

CHRONIC MYOPIA: FOUNDATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY
WESTERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE BALKANS

Brittany Kelley, B.A.

Thesis Prepared for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS

August 2012

APPROVED:

Nancy Stockdale, Major Professor
Christopher Fuhrmann, Committee Member
Richard McCaslin, Committee Member and
Chair of the Department of History
Mark Wardell, Dean of the Toulouse Graduate
School

Kelley, Brittany, Chronic Myopia: Foundations of Contemporary Western Perspectives on the Balkans. Master of Arts (History), August 2012, 79 pp., 5 illustrations, bibliography, 44 titles.

The construction of Southeastern Europe in Western imagination is the result of assertions of imperial power from some of the first recorded histories onward to modern time. Instead of providing alternative narratives gaping differences in time period, literary genres and geographical origins ballast stereotypical racist tropes and derogatory images of the countries of Southeastern Europe. For example, Roman histories, secondary historical works, twentieth century travel literature, and Central Intelligence Agency estimates all exhibit the same perception. The narrative created by these accounts is limited, remarkably racist and counterfactual. While there has been an abundance of new scholarship aimed at debunking the myths surrounding the area, much of the revisionist histories focus on placing blame, proving ethnogenesis, and serving political purposes. Understanding how the sources continue to influence perception is a pivotal step to understanding Southeastern Europe.

Copyright 2012

by

Brittany Kelley

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.....	iv
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 2 INTERPLAY OF THEORIES ON ORIENTALISM, BALKANISM AND DISCOURSE	4
CHAPTER 3 CASE STUDY: ROMAN TREATMENT OF ILLYRICUM.....	12
CHAPTER 4 BALKANISM AND ORIENTALISM IN SECONDARY SOURCES	27
CHAPTER 5 ENDURING BIASES AS SEEN IN TRAVEL LITERATURE.....	37
CHAPTER 6 THE IMPACT ON U.S. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS: YUGOSLAVIA FROM 1970-1993.....	56
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION.....	75
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	77

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Lester Hornby, Map of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats & Slovenes, 1927.....	38
Figure 2. Lester Hornby, Balkan Sketches, 1927	42
Figure 3. Hornby, Balkan Sketches, “The Lace Shop” 1927.....	51
Figure 4. Office of the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslavia Transformed,” 1990.....	58
Figure 5. Office of the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslavia Transformed,” 1990.....	59

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Corruption and influence peddling . . . pervade Yugoslav society. Such practices are, of course, typically Balkan.

Directorate of Intelligence, CIA

The construction of Southeastern Europe in Western imagination is the result of assertions of imperial power from some of the first recorded histories onward to modern time. Instead of providing alternative narratives, gaping differences in time periods, literary genres, and geographical origins spawned stereotypical racist tropes and derogatory images of the countries of Southeastern Europe. There is one striking similarity in perspective and language describing the cultures and countries of the Balkan peninsula: the overwhelming narrative created by these accounts is limited at best, and at worst, remarkably racist and counterfactual. Understanding how the sources echo each other and continue to influence perception is a pivotal step to creating realistic historical and human understanding of Southeastern Europe. These disparate sources, namely early histories, contemporary historical commentary, and travel literature, create a negative metanarrative. These flawed representations masquerade as fact and unduly influence political perspective in a modern context. Remarkably, the same rhetorical strategies are present throughout the corpus of Western literature on the Balkans, regardless of time or space. Examining the foundations of Western thought in early Roman official histories provides insight into the beginnings of bias against the peoples of Southeastern Europe. The ideas about the Balkan people contained in the Roman histories were disseminated throughout Western Europe and were later duplicated in Western travel literature and as historical fact.

Conflicting ideas of ethnic and national identity led to ongoing conflict in the Balkans. Modern Albanians and Kosovars claim Illyrian heritage as part of their shared heritage. The

veracity of this assertion has been widely contested, leading to conflict between Balkan ethnic groups over the location of a historical homeland. Much of the scholarship on this area is colored by contemporary politics, further clouding the historical record. The earliest remaining sources on the Balkans hail from Rome, and are steeped in the Roman tradition of maintaining Rome's ideological and physical grasp on the world around it. These earliest accounts of Southeastern Europe and its peoples are obviously biased, as many historians have pointed out. However, they have provided a blueprint that has been manipulated and recycled by historians and writers seeking to assert power over the area throughout time. Historians and their work are products of varied power dynamics that determine how knowledge and 'fact' are disseminated. Regardless of how impartial a history text or 'fact' might appear, the writers of history are raised and trained during specific time periods and in sociopolitical climates that have an irrevocable and irrefutable influence on their historical commentary.

Troublingly, these biases and rhetoric are also found in modern United States intelligence documents used to decide foreign policy. A careful evaluation and close reading of these heterogeneous sources yields confirmation of a common intellectual thread, proving that racist perceptions of Southeastern Europe have for so long been a part of the dialogue that negative, imbalanced tropes are now rote.

Deconstructing how historians interact with their influences yields a better understanding of the past, the process of history, and the present. The propagation of either homogenous or diverse historical narratives has immediate and often violent results in present conflict. Understanding the dynamics that shape these narratives helps clarify the diluted past as well as the murky present. According to Foucault, scholars must "rediscover the silent murmuring" and

“re-establish the tiny, invisible text” that shape history, and thus their perceptions of reality.¹

Thus, historians lay the foundation for more effective national and international policies, and assuage long-held stereotypes.

¹ Foucault, Michel, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourses on Language*, (New York: Random House 1972), 26.

CHAPTER 2

INTERPLAY OF THEORIES ON ORIENTALISM, BALKANISM AND DISCOURSE

Historians interact with power paradigms in several disparate ways. Many historians reaffirm the socially accepted structure of the past and write in order to maintain the present status quo. Other historians set out to work against widely accepted generalities and thus write in opposition to the power structure. Both groups manipulate the very idea of ‘facts’ and ‘history’ in order to prove their notion of reality. The dominant conviction in these camps is that the past is knowable, concrete and provable. The polarization and politicization of these histories only proves present pressure on pushing specific agendas through academia. Some historians are able to recognize the chimerical quality innate in attempting eschatological proofs through writing history. These works are often cognizant of the power dynamics and these writers produce histories that are nuanced, multifaceted looks at the past that often lack a ‘narrative’ thread.

Western European literary and historical traditions position Southeastern Europe as a liminal space, a bridge between antipodal abstractions. In the British imagination, the Balkan Peninsula straddled ideas of east and west, past and present, as well as real and unreal. Traveling writers actively create the present by imprinting their imperialistic ideologies onto the physical and cultural landscape of the Balkans. Their narratives recreate the past as they literally write their contemporary experiences into it. This is an act of appropriation that constructs and reinforces ideas of European superiority in comparison to the Balkans.

In order to elucidate how assertions of power work in Southeastern Europe, the theoretical works of Michel Foucault, Edward Said and Bernard Cohn provide a solid foundation. Foucault’s interdisciplinary work on how discourse functions as a product of known and subconscious paradigms informs this work's discussion of the historical treatment of

Southeastern Europe. Said's arguments in *Orientalism* also lay the theoretical groundwork for a discussion of the power dynamics inherent in creating the past. As several relevant secondary texts are hybrid works of anthropology, archaeology and history, Cohn's succinct explanations of the disciplines' interrelatedness help demonstrate how power structures influence the creation of 'fact' and 'science.'² Foucault argues that "in analyzing discourses themselves, one sees the loosening of the embrace, apparently so tight of words and things, and the emergence of a group of rules" that guide the formation of history and knowledge.³ Thus, a careful breakdown of the language used to create history becomes a blueprint for understanding the intellectual buttresses of power. Interpreting diction and dissecting the choice of source material complicates the metanarrative of history. The purpose of such an endeavor is not "neutraliz[ing] discourse, to make it the sign of something else, and to pierce through its density in order to reach what remains silently anterior to it, but on the contrary to ... make it emerge in its own complexity."⁴ Foucault points to a series of reasons why constructors of knowledge over-simplify, pare down and change different disciplines; these include "error, oblivion, illusion, ignorance, or the inertia of beliefs and traditions, or even the perhaps unconscious desire not to see and not to speak."⁵ These symptoms are evident throughout the historical record and are an intrinsic part of what drive historians to erect the past through written word. As such, history is a flawed, fallible and utterly human creation. Understanding the imperfections and facets of history writing reveals intricate nuance and interplay between past and present. Importantly, "discourse and system

² Bernard S. Cohn, "History and Anthropology: The State of Play", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 200.

³ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, trans. and ed. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), 49.

⁴ Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, 47.

⁵ Ibid.

produce each other.”⁶ Therefore, history, as a discourse, is a result of the power structure as well as its creator and sustainer. This theory is essential for understanding the importance of how historians engage with the systems of power in their writing.

Said’s work *Orientalism* is pivotal to understanding how systems of power and privilege have dictated the corpus of knowledge and thought about the Middle East. According to Said, “knowledge of the Orient, because it is generated out of strength, in a sense creates the Orient, the Oriental, and his world,” which hearkens back to Foucault’s argument that power systems and history are inextricably bound together.⁷ Furthermore, this “knowledge was effective” and put to use in foreign governance of Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries.⁸ The power dynamic Said is most interested in here is that between dominator (the West) and dominated (the East). Said’s explication of this relationship is pivotal for understanding how modern writers engage with the past and, importantly, how they operate within the framework of Orientalism postulated by Said. The practice of wholly dichotomizing people through “analysis, research, [and] public policy” serves to “limit the human encounter between different cultures, traditions and societies.”⁹ This idea echoes that of Foucault’s, that the human desire to label and understand ultimately produces an over-reduced facsimile of the nuance of the human experience. Furthermore, Said argues that this type of knowledge is transmitted through a variety of discourses: history, archaeology, literature, and anthropology. The diversity of these sources exacerbates the problem, as “often literature and culture are presumed to be politically, even historically innocent.”¹⁰ The belief that the written record is politically innocent is a hallmark of

⁶ Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, 76.

⁷ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Random House, 1978), 40.

⁸ Said, *Orientalism*, 38.

⁹ Said, *Orientalism*, 46.

¹⁰ Said, *Orientalism*, 19.

how systems of domination perpetuate and recreate themselves. Biases in history and literature are far from innocuous, as evidenced by their ability to transmit and diffuse information and experience over centuries.

Cohn's explanation of the relation between anthropology and history as well as their governing framework serves as another theoretical analysis of how knowledge is constructed. Cohn's article, "History and Anthropology: The State of Play," supports the position that history, and the construction of the past, is not the result of a series of hard and fast proofs that are simply put together as a part of some magical equation that irrefutably, factually portray the past. Instead, Cohn posits that the production of history and anthropology are directly correlated to the present, as well as to the search for what is "*really real*," substituting nuance in pursuit of scientific reality.¹¹ According to Cohn, to "discover the historian's theoretical assumptions one must study the language of the historian, the metaphors more or less unconsciously used."¹² The language the historian uses opens a window into the process of writing, creating and recreating history as well as the processes and omnipresent strictures of systems of domination and power. Examining the basic components of historical narrative, even well done, complex history, helps provide the "meaning involved in the creation of systems of solidarity and authority and to what appear to be the unconscious systems of control which mark many modern societies."¹³ It is these "unconscious systems of control" that can be found in an exacting examination of history texts.

Historical study is not invalidated by the postmodern debate between real and unreal. Instead, modern historians have to be hyper cognizant of the power structures that they work

¹¹ Bernard S. Cohn, "History and Anthropology: The State of Play", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 200.

¹² *Ibid.*, 209.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 214-215.

around. Analyzing how authors engage with, work against, manipulate, or even work within power paradigms is extremely important in understanding how ideas are transmitted. Cohn's theories are especially relevant, as the idea of "really real" history informs policy and international interactions.¹⁴

Said's theories on Orientalism are pivotal to understanding the importance of how the West imagines Southeastern Europe. According to Said, "often literature and culture are presumed to be politically, even historically innocent," and a careful scrutiny of twentieth century travel journals reveals them to be politically and racially charged.¹⁵ In the eyes of the writing west, the influence after the long period of Ottoman rule unquestionably tainted the Balkan peninsula, causing an irrevocable reversion to primitivity. The binary lens through which travelers write constantly juxtaposes the culture and people of the Balkans to the accepted civilized normalcy of the West.

Said also claims that a primary function of Orientalism is the ability to "survey a civilization from its origins to its prime to its decline," and that the Western European thus "knows them and what is good for them better than they could possibly know themselves."¹⁶ The histories, travel journals, and government documents examined in this paper are peppered with historical and mythic references, thereby purporting intimate knowledge of the culture and people. The travel writers also share a self-professed desire to save the backward natives and help them achieve European ideals of normalcy and civilization. Despite the tendency towards declarations of aspired saviorship, the writers construct the area in such a manner as to make the

¹⁴ Ibid., 200.

¹⁵ Said, *Orientalism*, 19.

¹⁶ Said, *Orientalism*, 33-35.

humanity of the Balkans unsalvageable. Most meaningfully, some writers paradoxically profess their desire to 'save' the Balkans and later claim that modernity would ruin its appeal.

The use of the term "Balkan" is, in fact, a geographical misnomer. Balkan, roughly translated, is Turkish for 'wooded mountain.' The term was first used by travel writer John Morritt when discussing the Dinaric Alps. The word eventually became synonymous with the Southeastern European peninsula, through use and transmission in popular travel literature of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.¹⁷ Said explains this phenomenon as a function of "imaginative geography" that encourages "dramatizing the distance and difference" between Western Europe and other regions. In classic Orientalism, this manipulation of spatial reality goes hand in hand with the transformation of temporal reality. The authors of travel literature all speak of experiencing a fluidness to time; often couching the present in terms of the past. Each writer feels the need to provide historical background to their explorations, which also fits Said's Orientalist framework. According to Said, "knowledge of the Orient... creates the Orient, the Oriental and his world."¹⁸ The ability of each writer to have authority over the region's past allows them authority to shape the present.

Despite the definite link between theoretical Orientalism and Southeastern Europe, the manipulation of the area's history, geography, and culture are currently experiencing a different sort of phenomenon. Historian Maria Todorova illuminates the main difference between Said's Orientalism and her theory of Balkanism:

Geographically inextricable from Europe, yet culturally constructed as "the other," the Balkans became, in time, the object of a number of externalized political, ideological and cultural frustrations and have served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the "European" and "the west" has been constructed. Balkanism conveniently exempted "the west" from charges of racism,

¹⁷ Maria Todorova, "The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention," *Slavic Review*, 53 (1994), 462-463.

¹⁸ Said, *Orientalism*, 40.

colonialism, Eurocentrism and Christian intolerance: the Balkans, after all, are in Europe, they are white and they are predominantly Christian.¹⁹ Thus, traveling Europeans consider themselves exponentially more knowledgeable about Southeastern Europe due to the components of shared culture and ethnicity. This allows the writers to recreate and, importantly, experience the past with omniscient authority. Furthermore, Said postulates that one of the most important components of Orientalism was that it allowed the West to view the many disparate Eastern ethnicities as a homogenous group; as he explained, “Orientals were almost everywhere nearly the same.”²⁰ The people of the Balkans, then, are a definite exception to the parameters Said sets for ‘Orientals.’ While some aspects of Balkanism indeed fit Said’s proscriptions of Orientalism, Todorova argues that “Balkanism is not merely a sub-species of Orientalism,” and that Balkanism evolved independently or even as a reaction to Orientalism.²¹ Todorova also makes the distinction that Western Europe did not colonize the Balkans, and thus does not belong under the same Orientalist umbrella.

