




U.S.S.R., MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND POLITICAL
INTEGRATION: A CASE STUDY

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The problem with which this investigation is concerned addresses the question of the proper role of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the Soviet state. The political leadership has two alternatives in seeking a remedy to this civil-military question. They may either control the military establishment by granting strict professional autonomy or by integrating the armed forces into the civil structure. This question has been a point of contention since the birth of the Soviet Union. The overall direction of the conflict has been the ability of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to control an autonomous institution with its own principles and group loyalties.

The conflicting claims may be thought of as balancing military elitism and party egalitarianism, professional autonomy and political integration, nationalism and proletarian internationalism, and heroic symbolism and anonymity. The increasing and irrevocable emphasis upon military professionalism clashes with Party policy, since it threatens a self-contained institution within the state. Such conflict becomes increasingly sharper as the Party continues to enforce

the ideological tenets that it is the sole directive force for all state activities.

No particular state leadership has been successful in preventing the military establishment from formulating its own interpretation of national interests or in eliminating a serious concern for professional interests. Despite the clashes along these lines with the civil authority, the armed forces cannot and have not openly attempted to contravene civil authority. The ideological norms of legitimacy dictate that the military as well as the remainder of the institutions of Soviet society must act upon the Party's leadership and in its name.

This study examines the two major aspects of the civil-military conflict, Party-military interaction and the dynamics of Party-military relations. The former includes facets of the role of the Party in the Soviet Union, the political controls of the military, the changes in the role of the military, and the conflicting interests and objectives of the state and military organizations. The latter treats the Party-military interplay and the basic issue of political reliability and professional autonomy.

Despite the obliqueness of the conflict, indications lend validity to the apparent trends toward increasing military professionalism. The civil structure is faced with collateral trends toward a professional governmental and economic

bureaucracy and a nominally independent intelligentsia. What will be the results when the Party seeks to enforce its "decisive role?" What will be the course of development and action in the Soviet Union as the new generation of civil and military figures rise to power--those personalities less bound by ideological commitment and revolutionary elan? Since military influence may be felt in the areas of Party-state policy formulation, development and management of the military itself, and internal state politics, the resolution of internal civil-military conflict rests upon the ability of the civil structure to manage the military during times of crisis, to balance the military-industrial demands with consumer demands, and to face the professional autonomy-political integration dilemma.

U.S.S.R., MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND POLITICAL
INTEGRATION: A CASE STUDY

THESIS

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PREFACE

The history of the modern world is directly related to the experiences of mankind in efforts to coexist in a system of nation-states. Given this pattern of development, a persistent question arises in every nation: What is the proper role of the armed forces in the governing process? From Plato to Marx, this recurring problem has been dealt with by most of the major thinkers of Western civilization. There is the view that basic decisions of military policy must be rendered by accountable civilian officials. While such a definition may be adequate for a democratic society on the order of Great Britain or the United States, it is by no means comprehensive. General Baron Karl von Clausewitz formulated the customary (and more comprehensive) argument for the necessity of civilian control of the armed forces based on an analysis of the relationship between force and other components of the social order.¹

. . . [I]t is an unpermissible and even harmful distinction, according to which a great military event should admit a PURELY MILITARY JUDGMENT; indeed, it is an unreasonable procedure to consult professional soldiers on the plan of war, that they may give a PURELY MILITARY

¹General Baron Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, translated by O. J. Mattlijis Jolles (New York, 1943), pp. 3-56.

opinion, as is frequently done by cabinets, but still more absurd is the demand of theorists that a statement of the available means of war should be laid before the general, that he may draw up a purely military plan for the war. . . . General experience teaches us that in spite of the great diversity and development of the present system of war, still the main outlines of a war have always been determined by the cabinet, . . . by a purely political and not a military organ.²

War by its inherent nature is instrumental in giving a political end; if no political end exists, war serves no functional purpose. The rationale of civil control rests on two forces of vastly unequal strength: (1) an historical precedent lodged in fear of tyranny and usurpation and (2) an analysis of the uneasy relationship between force and society.³

Two factors are vitally important in considering the role of the military in state policy. First, the military organization as a political force forms a distinct political phenomenon. Armed forces intervene in politics in diverse nations and appear to follow a general pattern regardless of the level of political development. These coup d'etats are not exceptional, isolated events but represent a pervasive, distinctive form of political interaction.

The usual pattern is not to replace the civilian regime, but to institute a quasi-civilian front behind which these

²Ibid., p. 599.

³Harry Coles, editor, Total War and Cold War (Columbus, Ohio, 1962), p. 4.

eminences grises may withdraw. Such characteristics give a junta the appearance of a passing aberration, but the organized powers of a military establishment intervene as a latent and covert force--cabinet reorganizations, cabinet blackmail, and threatening opinions published in the military press. As S. E. Finer indicates, military influence in its true light is ". . . distinctive, persistent, and wide-spread."⁴

Secondly, is civilian control of the armed forces "natural?" There appears to be a widely held assumption that the military is the "natural" subordinate of civil authority and is responsive to the latter's call. No logical reason has been offered as to the "naturalness" of this arrangement. The armed forces have three massive political advantages over civilian organizations: a superiority in organization, a highly emotionalized symbolic status, and a monopoly of arms.⁵ Enjoying a superiority of the means of applying coercion, it forms an elitist corporate hierarchy or order. Rather than inquire as to why the armed forces enter the political arena, one ought, instead, inquire as to why they do not. Of all the advantages the military possesses vis-a-vis the civil authority, one need recognize only one primary factor--they possess the means to enforce their will.

⁴Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York, 1962), p. 4.

⁵Ibid., p. 6.

The object of this study is to view the more recent developments in the civil-military conflict within the ruling hierarchy of the USSR.⁶ The general direction of such conflict is and has been the ability of the Party to control an autonomous group inclusive of its own principles and loyalties. The increasing and irrevocable emphasis upon military professionalism clashes with Party policy, since it presents the possibility of a self-contained body within the state. This dispute becomes increasingly sharper as the Party continues to enforce the ideological tenet that it is the sole directive force for the sum total of state activities.

This old fear of "Bonapartism" on the part of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is quite valid if one notes that solutions to the problem of intervention on the basis of national interest and corporate self-interest have not been satisfactorily reached. The military had no evident political role during the Stalin years. However, since his death, the military has reportedly been the decisive element in succession struggles on three separate occasions (1953, 1955, and 1957).

⁶Note: Such disputes have occurred at various levels of intensity from the inception of the Soviet regime--e.g. Trotsky, Tukhachevsky and Svechin contra Stalin, Kamenev, Zineviev and Frunze in 1923-24. For further historical background consult Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), p. 24.

Civil-military relations in the Soviet Union are not without conflict. The armed forces, through the military press, frequently indicate points of opposition to policies of the political leadership. Thus far, no particular leadership has been successful in preventing the military from formulating its own interpretation of national interests or in eliminating serious concern for professional interests. Despite the clashes with Party authority along these lines, the armed forces cannot and have not openly attempted to contravene civil authority. The ideological norms of legitimacy dictate that the military as well as the other instrumentalities of the Soviet state, must act upon its leadership and in its name.

However, what of the future? Indications are that along with the trends toward increasing military professionalism, the Party-civil structure is faced with such collateral trends as indicating an autonomous professional governmental and economic bureaucracy and a nominally independent intelligentsia. How will the Party seek to enforce the dogma of its "decisive role?" What will be the course of development and action in the Soviet Union as the new generation of leaders (both civil and military) rise to power--those personalities who are less bound by ideological commitment and wartime service?

In attempting to indicate at least a partial explanation of the civil-military conflict in the USSR, the study

is in four chapters. Chapter I presents a brief background of this vexing problem for the Soviet civilian leadership, especially the experiences of the Stalin era as they, even now, color the interaction of these institutional elements within the Soviet state. Chapter II is concerned with the institutional and policy considerations relating to the role of the military in the Soviet state. A detailed analysis of weapons systems, force structure, and military capability is outside the scope of this paper. Rather, simply stated, the central problem for the Soviet system involves reconciling military proficiency with political control and the role of the military as a political actor. The dynamics of Party-military relations, dealt with in Chapter III, examine several points of contention relevant to the problem. These include the extent of professional freedom, the historical role in the Soviet state, and the degree of institutional autonomy. The efforts on behalf of the Party reflect the deeply rooted antagonism toward the military's potential in internal affairs. Chapter IV is an attempt to relate the civil-military conflict to the state of the developing political leadership and the evolution of Soviet society and the Soviet state. The long-term trend appears to indicate a growth of professionalism not only within the military establishment, but also within all institutional elements in Soviet society, a prospect seemingly stronger than recovery of revolutionary élan. The focus of this effort is primarily

upon the past ten years. To recount in detail the events prior to those occurring during the decade of the sixties would be more of an historical account. The Khrushchevian and post-Khrushchevian periods indicate more clearly the line of development of the forces within the Soviet state and how well the Party leadership is able to effectively meet such inevitable challenges.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

External militancy and internal coercion are the basic essentials of any authoritarian political system. For the system to survive and for such postures to be maintained, it is necessary for the ruling elite to maintain a powerful security establishment and large armed forces. The difference between the internal instruments of coercion and the military establishment in an authoritarian state is that the security apparatus is usually a component of the ruling Party's structure and its members intensely loyal to official dogma, while the military, though not disloyal, seeks to maintain a separate autonomous identity with its own principles, symbols, and labels.¹ Therefore, the distinction between "civil" and "military" is very slight. As the instrument of state policy with, for all practical purposes, the monopoly of force, the military tends to acquire considerable power and such power very likely intrudes into the civil sphere of the formulation, coordination, and execution of state policy.

¹Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and The Communist Party* (Princeton, 1967), p. 3.

Arms are no longer the sole concern of the warriors; the whole state is involved and not merely in the division of limited resources to military needs. The demarcation line between the "civil" and "military" in assessing the elements of national policy has become blurred.²

In effect one is dealing with the relative power of civilian and military groups. Civilian control is achieved to the extent that the power of the armed forces is reduced. Thus one must ask--How can military power be minimized?

With various combinations and modifications, statecraft appears to have devised two methods of control, objective and subjective methods.³ The objective sense of control is the distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the officer corps.⁴ Conversely, the subjective control method depends upon the large number, varied characteristics, and conflicting interests of civilian groups making possible the maximization of their power relative to the military structure.⁵ The concept associated with the latter method of control ". . . regard[s] with suspicion any

²Walter Millis and others, Arms and The State (New York, 1958), p. 5.

³Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and The State (New York, 1967), pp. 80-85.

⁴Ibid., p. 83.

⁵Ibid., p. 80.

group having its own values; it attempts, therefore, to indoctrinate the armed forces with the ideology of the ruling class."⁶

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union claims dominance within the state demanding absolute loyalty from the components of that state. The element that should attempt to stand apart from the ideological commitment and evade the controls and surveillance represents a threat to the hegemony of that elite. The dilemma is compounded when the Party realizes that the military establishment is at one and the same time a potential danger and indispensable, in the sense that its members object to pervasive political controls, but is the instrument of national defense.

. . . [T]he complex . . . precarious relationship between the Party and the military establishment which arises from the fact that, notwithstanding its distrust of the officer corps and its fear of "Bonapartism," the Party must grant the military the degree of professional and institutional freedom that a military establishment needs if it is to remain a formidable factor in its country's foreign policy. The Party's attitude and policy toward the military, therefore, are the result of a delicate balance between two conflicting motivations: the desire for hegemony within the state, and the need to maintain a strong military-political posture before the rest of the world.⁷

⁶Harry Coles, editor, Total War and Cold War: Problems of Civilian Control in the Military (Columbus, Ohio, 1962), p. 18.

⁷Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), p. 8.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is to a limited extent an organized body within the Soviet Union, in that less than total commitment is possible. On the other hand, the armed forces of the USSR are the one completely organized body possessing an "esprit de corps," a sense of corporate professionalism, and a potential ability to carry out moves to place its adherents in power. As is characteristic of authoritarian regimes, where the citizen has no overt opportunity to intervene in political affairs, the army may consider itself the legitimate repository of the "national will," perhaps, even in opposition to the government.

All armed forces which have become politicized . . . have some special and indeed unique identification with the national interest. . . . 'The Army,' said General von Seeckt, 'should not become a State within a State, but it should be merged in the State through service; in fact it should become the purest image of the State.' The Spanish Enciclopedia Universal speaks of the Spanish Army after 1931 as 'the last bastion of Spanish nationhood.' 'The Armed Forces,' said Peron, 'are the synthesis of the nation. They do not belong to specific parties or sectors. They belong to the nation.'⁸

The problem of political control of the military is understood by Soviet political leaders as a heritage bequeathed to successive Soviet leaders by the admonitions of V. I. Lenin. The necessities of the state in international interaction dictate that a delicate and precarious balance must be

⁸Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York, 1962), p. 35.

struck between strict Party control and the not easily replaceable professional expertise of an officer cadre. In order to insure this balance the Party has maintained political officers at various levels of the armed forces, through the Main Political Administration (MPA) which functions as both a part of the USSR Ministry of Defense and as the Military Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU.⁹ The power of the zampolit as well as the distance from the center of the power structure that Party scrutiny has extended have oscillated with the tempo of the political metronome.¹⁰ There appears to be at least one non-variable in the relationship between the political officer and the military professional in that the former has incurred the enmity and resentment of the latter. The military professional very deeply resents the "supervision" of his duties, since, among other things, it impairs his military proficiency.

This dispute over the range and depth of the political officer's authority is one of the stimuli for political activity

⁹Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), pp. 490-495.

¹⁰The full title of the zampolit is zamestitel' komandira po politicheskoi chasti. This official is responsible for the military and political condition of the unit. In theory he is subordinate to the military commander, but in practice he is independent of the commanding officer with the commander's promotion based on the political officer's evaluation. The position was created August 12, 1940 to replace the politruk (political instructor). Zbigniew Brzezinski, Political Controls in the Soviet Army (New York, 1954), pp. 9-13.

on behalf of the military seeking to reduce the power of the MPA operatives within the military apparatus. The Party has usually reacted to such challenges to even a portion of its authority. This civil-military conflict has placed the high command in a position to play a potentially rather decisive role in state policy. The military leaders are unquestionably loyal to the Soviet state. As of 1965 senior professionals in the High Command had been Party members longer than the political elite:¹¹

Military

Zhukov	1919	Chuikov	1919
Konev	1918	Grechko	1928
Zakharov	1917	Biruizov	1926
Malinovsky	1926	Gorbatov	1919
Rotmistrov	1919	Moskalenko	1920
Rokossovsky	1919	Meretskov	1917

Political

Khrushchev	1919	Mikoyan	1915
Brezhnev	1931	Shelest	1928
Kosygin	1927	Epishev	1929
Suslov	1921	Golikov	1943
Kirilenko	1931	Voronov	1933

Although this fact of membership indicates their commitment to the ideals of the Soviet system, they, nevertheless, represent a potentially uncontrollable force. As agents in the consolidation of Soviet power, they represented the no less professional elite of the movement than did the civil

¹¹Robert Conquest, Russia After Khrushchev (New York, 1965), p. 172.

officials. Following this consolidation and with the initiation of the Stalinist programs and policies, the successive leaderships have done much to develop a feeling among the ruling elite that they were a relatively privileged caste and that such position was due to conditions created as a result of the action of the political leadership, as opposed to the particular group from which they emerged. For the armed forces, the old ranks were re-instituted, the old epaulets were restored, regiments began to receive grandiose titles, the traditions of the campaigns and commanders of Czarist times were again given military glory, etc.¹² However, it appears that the army, despite this elevation of a "new nobility," was affected by the fact that its conscripts were mainly peasants, whose feelings about collectivization were not to be concealed from the High Command and, as was to be expected, the actions of the political apparatus during Stalin's purge of the army was resented even by the survivors.¹³ Such feelings are held by the group of high ranking officers who appeared to be

¹²Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 479.

¹³When war broke out in 1941 a number of the generals-- for example, Gorbатов, Meretskov, and Rokossovsky--who had not at that time been shot were in labor camps, were perforce released and restored to command. During the post-Stalin period, the Army continually pressed for the rehabilitation of the executed soldiers and had some difficulty in obtaining it. Robert Conquest, Russia After Khrushchev (New York, 1965), p. 173.

devotees of Stalin (generally for the practical reason of survival).¹⁴ Among both groups of officers there was and is a widespread dislike of Party controls placed in the hands of secret police figures.

If the military elite does think of itself as a privileged class, it is with reservations about any gratitude to the Party.

In a dictatorship however strong the more or less automatic loyalties of the Army to its political superiors, there are also special reasons for resentment. When the political leaders appear to be producing failures and operating according to narrow, cold-blooded, and unrealistic versions of the ruling ideology, alternative ideological interpretations may arise in the comparatively free discussion held among groups that have reason to trust each other . . . Some minds are capable, in private, of seeing through some of the third-rate political theorizing of today.¹⁵

Since the military membership of the Party is represented on the Central Committee, the Ofitsertsvo has means of vocalizing opposition to political activity. The marshals enter the political forum with a highly organized and dangerously powerful group relative to the other non-apparatchik elements--writers, scientists, engineers, technicians, etc.

¹⁴The core of Stalin's senior military command was the Stavka-GKO leaders on whom he learned to rely: Bulganin, Vasilevsky, Kuznetsov, Antonov, and Shtemenko. Hary Coles, Total War and Cold War: Problems of Civilian Control in the Military (Columbus, Ohio, 1962), pp. 245-248.

¹⁵Robert Conquest, Russia After Khrushchev (New York, 1965), p. 174.

The military Party members are not apparatchiks in the true sense. The element of professionalism is the quality that sets them apart, yet makes them difficult to control. They manipulate the forces of power with a specialized skill. The acquisition of such skill is a continuous process extending into the future. Specialization makes continuity necessary and imperative. Effects of the break in this continuity as a result of the purges of 1937-39 were long-lasting even though senior commanders were replaced by their subordinates.

The wartime reputations of the senior military professionals were high following the close of hostilities in 1945. From May to September 1945, the papers carried daily accounts of awards and honors for the marshals and officers of the Red Army.¹⁶

. . . Stalin instituted the new rank of Generalissimus for himself alone, and Beria was made a Marshal of the Soviet Union. But it was Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov on his white charger to whom the crowd turned in victory celebration.¹⁷

Although there exists no accurate data concerning the role of the armed forces during this period, evidence suggests popular opinion tended to view the military as an alternative to the destructive power of Stalin. Since Marshal Georgi K.

¹⁶Harry Coles, editor, Total War and Cold War: Problems of Civilian Control in the Military (Columbus, Ohio, 1962), p. 242.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 242.

Zhukov was held in such high esteem by both the people and the army, Stalin could foresee the possibility of a threat from the military.

References to Party affairs and its leaders began to supplant the references to the military in the official press. The wartime State Defense Committee (GKO) and the Stavka of the Supreme Command were abolished.¹⁸ Within a year some of the wartime military leaders were in disgrace, banishment, or in prison. The hero of the victory celebrations, Marshal Zhukov, was relegated to obscurity as commander of the Odessa Military District.

. . . There occurred a more widespread purge of wartime military leaders. Chief Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy A. Golovanov, wartime chief of the heavy bomber force, and several other senior airmen were removed. Admiral of the Fleet N. G. Kuznetsov, chief of the navy since 1939, was court-martialed for allegedly telling the Western allies more than had been necessary during the wartime alliance. . . .¹⁹

Upon setting about this course of reasserting Party primacy, Stalin represented the dilemma of the autocrat by attempting to fortify his own elite group power, yet realizing that national force was necessary as a factor of the new direction of post-war Soviet foreign policy.

¹⁸Donald Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia (New York, 1967), p. 359.

¹⁹Harry Coles, Total War and Cold War: Problems of Civilian Control in the Military (Columbus, Ohio, 1962), p. 244.

The post-World War II period commitment to an active international role necessitated highly qualified military leadership. Those military leaders in disgrace were recalled and were appointed to high posts (Zhukov elected a candidate member of the Central Committee), however, these concessions to expediency were tempered by secret police scrutiny and the political organs within the military establishment.

With the death of Stalin, the army sought to participate in political maneuvers of the successive succession crises that have occurred. The army has assumed the pivotal position between Party factions, particularly over leadership. The role of the armed forces is generally a negative factor in the role of "balancer." The prime example that can be given is the failure of Malenkov and Beria to eliminate opposition after falling heirs to Stalin's mantle. Although Interior Ministry Defense (MVD) troops controlled Moscow and the Kremlin, fear of the reaction of the Leningrad Military District under the command of Marshal Govorov possibly prevented a blood purge.

