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EXTERNAL FACTORS AND ETHNIC MOBILIZATION: A GLOBAL  
STUDY OF THE CAUSES OF MILITARY MOBILIZATION  
AMONG ETHNIC GROUPS, 1945-1995

DISSERTATION

Presented to the Graduate Council of the  
University of North Texas in Partial  
Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

Jalal K. Nejad, B.A., M.A.

Denton, Texas

December, 1998

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The main purposes of this study are to elaborate on the concept of ethnic military mobilization and to identify the factors that contribute to its occurrence.

The study utilizes both qualitative and quantitative methods. Content analysis is used to identify some of the common historical events and patterns that have contributed to the adoption of military mobilization as a means of addressing ethnic grievances. Bivariate correlation and multiple regression analysis are used to examine the existence and intensity of the relationship between the four independent variables of external political support, external military support, international contagion, and international diffusion and the dependent variable of military mobilization. The Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset is utilized in the quantitative portion of this study.

Major findings suggest that the presence of charismatic leadership, political support, military support, and rebellion by both kindred and non-kindred groups affect the military mobilization of ethnic groups. On the other hand, past experience with colonialism, lack of involvement in the state's decision making process, regional poverty, and protest by both kindred and non-kindred groups have little effect on the military mobilization of ethnic groups.

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND DEDICATION

Although I did not formally begin preparing this project until the Spring of 1996, I have thought seriously about it since the Fall of 1991--my first semester at the University of North Texas. This dissertation would not exist without the help and support of my committee members and all faculty members in the department of political science. I owe my greatest debt of gratitude to Milan J. Reban and John A. Booth whose constructive criticism, encouragement, and unconditional support were instrumental in the completion of this project.

My gratitude to my immediate family is inexpressible. I count my blessing everyday for being a member of a family that values education and has given me unconditional love and support in every step of my academic career. I am forever indebted to my mother whose sacrifices and vision some twenty years ago made all this possible today.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this work to my nieces and nephew--Miriam, Alborz, and Ida. They are the future of my family and I hope to be able to do for them what my family has done for me throughout my life.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Recent news headlines from all corners of the world point out that conflicts based on ethnic claims are on the rise. The resurgence of ethnic conflicts has not been endemic to one geographical region or one particular country. Today, ethnic conflict in its numerous forms and shapes occurs in every corner of the globe. Ethnic movements have developed in environments that experts have claimed to be free of ethnopolitical conflict. The end of the Cold War and "dissolution of the global system from a loose, bipolar world into an ethnically fragmented system" has created an environment in which the reemergence of old rivalries are threatening the viability of the established states (Gurr and Harff 1994, 10).

In the democratic West, ethnic groups such as the Basques and Catalans in Spain, the Bretons and Corsicans in France, and the Welsh and Scots in the United Kingdom have gone through what Stephen Ryan calls "ethnic revival." These groups have reasserted themselves into the sociopolitical arena of their respective countries, which has translated into greater demands from the states that

claim to have control over them (Ryan 1990, xxi). "From the movement for autonomy in Canada, the United Kingdom, Spain, and France to the striving for a more formally pluralistic society in the United States, ethnic cleavages have become a part of the political landscape of many of the western industrialized countries" (Jalali and Lipset 1992/1993, 586).

Similar situations can be observed in the so-called Third World countries. "Theories of uneven development derived from the dependencia tradition have tended to treat the periphery or the Third World as a homogeneous analytical category" (Rupesingh 1987, 528). Most of these countries that were artificially created at the end of World War I have been experiencing ethnic violence with grave consequences for millions of people. The Kurds' struggle for some form of autonomy, the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, the bitter and bloody conflicts in Congo, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Cyprus, and India, to name only a few, are all testimonies to the fact that ethnic conflict is alive and well in the world's less-developed regions.

Ethnic passions also have engulfed regions of the world that, until recently, were thought to have solved the "nationality" problem (Jalali and Lipset 1992/1993, 585). With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the

eventual liberalization of Eastern Europe, the so-called Second World also has been experiencing a renewed sense of ethnic awareness. For instance, the collapse of a strong state system in the former Yugoslavia has had grave consequences for both the people in the region and the international community.

It seems, therefore, that many parts of our world have been affected by some form of ethnic conflict and violence. The disintegration of Yugoslavia into four countries, the collapse of the Soviet Union into 15 independent republics, the question of Kashmir, the fate of the Kurds and the Shia of Iraq, China's hold on Tibet, the persistence of an independence movement in Scotland, the future of the Palestinian people, and the terrible ethnic violence throughout Africa are but a few cases among a long list of conflicts between states and people with some form of ethnic claim (Halperin, Scheffer, and Small 1992, 5).

Problems associated with ethnicity and conflicts centered on ethnic tendencies have always existed. Some social scientists, however, point out that ethnic conflicts have particularly proliferated since the early 1960s when the process of decolonization reached its height (Ryan 1990, xviii). Others push the date even farther back and argue that violence based on ethnic claims has steadily been

climbing since the end of World War II. The recent surge in such conflicts is the continuation and intensification of a trend in the past half a century (Gurr, 1993a). Still others cite the "decline of geopolitics in international relations" as another factor in the conspicuous rise of ethnic conflict (Said and Simmons 1976, 9).

Some social scientists such as Connor (1972) and Deutsch (1966) prescribed modernization theory as the healing medicine for the "disease" of ethnicity. Their argument was simple: As societies become increasingly modernized and people of different ethnic backgrounds are integrated into this new economic and political arrangement, ethnic and parochial tendencies would easily be replaced by a sense of belonging and loyalty to the larger communities (Gurr, 1994).

Obviously, this presumptive "cure" was not the solution to the pervasive problems related to ethnicity. Violence and conflicts based on ethnic claims are widespread. According to the latest United Nations report (1993), some 25 million refugees have fled regions engulfed in major conflicts that are based solely on ethnicity. In 1993 alone, more than 200,000 civilians worldwide lost their lives as a direct result of ethnic violence (Gurr, 1994).

One of the most significant consequences of the existence and persistence of ethnic violence has been their internationalization. It is no longer acceptable to assume that ethnically based conflicts can be contained in one country or region, with minimal or no devastating consequences for the international community. The presence of more than 60,000 international peacekeeping troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia is a clear indication of this fact. The spillover effect of ethnic conflicts and the great potential for their spread have forced the international community to scramble for short-term solutions. The effectiveness of these temporary solutions is unclear. NATO's air power presence in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds against the Iraqi regime or the temporary presence of multinational forces in the Balkans are just two cases in which ad hoc solutions have been applied to major conflicts with ethnicity as their root cause.

The apparent lack of understanding in the international community about ethnicity and ethnic conflicts contributes to the prevalent neglect of such conflicts by social scientists. More specifically, the discipline of international relations has been guilty of underestimating

the importance of ethnic conflicts for the international community.

Stephen Ryan (1988, 1990) has suggested that lack of concern among international relations scholars can be attributed to such factors as the emphasis of Western liberalism on individuals rather than groups. Furthermore, liberal theories of development have never embraced the idea of ethnic diversity with intellectual enthusiasm. "Diversity was seen in terms of coexistence of political systems, not ethnic nations" (Said and Simmons 1976, 10). Liberalism, with its post-Renaissance belief in the primacy of the individual, has held that, with modernization, group affiliation will fade and ultimately disappear (Rupesinghe 1987, 529). Industrialization and urbanization, social scientists have argued, will inevitably cause assimilation of ethnic groups. Soviet-style Marxism, on the other hand, tended to see nationalism as "an unfortunate diversion on the road to communist society" (Ryan 1990, xix).

A special criticism can be raised with regard to international relations theory. The dominant assumption of realism has tended to focus attention on the "state" as the rational actor within the international system. But Azar and Burton, among others, have successfully shown that states may not necessarily be the primary actors in the



international arena. Interstate conflicts are often a result of conflicts between the state and non-state actors, which spill over into the international arena (Azar and Burton 1986, 131). Scholars have devoted much of their time to study interdependence, integration of states, and solidarity in the world community, with little attention given "to the possibility that states could break up from within because of ethnic particularism" (Ryan 1990, xxi). Indeed, the collapse of states from within has been evident since the inception of the modern state system in the seventeenth century. The intensity of such breakdowns, however, has not been consistent over time. The former Yugoslavia is a case in point; ethnic violence ultimately led to the breakdown of a multiethnic state. But, in most other cases, violence between the state and ethnic group(s) can be protracted, with grave consequences for the civilian population. A report on states in armed conflict in 1988 shows that, of a total of 111 such conflicts, 36 were described as "wars of state formation . . . that is, conflict involving one government and an opposition group demanding autonomy or secession for a particular ethnic group or region" (Stavenhagen 1991, 117). The evidence clearly points to the fact that since the end of World War II the number of classic interstate wars has been decreasing

while the number of intrastate conflicts has been dramatically increasing (Stavenhagen 1991, 117), with devastating consequences for the civilian population. For instance, according to Gurr and Harrf (1989), "On average between 1.6 and 3.9 million unarmed civilians have died at the hand of the state in each decade since the end of World War II" (26).

Stavenhagen (1991) argues that, despite such evidence, relatively little attention has been paid to ethnic conflict in general and conflict between state and ethnic groups in particular; as a result, research on the international dimensions of ethnic conflict is still in the preliminary stages (Carment 1993, 145). The lack of research is indeed crucial because, as Immanuel Wallerstein (1993, 4) has noted, we have entered a period of great disorder in light of the collapse of the bipolar system and lack of significant authority for any major power to provide leadership in the world. This can lead to even more clashes between ethnic groups that are mobilizing more than ever before and the states that claim to have control over them.

### Purpose of the Study

Empirical studies of conflicts that have their roots in some aspect of ethnicity are rare in the field of political science. According to Rupert Taylor (1996), of the approximately 1,800 articles published in the leading five journals of political science in the period between 1983 and 1994 only 27 have dealt exclusively with the topic of ethnicity. In this vein, the overall objective of this study is to advance the general knowledge of ethnicity and, more specifically, to provide a better understanding of the types of conflicts that are based purely on some aspect of ethnicity.

The first specific purpose of this study is to address the general problems related to ethnicity and their persistence in the world, with emphasis on the nature of those problems and their degree of intensity. The dramatic consequences of such conflicts, in human suffering and threats to international peace, are discussed in detail.

The second purpose of this study is to concentrate exclusively on the phenomenon of ethnic military mobilization. That is, an attempt is made to explain the occurrence of ethnic military mobilization in terms of factors that fall outside of the countries in which this phenomenon occurs. It is hoped that by going beyond the use

of customary "internal factors" to explain ethnic military mobilization and redirect attention to a new set of variables (i.e., external factors), we may gain a better understanding as to why ethnic military mobilization occurs.

In order to develop a better understanding of ethnic conflicts, the causes behind ethnic groups' high level of military mobilization must be explored. Indeed, the search for a better understanding of how and why ethnic military mobilization takes place makes up the bulk of this study.

As mentioned earlier, the author attempts to build on the previous works concerning this topic by going beyond such theoretical arguments as collective grievances or relative deprivation, which are among the more popular attempts to explain the causes of ethnic groups' mobilization. The primary purpose of this study is to introduce a number of new variables that deal exclusively with the environment outside the country in which an ethnic group resides. The research focuses on the notion that these "external factors" directly or indirectly contribute to ethnic groups' military mobilization and hence deserve to be studied and analyzed in a more detailed manner.

The final objective seeks to address the element of predictability, by developing a model by which external factors contributing to ethnic mobilization can readily be

identified. This would allow the concerned parties to take necessary measures to avoid conflict and bloodshed.

#### Focus of the Study

The main theme of this study is to argue that conflicts based on ethnic claims have become a major and intensifying problem for the international community. One area of dramatic increase is conflicts involving the state apparatus on one side and one or more ethnic groups on the other side. To find an explanation for this phenomenon, this study focuses exclusively on the process through which ethnic groups militarily mobilize themselves in advance of waging a war against their respective state authorities. The first step in understanding any type of ethnic conflict is the development of a better understanding as to why and how ethnic military mobilization occurs.

Charles Tilly (1978), in the context of political mobilization, refers to the concept of mobilization as a "group's organization for and commitment to joint action in pursuit of group interests." In its political context, the term mobilization implies any attempt at becoming organized for political action. Therefore, ethnic mobilization implies ethnic groups organizing for political action.

According to Gurr (1993b), ethnic mobilization means "the extent to which group members are prepared to commit their energies and resources to collective action on behalf of their common interest" (127). This definition is compatible with that of Olzak (1983), who defines ethnic mobilization as a "process by which groups organize around some feature of ethnic identity (for example, skin color, language, customs, territorial identification) in pursuit of collective ends" (355).

Of course, there are broader definitions that, for instance, refer to ethnic mobilization as the "activation of ethnic boundaries" and "resource competition" (Olzak 1983, 357). However, I use the two compatible definitions by Gurr and Olzak in the explanation and analysis of the concept of ethnic mobilization.

In this study, ethnic military mobilization is measured in the same manner as that in the Minorities at Risk Phase III project. That is, the question here is whether there exist organizational capabilities within the group that could facilitate political and military actions. Hence, as in the Minorities at Risk Project, ethnic military mobilization is operationalized in terms of the following criteria:

1. The type of organization in existence (open or legal, illegal and non-military, illegal and military, clandestine)

2. The extent to which the group is cohesive. That is, the extent to which group members "have an active, self-conscious sense of group identity based on their defining traits such as common language, history, culture, religion" (Minorities at Risk Project User's Manual 1996, 72)

3. Whether the group has established a sense of autonomy in a region within the country of residence

4. Whether the group has used any type of military means in order to accomplish its ethnopolitical goals

5. The degree of strength of leadership within the organization (strong, weak, factionalized/competing leaders)

6. The estimated portion of the group that supports or sympathizes with the organization.

The above organizational indicators are used in the Minorities at Risk Phase III project in order to determine the level of mobilization within each group under study.

The scores for two separate indicators (level of organization and scope of support) are multiplied by each other in order to obtain the mobilization indicator for each group (Minorities at Risk Project User's Manual, 33):

Level of Organization: Open Political Organization  
(oporg) and Military Political Organization  
(milorg)

Scope of Support: Open Political Support (opscop)  
and Military Political Support (milscop)

From the above indicators, two categories of mobilization are identified:

Open Mobilization Index (opmob9) = (oporg) x  
(opscop)

Military Mobilization Index (milmob9) = (milorg) x  
(milscop)

The occurrence of military mobilization among ethnic groups is a focus of interest in this study; it is the dependent variable.

The types of organizations (that is, whether they are military or not) active on behalf of the group members are



determined and coded in the following manner by the Minorities at Risk project:

- 1 Open political organization (i.e., they are legal, and their activities are tolerated)
- 2 Non-legal and non-military political organization
- 3 Non-legal and military political organization
- 4 Clandestine and military political organization

As in the Minorities at Risk Project, the values for the indicators of military mobilization are determined based on the following criteria:

Scope of Support for the Military Group(s): MILSCOP

- 0 No support for any military organization
- 1 Limited: none of the military organizations supported by more than 1/10 of the group members
- 2 Medium: the largest military organization is supported by no more than a quarter of the group members
- 3 High: the largest organization is supported by at least half of the group members

- 4 Highest: the largest organization is supported by at least 3/4 of the group members

Number of Military/Illegal Organizations: MILORG

- 0 No movements or organization recorded  
1 One organization active  
2 Two organizations active  
3 Three or more organizations active

Military mobilization was derived by multiplying the number of military/illegal organizations with the scope of support for such military groups:

Military Mobilization (MILMOB) = (MILORG) X (MILSCOP)

For instance the level of military mobilization (MILMOB) for a group such as Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina is determined by multiplying the number of military organization active in Bosnia-Herzegovina as of 1995 (which was one) by the scope of support for that military organization which in this case was three (since the Serbian military organization had the support of more than half of the Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina). Hence, the level of military mobilization for Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina is three and that of Serbs in Croatia is four. On the other hand, an ethnic group such as Chechens with two

active military organizations (or MILORG = 2) and highest number of supporters for these two military organizations (or MILSCOP = 4) has a level of mobilization of eight (see Appendix D for a summary of each group's level of mobilization).

Because this study assumes that the pre-condition for the occurrence of conflicts between ethnic groups and their respective state is the group's high level of military mobilization, this study will focus on the effect of external factors in the groups' military mobilization process.

This study, however, goes beyond the customary domestic/internal factors that some social scientists have used in order to account for military mobilization, or lack thereof, among ethnic groups. This study puts forth a set of external variables that treats the whole question of ethnic mobilization from a completely different angle. The expectation is that by introducing external factors into the study of ethnic mobilization we may better understand the causes of ever-growing conflicts between ethnic groups and their respective states.

It is also appropriate at this juncture to introduce and define the term "kindred groups." In this study, as in Minorities at Risk Project, kindred groups are defined as

any two or more groups that reside (apart from each other) either in adjoining countries or even further apart. These groups are connected with each other along some form of collective identity. This collective identity can be based on a way of life and/or some cultural traits such as religion, language, common history, place of residence, and race.

Another area of focus is whether regional poverty may have an indirect effect on the potential for military mobilization among ethnic groups. A paradox arises when one conducts research on conflicts based on ethnic claims. Common sense suggests that greater poverty in a region implies a lack of resources. This lack of resources should consequently translate into reduction in the capabilities of ethnic groups to mobilize and wage a war against their respective states. As a result, there should be a lower level of military mobilization among ethnic groups in such regions as Sub-Saharan Africa with rampant poverty and a higher level of mobilization in regions such as North America and Western Europe, where ethnic groups have access to tremendous resources to wage and fight their wars against state authorities. Other factors held equal, ethnic groups such as Scots and Québécois in Western industrial democracies should have acquired a high level of military

mobilization and should be involved in some of the most intense and bloody wars with their respective states.

However, as of April 1998, none of the ethnic groups in the Western democracies and Japan region are militarily mobilized, while many in poor regions are. Also, no government of a country among the Western industrial democracies is in an actual state of war with its respective ethnic group(s), but several in poor regions are. The highest levels of military mobilization and the deadliest wars are waged and fought in regions with the least resources. This paradox is considered and investigated here.

#### Sources of Data and Limitations of the Study

This study relies heavily on the Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset, which is a combination of Phase I and II and spans a period of 50 years (1945-1995). This data set, which is considered the most complete and extensive source of information on ethnic groups, focuses primarily on conflicts between state and non-state ethnic groups and contains data on 449 variables for 268 ethnopolitical groups. The Phase III Dataset goes beyond simply presenting data on different ethnic groups. It attempts to provide a detailed collection of information on "organizations that

act on behalf of ethnic groups, and sources and types of international support" that extend any kind of support to ethnic groups (Minorities at Risk Project User's Manual 1996, 2). Perhaps most important, this dataset provides extensive information on different aspects of regimes, the ethnic groups' characteristics, and transnational influences on the relationship between ethnic groups and their respective states. All these are relevant for this study and are used in the analytical section.

The Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset is an excellent source for measuring such independent variables as external military and political support, international contagion, and international diffusion. For the independent variable of regional poverty, however, the following sources are used: International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics Yearbook (1997), and Steven C. Poe and C. Neal Tate's Peace Study Data Set (1994).

The unit of analysis is the ethnic group. All the groups analyzed in this work must meet the following criteria which are the same as the criteria used by the Minorities at Risk Project:

1. The group's country of residence, as of 1995, had at least one million in population.

2. The group's population, as of 1995, was at least one hundred thousand or, if less, exceeded 1.0 percent of the population of the country of residence.

In addition to the above criteria, a group's inclusion is also dependent upon the existence of a viable government in charge of the state that claims sovereignty over it. This is important because the data used here (i.e., Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset) are designed to analyze the conflict between ethnic minorities and the state, and not conflicts among ethnic groups.

A full list of the ethnic groups that meet the above criteria and that are included in this study can be found in Appendix A. The groups under study are scattered in all the following seven regions:

Western Industrialized Democracies (including Australia and New Zealand): Region 1

Eastern Europe and Ex-Soviet Republics: Region 2

South and Southeastern Asia (including China): Region 3

Pacific Asia (including Japan): Region 4

North Africa and the Middle East: Region 5

Sub-Saharan Africa: Region 6

Latin America: Region 7

A complete list of the variables used in this study, along with their descriptions can be found in Chapter 5.

A few words on the limitations that this study faces are appropriate at this juncture. The most significant limitation has to do with the inherently problematic nature of any study of ethnicity. The problems begin with a lack of coherent definitions for some fundamental concepts. Walker Connor (1994) has referred to this problem as "terminological confusion" and "terminological disease" in the global study of ethnicity. Basic concepts such as nationalism, ethnicity, nation-state are "shrouded in ambiguity due to their imprecise, inconsistent, and often totally erroneous usage" (Connor 1994, 91). As a result, a researcher has to choose among or reconcile numerous key definitions that appear in the literature. The lack of precise and scientific vocabulary has forced this study to adopt definitions in an interchangeable manner. For instance, terms such as nation and state, or the terms ethnonationalism and nationalism, have been used interchangeably throughout the literature on ethnicity. Thus some of this "terminological confusion" may be reflected, if only unintentionally, in this work as well.

The second limitation that this study faces involves the nature of the data used. Reliance on secondary sources, as is the case in this study, brings up the problem of accuracy. Unfortunately, as Johnson and Joslyn point out,



this has to do with the fact that seldom in the field of political science is there a chance to conduct experimental studies, implying a lack of control over the "independent variables, the unit of analysis, and the environment in which behavior occurs" (1995, 112).

#### Significance of the Study

The primary question here pertains to the relationship between ethnic groups and the states that claim to have control over them. This study attempts to investigate the reasons behind the bloody and protracted nature of conflict between ethnic groups and their respective state authorities. Why is it that some ethnic groups tend to coexist with their respective state authorities by entering into power-sharing arrangements with them, while other ethnic groups go to the opposite extreme and go through a mobilization process that allows them to become involved in high-level anti-regime activities?

I am proposing that, in regard to the category of ethnic groups that have acquired a high level of military mobilization, there must be a common set of factors that has affected all of them in the same manner; as a result, ethnic groups from diverse backgrounds have become highly

mobilized. This eventually allows them to wage a bloody war against their respective state authorities.

It is argued that the external factors which make up the independent variables of the model in various degrees affect the military mobilization process of ethnic groups and, as a result, deserve to be studied in more detail. Indeed, this is where the significance of the present study lies. By concentrating on the ethnic groups that have employed violence to address their problems, this study attempts to investigate the common factors that have contributed to this tendency. To my knowledge an investigation that concentrates exclusively on ethnic groups' military mobilization process and a specific category of variables (i.e., external factors) has never before been attempted.

The ethnic violence model put forth by Gurr (1993a, 1993b) is a comprehensive effort to explain, in general terms, why ethnic conflicts occur. Gurr's model concentrates on groups' grievances and disadvantages. The basic theory is that "if a group suffers from collective economic, political or social disadvantages including discrimination, this is likely to lead to group economic, political and social grievances. . . . These group grievances are likely to lead to group mobilization which,

in turn, leads to protest and/or rebellion" (Fox 1996, 13-14). Gurr's model includes an entire set of variables that addresses the domestic factors that play instrumental roles in ethnic mobilization. External factors such as international assistance to ethnic groups and international diffusion and contagion are briefly discussed but are not analyzed for a specific category of ethnic groups.

This study attempts to integrate external factors into the general model that Ted Gurr has put forth in the Minorities at Risk Project. The new model will allow us to concentrate exclusively on the external factors as a cause for ethnic military mobilization. It also proposes a new variable (regional poverty) as an addition to Gurr's model. The variables used in this study are either from the Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset or had to be created and coded. For a complete list of these variables, see Chapter 5.

### Resource Mobilization Theory

Resource mobilization theory's main concern is with the process and the manner in which "powerless groups attempt to mobilize sufficient political strength to bargain successfully with established polity members" (McAdam 1982, 20). McCarthy and Zald (1977) were the first to use the

term "resource mobilization" explicitly in their works on social movements. Prior to that, it was Zald and Ash's (1966) article, "Social Movement Organization: Growth, Decay and change," that pushed resource mobilization theory to its present dominant position in the social movements field (Hannigan 1991, 315). In fact, resource mobilization theory was advanced in reaction to the shortcomings of the collective action theories, which perceived social movements (of any kinds) in terms of certain predisposing psychological traits. By contrast, Hannigan (1991) points out that "shifts in resources (finances, recruits, etc) available to aggrieved or disadvantaged groups or in the structure of political opportunities were, in fact, the best indicators of collective action" (315).

Others such as Jenkins (1983), Jenkins and Perrow (1977), Oberschall (1973), and Tilly (1978), have examined how the availability of social, economic, and political resources to an otherwise unorganized group of people facilitates its mobilization and eventual uprising against the state authorities. Tilly attempted to treat the whole concept of collective action in a systematic manner in his seminal work From Mobilization to Revolution (1978), writing that "the analysis of collective action has five big components: interest, organization, mobilization,

opportunity and collective action itself" (1978, 7). The important aspect of his "five big components" relevance to this study, is the notion of mobilization and, more specifically, of ethnic mobilization. Tilly argues that mobilization among groups can be measured by the amount and kinds of resources in a group, multiplied by the probability that these will be delivered for the pursuit of group goals, when needed (78-81). But the questions that need to be addressed here have to do with how and why, according to resource mobilization theory, do ethnic mobilization takes place.

According to Doug McAdam (1982), resource mobilization theory does not put great emphasis on the existence of discontent among members of an ethnic group; the level of discontent is more or less constant over time. In this context, McAdam asks: How can we explain a dramatic rise in the number and intensity of social movements during certain periods?

To answer the above question, Jenkins and Perrow (1977), who are among the pioneers in the usage of mobilization theory to explain social movements, point out that "rather than focusing on fluctuations in discontent to account for the emergence of insurgency, it seems more fruitful to assume that grievances are relatively constant

and pervasive" (McAdam 1982, 21). What causes mobilization and eventual insurgency among groups, they argue, "is the amount of social resources available to unorganized but aggrieved groups, making it possible to launch an organized demand for change" (McAdam 1982, 21).

Therefore, ethnic mobilization (and similar social movements), based on the above argument, may occur as a direct consequence of an increase in the amount of resources available to groups at a particular time. Zald and McCarthy (1977) indicate, research mobilization theorists approach the study of any social movements, such as ethnic mobilization, from the point of view that "variety of resources must be mobilized. . . . These include the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence of movements upon external support for success" (1213). Furthermore, Webb et al. (1983) point out that resource mobilization theorists draw heavily on the "economic premises" in their analysis and predictions of processes of ethnic mobilization (315). The success of a group's efforts at mobilization depends upon the degree to which group members and their external supporters are willing and able to contribute material goods and political support to that group.

The main criticism raised against resource mobilization theory revolves around the treatment of grievances by its advocates. Criticism has to do with the manner in which resource mobilization theorists either ignore the level and intensity of grievances in a society or treat groups' collective grievances as a constant phenomenon that does not really play an instrumental role, over a long period, in the mobilization process of groups in a society.

The points raised by the critics of resource mobilization theory are well justified. Any comprehensive analysis of groups' mobilization in a society should indeed be comprised of all important variables that have influenced such process. For instance, numerous studies by relative deprivation theorists such as Gurr (1968, 1972) have shown the relevancy of discontent to social movements.

In spite of resource mobilization theory's shortcomings, this work utilizes it as the theoretical background against which the existence and influence of external support on ethnic groups' mobilization could be examined.

Two reasons justify exploring resource mobilization theory here. First, the theory addresses the core argument of a major aspect of this study. One of the major arguments raised in this study relates to the manner in which external

resources (i.e., external military support, external political support) shape the mobilization of groups in a society. Resource mobilization theory suggests an explanation of how those two phenomena affect the mobilization process of ethnic groups.

Second, this study's overall focus is solely on the factors that fall outside of the country in which an ethnic group resides. Domestic/internal factors, such as level of discontent or grievances (which resource mobilization is criticized for ignoring), that may contribute to mobilization are not considered in this study. Thus, to employ resource mobilization theory would not be problematic.

### Hypotheses

In his attempt to construct a general theory of ethnic conflict, Gurr (1993a, 1993b) "connected political, economic and social grievances to mobilization" (Fox 1996, 9). These internal/domestic factors make up the foundation upon which Gurr builds his comprehensive model of ethnic conflict. External factors are mentioned in this model with little elaboration. For instance, in the context of regional poverty, Gurr argues that at the macrolevel "poverty may have an indirect effect on the sites and intensity of



ethnopolitical conflict" (Gurr 1994, 359). Gurr's argument in regard to regional poverty and its contribution to ethnic conflict is straightforward: "Systemic poverty means limited state capacity: substantial concession to communal contenders therefore are prohibitively costly, military control of secessionist challenges is problematic, and conflicts over power and material issues tend to be seen by all contenders in zero-sum terms" (Gurr 1994, 359). This suggests a simple proposition. Regions with a higher degree of poverty may be more prone to ethnic military mobilization. Extending this argument to the 268 ethnic groups in this study, the following hypothesis is put forth:

**Hypothesis 1:** The higher the degree of poverty in a region, the higher will be the number of militarily mobilized ethnic groups in that region.

International contagion and diffusion have been extensively discussed, and the distinction between the two is explained by such social scientists as Foltz (1990) and Midlarsky (1992). The main concern in this study centers on the manner in which actions by kindred and other groups can affect, directly or indirectly, the behavior of ethnic groups in a region. More specifically, it is concerned with the manner in which ethnic groups' military mobilization

process is affected by the two independent variables of international contagion and diffusion.

International diffusion refers to the "process by which conflict within one country expands across international boundaries" (Gurr 1993b, 175). Anti-regime activities in one country may encourage the same behavior by kindred groups in other countries. The Minorities at Risk project reveals that more than two-thirds of ethnic groups have kindred in another country (Gurr 1993a, 133).

This segment of the study focuses on the manner in which ethnic groups' behavior in general and their level of military mobilization in particular are affected by the behavior of their kindred groups. The general proposition is that having kindred in other countries enhances a group's potential for military mobilization (Gurr 1993b, 133). The question then is: to what extent do political actions by one segment of a group in one country result in mobilization and action by other groups (Gurr 1993b, 175). Do ethnic groups that are involved in a protracted conflict against their respective state enjoy an exceptional amount of "demonstration effect of anti-regime activity" by their kindred groups in other countries? If so, has this affected their level of mobilization?

The above discussion and questions can be extended to the international contagion as well. International contagion, which simply refers to the "spread of protest and rebellion through a region" as a result of political activities by any groups other than kindred, can be used to explain the high degree of military mobilization among ethnic groups (Minorities at Risk Project User's Manual 1996, 48).

Based on the above arguments the following two hypotheses are put forth:

**Hypothesis 2:** An ethnic group's potential for military mobilization will increase as the number of protests and rebellions by its kindred groups in the region increases.

**Hypothesis 3:** An ethnic group's potential for military mobilization will increase as the mean level of protest and rebellion for the group's region of residence increases.

