when governments rose and fell. At Tehran in 1921, Zia-al-Din Tabatabai, a crusading journalist, was planning a coup d'etat to overthrow the cabinet government and install a government which would combat foreign influences and initiate reforms based on Western models. Military leadership of the coup was in the hands of Reza Khan. After the coup, Zia-al-Din became Prime Minister and Reza Khan was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

The first action of the new government was the conclusion of the Soviet-Iranian treaty on February 26, 1921. Then, it nullified the Treaty of 1919 between the United Kingdom and Iran. After three months, Reza Khan forced Zia-al-Din into exile in the British mandate of Palestine.²²

²²Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 19.

Soon Reza Khan became Minister of War, a post he held through all the cabinets before and after he became Prime Minister in October 1923. Within a year after Reza Khan moved into the position of Prime Minister, he decided to establish a republican form of government. He was confronted with opposition in the Majlis from Moslem clergymen. After meeting with these leaders, Reza Khan called a halt to his decision and moved to have himself declared the Shah of Iran, by approval of the Constitutional Assembly on December 12, 1925. He quickly built a strong central government and completely controlled the political process. His rule was absolute.²³

However, after the coup, Iran's third power policy continued. Iran expressed its desire to hire American advisors to work in Iran in 1921. With the recommendation of the United States Department of State, Arthur C. Millspaugh arrived in Tehran in November of 1922 as head of the American Mission. Like the Shuster Mission, this was also strictly a private contract between him and Iran. Later, because of a clash between the Shah and Millspaugh, the latter's position was terminated. In 1927, Iran turned to Germany as the third power. Soon the various advisory positions in Iran were filled by Germans. The Germans brought numerous skills along with financial, economic, military, and technical

²³ James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, The Middle East Politics and Power (Boston, 1975), p. 134.

"know-how" to Iran. Iran's increasing ties with Germany were to serve the overriding objective of politic-economic emancipation from the traditional control of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.²⁴

After the outbreak of the World War II, Iran adopted a policy of neutrality. The Soviet Union did not oppose Iran's policy, Germany supported it, and British objections to the presence of Germans in Iran were not pressed too seriously.²⁵ The Germans' attack in June of 1941, on the Soviet Union changed the whole situation. The British government decided to assist the Soviet Union in every possible way, and ". . . in order to pass munitions and supplies to Russia it was eminently desirable to open the fullest communication with her through Iran."²⁶ The security of the oil supply, which was under British control, was another reason.

The presence of numerous Germans in Iran could interfere with such plans; so the British and the Soviets demanded the dismissal of the German advisors. Iran did not comply with the Allied request. Finally Anglo-Soviet armies invaded Iran (August 25, 1941). By September of that year, the military occupation of the country was complete. Reza Shah,

²⁴Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500-1941, pp. 278-281.

²⁵Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973, pp. 25-27.

²⁶Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston, 1950), p. 476.

who was strongly nationalistic and resented foreign interference in Iranian affairs,²⁷ abdicated in favor of his eldest son on September 16, 1941.²⁸

Occupation of Iran and Azarbaijan Crisis

Soon after the occupation of Iran by British and Soviet troops, Iran was divided into a British zone, a Soviet zone, and a neutral zone, and cooperation by Iran with the Allied forces was made highly desirable.²⁹ As a result, the "Tripartite Treaty of Alliance" was signed by Iran, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union on January 29, 1942. The Allies promised to respect Iran's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence; also, the withdrawal of the allied forces would occur within six months after the end of the war with the Axis. With this foreign policy determination, Iran declared war on Germany on September 9, 1943.

To solve its political and economic problems caused in part by war, the Iranian government once again requested the help of American advisors. In January 1942, Iran asked for the services of an American specialist to assure the restructuring of the entire Iranian gendarmarie (rural

²⁷Bill and Leiden, The Middle East Politics and Power, p. 134.

²⁸Reza Shah was exiled by the allies first to Mauritius and later to South Africa, and he died in Johannesburg, on July 26, 1944.

²⁹Pahlavi, Mission For My Country, pp. 75-76.

police). On March 20 of the same year, Iran, also asked for a high-ranking American officer to assume the rank and title of Intendant General and to take charge of the entire financing and army supply of the Iranian War Department.³⁰

The stability of Iran had a direct bearing on the functioning of Allied troops and on the efficiency of their operations. They were stationed in Iran to facilitate the passage of the American supplies to the Soviet Union.³¹ The United States accepted the Iranian requests and American advisors arrived in Iran in 1942. Col. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, former director of the rural police for the state of New Jersey, popularly known in America for his outstanding work in the Lindberg kidnapping case and recognized in the profession as a leading American authority on rural police, was designated as director of the Iranian Gendarmerie.

The United States War Department also designated General John N. Greely to assume the work of the Intendant General of the Iranian Army. Greely was accepted by the Iranian government on June of 1942 but soon was replaced by Major General Clarence S. Ridely. At the same time the responsibility for reorganizing the City Police of Tehran and

³⁰U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Diplomatic Papers, The Near East and Africa, IV (Washington, D.C., 1963), 222-229.

³¹U.S., Department of State Bulletin, XI (July 23, 1944), 92.

other principal municipalities was entrusted to L. S. Timmerman.³²

Once again Millspaugh was invited by the Iranian government to organize the disordered public finances. Millspaugh and his mission arrived in Tehran at the end of 1942.

Through both the presence in Iran of both American advisors and that of the United States Army, known as the Persian Gulf Command (P.G.C.), which was composed of about 30,000 troops of a noncombatant character, the United States became more and more involved in Iranian affairs. The Lend-Lease Program was extended to Iran on March 10, 1942.³³

On December 1, 1943, the Tehran Conference Communique was signed by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. The three big powers pledged to observe the independence of Iran and to withdraw their troops from Iran after the war.³⁴

The End of War and the Beginning of the Cold War

Despite the Tehran Communique, Iran remained an occupied country. It was a link between Soviet Union troops that were stationed in the north and American and British troops that were garrisoned in the south. When the war ended, the

³²Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, D.P., 4:235.

³³Mehdi Heravi, Iranian-American Diplomacy (New York, 1969), p. 20.

³⁴Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, editors, Documents on American Foreign Relations, VI (Boston, 1945), 234-236.

Council of Foreign Ministers at the London conference decided all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Iran no later than March 26, 1946.

However, the Soviet troops did not leave Iran. Rather they began helping the Iranian Communist Party (the Tudeh). Moscow was attempting to create so-called autonomous republics of Azarbaijan and Kurdistan. The Azarbaijan crisis broke out in August of 1945, when the Tudeh party took over several governmental buildings in Tabriz. Rebellion was unleashed and backed by the Soviet army; the complete autonomy of Azarbaijan was proclaimed on November 23, 1945. The rebels began to organize elections for a National Assembly. That National Assembly proclaimed the Autonomous Republic of Azarbaijan and elected a government. Meanwhile, the Red Army halted the Iranian troops who had been sent to quell the uprising. In the same manner, a Kurdish group in western Azarbaijan proclaimed the Kurdish People's Republic on December 15, 1945. This policy along with Soviet policy towards Turkey³⁵ provoked an American reaction in support

³⁵ Soviet pressure on Turkey for increased Soviet administrative responsibility over the Dardanelles Straits began in June, 1945, and on August 1946, they requested a revision of the Montreux Convention to allow for joint Turkish-Soviet defense of the Dardanelles. To the United States this action was a move toward establishing Soviet naval bases in Turkey and making the country after a while a Soviet Satellite. The Turks backed with the units of the American fleet that had been dispatched to the Eastern Mediterranean rejected the Soviet's demands. The Soviets almost immediately halted their efforts in Turkey.

of these two countries which made the United States for the first time in its history a power in the region.³⁶

Iran, the United States, and the United Kingdom protested Soviet interference in Iranian affairs. The Iranian government protested before the United Nations Security Council, and that body recommended that the affair be settled by negotiations between Iran and the Soviet Union.³⁷

Negotiations followed between the Iranian Prime Minister, Ahmad Qawan, Stalin, and other Soviet leaders in Moscow; they were not successful. The Soviets emphasized that they wanted to keep their troops in some parts of Iran and, also, demanded that Iran recognize the autonomy of Azarbaijan.

By March 2, 1946, on the deadline for the foreign troop evacuation, the British and American troops left Iran. On March 3, Soviet forces in Tabriz divided into three columns and marched respectively towards Tehran and towards the Iraqi and Turkish frontiers.

The Iranian government renewed its appeal to the Security Council. The presence of Soviet troops in Iran called for every effort the United States could make through the United Nations to compel the Russians to carry out the

³⁶Safran, From War to War, p. 95.

³⁷Nollau and Wiehe, Russia's South Flank, p. 32.

London Agreement and get out of Iran.³⁸ President Truman had also sent Premier Stalin an ultimatum informing him that the United States would send troops to Iran if the U.S.S.R. did not leave Iran.³⁹

Meanwhile Qawam, the Prime Minister of Iran, responded to Soviet pressure by offering several concessions if the Soviets would evacuate their forces from Iran.⁴⁰ On April 4, the day of the Council's decision to defer further proceedings, a new agreement was signed between Qawam and Sadchikov, the Soviet Ambassador in Iran. Under the terms of the agreement, (1) all Soviet troops were to be withdrawn from Iran by May 6, 1946; (2) Azarbaijan was to be considered an internal problem of Iran and (3) a joint Soviet-Iranian Oil company was to be formed in northern Iran on the basis of Iran's holding 49 percent of the shares and the Soviet Union the remaining 51 percent, and upon conditions of the Majlis's approval of the agreement. Also, to convince the Soviet Union of its good faith, the central government on August 1, for the first time, formed a coalition cabinet with the participation of three Tudeh party members.⁴¹ Soon Qawam

³⁸Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope (New York, 1956), p. 523.

³⁹Harry S. Truman, Truman Speaks (New York, 1960), p. 71.

⁴⁰Pahlavi, Mission For My Country, p. 116.

⁴¹Sepher Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran, (Berkely and Los Angeles, 1966), p. 111.

reshuffled his cabinet and excluded the Tudeh members. The last Red Army soldier left Iran by May 9, 1946. The thrust of Soviet policy aimed at securing ratification of the oil agreement⁴² which could not be done without an elected Iranian Majlis; thus, they were interested in the speedy election of the Iranian Parliament.

The intense anxiety and desire of the Shah to secure the return of Azarbaijan and Kurdistan was important. As later Qawam acknowledged, ". . . for attainment of this objective, His Majesty spared no assistance reaching the limits of self-sacrifice."⁴³ And despite Soviet protests, the Shah ordered the Iranian Army under the command of General Ali Razmara⁴⁴ to advance toward Azarbaijan. They restored control in Azarbaijan in November. By December 15, the Kurdish Republic had surrendered to the government forces.

The Emergence of American Primacy

In April 1946, George Allen was appointed Ambassador to Iran. Allen convinced many influential Iranians that there was no third alternative between Soviet totalitarianism

⁴²J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas (New York, 1953), p. 28.

⁴³Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973, p. 255.

