

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # <sup>DEN 148</sup> 950420-10

FROM:	TO: EPSTEIN, DAVID
TITLE:	TITLE: NAVY ANALYST
ORGANIZATION:	ORGANIZATION:
CITIZENS FOR A STRONG NAVY	DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED:	SPAWAR

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./ CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./ COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./ INFORMATION SERVICES				DAVID EPSTEIN	✓		

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

LETTER SUPPORTING EFFORT TO KEEP SPAWAR CRYPTOLOGY FUNCTION IN NATIONAL CAPITOL REGION.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950420	Date Originated: 950419	Mail Date:
-----------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------

*Please refer to the number  
when responding 950420-10*

WHITE PAPER

**REALIGNMENT OF SPACE AND NAVAL WARFARE SYSTEMS COMMAND (SPAWAR)**

**Recommendation:** Keep the SPAWAR Cryptology function in the National Capital Region (NCR).

**Justification:**

- Movement of SPAWAR Cryptology to San Diego will undermine military and national security: Cryptology is part of Information Warfare (IW), the key to national security in the electronic "Information = Power" age; and requires working intimately with NSA, NSG, and other national commands.
- IW is focused upon Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), including Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT). Cryptologic sensors are one of three components of (IW). Sensors detect, identify and process threat Command and Control (C2) signals and disseminate tactical reports. The other two components are: attack enemy C2 signals, resources and facilities (Counter Command and Control); and protect own force C2 (SIGSEC).
- NSA is the SIGINT Czar by edict of Congress. Naval Security Group (NSG) is the Navy's Service Cryptology Element (SCE), and is the primary interface between Navy's cryptologic efforts and NSA. The Naval Information Warfare Activity (NIWA), initially a component of NSG, was recently established as a separate activity. NIWA is scheduled to move to ample existing facilities at Suitland, MD along with NSC from the Security Station Washington DC.
- SPAWAR's charter (SECNAVINST 5400.15), which assigns primary mission as C4I, does not include Cryptology. C4I is an information conduit and does not deal with sensors or information collection. It is only logical to consolidate SPAWAR cryptologic sensors, the acquisition arm, with NSG and NIWA for this move.
- Movement of SPAWAR Cryptology is uneconomical because the integral relationship of IW elements movement to San Diego will create: (1) greatly increased travel requirements and communications costs; (2) the need for added personnel to compensate for work time lost to travel; (3) added costs for local offices and support in the NCR.

**What is SPAWAR ?**

- One of five technical agencies within the Navy; the others include NAVSEA and NAVAIR. SPAWAR is a major hardware and software acquisition command. SPAWAR works with (Major Activities): Chief of Naval Operations, USMC, NAVSEA, NAVAIR, PEOs, DRPMs, National Security Agency (NSA), Naval Security Group (NSG), Naval Information Warfare Activity (NIWA), NCCOSC, NISE East, and Naval Research Lab (NRL).
- Responsibilities outlined in SECNAVINST 5400.15 of 5 Aug 91 define three major roles: (1) life-cycle management; (2) support services to PEOs and DRPMs; (3) and management of programs other than those assigned to Program Executive Officers (PEOs) and Direct Reporting Program Managers (DRPMs). As required by Title 10, U.S. Code, ASN (Research, Development & Acquisition) has been designated the single office within SECNAV to conduct the acquisition function. SPAWAR and the other Systems Commands report to ASN (RD&A).



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950420-11

FROM: SMITH, CHRIS	TO: KERNS, BRIAN
TITLE: REP. (nd)	TITLE: CROSS SERVICE ASSOC. ANNA
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: NATTC, ALKE FROM NAES, LAKEHURST	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR.. CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR.. COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR.. INFORMATION SERVICES				BRIAN KERNS	✓		

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓ FYI

Subject/Remarks:

PROVIDING REPORTS, AGAINST THE MOVES OF, THE AIRCRAFT LAUNCH AND RECOVERY EQUIPMENT TO NAEP JACKSONVILLE AND THE NAVAL AIR TECHNICAL TRAINING CENTER TO NAS PENSACOLA.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950420	Date Originated: 950420	Mail Date:
-----------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------

WASHINGTON OFFICE  
2383 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-1004  
(202) 226-3765

CONSTITUENT SERVICE CENTERS  
1720 GREENWOOD AVENUE  
HAMILTON, NJ 08609  
(609) 490-2800  
TTY (609) 890-7623

427 HIGH STREET  
ROOM 1  
BURLINGTON CITY, NJ 08016  
(609) 348-5634

100 LITTLE BLVD  
SUITE 28A  
WHITING, NJ 08759  
(608) 350-2300



**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
Washington, DC 20515-3004

**CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH**  
4TH DISTRICT NEW JERSEY

COMMITTEES  
**FOREIGN AFFAIRS**  
RANKING MEMBER—WESTERN  
MEMBER—AFFAIRS  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
AND HUMAN RIGHTS

**VETERANS AFFAIRS**  
RANKING MEMBER—MUNICIPAL  
AND HEALTH CARE

**COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND  
COOPERATION IN EUROPE**  
RANKING COMMISSIONER  
**TASK FORCE ON AGING**

**Congressional Visit Point Paper**

**Naval Air Depot Jacksonville, Florida**  
**(NADEP JAX)**

**Summary:**

Insufficient and incorrect certified data provided to the Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) by the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (COMNAVAIRSYSCOM), in reporting costs incurred in the relocation for the Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment (ALRE) Production Manufacturing and Prototype functions from Hangars 2 and 3, Naval Air Engineering Station (NAES), Lakehurst, New Jersey to Naval Air Depot, (NADEP) Jacksonville, Florida. The BSEC then further reduced initial cost estimates and minimized recurring cost data, providing incorrect data to the Secretary of the Navy.

The 89 civilian positions and 1 military officer to be relocated to NADEP Jacksonville represent less than one-half the current ALRE expertise currently on-line at NAES Lakehurst. These experienced personnel are skilled in the one-time manufacture of prototype equipment and sub-components designed by their co-located ALRE and Support Equipment (SE) engineers. In addition, these uniquely qualified men and women provide production manufacturing support for critical component repairs for both Naval Air and Naval Sea Systems Commands.

The BSEC reported to the Secretary of the Navy a one-time cost of \$1,641,000 to complete the relocation of Production Manufacturing and Prototyping, and recurring costs of only \$327,000 per year. The BSEC did agree with COMNAVAIRSYSCOM's position that there will be no savings to the government realized as a result of this realignment action. Actual data submissions by COMNAVAIRSYSCOM

**Certified data provided by COMNAVAIRSYSCOM to the Navy BSEC:**

One-time Unique Costs	(Machine foundations & Electrical Service)	\$ 1,541,000
One-time Moving Costs	(123 of 340 ALRE machines)	\$15,550,000
MILCON Requirement	(94,600 sq ft of Hi-Bay space)	\$ 9,460,000
<b>Total one-time cost incurred by US Government:</b>		<b>\$26,551,000</b>

The BSEC's \$1,541,000 cost estimate was based only on the estimate for machine foundations and electrical service. Added to a \$100,000 environmental mitigation cost equals the BSEC estimate of \$1,641,000.

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH  
4TH DISTRICT, NEW JERSEY

JAX PAPER  
PAGE 2

In fact, the facilities requirements for Production Manufacturing and Prototyping clearly exceed any capabilities currently possessed by NADEP Jacksonville. Initially, the Commanding Officer, NADEP JAX alleged to have in excess some 96,000 sq. ft of "Hi-Bay" space and an additional 40,000 sq. ft of space available to support this scenario. Now, the available space in excess has been reduced to 20,000 sq. ft of "Hi-Bay" space, requiring a Military Construction (MILCON) for the additional facilities.

Although the ALRE manufacturing functions would be located in Florida, the ALRE Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) functions would remain at Lakehurst, New Jersey. This situation would incur significant delays in the rework and test procedures for ALRE support of carrier aviation. These delays would affect aircraft catapults, arresting gear, emergency barricades, etc. In addition, this relocation scenario will incur significant costs in lost productivity time, and will deprive the Fleet of critical industrial capabilities during the months involved in the tear-down, packing, shipping and reassembling of manufacturing machinery and equipment.

In addition, the time required for the dismantling, shipping and reconstruction of the ALRE machinery will incur significant "down-time" and lost availability (productivity) for these unique machines. Since the Navy has not maintained a single Low Loss Launch Valve (LLLV) "in stock" during the past five years, the Jacksonville scenario requires the purchase of 5 - 8 additional LLLV's, at a cost of \$558,000 per valve. LLLV's are a critical component of catapults, and the valves must be available in order to prevent unacceptable reductions in fleet carrier readiness. The actual initial costs required to maintain the same capabilities currently on-line at NAES Lakehurst would be

Certified data provided by COMNAVAIRSYSCOM to the Navy BSEC:

**Annualized Recurring Costs:**

Recurring Costs for shipping costs (JAX to Lakehurst)	\$ 140,000
Recurring Costs for Travel & TDY	\$ 1,180,000
Recurring Costs for Eng. & Tech Services Contract (29 Workyears)	\$ 2,610,000
Recurring Costs for Support Services Contract (145 Workyears)	\$ 8,700,000

**Annual Recurring cost incurred by US Government: \$12,630,000**

The certified data provided by COMNAVAIRSYSCOM underestimated the annual recurring costs required in this relocation scenario. As an example, analysis of the proposed process for reworking Low Loss Launch Valves (LLLV) critical to aircraft catapult launchers would begin in Jacksonville, Florida. After reworking, the LLLV's would be shipped to Lakehurst, New Jersey, for necessary testing, and if rework were required, necessitate the components return to Florida for a repeat of the cycle. With the requirement for on-site engineering support, personnel travel time, component shipping time and related costs for each

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH  
4TH DISTRICT, NEW JERSEY

JAX  
63

12,000 pound LLLV the proposed scenario demands significant initial and recurring costs not currently present in maintaining the function at NAES Lakehurst

The BSEC eliminated or reduced these costs in order to protect NADEP Jacksonville from further BRAC deliberations and potential closure. Joint Scenario #102 and #102A demonstrated the viability of a Jacksonville Regional Maintenance Activity (RMA). The second scenario, #102A, envisioned the closure of NADEP Jacksonville, with several of its maintenance

functions remaining as part of the RMA. This scenario estimated a one-time cost of \$9,100,000 an immediate return on investment, an annual steady-state savings of \$37,300,000, and a 20-year savings of over \$500,000,000

In its deliberations on 13 JAN 95, the BSEC stated that NADEP Jacksonville " was removed from further consideration for the following reasons

*"Although the concept is an ongoing DoN initiative, the RMA is in the development phase, consequently this analysis was based on data that does not meet DoN's standards for BRAC"*

and

*"NADEP Jacksonville was identified as a receiving site that enabled the closure of a major technical center."*

Note the BSEC's projected savings in the realignment scenario for Lakehurst projects annual savings of \$37,200,000. This savings is the "smoke and mirror-image" of the real savings of \$37,300,000 anticipated from the creation of the Regional Maintenance Activity proposed by the Joint Cross-Service Group in its Scenario #102A.

In fact, the Navy has an excess capacity of 38% in its three NADEP's. Eliminating NADEP JAX and consolidating its necessary functions into the RMA would leave the Navy with NADEP Norfolk on the East Coast, and NADEP San Diego on the West Coast

WASHINGTON OFFICE  
 2353 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
 WASHINGTON DC 20515 3004  
 (202) 225-3766



CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH  
 6TH DISTRICT NEW JERSEY

CONSTITUENT SERVICE CENTERS  
 1720 GREENWOOD AVENUE  
 HAMILTON, NJ 08609  
 (609) 880-7800  
 TTY (609) 880-7023

427 HIGH STREET  
 ROOM 1  
 DUNELMONT CITY, NJ 08018  
 (609) 388-5634

100 LACEY ROAD  
 SUITE 38A  
 WHITING, NJ 08789  
 (908) 350-2300

COMMITTEES  
 FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
 RANKING MEMBER—WESTERN  
 HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS  
 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS  
 AND HUMAN RIGHTS  
 VETERANS AFFAIRS  
 RANKING MEMBER—HIGHPERF  
 AND HEALTH CARE  
 COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND  
 COOPERATION IN EUROPE  
 RANKING COMMISSIONER  
 TASK FORCE ON AGING

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
 Washington, DC 20515-3004

**Congressional Visit Point Paper**

**Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida**  
**(NAS Pensacola)**

**Summary:**

Insufficient and incorrect certified data provided to the Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) by the Commander, NAVAIRSYSCOM, in reporting cost of relocation for the Naval Air Technical Training Center (NATTC) from Hangar 1, Naval Air Engineering Station, Lakehurst, New Jersey to Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida. BSEC then further eliminated all remaining costs, allowing only \$199,000 for "Personal Support Equipment."

The proposed closing of NAES Lakehurst provides the final rationale for the Naval Education and Training Command to relocate the Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment (ALRE) from NAES Lakehurst to NAS Pensacola. No initial costs, beyond that of partial shipping of some training materials were included in the one-time cost estimate.

**Certified data provided by NATTC to COMNAVAIRSYSCOM:**

Disassembly, packaging and reinstalling of TC-13 Catapult	\$ 6,464,000
Disassembly, packaging and reinstalling of Mk-7 Arresting Gear	\$ 2,734,000
Disassembly, packaging and reinstalling of VLA Equipment	\$ 1,048,000
Disassembly, packaging and reinstalling of 11F12 Simulator	\$ 1,048,000
One-Time Moving Costs of ALRE Training Materials	\$ 271,000
MILCON Requirements	\$17,054,000
Disassembly and disposal of remaining ALRE training equipment	\$ 4,591,000

**Total one-time cost incurred by US Government: \$33,210,000**

Expect that the Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET) or NAS Pensacola representative will present enlisted and officer quarters "in excess," thus alleviating the \$3,988,000 MILCON requirement for military personnel quarters. In addition, there exists a \$13,065,000 MILCON requirement for new training facilities to house the above ALRE training equipment, and the substantial amounts of additional ALRE hardware presently located in CALASSES (Carrier Aircraft Launch And Support Systems Equipment Simulator).

The one-time costs that remain, however, cannot be negated. The expenses to be incurred in relocating these one-of-a-kind ALRE training devices are real and are required if the new school is to be as capable as the current Lakehurst facility. In addition, the costs of clean-up.

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH  
4TH DISTRICT, NEW JERSEY

INSACOLA  
Pg. 2.

remaining ALRE training equipment disposal and restoration of Hangar One equates to \$4,591,000.

Of particular note, the Navy's BSEC disallowed "lost productivity" costs, stating that "judicious management" of existing resources would eliminate this expense incurred in closing or relocating any military functions. Unfortunately, during the planned shutdown and relocation of NATTC Lakehurst, this area of important Fleet training will cease, causing disruptions in Fleet personnel assignments and creating the potential for personnel to report to their carriers untrained.

In this case, there is no other place in which to receive this specialized training except in the real-world of carrier operations. If real-world experiences were a sufficient, practical and safe option, the Navy would have disestablished NATTC years ago. In fact, it does not intend to close NATTC, merely move its highly successful current operation at Lakehurst to a new location at an estimated cost of \$33,210,000.

The Navy does not project any savings to the U.S. Government in relocating NATTC from NAES Lakehurst to NAS Pensacola. In fact, the Navy's decision to maintain its Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment (ALRE) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation facilities at Lakehurst provides an obvious training asset to the men and women preparing to use this equipment aboard Fleet aircraft carriers. Should the decision to close NAES be overturned by the BRAC Commission, NATTC should remain an integral part of Navy Lakehurst.

20 November 1994

Memorandum

From: LCDR Kennedy, OIC, NATTC Det Lakehurst  
To: LCDR Manley, Code N-4, CNET

Subj: BRAC-95 DATA CALL AMPLIFICATION

Ref: (a) BRAC-95 Scenario Development Data Call 3-20-0162-029

1. NATTC Millington BRAC Coordinator related to me that you are interested in the information we used to compile cost estimates for the BRAC Data Call of 18 NOV 94. This FAX will hopefully include more than you require.

2. First of all, the only data we had to work with was a draft copy of a letter from 1990 addressed from CO, NAEC to CNNT. It specified costs to move our equipment to NATTC Millington in that year. Using that date, we removed all TDY costs (BRAC Data Call instructions required us to ignore personnel per diem-type cost) and then very roughly corrected for inflation over six years (using slightly less than 3% per annum).

3. On page 2 of this FAX, you will see my spreadsheet math using their numbers and then correcting for inflation. Pages 3-6 are the draft copy of the letter from 1990.

4. You will note one number does not match our original input. The cost to move the C-13 catapult was noted as \$6,464,000 in our original input. I do not have the scratch paper on which we came up with that inflation-corrected number, but using the same algorithm as was used for the A-Gear and VLA, I now come up with \$7,055,373.

5. One last note: the 1990 estimate did not include the cost to move our 1112 Catapult Launch simulator. We estimated the cost to be the same as for the VLA simulator and equipment and that is why you see identical numbers for those on page 2-11 of our input to Ref (a).

6. I hope this data will be of use to you. If you have any questions, please call me at DSN 624-7359.

*D. L. Kennedy*  
D. L. KENNEDY

OPTIONAL FORM 99 (7-90)

**FAX TRANSMITTAL** # of pages = 5

To LCDR MANLEY	From LCDR KENNEDY OIC NATTC DET
Dept./Agency CNET - N4	Phone # DSN 624-7359
Fax # 922-4066	Fax # DSN 624-2639

NSN 7840-01-317-7300 5099-101 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

		1990	1994	Input	Totals
FC-13 Catapult	Disassemble	\$309,075	\$416,098	\$416,098	
	Preserve/Package	\$21,260	\$107,389	\$107,389	
	Reinstall & Checkout	\$3,737,685	\$4,857,691	\$4,857,691	
	Material	\$600,154	\$780,195	\$0	
	TDY	\$1,033,260	\$1,371,938	\$1,371,938	
	Program Mgmt	\$231,590	\$302,567	\$302,367	\$7,955,573
Mk7 Mod3 A-Gear	Disassemble	\$125,525	\$228,183	\$228,183	
	Preserve/Package	\$41,550	\$80,535	\$80,535	
	Reinstall & Checkout	\$1,517,930	\$1,973,309	\$1,973,309	
	Material	\$250,000	\$325,000	\$325,000	
	TDY	\$41,150	\$557,895	\$0	
	Program Mgmt	\$37,675	\$126,978	\$126,978	\$3,734,004
VLA Equipment	Disassemble	\$100,960	\$161,070	\$161,070	
	Preserve/Package	\$21,650	\$26,545	\$26,545	
	Reinstall & Checkout	\$410,455	\$511,590	\$511,590	
	Material	\$130,000	\$195,000	\$195,000	
	TDY	\$148,745	\$219,369	\$0	
	Program Mgmt	\$4,500	\$53,989	\$53,989	\$1,048,494
Packing/Trans	Packing	\$102,050	\$102,050	\$102,050	
	Rigging	\$115,596	\$115,596	\$115,596	
	Transportation	\$53,950	\$53,950	\$53,950	
Disassemble/Dispose (Equip not being trans)	Disassemble	\$1,498,900	\$1,498,770	\$1,498,770	
	Rigging/transport	\$6,084	\$6,084	\$6,084	
	Program Mgmt	\$123	\$119,999	\$119,999	
Disassemble/Dispose	Asbestos Removal	\$1,517,898	\$1,997,944	\$1,997,944	
	Steel	\$41,835	\$618,593	\$618,593	
	Disc/remove utility	\$71,883	\$96,022	\$96,022	
	Misc Removal/disp	\$130,500	\$177,150	\$177,150	Total One-Time Moving Costs
	Repair/repaint equip	\$71,814	\$76,460	\$76,460	\$4,540,935



Scenario No.:	3-20-0162-029
Scenario Title:	NAWC LAKEHURST
Date:	18 NOV 94

**Table 1-B: Point of Contact Information.** Please identify a knowledgeable point of contact familiar with the information relating to this closure/realignment scenario whom the BSA I can contact to answer any questions or to provide additional information as required. This point of contact must also be familiar with the location and name of the person responsible for maintaining any supporting documentation relating to this data call response.

Name:	LCDR DAVID L KENNEDY
Organization/Code:	NATTC DET LAKEHURST /00
Office Phone Number:	DSN 624-7359/2300 (908) 323-7359/2300
Fax Number:	DSN 624-2369 (908) 323-2369
Home Phone Number:	(908) 657-6212

**Table 1-C: Losing/Gaining Bases Involved in Scenario.** Complete the table on the next page to identify "bases" involved in the closure/realignment scenario. Note that the term "Losing Base" refers to host activities, independent activities or other activities specifically identified in the Scenario Development Data Call tasking which are being reduced in size, i.e., closing or being realigned. The term "Gaining Base" refers to host or independent activities which will be receiving sites for functions/personnel transferred from losing base(s). For example, a losing base is the activity referred to in the data call tasking, i.e., a Naval Station, Hospital, etc. Individual tenants should not be separately listed on this table, e.g., Dental Medical Clinic, Personnel Support Detachment, etc. Individual tenants will, however, be specifically identified in subsequent tables in the data call. The third column of the table

Enclosure (1)



**BRAC-95 SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT DATA CALL  
ENCLOSURE (2) - SCENARIO SUMMARY**

Complete a separate Enclosure (2) - Losing Base Questions for each "losing" base involved in the closure/realignment scenario. Make additional copies of this enclosure as necessary. Tables included in this enclosure are 2-A, 2-B, 2-C, 2-D, 2-E, and 2-F. Enter the Losing Base name in the block below:

Losing Base:	NAES LAKEHURST, NEW JERSEY
--------------	----------------------------

The first five tables in this enclosure will be used to identify the movement and/or elimination of military billets and civilian positions. Data entered in Tables 2-B and 2-C will be transferred to Table 2-D and will be used to reconcile manpower totals at the losing base. The entire losing base workforce as shown on the annotated copy of the Base Loading Data Attachment must be accounted for in the Table 2-D reconciliation.

General Note on Tables 2-A and 2-B. A separate copy of both of these two tables must be completed for each pair of activities between which transfers of personnel, equipment or vehicles will occur. That is, a single enclosure (1) response may require multiple copies of tables 2-A and 2-B. For example, if the scenario involves the closure of NAVSTA A and relocation of personnel to NAVSTA B and NAVSTA C, then two tables will be completed, one for transfers from NAVSTA A to NAVSTA B and one for transfers from NAVSTA A to NAVSTA C. Note that for purposes of completing these tables, Losing Bases and Gaining Bases are defined as a host activity, independent activity or other activity specifically identified in the data call tasking. Separate tables will not be prepared for individual tenant activities, instead, tenant numbers will be incorporated into the table for the Losing Base. Be certain to identify the name of both the gaining and losing base. Make additional copies of these two tables as necessary.

**Table 2-A: Disposition of Personnel - Detail Data** Please review the Base Loading Data Attachment and annotate any corrections, as necessary. Using the data contained in the Base Loading Data Attachment, complete the table on the next page. For both the host and tenant activities, identify, by UIC, the number of billets/positions being relocated to the identified receiving site. Each UIC shown as a separate line on the Base Loading Data Attachment must be separately listed in Table 2-A. Drilling reservists will not be included in officer and enlisted billet fields. Military students must be separately distinguished from officer and enlisted billets in COBRA. The Base Loading Data Attachment includes an identification of military students. Annotate the Base Loading Data Attachment to identify any additional students not currently shown, and include these corrected numbers in Table 2-A. Numbers of students are expressed as the estimated "Average On-Board" (AOB) which would be trained at the losing base in FY 2001 if a closure/realignment did not occur. Non-DON tenants must also be reviewed and a determination made as to whether the organization will be relocated. Relocating non-DON tenants must be included in the number of billets/positions identified as being transferred (and manpower totals adjusted accordingly). Disposition of tenant and reserve activities must be adequately coordinated.

Enclosure (2)

**BRAC-95 SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT DATA CALL  
ENCLOSURE (2) - SCENARIO SUMMARY**

**Table 2-F: Dynamic Base Information**

Complete the following "Supporting Data" section. Then, summarize this data in the Summary Data Table (2-F) that immediately follows this "Supporting Data" section. Show all entries in (\$000).

**Table 2-F: Supporting Data**

a. **Other One-Time Unique Costs.** Identify any other one-time unique costs at the losing base which will not be calculated automatically by the COBRA algorithms (as noted in the Introduction section). Examples include use of temporary office space, lease termination costs, etc. Only costs directly attributable to the closure/realignment action should be identified. This area should not be used to identify routine moving or personnel costs, which are calculated automatically by the COBRA algorithms, nor should it be used to identify one-time unique moving costs which will be addressed separately in item c. below. For each unique one-time cost, identify the amount, year in which the cost will be incurred and describe the nature of the cost. Do not double count any costs identified on Gaining Base tables (Enclosure (3)).

Losing Base: NAS LANGHURST NEW JERSEY

<u>Cost</u>	<u>FY</u>	<u>Description</u>
\$4,591	96	DISPOSAL OF EQUIPMENT NOT BEING TRANSFERRED

**BRAC-95 SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT DATA CALL  
ENCLOSURE (2) - SCENARIO SUMMARY**

b. **Other One-Time Unique Savings.** Identify any other one-time unique savings at the losing base which will not be calculated automatically by the COBRA algorithms (as noted in the Introduction section). Examples include net proceeds to DoD resulting from an existing MOU with a state or local government, one-time environmental compliance cost avoidances, etc. This area should not be used to identify routine moving or personnel savings, which are calculated automatically by the COBRA algorithms. Do not include Construction Cost Avoidances (which were identified in a separate data call), or Procurement Cost Avoidances (which are covered under item i, below). For each savings, identify the amount, year in which it will occur and describe the nature of the savings. Only savings directly attributable to the closure/realignment action should be identified. Do not double count any savings identified on Gaining Base tables (Enclosure (3)).

Losing Base: \_\_\_\_\_

N/A

Cost	FY	Description
------	----	-------------

1.

c. **One-Time Unique Moving Costs.** The COBRA algorithms use standard packing and shipping rates to calculate the cost of transporting equipment and vehicles. Identify here only those unique moving costs associated with movements out of the losing base that would be incurred in addition to standard packing and shipping costs associated with tonnage and vehicles identified in Table 2-B. Examples of unique moving costs include packing, special handling or recalibration of specialized laboratory or industrial equipment; movement of special materials, etc. If unique costs identified here include packing and shipping costs, then ensure that tonnage for this "unique" equipment is not included under the Mission and Support equipment identified in Table 2-B. For each cost included in the table above, identify the amount, year in which the cost will be incurred, the name of the gaining base and a brief description of the cost.

Losing Base: NAAS LAKEHURST, NEW JERSEY

Cost	FY	Gaining Base	Description
\$6,464	96	NAAS PENNSACOLA	CATAULTS
\$2,734	96	NAAS PENNSACOLA	INTERCOM-GEAR
\$1,048	96	NAAS PENNSACOLA	OPTICAL COORDINATE SYSTEMS
\$1,048	96	NAAS PENNSACOLA	11F12 CATAPULT LAUNCHING SIMULATION

**BRAC-95 SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT DATA CALL  
ENCLOSURE (2) - SCENARIO SUMMARY**

Summarize data shown in response to supporting data questions a. through j. above in the following table. Note that all entries must be shown in (\$000).

**Table2-F: Dynamic Base Information Summary**

Losing Base:							
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
a One-Time Unique Costs	\$4,591	0	0	0	0	0	\$4,591
b One-Time Unique Svgs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
c One-Time Move Costs	\$11,294	0	0	0	0	0	\$11,294
d Net Mission Costs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
e Net Mission Savings	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
f Misc Recur Costs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
g Misc Recur Savings	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
h Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
i Procurement Cost Avoid	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
j. Fac. Shutdown (KSI)				N/A			

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950420-12

FROM: <u>BROWDER, GLEN</u>	TO: <u>DIXON</u>
TITLE: <u>REP. (AL)</u>	TITLE: <u>CHAIRMAN</u>
ORGANIZATION: <u>U.S. CONGRESS</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCRCL</u>
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: <u>ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT</u>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓛ		COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

LETTER RESPONDING TO LAWE EUANS REQUEST TO TRANSFER TOWED AND SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY MAINTENANCE MISSIONS TO ROCK ISLANDS

Due Date: <u>950422</u>	Routing Date: <u>950420</u>	Date Originated: <u>950419</u>	Mail Date:
-------------------------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	------------

GLENN BROWDER  
3d DISTRICT, ALABAMA

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515-0103**

April 19, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

Processed by the committee  
when responding 950420-12

I am writing in response to a March 31 letter (attached) you received from my colleague Congressman Lane Evans of Illinois in which he proposed the transfer of towed and self-propelled artillery maintenance missions to Rock Island Arsenal. This proposal conflicts with the Department of Defense's 1995 base closure and realignment (BRAC) recommendation which calls for transfer of the maintenance missions to Anniston Army Depot. I urge the Commission to support the DOD recommendation and consolidate all tracked combat vehicles at Anniston. Transfer of these missions to Anniston will increase efficiencies, reduce costs, and improve readiness.

To understand the basis for the DOD recommendation, one must consider the distinct differences between an arsenal and a maintenance depot. Arsenals such as Rock Island manufacture weapon systems by assembling a combination of purchased and fabricated parts in a relatively clean environment. Rock Island has a history of manufacturing gun components for artillery systems.

A maintenance depot such as Anniston stands in stark contrast to the manufacturing operations of an arsenal. A depot has vehicle/component cleaning and reclamation operations, large abrasive cleaning and painting booths, chemical/degrease/steam cleaning operations and an industrial waste collection and treatment system to ensure the operations do not harm the environment. Anniston Army Depot has environmentally intensive operations that are used to clean, reclaim, overhaul, and/or maintain tracked combat vehicles such as tanks and self-propelled artillery.

As a combat vehicle maintenance depot, Anniston has capabilities not found at Rock Island Arsenal -- capabilities provided by vehicle engine, transmission, hydraulic and electro-optic repair shops/facilities. Repair and maintenance of self-propelled artillery also requires the use of specialized test facilities, such as Anniston's 22 engine test cells, five

WASHINGTON OFFICE:  
1221 LONGWORTH BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-0103  
(202) 225-3261

DISTRICT OFFICES:  
104 FEDERAL BUILDING  
POST OFFICE BOX 2042  
ANNISTON, AL 36202  
PHONE: 236-5655

107 FEDERAL BUILDING  
OPELIKA, AL 36801  
PHONE: 745-6221

115 EAST NORTHSIDE  
TUSKEGEE, AL 36083  
PHONE: 727-6490

April 19, 1995

Page 2

transmission test stands, a 1.13-mile vehicle test track, and a 1,399-acre function firing range -- test facilities that are not available at Rock Island Arsenal and that would be extremely expensive to duplicate. Often overlooked but essential to maintenance operations is the outdoor storage space necessary to store thousands of vehicles awaiting repair or disposal. Anniston currently has more than 93 acres set aside for outdoor vehicle storage.


Maintaining artillery systems is not new for Anniston Army Depot. Prior to 1976, Anniston routinely repaired and maintained self-propelled and towed artillery, light combat vehicles, and trucks. Anniston has retained the infrastructure, facilities, capacity, and skilled workforce to perform this work again. Anniston maintains the most technologically advanced ground combat vehicle in the Army arsenal, the M1 Abrams battle tank. The technological capabilities and skills possessed by Anniston more than meet the requirements of the artillery workload.

The recommendation to consolidate all ground maintenance workload at Anniston will improve peacetime efficiency and wartime readiness. Peacetime effectiveness and efficiencies occur when a given amount of overhead is spread across a greater direct labor base. Wartime readiness is improved by having maintenance of all combat vehicles, including artillery, at a single site. During exercises, preparation for deployment, contingencies and mobilization, each ground maintenance depot has regularly dispatched teams in support of its particular weapon systems to assist our troops. Once all ground combat vehicles are consolidated at Anniston, a single multi-skilled team of technicians will provide support to the soldier. This will simplify control and coordination for the field commander and provide improved support with fewer personnel.

I strongly agree with Congressman Evans' statement that your Commission must strive to limit BRAC implementation costs. The cost to move Letterkenny Army Depot's artillery workload to Anniston has been assessed already and found to be minimal. The movement of the artillery mission will improve efficiencies, reduce costs, and improve readiness.

Thank you for your consideration of this information. With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely,



Glen Browder  
Member of Congress



LANE EVANS  
17TH DISTRICT, ILLINOIS

COMMITTEES:

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON  
VETERANS' AFFAIRS  
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON  
NATURAL RESOURCES

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-1317

WASHINGTON OFFICE:  
2326 RAYBURN BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-1317  
(302) 225-5805

DISTRICT OFFICES:  
1936 47TH AVE., #5  
MOLINE, IL 61265  
(309) 793-5760  
TOLL FREE: 800-322-6210  
1640 N. HENDERSON ST.  
GALESBURG, IL 61401  
(309) 342-4411  
MONMOUTH CITY HALL  
SECOND FLOOR  
MONMOUTH, IL 61462  
121 SCOTLAND, MACLAN PLAZA  
MACOMB, IL 61455

March 31, 1995

The Honorable Alan Dixon, Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore St., Suite 1425  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:


I am writing you concerning the proposed transfer of the maintenance mission at the Letterkenny Army Depot to the Anniston Army Depot. I urge you to modify this recommendation by sending part of this work - the rebuild of self-propelled and towed howitzer systems - to the Rock Island Arsenal (RIA).

The transfer to Anniston, recommended by the Department of Defense (DOD), is part of a strategy to reduce infrastructure and overhead costs. I believe that one piece of this workload, the rebuilding of self-propelled and towed howitzer systems, could be accomplished with less expense by transferring it instead to RIA.

RIA already performs the mission of backing up Letterkenny for rebuild of these items. As a current producer of self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, RIA has the facilities, equipment and - most importantly - the expertise to accomplish this mission without upfront costs. Transfer of this mission to RIA would avoid the expense of setting up this capability at Anniston.

It is important that the commission keep implementation costs low by developing plans which reduce infrastructure rather than recreating it. I urge you to change the recommendation made on this matter by DOD and direct the rebuild mission of these items to RIA. I appreciate your consideration of this issue.

Sincerely,



LANE EVANS  
Member of Congress



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

950420-12R1

April 21, 1995

The Honorable Glen Browder  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congressman Browder:

Thank you for your recent letter concerning Anniston Army Depot. I appreciate your strong interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendation on Department of the Army depots.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I can be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950420-13

FROM: LUGAR, RICHARD	TO: DIXON
TITLE: SENATOR (IN)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: NAWC, INDIANAPOLIS	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION	✓			AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL	✓			CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR. INFORMATION SERVICES				BRITTA BRACKNEY	✓		

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING COPY OF HIS TESTIMONY FROM ~~RE~~ CHICAGO REGIONAL HEARING.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950420	Date Originated:	Mail Date:
-----------	----------------------	------------------	------------

**Statement of Senator Richard G. Lugar**  
**Before the Base Realignment and Closure Commission**  
**on Behalf of the Naval Air Warfare Center, Indianapolis, Indiana**  
**Chicago, Illinois**  
**April 12, 1995**

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950420-13

Chairman Dixon, members of the Commission, I am pleased to testify before you today to discuss the Department of Defense's (DoD) recommendation to the Base Closure Commission to close the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) in Indianapolis, Indiana.

I appreciate the opportunity to share my thoughts on the important work performed at NAWC - Indianapolis, and to express my support for an alternative partnership proposal prepared by Indianapolis Mayor Steve Goldsmith. I strongly support Mayor Goldsmith's plan because I believe it achieves real cost savings for DoD, reduces the economic impact on the local economy, and provides growth opportunities for Indiana's technology and manufacturing industries. I hope the Commission will carefully examine the merits of this partnership proposal as the Commission prepares to make its final base closure recommendations to the President later this year.

The Naval Air Warfare Center has a long and distinguished record of service to our nation's military forces. With its beginnings in 1942 as a naval ordnance plant producing the Norden Bombsight, NAWC over the years has changed, functions, missions and even its name to meet the evolving requirements of the U.S. Navy.

As a former mayor of Indianapolis, I am familiar with NAWC and have visited the facility many times. I have met with many of the skilled, dedicated professionals whose hard work and career service contributed to NAWC's special role in maintaining U.S. military readiness. I understand the valuable role they play in preserving a core technology research and knowledge base for our national defense.

NAWC can and should play a significant role in the development and maintenance of our nation's defense for the 21st Century. NAWC - Indianapolis is a leader in the design, development and limited manufacturing of high technology airborne electronic systems for the Navy.

As a "knowledge factory," NAWC is a unique and dynamic engineering and technology center that provides today's downsized Navy the opportunity to outsource and develop dual use technologies critical to our nation's industrial base. As a "smart buyer" for the Navy, NAWC provides acquisition support and rapid prototyping of new equipment to assure the Defense Department buys the right equipment at the lowest possible cost.

To maintain core capabilities and specialized workforce in an era of diminished defense spending, NAWC streamlined its management structure, expanded its customer base, and forged partnerships with the private sector and academia. Recently designated a "Reinvention Laboratory" by the Defense Department, NAWC strives to maintain the defense technology base by leveraging investment for dual use initiatives through entrepreneurial partnerships with private industry. NAWC and Crane have also developed a working relationship with Purdue University, a premier engineering school in Lafayette, Indiana.

As a result, NAWC benefits from Indiana's strong manufacturing industrial base and academic resources, finding new and better ways to serve its customers while reducing overhead costs.

As a Defense Base Operating Fund activity, NAWC is a cost contained, pay as you go, facility generating most of its revenue from its government customers. NAWC- Indianapolis is the most productive of all the Navy's warfare centers. Reimbursable revenues have remained steady since FY 1992, with inflows projected to average over \$335 million per year through FY 1996. Despite its steady workload, NAWC - Indianapolis managed to reduce overhead costs by 28% since 1992.

NAWC - Indianapolis has proven its ability to adjust to the changing demands of the Department of Defense while delivering essential engineering and technology services to the Fleet. While defense spending continues to decline, the core capabilities, facilities and institutional knowledge found at NAWC continue to be vital to the increasing demands of the 21st Century Navy.

Prior to the Defense Department's February 28th announcement to recommend closure of NAWC - Indianapolis, I worked with the Indiana Congressional Delegation to demonstrate to the Navy the value of maintaining a strong "Midwest Navy" presence in Indiana through the combined functions of NAWC, the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Crane, Indiana, and NSWC Crane, Louisville, Kentucky. I believed it was important to highlight the complementary equipment development, maintenance and testing work performed by these three sites, and to urge the Navy to review carefully the vital integrated role these facilities can play in meeting the Navy's air and surface warfare requirements for the next Century.

I support the Base Realignment and Closure process as a careful and systematic evaluation of our nation's military requirements and assets. Within this process, however, I believe creative solutions can be found to reduce defense spending, protect our nation's technology base and lessen the economic impacts on communities affected by a facility closure.

Anticipating the Defense Department's 1995 closure recommendations, Indianapolis Mayor Steve Goldsmith proposed his alternative partnership plan using privatization and administrative consolidation to meet Defense Department spending targets and to address local community concerns. Mayor Goldsmith has been a leader in the effort to downsize government and improve service efficiency through privatization.

On February 28, the Defense Department recommended closure of the NAWC facility and called for elimination of 1,300 positions and relocation of 1,600 additional jobs to bases in California, Maryland and southern Indiana. Under the Mayor's partnership proposal, the NAWC facility building would be transferred to the City of Indianapolis or to the General Services Administration at no cost. The positions slated for elimination would be transferred to private sector defense organizations but would remain located in the NAWC facility. This approach permits DoD to reduce overhead costs but retain the vital knowledge and capabilities base to meet future technology development needs and crisis response requirements.

After learning of the Mayor's partnership alternative, I met with Defense Secretary William Perry to express my support for the plan and request a Defense Department review of the proposal. I also arranged for Mayor Goldsmith to present his plan to Deputy Secretary John Deutch on March 8, 1995. Secretary Deutch expressed interest in privatization as a worthy alternative to outright closure and gave assurances that the Defense Department and the Navy would fully evaluate the Mayor's plan.

The Mayor's innovative proposal features several components I believe are attractive to the Defense Department as it seeks ways to do more with less. In addition to assuming closure of the NAWC facility as a DoD site, the Mayor's partnership plan also provides significant cost savings by: 1) removing 1,300 employees from the federal payroll; 2) avoiding relocation expenses for 1,600 employees currently slated for transfer to NSWC Crane, California, and Maryland; and 3) consolidating certain NAWC administrative and personnel records functions to Crane.

In addition, the Mayor's partnership proposal reduces DoD's overall facility closure costs from at least \$78 million to \$20 million, and eliminates all military construction costs, saving at least an additional \$20 million in costs to house workers slated for transfer.

Throughout its history, NAWC - Indianapolis performed a unique mission for the Navy. Whether in peacetime or in crisis, dedicated NAWC professionals have met the Fleet's readiness requirements and served as an engineering and product development resource for the Defense Department. With a changing national security environment and fewer dollars for defense programs, I believe Mayor Goldsmith's future growth plan is a viable proposal that addresses the community economic hardship and industrial base issues common with today's defense closures. I believe this alternative partnership proposal will promote cooperative public/private sector initiatives to ensure our national defense, protect the U.S. technology base, and encourage investment in dual use technologies. I also believe this proposal will help the U.S. maintain its leadership position in engineering and technology development for the defense and commercial sectors.

Despite reduced defense budgets, I believe we can still put our best minds to work in addressing the engineering challenges of today and tomorrow, and do so at less cost to the taxpayers.

I urge the Commission to give every consideration to the merits of this partnership proposal for the future of the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis as the Commission makes its final recommendations to the President later this year.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you and your committee today.

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950420-14

<b>FROM:</b> GILCREST, WAYNE T.	<b>TO:</b> COX, REBECCA
<b>TITLE:</b> REP. (MD)	<b>TITLE:</b> COMMISSIONER
<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> U.S. CONGRESS	<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> DBLRC
<b>INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED:</b> NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER, ANN	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
				COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				<b>REVIEW AND ANALYSIS</b>			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER		X	
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

Ⓢ	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

LETTER OF SUPPORT FOR THE NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER, ANNAPOLIS.

Due Date: 950422	Routing Date: 950420	Date Originated: 950419	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------



WAYNE T. GILCHREST

1ST DISTRICT, MARYLAND

332 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-2001  
TELEPHONE: (202) 225-5311  
FAX: (202) 225-0254



COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION  
AND INFRASTRUCTURE  
CHAIRMAN, PUBLIC BUILDINGS  
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
WATER RESOURCES

COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES  
FISHERIES, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS  
NATIVE AMERICANS AND  
INSULAR AFFAIRS

## Congress of the United States House of Representatives

April 19, 1995

Commissioner Rebecca Cox  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to this number  
when responding: 950420-14

Dear Commissioner Cox:

It was good to be part of your visit to the Naval Surface Center's Annapolis Detachment on March 27, 1995. I hope you got an appreciation for the importance and complexity of the Machinery R&D facilities at this site and the dedication and competence of the staff.

As a member of the BRAC 1993 Commission, you were a party to the unanimous rejection of the Navy's 1993 proposal to disestablish the Annapolis Detachment. There were several reasons for the rejection: the Detachment is an enclave within the Annapolis Naval Station - Naval Academy Complex, and much inefficient travel would be required in implementing the recommendation. The most significant BRAC conclusion, however was that costs were greatly understated and savings exaggerated.

Although the 1995 recommendation is different in some respects from that of 1993, the same flaws are increasingly evident. To illustrate, the Navy proposed to move people only in 1993, principally to Philadelphia, and retain facilities operational in Annapolis, all for a one-time cost of \$24.7M. For 1995, they are recommending moving people and the preponderance of these large and complex facilities, yet the costs are still claimed at only \$25M.

The errors in the Navy's economic reasoning are easier to uncover and evaluate this year because of the "openness" policy established by BRAC 1995 Commission. As summarized in the attached, real costs associated with the recommended closure and relocation exceed \$80M using the Navy's own "certified" data. Similarly, the real savings are less than \$6M per year, again using only Navy certified data. When these costs and savings are evaluated by the COBRA model, the time to break even is almost 20 years rather than the advertised one year.

Additional costs beyond these already certified will assuredly be identified as the planning process proceeds, further increasing the costs and reducing the savings - significant new military construction requirements at the Philadelphia and Carderock

receiving sites, and costs to transfer support functions to the USNA, to name a few.

Clearly the 1995 proposal for Annapolis deserves rejection as a significantly bad investment for the taxpayers. It's a bad deal for the Navy too, when we further consider the inevitable talent loss, the disruption to vital research, crucial programs, and the total loss of Deep Submergence and Submarine Fluid Dynamics Capabilities. A closure would also preclude consolidation of the cross-service Joint Spectrum Center at this site, and eliminate a long-standing synergistic relationship between the U.S. Naval Academy and the laboratory R&D community.

As the current Commission expert on the Annapolis Detachment, and the only one with the 1993 perspective, please help us again avoid a decision which would be both costly and damaging to an essential capability.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Wayne T. Gilchrest".

Wayne T. Gilchrest  
Member of Congress

Enclosure

## Economic Analysis of BRAC'95 Impact on NSWC\Annapolis

The Navy has recommended the closure of NSWC\Annapolis in accordance with Navy Scenario 3-20-0198-35A, as modified. Scenario 35A specifies the following capability disposition:

### To NSWC\Philadelphia

- Advanced Shipboard Auxiliary Machinery Facility
- Electric Power Technology Facility
- Advanced Electric Propulsion Development Facility
- Pulsed Power Facility
- Advanced Propulsion Machinery Facility
- Machinery Acoustics Silencing Facility
- 261 civilian personnel

### To NSWC\White Oak

- Magnetism Fields Laboratory
- 17 civilian personnel

### To NSWC\Carderock

- 2 civilian personnel

### Abandon at NSWC\Annapolis

- Deep Ocean Pressure Facility
- Submarine Fluid Dynamics Facility
- 138 civilian personnel eliminated

Scenario 35A was modified by direction of the Navy as follows:

- add the CFC Elimination capability to the NSWC\Philadelphia migration
- build a new magnetism capability at NSWC\Carderock, abandon the NSWC\White Oak facility
- transfer 5 civilians to Naval Station\Annapolis to operate the water treatment plant

The following analysis lists costs used by the Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) and certified Navy costs not used by the BSEC.

### Cost Data Used by the BSEC

● One-time costs	
- Unique	6513K
- Military Construction	8000K
- Moving	6854K
- Overhead	2905K
- Personnel	<u>764K</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b>25036K</b>

## Economic Analysis of BRAC'95 Impact on NSWC\Annapolis

The Navy, as part of DOD's BRAC'95 recommendations, has recommended the closure of NSWC\Annapolis. The following is a compilation of the cost data used by the Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) and certified Navy cost data not used by the BSEC.

### Cost Data Summary

Item	Data Used by the BSEC (\$)	Certified Navy Data Not Used by the BSEC (\$)
<b>One-time costs</b>		
- Unique	6513K	23232K
- Military Construction	8000K	8000K
- Moving	6854K	49015K
- Overhead	2905K	2487K
- Personnel	764K	760K
<b>Total</b>	<b>25036K</b>	<b>83494K</b>
<b>Recurring Savings</b>		
- Personnel	7623K	3630K
- Overhead	6904K	2047K
<b>Total</b>	<b>14527K</b>	<b>5677K</b>
<b>Personnel</b>		
- Relocated	280	320
- Eliminated	138	65
- Retained	0	5
- New hires	0	28
<b>Total</b>	<b>418</b>	<b>418</b>
<b>COBRA Results</b>		
- One-time Costs	25M	83.5M
- Annual Savings	14.5M	5.7M
- Breakeven	1 year	19 years
- Net Present Value (20 years)	175M	-5.6M

● <b>Recurring Savings</b>	
- Personnel	7623K
- Overhead	<u>6904K</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b>14527K</b>

● <b>Personnel</b>	
- Transferred	280
- Eliminated	<u>138</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b>418</b>

DOD's COBRA (Cost of Base Realignment Actions) model is used to then calculate the economic benefits of the closure:

<b>BSEC COBRA Results</b>	
● <b>Total one-time costs</b>	<b>- \$25M</b>
● <b>Recurring Savings</b>	<b>- \$14.5M</b>
● <b>Breakeven</b>	<b>- 1 year</b>
● <b>Net Present Value</b>	<b>- \$175M</b>

---

**Additional Certified Navy Cost Data Not Used by the BSEC**

● <b>One-time costs</b>	
- Unique	16719K (Contract termination costs)
- Military Construction	0K
- Moving	42161K (Movement of facilities)
- Overhead	-418K
- Personnel	<u>-4K</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b>58458K</b>
● <b>Recurring Costs</b>	
- Personnel	3993K (More personnel being retained/relocated)
- Overhead	4857K (Increased travel costs, lease costs, higher operating costs at Philadelphia, lower operating savings at Annapolis)
<b>Total</b>	<u><b>8850K</b></u>

● Personnel	
- Transferred	320 (includes the addition of 40 for the CFC work)
- Eliminated	65 (includes the subtraction of 40 for the CFC work, 5 for the water treatment plant operation and 28 required new hires from Philadelphia excess personnel)
- Retained at Annapolis	5 (water treatment plant operators)
- New hires at Philadelphia	<u>28</u> (from excess at Philadelphia)
Total	418

**COBRA Results Using All Certified Data**

- Total one-time costs - \$83.5M
- Recurring Savings - \$ 5.7M
- Breakeven - 19 years
- Net Present Value - (minus (-)) \$5.5M



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number  
when responding OS0420-14R1

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 24, 1995

The Honorable Wayne T. Gilchrest  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Congressman Gilchrest:

Thank you for your recent letter concerning the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Annapolis, Maryland. I appreciate your continued interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

The briefings and discussions with you and the other congressional and community officials provided the Commission with a great deal of information about the operations of the NSWC, Annapolis. I can assure you that the information you provided will be considered by the Commission in our continued review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I can be of service.

Sincerely,

Rebecca G. Cox  
Commissioner

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950420-15

FROM: STUMP, E. GORDON	TO: CORNELLA, AL
TITLE: THE ADJUTANT GENERAL	TITLE: COMMISSIONER
ORGANIZATION: STATE OF MICHIGAN	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: SELFRIDGE AFB	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓	<del>    </del>		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	①	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions		FYI

Subject/Remarks:

LETTER OF SUPPORT.

Due Date: 950424	Routing Date: 950420	Date Originated: 950417	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------



STATE OF MICHIGAN



JOHN ENGLER, Governor

**DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS**

2500 S. WASHINGTON AVENUE, LANSING, MI 48913-5101

MAJOR GENERAL E. GORDON STUMP

Director, and The Adjutant General

April 17, 1995

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950420-15

Honorable Al Cornella  
Defense Base Closing and Realignment Commission  
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Cornella:

Following the BRAC hearings in Chicago on April 12, 1995, you generously spent some invaluable time with a few members of Michigan's Save Our Selfridge delegation. On their behalf, please accept my genuine appreciation for your keen insights and sound advice.

As you might expect, we have earnestly begun integrating your suggestions into our presentation for Commissioner Steele's visit, April 24. As you indicated, we will focus our justification on the Army's considerable lack of economic feasibility. Given the joint nature of Selfridge Air National Guard Base, it simply doesn't make sense for the Army to start dismantling it.

Given that the Army didn't consider the costs of the other tenant units, or consult with them prior to making their proposal, we have firmed up our analysis of VHA/BOQ allowances required for the entire housing area. We have also itemized costs of the base support services (medical clinic, security and fire, MWR, to name a few) that must be replaced, if the Garrison closed. There are considerably more costs associated with shifting expenses from one agency to another, than the Army accounted for.

In every effort we can put forth, Save Our Selfridge, local and state legislators will be happy to provide you with any further information that supports keeping Selfridge open. We firmly contend Selfridge possesses all the elements of a model, joint installation. Through your objective contribution to our mission, Selfridge Garrison will stand the test of these hearings and continue to serve the best interests of our nation's defense.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "E. Gordon Stump".

E. GORDON STUMP  
Maj Gen, MI ANG  
The Adjutant General



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Please refer to file number  
when responding 950420-15R1

April 21, 1995

Major General E. Gordon Stump  
The Adjutant General  
State of Michigan  
2500 S. Washington Avenue  
Lansing, Michigan 48913-5101

Dear General Stump:

Thank you for your recent letter concerning Selfridge Army Garrison. It was good to meet with you at the Commission's regional hearing in Chicago, and I appreciate your comments.

The meeting with you provided the Commission with a great deal of information about the operations of the Selfridge Army Garrison. I can assure you that the information will be considered by the Commission in our continued review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,

Alton W. Cornella  
Commissioner

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950420-16

FROM: DUNCAN, DOUG	TO: COX, REBECCA
TITLE: COUNTY EXECUTIVE	TITLE: COMMISSIONER
ORGANIZATION: MONTGOMERY, COUNTY	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: NSWC, WHITE OAK	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER		X	
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES				BRITTA BRAEKUP	✓		

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Direct Response
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> FYI

Subject/Remarks:

LETTER OF SUPPORT

**\* NO RESPONSE NECESSARY \***

Due Date: 950424	Routing Date: 950420	Date Originated: 950411	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------



Please refer to this number  
when recording 950420-16

OFFICE OF THE COUNTY EXECUTIVE  
ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND 20850

Douglas M. Duncan  
*County Executive*

April 11, 1995

The Honorable Rebecca G. Cox  
Commissioner  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
Suite 1425  
1700 North Moore Street  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Commissioner Cox:

On behalf of the citizens of Montgomery County, I wish to express our gratitude for your visit to the Naval Surface Warfare Center at White Oak on March 27, 1995, and for the time and attention accorded our community representatives to express their views on this important installation.

As you heard, the County in cooperation with Governor Glendening, the Maryland Congressional delegation and local citizens groups, is intensively analyzing the data upon which the Department of Defense relied in recommending the closure of White Oak and cancellation of the Naval Sea Systems Command ("NAVSEA") relocation there. We intend to present our findings to the Commission very shortly.

White Oak has been an important part of our County and a critical factor in our Nation's Defense for 50 years. Its magnificent setting and unique laboratory facilities made White Oak one of the premier test and evaluation installations of the Defense Department. We believe that the Commission's analysis of the DOD data will convince you to retain these critically important and unique national security facilities and to reaffirm the BRAC '93 recommendation to relocate NAVSEA to White Oak.


The Honorable Rebecca G. Cox  
April 11, 1995  
Page 2

In this regard, we believe the quality of life advantages of White Oak for Navy personnel and their families ought to be an important factor in the Commission's decision on the NAVSEA relocation. We would urge you and your fellow commissioners to tour the Washington Navy Yard to see its inability to accommodate major additional increases of facilities and personnel. The costs to accommodate those facilities and personnel would be enormous. The Navy's recommendation to move NAVSEA to White Oak in 1993 was predicated in large measure on many of these factors.

Once again, I wish to thank you for giving us so much of your valuable time. We look forward to formally presenting our case to the Commission at your regional hearing in Baltimore on May 4, 1995.

We wish you the very best as you carry out your difficult assignment this year.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Douglas M. Duncan".

Douglas M. Duncan  
County Executive

DMD/ng

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950420-17

FROM: RENDELL, EDWARD G.	TO: DIXON
TITLE: MAYOR	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: CITY OF PHILADELPHIA	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: NSWC - PHILADELPHIA	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER		X	
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Direct Response
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING AN ADDITIONAL 30 MINUTES AT BALTIMORE REGIONAL HEARING; ~~AND~~ ALSO, REQUESTING A COMMISSIONER VISIT THE NSWC PHILADELPHIA.

Due Date: 950424

Routing Date: 950420

Date Originated: 950411

Mail Date:



# CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

OFFICE OF THE MAYOR  
ROOM 215 CITY HALL  
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19107-3295  
(215) 686-2181  
FAX (215) 686-2170

EDWARD G. RENDELL  
MAYOR

April 11, 1995

Chairman Alan Dixon  
Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 N. Moore Street  
Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950420-17

Dear Mr. Dixon:

I am writing to request that an additional 30 minutes be provided to the City of Philadelphia at the regional BRAC hearing to be held on May 4 in Baltimore, Maryland.

At the regional hearing, the BRAC Commission has allocated 130 minutes to the state of Maryland, 100 minutes to Virginia, and 165 minutes to Pennsylvania. **The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, however, is slated to lose almost three times as many jobs as Maryland and over eight times as many jobs as Virginia from this round of base closures.** I do not believe that the time allocated to Pennsylvania, compared to that given to Virginia and Maryland, adequately addresses this fact. Additionally, 20 minutes of time has been provided to North Carolina, even though the state is not scheduled to lose any jobs from the BRAC '95 recommendations.

The City of Philadelphia, by contrast, is the only community in the country to have military installations closed in all three previous BRAC rounds, accounting for over 75 percent of all the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's civilian job losses attributed to the BRAC process. The City has four distinct closure scenarios which it must address in 35 minutes at the May 4 hearing, whereas other communities in Pennsylvania can focus their time supporting one installation.

It is especially important that we have additional time allocated to discuss the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Philadelphia site. The Department of Defense has recommended realigning NSWC-Annapolis to Philadelphia, and supporting this consolidation is a high priority for the City. As you may be aware, the Maryland Congressional delegation was successful in

leading the effort which lead the BRAC Commission to overturn a similar proposal during BRAC '93 deliberations. We have learned that the Maryland delegation has launched a full-scale campaign to have the DoD's 1995 recommendation overturned and has developed a proposal which would target NSWC-Philadelphia for consolidation and/or closure.

Additionally, I would like to request that a Commissioner make a site visit to NSWC-Philadelphia. I am aware of the Commission's general policy not to send Commissioners to potential receiving sites. I understand, however, that exceptions have been made in certain cases, such as Fort MacDill, Florida. Given the importance of NSWC-Philadelphia to the City of Philadelphia's conversion plans for the Philadelphia Naval Complex as well as the Maryland delegation's concerted efforts to target NSWC-Philadelphia, I believe a site visit by a Commissioner would be appropriate.

I appreciate your help to assure that the City of Philadelphia has adequate opportunity to provide input to the BRAC Commission on our base closure issues. Please call me if you have any questions or require additional information.

Sincerely,

*Ed Rendell*

Edward G. Rendell  
Mayor

cc: Governor Thomas Ridge  
Senator Arlen Specter  
Senator Rick Santorum  
Congressman Thomas Foglietta  
Congressman Curt Weldon  
Congressman Robert Borski  
Congressman Chaka Fattah

EGR/bp





**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425

ARLINGTON, VA 22209

703-696-0504

950420-172

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

**COMMISSIONERS:**

AL CORNELLA

REBECCA COX

GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)

S. LEE KLING

RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)

MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)

WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 26, 1995

The Honorable Edward G. Rendell  
Mayor, City of Philadelphia  
Office of the Mayor  
Room 215 City Hall  
Philadelphia, PA 19107-3295

Dear Mayor Rendell:

Thank you for your letter requesting additional time for the City of Philadelphia at the May 4 Baltimore regional hearing. I appreciate your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.


I understand your interest in highlighting the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Philadelphia which would gain new missions under the Defense Department's closure and realignment recommendations. In making its time allocations for individual states, however, the Commission only considered installations which would be negatively affected by the Defense Department's recommendations. The State of Pennsylvania received 165 minutes and may use this block of time as it chooses. The Commission has requested in previous correspondence that the elected officials in Pennsylvania work together to coordinate witnesses to ensure that the allotted time is used to address the concerns of the people and communities affected by the Defense Department's recommendations.

As you know, Commissioner Alton W. Cornella visited two Philadelphia area facilities slated for closure or realignment by the Secretary of Defense on April 7, 1995. Additionally, Mr. David Epstein of the Commission staff visited NSWC/CD-P on April 6, 1995. You can be assured that the information gained from his visit has been shared with the other Commissioners and me. Your request to have a Commissioner visit the facility will be given every consideration, but it will depend on the schedules and availability of Commissioners in the coming weeks.

Page 2  
April 26, 1995  
The Honorable Edward G. Rendell

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process.  
Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I can be of service.

Sincerely,



Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cw

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950420-18

FROM: MEIER, RAYMOND A.	TO: DIXON
TITLE: COUNTY EXECUTIVE	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: ONEIDA COUNTY, NY	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: ROME LAB	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

THANK YOU FOR VISIT. ALSO, LETTER OF SUPPORT.

Due Date:

Routing Date: 950420

Date Originated: 950418

Mail Date:



COUNTY OF ONEIDA

*Office of the County Executive*

RAYMOND A. MEIER  
County Executive

ONEIDA COUNTY OFFICE BUILDING  
800 PARK AVENUE, UTICA, NEW YORK 13501  
(315) 798-5800 FAX (315) 798-2390

April 18, 1995

File number of this number  
when responding 950420-18

Alan J. Dixon, Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

Thank you for your recent visit to Oneida County's Rome Laboratory. As you had an opportunity to observe when you were here, as host to this irreplaceable asset, the people of our community have considerable reason to be proud. The nation and our military have also always believed that Rome Lab and its accomplishments are a source of pride and security. It is because of Rome Lab's unquestioned excellence, that we were glad that you were able to observe, first hand, the rarely trumpeted but always vital work that has been going on in Central New York for the last four decades.

Unfortunately, the Air Force, in their haste to make recommendations to your Commission, overlooked basic facts regarding the Lab's military value and the cost to replicate the physical and human resources that are Rome Lab. We are grateful that a Commission such as yours exists to provide a thoughtful, independent review of what we believe is, in this instance at least, an ill-conceived and potentially dangerously disruptive recommendation by the Department of Defense.

We appreciate the chance you are giving us for a fair hearing, Mr. Chairman, and although I am hopeful that the community's presentation was compelling, I must confess that the entire presentation could be distilled to one aphorism -- "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." For all our sakes.

Thank you again and I look forward to seeing you and your staff as we continue our dialogue throughout the process.

Sincerely,

Raymond A. Meier  
Oneida County Executive

RAM:msw



COUNTY OF ONEIDA  
*Office of the County Executive*  
ONEIDA COUNTY OFFICE BUILDING  
800 PARK AVENUE, UTICA, NEW YORK 13501  
(315) 798-5800 FAX (315) 798-2390

RAYMOND A. MEIER  
County Executive

April 18, 1995

Rebecca Cox, Vice-Chair  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Vice-Chair Cox:

Thank you for your recent visit to Oneida County's Rome Laboratory. As you had an opportunity to observe when you were here, as host to this irreplaceable asset, the people of our community have considerable reason to be proud. The nation and our military have also always believed that Rome Lab and its accomplishments are a source of pride and security. It is because of Rome Lab's unquestioned excellence, that we were glad that you were able to observe, first hand, the rarely trumpeted but always vital work that has been going on in Central New York for the last four decades.

Unfortunately, the Air Force, in their haste to make recommendations to your Commission, overlooked basic facts regarding the Lab's military value and the cost to replicate the physical and human resources that are Rome Lab. We are grateful that a Commission such as yours exists to provide a thoughtful, independent review of what we believe is, in this instance at least, an ill-conceived and potentially dangerously disruptive recommendation by the Department of Defense.

We appreciate the chance you are giving us for a fair hearing, Madame Commissioner, and although I am hopeful that the community's presentation was compelling, I must confess that the entire presentation could be distilled to one aphorism -- "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." For all our sakes.

Thank you again and I look forward to seeing you and your staff as we continue our dialogue throughout the process.

Sincerely,

Raymond A. Meier  
Oneida County Executive

RAM:maw

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950420-19

FROM: GRAHAM HENRY	TO: LYLES, DAVID
TITLE: CHAIRMAN	TITLE: STAFF DIRECTOR
ORGANIZATION: JACKSONVILLE CHAMBER	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A			
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Direct Response
<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

THANK YOU FOR MEETING WITH JACKSONVILLE GROUP.

Due Date: 0	Routing Date: 950420	Date Originated: 950417	Mail Date:
-------------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------



April 17, 1995

Please refer to this number  
when requesting 950420-19

Mr. David S. Lyles  
Staff Director  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment  
Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Lyles:

Personally and on behalf of the Jacksonville Chamber of Commerce, I want to thank you for meeting with our Washington D.C. trip participants during our trip last month.

Congresswoman Tillie Fowler speaks highly of you and is working hard for our community in its pursuit to retain its military complex. We appreciate you accepting her request to meet with our group.

Again, thank you for taking the time to meet with us, and for helping to make our trip such a success.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Henry H. Graham, Jr." in a cursive style.

Henry H. Graham, Jr.  
Chairman

**DOWNTOWN OFFICE**  
3 Independent Drive 32202-5092  
Post Office Box 329  
Jacksonville, Florida 32201-9965  
(904) 366-6600  
FAX (904) 632-0617

**BEACHES DEPARTMENT**  
413 Pablo Avenue  
Jacksonville Beach, Florida 32250  
(904) 249-3868  
FAX (904) 241-7556

**CONVENTION & VISITORS BUREAU**  
3 Independent Drive  
Jacksonville, Florida 32202-5092  
(904) 798-9148  
FAX (904) 798-9103



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950420-20

FROM: <u>DIXON</u>	TO: <u>HARRISON, JERRY</u>
TITLE: <u>CHAIRMAN</u>	TITLE: <u>CHIEF OF LEG LIAISON</u>
ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCRC</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>OFFICE OF SEC OF ARMY</u>
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: <u>FORT MCCLELLAN</u>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE	✓			COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Direct Response
<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING LETTER FROM ALABAMA DELEGATION CONCERNING THE CHEMICAL DEFENSE TRAINING FACILITY BEING MOVED FROM FORT MCCLELLAN.

Due Date: _____	Routing Date: <u>950420</u>	Date Originated: <u>950420</u>	Mail Date: <u>950420</u>
-----------------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	--------------------------





THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

April 20, 1995

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:  
AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTROYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

Major General Jerry C. Harrison  
Chief of Legislative Liaison  
Office of the Secretary of the Army  
1600 Army Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20310-1600


Dear General Harrison:

Attached is a letter I received from members of the Alabama Congressional delegation concerning Fort McClellan.

I would appreciate your responding to the questions raised and providing a copy of your responses directly to the members of the delegation. I would also appreciate your providing a copy of your response to the Commission.

Thank you for your assistance. I appreciate your time and cooperation.

Sincerely,



Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD/jjg

STIP

**Congress of the United States**  
Washington, DC 20515

Please refer to this number

950419-17

April 13, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon, Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

During Commissioner Davis' visit to Fort McClellan, Alabama, on March 22, he was briefed by Army Chemical School officials that the cost to build a new Chemical Defense Training Facility (CDTF) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, would be \$70 million.

The application submitted by Fort Leonard Wood on March 1 for an air permit for the CDTF incinerator listed the facility cost as only \$43 million.

Yet, the Department of the Army COBRA (Cost of Base Realignment Action) submitted to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission calculates the return on investment for Fort McClellan as \$30 million to construct a new CDTF.

Which number is correct?

Also, what are the Army's plans to dispose of the present CDTF should the Commission uphold the Army's recommendation to close Fort McClellan? During the March 22 briefing, the cost cited to dismantle the CDTF was approximately \$40-50 million. Is this number correct and is it included in the return on investment?


We respectfully request that the Base Closure Commission require the Army to provide answers to these questions concerning the proposed closure of Fort McClellan. A response by May 1 would be appreciated, and we ask that the Commission provide us with a copy of the Army's response.


It appears the Army is dealing very loosely and inconsistently with these cost estimates, which raises a more basic question of whether these loose and inconsistent figures indicate that the Army has not seriously considered the cost of closing Fort McClellan.


With kindest regards, we are

April 13, 1995  
Page 2

Sincerely,

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Howell Heflin  
United States Senator

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Richard Shelby  
United States Senator

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Glen Browder  
Member of Congress

cc: Department of the Army  
U.S. Army Chemical School

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950420-21

FROM: <u>DICKMARK, ANDERS</u>	TO: <u>DIXON</u>
TITLE: <u>HEAD OF EW SECTION</u>	TITLE: <u>CHAIRMAN</u>
ORGANIZATION: <u>SWEDISH AIR FORCE</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCRC</u>
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: <u>AF EWES</u>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	<del>✓</del>	✓		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

CONCERNED WITH PLANNED MOVE OF AFEWES TO ANOTHER LOCATION.

Due Date: 950427      Routing Date: 950420      Date Originated: 950411      Mail Date:

To

Mr Alan J. Dixon, Chairman  
Defence Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 N. Moore Street  
Suit 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950420-21


Copy to Dave Jagers, Lockheed Martin, USAF Plant #4, Fort Worth, TX, USA  
Maj. Jeff Cheney, USAF, Lockheed Martin, USAF Plant #4, Fort Worth, TX

Letter of concern

The Swedish Air Force (SAF) and the Material Department of the Armed Forces (FMV) have carried out EW test in AFEWES since 1977 and have plans to continue to use the facility.

During these test we have gained an increased knowledge of the performance of our systems as well as the behavior of different threat systems. This has been very valuable to us in our development of defence systems. We have found the personal skilled, helpful and dedicated and we have, during the years, also established a personal friendship to several members.

The Swedish Air Force has now been made aware of the plans of moving AFEWES to another location. By doing this, we fear there will be a substantial loss of experienced personal and we would like to express our concern of AFEWES' ability to help us during the next 3-5 years.



Bo Frössling

SAF  
EW Section  
Test & Analyzes



Anders Dickmark

SAF  
Head of EW Section



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Reference to this number  
950420-2121

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

**COMMISSIONERS:**

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

May 2, 1995

Mr. Bo G. Frossling  
Swedish Air Force  
EW Section  
Test & Analyses  
Projekt TK FV  
S-107 85  
Stockholm, Sweden


Dear Mr. Frossling:

Thank you for expressing your support for the Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator Activity (AFEWES) in Fort Worth, Texas. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendation of AFEWES.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I can be of assistance.

Sincerely,



Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:js

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950421-1

FROM: PRESS, BILL	TO: DIXON
TITLE: CHAIR	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: CA. DEMOCRATIC PARTY	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FY	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
DIR..CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR..COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING RESOLUTION OPPOSING THE CLOSING OF THE SHIPYARD.

Due Date: 950428	Routing Date: 950421	Date Originated: 950420	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------



# CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY

BILL PRESS, Chair

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950421-1

April 20, 1995

SENT VIA FAX; ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW

Honorable Alan Dixon, Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Honorable Dixon:

At our Sacramento Convention (April 9, 1995), the California Democratic Party adopted the enclosed resolution which relates to the Long Beach Naval Shipyard (LBNS).

We are concerned about the closing of this unique and profitable shipyard: closing the LBNS would directly cost 3,000 jobs and 7,000 more jobs indirectly; there would be a loss of \$750,000,000 to the region's economy; and we would lose a vital national treasure and an important facility in California.

We ask for your reconsideration in making your decision on this shipyard. As the resolution states, "We oppose the closing of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard by the Base Realignment and Closing Commission."

Thank you.

Sincerely,

BILL PRESS  
Chair  
California Democratic Party

Enc.

CC:  
President Bill Clinton  
Vice President Al Gore  
BRAC Members

P/RESOL.BP







# CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY

BILL PRESS, Chair

SACL95.03

## CALIFORNIA AND THE U.S. NEED THE LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD (LBNS)

**WHEREAS:** The Long Beach Naval Shipyard (LBNS), due to the outstanding and efficient work of its highly skilled and dedicated workforce, is the most profitable public shipyard in the United States (netting \$102,700,000 over the last six years); and

**WHEREAS:** Senators Boxer and Feinstein, as well as members of Congress and the State Legislature from both major parties, have called for the retention of the LBNS as being in the national military interest because of its unique facilities which would cost U.S. taxpayers at least \$750,000,000 to replicate elsewhere;

**WHEREAS:** California has already sacrificed disproportionately in 1991 and 1993, military facility closing decisions, and closing the LBNS would directly cost 3,000 jobs and 7,000 more jobs indirectly in the region with a loss of \$750,000,000 to the region's economy

**NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED:** That the California Democratic Party (CDP), at its State Convention in Sacramento on April 7-8-9, 1995, go on record as opposing the closing of the LBNS by the Base Realignment and Closing Commission (BRAC).

\* \* \*

Sponsored by Brian Finander, 56th Assembly District Delegate  
Adopted by the Progressive Democratic Club

Adopted by the Democratic State Central Committee  
AKA the California Democratic Party  
State Convention, Sacramento Convention Center  
April 9, 1995

P/R/CONVENTION.495





**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950421-1R1

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

**COMMISSIONERS:**

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 25, 1995

Mr. Bill Press  
Chair, California Democratic Party  
8440 Santa Monica Blvd.  
Los Angeles, California 90069


Dear Mr. Press:

Thank you for your letter providing the Commission with a copy of a resolution adopted by the California Democratic Party opposing the recommended closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations regarding the Long Beach Naval Shipyard.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,



Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cw

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950421-2

FROM: GRIFFITH, WOLFE	TO: DIXON
TITLE: DIRECTOR	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: SW IL BRAC TASK FORCE	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: CHARLES MELVIN PRICE SUPPORT CENTER	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Direct Response
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING INFO REGARDING ARMY FAMILY HOUSING AT THE CHARLES MELVIN PRICE SUPPORT CENTER.

Due Date: 9/15 Routing Date: 950421 Date Originated: 950417 Mail Date: \_\_\_\_\_

**Southwestern Illinois Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Task Force,  
Price Division**

April 17, 1995

Please refer to this number  
when responding.


Mr. Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street  
Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for allowing us to testify before the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission in Chicago on April 12th, 1995. During the questions following our presentation, you asked to what organizations are the personnel who live in the military family housing at Charles Melvin Price Support Center (CMPSC) assigned. I did not have the information available at the time and asked for permission to submit the information "for the record."

Attached is the requested information as extracted from a briefing presented by the Commander, CMPSC, to Senator Carol Moseley-Braun on April 17th, 1995.

Sincerely,

  
John E. Griffith  
Major General, USAF (Ret)  
Director

Enclosure

417 Randle Street Edwardsville, IL 62025

Madison County Administration Building 157 North Main Street Suite #114 Edwardsville, IL 62025-1963  
(618) 692-7040 ext. 6444/6446/6448 Fax: (618) 692-8951





# CMPSC ARMY FAMILY HOUSING

164 TOTAL FAMILY HOUSING UNITS

## OCCUPANCY BREAKOUT BY COMMAND

ARPERCEN.....33%

ATCOM.....18%

ARMY RECRUITING BN.....11%

PEO AVIATION.....4%

102ND ARCOM.....3%

OTHER.....30%

## OCCUPANCY BREAKOUT BY BRANCH OF SERVICE

ARMY.....154

NAVY..... 7  
(Incl 2 Marines)

AIR FORCE..... 2

COAST GUARD.... .....1

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950421-3

FROM: <u>Brown, ED</u>	TO: <u>JONES, MICHAEL G.</u>
TITLE: <u>ARMY TEAM LEADER</u>	TITLE: <u>DIRECTOR</u>
ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCR C</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>ARMY BASING STUDY</u>
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: <u>ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT</u>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Direct Response
<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING COBRA RUNS ON THE COSTS OF REALIGNING ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT,

Due Date: <u>950505</u>	Routing Date: <u>950421</u>	Date Originated: <u>950420</u>	Mail Date:
-------------------------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	------------



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

April 20, 1995

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:  
AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

Colonel Michael G. Jones  
Director, The Army Basing Study  
200 Army Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20310-0200


Please refer to this number  
when responding 950421-3

Dear Colonel Jones:

Request that your office prepare a COBRA to address the costs of realigning Anniston Army Depot. Please develop the scenario as necessary to meet Army requirements and stationing strategy. However, one alternative scenario should relocate ground vehicle and related work to Red River Army Depot; small arms work to either Red River or to Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany; and enclave ammunition storage and Chem-Demil operations.

Request you provide this information no later than 5 May 1995. Thank you for your assistance. I appreciate your time and cooperation.

Sincerely,

  
Edward A. Brown III  
Army Team Leader

EAB/rmm

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950421-4

FROM: HERGER, WALLY	TO: GENERAL
TITLE: REP. (CA)	TITLE:
ORGANIZATION: U. S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: SIERRA ARMY DEPOT	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR.. CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		⊙		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR.. COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION	✓			AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

⊙	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

SUBMITTING QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD TO THE GAO ~~FROM~~ FROM THE APRIL 17 HEARING.

Due Date: 950425 Routing Date: 950421 Date Originated: 950421 Mail Date:



QUESTIONS TO BE SUBMITTED TO GAO IN REFERENCE  
TO THEIR APRIL, 1995 REPORT TO BRAC

\*Do you know of any instances, other than Sierra Army Depot, where a Member of Congress needed to resort to FOIA in order to obtain supposedly public information from the Army?

\*Please confirm that GAO report statements cited below apply in the case of Sierra Army Depot:

"GAO has identified a number of instances where projected savings from base closures and realignments may fluctuate or be uncertain for a variety of reasons. They include uncertainties over future locations of activities that must move from installations being closed or realigned and errors in standard cost factors used in the services' analyses." (p.5)

"The other realignment...is caught up in debate over the accuracy of some data" (p.75)

"Also, some questions were raised concerning the accuracy of some data used in the military value analysis for ammunition storage installations" (p.77)

"Community concerns about the development of military value for ammunition storage installations centered around the accuracy of some of the information used to score all of the installations. Specifically data in two of the attributes were questioned - ammunition storage and total buildable acres...Our follow-up and that of the Army's seem to support the existence of some data inaccuracies; however, the correct information has not yet been ascertained...The Commission may want to ensure that the corrected data has been obtained and assessed prior to making a final decision on this recommendation." (p.78)

"Also, some questions remain about the accuracy of some data used in assessing Army ammunition depots. Therefore, we recommend that the Commission ensure that the Army's ammunition depot recommendations are based upon accurate and consistent information and that corrected data would not materially affect military value assessments and final recommendations." (p.86)

\*Did you independently verify that Army data was certified by viewing either original data call information and/or signed letters of certification?

\*Did you review the procedure by which installations were allowed to review, correct, and verify data? Did you talk to any installation personnel or only Army Audit Agency and WDC officials?

\*Do you still contend, in light of Army failure to provide information on inconsistencies, that the Army Audit Agency corrected all discrepancies (as noted in footnote on p. 72)?

\*If the Army cannot even provide basic information, how can it be certified as required by law?

\*If a facility cannot be closed (by the Army's own admission because it houses the three largest operational project stock missions), then shouldn't it be more fully utilized?

Particularly if it is located closer to port, rail, highway and air than the other two depots in the region? And if the storage capacity figures turn out to be substantially incorrect in terms of the Tier I facility in the West?

\*Has the Army documented the fact that it can complete all demilitarization at SIAD prior to 2001? If so, why could they not complete chemical demilitarization at two regional depots within the designated timeframe?

\*Since the Army is required by law (BRAC: PL 101-510, as amended) to evaluate all facilities equally for closure consideration, why were five facilities exempted early in the process (three for military value and two for inability to meet closure parameters)?

\*Since GAO states in their report (p.79) that "Army installations/facilities selected for closure or realignment generally had relatively small one-time closing costs and provided almost immediate savings after completing the closure."

If it was learned that the one-time closing costs would be significantly higher and not provide the proposed long term savings, would GAO agree that a decision should be reconsidered?

\*Has the Army provided specific data regarding transport cost of ammunition from SIAD to destination locations?

\*Why is 5% or more unemployment produced by closure considered unacceptable in populous areas (where diversity and recovery are more likely) and a 10% unemployment result in an entire county considered acceptable?

Especially since GAO indicates (p.145) that "...there was no evidence to support OSD's assumption that economic recovery would be more difficult in a large metropolitan area than in a smaller one."



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950421-4R1

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 24, 1995

The Honorable Wally Herger  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Herger:

Thank you for forwarding questions to be asked of the General Accounting Office (GAO) concerning the Sierra Army Depot. I certainly understand your strong interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

The questions you raised will be submitted to the GAO for their reply. You may be certain that their responses will be included in the record of the Commission's April 17 hearing with the GAO. As soon as we receive their responses to your questions, we will forward them to you.

Again, thank you for submitting questions. I look forward to working with you through this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I can be of assistance.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Please refer to file # 950421-421

April 21, 1995

The Honorable Wally Herger  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congressman Herger:

Thank you for forwarding questions to be asked of the General Accounting Office (GAO) concerning the Sierra Army Depot. I certainly understand your strong interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

The questions you raised will be submitted for the record from the Commission's April 17 hearing with the GAO. As soon as we receive a response to the questions, we will forward them to you.

Again, thank you for submitting questions. I look forward to working with you through this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I can be of assistance.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Phone number  
950421-421

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

May 9, 1995


The Honorable Wally Herger  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Herger:

Attached are responses to questions submitted on your behalf by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to the General Accounting Office at the Commission's April 17 hearing. I trust that this information is helpful and responds to your concerns.

Again, thank you for your interest in the base closure and realignment process. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of further assistance as we go through this difficult and challenging process.

Sincerely,



Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:js  
Enclosures



United States  
General Accounting Office  
Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and  
International Affairs Division

95042413

May 5, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon, Chairman  
The Defense Base Closure and  
Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Re: 950424-13

Dear Chairman Dixon:

Following our testimony before your Commission on April 17, 1995, you requested that we respond to numerous additional questions pertaining to the base realignment and closure process. Enclosed are our answers to those questions.

Sincerely yours,

Henry L. Hinton, Jr.  
Assistant Comptroller General

Enclosure

QUESTIONS FROM CONGRESSMAN WALLY HERGER

Question 1: Do you know of any instances, other than Sierra Army Depot, where a Member of Congress needed to resort to FOIA in order to obtain supposedly public information from the Army?

Answer: We did not examine Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) issues in connection with the BRAC process and, therefore, do not know the extent to which this situation occurred.

Question 2: Please confirm that GAO report statements cited below apply in the case of Sierra Army Depot:

(a) "GAO has identified a number of instances where projected savings from base closures and realignments may fluctuate or be uncertain for a variety of reasons. They include uncertainties over future locations of activities that must move from installations being closed or realigned and errors in standard cost factors used in the services' analyses." (p.5)

Answer: This statement refers to possible changes to BRAC savings that could affect a number of BRAC recommendations. Although not specifically directed at, it potentially could affect Sierra, to the extent changes in projected cost and savings data are determined to be required.

(b) "The other realignment...is caught up in debate over the accuracy of some data." (p. 75)

Answer: This statement does apply to Sierra.

(c) "Also, some questions were raised concerning the accuracy of some data used in the military value analysis for ammunition storage installations." (p.77)

Answer: The data in question applies to Sierra as well as other ammunition storage installations. For example, corrections to the other installations' data could affect the installation value of Sierra relative to other ammunition depots.

(d) "Community concerns about the development of military value for ammunition storage installations centered around the accuracy of some of the information used to score all of the installations. Specifically data in two of the attributes were questioned-- ammunition storage and total buildable acres...Our follow-up and that of the Army's seem to support the existence of some data inaccuracies; however, the correct information has not yet been ascertained...The Commission may want to ensure that the corrected data has been obtained and assessed prior to making a final decision on this recommendation." (p.78)

Answer: As indicated above, use of correct data for all ammunition depots is important to individual ammunition depot installation values and also to confirming the relative ranking of each facility, including Sierra.

(e) "Also, some questions remain about the accuracy of some data used in assessing Army ammunition depots. Therefore, we recommend that the Commission ensure that the Army's ammunition depot recommendations are based upon accurate and consistent information and that corrected data would not materially affect military value assessments and final recommendations." (p.86)

Answer: As stated above, use of correct data for all ammunition depots is important to individual ammunition depot installation



values and also to confirming the relative ranking of each facility, including Sierra.

Question 3: Did you independently verify that Army data was certified by viewing either original data call information and/or signed letters of certification?

Answer: We did verify that the data received from the Army Materiel Command relative to ammunition storage installations was certified.

Question 4: Did you review the procedure by which installations were allowed to review, correct, and verify data? Did you talk to any installation personnel or only Army Audit Agency and WDC officials?

Answer: We did not review this specific procedure. However, the Army Audit Agency examined the installation review process. They concluded that the installation assessments were reliable for further use in the study. It should be noted that even though some errors were found in the statistical sampling of data completed by the Army Audit Agency, it determined the errors it identified as not being materially significant so as to affect the outcome for which they were used.

Question 5: Do you still contend, in light of Army failure to provide information on inconsistencies, that the Army Audit Agency corrected all discrepancies (as noted in footnote on p. 72)?

Answer: According to Army Audit Agency officials, and as reflected in their report, all material discrepancies found by their audit work were corrected.

Question 6: If the Army cannot provide basic information, how can it be certified as required by law?

Answer: The Army's BRAC process accumulated a great deal of required information regarding its facilities. As indicated in our report, certification statements accompanying such data are intended to ensure that it is accurate to the best of the certifying official's knowledge.

Question 7: If a facility cannot be closed (by the Army's own admission) because it houses the three largest operational project stock missions, then shouldn't it be more fully utilized?

Answer: A key objective of the BRAC process is to eliminate excess infrastructure. Many facilities could be more fully utilized by shifting around workloads or more fully utilizing those facilities, but this would not necessarily lead to infrastructure reductions.

Question 8: Has the Army documented the fact that it can complete all demilitarization at SIAD prior to 2001? If so, why could they not complete chemical demilitarization at two regional depots within the designated timeframe?

Answer: According to Army officials, the Sierra depot stores conventional ammunition, and if funding is available, as planned, there is no reason that all conventional ammunition demilitarization at Sierra cannot be accomplished by the year 2001. If for some reason, the total demilitarization could not be accomplished at Sierra, Army officials indicate that the munitions would be moved for demilitarization to another ammunition depot. On the other hand, munitions stored at Umatilla and Pueblo are chemical and must be demilitarized in place--they are prohibited by law from being moved. In addition, incinerators must be built at those locations before the demilitarization can take place.

Question 9: Since the Army is required by law (PL 101-510, as amended) to evaluate all facilities equally for closure consideration, why were five facilities exempted early in the process (three for military value and two for inability to meet closure parameters)?

Answer: DOD components are required to include in their BRAC process installations meeting a threshold of having 300 authorized civilian personnel. This provides a baseline for ensuring that all eligible facilities are considered for closure. As the process progresses, installations are removed from consideration at various stages. In the final analysis only those Army installations identified as low in military value were selected as study candidates for closure or realignment. Regarding the two installations exempted from study because of the inability to complete any potential closure or realignment in 6 years, this decision was in keeping with a requirement of the BRAC law.

Question 10: Since GAO states in their report (p. 79) that "Army installations/facilities selected for closure or realignment generally had relatively small one-time closing costs and provided almost immediate savings after completing the closure," if it was learned that the one-time closing costs would be significantly higher and not provide the proposed long term savings, would GAO agree that a decision should be reconsidered?

Answer: Military facilities recommended for closure and realignment varied in the extent of one-time closing costs and savings. Our report indicates that fluctuations do occur in projected costs and savings for a variety of reasons; the magnitude of such changes have to be examined on a case-by-case basis.

Question 11: Has the Army provided specific data regarding transport cost of ammunition from SIAD to destination locations?

Answer: Army officials have told us that they expect any movement of the munitions to occur through issuances to meet operational requirements rather than as part of a BRAC related move. Otherwise, Army officials indicate they expect to demilitarize much of the excess munitions at Sierra.

Question 12: Why is 5% or more unemployment produced by closure considered unacceptable in populous areas (where diversity and recovery are more likely) and a 10% unemployment result in an entire county considered acceptable? Especially since GAO indicates (p. 145) that "...there was no evidence to support OSD's assumption that economic recovery would be more difficult in a large metropolitan area than in a smaller one."

Answer: A 5 percent figure was an arbitrary ceiling established in the BRAC 1993 round. There was no ceiling established in BRAC 1995 and the decision as to excess economic impact was left to the judgment of the service secretaries or the Secretary of Defense. No Army installation was removed from BRAC consideration in 1995 because of economic impact concerns.

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950421-5

FROM: BORSKI, ROBERT	TO: DIXON
TITLE: REP. (PA)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: DEF. INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CENTER	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		✓		COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER		X	
				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING THE DBRC TO DIRECT THE GAO TO FULLY STUDY THE DOD RECOMMENDATION TO CLOSE THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CENTER.

Due Date:	Routing Date:	Date Originated:	Mail Date:
-----------	---------------	------------------	------------

ROBERT A. BORSKI  
3D DISTRICT, PENNSYLVANIA

COMMITTEES:  
TRANSPORTATION  
AND INFRASTRUCTURE  
RANKING DEMOCRAT—SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT

STEERING COMMITTEE

REGIONAL WHIP

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

April 20, 1995

WASHINGTON OFFICE:  
ROOM 2182  
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BLDG.  
(202) 225-8251  
FAX: (202) 225-4628

DISTRICT OFFICES:  
7141 FRANKFORD AVE.  
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19135  
(215) 335-3355  
FAX: (215) 333-4508  
2630 MEMPHIS ST.  
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19125  
(215) 426-4616

Honorable Alan Dixon  
Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to file number  
when responding 950421-5

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing to request the Base Closure Commission to direct the General Accounting Office (GAO) to fully assess the Department of Defense's recommendation to disestablish the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC).

As you know, on March 30, I sent the enclosed letter to GAO requesting their assessment of DOD's recommendation to disestablish DISC. The letter includes my analysis of the flaws found in the recommendation.

Regrettably, none of these issues were addressed in GAO's April 13 report to Congress and the Base Closure Commission.

It is my understanding that the Base Closure Commission can request a GAO study of specific recommendations. I believe such an analysis is necessary, specifically on the following flaws of DOD's recommendation:


- \* Significant cost omissions in the COBRA for DISC, including the cost of transferring items and the cost of delaying the BRAC93 realignment of the Defense Personnel Support Center to the Aviation Supply Office compound.
- \* The methodology used to determine the amount of positions that would be eliminated under various ICP scenarios, which is the basis for the preponderance of savings, is patently illogical and contradicts common sense.

I can certainly appreciate the workload and time constraints under which you are working. However, I believe a rational, objective assessment of these issues by GAO is essential to your final decision on DISC.

April 20, 1995  
Page 2

Thank you for your expeditious consideration of this extremely important matter. Please do not hesitate to contact me for any additional information.

Sincerely,



ROBERT A. BORSKI  
Member of Congress

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Al Cornella, Commissioner  
Base Closure and Realignment Commission

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

March 30, 1995

Mr. Charles A. Bowsher  
Comptroller General of the United States  
General Accounting Office  
441 G Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mr. Comptroller:

I am writing to bring to your attention several issues relating to the Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) recommendation to disestablish the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) located in Philadelphia. I believe these issues must be addressed by the General Accounting Office (GAO) in its April 15 report to Congress analyzing the 1995 base closure recommendations.

As you may know, the DLA has recommended the "disestablishment" of DISC as a part of its 1995 base closure recommendations. After numerous meetings with DISC employees and the DLA base closure executive group (BRACEG), I believe DLA's recommendation is suspect for the following reasons:

Military Value

- \* DLA did not adequately assess the risk to military readiness associated with the large amount of items transferred.
- \* Inventory Control Point (ICP) performance and its impact on readiness is not included in the military value analysis.
- \* The multi-service ICP synergy that exists between DISC and the Navy's Aviation Supply Office (ASO) was not included in the military value analysis. Additional compound synergy is also achieved by DISC partnering with the Defense Printing Service (DPS) in pioneering development of critical procurement applications.
- \* DLA instead overemphasized a non-essential synergy between ICPs and distribution depots.
- \* The DLA did not adequately assess the value and available capacity of the ASO compound in its "installation military value analysis."
- \* Unexplained discrepancies exist among three separate computations of the military value of the ICPs.

March 30, 1995

Page 2

Costs

- \* The significant cost of transferring items was not included in the COBRA analysis.
- \* The cost of delaying the BRAC93 realignment of the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) to the ASO compound was not included in the COBRA analysis.
- \* DLA used a flawed methodology to determine the amount of positions that would be eliminated under each scenario.

The bottom line is that DLA is risking the loss of a critical, highly-skilled workforce -- all for savings which are highly suspect.

I have provided a full explanation of each of these major flaws in DLA's recommendation to disestablish DISC. I hope you can add a rational, objective assessment to a recommendation which in my opinion is highly flawed. I believe DLA can achieve higher efficiencies by building on the recommendations accepted by the Base Closure Commission in BRAC93.

Thank you for your expeditious consideration of this extremely important matter. Please do not hesitate to contact me for any additional information.

Sincerely,



ROBERT A. BORSKI  
Member of Congress

RAB/mdv  
Enclosure

cc: Mr. Barry Holman  
General Accounting Office



**FLAWS IN THE  
DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY'S  
RECOMMENDATION  
TO DISESTABLISH  
THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL  
SUPPLY CENTER**

**BY REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT A. BORSKI (PA)**

**March 30, 1995**

In 1993, the Base Closure Commission overturned the Department of Defense's recommendation to close the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC), as well as the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) and the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC). The Commission recognized that the true military value of these facilities was the people and their skills and experience that maintain our nation's readiness.

Despite this decision, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has once again recommended an action that jeopardizes the entire workforce at DISC.

The following flaws to DLA's recommendation have been discovered by representatives of DISC's workforce. These flaws illustrate what little consideration was given to the military value of DISC's workforce. They also illustrate costs that DLA omitted from its COBRA analysis, and how those costs would eliminate any possible savings DLA hopes to gain from its recommendation.

#### **MILITARY VALUE**

- 1) DLA did not adequately assess the risk to military readiness associated with the large amount of items transferred:

In the 1993 round of base closures (BRAC93), DLA concluded in its ICP recommendation that the mass migration of items was too risky and imprudent. In its recommendation, DLA stated that "with the recommended closures of DESC and realignment with DCSC, the additional move of DISC to DCSC was considered too risky. Scenarios were run splitting DISC among the remaining hardware centers and splitting DISC between DCSC and DGSC. Both options were considered too risky because proposed moves split managed items to multiple locations." (Appendix #1)

Yet two years later the implementation scenario recommends moving approximately 2.4 million items among DLA Inventory Control Points (ICPs). Add to that volume of movement a Consumable Item Transfer (CIT II) of approximately 280,000 items from the military services to DLA, the ICPs would experience a logistics transfer of almost 2.7 million items.

DISC currently manages 34.5 percent of all DLA hardware ICP items used on one or multiple weapon systems, and processes 40 percent of all military customer requisitions forwarded to the four DLA hardware ICPs. Yet DLA recommended relocating DISC's weapons-coded workload to the Defense General Supply Center (DGSC), which currently manages the lowest amount of weapons-coded workload of the DLA hardware ICPs.

This transfer will place a huge number (1.07 million) of weapons-coded items at risk. DGSC, which currently manages 630,972 items, would more than double its workload to 1,472,123 items -- but will increase its workforce by only 323 jobs in fiscal year 1999.

DLA chose its scenario relocating DISC weapons-coded work to DGSC over a scenario relocating DGSC workload to DISC. They made this decision, despite the fact that DISC has a larger, higher-skilled pool of federal workers to choose from to meet increased weapons-coded workload. DISC is also collocated with a Navy weapons management ICP and a weapons engineering facility, combining for an impressive on-compound logistics pool of expertise and people.

2) ICP performance and its impact on readiness is included in the military value analysis:

According to the DLA BRACEG, the military value analysis of the ICPs does not measure the performance of the workforce at each ICP. DLA chose to omit performance from this most critical determinant of base closure decisions, despite the fact that the true military value of these facilities is the people and their skills and experience that maintain our nation's readiness.

In meetings with the BRACEG, DLA maintains a position that performance is not a part of the BRAC process, because performance is determined by the quality of management, not where that management is located. This position completely neglects the value of the people currently performing these jobs, and the negative impact on the value that would result from its disestablishment. Management can hardly achieve high performance without a highly-skilled experienced workforce. This fact was one of the key reasons the Base Closure Commission overturned DLA's BRAC93 recommendation to move DISC (and its management and workforce) to New Cumberland, PA.

The disruption of the DISC workforce would have a serious impact on its ability to provide our armed forces with the highest level of service at the lowest level of cost. These employees have been "reinventing government" long before Vice President Al Gore began implementing his reforms, and have been recognized with numerous awards and citations.

DISC currently has proportionally the highest number of requisitions from military customers, yet provides the highest level of support of all hardware centers. DISC currently has the lowest number of chronic below goal systems and provides much better availability to weapon systems items than the other hardware ICPs. Yet none of these performance measures were given any significance in DLA's military value analysis.

- 3) The multi-service ICP synergy that exists between DISC and the Navy's Aviation Supply Office (ASO) was not included in the military value analysis:

A strong synergy currently exist between DISC and ASO, due to the direct relationship between DISC commodities managed and the ASO mission. This synergy was highlighted in BRAC93 and is pivotal in DISC's customer support. Yet in both its military value and COBRA analyses, DLA gave no consideration to this synergy, and how its permanent loss would affect readiness.

DISC currently has joint contracts in place with ASO covering more than 200 items and \$30 million. Proximity and a similar weapons orientation between ASO and DISC has accrued savings in both readiness and investment dollars.

Ironically, in its BRAC95 report to Congress, the Navy prominently cited this synergy as a reason to keep ASO in Philadelphia (see Appendix #2). Yet DLA makes absolutely no mention or consideration of the synergy in its recommendation to disestablish DISC.

- 4) DLA instead overemphasized a synergy between ICPs and distribution depots:

In its report, DLA refers to a synergy existing between DGSC and its tenant depot (DDRV) as a reason to keep both open. However, the type of synergy that exists between DISC and ASO does not occur between a DLA ICP and a Distribution Depot. The real logistics savings are in integrated acquisition and planning between ICPs.

In fact, both DLA's Corporate Strategic Plan and performance plan emphasize a decrease in depot inventory and cost due to Buy Response Vice Inventory efforts, obviating any special synergy between ICP and depot. This is further substantiated by DLA's BRAC95 recommendation to reduce the Columbus depot workforce by 90 percent by relocating its mission to storage of slow moving items. Additionally, if depot/ICP synergy is so important, why are performance statistics at Richmond and Columbus consistently lower than DISC's multi-service ICP site.

- 5) The DLA did not adequately assess the value of the ASO compound in its "installation military value analysis":

The Military Value of each DLA ICP did not matter in DLA's final decision to disestablish DISC. In its report, DLA stated that "the Executive Group did not consider the difference among the Military Value of the three Hardware ICPs significant enough, by itself, to point toward any obvious closure candidates."

Instead, the decision to close DISC was driven primarily by the decision to keep DDRV open. This fact is evident in General Farrell's testimony before the Base Closure Commission:

"Richmond is our best installation, and the Distribution Depot there will remain open. Therefore, we concluded that disestablishing the Defense Industrial Supply Center in Philadelphia was in the best interest of DLA."

This decision was reached by conducting an "installation military value analysis," which measures the value of all facilities collocated at a particular base. DLA chose to keep DGSC\DDRV open because it received the second highest score in the "installation military value analysis."

However, no "installation military value analysis" was conducted for the ASO compound, which includes ASO, DISC and smaller tenants, and will soon receive DPSC. DLA claims that such analysis was not possible because ASO is a Navy activity.

As a result, the ASO compound was not objectively weighed against the DGSC\DDRV compound. As a result, DLA made a decision that it felt was best for DLA without looking at the best scenario for the Department of Defense and the American taxpayer.

DLA recommended closing DISC, not because of its military value or costs, but because it is not collocated with a depot. Instead of being rewarded for saving taxpayer money through joint-service synergy, DISC is being penalized for being collocated with a Navy facility.

Furthermore, in reflecting on the expendability element of military value, DLA failed to accurately consider the DOD space available at this location, adversely affecting DISC's military value scores.

6) Unexplained discrepancies exist among three separate computations of the military value of the ICPs:

Based on the DLA BRACEG minutes (Appendix #3), DLA conducted computations of military value analysis of the ICPs on three separate occasions (12/5/94, 12/29/94, and 1/5/95) with three different results.

In the 12/5 computation, DISC scored second to DCSC in total points. In the 12/29 computation, DISC once again scored second, but with significant changes to the scores of DGSC, the largest being a 29 point increase in the category of "Additional Mission w/o Additional Personnel."

The 1/5 computation saw a substantial increase in scores for both DGSC and DCSC but a scoring decrease to DISC. The big change occurred in the area of "Base Operating Costs" and "Personnel Costs." Under the revised computations, DISC's score, however, decreased from 171 to 162 points. This change resulted in a 25 point deficit placing DISC with the lowest military value rating.

Aside from the point changes, however, significant dollar changes were also obvious. As an example, DGSC's total operational costs decreased by \$94 million between 12/15 and 12/20. The cause was not explained. An interesting audit trail exists which documents at least seven letters and phone calls to DGSC requesting additional data to reach this final conclusion.

## COSTS

- 1) The significant cost of transferring items was not included in the COBRA analysis:

There is a significant cost associated with transferring 2.4 million of items managed by the ICPs. Yet a thorough examination of DLA's recommendation reveals that these costs were not included in DLA's COBRA analysis. In fact, DLA is just now requesting such information.

Moving items is not simply an electronic process. Physical labor is required of the losing activity to package historical hard copy data, technical drawings and ancillary records. The receiving activities will also incur costs to re-establish the management records and build technical expertise. Continued human communication and interaction between functional experts in all disciplines will still be required even after the transfer. This continued dialogue is a mandatory element to come up to full operational capability.

Based on actual service ICP cost data, the cost of migrating items as required under DLA's recommendation averages \$66 per item. This migration process cost does not include the negative impact on material availability and readiness incurred in such a mass migration even if it is spread out over several years. DISC's previous history with CIT Phase I and migrating Federal Stock Classes 1560/1680 to the Defense General Supply Center shows a degradation in service support.

- 2) The cost of delaying the BRAC93 realignment of the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) to the ASO compound was not included in the COBRA analysis:

Another cost discrepancy apparently overlooked is the cost associated with maintaining the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) at its South Philadelphia compound for an additional two years. As you know, in its recommendation, DLA claims a cost avoidance of \$28.6 million by delaying the BRAC93 move of DPSC to the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) compound. In its COBRA analysis, DLA included the \$28.6 million as a "one-time saving," but neglected to include the costs of keeping DPSC in South Philadelphia as a "one-time cost." The cost of extending the facility over this period is estimated to be at least \$74 million (fiscal year 1994 dollars).

3) DLA used a flawed methodology to determine the amount of positions that would be eliminated under each scenario:

In its report, "The Executive Group determined that the synergy which would be achieved by grouping items requiring the same type of management would result in some savings." The Executive Group decided that 5 percent of direct labor, and 25 percent of indirect labor, and 50 percent of the general and administrative overhead associated with base operations could be saved by consolidating management of related Federal Supply Classes.

By grouping all FSCs under two Weapon Systems ICPs and one Troop and General Support ICP, DLA calculated that it could eliminate 404 civilian jobs throughout all ICPs. DLA calculates that the savings generated from eliminating these positions will result in \$15 million in steady state personnel savings.

Appendix #4, which was provided by DLA, and appendix #5, which analyzes these figures, shows how DLA broke down the positions at each ICP attributed to either weapons, troop and general, miscellaneous and base operating. DLA broke each category into direct, indirect, and general and administrative support.

Under each scenario, however, DLA only made the 5%/25%/50% reductions for the positions associated with the items transferred from the losing base. Similar reductions were not made for receiving bases.

For example, under Option IIIA, which disestablishes DISC, DLA calculates that 190 positions will be eliminated by moving DISC's weapon systems items to DGSC. However, under Option IV, which closes DGSC, DLA calculates that only 92 positions will be eliminated by moving DGSC's weapon systems to DISC. The difference of 100 jobs between these two transfer scenario is huge with respect to steady state savings.

Grouping weapon system positions together at one ICP should achieve the same number of eliminated positions, regardless of where that consolidation takes place. Using DLA's methodology, however, allows you to calculate a higher number of positions eliminated based on the amount of items you transfer, not on the extent to which you can consolidate. Because more weapon systems items are transferred in Option III than Option IV, a higher number of positions are eliminated using this flawed methodology.

Ironically, Option IIIA was chosen over Option IV, despite the fact that overall Option IV eliminates more positions (638) because it allows DLA to eliminate 308 Base Operating jobs. However, as mentioned above, the ultimate decision to close DISC was based on the decision to save DDRV, not on cost-effectiveness.



## ***DLA BRAC 93 Detailed Analysis***

Midatlantic, and other tenants with approximately 800 personnel. DPSC was not reviewed as part of the ICP category since it manages a much smaller number of items which have a significantly higher dollar value than the hardware ICPs. The activity has no administrative space available, but does have a small number of buildable acres. Environmental problems at DPSC would make building or extensive renovations impossible for some time in the future.

With the movement of DCMD Midatlantic and the Clothing Factory out of DPSC, the Working Group examined options to either utilize the base as a receiver or move DPSC to another location. Scenarios were built so that activities moved to locations where excess space had been identified. DISC, currently a tenant at ASO which is recommended for closure by the Navy, was considered for possible realignment to DPSC. A scenario which realigned DPSC to ASO where DLA would assume responsibility for the base was analyzed. Another, which split the three commodities at DPSC between DGSC and DCSC was also examined.

The distribution depot at New Cumberland has available buildable acres. Additionally, another recommendation moves DISC, a hardware ICP from Philadelphia to New Cumberland. This allows several activities to be consolidated. The presence of three ICPs and major DLA facilities in the area will create significant opportunities for savings and efficiencies in the future. As a result of the closure of DPSC, the property will be excess to Army needs. The Army will dispose of it in accordance with existing policy and procedure.

**Return on Investment:** Total estimated one time cost for these closures is \$173.0 million. Annual steady state savings are \$90.6 million with an immediate return on investment.

**Impacts:** Closing the DPSC installation and the Clothing Factory will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 0.4 percent of the employment base in the Philadelphia Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. The closure will ultimately result in a reduction in air emissions, wastewater discharges, and solid waste.

### **Defense Industrial Supply Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania**

**Recommendation:** Relocate the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC), a hardware Inventory Control Point (ICP), located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to New Cumberland, Pennsylvania.

**Justification:** DISC is a tenant of the Navy's Aviation Supply Office (ASO) located in Philadelphia. With the Navy decision to close ASO during BRAC 93, DISC must either be relocated or remain behind and assume responsibility for the base.

The Executive Group considered options where square footage or buildable acres existed. Also, only locations where ICPs currently exist were considered.

Collocation with DCSC, DESC and DGSC were also considered. DGSC has buildable acres but no space available. DESC has warehouse space and DCSC will have administrative space in 1997. However, with the recommended closures of DESC and realignment with DCSC, the additional move of DISC to DCSC was considered too risky. Scenarios were run splitting DISC among the remaining hardware centers and splitting DISC between DCSC and DGSC. Both options were considered too risky because proposed moves split managed items to multiple locations.



## ATTACHMENT L

### DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSIS OF INVENTORY CONTROL POINTS

This Inventory Control Points (ICPs) subcategory was composed of the Aviation Supply Office (ASO), located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and the Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC), located in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. These activities provide worldwide wholesale inventory control for all naval fleet units and program logistics support for naval weapons systems.

#### Data Call Development

The capacity and military value data calls were developed using the BRAC-93 data calls as starting points. Sets of questions were then expanded or compressed based on lessons learned for BRAC-93 and consultations with technical experts. The capacity data call was designed to capture throughput, measured in total government workyears performed. Information was also requested on subsidiary workload categories of Weapons Systems Program Support, Security Assistance workyears, and Requisition Volume, as subsets of the total work performed. The data call obtained both actual performed workload at each command, from FY 1986 to the present, and programmed workload through FY 2001. The data calls also requested information on specific features and capabilities of each activity, including manpower factors, physical space available for industrial support, facility and equipment characteristics, and contingency and mobilization features. Standard modules on quality of life, costs and investments, and environmental issues were included.

#### Capacity Analysis

Capacity analysis was conducted by comparing the maximum potential capacity of the ICPs to the workload programmed to support the FY 2001 force structure. The maximum potential capacity was determined for both individual and aggregated throughput measures based on the maximum historic performance levels for the period FY 1986-1993. The average of those levels for each ICP was summed to determine a maximum potential for the subcategory. This maximum capacity was compared to required capacity, determined from the reported programmed workload through FY 2001. Maximum capacity for the Inventory Control Points was determined to exceed future requirements by approximately 48 percent.

Maximum potential capacity was also calculated for the secondary measures, the subordinate collections of workload anticipated through the outyears. While the weapons systems program support paralleled the aggregate capacity analysis in identifying significant excess capacity, the other secondary measures remained relatively constant.

The BSEC concluded that sufficient excess capacity existed to warrant analysis of military value.

### **Military Value Analysis**

The military value matrix was developed after review of the BRAC-93 matrix, with modifications based on lessons learned, technical expert perspectives, and matrices already approved by the BSEC. The military value questions were grouped into six subject areas, covering customer service support, features and facilities, costs and investments, environment, quality of life, and strategic factors. Standardized modules assessing facilities, costs and investments, environmental, and quality of life concerns were adjusted for this subcategory to reflect the predominantly civilian workforce and distinct mission at the activities. Primary emphasis in the evaluation was placed on individual executed workload as reflected in questions pertaining to customer service support.

As would be expected in a group of only two activities which so closely parallel each other in mission and requirements, the military value analysis did not provide a clear differentiation. SPCC received a score of 58.1, while ASO was scored at 55.8 (out of 94.2 possible points). The two commands are differentiated primarily by those functions in which each specializes (i.e., support to aviation units or to ships).

### **Configuration Analysis**

Configuration analysis was conducted using a linear programming model to develop solutions that minimized excess capacity in the ICPs while meeting FY 2001 requirements and maintained an average military value. Standard sensitivity analyses were conducted, adjusting the FY 2001 requirement up 10 percent, down 10 percent, and down 20 percent.

The initial solution output from the configuration model closed ASO. The sensitivity analyses which increased the requirement closed no ICP, while the two which reduced the requirement both showed ASO closed. Given the requirement to maintain average military value from a universe of two activities, this was the only solution possible since SPCC has both a higher military value and a larger capacity.

### **Scenario Development and Analysis**

The results of the configuration analysis provided the BSEC with a starting point for deliberations leading to scenario development. The capacity reduction shown by the configuration runs appeared very efficient, suggesting that consolidation of those functions into SPCC would eliminate all but 7.6% of the total excess. Accordingly, the BSEC issued two scenarios which closed ASO. In one, ASO closed and consolidated at SPCC;

in the other, ASO closed and consolidated at SPCC but transferred ASO's compound host responsibilities to its largest tenant, DLA.

After a rigorous review, the COBRA analyses suggested that such a closure would eventually payoff, though one-time costs were quite large. The responses to the data calls indicated that, over the last year, the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) has restructured the ICPs by "consolidating in place," to eliminate the large amount of excess capacity identified during BRAC-93. As a result, savings resulting from elimination of personnel were not possible, since significant reductions in the workforce have already occurred. Given these results, the BSEC determined that it would not forward a recommendation to close ASO.

### **Conclusion**

Despite the capacity analysis which demonstrated significant excess capacity, the recommendation to close ASO and consolidate those functions at SPCC was not endorsed for two reasons. First, the gap between attributed costs and savings was most likely to narrow under the realities of implementation, resulting in an even narrower benefit between costs and savings and extending the payoff unacceptably. Secondly, the BSEC acknowledged that NAVSUP has been particularly vigorous in its efforts to restructure the ICPs independent of and external to the BRAC process, and so no further consolidation is required. The consolidation suggested by the BRAC-95 process might well disrupt those efforts, as well as the synergy which currently exists between ASO and DLA within the Philadelphia compound.

HARDWARE ICP's MILITARY VALUE

	Military Value	DCSC Points Earned			DCSC VALUES		
		A	B	C	A	B	C
<b>L. Mission Essentiality</b>							
<b>A. Current/Future Mission</b>							
1. DOD Essentiality	100	100	100	100			
2. Same/Similar Mission	100	0	0	0			
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>			
<b>B. Mission Scope</b>							
1. Field Activities Reporting Directly to this Activity	10	0	10	0			
2. % Paid Equivalents Directly Support Field Activities	10	0	10	0			
3. No. of NSN's Managed							
a. Active NSN's	40	40	6.64	12.77			
b. Inactive NSN's	10	7.2	6.28	10			
4. \$ Value Inventory Managed							
a. Active Inventory (\$M)	40	40	7.04	6.11			
b. Inactive Inventory (\$M)	10	4.02	10	6.2			
5. No. of PFRS Awarded	15	15	0.28	6.37			
6. \$ Value of Contracts Awarded	15	15	10.15	5.85			
7. % Business (\$ Value) Supporting Non-DOD	25	20.98	3.75	25			
8. % Paid Equivalent Supporting Non-DOD	25	25	4.47	0			
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>187.2</b>	<b>74.81</b>	<b>72.3</b>			
<b>TOTAL MISSION ESSENTIALITY</b>							
	400	287.2	174.81	172.3			
<b>II. Mission Sustainability</b>							
<b>A. Current/Future Mission</b>							
1. Age of Buildings	25	9	7	5			
2. Current Condition of Buildings	140	115	118	105			
3. Infrastructure Suitable for Electronic Comms	25	25	25	25			
4. Access to Transportation	10	10	10	10			
a. Air							
b. Bus							
c. Train							
<b>TOTAL MISSION SUSTAINABILITY</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>145</b>			

# HARDWARE ICP's MILITARY VALUE

4:39 PM  
3/21/05  
BRAC-A.XLS

<b>III. Operational Efficiencies</b>				
<b>A. BOS Costs</b>				
1. BOS Costs per Paid Equivalent	50	9.4	7.26	50
2. RPM Costs per Square Feet	50	39.94	50	38.03
3. Comm. Costs per Paid Equivalent	25	25	11.61	18.49
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>74.34</b>	<b>68.87</b>	<b>106.52</b>
<b>B. Personnel Costs</b>				
1. Total G&A Costs per Paid Equivalent	25	18.28	16.06	25
2. Total Direct Costs per Paid Equivalent	25	25	16.04	16.88
3. Total Indirect Costs per Paid Equivalent	25	6.75	25	20.85
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>50.03</b>	<b>57.1</b>	<b>62.53</b>
<b>TOTAL OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCIES</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>124.37</b>	<b>125.97</b>	<b>169.05</b>
<b>IV. Expandability</b>				
<b>A. Facility/Installation Expansion</b>				
1. Total Buildable Acres	40	40	19	5
2. Acceptable DoD Space in MSA (Sq Ft)	10	0	0	10
3. Additional Personnel Accommodated in Current Space	60	60	20	2
4. Excess DLA Warehouse Could be Allocated	50	0	0	0
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>B. Mobilization Expansion-Surge Capability</b>				
0				
<b>C. Mission Expansion</b>				
1. Additional Mission w/o Additional Personnel (%)	40	29	0	40
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>TOTAL EXPANDABILITY</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>TOTAL MILITARY VALUE</b>	<b>1000</b>	<b>679.57</b>	<b>499.58</b>	<b>543.35</b>
		6-Dec-04		

# HARDWARE ICP's MILITARY VALUE

4:38 PM  
3/21/05  
BRAC-A.XLS

			DCSC	DGSC	DISC	DCSC	DGSC	DISC	DCSC	DGSC	DISC
			A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
			VALUES	VALUES	VALUES	Points Earned	Points Earned	Points Earned	VALUES	VALUES	VALUES
						100	100	100			
						0	0	0			
						100	100	100			
						0	10	0			
						0	10	0			
						40	7	13			
						7	8	10			
						40	7	6			
						4	10	6			
						15	8	6			
						15	10	8			
						21	4	25			
						25	4	0			
						107	75	72			
						287	175	172			
						0	7	5			
						115	118				
						25	25	25			
						10	10	10			
						150	160	150			

# HARDWARE ICP's MILITARY VALUE

100	50	36	47																	
200	50	48	28																	
300	25	16	20																	
400	125	100	96																	
500																				
600																				
700	25	17	25																	
800	25	21	17																	
900	8	25	24																	
1000	58	63	66																	
1100																				
1200	183	163	182																	
1300																				
1400	40	19	5																	
1500	0	0	10																	
1600	93	29	2																	
1700	0	0	0																	
1800	189	39	17																	
1900																				
2000	29																			
2100	29	29	40																	
2200																				
2300	129	85	57																	
2400																				
2500																				
2600	738	506	541																	
2700																				
2800																				

8-Jan-05

Option I Class DISC/DPSC in 1999	Option II Class DGSC Inst/DISC in 1999	Option III Class DISC in 1999	Option III A Class DISC in 1999 IPE Remains at DGSC	Option IV Class DGSC Inst in 1999
<u>DISC to DGSC</u>	<u>DISC to DGSC</u>	<u>DCSC</u>		
DCSC Weapon Sys (n/c) 2274	DCSC W/S (n/c) 2274	DCSC W/S (n/c) 2274	DCSC W/S (n/c) 2274	DCSC W/S (n/c) 2274
DISC W/S 1141	DISC W/S 1141	Base Ops 391	Base Ops 391	Base Ops 391
DGSC W/S 513	DGSC W/S 513	Total Required 2888	Total Required 2888	Total Required 2888
DPSC W/S 0	DPSC W/S 0	1999 DCSC Available -3013	1999 DCSC Available -3013	1999 Available -3013
TOTAL W/S 3928	TOTAL W/S 3928	Base Ops -368	Base Ops -368	Base Ops -368
Base Ops 391	Base Ops 391			
TOTAL REQUIRED 4399	TOTAL REQUIRED 4399			
1994 DCSC AVAILABLE -3323	1994 DCSC AVAILABLE -3323			
Billets Transferred 988	Billets Transferred 988			
		<u>DISC to DPSC</u>	<u>DISC to DPSC</u>	<u>DGSC to DPSC</u>
		DPSC T & G 1480	DPSC T & G 1480	DPSC T & G (n/c) 1474
		DGSC T & G 552	DGSC T & G 552	DGSC T & G 552
		DGSC MISC 216	DGSC MISC (less IPE) 143	DGSC Misc 216
<u>DPSC to DGSC</u>	<u>DGSC to DPSC</u>	DCSC T & G 292	DCSC T & G 292	DCSC T & G 292
DGSC Troop & Gen (n/c) 655	DPSC T & G (n/c) 1480	DISC T & G 141	DISC T & G 141	DISC T & G 141
DGSC Misc (n/c) 280	DGSC T & G 552	TOTAL T & G 2881	TOTAL T & G 2888	TOTAL T & G 2878
DPSC T & G 1212	DGSC Misc 216	Base Ops 0	Base Ops 0	Base Ops 22
DCSC T & G 292	DCSC T & G 292	Total Required 2881	Total Required 2888	Total Required 2897
DISC T & G 141	DISC T & G 141	1994 DPSC Avail -2098	1994 DPSC Avail -2098	1994 DPSC Avail -2098
TOTAL T & G 2599	TOTAL T & G 2881	Billets Transferred 583	Billets Transferred 510	Billets Transferred 899
Base Ops 399	Base Ops 0			
TOTAL REQUIRED 2888	TOTAL REQUIRED 2881			
1994 DGSC AVAILABLE -2199	1994 DPSC AVAILABLE -2098			
Billets Transferred 679	Billets Transferred 583			
		<u>DISC to DGSC</u>	<u>DISC to DGSC</u>	<u>DGSC to DISC</u>
		DGSC W/S (n/c) 605	DGSC W/S (n/c) 605	DISC W/S (n/c) 1331
		DISC W/S 1141	DGSC IPE (n/c) 97	DGSC W/S 513
		DPSC W/S 0	DISC W/S 1141	DPSC W/S 0
		TOTAL W/S 1746	DPSC W/S 0	Total W/S 1844
		Base Ops 399	TOTAL W/S 1843	Base Ops 0
		Total Required 2064	Base Ops 399	TOTAL REQUIRED 1844
		1999 Avail -1828	Total Required 2151	1999 Avail -1497
		Billets Transferred 226	1999 Avail -1828	Billets Transferred 347
			Billets Transferred 323	



FY 94 Permanent Civilians

		Direct	% Dir	InDirect	% Ind	G & A	% G & A	Total
DCSC	Weapon Systems Items	1356	40.8	644	25.4	309	9.3	2509
	Troop & General Support	205	6.17	128	3.85	61	1.84	394
	Miscellaneous	0		0		0		0
	Base Operations	0		0		420	12.64	420
	Totals	1561		972		790		3323
DGSC	Weapons Systems Items	507	23.07	97	4.41	123	5.6	727
	Troop & General Support	550	25.02	105	4.78	133	6.05	788
	Miscellaneous	188		71		54		313
	[IPE]	[25]	[1.14]	[71]	[3.23]	[20]	[.91]	[116]
	[Other]	[163]	[7.42]	[0]	[0]	[34]	[1.55]	[197]
	Base Operations	0		0		370	16.83	370
	Totals	1245		273		650		2198
DISC	Weapon Systems Items	1228	66.34	143	7.73	275	14.86	1646
	Troop & General Support	146	7.89	25	1.35	34	1.84	205
	Miscellaneous	0		0		0		0
	Base Operations	0		0		0		0
	Totals	1374		168		309		1851

FY 96		FY 97		FY 98		FY 99	
Total	Pom Chg	Total	Pom Chg	Total	POM Chg	Total	POM chg
3284	-39	3269	-15	3138	-131	3013	-125
2066	-132	1963	-63	1904	-79	1828	-76
1679	-172	1624	-55	1559	-65	1497	-62

		FY 99				
		Direct	Indirec	G&A	Total	
DCSC	Weapon Systems Items	1229	765	280	2274	
	Troop & General Support	186	116	56	358	
	Miscellaneous					
	Base Operations					
	Totals	1415	881	361	3013	
DGSC	Weapon Systems Items	422	61	102	605	
	Troop & General Support	457	87	111	655	
	Miscellaneous	157	59	45	260	
	(IPE)	[21]	[59]	[17]	[97]	
	(Miscellaneous)	[136]	[0]	[28]	[163]	
	Base Operations					
	Totals	1035	227	506	1828	
DISC	Weapon Systems Items	993	116	222	1331	
	Troop & General Support	118	20	28	166	
	Miscellaneous					
	Base Operations					
	Totals	1111	136	250	1497	

	95%	75%	50%	TOTAL
	Direct	Indirec	G&A	
	1168	574	140	1882
	177	87	28	292
	401	61	51	513
	434	62	56	552
	149	44	23	216
	[129]	[0]	[14]	[149]
	943	87	111	1141
	112	15	14	141

	FY 94 Permanent Civilians							
	DIRECT	% DIR	INDIRECT	% IND	G & A	% G & A	TOTAL	
Weapons Systems Items								
Troop & General Support	1179	58.2	280	13.35	426	20.3	1885	
Base Operations					185	8.82	185	
Personnel Supt. to DISC					28	1.33	28	
Total	1179		280		639		2098	
POM Stream - DPSC at ASO in 1997	FY 98		FY 97		FY 98		FY 99	
	TOTAL	CHG	TOTAL	CHG	TOTAL	CHG	TOTAL	CHG
	1858	-240	1623	-235	1558	-65	1480	-78
POM Stream - DPSC at ASO in 1999	FY 98		FY 97		FY 98		FY 99	
	TOTAL	CHG	TOTAL	CHG	TOTAL	CHG	TOTAL	CHG
	1858	-240	1787	-71	1716	-71	1647	-69
							1480	-236

	FY 99 DPSC							
	DIRECT	DIRE	G & A	TOTAL	5% DI	5% INDI	50% G &	TOTAL
Weapons Systems Items								
Troop & General Support	926	220	334	1480	879	165	168	1212
Base Operations			145	145				
Personnel Supt. to DISC			22	22				
Total	926	220	501	1647				

Appendix #5

**COMPARISON OF POSITIONS ELIMINATED  
BETWEEN OPTION III A AND OPTION IV**  
**REP. ROBERT A. BORSKI**

**OPTION III A**

CLOSE DISC. MOVE DISC WEAPONS SYSTEMS TO DGSC. MOVE DISC, DGSC AND DCSC TROOP AND GENERAL TO DPSC. MOVE DGSC MISCELLANEOUS TO DPSC. KEEP IPE AT DGSC. NO BASES CLOSED.\*

	FY99	AFTER BRAC	JOBS ELIMINATED
DCSC			
DCSC WEAPS	2274	2274	0
DCSC BASE OPS	381	381	0
DISC TO DPSC			
DPSC T&G	1480	1480	0
DGSC T&G	655	552	103
DGSC MISC	163	143	20
DCSC T&G	358	292	66
DISC T&G	166	141	25
DISC TO DGSC			
DGSC WEAPS	605	605	0
DGSC IPE	97	97	0
DISC WEAPS	1331	1141	190
DGSC BASE OPS	308	308	0
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>404</b>

**BREAKDOWN BY CATEGORY:**

TOTAL T&G	2659	2465	194
TOTAL WEAPS	4210	4020	190
MISC/IPE	<u>260</u>	<u>240</u>	<u>20</u>
TOTAL FSC			404
<u>BASE OPS</u>	<u>689</u>	<u>689</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL MINUS BASE OPS			404

OPTION IV

CLOSE DGSC. MOVE DGSC WEAPONS TO DISC. MOVE DGSC TROOP & GENERAL, MISCELLANEOUS AND IPE TO DPSC. MOVE DCSC TROOP & GENERAL TO DPSC. CLOSES BASE AT DGSC, ELIMINATING BASE OPS PERSONNEL.\*

	FY99	AFTER BRAC	JOB ELIMINATED
DCSC			
DCSC WEAPS	2274	2274	0
DCSC BASE OPS	381	381	0
DGSC			
DGSC BASE OPS	308	0	308
DGSC TO DPSC			
DPSC T&G	1480	1474	6
DGSC T&G	655	552	103
DGSC MISC	260	216	44
DCSC T&G	358	292	66
DISC T&G	166	141	25
BASE OPS	0	22	-22
DGSC TO DISC			
DISC WEAPS	1331	1331	0
DGSC WEAPS	605	513	92
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>622</b>
 <u>BREAKDOWN BY CATEGORY:</u>			
TOTAL T&G	2659	2459	200
TOTAL WEAPS	4210	4118	92
<u>MISC/IPE</u>	<u>260</u>	<u>216</u>	<u>44</u>
TOTAL FSC			336
<u>BASE OPS</u>	<u>689</u>	<u>403</u>	<u>286</u>
TOTAL MINUS BASE OPS			622

\* This methodology eliminates positions associated with items transferred (losing base). It does not eliminate positions associated with items that will remain at their base (receiving base). For example, under both Options, no Weapon System position are eliminated from the 2274 positions at DCSC.

ROBERT A. BORSKI  
3D DISTRICT, PENNSYLVANIA

COMMITTEES:  
TRANSPORTATION  
AND INFRASTRUCTURE  
RANKING DEMOCRAT—SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT

STEERING COMMITTEE  
REGIONAL WHIP

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

April 20, 1995

WASHINGTON OFFICE:  
ROOM 2182  
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BLDG.  
(202) 225-8251  
FAX: (202) 225-4628  
DISTRICT OFFICES:  
7141 FRANKFORD AVE.  
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19135  
(215) 335-3355  
FAX: (215) 333-4508  
2630 MEMPHIS ST.  
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19125  
(215) 426-4616

Honorable Alan Dixon  
Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing to request the Base Closure Commission to direct the General Accounting Office (GAO) to fully assess the Department of Defense's recommendation to disestablish the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC).

As you know, on March 30, I sent the enclosed letter to GAO requesting their assessment of DOD's recommendation to disestablish DISC. The letter includes my analysis of the flaws found in the recommendation.

Regrettably, none of these issues were addressed in GAO's April 13 report to Congress and the Base Closure Commission.

It is my understanding that the Base Closure Commission can request a GAO study of specific recommendations. I believe such an analysis is necessary, specifically on the following flaws of DOD's recommendation:


- \* Significant cost omissions in the COBRA for DISC, including the cost of transferring items and the cost of delaying the BRAC93 realignment of the Defense Personnel Support Center to the Aviation Supply Office compound.
- \* The methodology used to determine the amount of positions that would be eliminated under various ICP scenarios, which is the basis for the preponderance of savings, is patently illogical and contradicts common sense.

I can certainly appreciate the workload and time constraints under which you are working. However, I believe a rational, objective assessment of these issues by GAO is essential to your final decision on DISC.

April 20, 1995  
Page 2

Thank you for your expeditious consideration of this extremely important matter. Please do not hesitate to contact me for any additional information.

Sincerely,



ROBERT A. BORIKI  
Member of Congress

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Al Cornella, Commissioner  
Base Closure and Realignment Commission

ROBERT A. BORSKI  
30 DISTRICT, PENNSYLVANIA

COMMITTEES:  
TRANSPORTATION  
AND INFRASTRUCTURE  
RANKING DEMOCRAT—SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT

STEERING COMMITTEE

REGIONAL WHIP

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

WASHINGTON OFFICE:  
ROOM 2182  
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BLDG.  
(202) 225-8251  
FAX: (202) 225-4628

DISTRICT OFFICES:  
7141 FRANKFORD AVE.  
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19136  
(215) 335-3355  
FAX: (215) 333-4508  
2630 MEMPHIS ST.  
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19125  
(215) 426-4616

March 30, 1995

Mr. Charles A. Bowsher  
Comptroller General of the United States  
General Accounting Office  
441 G Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mr. Comptroller:

I am writing to bring to your attention several issues relating to the Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) recommendation to disestablish the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) located in Philadelphia. I believe these issues must be addressed by the General Accounting Office (GAO) in its April 15 report to Congress analyzing the 1995 base closure recommendations.

As you may know, the DLA has recommended the "disestablishment" of DISC as a part of its 1995 base closure recommendations. After numerous meetings with DISC employees and the DLA base closure executive group (BRACEG), I believe DLA's recommendation is suspect for the following reasons:

Military Value

- \* DLA did not adequately assess the risk to military readiness associated with the large amount of items transferred.
- \* Inventory Control Point (ICP) performance and its impact on readiness is not included in the military value analysis.
- \* The multi-service ICP synergy that exists between DISC and the Navy's Aviation Supply Office (ASO) was not included in the military value analysis. Additional compound synergy is also achieved by DISC partnering with the Defense Printing Service (DPS) in pioneering development of critical procurement applications.
- \* DLA instead overemphasized a non-essential synergy between ICPs and distribution depots.
- \* The DLA did not adequately assess the value and available capacity of the ASO compound in its "installation military value analysis."
- \* Unexplained discrepancies exist among three separate computations of the military value of the ICPs.



March 30, 1995

Page 2

Costs


- \* The significant cost of transferring items was not included in the COBRA analysis.
- \* The cost of delaying the BRAC93 realignment of the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) to the ASO compound was not included in the COBRA analysis.
- \* DLA used a flawed methodology to determine the amount of positions that would be eliminated under each scenario.

The bottom line is that DLA is risking the loss of a critical, highly-skilled workforce -- all for savings which are highly suspect.

I have provided a full explanation of each of these major flaws in DLA's recommendation to disestablish DISC. I hope you can add a rational, objective assessment to a recommendation which in my opinion is highly flawed. I believe DLA can achieve higher efficiencies by building on the recommendations accepted by the Base Closure Commission in BRAC93.

Thank you for your expeditious consideration of this extremely important matter. Please do not hesitate to contact me for any additional information.

Sincerely,



ROBERT A. BORSKI  
Member of Congress

RAB/mdv  
Enclosure

cc: Mr. Barry Holman  
General Accounting Office

**FLAWS IN THE  
DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY'S  
RECOMMENDATION  
TO DISESTABLISH  
THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL  
SUPPLY CENTER**

**BY REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT A. BORSKI (PA)**

**March 30, 1995**

In 1993, the Base Closure Commission overturned the Department of Defense's recommendation to close the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC), as well as the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) and the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC). The Commission recognized that the true military value of these facilities was the people and their skills and experience that maintain our nation's readiness.

Despite this decision, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has once again recommended an action that jeopardizes the entire workforce at DISC.

The following flaws to DLA's recommendation have been discovered by representatives of DISC's workforce. These flaws illustrate what little consideration was given to the military value of DISC's workforce. They also illustrate costs that DLA omitted from its COBRA analysis, and how those costs would eliminate any possible savings DLA hopes to gain from its recommendation.

#### MILITARY VALUE

- 1) DLA did not adequately assess the risk to military readiness associated with the large amount of items transferred:

In the 1993 round of base closures (BRAC93), DLA concluded in its ICP recommendation that the mass migration of items was too risky and imprudent. In its recommendation, DLA stated that "with the recommended closures of DESC and realignment with DCSC, the additional move of DISC to DCSC was considered too risky. Scenarios were run splitting DISC among the remaining hardware centers and splitting DISC between DCSC and DGSC. Both options were considered too risky because proposed moves split managed items to multiple locations." (Appendix #1)

Yet two years later the implementation scenario recommends moving approximately 2.4 million items among DLA Inventory Control Points (ICPs). Add to that volume of movement a Consumable Item Transfer (CIT II) of approximately 280,000 items from the military services to DLA, the ICPs would experience a logistics transfer of almost 2.7 million items.

DISC currently manages 34.5 percent of all DLA hardware ICP items used on one or multiple weapon systems, and processes 40 percent of all military customer requisitions forwarded to the four DLA hardware ICPs. Yet DLA recommended relocating DISC's weapons-coded workload to the Defense General Supply Center (DGSC), which currently manages the lowest amount of weapons-coded workload of the DLA hardware ICPs.

This transfer will place a huge number (1.07 million) of weapons-coded items at risk. DGSC, which currently manages 630,972 items, would more than double its workload to 1,472,123 items -- but will increase its workforce by only 323 jobs in fiscal year 1999.

DLA chose its scenario relocating DISC weapons-coded work to DGSC over a scenario relocating DGSC workload to DISC. They made this decision, despite the fact that DISC has a larger, higher-skilled pool of federal workers to choose from to meet increased weapons-coded workload. DISC is also collocated with a Navy weapons management ICP and a weapons engineering facility, combining for an impressive on-compound logistics pool of expertise and people.

2) ICP performance and its impact on readiness is included in the military value analysis:

According to the DLA BRACEG, the military value analysis of the ICPs does not measure the performance of the workforce at each ICP. DLA chose to omit performance from this most critical determinant of base closure decisions, despite the fact that the true military value of these facilities is the people and their skills and experience that maintain our nation's readiness.

In meetings with the BRACEG, DLA maintains a position that performance is not a part of the BRAC process, because performance is determined by the quality of management, not where that management is located. This position completely neglects the value of the people currently performing these jobs, and the negative impact on the value that would result from its disestablishment. Management can hardly achieve high performance without a highly-skilled experienced workforce. This fact was one of the key reasons the Base Closure Commission overturned DLA's BRAC93 recommendation to move DISC (and its management and workforce) to New Cumberland, PA.

The disruption of the DISC workforce would have a serious impact on its ability to provide our armed forces with the highest level of service at the lowest level of cost. These employees have been "reinventing government" long before Vice President Al Gore began implementing his reforms, and have been recognized with numerous awards and citations.

DISC currently has proportionally the highest number of requisitions from military customers, yet provides the highest level of support of all hardware centers. DISC currently has the lowest number of chronic below goal systems and provides much better availability to weapon systems items than the other hardware ICPs. Yet none of these performance measures were given any significance in DLA's military value analysis.

- 3) The multi-service ICP synergy that exists between DISC and the Navy's Aviation Supply Office (ASO) was not included in the military value analysis:

A strong synergy currently exist between DISC and ASO, due to the direct relationship between DISC commodities managed and the ASO mission. This synergy was highlighted in BRAC93 and is pivotal in DISC's customer support. Yet in both its military value and COBRA analyses, DLA gave no consideration to this synergy, and how its permanent loss would affect readiness.

DISC currently has joint contracts in place with ASO covering more than 200 items and \$30 million. Proximity and a similar weapons orientation between ASO and DISC has accrued savings in both readiness and investment dollars.

Ironically, in its BRAC95 report to Congress, the Navy prominently cited this synergy as a reason to keep ASO in Philadelphia (see Appendix #2). Yet DLA makes absolutely no mention or consideration of the synergy in its recommendation to disestablish DISC.

- 4) DLA instead overemphasized a synergy between ICPs and distribution depots:

In its report, DLA refers to a synergy existing between DGSC and its tenant depot (DDRV) as a reason to keep both open. However, the type of synergy that exists between DISC and ASO does not occur between a DLA ICP and a Distribution Depot. The real logistics savings are in integrated acquisition and planning between ICPs.

In fact, both DLA's Corporate Strategic Plan and performance plan emphasize a decrease in depot inventory and cost due to Buy Response Vice Inventory efforts, obviating any special synergy between ICP and depot. This is further substantiated by DLA's BRAC95 recommendation to reduce the Columbus depot workforce by 90 percent by relocating its mission to storage of slow moving items. Additionally, if depot/ICP synergy is so important, why are performance statistics at Richmond and Columbus consistently lower than DISC's multi-service ICP site.

- 5) The DLA did not adequately assess the value of the ASO compound in its "installation military value analysis":

The Military Value of each DLA ICP did not matter in DLA's final decision to disestablish DISC. In its report, DLA stated that "the Executive Group did not consider the difference among the Military Value of the three Hardware ICPs significant enough, by itself, to point toward any obvious closure candidates."

Instead, the decision to close DISC was driven primarily by the decision to keep DDRV open. This fact is evident in General Farrell's testimony before the Base Closure Commission:

"Richmond is our best installation, and the Distribution Depot there will remain open. Therefore, we concluded that disestablishing the Defense Industrial Supply Center in Philadelphia was in the best interest of DLA."

This decision was reached by conducting an "installation military value analysis," which measures the value of all facilities collocated at a particular base. DLA chose to keep DGSC\DDRV open because it received the second highest score in the "installation military value analysis."

However, no "installation military value analysis" was conducted for the ASO compound, which includes ASO, DISC and smaller tenants, and will soon receive DPSC. DLA claims that such analysis was not possible because ASO is a Navy activity.

As a result, the ASO compound was not objectively weighed against the DGSC\DDRV compound. As a result, DLA made a decision that it felt was best for DLA without looking at the best scenario for the Department of Defense and the American taxpayer.

DLA recommended closing DISC, not because of its military value or costs, but because it is not collocated with a depot. Instead of being rewarded for saving taxpayer money through joint-service synergy, DISC is being penalized for being collocated with a Navy facility.

Furthermore, in reflecting on the expendability element of military value, DLA failed to accurately consider the DOD space available at this location, adversely affecting DISC's military value scores.

6) Unexplained discrepancies exist among three separate computations of the military value of the ICPs:

Based on the DLA BRACEG minutes (Appendix #3), DLA conducted computations of military value analysis of the ICPs on three separate occasions (12/5/94, 12/29/94, and 1/5/95) with three different results.

In the 12/5 computation, DISC scored second to DCSC in total points. In the 12/29 computation, DISC once again scored second, but with significant changes to the scores of DGSC, the largest being a 29 point increase in the category of "Additional Mission w/o Additional Personnel."

The 1/5 computation saw a substantial increase in scores for both DGSC and DCSC but a scoring decrease to DISC. The big change occurred in the area of "Base Operating Costs" and "Personnel Costs." Under the revised computations, DISC's score, however, decreased from 171 to 162 points. This change resulted in a 25 point deficit placing DISC with the lowest military value rating.

Aside from the point changes, however, significant dollar changes were also obvious. As an example, DGSC's total operational costs decreased by \$94 million between 12/15 and 12/20. The cause was not explained. An interesting audit trail exists which documents at least seven letters and phone calls to DGSC requesting additional data to reach this final conclusion.

## COSTS

- 1) The significant cost of transferring items was not included in the COBRA analysis:

There is a significant cost associated with transferring 2.4 million of items managed by the ICPs. Yet a thorough examination of DLA's recommendation reveals that these costs were not included in DLA's COBRA analysis. In fact, DLA is just now requesting such information.

Moving items is not simply an electronic process. Physical labor is required of the losing activity to package historical hard copy data, technical drawings and ancillary records. The receiving activities will also incur costs to re-establish the management records and build technical expertise. Continued human communication and interaction between functional experts in all disciplines will still be required even after the transfer. This continued dialogue is a mandatory element to come up to full operational capability.

Based on actual service ICP cost data, the cost of migrating items as required under DLA's recommendation averages \$66 per item. This migration process cost does not include the negative impact on material availability and readiness incurred in such a mass migration even if it is spread out over several years. DISC's previous history with CIT Phase I and migrating Federal Stock Classes 1560/1680 to the Defense General Supply Center shows a degradation in service support.

- 2) The cost of delaying the BRAC93 realignment of the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) to the ASO compound was not included in the COBRA analysis:

Another cost discrepancy apparently overlooked is the cost associated with maintaining the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) at its South Philadelphia compound for an additional two years. As you know, in its recommendation, DLA claims a cost avoidance of \$28.6 million by delaying the BRAC93 move of DPSC to the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) compound. In its COBRA analysis, DLA included the \$28.6 million as a "one-time saving," but neglected to include the costs of keeping DPSC in South Philadelphia as a "one-time cost." The cost of extending the facility over this period is estimated to be at least \$74 million (fiscal year 1994 dollars).

3) DLA used a flawed methodology to determine the amount of positions that would be eliminated under each scenario:

In its report, "The Executive Group determined that the synergy which would be achieved by grouping items requiring the same type of management would result in some savings." The Executive Group decided that 5 percent of direct labor, and 25 percent of indirect labor, and 50 percent of the general and administrative overhead associated with base operations could be saved by consolidating management of related Federal Supply Classes.

By grouping all FSCs under two Weapon Systems ICPs and one Troop and General Support ICP, DLA calculated that it could eliminate 404 civilian jobs throughout all ICPs. DLA calculates that the savings generated from eliminating these positions will result in \$15 million in steady state personnel savings.

Appendix #4, which was provided by DLA, and appendix #5, which analyzes these figures, shows how DLA broke down the positions at each ICP attributed to either weapons, troop and general, miscellaneous and base operating. DLA broke each category into direct, indirect, and general and administrative support.

Under each scenario, however, DLA only made the 5%/25%/50% reductions for the positions associated with the items transferred from the losing base. Similar reductions were not made for receiving bases.

For example, under Option IIIA, which disestablishes DISC, DLA calculates that 190 positions will be eliminated by moving DISC's weapon systems items to DGSC. However, under Option IV, which closes DGSC, DLA calculates that only 92 positions will be eliminated by moving DGSC's weapon systems to DISC. The difference of 100 jobs between these two transfer scenario is huge with respect to steady state savings.

Grouping weapon system positions together at one ICP should achieve the same number of eliminated positions, regardless of where that consolidation takes place. Using DLA's methodology, however, allows you to calculate a higher number of positions eliminated based on the amount of items you transfer, not on the extent to which you can consolidate. Because more weapon systems items are transferred in Option III than Option IV, a higher number of positions are eliminated using this flawed methodology.

Ironically, Option IIIA was chosen over Option IV, despite the fact that overall Option IV eliminates more positions (638) because it allows DLA to eliminate 308 Base Operating jobs. However, as mentioned above, the ultimate decision to close DISC was based on the decision to save DDRV, not on cost-effectiveness.





## ***DLA BRAC 93 Detailed Analysis***

Midatlantic, and other tenants with approximately 800 personnel. DPSC was not reviewed as part of the ICP category since it manages a much smaller number of items which have a significantly higher dollar value than the hardware ICPs. The activity has no administrative space available, but does have a small number of buildable acres. Environmental problems at DPSC would make building or extensive renovations impossible for some time in the future.

With the movement of DCMD Midatlantic and the Clothing Factory out of DPSC, the Working Group examined options to either utilize the base as a receiver or move DPSC to another location. Scenarios were built so that activities moved to locations where excess space had been identified. DISC, currently a tenant at ASO which is recommended for closure by the Navy, was considered for possible realignment to DPSC. A scenario which realigned DPSC to ASO where DLA would assume responsibility for the base was analyzed. Another, which split the three commodities at DPSC between DGSC and DCSC was also examined.

The distribution depot at New Cumberland has available buildable acres. Additionally, another recommendation moves DISC, a hardware ICP from Philadelphia to New Cumberland. This allows several activities to be consolidated. The presence of three ICPs and major DLA facilities in the area will create significant opportunities for savings and efficiencies in the future. As a result of the closure of DPSC, the property will be excess to Army needs. The Army will dispose of it in accordance with existing policy and procedure.

**Return on Investment:** Total estimated one time cost for these closures is \$173.0 million. Annual steady state savings are \$90.6 million with an immediate return on investment.

**Impacts:** Closing the DPSC installation and the Clothing Factory will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 0.4 percent of the employment base in the Philadelphia Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. The closure will ultimately result in a reduction in air emissions, wastewater discharges, and solid waste.

### **Defense Industrial Supply Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania**

**Recommendation:** Relocate the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC), a hardware Inventory Control Point (ICP), located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to New Cumberland, Pennsylvania.

**Justification:** DISC is a tenant of the Navy's Aviation Supply Office (ASO) located in Philadelphia. With the Navy decision to close ASO during BRAC 93, DISC must either be relocated or remain behind and assume responsibility for the base.

The Executive Group considered options where square footage or buildable acres existed. Also, only locations where ICPs currently exist were considered.

Collocation with DCSC, DESC and DGSC were also considered. DGSC has buildable acres but no space available. DESC has warehouse space and DCSC will have administrative space in 1997. However, with the recommended closures of DESC and realignment with DCSC, the additional move of DISC to DCSC was considered too risky. Scenarios were run splitting DISC among the remaining hardware centers and splitting DISC between DCSC and DGSC. Both options were considered too risky because proposed moves split managed items to multiple locations.

## ATTACHMENT L

### DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSIS OF INVENTORY CONTROL POINTS

This Inventory Control Points (ICPs) subcategory was composed of the Aviation Supply Office (ASO), located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and the Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC), located in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. These activities provide worldwide wholesale inventory control for all naval fleet units and program logistics support for naval weapons systems.

#### Data Call Development

The capacity and military value data calls were developed using the BRAC-93 data calls as starting points. Sets of questions were then expanded or compressed based on lessons learned for BRAC-93 and consultations with technical experts. The capacity data call was designed to capture throughput, measured in total government workyears performed. Information was also requested on subsidiary workload categories of Weapons Systems Program Support, Security Assistance workyears, and Requisition Volume, as subsets of the total work performed. The data call obtained both actual performed workload at each command, from FY 1986 to the present, and programmed workload through FY 2001. The data calls also requested information on specific features and capabilities of each activity, including manpower factors, physical space available for industrial support, facility and equipment characteristics, and contingency and mobilization features. Standard modules on quality of life, costs and investments, and environmental issues were included.

#### Capacity Analysis

Capacity analysis was conducted by comparing the maximum potential capacity of the ICPs to the workload programmed to support the FY 2001 force structure. The maximum potential capacity was determined for both individual and aggregated throughput measures based on the maximum historic performance levels for the period FY 1986-1993. The average of those levels for each ICP was summed to determine a maximum potential for the subcategory. This maximum capacity was compared to required capacity, determined from the reported programmed workload through FY 2001. Maximum capacity for the Inventory Control Points was determined to exceed future requirements by approximately 48 percent.

Maximum potential capacity was also calculated for the secondary measures, the subordinate collections of workload anticipated through the outyears. While the weapons systems program support paralleled the aggregate capacity analysis in identifying significant excess capacity, the other secondary measures remained relatively constant.

The BSEC concluded that sufficient excess capacity existed to warrant analysis of military value.

### **Military Value Analysis**

The military value matrix was developed after review of the BRAC-93 matrix, with modifications based on lessons learned, technical expert perspectives, and matrices already approved by the BSEC. The military value questions were grouped into six subject areas, covering customer service support, features and facilities, costs and investments, environment, quality of life, and strategic factors. Standardized modules assessing facilities, costs and investments, environmental, and quality of life concerns were adjusted for this subcategory to reflect the predominantly civilian workforce and distinct mission at the activities. Primary emphasis in the evaluation was placed on individual executed workload as reflected in questions pertaining to customer service support.

As would be expected in a group of only two activities which so closely parallel each other in mission and requirements, the military value analysis did not provide a clear differentiation. SPCC received a score of 58.1, while ASO was scored at 55.8 (out of 94.2 possible points). The two commands are differentiated primarily by those functions in which each specializes (i.e., support to aviation units or to ships).

### **Configuration Analysis**

Configuration analysis was conducted using a linear programming model to develop solutions that minimized excess capacity in the ICPs while meeting FY 2001 requirements and maintained an average military value. Standard sensitivity analyses were conducted, adjusting the FY 2001 requirement up 10 percent, down 10 percent, and down 20 percent.

The initial solution output from the configuration model closed ASO. The sensitivity analyses which increased the requirement closed no ICP, while the two which reduced the requirement both showed ASO closed. Given the requirement to maintain average military value from a universe of two activities, this was the only solution possible since SPCC has both a higher military value and a larger capacity.

### **Scenario Development and Analysis**

The results of the configuration analysis provided the BSEC with a starting point for deliberations leading to scenario development. The capacity reduction shown by the configuration runs appeared very efficient, suggesting that consolidation of those functions into SPCC would eliminate all but 7.6% of the total excess. Accordingly, the BSEC issued two scenarios which closed ASO. In one, ASO closed and consolidated at SPCC;

in the other, ASO closed and consolidated at SPCC but transferred ASO's compound host responsibilities to its largest tenant, DLA.

After a rigorous review, the COBRA analyses suggested that such a closure would eventually payoff, though one-time costs were quite large. The responses to the data calls indicated that, over the last year, the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) has restructured the ICPs by "consolidating in place," to eliminate the large amount of excess capacity identified during BRAC-93. As a result, savings resulting from elimination of personnel were not possible, since significant reductions in the workforce have already occurred. Given these results, the BSEC determined that it would not forward a recommendation to close ASO.

### **Conclusion**

Despite the capacity analysis which demonstrated significant excess capacity, the recommendation to close ASO and consolidate those functions at SPCC was not endorsed for two reasons. First, the gap between attributed costs and savings was most likely to narrow under the realities of implementation, resulting in an even narrower benefit between costs and savings and extending the payoff unacceptably. Secondly, the BSEC acknowledged that NAVSUP has been particularly vigorous in its efforts to restructure the ICPs independent of and external to the BRAC process, and so no further consolidation is required. The consolidation suggested by the BRAC-95 process might well disrupt those efforts, as well as the synergy which currently exists between ASO and DLA within the Philadelphia compound.

**HARDWARE ICP's MILITARY VALUE**

	Military Value	DCSC	DGSC	DISC	DCSC	DGSC	DISC
		A	B	C	A	B	C
		Points Earned	Points Earned	Points Earned	VALUES	VALUES	VALUES
<b>I. Mission Essentiality</b>							
<b>A. Current/Future Mission</b>							
1. DoD Essentiality	100	100	100	100			
2. Same/Similar Mission	100	0	0	0			
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>			
<b>B. Mission Scope</b>							
1. Field Activities Reporting Directly to this Activity	10	0	10	0			
2. % Paid Equivalents Directly Support Field Activities	10	0	10	0			
3. No. of NSN's Managed							
a. Active NSN's	40	40	6.64	12.77			
b. Inactive NSN's	10	7.2	6.28	10			
4. \$ Value Inventory Managed							
a. Active Inventory (\$M)	40	40	7.04	6.11			
b. Inactive Inventory (\$M)	10	4.02	10	6.2			
5. No. of PR'S Awarded	15	15	6.28	6.37			
6. \$ Value of Contracts Awarded	15	15	10.15	5.85			
7. % Business (\$ Value) Supporting Non-DoD	25	20.98	3.75	25			
8. % Paid Equivalent Supporting Non-DoD	25	25	4.47	0			
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>167.2</b>	<b>74.81</b>	<b>72.3</b>			
<b>TOTAL MISSION ESSENTIALITY</b>	<b>400</b>	<b>267.2</b>	<b>174.81</b>	<b>172.3</b>			
<b>II. Mission Suitability</b>							
<b>A. Current/Future Mission</b>							
1. Age of Buildings	25	9	7	5			
2. Current Condition of Buildings	140	115	118	105			
3. Infrastructure Suitable for Electronic Comms	25	25	25	25			
4. Access to Transportation	10	10	10	10			
a. Air							
b. Bus							
c. Train							
<b>TOTAL MISSION SUITABILITY</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>145</b>			

# HARDWARE ICP's MILITARY VALUE

4:39 PM  
3/21/85  
BRAC-A.XLS

<b>III. Operational Efficiencies</b>				
<b>A. BOS Costs</b>				
1. BOS Costs per Paid Equivalent	50	9.4	7.26	50
2. RPM Costs per Square Feet	50	39.94	50	38.03
3. Comm. Costs per Paid Equivalent	25	25	11.81	18.49
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>74.34</b>	<b>68.87</b>	<b>106.52</b>
<b>B. Personnel Costs</b>				
1. Total G&A Costs per Paid Equivalent	25	18.28	16.06	25
2. Total Direct Costs per Paid Equivalent	25	25	16.04	16.88
3. Total Indirect Costs per Paid Equivalent	25	6.75	25	20.85
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>50.03</b>	<b>57.1</b>	<b>62.53</b>
<b>TOTAL OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCIES</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>124.37</b>	<b>125.97</b>	<b>169.05</b>
<b>IV. Expandability</b>				
<b>A. Facility/Installation Expansion</b>				
1. Total Buildable Acres	40	40	19	5
2. Acceptable DoD Space in MSA (Sq Ft)	10	0	0	10
3. Additional Personnel Accommodated in Current Space	60	60	20	2
4. Excess DLA Warehouse Could be Allocated	50	0	0	0
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>B. Mobilization Expansion-Surge Capability</b>				
	0			
<b>C. Mission Expansion</b>				
1. Additional Mission w/o Additional Personnel (%)	40	29	0	40
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>TOTAL EXPANDABILITY</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>TOTAL MILITARY VALUE</b>	<b>1000</b>	<b>679.57</b>	<b>499.58</b>	<b>543.35</b>
			5-Dec-84	

HARDWARE ICP's MILITARY VALUE

4:38 PM  
3/21/05  
BRAC-A.XLS

DCSC A	DGSC B	DISC C	DCSC	DGSC	DISC	DCSC	DGSC	DISC	DCSC	DGSC	DISC
			A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
			VALUES	VALUES	VALUES	Points Earned	Points Earned	Points Earned	VALUES	VALUES	VALUES
						100	100	100			
						0	0	0			
						100	100	100			
						0	10	0			
						0	10	0			
						40	7	13			
						7	6	10			
						40	7	6			
						4	10	6			
						15	6	6			
						15	10	6			
						21	4	25			
						25	4	0			
						107	75	72			
						287	175	172			
						9	7	5			
						115	118				
						25	25	25			
						10	10	10			
						159	160	150			





Option I Close DISC/DPSC in 1999	Option II Close DGSC Inst/DISC in 1999	Option III Close DISC in 1999	Option III A Close DISC in 1999 IPE Remains at DGSC	Option IV Close DGSC Inst in 1999
<u>DISC to DCSC</u>	<u>DISC to DCSC</u>	<u>DCSC</u>		<u>DCSC</u>
DCSC Weapon Sys (n/c) 2274	DCSC W/S (n/c) 2274	DCSC W/S (n/c) 2274	DCSC W/S (n/c) 2274	DCSC W/S (n/c) 2274
DISC W/S 1141	DISC W/S 1141	Base Ops 391	Base Ops 391	Base Ops 391
DGSC W/S 513	DGSC W/S 513	Total Required 2888	Total Required 2888	Total Required 2888
DPSC W/S 0	DPSC W/S 0	1999 DCSC Available -3013	1999 DCSC Available -3013	1999 Available -3013
TOTAL W/S 3928	TOTAL W/S 3928	Base Ops -388	Base Ops -388	Base Ops -388
Base Ops 391	Base Ops 391			
TOTAL REQUIRED 4399	TOTAL REQUIRED 4399			
1994 DCSC AVAILABLE -3323	1994 DCSC AVAILABLE -3323			
Billets Transferred 988	Billets Transferred 988			
		<u>DISC to DPSC</u>	<u>DISC to DPSC</u>	<u>DGSC to DPSC</u>
		DPSC T & G 1480	DPSC T & G 1480	DPSC T & G (n/c) 1474
		DGSC T & G 552	DGSC T & G 552	DGSC T & G 552
		DGSC MISC 216	DGSC MISC (less IPE) 143	DGSC Misc 216
<u>DPSC to DGSC</u>	<u>DGSC to DPSC</u>	DCSC T & G 292	DCSC T & G 292	DCSC T & G 292
DGSC Troop & Gen (n/c) 655	DPSC T & G (n/c) 1480	DISC T & G 141	DISC T & G 141	DISC T & G 141
DGSC Misc (n/c) 260	DGSC T & G 552	TOTAL T & G 2881	TOTAL T & G 2888	TOTAL T & G 2878
DPSC T & G 1212	DGSC Misc 216	Base Ops 0	Base Ops 0	Base Ops 22
DCSC T & G 292	DCSC T & G 292	Total Required 2881	Total Required 2888	Total Required 2897
DISC T & G 141	DISC T & G 141	1994 DPSC Avail -2098	1994 DPSC Avail -2098	1994 DPSC Avail -2098
TOTAL T & G 2869	TOTAL T & G 2881	Billets Transferred 583	Billets Transferred 510	Billets Transferred 899
Base Ops 391	Base Ops 0			
TOTAL REQUIRED 2888	TOTAL REQUIRED 2881			
1994 DGSC AVAILABLE -2198	1994 DPSC AVAILABLE -2098	<u>DISC to DGSC</u>	<u>DISC to DGSC</u>	<u>DGSC to DISC</u>
Billets Transferred 670	Billets Transferred 583	DGSC W/S (n/c) 605	DGSC W/S (n/c) 605	DISC W/S (n/c) 1331
		DISC W/S 1141	DGSC IPE (n/c) 97	DGSC W/S 513
		DPSC W/S 0	DISC W/S 1141	DPSC W/S 0
		TOTAL W/S 1746	DPSC W/S 0	Total W/S 1844
		Base Ops 391	TOTAL W/S 1843	Base Ops 0
		Total Required 2064	Base Ops 391	TOTAL REQUIRED 1844
		1999 Avail -1528	Total Required 2181	1999 Avail -1497
		Billets Transferred 226	1999 Avail -1528	Billets Transferred 347
			Billets Transferred 323	

		FY 94 Permanent Civilians						
		Direct	% Dir	InDirect	% Ind	G & A	% G & A	Total
DCSC	Weapon Systems Items	1356	40.8	844	25.4	309	9.3	2509
	Troop & General Support	205	6.17	128	3.85	61	1.84	394
	Miscellaneous	0		0		0		0
	Base Operations	0		0		420	12.64	420
	Totals	1561		972		790		3323
DGSC	Weapons Systems Items	507	23.07	97	4.41	123	5.6	727
	Troop & General Support	550	25.02	105	4.78	133	6.05	788
	Miscellaneous	188		71		54		313
	[IPE]	[25]	[1.14]	[71]	[3.23]	[20]	[.91]	[116]
	[Other]	[163]	[7.42]	[0]	[0]	[34]	[1.55]	[197]
	Base Operations	0		0		370	16.83	370
	Totals	1245		273		680		2198
DtSC	Weapon Systems Items	1228	66.34	143	7.73	275	14.88	1646
	Troop & General Support	146	7.89	25	1.35	34	1.84	205
	Miscellaneous	0		0		0		0
	Base Operations	0		0		0		0
	Totals	1374		168		309		1851

FY 96		FY 97		FY 98		FY 99	
Total	Pom Chg	Total	Pom Chg	Total	POM Chg	Total	POM chg
3284	-39	3299	-15	3138	-131	3013	-125
2066	-132	1963	-83	1904	-79	1826	-78
1679	-172	1624	-55	1559	-65	1497	-62

		FY 99				
		Direct	Indirec	G&A	Total	
DCSC	Weapon Systems Items	1229	765	280	2274	
	Troop & General Support	186	116	56	358	
	Miscellaneous					
	Base Operators					
	Totals	1415	881	381	3013	
DGSC	Weapon Systems Items	422	81	102	605	
	Troop & General Support	457	87	111	655	
	Miscellaneous	157	59	45	260	
	(IPE)	[21]	[59]	[17]	[97]	
	(Miscellaneous)	[136]	[0]	[26]	[163]	
	Base Operators					
	Totals	1035	227	306	308	1828
DNSC	Weapon Systems Items	903	116	222	1331	
	Troop & General Support	118	20	28	166	
	Miscellaneous					
	Base Operators					
	Totals	1111	136	250	1497	

		95%	75%	50%	TOTAL
		Direct	Indirec	G&A	
		1188	574	140	1882
		177	87	28	292
		401	81	51	513
		434	62	56	552
	149	44	23	216	
	[129]	[0]	[14]	[143]	
		943	87	111	1141
		112	15	14	141

	FY 94 Permanent Civilians						
	DIRECT	% DIR	INDIRECT	% IND	G & A	% G & A	TOTAL
Weapons Systems Items							
Troop & General Support	1179	56.2	280	13.35	426	20.3	1885
Base Operations					185	8.82	185
Personnel Supt. to DISC					28	1.33	28
Total	1179		280		639		2098

	FY 96		FY 97		FY 98		FY 99	
	TOTAL	CHG	TOTAL	CHG	TOTAL	CHG	TOTAL	CHG
	POM Stream - DPSC at ASO in 1997	1858	-240	1623	-235	1558	-85	1480
POM Stream - DPSC at ASO in 1999	1858	-240	1787	-71	1716	-71	1647	-69
							1480	-238

	FY 99 DPSC							
	DIRECT	DIRE	G & A	TOTAL	5% DI	5% INDI	50% G &	TOTAL
Weapons Systems Items								
Troop & General Support	926	220	334	1480	879	165	168	1212
Base Operations			145	145				
Personnel Supt. to DISC			22	22				
Total	926	220	501	1647				

Appendix #5

COMPARISON OF POSITIONS ELIMINATED  
BETWEEN OPTION III A AND OPTION IV  
REP. ROBERT A. BORSKI

OPTION III A

CLOSE DISC. MOVE DISC WEAPONS SYSTEMS TO DGSC. MOVE DISC, DGSC AND DCSC TROOP AND GENERAL TO DPSC. MOVE DGSC MISCELLANEOUS TO DPSC. KEEP IPE AT DGSC. NO BASES CLOSED.\*

	FY99	AFTER BRAC	JOB ELIMINATED
DCSC			
DCSC WEAPS	2274	2274	0
DCSC BASE OPS	381	381	0
DISC TO DPSC			
DPSC T&G	1480	1480	0
DGSC T&G	655	552	103
DGSC MISC	163	143	20
DCSC T&G	358	292	66
DISC T&G	166	141	25
DISC TO DGSC			
DGSC WEAPS	605	605	0
DGSC IPE	97	97	0
DISC WEAPS	1331	1141	190
DGSC BASE OPS	308	308	0
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>404</b>
 <u>BREAKDOWN BY CATEGORY:</u>			
TOTAL T&G	2659	2465	194
TOTAL WEAPS	4210	4020	190
<u>MISC/IPE</u>	<u>260</u>	<u>240</u>	<u>20</u>
TOTAL FSC			404
<u>BASE OPS</u>	<u>689</u>	<u>689</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL MINUS BASE OPS			404

OPTION IV

CLOSE DGSC. MOVE DGSC WEAPONS TO DISC. MOVE DGSC TROOP & GENERAL, MISCELLANEOUS AND IPE TO DPSC. MOVE DCSC TROOP & GENERAL TO DPSC. CLOSES BASE AT DGSC, ELIMINATING BASE OPS PERSONNEL.\*

	FY99	AFTER BRAC	JOBS ELIMINATED
DCSC			
DCSC WEAPS	2274	2274	0
DCSC BASE OPS	381	381	0
DGSC			
DGSC BASE OPS	308	0	308
DGSC TO DPSC			
DPSC T&G	1480	1474	6
DGSC T&G	655	552	103
DGSC MISC	260	216	44
DCSC T&G	358	292	66
DISC T&G	166	141	25
BASE OPS	0	22	-22
DGSC TO DISC			
DISC WEAPS	1331	1331	0
DGSC WEAPS	605	513	92
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>622</b>
 <u>BREAKDOWN BY CATEGORY:</u>			
TOTAL T&G	2659	2459	200
TOTAL WEAPS	4210	4118	92
<u>MISC/IPE</u>	<u>260</u>	<u>216</u>	<u>44</u>
TOTAL FSC			336
<u>BASE OPS</u>	<u>689</u>	<u>403</u>	<u>286</u>
TOTAL MINUS BASE OPS			622

\* This methodology eliminates positions associated with items transferred (losing base). It does not eliminate positions associated with items that will remain at their base (receiving base). For example, under both Options, no Weapon System position are eliminated from the 2274 positions at DCSC.



