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Appeals for “One Million Belgian Children”: Understanding the Success of the Commission for Relief in Belgium through the Mudd Family Papers

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Claremont McKenna College

**Appeals for “One Million Belgian Children”: Understanding the Success of the
Commission for Relief in Belgium through the Mudd Family Papers**

SUBMITTED TO

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BY

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FOR

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Abstract

In response to the German occupation of Belgium in World War I, future U.S. president Herbert Hoover and a handful of his colleagues in the mining engineer industry founded the Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB). The CRB engineered one of the greatest relief movements in history partly on account of its successful public appeals; nevertheless, the success of these appeals has never been fully explained due to a remarkable dearth of scholarship on the topic. This paper seeks to fill in the gap by analyzing salient documents in the Mudd Family Papers, located in Honnold/Mudd Library's Special Collections section. The artifacts ultimately evince that the CRB tailored its appeals to the American upper and middle classes, appropriating their respective motifs and lexicons to successfully mobilize both groups; that rumors of wartime atrocities against Belgian children augmented its appeals to the middle class; and that it issued targeted messages to its American supporters after the United States' entry into World War I, maintaining vital public support. The findings of this paper promise to add invaluable knowledge to an exceedingly understudied historical subject.

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Historiography

Notwithstanding its import to the history of humanitarianism and the greater story of World War I, scholars have largely neglected the Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB) in the century since its liquidation. The few extant works devoted to the CRB are remarkably scrupulous, anthologizing and summarizing in granular detail its administration and operations—yet they fail to adequately articulate the underpinnings of its successful public appeals in the United States. Ironically, this holds true in the most seminal piece on the subject: George I. Gay and H. H. Fisher’s *Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium: Documents*.

As an annotated anthology comprised of countless CRB communications, *Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium* includes several examples of the Commission’s appeals in the United States, affording a glimpse into the semantics it employed. In fact, a handful of the documents contained in the compilation are almost identical to artifacts found in the Mudd Family Papers—including ones germane to Belgian Kiddies, Ltd., the Rocky Mountain Club, and the CRB’s response to the United States’ entry into World War I; nonetheless, Gay and Fisher never explicate these documents nor entertain the role of social classes in CRB appeals—even though evidence proves the Commission successfully mobilized the American upper and middle classes—leaving the connection between the Commission’s rhetoric and its target audiences

unformed.¹ Moreover, unlike the Mudd Family Papers, these documents are not included as attachments in larger correspondences, making it difficult to accurately assess their efficacy. The only important conclusion they posit on the topic is that the CRB’s \$52.3 million fund—much of which stemmed from the Commission’s public appeals—“provided invaluable support before government subsidies were granted and indicated the strength of the world-wide moral support of the undertaking, which was an important factor in securing government assistance.”²

Herbert Hoover echoes this notion in *An American Epic, Volume 1: The Relief of Belgium and Northern France, 1914-1930*, remarking that the CRB’s fund—and hence its public appeals—was vital to the enterprise’s overall success for the same reasons cited by Gay and Fisher.³ Additionally, he supplies statistics showing that American contributions far exceeded those from other nations.⁴ This is essentially all that he says on the matter, as his work is an anthology—similar to *Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium*—that emphasizes his administrative experiences over other CRB operations.

The academic piece that comes closest to explaining the strategies that animated the CRB’s successful public appeals is Ryan Thomas Austin’s 2009 doctoral dissertation, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’ the Commission for Relief in

¹ George I. Gay and H. H. Fisher, *Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium: Documents* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1929), Chapter XV: Parts 6 and 7, accessed April 20, 2015, <http://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/comment/CRB/CRB1-TC.htm>.

² *Ibid.*, Chapter XV: Introduction.

³ Herbert Hoover, *An American Epic, Volume 1: The Relief of Belgium and Northern France, 1914-1930* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959), 32.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 31.

Belgium: 1914-1915.” Austin devotes a chapter to the “Public Relations of the CRB (1914-1915)” wherein he recapitulates the content of the CRB’s public appeals.⁵ His summaries occasionally hint that class distinctions may have played a part in CRB appeals: for instance, he notes that many of them “focused on babies and children in particular as the innocent victims that suffered most tragically,” and that Hoover—at one of his myriad engagements as keynote speaker—“personalized the experience of Belgians by painting a picture of what life would be like in America if they faced similar circumstances.”⁶ Like Gay and Fisher, however, Austin does not formally consider the possibility that the CRB tailored its appeals for respective social classes—an idea that could help explain their success. Austin’s dissertation is also limited because it only treats the CRB’s first two years of existence, leaving out appeals made subsequent to the United States’ declaration of war on Germany in 1917.

In sum, the minimal literature on the CRB demonstrates that its public appeals were integral to its overall success and that the United States contributed the most to its influential charity fund. The works also suggest that the CRB employed different motifs for different audiences—but none of them seriously entertain the role of class distinctions in CRB appeals. Finally, all of them fail to touch on an external factor that likely augmented the CRB’s appeals: rumors of wartime atrocities against Belgian children. The current state of knowledge on the CRB’s public appeals is therefore wanting, begging further research.

⁵ Ryan Thomas Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’ the Commission for Relief in Belgium: 1914-1915” (PhD diss., Iowa State University, 2009), 169-79.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 173-5.

Introduction

On June 28, 1914, a Yugoslav nationalist discharged a fatal volley of shots that ignited a worldwide diplomatic conflagration.⁷ In the four years of ghastly warfare that followed, modern weapons would be employed at an unprecedented scale, converting vast swaths of the globe—especially Europe—into death factories.⁸ Entire nations would be mobilized to annihilate their opponents, signaling a new era of “total war.”⁹ A generation of “shell-shocked” soldiers would be birthed in the trenches, leaving millions with permanent physical and emotional scars.¹⁰ Several empires would collapse, giving way to new governments and transfiguring the international balance of power.¹¹ In all, nine million soldiers and twelve million civilians would perish.¹² But perhaps most importantly, the vindictive peace that followed incubated the requisite conditions for an even bloodier and costlier war two decades later.¹³

This is the conventional history of the Great War—better known today as World War I—that has been rendered for generations of students. For the better part of the past century, it has helped inform policymakers navigating through a world beset by

⁷ Gerard J. de Groot, *The First World War* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), 1.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 168-73.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 135-60. Michael S. Neiberg, *Fighting the Great War: A Global History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 282.

¹⁰ de Groot, *The First World War*, 174-6.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 185-97.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 197-9.

intractable international conflict; however, perhaps because of the war's manifest tragedy and its bearing on subsequent hostilities, the traditional narrative has largely omitted the uplifting yet equally salient chapters that underscore mankind's fathomless capacity for generosity. Of these, the story of the Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB)—an organization that countered an array of social ills precipitated by the German occupation of Belgium and Northern France—is both the most incredible and curiously understudied.

The CRB was by no means the first salient example of American-led international relief. Americans made their first foray into global philanthropy in 1816, when Bostonian merchants shipped emergency supplies to St. John's, Newfoundland after the city suffered an especially devastating fire.¹⁴ In the ensuing decades, the American people made valuable charitable contributions to a multiplicity of beleaguered nations—most notably the Greeks during their War of Independence and the Irish during their Potato Famine.¹⁵ Domestically, Americans conceived charity organization societies in the 1870s and 1880s to allay a host of ills endemic in traditional antebellum charities, including shoddy “coordination, vision, and planning” as well as “wasteful and inefficient” practices.¹⁶ Yet American philanthropy abroad through the late nineteenth century remained an “ad hoc” and “broadly generalized” enterprise “without a series of overriding principles or an organizational strategy.”¹⁷

The American response to the Russian famine of the early 1890s finally introduced some semblance of organization to American philanthropy overseas,

¹⁴ Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 15.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 15-7.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 24-5.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 14.

presaging the undertakings of the CRB. William C. Edgar—editor of the Minneapolis-based *Northwestern Miller*—began leading the charge for relief to Russia in December 1891.¹⁸ In his appeals, he argued that it was the duty of millers to act “in the name of humanity” rather than their customary religious impulses and redistribute the United States’ oversupply of wheat, corn, and flour.¹⁹ Edgar also posited that a robust display of miller benevolence could serve as an advertising opportunity for their industry, “[calling] worldwide attention to America’s plenteous store” of foodstuffs.²⁰ By February 1892, he announced that the steamer *Missouri* would transport collections free of charge, and that an American Red Cross official—as well as a *Northwestern Miller* staff member—would “accompany the relief shipment and check on the distribution of the provisions by the Russian Red Cross and the czarist government.”²¹ Nine mills each donated hundreds of flour sacks, and in all, the *Missouri* shipped 5.6 million pounds of flour and corn valued at \$100,000 “representing 800 subscriptions from twenty-five states and territories.”²²

In addition to Edgar’s efforts, John W. Hoyt—former editor of the *Wisconsin Farmer and Northwestern Cultivator* and recent governor of Wyoming Territory—organized a formal “Russian Famine Committee of the United States” to lobby Congress for “authorization for the transport of voluntary food contributions by the US Navy.”²³ The group was comprised of the Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice, fifteen senators,

¹⁸ Ibid., 26. Merle Curti, *American Philanthropy Abroad: A History* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1963), 101.