⁴⁴General Razmara was appointed as Prime Minister on June 26, 1950 and was assassinated on March 7, 1951; a day later, the Majlis Oil Commission adopted the nationalization of the oil.

and the western pattern of liberal democracy.⁴⁵ Encouraged by his western policy results, Qavam ordered the arrest of some of the leading Tudeh members, and on November 24, central troops marched into Azarbaijan. The Soviet ambassador in Iran demanded that the government's plans be abandoned, but Allen and Under-secretary of State Dean Acheson believed the dispatch of government troops was quite normal and appropriate.

Finally, the Fifteenth Majlis was inaugurated in August and on October 22, 1947, rejected the Soviet-Iranian Oil Concession. In the midst of the consideration of the Oil Concession in the Majlis, Ambassador Allen issued a statement and made it clear that if Iran rejected this concession, it could count on the support of the United States against Soviet threats and pressures. Allen's declaration was a logical consequence of a policy that had been gradually developed in 1946 and had found its dramatic expression in the Truman Doctrine.

In September 1946, the Iranian government asked for immediate assistance along two major lines: military supplies and substantial financial credits from the United States.⁴⁶ After preliminary negotiation, an agreement extending credit

⁴⁵Lenczowski, Russia and the West In Iran, pp. 307-308.

⁴⁶U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, VII. (Washington, D.C., 1969), 518.

to the Iranian government for the purchase of U.S. war surplus equipment through the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner was signed on June 20, 1947.

The agreement provided for the routine sale to Iran through FLC, on credit, of surplus supplies consisting of noncombat equipment but including also modest quantities of such light combat material as may be available. The credit was for twenty-five million dollars, repayable in fifteen years.

The agreement remained subject to the approval of the Majlis.⁴⁷

On February 17, 1948, the Iranian Parliament approved the purchase of surplus United States military equipment up to the amount of ten million dollars, but, because of the shortage of dollar exchange at the disposal of the Iranian government, the Parliament requested that the Iranian government obtain credit to cover the cost of repairing, packaging, and shipping the equipment as well as for the cost of the equipment itself.

As a result, a new agreement was signed between the United States and Iran on July 29, 1948. It replaced the previous agreement dated June 20, 1947. Under the new agreement, the United States extended credit to the Iranian government for the purchase of ten million dollars worth of surplus military equipment and credit not exceeding sixteen million dollars to cover the cost of repairing, packing, and

⁴⁷U.S., Department of State Bulletin, XVII (July 6, 1947), 47.

shipping this equipment to Iran.⁴⁸ A new agreement also was signed between the two countries concerning the operation of American military advisors in Iran on October 6, 1947. The Iranian government agreed not to engage the services of any personnel of any other foreign government for duties of any nature connected with the Iranian Army except by mutual agreement between the two governments. This agreement along with the agreement of 1943, with some modifications, remains the fundamental basis for the operation of American Military advisors in Iran up to the present.

During 1950, American aid shifted to military assistance. Through the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 27.64 million dollars was granted for aid to Iran, Korea and Philippines collectively.⁴⁹ In May of 1950, an exchange of notes brought agreement between the United States and Iran, and Iran adhered to the Program and became eligible for that aid.⁵⁰

Although the United States responded to Iran's request for military assistance immediately, its request for economic aid was not met until late 1950. In late 1949, the Shah went to the United States to plead for substantial economic

⁴⁸U.S., Department of State Bulletin, XVIII (August 15, 1948), 211.

⁴⁹U.S., Department of State Bulletin, XXII (February 13, 1950), 227.

⁵⁰Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States, Vol. I (Washington, D.C., 1952), 420.

aid, but he returned home completely empty-handed.⁵¹ A year later, the United States established its Point Four Program and negotiations for Modest American assistance began.⁵²

Iran's Political System Between 1941 and 1953:
The Policy of "Negative Equilibrium"⁵³

The abdication of Reza Shah in September of 1941 ended the two decades of one-man rule in Iran. A quasi-parliamentary form of government with a multi-party system characterized the period between 1941 and 1953.⁵⁴ During this period of time the Majlis exercised a powerful role.

In early 1943, Iran offered oil concessions to both American and British companies. Representatives of the Dutch Shell Oil Company arrived in Tehran shortly. This was followed by the arrival of the representatives of American oil companies. A large Soviet delegation arrived as well to seek oil concessions.⁵⁵

⁵¹Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, p. 88.

⁵²Ibid., p. 89.

⁵³Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran, p. 308. The doctrine of "equilibrium" for the first time was introduced by one of the Iranian Prime Ministers, Mirza Taghi Khan, in the late nineteenth century. He believed that given the Anglo-Russian rivalry, Iran should refuse the demands of both.

⁵⁴Shahrm Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1974), p. 1.

⁵⁵Joseph M. Upton, The History of Modern Iran (Massachusetts, 1970), p. 83.

With Mossadegh⁵⁶ behind it as sponsor, the Majlis passed a law which prohibited any discussion of new oil concessions by governmental officials. The Soviet refused to accept these formal pronouncements. They persisted in their oil demands, and they encouraged the communists in Azarbaijan to revolt against the central government.

The main goal of the Iranian policy makers at this time were (1) to nullify the Soviet desire to extend its influence into Iran, and (2) to regain Iran's independence by relying on external support. With this goal in mind, Iranian policy makers asked for American military and economic aid, and this gradually brought about more American involvement in Iran. Finally, the central government encouraged by the United States restored control over the regimes backed by the Soviets in Azarbaijan and Kurdistan.⁵⁷ When the Azarbaijan crisis was over, the Majlis rejected the projected Soviet oil concession.

After the rejection, the Majlis following its policy of "negative equilibrium" considered reducing the influence of the United Kingdom by nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian

⁵⁶Mossadegh was then a deputy in the Majlis. His notion of "negative equilibrium" had the same essence as Taghi Khan's. He believed that the independence of Iran depended only on its refusing to ally with any power. Because alliance and concessions to one side encouraged equivalent demands by the other side, he was against all such actions.

⁵⁷There are some historians and political scientists like Cottam who believe the first chapter of the Cold War was written in Iran during the Azarbaijan crisis.

Oil Company on March 15, 1951. Then the Majlis recommended to the Shah in April 1951 that Mossadegh be appointed as Prime Minister.⁵⁸

The reaction of the British government towards the nationalization of the oil was hostile. British technicians who worked in the Abadan refinery left Iran by order of the Company. By the end of July of 1951, the refinery was closed down. Moreover, upon British request other British and American oil companies embargoed Iranian oil. The British government in behalf of the Company instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice. British diplomacy submitted a complaint before the United Nation Security Council.

The United States during both Mossadegh's regime and the nationalization of the oil program placed serious limitations upon its economic aid to Iran; they reasoned that if Iran could reach an acceptable agreement with the United Kingdom, they could have access to funds derived from the sale of its own oil and its oil products. American technical and military assistance continued to Iran during this time.⁵⁹

As a result of the embargo, Iran became bankrupt. This could have meant the victory of the Tudeh elements, and the

⁵⁸This was an exception because according to the Iranian Constitutional Law ". . . The Ministers are appointed and dismissed by the decree of the King."

⁵⁹Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (Garden City, New York, 1963), p. 162.

victory of the Communists in Iran meant the transformation of Iran into a Soviet satellite, one very close to the Arabian peninsula, where American oil interests centered. This was one factor that the United States used in deciding to strengthen the position of the Shah,⁶⁰ who was in a struggle with Mossadegh and needed American support. Mossadegh thought the Shah should reign but not govern. Besides this important factor there were other factors worthy to be mentioned: (1) the oil dispute between the British and Iran could cause the stoppage of the delivery of oil to the United States' allies; (2) the nationalization of oil by Iran could have a harmful effect upon the United States' oil interests in the region; (3) the diminishing of the British influence meant the diminishing of the West's influence in the area.⁶¹

The United States' definition of its interests in the area led it to do everything it possibly could to back the Shah.⁶² Indirect involvement of the C.I.A. was reported. The result was the downfall of Mossadegh's government. Mossadegh fell from office during the events of August of 1953. Street fighting and military activities between pro-Shah elements and Mossadeghists ended with the victory of the

⁶⁰Henry C. Atyeo, "Political Development in Iran, 1951-1954," The Middle Eastern Affairs, V (August-September, 1959), 258.

⁶¹Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy, p. 242.

⁶²Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 164.

pro-Shah elements. The Shah, who had left the country, returned to Iran and the throne.⁶³

Following his return home, the Shah, who was seeking active American involvement in his country, began to play one super power against another. In 1959, when the United States was reluctant to furnish more military and economic assistance to Iran, the Shah turned to the Soviet Union. As a result, the United States responded quickly and positively to the Shah's request. Three years later, in 1962, when President Kennedy ceased the United States military aid to Iran, the Shah once again turned to the Soviet Union. This move cleared the way for more cooperation with the Soviets. Finally in 1967, Iran signed an agreement worth 100 million dollars to purchase Soviet weapons. By this move, Iran showed it is a free agent militarily and diplomatically. In the following chapter this policy along with Iran's internal problems during 1953-1968 are under examination.

⁶³The role of the C.I.A. in the Shah's departure and return to Iran and in Mossadegh's fall has surfaced to fascinated attention. See especially Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, pp. 223-230.

CHAPTER II

IRAN'S CHANGING POLICIES

"Positive Nationalism" and Alliance with the West

The collapse of Mossadegh's government opened a new chapter in Iran's foreign policy, characterized by the Shah as "positive nationalism."¹ Following the unseating of Mossadegh in 1953, the operation as well as the policies of Iranian foreign relations were more and more centered in the person of the Shah.² During 1941-1953, the main decision-makers in Iranian foreign policy were prime ministers. But during Mossadegh's regime, all decision-making power was concentrated in the hands of a Prime Minister.³

The concentration of the power in the hands of the Shah and the bipolarization of the world in the early 1950's changed the pattern of Iranian foreign policy. The failure of policies of neutrality during the two great wars and "negative equilibrium" during Mossadegh's regime, along with the desire of the Shah to strengthen his regime, led

¹Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mission For My Country (New York, 1961), pp. 111-131; by "positive nationalism," the Shah meant alignment with the West.

²E. A. Bayne, Persian Kingship in Transition (New York, 1968), p. 198.

³Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973 (Charlottesville, 1975), p. 225.

the Shah to ally his country to the West. The American initiative to erect a defense wall on the southern periphery of the Soviet Union made the choice for the Shah quite easy. After all, the United States was a distant power without a tradition of an imperialistic plan toward Iran which did not mean restoration of a dominant Western power in the country.⁴

The Nationalization of Iranian Oil in 1951 had diminished the British influence in Iran, and the United States began to move in to replace the vacuum. During Mossadegh's regime America did not have any chance to influence Iran. After the downfall of Mossadegh from power, the interest and assistance of the United States in trying to bring stability to Iran and create amiable feelings towards the West was tremendous. In response to the request for financial aid by the Iranian Prime Minister, on August 26, 1953, President Eisenhower authorized the American Ambassador to Iran to consult with him regarding the development of an American Program there.⁵ On September 3, 1953, the United States agreed to continue its planned technical aid program of 23.4 million dollars for that current fiscal year, the largest expenditure in any country. On September 5 of that year President Eisenhower announced forty-five million dollars

⁴Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1974), pp. 4-5.