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425 *Please refer to this number*  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209 *when responding 950421-5R1*  
703-696-0504

April 26, 1995

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

**COMMISSIONERS:**

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

The Honorable Robert A. Borski  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congressman Borski:

Thank you for forwarding to me a copy of your detailed analysis on the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) and your letter of inquiry to the General Accounting Office (GAO). I appreciate your interest in the base closure process and welcome your request for the Commission to direct the GAO to fully assess the DOD to recommendation to disestablish DISC.

The Commission works closely with analysts from the GAO to achieve the fairest and most objective outcome possible from the DOD's recommendations. As you know, the Commission recently held a hearing to question GAO representatives about their report which evaluates the base closure process used by the DOD. Following that hearing, the Commission sent a number of follow-up questions for the record to Mr. Charles A. Bowsher, including ones which address your concerns with the DISC recommendation. I have enclosed a copy of our letter to Mr. Bowsher with your DISC questions for your information. We will forward Mr. Bowsher's responses to your office as soon as they are received.

I can assure you that the Commission will continue to work with the GAO to thoroughly review the data used by the Department of Defense before rendering a decision on DISC. Additionally, the analysis that you provided on DISC will receive careful scrutiny by our review and analysis staff. We welcome any additional information on this issue which you may be able to provide to the Commission.

Again, thank you for submitting your information. I look forward to working with you through this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I can be of assistance.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

Encl.



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425

ARLINGTON, VA 22209

703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

**COMMISSIONERS:**

AL CORNELLA

REBECCA COX

GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)

S. LEE KLING

RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)

MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)

WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 22, 1995

Honorable Charles A. Bowsher  
Comptroller General of the United States  
General Accounting office  
441 G St. NW  
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Bowsher:

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission is continuing its review of the Secretary of Defense's base closure and realignment recommendations. GAO's Report to the Congress and the Commission, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 1995 Process and Recommendations for Closure and Realignment, as well as Assistant Comptroller General Henry L. Hinton, Jr.'s recent testimony, provided a great deal of valuable information and analysis, and will be very helpful to the Commission.

As we discussed with Mr. Hinton during his April 17 testimony, I am enclosing a number of follow-up questions based on Mr. Hinton's testimony and on GAO's Report. We would appreciate written responses to these questions by May 5 so the information can be considered in our deliberative process. If additional time is required to develop a complete response to a specific question, we would appreciate an interim response by May 5.

As the Commission continues our review and analysis of the Defense Department's recommendations, I anticipate that there will be more questions and issues where we will ask for GAO's assistance. If these questions require a written response, we will direct them to Mr. Hinton. In those cases where the Commission needs additional factual information on a specific issue, the Commission will work directly with your field offices in accordance with the arrangements discussed between Mr. Hinton and Mr. Lyles, the Commission's Staff Director.

We appreciate the assistance that GAO provides to the Commission as we carry out our responsibilities.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman



## DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

1. Congressman Robert Borski, PA, requested the Commission review the DoD recommendation to disestablish the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) based on his believe that:

Significant cost omissions in the COBRA for DISC, including the cost of transferring items and the cost of delaying the BRAC93 realignment of the Defense Personnel Support Center to the Aviation Supply Office compound.

The methodology used to determine the amount of positions that would be eliminated under various ICP scenarios, which is the basis for the preponderance of savings, is patently illogical and contradicts common sense.

What are your views on the disestablishment of DISC?

What is your assessment of Congressman Borski's contentions? If you have responded to Congressman Borski concerning this DoD recommendation, please provide a copy of your response to the Commission.

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950421-6

FROM: BOND, CHRISTOPHER	TO: DIXON
TITLE: REP. (MO)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: FORT LEONARD WOOD	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING A COMMISSIONER VISIT FORT LEONARD WOOD.

Due Date: 950425	Routing Date: 950421	Date Originated: 950414	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND

MISSOURI

COMMITTEES:  
APPROPRIATIONS  
BANKING, HOUSING AND  
URBAN AFFAIRS  
SMALL BUSINESS  
BUDGET  
ENVIRONMENT AND  
PUBLIC WORKS

## United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2503

April 14, 1995

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950421-6


The Honorable Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman  
The Defense Base Closure and  
Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street  
Suite 1425  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In connection with the Department of Defense recommendation to move Army missions from Fort McClellan, Alabama to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, General Davis, a member of the Commission has, I understand, visited Fort McClellan. I extend a most cordial invitation on behalf of the people of the Fort Leonard Wood area to visit the Fort to see what preparations are already underway and to see what a warm welcome the mission will receive at Fort Leonard Wood.

I do hope that General Davis will be able to make the visit; he will be impressed by what he sees there.

Sincerely,



Christopher S. Bond

CSB/jlp



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950421-6R1

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

**COMMISSIONERS:**

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 25, 1995

The Honorable Christopher S. Bond  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Kit:

Thank you for your letter inviting Commissioner J. B. Davis to visit Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

As you are aware, Commissioner Lee Kling has visited Fort Leonard Wood, in addition to Fort McClellan. It is my understanding that Commissioner Davis was scheduled to visit Fort Leonard Wood on April 20th, but his flight from St. Louis to Dallas was canceled. I am certain that Commissioner Davis will make every attempt to visit Fort Leonard Wood in the coming weeks if it can be accommodated in his schedule.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cw

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950421-7

FROM: <u>FILNER, BOB</u>	TO: <u>DIXON</u>
TITLE: <u>REP. (CA)</u>	TITLE: <u>CHAIRMAN</u>
ORGANIZATION: <u>U.S. CONGRESS</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCRC</u>
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: <u>NAVAL HEALTH RESEARCH CENTER</u>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
				COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER		X	
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

Ⓢ	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

LETTER OF SUPPORT FOR RETAINING  
NAVAL HEALTH RESEARCH CENTER IN SAN  
DIEGO.

Due Date: <u>950425</u>	Routing Date: <u>950421</u>	Date Originated: <u>950411</u>	Mail Date:
-------------------------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	------------

**BOB FILNER**  
50TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

504 CANNON BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515  
TEL: (202) 225-8045  
FAX: (202) 225-9073

333 F STREET, SUITE A  
CHULA VISTA, CALIFORNIA 91910  
TEL: (619) 422-5963  
FAX: (619) 422-7290



PUBLIC WORKS AND  
TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE

VETERANS' AFFAIRS  
COMMITTEE

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

April 11, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore St #1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950421-7

Dear Mr. Dixon:

An important matter has come to my attention regarding your proposal to move the scientists, staff, and biomedical research functions of the Naval Health Research Center from San Diego, California to Millington, Tennessee. This relocation seriously threatens medical research underway at the Center, which does research collaboratively with the School of Medicine at the University of California, San Diego and with San Diego State University--on topics ranging from Gulf War Syndrome, to AIDS, to the health of women sailors and soldiers in the Navy and Marine Corps.

The Naval Health Research Center is a center of excellence, involving approximately 150 scientists and staff. It has a long and distinguished history of research and significant linkages to the academic community. The Center is widely recognized for its work on HIV and AIDS, some of which is being done with input from Dr. Jonas Salk who is located in San Diego. The Center also is conducting the Navy's most comprehensive study to date of women's health, surveying shipboard exposures and illnesses in 10,000 Navy women and male controls.

I have been told that a recent review by the National Academy of Sciences of Gulf War Syndrome studies indicated that only one investigation had notable scientific merit--that study was the major Gulf War Syndrome study that is being conducted by this Naval Health Research Center. As mentioned earlier, this Gulf War Syndrome Study and the Women's Health Study are being conducted in collaboration with the local universities. The Center also collaborates with the Army and Air Force on major projects in the field of women's health, with a strong tri-service orientation.

The Center is currently operated by the Department of the Navy in San Diego, but is slated to be renamed and reconstituted as Armed Forces Medical Research Unit #3 (San Diego) in mid-1996. From that point in time forward, it will be funded through the Department of the Army and other sponsors. Under the terms of this transition from the Naval Health Research Center to Armed Forces Medical Research Unit #3 (San Diego), the Center would continue its important collaborative research on Gulf War Syndrome, HIV, women's health, and other topics. During the interim, the unit would normally remain under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Navy's Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon  
April 11, 1995

However, if the Naval Health Research Center is moved to Tennessee before it is reconstituted as Armed Forces Medical Research Unit #3 (San Diego), it will undoubtedly cease to operate. Its success depends on access to the Fleet and on the work of the distinguished scientists who are its principal investigators. Several key investigators have said that they cannot move at this state of their scientific career to a non-medical, non-academic setting distant from the Fleet and the populations they are studying. Several hold joint appointments in the University of California School of Medicine and San Diego State University.

With the Center's demise, the nation's most scientifically accredited study of the Gulf War Syndrome will suffer seriously or will vanish, as will its ongoing work on HIV and women's health. The move to Tennessee is unnecessary, as adequate space has been identified in San Diego for the Center to continue its research, and its funding will continue until it assumes its new role as Armed Forces Medical Research Unit #3 (San Diego). It furthermore has been estimated that the cost of running the Center will be less if it remains in San Diego, since Tennessee is distant from Fleet operations, and considerable more travel support would be needed than if the Center remained at its present location.

The decision to move this Center was predicated on the expectation by BRAC that its workload would be decreased. In fact, Congressional interest in the health status of military women and the Gulf War Syndrome have doubled the workload and funding of this Center during the past three years. The workload of the Center is expected to increase rather than decline in the future.

Please reconsider this proposed move. I would hope that you leave the Naval Health Research Center in place in San Diego under its usual Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery supervision, pending its planned transition to Armed Forces Medical Research Unit #3 (San Diego) in 1996.

I would appreciate your response by fax (202-225-9073).

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Bob Filner". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

BOB FILNER  
Member of Congress

BF/ss  
167436



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425 Please refer to this number

ARLINGTON, VA 22209

703-696-0504

when responding 950421-7R1

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA

REBECCA COX

GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)

S. LEE KLING

RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)

MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)

WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 27, 1995

The Honorable Bob Filner  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Filner:


Thank you for your letter expressing support for the Naval Health Research Center (NHRC) in San Diego. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendation on the NHRC.

As you know, Mr. Jeff Mulliner of the Commission staff visited the NHRC on April 26, 1995. You may be certain that the information gained from his visit will be shared with all of the Commissioners.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I can be of service.

Sincerely,



Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:js



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950421-8

FROM: <u>COOK, BOB</u>	TO: <u>MCMANAMY, MARGIE</u>
TITLE: <u>INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER</u>	TITLE: <u>DIRECTOR</u>
ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCRC</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>OLA BRAC</u>
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING COBRA RUNS FOR VARIOUS COBRA SCENARIOS.

Due Date: <u>950430</u>	Routing Date: <u>950420</u>	Date Originated: <u>950420</u>	Mail Date:
-------------------------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	------------



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425

ARLINGTON, VA 22209

703-696-0504

April 20, 1995

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA

REBECCA COX

GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)

S. LEE KLING

RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)

MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)

WENDI LOUISE STEELE

Ms Margie McManamay  
Director, DLA BRAC  
Headquarters Defense Logistics Agency  
Cameron Station  
Alexandria, VA 22304-6100

Dear Ms McManamay:

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950.421-8

In order to assist this Commission in reviewing DOD's recommendations to close or realign Defense Logistics Agency installations, request that you provide COBRA runs for the following scenarios. Please provide your response no later than 30 April, 1995.

- DISC remaining in place on the ASO compound and redirecting DPSC to Richmond VA. In this scenario, weapons systems ICPs would be located at Columbus, OH and Philadelphia, PA and the Troop and General Support ICP would be established at Richmond VA.
- Disestablishing DGSC and relocating all functions to Philadelphia, PA. In this scenario, one weapons system ICP would be located in Columbus, OH and two ICPs (one weapons system and the Troop and General Support) would be located in Philadelphia PA on the ASO compound.
- Closing the Distribution Depot at Richmond, VA (DDRV) and relocating assets to the remaining distribution depots. Please indicate the attendant DLA-wide distribution system shortfall if such an action were effected.
- An ADDER run for complete closure of the DGSC/DDRV facilities at Richmond, VA.
- Closing the Distribution Depot (DDAA) collocated with the Anniston Army Depot, AL and relocating assets to remaining distribution depots. This scenario is in concert with an Army action which will generate a COBRA to realign the Anniston Army Depot. Please indicate the attendant DLA-wide distribution system shortfall if such an action were effected.

Thank you for your assistance. I appreciate your time and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Bob Cook

Interagency Issues Team Leader

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950421-9

FROM: COUCH, PHIL	TO: EPSTEIN, DAVID
TITLE:	TITLE: NAUVE ANALYST.
ORGANIZATION: NAUSEA	ORGANIZATION: OBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: MACHINERY SILENCING DEPT, NAUSEA	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES				DAVID EPSTEIN			Ⓢ

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	✓	Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:  
 EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER PROPOSED MOVE OF THE MACHINERY SILENCING DEPT, NAUSEA TO THE NSWC CAROL ROCK.

Due Date: 950428	Routing Date: 950421	Date Originated: 950431	Mail
------------------	----------------------	-------------------------	------

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950421-9

12351  
Ser 03T/011  
31 MAR 95

From: Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command  
To: Commander, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division (Code 00)  
Subj: RELOCATION OF NSWC AD MACHINERY SILENCING DEPARTMENT  
(CODE 84)

1. As a major technical sponsor of work performed by the Machinery Silencing Department, NAVSEA 03T has serious concerns over the potential adverse impact of the proposed move and relocation of the department to the NSWC Carderock site at Philadelphia and serious consideration should be given to relocation of Code 84 personnel and facilities to Carderock.
2. With the downsizing that will take place over the next few years, it is extremely critical that every effort be made to ensure that critical acoustic skills are preserved to the maximum extent possible. The NAVSEA Headquarters restructuring demands that a strong technical capability be maintained in the field. NAVSEA 03T has developed and put in place a organization that requires heavy reliance on NSWC Codes 70 and 84 for not only R&D support, but for design and construction support as well. This new organization requires on site support and continual interface with the program sponsors in NAVSEA and the Pentagon. Relocation of the Code 84 personnel to Philadelphia will make on site support tremendously more costly because of the travel and per diem issue and make it almost impossible for the current restructuring plan to work. On the other hand, the relocation of Code 84 to Carderock would allow locating all acoustic personnel at one site and provide the critical mass needed to maintain a vital silencing organization. For the first time all acoustics personnel in NSWC will be under one roof. This would accelerate the cross training and consolidate the personnel resources that will most certainly be required as we get smaller and as the need for major or unique capabilities disappears.
3. Regardless of where Code 84 ultimately ends up, the relocation should be synchronized with current work on going to support the SEAWOLF and the New Attack Submarine (NSSN). The current pressure for very fast response to SEAWOLF construction support items is just an indication of what will be necessary for NSSN in the future. R&D efforts will be heaviest in the FY 95 to 97 time frame and relocation of the individual laboratories facilities should be planned to avoid disruption of these efforts. Of primary concern is the loss of unique test facilities, such as, the Submarine Fluid Dynamics Facility, the only one of its kind in the country, and which is so vital to the NSSN acoustics design package. This facility is needed to support this program at least through the year 2000 and most probably beyond. It is also envisioned that a large support effort will be required to correct deficiencies on SEAWOLF, through the FY 97-

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950421-10

FROM: BROWN, ED	TO: JONES, MICHAEL
TITLE: ARMY TEAM LEADER	TITLE: DIRECTOR
ORGANIZATION: DBCRC	ORGANIZATION: ARMY
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: LETTERKENNY • ARMY DEPOT	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Direct Response
<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

PROVIDE COMMENTS ON THREE LETTERKENNY BRIEFINGS • DISCUSSING IMPACT OF DOD RECOMMENDATION ON TENANT ORGANIZATIONS.

Due Date: 950518      Routing Date: 950421      Date Originated: 950421      Mail Date: 950421



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

April 21, 1995

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:  
AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

Colonel Michael G. Jones  
Director, The Army Basing Study  
200 Army Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20310-0200

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950421-10


Dear Colonel Jones:

On 20 April, 1995, the Letterkenny Army Depot Coalition (LEAD) presented three briefings on the impact of the Letterkenny recommendation on tenant organizations. These briefings have been provided to your office under separate cover.

Request that your office provide comments/responses to these briefings. Of particular interest are the quotes attributed to a 1991 GAO report, DPAS Project Manager, DFAS Project Manager, and CG IOC on SIMA-East move to Rock Island.

Request you provide your comments/responses no later than 18 May 1995. Thank you for your assistance. I appreciate your time and cooperation.

Sincerely,

  
Edward A. Brown III  
Army Team Leader

EAB/rmm



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
200 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200

May 3, 1995



Mr. Edward A. Brown III  
Defense Base Closure and  
Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street  
Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Brown:

Please refer to this number  
950421-10R1

The attached response is being provided to your request 950421-10, dated April 21, 1995, and provides comments on specifics of the briefing given by the Letterkenny Army Depot Coalition to the Commission staff on April 20, 1995.

Point of Contact for this action is Mr. Ron Hamner, (703) 693-0077.

MICHAEL G. JONES  
COL, GS  
Director, TABS

Attachment

LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT  
LETTERKENNY ARMY DEPOT COALITION VISIT

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the presentation by the Letterkenny Army Depot Coalition to the Commission staff on April 20, 1995.

The tenants reported as being "not included in DoD Letterkenny BRAC 95 proposal" were in fact included. The Defense Logistics Agency conducted their own BRAC analysis of their activities and provided their recommendations independently of the Army's recommendation. Therefore, the data and results associated with the DLA decision to disestablish its supply depot would not be reflected in Army data as either a cost or savings. The Coalition's contention that the Systems Integration & Management Activity - East and the Logistics Support Activity - Major Item Information Center (MIIC) likewise is in error. Both activities are relocating as a result of a prior commission decision. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to include additional costs in the latest reconsideration.

These are our comments on the specific areas of interest to you.

1991 GAO Report - The recommendation to realign the Depot Systems Command and Systems Integration and Management Activity was based on valid analysis of not only the activities themselves, but what the needs (requirement) of the Army were and what was the best economical solution that supported the Army requirement. The command structure is presently relocating to the Rock Island Arsenal.

DPAS Project Manager - Who will and will not relocate is speculative and often not decided until the last moment with any realignment or transfer of mission workload. DoD uses validated standard factors based on historical experience. This activity is moving into a geographical area that has considerable expertise in the automation arena.

DFAS Project Manager - There are other DFAS centers throughout the country. The Army's recommendation relocates this activity to "Base X" and allows the parent organization to decide where the activity will be best suited. Relocation of personnel and disruption are part of any realignment. By relocating to an existing activity, the shortfall in experience is often overcome by the personnel available at the gaining location.

CG IOC on SIMA-East move to Rock Island - It is true that SIMA East is not part of the BRAC 95 recommendation. SIMA East was affected by the BRAC 93 decision on Letterkenny. The Army is complying with the Commission and will locate SIMA-E to Rock Island. The Department of Army did review the issue with Army Materiel Command. Army is not aware of any document from MG Benchhoff that objects to the Army decision or indicates a lack of support.

The contention of the Letterkenny Army Depot Coalition of a "Green verse Purple Mindset" or a position of "If a mission does not support the Army, get rid of it" is neither supportable nor a position the Army leadership would consider. We are faced with some very hard decisions to ensure we can continue to support the Army of the 21st Century. Many very good installations



have been evaluated during the BRAC 95 analysis and some outstanding installations and activities are either being closed or realigned as a result. The Army is eliminating excess capacity in its depot infrastructure, a difficult but necessary decision.

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950421-11

FROM: BROWN, ED	TO: JONES, MICHAEL
TITLE: ARMY TEAM LEADER	TITLE: DIRECTOR
ORGANIZATION: DBCRC	ORGANIZATION: ARMY BASING STUDY
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Direct Response
<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

PLEASE COMMENT ON ATTACHED 'RED RIVER PRESENTATION TO DBCRC FROM DALLAS REGIONAL HEARING.

Due Date: 950518	Routing Date: 950421	Date Originated: 950421	Mail Date: 950421
------------------	----------------------	-------------------------	-------------------



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

April 21, 1995

COMMISSIONERS:  
AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

Colonel Michael G. Jones  
Director, The Army Basing Study  
200 Army Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20310-0200


Please refer to this number  
when recording 950421-11

Dear Colonel Jones:

The Red River Defense Committee made a presentation at the Dallas Texas Regional Hearing on April 19, 1995. In the presentation, several issues were raised that require your response/comment. A copy of the presentation package is attached to this letter.

Request that your office provide comments/responses to these briefings. Of particular interest are the issues that were raised. Please provide your comments/responses no later than 8 May 1995. Thank you for your assistance. I appreciate your time and cooperation.

Sincerely,

  
Edward A. Brown III  
Army Team Leader

EAB/rmm



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
200 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

June 5, 1995

Mr. Edward A. Brown III  
Army Team Leader  
Defense Base Closure and  
Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street  
Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950421-11R1

Dear Mr. Brown:

The attached response is being provided to your request 950421-11, dated April 21, 1995, and provides comments on the presentation of the Red River Defense Committee at the Dallas, Texas, Regional Hearing on April 19, 1995.

Point of Contact for this action is Mr. Ron Hamner, (703) 693-0077.

*SG* MICHAEL G. JONES  
COL, GS  
Director, TABS

Attachment

RED RIVER ARMY DEPOT  
Presentation By  
RED RIVER DEFENSE COMMITTEE

It is somewhat misleading to present the "Red River Military Complex" as four separate but related installations. The Defense Distribution Depot is in fact a tenant of the depot. It is a Defense Logistics Agency activity and is addressed in a separate BRAC 95 recommendation analysis for BRAC 95.

As for the Army Ammunition Depot, there is no such activity. The Red River Army Depot has an ammunition mission that involves the receipt, storage, maintenance, and issue of ammunition. The staffing guide for Red River identifies a Directorate of Ammunition Operations with some seven divisions and approximately 200 employees. The Army recommended that this particular mission transfer to the adjacent Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant. The move can easily be accomplished with a "fence-line" adjustment.

The Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant is not a part of the Red River Army Depot and has no mission linkage with Red River. It is located adjacent to Red River. There is some "common use" of facilities that include a new land-fill.

The reported 35,000 acres that make up "the complex" represents the 15,546 acres of Lone Star and the 19,081 of the depot. The DLA space (total acres) are included in the Red River figures.

As for the comments of Congressman Chapman, the Army does not consider its analysis to be flawed. The personnel reductions are not the result of force structure changes. The charge of "costs not included" is not valid since all costs associated with the closure of Red River Army Depot were part of the Army's recommendation. The costs of closing/realigning the DLA Distribution Center is an independent analysis, that should be treated separately. The costs of closure provided by the DLA recommendation are considerably less than those briefed by Congressman Chapman. The Army does not have the funding or the desire to maintain excess capacity at our maintenance depots.

The comments offered by BG (Ret) Claude B. Donovan, USA, are valid considerations and were addressed during our analysis. The impacts on depot capacity provided by General Donovan do not reflect certified data provided and used during analysis. The Defense Depot Maintenance Council Business Plan, FY95-99, reflects more than what Army requirements have been determined to be by the Army Materiel Command and provided as "certified" data for analysis.

The final synopsis offered during the briefing includes many aspects that were considered during the analysis. From the military value aspect, capacity of the gaining activities was a consideration and deemed to be an acceptable risk when the analysis was based solely on a single

eight hour workday, five days a week. There was no overtime or second/third shift consideration required due to the capacity being exceeded by only 4% in the worst scenario. The Army costs have not included any DLA figures for reasons explained earlier. The figures provided are not supportable.

The Army is extremely proud of the reputation and many accomplishments earned by the personnel of Red River Army Depot. The Army is indeed very fortunate to have five superior, top quality, and efficient facilities that offer the free worlds greatest sustainment capabilities for a military force. With the down-sizing of our military forces, there were no easy decisions associated with closing or realigning a particular military installation - all are quality facilities!



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

April 21, 1995

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:  
AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

Colonel Michael G. Jones  
Director, The Army Basing Study  
200 Army Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20310-0200


Please refer to this number  
when responding 950421-11

Dear Colonel Jones:

The Red River Defense Committee made a presentation at the Dallas Texas Regional Hearing on April 19, 1995. In the presentation, several issues were raised that require your response/comment. A copy of the presentation package is attached to this letter.

Request that your office provide comments/responses to these briefings. Of particular interest are the issues that were raised. Please provide your comments/responses no later than 8 May 1995. Thank you for your assistance. I appreciate your time and cooperation.

Sincerely,

  
Edward A. Brown III  
Army Team Leader

EAB/rmm

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950421-12

FROM: BROWN, ED	TO: JONES, MICHAEL G.
TITLE: ARMY TEAM LEADER	TITLE: DIRECTOR
ORGANIZATION: DBCRC	ORGANIZATION: ARMY
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: FITZSIMONS ARMY MEDICAL CENTER	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓ FYI

Subject/Remarks:

PLEASE PROVIDE COMMENTS ON REPORT PROVIDED BY COMMUNITY GROUP, OUTLINING THEIR CONCERNS WITH DOD RECOMMENDATION.

Due Date: 950515      Routing Date: 950521      Date Originated: 950521      Mail Date: 950521





THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209

703-696-0504  
April 21, 1995

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:  
AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

Colonel Michael G. Jones  
Director, The Army Basing Study  
200 Army Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20310-0200

Dear Colonel Jones:

Please refer to file number  
when responding: 950421-12

At our April 20, 1995 regional hearing in Albuquerque, NM, the community group opposing the closure of Fitzsimons Army Medical Center provided the Commission with a report outlining a number of concerns about the Army's criteria for evaluating medical centers, and the data gathered for Fitzsimons. A copy of this document is attached.

I would appreciate the Army's position on the points in the community report and their implications on your recommendation to close Fitzsimons Army Medical Center. I would appreciate a response by May 15, 1995.

Thank you for your assistance. I appreciate your time and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Edward A. Brown III  
Army Team Leader

EB/dll  
encl.



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0200



May 23 1995

Defense Base Closure and  
Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street  
Suite 1425  
ATTN: Mr Brown  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950421-12 R1

Dear Mr. Brown,

As requested in your 21 April 1995 letter (950421-12), The Army is pleased to provide the following comments regarding the briefing submitted by the community of Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, Denver, CO.

The community is mistaken on several major points. The first involves the differences and relationship between Installation Assessment (IA) and Military Value Assessment (MVA). The Army conducts its MVA by considering both the IA (current installation status) and the Army Stationing Strategy (future operational requirements). See attached comments for a detailed discussion. The primary reason why Fitzsimons was studied is explained by the Army Stationing Strategy, which strongly influences the military value for medical centers. It states:

" The Army cannot afford to maintain medical facilities that primarily support a retired population. Medical centers not collocated with sizable active component populations do not provide cost-effective medical care, nor do they contribute to the quality of life for active component soldiers and their families. In such cases, the medical center fails to support the operational requirements of the Army."

Fitzsimons would have been studied no matter where it was located in the IA rank order due to the operational requirements stated in the Army Stationing Strategy.

The other major point of misunderstanding is that OSD and the Army should have used the same attributes to examine Fitzsimons. OSD and the Army conducted two independent studies of medical centers. The Army focused on the installation upon which a medical center was located. The Joint Cross-Service Group for Graduate Medical Education/Medical Treatment Facilities focused on community hospitals and medical centers as medical facilities. Both the Army and OSD recommended Fitzsimons, as an installation and medical facility, for closure. The Army medical community was involved in the development, analysis, review, and conclusions drawn by both groups.

**BOTTOM LINE:** The comments and arguments developed by the community at Fitzsimons do not change the fact the Fitzsimons would have been studied regardless or that it should be closed. Both OSD and the Army independently recommended and still recommend Fitzsimons Army Medical Center for closure.



*for* Michael G. Jones  
Colonel, U.S. Army  
Director, The Army Basing Study

**COMMENTS REGARDING  
FITZSIMONS ARMY MEDICAL CENTER  
FROM  
FITZSIMONS COMMUNITY**

**Concerns about Installation Assessment attributes of medical center installations.**

The Installation Assessment portion of the Military Value Assessment was conducted to evaluate and compare like installations to generate a relative order of merit (OML). This OML was then combined with the requirements stated in the Stationing Strategy to develop the military value assessment for a given installation category. The IA process measured installation attributes relative to the type of mission the installation supported and not to measure the mission of the tenants of that installation. The Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSG) looked at the tenant missions.

In conjunction with the Commission request for clarification and the community concerns, the Army ask the Army Audit Agency to validate all IA attributes associated with the medical center installation category. The results of the IA model, with the audited figures, ranks Fitzsimons equal to Walter Reed with a relative score of 5.3 and only slightly ahead of Tripler with a relative score of 5.2. The difference is not statistically significant. This change in IA OML does not change the military value assessment to study Fitzsimons Medical Installation or the DoD recommendation to close it.

**Permanent vs. non-permanent facilities:** It was the intent of the Army to only measure permanent buildings for all attributes regardless of installation category or type building. The Army is trying to get out World War II wood building; therefore, only permanent building facilities would be used in the installation assessment process.

**Health Care Support Index vs. MTF cost per RWP:** The U.S. Army Medical Command developed this attribute and was used in BRAC 93. The Army attribute is designed to capture the capitation cost per beneficiary within the immediate 40 mile catchment area rather than the regional area. This is a measure of effective use of health care cost on a capitation basis in the immediate area for a medical care installation to support its primary beneficiaries - active duty and their families. Army did make an error by switching the health care index of Walter Reed and Fitzsimons. This has been corrected in the attached IA spreadsheet; but, this error made NO difference on the military value of Fitzsimons, only the installation value.

The JCSG used the ratio of the medical treatment facility (MTF) cost per relative weighted products (RWP) to CHAMPUS adjusted standardized per RWP to measure the cost of CHAMPUS to MTF costs. MTF RWP measure attempts to bring comparability to inpatient work produced at different facilities. However, some medical centers in overlapping catchment areas will have higher cost per RWP even if identical patients are treated. For example, physicians assigned to Walter Reed provide medical and administrative services for and work physically at community hospitals (Kimbrough Hospital - Ft Meade, and DeWitt Hospital - Ft Belvior). The

cost of these personnel is charge against Walter Reed thereby artificially lowering the cost per RWP at Kimbrough and DeWitt Hospitals. Additionally, Walter Reed, as a referral center for Kimbrough and DeWitt Hospitals, does have a significantly higher cost per RWP because of this relationship. For example, Patient 'A' admitted for a serious undiagnosed illness at Walter Reed would receive all care and diagnostic testing at Walter Reed and all cost would be charge to the same. Patient 'B' admitted at Kimbrough Hospital for the same illness would receive care at Kimbrough but diagnostic testing and ancillary support and diagnosis at Walter Reed performed by Walter Reed personnel (a significant charge against Walter Reed). Patient 'B' would then return to Kimbrough for care and discharge with significantly lower cost charge to them. This situation is due to the proximity of DeWitt and Kimbrough Hospitals to Walter Reed Medical Center. Only five of these overlapping catchment areas exist in CONUS. Fitzsimons and Tripler are NOT in overlapping catchment areas. This ratio measure used by the JCSG represented 20% of the overall score that resulting in the JCSG recommending the Fitzsimons Army Medical Center for closure.

**Economic Impact:** Economic impact is evaluated using FY 96 federal government permanent authorizations without students or contractors. Actual employment at Fitzsimons today maybe different. Reserve components are not moving so would not be included in any calculation of employment.

The Army was directed to use the DoD Economic model that uses standard factors to determine indirect employment loss; but does include cumulative economic impact over all DoD BRAC rounds. Closure of other than DoD installations would not be included in the DoD Economic model.

MEDICAL CENTER D-PAD MAIN MODEL  
REVISED AAA DATA

		FITZSIMMONS	TRIPLER	WRAMC
	WEIGHT			
PATIENT CARE FAC	150	451.8	1188.0	2567.0
APPL INSTRUCT FAC	100	7.2	9.0	0.0
MED RESEARCH FAC	50	7.0	18.4	432.6
DEPLOYMENT NETWORK	75	7.000	7.700	2.900
RESERVE TRAINING	75	10.000	0.000	3.200
MISSION REQUIREMENTS	--- 450	4.6	4.7	5.5
ENCROACHMENT	20	455.9	1439.7	1098.5
MOB CAPABILITY	50	6.200	6.300	5.100
IMA	20	490.0	1065.0	475.0
BUILDABLE ACRES	35	113.3	17.2	26.8
FUTURE REQUIREMENTS	--- 125	7.6	4.1	3.6
% PERM FACILITIES	75	52.7	100.0	93.2
FACILITIES AVG AGE	85	41.4	33.3	25.3
INFRASTRUCTURE	40	5.7	3.0	5.4
ENVIRONMENTAL CAP	25	6.000	8.000	7.600
LAND & FACILITIES	--- 225	2.4	6.1	9.1
COST OF LIVING INDEX	40	105.9	136.9	135.1
HOUSING COST	30	\$4,700	\$5,651	\$7,285
HEALTH CARE SPT IND	100	2121.0	1156.0	4646.0
MCA COST FACTOR	30	1.1	1.7	1.0
COST & MANPOWER	--- 200	8.5	5.9	1.6
	===			
SCORE	1000	5.3	5.2	5.3
RANK		1	3	1

SUB-MODEL FOR MEDICAL CENTERS  
REVISED AAA DATA

		FITZSIMMONS	TRIPLER	WRAMC
	WEIGHT			
MILES TO RAIL TRANS	30	0++	20	40--
MILES TO AIR TRANS	30	4+	6+	33--
MILES TO SEA TRANS	30	1033--	5+	40-
MILES TO HIGHWAY	10	0	2	3
DEPLOYMENT	--- 100	7.0	7.7	2.9
ANNUAL TNG (# PEOPLE)	25	1068+	163-	854
IDT (MANDAYS)	75	15360++	3912--	5834--
RESERVE TRAINING	--- 100	10.0	0.0	3.2
ARCH/HIST BLDGS	10	0.32000	0.05600	0.23900
ENDGRD FAUNA/FLORA	15	0	1-	0
WETLANDS	15	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
AIR QUALITY	15	10	1+	10
WATER QUALITY	15	2-	0	0
NOISE QUAL- ZONE II	10	0	0	0
NOISE QUAL- ZONE III	15	0	0	0
CONTAMINATED SITES	5	1	4	2
ENV CAR CAPACITY	--- 100	6.0	8.0	7.6
CAPACITY WATER	25	6+	2-	4
CAPACITY SEWAGE	25	1-	2+	1
CAPACITY ELECT	25	27000	13800-	60000+
LANDFILL COST	25	\$15++	\$58	\$69-
INFRASTRUCTURE	--- 100	5.7	3.0	5.4
MOB BILLETS	10	1015+	0	0
DEPLOYMENT NETWORK	10	7.0	7.7	2.9
RANGES	10	0.0	0.0	0.0
MANUEVER ACRES	10	0	0	0
MECHANIZED ACRES	10	0	0	0
WORK SPACE	10	57	1232	962
MOB CAPABILITY	--- 60	6.2	6.3	5.1
	===			
SCORE	460	7.0	4.9	4.8
RANK		1	2	3

LTC Barnhoff  
5-15 May



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425

ARLINGTON, VA 22209

703-696-0504

April 21, 1995

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA

REBECCA COX

GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)

S. LEE KLING

RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)

MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)

WENDI LOUISE STEELE

Colonel Michael G. Jones  
Director, The Army Basing Study  
200 Army Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20310-0200

Dear Colonel Jones:

950421-1a

At our April 20, 1995 regional hearing in Albuquerque, NM, the community group opposing the closure of Fitzsimons Army Medical Center provided the Commission with a report outlining a number of concerns about the Army's criteria for evaluating medical centers, and the data gathered for Fitzsimons. A copy of this document is attached.

I would appreciate the Army's position on the points in the community report and their implications on your recommendation to close Fitzsimons Army Medical Center. I would appreciate a response by May 15, 1995.

Thank you for your assistance. I appreciate your time and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Edward A. Brown III  
Army Team Leader

EB/dll  
encl.



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950421-13

FROM: GREENLEAF, STEWART	TO: DIXON
TITLE: STATE SENATOR	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: SENATE OF PA.	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CENTER; PHILADELPHIA	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL		X		COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER		X	
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Direct Response
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

DOES THE DIRECTOR OF THE OLA HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO CLOSE THE DEF INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CENTER

Due Date: 950428	Routing Date: 950421	Date Originated: 950417	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------

12TH DISTRICT  
STEWART J. GREENLEAF  
27 NORTH YORK ROAD  
WILLOW GROVE, PA 19090-3419  
(215) 657-7700

SENATE BOX 203012  
THE STATE CAPITOL  
HARRISBURG, PA 17120-3012  
(717) 787-6599



Senate of Pennsylvania

COMMITTEES

JUDICIARY, CHAIRMAN  
LAW AND JUSTICE, VICE CHAIRMAN  
APPROPRIATIONS  
BANKING AND INSURANCE  
CONSUMER PROTECTION AND  
PROFESSIONAL LICENSURE  
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950421-13

April 17, 1995

Mr. Alan Dixon, Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Dixon:

It is my understanding that more than 1,800 workers at the Defense Industrial Supply Center in Philadelphia will lose their jobs if the commission accepts the Defense Logistics Agency's recommendation to "disestablish" the activity.

Further distressing is that, as I understand the concept, these workers will be given no opportunity to transfer or take alternative positions at other defense facilities.

Of great concern to DISC employees, according to my constituents, is a persistent rumor that the head of the DLA has said he will close the facility even if BRAC, Congress and President Clinton don't approve the recommendation. They want to know whether that is within his power.

I would appreciate any information you can provide regarding these concerns. Please send any correspondence to my district office, 27 N. York Road, Willow Grove, PA 19090.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Stewart J. Greenleaf".

Stewart J. Greenleaf

SJG/rf



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:  
AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 26, 1995

The Honorable Stewart J. Greenleaf  
27 North York Road  
Willow Grove, PA 19090

Dear Senator Greenleaf:

950421-13 R1

Thank you for your recent letter expressing your concern that the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has recommended the disestablishment of the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) in Philadelphia. In your letter, you asked whether the head of DLA could close DISC even if the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (DBCRC) does not accept DLA's recommendation.

This is the last round of base closures and realignments authorized under the 1990 Base Closure Act. When the term of the current Commission expires this year, the Defense Department returns to permanent law for authority to close military installations. After December 31, 1995, and even if the DBCRC does not accept DLA's recommendation regarding DISC, DLA may disestablish DISC if they comply with the requirements of 10 U.S.C. § 2687(b). Under this law, the Secretary of Defense must notify the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives when making an annual request for authorization of appropriations that DLA proposes to disestablish DISC. The Secretary must submit with the notification an evaluation of the fiscal, local economic, budgetary, environmental, strategic and operational consequences of such disestablishment. After submitting these materials, the Secretary must wait a period of 30 legislative days or 60 calendar days, whichever is longer, before taking any action to effect or implement the decision to disestablish DISC. Once the waiting period has expired, the Secretary may use the funds made available to him to implement the disestablishment.

If you need any additional information, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,

Madelyn Creedon  
General Counsel

ELK  
ES# 950421-13R1

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

**EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) #** 950421-14

<b>FROM:</b> ARCARI, PAUL W.	<b>TO:</b> DIXON
<b>TITLE:</b> CO-CHAIRMAN	<b>TITLE:</b> CHAIRMAN
<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> THE MILITARY COALITION	<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> OBCRC
<b>INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:</b>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				<b>REVIEW AND ANALYSIS</b>			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Direct Response
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FYI

**Subject/Remarks:**

SUBMITTING TESTIMONY FOR THE RECORD TO BE INCLUDED WITH APRIL 17 - HEARING.

Due Date: 950428	Routing Date: 950421	Date Originated: 950420	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------



T H E M I L I T A R Y C O A L I T I O N

201 North Washington Street  
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950421-14

April 20, 1995

Chairman Alan J. Dixon  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore St., Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

By letter, dated March 9th, The Military Coalition, which represents approximately 3.75 million members of the seven uniformed services, officer and enlisted, active, reserve and retired plus their families and survivors, requested permission to testify before the Commission when it held hearings on this round of base closures.

We were advised by Chip Walgren on April 12th that due to the tight schedule of the Commission our request could not be accommodated, but that we could submit written testimony. Enclosed is The Military Coalition's written testimony which is submitted for the Commission's review and for the record.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing us to present our views on this critically important matter.

Sincerely,


*Paul W. Arcari*

Paul W. Arcari  
Colonel, USAF (Ret)  
The Retired Officers Assn  
Co-Chairman  
(703) 838-8103

*Michael Ouellette*

Michael Ouellette  
Sergeant Major, USA (Ret)  
Non Commissioned Officers Assn  
Co-Chairman  
(703) 549-0311

Enclosure



**T H E M I L I T A R Y C O A L I T I O N**

201 North Washington Street  
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

**STATEMENT OF**  
**THE MILITARY COALITION**  
**provided to the**  
**BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE**  
**COMMISSION**

**Presented by**

Colonel Frank G. Rohrbough, USAF (Ret.)  
The Retired Officers Association

YNC Ed Huylebroeck, Jr., USN (Ret)  
Fleet Reserve Association

**APRIL 20, 1995**

**MISTER CHAIRMAN AND DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION:**

The Military Coalition would like to express its appreciation to the Chairman and distinguished members of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission for holding these important hearings. The written testimony provided here represents the collective views of the following military and veterans organizations known as The Military Coalition which represent approximately 3.75 million members of the seven uniformed services, officer and enlisted, active, reserve and retired plus their families and survivors.

- Air Force Association
- Air Force Sergeants Association
- Association of Military Surgeons of the United States
- Association of the United States Army
- Chief Warrant Officer and Warrant Officer Association, United States Coast Guard
- Commissioned Officers Association of the United States Public Health Service, Inc.
- Enlisted Association of the National Guard of the United States
- Fleet Reserve Association
- Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America
- Marine Corps League
- Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association
- Military Chaplains Association of the United States of America
- National Association for Uniformed Services
- National Guard Association of the United States
- National Military Family Association
- Naval Enlisted Reserve Association
- Naval Reserve Association
- Navy League of the United States
- Non Commissioned Officers Association
- Reserve Officers Association
- The Retired Enlisted Association
- The Retired Officers Association

- United Armed Forces Association
- United States Army Warrant Officers Association
- USCG Chief Petty Officers Association
- The National Order of Battlefield Commissions (Associate Member)
- Army Aviation Association of America (Associate Member)

## **INTRODUCTION**

The Military Coalition's overall goal is to advance the national security interests of the United States by maintaining a strong national defense. The most vital elements of the nation's defense establishment are its men and women. As the nation draws down from the Cold War victory and bases close around the country, hundreds of thousands of military personnel and their families are affected. This turbulence adversely impacts on the morale and esprit-de-corps of the military community, particularly the retired component.

## **THE ISSUE IN PERSPECTIVE**

While the Coalition recognizes that one of the main reasons for base closures and realignments is to reduce the cost of defense, countless military retirees consider base closings to be a significant threat to their way of life. Many military retirees have selected their retirement homes based on proximity to military health care, commissary, exchange and recreational activities. Defense reports reveal that almost 70 percent of retirees locate near military installations upon their retirement from active duty to avail themselves of military health care services. While retirees were never guaranteed that bases would remain open indefinitely, most retirees can cite "chapter and verse" of how commanders and retention counselors guaranteed them lifetime care in military treatment facilities (MTFs) as an inducement to serve another "hitch" or extend their service obligations. It's no wonder that so many consider each wave of base closures as both a threat to their future



security and a lack of leadership's resolve to honor previous commitments.

The Coalition is deeply concerned over the severe morale and financial impacts base closures have had, and will continue to have, on retirees, their families and survivors, unless planning adjustments are made. The issues related to base closures are not new to us. We have first-hand knowledge of the medical problems retirees have experienced when trying to find alternative health care when bases began to close in 1990.

In earlier rounds of base closures, Coalition members asked the Commission to carefully assess the impact that increased healthcare costs would have on predicted base closure savings before deciding to close a base. We strongly recommend that such critically important information be obtained from DoD and that it become a part of this Commission's deliberations.

### **CONGRESSIONAL ADMONITION**

We're not alone in our concern. The conference report on The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 incorporated the concerns of the House - Senate conferees by mandating that the "Department of Defense have well-developed plans for each base closure location..." Specifically, the Act went on to say "the conferees expect such plans to include: 1) consideration of joint use or preferred care provider services which utilize rather than abandon the existing facility; and 2) consideration of the comparison of the cost both to the government and to beneficiaries for standard CHAMPUS (Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services) versus alternative health care options for each base closure location...". We enthusiastically supported these recommendations and believe they are on the right track for meeting the needs of those impacted by MTF closures. Further, with DoD's new Tricare Program, which Congress directed DoD to have fully implemented by December 1997, alternative arrangements for

CHAMPUS-eligible beneficiaries will most likely be in place in most regions of the country before this round of base closures begins.

### **IMPACT OF CLOSURES**

With the closure of MTFs, CHAMPUS-eligible retirees, who previously had access to MTFs, are forced to turn to CHAMPUS where they will incur high "out-of-pocket" costs (retirees pay a 25 percent co-pay plus an annual outpatient deductible of \$150 per member or \$300 per family), as their only alternative. The government is a "loser" as well because health care delivery through the private sector would be about twice as expensive as it is in an MTF, according to the U.S. General Accounting Office (Report B-240715, September 1990). Based on a review of six hospitals, GAO estimated savings ranging from \$18 million to \$21 million in CHAMPUS funds. If Medicare-eligible beneficiaries were included, the savings to the Government would have been substantially greater. Such potential savings were further substantiated in DoD's "Section 733 Study of the Military Medical Care System" released in May 1994, which found that care could be delivered 10 to 24 percent less expensively in military treatment facilities. Whatever the savings, DoD's health care delivery cost should be less after Tricare managed care support contracts are fully operational.

The situation is different for military Medicare-eligible beneficiaries because they would be forced to turn to Medicare as their only source of care. Not only would these beneficiaries incur significant "out-of-pocket" expenses (20 percent co-pay plus an annual outpatient deductible of \$100 per member), but the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) would begin picking up the tab for care now provided by the MTF to Medicare-eligible military beneficiaries at no cost to HCFA. As with CHAMPUS costs, these ancillary government costs should be included in the base closure cost equation.

During the first three rounds of base closures in 1988, 1991 and 1993, thirty-four (34) MTFs were tapped for closure impacting an estimated 520,000 beneficiaries. BRAC IV taps another six MTFs for closure impacting an estimated 177,000 retired beneficiaries. These are significant numbers of retirees and survivors who feel abandoned by the leaders of the system they served so well.

### **ALTERNATIVE HEALTH CARE SERVICES**

One of the most valued health benefits for retirees is the use of military pharmacy services within the military treatment facility (MTF). Therefore, when an MTF closes, it results in an immediate financial strain on their limited incomes. It is not infrequent that we hear from our members that medications, such as maintenance drugs for heart conditions, cost them \$200 to \$300 per month. In response, the Coalition urged members of Congress to address this need by pioneering a DoD mail-order pharmacy service. Congress demonstrated its compassion by including a requirement in the FY 93 Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts, for DoD to conduct mail service pharmacy demonstration to provide "multi-state mail-order service" for all CHAMPUS-eligible members. Further, retirees 65 years or older who are Medicare-eligible may access this service, but only if they reside in catchment areas of facilities that are closing. The demonstration program began in November 1994 in six states within the United States -- Southeast and Mid-Atlantic. It is being well received by beneficiaries.

This innovative approach will accommodate the majority of beneficiaries who lose access to military pharmacies. It should result in lower cost of drugs for the government and lower out-of-pocket co-payments for beneficiaries than if they had to rely solely on standard CHAMPUS. We are greatly heartened by this Congressional initiative to help those adversely impacted by base closings, but would hasten to add that it represents only the critical first step in the overall solution.

The Coalition has worked with members of Congress, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and the Surgeons General of the Military Departments to create an awareness of the need for alternative health care programs at base closure sites. We remain convinced that the most pressing requirement is for DoD to have an alternative solution, such as a managed care plan (MCP), in place before a base closure is effected.

There are many viable solutions to the voids created by base closure. In the final analysis, they will be driven by what is the most cost-effective. Where small hospitals or clinics are closing, the solution may be a plan which provides a limited range of services, such as a pharmacy service and advisory services through the use of Health Benefits Advisors to assist in processing CHAMPUS claims and Health Care Finders for locating participating CHAMPUS/Medicare providers. When major medical centers serving thousands of beneficiaries close, like Fitzsimons Army Medical Center in Denver, Colorado, the impact is great and the optimum solution may be a joint venture facility operated by Veterans Affairs and DoD, like Las Vegas, Nevada at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), or a managed care network under Tricare.

Our efforts were rewarded with the passage of the FY 93 Defense Authorization Act and Appropriations Act. As an alternative to standard CHAMPUS, authorization and funding was provided for a managed care alternative at three locations - Carswell AFB in Ft. Worth/Dallas, Texas, Bergstrom AFB in Austin, Texas and England AFB in Alexandria, Louisiana. Services began on May 1, 1993. The FY 94 Defense Authorization Act added Homestead AFB, Florida and services began in August 1994. The Coalition enthusiastically endorses these initiatives.

A review of the current list of base closures presents some awesome health care challenges to DoD. For example, DoD will have to determine how inpatient care services will be provided to remaining 43,200 retired beneficiaries in Denver, Colorado and the 18,000

retired beneficiaries in Albuquerque, New Mexico. At both of these locations, active duty members and their families obtain inpatient care, respectively, through the Fitzsimons Army Medical Center (AMC) in Denver, Colorado and the 377 Medical Group at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. When these facilities close there will be no adequate military inpatient facility within a reasonable distance. To avoid hardships upon retirees and their families, aggressive planning must be undertaken by DoD to resolve the impact these mission changes will have on the residual population.

The closure of Fitzsimons creates a unique organizational problem for DoD and a health care access problem for military beneficiaries. Because Fitzsimons AMC also has a regional mission serving 12 mid-western states (Region 8), its loss will mean major changes in the delivery of regional medical care for the 732,000 beneficiaries who rely on it for specialized health care services. Over 425,000 retired beneficiaries will have to rely on civilian sources using the CHAMPUS or Medicare as their primary source for health care services. Of these, over 75,000 Medicare-eligible military beneficiaries in the Fitzsimons regional service area will be impacted. Looking at the Denver area alone, 2,700 active duty members plus approximately 5,000 family members will remain in the area without the availability of an MTF. They will have to use civilian sources for their care. Over 10,500 Medicare-eligible military beneficiaries will be shifted on to Medicare. The cost could be as high as \$50 million if they enroll in local Medicare HMOs. When adding the increased Medicare costs to the cost of shifting CHAMPUS-eligible beneficiaries to the civilian sector, the cost to the government of closing Fitzsimons may be greater. Given these costs, **we believe the Commission should seriously consider retaining Fitzsimons AMC.**

One final issue that deserves comment relates to retirees who settled near a military base, but did not enroll in Medicare Part B when they were eligible to do so because they believed that the base military hospitals would always be there for their health care needs. Many of these individuals will be forced to use Medicare as their only source of

health care. Many are unaware of the penalties for late enrollment (ten percent per year of the monthly premium) they will incur if they use their Medicare entitlement (Part A) and enroll in Medicare's Part B coverage. To overcome this problem, **the Coalition strongly recommends that Part B late enrollment penalties be waived for Medicare-eligible military retirees** who are now forced to take Part B in order to enroll in Medicare. We understand that the Health Care Financing Administration is reluctant to waive these penalty fees because it would be precedent setting. Therefore, **if these penalties must be paid, the Coalition recommends that DoD pay them from funds provided for base closure actions.** Under no circumstances should the beneficiaries be required to pay these penalties or should funds from DoD's military pay account or medical budget be used.

#### **CLOSING REMARKS**

The Coalition recognizes the very difficult task this Commission has in deciding what is best for the Department of Defense, the people adversely affected and the fiscal security of this country. It is a complex matter where the choices are not easy. Your decisions will greatly impact the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans directly and indirectly. The Commission's recommendations and Congress' likely approval will place untold stress on the affected communities. Accordingly, **we ask this Commission to consider all the factors associated with base closures, to include DoD and Medicare health care services and its cost to the government and the thousands of DoD beneficiaries who are impacted.** Finally, we believe base closure planning must include alternative arrangements for health care where health care services are to be terminated.

The Coalition thanks the Chairman and the members of the Commission for this opportunity to present our views and our concerns. Any questions regarding our position, we can be contacted at (703)803-8164.



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number  
when responding 95042 F14R1

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

**COMMISSIONERS:**

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

May 15, 1995

Col. Paul W. Arcari, USAF (Ret.)  
The Military Coalition  
201 North Washington Street  
Alexandria, Virginia 22314


Dear Col. Arcari:

Thank you for sharing with the Commission The Military Coalition's statement on issues of importance to your membership. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I have shared a copy of your statement with each of the Commissioners for their examination and I can assure you that your information will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis process.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you feel I may be of service.

Sincerely,



Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cw



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950421-1421

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

May 15, 1995

Sergeant Major Michael Ouellette, USA (Ret.)  
The Military Coalition  
201 North Washington Street  
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Dear Sgt. Ouellette:

Thank you for sharing with the Commission The Military Coalition's statement on issues of importance to your membership. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I have shared a copy of your statement with each of the Commissioners for their examination and I can assure you that your information will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis process.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you feel I may be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cw



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950421-15

FROM: CHANDLER, MARK R.	TO: DIXON
TITLE: CHAIRMAN	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: ALAMEDA NAVY TACTICAL RET.	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: Comm.	ALAMEDA NAVY BASE

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER		X	
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

Ⓢ	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING DBCRC VISIT BASE. ALSO, PROVIDING COPY OF CITY'S PLAN TO RETAIN THE ALAMEDA NAVY BASE PIERS. A.

Due Date: 950428	Routing Date: 950421	Date Originated: 950419	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------

*Alameda Navy Tactical Retention Committee*

1033 Regent Street Suite #C  
Alameda, CA 94501  
510-521-8302/263-8048 FAX 510-521-8032

Mr. Alan Dixon  
Chairman  
Base Closure And Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950.421-15

April 19, 1995

Dear Mr. Dixon,

We are writing to you to invite you and your staff to visit the Alameda Naval Base to acquaint you with the excellent recreational, medical and family services provided to the men and women of our fleet. Based on the information contained in the enclosed informational messages, the Alameda Navy Base is recognized Navy wide as a unique facility in its provision of these services to our servicemen and women. It goes without saying that to continue providing these unique services to our fleet, carrier homeporting at Alameda is essential, and can be a win-win situation for both the Navy and the Bay Area communities as well: the community will be able to provide the Navy 25 percent of the existing base with all the required Quality of Life amenities, and at the same time continue conversion of the remaining acreage.

My committee and I understand the difficult challenges your commission is facing in the next few weeks. We appreciate your dedication and the difficult choices you must make. But we believe very strongly that the decision to close the Alameda piers was a grave mistake - an issue we feel should be revisited.


Several weeks ago, while Mayor Ralph Appezato was at a Mayor's conference in Washington, DC, he furnished your office with a copy of Alameda's proposal to retain the Alameda Navy Base piers as a homeport for the Navy carriers. It should be emphasized that his proposal does not require the reversal of the 1993 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission decision to close the Alameda NAS.

We are aware that Quality of Life issues are a major part of the Navy's blueprint for the future. Based on the enclosed messages, the Alameda Navy Base is equipped to provide facilities over and above the basic quality of life requirements, a remarkable achievement under the circumstances. In a word - we are a dedicated Navy base.

**Consequently, the proposal has the added benefit of alleviating some of the economic impact that will result from military base closures in California, particularly in the San Francisco Bay Area. Unique military capabilities will be preserved while achieving substantial cost savings for the fleet overall.**

**To review the excellent facilities the Navy base continues to provide, we encourage you to see the base first-hand. Mayor Appezzato will be delighted to arrange a guided tour for you. Please feel free to contact him at 510-748-4545 or myself at the committee phone number or fax.**

**VERY TRULY YOURS,**



**Mark Raymond Chandler**

**Chairman**

**Alameda Navy Tactical Retention Committee**

<b>CC: David Lyles</b>	<b>Staff Director</b>
<b>Ben Borden</b>	<b>Review and Analysis</b>
<b>Alex Yellin</b>	<b>Navy Team Leader</b>
<b>Cece Carmen</b>	<b>Liaison</b>

# Base to keep quality of life standards till 1997

By Capt. Jim Dodge

**J**ULY 1993 WAS a momentous occasion for the San Francisco Bay Area.

Six of eight Bay Area naval installations were approved by the President for closure under the Base Realignment and Closure decision of 1993. Naval Air Station Alameda, one of only three major Navy air, fleet support and industrial activities combined on one base in the United States, was affected by that decision.

It has been critically important for the Navy to reduce infrastructure in order to maintain readiness and recapitalize the force structure. In 1993 everyone knew the Navy had excess capacity in air stations and industrial activities, but home ports for nuclear carriers were not something the Navy seemed to have in excess capacity.

I think that seeing everything, including the aircraft carrier support at Alameda, go away with a single BRAC decision was what stunned everyone. The affects of disbelief, denial, anger and finally resignation on the employees of the air station and Bay Area residents resulting from the closure announcement are still sinking in.

With major cleanup and closure work ongoing basewide



today, it is still difficult to stand on the end of one of the piers or on the flight deck of USS Abraham Lincoln or USS Carl Vinson, see open ocean through the Golden Gate only 30-45 minutes away, and not wonder if the Navy is giving up an invaluable strategic asset that it will probably never be able to replace.

That said, our orders are to close Alameda in 1997, and my

goal is to close this base with the Navy's Quality of Life model in mind. Central to Alameda's closure planning was adoption of a schedule that will maintain the current quality of life for Navy and Marine men and women in the Bay Area and NAS Alameda at or above present standards all the way to the scheduled closure date in April 1997.

A good quality of life is critical in order to maintain the highest possible levels of readiness in our deploying units and high morale among those ashore who are charged with base cleanup and closure on top of their normal fleet support assignments.

Fortunately, a lot of positive steps were being taken at NAS Alameda when the BRAC 1993 decision was made.

The base was midway through a 1982 redevelopment program designed for the NAS Master Plan, so significant QOL funding had been spent effectively during the late 1980s and early 1990s. For example, in 1992 more than 300 new enlisted housing units were completed at the station's Marina Village Housing complex.

These new units enabled the San Francisco Bay Area's Navy housing to accommodate more than 60 percent of the fleet's family housing needs.

Major renovation of NAS Alameda's bachelor quarters began in 1990 and continued until last summer when enough upgrades had been completed to support all foreseeable permanent and temporary bachelor housing needs for the Bay Area.

Berthing spaces meet or exceed current CNO standards and occupancy remains high. Scheduled self-help renovations continue along with upgrades in furnishings and grounds keeping. The NAS galley has been an Edward

---

F. Ney Memorial Award contender or fleet finalist for the last four years.

---

The Child Development Center, opened in 1986, has capacity for ost

130 children and has a waiting list equally as long. Plans are to keep the center open until the end of Fiscal Year 1997, along with base housing, in order to support the final Bay Area military drawdown.

The Family Service Center has continued to expand since its inception here in 1983, adding eight staff members in 1992 to facilitate Transition and Relocation Assistance Programs and additional family counseling support.

The fleet and family support requirements are growing due to the impending closure of the Mare Island Naval Shipyard in 1995, which will result in NAS Alameda's FSC's adoption of Naval Weapons Station Concord and its ported ships as well as the 1,100 families at Department of Defense Housing Facility Hamilton Field in Novato, previously served by the FSC at Mare Island Naval Shipyard. This is combined with an increase in the amount of military personnel transitioning, relocating, seeking employment, requesting assistance and counseling generated by the tenant closures and home port changes involving most of Alameda's 13,000 military members.

Alameda Times-Star

Page A-11

Sunday  
April 16, 1995

Plans to build a new commissary/exchange complex were shelved with the BRAC 1993 closure announcement, but more than a million dollars in improvements to the Navy Exchange, from 1993-94 brought the NEX in line with the country's most prestigious department stores. The Navy Lodge underwent a complete remodeling last July to make it the newest in the Pacific Fleet. It boasts a 90 to 95 percent occupancy rate and provides some of the highest quality and cost effective accommodations in Northern California.

The medical/dental, Navy/Marine Corps Relief Society, Red Cross and religious facilities each have undergone significant positive change in the past year. The NAS clinic, in anticipation of the Oak Knoll Naval Hospital closure this year, has a renovated facility, all new equipment and added a pediatric treatment center to support family outpatient needs after the hospital closes.

Morale, welfare, recreation-sponsored programs continue to improve to better serve the changing needs of Alameda-based sailors and marines and was just selected the 1994 Best Holiday MWR Program winner for extra large facilities by the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Sailors who served at Alameda before 1987 would not recognize the totally renovated Fleet Recreation Center. This facility, once a bowling alley, then a laundromat, specifically serves the fleet sailors assigned to Alameda's homeported carriers, support ships and fleet visitors. It is located on San Francisco Bay next to the auto hobby center,

the RV park (built by Self-Help in 1993) and the marina (renovated in 1990). A short walk or a bus ride from the piers, the Fleet Rec Center contains a video arcade, billiards, all-sports big screen televisions, a pizza parlor, an entertainment room for special events, picnic area, tennis courts and ball fields. Today it is one of the most convenient and capable facilities for supporting fleet sailors in the entire Navy.

The club system at Alameda, including the Homeport Club, the Top Four Club and the Officers Club, continues to improve to meet patrons' needs. Cost-saving changes, like consolidating food service operations out of the O' Club to keep operations in the black have not diminished the unique identity of each facility. The changes made in 1994 should enable each club to maintain its distinct and separate identity until closure.

The gymnasium and recreation services programs have seen significant improvement since the late

1980s. The swimming pool was closed in 1989 after sustaining significant damage in the Loma Prieta earthquake. Last year it was reopened following major repairs and is showing significant usage for its final years as a Navy MWR facility. In November 1994, CBU-416, Alameda's SEABEE unit, completed two miles of rework and extension on the NAS jogging trail. The trail now extends through a 100-acre wildlife and wetlands sanctuary on the west end of the base, providing access to an area never before enjoyed by anyone. The 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 4.0, 6.0 mile and 10K jogging and walking courses provide some of the most scenic panoramas and wildlife viewing sites in the Bay Area.

To provide sailors with increased access to these QOL programs and facilities, NAS joined up with NADEP last August and created an NAS shuttle bus system which turned out to be a delightful investment for Alameda sailors and Ma-

rines. The free shuttle runs between the piers, the bachelor's quarters and all QOL facilities for periods up to 20 hours a day. Extra buses are added to the morning and afternoon schedule, providing NADEP workers convenient access between off-base and remote parking and their work centers. This program has increased patronage at all QOL facilities, reduced on-base traffic and improved Alameda's Clean Air Act posture with state and federal Environmental Protection Agency regulators.

In August 1994, a 30-day trial was conducted for a ferry service between NAS and Naval Station Treasure Island. Almost 500 service members living in base housing at Treasure Island work or are assigned to NAS ships and activities. The daily commute from TI to NAS across the Bay Bridge, over a reconfigured but less efficient highway system following the 1989 earthquake, was determined to be a worthwhile QOL issue. The success of the August 1994 ferry trial has resulted in a new contract to provide six to 12 months of ferry service between TI and NAS for most of 1995. The ferry will probably be maintained until USS Carl Vinson deploys in 1996.

Maintaining QOL programs takes resources and manpower. Alameda's QOL funding through closure in FY-97 is adequate to maintain the programs described here, although manpower shrinkages from the Navy force reduction program, coupled with attrition from base closure, make manning a

significant issue today. A Volunteers of America (VOA) pilot program which brought California State Prison system work-release prisoners aboard the air station in 1993 has greatly relieved these manning shortages. Alameda sailors can now work longer in their rates and assigned billets before adding unrelated maintenance and base closure collateral duties to their workload. The success of the VOA program is currently being expanded to involve VOA participation in building layup, salvage and demolition preparation, all key aspects of base closure.

These are just some highlights of a vibrant, dynamic Quality of Life Program which will continue to support the finest sailors and Marines in the world until the day NAS Alameda closes. Visitors to the air station over the next 24 months are encouraged to take advantage of all that Alameda has to offer. And yes, we'll show you a little bit about the right way to close the base.

*Capt. Jim Dodge is commanding officer of Naval Air Station Alameda.*

RTTUZYUW RHMSGG2955 0742051-UUUU--RUWGTNE.  
ZNR UUUUU

R 152051Z MAR 95 ZYB  
FM CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N46//  
TO RUWGTNE/NAS ALAMEDA CA//00//  
RHWIPXP/NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND WA//00//  
RUWFACH/NAS NORTH ISLAND CA//00//  
RUWDHJT/NAS MIRAMAR CA//00//  
RHWIPVA/NAVSTA EVERETT WA//00//  
RUAYBAA/COMFLEACT SASEBO JA//00//  
INFO RUWDEAA/COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA//N00//  
RUWFEAA/COMNAVVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA//N00//  
RUYNJDK/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA//N00//  
RUWDHLP/COMNAVBASE SAN DIEGO CA//N00//  
RUWGTEC/COMNAVBASE SAN FRANCISCO CA//N00//  
RHWIPQH/COMNAVBASE SEATTLE WA//N00//

BT

UNCLAS //N01700//  
MSGID/GENADMIN/CINCPACFLT/-/MAR//  
SUBJ/BUPERS MWR HOLIDAY AWARDS PROGRAM//  
REF/A/RMG/BUPERS/061812ZMAR94//  
AMPN/ANNOUNCED THE WINNERS OF THE 1994 HOLIDAY AWARDS PROGRAM.//

PAGE 02 RHMSGG2955 UNCLAS

RMKS/1. SUBJECT AWARD WINNERS ANNOUNCED BY REF A FOR THE 1994 HOLIDAY SEASON ARE NOTED WITH PLEASURE. THE SEVENTH ANNUAL AWARDS PROGRAM RECOGNIZED COMMANDS PROVIDING QUALITY RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES TO MEET THE LEISURE NEEDS OF SINGLE SAILORS AND NAVY FAMILIES FOR THANKSGIVING DAY, CHRISTMAS EVE, CHRISTMAS DAY, NEW YEAR'S EVE AND NEW YEAR'S DAY.

- A. EXTRA LARGE COMMANDS:  
NAS ALAMEDA, CA - FIRST PLACE  
NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND, WA - RUNNER UP  
NAS NORTH ISLAND, CA - HONORABLE MENTION
- B. LARGE COMMAND:  
NAS MIRAMAR, CA - HONORABLE MENTION
- C. MEDIUM COMMANDS:  
NAVSTA EVERETT, WA - RUNNER UP  
COMFLEACT SASEBO, JA - HONORABLE MENTION

2. WELL DONE TO ALL WHO CONTRIBUTED TO THIS IMPORTANT AND WORTHWHILE EFFORT.//

BT

#2955  
NNNN

UU  
U UNCLASSIFIED U  
UU

RTTUZYUW RUWFSGG4444 0761903-UUUU--RUWGTNE.

ZNR UUUUU

R 171903Z MAR 95 ZYB

FM COMNAVBASE SAN FRANCISCO CA//00//

TO RUWGTNE/NAS ALAMEDA CA//00//

INFO RUWFEEA/COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA//00//

BT

UNCLAS //N01700//

MSGID/GENADMIN/COMNAVBASE SF/00//

SUBJ/BUPERS MWR HOLIDAY AWARDS PROGRAM//

REF/A/RMG/CINCPACFLT/152051ZMAR95//

RMKS/1.REF A NOTED WITH GREAT PLEASURE. THE PROFESSIONALS AT NAS  
ALAMEDA DISPLAYED TREMENDOUS PRIDE AND DEDICATION DURING THE HOLIDAY  
SEASON IN PROVIDING QUALITY RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES FOR SINGLE  
SAILORS AND NAVY FAMILIES. YOUR MWR STAFF'S PROFESSIONALISM AND  
CONCERN FOR OUR SHIPMATES AND FAMILIES IS A POSITIVE INFLUENCE TO THE  
MWR PROGRAM AND THOSE IT SERVES. BRAVO ZULU FOR A JOB "WELL DONE."  
2. RADM TEDESCHI SENDS.//

BT

#4444

NNNN







January 18, 1995

The Honorable John Dalton  
Secretary of the Navy  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The City Council of Alameda, California requests reconsideration of the impending homeport change of the aircraft carriers based at Naval Air Station Alameda. This requested homeport change is in response to BRAC 93 legislation with the stated purpose to save the Department of Defense money. We believe that the cost of reorganization is exceeding the original estimates and negates the intent of BRAC 93. Additionally, we believe the resultant impact will negatively impact the U. S. Navy's peacetime readiness.

The Alameda City Council proposes the Navy keep a minimum of two carriers homeported at the current Alameda Naval Air Station. In addition to keeping the piers active, all government housing, land and facilities necessary to create a Naval Support Activity, Alameda should be retained for use by the U. S. Navy. The acreage and facilities needed for a Naval Support Activity, Alameda would be substantially less than the current Naval Air Station (approximately 25% of the current NAS size). Consolidation of activities into a Naval Support Activity, Alameda would render unnecessary the huge infusion of capital necessary to provide services for the Navy personnel and their families in the Northwest. We firmly believe that BRAC 95 should reconsider the homeporting of aircraft carriers at NAS Alameda for three primary reasons: **economic** - it will save the Navy millions of dollars; **strategic** - it will maintain fleet readiness; and, **quality of life** - the NAS Alameda already has in place those necessities that make serving in the Navy professionally enjoyable.

Ralph J. Appezzato, Mayor

Office of the Mayor, Room 301

City Hall


2263 Santa Clara Avenue • 94501-4456


510-748-4545


The Honorable John Dalton  
January 18, 1995  
Page 2


The Alameda Reuse and Redevelopment Authority is currently in the process of developing a Master Plan for the conversion of Naval Air Station Alameda to a civilian economy. Now is an appropriate time to enter into negotiations with the Navy so that conversion of the balance of the property to a naval support activity would be compatible with the reuse plan. Time is of the essence. We must proceed with some haste to ensure that there is sufficient time to compare the advantages and disadvantages of homeporting the aircraft carriers at NAS Alameda. Attached are an Executive Summary and Proposal justifying the continued homeporting of the aircraft carriers at NAS Alameda. We strongly urge and request the BRAC 95 to reconsider the decision to close NAS Alameda. Based on the information provided, we believe it is in the best interest of the United States of America.


Very truly yours,

  
Ralph J. Appezato  
Mayor

  
Charles Mannix  
Vice Mayor

  
A. J. "Lil" Arnerich  
Councilman

  
Al DeWitt  
Councilmember

  
Karin Lucas  
Councilmember

#### Attachments

Please Note - This letter is being addressed individually to the following persons:

Admiral Jeremy Borda, Chief of Naval Operations  
Mr. William Cassidy, Asst. Secretary of the Navy,  
for Installations & Environment  
Rear Admiral Pat Drennon, Director of Shore Activities  
Ms. S. Wasserman Goodman, Environmental Security  
The Honorable Ron Dellums  
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein  
The Honorable Barbara Boxer  
The Honorable Pete Wilson

25 January 1995

SUBJECT: COST ANALYSIS RELATED TO THE CLOSURE OF NAS ALAMEDA

BACKGROUND: The decision to close NAS Alameda and relocate tenant activities elsewhere was a result of a decision reached during the deliberations of the 1993 BRAC Commission. The impact of this decision was an "area closure" of Naval activities. Recently, a proposal was developed by the local community, which would enable the Navy to retain the aircraft carriers, piers, base housing, and necessary support facilities at a "Naval Station" Alameda, where approximately 25% of the existing NAS land would be utilized. With the balance remaining for reuse/conversion, a significant reduction in Base Operating Support Costs would be realized by the Navy. This "reduced footprint" option was never considered during the 1993 BRAC deliberations, but would result in substantial, immediate savings to the Government.

DISCUSSION: The cost impact of closing NAS Alameda is described in the Enclosure (1) "NAS Alameda closure implementation related costs" spreadsheet, where the total exceeds one billion dollars. This document is not meant to be an all inclusive accounting of closure related costs, rather it is a compilation of budget requirements related to actions that were available for review. This approach was necessitated due to the Navy's reluctance to share current budget execution documentation as well as planned Military Construction (MILCON) requirements for the Pacific Northwest.

This lack of acknowledgment to the costs is in fact documented on page 5, of the "Commander Naval Base San Francisco Regional Coordination Plan" (extract appears as Enclosure 2), where the Navy's BRAC cost estimate used to justify closure was understated by 2.75 Billion. Military Commanding Officers at closing and realigning activities are given strict deadlines on mission cessation timelines and budget allowances. Careers are literally on the line to meet these objectives. There is a very real probability that Operations & Maintenance, Navy (OM&N) and Defense Business Operations Funding (DBOF) account funding will be utilized to subsidize a portion of the base closure process to meet the Navy's reduced BRAC cost estimate.

Of further concern is the change in homeport assignments for the USS Carl Vinson that was to go to San Diego, but is now assigned to the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. The costs of this BRAC related homeport change have never been included in any payback calculation (they will be significant), nor reviewed by the BRAC Commission. Sources within the Navy insist that MILCON funding originally intended to upgrade pier facilities at San Diego for an aircraft carrier are now being reprogrammed to cover additional, unforeseen/unbudgeted costs in the Pacific Northwest.

CONCLUSION: While the exact costs to replicate the facilities at NAS Alameda may be debatable based upon the information available for review, a more finite analysis should be conducted by an authority that can request the most recent, pertinent documentation from the Navy. Further, in conducting this analysis, one should not look at what the Navy is planning to build for an *initial operating capability* (e.g. Everett), but should ask the question of what does a *mature* Naval Station entail for morale, welfare & recreation facilities, on-base housing availability as a percentage of assigned personnel to a given military base, etc., and compare this data to what is the standard at other Navy facilities. It is at this point in time that a clearer financial picture will become evident.

**NAS ALAMEDA  
CLOSURE IMPLEMENTATION RELATED COSTS**

ITEM	DESCRIPTION	NOTE	MILLIONS
A	Completion of Everett Facilities 491.9 M - 231.6M	1	\$260.30
B	Additional CVN training facilities required at Everett, WA or Bremerton	2	\$12.50
C	NAS Alameda one time closure costs (excludes environmental costs,NADEP & several other tenant activities)	3	\$495.20
D	One time costs for phone system buy-out	4	\$49.00
E	Family housing construction costs	5	\$199.00
<b>TOTAL COSTS:</b>			<b>\$1,016.00</b>

**DOES NOT INCLUDE HOMEPORT COSTS AT BREMERTON, WA FOR  
ONE AIRCRAFT CARRIER**

**NOTES**

- 1 Dept of the Navy letter, signed by Adm S. Loftus, dtd 28 Aug 92
- 2 Proposed Homeport at Everett, WA and Existing Facilities at Alameda, CA,  
by The Alameda County Base Retention Tactical Committee, dtd 28 Sep 92
- 3 COMNAVBASE San Francisco Regional Coordination Plan, Pages 28 - 29
- 4 COMNAVBASE San Francisco Regional Coordination Plan, Pages 23
- 5 NAS Alameda Base Closure Study (DRAFT), dtd 30 Sept 90



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
 WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO  
 11000  
 Ser N441C2/2U593809  
 28 Aug 92

Dear Mr.

The Office of the Secretary of the Navy has provided my office with your letter of July 23, 1992, which requested information regarding the building of the new homeport in Everett, Washington.

Specific answers to the questions in your letter are as follows:

1. How much money has been spent (expended) / committed (obligated) through FY92?

As of 31 July 92

Expended	\$198.5M	Military Construction
	\$ 5.8M	Base Closure Funds
Total	\$204.3M	
Obligated	\$215.7M	Military Construction
	\$ 15.9M	Base Closure Funds
Total	\$231.6M	

2. How much FY93 money has been appropriated for continued building?

No FY93 monies have been appropriated.

3. How many total dollars are expected to be spent in order to complete all needed construction at Everett?

\$368.1M	Military Construction <sup>1</sup>
\$ 20.7M	Military Housing <sup>2</sup>
\$ 89.9M	Base Closure Funds from <sup>3</sup>
	Naval Station Puget Sound (Sand Point)
\$ 3.7M	Non-appropriated Funds <sup>4</sup>
\$ 9.5M	Local Contributions <sup>4</sup>
\$491.9M	Total

- <sup>1</sup> IOC (Initial Operational Capability) Originally planned funding (Federal).
- <sup>2</sup> Additional Funding that may be required (Federal).
- <sup>3</sup> Funding not part of IOC (Federal).
- <sup>4</sup> Non-IOC funding. Local infrastructure improvements.

4. What is the cost of the required housing and other support facilities?

Estimated housing costs are \$20.7M. Housing was not originally planned as the local economy was expected to provide it. However, the recent massive expansion at the Boeing Everett Plant, to manufacture the new 777 aircraft, has significantly reduced the available rental housing.

Additionally, other support facilities will be built with \$89.9M of base closure and realignment funds. These facilities are necessary because of the closure of Naval Station Puget Sound (Sand Point), which would have provided them.

5. How large will the port/Navy base be in (square) acres?

The waterfront area at Naval Station Puget Sound (Everett) is approximately 117 acres. The addition support site made necessary by the closure of Sand Point will be approximately 60 acres.

6. How many ships will Everett be able to accommodate upon completion?

Thirteen ships were originally planned to be homeported at Everett, however, the current facility design can homeport about nine ships. At present, seven ships are projected to be homeported there.

7. How many carriers? One.


8. How many nuclear carriers? One.

9. Why is the Navy going ahead with this project?

The establishment of Naval Station Puget Sound (Everett) will give the Navy modern piers and facilities which meet environmental requirements and will provide a dispersed fleet basing for Navy's aircraft carriers well through the next century. In addition, the aircraft carrier at Everett will have convenient access to a nuclear capable repair yard and the new station will provide a high quality of life (affordable housing, low cost of living, etc.) for Navy personnel and their families.

I hope these answers adequately address your specific questions. Again, thank you for sharing your concerns on this issue. If I can be of further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,



S. F. LOFTUS  
Deputy Chief of Naval  
Operations (Logistics)

POLISHED COPY  
10/16/92

---

PROPOSED HOMEPORT AT EVERETT WA  
AND EXISTING FACILITIES AT ALAMEDA CA:

Comparative Training Costs

and

Quality of Life Factors

prepared by

The Alameda County  
Base Retention Tactical Committee

September 28, 1992

---



analysis noted some savings could be achieved by using mobile training teams (MTT's, for nine unspecified courses at a cost of \$200,000. However, MTT's can be used to reduce training costs at Alameda as well and therefore their use is not a significant discriminator between the two areas.

The Bremerton analysis also concluded that building new training facilities at Bremerton was not feasible. Although those figures are a few years outdated, they are roughly representative of current costs in the Pacific Northwest:

Damage Control Wet Trainer	\$ 397,000
Roof-Top Trainer/14E32 (Transponder)	\$ 770,000
Fire Fighting Trainers (Basic & Advanced)	\$6,800,000
Aviation Shipboard Fire Fighting Trainer (19F4)	\$4,500,000

The analysis also cautioned that environmental issues would have to be considered before planning any construction. Lack of space is an even greater consideration at the Everett site. All these issues underscore the value of existing facilities.

To summarize, the difference in individual skill and team training costs between ships homeported in the two areas, with facilities as they now exist, is truly significant. The difference can amount to over \$830,000 a year for a single nuclear carrier and \$1.65 M for a battle group.

At-Sea Unit and Battle Group Training

At present, Everett planners anticipate the homeporting of a nuclear aircraft carrier. For nuclear-powered ships, the cost of operating at sea is calculated in terms of Equivalent Full-Power Reactor Hours. Although the data is routinely recorded by the Navy, the information carries a secret classification and is therefore not available for analysis. As a means of estimating relative costs, and since Everett may not receive certification to homeport a nuclear vessel, an analysis of costs associated with conventionally powered vessels is instructive.

The Bremerton analysis found the 2510 mile trip from Bremerton to San Diego to require 167 hours and \$200,000 of fuel for a DD 963 class destroyer.<sup>9</sup> Using the same time and cost assumptions, a comparable trip from Alameda is 870 miles, takes 58 hours

---

<sup>9</sup> Time and fuel consumption based on an assumption of 15 knots and 1200 gallons per hour.

Commander Naval Base San Francisco

# Regional Coordination Plan

---

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE (BRAC) 93



Volume I

June 1993

Regional Coordination Plan  
Financial Summary

BRAC93  
Base Realignment and Closure  
(1993 Commission)  
REGIONAL FINANCIAL SUMMARY

NAS Alameda

IMPLEMENTATION COSTS:	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	(S000) TOTALS
Military Construction	10826	35715	199711	27304			273556
Family Housing							
Construction	22910	31780	42453				97048 (5)
Operations							
Environmental							
Studies	165	531	20	20	20	20	776
Compliance	12543	5432	13954	4350	2150	250	38679
Restoration	12089	7186	3397	12953	5326	14925	55876
Real Estate Disposol Cost							
Operations & Maintenance							
Civilian Personnel	1377	691	1983	28075	340		32466
Freight	444	1018	3123	1447			6037
Propery Disposal	150	200	200	400			950
Equip Removal/Relocate	967	1086	1084	1100			4237
Historic Preservation	50	50	50	50			200
Minor Projects	1275	2385	1750	1075			6485
Shutdown Costs							
Cost Variances							
Admin Functions	638	450	202	1540	1336	1336	5502
Function Relocations							
Caretaker		179	311	1632	7101	8536	17759 **
Other							
Military Personnel- PCS	11295	2598	1472	13902			29267
OTHER	1200	16326	1200	2998			21724
Land Sales Revenue (-)							
TOTALS	75829	105627	270920	96846	16273	25067	590562

SAVINGS	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	(S000) TOTALS
Military Construction	4700						4700
Family Housing							
Construction							
Operations							
Operations & Maintenance	10	60	25	198			293
Military Personnel- PCS							
OTHER							
Civilian End Strength	52	73	89	891	891	891	
\$000	81	324		1053			1458
Military End Strength	2996	6824	7214	10870	10870	10870	
\$000	10772	5954	5114	1014			22854
TOTAL SAVINGS	15563	6338	5139	2265			29305

Regional Coordination Plan  
Financial Summary

NAS Alameda

ONE-TIME IMPLEMENTATION COSTS:	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	(S000) TOTALS
(FUNDED BY OTHER APPROPRIATIONS)							
Military Construction							
Family Housing							
Construction							
Operations							
Operations & Maintenance							
OTHER							
TOTALS							

NET IMPLEMENTATION COSTS:	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	(S000) TOTALS
Military Construction	6126	35715	199711	27304			262856
Family Housing							
Construction	22310	31780	42458				97048
Operations							
Environmental							
Studies	165	531	20	20	20	20	776
Compliance	12543	5432	13954	4350	2150	250	36679
Restoration	12089	7186	3397	12953	5326	14925	55876
Operations & Maintenance	4891	5999	8683	35121	8777	9872	73343
Military Personnel- PCS	11295	2598	1472	13902			29267
OTHER	1200	16326	1200	2998			21724
Land Sales Revenue (-)							
Civilian End Strength	52	73	89	891	891	891	
S000	-81	-324		-1053			-1458
Military End Strength	2996	6824	7214	10870	10870	10870	
S000	-10772	-5954	-5114	-1014			-22854
NET IMPLEMENTATION COSTS	60266	99289	255781	94581	16273	25067	561257

- NOTES: (1) Cost of migration of USS LINCOLN is considered a regular homeport change and is not included in this summary.  
 (2) Savings for AIRPAC tenants will be added by CNAP.  
 (3) Environmental costs for closure site is included, however is a budget submission item from NAVFAC.  
 (4) NO costs are incurred for NADEP, PWC, DRSPAC and Med/Dental.  
 (5) Cost is submitted by NAVFAC and is not part of receiving site submission.

### Coast Guard Station Mare Island

The Coast Guard occupies a small portion of the Mare Island Naval Shipyard as a search and rescue/law enforcement station. Coast Guard Station Mare Island receives all municipal service from MINS. The cutoff of municipal services to/from MINS will require relocation of the station. Relocation costs are estimated at \$4.5 to \$5.5 million and are included in Mare Island BRAC budget estimates.

### Family Housing

Currently, some 500 Coast Guard families occupy government-owned quarters in the Bay Area. As the result of cost sharing in their construction, the Coast Guard has a real property interest in units built by the Navy on Treasure Island. Current costs to the Government are those of bachelor allowance for quarters (BAQ). Loss of family quarters for Coast Guard families in the Bay Area would increase government costs \$2.5 million per year due to additional variable housing allowance (VHA) reimbursements. While it is unclear whether the Coast Guard can support the needed infrastructure, we plan to set aside the 106 quarters on Yerba Buena Island and 400 units at NAS Alameda including

Marina Village for transfer to the Coast Guard.

### Consolidated Area Telephone System (CATS) Contract

The Navy is in year four of a ten year "lease to purchase" telephone contract with AT&T. The capital portion of this \$108 million contract is recovered through monthly charges to 27,000 users. The closure/drawdown of the Bay Area activities makes this method of paying for the capital portion of the contract infeasible. An economic analysis is included in Volume II under the FWCSFB Closure Plan. The economic analysis shows it is more cost effective to buy out this contract as soon as possible. One-time cost of terminating the capital portion of the contract is \$49 million. If the capital portion of the contract is not bought out, monthly telephone rates would reach \$200 per line per month by 1997. The costs for CATS buy-out are consolidated under the FWCSFB budget vice attempting to spread costs among 27,000 users. The CATS system will have to be re-engineered sometime during the drawdown.

FISCAL

The fiscal cost data, Exhibit 7, is a summation (in FY 92 \$) of all budgetary costs, Exhibit 6, incident to the closure of NAS Alameda during the six year implementation period FY 92-FY 97. A summary of the cost data and saving follows:

One Time Implementation

Costs.....\$488.6M  
Cost avoidance.....\$ 96.1M

Net Implementation Cost.....\$392.5M

Recurring Costs/Savings

Costs.....\$757.6M  
Savings.....\$115.4M

Environmental Costs

Total Environmental Cost.....\$183.0M

In the Military Construction (MILCON) account anticipated requirements exceed \$165M whereas projected savings are \$40M. The net represents an additional \$125M MILCON requirement distributed over a three year period, FY 93 through FY 95. Similarly, Family Housing Construction requirements total \$199M while projected savings are \$25M. The net additional requirement is \$174M distributed over the three year period FY 94 through FY 96.

In the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) accounts one time implementation costs of \$80M, including planning and support, are offset by a projected \$30M cost avoidance. During the six year closure period, maintaining operations at NAS Alameda while shifting tenants, and thereby increasing based loading at receiving sites, results in recurring O&M costs of \$648M with a commensurate savings of \$82M.

In the Family Housing (FH,N) operations accounts the recurring six year costs total \$60M whereas the savings over the same closure period equate to \$17M.

Regional Coordination Plan  
Executive Summary

These scenarios are primarily driven by CVN homeport changes in FY95 and FY97 and by workload drawdown plans at Mare Island Naval Shipyard and Naval Aviation Depot Alameda. The CNBSF planning team reviewed the Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) data provided on activity data summary sheets dated 29 March 1993 and identified 52 organizations with 301 military and 1,837 civilian personnel that were omitted. Disposition

of these additional tenant commands is addressed in Chapter 2.

The costs to implement this plan which include MILCON, Family Housing, environmental, operations, maintenance and personnel are approximately \$3.6 Billion. The BSEC data, which did not include specific environmental or nuclear closure costs, was \$849 million for the same seven activities. The costs are summarized in the following tables.

Cost Summary		
Major Cost Category (\$ Millions)	Sum of Local Budgets	ESEC
Civilian Personnel Severance/Relocation	532.2	*
Military Personnel Relocation	59.2	*
Environmental	728.4	*
Nuclear Closure (Preliminary Data)	322.0	*
Material/Equipment Disposal/Shipping	339.7	*
Caretaker	148.2	*
MILCON	578.0	*
Other	855.9	*
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$ 3,563.6</b>	<b>\$ 849</b>
Home Owners Assistance Program costed/administered by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers	\$ 106.2	*

\* COBRA/BSEC data on major cost categories was not available for each activity

Regional Coordination Plan  
Executive Summary

Regional Implementation Cost by Activity		
Activity (\$Thousands)	BSEC Costs	One Time Implementation Costs
Naval Shipyard, Mare Island	279900	1537844
Naval Air Station, Alameda	193700	590562
Naval Aviation Depot, Alameda	126800	478110
Naval Station, Treasure Island	33700	132755
Naval Hospital, Oakland	57500	334756
Naval Supply Center, Oakland	119400	299071
Navy Public Works Center San Francisco Bay	37500	178867
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Western Division	800	11625
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>849300</b>	<b>3563590</b>



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### PROPOSAL FOR A NAVAL STATION ALAMEDA

#### BACKGROUND:

Pursuant to an Act of Congress, a procedure was established for the identification and evaluation of military bases and activities that are excess to the Department of Defense. The goal of these actions was to close, consolidate and realign military installations to become more efficient and save money. As part of this process, the 1993 BRAC Commission endorsed the closure of the Naval Air Station, Alameda, by a 4 to 3 vote, where the Navy was directed to close the Alameda facilities and relocate necessary functions elsewhere. Specifically mentioned was the change in homeport of two nuclear powered aircraft carriers from Alameda to San Diego, CA, and to Everett, WA. NAS Alameda is currently planned to close in 1997, with both aircraft carriers scheduled to leave shortly beforehand.


#### DISCUSSION:

Factors affecting the Navy decision to close Alameda and relocate the aircraft carriers elsewhere primarily focused on cost, however it has been suspected that Bay Area political situations may have also entered into the process. In testimony to the BRAC Commission, it was disclosed that it was the Navy's position that as much as \$40 million per year could be saved in operational support costs, primarily due to the construction of a new, smaller facility in Everett, Washington. Also considered was the prevailing area cost of living in the Puget Sound Area which was less than the San Francisco Bay Area. These marginal cost differences indicated a rapid payback which supported the Navy's position.

However, as time has progressed, developments have occurred that were not envisioned by either the Navy nor BRAC Commissioners. Factors such as the Navy developing a berthing strategy for a CVN in an industrial area at Bremerton, Washington, which by previous Navy testimony to the BRAC Commission (Note 1), was not an acceptable alternative. Other issues include the Puget Sound area now being classified as a "high cost" area by the military, thereby decreasing the marginal difference in operational costs between Alameda and the Pacific Northwest, additional operational costs of \$14 million annually from having to sail the aircraft carriers further to their required training areas (Southern California), difficulties in dredging required access channels to Everett, the lack of Navy housing in the Puget Sound area coincidental with a scarcity of rental units (the Navy has requested \$343 million to construct new housing in the Puget Sound Area), and other reasons. It has been estimated that the combined one-time costs of NAS Alameda closure (\$390 million for NAS closure costs plus the cost of moving homeports for 2 CVN's), construction completion at Everett for an *initial operating capability* (\$273 million), new housing in the Puget Sound Area and facilitization of Bremerton (unknown cost, but it will be significant), will exceed one billion dollars.

PROPOSAL  
FOR A  
NAVAL STATION  
ALAMEDA

A Model Installation Initiative



# BACKGROUND

---

- The 1993 BRAC Commission voted (4 to 3) to close NAS Alameda, reassign tenant activities elsewhere, and homeport NAS Alameda aircraft carriers at Everett, WA., and San Diego, CA.
- Most other Bay Area Navy activities were closed as well.

**THE OPENING OF EVERETT WAS JUSTIFIED AS A CARRIER HOMEPORT DURING THE ERA OF A 600 SHIP NAVY**

# BRAC DECISION ISSUE

---

**BRAC GOAL** Close, Consolidate, Realign military installations and activities to become more efficient and save \$\$\$\$\$

An NAS Alameda *realignment action* was never considered by either the Navy or BRAC Commission. An entire area closure was the *only* option ever pursued.

It is realistic to significantly reduce the Navy footprint at Alameda by as much as 75%, and homeport three aircraft carriers, thereby avoiding enormous facilitization costs at other sites yet to be developed . *Naval Station Mayport, FL is an existing example of how to do this.*

# BRAC DECISION ISSUES (CONTINUED)

---

- There is a compelling case for the new BRAC 95 Commission to reevaluate the previous decision. *New data calls, with a new scenario (realignment) are a prudent action*
- *A payback period greater than 25 years already exists with an Alameda closure using the Everett plan*

# PRESENT SITUATION: Tenant Activities

- NADREP Alameda is largest tenant & will cease operations by Sept. 96.
- *Gaining CVN homeports all require significant facilities construction efforts, which are behind schedule, over budget (or worse yet not currently budgeted for), or just not feasible to complete*

Puget Sound area CVN homeport cost estimates continue to escalate, while increased readiness costs were never considered by the BRAC Commission

# PROPOSED CVN HOMEPORTS

---

- Homeports designated by the Navy to the BRAC Commission:
  - Everett, Washington
  - San Diego, California
- Homeports designated by the Navy **following** Presidential approval of above basing plan:
  - Everett, WA
  - San Diego, CA
  - Bremerton, WA**

ALAMEDA IS THE ONLY AIRCRAFT CARRIER HOMEPORT ON THE  
WEST COAST WITH A NUCLEAR SITE PERMIT

# WEST COAST CVN HOMEPORTING OPTIONS

---


- If Alameda is closed, the only combination of homeports with sufficient berthing capacity is Bremerton, Everett, and San Diego.

**IF ONE OF THE ABOVE BASES IS NOT USABLE  
AS A CVN HOMEPORT, THEN ALAMEDA MUST  
BE INCLUDED IN ANY NUCLEAR POWERED CARRIER  
BASING SCENARIO**



# CVN HOMEPORT REQUIREMENTS

- Adequate pier space
- Adequate channel depth (52')
- Ability to shutdown reactors (shore utilities issue)
- Replenishment & ship repair support
- Security
- Housing for 3,500
- Medical facility
- Chapel, Theatre, Bowling Alley, Crafts Shops, Commissary, etc.
- Area quality of life, social diversity with local community



# PRESENT SITUATION: San Diego Homeport

---

- Environmental Impact Study pending release
- **Infrastructure improvements required:**
  - Pier construction**
  - Dredging**
  - Housing**
- Tidal flushing action concern
- Constricted ship channel
- Strong potential for an environmental lawsuit to be filed to halt CVN berthing

These improvements are needed by the Navy,  
but are a decade away from completion

# PRESENT SITUATION

## Everett Homeport

---

- Dredging incomplete
- Lacks a breakwater
- Infrastructure incomplete (many facilities will be constructed at a “satellite” facility > 15 miles away)
- No Navy housing available
- High cost to subsidize personnel (5% of area housing are rentals, mostly to Boeing employees)
- Lack of diversified community
- 12 hour transit time to open ocean
- 2 day transit to operating/training areas

**READINESS, OPERATIONAL COSTS & MORALE ARE ISSUES**

# Everett Homeport Costs (Initial Operating Capability)

● Construction funds required		
	obligated	<u>\$231.6M</u> <sup>(1)</sup>
	additional required	\$260.3M <sup>(1)</sup>
	new training devices	\$ 12.3M <sup>(2)</sup>
	Unobligated	<u>\$272.6M</u> <sup>(3)</sup>

NOTES: (1) 28 Sep 92 Navy Letter by Admiral S.F. Loftus.

Also states no FY 93 funding available

- (2) Training devices required include Damage Control Wet Trainer, Roof-Top Trainer, Fire Fighting Trainers, Aviation Shipboard Fire Fighting Trainer.
- (3) As of 28 Sep 92

# PRESENT SITUATION

## Bremerton Homeport

---

- Additional dredging is required for operational CVNs (52' issue, only one CVN possible with bedrock on one side of the pier)
- One CVN is proposed to dock in an industrial area
- Very limited community housing available (option: commute by ferry to Seattle)
- Existing quality of life facilities are not sized for homeporting an aircraft carrier (nor funded)
- Navy testimony to 1993 BCRC stated Bremerton was not an option for CVN homeporting due to unsuitability of the industrial complex

# Pacific Northwest CVN Increased Operating Costs

- Increased annual operating expenses occur from moving CVN homeports further away from Southern California training areas, and Navy schools
  - 2-CVNs @18 Days added "at-sea" time = \$12.4M
  - 2-CVN crew training requirements = \$ 1.7M

Increased Annual Training Costs = 13.7M

These costs are a reality of carrier operations & were previously provided to the BRAC, but were not considered

# Pacific Northwest Personnel Issues

---

- Morale impact from additional at sea requirements (18 days annually).
- Inclement weather for 8 months of the year (October - May). Most free time activities will cost sailors \$ they don't have, in MWR facilities that don't exist.
- Puget Sound area has been designated as a "high cost area" by the military.
- Navy has requested \$343 million to fund housing construction.

# NAS ALAMEDA CLOSURE FUNDING

---

- Funding required to close NAS Alameda, including relocation of MAG-46 and HM-15, and personnel assigned two 2 aircraft carriers

- Planning

- Building Closure

- Movement of Personnel

- Movement of Equipment

- Miscellaneous

**Total:    \$ 390M**



# NAS ALAMEDA CLOSURE IMPLEMENTATION COSTS

---

NAS Alameda Closure Costs	\$390M
Everett Homeport Costs Remaining	\$272.6M
Everett/Bremerton Area Housing	\$343 M
Bremerton Homeport Costs Remaining	\$TBD
(These costs are unknown, but are very significant)	

**Total Homeport Costs Remaining \$1 BILLION**

# ALAMEDA CVN HOMEPORTING

---

- Maintain CVN Homeports at Naval Station Alameda as the least cost, best option available to the Navy
- Existing base infrastructure is satisfactory to support this mission (only 25% of NAS Alameda required for this function)
- CVN transit time to open ocean is one hour
- Alameda is the best West Coast strategic location
- San Francisco Bay Area is among the best for quality of life in the country

**Alameda is the best CVN homeport the Navy has. *Period.***

# Return On Investment (ROI)

## Navy BRAC Commission Submittal

---

One time cost to change homeports &  
facilitize gaining sites \$1 BILLION

Annual cost savings of operating a  
carrier base in a Everett \$40 million <sup>(1)</sup>

### **RETURN ON INVESTMENT**

**25 years**

NOTE: This calculation is flawed as the Navy now plans on basing carriers at two bases rather than one, so annual savings will be less. Further, if a “smaller” Alameda was modeled for operating costs comparison, the savings would be less yet. Does not include Bremerton costs.



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950421-15R1

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

**COMMISSIONERS:**

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 27, 1995

Mr. Mark R. Chandler  
Chairman  
Alameda Navy Tactical Retention Committee  
1033 Regent Street; Suite #C  
Alameda, California 94501

Dear Mr. Chandler:

Thank you for your letter requesting a visit to Alameda Naval Base by Commissioners of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

The Base Closure and Realignment Act provides that any additions to the list of bases recommended for closure or realignment by the Secretary of Defense must be published in the Federal Register by May 17. This would include any decisions to reconsider a previous Commission's actions if such action had not been recommended by the Secretary. In order to have a base added to this list, a Commissioner must offer a motion to add an installation for consideration. A majority of the Commissioners must support such a motion for the base to be added for consideration.

Of course, at any time during the process you and the Alameda community are welcome to meet with Commissioners or Commission staff to present additional information on your proposal for the Alameda Naval Base. All information presented to the Commission receives the same careful review and analysis.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you feel I may be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:js

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950421-16

FROM: TIO, ANGELES A.	TO: DIXON
TITLE: SECRETARY OF HOUSE OF REP.	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: PUERTO RICO	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: FORT BUCHAWAN	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING H. R. 3770 WHICH REQUESTS DBCRC TO EXCLUDE FORT FROM 95 LIST.

Due Date: 950425	Routing Date: 950421	Date Originated: 950407	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------



*Gobierno de Puerto Rico  
Cámara de Representantes  
Capitolio  
San Juan, Puerto Rico 00901*

Angeles Mendoza Tío  
Secretario

April 7, 1995

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950421-16

Hon. Allan J. Dixon  
Chairman  
Defense Base Realignment  
and Closure  
Suite 1425 1700 North Moore St.  
Arlington, Virginia B. A. 20209


Dear Mister Dixon:

For your information and any action which you might deem necessary, I am enclosing the Final Report on House Resolution 3770, rendered by the Committee on Internal Affairs, which reads as follows:

*"For the House of Representatives of Puerto Rico to exhort the Committee on Base Realignment and Closure to exclude Fort Buchanan in Puerto Rico from the list to be submitted, in due time, for the approval of the President of the United States, the Hon. William J. Clinton".*

This is in compliance with the mandate expressed in Conclusions and Recommendations of said in Final Report on House Resolution as it was approved, for your information, and whatever action you may deem proper.

Respectfully,

  
Angeles A. Mendoza Tío  
Secretary  
House of Representatives

Encl.: 1

**TEXT APPROVED IN FINAL VOTE BY THE HOUSE  
(APRIL 3, 1995)**

---

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO

12th Legislature

5th Regular Session

**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**H. R. 3770**

March 31, 1995

Introduced by Representative Lebrón-Lamboy and undersigned  
by Representative López-Torres

Referred to the Committee on Internal Affairs

**RESOLUTION**

For the House of Representatives of Puerto Rico to exhort the Committee on Base Realignment and Closure to exclude Fort Buchanan in Puerto Rico from the list to be submitted, in due time, for the approval of the President of the United States, the Hon. William J. Clinton.

**STATEMENT OF MOTIVES**

The Hon. William Perry, Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, has recommended to the Committee on Base Realignment and Closure that Fort Buchanan in Puerto Rico, be included in the 1995 list, so that the activities conducted by the Active Army in said facilities would be eliminated.

If said recommendation is finally approved, it would bring about the loss of hundreds of direct and indirect jobs in Puerto Rico. Furthermore, services which are of utmost importance to the community of veterans, retired persons and members of the reserve in San Juan and the northern area of the Island, would no longer be provided.



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425

ARLINGTON, VA 22209

703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

**COMMISSIONERS:**

AL CORNELLA

REBECCA COX

GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)

S. LEE KLING

RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)

MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)

WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 25, 1995

The Honorable Angeles A. Mendoza Tio  
Secretary, House of Representatives  
The Capitol  
San Juan, Puerto Rico 00901

Dear Secretary Tio:

Thank you for your letter providing the Commission with a copy of H.R. 3770 regarding Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations regarding Fort Buchanan.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cw



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950424-1

FROM: DIAZ-COLON, EMILIO	TO: DAVIS, J.B.
TITLE: THE ADJUTANT GENERAL	TITLE: COMMISSIONER
ORGANIZATION: PUERTO RICO NAT. GUARD	ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓ FYI

Subject/Remarks:

OFFERING ASSISTANCE DURING APRIL 28 VISIT.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950424	Date Originated: 950410	Mail Date:
-----------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------



April 10, 1995

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950424-1

Dear ~~General~~ Davis:


I enjoyed knowing you during the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's Regional hearings held at Birmingham, Alabama.

As you informed me during that occasion, you will come to Puerto Rico on the 28th of this month to attend a hearing on the same subject, please let us know if we can be of any assistance.

You can contact us at (809) 724-1295 and Fax 723-6360, It will be a pleasure to help you.

I will be looking forward to see you on the 28th.

Sincerely,

  
Emilio Díaz-Colón  
Major General (PR), Puerto  
Rico National Guard  
The Adjutant General

General (Ret.) J.B. Davis  
3600 Windber Boulevard  
Palm Harbor, Florida 34685

"A UNIQUE BILINGUAL FORCE"

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950424-2

<b>FROM:</b> WARSHAUER, JACQUES	<b>TO:</b> DIXON
<b>TITLE:</b> CHAIRMAN	<b>TITLE:</b> CHAIRMAN
<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> BELMONT FINANCIAL CORP.	<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> OBCRC
<b>INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED:</b> LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER		X	
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

Ⓢ	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

**Subject/Remarks:**  
 REQUESTING THAT HE BE ABLE TO INTERROGATE ALL DOD PERSONNEL WHO SUPPORT CLOSURE OF SHIPYARD.

Due Date: 950501	Routing Date: 950424	Date Originated: 950417	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------

April 17, 1995

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950424-2

Mr. Alan J. Dixon, Chairman  
Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 N. Moore, Ste. 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Dixon:

The enclosed copy of my letter to Mr. Passarella responding to his letter of March 24, copy enclosed, is an example of why citizens are becoming more and more disenchanted with the increasingly dangerous bureaucracy in Washington. I hope that you are above this level of partiality and that you will demand to review all the data I have requested. I assume that you can get it without being classified as a commercial entity.

I am sure that a review of the data I have requested will clearly reveal that the results of the DOD's vaunted projected savings to date are whole orders of magnitude less than its projections. Their recommendations are either based on political pressure from the "old buddy club of admirals and generals" or just a plain disregard for facts, or both.


I understand that private citizens cannot appear at your hearings, and I, therefore, make a formal request that I be allowed to appear and given time to interrogate all of the DOD personnel at all levels who proposed or support the closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. If I have the requested information I can cover the subject in a day or so. If it is denied to me I will need several days of sworn testimony to dig out the pertinent facts.

All of you, including the DOD and your commission, are employees of the citizens of this nation. The government is not my employer or master, but the bureaucracy acts as if it

is both, and it is time to change this even if we have to disassemble the bureaucracy and send all of its ivory tower members back to where they came from so that they can secure real jobs with no political perks and privileges.

If you are receiving the impression that I am "mad as hell," you are right.

Sincerely,



Jacques Warshauer  
Chairman

JW/bw  
encs.

cc Senator Diane Feinstein  
Senator Barbara Boxer  
Congressman Steve Horn  
Senator Bob Dole  
Speaker Newt Gingrich  
Congressman Chris Cox  
Congressman Bob Dornan  
Congressman Dana Rohrabacher  
Mayor Beverly O'Neill  
SOS Chairman Bill Gurzi  
Long Beach Councilman Alan Lowenthal

April 14, 1995

Mr. A. H. Passarella  
Director, Freedom of Information and  
Security Review  
Department of Defense  
1400 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1400

Dear Mr. Passarella:

Your response to my request for information vital to the rationale for closing the Long Beach Naval Shipyard is, at best, confusing, and at worst, a convenient way to abrogate my rights under the Freedom of Information Act.

I want to know how a private citizen with no economic ties to the shipyard as an employee, subcontractor, or supplier can be considered as a "commercial" entity. You have told me that I can have the information requested if I will pay what appears to be a substantial sum to exercise my legal rights.


In view of this obvious attempt to block my first request, I request a response to the following on a timely basis, which means within ten days:

1. An explanation as to how and why I am considered a commercial entity.
2. The cost I would have to incur to secure the data requested under a commercial category.
3. The time it will take to secure the requested information.

Based on your response I intend to notify the Base Realignment and Closure Commission that I as a private citizen demand that no decision be reached applicable to the closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard until after all the

information I have requested is made available and I and others have had an ample opportunity to review it and critique it.

Sincerely,

  
Jacques Warshauer  
Chairman

JW/bw

cc Senator Diane Feinstein  
Senator Barbara Boxer  
Congressman Steve Horn  
Senator Bob Dole  
Speaker Newt Gingrich  
Congressman Chris Cox  
Congressman Bob Dornan  
Congressman Dana Rohrabacher  
Mayor Beverly O'Neill  
SOS Chairman Bill Gurzi  
Long Beach Councilman Alan Lowenthal  
Mr. Alan J. Dixon, Chairman of the Base  
Closure and Realignment Commission



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1400



PUBLIC AFFAIRS

24 MAR 1995

Ref: 95-F-0597

Mr. Jacques Warshauer  
Belmont Financial Corporation  
5150 East Pacific Coast Highway  
Suite 102  
Long Beach, CA 90804-3326

Dear Mr. Warshauer:

This responds to your March 6, 1995, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request pertaining to your questions about base closings and the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, and your request for General Accounting Office (GAO) reports. Your letter, addressed to the Secretary of Defense, was referred to this Directorate for administrative FOIA processing. We received your letter on March 15, 1995.

Due to the size and complexity of the Department of Defense (DoD), there is no central repository for all DoD records. This Directorate is responsible for responding to requests for records of the components of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff (OSD/JS). The several components of the DoD, including the military departments and the separate defense agencies, operate their own Freedom of Information offices to respond to requests for records for which they are responsible. These procedures are provided in DoD Regulation 5400.7-R, as published at 32 CFR 286.

With the Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, Congress amended the FOIA to provide that some processing costs be passed on to requesters, particularly commercial category requesters. In addition, DoD Regulation 5400.7-R states that, regardless of the requester's fee category, all requesters must agree to pay the likely chargeable fees associated with processing their requests. This regulation also allows the assessment of search fees even if no responsive records are located, or if responsive records are located but determined to be exempt from release.

Pursuant to the Reform Act, as promulgated by DoD Regulation 5400.7-R, your request has been categorized as commercial in nature. Commercial requesters are obligated to pay search, review, and reproduction costs associated with their requests. Established DoD fees are: clerical search or review, \$12 per hour; professional search or review, \$25 per hour; executive search or review, \$45 per hour; computer search, varies according to the system used, billed per minute; microfiche, \$0.25 per



page; office copy reproduction, \$0.15 per page; and printed publications or reports, \$0.02 per page.

Absent your stated willingness to pay assessable fees, we are unable to process your FOIA request. Also, since the FOIA does not contain provisions for agencies to create documents or answer questions in response to FOIA requests, we would be unable to respond to all the items you indicated. However, if you still desire a FOIA search by an OSD/JS office for existing records responsive to items one, four, and nine, please submit your written agreement to pay search, review and excising, and reproduction charges. Our address is: Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review, Room 2C757, 1400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC, 20301-1400. Regarding item nine (GAO reports), any GAO reports we find would have to go to GAO for release. Therefore, for faster service you may wish to write directly to the following address: General Accounting Office, 441 G Street, NW, Washington, DC, 20548.

To date, there are no chargeable costs for processing this request. If you need any assistance or have any questions, please contact Lieutenant Colonel Kahn, on (703)697-1160, or 697-1180.

Sincerely,



A. H. Passarella  
Director  
Freedom of Information  
and Security Review



**DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Phone call to the number  
950424-221

April 26, 1995

Mr. Jacques Warshauer  
Belmont Financial Corporation  
5150 East Pacific Coast Highway, Suite 102  
Long Beach, CA 90804-3326

Dear Mr. Warshauer:

Thank you for your letter of April 17, 1995, discussing your Freedom of Information Act request and the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission was created by Congress to be independent of the Department of Defense. As a result, we are not able to address your Freedom of Information Act request to the Department of Defense.


The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission makes all information in its possession, including that which has been provided to it by the Secretary of Defense, available to the public in our library in Arlington, Virginia. In addition, all of the information is also available to your elected Congressional representatives in a DoD operated reading room on Capitol Hill. We have had many representatives from the Long Beach community visit the Commission offices and review the material on Long Beach Naval Shipyard.

You, or someone on your behalf, are always welcome to visit the Commission library and review and copy at no expense any documents that might be of interest to you. In addition, your Congressional representatives may also be able to secure copies of documents for you from the reading room on Capitol Hill.

All of the Commission hearings are open to the public. Private citizens are invited to testify before the Commission during a specific amount of time that we have allowed for public comment. If your comment should exceed this time allotment, or if you prefer, we will accept any written testimony that you may have for our permanent records.

I hope this information is helpful to you. Thank you for your interest in the base closure process.

Very truly yours,



Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

MRC  
ES#950424-2R1

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

**EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) #** 950424-3

<b>FROM:</b> FLOOD, WILLIAM G.	<b>TO:</b> DAVIS, J. B.
<b>TITLE:</b> VICE-PRESIDENT	<b>TITLE:</b> COMMISSIONER
<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> SDS INTERNATIONAL	<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> DBCRC
<b>INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED:</b> AIR LOGISTIC CENTERS	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				<b>REVIEW AND ANALYSIS</b>			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER		X	
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Direct Response
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FYI

**Subject/Remarks:**

FORWARDING COPY OF 1995 DEPOT HANDBOOK,  
"A GUIDE TO USAF AIR LOGISTICS CENTERS"

Due Date: 950501	Routing Date: 950424	Date Originated: 950417	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------



SDS  
International

April 17, 1995

Gen James B. Davis  
Defense Base Realignment Commission  
1700 N. Moore Street  
Arlington, VA 22202

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950424-3

Dear Gen Davis,

Thought you might be interested in this piece of work from my company. We have had many requests for the document since it seems to be one-of-a-kind. If you need (or want) anything related to the subject, we will try to get it for you.

As you can see, I am right down the street from you in Crystal City. If I can be of assistance please call (703) 553-7526.

Sincerely,

William G. Flood  
Senior Vice President

SDS International

One Crystal Park • 2011 Crystal Drive • Suite 100 • Arlington, Virginia 22202-3709 • (703) 553-7525 • Fax (703) 979-7447

# SDS International


---

## 1995 Depot Handbook

--

## A Guide To USAF Air Logistics Centers

3 April 1995



---

One Crystal Park  
2011 Crystal Drive  
Suite 100  
Arlington, Virginia 22202

**SDS**  
INTERNATIONAL



SDS  
International

---


## Introduction

---

The Department of Defense's network of supply and maintenance depots remains excessive for the military force structure that exists today. Attempts by senior DoD officials to encourage the Services to pare down surplus depot infrastructure voluntarily -- by promoting workload consolidation, greater interservicing, and the privatization of most "non-Core" depot maintenance functions -- have had only moderate success. Aided by Congressmen representing depot-dominated constituencies, Service logisticians have compiled impressive records of resisting turf encroachment, both from the private sector and other Services.

It is in the best interests of national aerospace development for commercial firms to obtain more military depot workload. Since the Services are unlikely to surrender it willingly, a comprehensive, well-thought-out marketing campaign will be necessary. The first step in mounting such a campaign is to study the competition. This **Depot Handbook** meets that need by providing essential relevant information on the capabilities, capacities, and operating environment of private aerospace industry's major competitors: the Air Force's five Air Logistic Centers. On a closely related issue, the **Depot Handbook** provides a status update on the current 1995 base realignment and closure process.

This document was prepared using unclassified, open-source material. It draws on insights provided during interviews with senior Department of Defense (DoD) personnel, military staff officers, and Congressional staff members. Questions or comments should be directed to SDS International which alone remains responsible for report contents.

  
Brian E. Wages  
Project Analyst

SDS International

One Crystal Park • 2011 Crystal Drive • Suite 100 • Arlington, Virginia 22202-3709 • (703) 553-7525 • Fax (703) 979-7447

# 1995 Depot Handbook

## A Guide To USAF Air Logistics Centers (ALC)

### Table of Contents

<b>1.0</b>	<b>Overview</b> .....	Page 1
<b>2.0</b>	<b>Sacramento ALC</b> .....	4
2.1	McClellan Air Force Base .....	4
	2.1.1 Field and Facilities .....	4
	2.1.2 Major Tenants .....	5
	2.1.3 Relationship to Local Community .....	6
2.2	Sacramento ALC Depot .....	7
	2.2.1 Specialization .....	7
	2.2.2 Unique Facilities/Equipment/Capabilities .....	8
	2.2.3 Workload .....	10
<b>3.0</b>	<b>Ogden ALC</b> .....	12
3.1	Hill Air Force Base .....	12
	3.1.1 Field and Facilities .....	12
	3.1.2 Major Tenants .....	13
	3.1.3 Relationship to Local Community .....	14
3.2	Ogden ALC Depot .....	15
	3.2.1 Specialization .....	15
	3.2.2 Unique Facilities/Equipment/Capabilities .....	16
	3.2.3 Workload .....	18
<b>4.0</b>	<b>Oklahoma City ALC</b> .....	20
4.1	Tinker Air Force Base .....	20
	4.1.1 Field and Facilities .....	20
	4.1.2 Major Tenants .....	21
	4.1.3 Relationship to Local Community .....	22
4.2	Oklahoma City ALC Depot .....	23
	4.2.1 Specialization .....	23
	4.2.2 Unique Facilities/Equipment/Capabilities .....	24
	4.2.3 Workload .....	26



<b>5.0</b>	<b>San Antonio ALC</b>	28
5.1	Kelly Air Force Base	28
5.1.1	Field and Facilities	28
5.1.2	Major Tenants	29
5.1.3	Relationship to Local Community	30
5.2	San Antonio ALC Depot	31
5.2.1	Specialization	31
5.2.2	Unique Facilities/Equipment/Capabilities	32
5.2.3	Workload	34
<b>6.0</b>	<b>Warner Robins ALC</b>	36
6.1	Robins Air Force Base	36
6.1.1	Field and Facilities	36
6.1.2	Major Tenants	37
6.1.3	Relationship to Local Community	38
6.2	Warner Robins ALC Depot	39
6.2.1	Specialization	40
6.2.2	Unique Facilities/Equipment/Capabilities	40
6.2.3	Workload	42
<b>7.0</b>	<b>1995 Base Realignment and Closure Process</b>	44
7.1	Background	44
7.2	Depots -- A Special Interest Item	45
7.2	Courses of Action	49
<b>8.0</b>	<b>Conclusions</b>	50

**Attachments**

<b>Attachment 1:</b>	<b>Air Force Depot Capacity/Plant Comparisons</b>	52
<b>Attachment 2:</b>	<b>Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Process</b>	55
<b>Attachment 3:</b>	<b>Prior BRAC Actions -- Major Base Closure Summary</b>	58
<b>Attachment 4:</b>	<b>BRAC 95 -- Proposed Major Base Closures/Realignments</b>	60
<b>Attachment 5:</b>	<b>DoD BRAC 95 Proposal -- Job Changes By State</b>	62
<b>Attachment 6:</b>	<b>Biographies of BRAC 95 Commissioners</b>	63
<b>Attachment 7:</b>	<b>Explanation of Workload Tables</b>	71
<b>Attachment 8:</b>	<b>Table of Acronyms</b>	72

Tables

<b>Table 1-1:</b>	<b>DoD Commodity Groups List</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Table 2-1:</b>	<b>Sacramento ALC Workload Chart</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Table 3-1:</b>	<b>Ogden ALC Workload Chart</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>Table 4-1:</b>	<b>Oklahoma City ALC Workload Chart</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>Table 5-1:</b>	<b>San Antonio ALC Workload Chart</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>Table 6-1:</b>	<b>Warner Robins ALC Workload Chart</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>Table A1-1:</b>	<b>Depot Capacity/Plant Comparisons</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>Table A3-1:</b>	<b>Major Bases Closed (Prior BRACs)</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>Table A3-2:</b>	<b>By-Service Base Closure Summary (Prior BRACs)</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>Table A3-3:</b>	<b>By-State Base Closure Summary (Prior BRACs)</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>Table A4-1:</b>	<b>BRAC 95 -- Major Base Closures</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>Table A4-2:</b>	<b>BRAC 95 -- Major Base Realignment</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>Table A5-1:</b>	<b>BRAC 95 -- By-State Job Losses</b>	<b>62</b>

# 1995 Depot Handbook

## A Guide To USAF Air Logistics Centers

### 1.0 Overview

---

Title 10 of the United States Code requires DoD activities to "maintain a logistics capability (including personnel, equipment and facilities) to ensure a ready and controlled source of technical competence and resources necessary to ensure effective and timely response to a mobilization, . . . contingency, . . . or other emergency requirement."<sup>1</sup> Within the Air Force that task falls primarily under Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), which is charged with managing the integrated research, development, test, acquisition, and sustainment of Air Force weapon systems. To accomplish these tasks, AFMC operates a number of laboratories, test centers, and logistics depots.

This Handbook provides a summary of information on AFMC's five logistics depots, known as Air Logistics Centers (ALC). The five are: Sacramento ALC (SM-ALC) at McClellan Air Force Base (AFB), California; Ogden ALC (OO-ALC) at Hill AFB, Utah; Oklahoma City ALC (OC-ALC) at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma; San Antonio ALC (SA-ALC) at Kelly AFB, Texas; and Warner Robins ALC (WR-ALC) at Robins AFB, Georgia. Each is discussed in the context of: the base on which it is located; its surrounding community; the depot functions it performs; the facilities, equipment, and special competencies that the individual ALC managers consider make their depot unique; and workload. Much of the information was extracted from ALC inputs to the DoD Joint Cross-Service Group charged with reviewing all military depots in developing DoD's 1995 base closure and realignment recommendations. Manpower, mission, and workload changes associated with DoD's BRAC 95 closure/realignment recommendations are not reflected herein except as specifically noted. Information and data are current as of February 1995, and are presented in the following format:

**Field and Facilities.** Provides an indication of an air base's suitability to support additional aircraft and missions, and to conduct test and training activities.

---

<sup>1</sup>Title 10, United States Code, Chapter 146, Section 2464.

**Major Tenants.** Lists other key military activities operating at the base.

**Relationship to Local Community.** Shows an ALC base's economic impact in its immediate area.

**Specialization.** Identifies each ALC's areas of expertise by listing the commodity groups for which it has been designated a *Service Center of Excellence* (Technical Repair Center) and its *Technology Application Program Management (TAPM)* assignments.<sup>2</sup>

**Unique Facilities/Equipment.** Identifies ALC facilities, equipment, and capabilities considered unique or one-of-a-kind.<sup>3</sup> Lists may not be all-inclusive.

**Workload.** Data tables showing each ALC's potential maximum workload capacity, its existing workload capacity, its actual programmed workload, and that amount of the programmed workload identified as "Core" for fiscal years (FY) 1996 and 1999. Workload figures are shown as thousands of Direct Labor Hours (kDLH) and are aggregated according to the DoD commodity group reference system shown on the following page. (Workload Tables are explained in detail at **Attachment 7**.)

---

<sup>2</sup>Military depots assigned primary responsibility for the maintenance and repair of specific weapon systems, system components, or categories of components are known as *Centers of Excellence* for those systems, components, or categories of components. *Technology Application Program Management (TAPM)* responsibility pertains to advanced technologies and equates to being designated the organization of primary responsibility within DoD for developing a particular technology, disseminating information on it to appropriate companies and agencies, and encouraging both its employment in new military products and -- where possible -- its insertion into older ones.

<sup>3</sup>This Handbook reports on those facilities, equipment, and capabilities that have been identified by the depots themselves as being unique or of particular importance. It was not within the scope of this study to verify ALC claims as to the uniqueness of such assets or competencies, or to attempt to determine their *utility* (through clarifying the amount of workload they process, frequency of use, future requirement for use in light of the projected retirement of the assets or systems they service, or whether or not the facility, equipment, or capability could be modified to service other systems or components). In many cases, it was not possible to determine from the source material whether it was a particular item of maintenance equipment or the facility containing it that was unique, as in the cases of buildings with special TEMPEST shielding, shock mounts, and special insulation. Likewise, in many cases it was not possible to determine whether some facility or capability was independent and separate or was embedded in a larger facility/competency as a sub-component or specialty. In some cases, the capabilities highlighted were not directly associated with depot maintenance activity, as with laboratories collocated with a depot maintenance operation but not actually performing maintenance work. It also was often not possible to determine whether special equipment could be relocated to another depot, or whether a comparable maintenance capability existed in private industry.

Workload and areas of specialization are categorized in accordance with the DoD-established commodity groups reference system shown below:

<b>DoD Commodity Groups List</b>	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Aircraft Airframes:                             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Rotary</li> <li>b. VSTOL</li> <li>c. Fixed Wing                                     <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Transport / Tanker / Bomber</li> <li>(2) Command and Control</li> <li>(3) Light Combat</li> <li>(4) Admin / Training</li> </ol> </li> <li>d. Other</li> </ol> </li> <li>2. Aircraft Components                             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Dynamic Components</li> <li>b. Aircraft Structures</li> <li>c. Hydraulic/Pneudraulic</li> <li>d. Instruments</li> <li>e. Landing Gear</li> <li>f. Aviation Ordnance</li> <li>g. Avionics/Electronics</li> <li>h. APUs</li> <li>i. Other</li> <li>j. Manufacture and Fabrication</li> </ol> </li> <li>3. Engines (Gas Turbine) (GTE)                             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Aircraft</li> <li>b. Tank</li> <li>c. Blades / Vanes (Type 2)</li> </ol> </li> <li>4. Missiles and Missile Components                             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Strategic</li> <li>b. Tactical / MLRS</li> </ol> </li> <li>5. Amphibians                             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Vehicles</li> <li>b. Components (less GTE)</li> </ol> </li> <li>6. Ground Combat Vehicles                             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Self-propelled</li> <li>b. Tanks</li> <li>c. Towed Combat Vehicles</li> <li>d. Components (less GTE)</li> </ol> </li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>7. Ground and Shipboard Communications and Electronic Equipment                             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Radar</li> <li>b. Radio Communications</li> <li>c. Wire Communications</li> <li>d. Electronic Warfare</li> <li>e. Navigation Aids</li> <li>f. Electro-Optics / Night Vision Equipment</li> <li>g. Satellite Control / Space Sensors</li> </ol> </li> <li>8. Automotive / Construction Equipment</li> <li>9. Tactical Vehicles                             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Tactical Automotive Vehicles</li> <li>b. Components</li> </ol> </li> <li>10. Ground General Purpose Items                             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Ground Support Equipment (except aircraft)</li> <li>b. Small Arms / Personal Weapons</li> <li>c. Munitions / Ordnance</li> <li>d. Ground Generators</li> <li>e. Other</li> </ol> </li> <li>11. Sea Systems                             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Ships</li> <li>b. Weapon Systems</li> </ol> </li> <li>12. Software                             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Tactical Systems</li> <li>b. Support Equipment</li> </ol> </li> <li>13. Special Interest Items                             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Bearings Refurbishment</li> <li>b. Calibration (Type I)</li> <li>c. Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE)</li> </ol> </li> <li>14. Other</li> </ol>

**Table 1-1: Commodity Groups List**

Note: Shading denotes commodity groups in which the ALCs do not have significant workload.

## **2.0 Sacramento ALC (SM-ALC)**

---

Sacramento ALC is the Air Force's F-111 and A-10 depot. It provides logistical support (supply and maintenance) for these and other assigned aircraft, for multiple aircraft electrical and pneumatic systems, and for ground-based communications and electronic equipment. Commensurate with its advanced capabilities in composites, electro-optics, and microelectronics, it also has responsibility within DoD for the development and fielding of advanced composites, fiber optics and fiber optic connectors, and very high speed integrated circuits (VHSIC).

### **2.1 McClellan AFB, California**

McClellan AFB is an AFMC-operated installation located approximately nine miles north of downtown Sacramento, California. Sacramento is Northern California's major interior transportation hub. It is located on the main railroad line running into the San Francisco Bay area from the East Coast, and sits at the junction of Interstate 5, the West Coast's primary north-south artery (extending from San Diego to Vancouver, British Columbia), and Interstate 80, a principal east-west roadway crossing the American Midwest (running from New York to San Francisco). The nearest deep-water ocean port is at Oakland approximately 70 miles away. Oakland can be accessed overland or via the Sacramento River (through the Sacramento Port Facility).

#### **2.1.1 Field and Facilities**

McClellan AFB has one 10,600-foot concrete runway with appropriate aircraft arresting gear and 471,550 square yards (approximately 97 acres) of usable aircraft parking apron. Permanently assigned aircraft require over 50 percent of the apron space. Four C-141-equivalent aircraft can be loaded or unloaded at one time for mobility/contingency operations.<sup>4</sup> Four C-141-equivalent aircraft can be refueled at one time. The base does not have an operational fuel hydrant system.

---

<sup>4</sup>The limiting factor is material handling equipment (MHE).

The base does not control or manage any ranges. The nearest suitable special-use airspace<sup>5</sup> is as shown below:

Warning/Restricted/Military Operating Area (MOA)	W-260	134 NM
Low-altitude MOA:	W-260	134 NM
Supersonic MOA:	W-283	170 NM
Scorable gunnery range complex:	Fallon B-19	130 NM
Electronic Combat range:	Fallon TACTS	188 NM
Air combat maneuvering instrumentation range:	Fallon TACTS	188 NM

Travis and Beale AFBs and Mather Field (formerly Mather AFB) all lie within a 50-mile radius of the base. The nearest ground force installation where joint training can be accomplished is Army Fort Hunter Liggett, 160 NM from McClellan. The nearest Navy installation where joint training can be accomplished is Naval Air Station (NAS) Fallon, 130 NM from McClellan

### 2.1.2 Major Tenants

Major associate units on McClellan AFB include: Headquarters 4th Air Force, Air Force Reserve (AFRES); 940th Air Refueling Group (ARG), AFRES; Defense Distribution Depot, McClellan (DDMC), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA); and the Defense Megacenter, Sacramento, (DMCS), Defense Information Services Agency (DISA).

**Headquarters, 4th Air Force.** 4th Air Force is one of the three Numbered Air Forces (NAF) comprising the AFRES. It commands five airlift wings (AW) operating C-130, C-141, and C-5 transports; one special operations wing (SOW) operating MC- and AC-130 aircraft; one airmobility wing (AMW) operating C-130 transports and KC-10 and KC-135 tankers; and one aeromedical airlift group (AAG) operating C-9 aeromedical airlift transports. The Commander, 4th Air Force, his headquarters element, and one ARG are stationed at McClellan. The headquarters employs approximately 400 personnel.

**940th ARG.** The 940th ARG (AFRES) operates 10 KC-130E tanker aircraft and provides aerial refueling support for both active-duty and gained forces. Approximately 900 personnel are in the unit. (Note: the 940th was slated to relocate from McClellan to nearby Beale AFB in late 1994. As of 3 April 1995, that move has yet to be undertaken.)

**Defense Distribution Depot, McClellan (DDMC).** Operated by DLA, DDMC stocks, stores, and issues defense goods. Categorized as a Collocated Depot, the DLA operation interfaces closely with the SM-ALC depot maintenance activity by providing repairable carcasses to the ALC which, in turn, returns the items to serviceable status and

<sup>5</sup>Military Operating Area (MOA) with a minimum size of 2100 square nautical miles (NM) and an altitude block of at least 20,000 feet within 200 NM. Low-altitude MOA with a minimum size of 2100 square NM and a floor no higher than 2000 feet above ground level (AGL) within 600 NM. Supersonic MOA with a minimum size of 4200 square NM within 300 NM. Scorable gunnery range capable of or having tactical or conventional targets and strafe within 800 NM.

re-enters them into the DLA distribution system. It employs approximately 600 personnel.

**Defense Megacenter, Sacramento (DMCS).** Identified in BRAC 93 as the site for one of 16 DoD data processing and telecommunication "megacenters" to be operated under the umbrella of DISA, DMCS is responsible for data processing workloads for the Navy, Air Force, and Air National Guard in a region encompassing Northern California, Oregon, and Washington. DMCS has approximately 150 employees working out of a recently constructed 76,000-square-foot facility that serves regional data processing requirements and houses the only DISA Continental US (CONUS) AUTODIN switching center west of Oklahoma.<sup>6</sup>

### 2.1.3 Relationship to Local Community

McClellan AFB is located in the Sacramento Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). Total population (FY 92) is 1,148,000. Total employment (FY 93) is 764,000. Average annual job growth is 14,000 and average annual per capita income is \$20,400.

Work force population at McClellan:

Active duty military	3,000
Reserve military	1,200
Civilian	<u>10,600</u>
Total	14,800

McClellan AFB is the largest industrial employer in Northern California. The work force annual payroll (military and civilian) is \$516 million. This produces a local area economic impact of approximately \$2.2 billion. The total value of McClellan's land (3,786 acres), buildings (549 non-residence and 693 residence), and infrastructure is estimated at \$2.2 billion.<sup>7</sup>

The estimated impact of base closure would be the loss of 31,000 jobs (13,000 direct, 18,000 indirect), 4.1% of the Sacramento MSA employment total. Combined with other Sacramento MSA job losses from prior BRAC decisions (1,600 jobs), the cumulative impact of McClellan's

<sup>6</sup>During BRAC 93, the Commissioners identified 43 DISA information processing centers for closure with their workloads to be consolidated at 16 megacenters.

<sup>7</sup>This is the value figure reflected in documents released recently by the base Public Affairs Office. While no detailed explanation was offered as to how this estimate was reached, it most probably is a more accurate reflection of *market value* than the figures presenting *replacement value* shown in the chart at Attachment 1, *Air Force Depot Capacity/Plant Comparisons*, which were provided in response to the Joint Cross-Service Group data call.



closure in BRAC 95 (if closure was directed) would be to increase the total employment loss to 4.3% of the Sacramento MSA's total.

It is estimated that the one-time closure costs associated with shuttering McClellan AFB would amount to \$514 million. Return on investment would be achieved in 5 years.

## 2.2 Sacramento ALC Depot

While the F-111 and A-10 are Sacramento ALC's primary assigned aircraft, the depot also provides a second source of repair for the F-15 and KC-135, and has been designated to assume responsibility for the F-22 when that aircraft begins entering service at the turn of the century. The F-117 and F-22 Program Managers are located at the depot. Additionally, Sacramento ALC manages a broad variety of: aircraft-related electronic accessories, hydraulic/pneudraulic components, and flight control instruments; battle tank and man-portable weapon system electronic components and electro-optics (night vision devices); and over 200 ground communications systems, including ground control equipment used to track and control space vehicles. It operates the McClellan Nuclear Radiation Center (MNRC), which has the only industrial nuclear reactor in DoD, and a fighter-sized non-destructive inspection (NDI) facility that reportedly is one of the most comprehensive in the US.

DoD's submission to the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 95) Commission proposed realigning workloads among the Air Force depots to consolidate selected specialties at each. The specialty areas recommended for consolidation at Sacramento ALC are: composites and plastics, hydraulics, instruments/displays (with some unique work retained at other ALCs), electrical/mechanical support equipment, and injection molding.

### 2.2.1 Specialization

Sacramento ALC is designated a *Service Center of Excellence* for the following systems:

**Aircraft Airframes:** F-111, A-10, T-39, F-22 (planned); Aircraft Battle Damage Repair.

**Aircraft Components (Hydraulic/Pneudraulic):** actuators, servo actuators, accumulators, valves, servo valves, cylinders, motors, manifolds, pumps, control boxes, servo dampers, dash pots, reservoirs, gearboxes, brake assemblies, snubber assemblies, filter assemblies, compensators, fan assemblies, mode selector assemblies, and pitch control ratio assemblies.

**Aircraft Components (Instruments):** accelerometers, altimeters, transducers, central air data computers, flight data recorders, attitude indicators, horizontal situation indicators, stall warning, position transmitter indicators, cockpit voice recorders, standard flight data recorders, and crash survivable flight data recorders.

**Aircraft Components (Avionics/Electronics):** airborne generators, generator control units, control panels, voltage regulators, inverters, frequency converters, power supplies, battery chargers, motors, aircraft linear/rotary actuators, aircraft screw jacks, winches, gear boxes, miscellaneous electro-mechanical devices, and accessories.

**Ground Communications and Electronic Equipment (Radar, Radio, Wire):** peculiar C3I test equipment; various radio, television, communications, and navigation systems; indicator group; computer group; search radar equipment; electronic countermeasures equipment; meteorological instruments and apparatus; radar training devices; automated data processing equipment; and computer central processing units.

**Ground Communications and Electronic Equipment (Electro-optics/Night Vision Equipment):** common power control units, electronics units, M-1 power control unit, laser rangefinders, driver viewers, M-1 thermal imaging system, tank thermal sight, integrated sight unit, man-portable common thermal night sights, ground laser target designators, ground vehicular laser locator/designators, individual and crew-served weapons night sights, night vision goggles, and aviator night vision imaging systems.

**Ground General Purpose Items (Ground Power Generators):** 5-to-200 kilowatt gasoline, diesel, and turbine powered stationary and mobile generator units for ground communications, bare base operations, forward air control use, disaster relief requirements, and any other need for routine or emergency AC electrical power.

**Ground General Purpose Items (Other):** Rigid wall shelters.

Sacramento ALC has the following *Technology Application Program Management* assignments:

**Fiber optics and fiber optic connectors**  
**Micro-electronics [Very high speed integrated circuits (VHSIC)]**  
**Advanced composites**

### 2.2.2 Unique Facilities/Equipment/Capabilities

SM-ALC officials have identified the following facilities, equipment, and/or capabilities as unique to the depot:

**F-111 Cold Proof Facility.** This is the only certified F-111 structural test facility in existence. It is an 8500 square foot (SF) enclosed environmental chamber used for testing F-111 aircraft in a flight simulation environment. Aircraft airframes are stressed on a wing fixture at sweep angles of 26 and 54 degrees, from -3G to +7G, at temperatures down to -40° (produced by a complex system for vaporizing liquid nitrogen), to detect

catastrophic structural failures. The chamber also has an advanced acoustic system capable of detecting secondary failures, such as popped rivets, broken bolts, and cracked panels.

**McClellan Nuclear Radiation Center (MNRC).** The MNRC is the only reactor facility in the Air Force and is the only DoD licensed source for providing Neutron Transmutation Doping for silicon use in the semiconductor industry. It is a 4500 SF facility with heavy radiation shielding for the one megawatt research-type reactor. It is used to perform neutron radiography of aircraft structures for non-destructive inspection (NDI) purposes, to assess the survivability of electro-optic components in nuclear and space environments, and for related general testing purposes.

**NDI Facility.** In conjunction with the MNRC, this reportedly is the most comprehensive fighter-sized NDI facility in the defense industry. It has 8000 SF of heavily shielded production space with state-of-the-art equipment for NDI using x-ray, ultrasound, mag particle, dye penetrant, and eddy current techniques. It includes robotic and conventional applications and can be used to inspect an entire aircraft as well as components.

**Near-Field Test Range with 1000-meter Tower, Near Field Probe, and Munson Test Track.** This complex of related facilities is used for testing the Army's TPQ-36/37 *Fire Finder* phased array radar. Transferred from the Sacramento Army Depot, it includes a 3900 SF close-tolerance anechoic chamber with precision alignment rails for positioning the radar in the chamber to calibrate near range beam pattern. The tower provides provides target simulation. The test track is a military-specification (mil-spec) designed bumpy road simulating rough terrain which is used to stress the *Fire Finder* system between burn-in and final calibration. While this complex is the only DoD test facility, Hughes is the system prime contractor and reportedly has duplicate or comparable capability.

**Hydraulics/Pneudraulics Component Repair Complex.** Claimed to be the most advanced facility of its kind in the world, this complex provides the largest aircraft-related hydraulic and pneudraulic overhaul and repair capability in DoD. It consists of 3 modern buildings with 186,000 SF of production space designed to provide unique power, fluid, and air systems. It has five separate hard-plumbed hydraulic manifold systems with 4000 psi working pressure proofed to 6000 psi, thousands of feet of stainless steel piping, and 70 hydraulic test stands. The facility has controlled temperature/humidity and sustains a 300,000 class air particle clean room environment, and includes a 100,000 class metrology lab and 100,000 class laminar flow stations. It has a computer operated mechanized material handling system, precision lapping equipment, and precision measuring equipment. Its high tolerance **Flow Grind** capability with specialized grinding equipment is believed to be world-class.

**Air Force Ground Communications Electronics Overhaul and Repair Complex.** The complex consists of 14 separate buildings with some 473,000 SF of production space used to manufacture, overhaul, repair, modify, integrate, and test systems ranging from hand-held radios to computer integrated radar systems. Two of the larger facilities in the complex, with 75,000 SF each, are special reinforced steel structures with filtered power, special security, and TEMPEST shielding. These are used for the insertion of advanced microelectronic technologies into fielded systems. Special skills and equipment are used to perform depot maintenance on several broad categories of systems. **Ground Communications** systems include LF/HF/VHF/UHF radios, troposcatter systems, microwave systems, and ground-based jammers. **Air Traffic Control and Navigation** systems include ILS, PAR, TACAN, and VOR equipment. **Radar** systems

include phased array and feedhorn types, fixed site and mobile equipment, height-finder, search, three-dimensional, and over-the-horizon backscatter sets. **Meteorology** systems include storm-tracking radars, satellite tracking systems, and weather forecasting equipment. **Miscellaneous** systems include microwave, electronic imagery, sensors, copy exploitation, and electronic warfare training devices. The complex also deals with **IFF** equipment, along with **Telephone and Teletype** systems. Under these broad categories, the complex works on components ranging from computers and television monitors to antennae and control systems for launching unmanned orbiters.

**Aircraft Instrument and Electronic Component Facility.** This 90,000 SF facility provides for the test and repair of the full range of pressure, temperature, humidity, time measurement, flight control and navigational instruments, and flight data recorders. Special competencies exist for reverse engineering (logistics retrofit engineering, or LRE), repair of unsupportable electronic equipment, large wire harness test automation, specialized test equipment manufacture, test system overhaul process development, and military-standard technical manual development.

**Ground Power Generator and Engine Test Facility.** This facility has a dynamometer test capability of up to 500 kilowatts to support work on ground power generators for all Air Force aircraft and ground support systems.

**Laser Test Bed and Outdoor Laser Range.** This complex houses the only test and calibration equipment of its kind and provides the capability to align hand-held and tank laser systems and laser-designating equipment. The equipment is readily relocatable.

**AN/FPS-117/-118 Integrated Logistics Support Facility (ISF).** This 3700 SF facility houses a reconfigurable phased array 592-class radar system that is used to test multiple separate production versions of the item.

**Sacramento Injection Molding Facility.** This reportedly is the largest facility of its kind in DoD and provides a test and development arena for the resolution of problems relating to composites and plastics. It manufactures parts using up to 20 pounds of material on dies up to 4 feet square. (A similar facility at Ogden ALC is limited to 16 ounces of material on dies no more than 16 inches square.)

Additional unique facilities/capabilities include:

**F-111 Radome Test**

**ISF for Modular Control Equipment (MCE) (TYQ-23)**

**ISF for Communications Nodal Control Element (CNCE) (TSQ-111)**

**Electronic Warfare ISF (806L System)**

**ISF for Ground Wave Emergency Network (GWEN and COMSEC)**

**A-10/F-111 Avionics Integrated Support Facility**

**Electro-Optics and Night Vision** (image intensification, thermal imagery, and lasers)

**Optical Measurement System** (laser mapping of parts)

### 2.2.3 Workload

The following table presents a breakout of the Sacramento ALC workload -- by DoD commodity group -- for FY 96 and FY 99. An explanation of the workload table is provided at Attachment 7.

**Sacramento ALC Workload Chart**  
(In Thousands of Direct Labor Hours -- kDLH)

Relevant Commodity Groups	Potential Maximum Capacity		Existing Capacity		Programmed Total Workload		Programmed Core Workload	
	FY96	FY99	FY96	FY99	FY96	FY99	FY96	FY99
1. Aircraft Airframes								
c. Fixed Wing								
(1) Tanker / Transport / Bomber	945	983	809	819	636	570	441	441
(2) Command and Control								
(3) Light Combat	1,456	1,520	1,442	1,460	1,181	1,056	835	907
(4) Admin / Training								
d. Other	162	164	--	--	--	--	--	--
2. Aircraft Components								
b. Aircraft Structures	668	525	226	229	175	157	175	157
c. Hydraulic / Pneumatic	737	815	483	492	400	358	357	357
d. Instruments	524	542	278	281	215	193	215	193
e. Landing Gear								
f. Aviation Ordnance								
g. Avionics / Electronics	781	870	449	457	373	334	344	334
h. APUs								
i. Other								
j. Manufacture and Fabrication	853	720	590	513	460	354	460	354
3. Engines (Gas Turbine) (GTE)								
a. Aircraft								
c. Blades / Vanes								
4. Missiles and Missile Components								
a. Strategic								
b. Tactical / MLRS								
7. Ground Comm-Electronic Equip								
a. Radar	1,226	1,235	715	702	481	430	383	430
b. Radio Communications	679	734	336	340	231	207	177	177
c. Wire Communications	230	233	202	214	144	129	80	118
d. Electronic Warfare	10	7	--	--	--	--	--	--
e. Navigation Aids	482	501	276	279	190	170	165	165
f. Electro-optics/Night Vision Equip	167	215	157	180	127	109	127	109
g. Satellite Control/Space Sensors	184	186	171	173	117	105	32	32
10. Ground General Purpose Items								
c. Munitions / Ordnance								
d. Ground Generators	111	113	100	101	94	84	62	62
e. Other	66	61	66	61	66	59	--	--
12. Software								
a. Tactical Systems	455	452	397	401	323	289	211	211
b. Support Equipment	453	358	325	328	264	237	184	184
13. Special Interest Items								
a. Bearings Refurbishment								
c. TMDE								
14. Other	37	37	37	37	32	29	--	--
<b>Total</b>	<b>10,227</b>	<b>10,271</b>	<b>7,058</b>	<b>7,068</b>	<b>5,509</b>	<b>4,871</b>	<b>4,249</b>	<b>4,231</b>

**Table 2-1: Sacramento ALC Workload Chart**

### **3.0 Ogden ALC (OO-ALC)**

---

Ogden ALC is DoD's primary depot for the repair and overhaul of aircraft landing gear, brakes, struts, and wheel assemblies, performing some 70 percent of the total DoD workload in this area. It is the Air Force's F-16 and C-130 depot, and provides the sole current source of repair for *Minuteman* and *Peacekeeper* silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (SBICBM). The center also conducts overhaul, modification, testing, and support functions for a wide range of other components, including rocket motors, small missiles, air munitions and guided bombs, photonics imaging and reconnaissance equipment, and simulators and training devices. Additionally, Ogden ALC has responsibility within DoD for developing and fielding new photonics, software, and reliability and maintainability (R&M) practices and standards.

#### **3.1 Hill AFB, Utah**

Hill AFB is an AFMC-operated installation located approximately eight miles south of Ogden, Utah, on the northern outskirts of Salt Lake City, the state's capital and major metropolitan center. It has ready access to the main railroad line running into San Francisco from the East Coast, and sits near the junction of Interstate 15, one of the primary north-south arteries in the Rocky Mountain region (extending from Calgary, Alberta, to San Diego), Interstate 84, a principal roadway linking Salt Lake City with Portland, Oregon, and Interstate 80, extending to the San Francisco Bay area. Portland and Oakland are the nearest deep-water ocean ports. Both are approximately 750 miles away and accessible by rail and highways. Hill AFB is within 750 air miles of any point along the US Western coastline.

##### **3.1.1 Field and Facilities**

Hill AFB has one 13,500-foot concrete runway with appropriate aircraft arresting gear and over 472,000 square yards (approximately 97 acres) of usable aircraft parking apron. Permanently assigned aircraft require over 87 percent of the apron space. Seven C-141- equivalent aircraft can be loaded or unloaded at one time for mobility/contingency operations.<sup>8</sup> Twenty C-141- equivalent aircraft can be refueled at one time. The base has an operational fuel hydrant system.

---

<sup>8</sup>The limiting factor is material handling equipment (MHE).

The base currently controls the Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR), which includes both Restricted and MOA airspace.<sup>9</sup> The range begins approximately 40 NM west of the base and encompasses over 17,000 square miles of airspace, the largest overland block of controlled airspace in DoD. With 2675 square miles of surface area, it provides full-scale weapons delivery capability for most air-to-surface and surface-to-surface weapons, and some air-to-air weapons. In conjunction with the Army's adjacent Dugway Proving Grounds, it offers almost 4000 square miles of impact area, a four-season climate, and terrain that varies from the 4300 foot desert floor to 12,000 foot mountains, making it ideal for the testing of cruise missiles. The range can accommodate most special weapons and has electronic warfare capability.

The nearest suitable special-use airspace<sup>10</sup> is as shown below:

Warning/Restricted/MOA:	UTTR	90 NM
Low Altitude MOA:	UTTR	90 NM
Supersonic MOA:	Austin/Gabbs CN	246 NM
Scorable gunnery range complex:	Eagle/UTTR	50 NM
Electronic Combat range:	Kittycat/UTTR	71 NM
Air combat maneuvering instrumentation range:	UTTR	97 NM

Hill AFB is the sole AFB within the state of Utah. Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, is the next closest one at 205 miles away. The nearest ground force installation where joint training can be accomplished is Army Camp W. G. Williams, 42 NM from Hill. The nearest Navy installation where joint training can be conducted is NAS Fallon, 325 NM from Hill.

### 3.1.2 Major Tenants

Major associate units on Hill AFB include: 545th Test Group, AFMC; 388th Fighter Wing (FW), Air Combat Command (ACC); 419th Fighter Wing FW, AFRES; and Defense Distribution Depot, Ogden (DDHU), DLA.

**545th Test Group.** Manages operation of the UTTR. This responsibility includes the scheduling of training and test sorties for all military services along with the testing of munitions and rocket propellants.

<sup>9</sup> Under DoD's recommendations for BRAC 95, AFMC would transfer management responsibility for operating the UTTR to Air Combat Command (ACC). While range availability could be reduced somewhat, the transfer would have little overall impact on Ogden ALC activities.

<sup>10</sup>MOA with a minimum size of 2100 square nautical miles (NM) and an altitude block of at least 20,000 feet within 200 NM. Low-altitude MOA with a minimum size of 2100 square NM and a floor no higher than 2000 feet above ground level (AGL) within 600 NM. Supersonic MOA with a minimum size of 4200 square NM within 300 NM. Scorable gunnery range capable of or having tactical or conventional targets and strafe within 800 NM.

**388th FW.** The 388th FW is part of the 12th Air Force, one of the four NAFs included in ACC. The 388th commands three operational squadrons of Block 50 F-16 fighter aircraft and is one of the Air Force's premier combat deployment units.

**419th FW.** The 419th FW is part of the 10th Air Force, which is one of three NAFs comprising the AFRES. The Wing includes the 466th Fighter Squadron (FS) operating F-16 aircraft at Hill and the 944th Fighter Group (FG) operating F-16 aircraft at Luke AFB.

**Defense Distribution Depot, Ogden (DDHU).** Operated by the DLA, DOHU receives, stores, and transports defense goods. It works closely with the OO-ALC depot maintenance activity by providing indoor and outdoor storage, packaging, and transportation functions for all non-explosive *Minuteman* and *Peacekeeper* missile assets. Approximately \$7 billion in goods are stored in over 3 million square feet of covered and open storage space. It employs approximately 1,100 personnel and is one of the 25 DLA depots remaining after 4 were earmarked for closure in BRAC 93. (Note: DDHU is one of four DLA depots DoD has recommended for closure in BRAC 95.<sup>11</sup>)

### 3.1.3 Relationship to Local Community

Hill AFB is located in the Salt Lake City-Ogden MSA. Total population (FY 92) is 1,127,000. Total employment (FY 93) is 659,500. Average annual job growth is approximately 15,000, and average annual per capita income is \$16,900.

Work force population at Hill:

Active duty military	4,700
Reserve military	1,250
Civilian	<u>15,200</u>
Total	21,150

Of this total, approximately 10,400 (1,900 military and 8,500 civilian) work in the OO-ALC depot.