¹⁹ Ibid. Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 26.

²⁰ Curti, *American Philanthropy Abroad*, 101.

²¹ Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 26-7.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid., 27. Curti, *American Philanthropy Abroad*, 109.

and several distinguished religious leaders.²⁴ Although its lobbying work proved abortive, the committee managed to muster \$10,000 for the Red Cross.²⁵ Including all other contributions from discrete relief groups, it is estimated that Americans donated approximately \$1 million to the Russian relief effort—a paltry sum compared to the subsequent achievements of the CRB.²⁶ Still, Americans contributed far more during the crisis “than any other people except the Russians themselves.”²⁷

The turn of the twentieth century also saw the emergence of the American Red Cross as a chief vehicle of American philanthropy overseas.²⁸ Founded in 1881, it was reorganized by Congress in 1905 so it could “pursue a system of national and international relief in times of peace by mitigating suffering caused by pestilence, famine, floods, and other national calamities.”²⁹ The American Red Cross ultimately “contributed [\$1.64 million] to natural disaster relief abroad” in the sixteen-year interval between the Spanish-American War and World War I.³⁰ Nonetheless, it was ill-prepared “for large scale funding and relief programs abroad” on the eve of 1914, with only 150 chapters and 20,000 members.³¹ The activities of the American Red Cross were also limited “when national interests involving foreign policy and security became involved” on account of its affiliation with the federal government.³² Ultimately, the milieu wherein the CRB materialized was wanting: while some Americans held a measure of experience in

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid. Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 27.

²⁶ Curti, *American Philanthropy Abroad*, 115.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 42.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid., 42-3.

³¹ Ibid., 43.

³² Ibid., 42.

extending benevolence overseas, most were woefully unready for the prodigious demands of relief in a world war.

Unlike the early American Red Cross, the CRB would predicate itself on negotiating the hazards of international politics. Prior to the summer of 1914, the emergence of the “Triple Entente” gave the German military cause to anticipate a two-front conflict pitted against France in the west and Russia in the east.³³ Count Graf von Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff, conceived an official stratagem for this eventuality: Germany would first achieve victory in the western theater by making a “lightning-quick invasion [of France] through Belgium”—notwithstanding the latter’s potential neutrality—and subsequently send forces east to address the Russian threat.³⁴ Schlieffen believed an invasion of Belgium would be necessary on account of the country’s flat landscape, which would expedite the German military’s march to Paris.³⁵ Once hostilities commenced in the First World War, Germany activated the “Schlieffen Plan” and attacked Belgium on August 4, 1914.³⁶ Within weeks, Germany had cleared the country and entered French territory.³⁷ The Allies finally repelled the German advance in September 1914 at the Battle of the Marne, but the trench stalemate that

³³ de Groot, *The First World War*, 12.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Vernon Kellogg, *Fighting Starvation in Belgium* (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1918), 5.

³⁷ de Groot, *The First World War*, 30-2.

followed left approximately ten million Belgian and French civilians behind German lines until October 1918—one month before the Armistice.³⁸

Thus began Germany’s protracted occupation of Belgium and Northern France. Almost instantly, Germany cut off the commercial supply chain to the region, decimating a place “dependent on imports for 70 per cent of [its] food, practically all of [its] textiles and clothing, and most of [its] leather and other industrial raw materials.”³⁹ By October 1914, observers remarked that Belgium was “on the point of starvation.”⁴⁰ People in the cities “had less than ten days’ bread supply.”⁴¹ Children were especially vulnerable “since the usual imports of dairy products were no longer available.”⁴² A handful of prominent Americans and Belgians collaborated swiftly to assuage the country’s miseries, establishing relief networks in the immediate aftermath of the German invasion—most notably the *Comité Nationale de Secours et d’Alimentation* (CN); but as domestic foodstuff reserves became depleted, they increasingly perceived the need for greater overseas assistance.⁴³

During these critical months, Herbert Hoover—future President of the United States, then an eminent mining engineer—commanded the American Citizens’ Relief Committee in London, helping to repatriate a total of 120,000 Americans stranded by the

³⁸ Neiberg, *Fighting the Great War*, 27. Herbert Hoover, *An American Epic, Volume 1: The Relief of Belgium and Northern France, 1914-1930* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959), xxi.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, xxi.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ David Burner, *Herbert Hoover: A Public Life* (New York City: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 74.

flare-up in Europe.⁴⁴ Impressed by his successes, leaders of the early Belgian relief networks implored Hoover to manage the importation of relief supplies into the city of Brussels and potentially all of Belgium.⁴⁵ Hoover answered the call despite some initial misgivings, and on October 22, he convened a meeting in his office with his “American engineer friends in London.”⁴⁶ Originally planning for a “wholly American” relief effort, the men in attendance elected to form the “American Commission for Relief in Belgium”; nevertheless, they soon “realized that the organization would be stronger” with the supplemental patronage of neutral Spanish and Dutch officials.⁴⁷ The word “American” was dropped from their title a few days later, creating the CRB brand as it was henceforth known.⁴⁸

The CRB gradually expanded its scope to include relief activities for all of Belgium in the months subsequent to its founding.⁴⁹ By March 1915, the CRB took charge of relief efforts in German-occupied Northern France as well.⁵⁰ Over the course of the war, the CRB developed for itself “six parallel tasks of organization”:

- (1) To build up [the] organization for purchase and overseas shipments of supplies;
- (2) To secure adequate agreements from the Germans to protect imported and native supplies in Belgium and immunity of attack on [CRB] ships en route;
- (3) To secure adequate agreements with the Allies for passage of [CRB] supplies through the blockade and liberty of action to charter ships;
- (4) To organize the charity of the world;
- (5) To obtain financial support from the Allies

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 73.

⁴⁵ Hoover, *An American Epic, Volume 1*, 2.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 2.

⁵⁰ Hoover, *An American Epic, Volume 1*, 18.

and possibly from the Germans; (6) To build up organization of the Belgians for adequate distribution.⁵¹

To execute these assignments, the CRB erected itself on the volunteer leadership of Hoover's American mining engineer cohorts.⁵² Notwithstanding Hoover's personal connections, this group was asked to become the nucleus of the CRB's administrative personnel because they were seasoned in the art of diplomacy and hailed as the world's best-trained "administrators of enterprises."⁵³ The CRB ultimately assigned these men to direct offices in all the theaters of its operations.⁵⁴

A British Foreign Office official once referred to the logistical juggernaut that Hoover and his colleagues assembled as a "piratical state organization for benevolence."⁵⁵ Indeed, by November 1914, the CRB became recognized on all sides "as a kind of informal state with its own international agreements under special privileges and immunities granted by the belligerents."⁵⁶ The CRB bought the preponderance of its raw relief provisions in purchasing centers throughout the Americas—most notably New York City.⁵⁷ From there, the supplies went aboard a convoy of fifty to sixty customized ships donning a CRB flag and "huge illuminated signs" bearing the "Belgian Relief

⁵¹ Ibid., 15.

⁵² Ibid., 34.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 35-6.

⁵⁵ Austin, "Creating a 'piratical state organization for benevolence,'" 335.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 90.

⁵⁷ Bruno Cabanes, *The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 1918-1924* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 207. "The Commission for Relief in Belgium C.R.B. (1914)," The Belgian American Educational Foundation, accessed March 1, 2015, <http://www.baef.be/documents/about-us/history/the-commission-for-relief-in-belgium-1914-.xml?lang=en>.