The fall of Beria was in no small way related to the military pressure. It is rumored that Marshals Zhukov and Konev were active participants in his arrest and trial.²⁰ Though not indicative of a change in political power, the military appears to have demanded and received concessions:

²⁰Ibid., p. 246.

1. Zhukov was elected full member of the Central Committee;
2. belated promotions were announced;
3. military slain in the purge were rehabilitated;
4. role of the police and the political organs in the armed forces declined in importance; and,
5. shift of control of border guards and MVD troops to the Ministry of Defense.²¹

The succeeding demise of Malenkov over the attempt to increase the power of the governmental and party bureaucracy at the expense of the military and the reallocation of resources demonstrated the covert influence of the armed forces in protecting its priorities. The armed forces also used the leadership crisis and the Khrushchev-Molotov dispute to effect a revision of World War II history as ordered by Stalin and presented the image that the armed forces were responsible for the victory.

This relentless effort on behalf of the armed forces to guard professional interests was again shown in the challenge to Premier Khrushchev by the "anti-party" group in 1957. The full role of Marshal Zhukov is not known, but it is reported that he placed the support of the armed forces with the Khrushchevite faction. The Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, marked both the consolidation of past leadership and policies--in the military as well as in the Party.

²¹Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, 1964), p. 486.

At this Congress ". . . Khrushchev finally brought the Army, which was already showing signs of independence, into a position where it could be truly dangerous."²² Marshal Zhukov was elected a candidate member of the Party Presidium-- the first professional military personality to be accorded that honor. This appointment in conjunction with others makes the threat to Party hegemony very real.

Zhukov, Konev, Sokolovsky, and Vasilevsky were retained as members of the Central Committee; Malinovsky and Moskalenko were added. Twelve other military leaders were made candidate members. . . . One revealing fact was the complete absence of senior officers of the political administration. This was unprecedented and shows their decline in importance under Zhukov's administration of the Ministry of Defense.²³

Khrushchev's successes at the Twentieth Party Congress and with the "anti-party" group also marked the unparalleled height of the power of the armed forces. The question now remained, Could a successful Party leadership allow the military and its "spokesman" in the Presidium to share the paramount position of leadership in state policy?²⁴ If

²²Robert Conquest, Russia After Khrushchev (New York, 1965), p. 177.

²³Harry Coles, Total War and Cold War: Problems of Civilian Control in the Military (Columbus, Ohio, 1962), p. 254.

²⁴The anti-party group included Molotov, Bulganin, Malenkov, Shepilov, and Kaganovich and their unsuccessful bid to challenge Khrushchev for the leadership of the Party. Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin (New York, 1969), pp. 16-30.

Zhukov could use the armed forces in defeating a coalition aligned against the leader, could he not use this power to possibly unseat him? This factor in conjunction with the relative weakening of governmental and Party bureaucracy, police powers, a divided political leadership and the effort for the armed forces to share a greater role in formulating strategy and doctrine, placed Zhukov and the armed forces in a position to endanger Party-state authority. Marshal Zhukov was subsequently removed from the Defense Ministry (as a source of real power) and expelled from both the Central Committee and the Presidium. His successor was Marshal Rodion Ia. Malinovsky, a professional soldier without Zhukov's personal popularity and who was associated with Khrushchev at Stalingrad. With the restoration of Party primacy, the armed forces were granted one concession--Colonel-General F. I. Golikov replaced A. S. Zheltov as head of the Main Political Administration.²⁵

Whether Zhukov really intended to be a "Bonaparte" as some accused him, seems doubtful. What is perfectly clear is that his goal--and he came close to achieving it--was total victory in the Army's bout with the politico-military organ. . . . He was accused of splitting the Army from the Party, setting up his own personal control in the Army and "liquidating Party leadership in the Armed Forces. . . ." The defeat of the Army seemed complete. Yet the logic of its special internal loyalties was to bring it back into play within a few years.

²⁵Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, 1964), p. 486.

The Zhukov era shows how the Army can emerge into the political field during a struggle at the top, even under "legal conditions". . . . The Malinovsky era . . . also shows the Army offering corporate resistance to political decisions, but not as yet in so dramatic a fashion.²⁶

The consolidation efforts associated with the Khrushchev succession were moves to secure control of the military establishment. Such a process saw the rise of the fortunes of the "Stalingrad Group" at the expense of the Stavka marshals. Although the fortunes of these individuals were of interest when they were as persistently and as politically relevant as they are in the case of Khrushchev's association with the Southern clique of marshals, the main question remained the institutional one--Malinovsky being a professional soldier with professional interests, the institutional autonomy of the armed forces was not basically altered by Marshal Zhukov's fall.²⁷

. . . , [A] maneuver . . . , similar to the "Ukrainian" appointments in the Party apparatus, was . . . unsuccessful in the long-run. A number of Stalingraders did exhibit servile gratitude for their accelerated and invidious promotion. But others of them, including Malinovsky, retained their professional attitudes. And meanwhile, a number of senior representatives of the other fronts, and of the old General Staff which contributed the alternative claimant to responsibilities for the victory [World War II], held certain positions.²⁸

²⁶Robert Conquest, Russia After Khrushchev (New York, 1965), p. 178.

²⁷Harry Coles, Total War and Cold War: Problems of Civilian Control in the Military (Columbus, Ohio, 1962), p. 261.

²⁸Robert Conquest, Russia After Khrushchev (New York, 1965), p. 179.

In addition to this continuing politico-military confrontation, the late fifties and early sixties witnessed another facet of the conflict. Two parallel crises arose during this period: (1) the modernist-traditionalist controversy of large ground forces as opposed to reliance on missile forces; and (2) the allocations crisis whereby the political leadership sought to reallocate resources to the consumer sector of the economy.²⁹ Throughout 1961 and the spring of 1962, the military vehemently opposed such action and its associated programs. The scheme represented a threat to the traditional arms and envisaged the release of millions of military personnel, many of whom had been career soldiers and were not prepared for civilian life. However, the heightened international tensions induced the Party to abandon the troop reduction scheme, increase the military budget, and resume nuclear testing.³⁰

October 1962, saw the humiliation of Soviet arms during the Cuban missile crisis. The military was thoroughly dissatisfied with the Party leadership (particularly N. S. Khrushchev) and felt the Party responsible for the debacle.

²⁹January 1960. Khrushchev proclaimed the reduction of the armed forces by 1,200,000 men with the maximum ceiling of 2,423,000 men to be reached by 1962. Although cloaked in propaganda terms, the more realistic reason for cuts was the need to find additional resources to accelerate light industrial growth and to invest in the agricultural sector of the economy.

³⁰Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (New York, 1964), p. 488.

Marshal Malinovsky, through a scathing criticism of the political organs in the military structure, sharply criticized the Party for its actions related to the Cuban adventure.³¹

The debate continued with a series of exchanges in the official press through the confrontation over the Stalingrad anniversary of 1963. One again realizes that the military took advantage of a split in the Party leadership to advance its own cause. However, the Party exacted its price on two separate occasions, once, before the crisis--the removal of Marshal F. I. Golikov as head of the MPA and once, after the crisis--the removal of Marshal M. V. Zakharov as Chief of the General Staff. The former realignment is the more significant in initial analysis, but the latter action has yet to reach culmination in any concrete action in relation to the perspective of civil-military relations.

In May 1962, the Soviet press announced the removal of Marshal F. I. Golikov as the head of the Main Political Administration and his replacement by A. A. Epishev. Although ill health was given as the official reason for the change in personnel, the features of the announcement and the background of the personalities suggested that important Party changes

³¹Red Star, October 25, 1962.

were involved.³² Red Star published the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated May 11, 1962:

1. Promoting Epishev to the rank of General of the Army; and,
2. describing him as Head of the Central Political Department of the Soviet Army and Navy.³³

Only in the back pages of the issue was the removal of Marshal Golikov mentioned and then only in connection with the official recall of Epishev from the Belgrade embassy.

³²Galay Nikolai, "The Significance of Golikov's Removal," Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., IX (August, 1962), pp. 34-40.

Background--Marshal F. I. Golikov:

(a) assumed the leadership of the MPA from a relative nonentity, General Zheltov. Experienced, able military commander capable of wielding authority as well as a skilled politician with diplomatic and secret police experience.

(b) 1939--Deputy Head of the Central Political Department of the Army. 1941--led military mission to the United States.

World War II--commanded an army, later a front.

1944-46--Chairman of the Commission on Repatriation of Soviet Citizens from Abroad. 1943-55--Head of the Personnel Department of the Central Administrative of the Soviet Army.

Background--General A. A. Epishev:

(a) held no military or Party political post since World War II.

(b) Party apparatchik when the war began and was detached and sent to a military council of an army.

(c) sent back to civilian post before the war ended.

1955--Ambassador to Rumania

1959--Ambassador to Yugoslavia

(d) wartime and post-war career closely connected to N. S. Khrushchev. Sudden promotion to Army General, abnormal procedure, skipped several intermediate ranks.

³³Red Star, May 22, 1962.

What is remarkable is that Epishev had been appointed to his new post almost two weeks before the fact was publicly reported and this does not represent the full delay. . . . Since the Central Political Department of the Soviet Army and Navy enjoys the status of a department of the Party Central Committee, Golikov's removal would have had . . . to be approved at a Central Committee plenary session . . . indicates that it was held to deal with urgent business . . . the fact that it promoted Kirilenko . . . and removed Spiridonov . . . makes it clear that the session was concerned with top-level changes in the Party apparatus resulting in a shift in the balance of forces within the Central Committee, Presidium and Secretariat.³⁴

The delay would appear to indicate dissension between Army and Party leaders within the Central Committee. Another factor suggests that Golikov's removal was the result of important political decisions. Of the seventy or so military leaders who signed the obituary of Army General H. I. Antonov, Chief of Staff of Warsaw Pact Forces, only the signatures of the disgraced marshals, Zhukov, Bulganin and Golikov were missing.³⁵ This fact was given more weight since it even included the signatures of the marshals in the reserves, including Meretskov and Voroshilov. This appointment was an insult to the Army, since Epishev was a Party and a police official of the Ukranian apparatus and Stalin's Deputy Minister of State Security.

³⁴Nikolai Galay, "The Significance of Golikov's Removal," Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., IX (August, 1962), pp. 34-40.

³⁵Ibid.

The factor of the appointment was that Khrushchev needed a loyal subordinate with no professional military bonds, who would introduce new policies in the armed forces. Marshal Golikov appears to have been unable or unwilling to introduce these new policies. Given his background, Golikov was the only member of the military-political apparatus who enjoyed the support of the professional military leaders, since his career most nearly paralleled their own. The conflict was not between military-political personnel, but between the armed forces and the Khrushchev-led faction within the Party leadership.

This series of political-military crises was followed by yet another, and in many ways more important than the previous crises--the ouster of Premier N. S. Khrushchev. The role of Marshal Malinovsky in the "palace coup" is not fully known, but several factors impinge on his attitude and possible acquiescence--opposition to some Khrushchev-sponsored policies; recognized as a spokesman for the professional military interests; and Marshal M. V. Zakharov, his closest associate, reappointed Chief of the General Staff. Such factors would seem to indicate that the armed forces are not to be ignored in leadership crises. One might reasonably assume that Brezhnev quite likely sounded out Malinovsky in preparation for the Politburo and Central Committee moves against Khrushchev. What assurances or guarantees could Malinovsky demand for neutrality--the return of Zakharov or greater prizes?

The immediate issue is almost certainly Epishev. His removal would be both a pleasure and a triumph for the Army, and it might be thought a small price to pay for its support. On the other hand, the "Ukrainians" in the Party machine must wish to hang on to every position they can hold. And the Party leadership as a whole must anyhow wish to replace him with another politically reliable figure.³⁶

If, indeed, this is the ultimate goal of the military, then the Party leadership must surely foresee such a move as a reassertion of military influence. Over the long-run, the civilian leadership must curb the autonomy of the military yet retain its support.

In the period of continuing succession struggles, there appears little likelihood that the Army will be relegated to a subservient role. The future role of the armed forces tends to cast it as the "apocalyptic pawn" that any faction aspiring to leadership position seeks to influence. The political leadership is confronted with the choice of succeeding Ministers of Defense with a thought to the degree of power they will seek to attain on behalf of the armed forces. In all likelihood, they will be professional personnel who hold the respect of the armed forces and particularly the Soviet Army. There are two very basic facets that the civilian authorities must realize concerning the future of civil-military relations in the Soviet system: that the inevitable strategic primacy of the new rocket

³⁶Robert Conquest, Russia After Khrushchev (New York, 1965), p. 182.

forces, whose officer corps is a technical cadre, politically apathetic, and confident of their indispensability; and that potential threats of the ground forces, which have the ability to enforce their will, may be under given conditions a possibility. The potentiality, at this point, concerns the question of a definite, clear-cut army coup d'etat. A coup is in reality a matter of definition and, as has been noted, does not have to be an overt overthrow of civil authority. The army may affect its will by supporting a particular political faction, though not party to the ruling body itself. Also, it may impose political nonentities or its own selection giving the impression of constitutionality to political succession--much on the order of Napoleon's coup of 18 Brumaire.³⁷

Since the evolution of professional militarism, the problem of exercising political control over the armed forces without affecting their professional efficiency and morale is of interest to all states in varying degrees.³⁸ As has been indicated, this is the primary and recurrent problem for Party-political authority in the Soviet Union, where the armed forces are both the indispensable instrument of the ruling party and a potential threat to the Party's power.

³⁷Ibid., p. 184.

³⁸Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, Ill., 1960), p. vii, and Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p. 19-58.

The military threat lies less in direct aspirations for political power than in dilution of the Party's hegemony over all the institutions in the society, accentuated by tendencies toward emergence of the military as a professionally autonomous group.³⁹ The nuclear age has introduced additional points of contention and aggravated old issues between the political authority and the military centering about organization, structure of authority, internal processes, and professional standards.⁴⁰

There appear to exist four alternatives and possibilities for the future of Soviet political-military relations that could be indicative of intervention, if one accounts for the multiplicity of centrifugal forces that are apparently unreconcilable given the present procedural basis for accommodation. First, there is the choice presented by the disintegration of the political leadership in the face of military cohesion. Secondly, the crisis created by Party instability leaving the army, by its own definition, the repository of the popular will. Feature the situation in which a Central Committee struggle forces a schism with one faction withdrawing to Leningrad and claiming to be the legitimate body. Who is to be the arbiter of such a crisis?

³⁹Thomas W. Wolfe, The Soviet Military Scene: Institutional and Defense Considerations (Santa Monica, California, 1966), p. 7.

⁴⁰Roman Kolkowicz, The Impact of Modern Technology on the Soviet Officer Corps (Santa Monica, California, 1966), p. 1.

Thirdly, consider the possibilities of an army rising away from the center of power. In 1937-38 the possibility seems to have been feared that Marshal Y. K. Blukher's Far Eastern Army might rise and march on Moscow. It appears not at all unlikely ". . . that such a move was prevented only by the vigilance of the political officers, aided by the secret police network, with their task made easier by the atmosphere of demoralization and terror that then prevailed. . . ."41

Finally, if a neo-Stalinist regime returned to power with no effective Party opposition, would the army intervene? If the level of political crisis (such as existed in 1937-39) is attained--as is likely in the future--the military represents a possible claimant to the seat of state power. There is precedent for such action. The army would have been infinitely better off, if it had intervened to halt the Stalinist purges. Given the character of the current political leadership and the ideological climate, such repression could not be effectively reintroduced. Firm control of the armed forces could be instituted, but the vivid memories of the blood purges could trigger a reaction.

The Party has harbored no doubts as to the principle of political supremacy over the armed forces as being paramount. However, the demands of national security has made it necessary for the principle to be upheld without impairing military

⁴¹Myron Rush, Russia After Khrushchev (New York, 1965), p. 184.

effectiveness. The efforts to meet both these aspirations reveal attitudes of deep-seated fear of the armed forces. To prevent the development of any sense of corporate identity, the political authority has attempted to integrate the military into the state structure. Laying stress upon--Splechennost--(solidarity) between the Party and the military, the leaders have opened places on the Central Committee to senior officers and have enrolled approximately 90 per cent of the officers in the Party and the Komsomol.⁴² With the single exception of Marshal Zhukov, the Party has maintained the "civil purity" of the pinnacle of power--the Politburo. The existence of a pervasive system of Party and secret police controls within the military structure is indicative of the Party's recognition of the potential of internal coercion and its obsession with means of controlling such potential.

What the future role of the Soviet armed forces is to be is difficult to ascertain. However, one must note that as long as the factors of national interest and corporate self-interest are not satisfactorily dealt with by the Party-political leadership the armed forces remain a political uncertainty. The Party will continue to wrestle with the problem of political integration and the natural tendencies toward professionalism.

⁴²Thomas W. Wolfe, The Soviet Military Scene: Institutional and Defense Considerations (Santa Monica, California, 1966), p. 8.

CHAPTER II

PARTY-MILITARY INTERACTION

A. Role of the Party in the Soviet Union

The institution that, more than any other, represents the destiny of the Russian people is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). To Lenin, the Party was the "two-edged sword" wielded by a proletariat that would in one stroke destroy the old oppressive classes and carve a new utopia for the aspiring masses. It was the embodiment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and most important, it was the means by which the ideology was to be presented to the people. In order for the great Marxian-inspired dream to become reality, the Party had to be without opposition in the society and, indeed, history has shown the ferocity with which this end has been pursued. Whether or not this instrument is to be the conspiratorial elite of Lenin or the vanguard of the proletariat of Stalin, matters little. Whichever view one espouses, the basic ideology and aims are the same. As such, Party organization and its role in the state engenders serious conflicts as institutions of its own creation appear to be attempting to follow trends of pluralism evident within Soviet society.

Upon reading the Constitution of the USSR, one must observe that one central point on which the document presents an unrealistic image of the political system, might be the failure to account for the role of the CPSU and its relations with the formal/constitutional state structure. The 1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union has 146 articles with the Party mentioned only once in Chapter X, Rights and Duties of a Citizen. Yet the document recognizes the Party as the primary institution of the political system.

In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to develop the organizational initiative and political activity of the masses of the people, the citizens of the USSR are guaranteed the right to unite in public organizations; trade unions, cooperative societies, youth organizations, cultural, technical and scientific societies; and the most active and politically conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class, working peasants, and working intelligentsia voluntarily unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to build a communist society and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both societal and governmental.¹

Not only is the evolved role of the Party impossible to discern by reading the constitution, but also the formal participation of the Party in the governmental process cannot be ascertained by constitutional provision. One might never guess that decrees and regulations issued by the Party have the force of law within the entire society, or that Party

¹Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, Chapter X, Article 126.

agencies play a decisive role in the recruitment of personnel on all levels of the political system, from the highest to the lowest, whether the office be elective or appointive.² Neither might one infer that meaningful discussion of public issues occurs exclusively within the Party structure, and that any resultant policies and administrative decisions are formulated by the Party as opposed to the formal governing state bodies.³

The CPSU's dominant position in the state is the major factor in shaping Soviet life. Its doctrinal formulas, policy declarations, institutional arrangements, massive indoctrination, and coercion ensures preservation of the Party power as a fundamental imperative in attaining its primary objective. Lenin expressed the sentiment that

Dictatorship is power based directly upon force and unrestricted by any law. The revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is power won and maintained by violence . . . power that is unrestricted by any laws. . . .⁴

Lenin reiterated his statement of the role of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union stating that the ". . . will of a class may sometimes be carried out by a dictator, who at times may do more alone and who is frequently more

²Alfred G. Meyer, The Soviet Political System (New York, 1965), p. 108.

³Ibid.

⁴V. I. Lenin, "Proletarian Revolution and Renegade Kautsky," Selected Works, Vol. 7 (New York, 1943), p. 123.

necessary."⁵ He was more complete and explicit in the tract, "State and Proletarian Dictatorship" in stating the Party's role.⁶ Succeeding regimes have little altered the basic statement or intent of Lenin for the position of the Party relative to society as a whole.