Hill AFB is the single largest basic employer in Utah. The work force annual payroll (military and civilian) is \$510 million. This produces an annual local area economic impact of

<sup>11</sup> DoD has recommended that DDHU be disestablished and all DLA activity there cease except for the operation of a 36,000 square foot cantonment for Army Reserve personnel. The decision is supported on the basis of declining storage requirements at the facility and the need to reduce infrastructure within the DLA. The other three Defense Distribution Depots recommended for closure in BRAC 95 include Memphis, Tennessee; Letterkenny, Pennsylvania; and Red River, Texas. DLA depots selected for disestablishment in BRAC 93 included: Charleston, South Carolina; Tooele, Utah; Oakland, California; and Pensacola, Florida. A DoD proposal to close the depot at Letterkenny, Pennsylvania, at that time was rejected by the BRAC Commission.



approximately \$1.7 billion. The total value of Hill's land (6,698 acres), buildings (1,475 residence and non-residence), and infrastructure is estimated at \$8 billion.<sup>12</sup>

The total estimated impact of base closure would be the loss of approximately 33,500 jobs (14,700 direct, 18,800 indirect), 5.1% of the Salt Lake City-Ogden MSA employment total. Considering other Salt Lake City-Ogden MSA job adjustments from prior BRAC decisions (1,500 jobs added as a result of consolidations in BRAC 93), the impact of Hill's closure in BRAC 95 (if closure was directed) would amount to 4.8% of the MSA total.

It is estimated that the one-time closure costs associated with shuttering Hill AFB would amount to \$1.4 billion. Return on investment would be achieved in 30 years.

### **3.2 Ogden ALC Depot**

In addition to Ogden ALC's responsibility for landing gear, wheels, and brakes, the depot provides worldwide engineering and logistics management for the F-16, involving over 3,000 aircraft flown by 21 countries. It also maintains the C-130 and F-4, and provides extensive support for the Navy/Marine F/A-18. The center conducts overhaul, modification, testing, and support functions for a wide range of other aircraft components, including ejection seats, 20MM guns, ram air turbines, electrical/mechanical instruments, and missile launchers. Its proximity to the UTTR facilitates the depot's execution of its responsibilities for the US SBICBM fleet. Several of OO-ALC's facilities are located at Oasis on the UTTR, permitting the test, maintenance, and disposal of ICBM rocket motors/components under isolated conditions.

DoD's submission to the BRAC 95 Commission proposed realigning workloads among the Air Force depots to consolidate selected specialties at each. The specialty areas recommended for consolidation at Ogden ALC are: airborne electronic automatic equipment software, sheet metal repair and manufacturing, foundry operations, unique work with instruments/displays, airborne electronics, and plating.

#### **3.2.1 Specialization**

Ogden ALC is designated a *Service Center of Excellence* for the following systems:

---

<sup>12</sup>See Attachment 1, *Air Force Depot Capacity/Plant Comparisons*, Note 9, on *market value versus replacement value*.

**Aircraft Components (Hydraulic/Pneumatic):** ram air turbines, missile control hydraulic actuation systems, LGM-30 (*Minuteman*) shock isolator.

**Aircraft Components (Instruments):** electrical/mechanical instruments, multi-function displays, and pressure/temperature/humidity/navigational instruments.

**Aircraft Components (Landing Gear):** wheels, brakes, struts, and related components for approximately 70 percent of DoD's landing gear inventory in all aircraft categories, including transport/tanker/bomber, command and control, light combat, and admin/training.

**Aircraft Components (Aviation Ordnance):** ejection seats, egress systems, 20- and 30-millimeter guns, missile launch control systems, gun racks, external fuel tanks, bomb racks, adapters, and pylons.

**Aircraft Components (Other):** photographic/reconnaissance/imaging equipment and physiological trainers.

**Missiles and Missile Components (Strategic):** LGM-30 (*Minuteman*) and LGM-118 (*Peacekeeper*) launch and launch control facility electronic equipment and flight control units, ground transportation and handling equipment, ground support equipment, rocket motors, cables, and pyrotechnic switches.

**Missiles and Missile Components (Tactical):** *Maverick*, *Sidewinder*, Short-Range Attack Missile (*SRAM*), Air Launched Cruise Missile (*ALCM*), Advanced Cruise Missile, *Paveway I and II*, GBU-15 Laser Guided Bombs (LGB), missile guidance control units, electro-optical, infrared, laser, and TV seeker control sensors, signal processing units, and missile test sets.

Ogden ALC has the following *Technology Application Program Management* assignments:

**Photonics**  
**Software Support Technology**  
**Reliability and Maintainability Engineering**

### 3.2.2 Unique Facilities/Equipment/Capabilities

OO-ALC officials have spotlighted the following facilities, equipment, and/or capabilities as unique to the depot:

**Strategic Missile Integration Complex.** This 5-building, 3-silo, 58,000 SF complex is one-of-a-kind within DoD. It is the only DoD facility capable of simulating launch scenarios with 90' vertical below-ground silos constructed to meet *Minuteman* and *Peacekeeper* silo hardness and operational requirements. The test site is a replica of an operational site and includes capsule and control equipment and interfaces, buried antenna systems, power and air supplies, and high-stress approach roads. Construction meets TEMPEST classified data processing and physical security requirements. Sensitive ICBM guidance system instruments and equipment are isolated by a large concrete seismic mass.

**Survivability and Vulnerability Integration Center.** This is a 4-building, 81,000 SF complex dedicated to the simulation testing of nuclear hardness, survivability, reliability, and electromagnetic compatibility of defense systems. The facilities simulate six environments required to test weapon system specifications such as those required for *Minuteman* and *Peacekeeper*. The environments include: nuclear radiation, provided by flash x-ray machines and a linear accelerator; airblast, provided by a blast load generator capable of simulating nuclear overblast pressures in excess of 1000 psi on buried structures; shock and vibration, provided by an eight-shaker triaxial system capable of supporting a 5000 pound test article; in-flight shock and vibration profiles, provided by the vibration facility; electromagnetic pulse events, provided by a laser triggered pulser of various waveform and energy capabilities; and electromagnetic interference (EMI) and compatibility testing, provided by EMI generators and fiber-optic instrumentation equipment in a large anechoic chamber simulating free space.

**Missile Motor Dissection and Propellant Analysis Facilities.** These include various specialized structures, pits, test stands, and buildings at Hill AFB and at Oasis on the UTTR, and offer DoD's only solid propellant NDI capability for motors associated with both small tactical missiles and large ICBMs. The facilities meet stringent explosive safety clear zone quantity distance requirements, combine heavy explosive shielding with patterned frangibility, and contain remote propellant machining equipment for motor repair. The **Computed Tomography Facility** provides extensive radiation containment and has a power source capable of generating energy levels from 11 to 15 million electronvolts, an output that is 14 to 36 times greater than other DoD computed tomography systems. The **High Energy X-Ray Facility** reportedly is the only such facility sited for explosives and is rated for 1,000,000 pounds of 1.3 class and 100,000 pounds of 1.1 class. **Static Test Pads** accommodate vertical and horizontal static rocket motor firing in environmentally controlled facilities.

**Thermal Treatment Unit.** This encompasses a 21,000 SF facility on a 21,000 acre remote site and is the only environmentally licensed propellant disposal site capable of disposing of *Minuteman* and *Peacekeeper* solid rocket motor propellants.

**Automated Landing Gear Repair Facility.** This is a 377,000 SF structure specifically designed to facilitate maximum efficiency in the overhaul, repair, modification, and testing of all-Service landing gear and gear components ranging in size from the small T-38 nose gear to the massive main gear trucks of the C-5. It is fully automated and includes such features as 12 foot minimum clearance jib cranes, outside dip and plating tanks, an overhead hoist system designed to load components from the largest gear systems onto machinery such as grinders, lathes, and hones, and walk-in continuous flow throughput ovens.

**Photographic Image Quality Test and Cartographic Camera Calibration Facilities.** These are multi-storey facilities for testing aerial photoreconnaissance and space-based sensors. All but the top floor are underground for enhanced vibration isolation and security. The **Quality Test** facility provides a single source of repair for sensitive imagery systems using multiple off-axis parabolic mirror collimators. The **Cartographic Camera Calibration** facility uses 121 collimators to calibrate cameras used for cartographic purposes.

**Tactical Missile All-Up-Round Maintenance Facility.** This explosive certified structure permits testing and repair of multiple fully loaded and fueled tactical missiles such as the *Maverick*.

**Avionics Integrated Support Facility.** With 144,000 SF, this facility is unique in both design and location. The entire facility is essentially a secure vault, radio frequency bonded, fenced, and requiring security code access. It houses a sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF), radar anechoic chambers, software testing laboratories, storage libraries and workspace, and was designed to allow a full range of testing without transfer of electronic emanations into or out of the building. The facility has engineering laboratories for the development, test, and integration of software and hardware for the F-4, F-16, *Minuteman*, *Peacekeeper*, and the Air Force Mission Support System.

Additional unique facilities/capabilities include:

***Peacekeeper* and *Minuteman* Missile Storage and Repair Facility**  
**Missile Support Equipment Repair Facility**  
**Compass Transmitter and Magnetic Azimuth Detector Test Facility**  
**Underground 20MM Automatic Gun Test Firing Facility**  
**F-16 Emergency Power Unit Test Facility**  
**Ram Air Turbine Wind Tunnel**  
***Maverick/Sidewinder* Missile Guidance & Control Section Test/Repair Facilities**  
**Advanced Cruise Missile Imaging Radar System Test Facility**  
**Hot Site Computer Recovery Facility**  
**Cartridge Activated Device and Munitions Surveillance Testing Facilities**  
**Cold/Heat Soak for *Minuteman* Motors**  
**Lithium Battery Storage/Disposal**  
**Physiological Trainer (Altitude Chamber) Maintenance and Repair**  
**Fighter-Size Aircraft Robotics Bead Blast Stripping**  
**Fighter-Size Aircraft Laser Automated Decoating System**  
**Robotic Canopy Polisher**  
**Investment Casting**  
**Airborne Reconnaissance Overhaul Capability (Photo and Electro-Optical Sensors)**  
**Optical Refurbishment Overhaul Capability**  
**Imaging System Overhaul Traveling Teams**  
**Software Technology Support Center**  
**Neural Engineering and Self-Organizing System**

### 3.2.3 Workload

The following table presents a breakout of the Ogden ALC workload -- by DoD commodity group -- for FY 96 and FY 99. The only commodity groups displayed in the table are those for which one or more of the five ALCs has a workload commitment. An explanation of the workload table is provided at Attachment 6.

**Ogden ALC Workload Chart**  
(In Thousands of Direct Labor Hours -- kDLH)

Relevant Commodity Groups	Potential Maximum Capacity		Actual Capacity Projection		Total Workload Projection		Total Core Workload Projection	
	FY96	FY99	FY96	FY99	FY96	FY99	FY96	FY99
1. Aircraft Airframes								
c. Fixed Wing								
(1) Tanker / Transport / Bomber	469	469	469	469	631	543	631	543
(2) Command and Control								
(3) Light Combat	1,870	1,870	1,381	1,381	849	691	809	691
(4) Admin / Training								
d. Other								
2. Aircraft Components								
b. Aircraft Structures	311	311	311	311	234	241	170	241
c. Hydraulic / Pneumatic	41	41	41	41	13	13	13	13
d. Instruments	192	192	192	192	105	124	105	124
e. Landing Gear	1,028	1,028	1,028	1,028	514	488	514	488
f. Aviation Ordnance	419	419	419	419	138	104	138	104
g. Avionics / Electronics	812	812	511	511	389	430	389	430
h. APUs	89	89	89	89	27	29	27	29
i. Other	1,103	1,103	492	492	238	256	162	180
j. Manufacture and Fabrication	63	63	74	74	76	76	76	76
3. Engines (Gas Turbine) (GTE)								
a. Aircraft	101	101	101	101	122	146	9	102
c. Blades / Vanes								
4. Missiles and Missile Components								
a. Strategic	746	746	746	746	715	674	715	674
b. Tactical / MLRS	569	569	569	569	170	181	136	181
7. Ground Comm-Electronic Equip								
a. Radar								
b. Radio Communications								
c. Wire Communications								
e. Navigation Aids								
f. Electro-optics/Night Vision Equip								
g. Satellite Control/Space Sensors								
10. Ground General Purpose Items								
c. Munitions / Ordnance								
d. Ground Generators								
e. Other	103	103	103	103	110	120	110	120
12. Software								
a. Tactical Systems	755	755	755	755	664	653	664	653
b. Support Equipment	313	313	313	313	221	214	221	241
13. Special Interest Items								
a. Bearings Refurbishment	20	20	20	20	5	5	5	5
c. TMDE								
14. Other								
<b>Total</b>	<b>9,005</b>	<b>9,005</b>	<b>7,614</b>	<b>7,614</b>	<b>5,221</b>	<b>4,988</b>	<b>4,895</b>	<b>4,895</b>

**Table 3-1: Ogden ALC Workload Chart**

## **4.0 Oklahoma ALC (OC-ALC)**

---

Oklahoma City ALC is the Air Force's primary center for the repair and maintenance of tanker and bomber aircraft, including the KC-135 and B-52. The depot also administers an inventory of over 17,000 aircraft and missile jet engines, ranging from the Korean War vintage J33 engine used with T-33 trainer aircraft to the advanced F118 used in the B-2 and the F107 and F112 used in cruise missiles. Matching its advanced capabilities in engine commodities and structural components, OC-ALC holds responsibility within DoD for fostering development in the areas of mechanical systems and nuclear hardness and survivability.

### **4.1 Tinker AFB, Oklahoma**

Tinker AFB is an AFMC-operated installation located on the southeast edge of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. As well as the state's metropolitan center and regional transportation hub, Oklahoma City is the both state's largest city and seat of government. Tinker AFB is accessible to one of the major rail systems crossing the southern US, and it sits at the intersection of two key interstate highways. Entrances to the base are on Interstate 40, the transcontinental artery extending from Wilmington, North Carolina to the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Nearby is Interstate 35, a central north-south freeway linking Duluth, Minnesota, with Laredo, Texas, a primary North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) gateway into Mexico. The base is approximately 460 miles from deep-water ports on the Gulf of Mexico. Strategically located 200 miles south of the geographic center of the US, Tinker is within 1200 miles of 134 DoD and 56 Air Force installations. This location is about a day and a half by truck from most US cities.

#### **4.1.1 Field and Facilities**

Tinker AFB has two active runways. The primary is 11,100 feet long and is composed of both asphalt and concrete while the secondary is approximately 7,800 feet long. There are 705,652 square yards (approximately 146 acres) of usable aircraft parking apron, and permanently assigned aircraft require nearly 64 percent of the apron space. Six C-141- equivalent aircraft can be loaded or unloaded at one time for mobility/contingency operations.<sup>13</sup> Ten C-141- equivalent aircraft can be refueled at one time. The base has an operational fuel hydrant system.

---

<sup>13</sup>The limiting factor is material handling equipment (MHE).

The base does not control or manage any ranges. The nearest suitable special-use airspace<sup>14</sup> is as shown below:

Warning/Restricted/MOA:	None	
Low-altitude MOA:	O'Neill	394 NM
Supersonic MOA:	None	
Scorable gunnery range complex:	Falcon	79 NM
Electronic Combat range:	Razorback	162 NM
Air combat maneuvering instrumentation range:	Gulfport MDS	566 NM

The nearest Active Duty Air Force units are Vance AFB and Altus AFB, both Air Education and Training Command (AETC) bases located approximately 100 NM from Tinker. The closest ground force installation where joint training can be accomplished is Army Fort Sill, 68 NM from the base. The nearest Naval Unit where joint operational training could be accomplished is NAS Dallas, approximately 200 miles south. At Tinker itself, however, the Navy bases key components of its TACAMO (Take Charge and Move Out) command and control operation, including Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadrons Three and Four of the Navy's Strategic Communications (STRATCOMM) Wing One.

#### 4.1.2 Major Tenants

Major associate units on Tinker AFB include: 552nd Air Control Wing (ACW), ACC; 507th ARG, AFRES; Navy STRATCOMM Wing One; Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City (DDOO), DLA; and Oklahoma City Megacenters (DMCO), DISA.

**552nd Air Control Wing.** The 552nd ACW is part of 12th Air Force, one of the four NAFs under ACC. As part of the ACC's mobile strike force, the 552nd flies E-3 AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft with radar and other sensors to provide deep-look surveillance, warning, interception control, and airborne battle management. Tinker AFB contains the operator, source of repair for engine and airframe components, and support manager for the Wing. All USAF AWACS training also is conducted at Tinker.

**507th ARG.** As Oklahoma's only AFRES flying unit, the 507th commands the 465th Air Refueling Squadron (ARS) operating KC-135 aircraft at Tinker. (The unit formerly operated F-16s.) It is part of the 4th Air Force, one of the three NAFs comprising the AFRES. Oklahoma City ALC is the Wing's primary source of depot maintenance.

<sup>14</sup>MOA with a minimum size of 2100 square nautical miles (NM) and an altitude block of at least 20,000 feet within 200 NM. Low-altitude MOA with a minimum size of 2100 square NM and a floor no higher than 2000 feet above ground level (AGL) within 600 NM. Supersonic MOA with a minimum size of 4200 square NM within 300 NM. Scorable gunnery range capable of or having tactical or conventional targets and strafe within 800 NM.

**Navy STRATCOMM Wing One.** This one-of-a-kind-unit in the Navy operates out of Tinker because of its central location. Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadrons Three and Four fly E-6 TACAMO aircraft to provide a secure communications link from the National Command Authorities and Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Navy's Ballistic Missile Submarine fleet. Air Force airframe artisans perform depot maintenance on the E-6 airplanes in Navy hangars while sailors perform field level work. Almost 1200 military and civilian personnel are assigned to the organization.

**Defense Distribution Depot, Oklahoma City (DDOO).** Operated by the DLA, DDOO receives, stores, issues, inspects, and ships defense goods, with the exception of munitions, for Tinker AFB. This activity includes material quality control, preservation and packaging, inventory, and transportation functions. It employs approximately 1100 personnel, nearly all civilian.

**Defense Megacenter, Oklahoma City (DMOC).** Identified in BRAC 93 as the site for one of 16 DoD data processing and telecommunication "megacenters" to be operated under the umbrella of the DISA, DMOC operates computer systems for Tinker and manages data processing workloads of 110 additional bases in 46 states. It employs 245 personnel, all civilian.

#### 4.1.3 Relationship to Local Community

Tinker AFB is located in the Oklahoma City, Oklahoma MSA. Total population (FY 92) is 981,000. Total employment (FY 93) is approximately 583,000. Average annual job loss is 1,265, and average annual per capita income is \$17,649.

Work force population at Tinker:

Active duty military	7,400
Reserve military	235
Civilian	<u>14,400</u>
Total	22,035

Tinker AFB is Oklahoma's largest single-site employer. The work force annual payroll (military and civilian) is \$752 million. This produces a local area economic impact of approximately \$2 billion. No reliable estimate has been provided on the realistic market value of Tinker's land (5,031 acres), buildings (763 residence and non-residence), and infrastructure.<sup>15</sup>

The estimated impact of base closure would be the loss of 48,000 jobs (22,000 direct, 26,000 indirect), 8.2% of the Oklahoma City MSA employment total. If closure was directed as a result of BRAC 95, this would be the first BRAC decision to cause job losses in the MSA.

<sup>15</sup>See Attachment 1, *Air Force Depot Capacity/Plant Comparisons*, Note 9, on *market value versus replacement value*.



It is estimated that the one-time closure costs associated with shuttering Tinker AFB would amount to \$1.3 billion. Return on investment would be achieved in 42 years.

## 4.2 Oklahoma City ALC Depot

While the B-1, B-2, B-52, C-135, and E-3 are Oklahoma City ALC's primary assigned aircraft, the depot also repairs the VC-25, VC-136, and 25 other Contractor Logistics Support Aircraft. The Commodities Directorate tracks nearly 45,000 exchangeable and commodity items used on defense weapon systems. These multiple parts include radomes, fuel accessories, control valves, turbines, blades, altitude indicators, and oxygen regulators. In terms of software development, Oklahoma ALC is the first DoD organization to be certified by the Software Engineering Institute for Software Process Maturity Level Two.

DoD's submission to the BRAC 95 Commission proposed realigning workloads among the five ALCs to concentrate selected specialties at each. The specific areas recommended for consolidation at Oklahoma ALC are: airborne electronic automatic equipment software, machining manufacturing, airborne electronics, and plating.

### 4.2.1 Specialization

Oklahoma City ALC is designated a *Service Center of Excellence* for the following systems:

**Aircraft Airframes:** B-1B, B-2, B-52, C/KC/VC/EC/RC/OC/WC-135, and E-3.

**Aircraft Components:** aircraft related exchangeables (radomes, cowls/fairings, structural components), engine instruments and automatic flight controls, oxygen and other gas generating equipment, constant speed drives/integrated drive generators, air driven accessories, and air valve systems.

**Engines (Gas Turbine) (Aircraft):** J57, TF30, TF33, F101, F-107, F108, F110, F112 and F118; engine related exchangeables, including fuel accessories, control valves, filters, starters, turbines, compressors, and blades and vanes.

**Software (Support Equipment):** avionic automatic test equipment and industrial plant equipment software.

Oklahoma City has the following *Technology Application Program Management* assignments:

**Mechanical Systems  
Nuclear Hardness and Survivability**

#### 4.2.2 Unique Facilities/Equipment/Capabilities

OC-ALC officials have identified the following facilities, equipment, and/or capabilities as unique to the depot:

**Air Accessories Overhaul/Test Facility.** This 114,00 SF facility provides single source repair, overhaul, calibration, and testing of any air driven item in the Air Force inventory. It has 22 test cells designed to contain high-speed rotating components (such as air turbine motors) in the event of failure. The building houses equipment required to generate, control, and condition compressed air from ambient temperature to 300 PSIG and 800° F at flow rates of up to 8 pounds per second to simulate inflight operational conditions. One "super cell" is capable of boosting test capability to 800 PSIG, 1400° F, and 3-9 pounds per second. The facility produces over 16,000 items per year and will be able to support C-17 and F-22 components when these weapon systems come fully on line.

**Cruise Missile Engine Facility.** This 104,000 SF facility is reported to be the only DoD self-contained single source maintenance repair/test center specializing in cradle-to-grave overhaul and production testing of air launched cruise missile engines (F107 and F112).

**Oxygen and Associated Equipment Overhaul Facility.** Over 22 different types of life support equipment are overhauled annually in this 14,000 SF facility, with over 8000 items being repaired tested, and calibrated.. The building is isolated to preserve a clean, dry, oil-free environment, and contains specialized chemical cleaning systems, overhaul and calibration equipment, and oxygen purging/filling systems. The facility is the only single source oxygen overhaul facility in the Air Force.

**Avionics Integrated Support Facility.** This is a 98,000 SF purpose designed facility constructed of specially designed brick and mortar with reinforced concrete floors, walls, and ceiling. It is the only B-1B/E-3/B-52/ALCM and Rotary Launcher complete avionics test facility in DoD, and provides single source software maintenance and integration of computer programs for these systems. The facility enables ground integration and test of avionics system software through the combined use of weapon system specific avionics components and one-of-a-kind hardware/software.

**Jet Engine Test Facilities.** The 61,000 SF of work space in these two special buildings contain a number of medium test cells and 4 single source test cells that are the only ones in DoD rated in the 100,000 pound thrust class. These high-performance cells are capable of handling up to 4000 pounds of air per second, up to 150,000 pounds per hour of fuel, and, for afterburner cooling, up to 5500 gallons per minute of water. An eleven foot centerline allows for the testing of engines with up to an 11 foot diameter inlet. A monorail system is used to transport engines from the buildup floor into the cell, providing a five-minute engine installation time. All cells are multi-engine capable. Each utilizes the Pacer Comet III Automated/Computerized Engine Test and Data Acquisition testing system. An Automatic Vibration Diagnostic system provides engine signature analysis and trim balance data. The facilities can be used for standard runs, endurance testing, and accelerated mission testing.

**B-1B Compact Range Facility.** This 9800 SF facility encloses an anechoic chamber mounted on an adjustable 19 x 37 foot isolated pad for protection against seismic vibration in the testing of the B-1B APQ-164 multi-functional radar antenna. It permits the antenna to be tested in both phased array and low observable antenna configurations.

**Fuel Control and Accessories Consolidated Test Facility (CTF).** The CTF is a 63,500 SF, \$13.6 million state-of-the-art facility designed to provide environmentally friendly, National Fire Protection Association rated safety controls to meet fuel wetted testing needs for engine controls and accessories. Completed in 1994, it houses an Automated Fuel Accessory Test System and has special charcoal filters and recycling distillation units to preclude the leakage of ozone depleting chemicals. It supports the performance of maintenance and repair on the multiple variants and configurations of F101, F108, F-110, F-118, TF30, and TF-33 engines, and has growth capability to accommodate others.

**Materials Test Facility.** This is a 27,000 SF laboratory configured to conduct crack growth rate and fatigue life testing on such aircraft components as wing skin and actuator rods. It also performs material properties determination in such areas as assessing adhesive strength. The facility uses five servo-hydraulic material test systems with programmable digital controllers to replicate in-flight cyclic loading of aircraft components.

**Multiple Workload Industrial Complex.** Shadowing almost 2.4 million SF (61 acres), this is the longest covered repair facility in DoD. It is used for special aircraft periodic depot maintenance (PDM), engine repair, aircraft/engine accessory overhaul, and depot repair for -135 airframe structure. It includes: a 500,000 SF highbay for handling aircraft ranging in size from -135s to A-7s, the entire area of which is supported by conveyers and overhead cranes; a 1,000,000 SF lowbay which has been reconfigured in many combinations (as dictated by workload and surge requirements) for maintenance of engines, aircraft structures, and aircraft and engine components; a 40,000 SF chemical cleaning facility (which also employs a unique **Carbon Dioxide Pellet Blasting System**); 50,000 SF of area for engine and component plating and plating preparation; a 42,000 SF heat treatment facility; 21,000 SF of automated-stacker vertical storage space; 12,000 SF of chemical and metallurgical labs; and almost 650,000 SF of administrative space.

**B-2 Weapon System Support Center.** This 124,000 SF facility will perform ground integration and test of B-2 systems software. A "B-2 Datalink" hub is located in the crypto vault of this facility providing classified electronic logistics management connectivity between Northrop Grumman, Tinker AFB, Wright-Patterson AFB, Whiteman AFB, Langley AFB, Edwards AFB, and the Pentagon.

**Paint Hangar.** Billed as "the premier aircraft paint facility in DoD," this is a 109,000 SF, two-bay hangar sized to perform corrosion control on any weapon system in the Air Force, including the C-5 and 747-size aircraft. Both docks are designed to allow complete stripping, washing, chemical treating, and painting. Each has an independent environmental control system. Multi-directional manlifts provide easy access to the upper portions of aircraft. The facility has centralized breathing air and chemical distribution systems for efficiency and ease of operation. The facility operates a prototype **Large Aircraft Robotic Paint Strip System** using high pressure water for paint removal on large, thin-skinned aircraft. Its **Paint Proportioning and Mix System** automatically measures, mixes, and delivers on demand only the amount of coating necessary.

**Blade and Vanes Repair Center.** OC-ALC is the only DoD center certified to repair F101 and F110 high pressure turbine blades. This 140,000 SF facility houses all of the processes for blade and vane inspection, repair, and recoating in a single location. It provides for automated cleaning, manual and automated inspection, welding (including microplasma welding, superalloy welding at elevated temperatures, and automated laser welding), machining, advanced electrophoretic coating, vibratory finishing, air and water flow testing, post-repair NDI, automated and high velocity plasma spray, shot peening, activated diffusion healing, and vane restrike.

**E-3 Maintenance Hangar.** Purpose designed, this facility is notable for facilitating maintenance and repair of the E-3 rotodome. "Texas Tower" platform maintenance workstands permit the servicing and repair of rotodomes in place, while overhead bridge crane systems can remove the 14,000 pound rotodome easily when required.

Additional unique facilities/capabilities include:

**Engine/Automatic Flight Control Instruments Repair  
Electrical Discharge Machining of Nozzles and Blades  
Avionics Reliability Center for Inertial Navigation, Attitude Heading  
Reference, and Automatic Flight Control Systems  
High Force Axial Torsion Test System  
Centralized Aircraft Support System**

#### 4.2.3 Workload

The following table presents a breakout of the Oklahoma City ALC workload -- by DoD commodity group -- for FY 96 and FY 99. The only commodity groups displayed in the table are those for which one or more of the five ALCs has a workload commitment. An explanation of the workload table is provided at Attachment 6.

**Oklahoma City ALC Workload Chart**  
(In Thousands of Direct Labor Hours -- kDLH)

Relevant Commodity Groups	Potential Maximum Capacity		Actual Capacity Projection		Total Workload Projection		Total Core Workload Projection	
	FY96	FY99	FY96	FY99	FY96	FY99	FY96	FY99
1. Aircraft Airframes								
c. Fixed Wing								
(1) Tanker / Transport / Bomber	2,839	2,609	2,202	2,279	2,211	2,176	2,155	2,023
(2) Command and Control	459	688	266	289	355	570	301	512
(3) Light Combat								
(4) Admin / Training								
d. Other								
2. Aircraft Components								
b. Aircraft Structures	434	434	430	404	418	334	417	334
c. Hydraulic / Pneumatic	885	885	279	278	188	181	188	181
d. Instruments	712	712	238	227	290	264	290	264
e. Landing Gear								
f. Aviation Ordnance	1	1	1	1	--	--	--	--
g. Avionics / Electronics	218	218	172	218	62	139	62	93
h. APUs								
i. Other	817	817	584	594	213	217	126	131
j. Manufacture and Fabrication	294	294	158	162	95	97	95	97
3. Engines (Gas Turbine) (GTE)								
a. Aircraft	4,912	4,912	2,559	2,497	2,410	2,347	2,370	2,308
c. Blabdes / Vanes	529	529	155	155	54	76	54	76
4. Missiles and Missile Components								
a. Strategic								
b. Tactical / MLRS								
7. Ground Comm-Electronic Equip								
a. Radar								
b. Radio Communications								
c. Wire Communications								
e. Navigation Aids								
f. Electro-optics/Night Vision Equip								
g. Satellite Control/Space Sensors								
10. Ground General Purpose Items								
c. Munitions / Ordnance								
d. Ground Generators								
e. Other								
12. Software								
a. Tactical Systems	250	240	248	238	336	364	325	325
b. Support Equipment	446	455	446	455	412	339	299	299
13. Special Interest Items								
a. Bearings Refurbishment	62	62	12	10	11	15	11	15
c. TMDE	4	4	4	3	2	2	--	--
14. Other								
<b>Total</b>	<b>12,863</b>	<b>12,863</b>	<b>7,753</b>	<b>7,811</b>	<b>7,058</b>	<b>7,122</b>	<b>6,695</b>	<b>6,658</b>

**Table 4-1: Oklahoma City ALC Workload Chart**

## **5.0 San Antonio ALC (SA-ALC)**

---

San Antonio ALC is the Air Force C-5, C-17, and T-38 depot facility. It is also the Air Force's primary center for the repair and overhaul of selected families of aircraft jet engines, engine-related exchangeables, and gas turbine engines for secondary power systems. It has responsibility for all Air Force nuclear ordnance and for reentry vehicle components, and manages cryptological equipment. Consistent with SA-ALC's high level of experience in metallurgy and manufacturing, the depot has responsibility within DoD for fostering the development of advanced metals and ceramics, and for pursuing advanced robotics.

### **5.1 Kelly AFB, Texas**

Kelly AFB is an AFMC-operated installation located approximately 5 miles southwest of downtown San Antonio, Texas. San Antonio is the major interior transportation hub for highways and rail lines in south-central Texas. Increased traffic and development from NAFTA has supported the city's continually growing importance in this capacity. Kelly is adjacent to one of the major railroads crossing the southern US and other lines extending south into Mexico. It sits at the junctures of two major highways, including Interstate 10, the nation's southernmost transcontinental artery linking Jacksonville, Florida, with Los Angeles, and Interstate 35, a centralized north-south route extending from Duluth, Minnesota, through many major cities in the midwest and Texas down to Monterrey in the Nuevo Leon province of Mexico. The nearest deep-water port is on the Gulf of Mexico approximately 175 miles east. It can be accessed overland via Interstate 37, which junctures with Interstate 10 east of the base. Kelly's location is strategically valuable for operations in Central and South America, and the Carribean.

#### **5.1.1 Field and Facilities**

Kelly AFB has one 11,550 foot concrete runway with appropriate aircraft arresting gear and 778,042 square yards (approximately 161 acres) of usable aircraft parking apron. Permanently assigned aircraft require nearly 42 percent of the apron space. Three C-141- equivalent aircraft can be loaded or unloaded at one time for mobility/contingency operations.<sup>16</sup> Twenty C-141- equivalent aircraft can be refueled at one time. The base has an operational fuel hydrant system.

---

<sup>16</sup>The limiting factor in this case is trained load crews.

The base controls and manages Yankee Range, a 2,600-acre unscored tactical air-to-surface gunnery range located 68 NM miles south of the base. Although the Range lacks full-scale weapons delivery capability, it can be certified for laser use and has a limited capacity for ground threat simulation. The nearest suitable special-use airspace<sup>17</sup> is as shown below:

Warning/Restricted/MOA:	W-228D	187 NM
Low-altitude MOA:	W-228D	187 NM
Supersonic MOA:	W-228A,B,C,D	190 NM
Scorable gunnery range complex:	McMullen	71 NM
Electronic Combat range:	Claiborne	316 NM
Air combat maneuvering instrumentation range:	Gulfport MDS	529 NM

Randolph AFB, located 18 miles northeast of Kelly, is the nearest Air Force installation with flying operations. Lackland AFB and Wilfred Hall Hospital are adjacent to Kelly, and Brooks Medical Center is approximately 10 miles away.<sup>18</sup> The nearest ground force installation where joint training can be conducted is Army Fort Sam Houston, 29 NM from Kelly. The closest Navy installation where joint training can be accomplished is NAS Dallas, 217 miles north of the base.

### 5.1.2 Major Tenants

Major associate units on Kelly AFB include: Headquarters, Air Intelligence Agency (AIA); 433rd AW, AFRES; 149th Fighter Group (FG), Air National Guard (ANG); Defense Distribution Depot, San Antonio (DDST), DLA; and Defense Megacenter, San Antonio (DMSA), DISA.

**Headquarters, Air Intelligence Agency.** The AIA provides direct intelligence, security, electronic combat, foreign technology, and treaty-monitoring support to national decision-makers and field air component commanders. It furnishes combat commanders with data enabling them to decide when to exploit, jam, deceive, or destroy hostile military communications. It also presents tailored intelligence assessments in support of Air Force planning and policy formation. The AIA works in conjunction with the SA-ALC cryptologic depot maintenance program.

<sup>17</sup>MOA with a minimum size of 2100 square nautical miles (NM) and an altitude block of at least 20,000 feet within 200 NM. Low-altitude MOA with a minimum size of 2100 square NM and a floor no higher than 2000 feet above ground level (AGL) within 600 NM. Supersonic MOA with a minimum size of 4200 square NM within 300 NM. Scorable gunnery range capable of or having tactical or conventional targets and strafe within 800 NM.

<sup>18</sup>Primarily a medical research facility, Brooks has been fingered for closure by the Air Force as part of DoD's BRAC 95 hit list.

**433rd AW.** The 433rd AW is part of the 4th Air Force, one of the three NAFs comprising the AFRES. It commands the 68th Airlift Squadron (AS) which operates C-5 cargo aircraft in support of worldwide DoD military operations.

**149th FG.** The 149th FG is an ANG unit assigned under the major command of the ACC. It operates F-16 aircraft in both air-to-ground and air-to-air roles.

**Defense Distribution Depot, San Antonio (DDST).** Operated by the DLA, the depot stocks, stores, issues, and ships defense goods and materials used at Kelly, additional Air Force installations, and units of the other services in the San Antonio region. It works closely with SA-ALC by packaging and shipping repairable items to the depot, which, in turn, returns the goods to serviceable status and re-enters them into the DLA distribution system. It employs approximately 900 personnel, all civilian.

**Defense Megacenter, San Antonio (DMSA).** Identified in BRAC 93 as the site for one of 16 DoD data processing and telecommunication "megacenters" to be operated under the umbrella of the DISA, DMSA provides information processing services and products supporting the needs of the San Antonio region. Its functions are divided into four categories: application support, operational support, technical support, and business management support. The Center runs 61 application systems that support the depot maintenance activities of SA-ALC.

### 5.1.3 Relationship to Local Community

Kelly AFB is located in the San Antonio, Texas, MSA. Total population (FY 92) is 1,377,000. Total employment (FY 93) is 731,000. Average annual job growth is 13,750, and average annual per capita income is \$17,284. For the past five years, San Antonio consistently has been one of the top ten cities in the US in total annual net job creation (jobs added minus jobs lost).

Work force population at Kelly:

Active duty military	4,800
Reserve military	3,950
Civilian	<u>14,100</u>
Total	22,850

Kelly AFB is one of the largest single-site, high technology employers in southern Texas, and over 13,000 of Kelly's workers are affiliated with the ALC. The total work force annual payroll (military and civilian) is \$692 million. This produces a local area economic impact of approximately \$2 billion. No reliable estimate has been provided on the realistic market value of Kelly's land (3,996 acres), buildings, and infrastructure.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup>See Attachment 1, *Air Force Depot Capacity/Plant Comparisons*, Note 9, on *market value* versus *replacement value*.



The estimated impact of base closure would be the loss of 43,200 jobs (18,100 direct, 25,100 indirect), 5.9% of the San Antonio MSA employment total. Combined with other San Antonio MSA job losses from prior BRAC decisions (59 jobs), the cumulative impact of Kelly's closure in BRAC 95 (if closure was directed) would cause the total employment loss to remain at 5.9% of the MSA's total.

It is estimated that the one-time closure costs associated with closing Kelly AFB would amount to \$653 million. Return on investment would be achieved in 10 years.

## 5.2 San Antonio ALC Depot

While the center is well-known for managing and repairing engine modules and nuclear ordnance, and for manufacturing parts for engines and fuel systems, it conducts several additional operations of significant note. Along with supporting the Air Force's newest transport, the C-17, and the aging C-5 and T-38 fleets, the depot services C-131, A-37, OV-10A, and T-37 aircraft. In all, San Antonio ALC supports 33 types of aircraft, over 19,000 aircraft engines, and more than 50,000 auxiliary engines, which comprise three-quarters of the Air Force engine inventory. It manages all Air Force nuclear ordnance, all liquid missile propellants used by the Air Force and NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration), and the Air Force's fleet of boats and ships. The depot maintains some of the physically largest hangars and maintenance facilities in the US to accommodate the outsize transport fleet it supports.

DoD's submission to the BRAC 95 Commission recommended realigning workloads among the five Air Force depots to consolidate selected specialties at each. The specialty areas proposed for consolidation at San Antonio ALC are: foundry operations, industrial plant equipment software, and plating.

### 5.2.1 Specialization

San Antonio ALC is designated a *Service Center of Excellence* for the following systems:

**Aircraft Airframes:** C-5, C-17; paint and corrosion control for large-bodied aircraft.

**Aircraft Components:** fuel accessories, automatic test equipment, engine controls and instruments, automatic gearboxes, F-15 and F-16 secondary power systems, F-16 engine start system, conventional starters, and organic manufacturing.

**Engines (Gas Turbine):** J69, J85, TF34, TF39, F100, J60, F117, and T56; engine components and component fabrication; GTCPs 180-5, 180-7, 397, 85-56, 85-70A, 85-71, 85-72A, 85-106A, 85-180L, 85-180(C), 165-1, 36-50, and *Patriot*.

**Missiles and Missile Components (Strategic):** components and equipment involved in nuclear weapon handling, test, delivery, launch, firing, and weapon control, including trailers, launchers, racks, and ICBM reentry vehicle (RV) microcircuits.

**Software (Support Equipment):** automatic test equipment software.

San Antonio has the following *Technology Application Program Management* assignments:

**Advanced Metals and Ceramics  
Robotics and Automation**

### 5.2.2 Unique Facilities/Equipment/Capabilities

SA-ALC officials have identified the following facilities, equipment, and/or capabilities as unique to the depot:

**Engine Test Facility.** This 65,000 SF facility provides for testing all versions of the Pratt and Whitney F100 engine used in the F-15 and F-16, the TF-39 used in the C-5, the T56, and the TF39 Engine Build-Up Unit. The facility is capable of testing any turbofan, turboshaft, or turbojet engine in the DoD inventory. The current test cell configuration includes four universal turbofan and turbojet multi-engine capable test cells, two T56 turboshaft propeller test cells, and two T56 dynamometer test cells. All utilize the Pacer Comet III Automated/Computerized Engine Test and Data Acquisition test system, employ quick engine connect test adapters, a mechanized material handling system, inlet air turning vanes, an Automatic Vibration Diagnostic system, and a noise abatement treatment system. The facility also employs a Gas Path Analysis system for determining engine/module performance from thermo-mathematical relationships.

**Advanced Fuel Accessories Repair and Test.** This is a 50,000 SF facility specially designed to accommodate the configuration of the Advanced Fuel Accessories Test System for testing fuel wetted components. Test stations are fully automated and can evaluate a broad variety of different engine and airframe fuel accessories such as pumps, valves, fuel controls, and atomizers. The system is environmentally friendly and minimizes the explosion/fire hazard previously associated with fuel component repair.

**Cryogenic Spin Test Facility.** This is a 9500 SF building with special systems and shielding to permit cryogenic spin testing to be performed on engine disks in order to identify potential critical flaws. Disks are mounted on a special test assembly, balanced, lowered into an insulated and heavily shielded spin pit which is momentarily flooded with liquid nitrogen to cool the assembly (down to approximately -320° F), spun in the pit at 15,000 rpm for one minute, and then allowed to free spin to a stop some 20 minutes later. The facility contains five spin pits and special associated plumbing for the liquid nitrogen and pit vacuuming.

**Gas Turbine Engine Repair and Test.** This is a 137,000 SF facility that collocates multiple formerly-separate test systems and assembly shops. Approximately one-third of the production space is a near-clean-room environment with a 300,000 classification.

**Unified Fuel Control Test Facility.** This is a unique, "explosion-proof" 95,000 SF facility dedicated to the inspection, repair, and testing of F-100 engine unified fuel controls. It also possesses the capability to overhaul and test fuel nozzles for the F-100, T56, and TF39, fuel controls for the TF39 and T56, and fuel atomizers for smaller GTE. The building is equipped with special ventilation, fire detection and suppression, and blast-proofing systems. It encompasses 89 test stands that are predominantly computer controlled electro- and hydromechanical systems designed to simulate the conditions and inputs test items will face in use.

**Aircraft NDI X-Ray Facility.** Construction on this 60,000 SF facility began in mid-1994 and is scheduled for completion in mid-1995. It will enable SA-ALC to perform NDI and substrate evaluation for C-17, C-5, and smaller aircraft.

**Large-Aircraft Depot Maintenance Hangar.** With over one million SF of floorspace, this is the largest permanent bridge construction hangar in DoD and one of the largest in the world. Designed to support work on the C-5, it is capable of completely housing six of the massive aircraft simultaneously. Extra-high hangar doors, three track-mounted bridge cranes, and a 10,000 pound capacity remote controlled hoist for removal of the aircraft's horizontal stabilizer are among the hangar's purpose-designed features. High roofing pockets permit four C-5s to remain jacked at the same time.

**Aircraft Corrosion Control/Depaint.** This 88,000 SF facility is the only one of its size in DoD which uses non-carcinogenic Plastic Media Blasting to remove coatings from airframes. It is the only one with the capability for stripping C-5 aircraft and can also handle smaller weapon systems. Overhead "stacker cranes" provide hands-on three dimensional accessibility to the entire aircraft

**Nuclear Weapon Components Repair and Test.** SA-ALC possesses a unique set of facilities for conducting environmental stress screening which permits the repair and testing of ICBM RV components, nuclear related aircraft components, and nuclear munitions handling equipment. It is the only DoD installation with this composite capability. The underground **Multi-Use Centrifuge** can attain an acceleration rate of 200 Gs with an onset rate of 50 Gs per second. With a capacity of 50,000 G-pounds, it can accommodate a payload of up to 1000 pounds. It is used to simulate G forces and timing intervals required to arm fuses. The **High Impulse Transducer Test System** is a high performance piezoelectric accelerometer that produces a haversine mechanical shock event of up to 100 kgs to test the impact transducers found on RVs. The **Altitude Temperature Test Chamber** produces a thermal cycle/altitude test environment that can simulate altitudes of up to 200,000 feet with temperature ranges of from -10° up to +350° F with indefinite holding time throughout the range. The **Shielded Cable Tester** assesses a component's ability to perform to mil-spec with an acceptable amount of degradation. The three above-ground **Accelerator Rotary Centrifuges** can accelerate a 150 pound payload to 150 Gs at a radius of 63 inches. The unit has a capacity of 22,500 G-pounds and can accomplish acceleration/deceleration from 1 G to 150 Gs to 1 G in 15 seconds. A **Shock Machine Test System** can subject components weighing up to 500 pounds to various levels and types of shock and stress with max acceleration of 600 Gs or 30,000 Gs (with dual mass shock amplifier) and a min/max pulse duration of 2 microseconds min/80 microseconds max. An **Isothermal Storage Room** holds components in a dust-free and temperature/humidity controlled environment. The **Thermotron Temperature Chamber** stresses components with a programmable

temperature variance capability of from -100° F up to 300° F at a rate of up to 9° F per minute. The **Shielded Microwave Anechoic Test Facility** is equipped with unique, frequency-specific absorbent material and is used to evaluate the performance of *Minuteman* MK-12 RVs.

Additional unique facilities/capabilities include:

**Textile Laboratory**  
**Integrated Support Software Engineering Facility**  
**Rubber Products Manufacturing**  
**Production of X-Ray Quality Aluminum Castings**  
**Stereolithography Pattern/Part Development**  
**C-5 Engine Pylon Repair**  
**Halon Recovery, Recycling, and Recharging Facility**  
**Bicarbonate of Soda Blast Stripping of Jet Engine Components**  
**Robotic Shot Peening System**  
**Non-Contact Dimensional Inspection**  
**Auto-Prompting Inspection System**

### 5.2.3 Workload

The following table presents a breakout of the San Antonio ALC workload -- by DoD commodity group -- for FY 96 and FY 99. The only commodity groups displayed in the table are those for which one or more of the five ALCs has a workload commitment. An explanation of the workload table is provided at Attachment 6.

**San Antonio ALC Workload Chart**  
(In Thousands of Direct Labor Hours -- kDLH)

Relevant Commodity Groups	Potential Maximum Capacity		Actual Capacity Projection		Total Workload Projection		Total Core Workload Projection	
	FY96	FY99	FY96	FY99	FY96	FY99	FY96	FY99
1. Aircraft Airframes								
c. Fixed Wing								
(1) Tanker / Transport / Bomber	3,251	3,251	1,542	1,573	1,006	821	833	821
(2) Command and Control								
(3) Light Combat								
(4) Admin / Training	795	795	388	2	341	--	--	--
d. Other								
2. Aircraft Components								
b. Aircraft Structures	162	162	93	90	56	57	17	19
c. Hydraulic / Pneumatic	4	4	3	4	3	3	2	3
d. Instruments	24	24	14	12	8	7	6	5
e. Landing Gear	15	15	6	8	4	5	4	4
f. Aviation Ordnance								
g. Avionics / Electronics	142	142	119	97	96	79	33	31
h. APUs	559	559	292	288	159	148	112	102
i. Other	443	443	235	288	302	340	91	93
j. Manufacture and Fabrication	1,058	1,058	298	417	123	152	120	120
3. Engines (Gas Turbine) (GTE)								
a. Aircraft	7,318	7,318	4,948	5,001	3,665	3,396	2,615	2,626
c. Blabdes / Vanes								
4. Missiles and Missile Components								
a. Strategic	200	200	107	109	99	100	58	57
b. Tactical / MLRS								
7. Ground Comm-Electronic Equip								
a. Radar								
b. Radio Communications								
c. Wire Communications								
e. Navigation Aids								
f. Electro-optics/Night Vision Equip								
g. Satellite Control/Space Sensors								
10. Ground General Purpose Items								
c. Munitions / Ordnance	6	6	2	3	2	3	1	2
d. Ground Generators								
e. Other								
12. Software								
a. Tactical Systems	26	26	19	20	19	16	18	14
b. Support Equipment	241	241	180	207	165	177	153	155
13. Special Interest Items								
a. Bearings Refurbishment								
c. TMDE	978	978	651	685	448	478	400	410
14. Other								
<b>Total</b>	<b>15,220</b>	<b>15,220</b>	<b>8,897</b>	<b>8,804</b>	<b>6,496</b>	<b>5,782</b>	<b>4,463</b>	<b>4,463</b>

**Table 3-1: San Antonio ALC Workload Chart**

## **6.0 Warner Robins ALC (WR-ALC)**

---

Warner Robins ALC is the Air Force's F-15, C-130, and C-141 depot, providing cradle-to-grave logistics support and depot-level maintenance for these. Additionally, Warner Robins is a primary maintainer of sophisticated aircraft avionics systems and weapons, including the Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN) system, and the AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). WR-ALC's proficiencies in airframe and avionics support have resulted in the center being assigned responsibility within DoD for promoting technology advancement in a number of related fields, including corrosion control and electronics systems architecture.

### **6.1 Robins AFB, Georgia**

Robins AFB is an AFMC-operated installation located approximately 15 miles south-southeast of Macon, Georgia. In the center of the state, Robins is about two hours' travel time from the major transportation hub of Atlanta. It has access to the national railway system and sits within minutes of both Interstate 16 and Interstate 75. Interstate 16 links nearby Macon with Interstate 95, the main highway extending down the entire East Coast with access to the major waterports of Savannah, Georgia; Charleston, South Carolina; and Jacksonville, Florida. Interstate 75 is one of the principal north-south arteries east of the Mississippi River extending from Sault Saint Marie, Ontario to the Fort Myers metropolitan area of Florida. Savannah is the nearest deep-water ocean port at 136 NM away, and it can be reached directly overland via Interstate 16. Robins is the only East Coast Air Force facility with depot maintenance activity to support military requirements in peace and war.

#### **6.1.1 Field and Facilities**

Robins AFB has one 12,000-foot asphalt runway with appropriate aircraft arresting gear and 653,344 square yards (approximately 135 acres) of usable aircraft parking apron. Currently, permanently assigned aircraft require only 10 percent of the apron space. However, Robins is scheduled to become the US main operating base for the E-8 Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), and beddown of those aircraft assets will reduce surplus ramp space appropriately. Six C-141- equivalent aircraft can be loaded or unloaded at one time

for mobility/contingency operations.<sup>20</sup> Eleven C-141-equivalent aircraft can be refueled at one time. The base has an operational fuel hydrant system.

The base does not control or manage any ranges. The nearest special-use airspace<sup>21</sup> is as shown below:

Warning/Restricted/MOA:	None	
Low-Altitude MOA:	W-157A	200 NM
Supersonic MOA:	W-157A	200 NM
Scorable gunnery range complex:	Grand Bay	103 NM
Electronic Combat range:	Townsend	123 NM
Air combat maneuvering instrumentation range:	Tyndall ACMI	195 NM

The nearest Active Duty Air Force unit where active training can be accomplished is Dobbins AFB, 85 miles from Robins. The closest ground force installation where joint training can be accomplished is Army Fort Benning, 73 NM from the base. Beaufort Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), 142 miles from Robins, is the nearest Naval/Marine unit where joint training can be accomplished.

### 6.1.2 Major Tenants

Major associate units currently on Robins AFB include: Headquarters, AFRES; 19th Air Refueling Wing (ARW), Air Mobility Command (AMC); 9th Space Warning Squadron (SWS), Air Force Space Command (AFSPC); 5th Combat Communications Group (CCG), ACC; Defense Distribution Depot, Warner Robins (DDWG), DLA; and Defense Megacenter, Warner Robins (DMWR), DISA. (Note: the 116th FW, ANG, currently based at Dobbins AFB, GA, and equipped with F-15s, is scheduled to relocate to Robins AFB at the beginning of 1996 and convert to the B-1B.)

**Headquarters, AFRES.** The Air Force Reserve supports the Active force by performing missions that encompass fighter, bomber, airlift, aerial re-fueling, rescue, and weather reconnaissance operations. It provides disaster relief in the US and supports national counterdrug efforts. The Reserve commands three numbered NAFs with nearly 78,000 reservists operating 400 aircraft ranging from F-16 fighters and B-52 bombers to C-5 transports and KC-135 tankers.

<sup>20</sup>The limiting factor is load crews.

<sup>21</sup>MOA with a minimum size of 2100 square nautical miles (NM) and an altitude block of at least 20,000 feet within 200 NM. Low-altitude MOA with a minimum size of 2100 square NM and a floor no higher than 2000 feet above ground level (AGL) within 600 NM. Supersonic MOA with a minimum size of 4200 square NM within 300 NM. Scorable gunnery range capable of or having tactical or conventional targets and strafe within 800 NM.

**19th ARW.** Under AMC, the 19th ARW flies KC-135 aerial refuelers to provide global refueling for bomber, airlift, fighter, air defense, and special mission aircraft.

**9th SWS.** Under AFSPC, the 9th SWS operates and maintains a solid-state phased array PAVE PAWS detection radar. As part of the worldwide space and missile warning network, the radar provides missile early-warning data to US Space Command; North American Aerospace Defense Command; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Command Authorities.

**5th CCG.** Comprised of the 51st, 52nd, 53rd, and 54th Combat Communications Squadrons, the 5th CCG provides mobile and transportable command and control communications along air traffic control systems worldwide. Under the ACC, the Group's squadrons deploy in support of joint task force, combatant command, and Air Force flying wing operations and exercises.

**Defense Distribution Depot, Warner Robins (DDWG).** Operated by DLA, the Depot stocks, stores, packages, and transports defense goods for depot-level maintenance activities along with the active and reserve units on the base. DDWG also provides parts and equipment to armed forces located worldwide and foreign military customers. Most items maintained at Warner Robins support maintenance of F-15, C-130, and C-141 aircraft, along with navigation and airborne electronic warfare systems. WR-ALC works closely with DDWG by providing lab analysis of fuels and by repairing/testing electronic and structural components before they are re-entered into the DLA distribution system.

**Defense Megacenter, Warner Robins (DMWR).** Designated in BRAC 93 as the site for one of 16 data processing and telecommunication "megacenters" to be operated under the umbrella of the DISA, DMWR operates systems linking battle space applications to the battlefield via DoD and commercial satellites. The center houses mainframes and midtier computers running 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to support over 170 data processing services for WR-ALC, AMC, AFRES, and ANG units.

### 6.1.3 Relationship to Local Community

Robins AFB is located in the Macon, Georgia, MSA. Total population (FY 92) is 296,000. Total employment (FY 93) is 157,800. Average annual job growth is 1,850, and average annual per capita income is \$17,542.

Work force population at Robins:

Active duty military	3,750
Reserve military	750
Civilian	<u>13,380</u>
Total	17,880



Robins AFB is Georgia's largest industrial complex. The work force annual payroll (military and civilian) is \$686 million. This produces a local area economic impact of approximately \$2 billion. No reliable estimate has been provided on the realistic market value of Robins' land (8,790 acres), buildings, and infrastructure.<sup>22</sup>

The estimated impact of base closure would be the loss of 31,100 jobs (15,600 direct, 15,500 indirect), 19.7% of the Macon, Georgia, MSA employment total. Combined with other Macon MSA job losses from prior BRAC decisions (9 jobs), the cumulative impact of Robins' closure in BRAC 95 (if closure was directed) would cause the total employment loss to remain at 19.7%.

It is estimated that the one-time closure costs associated with closing Robins AFB would amount to \$1 billion. Return on investment would be achieved in 18 years.

## 6.2 Warner Robins ALC Depot

While the F-15, C-130, and C-141 are Warner Robins ALC's primary airframe responsibilities, the center manages over 200,000 items representing the full range of avionic functions and technology. These items fall into the categories of aerospace communications, navigation equipment, airborne bomb and gun-directing systems, target acquisition systems, and most airborne electronic warfare equipment. The depot supports the LANTIRN navigation and targeting system, the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS), and the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). It holds responsibility for procurement, supply, and maintenance functions for most Air Force bases along the East Coast, as well as for the Atlantic Missile Test Range, Newfoundland, Labrador, Greenland, Iceland, Bermuda, the Azores, and all Air Force and Security Assistance Program activities in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.

DoD's submission to the BRAC 95 Commission recommended realigning the workloads among the Air Force depots to focus selected specialties at each. The specialty areas proposed for consolidation at Warner Robins ALC are: tubing manufacturing, airborne electronic automatic equipment software, sheet metal repair and manufacturing, machining manufacturing, airborne electronics, electronic manufacturing (printed wire boards), and plating.

---

<sup>22</sup>See Attachment 1, *Air Force Depot Capacity/Plant Comparisons*, Note 9, on *market value versus replacement value*.

### 6.2.1 Specialization

Warner Robins ALC is designated a *Service Center of Excellence* for the following systems:

**Aircraft Airframes:** F-15, C-130 transport, C-130 Special Operations Forces (SOF)/ Special Mission aircraft, and C-141.

**Aircraft Components:** flight data recorders, gyroscopes, fasteners, miniature precision instrument bearings, aging aircraft structures, airborne electronics technology repair, life support, radio frequency analysis measurement, C-130 propellers, electronic warfare systems, flexible computer integrated manufacturing, and special fuels testing.

**Other:** shelf-life extension data (Air Force Executive Agent), Joint Logistics Systems Center, physical sciences, and Depot Maintenance Management Information System.

Warner Robins has the following *Technology Application Program Management* assignments:

**Power Systems**  
**Environment Stress Screening**  
**Advanced Electronics Systems Architecture**  
**Force Management**  
**Corrosion**  
**Environmental Technology Needs**  
**Product Data**  
**Software Engineering**  
**Electronic Manufacturing and Repair**  
**Obsolete Micro-Electronics**  
**Aircraft Manufacturing and Repair**  
**Aircraft Structures Technology Needs**

### 6.2.2 Unique Facilities/Equipment/Capabilities

WR-ALC officials have identified the following facilities, equipment, and/or capabilities as unique to the depot:

**Avionics Complex.** This avionics complex is the single largest electronics repair activity in DoD housing over 535,000 SF of environmentally controlled avionics design, test, repair, and manufacturing capacity. Its specialized capabilities provide for the full spectrum of workloads, from the latest surface mount technologies found in the LANTIRN and Joint STARS programs to 1930s' vacuum tube technologies found in the ARN-6 radio compass. **Antenna Microwave Radiation Pattern and Boresight** evaluation capabilities are supported by eight indoor antenna ranges with shielded anechoic chambers to prevent radio frequency noise from infiltrating into the surrounding production facility. Removable exterior walls facilitate the introduction/removal of antennae and test equipment. The F-111 range has a seismic isolation pad. The facility has an extensive capability for **Printed Wiring Board Manufacturing** in a 17,000 SF

section dedicated to the design and manufacture of double sided and multi-layered printed wiring boards. Design-to-purpose construction features in this area are typical of most parts of the facility and include an extensive industrial waste system, recessed flooring for wet processing areas, special exhaust systems, deionized water, explosion-proof rooms for chemical mixing and distribution, and floor-to-roof sealed walls to prevent chemical leakage that could contaminate other facility operations. The **Hybrid Microelectronics Manufacturing** section of the facility consists of 2600 SF of class 10,000 clean room with additional special utilities, including liquid/gaseous nitrogen dispensing and a static dissipative raised floor system to preclude electrostatic discharge. The **LANTIRN** technology repair center features a 2,000 SF class 10,000 clean room, a 400 SF laser light tight room, and other systems essential for overhaul, repair, and test of the system. The Avionics Complex also features 2 **Optic Repair** stations with isolated seismic foundations, 16 laser safe firing rooms with interlocked door seals, and a total of over 12,000 SF of **Clean Rooms** ranging from class 10,000 up to class 300,000. The facility has special security and access control, a unique software production facility, and multiple tooling and manufacturing shops to support its needs. Systems supported by the facility include Joint STARS, E-3, F-15, F-111, C/AC/MC-130, MH-53, MH-60, B-52, the Global Positioning System (GPS), Miniature Receive Transmit (MRT), and LANTIRN.

**Avionics Integrated Support Facility (AISF).** This is a 215,000 SF complex containing modular multi-system engineering facilities developed to support specific avionics subsystems. Its general capabilities include real time system integration testing, operational flight program (OFP) software development, testing/reconfiguration, compilation, configuration control, off-line subsystem analysis, data reduction, comprehensive self-diagnostics, and maintenance of software documents for a variety of operational and support systems. AISF facilities provide data communication and software data transmission to operational user units. AISFs resident to WR-ALC include LANTIRN, Joint Tactical Information and Distribution System Centralized Software Support Activity (JTIDS CSSA), SOF Extendible Integrated Support Environment (EISE), and PAVE TACK. The Electronic Warfare AISF (EWAISF) has a 10,000 SF sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF), four electromagnetic screen rooms, two microwave anechoic chambers, and emergency power generation. The overall complex supports most major weapon systems, including Joint STARS, E-3, F/EF-111, F-15, C/AC/MC-130, MH-53, MH-60, B-52, C-141, F-16, GPS, MRT, OA-10, B-1B, C-5, and C-17.

**Security Assistance Electronic Warfare Support Facility.** This is a 21,000 SF facility constructed with Foreign Military Sales (FMS) funds to be used exclusively for FMS purposes. The facility includes labs within security vaults and has many of the same features found in the AISF complex. Included in the systems it supports are FMS versions of the ALR-46/69 electronic countermeasures (ECM) pod, the Royal Saudi Air Force F-15 Tactical Electronic Warning System (TEWS), and the Advanced Radar Warning Receiver/Countermeasures Dispenser (ARWR/CMD).

**Gyro Repair Facility.** This is a 69,000 SF facility purpose designed to support organic overhaul and testing of gyroscopes, accelerometers, and indicators. The entire facility is a certified clean room (75 percent to 300,000 class and 25 percent to 100,000 class), temperature/humidity-controlled, with extensive seismological stable piling. The facility houses 12 general purpose automatic test stations, 31 manual test stations, 9 mass spectrometer leak detector systems, 14 dynamic balancers, 2 random drift automated test stations, and a number of other specialized equipments.

Additional unique facilities/capabilities include:

- Aerospace Fastener Testing/Manufacturing**
- Miniature Precision Bearing Testing**
- Electronic Failure Analysis**
- Automated (Paperless) Depots**
- Corrosion Prevention/Control**
- Bicarbonate of Soda Paint Stripping**
- Computer Integrated Manufacturing**
- Metal Finishing Facility**
- F-111 Crew Escape Module Parachute Packing**
- F-15 Robotic Painting**
- Fluid Cell Press**
- Special Maintenance Hangars/Complexes for F-15, C-141, C/AC/MC-130  
Aircraft and Component Refurbishment**
- Electron Beam Welder**
- Automated Aircraft Rework System**
- Metallograph Image Analysis System**
- Rheometrics Spectrometric Materials Analysis**

### 6.2.3 Workload

The following table presents a breakout of the Warner-Robins ALC workload -- by DoD commodity group -- for FY 96 and FY 99. The only commodity groups displayed in the table are those for which one or more of the five ALCs has a workload commitment. An explanation of the workload table is provided at Attachment 6.

**Warner Robins ALC Workload Chart**  
(In Thousands of Direct Labor Hours -- kDLH)

Relevant Commodity Groups	Potential Maximum Capacity		Actual Capacity Projection		Total Workload Projection		Total Core Workload Projection	
	FY96	FY99	FY96	FY99	FY96	FY99	FY96	FY99
1. Aircraft Airframes								
c. Fixed Wing								
(1) Tanker / Transport / Bomber	2,104	2,104	2,104	2,104	2,544	1,349	2,376	1,349
(2) Command and Control								
(3) Light Combat	1,084	1,084	1,084	1,084	918	1,267	652	1,267
(4) Admin / Training								
d. Other								
2. Aircraft Components								
b. Aircraft Structures	801	801	656	656	472	477	472	477
c. Hydraulic / Pneumatic								
d. Instruments	503	503	412	412	296	299	296	299
e. Landing Gear	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
f. Aviation Ordnance	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
g. Avionics / Electronics	2,153	2,153	1,763	1,763	1,267	1,280	1,267	1,280
h. APUs								
i. Other	463	463	388	388	277	280	277	280
j. Manufacture and Fabrication	514	514	432	432	312	315	312	315
3. Engines (Gas Turbine) (GTE)								
a. Aircraft								
c. Blabdes / Vanes								
4. Missiles and Missile Components								
a. Strategic								
b. Tactical / MLRS	22	22	18	18	13	13	13	13
7. Ground Comm-Electronic Equip								
a. Radar	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1
b. Radio Communications								
c. Wire Communications								
e. Navigation Aids								
f. Electro-optics/Night Vision Equip								
g. Satellite Control/Space Sensors								
10. Ground General Purpose Items								
c. Munitions / Ordnance								
d. Ground Generators								
e. Other								
12. Software								
a. Tactical Systems	1,358	1,358	795	795	764	888	764	888
b. Support Equipment	906	906	530	530	509	592	509	592
13. Special Interest Items								
a. Bearings Refurbishment								
c. TMDE								
14. Other								
<b>Total</b>	<b>9,913</b>	<b>9,913</b>	<b>8,187</b>	<b>8,187</b>	<b>7,376</b>	<b>6,763</b>	<b>6,941</b>	<b>6,763</b>

**Table 6-1: Warner Robins ALC Workload Chart**

## 7.0 1995 Base Realignment and Closure Process (BRAC 95)

### 7.1 Background

BRAC 95 is the last of three rounds of closure activity mandated under current legislation.<sup>23</sup> As late as mid-December 1994, defense analysts were anticipating that the list of military installations recommended for closure or realignment under BRAC 95 would be nearly as large as the lists from the three previous closure rounds combined.<sup>24</sup> This expectation had been supported repeatedly by DoD officials who were quick to point out during most of the year that, while military manpower and equipment had been cut by a third since the end of the Cold War, basing infrastructure had been reduced only by some 18 percent. In January 1995, initiating preparations for developing the Pentagon's BRAC 95 closure/realignment proposal, Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) John Deutch established an "overall 15 percent reduction in plant replacement value" as "a minimum DoD-wide goal."<sup>25</sup> It was believed widely that military research facilities, laboratories, and depots would be particularly vulnerable, and that the Air Force, after avoiding heavy hits in these areas previously, stood to lose perhaps two of its five remaining depots.

Shortly before the end of 1994, however, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) William J. Perry told surprised reporters that he expected the 1995 list to be about the same size as the list from BRAC 93. The rationale for this 'expectation undershoot' was given by DEPSECDEF Deutch in an interview shortly before the list was made public: "We need time," Deutch said, "to balance the base-closing costs and the base-closing savings, and complete the transfer of facilities to productive community use."<sup>26</sup> With defense funding at its lowest level in nearly half a century, and the recouping of closure/realignment outlays requiring, on average, approximately seven years -- only after which can closure savings begin to be realized -- the Administration apparently was unwilling to squeeze Pentagon operational and procurement accounts any further.

---

<sup>23</sup>The BRAC process and enabling legislation are explained at Attachment 2. For a detailed discussion of prior BRAC actions, see the SDS study *Promoting/Protecting Contractor-Provided Depot Maintenance*, 30 December 1994.

<sup>24</sup>A summary of major base closures from prior BRAC rounds is at Attachment 3.

<sup>25</sup>Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Subject: *1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95)*, 7 January 1994.

<sup>26</sup>Reported by Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon To Seek Scaled-Back List Of Base Closings," *New York Times*, 25 February 1995, p. 1.

The list of bases recommended by DoD for closure and realignment was released officially on 28 February 1995. True to Perry's promise, what originally was supposed to have been the "mother of all BRACs" turned out affecting only 146 military facilities in the US.<sup>27</sup> Of those, only 35 *major* installations were identified for closure or significant downsizing -- and it seemed a stretch to call some of them major. The manpower adjustments associated with these proposals amounted to a net *increase* of 4,400 military positions (the result of personnel returning home after the closure of US bases overseas) and a net loss of roughly 34,000 civilian positions.<sup>28</sup> Interestingly, none of the Air Force's ALCs were on the closure list although all five were identified for realignment action.

Rather than close any ALCs, the Air Force consolidated some workloads and accepted relatively modest manpower cuts at three of the depots. "The net effect of [Air Force] depot realignments," according to the DoD *Base Closure and Realignment Report*, will be "to transfer approximately 3.5 million direct labor hours and to eliminate 37 product lines across the five depots."<sup>29</sup> The formal report continued:

Programmed work reductions, downsizing through contracting or transfer to other Service depots, and the consolidation of workloads . . . result in the reduction of real property infrastructure equal to 1.5 depots, and a reduction in manhour capacity equivalent to about two depots. The proposed moves also make available over 25 million cubic feet of space to the Defense Logistics Agency for storage and other purposes, plus space to accept part of the Defense Nuclear Agency and other displaced Air Force missions.<sup>30</sup>

As reported in a recent article in *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, the Air Force presented "a powerful argument that more money could be saved by reducing the size of all five aircraft maintenance depots than by closing one or two of them."<sup>31</sup> SECDEF Perry is quoted as having found the arithmetic "compelling."<sup>32</sup>

## 7.2 Depots -- A Special Interest Item

Military depots and depot capacity were to have received particularly close scrutiny by DoD in preparing its BRAC 95 closure/realignment list. The 1993 BRAC Commission had identified

---

<sup>27</sup>The list of major facilities in the US and its territories identified for closure/realignment is at Attachment 4.

<sup>28</sup>A list of net gains/losses by state is at Attachment 5.

<sup>29</sup>DoD *Base Closure and Realignment Report*, p. 5-126.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup>John D. Morocco, "Air Force To Trim, Not Close, Depots," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 6 March 1995, p. 22.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*

the need to pare down "the clearly excess capacity within the DoD depot system" as one of several *Issues for Further Consideration* in BRAC 95, and had pointed to two areas as offering opportunities to help do this: greater consolidation and interservicing of common workloads within the military depot structure, and more extensive exploitation of private-sector depot maintenance capability.<sup>33</sup>

Noting in its final report that the Pentagon "has been attempting for approximately 20 years without significant success to interservice depot maintenance workload," the 1993 Commission attempted to promote broader interservicing in four specific commodity areas -- wheeled vehicles, rotary-wing aircraft, tactical missiles, and ground communications -- with its closure/realignment recommendations.<sup>34</sup> While some progress was made, the Commission still felt there were both the need and opportunity for more, and urged its successors to focus on the issue: "The efficiencies to be realized from interservicing dictate DoD conduct an exhaustive review and present its recommendations/actions during the 1995 [base closure] round."<sup>35</sup>

Regarding privatization, the 1993 Commission came to the belief during its deliberations that the domestic sector could provide a potentially cost-effective option to DoD's in-house capability for repairing and maintaining its equipment. Further, they felt that moving work to the private sector could also have "a positive impact on maintaining the nation's industrial base."<sup>36</sup> Accordingly, the Commission "strongly" recommended that SECDEF "address the private-sector capability, within the context of an integrated national industrial philosophy, in his recommendations for the 1995 round of base closures."<sup>37</sup>

The Administration's DoD leadership appeared to be paying heed to the advice . . . initially. In preparing for BRAC 95, DEPSECDEF Deutch directed the establishment of five Joint Cross-Service Groups to pinpoint common support functions in designated functional areas, and to "oversee DoD Component cross-service analyses of these common support functions" in identifying candidate bases for closure under BRAC 95.<sup>38</sup> (A sixth Joint Cross-Service Group was established to develop guidelines for measuring the economic impact of closure/realignment

---

<sup>33</sup>1993 Report to the President, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 1 July 1993, p. 2-1. For a detailed examination of the depot issue, interservicing, and private sector capabilities, see the SDS study *Privatizing Depot Maintenance*, 1 November 1994.

<sup>34</sup>1993 Report to the President, p. 2-1.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 2-2.

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup>Deutch Memorandum, *1995 Base Realignments and Closures*.



recommendations.) The five functional areas were: depot maintenance, test and evaluation, laboratories, military treatment facilities, and undergraduate pilot training.

During the same time period in which the Joint Cross-Service Groups were beginning their activity, the privatization issue was being studied extensively by a Defense Science Board Task Force on Depot Maintenance. In its April 1994 report, this Board concluded that commercial firms did in fact offer a cost-effective alternative to publicly accomplished depot maintenance and recommended measures designed to bolster industry's opportunities to acquire depot workload.<sup>39</sup> Most of these recommendations were accepted by DoD and codified in a May 1994 memorandum on *Depot Maintenance Operations Policy* by Deutch.<sup>40</sup>

The good intentions for promoting reductions in depot infrastructure through greater interservicing and privatization, however, began to unravel just after mid-year, well before the Services began to get serious about identifying base closure candidates. The push for greater privatization of depot activities was the first thread to be pulled loose. Concerned with the potential adverse impact on their constituents of reduced government workload, Congressmen representing depot-dominated districts responded to the *Depot Maintenance Operations Policy* memorandum with a strong display of bi-partisan protectionism by inserting "hooks" into the FY 95 Defense Authorization and Appropriation Bills that effectively prohibited DoD from implementing the Deutch-directed efficiency measures.

The decisive Democratic election upset in November to some degree constituted another thread working free. While it launched a supposedly new breed of populist, reform-minded Republicans toward Washington, ostensibly mandated to carve bloat out of the federal bureaucracy -- in fact, the very sort of allies that Defense base closure advocates had long been seeking<sup>41</sup> -- the strong pro-military orientation of the new master-designates of the Capitol led the Administration into digging itself into a \$25 billion budgetary hole that subsequently left little room for significant base closure outlays.

---

<sup>39</sup>*Depot Maintenance Management*. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force, published by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Technology, April 1994.

<sup>40</sup>Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Subject: *Depot Maintenance Operations Policy*, 4 May 1994.

<sup>41</sup>Republican vows to do away with big government presented the Administration a unique win-win opportunity for proposing major reductions in the defense infrastructure. If a large BRAC list survived the all-or-none Congressional consideration process, the Administration could claim its share of the credit for fiscally responsible action on behalf of long-standing military desires to downsize basing. If the list were rejected by a Republican-dominated Congress, the Administration could accuse the opposing party of self-serving hypocrisy. From a cynical point of view, stacking the list with bases from low-vote, Republican-controlled districts (including, for example, Ogden ALC, Utah, and Oklahoma City ALC, Oklahoma, two Republican strongholds) would have presented the Administration with an opportunity to exact highly focused revenge in the bargain.

Even before they started preparing to swear in their new freshmen and claim committee gavels, Republican incumbents on the Hill intensified their attacks on the Administration's record of military funding. Asserting that the Democrats had managed to slash the defense budget drastically and still create a shortfall of between \$40 and \$150 billion over the Future Years Defense Program, they vowed to set things straight in the coming session.<sup>42</sup> The Administration, smarting at Republican charges that military readiness had eroded under its stewardship as a result of the diversion of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding to pay for peace-keeping operations ("feel-good foreign policy"), and stung by accusations that the hefty reductions in Defense procurement accounts amounted to forcing the military to eat its seed corn (with implied dire consequence for future military capability), on 1 December 1994 announced a six-year, \$25 billion Presidential Defense Funding Initiative. This was derided by the Republicans as mere political smoke and mirrors (and, at any rate, insufficient), but it had the practical consequences of limiting the Administration's ability to cope with a large base closure pricetag. The \$3.8 billion required up front to finance DoD's relatively modest BRAC 95 proposal for BRAC 95 was a tough enough pill to swallow. With the 1996 presidential elections already much on everyone's mind in Washington, budget concerns, plus the potential angry reaction of voters hurt by base closures, appear to have figured prominently in holding the Administration's closure list down.

Yet another wayward thread was the inability of the five functional Joint Cross-Service Groups to reach agreement on appropriate interservicing and consolidation in all but a few instances. The full extent of this incapacity became apparent only with the publication of the *Base Closure and Realignment Report* in March 1995. Discussing the outcome of the Joint Cross-Service Group on Test and Evaluation, which was representative of the outcome in most of the groups, the report observed wryly:

Cross-servicing and downsizing . . . proved to be a considerable challenge. In general, the Military Departments concluded that preservation of core test facilities, which have irreplaceable land, air, and water ranges, precluded closures of major facilities and that cross-servicing of T&E functions would not be cost effective.<sup>43</sup>

Referring to the Depot Maintenance Group, the report noted that, while its recommendations had been directly responsible for only limited cross-servicing, the recommendations had been

---

<sup>42</sup> The \$40 billion figure was the Congressional Budget Office's estimate; \$150 billion, that of the General Accounting Office.

<sup>43</sup> *Base Closure and Realignment Report*, p. 4-3.

used by the Services to develop "what they believe to be more cost effective in-house solutions."<sup>44</sup>

If deciding to keep work "in-house" was one of two themes common to Joint Cross-Servicing Group outcomes, the other was putting a positive, upbeat face on feverish unproductivity. This was done primarily by asserting that, even if the groups did not actually maximize cross-servicing, their deliberations "laid the foundation for further cross-servicing outside the BRAC process."<sup>45</sup> And in similar fashion, not unlike a politician given just one more term in office to finish tasks not yet completed, the groups suggested that one or two more closure rounds will

### 7.3 Courses of Action

It is reasonable to assume that, if the Administration requests a third or fourth round or two of base realignments, the Congress that follows will request. This presupposes that the current closure round will be completed by the DoD. Action on the do-it-again front, however, is unlikely to be brought to a successful conclusion.

That is not necessarily an assured thing. Of the eight members appointed to the BRAC 95 Commission (four by Republicans and four by Democrats), three have been highlighted so far for potential conflicts of interest (Al Cornella, Wendi Steele, and retired AF General J. B. Davis).<sup>46</sup> Cornella and Davis have recused themselves from deliberations in which the conflicts could surface. Steele, a close associate of Senator Don Nickles (R-OK), has declined to do so on the grounds that her principles and objectivity put her above such concerns. The proof will be in the process.

That process is now underway but with few solid indications where it is headed. Historically, BRAC commissions have largely accepted DoD-proposed closure lists, tinkering with them primarily at the margins. Whether the same pattern will be repeated this year remains in question. Commission Chairman Alan J. Dixon already has gone on record as stating that DoD's list of bases for closure is too small. "Even more installations will be added to the list of those marked for closing," Dixon has said, footnoting: "We've already made a determination

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup>BRAC 95 Commission member biographies are included at Attachment 6.

that we will add some."<sup>47</sup> It is too early to judge to what extent the reality will catch up with the rhetoric.

## **8.0 Conclusions**

---

√ **Depots Avoid Comparison With Private Sector.** ALCs perform many legitimate "Core" depot maintenance functions but appear also to be engaged extensively in research and maintenance/repair activity that is not inherently or exclusively military in nature. The extent to which these activities could be accomplished equally well in the private sector at comparable cost -- or more cheaply -- has not been examined thoroughly and systematically. Data provided by the ALCs does not encourage such an examination.

√ **Depots Are Insular and Insulated.** Information presented on -- and assessments made of -- depot uniqueness by individual ALCs indicates, to some degree, a lack of awareness on the part of depot managers of the facilities, equipment, and capabilities that exist today in private industry. In spite of sporadic sniping at each other, the individual ALCs do not even appear to be fully aware of the facilities, equipment, and capabilities resident at other ALCs.

√ **Depots Duplicate Competencies/Workload.** Clearly, there is extensive duplication of facilities, equipment, and workload among the ALCs. However, there is no information presented justifying that duplication in terms of total end items and weapon systems supported or other objective, quantifiable qualities. It is likely that a review of Navy/Marine and Army depots would reveal similarly repeated capabilities.

√ **Depot Self-Valuation Emphasizes the Subjective.** One-of-a-kind facilities, equipment, and capabilities are a source of much justifiable pride at each ALC. Unfortunately, this prevents the actual value ("cost benefit" or "cost utility") of these facilities, equipment, and capabilities from being measured objectively. Many facilities and equipment appear to exist solely or primarily to support small numbers of weapon systems that are in limited use with and/or being retired from the US military. In some cases, the only current user is a foreign military service. In no case is an *income capitalization* or similarly objective appraisal technique employed to justify the retention of capability or duplication of capacity. The application of such techniques could provide an objective basis for identifying uneconomic functions for transfer to the private sector.

---


<sup>47</sup>Richard A. Serrano, "Panel Questions Decision to Close Long Beach Yard," *Los Angeles Times*, 7 March 1995, p. 1.

# **SDS International**

---

## **Attachments**

- 1. Air Force Depot Capacity/Plant Comparisons**
- 2. Base Realignment and Closure Process**
- 3. Prior BRAC Actions -- Major Base Closure Summary**
- 4. BRAC 95 -- Proposed Major Base Closures/Realignments**
- 5. DoD BRAC 95 Proposal -- Job Changes By State**
- 6. Biographies of BRAC 95 Commissioners**
- 7. Explanation of Workload Tables**
- 8. Table of Acronyms**



## Air Force Depot Capacity/Plant Comparisons

	Sacramento [SM-ALC] McClellan AFB, CA		Ogden [OO-ALC] Hill AFB, UT		Oklahoma City [OC-ALC] Tinker AFB, OK		San Antonio [SA-ALC] Kelly AFB, TX		Warner Robins [WR-ALC] Robins AFB, GA	
	FY96	FY99	FY96	FY99	FY96	FY99	FY96	FY99	FY96	FY99
<b>Capacity, Workload, Facilities &amp; Land<sup>1</sup></b>										
Baseline (kDLH)										
Capacity Index (CI) <sup>2</sup>	7,058	7,068	7,614	7,614	7,753	7,811	8,897	8,804	8,187	8,187
Programmed Workload <sup>3</sup>	5,509	4,871	5,221	4,988	7,058	7,122	6,496	5,782	7,376	6,763
Utility Index (UI) <sup>4</sup>	78%	69%	69%	66%	91%	91%	73%	66%	90%	83%
<b>Core (kDLH)</b>										
Required Core Capability <sup>5</sup>	4,831	4,824	4,895	4,895	6,695	6,695	4,429+	4,429+	6,941	6,941
Req Core/CI	68%	68%	64%	64%	86%	86%	50%+	50%+	85%	85%
Programmed Core <sup>6</sup>	4,249	4,231	4,895	4,895	6,695	6,658	4,463	4,463	6,941	6,763
Prgm Core/CI	60%	60%	64%	64%	86%	85%	50%	51%	85%	83%
Prgm Core/Req Core	88%	88%	100%	100%	100%	99%	100%+	100%+	100%	97%+
Prgm Core/Prgm Workload	77%	87%	94%	98%	95%	94%	69%	78%	94%	100%
<b>Potential (kDLH)</b>										
Max Capacity <sup>7</sup>	10,227	10,271	9,005	9,005	12,863	12,863	15,220	15,220	9,913	9,913
CI/Max	69%	69%	85%	85%	60%	61%	58%	58%	83%	83%
Prgm Workload/Max	54%	47%	58%	55%	55%	55%	43%	38%	74%	68%
Req Core/Max	47%	47%	54%	54%	52%	52%	29%+	29%+	70%	70%
<b>Values (m\$)</b>										
Workload <sup>8</sup>	\$482	\$456	\$374	\$399	\$881	\$1,000	\$993	\$979	\$628	\$583
Plant Replacement Value <sup>9</sup>	\$3,100	\$3,619	\$2,701	\$2,944	\$2,405	\$3,415	\$1,436	\$1,554	\$1,975	\$2,442
Workload/Plant Value	16%	13%	14%	14%	37%	29%	69%	63%	32%	24%
<b>Facilities (kSF)</b>										
Total (Substandard) <sup>10</sup>	3,432 (88)		4,981 (1,866)		5,447 (290)		4,750 (1,146)		3,938 (992)	
Expansion Space <sup>11</sup>	1,168 (1,015)		1,318 (525)		1,844 (675)		489 (70)		775 (56)	
<b>Real Estate (acres)</b>										
Owned <sup>12</sup>	3,786		962,021		5,020		4,661		8,720	
Developed	3,350		4,710		2,071		3,016		4,085	
Available to develop <sup>13</sup>	436		9,406		266		962		502	

[Notes on following pages]

## Notes for Table "Air Force Depot Capacity/Plant Comparisons"

[Source: Air Force Data Call Supplements submitted to Joint Cross Service Group on Depot Maintenance, February 1995]

1. **Capacity** in thousands of Direct Labor Hours (kDLH); **Workload** in kDLH or \$ millions (m\$); **Facilities** in thousands of square feet (kSF); **Land** in acres.
2. "Capacity Index" (CI) is defined as overall depot maintenance production capacity assuming existing facilities and equipment (plus funded, in-process facility and equipment improvements for FY99) and a single-shift, 40-hour work week.
3. Workload currently programmed for FYs shown.
4. "Utility Index" (UI) is "Programmed Workload" as a percentage of "Capacity Index" ( $\text{Prgm Workload/CI}$ ).
5. Capability to be maintained by the ALC to perform depot maintenance work designated as "Core" (including both own-Service and other-Service requirements) in accordance with OUSD(L) Memorandum dated 15 November 1993, subject: Policy for Maintaining Core Depot Maintenance Capability. While the OUSD(L) policy memorandum provides broad guidance, the implementation of that guidance resulting in the designation of "Core" requirements is a Service function and is not wholly standardized between the Military Departments. "Required Core Capability" may include surge requirements as well as peacetime needs.
6. Programmed workload for the FYs shown that is assigned against "Core" maintenance functions.
7. "Maximum Potential Capacity" assuming current projected workload remains as assigned, sufficient production demand to justify maximum hiring with no significant new investment in capital equipment, no MILCON beyond that already approved and funded, and a single-shift, 40-hour work week.
8. Current workload projections for FYs shown expressed in millions of dollars.
9. Estimated replacement value (in FY95 dollars) of equipment and facilities (including buildings, pavements, and utilities) associated directly with depot maintenance activity. Note that this does not equate to "market value" as used in the commercial appraisal of real estate (which generally is determined through applying a combination of *cost*, *sales comparison*, and *income capitalization* techniques, and which must account for *demand* within a more universal market framework) and can be used only for "rough order of magnitude" comparisons between military installations so-valued. This artificiality is reflected in the detailed tabular data breakouts for each installation which reflect a steady appreciation in "value" of both facilities and equipment, irrespective of their *diminished utility* resulting from accrued depreciation (a function of *physical deterioration*, *functional obsolescence*, and *external obsolescence*).
10. Total area (in thousands of square feet) of buildings and special pads used to perform depot maintenance functions. Does not include general purpose space used by multiple organizations on a base, uncovered storage space, or ramp space. That part of the total that is contained in buildings rated "substandard" or "inadequate" is shown in parentheses.

11. Total additional space that could be obtained for depot maintenance functions (not administrative space) by reconfiguring and/or rehabilitating existing underutilized facilities to accept new or increased requirements. That part of the total that is contained in buildings rated "substandard" or "inadequate" is shown in parentheses.
12. Installation land owned by the government in the proximity of the depot maintenance area.
13. That owned land with no outstanding environmental constraints or operational restrictions. (Note that because some Ogden ALC facilities are sited on the Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR), the amount of land feasibly available for depot expansion there may be overstated.)



## Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Process

After hundreds of military installations were shuttered in the 1970s following the end of the Vietnam War, members of Congress enacted Section 2687 of Title 10, United States Code (USC), in order to impede the base closure process and thereby protect their constituencies from the adverse economic consequences of such actions. This required the Department of Defense (DoD) to notify Congress if an installation became a closure or realignment candidate, and imposed expensive and time-consuming environmental evaluations on all prospective closure actions. The law effectively halted base closures.

By the mid-1980s, however, Congress began to recognize that base-structure bloat constituted an increasingly unacceptable burden on the military departments and was forcing DoD to direct an ever-greater percentage of diminished operating funds to the maintenance of unneeded facilities. Thus, Congress cooperated closely with the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) in 1988 to develop a mechanism that would permit base structure to be reduced commensurately with force structure reductions while *insulating individual legislators from the political consequences*. The result was Public Law 100-526, enacted in October 1988, which created a BRAC Commission under SECDEF to independently study domestic base needs and recommend facilities for closure or realignment. The Commission subsequently recommended that 86 facilities be closed and 59 others be realigned.

In January 1990, the SECDEF attempted to implement additional base closures without prior coordination with Congress or the benefit of advice from an independent group (the 1988 BRAC Commission's charter had by then expired). In the face of Congressional protests that base selection had been politically influenced, agreement was reached between the executive and legislative branches to reestablish an objective (and, ostensibly, *politically neutral*) closure/realignment mechanism. The result this time was Public Law 101-510, signed in November of 1990, which established a BRAC process significantly different from that employed in 1988 and provided for BRAC recommendations to be made in 1991, 1993, and 1995. One of the two main changes between the new process and the one employed in 1988 was that, under the new system, proceedings were to be more open and involve actively soliciting input from the communities affected. The other was that, unlike 1988 when the BRAC Commission worked under SECDEF and itself identified and recommended facilities for closure, the new system cast the BRAC Commission in the role of independently reviewing and analyzing facility changes recommended by the SECDEF, and then reporting its conclusions directly to the President.

In 1991 the BRAC Commission recommended 34 base closures and 48 realignments. In 1993, the Commission added 73 installations for further consideration as potential closure/realignment candidates to the 165 facilities originally recommended by the SECDEF, and subsequently recommended 130 closures and 45 realignments. For 1995, the last year that existing legislation provides for BRAC activities, it had been predicted that more facilities would be recommended for closure/realignment than the total of all facilities affected during the previous three BRAC rounds.

### Main Provisions of Public Law 101-510

**Commission Membership.** The BRAC Commission consists of eight members appointed by the President *with the advice and consent of the Senate*. Nominations must be submitted by the President to the Senate by not later than 3 January 1995 or the BRAC process for 1995 is terminated. In identifying nominees, the President should consult with the Speaker of the House of Representatives on two, the Senate majority leader on two, and the minority leaders in both houses on one each. For 1995, the only member nominated to and confirmed by the Senate so far is the Commission's chairman-designate, former Senator Alan Dixon (D-IL).

**Base Selection Criteria.** Bases are to be nominated, evaluated, and selected for closure or realignment on the basis of (a) six-year force-structure plans submitted by DoD as part of the FY96 Defense Budget process, and (b) specific selection criteria identified and published by the SECDEF by not later than 15 February 1995 (and not disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress before 15 March 1995). The prioritized criteria shown below were used in BRAC deliberations in both 1991 and 1993.

- |                          |  |
|--------------------------|--|
| <b><u>Military</u></b>   | 1. Mission requirements and operational readiness impacts.   |
|                          | 2. Land, facility, and airspace availability.  |
|                          | 3. Ability to accommodate contingency and mobilization requirements.   |
|                          | 4. Cost and manpower implications.   |
| <b><u>Investment</u></b> | 5. Extent/timing of potential costs and savings.   |
| <b><u>Impacts</u></b>    | 6. Economic impact on communities (including, for BRAC 95, cumulative impact in light of prior BRAC actions) |
|                          | 7. Ability of receiving communities' infrastructure to support change.                                       |
|                          | 8. Environmental impact.   |

**Sequence of Events.** All BRAC Commission members must be nominated to the Senate by not later than 3 January 1995. (While not covered by the law, it is reported that SECDEF has given all of the Services until 3 January to submit to him their recommendations for base closure and realignment.) The SECDEF must promulgate the list of military installations within the US being recommended for closure or realignment by not later than 15 March 1995. After holding public hearings and conducting deliberations, but by not later than 1 July, the BRAC Commission transmits its findings and conclusion to the President. The Commission can change any of the SECDEF's recommendations if it determines he deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and/or selection criteria. By 15 July the President must approve or disapprove the Commission's recommendations. If he approves, he transmits his certification to Congress which then has 45 legislative days to enact a joint resolution *disapproving* the recommendations. If it fails to do so, the indicated closures and realignments go into effect. If the President disapproves the Commission's recommendations, the Commission has until 15 August to submit to the President a revised list of recommendations. The President then has until 1 September to forward a certification of approval of the revised list to Congress, which again has 45 legislative days to enact a joint resolution of disapproval. If the President does not forward his certification of the revised list to Congress by 1 September, or if the Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval, the BRAC process for 1995 is terminated. The President and Congress must approve or disapprove the Commission's recommendations in their entirety. The process does not allow individual bases or facilities to be singled out.

## Prior BRAC Actions -- Major Base Closure Summary<sup>48</sup> (US and Territories)

### BRAC 88

#### 16 Closures

Chanute AFB, IL	Philadelphia Naval Hospital, PA	Jefferson Proving Ground, IN
Mather AFB, CA	*Naval Station Galveston, TX	Lexington Army Depot, KY
Pease AFB, NH	*Naval Station Lake Charles, LA	Army Material Tech Lab, MA
George AFB, CA	Presidio of San Francisco, CA	Fort Douglas, UT
Norton AFB, CA	Fort Sheridan, IL	Cameron Station, VA
Naval Station Brooklyn, NY		

\* Denotes facilities that were never opened

### BRAC 91

#### 26 Closures

Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN	Naval Station Long Beach, CA	Grissom AFB, IN
Fort Devens, MA	Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, PA	Loring AFB, ME
Fort Ord, CA	Naval Station Puget Sound, WA	Lowry AFB, CO
Sacramento Army Depot, CA	Tustin MCAS, CA	Myrtle Beach AFB, SC
Hunters Point Annex, CA	England AFB, LA	Richards-Gebaur ARS, MO
Chase Field NAS, TX	Bergstrom AFB, TX	Rickenbacker ANGB, OH
Moffett NAS, CA	Carswell AFB, TX	Williams AFB, AZ
Naval Station Philadelphia, PA	Eaker AFB, AK	Wurtsmith AFB, MI
Castle AFB, CA	Naval Electric Systems Engineering Center, San Diego, CA	

### BRAC 93

#### 28 Closures

Vint Hill Farms, VA	Naval Station Mobile, AL	Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, CA
MCAS El Toro, CA	NAS Alameda, CA	Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, CA
Naval Hospital Oakland, CA	Naval Station Treasure Island, CA	Naval Training Center San Diego, CA
NAS Cecil Field, FL	Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, FL	Naval Training Center Orlando, FL
NAS Agana, Guam	NAS Barbers Point, HI	NAS Glenview, IL
Naval Station Charleston, SC	Naval Station Staten Island, NY	Charleston Naval Shipyard, SC
NAS Dallas, TX	Homestead AFB, FL	O'Hare IAP ARS, IL
Plattsburgh AFB, NY	Gentile AFS, OH (DESC)	Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, VA
K.I. Sawyer AFB, MI	Newark AFB, OH	Defense Personnel Support Center, Philadelphia, PA
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, St. Inigoes, MD		

**Table A3-1: Major Bases Closed (Prior)**

<sup>48</sup>List presents only facilities identified for **closure**, not those identified for **realignment**. Closures and realignments are considered "major" when they result in the loss of at least 300 military/civilian jobs.

### Closure Summary By Service

Major Domestic Base Closures						
	Bases Start	BRAC 88	BRAC 91	BRAC 93	Bases Left	Reduction
Army	109	-7	-4	-1	97	11%
Navy Marine Corps	168	-4	-9	-20	135	20%
Air Force	206	-5	-13	-5	183	11%
Defense Agencies	12	0	0	-2	10	17%
Totals	495	-16	-26	-28	425	15%

**Table A3-2: By-Service Base Closure Summary (Prior)**

### Closure Summary By State

States With More Than 1 Major Base Closure					
State	BRAC 88	BRAC 91	BRAC 93	Total	% of All
CA	4	8	7	19	27
TX	1	3	1	5	7
FL	-	-	4	4	6
IL	2	-	2	4	6
PA	1	2	1	4	6
IN	1	2	-	3	4
NY	1	-	2	3	4
OH	0	1	2	3	4
SC	-	1	2	3	4
VA	1	-	2	3	4
LA	1	1	-	2	3
MA	1	1	-	2	3
MI	-	1	1	2	3
All Others	3	6	4	13	19
Totals	16	26	28	70	100

**Table A3-3: By-State Base Closure Summary (Prior)**

**1995 Department of Defense BRAC List of  
Major Facilities for Closure and Realignment<sup>49</sup>  
(US and Territories)**

**Closures**

<b>Army</b>		<b>Navy</b>		<b>Air Force</b>		<b>DLA</b>	
<i>Installation</i>	<i>Δ Jobs<sup>50</sup>: Net Gain/(Loss)</i>	<i>Installation</i>	<i>Δ Jobs: Net Gain/(Loss)</i>	<i>Installation</i>	<i>Δ Jobs: Net Gain/(Loss)</i>	<i>Installation</i>	<i>Δ Jobs: Net Gain/(Loss)</i>
Fort McClellan, AL	(8,536)	Adak NAF, AK	(678)	North Highlands Air Guard Station, NY	0	Memphis Defense Depot, TN	(1,300)
Fort Chaffee, AR	(247)	Long Beach NSY, CA	(4,029)	Ontario IAP AGS, CA	0	Ogden Defense Depot, UT	(1,113)
Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, CO	(2,903)	Guam SRF, GU	(663)	Rome Laboratory, NY	(1,067)	Red River Defense Depot, TX	(2,901)
Price Support Center, IL	(225)	Indianapolis NAWC-AD, IN	(2,841)	Roslyn AGS, NY	(44)	Letterkenny Defense Depot, PA	(378)
Savanna Army Depot Activity, IL	(450)	Louisville NSWC DET, KY	(1,464)	Springfield-Beckley MAP AGS, OH	0		
Fort Ritchie, MD	(2,344)	White Oak NSWC DET, MD	(202)	Greater Pittsburgh IAP ARS, PA	(387)		
Selfridge Army Garrison, MI	(609)	South Weymouth NAS, MA	(936)	Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, TX	(585)		
Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, NJ	(1,367)	Meridian NAS, MS	(2,581)	Brooks AFB, TX	(3,759)		
Seneca Army Depot, NY	(325)	Lakehurst NAWC-AD, NJ	(1,763)	Reese AFB, TX	(2,083)		
Fort Indiantown Gap, PA	(521)	Warminster NAWC-AD, PA	(348)				
Red River Army Depot, TX	(2,901)						
Fort Pickett, VA	(254)						

**Table A4-1: BRAC 95 -- Major Base Closures**

<sup>49</sup>Data extracted from News Release No. 095-95, "Secretary Perry Recommends Closing, Realigning 146 Bases," released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 28 February 1995, and from the formal *Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment Report* published by DoD in March 1995. Closures and realignments supposedly are considered "major" only when they result in the adjustment of at least 300 military/civilian jobs. A review of information included in the two sources cited, however, fails to clarify why bases such as the Air Force's North Highlands Air Guard Station, NY, are reflected as "Major Closures." Similarly, there is no explanation for the omission from the list of DLA's Defense Distribution Depots at Letterkenny, PA, and Red River, TX. They have been included here by the author.

<sup>50</sup>Jobs include active, reserve, and student military personnel along with civilian and on-base contractor positions.

## Realignments

Army		Navy		Air Force	
<i>Installation</i>	<i>Δ Jobs<sup>51</sup>: Net Gain/(Loss)</i>	<i>Installation</i>	<i>Δ Jobs: Net Gain/(Loss)</i>	<i>Installation</i>	<i>Δ Jobs: Net Gain/(Loss)</i>
Fort Greely, AK	(724)	Key West NAS, FL	(20)	McClellan AFB, CA	379
Fort Hunter Liggett, CA	(478)	Guam Naval Activities, GU	(2,421)	Onizuka AS, CA	(1,875)
Sierra Army Depot, CA	(592)	Corpus Christi NAS, TX	(142)	Eglin AFB, FL	719
Fort Meade (Hospital), MD	(129)	Keyport NUWC, WA	64	Robins AFB, GA	(534)
Detroit Arsenal, MI	186			Malmstrom AFB, MT	(779)
Fort Dix, NJ	(739)			Kirtland AFB, NM	(6,850)
Fort Hamilton, NY	(49)			Grand Forks AFB, ND	(1,625)
Charles E. Kelly Support Center, PA	(121)			Tinker AFB, OK	(704)
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA	(2,090)			Kelly AFB, TX	221
Fort Buchanan, PR	(182)			Hill AFB, UT	147
Dugway Proving Ground, UT	(1,096)				
Fort Lee (Hospital), VA	(205)				

**Table A4-2: BRAC 95 -- Major Base Realignments**

<sup>51</sup> Jobs include active, reserve, and student military personnel along with civilian and on-base contractor positions.

**Department of Defense Recommended  
BRAC 95 Job Changes by State<sup>52</sup>**

STATE	Δ JOBS: GAINS/(LOSSES)		STATE	Δ JOBS: GAINS/(LOSSES)	
	Military <sup>53</sup>	Civilian <sup>54</sup>		Military	Civilian
Alabama	(5,877)	931	Montana	(719)	(60)
Alaska	(773)	(368)	Nebraska	0	0
Arizona	147	184	Nevada	87	85
Arkansas	(40)	(207)	New Hampshire	0	0
California	602	(3,988)	New Jersey	(758)	(1,866)
Colorado	(841)	(1,320)	New Mexico	(3,188)	(1,950)
Connecticut	13	(609)	New York	(41)	(1,415)
Delaware	0	0	North Carolina	703	0
District of Columbia	225	0	North Dakota	(1,506)	(119)
Florida	3,754	679	Ohio	1,313	512
Georgia	791	(613)	Oklahoma	1,870	(379)
Guam	(2,104)	(2,665)	Oregon	0	0
Hawaii	995	773	Pennsylvania	(221)	(3,379)
Idaho	123	3	Puerto Rico	(59)	(123)
Illinois	(72)	(588)	Rhode Island	522	572
Indiana	(23)	(1,027)	South Carolina	4,569	31
Iowa	0	0	South Dakota	0	0
Kansas	(10)	(4)	Tennessee	222	(996)
Kentucky	1,401	(1,395)	Texas	(375)	(6,606)
Louisiana	(39)	(60)	Utah	(173)	(1,889)
Maine	215	5	Vermont	0	0
Maryland	(481)	(1,211)	Virginia	4,354	(511)
Massachusetts	(628)	453	Washington	780	0
Michigan	0	(280)	West Virginia	0	(7)
Minnesota	0	0	Wisconsin	(6)	0
Mississippi	(1,519)	(710)	Wyoming	0	0
Missouri	1,164	(4,102)			
<b>NET JOB ADJUSTMENTS</b>				<b>4,397</b>	<b>(34,219)</b>

**Table A5-1: BRAC 95 -- By-State Job Losses**

<sup>52</sup> Includes Guam, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.

<sup>53</sup> Includes all active, reserve, and student personnel.

<sup>54</sup> Includes all civilian and on-base contractor positions.



## 1995 Base Realignment and Closure Commission

--

### Member Biographies

#### ALAN J. DIXON, Chairman

Alan J. Dixon was confirmed by the US Senate October 7, 1994, as chairman of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Dixon, 67, is a senior partner in the corporate and business department of the St. Louis-based law firm of Bryan Cave, which he joined in 1993 after representing Illinois in the US Senate for 12 years. Until his defeat in the Democratic primary election in 1992, Dixon had enjoyed an unbroken string of 29 election victories dating from 1949 when, while attending law school, he was elected police magistrate in his hometown of Belleville, Illinois.

In 1988 and again in 1990, Democratic Senators elected him unanimously to serve as chief deputy whip, their number three leadership post.

During his Senate career, Dixon held important positions on the committees on Armed Services, Small Business, and Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.

On the Armed Services Committee, he chaired the Subcommittee on Readiness, Preparedness and Sustainability, which oversees 38 percent of the US defense budget. The subcommittee was one of those responsible for making sure US manpower and weapons systems employed in the Persian Gulf War were adequate for the task. In 1990, he co-authored the legislation that created the commission he now chairs and the process under which the federal government operates to close realign military bases in the United States.

Dixon began a 20-year career in the Illinois General Assembly with election to the House of Representatives in 1950. As a legislator, he wrote or co-sponsored legislation that produced or nurtured the state's modern criminal code, the modern judicial article to the Illinois Constitution, the state's community college system, and its open meetings law.

He served as Illinois Treasurer from 1971-77, during which time his policies earned hundreds of millions of dollars for Illinois taxpayers and he established investment incentives for Illinois banks to encourage them to invest locally.

He was elected Illinois Secretary of State a margin of 1.3 million votes in 1976. In 1978, he was re-elected by 1.5 million votes, becoming the first candidate in Illinois history to carry all 102 counties in the state, including all 30 townships in suburban Cook County and all 50 wards in the City of Chicago.

He was the first Democratic statewide candidate to disclose the sources and amounts of all campaign contributions, and since 1970, his personal financial assets and liabilities were a matter of public record.

Dixon is a graduate of the University of Illinois and holds a law degree from Washington University in St. Louis. He and his wife, Jody, have three children and seven grandchildren.

**AL CORNELLA**

Al Cornella is the President of Cornella Refrigeration Inc., a Rapid City, South Dakota, firm specializing in commercial and industrial refrigeration. He is a US Navy Veteran with service in Vietnam and has been active in military issues for over a decade.

Cornella has also served on a number of boards and commissions in South Dakota, including the Rapid City Chamber of Commerce. During his tenure with the Chamber, he served as Chairman of the Board of Directors from 1991-1992 and as Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee.

In 1992, Mr. Cornella was appointed by former South Dakota Governor George Mickelson to serve on the State Commission on Hazardous Waste Disposal.

Mr. Cornella currently serves on the boards of the South Dakota Air and Space Foundation and the Rapid City Economic Development Loan Fund.

**REBECCA G. COX**

Rebecca G. Cox is currently a Vice President of Continental Airlines, Inc. She joined Continental in January, 1989. In 1993, she served as a Member of the Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission.

Before joining Continental, Cox served as Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Public Liaison, President Reagan's primary outreach effort to the private sector. She was also appointed by the President to serve as Chairman of the Interagency Committee for Women's Business Enterprise.

Prior to her 1987 White House appointment, Cox had served as Assistant Secretary for Governmental Affairs at the Department of Transportation. As Assistant Secretary, she was responsible for coordinating legislative strategies and non-legislative relationships between the Department and Congress, as well as ensuring a continuing Departmental program for effective communication and policy development with other Federal agencies, state and local governments, and national organizations.

Ms. Cox had previously served at the Department of Transportation as Counselor to Secretary Elizabeth Dole and as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Government Affairs.

Before coming to the Department of Transportation, Cox worked in the US Senate first as staff assistant, then legislative assistant and, finally, as Chief of Staff to US Senator Ted Stevens. As Chief of Staff, she was responsible for managing the Senator's Alaska staff, the leadership duties of the Office of the Assistant Majority Leader and the oversight of his Subcommittee assignments including those involving the Commerce, Appropriations, and Governmental Affairs Committees.

In 1976, she received a B.A. degree from DePauw University in Greencastle, Indiana and a Juris Doctorate degree from the Columbus School of Law, Catholic University, Washington, D.C. in 1981.

Ms. Cox resides in Newport Beach, California with her husband Chris and their two children.

**JAMES B. DAVIS**

In August of 1993, General J.B. Davis concluded a thirty-five year career with the United States Air Force as a combat fighter pilot, commander and strategic planner and programmer. He has served as a commander of a combat fighter wing, of the US Air Force's Military Personnel Center, Pacific Air Forces, and United States Forces Japan. On the staff side, he served as the Director and Programmer of the US Air Force's personnel and training, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Intelligence Pacific Air Forces, and served his last two years on active duty as the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO).

During his career he has had extensive experience in operations, intelligence, human resource management, and political/military and international affairs. He has commanded a nuclear capable organization of about six thousand personnel and a joint service organization of about sixty thousand personnel and several sizes in between.

In the 1990's, he was deeply involved in the successful multimillion dollar negotiations for support of US Forces in Japan and the Japanese financial support of US Forces in Desert Storm. In NATO, he was the chief negotiator with the North Atlantic Council and the United Nations for NATO's participation in the Yugoslavian conflict.

General Davis has lived overseas for more than ten years almost evenly split between the Pacific and Europe. Because of his official duties, he has traveled extensively to all the ASEAN and NATO countries and many of the Central and Eastern European countries, including Hungary and Albania, meeting with Ministers of State and Defense, Prime Ministers, and Presidents.

General Davis has a B.S. degree in Engineering from the US Naval Academy, a Masters degree in Public Administration from Auburn University at Montgomery, and has attended multiple professional schools.

### S. LEE KLING

S. Lee Kling serves as Chairman of the Board of Kling Rechter & Company, a merchant banking company. The company was formed in 1991. Additionally, he serves as a Special Advisor and Managing Director of Willis Corroon Corp. of Missouri.

Mr. Kling served as Chairman of the Board of Landmark Bancshares Corporation, a St. Louis based bank holding company located in Missouri and Illinois, from 1975 through December 1991 when the company merged with Magna Group, Inc. He served additionally as the company's Chief Executive Officer from 1974 through October 1990, except for the year 1978 when he served as Assistant Special Counselor on Inflation for the White House, and in that capacity as Deputy for Ambassador Robert S. Strauss.

From 1953 until 1974, Mr. Kling was in the insurance brokerage business. He founded his own insurance firm in 1965, which was sold in 1969 to a publicly traded manufacturing company, Weil McClain Co., Inc. He remained with the company as Chairman and CEO of the insurance division until 1974, when the company was sold to Reed Stenhouse of Canada. He then continued on a part-time basis for a number of years.

From 1974 to 1977, Mr. Kling served as Finance Chairman of the Democratic National Committee and a member of its Executive Committee. In 1976, he was Treasurer of the Democratic National Convention. He founded and chaired for two years the Democratic Congressional House and Senate Council. He was Co-Chairman in 1977 of the Democratic Congressional Dinner, and in 1982 was the recipient of the Democratic National Committee Distinguished Service Award. He served as National Treasurer of the Carter-Mondale Election Committee, and in 1987-88 Mr. Kling served as National Treasurer of the Gephardt for President Committee.

Mr. Kling was Co-Chairman of the Citizens Committee for the Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties. In 1979 he served as United States Economic Advisor representing the private sector during the peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt. In 1982-83 he was Co-Chairman of the Coalition for Enactment of the Caribbean Basin Initiative legislation. Mr. Kling serves on the boards of a number of public and private corporations, civic and charitable organizations.

He received the Distinguished Business Alumni Award from Washington University in 1989 and was the Missouri Building & Construction Trade Counsel "Construction Man of the Year" in 1990.

Mr. Kling and his wife, Rosalyn Hauss, have four children. Their residence is at Grayling Farms in Villa Ridge, which is just west of St. Louis, Missouri. He attended New York Military Academy, Cornwall-on-Hudson, New York, and received his B.S.B.A. degree from Washington University in St. Louis. From 1950 to 1952, he served in the Army as a 1st Lieutenant and aide-de-camp to General Buy O. Kurtz. Mr. Kling was born in St. Louis, Missouri on December 22, 1928.

**BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA**

Benjamin F. Montoya is currently the President and Chief Executive Officer of Public Service Company of New Mexico, an investor-owned public utility serving gas, electricity, and water throughout the State.

His private sector career, which began in 1989 when he retired from the Navy, has included the positions of Manager, Vice President, and Senior Vice President of Pacific Gas and Electric company, San Francisco.

Mr. Montoya enjoyed a distinguished and decorated US Navy career spanning 31 years, rising to the rank of Rear Admiral. He served as Commanding Officer of the Navy Public Works Center in San Diego, California; Commander of the Western Division Naval Facilities Engineering Command in San Bruno, California; and Director of the Shore Activities Division in the Office of Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) in Washington, D.C. From 1987-1989, he assumed the duty as Commander of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command and Chief of Civil Engineers. Mr. Montoya was selected to the rank of Rear Admiral in March, 1987.

His awards include the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V," Meritorious Service Medal, Navy Commendation Medal, and the Navy Achievement Medal.

Mr. Montoya is a graduate of the US Naval Academy. He also holds a Bachelor of Science degree in civil engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, a Master of Science degree in sanitary engineering from Georgia Institute of Technology.

**JOSUE (JOE) ROBLES, JR.**

Joe Rubles is Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer/Corporate Controller for USAA Financial Services. He directs USAA's activities in the areas of Payroll and Compensation Accounting, Accounting Policy, Corporate Financial Analysis, Internal Audit, and Taxes. He joined USAA in July 1994 as Special Assistant to the Chairman after retiring from the US Army as a Major General after 28 years of service. He assumed the role of CFO/Controller in September 1994.

General Robles was born in Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico, January 24, 1946. He joined the US Army in 1966 and received his commission at a second lieutenant through the Artillery Officer Candidate School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma in 1967. He received a Bachelor of Business Administration degree in Accounting from Kent State University in 1972. He also holds a Master of Business Administration from Indiana State University. His military education included Field Artillery Basic and Advanced courses, US Army Command and General Staff College, Spanish General Staff College, and US Naval War College.

Rubles served in a variety of important command and staff positions, culminating in his assignment as Commander General, 1st Infantry (Mech) at Fort Riley, Kansas. Prior to that position, General Robles served as Director of the Army Budget, and as the assistant division commander, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. The latter included participation in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. His early troop assignments included command and staff positions in Field Artillery units in Korea; Fort Knox, Kentucky; Vietnam; and Germany.

Rubles' mid-level assignments included work with the Resource Management Department, US Army Institute of Administration, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. He also served as special assistant to the G-3, 1st Infantry Division (Mech), and battalion commander, 1st Battalion 7th Field Artillery, 1st Infantry Division, both at Fort Riley, Kansas.

Recent assignments included Chief, programming and budget office with Headquarters, US Army, the Pentagon, and Division Artillery commander of the 1st Infantry Division (Mech), Fort Riley, Kansas.

Robles' military awards include the Distinguished Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Legion of Merit with two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Bronze Star Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Meritorious Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Air Medal, the Army Commendation Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Army Good Conduct Medal, and the Army General Staff Identification Badge.

General Rubles is married to the former Patricia Ann Gavin of East Greenwich, Rhode Island and has three sons, Joseph (deceased), Andrew, and Christopher, and a daughter, Melissa.

**WENDI L. STEELE**

Wendi L. Steele served as the Senate liaison for the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission in 1991. She began her career in the Reagan Administration, working in the legislative affairs offices of both the Office of Management and Budget and the White House. Following her service in Washington, Mrs. Steele was a congressional and economic analyst for the Defense and Space Group of the Boeing Company in Seattle, Washington. She returned to D.C. during the Bush Administration and worked for the assistant secretary for legislative and intergovernmental affairs of the US Department of Commerce. In 1993, she staffed defense, veterans' affairs, foreign policy, and trade issues for Senator Don Nickles (R-OK).

Mrs. Steele currently resides with her husband Nick in Houston, Texas, where she is a writer.



## Explanation of Workload Tables

**Workload** is shown in thousands of Direct Labor Hours (kDLH).

**Potential Maximum Capacity** assumes that current workload projections remain as assigned, demand increases sufficiently to justify maximum hiring, there is no significant new investment in capital equipment or military construction beyond that already approved and funded, and a single-shift, 40-hour work week is maintained.

**Existing Capacity** assumes existing facilities and equipment (plus, for FY 99, any currently funded capital improvements that will have been completed by that time), and a single-shift, 40-hour work week.

**Programmed Total Workload** is that workload currently booked or forecast.

**Programmed Core Workload** is that portion of the programmed total workload assigned against "Core" maintenance functions. Per DoD memorandum, *Depot Maintenance Capability*, 15 November 1993:

CORE is the capability maintained within organic Defense depots to meet readiness and sustainability requirements of the weapon systems that support the JCS contingency scenario(s). Core depot maintenance capabilities will comprise only the minimum facilities, equipment, and skilled personnel necessary to ensure a ready and controlled source of required technical competence.

The individual Services determine what their "Core" capabilities will be, and are supposed to adhere to the guidance above. However, there is no DoD-wide "quality control" to ensure that the spirit of the standard honored, or that it is applied uniformly across the Military Departments.

Workload data presented in this Handbook are selectively compiled from the initial data call inputs provided by each ALC to the DoD Depot Joint Cross-Service Group. Totals may not add due to rounding and/or erroneous data. Some of the ALC submissions contain apparent discrepancies of up to 30 kDLH. They are reproduced here without change for lack of a reconciliation mechanism. The apparent discrepancies amount to less than one percent of any depot's total workload and, thus, still provide a valid basis for relative comparisons between depots.

## Table of Acronyms

AAG	Aeromedical Airlift Group	MSA	Metropolitan Statistical Area
ACC	Air Combat Command	NAF	Numbered Air Force
AFB	Air Force Base	NAS	Naval Air Station
AFMC	Air Force Materiel Command	NDI	Non-destructive Inspection
AFRES	Air Force Reserve	NM	Nautical Miles
AFSPC	Air Force Space Command	OC-ALC	Oklahoma City ALC
AG	Airlift Group	OO-ALC	Ogden ALC
AISF	Avionics Intermediate Support Facility	RV	Reentry Vehicle
ALC	Air Logistics Center	SA-ALC	San Antonio ALC
ALCM	Air Launched Cruise Missile	SBICBM	Silo-Based Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
AMC	Air Mobility Command	SM-ALC	Sacramento ALC
AMW	Air Mobility Wing	SOW	Special Operations Wing
ANG	Air National Guard	SRAM	Short Range Attack Missile
ARG	Air Refueling Group	SWS	Space Warning Squadron
ARS	Air Refueling Squadron	TAPM	Technology Application Program Management
ARW	Air Refueling Wing	TMDE	Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment
AUTODIN	Automatic Defense Information Network	VHSIC	Very High Speed Integrated Circuits
AW	Airlift Wing	WR-ALC	Warner-Robins ALC
BRAC 95	1995 Base Realignment and Closure process		
CONUS	Continental US		
DDHU	Defense Distribution Depot Hill, Utah		
DDMC	Defense Distribution Depot McClellan, California		
DDOO	Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City, Oklahoma		
DDST	Defense Distribution Depot San Antonio, Texas		
DDWG	Defense Distribution Depot Warner Robins, Georgia		
DISA	Defense Information Services Agency		
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency		
DLH	Direct Labor Hours		
DMC	Defense Megacenter		
DoD	Department of Defense		
FG	Fighter Group		
FS	Fighter Squadron		
FW	Fighter Wing		
GTE	Gas Turbine Engines		
Joint STARS	Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System		
kDLH	Thousands of Direct Labor Hours		
kSF	Thousands of Square Feet		
LANTIRN	Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night		
m\$	Millions of Dollars		
MHE	Material Handling Equipment		
MNRC	McClellan Nuclear Radiation Center		
MOA	Military Operating Area		



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425

ARLINGTON, VA 22209

703-696-0504

9150424-321

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA

REBECCA COX

GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)

S. LEE KLING

RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)

MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)

WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 25, 1995

Mr. William G. Flood  
Senior Vice President  
SDS International  
2011 Crystal Drive; Suite 100  
Arlington, Virginia 22202-3709

Dear Mr. Flood:

Thank you for forwarding a copy of the "1995 Depot Handbook - A Guide to USAF Air Logistics Centers." I appreciate your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

I can assure you that the information contained in the handbook will be made a part of our library, and it will be shared with the other Commissioners.

Thank you again for the handbook. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I can be of service.

Sincerely,

General J. B. Davis, USAF (Ret.)  
Commissioner

JBD:js

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950424-4

FROM: <u>TOBIN, THOMAS G.</u>	TO: <u>STEELE, WENDI L.</u>
TITLE: <u>B/GEN</u>	TITLE: <u>COMMISSIONER</u>
ORGANIZATION: <u>TEAM PLATTSBURGH</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCRC</u>
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: <u>PLATTSBURGH AFB</u>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
				COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER		X	
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Direct Response
✓	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	X	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING DBCRC RE-DIRECT 1993 DECISION TO CLOSE PLATTSBURGH.

Due Date: 950426

Routing Date: 950424

Date Originated: 950420

Mail Date:



# Plattsburgh, New York

Clyde M. Rabideau, Jr.  
Mayor

Office of the Mayor  
City Hall  
Plattsburgh, New York 12901  
518-563-7701

## MEMORANDUM

TO: Wendi L. Steele, Commissioner

FROM: B/Gen. Thomas G. Tobin

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950424-41

DATE: April 20, 1995

RE: A Re-Direct for Plattsburgh Air Force Base in 1995

As you can well imagine Plattsburgh Community Officials, members of Team Plattsburgh, New York Delegates and New York Officials were more than surprised by the 1993 BRAC decision to close Plattsburgh Air Force Base. Plattsburgh seeks a Re-Direct because we believe there is still a position for PAFB in our Nation's Defense Posture.

ATTACHMENT #1 is a listing of criteria supporting the Air Force choice of Plattsburgh as the East Coast Air Mobility Wing choice. The grey shaded area .PROXIMITY TO CUSTOMERS. was not an Air Force factor but was cited as the key (only) reason for choosing McGuire over Plattsburgh, effectively eliminating 28 other criteria (which the BRAC staff and D.O.D. had validated as being Plattsburgh strengths).

Realistically nearly 22 months have transpired and the KC-10 beddown at McGuire is ongoing. It would be another waste of resources to suggest a reversal of the KC-10 basing.

However, some key questions and options remain for your consideration. Let's try to review the decision:

Why the '93 decision was wrong:

1. Plattsburgh Air Force Base was ranked #1 by the Air Force, DOD, GAO, DLA and the BRAC staff for the EAST COAST Air Mobility Mission.
2. Plattsburgh's superior, year-round weather, was disregarded in favor of McGuire's Fog and High summer temperatures.
3. Plattsburgh's traffic free airspace was ignored in favor of a highly congested area at McGuire.
4. Air Crew Safety and Long Term Crew training requirements have been ignored for Northeastern Crews.
5. The largest most modern (1954 construction for a B-47 Super Wing - can park 156 ICC 135's on Ramp with Taxi on Taxi off capability) RAMP is now empty at Plattsburgh.
6. Plattsburgh Ramp Refueling Capacity ignored.

7. Personnel prefer Plattsburgh - it's the Base of choice for the North East.

8. Room for growth, surge and outsize aircraft like C-17 at the already mint condition Plattsburgh facility.

9. Commissioners who visited Plattsburgh did not visit McGuire, therefore a proper comparison NOT possible.

10. Air Force has no MODERN, LARGE RAMPED, ACTIVE DUTY RUNWAY in the Northeast.

What has changed?

1. Active duty tanker imbalance has been created east vs. west.

2. SALT TREATY requirements are progressing, Malmstrom and Grand Forks missiles may draw down negating need for tankers at Malmstrom and Grand Forks.

3. McGuire's air traffic liability has increased and F.A.A. resources are being strained at and around McGuire.

4. Dollars are being spent for upgrades at McGuire that were not required at Plattsburgh:

- Additional aircraft parking
- Hydrant Refueling System
- New Control Tower
- Add to and alter Childcare Center
- Add to Communication Ducts for Cable
- Contingency Communications Element Facility
- Add to Base Supply Facility
- Renovation of Army Houses for Air Force family quarters

However, these upgrades are needed to support basic requirements at McGuire for the KC-10. Set Attachment #2.

5. Future BRACs (year 2000 and beyond) will most likely include (Purple Suit) joint Service Basing/consolidations. Only Plattsburgh has the space for growth and capacity if out year downsizing of combined service capacities is required.

6. Tanker Task Force Mission will now be a National Guard responsibility. This problem is not popular to discuss but daily ground aircrews availability is only 28% of active duty aircrew availability.

A review of the Northeast draw down is provided. As bases were closed from Westover through Pease, Loring and Griffiss, the Air Staff was comforted knows that it still had Plattsburgh as its base of choice. McGuire was over tasked and threatened by traffic restrictions and programmed for downsizing to match capacity. We now have a hole in the Northeast. We now face a regional problem because we are closing our programmed regional solution.


In summary we suggest a range of options exist for Plattsburgh.

A. Training - retain Plattsburgh as a tanker and mobility facility to assure a training site for Northeastern resources.


B. Consolidate - Join AMC & ACC assets at Plattsburgh to create a deployment facility as a Multi-Role Composite Wing.

C. Contonment - Conton Plattsburgh for 24 months or longer so as to allow a final Joint Service Force Structure review after BRAC 95 so as to assure required outyear capacity for DOD.

Respectfully,



Thomas G. Tobin  
B/Gen. USAF (Ret).



Clyde M. Rabideau, Jr.  
Mayor

Background data on Gen. Tobin.

B/Gen. Tobin testified on Plattsburgh's behalf in 1991 and 1993. Gen. Tobin retired in October of 1985 after 30 years active duty of which the major portion was spent in the Strategic Air Command. 12 years experience and assignments in the Northeastern region included 2 postings at Pease Air Force Base and 2 postings at Plattsburgh Air Force Base. While at Pease as 45th Air Division Commander, Gen. Tobin commanded all Strategic Bombers and Tankers at Loring, Pease, Pittsburgh, Griffiss, Plattsburgh, Bangor, McGuire and Dow. Gen. Tobin is the head of the military Advisory Team at Plattsburgh, a non-remunerated position.

"Plattsburgh AFB ranked best in capability to support the Air Mobility Wing due to its geographic location, attributes and base loading capacity." \*

GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION	ATTRIBUTES	CAPACITY
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Northeastern Region</li> <li>• Proximity-Air Refueling Tracks</li> <li>• Training                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No Congestion</li> <li>• Pattern activity (daily)</li> <li>• P-3's</li> <li>• C-5's</li> <li>• C-141's</li> <li>• KC-135's</li> <li>• F-16's</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Tanker Task Force (East)</li> <li>• Low Density Traffic</li> <li>• WX for Recovery of Conus West Bound traffic</li> <li>• Low Density Traffic                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High Altitude</li> <li>• Low Altitude</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Air Bridge to Europe</li> <li>• NATO Support Missions                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• French Base of Choice</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Modern                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ramp/Buildings</li> <li>• Construction 1954 vice</li> <li>• Makeover 1943</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Quality of Life</li> <li>• Runway Length                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 11,000'</li> <li>• Critical summer heat</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Safety</li> <li>• Ramp flexibility</li> <li>• FAA area of choice vice McGuire</li> <li>• Minimum Upgrades                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Best investment</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Rural Setting                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enlisted Moral</li> <li>• Family unity</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Historical Designation                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 28 buildings National Reg.</li> <li>• 2nd oldest continually operating US Military inst.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Educational/Work Opportunity                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Blue Suitors</li> <li>• Spouses</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 156 KC-135 equivalent Parking spaces</li> <li>• 84 Pits                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 50 Refuelings at same time</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Fuel                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Storage (surge capacity)</li> <li>• Rail, barge, track resupply</li> <li>• DLA verified</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Housing                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• On Base</li> <li>• Off Base</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Purple Suite Expansion                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Space accommodates future base closures</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Exercises                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Alert Ramp / Facilities</li> <li>• 9 Hangers</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Squadrons                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 5 -2 - 6</li> </ul> </li> <li>• KC-10                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Growth space</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Largest Number of Aircraft in Strategic Air Command for several years                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Additional ramp could be extended south</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proximity to Customers</li> </ul>		

\* SOURCE: 1993 Capacity Analysis Basing Data

DATA RESOURCE: BRAC Staff R & A, Page 131, PAFB #1

ATCH #1



**McGuire AFB NJ MILCON Project list**

<b>MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECT</b>	<b>PURPOSE of PROJECT</b>	<b>COST IN \$\$\$ THOU</b>	<b>REQ AT PLTBGH</b>
<b>1994 PROJECTS</b>			
Alter Interim Facilities	Support operations and maintenance until permanent facilities are completed	1,350	yes
Refueling Operations Facilities	Provide for additional KC-10 and KC-135 refueling personnel and operations	2,923	yes
Add to Parking Ramp	Provide for additional aircraft parking	6,129	no
Hydrant Refueling System	Provide on ramp refueling capability	20,744	no
Cryogenic Storage Area	To supply proper storage areas for KC-10 cryogenic equipment and supplies	930	yes
<b>1995 Projects</b>			
KC-10 Squadron Operations and Maintenance Facilities	Self Explanatory	8,567	yes
Fuel System Maintenance Dock	Environmentally safe enclosed facility large enough to work on KC-10 fuel systems	12,438	yes
Corrosion Control Facility	Environmentally-safe enclosed facility large enough to paint and strip KC-10s	12,173	yes
KC-10 Maintenance Hanger	Self Explanatory	15,084	yes
KC-10 Contractor Operated and Maintained Base Supply Facility (COMBS)	KC-10 (COMBS) facility to house and maintain specific KC-10 supplies and equipment	6,400	yes
KC-10 Flight Simulator Facility	Facility for simulator to train KC-10 crews	4,350	yes
Control Tower	New Control Tower required; old tower located in a blind spot created by a new KC-10 facility	3,474	no
Add to and Alter Vehicle Complex	Vehicle complex requires additional space to handle additional 100 vehicles	1,821	yes
Add to and Alter Childcare Center	Addition required to meet increased demand of larger population	2,585	no
Utility Work; Extend High Temperature Hot Water (HTHW) Distribution System	Increased demand by additional facilities requires adds to the HTHW distribution system	400	yes
Add to Aero-Medical Service Clinic	Additional clinic space needed to accommodate increase in flying personnel	1,950	yes
Add to Communications Ducts for Cable	Additional comm cable needed to support new facilities	1,000	no
Contingency Communications Element Facility	New facility required because old facility relocated due to new KC-10 bldg	2,944	no
Upgrade Roads to Meet Increased Demand	Self Explanatory	1,400	yes
Add to the Base Supply Facility	Increased KC-10 personnel mobility equipment requires additional space in base supply	300	no
KC-10 Squadron Operations Facility for AFRES Squadron	Self Explanatory	7,338	no
Improve Military Family Housing	Renovate 142 existing units of former Army houses for Air Force family living quarters	15,884 <sup>a</sup>	yes <sup>b</sup>

**NOTES**

a. This alternative being worked with the DoD IG to validate requirement and cost

b. Housing requirement at Plattsburgh would have been new build not renovation at an estimated cost of \$15.0M

Atch # 2

Data provided by SAE/LL 2/1/95 in LTR. to Congressman McHugh

Dear Commissioner Steele:

Thank you for spending valuable time with our package and concerns.

I have added two pages of "Sequence of Events" for your review - These events are my outline - reflection - of the process as "I saw it."

Sincerely

Tom Dobin

## SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

### History of Plattsburgh Air Force Base

Second oldest continually operational Military installation in the United States, after U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

1917 - Home of first ROTC program

1954 - "New Base" portion was constructed for a B-47 and KC-97 "Super Wing". Only Travis has as larger/ramp. Base design similar to Whiteman, Dyess, and other mid-50's bases built to "Cold War needs and specifications". Part of the MEMAY era.

1988 - BRAC. Pease closed, only other large modern ramp in the Northeast.

1991 - BRAC. Loring closed. Loring challenged Plattsburgh. Plattsburgh Air Force Base rated #1 in Northeast. "The Air Force must provide for its people. The best way to accomplish retention is to insure we keep our best facilities so people will have suitable places to live while serving."

1993 - BRAC.

- McGuire, a 1943 base, slated to downsize to match its capacity.
  - FAA on record as needing to reduce traffic/conflict impacts.
- Griffiss, a 1942 base slated to close, B-52's to disperse
  - Excess large aircraft capacity
    - Rome Lab left open
    - Runway contoned for Ft. Drum support
- Plattsburgh scheduled to become East Coast Mobility Wing
  - Northeastern Region Mobility Hub
  - 29 KC-135's remain
  - FB 111's had departed
  - KC-10's from Barbsdale (19)
  - C-141's from McGuire (36)

### Show Ramp Comparison Charts

And then the games began

- McGuire said "PAFB can't get fuel"
  - Not so, but "too expensive"
- Griffiss said "We're better suited than PAFB and PAFB has encroachment problems"
  - Not so. Mall not in clear zone. Parking lot is permitted use.
- NY State said "Keep 'em both - we've got the clout"
  - Cuomo believes in "Cuomo power"

Therefore:

- '93 BRAC says "In the interest of fairness to the communities of McGuire and Griffiss, we'll look at PAFB again - also Grand Forks and Fairchild.
- Team Plattsburgh begins its second effort
  - Air Force choice
  - DLA verifies fuel supply
  - GAO validates capacity
  - FAA validates traffic capacity at PAFB - area of choice

- BRAC staff rated PAFB superior 3 times!!!
- This time:
  - Johnson and Courtier -only commissioners to visit McGuire.
  - Beverly Byron and Capt. Bowman visit PAFB. Byron says base is beautiful, "no problem"
  - Senator Mitchell threatens BRAC over Portsmouth.
  - Chairman Courtier walks out of testimony in Boston
    - Says he'll see PAFB contingency in Washington 2 days later in closed session
  - In Washington, Courtier says:
    - "Our job is to close bases."
    - "We aren't interested in the future."
    - "Yours is the only base we can close."
      - It's over
      - Called Cuomo
      - No help
      - AICUZ at PAFB said to be main fault
      - McGuire not discussed
- Swept under the carpet
  - McGuire can't train with the safety and ease of PAFB(6,000' hold-downs)
  - McGuire has air encroachment
  - McGuire can't park 'em, soft ramp in summer
  - McGuire can't refuel 'em, still using trucks
  - McGuire didn't take 29 KC-135's from PAFB
    - At Grand Forks (for now)
  - McGuire can't house troops, building houses
    - Already at PAFB being renovated for expected mission
  - 28 buildings at PAFB on National Historic Register
  - PAFB can surge during times of crises or during annual joint service training exercises
    - McGuire can't turn any extras
  - 85% fuel load restrictions on KC-10's at McGuire
  - Building new tower (surprise) - How many more surprises needed to bring McGuire up to PAFB capacity?
  - Future liability due to air traffic saturation
- We request a Re-direct
  - A. Reconsider Air Mobility for PAFB (Downsize McGuire to its capacity and save \$)
  - B. Tanker Wing / Composite Wing N.E.
  - C. Contonment areas / C-5's Stewart, NY assets, G.F. tankers, Fairchild tankers



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950424-4R1

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

May 8, 1995

Brigadier Gen. Thomas G. Tobin, (Ret.)  
C/O Office of the Mayor  
City Hall  
Plattsburgh, New York 12901

Dear General Tobin:

Thank you for providing me with information concerning your request for the Commission to reconsider the 1993 decision to close Plattsburgh Air Force Base. I read the information with interest and appreciate your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information provided to us by the Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis process.

I am enclosing copies of responses from the Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration with respect to your inquiries on the current status of Plattsburgh and McGuire Air Force Bases. I look forward to working with you as we go through this difficult and challenging process.

Sincerely,

Wendi L. Steele  
Commissioner

WLS:cw  
enclosures



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE



20 APR 1995

66  
950410-4

MEMORANDUM FOR BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION (Mr. Frank Cirillo)


FROM: AF/RT  
1670 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20330-1670

SUBJECT: Response to Questions on Plattsburgh and McGuire Air Force Bases

Attached is the Air Force response to your April 6, 1995, request for answers to fifteen questions concerning Plattsburgh and McGuire Air Force Bases. The Air Force response to these questions was in some ways limited because Plattsburgh AFB is scheduled for closure on September 30, 1995, dictating that no base questionnaire be completed for the 1995 round of closures. Since some of the requested answers concerned comparisons of data from Plattsburgh and McGuire, the Air Force responded by providing data from 1993 questionnaires for both bases and then adding data, as required, from the McGuire 1995 questionnaire as well as current information available on on-going projects and upgrades.

In addition, responses to questions 10 and 15 could not be provided at this time due to the nature of the questions. In question 10, the Air Force was requested to provide information updating a study done by the 1993 BRAC Commission. Though we know of the study, we were not provided a copy by the 1993 Commission and therefore cannot respond to questions concerning its content or parameters. A review of your records should provide a basis for the response to this question. In question 15, the Air Force was asked to task the FAA to do a study of the Plattsburgh and McGuire traffic patterns. This office cannot task the FAA to do a study on traffic patterns. If the Commission determines that a study of this nature is needed, then it may be appropriate for the Commission to request the FAA to do such a study.

We hope the provided information is useful.

  
JAY D. BLUME, Jr., Major General, USAF  
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for  
Realignment and Transition

Attachment:  
Responses to questions

**AIR FORCE FACT SHEET**  
**Plattsburgh/McGuire AFBs**

1. **Question/Statement:** What are the certified usable ramp spaces at McGuire and Plattsburgh?

**Response:** (Department of the Air Force Analyses and Recommendations, Volume V, March 1993) KC-135 equivalent:

- Plattsburgh - 156
- McGuire - 88

1995 BRAC Questionnaire did not specifically address number of parking spaces.

2. **Question/Statement:** Are there any restrictions as to parking: ie: a lack of flexibility at McGuire and/or Plattsburgh?

**Response:** Yes, McGuire had a taxiway limitation due to wingtip clearance of the KC-10. A project to add a perimeter taxiway is under construction (see question 14).

3. **Question/Statement:** What is the runway length of McGuire? Is the KC-10 restricted as to Maximum Gross Weight for takeoff due to runway length and summer temperature?

**Response:** McGuire has two runways that are 10,001 feet and 7,214 feet respectively. The maximum gross weight of the KC-10 (590,000 lbs) is limited in the summer to 540,000 pounds (Runway 24 with an obstacle 36 feet high at 2553 feet, 30 degrees centigrade, +150 feet pressure altitude, no wind, dry runway).

4. **Question/Statement:** How many parking spots are available at McGuire?

- KC-135 equivalent
- Any size comparison
- How do those numbers compare to Plattsburgh?

**Response:** (Department of the Air Force Analyses and Recommendations, Volume V, March 1993)

- KC-135 equivalent- McGuire - 88 ; Plattsburgh - 156
- Any size comparison - See above
- How do those numbers compare to Plattsburgh? - See above

5. Question/Statement: Compare the refueling capacity of McGuire and Plattsburgh under the following categories:

- Storage
- Pits
- Laterals
- Simultaneous refueling
- Methods of Supply

Response: (1993 BRAC Questionnaire for Plattsburgh; 1993 BRAC Questionnaire plus 1995 updates for McGuire)

- Storage - Plattsburgh (1993 BRAC Questionnaire) - 4,502 (K/gal); McGuire (BRAC 93 Questionnaire) - 4,100 (K/gal)

- Pits - Plattsburgh - 84 hydrants;  
McGuire - 29 hydrants (1993 BRAC Questionnaire);  
McGuire - 36 hydrants (1995 BRAC Questionnaire); 17 hydrants are under construction using BRAC funds (See question 14). In addition, MILCON funds are programmed for DLA to add 18 more hydrants in FY 96 (See question 13). The 35 new hydrants in these projects will replace 20 existing older hydrants. The total number of hydrants available at McGuire once construction is complete is 51. Of these 51 hydrants, 35 will be able to accommodate wide-bodied aircraft.

- Laterals - (1993 BRAC Questionnaire) Both Plattsburgh and McGuire have lateral pipelines.

- Simultaneous refueling - Plattsburgh (1993 BRAC Questionnaire) - 5 C-141 equivalents; McGuire (1993 BRAC Questionnaire) - 3 C-141 equivalents; McGuire (1995 BRAC Questionnaire) - 7 C-141 equivalents

- Methods of Supply - Methods of supply to each of these bases was not addressed in the base questionnaire. This category was addressed directly by the 1993 Commission who should have this comparison on file.

6. Question/Statement: Compare the condition of the ramp and runways at McGuire to those at Plattsburgh.

Response: Plattsburgh (1993 BRAC Questionnaire)

- Runway - 100% Code 1
- Taxiway - 86% Code 1, 14% Code 2
- Aprons - 100% Code 1

McGuire (1993 BRAC Questionnaire)

- Runway - 100% Code 1
- Taxiway - 74% Code 1, 16% Code 2, 10% Code 3
- Aprons - 64% Code 1, 31% Code 2, 5% Code 3

McGuire (1995 BRAC Questionnaire)

- Runway - 99% Code 1, 1% Code 2
- Taxiway - 92.9% Code 1, 6.7% Code 2, 0.4% Code 3
- Aprons - 87% Code 1, 6.8% Code 2, 6.2% Code 3



7. Question/Statement: What is the current bed-down at McGuire by aircraft type and unit?

Response: Current aircraft assigned at McGuire by type and unit include:  
38 C-141s - [6th Airlift Squadron (AS), 13th AS, and 18th AS] (Active Duty);  
22 KC-10s - [2nd AS and 32nd AS] (Active Duty);  
19 KC-135Es - [150th Air Refueling Squadron (ARS) and 141 ARS] (ANG).

8. Question/Statement: Review the status of housing at McGuire compared to Plattsburgh.

- Number of houses on base
- Number of houses off base

Response: On Base Housing

- Plattsburgh (1993 BRAC Questionnaire) - 1,641
- McGuire (1993 BRAC Questionnaire) - 1,753
- McGuire (1995 BRAC Questionnaire) - 1,754

Off Base Housing - The number of off base houses is not addressed in the base questionnaire. It does, however, address the affordability, acceptability, and availability of off base housing. The responses to these areas are listed below for Plattsburgh and McGuire.

- Plattsburgh (1993 BRAC Questionnaire)
  - Available - Yes
  - Acceptable - Yes
  - Affordable to all but the lowest ranking airmen w/families
- McGuire (1993 BRAC Questionnaire)
  - Available - Yes
  - Acceptable - Units within 7 miles of base are very old,

upkeep is just above adequacy standards. Some are subsidized with waiting lists from 1-5 years. Outside 7 miles the standard is better, but price-wise the units are small with no storage or garage space.

-- Affordable - Affordability makes housing in the community limited. 3 subsidized apartment complexes are available with waiting period of 6 months to 5 years. Subsidized rents are according to income and vary from \$325 to \$585 and up. Houses for rent vary. Two and three bedroom houses are available year round from \$680 - \$1100.

- McGuire (1995 BRAC Questionnaire)

-- Available - Yes  
-- Acceptable - 8.9% of off-base housing was rated unsuitable in latest VHA survey.

-- Affordable - Yes. Latest VHA survey lists median monthly cost of off-base housing as \$909.

9. Question/Statement: Review and compare the AICUZ data of Plattsburgh and McGuire. .

Response: The following is AICUZ data for Plattsburgh and McGuire from the 1993 BRAC Questionnaire for Plattsburgh, 1993 BRAC Questionnaire and 1995 BRAC questionnaire and recent updates for McGuire.

- Plattsburgh (1993 BRAC Questionnaire)

-- Date of most recent AICUZ study - May 1978

-- Latest revalidation - October 1991

-- Projected date of new AICUZ public release - Dec 92

-- Is off base development generally consistent with AICUZ recommendation - Yes

-- Has the city or county officially adopted AICUZ recommendations - Yes

- McGuire (1993 BRAC Questionnaire)

-- Date of most recent AICUZ study - 1979

-- Latest revalidation - 1979

-- Projected date of new AICUZ - None listed -- "The AICUZ is to be revalidated to reflect the changes in air operations at McGuire <from fighters to tankers>. HQ AMC and HQ USAF are attempting to secure funding."

-- Is off development generally consistent with AICUZ recommendations - Yes

-- Has the city or county officially adopted AICUZ recommendations - No. While most of the land around the base is government owned, there is some residential construction within the 65-70 Ldn noise contour but no large scale development to date. Less than one percent of the current zone is incompatible with off base development.

- McGuire (1995 BRAC Questionnaire)

-- Date of new AICUZ - Oct 94 - Awaiting public comment

-- Has the city or county adopted AICUZ - No

-- Assessment of significant development in 7 AICUZ Zones -

No significant development exists or is projected in any AICUZ zone.

10. Question/Statement: Provide a list of customers and run the flying times to these customers from McGuire and Plattsburgh.

Response: The study referred to in this question was done in 1993 by the Commission. The Air Force does not have access to this data and therefore cannot respond to this question at this time.

11. **Question/Statement:** Where are the tankers of the Air Force based? Request 2 charts:

- AMC Bed-down
- ACC Bed-down

If not broken down to reflect Guard and Reserve verses Active Duty Forces, then two more charts are required:

- AMC Bed-down of Guard and Reserve
- ACC Bed-down of Guard and Reserve

**Response:** The charts requested are attached. The first chart depicts active tanker beddown and the second chart depicts Guard and Reserve tanker beddown. Separate charts were not provided for AMC and ACC tankers since all tanker aircraft belong to AMC except the 6 Active Duty KC-135Rs at Mountain Home AFB which belong to ACC.

12. **Question/Statement:** What construction is on-going at McGuire?

**Response:** The following MILCON projects are on-going at McGuire:

- FY 91 - C-141 Flight Simulator [\$3.0M]
  - Alter 2 dorms [\$5.0M]
- FY 92 - Housing Improvements (100 units) [\$7.0M]
  - Waste Water Plant (AF Share) [\$22.0M]
  - Child Care Center [\$4.0M]
  - Alter 2 dorms [\$5.0M]
- FY 93 - Upgrade Storm Drains [\$3.0M]
  - Remove Underground Fuel Storage Tank [\$6.0M]
- FY 94 - NONE
- FY 95 - Storm Drains and Sanitary/Sewer System [\$7.0M]
  - Dorm [\$2.0M] (Out for bids)
  - Dorm [\$9.0M] (Out for bids)
  - Hospital Upgrade [\$2.0] (Out for bids)

13. **Question/Statement:** What construction is requested in the 96, 97, 98, 99, and 2000 Milcon budget for McGuire?

**Response:** The following MILCON projects have been requested:

- FY 96 - Fire Training [\$2.0M]
- DLA Hydrant System [\$12M]
- EMCS [\$2.0M]
- HTHW [\$3.0M]
- KC-10 Squadron Ops [\$8.0M]
- Housing Improvements (100 Units) [\$9.0M]
- FY 97 - Housing Improvements (68 Units) [\$7.0M]
- C-141 Squadron Ops [\$6.0M]
- FY 98 - FY2000 - Nothing programmed as of yet.

14. **Question/Statement:** What BRAC funds are being spent at McGuire and what are programmed?

**Response:** BRAC funds are programmed for the following projects:

- FY 94 - Alter Interim Facilities [\$2.1M]
- Cryogenic Storage Area [\$0.566M]
- Refueling Ops Facility [\$2.923M]
- Control Tower [\$3.474M]
- Extend HTHW Distribution System [\$0.400M]
- Communications Ducts [\$1.0M]
- ADAL Vehicle Complex [\$1.821M]
- FY 95 - KC-10 Squadron Ops/AMU [\$8.567M]
- Fuel System Maintenance Dock [\$12.384M]
- Corrosion Control Facility [\$12.173M]
- KC-10 Maintenance Hangar [\$15.084M]
- Child Development Center [\$2.585M]
- KC-10 Squadron Ops/AMU [\$7.338M]
- Add to Parking Ramp [\$6.129M]
- Hydrant Refueling System [\$20.744M]
- KC-10 COMBS Facility [\$5.848M]
- FY 96 - Contingency Comm Element [\$2.944M]
- KC-10 Simulator [\$4.35M]
- FY 97 - Upgrade Roads [\$1.4M]
- Add Health Care Center [\$1.95M]

15. **Question/Statement:** Task the FAA to compare, in depth, the Plattsburgh and McGuire traffic. Place particular emphasis on where might aircrews best accomplish crew training with proper separation and safety.

**Response:** AF/RT cannot task the FAA to do a study for the Commission. If the Commission wishes such a study done, they must contact the FAA directly.



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:  
AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTROYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 26, 1995

Major General Jay Blume (ATTN: Lt. Col. Mary Tripp)  
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff  
for Base Realignment and Transition  
Headquarters USAF  
1670 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20330-1670

109  
Please refer to this number  
6150426-27

Dear General Blume:

Thank you for the timely response to our April 6, 1995 letter regarding the 15 questions on Plattsburgh and McGuire Air Force Bases. Unfortunately, we need to obtain your assistance in resolving the response to question 10. In this regard, attached is the chart used in the 1993 final deliberations hearing to which the question refers. Request you provide a similar chart identifying current cargo/troop customer onload locations for McGuire AFB to include distances and flying times from McGuire and Plattsburgh AFBs. We believe this would answer the intent of the question raised by General Tobin. Please provide your response by May 6, 1995.

Thank you for your continued patience and support in responding to our many requests.

Sincerely

Francis A. Cirillo, Jr, PE  
Air Force Team Leader

Attachment

# Air Distances to Customers

	PLATTSBURGH	MCGUIRE	GRIFFISS	TRAVIS	MARCH	MCCHORD	FAIRCHILD
ANDREWS	421	128	332	2152	1992	2062	1836
FT DRUM (GRIFFISS)	119	196	—	2108	2019	1974	1776
LANGLEY	472	194	371	2143	1992	2106	1911
SHAW	717	459	604	2009	1821	2041	1853
MACDILL	1097	829	985	2060	1815	2191	2018
TINKER	1223	1113	1118	1187	983	1322	1162
MT HOME	1816	1844	1754	398	553	371	284
CANNON	1501	1407	1400	827	691	1153	1022
HILL	1689	1692	1618	490	501	577	459
POPE	622	358	511	2054	1880	2060	1869
HUNTER AAF	839	576	726	2020	1812	2085	1901
FT CAMPBELL	795	638	679	1634	1461	1666	1481
FT HOOD	1403	1250	1290	1260	996	1487	1345
FT RILEY	1088	1025	944	1176	1033	1218	1041
PETERSON/ FT CARSON	1431	1391	1345	808	674	822	772
CHERRY POINT	605	325	504	2159	1986	2155	1963
FT LEWIS (MCCHORD)	2018	2090	1974	533	829	—	198



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE



03 MAY 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION (Mr. Frank Cirillo)

FROM: AF/RT  
1670 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20330-1670

109  
950426-27

SUBJECT: Response to Question on Plattsburgh and McGuire Air Force Bases

Attached is the Air Force response to your April 20, 1995, request for additional information on question 10. As you requested, the attached chart identifies cargo/ troop customer onload locations. Additionally, we provided distance and flying time to aerial refueling routes that are (were) commonly used by McGuire and Plattsburgh AFB since tanker aircraft, especially the KC-135, are more likely to use aerial refueling routes.

We hope this information is beneficial.

JAY D. BLUME, Jr., Major General, USAF  
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for  
Realignment and Transition

Attachment:  
Response to question



### AIR DISTANCE TO CUSTOMERS

Customers:	McGuire:		Plattsburg:	
	Distance (NM)	Flying Time (HRS)	Distance (NM)	Flying Time (HRS)
Yuma, AZ	1970	4+38	2032	4+46
Ft Benning, GA	674	1+35	905	2+07
Hunter Army Airfield, GA	576	1+21	839	1+58
Ft Stewart, GA	593	1+23	854	2+00
Ft Riley, KS	1031	2+25	1096	2+34
Ft Campbell, KY	638	1+30	796	1+52
Ft Polk, LA	1053	2+28	1235	2+54
Ft Drum, NY	247	0+35	104	0+14
Ft Bliss, TX	1610	3+47	1714	4+01
Ft Hood, TX	1242	2+55	1396	3+16
Ft McCoy, WI	752	1+45	737	1+43
Philadelphia, PA	31	0+04	298	0+41
Norfolk, VA	205	0+28	484	1+08
Peterson/ Ft Carson, CO	1386	3+15	1426	3+21
Eglin AAF, FL	809	1+54	1041	2+26
MacDill, FL	829	1+56	1097	2+34
Westover, MA	160	0+22	154	0+21
Griffis, NY	196	0+27	119	0+16
Pope, NC	358	0+50	623	1+27
Charleston, SC	502	1+10	769	1+48
McEntire, SC	471	1+06	728	1+42
Langley, VA	194	0+27	472	1+06
Andrews, MD	128	0+18	383	0+54
Tinker, OK	1113	2+37	1224	2+52
Cheery Point, NC	325	0+45	606	1+25
Aerial Refueling Tracks:				
AR 777	139	0+19	325	0+45
AR 88	164	0+23	378	0+53
AR 204	234	0+33	48	0+06
AR 212	234	0+33	48	0+06
AR 218H	172	0+24	320	0+45
AR 218A	173	0+24	325	0+45
AR 202	382	0+53	659	1+32
AR 207	607	1+25	864	2+01
AR 455	617	1+26	750	1+45
AR 206	195	0+27	120	0+16
AR 20	364	0+51	278	0+39



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:  
AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 26, 1995

Major General Jay Blume (ATTN: Lt. Col. Mary Tripp)  
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff  
for Base Realignment and Transition  
Headquarters USAF  
1670 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20330-1670

Please refer to the number  
when responding 950428-27

Dear General Blume:

Thank you for the timely response to our April 6, 1995 letter regarding the 15 questions on Plattsburgh and McGuire Air Force Bases. Unfortunately, we need to obtain your assistance in resolving the response to question 10. In this regard, attached is the chart used in the 1993 final deliberations hearing to which the question refers. Request you provide a similar chart identifying current cargo/troop customer onload locations for McGuire AFB to include distances and flying times from McGuire and Plattsburgh AFBs. We believe this would answer the intent of the question raised by General Tobin. Please provide your response by May <sup>15</sup> 1995.

Thank you for your continued patience and support in responding to our many requests.

Sincerely

Francis A. Cirillo, Jr, PE  
Air Force Team Leader

Attachment

• need distances and flying times

# Air Distances to Customers

	PLATTSBURGH	MCCUIRE	GRIFFISS	TRAVIS	MARCH	MCCHORD	FAIRCCHILD
ANDREWS	421	128	332	2152	1992	2062	1836
FT DRUM (GRIFFISS)	119	196	—	2108	2019	1974	1776
LANGLEY	472	194	371	2143	1992	2106	1911
SHAW	717	459	604	2009	1821	2041	1853
MACDILL	1097	829	985	2060	1815	2191	2018
TINKER	1223	1113	1118	1187	983	1322	1162
MT HOMIE	1816	1844	1754	398	553	371	284
CANNON	1501	1407	1400	827	691	1153	1022
HILL	1689	1692	1618	490	501	577	459
POPE	622	358	511	2054	1880	2060	1869
HUNTER AAF	839	576	726	2020	1812	2085	1901
FT CAMPBELL	795	638	679	1634	1461	1666	1481
FT HOOD	1403	1250	1290	1260	996	1487	1345
FT RILEY	1088	1025	944	1176	1033	1218	1041
PETERSON/ FT CARSON	1431	1391	1345	808	674	822	772
CHERRY POINT	605	325	504	2159	1986	2155	1963
FT LEWIS (McCHORD)	2018	2090	1974	533	829	—	198



U.S. Department  
of Transportation

800 Independence Ave., S.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20591

Federal Aviation  
Administration

APR 27 1995

Mr. Francis A. Cirillo, Jr.  
Air Force Team Leader  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 N Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr Cirillo:

At the request of Mr. Ed Flippen, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Liaison to the Base Closure Committee, we have reviewed air traffic in the Plattsburgh and McGuire areas. This response has been coordinated with the FAA's Eastern and New England regional offices.

McGuire Air Force Base and its associated airspace are located in a high density traffic area which does affect the established traffic flows and patterns used by civil traffic flying in the Philadelphia and New York areas. Procedures have been developed between the FAA and the U. S. Air Force to accommodate civil and military traffic in the area simultaneously and to minimize limitations on either operation. Since 1992, military traffic at McGuire has decreased. The recent addition of air mobility aircraft at McGuire has not necessitated any procedural changes and has not caused any increase in delays.

At present, there are no aircraft based at Plattsburgh and no transient services are available for aircraft. Traffic activity has steadily declined since 1993 as base aircraft were assigned to other operational units.

While it is not within the FAA's purview to mandate where the military should base or train their flightcrews, ongoing coordination is accomplished to ensure that all users of the National Airspace System are provided proper separation and the safety of the entire system is preserved. We remain confident that our traffic management team is capable of handling any air traffic generated by McGuire Air Force Base in a safe and efficient manner.

Sincerely,

David J. Hurley  
Program Director for Air Traffic  
System Management, ATM-1



DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY  
HEADQUARTERS  
CAMERON STATION  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22304-6100



IN REPLY  
REFER TO

CAAJ(BRAC)

2 JUN 1995

Honorable Alan Dixon  
Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to this number  
9505244

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to the May 22, 1995, request from Mr. Ben Borden, Director of Review and Analysis, the enclosure contains the COBRA runs and associated disks for our Defense Depots at Tobyhanna, Warner Robins, Oklahoma City, San Antonio, McClellan, and Hill.

The information you requested relative to potential impacts on DLA storage capacity will be provided by separate cover per our discussion with Mr. Robert Cook.

I certify to the best of my knowledge and belief that the information provided is accurate and complete. Should you desire additional information or clarification, my staff and I stand ready to assist you.

Sincerely,

1 Encl

*M.V. McManamay*  
M.V. McMANAMAY  
Team Chief  
DLA BRAC

*George T. Babbitt*  
GEORGE T. BABBITT  
Major General, USAF  
Principal Deputy Director

\* DATA IN LIBRARY \*

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950424-5

FROM: CIRILLO, FRANK	TO: BLUME, JAY
TITLE: AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	TITLE: SPECIAL ASST
ORGANIZATION: DBCRC	ORGANIZATION: HEADQUARTERS USAF
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: HANSCOM	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓ FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING COBRA RUNS ON HANSCOM AFB THAT WERE CONDUCTED FOR JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP.

Due Date: 950501      Routing Date: 950424      Date Originated: 950421      Mail Date: 950424



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:  
AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 21, 1995

Major General Jay D. Blume, Jr. (Lt. Col. Mary Tripp)  
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff  
for Base Realignment and Transition  
Headquarters USAF  
1670 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20330-1670

Disagreed with the findings  
and recommendations 950424-5

Dear General Blume:

We request you provide two COBRA runs on Hanscom AFB that were conducted for the Joint Cross Service Group. The two COBRA runs are HNSMCLS.CBR and SDC09.CBR. These runs are needed to complete our analysis on the DoD recommendation for the closure of Rome Lab. Please provide these runs in both hard copy and electronic format.