Committee” title—all designed to indicate their privileged, neutral status.⁵⁸ The ships then docked in Rotterdam, where “the cargo was unloaded, warehoused, repackaged and sent by rail and canal to Belgium” and Northern France.⁵⁹ Finally, under the auspices of the CRB, the existing CN—as well as its sister organization in Northern France, the “CF”—distributed the supplies to their respective populations through ration cards.⁶⁰

An assortment of sources funded the CRB throughout its existence. For the first four months, the CRB was especially reliant on charitable donations.⁶¹ Most of these contributions arrived from the United States, the British Empire, Spain, and South America, where the CRB’s central press agency made targeted charity appeals through affiliated local subcommittees.⁶² Afterwards, the CRB secured government loans from Britain, France, and later the United States, which added to its finances tremendously; nevertheless, the CRB continued its public charity appeals until shortly after the United States’ entry into the war.⁶³ In all, the CRB received 75 percent of its finances from government appropriations and 5.6 percent from its public charity fund.⁶⁴

At the conclusion of its nearly five-year existence, the CRB had successfully engineered one of the greatest humanitarian movements in the history of mankind. An

⁵⁸ Cabanes, *The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism*, 207. Hoover, *An American Epic, Volume 1*, 27.

⁵⁹ “The Commission for Relief in Belgium C.R.B. (1914),” The Belgian American Educational Foundation. Hoover, *An American Epic, Volume 1*, 19.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 18-9. Cabanes, *The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism*, 207.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 30-2.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 30-1. Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 11-171. Gay and Fisher, *Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium*, Chapter XV: Introduction.

⁶³ Hoover, *An American Epic, Volume 1*, 32-415.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 415.

approximate total of 137,000 people—the vast majority of whom were volunteers—operated in some capacity for the Commission, allowing it to import nearly 5.2 million tons of relief supplies into Belgium and Northern France.⁶⁵ The CRB’s final receipts totaled \$930.5 million—a figure “unprecedented in the history of philanthropy.”⁶⁶ The Commission’s charity fund of \$52.3 million also “[amounted] to the largest fund known up to that time.”⁶⁷ Including internal purchases in the occupied territories, the CRB leveraged a total of \$2.8 billion for the relief movement.⁶⁸

These herculean efforts paid epic dividends, making the CRB “the first recorded moment in history in which a group of humanitarians contained on such a scale the civilian suffering brought about by war.”⁶⁹ The CRB’s work “saved hundreds of thousands of lives,” keeping Belgium’s death rate at a trivial 0.5% while the Great War wreaked havoc on the rest of the continent.⁷⁰ Incredibly, “the child mortality rate in Belgium and [Northern] France was lower under the CRB than it had ever been before.”⁷¹ David Burner—author of *Herbert Hoover: A Public Life*—even opined that “had similar help been given to all of Europe after the war, the chronic problems that gave way to another war might have been avoided.”⁷² Finally, the CRB represented a

⁶⁵ Ibid., 33-415.

⁶⁶ Hoover, *An American Epic, Volume 1*, 415. Gay and Fisher, *Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium*, Chapter IV: Introduction.

⁶⁷ Hoover, *An American Epic, Volume 1*, 31.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 416.

⁶⁹ Burner, *Herbert Hoover*, 74.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 94. Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 335.

⁷¹ Burner, *Herbert Hoover*, 94.

⁷² Ibid.

profound paradigm shift in humanitarian work, “[revolutionizing]” the logistics of relief distribution and ushering in a new era of private, professionalized charity organizations.⁷³

Despite the incontrovertible success of the CRB, scholars have paid surprisingly scant attention to the movement in the past century. The few that have treated the subject, however, usually explain the CRB’s historic success by pointing to a slew of factors—including the expert leadership and political dexterity of Hoover and his American mining engineer associates, the receipt of neutral privileges and immunities from the belligerent countries, and the efficiency of its administration and distribution systems.⁷⁴ In addition, all sources agree that the CRB’s public appeals were central to its success, as they augmented the groundbreaking charity fund that financed the Commission in its first months and signaled the worldwide moral support of the enterprise—an important factor in securing and maintaining government loans. Yet the existing scholarship on the CRB’s public appeals is deficient for a number of reasons: 1. It fails to consider the role of class distinctions in CRB appeals—even though evidence demonstrates that the Commission successfully mobilized the American upper and middle classes; 2. It neglects to assess the import of wartime rumors to CRB appeals; and 3. It does not connect the CRB’s appeals subsequent to the United States’ declaration of war on Germany with the Commission’s maintenance of public support.

Thankfully, the Mudd Family Papers promise to fill in these gaps. The Claremont Colleges Library’s primary facility, “Honnold/Mudd Library,” is named after two of its

⁷³ Cabanes, *The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism*, 206-19.

⁷⁴ Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 81-335.

chief benefactors: William L. Honnold and Seeley W. Mudd.⁷⁵ Both were eminent American mining engineers at the turn of the twentieth century—meaning both partook in the CRB’s efforts in some capacity.⁷⁶ Honnold, in fact, served as a director of two CRB offices, and Seeley W. Mudd was both a member of the “General Committee of the Rocky Mountain Club-Hoover Fund” and a prominent donor for Belgian Kiddies, Ltd (see Appendix A, Figure VI and Appendix B, Figure I).⁷⁷ The namesake of Harvey Mudd College and mining engineer son of Seeley W. Mudd—Harvey S. Mudd—contributed financially to Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. as well (see Appendix B, Figure II and Appendix E, Figure I).

For the betterment of posterity, these men bequeathed many records of their experiences assisting the CRB to Honnold/Mudd Library’s Special Collections section—and a large number of them are currently located in the Mudd Family Papers. This collection happens to host an amalgam of materials germane to the CRB’s public appeals, affording an opportunity for researchers to understand their unequivocal success. Ultimately, the artifacts reveal three key explanations for the CRB’s successful public appeals: 1. The Commission disseminated tailored appeals to the American upper and middle classes, appropriating their respective motifs and lexicons to successfully mobilize both groups; 2. Rumors of wartime atrocities against Belgian children augmented its appeals to the middle class; and 3. It issued targeted messages to its

⁷⁵ “Honnold/Mudd Library: A Brief History,” Claremont Colleges Library, accessed March 1, 2015, <http://libraries.claremont.edu/about/libraries/honnold/honnoldhistory.asp>.

⁷⁶ “Guide to the William L. Honnold Papers,” Online Archive of California, accessed March 1, 2015, <http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/c89s1rpp/>. “Guide to the Mudd Family Papers,” Online Archive of California, accessed March 1, 2015, <http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt0m3nd52d/>.

⁷⁷ Hoover, *An American Epic*, Volume 1, 35.

American supporters after the United States' entry into World War I, maintaining vital public support.

The following essay will dissect these artifacts and articulate their implications in three distinct chapters. The first will discern how CRB appeals mobilized the upper class by analyzing Hoover's January 29, 1917 address to the Rocky Mountain Club as well as the Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. stock. The second will determine how the Commission's appeals and wartime rumors mobilized the middle class, examining *A Plea for One Million Belgian Children* and letters from Helen C. Foote to the CRB. The third will distill how the CRB maintained public support following the United States' declaration of war on Germany by inspecting a letter from Hoover to the supporters of the Commission. Subsequent to these chapters, the essay will briefly discuss the relationship between the appeals of the CRB and the American Relief Administration (ARA).

Chapter 1: Mobilizing the Upper Class

One explanation for the CRB's patent success has never been in contention: the unprecedented contributions of Hoover and his network of affluent, mostly American mining engineer friends. Not only were these men responsible for conceiving the organization and effectively shepherding it through the duration of the war, but they also played a profound role in augmenting the CRB's historic fund, submitting large sum donations as individuals or through their own organizations—including a noteworthy \$200,000 donation from the Rockefeller Foundation.⁷⁸ In no way can the import of their leadership be overstated: according to Merle Curti, "Belgium would have starved without the brilliant help of Hoover and his associates."⁷⁹ The CRB's overall success was thus contingent on the Commission's effective mobilization of the American upper class—especially the mining engineers with whom Hoover collaborated.