Todorova’s claims that the racist phenomena surrounding the Balkans inherently differs than Orientalism is true, to a degree. However, Balkanism is more effectively described as a natural extension of Orientalism. Despite the shared ethnicity, religion and even history of Western and Eastern Europe, the people of the Balkans undergo a literary and historical transformation that can be best described as a process of Orientalism. The Balkans experience a systematic 'other-ing' based on their proximity to the East and its influence on the region. It is a borderland, the doorway between East and West, Occident and Orient.

The region is further steeped in historic and mythic meaning as the birthplace of classic European civilization. In this context, Balkanism does differ from Orientalism. However, it

¹⁹ Todorova, , “Balkans: From Discovery to Invention,” 456.

²⁰ Said, *Orientalism*, 38.

²¹ Todorova, “ Balkans: From Discovery to Invention,” 454-455.

cannot be fully separated from Orientalism, as the long history of Eastern conquest in the region is described by travel writers as the reason for backwardness, decline, decay and barbarity in the area. Thus, the Balkans must be understood as a permutation, an extension, of Orientalism. As a borderland, it is necessary for the area to be seen as such, in order to support and continue the myth of the East.

CHAPTER 3

CASE STUDY: ROMAN TREATMENT OF ILLYRICUM

This case study serves as a critique of historical perspective towards the region as evidenced in the rhetoric used to describe the culture and customs of the ancient people of Illyria. There is a great need for careful analysis of historical interpretation and re-examination of material evidence in order to present a more balanced picture. While accomplishing that task is beyond the scope of this work, this case study is intended to call attention to the attitudes that color the scholarship on the Balkans. Using the Roman portrayal of the Illyrians and later historical treatment as a case study is pivotal to promoting valid historical understanding of the area and interpretation of the society.

The historical treatment of the eastern provinces has seldom been realistic in portraying the people that dwelt there and interpreting their lives. Historians from the time of the Roman Empire onward have rarely dealt with this area and its people objectively, and a careful critique of the tradition regarding Illyria is necessary to fully understanding the contemporary importance of this region and its past.

Due to the lack of material and literary evidence tracing their society from antiquity forward, the identity and lineage of the Illyrians remains somewhat murky. However, there are several factors that can help ‘demystify’ life in the Illyrian provinces under the Roman Empire. For example, knowable geographical factors like climate and physical landscape greatly shaped cultural norms and everyday life. Roman imperialism and city building projects greatly impacted the use of public space and spread Roman ideology throughout the eastern provinces. The trail of bread crumbs left behind by the people of the Illyrian region include remnants of material culture like jewelry as well as the remains of buildings, cities, and Romanesque artwork.

References to the Illyrians are scattered throughout the literature and official histories of the Roman Empire. Investigation of this evidences yields glimpses into what daily life was like for the people of Illyricum at the end of the Empire.

Projecting the boundaries of Illyricum has differed both historically and historiographically. References to both Illyria and Illyricum are scattered throughout Roman and modern histories. Illyria alludes to the land inhabited by people of common Illyrian tribal heritage, whereas Illyricum is the Roman created and delineated province. Under the Roman Empire, the borders of Illyricum were changeable. The area that began as Illyricum²² was eventually split into several provinces, notably Pannonia and Dalmatia²³ as well as the ethnically Illyrian Macedonia²⁴ and Dardani in modern Kosovo.²⁵ Definitive regional boundaries of Illyria have also been susceptible to change, depending on the historian. J. J. Wilkes estimates that Illyrians stretched from the southern boundaries of modern Albania east through the modern Macedonia and Serbia to northern Croatia.²⁶ Theodor Mommsen defines the boundaries of Illyricum as:

Fill[ing] the coast of the Adriatic Sea from the mouth of Po through Istria, Dalmatia, and Epirus, as far Acarnania and Aetolia, and also in the interior upper Macedonia, as well as the modern Servia and Bosnia and the Hungarian territory on the right bank of the Danube; it bordered thus on the east with the Thracian tribes, on the west with the Celtic.²⁷

²² “Illyricum was, according to the design of the dictator Caesar, to be constituted as a special governorship,” Theodor Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire* (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2004), 201.

²³ Dalmatia was known as ‘Upper Illyricum;’ Pannonia was referred to as ‘Lower Illyricum’ until the time of Flavii. Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, 201.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 298.

²⁵ Lesley and Roy Adkins, *Handbook of Life in Ancient Rome* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 116.

²⁶ J.J. Wilkes, *The Illyrians* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing, 1992), 20.

²⁷ Mommsen, *Provinces of the Roman Empire*, 199.

Despite difference in perceptions of boundaries, both scholars attribute vast tracts of land to the Illyrian tribes. The assignment of these historical boundaries is of great importance for the contemporary peoples of the Balkans. Claims of Illyrian heredity in modernity translate to disputes over historical validity in determining current political boundaries.

Reconstructing the use and effect of the physical landscape in contemporary imagination is pivotal to understanding how the people of the eastern provinces lived. The climate and landscape of traditional Illyrian lands varied from abundantly forested to bare plateaus. Composed of “steep diversity of ecologic niches quite closely spaced, a rather small arable area (20-30%) often both stony and requiring some irrigation and terracing to farm, and a divisive land topography, so that the sea is the medium of unity.”²⁸ The area is marked by drastic altitude changes due to the tectonic fault lines that wind throughout the region. In northern Albania, the ground is mostly limestone, making agricultural pursuits “impossible, while travel in the region is made difficult by serrated ridges caused by uneven erosion.”²⁹ Wind is another climate factor that contributes to the arduous nature of raising crops. The winter wind, known as *bura*, “is totally destructive of any tree or vegetation growth” and poses a danger to ships at anchor in the Northern Adriatic.³⁰ Procopius even comments on the strength of the wind blowing through Dalmatia:

A wind of great violence and exceedingly wild is wont to fall upon the country, and when this begins to blow, it is impossible to find a man there who continues to travel on the road, but all shut themselves up at home and wait. Such indeed, is the force of the wind that it seizes a man on horseback together with horse and carries him through the air, and then, after whirling him about in the air to a great distance, it throws him down wherever he may chance to be and kills him.³¹

²⁸ J. Lawrence Angel, “Ecology and Population in the Eastern Mediterranean.” *World Archaeology* (Winter 1972): 88.

²⁹ Wilkes, *The Illyrians*, 20.

³⁰ Wilkes, *The Illyrians*, 24.

³¹ Procopius, *History of the Wars*: V. xv. 5-6.

While the hyperbolic quality of the passage certainly adds color to Procopius' history, it is notable that even the wind that blew through the Illyrian region is recorded as savage and wild. This further underlines the antagonistic perception and portrayal of both the region and its inhabitants. The impassable mountain ranges that dot the landscape of the Balkan Peninsula thus contributed to the formation of Illyrian society by secluding areas from alien tribal influence. The isolation of certain areas helped to maintain pockets of traditional Illyrian culture as Roman influence continued to expand into the Balkan Peninsula and, later, Slavic migration into the area.

The economic activities of the Illyrian peoples vary with geographic differences. Forestry, mining, agricultural, livestock raising and salt production were all pursued throughout the Illyrian lands. In contemporary northern Bosnia, the thickly forested areas produced large quantities of timber that were transported via the ample river systems.³² The rivers that course through the Illyrian lands were widely used, not only for floating logs, but as crucial arteries for trade and cardinal to connecting the Illyrii. The numerous rivers, however, do not provide easy passage to the interior. In fact, despite "the gorges and defiles that had to be by-passed through the surrounding hills, the Morava up to the Leskovac has been the favored route for passage."³³ The Illyrians, then, were expert at navigating dangerous waterways. Indeed, the Illyrian people are oft depicted as fearsome pirates throughout the Roman histories.

Abundant mineral deposits also dot the region. Utilization of lead, iron and silver mines during Roman rule point to a population that was desirous of such minerals as well as capable of obtaining them. In fact, archaeologists have uncovered a number of varied specialized equipment

³² Wilkes, *The Illyrians*, 22.

³³ Wilkes, *The Illyrians*, 20.

to work the ore, “including picks and mallets for extracting and crushing the ore... while ingots suggest the existence of itinerant craftsmen.”³⁴ Skilled laborers such as the wandering artisan point to a society in which accoutrement was prized, and specialty items desired throughout the region.

In many parts of Illyricum the climate and soil created a serious problem in sustaining food production, but other areas yielded far greater results. However, “agriculture was less important than livestock, hunting and fishing” due to the intractable nature of climate and topography. Mommsen even classifies the Illyrians as “shepherds more than agriculturalists.”³⁵ Due to the rocky and mountainous landscape, the majority of livestock raised were sheep and goats. Also, archaeologists have surmised from the massive quantities of fishing gear found in trash heaps that fishing was heavily relied on as a food source. Salt was the primary method of preserving meat, and salt evaporated from the coastline was transported inland via the network of rivers and “salt roads, which continu[es] in use down to modern times.”³⁶ The reliance on this product of the Adriatic further emphasizes the connectivity and dependence amongst different Illyrian tribes commonly separated by distance and topography.

The natural resources of Illyricum alone made the province appealing to and profitable for imperial Rome. However, several other important factors played a role in Roman imperialism of the region. For instance, the location of Illyricum as a conduit between Rome and industrialized cities like Thessalonica in the eastern provinces is of great significance. According to Peter Heather, “the Balkans prime function, viewed from a central imperial perspective, was

³⁴ Ibid., 223.

³⁵ Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, 199.

³⁶ Wilkes, *The Illyrians*, 223.

to provide a bridge between the two halves of Empire.”³⁷ The Romans were forced to “carve a road through sheer solid rock.”³⁸ In other words, Rome had to physically change the landscape in order to control the region in the most literal sense.

Control of the Illyrian peoples is also demonstrated figuratively in the written record. References to the Illyrians are peppered throughout the Roman histories. The portrayal of the Illyrian tribes stands out as overly negative. Displaying the neighboring Illyrians as barbaric, sexually promiscuous and blood-thirsty can be read as a validation of Rome’s own sometimes barbaric brand of imperialistic actions against the Illyrian people.

Evidence of Romanization is clear in the preponderance of city-centers found throughout the region. The lay-out of buildings in different cities had great significance to the people that lived in them. The location of certain social structures as well as the use of space within a city speaks volumes about the culture that inhabits it. A careful examination of different city centers provides a snapshot of the daily lives of the Illyrian people as well as the Romans who made them their homes.

Fifth century Sirmium, located in modern day Mitrovica, Serbia, features several different houses. In the central area of the city, house upon house were literally built on top of each other. More recent houses have been excavated to reveal fragments of reused building material, or spolia, from other older houses. Florin Curta reports that “the city’s walls had been leveled and a three aisled basilica erected on top of them. A group of houses built with spolia bonded with earth surrounded the church.”³⁹ This grouping of houses around a church boldly hints at the importance of religion in Sirmium during the fifth century. The church is literally the

³⁷ Peter Heather, *The Fall of the Roman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 170.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Florin Curta, *The Making of the Slavs: History and Archaeology of the Lower Danube Region c.500-700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 133.

central feature of the town; the axis of Roman provincial life. Furthermore, the protective walls were destroyed in order to make room for the basilica. This suggests a belief and preference in the protection ensured by religion to the man-made barriers of earth and stone. The proximity of the houses excavated at Sirmium also points to a society that was in constant close contact and reliance on one another. The closeness of the houses in the city center also indicates the tribal heritage of the area, as Illyrians would have been used to protecting their homes as a social unit. Another type of house found in Sirmium alludes to the Romanization of the area. An aristocratic home located in the southern section of the city is typical of Roman imperial residences.⁴⁰ According to Heather, a city center with such a villa would have been considered “a proper Roman” city “cheerfully exploited to good effect by a landowning class living in luxurious villas.”⁴¹ The mixed heritage of the Balkans is thus in full display in Sirmium, from the Illyrian tribal heritage to the Roman influence.

Macedonian city-center Stobi also provides evidence of a society far from barbarism. Excavating Stobi unearthed “large palatial residences” resplendent with once manicured courtyards with elaborately carved fountains and the remains of “floors with pavements of mosaic” and frescoed walls.⁴² Such painstaking aesthetic effort points to the desire to be considered part of the Romanized world. Furthermore, artisans specializing in laying mosaics and creating frescoes would have been employed by the owners of the homes. Again, artistic specialization points to a society that did appreciate sensory pleasure and was not solely concerned with warfare as many Roman historians attempted to portray. Another building excavated at Stobi contained a “considerable quantity of spindle whorls and loom weights,”

⁴⁰ Curta, *The Making of the Slavs*, 133.

⁴¹ Heather, *The Fall of the Roman Empire*, 171.

⁴² Curta *The Making of the Slavs*, 134.

which were obviously used to create fabric.⁴³ The significance of this site rests in another example of specialized labor, weaving. Interestingly, this building appears to have been a location where tools were made on a large scale for the public.

Caričin Grad, a fifth century city located in modern Serbia, boasts significant space for public use. The city was “divided into four unequal parts by two main colonnaded streets meeting in a large, circular plaza surrounded by porticoes.”⁴⁴ This planned separation of space coupled with a central plaza indicates that the middle open space acted a bustling hub for social interaction, and was most likely filled with vendors and artisans selling their wares. Also found at Caričin Grad were “workshops and a bakery, as well as store-rooms with *dolia*” pointing to a thriving economy based on more than subsistence agriculture. Eventually renamed by Justinian as Justininia Prima,⁴⁵ Caričin Grad serves as an example of Roman building projects in areas already historically inhabited by the native population. The building and restoration projects undertaken by Justinian illustrate the historical tradition of Roman appropriation of traditional Illyrian space. The Romanization and eventual Christianization of Illyrian public spaces is further justified in the official histories through the portrayal of the Illyrian tribes as subhuman.

Romanized Dyrrachium in the Macedonian imperial administrative district (now Durrës, Albania) provides an excellent example of a provincial city in the Illyrian region that illustrates how natives and Romans cohabitated successfully.⁴⁶ Originally established by the neighboring Greeks, Dyrrachium experienced a revitalization under Roman imperialism as a popular home for retired soldiers. Dyrrachium was “called into life primarily by the need of providing quarters

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 130.

⁴⁵ Jas Elsner, “The Rhetoric of Buildings in the *De Aedificiis* of Procopius,” *Art and Text in Byzantine Culture*, ed. Liz James (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 47.

⁴⁶ Curta, *The Making of the Slavs*, 134.

... for Italian soldiers who had served their time, and for whom there was no longer room in Italy.”⁴⁷ Despite the Illyrians’ reputation as a barbaric people, Romans were content to live alongside them. Salmon describes the relationship between the natives and the transplanted Romans as a “double” community “where the two groups were on much more equal terms” and even claims that each group had “full autonomy.”⁴⁸ Salmon argues that provincial cities with social structures similar to Dyrrachium could also be found scattered throughout Pannonia.⁴⁹ Under the imperial magistracy, Dyrrachium grew in importance due to the construction of a main road leading to Thessalonica. Mommsen names this road as “the most important” artery “in the whole empire.”⁵⁰

The architecture of homes found throughout the eastern provinces as well as the construction of social space in city centers speaks volumes as to how people in Illyria related to each other. In most cases, the locus of the city revolved around shops and religious buildings. Usually, the average citizen inhabited the inner portion of the city while the wealthier aristocrats owned land and larger homes on the outskirts of the city. Generally, homes were constructed with the “vestibule of the home” housing a “baking oven, arguably used for the needs of the entire household.”⁵¹ City-dwellers inhabited homes made of clay, remnants of older buildings, and stone.

Building projects and urban development projects were undertaken not only for strategic reasons by the Romans, but also as conscious symbols of imperial power. According to Elsner, “the great advantage of buildings as a choice of subject [in historical literature] was the

⁴⁷ Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, 301.