To assist the Commission in its work, we request this information to be provided by May 1, 1995. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

FOR

Francis A. Cirillo, Jr., PE  
Air Force Team Leader



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425

ARLINGTON, VA 22209

703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA

REBECCA COX

GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)

S. LEE KLING

RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)

MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)

WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 21, 1995

Major General Jay D. Blume, Jr. (Lt. Col. Mary Tripp)  
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff  
for Base Realignment and Transition  
Headquarters USAF  
1670 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20330-1670

*Message sent to the wrong  
number 950424-5*

Dear General Blume:

We request you provide two COBRA runs on Hanscom AFB that were conducted for the Joint Cross Service Group. The two COBRA runs are HNSMCLS.CBR and SDC09.CBR. These runs are needed to complete our analysis on the DoD recommendation for the closure of Rome Lab. Please provide these runs in both hard copy and electronic format.

To assist the Commission in its work, we request this information to be provided by May 1, 1995. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

*FOR*

Francis A. Cirillo, Jr., PE  
Air Force Team Leader





DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE



24 APR 1995

HQ USAF/RT  
1670 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20330-1670

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to this number  
when responding 450424 5R1

Dear Mr. Cirillo

This is in response to your letter of April 21, 1995, requesting the two COBRA runs HNSMCLS.CBR and SDC09.CBR. Copies of the requested runs are attached.

Sincerely

JAY D. BLUME, Jr.  
Major General, USAF  
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff  
for Base Realignment and Transition

Attachments:

1. Hardcopy of requested COBRA runs
2. Electronic Copy of requested COBRA runs

RT#445

COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/2  
 Data As Of 11:21 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:46 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm to Mnth/Kir  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\HNSMCLS.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

Starting Year : 1996  
 Final Year : 2001  
 ROI Year : 2012 (11 Years)

NPV in 2015(\$K): -107,061  
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 440,901

Net Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars	1996						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	49,867	28,487	37,982	52,226	26,113	37,982	232,657	0
Person	-273	-662	-882	965	2,527	-11,112	-9,438	-30,830
Overhd	2,433	2,616	1,171	3	-3,339	-15,044	-12,159	-22,607
Moving	3,118	6,257	15,708	18,872	15,708	6,085	65,749	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	5,405	5,405	5,405
Other	5,781	11,568	28,926	34,711	28,926	6,238	116,152	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>60,926</b>	<b>48,267</b>	<b>82,906</b>	<b>106,777</b>	<b>69,936</b>	<b>29,555</b>	<b>398,366</b>	<b>-48,033</b>

POSITIONS ELIMINATED	1996						Total
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	
Off	0	0	0	0	0	64	64
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	402	402
Civ	0	0	0	0	0	272	272
<b>TOT</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>738</b>	<b>738</b>

POSITIONS REALIGNED	1996						Total
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	
Off	35	72	183	220	183	42	735
Enl	22	46	118	141	118	30	475
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	85	172	432	518	432	94	1,733
<b>TOT</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>290</b>	<b>733</b>	<b>879</b>	<b>733</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>2,943</b>

Summary:

SDC-07: Close Hanscom. Move ESC/RL to Ft Monmouth, PL to Kirtland  
 Distance to Ft Monmouth is to Newark + 50 miles  
 FFRDC/ESC moving costs taken from AFMC 21 data  
 Screen 4 data is from Army response  
 MILCON numbers inflated from Army response (Note --Note no MFH)  
 No geophysics reduction assumed  
 FFRDC contract termination costs taken using same methodology as with LA  
 Assume Air Force continues to support MIT Lincoln Lab

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm to Mmth/Kir  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\HNSMCLS.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

	Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	54,600	28,487	37,982	52,226	26,113	37,982	237,390	0
Person	349	1,248	3,831	6,144	7,706	10,194	29,471	6,602
Overhd	2,433	4,735	6,767	10,075	12,934	14,043	50,988	12,384
Moving	3,207	6,442	16,181	19,439	16,181	6,198	67,649	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	5,405	5,405	5,405
Other	5,781	11,568	28,926	34,711	28,926	6,238	116,152	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>66,371</b>	<b>52,481</b>	<b>93,688</b>	<b>122,595</b>	<b>91,861</b>	<b>80,060</b>	<b>507,055</b>	<b>24,391</b>

	Savings (\$K) Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	4,733	0	0	0	0	0	4,733	0
Person	622	1,910	4,713	5,179	5,179	21,306	38,909	37,432
Overhd	0	2,119	5,596	10,073	16,273	29,087	63,147	34,992
Moving	89	185	472	567	472	113	1,900	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5,445</b>	<b>4,214</b>	<b>10,781</b>	<b>15,819</b>	<b>21,924</b>	<b>50,505</b>	<b>108,689</b>	<b>72,424</b>

NET PRESENT VALUES REPORT (COBRA v5.08)  
 Data As Of 11:21 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:46 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm to Mnth/Kir  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\HNSMCLS.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

Year	Cost(\$)	Adjusted Cost(\$)	NPV(\$)
1996	60,925,668	60,104,832	60,104,832
1997	48,266,741	46,342,049	106,446,881
1998	82,906,576	77,470,151	183,917,032
1999	106,776,728	97,104,689	281,021,721
2000	69,936,205	61,899,028	342,920,748
2001	29,554,637	25,458,075	368,378,824
2002	-48,032,728	-40,267,564	328,111,260
2003	-48,032,728	-39,189,843	288,921,416
2004	-48,032,728	-38,140,967	250,780,450
2005	-48,032,728	-37,120,162	213,660,287
2006	-48,032,728	-36,126,678	177,533,609
2007	-48,032,728	-35,159,784	142,373,824
2008	-48,032,728	-34,218,768	108,155,056
2009	-48,032,728	-33,302,937	74,852,118
2010	-48,032,728	-32,411,618	42,440,500
2011	-48,032,728	-31,544,154	10,896,346
2012	-48,032,728	-30,699,906	-19,803,560
2013	-48,032,728	-29,878,254	-49,681,814
2014	-48,032,728	-29,078,593	-78,760,407
2015	-48,032,728	-28,300,334	-107,060,741

TOTAL ONE-TIME COST REPORT (COBRA v5.08)  
 Data As Of 11:21 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:46 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm to Mmth/Kir  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\HNSMCLS.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----		
<b>Construction</b>		
Military Construction	157,460,000	
Family Housing Construction	79,930,000	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
<b>Total - Construction</b>		<b>237,390,000</b>
<b>Personnel</b>		
Civilian RIF	2,164,655	
Civilian Early Retirement	839,556	
Civilian New Hires	2,448,000	
Eliminated Military PCS	2,901,010	
Unemployment	372,708	
<b>Total - Personnel</b>		<b>8,725,929</b>
<b>Overhead</b>		
Program Planning Support	5,390,158	
Mothball / Shutdown	5,593,750	
<b>Total - Overhead</b>		<b>10,983,908</b>
<b>Moving</b>		
Civilian Moving	35,568,730	
Civilian PPS	2,361,600	
Military Moving	5,985,882	
Freight	616,555	
One-Time Moving Costs	23,116,000	
<b>Total - Moving</b>		<b>67,648,767</b>
<b>Other</b>		
HAP / RSE	2,705,222	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	113,447,000	
<b>Total - Other</b>		<b>116,152,222</b>
<b>Total One-Time Costs</b>		<b>440,900,827</b>
-----		
<b>One-Time Savings</b>		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	4,733,000	
Military Moving	1,899,700	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
<b>Total One-Time Savings</b>		<b>6,632,700</b>
-----		
<b>Total Net One-Time Costs</b>		<b>434,268,127</b>

i

**TOTAL MILITARY CONSTRUCTION ASSETS (COBRA v5.08)**  
 Data As Of 11:21 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:46 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm to Mmth/Kir  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\HNSMCLS.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

All Costs in \$K

Base Name	Total MilCon	IMA Cost	Land Purch	Cost Avoid	Total Cost
FT MONMOUTH	204,920	0	0	0	204,920
HANSCOM	0	0	0	-4,733	-4,733
BASE X	0	0	0	0	0
KIRTLAND	32,470	0	0	0	32,470
-----					
Totals:	237,390	0	0	-4,733	232,657

PERSONNEL SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v5.08)  
 Data As Of 11:21 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:46 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm to Mmth/Kir  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\HNSMCLS.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: FT MONMOUTH, NJ

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
416	505	406	7,341

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

From Base: HANSCOM, MA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	32	64	160	192	160	32	640
Enlisted	8	17	43	51	43	10	172
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	63	127	319	383	319	67	1,278
TOTAL	103	208	522	626	522	109	2,090

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Into FT MONMOUTH, NJ):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	32	64	160	192	160	32	640
Enlisted	8	17	43	51	43	10	172
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	63	127	319	383	319	67	1,278
TOTAL	103	208	522	626	522	109	2,090

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
1,056	677	406	8,619

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: HANSCOM, MA

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
852	872	0	2,354

FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES:

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	-53	0	0	0	0	-53
Enlisted	0	5	0	0	0	0	5
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	-349	0	0	0	0	-349
TOTAL	0	-397	0	0	0	0	-397

BASE POPULATION (Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
799	877	0	2,005

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

To Base: FT MONMOUTH, NJ

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	32	64	160	192	160	32	640
Enlisted	8	17	43	51	43	10	172
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	63	127	319	383	319	67	1,278
TOTAL	103	208	522	626	522	109	2,090

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm to Mmth/Kir  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\HNSMCLS.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

To Base: BASE X

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	2	5	14	17	14	5	57
Enlisted	14	28	71	85	71	15	284
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	4	8	20	24	20	7	83
TOTAL	20	41	105	126	105	27	424

To Base: KIRTLAND, NM

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	1	3	9	11	9	5	38
Enlisted	0	1	4	5	4	5	19
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	18	37	93	111	93	20	372
TOTAL	19	41	106	127	106	30	429

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Out of HANSCOM, MA):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	35	72	183	220	183	42	735
Enlisted	22	46	118	141	118	30	475
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	85	172	432	518	432	94	1,733
TOTAL	142	290	733	879	733	166	2,943

SCENARIO POSITION CHANGES:

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	0	0	0	-64	-64
Enlisted	0	0	0	0	0	-402	-402
Civilians	0	0	0	0	0	-272	-272
TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	-738	-738

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
0	0	0	0

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: BASE X

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
736	3,263	0	11,455

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

From Base: HANSCOM, MA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	2	5	14	17	14	5	57
Enlisted	14	28	71	85	71	15	284
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	4	8	20	24	20	7	83
TOTAL	20	41	105	126	105	27	424

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Into BASE X):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	2	5	14	17	14	5	57
Enlisted	14	28	71	85	71	15	284
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	4	8	20	24	20	7	83
TOTAL	20	41	105	126	105	27	424



Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm to Mnth/Kir  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\HNSMCLS.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
----- 793	----- 3,547	----- 0	----- 11,538

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: KIRTLAND, NM

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
----- 1,313	----- 2,837	----- 0	----- 2,331

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

From Base: HANSCOM, MA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	1	3	9	11	9	5	38
Enlisted	0	1	4	5	4	5	19
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	18	37	93	111	93	20	372
TOTAL	19	41	106	127	106	30	429

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Into KIRTLAND, NM):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	1	3	9	11	9	5	38
Enlisted	0	1	4	5	4	5	19
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	18	37	93	111	93	20	372
TOTAL	19	41	106	127	106	30	429

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
----- 1,351	----- 2,856	----- 0	----- 2,703

TOTAL PERSONNEL IMPACT REPORT (COBRA v5.08)  
 Data As Of 11:21 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:46 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm to Mmth/Kir  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\HNSMCLS.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		85	172	432	518	432	94	1733
Early Retirement*	10.00%	8	18	43	51	43	10	173
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	4	8	22	26	22	4	86
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	13	26	65	78	65	14	261
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*+		5	10	26	31	26	5	103
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		55	110	276	332	276	61	1110
Civilian Positions Available		30	62	156	186	156	33	623
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	0	0	0	272	272
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	27	27
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	14	14
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	41	41
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*+		0	0	0	0	0	16	16
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	163	163
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	11	11
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	11	11
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		85	172	432	518	432	94	1733
Civilians Moving		55	110	276	332	276	72	1121
New Civilians Hired		30	62	156	186	156	22	612
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		8	18	43	51	43	37	200
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS		5	10	26	31	26	21	119
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	0	0	0	163	163
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		30	62	156	186	156	22	612

\* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

+ The Percentage of Civilians Not Willing to Move (Voluntary RIFs) varies from base to base.

# Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/3  
 Data As Of 11:21 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:46 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm to Mnth/Kir  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\HNSMCLS.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

ONE-TIME COSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
<b>CONSTRUCTION</b>							
MILCON	36,216	18,895	25,194	34,641	17,321	25,194	157,460
Fam Housing	18,384	9,592	12,789	17,585	8,792	12,789	79,930
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>O&amp;M</b>							
<b>CIV SALARY</b>							
Civ RIF	91	182	473	564	473	382	2,165
Civ Retire	33	75	180	214	180	155	839
<b>CIV MOVING</b>							
Per Diem	174	349	878	1,056	878	227	3,562
POV Miles	7	14	36	43	36	9	146
Home Purch	725	1,450	3,639	4,378	3,639	950	14,782
HHG	371	743	1,865	2,243	1,865	484	7,572
Misc	38	77	193	232	193	50	785
House Hunt	127	255	641	770	641	164	2,597
PPS	0	0	0	0	0	2,361	2,361
RITA	300	601	1,509	1,814	1,509	392	6,124
<b>FREIGHT</b>							
Packing	28	57	143	172	143	36	579
Freight	2	3	9	11	9	2	37
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	16	31	81	97	81	66	373
<b>OTHER</b>							
Program Plan	1,639	1,229	922	691	519	389	5,390
Shutdown	0	1,286	671	895	1,231	1,510	5,594
New Hire	120	248	624	744	624	88	2,448
1-Time Move	1,155	2,311	5,779	6,934	5,779	1,158	23,116
<b>MIL PERSONNEL</b>							
<b>MIL MOVING</b>							
Per Diem	7	15	41	49	41	13	167
POV Miles	5	11	31	37	31	10	124
HHG	228	472	1,205	1,447	1,205	290	4,847
Misc	40	82	211	253	211	50	847
<b>OTHER</b>							
Elim PCS	0	0	0	0	0	2,901	2,901
<b>OTHER</b>							
HAP / RSE	110	224	565	678	565	561	2,705
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	5,671	11,344	28,361	34,033	28,361	5,677	113,447
<b>TOTAL ONE-TIME</b>	<b>65,488</b>	<b>49,550</b>	<b>86,042</b>	<b>109,582</b>	<b>74,329</b>	<b>55,910</b>	<b>440,901</b>

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 2/3  
 Data As Of 11:21 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:46 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm to Mnth/Kir  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\HNSMCLS.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

RECURRINGCOSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	346	869	1,292	1,862	2,361	2,766	9,498	3,007
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	294	421	485	577	1,777	577
BOS	447	1,350	3,587	6,205	8,338	8,800	28,729	8,800
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	89	711	2,472	4,525	6,347	6,602	20,745	6,602
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	5,405	5,405	5,405
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	882	2,930	7,646	13,014	17,532	24,150	66,155	24,391
TOTAL COST	66,371	52,481	93,688	122,595	91,861	80,060	507,055	24,391
ONE-TIME SAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing	4,733	0	0	0	0	0	4,733	0
O&M								
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	89	185	472	567	472	113	1,900	0
OTHER								
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ONE-TIME	4,822	185	472	567	472	113	6,633	0
RECURRINGSAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	1,034	2,609	3,868	5,577	7,781	20,871	8,996
O&M								
RPMA	0	669	1,701	2,538	3,700	5,271	13,880	6,259
BOS	0	415	1,287	3,666	6,994	16,034	28,396	19,736
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	6,343	6,343	12,687
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	2,517	2,517	5,035
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	7,266	7,266	14,531
House Allow	622	1,910	4,713	5,179	5,179	5,179	22,783	5,179
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	622	4,029	10,309	15,252	21,452	50,392	102,056	72,424
TOTAL SAVINGS	5,445	4,214	10,781	15,819	21,924	50,505	108,689	72,424

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 3/3  
 Data As Of 11:21 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:46 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm to Mmth/Kir  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\HNSMCLS.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
<b>CONSTRUCTION</b>								
MILCON	36,216	18,895	25,194	34,641	17,321	25,194	157,460	
Fam Housing	13,651	9,592	12,789	17,585	8,792	12,789	75,197	
<b>O&amp;M</b>								
Civ Retir/RIF	124	257	653	778	653	537	3,004	
Civ Moving	1,773	3,549	8,914	10,719	8,914	4,676	38,547	
Other	2,930	5,106	8,078	9,362	8,234	3,211	36,921	
<b>MIL PERSONNEL</b>								
Mil Moving	190	396	1,015	1,219	1,015	3,152	6,987	
<b>OTHER</b>								
HAP / RSE	110	224	565	678	565	561	2,705	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	5,671	11,344	28,361	34,033	28,361	5,677	113,447	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
<b>TOTAL ONE-TIME</b>	<b>60,666</b>	<b>49,365</b>	<b>85,569</b>	<b>109,015</b>	<b>73,856</b>	<b>55,797</b>	<b>434,268</b>	
<b>RECURRING NET</b>								
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	346	-165	-1,317	-2,006	-3,216	-5,015	-11,373	-5,989
<b>O&amp;M</b>								
RPMA	0	-669	-1,406	-2,117	-3,216	-4,694	-12,103	-5,682
BOS	447	935	2,301	2,540	1,344	-7,233	333	-10,936
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	-6,343	-6,343	-12,687
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>MIL PERSONNEL</b>								
Mil Salary	0	0	0	0	0	-9,783	-9,783	-19,566
House Allow	-534	-1,199	-2,241	-654	1,168	1,422	-2,037	1,422
<b>OTHER</b>								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	5,405	5,405	5,405
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL RECUR</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>-1,098</b>	<b>-2,663</b>	<b>-2,238</b>	<b>-3,920</b>	<b>-26,242</b>	<b>-35,901</b>	<b>-48,033</b>
<b>TOTAL NET COST</b>	<b>60,926</b>	<b>48,267</b>	<b>82,906</b>	<b>106,777</b>	<b>69,936</b>	<b>29,555</b>	<b>398,366</b>	<b>-48,033</b>

PERSONNEL, SF, RPMA, AND BOS DELTAS (COBRA v5.08)  
 Data As Of 11:21 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:46 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm to Mnth/Kir  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\HNSMCLS.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

Base	Personnel		SF		
	Change	%Change	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
FT MONMOUTH	2,090	24%	945,020	21%	452
HANSCOM	-3,681	-100%	-4,475,000	-101%	1,216
BASE X	424	3%	0	0%	0
KIRTLAND	429	7%	0	0%	0

Base	RPMA(\$)			BOS(\$)		
	Change	%Change	Chg/Per	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
FT MONMOUTH	576,867	6%	276	7,474,903	12%	3,576
HANSCOM	-6,259,325	-102%	1,700	-19,736,406	-100%	5,362
BASE X	0	0%	0	366,434	1%	864
KIRTLAND	0	0%	0	958,927	4%	2,235

Base	RPMABOS(\$)		
	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
FT MONMOUTH	8,051,770	11%	3,852
HANSCOM	-25,995,731	-103%	7,062
BASE X	366,434	1%	864
KIRTLAND	958,927	4%	2,235

RPMA/BOS CHANGE REPORT (COBRA v5.08)  
 Data As Of 11:21 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:46 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm to Mmth/Kir  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\HNSMCLS.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

Net Change(\$K)	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
RPMA Change	0	-669	-1,406	-2,117	-3,216	-4,694	-12,103	-5,682
BOS Change	447	935	2,301	2,540	1,344	-7,233	333	-10,936
Housing Change	346	-165	-1,317	-2,006	-3,216	-5,015	-11,373	-5,989
<b>TOTAL CHANGES</b>	<b>794</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-422</b>	<b>-1,584</b>	<b>-5,088</b>	<b>-16,943</b>	<b>-23,143</b>	<b>-22,607</b>

INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v5.08)  
Data As Of 11:21 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:46 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm to Mmth/Kir  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\HNSMCLS.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

INPUT SCREEN ONE - GENERAL SCENARIO INFORMATION

Model Year One : FY 1996

Model does Time-Phasing of Construction/Shutdown: No

Base Name	Strategy:
-----	-----
FT MONMOUTH, NJ	Realignment
HANSCOM, MA	Closes in FY 2001
BASE X	Realignment
KIRTLAND, NM	Realignment

Summary:

-----  
 SDC-07: Close Hanscom. Move ESC/RL to Ft Monmouth, PL to Kirtland  
 Distance to Ft Monmouth is to Newark + 50 miles  
 FFRDC/ESC moving costs taken from AFMC 21 data  
 Screen 4 data is from Army response  
 MILCON numbers inflated from Army response (Note --Note no MFH)  
 No geophysics reduction assumed  
 FFRDC contract termination costs taken using same methodology as with LA  
 Assume Air Force continues to support MIT Lincoln Lab

INPUT SCREEN TWO - DISTANCE TABLE

From Base:	To Base:	Distance:
-----	-----	-----
FT MONMOUTH, NJ	HANSCOM, MA	276 mi
HANSCOM, MA	BASE X	1,000 mi
HANSCOM, MA	KIRTLAND, NM	2,229 mi

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from HANSCOM, MA to FT MONMOUTH, NJ

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Officer Positions:	32	64	160	192	160	32
Enlisted Positions:	8	17	43	51	43	10
Civilian Positions:	63	127	319	383	319	67
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Light Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Special Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Transfers from HANSCOM, MA to BASE X

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Officer Positions:	2	5	14	17	14	5
Enlisted Positions:	14	28	71	85	71	15
Civilian Positions:	4	8	20	24	20	7
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Light Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Special Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0



Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm to Mnth/Kir  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\HNSMCLS.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from HANSCOM, MA to KIRTLAND, NM

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Officer Positions:	1	3	9	11	9	5
Enlisted Positions:	0	1	4	5	4	5
Civilian Positions:	18	37	93	111	93	20
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Light Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Special Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: FT MONMOUTH, NJ

Total Officer Employees:	416	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	10,331
Total Enlisted Employees:	505	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	406	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	60,417
Total Civilian Employees:	7,341	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	39,183
Mil Families Living On Base:	100.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	3,861
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.19
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	4,474	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	441	Activity Code:	34555
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	261	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	103	Unique Activity Information:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07		

Name: HANSCOM, MA

Total Officer Employees:	852	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	6,164
Total Enlisted Employees:	872	Communications (\$K/Year):	3,704
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	18,161
Total Civilian Employees:	2,354	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	59.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	8,996
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.29
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	4,425	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	432	Activity Code:	AF036
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	303	Homeowner Assistance Program:	Yes
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	139	Unique Activity Information:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07		

Name: BASE X

Total Officer Employees:	736	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	6,147
Total Enlisted Employees:	3,263	Communications (\$K/Year):	3,887
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	21,001
Total Civilian Employees:	11,455	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	54.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	6,225
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.00
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	13,709	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	66	Activity Code:	44444
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	50	Homeowner Assistance Program:	Yes
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	69	Unique Activity Information:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07		

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm to Mmth/Kir  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\HNSMCLS.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: KIRTLAND, NM

Total Officer Employees:	1,313	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	67
Total Enlisted Employees:	2,837	Communications (\$K/Year):	883
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	26,346
Total Civilian Employees:	2,331	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	52.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	10,788
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.02
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	9,762	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	147	Activity Code:	AFO45
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	83		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	94	Homeowner Assistance Program:	Yes
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: FT MONMOUTH, NJ

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	385	770	1,925	2,310	1,925	385
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	23%	12%	16%	22%	11%	16%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	23%	12%	16%	22%	27%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0					
					Perc Family Housing ShutDown:	0.0%

Name: HANSCOM, MA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	5,286	10,574	26,436	31,723	26,436	5,292
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	1,155	2,311	5,779	6,934	5,779	1,158
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	5,405
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	23%	12%	16%	22%	11%	16%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	23%	12%	16%	22%	27%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	4,733	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	4,475					
						Perc Family Housing ShutDown:
						100.0%

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm to Mmth/Kir  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\HNSMCLS.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: BASE X

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Name: KIRTLAND, NM

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	23%	12%	16%	22%	11%	16%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	23%	12%	16%	22%	27%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: HANSCOM, MA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Off Force Struc Change:	0	-53	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	5	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	0	-349	0	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	-64
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	-402
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	-272
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm to Mmth/Kir  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\HNSMCLS.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

INPUT SCREEN SEVEN - BASE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION

Name: FT MONMOUTH, NJ

Description	Categ	New MilCon	Rehab MilCon	Total Cost(\$K)
Mission Facilities	OTHER	264,380	0	98,950
CE Estimate -- includes ESC/RL				
MFH	FAMLQ	512	0	79,930
Dorms	BACHQ	4,800	0	950
BOS	OTHER	0	0	8,170
Planning	OTHER	0	0	16,920

Name: KIRTLAND, NM

Description	Categ	New MilCon	Rehab MilCon	Total Cost(\$K)
Mission Facilities	OTHER	0	0	32,470
CE Estimate for PL				

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

Percent Officers Married:	76.80%	Civ Early Retire Pay Factor:	9.00%
Percent Enlisted Married:	66.90%	Priority Placement Service:	60.00%
Enlisted Housing MilCon:	80.00%	PPS Actions Involving PCS:	50.00%
Officer Salary(\$/Year):	78,668.00	Civilian PCS Costs (\$):	28,800.00
Off BAQ with Dependents(\$):	7,073.00	Civilian New Hire Cost(\$):	4,000.00
Enlisted Salary(\$/Year):	36,148.00	Nat Median Home Price(\$):	114,600.00
Enl BAQ with Dependents(\$):	5,162.00	Home Sale Reimburse Rate:	10.00%
Avg Unemploy Cost(\$/Week):	174.00	Max Home Sale Reimburs(\$):	22,385.00
Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks):	18	Home Purch Reimburse Rate:	5.00%
Civilian Salary(\$/Year):	46,642.00	Max Home Purch Reimburs(\$):	11,191.00
Civilian Turnover Rate:	15.00%	Civilian Homeowning Rate:	64.00%
Civilian Early Retire Rate:	10.00%	HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate:	22.90%
Civilian Regular Retire Rate:	5.00%	HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate:	5.00%
Civilian RIF Pay Factor:	39.00%	RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate:	0.00%
SF File Desc:	Final Factors	RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate:	0.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN TWO - FACILITIES

RPMA Building SF Cost Index:	0.93	Rehab vs. New MilCon Cost:	0.00%
BOS Index (RPMA vs population):	0.54	Info Management Account:	0.00%
(Indices are used as exponents)		MilCon Design Rate:	0.00%
Program Management Factor:	10.00%	MilCon SIOH Rate:	0.00%
Caretaker Admin(SF/Care):	162.00	MilCon Contingency Plan Rate:	0.00%
Mothball Cost (\$/SF):	1.25	MilCon Site Preparation Rate:	0.00%
Avg Bachelor Quarters(SF):	256.00	Discount Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	2.75%
Avg Family Quarters(SF):	1,320.00	Inflation Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	0.00%
APPDET.RPT Inflation Rates:			
1996: 0.00% 1997: 2.90% 1998: 3.00%		1999: 3.00% 2000: 3.00% 2001: 3.00%	

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN THREE - TRANSPORTATION

Material/Assigned Person(Lb):	710	Equip Pack & Crate(\$/Ton):	284.00
HHG Per Off Family (Lb):	14,500.00	Mil Light Vehicle(\$/Mile):	0.43
HHG Per Enl Family (Lb):	9,000.00	Heavy/Spec Vehicle(\$/Mile):	1.40
HHG Per Mil Single (Lb):	6,400.00	POV Reimbursement(\$/Mile):	0.18
HHG Per Civilian (Lb):	18,000.00	Avg Mil Tour Length (Years):	4.10
Total HHG Cost (\$/100Lb):	35.00	Routine PCS(\$/Pers/Tour):	6,437.00
Air Transport (\$/Pass Mile):	0.20	One-Time Off PCS Cost(\$):	9,142.00
Misc Exp (\$/Direct Employ):	700.00	One-Time Enl PCS Cost(\$):	5,761.00

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm to Mmth/Kir  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\HNSMCLS.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN FOUR - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Category	UM	\$/UM	Category	UM	\$/UM
-----	---	----	-----	---	----
Horizontal	(SY)	0	other	(SF)	0
Waterfront	(LF)	0	Optional Category B	( )	0
Air Operations	(SF)	0	Optional Category C	( )	0
Operational	(SF)	0	Optional Category D	( )	0
Administrative	(SF)	0	Optional Category E	( )	0
School Buildings	(SF)	0	Optional Category F	( )	0
Maintenance Shops	(SF)	0	Optional Category G	( )	0
Bachelor Quarters	(SF)	0	Optional Category H	( )	0
Family Quarters	(EA)	0	Optional Category I	( )	0
Covered Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category J	( )	0
Dining Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category K	( )	0
Recreation Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category L	( )	0
Communications Facil	(SF)	0	Optional Category M	( )	0
Shipyards Maintenance	(SF)	0	Optional Category N	( )	0
RDT & E Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category O	( )	0
POL Storage	(BL)	0	Optional Category P	( )	0
Ammunition Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category Q	( )	0
Medical Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category R	( )	0
Environmental	( )	0			

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm/RL to Mmth  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\SDC09.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

Starting Year : 1996  
 Final Year : 2000  
 ROI Year : 100+ Years

NPV in 2015(\$K): 11,171  
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 13,581

Net Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars	Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	2,031	1,060	1,413	1,943	971	1,413	8,830	0
Person	-29	-29	-29	110	161	-95	89	-95
Overhd	102	79	18	215	362	47	824	-38
Moving	19	0	0	1,282	1,990	0	3,291	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	2	0	0	233	354	0	590	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,126</b>	<b>1,110</b>	<b>1,401</b>	<b>3,783</b>	<b>3,839</b>	<b>1,365</b>	<b>13,625</b>	<b>-133</b>

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
<b>POSITIONS ELIMINATED</b>							
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
<b>POSITIONS REALIGNED</b>							
Off	0	0	0	5	8	0	13
Enl	8	0	0	4	7	0	19
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	0	51	79	0	130
TOT	8	0	0	60	94	0	162

**Summary:**

-----  
 SDC-09: Move ESC/RL to Ft Monmouth. ESC and PL stay in place.  
 Distance to Ft Monmouth is to Newark + 50 miles  
 No consolidation savings from move.  
 Screen 4 data is from Army response  
 MILCON numbers inflated from Army response (Note --Note no MFH)  
 No geophysics reduction assumed  
 No FFRDC contract termination costs

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm/RL to Mmth  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\SDC09.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
MilCon	2,031	1,060	1,413	1,943	971	1,413	8,830	0
Person	41	41	41	277	488	231	1,120	231
Overhd	102	122	90	312	666	669	1,962	607
Moving	32	0	0	1,296	2,013	0	3,341	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	2	0	0	233	354	0	590	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,209</b>	<b>1,223</b>	<b>1,545</b>	<b>4,061</b>	<b>4,493</b>	<b>2,313</b>	<b>15,844</b>	<b>839</b>

Savings (\$K) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	70	70	70	167	326	326	1,031	326
Overhd	0	43	73	97	304	622	1,138	645
Moving	12	0	0	14	23	0	50	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>278</b>	<b>654</b>	<b>948</b>	<b>2,219</b>	<b>971</b>

NET PRESENT VALUES REPORT (COBRA v5.08)  
 Data As Of 11:45 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:50 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm/RL to Mnth  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\SDC09.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

Year	Cost(\$)	Adjusted Cost(\$)	NPV(\$)
----	-----	-----	-----
1996	2,126,162	2,097,517	2,097,517
1997	1,110,007	1,065,745	3,163,262
1998	1,401,592	1,309,685	4,472,947
1999	3,783,002	3,440,331	7,913,278
2000	3,839,299	3,398,081	11,311,359
2001	1,364,641	1,175,488	12,486,848
2002	-132,960	-111,465	12,375,382
2003	-132,960	-108,482	12,266,900
2004	-132,960	-105,579	12,161,321
2005	-132,960	-102,753	12,058,568
2006	-132,960	-100,003	11,958,565
2007	-132,960	-97,326	11,861,239
2008	-132,960	-94,722	11,766,517
2009	-132,960	-92,186	11,674,331
2010	-132,960	-89,719	11,584,611
2011	-132,960	-87,318	11,497,293
2012	-132,960	-84,981	11,412,312
2013	-132,960	-82,706	11,329,606
2014	-132,960	-80,493	11,249,113
2015	-132,960	-78,339	11,170,774
2016	-132,960	-76,242	11,094,532
2017	-132,960	-74,201	11,020,330
2018	-132,960	-72,215	10,948,115
2019	-132,960	-70,283	10,877,832
2020	-132,960	-68,402	10,809,430
2021	-132,960	-66,571	10,742,859
2022	-132,960	-64,789	10,678,070
2023	-132,960	-63,055	10,615,014
2024	-132,960	-61,368	10,553,647
2025	-132,960	-59,725	10,493,921
2026	-132,960	-58,127	10,435,795
2027	-132,960	-56,571	10,379,224
2028	-132,960	-55,057	10,324,167
2029	-132,960	-53,583	10,270,583
2030	-132,960	-52,149	10,218,434
2031	-132,960	-50,754	10,167,680
2032	-132,960	-49,395	10,118,285
2033	-132,960	-48,073	10,070,212
2034	-132,960	-46,787	10,023,425
2035	-132,960	-45,534	9,977,891
2036	-132,960	-44,316	9,933,575
2037	-132,960	-43,130	9,890,445
2038	-132,960	-41,975	9,848,470
2039	-132,960	-40,852	9,807,618
2040	-132,960	-39,758	9,767,859
2041	-132,960	-38,694	9,729,165
2042	-132,960	-37,659	9,691,506
2043	-132,960	-36,651	9,654,855
2044	-132,960	-35,670	9,619,185
2045	-132,960	-34,715	9,584,470
2046	-132,960	-33,786	9,550,683
2047	-132,960	-32,882	9,517,801
2048	-132,960	-32,002	9,485,800
2049	-132,960	-31,145	9,454,654
2050	-132,960	-30,312	9,424,342
2051	-132,960	-29,500	9,394,842
2052	-132,960	-28,711	9,366,131
2053	-132,960	-27,943	9,338,188
2054	-132,960	-27,195	9,310,993
2055	-132,960	-26,467	9,284,526
2056	-132,960	-25,758	9,258,768



Department : Air Force  
Option Package : Hnscm/RL to Mmth  
Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\SDC09.CBR  
Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

2057	-132,960	-25,069	9,233,699
2058	-132,960	-24,398	9,209,301
2059	-132,960	-23,745	9,185,555
2060	-132,960	-23,110	9,162,446
2061	-132,960	-22,491	9,139,954
2062	-132,960	-21,889	9,118,065
2063	-132,960	-21,303	9,096,762
2064	-132,960	-20,733	9,076,029
2065	-132,960	-20,178	9,055,850
2066	-132,960	-19,638	9,036,212
2067	-132,960	-19,113	9,017,099
2068	-132,960	-18,601	8,998,498
2069	-132,960	-18,103	8,980,395
2070	-132,960	-17,619	8,962,776
2071	-132,960	-17,147	8,945,629
2072	-132,960	-16,688	8,928,941
2073	-132,960	-16,242	8,912,699
2074	-132,960	-15,807	8,896,892
2075	-132,960	-15,384	8,881,508
2076	-132,960	-14,972	8,866,536
2077	-132,960	-14,571	8,851,964
2078	-132,960	-14,181	8,837,783
2079	-132,960	-13,802	8,823,981
2080	-132,960	-13,432	8,810,549
2081	-132,960	-13,073	8,797,476
2082	-132,960	-12,723	8,784,752
2083	-132,960	-12,383	8,772,370
2084	-132,960	-12,051	8,760,319
2085	-132,960	-11,729	8,748,590
2086	-132,960	-11,415	8,737,175
2087	-132,960	-11,109	8,726,066
2088	-132,960	-10,812	8,715,254
2089	-132,960	-10,522	8,704,732
2090	-132,960	-10,241	8,694,491
2091	-132,960	-9,967	8,684,524
2092	-132,960	-9,700	8,674,824
2093	-132,960	-9,440	8,665,383
2094	-132,960	-9,188	8,656,195
2095	-132,960	-8,942	8,647,253

TOTAL ONE-TIME COST REPORT (COBRA v5.08)  
 Data As Of 11:45 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:50 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm/RL to Mmth  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\SDC09.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
-----	----	-----
<b>Construction</b>		
Military Construction	8,830,000	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
<b>Total - Construction</b>		<b>8,830,000</b>
<b>Personnel</b>		
Civilian RIF	145,523	
Civilian Early Retirement	54,571	
Civilian New Hires	192,000	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	25,056	
<b>Total - Personnel</b>		<b>417,150</b>
<b>Overhead</b>		
Program Planning Support	237,220	
Mothball / Shutdown	165,000	
<b>Total - Overhead</b>		<b>402,220</b>
<b>Moving</b>		
Civilian Moving	2,556,216	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	141,219	
Freight	29,111	
One-Time Moving Costs	615,000	
<b>Total - Moving</b>		<b>3,341,547</b>
<b>Other</b>		
HAP / RSE	150,913	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	439,000	
<b>Total - Other</b>		<b>589,913</b>
<b>Total One-Time Costs</b>		<b>13,580,829</b>
-----		
<b>One-Time Savings</b>		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	50,240	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
<b>Total One-Time Savings</b>		<b>50,240</b>
-----		
<b>Total Net One-Time Costs</b>		<b>13,530,589</b>

TOTAL MILITARY CONSTRUCTION ASSETS (COBRA v5.08)  
 Data As Of 11:45 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:50 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm/RL to Mmth  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\SDC09.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

All Costs in \$K

Base Name	Total MilCon	IMA Cost	Land Purch	Cost Avoid	Total Cost
FT MONMOUTH	8,830	0	0	0	8,830
HANSCOM	0	0	0	0	0
Totals:	8,830	0	0	0	8,830

PERSONNEL SUMMARY REPORT (COBRA v5.08)  
 Data As Of 11:45 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:50 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm/RL to Mmth  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\SDC09.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: FT MONMOUTH, NJ

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996, Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
416	505	406	7,341

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

From Base: HANSCOM, MA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	0	5	8	0	13
Enlisted	8	0	0	4	7	0	19
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	0	51	79	0	130
TOTAL	8	0	0	60	94	0	162

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Into FT MONMOUTH, NJ):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	0	5	8	0	13
Enlisted	8	0	0	4	7	0	19
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	0	51	79	0	130
TOTAL	8	0	0	60	94	0	162

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
429	524	406	7,471

PERSONNEL SUMMARY FOR: HANSCOM, MA

BASE POPULATION (FY 1996):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
852	872	0	2,354

FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES:

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	-53	0	0	0	0	-53
Enlisted	0	5	0	0	0	0	5
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	-349	0	0	0	0	-349
TOTAL	0	-397	0	0	0	0	-397

BASE POPULATION (Prior to BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
799	877	0	2,005

PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS:

To Base: FT MONMOUTH, NJ

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	0	5	8	0	13
Enlisted	8	0	0	4	7	0	19
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	0	51	79	0	130
TOTAL	8	0	0	60	94	0	162

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm/RL to Mmth  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\SDC09.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

TOTAL PERSONNEL REALIGNMENTS (Out of HANSCOM, MA):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Officers	0	0	0	5	8	0	13
Enlisted	8	0	0	4	7	0	19
Students	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians	0	0	0	51	79	0	130
TOTAL	8	0	0	60	94	0	162

BASE POPULATION (After BRAC Action):

Officers	Enlisted	Students	Civilians
786	858	0	1,875

TOTAL PERSONNEL IMPACT REPORT (COBRA v5.08)  
 Data As Of 11:45 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:50 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm/RL to Mmth  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\SDC09.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

	Rate	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING OUT		0	0	0	51	79	0	130
Early Retirement*	10.00%	0	0	0	5	8	0	13
Regular Retirement*	5.00%	0	0	0	3	4	0	7
Civilian Turnover*	15.00%	0	0	0	8	12	0	20
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*+		0	0	0	3	5	0	8
Civilians Moving (the remainder)		0	0	0	32	50	0	82
Civilian Positions Available		0	0	0	19	29	0	48
CIVILIAN POSITIONS ELIMINATED		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Early Retirement	10.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular Retirement	5.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian Turnover	15.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civs Not Moving (RIFs)*+		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Priority Placement#	60.00%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Available to Move		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civilian RIFs (the remainder)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CIVILIAN POSITIONS REALIGNING IN		0	0	0	51	79	0	130
Civilians Moving		0	0	0	32	50	0	82
New Civilians Hired		0	0	0	19	29	0	48
Other Civilian Additions		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN EARLY RETIRMENTS		0	0	0	5	8	0	13
TOTAL CIVILIAN RIFS		0	0	0	3	5	0	8
TOTAL CIVILIAN PRIORITY PLACEMENTS#		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CIVILIAN NEW HIRES		0	0	0	19	29	0	48

\* Early Retirements, Regular Retirements, Civilian Turnover, and Civilians Not Willing to Move are not applicable for moves under fifty miles.

+ The Percentage of Civilians Not Willing to Move (Voluntary RIFs) varies from base to base.

# Not all Priority Placements involve a Permanent Change of Station. The rate of PPS placements involving a PCS is 50.00%

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 1/3  
 Data As Of 11:45 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:50 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm/RL to Mnth  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\SDC09.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

ONE-TIME COSTS -----(\$K)-----	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
CONSTRUCTION							
MILCON	2,031	1,060	1,413	1,943	971	1,413	8,830
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land Purch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M							
CIV SALARY							
Civ RIF	0	0	0	54	91	0	145
Civ Retire	0	0	0	21	33	0	54
CIV MOVING							
Per Diem	0	0	0	101	158	0	260
POV Miles	0	0	0	1	2	0	4
Home Purch	0	0	0	427	668	0	1,095
HHG	0	0	0	207	324	0	531
Misc	0	0	0	22	35	0	57
House Hunt	0	0	0	65	101	0	166
PPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RITA	0	0	0	173	270	0	443
FREIGHT							
Packing	2	0	0	10	16	0	28
Freight	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Vehicles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Driving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployment	0	0	0	9	16	0	25
OTHER							
Program Plan	72	54	40	30	23	17	237
Shutdown	0	38	20	26	36	44	165
New Hire	0	0	0	76	116	0	192
1-Time Move	0	0	0	246	369	0	615
MIL PERSONNEL							
MIL MOVING							
Per Diem	1	0	0	1	1	0	2
POV Miles	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
HHG	23	0	0	34	57	0	115
Misc	6	0	0	6	10	0	22
OTHER							
Elim PCS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER							
HAP / RSE	2	0	0	58	90	0	151
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Other	0	0	0	175	264	0	439
TOTAL ONE-TIME	2,137	1,152	1,473	3,689	3,654	1,474	13,581

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 2/3  
 Data As Of 11:45 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:50 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm/RL to Mmth  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\SDC09.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

RECURRINGCOSTS	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOS	30	30	30	255	607	607	1,560	607
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	41	41	41	116	231	231	703	231
OTHER								
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	71	71	71	371	839	839	2,263	839
TOTAL COST	2,209	1,223	1,545	4,061	4,493	2,313	15,844	839
ONE-TIME SAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	
CONSTRUCTION								
MILCON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
O&M								
1-Time Move	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MIL PERSONNEL								
Mil Moving	12	0	0	14	23	0	50	
OTHER								
Land Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL ONE-TIME	12	0	0	14	23	0	50	
RECURRINGSAVES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O&M								
RPMA	0	20	50	73	106	148	397	171
BOS	0	23	23	23	198	474	741	474
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIL PERSONNEL								
Off Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	70	70	70	167	326	326	1,031	326
OTHER								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL RECUR	70	113	143	263	630	948	2,169	971
TOTAL SAVINGS	83	113	143	278	654	948	2,219	971



TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS DETAIL REPORT (COBRA v5.08) - Page 3/3  
 Data As Of 11:45 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:50 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm/RL to Mmth  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\SDC09.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

ONE-TIME NET	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
<b>CONSTRUCTION</b>								
MILCON	2,031	1,060	1,413	1,943	971	1,413	8,830	
Fam Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
<b>O&amp;M</b>								
Civ Retir/RIF	0	0	0	75	124	0	200	
Civ Moving	2	0	0	1,008	1,575	0	2,585	
Other	72	92	60	388	560	62	1,234	
<b>MIL PERSONNEL</b>								
Mil Moving	17	0	0	28	46	0	91	
<b>OTHER</b>								
HAP / RSE	2	0	0	58	90	0	151	
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Info Manage	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-Time Other	0	0	0	175	264	0	439	
Land	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
<b>TOTAL ONE-TIME</b>	<b>2,125</b>	<b>1,152</b>	<b>1,473</b>	<b>3,675</b>	<b>3,631</b>	<b>1,474</b>	<b>13,530</b>	
<b>RECURRING NET</b>								
-----(\$K)-----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----	-----
FAM HOUSE OPS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>O&amp;M</b>								
RPMA	0	-20	-50	-73	-106	-148	-397	-171
BOS	30	7	7	232	409	133	819	133
Unique Operat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretaker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>MIL PERSONNEL</b>								
Mil Salary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
House Allow	-29	-29	-29	-51	-95	-95	-328	-95
<b>OTHER</b>								
Procurement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unique Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL RECUR</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-42</b>	<b>-71</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>208</b>	<b>-110</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>-133</b>
<b>TOTAL NET COST</b>	<b>2,126</b>	<b>1,110</b>	<b>1,401</b>	<b>3,783</b>	<b>3,839</b>	<b>1,365</b>	<b>13,625</b>	<b>-133</b>

PERSONNEL, SF, RPMA, AND BOS DELTAS (COBRA v5.08)  
 Data As Of 11:45 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:50 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm/RL to Mnth  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\SDC09.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

Base	Personnel		SF		
	Change	%Change	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
FT MONMOUTH	162	2%	0	0%	0
HANSCOM	-162	-4%	-132,000	-3%	815

Base	RPMA(\$)			BOS(\$)		
	Change	%Change	Chg/Per	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
FT MONMOUTH	0	0%	0	607,149	1%	3,748
HANSCOM	-171,184	-3%	1,057	-473,893	-2%	2,925

Base	RPMABOS(\$)		
	Change	%Change	Chg/Per
FT MONMOUTH	607,149	1%	3,748
HANSCOM	-645,078	-3%	3,982

RPMA/BOS CHANGE REPORT (COBRA v5.08)

Data As Of 11:45 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:50 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm/RL to Mmth  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\SDC09.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

Net Change(\$K)	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total	Beyond
RPMA Change	0	-20	-50	-73	-106	-148	-397	-171
BOS Change	30	7	7	232	409	133	819	133
Housing Change	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL CHANGES</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>-13</b>	<b>-43</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>303</b>	<b>-15</b>	<b>422</b>	<b>-38</b>

INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v5.08)  
 Data As Of 11:45 02/04/1995, Report Created 08:50 04/24/1995

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm/RL to Mmth  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\SDC09.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

INPUT SCREEN ONE - GENERAL SCENARIO INFORMATION

Model Year One : FY 1996

Model does Time-Phasing of Construction/Shutdown: No

Base Name	Strategy:
-----	-----
FT MONMOUTH, NJ	Realignment
HANSCOM, MA	Realignment

Summary:

-----  
 SDC-09: Move ESC/RL to Ft Monmouth. ESC and PL stay in place.  
 Distance to Ft Monmouth is to Newark + 50 miles  
 No consolidation savings from move.  
 Screen 4 data is from Army response  
 MILCON numbers inflated from Army response (Note --Note no MFH)  
 No geophysics reduction assumed  
 No FFRDC contract termination costs

INPUT SCREEN TWO - DISTANCE TABLE

From Base:	To Base:	Distance:
-----	-----	-----
FT MONMOUTH, NJ	HANSCOM, MA	276 mi

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from HANSCOM, MA to FT MONMOUTH, NJ

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
Officer Positions:	0	0	0	5	8	0
Enlisted Positions:	8	0	0	4	7	0
Civilian Positions:	0	0	0	51	79	0
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Light Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Special Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: FT MONMOUTH, NJ

Total Officer Employees:	416	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	10,331
Total Enlisted Employees:	505	Communications (\$K/Year):	0
Total Student Employees:	406	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	60,417
Total Civilian Employees:	7,341	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	39,183
Mil Families Living On Base:	100.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	3,861
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.19
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	4,474	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	441	Activity Code:	34555
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	261		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	103	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm/RL to Mmth  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\SDC09.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: HANSCOM, MA

Total Officer Employees:	852	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	6,164
Total Enlisted Employees:	872	Communications (\$K/Year):	3,704
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	18,161
Total Civilian Employees:	2,354	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	59.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	8,996
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	6.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.29
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	4,425	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	432	Activity Code:	AF036
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	303		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	139	Homeowner Assistance Program:	Yes
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.07	Unique Activity Information:	No

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: FT MONMOUTH, NJ

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	162	243	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	23%	12%	16%	22%	11%	16%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	23%	12%	16%	22%	27%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0					Perc Family Housing ShutDown: 0.0%

Name: HANSCOM, MA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	----	----	----	----	----	----
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	13	21	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	246	369	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	23%	12%	16%	22%	11%	16%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	23%	12%	16%	22%	27%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	132					Perc Family Housing ShutDown: 0.0%

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm/RL to Mmth  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\SDC09.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: HANSCOM, MA

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Off Force Struc Change:	0	-53	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	5	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	0	-349	0	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sal Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

INPUT SCREEN SEVEN - BASE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION

Name: FT MONMOUTH, NJ

Description	Categ	New MilCon	Rehab MilCon	Total Cost(\$K)
Mission Facilities	OTHER	0	0	8,830
CE Estimate 2/2/95				

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

Percent Officers Married:	76.80%	Civ Early Retire Pay Factor:	9.00%
Percent Enlisted Married:	66.90%	Priority Placement Service:	60.00%
Enlisted Housing MilCon:	80.00%	PPS Actions Involving PCS:	50.00%
Officer Salary(\$/Year):	78,668.00	Civilian PCS Costs (\$):	28,800.00
Off BAQ with Dependents(\$):	7,073.00	Civilian New Hire Cost(\$):	4,000.00
Enlisted Salary(\$/Year):	36,148.00	Nat Median Home Price(\$):	114,600.00
Enl BAQ with Dependents(\$):	5,162.00	Home Sale Reimburse Rate:	10.00%
Avg Unemploy Cost(\$/Week):	174.00	Max Home Sale Reimburs(\$):	22,385.00
Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks):	18	Home Purch Reimburse Rate:	5.00%
Civilian Salary(\$/Year):	46,642.00	Max Home Purch Reimburs(\$):	11,191.00
Civilian Turnover Rate:	15.00%	Civilian Homeowning Rate:	64.00%
Civilian Early Retire Rate:	10.00%	HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate:	22.90%
Civilian Regular Retire Rate:	5.00%	HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate:	5.00%
Civilian RIF Pay Factor:	39.00%	RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate:	0.00%
SF File Desc:	Final Factors	RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate:	0.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN TWO - FACILITIES

RPMA Building SF Cost Index:	0.93	Rehab vs. New MilCon Cost:	0.00%
BOS Index (RPMA vs population):	0.54	Info Management Account:	0.00%
(Indices are used as exponents)		MilCon Design Rate:	0.00%
Program Management Factor:	10.00%	MilCon SIOH Rate:	0.00%
Caretaker Admin(SF/Care):	162.00	MilCon Contingency Plan Rate:	0.00%
Mothball Cost (\$/SF):	1.25	MilCon Site Preparation Rate:	0.00%
Avg Bachelor Quarters(SF):	256.00	Discount Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	2.75%
Avg Family Quarters(SF):	1,320.00	Inflation Rate for NPV.RPT/ROI:	0.00%
APPDET.RPT Inflation Rates:			
1996: 0.00%	1997: 2.90%	1998: 3.00%	1999: 3.00%
			2000: 3.00%
			2001: 3.00%

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm/RL to Mmth  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\SDC09.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN THREE - TRANSPORTATION

Material/Assigned Person(Lb):	710	Equip Pack & Crate(\$/Ton):	284.00
HHG Per Off Family (Lb):	14,500.00	Mil Light Vehicle(\$/Mile):	0.43
HHG Per Enl Family (Lb):	9,000.00	Heavy/Spec Vehicle(\$/Mile):	1.40
HHG Per Mil Single (Lb):	6,400.00	POV Reimbursement(\$/Mile):	0.18
HHG Per Civilian (Lb):	18,000.00	Avg Mil Tour Length (Years):	4.10
Total HHG Cost (\$/100Lb):	35.00	Routine PCS(\$/Pers/Tour):	6,437.00
Air Transport (\$/Pass Mile):	0.20	One-Time Off PCS Cost(\$):	9,142.00
Misc Exp (\$/Direct Employ):	700.00	One-Time Enl PCS Cost(\$):	5,761.00

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN FOUR - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Category	UM	\$/UM	Category	UM	\$/UM
Horizontal	(SY)	0	other	(SF)	0
Waterfront	(LF)	0	Optional Category B	( )	0
Air Operations	(SF)	0	Optional Category C	( )	0
Operational	(SF)	0	Optional Category D	( )	0
Administrative	(SF)	0	Optional Category E	( )	0
School Buildings	(SF)	0	Optional Category F	( )	0
Maintenance Shops	(SF)	0	Optional Category G	( )	0
Bachelor Quarters	(SF)	0	Optional Category H	( )	0
Family Quarters	(EA)	0	Optional Category I	( )	0
Covered Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category J	( )	0
Dining Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category K	( )	0
Recreation Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category L	( )	0
Communications Facil	(SF)	0	Optional Category M	( )	0
Shipyard Maintenance	(SF)	0	Optional Category N	( )	0
RDT & E Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category O	( )	0
POL Storage	(BL)	0	Optional Category P	( )	0
Ammunition Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category Q	( )	0
Medical Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category R	( )	0
Environmental	( )	0			



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON DC 20330-1000

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

950424-5  
23 FEB 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, LABORATORY JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP

FROM: SAF/MII

SUBJECT: Assessment of DDR&E Memo #4 Alternatives

REFERENCES:

- A. DDR&E Memo #4 of 29 Nov 94 re Alternatives for MILDEP Consideration
- B. SAF/MII Memo of 19 Jan 95 re LJCSG Memo #4 Alternatives

In reference B, the AF committed to consider the Memo #4 Alternatives (Reference A). Attached you will find our functional review and COBRA analysis of these alternatives.

JAMES F. BOATRIGHT  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force  
(Installations)

Attachments:  
Functional Review  
COBRA Analysis





FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -- BRAC '95 SENSITIVE  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE



FEB 15 1995

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE CO-CHAIRMAN, AIR FORCE BASE CLOSURE EXECUTIVE GROUP**

**FROM: SAF/AQ**

**SUBJECT: Functional Assessment of DDR&E Memo #4 Alternatives**

**REFERENCES:**

- A. DDR&E Memo #4 of 29 Nov 94 re Alternatives for MILDEP Consideration
- B. SAF/MII Memo of 19 Jan 95 re LJCSG Memo #4 Alternatives


In Reference A Memo, DDR&E requested the MILDEPs to consider some additional alternatives beyond those identified by the LJCSG Working Group. The AF has done so, in accordance with Reference B. The resulting functional analysis is contained in the attachments to this Memo. Specifically, the response to Paragraph 1 is in Attachment 1; to Paragraphs 2, 3 & 4 is in Attachments 2 & 3; and to Paragraph 6 is in Attachment 4. No AF response is required to Paragraph 5 as no AF activities reported involvement in Pyrotechnics.

One factor apparently not fully considered by DDR&E in its development of alternatives is that most of the products under discussion (e.g., Air Vehicles) involve the primary mission of the AF and secondary missions of the other MILDEPs. Even though the AF is the most significant player in the majority of the Cross-Service product lines and has already achieved the greatest consolidation, many of the Memo #4 alternatives surprisingly suggested consolidation at other MILDEP activities. For example, the AF has already consolidated its RDT&E of conventional weapons at Eglin AFB (with some cruise missile R&D at ASC (WPAFB)). In addition, these same RDT&E resources are also leveraged by the collocation of S&T, R&D, Acquisition, , DT&E, OT&E, and Training communities. Major operational users, such as AFSOC, 33rd FW and USAFAWC are collocated at Eglin and work closely to support our integrated product team focus. On the other hand, the other Services' Weapons RDT&E is fragmented among multiple activities and locations (e.g. Navy at 11 activities/locations, and the Army at 7 activities and 6 locations).

Another factor apparently not considered by DDR&E in their analysis is the degree to which the MILDEPs have successfully outsourced their R&D work. This represents the efficiency with which the MILDEPs are using the resources, particularly personnel, provided to them. An examination of the number of personnel required to accomplish a given amount of work (represented by funds provided) and the facilities and equipment required to accomplish the work reveals that AF leveraging of its resources is very significant (e.g., almost three-fourths of Phillips Lab, Edwards funding goes to

the private sector), yet this important consideration was not included in the DDR&E analysis supporting the Reference A alternatives.

Since (a) the AF share of the DoD C3 budget has consistently been over 50% for the past few years, and (b) the AF will be the only MILDEP to complete consolidation of its C4I S&T and EMD activities at a single site (Hanscom AFB), the DDR&E recommendations concerning C4I seemed particularly unsupported by the facts.



CLARK G. FIESTER  
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force  
(Acquisition)

Attachments: a/s

**AIR VEHICLES**

Reference DDR&E memo paragraph #1 requested that the MILDEPs “analyze the consolidation of those (Air Vehicle) laboratory activities and support functions that they are otherwise considering for realignment or closure...” The AF Air Vehicle laboratory activities are all located at a single location, Wright-Patterson AFB. As Wright-Patterson AFB is not being considered for realignment or closure by the AF as part of BRAC '95, no additional analysis of this alternative is required.

**AIR-TO-AIR & AIR-TO-GROUND WEAPONS**

**(including EXPLOSIVES and PROPELLANTS)**

Memo #4 requested that the MILDEPs consolidate "...all fixed wing air-to-air and air-to-ground RDT&E at NAWC, Weapons Division China Lake" under the presumption of moving from lower to higher Functional or Military Value T&E sites. Based on the T&E JCSG Functional Values, Eglin scored significantly higher than China Lake for Armaments/Weapons (82 vs 57). The identification of China Lake in Memo #4 for a consolidation site, versus Eglin, is inconsistent with the T&E JCSG results.

In addition, since there was no T&E analysis provided to support this alternative, the AF completed the analysis using certified Lab and T&E JCSG data. The completed analysis combines the T&E portion (since the objective was to collocate to the higher value T&E location), with the Lab portion to address RDT&E.. This approach permitted the air launched weapons RDT&E activities of Eglin and China Lake to be examined as a whole, rather than piecemeal.

The results of that analysis for air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons, including explosives, (attachment 2B), show that **Eglin is the best alternative** based on:

- Analysis of Lab and T&E JCSG certified data
- Full Capability/Capacity to Satisfy Requirements
- Leverages RDT&E resources to support collocated S&T, EMD, DT&E, OT&E, and User Communities
- RDT&E capability fully integrated with collocated acquisition SPOs
- Significant Joint Activity in Place (e.g., AMRAAM, JDAM)

Based on this analysis, efforts to consolidate air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons RDT&E should be focused on Eglin, since it is supported by the T&E JCSG Functional Values and combined R&D/T&E analysis of certified data. Therefore, no further analysis should be conducted on the consolidation of air-to-air/air-to-ground weapons RDT&E at China Lake.

A similar analysis was done for the Propellants area since Memo #4 requested the MILDEPs to consolidate "...all missile and rocket propulsion RDT&E at NAWC, China Lake". The result of that analysis (also attachment 2B) shows that **Phillips Lab is the best alternative** based on:

- Analysis of Lab and T&E JCSG certified data
- Full S&T Capability/Capacity
- Significantly Greater Capital Investment than China Lake
- Overwhelmingly (<85%) Focused on Space (vs Missiles/Rockets)

Based on this analysis, efforts to consolidate propulsion should be focused on Philips Lab at Edwards, and no further analysis should be conducted on the consolidation at China Lake.

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE**

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

**Air Force BRAC '95 Analysis  
of  
T&E Infrastructure**

Part III: Analysis of RDT&E Alternatives for  
Armament/Weapons, Explosives, and Propulsion

File:afv6207.ppt

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

94 2/12/95

Part III of the Air Force analysis developed RDT&E alternatives for armament/weapons, energetics-explosives, and energetics-propulsion.

Primarily, Part III addresses the Laboratory JCSG Chair's RDT&E alternatives as forwarded in the DDR&E Memo #4, dated 29 Nov 94 (Reference 3).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

### **Air Launched Weapons RDT&E** **Background**

- LJCSG Chair Alternatives (29 Nov 94 Memo #4)
  - Proposes to Consolidate Fixed Wing, Air-Launched (A-A/A-S) Weapons at NAWC (China Lake)
  - AF Did Not Analyze Since Not Developed Jointly and No Supporting Analysis Provided
- OSD(ES) Clarification of DepSecDef's 7 Jan 94 Memorandum (27 Dec 94)
  - Expanded to Include Alternatives Provided by JCSG Chairs (vs Jointly Developed)
- LJCSG Chair Provided Supporting Analysis
  - Conceptual Approach for Integrating Lab (R&D) and T&E JCSG Results
  - Analysis Only Addressed Lab Activities
  - AF Proceeded with Evaluating R&D Portion of Alternatives Only
- Since No T&E Analysis Provided to Support RDT&E Alternative, AF Completed T&E Analysis for "Core" T&E Activities (See Part II)
  - Used Results, Along with LJCSG Data, to Address RDT&E Alternatives

File:aw9207.gpt


FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

95 2/13/95

The LJCSG Chair alternatives in the 29 Nov 94 Memorandum #4 (Reference 3) proposed to consolidate fixed wing, air-launched, air-to-air, and air-to-surface weapons at NAWC (China Lake). The Air Force's initial position was to not analyze these alternatives since they were not developed jointly and no supporting analyses were provided, in accordance with DepSecDef's 7 Jan 94 tasking memo (Reference 1).

OSD (ES) clarified the DepSecDef's policy allowing for any JCSG chair to propose alternatives for consideration by the MilDeps. The AF requested the analysis supporting these alternatives from the LJCSG and the T&E JCSG chairs. Subsequently, the LJCSG Chair provided some supporting analysis for the R&D (Lab) portion of the RDT&E alternatives and the Air Force proceeded in evaluating this portion of the LJCSG Chair's RDT&E alternative.

Since no T&E-specific analyses were provided to the Air Force to support the T&E portion of the RDT&E alternatives, the Air Force used the T&E JCSG results and combined them with further analysis of the LJCSG certified data to address the RDT&E alternatives.



This chart was extracted directly from the LJCSG Chair's analyses furnished as supporting documentation for the alternatives offered in Memo #4 (Reference 3). The intent of the chart, as briefed to the LJCSG, was to illustrate the flow of R&D and T&E activities from lower functional values (FV) to higher functional values, and the flow of lower functional value R&D laboratories to higher functional value T&E activities with open air ranges (OAR).

This integration concept is explained further in the following charts.



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

**LJCSG RDT&E Integration Concept  
(Analysis Ground Rules)**

- Integrate RDT&E Functions
- Move Lab Activities to T&E Sites Due to Range Space
- Move From Lower to Higher Functional or Military Values
- Roll Up/Look For Activity/Installation Alternatives

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

File:nlw0207.ppt 97 2/13/95

The analyses provided by the LJCSG Chair, as support for the proposed RDT&E alternatives, contained an LJCSG RDT&E integration concept chart (with the following guidelines).

- a. integrate RDT&E functions,
- b. move lab activities to T&E sites due to range space,
- c. move from lower to higher functional or military values, and
- d. roll-up/look for activity/installation alternatives.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

**Air Launched Weapons RDT&E**  
**Scope**

- RDT&E
  - Includes S&T and EMD (Excludes ISE)
- Fixed-Wing A-A/A-G Weapons
  - Surface-to-Surface T&E Excluded
  - Includes 5 CSFs
    - Conventional Missiles and Rockets
    - Guided Projectiles
    - Bombs
    - Guns/Ammo (Added)
    - Cruise Missile
  - Excludes Land, Sea, and Rotary-Wing Launched Weapons
- Lab Activities Include
  - 3 AF (1 Added)
  - 10 Navy (5 Added)
  - 4 Army (All Added)
- Energetics-Explosives Integral Part of Weapons RDT&E

File:aww9207.ppt

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

98 2/13/95

The LJCSG Chair's alternatives provided in Reference 3 focused exclusively on RDT&E and specifically addressed S&T, EMD, and T&E but excluded reference to in-service engineering (ISE). Although the LJCSG collected R&D data for air-launched, land-launched and sea-launched weapons, the LJCSG Chair narrowed the alternatives by examining "air-launched weapons" going on to define this as "...fixed wing air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons...". Thus, these alternatives addressed four weapons common support functions (CSFs) as follows:

- a) conventional missile and rockets
- b) bombs
- c) guided projectiles
- d) cruise missiles

Even though data were collected and analyzed for a fifth CSF (Guns and Ammunition), the LJCSG Chair's alternative did not address this CSF. The alternatives provided by the T&E JCSG addressed air armaments/weapons T&E which included air-to-air, air-to-surface, and surface-to-air but excluded surface-to-surface weapons.

As a result of the above constraints posed by both the LJCSG and T&E JCSG, the Air Force's analysis focused on air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons excluding from analysis, land, sea, and rotary-wing launched weapons. Additionally, LJCSG Memo #4 (Reference 3) also excluded from their analysis several Service organizations. To make the Air Force's analysis complete, these organizations (one for Air Force, five for Navy, and four for Army) were all included to ensure a thorough and accurate comparison.


**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE**

These organizations are:

Air Force	ASC WPAFB, OH
Navy	NSWC Dahlgren, VA
	NSWC Port Hueneme, CA
	NSWC Crane, IN
	NSWC Louisville, KY
	NSWC RDTE Warminster, PA
Army	ARDEC Picatinny Arsenal, NJ
	MRDEC Redstone Arsenal, AL
	ARL-APG, MD
	Benet

The LJCSG Chair's Memorandum #4 alternatives actually broke the energetics area into three sub areas: propellants, explosives, and pyrotechnics. Energetics-explosives is an integral part of all weapons and consequently, the Air Force did not separately analyze the weapons systems and explosives. Energetics-propellants was analyzed by the Air Force. Energetics-pyrotechnics was not analyzed by the Air Force because the Air Force is not a player in this area.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE



The process used to analyze the air launched weapons RDT&E is as follows:

Step 1: Initiate the analysis by using the data provided by the LJCSG for weapons. These data considered five CSF's:

- a. Conventional missiles/rockets
- b. Guided projectiles
- c. Bombs
- d. Guns/ammo
- e. Cruise missiles

For these CSF's, functional capacity and DoD-level functional requirement were available for S&T, EMD, and ISE.

Step 2: Based on the content of LJCSG Chair's Memo #4 (Reference 3) and as stated in the scope, these data were modified by excluding ISE and sea/land launched R&D. This brings the data in direct alignment with the content of Memo #4.

Step 3: Then, the best T&E activity/site was selected for RDT&E consolidation. This selection was based on the T&E JCSG certified data and results for Armament/Weapons. The T&E JCSG analysis preserved critical air, land, and sea space and, through policy imperatives, realigned facilities to open air ranges so as to minimize the number of sites (and cost) required.

Step 4: Using the T&E site from Step 3, evaluate consolidation of the DoD R&D workload for air-launched weapons at that site; that is, combine all relevant R&D activities at the site. For these activities, conduct capability and capacity analyses, identify any shortfalls/solutions, and identify any impacts.

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE**

Step 5: Based on the preceding steps, the best site for consolidation of air-launched weapons RDT&E is identified, leaving the assessment of any impacts on other missions/activities to be accomplished.

Step 6: The last step is to conduct a functional COBRA analysis for consolidation to the site selected in Step 5. This step was not addressed due to inadequate data.

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE**

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

**Air Launched Weapons RDT&E**  
**\*Best T&E Activity/Site**

	Requirement	AFDTC (Eglin)	NAWC (China Lake)
Functional Value		82	57
OAR Capacity (Test Hours)	N/A	16,036	3,986
A/W Flight Tests Per Year	N/A	582	118
Air Space (sq mi)	50,000	93,143	19,445
DoD Land Space (sq mi)	<sup>(1)</sup> 21,000	724	1693
Sea Space (sq mi)	50,000	91,998	None
Max Straight Line (nm)	A-A = 220	<sup>(2)</sup> 478	60
	A-S = 350	478	60
	S-A = 240	<sup>(2)</sup> 478	60

Note: (1) No activity meets 21,000 sq mi DoD Land Space Requirement  
 WSMR's 3,381 sq mi DoD Land Space is max  
 (2) Includes Theater Missile Defense Capability

\* Based on Part II T&E Analysis

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE


File:aww0207.ppt 102 2/13/95

A direct comparison of AFDTC Eglin and NAWC China Lake clearly shows that AFDTC Eglin is the only site capable of meeting the DoD T&E capability and capacity requirements. Eglin's functional value is significantly higher than China Lake (82 versus 57). Eglin has four times the capacity of China Lake, and Eglin conducts five times the number of flight tests of China Lake.

Eglin contains both land and sea space at one site, whereas China Lake only provides land space. Eglin provides almost five times the amount of air space as China Lake which can be used to launch live armament/ weapons. Eglin's air space includes 33,763 square miles of restricted/warning air space plus 59,380 square miles of Eglin Water Test Areas (EWTAs) which Eglin controls for live weapons testing per agreement with FAA. Eglin's sea space includes 32,618 square miles under warning areas plus 59,380 square miles under EWTAs. Further, Eglin can conduct air-to-air, air-to-surface, and surface-to-air tests which require up to a 478 nautical mile maximum straight line segment within the safety footprint. Eglin's safety footprints size also supports Theater Missile Defense and cruise missile T&E. In contrast, China Lake is constrained to a 60 nautical mile straight line segment within their safety footprints which only supports short range air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons.

These results are taken from the T&E JCSG data and results shown in Part II of this report.

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE**



As previously discussed under Scope, the content of the LJCSG Chair's Memo #4 (Reference 3) specifically excluded the ISE life cycle and land/sea/rotary-wing launched weapons. This focused the LJCSG Chair's alternatives to R&D air-to-air/air-to-ground weapons launched from fixed-wing platforms (as opposed to rotary-wing). However, all data provided as a part of the LJCSG analysis did not discriminate as to its source; that is, air-launched, land-launched, or sea-launched weapons data. Since the thrust of the LJCSG Chair's alternative was air-launched, the proportions of land/air/sea launched were estimated.

For each activity (2 Air Force; 4 Army; 10 Navy), the functional capacity (FC) for all 16 activities was provided; although FC was not broken down into land/sea/air. The functional requirement (FR), however, was only provided for each CSF and was not broken down to each activity supporting that CSF. To compute the FR value for each activity, it was assumed that the ratio of the FR for the activity in a CSF (FR: activity, CSF) is the same as the ratio of the FC for the activity in a CSF (FC: activity, CSF) to the total FC for a CSF (FC: total, CSF).

The FC: activity, CSF, FC: total, CSF, and FR: total, CSF are known making computation of the FR: activity, CSF possible. With these calculations, the FC and FR is defined for each of the 16 activities. From these FC/FR values the portion of the capacity/requirement directed toward land-launched, air-launched, and sea-launched weapons was derived using the certified BRAC data from all three Services. Using the certified data from each activity, a review was conducted and an estimate was made regarding that activity's involvement in land, air, or sea weapons research and development. This percentage involvement was then used to compute the portion of FC and FR for land, air, and sea-launched weapons. This allowed the creation of a bar graph

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE**

that shows the involvement of each of the 16 activities in all three areas of weapons R&D: land-launched, air-launched, and sea-launched.

One further clarification can be achieved in accomplishing the analysis of this bar graph. LJCSG Chair Memo #4 specifically addressed air-launched weapons from fixed-wing aircraft. This allows deletion of the Army's R&D air-launched capacity/requirement since their efforts are rotary-wing oriented. This results in an Air Force to Navy comparison in the air-launched weapons area. Using the bar graph composed, analytical comparisons can be made with regards to the capability of different Services/activities to absorb air-launched weapons requirements from across DoD.



**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE**

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE			
<b><u>Air-Launched Weapons RDT&amp;E</u></b> <b>R&amp;D Assessment</b> <b>(Functional Requirement/Excess Capacity)</b>			
	Eglin	China Lake	Comments
Before Intra-Service Consolidations	1124/631	390/218	Eglin Can Absorb China Lake - But Not Vice Versa
		516/287 (Total Navy)	Eglin Can Absorb Total Navy Req't - But Not Vice Versa
After Intra-Service Consolidations	1332/423	608/0	Requires Second Navy Site to Accomodate 798 Work Years to Meet Total Navy Requirement

Note: - Eglin Has Full R&D Capability (i.e., Collocated Acquisition) vs Partial Capability at China Lake (i.e., Acquisition at Crystal City)  
 - Even Assuming China Lake 100% Air-Launched, Eglin Short Fall Only 147 Workyears versus 687 for China Lake

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE 105 2/13/95

Based on an analysis of this bar graph for land-, air-, and sea-launched weapons, the following can be concluded:

- Before Intra-Service consolidations:

Eglin AFB    Functional Requirement (FR) = 1124 Wyr  
                   Excess Capacity (EC) = Functional Capacity (FC) - FR  
                   EC = 1755 - 1124 = 631 Wyr

China Lake    FR = 390 Wyr  
                   EC = 608 - 390 = 218 Wyr (assuming a 50/50 split between air-launched and sea-launched weapons)  
                   FR = 390 + 388 = 778 Wyr  
                   EC = (608 + 607) - 778  
                   EC = 1215 - 778  
                   EC = 437 Wyr (assuming 100 percent in air-launched weapons)

Assuming China Lake's division of R&D is 50/50 between air- and sea-launched weapons, Eglin AFB's excess capacity (631 Wyr) can absorb China Lake's workload (390 Wyr) but not the reverse as seen from the above China Lake data (China Lake's EC = 218 Wyr and Eglin's requirement is FR = 1124 Wyr). If China Lake is 100 percent air-launched weapons and 0 percent sea-launched weapons, Eglin AFB can still accept all of the air-launched R&D from China Lake with a modest shortfall of 147 Wyr.

EC (Eglin) = 631 Wyr  
 FR (CL) = 778 Wyr @ 100 percent air-launched  
 Shortfall for Eglin = 631 - 778 Wyr = 147 Wyr

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

The reverse of this situation shows a large shortfall for China Lake (687 Wyr) if China Lake tries to absorb all of the air-launched weapons R&D from Eglin.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{EC (CL)} &= 437 \text{ Wyr} \\ \text{FR (EG)} &= 1124 \text{ Wyr} \\ \text{Shortfall for CL} &= 437 - 1124 \text{ Wyr} = 687 \text{ Wyr} \end{aligned}$$

The 147 Wyr shortfall at Eglin AFB could be easily accommodated within the current base infrastructure.

### - After Intra-Service Consolidations:

Because of the large number of Navy organizations currently involved in weapons R&D (ten organizations at this time), there is a significant opportunity for intraservice consolidation within the Navy before considering any interservice consolidation.

All Air Force (AF) consolidation at Eglin AFB -

$$\begin{aligned} \text{FR (AF)} &= 1124 \text{ (Eglin)} + 208 \text{ (WPAFB)} \\ \text{FR (AF)} &= 1332 \text{ Wyr} \\ \text{EC (AF)} &= 631 \text{ (Eglin)} - 208 \text{ (WPAFB)} \\ \text{EC (AF)} &= 631 - 208 \\ \text{EC (AF)} &= 423 \text{ Wyr} \end{aligned}$$

All Navy consolidation at China Lake -

$$\begin{aligned} \text{FR (Navy)} &= 516 + 890 \\ \text{FR (Navy)} &= 1406 \text{ Wyr} \\ \text{FC (CL)} &= \text{FR (CL)} = 608 \text{ Wyr} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, China Lake can absorb 608 Wyr of the Navy's requirement of 1406 Wyr leaving 798 Wyr (1406 - 608 = 798 Wyr) that has to be met by a second Navy site to meet the total Navy requirement.

A note worthy of mention is that Eglin already has full R&D capability (i.e., collocated acquisition) on site whereas the Navy at China Lake only has the technical capability to support acquisition (i.e., acquisition located at NAVAIR in Crystal City which was not included in the Navy's LJCSG Data).

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

### Air Launched Weapons RDT&E

#### Recap

- **Eglin (vs China Lake) is Best Alternative for Consolidation of Fixed-Wing Air-Launched Weapons RDT&E**
  - Based on Analysis of T&E and Lab JCSG Data
  - Full Capability and Capacity to Satisfy Requirements
  - Leverages Same RDT&E Resources to Support Collocated S&T, SPO, DT&E and Operational Test, Training and Tactics Development Users
  - Significant Joint and Cross-Servicing Activity Already in Place (e.g., AMRAAM, JDAM, LOCAAS, Hellfire Test Complex, Project Chicken Little, etc.)
- **Energetics-Explosives RDT&E Treated as Integral Part of Weapons RDT&E**
  - No Separate Analysis

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

File:aww0207.ppt

107 2/13/93

Based on the T&E JCSG data/results and analysis of LJCSG data, and using the LJCSG Chair's RDT&E integration concept, Eglin AFB (instead of China Lake) is the best alternative for consolidation of the DoD fixed-wing air-launched weapons RDT&E. Eglin AFB has the best capability in the DoD for consolidating the air-launched T&E and the capacity to absorb China Lake T&E workload, where the reverse is not true. Eglin AFB places both sea and land ranges at one site versus a land only capability for China Lake. Combined with WSMR, Eglin satisfies DoD T&E requirements for critical air, land, and sea space, diverse topography and diverse climatology, where the reverse combination would not be true with China Lake.

Eglin, combined with ASC (WPAFB), has the capacity (2080 Wyr) to absorb all DoD workload (1848 Wyr) for fixed-wing air-launched R&D whereas the reverse is not true (i.e., Navy capacity of 803 Wyr vs 1332 Wyr requirement for Air Force). Eglin alone has the excess capacity (631 Wyr) to absorb China Lake's air-launched R&D workload (390 Wyr). This would leave the Navy and Army capabilities for sea- and land-launched R&D in place and would collocate the air-launched weapons acquisition with the technical capabilities, versus the Navy approach where the acquisition function is located separately at NAVAIR in Crystal City, VA. This alternative allows the research, development, acquisition, T&E and Operational Training and Tactics Development/Evaluation communities to leverage the same RDT&E resources. The precedent for this alternative is readily illustrated by the significant joint and cross-servicing activities already in place at Eglin AFB, e.g., AMRAAM, JDAM, LOCAAS, Hellfire Test Complex, Project Chicken Little, etc.

As noted earlier, Energetics-Explosives RDT&E is an embedded part of Weapons RDT&E and thus covered in the above analysis.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

**Air Launched Weapons RDT&E**  
**Recap (Cont'd)**

- **Similar to T&E Analysis, Significant Opportunities Exist for Navy and Army for Intra-Service R&D Consolidation**
  - **Army Could Consolidate from 4 to 2 Activities**
  - **Navy Could Consolidate from 10 to 2 Activities**
  - **Air Force is Already Consolidated at 2 Locations (Could go to 1)**

File:slwv0207.ppt

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

108 2/13/95

Similar to the result found for T&E, both the Army and the Navy have significant opportunities for intra-Service R&D consolidation. The Air Force is already streamlined and consolidated at 2 locations but could consolidate to one location if required. The data show that the Army could consolidate from 4 to 2 activities, while the Navy could consolidate from 10 to 2 activities.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

## Energetics-Propulsion S&T Capabilities

Site	Solids			Liquids		
	Research Labs	Propellant Mix Capabilities	Mono & Bi-Propellants	Cryogenic Propellants	Electrics/Solar	High-Energy Density Materials
PL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CL	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
RTTC	Yes	UNK	No	No	No	No

PL = Phillips Lab (AF)  
 CL = China Lake (Navy)  
 RTTC = Redstone Technical Test Center (Army)

File:stew0207.ppt 109 2/13/95

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

LJCSG Chair's RDT&E alternatives, as forwarded under Memo #4 (Reference 3), indicated excess capacity in this function and proposed consolidating all missile and rocket propulsion RDT&E at NAWC/CL. Principal candidates for closure or realignment were Philips Laboratory, Edwards AFB CA, and MRDEC, Redstone Arsenal AL.

The analyses provided by the LJCSG Chair to support these conclusions were very limited. The analyses did not contain any computation of functional capacities, functional requirements, excess capacity, etc., nor were there analyses to indicate that any optimization model runs had been accomplished to determine the best workload assignments based on functional values.

Because of this analysis void, the Air Force constructed its own analysis by using both certified data from the Supplemental Data Call on Energetics and drawing on functional expert judgment. From this review, the table above was constructed to show the wide spectrum of S&T capabilities across Philips Laboratory (PL), China Lake (CL), and Redstone Test Center (RTTC). The table shows the diversity of technology areas within solid and liquid propulsion and shows involvement by the research and development laboratories.

It is clear from this comparison that only the Air Force's PL has the full spectrum S&T capability, with CL and RTTC having predominately solids capability.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

## ENERGETICS - PROPULSION T&E CAPABILITIES

Site	Replacement Value (\$M)	Ambient Facilities				Altitude	Altitude Facilities			
		Liquids		Solids			Liquids		Solids	
		No.	Thrust (lbf)	No.	Thrust (lbf)		No.	Thrust (lbf)	No.	Thrust (lbf)
PL	\$188.80	7	10,000 K	13	6,000 K	100 K R	1	50 K	2	100 K
CL	\$ 19.59	1	300 K	8	1,500 K	-	0	-	0	-
RTTC	\$ 4.05	1	150 K	6	2,000 K*	-	0	-	0	-
AEDC	\$1,000.00	0	-	0	-	125 K R	2	1,500 K	2	750 K

\* RTTC has a concrete pad for thrust of 10,000 K lbf, but not demonstrated and not instrumented

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

File:ahw0207.ppt 110 2/13/95

Expanding the analysis to look at the T&E capabilities, as well as the S&T capabilities shown in the previous table, a quantitative comparison can be made for the facilities located at Philips Laboratory, China Lake, RTTC, and AEDC. AEDC was added because of its extensive T&E propulsion capabilities. Not only were solid and liquid capabilities addressed but also the ability of the activity to perform solid/liquid tests at both ambient and altitude conditions.

As can clearly be seen, the Air Force's Philips Laboratory has the dominant ambient facility capabilities, and AEDC the dominant altitude capabilities. China Lake and RTTC only have ambient capabilities that are subsets of Philips Laboratory.

In addition, Phillips Laboratory has a significantly larger infrastructure than China Lake or Redstone, as evidenced by their replacement values. These values were obtained from the LJCSG Supplemental Data Call. The value for AEDC was extracted from the T&E JCSG Data Call.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

**ENERGETICS - PROPULSION  
RECAP**

- AIR FORCE PL IS BETTER ALTERNATIVE FOR CONSOLIDATING ENERGETICS-PROPULSION THAN CHINA LAKE
  - FULL CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY TO SATISFY REQUIREMENTS
  - SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER CAPITAL INVESTMENT THAN CHINA LAKE OR RTTC
- PL COMBINED WITH AEDC HAS CAPABILITY TO SATISFY TOTAL DOD REQUIREMENTS

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - BRAC SENSITIVE

111 2/19/95

For energetics-propellants, the data presented in the previous two tables clearly show that from both an S&T and a T&E perspective, Philips Laboratory (PL) is clearly the activity of choice for consolidation, not China Lake. Philips Laboratory has full S&T capabilities (solid and liquid propulsion) with supporting research laboratories and personnel, whereas China Lake and RTTC have capability only in solid propulsion and no capability in liquid propulsion.

Additionally, from a T&E capability standpoint, Philips Laboratory has significant infrastructure already in place, \$188.8M replacement value, for both ambient and altitude facilities. China Lake has only \$19.59M worth of infrastructure in place while RTTC has only \$4.05M, and both of these investments are only in the ambient facility area.

Combining Philips Laboratory's capabilities with AEDC's \$1B capability for altitude testing can satisfy the total S&T and T&E DoD requirement for energetics-propellants.

**REFERENCES**

1. DepSecDef Memorandum of January 7, 1994, 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95)
2. T&E JCSG Co-Chairmen Memorandum of November 22, 1994, Alternatives for Test and Evaluation in Base Realignment and Closure 1995 (BRAC 95) Deliberations
3. DDR&E Memorandum of November 29, 1994, Additional BRAC 95 Laboratory Alternatives for Military Department Consideration (#4)
4. T&E JCSG Analysis Plan, dated 3 August 1994 and amended 3 October 1994
5. SAF/MII Memorandum of December 14, 1994, Assessments of JCSG T&E Alternatives
6. T&E JCSG Co-Chairmen Memorandum of December 20, 1994, Assessments of JCSG-TE Alternatives
7. SAF/MII Memorandum of December 22, 1994, Assessment of JCSG-TE Alternatives
8. AF/TE Memorandum of 10 January 1995, Assessments of T&E JCSG Alternatives
9. SAF/MII Memorandum of February 8, 1995, Final Assessment of T&E Alternatives
10. ASD(ES) Memorandum, of November 23, 1994, 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95) -- Policy Memorandum Two -- Joint Cross-Service Group Functional Analysis Process, with attachment, Joint Cross-Service Analysis Tool User's Guide
11. T&E JCSG Co-Chairmen Memorandum of August 4, 1994, 1995 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Test and Evaluation (T&E) Joint Cross-Service Group Supplemental Data Call
12. ASD(ES) Memorandum of December 27, 1994, 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95) - Clarification of the Joint Cross-Service Group Functional Analysis Process



**CRUISE MISSILES**

DDR&E memo paragraph #2 requested that the MILDEPs examine the movement of Air-to-Air and Air-to-Ground missile development work from their R&D centers to a T&E center. One of the Common Support Functions listed in paragraph #2 for consideration was Cruise Missiles. The AF Cruise Missile development work is done at Wright-Patterson AFB's Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC). Although Cruise Missiles was listed in paragraph #2, ASC at Wright-Patterson AFB was not one of the candidate organizations listed in Paragraph #2 for movement to a weapons T&E center.

The primary purpose of the alternatives described in paragraph #2 is to collocate in one DoD location all the RDT&E activity associated with Air-to-Air and Air-to-Ground missiles involving the handling of propellants/explosives. The reason for this proposed consolidation is the investment required in specialized facilities required to handle explosives/propellants. The Cruise Missiles development work conducted at ASC/Wright-Patterson does not involve the handling of propellant/explosives; that is, the handling of propellant/explosives is done by private industry or other DoD activities as part of ASC's Cruise Missile development work. Since ASC/Wright-Patterson is not mentioned in paragraph #2 and since they are not involved in the handling of explosives/propellants, one must conclude that their work was not intended to be included under Paragraph #2 and therefore no further analysis of ASC/Wright-Patterson's Cruise Missile work is required.

C4I

This alternative consists of three separate options:

- Relocate SPAWAR to either Hanscom AFB or Ft. Monmouth
- Relocate the portion of ESC and Rome Lab at Hanscom AFB to Ft. Monmouth
- Relocate Rome Lab, Rome, NY to some combination of Hanscom AFB and Ft. Monmouth

For the SPAWAR option, the AF replied to the Navy request for COBRA information. Hence, the Navy is responsible for performing a COBRA run and making a final decision on the disposition of SPAWAR. We did note from the C4I supplemental data call that there is commonality in the activities of SPAWAR and ESC (e.g., JTIDS), and therefore the likelihood of consolidation savings should the Navy elect to relocate SPAWAR to Hanscom AFB. ESC already has efforts jointly underway with the Navy, and the SPAWAR collocation would effectively build on the mutual work already in place.

For the option that relocates the portions of ESC and Rome Lab at Hanscom AFB to Ft. Monmouth, the AF followed the LJCSG process of examining the "fit" of the activities involved. The results of that examination are contained in the attached.

For the Rome Lab, Rome, NY option, the AF examined a range of alternatives from complete relocation to Ft. Monmouth, complete relocation to Hanscom AFB, and various mixes of Ft. Monmouth/Hanscom AFB. The AF preliminary decision was the relocation of unique AF work to Hanscom AFB and DoD-common work to Ft. Monmouth. This decision balanced the interests of DoD in further consolidating C4I S&T and the AF in further consolidating C4I S&T and EMD.

## C4I

**Alternative Description:** This alternative would close Hanscom AFB, MA and Rome Lab, Rome, NY. The Electronic Systems Center (ESC) and both portions of Rome Laboratory (at Rome, NY and Hanscom AFB, MA) would be relocated to Ft. Monmouth, NJ.

### **Analysis Issues:**

The LJCSG Memo #4 analysis assumed that the functional requirement (FR) would be "CFY-20% at least". However, the Director of DDR&E's 1994 Defense Technology Plan and Defense Science and Technology Strategy, released by the Pentagon on 5 Oct 1994, depicted technology research spending on C3 increasing by over 75% (in constant dollars) from FY94 to FY97. Clearly, the Memo #4 assumed requirement reduction of over 20% is not valid, given the DDR&E forecast of a significant increases in C3 spending.

The LJCSG Memo #4 analysis assumed that the desirable objective was to "Collocate Common Functions" (e.g., AF and Army S&T). An equally desirable objective would be to collocate the S&T and EMD activities of a single MILDEP. Currently, the AF has its C4I S&T/EMD activities at two sites, the Army at three sites, and the Navy at eight sites. In spite of the benefits accruing from consolidating each MILDEP's S&T and EMD activities, no examination of these alternatives was conducted as part of the Memo #4 analysis.

An examination of the Major Facilities/Equipment portion of the LJCSG analysis for Airborne C4I reveals that Ft Monmouth requires over 20 times the DoD infrastructure investment to carry out the Airborne C4I mission as does ESC. A higher degree of outsourcing (public/private partnership) and greater use of Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) hardware and software all lead to mission accomplishment using far fewer DoD resources.

An analysis of the education levels of the ESC and Ft. Monmouth workforces reveals that the ESC workforce average education is greater than a Masters degree, while the Ft. Monmouth workforce averages better than a Bachelors degree. In fact, of over a dozen MILDEP activities engaged in C4I activities, ESC is the only activity to have an education level greater than a Masters degree.

Lastly, ESC manages the greatest concentration of acquisition programs of any of the MILDEP activities reporting C4I activities. In an era when customers vote with their program dollars, ESC should have been the hands down number one choice of where to consolidate the DoD's C4I acquisition work.

### **Organization/Mission Compatibility:**

There are significant differences between the AF and Army C4I organizational structures. Specifically, the Army's C4I EMD activities are dispersed among three primary locations: Ft. Monmouth, Ft. Huachuca, and Ft. Belvoir. The AF, on the other hand, currently has all of its C4I EMD work located at one place - the ESC at Hanscom AFB. The result of this mismatch between AF and Army organizational structures would be to disrupt the AF's consolidated C4I EMD activities in order to relocate it to an Army installation where only pieces of the Army's C4I

EMD work is done. It certainly seems as if the wrong organization is being disrupted and the wrong pieces are being moved if the objective is consolidation of MILDEP C4I activities.

There is little program (e.g., mission) compatibility between the Army C4I effort at Ft. Monmouth and that at the AF's ESC. The Army C4I activities focus primarily on mobile C4I systems while the AF C4I activities focus primarily on Airborne C4I activities. Specifically, of the hundred or so programs at ESC, less than ten are common with the Army C4I work at Ft. Monmouth.

Additionally, the commercial content of ESC's products is very high. ESC has dramatically increased the use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components in its products. The result has been C4I products that cost less to acquire and take significantly less time to get to the operational customer. This change in the nature of the products requires both a cultural change in the organization mindset and access to state-of-the-art commercial hardware and software components. Acquisition managers have to be willing to substitute commercial practices for MILSPEC processes and have to have knowledge of what commercial technology can do for the operator in the field. Without knowledge of the technology, new systems will be developed from scratch. ESC has undergone the cultural change required and the local Hanscom AFB area is recognized as one of the two largest concentrations of innovative commercial hardware and software products in the nation.

**Other Alternatives that should be Considered:**

The alternatives of consolidating (a) all the AF C4I activities at Hanscom AFB and (b) consolidating Mobile C4I at Ft. Monmouth and Airborne C4I at Hanscom AFB should be considered. Both alternatives would achieve the AF objective of consolidating all its C4I activities at a single location, thus making the AF the only MILDEP to have achieved this desirable objective. The latter alternative, by assigning lead MILDEP roles to specific C4I functional areas, reduces the potential for duplication between MILDEPs. Had these alternatives been considered in the Memo #4 analysis, we would have been able to compare the cost benefit of the various alternatives. As it is, these alternatives, potentially less expensive, were never compared with the selected alternative.

Additionally, the various DoD agencies involved in C4I activities (e.g. DISA) should have been considered by DDR&E in the C4I analysis. Had these activities been considered, other alternatives to reduce DoD infrastructure (e.g. relocate from lease space to government owned space) would have been identified.

**Redundancy:**

Currently, there are Joint STARS and JTIDS Program Offices at both Hanscom AFB and Ft. Monmouth. Since the AF is the Executive Service in both cases, the Lead Program Offices are located at Hanscom AFB. Consolidating Airborne C4I at Hanscom AFB would presumably consolidate these Program Offices at Hanscom.

**Existing Interconnects that would be broken:**

The most significant interconnect that would be broken is the linkage to the computer hardware and software industry in the Hanscom AFB area. The computer industry in the Hanscom area, particularly the software industry, is nationally recognized as one of the leading centers in the US. It is the source of many state-of-the-art software products involving networking, data base systems, security, etc. With the ever increasing emphasis on commercial hardware and software solutions to DoD C4I requirements, the interconnect to local software firms on the cutting edge of technology is vitally important to the successful fielding of cutting edge operational C4I capability. Those same interconnects do not exist at Ft. Monmouth due to the different character of the surrounding industrial base.


Approximately two-thirds of the ESC workforce is contracted from the local Hanscom AFB area (the FFRDC and SETA/TEMS personnel). The workforce in the Ft. Monmouth area does not have the same technical characteristics as the workforce in the Hanscom AFB area. Specifically, because there is not the same computer systems R&D infrastructure in the area, the Ft. Monmouth area workforce is less likely to have personnel with the required computer system skills. The most valuable resource in the C4I RDT&E area is the knowledge possessed by the acquisition workforce. Other than in special cases like AWACS and Joint STARS, military unique hardware and software does not make up the majority of the operational DoD C4I product line.

**Customer View:** Many of ESC's programs were assigned to ESC at the request of their customer, not because ESC is the sole source supplier for that product. In a C4I world primarily based on COTS, the customer goes to the "supplier of choice". An examination of ESC's Customer Satisfaction metrics will show that overall, ESC's customers are quite satisfied with ESC's work on their behalf, and their selection of ESC as their supplier of choice dramatically reinforces that view.

Additionally, the Defense Science Board in its Summer Study on Information Architecture for the Battlefield (i.e., C4I) (a) recommended increased use of commercial technology, (b) did not recommend consolidation of Service programs at one service location, and (c) did reinforce the reduced response time through use of COTS. These recommendations only serve to reinforce the culture and acquisition strategy that has been established at ESC. Since about two-thirds of the ESC workforce comes from the private sector, that culture that would, as a minimum, be severely disrupted and quite possibly lost, in a relocation to Ft. Monmouth.

**Infrastructure Quality:** Ft. Monmouth is further from a major airport (Newark) than is Hanscom AFB (Logan/Boston). With respect to Educational institutions, both locations have numerous higher education institutions within 50 miles, but Hanscom's are generally closer (within 25 miles) and consist of more nationally renowned universities.

**Air Quality:** With the significant number of personnel already programmed for Ft. Monmouth, an Air Quality conformity determination would likely be required before a decision could be made on adding the Hanscom AFB workforce. Air Quality limitations could preclude a workforce the size of ESC's from being moved to Ft. Monmouth.





FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -- BRAC '95 SENSITIVE  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE



13 FEB 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CO-CHAIRMAN, AIR FORCE BASE CLOSURE EXECUTIVE GROUP

FROM: AF/RTR (Laboratories)

SUBJECT: COBRA Analysis of DDR&E Memo #4 Alternatives

REFERENCES:

- A. DDR&E Memo #4 of 29 Nov 94 re Alternatives for MILDEP Consideration
- B. SAF/MII Memo of 19 Jan 95 re LJCSG Memo #4 Alternatives

In Reference A Memo, DDR&E requested the MILDEPs consider some additional alternatives beyond those identified by the LJCSG Working Group. The AF has done so, in accordance with Reference B. This memo conveys the results of the COBRA analysis on the alternatives.

Two of the Alternatives (Air Vehicles and Pyrotechnics) required no AF COBRA analysis. None was required for Air Vehicles since the AF was not considering Wright-Patterson AFB for realignment or closure (ref SAF/AQ Functional Assessment of DDR&E Memo #4). Since the AF reported no work in Pyrotechnics, no COBRA analysis was required for that alternative either.

For the other three alternatives, Air-to-Air & Air-to-Ground Weapons, Explosives, and Propellants, we needed COBRA quality information from the Navy. In spite of our initial request followed by a request for clarification, we were unable to get confirmation from the Navy that they were proposing to locate our Air Launched Weapons work at (only) China Lake. The impression created by the response was that they would split up our (currently collocated) Air Launched Weapons R&D activity to two or more sites (including China Lake). While we were able to obtain COBRA data (Screen 4 data) on China Lake and Point Mugu from the AF T&E community, we still lack the information necessary to allocate the personnel and facilities data we were provided by the Navy between China Lake, Point Mugu and any other proposed receiving sites being offered. Additionally, in their response to the Propellants portion, there was a decrease of several hundred thousand square feet of in our requirement for heavy lab space, with no accompanying analysis explaining the decrease or methodology, thereby preventing us from accurately determining the MILCON cost. In sum, we could not perform a COBRA run with the information provided by the Navy. In addition, we asked the Navy as part of the request for clarification, to provide us the facilities listing they are proposing because of significant differences between the certified JCSG data and the COBRA data call (e.g., in a number of cases, the JCSG data says China Lake does not possess the required facilities, yet the COBRA data call says no MILCON is required to satisfy the requirement). The Navy said they could not provide the requested listing in their response to the Request for Clarification. The significant

difference in certified facilities data from the two sources makes the validity of any COBRA performed on the data highly questionable.

To perform the requested functional analysis, the AF has used the T&E JCSG results and combined them with the LJCSG certified data. The T&E JCSG results show that Eglin scored significantly higher Functional Value than China Lake (82 vs. 57). Based on the LJCSG proposed RDT&E integration concept of moving from lower to higher functional value T&E sites, plus the combined RDT&E analysis completed by the AF (see SAF/AQ letter), efforts to consolidate the Air-to-Air/Air-to-Ground weapons CSF should be focused on Eglin, not China Lake. Similar analysis for the Energetics-Propellants CSF shows that efforts to consolidate should be focused at Phillips Lab at Edwards, not China Lake. Based on this analysis, and the AF Installation Tiering for Eglin and Edwards, no further analysis of these alternatives was pursued.


For the C4I alternative, there were four potential COBRA analyses to perform.

- The first, consolidate SPAWAR at either Ft. Monmouth or Hanscom AFB, did not require an AF COBRA analysis (the Navy, as the contributing MILDEP, performs the required COBRA analysis).
- The second, consolidate ESC at Ft. Monmouth, was performed. Consolidating ESC at Ft. Monmouth would make Hanscom AFB non-viable, and therefore the costs of moving Rome Lab Hanscom and Philips Lab Hanscom (thereby closing Hanscom AFB) were included. Infrastructure savings resulting from the closing of Hanscom AFB were also included. The results were: a one-time cost of \$441M, a net present value of (\$107M) and a Return on Investment of 11 years (Attachment 1). The COBRA Analysis, Functional Assessment and AF Installation Tiering all indicate this alternative would not be beneficial. Therefore, it was not pursued further.
- The third, consolidate Rome Lab Hanscom AFB at Ft. Monmouth was also performed. The results were: a one-time cost of \$13M, a net present value of \$11M, and a Return on Investment of 100+ years (Attachment 2). The COBRA Analysis, Functional Assessment and AF Installation Tiering all indicate this alternative would not be beneficial. Therefore, it was not pursued further.
- The fourth, and last, alternative involved the relocation of Rome Laboratory, Rome NY to a combination of Ft. Monmouth and Hanscom AFB. A COBRA analysis was performed for the scenario recommended by the AF as part of its BRAC '95 submission. The results were: a one-time cost of \$53M, a net present value of (\$98M), and a return on investment of 4 years (Attachment 3). With the favorable COBRA analysis and functional assessment, the AF is considering the relocation of Rome Lab, Rome, NY to a combination of Ft. Monmouth and Hanscom AFB.

We must also keep in mind the disruption to ongoing activities as we evaluate various alternatives. In some cases (e.g., large organizations over 1000 personnel) the disruptions would be



significant and the cost in program turbulence and lost time would likewise be very dramatic (some of our organization's obligations average over \$500 Million per month). A few months disruption to these activities could well wipe out any apparent savings due to the activity's relocation. While not an explicit consideration in the COBRA model, the cost of such turbulence will eventually be borne by the investment accounts and hence should be considered in the decision process.



MATT MLEZIVA  
AF Lab Team Chief

Attachments: a/s

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm to Mnth/Kir  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\HNSMCLS.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

Starting Year : 1996  
 Final Year : 2001  
 ROI Year : 2012 (11 Years)

NPV in 2015(\$K): -107,061  
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 440,901

	Net Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	49,867	28,487	37,982	52,226	26,113	37,982	232,657	0
Person	-273	-662	-882	965	2,527	-11,112	-9,438	-30,830
Overhd	2,433	2,616	1,171	3	-3,339	-15,044	-12,159	-22,607
Moving	3,118	6,257	15,708	18,872	15,708	6,085	65,749	0
Miscio	0	0	0	0	0	5,405	5,405	5,405
Other	5,781	11,568	28,926	34,711	28,926	6,238	116,152	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>60,926</b>	<b>48,267</b>	<b>82,906</b>	<b>106,777</b>	<b>69,936</b>	<b>29,555</b>	<b>398,366</b>	<b>-48,033</b>

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
<b>POSITIONS ELIMINATED</b>							
Off	0	0	0	0	0	64	64
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	402	402
Civ	0	0	0	0	0	272	272
<b>TOT</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>738</b>	<b>738</b>

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
<b>POSITIONS REALIGNED</b>							
Off	35	72	183	220	183	42	735
Enl	22	46	118	141	118	30	475
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	85	172	432	518	432	94	1,733
<b>TOT</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>290</b>	<b>733</b>	<b>879</b>	<b>733</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>2,943</b>

**Summary:**

SDC-07: Close Hanscom. Move ESC/RL to Ft Monmouth, PL to Kirtland  
 Distance to Ft Monmouth is to Newark + 50 miles  
 FFRDC/ESC moving costs taken from AFMC 21 data  
 Screen 4 data is from Army response  
 MILCON numbers inflated from Army response (Note --Note no MFH)  
 No geophysics reduction assumed  
 FFRDC contract termination costs taken using same methodology as with LA  
 Assume Air Force continues to support MIT Lincoln Lab

Attachment 1

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Hnscm/RL to Mmth  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\SDC09.CBR  
 Mod Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

Starting Year : 1996  
 Final Year : 2000  
 ROI Year : 100+ Years

NPV in 2015(\$K): 11,171  
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 13,581

	Net Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	2,031	1,060	1,413	1,943	971	1,413	8,830	0
Person	-29	-29	-29	110	161	-95	89	-95
Overhd	102	79	18	215	362	47	824	-38
Moving	19	0	0	1,282	1,990	0	3,291	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	2	0	0	233	354	0	590	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,126</b>	<b>1,110</b>	<b>1,401</b>	<b>3,783</b>	<b>3,839</b>	<b>1,365</b>	<b>13,625</b>	<b>-133</b>

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
<b>POSITIONS ELIMINATED</b>							
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
<b>POSITIONS REALIGNED</b>							
Off	0	0	0	5	8	0	13
Enl	8	0	0	4	7	0	19
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	0	0	51	79	0	130
TOT	8	0	0	60	94	0	162

Summary:

-----  
 SDC-09: Move ESC/RL to Ft Monmouth. ESC and PL stay in place.  
 Distance to Ft Monmouth is to Newark + 50 miles  
 No consolidation savings from move.  
 Screen 4 data is from Army response  
 MILCON numbers inflated from Army response (Note --Note no MFH)  
 No geophysics reduction assumed  
 No FFRDC contract termination costs

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Rome Lab to Ft Mnmth  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\RL-HM42.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA\LAB95\FINAL\JCSG\DEPOTFIN.SFF

Starting Year : 1996  
 Final Year : 1999  
 ROI Year : 2003 (4 Years)

NPV in 2015(\$K): -98,364  
 1-Time Cost(\$K): 52,806

Net Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars	1996						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	4,370	5,462	5,462	6,555	0	0	21,850	0
Person	0	-664	-1,790	-515	-2,296	-2,296	-7,561	-2,296
Overhd	378	-591	-2,978	-4,397	-9,213	-9,213	-26,015	-9,213
Moving	0	4,050	4,847	15,924	0	0	24,821	0
Misio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	343	398	1,307	0	0	2,049	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4,748</b>	<b>8,602</b>	<b>5,938</b>	<b>18,873</b>	<b>-11,509</b>	<b>-11,509</b>	<b>15,143</b>	<b>-11,509</b>

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
<b>POSITIONS ELIMINATED</b>							
Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	50	0	0	0	0	50
TOT	0	50	0	0	0	0	50

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
<b>POSITIONS REALIGNED</b>							
Off	0	0	2	8	0	0	10
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	130	173	570	0	0	873
TOT	0	130	175	578	0	0	883

**Summary:**

-----  
 Closure of Rome lab in four years and move C3 and Electro/Rel directorate to Ft Monmouth. Other directorates to Hanscom (plus some puts and takes)  
 Option 4 (was option 4.2)  
 Screen 4 data is from Army response  
 Use inflated Army MILCON numbers (from AF/CEP)  
 Other assumptions similar to AF run (consolidation savings on Hanscom move)  
 Army upgrade numbers modified as appropriate.  
 No savings taken due to force structure reduction at Hanscom (geophysics)

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

**EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) #** 950424-6

<b>FROM:</b> DIXON	<b>TO:</b> SHELBY, RICHARD
<b>TITLE:</b> CHAIRMAN	<b>TITLE:</b> SENATOR
<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> DBCRC	<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> U.S. CONGRESS
<b>INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:</b>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				<b>REVIEW AND ANALYSIS</b>			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	Prepare Direct Response
<b>ACTION:</b> Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	FYI

**Subject/Remarks:**

FORWARDING RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FROM THE APRIL 1 HEARING.

<b>Due Date:</b>	<b>Routing Date:</b> 950424	<b>Date Originated:</b> 950418	<b>Mail Date:</b> 950424
------------------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	--------------------------



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425

ARLINGTON, VA 22209

703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA

REBECCA COX

GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)

S. LEE KLING

RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)

MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)

WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 18, 1995

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Dick:

Please refer to this number

when responding 950424-6

Attached are responses to questions submitted on your behalf by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission at an investigative hearing on March 1, 1995. I trust that this information is helpful and responds to your concerns.

Again, thank you for your interest in the base closure and realignment process. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of further assistance as we go through this difficult and challenging process.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cmc  
Enclosures

## CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

From Senator Shelby and Representative Browder (Alabama):

**Question:** Secretary Perry, the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission removed Fort McClellan from the list proposed by the Department of Defense and directed the Secretary of Defense to pursue all the required permits and certification for the construction of facilities at a new location prior to the 1995 base closure round if DoD wanted to put the installation on the list again. It appears that DoD did not follow this direction.

Have all the necessary permits been obtained by Army at Fort Leonard Wood, the receiving installation?

**Answer:** No. As Secretary Deutch pointed out in his testimony, he instructed the Secretary of the Army, Togo West, not to pursue the requisite permits until the DoD recommendations were publicly announced. The Army has assured me that the permits will be in place prior to your decision making.



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 18, 1995

The Honorable David Pryor  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear David:

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950424-6

Attached are responses to questions submitted on your behalf by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission at an investigative hearing on March 1, 1995. I trust that this information is helpful and responds to your concerns.

Again, thank you for your interest in the base closure and realignment process. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of further assistance as we go through this difficult and challenging process.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cmc  
Enclosures



## CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

**From Senator Pryor (Arkansas):**

**Question:** Secretary Perry, the Army was asked to consider the cost of moving the Defense Logistics Agency activity at the Red River Army Depot in its analysis of the total closure costs. The community has estimated the cost for such a move to be in excess of \$300 million. Is this estimate consistent with the cost calculated by DoD?

**Answer:** The Defense Logistics Agency recommendation to disestablish the distribution depot at Red River Army Depot and relocate the remaining material to Defense Depot Anniston, Alabama, is estimated to cost \$58.9 million over the implementation period. Annual recurring savings after implementation are estimated to be \$18.9 million and a 20 year net present value (savings) of \$186.1 million.

**Question:** Secretary Perry, it is my understanding that the Red River Army Depot was recently awarded the President's Prototype Award in support of the Administration's National Performance Review initiatives. Were such awards for quality and efficiency considered by DoD in its base closure process?

**Answer:** In his testimony before you, Secretary Deutch indicated that many of the installations slated for closure or realignment are made up of high-performing individuals and very supportive communities in relationships that span decades. DoD did not direct the Military Departments to specifically consider awards.

**Question:** Secretary Perry, could you detail the reasoning behind the Army's recommendation to completely close out one of its primary depots and realign another when the other Services appear to have chosen realignment initiatives through "downsizing in place" at their maintenance facilities?

**Answer:** Each of the Military Departments conducted an independent analysis of various alternatives based upon the eight approved criteria and the force structure plan. Different results were obtained based upon the maintenance philosophies of each of the Military Departments. The Air Force determined that, in light of the large Air Logistics Center installations on which depot activities are located and the significant costs associated with closure, downsizing of all depot activities was more cost-effective than the closure of a single depot installation. Conversely, the Army determined that the closure of a relatively small Army depot would be a better alternative for producing savings than downsizing.



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:  
AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 18, 1995

The Honorable Jeff Bingaman  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Jeff:

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950424-6

Attached are responses to questions submitted on your behalf by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission at an investigative hearing on March 1, 1995. I trust that this information is helpful and responds to your concerns.

Again, thank you for your interest in the base closure and realignment process. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of further assistance as we go through this difficult and challenging process.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cmc  
Enclosures

## CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

From Senator Bingaman (New Mexico):

**Question:** Secretary Perry, in December 1990 Senators Jeff Bingaman and Pete Domenici were told by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Merrill McPeak, that the Air Force planned to close Los Angeles AFB in the mid-1990s and move the Air Force's Space Systems Division and the Aerospace Corporation to Kirtland AFB in Albuquerque. The Air Force in 1990 even did a draft environmental impact statement in preparation for that move.

The Air Force analysis in this round of Air Force Lab and Product Centers puts Los Angeles AFB in Tier II, along with Kirtland AFB. In six of the eight categories, Kirtland ranks ahead of L.A. and in another is tied.

Why is Kirtland closing in your proposal and not L.A.?

**Answer:** The Department of Defense has recommended realigning (not closing) Kirtland AFB. The Phillips Laboratory activity, that scored high in both the Air Force and the Joint Cross-Service Group for Laboratories analysis is retained at Kirtland along with other activities. The placement of Kirtland AFB and Los Angeles AFB in the middle tier of bases indicates that the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group viewed them as roughly comparable, based on all eight criteria. From this starting point, the Secretary of the Air Force directed the examination of a number of scenarios for the closure or realignment of these and other installations in the Laboratory and Product Center subcategory. The details of that analysis are described in the minutes of the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group. The decision by the Secretary of the Air Force not to recommend the closure of Los Angeles AFB indicates that no scenario for the closure of Los Angeles AFB was viewed by her as cost-effective or consistent with mission needs. The recommendation regarding Kirtland retains laboratory, weapon storage, and DNA activities that can operate with minimal military support, while reducing the overall support infrastructure associated with flying units and other DoD activities producing significant savings.

## CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

From the New Mexico delegation:

**Question:** Secretary Perry, nuclear deterrence remains the backbone of the United States Strategic Policy of deterrence. Are any facilities under consideration involved with, or connected to the US nuclear deterrent capability? Was an analysis done on the impact on this capability? Was the Department of Energy consulted with regard to this impact?

**Answer:** There were facilities under consideration that involved the U.S. nuclear deterrent capability. Military Departments also conducted an analysis on the impact proposed base closures or realignments would have on this capability. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducted a review of the recommendations and identified no impacts to the Nation's nuclear deterrent capability. The Department of Energy was consulted.

**Question:** Secretary Perry, one of the principal BRAC objectives is to consolidate DoD activities. Was consideration given to the interrelationship of the bases on the list and the tenants located on the facility? Were these tenants contacted and asked to provide information about the economic effects base realignment would have on them, and the effects on their overall mission? Can you provide tenant responses to these questions, along with a list of tenants for each base on this list including the functions shared between the base and the tenant?

**Answer:** We believe the principal goal of the BRAC process is to reduce unnecessary infrastructure. Tenants were fully considered in the installation data calls sent out by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. Tenant needs were an important part of the Military Department analysis. Specific data call responses regarding tenants have been provided to the Commission in the Military Department's detailed back-up data.

However, the sensitivity of the BRAC process raises concerns with communications outside the Department of Defense on potential base actions. With regards to the Department of Energy (DoE) and other non-DoD tenants at Kirtland Air Force Base, the Air Force did consult informally with DoE during the latter stages of the process, and used the information it possessed to gauge the impact of this action on that and other agencies. Following the announcement of the recommendations the Air Force sent teams to meet with DoE, the Sandia National Laboratory, and other agency representatives at Kirtland Air Force Base to assess needs and impact. The Air Force is in the process of conducting site surveys and will continue in this

cooperative process throughout the implementation period if this recommendation is approved.

**Question:** Secretary Perry, which bases on the proposed list for realignment or closure have an intergovernmental relationship with agencies or entities outside the base? Were these entities notified, or asked to provide information about economic effects, or mission? Will you provide these responses?

**Answer:** Every military installation has a relationship with other government agencies, most notably the local community. We can not as a practical matter notify and solicit all the the local community governments for information regarding potential closure or realignment recommendations; the data would not be consistent or certifiable and the effect on community morale could be severe. However, we did conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the economic impacts of every recommendation on the local economy. This information has been provided to the Commission and to the reading rooms set up in the House and the Senate.



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:  
AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 18, 1995

The Honorable Pete Domenici  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Pete:

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950424-6

Attached are responses to questions submitted on your behalf by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission at an investigative hearing on March 1, 1995. I trust that this information is helpful and responds to your concerns.

Again, thank you for your interest in the base closure and realignment process. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of further assistance as we go through this difficult and challenging process.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cmc  
Enclosures

## CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

### From the New Mexico delegation:

**Question:** Secretary Perry, nuclear deterrence remains the backbone of the United States Strategic Policy of deterrence. Are any facilities under consideration involved with, or connected to the US nuclear deterrent capability? Was an analysis done on the impact on this capability? Was the Department of Energy consulted with regard to this impact?

**Answer:** There were facilities under consideration that involved the U.S. nuclear deterrent capability. Military Departments also conducted an analysis on the impact proposed base closures or realignments would have on this capability. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducted a review of the recommendations and identified no impacts to the Nation's nuclear deterrent capability. The Department of Energy was consulted.

**Question:** Secretary Perry, one of the principal BRAC objectives is to consolidate DoD activities. Was consideration given to the interrelationship of the bases on the list and the tenants located on the facility? Were these tenants contacted and asked to provide information about the economic effects base realignment would have on them, and the effects on their overall mission? Can you provide tenant responses to these questions, along with a list of tenants for each base on this list including the functions shared between the base and the tenant?

**Answer:** We believe the principal goal of the BRAC process is to reduce unnecessary infrastructure. Tenants were fully considered in the installation data calls sent out by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. Tenant needs were an important part of the Military Department analysis. Specific data call responses regarding tenants have been provided to the Commission in the Military Department's detailed back-up data.

However, the sensitivity of the BRAC process raises concerns with communications outside the Department of Defense on potential base actions. With regards to the Department of Energy (DoE) and other non-DoD tenants at Kirtland Air Force Base, the Air Force did consult informally with DoE during the latter stages of the process, and used the information it possessed to gauge the impact of this action on that and other agencies. Following the announcement of the recommendations the Air Force sent teams to meet with DoE, the Sandia National Laboratory, and other agency representatives at Kirtland Air Force Base to assess needs and impact. The Air Force is in the process of conducting site surveys and will continue in this

cooperative process throughout the implementation period if this recommendation is approved.

**Question:** Secretary Perry, which bases on the proposed list for realignment or closure have an intergovernmental relationship with agencies or entities outside the base? Were these entities notified, or asked to provide information about economic effects, or mission? Will you provide these responses?

**Answer:** Every military installation has a relationship with other government agencies, most notably the local community. We can not as a practical matter notify and solicit all the the local community governments for information regarding potential closure or realignment recommendations; the data would not be consistent or certifiable and the effect on community morale could be severe. However, we did conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the economic impacts of every recommendation on the local economy. This information has been provided to the Commission and to the reading rooms set up in the House and the Senate.



## CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

From Senator Bingaman (New Mexico):

**Question:** Secretary Perry, in December 1990 Senators Jeff Bingaman and Pete Domenici were told by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Merrill McPeak, that the Air Force planned to close Los Angeles AFB in the mid-1990s and move the Air Force's Space Systems Division and the Aerospace Corporation to Kirtland AFB in Albuquerque. The Air Force in 1990 even did a draft environmental impact statement in preparation for that move.

The Air Force analysis in this round of Air Force Lab and Product Centers puts Los Angeles AFB in Tier II, along with Kirtland AFB. In six of the eight categories, Kirtland ranks ahead of L.A. and in another is tied.

Why is Kirtland closing in your proposal and not L.A.?

**Answer:** The Department of Defense has recommended realigning (not closing) Kirtland AFB. The Phillips Laboratory activity, that scored high in both the Air Force and the Joint Cross-Service Group for Laboratories analysis is retained at Kirtland along with other activities. The placement of Kirtland AFB and Los Angeles AFB in the middle tier of bases indicates that the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group viewed them as roughly comparable, based on all eight criteria. From this starting point, the Secretary of the Air Force directed the examination of a number of scenarios for the closure or realignment of these and other installations in the Laboratory and Product Center subcategory. The details of that analysis are described in the minutes of the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group. The decision by the Secretary of the Air Force not to recommend the closure of Los Angeles AFB indicates that no scenario for the closure of Los Angeles AFB was viewed by her as cost-effective or consistent with mission needs. The recommendation regarding Kirtland retains laboratory, weapon storage, and DNA activities that can operate with minimal military support, while reducing the overall support infrastructure associated with flying units and other DoD activities producing significant savings.



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:  
AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 18, 1995

The Honorable Bill Richardson  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Richardson:

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950424-6

Attached are responses to questions submitted on your behalf by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission at an investigative hearing on March 1, 1995. I trust that this information is helpful and responds to your concerns.

Again, thank you for your interest in the base closure and realignment process. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of further assistance as we go through this difficult and challenging process.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cmc  
Enclosures

## CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

From Senator Bingaman (New Mexico):

**Question:** Secretary Perry, in December 1990 Senators Jeff Bingaman and Pete Domenici were told by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Merrill McPeak, that the Air Force planned to close Los Angeles AFB in the mid-1990s and move the Air Force's Space Systems Division and the Aerospace Corporation to Kirtland AFB in Albuquerque. The Air Force in 1990 even did a draft environmental impact statement in preparation for that move.

The Air Force analysis in this round of Air Force Lab and Product Centers puts Los Angeles AFB in Tier II, along with Kirtland AFB. In six of the eight categories, Kirtland ranks ahead of L.A. and in another is tied.

Why is Kirtland closing in your proposal and not L.A.?

**Answer:** The Department of Defense has recommended realigning (not closing) Kirtland AFB. The Phillips Laboratory activity, that scored high in both the Air Force and the Joint Cross-Service Group for Laboratories analysis is retained at Kirtland along with other activities. The placement of Kirtland AFB and Los Angeles AFB in the middle tier of bases indicates that the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group viewed them as roughly comparable, based on all eight criteria. From this starting point, the Secretary of the Air Force directed the examination of a number of scenarios for the closure or realignment of these and other installations in the Laboratory and Product Center subcategory. The details of that analysis are described in the minutes of the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group. The decision by the Secretary of the Air Force not to recommend the closure of Los Angeles AFB indicates that no scenario for the closure of Los Angeles AFB was viewed by her as cost-effective or consistent with mission needs. The recommendation regarding Kirtland retains laboratory, weapon storage, and DNA activities that can operate with minimal military support, while reducing the overall support infrastructure associated with flying units and other DoD activities producing significant savings.

## CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

From the New Mexico delegation:

**Question:** Secretary Perry, nuclear deterrence remains the backbone of the United States Strategic Policy of deterrence. Are any facilities under consideration involved with, or connected to the US nuclear deterrent capability? Was an analysis done on the impact on this capability? Was the Department of Energy consulted with regard to this impact?

**Answer:** There were facilities under consideration that involved the U.S. nuclear deterrent capability. Military Departments also conducted an analysis on the impact proposed base closures or realignments would have on this capability. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducted a review of the recommendations and identified no impacts to the Nation's nuclear deterrent capability. The Department of Energy was consulted.

**Question:** Secretary Perry, one of the principal BRAC objectives is to consolidate DoD activities. Was consideration given to the interrelationship of the bases on the list and the tenants located on the facility? Were these tenants contacted and asked to provide information about the economic effects base realignment would have on them, and the effects on their overall mission? Can you provide tenant responses to these questions, along with a list of tenants for each base on this list including the functions shared between the base and the tenant?

**Answer:** We believe the principal goal of the BRAC process is to reduce unnecessary infrastructure. Tenants were fully considered in the installation data calls sent out by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. Tenant needs were an important part of the Military Department analysis. Specific data call responses regarding tenants have been provided to the Commission in the Military Department's detailed back-up data.

However, the sensitivity of the BRAC process raises concerns with communications outside the Department of Defense on potential base actions. With regards to the Department of Energy (DoE) and other non-DoD tenants at Kirtland Air Force Base, the Air Force did consult informally with DoE during the latter stages of the process, and used the information it possessed to gauge the impact of this action on that and other agencies. Following the announcement of the recommendations the Air Force sent teams to meet with DoE, the Sandia National Laboratory, and other agency representatives at Kirtland Air Force Base to assess needs and impact. The Air Force is in the process of conducting site surveys and will continue in this

cooperative process throughout the implementation period if this recommendation is approved.

**Question:** Secretary Perry, which bases on the proposed list for realignment or closure have an intergovernmental relationship with agencies or entities outside the base? Were these entities notified, or asked to provide information about economic effects, or mission? Will you provide these responses?

**Answer:** Every military installation has a relationship with other government agencies, most notably the local community. We can not as a practical matter notify and solicit all the the local community governments for information regarding potential closure or realignment recommendations; the data would not be consistent or certifiable and the effect on community morale could be severe. However, we did conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the economic impacts of every recommendation on the local economy. This information has been provided to the Commission and to the reading rooms set up in the House and the Senate.



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:  
AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 18, 1995

The Honorable Steven Schiff  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Schiff:

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950424-6

Attached are responses to questions submitted on your behalf by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission at an investigative hearing on March 1, 1995. I trust that this information is helpful and responds to your concerns.

Again, thank you for your interest in the base closure and realignment process. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of further assistance as we go through this difficult and challenging process.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cmc  
Enclosures

## CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

From the New Mexico delegation:

**Question:** Secretary Perry, nuclear deterrence remains the backbone of the United States Strategic Policy of deterrence. Are any facilities under consideration involved with, or connected to the US nuclear deterrent capability? Was an analysis done on the impact on this capability? Was the Department of Energy consulted with regard to this impact?

**Answer:** There were facilities under consideration that involved the U.S. nuclear deterrent capability. Military Departments also conducted an analysis on the impact proposed base closures or realignments would have on this capability. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducted a review of the recommendations and identified no impacts to the Nation's nuclear deterrent capability. The Department of Energy was consulted.

**Question:** Secretary Perry, one of the principal BRAC objectives is to consolidate DoD activities. Was consideration given to the interrelationship of the bases on the list and the tenants located on the facility? Were these tenants contacted and asked to provide information about the economic effects base realignment would have on them, and the effects on their overall mission? Can you provide tenant responses to these questions, along with a list of tenants for each base on this list including the functions shared between the base and the tenant?

**Answer:** We believe the principal goal of the BRAC process is to reduce unnecessary infrastructure. Tenants were fully considered in the installation data calls sent out by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. Tenant needs were an important part of the Military Department analysis. Specific data call responses regarding tenants have been provided to the Commission in the Military Department's detailed back-up data.

However, the sensitivity of the BRAC process raises concerns with communications outside the Department of Defense on potential base actions. With regards to the Department of Energy (DoE) and other non-DoD tenants at Kirtland Air Force Base, the Air Force did consult informally with DoE during the latter stages of the process, and used the information it possessed to gauge the impact of this action on that and other agencies. Following the announcement of the recommendations the Air Force sent teams to meet with DoE, the Sandia National Laboratory, and other agency representatives at Kirtland Air Force Base to assess needs and impact. The Air Force is in the process of conducting site surveys and will continue in this

cooperative process throughout the implementation period if this recommendation is approved.

**Question:** Secretary Perry, which bases on the proposed list for realignment or closure have an intergovernmental relationship with agencies or entities outside the base? Were these entities notified, or asked to provide information about economic effects, or mission? Will you provide these responses?

**Answer:** Every military installation has a relationship with other government agencies, most notably the local community. We can not as a practical matter notify and solicit all the the local community governments for information regarding potential closure or realignment recommendations; the data would not be consistent or certifiable and the effect on community moreale could be severe. However, we did conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the economic impacts of every recommendation on the local economy. This information has been provided to the Commission and to the reading rooms set up in the House and the Senate.



## CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

From Senator Bingaman (New Mexico):

**Question:** Secretary Perry, in December 1990 Senators Jeff Bingaman and Pete Domenici were told by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Merrill McPeak, that the Air Force planned to close Los Angeles AFB in the mid-1990s and move the Air Force's Space Systems Division and the Aerospace Corporation to Kirtland AFB in Albuquerque. The Air Force in 1990 even did a draft environmental impact statement in preparation for that move.

The Air Force analysis in this round of Air Force Lab and Product Centers puts Los Angeles AFB in Tier II, along with Kirtland AFB. In six of the eight categories, Kirtland ranks ahead of L.A. and in another is tied.

Why is Kirtland closing in your proposal and not L.A.?

**Answer:** The Department of Defense has recommended realigning (not closing) Kirtland AFB. The Phillips Laboratory activity, that scored high in both the Air Force and the Joint Cross-Service Group for Laboratories analysis is retained at Kirtland along with other activities. The placement of Kirtland AFB and Los Angeles AFB in the middle tier of bases indicates that the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group viewed them as roughly comparable, based on all eight criteria. From this starting point, the Secretary of the Air Force directed the examination of a number of scenarios for the closure or realignment of these and other installations in the Laboratory and Product Center subcategory. The details of that analysis are described in the minutes of the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group. The decision by the Secretary of the Air Force not to recommend the closure of Los Angeles AFB indicates that no scenario for the closure of Los Angeles AFB was viewed by her as cost-effective or consistent with mission needs. The recommendation regarding Kirtland retains laboratory, weapon storage, and DNA activities that can operate with minimal military support, while reducing the overall support infrastructure associated with flying units and other DoD activities producing significant savings.



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:  
AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 18, 1995

The Honorable Joe Skeen  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Skeen:

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950424-6

Attached are responses to questions submitted on your behalf by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission at an investigative hearing on March 1, 1995. I trust that this information is helpful and responds to your concerns.

Again, thank you for your interest in the base closure and realignment process. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of further assistance as we go through this difficult and challenging process.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cmc  
Enclosures

## CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

From Senator Bingaman (New Mexico):

**Question:** Secretary Perry, in December 1990 Senators Jeff Bingaman and Pete Domenici were told by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Merrill McPeak, that the Air Force planned to close Los Angeles AFB in the mid-1990s and move the Air Force's Space Systems Division and the Aerospace Corporation to Kirtland AFB in Albuquerque. The Air Force in 1990 even did a draft environmental impact statement in preparation for that move.

The Air Force analysis in this round of Air Force Lab and Product Centers puts Los Angeles AFB in Tier II, along with Kirtland AFB. In six of the eight categories, Kirtland ranks ahead of L.A. and in another is tied.

Why is Kirtland closing in your proposal and not L.A.?

**Answer:** The Department of Defense has recommended realigning (not closing) Kirtland AFB. The Phillips Laboratory activity, that scored high in both the Air Force and the Joint Cross-Service Group for Laboratories analysis is retained at Kirtland along with other activities. The placement of Kirtland AFB and Los Angeles AFB in the middle tier of bases indicates that the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group viewed them as roughly comparable, based on all eight criteria. From this starting point, the Secretary of the Air Force directed the examination of a number of scenarios for the closure or realignment of these and other installations in the Laboratory and Product Center subcategory. The details of that analysis are described in the minutes of the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group. The decision by the Secretary of the Air Force not to recommend the closure of Los Angeles AFB indicates that no scenario for the closure of Los Angeles AFB was viewed by her as cost-effective or consistent with mission needs. The recommendation regarding Kirtland retains laboratory, weapon storage, and DNA activities that can operate with minimal military support, while reducing the overall support infrastructure associated with flying units and other DoD activities producing significant savings.

## CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

From the New Mexico delegation:

**Question:** Secretary Perry, nuclear deterrence remains the backbone of the United States Strategic Policy of deterrence. Are any facilities under consideration involved with, or connected to the US nuclear deterrent capability? Was an analysis done on the impact on this capability? Was the Department of Energy consulted with regard to this impact?

**Answer:** There were facilities under consideration that involved the U.S. nuclear deterrent capability. Military Departments also conducted an analysis on the impact proposed base closures or realignments would have on this capability. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducted a review of the recommendations and identified no impacts to the Nation's nuclear deterrent capability. The Department of Energy was consulted.

**Question:** Secretary Perry, one of the principal BRAC objectives is to consolidate DoD activities. Was consideration given to the interrelationship of the bases on the list and the tenants located on the facility? Were these tenants contacted and asked to provide information about the economic effects base realignment would have on them, and the effects on their overall mission? Can you provide tenant responses to these questions, along with a list of tenants for each base on this list including the functions shared between the base and the tenant?

**Answer:** We believe the principal goal of the BRAC process is to reduce unnecessary infrastructure. Tenants were fully considered in the installation data calls sent out by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. Tenant needs were an important part of the Military Department analysis. Specific data call responses regarding tenants have been provided to the Commission in the Military Department's detailed back-up data.

However, the sensitivity of the BRAC process raises concerns with communications outside the Department of Defense on potential base actions. With regards to the Department of Energy (DoE) and other non-DoD tenants at Kirtland Air Force Base, the Air Force did consult informally with DoE during the latter stages of the process, and used the information it possessed to gauge the impact of this action on that and other agencies. Following the announcement of the recommendations the Air Force sent teams to meet with DoE, the Sandia National Laboratory, and other agency representatives at Kirtland Air Force Base to assess needs and impact. The Air Force is in the process of conducting site surveys and will continue in this

cooperative process throughout the implementation period if this recommendation is approved.

**Question:** Secretary Perry, which bases on the proposed list for realignment or closure have an intergovernmental relationship with agencies or entities outside the base? Were these entities notified, or asked to provide information about economic effects, or mission? Will you provide these responses?

**Answer:** Every military installation has a relationship with other government agencies, most notably the local community. We can not as a practical matter notify and solicit all the the local community governments for information regarding potential closure or realignment recommendations; the data would not be consistent or certifiable and the effect on community morale could be severe. However, we did conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the economic impacts of every recommendation on the local economy. This information has been provided to the Commission and to the reading rooms set up in the House and the Senate.



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425

ARLINGTON, VA 22209

703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA

REBECCA COX

GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)

S. LEE KLING

RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)

MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)

WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 18, 1995

The Honorable Glen Browder  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Handwritten note: *Handwritten number 9504246*

Dear Representative Browder:

Attached are responses to questions submitted on your behalf by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission at an investigative hearing on March 1, 1995. I trust that this information is helpful and responds to your concerns.

Again, thank you for your interest in the base closure and realignment process. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of further assistance as we go through this difficult and challenging process.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cmc  
Enclosures

## CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

From Senator Shelby and Representative Browder (Alabama):

**Question:** Secretary Perry, the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission removed Fort McClellan from the list proposed by the Department of Defense and directed the Secretary of Defense to pursue all the required permits and certification for the construction of facilities at a new location prior to the 1995 base closure round if DoD wanted to put the installation on the list again. It appears that DoD did not follow this direction.

Have all the necessary permits been obtained by Army at Fort Leonard Wood, the receiving installation?

**Answer:** No. As Secretary Deutch pointed out in his testimony, he instructed the Secretary of the Army, Togo West, not to pursue the requisite permits until the DoD recommendations were publicly announced. The Army has assured me that the permits will be in place prior to your decision making.

**TRF DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

**EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) #** 950424-7

FROM: <u>DIXON</u>	TO: <u>ALASKA &amp; GUAM DELEGATION</u>
TITLE: <u>CHAIRMAN</u>	TITLE:
ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCRC</u>	ORGANIZATION:
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				<b>REVIEW AND ANALYSIS</b>			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓ FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING SCHEDULE FOR SAN FRANCISCO REGIONAL HEARING.

Due Date: _____	Routing Date: <u>950424</u>	Date Originated: <u>950421</u>	Mail Date: <u>950421</u>
-----------------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	--------------------------





**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:  
AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 21, 1995

To: Members of the Alaska and Guam Delegations

From: Alan J. Dixon, Chairman  
The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Re: San Francisco Regional Hearing Information

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950424-7

As you know, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission will hold a regional hearing in San Francisco, CA on Friday, April 28, 1995. The hearing will be held at the Westin Hotel, 1 Old Bayshore Highway, in Millbrae, CA and will commence at 1:00 PM. The Commission will take testimony from officials from California, Guam, and Alaska. A copy of the hearing schedule is attached. As a reminder, all testimony received by the Commission will be under oath.

I look forward to working with you as we go through this difficult and challenging process. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me or the Commission's liaison staff at (703) 696-0504:

Cece Carman	Director, Congressional & Intergovernmental Senate Liaison
Jim Schufreider	House Liaison
Chip Walgren	State & Local Liaison



**DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

**SCHEDULE FOR REGIONAL HEARING**

**SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA**

**April 28, 1995**

1:00-1:10 p.m.	Opening remarks	
1:10-3:10 p.m.	California	120 minutes
3:10-3:20 p.m.	break	
3:20-5:10 p.m.	California	110 minutes
5:10-5:20 p.m.	break	
5:20-6:05 p.m.	California	45 minutes
6:05-6:10 p.m.	break	
6:10-6:40 p.m.	Public comment: California	
6:40-6:50 p.m.	break	
6:50-7:20 p.m.	Guam	30 minutes
7:25-7:45 p.m.	Alaska	20 minutes

(AS OF 3/21/95)

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950424-8

FROM: <u>DIXON</u>	TO: <u>KAMINSKI, PAUL G.</u>
TITLE: <u>CHAIRMAN</u>	TITLE: <u>UNDER SEC DEF</u>
ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCRC</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>OFFICE OF SECDEF</u>
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: <u>STRATFORD ARMY ENGINE PLANT</u>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Direct Response
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓ FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING INPUT ON THE IMPACT OF ARMY'S BRAC 95 RECOMMENDATION TO CLOSE STRATFORD ARMY ENGINE PLANT.

Due Date:	Routing Date: <u>950424</u>	Date Originated: <u>950421</u>	Mail Date: <u>950424</u>
-----------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	--------------------------



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425

ARLINGTON, VA 22209

703-696-0504

April 21, 1995

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA

REBECCA COX

GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)

S. LEE KLING

RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)

MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)

WENDI LOUISE STEELE

Honorable Paul G. Kaminski  
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology)  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20310-3410

Please refer to this number

when responding 950424-8

Dear Secretary Kaminski:

I would like to request your input on the impact of the Army's BRAC 95 recommendation to close Stratford Army Engine Plant (SAEP). I am particularly interested in how the recommendation complies or conflicts with the final report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on the Tracked Vehicle Industrial Base, dated 5 May 1994.

In the DSB's final report, the Task Force recommended that the Army "retain a downsized Stratford Army Engine Plant; somewhat increase support engineering; provide current funding streams; transfer some maintenance work from Anniston to SAEP; share in the cost of plant downsizing; and provide engineering funding for an evolutionary engine upgrade program." This recommendation appears to support continued operations at SAEP. However, it does not specifically address ownership of the facility.

The Army's BRAC 95 recommendation is to close Stratford Army Engine Plant. The Army justifies this recommendation due to reduced production requirements and an increased capability for rebuild and repair. It will be of great assistance to the Commission if you would provide clarification on the impact of the Army's recommendation on the DSB report. Specifically, please address if they are in conflict. If not, please clarify how they relate or what has changed since the DSB report.

I appreciate your assistance in this matter. Your efforts will be very helpful to the Commission as we carry out our review of the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense in the months ahead.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950424-9

FROM: NEMFAKOS, CHARLES	TO: DIXON
TITLE: VICE CHAIRMAN	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: BASE STRUCTURE EVALUATION COM	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: MARCH AFB.	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓ FYI

Subject/Remarks:

RESPONSE TO KEN CALVERT'S PROPOSAL TO RELOCATE MCA'S EL TORO AND TUSTIN ROTARY WING RESOURCES TO MARCH AFB.

Due Date:	Routing Date: <u>950424</u>	Date Originated: <u>950421</u>	Mail Date:
-----------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	------------



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20360-5100

LT-0711-F14  
BSAT/LH  
21 April 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman, Defense Base Closure  
and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street,  
Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950424-9

Dear Chairman Dixon:

This is in response to a request from Mr. Alex Yellin of your staff for comments on the efficacy of California Congressman Ken Calvert's proposal to relocate MCAS El Toro and MCAS Tustin rotary wing resources to March AFB, CA and the Department's position on the Marine Corps acquiring ownership of March AFB and host the responsibilities for Reserve Components assigned to the base.

As you are aware, the fundamental goal of Base Closure is to reduce the excess infrastructure within DOD. Consolidation of Marine Corps aviation at one base offers significant fiscal advantages and, based on our analysis both in BRAC 93 and again in BRAC 95, is the optimal solution to infrastructure reduction in support of those assets.

March AFB was closed as an active force base in the 1993 base closure round. As we understand the situation, to implement this action the United States Air Force turns over the facility to the Air Force Reserve, and active duty support facilities close, inactivate or substantially downsize for required support to the Reserve community. This means that normal activities and services provided to active duty personnel cease, (e.g., hospital, housing, commissary and exchange), any support beyond basic host capability would have to be reestablished.


The Department of the Navy cannot assume the fiscal responsibility for operating March AFB. This alternative suggests that the Department should keep two bases vice one, and, in essence, reestablish/rebuild a new base. While there is no cost data for such an alternative in our data base because we were not interested in gaining additional capacity, the 20 year net present value cost of operating and maintaining two bases instead of one clearly overwhelms any reasonable estimate of reducing up-front costs by moving into March AFB.

Moving to March AFB only makes sense fiscally for the Department of the Navy, if we were to close another base so that overall base operating costs are not increased, e.g., close NAS Miramar and move the Marine Corps fixed wing assets to another Navy base in conjunction with reopening March AFB. That alternative is unacceptable to the Department

of the Navy from any perspective, as NAS Miramar presents the best overall solution, operationally and financially, for the combination of rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft.

As always, if I can be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,



Charles P. Nemrakos  
Vice Chairman,  
Base Structure Evaluation Committee

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950424-10

FROM: <b>HALEY, PAUL R.</b>	TO: <b>DIXON</b>
TITLE:	TITLE: <b>CHAIRMAN</b>
ORGANIZATION: <b>SOUTH SHORE CHAMBER</b>	ORGANIZATION: <b>DBCRC</b>
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: <b>SOUTH Weymouth NAS</b>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				<b>REVIEW AND ANALYSIS</b>			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES				<b>DOYLE REEDY</b>	✓		

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Direct Response
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	<input type="checkbox"/> FYI

Subject/Remarks:

**LETTER OF SUPPORT, INCLUDING DOCUMENTATION,**

Due Date: <b>950501</b>	Routing Date: <b>950424</b>	Date Originated: <b>950421</b>	Mail Date:
-------------------------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	------------

**200**





Please refer to this number  
when responding 950424-10

April 21, 1995

The Honorable Alan Dixon, Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I am Chairman of the "Save the Base" Committee, a composite group of local officials, reservists, base employees, and concerned citizens, formed under the auspices of the South Shore Chamber of Commerce. Herein, I outline some of the essential points we intend to make as part of our presentation to Commissioner Robles when he visits the South Weymouth Naval Air Station on April 28, 1995.

In 1993, South Weymouth NAS was removed from the closure list when Commissioner Stuart, citing lowered demographics at receiving sites and the prospective loss of a base rated third in military value of eight naval air reserve stations evaluated, moved the Commission to find that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and the final criteria in making his recommendation. The Commission voted unanimously 7-0 to reject the Secretary's recommendation. Commissioner Stuart said in making his motion:

"I am impressed with the logic of maintaining a Reserve Facility which we already own, and it looks like a superb facility that is available to the Northeast, where there are a lot of reservists operating. I think we have to keep in consideration that all parts of the country need to have facilities available to them. (BRAC Transcript of June 26, 1993, page 319).

What has happened at South Weymouth in the interim? As a result of BRAC 93, a 4-plane C-130 squadron (VR-62) was stood up in February of this year, a Surface Reserve Center was established to accommodate over 500 surface reservists from NRC Lawrence, NRC Chicopee and NRC Quincy which were ordered consolidated at Weymouth as a result of the Community's suggestion. Additionally, other construction projects that had been on hold for

The Honorable Alan Dixon, Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
April 21, 1995  
Page Two

several years under the threat of closure, went forward, including the rehabilitation of several other buildings, a new addition to the fire house, a new air control tower, a new liquid oxygen farm and a new Dopplar Weather Radar.

However, despite BRAC 93 and the actions taken as a result, the continued high military value of South Weymouth as borne out by the Navy's military value matrix, Weymouth's high level of contributory support and its overall readiness, the Secretary once again recommended South Weymouth for closure. We maintain the recommendation is not supportable through any application of the selection criteria and is in contradiction to that which is required to meet the needs of the long-term force structure plan.

South Weymouth is a Reserve Air Station. The sole purpose of its active duty personnel is to train reservists who will be capable of effectively mobilizing during a major conflict. In more recent years, reservists have been additionally called upon for contributory support, side by side, with fleet units to meet operational goals. Why? because it is cost-effective to rotate citizen-sailors for short periods to meet various contingencies at the same skill level but at 1/6th the cost. Numerous personnel from South Weymouth answered the call in support of Desert Storm/Desert Shield. Many others volunteered but were not needed. Today, we have reserve aircrews, rotating back and forth from Europe for 17 day stints in support of operations near Bosnia. Last summer, these same crews rotated out of the Caribbean, flying numerous missions in support of operations in and about Haiti.

To fully utilize capable reservists, training sites must be accessible to reservists where they live and work. South Weymouth is located in the heart of metropolitan Boston which is the most highly-educated population center in the country. Many young reservists come off active duty to use the G.I. bill to further their education at the many fine institutions of higher

The Honorable Alan Dixon, Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
April 21, 1995  
Page Three

learning located in Boston and the surrounding area. There is no better area to site a reserve air station than in the middle of this demographic mecca.

The Navy's own analysis rated South Weymouth #1 in demographics, arguably the single most important factor in selecting an installation which can support a force structure plan that will undoubtedly include an even greater compliment of reservists in the years to come in the face of dwindling resources. The Army and Air Force now have a higher percentage of reserve forces in their makeup than they ever had in their history. The Navy recognized the uniqueness of its Reserve Air Station when designing its selection process comparing one against each other, particularly in the area of demographics. The evaluation done was different from those conducted for Operational Air Stations. Most notably, the inquiries made to the two separate subcategories were not the same and there was no analysis completed in evaluating reserve demographics or reserve recruiting potential in the analysis done on active duty operational facilities.

The decision to close South Weymouth which links a reserve facility with an active facility is without analytical support. To have provided justification, a comparison of military values across categories where no data existed would have been required. Such a procedure would be flawed. The Navy virtually admitted as much as demonstrated on page 25 of the Department of the Navy's Analysis and Recommendation (Volume IV), March, 1995, when DOD reported:

"The score for a particular installation is a relative measure of military value within the context only of the subcategory in which that installation is being analyzed. . . . Furthermore, the score obtained by an activity in one subcategory has no relevance for comparison to the score obtained by an activity in another subcategory since the question and quantitative scores were different for each matrix."

The Honorable Alan Dixon, Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
April 21, 1995  
Page Four

Despite this emphasis in separating Reserve and Operational Naval Air Stations, the BSEC eventually saw fit to measure NAS South Weymouth against NAS Brunswick in an effort to meet the CINCLANTFLT's "desire" to have a fully capable air station north of Norfolk. This comparison resulted in a serious departure from BSEC's initial findings: NAS Brunswick had been marked for closure during BSEC's initial configuration model output for Operation Air Stations, and NAS South Weymouth had been "kept open" during similar phases in the Reserve Air Station analysis. Moreover, this comparison is out of sync with the internal control procedures set forth by Secretary Perry's January 7, 1994 memorandum, stating that the accuracy of BRAC data collections and analyses depends at a minimum, "on uniform guidance defining data requirements and sources." ( Department of Defense Memorandum, Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC): Policy, Procedures, Authorities and Responsibilities, January 7, 1994, p.9).

While the use of military judgment in selecting bases is certainly acceptable, it is intended to be a tool in the analysis of like facilities, rather than the decisive factor in choosing among unlike facilities. The Navy, however, chose to incorporate the CINCLANTFLT's input by dismissing its own analysis and commencing a comparison of apple and oranges.

Even if the Commission were to determine that the comparison of naval and operational air stations was somehow justified, the inconsistency of the process employed by the Navy seems unacceptable. If naval and operational air stations could be easily and logically compared, why was the configuration not utilized at the outset? The last minute methodological shift on the part of BSEC looks like an attempt to justify the CINC's expressed operational desires by presenting an either/or alternative, under which any

The Honorable Alan Dixon, Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
April 21, 1995  
Page Five

Reserve Naval Air Station, regardless of its ranking within its own subcategory, would, by definition, lose to an Operational Station, regardless of the Operational Stations's relative ranking.

It is apparent that the BSAT conducted a series of deliberative sessions with various CINC's and compiled "Policy imperatives" based on those discussions. Such a critical step in the process is surely worthy of written public record, and yet we have been unable to uncover any related documentation. Under the Base Closure Act, the Secretary of Defense must include with his recommendations a summary of the selection process that resulted in the recommendation for each installation and a justification for each recommendation, as well as certification of the accuracy and completeness of the information on which the recommendations are based. (Department of the Navy: Analyses and Recommendations (Volume IV), March 1995, p.10). We have been unable to obtain documentation concerning either the CINCLANTFLT's request for a single air station north of Norfolk, or the BSEC's response. For these reasons the Secretary's recommendation is flawed and should not be adopted.

This gap in information is disturbing because it requires the community to simply trust that the Navy correctly interpreted the CINC's request. If the CINC's input holds more weight than any other aspect of the process-- and particularly if that input is not assigned a procedural weighing or ranking in importance--then it stands to reason that there should be a record of that input and that it should be available to communities. Indeed, if final recommendations depend solely on-- and can be justified by-- a single missive from a Commander-in-Chief, why not dispense with the entire analysis before this point? Clearly this was not the impartial and logical process envisioned by the framers of the BRAC legislation.

The Honorable Alan Dixon, Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
April 21, 1995  
Page Six

We have attached detailed memoranda on various issues which we feel should be considered by the BRAC in its deliberation. All focus on the strengths of NAS South Weymouth. We are troubled that despite South Weymouth's high military value and its unmatched demographics there was only one scenario of the hundreds conducted which considered keeping South Weymouth open. Despite certification from the local command that the scenario to keep South Weymouth open (which called for the closure of NAS Atlanta and the transfer of a C-9 squadron located there moving to Weymouth) could be readily accommodated at minimal expense, there were no follow-on scenarios which considered South Weymouth for other type of aircraft such as tactical aircraft flown by Marine and Navy reservists.

Any recommendation that spared NAS Atlanta ahead of South Weymouth was in contradiction to the stated mandate that where excess capacity existed in a subcategory, a scenario which rendered an average aggregate military value of those stations remaining less than the average aggregate military value of all installations in the subcategory, that scenario should not be followed. NAS Atlanta's poor military value--some ten points less than South Weymouth and the other reserve installations--should have dictated early on that any scenario sparing Atlanta would always result in an average below that which was required by the state control factor. Any scenario which considered keeping Atlanta should not then have been considered.

We look forward to Commissioner Robles visit in order to demonstrate the outstanding capabilities of this facility and to further justify to him how additional air activities could be supported here. Whether fixed-wing or rotary, tactical jet or logistics, Weymouth is ready, willing and able to support these types of missions with its available infra structure and with its highly capable and motivated personnel.

The Honorable Alan Dixon, Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
April 21, 1995  
Page Seven

We thank you for your anticipated consideration.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Paul R. Haley". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above the printed name.

Paul R. Haley

PRH/rmi  
Enclosure

c:\pdr\arbour\users\hale1

4/21/95

LISTING OF MATERIALS SENT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BRAC ON 21, APRIL 1995  
ATTENTION: DOYLE REEDY

1. PROPOSED AGENDA FOR VISIT OF COMMISSIONER ROBLES ON 4/28/95
2. DEVIATIONS FROM BRAC CRITERIA
3. COPY OF LETTER FROM GOVERNOR WILLIAM F. WELD TO THE HONORABLE JOHN JOHN H. DALTON
4. COPY OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS \$100,000,000 BOND BILL
5. SITING OF RESERVE AVIATION SQUADRONS
6. AREA BASE CLOSINGS OR REALIGNMENTS
7. NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH ENVIRONMENT
8. LONG TERM IMPLICATIONS OF CLOSING NAS ATLANTA OR NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH
9. NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH INFRASTRUCTURE
10. 1993 BRAC REALIGNMENT/CONSOLIDATION
11. ACTIVE 1995 CONTRACTS & COMPLETED 1994/1995
12. DEMOGRAPHICS



NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH BRAC COMMISSIONER SITE VISIT AGENDA 4/28/95

"PRESENTATION BY THE COMMITTEE TO SAVE NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH"

JOSUE (JOE) ROBLES, JR, COMMISSIONER

DOYLE REEDY, BRAC STAFF

- I. OPENING REMARKS/OVERVIEW:
- II. DEVIATIONS:
- III. DEMOGRAPHICS:
- IV. INFRASTRUCTURE:
- V. SQUADRON PLACEMENT:
- VI. MASSACHUSETTS NATIONAL GUARD:
- VII. COMMUNITY ROLE & PARTNERSHIP:
- VIII. ECONOMIC IMPACT:
- IX. RECAP/CLOSING:

## DEVIATION FROM BRAC CRITERIA

DATE 21 April, 1995

TO Committee to Save Naval Air Station South Weymouth

FROM Subcommittee on Military Value



---

In the course of our analysis into the Department of the Navy's recommendation to close NAS So Weymouth we found that the Navy's analysis was flawed and deviated significantly from established policy. We take serious issue with the last minute combining of Reserve and Operational Naval Air Stations to satisfy CINCLANTFLT's desire to trade-off NAS So. Weymouth in order to preserve an operational station at Brunswick. This is a significant departure from the segmented analysis that is the foundation for the Dept. of Defense's BRAC selection process, as mandated by congressional legislation and subsequent policy guidance issued by the DON and Sec. of Defense. The lack of material documenting this critical transition contributes to the strong perception that the Navy process circumvented official SECDEF policy guidance.

There are two specific breakdowns in the Navy BRAC analytical process: 1) the comparison of unlike facilities mid-way through the process, and 2) the lack of documentation detailing this critical switch.

1) The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Public Law 101-501, claims to create "a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States." The Act mandates that the DoD recommend facilities for realignment or closure based on two criteria: the long term force structure plan and the selection criteria which are applied to rank bases in categories where there is excess capacity. The foundation for the selection criteria is the comparison of one facility in a particular category against others in that same category. The DoD's policy guidance

memorandum requires that, " The studies must be based on analyses of the base structure by like categories of bases using: objective measures for the selection criteria, where possible: the force structure plan: programmed workload over the FYDP (future years def. plan): and military judgement in selecting bases for closure and realignment." The Navy designed its selection process to ensure that like installations were compared. The process established 5 major categories and 27 subcategories to ensure fairness. NAS So. Weymouth was grouped with 5 other Reserve facilities and NAS Brunswick was in a group of 20 Operational facilities: a confirmation of the fact that the activities of the Reserve and Operational facilities warranted separate categorization and separate evaluation. Now, in the attempt to meet CINCLANTFLT's "desire", it was necessary to measure NAS So. Weymouth against NAS Brunswick and reverse the BSEC's own configuration model analysis that targeted NAS Brunswick for closure and recommended that NAS So. Weymouth be "kept open " Refer to Sec. Perry's memo of 7 January, 1994 stating that the accuracy of BRAC data collection and analyses depends, at a minimum on "uniform guidance defining data requirements and sources." While the use of military judgement is acceptable, if not vital, it is intended to be a tool in the analysis of like facilities, rather than the decisive factor in choosing among unlike facilities. Furthermore, by the Navy's own Analyses and Recommendations (Vol. IV), comparison of military value across categories is virtually meaningless.

2) Apparently the BSAT conducted a series of deliberative sessions with the various CINCs and compiled "policy imperatives " The DON senior leadership reviewed them and made decisions from them. Such a critical step in the process is surely worthy of written public record. Under the Base Closure Act, the SECDEF must include with his recommendations a justification of the selection process for each recommendation as well as certification of the accuracy and completeness of the information. The Navy also employed its own internal control mechanisms to "ensure the accuracy, completeness and integrity of the information upon which the Secretary

of the Navy's recommendations ... would be based." This apparent application of military judgement without supporting documentation or analysis has concerned many analysts in previous Navy closure recommendations. In its 1993 analysis, the GAO found that the Navy relied heavily upon the acceptance of certain assumptions and military judgements.

In conclusion, one of the primary tasks of the BRAC Commission is to review the means by which individual service closure and realignment decisions are made. It is this process that inspires public trust in, and ultimate acceptance of, the final decisions. Herein lies the most disturbing aspect of the Navy's recommendation to close NAS So. Weymouth:

The process by which the decision was made appears to violate several of the statutes, public laws, SECDEF guidance, and policy statements, which taken as a whole, form the foundation of the process. The lack of vital records concerning input from CINCLANTFLT and the procedural weighting that carries, the implication that it conceivably could carry more weight than any other aspect of the process, and the forced comparison of Reserve NAS So. Weymouth to Operational NAS Brunswick so late in the process to satisfy a "desire" do much to destroy public confidence in the process and destroy the credibility of the Base Closure Act.



THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

STATE HOUSE • BOSTON 02133

(617) 727-3800

WILLIAM F. WELD  
GOVERNOR

ARGEO PAUL CELLUCCI  
LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR

February 8, 1995

The Honorable John H. Dalton  
Secretary of the Navy  
1000 Navy Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20350-1000

Dear Secretary Dalton:

This letter is to follow up on our recent phone conversation concerning Naval Air Station (NAS) South Weymouth.

As we discussed, the Massachusetts National Guard is impressed with the facilities at NAS South Weymouth and, with the Navy's approval, is interested in locating a unit onto the base. Specifically, the Guard is interested in moving a field artillery battalion totaling 45 full time and 600 part time Guardsmen as well as their trucks, howitzers, and other equipment. This is a new, high priority unit that is assigned to the "Contingency Force Pool."

Locating this unit onto NAS South Weymouth would require the construction of two buildings, one of 85,000 square feet to house the military units, and one of 12,000 square feet for the maintenance of their equipment. As we discussed, the state could fund such construction from a \$100 million capital improvement fund intended for the state's military installations. Moreover, the state would willingly negotiate with the Navy to fund the improvement of other facilities or infrastructure at NAS South Weymouth that would be used jointly by the Guard and Navy personnel. As I mentioned, the legislation authorizing this capital improvement fund specifies that state funding is available only if NAS South Weymouth is enhanced or expanded under the 1995 base closure process.

If it is all right with you, I would like to send my staff to Washington to discuss this possible option with your installation experts. Your staff can contact Jim Kane in my office at: (617) 727-3600. Thanks very much for your consideration.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Bill Weld".

William F. Weld



# The Commonwealth of Massachusetts

IN THE YEAR ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND NINETY-

## AN ACT

RELATIVE TO SIMULATING EMPLOYMENT ENCOURAGING THE SITING OF CERTAIN FEDERAL FACILITIES IN THE COMMONWEALTH.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:*

### SECTION 1.

Section 1 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by inserting after the words "economic activity" in clause (4) the following words:-;the preservation and enhancement of the commonwealth's high-tech economic base.