In *Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium*, Gay and Fisher highlight a pair of especially salient mining engineer-led organizations that helped the CRB galvanize this cohort:

Two institutions with which Hoover was personally connected employed interesting methods of increasing their donations. The American Institute of Mining Engineer [sic] organized a campaign to sell shares in "Belgian Kiddies, Ltd." The entire amount of "preferred stock" \$120,000 was soon pledged. Under the leadership of John Hays Hammond and W. B. Thompson, the Rocky

⁷⁸ Gay and Fisher, *Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium*, Chapter XV: Part 5.

⁷⁹ Curti, *American Philanthropy Abroad*, 235.

Mountain Club, composed largely of mining engineers, set up the “Rocky Mountain Club-Hoover Fund for Belgian Relief” and in view of the need in Belgium deferred the erection of a clubhouse for which plans were well advanced. At a complimentary dinner to Hoover on the 20th January 1917 the Fund was open with an anonymous \$100,000 donation.⁸⁰

Unsurprisingly, sundry documents in the Mudd Family Papers indicate that Seeley W. Mudd and Harvey S. Mudd—both mining engineers—partook in the two noteworthy movements. A handful of the papers—including an address by Hoover to the Rocky Mountain Club, as well as the Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. stock themselves— help to explain how the CRB successfully marshaled the talents and resources of the American upper class, demonstrating that the Commission appropriated capitalist motifs and lexicon in its appeals to the mining engineers.

I. Proceedings at Reception and Dinner to Herbert C. Hoover, Chairman, Commission for Relief in Belgium, by Rocky Mountain Club – January 29, 1917

a. Survey of Pertinent Document Features

The Rocky Mountain Club was unquestionably marked by remarkable affluence and clout. As aforementioned, the club was “composed largely of mining engineers,” but it also embraced in its ranks “railroad men and capitalists.”⁸¹ Incorporated “to create good-fellowship among the members and advance the interests of the Rocky Mountain States” in the United States’ economic capital, New York City, the group was characterized by the New York Times as “[possibly] the richest club in the world,” with

⁸⁰ Gay and Fisher, *Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium*, Chapter XV: Part 6.

⁸¹ Ibid. “Enroll Westerners for Service in War,” *The New York Times*, March 13, 1917.

John Hays Hammond—“reputed to be the highest salaried mining engineer in the world” in 1907—serving as its president.⁸² Another prominent member of the organization was former U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt, who went on to act as the Honorary Chairman of the Rocky Mountain Club-Hoover Fund.⁸³ In consideration of the club’s composition of economic and political heavyweights, it is axiomatic that Hoover tailored his speech for a decidedly upper class audience.

Predictably, Hoover’s address to the Rocky Mountain Club on January 29, 1917 is replete with corporate themes and rhetoric, reading like a prototypical sales pitch. John Hays Hammond and A. J. Hemphill introduce Hoover in gushing terms, explaining that his oratorical cogence and superlative record with the CRB prompted the club’s governors to postpone the erection of a new clubhouse and establish a “Hoover Fund” in direct support of the larger CRB fund nine days prior (see Appendix A, Figure I).⁸⁴ Hoover ostensibly receives these praises bashfully, yet he quickly launches the corpus of his speech in an assured, methodological fashion that asks club members to envision their own economic capital under martial duress—thereby underscoring the deleterious effects of the German occupation on Belgium’s logistics, economy, and overall well-being:

... imagine New York and about five adjoining counties occupied by an enemy army, blockaded from without, and surrounded with a wall of steel, the normal flow of food, seventy per cent. of which food normally comes from without, stopped, you would awaken within thirty-six hours to find your markets empty, and your bakeries stopped. Add to this that your railways would be taken over for military purposes; that your telephones and telegraphs would be suppressed; ... [the] feeling that the food supply of the community, the food supply to the

⁸² “New Club in Times Square,” *The New York Times*, November 1, 1907.

⁸³ Gay and Fisher, *Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium*, Chapter XV: Part 6.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

individual, may cease at any moment; that your women and children are in imminent jeopardy... That has been the situation of Belgium and Northern France with 10,000,000 of people, for nearly two years... (see Appendix A, Figure II).

Hoover then recapitulates the history of the CRB, noting that “the Belgian people themselves sent up the first plea to the Americans for help,” while also supplying impressive statistics pertaining to the CRB’s relief efforts (see Appendix A, Figure III). He continues his address by making a direct appeal to the capitalist sensibilities of his audience: “It will occur to every businessman to know something of this organization. Everyone has a right to know whether it is efficient; whether it is honest, and whether it accomplishes its purposes. Now there have been three tenets of this organization: the first is de-centralization; second, voluntary service, and third, high ideals” (see Appendix A, Figure III). Assuming his audience trusts the CRB and its irreproachable mission, Hoover commences to confirm the efficiency and success of the organization by first referencing the value of voluntarism: “We realized from the start that it was necessary to have the co-operation of every intelligent man in Belgium and Northern France...” (see Appendix A, Figure III). Secondly, he limns its decentralized, subcommittee dependent structure: “We have built up by degrees some four or five thousand committees recruiting charity throughout the world, and we have recruited about thirty millions of dollars, of which about nine millions came from this country” (see Appendix A, Figure III).

After bemoaning the hazards of the food distribution process, Hoover introduces another layer of CRB labors, mentioning that “relief work consists not alone in the distribution of food, but in the handling of destitution” (see Appendix A, Figure III). To him, ameliorating unemployment and establishing economic self-reliance is imperative to

the survival of the relief movement: “There is in Belgium about fifty per cent. of unemployment, and about seventy per cent. in the North of France... They must have the means with which to obtain food; it is not enough to give them rations, they must have the means with which to buy their own production and their own local food supply” (see Appendix A, Figure III).

Hoover’s rhetoric grows increasingly alarmist hereafter: as if to initiate a class competition for charity, Hoover announces that the CRB’s “[appeal] to the American public to assume [the] responsibility” of furnishing \$1 per child per month “failed” (see Appendix A, Figure IV). Since the CRB is allegedly “\$3,000,000 to \$5,000,000 a month short”—a figure that “is crushing to [America’s] national pride” if allowed to stand—Hoover beseeches his mining friends to answer the call of duty (see Appendix A, Figure IV). In contrast to the “American public,” Hoover is nearly certain his “friends” and mining engineer colleagues in the Rocky Mountain Club will donate generously, as they responded superlatively to an appeal he made years earlier on behalf of “distress work” in Australian mines (see Appendix A, Figure IV). Finally, Hoover concludes his address by highlighting the reputational implications of American charity:

Now, gentlemen, this matter is one of more importance even than the feeding of 1,250,000 children, as large as that may be. This relief has come to be America’s greatest exhibit in Europe... We want to give a demonstration of that great strain of humanity which we know runs through our people because we know the character of the people that make up this Republic (see Appendix A, Figure IV).

b. Overview of Herbert Hoover

Hoover's speech to the Rocky Mountain Club on January 29, 1917 unequivocally evinces the turn-of-the-century capitalist ethos shared by Hoover and his American upper class peers. Born to a humble Iowan household on August 10, 1874, Hoover and his siblings became orphans after the deaths of their father in 1880 and their mother in 1884.⁸⁵ Hoover attended night school while working for his uncle in Oregon, and although he never received a high school diploma and failed nearly all his college entrance exams, he passed remedial courses and subsequently matriculated to Stanford University in 1891—its inaugural year.⁸⁶ In Palo Alto, he studied geology, graduating in 1895; two years later, he entered the mining engineer business with employment in Australia.⁸⁷ Hoover quickly ascended through the ranks of the industry, becoming one of the world's more prolific mining engineers by the eve of the First World War.⁸⁸

Ideologically, Hoover aligned himself with many of his affluent contemporaries. As a self-made capitalist, Hoover subscribed to the “self-help” paradigm of philanthropy popularized by Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller, which eschewed indiscriminate charity in favor of targeted philanthropic practices that enabled the destitute to become self-reliant.⁸⁹ Curti notes in *American Philanthropy Abroad* that Hoover's adherence to “self-help” philanthropy imbued the mission and organization of the CRB: “... as Hoover himself realized, Belgian participation in the relief work added

⁸⁵ Burner, *Herbert Hoover*, 5-11.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 15-6.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 17-26