⁴⁸ E.T. Salmon, *Roman Colonization Under the Republic* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 150.

⁴⁹ Salmon, *Roman Colonization Under the Republic*, 152.

⁵⁰ Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, 302.

⁵¹ Curta, *The Making of the Slavs*, 131.

geographical scope by which the emperor's works could be used to represent the extent of his empire."⁵² As such, buildings commissioned by imperial authority were already used as a symbol of power. The physical placement of buildings in city-centers can thus be interpreted as a political statement. According to Procopius, Justinian extensively built in the provinces in order to bring civilization to the people. This emperor brought the Armenians out of a very precarious way of life into their present state of complete safety: "This emperor brought [the people of the east] out of a very precarious way of life into their present state of complete safety."⁵³ Again, the degradation of the provincial population is evident in the historical text. The historical record clearly delineates Rome as the saviors of the region, as the natives were sorely unable to care for themselves in the proscribed Roman fashion. This bicameral ideology stems from earlier tradition, and the juxtaposition of 'west' as civilized and 'east' as wild and barbarian continues even in modern scholarship.

Remnants of material culture like jewelry and ornamentation are often excavated from the Illyrian region. Wilkes proclaims that "Illyrians loved ornaments" and that women often "would appear heavily draped with all manner of jewelry" and Illyrian men were assume to have carried "highly decorated weapons" usually found entombed with their bodies.⁵⁴ One of the most frequently found accessories are large brooches known as bow fibulae, which were worn by both women and men. Curta postulates that these brooches, which varied regionally, carried social importance and might have even been signs of social rank and tribal affiliation; or for "negotiating social power."⁵⁵ This theory of "communicative symbolism"⁵⁶ in dress is important

⁵² Elsner, "The Rhetoric of Buildings," 38.

⁵³ Procopius, *De Aedificiis*, II.i.3.

⁵⁴ Wilkes, *The Illyrians*, 231.

⁵⁵ Curta, "Female Dress and 'Slavic' Bow Fibulae in Greece," *Hesperia* 74 (Winter 2005), 101.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

to understanding how Illyrian culture was performed on a daily basis. Curta's argument that ornamentation provided important information of the wearer's physical origins as well as social standing provides a more complicated and realistic perspective than Wilkes' view that Illyrians simply 'loved jewelry.'

Examples of Illyrian dress are found depicted on monuments constructed during the Roman era. The type of garment most frequently seen on women consists of a shoulder to foot length shift with long sleeves, coupled with a shorter upper garment designed to cover the torso. Often, this long robe was paired with a scarf or cloak for further upper body warmth, often covering the head. According to Wilkes, contemporary women still wear "a version of this dress which survives in northern Albania" and Kosovo.⁵⁷ The cloaks or head scarves were fastened with the bow fibulae described above. Tattooing was a popular practice among the people of the east, and Illyrians were characterized by Romans due to their choice of body art. The Japodes tribe⁵⁸ of northern Illyria are described by Strabo:

They are indeed a war-crazy people but have been utterly worn down by Augustus. Their cities are Metulum, Arupium, Monetium and Avendo. Their lands are poor, the people living for the most part on spelt and millet. Their armor is Celtic but they are tattooed like the rest of the Illyrians and Thracians.⁵⁹

While extensive tattooing is not unusual among tribal peoples, for the Romans, the tattoos suggest a "war-crazy" lifestyle. Strabo does not account for the possibility that any people whose lands are invaded are likely to put up a fight. Strabo's description of the Japodes is ultimately condescending, castigating the tribe as irreversibly backwards in contrast to the 'civilized' Romans.

⁵⁷ Wilkes, *The Illyrians*, 229.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 197.

⁵⁹ Strabo, *Geography*, 7.5 4.

Analyzing the role of women in the Illyrian provinces is helpful in understanding the perspective of classical Roman scholars. The large amount of looms and shuttles found also suggest that what was regarded traditionally as women's work by the Romans was a major economic contributor in the Illyrian provinces. Wilkes claims that women in Illyria had a much more "significant role" than their contemporary counterparts due to the prevalence of extended family units, which points to a "dispersed federation of groups belonging to a single tribe."⁶⁰ This evidence coupled with the evidence of matriarchy would have been extremely unsettling to a society deeply rooted in patriarchy. The threat to patriarchal rule would have been motivation for Roman historians to vilify the Illyrians, label them as barbaric, and portray them as less intelligent. The late Roman fascination with and condemnation of Illyrian female sexuality is a classic example of Augustinian ideology.

The tribal connectivity of the Illyrians described by Wilkes is backed by meticulous archaeological research. This accurate research has produced a cross-disciplinary ripple effect. For example, feminist scholar Julia Kristeva presents the modern Balkans as a sorely unequal comparison to western Europe.⁶¹ Kristeva bases much of her analysis of the area on a bicameral view of nationalism. According to critic Dušan Bjelić, Kristeva views the acceptable brand as "civic nationalism" which "has a strong rational and legal basis and a long history of public discourse."⁶² In contrast, "tribal nationalism" stems from "mystical sentiments that supersede legal authority" and therefore the Balkans present a "hegemonic threat to society."⁶³ Kristeva's

⁶⁰ Wilkes, *The Illyrians*, 110.

⁶¹ Julia Kristeva, *Crisis of the European Subject* (New York: Other Press, 2000), 171.

⁶² Dusan Bjelić, "The Balkans: Europe's Cesspool," *Cultural Critique* 62 (2006), 37.

⁶³ Bjelić, "The Balkans: Europe's Cesspool," 37.

perspective echoes the sentiments of the Roman historians that preceded her, and illustrates how classical history is politically charged.

The Illyrian provinces were also a traditional recruiting ground for the Roman legions. The Roman historical record varies in describing the extent of and reason for recruitment. One account can be found in Plutarch's biography of Aemilius Paullus. Plutarch aligns the Illyrian troops with the villain of his story, Perseus. As Perseus advanced towards Rome the Illyrians joined his ranks under King Genthius as paid mercenaries.⁶⁴ Later, Genthius' ignorance of Roman custom allows him to be double-crossed by Perseus. The overall effect of Plutarch's characterization of the Illyrian Genthius is classic racist archetype. The lower morals of the Illyrians allowed them to be purchased by Perseus, as easily as a slave might have been bought. Perseus' eventual duping of Genthius further demonstrates the low regard in which Romans held the Illyrians, as Plutarch's eschatological narration makes it clear to his audience that Genthius and his people never stood a chance against the superior Romans. Even Perseus, whom other Romans easily identify as morally deficient, is able to hoodwink the Illyrians by dangling money in front of them "even allow[ing] them to store" the gold "in their own sealed caskets."⁶⁵ Plutarch later compares Genthius' expulsion from his kingdom to that of a bird being flung from its nest, further heightening the idea that the bumbling Illyrian king never stood a chance against Rome.

As the power of Rome waned, the desire for renewed control over Illyricum increased proportionately. The reason for this lies in the region's history. Heather posits that the desperate need for "military manpower" as a major motivation in "winning back east Illyricum" was a

⁶⁴ Plutarch, *Roman Lives*, AemP 13-14.

⁶⁵ Plutarch, *Roman Lives*, AemP 13.

“cunning plan to secure” more recruits.⁶⁶ Mommsen provides a concurrent perspective: “Italy had wholly ceased to be military; and history does not acknowledge the ruler’s right without the warrior’s power.”⁶⁷ As a place of military and strategic importance, Roman influence spread easily throughout the region. Plutarch references Illyricum’s strategic importance in his chapter on Caesar. Illyricum is cited as part of the negotiations between Caesar and Pompey, as Pompey wanted to “be allowed to keep Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum.”⁶⁸ The fact that Illyricum was a contested piece of the Roman pie suggests its importance in the grand plan of the empire. Frank Wozniak describes the perspective of Rome in the fifth century as “anxious in regard” to Illyricum, especially “when land or sea access” was jeopardized by unruly natives or invading hordes.⁶⁹ In Plutarch’s piece on Antony, Illyricum is again noted as a source of many soldiers: “every king, ruler, tetrarch, tribe and community from... Illyricum had been ordered to send or bring men.”⁷⁰ Again, Plutarch’s diction implies the subservient status of the region, and the importance of men recruited from the region is reiterated.

Wilkes’ book *The Illyrians* is one of few in English that focus solely on the ancient province and people. As such, it carries a lot of weight. Much of Wilkes’ description is invaluable, however, his purpose in solving dispute over the lineage of modern day Albanians is too politically charged for his scholarship to be objective. Furthermore, Wilkes questions few of the official histories. For instance, when describing Alexander’s campaign in Dassretis, he wholly accepts Arrian’s account “in which the Illyrians were overawed, outwitted and humiliated

⁶⁶ Heather, *The Fall of the Roman Empire*, 219.

⁶⁷ Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, 251.

⁶⁸ Plutarch, *Roman Lives*, Caesar 31.

⁶⁹ Frank Wozniak, “East Rome, Ravenna, and Western Illyricum: 454-536 A.D.” *Historia* 30 (1981), 351.

⁷⁰ Plutarch, *Antony*, 56.

by a trained army.”⁷¹ Frankly, his diction reflects the same bias towards the native Illyrians as the historical record. While Alexander’s troops were indeed an elite force, Wilkes’ rote acceptance of the encounter speaks to his unwillingness to challenge racist assumptions in the official histories. Wilkes’ apathy in spite of the obvious need to address the unbalanced histories can be explained in political terms. According to Wilkes, “the Albanian case [claiming Illyrian heritage] is weakened” by his analysis.⁷² The reason many Albanians defend their descent from Illyrian stock is in order to protect their modern homeland in the eastern Balkans. Ideas surrounding ethnic descent and race have a very real impact in this area, and scholarship conducted on the Balkans must be carefully constructed.

Western ideology and Western binary perspective has greatly adulterated the historical treatment of the Illyrian region. From descriptions as disparate as climate and landscape to racial descriptions and military history, Illyrians are traditionally set up as an inferior ethnicity, a stigma that is later transmuted to all of the Southeastern European peoples. The Roman’s interest in the area and people is due primarily to the geographic location of the Balkan peninsula, and the Roman desire for control of the area is replicated by later empires. The Romans provide the first primitive and savage characterizations of the Balkans an idea that future foreign powers, like many Roman innovations, will adopt and build upon.

⁷¹ Wilkes, *The Illyrians*, 124.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 278.

CHAPTER 4

BALKANISM AND ORIENTALISM IN SECONDARY SOURCES

Since the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the identity of the people of the Balkans has been scrutinized extensively. The temporal gap between Roman and Ottoman empires is large, however, the Roman conceptualization of the Balkan peoples remarkably survived and flourished in the interim centuries. The perceived ability to categorize and define the varied people of the Balkans is an inherently racially prejudiced project. Due to the long history of Ottoman rule in southeastern Europe, the divide can be seen as a continuation of Orientalism. Furthermore, the western gaze envisages the Balkan peninsula as a hotbed of violent home-grown nationalistic clashes and disavows responsibility for ethnic conflict rooted in the break-up of the Ottoman empire. While some scholars question the Orientalist approach to southeastern Europe, the accepted Eurocentric perspective continues to color historical interpretation of the area. Interrogation of the scholastic perspective towards conflict, nationalism, civilization and identity in the Balkans sheds light on role of traditional western ideology in perpetuating animosity towards and within the region.

The western concept of civilization plays a key role in the analysis of nationalism and identity in southeastern Europe. Jeremy Salt provides an excellent etymology of the word, explaining its Latin roots, as well as how it gained popularity:

Richard Hooker used the expression civil society to describe a system of government established with the consent of the people and implying a political, legal, social and religious relationship between ruler and ruled... somewhere around the middle of the eighteenth century the noun civilization emerged as a description of a large social unit subsuming cultures bound together by a common level of morality and development.⁷³

Salt continues, explaining how western culture appropriated the idea to define ‘discovered’

⁷³ Jeremy Salt, *The Unmaking of the Middle East: A History of Western Disorder in Arab Land* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 14.

cultures as barbaric in contrast to their own known civilized ways. These ideas of civilization and barbarism are lynchpin ideas in understanding how southeastern Europe has been literally defined throughout the historical record.

Again, the word ‘Balkan’ is derived from Turkish, translates to “wooded mountain.”⁷⁴ While the origins of the modern usage of the term was simply to signify a geographic place name, ‘Balkan’ no longer functions as such. Instead, the name of the region has taken on an extremely negative, and even racist, meaning. Madreagu defines ‘Balkanism’ as “a permanent state of cold or warm conflict between neighbors countries for territories with mixed populations.”⁷⁵ The process of ‘Balkanization’ is routinely taught in public schools as the violent splintering of countries based on religion and cultural heritage. The linguistic appropriation and wide acceptance of the geographic name ‘Balkan’ to mean conflict and division illustrates Eurocentric ideology and clearly delineated ‘othering’ of southeastern Europe. Milica Hayden claims that “the unfavorable ‘normative’ use of ‘balkan’ is so pronounced as to make Orientalism axiomatic in regard to peoples or societies so labeled.”⁷⁶ In other words, the use of the word to denote something so negative automatically others the people of the Balkans by English speakers. Furthermore, the use of the term ‘powder keg’ to describe southeastern Europe is a loaded term. The phrase suggests an inevitability of violent conflict. The term echoes the eschatological perspective of writers from the Roman Empire who consistently described the people of the Balkan peninsula as war-like and barbaric. Despite the inherent politicization and racist overtones of these words, they are a part of everyday vernacular used to describe the area.

⁷⁴ Alexander Madgearu, *The Wars of the Balkan Peninsula: Their Medieval Origins* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2008), 3.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Milica and Robert M. Hayden, “Orientalist Variations on the Theme “Balkans”: Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics,” *Slavic Review* 52 (April 1992), 2.

Hijacking linguistics does not end at the use of the term ‘Balkanization’. There are several other words borrowed from southeastern European languages used in English to denote different unsavory acts. Dušan Bjelić cites several racially charged words that have become part of the English lexicon. For example, Bjelić defines “*Bugar*” the Slavic word for Bulgarian, “in order to emphasize the fact that the English word, bugger (a sodomite) is derived from *Bugar*.”⁷⁷ Furthermore, Bjelić cites ‘slovenly’ as another example of a borrowed word. Slovenly, derived from *Slovene*, means “lazy and dirty,” and Bjelić half jokingly accuses the Oxford English Dictionary of “conspir[ing] in the creation of a linguistic hegemony.”⁷⁸ A more widely known example, slave, is derived from the Latin word *sclavus*, defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as the Slavonic people forced into slavery by Roman conquest. The appropriation of words from Southeastern European languages and subsequent negative permutation into English vernacular is the ultimate example of Orientalism. Refashioning Slavic ideas and words in order to denote something ugly and different provides a model of how west asserts power over east.

Historian Barbara Jelavich’s ambitious *History of the Balkans* presents an overwhelmingly inimical understanding of southeastern Europe. Jelavich describes the Ottoman influence on the Balkan peninsula as the source of the moral and intellectual deficiencies of society there. Jelavich begins her book with an ethnographic description of the disparate population as lacking “ethnically ‘pure’ people.”⁷⁹ The use of such racially charged language is extremely disturbing and proves her analysis is intrinsically faulty, as proving ethnic purity in any area is an irrational and irrelevant exercise. Later, Jelavich juxtaposes Islamic influence with social development. She describes sixteenth century Albanians as “the most backward people in

⁷⁷ Dusan Bjelić, “The Balkans: Europe’s Cesspool,” *Cultural Critique* 62 (2006), 51.

⁷⁸ Bjelić, “The Balkans: Europe’s Cesspool,” 51

⁷⁹ Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 27.

the Balkans. They [Albanians] also had the largest number of conversions to Islam.”⁸⁰ Jelavich’s equation of ‘backwardness’ with the success of Islamic conversion clearly delineates the extreme racist perspective of her scholarship.