SECTION 2. Chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by deleting section 1A and inserting in place thereof the following new section:-SECTION 1A. To provide for the projects and expenditures provided for in this act, the secretary of administration and finance is hereby authorized to spend the sum set forth in section two of this act for the several purposes of this act, subject to the conditions specified under the

provisions of this act and subject to the provisions of law regulating the disbursement of public funds and the approval thereof.

SECTION 3. Item 1599-8000 in section 2 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by inserting after the word "Southbridge" in line 4 the following words:-or for capital projects to enhance or expand other United States Department of Defense facilities in the commonwealth.

SECTION 4. Item 1599-8000 in section 2 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby further amended by inserting after the word "requirements" in line 9 the following words:-, or other United States Department of Defense requirements.

SECTION 5. Item 1599-8000 in section 2 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby further amended by inserting after the word "Southbridge" in line 21 the following words:-or enhance or expand other United States Department of Defense facilities in the commonwealth.

SECTION 6. Section 3 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by inserting after the word "Southbridge" in the definition of "Selected Site" the following words:-, or any United States Department of Defense facility in the commonwealth selected for enhancement or expansion as the result of the 1995 base closure and realignment process.

SECTION 7. Section 3 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby further amended by inserting after the word "chosen" in line 8 the following words:-including any land or buildings, or interest therein, necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

SECTION 8. Section 4 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by inserting after the word "facilities" in line 4 the following words:-or upon notification by the United States Department of Defense to the base commander or facility administrator of a Department of Defense facility that the facility has been selected for enhancement or expansion as the result of the 1995 base closure and realignment process.

SECTION 9. Section 4 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby further amended by inserting after the word "requirements" in line 12 the following words:-or other United States Department of Defense requirements.

SECTION 10. Section 4 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby further amended by inserting after the word "Services" in line 6 of paragraph (c) the following words:- or other United States Department of Defense requirements.

SECTION 11. Section 5 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by adding after the word "facilities" in line 7 the following words:-or prior to the notification by the United



States Department of Defense that facilities in the commonwealth have been selected for enhancement or expansion.

SECTION 12. Section 6 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by adding after the word "Government" in line 4 the following words:-, or to any United States Department of Defense contractor performing work for a Department of Defense facility.

SECTION 13. Section 7 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by adding after the word "Services" in line 6 the following words:-, the Department of Defense facilities that have been selected for enhancement or expansion, or a Department of Defense contractor performing work for a Department of Defense facility that has been selected for enhancement or expansion.

SECTION 14. Section 9 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by inserting after the word "Southbridge" in line 3 the following words:-or enhance or expand other United States Department of Defense facilities in the commonwealth.

SECTION 15. Section 9 of chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by deleting the word "ninety-four" in line 4 and inserting in place thereof the following word:-ninety-six.

SECTION 16. Chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by adding the following new section:-SECTION 8A. To meet

the expenditures necessary in carrying out the provisions of this act, the state treasurer shall, upon request of the governor, issue and sell bonds of the commonwealth, in an amount to be specified by the governor from time to time, but not exceeding, in the aggregate, the sum of one hundred million dollars. Said bonds shall only be issued and sold after final approval by the United States Congress of the recommendation of the Department of Defense to locate said Finance and Accounting Services Facility in the town of Southbridge or after final approval by the United States Congress of a recommendation from the Base Realignment and Closure Commission to enhance or expand other United States Department of Defense facilities in the commonwealth. All bonds issued by the commonwealth, as aforesaid, shall be designated on their face, Federal Facilities Enhancement Act of 1995, and shall be issued for such maximum term of years, not exceeding thirty years, as the governor may recommend to the general court pursuant to Section 3 of Article LXII of the Amendments to the Constitution of the commonwealth; provided, however, that all such bonds shall be payable not later than December thirty-first, two thousand and thirty. Bonds and the interest thereon issued under the authority of this section, notwithstanding any other provisions of this act, shall be general obligations of the commonwealth.

SECTION 17. Chapter 300 of the acts of 1992 is hereby amended by adding the following new section:-SECTION 8B. The state treasurer may borrow from time to time on the credit of the

commonwealth such sums of money as may be necessary for the purposes of meeting payments as authorized by this act and may issue and renew from time to time notes of the commonwealth therefor, bearing interest payable at such time and at such rates as shall be fixed by the state treasurer. Such notes shall be issued and may be renewed one or more times for such term, not exceeding one year, as the governor may recommend to the general court in accordance with Section 3 of Article LXII of the Amendments to the Constitution of the commonwealth, but the final maturities of such notes, whether original or renewal, shall not be later than June thirtieth, two thousand and seven. Notes and interest thereon issued under the authority of this act, notwithstanding any other provision of this act, shall be general obligations of the commonwealth.

## SITING OF RESERVE AVIATION SQUADRONS

TO: 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

FROM: Committee to Save Naval Air Station South Weymouth

---

In its justification for recommending the closure of NAS South Weymouth, the Department of the Navy made the following statement:

"In addition, this recommendation furthers the Departmental preference to collocate active and reserve assets and personnel wherever possible to enhance the readiness of both."

Regarding the basing of Reserve squadrons at active duty bases, it would appear that the navy itself, irrespective of the above statement, is not convinced of its merits or, at the very least, the Navy is inconsistent in its actions. One has to look no further than the 1993 closure process to see that actions speak much louder than words with regard to the Navy.

Specifically, the 1993 base closure process resulted in the closure of four Naval Air Stations within the Reserve Claimancy; namely, NAS Dallas, NAF Detroit, NAS Glenview, and NAS Memphis. The closure of these four bases certainly presented the Navy with the perfect opportunity to put its belief of moving reserve squadrons to active bases into practice. Yet, not one squadron from any of these four bases has since been relocated by the Navy to an active duty base! Rather, the remaining assets from these four Reserve bases have all been transferred to other Reserve activities. And, in fact, the Navy went so far as to create a new Reserve base! This latter base is located at the former Carswell AFB and is in the process of being opened under the new name of NAS Fort Worth at a cost of several hundred million dollars.

The opening of NAS Fort Worth is especially interesting to analyze, since it would appear to entirely contradict the Navy's stated preference of collocating reserve and active assets. Specifically, the closure of NAS Dallas gave the Navy the chance to relocate the Reserve F-14s of VF-201 from NAS Dallas to NAS Oceana, the only active duty base on the East Coast where F-14s are stationed. Similarly, the Marine Reserve F-18s at NAS Dallas could have been relocated to MCAS Beaufort in South Carolina, the only active duty Marine Corps base on the East Coast where that type of aircraft is stationed. But, when given the opportunity to locate these valuable reserve assets from a closing reserve base to an active duty base, the Navy chose not to do so. Apparently, the Navy recognized that the highly-skilled manpower required to staff these squadrons can only be found in highly-populated urban areas where reserve bases have traditionally been sited.

Another aircraft type to be found at the new NAS Fort Worth is the KC-130T tanker flown by the Marine Air Reserve. This type of aircraft is flown by squadron VMGR-234,

which relocated to Forth Worth from NAS Glenview when the latter Reserve base was ordered closed by BRAC 1993. Here was another perfect opportunity whereby this squadron could have been moved from Glenview on to an active duty Marine Corps Air Station already having this type of aircraft stationed there. MCAS Cherry Point in North Carolina is such a base, since it currently is home to two active duty Marine Corps squadrons flying the KC-130. But, was this the Marines chosen course of action? The answer is no. MCAS Cherry Point is not located in an urban area from which the manpower needed to operate this squadron could have been drawn. The nearest major urban area is Norfolk, Virginia, slightly more than 150 miles away. Since VMGR-234 ended up at Fort Worth and not Cherry Point, one could conjecture that it was believed that the 150 mile distance was too far to attract Reservists to Cherry Point. Boston to Brunswick is also approximately 150 miles.

Similar comments to those stated above can also be said for many other types of squadrons in the Naval and Marine Air Reserve. They would all show this same pattern of inconsistencies between the so-called policy of the Navy to locate its Reserve squadrons at active-duty bases and the actual actions taken by the Navy in siting these squadrons. In the interest of brevity, only the issue of the siting of Reserve P-3 and C-130 squadrons will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

There are presently many Reserve P-3 squadrons that are based at Reserve bases. These Reserve bases housing P-3 squadrons include NAS Willow Grove (2 squadrons), NAS New Orleans, NAF Washington, Moffett Field, and, of course, NAS South Weymouth. Additionally, there is a Reserve P-3 squadron at NAS Point Mugu, an active duty base but which has no active-duty P-3 squadrons stationed there. If it is so advantageous for the Navy to propose to move VP-92 from NAS South Weymouth to the active duty base of NAS Brunswick, why has the Navy not proposed to also relocate the other Reserve P-3 squadrons to active duty bases, particularly active duty P-3 bases. The answer is simple. All of these Reserve P-3 squadrons, including VP-92 at NAS South Weymouth, are located near major population centers where the necessary manpower that these large squadrons need to operate can be easily obtained. It makes no sense to remove these squadrons from Reserve bases to remotely-located active duty bases where squadron manning would prove to be very difficult, if not impossible. Again, the navy apparently recognizes this fact in light of its actions to keep the majority of these squadrons at Reserve bases, yet it persists in trying to make an exception out of VP-92 at South Weymouth. If a move to active duty bases does not make sense for all of these squadrons, then it does not make sense for VP-92 either.

The C-130T is one of the newest aircraft in the Navy inventory and is operated exclusively by the Naval Air Reserve. However, much of the utilization of these aircraft is devoted toward the direct support of the active duty Navy throughout the country and, literally, around the world. Yet, when the four Reserve squadrons which fly this type of aircraft were established, all four were sited at Reserve bases (NAS South Weymouth, NAF Washington, NAS New Orleans, and Moffett Field) -- not active duty bases. Again, the Navy has apparently recognized that the large manpower requirements of these squadrons can only be found in areas of high population densities -- areas where Reserve bases, not active duty bases, are typically sited. One can only

conclude that moving VR-62 and its C-130s from South Weymouth to Brunswick would result in severe manning difficulties for the squadrons.

The basing practices of the Reserve components of the U.S. Air Force have been examined as a comparison with those of the Navy. These components consist of the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve. The examination indicates that the Air Force bases only a relative small percentage of its aviation squadrons at active duty bases, and thus appears to indicate that the Air Force apparently does not see any great advantages in does so.

Looking first at the Air National Guard, America's largest aviation reserve force according to any definition, that organization, based on 1992 data, operates a total of 98 aviation squadrons. Of those 98 squadrons, 80 of them are located at civilian airports near major population centers where personnel to man those squadrons are readily available for recruitment. Only 18 squadrons in the Air National Guard are located aboard purely military facilities. Of those latter 18 squadrons, 12 are located at active-duty Air Force bases, with the remaining 6 being sited at one Air Force Reserve base and 5 Naval Air Stations.

One might presume that the 12 Air National Guard squadrons located at active-duty Air Force Bases are sited at those locations in order to obtain some special advantages as a result of that arrangement. However, upon closer examination, this does not appear to be the case in most instances. Rather, their location at active-duty bases appears to be largely for convenience only. Specifically, of the 12 squadrons, only 3 are located at active-duty bases where the active-duty forces fly the same type of aircraft as the Guard units stationed at those same bases. For example, the State of Washington Air National Guard has a KC-135 squadron stationed at Fairchild AFB, where the active-duty forces at that same base also fly the KC-135. These units may, accordingly, have some opportunities to work with each other train together. On the other hand, a Kansas Air National Guard F-16 tactical fighter squadron stationed at McDonnell AFB presumably has few working relationships with the B-1B bombers flown by the active-duty forces stationed at that same base.

In summary with regard to the Air National Guard, only 3 out of a total of 98 squadrons are based at locations where those squadrons operated the same type of aircraft as their active-duty counterparts. This fact would seem to indicate that the Air Force, through its National Guard Bureau, does not appear to see major advantages in locating its Air National Guard squadrons at active-duty bases and, even when it does locate them at those locations, far more often than not the types of squadrons so assigned would appear to bear no direct relationship to the active-duty squadrons at those same bases.

The Air Force Reserve in 1992 had a total of 37 aviation squadrons that actually operated their own assigned aircraft. Of those 37 squadrons, 20 were located at active-duty Air Force bases. However, only 6 of those 20 fly the same types of aircraft as the active forces at those same bases. Once again, it would appear that the basing of Air Force Reserve squadrons at active-duty bases is also largely a matter of geographical convenience rather than from any perceived military advantage in doing so.

## AREA BASE CLOSINGS OR REALIGNMENTS

By  
John C. Yaney

### "Save Our Base Committee"

The following military facilities in New England have been closed or substantially reduced in size since 1970, resulting in the loss of tens of thousands of military and civilian jobs and severe impacts to the regional economy. Many of these facilities are concentrated in the Boston and Providence areas, a combined geographical area smaller in size than some counties in western and southern states.

1. NAVAL AIR STATION SOUTH WEYMOUTH (1995 DOD RECOMMENDATION)
2. Sudbury Training Annex (1995 DOD Recommendation)
3. Hingham Cohasset Army Reserve Center (1995 Recommendation)
4. Naval Officer Candidate School Newport (1993 BRAC)
5. Naval Reserve Center New Bedford (1993 BRAC)
6. Naval Reserve Center Pittsfield (1993 BRAC)
7. Fort Devens (1991 BRAC)
8. Loring AFB (1991 BRAC)
9. Watertown Massachusetts Army Material & Mechanics Research Center (1988 BRAC)
10. Pease AFB (1988 BRAC) (Major downgrading from active Strategic Air Command Base to Air National Guard Base)
11. Naval Shipyard Boston
12. Naval Shipyard Boston (South Boston Annex)
13. Naval Station Boston
14. Naval Hospital Boston (Chelsea)
15. Headquarters First Naval District (Boston)
16. Boston Army Base
17. U.S. Army Arsenal (Watertown)
18. Naval Reserve Center Brockton
19. Otis AFB (Major downgrading from active Air Defense Command base to Air National Guard Base)
20. Westover AFB (Major downgrading from active Strategic Air Command base to Air Reserve Base)
21. Naval Air Station Quonset Point
22. Naval Construction Battalion Center Davisville
23. Naval Station Newport, including Cruiser/Destroyer Force LANT
24. North Truro AFS
25. Naval Security Group Activity Nantucket

Prior to the closings listed above, there were also many additional closings of major military facilities in the Boston/New England region. These additional facilities include:

26. Naval Ammunition Depot Hingham
27. Naval Ammunition Depot Hingham (Cohasset Annex)
28. Springfield Armory
29. Grenier AFB

30. Dow AFB
31. Presque Isle AFB
32. Ethan Allen AFB

While every region in the country must share in defense cutbacks, we here in New England and especially here in the Boston area believe that we have already contributed far more than our fair share of closings. We are aware of no other area of the country that has been called upon to bear so many closing or major cutbacks in such a small, concentrated geographic area. As can be seen from the lists presented above, many of the closings had to be endured before the BRAC process came into being, giving us no opportunity at the time to publicly defend the value of those bases to the nation's defense effort. Not specifically mentioned above is the fact that the area also lost the huge General Dynamics Fore River Shipyard in Quincy, largely as the result of lack of contracts from the Navy. In addition, essentially all of the smaller private ship repair yards in Boston have been put out of business, again largely the result of Navy decisions to no longer homeport ships in Boston and Newport.

During recent testimony of DOD personnel earlier this year before the newly-formed 1995 BRAC, it was stated that certain bases in California were not considered for closure due to the history of prior closings in their immediate areas and the impacts which those closures had. We believe that the Boston area should have been given similar consideration.

When BRAC 1993 approved the closure of the Naval Station and the Naval Shipyard in Charleston, SC, there was general agreement by everyone that the loss of these two major facilities in one city was devastating. Yet, Boston has also lost its Naval Station and Naval Shipyard, as well as its Naval Hospital, its Naval Ammunition Depot, its Army Base, its Army Arsenal, and its Naval District Headquarters, not to mention the loss of nearby Fort Devens, the last major active Army combat presence in New England. (The latter loss was particularly painful, since a previous BRAC had voted to expand Fort Devens, only to be reversed by BRAC 1991.) Now, NAS South Weymouth is proposed once again to be closed, despite a 7-0 decision by BRAC 1993 to keep the base open and to expand it. It is not just that one city should be asked to sacrifice so much over the years while some other areas of the country have remained relatively unscathed.

It is sincerely hoped that the 1995 BRAC Commission in its work will consider the cumulative impacts which these prior closings have already had on this region. With particular regard to the proposed closing of NAS South Weymouth, it is also hoped that the Commission is aware that it was here in Massachusetts that the U.S. Navy was born and that the whole concept of a reserve force in readiness was created and first put to the test at Lexington and Concord. It was also here in Massachusetts that the first Naval Air Station in the country devoted to the training of Naval Air Reservists was established right up the road from South Weymouth at Squantum. Keeping South Weymouth open will allow the proud tradition of the Naval Air Reserve in Massachusetts to continue.



## NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH ENVIRONMENT

To: 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

From: Committee to Save Naval Air Station South Weymouth

The following paragraphs briefly describe several key environmental issues as they relate to the proposed closure of NAS South Weymouth and the transfer of its squadrons to NAS Brunswick.

### Noise

South Weymouth receives very few noise complaints from the surrounding communities, as stated in the Draft Environmental Impact Statement prepared by the Navy for the base in 1990. In that same document, noise problems at other bases (NAS Jacksonville, etc.) were well documented. Many of those bases were described as having noise problems both on- and off-base, with hundreds or thousands of housing units and other sensitive land uses experiencing noise levels today of between 65 and 75 Ldn or more. Measures required to help mitigate the noise problems at those bases include the prohibition of afterburner takeoffs by jets, the prohibition of practice approaches, and the prohibition of touch-and-go operations by jets, for example. No such constraints exist at South Weymouth. On-base housing at South Weymouth is located well away from the flight lines, while the key approaches (Runways 26 and 35) to South Weymouth are located for the most part over undevelopable land (wetlands, generally), thus helping to ensure the continuing freedom from noise complaints.

South Weymouth has a key advantage compared to many other bases with regard to noise, in that the base has two runways at 90 degrees (perpendicular) to each other. Thus whatever little noise that is generated by flight activity can be distributed (weather permitting) over these two runways so that the same people are not constantly exposed to noise day in and day out, as happens at many other bases with only one runway. Several other Reserve bases have only one runway. NAS Willow Grove is such a base, as is NAS Dallas now and the new NAS Fort Worth at the former Carswell AFB. NAS Atlanta is another example of a reserve base having only one runway. NAF Washington, still another Reserve base does have two runways, but they are parallel, thus still exposing the same areas on the runway approaches to constant noise, regardless of which (or both) runway is in use. At all these bases, there is no possibility for "spreading out" the noise, as is done at South Weymouth.

At NAS Brunswick, there are two runways, but as for NAF Washington, they are parallel to each other and very closely spaced. Again, regardless of which runway at Brunswick is in use (often they both are), noise sensitive areas off the runway ends are constantly exposed to noise. Moving additional P-3Cs from VP-92 and C-130Ts from VR-62 at South Weymouth to Brunswick will add to the overall noise level there.

As an aside, having two perpendicular runways as South Weymouth does provides for improved safety of flight operations when compared with bases having only one runway or parallel runways. That is, the two runway configuration at South Weymouth permits aircraft to take off and land directly into the wind much more often than is the case otherwise. By having the capability of doing so, the chance of an accident occurring as a result of an aircraft being blown off course while attempting to land or take off is greatly reduced, particularly when the wind is strong.

### Air Quality

The same general comments as stated above with regard to noise also apply to the air quality issue. That is, South Weymouth's relatively low level of activity when compared to some other bases does not result in significant degradation of the region's overall air quality. On the other hand, moving South Weymouth's squadrons to another base already having much higher existing levels of aeronautical activity can do nothing but result in negative air quality impacts at that location. Since that base already has greater levels of activity than South Weymouth, one can reasonably presume that air quality there in the immediate vicinity of the base is poorer than that at South Weymouth. Adding additional aircraft will exacerbate those conditions.

The Navy's 1995 Recommendation for Closure with regard to NAS South Weymouth, in its environmental impact section, noted that South Weymouth is in a severe non-attainment area for ozone. As the attached recent article from the Boston Globe indicates, it is expected that this non-attainment label for the Boston area will soon be removed.

### Traffic

Traffic congestion is always an important environmental issue. The Draft Environmental Impact Statement for South Weymouth, previously referenced, documented traffic congestion problems at other Reserve bases, but none at South Weymouth. Also, the base has no parking problems and has a new main gate only several years old, which is served by a modern traffic signal system which assures efficient traffic management.

South Weymouth will soon have another advantage that no other base may have. Specifically, a new commuter rail station will soon be constructed to serve the town of South Weymouth. It will be located adjacent to the base's Trotter Road gate. Thus, many base personnel would potentially be able to arrive from origins throughout eastern

Massachusetts by using public transportation direct to the base. Any such use would, naturally, reduce vehicular volumes on the regional roadway system as well as reduce air pollution, etc.

From another perspective with regard to traffic, South Weymouth's two aviation squadrons, VP-92 and VR-62, are proposed to be relocated to NAS Brunswick, Maine. Given the rural character of Maine in general, demographics suggest that the squadrons will continue to have to rely on reservists from the Boston area for manning. Because of the lack of public transportation, these reservists will all most likely drive to Brunswick, resulting in a round trip typically of 300 miles or so, compared with the short drive from the Boston area to South Weymouth.

NAS Brunswick is located adjacent to U.S. Route 1, one of the most heavily congested roadways in Maine. Traffic congestion on this roadway is extremely severe during the summer tourist months, as this is the main roadway serving Maine's famous coastline. Traffic congestion in Maine has become of such concern that the State's voters in a recent referendum voted to prohibit the widening of the Maine Turnpike between the New Hampshire border and Portland in an attempt to discourage more vehicles from coming to the State. Thus, the addition of reservists from VP-92 and VR-62 will only serve to make Maine's roads even more congested than they already are.

#### Land Use

In this category of evaluation, it is useful to quote from Section V of the 1981 Master Plan prepared by the Navy for NAS South Weymouth in which, on Page 4, it is stated the following: "Generally, except for a very few situations, the relationship of on-station land uses to each other is nearly ideal." With regard to off-station land uses, existing flight paths to key runway ends pass over largely undevelopable land, as stated previously. This latter fact not only keeps the number of noise complaints to a minimum but also improves safety in the event of an accident. Local communities have taken a number of steps to help preserve land use compatibility between the base and land uses in the surrounding towns. An example of such a recent step was the refusal of one of the towns to permit the development of a large multi-unit housing complex near the approach to one of the runways.

#### Ecosystems

According to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the Massachusetts Heritage Program, there are no endangered or threatened species or critical habitats on the base.

## SUMMARY

From this information , it is clear that NAS South Weymouth enjoys a good relationship with the surrounding environment. Accordingly, from an environmental point of view, it makes little sense to close South Weymouth, where there are few environmental problems, and then create more environmental problems at a base which already has a higher level of activity, and thus more environmental impacts on the environment, than South Weymouth.

## LONG TERM IMPLICATIONS OF CLOSING NAS ATLANTA OR NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH

TO: 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

FROM: Committee to Save Naval Air Station South Weymouth

---

One of the key differences between closing NAS Atlanta or closing NAS South Weymouth relates to the long term implications for the availability of the respective airfields.

Specifically, NAS Atlanta is a tenant of Dobbins Air Reserve Base (ARB), as are several other military and civilian organizations. There are no plans to close the ARB, regardless of what happens to NAS Atlanta. The airfield (runway, taxiways, etc.) will remain open to serve the Air Force Reserve and its other tenants. Accordingly, it would be possible to put the facilities of NAS Atlanta in "mothballs" if the Navy so desired. Should some national emergency arise in the future, NAS Atlanta could be quickly reopened. In the meantime, should NAS Atlanta be selected for closure, its reservists could be airlifted each weekend from Dobbins to other Naval Air Reserve activities in the Southeast (e.g., NAS New Orleans, NAS Fort Worth, NAR Jacksonville, etc.). Or, these same reservists could attempt to affiliate with the reserve activities of the other military services located aboard Dobbins ARB (e.g., the Air Force Reserve, the Army Reserve, the Georgia Air National Guard).

If, on the other hand, NAS South Weymouth were to be closed, its airfield facilities could very likely be lost forever, since there is no guarantee that the airfield will be taken over by civilian authorities and operated as an airport. Thus, under that scenario, the airfield at South Weymouth would not be available in a time of national emergency. Also, and just the opposite of the situation in Atlanta, closure of the airfield at South Weymouth eliminates the opportunity for the Navy to airlift local reservists to other training sites, thus forcing these reservists to either drive long distances to maintain their military affiliations or to drop out of the program.

4/18/95

NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH INFRASTRUCTURE

THE NAVAL AIR STATION SOUTH WEYMOUTH IS LOCATED ON 1,444 ACRES OF LAND LOCATED IN THE TOWNS OF WEYMOUTH, ROCKLAND AND ABINGTON. ON THIS FACILITY, BUT NOT ALL INCLUSIVE ARE TWO RUNWAYS, TWO AIRCRAFT HANGARS AND 165 UNITS OF HOUSING, WITH AN ADDITIONAL 105 UNITS LOCATED IN QUINCY, MA. AND AN ADDITIONAL 95 LEASED UNITS FROM THE U.S. COAST GUARD AT THE OTIS ANG, BOURNE, MA.

THE OVERALL CONDITION OF THE NAVAL AIR STATION IS EXCELLENT. \$5,014,000 IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS WERE COMPLETED IN 1994/1995 WITH AN ADDITIONAL \$8,050,000 IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS CURRENTLY IN PROGRESS TO UPGRADE THIS FINE FACILITY. THE AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF COMPLETION OF THE 16 CONTRACTS IN PROGRESS IS 82% WITH THE MAJORITY IN THE 95% COMPLETION STAGE.

I. INTRODUCTION UTILITIES: THE CONDITION OF NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH UTILITIES IS EXCELLENT AND WILL PROVIDE THIS COMMAND WITH UNINTERRUPTABLE SERVICE INTO THE YEAR 2040. DUE TO OUR ENERGY CONSERVATION PROGRAMS AND RECENT UPGRADE OF UTILITY SYSTEMS OUR TOTAL UTILITY COST FOR FISCAL YEAR 1992 WAS THE LOWEST IN THE CLAIMANCY FOR FULL FLEDGED AIR STATIONS. OUR PRIMARY UNDERGROUND ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM WAS REPLACED IN 1992, CENTRAL HEATING PLANT WAS UPGRADED IN 1992, THE PRIMARY UNDERGROUND STEAM DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IS BEING REPLACED AND IS NOW UNDER CONSTRUCTION WITH A COMPLETION DATE OF SEPTEMBER OF 1993 AND THE SEWAGE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM WAS UPGRADED IN 1991.

II. INTRODUCTION AIRFIELD: A PAVEMENT CONDITION SURVEY OF THE AIRFIELD WAS CONDUCTED BY THE NAVY IN 1990 AND OUR RUNWAYS WERE RATED IN THE BEST CONDITION OF ALL 8 NAVAL AIR RESERVE STATIONS IN THE

CLAIMANCY. RUNWAY 17/35 HAS THE SECOND HIGHEST LOAD & WEIGHT RATING IN THE CLAIMANCY AND 6TH AMONG 51 NAVAL AND MARINE CORPS STATIONS IN THE COUNTRY.

OUR AIRFIELD LIGHTING IS IN EXCELLENT CONDITION WITH A NEW ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM COMPLETED IN 1991, THE TAXIWAY LIGHTS WERE REPLACED IN 1992 AND RUNWAY LIGHTS IN 1983.

WE HAVE TWO AIRCRAFT HANGARS THAT CAN ACCOMMODATE ALL BUT ONE OF THE 38 TYPES OF AIRCRAFT UTILIZED BY THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS TODAY.

III. INTRODUCTION STATION: ALL STATION BUILDINGS ARE STRUCTURALLY SOUND AND WELL MAINTAINED. MANY OF THE BUILDINGS HAVE BEEN UPGRADED WITH INTERIOR RENOVATIONS AND ENERGY EFFICIENT UTILITY SYSTEMS. TO COMPLIMENT QUALITY OF LIFE, THE PERSONNEL ABOARD NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH HAVE A FULL RANGE OF SUPPORT SERVICES AT THEIR DISPOSAL SUCH AS MEDICAL/DENTAL, FAMILY SERVICE CENTER, NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, CHID CARE CENTER, YOUTH CENTER, A FULL FLEDGED RECREATIONAL CENTER, NAVY EXCHANGE, CHAPEL, TWO BALL FIELDS, SWIMMING POOL, SNACK BAR, RESTAURANTS AND CLUBS FOR OFFICERS, CHIEFS AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL.

IV. INTRODUCTION HOUSING: ALL 270 HOUSING UNITS ARE STRUCTURALLY SOUND AND WELL MAINTAINED. A STRONG EMPHASIS ON RESIDENTIAL QUALITY OF LIFE IS SUPPORTED BY THE PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT BY PROVIDING CONTINUOUS IN-HOUSE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT AND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS.

V. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT PLANS: THE NAVAL AIR STATION HAS THE CAPABILITY TO EXPAND ITS INFRASTRUCTURE WITHIN THE PERIMETER OF ITS LOCATION. THE FOLLOWING PROJECTS HAVE BEEN DEFINED IN THE NAVAL AIR STATION SOUTH WEYMOUTH BASE MASTER PLAN;

A. AIRCRAFT HANGARS AND MAINTENANCE FACILITIES ON A PRESENTLY

CONCEPTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED WITH THE INFRASTRUCTURE OUTLINE.

B. A SITE HAS BEEN SELECTED FOR FIFTY ADDITIONAL HOUSING UNITS.

C. A DESIGN HAS REACHED 95% FOR A BACHELOR ENLISTED QUARTERS THAT WILL ACCOMMODATE 160 ENLISTED PERSONNEL.

D. AN AIRFIELD PLAN FOR A 1000 FT EXTENSION (DISPLACED THRESHOLD) TO THE APPROACH END OF RUNWAY #17.



4/19/95

## 1993 BRAC REALIGNMENT/CONSOLIDATION

On June 27th 1993, the 93' BRAC voted unanimously on the Committee to Save NAS South Weymouths proposal to consolidate 3 Navy Reserve Centers and place them aboard NAS South Weymouth Ma. A BRAC Commissioner passed comment that this was a sound economical proposal & should be used as a model by the U.S Navy. With the use of BRAC Realignment Funds in the amount of \$216,500., the Navy re-habbed Bldg#17 in order to support the consolidation of the Navy Reserve Centers. The Naval Reserve Center (NRC) South Weymouth has been occupied as of February 25, 1995.

The Personnel Support Detachment was the occupant of the NRC building prior to the re-hab, in turn the Navy used BRAC Realignment Funds in the amount of \$425,959. for the relocation of this detachment in Bldg #2. The Personnel Support Detachment occupied their new facility on January 9, 1995. The architectural design of the Naval Reserve Center incorporated the input of the their Commanding Officer, and the architectural design of the Personnel Support Detachment incorporated the input of the Officer-in Charge to ensure that these new facilities met today's standards for their primary function.

Consolidation makes sound economic sense, whether it is through joint servicing or inter-servicing within or outside of the DOD.

Again in the 1995 BRAC another proposal is being made in the concept of consolidation by the Massachusetts Army National Guard. They have submitted a proposal to stand up a new Field Artillery Battalion at NAS South Weymouth, which will be totally funded by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the amount of \$12,000,000. The benefits to the DOD relative to this proposal consists of the following; Increased Readiness

of the unit, use of the airfield for Deployment & Mobilization, and Support Services.

The rationale for the Committee to Save NAS South Weymouth in submitting the realignment/consolidation proposals consist of the following merits; Reduced Fiscal Expenditures, Full Fledged Support Services, Improved Quality of Life and Enhanced Readiness.

In the concept of mobilization, the Naval Air Station South Weymouth is a Self Sufficient Mobilization Processing Site. The advantages of being a self sufficient site consist of the following merits; in-processing services including full medical and dental exams, legal advisors, uniforms, gear, a family service center, an airfield for deployment and out-processing relative to Demobilization.

NUMBER OF CONTRACTS 16 TOTAL AMOUNT \$8,049,773

04/15/95

NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH CONSTRUCTION STATUS  
(AS OF 06 APRIL 1995)

<u>ACTIVE CONSTRUCTION</u>	<u>CURRENT AMOUNT</u>	<u>AWARD DATE</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE COMPLETED</u>	<u>CONTRACTOR COMPLETION DATE</u>
Alterations & Repairs BRAC REALIGNMENT Bldg #17 NAVAL RESERVE CENTER (NRC)	\$216,500	05/02/94	95%	02/25/95 (93' BRAC FUNDED)
Alteration & Repairs Personnel Support Det Bldg #2	\$425,959	05/02/94	95%	10/25/94 (93' BRAC FUNDED)
HVAC Rehab AIMD Bldg #117	\$660,001	01/14/94	95%	09/03/94
Replace Exhaust Fans Boiler Plant Bldg #8	\$54,490	03/09/94	95%	11/03/94
Demolition of 30 Inactive Housing Units Quincy, Ma.	\$431,902	09/03/93	80%	09/06/94 Delete Remaining Work
Radar Facility & Control Tower	\$2,381,711	9/14/94	12%	04/26/96
Aircraft Parking Apron Repairs	\$560,021	2/22/94	80%	04/04/95
HVAC Rehab AIMD	\$660,001	01/14/94	95%	09/03/94 Extended
Wetland Mitigation	\$165,363	08/30/94	80%	12/08/95
Replace Heating Sys Navy Family Housing	\$1,132,395	04/21/94	85%	09/16/95
Indefinite Qty Asbestos Removal	\$27,128	04/01/93	95%	04/16/94 Extended
Repair Underground Fuel Storage Tanks	\$109,334	09/27/93	90%	05/23/94 Extended
Pest Control Facility	\$243,135 ** Not Included in total **	11/30/94	0%	06/13/95 Work Suspended
Fire Station Addition	\$754,000	09/23/94	50%	04/06/95
Backflow Devices Various Locations	\$59,925	09/21/94	75%	01/04/95 Extended
Indefinite Quantity Painting	\$127,979	06/17/94	95%	07/02/95
Indefinite Quantity Interior Repairs Housing	\$283,064	07/06/94	98%	07/21/95

NUMBER OF CONTRACTS 21      TOTAL AMOUNT \$5,013,539

COMPLETED CONSTRUCTION      CURRENT      COMPLETION  
1994/1995      AMOUNT      DATE      COMMENTS

Exterior Repairs Hgr #1 Hgr #2 & Bldg #115	\$57,555	10/14/94	
Family Housing Repairs	\$748,865	12/13/94	
A/C Installation Galley Bldg #103	\$132,200	01/25/94	
Roof Replacement Hangar 2	\$134,700	02/17/94	
Replace Roof & HVAC EM Club Bldg #112	\$237,124	11/03/94	
Replace PCB Transformers Airfield	\$229,384	02/22/95	
Indefinite Quantity Painting NAS	\$66,339	02/10/94	
Steam Distribution Replacement	\$1,855,290	10/13/93	Closed out/completed 02/17/95
Remove Jet Fuel Storage Tanks	\$323,625	10/18/94	Close out/completed 03/14/95
Bathroom Rehabs Housing Naval Terrace Quincy	\$94,330	06/05/94	
Barracks #75 & #76 Head Rehabs	\$161,825	07/13/94	
Station Roof Repairs	\$109,524	12/16/93	
Airfield Paving Hangar #1	\$468,410	09/22/94	
Repairs Service Station Fuel Tanks	\$27,600	12/08/94	
Storm Sewer Installation	\$77,250	11/07/94	
Construct Spill Prevention Control	\$69,400	11/04/94	
Airfield Tree Brush Clearing	\$40,745	02/10/94	
Indefinite Quantity Painting Station	\$75,174	04/18/94	
Repairs & Reinsulate HVAC Hangar #1 & #2	\$38,344	08/04/94	
Replace Flush Hydrants Hangar #2	\$41,980	07/15/94	
Install Vehicle Exhaust	\$23,875	02/07/95	

04/05/95

## NAVAL AIR RESERVE DEMOGRAPHICS

The mission of the Naval Reserve and its ability to carry out that mission falls from demographics as does readiness. The first and probably most important is demographics, because on that almost everything else impacts. Retention and recruiting fall from demographics.

There are two components for the Navy and the Marine Corps Reserves. There is an active duty component, which is full time military people and reservists, who are weekend sailors and marines, thus weekend warriors.

If an activity closes or moves, the active duty personnel are moved with that activity or transferred elsewhere and most of the time the reservists who are tied to a geographic location by their domicile and their civilian occupation will not transfer.

The make up of a Navy or Marine Corps Reserve aircraft squadron consists of approximately one third active duty members and two thirds part time sailors and marines, which brings up the question of retention when you increase the distance that a reservists must travel from their homes.

This is a quote from the Reserves Forces Policy Board "surveys show that an individuals employment situation is a major factor in deciding whether to enlist or re-enlist in the reserve components. To the extent that the employer-related issues have an impact on recruiting and retention, they have an impact on readiness." For those individuals who would attempt to remain affiliated with the migrating units, they would have to take time away from family and their jobs on a Friday to get to a drill on Saturday, and come back Sunday night, and then be back to work Monday morning, and that would be little bit difficult in of these cases.

The primary reasons why people in the Naval or Marine Corps Reserve elect not to continue their affiliation are family and job conflicts.

Supplemental Information for Question 39.

Unit	Active or Reserve	FY 1994	FY 1995	FY 1997	FY 1999	FY 2001
NRTSC 191	Reserve	X	X	X	X	X
NRTSC 791	Reserve	X	X	X	X	X
NRVTU 9191	Reserve	X	X	X	X	X
Reserve Mobile Construction Battalion	Reserve	X	X	X	X	X
4th Marine Div. Reserve Rifle Co.	Reserve	X	X	X	X	X

For each of these other reserve Navy/Marine Corps units at your air station, provide the number of authorized billets and the number of personnel actually assigned to the squadron for the past three fiscal years. Provide this information in the format below for both Selected Reservists (SELRES) and Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR) Navy reservists/Full-Time Support (FTS) Marine Corps reservists. Explain differences between authorized and actual manning in the remarks section.

NR Activity/Unit: NRTSC 191	FY 1991				FY 1992				FY 1993			
	Auth		Actual		Auth		Actual		Auth		Actual	
	SELRES	TAR/FTS	SELRES	TAR/FTS	SELRES	TAR/FTS	SELRES	TAR/FTS	SELRES	TAR/FTS	SELRES	TAR/FTS
Officer	11	0	11	0	12	0	12	0	12	0	12	0
Enlisted	28	0	1	0	28	0	17	0	38	0	28	0

Remarks: Recruiting personnel of the proper rate/rating continues to be the single largest problem for unit readiness.

NR Activity/Unit: NRTSC 791	FY 1991				FY 1992				FY 1993			
	Auth		Actual		Auth		Actual		Auth		Actual	
	SELRES	TAR/FTS	SELRES	TAR/FTS	SELRES	TAR/FTS	SELRES	TAR/FTS	SELRES	TAR/FTS	SELRES	TAR/FTS
Officer	11	0	11	0	11	0	11	0	11	0	10	0
Enlisted	42	0	32	0	49	0	35	0	41	0	33	0

Remarks: Recruiting personnel of the proper rate/rating continues to be the single largest problem.

62A

R(18 Oct 94)

4/19/95

NAS BRUNSWICK SELRES READINESS  
(UNIT READINESS REPORT DATA 31 MARCH 95)

NR Activity/Unit <u>NRTSC 191</u>	FY 1995 <u>AUTH</u>	FY 1995 <u>ACTUAL</u>
OFFICER	12	12
ENLISTED	33	18

---

NR Activity/Unit <u>NRTSC 791</u>	FY 1995 <u>AUTH</u>	FY 1995 <u>ACTUAL</u>
OFFICER	10	9
ENLISTED	35	29





**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950424-102

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

**COMMISSIONERS:**

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 25, 1995

Mr. Paul Haley  
South Shore Chamber of Commerce  
36 Miller Stile Road  
Box 488  
Quincy, Massachusetts 02268


Dear Mr. Haley:

Thank you for your letter regarding Naval Air Station South Weymouth. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations regarding Naval Air Station South Weymouth.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,



Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cw

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950424-11

FROM: <u>LYLES, DAVID</u>	TO: <u>HUANG, JOHN D.</u>
TITLE: <u>STAFF DIRECTOR</u>	TITLE: <u>ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR</u>
ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCRC</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>FEMA</u>
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓ FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING ROBERT R. WILSON BE DETAILED TO THE DBCRC STAFF.

Due Date: <u>                    </u>	Routing Date: <u>950424</u>	Date Originated: <u>950424</u>	Mail Date: <u>950424</u>
---------------------------------------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	--------------------------



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425

ARLINGTON, VA 22209

703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

April 24, 1995

**COMMISSIONERS:**

AL CORNELLA

REBECCA COX

GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)

S. LEE KLING

RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)

MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)

WENDI LOUISE STEELE

Dr. John D. Hwang  
Associate Director  
Information Technology Services  
Federal Emergency Management Agency  
500 C St., SW  
Washington, D.C. 20472

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950424-11

Dear Mr. Hwang:

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission was established to assure that military base closure and realignment decisions are made as objectively as possible. The Commission evaluates each military installation on eight criteria, one of which is a consideration of the economic impact on the communities in which the affected installations are located. To assure that the best possible analysis goes into the Commission's decisions, I have requested that experts be detailed from selected federal government agencies because their specific knowledge can make a significant contribution to the Commission. Thus far, we have had favorable responses from all agencies we have contacted.

On behalf of the Commission, I request that Mr. Robert R. Wilson, a Senior Program Analyst with FEMA's Information Technology Services Directorate, Policy and Oversight Division, be detailed to the Commission's staff for a period not to exceed 120 days, beginning during the week of April 11-14, 1995. I anticipate that he will not be required at the Commission more than 2 1/2 days per week on average. Mr. Wilson will serve as a Senior Economist on the Commission staff and would complement the detailee now serving the Commission from the Department of Commerce. In this capacity, he would review and apply various economic models and databases to evaluate the economic impacts of proposed base closures and assure that community economic concerns are properly reflected in the overall analysis.

If you have any questions about my request, please do not hesitate to contact me. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

David S. Lyles  
Staff Director

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950424-12

FROM: <b>BORDEN, BEN</b>	TO: <b>BLUME, JAY</b>
TITLE: <b>DIRECTOR OF R &amp; A</b>	TITLE: <b>SPECIAL</b>
ORGANIZATION: <b>DBCRC</b>	ORGANIZATION: <b>HEADQUARTERS USAF</b>
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: <b>WILFORD HALL USAF MEDICAL CENTER</b>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER	✓		
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

**REQUESTING AIR FORCE COBRA AND OTHER APPROPRIATE ANALYSES FOR TWO OPTIONS REGARDING WILFORD HALL USAF MEDICAL CENTER**

Due Date: <u>9</u>	Routing Date: <u>950424</u>	Date Originated: <u>950421</u>	Mail Date: <u>950424</u>
--------------------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	--------------------------



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON DC

- 5 MAY 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
ATTN: MR. BORDEN

FROM: HQ USAF/RT  
1670 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20330-1670


SUBJECT: Request for Analyses - WHMC Medical Center (Your Ltr 21 Apr 95)

We received your tasker on 27 April 1995 requesting Air Force cost of base realignment actions (COBRA) and other appropriate analyses for two options regarding WHMC Medical Center (WHMC). You also requested that the overall feasibility, cost, quality, and access implications of the two options be provided. An Air Force-only evaluation of each of these options is attached.

The Air Force feels strongly in stating that WHMC is the *premier* Air Force medical facility known internationally for its specialty medical services and GME teaching programs. It has a long and distinguished history in delivering health care to a population spanning the globe and in its medical research and technology development. Any decrease in capability along the lines of the two options will impact negatively on the Air Force's wartime readiness mission and operational healthcare costs.

The Air Force performed no COBRAs on WHMC during the Service's review or in the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group's study. The Air Force prefers to facilitate medical mission changes programmatically rather than through BRAC law in order to maintain a degree of flexibility in sculpting its future medical force. Flexibility is important in implementing TRICARE initiatives and delivery of healthcare to all beneficiaries. The Air Force advocates aggressive efforts in rightsizing its medical facilities based on its readiness mission, along with TRICARE, through a strategic resourcing methodology. This methodology forges the results of a population-based, demand projection, business case analysis with capitated based resource allocation and incorporates best business practices to culminate in the most effective and efficient use of healthcare resources. Using these tools will methodically and purposely eliminate duplication of services and provide for an optimum product-line and personnel mix.

We are unable to complete the requested COBRA analysis within the time constraints of your request. The Air Force has serious operational concerns with these proposed actions and believes COBRA analysis, even if available, should not be a decisive factor. Please contact Col Mayfield, HQ USAF/RTR, at DSN 225-6766 if you have any questions.

  
JAY D. BLUME JR., Major General, USAF  
Special Assistant to Chief of Staff for Realignment  
and Transition

Attachment:  
As Stated

cc:  
OASD/HA  
HQ USAF/SG

## **Response To Base Realignment And Closure (BRAC) Commission's Options**

**For**

### **WHMC USAF Medical Center (WHMC)**

#### **Introduction**

The Air Force does not support any BRAC initiative that eliminates a major Air Force medical presence in the San Antonio region. By any standard, the Air Force is the major Service component represented in the San Antonio area. Operationally, it is home to the only Air Force induction and basic military training center. It contains four major Air Force installations, including two major commands, with WHMC representing the total Air Force bed capacity. Air Force beneficiaries outnumber other service beneficiaries by an overwhelming margin. Medically, WHMC is the flagship of the Air Force Medical Service. It is the largest, single contributor to our readiness capability, houses 34 percent of our GME training programs of which 27 are unique to WHMC, and accounts for 41% of the total physician training man-years, is the only designated Specialty Treatment Center in the Air Force, as well as its only operating Level 1 Trauma Center.

A large patient population and teaching infrastructure is absolutely essential to generate the volume and types of patients required to support graduate medical education and other specialty training programs. The Air Force has only one such hospital in their system and depends on WHMC as the foundation on which the remainder of the Air Force and DoD regional healthcare system is designed. The other three graduate medical education sites are very limited in their scope, capability, demand and capacity.

Evaluation of both options proposed for WHMC involve a review of three major functions: 1) medical readiness; 2) clinical capability (to include graduate medical education); and 3) managed care. Each of these topic's impact on cost, quality, access, and feasibility are discussed in detail below. It is impossible to separate any of these issues and fully understand the significance of WHMC's status as the "flagship" for Air Force medicine. Any dramatic change in the operational capability of WHMC threatens the viability of the entire Air Force Medical Service (AFMS) structure. It is not just the Air Force structure that is threatened by the options. The Air Force's substantial DoD mission is magnified by support of the entire San Antonio community. This total demand forced establishment of a consolidated WHMC/BAMC operating Level 1 Trauma training center. This unique mission is integral to the support of the 56 training programs and four organ transplant missions and the entire DoD medical readiness mission. In addition, a portion of the civilian indigent health care in San Antonio is supported through Congressional appropriations. In essence, the total demand generated by Lackland AFB and its external forces continue to support the requirement for WHMC. Brooke Army Medical Center (BAMC) has practically no physical capacity to support this demand. In addition, the

worldwide referral pattern also focuses on WHMC's tertiary and quaternary care capabilities and any reduction in capability, as it exists today, will degrade the overall AFMS mission effectiveness. Most critically, relocating our readiness missions, training programs and redesigning the entire DoD and AFMS referral process will raise costs and lower access to specialty and subspecialty healthcare and the quality of this care.

The Military Health Service System (MHSS) is sensitive to structuring itself to the needs of the world-wide community it serves, and is aggressively addressing this issue outside the BRAC process. In San Antonio, the new Army Medical Center at Ft Sam Houston is built recognizing the size and capability of WHMC, eliminating duplication of services and creating economies of scale. In pursuing our local GME and services realignment in San Antonio, the designated operating capacity of WHMC has been judiciously decreased from 1,000 beds to its present level of 530. Additional economies in this community may be warranted; however, it is the position of the Air Force and DoD that such actions be incorporated through careful and programmatic analyses of all pertinent factors. Weaknesses in the Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG) model were evident in its handling of referral flow patterns, neglect of BRAC closure nominees, and an inordinate reliance on the age of facilities without regard to overall operational considerations. By any measure of merit, other than facility age, the major medical player in San Antonio is the Air Force. WHMC, despite its relatively age, is a modern, extremely well-equipped, and efficient facility.

### **Medical Readiness**

WHMC has the largest single medical deployment mission in the Air Force. It consists of the following personnel and equipment packages: a 750-bed contingency hospital, an air transportable hospital, three 40-bed hospital surgical expansion teams, and various other taskings totaling 1360 personnel and involving 26 Unit Type Codes (UTC's).

Transfer of these taskings is impossible without moving existing medical subspecialties. Certain medical specialties are nearly 100% utilized throughout the AFMS. These include surgery, urology, aerospace medicine, anesthesiology, nephrology, pulmonary/critical care, and associated ancillary support which must be retained and relocated to other medical centers. With WHMC deployable specialty capability representing 20-30% of the total AFMS readiness mission, these taskings then could be relocated, but not without substantial medical military construction (MILCON) costs and redistribution of referral workload. Again, the demand for these critical subspecialties already exists in the greater San Antonio area and is increased by the existing AFMS referrals. These subspecialties are also integral to meeting the American College of Surgeon's Level I trauma center requirements as well as the national accreditation requirements for the 33 medical residencies and fellowships currently located at WHMC. To challenge the need for WHMC is to challenge the very essence of the AFMS delivery system and compromises our readiness mission creating a shortfall in critical specialty areas.

World events challenged the personnel assigned to this facility. During Operation Desert Storm (ODS) tasked 1047 personnel from WHMC. Similarly, taskings for operations other than war (OOTW) locations such as Haitian/Cuban support (424 personnel) have been supported by deployments from WHMC. The Air Force's most effectively trained trauma personnel either are based at WHMC or have rotated through its Level I Trauma center. Deployment requirements tasked to smaller AFMS medical facilities often force a degradation of beneficiary care. WHMC must experience a very large tasking before this would occur.

The Air Force blood program receives 25-30% of its total annual support from WHMC. This is achievable since Lackland AFB is the induction and basic military training site for the entire Air Force. WHMC also has the casualty reception center for the entire San Antonio area. This 50-bed aeromedical staging facility (expandable to 250-beds) supports casualty reception in peace and war. Casualties returning from Just Cause, Operation Desert Storm, and other humanitarian peacetime operations are sent to San Antonio for care and most frequently to WHMC for treatment. WHMC is unique in its ability to provide all levels of casualty healthcare. In addition, the proximity of WHMC to a major airhead at Kelly AFB, precludes transport delays in receiving intensive care in a medical center environment. These capabilities must continue in the San Antonio area.

WHMC's extensive medical capabilities and leadership places them at the forefront in deployable specialty care. An example is the development of the Mobile Field Surgical Team (MFST) and Critical Care Transport (CCT) Teams. These unique capabilities are designed to deliver highly mobile, subspecialty care far forward. As a result, more critical casualties can be treated at the point of injury and then transported safely to more definitive sources of care. Both the MFST and CCT have been deployed to support of White House and Special Operations taskings. Again, this is an innovative by-product of WHMC's clinical capabilities.

WHMC and medical readiness and the AFMS cannot be separated. The vast capabilities demanded by the local community and base mission support the worldwide casualties transferred to this hospital. The entire AFMS is predicated on use of this "flagship" as the focal point for our operational readiness. Use of this focal point ensures that its graduate medical education programs turn out medical personnel who are the best qualified personnel in the world to respond to trauma in contingency situations. Diffusing this health care delivery system based upon either option proposed would drastically reduce our patient care capability and greatly increase the cost of obtaining this same capability at other locations.

### **Clinical Capability**

WHMC represents a unique entity which would be extremely expensive to disperse or replicate anywhere in the MHSS. Located in San Antonio, it has one of the largest local beneficiary populations in the world. Over the years many military beneficiaries have relocated to San Antonio because of the vast and often unique medical services available. These include



services for many children with complex medical needs and specialties for retired groups with increasing needs for medical and surgical care. Located in southwest San Antonio, the civilian community generates over 800 cases of very serious trauma per year treated at WHMC (representing 25-33% of all cases in San Antonio). The large community combined with the large referral workload have justified the development of highly specialized services, many of which are unique in DoD.

There is limited capacity in the San Antonio area to absorb the care now being provided at WHMC particularly as it applies to quaternary services. Furthermore, there is little capacity in the MHSS to absorb the clinical training now being conducted at WHMC. Because of the national climate to reduce specialty residency programs, it would be impossible to obtain Residency Review Committee approval to reestablish military GME programs elsewhere once a WHMC program has been closed. Finally, there are both clinical services and clinical training that are unique to WHMC that could not be provided in a community hospital. These services would be difficult to defend or establish in other DoD facilities, and extremely expensive to access in the civilian community.

Realignment of WHMC as a clinic or community hospital would result in significant decrements in clinical services as well as clinical training. Providing these clinical services and clinical training in other locations would be costlier in many cases and unfeasible in many others. The overall impact on cost, quality and access to the widest range of general and highly specialized services would be severe if WHMC was realigned as a community hospital. The effects are worsened substantially if WHMC is realigned as a clinic. In both options, WHMC would be unable to provide the following services now offered by the medical center:

a. Specialized Treatment Service for autologous and allogeneic bone marrow transplantation. This requires additional clinical specialties and laboratory services not justifiable in a community hospital. This service would have to be relocated to another appropriate facility along with its vast support structure in both specialty and ancillary services. This transfer would be at great expense to the DoD.

b. Level I Trauma Services. A community hospital would not have the requisite specialty services, critical care units, patient acuity, or volume to support a full service trauma facility. WHMC has the only Air Force military trauma center which qualifies for Level I Trauma Center Certification providing this service in peacetime. This trauma center supports Mobile Surgical Team (MST) training and the Trauma and Critical Care Course for Surgeons which provides intensive refresher training for dozens of Air Force surgeons annually. The trauma center also provides the training opportunity for many Army, Navy and Air Force special forces paramedics. CBO recently lauded WHMC's trauma operation for its support of both the local community and its contribution to wartime skills preparedness of the assigned medical staff.

c. **Critical Care Units.** Critical care units are seldom provided in community hospitals. These units currently provide essential clinical services and a major training environment for numerous medical personnel as well as the newly established Critical Care Transport Teams.

d. **Emergency Services.** An estimated two thousand Code III emergency patients would be diverted or retransported to other facilities due to limited hospital capability. This introduces additional risk and morbidity to these patients and legal exposure for the Air Force.

e. **Organ Donation.** Participation in the San Antonio Emergency Medical System as a Level I Trauma Center has produced the majority of organ donors for the DoD Liver Transplant STS and the only DoD Eye Bank and it has also produced a substantial number of donors as a substantial community service. WHMC also provides a substantial number of the organs for the San Antonio donor bank.

f. **Solid organ transplant services** include the DoD Liver Transplant STS, and kidney and pancreas transplant programs. A community hospital lacks the requisite specialty services, critical care units, patient acuity or volume to support a solid organ transplant program.

g. **Specialty medical and surgical services.** No community hospitals can justify the full range of medical and surgical subspecialties. The patients generated by these subspecialties would exceed Brooke's planned capability and would be seen at substantial expense in the community. An ambulatory surgery facility would not be justified in a free standing clinic serving the military population alone.

h. **Clinical outreach services.** WHMC currently provides specialty services at outlying military facilities in DoD Region VI. These would be unsupportable as a community hospital.

i. **Reference laboratory services and specialized laboratory services to support HIV and transplant services** would no longer be required. This requirement would continue to exist and need to be transferred.

j. **A unique DoD stereotactic radiation therapy and neurosurgery capability** would no longer be justified but its requirement would continue.

k. **Inpatient mental health currently serving Region 6** could not be justified in a community hospital. Absence of an inpatient mental health unit in the clinic scenario would seriously degrade support for the military training center at Lackland. No inpatient mental health unit is planned for BAMC.

l. Pediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU). This is the only PICU in DoD (400 admissions per year). BAMC will not have a PICU. Local civilian facilities are frequently closed to PICU patients.

m. Extensive services for multiple handicapped children are available. These services are at WHMC principally because they serve a worldwide population. However, many active and retired personnel have relocated to the WHMC catchment area because of the availability of these specialized capabilities.

n. Neonatal Intensive Care. The 34 bed NICU supports critical neonates from a worldwide referral base. Military and civilian NICUs are often saturated; civilian NICU care is extremely expensive and very limited in capacity. Specialized services like extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) and high frequency oxygenation would have to be sought elsewhere at great expense from one of the few such services that are available in the country. WHMC is the only in-transport ECMO in the country.

o. Dental. WHMC hosts 84% of the Air Force's dental GME program.

Both discussions on medical readiness and clinical capabilities have documented a substantial demand base supporting the population in the San Antonio area. Referrals from Region 6 in addition to the worldwide focus on WHMC as a source of many unique sources of care within the DoD compound the need for the health delivery system that WHMC represents. Clearly, immense costs would be driven to shift these services to other locations. Quality of patient care and access to the complete range of services currently offered by WHMC would not be possible. As documented earlier, removing the nucleus of the AFMS delivery system by changing the structure of WHMC threatens to severely limit the capability of the entire system resulting in shifted workload to much more costly civilian sources of care.

Similarly, clinical education for Air Force physicians, dentists, nurses, scientists and numerous other disciplines would be severely decremented in either scenario. The large San Antonio patient base, substantial worldwide referral patient demand, and designation as the only Level I Trauma training center have fostered the establishment of 56 graduate medical education programs including 33 medical residencies and fellowships. This demand has created a highly centralized Air Force Graduate Medical, Advanced Medical Education and Dental programs at WHMC.

AFMS personnel train in 119 different graduate programs. WHMC operates 40 of these training programs (34%); 27 of these programs are unique to WHMC. WHMC's training programs represent 471 of 1489 training years for all corps (32%) and 398 of 965 medical corps training years (41%).

The Air Force already has the leanest in-house GME program of the 3 Services relying upon sponsorship of trainees in civilian and military training programs and deferment of trainees in civilian programs. As a result of having only one major medical center, AF makes greatest use of civilian deferred status. Historical data show that physicians trained in civilian deferred status have poorer retention than those trained in military programs (20% vs. 40%). Having a greater proportion of physicians in civilian training requires AF to have more total physicians in GME training than either the Army or Navy.

Maintaining the current level of military GME programs is vital to our readiness mission. Instructors/staff actually deploy to operations or contingencies, bringing back levels of experience not available by any other means (contingency operations, utilization of military-unique equipment and apparatus). Trainees who study under these instructors gain from this experience (obviating the need to gain the experience "on-the-ground" at the time of deployment).

WHMC, by virtue of its size and location, provides a "critical mass" of organic patient population, referral patients, experienced staff, and support programs to support the training of combat critical specialties. Residency Review Committees (RRC) of Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) requires presence of supporting training programs to maintain accreditation of numerous militarily critical specialties. National healthcare economics and certain specialty RRC decisions are leading to downsizing or **elimination of civilian training programs** in these critical specialties, making it more difficult to defer trainees to these programs or to establish new programs at other DoD medical centers. Training programs in these specialties in other Services cannot produce the combined output required by their own Services and the Air Force. Therefore, WHMC's programs would have to be relocated to another medical center (none of which is large enough or has the patient base to support them or their attendant specialty programs) if WHMC was downsized. To transfer GME programs, the gaining medical center would require additional catchment area population sufficient to support the additional training requirements, akin to transfer of the Air Force beneficiary population from the San Antonio catchment area. Relocation or changes in existing GME programs require accreditation by the RRC as new programs, a process that is neither simple nor guaranteed.

STSs provide highly specialized, cost effective alternatives to civilian referral. Many would not be possible or would be much more expensive without support of GME residents and fellows. STS services must be provided in larger medical centers since smaller centers cannot provide the ancillary support or supporting specialty services necessary to make the STS effective.

Elimination of all GME programs at WHMC will deprive the Air Force of critical medical, dental, and ancillary support specialists. WHMC presently provides clinical training to over 450 officers and enlisted professionals over and above the medical and dental GME. Transfer of GME programs from WHMC will dilute the specialty training program mix necessary to provide the highly specialized medical specialists necessary to meet the healthcare needs of TRICARE beneficiaries into the next century.

In conclusion, the medical readiness, clinical capabilities and graduate medical education programs are inextricably combined. Either option would force a dilution of medical capabilities within the entire spectrum of the AFMS to a point that the AFMS may not be able to regain. Certainly, any such change would be far more costly than the continued existence of WHMC.

### Managed Care

WHMC is the keystone to the DoD's managed care program called TRICARE for Health Service Region (HSR) 6. TRICARE represents a system that integrates quality, cost, and accessibility in the delivery of healthcare to our patient population. It also expands the lead agency concept from management of overlapping catchment areas to oversight of entire, considerably larger regions. HSR 6 is the second largest of the twelve regions with a total population of 1,031,513 and 17 military medical treatment facilities, of which 14 are Air Force.

Any significant realignment or reduction of WHMC's capability will significantly impact its awarded TRICARE managed care support contract. The recently awarded \$1.82 billion TRICARE managed care support contract was based on existing DoD health care resources and capacities, CHAMPUS utilization rates, and estimated future workload and physical plant capacities. By 1997, all DoD HSRs will have a single, private TRICARE support contractor responsible for developing civilian health care networks and managing the DoD health benefit in support of the Services. The contractor is "hired" to supplement the DoD direct care system based on known capacities and demand at the time of awarding the contract. Any changes to the baseline will require major revisions to the contract creating the potential for a tremendous escalation in the cost of the contract through extensive bid-price adjustments. Changing the capacity of WHMC does not negate the population's need for health care, either within the San Antonio catchment area, or within the entire region for which the contract and regional planning are based.

While government direct care savings may initially accrue from resizing WHMC, the potential savings generated will in all probability be greatly offset by the increased contract costs. Using the assumptions in the Section 733 Study, government costs could increase 10% to 24% on a per-unit basis for the same care provided in the civilian network.

TRICARE support contracts. Changing the contract-provided capacities of either WHMC or any other bedded military medical treatment facility, such as BAMC will have the following affects:

a. Affect on local catchment DoD and beneficiary costs and access. Overall, DoD and beneficiary-shared costs will increase to the extent direct care workload (inpatient and outpatient) is shifted to civilian providers. The trade-off factors identified in the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative studies may be too conservative for WHMC, given the higher demand for non-elective specialty care services, and the fact a significant portion is based on referral. Although the contractors civilian network will be held to the same access standards as the MTF, retirees over the age of 65 (who are ineligible for TRICARE and CHAMPUS) will face both increased costs and greater difficulty accessing providers.

b. Affect on DoD Region 6 costs and beneficiary access. Because about half of WHMC's inpatient workload originates from outside the catchment area, it is probable that bid-price adjustments will occur in other regional managed care support contracts as well as Region 6's. There is extremely limited capacity at BAMC to absorb any additional inpatient workload in Region 6. Other MTFs will refer care to their local civilian network, increasing the number of non-availability statements issued, causing an unfavorable bid-price adjustment. Again, as previously mentioned, retirees over the age of 65 will face both increased costs and greater difficulty accessing providers. Increased wait times may occur for patients with elective cases which would have to remain in their local area for care.

c. Affect on DoD HSRs other than Region 6. Depending on the extent of reductions to services at WHMC affecting its reception of patients from outside Region 6, the extremely limited ability of BAMC to absorb the difference, and concomitant reduction in overall San Antonio direct care system capacity to absorb referral workload, outlying catchment areas will either have to increase direct care service capability, or increase reliance on civilian provider network workload. While this may have minimal impact on primary and secondary care, it will greatly impact tertiary and quaternary care services (e.g., bone marrow transplant, liver transplant), especially in smaller metropolitan areas (e.g., Laughlin, Reese, etc.). Limitation of WHMC's capabilities may drive increased demand for care in the local community and local MHSS facilities with resultant increase in queuing.

d. Outreach Care capability. Eliminating the WHMC capability would either show a reduction in outlying MTF workload or would have to increase local MTF resources accordingly. Given the smaller size of most other MTF populations in the region, to compensate for the loss of just one surgeon in the WHMC's Outreach program would require more than a one-to-one surgeons elsewhere in the region due to lower economies of scale at smaller MTFs. That is, if several or all MTFs attempted to continue the same level of surgical services provided currently through the Outreach program each MTF would have to procure

the services of at least one surgeon. This phenomenon is due to the ability of WHMC to use its marginal available capability to assist other MTFs (at an overall savings to the Air Force, as well as to the beneficiaries, who would otherwise use CHAMPUS). Reduction to the Outreach program would increase other MTF costs to the extent additional manpower were added to the MTFs to maintain the same capability. Without re-deploying those assets, at a greater than one-for-one basis, local CHAMPUS and beneficiary costs will increase.

Temporary deployment of clinical assets from WHMC under the Outreach program to outlying smaller MTFs provides several quality opportunities.

(a) Beneficiaries receive an enhanced direct care medical benefit than might otherwise be provided locally, and may continue receiving their care in the same institution, rather than being referred to local, off-base civilian providers.

(b) The local MTF providers receive enriched clinical opportunities as they participate in clinical practice with WHMC experts, and receive continuing medical education.

Beneficiaries currently receiving care via these TDY resources, if discontinued, would be disengaged from the direct care system, and required to access these services in the local community.

e. Impact of reduction on DoD national and regional STSs. WHMC has two of only three DoD-designated National DoD STSs: liver transplants (since 2 Dec 93) and allogenic/autologous adult bone marrow transplant (since Dec 94). WHMC's STS programs are nationally acclaimed resources serving the DoD that required years of development and system maturation. They are predicated, as are the other GME-related services, on a core local population requirement supporting an appropriate mix of diversity in patient condition, chronicity, and clinical need.

Reduction in WHMC capability and inability of BAMC to absorb these critical STS programs will require transfer and maturation of the programs elsewhere in DoD (thus MILPERS, equipment and time-related costs), or transfer of these programs to the civilian community (at increased TRICARE contractual costs), and loss of a benefit for those patients 65 years of age or older. In addition, it would affect the continuity of treatment currently provided to patients, and the critical loss of GME and clinical treatment synergies arising from multi-disciplinary and highly specialized services. Access, of course, would diminish for patients required to transfer to the civilian network, if eligible, or to fee-for-service or private HMOs if Medicare eligible.

f. Impact on AFMS quality standards. WHMC compares very favorably, or exceeds, national indicators of quality health as follows:

JCAHO Grid Scores:

AF Average- 90

Civilian Average- 83

WHMC- 98

JCAHO Accreditation With Commendation:

AF- 22%

Civilian- 10%

WHMC- All major categories received "1s" (highest score possible), no "Type 1" recommendations

MHA Quality Indicators:

AF Better than National Average on 11 of 14 Indicators

WHMC - better than the median in 19 of 23 indicators

Physician Specialty Board Completion (pass rate, first testing):

AF - 92-100%, depending on specialty

- All of our physicians (non resident) are Board Certified

Civilian- 83-92%

WHMC- The five year first time pass rates are as follows: 100% in 19 of 27 medical specialties, 95% or better in four, 90% or better in three, and one at 81%.

g. Physical plant. The new BAMC facility was planned, budgeted, and approved by Congress based on WHMC's capabilities to avoid unnecessary duplication of services. The new BAMC will not have the capacity to absorb both the inpatient and outpatient medical requirements of the local community, let alone GME/tertiary care and referral requirements, without substantial MILCON and O&M funded enhancements.

h. Reduction of services. Reduction of WHMC capabilities will degrade its Level I Trauma Center capabilities. Loss of this vital military and civilian community emergency asset will reduce access to exigent care services. A significant amount of uncompensated emergency care is also provided to the community by WHMC on an annual basis. Trauma care is usually associated with catchment and near catchment populations, and could not realistically support that population's trauma needs if transferred to another major DoD medical center (e.g. Keesler or Travis).



The new BAMC was not planned or designed to accommodate WHMC's trauma workload, but, rather, to supplement WHMC's capability. MILCON and O&M funds will be required at BAMC to maintain the same DoD capability in the community. Otherwise, the TRICARE support contract will require modification, at increased costs, since true trauma care is a local requirement, and not elective, hence, not subject to the "trade-off" factors.

Emergent patients will have to seek care elsewhere, potentially at lower level emergency medicine departments with fewer specialties immediately available. Medical staff, especially specialists, will suffer reduced opportunities for practicing wartime trauma skills. These staff could practice emergency skills in a local civilian emergency medicine department, but would then be unavailable for more routine care, consultation and continuing provider education.

### Summary

This document substantiates two key points:

a: WHMC is a unique platform in the AFMS providing world-class training and medical capabilities whose continuation are critical to the entire Air Force Medical Service. No other platform exists that can accommodate the infrastructure required to support many of the medicine and surgical subspecialty training programs that are required. Diffusion of the graduate medical education program to other locations would not replace the capability that WHMC represents nationally today.

b. No COBRA has been done. If a platform could be found to accommodate this vast mission, the cost of transferring the programs and associated infrastructure would be staggering.

It is therefore critical that WHMC be maintained at its existing operational capability. Any changes to the structure of WHMC should be made programmatically and not through the BRAC process.



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:  
AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTROYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 21, 1995

Major General Jay Blume  
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Base Realignment and Transition  
1670 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20330-1670

Dear General Blume:

Thank you for your recent testimony before the Commission regarding the recommendations of the DOD Joint Cross Service Groups. In order to support the Commission's review of the armed forces' medical infrastructure requirements, please provide the Air Force COBRA and other appropriate analyses for the following two options regarding Wilford Hall USAF Medical Center:

-- Realign Lackland Air Force Base by converting Wilford Hall USAF Medical Center into an outpatient clinic and eliminating all acute care inpatient capability. Maintain capacity at Wilford Hall to include an ambulatory care capability, an appropriate and cost effective outpatient surgery capability and sufficient "medical hold" or sub-acute care beds to support the recruit training mission at Lackland Air Force Base.

-- Realign Lackland Air Force Base by converting Wilford Hall USAF Medical Center into a community hospital. Transfer all graduate medical education to other medical centers. Maintain the autologous bone marrow transplant program at Wilford Hall as a satellite of Brooks Army Medical Center.

Please include the overall feasibility, cost, quality, and access implications of the alternatives in your documentation.

The Commission needs this information by May 5, 1995. Thank you for your assistance. I appreciate your time and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Benton L. Borden  
Director of Review and Analysis

950424-12



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON DC

- 5 MAY 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
ATTN: MR. BORDEN

FROM: HQ USAF/RT  
1670 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20330-1670

950424-12


SUBJECT: Request for Analyses - WHMC Medical Center (Your Ltr 21 Apr 95)

We received your tasker on 27 April 1995 requesting Air Force cost of base realignment actions (COBRA) and other appropriate analyses for two options regarding WHMC Medical Center (WHMC). You also requested that the overall feasibility, cost, quality, and access implications of the two options be provided. An Air Force-only evaluation of each of these options is attached.

The Air Force feels strongly in stating that WHMC is the *premier* Air Force medical facility known internationally for its specialty medical services and GME teaching programs. It has a long and distinguished history in delivering health care to a population spanning the globe and in its medical research and technology development. Any decrease in capability along the lines of the two options will impact negatively on the Air Force's wartime readiness mission and operational healthcare costs.

The Air Force performed no COBRAs on WHMC during the Service's review or in the Medical Joint Cross-Service Group's study. The Air Force prefers to facilitate medical mission changes programmatically rather than through BRAC law in order to maintain a degree of flexibility in sculpting its future medical force. Flexibility is important in implementing TRICARE initiatives and delivery of healthcare to all beneficiaries. The Air Force advocates aggressive efforts in rightsizing its medical facilities based on its readiness mission, along with TRICARE, through a strategic resourcing methodology. This methodology forges the results of a population-based, demand projection, business case analysis with capitated based resource allocation and incorporates best business practices to culminate in the most effective and efficient use of healthcare resources. Using these tools will methodically and purposely eliminate duplication of services and provide for an optimum product-line and personnel mix.

We are unable to complete the requested COBRA analysis within the time constraints of your request. The Air Force has serious operational concerns with these proposed actions and believes COBRA analysis, even if available, should not be a decisive factor. Please contact Col Mayfield, HQ USAF/RTR, at DSN 225-6766 if you have any questions.

  
JAY D. BLUME JR., Major General, USAF  
Special Assistant to Chief of Staff for Realignment  
and Transition

Attachment:  
As Stated

cc:  
OASD/HA  
HQ USAF/SG

## **Response To Base Realignment And Closure (BRAC) Commission's Options**

**For**

### **WHMC USAF Medical Center (WHMC)**

#### **Introduction**

The Air Force does not support any BRAC initiative that eliminates a major Air Force medical presence in the San Antonio region. By any standard, the Air Force is the major Service component represented in the San Antonio area. Operationally, it is home to the only Air Force induction and basic military training center. It contains four major Air Force installations, including two major commands, with WHMC representing the total Air Force bed capacity. Air Force beneficiaries outnumber other service beneficiaries by an overwhelming margin. Medically, WHMC is the flagship of the Air Force Medical Service. It is the largest, single contributor to our readiness capability, houses 34 percent of our GME training programs of which 27 are unique to WHMC, and accounts for 41% of the total physician training man-years, is the only designated Specialty Treatment Center in the Air Force, as well as its only operating Level 1 Trauma Center.

A large patient population and teaching infrastructure is absolutely essential to generate the volume and types of patients required to support graduate medical education and other specialty training programs. The Air Force has only one such hospital in their system and depends on WHMC as the foundation on which the remainder of the Air Force and DoD regional healthcare system is designed. The other three graduate medical education sites are very limited in their scope, capability, demand and capacity.

Evaluation of both options proposed for WHMC involve a review of three major functions: 1) medical readiness; 2) clinical capability (to include graduate medical education); and 3) managed care. Each of these topic's impact on cost, quality, access, and feasibility are discussed in detail below. It is impossible to separate any of these issues and fully understand the significance of WHMC's status as the "flagship" for Air Force medicine. Any dramatic change in the operational capability of WHMC threatens the viability of the entire Air Force Medical Service (AFMS) structure. It is not just the Air Force structure that is threatened by the options. The Air Force's substantial DoD mission is magnified by support of the entire San Antonio community. This total demand forced establishment of a consolidated WHMC/BAMC operating Level 1 Trauma training center. This unique mission is integral to the support of the 56 training programs and four organ transplant missions and the entire DoD medical readiness mission. In addition, a portion of the civilian indigent health care in San Antonio is supported through Congressional appropriations. In essence, the total demand generated by Lackland AFB and its external forces continue to support the requirement for WHMC. Brooke Army Medical Center (BAMC) has practically no physical capacity to support this demand. In addition, the

worldwide referral pattern also focuses on WHMC's tertiary and quaternary care capabilities and any reduction in capability, as it exists today, will degrade the overall AFMS mission effectiveness. Most critically, relocating our readiness missions, training programs and redesigning the entire DoD and AFMS referral process will raise costs and lower access to specialty and subspecialty healthcare and the quality of this care.

The Military Health Service System (MHSS) is sensitive to structuring itself to the needs of the world-wide community it serves, and is aggressively addressing this issue outside the BRAC process. In San Antonio, the new Army Medical Center at Ft Sam Houston is built recognizing the size and capability of WHMC, eliminating duplication of services and creating economies of scale. In pursuing our local GME and services realignment in San Antonio, the designated operating capacity of WHMC has been judiciously decreased from 1,000 beds to its present level of 530. Additional economies in this community may be warranted; however, it is the position of the Air Force and DoD that such actions be incorporated through careful and programmatic analyses of all pertinent factors. Weaknesses in the Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG) model were evident in its handling of referral flow patterns, neglect of BRAC closure nominees, and an inordinate reliance on the age of facilities without regard to overall operational considerations. By any measure of merit, other than facility age, the major medical player in San Antonio is the Air Force. WHMC, despite its relatively age, is a modern, extremely well-equipped, and efficient facility.

### **Medical Readiness**

WHMC has the largest single medical deployment mission in the Air Force. It consists of the following personnel and equipment packages: a 750-bed contingency hospital, an air transportable hospital, three 40-bed hospital surgical expansion teams, and various other taskings totaling 1360 personnel and involving 26 Unit Type Codes (UTC's).

Transfer of these taskings is impossible without moving existing medical subspecialties. Certain medical specialties are nearly 100% utilized throughout the AFMS. These include surgery, urology, aerospace medicine, anesthesiology, nephrology, pulmonary/critical care, and associated ancillary support which must be retained and relocated to other medical centers. With WHMC deployable specialty capability representing 20-30% of the total AFMS readiness mission, these taskings then could be relocated, but not without substantial medical military construction (MILCON) costs and redistribution of referral workload. Again, the demand for these critical subspecialties already exists in the greater San Antonio area and is increased by the existing AFMS referrals. These subspecialties are also integral to meeting the American College of Surgeon's Level I trauma center requirements as well as the national accreditation requirements for the 33 medical residencies and fellowships currently located at WHMC. To challenge the need for WHMC is to challenge the very essence of the AFMS delivery system and compromises our readiness mission creating a shortfall in critical specialty areas.

World events challenged the personnel assigned to this facility. During, Operation Desert Storm (ODS) tasked 1047 personnel from WHMC. Similarly, taskings for operations other than war (OOTW) locations such as Haitian/Cuban support (424 personnel) have been supported by deployments from WHMC. The Air Force's most effectively trained trauma personnel either are based at WHMC or have rotated through its Level I Trauma center. Deployment requirements tasked to smaller AFMS medical facilities often force a degradation of beneficiary care. WHMC must experience a very large tasking before this would occur.

The Air Force blood program receives 25-30% of its total annual support from WHMC. This is achievable since Lackland AFB is the induction and basic military training site for the entire Air Force. WHMC also has the casualty reception center for the entire San Antonio area. This 50-bed aeromedical staging facility (expandable to 250-beds) supports casualty reception in peace and war. Casualties returning from Just Cause, Operation Desert Storm, and other humanitarian peacetime operations are sent to San Antonio for care and most frequently to WHMC for treatment. WHMC is unique in its ability to provide all levels of casualty healthcare. In addition, the proximity of WHMC to a major airhead at Kelly AFB, precludes transport delays in receiving intensive care in a medical center environment. These capabilities must continue in the San Antonio area.

WHMC's extensive medical capabilities and leadership places them at the forefront in deployable specialty care. An example is the development of the Mobile Field Surgical Team (MFST) and Critical Care Transport (CCT) Teams. These unique capabilities are designed to deliver highly mobile, subspecialty care far forward. As a result, more critical casualties can be treated at the point of injury and then transported safely to more definitive sources of care. Both the MFST and CCT have been deployed to support of White House and Special Operations taskings. Again, this is an innovative by-product of WHMC's clinical capabilities.

WHMC and medical readiness and the AFMS cannot be separated. The vast capabilities demanded by the local community and base mission support the worldwide casualties transferred to this hospital. The entire AFMS is predicated on use of this "flagship" as the focal point for our operational readiness. Use of this focal point ensures that its graduate medical education programs turn out medical personnel who are the best qualified personnel in the world to respond to trauma in contingency situations. Diffusing this health care delivery system based upon either option proposed would drastically reduce our patient care capability and greatly increase the cost of obtaining this same capability at other locations.

### **Clinical Capability**

WHMC represents a unique entity which would be extremely expensive to disperse or replicate anywhere in the MHSS. Located in San Antonio, it has one of the largest local beneficiary populations in the world. Over the years many military beneficiaries have relocated to San Antonio because of the vast and often unique medical services available. These include

services for many children with complex medical needs and specialties for retired groups with increasing needs for medical and surgical care. Located in southwest San Antonio, the civilian community generates over 800 cases of very serious trauma per year treated at WHMC (representing 25-33% of all cases in San Antonio). The large community combined with the large referral workload have justified the development of highly specialized services, many of which are unique in DoD.

There is limited capacity in the San Antonio area to absorb the care now being provided at WHMC particularly as it applies to quaternary services. Furthermore, there is little capacity in the MHSS to absorb the clinical training now being conducted at WHMC. Because of the national climate to reduce specialty residency programs, it would be impossible to obtain Residency Review Committee approval to reestablish military GME programs elsewhere once a WHMC program has been closed. Finally, there are both clinical services and clinical training that are unique to WHMC that could not be provided in a community hospital. These services would be difficult to defend or establish in other DoD facilities, and extremely expensive to access in the civilian community.

Realignment of WHMC as a clinic or community hospital would result in significant decrements in clinical services as well as clinical training. Providing these clinical services and clinical training in other locations would be costlier in many cases and unfeasible in many others. The overall impact on cost, quality and access to the widest range of general and highly specialized services would be severe if WHMC was realigned as a community hospital. The effects are worsened substantially if WHMC is realigned as a clinic. In both options, WHMC would be unable to provide the following services now offered by the medical center:

a. Specialized Treatment Service for autologous and allogeneic bone marrow transplantation. This requires additional clinical specialties and laboratory services not justifiable in a community hospital. This service would have to be relocated to another appropriate facility along with its vast support structure in both specialty and ancillary services. This transfer would be at great expense to the DoD.

b. Level I Trauma Services. A community hospital would not have the requisite specialty services, critical care units, patient acuity, or volume to support a full service trauma facility. WHMC has the only Air Force military trauma center which qualifies for Level I Trauma Center Certification providing this service in peacetime. This trauma center supports Mobile Surgical Team (MST) training and the Trauma and Critical Care Course for Surgeons which provides intensive refresher training for dozens of Air Force surgeons annually. The trauma center also provides the training opportunity for many Army, Navy and Air Force special forces paramedics. CBO recently lauded WHMC's trauma operation for its support of both the local community and its contribution to wartime skills preparedness of the assigned medical staff.

c. **Critical Care Units.** Critical care units are seldom provided in community hospitals. These units currently provide essential clinical services and a major training environment for numerous medical personnel as well as the newly established Critical Care Transport Teams.

d. **Emergency Services.** An estimated two thousand Code III emergency patients would be diverted or retransported to other facilities due to limited hospital capability. This introduces additional risk and morbidity to these patients and legal exposure for the Air Force.

e. **Organ Donation.** Participation in the San Antonio Emergency Medical System as a Level I Trauma Center has produced the majority of organ donors for the DoD Liver Transplant STS and the only DoD Eye Bank and it has also produced a substantial number of donors as a substantial community service. WHMC also provides a substantial number of the organs for the San Antonio donor bank.

f. **Solid organ transplant services** include the DoD Liver Transplant STS, and kidney and pancreas transplant programs. A community hospital lacks the requisite specialty services, critical care units, patient acuity or volume to support a solid organ transplant program.

g. **Specialty medical and surgical services.** No community hospitals can justify the full range of medical and surgical subspecialties. The patients generated by these subspecialties would exceed Brooke's planned capability and would be seen at substantial expense in the community. An ambulatory surgery facility would not be justified in a free standing clinic serving the military population alone.

h. **Clinical outreach services.** WHMC currently provides specialty services at outlying military facilities in DoD Region VI. These would be unsupportable as a community hospital.

i. **Reference laboratory services and specialized laboratory services to support HIV and transplant services** would no longer be required. This requirement would continue to exist and need to be transferred.

j. **A unique DoD stereotactic radiation therapy and neurosurgery capability** would no longer be justified but its requirement would continue.

k. **Inpatient mental health currently serving Region 6** could not be justified in a community hospital. Absence of an inpatient mental health unit in the clinic scenario would seriously degrade support for the military training center at Lackland. No inpatient mental health unit is planned for BAMC.



l. Pediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU). This is the only PICU in DoD (400 admissions per year). BAMC will not have a PICU. Local civilian facilities are frequently closed to PICU patients.

m. Extensive services for multiple handicapped children are available. These services are at WHMC principally because they serve a worldwide population. However, many active and retired personnel have relocated to the WHMC catchment area because of the availability of these specialized capabilities.

n. Neonatal Intensive Care. The 34 bed NICU supports critical neonates from a worldwide referral base. Military and civilian NICUs are often saturated; civilian NICU care is extremely expensive and very limited in capacity. Specialized services like extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) and high frequency oxygenation would have to be sought elsewhere at great expense from one of the few such services that are available in the country. WHMC is the only in-transport ECMO in the country.

o. Dental. WHMC hosts 84% of the Air Force's dental GME program.

Both discussions on medical readiness and clinical capabilities have documented a substantial demand base supporting the population in the San Antonio area. Referrals from Region 6 in addition to the worldwide focus on WHMC as a source of many unique sources of care within the DoD compound the need for the health delivery system that WHMC represents. Clearly, immense costs would be driven to shift these services to other locations. Quality of patient care and access to the complete range of services currently offered by WHMC would not be possible. As documented earlier, removing the nucleus of the AFMS delivery system by changing the structure of WHMC threatens to severely limit the capability of the entire system resulting in shifted workload to much more costly civilian sources of care.

Similarly, clinical education for Air Force physicians, dentists, nurses, scientists and numerous other disciplines would be severely decremented in either scenario. The large San Antonio patient base, substantial worldwide referral patient demand, and designation as the only Level I Trauma training center have fostered the establishment of 56 graduate medical education programs including 33 medical residencies and fellowships. This demand has created a highly centralized Air Force Graduate Medical, Advanced Medical Education and Dental programs at WHMC.

AFMS personnel train in 119 different graduate programs. WHMC operates 40 of these training programs (34%); 27 of these programs are unique to WHMC. WHMC's training programs represent 471 of 1489 training years for all corps (32%) and 398 of 965 medical corps training years (41%).

The Air Force already has the leanest in-house GME program of the 3 Services relying upon sponsorship of trainees in civilian and military training programs and deferment of trainees in civilian programs. As a result of having only one major medical center, AF makes greatest use of civilian deferred status. Historical data show that physicians trained in civilian deferred status have poorer retention than those trained in military programs (20% vs. 40%). Having a greater proportion of physicians in civilian training requires AF to have more total physicians in GME training than either the Army or Navy.

Maintaining the current level of military GME programs is vital to our readiness mission. Instructors/staff actually deploy to operations or contingencies, bringing back levels of experience not available by any other means (contingency operations, utilization of military-unique equipment and apparatus). Trainees who study under these instructors gain from this experience (obviating the need to gain the experience "on-the-ground" at the time of deployment).

WHMC, by virtue of its size and location, provides a "critical mass" of organic patient population, referral patients, experienced staff, and support programs to support the training of combat critical specialties. Residency Review Committees (RRC) of Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) requires presence of supporting training programs to maintain accreditation of numerous militarily critical specialties. National healthcare economics and certain specialty RRC decisions are leading to downsizing or **elimination of civilian training programs** in these critical specialties, making it more difficult to defer trainees to these programs or to establish new programs at other DoD medical centers. Training programs in these specialties in other Services cannot produce the combined output required by their own Services and the Air Force. Therefore, WHMC's programs would have to be relocated to another medical center (none of which is large enough or has the patient base to support them or their attendant specialty programs) if WHMC was downsized. To transfer GME programs, the gaining medical center would require additional catchment area population sufficient to support the additional training requirements, akin to transfer of the Air Force beneficiary population from the San Antonio catchment area. Relocation or changes in existing GME programs require accreditation by the RRC as new programs, a process that is neither simple nor guaranteed.

STSs provide highly specialized, cost effective alternatives to civilian referral. Many would not be possible or would be much more expensive without support of GME residents and fellows. STS services must be provided in larger medical centers since smaller centers cannot provide the ancillary support or supporting specialty services necessary to make the STS effective.

Elimination of all GME programs at WHMC will deprive the Air Force of critical medical, dental, and ancillary support specialists. WHMC presently provides clinical training to over 450 officers and enlisted professionals over and above the medical and dental GME. Transfer of GME programs from WHMC will dilute the specialty training program mix necessary to provide the highly specialized medical specialists necessary to meet the healthcare needs of TRICARE beneficiaries into the next century.

In conclusion, the medical readiness, clinical capabilities and graduate medical education programs are inextricably combined. Either option would force a dilution of medical capabilities within the entire spectrum of the AFMS to a point that the AFMS may not be able to regain. Certainly, any such change would be far more costly than the continued existence of WHMC.

### **Managed Care**

WHMC is the keystone to the DoD's managed care program called TRICARE for Health Service Region (HSR) 6. TRICARE represents a system that integrates quality, cost, and accessibility in the delivery of healthcare to our patient population. It also expands the lead agency concept from management of overlapping catchment areas to oversight of entire, considerably larger regions. HSR 6 is the second largest of the twelve regions with a total population of 1,031,513 and 17 military medical treatment facilities, of which 14 are Air Force.

Any significant realignment or reduction of WHMC's capability will significantly impact its awarded TRICARE managed care support contract. The recently awarded \$1.82 billion TRICARE managed care support contract was based on existing DoD health care resources and capacities, CHAMPUS utilization rates, and estimated future workload and physical plant capacities. By 1997, all DoD HSRs will have a single, private TRICARE support contractor responsible for developing civilian health care networks and managing the DoD health benefit in support of the Services. The contractor is "hired" to supplement the DoD direct care system based on known capacities and demand at the time of awarding the contract. Any changes to the baseline will require major revisions to the contract creating the potential for a tremendous escalation in the cost of the contract through extensive bid-price adjustments. Changing the capacity of WHMC does not negate the population's need for health care, either within the San Antonio catchment area, or within the entire region for which the contract and regional planning are based.

While government direct care savings may initially accrue from resizing WHMC, the potential savings generated will in all probability be greatly offset by the increased contract costs. Using the assumptions in the Section 733 Study, government costs could increase 10% to 24% on a per-unit basis for the same care provided in the civilian network.

TRICARE support contracts. Changing the contract-provided capacities of either WHMC or any other bedded military medical treatment facility, such as BAMC will have the following affects:

a. Affect on local catchment DoD and beneficiary costs and access. Overall, DoD and beneficiary-shared costs will increase to the extent direct care workload (inpatient and outpatient) is shifted to civilian providers. The trade-off factors identified in the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative studies may be too conservative for WHMC, given the higher demand for non-elective specialty care services, and the fact a significant portion is based on referral. Although the contractors civilian network will be held to the same access standards as the MTF, retirees over the age of 65 (who are ineligible for TRICARE and CHAMPUS) will face both increased costs and greater difficulty accessing providers.

b. Affect on DoD Region 6 costs and beneficiary access. Because about half of WHMC's inpatient workload originates from outside the catchment area, it is probable that bid-price adjustments will occur in other regional managed care support contracts as well as Region 6's. There is extremely limited capacity at BAMC to absorb any additional inpatient workload in Region 6. Other MTFs will refer care to their local civilian network, increasing the number of non-availability statements issued, causing an unfavorable bid-price adjustment. Again, as previously mentioned, retirees over the age of 65 will face both increased costs and greater difficulty accessing providers. Increased wait times may occur for patients with elective cases which would have to remain in their local area for care.

c. Affect on DoD HSRs other than Region 6. Depending on the extent of reductions to services at WHMC affecting its reception of patients from outside Region 6, the extremely limited ability of BAMC to absorb the difference, and concomitant reduction in overall San Antonio direct care system capacity to absorb referral workload, outlying catchment areas will either have to increase direct care service capability, or increase reliance on civilian provider network workload. While this may have minimal impact on primary and secondary care, it will greatly impact tertiary and quaternary care services (e.g., bone marrow transplant, liver transplant), especially in smaller metropolitan areas (e.g., Laughlin, Reese, etc.). Limitation of WHMC's capabilities may drive increased demand for care in the local community and local MHSS facilities with resultant increase in queuing.

d. Outreach Care capability. Eliminating the WHMC capability would either show a reduction in outlying MTF workload or would have to increase local MTF resources accordingly. Given the smaller size of most other MTF populations in the region, to compensate for the loss of just one surgeon in the WHMC's Outreach program would require more than a one-to-one surgeons elsewhere in the region due to lower economies of scale at smaller MTFs. That is, if several or all MTFs attempted to continue the same level of surgical services provided currently through the Outreach program each MTF would have to procure

the services of at least one surgeon. This phenomenon is due to the ability of WHMC to use its marginal available capability to assist other MTFs (at an overall savings to the Air Force, as well as to the beneficiaries, who would otherwise use CHAMPUS). Reduction to the Outreach program would increase other MTF costs to the extent additional manpower were added to the MTFs to maintain the same capability. Without re-deploying those assets, at a greater than one-for-one basis, local CHAMPUS and beneficiary costs will increase.

Temporary deployment of clinical assets from WHMC under the Outreach program to outlying smaller MTFs provides several quality opportunities.

(a) Beneficiaries receive an enhanced direct care medical benefit than might otherwise be provided locally, and may continue receiving their care in the same institution, rather than being referred to local, off-base civilian providers.

(b) The local MTF providers receive enriched clinical opportunities as they participate in clinical practice with WHMC experts, and receive continuing medical education.

Beneficiaries currently receiving care via these TDY resources, if discontinued, would be disengaged from the direct care system, and required to access these services in the local community.

e. Impact of reduction on DoD national and regional STSs. WHMC has two of only three DoD-designated National DoD STSs: liver transplants (since 2 Dec 93) and allogenic/autologous adult bone marrow transplant (since Dec 94). WHMC's STS programs are nationally acclaimed resources serving the DoD that required years of development and system maturation. They are predicated, as are the other GME-related services, on a core local population requirement supporting an appropriate mix of diversity in patient condition, chronicity, and clinic need.

Reduction in WHMC capability and inability of BAMC to absorb these critical STS programs will require transfer and maturation of the programs elsewhere in DoD (thus MILPERS, equipment and time-related costs), or transfer of these programs to the civilian community (at increased TRICARE contractual costs), and loss of a benefit for those patients 65 years of age or older. In addition, it would affect the continuity of treatment currently provided to patients, and the critical loss of GME and clinical treatment synergies arising from multi-disciplinary and highly specialized services. Access, of course, would diminish for patients required to transfer to the civilian network, if eligible, or to fee-for-service or private HMOs if Medicare eligible.

f. Impact on AFMS quality standards. WHMC compares very favorably, or exceeds, national indicators of quality health as follows:

JCAHO Grid Scores:

AF Average- 90

Civilian Average- 83

WHMC- 98

JCAHO Accreditation With Commendation:

AF- 22%

Civilian- 10%

WHMC- All major categories received "1s" (highest score possible), no "Type 1" recommendations

MHA Quality Indicators:

AF Better than National Average on 11 of 14 Indicators

WHMC - better than the median in 19 of 23 indicators

Physician Specialty Board Completion (pass rate, first testing):

AF - 92-100%, depending on specialty

- All of our physicians (non resident) are Board Certified

Civilian- 83-92%

WHMC- The five year first time pass rates are as follows: 100% in 19 of 27 medical specialties, 95% or better in four, 90% or better in three, and one at 81%.

g. Physical plant. The new BAMC facility was planned, budgeted, and approved by Congress based on WHMC's capabilities to avoid unnecessary duplication of services. The new BAMC will not have the capacity to absorb both the inpatient and outpatient medical requirements of the local community, let alone GME/tertiary care and referral requirements, without substantial MILCON and O&M funded enhancements.

h. Reduction of services. Reduction of WHMC capabilities will degrade its Level I Trauma Center capabilities. Loss of this vital military and civilian community emergency asset will reduce access to exigent care services. A significant amount of uncompensated emergency care is also provided to the community by WHMC on an annual basis. Trauma care is usually associated with catchment and near catchment populations, and could not realistically support that population's trauma needs if transferred to another major DoD medical center (e.g. Keesler or Travis).

The new BAMC was not planned or designed to accommodate WHMC's trauma workload, but, rather, to supplement WHMC's capability. MILCON and O&M funds will be required at BAMC to maintain the same DoD capability in the community. Otherwise, the TRICARE support contract will require modification, at increased costs, since true trauma care is a local requirement, and not elective, hence, not subject to the "trade-off" factors.

Emergent patients will have to seek care elsewhere, potentially at lower level emergency medicine departments with fewer specialties immediately available. Medical staff, especially specialists, will suffer reduced opportunities for practicing wartime trauma skills. These staff could practice emergency skills in a local civilian emergency medicine department, but would then be unavailable for more routine care, consultation and continuing provider education.

### **Summary**

This document substantiates two key points:

a. WHMC is a unique platform in the AFMS providing world-class training and medical capabilities whose continuation are critical to the entire Air Force Medical Service. No other platform exists that can accommodate the infrastructure required to support many of the medicine and surgical subspecialty training programs that are required. Diffusion of the graduate medical education program to other locations would not replace the capability that WHMC represents nationally today.

b. No COBRA has been done. If a platform could be found to accommodate this vast mission, the cost of transferring the programs and associated infrastructure would be staggering.

It is therefore critical that WHMC be maintained at its existing operational capability. Any changes to the structure of WHMC should be made programmatically and not through the BRAC process.

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950424-13

FROM: <u>DIXON</u>	TO: <u>BOWSER, CHARLES A</u>
TITLE: <u>CHAIRMAN</u>	TITLE: <u>COMPTROLLER GENERAL</u>
ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCRC</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>GAO</u>
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓ FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FROM THE APRIL 17 GAO HEARING.

Due Date:	Routing Date: <u>950424</u>	Date Originated: <u>950422</u>	Mail Date: <u>950424</u>
-----------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	--------------------------





THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:  
AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 22, 1995

Honorable Charles A. Bowsher  
Comptroller General of the United States  
General Accounting office  
441 G St. NW  
Washington, D.C. 20548

9150424-13

Dear Mr. Bowsher:


The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission is continuing its review of the Secretary of Defense's base closure and realignment recommendations. GAO's Report to the Congress and the Commission, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 1995 Process and Recommendations for Closure and Realignment, as well as Assistant Comptroller General Henry L. Hinton, Jr.'s recent testimony, provided a great deal of valuable information and analysis, and will be very helpful to the Commission.

As we discussed with Mr. Hinton during his April 17 testimony, I am enclosing a number of follow-up questions based on Mr. Hinton's testimony and on GAO's Report. We would appreciate written responses to these questions by May 5 so the information can be considered in our deliberative process. If additional time is required to develop a complete response to a specific question, we would appreciate an interim response by May 5.

As the Commission continues our review and analysis of the Defense Department's recommendations, I anticipate that there will be more questions and issues where we will ask for GAO's assistance. If these questions require a written response, we will direct them to Mr. Hinton. In those cases where the Commission needs additional factual information on a specific issue, the Commission will work directly with your field offices in accordance with the arrangements discussed between Mr. Hinton and Mr. Lyies, the Commission's Staff Director.

We appreciate the assistance that GAO provides to the Commission as we carry out our responsibilities.

Sincerely,



Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

## **COSTS**

1. GAO previously criticized DoD's decision to expend no effort capturing the total costs to government of BRAC recommendations. You cited the example of Kirtland AFB where DoD might not have captured total costs.

Please provide your estimate of the costs to the U.S. Government for the DoD proposal to realign Kirtland AFB action?

## **DoD SELECTION CRITERIA**

1. Written guidance for the selection process was provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to the Services.

What is GAO's opinion of the OSD guidance?

Did you detect instances of substantial deviation from the Secretary's guidance by the Joint Cross Service Groups or by the Services?

## **ECONOMIC IMPACT**

1. Some of the functions on installations recommended for closure or realignment are operated by contractors' employees. When we asked what is the appropriate way to count these job losses, you offered to provide a response. Please provide your answer.

## EXCESS CAPACITY / CROSS SERVICE

1. When discussing Joint Cross Service Group recommendations, Commissioner Kling addressed the subject of GAO's review of Wilford Hall and excess capacity in the San Antonio, TX area.

Do you agree with the Air Force's decision not to downsize Wilford Hall Medical Center?

Do you believe the issue of excess hospital bed capacity (both military and civilian) in the San Antonio area warrants further study?

2. Mr. Kling also discussed the number of small, close-proximity military hospitals around the country.

Do you believe the DoD missed opportunities to close, realign, or consolidate services at small military hospitals?

3. One early Joint Cross Service Group decision was to separate the evaluation of research and development activities (Labs) from test and evaluation activities (T&E).

What is your view on the decision to separate these functions?

To what extent did that result in retaining excess capacity / infrastructure?

4. According to the DoD closure and realignment report, the Services concluded that the need to preserve "core" test facilities precluded major closures, and that cross-servicing of T&E functions would not be cost effective.

What is GAO's view on the controversy over the "core" alternatives suggested by the T&E Joint Cross Service Group?

What happened in the process that resulted in Service non-responsiveness?

5. Commissioner J. B. Davis asked Mr. Holman to define GAO's recommendation for the Commission to review the DoD recommendation on Letterkenny Army Depot. The GAO report expresses concerns that the BRAC 95 recommendation represents a change to the BRAC 93 decision consolidating tactical missile maintenance.

What is the impact of the separation of missile disassembly/storage at Letterkenny, guidance systems at Tobyhanna, and ground support equipment (including trucks and trailers) at Anniston?

Do the Army assumptions and associated costs for the Letterkenny recommendation appear to support the recommendation? Are there additional costs associated with the Letterkenny recommendation? What is the impact of these costs on the ROI?

## ARMY

1. The Army's cost data concerning Fort McClellan, AL includes barracks construction expenditures at Fort Leonard Wood, MO to accommodate joint-service training, and costs at other bases to move basic training out of Fort Leonard Wood. None of these moves (or costs) is required by the Army's realignment recommendation.

Please review Fort McClellan's Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) analysis and provide your opinion on the inclusion of discretionary costs.

2. Chairman Dixon noted concerns over Army recommendations that dealt primarily with closing family housing areas, especially in view of recent SECDEF comments on housing inadequacies. At issue is the costs to upgrade and maintain family housing versus the costs and availability of suitable housing on the local economy.

Please provide the Commission with GAO's analyses of the cost alternatives regarding the Army's recommendations to close family housing at Price Support Center, Fort Totten, Fort Buchanan, Army Garrison - Selfridge, and Dugway's English Village Housing Area.

3. The Army recommended consolidating its Baltimore and St. Louis Publications Centers at St. Louis.

Please examine the possibility of consolidating all DoD publications centers, and provide the results of your examination to the Commission.

4. In discussion with Commissioner Cornella, you noted GAO was aware that Fort Indiantown Gap, PA community groups had submitted alternate cost data challenging Service estimates.

Please provide your analysis of new COBRA data provided by the community on Fort Indiantown Gap.

5. The GAO report cites errors found in the data supporting recommendations on ammunition storage depots.

In your view, would correction of the errors justify changing the Army's recommendations for closure of ammunition storage installations?

6. The General Service Administration has stated that the Army's recommendation to disestablish the Aviation-Troop Support Command and relocate its functions to four different locations will result in a potential increase in Federal facilities costs of over \$130 million in a 10-year period.

Does GAO agree with GSA's contention? Please provide your rationale.

## NAVY

1. Please provide for the record the work GAO has done studying options available to the Navy to maintain attack submarine force structure levels.

## AIR FORCE

1. The Air Force made a “conditional” recommendation to inactivate the missile group at Grand Forks AFB--unless the Secretary of Defense determined that ABM Treaty considerations preclude the recommendation.

What are your views on a “conditional” recommendation to the Commission?

2. In December 1994, GAO issued a report concerning the Newark AFB Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center, which was closed by the 1993 Commission. The report challenged the Air Force attempts to privatize the Center’s workload in place and recommended the Secretaries of the Air Force and Defense reevaluate the 1993 DoD recommendation to close and challenged the Air Force’s approach to implementing the recommendation through privatization-in-place.

Given that the Air Force and the Department of Defense did not request the Commission to redirect its 1993 recommendation and given that the Air Force appears not to have fully investigated other approaches to the 1993 recommendation other than privatization in place, do you believe that the Secretary of Defense has substantially deviated from the eight Selection Criteria or the Force Structure in not requesting a redirect of the Newark AFB?

Do you believe the Commission should revise the 1993 recommendation to close Newark AFB?

3. The GAO report states “the Air Force may not have considered other issues regarding those facilities that are scheduled to remain at Kirtland.”

What are the “other issues”?

4. The Air Force’s Base Closure Executive Group deliberated and voted on base closures for both Active and Reserve Components.

Please assess the impact of changing base ownership from the Active Component to the Reserve Component.

5. The Services must consider the DoD Force Structure Plan when making closure and realignment recommendations to this Commission.

How did the Air Force use the Force Structure Plan regarding the Reserve Components in making its base closure and realignment recommendations.

6. In discussion with Commissioner Steele, Mr. Hinton noted that a final study of the Air Force's scoring of selection criteria number 1 regarding Reese AFB has just been completed.

Please provide GAO's analysis of your review of the Air Force's final study.

7. GAO reviewed the Air Force's data and analysis on projected workloads of total available capacity at Electronic Combat facilities (particularly the AFEWES and REDCAP missions).

Do you agree with the Air Force recommendation to disestablish these two facilities?

## DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

1. Congressman Robert Borski, PA, requested the Commission review the DoD recommendation to disestablish the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) based on his believe that:

Significant cost omissions in the COBRA for DISC, including the cost of transferring items and the cost of delaying the BRAC93 realignment of the Defense Personnel Support Center to the Aviation Supply Office compound.

The methodology used to determine the amount of positions that would be eliminated under various ICP scenarios, which is the basis for the preponderance of savings, is patently illogical and contradicts common sense.

What are your views on the disestablishment of DISC?

What is your assessment of Congressman Borski's contentions? If you have responded to Congressman Borski concerning this DoD recommendation, please provide a copy of your response to the Commission.

### **COST OF BASE REALIGNMENT ACTIONS (COBRA)**

1. During testimony questions, the rationale and effects of cost estimate discount rates was a topic of discussion.

Does GAO have a recommendation on a discount rate the Commission should use in preparing its cost analyses?

### **BUSINESS EXECUTIVES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT**

1. During testimony questions, GAO expressed concern over the DoD's decision to place 12 new Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) offices on bases previously slated to close as a result of prior base closure rounds.

Please provide for the record a copy of GAO's current draft report on the Defense Finance and Accounting Service.



## QUESTIONS FROM CONGRESSMAN RICHARD GEPHARDT

1. The General Accounting Office report states that the Army “did not fully adhere to its regular process for installations in assessing military value when recommending...leased facilities for closure.” It specifically notes that the “ Army did not prepare installation assessments for leased facilities.”

Is it true the Army’s installation assessment consisted of an evaluation based on the four DoD military value criteria?

If so, were leased facilities therefore excluded from an evaluation based on these four criteria?

It is true that the base closure law requires the Army to make closure recommendations on the basis of the DoD criteria?

2. In response to a question by the Commission, the Army stated its leaders considered the military value of the Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) in their deliberations. The community in which ATCOM is located contends that no such consideration occurred.

Did the General Accounting Office find any evidence that the Army’s leaders considered the specific military value of ATCOM in their deliberations?

Is it legitimate for the Army to claim that vacating leased facilities owned by the General Services Administration will result in a savings to the government?

## QUESTIONS FROM CONGRESSMAN GERRY E. STUDDS

1. In recommending NAS South Weymouth for closure, the Navy has apparently overlooked two facilities (NAS Atlanta and NAS Fort Worth) with a lower "military value", according to the Navy's own criteria. In the case of NAS Atlanta--which is significantly lower in military value than South Weymouth and was initially considered for closure-- the Navy has argued that the area is "rich in demographics" and should remain open. Yet the Navy's own Military Value matrix for reserve Air Stations rates NAS Atlanta last and NAS South Weymouth first in demographics.
2. In its 1993 report to the BRAC, the GAO identified a "problem" with the Navy's process in instances when " a base recommended for closure, even though its military value was rated higher than bases that remained open." I see no reason that these concerns would not be relevant to the Navy in 1995. While the GAO's 1995 report describes the Navy's recommendations as "generally sound," does the GAO continue to view the Navy's disregard for military value--particularly in the case of South Weymouth--as a problem in its decision-making process?

**QUESTIONS FROM CONGRESSMAN HAROLD FORD, SENATOR BILL FRIST, AND  
SENATOR FRED THOMPSON**

1. The Department of Defense and Defense Logistics Agency created a 1,000 point ranking system to evaluate its distribution depots. Within this 1,000 point system, only 20 points related to a depot's transportation capabilities. Does GAO believe it was appropriate to allocate only 2 percent of the evaluation of a *distribution* depot to the issue of *transportation* capabilities?
2. How can the GAO validate DLA's procedures when the installation military value rankings placed the oldest depot with the highest real property maintenance as the top installation? Shouldn't this result have sent a red flag to the GAO that mission scope was skewing the military value analysis?
3. Did the GAO analyze DoD's process of selecting DLA depots for closure that are collocated with other service branch bases?

## QUESTIONS FROM CONGRESSMAN WALLY HERGER

1. Do you know of any instances, other than Sierra Army Depot, where a Member of Congress needed to resort to FOIA in order to obtain supposedly public information from the Army?
2. Please confirm that GAO report statements cited below apply in the case of Sierra Army Depot:

“GAO has identified a number of instances where projected savings from base closures and realignments may fluctuate or be uncertain for a variety of reasons. They include uncertainties over future locations of activities that must move from installations being closed or realigned and errors in standard cost factors used in the services’ analyses.” (p. 5)

“The other realignment...is caught up in debate over the accuracy of some data.” (p. 75)

“Also, some questions were raised concerning the accuracy of some data used in the military value analysis for ammunition storage installations.” (p. 77)

“Community concerns about the development of military value for ammunition storage installations centered around the accuracy of some of the information used to score all of the installations. Specifically data in two of the attributes were questioned – ammunition storage and total buildable acres...Our follow-up and that of the Army’s seem to support the existence of some data inaccuracies; however, the correct information has not yet been ascertained...The Commission may want to ensure that the corrected data has been obtained and assessed prior to making a final decision on this recommendation.” (p. 78)

“Also, some questions remain about the accuracy of some data used in assessing Army ammunition depots. Therefore, we recommend that the Commission ensure that the Army’s ammunition depot recommendations are based upon accurate and consistent information and that corrected data would not materially affect military value assessments and final recommendations.” (p. 86)

3. Did you independently verify that Army data was certified by viewing either original data call information and/or signed letters of certification?
4. Did you review the procedure by which installations were allowed to review, correct, and verify data? Did you talk to any installation personnel or only Army Audit Agency and WDC officials?
5. Do you still contend, in light of Army failure to provide information on inconsistencies, that the Army Audit Agency corrected all discrepancies (as noted in footnote on P. 72)?
6. If the Army cannot even provide basic information, how can it be certified as required by law?

7. If a facility cannot be closed (by the Army's own admission because it houses the three largest operational project stock missions), then shouldn't it be more fully utilized?

Particularly if it is located closer to port, rail, and highway and air than the other two depots in the region? And if the storage capacity figures turn out to be substantially incorrect in terms of the Tier I facility in the West?

8. Has the Army documented the fact that it can complete all demilitarization at SIAD prior to 2001? If so, why could they not complete chemical demilitarization at two regional depots within the designated timeframe?
9. Since the Army is required by law (BRAC: PL 101-510, as amended) to evaluate all facilities equally for closure consideration, why were five facilities exempted early in the process (three for military value and two for inability to meet closure parameters)?
10. Since GAO states in their report (p. 79) that "Army installations/facilities selected for closure or realignment generally had relatively small one-time closing costs and provided almost immediate savings after completing the closure."

If it was learned that the one-time closing costs would be significantly higher and not provide the proposed long term savings, would GAO agree that a decision should be reconsidered?

11. Has the Army provided specific data regarding transport cost of ammunition from SIAD to destination locations?
12. Why is 5% or more unemployment produced by closure considered unacceptable in populous areas (where diversity and recovery are more likely) and a 10% unemployment result in an entire county considered acceptable?

Especially since GAO indicates (p. 145) that "...there was no evidence to support OSD's assumption that economic recovery would be more difficult in a large metropolitan area than in a smaller one."



United States  
General Accounting Office  
Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and  
International Affairs Division

95042413

May 5, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon, Chairman  
The Defense Base Closure and  
Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Re: 950424-13

Dear Chairman Dixon:

Following our testimony before your Commission on April 17, 1995, you requested that we respond to numerous additional questions pertaining to the base realignment and closure process. Enclosed are our answers to those questions.

Sincerely yours,

Henry L. Hinton, Jr.  
Assistant Comptroller General

Enclosure

## COSTS

Question: GAO previously criticized DOD's decision to expend no effort capturing the total costs to government of BRAC recommendations. You cited the example of Kirtland AFB where DOD might not have captured total costs. Please provide your estimate of the costs to the U.S. Government for the DOD proposal to realign Kirtland AFB.

Answer: The Air Force's ongoing reassessments do not allow us to give such an estimate. However, available information indicates that the Air Force's initial estimate of \$62 million a year in recurring savings is overstated from a government-wide cost perspective. This is because the Air Force did not reflect between approximately \$18 and \$31 million in annual operating costs identified in subsequent Air Force and Department of Energy (DOE) studies identifying the costs required to support a DOE cantonment at Kirtland. The above variance results from DOE's assumption that it must independently establish base support operations for its cantonment while the Air Force study indicated a lower estimate of incremental Air Force cost to support DOE as part of the planned remaining active Air Force cantonment under a host-tenant relationship.

Additionally, the Air Force now recognizes that it overstated personnel savings by 179 personnel which we calculate overstated savings by about \$7 million using average Air Force salary factors. However, the Air Force has not yet recognized increased salary costs of about \$6 million that could be required if Kirtland transitioned to a largely civilian operated facility. These latter costs are based on our review of Phillips Laboratory and Kirtland Underground Munitions Storage Complex analyses. Further, the Air Force's one-time cost estimate of \$278 million for the realignment could increase significantly, including between \$18 and \$64 million in estimated one-time DOE costs depending on the host-tenant relationship, and \$227 million in DOD construction costs depending on the final results of Air Force site surveys and reviews. Air Force officials cautioned that both their initial cost and savings estimates, and the revised site survey data, are subject to on-going reviews, refinement, and consideration of other options that will continue for some time.

## DOD SELECTION CRITERIA

Question 1: Written guidance for the selection process was provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to the services. What is GAO's opinion of the OSD guidance? Did you detect instances of substantial deviation from the Secretary's guidance by the Joint Cross Service Groups or by the Services?

Answer: Our report noted some areas where there were

inconsistencies in some services' application of policy guidance or established processes, such as the Navy's action in applying economic impact criteria. More generally, however, we found that DOD components and cross-service groups adhered to OSD guidance and their internal decision-making processes. We recognize, however, that under law, the determination of "substantial deviation" is committed solely to the Commission's discretion.

OSD guidance provided an important framework for BRAC decision-making by the services. At the same time, it was sufficiently broad that it permitted the components to establish decision-making processes unique to their individual organizations. An important element of consistency between BRAC rounds resulted from DOD's decision to retain the same eight selection criteria in BRAC 1995 as it used in both the 1991 and 1993 rounds. Much of the guidance OSD issued for BRAC 1995 was similar to that issued for BRAC 1993. In general, this guidance has improved with each BRAC round. The Joint Cross-Service Groups were new in BRAC 1995, and OSD guidance pertaining to them likewise was also new.

#### ECONOMIC IMPACT

Question 1: Some of the functions on installations recommended for closure or realignment are operated by contractors' employees. When we asked what is the appropriate way to count these job losses, you offered to provide a response. Please provide your answer.

Answer: The portion of overhead costs (base operating support) attributable to contractor or non-appropriated fund employees is included in COBRA for BRAC 1995; that cost was not included in COBRA in prior BRAC rounds. Also, on-base contractors (those in support of a base's mission) are counted in the economic impact database in a manner similar to civilian employees. They are included in the calculation with multipliers for civilians. Sub-contractors were considered as part of indirect impact as were off-base contractors. This approach makes sense from a consistency standpoint, since it is similar to the manner in which military and civilian employees are counted.

#### EXCESS CAPACITY/CROSS SERVICE

Question 1: When discussing Joint Cross-Service Group recommendations, Commissioner Kling addressed the subject of GAO's review of Wilford Hall and excess capacity in the San Antonio, TX area. Do you agree with the Air Force's decision not to downsize Wilford Hall Medical Center? Do you believe the issue of excess hospital bed capacity (both military and civilian) in the San Antonio area warrants further study?



Answer: As we stated in our report,<sup>1</sup> a crucial task facing the Congress and DOD as they plan for the future of the military health services system is reaching agreement on the size and structure of the medical force needed to meet wartime requirements. Also, as we have noted, several key variables that greatly affect the wartime demand for medical care are still a matter of debate, making it difficult to prescribe the extent of additional infrastructure reductions that could or should be undertaken at this time. Further study of excess hospital bed capacity is certainly warranted as requirements become more clearly defined. However, at this time, we have not studied, nor are we able to definitively establish within the short time remaining in the 1995 BRAC process, the amount of military and civilian excess hospital bed capacity in the San Antonio, Texas area.

Question 2: Mr. Kling also discussed the number of small, close-proximity military hospitals around the country. Do you believe the DOD missed opportunities to close, realign, or consolidate services at small military hospitals?

Answer: As discussed in question one above, until DOD resolves the requirements issue, conclusive answers are not possible. However, DOD still has the opportunity to close, realign, or consolidate services at small hospitals outside of the BRAC process. Many hospitals or the realignment of some larger facilities would fall below the current BRAC threshold of authorized civilian positions.

Question 3: One early Joint Cross-Service Group decision was to separate the evaluation of research and development activities (Labs) from test and evaluation (T&E) activities. What is your view on the decision to separate these functions? To what extent did that result in retaining excess capacity/infrastructure?

Answer: If there are further BRAC rounds these two functions should not be separated. One of the problems DOD officials identified in this area was the separation of test and evaluation and laboratory functions between two cross-service groups. This created artificial barriers around the functions and facilities that each group could consider. While it would appear that this was a contributing factor affecting the retention of excess capacity/infrastructure in this area, sufficient data is not available to accurately quantify its impact.

---

<sup>1</sup>Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 1995 Process and Recommendations for Closure and Realignment (GAO/NSIAD-95-133, Apr. 14, 1995).

Question 4: According to the DOD closure and realignment report, the services concluded that the need to preserve "core" test facilities precluded major closures, and that cross-servicing of T&E functions would not be cost effective. What is GAO's view on the controversy over the "core" alternatives suggested by the T&E Joint Cross-Service Group? What happened in the process that resulted in service non-responsiveness?

Answer: Because the services did not completely analyze the core set of alternatives developed by the chairpersons of the cross-service group for test and evaluation, we suggest that the Commission have the services complete detailed analyses, including cost analyses, of these alternatives for its consideration. Since the cross-service group identified a large amount of excess capacity and analyzed certified data collected within the BRAC process, the Commission may find it useful to know if the core alternatives were feasible and cost-effective options.

Question 5: Commissioner J.B. Davis asked Mr. Holman to define GAO's recommendation for the Commission to review the DOD recommendation on Letterkenny Army Depot. The GAO report expresses concerns that the BRAC 95 recommendation represents a change to the BRAC 93 decision consolidating tactical missile maintenance. What is the impact of the separation of missile disassembly/storage at Letterkenny, guidance systems at Tobyhanna, and ground support equipment (including trucks and trailers) at Anniston? Do the Army assumptions and associated costs for the Letterkenny recommendation appear to support the recommendation? Are there additional costs associated with the Letterkenny recommendation? What is the impact of these costs on the ROI?

Answer: As we indicated in our report, we identified about \$3 to \$5 million in additional costs to implement the realignment than indicated by the Army. We are also aware, as we indicated in our testimony, that the Army is currently developing an implementation plan for the realignment. The process of developing this plan should identify any operational impacts and impediments to its implementation, as well as additional costs. For that reason, we suggest that the Commission obtain a briefing on the implementation plan and updated cost data from the Army in the late May or early June 1995 timeframe to more completely assess the operational and cost factors and the impact on the Army's projected return on investment. Until this information is provided, the feasibility of the maintenance concept and cost implications cannot be fully determined.

#### ARMY

Question 1: The Army's cost data concerning Fort McClellan, Alabama includes barracks construction expenditures at Fort Leonard Wood, MO to accommodate joint-service training, and costs at other

bases to move basic training out of Fort Leonard Wood. None of these moves (or costs) is required by the Army's realignment recommendation. Please review Fort McClellan's Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) analysis and provide your opinion on the inclusion of discretionary costs.

Answer: According to an Army official, the Inter-Service Training Review Organization (ITRO) construction included in this recommendation is necessary because ITRO personnel are currently housed in permanent party facilities planned for use by incoming Fort McClellan personnel. According to the Army, the ITRO personnel in question should be housed in trainee barracks which are less costly to renovate to required standard. To ensure that both permanent party and trainee personnel are in adequate facilities, ITRO personnel are expected to occupy renovated trainee barracks. An Army official told us that there is some indication that the construction costs may have been overestimated. However, the Army is currently reviewing this situation and has indicated that appropriate adjustments will be made as needed.

Also, an Army official told us that they included discretionary moves in the COBRA submitted to the Commission because they believed that this provided a more accurate picture of the cost of executing this recommendation. However, this official also indicated that the Army's Training and Doctrine Command may determine that there is a better way of breaking out student loads during the execution phase. A number of options are currently being explored as part of the implementation phase. Options which may develop from implementation planning could warrant revising COBRA analyses at a later date. However, the Army believes that at present the current COBRA analysis provides the most viable analysis.

Question 2: Chairman Dixon noted concerns over Army recommendations that dealt primarily with closing family housing areas, especially in view of recent SecDef comments on housing inadequacies. At issue is the cost to upgrade and maintain family housing versus the cost and availability of suitable housing on the local economy. Please provide the Commission with GAO's analyses of the cost alternatives regarding the Army's recommendations to close family housing at Price Support Center, Fort Totten, Fort Buchanan, Army Garrison-Selfridge, and Dugway's English Village Housing Area.

Answer: This issue was not covered in the scope of our review. However, based on inquiries made since the April 17, 1995 hearing, we noted the following. The family housing in question is located on what the Army considers to be installations that are of low military value and that it no longer requires. Initial Army studies showed that these facilities can be closed at savings to the Army. Subsequently, the issue was raised regarding non-Army

personnel who reside in the family housing in question. The cost impact of such personnel was not included in some of the Army's original COBRA data. The Army has now adjusted its COBRA analysis to include increased BAQ/VHA for those personnel which will be forced to relocate on the local economy. The effect of this was that BAQ/VHA recurring costs were increased by \$4.2 million. There was no change in the return on investment years as a result of the increased costs.

Housing is currently an area of major concern in the Department of Defense. In recent congressional testimony, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations) said that 12 percent of military families living in civilian communities are in substandard housing. One reason cited for this is cost. Families who live off base receive about 21 percent less in allowances than they pay on the average for their housing. Families in government housing do not have this additional expense. On the other hand, the Deputy Assistant Secretary pointed out that there are also serious problems with government owned housing. The inventory is aging--average age of military housing is 33 years--and about 250,000 unsuitable houses need to be fixed up or closed.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary went on to say that DOD is collaborating with the services to develop and use both private capital and private sector management techniques to meet the Department's housing requirements. They are looking at such things as joint public/private housing ventures and sale/lease-back arrangements.

In view of the above statements, we believe it would be appropriate for the Commission to request DOD to explain how its BRAC recommendations affecting the Army's military family housing fit into overall concerns about and plans for addressing family housing needs.

Question 3: The Army recommended consolidating its Baltimore and St. Louis Publications Center at St. Louis. Please examine the possibility of consolidating all DOD publications centers, and provide the results of your examination to the Commission.

Answer: Such an examination is not possible in the timeframe available. However, information available within DOD indicates the following. A 1994 DOD-wide Business Process Reengineering Task Force recommended that a study be undertaken to determine the best alternative for carrying out the missions of the services' and Defense Logistics Agency's publication distribution centers--there are 18 such centers. The DOD study, which is expected to take eight months to complete, is expected to begin in late 1995. It is expected to examine the consolidation potential and the impact of long-term alternatives such as electronic forms creation. Adoption of an electronic forms alternative could radically change the

business process for publications management from storing paper in warehouses to storing digital files in data centers and thus create the potential for increased infrastructure reductions in the future.

The Army recommended the closure of its Baltimore Publication Center because, in its estimation, it is no longer needed, and it could no longer afford two separate distribution centers. In view of the upcoming study, and potential changes, Army officials continue to express the view that closure of the Baltimore Publication Center is a sound decision and will not adversely impact any future DOD consolidations. The Army believes that as DOD continues to downsize and as the publication management process further changes, the demand for storage space will continue to significantly decrease. Our work on other storage capacity issues shows that space reduction can be achieved by using compact discs. (See Space Operations: Archiving Space Science Data Needs Further Management Improvements (GAO/NSIAD-94-25, Dec. 9, 1993.)

Question 4: In discussion with Commissioner Cornella, you noted GAO was aware that Fort Indiantown Gap, PA community groups had submitted alternate cost data challenging Service estimates. Please provide your analysis of new COBRA data provided by the community on Fort Indiantown Gap.

Answer: The Fort Indiantown Gap community raised several concerns about the accuracy and reasonableness of the Army's cost data. We analyzed each of the concerns including average annual civilian salary expenses, base operating support costs, operating funds and real property that will remain at Fort Indiantown Gap to support a National Guard enclave, and travel costs to satisfy National Guard training requirements. As part of our analysis, we also reran the COBRA using the community's cost estimates.

Based on data available at this time, we believe that the Army's recommendation to close Fort Indiantown Gap continues to project a significant cost savings. We found no indication that the Army deviated from its standard data sources and methodologies to project the savings that would result from this closing action. We were not able to validate the cost estimates cited by the community; however, for purposes of making a sensitivity assessment, we employed their figures in a COBRA run to assess their impact. We found that if the community's cost estimates were valid, the return on investment (ROI) associated with closing Fort Indiantown Gap would remain approximately one year; the net present value over 20 years would decrease from \$281.5 million to \$90.6 million. However, discussions remain ongoing between Army and Fort Indiantown Gap officials to reconcile differences in their cost data.

Question 5: The GAO report cites errors found in the data supporting recommendations on ammunition storage depots. In your view, would correction of the errors justify changing the Army's recommendations for closure of ammunition storage installations?

Answer: As indicated in our report, we performed some sensitivity tests on the ammunition storage installation data. We basically used lower data amounts from the 1993 BRAC round and found that those tests did not materially change the relative rankings of the facilities. However, we cannot conclusively say that the rankings would not change without knowing the results of applying correct data for these facilities.

Question 6: The General Services Administration has stated that the Army's recommendation to disestablish the Aviation-Troop Support Command and relocate its functions to four different locations will result in a potential increase in Federal facilities costs of over \$130 million in a 10-year period. Does GAO agree with GSA's contention? Please provide your rationale.

Answer: GSA has stated that the Federal Government would incur significant costs if ATCOM's missions are shifted to other Army locations. Some of these costs are already recognized by the Army and reflected in its COBRA analyses. For example, COBRA does contain about \$59 million in military construction costs, most at Redstone Arsenal, that would be required to implement the realignment. The Army's COBRA assessment for this realignment also recognizes additional facility base operating costs of \$11 million at the new locations, compared to \$7.6 million for the current GSA lease. Other costs cited by GSA are not included in the Army's COBRA analyses. For example, GSA suggests that an additional \$10 million will be required to move the remaining tenants at the ATCOM site after the realignment. We have not validated that estimate but have assessed its impact on the Army's projected 20-year net present value (NPV) from the realignment; we found that it decreased the 20-year NPV by \$9 million and increased the return on investment (ROI) period from 3 to 4 years.

GSA has suggested that tenants that remained at the GSA facility in St. Louis could incur an additional recurring annual rental cost of \$3 million since overhead costs will continue to be allocated among the tenants who remained at the facility. It is not known whether the remaining tenants would absorb such an increase or decide to relocate elsewhere.

While facilities costs are important, a more significant factor affecting the Army's projected costs and savings from this realignment involves personnel costs. Under the Army's COBRA analysis, a significant portion of the projected cost savings are derived from reduced personnel costs resulting from the realignment. By collocating aviation and troop support commodity

functions with their research and development/testing functions, the Army estimates that significant personnel reductions will occur and are expected to more than offset the costs associated with implementing the recommendation.

## NAVY

Question: Please provide for the record the work GAO has done studying options available to the Navy to maintain attack submarine force structure levels.

Answer: Recent GAO studies have examined this topic. (See Attack Submarines: Alternatives for a More Affordable SSN Force Structure (GAO/NSIAD-95-16, Oct. 13, 1994) and Navy Shipbuilding Programs: Nuclear Attack Submarine Requirements (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-120, Mar. 16, 1995). Several options for maintaining attack submarine forces were presented in these reports. Most of these options involve cancellation of construction of SSN-23, the third boat in the Seawolf class, or deferment of construction on a less expensive follow-on submarine. We are on record as questioning continuation of the Seawolf program in its current form on fiscal grounds and have disagreed with Navy concerns about losing the submarine industrial base, should further SSN construction be deferred.

We are much less certain about an assessment of the submarine threat and subsequent future SSN force structure requirements. The Navy has stated that the continuing improvement in Russian attack submarines represents a capability it must be prepared to counter. In addition, the threat posed by increasingly capable Third World diesel-electric submarines is viewed by the Navy as an important consideration in continuing to improve US SSNs.

## AIR FORCE

Question 1: The Air Force made a "conditional" recommendation to inactivate the missile group at Grand Forks AFB--unless the Secretary of Defense determined that ABM Treaty considerations preclude the recommendation. What are your views on a "conditional" recommendation to the Commission?

Answer: The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended, does not address "conditional" recommendations such as this one. The Secretary's recommendations must be based on the final criteria and the force-structure plan, and that evaluation appears to have been done here for both bases. The outcome of that evaluation indicates that Grand Forks was the preferred base for realignment except for the complicating factor of treaty considerations.

Question 2: In December 1994, GAO issued a report concerning the Newark AFB Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center, which was closed by the 1993 Commission. The report challenged the Air Force attempts to privatize the Center's workload in place and recommended the Secretaries of the Air Force and Defense reevaluate the 1993 DOD recommendation to close and challenged the Air Force's approach to implementing the recommendation through privatization-in-place. Given that the Air Force and the Department of Defense did not request the Commission to redirect its 1993 recommendation and given that the Air Force appears not to have fully investigated other approaches to the 1993 recommendation other than privatization in place, do you believe that the Secretary of Defense has substantially deviated from the eight selection criteria or the force structure in not requesting a redirect of the Newark AFB? Do you believe the Commission should revise the 1993 recommendation to close Newark AFB?

Answer: While the Commission can make changes to a recommendation of the Secretary of Defense upon a determination of "substantial deviation" from the final criteria and force structure plan (section 2903(e)(2)(B)), there is a question of whether there can be a "substantial deviation" determination where, as here, no Secretarial recommendation is made and what is at issue is the recommendation of a prior BRAC Commission. In any event, the determination of "substantial deviation" is committed solely to the Commission's discretion. Consequently, GAO has not developed standards for such a determination and is not in a position to express an opinion at this time on what constitutes a "substantial deviation."

In light of the matters raised in our report on Newark AFB, we believe the Secretaries of the Air Force and Defense should have recommended Commission reconsideration of the 1993 Newark AFB closure.

Question 3: The GAO report states "the Air Force may not have considered other issues regarding those facilities that are scheduled to remain at Kirtland." What are the "other issues"?

Answer: The other issues deal with whether the Air Force gave adequate consideration to sensitive security and operational matters for the Kirtland Underground Munitions Storage Complex. There are issues related to perimeter security; the provision of security personnel, either military or civilian; and the adequate and timely provision for backup alert personnel in the event of an emergency. Additionally, there are indications that conversion of the facility largely to a civilian operation could make it subject to more stringent and costly Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) provisions than are currently encountered by the military operation.



Question 4: The Air Force's Base Closure Executive Group deliberated and voted on base closures for both Active and Reserve Components. Please assess the impact of changing base ownership from the Active Component to the Reserve Component.

Answer: Changing base ownership from active to reserve components may result in overall savings to the active component. However, it will result in the shifting of some base operating costs to the reserve component; the amount would depend upon the size of the cantonment area. Since 1988, BRAC recommendations have converted portions of at least 6 active-duty Air Force bases to reserve component bases. These conversions generally consist of closing most of the base and leaving an existing reserve component unit in cantonment. Therefore, while some operating costs remain, the overall cost of operating the remaining portions of the bases should decrease in line with the smaller cantonment areas.

Question 5: The Services must consider the DOD Force Structure Plan when making closure and realignment recommendations to this Commission. How did the Air Force use the Force Structure Plan regarding the Reserve Components in making its base closure and realignment recommendations?

Answer: Based on our review of minutes of the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group's meetings, it appears that the Executive Group considered, to some extent, the force structure plan during its deliberations regarding the Air Force Reserve. Documentation is less clear regarding the Air Guard where the minutes indicate that primary consideration focused on achieving cost saving opportunities.

Question 6: In discussion with Commissioner Steele, Mr. Hinton noted that a final study of the Air Force's scoring of selection criteria number 1 regarding Reese AFB has just been completed. Please provide GAO's analysis of your review of the Air Force's final study.

Answer: This assessment of criteria 1 was predicated on community concerns raised concerning the Air Force's evaluation of Reese. We discussed the community concerns with cognizant Air Force officials. Particular emphasis was given to criterion 1 (mission requirements) since it showed the greatest differentiation among the Air Force bases. The community had pointed out what it considered to be errors in the Air Force's scoring in the measurements of mission requirements such as airspace, weather, and airfield pavement.

We noted that the Air Force has addressed the issues raised by the community and that changes were made to the functional values where appropriate. For example, the community pointed out data call

differences between Air Force and Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG) measurements of available airspace. However, Air Force officials indicated that their data base was not used; instead they opted to use cross-service group functional values as the basis for criterion 1 scores. However, some of Reese's areas with 11,000 feet of altitude were credited with 9,000 feet due to transcribing errors. The Air Force also agreed with the community's finding that Reese should receive credit for two additional areas and for having an alert area. The Air Force provided data showing that the net total effect of making these airspace corrections would increase Reese's functional value by only about 0.08 point.

We also noted that some of the community issues came from non-certified data or data otherwise not part of the Air Force's BRAC process. For example, the community questioned why Reese fell from being the Air Force's "second highest ranked UPT base" during BRAC 1991 to the lowest ranked UPT base in BRAC 1995. An Air Force official told us that they did not rank these bases as part of their BRAC process in 1991 or 1995.

The Air Force has concluded that the net effect of incorporating the community's valid points would only increase Reese's average functional score by less than 1.5 percent and would have no impact on its recommendation to close Reese AFB. Based on available information, the Air Force's actions in addressing the issues in question appear reasonable.

Question 7: GAO reviewed the Air Force's data and analysis on projected workloads of total available capacity at Electronic Combat facilities (particularly the AFEWES and REDCAP missions). Do you agree with the Air Force recommendation to disestablish these two facilities?

Answer: Neither of these facilities were originally considered by the Air Force in its own BRAC review process because they did not meet the DOD BRAC threshold of 300 authorized civilian personnel. The Air Force considered them for disestablishment because they were suggested to them as alternatives by the Test and Evaluation Cross-Service Group. Available information indicates that REDCAP consists of government-owned equipment located in a contractor facility and AFEWES is a government-owned/contractor-operated facility. The cross-service group reported that realigning both of these facilities to other bases met its policy imperative of migrating workload to core activities. The cross-service group found that the future projected workload at each of these two facilities was less than 30 percent of facility capacity. The cross-service group's analysis shows that disestablishing these two facilities will eliminate nearly all identified excess capacity in one test category.

The Air Force's recommendation was to relocate the facilities' unique workloads to existing facilities at Edwards AFB, California. It indicated that the remaining workloads are duplicated elsewhere and are not needed. Based on available documentation, we found no information to suggest that these were not viable recommendations.

#### DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

Question: Congressman Robert Borski, PA, requested that the Commission review the DOD recommendation to disestablish the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) based on his belief that: (1) there were significant cost omissions in the COBRA for DISC, including the cost of transferring items and the cost of delaying the BRAC 93 realignment of the Defense Personnel Support Center to the Aviation Supply Office compound; and (2) the methodology used to determine the amount of positions that would be eliminated under various ICP scenarios, which is the basis for the preponderance of savings, is patently illogical and contradicts common sense. What are your views on the disestablishment of DISC? What is your assessment of Congressman Borski's contentions?

Answer: We are unable to comment on whether every item should be moved or not, and what the associated costs are likely to be. However, it is our view that to the extent the movements occur as a direct result of the BRAC recommendation, we believe they should be accounted for in DLA's analysis. In addition, we also believe that some costs associated with delaying the BRAC 1993 realignment of DPSC to the ASO compound in North Philadelphia should have been captured in DLA's analysis. Unfortunately, a precise determination of these costs is difficult to determine at this time. However, we performed a sensitivity analysis to broadly assess the potential impact of these costs on DLA's recommendation. We found that capturing these costs, even under what appears to be a worst case scenario, still results in significant savings from this recommendation.

DLA officials have indicated that they do not believe that the cost of transferring items (i.e., historical hard copy data, technical drawings and ancillary records) is relevant to the BRAC process because this transfer would occur regardless of which ICP was disestablished. During 1995 BRAC Executive Group meetings the driving force behind DLA's ICP decisions was the fact that excess capacity existed and that one or two ICPs could be disestablished. DLA officials stated that another reason why it did not consider these costs in its 1995 process was because the costs associated with the transfer of items from the Defense Electrical Supply Center to Columbus, Ohio, as a result of BRAC 1993 were not included in that cost analysis.

DISC personnel believe that the costs associated with the transfer of items between ICPs as a result of the 1995 BRAC action should

have been considered. They contend that if it were not for BRAC, this transfer of DISC items would not occur. They believe it will cost about \$66 million to physically transfer DISC items. DLA contends that greater reliance on commercial practices requires changes in item management assignments, whether or not an ICP is eliminated as a result of BRAC. And, while eliminating an ICP results in a greater volume of movement, the increase would occur regardless of which ICP was disestablished. DLA officials believe that the associated costs would be much less than \$66 million, because most items will be transferred electronically as opposed to the physical transfer that DISC personnel describe. This official stated that the actual number of items and associated costs will be determined during BRAC 1995 implementation. Implementation planning is currently underway.

During a 1995 BRAC Executive Group meeting, the cost of delaying the BRAC 1993 realignment of the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) to the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) compound was discussed. According to the Chief of the BRAC Working Group at that time, she had received guidance from OSD on how to address this issue in the 1995 BRAC round. Based on this guidance, DLA only claimed as savings the military construction costs avoided, and not the associated real property maintenance (RPMA) and payroll costs associated with the number of people required to maintain the facility for an additional two years. DLA officials told us that they sought OSD guidance because (1) the move to the ASO compound was still within the BRAC 1993 timeframe and they were unsure whether any costs and savings could be attributable to DLA BRAC 1995 recommendations; and (2) DLA's methodology for computing RPMA and base operating support (BOS) costs in 1995 were different from what was used in BRAC 1993; and (3) the COBRA model, the discount rate, and standard factors were different.

DISC personnel believe that the cost of delaying the BRAC 1993 realignment of DPSC to the ASO compound in North Philadelphia should have been included in DLA's analysis. They believe that this cost is at least \$74 million in fiscal year 1994 dollars. According to DISC officials, they used BRAC 1993 data to arrive at this figure. In our discussions with DLA officials, they do not believe that BRAC 1993 data should be used because of the various changes that have occurred since BRAC 1993. We concur with DLA on that issue. However, we do believe that some costs to maintain the facility for two years should have been captured in their analysis. Therefore, using BRAC 1995 data, we developed what we believe are the associated RPMA, personnel, and BOS non-payroll costs for staying at the South Philadelphia compound for an additional two years. We estimate the associated costs could be \$7.9 million for this two-year period. We calculated this number based on 185 personnel (who currently remain at the South Philadelphia compound) remaining on DLA's rolls to maintain the facility. We did not include the item managers or other operational personnel because the costs associated with these personnel were already captured in

DLA's analysis. Although it is not clear that 185 personnel would be retained for a full two years, we used this number because it represents what appears to be a worst case scenario.

Given the absence of firm data relating to the movement of DISC items, and OSD's guidance that precluded DLA from including the two-year associated DPSC costs, we conducted our own COBRA sensitivity analysis to determine the impact on DLA's decision to disestablish DISC by incorporating these additional costs. We conducted this analysis with four variations while keeping the \$7.9 million costs constant over 1998 and 1999: (1) placing the \$66 million as a one-time cost in 1996; (2) placing the \$66 million as a one-time cost in 1999; (3) placing a third of these costs in years 1996 through 1998; and (4) placing a third of these costs in years 1997 through 1999 (see the following table). For comparison purposes, we also showed DLA's recommended action. As shown in the table, regardless of the scenario, the decision to disestablish DISC still pays for itself. While the net present value (NPV) and return on investment (ROI) years change, the annual recurring savings once the action is completed remains the same.

Impact of Various Cost Considerations on DLA's Decision to Disestablish DISC

Fiscal year 1996 dollars in millions

Scenario	Recurring annual savings	ROI years	20-year NPV
DLA's recommended action	\$18.4	Immediate	\$236.5
\$66 million one-time cost in 1996 plus \$7.9 million allocated over two years (1997 and 1998)	18.4	4	156.4
\$66 million one-time cost in 1999 plus \$7.9 million allocated over two years (1997 and 1998)	18.4	4	161.5
\$66 million one-time cost allocated over three years (1996-1998) plus \$7.9 million allocated over two years (1997 and 1998)	18.4	4	158.1
\$66 million one-time costs allocated over three years (1997-1999) plus \$7.9 million allocated over two years (1997 and 1998)	18.4	4	159.8

In its data call questionnaire, each ICP provided the number of positions which allowed the DLA BRAC Working Group to determine the

number of direct, indirect, and G&A positions. The number of positions by category differs at each ICP. When analyzing DLA's various ICP scenarios, the number of positions eliminated vary based on the overhead positions on board at the losing activity.

DLA officials told us that they will determine the actual number of people required at each of the remaining ICPs during BRAC 1995 implementation; this will occur as a result of DLA refining its breakout of workload into weapon system, and troop and general support items.

#### COST OF BASE REALIGNMENT ACTIONS (COBRA)

Question: During testimony questions, the rationale and effects of cost estimate discount rates was a topic of discussion. Does GAO have a recommendation on a discount rate the Commission should use in preparing its cost analyses?

Answer: As indicated in our report, DOD's use of a different discount rate approach for BRAC 1995 tied to the Treasury's borrowing rate appears reasonable, and we see no reason why it should not be used. However, in using that approach, we believe that a discount rate of 4.85 percent should be employed to calculate NPV since that is the current rate approved by the Office of Management and Budget.

#### BUSINESS EXECUTIVES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT

Question: During testimony questions, GAO expressed concern over DOD's decision to place 12 new Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) offices on bases previously slated to close as a result of prior base closure rounds. Please provide for the record a copy of GAO's current draft report on the Defense Finance and Accounting Service.

Answer: We expect to provide a copy of this draft report to DOD for comment within the week and plan to make a draft available to the Commission shortly thereafter.

#### QUESTIONS FROM CONGRESSMAN RICHARD GEPHARDT

Question 1: The General Accounting Office report states that the Army "did not fully adhere to its regular process for installations in assessing military value when recommending...leased facilities for closure." It specifically notes that the "Army did not prepare installation assessments for leased facilities." Is it true the Army's installation assessment consisted of an evaluation based on the four DOD military value criteria? If so, were leased facilities therefore excluded from an evaluation based on these

four criteria? Is it true that the base closure law requires the Army to make closure recommendations on the basis of the DOD criteria?

Answer: Yes, the Army's installation assessment did consist of an evaluation based on the four DOD military value criteria. As we indicated in our report, the Army did not prepare installation assessments for leased facilities; however, the Army's stationing strategy provided the basis for the military value of leased facilities. Yes, the services are required to employ DOD's selection criteria in making BRAC decisions. See our response to question 2 below for a fuller discussion of these issues.

Question 2: In response to a question by the Commission, the Army stated its leaders considered the military value of the Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) in their deliberations. The community in which ATCOM is located contends that no such consideration occurred. Did the General Accounting Office find any evidence that the Army's leaders considered the specific military value of ATCOM in their deliberations? Is it legitimate for the Army to claim that vacating leased facilities owned by the General Services Administration will result in a savings to the government?

Answer: The Army did send out a data call related specifically to leases. This data call was sent to the Major Commands that had leases costing more than \$200,000 per year. The data call requested the following empirical information on each lease: location, tenants by lease and location, size of leased facility, cost, buy-out penalties, reorganization plans affecting leases (planned changes), and population.

The Army prepared a letter, dated April 14, 1995, addressed to the Commission, which explains how the Army addressed each of the four military value criteria for each of the leases. In this letter, the Army stated that "in no instance did the Army assess the military value of a leased facility solely according to the qualitative guidance provided by the Army's Stationing Strategy." The Army maintained that it used the empirical data collected in the data call along with other corporate data bases such as the facility data base in analyzing military value both from a quantitative and qualitative standpoint.

The qualitative assessment of leases appeared to be inherent in the stationing strategy. However, we found no other documentation supporting an analysis of, or addressing, the military value of leases. Further, the Army's Management Control plan does not describe a process to be used for determining military value of leases. Yet, Army officials state that military value considerations were present and inherent in the Army's consideration of alternative scenarios. For example, Army officials said that mission impact and operational considerations

were key in their analysis of the ATCOM and other leases. The conclusion reached was that affected operational efficiencies would be optimized through the ATCOM realignment. Also, Army officials indicated that consideration regarding the ability of the receiving installation to accommodate ATCOM (availability and condition of land and facilities) at both the existing and potential receiving locations was also necessary in reaching the decision that this lease could be vacated. Data regarding the ability to expand, and costs at the receiving and losing locations, was also available for consideration.

The Army's COBRA analysis did not take into consideration costs to GSA in this realignment proposal; however, the precise cost to the government is not clear given the uncertainty over future use of the vacated space. Also, see our response to question 6 under the Army portion of these Q&As.

#### QUESTIONS FROM CONGRESSMAN GERRY E. STUDDS

Questions 1 and 2: In recommending NAS South Weymouth for closure, the Navy has apparently overlooked two facilities (NAS Atlanta and NAS Fort Worth) with a lower "military value," according to the Navy's own criteria. In the case of NAS Atlanta--which is significantly lower in military value than South Weymouth and was initially considered for closure--the Navy has argued that the area is "rich in demographics" and should remain open. Yet the Navy's own Military Value matrix for reserve Air Stations rates NAS Atlanta last and NAS South Weymouth first in demographics.

In its 1993 report to the BRAC, the GAO identified a "problem" with the Navy's process in instances when "a base recommended for closure, even though its military value was rated higher than bases that remained open." I see no reason that these concerns would not be relevant to the Navy in 1995. While the GAO's 1995 report describes the Navy's recommendations as "generally sound," does the GAO continue to view the Navy's disregard for military value--particularly in the case of South Weymouth--as a problem in its decision-making process?

Answer: The goal of the Navy's 1995 BRAC process, as in the 1993 round, was to reduce excess capacity and maintain average military value across each subcategory of activity. This approach gave rise to instances where activities with higher military value were recommended for closure over activities with lower military value in their respective subcategories. The recommendation to close NAS South Weymouth is such an example.

The Navy's military value analysis is the second step in what is, essentially, a four step process: (1) capacity analysis, (2) military value analysis, (3) configuration analysis, and (4) the derivation and assessment of BRAC alternatives/scenarios. The



determination of relative military values for each activity in a subcategory was not the sole determinant for closing activities. The results of capacity and military value analyses were used in a configuration analysis to identify potential BRAC actions.

In the case of reserve air stations, the Navy's configuration analysis indicated the possibility of closing NAS Atlanta. However, the results of the Navy's analysis of operational air stations left NAS Brunswick, Maine, open, after CINCLANT indicated that the Navy should retain an operational air station north of Norfolk. This permitted the BSEC to consider another reserve air station option. By closing NAS South Weymouth and moving any necessary aircraft and functions to NAS Brunswick, which the Navy determined to be a more capable air station, excess capacity was reduced in both operational and reserve air station subcategories, while not adversely affecting demographic concerns in that area. The resulting average military value for operational air stations increased, while the reserve air station subcategory essentially maintained its average value, dropping only a few decimal points (61.12 vice 61.16).

QUESTIONS FROM CONGRESSMAN HAROLD FORD, SENATOR BILL FRIST, AND SENATOR FRED THOMPSON

Question 1: The Department of Defense and Defense Logistics Agency created a 1,000 point ranking system to evaluate its distribution depots. Within this 1,000 point system, only 20 points related to a depot's transportation capabilities. Does GAO believe it was appropriate to allocate only 2 percent of the evaluation of a distribution depot to the issue of transportation capabilities?

Answer: DLA's methodology provided that a total of 90 points could be awarded for transportation related questions in its military value analysis of stand-alone depots. Of those 90 points, 60 points were possible based on a depot's transportation capabilities, and 30 points were possible based on a depot's transportation cost operational efficiency. Had a greater number of points been assigned to these questions, the number of points awarded would still be proportional to the points awarded to other depots. The points each depot received was based proportionally on the number of points awarded to the depot which had the greatest transportation capability or the lowest transportation cost. An important aspect of the BRAC process, one enhancing its credibility, was the assignment of values and weights before data is collected and evaluated.

Question 2: How can the GAO validate DLA's procedures when the installation military value rankings placed the oldest depot with the highest real property maintenance as the top installation?

Shouldn't this result have sent a red flag to the GAO that mission scope was skewing the military value analysis?

Answer: In terms of real property maintenance, DLA's operational efficiency section of the stand-alone depot military value analysis shows that the San Joaquin depot (Tracy/Sharpe, California) had the highest real property maintenance cost and was awarded the least number of points. That analysis also showed that the Ogden depot received the greatest points, while the Columbus depot (DLA's oldest depot), rated second best. Memphis rated third.

Mission scope, by itself, was not the basis on which DLA made its decisions. DLA's excess capacity and military value analyses of installations and depots, in conjunction with other analytical tools, were considered by DLA in making its closure and realignment recommendations. At the same time, since mission scope was one of four measures of merit which were considered in the installation military value analysis, it is not clear to us that mission scope skewed the installation military value analysis results, or the final decision.

The Richmond installation was assessed as having the best facility condition and therefore received the greatest number of points; the New Cumberland facility received the least number of points. In addition, in the stand-alone depot military value analysis, the Richmond depot was rated the best in terms of facilities, while the Susquehanna depot (New Cumberland, Pennsylvania) scored the fewest points.

Question 3: Did the GAO analyze DOD's process of selecting DLA depots for closure that are collocated with other service branch bases?

Answer: GAO analyzed DLA's overall process for selecting activities for BRAC action, including its process for selecting collocated depots for closure.

#### QUESTIONS FROM CONGRESSMAN WALLY HERGER

Question 1: Do you know of any instances, other than Sierra Army Depot, where a Member of Congress needed to resort to FOIA in order to obtain supposedly public information from the Army?

Answer: We did not examine Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) issues in connection with the BRAC process and, therefore, do not know the extent to which this situation occurred.

Question 2: Please confirm that GAO report statements cited below apply in the case of Sierra Army Depot:

(a) "GAO has identified a number of instances where projected savings from base closures and realignments may fluctuate or be uncertain for a variety of reasons. They include uncertainties over future locations of activities that must move from installations being closed or realigned and errors in standard cost factors used in the services' analyses." (p.5)

Answer: This statement refers to possible changes to BRAC savings that could affect a number of BRAC recommendations. Although not specifically directed at, it potentially could affect Sierra, to the extent changes in projected cost and savings data are determined to be required.

(b) "The other realignment...is caught up in debate over the accuracy of some data." (p. 75)

Answer: This statement does apply to Sierra.

(c) "Also, some questions were raised concerning the accuracy of some data used in the military value analysis for ammunition storage installations." (p.77)

Answer: The data in question applies to Sierra as well as other ammunition storage installations. For example, corrections to the other installations' data could affect the installation value of Sierra relative to other ammunition depots.

(d) "Community concerns about the development of military value for ammunition storage installations centered around the accuracy of some of the information used to score all of the installations. Specifically data in two of the attributes were questioned-- ammunition storage and total buildable acres...Our follow-up and that of the Army's seem to support the existence of some data inaccuracies; however, the correct information has not yet been ascertained...The Commission may want to ensure that the corrected data has been obtained and assessed prior to making a final decision on this recommendation." (p.78)

Answer: As indicated above, use of correct data for all ammunition depots is important to individual ammunition depot installation values and also to confirming the relative ranking of each facility, including Sierra.

(e) "Also, some questions remain about the accuracy of some data used in assessing Army ammunition depots. Therefore, we recommend that the Commission ensure that the Army's ammunition depot recommendations are based upon accurate and consistent information and that corrected data would not materially affect military value assessments and final recommendations." (p.86)

Answer: As stated above, use of correct data for all ammunition depots is important to individual ammunition depot installation

values and also to confirming the relative ranking of each facility, including Sierra.

Question 3: Did you independently verify that Army data was certified by viewing either original data call information and/or signed letters of certification?

Answer: We did verify that the data received from the Army Materiel Command relative to ammunition storage installations was certified.

Question 4: Did you review the procedure by which installations were allowed to review, correct, and verify data? Did you talk to any installation personnel or only Army Audit Agency and WDC officials?

Answer: We did not review this specific procedure. However, the Army Audit Agency examined the installation review process. They concluded that the installation assessments were reliable for further use in the study. It should be noted that even though some errors were found in the statistical sampling of data completed by the Army Audit Agency, it determined the errors it identified as not being materially significant so as to affect the outcome for which they were used.

Question 5: Do you still contend, in light of Army failure to provide information on inconsistencies, that the Army Audit Agency corrected all discrepancies (as noted in footnote on p. 72)?

Answer: According to Army Audit Agency officials, and as reflected in their report, all material discrepancies found by their audit work were corrected.

Question 6: If the Army cannot provide basic information, how can it be certified as required by law?

Answer: The Army's BRAC process accumulated a great deal of required information regarding its facilities. As indicated in our report, certification statements accompanying such data are intended to ensure that it is accurate to the best of the certifying official's knowledge.

Question 7: If a facility cannot be closed (by the Army's own admission) because it houses the three largest operational project stock missions, then shouldn't it be more fully utilized?

Answer: A key objective of the BRAC process is to eliminate excess infrastructure. Many facilities could be more fully utilized by shifting around workloads or more fully utilizing those facilities, but this would not necessarily lead to infrastructure reductions.

Question 8: Has the Army documented the fact that it can complete all demilitarization at SIAD prior to 2001? If so, why could they not complete chemical demilitarization at two regional depots within the designated timeframe?

Answer: According to Army officials, the Sierra depot stores conventional ammunition, and if funding is available, as planned, there is no reason that all conventional ammunition demilitarization at Sierra cannot be accomplished by the year 2001. If for some reason, the total demilitarization could not be accomplished at Sierra, Army officials indicate that the munitions would be moved for demilitarization to another ammunition depot. On the other hand, munitions stored at Umatilla and Pueblo are chemical and must be demilitarized in place--they are prohibited by law from being moved. In addition, incinerators must be built at those locations before the demilitarization can take place.

Question 9: Since the Army is required by law (PL 101-510, as amended) to evaluate all facilities equally for closure consideration, why were five facilities exempted early in the process (three for military value and two for inability to meet closure parameters)?

Answer: DOD components are required to include in their BRAC process installations meeting a threshold of having 300 authorized civilian personnel. This provides a baseline for ensuring that all eligible facilities are considered for closure. As the process progresses, installations are removed from consideration at various stages. In the final analysis only those Army installations identified as low in military value were selected as study candidates for closure or realignment. Regarding the two installations exempted from study because of the inability to complete any potential closure or realignment in 6 years, this decision was in keeping with a requirement of the BRAC law.

Question 10: Since GAO states in their report (p. 79) that "Army installations/facilities selected for closure or realignment generally had relatively small one-time closing costs and provided almost immediate savings after completing the closure," if it was learned that the one-time closing costs would be significantly higher and not provide the proposed long term savings, would GAO agree that a decision should be reconsidered?

Answer: Military facilities recommended for closure and realignment varied in the extent of one-time closing costs and savings. Our report indicates that fluctuations do occur in projected costs and savings for a variety of reasons; the magnitude of such changes have to be examined on a case-by-case basis.

Question 11: Has the Army provided specific data regarding transport cost of ammunition from SIAD to destination locations?

Answer: Army officials have told us that they expect any movement of the munitions to occur through issuances to meet operational requirements rather than as part of a BRAC related move. Otherwise, Army officials indicate they expect to demilitarize much of the excess munitions at Sierra.

Question 12: Why is 5% or more unemployment produced by closure considered unacceptable in populous areas (where diversity and recovery are more likely) and a 10% unemployment result in an entire county considered acceptable? Especially since GAO indicates (p. 145) that "...there was no evidence to support OSD's assumption that economic recovery would be more difficult in a large metropolitan area than in a smaller one."

Answer: A 5 percent figure was an arbitrary ceiling established in the BRAC 1993 round. There was no ceiling established in BRAC 1995 and the decision as to excess economic impact was left to the judgment of the service secretaries or the Secretary of Defense. No Army installation was removed from BRAC consideration in 1995 because of economic impact concerns.



**DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY  
HEADQUARTERS  
CAMERON STATION  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22304-6100**



IN REPLY  
REFER TO

**CAAJ(BRAC)**

19 APR 1995

**Honorable Alan Dixon  
Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209**

**Dear Mr. Chairman:**

**Enclosed is information being forwarded as a result of verbal requests from Mr. Cook and Ms. Wasleski of your staff. The information includes the following:**

- a. Standard bin and bulk cost per ton data and the spreadsheet developed from it for use in processing Cost of Base Realignment Action (COBRA) scenarios are at enclosure 1.**
- b. Military construction and mechanization projects for the six stand-alone depots are at enclosure 2.**
- c. A point paper indicating why it is not a good idea to keep open the Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, UT and close either the Tracy or Sharpe sites at Defense Distribution Depot San Joaquin, CA is at enclosure 3.**

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950424-14

FROM: <u>McMANAMAY, M. U.</u>	TO: <u>DIXON, ALAN</u>
TITLE: <u>TEAM CHIEF</u>	TITLE: <u>CHAIRMAN</u>
ORGANIZATION: <u>DLA BRAC</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCRC</u>
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR				COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION	✓			AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES				<u>LIBRARY</u>	✓		

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓ FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING INFO!  
 1) STANDARD BIN AND BULK COST PER TON DATA  
 2) MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND MECHANIZATION PROJECTS FOR SIX STAND ALONE DEPOTS.  
 3) POINT PAPER ON CGDEW UTAH.

Due Date:	Routing Date:	Date Originated:	Mail Date:
-----------	---------------	------------------	------------




19 APR 1995

CAAJ(BRAC) PAGE 2  
Honorable Alan Dixon


I certify to the best of my knowledge and belief that the information provided in paragraph a above is accurate and complete. Should you desire additional information or clarification, my staff and I stand ready to assist you.

Sincerely,



M. V. McMANAMAY  
Team Chief  
DLA BRAC

3 Encls



GEORGE T. BABBITT  
Major General, USAF  
Principal Deputy Director

ENCLOSURE

|

**COST PER TON ISSUED**

A. Tons Issued 1Q FY 95 (MIS Data)

Est 1Q=487Kx4=1,948K Tons

B. Net Cubic Feet Storage Space Occupied (DD805)

Bin	21,895K	6.8%
Bulk	301,422K	93.2%

C. Tons Issued (AxB)

Bin Tons	132.5K
Bulk Tons	1815.5K

D. Cost (FY 95 Budget) (\$000)

Bin Issue Cost	137,328.9
Bulk Issue Cost	255,139.7

\* Less Storage and 2nd Destination

E. Cost per Ton (D\C)

Bin	=	\$1,036.85
Bulk	=	\$ 140.53

Aggregate = \$201.50/Ton

		% of Bin & Bulk for Depots		DDCO		DJF		DPLP		DDMT		DDNV		DDPF	
Bin-ACF	68,000	233,000	394,000	431,000	653,000	708,000	711,000	1,848,000	1,171,000	140,000					
Bin-Vacant	14,000	150,000	0	290,000	225,000	245,000	333,000	653,000	181,000	45,000					
Bin-Occupied	54,000	83,000	394,000	141,000	428,000	463,000	378,000	1,195,000	990,000	95,000					
Bulk-ACF	15,374,000	18,732,000	3,211,000	2,808,000	30,515,000	4,228,000	24,439,000	33,284,000	28,341,000	2,693,000					
Bulk-Vacant	6,620,000	6,637,000	1,157,000	509,000	5,263,000	1,247,000	6,063,000	5,074,000	9,954,000	788,000					
Bulk-Occupied	8,754,000	12,095,000	2,054,000	2,299,000	25,252,000	2,981,000	18,376,000	28,210,000	18,387,000	1,905,000					
%Bin	0.0061308	0.006815569	0.1609477	0.0577869	0.016666667	0.1344367	0.0201557	0.040639347	0.0510915	0.0475					
%Bulk	0.9938692	0.993184431	0.8390523	0.9422131	0.983333333	0.8655633	0.9798443	0.959360653	0.9489085	0.9525					
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1					
Bin Cost/ton:	\$1,036.85	Bulk Cost/ton:	\$140.53												
Tons Reported	142.0	530,020.0	closed	572.8	54,099.0	9,094.0	80,985.0	548,559.0	517,259.0	closed					
40 % of total tons and moving 100% of that															
Bin tons	0.3	1,445.0		13.2	360.7	489.0	652.9	8,917.2	10,571.0						
Bin Cost	\$361	\$1,498,202		\$13,728	\$373,950	\$507,048	\$676,984	\$9,245,832	\$10,960,557						
Bulk tons	56.5	210,563.0		215.9	21,278.9	3,148.6	31,741.1	210,506.4	196,332.6						
Bulk cost	\$7,933	\$29,590,425		\$30,338	\$2,990,329	\$442,469	\$4,460,573	\$29,582,460	\$27,590,618						
Total Cost	\$8,294	\$31,088,626		\$44,066	\$3,364,280	\$949,517	\$5,137,557	\$38,828,292	\$38,551,175						
40 % of total tons and moving 20 % of that															
Bin tons	0.1	289.0		2.6	72.1	97.8	130.6	1,783.4	2,114.2						
Bin Cost	\$72	\$299,640		\$2,746	\$74,790	\$101,410	\$135,397	\$1,849,166	\$2,192,111						
Bulk tons	11.3	42,112.6		43.2	4,255.8	629.7	6,348.2	42,101.3	39,266.5						
Bulk cost	\$1,587	\$5,918,085		\$6,068	\$598,066	\$88,494	\$892,115	\$5,916,492	\$5,518,124						
Total Cost	\$1,659	\$6,217,725		\$8,813	\$672,856	\$189,903	\$1,027,511	\$7,765,658	\$7,710,235						

	DDRV	DDSP	DDTP	DDWG	DDBC	DDCT	Hill	DDMC	DDOC	DDOU
Bin-ACF	662,000	5,038,000	214,000	53,000	99,000	51,000	1,485,000	1,457,000	4,052,000	1,379,000
Bin-Vacant	67,000	1,411,000	19,000	14,000	38,000	17,000	529,000	434,000	3,057,000	607,000
Bin-Occupied	595,000	3,627,000	195,000	39,000	61,000	34,000	956,000	1,023,000	995,000	772,000
Bulk-ACF	26,622,000	64,534,000	16,648,000	18,305,000	9,534,000	2,264,000	14,140,000	11,334,000	22,129,000	30,459,000
Bulk-Vacant	2,244,000	8,927,000	1,424,000	4,418,000	4,994,000	422,000	1,906,000	3,589,000	9,302,000	7,344,000
Bulk-Occupied	24,378,000	55,607,000	15,224,000	13,887,000	4,540,000	1,842,000	12,234,000	7,745,000	12,827,000	23,115,000
%Bin	0.023825732	0.061231725	0.012646735	0.002800517	0.013257987	0.0181237	0.072479151	0.1166743	0.0719867	0.032318835
%Bulk	0.976174268	0.938768275	0.987353265	0.997199483	0.986742013	0.9818763	0.927520849	0.8833257	0.9280133	0.967681165
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Bin Cost/ton:										
Tons Reported	294,532.0	114,296.0	154,260.0	81,170.0	21,415.0	9,288.0	230,988.0	7,914.0	closed	551,363.0
40 % of total to										
Bin tons	2,807.0	2,799.4	780.4	90.9	113.6	67.3	6,696.7	369.3		7,127.8
Bin Cost	\$2,910,413	\$2,902,575	\$809,110	\$94,278	\$117,753	\$69,814	\$6,943,500	\$382,954		\$7,390,422
Bulk tons	115,005.8	42,919.0	60,923.6	32,377.1	8,452.4	3,647.9	85,698.5	2,796.3		213,417.4
Bulk cost	\$16,161,768	\$6,031,405	\$8,561,600	\$4,549,950	\$1,187,820	\$512,635	\$12,043,207	\$392,958		\$29,991,552
Total Cost	\$19,072,182	\$8,933,980	\$9,370,710	\$4,644,228	\$1,305,573	\$582,449	\$18,986,707	\$775,912		\$37,381,974
40 % of total to										
Bin tons	561.4	559.9	156.1	18.2	22.7	13.5	1,339.3	73.9		1,425.6
Bin Cost	\$582,083	\$580,515	\$161,822	\$18,856	\$23,551	\$13,963	\$1,388,700	\$76,591		\$1,478,084
Bulk tons	23,001.2	8,583.8	12,184.7	6,475.4	1,690.5	729.6	17,139.7	559.3		42,683.5
Bulk cost	\$3,232,354	\$1,206,281	\$1,712,320	\$909,990	\$237,564	\$102,527	\$2,408,641	\$78,592		\$5,998,310
Total Cost	\$3,814,436	\$1,786,796	\$1,874,142	\$928,846	\$261,115	\$116,490	\$3,797,341	\$155,182		\$7,476,395

	DDOO	DDPW	DDRT	DDDS	DDST	DDDC	DDJC	Tooele		Total
Bin-ACF	1,701,000	625,000	385,000	80,000	4,050,000	684,000	5,953,000	80,000		34,405,000
Bin-Vacant	293,000	319,000	83,000	57,000	2,386,000	450,000	563,000	30,000		12,510,000
Bin-Occupied	1,408,000	306,000	302,000	23,000	1,664,000	234,000	5,390,000	50,000		21,895,000
Bulk-ACF	26,390,000	3,184,000	25,171,000	6,604,000	22,268,000	14,291,000	71,981,000	13,082,000		562,565,000
Bulk-Vacant	5,056,000	888,000	3,470,000	5,614,000	6,086,000	4,298,000	19,617,000	6,160,000		139,071,000
Bulk-Occupied	21,334,000	2,296,000	21,701,000	990,000	16,182,000	9,993,000	52,364,000	6,922,000		423,494,000
%Bin	0.061911881	0.117601845	0.013725401	0.0227048	0.093242183	0.02288061	0.093326869	0.0071715		
%Bulk	0.938088119	0.882398155	0.986274599	0.9772952	0.906757817	0.97711939	0.906673131	0.9928285		
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
Bin Cost/ton:										
Tons Reported	106,337.4	40,656.0	165,032.0	closed	12,629.0	265,313.0	590,355.0	closed		
40 % of total to										
Bin tons	2,633.4	1,912.5	906.1		471.0	2,428.2	22,038.4			
Bin Cost	\$2,730,461	\$1,982,963	\$939,440		\$488,379	\$2,517,689	\$22,850,508			
Bulk tons	39,901.5	14,349.9	65,106.7		4,580.6	103,697.0	214,103.6			
Bulk cost	\$5,607,364	\$2,016,593	\$9,149,451		\$643,709	\$14,572,538	\$30,087,980			
Total Cost	\$8,337,824	\$3,999,557	\$10,088,891		\$1,132,088	\$17,090,227	\$52,938,488			
40 % of total to										
Bin tons	526.7	382.5	181.2		94.2	485.6	4,407.7			
Bin Cost	\$546,092	\$396,593	\$187,888		\$97,676	\$503,538	\$4,570,102			
Bulk tons	7,980.3	2,870.0	13,021.3		916.1	20,739.4	42,820.7			
Bulk cost	\$1,121,473	\$403,319	\$1,829,890		\$128,742	\$2,914,508	\$6,017,596			
Total Cost	\$1,667,565	\$799,911	\$2,017,778		\$226,418	\$3,418,045	\$10,587,698			

ENCLOSURE

2

# DLA Stand Alone Depot MILCON and Equipment Project

## Summary -

**FY 85 - FY94**

<u>SLFA</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>MILCON Current Estimate (\$k)</u>	<u>% of total MILCON investment</u>	<u>EQPT (\$k)</u>	<u>% of total EQPT investment</u>
DDCO	COLUMBUS	7,420	3%	5,587	1%
DDRV	RICHMOND	41,625	14%	14,346	3%
DDSP	MECH/NCUM	135,163	46%	195,088	46%
DDMT	MEMPHIS	28,724	10%	30,075	7%
DDOU	OGDEN	14,409	5%	17,600	4%
DDJC	SHAR/TRACY	63,628	22%	156,894	37%
<b>Totals:</b>		<b>290,968</b>		<b>419,590</b>	
Service Funded % of above*		156,607	54%	257,300	61%
* DDJC and DDSP only sites affected					



# DLA Projects at DDRV

<u>FY</u>	<u>PLFA/SLFA</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Project Title</u>	<b>MILCON</b> Current Estimate (\$k)	<b>MILCON</b> Comp Date	<b>EQPT</b> (\$k)
88	DDRV	RICHMOND	CONNECTOR WAREHOUSE	18,325	Jun-92	13,298
88	DDRV	RICHMOND	MODIFY HAZMAT WAREHOUSE	2,117	Apr-90	0
90	DDRV	RICHMOND	HAZARDOUS MATERIAL WH13	7,000	May-93	0
94	DDRV	RICHMOND	SHEDS FOR OIL STORAGE	8,520	Jan-96	0
94	DDRV	RICHMOND	HAZMAT PROCESSING FAC	3,653	Jan-96	400
94	DDRV	RICHMOND	ALTER HAZMAT BLDG 12	2,010	Jul-94	0
94	DDRV	RICHMOND	<i>Package Rack, WH 66</i>	<u>0</u>		<u>648</u>
<b>Totals:</b>				<b>41,625</b>		<b>14,346</b>

# Projects at DDSP

## DLA PROJECTS AT DDSP

<u>FY</u>	<u>PLFA/SLFA</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Project Title</u>	<u>MILCON Current Estimate (\$k)</u>	<u>MILCON Comp Date</u>	<u>EQPT (\$k)</u>
85	DDSP	Mechanicsburg	INTEGR MATERIAL COMPLEX	16,158	Jun-87	37,800
86	DDSP	Mechanicsburg	FUMIGATION FACILITY	415	Apr-87	0
88	DDSP	Mechanicsburg	<i>Pallet Handling System</i>	0		1,524
89	DDSP	Mechanicsburg	TRAILER LOADING/PARKING	1	Dec-89	0
91	DDSP	Mechanicsburg	UPGRADE IPE BUILDING	3,347	Apr-95	0
92	DDSP	New Cumberland	<i>Narrow Asile Racks</i>	0		4,803
92	DDSP	New Cumberland	<i>Conveyor Additions, EDC</i>	0		243
92	DDSP	Mechanicsburg	<i>Unit &amp; Set Assy Bldg 213</i>	0		453
92	DDSP	Mechanicsburg	<i>Traypack Mech'n Bldg 105</i>	0		339
93	DDSP	New Cumberland	<i>Tire Support Assemblies</i>	0		1,300
93	DDSP	New Cumberland	<i>Narrow Asile Racks, 80 Series</i>	0		3,300
93	DDSP	New Cumberland	<i>High Rise Vehicles, EDC</i>	0		2,160
93	DDSP	New Cumberland	<i>Fire Protection, 80 Series</i>	0		815
94	DDSP	Mechanicsburg	<i>IMC Bypass</i>	0		258
94	DDSP	New Cumberland	<i>Tire Support Assemblies</i>	0		1,300
94	DDSP	New Cumberland	<i>EDC Enhancements</i>	0		708
94	DDSP	New Cumberland	<i>Industrial Storage</i>	0		1,585
<b>ARMY PROJECTS AT DDSP (New Cumberland)</b>						
	DDSP	New Cumberland	EAST DISTRIBUTION CENTER	101,500	Jan-89	137,900
90	DDSP	New Cumberland	HAZMAT WAREHOUSE	10,500	Aug-95	600
	DDSP	New Cumberland	USA RESERVE CENTER	<u>3,242</u>	Jan-94	<u>0</u>
<b>Totals:</b>				<b>135,163</b>		<b>195,088</b>

# DLA Projects at DDMT

<u>FY</u>	<u>PLFA/SLFA</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Project Title</u>	<u>MILCON Current Estimate (\$k)</u>	<u>MILCON Comp Date</u>	<u>EQPT (\$k)</u>
86	DDMT	MEMPHIS	HAZARDOUS WAREHOUSE	8,261	Dec-88	
86	DDMT	MEMPHIS	WATER DISTRIBUTION	826	Apr-86	0
87	DDMT	MEMPHIS	DINING FACILITY	1,450	Jul-89	0
87	DDMT	MEMPHIS	GENERAL PURPOSE WH	8,760	Sep-90	
88	DDMT	MEMPHIS	<i>Automated Pallet Stretchwrap</i>	0		899
89	DDMT	MEMPHIS	<i>Bulk Packaging</i>	0		355
89	DDMT	MEMPHIS	<i>Consolidated Packaging</i>	0		13,292
91	DDMT	MEMPHIS	FLAMMABLE STORAGE FAC	1,232	Dec-93	0
91	DDMT	MEMPHIS	GENERAL PURPOSE WH	6,854	Oct-95	1,983
91	DDMT	MEMPHIS	RELOCATE BULK RECEIVING	1,341	Dec-92	3,815
91	DDMT	MEMPHIS	<i>Regional Freight Con Ctr</i>	0		9,336
94	DDMT	MEMPHIS	<i>Upgrade HAZMAT Warehouse</i>	<u>0</u>		<u>395</u>
<b>Totals:</b>				<b>28,724</b>		<b>30,075</b>

# Projects at DDJC

DLA PROJECTS AT DDJC				MILCON Current Estimate (\$k)	MILCON Comp Date	EQPT (\$k)
<u>FY</u>	<u>PLFA/SLFA</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Project Title</u>			
87	DDJC	TRACY	<i>Small Package Storage Sys</i>	0		4,885
87	DDJC	TRACY	<i>Conveyor Sys/Ship Cons Area</i>	0		696
87	DDJC	TRACY	<i>Small Parcel Ship Ctr</i>	0		314
87	DDJC	TRACY	<i>Receiving Area Conveyor Sys</i>	0		663
89	DDJC	TRACY	<i>Pallet Repair Mill/Pavilion</i>	0		517
89	DDJC	TRACY	IMPROVE LIGHTING	1	Mar-90	0
90	DDJC	TRACY	SUBSISTENCE WAREHOUSE	17,244	Feb-93	14,962
91	DDJC	TRACY	CONSOLIDATED MAINTENANCE	1,700	Aug-94	
91	DDJC	TRACY	CONFORMING STORAGE FAC	1,318	Jun-93	
91	DDJC	SHARPE	<i>Receiving Mechanization, B330</i>	0		931
92	DDJC	TRACY	WATER WELLS	2,000	Jul-94	0
92	DDJC	SHARPE	<i>Fast Pick System</i>	0		1,858
92	DDJC	SHARPE	<i>Packing/Offer/Ship Mechanization</i>	0		3,812
92	DDJC	SHARPE	<i>Transporter Docks</i>	0		1,462
93	DDJC	SHARPE	<i>High Rise Vehicles</i>	0		1,952
94	DDJC	TRACY	<i>Package Consolidation/Pack MHS</i>	0		4,274
94	DDJC	TRACY	<i>Tray Pack Mechanization</i>	0		361
94	DDJC	TRACY	<i>Metal Storage&amp;Processing Sys</i>	0		1,407
<b>ARMY PROJECTS AT DDJC (SHARPE)</b>						
85	DDJC	SHARPE	WESTERN DIST CENTER	<u>41,365</u>		<u>118,800</u>
<b>Totals:</b>				<b>63,628</b>		<b>156,894</b>

## DLA Projects at DDOU

<u>FY</u>	<u>PLFA/SLFA</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Project Title</u>	<b>MILCON</b> Current Estimate (\$k)	<b>MILCON</b> Comp Date	<b>EQPT</b> (\$k)
86	DDOU	OGDEN	HAZARDOUS WAREHOUSE	2,896	Nov-87	
86	DDOU	OGDEN	ADDITION TO BLDG 286	2,757		0
86	DDOU	OGDEN	<i>Automated Rack Complex</i>	0		4,012
86	DDOU	OGDEN	<i>DWASP II</i>	0		1,356
86	DDOU	OGDEN	STEAM LINES	434	Sep-88	0
87	DDOU	OGDEN	<i>DWASP II</i>	0		807
88	DDOU	OGDEN	<i>Transporter Dock System</i>	0		286
88	DDOU	OGDEN	<i>Bulk Receiving Upgrade</i>	0		624
88	DDOU	OGDEN	<i>Automated Kitting Facility</i>	0		779
89	DDOU	OGDEN	ADP BUILDING	6,922	May-91	
89	DDOU	OGDEN	<i>Binnable Item Storage &amp; Ret</i>	0		9,352
89	DDOU	OGDEN	<i>Freight Packing Facility</i>	0		384
93	DDOU	OGDEN	CONFORMING STORAGE FA	<u>1,400</u>	Mar-95	—
<b>Totals:</b>				<b>14,409</b>		<b>17,600</b>

# DLA Projects at DDCO

<u>FY</u>	<u>PLFA/SLFA</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Project Title</u>	<b>MILCON</b> Current Estimate (\$k)	<b>MILCON</b> Comp Date	<b>EQPT</b> (\$k)
88	DDCO	COLUMBUS	<i>DWASP Implementation</i>	0		1,340
89	DDCO	COLUMBUS	<i>Bin Replacement</i>	0		2,527
90	DDCO	COLUMBUS	<i>Pipe Rack, Bldg 10</i>	0		550
90	DDCO	COLUMBUS	GENERAL PURPOSE WH	7,420	Dec-92	1,170
<b>Totals:</b>				7,420		5,587

ENCL

3

## POINT PAPER

**QUESTION: WHY IS IT NOT A GOOD IDEA TO KEEP OGDEN OPEN AND CLOSE TRACY or SHARPE SITE?**

**REPLY:**

DLA is a combat support Agency. As such, our primary mission is support of the armed forces during peacetime or a mobilization scenario. Our concept of operations, as determined by the most senior experts in the Distribution business area requires a major distribution facility collocated with a Container Consolidation Point operation in proximity to both East and West coast ports. These facilities must have sufficient capacity in both bin and bulk throughput to surge to meet war time requirements. There are only two depot complexes currently in DoD that meet both functional and geographic requirements. They are Susquehanna and San Joaquin depots. Ogden depot has a large binnable throughput, but does not meet any of the other requirements.

Another consideration is geographic location. In comparison with San Joaquin, Ogden depot is not located in proximity to customers, vendors or ports. During a conflict, time becomes one of the most important factors in providing logistics support to the warfighters. The location of San Joaquin depot and proximity to ports will continue to be essential to timely logistics support of any conflict in the areas of the Pacific Rim or Southwest Asia. The location close to the ports during a conflict becomes very important in the expedited recycling and backhauling of transportation conveyances (vans, chassis and flatracks, etc.). The location of the San Joaquin depot to customers, vendors and the ports also reduces the transportation delivery time and cost both inbound and outbound during peacetime too.

Due to the close proximity of the Tracy and Sharpe facilities to each other (approx 12 miles), we were able to fully leverage equipment and personnel resources to achieve optimum utilization. We eliminated the duplicate management layers and San Joaquin operates as a single depot, which allows management to fully maximize utilization of resources by shifting the workforce and equipment to accomplish daily workload surges and changes. We have positioned stock at the individual site locations to maximize consolidation and have developed carrier stop offs to alleviate doublehandling of material and maximize transportation savings. We would not be able to accomplish these efficiencies by operating two separate depots hundreds of miles apart.

Bottom line, if the Ogden depot was utilized instead of the Sharpe/Tracy combination, it would reduce efficiency, increase cost and affect our ability to support two major regional conflicts simultaneously.



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950424-15

FROM: <del>MIKULSKI</del> MIKULSKI, BARBARA	TO: DIXON
TITLE: SENATOR (MO)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCR
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: NAVAL MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		⊙		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER		X	
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER MOVING THE MANNED DIVING RESEARCH FROM THE NAVAL MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE TO PANAMA, CITY,

Due Date: 950426	Routing Date: 950424	Date Originated: 950418	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2002

April 18, 1995

Honorable Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 N. Moore Street  
Suite 1425  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We are writing to bring to the Commission's attention some serious concerns which have been raised about the proposed closing of the Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI) in Bethesda, Maryland.

As you know, in its March 1995 Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission, DoD recommended closing NMRI, Bethesda, Maryland and relocating the Infectious Diseases, Combat Casualty Care and Operational Medicine programs out of inadequate and substandard lab space to the new Walter Reed Army Institute for Research at Forest Glen, Maryland. We fully support this decision and believe that collocating medical research in these areas with the Army makes sense. However, DoD also proposed splitting NMRI's current diving medical research program, moving the "manned diving" research component to Panama City, Florida while retaining the animal research component at Forest Glen. As one of the senior research scientists at NMRI points out in the enclosed letter, this proposal would disrupt "one of the truly integrated (from basic to applied) programs in existence in the world." This view is also supported by R.A. Riddell, Head of the Deep Submergence Branch for the Navy, who raises serious concerns in the BRAC data calls regarding the adequacy of existing facilities, staffing, and operation and maintenance funding at Panama City to support the additional requirements of "manned diving" research.

We urge the Commission to look into this matter and also request that a member of the Commission or staff visit the facility to see firsthand the issues and concerns which have been raised.

Sincerely,



Barbara A. Mikulski  
United States Senator



Paul S. Sarbanes  
United States Senator



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425

ARLINGTON, VA 22209

703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA

REBECCA COX

GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)

S. LEE KLING

RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)

MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)

WENDI LOUISE STEELE

May 2, 1995

The Honorable Paul S. Sarbanes  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Paul:


Thank you for your letter regarding the Secretary of Defense's recommendation to move the manned diving research component of the Naval Medical Research Institute in Bethesda, Maryland to Panama City, Florida. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations regarding the Naval Medical Research Institute.

Regarding your request that a member of the Commission or staff visit the Bethesda facility, you will be pleased to know that a member of the Commission staff will visit the NMRI in Bethesda on May 12.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,



Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cw



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

May 2, 1995

The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Barbara:


Thank you for your letter regarding the Secretary of Defense's recommendation to move the manned diving research component of the Naval Medical Research Institute in Bethesda, Maryland to Panama City, Florida. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations regarding the Naval Medical Research Institute.

Regarding your request that a member of the Commission or staff visit the Bethesda facility, you will be pleased to know that a member of the Commission staff will visit the NMRI in Bethesda on May 12.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,



Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cw

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950424-16

FROM: <b>BORSKI, ROBERT A</b>	TO: <b>DIXON</b>
TITLE: <b>REP. (PA)</b>	TITLE: <b>CHAIRMAN</b>
ORGANIZATION: <b>U. S. CONGRESS</b>	ORGANIZATION: <b>DBCRC</b>
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: <b>NAVAL AVIATION ENGINEERING SERVICE</b>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		①		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				<b>REVIEW AND ANALYSIS</b>			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER		X	
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓ FYI

Subject/Remarks:

**INFORMING THAT EMPLOYEES OF THE NAVAL AVIATION ENGINEERING SERVICE WILL SUBMIT AN ALTERNATIVE PLAN FOR REALIGNMENT ON MAY 4.**

Due Date: <b>950426</b>	Routing Date: <b>950424</b>	Date Originated: <b>950421</b>	Mail Date:
-------------------------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	------------

ROBERT A. BORSKI  
3D DISTRICT, PENNSYLVANIA

COMMITTEES:  
TRANSPORTATION  
AND INFRASTRUCTURE  
RANKING DEMOCRAT—SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT

STEERING COMMITTEE  
REGIONAL WHIP

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

April 21, 1995

WASHINGTON OFFICE:  
ROOM 2182  
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BLDG.  
(202) 225-8251  
FAX: (202) 225-4628  
DISTRICT OFFICES:  
7141 FRANKFORD AVE.  
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19135  
(215) 335-3355  
FAX: (215) 333-4508  
2630 MEMPHIS ST.  
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19125  
(215) 426-4616

Honorable Alan Dixon  
Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to this number  
when responding 95042 4-16

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing to update you on the efforts of the employees of the Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit (NAESU) Headquarters in response to the DOD's recommendation to move the activity to North Island, CA.

As you know, NAESU Headquarters is an administrative activity that manages worldwide aviation technical services. The 1991 round of base closures resulted in the relocation of NAESU from the Philadelphia Naval Base to the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) compound at a cost of \$712,000. The current DOD proposal recommends relocating NAESU Headquarters from Philadelphia to NADEP North Island.

On May 4, the employees of NAESU will submit to you a logical and more cost-effective alternative to the DOD proposal. Their proposal will achieve the objectives and consolidations sought by Congress and the President, but at a higher military value and in a more cost-effective manner than DOD's proposal. Unlike DOD's proposal, the alternative preserves most of the skilled and experienced NAESU workforce. It will preserve military readiness, while at the same time achieving a savings in excess of \$36 million -- \$7 million more than the DOD proposal's stated savings of \$29 million.


The Employee Group proposal consolidates NAESU Headquarters with ASO rather than NADEP North Island. This eliminates relocation and military construction costs. Additionally, it reduces more positions than the DOD proposal while preserving the expertise of the employees that execute the NAESU mission.

This alternative proposal logically keeps NAESU on the ASO compound and allows its Program Managers face-to-face contact with ASO's Logistic personnel. ASO, their host, also provides experienced worldwide personnel and computer support. Additionally, NAESU can interface with their sister command, the Naval Air Technical Services Facility, and Contracting Team, FISC, Philadelphia.

April 21, 1995  
Page 2

Thank you for your expeditious consideration of this extremely important matter. Please do not hesitate to contact me for any additional information.

Sincerely,



ROBERT A. BORSKI  
Member of Congress

Enclosure

cc: Commissioners,  
Base Closure and Realignment Commission



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425 Please refer to this number

ARLINGTON, VA 22209

703-696-0504

950424-1621

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA

REBECCA COX

GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF RET.

S. LEE KLING

RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN RET.

MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA RET.

WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 26, 1995

The Honorable Robert A. Borski  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Borski:

Thank you for your letter in support of the Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit (NAESU). We look forward to hearing from NAESU employees on May 4, 1995, during the Baltimore regional hearing and welcome their alternative recommendation for the NAESU. I certainly understand your continued interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided, and the alternative recommendation for the NAESU will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendation on NAESU.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I can be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:js



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950424-17

FROM: <sup>ROS</sup> LEHTINEN, ILEAWA TITLE: REP. (FL) ORGANIZATION: U. S. CONGRESS INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: HOMESTEAD AFB	TO: DIXON TITLE: CHAIRMAN ORGANIZATION: OBCRC
--	---

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		⓪		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER		X	
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Direct Response
X ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓ FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING OBCRC UPHOLD 1993 DECISION TO RETAIN THE 301ST RESCUE SQUADRON AT HOME STEAD.

Due Date: 950426	Routing Date: 950424	Date Originated: 950417	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------

**ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN**  
18TH DISTRICT, FLORIDA

COMMITTEES:

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
GOVERNMENT REFORM

CHAIRMAN:  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
AFRICA

VICE CHAIR:  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
WESTERN HEMISPHERE



**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**

PLEASE RESPOND TO:

2440 RAYBURN BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-0918  
(202) 225-3931

DISTRICT OFFICE:  
5757 BLUE LAGOON DRIVE  
(NW 11TH STREET)  
SUITE 240  
MIAMI, FL 33126  
(305) 262-1800

April 17, 1995

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950424-17

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman, Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Monroe Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22205

Dear Chairman Dixon:


The Base Realignment and Closure Commission is now being asked to reverse the assignment of the 301st Air Rescue Squadron. I am writing you to express my strong opposition to this backtracking from the carefully crafted plan now in place.

As you know, in 1993 the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) decided that a portion of the Homestead Air Force Base would continue to function as the Homestead Air Reserve Base (HARB) and would be the home of two mutually supportive Reserve units: the 482nd Fighter Wing and the 301st Air Rescue Squadron. Working closely with the BRAC and other Federal agencies in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, Dade County worked out a dual-use plan for the Base based on military and civilian use of the facility. The cornerstone of that redevelopment plan was the presence of both the 482nd Fighter Wing and the 301st Air Rescue Squadron.

Secretary of Defense William Perry described this existing plan as an exemplary model of military-civilian partnership for future base closures and realignments. Undoing this careful plan not only undermines the viability of this project in Dade County, but will also serve to undermine other proposals to mitigate the impact of the BRAC's decisions on affected communities by undercutting the reliability of the its decisions.

I strongly urge you and the other commissioners to end the uncertainty about the future location of the 301st and the certainty of BRAC decisions by reaffirming the return of this unit to HARB in 1996.

Sincerely

  
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen  
Member of Congress

IRL/pgg



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

950424-1721

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 27, 1995

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Ros-Lehtinen:

Thank you for your letter expressing your support for maintaining the 301st Rescue Squadron at Homestead Air Force base. I certainly understand your continued interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendation on Homestead and Patrick Air Force Bases.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I can be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:js

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

**EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) #** 950424-18

FROM: CHAPMAN, Jim	TO: COX, REBECCA
TITLE: REP. (TX)	TITLE: COMMISSIONER
ORGANIZATION: U. S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: RHO RIVER ARMY DEPOT	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓ FYI

Subject/Remarks:

THANK YOU FOR ATTENDING DALLAS REGIONAL HEARING.

Due Date: _____	Routing Date: <u>950424</u>	Date Originated: <u>950421</u>	Mail Date: _____
-----------------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	------------------



CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515

April 21, 1995

JIM CHAPMAN  
1ST DISTRICT  
TEXAS

Commissioner Rebecca G. Cox  
Defense Base Closure and  
Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street  
Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

100-5042-18


Dear Commissioner Cox:

Thank you for attending Wednesday's Dallas regional hearing to receive the presentation from those of us who are advancing the case for Red River Army Depot and Distribution Depot Red River, Texas.

Commissioner Cox, as I stated at the hearing, I strongly believe the Pentagon grievously erred in recommending this fine installation for closure. The claimed return on investment simply does not exist.

I appreciate your earlier pledge to try to visit Red River, and I understand the difficulty of making scheduling arrangements. Please let me know if I may assist you in any way to set up a site visit in the coming weeks. Thank you again for coming to Dallas.

Sincerely,

  
Jim Chapman  
Member of Congress



CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON D C 20515

JIM CHAPMAN  
5TH DISTRICT  
TEXAS

April 21, 1995

Commissioner Josue Robles  
Defense Base Closure and  
Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street  
Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

950134-10


Dear Commissioner Robles:

I want to take this opportunity to thank you for attending Wednesday's regional hearing in Dallas and especially to thank you for your kind words on behalf of the Red River Defense Complex.

General, your authoritative perspective as a career soldier and your description of your personal familiarity with Red River's quality performance has given a tremendous morale boost to the Red River family. These people literally have their lives on the line, and your words of support has provided them with the one thing they need: hope. As their Congressman, I want you to know how much I appreciate your doing so.

I do not envy the job the Commission is charged with doing, but I am glad you will be coming to Red River next month. I look forward to seeing you at the depot on May 15. Thank you again.

Sincerely,

  
Jim Chapman  
Member of Congress



CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON D C 20515

JIM CHAPMAN  
1ST DISTRICT OF  
TEXAS

April 21, 1995

Commissioner Al Cornella  
Defense Base Closure and  
Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street  
Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209


Dear Commissioner Cornella:

I want to take this opportunity to thank you for attending Wednesday's regional hearing in Dallas to receive our testimony on behalf of the Red River Defense Complex.

Commissioner Cornella, as you know from your unique vantage point of having been to the Red River site visit on April 6, we have an outstanding installation with unmatched community support. As a successful businessman, you know firsthand the importance of quality production. I am sure you will agree that an installation that has won the federal government's equivalent to the private sector's Malcolm Baldrige award for leadership in quality production should not be a target for closure without overwhelmingly compelling justification. I strongly believe the Pentagon has fallen woefully short of meeting that test.

I appreciate the time you have devoted to considering Red River's case. Please let me know if I may provide you with any additional information to assist you in this process. Thank you again.

Sincerely,

  
Jim Chapman  
Member of Congress



CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515

April 21, 1995

JIM CHAPMAN  
57 DISTRICT  
TEXAS

Commissioner James B. Davis  
Defense Base Closure and  
Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street  
Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

9504248


Dear Commissioner Davis:

Thank you for attending Wednesday's regional hearing in Dallas and receiving the presentation on behalf of Red River Army Depot and Distribution Depot Red River, Texas.

Commissioner Davis, as I testified at the hearing, the Defense Department has grossly overstated its return on investment from the recommended closure of Red River. Whereas the Department claims an immediate return on investment, the failure to consider complete cost figures puts that claim in serious doubt. I estimate the actual return on investment to be 57 years. I strongly believe the Department deviated substantially from this critical selection criterion.

I appreciate your consideration of Red River's case, and I encourage you to visit this fine installation. Thank you again.

Sincerely,

  
Jim Chapman  
Member of Congress





CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515

April 21, 1995

JIM CHAPMAN  
1ST DISTRICT  
TEXAS

Commissioner Wendi Steele  
Defense Base Closure and  
Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street  
Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209


Dear Commissioner Steele:

I want to thank you for attending Wednesday's regional hearing in Dallas and especially for agreeing to visit the Red River Defense Complex on May 15.

Commissioner Steele, as you know from the hearing, it is obvious that the Defense Department has grossly miscalculated in making its decision to close this fine installation. As you will see firsthand next month, Red River is on the cutting edge of delivering quality performance for the American taxpayers. We simply must not allow this mistaken recommendation to stand.

I appreciate the difficulty of the Commission's task, and I am very pleased you will visit the best of the best. I look forward to seeing you May 15.

Sincerely,

  
Jim Chapman  
Member of Congress



CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515

JIM CHAPMAN  
1ST DISTRICT  
TEXAS

April 21, 1995

Commissioner Benjamin Montoya  
Defense Base Closure and  
Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street  
Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209


Dear Commissioner Montoya:

Thank you for coming to Dallas to hear the Red River Defense Committee's presentation at Wednesday's regional hearing.

Commissioner Montoya, as you know from the community's briefing, Texarkana and the surrounding area would take the biggest hit of the Defense Department's 1995 base closure round. The economic impact on this rural area would be exceeded only by two other entire states! While base closures are a necessary fact of life, I think you will agree that an action that will put one family in five on unemployment and food stamps should not be taken without the most overwhelmingly compelling justification. I strongly believe that the Pentagon has egregiously failed to meet this test in its recommendation to close Red River.

I appreciate your consideration of Red River's case, and I encourage you to visit this fine installation. Thank you again.

Sincerely,

  
Jim Chapman  
Member of Congress

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950424-19

FROM: <u>BORDEN, BEN</u>	TO: <u>MEYER, ROBERT L.</u>
TITLE: <u>DIRECTOR OF R &amp; A</u>	TITLE: <u>DIRECTOR</u>
ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCRC</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>BASE CLOSURE</u>
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: <u>PUBLICATION DISTRIBUTION CENTER BALTIMORE</u>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓ FYI

Subject/Remarks:  
REQUESTING BRIEFING ON THE PUBLICATION DISTRIBUTION CENTER BALTIMORE BY MAY 3.

Due Date:	Routing Date: <u>950424</u>	Date Originated: <u>950424</u>	Mail Date: <u>950424</u>
-----------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	--------------------------



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425

ARLINGTON, VA 22209

703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

April 24, 1995

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA

REBECCA COX

GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)

S. LEE KLING

RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)

MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)

WENDI LOUISE STEELE

Mr. Robert L. Meyer  
Director, Base Closure  
3300 Pentagon Room 2C426  
Washington, D.C. 20310-0200

Please refer to this number  
when recording 950424-19

Dear Bob:

In reviewing the Army's recommendation to close the Baltimore Publications Center, the Commission staff has learned of two ongoing efforts which will impact all DoD Publication Centers. First, the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Logistics is testing the Joint Computer Aided Logistics Systems (JCALS), which is an effort to convert all technical orders to electronic media. Second, the Army is leading an ongoing effort to convert administrative forms and publications to electronic media.

The Commission would like to be briefed on the current status and implementation plans for these efforts. In addition, the briefing should provide information on the current staffing and budget for all existing DoD Publication Centers. We would appreciate a briefing to address these issues by May 3, 1995.

If you have any questions, please call Ed Brown, the Army Team Leader, or Mike Kennedy, the Army Team analyst. Thank you for your cooperation and assistance.

Sincerely,

Ben L. Borden  
Director of Review and Analysis

BB/mk

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950424-20

FROM: <u>DIXON</u>	TO: <u>GOT BAUM, JOSHUA</u>
TITLE: <u>CHAIRMAN</u>	TITLE: <u>ASST SEC DEF. (ECON SEC)</u>
ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCRC</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>DEPT OF DEF</u>
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION	✓			AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Direct Response
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓ FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FROM THE APRIL 17 HEARING.

Due Date: <del>950424</del>	Routing Date: <u>950424</u>	Date Originated: <u>950424</u>	Mail Date: <u>950424</u>
-----------------------------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	--------------------------



THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:  
AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 24, 1995

The Honorable Joshua Gotbaum  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security)  
Chairman, BRAC 95 Steering Group  
3310 Defense Pentagon  
Room 3E808  
Washington, D.C. 20301-3310

Please refer to this number  
when recording 950424-20


Dear Secretary Gotbaum:

I would like to thank the Joint Cross Service Group Chairmen and the military service and Defense Logistics Agency representatives for their testimony before the Commission on April 17, 1995.

I have attached a number of questions that the Commission would like answered for the record. I would appreciate the responses to these questions by May 5, 1995 in order that the Commission can consider them during its deliberative process. An interim response will suffice for those issues requiring additional time.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter. I appreciate your time and cooperation.

Sincerely,



Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD/sma  
encl.

## DEPOT MAINTENANCE

### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO MR. KLUGH FOR THE RECORD

1. You identified a spreadsheet of a database created by a team of operations research systems analysts that would be provided for the record. Please provide the constraint equations to minimize and maximize the functional military value rankings. In addition, please identify where the flexibility exists in the algorithm assumptions.
2. Please provide the core functions by commodity for each Air Force depot, and the co-located weapon system for those commodities.
3. Describe how your Joint Cross Service Group assigned functional values to each of the depots and shipyards?
4. When assigning workload, how did the functional value scores impact the positioning of workload?
5. What is the excess capacity by Service, and by depot?
6. Please provide the capacity charts that describe excess capacity with implementation of this BRAC by Service, and by depot?
7. Cross Service Alternative Two proposes the closure of Long Beach and either Pearl Harbor or Portsmouth. Did the Joint Cross Service Group view Pearl Harbor and Portsmouth as equivalent in terms of capability as well as capacity?
8. In both Alternatives One and Two, specific workload transfers are identified for each commodity group except for sea systems. In that case, the alternative states, "Consolidate as possible within the Department of the Navy." Why was the sea systems commodity area proposal not specific concerning workload distribution?
9. What does the DoD BRAC recommendation do to your ability to inter-service depot maintenance work in the future?
10. Why did the Joint Cross Service Group initially recommend decentralization of tactical missile maintenance and then later "approve" the Army plan to consolidate at Tobyhanna?

Did the JCSG consider the centralization of tactical missile maintenance at Hill Air Force Base? If so, what were the findings?

Was Anniston Army depot considered for missile maintenance consolidation?

## DEPOT MAINTENANCE

### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO GENERAL BLUME FOR THE RECORD

1. The Commission staff was recently briefed on a revision to the 1 March DoD recommendation from the Air Force.
  - a. Please outline for the Commission the revision to the recommendation.
  - b. Would you please explain why the Air Force found it necessary to revise its BRAC recommendation 7 weeks into the process?
2. All of the savings from the Air Force's BRAC recommendation to downsize all Air Force depots in place is the result of a 15 % reengineering factor.
  - a. Have the reengineering studies been performed yet?
  - b. What is the basis of the 15 % factor?
  - c. Do your site surveys confirm that a 15% productivity savings is achievable?
3. The downsizing of ALCs would not breach the BRAC thresholds if actions were to be evenly phased over the next several years. Why did the Air Force choose to use the BRAC process if it could independently accomplish the same result?
4. Military value is the most important criterion to be considered when sizing the DoD infrastructure through the base closure process. The Air Force has used a tiering system in place of assigning military values.
  - a. What was the basis for assigning Kelly and McClellan Air Force Bases to "tier" 3?
  - b. What was the basis for assigning the depot at Kelly to "tier" 3?
  - c. The Air Force Base Closure Executive Group minutes indicate that the Air Force was studying the closure of Kelly and McClellan for 11 months. Were tier values a significant basis for studying Kelly and McClellan as closure candidates?
  - d. How did the low military values of Kelly Air Force Base and McClellan Air Force Base impact the Air Force's final base closure recommendations?
  - e. The Air Force's depot downsizing recommendation would result in a "tier" 3 base (lowest ranking) receiving workload from "tier" 1 bases (highest ranking). What is the reason for this?



f. Why was there not a means to measure the value of co-located missions on Air Force Bases?

g. Why did the Air Force only look at the ability to receive different operational missions?

5. Secretary Widnall testified that a depot closure is prohibitively expensive. We are interested in understanding the relatively high cost that you estimated for the closure of an Air Force depot.

a. Why does the closure of an Air Force installation result in the elimination of such a low percentage of jobs, particularly compared to the closure of industrial facilities in the other services?

b. Why do 86 percent of the authorized manpower positions have to be moved with the closure of a depot installation?

c. What was the projected cost to close McClellan Air Force depot in the 1993 BRAC compared with the cost to close estimate of the 1995 BRAC?

d. What factors changed the estimates of '93 vs '95?

## DEPOT MAINTENANCE

### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO GENERAL SHANE FOR THE RECORD

1. In terms of buildings and acres, Letterkenny is a considerably larger depot than Tobyhanna Army Depot. Did the Army look at possibly closing Tobyhanna Army Depot and transferring the electronics workload to Letterkenny, a facility that is partly focused on electronics and partly focused on ground vehicle maintenance?

2. In determining military value, why did the Army place heavy emphasis on capacity, which is based on the number of work stations to produce a particular workload, and relatively less emphasis on building square footage and expandable acreage?

Were other options considered as an alternative to the Letterkenny / Tobyhanna scenario recommended by DoD? For example, did the Army look at sending all of the tactical missile storage and maintenance workload to Hill Air Force Base and sending the residual conventional ammunition storage mission to other DoD storage locations? This would result in a total base closure, rather than a partial realignment.

3. The Army plans to transfer ground vehicle workload from Letterkenny to Anniston, but none of the personnel authorizations would be realigned. How can this work be accomplished at Anniston with no additional people?

4. Did the Army look at moving the Tobyhanna Depot workload to Letterkenny? If so, what were the results? Do you believe this would be a good idea?

## DEPOT MAINTENANCE

### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO MR NEMFAKOS FOR THE RECORD

1. Did the Navy consider consolidating plating operations at Louisville's new \$36 million modern plating facility?
2. Regarding the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis, could you explain why the Navy gave this installation a 0 in the Military Value category for integrated capabilities?
3. During the Commission's recent visit to the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis, we were shown the systems design facility for the EP-3 and ES-3 aircraft. We were told by the Naval Air Warfare Center that the cost to relocate those facilities to China Lake would be \$30 million. Could you please explain why the Navy only provided \$1.17 million for Military Construction at China Lake to accommodate these facilities?
4. The Navy says that "continuing decreases in force structure eliminates the need to retain the capacity to dry-dock large naval vessels for emergent requirements." How many large-decked ships (CV, CVN, LHA & LHD) are in the Pacific Fleet now? How many less are expected to be in the Pacific Fleet in 2001?
5. How many positions has the Navy historically saved with the closure of a Naval Aviation Depot or comparable industrial activity?

## UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

### ITEMS FOR INCLUSION IN THE RECORD

1. Mr. Finch, during your testimony, you stated to Commissioner Robles that you would provide a list of those criteria used by the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group to constrain the linear programming model from presenting nonsensical results. Please provide these criteria.

2. Mr. Finch, during your testimony, you stated to Commissioner Cornella that Flight Screening was "basically" included as a matter of completeness. For the record, please respond to the following question:

Why did you include Flight Screening, a function not now nor envisioned to be done at UPT bases, but did not include Introduction to Fighter Fundamental (IFF) training, a function that is done at UPT bases, in the scope of your analysis?

3. General Blume/Mr. Nemfakos/General Shane, during your testimony, Commissioner Davis asked how much surge capacity exists in each service. Please respond to this question in terms of capacity to recover from temporary situations, such as a period of prolonged bad weather, and also in terms of capacity to accommodate an increase in the Pilot Training Rate in the event of a long-term increase in pilot requirements.

4. General Blume/Mr. Nemfakos/General Shane, during your testimony, Commissioner Robles requested that each Service provide data summarizing the costs to train pilots. Please include in this information the fixed costs for Base Operating Support (BOS), Real Property Management Account (RPMA), Overhead and Personnel at each UPT base, and the variable costs which vary by the number of students and flight hours/sorties flown. These costs should reflect only the portion attributable to UPT for the installations that also host other tenant units.

5. Mr. Finch, during your testimony, you stated that in order to achieve uniformity when making comparisons between the services, the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group drafted rules used by the FAA to measure airfield operations capacity at each UPT base. Please provide the formula that the FAA uses and how these rules were applied by your group.

6. General Blume, during your testimony, you stated you would provide answers to several questions relating to weather. Please respond to the following questions:

Why was the percent of time at which the ceiling and visibility are better than 1000 feet and 3 miles given any weight in the analysis when it is 1500 feet and 3 miles that represents a key weather decision factor in conducting Air Force flight training operations?

In tracking weather attrition, factors such as actual attrition experience, cancellations due to forecast icing conditions, and the occurrence of crosswinds out of limits can be used. Why was so much weight placed on crosswinds rather than some of these other factors in the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group functional value analysis?

The T-38 attrition rate planning factor at Reese is 28 percent compared to 17 percent for the T-1. Since the T-1 factor is currently in use at Reese, why did the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group use the T-38 instead of the T-1 planning factor in its functional value analysis?

7. Mr. Nemfakos, during your testimony, you stated to Commissioner Davis that you would provide for the record your analysis on Strike Pilot Training Rates. Please provide that general data along with your response to the following specific questions:

Are the flight operations per strike Pilot Training Rate (PTR) at NAS Meridian and NAS Kingsville used in your capacity analysis the same? Please explain any differences.

What is the current operations per strike Pilot Training Rate at NAS Kingsville? How does this compare with the figure used to determine strike Pilot Training Rate capacity at NAS Kingsville?

To what extent was the Navy's determination that a single intermediate/advanced strike UPT base containing sufficient capacity to conduct training to support the strike Pilot Training Rate (PTR) in the future and under surge operations based upon the availability of NAS Corpus Christi as an outlying field?

What is the maximum strike Pilot Training Rate (PTR) that NAS Kingsville could support with Orange Grove and NAS Corpus Christi available as outlying fields?

To what extent would the strike training capacity of NAS Kingsville be impacted if NAS Corpus Christi was not available?

8. Mr. Finch, your optimization analysis apparently placed primary emphasis on the installation military value data provided to you by the services, and less emphasis on the functional values developed by the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group.

Please explain the reasoning for this approach?

9. Mr. Finch, your Joint Cross-Service Group minutes of March 24, 1994, state that the UPT category is largely installation oriented. If the value of a UPT base is best reflected in its functional rather than military value, why didn't you base your alternatives on model output which maximized functional value unconstrained by installation military value?

Since there is a direct correlation between the Joint Cross-Service Group's functional value rating and the Air Force's determination of military value, didn't the use of both functional and military value in the model simply increase the impact of functional value in the result?

10. General Blume, since the Air Force relied so heavily on the results of the Joint Cross-Service Group's computer model, did you analyze the model for calculation errors?

11. General Blume/Mr. Nemfakos, your Service recommendations used your own BRAC process as well as non-BRAC policy decisions to chose which UPT bases to close or realign. Why didn't your recommendations necessarily reflect the high functional value scores from the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group?

12. Gen Blume, the average functional value for each Air Force UPT base is shown (the Reese score is adjusted based on your recent memo to us).

Columbus AFB	6.74
Vance AFB	6.67
Randolph AFB	6.53
Laughlin AFB	6.50
Reese AFB	6.22

The Air Force Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) apparently used the functional values from the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group. These averages were used to find military value by performing a standard deviation analysis to assign a color "Stop Light" code to Criteria I, "Flying Mission Evaluation." All eight criteria were then considered to derive an overall Air Force ranking: the result was Tier I for Columbus, Laughlin, Randolph, and Vance, and Tier III for Reese.

Why didn't the Air Force simply use the functional value for the training that is actually accomplished at each specific UPT base to determine its score? Would the result have been different?

13. Mr. Finch, did the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group run any excursions using the Linear Programming Optimization Model, such as the ones shown on below:

- a. Examining only Air Force Bases
- b. Examining only Naval Air Stations
- c. Excluding flight screening
- d. Excluding Navy-unique functional areas
- e. Excluding Air Force-unique functional areas
- f. Changing the weights on various factors, such as airspace

What would the results be if these excursions were run?

14. Mr. Finch, what were the options you considered for measuring capacity, and why did you choose the methods you did?

15. Mr. Finch, a separate functional value for the Air Force's post-UPT Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals (IFF) training was not included among the 10 functional areas selected for assessing the overall functional value of each UPT-category base.

Even though it is conducted after "Wings" are awarded, IFF is conducted at a UPT base, consumes capacity, and is similar in content to training events contained within the latter stages of the Navy's Strike Training syllabus.

Why didn't the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group include IFF as an additional functional area?

16. General Blume, did the Air Force consider transferring the Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals training from Columbus AFB to another location such as Luke AFB in order to increase the capacity to do other training at Columbus?

17. Mr. Finch, in the consideration of training airspace for both capacity analysis and functional value, the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group methodology permitted a base to claim credit for large sectors of airspace so long as any portion of it was within 100 nautical miles of the base. For bases near the Gulf of Mexico, this meant credit for huge over-water sectors.

Both Air Force and Navy UPT programs train predominantly over land. This is to permit such over-land flight training events as ground reference maneuvers and low level navigation. Over-water training is performed close to shore. Since actual UPT practice precludes the use of large blocks of over-water airspace, doesn't giving credit for such over-water airspace unfairly skew the results in favor of coastal bases?

18. Mr. Finch, did either the Services or the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group consider the impact of contracting some UPT functional training areas to outside sources?

19. General Blume, does closing Reese AFB leave sufficient capacity in the UPT area to provide for surge capability in pilot training?

20. Mr. Finch, all of your alternatives move the Navy's helicopter training to Fort Rucker. There are several different ways to implement this alternative. For example, the Navy could retain their current helicopter training process and be collocated at Fort Rucker as an Army tenant; or the Navy's pilots could be integrated into the Army training through a consolidation. Did the Joint Cross Service Group consider the issue of consolidation vs. collocation when developing its alternatives?

21. Mr. Finch, the Navy responded to your alternatives to close Whiting Field with COBRA analyses that showed a high cost of implementing the move of primary training to Naval Air Station Pensacola and helicopter training to Fort Rucker.

Did the UPT-Joint Cross Service Group look at variations to this scenario, such as the relocation of helicopter training to Fort Rucker with primary training remaining at Whiting Field?

22. Mr. Nemfakos, would moving helicopter training out of Whiting Field help the Navy meet its requirement for outlying fields for primary training?

Does your answer change when considering the transition to any of the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) aircraft?

23. Mr. Nemfakos, the Navy Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) record states that the reason for rejecting the movement of helicopter training to Fort Rucker is the high one-time cost and long return on investment.

Did operational concerns also enter into this decision or was it strictly an economic decision?

24. General Blume, please summarize the main reasons why the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) choose Reese AFB to close?

25. Mr. Nemfakos, please summarize the main reasons why the Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) choose NAS Meridian to close?

26. Mr. Finch, please discuss the process used to analyze a potential NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex.

What alternatives or "strawmen" did the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group consider?

What COBRA runs were performed to assess a potential NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex?

What cost advantages were considered (for example, NAS Meridian and Columbus AFB using joint targets and outlying fields and sharing excess capacity during runway maintenance)?

27. Mr. Nemfakos, if the redirect of mine warfare helicopter assets to NAS Corpus Christi is not approved, what impact would that have on the operations per day available for pilot training at Corpus Christi?

How much do other flight operations at Corpus Christi reduce daily operations available for pilot training?

28. Mr. Finch, will Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) increase or decrease the number of bases required for UPT training?

29. Mr. Finch, what was the impact of Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS)-related issues on the group's assessment of functional value?

What specific facility and airspace requirements were used to determine Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) functional values?



## CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

### UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

#### Questions submitted by Congressman Smith:

1. Since the Navy has recommended relocating the Naval Air Technical Training Center (NATTC) from Lakehurst, NJ, to Pensacola, do you envision recreating the Carrier Aircraft Launch and Recovery System (COLASSES) at Pensacola or do you expect to disassemble, package, ship and reinstall those devices that are critical to training pilots for flying off and onto aircraft carriers?
2. At what cost do you envision recreating the unique aircraft flight training facility in Pensacola?
3. Do facilities exist at Pensacola for the housing of the Lakehurst NATTC students?
4. What type of delay or disruptions are anticipated or planned for in the training of these aircraft carrier student pilots while the training facility is disassembled, moved and recreated in Pensacola?

#### Questions submitted by Senators Shelby and Heflin and Congressman Everett:

1. In November of 1994, the Joint Cross-Service Group on Undergraduate Pilot Training submitted three different alternatives for consideration by the military departments and Secretary Perry. According to documents submitted to the BRAC, each alternative reduced excess capacity while maintaining high military value. Each of the three alternatives consistently recommended consolidating all military undergraduate helicopter pilot training at Fort Rucker.

However, these recommendations were not adhered to in their entirety. Secretary Perry chose not to consolidate UHPT at Fort Rucker as recommended due to high MILCON costs associated with closing Whiting NAS. He then directed consolidating all Navy initial fixed wing training at Whiting NAS.

- a. Why is it that consolidation of UHPT at Ft. Rucker was not adopted?
- b. Since the Navy is moving all of its initial fixed wing training to Whiting NAS, wouldn't limited space be freed-up if UHPT was moved to Ft. Rucker?
- c. From an efficiency standpoint, doesn't it make sense to have all initial rotary wing training dedicated at one location?

2. On March 30, 1993 General Colin Powell stated at the House Armed Services Committee Army Posture Hearing that, "I believe the proper place to do the centralization (of UHPT) and where it can be done very well is at Fort Rucker, Alabama." He went on to say, "I am committed to push this as hard as possible because there are real savings here and this is where we ought to find the savings."

The cost to transfer the UHPT operation at Whiting Field to Fort Rucker is less than \$18 million dollars. In 1992 the DoD IG reported that relocation of UHPT to Fort Rucker would save at least \$79 million dollars over 5 years.

a. Is this savings estimate still valid today?

3. In a proposal to the Roles & Missions Commission, the Army has stated that by consolidating all primary DoD rotary wing training, integration and standardization among the services would be enhanced to truly support jointness. Each of the services would continue to provide advanced training for their own unique aspects of rotary wing aviation.

The Army has the capacity to train all of DoD's primary helicopter pilot requirements without any need for expansion or new construction.

a. From an efficiency and interoperability standpoint, doesn't it make sense for all introductory helicopter pilot training to be conducted by the Army?

4. During the BRAC 95 Navy hearing earlier this year, General Mundy commented that in the 1970's the Army was training Marine helicopter pilots, and that this arrangement worked very well.

a. Is there any reason why the Marine Corps couldn't return to this arrangement?

5. In 1992, the JCS report on Roles & Missions recommended consolidation of all primary helicopter training with the Army. A team led by the Navy was tasked by Secretary of Defense Aspin to review this recommendation. Their findings concluded that consolidation would need to be put on hold until primary training for both fixed wing and rotary wing could be evaluated together, the service and operating costs of the new TH-67 trainer had been determined, and that the decision would be made with the context of a base closure round.

a. Each of these points has been satisfied, yet DoD only adopted the fixed wing portion of the Cross-Service Group recommendation. Why was rotary wing training ignored?

6. Earlier this year, the Navy testified before the BRAC 95 commission that the consolidation of Navy helicopter training with the Army was not feasible because it was a "people" issue, or a quality of life issue and that Navy Pilots fly in more extreme weather conditions at sea than the Army does. If that in fact is the case, why does the Pentagon continue to request Army helicopters and pilots to support naval missions?

A number of Army missions in support of Naval operations:

1983: Operation Urgent Fury

- \*Shipboard operations involving the Army's 18th Airborne Corps: UH-60's, OH-58A/C's, AH-1's

1987: Operation Prime Chance

- \*Shipboard and overwater operations involving the Army's 4/17th CAV (now 4/2) with OH-58D's
- \*valid CONOPS mission today

1994: Operation Uphold Democracy - Haiti

- \*10th Mountain Division operated from the USS Eisenhower
- \*OH-58D's had extensive missions prior to invasion
- \*UH-60's, CH-47's, OH-58A/C's and AH-1's transported troops and equipment to the AO for several days, followed by command & control missions

Each Army Aviation unit has a task for shipboard operations incorporated in their mission essential list of tasks. The Army trains for shipboard operations and performs shipboard operations.

7. In 1992, MGen. Dave Robbins, then-Commander of the Army Aviation Center, noted that one of the main reasons the Navy was opposed to consolidating this training with the Army was because the Navy used initial fixed-wing training as a "cutting" tool for students.
  - a. Do you believe this to be the case, and is there any legitimate reason why the Navy needs this extra "cutting" tool?
  - b. Could the Navy use the Army's training syllabus that places student pilots directly into the rotary wing pipeline?
8. According to the DoD IG, "Relocating the Navy's primary helicopter training to Fort Rucker would relieve ground and air traffic congestion at Whiting Field NAS."
  - a. Is there a problem with congestion at Whiting Field, both in the air and on the ground? If so, would relocation of the Navy's Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot Training program free up space at Whiting Field?
  - b. How does Fort Rucker compare with Whiting with regard to available space?
  - c. Since the Army already owns nearly 80% of all DoD helicopters, does Fort Rucker have the capacity to train all of DoD's primary helicopter pilot requirements?

## MEDICAL JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP

### PROCESS

#### Questions submitted to Dr. Edward Martin

1. All but one of the 16 Joint Cross Service Group alternatives describe realignment of an acute care hospital to an outpatient clinic.

Why were so many of the Joint Cross Service Group's alternatives realignments rather than closures?

Is realignment to a clinic a cost effective way to eliminate excess capacity?

Would it be more cost effective to close rather than realign hospitals, especially in areas that have additional military hospitals or substantial civilian capacity?

2. What exactly did the Joint Cross Service Group have in mind when it used the word "clinic?"

3. Who has the final say as to what is included in a clinic, and who decides how many people it takes to operate one?

4. Given that direct care services in military hospitals are essentially free to beneficiaries, while services received under CHAMPUS involve copayments and deductibles, do you believe it is reasonable to conclude that demand for services may diminish when direct care services are reduced?

## PRIOR ROUND AND NON-BRAC ACTIONS

5. Please describe how reductions in the medical area fit into the larger, DOD-wide drawdown context?
6. Do past BRAC actions and the current set of recommendations keep pace with changes in the rest of the military or are medical assets drawing down at a faster or slower pace?
7. In meetings with Commission staff, you described a number of hospital realignment actions taking place outside of the BRAC process.

Please specify what the Department is doing to eliminate excess inpatient capacity beyond the recommendations sent to this Commission. Please include name of hospital, details of the action, and the time frame during which the action is to occur.

In particular, please describe current or planned actions for realignment, consolidation, or other "right-sizing" at the following facilities:

- Blanchfield Army Community Hospital, Fort Campbell, KY
- Ireland Army Community Hospital, Fort Knox, KY
  
- Madigan Army Medical Center, Fort Lewis, WA
- Naval Hospital Bremerton, WA
- Naval Hospital Oak Harbor, WA
  
- Walter Reed Army Medical Center, DC
- DeWitt Army Community Hospital, Fort Belvoir, VA
- National Navy Medical Center, MD
- Malcolm Grow USAF Medical Center, Andrews AFB, MD
  
- McDonald Army Community Hospital, Fort Eustis, VA
- Naval Hospital Portsmouth, VA
- 1st Medical Group, Langley AFB, VA
  
- Munson Army Community Hospital, Fort Leavenworth, KS
- Irwin Army Community Hospital, Fort Riley, KS
- 351st Medical Group, Whiteman AFB, MO
  
- Womack Army Medical Center, Fort Bragg, NC
- Naval Hospital Cherry Point, NC
- Naval Hospital Camp Lejeune, NC
- 4th Medical Group, Seymour Johnson AFB, NC
  
- Naval Hospital Camp Pendleton, CA

- Naval Hospital San Diego, CA
- Evans Army Community Hospital, Fort Carson, CO
- USAF Academy Hospital, CO
- Bliss Army Community Hospital, Fort Huachuca, AZ
- 355th Medical Group, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ
- Naval Hospital Pensacola, FL
- 646th Medical Group, Eglin AFB, FL
- 325th Medical Group, Tyndall AFB, FL
- Keesler USAF Medical Center, Keesler AFB, MS
- Martin Army Community Hospital, Fort Benning, GA
- Lyster Army Community Hospital, Fort Rucker, AL
- 502nd Medical Group, Maxwell AFB, AL
- 653rd Medical Group, Robins AFB, GA
- Reynolds Army Community Hospital, Fort Sill, OK
- 97th Medical Group, Altus AFB, OK
- 654th Medical Group, Tinker AFB, OK
- 396th Medical Group, Sheppard AFB, TX
- Moncrief Army Community Hospital, Fort Jackson, SC
- 363rd Medical Group, Shaw AFB, SC
- Winn Army Community Hospital, Fort Stewart, GA
- Naval Hospital Beaufort, SC

In regards to planned actions, please be specific about the status of those plans in Defense Health Program budgeting.

Also, please describe in detail the status of current plans to convert Naval Hospital Charleston, SC; Naval Hospital Patuxent River, MD; 9th Medical Group, Beale AFB, CA; 323rd FTW Hospital, Mather AFB, CA; and 438th Medical Group, Fort Dix, NJ into outpatient clinics.

Why isn't the Department doing these actions through the BRAC process?

Given the frequency with which budgets can and do change, what assurances do you and the Commission have that these actions are really going to take place?

Do you believe it would be beneficial for the Commission to add any or all of the actions you describe to its list of actions to consider?

8. San Antonio, Texas is home to two large military medical centers and a large number of civilian hospitals. This appears to be an example of an opportunity to eliminate a substantial portion of excess capacity, and, indeed, the Air Force facility, Wilford Hall, was on the Joint Cross Service Group list of realignment alternatives. Yet neither facility is on the DOD list.

Why?

Why did the Air Force choose not to realign Wilford Hall to either a clinic, as the Joint Cross Service Group alternative suggests, or a community hospital?

Is there a plan to realign and consolidate services at Wilford Hall and Brooke Army Medical Center? If so, what is its status?

Are you comfortable with the Army and Air Force plans to enact such an alternative through the budget process? If not, do you feel that Commission action could better ensure that the necessary realignment takes place?

Given the unique aspects within both the Brooke Army Medical Center and Wilford Hall, would you envision any actual infrastructure operating efficiencies by a consolidation? Would you actually be able to close a facility by consolidation?

### **REQUIREMENTS**

9. The Commission staff understands that there is some disagreement within the Department in the area of wartime readiness requirements for hospital beds.

However, do even the highest estimates of required wartime beds exceed the current inventory of over 20,000 mobilization beds?

### **SERVICES' RESPONSES TO JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP ALTERNATIVES**

10. Eleven of the sixteen alternatives provided to the Services by the Joint Cross Service Group were not accepted.

Are you satisfied that the DOD list goes as far as it should in reducing medical infrastructure?

Do the eleven rejected alternatives represent missed opportunities?

## **TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMISSION**

11. In testimony before the Commission on April 17, 1995, you stated that there is a significant change in how DoD delivers care to eligible beneficiaries within its facilities. Specifically, you stated that the Air Force has stopped doing emergency services in 11 hospitals and closed 17 others. In addition, you testified that the Navy is in the final process of making judgment about downsizing five hospitals to clinics.

Please provide for the record the details upon which your statements were based. At a minimum, please include the locations of affected hospitals, the date the change became or will become effective, and what other plans your office may have to continue the significant changes in how DoD delivers care.

### **Questions Submitted for General Shane**

1. How did the Army define "clinic" for the Fort Lee and Fort Meade realignments and what was the basis for the size of the staff reductions in the recommendations for these two hospitals?
2. In developing the cost savings estimates for the two Army hospital realignment actions, what assumptions did the Army make about both inpatient and outpatient CHAMPUS cost increases?
3. Please explain why the Army accepted some of the Joint Cross Service Group alternatives but not others?

### **Questions Submitted for Major General Blume**

1. Based on documents provided to the Commission and discussions between the Commission staff and DoD representatives, it is understood that both the Army and the Navy performed COBRA analyses for all of the Joint Cross Service Group alternatives, but that the Air Force did not perform any.

Is this correct? If so, why didn't the Air Force do the analyses needed to determine such an important aspect of the feasibility of the alternatives?

Did the Air Force actively participate in the Joint Cross Service Group effort?

If the Air Force wasn't going to consider the Joint Cross Service Group alternatives, why did the Joint Cross Service Group bother to consider Air Force Hospitals at all?



**Question Submitted for Mr. Nemfakos**

1. Please explain why the Navy did not accept either of the two Naval Hospital realignment alternatives on the Joint Cross Service Group list?

## LABORATORY AND TEST AND EVALUATION

### LABORATORY

#### QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

1. Dr. Dorman, please explain the context in which your group proposed the closing of Rome Lab and the alternative for cross service collocation of common Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) activities at Fort Monmouth.
2. Dr. Dorman, what organizations and how many personnel would have been located at Fort Monmouth under this alternative?
3. Dr. Dorman, as you know, Rome was designated as one of the Air Force's four Tier I laboratories. As Director of Defense Research and Engineering, are you concerned that closing the lab and moving some of its C4I functions to Fort Monmouth and the others to Hanscom Air Force Base will have a major impact on the DoD's and the Services' ability to conduct current and further C4I research and development?
4. Dr. Dorman, does it make sense to split Rome Lab's C3I functions between two military installations?
5. General Blume, how did the Air Force determine the cost and savings of the Rome Laboratory recommendation? Did anyone from the Air Force involved in the decision to close the lab and realign its functions visit the lab before the recommendation was made to: (1) discuss these actions with the lab's managers, (2) evaluate the impact of these actions on the lab's current and future C4I work, (3) determine the Lab's requirements at the receiving locations, and (4) determine what had to be moved to the new location and at what cost?
6. Major General Blume, during the Commission's visit of Brooks, the San Antonio community presented a plan to establish a cantonment area, close Brooks, and preserve the functions of the Human Systems Center, that is, Armstrong Laboratory, the School of Aerospace Medicine, and other related activities.

Had the Air Force considered this option previously?

How does the Air Force plan to eliminate excess capacity at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base should the San Antonio community proposal be adopted?

7. Major General Blume and Dr. Dorman, the current DoD recommendations dictate that the Aircrew Training Research Division of Armstrong Laboratory remain as a stand-alone facility at the closed Williams Air Force Base.

Nearby Luke Air Force Base already conducts the majority of the fighter weapons training for the Air Force, and has a long history of cooperation with Williams.

How strongly did the Air Force consider moving this unique and necessary function from Williams Air Force Base to Luke Air Force Base? Have any COBRA runs performed?

If so, could they be provided to the Commission as soon as possible?

8. As indicated during the hearing, Dr. Dorman agreed to provide, for the record, what the impact on excess capacity would have been had the Laboratory Joint Cross Service Group's four alternatives been accepted by the separate services within the Department of Defense. Please provide this information for the record.

## TEST AND EVALUATION

### QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

1. Major General Blume, the Joint Cross Service Group stated "electronic combat Test and Evaluation capability at Eglin and China Lake have approximately 85% overlap." One alternative suggested was to move China Lake test assets to Eglin.

Why is the Air Force, in light of this alternative, proposing to move Electronic Combat Testing from Eglin Air Force Base to Nellis Air Force Base?

What will be the cost for the relocation of the Electronics Combat Testing to Nellis Air Force Base?

Will there be a scheduled delay and a negative impact on programs from this proposed move of Electronic Combat Testing to Nellis Air Force Base?

Mr. Nemfakos, did the Navy consider the alternative to move China Lake T&E missions primarily to Eglin?

2. General Blume, why did the Air Force not implement any of the core alternatives presented by the Joint Cross-Service Group?

3. Mr. Nemfakos, why did the Navy not implement any of the core alternatives presented by the Joint Cross-Service Group?

4. Mr. Nemfakos, did the Navy consider moving the test activities from Pt. Mugu to China Lake or Eglin Air Force Base to eliminate excess test infrastructure?

Would this be the prudent course to follow considering the excess capacity identified by the Joint Cross-Service Group?

5. General Blume, The Joint Cross-Service Group recommended the Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator Activity (AFEWES) at Fort Worth, Texas, and the Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor Activity (REDCAP) at Buffalo, New York (Electronic Combat test simulation systems) be moved to Patuxent River or to Edwards Air Force Base.

The Air Force recommended to move these activities to Edwards Air Force Base. Why?

Please provide specific information on the methodology the Air Force used for determining projected workloads at the AFEWES and the REDCAP facilities.

6. Mr. Coyle, the Joint Cross Service Group on Test and Evaluation put forth the alternative to consolidate Armament/Weapons testing at Eglin Air Force Base eliminating these missions at China Lake and Point Mugu.

Do you still support this alternative?

7. Mr. Coyle, since you suggested an alternative to consolidate testing at the Eglin Air Force Base Test Range, does the proposed movement by the Air Force of the Electromagnetic Test Environment effort to Nellis Air Force Base eliminate the opportunity to consolidate DoD electronic combat testing?

8. Mr. Burt, as you indicated during testimony, you agreed to provide, for the record, the percent of excess Test and Evaluation capacity that could be eliminated had the alternatives put forward by the Joint Cross Service Group been adopted. Please provide this information for the record.

## **LABS, TEST AND EVALUATION**

### **Questions submitted by Representative Smith**

1. In studying the catapult and arresting gear testing for aircraft carriers that is performed at Lakehurst, New Jersey, it seems that the Navy concluded that this mission cannot be done today at any other military facility in the world. Having reached that conclusion, why did the Navy decide to move the prototyping and manufacturing of the catapult and arresting gear devices nearly 1000 miles away to Jacksonville, Florida?
2. Is it possible that the Navy underestimated the obvious industrial, economic, and performance advantages of manufacturing and prototyping these items where they are tested, as is done today?
3. One of the alternative recommendations of the Laboratory Cross Service Group was to consolidate the Fixed Flight Subsystems ED work and the Fixed Flight Subsystems ISE work (now done at 9 separate bases) at the Naval Air Warfare Center at Lakehurst. Why were these recommendations made? And why were they not thoroughly explored?

### **Questions submitted by Representative Scarborough**

1. The Board of Directors Report of February 1994 addressed the question of consolidating DoD Electronic Combat (EC) Open Air Ranges from three (Elgin, China Lake, and the Nellis complex) to two. The report cited clear financial and capability reasons for closing China Lake's EC open air range and leaving Eglin to complement the Nellis complex. In November 1994, T&E Joint Cross Service Group (JCSG) optimization model output results based upon JCSG-developed functional values, projected workload, and capabilities identified closing China Lake as the DoD alternative to analyze. Similar opportunities appear to exist in Armament/Weapons T&E. These JCSG results were developed by the most knowledgeable individuals in DoD on the T&E issue. It appears that cross-servicing alternatives involving these "core" T&E activities were ground ruled out. Why didn't DoD analyze these cross-service opportunities?
2. The 1995 Defense Authorization bill prohibited DoD from spending any money to move Electronic Combat equipment from the Elgin range until DoD delivered an Electronic Combat Master Plan to the Congress. Considering this direction and the JCSG-cited superiority of the Eglin Electromagnetic Test Environment (EMTE) to all other DoD ranges evaluated, why has the Air Force chosen to dismantle the Eglin EMTE and replicate it in the Nellis complex, essentially eliminating forever the opportunity to consolidate DoD EC testing and realize the significant savings the JCSG identified?

### **Questions submitted by Representative Farr**

1. As the person responsible for operational testing in DoD, you state in your February 10, 1995 memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security (Economic Reinvestment & BRAC) that the recommendation to realign Fort Hunter Liggett is a "showstopper." Please explain.
2. We understand that there are conditions at Fort Hunter Liggett which enhance it as a site for performing operational testing. These include: a varied terrain, isolation, no artificial light contamination and no radio frequency interference. Do these conditions exist at Fort Bliss? If not, could they be created?
3. From a military value standpoint, is the "laser-safe bowl" (which allows for non-eye safe laser testing in an instrumented valley) at Fort Hunter Liggett a critical component of operational testing?
4. Do you think the instrumentation suite (used to monitor and record every player's activity during a test) could be duplicated at Fort Bliss? If so, would it be as effective?
5. From a military value standpoint, is Fort Hunter Liggett essential to operational testing to DoD?

### **Questions submitted by Representative Hansen (to Dr. Coyle)**

1. Can you explain to the commission your position your position on the Army's recommendation to realign biological and chemical test and evaluation missions from Dugway Proving Grounds as outlined in the memorandum you signed dated February 10, 1995, to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security.
2. From a military value standpoint, do you feel it is essential to keep chemical, biological, and smoke/obscurant testing at Dugway Proving Grounds rather than moving these missions to Yuma Proving Ground or Aberdeen Maryland?
3. Can you outline for the Commission the unique features of Dugway Proving Ground which cannot be replicated elsewhere?
4. In your memo dated February 10, 1995, you indicated that since Dugway conducted chem/bio testing for all of the services, that each of the services would have to sign-off and agree that their services' testing needs could still be met under the Army's recommendation for Dugway. To your knowledge, did the Department of Defense or the Army check with the other services prior to the final recommendation coming forward from the Army?

**Questions submitted by Senators Mikulski and Sarbanes and Representative Wynn  
(To Dr. Coyle)**

1. During testimony before the Commission on March 1, General Shalikashvili expressed concerns about how the proposed closure of the Naval Surface Warfare Center at White Oak, Maryland, would affect the hypervelocity wind tunnel located there. Do you have similar concerns?
2. Is it your view that this wind tunnel must continue to stay in operation, either by the Navy, or some other agency, at White Oak or some other location.
3. Just to clarify, the certified data call responses indicate that the US government has no other wind tunnel with the capabilities of the one at White Oak. Is this the case?

**Additional Questions submitted by Senators Mikulski and Sarbanes**

4. Were the hypervelocity wind tunnel and the nuclear weapons effects simulation facility at NSWC White Oak considered by the Test and Evaluation or Laboratory Joint Cross Service Groups?





OPERATIONAL TEST  
AND EVALUATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1700

Please note to file number  
when available 950424-20

April 25, 1995

RI

Honorable Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman, Defense Base Closure  
and Realignment Commission  
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I appreciated the opportunity to testify before you on April 17, 1995. We are committed to providing the Commission with all the assistance and support we can. Enclosed are the responses to the questions you provided me from Congressman Sam Farr.

I trust this information will be helpful to you and please let me know if there is anything else I can provide.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Philip E. Coyle".

Philip E. Coyle  
Director

Enclosure

## Congressional Questions for the Record

Question: Mr. Coyle, as the person responsible for operational testing in DoD, you state in your February 10, 1995 memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security (Economic Reinvestment & BRAC) that the recommendation to realign Fort Hunter-Liggett is a "showstopper."

Answer: To quote from our February 10, 1995 memorandum, our recommendation was that the "Army withdraw (its) proposal to move its test battalion from Fort Hunter-Liggett to Fort Bliss." Perhaps our use of the word "showstopper" was not the best choice. In the theater, a showstopper is applause that is so extended that it stops the show. This was not our meaning. Our memorandum was to convey our feeling that Fort Hunter-Liggett is an especially valuable asset, and that its inclusion on the BRAC list should not be recommended to the Secretary of Defense. Subsequent to our February 10 memorandum, I discussed my concerns with the Army. The Army expressed their view that the operational considerations raised by DOT&E were, in fact, considered in the Army's test planning. In addition, they pointed out that the size of the TEC mission is small and could be realigned in the future outside of the BRAC process should the need arise. The recommendation also retains the land at Hunter-Liggett under Army control should the need arise to resume major testing there. I told the Army that I remained skeptical and concerned about the implications of this realignment for future Army testing capability.

Question: Mr. Coyle, we understand that there are conditions at Fort Hunter-Liggett which enhance it as a site for performing operational testing. These include: a varied terrain, isolation, no artificial light contamination and no radio frequency interference. Do these conditions exist at Fort Bliss? If not, could they be created?

Answer: Fort Bliss does not have the quality of terrain, weather, foliage, lack of artificial light contamination, or freedom from radio frequency interference as Fort Hunter-Liggett. It would be impractical to "create" these features at Fort Bliss. Instead the testing capabilities from other Army test assets would be used in combination to approximate the capabilities at Fort Hunter-Liggett. Also the Army proposal provides for future use of Fort Hunter-Liggett when required.

Question: Mr. Coyle, from a military value standpoint is the "laser-safe bowl" (which allows for non-eye safe laser testing in an instrumented valley) at Fort Hunter-Liggett a critical component of operational testing?

Answer: Yes, modern testing of military systems often involves firing lasers instead of actual bullets or missiles. These laser firings are "paired" with laser receptors on the intended targets to determine if a hit has taken place. Of course, this must be done with the utmost personnel safety. The natural bowl at Fort Hunter-Liggett provides an ideal setting for such tests. Laser firings are conducted at other DoD test ranges but with concomitant restrictions where natural protection is unavailable.

Question: Mr. Coyle, do you think the instrumentation suite (used to monitor and record every player's activity during a test) could be duplicated at Fort Bliss? If so, would it be as effective?

Answer: For the right amount of money, the instrumentation at Fort Hunter-Liggett could be duplicated at Fort Bliss. If as good a job were done as has been done at Fort Hunter-Liggett, it could be as effective at Fort Bliss.

Question: Mr. Coyle, from a military value standpoint, is Fort Hunter-Liggett essential to operational testing to DoD?

Answer: Military value was evaluated by the Services, not by the Joint Cross Service Groups (JCSG). Military value-as determined by the Services-was considered along with functional values-determined by the JCSG's-in the final Service recommendations. Recognizing the special value of Fort Hunter-Liggett, the Army has proposed to continue to test at Fort Hunter-Liggett on a campaign basis. My concern is that moving the test command to Fort Bliss could become a de facto closing from a testing point of view.

Just four years ago, in 1991, the Army consolidated testing activities at Fort Hunter-Liggett because of the higher costs of campaign-style operation. Accordingly, once having moved to Fort Bliss, the Army may find that it is too expensive to return to Fort Hunter-Liggett on a campaign basis.



ECONOMIC SECURITY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3300



25 MAY 1995

Honorable Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman, Defense Base Closure  
and Realignment Commission  
1700 N. Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Please refer to this number  
when responding 150424-20

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your April 27, 1995, letter requesting that the Department of Defense provide responses to questions for the record resulting from the April 17, 1995 hearing. On May 9, 1995, we forwarded an interim response to these questions. Enclosed is the final set of answers.

I trust this information will be helpful, please let me know if there is anything else we can provide.

Sincerely,

Robert L. Meyer  
Director  
Base Closure

Enclosure

cc: Senate and House Reading Rooms



## DEPOT MAINTENANCE

### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO MR. KLUGH FOR THE RECORD

1. You identified a spreadsheet of a database created by a team of operations research systems analysts that would be provided for the record. Please provide the constraint equations to minimize and maximize the functional military value rankings. In addition, please identify where the flexibility exists in the algorithm assumptions.

**ANSWER:** For the Joint Cross-Service Group for Depot Maintenance, I directed the creation of a database from the certified data provided by the Military Departments. This data base was similar to a spreadsheet, strictly mechanical, and permitted accuracy cross-checks and rapid access. On the other hand, the Department adopted a linear program, known as the Joint Cross-Service Analysis Tool, or Optimization Model, for use by all cross-Service groups. The best way for me to respond to this question is to provide the model documentation (see **TAB 1**); this should answer all of your specific questions relating to constraints. Flexibility in the model comes from allowing it to move commodity workload from depot to depot in its efforts to optimize on a criteria, i.e., minimize sites, minimize excess capacity, maximize military value, or maximize functional value. It is inflexible in that a commodity workload can not be sent to a depot that was not previously identified as having the capability to perform that type of work. In other words, the model did not add capability over that which had been certified by the Services in an effort to close more facilities. Having said that, it should be pointed out that we created a notional depot for analysis purposes which allowed us to analyze, on an individual basis, any workloads that didn't "fit". This process is fully explained in our process summary which has been provided to your staff.

2. Please provide the core functions by commodity for each Air Force depot, and the co-located weapon system for those commodities.

**ANSWER:** Core functions by commodity, previously provided for all Services, are provided at **TAB 2**. It is evident from this chart that the Air Force, independent of BRAC actions, is evolving to a center of technical excellence philosophy. For example, landing gear depot maintenance workload is accomplished at Ogden ALC. The majority of the Air Force communications and electronics workload is performed at Warner Robins ALC. Aircraft engine depot maintenance is essentially accomplished at two depots, Oklahoma City ALC and San Antonio ALC. All Air Force blade and vane depot maintenance is performed at Oklahoma City ALC. The majority of bearing work is performed at Oklahoma City ALC.

3. Describe how your Joint Cross Service Group assigned functional values to each of the depots and shipyards?

**ANSWER:** The Joint Cross-Service Group assigned a functional value to performing maintenance on a particular commodity at a particular location. We looked at measures of merit that were applicable to all commodity groups and then assigned weights to those measures.

- CORE workloads/CORE capabilities - 30 Points
- Unique/peculiar CORE workload, capabilities and capacity - 15 Points
- Unique/peculiar CORE workload test facilities - 15 Points
- Other workloads - 30 Points
- Environmental issues/questions - 10 Points

Specific questions and weightings were developed and applied to each commodity at each activity.

4. When assigning workload, how did the functional value scores impact the positioning of workload?

**ANSWER:** The Optimization Model looked first to the criteria being optimized, that is :

- Minimize sites
- Minimize excess capacity
- Maximize Military value
- Maximize functional value

then within that criteria, it assigned workload to that location reporting capability and capacity on the basis of the highest functional value.

5. What is the excess capacity by Service, and by depot?

**ANSWER:** The spreadsheet provided at **TAB 3** and previously provided to your staff, displays excess capacity by commodity, by depot, and by Service. This spreadsheet is based upon capacity minus FY 1999 programmed, or funded core workload. All of the data were certified by the providing Service.

6. Please provide the capacity charts that describe excess capacity with implementation of this BRAC by Service, and by depot?

**ANSWER:** See spreadsheet at **TAB 3**. See **TAB 4** for supplemental Navy comments.

7. Cross Service Alternative Two proposes the closure of Long Beach and either Pearl Harbor or Portsmouth. Did the Joint Cross Service Group view Pearl Harbor and Portsmouth as equivalent in terms of capability as well as capacity?

**ANSWER:** In terms of capacity and core workloads they are similar. See **TAB 4** for supplemental Navy comments.

8. In both Alternatives One and Two, specific workload transfers are identified for each commodity group except for sea systems. In that case, the alternative states, "Consolidate as possible within the Department of the Navy." Why was the sea systems commodity area proposal not specific concerning workload distribution?

**ANSWER:** We felt that the commodity group of “Sea Systems” was unique to Navy and not susceptible to interservicing. We were also aware that there were nuclear and non-nuclear issues involved. We felt we could highlight the excess capacity, give the Navy some flexibility, and still track the results. See **TAB 4** for supplemental Navy comments.

9. What does the DoD BRAC recommendation do to your ability to inter-service depot maintenance work in the future?

**ANSWER:** It should help our efforts to interservice in the future. In my position as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics), I chair the Defense Depot Maintenance Council, or DDMC. Joining me on that council are the Logistics Chiefs from each of the Services. By charter, the DDMC can direct the assignment of depot maintenance workloads. The extensive database developed by the Joint Cross-Service Group provides an excellent baseline. Throughout the BRAC 95 process, I held Defense Depot Maintenance Council interservicing initiatives in abeyance in order not to prejudice the BRAC process.

10. Why did the Joint Cross Service Group initially recommend decentralization of tactical missile maintenance and then later “approve” the Army plan to consolidate at Tobyhanna?

**ANSWER:** Based upon the certified data available, Tobyhanna did not have the capacity to perform the entire workload if Letterkenny were to close. The Army then submitted a plan realigning Letterkenny under Tobyhanna which provided sufficient capacity and allowed the best use of facilities within a hundred mile radius. This plan will also allow the Army to shed excess overhead.

Did the JCSG consider the centralization of tactical missile maintenance at Hill Air Force Base? If so, what were the findings?

**ANSWER:** Yes, we specifically looked at consolidating the depot maintenance of tactical missiles at Ogden Air Logistics Center. Based upon the core requirements and the certified maximum potential capacity supplied by the Air Force, Ogden lacked sufficient capacity to accept the core workload. Subsequent review, at the direction of the BRAC Commission indicates Ogden ALC does not currently have sufficient storage capacity, or personnel resources to absorb the tactical missile requirement without substantial investment and hiring.

Was Anniston Army depot considered for missile maintenance consolidation?

**ANSWER:** Yes, the Joint Cross-Service Analysis Tool, or Optimization Model, considered the consolidation of workloads at all depots indicating the capability to perform that type of work. That depot was then considered for workload based upon the optimized criteria, certified maximum potential capacity, and relative functional value for that commodity. The Data Analysis Team then reviewed the model outputs on a commodity-by-commodity basis to determine if further consolidations of like workloads could be accomplished.

Should the Commission decide not to accept the Department's recommendation relating to tactical missiles, I would encourage the investigation of privatization. Tactical missile workload is conducive to being performed in the private sector. This could be accomplished either by having the original equipment manufacturer perform maintenance on individual systems, or the establishment of a Government-Owned Contractor-Operated cantonment facility at Letterkenny Army Depot.



## DEPOT MAINTENANCE

### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO GENERAL BLUME FOR THE RECORD

1. The Commission staff was recently briefed on a revision to the 1 March DoD recommendation from the Air Force.

a. Please outline for the Commission the revision to the recommendation.

**ANSWER:** As a normal part of our process, the Air Force conducted site surveys on the implementation of the recommendation regarding the ALCs. During that site survey, we reviewed the details of the recommendation, including specific product line consolidations and the identification of specific buildings for demolition or mothballing. In the site survey, we refined our estimates of personnel reductions and transfers associated with the consolidations, as well as the costs of the actions. These refined numbers were provided to the Commission staff.

The Air Force also identified four areas where a refined approach was better from a cost or mission effectiveness standpoint. Two modifications alter the location where work would be consolidated and two alter the recommendation to fully consolidate workload. These were identified to the Commission staff for their consideration.

b. Would you please explain why the Air Force found it necessary to revise its BRAC recommendation 7 weeks into the process?

**ANSWER:** Subsequent to submitting its recommendations, the Air Force obtained refined data. This was provided to the Commission staff to ensure the best information was considered.

2. All of the savings from the Air Force's BRAC recommendation to downsize all Air Force depots in place is the result of a 15 % reengineering factor.

a. Have the reengineering studies been performed yet?

**ANSWER:** No, they have not. Establishing new shop floor layouts for new workload mixes is a time-consuming and expensive process involving substantial industrial engineering resources. The Air Force plans to conduct the majority of the required industrial reengineering using contract industrial engineering support beginning in October 1995. Until that time, advance actions will be taken so the depots are prepared to execute as soon as practical following final approval of the BRAC 95 actions. Additionally, some relatively simple industrial reengineering may be conducted using organic industrial engineers where minor shop floor layout changes are required to accommodate some of the smaller workload consolidations.

b. What is the basis of the 15 % factor?

**ANSWER:** The 15% industrial reengineering productivity factor is an efficiency factor developed during the AFMC TRC review process. The 15 % is based on the plan to reengineer

all production lines supporting consolidating workloads and processes at gaining sites to the most efficient layouts possible for the new workload mixes. This reengineering will retain only the minimum capacity needed to support the Core workload at a targeted 85 % utilization rate. The consensus of HQ AFMC and ALC senior managers is that the improved industrial processes will yield (on average) a productivity increase of 15%.

c. Do your site surveys confirm that a 15% productivity savings is achievable?

**ANSWER:** Nothing was revealed during the site surveys that challenged the 15% productivity improvement planning factor. Savings above 15% are expected in many cases, and savings below 15% may occur in some instances. On the whole, the site surveys support the planned savings of approximately 15 percent.

3. The downsizing of ALCs would not breach the BRAC thresholds if actions were to be evenly phased over the next several years. Why did the Air Force choose to use the BRAC process if it could independently accomplish the same result?

**ANSWER:** Personnel reductions at the depot installations was clearly an item of interest that needed to be addressed within the BRAC process. Moreover, including the ALC actions within the BRAC process provides an opportunity for communities to address their concerns, and for the Commission to compare the Air Force recommendation to the more traditional closure option. Given these advantages of the BRAC process, it appears appropriate to include this in the overall Air Force recommendations.

4. Military value is the most important criterion to be considered when sizing the DoD infrastructure through the base closure process. The Air Force has used a tiering system in place of assigning military values.

a. What was the basis for assigning Kelly and McClellan Air Force Bases to "tier" 3?

**ANSWER:** First, a misunderstanding evident in the question should be cleared up. There is no "military value" criterion. Instead, the first four criteria are considered when evaluating military value. Rather than an overall value, there are four criteria, including cost and manpower implications, that comprise military value. The initial tiering of bases in the Air Force process is not based solely on the military value criteria, but on all eight criteria and a level playing field scenario. This is consistent with the direction that the recommendations are to be based on all eight criteria, with emphasis given to the first four. The basis for assigning Kelly and McClellan to their tier (as well as all other Air Force bases), was the BCEG's judgment of the relative value of each base's retention based on all eight criteria and the level playing field analysis.

b. What was the basis for assigning the depot at Kelly to "tier" 3?

**ANSWER:** In order to accommodate the Depot Maintenance Joint Cross-Service Group's request for a single "military value" for the bases, the Air Force provided two values for its depot bases. The first value reflected the tiering for the bases considered by the Joint Cross-Service

Group for Depot Maintenance (JCSG-DM). The second value reflected a tiering by depot asset only, not as a base, and was based on the Criterion I depot operations grade only. This second tiering was not a normal part of the Air Force process, and was accomplished only to assist the JCSG-DM. Kelly AFB received a yellow grade in the Depot Evaluation under Criterion I, and this was lower than the grades for the other depot operations.

c. The Air Force Base Closure Executive Group minutes indicate that the Air Force was studying the closure of Kelly and McClellan for 11 months. Were tier values a significant basis for studying Kelly and McClellan as closure candidates?

**ANSWER:** The assertion that these two bases were examined for closure for 11 months is unsupported. The identification of Kelly and McClellan as potential closures was not clear until the bases were tiered on September 13, 1994, and the tiering of depot bases was not briefed to the SECAF until November 10, 1994. The SECAF direction subsequent to this meeting to examine Kelly and McClellan for closure was based on their status as lower tier bases. This is the starting point for Air Force focused closure analysis in all categories.

d. How did the low military values of Kelly Air Force Base and McClellan Air Force Base impact the Air Force's final base closure recommendations?

**ANSWER:** The placement of these two bases in the lower tier meant that they were the first bases examined for potential closure. This did not, in the end, affect the Air Force recommendation since the Air Force chose not to recommend the closure of any depot due to the high one-time costs and relatively low return on the costs incurred.

e. The Air Force's depot downsizing recommendation would result in a "tier" 3 base (lowest ranking) receiving workload from "tier" 1 bases (highest ranking). What is the reason for this?

**ANSWER:** The tiering process was based on an overall base or depot evaluation. The consolidation, however, was focused on specific commodities. A lower ranking base may have the most cost effective site for consolidation of a specific commodity.

For example, McClellan has been the AF Technology Repair Center (TRC) for the repair and overhaul of aircraft hydraulic components since the early 1970s. Despite the fact that McClellan was ranked in tier 3 compared with the other ALCs overall, it is still by far the most economical center when considering the overhaul and repair of aircraft hydraulic components. McClellan already supports over 90% of this workload and has the most modern facilities and equipment available within the DoD. Accordingly, any other hydraulic component workload currently dispersed at other ALCs was recommended for consolidation at McClellan. This is a logical, economically sound, and fully supportable decision. In addition, once a decision is made not to close a base, it is eligible to receive missions or activities regardless of the origin of the relocating mission.

f. Why was there not a means to measure the value of co-located missions on Air Force Bases?

**ANSWER:** No base evaluation credits a base with the fact that a mission is located on that base. Instead, all bases including depots are evaluated against their ability to support various missions. The operational evaluation of Criterion I in the Air Force analysis, as well as Criteria II and III, provide an evaluation of this ability.

g. Why did the Air Force only look at the ability to receive different operational missions?

**ANSWER:** For depots, the ability to receive different operational missions is an important part of these installations, most of which have significant operational missions. The ability to receive and support other missions is an important measure of a base's contribution to the Air Force and was measured also. The ability of depots to receive other depot work was evaluated, particularly in the Joint Cross-Service Group for Depot Maintenance.

5. Secretary Widnall testified that a depot closure is prohibitively expensive. We are interested in understanding the relatively high cost that you estimated for the closure of an Air Force depot.

a. Why does the closure of an Air Force installation result in the elimination of such a low percentage of jobs, particularly compared to the closure of industrial facilities in the other services?

**ANSWER:** The closure of a depot installation assumes that the mission elements, tenants, and non-Air Force organizations move without reduction to new locations. Since the depot installations have significant portions dedicated to those uses, there is no manpower savings associated with those elements. The Air Force assumes that the workload projected for the closing depot will be transferred to another depot. Since the workload is being transferred the manpower associated with that workload must also be transferred. A six percent overhead savings was assumed based on expert judgment, but most of the manpower will transfer. The other savings achieved in manpower is that associated with the BOS manpower, reduced by BOS manpower increases at receiving locations.

b. Why do 86 percent of the authorized manpower positions have to be moved with the closure of a depot installation?

**ANSWER:** This answer is identical to the previous question. The closure of a depot installation assumes that the mission elements, tenants, and non-Air Force organizations move without reduction to new locations. Since the depot installations have significant portions dedicated to those uses, there is no manpower savings associated with those elements. The Air Force assumes that the workload projected for the closing depot will be transferred to another depot. Since the workload is being transferred, the manpower associated with that workload must also be transferred. A six percent savings can be assumed based on expert judgment, but most of the manpower will transfer. The other savings achieved in manpower is that associated with the BOS manpower, reduced by BOS manpower increases at receiving locations.

c. What was the projected cost to close McClellan Air Force depot in the 1993 BRAC compared with the cost to close estimate of the 1995 BRAC?

**ANSWER:** 1993 (Air Force recommendation) \$427.5 million  
1995 (closure scenario) \$559 million

d. What factors changed the estimates of '93 vs. '95?

**ANSWER:** Many factors contributed to the changes in cost estimates of BRAC 1993 and BRAC 1995. New versions of the costing model were used (called COBRA or Cost of Base Realignment Actions), the standard factors used by COBRA were revised, and there were different workload transfers and basing assumptions.

Several updated versions of COBRA have been released since BRAC 1993. Each new version revised the basic algorithms thus impacting the resulting cost estimate. BRAC 1993 estimates were calculated using COBRA version 4.04 and BRAC 1995 estimates used COBRA version 5.08.

The standard factors used by the COBRA model have also changed. The majority of standard factors used for BRAC 1995 were developed by a Joint COBRA team and varied significantly from BRAC 1993. The most significant changes in standard factors include the discount rate (7% in BRAC 1993 versus 2.75% in BRAC 1995), civilians not willing to move (55% versus 6%), and percent of civilians placed in priority place system (30% vs. 60%).

The workload transfers and basing assumptions were also different between BRAC 1993 and BRAC 1995. For example, the Hydraulics Component Repair operation was cantoned at McClellan AFB in BRAC 1993. In contrast, this operation was relocated to Tinker AFB in BRAC 1995. Similar situations existed with other depot and non-depot organizations.

## DEPOT MAINTENANCE

### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO GENERAL SHANE FOR THE RECORD

1. In terms of buildings and acres, Letterkenny is a considerably larger depot than Tobyhanna Army Depot. Did the Army look at possibly closing Tobyhanna Army Depot and transferring the electronics workload to Letterkenny, a facility that is partly focused on electronics and partly focused on ground vehicle maintenance?

**ANSWER:** Size alone is not a valid measure of comparing one depot against another without having an understanding of the respective missions of each depot. Letterkenny, is in fact "considerably larger" than Tobyhanna. However, Letterkenny is a multi-functional depot having a ground combat vehicle maintenance mission, an ammunition storage mission, a tactical missile consolidation mission, and serves as the host for several large tenant activities. On the other hand, Tobyhanna is a single function depot having only one primary mission - ground communications and electronics. The actual 19,243 acres that make Letterkenny "larger" than the 1,293 acres of Tobyhanna consist of some 12,000 acres of ammunition storage area than includes considerable areas that function as "blast zones" and safety requirements associated with storing high explosives and cannot be used for other missions. Letterkenny is also larger in total buildings, maintenance buildings, and total covered floor space. However, when evaluating "maintenance" covered floor space, Tobyhanna and Letterkenny are approximately the same. When the covered maintenance area is broken down, one finds that Tobyhanna utilizes 23% of its covered floor space as "dedicated" to maintenance while Letterkenny is only 11%. Bigger is not always better when all the data is looked at from a mission perspective.

Tobyhanna is the Army's best rated depot in terms of military value. The Army Stationing Strategy is to have a ground communications and electronics depot, a single ground combat vehicle depot, and a single aviation depot. In the Army analysis, the stationing strategy was complied with and each depot was considered during the evaluation process. Being "partly" focused on electronics does not constitute a communications and electronics mission. The Army has recently done analysis on closing Tobyhanna and moving that mission into Letterkenny as a result of a BRAC Commission request. Our analysis indicates that such a realignment is neither practical nor economical.

2. In determining military value, why did the Army place heavy emphasis on capacity, which is based on the number of work stations to produce a particular workload, and relatively less emphasis on building square footage and expandable acreage?

Were other options considered as an alternative to the Letterkenny / Tobyhanna scenario recommended by DoD? For example, did the Army look at sending all of the tactical missile storage and maintenance workload to Hill Air Force Base and sending the residual conventional ammunition storage mission to other DoD storage locations? This would result in a total base closure, rather than a partial realignment.

**ANSWER:** The Army determined that capacity is a more accurate method of determining military value than square footage. As with the buildings and acres issue above, bigger is not always better nor more economical since the Army has approximately 40% excess capacity within its maintenance depots. In the case of Tobyhanna, the Letterkenny workload could be absorbed with a very minimum cost. It makes no sense to expand the capacity of Letterkenny when the Army already has excess depot capacity.

The Joint Cross-Service Group for Depot Maintenance did consider realigning the tactical missile workload to Hill Air Force Base. But the storage requirement for such a move was not available at Hill Air Force Base according to Department of the Air Force certified data. The required construction included a considerable number of ammunition storage bunkers, making the scenario unacceptable.

3. The Army plans to transfer ground vehicle workload from Letterkenny to Anniston, but none of the personnel authorizations would be realigned. How can this work be accomplished at Anniston with no additional people?

**ANSWER:** The transfer of the workload to Anniston was verified by labor skills required and available personnel at the time transfer would be accomplished. Based on the required skills, Anniston had the identical skills required along with experienced personnel. The transfer of workload would be accomplished at a time when the Anniston workload would be decreasing. Rather than eliminate positions at Anniston and transfer the exact same job skills from Letterkenny, it was determined that it was more economical to eliminate positions at Letterkenny and not assume the added costs associated with personnel movements.

4. Did the Army look at moving the Tobyhanna Depot workload to Letterkenny? If so, what were the results? Do you believe this would be a good idea?

**ANSWER:** The Army Stationing Strategy requires a single ground communications and electronics depot. Tobyhanna is the number one rated of the Army's four maintenance depots, Letterkenny is rated fourth. In order to assume the mission of Tobyhanna, considerable new construction and renovation would be required. The Army did not consider realigning the Tobyhanna workload to Letterkenny due to the overwhelming advantages of Tobyhanna - military value, technical skills, modernization investments, and the cost of doing business.

Recently, the BRAC Commission Staff has requested that the Army analyze closing Tobyhanna and transferring its workload to Letterkenny. Our analysis shows that it would be costly and not preferable to DoD's recommendation.

## DEPOT MAINTENANCE

### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO MR NEMFAKOS FOR THE RECORD

1. Did the Navy consider consolidating plating operations at Louisville's new \$36 million modern plating facility?

**ANSWER:** No specific scenario was run that consolidated plating operations at NSWC Louisville. Although it is recognized that Louisville has a modern plating facility, the DON analysis focused on entire capability of an installation. It is the goal of DON to reduce excess capacity/infrastructure primarily by the total closure of installations. The plating process is only one of the many depot maintenance functions performed by NSWC Louisville. The final scenario adopted by DON for the closure of Louisville, not only transfers all other depot work to other depot activities, but allows for the plating work currently accomplished at Louisville to be performed at other existing DoD installations. This not only equates to greater savings in operational costs, but provides a significantly more positive environmental impact.

2. Regarding the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis, could you explain why the Navy gave this installation a 0 in the Military Value category for integrated capabilities?

**ANSWER:** Within the "Mission Statement" section of the Technical Centers military value matrix, NAWC Indianapolis received a "0" for question #4, "Includes systems integration responsibility", and question #5, "Includes component integration responsibility". Questions within this section of the matrix were based on the activity's literal/official mission statement, as reported in the Military Value data call #5. Since the mission statement for NAWC Indianapolis did not assign responsibility for systems integration or component integration, both of these questions were scored "0".

3. During the Commission's recent visit to the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis, we were shown the systems design facility for the EP-3 and ES-3 aircraft. We were told by the Naval Air Warfare Center that the cost to relocate those facilities to China Lake would be \$30 million. Could you please explain why the Navy only provided \$1.17 million for Military Construction at China Lake to accommodate these facilities?

**ANSWER:** In COBRA analysis, the Navy included \$1.17M for military construction at NAWC China Lake precisely as submitted by NAWC Indianapolis in the certified Scenario Development data call.

4. The Navy says that "continuing decreases in force structure eliminates the need to retain the capacity to dry-dock large naval vessels for emergent requirements." How many large-decked ships (CV, CVN, LHA & LHD) are in the Pacific Fleet now? How many less are expected to be in the Pacific Fleet in 2001?



**ANSWER:** The continuing decrease in force structure describes the fleet's requirement for drydock capacity as it relates to the force structure used as a basis for BRAC-91. Since the '91 round, and through 2001, the number of large-decked ships in the Pacific Fleet will decrease from 14 to 12, including a reduction of 2 CVN/CVs. The Navy has retained two U.S. Navy shipyards in the Pacific theater, capable of handling any of the 12 large-deck ships homeported in that area.

5. How many positions has the Navy historically saved with the closure of a Naval Aviation Depot or comparable industrial activity?

**ANSWER:** The following represents the positions/billets eliminated based on the closure of 3 Naval Aviation Depots during BRAC-93:

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Positions/Billets Eliminated</u>
NADEP Alameda	764
NADEP Pensacola	1,000
NADEP Norfolk	1,464

## UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

### ITEMS FOR INCLUSION IN THE RECORD

1. Mr. Finch, during your testimony, you stated to Commissioner Robles that you would provide a list of those criteria used by the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group to constrain the linear programming model from presenting nonsensical results. Please provide these criteria.

**ANSWER:** In addition to the "Site/Function Constraint Matrix" which limited potential site/functions combinations from the outset of the modeling process, constraints were imposed as the JCSG proceeded with its Optimization Model process. These constraints which were applied in an additive manner are as follows:

1. Flight screening would not be performed/collocated with any other function - based on JCSG military judgment.
2. Primary and advanced NAV/NFO, advanced NFO Strike, and advanced NFO Panel functions would be joint and single-sited - based on DEPSECDEF memo of October 24, 1994.
3. No function would be "spread" or fractionalized smaller than a "notionalized" or smallest squadron (approximately 100 annual production) - JCSG military judgment.
4. Flight screening function limited to the Air Force Academy and Hondo, TX sites - JCSG military judgment.
5. Primary function limited to four sites - JCSG military judgment. (This constraint was later dropped.)
6. Three site closure results (MIN PRIME model run) used as baseline for follow-on Optimization Model runs.
7. Air space and outlying airfield operations capacity from sites closed in MIN PRIME model run were transferred to remaining sites in close proximity for all additional modeling efforts.

2. Mr. Finch, during your testimony, you stated to Commissioner Cornella that Flight Screening was "basically" included as a matter of completeness. For the record, please respond to the following question:

Why did you include Flight Screening, a function not now nor envisioned to be done at UPT bases, but did not include Introduction to Fighter Fundamental (IFF) training, a function that is done at UPT bases, in the scope of your analysis?

**ANSWER:** The JCSG defined its category scope to include: DoD flight programs which support and facilitate selection and training of pilots, naval flight officers, and navigators to the point of awarding "Wings." Post-"Wings" flying missions such as IFF, the Blue Angels, and a large number of graduate rotary-wing courses were excluded from direct analysis. Non-flying missions at the bases (such as technical training at Sheppard AFB and NAS Meridian) were also excluded. When forwarding alternatives for consideration, the JCSG asked the military departments to quantify any such missions that impacted their capacity.

3. General Blume/Mr. Nemfakos/General Shane, during your testimony, Commissioner Davis asked how much surge capacity exists in each service. Please respond to this question in terms of capacity to recover from temporary situations, such as a period of prolonged bad weather, and also in terms of capacity to accommodate an increase in the Pilot Training Rate in the event of a long-term increase in pilot requirements.

**ANSWER: Maj Gen Blume.** If Reese AFB closes as recommended by DoD, the Air Force will retain approximately 12 percent surge capacity to recover from temporary situations at the Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training bases. In addition, bases will have the capability to respond to temporary requirements by lengthening the duty day, increasing sortie density, flying on the weekend, etc. Increases such as these are not sustainable over a sufficient period of time to generate net increases in production. For extended operations such as an increase in the pilot training rate, the Air Force will retain between 7 and 12 percent surge capacity.

**Mr. Nemfakos.** To ensure the DON has capacity to support future unforeseen increases in pilot/NFO training rates, as part of its configuration analysis the BSEC looked at scenarios where all the FY 2001 pilot and NFO training rates were increased by 10 and 20 percent. (This includes increases in the Air Force training scheduled for Naval air stations.) The results showed that even with the its closure recommendations, the DON could support a 20 percent increase in PTR requirements and still have some excess capacity.

In addition, the capacity analysis was based on a 237-day work year and accounted for down time due to bad weather. If need be, training capacity could be increased at each air station by increasing the operating schedule (e.g., pilots could train on weekends to make up for lost flying time during the week days).

**Brig Gen Shane.** The ability to recover from temporary situations, such as a period of prolonged bad weather is excellent. Because our flight training facilities are underutilized, our capability to surge is only constrained on the availability of instructor pilots, aircraft, and OMA funding. USAAVNC has the capability to support long term training increases. According to the Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Group certified data, the Pilot Training Rate could be increased to 2,056 annually with no additional MILCON.

4. General Blume/Mr. Nemfakos/General Shane, during your testimony, Commissioner Robles requested that each Service provide data summarizing the costs to train pilots. Please include in this information the fixed costs for Base Operating Support (BOS), Real Property Management Account (RPMA), Overhead and Personnel at each UPT base, and the variable costs which vary by the number of students and flight hours/sorties flown. These costs should reflect only the portion attributable to UPT for the installations that also host other tenant units.

**ANSWER: Maj Gen Blume.**

**COST ESTIMATE BASED ON FY94 DATA**

	Mission Fixed Costs (in \$M)	RPM Fixed Costs (in \$M)	BOS Fixed Costs (in \$M)	Medical* Fixed Costs (in \$M)	Total Fixed Costs (in \$M)	SUPT Variable Cost Per Graduate
Columbus	\$33.5	\$4.9	\$27.9	\$8.5	\$74.8	\$237,507
Laughlin	\$35.3	\$5.7	\$32.2	\$11.0	\$84.2	\$245,039
Reese	\$32.1	\$5.5	\$31.0	\$9.9	\$78.5	\$244,619
Vance	\$33.8	\$5.7	\$25.4	\$4.9	\$69.8	\$232,394

\* Although not specifically asked for, medical fixed costs are also provided. These costs are not included in any other of the fixed costs provided.

**Definitions:**

**Mission Fixed Costs:** Open-the-door costs to enter one student. Includes Instructors, school overhead, and maintenance.

**RPM Fixed Costs:** The upkeep on the facilities that is required whether or not you have students in training (e.g., utilities).

**BOS Fixed Costs:** Base operating support costs that are required to support the fixed personnel (e.g., transportation, supply, grounds maintenance, chaplains, comptroller).

**Medical Fixed Costs:** Open-the-door costs to enter one student (e.g., supplies, and equipment to support fixed population).

**Variable Cost Per Graduate:** The cost of sending one additional student through SUPT. It does not include any fixed costs.

**Mr. Nemfakos.** The Navy has issued a data call to collect these data. We will forward a response as soon as possible.

**Brig Gen Shane.**

**Estimated costs for Undergraduate Pilot Training**

Undergraduate Pilot Training fixed-cost: \$45,611,784

Undergraduate Pilot Training variable-cost: \$30,599 per student

Undergraduate Pilot Training flying hour variable-cost: \$322 per flying hour

Undergraduate Pilot Training actual total cost: \$114,745,433 (FY 94)

Undergraduate Pilot Training actual civilian salary proportion: \$9,150,860 (8.0%)

Estimated costs for Undergraduate Pilot Training Share of Base Operations

Base Operations fixed cost for Undergraduate Pilot Training: \$2,926,412

Base Operations fixed variable for Undergraduate Pilot Training: \$1,009 per student

Base Operations total cost for Undergraduate Pilot Training: \$4,985,370

[Base Operations civilian salary proportion: \$3,300,315 (66.2%)]

Note: RPMA, overhead and personnel are included in above calculations.

5. Mr. Finch, during your testimony, you stated that in order to achieve uniformity when making comparisons between the services, the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group drafted rules used by the FAA to measure airfield operations capacity at each UPT base. Please provide the formula that the FAA uses and how these rules were applied by your group.

**ANSWER:** In collecting runway capacity data, the JCSG data call asked for the sustainable capacity of the air station's main field and each outlying field in terms of the number of flight operations per hour each runway complex can support. To ensure consistency in the responses, the question instructed the air stations to base their capacity calculations on the methodology in the FAA Advisory Circular 150/5060-5 entitled "Airport Capacity and Delay." This methodology accounts for the type and mix of aircraft, the runway and taxiway configurations, and reductions in operations due to weather and times the airfield is closed to flying operations for other reasons. The attached pages at **TAB 5** excerpted from the Circular describe the procedure for determining the weighted hourly capacity for each runway.

6. General Blume, during your testimony, you stated you would provide answers to several questions relating to weather. Please respond to the following questions:

**ANSWER:** These questions pertain to Joint Cross-Service Group analysis and data and should therefore be directed to the Joint Cross-Service Group.

Why was the percent of time at which the ceiling and visibility are better than 1000 feet and 3 miles given any weight in the analysis when it is 1500 feet and 3 miles that represents a key weather decision factor in conducting Air Force flight training operations?

**Mr. Finch:** The measures and criterion reflected the JCSG developed consensus decision. The 1000/3 ceiling visibility cutoff represents a key Navy decision factor. Missions were analyzed based on the users. For example, both Military Departments will conduct primary training, so both 1000/3 and 1500/3 were used. In Air Force unique bomber-fighter training, on the other hand, 1500/3 was used while 1000/3 was not.

In tracking weather attrition, factors such as actual attrition experience, cancellations due to forecast icing conditions, and the occurrence of crosswinds out of limits can be used. Why was so much weight placed on crosswinds rather than some of these other factors in the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group functional value analysis?

**Mr. Finch:** All weather factors (icing, crosswinds, etc.) were captured by weather attrition inputs. The extra weight given to crosswinds represents a measurement of the frequency of crosswinds, not a measure of "lost sorties." While some crosswind exposure is useful, frequent crosswinds complicate the learning process and can cause last-minute scheduling changes.

The T-38 attrition rate planning factor at Reese is 28 percent compared to 17 percent for the T-1. Since the T-1 factor is currently in use at Reese, why did the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group use the T-38 instead of the T-1 planning factor in its functional value analysis?

**Mr. Finch:** In computing the T-1 attrition planning factors, the JCSG used the reported value for Reese AFB and a surrogate, based on existing aircraft, for the other sites. In the final analysis, no Air Force site received points for the T-1 planning factor in the JCSG model. Based on T-37/T-38 attrition planning factor comparisons across sites, there is no reason to believe that Reese AFB would gain an advantage from a T-1 planning factor comparison.

7. **Mr. Nemfakos,** during your testimony, you stated to Commissioner Davis that you would provide for the record your analysis on Strike Pilot Training Rates. Please provide that general data along with your response to the following specific questions:

Are the flight operations per strike Pilot Training Rate (PTR) at NAS Meridian and NAS Kingsville used in your capacity analysis the same? Please explain any differences.

**ANSWER:** Yes, the analysis used 1511 daylight flight operations per Strike PTR

What is the current operations per strike Pilot Training Rate at NAS Kingsville? How does this compare with the figure used to determine strike Pilot Training Rate capacity at NAS Kingsville?

**ANSWER:** NAS Kingsville's data call reported a daylight flight operations requirement for an all T-45 syllabus of 1393 ops. The 1511 ops used in the analysis was derived as follows. Because in FY 2001 not all strike training will be done in T-45 aircraft, we assumed 50 percent of the Strike pilots would go through an all T-45 syllabus and 50 percent would go through a split syllabus consisting of an Intermediate phase in the T-2 aircraft and an Advanced phase in the T-45 aircraft. Based on certified data, the flight ops requirement for this split syllabus was calculated as follows:

Intermediate Phase in T-2 -- 741 (from NAS Meridian' data call)  
Advanced Phase in T-45 -- 888 (from NAS Kingsville's data call)  
Total: 1,629

Taking a weighted average, this gives

$$(1393 \times .5) + (1629 \times .5) = 1511 \text{ daylight flight ops per Strike PTR}$$

To what extent was the Navy's determination that a single intermediate/advanced strike UPT base containing sufficient capacity to conduct training to support the strike Pilot Training Rate (PTR) in the future and under surge operations based upon the availability of NAS Corpus Christi as an outlying field?

**ANSWER:** Under the recommended scenario, the main airfield at NAS Corpus Christi is needed to support the single-siting of Strike training at NAS Kingsville.

What is the maximum strike Pilot Training Rate (PTR) that NAS Kingsville could support with Orange Grove and NAS Corpus Christi available as outlying fields?

**ANSWER:** Because daylight runway operations is the capacity limiter at training air station, we will show the capacity of this complex to support Strike training in these terms. As explained in response question 6b, the certified data showed that the daylight runway operations per pilot training rate (PTR) for Strike training is 1511 operations. The capacity at NAS Kingsville, OLF Orange Grove, and NAS Corpus Christi (after the proposed runway extensions) is as follows:

NAS Kingsville ----- 237 days x 12.1 hrs/day x 80 ops/hr = 229,416 annual flight ops  
OLF Orange Grove -- 237 days x 11.6 hrs/day x 54 ops/hr = 148,457 annual flight ops  
NAS Corpus Christi -- 237 days x 11.6 hrs/day x 80 ops/hr = 219,936 annual flight ops  
Total: 597,806 annual flight ops

Dividing the total annual flight ops by the flight ops required per PTR gives a strike PTR capacity of

$$597,806/1511 = 396 \text{ PTR}$$

The FY 2001 pilot training rate for Strike is 336 pilots. Thus, the recommended scenario provides an excess capacity of

$$396 - 336 = 60 \text{ PTR}$$

which equates to about an 18% surge capability under planned and budgeted operations. Note that the Strike training capacity at this complex will increase as the Navy completes its transition to an all T-45 training syllabus. Once this transition is completed, the capacity at this complex will be

$$597,806/1393 = 427 \text{ PTR}$$

which increases the surge capability to about 28%

To what extent would the strike training capacity of NAS Kingsville be impacted if NAS Corpus Christi was not available?

**ANSWER:** Without the use of NAS Corpus Christi, NAS Kingsville would need another outlying field to support all Strike training.

8. Mr. Finch, your optimization analysis apparently placed primary emphasis on the installation military value data provided to you by the services, and less emphasis on the functional values developed by the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group.

Please explain the reasoning for this approach?

**ANSWER:** Sites have value both with respect to their ability to accommodate activities involving specific functions (e.g., those associated with flight training) and the more general military missions of the Military Departments. For the former, the initial means of representing value for flight training functions was to consider the capacity of sites collectively to carry out all the functions associated with flight training. This was done by introducing a set of constraints that ensured that there was sufficient capacity in the collection of sites that remained open to handle all flight training functions.

Beyond ensuring there was sufficient capacity to perform flight training functions, the Group's methods next considered military value, maximizing the inherent military value of all sites that remained open to carry out general military missions of the Military Departments.

Finally, the Group's method considered the value of sites that remained open to perform flight training functions. Since functional value was already considered implicitly by setting constraints that guaranteed sufficient capacity to carry out all functions, this additional consideration of functional value was given lower priority.

To allow functional value to drive the model is relevant only if we assume functions can be easily moved and are completely interoperable. In practice, this led to nonsensical results during the early, "unconstrained" model runs. For example, Navy Strike training with its attendant costly T-45 infrastructure was spread to four sites. Other functions were swapped between Air Force and Navy sites. Site functional value was also a more narrow look at installation value, as it did not consider collateral missions such as technical training. The Military Departments' inputs encompassed all functions and potential alternative uses of the installation.

9. Mr. Finch, your Joint Cross-Service Group minutes of March 24, 1994, state that the UPT category is largely installation oriented. If the value of a UPT base is best reflected in its functional rather than military value, why didn't you base your alternatives on model output which maximized functional value unconstrained by installation military value?

Since there is a direct correlation between the Joint Cross-Service Group's functional value rating and the Air Force's determination of military value, didn't the use of both functional and military value in the model simply increase the impact of functional value in the result?

**ANSWER:** Functional and military values are not independent. SECDEF guidelines define the first four BRAC criteria as military value. Criterion one is "mission requirements." This indicates functional value is a significant element of military value. There is also no single



functional value for each base. The JCSG generally analyzed each site for all UPT missions, regardless of whether the site currently supported those missions. The JCSG did not analyze non-UPT missions. Functional value is only a subset of military value.

10. General Blume, since the Air Force relied so heavily on the results of the Joint Cross-Service Group's computer model, did you analyze the model for calculation errors?

**ANSWER:** The Air Force had representatives on the Joint Cross-Service Group and its Study Team to continuously monitor the process and its output. The Base Closure Executive Group also did an independent capacity analysis to confirm the required infrastructure level.

11. General Blume/Mr. Nemfakos, your Service recommendations used your own BRAC process as well as non-BRAC policy decisions to choose which UPT bases to close or realign. Why didn't your recommendations necessarily reflect the high functional value scores from the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group?

**ANSWER: Maj Gen Blume.** The Air Force recommendations do reflect the high functional value scores. The recommendation to close Reese AFB is consistent with the fact Reese had the lowest average functional value.

**Mr. Nemfakos:** The DON's process did not consider functional value. It used its own documented method for evaluating the military value of its installations.

12. Gen Blume, the average functional value for each Air Force UPT base is shown (the Reese score is adjusted based on your recent memo to us).

Columbus AFB	6.74
Vance AFB	6.67
Randolph AFB	6.53
Laughlin AFB	6.50
Reese AFB	6.22

The Air Force Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) apparently used the functional values from the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group. These averages were used to find military value by performing a standard deviation analysis to assign a color "Stop Light" code to Criteria I, "Flying Mission Evaluation." All eight criteria were then considered to derive an overall Air Force ranking: the result was Tier I for Columbus, Laughlin, Randolph, and Vance, and Tier III for Reese.

Why didn't the Air Force simply use the functional value for the training that is actually accomplished at each specific UPT base to determine its score? Would the result have been different?

**ANSWER:** Functional value is an important part of military value, but is not necessarily the only indicator. For example, Randolph AFB houses a Major Command Headquarters, a Numbered Air Force Headquarters, and the Air Force Military Personnel Center besides having a

flying mission. In the case of UPT bases, average functional value scores, the BCEG "Stop Light" analysis, and professional judgment all indicated Reese AFB is the correct base to close. The Air Force does not believe the results would have been different if functional value were used as an exclusive measure. However, using only functional value would be a narrow analysis and would not comply with Secretary of Defense guidelines. In addition, the Air Force made a conscious effort to fully integrate, where possible, the Joint Group process into its entire 1995 BRAC analysis. For the Laboratory, Test and Evaluation, and Depot subcategories, the Air Force used Joint Group data, the same methodology and, with few exceptions, the same measures of merit to produce the functional portion of the Criterion I grade for those installations. For the Undergraduate Flying Training category, the Air Force used the Joint Group functional values as the basis for its Criterion I grade. These steps ensured that the Air Force analysis was consistent, to the maximum extent possible, with the Joint Group direction on analysis of these functions.

It should be noted that the average functional values were not used to find "military value," but were instead used to determine the Criterion I grade. Military value, under the criteria, consists of the first four criteria.

Finally, the BCEG examined the functional values derived by JCSG-UPT. After discussion, the BCEG agreed to include all activities pertaining to Air Force operations as the basis for the average functional value. Including all potential flying training activities rather than the training actually accomplished provides a better analysis of both current and potential training value.

13. Mr. Finch, did the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group run any excursions using the Linear Programming Optimization Model, such as the ones shown on below:

- a. Examining only Air Force Bases
- b. Examining only Naval Air Stations
- c. Excluding flight screening
- d. Excluding Navy-unique functional areas
- e. Excluding Air Force-unique functional areas
- f. Changing the weights on various factors, such as airspace.

**ANSWER:** The Group was sensitive to the potential issue of adjusting the model after the data had been collected. Excursions to evaluate the sensitivity of the model to movement of new functions to new sites given differing minimum site levels was performed. Service specific excursions were not performed, given the joint perspective of the Group's efforts.

What would the results be if these excursions were run?

**ANSWER:** It would be inappropriate to speculate as to potential results without running the model.

14. Mr. Finch, what were the options you considered for measuring capacity, and why did you choose the methods you did?

**ANSWER:** Factors of capacity and the methods to measure them were developed over time by the JCSG. The process started with development of the Data Call followed by construction of the Capacity Analysis Matrix and the questions utilized in point distribution for the Measures of Merit. As the process evolved, the JCSG refined its methods of measurement in the framework of sound operational experience and military judgment.

15. Mr. Finch, a separate functional value for the Air Force's post-UPT Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals (IFF) training was not included among the 10 functional areas selected for assessing the overall functional value of each UPT-category base.

Even though it is conducted after "Wings" are awarded, IFF is conducted at a UPT base, consumes capacity, and is similar in content to training events contained within the latter stages of the Navy's Strike Training syllabus.

Why didn't the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group include IFF as an additional functional area?

**ANSWER:** Post-"Wing" flying missions such as IFF, the Blue Angels, and a large number of graduate rotary-wing courses were excluded from direct JCSG analysis. Non-flying missions collocated at the UPT sites (such as technical training at Sheppard AFB and NAS Meridian) were also excluded. When forwarding alternatives for consideration, the JCSG asked the military departments to quantify any such missions that impacted their capacity.

16. General Blume, did the Air Force consider transferring the Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals training from Columbus AFB to another location such as Luke AFB in order to increase the capacity to do other training at Columbus?

**ANSWER:** No. The Air Force collocated Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals (IFF) training on the UPT bases in 1993 when it stood up Air Education and Training Command during a major reorganization. This allowed a more seamless training continuum for fighter-bound students, particularly as the Air Force converted from generalized UPT to specialized UPT. Luke AFB also does not have the capacity to absorb this training. Even if Luke could absorb IFF, this would require an additional move for many fighter-bound students whose final formal training units were located elsewhere. To return to a different basing structure would be expensive and counterproductive.

17. Mr. Finch, in the consideration of training airspace for both capacity analysis and functional value, the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group methodology permitted a base to claim credit for large sectors of airspace so long as any portion of it was within 100 nautical miles of the base. For bases near the Gulf of Mexico, this meant credit for huge over-water sectors.

Both Air Force and Navy UPT programs train predominantly over land. This is to permit such over-land flight training events as ground reference maneuvers and low-level navigation. Over-water training is performed close to shore. Since actual UPT practice precludes the use of large blocks of over-water airspace, doesn't giving credit for such over-water airspace unfairly skew the results in favor of coastal bases?

**ANSWER:** Over-water airspace has intrinsic value to the Navy and the consensus of the JCSG was to consider it equally with over-land airspace.

18. Mr. Finch, did either the Services or the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group consider the impact of contracting some UPT functional training areas to outside sources?

**ANSWER:** No. The JCSG charter was to help size infrastructure, not to make policy decisions.

19. General Blume, does closing Reese AFB leave sufficient capacity in the UPT area to provide for surge capability in pilot training?

**ANSWER:** Yes. The closure of one Air Force UPT base leaves sufficient capacity to provide for surge capability. However, there is not enough excess capacity to close more than one Air Force UPT base.

20. Mr. Finch, all of your alternatives move the Navy's helicopter training to Fort Rucker. There are several different ways to implement this alternative. For example, the Navy could retain their current helicopter training process and be collocated at Fort Rucker as an Army tenant; or the Navy's pilots could be integrated into the Army training through a consolidation. Did the Joint Cross Service Group consider the issue of consolidation vs. collocation when developing its alternatives?

**ANSWER:** No. The JCSG was not established to consider policy issues related to undergraduate pilot training. Therefore, its approach was to use existing policies that were applicable to the various functions considered by the Group. In the case of helicopter training, existing policy was, and is, not to consolidate such training for the Army and Navy. Therefore, only alternatives that involved collocating or not collocating this function were considered.

21. Mr. Finch, the Navy responded to your alternatives to close Whiting Field with COBRA analyses that showed a high cost of implementing the move of primary training to Naval Air Station Pensacola and helicopter training to Fort Rucker.

Did the UPT-Joint Cross Service Group look at variations to this scenario, such as the relocation of helicopter training to Fort Rucker with primary training remaining at Whiting Field?

**ANSWER:** Given the resource requirements, site capacities and functional values, and site military values, the Optimization Model consistently moved the helicopter function to Fort Rucker and closed NAS Whiting Field. The Group did not look at additional variations.

22. Mr. Nemfakos, would moving helicopter training out of Whiting Field help the Navy meet its requirement for outlying fields for primary training?

Does your answer change when considering the transition to any of the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) aircraft?

**ANSWER:** No, the OLFs used for helicopter training are not configured to support fixed-wing training. JPATS does not change this situation.

23. Mr. Nemfakos, the Navy Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) record states that the reason for rejecting the movement of helicopter training to Fort Rucker is the high one-time cost and long return on investment.

Did operational concerns also enter into this decision or was it strictly an economic decision?

**ANSWER:** The decision not to co-locate helicopter training at Fort Rucker was strictly an economic decision -- high one-time costs and a poor return on investment. Operational considerations, however, lead the DON to evaluate a co-location scenario as opposed to a consolidation scenario.

24. General Blume, please summarize the main reasons why the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) choose Reese AFB to close?

**ANSWER:** When all eight criteria were applied to the bases in the UFT category, Reese AFB ranked lowest relative to the other bases in the Undergraduate Flying Training category. In addition, Reese AFB was recommended for closure in each alternative recommended by the DoD Joint Cross-Service Group for UFT.

25. Mr. Nemfakos, please summarize the main reasons why the Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) chose NAS Meridian to close?

**ANSWER:** First, the current Force Structure Plan shows a continuing decline in the PTR (particularly in the decline from 11 to 10 carrier air wings) so that Navy strike training could be handled by a single full-strike training base. Second, the consolidation of strike training that follows the closure of NAS Meridian is in the spirit of the policy of the Secretary of Defense that functional pilot training be consolidated. The training conducted at NAS Meridian is similar to that conducted at NAS Kingsville, which has a higher military value, presently houses T-45 assets (the Department of the Navy's new primary strike training aircraft) and its supporting infrastructure, and has ready access to larger amounts of air space, including over-water air space if such is required. Lastly, the net of all costs and savings associated with this recommendation is a savings of \$158.8 million. Annual recurring savings after implementation are \$33.4 million with an immediate return on investment expected.

26. Mr. Finch, please discuss the process used to analyze a potential NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex.

What alternatives or "strawmen" did the UPT-Joint Cross-Service Group consider?

**ANSWER:** The Group evaluated three alternatives for the NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex: 1) A JPATS Primary "Master" site, 2) a Strike/Bomber-Fighter complex with Strike at NAS Meridian and Bomber-Fighter at Columbus AFB, and 3) moving Maritime and Primary/Intermediate NFO/NAV to NAS Meridian to allow creation of a JPATS Primary "Master" site at NAS Pensacola and NAS Whiting Field. The first alternative's up-front costs - building five outlying fields and relocating Columbus AFB's Bomber Fighter function to Laughlin AFB were considered excessive. The second alternative was dropped because it did not result in the net increase of a "base complex," would waste significant investment in the T-45 training system at NAS Kingsville, and it would also require high, up-front cost at NAS Meridian. The third alternative, while not as costly to implement as alternative one, was discounted as the Maritime and Primary/Intermediate NFO/NAV functions could be readily accommodated by those flight training bases not recommended for closure. (JCSG Meeting Minutes of February 23, 1995).

What COBRA runs were performed to assess a potential NAS Meridian/Columbus AFB complex?

**ANSWER:** None.

What cost advantages were considered (for example, NAS Meridian and Columbus AFB using joint targets and outlying fields and sharing excess capacity during runway maintenance)?

**ANSWER:** The JCSG considered potential savings in shared or combined facilities from a JPATS site consolidation or formation of a JPATS base complex, but found they could not readily be identified. The Group also agreed that savings, if any, would be well in the future. In reviewing the base complex issue, the Group found no clear or compelling rationale to change the Military Departments' recommendations.

27. Mr. Nempfakos, if the redirect of mine warfare helicopter assets to NAS Corpus Christi is not approved, what impact would that have on the operations per day available for pilot training at Corpus Christi?

How much do other flight operations at Corpus Christi reduce daily operations available for pilot training?

**ANSWER:** Operating mine warfare helicopters out of NAS Corpus Christi would have a negligible effect on the runway operations available for pilot training. All other flight operations at NAS Corpus Christi, to include the proposed mine warfare helicopter operations, require less than 5 percent of NAS Corpus Christi's pilot training capacity.

28. Mr. Finch, will Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) increase or decrease the number of bases required for UPT training?

**ANSWER:** The answer will depend on the aircraft selected and the evolution of the JPATS training syllabus. For example, some contenders may require longer runways than others. On the other hand, these same aircraft may be able to absorb some flying time from the more costly and more infrastructure-intensive advanced training tracks (i.e., T-45 Strike training).

29. Mr. Finch, what was the impact of Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS)-related issues on the group's assessment of functional value?

What specific facility and airspace requirements were used to determine Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) functional values?

**ANSWER:** For purposes of the analyses, the Measures of Merit utilized the maximum requirements identified in the source selection process for JPATS (i.e., 5,000 ft runway).

## CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

### UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING

#### Questions submitted by Congressman Smith:

1. Since the Navy has recommended relocating the Naval Air Technical Training Center (NATTC) from Lakehurst, NJ, to Pensacola, do you envision recreating the Carrier Aircraft Launch and Recovery System (COLASSES) at Pensacola or do you expect to disassemble, package, ship and reinstall those devices that are critical to training pilots for flying off and onto aircraft carriers?

**ANSWER:** The mission of NATTC Lakehurst Detachment does not include training pilots for flying off and onto aircraft carriers. The NATTC Lakehurst Detachment personnel and equipment support training requirements specific to operations and maintenance of aircraft carrier catapult, launch, and recovery equipment systems. The personnel and equipment necessary to continue supporting this training will be relocated to NAS Pensacola.

2. At what cost do you envision recreating the unique aircraft flight training facility in Pensacola?

**ANSWER:** NATTC Lakehurst Detachment is not a unique aircraft flight training facility and therefore will not be recreated as such. However, all appropriate costs to relocate NATTC Lakehurst Detachment necessary personnel and equipment that support training requirements specific to operations and maintenance of aircraft carrier catapult, launch, and recovery equipment systems were included in the COBRA analysis for Lakehurst. These costs are calculated automatically by COBRA algorithms from various input data and appear as part of the

aggregate one-time costs for NAWC AC Lakehurst, NJ plus the one-time costs for NAS Pensacola, FL. The exact cost will be determined as part of the implementation planning and budgeting process; however, it would be expected that the final cost would be of a similar magnitude.

3. Do facilities exist at Pensacola for the housing of the Lakehurst NATTC students?

**ANSWER:** Yes. BRAC 93 moved average onboard of 5004 students to NAS Pensacola. BRAC 95 adds the relocation of aviation students from both NTTC Meridian and Lakehurst, a total of 162 additional students. Barracks space was sized under BRAC 93 to accommodate the planned force structure through the end of the century. The FY 2001 average onboard for aviation students, including Meridian and Lakehurst, is 4226. The Navy is under contract to build BEQ space for 4924 beds. This number includes planned onboard, transient students and a surge capability. In view of this, the BSEC made a determination that no additional BEQ construction was required.

4. What type of delay or disruptions are anticipated or planned for in the training of these aircraft carrier student pilots while the training facility is disassembled, moved and recreated in Pensacola?

**ANSWER:** NATTC Lakehurst Detachment does not train aircraft carrier student pilots.

**Questions submitted by Senators Shelby and Heflin and Congressman Everett:**

1. In November of 1994, the Joint Cross-Service Group on Undergraduate Pilot Training submitted three different alternatives for consideration by the military departments and Secretary Perry. According to documents submitted to the BRAC, each alternative reduced excess capacity while maintaining high military value. Each of the three alternatives consistently recommended consolidating all military undergraduate helicopter pilot training at Fort Rucker.

However, these recommendations were not adhered to in their entirety. Secretary Perry chose not to consolidate UHPT at Fort Rucker as recommended due to high MILCON costs associated with closing Whiting NAS. He then directed consolidating all Navy initial fixed-wing training at Whiting NAS.

a. Why is it that consolidation of UHPT at Ft. Rucker was not adopted?

**ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos.** While the recommendations forwarded by the UPT Joint Cross-Service Group called for moving the DON's Advanced Helicopter training to Fort Rucker, they said nothing about consolidating UHPT. Because of operational differences in training Navy and Army helicopter pilots, in evaluating these proposals, the DON only considered the co-location of UHPT.



b. Since the Navy is moving all of its initial fixed-wing training to Whiting NAS, wouldn't limited space be freed-up if UHPT was moved to Ft. Rucker?

**ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos.** Moving the DON's Advanced Helicopter training to Fort Rucker would free-up space at NAS Whiting Field for fixed-wing training. However, because there is no issue of limited space at NAS Whiting Field for fixed-wing training, this additional space would be of little value.

c. From an efficiency standpoint, doesn't it make sense to have all initial rotary-wing training dedicated at one location?

**ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos.** It would make sense to have all initial rotary wing training at one location if both the Navy and Army had the same training syllabi, same trainers, and identical aircraft. They do not. The DON has unique training requirements which are driven by its operational missions (i.e., a sea-based environment). Because of this, a consolidation of UHPT training would still require separate training tracks for Navy and Army pilots, and therefore, only create costs.

2. On March 30, 1993 General Colin Powell stated at the House Armed Services Committee Army Posture Hearing that, "I believe the proper place to do the centralization (of UHPT) and where it can be done very well is at Fort Rucker, Alabama." He went on to say, "I am committed to push this as hard as possible because there are real savings here and this is where we ought to find the savings."

The cost to transfer the UHPT operation at Whiting Field to Fort Rucker is less than \$18 million dollars. In 1992 the DoD IG reported that relocation of UHPT to Fort Rucker would save at least \$79 million dollars over 5 years.

a. Is this savings estimate still valid today?

**ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos.** It should be noted that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) and the Department of the Navy nonconcurred with the portion of the 1992 DoD IG audit report in which were presented the savings estimate cited above, believing that the audit analysis attempted to compare dissimilar programs and also questioning the estimated monetary benefits from relocation.

In considering the UPT JCSG alternatives during the 1995 base realignment and closure process, the BSEC used only data, certified to be accurate and complete, contained in our 1995 Base Structure Data Base, and information provided and verified by the other Military Departments. Based on our analysis of this certified data, the total estimated one-time cost to implement the "non-JPATS' alternative is \$155.7 million with an annual recurring savings after implementation of \$13 million and a return on investment expected in 14 years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years for this scenario is a savings of \$9 million. The total estimated one-time cost to implement the "JPATS' alternative is \$159 million with an annual recurring savings after implementation of \$13 million and a return on investment expected in 15

years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years for this scenario is a savings of \$7 million.

3. In a proposal to the Roles & Missions Commission, the Army has stated that by consolidating all primary DoD rotary-wing training, integration and standardization among the services would be enhanced to truly support jointness. Each of the services would continue to provide advanced training for their own unique aspects of rotary-wing aviation.

The Army has the capacity to train all of DoD's primary helicopter pilot requirements without any need for expansion or new construction.

a. From an efficiency and interoperability standpoint, doesn't it make sense for all introductory helicopter pilot training to be conducted by the Army?

**ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos.** There is a fundamental difference in how the Army and the naval services desire to train their pilots from an operational perspective; each has its own set of validated requirements that drive its training program, the location for the training, and efficiencies derived. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard training requirements include fixed-wing training for all students, emphasis on basic and radio instrument training, situational awareness/unusual attitude/aerobatic training and shipboard landing training. We use aircraft systems as well as simulators and ground support systems that are different from those used by the Army in support of this specialized training. Then too, we believe that the operational environment in which our helicopter pilots will eventually be required to fly validates and mandates our current approach to UHPT. For example, the absolute necessity for aviator competence in over water flight, where aircraft performance and navigational techniques employed differ significantly from those over land, carries unique training demands. And, especially for Marine helicopter pilots, replacement of the aging CH-46 fleet with V-22 aircraft that feature in-flight transitions between rotary and fixed-wing modes will spawn a completely different dynamic for which they must be trained. In contrast, Army requirements and training are oriented toward the day/night VMC, ground contact environment that supports the Army mission in the field.

What makes the most sense for all the Services is to adhere to training programs that best prepare pilots to function in the respective operational environments in which they will be employed. Different requirements produce efficiencies unique to the specific training program at each base (NAS Whiting Field and Fort Rucker). It should be noted that intent of the Secretary of Defense in establishing a JCSG for UPT was not for it to examine the UPT programs of the Services with an eye toward consolidation, but to assist the Military Departments in identifying asset sharing opportunities. To what extent "jointness" is served by consolidation of UHPT, whether it should be, and which Service ought to conduct consolidated UHPT for all are issues more appropriately addressed outside the base realignment and closure process.

4. During the BRAC 95 Navy hearing earlier this year, General Mundy commented that in the 1970's the Army was training Marine helicopter pilots, and that this arrangement worked very well.

- a. Is there any reason why the Marine Corps couldn't return to this arrangement?

**ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos.** The Department of the Navy does not endorse Army UHPT for Marine pilots, because it does not meet the training requirements for service with the Fleet and Fleet Marine Forces. During the Vietnam War, the Marine Corps experienced a severe shortage of pilots, and following the direction of the Secretary of Defense, accepted helicopter pilots who had been trained by the Army. To meet Marine Corps requirements those Army-trained pilots, whose training was complete by Army requirements, required an additional 70 to 75 hours of flight training that was provided in Marine Corps helicopter training groups. General Mundy's comment during the Commission's hearing on March 6, 1995, did not indicate his willingness to change the training syllabus for Marine Corps helicopter pilots, but was offered in rebuttal to suggestions that our current resistance to UHPT consolidation is fueled in whole or in part by interservice rivalry.

5. In 1992, the JCS report on Roles & Missions recommended consolidation of all primary helicopter training with the Army. A team led by the Navy was tasked by Secretary of Defense Aspin to review this recommendation. Their findings concluded that consolidation would need to be put on hold until primary training for both fixed wing and rotary wing could be evaluated together, the service and operating costs of the new TH-67 trainer had been determined, and that the decision would be made with the context of a base closure round.

- a. Each of these points has been satisfied, yet DoD only adopted the fixed-wing portion of the Cross-Service Group recommendation. Why was rotary-wing training ignored?

**ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos.** The 1992 JCS Report on Roles & Missions, signed by General Colin Powell in February 1993, did not recommend consolidation of primary helicopter training. Instead, it stated *"If it is cost effective, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard helicopter training will be moved from Pensacola to Ft Rucker."* A joint working group, led by the Navy with assistance from the Army, recommended *"retaining existing Navy helicopter training at Whiting Field and continuing use of the T-34C for primary training and track selection at least through JPATS introduction. This proven training format is presently the least costly approach to producing Navy helicopter pilots that meet service requirements."* The study further recommended that *"All services reevaluate each of the options presented in this study shortly after the following events occur: JPATS source selection is complete and acquisition/operating costs are identified. Final force levels are established and this flight training requirements determined. Army receives TH-67 deliveries and actual inventory and operating costs are identified."* The study was forwarded with concurrence from the Army.

Rotary-wing training was considered on an equal basis with all other types of UPT in both the Department of the Navy's analysis and that conducted by the UPT JCSG. The rationale for the Department of the Navy's rejection of the UPT JCSG alternative to close NAS Whiting Field is explained in response to question 1.

6. Earlier this year, the Navy testified before the BRAC 95 commission that the consolidation of Navy helicopter training with the Army was not feasible because it was a “people” issue, or a quality of life issue and that Navy Pilots fly in more extreme weather conditions at sea than the Army does. If that in fact is the case, why does the Pentagon continue to request Army helicopters and pilots to support naval missions?

A number of Army missions in support of Naval operations:

1983: Operation Urgent Fury

\*Shipboard operations involving the Army’s 18th Airborne Corps: UH-60’s, OH-58A/C’s, AH-1’s

1987: Operation Prime Chance

\*Shipboard and overwater operations involving the Army’s 4/17th CAV (now 4/2) with OH-58D’s  
\*valid CONOPS mission today

1994: Operation Uphold Democracy - Haiti

\*10th Mountain Division operated from the USS Eisenhower  
\*OH-58D’s had extensive missions prior to invasion  
\*UH-60’s, CH-47’s, OH-58A/C’s and AH-1’s transported troops and equipment to the AO for several days, followed by command & control missions

Each Army Aviation unit has a task for shipboard operations incorporated in their mission essential list of tasks. The Army trains for shipboard operations and performs shipboard operations.

**ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos.** As mentioned in response to question 1, training for Army helicopter pilots and naval aviators is designed to prepare them for two significantly different operational environments. The record of employment of Army helicopters shows that the Army does operate from Navy ships on certain occasions and under visual meteorological (VMC) weather conditions. However, Army helicopter pilots are not trained for, and do not operate during, degraded weather conditions. In contrast, every Navy pilot is trained to operate from large and small deck ships under all weather conditions. In each of the cases cited above, Army helicopters were required due to unique mission circumstances and operated under favorable weather conditions as directed by senior Defense Department officials.

7. In 1992, MGen. Dave Robbins, then-Commander of the Army Aviation Center, noted that one of the main reasons the Navy was opposed to consolidating this training with the Army was because the Navy used initial fixed-wing training as a “cutting” tool for students.

a. Do you believe this to be the case, and is there any legitimate reason why the Navy needs this extra “cutting” tool?

b. Could the Navy use the Army's training syllabus that places student pilots directly into the rotary wing pipeline?

**ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos.** The Navy practice of using fixed-wing aircraft in rotary-wing pilot track selection and training was validated by a 1994 Center for Naval Analysis study which concluded that *"Splitting the current Navy primary into two separate tracks, rotary primary and fixed-wing primary, could increase attrition if current standards are maintained. Attrition would be higher in each track than in the present unified primary and thus would be higher overall."* Increasing attrition will increase the cost of training and require increased accessions. In addition, the study forwards the following training considerations:

*"The motor skills and learned responses needed to fly helicopters and fixed-wing airplanes in forward flight are almost exactly the same... These skills are transferable."*

*"Flying helicopters in hover mode is different from flying them in forward flight mode. From a training standpoint, it is sensible to first teach rotary-wing pilots forward flight in a fixed-wing trainer. Student pilots can then move to helicopters where they acquire specialized flight skills."*

*"Some flight training, particularly navigation and instrument flying, involves skills that are not specific to a particular type of aircraft."*

The Air Force also supports the concept of undergraduate, primary fixed-wing training for its helicopter pilots. In December 1992 the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force stated *"...fixed-wing training before rotary-wing training produces a better trained helicopter pilot for less money."*

Based on the benefits of fixed-wing primary training, using the Army's curriculum would not meet Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard requirements.

8. According to the DoD IG, "Relocating the Navy's primary helicopter training to Fort Rucker would relieve ground and air traffic congestion at Whiting Field NAS."

a. Is there a problem with congestion at Whiting Field, both in the air and on the ground? If so, would relocation of the Navy's Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot Training program free-up space at Whiting Field?

b. How does Fort Rucker compare with Whiting with regard to available space?

c. Since the Army already owns nearly 80% of all DoD helicopters, does Fort Rucker have the capacity to train all of DoD's primary helicopter pilot requirements?

**ANSWER: Mr. Nemfakos.** There is no ground or air congestion at NAS Whiting Field. As previously stated, fixed wing (T-34C) aircraft normally conduct training operations at altitudes above 1500 feet and rotary wing (TH-57B/C) training aircraft operate in the airspace structure

below 1500 feet. Commercial airliners overfly training airspace at altitudes above 24,000 feet. Navy fixed-wing aircraft conduct landing operations at exclusive fixed-wing airfields, which are specifically designed to train naval aviators to land day or night, in fair or foul weather, and aboard the confined landing areas of our ships at sea. These airfields are located within ten miles of home field, enhancing training efficiency and lowering cost per completed student sortie. NAS Whiting, in effect, is two airfields for the price of one. There are no course rule conflicts between fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft operating at these two fields. Operations in joint-use areas are normally conducted using air traffic control procedures and/or radar monitoring. Additionally, helicopters, by design, can operate at very slow airspeeds. As a result, near mid-air collisions involving Navy helicopters are virtually non-existent. In contrast, increased congestion at Fort Rucker would result from consolidating training there.

Fort Rucker is larger than NAS Whiting Field. However, NAS Whiting Field meets all present and future Navy requirements for primary and helicopter training and includes sufficient maritime operating areas for the Helicopter Landing Trainer ship. Additionally, the area around Fort Rucker has a much greater concentration of noise sensitive areas than does NAS Whiting Field.

Fort Rucker requires significant facilities MILCON, extensive rehabilitation and upgrade of existing structures and, equally important, extensive quality of life improvements to support consolidated training. Facilities meeting the Navy's requirements for both mission and quality of life are currently available and in use at NAS Whiting Field.

**Brig Gen Shane.** Yes. According to Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross- Service Group certified data, the total DoD throughput in the near future is 1,481. This training rate would only engage 72% of Fort Rucker's present capacity for undergraduate helicopter pilot training.

## MEDICAL JOINT CROSS-SERVICE GROUP

### PROCESS

#### Questions submitted to Dr. Edward Martin

1. All but one of the 16 Joint Cross Service Group alternatives describe realignment of an acute care hospital to an outpatient clinic.

Why were so many of the Joint Cross Service Group's alternatives realignments rather than closures?

**ANSWER:** The Joint Cross Service Group (JCSG) did not attempt to eliminate a medical presence unless the medical facility was the host unit or the installation closed and there was not a significant active duty population projected to remain in the area. If a significant active duty population does remain, then a minimum of an ambulatory clinic will be required. This was the reason most of the proposed alternatives that the JCSG developed called for realignment to clinic status.

Is realignment to a clinic a cost effective way to eliminate excess capacity?

**ANSWER:** Yes, if it is clear that the hospital capability is not required. We parallel the civilian health care industry's move toward increased use of ambulatory service clinics instead of inpatient hospitals. The most significant difference in a super clinic and a small hospital is the requirement NOT to maintain a 24 hour blood bank, 24 hour nursing care and 24 hour ancillary services, such as pharmacy, laboratory and radiology. This is especially cost effective at locations with small inpatient services, and adequate civilian facilities in the immediate communities.

Would it be more cost effective to close rather than realign hospitals, especially in areas that have additional military hospitals or substantial civilian capacity?

**ANSWER:** The "733 Study" states that "on average, MTFs appear to provide a given amount of care at significantly less cost than is the case in the private sector." Aside from this, however, there are many other issues which mandate a medical presence on an installation other than the cost effectiveness of the medical care. Our rightsizing initiatives take into account factors such as readiness, operational medicine in support of a flying or other mission, lost time from training, TRICARE, etc.

2. What exactly did the Joint Cross Service Group have in mind when it used the word "clinic?"

**ANSWER:** The simplest definition of a "clinic" is a military treatment facility without inpatient services. In its April 15, 1995 Report to the BRAC 95 Review Group, the BRAC 95 Joint Cross-Service Group for MTFs and GME defined a clinic as "An outpatient treatment facility that has a

commanding officer, receives funds directly from the Service headquarters, and provides care to active duty and other beneficiaries.”

It is expected that the medical service plans developed for each realignment location will specify the services and personnel required to best support the remaining beneficiary population. In some cases that may be a “super clinic” in which there is significant capability to provide comprehensive ambulatory services to include same day surgery, laboratory, pharmacy and radiology services. A super clinic might also often include the capability for overnight care for active duty personnel who cannot return to the billets.

3. Who has the final say as to what is included in a clinic, and who decides how many people it takes to operate one?

**ANSWER:** The Military Departments have responsibility for providing medical and dental care for their personnel and allocation of staffing to provide those services. This is done by the medical command or line authority responsible for the military treatment facility. The responsible command takes many factors, including operational medicine, special base concerns, and local circumstances into consideration as they make these determinations.

TRICARE, the Department’s regionalized managed care plan brings together the health care delivery system of each of the military services, as well as the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), in a cooperative and supportive manner to better serve military patients and to better use the resources available to military medicine. The organization of TRICARE includes twelve regions, each administered by a lead agent, who is a commander of one of the military medical centers located within the region. These lead agents have developed, and are in the process of implementing, in collaboration with all the military treatment facility commanders in the region, integrated plans for the delivery of health care to beneficiaries residing in the region. This will shape the level of service and staffing found in each facility.

4. Given that direct care services in military hospitals are essentially free to beneficiaries, while services received under CHAMPUS involve co-payments and deductibles, do you believe it is reasonable to conclude that demand for services may diminish when direct care services are reduced?

**ANSWER:** It is possible that the number of visits may decrease slightly, but there probably would not be a corresponding decrease in the intensity of services. Various DoD studies, including the “733 study”, found an “induced-demand” effect given free MTF care in lieu of CHAMPUS; however, this applied mostly to routine outpatient care and not specialty care.



## PRIOR ROUND AND NON-BRAC ACTIONS

5. Please describe how reductions in the medical area fit into the larger, DOD-wide drawdown context?

**ANSWER:** The Department of Defense is changing and so is its medical support. Assuming all BRAC and other DHP programming actions are implemented, the Department will have reduced our infrastructure by 59 hospitals and 12,000 beds worldwide since 1988. This is a 35% reduction in hospitals and a 42% reduction in bed capacity. 17 facilities overseas were closed and 42 inpatient facilities within CONUS have been closed or realigned. 25 of those inpatient facilities have occurred due to BRAC 88, 91, and 93.

6. Do past BRAC actions and the current set of recommendations keep pace with changes in the rest of the military or are medical assets drawing down at a faster or slower pace?

**ANSWER:** Medical infrastructure reductions parallel similar changes occurring elsewhere in the Department. Overall active duty strength has decreased approximately 30% with a corresponding 35% reduction in hospitals and a 42% reduction in bed capacity.

7. In meetings with Commission staff, you described a number of hospital realignment actions taking place outside of the BRAC process.

Please specify what the Department is doing to eliminate excess inpatient capacity beyond the recommendations sent to this Commission. Please include name of hospital, details of the action, and the time frame during which the action is to occur.

**ANSWER:** Since the end of the Cold War, the Department has aggressively sought to reduce excess infrastructure. Over 58 hospitals will have closed or realigned. The Defense Health Program has also experienced approximately 12,000 normal bed reduction during this period. These reductions account for a 43% decrease in beds and a 35% decrease in number of inpatient facilities since 1988.

Within the continental United States, 42 hospitals will have closed by the end of BRAC 95, assuming the current recommendations are accepted. These actions were accomplished by the cumulative base realignment and closure rounds and the Defense Health Program initiatives. These initiatives include, but are not limited to the following type actions:

- Small Hospital Study
- Realignment of hospitals to ambulatory care centers
- Modification of emergency room services
- Evaluation of alternative staffing options and delivery models
- Reshaping the medical force to focus toward managed care and shift to ambulatory surgery
- Joint staffing

- Sharing agreements with the Department of Veterans Affairs

**Discontinuation of inpatient services:**

- Naval Station, Adak, Alaska
- Naval Home, Gulfport, Mississippi
- McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas
- Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico (resource sharing with DVA)
- Malstrom AFB, Montana
- Naval Hospital, Newport, Rhode Island
- Grissom Air Force Base, Indiana
- Reese Air Force Base, Texas
- McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey

Defense Programming Action is slated to terminate inpatient services in the following Navy hospitals:

- Naval Hospital Charleston, South Carolina
- Naval Hospital Patuxent River, Maryland
- Naval Hospital Millington, Tennessee
- Naval Hospital Corpus Christi, Texas
- Naval Hospital Groton Connecticut

**Discontinuation of emergency room services:**

Emergency room services have been modified at 18 Air Force bases (level III to level IV emergency services)

- Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina
- Griffiss Air Force Base, Indiana
- Sawyer Air Force Base, Michigan
- Moody Air Force Base, Georgia
- Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico
- Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico
- Castle Air Force Base, California
- Beale Air Force Base, California
- Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas
- Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri
- Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York
- Columbus Air Force Base, Ohio
- Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas
- Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida
- Reese Air Force Base, Texas
- McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey
- Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota
- Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

The Air Force is evaluating two other facilities.

**Termination of Obstetric and nursery Services:**

- March Air Force Base, California
- McClellan Air Force Base, California
- Beale Air Force Base, California
- Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington
- The Air Force is evaluating an additional eight facilities.