⁵U.S., Department of State Bulletin, XXIX (September 14, 1953), 349.

for emergency economic assistance; in addition, the United States technical and military programs would continue in operation.⁶ In March of 1954, six million dollars and on May 1 of that year an addition nine million dollars in emergency financial aid was granted to Iran by the United States. These payments brought to a sixty million dollar total the emergency aid given to Iran following the overthrow of Mossadegh.⁷

A settlement of the oil dispute gave the American oil companies 40 percent of the shares in the Consortium established, and for the first time the United States obtained a working concession in Iran. The settlement also prepared the way for more American financial aid to Iran, and the Foreign Operations Administration offered 127.3 million dollars in loans and grants to Iran.⁸ American policy succeeded, and in July 1954, Iran's Prime Minister announced the readiness of his country for close cooperation with the West.⁹

Baghdad Pact

In 1955, events in Europe that had begun with the Berlin Blockade were settling down. The Korean War had ended, the

⁶Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (Garden City, New York, 1963), p. 165.

⁷The New York Times, May 9, 1954, Sec. A, p. 54.

⁸Ibid., November 3, 1954, Sec. A, p. 9.

⁹Ibid., July 28, 1954, Sec. A, p. 1.

Geneva Conference had divided Vietnam, and the problems over leadership in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death in 1953 were beginning to be resolved. With such tranquility in the world, the Soviet Union began to increase its effort to influence the Middle East and its states.

The United States, in order to strengthen resistance to communist expansion, decided to promote the formation of a defense system.¹⁰ American endeavors to persuade Egypt to be the center of this defense system failed, though, while Iraq, Egypt's rival for leadership of the Arab world, favored the central base idea. As a result, a defense alliance was signed by Iraq and Turkey, namely, the Baghdad Pact, on February 24, 1955. On April 24, the United Kingdom and on September 23, Pakistan joined the Pact. Iran, on October 11, 1955, was the last country to announce that it had decided to accede to the Pact.¹¹

The five members of the Pact pledged to provide mutual security and defense and to promote a mutual economic development. Although the Pact had an anti-Communist character, each country had its own objective. Protection of its security, support of its anti-zionist policy, and political backing for its conflict with India and

¹⁰James A. Bill and Robert W. Stookey, Politics and Petroleum (Brunswick, 1975), p. 149.

¹¹The New York Times, October 13, 1955, Sec. A, p. 1.

Afganistan were motives of Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan, respectively.¹²

The accession of Iran closed the gap in the defensive arrangement of the so-called "northern tier nations." Through Turkey, on the west flank, they were linked with NATO; through Pakistan, on their east flank, they were linked with SEATO. Thus, the "northern tier" completed a collective-security system which, with the United States as its center, stretched around the Earth.

The United States did not adhere to the Pact. It hoped that Cairo might change its mind and finally join this new defensive system.¹³ Another reason for holding out was the American desire not to provoke any new Soviet movements in the Middle Eastern region. Yet, soon after the formation of the Pact, Egypt denounced Iraq and asked for military equipment from the Soviet Union. Moscow's response to this request was quick and affirmative, and Moscow became Cairo's major arms supplier.

The United States policy toward the Middle East, instead of membership in the Baghdad Pact, was forged in the "Eisenhower Doctrine" that on January 5, 1957, was announced in a Congressional resolution. The Joint Resolution

¹²Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs (London, 1964), pp. 413-415.

¹³Congressional Quarterly, The Middle East: U.S. Policy, Israel, Oil and the Arabs, 1975. (Washington, D.C., 1975), p. 14.

gave the President the authority to aid by military or economic means any group of nations desiring such assistance in the general area of the Middle East against overt, armed aggression from any Communist countries.¹⁴ Meanwhile, the United States expressed its readiness to join in the military committee of the Pact.

The 1958 coup in Iraq, which installed the radical anti-monarchical regime of Kassem, along with the disturbances in Jordan and Lebanon triggered alarms concerning the adequacies of both the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine. After its revolution, Iraq broke her relations with the Baghdad Pact, and the Pact was renamed CENTO (the Central Treaty Organization).

The Shah, who was worried that a similar coup could take place in Iran, decided to strengthen his military forces and asked for more military and economic aid from the United States. He also urged a commitment by the United States to come to Iran's assistance in case of any attack. The main objective of Iran was that the United States should join CENTO and commit itself to the Pact in the same way it was committed to NATO; or, the United States should come to have a bilateral defense treaty with Iran similar to that between

¹⁴Public Papers of the President of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957 (Washington, D.C., 1958), pp. 6-16.

the United States and Japan.¹⁵ The United States contended that militarily it could not go beyond the Eisenhower Doctrine, and more economic aid required a longer study.¹⁶

Negotiations With the Soviet Union for
Military and Economic Aid

To persuade the United States to change its policy, Iran turned to the Soviet Union. The Soviets, afraid of an American commitment with subsequent building of American military bases in Iran, responded positively to the Shah's request. On January 12, 1959, Iranian newspapers reported that the Soviet Union had offered Iran unlimited technical and economic aid and also a fifty-year non-aggression pact that would have replaced the 1921 treaty.¹⁷ On January 29, 1959, at the Shah's invitation, a Soviet delegation, headed by Semyenov, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, arrived in Tehran, and the Shah himself sat down with them and negotiated.¹⁸ Washington responded to these moves with a 47.5 million dollar economic development loan.

In the background, the leaders of the United States, United Kingdom, and Pakistan sent messages to the Shah urging him to stand firm with the Western allies. The

¹⁵ Sefher Zabih, "Iran's International Posture," The Middle Journal, XXIV (Summer, 1970), 308.

¹⁶ The New York Times, February 12, 1959, Sec. A, p. 1.

¹⁷ Ibid., January 13, 1959, Sec. A, p. 11.

¹⁸ Newsweek, February 23, 1959, p. 46.

immediate objective of these messages was to persuade the Shah to reject Soviet offers and to come to terms with the United States on new economic and defense agreements.¹⁹ Backed with Western promises, the Shah did not continue the Soviet negotiations. Talks with the Soviet delegation broke off. The Shah later told an interviewer that the Soviets did not want Iran to sign the bilateral defense agreement with the United States that was under negotiation. They also wanted Iran not to grant any military base to a foreign power.²⁰

With the breakdown of negotiations, Soviet propaganda against Iran mounted, especially when, on February 16, 1959, Iran announced that it would sign a bilateral defense agreement with the United States. The Soviet Union threatened to occupy Iran if it signed a new defense alliance with the United States according to the terms of the 1921 treaty that gave the Soviet Union the right to move troops into Iran if the forces of a third party entered the country to use it as a base to threaten the Soviet southern frontier.²¹

On March 2, 1959, it was announced that Iran regarded the articles of the 1921 treaty invalid, reasoning that articles five and six of the 1921 treaty applied to a

¹⁹The New York Times, February, 12, 1959, Sec. A, p. 1.

²⁰U.S. News & World Report, March 23, 1959, p. 54.

²¹The New York Times, February 23, 1959, Sec. A, p. 1.

possible threat against the young Russian state from White Russians and from an Armenian anti-communist party called the Dashnaks and that neither of those threats were in existence.²²

Finally, on March 5, 1959, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan signed a separate defense pact with the United States. According to the executive agreement that was signed, the United States undertook to continue its military and economic aid to Iran and furthermore to come to Iran's assistance in case of aggression. In return, Iran undertook to utilize the aid for the purpose of effectively promoting economic development.

By the end of the Eisenhower Presidency and the beginning of the Kennedy administration during 1953-1961, the total American military assistance to Iran amounted to 436 million dollars, and economic aid during the same period totaled 611 million dollars.

Iran's "Independent National Policy"

In the 1960's, Iran's foreign policy underwent significant changes, and Iran's "Independent National Policy" was marked by the reduction of dependence on the United States even as increased ties with the Soviet Union were established in order to bring an equilibrium between Iran

²²Ibid., March 3, 1959, Sec. A, p. 6.

and the two super powers.²³ To understand the changes in Iranian foreign policy, various internal and external factors must be considered.

Internal Factors

In 1957, the Shah began to promote the two-party system in Iran, with both parties pledging loyalty to the Shah. He, himself, chose the leaders of these parties. Prime Minister Manuchehr Eqbal was chosen as the leader of the Milliyun (Nationalist) Party. Amir Alam was named as the leader of the Mardom (People) party. This latter was "His Majesty's Loyal opposition."²⁴

Most of the youth and the middle class people in Iran did not consider this two-party system real. In the elections which were held in 1960, these two parties entered the Majlis. A government was formed by Eqbal. Soon, it became clear that these two parties did not have any major differences in their approaches to solve Iran's critical socio-economic problems.²⁵

Immediately after this election, some political leaders in Iran began to criticize the election. They charged that it was corrupt. The Shah under these protests annulled the

²³Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "Iran's Changing Foreign Policy," The Middle East Journal, XXIV (Autumn, 1970), 433.

²⁴T. Cuyler Young, "Iran in Continuing Crisis," Foreign Affairs, XXXX (January, 1962), 276.

²⁵Robert Kingsley, "Premier Amini and Iran's Problem," Middle Eastern Affairs, XIII (August-September, 1962), 194.

elections and dismissed the Eqbal government. Jaafar Sharif-Imami was appointed by the Shah as new Prime Minister. He promised a new and honest election.

In the winter of 1960 the new elections were held. The Shah inaugurated the Majlis in February of 1961. But to the eyes of the "real opposition" in Iran, the new deputies also were not the real representatives of the people. Politically aware people in Iran began to articulate their dissatisfactions. The students held many demonstrations, and in Tehran the teachers struck. As a result, Imami resigned, and on May 5, 1961, Ali Amini²⁶ on American insistence, was appointed as Prime Minister.²⁷ Amini formed a government, and the Shah dissolved the Majlis.

President Kennedy was against United States sponsorship of military governments, and he advocated that large distributions of wealth and political authority should not go to such countries. When Amini was appointed, it was hoped that he with his political skill and reputation for integrity would be able to carry out reforms.

The Shah also wanted to have a broader popular support, and it was hoped Amini would be able to limit the power of the landed aristocracy and give the Middle class a greater

²⁶Amini was Finance Minister and main negotiator of the oil agreement in the first cabinet after Mossadegh and former ambassador to Washington, 1956-1958.

²⁷Economist, July 21, 1962, pp. 220-221.

participation in Iran's political affairs.²⁸ This middle class was a by-product both of Iran's meeting with the West and of the industrialization of the country. The members of the middle class were agreed that the traditional system and feudal society had to be changed. After World War II, this middle class gathered around Mossadegh and formed the National Front Party. Some of them went to the Tudeh party. After the downfall of Mossadegh, the rest went underground.

During its first two months in power the Amini government gave more freedom to the press and welcomed criticism and assembly by the opposition. The opposition during that time threatened to explode and destroy the system.²⁹ Understandably, Amini soon shifted from his policy dealing with freedoms of speech, press, and assembly.

Beside the opposition by the National Front Party, Amini was confronted with the resistance of the landed aristocracy, which with the army constituted the main support of the Shah. Aside from the political problems when Amini took office, the country was faced with the fact that it was almost completely without foreign exchange.

Amini, who was appointed to carry out socio-economic reforms, after several months wrestling with a badly

²⁸Kingsley, "Premier Amini and Iran's Problem," pp. 195-196.

²⁹James A. Bill, "Modernization and Reform from Above," The Journal of Politics, XXXII (February, 1970), 28.

unbalanced budget (about sixty million dollars deficit), resigned on July 18, 1962, without having had very much success.