Other Balkan identities are treated similarly. For instance, Jelavich describes Montenegro as “the most primitive area in the Balkans, if not Europe.”⁸¹ She also calls the Montenegrins “naïve” and seems shocked that “this country was to play a role far outweighing its poverty, small size, and backward condition.”⁸² Apparently analyzing the Montenegrins on their own terms and thereby explaining their ability to control their fate was beyond the scope of Jelavich’s work. Jelavich’s basis for describing the Montenegrins so disparagingly seems to hinge on cultural makeup of the area, which she explains as consisting of tribal units tied together by familial relationships. Jelavich’s prejudice might be rooted in this social structure, as it contrasts greatly with the preferred nuclear family in the western, Eurocentric view.

Later, Jelavich interestingly manipulates her negative personal feelings towards extended family social systems to a more positive view fitting her analysis of Johann von Herder’s theories on nationalism. Jelavich contends that the Balkan ethnic groups exemplified Von Herder’s romantic ideas of *Volkgeist*, or the national group identity as witnessed through folklore, music and art.⁸³ Jelavich’s change in attitude is not as strange as it seems. She is simply continuing to defend the Eurocentric model. For instance, when tribal affiliation meant that ‘alien’ Islamic religion more easily diffused throughout southeastern Europe, Jelavich views it negatively. However, once the western ideological pendulum swings back in favor of tribal

⁸⁰ Ibid., 80.

⁸¹ Ibid., 84.

⁸² Ibid., 84,86.

⁸³ Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, 172.

familial ties as an exemplification of western Romantic views of nationalism, Jelavich accepts traditional Balkan social structure.

Theories on civilized versus primitive nationalism in the Balkans have sparked lively debate amongst scholars. For example, feminist scholar Julia Kristeva presents the modern Balkans as a sorely unequal comparison to western Europe.⁸⁴ Much of Kristeva's analysis is based on her dualist view of nationalism. According to critic Dušan Bjelić, Kristeva names the acceptable brand as "civic nationalism" which "has a strong rational and legal basis and a long history of public discourse" and can be compared to Jeremy Salt's description of western defined civilization.⁸⁵ In contrast, "tribal nationalism" stems from "mystical sentiments that supersede legal authority," and therefore the Balkans represent a "hegemonic threat to society."⁸⁶ The barbarous nature of the Balkan people is further illustrated, in Kristeva's opinion, by the "dirty" national language filled with loan words.⁸⁷ Kristeva's idea of purity in language is not a new one. According to Jelavich, "the nationalist was extremely interested in the study and purification of his language, since he regarded this manifestation of national character as perhaps the most important."⁸⁸ Again, the idea of purification presents itself. The obsession with purity of language intimates a parallel to the idea of racial purity and superiority. Jelavich explains further: "each writer should use his own language, because it alone could express his own ideas and true national culture. Foreign words were to be rigorously expunged from the vocabularies of every language as detrimental to natural modes of expression."⁸⁹ Here, ideas of cultural

⁸⁴ Julia Kristeva, *Crisis of the European Subject*, (New York: Other Press), 171.

⁸⁵ Bjelić, "The Balkans: Europe's Cesspool," 37.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Bjelić, "The Balkans: Europe's Cesspool," 39.

⁸⁸ Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, 173.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

diffusion and borrowing are seen as dangerous to national identity and should be ‘rigorously expunged,’ suggesting a forcible and active participation of the local identity against alien ideas. The rhetoric describing language cleansing scarily echoes the rhetoric used to justify ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, the act of purifying language is an unnatural one. The natural process of diffusion is interrupted by nationalistic political intervention and language growth stagnates. Complete language purification in southeastern Europe is a highly irrational aim, as the area has experienced centuries of varied cultural influence. Thus, Kristeva’s argument embodies Eurocentric racist perceptions towards the Balkan peninsula.

Binary ideas of nationalism are also described by Victor Roudometof, who again pits ideas of citizenship against ideas of culturally tied national identity. Roudometof’s analysis, however, focuses on the historiographic weight placed on these ideas in nationalistic discourse. Countering Jelavich’s and Kristeva’s arguments, Roudometof argues that a binary view of nationalism is less “fruitful” than analyzing how ideas of “citizenship and nationhood” are adapted in southeastern Europe.⁹⁰ By seeking a more complex interaction between the two, Roudometof presents a more balanced picture than that of Kristeva and Jelavich. Roudometof also seems to dismiss the Herderian approach to national ideas of *volkgeist*, arguing that seeking to “discover the primordial element that determines the nature of nationalism” a faulty approach.⁹¹ Roudometof’s perspective is echoed by Jeremy Salt:

The fact that cultures are not often confined to the same geographical space or national boundaries has propelled the search over the last two centuries for a mystical something else that defines civilization, perhaps a soul, a mentality, a character, a sense of itself, a personality- in short, an essence.⁹²

⁹⁰ Roudometof, *Nationalism, Globalization and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans*, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001), 10-11.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Salt, *The Unmaking of the Middle East*, 15.

Accordingly, Salt claims that this view of essential identities has help demarcate the line between ‘east’ and ‘west,’ as notions of civil relationships were used to define western cultures and barbarity as a synonym for the east. Roudemetof argues similarly, as Balkan nationalist movements “are routinely discussed in terms of ‘tribalism’ or ethnic unrest, interpretations that confirm assumptions of cultural superiority and inferiority” between east and west.⁹³

Milica Hayden defines Edward Said’s theory of Orientalism as “a tool for and justification of cultural as well as political dominance in that it both presumes and restates the inferiority of the eastern races, religions and societies to those of the west.”⁹⁴ Balkan history is often analyzed comparatively to ‘normative’ western civilizations. Ivan Berend claims that the western brand of feudal society was incapable of being fully established in southeastern Europe. According to Berend, the western “classic” feudal model “was characterized by a harmonious and proportionate amalgamation” of classic social elements, which was impossible to replicate harmoniously “in the east.”⁹⁵ Berend does not give a reason why the western feudal model was considered ‘correct;’ it is understood that western society is normative and eastern Europe ‘backwards’. Later, Berend claims that:

As many analysts have noted, in the case of the Balkans, for example, Turkish dominion (which there lasted longest and had the most serious effects) cannot be blamed exclusively for the backwardness of the region; the initial setback actually predated the Ottoman occupation.⁹⁶

What Berend considers the ‘initial setback’ causing Balkan backwardness remains unclear.

Undoubtedly, Berend would disagree that Roman exploitation and depletion of soil nutrients

⁹³ Roudometof, *Nationalism, Globalization and Orthodoxy*, 3.

⁹⁴ Hayden, “Orientalist Variations on the Theme “Balkans,”” 2.

⁹⁵ Ivan T. Berend, “The Historical Evolution of Eastern Europe as Region.” *International Organization* 40 (Spring 1986),” 331.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 335.

played a role in the economic stability of the area. Berend's article epitomizes Orientalist perceptions of the Balkans, as does Jelavich's work.

The origins and identity of the varied cultural groups of the Balkan peninsula has also been interpreted differently over time. For example, the descent of the Albanians is a hotly contested subject, one Madreagu calls "the most disputed problem of Southeast European history."⁹⁷ Albanians and Kosovars claim autochthonous origin, while Serbs maintain that the disputed territory of Kosovo is their ethnic heartland. The task of proving an indisputable link between the ancient Illyrian people and the modern Albanians has preoccupied dozens of scholars. According to Madreagu, the "ideology forged during the period of national revival tried to ascribe" Illyrian or even more ancient heritage (Pelasgian descent) to the ethnic Albanians "in order to support their rights."⁹⁸ The scholastic drive towards a national identity is described by Hayden. She points out that details are contrived, and nationalists strive to create and explains fallacious constructs in terms of Orientalism. She claims that "students of nationalism" are aware that they must reinterpret their histories in order to view their nation as "unchanging in its essential elements."⁹⁹ Again, the idea of a mystical essential ethnic tie is presented. However, Hayden challenges this assumption, explicating that nationalism is a false reality created by "political actors who build support by manipulating cultural 'facts.'¹⁰⁰ Hayden concludes that the construction of nationalism does serve a purpose, as a lens through which to see southeastern Europe's similarities and their interdependent past.

⁹⁷ Madreagu, *The Wars of the Balkan Peninsula*, 144.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 145.

⁹⁹ Hayden, "Orientalist Variations on the Theme 'Balkans,'" 14.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

The idea that “proving” ethnogenesis is even possible demonstrates the highly problematic nature of research in order to procure cultural validity. The idea that ethnogenesis can be systematically determined through historical research harkens back to Bernard Cohn’s theory of the pitfalls inherent in “really real” historical paradigms. The reality is that proving lineage is irrational, and discounting the positive aspects of cultural diffusion widens the ideological rift between cultures. Hayden expounds on this idea arguing that dividing “the continua of human reality” into “clearly differentiated cultures, histories, traditions” and societies has “become an existential issue” for southeastern Europe. Evidenced by violent bouts of conflict, Orientalist ideology has permeated throughout the area. Hayden provides numerous examples of how political leaders and thinkers “cast the various peoples” of former Yugoslavia as “inherently democratic and advanced, or authoritarian and backward.”¹⁰¹ The dichotomy between progressive and backward is an example of an ancient model used for centuries. Hayden claims that in modern times an “ideological other” represented by communism in southeastern Europe has “replaced the geographical/cultural ‘other’ of the Orient.”¹⁰² Again, Hayden emphasizes the difference in historical terminology between east and west:

Defining the western parts of Yugoslavia as different from the southeastern parts: more progressive, prosperous, hard-working, tolerant democratic... in a word, *European*, compared to the primitive, lazy, intolerant Balkans. Were this characterization to become accepted, it would be clear, first, that Yugoslavia was an impossible union of parts not only disparate, but completely incompatible; and second, that the northwestern parts of the country were really parts of Europe, artificially separated by their imprisonment in the Balkans.¹⁰³

This analysis, when coupled with the examination of linguistic appropriation of cultural names, is compelling evidence of the Orientalist influence within southeastern Europe. Hayden also

¹⁰¹ Hayden, “Orientalist Variations on the Theme ‘Balkans,’” 3.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁰³ Hayden, “Orientalist Variations on ‘Balkans,’” 8.

explains the Orientalist perspective as drawn along religious lines, and Eastern Orthodox and Islam are both considered alien ‘backwards’ cultural indicators. Additionally, Hayden cites Slovenian writer Taras Kermauner as stating that Serbia cannot become a member of “civil society so long as it maintains a ‘Balkans-type church and Orthodox Christianity.’”¹⁰⁴ This religious divide within the Balkan peninsula’s ethnic groups has perpetuated Orientalism and led to divisive splits between different cultures. The longevity of the clashes between groups is an example of Eurocentric Orientalism at work. Hayden also cites numerous articles written in American newspapers that paint the southeastern part of the Balkan peninsula in a similar fashion.

The contrast between the belief that western Europe personified civil and rational ideals and southeastern Europe’s literary embodiment of savage wildness has irrevocably colored the histories of the Balkans from the time of the Romans to the present. From examples of downright Orientalist scholarship and the biased discussion of nationalist movements, binary stratification has caused a major rift in the reality of how people in southeastern Europe view each other, as well as how the ‘western’ world uses the Balkans. The theft and reconstruction of Slavic words to portray something vile in the English language is an example of the insidious integration of Orientalism. Negative definitions of Balkan identities has become standard in the vernacular of the media as well as in public schools. Scholarship on the classic and ancient past is also fueled by nationalist identities and Orientalism. Though the tide is beginning to turn, and scholars are beginning to examine the area aware of the bias, reexamination of historical evidence remains necessary.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 9.

CHAPTER 5

ENDURING BIASES AS SEEN IN TRAVEL LITERATURE

Deconstructing travel literature provides another important facet to understanding the pervasive nature and influence of derogatory ideas about cultures other than the European “norm.” According to Mary Louise Pratt, the genre of travel writing affords the “reading publics a sense of ownership... with respect to” the work’s region and culture. The sense of entitlement elicited through the act of reading functions as a cornerstone of imperialist pathos. Writers traveling to Southeastern Europe provide an excellent example of how racist stereotypes continue to pervade Western thinking during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The mystery of the Orient coupled with the Greek and Roman heritage of the region combine to create motley fictional elements in the writings of each traveler. The coupling of rich cultures and the relatively untouched, fierce quality of the landscape, led early twentieth century writers to imagine themselves in a fantasy realm replete with fairies, monsters and the Greek pantheon. Furthermore, as travelers are wont to do, each made special efforts to visit areas of historical significance. Regardless of the period in which the traveler wrote, each author described their experiences as linking the writer to the classic history of the site. The tangibility of history and myth in the writer’s experience serves to provide a classical standard of European-ness by which each author compared the natives. These experiences furthered their distaste for the modern inhabitants of the Southeastern European peninsula. The travelers were united in their disdain for the native people in comparison to the classic and civilized ideals that each ruin symbolizes.

Traveler Lester Hornby, writing in the late nineteenth century, couches his experience in Southeastern Europe in mythic terms. Before the text of his work begins, Hornby provides an

eighteenth century map of the Balkans bearing words ‘revised from an old Map.’ The map depicts the physical landscape of Southeastern Europe, as well as the borders between the regions Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Croatia. Importantly, the map also contains illustrations of bare-breasted mermaids frolicking in the western Adriatic. In the eastern portion of the map, giant winged fish swim near the Balkan coast. The northeastern corner depicts the Greek god Zephyr blowing wind across Bosnia, while a Turk on horseback appears to raid the Dinaric Alps.



Figure 1. Lester Hornby, Map of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats & Slovenes, 1927¹⁰⁵

Before his first written words, Hornby has already muddled fact and fantasy, depicting both tangible landforms through the map and the inclusion of creatures whose sole existence is in the minds’ eye, not the Adriatic. The juxtaposition of Zephyr and the Turk on horseback serve as a

¹⁰⁵ Lester Hornby, *Balkan Sketches: An Artists Wanderings in the Kingdom of the Serbs* (Boston: Little Brown and Co, 1927), ii.

reminder of the commingling of culture in the area; the distinction between classical Greek and Roman civilization and the raiding Turk, whose barbarism is evident through his the arc of his cudgel.

The opening phrase of Hornby's work, "all travelers are liars," points to his awareness of the authoritative nature his writing takes in the eyes of his readership.¹⁰⁶ Hornby justifies his writing, stating that "it takes some imagination to lie - that is Art. All art is built on - imagination, we'll say."¹⁰⁷ Hornby is thus complicit in the transmission and perpetuation of falsehoods, willingly participating in the creation of the Balkans in the Western imagination as well as the 'othering' of the Balkan people. The hybridization of fact and fantasy is a major theme throughout the work. Hornby regularly fuses disparate elements of Greek mythology, the Arabic Thousand and One Nights, and even European fairytales into his daily experiences.

For example, Hornby describes a woman emerging from the surf on the Dalmatian coastline as rising "out of the water like a seal and lie gleaming and relaxed- another Aphrodite."¹⁰⁸ In a single breath, Hornby draws on two archetypes from different fantastical traditions. The first image comparing the woman to a gleaming seal recalls tales from the British Isles of Selkies. These traditional Welsh and Scottish fairytales tell of shapeshifting seal-women. The majority of these fairytales revolve around the capture of a selkie by everyday fishermen. The Selkie is described as a beautiful, seductive creature, and no matter how hard the man tries to keep a Selkie in human form, they always are successful in escaping back to the wilds of the sea. Thus, this aspect of imagery serves the purpose of painting the native women Hornby sees as untamable, sexual non-humans on the brink of reverting to primitivity. Furthermore, many of

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 3.