Stalin in 1926, saw "the highest expression of the leading role of the Party in the Soviet Union" . . . in the fact that not a single important political or organizational question is decided by any Soviet or mass organization without guiding directions from the Party. On another occasion, Stalin emphasized that the Party "does not share, and must not share guidance of the state with any other Party." Khrushchev continued to uphold this traditional viewpoint: "The reactionary forces," he said, "assert that the dictatorship of the proletariat is a cruel power. This is true. . . ."⁷

The institutional arrangements forming the bases of Party power are ruthlessly and summarily enforced. The Party presents a rather elitist image in that its role in the state and its relationship to the people are bent in the direction to keep the masses malleable, committed, and to prevent widespread active questioning of the prescribed direction of

⁵V. I. Lenin, "Speech to the Ninth Congress of the R.K.P.," Selected Works, Vol. 8 (New York, 1943), p. 222.

⁶V. I. Lenin, "State and Proletarian Dictatorship," Selected Works, Vol. 7, p. 254.

⁷Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), p. 16.

state policy.⁸ Any manifestation of opposition, disagreement, passive noninvolvement, or personalities is an anathema to the Party. The Party maintains a continual awareness of potential opposition and challenges to its authority. As an outcome of this vigilance, it is prepared to take action against Party as well as non-Party dissidents.⁹ The history of the USSR is filled with examples of individuals, professional groups, entire classes, and ethnic committees that the Party has regarded as an actual or potential threat being brought to heel. Such groups have generally stood in the path of the pursuit of absolute power.

This institutional mistrust of Soviet citizenry has, as one example, its basis in Marxist ideology which maintains

⁸Andrei Vyshinsky, Stalin's "procureur général," stated that Stalin demonstrated the "mechanism of the dictatorship of the proletariat; the transmission belts," the "levers," the "directing force," "the sum total of which constitutes the dictatorship of the proletariat," of which Lenin spoke. Here we see the Party (the main guiding force in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat) . . . the trade unions (as a school of Communism), the Soviets (. . . a direct expression of the dictatorship of the proletariat), the cooperatives (facilitating contact between the vanguard and the masses of the peasantry) . . . the Komsomol (which helps the Party, provides reserves for all other mass organizations . . .). Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), p. 18.

⁹This fact is illustrated by N. S. Khrushchev's statements in Pravda, January 14, 1957 and to the Seventh Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party. "The Communist Party guards the unity of its ranks like the apple of its eye," and that the "Communist must act like a surgeon who takes a sharp knife and operates on man's body to cut out malignant growths and thus make possible the further development and strengthening of the organism."

the inevitability of conflict as the antithetical moving forces of society proceed along the historical path. These include the forces of class, economic, and political conflict. An alternate explanation of the Party's pervasive mistrust might stem from its origins under the surveillance of the Okhrana. The need to maintain constant vigilance against spies and provocateurs prompted the Party to develop an effective system of protective measures "from limiting the size of Party cells to periodic purges, which became part of its modus operandi when it came into power."¹⁰

However, the most plausible explanation of this institutionalized suspicion of any person or organization which might present a threat to the Party's absolute power could rest in the fact that there are no established procedures, either constitutional or precedent, for transfer of power, both within the Party and within the state. This particular recognition colors the ruling faction's views of institutions and personalities around it. In the absence of any formal provision for succession, authority ultimately rests with the strongest faction. Once power has been attained, the prevailing faction has command of the Party, government, and police organizations to prevent an opposition coalition. Such maneuvers and countermoves suggest the Byzantine character of Russian politics. Absolute power must be

¹⁰Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), p. 18.

maintained if Party goals are to be attained. Internal stability and compliance are requisites in order to effect comprehensive social, political, and economic policies.

The death of Stalin saw the elimination of the more harsh measures effected in order to strengthen popular support for the regime. Nonetheless, the threat is still present, the differences being that the methods tend to be more subtle. The principle objective is unchanged--Party primacy must be perpetuated.

B. Party Controls of the Military

As has been noted, the military establishment in its halting drive for professional autonomy, particularly in the formulation of doctrine and strategy, presents a threat to Party hegemony that holds the potential for a severe succession crisis. Military establishments are predictable in that authority is exercised in accordance with explicit procedures that tend to stabilize the hierarchical lines of authority. Since the flow of authority within the military is from top to bottom, such a well-ordered arrangement would be altered if authority were to be exerted by a force outside the channels of military authority.

Such multiple authority exists within the Soviet military establishment. Thus, the usual military unit is ". . . a microcosm of the tensions and conflicts that have

beset the Red Army as a whole since its very creation."¹¹ Although such tensions have not unalterably damaged the armed forces, they do initiate inertia and low morale. The degree to which political controls are strengthened can cause a military reaction. Kolkowicz summarizes the apparent unconcern on behalf of the Party by recognizing the fact that

. . . Soviet Party leaders are very well aware of the disruptive effects of having multiple sources of authority within individual military units. However, since the military's political reliability is to them a matter of even greater concern than its technical and administrative viability, they accept this risk as the price they must pay for ensuring full control over their military establishment. Any tendency toward arbitrariness in dealing with the military is tempered . . . by considerations of efficiency . . . [and] morale; and the Party's complex system of controls . . . is so designed as to strike a balance between the permissiveness needed to maintain morale, discipline, efficiency, and readiness at desirable levels, and the degree of coercion that will prevent the military from becoming too self-assertive.¹²

The measures by which the Party maintains controls within the military structure can be assumed to fall into three categories: positive measures related to socio-economic privileges, political cooption, acquiescence to military demands, prophylactic measures of indoctrination and supervision, and negative measures of intimidation and coercion.¹³

¹¹Roman Kolkowicz, Political Controls in the Red Army: Professional Autonomy versus Political Integration (Santa Monica, California, July 1966), p. 2.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), p. 28.

The civil authorities must balance effectiveness, high morale, and discipline and the elimination of elitist movements in the ranks. First, the positive controls relate to the fact that privileges and allowances place officers among the Soviet elite.¹⁴ The attachment to this position and its rewards are strong among the officer corps, thus explaining in part the bitter resentment to reduction in the level of the armed forces. Party bureaucrats realize the situation and, as expected, can exert selective pressure to either eliminate or chasten a recalcitrant officer. The higher ranking military personnel are coopted into a policy-making organ to presumably represent military opinion. However, in reality those entering these organs are most ideologically acceptable to the leadership by placing political interests over professional interests.

Secondly, prophylactic control measures are designed to keep the officer committed and loyal, to give him a set of aims in alignment with the Party position, and to teach him to view any other than the image of Soviet reality as a negative force. Indoctrination, manipulation, and supervision create an air of tension and distrust. Indoctrination, particularly, is relied upon since it ". . . describes to the soldier the face of his enemy, making it credible through constant repetition and by denying him other sources of

¹⁴M. Martens, "Providing for the Soviet Officer," Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, III (February, 1956), pp. 26-32.

references; it reminds him constantly of his duty; and it generates in him a willingness to fight and suffer for the goals established and rationalized by the Party."¹⁵ Such an atmosphere encourages criticism of superiors at Party meetings. The Kritika/Samokritika ritual is a self-control device incorporated into military units.¹⁶ The device is exploited at Party meetings with rank being relatively unimportant where all members (the young in particular) are encouraged to publicly criticize the actions of others that are thought to be not in the Party's interest. The method has been a useful measure as well as a source of information, that exploits jealousies and rivalries. It operates best during crisis periods when personal tensions are most evident and when activities that could be considered anti-Party cause resentment or jealousy among unit members who do not participate in them.¹⁷ The attempt is to inhibit the ability to make unorthodox judgments.

¹⁵Roman Kolkowicz, Political Controls in the Red Army: Professionalism versus Political Integration (Santa Monica, California, July 1966), p. 17.

¹⁶The ritual serves a dual purpose. First, it provides a forum for criticism where rank theoretically has no meaning. Second, it is a source of information to the secret police that cannot be duplicated within the normally functioning military unit. More basically kritika/samokritika is a facade of consensus.

¹⁷Roman Kolkowicz, Political Controls in the Red Army: Professionalism versus Political Integration (Santa Monica, California, July 1966), p. 18.

Finally, negative control measures are harsher, utilizing intimidation, blackmail, coercion, and, perhaps as an ultimate measure, the purge (chistki). The post-Stalin era has brought a moderating effect to bear in relation to the extreme measures. The political organs and the secret police maintain a network of informers and provocateurs to report private and professional actions which are subsequently included in a dossier on the individual. This is particularly important in relation to the yearly attestations of officers and their approval is indispensable to the officer's career.¹⁸

The concept of frictionless civil-military relations in the Soviet Union is a myth despite the ideological formulae. The Soviet Army is not an armed militia, not common people in arms, and not a revolutionary army. It, however, is a large standing force with a high professional officer corps enjoying a privileged position in society and with discipline that compares with the Prussian Army at its harshest. Its "classlessness" has little bearing on the general aims of the military as an organizational whole. One must realize that it is able to replace any leadership with one more sympathetic to its position. As Finer indicates:

¹⁸Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), p. 30.

. . . successive Soviet governments have feared since the Red Army was established in 1917 a so called "Bonapartist" coup. Furthermore they did so with good reason. Their relations with their armed forces have been shot through with friction --as witness the Kronstadt mutiny of 1922, the great purges of 1937, and three military interventions of 1953, 1955, and 1957.¹⁹

There can be little doubt as to the mass support enjoyed by the Soviet government. The CPSU is the pivotal point upon which legitimacy revolves. Its endorsement is considered necessary in legitimizing a decision. The label "anti-Party" carries the connotation of usurpation, though

. . . particular acts of the regime are unpopular;
 . . . the regime itself is not actively unpopular.
 In this regime, the Party at the moment . . . is generally regarded as the legitimate source of authority.²⁰

In this respect, consensus is fragile and artificially secured by indoctrination and the sanction of fear. It tends to rest on acquiescence and long habit in perhaps, what is and has been one of the most stifling of conforming societies.

Politics in the Soviet Union is an interplay of notables who head and speak for the not always identified interests of massive institutions--the Party apparatus, the state bureaucracy, the managers, the police, and the army.²¹ The important point being that the factor of Party membership is

¹⁹Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York, 1962), p. 100.

²⁰Ibid., p. 101.

²¹Ibid.

the integrating factor. The armed services must operate within the boundaries of Party-defined authority. It cannot, itself, assume a "first-among-equals" position in relation to the other institutions of the state, much less, form opposition to the Party.

In the assertion of Party controls, the Party-civil authority effects an identity of views between the Party and the armed forces, characterized by a penetration of the military by proponents of the civilian order. If one examines why the military must conform to civilian directives, the emphasis is wrong. Such considerations were true during the civil war and afterward when the Soviet state was fighting for its existence, when the officer corps was largely composed of former imperial officers. The extensive system of controls served to guarantee the loyalty of the forces.

The problem after 1930 was no longer to secure the army for the Soviet state, but rather to secure its communism, to be certain that it was the right variety. The institution of the Political Command, with its staff of zampolits and politruks under the authority of the Central Committee integrated with all levels of command, served as the guardian of ideological "purity." The fact is that even after the consolidation of Soviet power the problem of ideological orthodoxy opens the possibility that the armed forces might have their own version of Communism.

The Soviet government's concern has not been confined to indoctrination, as a necessary condition of civil-military identity, but orthodoxy, which has been achieved by infiltrating the armed forces with secret police, the counterintelligence services of the KGB.²² Above the regimental level the "OO" detachments perform the surveillance tasks to ensure the loyalty and the obedience of the upper echelons of command.²³ Below this level the armed forces are infiltrated by secret counterintelligence police. Finer analyzes the pervasiveness of such controls as

. . . simple and convincing proof that party affiliation is no longer the decisive mechanism for securing military loyalty, but that this is accomplished by the KGB's security network--the proof comes from the great purges of 1937. In it Stalin eliminated 40 per cent of the more senior officers and between one-half and one-quarter of the junior officers. Yet he did not confine himself to the command officers. On the contrary, the political officers who were supposedly the tutors, mentors, and controllers of the armed personnel, were themselves purged by the OGPU in equal degree with the command staff.²⁴

²²Ibid., p. 104.

²³"The Special Sections in the Soviet Armed Forces represent the element of coercion in the system of controls which pervades the Soviet military machine. The Special Sections, commonly known in the Soviet Army by the abbreviation "OO" (from the Russian Osobyi Otdel and during the war renamed SMERSH, and abbreviation of 'Smert' Shpionam-Death to Spies) and part of the overall police network directed by the Ministry of the Interior (MVD), and for this reason their activities are shrouded by secrecy." Zbrigniew Brzezinski, Political Controls in the Soviet Army (New York, 1954), p. 54.

²⁴Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York, 1962), p. 104.

The military is permeated by a network of control mechanisms operating as parallel hierarchies, political and punitive in nature.²⁵ The former is composed of the zampolits and the Party and Komsomol organizations in the armed forces with the responsibility for agitation and propaganda, while the latter concerns the security organs of the Committee for State Security (KGB) with the responsibility for eliminating dissatisfied and disloyal elements. These control hierarchies are mutually cross-checking and subordinated to authority at the apex. They are designed to ensure loyalty to the Soviet state, but more importantly, they are to promote total integration in relation to the Soviet system in an attempt to quell the specter of professionalism that tends to set the armed forces apart from the remainder of society.²⁶ With the surveillance organs institutionalized in both the Party organization and political controls, the attempt is to educate and indoctrinate the soldier in an active loyalty to the Soviet system.

Administratively, the political control mechanism conforms to three levels, which parallel corresponding levels in the military structure:

²⁵Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 490.

²⁶Zbigniew Brzezinski, Political Controls in the Soviet Army (New York, 1954), p. 7.

1. The Main Political Administration which parallels the Defense Ministry;
2. the Political Departments, which parallel the Military District, Army Group, or Fleet; and,
3. the Political Sections, which parallel the division level (soedinenie).²⁷

Each of these military divisions has its own administrative structure, with stated size and responsibility.²⁸

With the control system operating as both a section of the Ministry of Defense and a department of the Central Committee, its responsibilities, broadly stated are: all propaganda and educational activities of the army; supervision of Party and Komsomol organizations; preparation of programs for political instruction followed by the army; supervision of clubs, movies, educational circles, libraries, and all other centers of army life; preparation of regular reports to the Party on army morale; and maintenance of a series of special schools for training junior political personnel and the Lenin Political Academy for senior officers.²⁹ Candidates for admission to advanced staff

²⁷Roman Kolkowicz, Political Controls in the Red Army Professional Autonomy versus Political Integration (Santa Monica, California, July 1966), p. 7.

²⁸The ministerial level deals with policy and broad administration; the district level has operational as well as administrative responsibilities; and the soedinenie is operational. Ibid., p. 7.

²⁹Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 490.

training are recruited from members of the military establishment who exhibit military skill as well as practical experience in political work in lower units. Zbigniew Brzezinski summarizes the objectives of political controls as being

. . . designed to strengthen the political morale of the troops and their military discipline; to combat cowards and deserters; to create hatred for the enemy and a desire for his destruction; to prepare the troops to hold fast under any circumstances, contemptuous of death for the sake of victory; to educate the ranks in the spirit of intense political vigilance, thus preventing the penetration of the Soviet Armed Forces by spies and diversionists; to inculcate in the Soviet soldier and officer devotion to their arms--to safeguard them in all situations and not to hand them over to the enemy; to familiarize the enlisted men with military traditions . . . and with the "heroic achievements" . . . , to organize mass political agitation and propaganda, political study and leisure, and to supply the units with adequate reading material; and to analyze the political morale of the forces of the enemy and to attempt to undermine them from within.³⁰

Officers are assisted by a Deputy for Political Affairs (zampolit). The unit commander is responsible for the unit with the zampolit being, theoretically, subordinate to the commander. But, in practice, the political nature of the duty makes the political officer independent of the commander whose political loyalty and promotion is subject to the zampolit's evaluation. MPA officials inspect units to check the quality of political education in the units, to

³⁰Zbigniew Brzezinski, Political Controls in the Soviet Army (New York, 1954), pp. 8-9.

interrogate men and officers on political themes, and to evaluate the state of political morale. The pressure to raise the level of political consciousness is unyielding and incessant. An unfavorable report reflects on both the commander and the zampolit.

As such the network of political controls touches every soldier and Party and Komsomol organizations are relied upon to project the official policy. The effectiveness of the system is dependent upon the support of Party members in generating enthusiasm and drive. The Party organization provides the strength of the system of political controls and with lines of authority running through the MPA directly to the Central Committee. The military-political organs are not dependent on the territorial Party subdivisions.³¹ One is able to ascertain four lines of authority within most Soviet military units utilized as the instruments of control: ". . . the political organs; the military commanding personnel; the local Party organs; and the prokuratura and secret police."³² Every Communist in the Soviet Armed

³¹Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 492.

³²Roman Kolkowicz, Political Controls in the Red Army: Professionalism versus Political Integration (Santa Monica, California, July 1966), p. 10.

Forces is a member of a Party organization.³³ Within the Primary Party Organization, members are subject to Party discipline and statutes regardless of military rank or position.³⁴ The Party secretary has the responsibility of stimulating the growth of Party organizations as well as the administrative duties that Party leadership places upon him. Party members are expected to inspire others by their behavior, self-discipline, partiinost, and "to sacrifice themselves in the interests of the Party and the state."³⁵

Party activities are supplemented by the Komsomol. They are directed by a section of the MPA and are responsible to the unit zampolit with members and secretaries approved by this officer.³⁶ Primary Komsomol Organizations function at

³³Party organization of several types depending upon their location within the military hierarchy:

(1) Party Committee--usually found at higher levels, (Ministry of Defense, Military Institute, District and division), elective body with powers of decision concerning Party affairs as well as parent organization;

(2) Primary Party Organization (PPO)--basic operational unit of the CPSU in the military, was moved down to the battalion level as of the summer of 1960;

(3) Party Organization--special section of the PPO;

(4) Party Group--small number of members or candidates at company level or below;

(5) Party Commission--not in the hierarchy, rather an appellate body at the division level.

Roman Kolkowicz, Political Controls in the Red Army: Professionalism versus Political Integration (Santa Monica, California, July 1966), p. 11.

³⁴Zbigniew Brzezinski, Political Controls in the Soviet Army (New York, 1954), p. 14.

³⁵Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 493.

³⁶Zbigniew Brzezinski, Political Controls in the Soviet Army (New York, 1954), p. 27.

the company and even at the platoon level, thus forming a reserve of political activists to serve as an example in raising the level of "Bolshevik consciousness" among the ranks.³⁷ The strength of such a control measure is the necessity to capture the positive loyalty of the armed forces and to coopt the active and able elements into the ruling elite. The Party, in expanding its influence, draws soldiers exhibiting leadership potential into a Party organization. The ambitious officer is well aware of the importance of Party membership to a career.

Despite the mass agitation in relation to the ordinary soldier and the structure necessary to effect its dissemination, the officer is the main object of political control. The Party seeks to control the officer by promoting the ideologically and politically acceptable individuals and to immerse them in Party activity. However, one must assume that this would tend to be less than effective, since professional responsibility would exert a greater magnetism than the tolerated Party-political activities. Civilian Party apparatchiki have been at various times given the authority to assume a role in the Party functions of a military unit. Although quite useful during the civil war period, it was found to interfere with military efficiency. It must be noted that in times of internal crisis

³⁷Ibid., p. 27.

. . . the Party leadership has repeatedly fallen back on the local Party organs. . . . Their functionaries frequently participate in the meetings and other activities of the political organs and Party organizations within the units. Professionally uncommitted, they serve the Party as an external control link to the military.³⁸

The Prokuratura and the secret police functions are preemptive and coercive.³⁹ The Party leadership has in these elements an external, militarily unbiased source of information, but, more importantly, an instrument of coercion.⁴⁰ These negative controls supplement the affirmative appeals. The KGB structure parallels both the political and military hierarchy of the armed forces. Although they wear uniforms and insignia and are theoretically subordinate to the unit commander, their ultimate responsibility to the KGB makes this little more than a myth. Their arbitrary powers of the Stalinist era have largely been modified, but their presence is still evident by the maintenance of the surveillance function. Dossiers are maintained on all members of the armed forces and personal

³⁸Roman Kolkowicz, Political Controls in the Red Army: Professionalism versus Political Integration (Santa Monica, California, July 1966), p. 12.

³⁹The Procuracy is modeled after analogous Continental institutions. The Soviet Prokurator not only acts as prosecutor in criminal trials, but also supervises the investigation, he has the powers of arrest and detention, inspects prisons and reviews the work of the secret police. Alfred G. Meyer, The Soviet Political System (Random House, New York), pp. 313-314.