Reform from the Throne

The violent demonstrations of the early 1960's indicated that the middle class refused to accept the Shah's new programs. Thus, it was decided that the peasant class ". . . whose members supported traditional patterns, had to be strengthened and brought into closer contact with the political elite."³⁰

In the absence of the Majlis, on the ninth of January 1963, the Shah outlined the principle of a "White Revolution" in a six point plan. On January 26, 1963, the six point program was approved by the majority of the people. The program called for breaking up feudal estates; an end to serfdom; profit sharing by industry; a vast educational program; and a new electoral law. These six points of reform became the basis of the "White Revolution." Between 1963 and 1976, eleven additional reforms were adopted.

As a result of these domestic reforms, a by-product of the "White Revolution," a significant change began to take place in Iranian foreign policy.³¹ This was labeled

³⁰James A. Bill, The Politics of Iran (Columbus, 1972), p. 140.

³¹R. M. Burrell and Alvin J. Cottrel, Iran, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Indian Ocean (New York, 1972), p. 11.

as the "Independent National Policy," and was based on peace, co-existence, and a better understanding with other nations, whatever their ideologies might be; support for any endeavor for the establishment and furtherance of social justice; every effort to bridge the gap between the rich and poor nations of the world; international co-operation against illiteracy, poverty, disease, and other contemporary ills.³²

External Factors Confronting Iran

After nationalization of the oil industry in 1951, the United Kingdom had ordered an embargo on Iranian oil. Oil companies and even the United States complied with the embargo. Interruption of the sales of oil to other countries badly affected the Iranian economy. After the downfall of Mossadegh's regime, the United States budgetary aid to Iran began and on a large scale. But, when Amini became Prime Minister, in spite of the flow of 400 million dollars a year from the oil and United States's aid, because of a wasteful economy, the country was left faced with a great need for foreign exchange.

The Kennedy administration at the time emphasized the need for basic socio-economic development, with preserving some kind of democracy in Iran; and under American pressure,

³²Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, The White Revolution (Tehran, Iran), p. 165.

Iran cut down one-third of its armed forces. On April 11, 1962, the Shah and President Kennedy agreed on the necessity for further acceleration of economic development in Iran.³³

On July 1 of the same year, the United States ended its thirty million dollar annual payment to defray the cost of maintaining some part of Iran's Army, reasoning that Iran allocated too much of its budget to what was essentially an internal security force.³⁴ The Americans believed that a military reform program and a modernization of the army would both contribute to the reforms on the political and civil sides.³⁵ Prime Minister Amini resigned in July of 1962 and he blamed the United States for the failure of his government. He said that sluggish economic aid and the cutting off of military assistance had made it impossible for him to carry on. He also said it was shocking to see other countries, not friendly to the United States, get huge sums in aid while Iran, an ally, was forgotten.³⁶

Interests in the Persian Gulf

The Persian Gulf is a source of oil; it also is Iran's only vital routeway for trade and oil. The discovery of

³³Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963 (Washington, D.C., 1964), p. 327.

³⁴The New York Times, August 26, 1962, Sec. A, p. 7.

³⁵Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 397.

³⁶The New York Times, July 19, 1962, Sec. A, p. 2.

undersea oil resources and exploitation of those resources in 1957 caused Iran to take an active interest in the Persian Gulf beginning in the early 1960's.

Iran, unlike Iraq and Saudi Arabia, has no pipeline outlet to the Mediterranean and thus is totally dependent on the Persian Gulf as the only channel for oil exports. The massive Egyptian involvement in Yemen brought alarm that a potential enemy was also active in the south in the form of President Gamal Abdul Nasser and the doctrines of Arab Nationalism and Arab Socialism. The possibility of British withdrawal from Aden was clear, and it could open rapidly the way for expansion and infiltration by Egypt into the Persian Gulf regions, especially into Muscat and Oman.³⁷ To Iran, the control of these areas meant the control of the Strait of Hormuz.

The Swing Towards the Soviet Union

The American policy toward Iran and reluctance to grant sufficient financial aid to Iran, the recognition of the republican regime in Yemen by the United States along with the potential threat from the south and a pro-Moscow Iraq in the west caused Iran to move for closer relations with the Soviet Union. After months of negotiations the Soviet Union announced on September 15, 1962, that it had

³⁷ Burrell and Cottrel, Iran, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Indian Ocean, p. 12.

obtained a pledge from Iran that no foreign rocket bases would be established on the soil of Iran.³⁸

The emergence of an American ballistic missile submarine made it possible for such a pledge to be made. But it led to an easing of tensions with the Soviet Union. Nikita Khrushchev, who in April, 1961, in an interview with Walter Lippman had predicted revolutionary experience in Iran,³⁹ repeated his statement in Vienna in his meetings with President Kennedy.⁴⁰ The pledge by Iran changed his attitude, and he condemned the opponents of the regime of the Shah.

Taking this step toward what became detente with the Soviet Union made it possible for the Shah to turn away from Iran's northern neighbor. The center of attention became the Persian Gulf.⁴¹ The relaxation of the relations between Moscow, that before 1962 directly or indirectly supported the opponents of the regime, helped. and the Shah desired to broaden the basis of his power; to solve the internal problems of Iran; and these along with America's policy toward Iran during the Kennedy Administration caused the announcement of the "White Revolution" and led to changes in Iran's foreign policy. Internationally, the relaxation

³⁸The New York Times, September 16, 1962, Sec. A, p. 20.

³⁹Ibid., May 22, 1961, Sec. A, p. 9.

⁴⁰Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York, 1965), p. 546.

⁴¹R. M. Burrell, "Iranian Foreign Policy," Journal of International Affairs, XXIX (Fall, 1975), 132.

of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the Soviet-China conflict also were factors which had impact.

The Johnson Administration and Changes of
American Attitude Towards Iran

During the Kennedy administration and, subsequently, after him in the Johnson administration, the United States military grants in aid and credit sales changed. The economic advances of some American allies had enabled them to assume an increasingly larger responsibility for their own defense costs. This development was reflected in the decline of the United States military grants and increases of United States military sales.⁴²

The effects of the Shah's "White Revolution" and the accompanying socio-economic reforms added to Iran's oil revenues meant that its economy became more viable and had greater capability. The United States accordingly made an agreement to sell 200 million dollars worth of military equipment to Iran.⁴³ The Iranian Parliament, at the request of the Council of Ministers on October 13, 1964, approved

⁴²Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 (Washington, D.C., 1967), pp. 118-120.

⁴³Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 (Washington, D.C. 1965), p. 734.

a law that gave diplomatic immunity to the members of the United States Military Advisory Service in Iran.⁴⁴

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 led Iran's defense policy to change. Pakistan was a member of SEATO and CENTO as well, and also under the term of a bilateral treaty of 1959, the United States was obliged to defend her in case of aggression. But during this war, the United States did not assist Pakistan, and also it did not allow Iran to help Pakistan with its American arms. This indicated a certain inadequacy in such pacts and bilateral arrangements. The only way of survival, as Prime Minister Hoveida, once said, ". . . is our military build-up."⁴⁵ Thus, the Shah became convinced that Iran would have to acquire the capability to fend for itself in local conflicts.

At this point, negotiations to buy more weapons began, and in November, 1966, an agreement was signed between the United States and Iran to sell at least one squadron of F-4 phantom jets, then the most sophisticated aircraft in the world. From 1964 to February, of 1967, the United States agreed to make a total 400 million dollar military sale to Iran. On February 7, 1967, Iran signed an agreement worth 100 million dollars in aid with the Soviet Union in exchange for Iranian natural gas. This was Moscow's first such pact

⁴⁴U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 1968 (Washington, D.C., 1969), pp. 7535-7594.

⁴⁵Time, November 4, 1974, p. 33.

with an ally of the West, and it was interpreted in the United States as a move to show Iran to be a free agent militarily and diplomatically.⁴⁶ The Shah said ". . . We are following an independent national policy; whatever is best for our country we will do."⁴⁷

Accordingly, on August 23, 1967, after the Shah's visit to the United States and his talks with President Johnson, it was announced that Iran would buy a second squadron of F-4 phantom jets from the United States. The purchase of these American planes was being financed under a ten year, 200 million dollar credit arrangement through the Export-Import Bank.⁴⁸ Another important result of the Shah's talks with President Johnson at that time was a tacit recognition by the United States of the vital military role that Iran should play in the Persian Gulf area, in filling the vacuum left by the British withdrawal.

A change occurred in 1968, when the Foreign Military Act prohibited the granting by the Export-Import Bank of direct credits to less developed countries for military purchases.⁴⁹ Consequently on November 29, 1968, direct economic assistance

⁴⁶The New York Times, February 8, 1967, Sec. A, p. 1.

⁴⁷U.S. News & World Report, January 27, 1969, p. 49.

⁴⁸The New York Times, August 24, 1967, Sec. A, p. 1.

⁴⁹Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Foreign Military Sale Act of 1968 (Washington, D.C., 1968).

to Iran, which had begun in 1951 under President Truman's Point Four technical assistance program, came to an end. The reasoning was that Iran had reached the "take-off" point, where it could support its own development.⁵⁰ With this change in its status, again Iran became eligible for financing, this time by the Export-Import Bank.

⁵⁰The New York Times, November 30, 1967, Sec. A, p. 13.

CHAPTER III

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD EGYPT AND THE ARAB WORLD

The first major roles and responsibilities of the United States in the Middle East region, as was noted before, began in 1947, when the Truman Doctrine was enunciated. The main objective of the Doctrine was to contain the expansion of communism throughout the free world. It was followed by the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the war in Korea; but application of the Truman Doctrine toward the Arab world developed quite slowly.¹

Traditionally, the United States had decided to stay out of Middle Eastern Affairs, and this from the beginning.² A major change in the United States policy occurred in 1917, when President Wilson agreed with the Balfour Declaration.³

¹George Lenczowski, editor, United States Interests in The Middle East (Washington, D.C., 1973), p. 15.

²For the first time, vast oil reserves of the Middle East attracted the U.S., and in 1928 several American companies joined with an European group to operate the Iraq Petroleum Company.

³Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (London, 1961), p. 548; the Balfour Declaration was issued by the British government on November 2, 1917, in the form of a letter to Lord Rothschild (then vice president of the British Zionist Federation), by Balfour, (then British Foreign Secretary); by this action the British government recognized ". . . the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. . ."

But a traditional isolationism inhibited any positive U.S. initiative after President Wilson.⁴

When World War II came to an end, the United Kingdom emerged from the war in the Middle East relatively strong. The U.S. government decided to collaborate with both the United Kingdom and France to protect the security of the region; also involved were matters of its economic development.⁵ Furthermore, the U.S. hoped that with its policy towards Iran, Turkey, and Greece it could prevent the spread of influence of the Soviet Union and communism into the Arab world.

Creation of Israel

But the United States' hope in the leadership of the British in the area did not last very long. The United Kingdom, in 1947, withdrew from India and Greece; and although it had a Mandate granted by the League of Nations to administer Palestine,⁶ it could not establish any compromise

⁴Carl J. Friedrich, American Policy Towards Palestine (Westport, 1944), p. 34; On June 30, 1922, the Sixty-Seventh Congress of the U.S. in a joint resolution accepted the principle of the Balfour Declaration; President Harding signed the resolution, and thus the U.S. became officially committed to the Balfour Declaration.