¹⁰⁷ Hornby, *Balkan Sketches*, 3-4.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 71.

these stories emphasize the power of the human over the selkies, who are powerless against the cunning human. Hornby's readership would have been familiar with these fairytales, and his comparison between seal and human emphasizes Hornby's (and by extension, the Western readers') position of power over the people of Southeastern Europe. Secondly, it reinforces the idea of a reality that in the Balkans, is nebulous at best. Lastly, the image of the Selkie underlines the idea that the people of the Balkans are incapable of being brought into modernity. Like the Selkie, they are wont to shed their "human" skin at first opportunity to revert to barbarism. The fisherman's character in this British tradition symbolizes the West as the last bastion preventing their complete deterioration as a society.

It is also important to note the second image of Aphrodite in Hornby's description. The woman is described rising from the sea and becoming "another Aphrodite."¹⁰⁹ This second layer of fictional symbolism is crucial to understanding Hornby's sexualization of the native populace. Hornby is obviously imagining the woman nude, as the Aphrodite of Grecian myth was upon her ocean shore ascent. By omitting description of the woman's bathing clothes, Hornby also further strips away her autonomy over reality. The allusion to Aphrodite also recalls the fact that the Balkan peninsula served as the birthplace of classical Western knowledge. Thus, this is an example of Hornby writing himself into classical Western literary tradition, by creating a second Aphrodite out of an unwitting native.

As Hornby's cruise ship approached the Dalmatian coastline, he constantly expresses wonderment at the rugged geography of the archipelago. As he surveys the blue green waters and craggy precipices, he continues to write himself into Western literary tradition, remarking "I

¹⁰⁹ Hornby, *Balkan Sketches*, 71.

knew that forgotten treasures of ancient argonauts must still be mouldering in caves there."¹¹⁰

His physical approach to the Croatian coastline is defined by his fictional literary experience, and thus concrete knowledge, of the Adriatic. He ‘knows’ that the vast wealth of the Greeks is there, waiting for him, or the West, to find it. This conveys that the people of the Balkans are incapable or simply not desirous, of unearthing such a wealth. Metaphorically, the knowledge of the Greeks could be considered to be their greatest treasure. Despite inhabiting the footprint of classic Western civilization, Hornby implies that the modern Balkan peoples were incapable of accessing their greatness. Thus, the Greek treasure languished in its abandonment, mouldering in the decay of civilization wrought by the influx of Slavs and Turks.

Hornby undertakes several side trips throughout *Balkan Sketches*, and he recounts a particularly treacherous mountain journey sprinkled with phantasmagoric encounters. The Dinaric Alps are personified throughout his work as violent, treacherous and uncivilized. The repetition of this sentiment throughout his travels becomes a reflection of the people, whose savage nature is directly linked to their habitation of the place. He asserts that there is “something like defiance in their grim remoteness” and even the clouds are “sullen,” creating a “grim cowl” about the mountain villages.¹¹¹ The personification of the landscape furthers the division between civilized West and barbaric East; the feral land cannot be tamed or touched by European modernity. Day gives way to night on his journey up the mountainside, causing Hornby to imagine all sorts of nocturnal horrors. As he treks up the mountain path, he encounters a “sinister silhouette.”¹¹² He describes a “huge winged creature” evocative of “the Greek story of

¹¹⁰ Hornby, *Balkan Sketches*, 4.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 137-138.

¹¹² Hornby, *Balkan Sketches*, 139.

Ganymede.”¹¹³ The monster that frightens Hornby is eventually revealed to be a Bosnian peasant carrying the corpse of an eagle down the mountain.

BALKAN SKETCHES

huge winged creature was stealthily approaching. Beast or bird, I could not tell. But this indelible impression I can never forget. It was as tall as a man, but with a large head, and, instead of arms, great drooping wings that flapped at



times against two long shaggy legs. The slow threatening pace of the monster, never varying, bespoke its fearlessness. The moonlight was full upon me; I was clearly visible. To relate half the thoughts that passed through my mind in the short interval that followed would take pages.

One wing of the creature hung out over the precipice; the other scraped the inside wall of rock. By these rasping scrapes I measured the seconds of its approach. As the

140

Figure 2. Lester Hornby, *Balkan Sketches*, 1927¹¹⁴

Hornby's narrative and accompanying sketch furthers the illusive nature of reality in the wooded mountains of Southeastern Europe. The reader is easily immersed in the narrative, and Hornby's decision to draw the peasant in black silhouette against the rising moon allows for the reader to experience the same horror and delight as Hornby in the unknown. Despite the simple explanation of mistaken identity, the encounter illustrates how Hornby continues to write himself into the ancient Greek mythos. The mountains, with all their wildness, transform into a place where the possibilities of myth are compounded with the already liminal Balkan borderland.

¹¹³ Ibid., 140-141.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 140.

Hornby constantly traverses between reality and fiction, bolstering the idea of the Balkans as a timeless, stagnant place where witnessing the abduction of Ganymede by Zeus in eagle form is more likely than simply encountering a Bosnian peasant carrying a trophy from a successful hunting trip.

Another early twentieth century writer and traveler, Maude Holbach, writes of the Balkans in much the same manner as Hornby. She describes Croatian Ragusa, modern day Dubrovnik, as a "dream city by the sea."¹¹⁵ Indeed, her recollections of Southeastern Europe have a dreamlike quality, in that Holbach has propensity for blurring fact and fiction. Also, her willingness to accept and perpetuate broad, racist generalizations about the people and places she visits smacks of Orientalism. The people she encounters are incapable of autonomy over her representation of them due to her inability to converse with them. In spite of the communication and culture barriers, she imagines their thoughts and beliefs onto her pages. The everyday lives and tasks that Holbach witnesses are brimming with nostalgia and a romantic idealism.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, a land of green pastures of rushing waters, of wooded hills and forestclad mountains, a primitive pastoral land, where shepherds still play upon their flutes and shepherdesses wander with distaff in hand spinning as they watch their flocks; a land untouched by the fret and hurry of modern life.¹¹⁶

Despite the daily hardships that lower class inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina faced, in this passage Holbach paints an idyllic picture of the idle lives of the peasants. She imagines their lives as lacking "fret and hurry," especially in contrast to the bustle of modernity in Western Europe. The land is described as "primitive," which heightens a feeling of stagnation that Holbach claims makes for such 'picturesque' inhabitants. Holbach, as the writing authority,

¹¹⁵ Maude Holbach, *Bosnia and Herzegovina, Some Wayside Wanderings* (New York: J. Lane Company: 1910), 6.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

widens the gap between West and East, by turning the lives of these borderland working class people into romantic folk ideals.

Holbach, like Hornby, draws on Greek myths as a way to fully explicate her experiences. She describes a picnic in Jablanica, Bosnia: “We lunched in Elysium, beneath the flowering chestnut trees, and listened to the birds'-songs that filled the air with rapturous melody.”¹¹⁷ Suddenly, Elysium, the Greek portion of the Underworld reserved for those who performed heroically in life, is accessible to Holbach. This is another example of Bosnia serving as a threshold, where travelers are able to move spatially, temporally and recreate history. Holbach imagines being able to access not only a mythic place, but one reserved for heroes. She casts herself, and by extension the West, as a hero to the Balkans, sustaining the idea of the oppressive East in dualistic opposition.

Holbach ceaselessly refers to the landscape and people as mystical, picturesque and fairylike by turn. Her utilization of this type of diction evidences the unrealistic and arrogant quality of her writing. For instance, she describes working people in the countryside as “the little group of country people in their picturesque dress, dotted here and there among the trees added not a little to the fairylike scene.”¹¹⁸ This description of native people has feeling of myopic brusqueness that belies the troubling habit of Holbach’s to not delve into the reality of life on the countryside. She actualizes fiction as well, describing a full moon as providing “a summer’s night as that on which the fairies dance.”¹¹⁹ Fictive elements are detailed just as intimately as the flesh and blood populace of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

¹¹⁷ Holbach, *Bosnia and Herzegovina, Some Wayside Wanderings*, 14.

¹¹⁸ Holbach, *Bosnia and Herzegovina, Some Wayside Wanderings*, 61.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 87.

Later in her narrative, Holbach recounts the history of a bridge in Visegrad. She reports that the building of the bridge was stalled by a golden haired “river fairy” who would only allow the bridge to be built if two virgins were walled up, alive, within the foundation.¹²⁰ This story is given credence by Holbach’s continual description of the Balkans as a place where fantasy is real. Furthermore, she offers another similar story from another town. In this version babies were substituted for the maidens. She takes these tales at face value, commenting that “it is a curious instance of how superstition lingers among a primitive people!”¹²¹ Her unwitting irony here is almost laughable. However, as she constantly describes her surroundings in fictional terms, it is not a surprise. It is sobering to realize that Holbach’s racist perceptions were voraciously consumed by an entire population of readers as authoritative fact. By the time she relays the tales about the making of the bridge, Holbach has created an entire world that solely relies on fictional Western models. While the people and land she describes are Balkan, Holbach uses typical Orientalist techniques in order to other the populace, appropriate their history, and recreate the reality of the region. Furthermore, her acceptance of the bridge legend is in line with her binary perspective. The Balkans, according to Holbach, were a savage place full of barbaric possibility.

Victoria Clark, writing almost one hundred years later, illustrates how pervasive the Balkanist genre remains in contemporary literature. Despite tumultuous decades of change, Clark transmits a tale that could almost be mistaken as a contemporary of Hornby and Holbach. Even the title of Clark’s travelogue, *Why Angels Fall: A Journey Through Orthodox Europe from Byzantium to Kosovo*, contains the same three Orientalist themes as Holbach and Hornby. There is an aura of fantasy in “Angels,” as well as the idea of being able to travel spatially and temporally, from the long defunct “Byzantium” to modern “Kosovo.” The title also hints at a

¹²⁰ Ibid., 124-125.

¹²¹ Ibid., 126.

preternatural ability to ascertain “why angels fall,” casting Clark as a sort of spiritual or humanitarian authority. Notwithstanding her aforementioned superhuman deductive skills, Clark is as susceptible as Hornby and Holbach to writing herself into the history of the Balkans. According to Clark, “the past is as tangible here as the present.”¹²² At first glance, it appears as though Clark means to say that there are historic sites that she could visit. However, her diction belies that interpretation. Her word choice, “the past,” secures her place amongst other travel writers manipulating both history and the present. The past is utterly intangible and unknowable. Later, during a visit to an Orthodox church in Serbia, Clark claims that she does, in fact, experience the past: “the darkness of the present was the darkness of six hundred years ago. The centuries vanished and time telescoped.”¹²³ Her presumption that the past is as accessible as the present is typical Orientalist fallacy. She audaciously assumes authority over past and present, and thus, the Balkans as a region.

In the eyes of the traveling writers, the people of the Balkans are so far removed from the realities of modernity and civilization that Holbach and Hornby are only able to fully describe them through fictional paradigms. All three writers imagine themselves as active participants in the distant past of classical Western civilization. By writing themselves into that portion of history, Holbach, Hornby and Clark justify the appropriation of quintessential European ideals that began in the Balkans. They also justify their superiority by casting themselves as civilized authorities in opposition to the primitive native peoples.

The travelers’ interactions with and impressions of the native people are fairly consistent throughout the travel literature. Each author provides a slightly different picture of the dress,

¹²² Victoria Clark, *Why Angels Fall: A Journey Through Orthodox Europe from Byzantium to Kosovo* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 85.

¹²³ Clark, *Why Angels Fall*, 77.

looks and lives of the Serbs, Bosnians and Croats. However, all three writers depict the Southeastern Europeans in a similarly derogatory manner. They are interchangeably compared to animals, children and savages. This rhetoric technique casts the people of the Balkans as less than human, less than the West, and in great need of the saving grace of modern civilization. The blanket use of such degrading imagery to generalize an entire race furthers the idea that the people of the Balkans were genetically incapable of self-actualization.

Hornby uses an array of exotic images to describe the people of the Balkans. A visit to a market street yielded glimpses of “a black-eyed gypsy girl with easy, panther-like grace carried a basket of fruit above her yellow-kerchiefed head.”¹²⁴ Hornby’s choice to compare the girl’s grace to a panther hints at a latent destructive power that contrasts sharply with the everyday chore of carrying fruit to market. In other words, the image of the panther in this use suggests an underlying savagery as well as danger within even the most benign context. Thus, Hornby intimates that the Balkan people are far from domestication and civilization.

Hornby describes another Slav, though a more constant companion, as birdlike. Instead of being attracted to a flowering vine, he writes that “Daria was attracted by the flowers,” unable to resist it.¹²⁵ This usage connotes a sense of powerlessness. Daria had no choice in the matter. She had to examine the flowers, much like a bee or hummingbird would have to stop and pollinate roadside weeds. Daria then, has not self actualized, allowing the world around her to act on her. He describes her as possessing a “naïve sophistication” that “vanished in the faintest suggestion of a smile,” a very childish quality.¹²⁶ This reinforces the idea that the Slavic peoples were incapable of autonomy. Hornby delights in his perception of Daria’s birdlike pleasure. He

¹²⁴ Hornby, *Balkan Sketches; an Artist's Wanderings in the Kingdom of the Serbs*, 32.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 75.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 19.

“remembers how her finger tips lingered with a caressing touch” on the vine itself.¹²⁷ Hornby’s retelling of Daria’s sole sensory awareness recalls Plato’s allegory of the cave, and he even claims that her actions brought a “disturbing worldliness” to the monastery they toured.¹²⁸ Hornby styles himself a philosopher, effectually casting Daria as blind to anything but sensory imagery.

Hornby often expresses awe at the Slavic languages throughout his narrative. Early on, he reflects on the “strangeness” that some of his fellow foreigners have command of the “Slavonic tongue.”¹²⁹ The choice of the word tongue, as opposed to language, highlights Hornby’s scornful view of communication in the region, not to mention the fact that civilized people would trouble themselves to learn it. He further betrays this sentiment in describing a scene at a fish market, “a boy of ten, beat the pony with an empty basket, and uttered a volume of raucous sounds that made us marvel where they came from.”¹³⁰ The boy’s language use is so foreign and barbaric as to be “raucous” and cause the foreigners to “marvel” at its origins. The word “raucous” connotes the squawking of a crow, belittling the ability of the people of Bosnia to communicate at a level beyond a cacophony of animal sounds.

Hornby’s interactions with the native people are oft stopped at an inability to communicate. Once, when walking around an older part of Bosnia, Daria and Hornby cross paths with a local girl: “emerging to view from a leafy path, the girl stopped still, like a frightened fawn, and gazed with great brown eyes, until Daria spoke in a pleasant voice which the girl of the hills knew to be friendly.”¹³¹ However, Daria and the girl speak different dialects, and are

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Hornby, *Balkan Sketches; an Artist's Wanderings in the Kingdom of the Serbs*, 75.

¹²⁹ Hornby, *Balkan Sketches; an Artist's Wanderings in the Kingdom of the Serbs*, 19.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 25.

¹³¹ Ibid., 97.

unable to communicate. Besides the outright comparison to a “frightened fawn,” the girl is wholly described as a forest creature. She “emerges” from a “leafy path,” she is not described as walking purposefully on the street, but as some sort of rare or shy creature. Hornby describes her as stopping, deer like, and gazing “with great brown eyes” at the strangers, constructing a feeling of both fear and awe. Daria attempts to calm the girl “in a pleasant voice” much like one would quiet a spooked farm animal. Again, Hornby constructs an image of the Balkan people as more animal than human, requiring pacification in the West’s dulcet tones.