As for the political and military supports that ethnic groups receive from the outside world, this study concentrates on the nature and extent of these two types of support and not necessarily on the sources from which they

are extended. The proposition suggests that the more such support for an ethnic group, the more successful that group would be in its attempt at military mobilization against the state that claims to have control over it. In such a context the following two hypotheses are put forth:

**Hypothesis 4:** A higher degree of political support extended from outside sources will lead to a greater level of military mobilization.

**Hypothesis 5:** The higher the degree of military support for an ethnic group, the higher its level of military mobilization against the state.

#### Methodology

In this study I use both qualitative and quantitative methods of research and analysis. The general purpose is to seek in the external (international environment) explanations for the occurrence of ethnic military mobilization. In an attempt to show a relationship between external factors and ethnic groups' level of military mobilization, five independent variables of external political and military support, international contagion and

diffusion, and regional poverty are employed (Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5).

I use the descriptive method of content analysis to explain the historical events that may have forced certain ethnic groups (i.e., groups with the highest degree of military mobilization that are involved in a long and bloody conflict against their own state) to embark upon such a violent path. The goal here is to identify those common historical experiences (if there are any) that have caused all such ethnic groups in the international arena to adopt a similar strategy (i.e., a high level of military mobilization) against their respective state authorities. For a list of ethnic groups that, as of 1990, had acquired a high level of military mobilization, see Appendix B and D.

In addition to the qualitative techniques mentioned above, two quantitative techniques are used to test the hypotheses in this study. Frequency distribution analysis is used to examine empirically some repeated patterns between the degree of poverty in a region and ethnic groups' level of military mobilization.

Furthermore, bivariate correlation and multiple regression analysis are used in order to examine the existence and intensity of a relationship between the four independent variables (external political support, external

military support, international contagion, and international diffusion) and the dependent variable (military mobilization).

Concerning the data set used in this study a cautionary note must be made. In this study I use the Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset. This data set is made of 449 variables which were constructed based upon content analysis. Consequently, as in any other content analysis cases, this data set has certain limitations and error. These shortcomings will be addressed and discussed in Chapter 4.

#### Organization of the Study

This chapter has introduced the main elements of this research and introduced the major hypotheses. Chapter 2 includes a comprehensive review of the literature on ethnicity in political science. Approaches to the study of ethnicity and theories of ethnicity comprise the bulk of the chapter.

Chapter 3 presents an in-depth study of different mobilization theories from which resource mobilization theory is chosen as the theoretical foundation of this work. Chapter 4 is a descriptive study of the ethnic groups that have acquired a high level of military mobilization and some of the factors that may have led them to be involved in a

protracted conflict against their own state. In Chapter 4, I identify the common historical experiences and factors that, more or less, have contributed to all these groups' adoption of similar strategy (i.e., military mobilization) against their respective state.

Data analysis and results of different tests are discussed in Chapter 5, and Chapter 6 contains concluding remarks and recommendations for future research.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on ethnicity is dominated by the primordialist and instrumentalist viewpoints. These perspectives present two unique explanations and methods for understanding what comprises ethnicity.

At a fundamental level, primordialists believe that peoples' ethnic identities have deep social, historical, and genetic foundations. Instrumentalists, on the other hand, argue that ethnicity is nothing but an expression of the desire for material and/or political gains by a group of people.

At a more complex level of discussion, for the primordialists, ethnicity is a culturally oriented "quasi-natural state of being determined by one's descent with, in the extreme view, sociobiological determinants" (Douglass 1988, 192). Instrumentalists, however, point out that ethnicity is "an exercise in boundary maintenance requiring a praxis; ethnic identity and group boundaries may be defended, penetrated or ignored depending upon situational exigencies" (Smith 1986, 285).



As can be observed from the above paragraphs, one viewpoint perceives ethnicity as something that is manipulated at an opportune time, while the other sees ethnicity as something unavoidable that one is "stuck" with for the duration of his/her life. Primordialists believe that "before an individual becomes a member of society or a nation, he or she already has a sense of common origins, of cultural or physical sameness, or of simple affinity" (Greenberg 1980, 14). Researchers who advocate the primordial perspective include Gambino (1974), Isaacs (1975), Connor (1978, 1984a), and Smith (1981).

The instrumentalists argue that only when ethnicity "is called upon for political purposes, given certain contextual factors, does it become a significant force" (Taylor 1996, 890). Researchers who advocate the instrumental perspective include Hechter (1975, 1978, 1986a, 1986b), Horowitz (1975), Rothschild (1981), and Yinger (1976, 1985).

#### Primordial Perspective

According to Eller and Coughlan (1993), primordial may be defined in two ways. It can mean "first created," but it can also be taken to mean "primeval," which suggests something that has persisted from the beginning (186). As far as social sciences are concerned, Edward Shils was the

first person to employ the term primordial in reference to the relationship within the family (Eller and Coughlan 1993, 184). In an article entitled "Primordial, Personal, Sacred, and Civil Ties" (1957), Shils explains ties of kinship in the following manner:

As one thought about the strengths and tensions in family attachments, it became apparent that the attachment was not only to the other family member merely as a person but as a processor of certain especially significant relational qualities which could only be described as primordial. The attachment to another member of one's kinship group is not just a function of interaction. . . . It is because a certain ineffable significance is attributed to the tie of blood (Scott 1990, 150). According to Shils, primordial attachments to kin,

territory, and religion were characterized by "a state of intense and comprehensive solidarity, coerciveness, ineffable significance, fervor and passion, and sacredness" (McKay 1982, 396). This is the extent to which Shils (1957) elaborated on the notion of primordial attachments.

Several years later, Clifford Geertz's (1963b) Old Societies and New States provided a more comprehensive meaning of the term primordialism, arguing that primordial tendencies play a significant role in the political development of post-colonial societies. Geertz's argument centered on the idea that in these developing societies, "actions by central elites to foster a sense of civic consciousness among citizens were often thwarted by the fact

that people had no concept of loyalty which extended beyond their kinship, racial, regional, or cultural groups" (McKay 1982, 396).

Geertz went beyond Shils's argument by applying the concept of primordialism not only to kinship but also to "larger-scale groups, such as those based on common territory, religion, language, and other customs" (Scott 1990, 150). Geertz points out that

by a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the givens . . . of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the grievances that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language . . . and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one's kinsman, one's to neighbor, one's fellow believer, ipso fact; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself. (Scott 1990, 150)

Shils (1957) and Geertz (1963b) utilized the concept of primordialism in order, not necessarily to explain the phenomenon of ethnicity, but simply to describe the attachments (i.e., common interests, incurred obligations) that are involved with most, if not all, ethnic ties.

For a more detailed explanation and understanding of ethnic ties, Edward Stewart's "The Primordial Roots of

Being" (1987) is considered an important source. Stewart defines and explains "communal bonds" or ethnic attachments as a manifestation of "social actualities of religion, language, race, ethnicity, customs, and traditions" (105, in Scott 1990, 151).

Pierre Van den Berghe (1974, 1978) used the concept of primordialism in order to shed light on the phenomenon of ethnicity. As Scott (1990) points out, Van den Berghe goes beyond the customary tendency of most social scientists who try to explain conflict between ethnic and racial groups in terms of competition over scarce resources. Van den Berghe provided an explanation of ethnic conflict that is based on a mixture of social, economical, historical and, most important of all, biological forces. Ethnic conflict, according to Van den Berghe, "is based on primordial sentiments which, in turn, rests on genetic tendencies" of groups (Scott 1990, 152). This biological approach in the explanation of ethnicity with its emphasis on "genetic" and the "genetic kin selection" has not found much appeal among scholars of ethnic studies.

Others have rigorously emphasized primordial factors. For instance, Da Silva, in "Modernization and Ethnic Conflict: The Case of the Basques" (1975), puts forth an argument that centers on the notion of "group identity" in

explaining the persistence of the Basque separatist movement in Spain (McKay 1982, 397). Furthermore, scholars such as Yinger(1976) and Esman(1977) argue that the modernization of societies does not necessarily translate into a disappearance of ethnic tendencies in those societies. Esman uses Scottish nationalism to illustrate the notion that ethnonationalistic tendencies are not endemic to developing countries and can indeed be observed as intensely in a country such as Great Britain, where the state-building process was completed a century or so ago.

Overall, social scientists are in general agreement that the value of primordialism lies in the fact that it provides a psychological explanation of ethnonationalistic tendencies and causes of ethnic movements around the world (Scott 1990, 157). Furthermore, they are in general agreement that primordialism is the best tool, up to now, for explaining the strength of ethnic bonds within different groups.

According to James McKay (1982) there are flaws in this viewpoint, limiting its explanatory power. The most important criticism raised against primordialism holds that "primordial traits are often viewed as fixed, involuntary, and compelling. . . . This posture overlooks the creative abilities of human beings" (McKay 1982, 398). Other

criticisms also revolve around this apparent inevitability of primordial traits. McKay argues that there is a sense of primacy about ethnicity in the primordial literature, and "rather than viewing ethnicity as a possible focus of identity it is seen as the cardinal orientation" (McKay 1982, 398).

The primordial perspective, in spite of its usefulness in identifying the emotional basis of ethnicity, falls short in accounting for social change. Furthermore, the primordial perspective disregards political, economic, and social influences that must be accounted for in any viable explanation of ethnicity.

#### Instrumental Perspective

Given the shortcomings of the primordial perspective, others, beginning in the early 1970s, tried to identify other factors in this subject. The argument that initiated the process was as follows:

Renewed ethnic tension and conflict are not the result of any primordial need to belong, but are due to the conscious efforts of individuals and groups mobilizing ethnic symbols in order to obtain access to social, political, and material resources. (McKay 1982, 399)

Instrumentalists believe that the main goals of ethnic groups concern material and political gains. Ethnic identities are invoked for the sole purpose of attaining

those goals. William Bernard, in "Directions in Integration and Ethnicity" (1971), points out that there is no denying that groups have a tendency to hold on to their collective identity, but, concerning the question as to why ethnic groups have such a tendency, Bernard's instrumentalist approach manifests itself. He points out that the influencing of social, political, and economic policies in society is the fundamental reason for groups' preservation of their ethnic identities (3-11).

Ron Henry (1976) in an argument that is similar to Bernard's (1971) goes even farther in emphasizing instrumental tendencies among certain ethnic groups in North America. Using ethnic groups in larger cities in the United States and Canada as cases in point, Henry argues that, more often than not, groups' demonstrations of ethnic identities and affiliations dramatically subside in the aftermath of the achievement of certain political and economic goals. It is only in the context of accomplishing the next set of goals that ethnic tendencies and identities come to the surface and become contending issues for the whole society. According to Henry (1976), ethnicity is nothing but a tool in the hands of those who capitalize on and take advantage of the differences that may exist in a society (23-41).

Yet another school of thought within the instrumental approach brushes aside any primordial tendencies of groups as being irrelevant to the dynamic of interactions within and among ethnic groups. Jerome Vincent (1974), and Oliver Patterson (1975) are among the "extremists" within the instrumental approach. These authors, according to McKay (1982), maintain that "ethnic groups are similar to classes in that they are rational interest groups devoid of any primordial significance" (399).

The argument put forth by instrumentalists is simple and to the point: Ethnic differences and economic, political, and social discrepancies always coincide. In such a context, ethnic differences, according to instrumentalists, become more salient as economic, political, and social gaps among groups widen.

This extreme emphasis on political and economic gains led numerous scholars to question the viability of this perspective. Walker Connor (1972) and Andrew Epstein (1978) argue against any explanation that exclusively concentrates on political and economic factors. Connor points out that such an emphasis "underrates the emotional power of ethnic bonds and exaggerates the influence of materialism on human behavior" (McKay 1982, 400).



Despite some of its shortcomings, the instrumental perspective is considered to be more comprehensive. Scholars have argued that the instrumental perspective has greater potential utility in accounting for and explaining ethnic conflict.

The differences between the two approaches are important to this study because each attempts to explain ethnically based behavior in a different way. Primordialism puts the emphasis on culture, while instrumentalists argue that ethnicity is mainly an expression of the desire for material and political gains. Both of these arguments are relevant to the research goals set forth in this work and these two perspectives on collective ethnic behavior will be utilized throughout this study.

### Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity

The two major approaches to the study of ethnicity can best be described as sociological and political.

#### Sociological Approach

This approach to the study of ethnicity is mainly concerned with the "what is" aspect of ethnicity. Ethnicity is defined, explained, and understood in terms of such factors as social stratification, discrimination, cultural

variation, ethnocentrism, and the integration of minority groups into society. For instance, Yinger (1985) concentrates on the social stratification factor which "emphasizes how ethnic and racial systems are involved in patterns of inequality and conflict" (Yinger 1985, 163). Others, such as Brewer and Campbell (1976) and Turner and Singleton (1978) concentrate on the concept of ethnocentrism and cultural differences in society. Accordingly, ethnocentrism is one of the consequences of the many differences (e.g., cultural) that exist among groups.

Others try to seek out the manner in which the existence of groups with various ethnic backgrounds in a society has manifested itself in a negative manner for the whole society. For instance, a large body of scholarly works within this approach concerns the notions of "prejudice," "stereotype," and "racism" that different minority groups in a society may encounter (Yinger 1985, 163-64). Rosenthal (1980) and Kinder and Sears (1981) are among some of the more important investigators attempting to shed light on the manner in which "early-learned racial fears and stereotypes" shape the relationships among ethnic groups in a society (Yinger 1985, 164).

Overall, the main concern of the sociological approach to the study of ethnicity is the manner in which "newly"

established societies, which are made up of peoples of different ethnic backgrounds, function. The study and understanding of obstacles (e.g., prejudice and discrimination) that prevent these societies from operating smoothly make up the bulk of what the sociological approach is all about.

The most obvious criticism raised against the sociological approach is that it largely ignores the root causes of ethnically related problems in a society. Symptoms of ethnicity are of paramount concern for scholars who advocate the sociological approach to the study of ethnicity.

#### Political Approach

The political approach attempted to go beyond the symptoms with which the sociological approach was concerned. In such a context, the concept of ethnicity and the processes involved in nation-building were researched in an inter-related manner.

The political approach to the study of ethnicity accepted the symptoms put forth by the sociological approach as basic facts that set the groundwork for the next stage of research, which involved the study of ethnicity in both developed and developing areas of the world. Researchers

who advocated this approach became concerned with the manner in which ethnicity emerged and served as an organizing factor in shaping complex political structures of both developing and developed societies.

In developing societies, ethnicity was initially looked upon as an obstacle to development. The political approach to ethnicity, in its initial stages, attempted to rectify the problem of ethnicity by prescribing modernization theory.

On the other hand, in the developed world, the persistence of ethnic identities and affinity was looked upon with a sense of amazement. Modernization theory simply could not explain the assertiveness of ethnic groups in such advanced societies as the United States and Canada. In such a context, the political approach had to scramble to find new explanations for this unforeseen phenomenon in advanced industrial societies. Researchers of the political approach to the study of ethnicity finally did come to an inevitable realization. The solution to the puzzle had to be found in the manner in which ethnicity shaped, not only social relations in multiethnic societies, but also every political aspect of those societies as well.

### Political Science and Ethnicity

Research on ethnicity within political science did not flourish until the early 1970s (Connor 1978, 196-220). This is not to say, however, that the important scholarly works by Karl Deutsch (1966), Elie Kedourie (1960), Louis Snyder (1954) have not contributed to the field of ethnic studies and the general understanding of ethnicity. It is just that these scholars' main concentration and emphasis were on the sole issue of nationalism. Ethnicity and its implications for national and international stability were completely ignored. Ken Wolf (1986) argues that ethnicity is an inalienable component of nationalism and that these two must be studied in accordance and conjunction with each other. In such a context, Ma Shu Yun (1990) indicates that

ethnicity provided an important source of personal and group identity before modern nations appeared. During the Middle Ages, though ethnic groups existed, they were unconscious of the political meaning of their ethnic identity. Yet, ethnic attachments competed with, and won out over, other forms of group loyalty. They provided a strong bond of sentiment that helped the birth of modern nationalism in the eighteenth century. (527-28)

Yun (1990) also argues that to study nationalism without relating it to ethnicity is to ignore the historical origin of the doctrine. In such a context, Walker Connor's 1972 coinage of the term ethnonationalism made a significant contribution in the sense that it "formally acknowledges the

close relation between ethnicity and nationalism" (Yun, 1990, 528).

There are two reasons why the early 1970s are considered as the beginning of an era in which ethnicity is looked upon in a new light and treated more seriously by the scholarly community in the field of political science. First, as Anthony Smith (1992a) indicates, this dramatic rise in the early 1970s in the number of scholarly works on ethnicity can be attributed to the notion of "ethnic revival" in the Western world (Smith 1992a, 1). Smith points out that ethnic revival, which began in the early 1960s, was the direct consequence of a rise in support (in the West) for ethnonationalist/autonomy struggles of such groups as the Basques, Catalans, Bretons, Flemish, Scots, and Welsh.

At the outset of this revival Walker Connor's seminal work, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" (1972), examined the nation-destroying consequences of societies' sometimes desperate attempts at nation-building. Anthony Smith (1981) and James Mayall (1990), continued Connor's work and expanded on this unique line of argument. According to Smith (1992a),

It became clear that so-called "nation-building" which centered on the construction of national institutions by state elites, favored the integration and ultimate assimilation of ethnic

minorities by the culture of the dominant ethnic majority in each western state. But, with the reaction against bureaucracy and its mechanical rationalism, and the rising tide of popular activism fueled by a belief in authenticity and subjective participation, scholars soon came to realize that, in the words of Walker Connor, nation-building is also nation-destroying. (2)

In recent years, with the collapse of communism, another wave of ethnic revival is underway. This time, however, the focus has shifted from Western Europe to the eastern and southern parts of that continent. Since the early 1990s, the collapse of the autocratic state system in these areas has created a power vacuum which in turn has allowed the muffled ethnic aspirations of numerous groups to manifest themselves in what has been termed ethnic warfare. Works by Misha Glenny (1990) and Arend Lijphart (1994) point to the inevitable fact that "ethnic divisions have replaced the Cold War as the world's most serious source of violent conflict" (Taylor 1996, 889).

The second reason behind the rise of work on ethnicity in the field of political science has to do with the scholarly developments in the field by the late 1960s and early 1970s. In order to understand these developments, it is imperative briefly to recall some of the historical events that gave rise to the political science subfield, albeit a weak one, of ethnic studies.

Rupert Taylor (1996) demonstrates that prior to World War II the topic of ethnicity was almost nonexistent in the field of political science. This is true in spite of the fact that in the period prior to World War II such fields as sociology and psychology had made great strides in understanding ethnicity and race relations. In fact, Harold Gosnell (1935) and Ralph Bunche (1936) were among a handful of scholars who prior to World War II addressed the issues of ethnicity and race in the field of political science (Taylor 1996, 884).

In the period immediately after World War II, the treatment of ethnicity, or the lack thereof, by political scientists did not change much. Some of the more important works on the topic of political behavior published in the 1950s, such as those by Berelson (1954) and Campbell et al. (1954) failed to address the issue of ethnicity and whether one's ethnic background might affect his/her political actions and behavior.

Taylor (1996) argues that the cause of this neglect in the field of political science has to be understood in the context of the Behavioral Revolution that took place in the aftermath of the publication of David Easton's The Political System in 1953. This new era in political shifted interest toward "explaining patterns of political socialization and



political participation" (Taylor 1996, 885). Furthermore, this new tendency in political science implied a value-free environment in which "value questions are avoided in the interests of objectivity and the imperative is to discover basic invariants, structures or laws that can serve as a foundation for theoretical explanations--explanations which will take deductive form" (Taylor 1996, 885).

The extent to which political science has exercised objectivity is a matter of opinion, but the search for theoretical explanations pushed forward in the 1960s. This was most apparent in the emergence of the new theme of modernization, which looked upon the process of nation-building in the developing world in a completely new light. Classic works such as those of Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (1960), David Apter (1965), and Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell (1966) were all held that ethnicity and ethnic tendencies were temporary phases that would eventually disappear with industrialization and modernization.

The "formula" or "cure" that was being put forth to the developing countries of the world was not a complicated one. The argument by modernization theorists simply held that, as societies become increasingly modernized and people of diverse ethnic backgrounds are increasingly integrated into

this new economic and political arrangement, ethnic and parochial tendencies would easily be replaced by a sense of belonging and loyalty to the larger communities (Gurr 1994, 7-14). Thus, ethnicity was "left outside of the discipline's main framework assumptions," and authors of political science texts did not deem it necessary to include any discussion of ethnicity in their works (Taylor 1996, 886).

Ultimately, the beginning of the end of this intentional neglect of ethnicity came about as a result of an awakening in the scholarly community caused by the civil rights movement in the United States. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (ratified in 1964) and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 eradicated all of the systemic barriers that had prevented a large portion of the population in the United States from participating in the political process.

The new political realities in the United States, in turn, created a new category of works that, for the first time, centered exclusively on the issue of ethnicity. Rupert Taylor (1996) argues that in the mid-1960s concern over the issue of "ethnic voting" served as a catalyst in the research and publication of important scholarly works. For instance, an article by Raymond Wolfinger (1965)

"stressed the role of ethnicity as an important independent variable in voting behavior," and Levy and Kramer (1972) attempted to link "ethnic vote and party support" (Taylor 1996, 887).

All these new works played an important role in pushing the issue of ethnicity to the forefront of the field of political science. But the social and political events of the 1960s were not enough to convince political scientists, once and for all, to accept ethnicity as one factor among many in determining political behavior. The final awakening came about as a result of scholarly community's disappointment with the modernization theory and its predictions in regard to the persistence of ethnicity in both developed and developing societies.

Ethnic conflicts in such developing areas as the Middle East and in such countries as Nigeria were on the rise more than ever before. More astonishing was the rise in ethnic conflicts and violence in the developed areas of the world, where modernization theory had authoritatively predicted that such events would never happen. By the early 1970s, the persistence of ethnic violence in Canada, Great Britain, France, and Spain was an irrefutable fact that modernization and its advocates could not explain. The persistence of ethnically based conflicts in the international arena and,

more specifically, the continuation of those in the advanced industrial societies of the West "signaled that the modernization process had not appeared to dissolve the saliency of ethnicity, and led to increasing concern being directed to the role of ethnic cleavages in mitigating the onward march of liberal democratic nation-building" (Taylor 1996, 889).

Walker Connor was among the first to recognize the shortcomings associated with modernization and nation-building theories that were put forth during the 1950s and 1960s. Connor (1972) contended that the process of nation-building in developing countries, which, according to modernization theory, revolved around the negligence of ethnic tendencies, would eventually backfire and cause the collapse of nation-states in those societies. A year later, Cynthia Enloe (1973) reaffirmed Connor's assertions of the role of ethnicity in the nation-building process. Enloe argues that "ethnicity and political development are not necessarily inversely related, that the saliency of ethnicity has actually increased through the diffusion of modernity" (Taylor 1996, 889).

Ethnic groups in advanced industrial societies became a topic in the scholarly community. Milton Esman (1977) and Edward Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski (1985) made the "ethnic

dimension of politics part of the agenda of industrial and postindustrial societies for the indefinite future" (Esman 1977, 387). Other authors included Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (1975); Judy Bertelsen (1977); Harold Isaacs (1975); John Stack (1979); and Crawford Young (1976).

During the 1970s, major efforts also were undertaken to link ethnicity to world politics. Works by Judy Bertelsen (1977), Ronald Grant and Spenser Welhofer (1979), and Astri Suhrke and Lela Noble (1977) all represented attempts to examine the "intersection of international relations theory and ethnicity" (Stack 1986, 3). The main questions addressed in these works concerned the roles that ethnic groups and ethnicity play in the international political system. Furthermore, these works concluded that ethnicity and nationalism are "intimately related" in the sense that nationalism is "the most visible and politicized manifestation" of the phenomenon called ethnicity (Stack 1981, 4).

Not surprisingly, research on the causes of ethnic conflicts began to appear. Arend Lijphart (1977), for example, discussed methods by which ethnic conflicts could be "regulated" in more advanced industrial societies. Donald Horowitz (1985) and John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (1993) have tried to expand on Lijphart's ideas that ethnic

groups' interests in the society can be protected "through elite accommodation and cooperation, and following the principles of segmental autonomy, proportionality and mutual veto rights" (Taylor 1996, 890).

Investigators of the persistence of ethnicity among certain groups included Frederick Barth (1979) and Anthony Smith (1986), who argue that creation of nations and the consequential tendencies of nationalism have their roots in ethnicity.

Others investigated the ways in which "migration, conflict, and other processes of increased contact among groups enhance or even generate ethnic identities" (Gurr 1993b, 367). Nancie Gonzalez and Carolyn McCommon (1989) and Eugene Roosens (1989) conducted case studies in which the process of ethnic awareness among groups has led to political awareness and movement.

This accumulation of scholarly works, however, has not translated into any legitimate generalization about the political effects (if any) of ethnicity in a society. At best, up to the mid-1980s, most works have been case studies in which specific aspects of a region or a country are examined. Some of the attempts at some form of generalization can be found in works by Donald Horowitz (1985), Joseph Montville (1990), and Hurst Hannum (1990).

The relative success of these works, which provide "important generalizations," lies in the fact that they are "based on analysis of a wider range of case studies and observations" (Gurr 1993b, 365).

The utilization of ethnicity as a tool for analysis in political science still has far to go. Most scholars in the field have argued that we have not yet addressed the most fundamental aspects of the complex relationship between ethnicity and political development in a society.

Furthermore, such basic concerns as standardization of terminology in the field of ethnic studies have not been fully addressed by scholars. This is in spite of a great effort by Fred Riggs (1991) at providing a list of uniform concepts and vocabularies on the subject of ethnicity that is comprehensible to scholars trying to conduct research in this area.

In recent years, with the dramatic events in the former Eastern Bloc countries looming in the background, ethnicity and ethnically based conflicts have received a new wave of attention from the scholarly communities of political science. At the forefront of this newly revived effort to shed light on the role of ethnicity in shaping political events has been Ted Gurr.

Gurr's Minorities at Risk Project is the first and most comprehensive effort to gather empirical data on all politically significant ethnic groups around the world. This project which is presently in its third phase, began in the early 1990s by collecting data on numerous variables on 233 ethnic groups that were actively involved in some form of ethnic conflict between 1945 and 1989. Phase II of this project concentrated on the protracted conflicts among ethnic groups and states that claim to have control over them. Phase III of the project is similar to phase II except that the scope of the study has expanded to include 268 ethnic groups and has been updated through 1995.

The Minorities at Risk Project is the greatest effort so far to provide a firm foundation upon which scholarly attempts at some kind of generalization about ethnic conflict can be made. Furthermore, in the past few years this project has served as a staging ground for numerous other projects and studies exploring ethnicity and ethnically based political violence.



## CHAPTER 3

### COMPETING THEORIES OF ETHNIC MOBILIZATION

Mobilization, according to Oberschall (1973), refers to the process through which "individual group members' resources are surrendered, assembled, and committed for obtaining common goals and for defending group interest" (56). Attempting to interject political leadership into the definition of mobilization, Oberschall also defines it as the process by which "leaders organize the energies and resources of their followers to pursue common political objectives" (59). Tilly's (1978) definition is similar to Oberschall's: A process by which a group "acquires collective control over the resources needed for action" (7). Tilly points out that mobilization causes a group to go from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life.

Olzak (1983) explains mobilization among ethnic groups as the process by which groups organize around "some feature of ethnic identity (for example, skin color, language, customs, etc.) in pursuit of collective ends" (355). Gurr (1993b) defines ethnic mobilization as "the extent to which group members are prepared to commit their energies and

resources to collective action on behalf of their common interest" (127). Anthropological literature provide a broader definition of ethnic mobilization by pointing out activation of ethnic boundaries (Barth 1969) by generally focusing on "resource competition and ecological principles of competitive exclusion as the factors activating ethnic conflict" (Olzak 1983, 357).

Hence, based on the above discussions, I define ethnic mobilization as collective action by any group whose members are either a majority or minority in the society with an enduring and persisting collective identity based on a way of life and some cultural traits such as religion, language, common history, place of residence, and race.

It must be noted the definition of ethnic mobilization here should be understood in the broader context of definition of "ethnic group." In addition to the restrictive conceptualization of an ethnic group mentioned above, I also include what Ted Gurr calls "communitarian groups" and "communal contenders" to demonstrate what this study considers to be an ethnic group (Gurr and Harff 1994, 21-23). This study is broadening the "ethnic" label to include community of people who may be a collection of many minority groups. This collection or community of minority groups may not necessarily be an ethnic group in the

traditional sense of the term, but do behave as if they were ethnic communities. Indigenous People of Guatemala, Mayan of Mexico, Cabindas of Angola, and the Southerners of Chad are examples of groups that fall into this category. None of these groups fall in the restrictive definition of "ethnic group" mentioned earlier. For instance, the Indigenous People of Guatemala are made up of many Indian tribes that may not even speak the same language, but together they do behave as if they were an ethnic community. Hence, in this study, they are considered as one ethnic group and treated as such in the analysis.

There are eight theoretical perspectives on the reasons for mobilization among ethnic groups in a society. There follow brief overviews of each.

#### Developmental/Modernization Theory

This theory, which has its origins in the works of such social science scholars as Deutsch (1953), Apter (1965), Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Eisenstadt and Rokkan (1973), and Petrella (1980), tends to equate ethnic mobilization with "stymied political development" (Olzak 1983, 358). That is, during the process of economic development a sense of ethnic awareness among ethnic minorities is developed. This awareness of one's ethnic uniqueness, along with lack of

development in the political arena (i.e., absence of multiparty system and general lack of upward mobility in the social and political structure of the society), eventually becomes a major source of grievance for ethnic groups in that society. Ethnic groups, which as a result of the "developmental" policies of the state authorities feel either left behind or deprived of their traditional values, attempt to take actions to overcome this apparently uneven treatment by mobilizing their resources against the state authorities.

According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Linz (1973) ethnic mobilization is more likely to occur when a multiethnic society is comprised of ethnic groups of equal size residing in regions with unequal levels of economic development. The perceived disparities between core and periphery entice the members of an ethnic group on the periphery to mobilize against the dominant core ethnic group. Furthermore, as late as the mid-1970s the advocates of developmental/modernization theory predicted that "greater political and economic interaction among people and widespread communication networks would break down people's parochial identities with ethnic groups and replace them with loyalties to larger communities" (Gurr 1994, 78).

Of course, the political upheavals that have revolved around ethnicity throughout the 1980s and 1990s clearly indicated that the above prediction was false. As Gurr (1994) has noted, ethnic mobilization and ethnic conflicts "increased not only in modernizing societies but also in developed western societies" (78).

#### Ethnic Competition Theory

One of the pioneers in the field of ethnic competition theory is Frederick Barth (1969). Barth argues that as ethnic groups compete with each other for the increasingly scarce resources in the society, ethnic mobilization and eventually ethnic conflict will occur. Despres (1982) and Rothschild (1981) point out that "as ethnic groups come to compete in the same labor markets and increase their access to similar sets of political, economic, and social resources, ethnic mobilization will occur" (Olzak 1983, 362).