⁵J. C. Hurewitz, Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East (New York, 1969), p. 9.

⁶In 1920, Turkey, who had ruled Palestine since 1517, ceded the territory to the Allies, and a Mandate to administer Palestine as well as Syria and Trans-Jordan was given to the U.K. by the Allied Conference at San Remo on April 25, 1920, requiring approval of the League of Nations; the Mandate was approved on July 24, 1922, and came into force on September 29, 1923.

between the Arab and Jewish people in the area and decided to hand back the Mandate to the United Nations.

In May of 1947, the United Nations General Assembly appointed a committee to investigate the Palestine problem. In August of that year, the committee presented its report. The committee recommended the termination of the Mandate and the granting of independence. Seven nations of the committee recommended partition -- the creation of two separate states, Arab and Jewish, to be joined by economic union, with a Jerusalem enclave. Three other countries recommended a unitary state with Arab and Jewish provinces; one country abstained. The United States and the Soviet Union agreed on the partition plan, and the General Assembly on November 29, 1947, voted for the Partition of Palestine.⁷

The Arabs rejected the Partition Plan and asserted they would resist by force. Soon disorder in Palestine began to mount. The United Nations was deliberating the problem when the British government announced its intention to relinquish the Mandate on May 15, 1948. The British Mandate came to an end, and in the evening of May 14, 1948, Ben-Gurion proclaimed the independence of the State of Israel. Eleven minutes after this proclamation, the White House recognized

⁷Yearbook of United Nations, 1947-1948 (New York, 1949), p. 248.

". . . the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel."⁸

After the proclamation of the State of Israel, the forces of five Arab countries, those of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, moved across the Palestine frontiers for the purpose of preventing the consolidation of a Jewish State in Palestine. The first Arab-Israeli war lasted from 1948 to 1949, and it was won by the Israelis, who won hands down without any official American government help.

American policy towards Israel and Palestine created a problem for the United States. The Arab people were still mad because of the U.S. policy toward the Balfour Declaration. The Partition of Palestine and recognition of Israel by the U.S. increased the hostility of the Arab peoples towards the United States. The Arabs thought the U.S. was motivated to protecting the benefits of its European allies, which in the Arab point of view was some kind of "imperialism."

After the first Arab-Israeli War, in order to bring stability to the Middle East and to prevent an arms race between the Arab states and Israel, the United States, United Kingdom, and France issued the Tripartite Declaration on May 25, 1950. These three powers also declared their opposition to the use of force throughout the Middle East.⁹

⁸John Snetsinger, Truman, The Jewish Vote and the Creation of Israel (Stanford, 1974), p. 2.

⁹U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, XXII (June 5, 1950), 886.

Nationalist Movements in Egypt

British withdrawal and the first Arab-Israeli war basically changed the opinion of the Arab people towards the United Kingdom in particular and the west in general. In many of the Arab countries a nationalist movement began. For these nationalists ". . . a British connection was no longer, the basic assumption of independence and national development."¹⁰

The nationalist movements in Egypt were accompanied with feelings against the United Kingdom and foreign influences in general. When the Wafd government of Egypt came to power in January of 1950, it demanded (1) the evacuation of British forces in Egypt; (2) the revision of the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936¹¹ and (3) the "unity of the Nile valley."

With the outbreak of the Korean war, the United States, United Kingdom, and France decided to create a general defense arrangement against Soviet expansion in the Middle East (1950-1951). The idea was to bring Egypt and other Arab countries into a closer relationship with the West. If the arrangement were accepted, it would give an equal partnership to Egypt

¹⁰John S. Badeau, The American Approach to the Arab World (New York, 1968), p. 3.

¹¹British-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance stipulated a 20 year military alliance between these two countries, with British troops to be stationed in the Suez Canal Zone; moreover under the terms of the Treaty, all the Egyptian military facilities could be available, if U.K. became involved in any war anywhere.

and would replace the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The proposal failed because (1) the Arabs hated the West because, to them, it was responsible for the creation of Israel; (2) the Arab states felt little threat from the Soviet Union; and (3) they thought that any cooperation with the West meant the continuation of British domination in the region.¹² To diminish the British influence after many warnings, Egypt, on October 16, 1951, unilaterally abrogated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and demanded the total British evacuation of Egyptian soil, but the British forces remained in Egypt.

The presence of the British soldiers, after the abrogation of the Treaty, in the Canal Zone increased the confrontations between the nationalists and British forces. Anti-foreign demonstrations reached their high point when, on January 26, 1952, demonstrators destroyed millions of dollars of British, United States, and French properties in Cairo. Six months later, on July 23, 1952, a revolutionary regime came to power.

The Soviet attitude toward the new regime was not sympathetic. They thought the coup had taken place with American help. Yet they encouraged Egypt to resist in the negotiations with the British over the Suez Canal.¹³ On

¹²Lenczowski, The United States Interests in the Middle East, p. 17.

¹³Charles B. McLane, Soviet-Middle East Relations (London, 1973), p. 30.

the other hand, the United States encouraged the United Kingdom and Egypt to conclude a new treaty over the disputed problem. The United Kingdom had recognized that in the age of atomic bombs, it was not necessary to keep a large force at the Suez. The United States, to encourage Egypt, granted forty million dollars for economic development.¹⁴ As a result, a new treaty was signed between the United Kingdom and Egypt, in October, 1954, and the United Kingdom decided to withdraw its forces from the Egyptian territory.

Development of Relations between the Soviet Union and Egypt

At the beginning of 1955, the relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union developed rapidly, and soon Egypt became the center of Soviet policies in the Arab world. In this same year the Baghdad Pact was created. The pact aroused the hostility of Nasser and he rejected it because (1) it was a foreign pact; (2) the purpose of the Pact was to bring the Arab states closer to western "imperialism," which they disliked; and (3) the Pact strengthened Egypt's rival regime, Iraq.¹⁵

Moscow opposed the Pact because it was a means to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence in the area and supported the security of the Pact's members against Soviet expansion.

¹⁴Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (Garden City, New York, 1963), p. 427.

¹⁵George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East (New York, 1970), p. 7.

Furthermore, after Stalin's death, Soviet policy towards the world had become more flexible, and they began willingly to support the Arab's neutralism.

In February of 1955, Israeli troops attacked the Egyptian headquarters in the Gaza Strip. As a result of this raid, the inadequacy of the Egyptian military equipment became apparent. Egyptian officers increased their demands for more military hardware. Under this pressure, Nasser sent a mission to the United States to purchase American arms. The United States stipulated that Egypt must sign a mutual security agreement whereby the United States would have some kind of control over the use of the purchased arms.¹⁶ France's answers to the Egyptian military request was based on an Egyptian promise to cease their support of nationalists in Algeria. The United Kingdom wanted to supply only token amounts.¹⁷

Angry with the West, Egypt turned to the Soviet Union and its bloc. Nasser, in September 1955, announced that Egypt had signed an agreement with Czechoslovakia. Under the terms of the agreement, Czechoslovakia would exchange all kinds of its manufactured arms in return for Egyptian cotton. Egypt also accepted a Soviet offer of military aid,

¹⁶U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Studies of Conflict (Washington, D.C., 1967), Vol. III, p. 639.

¹⁷Wynfred Joshua, Soviet Penetration into the Middle East (New York, 1970), p. 7.

and Cairo signed its first military assistance agreement with Moscow. Following the signing of the agreement, almost 200 Soviet jet fighters, hundreds of tanks, and other kinds of military equipment were delivered to Cairo.¹⁸

The United States wanted to maintain a degree of influence in Egypt, and it offered on December 16, 1955, seventy million dollars to finance the construction of the Aswan High Dam. Furthermore, the World Bank was ready to extend a 200 million dollar loan. The United States and the United Kingdom were willing to extend together about 100 million dollars as supplementary finance. With the continuation of anti-American propaganda by Nasser in Asia and Africa, the United States withdrew the Aswan offer. Nasser's reaction to the withdrawal of the offer was the nationalization of the Suez Canal. He reasoned that he would finance the dam with the revenues from the Canal.

Wrathful at Nasser's decision about the nationalization of the Canal, on October 29, 1956, Anglo-French and Israeli troops attacked Egypt, and in a few days they were close to defeating Egypt in a decisive way. The United States joined with the U.S.S.R. in the United Nations Security Council against the British, French, and Israeli position, and after crucial negotiations, Anglo-French and Israeli troops withdrew

¹⁸John H. Hoagland, Jr. and John B. Teeple, "Regional Stability and Weapon Transfer; The Middle Eastern Case," Orbis, IX (Fall, 1965), 7.

from Egypt, turning over their positions to the first United Nations Emergency Force.

When the United States humiliated the United Kingdom and France (its allies), the collective responsibility of the three powers to keep stability in the Middle East was terminated and ". . . Soviet-Western rivalry in the Arab-Israel zone had been transformed into Soviet-American rivalry."¹⁹

After the Suez crisis, most of the events in the Middle East turned against the United States. Egypt and other radical Arab countries disregarded too soon the American support given during the 1956 war. All the manifestations of friendship were given to the Soviet Union.²⁰ The American policy towards the Arab countries to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence in the area remained the Eisenhower Doctrine.

In July of 1958, a leftist military coup overthrew the pro-American regime of Iraq. As a result, the influence of the Soviet Union increased in the area. In 1963, another leftist military clique affiliated with the "Ba'ath Party" seized power in Syria. In response, the United States increased its military aid to Israel tremendously. In

¹⁹J. C. Hurewitz, Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East, p. 10.

²⁰John Galvani and Peter Johnson, "Imperialist Strategy in the Middle East," New Politics, XI (Spring, 1974), 65.

American eyes, the Israeli strength was viewed as a counter-weight to increased Soviet influence in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. This policy was demonstrated by Israel's military performance in the June war of 1967.

The June War of 1967

The Arab-Israeli war of June of 1967 brought Egypt and the Soviet Union closer together. The Soviet Union supported the Arab countries in international organizations and by military equipment as well. The diplomatic relations between the United States and Egypt were severed. Due to the extreme involvement of the United States in Vietnam, Soviet influence in the Middle East increased in fact. Washington ". . . decided that strengthening Israel would be the best way to prevent a new war."²¹ The Soviet Union, besides selling more arms to Egypt, sent in fifteen thousand men as military advisors to that country.

In 1969, President Nixon took office. His administration announced that international relations were passing from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiations, and "Negotiations" became the watch-word of the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy.²²

²¹Simon Rosenblum, "New Chapter in the Palestine-Israel Conflict," New Politics, XI (Spring, 1974), 68.

²²William B. Quandt, "Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Disengagement Negotiations," Journal of International Affairs, XXIX (Spring, 1975), 33.

Throughout 1969, the United States sought a framework for an agreed settlement through bilateral talks with the Soviet Union and through multilateral channels of the Four Power talks, the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and France as well as through continuing consultation with Israel, Jordan, and Egypt.²³ In the course of these discussions, a proposal was outlined by Secretary of State Rogers for creating a framework for negotiation.