Unlike Hornby, Maude Holbach tends towards describing Bosnians as savage children. Regardless of her “inability to converse with them,” Holbach is able to make several general ethnographic conclusions about the nature of Bosnians.¹³² She describes them as making “the impression of being an intelligent people...[they] must also in their rude way be an artistic people, for the national dress is beautiful; and does not national dress evolve from a people's innate, if unconscious sense of beauty?”¹³³ Despite the fact she is unable to communicate with them, she generously deduces that they must have some inkling of intelligence due to their “rude...unconscious” sense of beauty. Holbach assumes the Bosnian people did not purposefully clothe themselves well, instead their looks were some happy accident of primordial origins. Holbach, besides being unable to communicate with them, is entirely unwilling to recognize the culture of Bosnians as a legitimate civilization full of cultural borrowing and adaptation, even though she finds their way of dress “picturesque.” Recognizing their rich multi-cultural heritage would mean recognizing the Ottoman imperial influence as a positive force. This case presents an excellent example of how the ‘othering’ of Balkan people is an Orientalist necessity. The East

¹³² Holbach, *Bosnia and Herzegovina, Some Wayside Wanderings*, 17.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

must remain in contrast to the West. Since the Balkans were irrevocably tainted by Ottoman rule, they must be quarantined from proper civilization by extension.

Importantly, Holbach does not simply condemn Bosnian Muslims, but Eastern Orthodoxy as well. She chides the Bosnians for practicing what she sees as a lesser faith in comparison to her Protestantism. She confesses that the Bosnians are fervent believers, but “with the childish simple superstitious religion of the Middle Ages, and the Catholic people of Jajce still cling to the custom of tattooing a cross on their hands and breast.”¹³⁴ The act of tattooing the cross is perceived as an especially savage grotesquery by Holbach. By devaluing even her fellow practicing Christians of the region, Holbach effectively lumps the entirety of the Balkan people together as a morally and socially inferior race.

In *Why Angels Fall*, Victoria Clark sympathizes with the Orthodox Serbians and Croatians. As she tours monasteries and other Orthodox churches, she ruminates on “what was to become of these priceless treasures... if Muslim Albanians overran the region?”¹³⁵ Clark’s Islamophobic sentiment is a clear indicator and product of Orientalist fear. Her use of the verb “overran” conjures images of fast-breeding vermin hell-bent on disrupting the food chain to the detriment of all other species. Sadly, Clark’s racist sentiments are an echo of historian Barbara Jelavich’s work. Clark later asks one nun how it felt to be an Orthodox Serbian “adrift in an evergrowing sea of Albanian Muslims.”¹³⁶ This verbage furthers her earlier image of Albanians as non-sentient beings whose only purpose was to breed like rats. The phrase “evergrowing sea” also portrays a feeling of inexorability, as though the Albanians were a non-entity sort of red tide that would intentionally wash out all other ethnicities and religions.

¹³⁴ Holbach, *Bosnia and Herzegovina, Some Wayside Wanderings* 62.

¹³⁵ Clark, *Why Angels Fall*, 78.

¹³⁶ Clark, *Why Angels Fall*, 81.

One of the most effective ways that the people of Southeastern Orient are dehumanized is through their descriptions as purely sexual beings. Western ideology immutably links moral depravity to sexual depravity. The depiction of an entire race as sexually promiscuous provides an outlet for pent-up Western sexual desires. Gender is portrayed differently based on the sexual preference of the author, though women of Southeastern Europe are typically written as coquettes and men as both sexually aggressive and hopelessly impotent.




Figure 3. Hornby, *Balkan Sketches*, “The Lace Shop” 1927. ¹³⁷

Hornby writes of a sexual encounter with a local shopkeeper in Serbia. He steps into a shop full of “delicate feminine things” and is pleasantly surprised when the “unusually

¹³⁷ Hornby, *Balkan Sketches*, 167.

attractive” shopkeeper can speak French.¹³⁸ She flits about the store, asking what “monsieur” would like, eventually seductively posing with a lace negligee. Poor Lester Hornby recounts being simply agog at her tactics, and buys the negligee, claiming that “none but a stoic could have done otherwise.”¹³⁹

He is helpless to withstand the charms of the “chic” shopkeeper. The shopkeeper promises to deliver his parcel to his hotel later in the evening, and for the remainder of the afternoon, helpless Lester can not keep his mind off of the “bewitching shopkeeper.”¹⁴⁰ The shopkeeper here is the quintessential morally depraved coquette, she uses her feminine wiles to secure the sale of the negligee. Later, when she stops by to drop off the package, Hornby “thought at least I could invite her to enter.”¹⁴¹ Upon stepping into his hotel room, she sees his sketches all over the floor and tables and informs him that she had once been desirous of modeling, but “was not sure that her figure was perfect enough.”¹⁴² Hornby assuages the young shopkeepers fears, assuring her of her lovely figure, and he tells her that he would be happy to sketch her. As he turns around after fetching his artistic implements he “beheld, stepping out from a dainty pile of lacy things, the most bewitchingly modest personification of Nature in a glory of unadorned feminine perfection.”¹⁴³ Hornby paints himself as an innocent bystander to the shopkeepers’ seduction. The shopkeeper is the second of Hornby’s conquests. Both sexual conquests are the only two women that he converses with, and are thus made representative of the entire populace.

¹³⁸ Hornby, *Balkan Sketches*, 167.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 169.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 169.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 172.

¹⁴² Hornby, *Balkan Sketches*, 172.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

After a knock at Hornby's hotel door, the shopkeeper hides in fear that her husband is at the door. However, it is only the hotel owner, and the shopkeeper and Hornby have a conversation about her husband, revealing "him as an awkward person with an unbelievable lack of understanding."¹⁴⁴ The husband turns out to be the "Count Nicolai Vladimir Petrofski, once distinguished as a captain of cavalry in a Cossack regiment, but now reduced the humble estate of local droshky driver."¹⁴⁵ Hornby has not only been a poor victim to the expert seductions of the local girl, but has also cuckolded a former local dignitary. This is a perfect example of Orientalist writing. The beguiling shopkeeper is forced to turn to an outsider for sexual satisfaction, because her own native husband is incapable of pleasing her. Her personal identity and name is of no importance, she is only worth mentioning because of her sexual promiscuousness. This idea is compounded by the importance of her husband's name in relating his former political status and his inability to keep his woman in her rightful place. The cuckolding of Count Nikolai and his inability to control his own wife acts as a powerful metaphor for the political authority of Western Europe over the area.

Maude Holbach's perception of gender roles differs from Hornby's. Though she comments on the seductive way young women wore their hair, "almost hidden by the caps and veils, but often neatly-braided plaits twisted round the head peeped through," causing Holbach to see them as "coquettish."¹⁴⁶ She describes the men and women in Herzegovina as "singularly good-looking," but she finds that the "men's close-fitting clothes show off their slim athletic figures to perfection," whereas girls in Bosnia are described as very pretty but disfigured by

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 175.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 175.

¹⁴⁶ Holbach, *Bosnia and Herzegovina, Some Wayside Wanderings*, 33.

“their hair being dyed red with henna.”¹⁴⁷ The detail that Holbach goes to in describing the dress, bodies, and even posture of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina recalls how an auctioneer might describe prize cattle. Later, traversing a river, she finds that “the men of the mountains are splendid specimens of humanity- tall and supple of limb with finely cut features and dignified mien.”¹⁴⁸ She attributes the mixed Eastern bloodline to the postural grace of the people she sees in the streets. The authoritative technical manner in which Holbach discusses the different aspects of appearance reeks of Orientalism, as does her interpretation of married life in Bosnia: “once married, the Bosnian peasant woman is content to trudge behind the man through life.”¹⁴⁹ Unlike Hornby, Holbach is concerned with the rights and education of women, and her observance that married women in Bosnia are downtrodden both rankles her and allows her to feel morally superior as a Westerner.

Each travel narrative is unable to separate the Balkans from the East, supporting the idea that while Balkanism is an extension of Orientalism. Holbach describes the ruins of Diocletian’s palace as full of “exotic flowers of the east” that left “their balmy perfume lingering in the dusky silence.”¹⁵⁰ The influence of the Ottoman Empire figures largely in the imagination of each writer. As Hornby travels through a public garden in Bosnia, he tells of glimpsing a Muslim woman:

Unaware of my observance she moved her veil aside. No sooner had she exposed the shadowy mystery of her olive features, with eyes heavily marked with kohl, than she discovered my presence and immediately readjusted her veil, moving slowly along the path until she was lost like a dark specter -- mysteriously reminiscent of the bygone realm of the Turks.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 66.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 64.

¹⁵⁰ Hornby, *Balkan Sketches*, 30.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 135.

Like many of Hornby's accounts, this importance of this story revolves not around the truth of the experience but in its quality as a cliché his audience would have expected to read. In gazing upon the face of a veiled woman, Hornby gains knowledge of her "shadowy mystery" as well as the "bygone realm" of the Ottomans.

Modernity and civilization presented in contrast to Balkan barbarity is the Orientalist cliché that Holbach most readily clings to. Holbach sees the Balkans both grotesquely backwards yet guards against its modernization. By perpetuating stereotypes of Balkan backwardness, Holbach assures their continuance. She waxes eloquent over her surprise at the improvement of Bosnia without the Turks: "I expected... half savage people showing still the traces of oppression, for I remembered that it is but thirty years ago since Bosnia was rescued from Turkish rule."¹⁵² Holbach thus paints Western European civilization as the saviors who "rescued" Bosnia from the 'oppression' of the East. However, Holbach does not want too much modernity in Southeastern Europe, claiming "Bosnia will lose half her charm if her forests fall a victim to the march of civilization!"¹⁵³ Holbach has no intention of improving conditions in Bosnia through economic changes, as that would no doubt ruin her picturesque imaginings of Southeastern Europe.

¹⁵² Holbach, *Bosnia and Herzegovina, Some Wayside Wanderings*, 15.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 87.

CHAPTER 6

THE IMPACT ON U.S. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS: YUGOSLAVIA FROM 1970-1993

The dominant tropes that are so widespread from the official Roman histories to travel literature and more contemporary histories unduly influence western perspectives on Southeastern Europe. Examining the language used by contemporary policy writers and the intelligence community in the United States reveals that the overwhelmingly negative rhetoric of earlier writing has become alarmingly accepted as fact and even enhanced by new concerns. Unlike the pre-Soviet travel literature, the newer rationale for the castigation of the peoples of Southeastern Europe focuses on the region's connection to communism, the potential threat of the Soviet Union, and Islam. The United States government's treatment of the former Yugoslavia provides a particularly relevant case study. The region's historical ties to the Ottoman Empire continued to inform the biases of the United States intelligence community throughout the 1970's, 1980's and 1990's. Additional prejudices against the double edged dangers of Marxist or Islamic influence combined in a complex interplay that shaped the excoriating opinions of the late twentieth century cognoscenti. The striking similarities to the Roman histories and travel literature evidence a clear line of historical transmission of bias, and the essential role that history and literature play in informing decision making on the national level.

The findings presented in this paper are in line with Edward Said and Maria Todorova's theories on the pitfalls and problems caused by Orientalist and Balkanist ideologies. A short sighted view of the region can only compound foreign policy problems and is detrimental to United States interests in the region. Review and reevaluation of United States conceptions of the Balkan peoples is essential if the United States truly wants to be a catalyst for sustained peace in the region.

Central Intelligence Agency estimates from the end of the twentieth century provide a critical link in understanding how travel literature shapes official rhetoric and modern opinions. Oftentimes, the monotony of the official intelligence estimates is broken by the inclusion of quotes and other materials that coyly express long-held stereotypes of Western literature. Many of the estimates also contain blatantly unprofessional criticisms and thinly veiled racist perceptions.

One such document, “Yugoslavia Transformed,” prepared by members of the United States intelligence community like the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency and the Department of State, contains a bevy of quotes that exemplify the biased Western view. For example, the “Discussion” section of the brief details the emerging “political realities” of the Balkans. Prefacing this portion of the paper is a quote from nineteenth century novelist P.G. Wodehouse: “How’s the weather, Jeeves? Exceptionally clement, sir. Anything in the papers? Some slight friction threatening in the Balkans, sir. Otherwise, nothing.”¹⁵⁴ The inclusion of this seemingly innocuous quote attempts to lend some humor to an otherwise dry report. However, its inclusion also highlights a flippant attitude toward the problems of the region. Furthermore, as the quote is six decades old, it suggests that the conflict within the Balkans is utterly unsolvable and rife with stagnation. The addition of the quote also evidences the awareness, in the United States, of the corpus of literature and ideologies prevalent in travel literature and histories.

The briefing also includes, questionably, a political cartoon depicting a rickety wooden cart pulled by an emaciated ox. The ox’s prominent left hip bone is emblazoned with a five point star, a common communist symbol. Thus, the ox symbolizes the Western view of

¹⁵⁴ P.G. Wodehouse, *The Inimitable Jeeves*, 1928, quoted by the Office of the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslavia Transformed,” (internal document: October 18, 1990) 1, accessed September 21, 2011. <http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000254259/DOC_0000254259.pdf>

communism in Eastern Europe. The cart is driven by a man of massive proportions, holding a whip, presumably to flay the ox, and thus communist ideology, into action. The driver has the word “Serbia” inscribed across his large backside. In the bed of the cart, wizened old men hold suitcases that read “Croatia” and “Slovenia.”




Figure 4. Office of the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslavia Transformed,” 1990.¹⁵⁵

The cartoon appears amongst text that delineates how Serbians are pushing for control over non-Serb Yugoslav territories after the death of Tito. The portrayal of Croats and Slovenes as weak and old fashioned alongside the image of the fat Serb driving them in an ox cart portrays the region as backward, weak, and the antithesis of the European ideal. Indeed, the cart is directed away from the viewer, further amplifying the idea that the Balkan peoples are ethnically inferior or even devolutionary.

¹⁵⁵ Office of the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslavia Transformed,” 3. Redaction done upon declassification.

The bulk of the intelligence estimate “Yugoslavia Transformed” is written in a professional, detached voice. However, several passages stand out in stark contrast. These portions are strikingly similar in tone and content to historical texts and travel literature that discuss the region. The brief is divided into different sections, beginning with four short speculative synopses of the contents of the paper.¹⁵⁶ The four principal findings are notable in that the peoples of Yugoslavia are identified contradictorily as both Yugoslavs and as parts of their ethnic groups:

- **There will be a protracted armed uprising by Albanians in Kosovo. A full-scale, interrepublic war is unlikely, but serious intercommunal conflict will accompany the breakup and will continue afterward. The violence will be intractable and bitter.**
- **There is little the United States and its European allies can do to preserve Yugoslav unity. Yugoslavs will see such efforts as contradictory to advocacy of democracy and self-determination.**

Figure 5. Office of the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslavia Transformed,” 1990.¹⁵⁷

The inconsistent terminology in the statement “Yugoslavs will see such efforts as contradictory” make it nonsensical. Yugoslavs will cease to exist as soon as the country of Yugoslavia dissolves. The term “Yugoslav” is a construct of convenience. The usage of the term ‘Yugoslav,’ when describing the desires of the multiplicity of ethnic groups to gain autonomy, is incongruous and demonstrates a severe lack of understanding. Importantly, the intermittent use of the label complies with Said’s theory of Orientalism, “Orientals were almost everywhere nearly the

¹⁵⁶ This is followed by a map of the nine provinces within Yugoslavia; Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Serbia, Montenegro, Novi Sad, Kosovo and Macedonia.

¹⁵⁷ Office of the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslavia Transformed,” iii.

same.”¹⁵⁸ The intelligence writers’ proclivity toward using the term when a more precise name might be better used provides an example of how structures of dominance are created through the use of the term. Without comprehensive, nuanced area knowledge and thoughtful analysis the United States will continue to be handicapped in their dealings with Southeastern Europe.