The core of this theory, as Hannan and Meyer (1979) and Olzak (1982) observe, is the notion that "overlaps in the economic activities of two or more ethnic groups lead to ethnic competition, which in turn triggers attempts at ethnic exclusion" of a group by another (Medrano 1994, 875). Such an attempt to rid oneself from a competitor in the

society creates animosity among the members of the targeted group. Mobilization of members of the targeted group is only the first step in the long process of initiating and waging an ethnic war.

Olzak argues that competitive theory of ethnic mobilization brushes aside mobilization along socioeconomic class or occupational factors and concentrates solely on certain aspects of ethnicity that may serve as a mobilizing factor among members of an ethnic group (1983, 362).

It is also important to note that competition theory of ethnic mobilization draws heavily from the modernization theory. Economic and state modernization, competition theorists observe, "encourage[s] mobilization based upon ethnic identity because economic and state modernization processes favor reorganization along larger-scale lines, rather than along kinship, village, or some other smaller-scale boundary (Olzak 1983, 362). The emphasis on larger scale political and social units in the society tends to delegitimize the actions of smaller units with parochial tendencies. The lack of adequate attention on the part of a modernizing society to the smaller units (i.e., ethnic groups) and the consequent sense of being "lost in the crowd" that occurs among the members of an ethnic group can have grave consequences for the whole society.

Such alienation among members of an ethnic group in a modernizing society causes more cohesiveness, in turn encouraging mobilization of resources on the part of an ethnic group to, if nothing else, regain the lost status and get the upper hand vis-a-vis other groups in the society.

#### Ethnic Segregation Theory

Michael Hechter (1975) was the first to propose this theory. According to Medrano (1994), ethnic segregation theory in many ways can be seen as an alternative to ethnic competition theory. Ethnic segregation theory's argument as to what causes ethnic mobilization is a simple one. As Medrano (1994) states, "Ethnic mobilization occurs when members of one ethnic group perceive that their life chances are fewer than those of other ethnic groups" (874). For instance, as Hechter argues, "The concentration of an ethnic group in low-status occupations leads to increased ethnic solidarity and ethnic political mobilization" (Medrano 1994, 878).

Others, including Gellner (1983), Hogg and Abrams (1988), and Belanger and Pinard (1991) have echoed Hechter's (1975) theory of segregation by agreeing that "the perception of blocked opportunities for upward mobility

leads to the political mobilization of economically disadvantaged ethnic groups" (Medrano 1994, 878).

Ethnic segregation theory's emphasis is on the dynamics of the job market in the more advanced societies where immigrants are actively seeking employment. This theory has attempted to explain the persistence of ethnic boundaries by concentrating on the "specialized economic institutions and network relations in maintaining ethnic solidarity" (Olzak 1983, 361). New immigrants, with their attachments to their native country's language and culture, are confronted with all kinds of societal and institutional barriers that in one way or another prevent them from fully becoming assimilated into the new society.

The existence and persistence of these barriers results in the development of a sense of cohesiveness among the members of a group who confront these difficulties on a daily basis. As Bonacich and Modell (1980) have noted, first-generation Japanese Americans, who confronted all kinds of difficulties in obtaining credit and loans from American financial institutions, "established highly integrated rotating credit organizations and horizontally linked small businesses on the West Coast" among themselves, which to a very large extent made them completely self-sufficient in that regard (Olzak 1983, 361).



Regardless of the nature and causes of segregation (i.e., either self-imposed or systematically enforced by different apparatus such as state authorities in a society), it eventually, according to ethnic segregation theory, will lead to stronger bonds and solidarity among members of the targeted group. As in the case of Japanese Americans, this will result in the mobilization of resources of the members who do so as a matter of survival. Contemporary examples of such groups who have had to mobilize to protect themselves are numerous. Turks in Germany and Chinese in Malaysia are but two examples of ethnic minorities who have had to confront both societal and institutional discrimination in their countries of residence. High levels of discrimination against these two ethnic groups, according to Gurr (1994), first created a sense of cohesion among the group members and then resulted in a high level of mobilization among them (106-10).

#### Split Labor Market Theory

Split labor market theory is similar to the ethnic competition theory in that both perceive a rise in ethnic conflict to be the direct result of competition among ethnic groups. Split labor market theory, however, differs from other competitive theories of ethnic mobilization in its dynamics of the labor market. For instance, Edward Bonacich

(1972) argues that "ethnic conflict peaks when two or more ethnic groups competing within the same labor market (that is, without a cultural division of labor) command different wages" (Olzak 1983, 360).

Labor groups of diverse ethnic backgrounds who are performing similar or equivalent jobs are financially compensated unequally. Furthermore, according to Bonacich, the capitalist owners, due to their economic interests, have a great incentive to keep the labor market divided along racial or ethnic lines. As a result, the lines of class division and ethnic boundaries in the society are drawn in parallel with each other.

In such an environment, split labor market theorists argue, solidarity among workers would begin to deteriorate. Labor groups who are divided along ethnic lines have to compete with each other in the market for jobs and higher wages. In the absence of workers' solidarity, ethnic boundaries become dominant factors bonding workers of similar ethnic backgrounds together.

According to Bonacich, as some of these ethnic based labor groups confront racism, prejudice, discrimination, and segregation laws, they tend to become more cohesive amongst themselves and attempt to mobilize their resources to combat the injustices inflicted upon them in the labor market

(Olzak 1983, 360). That is, ethnic antagonism will eventually manifest itself in the form of ethnic mobilization.

#### Internal Colonialism Theory

According to Gellner (1973), Hechter (1975), and Nairn (1977), an internal colony exists to the extent that a richer and culturally dominant core exploits and dominates an ethnically identified periphery (Olzak 1983, 359). The internal colonialism theory, which was first developed by Michael Hechter (1975), is similar to world-system theory, for "at both the world system and the state level, core-periphery conflict is exacerbated by the uneven development of industrialization" (Olzak 1983, 359).

The sense of separate identity, along with massive cultural differences which coincide with uneven levels of economic development between core and periphery, provides a ripe situation in which actions by the deprived groups seem only natural. Ethnic solidarity among members of the group in the periphery becomes increasingly reinforced.

Ethnic mobilization, according to internal colonial theorists, occurs when, along with the conditions mentioned above, cultural division of labor within the internal colony

extends low-paying and low-status jobs to certain ethnic groups in the society.

### Primordial Theory

The primordial approach to ethnic mobilization argues that peoples' ethnic identities and tendencies have to be understood in terms of social, historical, and genetic characteristics that are unique to each individual group in a society. Primordial theory of ethnic mobilization concentrates on the psychological explanation of ethnonationalistic tendencies and behavior.

For a full explanation of Primordial theory see Chapter 2.

### Instrumental Theory

Instrumental theory, which to a certain extent is a reaction to the shortcomings of primordial theory, is a comprehensive approach in the investigation of the causes of ethnic mobilization. The main argument of this theory is that the fundamental reason behind any collective action on the part of an ethnic group can be found in a group's desire to gain political and material goods. Ethnic identities are invoked for the sole purpose of attaining those goals.

Instrumental theorists also believe that ethnic differences and economic, political, and social discrepancies always coincide with each other. In such a context, ethnic differences, according to instrumentalists, become more salient as economic, political, and social gaps among groups widen.

For a full explanation of Instrumental theory see Chapter 2.

#### Resource Mobilization Theory

Resource mobilization theory has been fully discussed in the early part of this study (please see Chapter 1). Suffice to say that this theory revolves around the notion that availability of social, economic, and political resources to an otherwise unorganized group of people facilitates their mobilization and eventual uprising against the state authorities. This argument makes up the bulk of theoretical foundation of this study and will be utilized throughout this work in order to examine some of the causes of ethnically based conflicts in our world.

## CHAPTER 4

### MILITARY MOBILIZATION AND HISTORICAL PROCESSES: AN OVERVIEW

#### Introduction

This chapter is a descriptive study and analysis of all ethnic groups that, as of 1995, had attained a high level of military mobilization. The primary purpose is to identify common historical events that all or a majority of the ethnic groups falling into this category (i.e., high military mobilization) have experienced since World War II. Are there similar historical patterns among ethnic groups characterized by a high level of military mobilization? Are there any historical reasons that have compelled these ethnic groups to adopt such a strategy against their state authorities?

Regarding the characterization of some ethnic groups as militarily mobilized, a few comments are in order. First, as in the Minorities at Risk Project, ethnic mobilization for each group is calculated or derived by "multiplying the level of organization with the scope of support" (Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset Users Manual 1996, 33). Two categories of ethnic mobilization are identified: open and

legal mobilization and military and illegal mobilization. In this study, our concern is with groups that fall into the category of the military and illegally mobilized. This is the type of mobilization, more often than not, leads to conflict and bloodshed, and hence is of greatest significance here.

Military mobilization in the Minorities at Risk Project is calculated by multiplying the level of military organization (the number of military-oriented organizations active on behalf of the group) with the level of military support (the level of military support within the ethnic group for the largest organization). The range of score for military organization and level of military support, in the Minorities at Risk Project, is between zero and four. Therefore, the potential minimum and maximum score for levels of military mobilization ranges between zero and 16, with zero indicating no military mobilization and 16 denoting the highest level of military mobilization.

As noted earlier, the background information was obtained through the Minorities at Risk Project's website ([www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar](http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar)). The Minorities at Risk Project Phase III data set is utilized here in order to gather information on all the groups included in this study. While this data set covers the period between 1945 and 1995,

in some instances the latest available information was used in analysis. For example, in determining level of mobilization for each group in this part of the study, the status of an ethnic group for the period 1990-95 was considered. The available information concerning the numbers of active military organizations and scope of support for such organizations are gathered for the period 1990-95 (see Appendix D).

It is also important to note that in this study the definition of "ethnic group" has been broadened to include what Ted Gurr calls "communitarian groups" and "communal contenders" (Gurr and Harff 1994, 21-23). This allows us to include groups such as Mayans of Mexico, Indigenous People of Guatemala, Cabindas of Angola, and the Southerners of Chad (which do not meet the traditional definition of an ethnic group) in this study. For a detailed explanation see Chapter 3.

The following levels of military mobilization were observed:



Table 4.1  
Breakdown of Level of Mobilization and Number  
of Groups in Each Category

Level of Military Mobilization	Number of Groups
0	193
1	18
2	15
3	17
4	18
6	6
8	1

As can be seen in Table 4.1, out of 268 groups considered in this study, 42 ethnic groups have a level of military mobilization of three or higher. Thirty-three have military mobilization level of one or two, and some totals of 193 have a level of zero. The following criterion was used to categorize each of the 268 groups under study as having attained a high level of mobilization, a low level of mobilization, and no mobilization at all.

A high military mobilization simply implies that the group possesses two characteristics: first, at least one military organization (usually at least two and sometimes three) within the ethnic group is actively operating against the state authorities, and second, this organization is supported by at least half of the group membership

(Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset Users Manual 1996, 34).

The second type includes a low level of one or two mobilization. As can be seen in Table 4.1, 33 groups fall into this category. A low level of mobilization implies that at least one military organization (usually no more than one) within the group is active against the state but the degree of support among group members is much less than in the groups with a high level of military mobilization. As the Minorities at Risk Project points out, the support for the organization is limited. Usually fewer than a quarter of the group members are actively involved in extending support to the military organization.

The last category includes groups without military mobilization. One hundred ninety-three groups fall into this category. These do not possess any military organization or, if there is such an organization, it does not garner any support from the group membership.

This part of the study, then concentrates on the 42 groups that have acquired a high level of military mobilization. These 42 ethnic groups are scattered in six of the seven regions around the world. The only area without highly militarily mobilized ethnic groups consist Western Industrialized Democracies .

The following lists the regions, countries, and the 42 ethnic groups which as of 1995 had acquired a high level of military mobilization:

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

<u>Group Name</u>	<u>Country Name</u>
Ovinumundu	Angola
Cabinda	Angola
Southerners	Chad
Afars	Djibouti
Oromo	Ethiopia
Tuareg	Mali
Tuareg	Niger
Tutsi	Rwanda
Hutus	Rwanda
Diolas	Senegal
Southerners	Sudan

SOUTH AND SOUTHEASTERN ASIA (INCLUDING CHINA)

<u>Group Name</u>	<u>Country Name</u>
Hazaras	Afghanistan
Pashtuns	Afghanistan
Uzbeks	Afghanistan
Lhotshampas	Bhutan

Kachins	Burma
Karens	Burma
Kashmiris	India
Nagas	India
Tripuras	India
Assamese	India
Bodos	India
East Timorese	Indonesia
Hmong	Laos
Sri Lankan Tamils	Sri Lanka
Malay-Muslims	Thailand

PACIFIC ASIA (INCLUDING JAPAN)

<u>Group Name</u>	<u>Country Name</u>
Bouganvilleans	Papua New Guinea
Moros	Philippines

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

<u>Group Name</u>	<u>Country Name</u>
Mayans	Guatemala
Mayans	Mexico

## NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

<u>Group Name</u>	<u>Country Name</u>
Kurds	Iran
Kurds	Iraq
Shi'as	Iraq
Palestinians	Israel
Maronite Christians	Lebanon
Palestinians	Lebanon
Saharawis	Morocco
Kurds	Turkey

## EASTERN EUROPE AND FORMER SOVIET UNION

<u>Group Name</u>	<u>Country Name</u>
Serbs	Bosnia
Croats	Bosnia
Serbs	Croatia
Chechens	Russia

## Political and Social Background of 42 Groups

The following pages contain brief summaries of the political and social events for each of the 42 groups that, as of 1995, had acquired a high level of military mobilization. Special care is made to identify similar historical events that may have contributed to all or a

great majority of these ethnic groups' adoption of a common strategy (i.e., military mobilization) against state authorities. Unless otherwise noted, the source is the Minorities at Risk Project, available through the following Worldwide Web address:

[www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar](http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar)

#### Ovimbundu (Angola)

According to Anne Pitsch (1995b) Ovimbundus make up more than 37 percent of the population of Angola. Among the more than one hundred ethnic groups in Angola, Ovimbundus are concentrated in the west-central part of that country, and are Angola's largest ethnic group. This has not, however, translated into political power. This group, along with two other major ethnic groups in Angola (i.e., Bakongo and Mbundu), is involved in a bloody civil war to gain control of the entire country.

Ethnic tendencies among Ovimbundus became paramount at the outset of the Angolans' struggle against Portuguese colonial power. Throughout the early nineteenth century, Portuguese control over rubber and other lucrative commodities, along with rampant abuse of the fertile land in Angola, provided an environment in which an uprising by the people of the colony seemed almost inevitable. The struggle

for independence began in the early 1950s and involved three ethno-linguistic groups. In their mobilization for independence, Ovimbundus gave their support to UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).

After the war of independence, a group called MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), which did not have the support of the Ovimbundus, gained the upper hand among all the other ethnic groups and formed a government in Angola. The Ovimbundus, left out of the new power arrangement, complained of being discriminated against, and mobilized their resources for a new struggle. This time, however, the enemy they were mobilizing against was not a colonial power, but Angolans of different ethnic background.

It is important to note that, in the early 1940s, the Ovimbundus created a sophisticated network of villages comprised of schools, clinics, and churches (Pitsch 1995b). This was a strategy to maintain their culture. Eventually, the generation that emerged out of this structure became the basis for UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi. Savimbi's leadership since 1963, when he broke away from FLNA (The Union of Angolan People), has been instrumental in the mobilization process of the Ovimbundus.

Experience with colonialism, along with involvement in a bloody war of independence, make up the early part of the history of the Ovimbundus. Deprivation from social benefits through discriminatory policies of the ruling ethnic group (i.e., MPLA) and the presence of a leader contributed to the present high level of military mobilization among the Ovimbundus in Angola.

#### Cabinda (Angola)

Cabinda is a small province in Angola that has a population of approximately 175,000 or 1.6 of the total population of Angola (Pitsch 1995a). This province is rich in oil and provides more than 90 percent of Angola's foreign earnings. The people of Cabinda, who are Roman Catholics, have a much lower standard of living compared to the rest of Angolans. This, in turn, has created a feeling of separateness among the people of Cabinda from the rest of Angola.

The desire to seek independence from Angola is based on the predominant belief among the people of Cabinda that they are being exploited by the Angolan government and by foreign oil companies such as Chevron.

According to Pitsch (1995a) the people of Cabinda, like other Angolans, originally mobilized for the sole purpose of



ridding the country of the Portuguese colonial forces. Soon after independence they appealed to the newly formed government for greater autonomy in their region of residence. The new government, which was made up of the members and supporters of Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), refused to grant such a request and began a brutal campaign of suppression in the Cabinda province.

As a result of the MPLA's atrocities, the people of Cabinda mobilized to form FLEC (Front for the Liberation of Cabinda) in 1963. This military organization has been active in the past 30 years in waging low-level insurgencies against the state authorities in Angola. It has not, however, been successful in making strides toward the independence of Cabinda. Furthermore, due to massive reserves of natural resources in the province of Cabinda, it is highly unlikely that the government of Angola will give up control of the region; hence, for the foreseeable future, the stalemate will continue (Pitsch 1995a).

The mobilization process for the people of Cabinda began with their anti-colonial struggle. Their status as a small minority in Angola seems to have helped keep the cohesion among the group members. The fact that they are being systematically deprived of their natural resources,

and also their lack of involvement in the power structure that governs Angola appear to be contributing factors in the military mobilization of people of Cabinda.

#### The Southerners (Chad)

According to Shin-wha Lee (1994a) Southerner is a term used to refer to a large group of people who reside in the southern part of Chad. Southerners, who are Christians, make up approximately 46 percent of the total population of 6.3 millions in Chad.

Chadian's experience with French colonialism had an uneven effect on the country as a whole. The northern part of the country, due to the influence of Muslim Arab countries such as Libya and Egypt, resisted French colonialism and refused interjection of French values and belief system into their lives; in fact, according to Shin-wha-Lee (1994a), French colonial authorities had little control in the Muslim-dominated north. In contrast, the southern part of the country, which was not as influenced by the Arab neighbors to the north, was fully receptive to anything that was French. This included, among other things, the adoption of Christianity as the official religion and of French rather than English as the language spoken by the intelligentsia.

Their feeling of separateness from the rest of the population of Chad has had dramatic consequences for the country's political environment. Following independence in 1960, the Southerners did not hide their desire to form a country of their own. In fact, by the early 1970s, Southerners had established organizations such as the National Front of Chad (FNT) and the Committee of National Revival for Peace and Democracy (CSNPD), in order to accomplish at least a greater sense of autonomy in their region.

The FTN and CSNPD, which are involved in protest and rebellion against the central government, have on occasion been considered by authorities as having had a role in the numerous coups that have taken place in Chad (Lee 1994a). As a result, the central government in Chad, through the Republican Guards, have been involved in the brutal suppression of any Southerners' attempt at gaining independence.

French colonialism and its uneven effect in Chad can be considered unintentionally to have caused the creation of a separate entity in the southern part of that country. The presence of leaders such as Moise Kette, along with the central government's refusal to share power with the Southerners, has created an environment in which military

mobilization seemed the obvious choice. Considering the Southerners' level of mobilization and the fact that they make up almost half the population of the country, the prospects for a full-fledged civil war in Chad appear to be better than ever before.

#### Afars (Djibouti)

Djibouti, formerly the French territory of the Afars and the Issas, is a country of approximately half a million population that is divided equally between two ethnic groups: the Issas, who have their roots in Somalia, and the Afars, who identify with Ethiopia.

Since gaining independence from France in 1977, the Issas and the Afars have made every attempt to "reunify" Djibouti with Somalia or Ethiopia, respectively. According to Lee (1995a) even though the Issas have not been successful in uniting Djibouti with Somalia, they were able to gain control of the country by receiving tremendous assistance from the Somalian government. Left out of the power arrangement in their own country, the afars began a mobilization process that by 1991 led to a full-fledged revolt.

Two major paramilitary organizations, the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) and the Union of

Democratic Movements (UMD), are currently active in waging a protracted war against the government in Djibouti (Lee 1995a). Their major contention concerns the fact that the territory in which the Afars used to reside is now divided into the three states of Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Eritrea and they are not included in any power-sharing arrangement in any of these countries. Since the Afars make up a small minority of the population in both Ethiopia and Eritrea, they feel that their best chance to gain some form of autonomy is in Djibouti, where they make up almost half the population. Therefore, in spite of their ties to Ethiopia, the Afars' goal is not unification with that country but independence and statehood within the country of Djibouti. Because of their desire to create the greater Afar state, the Issas-dominated government of Djibouti is currently involved in a brutal suppression of the Afars, and no end to the conflict is in sight.

French colonialism and the manner in which East African territory was divided into three countries (Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti) without any regard to the ethnic makeup of the population has created the present situation for the Afars and other ethnic groups within such artificially created boundaries. Furthermore, as is the case with the other groups studied thus far, lack of

involvement in the governmental apparatus, along with the presence of such leaders as Mohammed Yussuf and Ahmed Kible, has contributed to their mobilization against the state authorities in Djibouti.

#### Oromo (Ethiopia)

The Oromo people are the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, constituting about one third of the country's total population. This ethnic group is mainly located in the southern part of Ethiopia. The desire of the Oromo people to gain independence and form their own country goes back to the early 1940s when Italy's occupation was ended by the British forces and Emperor Haile Selassie was restored to the throne.

According to Shin-wa Lee (1995c), Haile Selassie, like many other rulers before him, had suppressed the ethnic sentiments for self-determination of the Oromo and other ethnic groups in the country. By 1973, however, the situation in Ethiopia had begun to change, and Haile Selassie was overthrown by the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist military leaders. The Oromo people took advantage of the new political environment by forming the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and demanded self-determination in the southern region of Ethiopia.

The new Marxist regime in Ethiopia, led by Colonel Mengistu, proved to be even more brutal in suppressing the ethnic tendencies of groups such as the Oromo. The brutal suppression of the Oromo people led to the creation of two more military organizations--the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromo (IFLO) and the Oromo People's Liberation Front (OPLF). These groups, in spite of some political differences at the leadership level, have continued to work with each other in order to accomplish full separation from the central government in Ethiopia (Lee 1995c).

Despite recent efforts on the part of the central government in Ethiopia to include all ethnic groups in a unified government, the consensus among the Oromo people seems to be that the struggle for independence should continue until an independent country of Oromia is established. As a result, the prospect for peace in Ethiopia appears to be slim.

#### Tuareg (Mali)

Of the ten ethnic groups living in Mali, the Tuareg is the smallest, with a population of fewer than 300,000. Tuareg nomads have wandered the Sahara since before the arrival of the Arabs in the 18th century. According to Shin-wa Lee (1994c) at the core of the Tuaregs' contention

with the state authorities lies in their passionate devotion to the desert and their identity and culture, which they believe is being threatened by economic and political development in Mali.

Before the French colonized this part of Africa, the Tuaregs ruled much of northern Mali. They enslaved black Africans as their servants, which explains the animosity that exists between the two groups today. The Tuaregs now must become accustomed to being a powerless minority in a country that is run by their former subjects (Lee 1994c).

The real causes of the current unrest are economic grievances and an identity problem. The Tuaregs live in one of the poorest parts of the world, and they are systematically prohibited by the state authorities from practicing their unique culture. The latter is indeed important because intellectual and uneducated Tuaregs alike recognize their language as their major cultural bond (Lee 1994c). Their ultimate desire is for their culture and writing to be formally recognized by the government in Mali.

The problem for the Tuaregs is exacerbated because the Malian economy is growing and multiparty democracy has successfully been implemented within the state, yet they want to hold on to the nomadic lifestyle, which does not appeal to the rest of the population in Mali.



The present situation in Mali can be attributed to the manner in which French colonialism destroyed the traditional lifestyle of the people of West Africa. The Tuaregs never assimilated to the new standards set by the French authorities and were adamant in holding on to their nomadic way of life. Despite the absence of any formal organization among the Tuaregs, they are among the most highly mobilized ethnic groups in North Africa. This, along with the fact that they are currently demanding autonomy, has created a situation in which a full-fledged rebellion by the Tuaregs may seem more likely today than ever before.

#### Tuaregs (Niger)

The colonial background for the Tuaregs in Niger is similar to that of the Tuaregs in Mali. The Tuaregs in Niger make up about 14 percent of the population and their grievances are similar to those in Mali. At the heart of their uprising is the issue of protection of their culture and the nomadic way of life that sustains it.

The latest round of trouble began when thousands of Tuareg tribesmen began to return to Niger from Algeria and Libya, where they had gone in the 1970s and 1980s to flee the drought-related famines (Lee 1994d). Most of those who had served in the armies of Algeria and Libya returned home

fully armed with automatic weapons and grenade launchers. The Niger government soon began a campaign to disarm them, which led to more violence. The Tuaregs who remained in the desert began to organize and mobilize their resources for a protracted war against the government.

The two main military organizations that are currently involved in an armed struggle against the government in Niger are the Liberation Front of Air and Azawad (FLAA) and the Revolutionary Army of the Liberation of Northern Niger (ARLN). As a result of the military activities of these two organizations and the manner in which the Tuaregs are mobilized, observers have concluded that the current conflict in Niger is nothing but "another tremor along the ethnic fault-line between largely black population of the south and the light-skinned Tuareg tribesmen who are concentrated in the North" (Lee 1994d, Sect: Risk Assessment).

The process of military mobilization of the Tuaregs in Niger follows the same pattern as many of the other groups examined thus far. The Tuaregs have been dramatically affected by some form of colonial experience in their recent past. This, along with the government's brutal discriminatory policies, has left no choice for the Tuareg

population but to mobilize and wage a protracted war against the government of Niger.

#### Tutsi and Hutu (Rwanda)

The Tutsis and the Hutus are the two major ethnic groups in the country of Rwanda, which as of 1995 had a population of six million. The Hutu population makes up about 80 percent of the total population, while the Tutsis making up approximately 17 percent. Both Hutus and Tutsis speak Kinyarwanda and practice some aspect of Christianity (most are Roman Catholics). No distinctive characteristics distinguish the two groups, the consensus is that they are exactly the same people. So the question is, what has contributed to the present feeling of separateness that exists between these two peoples?

The answer lies in the colonial past of Rwanda. According to Dravis (1996) in pre-twentieth century Rwanda, the terms Hutu and Tutsi did not carry the same political meaning they do today. In fact, the two names represented economic classes, for as Dravis (1996) points out, "Hutus who accumulated sufficient wealth, for example a large herd of cattle, could become Tutsis, while Tutsis who fell on hard economic times could fall into the ranks of Hutus" (Sect: 2). Furthermore, evidence clearly points to the fact

that, prior to colonialism, ethnic killings simply did not occur.

With the arrival of colonialism, however, dramatic changes occurred. German, and later Belgian, colonizers came to Rwanda with firmly held convictions about race and one's place in the society. The Tutsis who had accumulated some wealth were able to impress the Europeans by their sense of nobility and European-like features. The Germans and Belgians considered the Tutsis to be natural rulers, and they decided to administer Rwanda using the power structure they had found in place.

Indeed the colonial authorities, especially the Belgians, were largely responsible for creating tribal identities among the Tutsis and Hutus. Europeans first ruled through the Tutsis, and then, after World War II, Belgian Marxists encouraged the Hutus to intensify their struggle against their Tutsi oppressors (Dravis 1996).

The colonial powers were also neglectful of the economic affairs of Rwanda. No economic infrastructure of lasting value was established either by the Germans or the Belgians. Therefore, when Rwanda was granted its independence in 1961, the people of that country had no resources to rely on. As a result of newly accomplished freedom, political reform was introduced and democratic

elections were held. Since the Hutus made up a majority of the country, they won the elections throughout the country and consequently, power was transformed from the Tutsi minority to the Hutu majority.

Since its independence, Rwanda has had three leaders. The first two were Hutus, and the current leader, Paul Kagame, is a Tutsi. Between 1961 and 1973 Rwanda was ruled by Gregoire Kayibanda, who was deposed in a bloodless coup by General Juvenal Habyairmana, who took power and remained as a dictator until his assassination in 1994. Under the leadership of the first two Hutu dictators, a simple fact of life in Rwanda was discrimination against the Tutsis. Rwanda was the only country in Africa where the citizens were required to carry identification cards distinguishing the Tutsis from Hutus (Dravis 1996). This practice, which began during the Belgian colonial era, had great significance in determining the course of a person's life, because it decided who was eligible for higher education and, therefore, for government employment. The practice of discrimination against the Tutsis was considered a major ingredient in the regime's survival.

Dravis (1996) points out that the manner in which the Tutsis were treated by the Hutus eventually led to the mobilization of the former and the creation of a military

organization, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Founded in 1979 and by 1994, this organization was made up of 14,000 fighters, and is considered as the sole entity that carried out Habyarimana's assassination.

Soon after Habyarimana's assassination, mass killings began in Rwanda. The Hutus went on a rampage throughout Rwanda and took revenge for the loss of their leader by massacring approximately half a million Tutsis. This action by the Hutus enticed the RPF, which was based in neighboring Brundi, to invade Rwanda, and by July 1994 the victorious Rwandan Patriotic Front had formed a government in Rwanda. Once again the Tutsi minority was in control of the affairs of Rwanda. Once again, it was the Hutus' turn to be at the mercy of the Tutsis (Dravis 1996). All these events have made the prospect for peace in Rwanda highly unlikely, and the bloodshed initiated by both sides continues.

The negative consequences of colonial actions and policies are apparent in the case of Rwanda. A lack of involvement in the governmental structure, along with overt discrimination on the part of the Hutus and Tutsis against each other, has enticed both sides to become highly mobilized against one another.

### Diolas (Senegal)

The Diolas are a predominantly Christian minority that make up about 11 percent of the population of Senegal. The Diolas are mainly located in the south and southwestern part of Senegal known as Casamancais. The Diolas in Casamancais are geographically separated from the rest of Senegal by Gambia and the Gambian river. According to Lee (1995), the geographical and political separation has helped the Diolas to maintain their own language and culture but it has also prevented the region from being incorporated into the rest of Senegal (Lee 1995b).

The Casamancais region produces most of the country's food (such as rice and corn) both for domestic consumption and export. The Diolas, however, complain that most of the region's agricultural earnings are directed toward the Muslim-dominated capital, Dakar. As a result, since the independence of Senegal in 1960, the Diolas have developed a separatist movement. The current phase began in 1982, when the Diolas-led Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC) conducted a peaceful march to demand secession from the Senegalese state (Lee 1995b). The government used every means to brutally suppress this movement. Numerous protest leaders were arrested and imprisoned.

Aside from economic exploitation, the Diolas' complaints revolve around ethnic, linguistic, and religious factors. The Diolas do not speak Wolof, the nation's main language, or French, the language of Senegal's government. As a result, Lee (1995b) points out, opportunities for higher education and economic progress are almost nonexistent.

The Diolas make up a small minority in Senegal, with no involvement in the political power structure of the country. The Diolas have been influenced by British colonialism, but the rest of Senegal was colonized by France. Leaders of the MFDC, most of whom are under arrest, have been able successfully to mobilize the Diolas and continue their struggle for independence.