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 27-62

⁸⁹ Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 20-2.

immensely to its overall effectiveness. Enabling Belgians to help themselves and to regain their feet economically was for Hoover a primary objective of the relief.”⁹⁰

Hoover also approached his forays into humanitarianism with ulterior, economic motives predicated on the ubiquitous philanthropic doctrine of “trusteeship.” According to Bruno Cabanes in *The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 1918-1924*, “Hoover was sincerely moved by the distress of French and Belgian civilians, but he did not lose sight of the political and economic advantages of the entire operation.”⁹¹ Hoover specifically “hoped that the work of the CRB would eventually create new markets for American exports.”⁹² These underlying intentions were profoundly colored by the works and writings of Carnegie and Rockefeller, who posited that the upper class, as deserving “trustees” of large sums of capital, should have the prerogative to redistribute wealth on their own volition; thus, in a February 1, 1917 address to the New York Chamber of Commerce—one that is strikingly similar to his Rocky Mountain Club speech made two days earlier—Hoover reasoned that the United States, being the world’s “rich man,” had a mandate to promote “Americanism” and capitalist values in Europe:

... it was our opportunity to demonstrate that great strain of humanity and idealism which built up and in every essential crisis saved our Republic... The justification of any rich man in the community is his trusteeship to the community for his wealth. The justification of America to the world-community to-day is her trusteeship to the world-community for the property which she holds... We have tried to keep the lamp of humanity alight and to implant true Americanism in Europe.⁹³

⁹⁰ Curti, *American Philanthropy Abroad*, 235.

⁹¹ Cabanes, *The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism*, 207.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid., 208.

c. Import of Document to Upper Class Mobilization

In light of this evidence, Hoover's January 29, 1917 speech to the Rocky Mountain Club clarifies the means by which the CRB successfully mobilized the American upper class, revealing that it invoked the semantics and motifs of capitalism in addresses to key capitalist networks. By compelling his audience to vicariously experience the German occupation in an American setting, Hoover highlights the manifest symbiotic relationship between economic health and individual well-being; in doing so, he establishes that the plight of Belgium and Northern France can be ameliorated through targeted philanthropy that promotes business and individual self-reliance. This theme is repeated several times throughout his speech: the Belgian people are deserving of assistance because they "themselves sent up the first plea to the Americans"—but rather than doling out mere rations, the CRB must supply the Belgians and their French neighbors "the means with which to buy their own production and their own local food supply." Hoover's espousal of the "self-help" doctrine almost undoubtedly resonated with the Rocky Mountain Club, as its turn-of-the-twentieth-century capitalist members were likely averse to inklings of indiscriminate charity.

Hoover further wins over his "businessman" audience by positing that it is an economically sound decision to succor the CRB. According to him, the CRB is a frugal yet effective organization on account of its decentralized, subcommittee and volunteer reliant system—meaning every dollar donated will be well spent. Hoover also contends that it is absolutely imperative for the United States and its leaders to leave a positive impression on the peoples of Belgium, Northern France, and Europe at large through the

CRB, “America’s greatest exhibit in Europe”; in fact, to Hoover, it is a “matter” more important “than the feeding of 1,250,000 children” since it can promote Americanism and foster capitalism in Europe, paving the way for access to untapped and underexploited markets. While this logic certainly struck a chord with the Rocky Mountain Club members’ profit-driven predilections, Hoover’s language of patriotic paternalism likely piqued the interests of an audience already well versed in the associated “trusteeship” doctrine.

Finally, Hoover’s anxieties about the CRB’s “failed” appeal to the American public likely had a degree of merit: according to Burner, he “was chagrined that Australians and many others were contributing much more than Americans”—and indeed, the CRB disseminated pamphlets underscoring that “Britain, Australia, and New Zealand contributed 22 cents, \$1.34, and \$2.29 respectively [per person],” while the United States only “donated 10 cents per person.”⁹⁴ Yet as will be discussed in the following chapter, the American middle class actually made impressive contributions to the CRB—rendering his claim more inflammatory than factual. As a result, Hoover’s mentioning of the American public’s “shortcomings” suggests that the CRB purposefully challenged the upper class to “compete” charitably with the middle class—a strategy that ultimately proved fruitful. By appropriating capitalist rhetoric and themes throughout, Hoover’s January 29, 1917 Rocky Mountain Club address ultimately elucidates how the CRB attempted to convince the upper class of its mission’s rectitude and economical prudence.

⁹⁴ Burner, *Herbert Hoover*, 91. Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 173.

Correspondences between Hammond and Seeley W. Mudd, a member of the Rocky Mountain Club, demonstrate the incredible efficacy of CRB speeches and pamphlets tailored to the upper class—including Hoover’s January 29, 1917 Rocky Mountain Club address. Hammond enclosed the Hoover speech in a letter to Mudd on February 15, 1917, explaining the establishment of the Rocky Mountain Club-Hoover Fund and offering high praise for Hoover: “Never has a story of human suffering so aroused our sympathies as did Mr. Hoover’s presentation of the plight of the children of Belgium” (see Appendix A, Figure V). Mudd summarily agreed to serve as a “Member of the General Committee of the Rocky Mountain Club-Hoover Fund,” and on February 23, Hammond replied confirming his new position (see Appendix A, Figure VI). Then, on March 6—while in Colorado Springs, Colorado—Mudd messaged Hammond informing him of his decision to increase his “monthly subscription from \$150.00 per month to \$500.00 per month” and relating that the Rocky Mountain Club’s actions were “met with great approval in [his] section of the country” (see Appendix A, Figure VII). Clearly, Hoover’s tailored speech resonated with his mining engineer colleagues, allowing the CRB to reap from the brightest minds and deepest wallets in the industry. In a similar vein, the Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. stock corroborates that the CRB tapped into the unrivaled resources of the American upper class through the motifs and lexicon of capitalism.

II. Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. Stock

a. Overview of Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. and Survey of Pertinent Document

Features

The brainchild of D. H. Browne from the International Nickel Company, Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. was incorporated on January 9, 1917 during the annual dinner of the Mining and Metallurgic Society in New York City.⁹⁵ Chartered to “work through the [CRB],” it was intended to fulfill Hoover’s goal of “[guaranteeing] every child in Belgium at least one meal a day” by contributing to the needs of exactly “ten thousand Belgian children for the year 1917.”⁹⁶ To do so, Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. “[issued] ‘stock’ at a par value of \$12 a share,” and eventually—as noted by Gay and Fisher—“the entire amount of ‘preferred stock’ \$120,000 was... pledged.”⁹⁷ Although the organization allowed its \$12 stock—worth \$220 in 2015—to be bought in payment plans, it nonetheless “preferred” their “subscribers [to be] taken from the members of the mining and metallurgical professions, and their wives and sisters”—meaning that the enterprise was certainly customized for the upper class.⁹⁸

The Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. stock in the Mudd Family Papers shows that Seeley W. Mudd and Harvey S. Mudd subscribed to enormous contributions of \$480 and \$50—or

⁹⁵ “Belgian Kiddies, Ltd., A New Relief Society,” *The New York Times*, January 10, 1917.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.* Gay and Fisher, *Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium*, Chapter XV: Part 5.

⁹⁷ “Belgian Kiddies, Ltd., A New Relief Society,” *The New York Times*. Gay and Fisher, *Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium*, Chapter XV: Part 5.

⁹⁸ “CPI Inflation Calculator,” United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, accessed April 20, 2015, <http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl>. Gay and Fisher, *Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium*, Chapter XV: Part 5.

\$8,802 and \$917 in 2015 dollars—respectively, signifying the import of the affluent to the effort (see Appendix B, Figures I and II).⁹⁹ Each share looks and reads like a prototypical stockholder certificate, “[certifying] that” the buyer is now “the owner of... shares of the preferred stock of Belgian Kiddies, Ltd.” (see Appendix B, Figures I and II). The shares also appear to showcase the organization’s logo: a bald eagle underlining the phrase “Incorporated Under the Laws of Humanity” (see Appendix B, Figures I and II). But lest its owner forget that Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. is in the strict business of charity, the certificates reminds that “each share... gives one meal per day for one year to a Belgian child. No cash dividend will ever be paid, and the stock is fully assessable” (see Appendix B, Figures I and II).

b. Import of Documents to Upper Class Mobilization

Like Hoover’s address to the Rocky Mountain Club, the Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. stock exemplifies the judicious tactics by which the CRB appealed to the predilections of the American upper class. By borrowing the corporate model for its fundraising efforts, the Commission shrewdly marketed itself and its virtuous cause to an audience well versed in the art of stockholding. Moreover, the semantics of “humanity” integrated into the shares were in keeping with the secular discourse of the times—likely pronounced in elite, educated circles—“that spoke less of charity” in traditional Christian terms “and more about human rights.”¹⁰⁰ Lastly, the bald eagle featured on the certificates further evoked Hoover’s claim that the CRB was “America’s greatest exhibit in Europe,” highlighting for the upper class the economic implications of the Commission’s efforts.