These flawed synopses are ballasted throughout the paper by equally faulty stereotyping. In a segment entitled “Key Judgments,” the author describes the Balkans as “historically antagonistic religious and cultural identifications,” yet describes regional ethnic violence as “sporadic and spontaneous.”¹⁵⁹ This unfortunate pairing of “Key Judgments” is both inaccurate and antithetical. The use of the term “spontaneous” is especially detrimental and echoes the old standby that the South Slavic peoples are naturally inclined towards violence and war.¹⁶⁰ The term further connotes an extemporaneous casualness with which the violence is conducted. The context of the lengthy historical conflict in the region is at best overlooked and at worst belittled and erroneous, resulting in the downgrading of egregious ethnic violence to simply “spontaneous.” This ironically negates the desperate reality of the situation.

The author also chooses to characterize these centuries-old issues as one might a child’s concerns. For example, the author postulates that as Soviet influence in Eastern Europe waned in the late eighties, that signaled to “Yugoslavs that it is safe to resume old quarrels.”¹⁶¹ The choice of the word “quarrels” positions the peoples of Southeastern Europe as unruly children who cannot help but to act up as Western Europe and Soviet interests are focused elsewhere. This

¹⁵⁸ Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Random House, 1978), 38.

¹⁵⁹ Office of the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslavia Transformed,” v, vi.

¹⁶⁰ See Chapter 3, Strabo and Wilkes.

¹⁶¹ Officer of the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslav Transformed,” 3.

echoes the verbiage of travel writers such as Lester Hornsby and Maude Holbach, as well as the imperialist tone in the official Roman histories.

The author further posits that Slovenes and Croats feel that “their chances for inclusion in Europe are better as autonomous entities than in association with the more backward parts of the Yugoslav state.”¹⁶² Again, the description of Slavs as “backward” exemplifies the immortal status of the Balkans as a savage borderland in which even the Slavic people are desirous of shunning their heritage and fellow Slavs in favor of joining the civilized Western world. The Slovenian and Croatian desire to be seen as European is lauded by the writer of the National Intelligence Estimate, however, the brief does not once take into account that the divisive eye the West turns on the peninsula might somehow factor into the reason why Yugoslavia is fracturing.

The writer continues to cleave the “land of the South Slavs” from the construct of civilized Western Europe while discussing the possibility of the continuation of a loose federation:

Moreover, a Serb-dominated attempt to muddle through, using the old federal institutions and military brinkmanship to block independence, will not be tolerated by the newly enfranchised, nationalistic electorates of the breakaway republics. Serbs know this.¹⁶³

This explanation and estimation of Serbian intent and mindset is severely lacking. The irreverent use of the term “muddle through” to describe how a Serbian-led governorship that had not yet happened evidences the negative bias. According to the author, despite “knowing” the trouble that Serbs will inevitably face by trying to maintain control and South Slavic unity, they will undoubtedly choose the path of most resistance. This whole idea and hypothesis rests on the foundation that has been laid by earlier writers; that the Serbs are intellectually inferior, as demonstrated through their hard headed resistance to change, especially change espousing

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Office of the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslavia Transformed,” v.

democracy. This also harkens back to the dichotomy between acceptable types of nationalism debated by Julia Kristeva and Dušan Bjelić. The concluding sentence here, “Serbs know this,” also signifies that Serbs know they will incite violence by attempting to hold the federation together and look forward to that eventuality. Strabo might conclude that they are indeed a “war-crazy” people.

Portions of the estimate have a more narrow focus and describe specific ethnic and cultural concerns. One such specialized section, “Kosovo-Yugoslavia’s Killing Fields,” focuses on the tensions between Serbs and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. However, the article begins with a fallacious statement, “Albanian-Serb hostility stems from historic experience under the Ottoman Turks, when many Albanians chose Islam and rose to influence in an Empire that often repressed its Christian Serb subjects.”¹⁶⁴ This statement presents problematic presentation of historical “fact” that recalls Orientalist theory and evidences a severe lack of understanding. Furthermore, the erroneous nature of the historical critique coupled with the overt racist tones in the estimate highlight the need for more complex knowledge and research in area studies.

An earlier national intelligence estimate, 1983’s “Yugoslavia: Trends in Ethnic Nationalism,” is rife with the same familiar insinuations about the nature of the peoples of Southeastern Europe. The report focuses on breaking down the different ethnic groups and the challenges that each poses to the continuation of the Yugoslav state. However, “Trends in Ethnic Nationalism” also deftly portrays the Bosnian and Albanian ethnic groups as a threat to peace in the area and relations with the United States. This representation of the dangerous nature of these groups and their threat to the continuation of Yugoslavia’s statehood is inextricably linked by the writers to their affiliation with Islam and the East.

¹⁶⁴ Office of the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslavia Transformed: Kosovo-Yugoslavia’s Killing Fields,” 4.

The report helpfully discusses statistical division between ethnic groups according to a 1981 census. The most interesting part of the discussion revolves around those who self-reported as ‘Yugoslavs’ instead of one of the more definitive ethnic groups. Only a small portion, five percent of the population, are identified as “Yugoslavs without nationality.”¹⁶⁵ However, even this meager number was an increase from the 1971 census, an increase of “345 percent.”¹⁶⁶ Due to the significant increase in this reporting and the nature of ethnic tension in the region, this census data stirred up quite a controversy:

Dusan Bilandzic, a Croat professor in Zagreb, condemned the new trend because some “Yugoslavs” favor a unitarist (Serbian) state. Several other self-appointed ethnic spokesmen hinted broadly at chicanery in compiling census data; an exceptional delay in publishing detailed census data fuels these suspicions.¹⁶⁷

This information is extremely important because it reinforces the idea that referring to the various ethnic groups of the country under the broad term ‘Yugoslavs’ is highly erroneous. As so few people self-identify as Yugoslavs, and most likely even less people than the census reported, it is logical to assume that valid descriptions of the people in the federation are better served by more descriptive terminology. Furthermore, the admission that the census records may have been manipulated in order to reinforce a Serb-controlled government is extremely important. This possibility is also important, as it contradicts later key assumptions in the estimate. For example, the paper purports that nationalist leaders “lack the issues” to base confrontations on over autonomy with the Belgrade government.¹⁶⁸ Falsifying government documents that deal with

¹⁶⁵ Office of the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslavia: Trends in Ethnic Nationalism,” (internal document: September, 1983) 2, accessed September 21, 2011.

< http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000372459/DOC_0000372459.pdf >

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Office of the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslavia: Trends in Ethnic Nationalism,” 14.

ethnic breakdown in a country divided upon ethnic lines is most surely a reason that nationalist leaders could cling to, if they were solely desirous of anarchy and chaos.

The most inflammatory piece of literature contained in the intelligence estimate is an excerpt from a popular Serbian novel, *Knife*, by Vuk Drasković. The passage is included as an example of how incendiary literature, journalism and popular plays served as catalysts to conflict, exacerbating the already precarious situation in early eighties Yugoslavia. The excerpt from *Knife* details gruesome executions and maltreatment Serbs encountered under Ali-Aga, a Bosnian official in Sultan Mahmut's 1831 governance of the region:

Ali-Aga ordered four Serbs executed. They were impaled alive and hung in agony for three days cursing the faith of Mohamed. From then on Ali-Aga loosed a rein of terror against the Serbs. He ordered that the walls of his palace in Mostar be decorated with Serbian heads so that from any position, even reclining, he could see them. He took special pleasure in witnessing executions during meals. During his twenty-year rule, a day never passed without at least a hundred and fifty Serb heads hanging on his palace walls, with their eyes turned toward his quarters.¹⁶⁹

While the inclusion of this resource is no doubt helpful to developing an understanding of how widely digested popular material fomented tension in the region, the addition of a fictive document vividly detailing alleged Bosnian atrocities skews the impartiality of the document. The depiction of Ali-Aga as lustily enjoying the deaths of Serbs during meals and from any vantage point is an obvious attempt by Drasković to stir up his audience and dehumanize Bosnians. Importantly, the historical claims in the rest of the selection about the cruelty of the Ottoman Empire against Christians in the area are echoed in the later “Yugoslavia Transformed” intelligence estimate. This passage might be less offensive on its own, but due to the writers’ concurrent views that Bosnians' and Albanians' ties to Islam renders them dangerous groups, the passage reinforces the anti-Islamic rhetoric of the report. Furthermore, the writers report that

¹⁶⁹ Vuk Drasković, *Knife*, as quoted by Office of the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslavia: Trends in Ethnic Nationalism,” (internal document: September, 1983) 8, accessed September 21, 2011.

Knife “postulates that Muslim war criminals have infiltrated the present power structure in Bosnia and are biding their time until another round against the Serbs.”¹⁷⁰ The intelligence estimate says nothing to contradict the allegations in the best-selling novel; instead, the writers report on dangerous “Muslim Nationalism,” which is given its own prominent subheading and treatment.¹⁷¹ The overall effect of the report is an estimate subtly supporting a Serb-controlled Yugoslavia despite evidence of human rights violations and organized smear campaigns against the various ethnic groups in the region.

According to the estimate, the influence of Islam in Yugoslavia has led to tell-tale signs of radicalism due to allegiances to Islam abroad:

More than 150 Yugoslav Muslims pursue Islamic studies in the Middle East each year, and there are an unknown number of foreign students in Yugoslav *medresa*. Some of these foreign students, according to recent accusations by a top leader in Sarajevo, serve as links to radical ‘Muslim brotherhoods’ in the Middle East.¹⁷²

The overt concern over contact and collusion with the Middle East serves as a rationalization for the pro-Serbian stance taken in the intelligence estimate. Coupled with the selection from *Knife*, this definitively paints an anti-Bosnian picture. The comment about *medresa* students acting as links to unsavory Islamic elements abroad is specifically used to engender fear. The vague mention of a “top” Bosnian official seems to legitimize the threat.¹⁷³ However, as the piece is an official intelligence appraisal, the choice not to name the official calls into question the veracity of the quote. The estimates often specifically name foreign officials, and during the declassification process these names are normally redacted.

¹⁷⁰ Office of the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslavia: Trends in Ethnic Nationalism,” 7.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

The compilers of this estimate label Albanians as “Yugoslavia’s most volatile ethnic” group, degrading both the ethnicity and nature of the conflict.¹⁷⁴ Additionally, this type of value judgment lacks any sort of thoughtful reasoning about the impetus for violence, not to mention oversimplifying the problem and the people. This focus on typifying the different ethnicities of Southeastern Europe as violent is a theme seen repeatedly and redundantly over time. Furthermore, the estimate claims that Kosovar “Albanians are deeply influenced by a sense of wrongful separation from their co-nationals beyond the Yugoslav border.”¹⁷⁵ This rationalization fails to take into account that Serbs were desirous of returning Kosovo to Serb control, a fact that Kosovars were well aware of. Considered part of Serbia’s historic homeland, Belgrade was replete with narratives, similar to that of Ali-Aga, detailing how the province was stolen from the Serb kingdom and overrun by Albanians. The idea that Kosovars wished to reunite with Albania and Western Macedonia to create a “Greater Albania” is a common theme intended to ignite feelings for a Serb-controlled Kosovo. Interestingly, the theory that Kosovars want to join Albania is later negated on the same page, in a report that nationalists in the region were disseminating slogans “such as ‘Kosovo-Republic.’”¹⁷⁶

Unsurprisingly, the writers admit that “Albanians in Kosovo have resisted Belgrade’s attempts to coerce them or court them” with economic aid into ceasing nationalist resistance to Serb control of Kosovo.¹⁷⁷ The use of the verbs “coerce” and “court” to describe Serb attempts to calm the populace are especially loaded, as they connote a sense of childish willfulness on the part of the Albanians and a malignant purpose on the part of the Serbs. “Yugoslavia: Trends in

¹⁷⁴ Office of the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslavia:Trends in Ethnic Nationalism,” 12.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 13.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

Ethnic Nationalism” continues by detailing how Albanians in Kosovo routinely desecrate Serbian cemeteries, rape Serbian women, and perform other “nationalist excesses.”¹⁷⁸ While this one-sided synopsis of events in the region falls in line with the rest of the impressively biased document, it unfortunately further stereotypes the Albanians as animalistically savage and violent. The Serbs are victimized, while complex situational behavior is again ignored by the writers of the estimate, as is Serb aggression.

The report includes a section on Slovenian interests in leaving Yugoslavia. Importantly, this portion illustrates the perception of a division between the civilized West and backwards Eastern Europe by both the intelligence community and Slovenes. Slovenes are described as having no “legacy of bitter struggles” with the other ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, deftly placing them on the Western side of the binary rift as civilized. However, the Slovenes’ desire to remain prosperous strained relations with the rest of the federation.¹⁷⁹ According to the estimate, Slovenes are loathe to join the other ethnic groups in their quest for independence, due to their “economic superiority.”¹⁸⁰ In fact, the Slovenes seek to further themselves from the economic and social woes of the other groups, doling out the advice that “other Yugoslav regions should correct their mis-management practices.” Kosovars are cited by the estimate as complaining that Slovenia acts as an “imperial power,” due to their cheap access to Kosovo’s raw materials and expensive final products.¹⁸¹ Slovenia’s ability to separate itself economically and culturally from the rest of Yugoslavia is viewed positively by the writers of the estimate, and Kosovo’s place as

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Office of the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslavia: Trends in Ethnic Nationalism,” 13.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

an undeveloped and petulant place is cemented by their gall to “complain” that Slovenia’s success is built upon unfair trade practices with the region.

The intelligence briefing ends by summarizing the main points of the document as well as providing a guess to what will happen in the near future. In this estimate, there is repetition of a key phrase and idea:

Yugoslavia’s post-Tito system is prone to indecision. We expect the country’s leaders will attempt to ‘muddle through’ their ethnic difficulties, making only those ad hoc decisions absolutely necessary to preserve the country’s immediate stability.¹⁸²

Again, the peoples of Yugoslavia are described as only able to barely pull of running a government. The phrase “muddle through” seems to be the favored description of Yugoslav government actions, as it is repeatedly used in the last paragraph of the report. This trivializes the challenges faced by the struggling government and connotes a feeling of bumbling stupidity or foolhardiness. These phrase also appears in a report from a year earlier, “Yugoslavia: The Strains Begin to Tell,” in a description of how Yugoslavia might attempt to “mask its lack of leadership and will with a muddle-through approach while drifting into a state of chronic political and economic instability.”¹⁸³ A much later document, 1991’s “Yugoslavia: Prospects for Violence,” also contains a variation of the descriptive catch phrase. The brief focuses on determining what will happen if different areas of Yugoslavia declare independence. After a logical discussion of the matter, the brief concludes by stating that:

It is still possible that the Yugoslav factions will **avoid any escalation** of violence. The republics could simply muddle apart, with republic leaders avoiding any expansion of their conflicts despite low-level violence. This outcome would require great-and uncharacteristic-forgiveness on all parts.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Office of the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslavia: The Strains Begin to Tell,” Internal Document, December 1982, 9 < http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000372465/DOC_0000372465.pdf> accessed November 11, 2011.

¹⁸⁴ Emphasis original to document. Office of European Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency, “Yugoslavia: Prospects for Violence,” Internal Document, June 1991, 6 <http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000372452/DOC_0000372452.pdf> accessed January 6, 2012.

Even a decade later, the same phrase crops up. Though the majority of this estimate refrains from unfettered excoriation, this last paragraph makes it clear that the authors have been exposed to and influenced by the same biases. There are two possibilities as to why this term crops up repeatedly. A likely reason is that the briefs were prepared by the same person. Regardless of who wrote the intelligence estimate, the repetition of the same phrase is significant in that the connotation and bias behind its use informs the policies of the United States.