⁴⁰Roman Kolkowicz, Political Controls in the Red Army: Professionalism versus Political Integration (Santa Monica, California, July 1966), p. 13.

histories are checked for any evidence of anti-Soviet behavior. Special attention is given to the security of documents, facilities, and secret installations with maximum effort exerted to guard the services against espionage. Sanctions for state crimes and violation of military regulations are extremely severe.⁴¹ Such punitive controls are only one method by which the armed forces are controlled. The attempt is made to instill positive loyalty by appeals to patriotism and pride in Soviet achievements. Despite the need for powerful and efficient forces, the Party cannot

⁴¹"High treason, which is defined to include 'defection to the side of the enemy, espionage, and handing over a state or military secret to a foreign state,' is punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period of ten to fifteen years or death. Divulging a military secret in the absence of indications of high treason carries the risk of a two to five year prison sentence; the same act if it has grave consequences, is punished by deprivation of freedom for a period of five to eight years. The conduct of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda is subject to a penalty of deprivation of freedom for a period of six months to seven years or exile for a period of two to five years. Insubordination and unwarranted abandonment of a unit or duty station for more than three days in peacetime are punished by deprivation of freedom for a period of one to five years; in wartime or in a combat situation, the maximum penalty may be death. Violation of service regulations on routine garrison duty carries a penalty of a prison sentence of three to six months, while unwarranted abandonment during a battle, or voluntary surrender may be punished by death or by deprivation of freedom for fifteen years. The Disciplinary and Service Regulations put into effect in 1960 emphasize that a Soviet soldier may be taken captive only if he is in a helpless condition in consequence of having been seriously wounded or shellshocked. The threat of death is not recognized as a valid ground for surrender." Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), p. 494.

eliminate controls. To effectively utilize the elaborate control network, the Party-political leadership has placed its future in the hands of young trained political officers. The young political cadre

. . . without exception [are], postwar products of the military-political institutions. Like the Suvorov cadets, the military profession is their only calling in life. The majority of them completed only secondary education prior to going into military service and can hope for higher promotion only through graduation from the military-political academies. They are trained also in the military arts of war, together with the commanding personnel. The Party is placing increasing reliance on these young political specialists, and with time their role is becoming more and more important.⁴²

The network of controls that the Party-civil structure maintains within the military invades all aspects of the professional and private lives of both officers and enlisted personnel. The MPA and the KGB function to control the military, and the Party Central Committee controls the KGB. By creating enough tension and rivalry among the various control links, there will be "no coalescence of special interests and no collusion between controlled and controller."⁴³ In establishing independent and competing lines of authority and by playing upon the ambitions of the commanders, the Party apparat seeks to halt the march toward professional

⁴²Zbigniew Brzezinski, Political Controls in the Soviet Army (New York, 1954), pp. 30-31.

⁴³Roman Kolkowicz, Political Controls in the Red Army: Professionalism versus Political Integration (Santa Monica, California, July 1966), p. 21.

autonomy within the military establishment. Such lines converge at a point not far removed from the locus of power-- the Politburo. The Party leadership conserves its own hegemony in the application of the old dictum, "divide and rule." The political insecurity of the military command guarantees the military security of the political command.⁴⁴ Kolkowicz notes that the Party leadership has vivid memories of

. . . critical periods of conflict between Party and military when the political control network failed to act in the best interests of the Party. Thus, in the 1920's the heads of the MPA, Smilga and Antonov-Ovseenko, supported Trotsky in his antimilitaristic activities, proposing at one time the curbing of the political organ's authority and function. During the 1937 purges of the military, the head of the MPA, Gamarmik, committed suicide, since presumably he had supported the military in its struggle with Stalin. Between 1953 and 1957, Zheltov, who was head of the MPA, took a rather ambivalent stand in the various Party-military conflicts of that period. And his successor Marshal Golikov, administered the organization in a manner that may have been too moderate for Khrushchev, who in 1962 replaced him with the much more vigorous and pro-Party Epishev.⁴⁵

Since the birth of the Soviet State, defense has rested with a professional military establishment. If this effort was to be a success, the nation had to be able to repulse any

⁴⁴Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 495.

⁴⁵Roman Kolkowicz, Political Controls in the Red Army: Professionalism versus Political Integration (Santa Monica, California, July 1966), p. 12.

force threatening its existence.⁴⁶

C. Changes in the Role of the Military

Although Leon Trotsky is credited with building the Red Army, in reality Stalin defined its internal role, its characteristics, and set limits on that role. Trotsky was willing to sacrifice military professionalism and proficiency in the name of ideological purity and continuity. Since Stalin was more interested in the practical problems of building the socialist state than with ideology, he felt it necessary to maintain an instrument of power. Although he advocated a standing army, this did not indicate trust in military professionalism. This distrust was evidenced by

. . . his introduction of strong political controls . . . , by his denial of full authority (edinsonachalie) to the commanders, and by his strengthening the security organ's authority in the military establishment. The military did win concessions from Stalin, but these were intended to keep the army loyal to the regime and to make it proficient; they were outweighed by negative measures and practices which resulted in severe curtailment of professional freedom, authority, and institutional self-esteem.⁴⁷

The official role of the military establishment in national life, as it evolved from the formative years, is to execute the policies and directives of the CPSU; to protect the state and the regime; to crush opposition to Party dominance, both internal and external opposition; to accept

⁴⁶George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York, 1961), pp. 866-877.

⁴⁷Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), p. 19.

and to tolerate Party functionaries in the military structure; and to be an army citizen, pervaded by egalitarian values while performing in a professional manner.⁴⁸ The major test of the armed forces, particularly the army, was World War II. Despite the purges of 1937, Stalin's handling of mobilization, and organizational problems, the armed forces successfully defended the Russian state. However, since World War II, Soviet policy has been expansionist in nature. Such commitments away from the Russian periphery are based directly on military capabilities. The effect of this reorientation of Russian foreign policy has affected the position of the military establishment in that

. . . once subordinate to that [position] of the Party and closely integrated with the Party's interests in the state, [the military] has become progressively less subordinate and more self-assertive. Since the death of Stalin . . . the role of the military, and its relations with the Party has undergone a discernible change. Among the many factors which have contributed to this change, the most important have been the modification of the terror machine, the effects of de-Stalinization, the more moderate political and social climate in the Soviet Union, and the growing complexity of warfare.⁴⁹

Essentially, such considerations have necessitated an examination of the proper (acceptable) limits of military influence in state policy matters. The military establishment has generally appeared outwardly cooperative in accepting the periodic reassertions of political primacy, but evidence

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 20.

⁴⁹Ibid.

usually indicates resistance to the narrowing of the role of the armed forces. As has been previously indicated, the areas of potential military influence may be categorized into varying levels: Party-state policy formulation, military-technical consideration, and internal political relations.⁵⁰ Despite the apparent division of the High Command as indicated by the internal factions and debates, the military has tended to exploit the position that it, as a professional elite can perform functions that a political leadership could never hope to accomplish.⁵¹

The greatest alteration in the military's role is the assertion that it has a decisive voice in formulation of doctrine and strategy in the face of Party affirmation of ideologically sanctioned "leading role."⁵² The exchanges

⁵⁰Thomas W. Wolfe, The Soviet Military Scene: Institutional and Defense Policy Considerations (Santa Monica, California, June 1966), p. 9.

⁵¹Thomas W. Wolfe, "Political Primacy vs. Professional Elan," Problems of Communism, XIII (May-June, 1964), pp. 44-52.

⁵²Military doctrine is a body of assumptions and beliefs about military science and art, strategy, and tactics which is acceptable in any armed force as being the basic guide for its conduct of military affairs. Thus Soviet military doctrine, under ideological motivations is the fundamental conception representing the officially accepted expressions of state views on questions of war and national defense. Strategy is an analysis of political, economic, and social factors as well as military factors. In the eye of the Soviet political leadership, strategy is provisional until approved by the political leadership. Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine (Glencoe, Ill., 1953), pp. 25-27 and 12-13, respectively.

between the authors and reviewers of the Sokolovsky book reflect that the military lost little ground in a statement of its doctrinal aspirations. Wolfe indicates that in the preface of the second edition the authors bowed to the criticism that they had ". . . failed to accord enough weight to the role of the political leadership in the formulation of strategy."⁵³ The authors in the revised edition, abstractly, cleared themselves of tendencies toward a nonpolitical professional view of strategy, but were not prepared to exclude from the scope of military strategy the "study of problems of leadership in preparing the country for war."⁵⁴

The Sokolovsky authors ask the question:

Is it possible to separate so mechanically the two interrelated aspects of the indivisible process of leadership?⁵⁵

And in turn they answer this query

. . . in addition to questions of leadership of the armed forces, the task of Soviet military strategy must also include study of the problems of leader-

⁵³Thomas W. Wolfe, "Political Primacy vs. Professional Elan," Problems of Communism, XIII (May-June, 1964), pp. 44-52.

⁵⁴V. D. Sokolovsky, Military Strategy, second edition (Moscow, 1963), p. 4.

⁵⁵This question is prompted by the assumption that military strategy deals with questions of leadership concerning the armed forces alone, while preparation of the country itself in a military respect is a political matter. Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine (Glencoe, Ill., 1953), pp. 9-23 and 287-299 and V. D. Sokolovsky, Military Strategy, second edition (Moscow, 1963), p. 5.

ship involved in preparing the country itself to repulse aggression.⁵⁶

Attempts to support the military position in its demand for a greater voice in state policy have emphasized the contributions of a professional officer corps. Colonel-General N. A. Lomov in Soviet Military Doctrine, noting the fact that almost 90 per cent of the officer corps consisted of Party or Komsomol members, inferred that the political health of the armed forces need not be doubted and that the armed forces enjoyed a role in the era of revolutionary military technology.

Preparation of the officer corps has an especially important significance . . . for they are the backbone of the armed forces, the creator and bearer of the military art and the teacher of soldiers in the ranks.⁵⁷

The passage expressed the military view that the armed forces as the bastion of professionalism are the forces that need to be recognized in the councils of state. It is another expression of the older issue of professionalism and political interference that assumes new constancy when modern military technology and its resultant specialization appears to affect the potential weight of military opinion vis-a-vis political authorities. Matthew P. Gallagher notes the influence of the politico-military evolution of the second half of this century in that

⁵⁶V. D. Sokolovsky, Military Strategy, second edition (Moscow, 1963), p. 5.

⁵⁷Colonel-General N. A. Lomov, Soviet Military Doctrine (Moscow, 1963), p. 19.

. . . signs of tension between Soviet military and political interests . . . reflect the institutional effects of a functional change that has been taking place in the military's role in Soviet policy. At a time when few major government decisions can be made without regard for military advice or without consideration of military interests, the Soviet officer is no longer acting as a mere executant of policies formulated by others. Whether as an invited advisor or national policy, or an uninvited advocate of military interests, he is mixing to a greater extent than ever before in areas of political processes heretofore regarded as the preserve of political authority.⁵⁸

Under such circumstances conflict is inevitable since the interests of the Defense Ministry and the Kremlin do not necessarily coincide. If one considers the attitudes, values, beliefs, etc. of the two factions, policy evaluations and analyses are not synonymous. More importantly, no faction with the possible avenues of influence as the military possesses would be expected to submit quietly to policies detrimental to its corporate interests. Gallagher further indicates that

. . . the terms of the Soviet military-political relationship are thus shifting in ways which reduce the relevance of the army's subordination to party control. The reality of that control--and its legitimacy--is not in question. . . . But the important issues affecting the military-political relationship lie not today in the area of institutional control but in the shadowy realm of policy formulation where military and political interests overlap. The evidence afforded by the Soviet press over the past three years suggests that the military has not been constrained by the institutional formalities from airing its views and defending its interests.⁵⁹

⁵⁸Matthew P. Gallagher, "Military Manpower: A Case Study," Problems of Communism, XIII (May-June 1964), pp. 53-63.

⁵⁹Ibid.

Such conflict is neither an institutional nor a personal conflict, rather it is a product of the Soviet political system. "Thus while the military's influence on policy is no doubt limited, the extent to which . . . the entire political leadership can ignore military opinion also seems to have its limits."⁶⁰

D. Conflicting Interests and Objectives of the Party-state and Military Organization

Party distrust of persons and institutions is easily conceivable. Distrust of the military is unique in view of its structure, function, values, and inherent characteristics.⁶¹ The characteristics of the Soviet military establishment are not totally dissimilar to those of any other professional military organization despite the particularities of the socio-political system of the USSR.

⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 53-62.

⁶¹The pervasiveness of Party political distrust of the Soviet military establishment is colored by several factors:

(1) Vast physical power--weapons, equipment, men and logistic means are at the command of the armed forces;

(2) Ability for rapid widespread mobilization--integrated organization makes possible a quick response to command;

(3) Sense of solidarity--elitist character breed by training, enhanced by common experiences, and values;

(4) Command--officers trained to command, to demand obedience, and to respond to a chain of command. Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), pp. 21-25.

One finds the contending forces of professionalism with demands for professional autonomy, a professional ethos, and a stable, discernible, hierarchical organization. The conflict between the interests and objectives of the Party and the military establishment are evident in the institutional propensities of one organization as opposed to the desires and goals of the other.

The dilemma of balancing political controls and professional autonomy creates difficult alternatives for the Party. This dichotomy illustrates the contradictory position of the party protagonists of demanding results of the armed forces as if they enjoyed edinonachalie yet denying them such authority. The contradictions and incompatibilities of certain basic characteristics of the two institutions become evident if one compares them.⁶²⁻⁶³

<u>"Natural Military Traits"</u>	<u>"Traits Desired by the Party"</u>
Elitism	Egalitarianism
Professional autonomy	Subordination to ideology
Nationalism	Proletarian internationalism
Detachment from society	Involvement with society
Heroic symbolism	Anonymity

⁶²Ibid., p. 21.

⁶³Ibid.

These "natural" military traits have tended to become readily evident during periods of military assertiveness. The irreconcilability of the demands of Party and military organization is complicated by the official ideology

. . . which clashes with the military's own institutional beliefs. As we look at the relations between Party and military, we see two institutions, with distinct ideologies and conflicting institutional interests, in a state of uneasy coexistence; both striving for exclusiveness, elitism, and detachment from the rest of society; both subscribing to similar formalized codes of beliefs and behavior; both cultivating an almost messianic self-image.⁶⁴

Communist ideology has found it difficult to reconcile the existence of a standing army. Professional armies, to orthodox Marxists, are viewed as the instruments of coercion for the exploiting classes and are unnecessary in a socialist state as a classless society. Several events appeared to alter the ideological position of the major theorists of communism toward the existence of an instrument of force. Not that the positions were clarified, but rather that they tended to become more obscure. The results of the risings of the Paris Commune served to alter the position of Marx and Engels in perceiving the need for a "friendly" force. In the Russian experience, the 1905 risings prompted Lenin to adopt the Clausewitzian position that war is an instrument of policy. In Socialism and War (1915), Lenin wrote:

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 22.

War is the continuation of politics by other (namely violent) means. That well-known quotation belongs to one of the deepest writers on military affairs, Clausewitz. Marxists justly have always considered that this is the theoretical basis of views on the significance of any given war. Marx and Engels always looked at different wars especially from that point of view.⁶⁵

In 1917, Lenin commented on the need to look at war and instruments of war as a means of achieving the ends of socialism:

Socialists cannot, without ceasing to be Socialists, be opposed to all war.⁶⁶

Lenin's position in 1903, on the existence of a standing army expressed the views of an exile who had experienced the power of the professional forces of Czarism:

A standing army is an army divorced from the people . . . a standing army is not in the least necessary to protect the country from an attack of the enemy; a people's militia is sufficient.⁶⁷

The events of the Winter of 1905 showed Lenin the role that a standing army plays in securing the power of a regime

. . . great historical questions can be solved only by violence, and the organization of violence in the modern struggle is a military organization.⁶⁸

⁶⁵Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine (Glencoe, Ill., 1953), pp. 54-55.

⁶⁶V. I. Lenin, "Military Program of Proletarian Revolution," Collected Works (New York, 1942), Vol. 19, p. 362.

⁶⁷V. I. Lenin, "To the Rural Poor," Selected Works (New York, 1943), Vol. 2, p. 281.

⁶⁸V. I. Lenin, "Revolutionary Army and Revolutionary Government," Selected Works (New York, 1943), Vol. 3, p. 313.

Successive Soviet leaders have found it necessary to maintain a doctrinal fallacy in order to support the maintenance of a standing army. Both Lenin and Stalin utilized the device of "capitalist encirclement" to justify the need for armed forces in being. Khrushchev and the present Soviet leadership link the maintenance of high levels of preparedness with the "threat" from the West. Any likelihood that the professional armed services would be reduced to territorial units (much along the lines of Trotsky's original proposal) appears nil. This may be borne out by the reaction of the military to Khrushchev's proposal in 1960 to reduce the level of the armed forces.⁶⁹ Gallagher reports that

. . . an interim resolution of the conflict was registered in Khrushchev's February 27 speech to the Supreme Soviet. In it he announced, in strikingly defensive terms, that the realization of the welfare goals . . . would be deferred due to the implacable demands posed by defense requirements. Khrushchev's capitulation proved to be temporary, but the fact that it occurred at all seemed due . . . to the strength of the internal political forces arrayed against him.⁷⁰

The political leader's concern with the role of the military in the state is genuine. Such apprehensions originate in their uncertainty as to their ability to ". . . exercise constant, effective control over the experts in violence,

⁶⁹Pravda, January 15, 1960. All following translations of original works are by SLA Translations Center, The John Crerar Library, Chicago, Ill.

⁷⁰Matthew P. Gallagher, "Military Manpower: A Case Study," Problems of Communism, XIII (May-June, 1964), pp. 54-62.

with their well-integrated organization, whose institutional objectives frequently diverge from those of the Party."⁷¹

Parallels may be drawn between the military and the Russian Orthodox Church. This is evident in two aspects since the professional officer is strongly motivated by devotion or spiritual values--"duty" more than "calling"--and that the military is the bearer of a correct and realistic vision of life. However, there is yet another striking parallel that may be drawn, the armed forces, like the church, ". . . might admonish the ruler, but it had to submit . . . and support him . . ." whatever the course of governmental action.⁷²

Party ideologues are aware of the idealized image and self-image of military professionals and attempt to deny its existence in a communist system.⁷³ For officials concerned with the problems of morale and discipline and the increasing antimilitary attitudes of Soviet youth, the traditions and virtues of the military are extolled. Major-General N. I. Makeev, editor-in-chief of Red Star, asserted that

⁷¹Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), p. 24.

⁷²John A. Armstrong, Ideology, Politics, and Government in the Soviet Union (New York, 1962), pp. 6-7.

⁷³Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), p. 25.

. . . the concept of military honor has existed since time immemorial: it is as ancient as armies. . . . Even in the old Russian Army there existed good traditions--bravery, selfless dedication and expertise were revered.⁷⁴

In addition to the conflicts of an ideological nature, substantive issues arise to complicate the relations between the Party and the military establishment. Controls are seldom opposed as a tool of indoctrination. However, resistance does arise when political controls interfere with the functioning of the military machine. The Party's divide-and-rule policy heightens tensions by the preferential treatment given to some factions to the exclusion of others.⁷⁵ The historical issue of the contribution of the military arose following Stalin's death. The early version absolves Stalin and the Party of blame in the disastrous events of the opening of Russian participation in World War II.⁷⁶ The military professionals contend that the Party must share at least part of the blame and share some of the success with the armed forces.⁷⁷

⁷⁴Izvestia, February 12, 1963.

⁷⁵An example of this factor may be found in the comparison of the composition of the High Command and the other high echelon military commands under Stalin and his preference for the Stavka marshals and Khrushchev and his preference for the Stalingrad Group.

⁷⁶Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), p. 28.

⁷⁷Following the Cuban fiasco, the Party-military debate reopened over the World War II contributions to the ultimate victory. The open confrontation in the official organs Red Star and Pravda about the 1963 Stalingrad anniversary illustrated the lingering divisions on the historical issue.