In particular, please describe current or planned actions for realignment, consolidation, or other “right-sizing” at the following facilities:

**ANSWER:**

- **Blanchfield Army Community Hospital, Fort Campbell, Kentucky**
- **Ireland Army Community Hospital, Fort Knox, Kentucky**

Ireland Army Community Hospital is consolidating small outlying clinics and realigning internally to focus on product line management.

- **Madigan Army Medical Center, Fort Lewis, Washington**
- **Naval Hospital Bremerton, Washington**
- **Naval Hospital Oak Harbor, Washington**

These three facilities are all in DoD Health Service Region 11 which recently began implementation of TRICARE, our regionalized managed care program for the Department of Defense. Madigan Army Medical Center (MAMC) is the lead agent for this area and has developed, and is in the process of implementing, in collaboration with all the military treatment facility commanders in this region, integrated plans for the delivery of health care to beneficiaries residing within the region. TRICARE brings together the health care delivery systems of each of the military services, as well as the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), in a cooperative and supportive effort to better serve military patients and to better use the resources available to military medicine.

The Puget Sound Federal Health Council was established three years ago. It includes representatives from the Military Departments, Veterans Administration, Coast Guard and University of Washington. The council fosters resource sharing initiatives, such as:

- consolidation of laboratory functions so as to obtain bulk rates on supplies and the designation of MAMC as the sole site for certain tests
- regionalization of the pharmacy to maximize prime vendor efforts
- transportation sharing to enhance medical evacuation between the facilities.

While Madigan Army Medical Center (MAMC) has no current plans to reduce beds or service from their present levels, these issues are, and have been, under constant review. As a result of utilization reviews and implementation of improved pre-admission process for surgical candidates, MAMC has reduced bed capacity to better match care requirements. Changes in services are also anticipated at a number of outlying clinics in response to BRAC initiatives now under study.

The Navy is realigning nine officer and seven enlisted billets to Naval Hospital, Bremerton, Washington to meet anticipated increase of over 9,100 active duty and their family members. There is a BRAC military construction project scheduled for FY 98 for ambulatory care additions.

- **Walter Reed Army Medical Center, DC**
- **Dewitt Army Community Hospital, Fort Belvoir, Virginia**
- **National Navy Medical Center, Maryland**
- **Malcolm Grow USAF Medical Center, Andrews AFB, Maryland**

ASD(Health Affairs) Medical Program Guidance, FY 1997 - 2001, requires the Services "to integrate, right size and eliminate unnecessary duplication in the National Capital Region." The medical treatment facilities in this area are aggressively working to pursue graduate medical education consolidation as well as clinical services realignment/integration. This is a maturing initiative with the two most mature actions being the OB/GYN/NICU realignment between Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) and the National Navy Medical Center (NNMC) and mental health initiatives that involve all three medical centers in the national capital area. The OB/GYN/NICU initiative will permit concentration of resources for accommodation of larger beneficiary workloads (WRAMC will provide specialty gynecological services; NNMC will be responsible for neonatal ICU and problem obstetric cases). A similar initiative to consolidate and eliminate redundant mental health services within the region is expected to result in a 30% - 40% reduction in inpatient beds in the national capital area with significantly reduced outpatient CHAMPUS costs as well.

By October 1, 1995 WRAMC will have integrated all the Army medical assets within this area to provide command and control of a cost effective, multidisciplinary, customer focused health care network. This will allow appropriate shifting, consolidation, and efficiencies. DeWitt Army Community Hospital is in the middle of a major primary care initiative aimed at recapture of the primary care base in Northern Virginia and involves major realignments within the hospital and between outlying clinics to include PRIMUS clinics.

Malcolm Grow USAF Medical Center has decreased inpatient operating beds by 31% in the last two years.

- **McDonald Army Community Hospital, Fort Eustis, Virginia**
- **Naval Hospital Portsmouth, Virginia**
- **1st Medical Group, Langley AFB, Virginia**

The military services have a long tradition of cooperation and collaboration in the Tidewater area as evidenced by the many tri-service health care initiatives in this area in recent years. The Navy Medical Center, Portsmouth, Virginia is the Lead Agent for DoD Health Service Region II which includes all three facilities. Recent initiatives in this area include:

- the establishment of voice and data communication networks to allow joint utilization of medical resources
- integration of major information management systems to create enrollment, health care finder and provider networks
- establishment of a patient service center
- increased use of inpatient military resources and better, smarter, utilization of assets in the civilian community is resulting in a decline in both outpatient visits and hospital admissions.

The Navy is evaluating current staffing in this area and may realign some manpower resources into their Branch Clinic at Oceana. The 1st Medical Group at Langley AFB has decreased inpatient operating beds by 20% in the last two years and has developed resource sharing agreements in ENT and neonatology. In addition they have developed an oxygen contract buy-in with the Hampton VA Medical Center. McDonald Army Community Hospital will have a "TriPrime Clinic" open in January 1996 in a continuing effort to develop their primary care network.

- **Munson Army Community Hospital, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**
- **Irwin Army Community Hospital, Fort Riley, Kansas**
- **351st Medical Group, Whiteman AFB, Missouri**

The distance between these facilities, and their relative size and mission, diminish many of the opportunities for effective resource sharing between them. Individually however they have all incorporated managed care principles into their operations which contribute to efficiency and right-sizing at their own facilities. For example, Irwin ACH at Fort Riley, Kansas has combined its pediatric and medical/surgical wards into one in an effort to better utilize available health care resources for the community they serve.

- **Womack Army Community Hospital, Fort Bragg, North Carolina**
- **Naval Hospital Cherry Point, North Carolina**
- **Naval Hospital Camp Lejeune, North Carolina**
- **4th Medical Group, Seymour Johnson AFB, NC**

These facilities are part of DoD Health Services Region Two; the Lead Agent being the Navy Medical Center, Portsmouth, Virginia. A managed care organization, Eastern Carolina Coordinated Care, has been established to maximize referrals to the MTFs through the TRICARE Service Center that assists in locating appointments for beneficiaries with preferred and participating providers.

Womack Army Medical Center continues to develop its primary care initiative, started in January 1992, with the objective of developing a primary care network that would be capable of offering managed care enrollment to 80% of the eligible population in preparation for the transition to TRICARE. The 4th Medical Group at Seymour Johnson AFB modified emergency medicine services from level III to level IV in 1993.

- **Naval Hospital Camp Pendleton, California**
- **Naval Hospital San Diego, California**

These facilities are part of DoD Health Services Region Nine; the Lead Agent being the Navy Medical Center, San Diego, California. San Diego is just entering its implementation of region-wide resource sharing. They have a long standing association with the Naval Hospital Camp Pendleton to assist in graduate medical training. Some general surgical residents from the Naval Medical Center, San Diego obtain their obstetrics training at Pendleton and transitional inters perform their family practice rotation there. In addition family practice residents from Camp Pendleton rotate through the medical center for specialty training not available at their facility. In addition, NMC San Diego routinely provides specialty physicians to NH Camp Pendleton, in particular pediatric support and orthopedic support assist in reducing CHAMPUS and supplemental care expenditures.

- **Evans Army Community Hospital, Fort Carson, Colorado**
- **USAF Academy Hospital, Colorado**

ASD(Health Affairs) Medical Program Guidance, FY 1997 - 2001, requires the Services "to integrate, right size and eliminate unnecessary duplication at... Ft. Carson Army Community Hospital/Air Force Academy Hospital." The two facilities have formed the Pikes Peak Area Initiative in a proactive effort to improve cooperation and collaboration between their facilities. Resource sharing in urology and ENT is underway. Evans ACH has reduced inpatient beds from 110 to 85 and combined medical and surgical wards.

- **Bliss Army Community Hospital, Fort Huachuca, Arizona**
- **355th Medical Group, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona**

These facilities are part of DoD Health Services Region Seven; the Lead Agent being William Beaumont Army Medical Center (WBAMC), Texas. There is a joint Davis-Monthan/WBAMC preferred provider network that covers all specialties. Referral workload is sent to William Beaumont and Wilford Hall Medical Center. The Air Force also used the Navy Clinic, Yuma, AZ for orthopedic cases. The Air Force hospital has decreased inpatient operating beds by 14% in the last two years.

- **Naval Hospital Pensacola, Florida**
- **646th Medical Group, Eglin AFB, Florida**
- **325th Medical Group, Tyndall AFB, Florida**
- **Keesler USAF Medical Center, Keesler AFB, Mississippi**

These facilities are all part of DoD Health Services Region Four; the Lead Agent being Keesler USAF Medical Center. The lead agent is exploring the idea of locating a tri-service alcohol rehabilitation program at Pensacola Naval Hospital for all the southeast. A region-wide reference laboratory service, for all beneficiaries in this area is also being pursued.

Pensacola NH and Keesler USAF Medical Center have agreements regarding several training programs and reciprocal medical board processing. Pensacola NH and the 646th Medical Group at Eglin AFB have combined efforts in procuring some highly specialized diagnostic equipment for their facilities. In addition Eglin cares for Pensacola's inpatient psychiatric patients in exchange for Pensacola taking Eglin's outpatient alcohol rehabilitation patients. Tyndall AFB refers all specialty required work to Keesler.

Other right-sizing initiatives have resulted in the 646th Medical Group decreasing inpatient operating beds by 19% in the last two years while Keesler has decreased beds by 8% in this same period.

- **Martin Army Community Hospital, Fort Benning, Georgia**
- **Lyster Army Community Hospital, Fort Rucker, Alabama**
- **502nd Medical Group, Maxwell AFB, Alabama**
- **653rd Medical Group, Robins AFB, Georgia**

The relative distance between these facilities limits many types of right-sizing opportunities although they do share assets. Robbins AFB is exploring possible sharing agreements with the Veterans Administration medical center in the area and with a local civilian medical facility. There has been a 50% decrease in operating beds at Maxwell AFB in the last two years.

- **Reynolds Army Community Hospital, Fort Sill, Oklahoma**
- **97th Medical group, Altus AFB, Oklahoma**
- **654th Medical Group, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma**
- **396th Medical Group, Sheppard AFB, Texas**

Reynolds Army Community Hospital has several initiatives to maximize assets. Resource sharing agreement with the adjacent VA outpatient clinic has been completed. Reynolds anticipates completion later this year of resource sharing agreements with two nearby Air Force facilities through their "Friends and Neighbors" program that promotes cost avoidance in such areas as orthopedics, general surgery, neurology, and dermatology. Their outlying family practice facilities have been consolidated in the main hospital facility thereby allowing turn in of excess buildings. Other consolidations of wards, clinics and staff have also occurred.

Tinker AFB, OK provides orthopedic surgeons to assist McDonnell AFB, KS. A proposal to convert the emergency room at Tinker AFB into a 24 hour acute care clinic is currently being developed. Sheppard AFB provides monthly manning assistance to Altus, Tinker, and Reese AFBs in such areas as ENT, audiology, orthopedics and podiatry. Other such cross-

sharing of assets in frequent between these facilities. Inpatient beds at Altus AFB have declined by 53% in the last two years and 29% at Tinker AFB.

- **Moncrief Army Community Hospital, Fort Stewart, Georgia**
- **363rd Medical Group, Shaw AFB, South Carolina**

Inpatient operating beds have decreased 17% in the last two years at Shaw AFB and the Special Care Inpatient Nursing Unit is being evaluated for closure. Air Force ophthalmologists care for Army beneficiaries at Moncrief Army Community Hospital. Army radiologists read mammography films for Shaw AFB and the Air Force provides gynecological care to Army beneficiaries at SHAW AFB.

- **Winn Army Community Hospital, Fort Stewart, Georgia**
- **Naval Hospital Beaufort, South Carolina**

No formal agreements or programs are in place though they share assets on a frequent basis. 66 miles separate the facilities making routine sharing difficult.

In regards to planned actions, please be specific about the status of those plans in Defense Health Program budgeting.

**ANSWER:** ASD(Health Affairs) Medical Program Guidance, FY 1997 - 2001, requires the Services "to integrate, right size and eliminate unnecessary duplication at Ft. Carson Army Community Hospital/Air Force Academy, at Brooke Army Medical Center/Wilford Hall USAF Medical Center, and in the National Capital Region."

In addition the programming guidance addresses graduate medical education: "The components shall integrate remaining duplicate training GME programs in the National Capital Region and San Antonio, Texas not later than FY 1998."

Also, please describe in detail the status of current plans to convert Naval Hospital Charleston, SC; Naval Hospital Patuxent River, MD; 9th Medical Group, Beale AFB, CA; 323rd FTW Hospital, Mather AFB, CA; and 438th Medical Group, Fort Dix, NJ into outpatient clinics.

**ANSWER:**  
Navy hospitals

A "quick analysis" of these five facilities was performed in April 1994 and it was determined that ambulatory health care centers were viable alternatives at these sites. As a result of this "rightsizing," Navy could optimize manpower and fiscal resources by transferring end strength from these facilities to OCONUS and Fleet units, and by off-setting very expensive contracts in Navy MTFs. The contractual and MILCON savings realized by this action equate to over \$270 million dollars across the FYDP.



A complete analysis of each facility is currently in progress by BUMED. It is anticipated that this detailed analysis will be completed later this summer. If the analysis supports the earlier review, then the projected transition date should coincide with the implementation plan for realignment.

Change in service dates, now projected, are as follows:

Naval Hospital, Millington	Nov 96
Naval Hospital, Groton	Nov 97
Naval Hospital, Patuxent River	Nov 97
Naval Hospital, Corpus Christi	Nov 96
Naval Hospital, Charleston	Nov 97

Naval Hospital, Charleston

As a result of BRAC actions closing Naval Base Charleston and the decommissioning of many associated fleet units and the migration of many others, it became necessary to right-size the Naval Hospital, Charleston to support remaining active duty members and their families.

Naval Hospital, Charleston reduced operating beds from 130 to 90 in December 1992. As of October 1995, it is projected that approximately 29,000 active duty and family members will remain in the Charleston catchment area. Historic utilization rates project an average daily inpatient census of between 35 and 37 for that remaining population and the decision was made to further reduce operating beds to 40 effective 1 October 1995. As a result, external partnerships for routine inpatient obstetric service and inpatient psychiatric services were initiated and are in place.

The result of BRAC 95 and other fleet and operational movements is being carefully monitored to determine if it will be necessary to increase operating beds or, with the arrival of TRICARE in May 1997, to further decrease or eliminate inpatient beds. The plan would use contracts and partnerships for the limited number of active duty inpatient beds required and rightsize the Naval Hospital to an ambulatory care center later in 1997.

#### Air Force Hospitals

9th Medical Group, Beale AFB -- A change from hospital to clinic status is currently being evaluated. Obstetrical services closed in 1994 and inpatient operating beds have decreased 17% in the last two years.

323rd FTW Hospital, McClellan AFB -- Obstetrical services closed in 1994. Inpatient operating beds have declined 17% in the last two years.

438th Medical Group, Ft Dix -- This facility was reduced to clinic status from an inpatient facility on 1 January 1995.

Why isn't the Department doing these actions through the BRAC process?

**ANSWER:** Our purpose during BRAC 95 was to evaluate cross Service opportunities for Single Service asset sharing, decrease excess capacity, and reduce duplication within the Military Health Service System (MHSS). The alternatives submitted by the Joint Cross-Service Group on Military Treatment Facilities have been largely accomplished through the BRAC process and other ongoing management initiatives. I understand and support the rationale the Services have provided for maintaining most of the remaining facilities that were provided for their consideration.

The MHSS is sensitive to structuring itself to the needs of the world-wide community it serves, and has been aggressively addressing this issue outside the BRAC process. Additional rightsizing initiatives, such as the planned integration of Wilford Hall USAF Medical Center and Brooke Army Medical Center and the integration of Evans Army Community Hospital and the USAF Academy Hospital, will be addressed through future Defense program and budget review processes.

Our goal is to reduce unneeded infrastructure thus allowing us to use our resources for more critical requirements. The Services have taken different approaches to how to accomplish this. We are concerned with the results, not the process the Military Departments have taken to achieve them. Our cumulative record of infrastructure reductions since the end of the Cold War demonstrate the success of our efforts.

Given the frequency with which budgets can and do change, what assurances do you and the Commission have that these actions are really going to take place?

**ANSWER:** The ASD(Health Affairs) has been the program manager for the Department's health resources since 1991. As a consequence, we have worked on a joint basis for several years and will continue to develop and implement programs and systems that facilitate effective and efficient use of resources.

Do you believe it would be beneficial for the Commission to add any or all of the actions you describe to its list of actions to consider?

**ANSWER:** I don't think this is necessary. We are confident that the rightsizing initiatives now underway and planned can achieve the management goals we have established.

8. San Antonio, Texas is home to two large military medical centers and a large number of civilian hospitals. This appears to be an example of an opportunity to eliminate a substantial portion of excess capacity, and, indeed, the Air Force facility, Wilford Hall, was on the Joint Cross Service Group list of realignment alternatives. Yet neither facility is on the DOD list.

Why?

Why did the Air Force choose not to realign Wilford Hall to either a clinic, as the Joint Cross Service Group alternative suggests, or a community hospital?

Is there a plan to realign and consolidate services at Wilford Hall and Brooke Army Medical Center? If so, what is its status?

Are you comfortable with the Army and Air Force plans to enact such an alternative through the budget process? If not, do you feel that Commission action could better ensure that the necessary realignment takes place?

Given the unique aspects within both the Brooke Army Medical Center and Wilford Hall, would you envision any actual infrastructure operating efficiencies by a consolidation? Would you actually be able to close a facility by consolidation?

**ANSWER:** The Joint-Cross Service Group for Medical Treatment Facilities analysis did provide an alternative for consideration by the Air Force that realigned Willford Hall Medical Center (WHMC) to a clinic. This option was based on computer modeling that consolidated the acute and medical center inpatient care requirements in San Antonio at Brooke Army Medical Center and converted Willford Hall to an ambulatory care facility. The alternative was based on quantitative modeling results that suggest the reduced beds are not needed for wartime demand nor to meet the projected peacetime direct care inpatient requirements.

The Air Force evaluated, and strongly rejected, this alternative based on consideration of several additional factors that were not included in the model. Wilford Hall Medical Center is the premier Air Force medical facility and is known internationally for its specialty medical services and graduate medical education teaching program. It is the largest, single contributor to their readiness capability, houses 34% of their GME training programs of which 27 are unique to WHMC, and accounts for 41% of the total physician training man-years, is the only designated Specialty Treatment Center in the Air Force, as well as its only operating Level 1 Trauma Center. The Air Force believed that any decrease in capability along the lines of the two options indicated will impact negatively on both their wartime readiness mission and operational healthcare costs.

The Department fully agreed with the Air Force's assessment. We are currently developing a plan for consolidating health services throughout DoD Health Service Region VI that includes most of Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana and Arkansas. One aspect of this is the integration Wilford Hall USAF Medical Center and Brooke Army Medical Center so as to eliminate any nonessential duplication of services in the San Antonio area. Integration of graduate medical education programs between these two facilities is already underway.

I believe this can, and will, be achieved by the management initiatives now planned and underway. It is expected there will be considerable operating efficiencies gained through these actions. I don't think action by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission is necessary. We are confident that the rightsizing initiatives now underway and planned can achieve the management goals we have established.

## REQUIREMENTS

9. The Commission staff understands that there is some disagreement within the Department in the area of wartime readiness requirements for hospital beds.

However, do even the highest estimates of required wartime beds exceed the current inventory of over 20,000 mobilization beds?

**ANSWER:** The General Accounting Office's report on DoD's 1995 process and recommendations for closure and realignment states, "several key variables that greatly affect the wartime demand for medical care are still in debate. And, while the cross-service group's analysis and other studies indicate some excess capacity in medical facilities will remain after BRAC 1995, it is unclear that there is consensus on wartime requirements and therefore on how much excess capacity exists DoD-wide."

Overall active duty strength has decreased approximately 30% with a corresponding 35% reduction in hospitals and a 42% reduction in bed capacity. For BRAC 95, our wartime requirements were based on the most current Defense Planning Guidance, which was approximately 10,000 beds. Our modeling of the MHSS required that any alternative solution retain the aggregate number of wartime beds to meet the MHSS system wide and Service specific bed requirements. We also defined requirements based on FY 94 direct care inpatient rates for active duty members, retired personnel, and their family members. The rates were applied to the projected 2001 populations associated with each catchment area and resulted in a bed requirement for each MTF. This requirement could be met by either the direct care system or civilian sector resources. Our model ensured enough beds were retained in the aggregate MHSS to meet the non-wartime requirement.

Tertiary care demand was also based on FY 94 direct care rates for our GME facilities. Demand was generated based on populations east and west of the Mississippi. Our model then found the "best fit" of our MHSS resources to meet the requirements.

## SERVICES' RESPONSES TO JOINT CROSS SERVICE GROUP ALTERNATIVES

10. Eleven of the sixteen alternatives provided to the Services by the Joint Cross Service Group were not accepted.

Are you satisfied that the DOD list goes as far as it should in reducing medical infrastructure?

Do the eleven rejected alternatives represent missed opportunities?

**ANSWER:** There is probably some excess capacity still in our system. I don't at all consider these "missed opportunities." The alternatives submitted by the Joint Cross-Service Group on Military Treatment Facilities have been largely accomplished through the BRAC process and

other ongoing management initiatives. I understand and support the rationale the Services have provided for maintaining most of the remaining facilities that were provided for their consideration. Additional rightsizing initiatives will be addressed through future Defense program and budget review processes.

### **TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMISSION**

11. In testimony before the Commission on April 17, 1995, you stated that there is a significant change in how DoD delivers care to eligible beneficiaries within its facilities. Specifically, you stated that the Air Force has stopped doing emergency services in 11 hospitals and closed 17 others. In addition, you testified that the Navy is in the final process of making judgment about downsizing five hospitals to clinics.

Please provide for the record the details upon which your statements were based. At a minimum, please include the locations of affected hospitals, the date the change became or will become effective, and what other plans your office may have to continue the significant changes in how DoD delivers care.

**ANSWER:** See question 7 above for the response.

### **Questions Submitted for General Shane**

1. How did the Army define "clinic" for the Fort Lee and Fort Meade realignments and what was the basis for the size of the staff reductions in the recommendations for these two hospitals?

**ANSWER:** Both Kenner and Kimbrough General Community Hospitals perform same day surgery and would therefore normally generate a one day admission even without "inpatient services." Kenner and Kimbrough Army Community Hospitals did not receive a listing of what services to provide to qualify as a clinic. US Army Medical Command expectation is that the Medical Service Action Plan developed by Kenner and Kimbrough staffs will describe the services they think best for the community and the amount support staff. The staff reductions were developed using a manpower staffing assessment model (Benchmark). This methodology determined manpower requirements at 25 Army medical treatment facilities (MTF). By the end of CY 95, 100 percent of the Army MTFs will have been assessed using the Benchmark Requirements Determination Process. The Army Personnel Proponency Directorate (APPD) uses the model to determine AMEDD Program Objective Memorandum manpower requirements.

2. In developing the cost savings estimates for the two Army hospital realignment actions, what assumptions did the Army make about both inpatient and outpatient CHAMPUS cost increases?

**ANSWER:** Trade-off factors developed and validated by DoD project the civilian sector utilization when a MTF is realigned. Active duty family members' care would shift to outside sources at a ratio of 1:1. Beneficiaries other than active duty family members would seek care

from outside sources at a rate of 1:2.8 MTF dispositions and outpatient visits. All scenarios depicting the elimination of inpatient services at any MTF assume that sufficient personnel and funding resources remain to provide outpatient, diagnostic, ancillary, and referral services commensurate with the remaining mission.

The elimination of inpatient services would result in a 100 percent reduction in personnel supporting the inpatient services. A portion of these personnel would transfer with associated funding to other MTFs to provide the inpatient care formerly performed or subsequently referred by the realigning MTFs.

For Fort Lee, the costing assumes that the fiscal year 1994 dispositions would transfer to outside sources at the tradeoff factor rates shown above.

For Fort Meade, the costing assumes 85 percent of the fiscal year 1994 dispositions would transfer to Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC); the remaining 15 percent would live a significant distance outside the WRAMC catchment area to warrant their seeking care through CHAMPUS; i.e., the CHAMPUS deductible/copay would be less the cost/inconvenience of traveling to WRAMC.

3. Please explain why the Army accepted some of the Joint Cross Service Group alternatives but not others?

**ANSWER:** The Army accepted some JCSG alternatives and not others for operational and financial reasons. DeWitt Army Community Hospital (DACH), Fort Belvoir, VA, is a keystone to the Northern Virginia Primary Care Initiative that provides the area beneficiaries with scarce primary care services so vital to a successful managed care program. The closure or downsizing of DACH to a clinic would not have only jeopardized the primary care initiative (for which DACH received the Vice President's Reinventing Government Award), but might have caused ASD (HA) to lose valuable Congressional support for DoD's TRICARE program. The DACH averages about 42,000 outpatient visits per month, which is greater than the outpatient contribution of Malcom Grow Medical Center (39,000 monthly). Additionally, the realignment of DACH never had a return on investment which was primarily caused by the high increase to the recurring CHAMPUS cost of \$23.6 M/year.

Downsizing or closure of Lyster Army Community Hospital (LACH), Fort Rucker, AL, would impact readiness by reducing specialized medical support for the Army Aviation School. The closure or downsizing of LACH to a clinic would force active duty patients (flight students and cadre) to on-post care in Dothan, AL about 45 minutes away. The lack of on-post care would result in high levels of pilot "downtime." Additionally, the realignment scenario never had a return on investment.

### **Questions Submitted for Major General Blume**

1. Based on documents provided to the Commission and discussions between the Commission staff and DoD representatives, it is understood that both the Army and the Navy performed

COBRA analyses for all of the Joint Cross Service Group alternatives, but that the Air Force did not perform any.

Is this correct? If so, why didn't the Air Force do the analyses needed to determine such an important aspect of the feasibility of the alternatives?

**ANSWER:** Yes, this is correct. The Air Force performed no COBRA analyses on the JCSG alternatives because any list provided by the model at that time was premature. The initial results provided by the model in December did not incorporate (remove) the Services' proposed bases for closure and realignment before it was run. Medical facilities at installations which should have been removed from the model included those at Reese and Kirtland AFBs; Army facilities at Fort McClellan, Fort Ritchie, and Fitzsimmons AMC; and Navy installations at Long Beach, and centers in Kentucky, Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.

Also, and just as important, the model used by the JCSG needed improvements and enhancements in order to provide an accurate list of alternatives for further discussion. Some of these included correcting the excessive flow of GME beds to OCONUS, disallowing binary constraints to keep a facility open at medical center level, and verifying that MTF data accurately reflected reality.

Did the Air Force actively participate in the Joint Cross Service Group effort?

**ANSWER:** Yes, officers from the Air Force Surgeon General's office participated in the Joint Cross Service Group effort; however, this involvement should not be interpreted as Air Force endorsement of the final results. The alternatives produced by the Joint Cross-Service Group would require review against the total Air Force installation BRAC evaluation and recommendations.

If the Air Force wasn't going to consider the Joint Cross Service Group alternatives, why did the Joint Cross Service Group bother to consider Air Force Hospitals at all?

**ANSWER:** The Air Force would have considered the Group's alternatives if the model had incorporated each of the Services' proposed bases for closure and realignment made in this round. But, since these alternatives were based on the current base structure and did not factor in the Services' BRAC 95 recommended closures and realignments, it was considered premature to pursue any action on this list of alternatives. Improving and enhancing the model, then returning it with the '95 BRAC basis included, would have certainly provided a worthwhile bases from which to discuss potential rightsizing actions and how best to meet the needs of our beneficiary population.

Additionally, and for your consideration, the Air Force prefers to facilitate medical mission changes programmatically rather than through the BRAC process in order to maintain a degree of flexibility in sculpting its future medical force. Flexibility is important in implementing TRICARE initiatives and delivery of health care to all beneficiaries. The Air Force advocates aggressive efforts in rightsizing its medical facilities based on its readiness

mission, along with TRICARE, through a strategic resourcing methodology. This methodology forges the results of a population-based, demand projection, business-case analysis with capitated-based resource allocation and incorporates best business practices to culminate in the most effective and efficient use of health care resources. Using these tools will methodically and purposely eliminate duplication of services and provide for an optimum product-line and personnel mix.

**Question Submitted for Mr. Nemfakos**

1. Please explain why the Navy did not accept either of the two Naval Hospital realignment alternatives on the Joint Cross Service Group list?

**ANSWER:** The alternative to realign Naval Hospital Beaufort to a clinic is not a feasible alternative. Navy Medicine has an obligation to support the operational requirements of the Fleet and Fleet Marine Force. Analysis showed the local civilian health care infrastructure has insufficient accredited inpatient and critical care capability to support the Marine Corps training operations at Parris Island and the Marine Corps Air Station at Beaufort. Naval Hospital Beaufort is the only hospital in the area with adequate inpatient and critical care capability to support any significant operational mishap. Therefore, realigning Naval Hospital Beaufort to an outpatient clinic would require the transfer of military medical personnel to a nearby Military Treatment Facility to meet inpatient care needs of the active duty population in the Beaufort area. Since there will be no savings associated with the elimination of military end strength and there will be increased CHAMPUS costs in the Beaufort area with the loss of military inpatient care capability, this alternative produces no savings for the Department of the Navy.

Although the alternative to realign Naval Hospital Corpus Christi to a clinic was cost effective, it is not feasible due to the personnel demographics of the area. The Naval Hospital Corpus Christi will provide care for the mine warfare helicopter assets relocating to Naval Air Facility Corpus Christi in support of the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence and for the strike training units being consolidated at Kingsville-Corpus Christi. Consequently, while the 1995 actions eliminate from Naval Air Station Corpus Christi the students who traditionally do not have their dependents with them during flight training, they bring in active duty members with their dependents who will all require medical care.



## LABORATORY AND TEST AND EVALUATION

### LABORATORY

#### QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

1. Dr. Dorman, please explain the context in which your group proposed the closing of Rome Lab and the alternative for cross service collocation of common Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) activities at Fort Monmouth.

**ANSWER:** The Laboratory Joint Cross Service Group actually proposed the collocation of most common C4I activities (acquisition, R&D, in service engineering and procurement). During our analysis it became evident that Ft. Monmouth was the only installation with the capacity to accommodate C4I activities from all three services. We realized that such a proposal, in spite of its inherent contribution to joint warfighting and quality, might not prove cost effective or might conflict with service unique goals. Therefore, we identified four elements of C4I consolidation that made sense from a functional and technical perspective:

a. Realign C4I functions of the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR; appropriate portions of Codes 00, 05 and staff, 01, 02, and 10; the PEO for Space, Communications and Sensors; and PDs 50 and 60 [to be PD 70]) to Fort Monmouth, NJ (collocate with U.S. Army Communications and Electronics Command [CECOM]), or to Hanscom AFB, MA (collocate with U.S. Air Force Electronic Systems Command [ESC]).

b. Realign ESC, Hanscom AFB, MA to Ft. Monmouth, NJ (collocate with CECOM and potentially SPAWAR at Ft. Monmouth).

c. Realign Rome Laboratory, Griffiss AFB, NY to a combination of Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Systems Center RDT&E Division (NRaD), San Diego, CA; Communications RDEC, Ft. Monmouth, NJ; Topographic Engineering Center, Ft Belvoir, VA; and Wright Laboratory, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH.

d. Realign Rome Laboratory, Hanscom AFB, MA to NRaD, San Diego, CA; or to CECOM Communications RDEC, Ft Monmouth, NJ (or to Rome Laboratory, Griffiss AFB, NY, if it remains in place).

We used the word realign rather than close in these alternatives because each Military Department could elect to maintain other, service unique, functions at these bases.

2. Dr. Dorman, what organizations and how many personnel would have been located at Fort Monmouth under this alternative?

**ANSWER:** Our analysis was based on the certified data provided by the MILDEPs, and the following assumptions:

- attrition and force structure reductions will reduce the current fiscal year workforce by at least an additional 20% over the implementation period. (this is less than the “FR-20%” used for detailed analyses of Common Support Functions)
- Selected support functions (non-S&T; e.g. legal, contracting support) could be reduced an additional 10 to 20 percent.
- Base Operations Support (BOS) would not move.

The functions/organizations and personnel which could collocate at Fort Monmouth under these assumptions are:

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Personnel</b>
SPAWAR (appropriate functions)	800
ESC, Hanscom	1,500
Rome, Hanscom	80
Rome, Griffiss	680

We believe these numbers are conservative. They account only for Full Time Equivalent (FTE) reductions comparable to those assumed for our detailed analyses of Common Support Functions. Additional savings should be achievable (i.e. less people moved) as a result of programmatic and technical commonalties identified during detailed implementation planning.

Our data indicated that Fort Monmouth could accommodate 1,085 workyears with little or no modification, and an additional 2,200 with renovation and conversion of existing facilities.

3. Dr. Dorman, as you know, Rome was designated as one of the Air Force’s four Tier I laboratories. As Director of Defense Research and Engineering, are you concerned that closing the lab and moving some of its C4I functions to Fort Monmouth and the others to Hanscom Air Force Base will have a major impact on the DoD’s and the Services’ ability to conduct current and further C4I research and development?

**ANSWER:** No, I think that collocating common C4I work among the services will strengthen our warfighting capability by improving interoperability as well as help avoid unnecessary and costly duplication of research staffs and projects. Much of the work in C4I is done by industry. I am more concerned that the services will be left with excessive infrastructure after this round of base closures. As funding declines this infrastructure will consume resources which would better serve our national defense by sustaining and leveraging the private sector.

The Laboratory Joint Cross-Service Group actually recommended the collocation of most common C4I functions from all services as described in my answer to an earlier question (#1). The services found the cost of this alternative prohibitive based on COBRA analyses.

4. Dr. Dorman, does it make sense to split Rome Lab's C3I functions between two military installations?

**ANSWER:** Yes. The Laboratory Joint Cross-Service Group actually recommended that the Air Force could place appropriate functions of Rome Lab at a combination of Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Systems Center RDT&E Division (NRaD), San Diego, CA; Communications RDEC, Ft. Monmouth, NJ; Topographic Engineering Center, Ft Belvoir, VA; and Wright Laboratory, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH.

These other locations do science and technology similar to that done at Rome, with greater "center of mass" in their areas of expertise. As stated in the previous question (#3), I think that collocating common C4I work among the services would strengthen our warfighting capability by improving interoperability and would help avoid unnecessary and costly duplication of research staffs and projects.

The question is whether to collocate common C4I functions at functional "centers of excellence", if you will, versus collocating C4I functions within each service. I happen to believe that the Department can improve joint warfighting capability as well as reduce infrastructure by doing the former.

5. General Blume, how did the Air Force determine the cost and savings of the Rome Laboratory recommendation? Did anyone from the Air Force involved in the decision to close the lab and realign its functions visit the lab before the recommendation was made to: (1) discuss these actions with the lab's managers, (2) evaluate the impact of these actions on the lab's current and future C4I work, (3) determine the Lab's requirements at the receiving locations, and (4) determine what had to be moved to the new location and at what cost?

**ANSWER:** The costs and savings associated with the Rome Lab recommendation were developed using COBRA based on certified data, originated at Rome Lab, that went through the Air Force Internal Control Plan process. Additionally, a preliminary site survey was conducted in January 1995 by AF/CE and RT personnel. The proposed actions were discussed with the Rome Lab Commander prior to the recommendation being finalized. The allocation of the Rome Lab activities were developed in discussions with the SECAF, AF/CV and the BCEG based on the impact to future C4I work.

6. Major General Blume, during the Commission's visit of Brooks, the San Antonio community presented a plan to establish a cantonment area, close Brooks, and preserve the functions of the Human Systems Center, that is, Armstrong Laboratory, the School of Aerospace Medicine, and other related activities.

Had the Air Force considered this option previously?

How does the Air Force plan to eliminate excess capacity at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base should the San Antonio community proposal be adopted?

**ANSWER:** The Air Force did not consider this option previously. The Air Force seeks to reduce infrastructure prudently. In the case of Brooks AFB, closure is the preferred approach. We are only now looking at a Brooks AFB cantonment option at the request of the Commission. This option does not represent the Air Force position. The Air Force has not developed any plans on eliminating excess capacity at Wright-Patterson AFB should the San Antonio community proposal be adopted by the Commission.

7. Major General Blume and Dr. Dorman, the current DoD recommendations dictate that the Aircrew Training Research Division of Armstrong Laboratory remain as a stand-alone facility at the closed Williams Air Force Base.

Nearby Luke Air Force Base already conducts the majority of the fighter weapons training for the Air Force, and has a long history of cooperation with Williams.

How strongly did the Air Force consider moving this unique and necessary function from Williams Air Force Base to Luke Air Force Base? Have any COBRA runs performed?

If so, could they be provided to the Commission as soon as possible?

**ANSWER: Maj Gen Blume.** The Air Force gave due consideration to moving this unique and necessary function from Mesa, AZ (formerly, Williams AFB) to Luke AFB among several other options. COBRA runs for this option were accomplished and the COBRA run presented to the BCEG has been attached at **TAB 6**. The recommendation to retain the Division at its current location continues to take advantage of the considerable resources of Luke AFB but avoids the expenses and disruption associated with the movement of this small, largely civilian operation to Luke AFB.

**Dr. Dorman.** I cannot answer for the Air Force. As you know, a previous BRAC decision directed the collocation of the Air Crew Training Research Division with similar work of the Army and Navy at Orlando. This was a case where the MILDEPS had agreed to collocate. We did include Williams AFB in our analysis of Training Systems S&T, and found no rationale for recommending a change to the BRAC '91 decision. The Laboratory Joint Cross Service Group's recommended alternative stated:

The Air Force Aircrew Training Research Division of Armstrong Lab at Williams AFB is already planned for relocation to the Central Florida Research Park in Orlando to join NAWC Orlando and STRICOM. Further, the collocation of NASA-KSC and approximately 150 contractors in the Center of Excellence in Central Florida allows concentration of resources to accomplish similar missions and tasks, avoids duplication of efforts, promotes technology sharing and produces

cost avoidances in travel and technical synergism between government, industry, and academia.

8. As indicated during the hearing, Dr. Dorman agreed to provide, for the record, what the impact on excess capacity would have been had the Laboratory Joint Cross Service Group's four alternatives been accepted by the separate services within the Department of Defense. Please provide this information for the record.

**ANSWER:** I must preface this answer by noting that neither lab capacity nor lab requirement are absolute. Capacity consists primarily of current available laboratory workspace, but facilities which could be converted to laboratory workspace and buildable acreage might also be considered when developing closure alternatives. Requirement can be met by both in-house and outsourced work, and is influenced by force structure limits.

Given these caveats, our approach to calculating Excess Capacity (EC) was quite simple. EC was defined as the difference between Functional Capacity (FC) and the projected laboratory workload in the year 2001 (i.e. the goal was to size the infrastructure to meet the workforce projected out to the year when implementation of BRAC '95 recommendations would be complete). FC was defined as the peak workload performed at a laboratory between fiscal years '86 and '93. The laboratories could only certify workload projections or Functional Requirement (FR) through the POM years (at the time of the data call this extended through FY 97). In order to project workload requirement out to FY2001, the LJCSG reduced the FY97 projections from the laboratories by an additional 20%. This 20%, agreed to by all parties, was based on civilian personnel reductions for fiscal years '98 through '01 mandated by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Using these definitions, excess lab capacity is over 47,000 workyears.

The four alternatives provided opportunities for the services to remove a significant portion of the excess capacity by closing installations and filling excess capacity space at receiving sites. If we assume that all recommended moves take advantage of existing or renovated laboratory workspace (as opposed to building new facilities) these four alternatives would remove over 12,000 workyears of excess capacity from the labs. The actual reduction would be somewhat less because some new facilities would have to be built.

The Secretary of Defense's recommendations remove capacity: approximately 4,826 workyears from Air Force (Brooks AFB and Rome Lab; 2,300 from laboratory activities), approximately 4,700 workyears from the Army (ATCOM; 462 from laboratory activities), and over 13,000 workyears from the Navy (17 activities; all laboratory), by closing installations. Not all this capacity will be eliminated due to rehab and new RDT&E military construction at receiving sites: approximately \$81 million-Air Force, \$24 million-Army, \$29 million-Navy.

## TEST AND EVALUATION

### QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

1. Major General Blume, the Joint Cross Service Group stated “electronic combat Test and Evaluation capability at Eglin and China Lake have approximately 85% overlap.” One alternative suggested was to move China Lake test assets to Eglin.

Why is the Air Force, in light of this alternative, proposing to move Electronic Combat Testing from Eglin Air Force Base to Nellis Air Force Base?

**ANSWER:** Analysis showed potential for further consolidation in Electronic Combat (EC). The Air Force pursued this avenue further to include EC open-air range (OAR) consolidation. Since the T&E JCSG had already agreed that the Nellis complex should be filled to capacity before other ranges, the Air Force evaluated realigning the workload from Eglin to Nellis. The results showed this to be a cost-effective relocation.

What will be the cost for the relocation of the Electronics Combat Testing to Nellis Air Force Base?

**ANSWER:** Current cost is \$6.1 million for the relocation of the Electromagnetic Test Environment (EMTE), consisting of 15 threat simulator systems and two EC pod systems. The nine additional threat simulator systems is a product of the site survey conducted by the losing command, HQ AFMC. The current net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$42.1 million.

Will there be a scheduled delay and a negative impact on programs from this proposed move of Electronic Combat Testing to Nellis Air Force Base?

**ANSWER:** We expect some increase in TDY for collocated units at Eglin to accomplish T&E requiring the full EC OAR capabilities. However, this will be mitigated by leaving EC systems at Eglin to support routine training and armament/weapons. At the same time, there should be less TDY required by units located out West that currently use EMTE at Eglin since they will be able to use Nellis Complex. Even when possible TDY costs for collocated units at Eglin are considered, the realignment provides significant cost savings. Because such a high percentage of the capabilities of the Eglin EC OAR already exists at the Nellis Range Complex, we expect minimal program delays. In addition, the transition plan will ensure that the customer is put first so as to minimize such delays, etc.

Mr. Nemfakos, did the Navy consider the alternative to move China Lake T&E missions primarily to Eglin?

**ANSWER:** Yes. The Department of the Navy (DoN) considered all recommendations made by the T&E Joint Cross-service Group. Specifically, the movement of T&E functions to Eglin was considered. However, since the China Lake ranges and facilities are used for many other

functions beyond those defined by the T&E JCSG, and since China Lake could not be closed because of its importance to the DoN, the functions remained in place.

2. General Blume, why did the Air Force not implement any of the core alternatives presented by the Joint Cross-Service Group?

**ANSWER:** The core alternatives were not presented by the T&E JCSG. They were separately proposed by the co-chairs of the JCSG. These alternatives had not been developed jointly and there was no analysis of certified data provided to support them. The Air Force requested the analysis, but none was provided. Without such an analytical basis, the Air Force did not think it appropriate to consider these alternatives. Subsequently, the Air Force completed the T&E JCSG Analysis Plan for the "core" T&E activities, using T&E JCSG certified data and results, which showed only three of the seven proposed alternatives were supported by analysis of certified data.

3. Mr. Nemfakos, why did the Navy not implement any of the core alternatives presented by the Joint Cross-Service Group?

**ANSWER:** The DoN provided to the Departments of the Army and the Air Force all necessary data to perform timely analyses on core recommendations where Navy sites were losing activities. No further action was requested by the other services. The DoN responded with appropriate information to requests from other services where Navy would be the gaining activity. Analysis on losing sites were to be performed by the losing service. The three "core" DoN sites have the highest Military Value of all DoN technical centers and remain open because of their importance to the DoN.

4. Mr. Nemfakos, did the Navy consider moving the test activities from Pt. Mugu to China Lake or Eglin Air Force Base to eliminate excess test infrastructure?

Would this be the prudent course to follow considering the excess capacity identified by the Joint Cross-Service Group?

**ANSWER:** Pt. Mugu was already consolidated into China Lake by BRAC-91. While physically separate, the missions of these activities are interdependent, and both the sea range at Point Mugu and the land ranges at China Lake required by the Department. Since the sea range is required for fleet exercises and other functions beyond those defined by the T&E JCSG no workload transfer to Eglin was considered.

5. General Blume, The Joint Cross-Service Group recommended the Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator Activity (AFEWES) at Fort Worth, Texas, and the Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor Activity (REDCAP) at Buffalo, New York (Electronic Combat test simulation systems) be moved to Patuxent River or to Edwards Air Force Base.

The Air Force recommended to move these activities to Edwards Air Force Base. Why?

**ANSWER:** Realignment of these facilities to Edwards AFB was shown to be more economically feasible than to Patuxent River. For AFEWES, the COBRA analysis showed a return of investment (ROI) period of only 13 years for Edwards vs. 18 years for Pax River. For REDCAP, the ROI for Edwards was only 4 years vs. 6 years for Pax River. Consolidation at Edwards also provides the capability to test bomber-sized aircraft, in addition to fighter-sized aircraft, which is the only capability at Pax River.

Please provide specific information on the methodology the Air Force used for determining projected workloads at the AFEWES and the REDCAP facilities.

**ANSWER:** The Air Force adopted and used workload projections which had been made by the T&E JCSG in accordance with a jointly developed and approved analysis plan using certified historical workload data submitted by the Services. The JCSG algorithm multiplied the average workload in FY92 and 93 by a workload projection factor. The workload projection factor (0.72) was computed by the OSD comptroller based on the FY95 FYDP.

6. Mr. Coyle, the Joint Cross Service Group on Test and Evaluation put forth the alternative to consolidate Armament/Weapons testing at Eglin Air Force Base eliminating these missions at China Lake and Point Mugu.

Do you still support this alternative?

**ANSWER:** After reviewing the initial recommendations of the working group that supported the Joint Cross Service Group on Test and Evaluation (JCSG/T&E), we (the JCSG/T&E Co-Chairs) identified several alternatives that appeared to have the potential for further reducing excess capacity. These alternatives were identified without consideration of the potential cost of implementation. The alternative described in Question 6 above was one possible scenario that we identified for reducing excess capacity, principally in Armament/Weapons testing. That scenario was matched with a "counter alternative" scenario to relocate the testing and evaluation workload from Eglin AFB primarily to China Lake and other core sites. These scenarios were identified because the co-Chairmen of the JCSG felt that a significant level of excess capacity continued to exist, and that it was important that the services look at these additional scenarios to determine the cost and benefits of undertaking the added scenarios. Neither scenario was supported as a preferred scenario by the JCSG/T&E -- in fact it was not a foregone conclusion that either scenario would be more cost effective than the status quo even with its excess capacity. Nevertheless, we believed that, because the scenarios offered the potential for significant reductions to excess capacity, they deserved to be more fully analyzed by the services during the analysis and formulation (including costs) of their BRAC recommendations.

7. Mr. Coyle, since you suggested an alternative to consolidate testing at the Eglin Air Force Base Test Range, does the proposed movement by the Air Force of the Electromagnetic Test Environment effort to Nellis Air Force Base eliminate the opportunity to consolidate DoD electronic combat testing?



**ANSWER:** The Air Force proposal does not eliminate the opportunity to consolidate DoD electronic combat testing. On the contrary, this proposed realignment enhances consolidation of Electronic Combat (EC) testing and training, at Nellis Air Force Base.

As mentioned in response to question 6, the Test and Evaluation Joint Cross-Service Group did not recommend consolidation of testing at Eglin AFB. Rather, we recommended it as one possible scenario worthy of analysis. Electronic combat (EC) testing currently occurs at both Eglin AFB and Nellis AFB (as well as at other locations), and the Air Force recommendation to move the EMTE to Nellis AFB does in fact result in consolidation of EC testing.

8. Mr. Burt, as you indicated during testimony, you agreed to provide, for the record, the percent of excess Test and Evaluation capacity that could be eliminated had the alternatives put forward by the Joint Cross Service Group been adopted. Please provide this information for the record.

**ANSWER:** The following tables reflect the percentage of excess capacity, by Functional Area and Test Facility Category, under two conditions:

"Baseline" reflects the total excess capacity of existing core and non-core sites prior to any closure or realignment. (Figure 1 at **TAB 7**.)

"Non-Core Realignment" reflects the excess capacity levels which would have resulted from realignment of all the non-core workload to core activities. (Figure 2 at **TAB 7**.)

Four of these non-core sites were included in the Secretary of Defense Recommendations to the Commission: Indianapolis, Warminster, REDCAP, and AFEWES. These represented a reduction of about 49,000 hours of excess capacity from the baseline.

The amount of excess capacity which would have resulted from adoption of one or more of the core alternatives identified by the JCSG co-Chairmen would be dependent on the specific alternative(s) chosen. However, it was not intended that excess capacity in any category be reduced below the level of 25 percent in order to accommodate workload peaks and surge requirements.

**LABS, TEST AND EVALUATION**  
**Questions submitted by Representative Smith**

1. In studying the catapult and arresting gear testing for aircraft carriers that is performed at Lakehurst, New Jersey, it seems that the Navy concluded that this mission cannot be done today at any other military facility in the world. Having reached that conclusion, why did the Navy decide to move the prototyping and manufacturing of the catapult and arresting gear devices nearly 1,000 miles away to Jacksonville, Florida?

**ANSWER:** Capacity excess to the planned Force structure requirements exists within the Naval Aviation infrastructure. Critical and unique to carrier aviation is the requirement for Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment (ALRE). Initially the Navy considered consolidating the NAWC Lakehurst ALRE capability with existing ALRE capability at NAWC Patuxent River; however, the technical community expressed concern with using the capabilities at NAWC Patuxent River which did not have as extensive testing capabilities and instrumentation. They suggested an enclave be left as a detachment of the parent command at Patuxent River. Based on these technical concerns and the higher costs of replication, a small cantonment was established. The recommendation retains at Lakehurst the critical ALRE engineers with ALRE equipment and testing functions. It does; however, relocate Support equipment full life cycle acquisition functions to NAWC Patuxent River further consolidating Naval Aviation RDT&E and Acquisition and eliminating excess capacity. The Manufacturing and Prototyping functions are transferred to NADEP Jacksonville and consolidated with critical aviation industrial capability, while reducing excess capacity and maintaining critical mass in this functional area.

2. Is it possible that the Navy underestimated the obvious industrial, economic, and performance advantages of manufacturing and prototyping these items where they are tested, as is done today?

**ANSWER:** The total Naval Aviation infrastructure and requirements were considered. Although some industrial, economic, and performance advantages may be lost by separating ALRE manufacturing and prototyping from the site where they are tested, industrial, economic, and performance advantages are gained by collocating ALRE manufacturing and prototyping within an aviation depot. The closure of NAWC Lakehurst will create efficiencies through the elimination of command and support structure and consolidation of critical aviation functions, and more fully utilizes the capacity and capabilities of major aviation depot activities. The estimated one-time cost to implement this recommendation is \$96.9 million, with annual recurring savings after implementation of \$37.2 million and a return on investment expected in three years. The net present value of the costs and savings over 20 years is a savings of \$358.7 million.

3. One of the alternative recommendations of the Laboratory Cross Service Group was to consolidate the Fixed Flight Subsystems ED work and the Fixed Flight Subsystems ISE work (now done at 9 separate bases) at the Naval Air Warfare Center at Lakehurst. Why were these recommendations made? And why were they not thoroughly explored?

**ANSWER:** The Laboratory Joint Cross-Service Group (LJCSG) was tasked to provide alternatives to the Military Departments to assist them in their analyses of Common Support Functions (CSFs). Laboratories typically are parts of larger installations, and CSFs represent only a portion of most labs' responsibilities. Therefore, the initial LJCSG recommendations had to be considered by the Military Departments in light of total installation activity (the alternative you reference was among those in this initial set). The LJCSG recognized that only a more macro approach would identify opportunities to eliminate infrastructure through cross-servicing and thus focused efforts on those areas where cross-servicing could be of most benefit. The LJCSG identified a priority set of alternatives for Military Department consideration. It was the intent of the LJCSG that the Military Departments place priority consideration on this set of macro alternatives. These alternatives included the Air Vehicles CSFs. Specifically, the priority alternative concerning Air Vehicles stated:

Air Vehicles: Both Laboratory and T&E JCSG alternatives retained considerable excess capacity for RDT&E of Air Vehicles. The Military Departments should analyze the consolidation of those laboratory activities and support functions that they are otherwise considering for realignment or closure, on core T&E installations at Edwards Air Force Base (AFB), CA or Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC), Patuxent River, MD (Fixed Wing Avionics, Flight Subsystems, and Structures); Arnold Engineering Development Center, TN (Propulsion); and Yuma Proving Ground, AZ (Rotary Wing support functions).

This alternative took into consideration the similarity of lab and developmental Test and Evaluation functions and facilities. Further, it recognized that lab functions can often be moved to T&E sites, while the open air range capacity, critical to T&E functions, cannot be moved to lab sites.

### **Questions submitted by Representative Scarborough**

1. The Board of Directors Report of February 1994 addressed the question of consolidating DoD Electronic Combat (EC) Open Air Ranges from three (Eglin, China Lake, and the Nellis complex) to two. The report cited clear financial and capability reasons for closing China Lake's EC open air range and leaving Eglin to complement the Nellis complex. In November 1994, T&E Joint Cross Service Group (JCSG) optimization model output results based upon JCSG-developed functional values, projected workload, and capabilities identified closing China Lake as the DoD alternative to analyze. Similar opportunities appear to exist in Armament/Weapons T&E. These JCSG results were developed by the most knowledgeable individuals in DoD on the T&E issue. It appears that cross-servicing alternatives involving these "core" T&E activities were ground ruled out. Why didn't DoD analyze these cross-service opportunities?

**ANSWER:** The Board of Directors Report referred to did not constitute certified data for purposes of BRAC, and therefore was not addressed by the JCSG for T&E.

After reviewing the initial recommendations of the working group that supported the Joint Cross Service Group on Test and Evaluation (JCSG/T&E), we (the JCSG/T&E Co-Chairs)

identified several alternatives that appeared to have the potential for further reducing excess capacity. These alternatives were identified without consideration of the potential cost of implementation. This alternative was one possible scenario that we identified for reducing excess capacity. That scenario was matched with an alternative scenario to relocate the testing and evaluation workload from Eglin AFB primarily to China Lake and other core sites. These scenarios were identified because the co-Chairmen of the JCSG felt that a significant level of excess capacity continued to exist, and that it was important that the services look at these additional scenarios to determine the cost and benefits of undertaking the added scenarios. Neither scenario was supported as a preferred scenario by the JCSG/T&E -- in fact it was not a foregone conclusion that either scenario would be more cost effective than the status quo even with its excess capacity. Nevertheless, we believed that, because the scenarios offered the potential for significant reductions to excess capacity, they deserved to be more fully analyzed by the services during the analysis and formulation (including costs) of their BRAC recommendations.

Cross-servicing alternatives for core sites were not, in fact, ground ruled out. Rather, the optimization modelling process was bounded by a number of "policy imperatives" established by the JCSG for T&E, one of which required the process to "Realign / consolidate capabilities, where cost effective, into existing Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB) Activities with open air ranges." Following the formulation of the JCSG's non-core site recommendations, the T&E JCSG co-Chairmen deemed it appropriate to consider still additional reductions in open air range excess capacity, and a series of core site alternatives was developed. One of these was the realignment of all the T&E missions from China Lake to Eglin, while another alternative was the realignment of Eglin's T&E workload primarily to China Lake or other core sites. These alternatives were provided to the Services for consideration in their respective BRAC processes.

2. The 1995 Defense Authorization bill prohibited DoD from spending any money to move Electronic Combat equipment from the Elgin range until DoD delivered an Electronic Combat Master Plan to the Congress. Considering this direction and the JCSG-cited superiority of the Eglin Electromagnetic Test Environment (EMTE) to all other DoD ranges evaluated, why has the Air Force chosen to dismantle the Eglin EMTE and replicate it in the Nellis complex, essentially eliminating forever the opportunity to consolidate DoD EC testing and realize the significant savings the JCSG identified?

**ANSWER:** The JCSG process did not judge the Eglin Electromagnetic Test Environment (EMTE) as "superior" to all other open air ranges. Neither did it identify significant savings to be realized by consolidating Electronic Combat (EC) testing at Eglin AFB. Eglin achieved a higher activity-level functional value for its overall (i.e. EMTE plus other facilities) capabilities to support EC testing workload. The optimization model was then used to realign workload from non-core sites to MRTFB facilities. Further, as addressed in Question 1, the JCSG co-Chairmen did identify a set of core site scenarios, including the consolidation of testing workload from China Lake primarily to Eglin AFB, as well as an alternative of realigning testing workload from Eglin primarily to China Lake. These were provided to the military departments for consideration during their processes.

The BRAC 95 recommendation to consolidate certain Electronic Combat test and evaluation activities, including realignment at Eglin AFB, were made pursuant to the requirements of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Section 2903. These recommendations, and the consequent elimination of underutilized infrastructure, are expected to generate a relatively high return on the front-end investment needed to implement the recommendations. Including this recommendation in the Secretary of Defense's recommendations to the Base Closure and Realignment Commission does not in itself involve the expenditure of FY95 or prior year funds for the relocation of equipment, and is therefore in compliance with the language of the "Report of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, National Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995." Further, the Department believes that making cost-effective recommendations is consistent with the FY1995 Appropriations Committee Report language requesting the Department to justify any Electronic Combat test facility consolidations on economic grounds.

### **Questions submitted by Representative Farr**

1. As the person responsible for operational testing in DoD, you state in your February 10, 1995 memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security (Economic Reinvestment & BRAC) that the recommendation to realign Fort Hunter Liggett is a "showstopper." Please explain.

**ANSWER:** To quote from our February 10, 1995 memorandum, our recommendation was that the "Army withdraw (its) proposal to move its test battalion from Fort Hunter-Liggett to Fort Bliss." Perhaps our use of the word "showstopper" was not the best choice. In the theater, a showstopper is applause that is so extended that it stops the show. This was not our meaning. Our memorandum was to convey our feeling that Fort Hunter-Liggett is an especially valuable asset, and that its inclusion on the BRAC list should not be recommended to the Secretary of Defense. Subsequent to our February 10 memorandum, I discussed my concerns with the Army. The Army expressed their view that the operational considerations raised by DOT&E were, in fact, considered in the Army's test planning. In addition, they pointed out that the size of the TEC mission is small and could be realized in the future outside of the BRAC process should the need arise. The recommendation also retains the land at Hunter-Liggett under Army control should the need arise to resume major testing there. I told the Army that I remained skeptical and concerned about the implications of this realignment for future Army testing capability.

2. We understand that there are conditions at Fort Hunter Liggett which enhance it as a site for performing operational testing. These include: a varied terrain, isolation, no artificial light contamination and no radio frequency interference. Do these conditions exist at Fort Bliss? If not, could they be created?

**ANSWER:** Fort Bliss does not have the quality of terrain, weather, foliage, lack of artificial light contamination, and freedom from radio frequency interference as Fort Hunter-Liggett provide a more realistic environment for Operational Test and Evaluation than that available at Fort Bliss. It would be impractical to "create" these features at Fort Bliss. Instead the testing capabilities from other Army test assets would be used in combination to approximate the

capabilities at Fort Hunter-Liggett. Also the Army proposal provides for future use of Fort Hunter-Liggett when required.

3. From a military value standpoint, is the "laser-safe bowl" (which allows for non-eye safe laser testing in an instrumented valley) at Fort Hunter Liggett a critical component of operational testing?

**ANSWER:** Yes, modern testing of military systems often involves firing lasers instead of actual bullets or missiles. These laser firings are "paired" with laser receptors on the intended targets to determine if a hit has taken place. Of course, this must be done with the utmost personnel safety. The natural bowl at Fort Hunter-Liggett provides an ideal setting for such tests. Laser firings are conducted at other DoD test ranges but with concomitant restrictions where natural protection is unavailable.

4. Do you think the instrumentation suite (used to monitor and record every player's activity during a test) could be duplicated at Fort Bliss? If so, would it be as effective?

**ANSWER:** For the right amount of money, the instrumentation at Fort Hunter-Liggett could be duplicated at Fort Bliss. If as good a job were done as has been done at Fort Hunter-Liggett, it could be as effective at Fort Bliss.

5. From a military value standpoint, is Fort Hunter Liggett essential to operational testing to DoD?

**ANSWER:** Military value was evaluated by the Services, not by the Joint Cross Service Groups (JCSG). Military value -- as determined by the Services -- was considered along with functional values -- determined by the JCSG's -- in the final Service recommendations. Recognizing the special value of Fort Hunter-Liggett, the Army has proposed to continue to test at Fort Hunter-Liggett on a campaign basis. My concern is that moving the test command to Fort Bliss could become a de facto closing from a testing point of view.

Just four years ago, in 1991, the Army consolidated testing activities at Fort Hunter-Liggett because of the higher costs of campaign-style operation. Accordingly, once having moved to Fort Bliss, the Army may find that it is too expensive to return to Fort Hunter-Liggett on a campaign basis.

#### **Questions submitted by Representative Hansen (to Dr. Coyle)**

1. Can you explain to the commission your position on the Army's recommendation to realign biological and chemical test and evaluation missions from Dugway Proving Grounds as outlined in the memorandum you signed dated February 10, 1995, to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security.

**ANSWER:** I believe that Dugway is a national asset, in that it is the one place where we currently can conduct comprehensive test and evaluation of chem/bio related items. The Army proposal is to retain this test capability at Dugway.

2. From a military value standpoint, do you feel it is essential to keep chemical, biological, and smoke/obscurant testing at Dugway Proving Grounds rather than moving these missions to Yuma Proving Ground or Aberdeen Maryland?

**ANSWER:** Military value is a service determination. Nevertheless, as stated in my previous response, I believe Dugway represents a national asset from a chem/bioT&E perspective. The Army recommendations retain this capability at Dugway.

3. Can you outline for the Commission the unique features of Dugway Proving Ground which cannot be replicated elsewhere?

**ANSWER:** Dugway Proving Ground is the only location where we currently can perform open air Chem/Bio simulant testing. No other DoD location has this mission.

4. In your memo dated February 10, 1995, you indicated that since Dugway conducted chem/bio testing for all of the services, that each of the services would have to sign-off and agree that their services' testing needs could still be met under the Army's recommendation for Dugway. To your knowledge, did the Department of Defense or the Army check with the other services prior to the final recommendation coming forward from the Army?

**ANSWER:** To the best of my knowledge, they have not. The Army BRAC operated within what they believe to be their authority as a Military Department and the public law regarding the BRAC process. The Army proposal retains the test capability at Dugway for all the Services.

**Questions submitted by Senators Mikulski and Sarbanes and Representative Wynn  
(To Dr. Coyle)**

1. During testimony before the Commission on March 1, General Shalikashvili expressed concerns about how the proposed closure of the Naval Surface Warfare Center at White Oak, Maryland, would affect the hypervelocity wind tunnel located there. Do you have similar concerns?

**ANSWER:** Yes, I do. I have recommended that the wind tunnel facility and a few other relatively unique capabilities at White Oak (e.g., the nuclear effects facility) should be considered to remain available to the DoD.

2. Is it your view that this wind tunnel must continue to stay in operation, either by the Navy, or some other agency, at White Oak or some other location.

**ANSWER:** We are interested in continued access to the facilities, but the location and ownership should be further considered by the BRAC. Our interest goes to the importance of the capability and how to retain it.

3. Just to clarify, the certified data call responses indicate that the US government has no other wind tunnel with the capabilities of the one at White Oak. Is this the case?

**ANSWER:** The T&E JCSG data call did not request data on all government wind tunnels. Our data call requested data on T&E facilities in three functional areas which were deemed to be common to the three Services. In their certified data submission, White Oak stated that "The combination of Mach number and altitude simulation, long run-times (0.25 to 15 seconds), and large size (5 foot diameter test section) make this facility unique and critical to the nation. There is no Navy, DoD, NASA or industry facility, existing or planned, which can approach Tunnel 9's capability." Considering all the information we have, both certified and uncertified, we have no basis for questioning that statement.

**Additional Questions submitted by Senators Mikulski and Sarbanes**

4. Were the hypervelocity wind tunnel and the nuclear weapons effects simulation facility at NSWC White Oak considered by the Test and Evaluation or Laboratory Joint Cross Service Groups?

**ANSWER:** The Laboratory Joint Cross Service Group did not consider these facilities. These facilities were also not considered by the JCSG for T&E as the certified data indicated that the amount of T&E workload performed was less than 5 percent which qualified as an exclusion from our process. Further, there was no duplication of capabilities apparent, based on certified data provided by the services. Consequently, the facilities were regarded as outside the scope of the JCSG (T&E) -- but within the scope of the Navy BRAC process.



1



ECONOMIC  
SECURITY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3300 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3300



November 23, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING  
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION  
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: 1995 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 95) -- Policy Memorandum Two --  
Joint Cross-Service Group Functional Analysis Process

This memorandum summarizes the process, involving both Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs) and the individual Military Departments, for developing BRAC alternatives in situations involving such common support functions as labs, depots, test & evaluation, undergraduate pilot training and medical facilities.

JCSGs will determine a functional value for each of the common support functions at each activity within their jurisdiction. These functional values will be independent of the military value of any installation, which is separately determined by the Military Departments. The assessments of functional value and assessments of functional capacity and requirements, using certified data, will then be incorporated into JCSG analyses of possible functional closure or realignment alternatives. The JCSG's (which include representatives from the Military Departments) will use their expertise and judgment to develop these functional closure or realignment alternatives.

To assist them as an analytic tool in this process, the JCSGs will use a linear programming optimization model (documentation attached) to the maximum extent possible. The model provides a basis for further analysis and the application of judgment in developing functional alternatives. While the model has value in assessing alternatives for relocations and consolidations of common support functions, it cannot by itself make recommendations regarding closures or realignments of installations. Those can be made only by the Military Departments or the BRAC 95 Review Group, reflecting judgment concerning the military value of installations, based on the final criteria and the six-year force structure plan.



Each JCSG is currently supported in its evaluations by a Joint Cross-Service Working Group (JCSWG), variously referred to as "sub-groups", "study teams" or "technical and support groups." JCSWGs will adapt the linear programming (optimization) model to assist each JCSG in its analysis and aid in developing alternatives. All JCSGs will be supported by a single Tri-Department BRAC Group consisting of representatives from each Military Department, which will execute runs of the linear programming (optimization) model, using certified data, according to the objective functions and policy imperatives provided by the JCSGs and the management controls required by the internal control plan. JCSG alternatives can be derived from any number of combinations of objective functions and policy imperatives as long as they have been previously approved by the Chairman of the BRAC 95 Steering Group.

The Military Departments will conduct their individual BRAC processes in parallel with the JCSG analyses, to determine the relative military value of their installations. JCSG products such as functional value may be used to assist in determining installation military value. If it is useful to a JCSG in developing its alternatives for analysis, a JCSG may solicit the guidance of the Military Departments concerning the military value of installations. It must be recognized that any such guidance must necessarily be preliminary and will not constitute a final determination of military value or of suitability for closure or realignment.

The JCSGs and the Military Departments will then review the sets of optimization model outputs. Working together, the JCSGs and the Military Departments will apply their collective judgment to develop feasible functional alternatives to facilitate cross-service actions that will strive to maximize infrastructure (overhead) reductions at minimal cost. This cooperative work by the JCSGs and the Military Departments should be completed in time for the BRAC 95 Review Group to consider any issues that may be appropriate and to leave sufficient time for the Military Departments to formulate their recommendations. The JCSGs and Military Departments will continue to interact during November and December as the Military Departments consider cross-service alternatives in their respective BRAC analytical processes.

The Military Departments will present their recommendations for closure and realignment to the Secretary of Defense no later than mid-February, 1995. The Military Departments will provide the Secretary of Defense a status report, to include all preliminary closure and realignment candidates, by January 3, 1995. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security will staff the Military Department recommendations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The BRAC 95 Review Group or OSD principals may solicit the opinion of or task the JCSG's during this period, if and as appropriate.

The process described above involves appropriate interaction between JCSG and Military Department analyses and permits consideration of joint functional alternatives to be incorporated within the existing BRAC process of the Military Departments. If you have questions concerning the process, please contact Mr. Robert Bayer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations, 703-697-1771.



Joshua Gotbaum

Attachment

# Joint Cross-Service Analysis Tool User's Guide

---

## Executive Summary

### Background

The Deputy Secretary of Defense established policy for the Department of Defense 1995 base realignment and closure (BRAC 95) process with strong emphasis on cross-service opportunities. This document describes operations and capabilities of the common analytical tool to assist Joint Cross-Service Groups (users) in the development of cross-service alternatives as part of the BRAC process.

### Analytical Tool

A standard tool often used to develop optimal solutions to complex allocation problems is the mixed-integer, linear program (MILP). The cross-service analysis of allocations of common support functional requirements to Military Department sites and activities is a complex allocation problem.

The MILP formulation described in this document can be used to develop cross-service functional alternatives. The data elements required for this tool are derived from the certified data available to the user. Policy imperatives and other constraints and considerations can be incorporated into the model to allow the tailoring of formulations to accommodate functional attributes and perspectives.

The tool provides the capability to vary the objective function for a formulation in order to obtain families of solutions. A solution defines a set of functional allocations and identification of sites or activities where cross-service functional workload could be assigned. An objective function that combines military value of sites and activities with functional values is discussed in this document. This particular objective function will tend to consolidate common support functions into high military value sites or activities. At the same time, this objective function will assign common support functions to sites having high functional values. The weighting between these two goals can be parameterized to obtain families of solutions for further consideration.

Second and third best alternatives for a given formulation can be obtained using methods described in this document. These alternatives may be considered as additions to the set for further review.

Other objective functions that the user may wish to consider in addition to the one mentioned above, include minimizing excess functional capacity, minimizing the total number of sites performing cross-service functions, and maximizing the sum of functional values. This tool will also allow the user to explore the sensitivity of the optimal solution for a given formulation to particular model inputs.

The MILP formulation described provides the basic analytical tool to generate cross-service functional alternatives.

## Contents

Section		Page
	Executive Summary	1
	User's Guide Organization	3
1	Analytical Methodology Overview	3
2	Data Elements	5
3	Optimization Formulations	5
4	Optimization Examples	10
5	Generating Alternatives	12
6	Optimization Software	13
Appendix		
A	AMPL Model Input File	A-1
B	AMPL Data Input File	B-1

---

## User's Guide Organization

This user's guide provides an overview of the analytical methodology in the next section. That section describes the products of the methodology and discusses terminology relating to what a *site or activity* is relative to a *function*.

Section 2 describes the basic data elements that are used in the methodology. Section 2 also discusses data elements in terms of what these elements are meant to represent.

The different optimization problem formulations that the user may choose to use to explore alternatives are discussed in section 3. These include finding a small set of high military value sites or activities that can perform the functional requirement, minimizing excess capacity, and minimizing the number of sites. All of these formulations are parameterized in such a way that the user can explore trade-offs between different factors, such as military value or excess capacity, and assignments of functional requirement based upon functional value. This section also discusses the incorporation of policy imperatives in the optimization problem formulations.

Section 4 demonstrates the application of each of these formulations to a notional set of data. Section 5 describes the methodology for obtaining the second and third best solutions to a given formulation. Finally, section 6 identifies the commercial software product that was used to solve the optimization example problems. Input files for this solver are included in the appendices.

---

## 1. Analytical Methodology Overview

The optimization formulations described in this document require a set of data elements as inputs. All of the formulations require a functional value and functional capacity for each site capable of performing that specific cross-service function. The DoD requirement for each cross-service function is needed. Some of the formulations will also require the military values for each site.

A preliminary formulation that allocates cross-service functional requirements based upon functional capacities and functional value will be conducted. The objective function of this formulation will assign the DoD requirement for each cross-service function to sites or activities having the highest functional value for each function. These assignments will only be constrained by the functional capacities at each site. This analysis will not require the military values for the sites.

The primary formulations optimize the assignment of cross-service functions based upon military values of sites, functional values, and capacities. These formulations are very flexible in that multiple objective functions and policy imperatives modeled as constraints may be used to explore different solutions.

A standard resource allocation tool comprises the core of this analytical approach. A standard tool used to find optimal solutions to complex allocation problems is the mixed-integer, linear program (MILP). Allocation of common support functional requirements to military department sites and activities subject to constraints is a complex allocation problem.


## Process Products

The following table lists the various products of the analytical approach defined in this document.

Process products	Description
Capacity analyses	Develop methodology to measure the capacity of a site or activity to perform a function. Use data call responses to calculate capacities.
Requirements analyses	For each function, develop methodology to estimate the out-year DoD requirement to perform the function. Calculate the required capacity and identify excess capacity reduction goals.
Functional value (FV) assessments	Develop measures and weights for assessing the value of performing a function at a site or an activity based upon data call responses. Provide FV for all appropriate functions and site/activity combinations.
Optimize functional requirement allocations (preliminary formulation)	Find the best allocation of functional requirements to sites or activities based solely upon functional capacities and functional values.
Optimize allocations of functional requirements to high military value sites or activities (primary formulations)	Develop solutions based upon the first three products, above, and policy imperatives. Solutions will be developed using the optimization formulations described later in this document as a tool to explore alternatives.

## Hierarchical Structure

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the departments, and other groups all use different terms to describe the various components of infrastructure that are to be considered by the users. In this document a *site* refers to an installation, base, or station. An *activity* refers to a component of the site such as depot or test facility residing on the site. A site may have one or more activities. A *function* is the capability to perform a particular support action or produce a particular commodity. A common support function is a function. An activity includes a collection of functions. For example, a depot (an activity) may repair engines and airframes. These would be two functions performed at this activity. A function may be further broken down into subfunctions or facilities required to perform functions, but the approach described here does not consider the subfunctions or facilities. Subfunctions or facilities can be incorporated into the process described here if the appropriate data is available. The following diagram illustrates this hierarchical structure.



## 2. Data Elements

The analytical approach assumes that the following data will be available for all of the sites and functions:

Data Elements	Description
$mv_s$	Military value of site $s$ expressed as 3 (high), 2 (medium), or 1 (low).
$fv_{sf}$	Functional value for performing function $f$ at site/activity $s$ expressed as a number from 0 (low) to 100 (high).
$cap_{sf}$	Capacity of site/activity $s$ to perform function $f$ .
$req_f$	The total DoD requirement or goal to perform function $f$ .

The military value of a site,  $mv_s$ , should measure the overall value of the site.

The  $fv_{sf}$  functional value for performing function  $f$  at site (or activity)  $s$  measures the capability and quality of performing work of type  $f$  at site (or activity)  $s$ . Capacity to perform a specialized subfunction that is not one of the functions called out in the formulation can be considered in calculating functional value.

## 3. Optimization Formulations

The mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model formulations, that are described below, serve as the basic analytical tools to assist users in the development of cross-service alternatives, allow for modification of formulations, and incorporation of policy imperatives.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>A *policy imperative* is a statement that restricts the solutions that are acceptable and that can be modeled as a constraint in the formulation. An example of a policy imperative is included in one of the examples.



## Preliminary Formulation.

The preliminary formulation of the optimization problem will be solved once the initial data ( $fv_{sf}$ ,  $cap_{sf}$ ,  $req_f$ ) are available. This formulation, called **MAXFV** will maximize the functional values weighted by the assigned workload and normalized by the functional requirement. No constraints other than the functional capacities at each site and the requirement to meet the DoD requirement for each cross-service function are included in this formulation. This solution will serve as a baseline of what is possible if no other factors, such as military values of sites or costs, are considered.

For each function, this formulation will load as much of the functional DoD requirement as it can into the site or activity having the highest functional value for that function. If that site or activity does not have the capacity to accommodate the full requirement, the site or activity having the next highest functional value will be allocated any remaining requirement up to its capacity, and so on.

The mathematical description of this formulation follows:

$$\text{Maximize } \sum_{s \in S} \sum_{f \in F} l_{sf} \times fv_{sf} / req_f$$

subject to:

$$\sum_{s \in S} l_{sf} = req_f : \text{ for all functions } f \in F,$$

$$l_{sf} \leq k_{sf} \times cap_{sf} : \text{ for all sites } s \in S \text{ and } f \in F,$$

$$o_s \leq \sum_{f \in F} k_{sf} : \text{ for all sites } s \in S,$$

$$k_{sf} \leq o_s : \text{ for all sites } s \in S \text{ and } f \in F,$$

$$k_{sf} \leq \frac{l_{sf}}{\alpha \times cap_{sf}} : \text{ for all functions } f \in F \text{ and sites } s \in S,$$

$$0 \leq o_s \leq 1, \text{ integer} : \text{ for all sites } s \in S,$$

$$0 \leq k_{sf} \leq 1, \text{ integer} : \text{ for all sites } s \in S \text{ and functions } f \in F;$$

where

$S =$  The set of all sites under consideration by joint cross-service groups;

$F =$  The set of all functions under consideration by joint cross-service groups;

$o_s =$  1 if any functional requirement is assigned to the site, and 0 otherwise;

$\alpha =$  0.01. No assignment of less than one percent of capacity will be allowed.

### Decision variable

$l_{sf} =$  amount of the DoD requirement for function  $f$  to be assigned to site  $s$ .

$k_{sf} =$  1 if any amount of function  $f$  is assigned to site  $s$ , 0 otherwise.

The  $o_s$  variables are included in this formulation only to keep count of the number of sites that actually have some functional requirement assigned to them. Their inclusion in the model does not affect the assignment of the functional requirement to sites or activities. The two constraints involving the  $o_s$  variables are used to ensure that these variables are set to the correct values.

The  $k_{sf}$  variables that are structural variables that indicate whether or not any functional workload of type  $f$  has been assigned to site  $s$ . The  $\alpha$  parameter can be used to prevent small functional workload assignments. If  $\alpha$  is set to 0.01, then the minimum workload assignment of a function to a site, given that any functional workload for this function is made to this site, would be one percent of that site's capacity to perform that function. The  $\alpha$  parameter may be adjusted as required to meet the requirements of the particular user.

### Primary Formulations

These formulations explore potential cross-service functional alternatives. The basic formulation is shown below. Specification of the objective function,  $f(o_s, l_{if}, k_{uh})$ , will create a different optimization problem.

Minimize  $f(o_s, l_{if}, k_{uh})$

$o_s, l_{if}, k_{uh}$

subject to

$$\sum_{s \in S} l_{sf} = req_f : \text{for all functions } f \in F,$$

$$o_s \leq \sum_{f \in F} k_{sf} : \text{for all sites } s \in S,$$

$$0 \leq l_{sf} \leq k_{sf} \times cap_{sf} : \text{for all functions } f \in F \text{ and sites } s \in S,$$

$$k_{sf} \leq o_s : \text{for all sites } s \in S \text{ and } f \in F,$$

$$k_{sf} \leq \frac{l_{sf}}{\alpha \times cap_{sf}} : \text{for all functions } f \in F \text{ and sites } s \in S,$$

$$0 \leq o_s \leq 1, \text{ integer} : \text{for all sites } s \in S,$$

$$0 \leq k_{sf} \leq 1, \text{ integer} : \text{for all sites } s \in S \text{ and functions } f \in F,$$

where

- $S =$  The set of all sites under consideration by joint cross-service groups;
- $F =$  The set of all functions under consideration by joint cross-service groups;
- $\alpha =$  0.01. No assignment of less than one percent of capacity will be allowed.

### Decision variables

- $o_s =$  1 if any cross-service functional requirements are assigned to the site or activity, 0 otherwise;
- $l_{sf} =$  amount of the DoD requirement for function  $f$  to be assigned to site or activity  $s$ .

$k_{sf} =$  1 if any DoD requirement for function  $f$  is to be assigned to site  $s$ , 0 otherwise.

Three different optimization formulations that vary only in the specification of the objective function are discussed next.

**The MINNMV Formulation.** This formulation will find a small number of sites having the highest military value that can accommodate the DoD required workload. In addition, it will assign the DoD requirement for each cross-service function to the retained sites (or activities) having the highest functional value for that function. The purpose of this formulation is to assign, to the extent possible, the cross-service functional requirements to sites or activities having high military value and high functional values. The rationale for this approach is that sites having high military value are the ones most likely to be retained by the military departments. The objective function for this formulation is as follows:

$$\text{Minimize } f(o_s, l_{ig}, k_{sf}) = \left(\frac{w}{u_1}\right) \times \sum_{s \in S} o_s \times nmv_s - \left(\frac{100-w}{u_2}\right) \times \sum_{i \in S} \sum_{g \in F} l_{ig} \times fv_{ig}/req_g$$

$o_s, l_{ig}$

where

$0 \leq w \leq 100$       Weight parameter used to vary the emphasis between military value and functional value,

$u_1 \geq 0, u_2 \geq 0$        $u_1 = \sum_{s \in S} (4 - mv_s), u_2 = \sum_{f \in F} \max_{s \in S} fv_{sf}$

$nmv_s =$                $4 - mv_s.$

This formulation will be referred to as the **MINNMV** model since it minimizes the sum of  $4 - mv_s$  for retained sites or activities. Site or activities having a high military value (3) will have 1 as their value. Site or activities with low military value (1) will have 3 as their value.

The parameters  $u_1$  and  $u_2$  are used to scale the two components of the objective function. Scaling the components of the objective function enhances the ability of the solver to find a solution. Apart from the weight parameters, these scaling parameters will scale the components of the objective function to values near 1.0 .

The weight parameter,  $w$ , can be varied to change the emphasis the formulation gives to military value versus functional value. If  $w = 0$ , this formulation matches the preliminary formulation (**MAXFV**) as site military value would have zero weight. Conversely, if  $w$  is set to a large value ( $w = 99$ ), functional value would have little weight. The **MAXFV** and **MINNMV** formulations are the same formulation, only differing in the parameter  $w$  . Varying  $w$  in the formulation allows the model to be used to create a family of solutions. These points are illustrated by an example in the next section.

The component of the objective function that addresses military value of sites,  $\sum_{s \in S} o_s \times nmv_s = \sum_{s \in S} o_s \times (4 - mv_s)$ , affects the optimal solution as follows. (For this discussion we will ignore the functional value component of the objective function,  $-\sum_{i \in S} \sum_{g \in F} l_{ig} \times fv_{ig}/req_g$  .) If there were no constraints in the formulation, i.e., satisfy the DoD requirement, the minimum value of the objective function would be achieved by setting

$o_s = 0$  for all sites since  $4 - mv_s \geq 1$  for all sites. Given that some sites have to be open, all else being equal, it is better to open a site with  $mv_s = 3$  because it increases the objective function by the least amount.

**The MINXCAP Formulation.** If the parameter  $w$  is set to a large value ( $w = 99$ ), this problem formulation will find the set of retained sites having the smallest total functional capacity but still able to perform the DoD functional requirement. Depending on  $w$ , functional assignments are also optimized. The objective function for this formulation is:

$$\text{Minimize } f(o_s, l_{ig}, k_{uh}) = \left(\frac{w}{u_1}\right) \times \sum_{s \in S} o_s \times \left(\sum_{f \in F} cap_{sf}/req_f\right) - \left(\frac{100-w}{u_2}\right) \times \sum_{i \in S} \sum_{g \in F} l_{ig} \times fv_{ig}/req_g$$

$o_s, l_{ig}, k_{uh}$

If  $w = 0$ , this formulation, like the MINNMV formulation, is also equivalent to the MAXFV formulation. If  $w$  is set to a large value, excess capacity is reduced as much as possible without regard to functional values. As in the MINNMV formulation,  $u_1$  and  $u_2$  are used to scale the components of the objective function. For this formulation  $u_1 = \sum_{s \in S} \sum_{f \in F} cap_{sf}/req_f$ . The other scale parameter  $u_2$  is set to the same value for all formulations.

**The MINSITES Formulation.** This formulation, depending on the value of  $w$ , will find the minimum-sized set of site or activities that can perform the DoD functional requirement. As in the previous formulations, if  $w = 0$ , this formulation is also equivalent to MAXFV. The objective function for this formulation is given by:

$$\text{Minimize } f(o_s, l_{ig}, k_{uh}) = \left(\frac{w}{u_1}\right) \times \sum_{s \in S} o_s - \left(\frac{100-w}{u_2}\right) \times \sum_{i \in S} \sum_{g \in F} l_{ig} \times fv_{ig}/req_g$$

$o_s, l_{ig}, k_{uh}$

If  $w$  is set to a large value, the cross-service functional workload is assigned to the smallest possible number of sites regardless of functional values. For this formulation  $u_1 = |S|$ , the number of sites in the set  $S$ .

**The MAXSFV formulation.** This formulation maximizes the sum of the functional values for all of the retained sites. The objective function for this formulation is given by:

$$\text{Maximize } f(o_s, l_{ig}, k_{uh}) = \left(\frac{w}{u_1}\right) \times \sum_{s \in S} (o_s \times \sum_{f \in F} fv_{sf}) + \left(\frac{100-w}{u_2}\right) \times \sum_{i \in S} \sum_{g \in F} l_{ig} \times fv_{ig}/req_g$$

$o_s, l_{ig}, k_{uh}$

For this formulation  $u_1 = \sum_{f \in F} \sum_{s \in S} fv_{sf}$ . If the number of sites to be retained is not constrained, all of the sites will be retained in the solution since the objective function is maximized when  $o_s = 1$  for all sites. Obtaining meaningful results with this formulation, therefore, requires a constraint on the number of sites retained.

## Policy Imperatives

A policy imperative is any statement that can be formulated as a constraint in the model. The model described here is very flexible in its capacity to handle imperatives. Examples of imperatives that can be modeled include:

- assigning functions in groups,
- increasing the average DoD military value of the sites assigned any cross-service functional workload,
- requiring the weighted functional value for a given common support function to be at least as great as some value,
- limiting the number of sites that have any cross-service functional workload assigned to them,
- requiring that each department's average military value is not allowed to go below some level,
- requiring a certain number of sites in a geographic area to remain open, and
- requiring the distribution of functional workload to follow a certain pattern, e.g., in one department, in one location, or on both coasts.

This is not an exhaustive list of the possibilities for policy imperatives. An example of a policy imperative added to the MINNMV formulation is given in the following section.

### Consistent Alternatives

The functional data and constraints from all of the users may be combined into a single formulation. In the event that two users obtain solutions that are inconsistent (e.g., the solutions have a site or activity receiving cross-service functional workload in one, and losing all of its cross-service functional workload in the other) this capability can be used to resolve the inconsistency.

---

## 4. Optimization Examples

The following examples use representative, notional data to demonstrate the formulations. Three different departments, X, Y, and Z, each have 5 sites (A, B, C, D, and E). Six functions are considered: air vehicles, munitions, electronic combat, fixed-wing avionics, conventional missiles and rockets, and satellites. Table 1 shows the basic data for these sites. Table 1 also shows the DoD requirement by function and the percent of excess capacity. Percent excess capacity is calculated as

$$100 \times \left( \frac{\sum_{s \in S} cap_{sj}}{req_j} - 1 \right).$$

### Preliminary Formulation (MAXFV).

Results for the MAXFV formulation are shown in table 2. If there is no functional requirement assigned to a site, the capacity for that function is shown as zero at that site even if the site has requirements for other functions assigned. Notice that, for this solution, *all sites have some cross-service functional workload assigned.*

The column in table 2 labeled *Wgt FV* shows the weighted functional value for each function. *Wgt FV* for function  $f \in F = \frac{\sum_{j \in S} f_{ij} \times req_{ij}}{\sum_{j \in S} req_{ij}}$ . *Wgt FV* is an indicator of the quality of the cross-service allocation of the functional requirement across all sites and activities. The average *FV*, the weighted average *FV*, and the weighted percent excess capacity are also shown in the table. These three numbers are gross measures of the quality of the solution.

### Primary Formulation (MINNMV).

Table 3 shows the data for the optimal solution to the **MINNMV** formulation with  $w = 99$ . The number of sites having cross-service functional workload assigned has been reduced from 15 to six. Excess capacity is greatly reduced. The weighted percent excess capacity is only 31 percent compared to 60 for the **MAXFV** formulation. The DoD military value average is increased by 28.8 percent. The military value averages for the two departments with any sites retained have both been increased. The weighted functional value scores are not as good as the scores obtained from the **MAXFV** formulation. The average *FV* score is almost 14 points lower than for the **MAXFV** formulation.

### Primary Formulation (MINNMV) with Policy Imperative

As an example of a policy imperative, consider the following. Suppose the user responsible for the missile function determines that only two sites should perform the conventional missiles and rockets function. The optimal solution to the original **MINNMV** formulation assigned the missile function to four different sites. Modifying the **MINNMV** formulation such that only two sites are allowed to perform the missile function results in the solution shown in table 4. The optimal solution still requires only six sites to perform the cross-service functions, but the sites are different. Only four of the sites are common to both solutions. Since the model has an additional constraint, the average military value has decreased compared to the original **MINNMV** formulation.

### Parameterization of the MINNMV Formulation

Table 5 summarizes the results of varying the parameter  $w$  in the **MINNMV** formulation over the values 0, 2, 3, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 60, and 99. As is to be expected, the number of sites and activities with cross-service functional workload assigned and weighted functional value decrease as  $w$  increases. The average military value generally increases as  $w$  increases. Though these results pertain only to this particular example, they clearly illustrate qualitative differences between the **MAXFV** and **MINNMV** formulations. The optimal solutions to the formulation do not change as  $w$  varies over the range of 60 to 99.

This example illustrates how the parameter  $w$  can be used to generate a family of cross-service functional solutions. For instance, a user with table 5 before him could decide that from this family of solutions, the solution obtained by setting  $w = 20$  is worth exploring further since the weighted functional values are very close to the best values obtained in the **MAXFV** formulation and the weighted average percent excess capacity has been reduced from 60 to 17 percent. Table 6 displays the full output from this formulation.

Figure 1 displays this information in graphical form. The figure shows the sharp decrease in the average functional value for conventional missiles and rockets when  $w$  is changed from 20 to 30. The figure also displays the increase in average military value that is achieved by using the MINNMV formulation.

### Primary Formulation (MINXCAP)

Table 7 shows the output of the MINXCAP formulation with  $w = 99$ . As would be expected, this formulation produces a solution that greatly reduces excess capacity, but the weighted functional values have suffered. The weighted average percent excess capacity has been reduced to almost 6 percent.

### Primary Formulation (MINSITES)

The results of using the MINSITES formulation with  $w = 99$  are given in table 8. The optimal solution retains only six sites. The sites are different than the sites retained in the MINNMV solution.

### Primary Formulation (MAXSFV)

The results of using the MAXSFV formulation with the number of retained sites constrained to be no more than six are displayed in table 9.

### Summary of Formulation Results

The following table summarizes the basic statistics for the five formulations.

Statistics	MAXFV	MINNMV	MINXCAP	MINSITES	MAXSFV
Sites retained	15	6	7	6	6
Weighted avg. percent excess capacity	60.37	31.39	6.11	12.14	24.1
Weighted average FV	84.7	73.9	74.2	76.5	62.9
Average military value	2.2	2.83	2	2.67	2.67

## 5. Generating Alternatives

Alternative solutions, in terms of the retained sites or activities, may be obtained by excluding a set of retained or open sites from a formulation. For example, the optimal solution obtained from the MINNMV formulation (see table 3) retains sites XA, XC, XD, ZA, ZB, and ZD. To find another optimal solution with the same objective function value or the next best solution, we define the set  $\Delta_1 = \{XA, XC, XD, ZA, ZB, ZD\}$  and add the following constraints to the MINNMV formulation:

$$\sum_{j \in \Delta_1} o_j \leq |\Delta_1| - \alpha \text{ (condition 1)}$$

$$\sum_{j \in S - \Delta_1} o_j \geq \beta \text{ (condition 2)}$$

$$\alpha + \beta \geq 1$$

$$\alpha = 0, 1 \text{ and } \beta = 0, 1.$$

A solution that satisfies either condition 1 ( $\alpha = 1$ ) or condition 2 ( $\beta = 1$ ) will be different from the original optimal solution. The formulation given above guarantees that at least one of these two conditions will hold at the optimal solution. The second best solution to the MINNMV formulation is given in table 10. The second-best solution retains sites XC, XD, YC, ZA, ZB, ZD. This solution actually has weighted functional values that are superior to those of the original optimal solution for some of the functions. Comparing values in tables 3 and 10, it would be difficult to argue that the optimal solution is clearly superior to the solution given in table 10.

If we define the set  $\Delta_2 = \{XC, XD, YC, ZA, ZB, ZD\}$ , then the following formulation can be used to find the third best solution:

$$\sum_{j \in \Delta_1 \cap \Delta_2} o_j \leq |\Delta_1 \cap \Delta_2| - \alpha \text{ (condition 1)}$$

$$\sum_{j \in \Delta_1 \cap \Delta_2} o_j \geq \beta \text{ (condition 2)}$$

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \sum_{j \in \Delta_1 - \Delta_2} o_j \geq \gamma \\ \sum_{j \in \Delta_2 - \Delta_1} o_j \geq \gamma \end{array} \right\} \text{ (condition 3)}$$

$$\alpha + \beta + \gamma \geq 1$$

$$\alpha = 0, 1, \beta = 0, 1, \text{ and } \gamma = 0, 1.$$

Any solution that satisfies any one of the three conditions will be different from the first two solutions. Table 11 shows the third best solution. Comparing table 11 to tables 3 and 10 results in a less compelling case for the strength of the third best alternative. Based upon this type of comparison, the first two solutions would be subjected to further analysis before selecting one as a recommendation.

---

## 6. Optimization Software

The solutions to these optimization problems were obtained using the commercially-available, IBM Optimization Subroutine Library (OSL)<sup>2</sup> interfaced with AMPL<sup>3</sup>. The text file describing these formulations in the AMPL format is contained in appendix A. Note that all of the different objective functions are defined in this single text file. This file contains the code required to generate the second and third best alternatives. The AMPL-format data file for the

---

<sup>2</sup>Optimization with OSL by Ming S. Hung, Walter O. Rom, and Allan D. Waren, published by The Scientific Press.

<sup>3</sup>AMPL: A Modeling Language for Mathematical Programming by Robert Fourer, David M. Gay, and Brian Kernighan, published by The Scientific Press, 1993.



example is given in appendix B. These files are processed by the AMPL/OSL package to produce the outputs discussed in the examples section of this document.

**Table 1. Joint Cross-Service Analysis Example  
Basic Data**

Function	Department															Totals
	X					Y					Z					
	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	
<b>Capacities</b>																
Air vehicles	450	7000	2500	0	0	5000	500	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	2857	0	22,507
Munitions	850	200	4500	0	0	300	0	2000	0	0	1000	0	1000	0	0	9,850
Electronic combat	3000	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	1543	20	7,563
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	250	3500	0	0	0	400	3500	0	1000	4000	0	2000	500	15,150
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	3000	0	0	200	100	2000	3000	700	200	300	200	9,900
Satelites	0	0	300	4000	0	0	0	500	0	0	250	50	0	300	2200	7,600
<b>Function FV Scores</b>																
Air vehicles	50	70	68	0	0	57	72	0	0	0	81	92	0	86	0	
Munitions	88	71	58	0	0	54	0	88	0	0	72	0	75	0	0	
Electronic combat	67	0	0	0	0	91	0	0	0	0	52	0	0	78	77	
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	92	94	0	0	0	78	69	0	72	93	0	68	71	
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	62	0	89	0	0	59	93	92	56	59	50	65	91	
Satelites	0	0	71	58	0	0	0	64	0	0	85	61	0	73	93	
<b>Department Military Value</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	

Function	DoD req.	Pct. excess
Air vehicles	9,463	137.8
Munitions	5,503	79.0
Electronic combat	3,234	133.9
Fixed-wing avionics	3,775	301.3
Conv. missiles/rockets	3,743	164.5
Satelites	2,480	206.5

Table 2. MAXFV Model Output

Function	Department															Retained totals	Percent excess
	X					Y					Z						
	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E		
Retain=1, Close=0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	15	
Department Mil. Val.	3	3	3	2	1	2	1	3	2	1	3	3	2	3	1		
<b>Capacities</b>																	
Air vehicles	0	7000	0	0	0	0	500	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	2857	0	14557	53.8
Munitions	850	200	4500	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	1000	0	1000	0	0	9550	73.5
Electronic combat	3000	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1543	20	5563	72.0
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	3500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4000	0	0	0	7500	98.7
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	0	0	3000	0	0	0	100	2000	0	0	0	0	200	5300	41.6
Satelites	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	250	0	0	300	2200	2750	10.9
																<b>Wgt. avg.</b>	<b>60.37</b>
<b>Workload assigned</b>																<b>Totals</b>	
Air vehicles	0	1906	0	0	0	0	500	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	2857	0	9463	
Munitions	850	200	453	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	1000	0	1000	0	0	5503	
Electronic combat	671	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1543	20	3234	
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	3500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	275	0	0	0	3775	
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	0	0	1443	0	0	0	100	2000	0	0	0	0	200	3743	
Satelites	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	250	0	0	30	2200	2480	
Department avg. MV			2.4					1.8					2.4				
Percent change			-0.0					0.0					-0.0				
DoD average MV								2.20									
Percent change								0.0									

DoD weighted FVs	
Function	Wgt FV
Air vehicles	81.2
Munitions	79.6
Electronic combat	79.7
Fixed-wing avionics	93.9
Conv. missiles/rockets	90.8
Satelites	92.0
Average FV	86.2
Weighted avg. FV	84.7

Table 3. MINNMV Model Output

Function	Department															Retained totals	Percent excess
	X					Y					Z						
	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E		
Retain=1, Close=0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	6	
Department Mil. Val.	3	3	3	2	1	2	1	3	2	1	3	3	2	3	1		
<b>Capacities</b>																	
Air vehicles	0	0	2500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	2857	0	9557	1.0
Munitions	850	0	4500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	6350	15.4
Electronic combat	3000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1543	0	4543	40.5
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	3500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4000	0	0	0	7500	98.7
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	700	0	300	0	4200	12.2
Satellites	0	0	300	4000	0	0	0	0	0	0	250	50	0	300	0	4900	97.6
																<b>Wgt. avg.</b>	<b>31.39</b>
<b>Workload assigned</b>																<b>Totals</b>	
Air vehicles	0	0	2406	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	2857	0	9463	
Munitions	850	0	3653	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	5503	
Electronic combat	1691	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1543	0	3234	
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	3500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	275	0	0	0	3775	
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2543	700	0	300	0	3743	
Satellites	0	0	300	1580	0	0	0	0	0	0	250	50	0	300	0	2480	
Department avg. MV			2.7					0.0					3.0				
Percent change			11.1					-100.0					25.0				
DoD average MV								2.83									
Percent change								28.8									

DoD weighted FVs	
Function	Wgt FV
Air vehicles	80.6
Munitions	65.2
Electronic combat	72.2
Fixed-wing avionics	93.9
Conv. missiles/rockets	57.6
Satellites	64.2
Average FV	72.3
Weighted avg. FV	73.9

Table 4. MINNMV Model with Policy Iterative Output

Function	Department															Retained totals
	X					Y					Z					
	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	
Retain=1, Close=0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	6
Department Mil. Val.	3	3	3	2	1	2	1	3	2	1	3	3	2	3	1	
<b>Capacities</b>	0	7000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	0	0	2857	0	12857
Air vehicles	0	200	4500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	5700
Munitions	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	1543	0	3543
Electronic combat	0	0	250	3500	0	0	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	4750
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	0	3000	0	0	0	0	0	3000	0	0	0	0	6000
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	300	4000	0	0	0	0	0	0	250	0	0	300	0	4850
Satellites																
<b>Workload assigned</b>	0	3606	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	0	0	2857	0	9463
Air vehicles	0	200	4300	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	5503
Munitions	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1691	0	0	1543	0	3234
Electronic combat	0	0	250	3500	0	0	0	0	0	0	25	0	0	0	0	3775
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	0	3000	0	0	0	0	0	743	0	0	0	0	3743
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	300	1630	0	0	0	0	0	0	250	0	0	300	0	2480
Satellites																
Department avg. MV			2.3					0.0					3.0			
Percent change			-6.3					-100.0					25.0			
<b>DoD average MV</b>																<b>Wgt. avg.</b>
Percent change																33.70
Totals																9463
																5503
																3234
																3775
																3743
																2480

Percent excess


2.50  
13.6

DoD weighted FVs		Wgt FV
Function	Wgt FV	
Air vehicles	78.3	
Munitions	61.0	
Electronic combat	64.4	
Fixed-wing avionics	93.7	
Conv. missiles/rockets	82.4	
Satellites	64.1	
Average FV	74.0	
Weighted avg. FV	74.7	

Table 5. Parameterization of the MINNMV Model

	Percent of weight on FV									
	0 MAXFV	2	3	5	10	20	30	40	60	99 MINNMV
<b>Sites/activities open</b>	15	13	12	11	9	8	7	6	6	6
<b>Percent excess</b>										
Air vehicles	53.8	48.5	48.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Munitions	73.5	73.5	73.5	69.9	51.7	51.7	51.7	15.4	15.4	15.4
Electronic combat	72.0	72.0	72.0	72.0	72.0	41.1	41.1	41.1	40.5	40.5
Fixed-wing avionics	98.7	98.7	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	98.7	98.7
Conv. missiles/rockets	41.6	38.9	38.9	38.9	4.2	4.2	22.9	17.6	12.2	12.2
Satellites	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	97.6	97.6
<b>Wgt. avg. % excess</b>	<b>60.37</b>	<b>58.24</b>	<b>45.83</b>	<b>29.16</b>	<b>21.00</b>	<b>17.46</b>	<b>19.94</b>	<b>12.14</b>	<b>31.39</b>	<b>31.39</b>
<b>Weighted FV</b>										
Air vehicles	81.2	81.1	81.1	80.6	80.6	80.6	80.6	80.6	80.6	80.6
Munitions	79.6	79.6	79.6	79.2	76.1	76.1	76.1	65.2	65.2	65.2
Electronic combat	79.7	79.7	79.7	79.7	79.7	72.3	72.3	72.3	72.2	72.2
Fixed-wing avionics	93.9	93.9	93.0	93.0	93.0	93.0	93.0	93.0	93.9	93.9
Conv. missiles/rockets	90.8	90.7	90.7	90.7	85.4	85.4	59.6	59.5	57.6	57.6
Satellites	92.0	92.0	92.0	92.0	92.0	92.0	92.0	92.0	64.2	64.2
<b>Average FV</b>	<b>86.2</b>	<b>86.2</b>	<b>86.0</b>	<b>85.9</b>	<b>84.5</b>	<b>83.2</b>	<b>78.9</b>	<b>77.1</b>	<b>72.3</b>	<b>72.3</b>
<b>Weighted avg. FV</b>	<b>84.7</b>	<b>84.6</b>	<b>84.5</b>	<b>84.2</b>	<b>82.9</b>	<b>82.1</b>	<b>78.6</b>	<b>76.5</b>	<b>73.9</b>	<b>73.9</b>
<b>DoD average MV</b>	<b>2.20</b>	<b>2.31</b>	<b>2.33</b>	<b>2.27</b>	<b>2.44</b>	<b>2.50</b>	<b>2.71</b>	<b>2.67</b>	<b>2.83</b>	<b>2.83</b>

Figure 1. Parameterization of MINNMV



Number of sites open are shown as labels on the excess capacity plot.

- ▲ Avg. percent excess capacity
- Average military value
- x- Average FV
- x Missile/rocket FV

Table 6. MINNMV Model Output with Weight = 20

Function	Department															Retained totals	Percent excess
	X					Y					Z						
	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E		
Retain=1, Close=0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	8	
Department Mil. Val.	3	3	3	2	1	2	1	3	2	1	3	3	2	3	1		
<b>Capacities</b>																	
Air vehicles	0	0	2500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	2857	0	9557	1.0
Munitions	850	0	4500	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	8350	51.7
Electronic combat	3000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1543	20	4563	41.1
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4000	0	0	0	4000	6.0
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	3000	0	0	200	0	0	0	0	0	300	200	3900	4.2
Satelites	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	250	0	0	300	2200	2750	10.9
																<b>Wgt. avg.</b>	<b>17.46</b>
<b>Workload assigned</b>																<b>Totals</b>	
Air vehicles	0	0	2406	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	2857	0	9463	
Munitions	850	0	1653	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	5503	
Electronic combat	1671	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1543	20	3234	
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3775	0	0	0	3775	
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	3000	0	0	43	0	0	0	0	0	300	200	3743	
Satelites	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	250	0	0	30	2200	2480	
Department avg. MV			2.3					3.0					2.5				
Percent change			-2.8					66.7					4.2				
DoD average MV								2.50									
Percent change								13.6									

DoD weighted FVs	
Function	Wgt FV
Air vehicles	80.6
Munitions	76.1
Electronic combat	72.3
Fixed-wing avionics	93.0
Conv. missiles/rockets	85.4
Satelites	92.0
Average FV	83.2
Weighted avg. FV	82.1



Table 7. MINXCAP Model Output

Function	Department															Retained totals
	X					Y					Z					
	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	
Retain=1, Close=0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	7
Department Mil. Val.	3	3	3	2	1	2	1	3	2	1	3	3	2	3	1	
Capacities	450	0	2500	0	0	5000	500	0	0	0	0	1200	0	0	0	9650
Air vehicles	850	0	4500	0	0	300	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5650
Munitions	3000	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	4020
Electronic combat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4000	0	0	0	4000
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	200	0	3000	0	0	0	0	0	0	700	0	0	200	4100
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	300	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2200	2500
Satellites																
Workload assigned	283	0	2500	0	0	5000	500	0	0	0	0	1200	0	0	0	9463
Air vehicles	850	0	4500	0	0	153	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5503
Munitions	2214	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	3234
Electronic combat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3775	0	0	0	3775
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	200	0	3000	0	0	0	0	0	0	343	0	0	200	3743
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	280	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2200	2480
Satellites																
Department avg. MV			2.3					1.5					2.0			
Percent change			-2.8					-18.7					-18.7			
Wgt. avg.																6.11
Totals																

Percent excess  
2.0  
2.7  
24.3  
6.0  
9.5  
0.8

DoD average MV  
Percent change

2.00  
-8.1

Function	Wgt FV
Air vehicles	64.9
Munitions	62.5
Electronic combat	74.5
Fixed-wing avionics	93.0
Conv. missiles/rockets	84.9
Satellites	90.5
Average FV	78.4
Weighted avg. FV	74.2

Table 8. MINSITES Model Output

Function	Department															Retained totals
	X					Y					Z					
	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	
Retain=1, Close=0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	6
Department Mil. Val.	3	3	3	2	1	2	1	3	2	1	3	3	2	3	1	
<b>Capacities</b>	0	0	2500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	2857	0	9557
Air vehicles	850	0	4500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	6350
Munitions	3000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1543	20	0	4563
Electronic combat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4000	0	0	0	4000
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	200	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	700	0	300	200	4400
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	250	0	0	300	2200	2750
Satellites	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Workload assigned</b>	0	0	2406	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	2857	0	9463
Air vehicles	850	0	3653	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	5503
Munitions	1671	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1543	20	0	3234
Electronic combat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3775	0	0	0	3775
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	200	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2343	700	0	300	200	3743
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	250	0	0	30	2200	2480
Satellites	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Department avg. MV			3.0					0.0					2.5			
Percent change			25.0					-100.0					4.2			
Wgt. avg.																12.14
<b>Totals</b>																

Percent excess

1.0  
15.4  
41.1  
6.0  
17.6  
10.9

2.67  
21.2

Function	Wgt FV
Air vehicles	80.6
Munitions	65.2
Electronic combat	72.3
Fixed-wing avionics	93.0
Conv. missiles/rockets	59.5
Satellites	92.0
Average FV	77.1
Weighted avg. FV	76.5

DoD average MV  
Percent change

Table 9. MAXSFV Model Output

Function	Department															Retained totals
	X					Y					Z					
	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	
Retain=1, Close=0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	6
Department MII. Val.	3	3	3	2	1	2	1	3	2	1	3	3	2	3	1	
Capacities																
Air vehicles	0	0	2500	0	0	5000	0	0	0	0	3000	0	0	0	0	10500
Munitions	0	0	4500	0	0	300	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	5800
Electronic combat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	1543	0	3543
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	250	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1000	4000	0	2000	0	7250
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	700	0	0	0	3900
Satellites	0	0	0	4000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4000
Workload assigned																
Air vehicles	0	0	2500	0	0	5000	0	0	0	0	1963	0	0	0	0	9463
Munitions	0	0	4500	0	0	300	0	0	0	0	703	0	0	0	0	5503
Electronic combat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	1234	0	3234
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	250	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1000	525	0	2000	0	3775
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	700	0	0	0	3743
Satellites	0	0	0	2480	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2480
Department avg. MV			2.5					2.0					3.0			
Percent change			4.2					11.1					25.0			
DoD average MV								2.67								
Percent change								21.2								

Percent excess  
11.0  
5.4  
9.6  
92.1  
4.2  
61.3  
24.10

Totals  
9463  
5503  
3234  
3775  
3743  
2480

DoD weighted FVs	Wgt FV
Function	
Air vehicles	64.9
Munitions	59.6
Electronic combat	61.9
Fixed-wing avionics	73.1
Conv. missiles/rockets	56.6
Satellites	58.0
Average FV	62.3
Weighted avg. FV	62.9

Table 10. MINNMV Model Output: Alternative 1

Function	Department															Retained totals	
	X					Y					Z						
	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E		
Retain=1, Close=0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	6	
Department Mil. Val.	3	3	3	2	1	2	1	3	2	1	3	3	2	3	1		
<b>Capacities</b>																<b>Percent excess</b>	
Air vehicles	0	0	2500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	2857	0	9557	1.0
Munitions	0	0	4500	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	7500	36.3
Electronic combat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	1543	0	3543	9.6
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	3500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4000	0	0	0	7500	98.7
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	0	0	0	200	0	0	3000	700	0	300	0	4400	17.6
Satellites	0	0	300	4000	0	0	0	500	0	0	250	50	0	300	0	5400	117.7
																<b>Wgt. avg.</b>	<b>34.41</b>
<b>Workload assigned</b>																<b>Totals</b>	
Air vehicles	0	0	2406	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	2857	0	9463	
Munitions	0	0	2503	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	5503	
Electronic combat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1691	0	0	1543	0	3234	
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	3500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	275	0	0	0	3775	
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	0	0	0	200	0	0	2343	700	0	300	0	3743	
Satellites	0	0	300	1080	0	0	0	500	0	0	250	50	0	300	0	2480	
Department avg. MV																	
Percent change																	

DoD average MV  
Percent change

2.83  
28.8

DoD weighted FVs	
Function	Wgt FV
Air vehicles	80.6
Munitions	71.4
Electronic combat	64.4
Fixed-wing avionics	93.9
Conv. missiles/rockets	57.8
Satellites	65.4
Average FV	72.3
Weighted avg. FV	74.4

Table 11. MINNMV Model Output: Alternative 2

Function	Department																		Retained totals
	X					Y					Z								
	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E				
Retain=1, Close=0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	6			
Department Mil. Val.	3	3	3	2	1	2	1	3	2	1	3	3	2	3	1				
<b>Capacities</b>																			
Air vehicles	0	7000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	0	11200			
Munitions	850	200	4500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	6550			
Electronic combat	3000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	0	0	5000			
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	3500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4000	0	0	0	7500			
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	700	0	0	3900			
Satellites	0	0	300	4000	0	0	0	0	0	0	250	50	0	0	0	4600			
<b>Workload assigned</b>																			
Air vehicles	0	5263	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000	1200	0	0	9463			
Munitions	850	200	3453	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	5503			
Electronic combat	3000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	234	0	0	0	0	3234			
Fixed-wing avionics	0	0	0	3500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	275	0	0	0	3775			
Conv. missiles/rockets	0	0	200	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2843	700	0	0	0	3743			
Satellites	0	0	300	1880	0	0	0	0	0	0	250	50	0	0	0	2480			
<b>Department avg. MV</b>																			
Percent change			2.8					0.0					3.0						
			14.6					-100.0					25.0						
<b>DoD average MV</b>																			
Percent change								2.83											
								28.8											

**Percent excess**  
 18.4  
 19.0  
 54.6  
 98.7  
 4.2  
 85.5  
**37.42**

Function	Wgt FV
Air vehicles	76.3
Munitions	65.7
Electronic combat	65.9
Fixed-wing avionics	93.9
Conv. missiles/rockets	56.9
Satellites	62.4
<b>Average FV</b>	<b>70.2</b>
<b>Weighted avg. FV</b>	<b>71.6</b>

**Appendix A**  
**AMPL Model Input File**

```

# JCSG Model Example

# Ronald H. Nickel, Ph.D.
# LTC Roy Rice, USAF

# 8-3-94

set X_sites;          # The set of Department X sites.
set Y_sites;          # The set of Department Y sites.
set Z_sites;          # The set of Department Z sites.

set SITE := X_sites union {Y_sites union Z_sites};
                # The set of all labs and T&E sites.

set EXCLD1 within SITE default {}; # A solution to be excluded.
set EXCLD2 within SITE default {}; # A solution to be excluded.
set EXCLD_INTER := if card(EXCLD2) > 0 then (EXCLD1 inter EXCLD2)
                else EXCLD1;

set EXCLD_1DIFF2 := EXCLD1 diff EXCLD2; # Sites in EXCLD1 but not
                # in EXCLD2.

set EXCLD_2DIFF1 := EXCLD2 diff EXCLD1; # Sites in EXCLD2 but not
                # in EXCLD1.

set EXCLD_COMPLEMENT := SITE diff (EXCLD1 union EXCLD2);
                # The set of sites not in EXCLD1 or EXCLD2.

param excld_num := max(0, card(EXCLD_INTER)-1);

set FUNC;            # The set of functions.

set SITE_CAP within {SITE, FUNC} ; # The set of site/function
                # combinations that are
                # meaningful.

param CAPAC {SITE_CAP}; # The functional capacity at each site for each
                # meaningful site/function combination.

param no_func := card(FUNC); # The number of function types.

# Define the set performing missile functions.

set MISSLE_FUNC within {FUNC};

param missile_sites >= 0, default 15;
                # Number of sites allowed to perform the
                # missile function. Used in the policy
                # imperative example (missile_sites = 3).

param max_sites >= 0, default card(SITE);
                # Number of open sites allowed in the
                # solution.

param REQ {FUNC}; # The DoD requirement for each function.

```

```

param MV {SITE};      # Military value for each site.

param NMV {s in SITE} := 4 - MV[s]; # Negative MV scoring.

param FV {SITE_CAP} >= 0.0; # Functional value by site and function.

param min_assign default 0.001; # Cannot assign less than
                                # min_assign * CAPAC[s,f] of
                                # function f to site s.

#
# Calculate upper bounds for the objective function components.
#

param MINNMV_UB := sum {s in SITE} NMV[s];

param MINSITES_UB := card(SITE);

param MINXCAP_UB := sum {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} CAPAC[s,f]/REQ[f];

param MAXSFV_UB := sum {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} FV[s,f];

param MAXFV_UB := sum {f in FUNC} max {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} FV[s,f];

#
# Use WGT_PCT to weight the functional value and non-functional value
# components of the objective functions.
#

param WGT_PCT >= 0, <= 100, default 99; # Percent of weight to put on
                                           # non-functional-value portion of the objective function.

param WGT1 := WGT_PCT; # Weight for non-FV portion of the objective
                        # functions.

param WGT2 := 100-WGT1; # Weight for FV portion of the objective functions.

#
# Decision variables
#

var OPEN {SITE} binary >= 0; # Open or closed decision variable for
                              # each site.

var SITE_LOAD {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} >= 0.0, <= CAPAC[s,f];
    # Amount of the requirement for function f to
    # be assigned to site s . Amount assigned
    # is limited by capacity of site s to perform
    # function f.

var SITE_FUNC {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} binary;
    # 1 if any assignment of workload for function
    # f is made to site s; 0 otherwise.

# The following variables, ALPHA, BETA, and GAMMA, are used to find
# alternative solutions.

```



```

var ALPHA binary; # At least one site from the intersection is excluded
                  # from the solution.

var BETA binary; # At least one site from the complement of the union
                # is included is included in the solution.

var GAMMA binary; # At least one site from
                  # EXCLD1 - (EXCLD1 intersect EXCLD2)
                  # and at least one site from
                  # EXCLD2 - (EXCLD1 intersect EXCLD2)
                  # are included in the solution.

#
# Objective Functions.
#
# Minimize total open site negative military value and
# maximize the normalized FV-weighted assignment of functional workload
# to sites.

minimize MINNMV:
    (WGT1/MINNMV_UB) * sum {s in SITE} OPEN[s]*NMV[s]
    - (WGT2/MAXFV_UB) * sum {(t,g) in SITE_CAP} FV[t,g]
    * (SITE_LOAD[t,g]/REQ[g]);

# Minimize the number of open sites and maximize the normalized
# FV-weighted assignment of functional workload to sites.

minimize MINSITES:
    (WGT1/MINSITES_UB) * sum {s in SITE} OPEN[s]
    - (WGT2/MAXFV_UB) * sum {(t,g) in SITE_CAP} FV[t,g]
    * (SITE_LOAD[t,g]/REQ[g]);

# Minimize total capacity and maximize the normalized FV-weighted
# assignment of functional workload to sites.

minimize MINXCAP:
    (WGT1/MINXCAP_UB) * sum {s in SITE} OPEN[s] *
    (sum {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} CAPAC[s,f]/REQ[f])
    - (WGT2/MAXFV_UB) * sum {(t,g) in SITE_CAP} FV[t,g]
    * (SITE_LOAD[t,g]/REQ[g]);

# Maximize functional value without workload assignment weightings
# and maximize the normalized FV-weighted assignment of functional
# workload to sites.

maximize MAXSFV:
    (WGT1/MAXSFV_UB) * sum {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} FV[s,f]
    - (WGT2/MAXFV_UB) * sum {(t,g) in SITE_CAP} FV[t,g]
    * (SITE_LOAD[t,g]/REQ[g]);

#
# Constraints
#
# The requirement for each function has to be met.

```

```

subject to func_assign {f in FUNC}:
    sum {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} SITE_LOAD[s,f] = REQ[f];

# Cannot assign functional workload to a site unless
# the site is open for assignment of that function.

subject to func_open {(s,f) in SITE_CAP}:
    SITE_LOAD[s,f] <= SITE_FUNC[s,f]*CAPAC[s,f];

# Sites with no functional requirement assigned
# are closed.

subject to site_closed {s in SITE}:
    OPEN[s] <= sum {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} SITE_FUNC[s,f];

# Allocation of functional requirements cannot be made
# to sites that are not open.

subject to site_open {s in SITE}:
    sum {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} SITE_FUNC[s,f] <= OPEN[s] * no_func;

# SITE_FUNC variables are set to 0 if little or no functional
# workload is assigned to a site.

subject to site_func_0 {(s,f) in SITE_CAP}:
    SITE_FUNC[s,f] <= SITE_LOAD[s,f]/(min_assign * CAPAC[s,f]);

# This constraint is an example of a policy imperative.
# Constrain the number of sites doing munitions work.
# This constraint only constrains the model if
#
# missile_sites < card(SITE).

subject to missile_2 {f in MISSLE_FUNC}:
    sum {(s,f) in SITE_CAP} SITE_FUNC[s,f] <= missile_sites;

# This constraint is used to constrain the number of
# open sites in a solution. max_sites has a default
# value equal to card(SITE), i.e., it does not constrain
# the solution unless max_sites is set to a lower value.

subject to no_sites:
    sum {s in SITE} OPEN[s] <= max_sites;

#
# Exclude solutions defined by the sets EXCLD1 and EXCLD2.
#

subject to alt_opt_cond_1:
    sum {s in EXCLD_INTER} OPEN[s] <= excld_num + 1 - ALPHA;

subject to alt_opt_cond_2:
    sum {s in EXCLD_COMPLEMENT} OPEN[s] >= BETA;

subject to alt_opt_cond_3a:
    sum {s in EXCLD_1DIFF2} OPEN[s] >= GAMMA;

```

subject to alt\_opt\_cond\_3b:  
sum {s in EXCLD\_2DIFF1} OPEN[s] >= GAMMA;

subject to alt\_opt\_cond\_123:  
ALPHA + BETA + GAMMA >= 1;

**Appendix B**  
**AMPL Data Input File**

\*# Data file for JCSG optimization examples.

# Ron Nickel  
# 7-6-94

set X\_sites :=  
X\_A  
X\_B  
X\_C  
X\_D  
X\_E;

set Y\_sites :=  
Y\_A  
Y\_B  
Y\_C  
Y\_D  
Y\_E;

set Z\_sites :=  
Z\_A  
Z\_B  
Z\_C  
Z\_D  
Z\_E;

set EXCLD1 := X\_A X\_C X\_D Z\_A Z\_B Z\_D;

set EXCLD2 := X\_C X\_D Y\_C Z\_A Z\_B Z\_D;

set FUNC :=  
Air\_Veh  
Mun  
E\_Cmbt  
Avion  
Mis  
Sat;

set SITE_CAP :	Air_Veh	Mun	E_Cmbt	Avion	Mis	Sat :=		
X_A		+		+	+		-	-
X_B		+		+	-		-	-
X_C		+		+	-	+	+	+
X_D		-		-	-	+	-	-
X_E		-		-	-	-	-	+
Y_A		+		+	+		-	-
Y_B		+		-	-		-	-
Y_C		-		+	-	+	+	+
Y_D		-		-	-	+	+	+
Y_E		-		-	-	-	-	+
Z_A		+		+	+	+	+	+
Z_B		+		-	-	+	+	+
Z_C		-		+	-	-	-	+
Z_D		+		-	+	+	+	+
Z_E		-		-	+	+	+	+

# Used to model the policy imperative.

param CAPAC:	Air_Veh	Mun	E_Cmbt	Avion	Mis	Sat	:=
X_A	450		850	3000		.	.
X_B	7000		200	.		.	.
X_C	2500		4500	.		250	200 300
X_D	.		.	.		3500	. 4000
X_E	.		.	.		.	3000 .
Y_A	5000		300	1000		.	.
Y_B	500		.	.		.	.
Y_C	.		2000	.		400	200 500
Y_D	.		.	.		3500	100 .
Y_E	.		.	.		.	2000 .
Z_A	3000		1000	2000		1000	3000 250
Z_B	1200		.	.		4000	700 50
Z_C	.		1000	.		.	200 .
Z_D	2857		.	1543		2000	300 300
Z_E	.		.	20		500	200 2200;

param FV:	Air_Veh	Mun	E_Cmbt	Avion	Mis	Sat	:=
X_A	50	88	67		.	.	.
X_B	70	71	.		.	.	.
X_C	68	58	.		92	62	71
X_D	.	.	.		94	.	58
X_E	.	.	.		.	89	.
Y_A	57	54	91		.	.	.
Y_B	72	.	.		.	.	.
Y_C	.	88	.		78	59	64
Y_D	.	.	.		69	93	.
Y_E	.	.	.		.	92	.
Z_A	81	72	52		72	56	85
Z_B	92	.	.		93	59	61
Z_C	.	75	.		.	50	.
Z_D	86	.	78		66	65	73
Z_E	.	.	77		71	91	93;

```

param REQ :=
  Air_Veh 9463
  Mun      5503
  E_Cmbt  3234
  Avion    3775
  Mis      3743
  Sat      2480;

```

# Banded military values for each site.  
# 3 is good, 1 is bad.

```

param MV :=
  X_A 3
  X_B 3
  X_C 3
  X_D 2
  X_E 1
  Y_A 2
  Y_B 1
  Y_C 3
  Y_D 2

```

Y\_E 1  
Z\_A 3  
Z\_B 3  
Z\_C 2  
Z\_D 3  
Z\_E 1;

2



Workload - Certified Data

Commodity Group	AMAD	CCAD	LEAD	HWAD	TOTAL	AMARC	AV Form	MCLB-A	MCLB-B	MCLB-C	MCLB-D	MCLB-E	MCLB-F	MCLB-G	MCLB-H	MCLB-I	MCLB-J	MCLB-K	MCLB-L	MCLB-M	MCLB-N	MCLB-O	MCLB-P	MCLB-Q	MCLB-R	MCLB-S	MCLB-T	MCLB-U	MCLB-V	MCLB-W	MCLB-X	MCLB-Y	MCLB-Z	TOTAL
A Air Frames - Rotary	1,871,000				1,871,000																											1,871,000		
B Air Frames - Turbo Prop																																		
C Air Frames - Turbo Jet																																		
D Air Engines - Turbo Prop																																		
E Air Engines - Turbo Jet																																		
F Air Engines - Other																																		
G Airframes - Other																																		
H Airframes - Other																																		
I Airframes - Other																																		
J Airframes - Other																																		
K Airframes - Other																																		
L Airframes - Other																																		
M Airframes - Other																																		
N Airframes - Other																																		
O Airframes - Other																																		
P Airframes - Other																																		
Q Airframes - Other																																		
R Airframes - Other																																		
S Airframes - Other																																		
T Airframes - Other																																		
U Airframes - Other																																		
V Airframes - Other																																		
W Airframes - Other																																		
X Airframes - Other																																		
Y Airframes - Other																																		
Z Airframes - Other																																		
TOTAL	1,871,000				1,871,000																													1,871,000

13.23 4.2695

3



44

## DEPOT MAINTENANCE

### SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

6. Please provide the capacity charts that describe excess capacity with implementation of this BRAC by service, and by depot?

Supplemental Answer:

The excess capacity remaining at NADEP Jacksonville was not determined at this time due to three specific factors. These factors preclude a simple arithmetic determination of remaining excess capacity.

a) After the Joint Cross Service Group-Depot Maintenance data base was locked, two additional sources of core workload were identified: 30,000 DLMHs of F-117 F404 engine workload interserviced from the Air Force; and 48,000 DLMHs of mobile causeways and side warping tugs workload supporting the Maritime Prepositioned Ship (MPS) Program from NAVSEA.

b) The mix of workload being transferred from NAWC Lakehurst, approximately 316,000 DLMHs, consumes the most excess. However, the aircraft launch and recovery, manufacturing and overhaul equipment occupies a greater amount of space with significantly fewer available work positions than the aircraft, engine, and component workload that it replaces. Therefore, a significant amount of additional capacity will be eliminated over and above the additional workload received. The precise impacts will not be determined until specific implementation planning is finalized.


c) Finally, two large hangers included in NADEP Jacksonville's initial capacity calculations are not required and are being returned to the host air station, another divestiture of excess capacity.

7. Cross Service Alternative Two proposes the closure of Naval Shipyards Long Beach and either Pearl Harbor or Portsmouth. Did the Joint Cross Service Group view Pearl Harbor and Portsmouth as equivalent in terms of capability as well as capacity?

No. The JCSG-DM did not have visibility into the capabilities of individual shipyards. All Category #11.a (Sea Systems-Ships) workload was grouped together with no breakout as to ship type, dry dock capability, nuclear versus non-nuclear capability, etc. This alternative, DM2, was generated by the optimization model to minimize excess capacity, and these two shipyards had similar capacity indexes.

8. In both alternatives DM1 and DM2, specific workload transfers are identified for each commodity group except for sea systems. In that case, the alternative states, "Consolidate as possible within the Department of the Navy." Why was the sea systems commodity area proposal not specific concerning workload distribution?

These sea systems commodity areas, unique to the Department of the Navy, offered no interservicing potential. The JCSG-DM was aware that significant differences existed between the individual shipyards, for example, ship type, drydock capability, strategic location, nuclear versus non-nuclear capability, etc., which were beyond the level of detail of the Joint analyses. The JCSG-DM determined that the Department of the Navy was in the best position to reallocate that workload in the most efficient manner based on their future force structure and operational requirements.



9/23/83

AC 150/5060-5

## CHAPTER 3. AIRPORT CAPACITY AND AIRCRAFT DELAY CALCULATIONS

3-1. GENERAL. This chapter contains instructions for calculating hourly capacity, ASV, and aircraft delay for a wide range of runway-use configurations and operational alternatives.

a. Capacity Calculations.

- (1) Hourly capacity of the runway component.
- (2) Hourly capacity of the taxiway component.
- (3) Hourly capacity of gate group components.
- (4) Airport hourly capacity.
- (5) ASV.

b. Delay Calculations.

- (1) Hourly delay.
- (2) Daily delay.
- (3) Annual delay.

Figure 3-1 provides a checklist of the data required for these calculations. Appendix 2 contains examples of these calculations.

3-2. HOURLY CAPACITY OF THE RUNWAY COMPONENT. Except for situations involving FVC conditions, an absence of radar coverage or ILS, and airports with parallel runways when one runway is limited to use by small aircraft (all of which are covered in chapter 4), calculate the runway component hourly capacity as follows:

- a. Select the runway-use configuration in figure 3-2 which best represents the use of the airport during the hour of interest. To adjust for staggered thresholds, see paragraph 4-6.
- b. Identify from figure 3-2 the figure number for capacity (for  $C^*$ , T, and E).
- c. Determine the percentage of Class C and D aircraft operating on the runway component and calculate the mix index.
- d. Determine percent arrivals (PA).
- e. Determine hourly capacity base ( $C^*$ ).
- f. Determine the percentage of touch and go operations during VFR operations and determine the touch and go factor (T). During IFR operations, T will be 1.00.
- g. Determine the location of exit taxiways (measured from the threshold at the approach end of the runway) and determine the exit factor (E).
- h. Calculate the hourly capacity of the runway component by the following equation:

$$\text{Hourly capacity of the runway component} = C^* \cdot T \cdot E$$

AC 150/5060-5

9/23/83

c. Calculate the component quotients by dividing each components capacity by its demand ratio.

d. Identify the airport hourly capacity, i.e., the lowest quotient calculated in c above.

3-6. ANNUAL SERVICE VOLUME (ASV). Calculate the ASV as follows:

a. Calculate the weighted hourly capacity ( $C_w$ ) for the runway component as follows:

(1) Identify the different runway-use configurations used over the course of a year.

(2) Determine the percent of time each runway-use configuration is in use ( $P_1$  through  $P_n$ ). Include those times when the hourly capacity is zero, i.e., the weather conditions are below airport minimums or the airport is closed for other reasons. If a runway-use configuration is used less than 2 percent of the time, that time may be credited to another runway-use configuration.

(3) Calculate the hourly capacity for each runway-use configuration ( $C_1$  through  $C_n$ ). See section 3-2.

(4) Identify the runway-use configuration that provides the maximum capacity. Generally, this configuration is also the configuration most frequently used.

(5) Divide the hourly capacity of each runway-use configuration by the hourly capacity of the runway-use configuration that provides the maximum capacity.

(6) Determine the ASV weighting factor ( $W_1$  through  $W_n$ ) for each runway-use configuration from Table 3-1.

Table 3-1. ASV Weighting Factors

Percent of Maximum Capacity	Weighting Factors			
	VPR	IFR		
		Mix Index (0-20)	Mix Index (21-50)	Mix Index (51-100)
91+	1	1	1	1
81-90	5	1	3	5
66-80	15	2	8	15
51-65	20	3	12	20
0-50	25	4	16	25



9/23/83  
9/23/83

ity by  
related  
as  
course  
in  
...  
other  
...  
capa-  
used.  
be  
ity.  
ay-

(7) Calculate the weighted hourly capacity ( $C_w$ ) of the runway component by the following equation:

$$C_w = \frac{(P_1 \cdot C_1 \cdot W_1) + (P_2 \cdot C_2 \cdot W_2) + \dots + (P_n \cdot C_n \cdot W_n)}{(P_1 \cdot W_1) + (P_2 \cdot W_2) + \dots + (P_n \cdot W_n)}$$

← variable of interest

b. Calculate the ratio of annual demand to average daily demand during the peak month (D). Typical annual demand to average daily demand ratios are provided in table 3-2.

c. Calculate the ratio of average daily demand to average peak hour demand during the peak month (H). Typical average daily to average peak hour demand ratios are provided in table 3-2.

Table 3-2. Typical Demand Ratios

Mix Index	Daily (D)	Hourly (H)
0-20	200-310	7-11
21-50	300-320	10-13
51-100	310-350	11-15

d. Calculate ASV by the following equation:

$$ASV = C_w \cdot D \cdot H$$

3-7. HOURLY DELAY TO AIRCRAFT ON THE RUNWAY COMPONENT. Hourly delay calculations described in this paragraph apply to those hours when the hourly demand does not exceed the hourly capacity of the runway component. For those hours when the hourly demand exceeds the hourly capacity of the runway component, paragraph 3-9 calculations apply. Calculate hourly delay as follows:

a. Calculate the hourly capacity of the runway component for the specific hour of interest.

b. Identify from figure 3-2 the figure number for delay (for the arrival delay index (ADI) and the departure delay index (DDI)).

c. Identify the hourly demand (HD) and the peak 15 minute demand (Q) on the runway component.

d. Calculate the ratio of hourly demand to hourly capacity (D/C).

e. Determine the arrival delay index (ADI) and departure delay index (DDI).

7/3/83

# Example

150/3060-5  
Appendix 2

**EXAMPLE 5.** Determine the ASV of the example airport assuming there are 219,750 annual operations, 690 average day operations and 30 peak hour operations.

**SOLUTION:** The work sheet on page 12 illustrates one method of recording data.

➔ **1. Calculate  $C_p$ .**

- a. Runway-use Configuration. Identify the different runway-use conditions used over the course of a year and the mix index for each use. Enter in columns 1 through 4.
- b. Percent of Use (P). Identify the percent of the time each configuration is used and enter in column 5. The figures shown on the work sheet in column 5 are hypothetical.
- c. Runway Hourly Capacity (C). Calculate the hourly capacities of operating conditions as in example 1 and enter in column 6. Example 1 data are used for operating conditions 1 and 2.
- d. Maximum Capacity Configuration. Identify the runway-use configuration that provides the maximum capacity.
- e. Percent of Maximum Capacity. Divide the hourly capacity of each runway-use configuration by the capacity of the configuration that provides the maximum capacity and enter in column 7.

Operating condition 1	89/89 = 100
"	2 51/89 = 57
"	3 62/89 = 70
"	4 52/89 = 58
"	5 89/89 = 66
"	6 46/89 = 52

f. ASV Weighting Factor (W). From Table 3-1, identify the weighting factor (W) for each operating condition and enter in column 8.

Table 3-1. ASV Weighting Factors

Percent of Maximum Capacity	Weighting Factors			
	VPR	SFR		
		Mix Index (0-20)	Mix Index (21-40)	Mix Index (41-100)
0-10	1	1	1	1
11-20	2	2	2	2
21-30	3	3	3	3
31-40	4	4	4	4
41-50	5	5	5	5
51-60	6	6	6	6
61-70	7	7	7	7
71-80	8	8	8	8
81-90	9	9	9	9
91-100	10	10	10	10

Figure A2-5. Annual service volume

AC 150/5060  
Appendix 2

9/23/83

No.	Operating Condition		ASV Index	Percent of Year (%)	Hourly Capacity (C)	Percent Maximum Capacity	Weighting Factor (W)
	Weather	Day-use Classes					
1	VFR	↕	62	74	89	100	1
2	IFR		91	5	51	57	20
3	VFR	↘	62	5	52	90	15
4	IFR		91	5	52	58	20
5	VFR	/ or	62	4	99	66	15
6	IFR		91	4	46	52	20
7	IFR	Below Minimum		3		-	25

Work sheet for ASV factors.

g. Weighted Hourly Capacity (C<sub>w</sub>). Calculate the weighted hourly capacity using the following equation:

$$C_w = \frac{(P_1 C_1 W_1) + (P_2 C_2 W_2) + \dots + (P_n C_n W_n)}{(P_1 W_1) + (P_2 W_2) + \dots + (P_n W_n)}$$

$$C_w = \frac{(.74 \cdot 89 \cdot 1) + (.05 \cdot 51 \cdot 20) + (.05 \cdot 62 \cdot 15) + (.05 \cdot 52 \cdot 20) + (.04 \cdot 59 \cdot 15) + (.04 \cdot 46 \cdot 20) + (.03 \cdot 0 \cdot 25)}{(.74 \cdot 1) + (.05 \cdot 20) + (.05 \cdot 15) + (.05 \cdot 20) + (.04 \cdot 15) + (.04 \cdot 20) + (.03 \cdot 25)}$$

$$C_w = \frac{287.56}{5.64} \text{ or } 51 \text{ operations per hour.}$$

← Variable of interest

2. Daily Demand Ratio (D). Calculate D using the equation:

$$D = \frac{\text{Annual}}{\text{Average Day-peak month}} = \frac{219,750}{690} = 318$$

3. Hourly Demand Ratio (H). Calculate H from the equation:

$$H = \frac{\text{Average Day-peak month}}{\text{Average Peak Hour-peak month}} = \frac{690}{50} = 14$$

4. Calculate ASV. ASV is calculated from the equation  $ASV = C_w \cdot D \cdot H$

$$ASV = 51 \cdot 318 \cdot 14 = 227,052 \text{ operations per year.}$$

5. Conclusion. ASV is an indicator of the annual operational capability of an airport adjusted for differences in hourly capacities which occur over the course of a year. In this example, the airport theoretically could have accommodated and additional 7,302 operations during the year.

Figure A2-5. Annual service volume (cont.)

9/23/83

# Definitions of Terms

AC 150/3060-3

f. Demand. Demand is the magnitude of aircraft operations to be accommodated in a specified time period.

g. Gate. A gate is an aircraft parking position used by a single aircraft loading or unloading passengers, mail, cargo, etc. A parking position which is regularly used by two aircraft at the same time is two gates for capacity calculations.

(1) Gate type is the size of the gate. A Type 1 gate is capable of accommodating all aircraft, including widebodies such as the A-300, B-747, B-767, DC-10, L-1011. A Type 2 gate will accommodate only non-widebodied aircraft.

(2) Gate mix is the percent of non-widebodied aircraft accommodated by the gate group.

(3) Gate occupancy time is the length of time required to cycle an aircraft through the gate.

h. Mix Index. Mix index is a mathematical expression. It is the percent of Class C aircraft plus 3 times the percent of Class D aircraft, and is written:  $0(C+3D)$ .

i. Percent Arrivals (PA). The percent of arrivals is the ratio of arrivals to total operations and is computed as follows:

$$\text{Percent arrivals} = \frac{A+(T\&G)}{A+DA+(T\&G)} \times 100, \text{ where}$$

A = number of arriving aircraft in the hour  
 DA = number of departing aircraft in the hour  
 T&G = number of touch and go's in the hour


j. Percent Touch and Go's. The percent touch and go's is the ratio of landings with an immediate takeoff to total operations and is computed as follows:

$$\text{Percent touch and go's} = \frac{(T\&G)}{A+DA+(T\&G)} \times 100, \text{ where}$$

A = number of arriving aircraft in the hour  
 DA = number of departing aircraft in the hour  
 T&G = number of touch and go's in the hour

Touch and go operations are normally associated with flight training. The number of these operations usually decreases as the number of air carrier operations increase, as demand for service approaches runway capacity, or as weather conditions deteriorate.

k. Runway-use Configuration. Runway-use configuration is the number, location, and orientation of the active runway(s), the type and direction of operations, and the flight rules in effect at a particular time.



Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Mesa to Luke  
 Scenario File : C:\CDRA\504\LAB\MESA\WESA-LTK.CDR  
 Std Cells File : C:\CDRA\504\MEMD01.STF

Scenario Year : 1995  
 End Year : 2001  
 End Year (All Years) : 2012 (All Years)

SPV in 2015(SKI) : -2.691  
 1-Time Cost(SKI) : 19.957

Net Costs (\$M) Constant Dollars

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Wilson	1,351	1,748	2,331	3,205	1,603	2,321	14,576
Person	0	-23	-45	-43	-41	-48	-172
Overhd	11	-123	-345	-524	-783	-1,118	-2,883
Moving	30	69	152	182	152	32	638
Misclo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	2	3	4	3	3	15
TOTAL	3,393	2,693	2,896	3,824	533	1,308	12,148
POSITIONS ELIMINATED	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Oil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
TOT	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
POSITIONS REALIGNED	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Oil	0	0	1	1	1	2	5
Enl	0	1	2	3	2	2	10
Civ	0	0	0	0	5	4	9
TOT	0	1	3	4	8	8	23
CDRA Numbers used -- 12/29/94							
Mesa screen 4 calculated based on Brooks ATB							
No PE data available -- standard 6% cut applied							
Used W/LCOM ranges/moving costs -- no recurring costs for Luke							

Summary

**COBRA REALIGNMENT SUMMARY (COBRA v5.04) - Page 2/2**  
 Date As Of 09:24 12/29/1994 Report Created 11:30 12/29/1994

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Base to Luke  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA504\LABS\MESA\MESANA\MESA-LUK.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA504\NEWDC01.SFF

	Costs (\$K) Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	2,351	1,748	2,331	3,305	1,603	2,331	14,570	0
Person	0	0	1	3	5	7	17	7
Overhd	11	35	55	76	97	117	394	88
Moving	30	89	152	182	152	32	638	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	2	3	4	3	3	15	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,393</b>	<b>1,875</b>	<b>2,543</b>	<b>3,474</b>	<b>1,860</b>	<b>2,499</b>	<b>15,634</b>	<b>94</b>

	Savings (\$K) Constant Dollars						Total	Beyond
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001		
MilCon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person	0	23	47	47	47	47	210	47
Overhd	0	158	480	603	680	1,235	3,276	1,467
Moving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>182</b>	<b>446</b>	<b>649</b>	<b>927</b>	<b>1,282</b>	<b>3,486</b>	<b>1,514</b>

TOTAL ONE-TIME COST REPORT (COBRA v5.04) - Page 1/3  
 Date As Of 09:24 12/29/1994. Report Created 11:30 12/29/1994

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Mesa to Luke  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA504\LABS\MESA\MESANA\MESA-LUK.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA504\NEWMOD1.SFF

(All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
<b>Construction</b>		
Military Construction	14,570,000	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
<b>Total - Construction</b>		<b>14,570,000</b>
<b>Personnel</b>		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
<b>Total - Personnel</b>		<b>0</b>
<b>Overhead</b>		
Program Planning Support	33,867	
Mothership / Shutdown	100,000	
<b>Total - Overhead</b>		<b>133,867</b>
<b>Moving</b>		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	28,800	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	9,509	
One-Time Moving Costs	600,000	
<b>Total - Moving</b>		<b>638,309</b>
<b>Other</b>		
MAP / RSE	840	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	14,000	
<b>Total - Other</b>		<b>14,840</b>
<b>Total One-Time Costs</b>		<b>15,357,016</b>
<b>One-Time Savings</b>		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
<b>Total One-Time Savings</b>		<b>0</b>
<b>Total Net One-Time Costs</b>		<b>15,357,016</b>



ONE-TIME COST REPORT (COBRA v5.04) - Page 2/3  
 Date As Of 09:24 12/29/1994. Report Created 11:38 12/29/1994

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Mesa to Luke  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA504\LABS\MESA\MESAH\MESA-LUK.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA504\NEW001.SFF

Base: WILLIAMS, TX  
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
<b>Construction</b>		
Military Construction	0	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
<b>Total - Construction</b>		0
<b>Personnel</b>		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
<b>Total - Personnel</b>		0
<b>Overhead</b>		
Program Planning Support	33,867	
Mothball / Shutdown	100,000	
<b>Total - Overhead</b>		133,867
<b>Moving</b>		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PFS	29,800	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	9,509	
One-Time Moving Costs	600,000	
<b>Total - Moving</b>		639,309
<b>Other</b>		
HAP / PSE	840	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	14,000	
<b>Total - Other</b>		14,840
<b>Total One-Time Costs</b>		<b>787,016</b>
<b>One-Time Savings</b>		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
<b>Total One-Time Savings</b>		0
<b>Total Net One-Time Costs</b>		<b>787,016</b>

ONE-TIME COST REPORT (OCBRA V5.04) - Page 3/3  
 Date As Of 09:24 12/29/1994. Report Created 11:38 12/29/1994

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Mesa to Luke  
 Scenario File : C:\OCBRA504\LABS\MESA\MESAMJ\MESA-LUK.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\OCBRA504\NEW001.SFF

Base: LUKE, AZ  
 (All values in Dollars)

Category	Cost	Sub-Total
<b>Construction</b>		
Military Construction	14,570,000	
Family Housing Construction	0	
Information Management Account	0	
Land Purchases	0	
<b>Total - Construction</b>		14,570,000
<b>Personnel</b>		
Civilian RIF	0	
Civilian Early Retirement	0	
Civilian New Hires	0	
Eliminated Military PCS	0	
Unemployment	0	
<b>Total - Personnel</b>		0
<b>Overhead</b>		
Program Planning Support	0	
Hutball / Shutdown	0	
<b>Total - Overhead</b>		0
<b>Moving</b>		
Civilian Moving	0	
Civilian PPS	0	
Military Moving	0	
Freight	0	
One-Time Moving Costs	0	
<b>Total - Moving</b>		0
<b>Other</b>		
MAP / RSE	0	
Environmental Mitigation Costs	0	
One-Time Unique Costs	0	
<b>Total - Other</b>		0
<b>Total One-Time Costs</b>		14,570,000
<b>One-Time Savings</b>		
Military Construction Cost Avoidances	0	
Family Housing Cost Avoidances	0	
Military Moving	0	
Land Sales	0	
One-Time Moving Savings	0	
Environmental Mitigation Savings	0	
One-Time Unique Savings	0	
<b>Total One-Time Savings</b>		0
<b>Total Net One-Time Costs</b>		14,570,000

INPUT DATA REPORT (COBRA v5.04)

Date As Of 09:24 12/29/1994. Report Created 11:39 12/29/1994

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Mesa to Luke  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA504\LABS\MESA\MESANAJ\MESA-LUK.CBR  
 Std Pctrs File : C:\COBRA504\NEWOOD1.SFF

INPUT SCREEN ONE - GENERAL SCENARIO INFORMATION

Model Year One : FY 1996

Model does Time-Phasing of Construction/Shutdown: No

Base Name : WILLIAMS, TX  
 Strategy : Closes in FY 2001  
 LUCE, AZ : Realignment

Summary:

CE MILCOM numbers used -- 12/29/94  
 Mesa screen 4 calculated based on Brooks AFB.  
 No PE data available -- standard 6% cut applied.  
 Used MAJCOM unique/moving costs -- no recurring costs for Luke

INPUT SCREEN TWO - DISTANCE TABLE

From Base:	To Base:	Distance:
WILLIAMS, TX	LUCE, AZ	49 mi

INPUT SCREEN THREE - MOVEMENT TABLE

Transfers from WILLIAMS, TX to LUCE, AZ

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Officer Positions:	0	0	1	1	1	2
Enlisted Positions:	0	1	2	3	2	2
Civilian Positions:	1	2	5	6	5	4
Student Positions:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missn Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suppt Eqpt (tons):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Light Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy/Special Vehicles:	0	0	0	0	0	0

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: WILLIAMS, TX

Total Officer Employees:	5	FFMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	157
Total Enlisted Employees:	10	Communications (\$K/Year):	2
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	103
Total Civilian Employees:	24	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	0.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	1.205
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	10.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.00
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(FSF):	80	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	106	Activity Code:	9
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	80		
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	97	Homeowner Assistance Program:	Yes
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.10	Unique Activity Information:	No

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Mesa to Luke  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA504\LABS\MESA\MESANA\MESA-LUK.CBR  
 Std Petra File : C:\COBRA504\NEWDO01.SPF

INPUT SCREEN FOUR - STATIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: LUKE. AZ

Total Officer Employees:	647	RPMA Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	3.459
Total Enlisted Employees:	5.039	Communications (\$K/Year):	1.458
Total Student Employees:	0	BOS Non-Payroll (\$K/Year):	11.722
Total Civilian Employees:	1.146	BOS Payroll (\$K/Year):	0
Mil Families Living On Base:	28.0%	Family Housing (\$K/Year):	4.950
Civilians Not Willing To Move:	10.0%	Area Cost Factor:	1.00
Officer Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS In-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Enlisted Housing Units Avail:	0	CHAMPUS Out-Pat (\$/Visit):	0
Total Base Facilities(KSF):	4.273	CHAMPUS Shift to Medicare:	20.9%
Officer VHA (\$/Month):	177	Activity Code:	52
Enlisted VHA (\$/Month):	126	Homeowner Assistance Program:	No
Per Diem Rate (\$/Day):	108	Unique Activity Information:	No
Freight Cost (\$/Ton/Mile):	0.10		

INPUT SCREEN FIVE - DYNAMIC BASE INFORMATION

Name: WILLIAMS. TX

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	1	3	4	3	3
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	30	60	150	100	150	30
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	23%	12%	16%	22%	11%	16%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	23%	12%	16%	22%	27%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	80	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				100.0%

Name: LUKE. AZ

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1-Time Unique Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Unique Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
1-Time Moving Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Env Non-MilCon Reqd(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Cost (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Activ Mission Save (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Cost(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Misc Recurring Save(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Land (+Buy/-Sales) (\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Construction Schedule(%):	23%	12%	16%	22%	11%	16%
Shutdown Schedule (%):	0%	23%	12%	16%	22%	27%
MilCon Cost Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fam Housing Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Procurement Avoidnc(\$K):	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS In-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
CHAMPUS Out-Patients/Yr:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facil ShutDown(KSF):	0	Perc Family Housing ShutDown:				0.0%

Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Mess to Luke  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRAS04\LABS\MESA\MESAH\MESA-LUK.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRAS04\NEW001.SFF

INPUT SCREEN SIX - BASE PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Name: WILLIAMS, TX

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Off Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stu Force Struc Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Off Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Scenario Change:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Scenario Change:	0	-1	0	0	0	0
Off Change(No Sel Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enl Change(No Sel Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Civ Change(No Sel Save):	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carotakers - Military:	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carotakers - Civilian:	0	0	0	0	0	0

INPUT SCREEN SEVEN - BASE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION

Name: LUKE, AZ

Description	Categ	New MilCon	Rehab MilCon	Total Cost(\$K)
AFMC MILCON	OTHER	64.042	0	14.570

Assumed all new construction -- possible reduction available

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN ONE - PERSONNEL

Percent Officers Married:	76.00%	Civ Early Retire Pay Factor:	9.00%
Percent Enlisted Married:	66.96%	Priority Placement Services:	60.00%
Enlisted Housing MilCon:	80.00%	PPS Actions Involving PCS:	50.00%
Officer Salary(\$/Year):	78,668.00	Civilian PCS Costs (\$):	20,000.00
Off BAQ with Dependents(\$):	7,073.00	Civilian New Hire Cost(\$):	4,000.00
Enlisted Salary(\$/Year):	36,148.00	Net Median Home Price(\$):	114,600.00
Enl BAQ with Dependents(\$):	5,162.00	Home Sale Reimburse Rate:	10.00%
Avg Unemploy Cost(\$/Week):	174.00	Max Home Sale Reimburs(\$):	22,305.00
Unemployment Eligibility(Weeks):	10	Home Purch Reimburse Rate:	5.00%
Civilian Salary(\$/Year):	46,642.00	Max Home Purch Reimburs(\$):	11,191.00
Civilian Turnover Rate:	15.00%	Civilian Homeowning Rate:	64.00%
Civilian Early Retire Rate:	10.00%	HAP Home Value Reimburse Rate:	22.90%
Civilian Regular Retire Rate:	5.00%	HAP Homeowner Receiving Rate:	5.00%
Civilian PIF Pay Factor:	39.00%	RSE Home Value Reimburse Rate:	0.00%
SF File Desc:		RSE Homeowner Receiving Rate:	0.00%

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN TWO - FACILITIES

PFMA Building SF Cost Index:	0.93	Rehab vs. New MilCon Cost:	0.00%
BOS Index (PFMA vs population):	0.54	Info Management Account:	0.00%
(Indices are used as exponents)		MilCon Design Rate:	0.00%
Program Management Factor:	10.00%	MilCon SICM Rate:	0.00%
Carotaker Admin(SF/Care):	162.00	MilCon Contingency Plan Rate:	0.00%
Mothers Cost (\$/SF):	1.25	MilCon Site Preparation Rate:	0.00%
Avg Bachelor Quarters(SF):	256.00	Discount Rate for NPV, PFT/ROI:	2.75%
Avg Family Quarters(SF):	1,320.00	Inflation Rate for NPV, PFT/ROI:	0.00%
APPDET, PFT Inflation Rates:			
1996: 0.60% 1997: 2.90% 1998: 3.00%		1999: 3.00% 2000: 3.00% 2001: 3.00%	


Department : Air Force  
 Option Package : Mesa to Luke  
 Scenario File : C:\COBRA504\LABS\MESA\MESAMJ\MESA-LUK.CBR  
 Std Fctrs File : C:\COBRA504\NEW0001.SFF

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN THREE - TRANSPORTATION

Material/Assigned Person(Lb):	710	Equip Pack & Crate(\$/Ton):	284.00
MIG Per Off Family (Lb):	14,598.00	Mil Light Vehicle(\$/Mile):	0.43
MIG Per Enl Family (Lb):	9,009.00	Heavy/Spec Vehicle(\$/Mile):	1.40
MIG Per Mil Single (Lb):	6,408.00	POV Reimbursement(\$/Mile):	0.10
MIG Per Civilian (Lb):	18,004.00	Avg Mil Tour Length (Years):	4.10
Total MIG Cost (\$/100Lb):	35.00	Routine PCS(\$/Pers/Tour):	6,437.00
Air Transport (\$/Pass Mile):	0.20	One-Time Off PCS Cost(\$):	9,142.00
Misc Exp (\$/Direct Employ):	700.00	One-Time Enl PCS Cost(\$):	9,761.00

STANDARD FACTORS SCREEN FOUR - MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Category	UM	\$/UM	Category	UM	\$/UM
Horizontal	(SY)	0	OTHER	(SF)	0
Waterfront	(LF)	0	Optional Category B	( )	0
Air Operations	(SF)	0	Optional Category C	( )	0
Operational	(SF)	0	Optional Category D	( )	0
Administrative	(SF)	0	Optional Category E	( )	0
School Buildings	(SF)	0	Optional Category F	( )	0
Maintenance Shops	(SF)	0	Optional Category G	( )	0
Bachelor Quarters	(SF)	0	Optional Category H	( )	0
Family Quarters	(EA)	0	Optional Category I	( )	0
Covered Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category J	( )	0
Dining Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category K	( )	0
Recreation Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category L	( )	0
Communications Facil	(SF)	0	Optional Category M	( )	0
Shipyards Maintenance	(SF)	0	Optional Category N	( )	0
RDT & E Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category O	( )	0
PCF Storage	(BL)	0	Optional Category P	( )	0
Ammunition Storage	(SF)	0	Optional Category Q	( )	0
Medical Facilities	(SF)	0	Optional Category R	( )	0
Environmental	( )	0			



# T&E Activity Profile

## Baseline Summary

### Workload, Capacity, Excess Capacity

by

### Functional Area & Test Facility Category

#### AIR VEHICLES SUMMARY

Core and Non-Core Sites

TFC	Workload	Capacity	Excess Capacity	Percent Excess
<b>DMS Total</b>	1,273	3,380	2,107	62%
<b>HITL Total</b>	114,171	166,054	51,883	31%
<b>IL Total</b>	81,806	193,167	58,361	41%
<b>ISTF Total</b>	9,674	16,087	6,413	40%
<b>MF-A Total</b>	2,631	6,155	3,524	57%
<b>MF-C Total</b>	1,136	2,091	955	46%
<b>MF-E Total</b>	23,158	35,314	12,156	34%
<b>MF-EM Total</b>	943	3,347	2,404	72%
<b>MF-G Total</b>	30,719	47,487	16,768	35%
<b>MF-P Total</b>	25,854	37,155	11,301	30%
<b>MF-ST Total</b>	170	614	444	72%
<b>OAR Total</b>	27,578	53,761	26,183	49%
<b>AV Total</b>	<b>319,113</b>	<b>509,612</b>	<b>190,499</b>	<b>37%</b>

#### ELECTRONIC COMBAT SUMMARY

Core and Non-Core Sites

TFC	Workload	Capacity	Excess Capacity	Percent Excess
<b>DM&amp;S Total</b>	246	1,010	764	76%
<b>HITL Total</b>	2,833	10,590	7,757	73%
<b>IL Total</b>	5,317	8,434	3,117	37%
<b>ISTF Total</b>	3,604	6,752	3,148	47%
<b>MF-C Total</b>	298	1,226	928	76%
<b>MF-E Total</b>	2,174	5,431	3,257	60%
<b>MF-EM Total</b>	4,929	7,927	2,998	38%
<b>MF-G Total</b>	1,728	2,400	672	28%
<b>MF-RCS Total</b>	6,674	13,763	7,089	52%
<b>MF-Sig Total</b>	826	1,516	690	46%
<b>OAR Total</b>	2,771	5,860	3,089	53%
<b>EC Total</b>	<b>31,400</b>	<b>64,909</b>	<b>33,509</b>	<b>52%</b>

#### ARMAMENT / WEAPONS SUMMARY

Core and Non-Core Sites

TFC	Workload	Capacity	Excess Capacity	Percent Excess
<b>DMS Total</b>	55,305	93,574	38,269	41%
<b>HITL Total</b>	52,667	76,680	24,013	31%
<b>IL Total</b>	13,368	26,854	13,486	50%
<b>ISTF Total</b>	792	1,374	582	42%
<b>MF-E Total</b>	56,129	142,304	86,175	61%
<b>MF-EM Total</b>	2,096	3,626	1,530	42%
<b>MF-G Total</b>	44,228	86,726	42,498	49%
<b>MF-GO Total</b>	14,296	27,344	13,048	48%
<b>MF-P Total</b>	6,801	17,312	10,511	61%
<b>MF-ST Total</b>	2,608	5,944	3,336	56%
<b>OAR Total</b>	31,742	68,857	37,115	54%
<b>AW Total</b>	<b>280,032</b>	<b>550,595</b>	<b>270,563</b>	<b>49%</b>

#### Test Facility Category Legend

<b>DMS</b>	Digital Modelling/Simulation
<b>HITL</b>	Hardware-in-the-Loop
<b>IL</b>	Integration Lab
<b>ISTF</b>	Installed System Test Facility
<b>MF</b>	Measurement Facility (various)
<b>MF-A</b>	Avionics & A/C Subsystems
<b>MF-C</b>	Comm/Nav/Antenna
<b>MF-E</b>	Environmental
<b>MF-EM</b>	Electro Magnetic Env Effects
<b>MF-G</b>	Guidance/Seeker/Sensor/Sig
<b>MF-GO</b>	Guns/Ordnance/Warheads
<b>MF-P</b>	Propulsion
<b>MF-ST</b>	Sled Tracks
<b>MF-RCS</b>	Radar Cross Section
<b>MF-Sig</b>	Signature
<b>OAR</b>	Open Air Range



# T&E Activity Profile

## Non Core Sites Realigned

### Workload, Capacity, Excess Capacity

by

### Functional Area & Test Facility Category

<b>AIR VEHICLES SUMMARY</b>				
Core and Non-Core Sites				
TFC	Workload	Capacity	Rev Excess	Percent Excess
<b>DMS Total</b>	1,273	1,987	714	36%
<b>HITL Total</b>	114,171	163,371	49,200	30%
<b>IL Total</b>	81,806	123,879	42,073	34%
<b>ISTF Total</b>	9,674	16,087	6,413	40%
<b>MF-A Total</b>	2,631	6,155	3,524	57%
<b>MF-C Total</b>	1,136	2,091	955	46%
<b>MF-E Total</b>	23,158	28,420	5,262	19%
<b>MF-EM Total</b>	943	943	0	0%
<b>MF-G Total</b>	30,719	47,487	16,768	35%
<b>MF-P Total</b>	25,854	37,155	11,301	30%
<b>MF-ST Total</b>	170	614	444	72%
<b>OAR Total</b>	27,578	39,704	* 12,126	31%
<b>AV Total</b>	<b>319,113</b>	<b>467,893</b>	<b>148,780</b>	<b>32%</b>

\* Total closure of Non-Core capacity would have reduced excess cap to 11,507. However, addtl. cap. of 619 was added to accommodate relocated wkld - -resulting in a final excess of 12,126

<b>ARMAMENT / WEAPONS SUMMARY</b>				
Core and Non-Core Sites				
TFC	Workload	Capacity	Rev Excess	Percent Excess
<b>DMS Total</b>	55,305	93,574	38,269	41%
<b>HITL Total</b>	52,667	76,680	24,013	31%
<b>IL Total</b>	13,368	26,854	13,486	50%
<b>ISTF Total</b>	792	1,374	582	42%
<b>MF-E Total</b>	56,129	125,973	69,844	55%
<b>MF-EM Total</b>	2,096	2,615	519	20%
<b>MF-G Total</b>	44,228	56,007	11,779	21%
<b>MF-GO Total</b>	14,296	25,124	10,828	43%
<b>MF-P Total</b>	6,801	15,312	8,511	56%
<b>MF-ST Total</b>	2,608	5,944	3,336	56%
<b>OAR Total</b>	31,742	67,669	35,927	53%
<b>AW Total</b>	<b>280,032</b>	<b>497,126</b>	<b>217,094</b>	<b>44%</b>

<b>ELECTRONIC COMBAT SUMMARY</b>				
Core and Non-Core Sites				
TFC	Workload	Capacity	Rev Excess	Percent Excess
<b>DM&amp;S Total</b>	246	1,010	764	76%
<b>HITL Total</b>	2,833	420	** -2413	0%
<b>IL Total</b>	5,317	8,434	3,117	37%
<b>ISTF Total</b>	3,604	6,752	3,148	47%
<b>MF-C Total</b>	298	1,226	928	76%
<b>MF-E Total</b>	2,174	5,431	3,257	60%
<b>MF-EM Total</b>	4,929	4,929	0	0%
<b>MF-G Total</b>	1,728	2,400	672	28%
<b>MF-RCS Total</b>	6,674	13,763	7,089	52%
<b>MF-Sig Total</b>	826	1,516	690	46%
<b>OAR Total</b>	2,771	5,860	3,089	53%
<b>EC Total</b>	<b>31,400</b>	<b>51,741</b>	<b>20,341</b>	<b>39%</b>

\*\* The JCSG analysis assumed the excess HITL wkld could be accomplished using the ISTF excess capacity of 3,148 hours.