⁹⁹ “CPI Inflation Calculator,” United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.

¹⁰⁰ Cabanes, *The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism*, 4.

A preponderance of evidence suggests that Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. ultimately proved valuable. With the financial assistance of mining engineers such as the Mudds, it was able to muster \$85,000 by May 1, 1917.¹⁰¹ The fact that Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. continued its campaign after the United States' declaration of war on Germany on April 6, 1917 was also significant—as will be discussed in Chapter 3. This rendered their enterprise uniquely durable. Finally, it appears that at least in some instances, Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. was able to expand beyond its established upper class subscriber base and secure the backing of middle class individuals. On February 2, 1917, Seeley W. Mudd sent a letter with attachments to Professor F. B. Brackett—the first professor of Pomona College and an American delegate of the CRB—informing him of Belgian Kiddies, Ltd.'s efforts (see Appendix B, Figure III).¹⁰² This message apparently spurred Professor Brackett into action: leaflets attributed to him were soon disseminated throughout his neighborhood, which secured more modest contributions of \$1 per month for one year (see Appendix B, Figure IV). The American middle class ultimately played a large part in the CRB's success, but it was not on account of the Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. campaign; rather, CRB materials appealing to the middle class's Progressive proclivities—as well as rumors of wartime atrocities committed against Belgian children—were more responsible for their introduction to the relief movement fold.

¹⁰¹ Kellogg, *Fighting Starvation in Belgium*, 105.

¹⁰² Frank Parkhurst Brackett, *History of Pomona Valley, California, with Biographical Sketches of The Leading Men and Women of the Valley Who Have Been Identified With Its Growth and Development from the Early Days to the Present* (Los Angeles: Historic Record Company, 1920), 197-257.

Chapter 2: Mobilizing the Middle Class

The unqualified achievement of the CRB was also predicated on its successful mobilization of American middle class support—a fact most clearly reflected by its charity apparatus. In the early days of the movement, while he still “believed that the CRB could be run [entirely] as a charitable undertaking,” Hoover “telegraphed the Governors of the... States asking them to establish committees of responsible men and women to collect money and commodities for relief.”¹⁰³ This led to the formation of thousands of regional subcommittees “in each state which maintained a direct contact with the New York office of the CRB.”¹⁰⁴ The majority of these subcommittees were exceedingly local in character; for instance, Southern California maintained standing subcommittees in the then-sleepy suburban hamlets of Claremont, Pasadena, Santa Barbara, and Redlands.¹⁰⁵ Individually, these subcommittees rarely assembled astonishing gifts, and the Claremont committee—Southern California’s most charitable subcommittee—only managed to donate \$4,952.83 during the course of the First World War.¹⁰⁶ The aggregate of the American subcommittees’ donations, on the other hand, mustered a much more impressive figure—\$34.5 million of the \$52.3 million

¹⁰³ Burner, *Herbert Hoover*, 80. Hoover, *An American Epic, Volume 1*, 30.

¹⁰⁴ Gay and Fisher, *Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium*, Chapter XV: Introduction.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, Chapter XV: Part 8.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

international total—that required the financial backing of untold scores of Americans.¹⁰⁷

Ultimately, as noted by Vernon Kellogg—a prominent CRB official—“The great majority of the gifts made to the Commission through State committees or through special fund [organizations], or directly to the New York office, [came] in small sums coming from millions of individuals.”¹⁰⁸

This information suggests that Hoover’s complaints about “failed” appeals were poorly founded. While there are admittedly no statistics that properly portray the exact distribution between upper class and middle class contributions in the CRB’s charity fund, the humble character of the American subcommittees, the verifiable mode of small-size donations, and the sheer number of philanthropic contributors all suggest that a galvanized middle class played an integral role in shoring up the CRB. Key artifacts from the Mudd Family Papers ultimately elucidate how the Commission mobilized the American middle class: *A Plea for One Million Belgian Children* demonstrates that CRB appeals harnessed the American middle class’s Progressive predilections, while the *Letters from Helen C. Foote* illustrate that wartime rumors—particularly of German atrocities against Belgian children—augmented its efforts.

I. A Plea for One Million Belgian Children

a. Survey of Pertinent Document Features

Unlike the artifacts analyzed in the previous chapter, *A Plea for One Million Belgian Children* was an undeniable appeal to the pathos of the American middle class.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Kellogg, *Fighting Starvation in Belgium*, 106-7.

Because the pamphlet was printed in English by the CRB's New York City branch—the locus of Belgian relief efforts in North America—and addressed to the “American people” by name, it is axiomatic that the document was produced for American consumption (see Appendix C, Figures I and IV). Moreover, while high enough to preclude many lower class workers from donating, the suggested pledge of \$1 per month—which represents about \$22 in 2015 currency—paled in comparison to other types of CRB fundraising, such as the aforementioned Belgian Kiddies, Ltd. stocks sold at \$12 per share to elite mining engineers.¹⁰⁹ This means that *A Plea for One Million Belgian Children* was indubitably disseminated for the purpose of garnering donations from the American middle class.

Although the five-page pamphlet reads largely like an abridged company report, it is nonetheless replete with an inescapable air of pathos. The cover sets the tone of *A Plea for One Million Belgian Children* by integrating a quote from Maurice Maeterlinck, an eminent Belgian writer, who laments the plight of the one million Belgian children “who for two years have not eaten according to their hunger” (see Appendix C, Figure I). After recapitulating the CRB's founding under the leadership of Herbert Hoover and championing the \$173,658,913 in food and clothing imported into Belgium prior to the pamphlet's publication, the third page warns that higher food costs and a “pressing need for an extra ration to the children” necessitates \$10,000,000 to be raised in the upcoming year; anything “less than this sum will mean hunger and sickness” for the Belgian children (see Appendix C, Figures II and III).

¹⁰⁹ “CPI Inflation Calculator,” United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The final two pages validate this “pressing need for an extra ration to the children”—one million of them, to be exact—by explaining that malnourishment has engendered a host of ills in Belgium. First, the pamphlet reports that the status quo ration “had proved inadequate over a prolonged period, and, more particularly, had failed to provide the necessary nourishment for growing children, their power of resistance being in consequence greatly impaired” (see Appendix C, Figure IV). Shortly thereafter, the pamphlet notes, “There was an alarming increase in tuberculosis and certain other diseases, particularly among children, and that this was clearly due to malnutrition” (see Appendix C, Figure IV). *A Plea for One Million Belgian Children* finally rests its case and “[asks] the American people to assume [the] responsibility” of providing supplementary meals to Belgian children by contributing donations at the “cost of one dollar per month for each child” (see Appendix C, Figure IV). In order to do so, the CRB breaks the fourth wall: “The requirements have been simply and concisely stated. The need is urgent and irresistible. What is your answer?” (see Appendix C, Figure IV). Underscoring the moral imperative of the pamphlet, the back makes a parting appeal to pathos with an emblazoned image of a young boy, presumably Belgian, saluting and thanking readers for their pledges (see Appendix C, Figure VI).

b. Overview of Middle Class Progressivism

A Plea for One Million Belgian Children’s manifest emphasis on moral duty and child welfare fit squarely within the foremost concerns of the turn-of-the-twentieth-century, middle class Progressives. The prevailing mores of the Progressive Era were profoundly informed by the works and ideologies of eminent American philanthropists,

such as Carnegie and Rockefeller, who conceived private, charitable foundations as a medium to pool their capital and promote basic social welfare and cultural maintenance; however, according to Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. Katz, “the creators of the great foundations,” most notably Carnegie and Rockefeller, “were not ‘Progressives,’ either politically or intellectually.”¹¹⁰ This was because the thrust of the Progressive Movement—despite taking cues from the charitable tendencies of elite philanthropists—was animated by an American middle class whose views only variably aligned with theirs.