The roots of the most recent phase of the hierarchical conflict are bureaucratic and involve problems of financing, jurisdiction, and social cohesiveness. Sidney I. Ploss, commenting on the dispute within the Soviet hierarchy, noted that

. . . the proposals for innovation have raised a challenge to the complacency and prerogatives of senior planning and military executives. The resurgence of these elements, achieved on the coattails of Kozlov in 1960, may be ascribed to fearsome doubts in sections of the party bureaucracy lest hasty concessions to the widespread desire for progress beget disruption and anarchy. The military command in particular has insisted on a larger role for itself in general policy-making and more autonomy in the handling of its professional affairs. This assertiveness of the officer corps seems to account for the . . . [reason to] shift L. I. Brezhnev, a specialist in civil-military relations[,] . . . to full time activity in the Secretariat of the party Central Committee. A drive to pension off overaged retrograders in the military establishment was launched shortly after Brezhnev's concentration on Secretarial work.⁷⁸

The economic "modernists" sought to energize a sluggish economy, transform territorial antagonism into a real sense of national unity, transfer substantially more resources to consumer-serving branches in 1966-1970, and decentralize the top-heavy structure of industrial management and price formulation.⁷⁹ The continuing debate over the investment pattern was related

⁷⁸Sydney I. Ploss, The Soviet Leadership Between Cold War and Détents (Princeton, 1963), p. 3.

⁷⁹Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin: from Khrushchev to Kosygin (New York, 1968), pp. 252-254.

to the matter of arms control making it possible to reallocate resources, since the military budget could be reduced. For the Soviet Union, the crucial importance of problems of resource allocation

. . . deems it the topic for communism since failure to solve it leads to fantastic waste and a serious reduction in the current standard of living. . . . [T]he manner of the solution of the scarcity problem under communism has immense sociological and political consequences.⁸⁰

The distance between economics and politics is, indeed, narrow. With the recovery of the initiative in 1963 from the conservative forces within the political hierarchy, Khrushchev renewed his drive for economic reform. The economists began to express potential reforms in the wake of the Party's lead. V. S. Nemchinov, a specialist in agrarian relations and statistics, presented a proposal that would later be criticized as harmful to standard investment practices.⁸¹ He predicted that the Soviet economy, permeated by quotas, would ". . . sooner or later breakdown (budet slomana) under the pressure of the actual processes of economic life."⁸² This

⁸⁰Sydney I. Ploss, The Soviet Leadership Between Cold War and Detente (Princeton, 1963), p. 5.

⁸¹Kommunist, No. 5, April 4, 1964.

⁸²Ibid.

proposal was totally unacceptable to the heavy and arms industry proponents.⁸³ Economists continued to call for a re-examination of priorities, for example stating

. . . when high rates of developments of Group A [heavy industry] and productive accumulation are attained by retarding the rates of increase of consumer goods production, and thereby reducing material incentives, then too there inevitably commences an artificial hampering of the growth of all social production. . . .⁸⁴

The review of the article in Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta was favorable and was not a display of personal conviction on the part of the author, that rapid growth of light industry was necessary.⁸⁵

The proponents of the traditional economic practices reacted to the innovative school with arguments framed in terms of military and technological expediency.

Certainly, international tension inhibits to some degree the action of the basic economic law of socialism as it compels the lands of socialism to allocate part of their national income to defense requirements. Not by accident, therefore, is it

⁸³These proposed economic reforms directly threatened the priorities that the military establishment considered necessary to secure the defense of the nation. Elements of the proposal contended: that there were too many plan indicators from the central organs; it was necessary to alter the relationship of planning agencies and enterprises; need for local estimates and contract distribution; production and consumption of industrial materials must be balanced; avert stoppage through a price system corresponding to volume indicators of a plan; and a measure of enterprise autonomy in price formulation.

⁸⁴Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, April 16, 1954.

⁸⁵Voprosy Ekonomiki, May 12, 1964.

noted in the CPSU Program that the set program can be fulfilled with success under conditions of peace. Complications in the international situation and the resultant necessity to increase defense expenditures may hold up the fulfillment of the plans for raising the living standard of the people.⁸⁶

Ukrainian Party leader, P. Ia. Shelest, then a candidate member of the Politburo and a graduate of a metallurgical institute, supported the priority of heavy industry.⁸⁷ The importance of the factional dispute is evident by its appearance in the official Party organ, Pravda. The debate throughout the spring and summer of 1964 with rebuttal in the organs of the Academy of Sciences, Voprosy Ekonomiki, indicated the division within the Party-state hierarchy. Ploss observed that the ". . . outstanding fact of these exchanges was that more than two weeks after a Pravda leader had blessed the time-honored investment policy as 'Leninist,' it was challenged."⁸⁸

The reaction of the Defense Ministry to the reforms appeared in an article over the signature of Lt. Colonel S. Bartenev, who extolled the virtues of a command economy and severely criticized economic reformists.

It is obvious that the socialist organization of production enjoys an indisputable advantage over the capitalist. These advantages are manifest in the economy in the successes of our science and

⁸⁶Voprosy Ekonomiki, May 26, 1964.

⁸⁷Pravda, August 23, 1964.

⁸⁸Sydney I. Ploss, The Soviet Leadership Between Cold War and Détente (Princeton, 1963), p. 15.

technology, which solidly hold the lead place in many of the most important branches and insure the Armed Forces with the most perfected types of modern weapons. Also, the indisputable advantage and the great efficiency of the planned system of economy will ultimately be of decisive importance in a missile nuclear war, if the imperialistic aggressors dare to unleash it. An economy subordinated to a single plan, a single will, can more fully and purposefully utilize material and human resources, and ensure the harmonious functioning of all links of the national economic organism. It is the socialist system of production, and not the private capitalist [,] . . . which is riddled with internal conflicts [,] . . . that is able to press to the hilt, and is really capable of supplying the armed forces most rapidly with a maximum of goods.⁸⁹

An interesting aspect that this rejection by a Defense Ministry spokesman is that it tended to undermine the claim in the Party press that the USSR is immunized against the rise of a military-industrial complex.⁹⁰ As additional support for the military position, the Defense Ministry announced that it was republishing Marshal B. M. Shapsohnikov's book Brain of the Army (Mozg Armii).⁹¹ The book advocated coordination of the work of military, diplomatic, and economic officials.⁹²

Predictably, the military, already restive over the partial test ban treaty, was especially unhappy about

⁸⁹Red Star, July 7, 1964.

⁹⁰Sydney I. Ploss, The Soviet Leadership Between Cold War and Detente (Princeton, 1963), p. 18.

⁹¹Pravda, July 10, 1964.

⁹²Sydney I. Ploss, The Soviet Leadership Between Cold War and Detente (Princeton, 1963), p. 18.

Khrushchev's defense budget and his announced desire to reduce the size of the armed forces. The position assumed by the military appeared in the military press in a statement by Marshal Malinovsky claiming that ". . . concerning any urgent problems of military development, the Central Committee and Presidium, make detailed studies and consult leading military cadres [before] a concrete decision is reached."⁹³ William Hyland and Richard Shyrock in commenting on statements in the military press during this period noted that

. . . that military's concept of what might constitute "urgent problems of military development" was considerably broader than many in the party would be likely to wish to admit. The military, for example, did not view the formulation of economic policy as something which belonged solely within the province of the party politicians and the government economists. When Khrushchev sought to divert funds from defense and reallocate them to the chemical industry, or even when he sought to transfer funds from heavy industry (especially the metalurgical industries) for the sake of one or another of his pet programs, the military was understandably concerned. . . . The priority development of metals . . . is the "fundament of all industry."⁹⁴

Sympathy for the heavy industry proponents and the military was expressed by the former chief of military production, D. F. Ustinov.⁹⁵ As head of the Sovnarkoz, Ustinov reiterated the

⁹³Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership 1957-1964 (Baltimore, 1966), pp. 192-193.

⁹⁴William Hyland and Richard W. Shyrock, The Fall of Khrushchev (New York, 1968), p. 111.

⁹⁵Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin: from Khrushchev to Kosygin (New York, 1968), pp. 343-344.

traditional priorities in economic planning. He urged unrelenting development of heavy industry with emphasis on machine building and gave secondary importance to Group B[light industry].⁹⁶

The effects of the proposed Khrushchevian reforms would be to alter at least part of the Leninist norms in order to sanction the change in priorities. In late February Pravda ran a two-part article by the economist Anushavan Arzumanyan that was a proposal for radical economic reform.⁹⁷ Although the outcome of these proposals was an unspectacular failure in gaining official support from all sectors of the Party hierarchy, they appeared to express Khrushchev's feelings in that he

. . . sought to repeal the law of preferential growth for heavy industry. Khrushchev had long sought . . . to do this himself, but had never been able to do so in public. Now it appeared as if the stage had finally been set, and that Khrushchev would make it all official at the next plenum of the Central Committee. Such . . . seemed to be a necessary doctrinal and political precursor to any truly ambitious amendment of the nation's system of allocational priorities. Existing ideology and its advocates seemed to require a direct refutation and a direct rebuke before further progress could be made.⁹⁸

Amidst such discord, on July 24, 1964, the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers met in augmented session under

⁹⁶Pravda, March 31, 1963.

⁹⁷William Hyland and Richard W. Shyrock, The Fall of Khrushchev (New York, 1968), p. 113.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 114.

Khrushchev's chairmanship to examine guidelines of the 1966-1970 economic plan.⁹⁹ Although the proceedings of this body are rarely announced, the directive to planners was to accelerate the light industrial growth. Even more significantly, the press release failed to mention engineering or defense requirements. These disagreements over priorities were confined to intra-Party discussion, but the basic issue was not resolved. Carl Linden noted that:

[T]he plenum's formal approval . . . did not put an end to the vigorous contention between the Khrushchev forces and the defenders of the status quo in economic policy. Two months later Khrushchev explicitly defended his program against criticism within the regime. That criticism was apparently severe enough to cause him to protest against "hidebound" and dogmatic attitudes that saw his economic policy as a retreat from the "general line" of the party.¹⁰⁰

Khrushchev in his speeches on the farm tour in August 1964, appeared to be "taking the issue to the country" by emphasizing the future benefits of the reforms. In seeking popular support, he verbally engaged his opponents and promised to settle with them at a Central Committee plenary session which the Presidium had scheduled for November 1964.¹⁰¹ As events proved, the interim was fateful, since the opposition

⁹⁹Sydney I. Ploss, The Soviet Leadership Between Cold War and Détente (Princeton, 1963), p. 19.

¹⁰⁰Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership 1957-1964 (Baltimore, 1966), p. 188.

¹⁰¹Sydney I. Ploss, The Soviet Leadership Between Cold War and Détente (Princeton, 1963), p. 20.

consolidated its strength to effect a palace coup.

Moves on the domestic front were being dovetailed with major moves in foreign affairs. The easing of tensions on the international scene made the time auspicious for moves in this direction as well as giving substance to the Party Program approved at the Twenty-Second Party Congress, halting disintegration of Soviet influence by formalizing the split with the Chinese.¹⁰² Through these efforts the military establishment could perceive a challenge to its position and its claim to resources.

Marshal A. A. Grechko forecast a dangerous situation arising in international affairs. He saw the necessity for the Warsaw Pact nations to maintain a high state of readiness.

Historical experience and numerous facts of contemporary reality testify that during the solution of controversial world problems the imperialists reckon only with force. As yet they do not recognize any other sort of arguments.¹⁰³

The editorial position of the newspapers in industrial areas vigorously supported the maintenance of industrial priorities and lent support to the marshal's position. In order to counter the civil offensive in seeking détente, the military invoked the specter of threats to the Russian homeland.

¹⁰²Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership 1957-1964 (Baltimore, 1966), p.

¹⁰³Kazakhastanskaya Pravda, February 19, 1964.

On the forty-sixth anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces, Marshal Malinovsky charged the Western allies with plans to attack the USSR.¹⁰⁴ For the same occasion Marshal N. I. Krylov drew attention to the statements of Western leaders on the need for strengthening armed forces.¹⁰⁵ Any diplomatic successes were pointedly ignored especially in the area of arms control.¹⁰⁶ Earlier, Malinovsky had ". . . served notice both that the Soviet military had come to expect a full hearing for its views and that it opposed any unilateral actions by political leaders affecting its interests."¹⁰⁷

Such conflicts as those which periodically occur between the Party and the military establishment are not unusual in

¹⁰⁴Pravda, February 23, 1964.

¹⁰⁵Komsomol'skaya Pravda, February 23, 1964.

¹⁰⁶Seven senior officers frowned on troop cuts in V-E Day statements. Only one mentioned diplomatic successes.

May 9, 1964--Pravda--Malinovsky
Izvestia--Grechko
Sovetskaya Rossiya--Zahkarov
Sovetskaya Litva--Bagramyan
Turkmenskaya Iskra--Sokolovsky
Zarya Vostoka--Stuchenko
Krasnaya Zvezda--Biriuzov

¹⁰⁷"Before deciding on any problem and adopting a practical decision on it, members of the Party Central Committee and members of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium, make a detailed study of the state of affairs in the army and navy, of the urgent problems in consolidating the country's defense capacity, of urgent problems of military development, and consult leading cadres. After this a concrete decision is reached."
Pravda, April 17, 1964.

view of institutional propensities. Conflicts within and among groups within the Soviet system have risen to the surface. Methods of monolithic politics still color the scenario in which these conflicts are played out. Expressed opinions and attitudes of the range of Soviet expertise may have far reaching affects upon the Soviet system. Against these developments must be balanced the natural and powerful inclination of the Party apparatchiki to attempt to prevent pluralistic tendencies from propelling institutional elements toward acquiring autonomous force within the system. Successive leaders of the Soviet Union cannot escape such trends. Not only must the leaders contend with elements within the Party, but also with the demands of a changing Soviet society. One must recognize the powerful magnetism of traditional methods used to govern the Russian state. Although Stalinism is modified, the precedents of that period remain. The question of creative leadership is the point upon which the future of internal conflicts rest. The presence or absence of that unknown quality holds the critical key to the viability of Party rule in the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER III

THE DYNAMICS OF PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS

A. Political Reliability and Professionalism

The dynamics of Party-military relations turn about several points of contention: the extent of professional freedom, the historical role of the armed forces in the Soviet state, and the degree of institutional autonomy. One can ascertain two principal issues of analysis of Soviet civil-military relations. First, there is the Party's effort to impose rigid political controls at all levels of the military hierarchy and to counteract both active and passive military resistance. Such efforts reflect the deeply rooted source of mistrust and antagonism toward the military's potential power in internal affairs. This fear of elitism has manifested itself in persistent attempts to politicize and control the officer corps. As a closed institution the officer corps represents a challenge to absolute state power. In an effort to break down the protective walls that the military seeks to erect, the Party divides and subdivides authority horizontally, vertically, and diagonally, hoping to prevent the coalescence of power and authority at focal

points; and it gathers the commanders together in collective bodies in which they are open to scrutiny and criticism.¹

Secondly, the military opposes measures imposed by the Party in the area of strategy and doctrine as detrimental to the proficiency of the armed forces and the security of the nation. The military has sought to obtain a more definitive role in high-level planning and formulation of strategic doctrine and military policy; however, the Party leadership has made such decisions and appears unlikely to concede such authority. The military is haunted by two fears in dealing with doctrine and strategy: an overt fear of harm to national interests if decisions are made by civilians and a covert fear of invasion of this traditional area of military authority and prerogative. Although military autonomy and Party hegemony are not mutually exclusive ends, the Party apparently sees them as such, ". . . as in zero-sum games, where any advantage of one adversary is at the expense of the other adversary, so the Party elite regards any increment in the military's prerogatives and authority as its own loss and therefore a challenge."²

The military establishment has a de facto power of coercion beyond the scope of any other state or Party apparatus. The Party, therefore, seeks to see it remain a

¹Roman Kolkowicz, The Communist Party and the Soviet Military (Princeton, 1967), p. 104.

²Ibid., p. 105.

malleable instrument of political authority. The built-in tensions and controversies arise from the Party's attempt to integrate the armed forces into the state structure preventing (nominally) any separate identity. The military establishment cannot directly challenge the Party in basic policy-making realms. Rather, it indirectly seeks a greater degree of independence in matters that are considered as being within its professional competence. Excessive Party intrusion into exclusively military matters is viewed as being destructive of military effectiveness. Such factors are not unique in the history of Soviet civil-military relations. The search for reconciliation of political control with professional efficiency rests upon the basic issue of the extent of military influence on formulation of Soviet policy and strategy.

The Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962, had a far-reaching effect on the relations between Party and military. Although much remains vague about this period, the substance of their dialogue after the crisis indicates that certain military circles opposed Premier N. S. Khrushchev's handling of the affair.³ Political controls were intensified and General A. A. Epishev was conspicuous on a number of occasions

³Ibid., p. 210.

when the military was rebuked.⁴ The continued existence of this civil-military conflict and the additional question raised by the advent of the missile age, indicated that a solution to the problem of the tolerated degree of professionalism was still absent.

A noticeable trend toward reassertion of political primacy became evident in the fall of 1962 on the heels of the Cuban missile crisis, at a time when critical second thoughts about the handling of the crisis presumably were circulating among the Soviet hierarchy.⁵ Not only was the reassertion of political primacy a reaction to military criticism of Party actions during the crisis, but also, it was symptomatic of the presence of deeper disagreements over strategy and doctrine and a counter trend of professionalism and de-emphasis of ideology. One of Khrushchev's adherents,

⁴Ibid., pp. 169-171. A speech that Epishev delivered at an unpublicized meeting of MPA functionaries emphasized the unquestionability of Party control of the military and served to warn the armed forces: "We think it is a very important task to explain to the military cadres the essence of edinsonachalie in the Soviet Armed Forces. . . . It is absolutely necessary that all officers, generals, and admirals clearly understand that the indispensable condition for achieving edinsonachalie and for successful mastering of the tasks of regiments, ships, and divisions, is the constant support given to the commanders by Party and Komsomol organizations, the ability to direct their activities. . . ." Communist of the Armed Forces, No. 19, October 1962. "Firmly Carry out the Party's Policy in the Armed Forces."

⁵Thomas W. Wolfe, Signs of Stress in Soviet Political-Military Relations (Santa Monica, California, April, 1964), p. 3.

Marshal V. I. Chuikov, sounded the Party line in an article in Red Star where he reaffirmed the dominant role of the Party in military affairs, criticized unnamed officers for failing to maintain proper attitudes and opinions.⁶ The interesting feature of the article was that the delivery of this "message" by a high ranking military leader avoided any open confrontation between the Party and the military.⁷

Thomas Wolfe indicates further significance of a military leader lecturing his colleagues in that

. . . while impetus for the campaign may have come from political authorities, there is also a possibility that the military leadership may have embarked to some extent upon a process of self-catharsis in order to ward off stronger measures of the sort that Khrushchev felt obliged to administer in the Zhukov case in 1957.⁸

In the public monologue, Marshal R. Ia. Malinovsky lent his support and prestige to the Party position. A pamphlet over Malinovsky's name appeared in November of 1962 asserting complete domination of the Party generally and N. S. Khrushchev personally in military affairs and doctrine, ". . . military doctrine is developed and determined by the

⁶Red Star, November 17, 1962.

⁷Thomas W. Wolfe, "Political Primacy versus Professional Elan," Problems of Communism, XIII (May-June, 1964), 44-52.

⁸Thomas W. Wolfe, Signs of Stress in Soviet Political-Military Relations (Santa Monica, California, April, 1964), p. 4.

political leadership of the state."⁹ Malinovsky, ostensibly, was writing under his own name to avoid Party criticism of the military. However, it is not inconceivable that the Party leadership (Khrushchev) may have chosen the Defense Minister to author the pamphlet asserting Party dominance.

The campaign to reassert the Party role in state affairs gained in intensity in 1963 on two fronts. Head of the MPA, Army General A. A. Epishev published an article emphasizing the role of the Party in formulation of doctrine and policy and assuring national security.¹⁰ Several reviews of Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky's book, Military Strategy, intimated a reaffirmation of Party supremacy. In revising earlier reviews of the book, the reviewers cited the work for failing to follow the Leninist injunction to "subordinate the military point of view to the political" and that the book had "broadened the scope of military doctrine at the expense of politics" and had "exaggerated military prerogatives in strategy formulation."¹¹

Other publications also raised the issue of Party supremacy in formulation of doctrine and where competence lay. There is little doubt that the Party had issued new guidelines

⁹Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 93.

¹⁰A. A. Epishev, Voprosy Istorii KPSS, 1963.