The "Rogers Plan" endorsed Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai in return for Egyptian commitments to peace. Israel was willing to enter talks looking towards agreement on secure and recognized borders but not to agree in advance to withdraw to her former borders; therefore the plan was rejected by Israel.²⁴

Nasser's Death and Changes in Egypt's Policy Toward the United States

Nasser's death in 1970 opened a new chapter in Egypt's policy towards the world. The unity of the Arab world, which was one of Nasser's aims, lost its primacy. For Sadat, Nasser's successor, the withdrawal of the Israelis

²³Richard Nixon, "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace," a report to Congress, February 25, 1971, Department of State Bulletin, LXIV (March 21, 1971), 390.

²⁴Richard Nixon, "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace," a report to Congress, February 9, 1972, Department of State Bulletin, LXVI (March 13, 1972), 381.

from the Sinai area was a more important goal. In his view, the Soviet's aid could not go on any further. He had reached the conclusion that the United States could play the major role in achieving peace in the Middle East by persuading the Israelis to give up the occupied lands. As he said, ". . . all the cards [were] in the hands of the United States."²⁵

After the failure of "the"Rogers Plan" in 1969-1971, Egyptian leaders clearly understood from it that the United States was not willing to persuade the Israelis to solve the Middle East problem. Disappointed because of the United States' reaction, Sadat increased his ties with Moscow. As a result, on May 27, 1971, a fifteen year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed in Cairo by Sadat and Soviet President Podgorny. This treaty increased the cooperation and friendship between the two countries. On the other hand, in regard to the Arab-Israeli War, Egypt lost its freedom of action. Not only did the Soviets declare that they would not go to war for Egypt, but also, they would not allow the Egyptians to start a war.²⁶

Signing this Treaty did not change the situation. To press the Soviets to give extra weapons and more support,

²⁵U.S. News & World Report, June 6, 1975, p. 39.

²⁶For the Text of Treaty see Lenczowski, "Soviet Advances in the Middle East," pp. 165-167.

Sadat announced that 1971 was "the year of decision." Sadat and other Egyptian officials visited the Kremlin to talk about the existing situation and their demands. The military assistance that they received was not matched with the military equipment that they demanded.²⁷

To break some of the restrictions of the Soviet restraint on Egypt, President Sadat, on July 18, 1972, requested the withdrawal of thousands of Soviet military personnel from his country. Sadat's decision was made because (1) Egyptian officers were not happy with the presence of Soviet Advisors;²⁸ (2) Soviet military equipment was defensive and they did not supply Egypt with offensive missiles, for which they wished; and (3) if Cairo wanted to regain its territory by peaceful means, it had to have a good relationship with Washington. The presence of thousands of Soviet citizens in Egypt prevented such a relationship;²⁹ and (4) an open-ended cease-fire or "no war no peace" was not tolerated by Sadat. Any action that could endanger the existing cease-fire was vetoed by the Soviets.³⁰ Thus, the only choice that

²⁷Nadav Safran, "Arab Politics, Peace and War," Orbis, XVIII (Summer, 1974), 388.

²⁸Economist, July 22, 1972.

²⁹Shlomo Slonim, "American-Egyptian Rapprochement," The World Today, XXXI (February, 1975), 51-52.

³⁰Anthony McDemott, "Sadat and the Soviet Union," The World Today, XXVIII (September, 1972), 407.

Sadat had to eliminate the presence of the Soviets in Egypt.

Sadat's "year of decision" passed without any important decisions made. In 1972, a "war government" was created in order to answer to those people who were not satisfied with the status quo.³¹ On the other hand, in the United States the Nixon Administration began to reconsider the Middle Eastern problem. From 1969 thru 1971, the United States policy towards this area ". . . was based on the assumption that little could be done."³² But in the election campaigns of 1972, Nixon announced, if he were reelected, the Middle East would be the most important area of his administration.³³ At the beginning of 1973, a channel of communication was opened between the United States and Egypt. Sadat's advisor for national security affairs, Hafiz-Ismael visited the White House and talked with American officials. Ismael came back home empty-handed. The United States had decided to preserve its detente with the Soviet Union and did not want to change the existing situation. For Sadat, there was only one alternative left. He and Assad decided to launch the October war. To them, ". . . neither the Soviet Union or the

³¹Safran, "Arab Politics, Peace and War," p. 389.

³²Quandt, "Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Disengagement Negotiations," p. 34.

³³Ibid., p. 36.

United States would force Israel out of the occupied areas."³⁴

With the outbreak of war, Kissinger remained in very close contact with Sadat, Assad, and Meir. Besides bringing a ceasefire to the area, he wanted to keep out the Soviets from these negotiations. Moreover, the use of oil as a weapon also forced the United States to change its full support of Israel.³⁵ The October war in Sadat's words ". . . was the turning point which led the United States to take a new look at the Middle East and to embark, as a result of that, on a policy of working towards peace based on justice for the region."³⁶ The new United States policy was called "shuttle diplomacy" or "step-by-step" diplomacy. To perform this policy neither the Arabs nor the Israelis felt that their strategic principles were threatened.³⁷ The United States had decided to have close ties with the Arabs, to guarantee oil supplies for itself and its western allies. By the same token, it wanted to neutralize the Soviet influence in the area.

³⁴William E. Griffith, "The Fourth Middle East War, the Energy Crisis and U.S. Policy," Orbis, XVII (Winter, 1974), 1165.

³⁵Rosenblum, "New Chapter in the Palestine-Israel Conflict," p. 68.

³⁶Newsweek, March 25, 1974, p. 44.

³⁷"The Middle East: Reassessment and Choice," Orbis, XIX (Summer, 1975), 307.

Conditions which existed after the war also prepared the road for negotiations. Prime Minister Meir wanted (1) the return of Israeli war prisoners; (2) the end of the blockade of Babal-Mandab; and (3) an opportunity to demobilize some of the Israeli forces.

Sadat also wanted (1) the relief of Egyptian Third Army, which was surrounded by Israelis; (2) removal of the Israeli troops from the west bank; and (3) he hoped he could regain some of the Egyptian territories east of the Canal, in return for reopening it. Mrs. Meir needed more weapons and economic aid from the United States. Sadat also expected economic assistance and American diplomatic support.³⁸

A new American policy, which was accompanied with American promises and economic assistance to Egypt, was worked out, and on February 28, 1974, both countries resumed diplomatic relations³⁹ broken off during the 1967 war. After this step, on April 18, 1974, Sadat announced that Egypt had decided to end the relationship of the Soviet Union being the only supplier of Egyptian weapons and to seek arms from other countries, including the United States.⁴⁰ The main reason behind this decision, according

³⁸Quandt, "Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Disengagement Negotiation," p. 39.

³⁹U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LXX (April, 1), p. 338.

⁴⁰The New York Times, April 19, 1974, Sec. A, p. 1.

to Sadat, was because the Soviet Union used its arms policy and supplies as an "instrument of policy leverage" to influence Egyptian actions.⁴¹

When gradually the influence of the Soviets in the area had diminished, President Nixon in June of 1974, while visiting the Middle East, and Sadat signed the "declaration of cooperation and friendship" in Cairo. The United States undertook to help the economy of Egypt in every possible way.⁴²

When President Ford took office in the same year, he followed the Nixon policy towards the Middle East. Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" to find a permanent peace in the area continued until March, 1975, when he failed to bring together the Israelis and Egyptians to sign a new interim agreement about the Sinai.

Israel did not want to withdraw from strategic locations in the Sinai area or the Abu Rudeis oil fields without major concessions by Egypt. Washington at this time chose an official 'reassessment' of American policy towards Israel.⁴³ This meant that if Israel did not change its policy towards the disputed problem, the United States would change its policy towards Israel. On June 11, six days after the

⁴¹Ibid., April 22, 1974, Sec. A, p. 1.

⁴²Ibid., June 15, 1974, Sec. A, p. 1.

⁴³"Reassessment and Choice," 307.

reopening of the Suez Canal by Sadat and twelve days after the Ford-Sadat meetings at Salzburg, Austria, Israel's Prime Minister Rabin visited Washington. This time he could not get any aid from the United States which meant that they had to negotiate a compromise with Washington, in which they gave some concessions on the Sinai, etc. At the end of August, Kissinger again visited the Middle East. By September 1, the new interim agreement between Egypt and Israel had been signed. Under the terms of the agreement, both parties, Egypt and Israel, agreed to solve their problems "by peaceful means." Moreover, Israel gave back some of Egypt's territories in the Sinai that they had captured during the 1967 war. Soon the military forces of both parties in the Sinai deployed on agreed, special lines. More important, after the United States Senate's approval, 200 volunteer civilian American technicians were stationed in the Sinai to operate in three watch stations.⁴⁴

The relationship between the West and Egypt improved rapidly during 1975 and 1976. Sadat turned towards France and the United Kingdom to buy military equipment. But in order to buy arms from the United States, the way was not clear. With the existence of Egypt's Treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union, the United States was not willing to sell arms to Egypt. To clear the way, Sadat decided to

⁴⁴U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LXXIII (September 29, 1975), 465.

abrogate the Treaty and open the door for purchasing American arms. Soon he requested the purchase of six C-130 military transport planes from the United States. The amount of the transaction was sixty million dollars. After a sharp controversy, it was made public that the United States would sell the requested items.⁴⁵ With this decision of American arms sales to Egypt, the cycle of arms sales to that country was completed.

⁴⁵The New York Times, March 5, 1976, Sec. A, p. 3.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONSEQUENCES OF BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PERSIAN GULF

On January 16, 1968, Harold Wilson, the United Kingdom's Prime Minister, formally announced that his country would withdraw her 6,000 ground troops stationed in Bahrein and Sharaja in the Persian Gulf, along with their support units, by the end of 1971.¹ Although strategic shifts in the United Kingdom's international position and the perennial balance of payment crisis were among the reasons given to withdraw,² the main purpose was to disengage, as far as possible, from the military and political commitments, which had become increasingly untenable.³ Economic, political, and social changes in the southern part of the Persian Gulf had caused political change and ferment to begin in the region that had been thought as traditional, even unpolitical.

The British withdrawal meant the end to 150 years of stability in the region, and a power vacuum was created in

¹The New York Times, January 17, 1968, Sec. A, p. 1.

²Robert R. Sullivan, "The Architecture of Western Security in the Persian Gulf," Orbis, XIV (Spring, 1971), 71.

³David Holen, "The Persian Gulf: After the British Raj," Foreign Affairs, XXXIX (July 1971), 24.

the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean regions. The Shah, who had recognized that the earlier British decision to withdraw from Aden would ultimately lead to a similar policy in the Persian Gulf, had begun to prepare an Iranian policy to perform after the British withdrawal. However, the United Kingdom's announcement accelerated the build up of the Iranian military forces.

In June 1968, the Shah paid a private visit to Washington, seeking to persuade President Johnson and other American officials to sell about 600 million dollars of sophisticated weapons to Iran. The rationale offered for the modernization of Iran's armed forces was to fill the vacuum created in the Persian Gulf and to nullify the potential threat posed by increased Soviet activity in the region. President Johnson promised the Shah to support Iran's goal of building an adequate, modern, defense force to insure its national security.⁴

As a result, the United States agreed to grant Iran 100 million dollars for 1969, with the remainder subject to annual review. In December of the same year, President Johnson expressed to the Iranian Prime Minister while visiting Washington the desire of the United States to continue its

⁴The New York Times, June 13, 1968, Sec. A, p. 1.

cooperation with Iran, given its greater responsibility in the Persian Gulf region.⁵

Iran's policy was that ". . . the Persian Gulf affairs should be the concern of the coastal countries alone."⁶ In January 1969, Richard Nixon, whose personal friendship with the Shah, as he said, went back over many years,⁷ entered the White House as the President of the United States. Nixon brought a new doctrine of American foreign policy. This was compatible with Iran's objectives in the Persian Gulf.