<b>Test Facility Category Legend</b>	
<b>DMS</b>	Digital Modelling/Simulation
<b>HITL</b>	Hardware-in-the-Loop
<b>IL</b>	Integration Lab
<b>ISTF</b>	Installed System Test Facility
<b>MF</b>	Measurement Facility (various)
<b>MF-A</b>	Avionics & A/C Subsystems
<b>MF-C</b>	Comm/Nav/Antenna
<b>MF-E</b>	Environmental
<b>MF-EM</b>	Electro Magnetic Env Effects
<b>MF-G</b>	Guidance/Seeker/Sensor/Sig
<b>MF-GO</b>	Guns/Ordnance/Warheads
<b>MF-P</b>	Propulsion
<b>MF-ST</b>	Sled Tracks
<b>MF-RCS</b>	Radar Cross Section
<b>MF-Sig</b>	Signature
<b>OAR</b>	Open Air Range

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950424-21

FROM: FARR, SAM	TO: BROWN, ED
TITLE: REP. (CA)	TITLE: ARMY TEAM LEADER
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: FORT HUNTER LIGGETT	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Direct Response
	FYI
	✓
	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions

Subject/Remarks:

THANK YOU FOR VISITING BASE.

Due Date:	Routing Date: 950424	Date Originated: 950420	Mail Date:
-----------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515

SAM FARR  
CALIFORNIA

April 20, 1995

LTC Stephen Bailey  
Senior Analyst  
Defense Base Closure &  
Realignment Commission  
1700 N. Moore St., Suite 1425  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear LTC Bailey:

Thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule today to meet with members of the Fort Hunter Liggett community task force.

I appreciate your interest in the Fort Hunter Liggett community's input, and look forward to working with you.

Please let me know if there is ever any assistance my office can provide you.

Thank you again for your time and interest.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Sam Farr", written in a cursive style.

SAM FARR  
Member of Congress

SF:db



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515

SAM FARR  
CALIFORNIA

April 20, 1995

Mr. Edward A. Brown III  
Army Team Leader  
Defense Base Closure &  
Realignment Commission  
1700 N. Moore St., Suite 1425  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Brown:

Thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule today to meet with members of the Fort Hunter Liggett community task force.

I appreciate your interest in the Fort Hunter Liggett community's input, and look forward to working with you.

Please let me know if there is ever any assistance my office can provide you.

Thank you again for your time and interest.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Sam Farr", written in a cursive style.

SAM FARR  
Member of Congress

SF:db

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950424-22

FROM: COLLIN, RICK	TO: GOODE, CHRIS
TITLE: COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTOR	TITLE: DIRECTOR OF ADMIN
ORGANIZATION: GOVERNOR'S OFFICE ND.	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: MINOT & GRAND FORKS AFB	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION	✓			AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES				LIBRARY	✓		


TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING TESTIMONY OF GOV EDWARD T. SCHAFER AT GRAND FORKS REGIONAL HEARING.

Due Date:                      Routing Date: 950424 Date Originated: 950418 Mail Date:



EDWARD T. SCHAFER  
GOVERNOR

## State of North Dakota

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR  
600 E. Boulevard - Ground Floor  
BISMARCK, NORTH DAKOTA 58505-0001  
(701) 224-2200

Apr. 18, 1995

Dear Chris:

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950424-22

As we discussed, here are 2 copies  
of the Governor's statement to the BRAC  
Commission in Grand Forks Mar. 30, to  
include his ad lib remarks.

I understand they will be included  
in the official records. Thank you for  
your help.

Sincerely,  
Phil Collins



EDWARD T. SCHAFER  
GOVERNOR

# State of North Dakota

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR  
600 E. BOULEVARD — GROUND FLOOR  
BISMARCK, NORTH DAKOTA 58505-0001  
(701) 224-2200

**TESTIMONY OF GOVERNOR EDWARD T. SCHAFER  
AIR BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION  
GRAND FORKS, ND  
THURSDAY, MARCH 30, 1995**

Members of the BRAC Committee, and fellow North Dakotans. Thank you for the opportunity to present our views on the future of the Air Force bases in Minot and Grand Forks. We gather here tonight with the knowledge that many challenges confront our state in the coming months. While there isn't a crystal ball in which to look to foretell the future, we do know that, for now, the future is unclear.

Fortunately, North Dakotans have great trust in our nation's military leaders. We are confident they understand, and will remain true to the principle that the global responsibilities of the United States Air Force demand balance, flexibility, and readiness.

Not only do the bases play a key role in our overall defense strategy, they play a vital role in North Dakota's economy. Minot and Grand Forks weathered the recession of the late 1980s and early '90s, and both are on the rebound thanks to more jobs in manufacturing, health care, and telecommunications. But it goes without saying that removing the 321st Missile Group in Grand Forks or the 91st Missile Group at Minot would have an adverse impact -- both financially and psychologically -- on the communities, the region, and the entire state.

The Air Force currently provides North Dakota with about \$600 million in direct economic and military aid, and indirect assistance brings the total to more than one billion dollars when computing the amount of capital that flows to maintain the facilities that support our servicemen and women. Now, a billion

dollars may not be much in states like Florida and California, but to North Dakota, these dollars are very significant. Obviously, the military presence has become a part of our daily life, and the arguments for retaining dual missions for both Minot and Grand Forks air bases are strong.

Civic leaders in both cities have rededicated themselves to the task of building strong and viable communities... to strengthening local resources and small businesses that serve our friends in the military... and to providing excellent educational facilities to train our youngsters for the needs of the future.

I don't think you will find better interaction or stronger ties between a base and a community anywhere in the system than in Grand Forks and Minot.

Minot Air Force Base and Grand Forks Air Force Base are more than military installations, though -- they are home to thousands of our friends. The personnel who live and work at the bases are next-door neighbors.... they are best friends....they are part of our North Dakota family.

The cultural diversity the personnel at these fine installations bring to their respective communities and to North Dakota must not be underestimated. Our quality of life is enhanced by their presence... our quality of education in area schools is improved, and our quality of government is elevated by Air Force interaction with elected officials, both in the capital of Bismarck and on the local level.

Tonight, we display our affection for the outstanding men and women stationed at the two air bases -- men and women who draw their strengths, their performance capabilities and their values from the communities of Minot and Grand Forks.

In closing, I again, on behalf of all the people of North Dakota, extend a hand of friendship and hospitality. The same hand we extend every day to the servicemen and women who are stationed in our state. We humbly ask you to give fair consideration to keeping our Air Force bases at Grand Forks and Minot whole and integral parts of our communities. As Governor, I can guarantee you that missions based in North Dakota will best deliver the global mission of the United States Air Force.



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950425-1

FROM: JOHNSTON, PATRICK	TO: DIXON
TITLE: STATE SENATOR	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: CA. LEGISLATURE	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: ROUGH AND READY ISLAND	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
				COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER		X	
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	Prepare Direct Response
ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	FYI

Subject/Remarks:  
 SUPPORTING PART OF STOCKTON'S PLAN TO TAKE OVER  
 MANAGEMENT OF ROUGH AND READY ISLAND.

Due Date: 950427	Routing Date: 950425	Date Originated: 950420	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------

REPLY TO:

CAPITOL OFFICE  
ROOM 5066  
STATE CAPITOL  
SACRAMENTO, CA 95814  
(916) 445-2407

DISTRICT OFFICES

31 E. CHANNEL STREET  
ROOM 440  
STOCKTON, CA 95202  
(209) 948-7930  
FAX (209) 948-7993

1020 N STREET,  
ROOM 504  
SACRAMENTO, CA 95814  
(916) 323-4306  
FAX (916) 327-8729

# SENATE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE



SENATOR  
PATRICK JOHNSTON

FIFTH SENATORIAL DISTRICT  
SERVING SACRAMENTO AND SAN JOAQUIN COUNTIES

COMMITTEES:  
APPROPRIATIONS  
CHAIR  
CONSTITUTIONAL  
AMENDMENTS  
INSURANCE  
LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
NATURAL RESOURCES  
& WILDLIFE  
TRANSPORTATION

April 20, 1995

Please refer to this Senator  
when responding 450425-1

Alan Dickson  
Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Ralignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dickson:

It has come to my attention that the Port of Stockton has asked the BRAC Commission to realign the U.S. Navy facility on Rough and Ready Island in San Joaquin County.

Port Director Alex Krygsman tells me the Port of Stockton is prepared to take over the management, operation and maintenance of Rough and Ready Island. Included in the Port's plan for this property is a provision for the U.S. Navy and other federal agencies to continue using the island for their respective operations.

The Port plans to introduce maritime activities on the island as space is made available in order to extend its current operations which are now adjacent to Rough and Ready Island.

I strongly support the Port of Stockton's request to the BRAC Commission to realign Rough and Ready Island for the purposes described above. Port acquisition of the island makes good economic sense for the federal government and for our community. Your favorable consideration of this request is appreciated.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "P. Johnston", written over the typed name.

PATRICK JOHNSTON  
Senator, 5th District

PJ:lbg



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

950425-1R1

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

**COMMISSIONERS:**

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

May 2, 1995

The Honorable Patrick Johnson  
Senator, California Legislature  
Room 5066  
State Capitol  
Sacramento, California 95814

Dear Senator Johnson:

Thank you for your letter requesting the Commission to consider realigning the functions of the Naval Communications Station on Rough and Ready Island. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

The Base Closure and Realignment Act provides that any additions to the list of bases recommended for closure or realignment by the Secretary of Defense must be published in the Federal Register by May 17. This would include any decisions to reconsider a previous Commission's actions if such action had not been recommended by the Secretary. In order to have a base added to this list, a Commissioner must offer a motion to add an installation for consideration. A majority of the Commissioners must support such a motion for the base to be added for consideration.

You may be certain that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis process.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I can be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950425-2

FROM: <u>BALDUS, AL</u>	TO: <u>DIXON</u>
TITLE: <u>STATE REP.</u>	TITLE: <u>CHAIRMAN</u>
ORGANIZATION: <u>STATE OF WISCONSIN</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCRC</u>
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED: <u>PROJECT ELF</u>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER		X	
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Direct Response
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FYI


Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING DBCRC CLOSE THE NAUY'S PROJECT ELF TRANSMITTER.

Due Date: <u>950427</u>	Routing Date: <u>950425</u>	Date Originated: <u>950418</u>	Mail Date:
-------------------------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	------------

STATE REPRESENTATIVE

AL BALDUS



CHAIR:  
 Committee on Insurance,  
 Securities & Corporate Policy

COMMITTEE MEMBER:  
 Colleges & Universities  
 Financial Institutions and Housing  
 Veterans & Military Affairs

ADVISORY MEMBER:  
 Minnesota-Wisconsin  
 Boundary Area Commission

April 18, 1995

Alan J. Dixon, Chairman  
 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (DBCRC)  
 1700 N Moore St, Suite 1425  
 Arlington, VA 22209

Please refer to this number  
 when responding 950425-2

Dear Mr. Dixon:

This letter is in regard to the Navy's Project ELF transmitter located in northern Wisconsin.

I have joined several of my legislative colleagues to sponsor a resolution in Wisconsin recommending the closure of the ELF transmitter. It is my understanding that the ELF base meets the three principal criteria that are considered by DBCRC for base closures: a lack of military or national security need; an unjustifiable federal expense; and a potential environmental or health hazard.

I write this letter from a unique perspective. Having served in Congress, I know how some Congressmen fight "tooth and nail" to salvage a military project or base in their home district. That is not the case on this project. U.S. Senators Herb Kohl and Russ Feingold along with Congressman Dave Obey are all in favor of closing the ELF transmitter. Clearly, there is neither a need for nor support of this project.

I thank you in advance for your attention to this matter, and I respectfully request that you strongly consider eliminating the ELF transmitter in northern Wisconsin when DBCRC considers other base closings.

Sincerely,

*Al Baldus*  
 F.M.C.

AL BALDUS  
 State Representative  
 29th Assembly District

AB/rr



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number  
950425-2R1

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:  
AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 26, 1995

The Honorable Al Baldus  
State Representative, 29th District  
Wisconsin State Legislature  
P.O. Box 8952  
Madison, Wisconsin 53708

Dear Representative Baldus:


Thank you for your letter urging the Commission to consider adding the Project ELF transmitter near Clam Lake, WI to the list of bases to be closed. You may be assured that I will share your thoughts with the other members of the Commission.

The Base Closure and Realignment Act provides that any additions to the list of bases recommended for closure or realignment by the Secretary of Defense must be published in the Federal Register by May 17. This would include any decisions to reconsider a previous Commission's actions if such action had not been recommended by the Secretary. In order to have a base added to this list, a Commissioner must offer a motion to add an installation for consideration. A majority of the Commissioners must support such a motion for the base to be added for consideration.

The information that you have provided will be placed in the Commission's library and utilized by the Commission in our review and analysis process.

I look forward to working with you. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of additional assistance as we go through this difficult and challenging process.

Sincerely,



Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cw

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950425-3

FROM: <b>GOLDSMITH, STEWEN</b>	TO: <b>DIXON</b>
TITLE: <b>MAYOR</b>	TITLE: <b>CHAIRMAN</b>
ORGANIZATION: <b>INDIANAPOLIS, IN</b>	ORGANIZATION: <b>DBCRC</b>
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: <b>NAWC INDIANAPOLIS</b>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON	✓			COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Direct Response
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓ <input type="checkbox"/> FYI

Subject/Remarks:

LETTER SUMMARIZING THEIR PRESENTATION AT THE CHICAGO REGIONAL HEARING REGARDING NAWC, INDIANAPOLIS.

Due Date:

Routing Date: **950425**

Date Originated: **950419**

Mail Date:



CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS  
STEPHEN GOLDSMITH  
MAYOR

April 19, 1995

Honorable Alan Dixon  
Chairman  
Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950425-3

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I appreciated the opportunity to testify before you and your colleagues regarding the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) in Indianapolis at the April 12th Base Closure and Realignment Commission Midwest Regional hearing in Chicago, Illinois. We hope you found our presentation describing our unique public-private partnership proposal to be informative and beneficial.

The following points summarize our presentation:

1. Saves at least \$150 million as compared to the real costs of implementing the Department of Navy's (DoN) and Department of Defense's (DoD) recommendation.
2. No risk to DoN and DoD to implement this plan (risk will be borne by the City of Indianapolis by assuming ownership of land, building and excess equipment, including associated maintenance overhead costs and private sector partners through capital investment in the new business).
3. NAWC-Indianapolis is a "knowledge factory" and by closing the facility and dispersing people and technology to three different sites, DoN and DoD will lose valuable integrated capability which will not allow the military to fulfill the roles of: a) smart buyer for acquisitions, b) emergency response design, development and manufacturing, and c) dual use/technology transfer (two-way) between the federal government and private industry.
4. We have spoken with a number of private sector companies regarding their interest in partnering with the city and federal government on this initiative. Companies such as: a) Science Applications International Corporation, b) Magnavox, c) Rolls Royce-Allison Engine, and d) Babcock & Wilcox. Purdue University and ESOP Advisors, Inc. (the firm which created the new employee owned private company at the Newark [Ohio] Air Force Base) have also expressed an interest in participating in our proposed public-private partnership.






April 19, 1995  
Page Two

5. Significant errors were made in the Military Value Assessment (MVA) for NAWC-Indianapolis. Indianapolis received zeroes for its core capabilities: 1) full-spectrum life cycle responsibility, b) total systems responsibility, c) system integration responsibility, and d) component integration responsibility, even though DoN and DoD wishes to move these functions at a great cost (over \$50 million) to Pax River, Maryland, China Lake, California and Crane, Indiana (only 90 miles from NAWC-Indianapolis).
5. Significant errors in COBRA data submitted by DoN and DoD to BCRC. Based on information submitted by DoN and DoD, the one time costs to close NAWC equals \$77.6 million and annual savings of \$39.2 million, but based on data submitted by NAWC to DoN, the real one-time cost equals \$187.4 million and annual savings of \$9.9 million, while our partnership proposal's one-time cost equals \$20.3 million and annual savings equals \$12 million. In fact, the budget submitted by NAWC to DoN last week estimates the closure costs for NAWC at \$250 million.
6. The recommendation we respectfully request from the BCRC is to adopt the public-private partnership proposal versus the recommended scenario by DoN and DoD to the BCRC.

I appreciated your attention during our presentation. My staff and I look forward to working with you and your staff during the next two and one-half months. I look forward to discussing this proposal with you in person soon. Thank you for your consideration!

Yours truly,



Stephen Goldsmith

SG:lp

cc: Larry Gigerich, Executive Assistant for Economic Development

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950425-4

FROM: <u>EUANS, DIANNE R.</u>	TO: <u>DIXON</u>
TITLE: <u>CHAIRMAN</u>	TITLE: <u>CHAIRMAN</u>
ORGANIZATION: <u>COUNTY COUNCIL OF ANNE ARUNDEL</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCRC</u>
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: <u>NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER, ANNAPOLIS</u>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		⊙		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER		X	
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							


TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Direct Response
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING COPY OF RESOLUTION NO. 22-95,  
WHICH REQUESTS DBCRC TO NOT CLOSE CENTER

Due Date: <u>950427</u>	Routing Date: <u>950425</u>	Date Originated: <u>950418</u>	Mail Date:
-------------------------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	------------



COUNTY COUNCIL OF ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY

DIANE R. EVANS  
CHAIRMAN

GEORGE F. BACHMAN  
VICE-CHAIRMAN

JAMES E. DeGRANGE, SR.  
THOMAS W. REDMOND, SR.  
BERT L. RICE  
WILLIAM C. MULFORD, II  
JOHN J. KLOCKO, III

April 18, 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon, Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington Virginia 22209

Dear Senator Dixon:

Enclosed is a copy of Resolution No. 22-95, passed by the County Council on April 17, 1995. This Resolution urges the Federal Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to reject the recommendation of the Department of Defense to close the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Annapolis.

As you know, this federal facility plays an important role in the economic life of Annapolis and Anne Arundel County. We earnestly and respectfully request your support in continuing the Center's vital role in our defense posture.

Very truly yours,

Diane R. Evans  
Chairman

ps  
Enclosure

Box 2700 • Annapolis • Maryland 21404  
Phones • 222-1401 • 222-6890  
FAX • 222-1755 • 222-6774

COUNTY COUNCIL OF ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND

Legislative Session 1995, Legislative Day No. 8

Resolution No. 22-95

Introduced by The Entire Council

By the County Council, April 17, 1995

1                   **RESOLUTION URGING THE FEDERAL DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE**  
2                   **AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION TO REJECT THE RECOMMENDATION**  
3                   **OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO CLOSE**  
4                   **THE NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER, ANNAPOLIS**

5  
6                   **WHEREAS, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Annapolis (NSWC), located on the**  
7                   **Severn River directly across from the United States Naval Academy, has been an**  
8                   **integral part of the Annapolis and Anne Arundel County community since 1908; and**  
9

10                   **WHEREAS, NSWC plays a vital role in the research, development and testing of**  
11                   **technologies for the Navy's surface and undersea vehicles of the 21st century and**  
12                   **beyond; and**  
13

14                   **WHEREAS, the facility employs scientists, engineers and technicians of the highest**  
15                   **professional achievement whose productive alliances with private industry and**  
16                   **academia have been of mutual benefit; and**  
17

18                   **WHEREAS, the location of the facility in Annapolis allowed the sharing of**  
19                   **knowledge and expertise with the resources of the Naval Academy and other**  
20                   **Washington/Baltimore area institutions; and**  
21

22                   **WHEREAS, the loss of this important facility would undermine the strength of the**  
23                   **intellectual, family and economic life of Anne Arundel County; and**  
24


25                   **WHEREAS, closing NSWC would result in the loss of over 400 military and**  
26                   **civilian jobs and a far greater number in terms of the buying power of these**  
27                   **employees and their families; now, therefore, be it**  
28

29                   *Resolved by the County Council of Anne Arundel County, Maryland, That it hereby*  
30                   **urges the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to reject the**  
31                   **recommendation of the Department of Defense to close the Naval Surface Warfare Center,**  
32                   **Annapolis; and be it further**  
33


34                   *Resolved, That a copy of this Resolution be sent to the members of the Base Closure*  
35                   **and Realignment Commission, the Maryland Congressional Delegation, the Governor of**  
36                   **Maryland, and the Anne Arundel County Delegation to the Maryland General Assembly.**

READ AND PASSED this 17th day of April, 1995

By Order

  
Judy C. Holmes  
Administrative Officer

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT RESOLUTION NO. 22-95 IS TRUE AND CORRECT AND DULY  
ADOPTED BY THE COUNTY COUNCIL OF ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY.

  
Diane R. Evans  
Chairman



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number  
when recording 950425-421

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

**COMMISSIONERS:**

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 25, 1995

Ms. Diane R. Evans  
Chairman, County Council  
of Anne Arundel County  
Box 2700  
Annapolis, Maryland 21404


Dear Ms. Evans:

Thank you for your letter providing the Commission with a copy of Resolution No. 22-95 adopted by the County Council of Anne Arundel County opposing the recommended closure of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Annapolis. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations regarding the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Annapolis.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,



Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cw

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950425-5

FROM: CANADA, ROBERT G.	TO: DIXON
TITLE: MAYOR	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: HAWAIIAN GARDENS, CA	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
				COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER		X	
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Direct Response
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FYI

Subject/Remarks:

LETTER OF SUPPORT.

Due Date: 950427	Routing Date: 950425	Date Originated: 950419	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------

"Our Youth - Our Future"



# CITY OF HAWAIIAN GARDENS

ROBERT G. CANADA  
MAYOR

KATHLEEN M. NAVEJAS  
MAYOR PRO TEM

LUPE A. CABRERA  
COUNCIL MEMBER

ROBERT J. PRIDA  
COUNCIL MEMBER

RENE R. FLORES  
COUNCIL MEMBER

April 19, 1995

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950425-5

The Honorable Alan Dixon, Chairman  
and Honorable Commission Members  
Defense B.R.A.C.  
1700 North Moore Street (#1425)  
Arlington VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

The Hawaiian Gardens City Council has been advised that you will be conducting hearings in San Francisco on April 27 and 28, 1995 regarding the 1996 closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. We are very concerned about the shipyard; many employees are residents of small cities surrounding the Long Beach area, and the economics of a closure will be widely felt.


The Long Beach Naval Shipyard, due to the outstanding and efficient work of its highly skilled and dedicated work force, is the most profitable public shipyard in the U S, netting \$102,700,000 over the last six (6) years.

We respectfully request that you address the base closure, and the potential economical consequences to our cities in Southern California.

Sincerely,

Robert G. Canada  
Mayor  
City of Hawaiian Gardens

Enclosures



# CITY OF HAWAIIAN GARDENS

ROBERT G. CANADA  
MAYOR

KATHLEEN M. NAVEJAS  
MAYOR PRO TEM

LUPE A. CABRERA  
COUNCIL MEMBER

ROBERT J. PRIDA  
COUNCIL MEMBER

RENE R. FLORES  
COUNCIL MEMBER

April 19, 1995

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D C 20500


Dear President Clinton:

The City Council of Hawaiian Gardens is concerned with the possible 1996 closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. The shipyard employees are residents of many small cities surrounding the Long Beach area, hence the effect of a closure will be widely felt.


Hearings by the Base Realignment and Closing Commission are to be held in San Francisco on April 27 and 28, 1995, Chaired by The Honorable Alan Dixon, former Democratic US Senator from Illinois. Time is short. The Long Beach Naval Shipyard, due to the outstanding and efficient work of its highly skilled and dedicated work force, is the most profitable public shipyard in the US, netting \$102,700,000 over the last six (6) years.

We respectfully request that you address the base closure, and the potential economical consequences to Southern California.

Sincerely,

  
Robert G. Canada, Mayor

  
Kathleen M. Navejas,  
Mayor Pro tem

  
Lupe A. Cabrera,  
Council Member

  
Robert J. Prida,  
Council Member

  
Rene R. Flores,  
Council Member





# CITY OF HAWAIIAN GARDENS

ROBERT G. CANADA  
MAYOR

KATHLEEN M. NAVEJAS  
MAYOR PRO TEM

LUPE A. CABRERA  
COUNCIL MEMBER

ROBERT J. PRIDA  
COUNCIL MEMBER

RENE R. FLORES  
COUNCIL MEMBER

April 19, 1995

The Honorable Al Gore  
Vice President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D C 20500

Dear Vice President Gore:

The City Council of Hawaiian Gardens is concerned with the possible 1996 closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. The shipyard employees are residents of many small cities surrounding the Long Beach area, hence the effect of a closure will be widely felt.

Hearings by the Base Realignment and Closing Commission are to be held in San Francisco on April 27 and 28, 1995, Chaired by The Honorable Alan Dixon, former Democratic US Senator from Illinois. Time is short. The Long Beach Naval Shipyard, due to the outstanding and efficient work of its highly skilled and dedicated work force, is the most profitable public shipyard in the US, netting \$102,700,000 over the last six (6) years.

We respectfully request that you address the base closure, and the potential economical consequences to Southern California.

Sincerely,

Robert G. Canada, Mayor

Kathleen M. Navejas,  
Mayor Pro Tem

Lupe A. Cabrera,  
Council Member

Robert J. Prida,  
Council Member

Rene R. Flores,  
Council Member



"Our Youth - Our Future"

# CITY OF HAWAIIAN GARDENS

ROBERT G. CANADA  
MAYOR

KATHLEEN M. NAVEJAS  
MAYOR PRO TEM

LUPE A. CABRERA  
COUNCIL MEMBER

ROBERT J. PRIDA  
COUNCIL MEMBER

RENE R. FLORES  
COUNCIL MEMBER

April 19, 1995

The Honorable Edward Royce  
U S House of Representatives  
1133 Longworth Building  
Washington, D C 20515

Dear Senator Royce:

The City Council of Hawaiian Gardens is concerned with the possible 1996 closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. The shipyard employees are residents of many small cities surrounding the Long Beach area, hence the effect of a closure will be widely felt.

Hearings by the Base Realignment and Closing Commission are to be held in San Francisco on April 27 and 28, 1995, Chaired by The Honorable Alan Dixon, former Democratic US Senator from Illinois. Time is short. The Long Beach Naval Shipyard, due to the outstanding and efficient work of its highly skilled and dedicated work force, is the most profitable public shipyard in the US, netting \$102,700,000 over the last six (6) years.

We respectfully request that you address the base closure, and the potential economical consequences to Southern California.

Sincerely,

Robert G. Canada, Mayor

Kathleen M. Navejas,  
Mayor Pro tem

Lupe A. Cabrera,  
Council Member

Robert J. Prida,  
Council Member

Rene R. Flores,  
Council Member



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

950425-JR1

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 26, 1995

The Honorable Robert G. Canada  
Mayor, City of Hawaiian Gardens  
21815 Pioneer Boulevard  
Hawaiian Gardens, CA 90716

Dear Mayor Canada:

Thank you for your letter in support of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments. The Commission will hold a Regional Hearing on Friday, April 28 at 1:00 PM at the Westin Hotel, 1 Old Bayshore Highway, in Millbrae, California, to hear testimony from the affected communities in California. The State of California has been allotted 275 minutes for its testimony at the hearing.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations regarding the Long Beach Naval Shipyard.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cw

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950425-6

FROM: DE THRAGE, DAVID	TO: DIXON
TITLE: MAYOR	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: CITY OF ANNISTON	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: FORT MCCLELLAN	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Direct Response
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FYI

Subject/Remarks:  
 LETTER OF SUPPORT FOR THE RETENTION OF THE CHEMICAL DEFENSE TRAINING FACILITY AT FORT MCCLELLAN.

Due Date: 950427	Routing Date: 950425	Date Originated: 950419	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------



CITY OF ANNISTON

P. O. BOX 670  
ANNISTON, ALABAMA 36202

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950425-6

April 19, 1995

Mr. Alan Dixon, Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I am writing this letter today to express my individual support and belief that the overwhelming majority of the citizens of Anniston support the retention of the Chemical Defense Training Facility at Fort McClellan.

Chairman Dixon, the history of this community's support of the military is unique and well documented. The original location of Fort McClellan in Calhoun County resulted in part from a willingness of our city to purchase the land and give it to the United States Army for its use. Through the decades of its existence, Fort McClellan has always been viewed as a partner and asset to this community.

The construction of the Chemical Defense Training Facility at Fort McClellan in the mid 1980's was made without any opposition; not because this community is naive but because we are patriotic. The assets represented at Fort McClellan of over 6 million square feet of buildings and approximately 40,000 acres of land represent a huge resource to the Department of Defense and the United States of America.

There is currently permanent party personnel from all branches of the armed forces located at Fort McClellan, as well as an ongoing international presence as our country's allies and former enemies come to train and review the chemical decontamination procedures offered.

The linchpin of the defense of Fort McClellan has been and will continue to be its critical and significant military value. From a geographical standpoint, Fort McClellan offers ease of international mobilization through the ocean ports at Mobile and

Page Two  
April 19, 1995

Savannah, Georgia and the Atlanta and Birmingham airport facilities. It should also be noted that our own municipal airport has landed C-5 cargo aircraft. Our region has an abundance of natural resources and an extremely low cost of living. We have in Alabama: an inexpensive tax structure, an abundant supply of housing, and outstanding recreational opportunities which all serve to increase the quality of life for soldiers stationed at Fort McClellan.

The army is projecting a potential job loss of over 10,700 jobs should Fort McClellan close and there be no economic recovery. This number represents approximately 18% of the local work force and an undetermined portion of the local total payroll. Speaking very selfishly, I think this represents an excessive loss to our community. In view of Fort McClellan's severe environmentally impacted properties, the likelihood of quick reuse and substantial economic recovery is doubtful.


It must also be noted that this community has generally embraced the concept of incineration of the chemical weapons currently stored at Anniston Army Depot. We did this knowing the substantial skills and assets at Fort McClellan would be available in the event of a chemical disaster in association with that process. The Army's proposal to leave "a contingency" for this purpose has been neither defined nor budgeted.

Chairman Dixon, basically what I am trying to express here is this community embraces Fort McClellan and we value our country. If we truly believed it were in the best interest of our country to close Fort McClellan, we would be extremely supportive of this effort regardless of the local economic impact. I pray the close examination of Fort McClellan's assets and the pitfalls of the projected savings proposal will reveal Fort McClellan's ability to again survive the BRAC process intact.

I appreciate your willingness to serve our country in this important role as BRAC Chairman. I wish you well in your deliberations and will of course endorse BRAC's final decision.

Thank you for your consideration.

Very truly yours,



David Dethrage  
Mayor

DD:jd



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number  
950425-621

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

**COMMISSIONERS:**

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTROYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 26, 1995

The Honorable David Dethrage  
Mayor, City of Anniston  
P.O. Box 670  
Anniston, Alabama 36202


Dear Mayor Dethrage:

Thank you for your letter expressing the support of the citizens of Anniston for retention of the Chemical Defense Training Facility at Fort McClellan. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations regarding the Chemical Defense Training Facility at Fort McClellan.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,



Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cw

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950425-7

FROM: <u>EDDINGTON, ROBERT A.</u>	TO: <u>GENERAL</u>
TITLE: <u>PRESIDENT</u>	TITLE:
ORGANIZATION: <u>KING CITY CHAMBER</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCRC</u>
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: <u>FORT HUNTER LIGGETT</u>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Direct Response
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING DBCRC NO RE-ALIGN FORT, BECAUSE OF ECONOMIC IMPACT IT WILL HAVE ON AREA,

Due Date: <u>950502</u>	Routing Date: <u>950425</u>	Date Originated: <u>950417</u>	Mail Date:
-------------------------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	------------



# KING CITY

King City & Southern Monterey County  
Chamber of Commerce & Agriculture  
203 Broadway, King City, CA 93930 • (408) 385-3814

April 17, 1995

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950425-7

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 N. Moore St., Suite 1425  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear BRAC Commissioners:


On behalf of the King City Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture we are writing this letter to voice our concern regarding the downsizing of Fort Hunter Liggett.

We believe that downsizing Fort Hunter Liggett will have a major impact on the economy of our area.

The chamber of commerce did a survey of various local businesses on the economic impact to King City if Fort Hunter Liggett were to downsize. The results showed well over \$2 million would be lost annually to just King City alone; not to mention lost sales tax dollars to our city.

The King City Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture strongly recommend that Fort Liggett be left intact for the economic benefit of our entire area.

Sincerely,



Robert J. Eddington,  
President

enclosure

cc: Supervisor Tom Perkins  
Assemblyman Peter Frusetta  
Congressman Sam Farr  
Senator Henry Mello  
Chief of Staff Leon Panetta  
Senator Dianne Feinstein  
Senator Barbara Boxer  
Colonel Thomas McNerney  
King City Mayor John Myers  
King City Manager Blaine Michaelis  
Red Walkley

# KING CITY

King City & Southern Monterey County  
Chamber of Commerce & Agriculture  
203 Broadway, King City, CA 93930 • (408) 385-3814

## SURVEY - KING CITY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE - MARCH 1995

If 2/3 of Fort Hunter Liggett left the area, what \$ amount of business would you estimate you would lose annually?

### ESTIMATED ANNUAL LOSS

\$ 310,000.00	MOTELS
26,000.00 +	BANKS
88,000.00 +	RENTALS
30,000.00 +	INSURANCE
81,200.00 +	RESTAURANTS
827,000.00 +	RETAIL
<u>630,000.00</u>	OTHER
\$ 1,992,200.00 +	TOTAL



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950425-7R1

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

**COMMISSIONERS:**

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 26, 1995

Mr. Robert J. Eddington  
President, King City Chamber of  
Commerce and Agriculture  
203 Broadway  
King City, California 93930

Dear Mr. Eddington:

Thank you for your letter regarding the Secretary of Defense's recommendation on Fort Hunter Liggett, California. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations on Fort Hunter Liggett.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cw

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950425-8

FROM: <u>COIA, ARTHUR A.</u>	TO: <u>DIXON</u>
TITLE: <u>GENERAL PRESIDENT</u>	TITLE: <u>CHAIRMAN</u>
ORGANIZATION: <u>LIUNA</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCRC</u>
INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES				<u>SYLVIA THOMPSON</u>	✓		

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Direct Response
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓ <input type="checkbox"/> FYI

Subject/Remarks:  
THANK YOU FOR HELPING LIUNA,

Due Date:	Routing Date: <u>950425</u>	Date Originated: <u>950420</u>	Mail Date:
-----------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	------------



LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA

ARTHUR A. COIA  
General President

JAMES J. NORWOOD  
General  
Secretary-Treasurer

MASON M. WARREN  
1st Vice President

R.P. VINALL  
2nd Vice President

JOHN SERPICO  
3rd Vice President

VERE O. HAYNES  
4th Vice President

SAMUEL J. CAIVANO  
5th Vice President

ENRICO MANCINELLI  
6th Vice President

CHUCK BARNES  
7th Vice President

JACK WILKINSON  
8th Vice President

GEORGE R. GUDGER  
9th Vice President

MIKE QUEVEDO, JR.  
10th Vice President

CARL E. BOOKER  
Assistant to the  
General President

ROBERT J. CONNERTON  
General Counsel

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950425-8

April 20, 1995

Senator Alan Dixon  
Base Closure Commission  
1700 North Moore Street  
Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Senator Dixon:

I would like to take this opportunity to thank you and your staff, especially the efforts of Charlie Smith for the time and effort put forth in helping LIUNA.

Your help in our effort to assist displaced base closing personnel in training for a career path has and continues to be very beneficial.

Your attention to this matter is greatly appreciated.

With kind regards, I remain

Fraternally yours,

ARTHUR A. COIA  
General President

dyc

cc: Charlie Smith

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950425-9

FROM: <u>EVANS, LAWE</u>	TO: <u>DIXON</u>
TITLE: <u>REP. (IL)</u>	TITLE: <u>CHAIRMAN</u>
ORGANIZATION: <u>U. S. CONGRESS</u>	ORGANIZATION: <u>DBCRC</u>
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: <u>ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL</u>	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓚ		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER		X	
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

✓	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

RESPONDING TO CONG GLEN BROWDER'S MARCH 31 LETTER; REQUESTING WE CONSIDER <sup>FERRING</sup> THE REBUILD OF TOWED ARTILLERY AND THE GUN MOUNTS FOR SELF PROPELLED HOWITZERS TO RIA.

Due Date: 950427      Routing Date: 950425      Date Originated: 950424      Mail Date:

LANE EVANS  
17TH DISTRICT, ILLINOIS

COMMITTEES:

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON  
VETERANS' AFFAIRS  
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON  
NATURAL RESOURCES

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515-1317**

WASHINGTON OFFICE:  
2335 RAYBURN BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-1317  
(202) 225-5905

DISTRICT OFFICES:  
1535 47TH AVE., #5  
MOLINE, IL 61265  
(309) 793-5760  
TOLL FREE: 800-322-6210  
1640 N. HENDERSON ST.  
GALESBURG, IL 61401  
(309) 342-4411  
MONMOUTH CITY HALL  
SECOND FLOOR  
MONMOUTH, IL 61462  
121 SCOTLAND, MACLAN PLAZA  
MACOMB, IL 61455

April 24, 1995

The Honorable Alan Dixon, Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore St., Suite 1425  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Please refer to this number  
when responding 9504259

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I am writing you concerning the response of my colleague, Congressman Glen Browder, to my March 31st letter to you concerning the proposed transfer of the maintenance mission at the Letterkenny Army Depot (LAD) to the Anniston Army Depot (ANAD).

I agree with many of Congressman Browder's comments concerning the capabilities of ANAD, a number of which complement those present at the Rock Island Arsenal (RIA). I do not propose to change the DOD recommendation regarding the consolidation of all tracked combat vehicle systems at Anniston. The maintenance depot work for tanks and self-propelled artillery requires capabilities not found or proposed at RIA. These large combat vehicles can be maintained quite capably at ANAD.

However, I believe the Commission should consider transferring the rebuild of towed artillery and the gun mounts for self-propelled howitzers to RIA. RIA has been the manufacturer of towed artillery and other gun mounts for decades. The gun mounts for self-propelled artillery are relatively small subassemblies which requires specialized expertise and facilities which exist at RIA. The arsenal has modern clean rooms for assembly and unique function firing simulators for testing and acceptance that can accommodate this mission without the environmental impact of live firing. The specialized knowledge and expertise needed to maintain these systems currently exists at RIA, which is already performing this mission as a backup to LAD.

Towed artillery systems are lightweight weapons manufactured at RIA from weldments of thin sheets and plates, not the heavy weldments of tracked combat vehicles. The low weight of these systems requires that they be returned often for maintenance. This maintenance, in the form of needed repair and realignment, is best accomplished with fixtures used in the original manufacture of the weapons. For example, the M119 towed howitzer is made from a specialized steel which normally cannot be repair

welded. RIA has developed the unique heat treating and welding procedures necessary to accomplish this. Such repair was not even available from the original howitzer designer, Royal Ordnance, of the United Kingdom, but was developed through a specialized design and productability analysis performed by RIA.


I agree with Congressman Browder's April 19th letter with regard to the special capabilities at ANAD for combat vehicle maintenance, especially repairs involving vehicle engines, transmissions, hydraulics and electro-optical systems. It would not be prudent to duplicate the engine test stands, transmission test stands, vehicle test track or function firing range present at ANAD. Nor would it make sense to ship any tracked combat vehicles to RIA, since Anniston has substantial space for storing vehicles.

The capability of ANAD to maintain complex vehicles such as the M1 Abrams battle tank is important. However, towed artillery systems are relatively less complex and do not have the engines, transmissions, track or electrical systems, nor the specialized structural requirements as outlined above for tracked vehicles. RIA is currently performing this work on lightweight towed artillery systems.

The benefits of consolidation as outlined in my colleague's letter apply as well to consolidation of some specialized missions at RIA. Deployment of skilled civilians to support wartime needs is an important reason to retain that workforce. In Desert Storm and other recent conflicts employees from both RIA and ANAD were deployed with little notice and often worked on the same teams in the theater of conflict. This management of civilians technicians to support our troops is coordinated by the Industrial Operations Command which oversees the operation of depots and the arsenals. This support and the cooperation between facilities will continue and will grow in the future.

I hope that my letter not only reinforces the important capabilities at ANAD, but also demonstrates the feasibility and practicality of transferring the rebuild of towed artillery and the gun mounts for self propelled howitzers to RIA. Please feel free to contact me if I can be of any other assistance concerning this matter. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Lane Evans". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

LANE EVANS  
Member of Congress





**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Proceed for this number  
950425-921

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

**COMMISSIONERS:**

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 26, 1995

The Honorable Lane Evans  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Lane:

Thank you for your additional correspondence urging the Commission to consider transferring self-propelled and towed howitzer system rebuild work to the Rock Island Arsenal. I certainly understand your continuing interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the additional information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I can be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:js

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950425-10

FROM: FAIRCLOTH, LAUCH	TO: DIXON
TITLE: SENATOR, (NC)	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: U.S. CONGRESS	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: NAS CHERRY POINT	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
				COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER		X	
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Direct Response
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

REQUESTING THAT 1993 DBCRC DECISION TO MOVE F-18 SQUADRONS FROM CECIL FIELD TO NAS CHERRY POINT BE UPHELD; ALSO, REQUESTING NAVY PROVIDE THE LEAST COST BEB DOWN OPTION AT CHERRY POINT.

Due Date: 950427	Routing Date: 950425	Date Originated: 950421	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3305

April 21, 1995

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950425-10

The Honorable Alan Dixon  
Chairman  
Base Realignment and Closure  
Commission  
1700 North Moore Street  
Suite 1425  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

As you know, your staff was recently briefed regarding our desire to change the relocation of F-18 squadrons from Cecil Field NAS to Oceana NAS to the original 1993 BRAC mandated move to Cherry Point NAS, N.C. One of the major issues according to the Department of the Navy, was the Military construction cost avoidance associated with the move to Oceana. Our briefing provided a compelling argument why these figures do not reflect true costs. In considering the F-18 basing options at MCAS Cherry point and NAS Oceana there appear to be two completely different calculations made. At Cherry Point, all military construction (Milcon) was planned to strict P-80 standards and little effort was made to look at the lowest cost option. In the case of Oceana the opposite approach was taken. Squadrons are being matched to existing facilities with little regard to P-80 standards.

Why is Cherry Point not being evaluated in the same manner? In the past, the Marine Corps Housed two squadrons in hangers 1700 and 1701. Because they do not quite meet P-80 standards, the Navy plans only to place one F-18 squadron in each facility. By making this one exception to P-80 standards and continuing with current plans, 7 F-18 squadrons can bed down in the existing west area.

The two remaining Squadrons, a Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) and a tactical Squadron along with the AIMD can be accommodated through Milcon in the West area with significant cost savings. By placing all the F-18 squadrons and their associated support in the existing industrial plant and by not moving to an undeveloped area, much of the cost associated with utilities, parking aprons and taxiways can be avoided.

April 21, 1995  
Page Two

Because of these issues, I believe an "apples to apples" comparison is in order and I request that the same basing principles that were applied to NAS Oceana be applied to MCAS Cherry Point. I would also request the Department of the Navy provide the least cost bed down option at Cherry Point.

I look forward to your response and an opportunity to talk with you about this issue. Your response before the Baltimore Regional Hearing would be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Lauch Faircloth". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "L".

Lauch Faircloth  
United States Senator

LF/slh



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number  
when responding 95C425-10R1

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

May 1, 1995

Mr. Charles Nemfakos  
Executive Director  
Base Structure Analysis Team  
4401 Ford Avenue  
Alexandria, Virginia 22302

Dear Mr. Nemfakos:

The Commission has received the attached letter from Senator Lauch Faircloth concerning the 1995 Defense Department recommendation to change the receiving sites for the F/A-18 squadrons moving from Naval Air Station Cecil Field as specified by the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. In the letter, Senator Faircloth has raised several questions about the 1995 recommendation.

I would appreciate your responding to Senator Faircloth's questions and providing the Commission with a copy of your response.

Thank you for your assistance. I appreciate your time and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

Enclosure

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3305

April 21, 1995

950425-10

The Honorable Alan Dixon  
Chairman  
Base Realignment and Closure  
Commission  
1700 North Moore Street  
Suite 1425  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

As you know, your staff was recently briefed regarding our desire to change the relocation of F-18 squadrons from Cecil Field NAS to Oceana NAS to the original 1993 BRAC mandated move to Cherry Point NAS, N.C. One of the major issues according to the Department of the Navy, was the Military construction cost avoidance associated with the move to Oceana. Our briefing provided a compelling argument why these figures do not reflect true costs. In considering the F-18 basing options at MCAS Cherry point and NAS Oceana there appear to be two completely different calculations made. At Cherry Point, all military construction (Milcon) was planned to strict P-80 standards and little effort was made to look at the lowest cost option. In the case of Oceana the opposite approach was taken. Squadrons are being matched to existing facilities with little regard to P-80 standards.

Why is Cherry Point not being evaluated in the same manner? In the past, the Marine Corps housed two squadrons in hangers 1700 and 1701. Because they do not quite meet P-80 standards, the Navy plans only to place one F-18 squadron in each facility. By making this one exception to P-80 standards and continuing with current plans, 7 F-18 squadrons can bed down in the existing west area.


The two remaining Squadrons, a Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) and a tactical Squadron along with the AIMD can be accommodated through Milcon in the West area with significant cost savings. By placing all the F-18 squadrons and their associated support in the existing industrial plant and by not moving to an undeveloped area, much of the cost associated with utilities, parking aprons and taxiways can be avoided.

April 21, 1995  
Page Two

Because of these issues, I believe an "apples to apples" comparison is in order and I request that the same basing principles that were applied to NAS Oceana be applied to MCAS Cherry Point. I would also request the Department of the Navy provide the least cost bed down option at Cherry Point.

I look forward to your response and an opportunity to talk with you about this issue. Your response before the Baltimore Regional Hearing would be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Lauch Faircloth". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name and title.

Lauch Faircloth  
United States Senator

LF/slh



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425

ARLINGTON, VA 22209

703-696-0504

Please refer to this number  
when responding: 950425-1021

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA

REBECCA COX

GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)

S. LEE KLING

RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)

MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)

WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 26, 1995

The Honorable Lauch Faircloth  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510


Dear Lauch:

Thank you for your recent letter concerning the 1995 Defense Department recommendation to change the receiving sites for the F/A-18 squadrons moving from Naval Air Station Cecil Field as specified by the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. I appreciate your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations. I have also asked the Department of the Navy to respond to the questions you raised in your letter. As soon as we receive a response to the questions, we will forward them to you.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I can be of service.

Sincerely,



Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman





DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

LT-0741-F15  
BSAT/OEN  
9 May 1995

The Honorable Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman, Defense Base Closure  
and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street  
Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209


Please refer to this number  
when responding 950425-10R2

Dear Chairman Dixon:

This is in response to your letter of May 1, 1995, forwarding correspondence from Senator Lauch Faircloth concerning the 1995 Department of Defense recommendation to relocate F/A-18 squadrons at Naval Air Station Cecil Field (reference number 950425-10R1).

As you requested, a copy of our response to Senator Faircloth is provided. If I can be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,



C. P. NEMFAKOS  
Vice Chairman,  
Base Structure Evaluation Committee

Attachment



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

LT-0741-F15  
BSAT/DOR  
9 May 1995

The Honorable Lauch Faircloth  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Faircloth:

This is in response to your letter of April 21, 1995, to the Chairman of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, which he has forwarded to me, requesting assistance in obtaining the remaining information regarding the relocation of the F/A-18 squadrons moving from Naval Air Station (NAS), Cecil Field.

Since the 1993 round there have been significant reductions in naval aviation forces. For instance, we have retired the A-6 attack aircraft series, reduced the maritime patrol aircraft inventory by about one-third and have eliminated approximately fifty percent of the Navy's F-14 inventory. Additionally, the number of F/A-18 squadrons that will require relocation from NAS Cecil Field will be reduced from thirteen to eleven.

Our analysis found that these reductions provided us with excess capacity at both NAS Oceana and NAS Jacksonville, Florida, allowing us to propose redirecting the F/A-18s to NAS Oceana. The S-3s scheduled to move to NAS Oceana would go to Jacksonville instead. To take advantage of the robust demographics of the Atlanta area, two reserve squadrons would be redirected from MCAS Beaufort, South Carolina, to NAS Atlanta, Georgia, an action that would provide additional space at MCAS Beaufort in which to move two active Navy F/A-18 squadrons. In addition to saving about \$290 million in new construction at MCAS Cherry Point, our recommendations will result in the establishment of a Naval Aviation Anti-Submarine Warfare Center of Excellence in the Jacksonville area.

As you may be aware, we only used certified data in our analysis which in this instance was provided by Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps and Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Using this data, the same military construction standards (P-80) were applied to both MCAS Cherry Point and NAS Oceana. The standards utilized and the analysis conducted were reviewed by the Naval Audit Service with no discrepancies noted. Enclosures A and B reflect the comparison of the certified data that we had available and used with regard to our basing decision. Enclosure C is a brief overview of the P-80 standards that apply.

As always, if I can be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "C. P. NEMFAKOS".

C. P. NEMFAKOS  
Vice Chairman,  
Base Structure Evaluation Committee

Attachments

1. One Type II hangar module equals two Type I hanger modules.
2. Two type II module requirement at Cherry Point, for two C-130 squadrons.\*
3. Eleven Type I module requirement at Cherry Point of thirteen available. (Does not include a deployment factor).
4. BRAC - 93 MILCON: Builds twelve new hangar modules, upgrades two modules (HGR - 131) and demolishes two modules (HGR - 130). FY 2001 total: 25 modules.\*\*

<b>CHERRY POINT</b>		
Hangar ID# / Type	Current Usage # Modules	Projected Usage #Modules: BRAC 95
130 / I	2	2
131 / I	2	2
250 / II	2*	2*
1665 / I	2	2
1667 / I	2	2
1700 / I	2 (NADEP storage)	2
1701 / I	2	2
3998 / I	1	1
Modules Available	15**	15**

ENCLOSURE A

1. One Type II hangar module equals two Type I hanger modules.
2. Zero Type II modules requirement at Oceana.
3. Twelve Type I module equivalent requirement at Oceana of twenty three available. (Does not include a deployment factor).

<b>OCEANA</b>		
Hangar ID# / Type	Current Usage # Modules	Projected Usage #Modules: BRAC 95
23 / I	1	1
111 / I	4 (A-6 sqdns)	4
122 / II	4 (A-6 sqdns)	4
137 / I	1 (Fleet training)	1
200 / II	4	4
223 / I	2 (Fleet training)	2
404 / I	3	3
500 / I	4	4
Modules Available	23	23

ENCLOSURE B

TABLE 211-05  
Modular Hangar Dimensional Statistics for Planning Purposes

Hangar Spaces	Type I	Type II
(OH) <u>Hangar - Cat. Code 211 05</u>		
Gross Area (Sq. Ft.)	19,968	28,560
Clear Height (Ft.)	28	42
Usable Dept (Ft.)*	85	100**
Usable Width (Ft.)***		
1 Module	172	220
1-1/2 Modules	258	335
2 Modules	354	450
2-1/2 Modules	445	565
3 Modules	536	680
3-1/2 Modules	627	795
4 Modules	718	910
(O1) <u>Crew and Equipment - Cat. Code 211 06</u>		
Gross Area (Sq. Ft.)	8,800	12,050
Clear height (Ft.)	10	10

(Table continued on next page.)

211-10

NAVFAC P-80

TABLE 211-05 (Continued)  
Modular Hangar Dimensional Statistics for Planning Purposes

Hangar Spaces	Type I	Type II
(O2) <u>Administrative - Cat. Code 211 07</u>		
Gross Area (Sq. Ft.)	8,640	12,000
Clear Height (Ft.)	8	8
<u>Mezzanine - Cat. Code 211 06</u>		
Gross Area (Sq. Ft.)	1,536	NONE

\*Computed upon the requirement for a 10-foot fire lane along the rear wall of the hangar and a 5-foot work clearance between aircraft and doors.

\*\* For aircraft other than the P-3, for which the Type II hangar was basically designed. May also be used for other longer aircraft by modifying doors for "tailcutout" closure.

\*\*\* Computed upon the requirement for one 10-foot wide fire lane from the front to the rear of the hangar and 5 feet from aircraft to outer walls. Also assumes aircraft will be parked parallel to each other and to the side walls of the hangar to minimize evacuation time in case of fire.

ENCLOSURE C

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950425-11

FROM: SLOAN, ROBERT L.	TO: DIXON
TITLE: CITY CLERK	TITLE: CHAIRMAN
ORGANIZATION: CITY OF BAYONNE, NJ.	ORGANIZATION: DBCRC
INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED: BAYONNE MILITARY OCEAN TERMINAL	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER		X	
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

Ⓢ	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

RESOLUTION NO 950412-029 REQUESTING  
DBCRC NOT TO CLOSE THE TERMINAL.

\* NO RESPONSE NECESSARY \*

Due Date: 950427	Routing Date: 950425	Date Originated: 95	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	---------------------	------------

MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF BAYONNE

RESOLUTION No. 95-04-12- 029

WHEREAS, the Pentagon is recommending the closure of the Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal; and

WHEREAS, the closure of the terminal is projected to cost one hundred military and over twelve hundred civilian jobs and indirectly almost seven hundred fifty additional jobs; and

WHEREAS, a great number of these employees are residents of the City of Bayonne and, as such, this closure has a direct and tangible impact upon the citizenry of the City of Bayonne in addition to the significant disruption of the City of Bayonne's economic well-being; and

WHEREAS, the Municipal Council of the City of Bayonne emphatically opposes this proposed closure in light of the pejorative impact that the closure will have upon both the citizenry and finances of the City of Bayonne; and

WHEREAS, the Municipal Council of the City of Bayonne joins in support of those who have already voiced their objections to this proposed closure; now, therefore, be it

RESOLVED, That the Municipal Council of the City of Bayonne publicly implores the Base Closure and Realignment Commission to remove the Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal from the list of base closings; and be it further

RESOLVED, That duly authenticated copies of this resolution be transmitted to the Speaker of the General Assembly of the State of New Jersey, Governor Christine Todd Whitman, the Base Closure and Realignment Commission, the President of the United States, the Vice President of the United States, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and every member of Congress elected from this State.

JFC/emg

TRUE COPY

R-14



ROBERT J. SLONE

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950425-12

<b>FROM:</b> CONDOT, GARY A.	<b>TO:</b> DIXON
<b>TITLE:</b> REP. (CA)	<b>TITLE:</b> CHAIRMAN
<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> U.S. CONGRESS	<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> DBCRC
<b>INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED:</b> SAN JOAQUIN DEPOT	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				<b>REVIEW AND ANALYSIS</b>			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER	✓	X	
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

Ⓢ	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

INQUIRING ABOUT STATUS OF SAN JOAQUIN DEPOT; ALSO, INFORMING CA DELEGATION WILL BE CONTACTING DBCRC REGARDING DEPOT.

Due Date: 950427

Routing Date: 950425

Date Originated: 950424

Mail Date:



GARY A. CONDIT  
2<sup>ND</sup> DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA



2444 RAYBURN BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-0518  
(202) 225-6131

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS,  
NUTRITION, AND FOREIGN  
AGRICULTURE  
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER

SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
RESOURCE CONSERVATION,  
RESEARCH, AND FORESTRY

COMMITTEE ON  
GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
ECONOMIC GROWTH, NATURAL  
RESOURCES, AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS

SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL  
AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515-0518**

April 24, 1995

DISTRICT OFFICES:

FEDERAL BUILDING  
415 WEST 18TH STREET  
MERCED, CA 95340  
(209) 383-4455

920 16TH STREET, SUITE C  
MODESTO, CA 95354  
(209) 527-1914

18TH DISTRICT  
TOLL FREE:  
1-800-356-6424

Chairman Alan Dixon  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950425-12

Dear Chairman Dixon:


It has come to my attention that your Commission may be considering the San Joaquin Depot among its base closure discussions. As you are aware, the San Joaquin Depot has not been included in any of the staff recommended lists for closure. I want to bring to your attention the concern such an inclusion of the depot would bring to me and other representatives from California. The Defense Logistics Agency's distribution concept of operation is well thought out and meets the needs of our Defense Department. We ought not modify this concept absent sound military grounds.

Californians understand the dislocation and costs military base closures bring to a community. No state has suffered more than California from this process. I want to alert you that the California Delegation will be watching this matter closely as your Commission continues its deliberations. You will soon formally hear from the delegation on this issue.

I would appreciate being alerted to any discussions that could involve the San Joaquin Depot.

I appreciate your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

  
GARY A. CONDIT  
Member of Congress

GAC/jm

cc: Leon Panetta, Chief of Staff to the President  
Senator Dianne Feinstein  
Senator Barbara Boxer  
Vice Admiral Edward Straw, Director, Defense Logistics Agency  
California House Delegation

GARY A. CONDIT  
18TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA



2444 BAYBURN BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-0518  
(202) 225-6111

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS,  
NUTRITION, AND FOREIGN  
AGRICULTURE  
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER

SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
RESOURCE CONSERVATION,  
RESEARCH, AND FORESTRY

COMMITTEE ON  
GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
ECONOMIC GROWTH, NATURAL  
RESOURCES, AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS

SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL  
AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-0518

April 24, 1995

DISTRICT OFFICES

FEDERAL BUILDING  
415 WEST 18TH STREET  
MERCED, CA 95340  
(209) 383-4455

920 18TH STREET, SUITE C  
MODESTO, CA 95354  
(209) 527-1914

18TH DISTRICT  
TULLY HOUSE  
1 800 356 8624

Please refer to this report  
when responding 950425-12

Chairman Alan Dixon  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

It has come to my attention that your Commission may be considering the San Joaquin Depot among its base closure discussions. As you are aware, the San Joaquin Depot has not been included in any of the staff recommended lists for closure. I want to bring to your attention the concern such an inclusion of the depot would bring to me and other representatives from California. The Defense Logistics Agency's distribution concept of operation is well thought out and meets the needs of our Defense Department. We ought not modify this concept absent sound military grounds.

Californians understand the dislocation and costs military base closures bring to a community. No state has suffered more than California from this process. I want to alert you that the California Delegation will be watching this matter closely as your Commission continues its deliberations. You will soon formally hear from the delegation on this issue.

I would appreciate being alerted to any discussions that could involve the San Joaquin Depot.

I appreciate your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

GARY A. CONDIT  
Member of Congress

GAC/jm

- cc: Leon Panetta, Chief of Staff to the President
- Senator Dianne Feinstein
- Senator Barbara Boxer
- Vice Admiral Edward Straw, Director, Defense Logistics Agency
- California House Delegation



**DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Please refer to file number  
which is 950425-12R1

April 27, 1995

The Honorable Gary Condit  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Condit:

Thank you for your letter supporting the Defense Distribution Depot San Joaquin (DDJC). I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

The Base Closure and Realignment Act provides that any additions to the list of bases recommended for closure or realignment by the Secretary of Defense must be published in the Federal Register by May 17. In order to have a base added to this list, a Commissioner must offer a motion to add an installation for consideration. A majority of the Commissioners must support such a motion for the base to be added for consideration.

The Commission has scheduled a public hearing on May 10, 1995, to consider adding additional bases and facilities to the Secretary's recommended list of closures and realignments. The hearing will be held in Room 216 of the Hart Senate Office Building.

I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis process. I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I can be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:js  
ECTS#: 950403-15

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) # 950425-13

<b>FROM:</b> HALEY, PAUL R	<b>TO:</b> DIXON
<b>TITLE:</b> <del>REP</del> STATE REP.	<b>TITLE:</b> CHAIRMAN
<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> Comm. OF MASS.	<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> DBCRC
<b>INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:</b> NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
STAFF DIRECTOR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			COMMISSIONER COX	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
GENERAL COUNSEL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			COMMISSIONER KLING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		COMMISSIONER STEELE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				<b>REVIEW AND ANALYSIS</b>			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FYI

Subject/Remarks:

FORWARDING INFO REGARDING DEMOGRAPHICS OF NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH.

Due Date: 950427	Routing Date: 950425	Date Originated:	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	------------------	------------



*The Commonwealth of Massachusetts*

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
STATE HOUSE, BOSTON 02133-1054

PAUL R. HALEY  
REPRESENTATIVE  
4TH NORFOLK DISTRICT

Chairman  
Committee on  
Criminal Justice  
ROOM 186, STATE HOUSE  
TEL: (617) 722-2900

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950425-13

Alan Dixon, Chairman  
The Defense Base Closure  
and Realignment Commission  
1200 North Moore St., Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I am sending further information, for your consideration,  
pertaining to the demographics of NAS South Weymouth.

I feel the issue of demographics deserves careful review in order  
to make an impartial and informed determination about the future  
of NAS South Weymouth and the Naval Reserve's presence in New  
England. I hope you will find this additional information useful  
in your deliberations.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Paul R. Haley".

Paul R. Haley  
Chairman,  
Save the Base Committee

# Demographics, The Navy's Future, Our Nation's Security

## Introduction

We believe the Navy's decision to close the South Weymouth Naval Air Station was carried out without the examination or consideration of all pertinent demographic data. This documentation includes findings generated internally during the base closure and realignment process, specifically the Navy's own data calls and BRAC testimony. Additionally, more supporting evidence has been gathered using the most recent census data and an independent, "Best Cities Study", conducted in 1993 by the respected management firm of Moran, Stahl and Boyer for the November edition of Fortune Magazine. To ignore this important demographic data amounts to the surrender of the Navy's position in the Northeast and will lead to the eventual disintegration of the New England contingent of the Naval Reserves

## Navy Demographics

Throughout the process the Navy has their own demographic findings. Please review the demographic section contained in the Reserve Air Station Military Value Matrix Responses (Scoring), dated 2-21-95. (See Chart #1) South Weymouth's score of 7.82 (See Chart #2) was the highest in the reserve air station category. But throughout the process, there are references to the "demographically rich" Atlanta area. As an example, the following remark was made by Mr. Charles Nemfakis. The following is an excerpt from Section 5a. of the BSEC deliberations dated 9 February 1995.

**Mr. Nemfakis; 5a. South Weymouth. NAS Atlanta actually had a lower military value score than South Weymouth, but NAS Atlanta could not close because of demographics.**

Many similar references to the "demographically productive and demographically rich Atlanta area", from a variety of sources, are littered throughout the process. Yet, the Navy's own standard of measurement places Atlanta last in demographics. These references are misleading and weaken the credibility of the Navy's conclusions.

In fact, Navy Data Calls fail to define meaningful statistics as they relate demographics to Naval Reserve Recruiting. To do so, you must first identify the sources for recruiting qualified Naval Reservists. A variety of programs exist that define these sources: NAVET, OSVET, APG, SAM, OSAM and Direct Commissioning. Let us examine each in turn.

1. **NAVET**: The NAVET Program focuses on honorably discharged, physically qualified Naval Veterans who have earned a favorable re-enlistment code.
2. **OSVET**: The OSVET program targets physically qualified Other Service Veterans with Honorable Discharges and favorable re-enlistment codes. Additionally, their Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) must convert readily to Naval Enlisted Ratings or Naval Officer Designators.
3. **APG**: APG enlisted recruits are assessed directly from civilian occupations which can be converted to advanced paygrade level navy ratings. These personnel must demonstrate proficiency by successfully completing the prescribed professional leadership and rating correspondence courses and passing applicable leadership and advancement exams within prescribed timeframes to make their advanced paygrades and ratings permanent.
4. **SAM and OSAM**: The Sea and Air Mariner and Officer Sea and Air Mariner programs focus on high school and college graduates respectively. After an initial

active duty training period at boot camp or Officer Candidate School, these recruits are assigned to further professional training at A & C Schools for enlisted, or Surface Warfare School and follow-on sea duty for officers. Upon completion of this initial training, these reservists are released from active duty and assigned to reserve units in a obligor status. These programs create a pool of junior level reservists.

5. **Direct Commissioning:** This program targets selected professional non-prior service civilians with skills directly convertible to specific Naval Officer Designators and Naval Officer Billet Codes.

In all of these programs, a reservist must be able to complete twenty (20) satisfactory years of service prior to reaching age sixty (60), or high year tenure in their particular paygrade. Further, they must fall within the criteria specified under RAMOS for enlisted personnel and ORAMOS for officers. They must also meet the Reserve Functional Assignment Substitution Codes for the billets to which they will be assigned.

The numbers of personnel listed in Data Call 16 as awaiting billet assignments are meaningless, because the Data Call fails to answer the following questions.

1. For Pilots: How many are fixed-wing qualified? How many are rotary-wing qualified? How many are single-engine rated? How many are multi-engine rated?
2. For NFO's. How many are familiar with each type of aircraft on board the station? How many are familiar with each type of aircraft projected to be transferred in to the station?



3. For Other Officers: What is their distribution by Designators, NOBC's and paygrade? How does this relate to the ORAMOS Critical List and projected available billets?
4. For Enlisted: What is their distribution by Ratings and NEC's? How does this relate to the RAMOS Critical List and projected available billets?

In fact, Navy Data Calls for NAS Atlanta have historically shown that this station has been unable to maintain a level of reserve manning that allows its assigned units to maintain an R-1 Readiness Rating. As illustrated by Chart #3, in many cases, units fail to maintain a personnel manning that would allow them to be designated as a mobilizable asset for meeting contingency operations or a state of emergency or war.

It must also be remembered that more than pilots are required to safely operate aircraft. Fully two-thirds of a reserve squadron is made up of reservists. The enlisted portion of these units is tasked with the demanding duty of repairing and maintaining the many technical systems that allow a given airframe to operate safely. NATOPS prescribes the required maintenance schedules, and prudence demands that they be followed to the letter to ensure the safety of the aircrew, the continued efficient service life of the aircraft, and the continued ability of the unit to successfully complete its assigned missions in support of National Policies. For unlike many Naval Surface Reserve Units, the Naval Air Reserve is tasked with operational missions. It currently provides 100% of the Logistics Support Squadrons and 24% of the Maritime Patrol Squadrons (**Table 2-2 Reserve Component Programs FY 1994 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board**). Inability to adequately man these units will have a detrimental effect on the Navy's overall ability to perform these missions.

Further contradictory evidence can be found in the most recent census data and the 1993 independent study conducted by Moran, Stahl and Boyers for Fortune Magazine's, November 1993 "Best Cities" article

### Census and Best Cities Data

When the demographic data is compared and analyzed, it is actually the South Weymouth/Greater Boston area that is proven to be demographically rich and best suited to support the mission of the Naval Reserves.

The 1993 MS&B study conducted for Fortune Magazine ranks the South Weymouth/Boston statistical area as a leader in the areas of educational opportunities, college enrollment, and skilled workers. Combined with the diverse minority pool, the South Weymouth/Boston area should be viewed as one of the richest resources for the Navy. The study published in Fortune Magazine supports the Navy's own demographic documentation that ranks South Weymouth/Greater Boston at the top of the Nation. Overall, the study ranks the Boston area 3rd, with the first two spots going to Raleigh/Durham and New York. The study reveals that there are more than a quarter of a million students in the greater Boston area. Of the six metropolitan areas that play host to a Naval Reserve Station, Boston ranks first in education. As charts #3 and #4 illustrate, 28.8 percent of the population holds a four year degree or higher while 11.2 percent of the people age 25 or older have earned a graduate degree. NROTC programs exist on the campuses of Boston University, Boston College, Harvard University, Tufts University, Northeastern University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). NROTC programs also operate in the City Of Worcester, approximately 35 miles from Boston at the College of the Holy Cross, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, and Worcester State College. All of the preceding schools are recognized nation-wide as the finest educational institutions in the country, the perfect breeding ground for future reservists. Boston ranked 2nd in the category of four year

college enrollment, 8th in the availability of a quality labor force, 5th in the availability of skilled workers, 1st in the presence of high quality colleges and universities, and topped the country as the best city for knowledge workers. (See Chart #5)

### Reservists Pool

The population of the Greater Boston/South Weymouth metropolitan area is 5,992,712. In key sections of the population considered to be prime recruiting targets, namely able-bodied veterans and people within the 17-35 age bracket, South Weymouth/Greater Boston easily outdistances both Atlanta and Brunswick. Over 316,000 veterans call the Greater Boston area home. Veterans in the Atlanta area number 271,000 while Brunswick records just over 82,000 veterans. Over 46 percent of the population base in the South Weymouth/Greater Boston area is between the ages of 17 and 35. The problems with closing South Weymouth are only magnified when you consider the negative affects the current BRAC plan will have on reservists reassigned to Brunswick, Maine, which is located approximately 160 miles north of South Weymouth. And, like Atlanta, Brunswick is also unable to man existing billet space. The following response was recorded in the Brunswick data call, "recruiting personnel of the proper rate/rating is already the single largest problem for unit readiness." The shortage in manpower is evident, especially when you look at NRTSC 791 and NRTSC 191.

As of March 95, only 29 of 35 billets for NRTSC 791 were filled and in the case of NRTSC 191 only 18 of 33 billets could be filled. In the case of South Weymouth vs Atlanta, both are located near a major airport and naturally attract a high number of pilots, but, we have not seen any documentation that details the specific abilities and qualifications of the "rich" Atlanta demographic pool. Pilot qualifications such as, fixed-rotary wing or single/multi engine NFO qualifications, other officer designators or enlisted ratings and NECS have not been documented by the Navy. But, at South

Weymouth, as recently as 24 months ago, they were able fully man an A-4 Sky Hawks Squadron, VMA-223. While it appears the availability of qualified personnel at Atlanta is in question, South Weymouth can support with local personnel, a Navy or Marine Squadron. Additionally, South Weymouth would still have enough qualified personnel available to man an F-18 Navy Squadron. This could be accomplished without the need to airlift personnel.

Failure to produce documentation to substantiate the closure of South Weymouth is not the Navy's only mistake. There are some loose ends, nowhere in the plan does the Navy mention what will happen to South Weymouth's 545 Air Reservists. These reservists need to drill at an air station, yet their future has never been addressed. Action that would move these reservists to Brunswick would be met with the reality that Brunswick, according to data call responses, has inadequate housing and space needed to make such a move feasible. In essence there is no plan.

Another factor affecting a move by reservists to Maine is the distance they will have to travel if they intend to continue serving in the Navy Reserves. As you can see in maps 1-3, the overwhelming majority of reservists affected by the decision live outside of the 50 mile border set down by the Navy as the distance that determines whether or not a reservist must be compensated for housing during reserve activities. The problem with the distance raises two important questions: what will be the messing and berthing cost to the Navy for reservists traveling from outside the 50 mile radius and how will the distance affect the attrition, retention and recruitment of reservists? It is our contention that the traveling distance will have a serious adverse affect resulting in the loss of many highly skilled reservists, as well as increased difficulty in recruiting qualified reservists. The bottom line, no other reserve NAS facility can match the people resources within the South Weymouth/Greater Boston

community.

## Recruiting Goals

In July of 1994, as reported in the August 18th edition of the Navy Times, Navy Secretary John Dalton announced his first major equal opportunity initiative. He announced then that by the turn of the century, he wants the naval services officer corps to "reflect society". He went on to say that by the year 2000, the number of minority officer accessions into the Navy and Marine Corps should in some cases, almost triple.

While these future goals should be lauded, it should be noted that the Navy has failed to meet current minority recruiting goals. Let's put this in the context of testimony from Secretary Dalton during the March 6, 1995 Defense Closure and Realignment Commission Open Meeting. Secretary Dalton noted that reservists play an important role in the area of recruitment. He said, "We asked our reservists to assist in recruiting". At the same time, he conceded that new recruitment targets will be difficult because the American public is under the misimpression that the draw down means the Navy isn't hiring. We make a similar conclusion, a lack of presence by the Navy in the South Weymouth/Greater Boston area will further contribute to the impression that the "not hiring" sign is hanging in the Navy's door essentially closing out the richest recruitment area in New England and arguably the whole country

## Conclusions

Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda explained during the March 6th Open Meeting that it is important to put our Reserve centers where there are Reservists of the right skill

levels and quality for us to have in our force. Additional support comes from the Reserve Officers Association of the United States in its testimony to the House and Senate MILCON Subcommittees, "If the BRAC 95 recommendations are approved, the Naval Reserve will be reduced to less than 200 air and surface facilities nationwide. This amounts to the smallest number of demographic centers for Naval Reserve activity since World War II and one third fewer than were in operation in 1978 when the number of drilling Reservists was approximately the same as it is today" This being the case, then the Navy cannot afford to lose South Weymouth.

The documentation generated by the Navy and other sources demonstrate on a consistent basis that South Weymouth is rich in demographics providing high quality recruits and reservists who are invaluable to the Navy and its mission. Unlike other facilities, South Weymouth is capable of handling its current mission and if the need arises, an expanded mission.

The Navy's demographic case is similar to the one presented in 1993. They have made statements that cannot be substantiated. The Navy has wrongly inflated the demographic importance of other Naval Bases and Air Stations while ignoring the value of South Weymouth. Deviation from the facts amounts to a deviation from the process.

**Naval Reservists Located Within 50 Miles of South Weymouth Naval Air Station by Town**

Acton, MA.	6	Holbrook, MA.	6	Millford, MA.	8
Arlington, MA.	6	Medfield, MA.	3	Millbury, MA.	2
Ashland, MA.	4	Medway, MA.	9	Northbridge, MA.	2
Ayer, MA.	1	Millis, MA.	1	Oxford, MA.	2
Belmont, MA.	11	Milton, MA.	10	Shrewsbury, MA.	7
Billerica, MA.	14	Needham, MA.	5	Sterling, MA.	2
Boxborough, MA.	1	Norfolk, MA.	4	Sutton, MA.	3
Burlington, MA.	4	Norwood, MA.	18	Upton, MA.	2
Cambridge, MA.	15	Plainville, MA.	4	Webster, MA.	2
Carlisle, MA.	4	Quincy, MA.	44	Westborough, MA.	2
Cheimsford, MA.	11	Randolph, MA.	29	Worcester, MA.	18
Concord, MA.	3	Sharon, MA.	7	Barnstable, MA.	15
Dracut, MA.	2	Stoughton, MA.	14	Bourne, MA.	4
Everett, MA.	7	Walpole, MA.	9	Falmouth, MA.	8
Frammingham, MA.	14	Wellesley, MA.	11	Mashpee, MA.	1
Holliston, MA.	5	Westwood, MA.	8	Sandwich, MA.	6
Hopkinton, MA.	3	Weymouth, MA.	55	Acushnet, MA.	3
Hudson, MA.	2	Wrentham, MA.	8	Attleboro, MA.	19
Lexington, MA.	5	Abington, MA.	9	Dartmouth, MA.	2
Lincoln, MA.	2	Bridgewater, MA.	15	Easton, MA.	9
Lowell, MA.	15	Brockton, MA.	37	Fairhaven, MA.	6
Malden, MA.	13	Carver, MA.	3	Fall River, MA.	13
Marlborough, MA.	10	Duxbury, MA.	11	Mansfield, MA.	10
Medford, MA.	13	Halifax, MA.	3	New Bedford, MA.	11
Melrose, MA.	8	Hanover, MA.	11	Norton, MA.	7
Natick, MA.	8	Hanson, MA.	14	Raynham, MA.	5
Newton, MA.	17	Hingham, MA.	6	Rehoboth, MA.	3
Reading, MA.	3	Hull, MA.	11	Seekonk, MA.	3
Shirley, MA.	1	Kingston, MA.	3	Somerset, MA.	2
Somerville, MA.	15	Lakeville, MA.	7	Swansea, MA.	2
Stoneham, MA.	1	Marshfield, MA.	11	Taunton, MA.	15
Stow, MA.	1	Middleborough, MA.	12	Westport, MA.	1
Sudbury, MA.	4	Norwell, MA.	9	Amesbury, MA.	4
Tewksbury, MA.	9	Pembroke, MA.	19	Andover, MA.	9
Tyngsborough, MA.	2	Plymouth, MA.	29	Beverly, MA.	11
Wakefield, MA.	6	Rochester, MA.	2	Boxford, MA.	4
Waltham, MA.	13	Rockland, MA.	16	Danvers, MA.	8
Watertown, MA.	6	Scituate, MA.	6	Essex, MA.	5
Wayland, MA.	1	Wareham, MA.	7	Georgetown, MA.	2
Westford, MA.	9	Whitman, MA.	10	Hamilton, MA.	2
Weston, MA.	1	Boston, MA.	144	Haverhill, MA.	12
Wilmington, MA.	6	Chelsea, MA.	6	Ipswich, MA.	2
Winchester, MA.	8	Revere, MA.	5	Lawrence, MA.	4
Woburn, MA.	7	Winthrop, MA.	5	Lynn, MA.	24
Avon, MA.	2	Auburn, MA.	1	Lynnfield, MA.	4
Bellingham, MA.	1	Blackstone, MA.	3	Marblehead, MA.	7
Braintree, MA.	18	Clinton, MA.	2	Methuen, MA.	11
Brookline, MA.	7	Douglas, MA.	1	Nahant, MA.	5
Canton, MA.	6	Grafton, MA.	1	Newburyport, MA.	4
Cohasset, MA.	6	Harvard, MA.	1	Peabody, MA.	9
Dedham, MA.	5	Holden, MA.	3	Rowley, MA.	3
Dover, MA.	2	Hopedale, MA.	2	Salem, MA.	15
Foxborough, MA.	8	Leominster, MA.	2	Salisbury, MA.	1
Franklin, MA.	4	Mendon, MA.	2	Saugus, MA.	1

Naval Reservists Located Within 50 Miles of South Weymouth Naval Air Station by Town


Swampscott, MA.	6
Wenham, MA.	2
Hudson, NH.	4
Nashua, NH.	10
Atkinson, NH.	1
Plaistow, NH.	2
Salem, NH.	5
Seabrook, NH.	1
Windham, NH.	1
Barrington, RI.	8
Bristol, RI.	5
Warren, RI.	1
Warwick, RI.	16
Little Compton, RI.	4
Middletown, RI.	11
Portsmouth, RI.	7
Tiverton, RI.	4
Cranston, RI.	4
Cumberland, RI.	1
Foster, RI.	1
Lincoln, RI.	5
North Providence, RI.	5
Pawtucket, RI.	5
Providence, RI.	16
Scituate, RI.	6
Woonsocket, RI.	3
<b>Total Count</b>	<b>1,503</b>



## Naval Reservists Located Within 50 Miles of Brunswick Naval Air Station by Town

Norway, ME.	1
Paris, ME.	4
Bath, ME.	12
Bowdoinham, ME.	3
Phippsburg, ME.	1
Richmond, ME.	4
Topsham, ME.	19
Biddeford, ME.	2
Kennebunk, ME.	4
Newfield, ME.	1
Saco, ME.	5
Damariscotta, ME.	2
Newcastle, ME.	2
Wiscasset, ME.	3
Rockport, ME.	1
Augusta, ME.	2
China, ME.	1
Gardiner, ME.	5
Hallowell, ME.	2
Litchfield, ME.	1
Manchester, ME.	1
Monmouth, ME.	2
Randolph, ME.	1
Winthrop, ME.	1
Brunswick, ME.	12
Cape Elizabeth, ME.	5
Cumberland, ME.	2
Falmouth, ME.	3
Freeport, ME.	5
Gorham, ME.	3
Portland, ME.	17
Scarborough, ME.	3
Westbrook, ME.	1
Windham, ME.	1
Yarmouth, ME.	4
Auburn, ME.	5
Durham, ME.	1
Greene, ME.	1
Lewiston, ME.	6
Lisbon, ME.	13
Mechanic Falls, ME.	1
Turner, ME.	1
<b>Total Count</b>	<b>164</b>

# Location of Naval Reservists Attached to the South Weymouth Naval Air Station



Scale @ 1" = 30 miles, April 24, 1995

Note: 103 SWNAS Reservists Located Outside of New England

Source: South Weymouth Naval Air Station

Prepared by the Weymouth Office of Planning and Community Development



*The Commonwealth of Massachusetts*

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
STATE HOUSE, BOSTON 02133-1054

PAUL R. HALEY  
REPRESENTATIVE  
4TH NORFOLK DISTRICT

950425-13

Chairman  
Committee on  
Criminal Justice  
ROOM 166, STATE HOUSE  
TEL. (617) 722-2900

Alan Dixon, Chairman  
The Defense Base Closure  
and Realignment Commission  
1200 North Moore St., Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

I am sending further information, for your consideration,  
pertaining to the demographics of NAS South Weymouth.

I feel the issue of demographics deserves careful review in order  
to make an impartial and informed determination about the future  
of NAS South Weymouth and the Naval Reserve's presence in New  
England. I hope you will find this additional information useful  
in your deliberations.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Paul R. Haley".

Paul R. Haley  
Chairman,  
Save the Base Committee

# Demographics, The Navy's Future, Our Nation's Security

## Introduction

We believe the Navy's decision to close the South Weymouth Naval Air Station was carried out without the examination or consideration of all pertinent demographic data. This documentation includes findings generated internally during the base closure and realignment process, specifically the Navy's own data calls and BRAC testimony. Additionally, more supporting evidence has been gathered using the most recent census data and an independent, "Best Cities Study", conducted in 1993 by the respected management firm of Moran, Stahl and Boyer for the November edition of Fortune Magazine. To ignore this important demographic data amounts to the surrender of the Navy's position in the Northeast and will lead to the eventual disintegration of the New England contingent of the Naval Reserves.

## Navy Demographics

Throughout the process the Navy has their own demographic findings. Please review the demographic section contained in the Reserve Air Station Military Value Matrix Responses (Scoring), dated 2-21-95. (See Chart #1) South Weymouth's score of 7.82 (See Chart #2) was the highest in the reserve air station category. But throughout the process, there are references to the "demographically rich" Atlanta area. As an example, the following remark was made by Mr. Charles Nemfakis. The following is an excerpt from Section 5a. of the BSEC deliberations dated 9 February 1995.

Mr. Nemfakis; ***5a. South Weymouth. NAS Atlanta actually had a lower military value score than South Weymouth, but NAS Atlanta could not close because of demographics.***

Many similar references to the "demographically productive and demographically rich Atlanta area", from a variety of sources, are littered throughout the process. Yet, the Navy's own standard of measurement places Atlanta last in demographics. These references are misleading and weaken the credibility of the Navy's conclusions.

In fact, Navy Data Calls fail to define meaningful statistics as they relate demographics to Naval Reserve Recruiting. To do so, you must first identify the sources for recruiting qualified Naval Reservists. A variety of programs exist that define these sources:

NAVET, OSVET, APG, SAM, OSAM and Direct Commissioning. Let us examine each in turn.

1. **NAVET:** The NAVET Program focuses on honorably discharged, physically qualified Naval Veterans who have earned a favorable re-enlistment code.
2. **OSVET:** The OSVET program targets physically qualified Other Service Veterans with Honorable Discharges and favorable re-enlistment codes. Additionally, their Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) must convert readily to Naval Enlisted Ratings or Naval Officer Designators.
3. **APG:** APG enlisted recruits are assessed directly from civilian occupations which can be converted to advanced paygrade level navy ratings. These personnel must demonstrate proficiency by successfully completing the prescribed professional leadership and rating correspondence courses and passing applicable leadership and advancement exams within prescribed timeframes to make their advanced paygrades and ratings permanent.
4. **SAM and OSAM:** The Sea and Air Mariner and Officer Sea and Air Mariner programs focus on high school and college graduates respectively. After an initial

active duty training period at boot camp or Officer Candidate School, these recruits are assigned to further professional training at A & C Schools for enlisted, or Surface Warfare School and follow-on sea duty for officers. Upon completion of this initial training, these reservists are released from active duty and assigned to reserve units in a obligor status. These programs create a pool of junior level reservists.

5. **Direct Commissioning**: This program targets selected professional non-prior service civilians with skills directly convertible to specific Naval Officer Designators and Naval Officer Billet Codes.

In all of these programs, a reservist must be able to complete twenty (20) satisfactory years of service prior to reaching age sixty (60), or high year tenure in their particular paygrade. Further, they must fall within the criteria specified under RAMOS for enlisted personnel and ORAMOS for officers. They must also meet the Reserve Functional Assignment Substitution Codes for the billets to which they will be assigned.

The numbers of personnel listed in Data Call 16 as awaiting billet assignments are meaningless, because the Data Call fails to answer the following questions:

1. For Pilots: How many are fixed-wing qualified? How many are rotary-wing qualified? How many are single-engine rated? How many are multi-engine rated?
2. For NFO's: How many are familiar with each type of aircraft on board the station? How many are familiar with each type of aircraft projected to be transferred in to the station?

3. For Other Officers: What is their distribution by Designators, NOBC's and paygrade? How does this relate to the ORAMOS Critical List and projected available billets?

4. For Enlisted: What is their distribution by Ratings and NEC's? How does this relate to the RAMOS Critical List and projected available billets?

In fact, Navy Data Calls for NAS Atlanta have historically shown that this station has been unable to maintain a level of reserve manning that allows its assigned units to maintain an R-1 Readiness Rating. As illustrated by Chart #3, in many cases, units fail to maintain a personnel manning that would allow them to be designated as a mobilizable asset for meeting contingency operations or a state of emergency or war.

It must also be remembered that more than pilots are required to safely operate aircraft. Fully two-thirds of a reserve squadron is made up of reservists. The enlisted portion of these units is tasked with the demanding duty of repairing and maintaining the many technical systems that allow a given airframe to operate safely. NATOPS prescribes the required maintenance schedules, and prudence demands that they be followed to the letter to ensure the safety of the aircrew, the continued efficient service life of the aircraft, and the continued ability of the unit to successfully complete its assigned missions in support of National Policies. For unlike many Naval Surface Reserve Units, the Naval Air Reserve is tasked with operational missions. It currently provides 100% of the Logistics Support Squadrons and 24% of the Maritime Patrol Squadrons (**Table 2-2 Reserve Component Programs FY 1994 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board**). Inability to adequately man these units will have a detrimental effect on the Navy's overall ability to perform these missions.

Further contradictory evidence can be found in the most recent census data and the 1993 independent study conducted by Moran, Stahl and Boyers for Fortune Magazine's, November 1993 "Best Cities" article.

### Census and Best Cities Data

When the demographic data is compared and analyzed, it is actually the South Weymouth/Greater Boston area that is proven to be demographically rich and best suited to support the mission of the Naval Reserves.

The 1993 MS&B study conducted for Fortune Magazine ranks the South Weymouth/Boston statistical area as a leader in the areas of educational opportunities, college enrollment, and skilled workers. Combined with the diverse minority pool, the South Weymouth/Boston area should be viewed as one of the richest resources for the Navy. The study published in Fortune Magazine supports the Navy's own demographic documentation that ranks South Weymouth/Greater Boston at the top of the Nation. Overall, the study ranks the Boston area 3rd, with the first two spots going to Raleigh/Durham and New York. The study reveals that there are more than a quarter of a million students in the greater Boston area. Of the six metropolitan areas that play host to a Naval Reserve Station, Boston ranks first in education. As charts #3 and #4 illustrate, 28.8 percent of the population holds a four year degree or higher while 11.2 percent of the people age 25 or older have earned a graduate degree. NROTC programs exist on the campuses of Boston University, Boston College, Harvard University, Tufts University, Northeastern University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). NROTC programs also operate in the City Of Worcester, approximately 35 miles from Boston at the College of the Holy Cross, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, and Worcester State College. All of the preceding schools are recognized nation-wide as the finest educational institutions in the country, the perfect breeding ground for future reservists. Boston ranked 2nd in the category of four year



college enrollment, 8th in the availability of a quality labor force, 5th in the availability of skilled workers, 1st in the presence of high quality colleges and universities, and topped the country as the best city for knowledge workers. (See Chart #5)

## Reservists Pool

The population of the Greater Boston/South Weymouth metropolitan area is 5,992,712. In key sections of the population considered to be prime recruiting targets, namely able-bodied veterans and people within the 17-35 age bracket, South Weymouth/Greater Boston easily outdistances both Atlanta and Brunswick. Over 316,000 veterans call the Greater Boston area home. Veterans in the Atlanta area number 271,000 while Brunswick records just over 82,000 veterans. Over 46 percent of the population base in the South Weymouth/Greater Boston area is between the ages of 17 and 35. The problems with closing South Weymouth are only magnified when you consider the negative affects the current BRAC plan will have on reservists reassigned to Brunswick, Maine, which is located approximately 160 miles north of South Weymouth. And, like Atlanta, Brunswick is also unable to man existing billet space. The following response was recorded in the Brunswick data call, "recruiting personnel of the proper rate/rating is already the single largest problem for unit readiness." The shortage in manpower is evident, especially when you look at NRTSC 791 and NRTSC 191.

As of March 95, only 29 of 35 billets for NRTSC 791 were filled and in the case of NRTSC 191 only 18 of 33 billets could be filled. In the case of South Weymouth vs. Atlanta, both are located near a major airport and naturally attract a high number of pilots, but, we have not seen any documentation that details the specific abilities and qualifications of the "rich" Atlanta demographic pool. Pilot qualifications such as, fixed-rotary wing or single/multi engine NFO qualifications, other officer designators or enlisted ratings and NECS have not been documented by the Navy. But, at South

Weymouth, as recently as 24 months ago, they were able fully man an A-4 Sky Hawks Squadron, VMA-223. While it appears the availability of qualified personnel at Atlanta is in question, South Weymouth can support with local personnel, a Navy or Marine Squadron. Additionally, South Weymouth would still have enough qualified personnel available to man an F-18 Navy Squadron. This could be accomplished without the need to airlift personnel.

Failure to produce documentation to substantiate the closure of South Weymouth is not the Navy's only mistake. There are some loose ends, nowhere in the plan does the Navy mention what will happen to South Weymouth's 545 Air Reservists. These reservists need to drill at an air station, yet their future has never been addressed. Action that would move these reservists to Brunswick would be met with the reality that Brunswick, according to data call responses, has inadequate housing and space needed to make such a move feasible. In essence there is no plan.

Another factor affecting a move by reservists to Maine is the distance they will have to travel if they intend to continue serving in the Navy Reserves. As you can see in maps 1-3 , the overwhelming majority of reservists affected by the decision live outside of the 50 mile border set down by the Navy as the distance that determines whether or not a reservist must be compensated for housing during reserve activities. The problem with the distance raises two important questions; what will be the messing and berthing cost to the Navy for reservists traveling from outside the 50 mile radius and how will the distance affect the attrition, retention and recruitment of reservists? It is our contention that the traveling distance will have a serious adverse affect resulting in the loss of many highly skilled reservists, as well as increased difficulty in recruiting qualified reservists. The bottom line, no other reserve NAS facility can match the people resources within the South Weymouth/Greater Boston

community.

## Recruiting Goals

In July of 1994, as reported in the August 18th edition of the Navy Times, Navy Secretary John Dalton announced his first major equal opportunity initiative. He announced then that by the turn of the century, he wants the naval services officer corps to "reflect society". He went on to say that by the year 2000, the number of minority officer accessions into the Navy and Marine Corps should in some cases, almost triple.

While these future goals should be lauded, it should be noted that the Navy has failed to meet current minority recruiting goals. Let's put this in the context of testimony from Secretary Dalton during the March 6, 1995 Defense Closure and Realignment Commission Open Meeting. Secretary Dalton noted that reservists play an important role in the area of recruitment. He said, "We asked our reservists to assist in recruiting". At the same time, he conceded that new recruitment targets will be difficult because the American public is under the misimpression that the draw down means the Navy isn't hiring. We make a similar conclusion, a lack of presence by the Navy in the South Weymouth/ Greater Boston area will further contribute to the impression that the "not hiring" sign is hanging in the Navy's door essentially closing out the richest recruitment area in New England and arguably the whole country.

## Conclusions

Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda explained during the March 6th Open Meeting that it is important to put our Reserve centers where there are Reservists of the right skill

levels and quality for us to have in our force. Additional support comes from the Reserve Officers Association of the United States in its testimony to the House and Senate MILCON Subcommittees, "If the BRAC 95 recommendations are approved, the Naval Reserve will be reduced to less than 200 air and surface facilities nationwide. This amounts to the smallest number of demographic centers for Naval Reserve activity since World War II and one third fewer than were in operation in 1978 when the number of drilling Reservists was approximately the same as it is today". This being the case, then the Navy cannot afford to lose South Weymouth.

The documentation generated by the Navy and other sources demonstrate on a consistent basis that South Weymouth is rich in demographics providing high quality recruits and reservists who are invaluable to the Navy and its mission. Unlike other facilities, South Weymouth is capable of handling its current mission and if the need arises, an expanded mission.

The Navy's demographic case is similar to the one presented in 1993. They have made statements that cannot be substantiated. The Navy has wrongly inflated the demographic importance of other Naval Bases and Air Stations while ignoring the value of South Weymouth. Deviation from the facts amounts to a deviation from the process.

**Naval Reservists Located Within 50 Miles of South Weymouth Naval Air Station by Town**

Acton, MA.	6	Holbrook, MA.	6	Milford, MA.	5
Arlington, MA.	6	Medfield, MA.	3	Millbury, MA.	2
Ashland, MA.	4	Medway, MA.	9	Northbridge, MA.	2
Ayer, MA.	1	Millis, MA.	1	Oxford, MA.	2
Belmont, MA.	11	Milton, MA.	10	Shrewsbury, MA.	7
Billerica, MA.	14	Needham, MA.	5	Sterling, MA.	2
Boxborough, MA.	1	Norfolk, MA.	4	Sutton, MA.	3
Burlington, MA.	4	Norwood, MA.	18	Upton, MA.	2
Cambridge, MA.	15	Plainville, MA.	4	Webster, MA.	2
Carlisle, MA.	4	Quincy, MA.	44	Westborough, MA.	2
Chelmsford, MA.	11	Randolph, MA.	29	Worcester, MA.	18
Concord, MA.	3	Sharon, MA.	7	Barnstable, MA.	15
Dracut, MA.	2	Stoughton, MA.	14	Bourne, MA.	4
Everett, MA.	7	Walpole, MA.	9	Falmouth, MA.	8
Framingham, MA.	14	Wellesley, MA.	11	Mashpee, MA.	1
Holliston, MA.	5	Westwood, MA.	8	Sandwich, MA.	6
Hopkinton, MA.	3	Weymouth, MA.	55	Acushnet, MA.	3
Hudson, MA.	2	Wrentham, MA.	8	Attleboro, MA.	19
Lexington, MA.	5	Abington, MA.	9	Dartmouth, MA.	2
Lincoln, MA.	2	Bridgewater, MA.	15	Easton, MA.	9
Lowell, MA.	15	Brockton, MA.	37	Fairhaven, MA.	6
Malden, MA.	13	Carver, MA.	3	Fall River, MA.	13
Marlborough, MA.	10	Duxbury, MA.	11	Mansfield, MA.	10
Medford, MA.	13	Halifax, MA.	3	New Bedford, MA.	11
Melrose, MA.	8	Hanover, MA.	11	Norton, MA.	7
Natick, MA.	8	Hanson, MA.	14	Raynham, MA.	5
Newton, MA.	17	Hingham, MA.	6	Rehoboth, MA.	3
Reading, MA.	3	Hull, MA.	11	Seekonk, MA.	3
Shirley, MA.	1	Kingston, MA.	3	Somerset, MA.	2
Somerville, MA.	15	Lakeville, MA.	7	Swansea, MA.	2
Stoneham, MA.	1	Marshfield, MA.	11	Taunton, MA.	15
Stow, MA.	1	Middleborough, MA.	12	Westport, MA.	1
Sudbury, MA.	4	Norwell, MA.	9	Amesbury, MA.	4
Tewksbury, MA.	9	Pembroke, MA.	19	Andover, MA.	9
Tyngsborough, MA.	2	Plymouth, MA.	29	Beverly, MA.	11
Wakefield, MA.	6	Rochester, MA.	2	Boxford, MA.	4
Waltham, MA.	13	Rockland, MA.	16	Danvers, MA.	8
Watertown, MA.	6	Scituate, MA.	6	Essex, MA.	5
Wayland, MA.	1	Wareham, MA.	7	Georgetown, MA.	2
Westford, MA.	9	Whitman, MA.	10	Hamilton, MA.	2
Weston, MA.	1	Boston, MA.	144	Haverhill, MA.	12
Wilmington, MA.	6	Chelsea, MA.	6	Ipswich, MA.	2
Winchester, MA.	8	Revere, MA.	5	Lawrence, MA.	4
Woburn, MA.	7	Winthrop, MA.	5	Lynn, MA.	24
Avon, MA.	2	Auburn, MA.	1	Lynnfield, MA.	4
Bellingham, MA.	1	Blackstone, MA.	3	Marblehead, MA.	7
Braintree, MA.	18	Clinton, MA.	2	Methuen, MA.	11
Brookline, MA.	7	Douglas, MA.	1	Nahant, MA.	5
Canton, MA.	6	Grafton, MA.	1	Newburyport, MA.	4
Cohasset, MA.	6	Harvard, MA.	1	Peabody, MA.	9
Dedham, MA.	5	Holden, MA.	3	Rowley, MA.	3
Dover, MA.	2	Hopedale, MA.	2	Salem, MA.	15
Foxborough, MA.	8	Leominster, MA.	2	Salisbury, MA.	1
Franklin, MA.	4	Mendon, MA.	2	Saugus, MA.	1


**Naval Reservists Located Within 50 Miles of South Weymouth Naval Air Station by Town**

Swampscott, MA.	6
Wenham, MA.	2
Hudson, NH.	4
Nashua, NH.	10
Atkinson, NH.	1
Plaistow, NH.	2
Salem, NH.	5
Seabrook, NH.	1
Windham, NH.	1
Barrington, RI.	8
Bristol, RI.	5
Warren, RI.	1
Warwick, RI.	16
Little Compton, RI.	4
Middletown, RI.	11
Portsmouth, RI.	7
Tiverton, RI.	4
Cranston, RI.	4
Cumberland, RI.	1
Foster, RI.	1
Lincoln, RI.	5
North Providence, RI.	5
Pawtucket, RI.	5
Providence, RI.	16
Scituate, RI.	6
Woonsocket, RI.	3
<b>Total Count</b>	<b>1,503</b>

## Naval Reservists Located Within 50 Miles of Brunswick Naval Air Station by Town

Norway, ME.	1
Paris, ME.	4
Bath, ME.	12
Bowdoinham, ME.	3
Phippsburg, ME.	1
Richmond, ME.	4
Topsham, ME.	19
Biddeford, ME.	2
Kennebunk, ME.	4
Newfield, ME.	1
Saco, ME.	5
Damariscotta, ME.	2
Newcastle, ME.	2
Wiscasset, ME.	3
Rockport, ME.	1
Augusta, ME.	2
China, ME.	1
Gardiner, ME.	5
Hallowell, ME.	2
Litchfield, ME.	1
Manchester, ME.	1
Monmouth, ME.	2
Randolph, ME.	1
Winthrop, ME.	1
Brunswick, ME.	12
Cape Elizabeth, ME.	5
Cumberland, ME.	2
Falmouth, ME.	3
Freeport, ME.	5
Gorham, ME.	3
Portland, ME.	17
Scarborough, ME.	3
Westbrook, ME.	1
Windham, ME.	1
Yarmouth, ME.	4
Auburn, ME.	5
Durham, ME.	1
Greene, ME.	1
Lewiston, ME.	6
Lisbon, ME.	13
Mechanic Falls, ME.	1
Turner, ME.	1
<b>Total Count</b>	<b>164</b>

*Location of Naval Reservists  
Attached to the South Weymouth  
Naval Air Station*



Scale @ 1" = 30 miles, April 24, 1995

Note: 103 SWNAS Reservists Located Outside of New England

Source: South Weymouth Naval Air Station

Prepared by the Weymouth Office of Planning and Community Development





**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425 Please call to file number  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209 950425-1321  
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 26, 1995

The Honorable Paul R. Haley  
Representative, 4th Norfolk District  
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts  
State House  
Boston, Massachusetts 02133-1054


Dear Representative Haley:

Thank you for providing the Commission information pertaining to the demographics of Naval Air Station South Weymouth. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations regarding Naval Air Station South Weymouth.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,



Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cw

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

**EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) #** 950425-14

<b>FROM:</b> WILLIAMS, BRYAN	<b>TO:</b> GENERAL
<b>TITLE:</b>	<b>TITLE:</b>
<b>ORGANIZATION:</b>	<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> DBCRC
<b>INSTALLATION (s) DISCUSSED:</b> FORT LEONARD WOOD	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER	✓		
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES				DELORE NURRE	✓		

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Direct Response
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FYI

**Subject/Remarks:**

SUBMITTING TESTIMONY FOR CHICAGO REGIONAL HEARING.

Due Date: 950502	Routing Date: 950425	Date Originated	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	-----------------	------------

Testimony for BRAC hearing in Chicago, IL on April 12, 1995.

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Commission:

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950425-14

My name is Bryan Williams and I am here to present the Base Closure and Realignment Commission with two documents in response to the proposed movement of units from Ft. McClellan to Ft. Leonard Wood. One is from the Coalition for the Environment and one is a technical evaluation letter in regard to the Ft. Leonard Wood air applications to construct new facilities. The BRAC needs to assure the public that none of the State of Missouri or USEPA permitting requirements will be shortcut in the approval of these applications.

The applications as filed have been reviewed and are woefully incomplete. There are numerous blanks in the submitted applications.

The application to construct the CDTF at Ft. Leonard Wood as approved is based on the original 1983 designs for the facility currently in operation at Ft. McClellan in Alabama. None of the State of Alabama required safety related equipment additions and none of the lessons learned design changes have been incorporated in the facility destined to be built at Ft. Leonard Wood. The two facilities are not comparable.

The incinerator at Ft. Leonard Wood will produce emissions of Sarin, the toxic nerve agent responsible for the recent deaths of subway riders in Japan, nerve agent VX and mustard gas. Information included with the application to construct the facility does not indicate how these emissions were determined. If they are based on current operations at Ft. McClellan, the Ft. Leonard Wood application, and approved permit, as of April 11, 1995, is seriously flawed based on the differences of the two facility designs.

The applications are not in compliance with the State of Missouri "Restriction of Emissions of Visible Air Contaminants"

The applications are not in compliance with the State of Missouri requirements for ambient air quality modeling.

The application for stormwater discharges from Ft. Leonard Wood included a one paragraph statement that "modifications might be required in the non point source water discharge permit for the installation". No information was submitted on the chemicals to be used or the quantities. Information submitted with the fog oil Air applications indicate that a hazardous air pollutant, hexachloroethane, which is also a "toxic pollutant" as listed in 40 CFR 401.15, will be part of the "smoke training activities". Any discharge of this material will need to be monitored and reported. This application was received by MDNR on January 24, 1994. After the original stormwater application had been review for more than one year, the "smoke training " issue was added to it and approved in one month. (Copy attached)

In addition, the application for smoke training does not address the federal requirements for "Prevention of Significant Deterioration". This PSD permitting process takes, on average, two years to complete.

By the compromises these incomplete applications may present, future use permits may be denied.

I hope the BRAC and the Missouri DNR will follow all of the approved guidelines and policies established over many years of permitting for the continued protection of our air, land and water resources.



271 Wolfner Drive  
Saint Louis, Missouri 63026

A SUBSIDIARY OF PERMA-FIX ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC.



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

File no. 950425-1421

April 25, 1995

Mr. Bryan Williams  
Schreiber Grana & Yonley, Inc.  
271 Wolfner Drive  
Saint Louis, Missouri 63026

Dear Mr. Williams:

Thank you for submitting testimony regarding the proposed movement of units from Fort McClellan, Alabama to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendation on Fort McClellan and Fort Leonard Wood

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I can be of service.

Sincerely,

Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cmc

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

**EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) #** 950425-15

<b>FROM:</b> CARPENTER, HERBERT	<b>TO:</b> DIXON
<b>TITLE:</b> CHAIRMAN	<b>TITLE:</b> CHAIRMAN
<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> PLATTSBURGH INTERMUNICIPAL DEU.	<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> DIBCRC
<b>INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED:</b> PLATTSBURGH AFB, MCGUIRE AFB	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		Ⓢ		COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				<b>REVIEW AND ANALYSIS</b>			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER		X	
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Direct Response
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FYI

**Subject/Remarks:**

FORWARDING ISSUE PAPER REGARDING THE CAPACITY OF MCGUIRE AFB TO MEET THE MISSION REQUIREMENTS ORIGINALLY SLATED FOR PLATTSBURGH

Due Date: 950502	Routing Date: 950425	Date Originated: 950420	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------

# PLATTSBURGH INTERMUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

---

324 U.S. OVAL • PLATTSBURGH AFB, NY 12903 • (518) 561-0232 • FAX: (518) 561-0686

April 20, 1995

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950425-15

Mr. Alan Dixon  
Chairman  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
1700 North Moore Street, Suite 1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon:

Since we last corresponded with you on March 15, one of our members has compiled the attached and very thoughtful background piece relative to the capacity of McGuire AFB to meet the mission requirements originally slated for Plattsburgh AFB.

I hope that it contributes to the quality and depth of your deliberations concerning a "redirect" for any future joint use opportunities that may exist for the Air Force here in Plattsburgh. Once again, thank you in advance for your consideration.

Sincerely,



Herbert Carpenter, Chairman

Review of  
**Deviations from Force Structure Plan,  
Environmental Constraints,  
Physical Constraints  
and  
Operational Deficiencies**  
in the  
**Realignment of McGuire Air Force Base**  
As Ordered by  
**The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission 1993**

Issues Raised by Plattsburgh Intermunicipal Development Council  
in its  
Request to Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission 1995  
for Re-Direct Hearing on  
Decision to Close Plattsburgh A.F.B.

Prepared by Assemblyman Chris Ortloff, 110th Dist. NY  
April, 1995



**Review of**  
**Deviations from Force Structure Plan,**  
**Environmental Constraints,**  
**Physical Constraints and**  
**Operational Deficiencies**  
in the  
**Realignment of McGuire Air Force Base**  
as ordered by  
**The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission 1993**

## **Executive Summary**

DBCRC 1993 realigned McGuire AFB by ordering the Air Force to put its East Coast Air Mobility Wing there and then (in a second resolution) ordered Plattsburgh AFB closed. The resolutions took on the force of law when the President accepted them and the Congress failed to rescind them. However, these orders have not been followed, the Force Structure Plan has been deviated from and environmental constraints have since been identified which prevent the Air Force from carrying out DBCRC's orders at McGuire AFB.

### **I. The Air Force Has Deviated from DBCRC Resolutions and The Force Structure Plan**

Despite their explicit language and the clear force of law behind them, DBCRC '93's orders have not been followed. An East Coast Air Mobility Wing does not exist as a viable operational reality and is not located at McGuire AFB as ordered. Specifically, the wing's KC-135 tankers, ordered to McGuire by DBCRC '93, have instead been located at Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota (a few to other locations and one entire squadron to England). This is a substantial deviation from the Force Structure Plan under which the AMW was established, and from the orders of DBCRC.

---

*No amount of Orwellian double-speak can refute these facts. Testimony of the Air Force Chief of Staff notwithstanding, neither McGuire AFB nor the Air Mobility Wing itself is functioning as ordered, and the magnitude of this deviation from the Force Structure Plan poses serious Concerns for the National Defense of the United States.*

---

### **II. Adverse Environmental Impacts Prove That USAF Cannot Comply with DBCRC '93**

The Air Force Draft Environmental Impact Statement for its realignment projects at McGuire AFB, published in March, 1994, discusses and raises several significant issues of fact relevant to a redirect on this matter. While the DEIS itself is moot (its process having been completed) a review thereof is nonetheless pertinent and useful in illuminating three types of additional issues:

#### **1. Practical Environmental Constraints**

These practical constraints explain and define parameters which have prevented the

Air Force from complying with the full realignment mandated by law (with Plattsburgh's KC-135s). These factors asserted the Air Force's DEIS prove PIDC's underlying claim that the DBCRC decision did not comply with the Force Structure Plan in the first place. *It could not comply.* No evidence of compliance was presented; *such evidence did not and does not exist.*

## **2. Legal and Regulatory Environmental Compliance Conflicts**

These impacts of the proposed realignment may or may not be serious environmental impacts, but they appear to conflict with federal and New Jersey environmental quality mandates. By preventing or adversely affecting operation of realigned aircraft, they support PIDC's claim that forcing the Air Force to operate an Air Mobility Wing at McGuire jeopardizes the National Defense.

## **3. Significant Adverse Environmental Impacts**

Even with a limited realignment, these impacts, *which would not exist at Plattsburgh AFB*, support PIDC's claim that evidence did not support the DBCRC resolution with respect to the final criteria.

Not surprisingly, the Air Force DEIS asserted that most of these environmental impacts could be mitigated. But in two specific areas of concern, no mitigating measures were identified, meaning that the Air Force has serious problems with both and has no practicable way to effectively deal with either of them at McGuire:

### **1. Air Traffic Congestion and Delay**

In the DEIS, the Air Force admitted its potential inability to carry out the mission of the Air Mobility Wing, and *no mitigating measures were suggested or claimed.* The Air Force again asserted (as it had in recommending McGuire's active duty mission be terminated in 1993) that McGuire AFB is unsuitable for the Air Mobility Wing mission. Of critical interest to DBCRC '95 is the detail and specificity on this matter which was *suppressed by DBCRC '93.* **This is the official Air Force statement:**

"Air traffic in the vicinity of McGuire AFB currently is heavy. At 8,000 feet and above, the airspace is extremely congested from commercial aircraft, a condition that may lead to delays because of the need for proper aircraft spacing. Consequently, there is concern that the timing needed to properly carry out refueling training may be jeopardized during some busy portions of the day. A regularly planned rendezvous between a KC-10 and another military aircraft may be jeopardized if there are delays in the KC-10 authorization for travel in the departure region. Time constraints needed for proper training during these air refueling missions may be violated because of the commercial air traffic congestion in the departure region. The dimensions of this problem are not known ... 14 satellite airports (and) special use airspaces along with the air traffic control wake turbulence separation criteria for heavy aircraft may significantly limit the KC-10 local training capability."

(see p. 10)

### **2. Ozone Non-Attainment**

Burlington County, New Jersey is an *ozone non-attainment area*. Operation of additional aircraft are shown in the DEIS to increase some ozone precursor gases by up to 415% despite mandatory restrictions on *any* new mobile sources of these gases. Either Air Force operations or other sources will have to be curtailed. If not the mission, then

the civilian economy will be impacted, and expensive mitigative measures *must* be taken in both additional capital construction and regular operating procedures, the cost of which was not considered by DBCRC '93. No such violations or costs would exist at Plattsburgh AFB. (see pp. 11-16)

---

## Conclusions

---

*1. The lack of active-duty KC-135s in the Northeast is a substantial deviation from the Force Structure Plan.*

---

*2. It results directly from the decision to close Plattsburgh AFB and assign its tankers to McGuire AFB, which could not accommodate them, leaving them instead in North Dakota and England.*

---

*3. Proof of ongoing serious air traffic delays at McGuire was available but was not considered by DBCRC '93. Further proof is now available along with conclusions contained in the DEIS.*

---

*4. The cost of extensive environmental mitigation measures mandated at McGuire (but not at Plattsburgh) was not considered by DBCRC '93.*

---

**• Plattsburgh AFB has none of these problems  
and should remain on active status as  
the Northeast base for active duty tankers or an Air Mobility Wing.**

---

## I. Deviations from Force Structure Plan and DBCRC Orders

### 1. Clear and Direct Orders Were Given But They Were Not Followed

The Air Force has not taken the action mandated by the DBCRC '93, defined by the following language in two resolutions adopted on June 24, 1993:

*"Move the 19 KC-10 aircraft from Barksdale Air Force Base to McGuire Air Force Base. Move the requisite number of KC-135s to establish the East Coast Mobility Base at McGuire."* (p. 132, l. 9-12, DBCRC hearing record)

and

*"Close Plattsburgh Air Force Base and transfer the KC-135s to McGuire Air Force Base."* (p. 200, l. 15-16).

### 2. The Commission Vote Was Based on a False Assurance of Force Structure Compliance

During the commission discussion on whether closing Plattsburgh would leave enough tankers in the northeast (the critical question as to whether the proposed action would deviate from the Force Structure Plan) the resulting scenario was described by Mr. DiCamillo:

*"With McGuire as the mobility base, that essentially takes the same tankers that would have been at Plattsburgh under the mobility base and places it just a little bit further south ..."* (p.195, l. 16-19)

Thus assured, the commissioners adopted the second resolution above by a 6-1 vote. However, none of Plattsburgh's KC-135s were transferred to McGuire, nor were any other KC-135s transferred to McGuire. Plattsburgh's KC-135s mostly went "a little bit further west" to Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota (1225 miles from Plattsburgh and 1330 miles from McGuire). Thus, the Air Force did not comply with the direct order to move "the requisite number of KC-135s" to McGuire and its action deviates from the Force Structure Plan.

### 3. No Active-Duty KC-135s Are Left in the Northeast

As a result, *there are no active-duty KC-135 tankers in the Northeast.* The east coast Air Mobility Wing's primary mission is impaired and the ability of active-duty Air Force tankers to safely, cost-effectively and reliably carry out their on-going refueling missions in support of the Atlantic air bridge is seriously jeopardized because these assets are based nearly 2000 miles west of their refueling points on the tanker track. Subsequent Unit Integrated Deployment mission requirements have led to one squadron being assigned on extended TDY to England in order to cover refueling missions within range of Plattsburgh but not within range of Grand Forks.

Furthermore, as we shall see in the next section, the only active duty tankers of any kind in the Northeast, McGuire's KC-10s, cannot conduct full operations as required under the Force Structure Plan

because of environmental constraints, and what operations they do conduct cause adverse environmental impacts which would not occur at Plattsburgh AFB.

#### **4. A Redirect is Essential to Correct a Substantial Deviation from the Force Structure Plan**

DBCRC '93 members asked an important question prior to voting to close Plattsburgh AFB. The commissioners correctly understood that they could not legally take an action which created a substantial deviation from the Force Structure Plan. They correctly understood that the Force Structure Plan required active duty KC-135s in the Northeast. Their votes to close Plattsburgh AFB clearly relied on Mr. DiCamillo's assurance that their action would not deviate from the plan. DBCRC '95 commissioners, unlike their predecessors, possess the truth:

---

### **Conclusion**

---

*1. The lack of active-duty KC-135s in the Northeast is a substantial deviation from the Force Structure Plan*

---

*2. It results directly from the decision to close Plattsburgh AFB and assign its tankers to McGuire AFB, which could not accommodate them, leaving them instead in North Dakota and England.*

---

- **Closing Plattsburgh did not leave enough tankers in the Northeast.**

*A redirect is essential on this issue alone.*

---

## II Undue Adverse Environmental Impacts Impair the Mission

Although the Air Force originally recommended Plattsburgh AFB to host the Air Mobility Wing, its statements to DBCRC '93 and '95 have maintained that the AMW can operate within mission parameters at McGuire. Despite persistent reports of internal reservations about the AMW's readiness, the Air Force did not recommend a redirect this year.

However, Air Force statements made in another official context tell a very different story. Discrepancies between Air Force statements to DBCRC and to state and federal environmental agencies bear close scrutiny by DBCRC '95 commissioners.

Statements made by the Air Force in its own official documents prepared as part of the environmental assessment of the realignment action at McGuire support the conclusion that McGuire AFB is not properly fulfilling the mission assigned there by DBCRC '93 and cannot properly host the Air Mobility Wing.

*(The remainder of this review draws directly from these official Air Force statements. They are presented here in topical order, not the order in which they were presented in the Draft Environmental Impact Statement, with page citations where appropriate and with parenthetical language added to give proper context to the present situation and/or ability of McGuire's environment to accommodate the additional KC-135s required to comply with the Force Structure Plan.)*

### From the Executive Summary of the DEIS, March 1994

#### 1. Air Traffic Congestion

*(p. xix)* "Concerns exist relative to congestion of air traffic. The congestion in these areas could cause delays in Air Force training missions or in commercial flights." (Adding the 28 KC-135s ordered by DBCRC '93 would cause even more delays in training missions and other operations).

#### 2. Ozone Non-attainment

*(p. xv)* "The KC-10s ... add volatile organic compounds ... precursors to ozone (for which the McGuire AFB area has been designated as in "severe" nonattainment). The effect ... is largely unknown. However, since the region's attainment status is so poor, all new stationary and mobile sources (however minor) must ... be in conformity with New Jersey's state implementation plan (SIP) for ozone."

#### 3. Threatening Salination of the Drinking Water Supply

*(p. xvii)* "... increased water use associated with the realignment and other force structure action ... contribute(s) to the decline of the water level of the deep aquifer supplying water for McGuire AFB." (Further decline threatens to result in sea water infiltration).

#### 4. Elimination of Wetlands

*(p. xvii)* "Construction (of the modest realignment to bring only the KC-10s there) (has) eliminate(d) (12.64 acres of wetland). Any (further) development (of additional ramp and runway would destroy even more) wetlands. Such development has not been

authorized by the state of New Jersey and the New Jersey Pinelands Commission, (as would be required by law)."

### **Notes on Section 1: Purpose of and Need for the Action**

*Of interest to any reader of this section is the repeated affirmation in the DEIS that a "no action" option, normally required in every NEPA environmental review process, is not possible because the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act (DBCRA) exempted base realignments from this requirement. However, the Air Force in fact takes a deliberate "no action" option by willfully failing to follow the orders of the DBCRC to include KC-135 aircraft in the realignment. The Secretary of the Air Force failed to implement the law; thus, a significant portion of the realignment mandated by the DBCRC for McGuire AFB is simply ignored for the purpose of claiming a smaller environmental impact.*

*Extrapolating from the DEIS for this small realignment clearly shows the inherent contradiction in the following two points: the realignment actually done at McGuire AFB substantially deviated from the Force Structure Plan, but if it had complied with the DBCRC orders, far greater adverse environmental impact would have resulted. Congress expressly precluded consideration of alternatives with less adverse environmental impact, to all agencies but DBCRC. Thus, DBCRC is the only agency with legal authority to do so and the PIDC request for a redirect expressly offers commissioners that opportunity. however ...*

---

*The main reason for DBCRC to examine the environmental impact statements is to more fully understand a number of practical environmental constraints, described therein, which help illuminate just why it was never possible for McGuire AFB and the region to accommodate the full Air Mobility Wing called for in the Force Structure Plan.*

---

*Obstacles to McGuire presented in the DBCRC '93 hearing process were essentially space and facility limitations, which DBCRC '93 presumed to "overcome" by accounting for the cost of additional ramp and fuel system construction. The EIS documents help to show how these constraints also have an environmental component, the mitigation costs of which were not accounted for by DBCRC '93. In other words, the ability of McGuire AFB to accommodate the full Air Mobility Wing is precluded in a practical way by environmental constraints that can't be waved away with a magic wand the same way putative construction costs were dismissed by DBCRC '93.*

### **Table 2.3**

This table details a number of adverse environmental impacts of the limited realignment action at McGuire AFB which would not have existed at Plattsburgh AFB:

(2-11) "Extensive demolition (of buildings) would be done (to make room for ramp expansion) requiring removal and disposal of asbestos."

*No demolition would have been required because Plattsburgh's ramp required no expansion to accommodate the mission.*

(2-15) "Increased water withdrawal would contribute to decline of water level in the deep aquifer."

*Plattsburgh's water is drawn from surface reservoirs fed by mountain streams. No such adverse impact would have existed at Plattsburgh.*

"Increase in impervious surface of 40 acres would result in increased storm-water runoff along the flight line. ... Grassy old-field vegetation would be removed."

*No ramp expansion would have been required and thus no such adverse environmental impact would have occurred at Plattsburgh.*

(2-16) "Elimination of 12.6 acres of wetlands."

*Ditto.*

"Elimination of habitat (for threatened species)."

*Ditto*

"WWII structures that are potentially eligible for the National Register will be demolished (to make room for ramp expansion)."

*No such adverse cultural impact would occur at Plattsburgh. To the contrary, the closing of Plattsburgh AFB will result in the abandonment and resulting degradation of numerous 19th-century buildings already on the National Register.*

## Air Space and Air Traffic Congestion Issues

### 3.2.12

#### Air Space

*The Air Force avoids the real issues in this section.*

*Despite acknowledgements elsewhere that air space considerations are severe constraints on operations of the Air Mobility Wing's additional heavy aircraft, the entire discussion here is about existing air space requirements for the old airlift wing which are irrelevant to the new mission assigned to this base by the DBCRC. No discussion is presented for air space to be used by the new Air Mobility Wing.*

*This is a major defect in the document, but also suggests that any honest discussion of these issues would reveal the true operational inadequacies of the air space around McGuire.*

*DBCRC '95 should require the Air Force to give detailed testimony on all the actual air space issues, which DBCRC '93 glossed over.*

*The question is not "can the FAA make the air space safe?" In 1993, that was the only question allowed of the FAA, to which it responded in the affirmative, and further discussion was terminated. In fact, FAA can always make any air space "safe," if necessary, by restricting traffic. From the point of view of National Defense capability, however, an air space made "safe" by excessive restrictions is detrimental to readiness. In 1993, valid questions about the extent to which FAA was already restricting McGuire-originated missions were never fully explored. The DEIS offers DBCRC '95 an opportunity to begin to examine the Air Force's real concerns.*



#### 4.1.12 Air Space

##### Concerns Suppressed by DBCRC '93:

(4-36) "Air traffic in the vicinity of McGuire AFB currently is heavy. At 8,000 feet and above, the airspace is extremely congested from commercial aircraft, a condition that may lead to delays because of the need for proper aircraft spacing. Consequently, there is concern that the timing needed to properly carry out refueling training may be jeopardized during some busy portions of the day. A regularly planned rendezvous between a KC-10 and another military aircraft may be jeopardized if there are delays in the KC-10 authorization for travel in the departure region. Time constraints needed for proper training during these air refueling missions may be violated because of the commercial air traffic congestion in the departure region. The dimensions of this problem are not known\* but are not *thought* to be insurmountable. The McGuire AFB air traffic control area comprises 14 satellite airports that serve many light civil aircraft. Additionally, the air traffic area consists of the Coyle drop zone, Navy Lakehurst drop zone, an aerobatics box, warning areas, and an Army drop restricted area. These special use airspaces along with the air traffic control *wake turbulence separation criteria for heavy aircraft* may significantly limit the KC-10 local training capability."

\*Some critical dimensions of the problem, however are well known to the FAA and the Air Force. In addition to two decades worth of documentation summarized in a scathing FAA letter to DBCRC '93, there have been the following developments since DBCRC '93:

- McGuire tankers tasked to perform real (not training) refueling missions for aircraft inbound from Europe refused the assignments due to inability to surmount air traffic control delays regularly experienced by McGuire aircraft. In at least two cases, tankers based at Plattsburgh AFB accepted and promptly fulfilled the missions, enabling those inbound aircraft to make it safely to landfall without running out of fuel and crashing into the Atlantic Ocean..
- Until Plattsburgh AFB's fuel pit operation was shut down, McGuire-based KC-10s on routine refueling missions would typically depart McGuire with half a load of fuel, fly to Plattsburgh, land and take on a full load, launch from Plattsburgh and complete the mission. This was due to the fact that fully-loaded KC-10s cannot launch from McGuire because the runway isn't long enough.
- Since Plattsburgh ceased being available for fueling, McGuire KC-10s routinely require 2 aircraft to perform a routine refueling mission: each aircraft launches with half a load of fuel, one refuels the other in mid-air and returns to McGuire while the now fully-loaded tanker proceeds to the rendezvous to carry out the mission. Fully-loaded KC-10s cannot launch from McGuire.
- Reliance on only National Guard and Reserve KC-135s in the Northeast is an unfair burden; Integrated Force Structure tanker missions rely on a core of active duty aircraft and aircrews which doesn't exist.
- Aircraft departing Northeast US bases bound for continental European bases, in order to arrive at their destinations during hours of the day when the receiving base is not shut down for domestic noise considerations, must typically depart US bases at 0200 hours. When active-duty KC-135s were based at

Plattsburgh, these tankers customarily fulfilled such missions. However, National Guard and Reserve aircrews do not work at night, and cannot accept missions requiring 0200 departure times. Thus, the only active-duty KC-135s, based in Grand Forks, must take these missions.

- Because of the repeated demand for such Unit Integrated Deployment missions, as well as refueling missions over the eastern reaches of the Atlantic Air Bridge, the Air Force has found it necessary to place an entire squadron from Grand Forks AFB on extended TDY status in England. It goes without saying that this incurs extra cost, not only in fiscal terms, but in personal terms as well, which would not incur if they were based at Plattsburgh.

*This is what is at issue. Lives and families, not only funds, are at stake.*

#### 4.2.11 Air Space

(4-41) "No mitigative measures have been identified for operations in special use air space areas that would be utilized by the KC-10 aircraft."

### Ozone Non-Attainment Air Pollution Issues

#### 3.2 ENVIRONMENTAL SETTING

##### 3.2.1.2 Air Quality

(3-4) "... the area around McGuire AFB has been designated as nonattainment ... for O<sub>3</sub>. The O<sub>3</sub> standard has been exceeded at the monitors in the vicinity of McGuire AFB on at least four days within a three-year period ... The McGuire AFB monitoring site recorded four days in 1989, four days in 1990, and 10 days in 1991 when O<sub>3</sub> concentration averages violated the primary NAAQS (0.12 ppm one-hour average); the secondary standards for O<sub>3</sub> (0.08 ppm one-hour average) were exceeded on 149 days in 1990.

*Compliance with the New Jersey State Implementation Plan (SIP) is a mandate, from which the Air Force is not exempted by the DBCRA.*

*Violations within the state are increasing over time. Operating additional KC-10s within the Burlington County ozone non-attainment area cannot be done without affecting one or more variables and potentially violating the SIP.*

(3-6) "The largest annual VOC emissions come from aircraft operation (328.0 tons), followed by aircraft engine trim/power checks (259.6 tons)."

*Because of waiting time with engines running due to air traffic congestion, these emissions are larger at McGuire than would be experienced at Plattsburgh AFB or any other base, and the very large increase in training time for an Air Mobility Wing would further exaggerate this adverse environmental impact in the Burlington County ozone non-attainment area.*

"The New Jersey SIP requires that 1990 VOC and NO<sub>x</sub> baseline source emissions for the entire state be reduced by 10% by 1996 ... This emissions reduction requirement would necessitate a change in the use or application of control technologies of some of the above-mentioned sources."

*Note: again, this is a mandate from which the DBCRA does not exempt the Air Force. No mitigating measures are offered to enable the Air Force to comply with this mandate, which would not obtain at Plattsburgh, inasmuch as Plattsburgh does not lie in an ozone non-attainment area.*

#### 4.1 PROPOSED ACTION AND ALTERNATIVES

##### 4.1.1

##### Air Resources

(4-1) "... the additional KC-10 aircraft operations would increase the annual emissions of all pollutants, except PM<sub>10</sub>."

DEIS tables 4-1 and 4-2 show the critical figures for VOCs and NO<sub>x</sub>, the ozone precursors. Those tables are summarized here:

From Table 4-1: Aircraft Emissions (tons per year)

	VOCs	NO <sub>x</sub>
1993 Baseline total	328.0	227.6
Future total with 24 KC-10s	519.6	1,016.0
Percentage Increase	58.4%	346.4%*

\*Note: on page 2-13, the DEIS characterizes this as "extremely small", while on page 4-37 it characterizes it as "significant quantities (which may force) controls on other sources to compensate." Further not that conversion to JP-8 introduces a 20% variation in this number which could be as high as 415%

From Table 4-2: All Emissions at McGuire AFB (tons per year)

	VOCs	NO <sub>x</sub>
1993 Baseline Total	1,096.5	866.8
Future Total with 24 KC-10s	1,288.1	1,655.2
Percentage Increase	17.5%	91.0%

(4-1) "All sources of ozone precursors at McGuire AFB must be controlled and minimized in order to comply with the New Jersey State Implementation Plan (SIP)."

*Again, this is a mandate.*

(4-3) "Under the worse-case scenario, and exclusive of ozone, the pollutant additions from the KC-10s would not result in violations of any of the ambient air standards because background concentrations are far below the air quality standards for each pollutant."

*Note that the emphasized words above were not emphasized in the DEIS. Yet they are the salient ones. Ozone is a critical consideration and pollution additions from the KC-10s would be a violation of significant magnitude.*

(4-5) "The number of stationary sources of VOCs ... would increase."

"Emissions of VOCs ... from ... jet fuel, gasoline, paints and degreasers ... additional aircraft fuel ... would result in additional VOC emissions."

"The Air Force intends to convert completely to the use of JP-8 fuel in FY 1994. The effects of the JP-8 conversion on emissions from aircraft engine exhaust are currently unknown. Preliminary studies...indicate that emissions of all critical pollutants would vary within 20% of JP-4 engine exhaust emissions."

*It appears a deliberate attempt has been made here to imply that emissions would decrease, when in fact "vary" can mean either increase or decrease. A 20% variation means that the 346.4% increase in NO<sub>x</sub> emissions predicted in Table 4-1 could be as high as 415%, or could be lower. The Air Force says it has no idea, yet confidently forges ahead with this serious adverse environmental impact in an ozone non-attainment area when no such issue would exist at Plattsburgh AFB.*

## 4.22 MITIGATIVE MEASURES

### 4.2.1

#### Air Resources

(4-37) "... the significant quantities of ozone to be emitted as a result of the realignment and additional force structure action may make it necessary to place controls on other sources\* to compensate ... Because the region is currently in nonattainment for ozone, the paint booths and degreasing washracks needed to support the KC-10 operations must be constructed in consultation with the New Jersey DEPE. The extensive permitting requirements of the state's "lowest achievable emission rate" program mandate that these new facilities employ state-of-the-art emission control technologies."

*\* Controls on other sources typically include restrictions on automobiles, required use of reformulated gasolines at higher costs, bans on backyard barbecues and gas-powered lawn mowers, as well as a myriad of restrictions on private businesses. A "lowest achievable" strategy is essentially a cost-irrelevant one. Standards must be achieved, whatever the cost. Costs to achieve this will be substantially higher than construction costs for these stationary emissions sources would be at Plattsburgh AFB. They are certainly higher, by a significant margin, than estimates used by the DBCRC in concluding that there was virtually no difference in construction costs between Plattsburgh and McGuire.*

*(See DBCRC June 24, 1993 transcript, pp. 96-104, concluding with Commissioner Byron's question "... is that the same cost at each of the facilities?" and Mr. DiCamillo's answer that "it's in the same ballpark.")*

## 4.3 ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND PERMIT REQUIREMENTS

### 4.3.1

#### Introduction

(4-41) "... various federal statutes ... impose environmental protection and compliance requirements upon the Air Force."

(4-42) "... (also) federal law delegates enforcement or implementation authority to state or local agencies ... construction and *operation* of the facilities necessary to carry out the realignment *must* be in compliance with the statutes, regulations and standards then in effect."

*Note that these are mandates which apply not only to the construction project but to the operation of the aircraft thereafter.*

#### 4.3.2 Air Pollution

*Without citing the entire text here, this detailed discussion of the interrelated impacts and mitigative measures required by the Clean Air Act (CAA) is illustrative of the difficulties involved in permitting any new emission source. When the ozone non-attainment status of McGuire AFB is considered in this context, a general idea of the practical constraints facing the Air Force in attempting to operate the Air Mobility Wing at McGuire is gained.*

---

*A thorough analysis of the combined effect of the law and this circumstance is not done by the DEIS, but if done, would more clearly expose the severity of the constraints. DBCRC '95 should do so, since no other agency has the authority.*

---

(4-45) "To implement a control strategy for ozone pollution ... there may be no storage of VOCs in any stationary storage tank having a maximum capacity of 10,000 gal or greater and the transfer of any VOC that has a vapor pressure or sum of partial pressure of 0.02 lb/in<sup>2</sup> absolute or greater at standard conditions into any receiving vessel having a maximum capacity of 2,000 gal or greater unless the operation is equipped with control apparatus to prevent the emission of a VOC into the outdoor atmosphere.

(4-47) "The CAA established the NAAQS to protect the public from adverse effects caused by specific pollutants. For ozone, the NAAQS is set at a maximum of 0.12 ppm averaged over a one-hour period. ... this standard must be attained ... McGuire AFB is ranked severe or low severe and must meet the NAAQS standard for ozone by November 15, 2005. ... 24 KC-10s would add about 190 tons per year of VOCs and 790 tons per year of NO<sub>x</sub> to the atmosphere (Table 4.1) The direct emissions from the proposed relocation, therefore, exceed the *de minimis* threshold and a conformity determination must be made."

(4-48) "There are no exemptions from the rule. ...Under the rule, the emissions from the construction of any facility that would require permitting as a new major or modified source under the New Source Review Program or the Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program are not included in the calculation of emissions for determining the direct and indirect emissions that require conformity determination. However, since the aircraft, as mobile sources, are not required to be permitted in New Jersey, those emissions must be counted and clearly exceed the *de minimis* threshold set forth in the rule."

*Note that the DEIS on page 2-13 characterizes these emissions as "extremely small" without pointing out that, even if that were true, the standard against which such emissions must be measured is a de minimus threshold, and every VOC and NO<sub>x</sub>.*

*emission increase in an ozone non-attainment area must trigger tough absolute mitigative measures which are not identified in the DEIS.*

"The action *may* be presumed to conform if McGuire AFB can clearly demonstrate that, using methods consistent with those set forth in the rule, the emissions from the proposed activities would not cause or contribute to any new violation of any standard in any area; interfere with the provisions in the applicable SIP; increase the frequency or severity of any existing violation of any standard in any area; or delay timely attainment of any standard or any required interim emission reductions or other milestones in any area including emission levels specified in the SIP."

*How? Park the aircraft and never fly them?*

"If the action is not exempt and cannot be presumed to conform, a conformity determination must be made. An action is in conformity ... *if*, for each pollutant that exceeds the *de minimis* threshold, the appropriate state or local agency makes a determination that the action meets the following requirements:

"1. For any criteria pollutant, the total ... emissions ... are specifically identified and accounted for in the applicable SIPs ...

"2. For ozone or nitrogen dioxide, the total ... emissions ... are fully offset within the same non-attainment or maintenance area through a revision to the applicable SIP or ... there is no net increase ...

"3. For ozone or nitrogen dioxide, the total ... emissions, ... as a whole, together with all other emissions in the nonattainment area ... not exceed ... emissions *budgets* specified in an applicable SIP or ... (if they) would exceed the specified emission budget, the governor of the state must make a written commitment to EPA that the state will submit a revision to the SIP that would achieve emission reductions needed to not exceed the emissions budget specified, through specific measures, including any reasonable mitigation measures required by the federal agency, *prior to the time emissions ... would occur.*

(4-49) "...no action may be found in conformity unless it is in compliance or consistent with all relevant requirements and milestones contained in the applicable SIP. McGuire AFB will have to coordinate with New Jersey DEPE to determine *if* the proposed actions are in conformity with the New Jersey SIP. The final conformity determination will be made *by the Air Force* in a separate document."

#### 4.4 UNAVOIDABLE ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

(4-60) "... the realignment ... would result in some adverse impacts to the environment. Those adverse impacts that cannot be mitigated to insufficient levels ... are summarized in this section. ... During operation, there would be no new violations of ambient air quality (separate from the regional ozone) ... Any additional VOCs ... NO<sub>x</sub> ... would contribute to additional ozone pollution."

(2-9) "When the first KC-10 aircraft arrived at McGuire AFB from Barksdale AFB in the summer of 1994, none of the facilities listed in Section 2.2.1 were available. During the construction phase, required maintenance for the KC-10s had to be conducted while the aircraft were sitting outside on the ramp. If an aircraft developed a fuel leak, repairs had to be delayed until the temperature remained above 50° F for an extended period of time. Other maintenance, such as hydraulic work on struts and No. 2 engine changes, cannot be done on a ramp and could not be done at McGuire AFB."

"Such operations can be made to work temporarily, but the mission cannot be sustained under these conditions."

*No such problems would have existed at Plattsburgh AFB.*

## Groundwater Issues

### 3.2.5.2 Groundwater

(3-27) "The deep hydrogeologic unit present at McGuire AFB is the Potomac-Raritan-Magothy aquifer system. The system is regional in extent and is the primary source for potable water supplies in the area.

"The primary source of recharge to the system consists of rainfall or surface water.

"Before the massive pumping that has been relatively commonplace in the region since the early 1960s, groundwater flow was primarily down gradient (south or southeast). Large pumping centers such as McGuire AFB have caused large-scale reversal of the historical flow path. During the period 1900-1968, groundwater levels in the system declined about 80 ft in the Fort Dix-McGuire AFB area.

"In 1992 groundwater levels continued to undergo long-term decline at a rate of about 1 foot per year."

*The Air Force claims that the additional pumping for the realignment is acceptable because Ft. Dix pumping declined by more than 50% after 1987. However, that decline had already occurred when the USGS 1993 report documented the continued foot-per-year decline in groundwater levels. No such adverse impact, false claim by the Air Force or even the concern about groundwater would exist at Plattsburgh AFB.*

"The New Jersey DEPE has designated the Camden Metropolitan area, including McGuire AFB, as a critical water supply management area because of possibility of saltwater contamination in the overpumped Potomac-Raritan-Magothy aquifer system."

*It goes without saying that, even if groundwater levels were an issue at Plattsburgh AFB, saltwater contamination would not because Plattsburgh lies on freshwater Lake Champlain, at an elevation of 95-100 feet above mean sea level.*

### 4.1.5 Water Resources

(4-20) "Potential impacts ... include degradation of water quality (and) depletion of water supplies."

(4-21) "The realignment would increase the water requirement by about 25%."

(4-22) "The total withdrawal ... would not exceed the water permit amount. However, the deep aquifer that supplies the water for McGuire AFB is overpumped, and the potentiometric surface continues to drop about 1 ft a year. The realignment at McGuire AFB would increase the water withdrawal and contribute to the decline of the potentiometric level. The potential impact on groundwater level from the realignment and the proposed force structure action at McGuire AFB would be a function of the increased number of personnel and dependents moving into the area ... although the realignment at McGuire AFB would increase the current water use, the combined impact of a decrease in personnel at Fort Dix and an increase at McGuire AFB would not result in a higher water demand than that experienced before 1991."

*This is verified by Table 3.9 on page 3-28. The existing permit does allow for the proposed increase, but - as noted above - even the significantly lower pumping of 1992 was found by USGS in 1993 to be lowering the groundwater level by one foot per year. No such issue would exist at Plattsburgh AFB.*

#### 4.3.4.1 Drinking Water

(4-50) "The additional water usage resulting from realignment would not exert a higher water demand than in 1991 or than allowed by McGuire AFB's water allocation permit (Section 4.1.5.)."

*While technically true, this statement glibly avoids the previously-documented fact that even at the lower 1991-1992 pumping levels experienced after Fort Dix was realigned, the USGS still found the aquifer water level to be dropping by 1 foot per year. The additional water usage resulting from McGuire realignment will increase this adverse impact. Such an impact would not be a problem at Plattsburgh AFB.*

### Wetlands Issues

(4-25) "The proposed expansion of the aircraft parking apron...would eliminate 93% of this (13.5-acre) wetland."

(4-26) "Wetlands...would be destroyed."

*No wetlands would be destroyed at Plattsburgh AFB.*

(4-54) "It is anticipated construction of new facilities in support of the realignment may impact wetlands ... The construction of the control tower would eliminate 0.04 acre ... The parking apron would eliminate 12.6 acres of wetland ... permits will only be issued if there is "no practicable alternative" to the proposed activity."

*Of course, Plattsburgh AFB is a practicable alternative, and DBCRC may consider the Plattsburgh AFB option, even if the DBCRA prohibits such an alternative under NEPA.*



## Historic Preservation Issues

(4-58) "... if a proposed action might impact a historic property resource, consultation with the State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation is required."

*The closing of Plattsburgh AFB, which was done to enable McGuire AFB to expand, will cause the complete abandonment of dozens of 19th century buildings on the National Register of Historic Places and an historic military cemetery. Yet, despite this direct causal link to the McGuire realignment project, consultation with the New York state historic preservation officer was not done as part of the DEIS.*

## Conclusions

*1. Air Traffic Congestion unquestionably limits training near McGuire.*

*2. FAA aircraft separation requirements for KC-10s further limit training near McGuire.*

*3. Air Traffic Delays at McGuire unquestionably affect timing of refueling training.*

*4. Air Traffic Delays at McGuire unquestionably jeopardize actual refueling missions.*

**• Air Traffic Delays at McGuire jeopardize the National Defense capability.**

*1. Ozone issues severely restrict mobile sources of ozone precursor gasses in the McGuire area.*

*2. Just 24 KC-10s may increase NO<sub>x</sub> emissions at McGuire up to 415%.*

*3. Any additional emissions violate the New Jersey SIP.*

*4. The limited realignment at McGuire thus creates daily ozone-precursor emissions violations.*

**• The full realignment ordered by DBCRC '93 has proved to be impossible at McGuire.**

**• Plattsburgh AFB has none of these problems.**

*A redirect is essential on these issues, and only a redirect can solve them.*



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Change order to contract for  
950425-15R1

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:

AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

April 26, 1995

Mr. Herbert Carpenter  
Chairman, Plattsburgh Intermunicipal  
Development Council  
324 U.S. Oval  
Plattsburgh AFB, New York 12903


Dear Mr. Carpenter:

Thank you for providing the Commission with information regarding the capacity of McGuire Air Force Base to meet the mission requirements originally slated for Plattsburgh Air Force Base. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

The information that you have provided will be placed in the Commission's library and utilized by the Commission in our review and analysis process. Also, I can assure you that the information you have provided will be shared with my fellow Commissioners.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Please do not hesitate to contact me whenever you believe I may be of service.

Sincerely,



Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cw

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

**EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) #** 950425-16

<b>FROM:</b> JEFFERSON, JAMES T.	<b>TO:</b> DIXON
<b>TITLE:</b> SENIOR ENLISTED ADVISOR	<b>TITLE:</b> CHAIRMAN
<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> SACRAMENTO AIR LOG. CENTER	<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> DBCRC
<b>INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED:</b> MCCLELLAN AFB	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL				COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON		ⓧ		COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER		X	
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature		Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
	Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature		Prepare Direct Response
X	ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓	FYI

**Subject/Remarks:**

LETTER OF SUPPORT.

Due Date: 950502	Routing Date: 950425	Date Originated: 950420	Mail Date:
------------------	----------------------	-------------------------	------------



## DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS SACRAMENTO AIR LOGISTICS CENTER (AFMC)  
McCLELLAN AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA

950425-16

20 April 95

SM-ALC/CCC  
3237 Peacekeeper Way  
Suite 9  
McClellan AFB CA 95652-1052

Honorable Alan J. Dixon  
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission  
Suite 1425  
1700 N. Moore Street  
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Chairman Dixon


I am writing to request that you keep McClellan Air Force Base open. As the high-tech depot in the Department of Defense, McClellan Air Force Base is in an excellent position to support America's future military forces.

Pentagon leaders, including General John Shalikashvili, acknowledge that future conflicts will be increasingly dependent on technological advances. The high-tech "smart" bomb nature of the Persian Gulf War gave us a glimpse of these advances. As General Shalikashvili pointed out, the Gulf War "showed a snapshot of this revolution in progress."

McClellan's microelectronics capabilities, advanced composite technologies, large and small radar applications, electro-optics "night vision" program, and electronic warfare systems expertise make our base even more important for our nation's military requirements in the future. Therefore, McClellan should not only stay open, its missions should be expanded as part of BRAC '95.

McClellan Air Force Base has the bipartisan support of the entire Sacramento community. We urge you to preserve this irreplaceable national asset.

Sincerely

  
JAMES T. JEFFERSON, CMSgt, USAF  
Senior Enlisted Advisor  
Sacramento Air Logistics Center



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

Please refer to this number  
when responding 950425-16R1

April 25, 1995

CMSgt James T. Jefferson, USAF  
SM-ALC/CCC  
3237 Peacekeeper Way  
Suite 9  
McClellan Air Force Base, CA 95652-1052


Dear CMSgt Jefferson:

Thank you for your letter regarding McClellan Air Force Base, California. I certainly understand your interest in the base closure and realignment process and welcome your comments.

You may be certain that the Commission will thoroughly review the information used by the Defense Department in making its recommendations. I can assure you that the information you have provided will be considered by the Commission in our review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendation on Air Force depots.

I look forward to working with you during this difficult and challenging process. Again, thank you for providing information to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Sincerely,



Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman

AJD:cmc

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

**EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) #** 950425-17

<b>FROM:</b> BORSKI, ROBERT A	<b>TO:</b> STRAW, E. M.
<b>TITLE:</b> REP. (PA)	<b>TITLE:</b> DIRECTOR
<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> U. S. CONGRESS	<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> DLA
<b>INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED:</b> DEF. INVD. SUPPLY CENTER, DEF PERS. SUP. CENTER	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA	✓		
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX	✓		
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS	✓		
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING	✓		
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA	✓		
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES	✓		
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE	✓		
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION				AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	Prepare Direct Response
<b>ACTION:</b> Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	FYI

**Subject/Remarks:**

REQUESTING THEY CONTINUE WITH THE ORIGINAL BRAC 93 SCHEDULE FOR THE DEF. PERSONNEL SUPPORT CENTER.

<b>Due Date:</b> _____	<b>Routing Date:</b> 950425	<b>Date Originated:</b> 950421	<b>Mail Date:</b> _____
------------------------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	-------------------------

ROBERT A. BORSKI  
3D DISTRICT, PENNSYLVANIA

COMMITTEES:  
TRANSPORTATION  
AND INFRASTRUCTURE  
RANKING DEMOCRAT—SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT

STEERING COMMITTEE

REGIONAL WHIP

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

April 21, 1995

WASHINGTON OFFICE:  
ROOM 2182  
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BLDG.  
(202) 225-8251  
FAX: (202) 225-4628

DISTRICT OFFICES:  
7141 FRANKFORD AVE.  
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19135  
(215) 335-3355  
FAX: (215) 333-4508  
2630 MEMPHIS ST.  
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19125  
(215) 426-4616

Vice Admiral E.M. Straw, USN  
Director, Defense Logistics Agency  
Cameron Station  
Alexandria, VA 22304-6100

Phone number to my number  
What is your number 950425-17

Dear Admiral Straw:

Thank you for your March 31 letter clarifying the intent of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) with respect to the future of the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) and the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) workforces in conducting the Inventory Control Point (ICP) mission.


I appreciate your extra effort in explaining what has been a confusing situation since the initial announcement of your recommendation.

Given that the bulk of these activities will reside at the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) compound in Northeast Philadelphia, and that military construction (MILCON) is required in any event, I am looking to facilitate a smooth planning for this transition. Since the administrative spaces available, even in fiscal year 1999, will not accommodate the combined total workforce of 2608 personnel in addition to DPSC tenants, it makes no sense to further delay the DPSC MILCON.

It would seem to me that, once the costs of operating the DPSC facility are considered, and given that a MILCON is required in any event, the economical decision is to continue with the original BRAC 93 schedule regarding this aspect.

I would appreciate your direct response to this suggestion. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,

  
ROBERT A. BORSKI  
Member of Congress

RAB/mdv

✓ cc: Honorable Alan Dixon, Chairman  
Defense Base Closure Commission

**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**

**EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SYSTEM (ECTS) #** 950425-18

<b>FROM:</b> ROBLES, JOSEPH W.	<b>TO:</b> COOK, BOB
<b>TITLE:</b> DEPUTY DIRECTOR	<b>TITLE:</b> INTER. TEAM LEADER
<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> DEF DISTRIBUTION DEPT-OGDEN	<b>ORGANIZATION:</b> DBCRC
<b>INSTALLATION (S) DISCUSSED:</b> DEFENSE DEPOT OGDEN	

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN	FYI	ACTION	INIT	COMMISSION MEMBERS	FYI	ACTION	INIT
CHAIRMAN DIXON				COMMISSIONER CORNELLA			
STAFF DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER COX			
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR	✓			COMMISSIONER DAVIS			
GENERAL COUNSEL	✓			COMMISSIONER KLING			
MILITARY EXECUTIVE				COMMISSIONER MONTOYA			
				COMMISSIONER ROBLES			
DIR./CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON				COMMISSIONER STEELE			
DIR./COMMUNICATIONS				REVIEW AND ANALYSIS			
				DIRECTOR OF R & A	✓		
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT				ARMY TEAM LEADER			
				NAVY TEAM LEADER			
DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION	✓			AIR FORCE TEAM LEADER			
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER				INTERAGENCY TEAM LEADER	✓		
DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL				CROSS SERVICE TEAM LEADER			
DIR./INFORMATION SERVICES							

**TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED**

<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Chairman's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Commissioner's Signature
<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Reply for Staff Director's Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Direct Response
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION: Offer Comments and/or Suggestions	✓ <input type="checkbox"/> FYI

**Subject/Remarks:**

FORWARDING LIST OF PEOPLE WHO WERE INVOLVED WITH THE DBCRC VISIT ON APRIL 13.

<b>Due Date:</b> _____	<b>Routing Date:</b> 950425	<b>Date Originated:</b> 950419	<b>Mail Date:</b> _____
------------------------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------	-------------------------





**DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY**

DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION REGION WEST  
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT OGDEN  
500 W. 12TH STREET  
OGDEN, UT 84407-



IN REPLY  
REFER TO

DDOU-D

SUBJECT: DDOU BRAC Visit Committee Members

19 April 1995

TO: Base Realignment & Closure Committee  
ATTN: Mr. Bob Cook  
1700 N. Moore Street  
Suite #1425  
Arlington, VA 22209

1. As requested, enclosed are the lists of people who were involved with the DDOU BRAC Visit on 13 April 1995, including the Community Briefing.
2. If you need further assistance, please call me at DSN 352-7859 or Commercial (801) 399-7859.

5 Encls

JOSEPH W. ROBLES  
Deputy Director  
Defense Distribution Depot Ogden

VIPs

Governor Mike Leavitt  
210 State Capitol  
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

Congressman James Hansen  
324 25th Street  
Ogden, UT 84401

Senator Robert F. Bennett  
324 25th Street  
Ogden, UT 84401

Senator Orrin G. Hatch  
324 25th Street  
Ogden, UT 84401

Mayor Glen Meham  
2484 Washington Blvd.  
Ogden, UT 84401

Community Briefing

MG(RET) Mike Pavich  
2260 E. Summerwood Drive  
Layton, UT 84040

Mr. Barney Chapman  
America First Credit Union  
P. O. Box 9199  
Ogden, UT 84409

Mr. Dave Correll  
IOMEGA  
1821 W. 4000 S.  
Roy, UT 84067

Ms. Flora Ogan  
Ogden Standard Examiner  
455 23rd Street  
Ogden, UT 84401

Ms. Vickie McCall  
1485 27th Street  
Ogden, UT 84403

Mr. Steve Critchlow  
3705 N. 800 W.  
Pleasant View, UT 84414

Ogden Park Hotel Employees

Mr. Mike Bowman	Ms. Kathi Dysert
247 24th Street	247 24th Street
Ogden, UT 84401	Ogden, UT 84401

Ben Lomond High School

Bagpipers  
800 Jackson Ave  
Ogden, UT 84401

Planning Committee

Defense Distribution Depot Ogden  
ATTN:  
500 W. 12th Street  
Ogden, UT 84407-5000

Mr. Steve Sugimoto  
DDOU-X

Mr. Stephen Larsen  
DDOU-W

Mr. James Owen  
DDOU-WT

Ms. Carolyn Brunson  
DDOU-XA

Ms. Patricia Mulstay  
DDOU-WN

Ms. Karen Wright  
DDOU-WN

Ms. Debi Sandlund  
DDOU-XA

Ms. Eleanor Pulido  
DDOU-WTS

Mr. Steve Tippetts  
DDOU-WFC

Mr. Jack Taylor  
DDOU-WFC

Mr. Bill Burbidge, Tour Narrator  
DDOU-S

Ms. Judy Luthy, Tour Narrator  
DDOU-M

Ms. Betty Hunter  
DDOU-XA

## Honorary Escorts

Ms. Cherie Coolbear  
DDOU-WN

Ms. Linda Corbridge  
DDOU-XA

Mr. Rick Bjerke  
DDOU-XA

Mr. Richard Driggs  
DDOU-XP

Mr. Van Evans  
DDOU-XA

## Ushers

Ms. Lynda O'Neill  
DDOU-DE

Ms. Kay Chapple  
DDOU-WN

Ms. Jolynn Casalapro  
DDOU-WT

Mr. Robert McNabb  
DDOU-WN

Mr. Mark Fernelius  
DDOU-XA

Ms. Carolyn Brown  
DDOU-WE

Ms. Lori Florence  
DDOU-XA

Mr. Tom Tudor  
DDOU-WTS

## VIP Parking/Ushers

Mr. Kirk Boyington  
DDOU-WN

Mr. Jason Steed  
DDOU-WN

Van Drivers

Mr. Larry Richins  
DDOU-SEM

Ms. Lynette Hansen  
DDOU-SEM

Mr. Dennis Owens  
DDOU-SEM

Mr. John Bingham  
DDOU-SEM

Ms. Cecilia Gomez  
DDOU-SEM

DDOU Main Support Group Committee

Mr. Rick Winn  
DDOU-WFL

Ms. Taya Judkins  
DDOU-WFL

Mr. Monte Rudd  
DDOU-WFL

Ms. Pam Lanier  
DDOU-SEC

Ms. Wendy DeBartolo  
DDOU-EOD

Ms. Alma Dominguez  
DDOU-EOD

Ms. Sherry Watkins  
DDOU-EOC

Ms. MelaLee Winn  
DDOU-XIC

Mr. Curtis Watkins  
4562 S. 950 W.  
Riverdale, UT 84405