¹¹Thomas W. Wolfe, "Political Primacy versus Professional Elan," Problems of Communism, XIII (May-June, 1964), 44-52.

and that military writers found it expedient to conform. In May 1963, a conference on Soviet military doctrine reached the conclusion that "military doctrine is developed and determined by the political leadership of the state."¹² That a new mood was evident is illustrated by the appearance of a revision of an article by Colonel-General N. A. Lomov advocating a primary role for the military in policy formulation. However, the assertion was missing in the republication a year later.

May 1962:

The formulation of our military world-view has taken place in a creative atmosphere. . . . And is the result of the common efforts of military theorists and practical military people. Thanks to this we have developed a body of unified, theoretical views, on the basis of which has been carried out a broad state program to prepare the country and the armed forces for the defense of the Fatherland.¹³

May 1963:

The foundations of military doctrine are determined by the country's political leadership, for it alone has the competence and the jurisdiction to solve the problems of developing the armed forces.¹⁴

The organ of the MPA, Communist of the Armed Forces, was particularly emphatic in asserting that the Party is both the

¹²Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 95.

¹³N. A. Lomov, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 10, May, 1962.

¹⁴Ibid.

creator and leader of the armed forces.¹⁵

The civil-military conflict assumed new posture when the official press appeared to be disturbed by Western interpretations of the first edition of Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky's book as an indication of conflicting views of political and military leaders. The Glagolev-Larinov article in the November issue of International Affairs noted

. . . that Western writers had sought to use the Sokolovskii work as evidence of "glaring" contradictions between Soviet foreign policy and military thinking. Four of the Sokolovskii authors conceded that the work had been a forum for "theoretical discussion" of varying viewpoints, but vehemently denied that this betokened any conflict of views over military doctrine, strategy, or defense appropriations.¹⁶

The second edition of the book appeared within fifteen months of the first. Apparently, the editors felt that the book needed to be brought more into line with the emphasis on Party primacy. In reality the Sokolovsky authors made only minor revisions in particular passages, not altering the basic import of the work. Rather grudgingly conceding points to the Party editors, the authors removed or altered sentences

¹⁵Articles by Colonels S. Baranov and E. Nikitin were notable in this period as underscoring the Party position by a quote from Lenin. "The policy of the military establishment like that of all other establishments and institutions is conducted on the exact basis of general directions issued by the Party Central Committee, and under its control." Communist of the Armed Forces, No. 8, April 8, 1963.

¹⁶Thomas W. Wolfe, Signs of Stress in Soviet Political-Military Relations (Santa Monica, California, April, 1964), p. 9.

that tended to slight the Party's policy-making role and particularly those passages that could be construed to refer to Premier Khrushchev.¹⁷

Military doctrine is not thought out or compiled by a single person or group of persons.¹⁸

In the revised edition the authors substituted a more acceptable statement.

The basic positions of military doctrine are determined by the political leadership of the state.¹⁹

Where the discussion concerned the relationship of strategy to policy, the first edition cited Engels to the effect that policy must not violate laws of military strategy in wartime.

In wartime, therefore, strategic considerations often determine policy.²⁰

The second edition inserted the allusion that Engels did not intend to emphasize the exclusivity of strategy and politics.

In wartime, strategic considerations often reflect and in turn influence policy.²¹

The Sokolovsky authors appeared to make concessions to criticism that they had "failed to subordinate the military point of view to the political" but, retained in the new

¹⁷Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 97.

¹⁸V. D. Sokolovsky, Military Strategy, first edition (Moscow, 1962), 130.

¹⁹Ibid., second edition, p. 54.

²⁰Ibid., first edition, p. 104.

²¹Ibid., second edition, p. 30. The discussion in the military press appeared under the title, "The Main Rocket Strength of the Country," Red Star, November 19, 1963.

edition a sentence stating unequivocally that

[C]ases even arise where the military factor not only predominates but even acquires decisive significance."²²

The old issue of military professionalism and political indoctrination has assumed new currency. The primary cause of friction in civil-military relations has been the inability of the Party to reconcile two objectives--provision of military capability and that the armed forces should be a "school for communism."²³ The fate of Marshal Zhukov was held before the military in the reassertion of Party primacy as, perhaps, an example, citing the fact that he ". . . followed a line of ignoring and doing away with Party-government control of the armed forces," and ". . . sought to tear the army away from the Party and the people."²⁴

²²Thomas W. Wolfe, Signs of Stress in Soviet Political-Military Relations (Santa Monica, California, April, 1964), p. 11. Sokolovsky, second edition, p. 30.

²³The first objective was Marshal Zhukov's principle goal and was among the charges levelled against him--"underestimated" and tried to "liquidate" on doctriation and activities of political workers in the armed forces. Pravda (editorial), November 3, 1957 and Red Star, November 5, 1957. The concept of the armed forces as a "school for communism" has been treated by N. M. Kiriaev, "The Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU on Strengthening the Armed Forces and Defense Capability of the Soviet Union," Problems of the History of the CPSU, No. 1, January 1962, p. 74.

²⁴Thomas W. Wolfe, Signs of Stress in Soviet Political-Military Relations (Santa Monica, California, April, 1964), p. 13. Originally published in Communist of the Armed Forces, No. 8, April 1963, p. 13.

At a military conference in 1963, Marshal Malinovsky warned the military cadres to avoid thinking too exclusively in professional military terms and to develop political skill. Clearly, this was an effort to avoid the mistakes that led to the fall of Marshal Zhukov.

His admonition came in the wake of a year-long dialogue in which one side argued in effect against spending too much time on propaganda activities in the armed forces when the increasing complexity of the new military technology demanded more time for intensive training while the other side bore down on the tendency of high-ranking officers to give superficial attention to ideological and Party matters and to set a poor example.²⁵

The ideological "health" of the officer corps appeared to be of concern to the Party as evidenced by the series of meetings held in 1962-1963 to examine this question. However, as a prelude to these events the MPA underwent a change in leadership that placed a more pliant figure, a figure more closely associated with the Party and particularly the secret police, as its head. The significance of Marshal F. I. Golikov's removal lay in the renewed emphasis on "military public opinion" which appeared to be the Party's effort to transfer disciplinary powers in practice to Party and Komsomol organizations while in theory leaving it in the hands of the military commander. This effort was a threat to

²⁵Thomas W. Wolfe, "Political Primacy versus Professional Elan," Problems of Communism, XIII (May-June, 1964), pp. 44-52. The two positions of the dialogue may be seen in the official press: General I. Pliev, "The New Technology and Problems of Strengthening Discipline," Communist of the Armed Forces, No. 19, October, 1962.

the principle of edinonachalie, Marshal Golikov (as the military voice in the Central Committee) and other senior military leaders see success of Soviet arms as being based on this principle.²⁶

The removal of Marshal Golikov and his replacement by General Epishev, whose background (see note 32) suggests that his appointment was based on political loyalties rather than allegiance to the professional military establishment, registered the Party's concern. The course of the conflict does not appear to have been over military doctrine, but rather, over the application to the armed forces of the Party campaign to produce the "new man of Communist society" and to inculcate the principles of the new Communist moral code proclaimed at the Twenty-second Party Congress.²⁷ Publications in the military press indicated that the campaign concentrated on the following specific items:

²⁶Edinonachalie or "full authority" refers to the desire on the part of the Soviet officer to enjoy full command functions without having to be responsible to his political deputy in all matters that concern the unit. It is a desire to see the unity and practice of such command function.

²⁷Red Star, November 18, 1962 and December 8, 1962. Major-General D. Reshetov, "The Highest Level of Marxist-Leninist Training of Officers," No. 20, October 1962. Nikolai Galay, "The Significance of Golikov's Removal," Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, IX, No. 8 (August 1962), pp. 34-40.

1. The reduction of the armed forces with a view to removing "capitalist survivals" and promoting the execution of the directives of the Twenty-second Party Congress;
2. the need to instill a spirit of self-discipline in the armed forces instead of the discipline produced by merely improving orders or inflicting punishments;
3. the role of the Party and Komsomol committees or to use the official phrase, "of military public opinion" in running and re-educating the armed services; and,
4. the criticism and public condemnation, by means of definite examples, of serious offense among all ranks except general officers.²⁸

The extension of the power of the Party and Komsomol committees at the expense of edinonachalie follows from the Twenty-second Party Congress directives. The nominal retention of the principle in theory and its reduction in practice in areas of operations, recruitment, and administration has the effect of vesting authority in the unit commander AND his political deputy and two elected secretaries (Party and Komsomol representatives). The innovative features of the campaign center about the intensified criticism of officers up to the highest ranks and the demand that the "educators themselves be re-educated."²⁹ Malinovsky issued a statement that appeared to have been written upon Party directive.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid.

The principal element in educational work and the guarantee of its success is the education of the leaders, of the educators themselves. They must daily learn how to handle people and never forget criticism/self-criticism or self-education, since without that they have no moral right to occupy high positions. . . .

Our Party has for the first time formulated in its program a moral code for builders of Communism. It is the marshals, generals, admirals and [other] officers who are called upon to set an example in the fulfillment of its precepts. . . .³⁰

Apparently, upon additional instructions from the Party, Malinovsky commented further on the subject of the Party campaign to increase its authority in the armed services.³¹ He emphasized the need for creation of "conscious" discipline and that all ranks were in need of constant education.³² He further complained of a decline in morale and discipline citing cases of high-ranking officers "squandering state property, drunkenness [,] and misappropriation."³³

. . . it may be deduced that the reform launched in 1960 and designed to inculcate a new form of discipline in the armed forces and to increase the ideological influences of the Party has not yet met with success, having merely undermined the previous system. Golikov as the man responsible for morale and discipline, was bound to put up resistance to this policy, advocating a return to the principle of edinonachalie and the earlier form of discipline based on the disciplinary powers of the military commander. This protest cost him his post, and his removal is no less important than

³⁰Red Star, May 24, 1962.

³¹Communist of the Armed Forces, No. 11, 1962.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

the fall of Zhukov in 1957, which was followed by a tightening of the Party's grip on the armed forces. . . .³⁴

Following Epishev's assumption of the duties of office, the expected direction of MPA policy had the effect of tightening the Party's control at all levels of the armed forces. Epishev urged the political organs to "inquire deeply into the activities of generals, admirals, and officers and to evaluate their professional and political-morale qualities on the basis of their activities."³⁵ These warnings were not totally effective as complaints of high-ranking officers still found their way into the military press criticizing undue interference in military responsibilities and in private lives.³⁶ Malinovsky's statement in late 1963 to the effect that military professionalism should not eclipse political indoctrination indicated that the conflict remained unsolved. The conflict apparently continued unabated into the next year as evidenced by exhortations to improve Party indoctrination activities and to make better use of the

³⁴Nikolai Galay, "The Significance of Golikov's Removal," Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, IX, No. 8 (August, 1962), pp. 34-40.

³⁵Red Star, December 1, 1962.

³⁶Red Star, January 8, 1963. Additional professional military criticism appeared under the authorship of Col-General Getman and Lt. Colonel Baranov on March 29, 1963, and March 20, 1963, respectively.

military press for such purposes.³⁷ Malinovsky again issued a conciliatory statement in an attempt to silence the dialogue. The pertinent message in this article, essentially, noted the need for unity of theory and practice and a criticism of both professional military and political personnel.³⁸

Wolfe indicates that in addition to the usual bases of conflict between the professional military and the Party, a new facet in the political-military conflict should be observed.³⁹ This development relates to the rise of the generation of well-trained technically oriented officers associated with the strategic rocket forces.

Evidently, an unusual amount of tension has arisen between those officers, who urge release from political activities to devote more time to their complex military tasks, and the Party apparatus in the armed forces. This is suggested by the fact that Party workers' complaints have tended to

³⁷Red Star, January 23, 1964.

³⁸Red Star, March 3, 1964. The author attempts to reconcile the two elements by intimating that commanders and military personnel should seek aid from Party workers in noting deficiencies in training and that political officers should acquaint themselves better with modern military technology.

³⁹Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 100.

single out the "military technologists" along with some "staff officers" as the source of "obstructionism," and resistance to Party activities in the military forces.⁴⁰

An attempt to mediate this internal crisis was reported to have been made during a meeting of senior political and professional officers.⁴¹ The importance of the meeting was evident by the presence of both Malinovsky and Epishev as well as N. R. Mironov, chief of the Central Committee section for administrative organs and an old associate of Epishev in the MGB.⁴² The seeming result was indicated in an article by Epishev that appeared shortly after the conference in which he advocated the faster advancement of younger officers with technical backgrounds, advised pensioning of aged, infirm, and incompetent officers, and that military councils intensify surveillance of indulgent personnel departments.⁴³

B. Factors of Military Influence

Despite factionalism, differences of opinion on questions of strategy, and professional jealousies, the post-

⁴⁰Ibid. The "military specialists" are officers with engineering backgrounds who are concentrated in the strategic missile forces. Marshal N. Krylov, then commander-in-chief of the strategic rocket forces, estimated the proportion to be in excess of 70 per cent. Marshal N. Krylov, "In the Interest of the Highest Military Preparedness," Red Star, January 11, 1964.

⁴¹Red Star, August 8, 1964.

⁴²Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), pp. 169 and 360.

⁴³Red Star, August 19, 1964.

Stalin High Command has been relatively free from extensive purges. Even such events as the removal of Marshal G. K. Zhukov, the Cuban missile crisis, and the 1967 war in the Middle East have failed to produce wholesale changes in the high command. The removal of Khrushchev did not produce the downfall of the Stalingrad Group. Perhaps, one factor in the seemingly slow rate of change in the High Command could be the painful memories of the Stalinist purges. For the most part, the current ranking officers witnessed the destruction of their compatriots. This factor, in addition to wartime comradeship, tends to effect a bond among members of the High Command. The Party is well aware of the possible effects of extensive purging from within and without as a threat to military corporate self-interest.

The central question is: Has this corporate unity, essential to any military establishment, proven desirable for the Soviet Armed Forces? World War II commanders occupy top Defense Ministry posts.⁴⁴ As a group they tend to be conservatively oriented and, without technical training, tend to impede development.⁴⁵ By comparison with the West (early 1960's) where World War II regimental commanders were holding top

⁴⁴Michael Parish, "The Soviet High Command," Military Review, XLI (February, 1969), pp. 22-27.

⁴⁵Roman Kolkowicz, The Impact of Modern Technology on the Soviet Officer Corps (Santa Monica, California, June 1966), pp. 1-7.

positions, the command of the Soviet Army remained almost totally in the hands of officers who were senior generals and army commanders during the Second World War.⁴⁶ Rejuvenation of a kind was forced upon the Soviet military in the early 1960's as an effort to effectively incorporate modern weapons systems into the armed services. Generally speaking, Khrushchev was not able to make any appreciable sally into the upper reaches of the High Command; in fact, the program lagged during his latter years, only to resume after his political demise. Indeed, the closing of the officer ranks was part of the show of displeasure and discontent directed at him.⁴⁷ Despite the recent promotions and retirements, the average age of the forty-five officers comprising the Soviet High Command has declined only slightly.⁴⁸

The death of Marshal R. Ia. Malinovsky and his replacement by Marshal A. A. Grechko came as no real surprise, in the sense that the Defense Ministry remained in military hands despite rumors that a civilian official was being considered for the post. The noteworthy feature that

⁴⁶Michael Parish, "The Soviet High Command," Military Review, XLIX (February, 1969), p. 23.

⁴⁷John Erickson, "Rejuvenating the Soviet High Command," Military Review, L (July, 1970), p. 86.

⁴⁸Michael Parish, "The Soviet High Command," Military Review, XLIX (February, 1969), p. 23.

accompanied this event was the promotion of younger officers to the higher echelons of command. John Erickson notes that "Grechko's choice as Defense Minister was a compromise, or at least part of a compromise."⁴⁹ There had been strong arguments for greater military weight in strategic planning and control functions as well as efforts of the body of younger officers to gain concessions from the hierarchy in the area of modern military requirements.⁵⁰ Grechko's appointment was confirmed at the April 1967 meeting of the full Central Committee with the full Supreme Military Council present. The World War II leadership continued to hold high posts and the younger faction did not secure the commanding heights. However, since 1967 promotions have been divided evenly between the two factions.⁵¹

Indications are that a gradual phase-out of the aging commanders in all branches of the Soviet armed services is occurring. The new officers assuming the positions are products of Soviet society. Perhaps, the most distinguishable factor separating the two groups is the fact that their experiences both during the purges and war years have been markedly different. The unknown quantity is whether or not

⁴⁹John Erickson, "Rejuvenating the Soviet High Command," Military Review, L (July, 1970), p. 90.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 90.

⁵¹Michael Parish, "The Soviet High Command," Military Review, XLIX (February, 1969), pp. 23-26.

they will prove to be more adventurous or restless on such issues as Soviet global strategy and Party-military relations. Erickson summarizes the effects of the change in the Soviet High Command as follows:

Essentially, the real issue hangs on the whole "aging" trend within the party and administrative cadres. It seems a plausible explanation that the present leadership prefers a comparable age group in its senior military men, and is prepared to run the gamut of the generation gap to get it. From the point of view of continuity and a certain stability in party-military relations, there is some logic in that position.⁵²

The collateral issue that accompanies the question of political primacy is one of proper limits of military influence in the areas of strategy and national security policy. Despite the appearance of cooperation with the Party apparatus, the military resists any attempt to narrow the range of its authority. There are several levels at which the armed forces may attempt to exert influence on the state policy-makers. The first is Party-state policy formulation.⁵³ The second is the development and management of the military establishment itself.⁵⁴ The third is internal Soviet politics.⁵⁵

⁵²John Erickson, "Rejuvenating the Soviet High Command," Military Review, L (July, 1970), p. 94.

⁵³Thomas W. Wolfe, The Soviet Military: Institutional and Defense Policy Considerations (Santa Monica, California, June, 1966), p. 9.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Ibid.

The direct formal influence of the military in Party-state policy formulation has traditionally been slight, even concerning national defense arrangements. There appears little disposition, judging by past example, of the Soviet military to challenge the dominant role of the political leadership. Neither the case of Tukhachevsky in the 1930's nor Zhukov in the 1950's constitute an exception.⁵⁶ Basic policy questions, such as natural resources and the use of military power, are determined by the civil authority. Rather than active political participation in policy-making, the military role seems to be confined to professional advice and in assisting in achievement of integration of military strategy and doctrine and state policy. As Wolfe correctly observes, "Whatever the indirect influence of the military may have been from time to time, the absence of military figures at the summit of the Soviet policy-making structure--except for Zhukov's short lived tenure on the Party Presidium--attests to the formal primacy of the political leadership at this level."⁵⁷

Although the military does have a voice in the Central Committee, this representation does not exceed 10 per cent of the total membership. The body in which the armed services

⁵⁶Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 100.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 101.

do have a voice is the Higher Military Council (Vysshi
Voennyi Sovet).⁵⁸ This council contains elements of military,
political, and civilian authority that could be a forum for
not only recommendations to Party policy-makers, but also a
top level source of policy decisions.

Military-technical considerations relate to the develop-
ment and management of the military establishment itself and
the armed forces have enjoyed considerable autonomy over the
past several years. Since 1955, the Minister of Defense has
been a professional soldier and the ministry is staffed by
professional military personnel rather than civil function-
aries. However, the military has not been able to assert
total authority in the professional realm. Statements of
general policy and determination of mission are, and have
been, ascertained by the political leadership whose authority
is guarded by the political and secret police controls which
permeate the military establishment.

The tendency of the armed forces is to seek greater
professional and institutional freedom from Party-political

⁵⁸Military Councils have been maintained at various
levels of command since 1938. The elements of military,
political, and civilian authority maintain uneasy balance.
The institution deeply undermines the authority of the
commander, since it is responsible mainly to the Central
Committee and answers to the Ministry of Defense in an
operational context. Local Party organizations, whose
secretaries normally participate in the activities of the
military Party organizations, introduce an external pro-
fessionally uncommitted control element into the military
community. Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the
Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), p. 123.

controls. The military professionals have sought to establish their prerogatives in formulation of strategy and doctrine, thus covertly challenging Party supremacy. The Party, in turn, has recognized such challenges and has answered with a tightening of the political reins (1958, 1962). Wolfe indicates that the:

. . . principle of Party primacy in military affairs remains formally inviolate. According to the theoretical model, the Party sets policy and the military, as managers and technicians, carry it out. In practice, the situation is by no means this simple. Problems arise from the fact that military doctrine and strategy, as well as military power itself, must be articulated with Soviet political strategy. The task of manipulating military power and doctrine for political ends, as well as that of studying war as a socio-political phenomenon, falls--so to speak--under one jurisdiction, while the task of developing military theory and preparing the armed forces for the conduct of war falls under another. The split jurisdiction, roughly separating political strategists from military professionals, is marked off by a somewhat indistinct boundary.⁵⁹

Essentially, what one sees is the recurring problem of maintaining political control in the armed forces without hampering professional effectiveness. As has been the case throughout the history of Soviet civil-military relations, no permanent solution has been found.