#### Southerners (Sudan)

According to Lee (1994b), Southerner is an inclusive term used to identify more than six million black Christians who live in the southern part of Sudan. These black non-Muslim Southerners have tried to hold on to their tribal and regional identity ever since 1956 when British government, which had institutionalized the North-South Schism, granted the Sudanese their independence. The current civil war, however, did not begin until 1983 when the Muslim northern



government instituted Sharia, or Islamic law, throughout Sudan. The Southerners, in turn, began a campaign of armed struggle against the government that has left over 1.3 million Sudanese dead.

The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) is the sole military organization that has been actively fighting with the government of Sudan over its imposition of Islamic laws on the Christian population. According to Lee (1994b), the leadership of Colonel John Garang de Mabior has been crucial in the military mobilization of the Southerners in Sudan.

#### Hazaras (Afghanistan)

The Hazaras, who make up 19 percent of the population of Afghanistan, are Shi'i Muslims and speak Farsi. They settled in Afghanistan some seven centuries ago. The Hazaras, who have always been among the poorest people in Afghanistan, have suffered severe political, social, and economic repression at the hands of another ethnic group, the Pashtuns. As a result of the Pashtuns' expansionism in the early nineteenth century, which was fueled by Sunni prejudices against the Shi'i, the Hazaras were driven from their traditional homeland to the barren dry mountains of central Afghanistan where they live today (Fox 1995a).

The Hazaras' mobilization against the dominant Pashtuns has an economic roots more than anything else. According to Fox (1995a), the economic deprivation of the Hazaras took on a new dimension in the early 1960s when the Pashtuns began a systematic campaign of forcing the Hazaras out of the capital city's higher paying jobs and into the lowest paying positions. This, in turn, ultimately forced a relatively educated class of Hazaras to move back to their homeland in the barren mountains of central Afghanistan. This intellectual class of Hazaras is given credit for having been able to successfully create a unified front among the Hazaras in Afghanistan.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was the defining factor in Afghanistan's ethnic relations. The Pashtuns were the only ethnic group in Afghanistan that actively supported the communists from the beginning. In return, the Soviets allowed them to be in control of the government in Afghanistan.

The Hazaras were among those who fought against the communist government, and succeeded in liberating much of their homeland early in the civil war. According to Fox (1995a), the military organization that has the full support of the Hazaras is called the Islamic Coalition Council of Afghanistan (ICCA). The two leaders of ICCA, Abdul Karim

Hkalee and Abdul Ali Mazari, have had great success in keeping the Hazaras mobilized for more than 20 years.

Considering the fact that the political climate in recent months has worsened, the prospect for peace in Afghanistan appears to be slim. In such a context, the Hazaras who are Shi'i Muslims, now more than ever before, are embroiled in a bloody civil war with the predominantly Suni Taliban with no immediate solution in sight.

#### Pashtuns (Afghanistan)

The Pashtuns make up approximately 38 percent of the population of Afghanistan. They are generally Sunni Muslims, and they speak Dari. The Pashtuns are divided into tribal and subtribal groups to which they remain loyal. These tribal divisions have been the source of conflict among Pashtuns throughout their history (Fox 1995d).

From its founding in 1747, Afghanistan has traditionally been dominated by the Pashtun, who have never been the majority ethnic group in that country. The dominance of the Pashtuns continued in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. For instance, a Pashtun-dominated Marxist party called the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which was founded in 1965, ruled

Afghanistan from 1978 until the Soviets' complete withdrawal in 1992.

Another strong political organization among the Pashtuns is Hizb-I-Islami, which is a radical Sunni Muslim organization with strong backing from the Saudi Arabian government. According to Fox (1995d), in the period since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Hizb-I-Islami has replaced PDPA as the dominant group among the Pashtuns and hence in Afghanistan.

A recent major change in the status of the Pashtuns has been the Taliban's displacing the Hizb-I-Islami faction as the most powerful political and military force in Afghanistan. The Taliban are an Islamic fundamentalist group with extreme views on Islamic laws and social and political issues. For instance, they are strictly against education for women and their presence in the job market. Since taking control over Afghanistan in early 1997, the Taliban have banned females from schools. Furthermore, the Taliban believe that the fighting in Afghanistan has gone on long enough, and they blame the rest of the Pashtun factions for the present disastrous situation in Afghanistan (Fox 1995d). This group is now controlling most of the country and has maintained a high level of order in

Afghanistan through brutal suppression of all other ethnic groups in Afghanistan.

Given that other factions within the Pashtuns and other ethnic groups such as the Uzbeks and the Hazaras are not allowed to share power with the Taliban in the state structure and governing of the country, the settlement of the civil war seems highly unlikely; making the future of some of its powerless ethnic groups more uncertain than ever before.

#### Uzbeks (Afghanistan)

The Uzbeks who make up approximately 12 percent of the population of Afghanistan, are mainly Sunni Muslims. They are ethnically and linguistically Turkic and are closely related to the people of modern Turkey to the west and to the majority Muslim population of the former Soviet Central Asia across the border to the north (Fox, 1995f). The Uzbeks are descended from Turkish invaders who arrived beginning in the sixteenth century, and many of them are descendants of the Uzbeks who fled from Soviet Central Asia in the 1920s and 1930s.

The Uzbeks are the most economically viable group in Afghanistan. This is due to their occupation of the most fertile land in Afghanistan and their involvement in cotton

production and the textile industry. Because of their economic status, Jonathan Fox (1995f) points out, the Uzbeks have traditionally been able to reach high-level posts in the government bureaucracy. Of course, their status was relatively reduced in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

In recent years, however, under the leadership of General Abdul Rashid Dostam, the Uzbeks have been able once again to unify and mobilize their resources. A military organization called Jambush-I-Milli (National Movement) has the support of the majority of the Uzbeks and is considered by observers as maintaining some influence in Afghanistan.

The Uzbeks' main concern at the present time is to hold on to the northern part of Afghanistan, where they have been able economically to thrive in the past (Fox, 1995f). Furthermore, their desire to reclaim their long-lost status as the wealthiest ethnic group in Afghanistan is clearly expressed through recent peace negotiation with the Taliban. However, the Uzbeks' desire to have a hand in the governing body of Afghanistan seems highly unlikely. This is a great cause of contention between the Uzbeks and the Taliban, which may bring about renewed violence and bloodshed.

### Lhotshampas (Bhutan)

Bhutan is a small landlocked country at the foot of the eastern Himalayas. According to Mizan Khan (1995b), Bhutan consists of two ethnic groups--the Drukpas of the north, who are considered to be the original inhabitants, and the Lhotshampas of the south, who are immigrants of Nepali origins.

The Lhotshampas' presence in Bhutan today is the result of years of legal migration. Many were brought to Bhutan at the turn of the century to serve as laborers, and others came later never to leave. By the late 1950s, the Lhoshampas population in Bhutan amounted to about one-third of the total population of Bhutan. As a one-time measure, these immigrants were granted Bhutanese citizenship in 1958 (Khan, 1995b).

By the late 1960s and 1970s, as thousands more Nepalese immigrated to Bhutan, the Buddhist Drukpas began to fear for their majority status in the tiny kingdom. As a result, laws were passed to make immigration to Bhutan more difficult and, most important of all, to make acquiring of citizenship almost impossible. For instance, under the new law, anyone born after 1958 who had only one Bhutanese parent had to apply for citizenship, demonstrate fluency in the national language of Dzongkha, and produce evidence of

15 to 20 years of residence in the country (Khan 1995b). Furthermore, the government ordered all people to wear Bhutanese traditional clothing, and schooling in the Nepali language was stopped in all schools by the late 1980s.

By the late 1980s growing discontent among the Lhotshampas population led to the formation of the Bhutan People's Party (BPP). The BPP has called for a constitutional monarchy to be established. It also seeks multi-party democracy, changes in the citizenship laws, the right to preserve the Nepali dress, language, and culture.

In recent years there have been numerous clashes between government forces and the highly mobilized Lhotshampas population. Coupled with the expulsion of thousands of the Lhotshampas people, this has created an environment which is ripe for outbreak of a full-fledged civil war in Bhutan (Khan 1995b).

#### Kachins (Myanmar)

The Kachins make up approximately 1 percent of the population of Myanmar. They are a tribal group of people who are scattered mainly in the mountains of northern Myanmar. The Kachins, who are predominantly Christians, worked closely with the British colonial rulers in Myanmar during the nineteenth and early part of twentieth centuries.



As a result, today the people of Myanmar consider the Kachins as agents of external domination who betrayed their homeland during British colonial rule (Khosla 1996b).

The Kachins' suffering at the hands of authorities in Myanmar began in 1961 when the military regime made Buddhism the official state religion and attempted to gain greater control over the affairs of the Kachins in Myanmar. According to Khosla (1996b), in recent years the Kachins, as a result of opium producing and smuggling, have gained some economic prosperity in Myanmar. Furthermore, the Kachins have been able to consolidate their resources and create an organization called the Kachin Independent Movement and Army (KIMA), which is a highly disciplined military organization involved in insurrectional activities in Myanmar.

The future of the Kachins in Myanmar is uncertain. The military junta in Myanmar has been able fully to implement its "divide and rule" policy in the Kachiland and is maintaining a tight grip over the whole country. In fact, the military regime has been able to convince some sectors within the Kachins to lay down their arms and come to the peace table (Khosla 1996b). It appears unlikely, however, that the KIMA will stop its military activities against the military regime in Myanmar.

### Karens (Myanmar)

The Karens, who are the largest ethnic group in Myanmar, make up about 7 percent of the population of that country. They live mostly in the densely forested hills along the eastern border with Thailand. The Karens are mainly Buddhist, but there is also a significant Christian influence, especially among the Karen elite.

Like the Kachins, the Karens were recruited by the British colonial authorities to help them maintain their domination over the people of Myanmar (Khosla 1996c). As a result, The Karens were able to develop their social and political structure and attain a higher socioeconomic status in Myanmar. The Karens' association with the British domination, however, has stimulated strong animosity among the majority population of Myanmar, which has turned into widespread violence.

Due to overt discriminatory policies of the government and people of Myanmar, the Karens began to mobilize their forces soon after the British withdrawal and Myanmar's independence in 1949, and have maintained one of the longest continuing insurgencies in the world. Currently, they have established an alternative political and economic system in the rebel-controlled territories in the eastern part of Myanmar (Khosla 1996c).

The Karen National Union (KNU) and its armed organization, the Karen Liberation Army, are actively involved in a violent campaign to gain autonomy for the Karen population in Myanmar. The presence of these two military organizations, along with the societal implications of the Karens' involvement in Myanmar's colonial past, has made peaceful resolution of the conflict in the eastern part of that country an impossible task. Given the brutal nature of the military regime in Myanmar, the chances for extension of any form of autonomy to the Karens seems to be extremely rare.

#### Kashmiris (India)

The territory in the northwest corner of India is called Kashmir. There are about six and half million Kashmiris, of whom more than two-thirds are Muslim and the rest mainly Hindus. The main area of contention in Kashmir is between these two groups. The Muslims would like to join Pakistan, which is a Muslim country. The Hindu population, on the other hand, would like for Kashmir to remain a province in the country of India.

According to Amina Malik (1995), the history of Kashmir is intertwined with British colonialism and its influence on every aspect of life in the Indian subcontinent. In 1846

the British defeated the Sikhs and gained control of the territory now known as Kashmir. This territory, which served as a buffer zone between the British colony and China, was never officially annexed by the British colonial authorities. By the time the British withdrew from the Indian subcontinent and Pakistan had been divided, the Muslims and Hindus were attempting to push Kashmir toward Pakistan or India. The Hindu population, with help from the government of India, was able to integrate Kashmir with India.

The open and democratic election that was promised to the Muslim population of India has yet to be held, and Muslim advocates of self-determination were, and to this day, are severely repressed. As a result, according to Malik (1995), the Muslims have organized themselves in a military organization called Kashmir Liberation Front (KLF), which in recent years has escalated its violent campaign against the Indian authorities in the province of Kashmir. The Indian government has stationed a large number of troops in Kashmir and imposed strict curfews and press regulations. All this has caused the Muslims in Kashmir to sustain a bloody campaign of violence resulting in thousands of deaths and injuries in recent years.

The conflict in Kashmir which has colonial roots is the manifestation of the great religious differences that exist between the Muslims and the Hindus. Muslim military leaders such as Mushtaq Ahmed have been able to take advantage of the people's religiosity to mobilize them in the cause of Kashmir's independence. Muslims in Kashmir are among the highest militarily mobilized ethnic group in the Indian subcontinent. Because the current situation in Kashmir is the worst it has been since 1947, any peaceful resolution is highly unlikely.

#### Nagas (India)

The Nagas are an ethnic group of approximately one million who reside in the northeast part of India. They are mainly Christians, and they exhibit marked cultural differences from the lowland cultures of India. According to Shin-wha Lee (1995d), the Nagas' sense of national identity was basically forged during the years of British administration and reinforced by their resistance to Indian government domination since the late 1940s.

Throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth century the Nagas were socially isolated people until they were forcibly brought under British colonial rule. The politicization of the Nagas' identity into the ways of the

Western political tradition developed in the twentieth century as a direct result of their contact with American Baptist missionaries and through their special status under the British authority (Lee 1995d).

The Naga separatists formed the Naga National Council (NNC) in 1946 to unite the Nagas' different tribes in a desire to avoid the incorporation of their homeland into the Indian Union and to demand regional independence. The desire of the NNC, along with other military organizations such as Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), is for the Nagas to gain full sovereignty over their traditional homeland. Furthermore, the immediate withdrawal of Indian forces who are currently involved in a violent campaign of suppression in Nagaland leads the list of demands by the military organizations among the Nagas.

Military leaders such as Zapu Phizo have played an instrumental role in mobilizing the Nagas to support periodic small-scale attacks against government troops (Lee 1995d). Governmental authorities, in turn, have reacted by utilizing all kinds of repressive techniques in order to quell the insurgencies. All this has made it impossible for the Naga rebels and the Indian government to engage in any meaningful negotiation for peaceful resolution of the problems in Nagaland.

### Tripuras (India)

Located in the northeast corner of India, at the turn of the century, the state of Tripura was dominated by different tribal groups known as Tripuras. With the expansion of British colonialism in the Indian subcontinent, immigrants of Bengali background, with full support of the British colonial authorities, began to move into the state. Immigration has grown to the point that, today, the original residents of this state (i.e., Tripuras) make up a minority population of 750,000 or 29 percent, of the total population (Khosla 1996d).

The main problem for the Tripuras concerns the Bengalis' domination of their traditional land. Furthermore, the Tripuras have been systematically left out of any form of power-sharing arrangement in the state of Tripura. As a result, since the early 1960s the Tripuras have been able to mobilize themselves in their striving for independence. Many military organizations, such as the All Tripura Tribal Force (ATTF), The Tripura Liberation Organization Front (TLOF), and the Youth Tribal Force of Tripura (YTFT), have waged a violent campaign for independence with full support from the ethnic Tripuras (Khosla 1996d).

As four thousand or so rebels from different military organizations among the Tripuras conduct their daily small-scale insurgencies, the Bengali-dominated state authorities have become more adamant in suppressing the Tripuras struggle for independence. The situation makes the prospect for peace in Tripura unlikely.

#### Assamese and Bodos (India)

According to Deepa Khosla (1996a), historically the northeast part of India where the state of Assam is presently located was sparsely populated. However, this changed when British colonialism established its roots in the Indian subcontinent. The shortage of manpower to carry out British plans for the region led the British to encourage the Bengali people to immigrate to the region. In the short term, the consequence of this population transfer was the unprecedented growth of the Bengali population in the state of Assam. The long-term consequence of British colonial plans of population transfer can be seen today in the state of Assam. The indigenous Assamese and the Bodos, who consider Assam as their homeland, are threatened by the Hindu and Muslim Bengalis, who are not only growing in population but who also have established their political and economic roots in every aspect of Assamese society. They



are threatened mainly by the continuing migration from West Bengal and Bengali-speaking East Pakistan to Assam, which may undermine their political domination in the region (Khosla 1996a); as a result, the Assamese people in the early 1970s began the struggle for more political, economic, and social autonomy in their homeland.

By the late 1970s, the Assamese began a mobilization process leading to the creation of such military organizations as the All Assam Students Union (AASU) and the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). These radical, military organizations have, on occasion, called for the secession of Assam from India.

According to Khosla (1996a), the recent turmoil in Assam is largely a result of "central government neglect, geographic isolationism, the influx of illegal migration from neighboring regions, and resentment at persistent underdevelopment" (Sect: Overview).

The Bodos make up another ethnic group in Assam whose grievances are similar to those of the Assamese. The Bodos are tribal people of Mongol extraction who inhabit the northern regions of Assam. Deepa Khosla points out that Bodos are extremely proud of their Mongol heritage and culture and have increasingly felt that their own culture and language are threatened by the Assamese dominance in the

Assam state. The Bodos are currently seeking autonomy in the northern region of Assam, which they call the Bodoland (Khosla 1996a).

The process of mobilization among the Bodos began in earnest in the mid-1970s when, under the leadership of Upendra Nath Brahma, a military organization called the All-Bodos Students Union was created. This organization has demanded that "the central government recognize Bodo as one of India's national languages and that Bodo be declared as the official language in Bodo areas" (Khosla 1996a, Sect: Overview).

The Bodos' popular political leaders, along with strong organizational capabilities, have allowed them in recent years to carry out violent attacks against the Assamese' financial interests across the state of Assam. This, along with the Assamese' often brutal suppression of the Bodos, has shut down all possibilities for peaceful settlement of the ethnic problems in the state of Assam. The insurgency movements of the Assamese and the Bodos continue to plague the state of Assam, resulting in thousands of deaths each year (Khosla 1996a).

### East Timorese (Indonesia)

East Timor is the territory located in the eastern part of the Timor island. This territory, which was a colony of Portugal until 1975, is inhabited mainly by the indigenous people whose roots on the island go back five centuries. In the mid-1970s, as a result of political instability in Portugal, the East Timorese, who had begun a process of mobilization a few years earlier, were able to gain independence. A socialist group called the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), which had the support of the masses in East Timor, gained the majority of the votes to form the first government in East Timor (Khan 1996a).

The socialist nature of the government in Independent East Timor did not please the Indonesian government. As a result, with the blessing of Australia and other Western powers, only a week after the creation of the new government, Indonesia invaded East Timor. Immediately after defeating the small army in East Timor, Indonesia annexed the small island and has ever since remained there as an occupying force.

Needless to say, the East Timorese immediately began a mobilization process to rid themselves of the Indonesian occupying forces. The military organization, which has

carried out low-level insurgencies against Indonesia's military forces, is known as the National Council of Maubere Resistance (NCFM) (Khan 1995a). The imprisoned leader of this military organization, Xanana Gusmao, has led the East Timorese against the occupying forces from his prison cell.

The East Timorese struggle against the Indonesian army, which is one of the world's largest and best equipped, has not been successful. Furthermore, considering the uneven power distribution between these two warring entities, it seems unlikely that the East Timorese will be able to make any significant gains. Hence, the chances for an end to the occupation and bloodshed in East Timor appear to be slim.

#### Hmong (Laos)

According to Mizan Khan (1994), the people of Laos can be divided into three main categories: the Lao Loums, who speak a Thai language and comprise the dominant group (approximately 55 percent of the population); the Lao Theungs, who speak Mon-Khmer languages, were the earliest inhabitants, and make up about 35 percent of the population; and the Hmong, who speak Chinese and make up approximately 10 percent of the population (Khan 1994).

The Hmong migrated to Laos from the southern region of China in the early nineteenth century. The Hmong are

fiercely independent people, who as Khan (1994) points out, "have evolved a culture and economy dependent upon opium cultivation" (Sect: Overview). They have resisted the domination of Lao Loum by inhabiting the more inaccessible and least desirable lands in the northeastern part of Laos. This has allowed the Hmongs to gain a semi-autonomous status in the northern part of Laos. Of course, possession of large quantities of opium has also allowed the Hmongs to acquire a great deal of wealth which, in turn, has facilitated the purchase of weapons on the black market (Khan 1994).

Presently, the main complaint of the Hmong in Laos is the refugee situation across the border in Thailand. Following the takeover of the communists in 1975, some 50,000 Hmongs who had been cooperating with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) fled Laos and were settled in the refugee camps in Thailand. More than half of these refugees have migrated to United States, but the rest are still living "a tenuous and unwelcome existence in refugee camps in Thailand" (Khan 1994, Sect: Overview).

Due to the refugee situation in Thailand and the independent nature of these people, in the early 1980s, the Hmongs began a mobilization process that has regional autonomy and the overthrow of the communist government in

Laos as its main goals. This posture on the part of the Hmongs is in spite of the fact that in recent years the communist government in Laos has taken some initiatives to repatriate the refugees and has given de facto autonomy to the Hmongs in the northern regions of the country.

It seems that as long as the Hmongs have access to a great deal of cash (due to the opium trade), which allows them to finance their struggle, and the communist government refuses to establish democratic institutions, the bloodshed in Laos will continue, with no apparent end in sight.

#### Bougainvilleans (Papua New Guinea)

There are approximately 130,000 People of Buka background living in the island of Bougainville. The Buka people, or Bougainvilleans, have always considered themselves as closer to the people of the nearby Solomon Islands than the people of Papua New Guinea (Khan 1996). One of the factors that separates the Bougainvilleans from the people of Papua New Guinea is the darker skin color of the former. Furthermore, the Bougainvilleans were colonized by the Australians rather than the British, who were the dominant power in the region.

The desire of the Bougainvilleans to be independent became apparent in 1975 when on the eve of Papua New

Guinea's independence, they announced their secession from the new state. This action did not sit well with the new government in Papua New Guinea, and Bougainville was declared as a province of New Papua New Guinea (Khan 1996).

The tense situation between the government in Papua New Guinea and the Bougainvilleans became worse when the government allowed a mining company in Australia to mine for copper in Bougainville without consulting the local officials of the island. The resentment toward this action caused the Bougainvilleans to begin a mobilization process that led, in 1987, to the creation of a military organization called the Bougainvillea Revolutionary Army (BRA) (Khan 1996).

The BRA's violent attacks against the Australian mining company resulted in its closure in 1989. This came as a great economic shock to the government in Papua New Guinea, which had relied heavily on the cash revenue resulting from the mining activities on the island.

The major grievances of the Bougainvilleans revolved around the issue of land being taken from people of the island without proper compensation. Furthermore, the Bougainvilleans argued that the influx of Australian workers had brought "social ills like drinking and prostitution to the island" (Khan 1996, Sect: Overview).

The Bougainvilleans, under the leadership of Francis Ona, are passionate about gaining political independence. The colonial-style economic exploitation by the government of Papua New Guinea is the main bone of contention for the 130,000 population of Bougainville. As a result, since 1987, they have been involved in low-scale rebellion against the governmental authorities on the island, which, in turn, has caused the government in Papua New Guinea to react in a brutal manner toward the civilian population in Bougainville.

The evidence at hand suggests that the military stalemate between the BRA and government forces will continue for the foreseeable future. The prospect for a peaceful end to the situation in Bougainville is highly unlikely.

#### Moros (Philippines)

There are approximately five million Moros in the Philippines. These people, who are Muslims, are mainly located on the islands of Sulu and Palawan. According to Khan (1995c), the Moros are not a unitary ethnic group but "rather a conglomeration of tribal identity groups . . . associated through a common religion and by a common



mistreatment by the Christian-Filipino central government” (Sect: Overview).

Historically, the Moros have had great success in protecting their communities against both Spanish and American colonialism. By the early twentieth century, as Khan (1995c), points out, the Moros’ territories were finally subjugated and opened to economic exploitation.

The opening of the Moro territories meant a massive migration of mostly Christian-Filipinos into an otherwise predominantly Muslim area. As Khan (1995c) observes, the indigenous Muslim population saw their status quickly erode due to “obvious central government bias toward the Christian settlers in the communal competition for land and resources” (Khan 1995c, Sect: Overview).

Conflicts revolving around property issues separated the communities in the Sulu and Palawan Islands into Muslim and Christian. By the mid-1970s each community had mobilized itself against the other, and sporadic violence between the two had become routine. The Muslim mobilization efforts led to the creation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and its military wing, the Bangasa Moro Army (BMA). These two organizations have received a tremendous amount of political and military support from such Middle Eastern countries as Lybia and Saudi Arabia, making the

Moros one of the most highly mobilized groups in Asia. As a result, the Philippine government, in an effort to protect the Christian population, has deployed the military in the Muslim-dominated islands of Sulu and Palawan. Needless to say, the clashes between these two camps have been bloody.

After thousands of deaths and over a million persons displaced, battle fatigue has taken its toll. The 20-year-old Muslim insurgency seem to be bearing fruit. Recently, the Philippine government and the rebel leaders have been in constant negotiation over some form of autonomy in the predominantly Muslim regions of the Philippines.

The main problem in the Philippines currently is that small ultra-military groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front are not happy with any kind of settlement short of outright independence for the Muslim-dominated islands of Sulu and Palawan. The Philippine government has already adamantly rejected anything that remotely resembles an independent Muslim entity in the Philippines. This, in turn, has caused more conflict and bloodshed between the smaller Muslim military groups and the Philippine military forces. The ethnic conflict in the Philippines could, in one form or another, continue in the foreseeable future.

Tamils (Sri Lanka)

The Sri Lankan Tamils comprise the majority of the inhabitants of the northern part of the island nation of Sri Lanka. The rest of this country is consist of the Sinhalese. The Tamils, who are about 13 percent of the population, and the Sinhalese remained mostly isolated from one another for centuries until the imposition of British colonial rule brought them into contact with each other (Khan 1995e).

The Tamils, because of their education and skilled background, gained favor with the British colonial authorities and were allowed to occupy administrative positions in the colonial government. This newly acquired status on the part of the Tamils, planted the seeds of hatred in the hearts and minds of Sinhalese, which became apparent when Sri Lanka gained its independence in 1948 and the majority Sinhalese gained control of the newly established government.

The majority of Sinhalese "reacted strongly against the perceived instruments of their prior domination and enacted legislation designed to promote the preeminence of Sinhalese culture" (Khan 1995e, Sect: Overview). For instance, the Sinhalese government diminished the citizenship rights of a well-established Indian Tamil minority, decreed Sinhala as

the only official language of the island nation, and favored Buddhism as the state religion.

The consequence of the Sinhalese's state policies toward the Tamils has been devastating for the island nation. The year 1975 marks the polarization of the Sri Lankan society along the Sinhala/Tamil division as "the Tamil United Liberation Front began to espouse separation and the Tamil Tigers Began to Commit sporadic acts of violence" (Khan 1995e, Sect: Overview). The character of ethnic violence became dramatically harsher as the two Tamil military groups were able to radicalize and mobilize the entire Tamil population in Sri Lanka. In July 1983, a new wave of communal conflict began; it soon spread across the country and turned into a full-fledged civil war that continues today.

The cause of the present situation in Sri Lanka can be traced back to British colonial rule, which forcibly brought the Tamils and the Sinhalese together. The "divide and rule" policies of the British administrative authorities pitted the two groups against each other. The Tamil resentment of the Sinhalese is a fact of life in Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers' bloody rebellion and insurgency is nothing but the manifestation of such resentment. The chances for peace in Sri Lanka are small. The situation in

Sri Lanka has become worse as the main rebel group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), has in recent years raised the stakes by demanding full independence for the Tamil residents in the northern part of Sri Lanka.

#### Muslims (Thailand)

The 1.75 million Muslims in Thailand make up only 3 percent of that Buddhist country. The adherents of the Muslim faith, who are located mainly in the southern provinces of Thailand, due to the infusion of Buddhist ritual in the Thai state are systematically excluded from full participation in the socioeconomic and political decision-making processes of the country (Khan 1995d). As a result the Muslim-dominated southern provinces of Thailand have remained neglected and economically backward regions of that country. Furthermore, the Thai government's attempt at assimilating the Muslim population and bringing them under control has only alienated the Muslims and pushed them to become mobilized and direct their effort to gain greater autonomy in the southern region of Thailand.

By the early 1980s two highly military groups, the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) were created. In recent years these two groups have been successful in coordinating

the Muslims' efforts to resist the Thai government's coerced assimilationist policies. The main objective for Muslims revolves around gaining greater cultural and religious autonomy in the southern region of Thailand. It must be noted, however, that some radical military Muslim groups such as the Tantra Jihad Islam (TJI) are demanding outright independence for the Muslim-dominated southern region of Thailand. These well-armed groups have successfully carried out terrorist actions against both non-Muslim civilians and Thai military officials in the southern provinces (Khan 1995d).

The prospects for peace in Thailand are almost non-existence. As long as Buddhism retains its preeminent status in the Thai state, the Muslims will continue their struggle for more cultural and religious autonomy.

#### Indigenous People (Guatemala)

The indigenous people in Guatemala, who make up approximately 38 percent of the total population of the country, are of Mayan descent. Land, which is the cornerstone of Mayan culture and traditions, has become the focus of the indigenous people in their struggle against the government in Guatemala. The issue of land and its ownership became paramount only at the inception of Spanish

colonization in Guatemala. The foreigners either bought all the fertile land at a low price or simply pushed the indigenous people out and took over their properties (Burke 1995a). This, in turn, has forced the indigenous people to resort to wage labor through seasonal migration, keeping the indigenous people of Guatemala among the poorest in the country. According to Susanne Jonas (1991), less than 15 percent of the population of Guatemala lives above the poverty line (2).

Aside from the extreme poverty, the indigenous people have suffered from brutal governmental suppressive policies throughout their history. In 1954 the military government of Colonel Carlos Castillo implemented a land-acquisition program that drove thousands of indigenous people off their traditional land and forced them to become refugees in Mexico and the United States (Burke 1995a). The military authorities' actions were justified by claiming that the indigenous people are communist sympathizers and therefore a threat to the security of Guatemala.

All these atrocities against the Mayan communities caused them to become mobilized and militant in their reaction toward the military regime in Guatemala. Beginning in the early 1960s many guerrilla organizations such as CUC (Peasant Unity Committee) began to take actions against the

military government in Guatemala with not much success. By late 1970s, the growth and emergence of such guerrilla organization as EGP (Guerrilla Army of the Poor), ORPA (Organization of People in Arms), FAR (Rebel Armed Forces), and (Guatemalan Labor Party) caused the military government to be even more brutal in its attacks against these groups and their civilian sympathizers (Jonas 1991, 138). In 1982, EGP, ORPA, FAR, PGT decided to combine their forces under an umbrella organization called Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). Ricardo Ramirez, also known as Comandante Rolando Moran, headed the Guerrilla Army of the Poor which was the basic fighting force of the URNG (Lexis-Nexis 1997, 36). Jorge Soto, also known as Comandante Pablo Monsanto, was the head of the Rebel Armed Forces which was the oldest guerrilla organization among all URNG factions. URNG enjoyed broad popular support in Guatemala, and was able to incorporate "the indigenous population in massive numbers as members and middle-level leadership" (Jonas 1991, 139). Among the demands put forth by URNG were "full equality for Indians and an end to their cultural oppression" (Jonas 1991, 139). The country was pushed into a bloody civil war, which has left hundreds of thousands dead or injured.