Another sentiment contained in the analysis is that without Tito to lead “the regime, squabbles among” Yugoslavia’s elected leaders would adversely affect the governance of the nation.¹⁸⁵ While no doubt arguments between the ethnicities of Yugoslavia were not conducive to finding solutions, the use of the word “squabble” instead of a less pejorative term is a poor choice. The writers of the brief again demean the region with this evocative label; a term that conjures images of mindless bickering and the “raucous” sounds of Hornby’s 1920’s fish market.¹⁸⁶ The mindset that is at the root of this type of language is exceedingly problematic. By naming the serious issues between the groups as simple “squabbles,” the author of the report makes light of the possibility for serious chaos as well as the severity of regional antagonism.

The 1982 intelligence brief, “Yugoslavia: The Strains Begin to Tell,” is sprinkled with the same types of terminology and phrases, again hinting at the bias of the U.S. intelligence community.¹⁸⁷ Several prime examples of this are found towards the end of the briefing. A key instance of negative and condescending opinion follows a discussion of the influence of popular media in early 1980’s Yugoslavia on people and politics:

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 2.

¹⁸⁶ Lester Hornby, *Balkan Sketches: An Artists Wanderings in the Kingdom of the Serbs* (Boston: Little Brown and Co, 1927) 25.

¹⁸⁷ Office of the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslavia: The Strains Begin to Tell,” Internal Document, December 1982, 7 < http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000372465/DOC_0000372465.pdf> accessed November 11, 2011.

Key among the media's critical themes have been the corruption and influence peddling that pervade Yugoslav society. Such practices are, of course, typically Balkan.

The main idea of this excerpt, that the South Slavic peoples are inclined to depravity and immorality, presents an extraordinary red flag. However, this presumptuous supposition about the nature of the Balkan peoples is readily accepted. Due to the long standing tradition of impugning the area, this type of analysis is sadly rote. This view reflects a lack of understanding regional issues, likely due to the historical prejudice surrounding scholarship and fiction on the area.

An interesting parallel between the official intelligence analysis and J.J. Wilkes' analysis of ancient Illyria presents itself in a discussion of popular entertainment. In a paragraph detailing the troubling effect popular plays and literature has on the populace, Tito's character is called into question by both the analysis and the heavily disseminated biography of the former leader. According to the brief, Tito's personal instability could be readily viewed, as an example of his "flawed character" could be "demonstrated by his love of fancy uniforms."¹⁸⁸ Though the brief's author is disseminating an argument made in a newly released book by Tito's former "official biographer," this is the sole piece of detailed information on popular literature. As such, the choice to include it bears significant weight, and reinforces the idea that the people of the Balkans are inherently foolish for allowing Tito to lead the country and indulge in such childishness. The inclusion of this detail also shows a striking resemblance to Wilkes' decade later argument that the Illyrians simply "loved ornaments" in their dress.¹⁸⁹ This rhetorical connection demonstrates that the thought processes behind this type of analysis are not fettered by time, topic, or type of writing. This provides strong evidence of the interwoven intellectual

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 7.

¹⁸⁹ J.J. Wilkes, *The Illyrians* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing, 1992), 231.

nature these seemingly disparate genres, as they both display the same patterns of thought and articulation of biases.

The precarious borderland nature of the geographic location of Yugoslavia plays a large part in the perception of the peninsular peoples in the mind of the author of “Yugoslavia: The Strains Begin to Tell.” In a paragraph that very much supports the assertions of Said’s Orientalist and Todorova’s Balkanist theories, the author postulates that the “Yugoslavs, in their attempt to perpetuate their recovered independence, chose to assume a position neither in the East nor the West.”¹⁹⁰ This statement follows a self-congratulatory explanation of the positive effects of United States aid in “stymying Soviet power in Europe.”¹⁹¹ Clearly, these two comments are completely contradictory. When discussing the positive financial impact United States’ aid had on keeping Yugoslavia free from Soviet control, the nation is a part of Europe. However, when discussing the irksome independent inclinations of Yugoslavia, the author claims that the country inhabits “neither the East nor the West.” Again, the area is presented as a liminal space in a textbook example of Balkanism, which also exemplifies Said’s theories of Orientalism as this statement is designed to “dramatize the differences” between civilization and the backwardness of the Balkans.¹⁹² The Balkan peoples are further censured for their “choice” to remain troublingly uncategorizable: “in sum, it may be arguable whether the Yugoslavs have been in recent decades a bigger thorn in the side of the East or of the West.”¹⁹³ This judgment strays from the arena of subtle, negative connotations and is simply unprofessional. The retributive attitude in this concluding sentence is unnecessary and detracts from the valid points that the

¹⁹⁰ Office of the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslavia: The Strains Begin to Tell,” 11.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Random House, 1978), 20.

¹⁹³ Office of the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslavia: The Strains Begin to Tell,” 11.

estimate does contain. However, the racist beliefs heretofore hinted around are exemplified by this castigation.

The authors of the brief exhibit another symptom of Balkanism in their attempts to categorize the area as East or West. Again, Todorova's theory posits that the Balkans are constructed by the West as "a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the 'European' and 'the west'" can compare itself.¹⁹⁴ Thus, when the people of the Balkans act in a way that aligns with the constructs of Western civilization, they are to be applauded: "Yugoslavia has, in our opinion, become more Western than Eastern, as demonstrated by the freedom of its peoples to travel, the openness of its presses, and only selective use of police repression."¹⁹⁵ However, this commendable behavior does not guarantee the ability of the Balkan peoples to remain enlightened and civilized, remember for one, that corruption is "typically Balkan,"¹⁹⁶ and the authors of the brief are quick to warn the intelligence community of this. Mary Neuburger argues in her book on Bulgaria that this sort of inconsistent appraisal of the figurative location of the Balkans speaks to a higher fear of "hybridity" by the West.¹⁹⁷ The inability to categorically define the people of the Balkans, then, is one of the reasons why the authors of these documents create such disparaging estimates.

The writers of the estimate state that despite the strides toward civilization that Yugoslavia has made, they are not far from depravity, and even the renowned positive influence of the United States is unable to "prevent Yugoslavia from slipping into a condition of chronic

¹⁹⁴ Maria Todorova, "The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention," *Slavic Review* 53 (June 1994): 463.

¹⁹⁵ Office of the Director of Intelligence, "Yugoslavia: The Strains Begin to Tell," 12.

¹⁹⁶ Office for the Director of Intelligence, "Yugoslavia: The Strains Begin to Tell," 7.

¹⁹⁷ In this section of her introduction, Neuburger primarily discusses the colonial gaze and its implications. However, this analysis is relevant to the discussion on more contemporary politics. Mary Neuburger, *The Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiations of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria*, New York: Cornell University Press, 5.

instability... or to inoculate the country” against the threat of Eastern influence and communism.¹⁹⁸ This statement provides compelling evidence of the Balkans stagnant place in the minds of even area specialists. Significantly, the use of medical terminology like “chronic” and “inoculate” to describe the political situation projects an aura of sickness and filth. This is reminiscent of Milica Hayden's and Bjelić's arguments about the role language plays in dividing the Europe into a pure West and an unclean East.¹⁹⁹ Furthermore, this verbage also calls to mind the Orientalist title given to the Ottoman Empire, “The Sick Man of Europe,” thereby tying the Balkans to the East and further widening the chasm between West and East.

While it is easy to look back over these intelligence estimates and, with the perfection of hindsight, judge the obvious errors and flaws contained in these documents. That is not, however, the purpose of this critical reading. Instead, this paper strives to point out where blatant and insidious racist perspectives have become a stumbling block to fully understanding the complex issues surrounding the region. These perceptions present a serious challenge that severely incapacitates the ability of policy writers to make informed decisions. The fact that the terminology and mindset evident in the documents so closely mirrors that of the travel writers and historians, both ancient and modern, provides significant evidence for the need to revisit widely taught precepts concerning the area. Despite the difference of several decades, these types of sentiments are readily discerned throughout the intelligence documents on the region. This is especially troubling since these types of estimates play a large role in informing United States action in the area. As such, these estimates should stay fairly dry and rational. The occurrence

¹⁹⁸ Office for the Director of Intelligence, “Yugoslavia: The Strains Begin to Tell,” 7.

¹⁹⁹ Dusan Bjelic, “The Balkans: Europe’s Cesspool,” *Cultural Critique* 62 (2006): 33-66; Milica Hayden and Robert M. Hayden, “Orientalist Variations on the Theme “Balkans”: Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics,” *Slavic Review* 51 (April 1992): 1-15.

rate and depth of bias highlights the need for renewed scholarship and communication on the area.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The pervasive nature of bias against Southeastern Europe links Roman histories, contemporary histories, travel literature and even United States government documents. Together, these sources provide insight into the immutable underlying racist qualities of the corpus of Western literature on the Balkans. The overwhelmingly cohesive perspective despite the variety of genre, time and locale provides incontrovertible evidence of intellectual transmission. Moreover, the dissimilitude in genre exposes the importance of careful analysis of many different and nontraditional types of sources in order to better understand the prevalence of racist and imperialist discourse. The ready exhibition of these sentiments in the newly released Central Intelligence Agency documents demonstrates the serious significance and the long-reaching effects of Balkanism.

Foremost scholars on Eastern Europe agree that historians have erroneously held beliefs that the Balkan conflicts are due to an ethnic predisposition to violence. Likewise, studies by the likes of Maria Todorova and Mary Neuburger roundly denounce this sort of scholarship. However, an examination of the depth and breadth of the theories that fuel that sort of reductionist belief is useful to understanding how these theories have taken root and shaped United States actions and policies in the Southeastern Europe. Most scholarship done on the bias in the area focuses on historiography or journalism on the area. The role of literature on the formation and transmission of the ideas cannot be overlooked or underestimated. Additionally, much of the contemporary theory and history on the region has become increasingly contrary. The real intent of much of the modern history is to declare some sort of historical winner, as evidenced in J.J. Wilkes' study of the Illyrians.

Polarized views of the area, motivated by politics, are as unhelpful as the ancient ‘hereditary violence’ theories. Both have an enormous capability to further damage the socio-political landscape of the Balkan peninsula, as seen in the national intelligence estimates. Despite the academic tide turning against the same beliefs held by Procopius and his contemporaries, scholarship that delves into the question of why historiography of the Balkans remains contentious is necessary and important. . While Michel Foucault, Edward Said and Todorova’s theories are helpful, there remains a serious need for new theories and revisionist histories that question how such biased thinking is rotely accepted. That ‘Balkanization’ is commonly taught in secondary level education as a synonym for the entire genocidal spectrum is, quite frankly, unconscionable and racist. The seemingly innocuous use of such negative terminology clearly leads to an acceptance of racism. The prejudice witnessed in the official intelligence estimates of the United States is the ultimate product of such ingrained behavior.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adkins, Lesley and Roy Adkins. *Handbook to Life in Ancient Rome*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Angel, J. Lawrence. "Ecology and Population in the Eastern Mediterranean." *World Archaeology* 4 (1972): 88-105.
- Berend, Ivan T. "The Historical Evolution of Eastern Europe as Region." *International Organization* 40 (1986): 329-346.
- Bjelic, Dusan. "The Balkans: Europe's Cesspool." *Cultural Critique* 62 (2006): 33-66.
- Clark, Victoria. *Why Angels Fall: A Journey Through Orthodox Europe From Byzantium to Kosovo*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.
- Curta, Florin. "Female Dress and "Slavic" Bow Fibulae in Greece." *Hesperia* 74 (2005): 101-146.
- Curta, Florin. *The Making of the Slavs: History and Archaeology of the Lower Danube Region c.500-700*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Dolan, Brian. *Exploring European Frontiers: British Travelers in the Age of Enlightenment*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 2000.
- Elsner, Jas. "The Rhetoric of Buildings in the *De Aedificiis* of Procopius." *Art and Text in Byzantine Culture*. Ed. Liz James. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Epictetus. *Discourses*. Trans. Robert F. Dobbin. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.
- Foucault, Michel. *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*. Trans. and ed. A.M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Vintage Books, 1982.
- Graczyk, Donald and Symeon Giannakos. "The Face of Kosovar Albanian Nationalism: A Violent and Volatile Transformation of the Balkan Landscape." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 17 (2006): 142-159.
- Hall, Derek. "Representations of Place: Albania." *The Geographical Journal* 2 (1999):161-172.
- Hayden, Milica and Robert M. Hayden. "Orientalist Variations on the Theme 'Balkans': Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics." *Slavic Review* 51 (April 1992): 1-15.
- Heather, Peter. *The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Holbach, Maude. *Bosnia and Herzegovina, Some Wayside Wanderings*. New York: J. Lane Company: 1910.

- Hornby, Lester George. *Balkan Sketches; an Artist's Wanderings in the Kingdom of the Serbs: 1882*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1927.
- Jelavich, Barbara. *History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Kristeva, Julia. *Crisis of the European Subject*. New York: Other Press, 2000.
- Madgearu, Alexander. *The Wars of the Balkan Peninsula: Their Medieval Origins*. Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2008.
- McCarthy, Justin. *The Ottoman Peoples and the End of Empire*. New York: Arnold Publishing, 2001.
- Mommsen, Theodor. *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*. Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2004.
- Neuburger, Mary. *The Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004.
- Office of European Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency. "Yugoslavia: Prospects for Violence." Internal document: June 25, 1991. Accessed November 11, 2011. <http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000372452/DOC_0000372452.pdf>
- Office for the Director of Intelligence. "Yugoslavia: The Strains Begin To Tell." Internal document: December 1982. Accessed November 11, 2011. <http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000372465/DOC_0000372465.pdf>
- Office for the Director of Intelligence. "Yugoslavia Transformed." Internal document: October 18, 1990. Accessed September 21, 2011. <http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000254259/DOC_0000254259.pdf>
- Office for the Director of Intelligence. "Yugoslavia: Trends in Ethnic Nationalism." Internal document: September, 1983. Accessed September 21, 2011. <http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000372459/DOC_0000372459.pdf>
- Plutarch. *Roman Lives*. Trans. Robin Waterfield. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Poulton, Hugh and Suha Taji-Farouki, eds. *Muslim Identity and the Balkan State*. New York: New York University Press, 1997.
- Procopius. *Wars*. Trans. H. B. Dewing. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1919.
- Roudometof, Victor. *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001.
- Said, Edward. *Orientalism*. New York: Random House, 1978.
- Salmon, E.T. *Roman Colonization Under the Republic*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970.

- Salt, Jeremy. *The Unmaking of the Middle East: A History of Western Disorder in Arab Lands*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008.
- Sells, Micheal. *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.
- Strabo. *Geography*. Ed. Horace Jones. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927.
- Shyrock, Andrew J. "Autonomy, Entanglement, and the Feud: Prestige Structures and Gender Values in Highland Albania." *Anthropological Quarterly* 61 (1988):113- 118.
- Tacitus. *The Annals*. Ed. A.J. Woodman. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004.
- Todorova, Maria. "The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention." *Slavic Review* 53 (1994): 453-482.
- Ward-Perkins, Bryan. *The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Wallace, Jennifer. "A (Hi)story of Illyria." *Greece & Rome* 40 (1998): 213-225.
- Walpole, Robert. *Memoirs Relating to European and Asiatic Turkey and Other Countries of the East : Edited from Manuscript Journals*. London: Printed for Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown, 1818.
- Wilkes, J. J. *The Illyrians*. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing, 1992.
- Wolff, Larry. *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.
- Wozniak, Frank. "East Rome, Ravenna, and Western Illyricum: 454-536 A.D." *Historia* 30 (1981): 351-382.