As a force in internal politics, the Soviet military establishment, like the Imperial institution, has never

⁵⁹Thomas W. Wolfe, The Soviet Military Scene: Institutional and Defense Policy Considerations (Santa Monica, California, June, 1966), p. 15.

really desired to exercise formal political power. However, despite the apolitical attitude, the armed forces have tended to become a potential political force of some consequence, especially in the post-Stalin period. The various periods of disunity and maneuvering of the political leadership during succession crises cast the military in the role of balancer. At the time of Beria's arrest and execution in 1953 and again in Khrushchev's struggle with the "anti-Party" in mid-1957, one internal political faction apparently sought military support against another with the marshal's intervention having proven important.⁶⁰ Though the actual details of these maneuvers are unknown, the downfall of Marshal Zhukov and the subsequent decline in military influence appeared to indicate that the political leadership feared the possibility that the military might play the balancer in a coalition against them. Judging from successive crises, the pattern of military involvement has been established: military support is sought by contending coalitions during succession crises and when the ruling faction is challenged by another.

Such ability to influence leadership selection may ultimately tend to increase military authority in matters of state policy and strategy. This process can be viewed as an encroachment on the realm of civil authority. To be sure

⁶⁰Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 102.

the attacks are not direct, but indirectly the military is attempting to exert a voice in matters of state policy, traditionally the sole preserve of the Party-state leadership. The direction of such efforts has been, first, in seeking greater influence in the formulation of doctrine and strategy, both of which bear on state policy. Doctrine being the most important, since it is a fundamental expression of official state policy. On the other hand, strategy is the more provisional, since it is subject to the approval and needs of the state leadership.⁶¹ This concept is important since the more broadly accepted the scope of doctrine and strategy, the greater the voice of the military establishment in influencing state policy. This is a partial explanation of the jurisdictional aspect of Soviet civil-military conflict for "unless the Party has sensed an implicit challenge from this direction, it is difficult to account for the concerted effort to re-establish a point that has generally been taken for granted--namely, that primary responsibility in the formulation of military doctrine and strategy belongs to the political leadership."⁶¹

⁶¹An authoritative definition of doctrine and strategy may be found in the following sources: Colonel-General N. A. Lomov, "Basic Tenets of Soviet Military Doctrine," Red Star, January 10, 1964; Major-General S. Krylov, "Military Doctrine and Military Science," Communist of the Armed Forces, No. 5, March, 1964.

⁶²Thomas W. Wolfe, Signs of Stress in Soviet Political-Military Relations (Santa Monica, California, April, 1964), p. 17.

The second direction of the indirect efforts to attain a more effective voice in state policy has been the subtle assertion that the military-technological revolution has placed higher value on professional military expertise, and therefore has increased the contribution that the professional officer is qualified to make to the complex task of national defense. This line of argument is clouded by the collateral debate between the modernist-traditionalist factions within the defense establishment.⁶³ The influx of the homo technicus has had an influence on the values, processes, and status structure of the military community. Such officers tend to depreciate the traditional military values held by the older officers who view technical expertise as detrimental to combat effectiveness, since it tends to place the human element in lesser light.⁶⁴ As Chief Marshal of Armor, P. A. Rotmistrov warns:

Disproportionate stress on theoretical training may lead to the separation of officers from life, may transform them into scholastics (skholasty) who do not understand life at all but are capable only of citing the book. Such officers may become dogmatic and superficial.⁶⁵

As might be expected the emergence of a large number of technical experts has increased the problem of control for

⁶³Ibid., p. 17.

⁶⁴Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), pp. 315-318.

⁶⁵Red Star, January 30, 1963.

the military political organs. In their indoctrination and educational activities they must not interfere with the duties of the technical officer and as such curb attempts to control this segment of the officer corps. The privileged position of the technical officer is an open challenge to some of the Party's basic practices in the armed forces. With their resistance to Party-political activities, a new and possibly serious facet in Party-military relations has arisen. The factor that tends to bind the factions into a united front to an external threat is the bond of the military profession. Despite this factionalism, the military leaders as a group seek leverage upon policy by claiming to perform unique functions beyond the capacity of the political leadership.⁶⁶

Since the latter part of 1962, the Party has reasserted its claim to the absolute role in the Soviet state. In the face of this campaign and the Khrushchevian succession, the military has sought to keep the issue alive. The revised Sokolovsky edition carried the image that for the Soviet military elite, as an entity, no amount of polemics on political supremacy and the "new Communist man" should obscure. No significant changes occurred in the total effect of the work, including an expression of the role and qualities of the Soviet High Command pointing to the fact

⁶⁶Thomas W. Wolfe, Signs of Stress in Soviet Political-Military Relations (Santa Monica, California, April, 1964), p. 18.

that "history affords no example of an army led by inexperienced military leaders successfully waging war against an army led by experienced military leaders."⁶⁷

The policies and other issues that caused conflicts between the military on one hand, and between Malenkov and Khrushchev on the other, are central to the understanding of the military establishment's institutional interests and the nature of the recurrent dissention between the civilian decision-makers in the Party and the professional officers.⁶⁸ Such conflicts have their origins in the allocation of resources and social functions. The political leadership is faced with the dilemma of balancing the demands of the various institutions in order to effect a reconciliation of external, internal, and ideological priorities. If amicable acquiescence cannot be achieved, then the losing faction must be soothed or coerced. Balancing such institutional demands during periods of internal Party unity is possible. However, during periods of a leadership struggle when one faction seeks assistance from outside the civil structure, such balancing is not possible. Then serious internal crisis disrupts the control system, extra institutions rise to political pre-eminence, coloring the outcome of the crisis. Kolkowicz observes that

⁶⁷Sokolovsky, Second Edition, p. 496.

⁶⁸Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), p. 106.

While it might appear as though in the Soviet Union plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose: there can be little doubt that military leaders have gained some important insights from this recurrent pattern. The chief lesson they owe to the cumulative effects of political changes followed by periods of military assertiveness is that it is safer and more profitable for the military professionals to remain politically aloof, with primary loyalty to their own institution than to serve the ephemeral idols of the Party.⁶⁹

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 219.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

An analysis of future civil-military relations in the USSR is dependent upon the state of the developing political leadership and the evolution of the Soviet system and the Soviet state. The long-term trend appears to gravitate toward a growth of professional interests, a prospect which seems stronger than the eventuality of a successful renaissance of revolutionary élan. Michel Tatu judges the future of the Soviet Union in terms of her leaders.

The sclerosis and mediocrity of the political leadership are acknowledged just about everywhere. They were already evident at the time of Khrushchev's fall and even a few years before then, but the period that has gone by since 1966 has confirmed them in the most varied fields. Ideology, for want of being renewed or of being capable of renewal, is now quite dead, but its corpse, which remains the regime's sole formal claim to legitimacy, cannot be thrown out. On the political plane, action can only be conservative, defensive, addressed to immediate problems; long-term perspectives and grand impulses no longer have any place there.¹

Granted, this characterization may be harsh, however, the basic premise that the current leadership represents a

¹Wolfgang Leonhard, Malcolm Mackintosh, Michel Tatu, and Adam Ulam, "The Future of the Soviet Union," Interplay, II, No. 10, May, 1969, pp. 4-9.

transitional phase caught between the past and the future, but not wholly committed to the present, must be granted. When Khrushchev and his successors--as heirs of Stalin--and the various military leaders from the war period fade, a new generation of military leaders will probably be even more professional and less bound to the political leaders by either ideology or by personal bonds forged by wartime service. The interaction of these two institutional forces within the Soviet state creates a basic instability--an instability of balancing ends of external policy and means of internal power.

Although conflict exists between these two institutions, the framework of legitimacy dictated by the Soviet system tends to limit the actions of the forces, much akin to a variable-sum game. The pattern that has prevailed since the birth of the Red Army

. . . shows periods of relative tranquility followed by gathering tensions, which culminate in crisis. . . . This crisis or near crisis has always . . . ended in victory for the Party, and been followed by another period of relative tranquility. One of the most interesting aspects of this "cyclical" pattern is the fact that . . . the deterioration of relations followed upon a period when the Party was exceptionally dependent on the support of the military because of either international or domestic developments. Its temporary need of the military caused the Party to relax some of its controls. . . . This usually led to greater self-assertiveness on the part of the military, which in turn worried the Party as foreshadowing an emancipation from the political controls. . . .²

²Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), p. 32.

Stalin very quickly came to the conclusion that the military must be a docile instrument responding only to Party-political orders. He willingly sacrificed military effectiveness and took extreme measures to subdue the military establishment.³ His successors have sought more moderate and conciliatory means of maintaining control over the military establishment. However, like the imposition of violence and its recurring use, the Party leaders must constantly increase the scope and range of controls for them to be comparatively effective. Also, like violence, a point may be reached whereby repression, as a system, breaks down. Again, one has only to note the change in loyalty of the Imperial Army from 1905 to 1917 and the inability of the leadership to perceive political change.

The effects of political evolution in the Soviet Union will increasingly alter the relationship of the civil authority and the armed forces. The Party has been willing to sacrifice proficiency for control. The death of Stalin and the resultant changes have set limits on such random manipulation. Terror kept all institutions from attaining any independence and prevented any leader from challenging Stalin. The post-Stalin era has seen a modification of terror

³For an interesting and detailed account of the army purge and its strategic and tactical effects, consult Malcolm Mackintosh, Juggernaut: A History of the Soviet Armed Forces (New York, 1967), pp. 84-110.

with its more blatant aspects largely having been eliminated. The Party has been weakened by the factionalism growing out of the succession crises since 1953. Such factors have loosened the political hold on the military. The Party was formerly able to muzzle the military establishment and to determine the nature of its relationship to the political authority. With the advent of the nuclear age, the military has assumed an active voice in formulating national policy.

The dynamics of modern warfare have more or less demanded the subordination of Party-ideological considerations to military need. Such a revolution is a continuing process. Soviet military thinkers have

. . . divided the revolution in military affairs into three phases. The first was the creation of the nuclear weapon. The second was the development of the dominant weapon carrier, the missile. The third phase, sometimes referred to as the cybernetics revolution, still is under way and provides the guidance and control system. The primary result of the revolution is the emergence of the strategic nuclear forces. . . .⁴

The growing proliferation of the officer-technocrat cannot be halted realistically by the Party. It is difficult to impose ideologically-oriented programs on them, since the growing complexity, proliferation of equipment and weapon systems, and the need for military expertise have set boundaries on the extent of Party controls. This increased dependence on

⁴William R. Kintner and Harriet F. Scott, translator and editor, The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs (Norman, Oklahoma, 1968), p. 4.

the military has forced the political leaders to deal more subtly with the institutionalized element.

To be certain, the Party has the initiative in controlling professional and autonomous potential in the armed forces. However, the military establishment possesses several attributes for questioning, opposing, challenging, and neutralizing the Party's position. The reservoir of professional expertise, increasingly augmented by the revolution in military affairs, has modified traditionalism and changed the character of the leadership. No longer is the principal criterion of officership the ability to lead men into battle, but to be able to function within complex bureaucracies based on equipment and weapon systems. Chief of the General Staff, Marshal M. V. Zakharov, warned that

. . . whereas in past wars gaps in the military and technological knowledge of a commander were sometimes made-up by his native intuition . . . it is very risky to rely on intuition in nuclear warfare, under conditions of rapid and highly mobile military operations. . . .⁵

Due to the increasingly complex and expensive training required to produce the modern officer and the shortage of technical specialists, the use of the purge mechanism would be detrimental to the Soviet armed forces. This factor of indispensability has caused officers in the technical and elite services to assert themselves more freely and often

⁵Red Star, October 12, 1962.

vis-a-vis the Party bureaucrats.⁶

The officer corps possesses an internal resilience retaining characteristics of a guild organization despite the attempt to eliminate such traditional values. It cultivates a sense of solidarity in reaction to a hostile socio-political environment. An "old boy" network is perpetuated by the military professionals by covering up for one another, furthering each other's careers, and protecting and favoring fellow officers. Such corporateness is strengthened by tradition, pride in profession, and a sense of duty in national service.⁷ Such qualities have given the military establishment the will to raise obstacles to the political leadership's efforts to destroy any move toward professional autonomy. Such attributes of professional strength and identity appear to be effective barriers to the post-Stalin civil leadership, who are, perhaps, unwilling or unable to risk an institutional confrontation with the military establishment.

The inherent instability of the power arrangements in the Soviet state force contenders for power to seek political alliances with major social groupings. Such practices serve

⁶Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), p. 31.

⁷Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), pp. 59-75.

to protect a monopoly of power or to provide support in the event of a challenge by an opposing coalition. This practice breeds both internal stability and instability. The former is achieved by the Party's pursuing a divide-and-rule policy in relation to the societal institutions and the latter by power struggles, succession crises, and external threats. The military is in the most advantageous position to exploit Party weakness. No post-Stalin leadership has felt strong enough to take pre-emptive action to induce fear in order to prevent the military from acting in a power vacuum. They tend to assure military loyalty by alliances and personal bonds. Cooperation, responsiveness, and factionalism within the High Command become acute when a change in leadership occurs, since the process:

. . . is not . . . governed by either tradition or established rules. No Soviet Party leader has ever voluntarily relinquished his powers, and no provisions exist for the transfer of authority should the incumbent die or be removed as a result of disability or political coercion. . . . A grave leadership crisis can be expected to arise also from an intra-party coup resulting from alignments of political relationships and loyalties among representatives of those institutions that carry the chief political weight in the state. The former leader then finds himself with a fait accompli, engineered by his opponents, to which he has no choice but to submit.⁸

Polarization of loyalties and interests are disruptive to the system during internal crises, especially when the military

⁸Ibid., p. 282.

is a vital factor. In such a case, one has a crisis of primary loyalty in which members are forced to choose between their professional and institutional interests as officers mindful of the welfare of the nation and of unquestioned loyalty to a benefactor. Finer observes that for the Soviet armed forces, under prevailing conditions:

. . . overt displacement or supersession of the ruling group in flagrant defiance of the civil institutions and notably of the Communist Party is as unlikely to occur (and as unlikely to be successful if it did occur) as in Weimar Germany, pre-war Japan and contemporary France. On the other hand, military influence, pressure and even blackmail aimed at ejecting the ruling group . . . and replacing it by an alternative group could occur and indeed has done so.⁹

The range of interests and objectives of large military institutions in any industrial society is, for all practical purposes, the same.¹⁰ Attempts to alter the priorities in relation to these interests and objectives result in tensions. The institutional arrangements of the Soviet system

⁹Samuel E. Finer, Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York, 1962), p. 99.

¹⁰Such objectives may be summarized under the following points:

- (1) consistently heavy investment in defense industry;
- (2) large standing forces and large military budgets;
- (3) certain level of international tension maintained by depicting political opponents as aggressive and unpredictable;
- (4) demands for professional freedom and autonomy;
- (5) cultivation of a noble image of the military in the eyes of society.

make it difficult to ease such tensions without endangering internal stability. The developments in the areas of defense industry investment, the military budget, the size of forces in being, the level of international tension, and domestic tension during 1963 and 1964, ultimately bringing Khrushchev's downfall, is indicative of the combination of circumstances that bring the military to seek alliances to protect its vital interests (as defined by the military establishment). He relentlessly pursued his conception of the Soviet state as embodied in the Party Program proclaimed in 1961, failing to

. . . adjust his objectives to the realities of power politics in an authoritarian state, his impatience with those who would not or could not keep up with his fast pace--these were the mistakes that hastened his defeat.¹¹

Having chafed under the reduced socio-economic role dictated by the Khrushchev-directed leadership, the military establishment reasserted itself following his downfall. The marshals interpreted the external threats to the Soviet Union as filled with tensions and dangers making political relaxation or military *détente* impossible. Such analyses of the international scene placed emphasis on defense priorities in economic planning and professional autonomy as well as a positive image of the military.

¹¹Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* (Princeton, 1967), p. 299.

The initial period of the collective leadership saw continuation of previous policies with overtones of attempted moderations. Gradually, conditions began to appear that indicated a growing dissent between hardliners and moderates within the top echelon of the political leadership. This continuing dialogue and its outcome are important for Soviet politics. As in the early sixties, the dialogue centers about resource allocation and defense priorities. An indication of the increased military influence was the reappointment of Marshal Zakharov as Chief of the General Staff. Marshal Zakharov's move back into the military holds implications for three different, but interrelated questions: the intra-military debate over doctrine, strategy, and force structure; the state of Party-military relations; the extent to which the military may affect basic Soviet military posture and policy.¹² The factors involved in this appointment and the appointment of Marshal Grechko are still prevalent. Wolfe observes that

. . . it would seem to be a fairly good bet that the influence of the Malinovskii-Zakharov line-up upon the policy decisions of the new regime will meet its acid test over the question of resource allocation, that perennial vexata quaestio upon which various groupings within the Soviet leadership have frequently failed to see eye to eye.¹³

¹²Thomas W. Wolfe, Note on the Naming of a Successor to Marshal Biriuzov (Santa Monica, California, December, 1964), p. 10.

¹³Ibid., p. 16.

How necessary is military support for the leadership to remain in power? Succession is unlikely to bring about an alteration in the pattern of civil supremacy. The appointment of Zakharov might have come in the form of compromise and payment for Malinovsky's apparent neutrality in the succession struggle. Analysts have observed not without interest that

. . . Zakharov is on record as a stout advocate of "single command" as opposed to "collective leadership" methods in the armed forces. . . . Zakharov's appointment at a time when the collective leadership principle is again in vogue at the political level might therefore suggest his sponsorship by Malinovskii and other military leaders wishing to get the point across that military professionalism and "edinonachalie" should continue to be the governing principle in the armed forces. . . . Seen in this light, Zakharov's return to his former post might be construed as another sign that the new political leadership felt obligated to make concessions to military preference.¹⁴

Growing disagreement on basic policy issues appears to have divided the ruling Party elite. How serious the repercussions will ultimately be is not fully known. The pattern that the 1968 Czech invasion took very dramatically indicates the indecision at the highest levels. Anatole Shub, during his stay in the Soviet Union, observed of this period that

. . . as the crisis developed and climaxed with the invasion of August 20, 1968, signs began to appear of both a vacuum of power and a struggle

¹⁴Ibid., p. 15.

for power at the top--with effective influence frequently appearing to pass outside the constituted Party bodies, to the marshals of the Soviet army and the shadowy agents of the KGB.¹⁵

Such divisions extend to almost all policy issues that the Soviet leadership must ultimately face, but has thus far avoided. N. I. Podgorny, D. S. Polyansky, and A. D. Kirilenko favor allocating resources for and emphasizing internal development. M. A. Suslov, A. N. Shelepin, and P. Y. Shelest have tended to side with the military in emphasizing the importance of Soviet defense. Brezhnev and Kosygin have attempted to play a centrist role. They presumably see the need to allocate a larger share of resources to the non-defense economy, but cannot disregard pressure from the military establishment and their Party adherents. The problems of the Brezhnev-Kosygin collegium appear to be as follows:

1. Those related to maintaining political control over the armed forces in time of crisis and amidst the hazards which a nuclear missile world may hold;
2. those related to meshing the industrial-military planning to cope most effectively with the resource-consuming appetite of modern weapons systems; and,
3. those related to balancing military influence on Soviet policy-making against the need of the political leadership to call increasingly

¹⁵Anatole Shub, The New Russian Tragedy (New York, 1969), p. 96.

upon the professional expertise of the military leadership.¹⁶

Brezhnev's careful centrist moves and his efforts to pass responsibility for controversial decisions onto the whole Politburo cannot indefinitely postpone accountability for failures of the past two years. The plausible explanation for his retention of power is through the support of the military and defense industry proponents and their recognition of his mediocrity. In attempts to manage the crises that have confronted the Soviet Union since the ouster of Premier Khrushchev, the split among the Party leadership is evident, particularly since the Czech invasion. Effective decision-making has appeared to dissolve upon the apparatchiki and away from the Central Committee. The Party power structure has evidently yielded power to the armed forces and the KGB. Anatole Shub notes that

. . . it is largely immaterial . . . how the marshals and the KGB professionals acquired this power--whether through their own initiative or through the readiness of Brezhnev and other politicians to anticipate military and police demands and thus assure continued support against political rivals. . . . Among the current Politburo members, Brezhnev, Kirilenko, and Voronov have frequently expressed their support for the "military-industrial complex" while Suslov, Pelshe, Shelepin, and Mazurov have passed important years in KGB operations. . . .¹⁷

¹⁶Thomas W. Wolfe, The Evolution of Soviet Military Policy (Santa Monica, California, February 1968), p. 34.