Finally, a peace accord between URNG and the government of president Alvaro Arzu Irigoyen was signed on December 29, 1996. This peace accord extended many rights to the indigenous people and has dramatically reduced the level of violence in Guatemala and put an end to the thirty six year old civil war. The once outlawed URNG is now a political party with the ex-guerrilla fighter Ricardo Ramirez as its president (Lexus-Nexis 1997, 36).

In spite of recent political development, indigenous people in Guatemala not only are still suffering from governmental discrimination, but also are mistreated at the societal level by the non-indigenous civilian population in Guatemala. As Burke (1995a) points out, the social, political, and economic divisions between antagonists and non-indigenous people are sharp and clear in Guatemala.

It remains to be seen how the Guatemalan military and political elites would react as the indigenous people are allowed to become active in the political process which eventually may lead to some gains for them in the political arena.

#### Mayans (Mexico)

There are approximately 1.5 million Mayan Indians living in the southeastern part of Mexico. Even though

these people are scattered in many of the southeastern states of Mexico, a majority (almost 60 percent) live in the state of Chiapas. Regardless of where Mayans live, extreme poverty is their lot. According to Burke (1995b), the areas where Mayans are located rank among the poorest in the country.

The history of the Mayan Indians in Mexico is filled with both accomplishments and failures for centuries prior to colonization by the Spaniards. Not until the Mexican Revolution in 1910 were Mayan Indians finally allowed to have a limited role in the state's policy-making processes. As a result, numerous governmental organizations, such as the National Indigenous Institute (INI), were created to address the indigenous peoples' issues in Mexico.

The process of social and political awareness which resulted in the mobilization of the Mayan Indians, began when the Mexican government, in response to pressures from foreign bankers, began an agrarian reform in the early 1970s that greatly affected the Indian population (Burke 1995b). Furthermore, Burke points out that the Ministry of Agrarian Reform was created in order to give government more control over independent Indian lands and to control Indian discontent and protest.

In recent years the Mexican government's mistreatment of the Indians is most apparent in the state of Chiapas. The development of oil fields and the construction of dams have drastically affected the agricultural productivity of the Mayan Indians in the state of Chiapas. The Chiapas uprising in 1994 was a "response to government policies, agricultural modernization, and cultural and economic isolation which affected the state of Chiapas more harshly than any other region in the country" (Burke 1995b, Sect: Overview). The Zapatista rebels, who are scattered all over southern Mexico, began their uprising in the state of Chiapas. Their demands are for an end to the subordination and the exploitation of indigenous peoples all over Mexico.

A cease fire agreement was signed between Zapatista rebels and the Mexican government in 1996. This agreement which was full of promises of political and economic reforms was considered by many observers as incomplete and has collapsed (Canak and Swanson 1998, 175).

The Mayan Indians , along with other indigenous people, still face a great deal of discrimination and poverty. The grievances that caused the rebellion in the state of Chiapas still exist. The socioeconomic status of the Mayan Indians, along with the presence of strong and popular leaders among them, have provided an environment that is ripe for

continuation of conflict and bloodshed between the indigenous people of Mexico and the government in that country.

#### Kurds (Iran)

The Kurds in Iran make up approximately 10 percent of the total population of the country. The Kurds in Iran are mostly Sunni Muslims and reside in the west and northwestern regions of that country. According to Fox (1995b), while the Kurds in Iran "traditionally had a nomadic component to their society, most have been settled due to governmental policy" (Sect: Overview).

Because of the Kurds' unique cultural values regarding independence, they have resisted domination by outside powers throughout their long history in Iran. During the central government's periods of weakness (for example, the period immediately after World War II), the Kurds have had brief experiences with some form of independence in Iran.

The main cause of discontent for the Kurds in Iran, which has caused them to enter armed conflicts with different Iranian governments throughout their history, is their desire to have full autonomy in their region of residence. The accomplishment of this desire has caused the Kurds to be the most highly mobilized group in Iran. In

recent years, two highly military organizations, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Kurdistan (Komala), have been active in waging a military campaign against the central government's military forces in the region.

As Jonathan Fox (1995b) points out, the Kurds' struggle in Iran is not for the purpose of creating an independent country of their own; it is rather, their desire to establish a working democracy for the Iranian people and to create an autonomous region in the western part of Iran for themselves so they can freely practice their unique culture and way of life.

The present government in Iran, like so many predecessors, has adamantly rejected any requests for autonomy and, since the early 1980s, has waged a massive campaign of suppressing Kurdish rebellion. Hence, it is more than likely that the situation between the Kurds and government of Iran will remain the same for the foreseeable future.

#### Kurds (Iraq)

The Kurds in Iraq make up approximately 25 percent of the population of that country. Like the Kurdish population in Iran, the Kurds' society in Iraq is tribal in nature.

The Kurds in Iraq have suffered atrocities similar to those in Iran, except perhaps a bit harsher. The Ba'ath government in Iraq has absolutely no tolerance for ethnic or linguistic identities separate from the predominant Arab ones that are allowed to be practiced (Wilkenfeld 1994a). Any group with any kind of separate identity is quickly and brutally suppressed.

The harsh treatment that Kurds have received from different Iraqi governments throughout history, along with the strong sense of independence that exists among all Kurds, has caused the Kurds to come together in their struggle against the Iraqi regime. The Iraqi Kurds are considered to be among the most mobilized ethnic groups in the Middle East and North African region.

The Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) are the two main active military organizations presently fighting against the Iraqi government. These two organizations, in the post-Gulf War era, are confronted with both the best opportunity so far to gain the long-demanded autonomy and a situation in which economic deprivation and the shortage of basic necessities in the Kurdish-controlled region of northern Iraq has reduced their prestige and authority among the Kurdish population in that country.

Overall, the situation of Kurds in Iraq is very bleak and it is not likely to change for the better (Wilkenfeld 1994a). As Wilkenfeld points out, the Kurds living in the autonomous region of northern Iraq are completely dependent on the allied forces not only for their basic necessities of life, but also for their physical security. Since the security arrangement in northern Iraq is temporary, the chances are that the brutal suppression of Kurds by the Iraqi regime will restart after allied troops' withdrawal from the region.

#### Kurds (Turkey)

There are more than 12 million Kurds living predominantly in the southeastern region of Turkey. Kurds have been living in this part of the world for centuries. Kurds who are scattered among the four countries of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria, are considered the original inhabitants of this region. The political history of the Kurds in Turkey, however, was shaped by post-World War I events. Kurds who had been under the Ottoman rule for centuries were promised outright independence by the Allies in the post-war arrangements. The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, however, completely ignored the Kurds and their desire

for independence, and deny them in the Republic of Turkey (Fox 1995c).

Since the inception of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Kurds have been involved in a massive and bloody struggle for independence against the government in Turkey. This is because the Turkish government does not recognize the Kurds as a distinct ethnic group. They are referred as "Mountain Turks," and their language is banned from schools in Turkey. Furthermore, according to Fox (1995c), teaching and research on the history and society of the Kurds are forbidden, and "there have been forced population transfers and there are repeated and widespread allegations of the arrest, torture and even assassination of anyone remotely associated with Kurdish pan-nationalism" (Fox 1995c). All this is in addition to the massive and systemic economic exploitation and armed suppression of the Kurds in the southeastern region of Turkey.

Due to the atrocities that Kurds in Turkey have suffered, unlike the Kurds in the neighboring countries, they are adamant in gaining outright independence. The Kurds in Turkey are highly mobilized and well armed, and they are currently involved in a bloody rebellion against the Turkish military forces. Strong military organizations such as the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) and the People's



Democratic Party (HADEP) have been involved in a violent rebellion against Turkey since the mid-1970s, with no end in sight.

Based on the historical animosity between the Turkish authorities and the Kurds, one may conclude that, as long as the Kurds are denied their cultural autonomy and political independence, it seems that the fighting will continue in the foreseeable future and that the situation for the Kurds in Turkey will not soon improve.

#### Shi'as (Iraq)

There are more than 11 million (approximately half the population) Shi'as presently living in Iraq. The Shi'as in Iraq are mainly located in the southern part of that country near the Iranian border. In spite of the predominant but wrong belief that the Shi'as in Iraq have a desire to split from Iraq and join their fellow Shi'as in Iran, most Iraqi Shi'as have no desire to seek autonomy from Iraq. Preferring to topple the ruling Ba'ath party and Saddam Hussein, who has become increasingly hostile to their community.

According to Wilkenfeld (1994e), the Shi'as "seek equality within Iraq and representation in the central government. The ruling Ba'ath party views the Shi'a as a

threat because most Shi'as advance the notion that Islam should be used as a guiding force in everyday life. This, contradicts the most basic principles of Ba'athist ideology which upholds secularism and nationalism as guiding principles" (Wilkenfeld 1994e, Sect: Risk Assessment).

The Shi'as' discontent toward the regime in Iraq has reached new heights in recent years. The Iraqi regime retaliated brutally toward Shi'as revolt in the period immediately after the Gulf War. For instance, according to Ari Wilkenfeld, the Iraqi army, in order to encourage the Shi'as to leave Iraq and seek refuge in Iran, has forcibly removed inhabitants of entire villages and then burnt the villages down to discourage them from returning.

The atrocities committed against the Shi'as have made them one of the most mobilized ethnic groups in the Middle East. In fact, the military organization, al-Dawa, has been able to gain tremendous support among Shi'as in Iraq, and it has been active in fighting against the authorities in southern Iraq. The presence of this military organization, along with the hatred of the Iraqi regime toward the Shi'as, has shut down all hope for a peaceful end to the problems in southern Iraq. Hence, one would not be wrong to conclude that the bloody conflict in southern Iraq will continue in the foreseeable future.

Palestinians (Israeli Occupied Territories)

The Palestinian population, who are scattered throughout the Middle East, are "descendants from the earliest recorded inhabitants of the areas which now form Israel, the Occupied Territories, and Jordan" (Wilkenfeld 1994c, Sect: Overview). These inhabitants later intermarried with various populations, such as Jews and Arabs, that controlled Palestine. When, as a result of the political arrangements among the Western powers in post-World War I and post-World War II, the states of Jordan and Palestine were created, the Palestinian population (i.e., the original inhabitants of Palestine) was left behind. In fact, due to the Israeli governments's land policies, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have become refugees throughout the Middle East. There are more than three million such refugees currently living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which are commonly known as the Occupied Territories.

The problems that Palestinian refugees face in the Occupied Territories are basically twofold. First, according to Wilkenfeld, the Palestinian workers in the Israeli labor market face severe discrimination. They are allowed to "perform the least desirable of manual labor jobs at the wages far below what most Israelis would find

acceptable for themselves" (Wilkenfeld 1994c, Sect: Overview). Second, in recent years the massive influx of Soviet Jews into Israel has created a labor crisis in that country; there are not enough jobs. Newly arriving immigrants began to take over positions that traditionally had been held by Palestinians. This meant a dramatic rise in the number of unemployed among the Palestinians.

The political situation for the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories has begun to change in recent years. Due to the 1993 agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Palestinians are allowed to take the initial steps that eventually will lead to self-rule and statehood. The greatest threats to peace and eventual statehood for the Palestinians are the actions of the two radical groups called Hamas and the Islamic Jihad (Wilkenfeld 1994c). These two extremist military organizations are against the continuation of the peace process, and in recent years, they have been active against the Israeli military presence in the Occupied Territories.

In spite of recent setbacks and the presence of extremists on both sides who are against the peace process, the prospects for a lasting peace between the two peoples now seems to be better than at any time in the past.

### Maronite Christians (Lebanon)

There are approximately one million Maronite Christians living in Lebanon. They make up about 25 percent of the population and are considered the third largest ethnic group in Lebanon. The history of the Maronites in Lebanon go back to the early seventh century when the Maronites, in order to escape persecution by the Syrians, moved to the region presently known as Lebanon. Due to their Christian background, the Maronites have developed a close relationship with the European countries. More specifically, according to Wilkenfeld (1994b), Maronites developed a sense of affinity toward France. The consequence of this close relationship between the Maronites and France manifested itself in the period after World War I. France gained control of a region that today includes the countries of Syria and Lebanon. France, in an attempt to protect its Maronite allies in the region, declared Lebanon as "a distinct geo-political entity from Syria" and made every effort to assure that Maronites would constitute a majority in the newly established country of Lebanon (Wilkenfeld 1994b, Sect: Overview).

The seeds of conflict, which were planted initially by the French policies in Lebanon, resulted in the creation of an atmosphere in which other ethnic groups felt betrayed and

left behind. The Sunni Muslims, Shi'a Muslims, Druze, and other groups in the region began to adopt a defensive posture toward the Maronites and other groups in the country. Ultimately, this tense situation in Lebanon turned into a full-fledged civil war in 1975, when the heavily armed Palestinian refugees from the Israeli Occupied Territories poured into Lebanon.

After years of bloodshed among all factions in Lebanon (but more specifically, between the Maronite Christians and Muslims), a peace accord was finally signed by all the warring parties in Lebanon in 1992. Due to specific reforms in the electoral laws and dramatic changes in Lebanon's new constitution, all ethnic groups participated in the parliamentary elections, and, at least for now, Lebanon seems finally to be at peace with herself.

Given their historical concerns regarding Arab nationalism or military Islamic sentiments, Maronites have remained as a highly mobilized ethnic group in Lebanon. The Phalangist Party is constantly working to assure the viability of this high degree of military mobilization among the Maronites in Lebanon. Furthermore, the Lebanese Forces (LF), the militia wing of the Phalangist Party, have refused to turn in their weapons and are adamant in keeping track of the Palestinian and Syrian movements in Lebanon.

Indeed, the presence of Palestinians and Syrian troops in Lebanon is the only cause of worry for the Maronites in Lebanon. As Wilkenfeld (1994b) points out, there is always the danger that the present coalition government in Lebanon may fall apart, and once again the Maronites will "have to defend their interests by military means" (Sect: Risk Assessment).

#### Palestinians (Lebanon)

Palestinians in Lebanon make up approximately 10 percent of the population of that country, which makes them the fourth largest ethnic group in Lebanon. The history of Palestinians in Lebanon and the actions of the Israeli government seem always to have been intertwined. The presence of such a large Palestinian population in Lebanon can be attributed to the Israeli expulsion policies in the Occupied Territories. In the decades of 1960s and 1970s, as a result of numerous Arab-Israeli wars, a large number of Palestinian refugees poured into Lebanon and other Arab countries. The influx of Palestinians made the already tense situation in Lebanon worse, and the ensuing civil war lasted more than 15 years. The 1992 peace accord that was signed by all warring parties promises, once and for all, to bring lasting peace to Lebanon.

The recent positive changes in Lebanon have not had a similar impact for the Palestinians. Lebanon's immigration policies treat Palestinians as foreigners who "do not have the right to participate in national elections, they are forced to reside in designated areas, and are denied social security and other social services" (Wilkenfeld 1994d, Sect: Overview). Furthermore, those Palestinians who are able to sell their manual labor on the black market are subject to a great degree of discrimination by other ethnic groups in Lebanon.

The manner in which Palestinians are treated in Lebanon, along with the fact that they have been left out of the Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement (i.e., no provisions for the right of return of these people to their homeland), has created an environment in which they feel they are on their own and must do anything possible to protect themselves. As a result, Palestinians in Lebanon have remained a highly mobilized ethnic group. Military organizations such as the Fatah Revolutionary Council (FRC) and the Popular Liberation for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) have been able to gain tremendous support among the Palestinians in Lebanon.

Palestinians in Lebanon, one can argue, have the worst status among all ethnic groups in the Middle East. They are



subject to discrimination by their fellow Arabs; they have been rejected by the Palestinian leadership in the Occupied Territories; and, of course, they cannot go back to their homeland because Israel will not let them. As the situation for the Palestinians in Lebanon worsens, the greater is the tendency on their part to remain mobilized and continue their struggle against both the Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and the Lebanese military forces.

#### Saharawis (Morocco)

There are approximately two hundred thousand Saharawis scattered in the territory known as the Western Sahara. The Saharawis of Western Sahara are Sunni Muslims made up of 22 nomadic tribes. The history of the Saharawis is fully intertwined with the Spanish colonial rule in the region. In late seventeenth century the Spanish claimed Western Sahara as a protectorate and were able to establish administrative agencies that controlled the region up until 1975 (Fox 1995e). Throughout the Spanish rule the Saharawis were active in showing their feelings of resentment toward the colonial authorities. In fact, serious anti-colonial activities began in earnest in the mid-1960s when the Saharawis' mobilization efforts led to the creation of the

Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguiet el Hamara and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO).

The Saharawis' desire to gain independence became complicated when, upon Spanish withdrawal in 1975, King Hassan of Morocco claimed sovereignty over Western Sahara. This claim on the part of Morocco, which was the result of King Hassan's strategy to stabilize his regime, obviously displeased the Saharawis. As a result, the Saharawis in 1976 declared the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as an independent country and directed their struggle toward the Moroccan authorities and military forces. According to Fox, SADR is recognized by more than 75 countries and is favored by such international organizations as the United Nations as the sole legitimate authority in Western Sahara.

The Saharawis' grievances are based on the Moroccan government's systematic actions in their homeland. These actions include "repressing demonstrations, engaging in mass arrests and probably torture, sending warplanes which occasionally open fire over the western Sahara, illegally moving people across the border" (Fox 1995e, Sect: Risk Assessment). All these actions have only strengthened the Saharawis' resolve to acquire a high level of military mobilization and fight even harder against the occupying forces.

### Croats and Serbs (Bosnia-Herzegovina)

In early 1992, when the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina's mainly Muslim population voted to secede from the Yugoslav Federation, the three main ethnic groups in that country began a war against each other that resulted in thousands of deaths, genocide, and ethnic cleansing perpetrated by all the factions in the conflict.

Historically, Bosnia-Herzegovina, like the rest of the Balkans, has been fought for and influenced by many different cultures. In the sixth century, the Slavs established their first settlement in the region. The Balkans subsequently were the scene of migration and invasions by Roman Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and Muslims, which led to the current diversity of the region (Kurth 1995a).

Bosnia-Herzegovina, one of the countries that emerged from the break-up of Yugoslavia is located in the Balkans, bordering Croatia and Serbia. Three ethnic groups comprise most of its population: Muslims (44 percent), Serbs (33 percent), and Croats (17 percent). All three ethnic groups speak Serbo-Croatian, which is a Slavic language. The ethnic groups differ in religious affiliation. The non-Muslim population are mainly divided into two groups: The

Croats are predominantly Catholic Christians, while Serbs are followers of the Eastern Orthodox church (Kurth 1995a).

The religious affiliation is important because, historically, the different groups have been influenced by political and ideological developments in parts of the world that share their religious identity. Bosnian Muslims have maintained a connection to the Muslim world. Croats have looked toward the rest of Europe, from where they were ruled for centuries. The Serbs have traditionally had close ties with the Russians.

As noted earlier, the trouble in Bosnia began when it was declared an independent country in 1992 and the international community immediately recognized it as such. The Muslim-initiated independence move was opposed by ethnic Serbs on one side and ethnic Croats on the other side. The Serbs wanted "to remain aligned with the Serb-dominated government of Yugoslavia," and ethnic Croats living in Bosnia "favored the secession from Yugoslavia, but wanted to unite with Croatia, rather than remain in a Muslim-dominated Bosnian state" (Kurth 1995a, Sect: Overview).

In the ensuing civil war that lasted until late 1995, different forms of alliances among these three ethnic groups were formed, which caused a great deal of suffering for all parties involved in the conflict. Ultimately the Dayton

peace agreement, signed by all the warring parties at the behest of the United States, seems to have been able at least for now, to subdue the rage that exists among these ethnic groups. Of course, the presence of thousands of peace-keeping forces has been instrumental in keeping the warring parties separate from each others' sphere of influence in Bosnia.

The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is dominated by religious ferment. The leaders, who seem to have a sense of mind control over their population, have played an instrumental role in keeping their followers mobilized. Outside forces with colonial-type influence on every faction in the conflict have not helped the situation. In such a context, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina remains tense. The greatest test for peace in this country comes when, in the not so distant future, the U.N. and NATO peace-keeping troops leave the country and once again these religious ethnic groups are forced to co-exist without supervision.

#### Serbs (Croatia)

There are approximately 250,000 Serbs living in the Eastern region of Croatia. The recent crisis in Croatia is traced to June 1991, when Croatia declared its independence. Croatian independence caused the Serbian militia in the

newly established country to form alliances with their fellow Serbs in the former Yugoslavian army and start a rebellion that has had devastating consequences for the population on both sides.

According to Steven Kurth (1995b), the origins of the historical conflict between Croats and Serbs go back to the period during World War II when Yugoslavia was overrun by German and Italian troops. The occupying forces installed a Croatian government that was extremely anti-Serb in nature, and atrocities committed against the Serbs in this period are well documented. Needless to say, upon Axis's defeat and Tito's takeover of Yugoslavia and installation of a Serbian-dominated regime there, the Croats suffered reprisals.

At the outset of Croatia's declaration of independence in 1991, the ethnic Serbs in that country who were afraid of a repeat of past brutal repression, with the assistance of fellow Serbs in Yugoslavia, waged a rebellion that resulted in occupation of more than 75 percent of Croatia (Kurth 1995b). After four years of fighting and accusations of "ethnic cleansing" on both sides, the Croatian army was successful in capturing the lost territories, which in turn resulted in massive expulsion of thousands of Serbs and brutal reprisal against Serbs who had remained in Croatia.

Today the remaining Serbs in Croatia live in constant fear. This is in spite of the presence of the United Nations' forces to assure the safety and security of all ethnic groups in that country. As a result, the Serbs have kept a high degree of mobilization and feel compelled to remain so while the Croatian government refuses to guarantee safety and security of all ethnic groups in that country.

#### Chechens (Russia)

There are approximately 1,000,000 Chechens who call the southern region of Russia, just north of Georgia, home. The Chechens are Sunni Muslims and consider themselves as having been colonized by the imperialistic forces of Russia in the past three centuries. The recent rebellion of Chechens, according to Dravis (1996a), is nothing but the continuation of their resistance to three centuries of an "inexorable cycle of persecution by Russians" (Sect: Overview).

Islam is considered to be as the unifying factor that has allowed the Chechens to become highly mobilized and sustain an intense resistance to Russianification. The impact of the Chechens' cohesiveness could easily be observed during the intense war that went on between them and the Russian forces for almost two years. The Chechens, despite their inferior equipment and arms, were able to keep

Russian forces in check and to inflict heavy casualties on them.

The Chechen superiority and the Russians' heavy casualties finally forced the Russian government to start a negotiation process that has resulted in the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from the traditional homeland of the Chechens (Dravis 1996a).

Despite Russian withdrawal and the extension of a great deal of autonomy to the Chechens, the situation in Chechenya remains tense. This is due to the fact that the Chechens have not given up on their demands to secede from Russia and form their own independent country. Russian authorities, on the other hand, have made it clear that they would not allow that. In such a context, the prospects for a lasting peace in Chechenya are unlikely and chances are that, sooner or later, we may be observing renewed violence and bloodshed in that province.

#### Summary and Evaluation

This chapter is a descriptive study and evaluation of the historical experiences of the 42 ethnic groups that, as of 1995, had acquired a high degree of military mobilization (The explanation as to how level of mobilization for each



group is determined has already been forwarded in Chapter 1; each group's level of military mobilization is also summarized in Appendix D).

The goal in this chapter is to identify historical patterns that may have contributed to certain ethnic groups' high level of military mobilization. The hope is to identify some of those common historical factors that have contributed to the highly mobilized ethnic groups' adoption of violent means in their relationship with their state authorities.

It is important at this point to address some of the shortcomings associated with Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset. This data set was created using content analysis. As Johnson and Joslyn (1995) point out, there are numerous disadvantages associated with this method of analysis (253-55). First, the source of information may be biased, wrong, or it may not be complete. Second, the coder may lack adequate knowledge of the region, country, and the ethnic group that he/she is coding.

As a result of these inherent problems with content analysis method, the Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset may suffer from certain errors and limitations. For instance, one error which may be attributed to coders' lack of knowledge is evident in the manner in which this data set

has treated the Indian population in such countries as Guatemala and Mexico. This data set lumps together several diverse and distinctive Indian groups of Guatemala, and refers to them as an "Indigeneous Group." Similarly, the Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset treats Mayans of Mexico as if they are a homogeneous group of people without linguistic and political diversity. It is with respect to such errors that one must take special care when using any data set that is constructed based upon content analysis method.

With respect to the terminology used in this part of the study the following explanation is provided by the way of summary.

#### Ethnic Military Mobilization

Ethnic military mobilization has already been defined and operationalized in the early part of this work. See Chapter 1 for a detailed explanation.

#### Power-Sharing

In the analysis that follows in the following pages, the concept of power-sharing is treated to mean any arrangement in which ethnic groups within a nation-state entity are allowed to be part of the nation's decision

making apparatus. That is, the state authorities have adopted an inclusive approach toward minority ethnic groups in the daily affairs of the country. This part of the study focuses on clear signs of inclusivity on the part of the state authorities. For instance, are there any members of the minority ethnic groups in the cabinet of the ruling party? Or for that matter, is there an official agreement between state authorities and minority ethnic groups for some form of power sharing arrangements?

#### Leadership

The concept of leadership is difficult to measure or, for that matter, to assess. This part of the study is not concerned with personal qualities of an effective leader or whether a self-proclaimed leader has been successful in accomplishing the goals set for his/her ethnic group as a whole. This part of the study is concerned with the mere presence of an individual or a group of individuals who act as decision makers and spokespersons for the ethnic group as a whole. In the determination as to the existence of a leader or group of leaders among members of an ethnic group, this study uses the descriptive data in the Minorities at Risk Project and focuses on the notion that the person or

persons proclaiming leadership enjoy support among at least a simple majority of the ethnic group's population.

#### Exposure to Colonialism

The concept of colonialism or colonial power refers to any non-indigenous power that takes over the control of a society's daily political and economic affairs. To determine whether an ethnic group or a nation-state has had some form of experience with a colonial power (i.e., exposure to colonialism), this study focuses exclusively on historical facts and precedents. The study of historical precedents in the following sections revolves exclusively around this notion of determining when a colonial power was in existence in a country and, more importantly, how the presence of such colonial entity in that society shaped the lives of ethnic minorities presently residing in that country.

The level of analysis in this part of the study is nation-state. Historical patterns and precedents for each of the 42 highly mobilized ethnic groups are studied in order to gather data regarding four specific questions we are concerned with in this part of the study. The four questions are as follows:

1. Relative to the total population of the country of residence and in compare to other ethnic groups in that country, is the ethnic group under study in minority or majority?

2. Is the ethnic group involved in any form of power-sharing arrangement in the country of residence? And, has a power-sharing arrangement lead to lower levels of military mobilization?

3. Is there a leader or group of leaders who are well respected and followed by a majority of the group members? Does the presence of such leaders advance the cause of mobilization?

4. Has the ethnic group's country of residence ever been colonized? If so, what have been the consequences of such experience for a specific ethnic group under study?

With respect to the above four questions, the result of study of the available historical information on each group shows that, as of 1995, of the 42 militarily mobilized ethnic groups, three were in an outright majority in their respective countries of residence. Eight were the largest groups in their respective countries of residence (Table 4.3). The remaining 34 had the status of minority. This status is acquired in relation to the existence of one dominant group in a society or is relative to the

combination of more than two other ethnic groups in that society.

Table 4.2  
Group Status for Militarily Mobilized Ethnic Groups  
in Respective Countries of Residence

Number of groups that comprise a majority	3
Number of groups that comprise a minority	39
Number of groups that comprise at least one-third of the total population	9
Number of groups that comprise at least one-quarter of the total population	11
Number of groups that comprise at least 10 percent of the total population	25

The results in Table 4.2 point to the fact that more than half of the ethnic groups in this section of the study made up at least 10 percent of the total population of their respective countries of residence. Hence, one is tempted to conclude that the relative size of the population of the ethnic group may have contributed to the group's acquiring a high level of military mobilization. This point is reiterated in Table 4.3, where, of the eight groups that are considered as the largest in their respective countries of

residence, four had acquired a level of mobilization of 4 or higher.

Table 4.3  
Ethnic Groups Comprising the Largest Groups  
in Their Country of Residence

Group Name and Country	Level of Mobilization	Percentage of Total Population
Ovimbundu (Angola)	3	37%
Southerner (Chad)	3	46%
Afars (Djibouti)	4	51%
Oromo (Ethiopia)	3	34%
Hutu (Rwanda)	6	80%
Pashtun (Afghanistan)	4	38%
Lhotshampa (Bhutan)	3	34%
Shi'a (Iraq)	4	51%

Table 4.4, on the other hand, shows the level of military mobilization and percentage of the total population for all the 42 ethnic groups with the highest level of military mobilization. By concentrating on the ethnic groups with the level of mobilization in the middle range

(i.e., level of mobilization of 4), we observe that, of the 18 ethnic groups in this category, 12 groups made up at least 10 percent or more of the population of their respective countries of residence. Furthermore, nine ethnic groups (50 percent of the groups) in this category made up at least one-fifth of the total population of their respective countries of residence.

It must also be noted that the ethnic groups with the highest level of mobilization (i.e., 6 or higher), are not necessarily the largest groups in their countries of residence. For instance, the Assemese and the Kashmiris make up a small percentage of the total population of India, yet they have acquired a high level of military mobilization. This is also true for the Chechens (with a level of mobilization of 8) and the Cabindas (with a level of mobilization of 6). Furthermore, we observe that some of the largest ethnic groups among the 42 groups studied fall into level 3 of military mobilization. Groups such as the Southerners (Chad), the Oromo (Ethiopia), and the Lhotshapnpas (Bhutan), are only some examples of the ethnic groups that make up a large portion of the population of their respective countries of residence yet have a lower level of mobilization compared to smaller groups with much higher levels of mobilization.



Table 4.4

Groups' Level of Mobilization and Their Percentage of the  
Total Population of the Country of Residence

Level of Mobilization	Group Name and Country of Residence	Groups' Population (Percent of the Total Population)
8	Chechen (Russia)	1.10
6	Assamese (India)	0.04
6	Kashmiri (India)	0.07
6	Moro (Phillippines)	7.00
6	Cabinda (Angola)	1.60
6	Hutu (Rwanda)	80.00
6	Kurd (Iraq)	23.00
4	Croat (Bosnia)	22.00
4	Serb (Croatia)	24.00
4	Hazara (Afghanistan)	19.00
4	Pashtun (Afghanistan)	38.00
4	Uzbek (Afghanistan)	12.00
4	Naga (India)	0.20
4	Tripura (India)	0.08
4	East Timorese (India)	0.40
4	Hmong (Laos)	4.00
4	Kurd (Iran)	9.00
4	Palestinian (Occupied Territories)	88.50
4	Shi'a (Iraq)	50.00
4	Saharavi (Morocco)	0.71
4	Kurd (Turkey)	18.00
4	Afar (Djibouti)	50.00
4	Tutsti (Rwanda)	17.00
4	Southerner (Sudan)	22.00
4	Indigenous People	38.00
3	Serb (Bosnia)	22.00
3	Lhotshanpa (Bhutan)	34.00
3	kachin (Myanmar)	1.00
3	Karen (Myanmar)	7.00
3	Bodo (India)	0.05
3	Bouganvillean (Papua New Guiana)	3.00
3	Tamil (Sri Lanka)	12.20
3	Muslim (Thailand)	3.00
3	Maronite ( Lebanon)	25.00

(table continues)

Table 4.4

Groups' Level of Mobilization and Their Percentage of the  
Total Population of the Country of Residence

Level of Mobilization	Group Name and Country of Residence	Groups' Population (Percent of the Total Population)
3	Palestinian (Lebanon)	10.00
3	Ovimbundu (Angola)	37.00
3	Southerner (Chad)	46.00
3	Oromo (Ethiopia)	34.00
3	Tuareg (Mali)	5.00
3	Tuareg (Niger)	14.00
3	Diola (Senegal)	11.00
3	Mayan (Mexico)	14.00

Although an ethnic group makes up only a small portion of the total population of the country it is residing in, it may have acquired a high level of military mobilization. Of course, the opposite is also true; an ethnic group may be in the majority and yet have a low level of military mobilization. So, is there a correlation between an ethnic group's percentage of total population and its level of mobilization? Analysis of data from the 1945-95 Minorities at Risk Phase III yields a Pearson's correlation coefficient ( $r$ ) of  $-0.031$  (one-tailed test).