The middle class of the time approximately “[ranked] below the ‘upper 10 percent,’ as the wealthy were often called, but above the struggling working classes,” and “comprised small businesspeople and bureaucrats, independent farmers and urban professionals, white-collar workers and teachers, clerks and small manufacturers.”¹¹¹ Shelton Stromquist posits that the American middle class spearheaded the Progressive Movement as a reaction to the myriad social ills begotten by the Industrial Revolution and the resultant “battles between labor and capital” in the late nineteenth century.¹¹² In order to resolve class conflict, the middle class emphasized “class harmony,” which would be achieved by protecting “the people” and “the common good as a social ideal” by eradicating “corrupting influences, represented by urban boss rule and corporate

¹¹⁰ Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 20-9. Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. Katz, “The American Private Philanthropic Foundation and the Public Sphere 1890-1930,” in *Minerva* 19, no. 2 (Summer 1981): 253.

¹¹¹ James Marten, *Childhood and Child Welfare in the Progressive Era: A Brief History with Documents* (New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2005), 6.

¹¹² Shelton Stromquist, *Reinventing “The People”: The Progressive Movement, the Class Problem, and the Origins of Modern Liberalism* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2006), 3.

‘robber barons.’”¹¹³ Progressive social reformers “[embraced] the idea that industrial progress, organized by capitalist property holders, would produce prosperity and alleviate misery.”¹¹⁴ The middle class sympathized with the plight of the marginalized working class, a stance that differentiated them from industrialists like Carnegie and Rockefeller, who “both... fought against [organized labor] with the kind of brutality many in their position considered appropriate.”¹¹⁵ The consensus that industry and capital could help fuel palpable social reform opened a crucial gap for nascent coalitions between the upper and middle classes to take full form.

Middle class Progressives also understood social dissonance to be a product of moral decay on both the upper and lower ends of the socioeconomic spectrum: on the one hand, they rebuked elite capitalists and their “contempt for traditional family values,” as they “divorced regularly,” “exiled their children to boarding schools,” and propped up institutions that deprived children of their innocence—including child labor.¹¹⁶ On the other hand, they perceived the working poor, beset by “debased lifestyles,” as “victims of ignorance and powerlessness” and in desperate need of proportionate reform.¹¹⁷

“No crusade tapped the moral outrage” of middle class Progressives, however, “more deeply than the campaign to abolish child labor.”¹¹⁸ To them, “[children] represented all that was good about the country, and the way they were treated reflected

¹¹³ Ibid., 3-5.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Karl and Katz, “The American Private Philanthropic Foundation and the Public Sphere 1890-1930,” 253.

¹¹⁶ Marten, *Childhood and Child Welfare in the Progressive Era*, 6.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Stromquist, *Reinventing “The People,”* 93.

the nation's values and priorities."¹¹⁹ Yet the mores of the United States appeared to be in a state of disarray: middle class Americans were unsurprisingly aghast at sociologist Lewis Hine's widely publicized photographs, which vividly depicted the excruciating plight of child laborers—all at a time when child labor accounted for “a staggering 30 percent of the work force in southern textile mills.”¹²⁰ The child welfare-focused concerns of the American middle class were also shaped by the works of Florence Kelley, a prominent children's advocate, who in 1905 “set the tone for Progressive child welfare reformers” by declaring for “all humans... ‘a right to childhood.’”¹²¹ Kelley and her colleagues' writings became the foundations of the League of Nations' “Declaration of the Rights of the Child”; issued in 1924, it enumerated not only the right of children “to be educated to a trade, and be protected from economic exploitation,” but also “to develop materially and spiritually; to be fed, nursed, disciplined, and sheltered; [and] to be the first to receive help in times of crisis.”¹²² The American middle class consequently became exceedingly sensitive to child welfare issues—rendering “child welfare [as] the issue that most Progressives could agree on.”¹²³

For many middle class Americans, then, the cause of Belgian relief represented a moral crusade that necessitated intervention by their own wherewithal—even at a time when the United States was officially neutral in the war itself. There are a multitude of anecdotes that point to the salience and moral imperative of the Belgian relief movement to middle class America; for example, Kellogg's book cites “a druggist in a small town in

¹¹⁹ Marten, *Childhood and Child Welfare in the Progressive Era*, 3.

¹²⁰ Stromquist, *Reinventing “The People,”* 93-5.

¹²¹ Marten, *Childhood and Child Welfare in the Progressive Era*, 88.

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 3.

Indiana [who] sent one dollar a week for more than two years” and “a country grocer [who] sent, each week, a fixed percentage of his profit.”¹²⁴ Clearly, the CRB’s mission and the middle class’ values intersected—making the middle class a valuable resource for the CRB’s charity campaigns.

c. Import of Document to Middle Class Mobilization

A Plea for One Million Belgian Children, then, evinces that the CRB employed the language and themes of Progressivism to successfully mobilize the American middle class. By addressing the pamphlet to “the American people,” the CRB deliberately appealed to the middle class ideal of a society bereft of class conflict and united by a yearning for the “common good”—which, in this particular case, meant relief for Belgian children. Moreover, by limning the malaise and malnourishment of Belgian children, forewarning the dangers of failed action, and deeming relief for Belgian children the “responsibility” of Americans, the CRB made an appeal to pathos that artfully established the rectitude of Belgian relief. The rhetoric of moral responsibility—predicated on the Progressive mission to allay social discord through moral harmony—was unquestionably salient to the relief movement: it can even be found in other CRB pamphlets not included in the Mudd Family Papers, such as “A Million a Month to Save Belgium’s Hungry Children,” which argued that “America and America alone can avert the ultimate, unthinkable tragedy which the failure of the Commission’s finances would mean to Belgium.”¹²⁵ Finally, *A Plea for One Million Belgian Children*’s wholesale concern for child welfare reflects a shared objective that easily coalesced the energies of both upper

¹²⁴ Kellogg, *Fighting Starvation in Belgium*, 108.

¹²⁵ Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 173.

and middle classes: on the one hand, relief for Belgian children comported with the ideals of elite philanthropists who placed a premium on fulfilling the basic needs of the utterly destitute; and on the other hand, the middle class had no qualms acting on their child welfare-oriented impulses—which, as expressed in the “Declaration of the Rights of the Child,” entailed securing the right of all children “to be fed... and sheltered” and “to be the first to receive help in times of crisis.”¹²⁶

From the opening quote to the parting image of the saluting Belgian boy, *A Plea for One Million Belgian Children* demonstrates how the CRB successfully utilized the motifs and rhetoric of Progressivism to enlist the American middle class’s support. This strategy was key for the upper class to gain the unqualified trust and financial backing of a middle class that already perceived capital—when exercised by “moral” persons—as a handy tool for enacting social reform. Yet an important development outside the CRB’s control also lent urgency to its appeals to child welfare and the rectitude of protecting Belgian children: rumors about wartime atrocities against Belgian children. The *Letters from Helen C. Foote* show that an especially outlandish rumor—German soldiers amputating Belgian children’s hands—informed and animated the American middle class to the advantage of the Commission.

¹²⁶ Marten, *Childhood and Child Welfare in the Progressive Era*, 88.

II. Letters from Helen C. Foote

a. Survey of Pertinent Document Features

Helen C. Foote was born on January 29, 1880 in South Bend, Indiana.¹²⁷ She was the second of four children born to William Alexis Foote—a “farmer, merchant and flour [miller]”—and Florence E. Frazier.¹²⁸ At the time she composed her letter, Foote was a thirty-seven-year-old teacher “in the Evansville High School” who “[had] just received [her] A.M. degree from Indiana University” (see Appendix D, Figures II and III). A variety of graduate registries from Indiana University corroborate her academic credentials: she received her A.B. in English from Indiana University in 1912 and her A.M.—also in English and from Indiana University—on October 27, 1916.¹²⁹ In 1919, she penned a sardonic article espousing textbook reform in a journal for educators, which lists her position as an “Assistant in the English Department” at Evansville, Indiana’s Central High School.¹³⁰ In the letter itself, Foote divulges her salary at “\$1,250.00 a year”—which in 2015 currency represents approximately \$22,922 (see Appendix D, Figure II).¹³¹ In sum, the evidence of her personal history supports one undeniable conclusion: Foote was a prototypical educated, professional, and reform-minded middle class American with a critical eye on the conditions of children.