¹⁷Op. cit., p. 114.

The influence of the military establishment is colored by the lessons arising from the crucial situation prior to, and during, the initial operations of World War II. The military seeks assurances that the political leadership will react in the initial stages of any future crisis. Attention is focused on command and control problems. Marshal Grechko noted that in the event of war beginning with a surprise blow, "the leadership's correct and timely evaluation of the situation prior to a war, and the reaching of initial decisions" have taken on greatly increased significance.¹⁸ The theme in the military press and an undercurrent in civil-military relations centered on the increased importance of effective coordination of the economy and planning and procurement for the armed forces. That this issue might have created internal pressures can be inferred from the rumored civilian successor to Marshal Malinovsky. Had a civilian assumed the post with its command prerogatives over the military establishment, it would most likely have meant far-reaching organizational reforms and less immediate military influence on state policy. The subsequent succession of Marshal Grechko to the Defense Ministry might be interpreted as an unwillingness on behalf of the Party to force the issue of the influence of the High Command.

Despite these periodic oscillations of relative power positions, the march of technological innovation conflicts

¹⁸Ibid., p. 36.

with both the values within the military establishment and with the ends that the Party-political leadership sees for this institution. Morris Janowitz observes that the history of modern military establishments

. . . can be described as a struggle between heroic leaders, who embody traditionalism and glory, and military "managers" who are concerned with the scientific and rational conduct of war. . . . The military manager reflects the scientific and pragmatic dimensions of war-making; he is the professional with effective links to civilian society. The heroic leader is a perpetuation of the warrior type, the mounted officer who embodies the martial spirit and the theme of personal valor.¹⁹

Developments since the turn of the century have radically altered the traditional military establishment. The introduction of nuclear weapons and missiles transformed it into an engineering establishment. Such an organization requires a balance between the three roles of heroic leader, military manager, and military technologist

. . . as the military establishment becomes progressively dependent on more complex technology, the importance of the military manager increases. He does not displace the heroic leader, but he undermines the long-standing traditionalism . . . and weakens the opposition to technological innovation. With the growth of the military manager, technological innovation becomes routinized.²⁰

Technical specialists have the potential of developing into crucial leadership roles. This, however, requires modification of both skill and outlook.

¹⁹Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, Ill., 1960), p. 21.

²⁰Ibid., p. 22.

The revolutionary changes in the technology and dynamics of war have precipitated far-reaching effects within the Soviet armed forces. Their appearance has substantially altered the interests of elements within the military establishment. In addition to the matter of their impact on the military community, the more important question remains: What changes have these developments brought about in the military power structure and in the military's relations with the Party apparatus?²¹ The more important consequence for the Soviet state is the political neutrality of the technical officer. The reluctance on the part of younger technical officers to participate in political work has caused resentment on the part of the traditional military commanders who must be involved in this time-consuming activity. Despite the criticism leveled at them in the official press, the military specialists still resist imposition of politically-oriented duties. The political organs may insist that they engage in political work, but military professionals tend to insist that their skill is vital to the effectiveness of the armed forces. Since the forward-looking elements of the High Command and some of the political leadership place emphasis on a strategy that gives the strategic forces a vital role,

²¹The internal conflicts range over three primary issues: relations between the traditional commanders and the technocrats; relations between the technocrats and the organs of political control; and relations between the traditionalists and the modernists.

it is natural that the specialists should have increasingly more influence. Being aware of this indispensability, expressions of such confidence ". . . range from simple self-congratulatory observations to dire forecasts of the consequences of not heeding the technocrat. . . ."22 This open challenge of some fundamental Party practices in the armed forces appears even more remarkable, since it took place in the wake of an intimidation campaign by the political organs.²³ Despite the differences within the military community, if ". . . the technocrat's pragmatism . . . [was] to be reconciled with the older commander's military ethos, this would greatly strengthen the corporate autonomy of the officer corps."²⁴

The Party does not recognize the existence of institutional values, professional interests, or loyalties other than those related to the Party. The history of conflict between the CPSU and the Soviet military establishment reflects the fact that the military is far from being an integral part of Soviet society. It has, and continues to have, a distinct personality and unique objectives. The supreme military virtue is obedience. However, can one

²²Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), p. 314.

²³Roman Kolkowicz, Political Controls in the Red Army: Professionalism versus Political Integration (Santa Monica, California, July, 1966), p. 9.

²⁴Ibid., p. 16.

realize any limits to obedience? This question is particularly important concerning the conflict between the military value of obedience and non-military values.²⁵ In relation to the state machine, a military interest in national policy reflects the professional responsibility for the security of the state. Huntington observes that this responsibility

. . . leads the military: (1) to view the state as the basic unit of political organization; (2) to stress the continuing nature of the threats to the military security of the state and the continuing likelihood of war; (3) to emphasize the magnitude and immediacy of the security threats; (4) to favor the maintenance of strong, diverse and ready military forces; (5) to oppose the extension of state commitments and the involvement of the state in war except when victory is certain.²⁶

Certain universal military traits reflect the drive toward institutional autonomy and assertions of professionalism.²⁷

Soviet Party-political leadership attempts to control the emergence of these traits. The importance of such control is amplified by the fact that the military controls an instrument of coercion. Recognizing that authoritarian states have difficulty in adjusting to the existence of a military establishment, the pervasiveness of political controls within

²⁵Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p. 74.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 64-65.

²⁷Institutional closure, detachment from the rest of society, elitist value systems, hierarchical structure of authority, and limited possibilities for soldiers in civilian life are examples of traits prevalent among all military establishments existing in the world.

the Soviet armed forces is ideologically colored, since the Party perceives a potential threat to its power. The Soviet political leadership attempts to curb the dangers of a potentially autonomous group by attacking the institutional boundaries and traditional prerogatives. The issue of political integration could become acute when formulae heretofore relatively successful in controlling the military dissolve under the stress of political and social demands. This lack of institutionalized means of dealing with acute crisis becomes more important when one notes that the system does not rely

. . . on regulatory provisions of the legal or constitutional kind . . . but resort[s] instead to a relentless and expensive effort at politicization and control to keep the military politically and ideologically docile and administratively manageable. . . . It is this conundrum of the inherent conflict of interests, between institutions, between military and political professionals whose relationship is both complementary and contradictory, that lies at the root of political instability in the Soviet state. . . .²⁸

The contradictions arise from balancing the requirements of external political objectives against considerations of internal political stability. The changes in the political climate and in Soviet military requirements since the close of the Second World War necessitating the maintenance of a force in being have aggravated these contradictions. Catering

²⁸Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), p. 332.

to the instinctive distrust of military power, the Party has made few real changes in politico-ideological control mechanisms, merely variations on a theme. The traditions of professionalism present a formidable barrier in the Party's unsuccessful drive to produce a military professional who is, at the same time, a loyal Party member.

That the military is a servant of the Party was particularly true throughout the long reign of Stalin. However, it was a giant on a leash of pervasive police and political controls with the slack determined by the severity of the internal threat. In the wake of the leadership crises of 1953, 1955, 1957, and 1964, the military has been placed in a position to make demands on the Party and to realize limited success.²⁹ Traditional military propensities surfaced during the Zhukov years, the height of direct military influence on Soviet policy. Although his removal began a reassertion of Party hegemony, the precedent was set. Since that time the demands for a greater military voice have not been stilled.

The changing character of the officer corps, in addition to the change in emphasis of Soviet foreign policy, the decline of revolutionary élan, the developing anti-military attitudes among the Russian people, the magnetism of Great

²⁹Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin: from Khrushchev to Kosygin (New York, 1969), pp. 550-584.

Russian nationalism, and the change in the character of the Party-political leadership holds the greatest potential and possibility for increased military influence on state policy. The change from charismatic leader to apparatchiki with the threefold combination of internal pressures, external commitments, and indecisive collective leadership has presented wider areas for military leverage. In spite of the ideological legacy, these factors have favored professionalism and heightened the institutional loyalty of the officer ". . . in a manner, that reaches into the upper layers of the military hierarchy."³⁰ Such propensities are still evident and the major points of contention between the Party and the Soviet military remain unresolved.

Since the removal of Khrushchev, the sensitive issue for the leadership is whether or not to grant the military leadership the power to alert Soviet forces in the face of an emergency.³¹ It appears unlikely that the Party-political powers would surrender the authority to commit forces. However, the Soviet High Command claims the alert capability to be a necessity in the nuclear age, but the Party can foresee some dangerous ramifications during times of political crisis. The dilemma is reached when Party factions appeal to the

³⁰Ibid., p. 347.

³¹Myron Rush, Political Succession in the U.S.S.R. (New York, 1965), p. 157.

military for either support or neutrality and may thereby feel compelled to grant such a concession. If such power is conceded, then military autonomy is virtually realized. With no regularized succession, concession on this point is conceivable. The standard of living, investment priorities, and the problem of generations are examples of some of the basic issues confronting the CPSU and the Soviet system. Thus far, the leadership has avoided coming to grips with such issues. Conquest observes that

. . . vacillation, the attempt to combine contradictory drives, has been the pattern. The predominant motive seems to be a desire to avoid all change and reform in the hope that no crisis will spring up and that the contradictions within their society and economy will go away.³²

Pressure for solution will ultimately force action or reaction. In either case, the military is waiting in the wings to arbitrate the issue. In relation to this "solidified" elite, Tatu observes that

. . . policy, which aspires in particular to self-perpetuation, reflects very precisely the specific character of the ruling elite. . . . The approximately 300 people who currently count in the USSR are, in the overwhelming majority, men of 50 and over, with 25 years or more of service to the state behind them, including a good ten years, at least, in the apparatus of Stalin's time. They have in common a need for security (memories of Stalin's purges and Khrushchev's caprices have made them deeply suspicious of every kind of

³²Time, Vol. 95, no. 18, May 4, 1970, p. 34.

personal power) and a concern for maintaining the considerable privileges they enjoy and the forms of government with which they are familiar.³³

The certainty of the moment is that the power of the Party apparatchiki that have held power for the past twenty-five years is in its Götterdämmerung or more accurately its Götzendämmerung.³⁴ The change to the new generation is likely to be chaotic. The average age of voting members of the Central Committee has risen from 49 in 1952 to around 60 for the present committee.³⁵ This is almost without precedent in the regime's history. The "Class of 1952" appears to be making an effort to prevent younger men from attaining posts of real authority.³⁶ It restricts its trust to older members of the Party elite and to those who have been close to the leadership for the past ten to fifteen years and who enjoy

³³Wolfgang Leonhard, Malcolm Mackintosh, Michel Tatu, and Adam Ulam, "The Future of the Soviet Union," Interplay, II, No. 10 (May, 1969), pp. 4-9.

³⁴For the philosophical ramifications of these two terms, consult Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche's Nietzsche contra Wagner and Twilight of the Idols. Walter Kaufman, editor and translator, The Portable Nietzsche (New York, 1954), pp. 463-565 and 661-684.

³⁵Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin: from Khrushchev to Kosygin (New York, 1969), p. 538.

³⁶Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson, editors, Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1968), pp. 41-71.

patronage (sheftsvo).³⁷ The old men preside over the destiny of the nation while younger men are kept in the "first circle" of the upper echelons of power.

The evolution of the Soviet system must occur, as well as overall evolution of Russian society, but the pace of this evolution is the unknown quantity. However, the possibility of this course being controlled by

. . . such as military or police dictatorships must certainly more than ever be contemplated. . . despite insistent reaffirmations of the Party's leading role, the army and the police are gradually gaining ground. The army is gaining since, thanks to international tension and ideological impoverishment, militant patriotism is about the only surviving reliable value. . . . Even under present conditions, things are probably doomed to get worse before they get better. The defensive conservatism of the regime has still not produced its full effects, and we shall see more writers' trials, signs of dissatisfaction and special laws.³⁸

Marshal Grechko's speech on VE Day, 1970 reflects an effort to give the Soviet armed forces the bulk of the credit for the victory with only the appropriate bows to the Party throughout the address.

³⁷Yu. V. Andropov (53) replaced V. E. Semichasty (43) as head of the KGB, N. G. Yegorychev (47) was replaced by V. V. Grishen (53) as head of the Urban Committee, N. N. Organov (66) recalled from a diplomatic post to the Central Committee, S. G. Lapin, news director of TASS, three years older than his predecessor is a figure from the past having been in charge of political broadcasting during World War II.

³⁸Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin: from Khrushchev to Kosygin (New York, 1969), p. 588.

The Great Patriotic War was a war of the entire people. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the peoples of . . . our . . . country defended the gains of October. . . . The Communist Party was the leader in the struggle of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, the inspirer and organizer of our victory. . . .³⁹

However, despite the laudatory references to the Party, the marshal's sentiments could be ascertained in the use of such phrases as ". . . the selfless struggles of the Soviet Armed Forces . . ." and ". . . the victory of the Soviet Armed Forces. . . ."40

The Defense Minister invoked both the historical issue and the heightened international tensions to present a case for increased military preparedness and expenditures.

The Party confidently directs the development of the Armed Forces along a path the correctness of which was graphically and convincingly demonstrated by our victory. . . . Each new stage in the economic and spiritual might of the socialist society at the same time becomes a new stage in the improvement of our military organization.⁴¹

The instruments of coercion and their leaders feel confident enough to praise the Party, yet subtly intimate a need for a larger voice in state affairs. Such influence is circum- spectly exercised through "friendly" adherents in the Party- ruling bodies.

³⁹Pravda, May 9, 1970.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid.

The local Party and Soviet agencies hold a leading position in organization of military-patriotic work and mass mobilization of assistance to the border troops in the safeguarding of the frontier. The border troops' combat effectiveness has also been intensified by the fact that they are carrying out their operational and official duties in close cooperation with the agencies of the Committee on State Security. . . .⁴²

Although the source of civil-political power lies in the Politburo and the Party officials based outside Moscow, the power of the armed forces lies in their being the organized managers of violence. Does the political leadership owe the military establishment any obligations? Brezhnev's apparent catering to the High Command could place the Party leadership in a precarious position. For further backing, the military leaders might possibly exact concessions which could ultimately drastically distort the economy and alter the quality of life.

None of the present ruling elite has a secure enough power base or the strength of character to completely dominate the military establishment. The conservative suspicious generation of apparatchiki lacking both will and ambition are given to contradictory drives. As a result, the body that is capable of concerted action appears to hold the advantage. Sections of Marshal Grechko's speech in May 1970 reflect this preoccupation with the events associated with World War II.

⁴²Pravda, May 28, 1970.

The situation on the European continent continues to be tense and unstable. In West Germany one can frequently hear revanchist calls and speeches in favor of a revision of existing European borders. . . . The policy of the West German state has still far from cleansed itself of the ballast of the past, of dogmas and concepts hostile to the interests of the peace. . . .⁴³

He pictures a hostile world threatening the Russian homeland stating that the

. . . present situation requires the peoples of the USSR and the Soviet Armed Forces . . . to increase their vigilance with respect to the aggressive intrigues of the imperialist and other militant forces, to maintain constant readiness for the selfless defense of socialism. We will remember the events preceding the Second World War, and we cannot relax our attention to . . . events of recent times . . . [and] all other facts testifying to the intensification of imperialistic aggressiveness.⁴⁴

Traditions of military subordination to civil power are deeply ingrained in Russian politics. Unlike many autocracies, the czarist regime was not politically challenged by its military establishment despite defeats. Neither the Crimean War nor the Russo-Japanese War led to internal coups. Professionalism gave the military the sense of being the custodian of the state and was one of the vital supports of czarism. Such intense loyalty was, and is, an expression of Great Russian nationalism and a means of maintaining control of a non-Russian empire. The advent of Soviet rule

⁴³Pravda, May 9, 1970.

⁴⁴Ibid.

strengthened this tradition. The ideology provided a rationale for the Clausewitzian view of the military.

Civilian control of a military establishment in this authoritarian system is rooted in concepts of absolute rule as opposed to the Western view of standing armies as threats to individual liberty. Although it is in the Russian tradition that the armed forces are the instrument of the state, political discord, succession crises, limited wars, and the characteristics of the ruling elite and how effectively they deal with recurring crises hold the key to future military actions, either overt or covert. Despite early attempts to impede the development of professionalism and the rise of traditional military values, these have been reasserted.

The balance of political forces has not been altered by abortive reforms. Decision-making is still centered in a small group, the Politburo. The result has been indecision in relation to policies. At the same time, Soviet society has reached a relatively modern level of development, but the Party appears incapable of perceiving changes in the political and intellectual climate. The intelligentsia is showing signs of 19th century Populism (Narodnichestvo); loyal critics to open opponents and opponents to radicals. The future is dependent on subjective elements in that a political crisis or crises are likely to appear in the

future. These are affected by the patterns of delays in reforms and a proportionate rise in violence as well as the character and action of the ruling elite.

The armed forces have not played an active political role in the past, however future events could mean that they

. . . will probably come into play the day the Party and its present apparatus seem unable to resolve an unusually serious leadership crisis . . . [creating] a vacuum of power that persists too long.⁴⁵

Increasing reliance on the armed forces comes in direct relationship to the changes in foreign policy that extends Soviet influence to the far corners of the world. The leaders who direct the operations of that machine seek closer contact with the decision-making process from which they have been constitutionally excluded. The demands for such a voice are likely to increase with a possibility of a military pressure for representation in full voting capacity in the Politburo. A combination of the military establishment and the defense industry champions could exercise dominant influence over the decision-making process. The use of military power is tempered by the characteristics of the High Command and the prevocativeness of foreign policy. They tend to be strong nationalists, conservative in outlook,

⁴⁵Wolfgang Leonhard, Malcolm Mackintosh, Michel Tatu, and Adam Ulam, "The Future of the U.S.S.R.," Interplay, II, No. 10 (May, 1969), pp. 4-9.

and cautious in recommending actual military operations.⁴⁶

The key to the future depends upon how the crucial contradictions of Soviet Communism are mediated. These are the contradictions between societal necessities and obsolete power interests of the apparatchiki claiming jurisdictional authority. Wolfgang Leonhard suggests several areas of pressure on the system, pressures that must be relieved, not avoided.⁴⁷ First, changes in the economic order are imperative. Economic modernization is bound up with social, political, governmental, and cultural reform.⁴⁸ Second, continuation of re-Stalinization is creating a wider chasm between the system and the society. It is forcing the intellectual community into more or less open opposition. Third, the scope of the reformist movement will expand. The literati are being joined by the technician, scientist, and academician. The reaction of Andrei Sakharov to the Sinyavsky and Daniel trials represents partial corroboration of such an alliance.⁴⁹ Finally, the successive delays in economic reform appear to inject a degree of paralysis into the system despite exhortations to increase productivity.

⁴⁶H. S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union (New York, 1962), pp. 167-251.

⁴⁷Wolfgang Leonhard, Malcolm Mackintosh, Michel Tatu, and Adam Ulam, "The Future of the U.S.S.R.," Interplay, II, No. 10 (May, 1969), pp. 4-9.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid.

The combination of internal and external tensions with the indecision of the Party leadership only serves to delay the evolution of the system. The increasing estrangement of the Party and the other institutional elements of Russian society casts the military establishment in the role of arbiter. If the pattern of delay is perpetuated, events could conceivably force the armed forces to exercise their power to prevent chaos and collapse of the directing forces of the nation. Upon what basis and in support of whom will the armed forces be called upon or feel obligated to intervene as a repository of national will? The dilemma may perhaps be reflected in a statement in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of December 18, 1968, by a group of Estonian intellectuals:

Twelve years have passed since the 20th Party Congress. We are waiting and ask our government for liberating reforms; we are still willing to ask and wait for a period of time. But finally, we will demand and act: And then tank divisions will no longer be sent to Prague and Bratislava, but will have to be used in Moscow and Lenin-grad.⁵⁰

⁵⁰Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 18, 1968.

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