Based on the above observations and correlation analysis, we can conclude that, for the 42 groups in this part of the study, no direct relationship between a group's

level of mobilization and its percentage of total population in the country of residence was observed.

As for the second question in this chapter, for the 42 countries in this part of the study, minority or majority status did not necessarily translate into any type of power-sharing arrangement. Of the 42 highly mobilized ethnic groups, only two (Hmongs and Oromos) were involved in some form of power-sharing arrangement with their respective state authorities. Interestingly, these two groups have nothing in common. The Hmong make up 4 percent of the total population in Laos, and have a military mobilization level of 4. In comparison, the Oromos make up 34 percent of the total population in Ethiopia, and have a military mobilization level of 3.

We can argue that, most probably, a lack of involvement in the state's decision-making process is just one factor, among many, leading these ethnic groups to a high level of military mobilization. Therefore, we cannot and, indeed, should not overemphasize the lack of involvement in the political process as the sole cause of the high level of military mobilization among the 42 ethnic groups in this part of the study.

The third question raised in this section concerns the role of leadership in the mobilization process of ethnic

groups. As can be observed in Table 4.5, as of 1995, of the 42 highly mobilized ethnic groups in this part of the study, 27 had leaders who were actively involved in promoting a higher level of mobilization for their respective ethnic group.

Table 4.5  
Groups With Active Leadership and Their Level  
of Mobilization

Level of Mobilization	Group Name and Country of Residence
3	Serbs (Bosnia)
3	Ovimbundu (Angola)
3	Southerner (Chad)
3	Diola (Senegal)
3	Bodo (India)
3	Bouganvillean (Papua New Guiana)
3	Mayan (Mexico)
3	Maronite (Lebanon)
3	Palestinian (Lebanon)
4	Croats (Bosnia)
4	Serbs (Croatia)
4	Afar (Djibouti)
4	Tutsi (Rwanda)
4	Southerner (Sudan)
4	Hazara (Afghanistan)
4	Pashtun (Afghanistan)
4	Uzbek (Afghanistan)
4	Naga (India)
4	Tripura (India)
4	Asseme (India)
4	East Timorese (India)
4	Kurd (Iran)

(table continues)

Table 4.5  
Groups With Active Leadership and Their Level  
of Mobilization

Level of Mobilization	Group Name and Country of Residence
4	Palestinians (Occ. Ter.)
6	Hutu (Rwanda)
6	Kashmiri (India)
6	Moro (Phillippines)
6	Kurd (Iraq)

It is noteworthy that 16 of the 24 ethnic groups with active leadership had acquired military mobilization levels of 4 and 6. That is, a great majority of these ethnic groups had acquired some of the highest degrees of military mobilization. The presence of active leaders appears to advance the cause of mobilization among members of an ethnic group. The reality is that leaders by promoting group solidarity and putting forth specific goals for the group as a whole have been able to unify group members. These goals which, more often than not, reflect the historical grievances of the group members, give the group a concrete purpose and direction. Purpose and direction, more often than not, translate into demands for more autonomy and possible independence. All these factors seem to indicate

that the presence of leadership, more often than not, leads to a higher level of demands on the part of ethnic groups, which in turn, can translate to a higher level of military mobilization.

The last question, and perhaps the most important one, concerns the ethnic groups' direct or indirect exposure to some form of colonial rule since the end of nineteenth century. As can be observed in Table 4.6, of the 42 militarily mobilized ethnic groups, 36 have had some direct or indirect form of experience with colonial rule. Is the past experience with colonialism by an ethnic group or by its respective country of residence correlated to the present level of mobilization? Analyzing data from the 1945-95 Minorities at Risk Phase III yields that the Pearson's correlation coefficient ( $r$ ) is  $-0.125$  (significant at 0.01 level, one-tailed test) which implies a weak negative correlation between past experience with colonial rule and present level of mobilization.

Table 4.6

## Groups' Level of Mobilization and Exposure to Colonial Rule

Level of Mobilization	Group Name and Colonizing Countries
3	Ovimbundu (Portugal)
3	Southerner-Chad (France)
3	Oromo (Italy)
3	Tuareg-Mali (France)
3	Tuareg-Niger (France)
3	Diola (Britain/France)
3	Lhotshmpa (Britain)
3	Kachin (Britain)
3	Karen (Britain)
3	Bodo (Britain)
3	Bougainvillean (Australia/Germany)
3	Tamil (Britain)
3	Mayan (Spain)
3	Maronite (France)
3	Palestinian-Lebanon (Israel)
4	Afar (France)
4	Tutsi (Belgium/Germany)
4	Southerner-Sudan (Britain)
4	Hazara (Russia)
4	Pashtun (Russia)
4	Uzbek (Russia)
4	Naga (Britain)
4	Tripura (Britain)
4	East Timorese (Portugal)
4	Hmong (China)
4	Indigenous (Spain)
4	Kurd-Iran (Britain)
4	Palestinian-Israel (Britain/Israel)
4	Saharawi (Spain)
4	Kurd-Turkey (Britain)
6	Moro (Spain/USA)
6	Cabinda (Portugal)
6	Hutu (Belgium/Germany)
6	Kashmiri (Britain)
6	Assame (Britain)
6	Kurd-Iraq (Britain)

For the groups in Table 4.6, colonial rule has generally been associated with economic, political, and social devastation. Colonial powers, in order to extract as much from their colonies as possible, were constantly involved in systematic undermining of the indigenous economies and cultures of native people. In such a context, as Ted Gurr (1994) points out, these colonial rulers were not hesitant, for instance, to forcibly move large numbers of people from one end of the territory to the other. In fact, most were involved in the practice of introducing new ethnic groups to areas where their economic interests necessitated such actions. Furthermore, the post-World War I period is full of instances in which colonial powers drew artificial boundaries and arbitrarily created nation-states with absolutely no regard to the ethnic make-up and cultural background of the original inhabitants ( Fromkin 1989, 26-38).

The unspoken general theme of "divide and rule," which was the general policy of such colonial rulers as Great Britain, had the sole purpose of creating a high degree of animosity among different ethnic groups in their domain. This hatred and animosity among ethnic groups meant that one group would be used to keep another in check, hence, facilitating the management of the vast colonies. It was in



such a context that, for instance, people of diverse ethnic backgrounds within the British colonies were either forced, or through financial incentives and promises of better jobs, were encouraged to migrate and settle throughout the British Empire (Fromkin 1989, 351-379). The consequences of those policies have been the creation of regions and countries with no ethnic homogeneity; often those ethnic groups that were forced to live next to each other were sworn enemies. As Gurr and Harff (1994) point out, "In some cases rival ethnic groups were forcibly merged into one new nation; other groups were divided among several states" (p. 22). The reason behind these actions, among other things, was to keep the ethnic groups occupied with each other while the colonial ruler was robbing them of their wealth and natural resources.

The data, as operationalized in this study reveal a slight negative impact of colonial experience on ethnic military mobilization. It is, however, important to note that based on such cases as Guatemala and Rwanda (just to name a few) the past experience with colonialism does appear to have effects on the present ethnopolitical condition of these countries. These effects, however, are not captured by the methods used in this study.

In summary, even though a great majority (36 out of 42) of highly mobilized ethnic groups have had some form of direct or indirect experience with a colonial power in the period since World War I, there is no evidence to prove that past actions of the colonial rulers have contributed to the contemporary ethnic conflicts in many of the countries under study.

Thus, with respect to the above discussion, it is important to search for other contributing factors that may have had a role in the mobilization of ethnic groups and the military nature of their activities. The remainder of this study focuses on the external factors and the manner in which they may have contributed to the military mobilization of ethnic groups.

## CHAPTER 5

### METHODOLOGY, DATA ANALYSIS, AND FINDINGS

#### Definitions and Operationalization of Terms Used in This Study

The primary purpose of this study is to introduce a number of new variables that deal exclusively with the environment outside of the country in which an ethnic group resides. The research focuses on the notion that these "external factors" directly or indirectly contribute to ethnic group's military mobilization and hence deserve to be studied and analyzed in a more detailed manner. Ethnic groups militarily mobilize themselves in advance of waging a war against their respective authorities. The first step in understanding any type of ethnic conflict is the development of a better comprehension as to why and how ethnic military mobilization occurs. In such a context, it is imperative at the outset to provide a clear definition and meaning of all the terms used in this portion of the study. The following is a summary of the manner in which different terms are used and operationalized throughout the remainder of this work.

#### Ethnic Groups

A brief review of the literature on ethnicity reveals numerous definitions of ethnic groups, each with its own merit and importance. Scholars such as Gurr and Harrf (1994) perceive ethnic groups as "psychological communities whose members share a persisting sense of shared historical experience and valued cultural traits--beliefs, language, ways of life, a common homeland" (5). Cohen (1974), on the other hand, defines an ethnic group as "a collectivity of people who share some patterns of normative behavior and form part of a larger population" (ix). Horowitz (1985) uses the same definition as that of Cohen but adds the notions of kinship and common origin to explain ethnic groups (32-38).

Anthony Smith (1986) goes even farther and identifies an ethnic group as "a social group whose members share a sense of common origins, claim a common and distinctive history and destiny, possess one or more distinctive characteristics, and feel a sense of collective uniqueness and solidarity" (65). In a later work Smith expands on the above definition and explicates the following five criteria that must be present in order for an entity to be considered an ethnic group: Cultural differences, territorial contiguity, a relatively large population, external political relations of conflict and alliance with similar

groups, and considerable group sentiment and loyalty (Yun 1990, 531).

The above definitions are similar, and all can satisfy the purpose of this work. As a result, an ethnic group is defined here as a combination of the definitions mentioned above: An ethnic group is any group whose members are either a majority or minority in the society, with an enduring and persisting collective identity based on a way of life and some cultural traits such as religion, language, common history, place of residence, and race.

#### Ethnopolitical Groups

According to Gurr and Haxton (1996), ethnopolitical groups are any groups that "have acquired political significance in the contemporary world because of their status and political actions" (2). In this work, as in their Minorities at Risk project, an ethnopolitical group is defined as any group that meets either of two criteria:

The group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other groups in a society. The group is the basis for political mobilization and action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests. (Gurr and Haxton 1996, 2)

### Ethnic Military Mobilization (MILMOB)

In this study, ethnic mobilization and ethnic military mobilization are measured in the same manner as those in the Minorities at Risk Phase III project. For a detailed discussion of these variables see Chapter 4.

### External Political Support (ISPOL)

This variable refers to all the passive support that ethnic groups receive from any source outside of the country in which they reside. It must be noted that the source of assistance is not of great importance or concern in this part of the study. What is important is the nature of support that ethnic groups receive from international/external sources.

The Minorities at Risk Phase III project provides a list of the forms of political assistance that groups can receive from the outside world. Indeed, this is how the project has measured and operationalized the independent variable of external political support. The list used in this study is as follows (Minorities at Risk Project User's Manual 1996, 36):

- 0 No support recorded
- 1 Ideological encouragement
- 2 Non-military financial support

- 3 Access to external markets and communications
- 4 Peacekeeping units, or instituting a blockade

The above list, provided by the Minorities at Risk Project, was used for the period between 1990 and 1995. The three indicators of ISPOL90 (international political support for the period 1990-91), ISPOL92 (international political support for the period 1992-93), and ISPOL94 (international political support 1994-95) summarize all forms of international political support for each biennium. According to the Minorities at Risk Project Users Manual the forms of political assistance received by an ethnic group are rescaled into an ordinal scale and only the highest occurrence of support from any external source was recorded. For instance, if an external source provided an ethnic group with both symbolic support (i.e., ideological encouragement) and tangible support (i.e., non-military financial support), only the latter was recorded. In such a context the lowest support an ethnic group received from external sources (i.e., ideological or diplomatic support) is coded as one, and the highest form of political support by external forces (i.e., external sources providing peacekeeping forces or instituting an economic blockade on behalf of the ethnic group) is recorded as four.

### External Military Support (ISMIL)

This variable addresses the more active support that ethnic groups receive from the sources outside of their country of residence. That is, all types of assistance that falls outside the realm of political support make up the context of this variable. The best way to categorize non-political support is to consider it as being militarily oriented. Hence, in considering the types of military support that are extended to groups, this study used criteria similar to those in the Minorities at Risk Project. For instance, the external military support variable is operationalized using the following list that summarizes the types of military supports extended to ethnic groups from outside sources (Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset Users Manual 1996, 37):

- 0 No military support is received
- 1 Funds for military supplies or military equipments are provided
- 2 Military training and military advisors are provided
- 3 Rescue missions and cross-border raids are extended
- 4 Cross-border sanctuaries and in-country combat units are provided



The above list, which is utilized by the Minorities at Risk Project, summarizes all forms of external military support for the period between 1990 and 1995. The three indicators of ISMIL90 (international military support for the period 1990-91), ISMIL92 (international military support for the period 1992-93), and ISMIL94 (international military support for the period 1994-95) summarize all forms of international military support for each biennium. As was the case with international political support, the Minorities at Risk Project Users Manual points out that the forms of military assistance received by an ethnic group are rescaled into an ordinal scale and only the highest occurrence of military support from any external source was recorded. For instance, if an external source provided an ethnic group with both funds for the purchase of military supplies and facilities for military training, only the latter is recorded. In such a context, the lowest military support an ethnic group could have received (i.e., funds for military supplies or direct shipment of military equipment) is coded as one, and the highest military support an ethnic group could have received from an external source (i.e., cross-border sanctuaries, or in-country combat units) is coded as four (Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset Users Manual 1996, 37).

### International Contagion (ICON)

This concept addresses the indirect effect that one group's actions can have on other groups in the region. As Gurr (1993b) writes, "Contagion refers to the processes by which one group's actions provide inspiration and strategic and tactical guidance for groups elsewhere" (134). More specifically, contagion refers to the ways in which anti-regime activities in other countries by a non-kindred group affect the levels of anti-regime activity in a given group (Minorities at Risk Project User's Manual 1996, 48). It is imperative to note that this concept addresses all the indirect effects that regional protest and rebellion (by any group) can have on an ethnic group within a country. In such a context, for purposes of analysis, this study, as in the Minorities at Risk project, would consider all types of rebellions and protests in the region where an ethnic group resides as having had some kind of an effect on its tendency to militarily mobilize against its respective state authorities. Therefore, in this study, as in the Minorities at Risk Phase III project, international contagion is measured by calculating the mean level of protest and rebellion for a group's region of residence.

An explanation of what "Mean Level of Protest and Rebellion" means and utilized in the Minorities at Risk project is necessary at this point.

This part of the study is concerned with the general effect of protest and rebellion by any group in the region of residence. That is, the question raised here has to do with the extent to which actions (i.e., protest and rebellion) on the part of non-kindred groups in the region can be considered as a factor in encouraging an ethnic group to mobilize itself militarily against its respective regime. Hence, this part of study in a similar fashion as that of Minorities at Risk project has focused on all types of activities that would not, in the context of rebellion and protest, be considered as extreme. That is, a middle range for all values of protest and rebellion was identified, and those mean values are used to measure the contagion effect on an ethnic group's military mobilization.

According to the Minorities at Risk Project the following types of actions on the part of any group are considered as protest against that group's respective regime (Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset Users Manual 1996, 76):

- 0 None reported
- 1 Verbal opposition toward the regime (i.e., public letters, petitions, posters, publications of anti-regime materials)
- 2 scattered acts of symbolic resistance against the regime (e.g. sit-ins, blockade of traffic, sabotage, symbolic destruction of property)
- 3 Political activity on a substantial scale (e.g. demanding autonomy)
- 4 Demonstrations, rallies, and strikes involving less than 10,000 participants
- 5 Demonstrations, rallies, and strikes involving between 10,000 and 100,000 participants
- 6 Demonstrations, rallies, and strikes involving more than 100,000 participants

In a similar fashion, the Minorities at Risk Project provides the following list, which was utilized to measure rebellion (1996, 76):

- 0 None reported
- 1 Political banditry, sporadic terrorism
- 2 Campaigns of terrorism
- 3 Local rebellions: armed attempts to seize power in a locale

- 4 Small scale guerrilla activity (e.g. fewer than 1000 armed forces, sporadic armed attacks, attacks in a small part of the area occupied by
- 5 Large-scale guerrilla activity (e.g. more than 1000 armed fighters, frequent armed attacks, attacks affecting large part of the area occupied by group
- 6 Protracted civil war fought by rebel's military forces

It must be noted that this study is mainly concerned with the occurrence of protest and rebellion in the region in which the ethnic group under study resides. In such a context, as in the Minorities at Risk Project, rebellion and protest were recorded when they occurred in the adjoining countries (Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset Users Manual 1996, 48). Three indicators of ICONPRO7 (international contagion of protest for 1970s), ICONPRO8 (international contagion of protest for 1980s), and ICONPRO9 (international contagion of protest for 1990-1995) summarize the spread of protest in the region of residence for an ethnic group under study. On the other hand, the three indicators of ICONREB7 (international contagion of rebellion for 1970s), ICONREB8 (international contagion of rebellion for 1980s), and ICONREB9 (international contagion of rebellion for 1990-95)

summarize the spread of rebellion in the region of residence for an ethnic group under study.

#### International Diffusion (IDIF)

This concept is similar to "international contagion" in the sense that it addresses the notion that conflict in one country has the potential to expand across international boundaries. The main difference between international diffusion and contagion lies in the fact that the former involves kindred groups in the adjoining country or the region in which the ethnic group resides.

Gurr (1993a) refers to diffusion as the "spillover" processes by which conflict in one country directly affects political organization and action in adjoining countries (133). The manifestation of such spillover can be observed, for instance, in the relative ease with which political activists and dissidents in one country can obtain "sanctuary and support" from their kindred groups in other countries (Gurr 1993a, 175). More than two-thirds of the 268 groups considered in this study have kindred groups in one or more adjacent countries or in the region in which they reside.

This study uses the same definition of international diffusion as that of Minorities at Risk Project. That is,

international diffusion is referred to as the "demonstration effect of anti-regime activity by a group in one country to kindred groups in other countries" (Minorities at Risk Project, User's Manual, 1996, 48). More specifically, the focus is on the dynamics of the interaction between kindred groups; that is, the extent to which political action by one segment of an ethnic group facilitates political mobilization and action by other segments (Gurr 1993b, 179-182). International diffusion, therefore, is measured by recording "the highest incidence of protest and rebellion by kindred groups in adjoining countries" for three different periods of 1970s, 1980s, and 1990-95 (Minorities at Risk Project User's Manual, 48).

As in the case of International Contagion, a brief explanation as to how the Minorities at Risk Project operationalizes the concepts of protest and rebellion is desirable. According to the Minorities at Risk Project the following types of actions on the part of any group are considered as protest against that group's respective regime (Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset Users Manual 1996, 76):

0     None reported

- 1 Verbal opposition toward the regime (i.e., public letters, petitions, posters, publications of anti-regime materials
- 2 scattered acts of symbolic resistance against the regime (e.g. sit-ins, blockade of traffic, sabotage, symbolic destruction of property)
- 3 Political activity on a substantial scale (e.g. demanding autonomy)
- 4 Demonstrations, rallies, and strikes involving less than 10,000 participants
- 5 Demonstrations, rallies, and strikes involving between 10,000 and 100,000 participants
- 6 Demonstrations, rallies, and strikes involving more than 100,000 participants

In a similar fashion, the Minorities at Risk Project provides the following list, which was utilized to measure rebellion (1996, 76):

- 0 None reported
- 1 Political banditry, sporadic terrorism
- 2 Campaigns of terrorism
- 3 Local rebellions: armed attempts to seize power in a locale



- 4 Small scale guerrilla activity (e.g. fewer than 1000 armed forces, sporadic armed attacks, attacks in a small part of the area occupied by
- 5 Large-scale guerrilla activity (e.g. more than 1000 armed fighters, frequent armed attacks, attacks affecting large part of the area occupied by group
- 6 Protracted civil war fought by rebel's military forces

As mentioned earlier, this part of the study addresses the question of how protest and rebellion in the adjoining countries affect the process of military mobilization of an ethnic group. Indeed, this is how the Minorities at Risk Project has treated the whole notion of rebellion and protest. That is, only those rebellions and protests that occurred in the adjoining country of residence for an ethnic group were recorded (Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset Users Manual 1996, 48). Three indicators of IDIFPRO7 (protest by international segment of an ethnic group in the 1970s), IDIFPRO8 (protest by international segment of an ethnic group in the 1980s), and IDIFPRO9 (protest by international segment of an ethnic group in the 1990-95 period) summarize the spread of protest in the adjoining countries of an ethnic group's kindreds. On the other hand,

the three indicators of IDIFREB7 (rebellion by international segment of an ethnic group in the 1970s), IDIFREB8 (rebellion by international segment of an ethnic group in the 1980s), and IDIFREB9 (rebellion by international segment of an ethnic group in the 1990-95 period) summarize the spread of rebellion in the adjoining countries of an ethnic group's kindred.

#### Regional Poverty

Much has been said and written about the material inequalities that exist between the poor and the rich nations or the so-called North and South. This study goes beyond the predominant tendency among social scientists to dichotomize the material differences among nations. The focus of this study, in the context of regional poverty, centers on the systemic poverty that exists within the seven regions under study (see Appendix C for details on the economic background of countries in each region). This study is not necessarily concerned with the degree or intensity of poverty that exists within a country. That would be an internal factor which contributes to ethnopolitical conflict in a country and is beyond the scope of this study.

There are numerous ways in which the term regional poverty can be operationalized. In this study I use population weighted Gross Domestic Product or Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (GDPPC) as an indicator of the level of poverty in a region. Since here the main concern revolves around the environment that may be conducive to the creation of higher levels of mobilization among ethnic groups, the economic status of each of the seven regions had to be estimated separately. In order to gain a more accurate picture of the economic status of the countries under study, the data on GDP for five consecutive years (1990-95) were used to determine the average GDP per capita for every country in a particular region. Furthermore, in order to have a more accurate estimate of regional poverty, population weighted Gross Domestic Product or Gross Domestic Product per Capita (GDPPC) was calculated for each region.

With respect to the missing data it must be noted that the economic data for some of the Eastern European countries and ex-Soviet republics were either not available or were incomplete at best. Hence, countries with no available economic data for the period 1990-95 were not included in the calculation of the regional GDPPC. These included such countries as Albania, Armenia, Bosnia, etc. (See Appendix C). On the other hand, for the six countries of Czech

Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus which had only partial economic data available a different technique had to be used. A method by which the missing data situation can be handled is to calculate the average GDP for a country with the missing data (using the available data) and substituting that average in place of the missing data. This, however, would not have changed the final averages observed in Appendix C. Therefore, rather than creating imaginary GDP's for the years that such data are missing, I have used only the available partial data to calculate each country's average GDP per capita and consequently average GDP per capita for each region.

#### Control Variables

In this study I will use the political discrimination (POLDIS90), economic discrimination (ECDIS90), and cultural restrictions (CULRES90) in the period 1990-95 as control variables in the multiple regression model that will be put forth in the latter part of this chapter.

According to the Minorities at Risk Project political discrimination refers to any form of neglect and/or exclusion that ethnic groups suffer at the hands of their respective state authorities. The category labels are as

follow (Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset Users Manual 1996, 24):

- 0 No discrimination
- 1 Neglect / remedial policies
- 2 Neglect / no remedial policies
- 3 Social exclusion / neutral policies
- 4 Formal exclusion / repressive policies

In the same vein as political discrimination, economic discrimination also refers to patterns of economic neglect and restrictions that ethnic group may have suffered during the period 1990-95. The categories are described in the following (Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset Users Manual 1996, 29):

- 0 No discrimination
- 1 Historical neglect / remedial policies
- 2 Historical neglect / no remedial policies
- 3 Social exclusion / neutral policies
- 4 restrictive policies

Cultural restrictions, on the other hand, refer to a series of activities on the part of the state authorities for the sole purpose of preventing an ethnic group from practicing what in general term can be considered as

cultural activities. According to the Minorities at Risk Project some of these restrictions can be summarized as follow (Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset Users Manual 1996, 69):

- restrictions on observance of group religion
- restrictions on speaking and publishing in group's language or dialect
- restrictions on instruction in group's language
- restrictions on celebration of group's holidays, ceremonies, cultural events
- restrictions on dress, appearance, behavior
- restrictions on marriage, family life
- restrictions on organizations that promote their group's cultural interests

The Minorities at Risk Project puts forth the following category labels for cultural restrictions:

- 0 No significant restrictions on the activities
- 1 activity is restricted by widespread but informal social practice, e.g. by discrimination against people who follow group customs or use the group's language
- 2 activity is somewhat restricted by public policy

- 3 activity is prohibited or sharply restricted by public policy

Table 5.1 summarizes the variables used in this part of the study, along with their codes and values.

Table 5.1

Variables Name/Abbreviation, Codes, and Values

Variables name/abbreviation	Codes/Values
Military Mobilization (MILMOB)	0=no military mobilization 1=Low levels of military mobilization 2=Low levels of military mobilization 3=High levels of military mobilization 4=High Levels of military mobilization 6=High levels of military mobilization 8=Highest levels of military mobilization
Scope of Support for Military/Illegal Organization (MILSCOP)	0=No support for any organization 1=Limited: None of the military Organizations supported by more than 1/10 of the group members 2=Medium: the largest military Organization is supported by no more than a quarter of the group members. 3=High: the largest organization is supported by at least half of the group members. 4=Highest: the largest organization is supported by at least 3/4 of the group members.

(table continues)

Table 5.1

## Variables Name/Abbreviation, Codes, and Values

Variables name/abbreviation	Codes/Values
Number of Military/ Illegal Organization (MILORG)	0=No military illegal organization existed Illegal 1=One military/illegal Organization 2=Two military/illegal organization active 3=Three or more military/illegal organization active
External Military Support (ISMIL)	0=No military support 1=Funds for military supplies or military equipment 2=Military training or provision of advisory military personnel 3=Rescue missions, cross border raids or peace keeping units 4=Cross border sanctuaries, or in- country combat units
External Political Encouragement/ Support (ISPOL)	0=No political support 1=Ideological and diplomatic 2=Non-military financial support 3=Access to external markets and communications 4=Peacekeeping units, or instituting a blockade

(table continues)



Table 5.1

## Variables Name/Abbreviation, Codes, and Values

Variables name/abbreviation	Codes/Values
International Contagion of protest (ICONPRO)	0=None reported 1=Verbal opposition toward the regime by any group 2=Scattered acts of symbolic resistance toward the regime by any group 3=Political activity on a substantial scale by any group 4=Demonstration, rallies, and strikes by any groups that involves less than 10,000 participants 5=demonstration, rallies, and strikes by any group that involves between 10,000 and 100,000 participants 6=Demonstration, rallies, and strikes by any group that involves more than 100,000 participants
International Contagion rebellion (ICONREB)	0=None reported 1=Political banditry and sporadic of terrorism by any group 2=Campaign of terrorism by any group 3=Local rebellion by any group 4=Small scale guerrilla activity by any group 5=Large-scale guerrilla activity by any group 6=Protracted civil war fought by any rebel group's military forces

(table continues)

Table 5.1

## Variables Name/Abbreviation, Codes, and Values

Variables name/abbreviation	Codes/Values
International Diffusion of protest (IDIFPRO)	0=None reported 1=verbal opposition toward the regime by kindred group(s) 2=scattered acts of symbolic resistance Against the regime by kindred group(s) 3=Political activity on a substantial scale by kindred group(s) 4=Demonstrations, rallies, and strikes by kindred group(s) that involves less than 10,000 participants 5=Demonstrations, rallies, and strikes by kindred group(s) that involves between 10,000 and 100,000 participants 6=Demonstration, rallies, and strikes by kindred group(s) that involves more than 100,000 participants
International Diffusion of Rebellion (IDIFREB)	0=None reported 1=Political banditry and sporadic terrorism by kindred group(s) 2=campaigns of terrorism by kindred group(s) 3=Local rebellion by kindred group(s) 4=Small-scale guerrilla activity by kindred group(s) 5=Large-scale guerrilla activity by kindred group(s) 6=Protracted civil war fought by kindred group's rebel forces

(table continues)

Table 5.1

## Variables Name/Abbreviation, Codes, and Values

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Variables name/abbreviation	Codes/Values
Political Discrimination (POLDIS)	0=No discrimination 1=Neglect / remedial policies 2=Neglect / no remedial policies 3=Social exclusion / neutral policies 4=Formal exclusion / repressive policies
Economic Discrimination (ECDIS)	0=No discrimination 1=Historical neglect / remedial policies 2=Historical neglect / no remedial policies 3=Social exclusion / neutral policies 4=restrictive policies
Cultural Restrictions (CULRES)	0=No significant restrictions on the activities 1=activity is restricted by widespread but informal social practice, e.g. by discrimination against people who follow group customs or use the group's language 2=activity is somewhat restricted by public policy 3=activity is prohibited or sharply restricted by public policy

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### Hypotheses

**Hypothesis 1:** The higher the degree of poverty in a region, the higher will be the number of militarily mobilized ethnic groups in that region.


**Hypothesis 2:** An ethnic group's potential for military mobilization will increase as the number of protests and rebellions by its kindred groups in the region increases.

**Hypothesis 3:** An ethnic group's potential for military mobilization will increase as the mean level of protest and rebellion for the group's region of residence increases.

**Hypothesis 4:** A higher degree of political support extended from outside sources will lead to a greater level of military mobilization.

**Hypothesis 5:** The higher the degree of military support for an ethnic group, the higher its level of military mobilization against the state.

Figure 5.1: The hypothesized model for external factors' effect on ethnic military mobilization



### The Model and Methodology

The model put forth in this study is simple and straightforward. As can be observed in Figure 5.1, the general argument of the model is that external factors have a positive impact on the military mobilization of ethnic groups. I expect five independent variables to contribute to a process that more often than not leads to violence and bloodshed between ethnic groups and their respective state authorities.