The Nixon Doctrine was announced informally during the height of American involvement in Vietnam. On an occasion in Guam, President Nixon said that the United States must avoid that kind of policy that makes countries in Asia dependent upon the United States.⁸ Later in a report to the Congress about the United States policy towards its allies, Nixon said, ". . . they must define the nature of their own security and determine the path for their own progress.

⁵U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LIX (December 13, 1968), 662.

⁶Iran's Domestic and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C., 1976), p. 118.

⁷Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon, 1969 (Washington, D.C., 1971), p. 821.

⁸Ibid., p. 548.

For only in this manner will they think of their fate as truly their own."⁹

With this new policy, the United States, instead of filling the vacuum of power in the Persian Gulf, decided to rely on friendly local power to maintain stability in the region.¹⁰ Unprecedented socio-economic development in Iran produced far greater direct effect on the international relations of Iran. Consolidation of Royal power and the stability of the Shah's regime also enabled him to play an active part in the world arena.¹¹ The size of Iran's populations, that was two times that of other littoral states, along with its rapid social, economic and political development gave it a capability to exercise leadership in the Persian Gulf region.

Moreover the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 highlighted the stability of Iran in the troublesome region of the Middle East. With Egypt's defeat, Nasser devoted his energy to Egyptian internal problems and Israel. This indirectly caused a diminution of Egyptian influence in the southern

⁹Richard Nixon, "United States Foreign Policy of the 1970's: Building for Peace," a report to Congress, February 25, 1971, Department of State Bulletin, LXIV (March 21, 1971), 423-427.

¹⁰Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, The Persian Gulf, 1975: Continuing Debate on Arms Sales (Washington, D.C., 1975), p. 80.

¹¹Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "Iran's Changing Foreign Policy," The Middle East Journal, XXIV (Autumn, 1970), 423-427.

part of the Persian Gulf, and in the course of that year, Egyptian troops withdrew from Yemen.

Furthermore, immediately after the adoption of the United Nation's Security Council Resolution 242, on November 22, 1967, the Shah became the first leader to confirm it, condemning the occupation of the Arab's lands by Israel.¹² Nasser, after the 1967 defeat, chose a moderate way to solve Egypt's dispute with Israel and, while Iraq and Syria opposed him, accepted Resolution 242. Meanwhile, a new regime in a coup came to power in Iraq and began to oppose Nasser's approach with Israel, and increased its opposition toward Iran. Iraq's policy toward Iran and Egypt brought the two countries closer together, and the diplomatic relations that had been severed in July 1960 were restored in August of 1970.

On January 4, 1969, the Shah declared that Iran would withdraw its territorial claims to Bahrain Island if its people did not wish to join Iran. Iran's claim to this island was a subject of great controversy between Iran and some Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia. After the Shah's announcement, the people of Bahrain, under the auspices of the United Nations, went to a referendum. They chose to be independent. The result of Bahrain's independence, that was endorsed by the United Nation's Security Council on

¹²Iran's Domestic and Foreign Policy, p. 133.

April 30, 1970, as well as by the Iranian Parliament, brought Tehran and Riyadh together against their common enemy, Iraq.

With the breakdown of Egypt's influence in the Persian Gulf and the isolation of Iraq by Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iran emerged as the medium power in the region. The United States welcomed Iran's taking a greater responsibility¹³ and increased its security assistance to Iran and to a lesser extent to Saudi Arabia as well.¹⁴ And, after the Shah paid an official visit to Washington in October 1969 and his warm reception there by President Nixon, it was announced that a billion dollars for Iran's military buildup had been underwritten by the United States and the United Kingdom to prepare for British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in the 1971. American military hardware consisted of Phantom jets, and the British contribution included tanks and naval units.¹⁵

As the British departure from the Persian Gulf came closer, negotiations began between Iran, the United Kingdom, and the Sheikhs of Sharajah and Ras-al-Khaymah concerning the three small but important islands at the neck of the Persian Gulf or Strait of Hormuz. The Sheikh of Sharajah agreed to Iranian troops occupying the Abu Musa Island, in

¹³The Persian Gulf, 1975, p. 10.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 80.

¹⁵The New York Times, July 25, 1971, Sec.

turn receiving 3.75 million dollars a year until the oil revenues from the Island or its offshore areas reached 7.5 million dollars when they would be split equally thereafter. About Tumbs islands, the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaymah did not come to an agreement with the Iranian government. As a result, on November 30, 1971, one day before the departure of the United Kingdom from the Persian Gulf, Iranian troops "repossessed" these islands.¹⁶

Iranian Objectives for Their Military Buildup

There are some five factors that led Iran to undertake the large buildup of military hardware and manpower: (1) economic factors and the general problem of the meaning of independence in the modern, present-day world; (2) Persian oil and the Persian Gulf; (3) the Dhophar rebellion and security of the Persian Gulf; (4) the threat by the Soviet Union; and (5) the stability of Iran and the region.

The Economic Factor

To the Shah, one of the guarantees of independence and the integrity of the whole territory of Iran is a strong

¹⁶Iran's Domestic and Foreign Policy, p. 122; the occupation of these islands was a controversial matter because the Arab countries claimed these islands belong to the Sheikdoms; The Iranian government had different view; to the Shah, these islands belong to Iran, and 78 years ago, the United Kingdom had seized them by force for the security of their navigation in the Persian Gulf.

economy.¹⁷ Until 1961, the Iranian economy was predominantly agrarian, and agriculture dominated with 61 percent of the total value of the industrial and agricultural sectors. Industrialization of the country after 1961 changed this portion to 59 percent to the industrial sector and 41 percent to the agricultural sector in 1975. During this period Iran's GNP expanded from four billion dollars in 1961 to fifty-one billion dollars in 1975. Per capita income also rose from 195 dollars to more than 1600 dollars during this period.¹⁸

More recent figures have shown that the Iranian economy in the Iranian fiscal year 1352 (1973-1974) grew at a rate of 34 percent and in 1353 (1974-1975) at 42 percent. In 1976 (1354) the Iranian budget was 178 percent larger than the budget of the previous year. This improvement in the Iranian economy is largely the result of the tremendous oil revenues pouring into the country. These tripled the size of total government income.¹⁹

The Persian Oil and the Persian Gulf

Oil is the backbone of the Iranian economy. According to the Director of the National Iranian Oil Company in July of 1976, the proven oil reserves in Iran were equal to 9.8 percent

¹⁷"The Shah's Remark," Tamasha (July 2, 1976), p. 4.

¹⁸Profile on Iran (April, 1976), 48.

¹⁹Ibid. (February, 1976), 36-37.

of the world's total and about 17.5 percent of the Middle East's. At that time Iran ranked second after Saudi Arabia as the largest producer and exporter of oil in the Middle East and fourth after the Soviet Union, the United States and Saudi Arabia as the largest producer in the world.²⁰

As an example, in 1975, Iran produced some 268 million metric tons (about two billion barrels) of oil, of which 249 million metric tons were exported in the form of crude and oil derivatives and the rest consumed within the country.²¹

In 1975, Iran earned 18.6 billion dollars from oil and gas exports.²² In 1974-1975 the oil sector accounted for 84.3 percent of government revenues and 89.4 percent of foreign exchange receipts on current accounts.²³

Furthermore, most of the Iranian oil wells are located in the south of the country, and upon completion of an expansion program in late 1977, the Abadan Oil Refinery in the south not far from the Iraqi border will once again rank as the largest export refinery in the world.²⁴ Iran, unlike Saudi Arabia and Iraq, does not have any pipeline to deliver its oil to the Mediterranean Sea, and it is dependent

²⁰Iran Economic News, II (July, 1976), 8.

²¹Ibid., II (March, 1976), 3.

²²Ibid., II (August, 1976), 1-2.

²³Ibid., II (November, 1976), 2.

²⁴Ibid., II (March, 1976), 3.

completely on the Persian Gulf, through which all of Iran's and two-thirds of the world's oil exports pass.

The Dhophar Rebellion and Security of the Persian Gulf

The Persian Gulf at its neck narrows until the super-tanker channel is only twelve miles wide; this is at the Strait of Hormuz, which could be mined. Mines can be laid by sea or by air and they can be laid covertly by underwater forces.²⁵ The Strait of Hormuz could be blocked by sinking a supertanker across the channel.²⁶ Iran's occupation of Tumbs Islands and Abu-Musa Island in 1971, and its participation in counter-insurgency in Oman have been designed to protect the entrance of the Strait of Hormuz and to prevent the spread of radical movements in the southern part of the Persian Gulf region.²⁷ If this line of communication or "Jugular Vein" were destroyed, not only the economy of Iran but also that of the West and Japan would be crippled.²⁸

The Threat of the Soviet Union

Iran shares a 1,250 mile border with the Soviet Union. While seeking cooperation with her, Iranians are concerned

²⁵Staff Report about U.S. Military Sales to Iran, to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate (Washington, D.C., 1976), p. 9.

²⁶Time, November 4, 1974, p. 35.

²⁷U.S. Military Sales to Iran, p. 10.

²⁸Iran's Domestic and Foreign Policy, p. 119.

about long-term Soviet intentions.²⁹ To cope with one of the superpower's attacks is not possible for Iran. So the Iranians are attempting to acquire a capability to delay a Soviet thrust until American help arrives.³⁰

What Iran is now concerned about is indirect Soviet activities in Iran's neighbours: Iraq, Afghanistan, India, the Indian Ocean area, and the Arab countries around the Persian Gulf, that could be a threat to Iran's national interest.

The buildup of Soviet influence and her supply of sophisticated Soviet weapons with advisors to Iraq is the first concern. In April 1972, the Soviet-Iraqi Treaty was signed. And soon the Iraqi army was reorganized and equipped with modern Soviet weapons. The Soviets participated in the exploitation of different oil and industrial projects in Iraq.

In South Yemen, Soviet activities continued. Communist intrigue in the Dhofar area entered a new phase. The sharp increase in Soviet involvement and arm deliveries to Iraq and her activities in South Yemen and Dhofar led Iran to enter into what is a major arms race in the Persian Gulf.

In May of 1972, President Nixon paid a visit to Iran. He affirmed that the United States ". . . would continue to

²⁹The Persian Gulf, 1975, p. 10.

³⁰Ibid., p. 92.

cooperate with Iran in strengthening its own defense."³¹ Nixon also informed the Shah that the United States would sell to Iran the F.14 or F.15 Jet fighters and any conventional weapons that Iran wanted.³² President Nixon's decision also exempted Iran from arms sales review processes in the State and Defense Departments. The dramatic increase in oil price in 1973 provided Iran with the means to buy what it wanted. As a study by the staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations concerning U.S. Military Sale to Iran indicates, Iranian defense spending had increased from approximately 800 million dollars in the fiscal year ending March 20, 1970, to 9.4 billion dollars in the year ending March 20, 1977, almost an increase of 1100 percent in seven years. But despite these increases, the percentage of the total Iranian budget allocated to defense has decreased from 32 percent in 1974 to 22 percent in 1975 and 24 percent in 1976.³³

To prevent further increasing Soviet influence in Iraq, the Shah decided to come to an acceptable agreement with Iraq. On June 13, 1975, a reconciliation treaty was signed between Iraq and Iran. Under the terms of the agreement, Iran abandoned help to the Kurdish movement for autonomy; the Shatt-al-Arab

³¹The New York Times, June 1, 1972, Sec. A, p. 1.