This study, which uses both qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis tests for the existence of the hypothesized relationships between certain external factors and ethnic groups' level of military mobilization. In the previous chapter, historical patterns and precedents were studied in order to discern how these factors may have affected certain ethnic groups' levels of military mobilization. In this part of the work, however, two quantitative techniques are used to test the aforementioned hypotheses. Frequency distribution analysis is used to examine empirically some repeated patterns between the degree of poverty in a region and ethnic groups' level of military mobilization. Bivariate correlation and multiple regression analysis are used in order to examine the existence and intensity of the relationship between the four

independent variables (i.e., external military support, external political support, international diffusion, and international contagion) and the dependent variable of military mobilization. The goal here, among other things, is to test whether groups that have had greater access to outside sources of support have, in turn, a greater tendency to be militarily mobilized.

#### Data

This study relies heavily on the Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset, which is a combination of Phase I and II and spans a period of 50 years (1945-1995). This data set, which is considered the most complete and extensive source of information on ethnic groups, focuses primarily on conflicts between state and non-state ethnic groups and contains data on 449 variables for 268 ethnopolitical groups. The Phase III Dataset goes beyond simply presenting data on different ethnic groups. It attempts to provide a detailed collection of information on "organizations that act on behalf of ethnic groups, and sources and types of international support" that extend any kind of support to ethnic groups (Minorities at Risk Project User's Manual 1996, 2). Perhaps most important, this data set provides a tremendous amount of information on different aspects of regimes, the ethnic groups'

characteristics, and transnational influences on the relationship between ethnic groups and their respective states. All these are relevant to the purpose of this study and are used in the analytical section of this work.

The Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset is an excellent source for measuring such independent variables as external military and political support, international contagion, and international diffusion. For the independent variable of regional poverty, however, the following sources are used: International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics Yearbook (1997), Steven Poe and Neal Tate's Peace Study Data Set (1994).

The population of a country was the only criterion used in the selection process of countries. That is, a country had to have at least one million population in order for it to have been included in this part of the study. The unit of analysis is the ethnic group. This study concentrates on all 268 ethnic groups included in the Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset that meet the following criteria:

1. The Group's country of residence, as of 1995, was at least one million in population.



2. The Group's population, as of 1995, was at least one hundred thousand or, if fewer, exceeded 1.0 percent of the population of the country of residence.

Because this study assumes that the pre-condition for the occurrence of conflicts between ethnic groups and their respective state is the former's high level of military mobilization, the study's main focus is on the process through which military mobilization among ethnic groups occurs.

A full list of the ethnic groups that meet the above criteria and that are included in this study can be found in appendix A.

For the purpose of measuring regional poverty, the countries included in this part of the study were divided into the following seven regions:

1. Western Industrialized Democracies (including Australia and New Zealand)
2. Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics
3. South and Southeastern Asia (including China)
4. Pacific Asia (including Japan)
5. North Africa and the Middle East
6. Subsaharan Africa
7. Latin America and the Caribbean

A total of 122 countries is included in this part of the study. For a complete list of the countries in each region please see appendix C.

### Data Analysis

**Hypothesis 1:** The higher the degree of poverty in a region, the higher will be the number of militarily mobilized ethnic groups in that region.

It must be noted at the outset that in order to estimate regional poverty, population weighted Gross Domestic Product or Gross Domestic product per capita (GDPPC) had to be calculated for each region. Using population weighted GDP allows a more accurate estimate of each region's level of poverty. Furthermore, in order to attain a more accurate GDPPC, this study has used data for the five consecutive years of 1990-95. The final GDP used for each country in this study is the average of the aforementioned five consecutive GDP's. The population weighted GDP or GDP per capita for each region is calculated as follows:

$$\frac{\text{Total GDP of countries in region}}{\text{Total Population of region}} = \text{Regional GDP per capita}$$

The empirical evidence for the above hypothesis is summarized in Table 5.2, which shows the annual average per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for each region (for a specific country see Appendix C). The following codes are used for the seven regions in this study:

- Western Industrialized Democracies (including Australia and New Zealand): 1
- Eastern Europe and Ex-Soviet republics: 2
- South and Southeastern Asia: 3
- Pacific Asia: 4
- North Africa and the Middle East: 5
- Sub-Saharan Africa: 6
- Latin America: 7

Table 5.2  
Regional Poverty and Number of Militarily Mobilized  
Ethnic Groups in Each Region for the Period 1990-1995

Regions	1	4	5	2	7	3	6
Annual average							
per capita G.D.P	12826	6432	5557	3757	3201	1620	1038
(In U.S. Dollar)							
Number (and %) of groups that have acquired high level military mobilization	0	3 (18%)	8 (31%)	4 (7%)	2 (7%)	14 (37%)	11 (16%)
Number (and %) of groups that have acquired low level military mobilization	6 (21%)	1 (6%)	3 (11%)	6 (10%)	0	11 (29%)	6 (8%)
Number (and %) of groups that are not militarily mobilized	23 (79%)	13 (76%)	15 (58%)	48 (83%)	27 (93%)	13 (34%)	54 (76%)
Total number of groups in the region	29	17	26	58	29	38	71

Table 5.2 also contains the number and percentage of ethnic groups that have acquired a high or low level of

military mobilization, along with those that are not militarily mobilized.

According to the above hypothesis, the poorest region should have the highest percent of militarily mobilized ethnic groups. A move to the right side (i.e., poorer regions) of Table 5.2 indicates a gradual increase in proportion of ethnic groups that have acquired a higher level of military mobilization within a region, and vice versa.

As can be observed in Table 5.2, the above expectations did not materialize. The wealthiest region (with an annual average per capita GDP of \$12,826), which includes Western Industrialized Democracies, Australia and New Zealand, does indeed lack any ethnic group with a high level of military mobilization. But the poorest region (i.e., Sub-Saharan Africa, with an annual average per capita GDP of \$1,038) has fewer militarily mobilized ethnic groups than South and Southeastern Asia, which has an annual average per capita GDP of \$1,620. In fact, North Africa and the Middle East region, which has the third highest annual average per capita GDP (\$5,557) has four times as many militarily mobilized ethnic groups as the Latin American region, with its third-lowest annual average per capita GDP (\$3,201). Furthermore, South and Southeastern Asia, with the second-lowest annual average per capita GDP (\$1,620), has 14 ethnic groups that have

acquired a high level of military mobilization, which is the highest among all seven regions in this study.

It is, however, interesting to note that when picking Eastern Europe and ex-Soviet republics as the median in Table 5.2, we observe that of the forty-two highly mobilized ethnic groups a great majority (twenty-seven) are located in the poorer half of the seven regions under study. The wealthier regions (i.e., western Industrialized Democracies, Pacific Asia, and North Africa and Middle East) have ended up with eleven highly mobilized ethnic groups, with the highest concentration (eight groups) being in the North Africa and Middle East region.

Another perspective from which data can be observed in Table 5.2 is to combine the numbers of ethnic groups that have acquired a high level and a low level of military mobilization in each region. The Western Industrialized Democracies region has a total of 6 ethnic groups that are mobilized; Pacific Asia has four; the North Africa and the Middle East region has 11; Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet block region has 10; Latin America has 2; South and Southeastern region has 25 and Sub-Saharan Africa has 17 ethnic groups that are militarily mobilized.

Once again, as can be observed in the above paragraph, combining ethnic groups that have acquired either a high

level of military mobilization or a low level of military mobilization does not change the outcome observed earlier. That is, it cannot be concluded in a firm or concrete manner that regional poverty and the number of militarily mobilized ethnic groups in a region are somehow related to each other. Once again, data show that the Latin American region, which has the third lowest annual average per capita GDP among the seven regions, has the lowest total numbers of militarily mobilized ethnic groups. South and Southeastern Asia, with its second lowest annual average per capita GDP, has the highest total numbers of militarily mobilized groups among the seven regions. It must be noted, however, that the wealthiest region (i.e., Western Democracies) has the second lowest total number of militarily mobilized ethnic groups. The poorest region (i.e., Sub-Saharan Africa), on the other hand, has the second highest total number of militarily mobilized ethnic groups. Once again, South and Southeastern region comes in first with a total of 25 militarily mobilized ethnic groups.

What are the implications of all these empirical observations for hypothesis 1? Hypothesis 1 predicts that, the poorer the region, the greater the number of militarily mobilized ethnic groups in that region. Based on the above observations, the prediction in hypothesis 1 is not

supported. There is no consistent pattern or relationship between the level of poverty in a region and the number of militarily mobilized ethnic groups in that region.

**Hypothesis 2:** An ethnic group's potential for military mobilization will increase as the number of protests and rebellions by its kindred groups in the region increases.

The above hypothesis predicts that political actions such as protest and rebellion by an ethnic group's kindred groups in the region may have a positive effect on the military mobilization process of that group. That is, neighboring countries' kindred groups rebellions may encourage an ethnic group to militarily mobilize itself against its state authorities.

Hypothesis 2 was tested using all 268 groups identified for this study, based on the Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset. The results of the correlation and regression analysis for hypothesis 2 are summarized in Table 5.3.

As can be observed in Table 5.3, the correlations for the two indicators of international protest (IDIFPRO9) and international rebellion (IDIFREB9) were completely different from each other. That is, the correlation between the number of rebellions in the region and level of mobilization was considerable (0.305), with a high level of significance. The



correlations for the international rebellion (IDIFREB9) and scope of support for the largest military organization within the group (MILSCOP9) and number of military organization (MILORG9) were also relatively considerable (0.281 and 0.239, respectively), with high levels of significance. These results seem to confirm hypothesis 2.

Table 5.3

Correlations between International Diffusion and Ethnic  
Military Mobilization (All Groups, N=268)

	Military Mobilization (MILMOB9)	Scope of Support for Military group(s) (MILSCOP9)	Number of Active Military group(s) (MILORG9)
International Diffusion of Protest (IDIFPRO9) (1990-95)	0.058 P>0.1 r <sup>2</sup> (-0.000) T(0.944)	-0.007 P>0.1 r <sup>2</sup> (-0.004) T(-0.112)	0.050 P>0.1 r <sup>2</sup> (-0.001) T(0.819)
International Diffusion of Rebellion (IDIFREB9) (1990-95)	0.305*** P(0.000) r <sup>2</sup> (0.090) T(5.2)	0.281*** P(0.000) r <sup>2</sup> (0.076) T(4.756)	0.239*** P(0.000) r <sup>2</sup> (0.054) T(3.998)

1-Tailed Significance

\* = P-Value < 0.1  
 \*\* = P-Value < 0.05  
 \*\*\* = P-Value < 0.01

It is interesting, however, that the strong correlations observed above were not observed for the international

protest (IDIFPRO9) indicator. That is, the number of protests by the kindred groups in the region does not have a significant effect on the occurrence of military mobilization within an ethnic group in the region.

One explanation for the above phenomenon perhaps can be found in the fact that a great majority of the countries with highly mobilized (militarily that is) ethnic groups fall into the category of undemocratic nations (see Appendix B for the list of countries with militarily mobilized ethnic groups). Hence, one may correctly assume that due to state's control over the media in these countries the news about any protests may not reach the kindred groups in other countries in the region. With respect to rebellion, however, It seems depending on its intensity and probable consequences for the region it would attract regional and international media. This is true even in the remotest parts of the Sub-Saharan African region. As a result it may not be too far fetched to assume that the rebellion indicator, rather than protest, seems to have become the paramount factor in affecting military mobilization among ethnic groups in all the regions under study.

**Hypothesis 3:** An ethnic group's potential for military mobilization will increase as the mean level of protest and rebellion for the group's region of residence increases.

Hypothesis 3 predicts that the spread of protest and rebellion through a region affects ethnic groups' levels of military mobilization. It is argued that political actions such as protest and rebellion by any entity in a region have a contagious effect on ethnic groups in that region. That is, as the number of protests and rebellions in a region increases, there is greater possibility that ethnic groups in that region would have a higher level of military mobilization.

Table 5.4 summarizes the correlations between military mobilization (MILMOB9) and international contagion indicators for all the 268 ethnic groups in this study.

Table 5.4

Correlations between International Contagion and Ethnic  
Military Mobilization (All Groups, N=268)

	Military Mobilization (MILMOB9)	Scope of Support for Military group(s) (MILSCOP9)	Number of Active Military group(s) (MILORG9)
International Contagion of Protest (ICONPRO9) (1990-95)	-0.067 P>0.1 r <sup>2</sup> (0.001) T(-1.100)	-0.065 P>0.1 r <sup>2</sup> (0.001) T(-1.058)	-0.0182 P>0.1 r <sup>2</sup> (-0.003) T(-0.297)

(table continues)

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	Military Mobilization (MILMOB9)	Scope of Support for Military group(s) (MILSCOP9)	Number of Active Military group(s) (MILORG9)
International Contagion of Rebellion (ICONREB9) (1990-95)	0.314*** P(0.000) r <sup>2</sup> (0.001) T(-1.100)	0.280*** P(0.000) r <sup>2</sup> (0.000) T(-1.058)	0.339*** P(0.000) r <sup>2</sup> (0.095) T(5.399)
1-Tailed Significance			
* = P-Value < 0.1			
** = P-Value < 0.05			
*** = P-Value < 0.01			

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The two indicators for international contagion are international contagion of protest (ICONPRO9) and international contagion of rebellion (ICONREB9).

As can be observed in Table 5.4, the correlations for the two indicators of international contagion are quite distinctive. As in the test of hypothesis 2, the rebellion indicator (ICONREB9) had much stronger correlation with military mobilization than the protest indicator (ICONPRO9). The correlation between military mobilization and international contagion of protest (-0.067), shown in Table 5.7, is weakly negative but statistically insignificant. Results for MILSCOP9 and MILORG9 (-0.065 and -0.0182) and the international contagion of protest were similar.

By contrast, the correlation between the military mobilization and international contagion of rebellion (0.314) was positive (in the hypothesized direction) and significant.

In fact, similar strong correlations were also observed for the two indicators of MILSCOP9 and MILORG9, which were 0.280 and 0.339 (with high levels of significance), respectively, and international contagion of rebellion.

As was the case in hypothesis 2, the protest indicator once again does not play any significant role in affecting the military mobilization process of ethnic groups in a region. It is, indeed, the international contagion of rebellion that apparently affects the mobilization process of all 268 ethnic groups under study.

**Hypothesis 4:** A higher degree of political support extended from outside sources will lead to a greater level of military mobilization.

This hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between the amount of political support that an ethnic group receives from outside sources and that group's tendency to militarily mobilize itself.

Hypothesis 4 was tested using the Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset. The results of the correlation and regression analysis for the above hypothesis are summarized in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5

Correlations Between External Political Support and Ethnic  
Military Mobilization (All Groups, N=268)

	Military Mobilization (MILMOB9)	Scope of Support for Military group(s) (MILSCOP9)	Number of Active Military group(s) (MILORG9)
External Political support (ISPOL90) (1990-91)	0.230*** P(0.00) r <sup>2</sup> (0.049) T(3.859)	0.178*** P(0.002) r <sup>2</sup> (0.028) T(2.944)	0.209*** P(0.001) r <sup>2</sup> (0.040) T(3.477)
External Political Support (ISPOL92) (1992-93)	0.199*** P(0.001) r <sup>2</sup> (0.036) T(3.315)	0.158*** P(0.005) r <sup>2</sup> (0.021) T(2.614)	0.183*** P(0.001) r <sup>2</sup> (0.030) T(3.031)
External Political Support (ISPOL94) (1994-95)	0.239*** P(0.00) r <sup>2</sup> (0.053) T(4.009)	0.191*** P(0.001) r <sup>2</sup> (0.033) T(3.181)	0.229*** P(0.00) r <sup>2</sup> (0.049) T(3.843)

1-Tailed Significance

\* = P-Value < 0.1  
\*\* = P-Value < 0.05  
\*\*\* = P-Value < 0.01

As can be observed in Table 5.5, the correlation and regression analysis was conducted for three periods covering a span of five years (1990-1995). The correlations between military mobilization (MILMOB9) and international political support (ISPOL90, ISPOL92, ISPOL94) for the three periods were 0.230, 0.199, 0.239, respectively, with a p-value of zero in all three cases. Similar strong correlations were also observed for scope of support for the largest military

organization (MILSCOP9) and the number of military organizations (MILORG9). The correlations between scope of support for the largest organization (MILSCOP9) and international political support (ISPOL90, ISPOL92, ISPOL94) for the three periods were 0.178, 0.158, 0.191, respectively, with p-values of zero in all three cases. The correlations for the number of military organizations and international political support were 0.209, 0.183, 0.229 (with p-values of zero in all three cases), which are even stronger than the previous set of correlation results.

Based on the above results, it can readily be concluded that, when considering all 268 groups in this study, the relationship between military mobilization and international political support is positive and significant, which is in accordance with the prediction in hypothesis 4.

**Hypothesis 5:** The higher the degree of military support for an ethnic group, the higher its level of military mobilization against the state.

This hypothesis predicts that international military support for an ethnic group is likely to result in a higher degree of military mobilization among members of that group. Hence, for the 268 ethnic groups in this study, the strongest correlations between the dependent variable (military

mobilization) and the independent variable (international military support) should be observed. The results of correlation and regression analysis for the above hypothesis are summarized in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6

Correlations Between External Military Support and Ethnic  
Military Mobilization (All Groups, N=268)

	Military Mobilization (MILMOB9)	Scope of Support for Military group(s) MILSCOP9)	Number of Active Military group(s) (MILORG9)
External Military Support (ISMIL90) (1990-91)	0.555*** P(0.00) r <sup>2</sup> (0.350) T (10.870)	0.495*** P(0.00) r <sup>2</sup> (0.242) T(9.293)	0.527*** P(0.00) r <sup>2</sup> (0.275) T(10.116)
External Military Support (ISMIL92) (1992-93)	0.531*** P(0.00) r <sup>2</sup> (0.279) T(10.217)	0.494*** P(0.00) r <sup>2</sup> (0.242) T(9.277)	0.504*** P(0.00) r <sup>2</sup> (0.251) T(9.522)
External Military Support (ISMIL94) (1994-95)	0.559*** P(0.00) r <sup>2</sup> (0.310) T(10.988)	0.494*** P(0.00) r <sup>2</sup> (0.241) T(9.268)	0.510*** P(0.00) r <sup>2</sup> (0.257) T(9.660)

## 1-Tailed Significance

- \* = P-Value < 0.1  
\*\* = P-Value < 0.05  
\*\*\* = P-Value < 0.01

As can be observed in Table 5.6, the data analysis was conducted for three different periods covering a span of five years (1990-95). The results in Table 5.6 strongly point to



the fact that there exists a strong correlation between international military support variables (ISMIL90, ISMIL92, ISMIL94) and the dependent variables of military mobilization (MILMOB9, MILSCOP9, MILORG9). The correlations for all three periods were at or above 0.50, with very high levels of significance ( $p$ -value in all instances equal to zero). Furthermore, adjusted  $r$ -squared for the regression equations exceeded 0.240 (the range for  $r$ -squared is 0.279 and 0.350). There is a significant, positive relationship between an ethnic group's military mobilization and international military support extended to that group, and this tends to persist across the time intervals studied.

#### Multiple Regression Model

The second quantitative technique I use in this part of the study is multiple regression analysis. The bivariate correlation analysis explained above does not fully explain the dependent variable and further investigation is necessary. Multiple regression will measure the amount of change in the dependent factor associated with a given amount of change in the independent factors. Hence, multiple regression technique is used in order to determine the effects that the four independent variables of international diffusion, international contagion, international political support, and international military support may have on the

dependent variable (military mobilization). The data used in this part of the study is Minorities at Risk Dataset Phase III. There are 268 cases (ethnic groups) in this part of the analysis. Table 5.7 summarizes the results of multiple regression analysis.

Table 5.7  
Effects of External Factors On Level  
of Military Mobilization Among Ethnic Groups

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Dependent Variable: Level of Military Mobilization in the 1990s (MILMOB9)

N= 268

Multiple R	0.620
R Square	0.384
Adjusted R Square	0.370
Standard Error	1.213

F= 26.822      SIGNIF F= 0.00\*

-----Variables in the Equation-----

<u>Variable</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>SE B</u>	<u>BETA</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>SIG T*</u>
IDIFPRO9	---	0.049	-0.064	-1.106	0.270
IDIFREB9	0.139	0.038	0.210	3.651	0.000
ICONPRO9	0.481	0.323	0.078	1.488	0.138
ICONREB9	0.861	0.193	0.235	4.457	0.000
ISPOL90	0.114	0.073	0.081	1.546	0.123
ISMIL90	0.524	0.064	0.440	8.140	0.000
(Constant)	-1.500	0.632		-2.374	0.018

\* One-Tail T Test

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The results in Table 5.7 indicate that there is a significant positive relationship between certain external factors and occurrence of military mobilization among the 268 groups under study. As can be observed in Table 5.7, there exists a relatively strong relationship (R-Squared = 0.384) and adjusted R-squared of 0.370. Thus, R-squared points out that about 38% of the variation in the level of military mobilization is explained by the existence of these external variables included in the model.

The results in Table 5.7 show significant positive T-values in the cases of international diffusion of rebellion (IDIFREB9), international contagion of rebellion (ICONREB9), and international military support (ISMIL90). Furthermore, as can be observed in Table 5.7, all independent variables except international diffusion of protest (beta = -0.064) have a positive relationship with respect to the level of military mobilization of ethnic groups. This is in line with the results of the bivariate analysis observed above. That is, as mentioned earlier, in both international contagion and international diffusion instances it seems that the rebellion indicator has a more positive effect on the level of military mobilization than the protest indicator. In such a context, as it can be observed in Table 5.7, the T-value for international diffusion of protest is less than two and

negative (IDIFPRO= -1.106) which indicates a relationship in the opposite direction, and the T-value for international diffusion of rebellion is 3.651. Hence, these results confirm that, relatively speaking, international diffusion of rebellion has had a greater effect on military mobilization of ethnic groups than international diffusion of protest.

Similar results are also observed in the case of international contagion. That is, once again we are observing a much higher T-value for the rebellion indicator of international contagion compare to the protest indicator. (T-values for international contagion of protest and rebellion are 1.488 and 4.457 respectively).

Furthermore, the results of the multiple regression analysis indicate that relative to the contribution of other independent variables, international political support has had little impact on the military mobilization of the ethnic groups in this study (the beta vale is 0.081 and T-ratio is less than two at 1.546). International military support, on the other hand, seems to have had the greatest relative effect on ethnic groups' military mobilization process. The beta value for ISMIL90 is 0.440 and T-ratio is 8.140.

Considering the beta weights in Table 5.7, we observe that international diffusion of rebellion (beta = 0.210), international contagion of rebellion (beta = 0.235), and

international military support (beta = 0.440) have considerable and positive relationship with the military mobilization. Since the beta weight for each variable is its independent contribution to overall explained variance, it is clear that international military support has had the greatest relative effect on ethnic groups' military mobilization process. In addition, international diffusion of rebellion and international contagion of rebellion have comparable betas (0.210 and 0.235 respectively), which implies comparable effect on the military mobilization of ethnic groups. International contagion of protest and international political support with comparable betas (0.078 and 0.081 respectively) seem to have the least positive effect on the military mobilization of ethnic groups.

It is important at this juncture to test for the possibility of multicollinearity. If two or more of the independent variables are highly correlated (the rule of thumb is 0.6 or more) this would indicate a multicollinearity problem. By inspecting the correlation matrix in Table 5.8, it is clear that all correlations are small and our independent variables do not correlate with each other in any significant way.

Table 5.8  
Correlations Among Variables in the Analysis

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	ISMIL	ISPOL	IDIFPRO	IDIFREB	ICONPRO	ICONREB
ISMIL	1.00					
ISPOL	0.304	1.00				
IDIFPRO	0.091	0.204	1.00			
IDIFREB	0.255	0.192	0.470	1.00		
ICONPRO	-0.146	0.059	0.196	-0.034	1.00	
ICONREB	0.215	-0.069	-0.203	0.003	-0.268	1.00

---

The question that arises at this juncture is how do we know that some internal factors did not cause the results observed above? In order to answer this question and have a clearer understanding of the effect of the four independent variables (which are external in nature) on the level of military mobilization, three control variables of political discrimination (POLDIS90), economic discrimination (ECDIS90), and cultural restriction (CULRES90) (which are internal/domestic in nature) are added to the above regression model.

A few words about the selection of these three control variables are in order. The general purpose behind using

control variables in our regression model was to bring into analysis certain domestic variables which may have played a role in the military mobilization process of the 268 ethnic groups in this study. Since this study's focus is on the external variables that contribute to groups' level of military mobilization, usage of these control variables, which are internal/domestic, help us to clarify and confirm the results obtained earlier in this work. In such a context, the three variables of political discrimination, economic discrimination, and cultural restriction are selected. It is important to note that since the level of analysis in this part of the study is ethnic group, such internal/domestic variables as GDP or GNP would not have been appropriate since those variables address economic conditions at the nation/state level. It is with respect to this consideration that the variable of "economic discrimination inflicted on ethnic groups in the 1990s" is chosen as one of the control variables. Furthermore, since most ethnic groups that are militarily mobilized have a great degree of grievances that are culturally and politically oriented, I have chosen political discrimination and cultural restrictions as the other two control variables. Like other variables in this study, these control variables were selected from the Minorities at Risk Phase III dataset. A

full explanation as to how these control variables were operationalized and coded by the Minorities at Risk project can be found in the first part of this chapter.

The results of the regression analysis for the model that includes the three control variables are summarized in Table 5.9.

Table 5.9  
Effects of External Factors On level  
of Military Mobilization Among Ethnic Groups  
(including the control variables)

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Dependent Variable: Level of Military Mobilization in the  
1990s (MILMOB9)

N= 268

Multiple R           0.641

R Square            0.411

Adjusted R Square   0.389

Standard Error      1.185

F= 18.910

SIGNIF F= 0.00\*

-----Variables in the Equation-----

<u>Variable</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>SE B</u>	<u>BETA</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>SIG T*</u>
IDIFPRO9	---	0.048	-0.045	-0.763	0.446
IDIFREB9	0.120	0.038	0.182	3.138	0.002
ICONPRO9	0.488	0.322	0.080	1.516	0.131
ICONREB9	0.869	0.191	0.243	4.547	0.000
ISPOL90	-----	0.078	0.065	1.162	0.247

(table continues)



Table 5.9  
Effects of External Factors On level  
of Military Mobilization Among Ethnic Groups  
(including the control variables)

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ISMIL90	0.533	0.064	0.459	8.390	0.000
POLDIS90	-----	0.061	-0.005	-0.086	0.931
ECDIS90	0.148	0.063	0.136	2.331	0.021
CULRES90	-----	0.056	-.033	-0.602	0.548
(Constant)	-1.767	0.639		-2.767	0.006

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\* One-Tail T Test

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As can be observed in Table 5.9, the results of the regression analysis which includes the three control variables once again show a relatively strong relationship (R-squared = 0.411) and adjusted R-squared of 0.389. Once again we are observing the same significant T-values for international diffusion of rebellion (IDIFREB9), international contagion of rebellion (ICONREB9), and international military support (ISMIL90). It is interesting to note that two of these control variables have a negative (albeit, insignificant) relationship with the level of military mobilization. That is, beta values for political discrimination (POLDIS90) and cultural restrictions

(CULRES90) are -0.005 and -0.033 respectively. Furthermore, T-values for these two control variables are less than two and negative as well (-0.086 and -0.602). It is also important to note that when the three control variables were added to the original multiple regression model, no dramatic change in the value of R squared is observed (R squared changed from 0.381 to 0.411). Adding the control variables only slightly strengthens the model. It is also important to note that once the control variables were added to the multiple regression model, no substantial change in the beta weights were observed. That is, international military support has the greatest positive relationship and international political support has the least positive relationship with the dependent variable of military mobilization.

The above observations confirm the results of the original regression model which point to the fact that, holding other factors constant, three of the four independent variables (i.e., international diffusion of rebellion, international contagion of rebellion and international military support) do indeed have a significant effect on the level of military mobilization for the 268 ethnic groups under study.

What are the implications of the observations made in the above paragraphs for hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5? Based on the results of the correlation analysis between international diffusion and level of military mobilization (Table 5.3) and the results of the above multiple regression analysis we can conclude that hypothesis two (which indicates that the potential for military mobilization of an ethnic group increases as the number of protest and rebellion by its kindred groups rises) is only partially confirmed. That is, international diffusion of rebellion (IDIFREB), in comparison to international diffusion of protest (IDIFPRO), has had a much greater effect on the military mobilization process of ethnic groups in the 1990s. In a similar fashion, we can conclude that hypothesis three is also only partially confirmed. Hypothesis three indicates that the potential for military mobilization of an ethnic group increases as the number of protest and rebellion by any group in its region of residence is increased. Once again, as was the case with previous hypotheses, we are observing significant relationship between international contagion of rebellion and level of military mobilization (Table 5.4). That is, we are observing a much greater effect by international contagion of rebellion (ICONREB) on the military mobilization of groups in

comparison to the effect of international contagion of protest in the 1990s (Table 5.7).

With respect to hypothesis four which predicts a positive relationship between external political support extended to an ethnic group and its level of military mobilization, based on the correlation results in Table 5.5, I must conclude that this hypothesis is confirmed. But, as it can be observed in Table 5.7, the relative contribution of this independent variable in comparison to the other three independent variable in the multiple regression model is weak. All these point to this conclusion that there is a positive relationship (albeit weak) between external political support and an ethnic group's level of military mobilization.

Finally, hypothesis five predicts that there is a positive relationship between international military support extended to an ethnic group and its level of military mobilization. The results from both correlation analysis (Table 5.6) and multiple regression analysis (Table 5.7) confirm this hypothesis. In fact, the results of the multiple regression analysis show that, relative to contribution of other independent variables, international military support (ISMIL90) has had the greatest effect on the military mobilization process of ethnic groups in the 1990s.

## CHAPTER 6

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

#### General Findings

This study introduced and analyzed a set of variables to facilitate a better understanding of ethnic conflict in general, and ethnic military mobilization in particular, seeking to identify the role of international factors in the military mobilization of ethnic groups around the world.

In our analysis of the 268 ethnic groups, the five hypotheses tested in this study yielded the following findings: First, for the ethnic groups that have attained a high level of military mobilization, no direct relationship between a group's level of military mobilization and its percentage of total population in the country of residence was observed. Furthermore, an ethnic group's lack of involvement in the state decision making process does not necessarily translate into a high level of military mobilization. On the other hand, the presence of leadership in an ethnic group seems to have a positive effect in its military mobilization process. The evidence suggests that leaders have been able to unify group members by advancing specific goals for the group as a whole. These goals, in

turn, give the ethnic group's grievances a direction and concrete purpose. Purpose and direction can translate into demands for autonomy and eventual independence for the group as a whole. Overall, higher levels of demand initiated by leaders translate into higher levels of military mobilization.