³²U.S. Military Sales to Iran, p. 5.

³³Ibid., p. 13.

(or Arvand Rood) dispute was settled on the basis of the "thalwag" (median) line.

Besides indirect Soviet activities in some Arab countries, Iran is concerned with any change in its Eastern neighbors, Afghanistan and Pakistan, that might put these two countries into the Soviet camp. Especially troublesome is Afghan expansionism and its support to independence movements in Pakistan's north and western provinces.³⁴ The integrity of Pakistan is vital for Iran; any separatist movement, in Pakistan, would create an absolutely intolerable situation for it.³⁵ Furthermore, Iran is concerned with the buildup of Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean, of which the north-western area is very important to Iran. Included in this is the problem of Soviet influence in India.³⁶

Stability of Iran and the Region

Stability to Iran means that it has the power to guard its five borders, to protect the Iranian oil wells and refineries, to prevent any interference with shipments of Iranian oil through the Persian Gulf and beyond to the Indian Ocean, and finally to pull down any "subversive" uprising in the area.

³⁴Griffith, "The Fourth Middle East War," p. 1173.

³⁵Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, an interview on Meet the Press (NBC) on July 31, 1973.

³⁶Trevor Taylor, "Foreign Policy Conducted from a Position of Strength," The Middle East, No. 10 (July, 1975), p. 68.

To the Shah, Iran also can play an essential stabilizing role in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Iran's decision has been to become strong enough, if it is necessary, alone to protect the stability of the region.³⁷ But, it is ready to do it within a collective security pact with the other Persian Gulf countries.³⁸

American Policy in the Persian Gulf Region

Iran's policy in the Persian Gulf region is compatible with American policy in this area. After the British withdrawal, the United States decided to support the idea of collective security for the stability of the region. And it has been responsive to these states for advice regarding their defense matters.³⁹ Through its arms support, United States obtains access to the region's oil which is in the background of the entire United States foreign policy in this area and beyond.⁴⁰

The Persian Gulf delivers about 70 percent of Europe's energy needs and about 90 percent of Japan's. The United States, also, remains dependent upon the Persian Gulf for oil. The best example of this dependency was seen during

³⁷Tamasha, "The Shah's Interview" (July 5, 1976), 4.

³⁸Iran's Domestic and Foreign Policy, p. 120.

³⁹The Persian Gulf, 1975, p. p.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 115.

the oil embargo after the Yom Kippur War, October, 1973. As the result of that embargo according to some estimates, just in the United States (1) 500,000 jobs were lost; (2) the loss to the United States of production was about 10 billion dollars; (3) and permanent inflation set in.⁴¹ The United States wants to have a strong Iran as a stabilizing factor in the Persian Gulf⁴² to insure the security of the vital oil route of this region.⁴³

Arms transfers contribute generally to the overall security of the United States and its allies. By strengthening these allies, there is no need to deploy United States manpower forces for regional defense. These transfers also help to provide for a standardization of equipment, and they increase operational flexibility of any combined allied forces.⁴⁴

Strategically, the important interest of the United States is to prevent any Soviet hegemony over the area. Stability, strength and independence of the Persian Gulf

⁴¹Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Early Warning System in Sinai (Washington, D.C., 1975), p. 207.

⁴²Foreign Military Sale Act of 1968, p. 12.

⁴³Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, The Persian Gulf, 1974 (Washington, D.C., 1974), p. 65.

⁴⁴The Persian Gulf, 1975, p. 80.

nations are the objectives, and through these the area can resist Soviet influence.⁴⁵

The arms sales bring several other advantages, to the United States. (1) The United States balance of payments is assisted. Since 1973 to the end of 1975, the United States has sold more than twelve billion dollars in defense hardware and services to the Persian Gulf countries, and this contributed considerably to offsetting the serious drain of dollars in this area. (2) The promotion of American technology and products in general is assisted. The process persuades those companies which produce military equipment also to produce non-military goods.⁴⁶ Indirectly, this means jobs for Americans involved in defense and other export industries. As one study indicates, for each ten billion dollars just in military sales, approximately 47,000 jobs are created. These sales are very important to the health of the American economy.⁴⁷

An example of this process is Grumman, the manufacturer of the F.14. After the Vietnam war, it was on the verge of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy for Grumman meant 23,000 employees would lose their jobs. The survival of Grumman

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 81.

⁴⁶Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, United States Arms Sales to the Persian Gulf (Washington, D.C., 1975), p. 25.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 26.

was also vital for the United States Navy because an end of the F.14 meant a reduction of the capability of the Navy. To save Grumman from bankruptcy, although the main idea was not to sell these jets to other countries, it was decided to go for a sale to a foreign market.⁴⁸ The Shah's decision, in 1974, to buy eighty F.14's at a cost of nearly 1.50 billion dollars saved the day at Grumman.⁴⁹

In good part, it is the larger production quantity and the production rates that helps the price of an article decrease; thus a significant saving to the United States government, as well as a profit benefit to the producing company, is achieved.

It is worthy to note that some portion of the money of the arms sales goes to the purchase of the training necessary to operate these equipments. So, wherever American military equipment goes, American advisors go with them. But the Yom Kippur War taught a lesson to Iran. In that war, both sides (the Arabs and Israelis) needed massive airlifts of Soviet and American supplies to keep their respective armies and airforces in the field. As a direct consequence, there is a tendency in Iran with the help of Americans to build aircraft and other military equipment and to build up a special transport command along with a special intelligence

⁴⁸"The Selling of the F.14," CBS Reports, August 27, 1976.

⁴⁹Time, November 4, 1974, p. 35.

gathering service. This tendency has increased the presence of American experts and their dependents in Iran. According to estimates, there are over 30,000 Americans in Iran.⁵⁰

Iran Defensive Policy

Iran's lesson from history is that only power can guarantee independence. And, the Shah thinks of Iranian policy as primarily defensive, as he said in an interview with German Television:

. . . Time and again, we have witnessed a country which lacks military strength become involved in international confrontation which leads to its total destruction. In our age, it is dire and an unforgiveable sin if a nation cannot defend itself. Hence, our national policy will be based on the need to defend ourself to the last breath.⁵¹

When this military policy was established, it was estimated in 1974 that by 1980 Iran would have more fighter-bombers (838) than any NATO nation except the United States. In 1974, the Shah said, ". . . according to our plan, in five years' time, Iran, would be among the top nonatomic armies of the world."⁵² Now in 1977, Iran is one of the great military powers in the Middle East, rivaled only by Israel and Turkey. Iran's immense and growing oil revenues, military power, and economic growth have replaced the British in the role of the hegemonic

⁵⁰"Yankees in Iran," CBS' Sixty Minutes, July 3, 1977.

⁵¹Iran's Domestic and Foreign Policy, p. 97.

⁵²Time, November 4, 1974, pp. 34-35.

power in the Persian Gulf, and the center of power of that area is not as under the British in New Delhi, but rather it is in Tehran.⁵³

⁵³Griffith, "The Fourth Middle East War," p. 1173.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The study began with the hypothesis that American policy towards Iran has been a successful policy so far. The chronological events that shaped the relationship between these two countries in general were studied as well as the American arms sales to Iran in 1948 and thereafter. At the same time, Iran's internal conditions and politics were explained in order to give more background yielding understanding of the relationship between the United States and Iran. The American policies towards Egypt and American arm sales to that country were examined, likewise, searching for understanding of a vital link in the chain of freedom.

Egypt was chosen for study because (1) both she and Iran are anchor states for the region called the Middle East; (2) both states had experience with the United States regarding the events and aspirations of the Middle Eastern nation states located between them; and (3) they share a profound awareness of Modern Islam participating through them in the modern, recent world of events. Apart from their similarities, there are certain differences between these two countries as follows: today, Iran remains as it has been for nearly seven decades, a major oil producer

accounting for between 10 percent and 11 percent of the world's production; this means Iran is fourth in the world in oil production. But Egypt's wealth is the Nile River and cotton and small amounts of oil, which never can be compared with Iran's oil and gas production. Iran is on the northern shore of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. From this waterway more than 80 percent of the Persian Gulf oil is delivered to the United States, West Europe and Japan. Any radical change in this region could damage the economy of the West and of Japan. The Suez Canal is also an important water-way. But in the case that it is closed, it is not impossible to ship using another route. It may be longer and more expensive, but not impossible. Apart from the Suez Canal, Egypt does not have any vital interest in the Mediterranean Sea to protect, except its own shores.

Iran is located to the south of the Soviet Union. If Iran turned to communism one day, it could be a major exporter of communism and revolutionary movements in the Persian Gulf region where the United States, the West and Japan have vital interests. In the eyes of the American policy makers, Egypt and most of the Arab countries are protected from possible Soviet aggression because they are shielded by Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan.

Iran and Egypt want to make their armies strong. But they have different objectives. Egypt's policy is to become strong enough to protect itself against the Israelis and,

if this is not possible by peaceful means, to regain its territory lost in the 1967 war, by force. Iran's policy is not only to protect its borders, but also to preserve the stability of the region, which means to protect the economy of the West as well.


American arms sales to Iran (or military aid) from the beginning to the summer of 1977 have been made by sympathetic United States administrations, except during the Kennedy administration. The Shah has received everything that he has wanted, but in the case of Egypt, the results are reversed. In 1955, when Egypt turned to the United States to buy arms, such sales were made conditional with the signing of a security pact with the United States. Nasser rejected the idea and turned to the Soviet Union. In 1976, after twenty years during which Egypt has been a Soviet buyer, she made a request to buy a few military airplanes from the United States. This request was the subject of a sharp controversy because Jewish leaders and their strong lobby in Congress have directly or indirectly a great influence regarding any policy in favor of the Egyptians.

Iran and Egypt's policies toward super powers have varied from time to time. Like most of the Third World countries, especially the developing countries, they seek to protect their national interests and at the same time their sovereignties. They have to have a close relationship with one of the Super powers, the United States or the Soviet Union. But

independence is still precious. For instance, when Nasser came to power, he announced that Egypt's policy towards the East and West was neutral. This was Egypt's declared policy up to 1971, when the treaty of friendship was signed between the Soviet Union and Egypt. But actually Nasser, during his life, had chosen the East. In Iran, also, at the beginning of the 1960's, the Shah marked out Iran's policy to be that of an "Independent National Policy." After the enunciation of this new policy, Iran increased its relations with the Soviet Union while decreasing its ties with the United States. Iran still has a very cordial relationship with the United States, although that friendship is not always seen as an asset; it could be taken to be a liability.

Lastly although, after the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, American policy towards the world follows a general pattern, application of this pattern towards each country is specific in nature. To the American policy makers, it is desirable to have a good relationship with all the countries in the world, but to have a very close relationship with some of them is most advantageous for the American national interest. Iran is one of these states. With its oil, its location, its strength and its total independent, pro-West nature, the future is bright.

APPENDIX



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