One of the most interesting findings of this study pertains to the role colonial powers have played in contributing to the present ethnopolitical crises around the world. Colonial rule has generally been associated with economic, political, social and cultural disruption of indigenous populations. Colonial rulers were not hesitant, for instance, to forcibly relocate large numbers of people. Most of the colonial rulers studied in this work were involved in the practice of introducing new ethnic groups to the regions where their economic interests called for such actions. In spite of these facts, in this study I could not find any concrete evidence which could have served as proof that past actions of the colonial rulers may have indeed contributed to the contemporary ethnic conflicts in many of the countries under study.

For the relationship between regional poverty and level of military mobilization, Hypothesis 1 predicts that the poorer the region, the greater the number of militarily

mobilized ethnic groups in that region. This prediction is not supported. There is no consistent pattern or relationship between the level of economic development of a region and the number of militarily mobilized ethnic groups in that region.

Hypothesis 2 states that an ethnic group's potential for military mobilization will increase as the number of protests and rebellions by its kindred groups in the region increases. The results of data analysis support the hypothesis but only with respect to rebellion. That is, both bivariate and multiple regression analysis point to the fact that political activity such as rebellion by kindred group(s) in the region has a positive effect on the military mobilization process of an ethnic group in that region. In comparison to the rebellion factor, however, the impact of protest by kindred group(s) is less apparent. In fact, the protest indicator does not seem to play any significant role in affecting the military mobilization process of ethnic groups in a region.

Hypothesis 3 predicts that protest and rebellion by any group (other than kindred groups) in the region will increase the potential for military mobilization of an ethnic group. Once again, results of both multiple regression and bivariate correlation analysis confirm this

for the rebellion indicator, but not for protest indicator.

As observed above, in both hypotheses 2 and 3 the protest indicator's role in the military mobilization process of ethnic groups has been insignificant. One explanation for this may be that most countries with highly militarily mobilized ethnic groups are undemocratic which implies lack of free press. Hence, one may assume that states control over the media may block news of protests getting to kindred and non-kindred groups in other countries in the region. With respect to rebellion, however, it seems depending on its intensity and probable consequences for the region it has a much better chance of attracting regional and international media attention so that news of such events can reach other ethnic groups in the region. Hence, one may conclude rebellion, rather than protest, contributes to military mobilization among ethnic groups.

Data analysis confirms the predicted relationship by hypothesis 4. There is a significant, positive relationship between an ethnic group's military mobilization and international political support for that group.

According to hypothesis 5, a higher degree of military support for an ethnic group translates into that group's higher level of military mobilization. The evidence clearly



supports the predicted relationship. That is, there is a significant, positive relationship between an ethnic group's military mobilization and international military support extended to that group, and this tends to persist across the time intervals studied.

The overall results provide considerable support for the model on the role of external factors in the military mobilization process of ethnic groups. Leadership, political support, military support, and rebellion by both kindred and non-kindred groups affect the military mobilization process of ethnic groups. Conversely, past experience with colonialism, lack of involvement in the state's decision making process, regional poverty, and protest by both kindred and non-kindred groups in the region do not present themselves as having a significant effect on the military mobilization process of the 268 ethnic groups in this study.

### Conclusion

This work is the first known comprehensive study of the role of external factors in the military mobilization process of a large number of ethnic groups around the world. The difficulties with research in the field of ethnicity and political violence have been alluded to in the early part of

this work. Lack of certainty in the validity of the available data and inadequacy in conceptual uniformity are but two examples, among many, that make the task of untangling the puzzle of ethnic conflict seem insurmountable. Political scientists, among others, have a tendency to avoid research in the area of ethnic conflict.

We are living in an interdependent world where more than 600 languages are spoken, somewhere between 900 and 1600 cultural groupings are in existence, more than 200 religions are practiced, and perhaps most important of all, of the 192 countries in the United Nations (as of September 1998) only a handful of them are ethnically homogeneous. Thus, for the foreseeable future ethnicity and problems associated with it are here to stay. The collapse of communist systems, in combination with the apparent weakening of state authorities in a rapid movement toward democratization, only exacerbated the problems associated with the study of ethnicity.

It is hoped that an understanding of external factors that facilitate the process of military mobilization of ethnic groups will enhance our understanding of the most tragic ethnic conflicts around the world.

APPENDIX A

Ethnic Groups and Their Country of Residence Included  
in the Study

Western Industrialized Democracies (including Australia and  
New Zealand)

Australia	Aborigines
United Kingdom	Afro-Caribbeans Asians Catholics Scots
Canada	French Canadians Québécois Indigenous People
France	Basques Corsicans Afro-Arabs Roma
Germany	Turks
Greece	Muslims Roma
Italy	South Tyroleanness Sardinians Roma
Japan	Koreans
New Zealand	Maoris
Spain	Basques Catalans Roma
Switzerland	Jurassiens Foreign Workers
United States Of America	African-Americans Hispanics Indigenous Peoples Native Hawaiians

Eastern Europe and Ex-Soviet Republics

Albania	Greeks
Azerbaijan	Armenians Lezghins Russians
Belarus	Russians Poles
Bosnia	Serbs Croats Muslims
Bulgaria	Turks Roma
Croatia	Serbs Roma
Czech Republic	Slovaks Roma
Estonia	Russians
Georgia	Abkhazians Adzhars Ossetians Russians
Hungary	Roma
Kazakhstan	Russians Germans
Kyrgyzstan	Russians Germans
Latvia	Russians
Lithuania	Poles Russians
Macedonia	Poles Serbs Roma

Eastern Europe and Ex-Soviet Republics (continued)

Moldova	Gagauz Slavs
Romania	Hungarians Roma
Russia	Adygeys Avars Bashkirs Buryat Chechens Ingushes Karachays Kumyks Lezghins Mari Tabassarans Tuva Ukrainians Yakutia Tatars Roma
Slovakia	Hungarians Roma
Tajikistan	Russians
Turkmenistan	Russians
Ukraine	Russians Crimean Tatars Crimean Russians
Uzbekistan	Russians
Yugoslavia	Albanians Hungarians Sandzak Roma Croats

South and Southeastern Asia (including China)

Afghanistan	Hazaras Pashtuns Tajiks Uzbeks
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Peoples Hindus Biharis
Bhutan	Lhotshampas
Myanmar	Rohingya Muslims Zomis Kachins Karen Mons Shans
China	Hui Tibetans Turkmen
India	Kashmiris Muslims Nagas Scheduled Tribes Sikhs AMW Mizos Tripuras Assamese Bodos
Laos	Hmong
Pakistan	Ahmadis Baluchis Hindus Pushtuns Sindhis Mohajirs
Sri Lanka	Indian Tamils Sri Lankan Tamils

South and Southeastern Asia (including China) (continued)

Thailand	Chinese Malay-Muslims Northern Hill Tribes
Mongolia	Chinese

Pacific Asia (including Japan)

Indonesia	Chinese East Timorese Papuan Aceh
S. Korea	Honamenses
Malaysia	Chinese Kayaks Indians Kadazans
Papua New Guinea	Bougainvilleans
Phillippines	Cordilleras Moros
Taiwan	Aboriginal Chinese Mainlanders Taiwanese
Japan	Koreans
Singapore	Malays
Vietnam	Chinese Montagnards

North Africa and the Middle East

Algeria	Berbers
Egypt	Copts



North Africa and the Middle East (continued)

Iran	Azerbaijanis Ba'hais Bakhtiari Baluchis Kurds Turkomans Arabs Christians
Iraq	Kurds Shi'as Sunnis
Israel	Arabs Palestinians
Jordan	Palestinians
Lebanon	Druze Maronite Christians Palestinians Shi'as Sunnis
Morocco	Berbers Saharawis
Saudi Arabia	Shi'as
Syria	Alawis
Turkey	Kurds

Sub-Saharan Africa

Angola	Bakongo Ovimbundu Cabinda
Botswana	San
Burundi	Hutu Tutsi
Chad	Southerners

Sub-Saharan Africa (continued)

Congo	Lari
Djibouti	Afars
Eritrea	Afars
Ethiopia	Afars Oromo Somalis Tigreans Amhara
Ghana	Ashanti Ewe Mossi
Guinea	Fulani Malinke Susu
Kenya	Kikuyu Luo Maasai Kalenjins Luhya Kisii
Madagascar	Merina
Mali	Tuareg Mande
Mauritan	Kewri Black Moors
Namibia	Europeans San Basters
Niger	Tuareg
Nigeria	Ibo Ogoni Yoruba

Sub-Saharan Africa (continued)

Rwanda	Tutsi Hutu
Senegal	Casamance Region
Sierra Leone	Creoles Limba Mende Temne
Somalia	Somalis
South Africa	Asians Coloreds Europeans Xhosa Zulus
Sudan	South Sudanese
Togo	Ewe Kabre
Uganda	Acholi Baganda
Zaire	Luba Lunda, Yeke Banyarwandans Gbandi
Zambia	Bembe Lozi
Zimbabwe	Europeans Ndebele

Latin America and the Caribbean

Argentina	Indigenous People
Bolivia	Indigenous Highland Indigenous Lowland

Latin America and the Caribbean (continued)

Brazil	Afro-Brazilians Amazonian Indians
Chile	Indigenous Peoples
Colombia	Afro-Americans Indigenous Peoples
Costa Rica	Antillean Blacks
Dominica	Afro-Americans
Ecuador	Afro-Americans Indigenous Lowland Indigenous Highland
El Salvador	Indigenous People
Guatemala	Indigenous
Honduras	Black Karibs Indigenous Peoples
Mexico	Mayans Zapotecs Other Indigenous
Nicaragua	Indigenous Peoples
Panama	Afro-Caribbeans Indigenous Peoples Chinese
Paraguay	Indigenous Peoples
Peru	Afro-Americans Indigenous Highland Indigenous Lowland
Venezuela	Afro-Americans Indigenous Peoples

APPENDIX B

Ethnic Groups' Level of Mobilization and Their Region/  
Country of Residence

Note: The following codes are used for the seven regions in  
this study

Western Industrialized Democracies (including Australia and  
New Zealand): 1

Eastern Europe and Ex-soviet republics: 2

South and Southeastern Asia: 3

Oceanic Asia: 4

North Africa and the Middle East: 5

Sub-Saharan Africa: 6

Latin America: 7

Ethnic groups that have acquired a high level of military  
mobilization

<u>ETHNIC GROUP</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>REGION</u>
Serbs	Bosnia	2
Bouganvilbeans	Papua New Guinea	4
Kachins	Burma	3
Lhotshamlas	Bhutan	3
Malaya-Muslims	Thailand	3
Tamils	Sri Lanka	3
Bodos	India	3
Karens	Burma	3
Palestinians	Lebanon	5
Maronite Christians	Lebanon	5
Tuareg	Mali	6
Diolas	Senegal	6
Tuareg	Nigeria	6
Southerners	Chad	6
Ovimbundu	Angola	6
Oromo	Ethiopia	6
Mayans	Mexico	7
Serbs	Croatia	2
Croats	Bosnia	2
Hmong	Laos	3

Ethnic groups that have acquired a high level of military mobilization (continued)

<u>ETHNIC GROUP</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>REGION</u>
Tripuras	India	3
East Timorese	Indonesia	4
Uzbeks	Afghanistan	3
Nagas	India	3
Hazars	Afghanistan	3
Pashtuns	Afghanistan	3
Saharawis	Morocco	5
Palestinians	Israel	5
Kurds	Iran	5
Shi'as	Iraq	5
Kurds	Turkey	5
Afars	Djibouti	6
Tutsis	Rwanda	6
Southerners	Sudan	6
Indigenous People	Guatemala	7
Moros	Philippines	4
Kashmiris	India	3
Assamese	India	3
Kurds	Iraq	5
Cabinda	Angola	6
Hutus	Rwanda	6
Chechens	Russia	2

Ethnic groups that have acquired a low level of military mobilization

<u>ETHNIC GROUP</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>REGION</u>
Basques	France	1
Corsicans	France	1
South Tyralians	Italy	1
Basques	Spain	1
Catholics (N. Ireland)	U.K.	1
Hispanics	U.S.A.	1
Greeks	Albania	2
Russians	Kazakhstan	2
Russians	Lithuania	2
Crimean Tatars	Ukraine	2
Turkmen	China	3
Scheduled Tribes	India	3

Ethnic groups that have acquired a low level of military mobilization (continued)

<u>ETHNIC GROUP</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>REGION</u>
Papuans	Indonesia	4
Achenese	Indonesia	4
Sindhis	Pakistan	3
Igorots	Philippines	4
Shi'as	Saudi Arabia	5
Acholi	Uganda	6
Slavs	Moldova	2
Avars	Russia	2
Chittagong Mill Tribes	Bangladesh	3
Rohingya	Burma	3
Zomis	Burma	3
Mons	Burma	3
Shans	Burma	3
Sikhs	India	3
Palestinians	Jordan	5
Shi'as	Lebanon	5
Hutus	Burundi	6
Westerners	Cameron	6
Kewri	Mauritania	6
Mende	Sierra Leon	6
Baganda	Uganda	6

Ethnic groups which are not militarily mobilized

<u>ETHNIC GROUP</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>REGION</u>
Aborigines	Australia	1
Québécois	Canada	1
French Canadians	Canada	1
Indigenous People	Canada	1
Muslims	France	1
Gypsies	France	1
Turks	Germany	1
Muslims	Greece	1
Gypsies	Greece	1
Sardinians	Italy	1
Koreans	Japan	1
Maori	New Zealand	1
Saami	Nordic	1
Catalans	Spain	1
Gypsies	Spain	1



Ethnic groups which are not militarily mobilized (continued)

<u>ETHNIC GROUP</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>REGION</u>
Jurassians	Switzerland	1
Foreign Workers	Switzerland	1
Scots	U.K.	1
Afro-Caribbeans	U.K.	1
Asians	U.K.	1
African Americans	U.S.A.	1
Native Americans	U.S.A.	1
Native Hawaiians	U.S.A.	1
Armenians	Azerbaijan	2
Lezgins	Azerbaijan	2
Russians	Azerbaijan	2
Russian	Belarus	2
Poles	Belarus	2
Muslims	Bosnia	2
Turks	Bulgaria	2
Roma	Bulgaria	2
Slovaks	Czech Republic	2
Gypsies	Czech Republic	2
Russians	Estonia	2
Abkhazims	Georgia	2
Ossetians	Georgia	2
Russians	Georgia	2
Gypsies	Hungary	2
Germans	Kazakhstan	2
Russians	Kyrgystan	2
Uzbecks	Kyrgystan	2
Russians	Latvia	2
Poles	Lithuania	2
Albanians	Macedonia	2
Serbs	Macedonia	2
Roma	Macedonia	2
Gagauz	Maldova	2
Magyars	Romania	2
Gypsies	Romania	2
Ingush	Russia	2
Lezgins	Russia	2
Buryat	Russia	2
Kumyus	Russia	2
Tuvinians	Russia	2
Yakut	Russia	2
Hungarians	Slovakia	2
Gypsies	Slovakia	2
Russians	Tajikistan	2
Russians	Turkmenistan	2

Ethnic groups which are not militarily mobilized (continued)

<u>ETHNIC GROUP</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>REGION</u>
Russians	Ukraine	2
Crimean Russian	Ukraine	2
Tatars	Russia	2
Karachax	Russia	2
Gypsies	Russia	2
Russians	Uzbekistan	2
Kosovo Albanians	Yugoslavia	2
Hungarians	Yugoslavia	2
Sandzak Muslims	Yugoslavia	2
Gypsies	Yugoslavia	2
Croats	Yugoslavia	2
Tajiks	Afghanistan	2
Hindus	Bangladesh	3
Biharis	Bangladesh	3
Hui Muslims	China	3
Tibetans	China	3
Muslims	India	3
Mizos	India	3
Chinese	Indonesia	3
Vietnamese	Kampuchea	3
Chinese	Malaysia	4
Dayaks	Malaysia	4
Indians	Malaysia	4
Kadazans	Malaysia	4
Ahmadis	Pakistan	3
Baluchis	Pakistan	3
Hindus	Pakistan	3
Pashcuns	Pakistan	3
Mohajirs	Pakistan	3
Malays	Singapore	4
Tamils	Sri Lanka	3
Aboriginal	Taiwan	4
Mainland Chinese	Taiwan	4
Taiwanese	Taiwan	4
Chinese	Taiwan	4
Northern Mill Tribes	Thailand	3
Chinese	Vietnam	4
Montagnards	Vietnam	4
Berbers	Algeria	5
Copts	Egypt	5
Azerbaijanis	Iran	5
Bahais	Iran	5
Bakhtiaris	Iran	5
Baluchis	Iran	5

Ethnic groups which are not militarily mobilized (continued)

<u>ETHNIC GROUP</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>REGION</u>
Turkmens	Iran	5
Arabs	Iran	5
Christians	Iran	5
Sunnis	Iraq	5
Arabs	Israel	5
Druze	Lebanon	5
Sunnis	Lebanon	5
Berbers	Morocco	5
Alawi	Syria	5
Bakongo	Angola	6
San Bushmen	Botswana	6
Tutsis	Brundi	6
Kirdis	Cameron	6
Bamileke	Cameron	6
Afars	Eritrea	6
Afars	Ethiopia	6
Somalis	Ethiopia	6
Tigreans	Ethiopia	6
Amharas	Ethiopia	6
Ashanti	Ghana	6
EWE	Ghana	6
Mossi-Dagomba	Ghana	6
Fulani	Guinea	6
Malinka	Guinea	6
Susu	Guinea	6
Kikuyu	Kenya	6
Luo	Kenya	6
Maasais	Kenya	6
Kalenjins	Kenya	6
Luhya	Kenya	6
Kissi	Kenya	6
Merina	Madagascar	6
Black Moors	Mauritania	6
Europeans	Namibia	6
San Bushmen	Namibia	6
Basters	Namibia	6
Ibe	Namibia	6
Ogani	Nigeria	6
Yorba	Nigeria	6
Creoles	Sierra Leon	6
Limba	Sierra Leon	6
Temne	Sierra Leon	6
Issaq	Somalia	6
Xhosa	South Africa	6

Ethnic groups which are not militarily mobilized (continued)

<u>ETHNIC GROUP</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>REGION</u>
Asians	South Africa	6
Coloreds	South Africa	6
Europeans	South Africa	6
Zulus	South Africa	6
EWE	Togo	6
Kabre	Togo	6
Luba	Zaire	6
Lunda	Zaire	6
Bayarwands	Zaire	6
NG Bandi	Zaire	6
Bemebe	Zambia	6
Lozi	Zambia	6
Europeans	Zimbabwe	6
Ndebele	Zimbabwe	6
Indigenous People	Argentina	7
Highland Indigenous	Bolivia	7
Lowland Indigenous	Bolivia	7
Afro-Brazilians	Brazil	7
Amazonian Indians	Brazil	7
Indigenous People	Chile	7
Blacks	Colombia	7
Indigenous People	Colombia	7
Antillean Blacks	Costa Rica	7
Haitians Blacks	Dominican Republic	7
Blacks	Ecuador	7
Indigenous Highlanders	Ecuador	7
Lowland Indigenous	Ecuador	7
Indigenous People	El Salvador	7
Black Caribbeans	Honduras	7
Indigenous People	Honduras	7
Zapotecs	Mexico	7
Other Indigenous	Mexico	7
Indigenous People	Nicaragua	7
Blacks	Panama	7
Indigenous People	Panama	7
Chinese	Paraguay	7
Blacks	Peru	7
Highland Indigenous	Peru	7
Lowland Indigenous	Peru	7
Blacks	Venezuela	7
Indigenous People	Venezuela	7

APPENDIX C

Annual per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of all the countries included in this study for the period 1990-95.

Note: All figures are in U.S. dollars.

Western Industrialized Democracies (Including Australia and New Zealand)

COUNTRY	91	92	93	94	95	AVERAGE GDP (In U.S. Dollars)	AVERAGE POP. (Millions)
Australia	14704	14425	14458	14675	14772	14607	17.8
G.Britain	13217	12818	12724	12850	12960	12914	58.8
Canada	17524	16368	16362	17489	17500	17049	27.5
France	13904	13870	13918	14089	14200	13996	58.4
Germany	12001	12132	12625	12898	12700	12471	82.0
Greece	6454	6703	6783	6812	6932	6737	10.3
Italy	12488	12602	12721	12860	13009	12736	59.1
N. Zealand	11510	11054	11363	11762	11820	11502	3.6
Spain	9583	9769	9802	9907	10046	9821	40.2
U.S.A.	18054	17594	17945	18068	18495	18031	26.0
Austria	12695	12850	12955	13045	13162	12941	8.1
Denmark	13663	13908	14891	14015	14078	13951	5.3
Finland	14065	12663	12000	12046	12246	12604	5.1
Ireland	9274	9395	9637	9842	9963	9622	3.6
Norway	14906	15047	15518	15618	15709	13360	4.3
Sweden	14681	14762	14363	13989	14033	14366	8.6
Holland	13029	13196	13281	13461	13492	13292	15.3
Portugal	6010	6575	7048	7059	7162	6771	10.1
Belgium	13232	13409	13848	13964	13978	13689	10.1
Switz.	16505	16245	15887	15906	15708	16050	7.0

Eastern Europe and Ex-Soviet Republics

COUNTRY	91	92	93	94	95	AVERAGE GDP (In U.S. Dollars)	AVERAGE POP. (Millions)
Albania	----	----	----	----	----	----	3.6
Bosnia	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Bulgaria	6743	6203	5245	5280	5136	5721	8.6
Croatia	----	----	----	----	----	----	4.8
Czech Rep.	----	----	1003	1212	1370	1195	10.4
Hungary	5357	4947	4645	4708	4802	4872	10.4
Macedonia	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Poland	3820	3712	3826	3750	3836	3789	40.1

## Eastern Europe and Ex-Soviet Republics (continued)

COUNTRY	91	92	93	94	95	AVERAGE GDP (In U.S. Dollars)	AVERAGE POP. (Millions)
Romania	2089	2043	2143	2260	2320	2171	24.0
Slovakia	----	695	824	961	1082	890	5.5
Slovenia	----	721	904	----	----	813	2.0
Yugoslavia	4548	4132	3960	3822	3840	4060	10.3
Russia	----	1157	4127	11003	15270	7889	150.0
Georgia	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Azerbaijan	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Armenia	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Kazakstan	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Kyrgyzstan	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Tajikistan	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Turkmenistan	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Uzbekistan	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Ukraine	----	231	1055	1575	1620	1120	52.5
Belarus	----	940	1712	1149	1754	1389	10.5
Estonia	9632	8544	7919	7810	8144	10512	1.5
Latvia	655	566	801	935	1111	1017	2.5
Lithuania	4264	4978	4564	6422	8386	7154	3.8
Moldova	----	----	----	----	----	----	4.6

## South and Southeastern Asia (including China)

COUNTRY	91	92	93	94	95	AVERAGE GDP (In U.S. Dollars)	AVERAGE POP. (Millions)
Afghanistan	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Bangladesh	1390	1470	1510	1562	1550	1496	120.0
Bhutan	695	703	672	642	622	667	1.9
Myanmar	574	543	611	462	431	524	40.1
China	1324	1378	1493	1562	1641	1480	1162.2
India	1262	1251	1282	1284	1293	1274	895.0
Laos	1236	1323	1384	1291	1340	1314	4.1
Pakistan	1371	1394	1432	1492	1513	1440	123.0
Sri Lanka	2096	2186	2215	2236	2312	2209	18.6
Thailand	3580	3756	3942	4063	4123	3893	59.0
Mongolia	1886	2008	1842	1885	1906	1905	2.4

## Pacific Asia (including Japan)

COUNTRY	91	92	93	94	95	AVERAGE GDP (In U.S. Dollars)	AVERAGE POP. (Millions)
Indonesia	1862	2044	2102	2242	2286	2107	189.0
S. Korea	6903	6673	7251	7254	7354	7087	44.1
Malaysia	5124	5616	5746	5819	5911	5643	18.6
P.N. Guinea	1702	1689	1606	1583	1542	1624	4.4
Phillippines	1763	1699	1689	1722	1781	1730	63.0
Taiwan	7169	7721	8063	8161	8213	7869	21.2
Japan	13706	14331	15105	15782	16112	15007	128.3
Singapore	11710	12240	12653	12895	13010	12501	2.9

## North Africa and The Middle East

COUNTRY	91	92	93	94	95	AVERAGE GDP (In U.S. Dollars)	AVERAGE POP. (Millions)
Algeria	2843	2720	2719	2193	2988	2693	24.0
Egypt	1912	1913	1869	1842	1746	1856	55.2
Iran	3392	3553	3685	3782	3910	3664	54.0
Iraq	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Israel	9298	9524	9843	9986	10046	9739	5.6
Jordan	3512	2993	2919	2815	2743	2996	3.4
Morocco	2115	2214	2173	2131	2014	2149	25.0
Syria	4172	3897	3994	3842	3762	3933	12.6
A. Arabia	7300	7075	6885	6900	6950	7022	18.3
Yemen	1063	1013	1092	1182	1198	1109	12.3
Oman	9199	7232	7564	7432	7486	7779	1.5
Turkey	3413	3741	3807	3817	3903	3736	60.1
U.A.E.	19648	16464	16590	18306	19424	18050	2.7
Kuwait	9864	10053	9073	10800	11000	10158	1.6
Tunisia	2910	2933	3075	2695	2988	2920	8.5
Lebanon	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	3.2
Libya	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	5.4

## Sub-Saharan Africa

COUNTRY	91	92	93	94	95	AVERAGE GDP (In U.S. Dollars)	AVERAGE POP. (Millions)
Angola	709	733	701	691	673	699	8.9
Botswana	2198	2343	2198	2460	2662	2372	1.3
Burundi	559	532	560	569	527	549	5.5



## Sub-Saharan Africa (continued)

COUNTRY	91	92	93	94	95	AVERAGE GDP (In U.S. Dollars)	AVERAGE POP. (Millions)
Cameroon	1361	1226	1110	1029	1010	1472	11.8
CAR.	380	389	482	514	529	459	4.1
Chad	399	427	408	425	449	422	6.0
Congo	2211	2405	2240	2317	2340	2322	2.3
Ethiopia	312	299	----	286	242	285	59.6
Ghana	902	915	956	983	942	940	15.9
Guinea	767	763	740	754	760	746	6.1
Kenya	881	902	914	889	910	1124	28.6
Liberia	869	853	788	742	790	792	2.3
Mali	495	531	482	492	485	497	8.9
Mauritania	808	791	802	837	849	817	2.0
Mozambique	744	760	711	743	791	750	15.6
Niger	543	507	505	523	489	513	8.1
Nigeria	952	995	1040	978	980	989	98.1
Rwanda	770	753	722	756	730	746	7.8
Senegal	1139	1145	1128	1164	1192	1154	7.8
Sierra Leone	920	926	734	701	689	794	4.3
Somalia	653	792	775	782	775	755	7.6
S. Africa	3242	3186	3068	3192	3262	3194	40.1
Sudan	808	757	736	721	698	744	26.0
Tanzania	466	473	534	538	540	510	22.0
Togo	530	611	641	637	633	610	3.5
Uganda	540	509	547	554	524	535	16.8
Zaire	401	424	460	463	454	461	39.6
Zambia	757	756	699	808	800	764	7.8
Zimbabwe	1216	1204	1162	1248	1243	1215	9.8
Benin	995	920	946	982	946	958	5.3
Gabon	3958	3692	3662	3826	3746	3777	1.3

## Latin America and the Caribbean

COUNTRY	91	92	93	94	95	AVERAGE GDP (In U.S. Dollars)	AVERAGE POP. (Millions)
Argentina	5720	5349	4706	4998	5132	5163	34.2
Brazil	4042	4007	3882	3960	3850	3948	156.0
Costa Rica	3402	3482	3569	3785	3890	3626	3.4
Cuba	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Chile	4338	4471	4890	4965	5063	4746	14.0
Colombia	3300	3297	3380	3401	3482	3372	35.3
Dom. Rep.	2166	2111	2250	2340	2460	2265	7.3
El Salvador	1853	1876	1892	1881	1904	1881	5.5
Ecuador	2755	2835	2830	2920	2980	2864	11.0
Guatemala	2151	2247	2310	2410	2430	2310	9.9
Haiti	834	802	789	823	846	819	7.5
Honduras	1364	1385	1396	1408	1425	1396	5.5
Jamaica	2545	2440	2360	2490	2546	2476	2.5

Latin America and the Caribbean (continued)

COUNTRY	91	92	93	94	95	AVERAGE GDP (In U.S. Dollars)	AVERAGE POP. (Millions)
Mexico	6018	6253	6490	6742	7010	6503	85.0
Nicaragua	1294	1301	1345	1409	1446	1359	4.2
Panama	3189	3226	3332	3389	3408	3309	2.6
Peru	2188	2170	2092	2080	2010	2108	23.1
Venezuela	6055	6662	7082	7230	7460	6898	21.1
Bolivia	1658	1699	1721	1738	1790	1721	7.7
Paraguay	2128	2146	2178	2236	2432	2224	4.9
Uruguay	4602	4766	5185	5235	5180	4994	3.4

APPENDIX D

Ethnic Groups and Their Country of Residence	Scope of Support for Military Organizations (MILSCOP)	Number of Military/ Illegal Organizations (MILORG)	Level of Military Mobilization (MILMOB)
Serbs (Bosnia)	3	1	3
Bouganvileans (Pa pua New Guinea)	3	1	3
Kachin (Burma)	3	1	3
Lhotshamlas (Bhutan)	3	1	3
Malaya-Muslim (Thailand)	1	3	3
Tamils (Sri Lanka)	3	1	3
Bodos (India)	3	1	3
Karens (Burma)	3	1	3
Palestinians (Lebanon)	1	3	3
Maronite Christians (Lebanon)	3	1	3
Tuareg (Mali)	3	1	3
Diolas (Senegal)	3	1	3
Tuareg (Niger)	3	1	3
Southerners (Chad)	3	1	3
Ovimbundu (Angola)	3	1	3
Oromo (Ethiopia)	3	1	3
Mayan (Mexico) (mexico)	3	1	3
Serbs (Coratia)	4	1	4
Croats (Bosnia)	4	1	4
Hmong (Laos)	2	2	4
Tripuras (India)	2	2	4
East Timorese (Indonesia)	4	1	4
Uzbeks (Afghanistan)	4	1	4

Ethnic Groups and Their Country of Residence	Scope of Support for Military Organizations (MILSCOP)	Number of Military/ Illegal Organizations (MILORG)	Level of Military Mobilization (MILMOB)
Nagas (India)	2	2	4
Hazars (Afghanistan)	4	1	4
Pashtuns (Afghanistan)	2	2	4
Sahrawis (Morocco)	4	1	4
Palestinians (Israel)	2	2	4
Kurds (Iran)	2	2	4
Shi'as (Iraq)	2	2	4
Kurds (Turkey)	2	2	4
Afars (Djibouti)	4	1	4
Tutsis (Rwanda)	4	1	4
Southerners (Sudan)	4	1	4
Indigenous People (Guatemala)	4	1	4
Moros (Philippines)	3	2	6
Kashm. (India) (In	3	2	6
Assamese (India)	3	2	6
Kurds (Iraq)	3	2	6
Cabinda (Angola)	3	2	6
Hutus (Rwanda)	3	2	6
Chechens (Russia)	4	2	8

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