¹²⁷ Abram W. Foote, *The Foote History and Genealogy* (Rutland, Vermont: Marble City Press - The Tuttle Company, 1907), 497.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 497-8.

¹²⁹ “Catalog for 1913,” in *Indiana University Bulletin* 11, no. 5 (1913): 355-400. “Catalog for 1917,” in *Indiana University Bulletin* 15, no. 10 (1917): 249-272. “Register of Graduates,” in *Indiana University Bulletin* 15, no. 12 (1917): 214.

¹³⁰ Helen C. Foote, “Our Text Books,” in *The Educator-Journal* 20, no. 2 (1919): 78-9.

¹³¹ “CPI Inflation Calculator,” United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Her letters to the CRB indicate that she was strongly informed by sensational tales of barbarisms surrounding the German occupation of Belgium. Addressed to the “Belgian Relief Commission” on June 8, 1917, Foote’s first letter explains her purpose candidly: “I wish to adopt a little Belgian boy of six years of age” (see Appendix D, Figure I). She proceeds to enumerate a litany of preferences for her adoptee, including the qualification that she receives “a bright intelligent blonde child, who is handsome and high bred in appearance”; nevertheless, in the letter’s sole underlined sentence, Foote emphatically specifies her chief requirement: “Also I desire you select him from the number of those children whose right hands are cut off” (see Appendix D, Figure I). After disclosing her biographical information, Foote concludes her letter by illuminating a key reason for her intention to rear a Belgian boy: “I wish a boy; because I wish to bring him up to avenge Belgium, if the occasion ever arises, when Germany must be beaten a second time” (see Appendix D, Figure III).

Foote received a “prompt answer”—ostensibly from William L. Honnold or a CRB official representing him—and responded on June 10 (see Appendix D, Figures IV and VI). In this second letter, she expresses her gladness of learning that the CRB “[does] not know of any children mutilated by the Germans”—a revelation that allows her to “hate the Germans... a little more calmly” and ceases her desire to see “the extermination of the whole race” (see Appendix D, Figures IV and V). Foote then explains how she came to accept the rumors:

My belief in the existence of mutilated children was based upon the Bryce report (or rather what others have told me of it); the cartoons of Raemakers [sic]; and “Belgium’s Agony,” that by Verhaeren. I still believe that these two men, at least,

might be telling the truth; but I certainly do not believe all that I read in the newspapers (see Appendix D, Figure V).

Notwithstanding the demise of her adoption plans, Foote pledges to support the CRB financially: “Since my plan to adopt an orphan in the flesh does not seem practical; I shall, a little later on, contribute monthly to the support of some Belgian child. The Little Theater Company here, to which I belong, may contribute to the support of several more. A few of us are urging this plan very strongly” (see Appendix D, Figures V and VI).

b. Overview of the “Rape of Belgium”

At first glance, Foote’s insistence that she adopt a Belgian boy with an amputated right hand may seem perplexing and disturbing; but as her second letter reveals, her plans were greatly informed by popular myths of ghastly German atrocities during the occupation of Belgium—collectively referred to as the “Rape of Belgium.” Like many modern myths, the “Rape of Belgium” was founded on a critical element of truth. During the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), “58,000 French irregulars were organized into so-called *corps-francs*” with the purpose of “[harassing] the enemy communication lines and [attacking] isolated pockets of German troops.”¹³² These soldiers often battled sans uniforms and camouflaged themselves by blending into the civilian population.¹³³ After the war, the *corps-francs*—despite only accounting for “no more than 1,000 German

¹³² James Hayward, *Myths & Legends of the First World War* (Stroud, England: Sutton Publishing, 2002), 70.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

casualties”—were remembered in Germany as “villainous murderers, or *franc-tireurs*”—which in French translates to “free shooter.”¹³⁴

During the invasion of Belgium a mere forty-three years later, the threat of *franc-tireurs* stymieing the Kaiser’s forces emerged as one of the foremost concerns of German commanders.¹³⁵ Certified anecdotes from the era confirm that these fears were only partly founded, as there was “a certain amount of sporadic and uncoordinated partisan activity by Belgian civilians and civil guards”; nevertheless, rumors began circulating amongst Germans of unspeakable crimes perpetrated by *franc-tireurs* in collaboration with the larger Belgian citizenry.¹³⁶ An excerpt from the German newspaper, *Kolnische Volkzeitung*, offers an example of a wild yet typical account of Belgian barbarity: “It is proven beyond a doubt that German wounded were robbed and killed by the Belgian population and indeed were subject to horrible mutilations, and that even women and young girls took part in these shameful actions. In this way, the eyes of German soldiers were torn out, their ears, noses, fingers, and sexual organs cut off or their body cut open.”¹³⁷

The specter of the *franc-tireurs* prompted the German army and government to adopt a “premeditated campaign of *Schrecklichkeit*, or frightfulness, against Belgian civilians.”¹³⁸ This policy specifically entailed “the wholesale destruction of property and

¹³⁴ Ibid. Neiberg, *Fighting the Great War: A Global History*, 15.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Hayward, *Myths and Legends of the First World War*, 71-4.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 74.

¹³⁸ Neiberg, *Fighting the Great War*, 15.

the execution of civilian hostages.”¹³⁹ One of the starkest—and most tragic—examples of *Schrecklichkeit*’s gruesome efficacy was the infamous “Sacking of Louvain.” The German army took over the city peacefully on August 19, 1914; but on August 25, “an attack by Belgian forces from Antwerp against German positions near Louvain triggered a mild panic amongst the troops in the city, and allegations of *franc-tireur* activity” ran amok accordingly.¹⁴⁰ The next day, the German military governor of Brussels, General von Luttwitz, fabricated a story that “the German commandant in Louvain had been shot by the son of the town mayor” as a pretext for sacking the city.¹⁴¹ German soldiers soon commenced a five-day slaughter, “[breaking] down doors, [hauling] people out, and either [shooting] them or [sending] them to the train station, where a firing squad or detention awaited.”¹⁴² The houses of “suspected” *franc-tireurs* were also set aflame.¹⁴³ The Germans later eviscerated Louvain of its cultural treasures: “They set fire to the university’s library, destroying the precious buildings and the irreplaceable Gothic and Renaissance manuscripts contained within.”¹⁴⁴ In the wake of the madness, “more than a thousand homes in Louvain proper” had been destroyed—accounting for “one-seventh of the housing stock”—and corpses of Belgians and horses littered Louvain’s streets.¹⁴⁵

While German forces were undoubtedly culpable for a slew of war crimes, including the Sacking of Louvain, the governments and press of the Allied countries

¹³⁹ Hayward, *Myths & Legends of the First World War*, 72.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 75-6.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 76.

¹⁴² Larry Zuckerman, *The Rape of Belgium: The Untold Story of World War I* (New York: New York University Press, 2004), 31.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ Neiberg, *Fighting the Great War*, 15.

¹⁴⁵ Zuckerman, *The Rape of Belgium*, 33. Hayward, *Myths & Legends of the First World War*, 76.

seized upon the panic to propagate exaggerated reports of “Hun” depravities for propaganda purposes.¹⁴⁶ A number of these unsubstantiated, “generic” stories tended to underscore the violent lechery of German soldiers; as a result, the collective experience of the German occupation of Belgium came to be known as the “Rape of Belgium.”¹⁴⁷

One of the more outlandish rumors that surfaced during the “Rape of Belgium” was the Germans’ sordid penchant for capriciously amputating the hands of Belgian children.¹⁴⁸ An early account of this “certainly untrue” wantonness came from Major A. Corbett-Smith, a British Expeditionary Force (BEF) officer who later became a “prolific author”: “Hanging up in the open window of a shop, strung from a hook in the cross-beam, like a joint in a butcher’s shop, was the body of a little girl, five years old, perhaps. Its poor little hands had been hacked off, and through the slender body were vicious bayonet stabs.”¹⁴⁹ Around this time, the image of the savage Hun amputating the hands of Belgian children became a favorite motif employed by Allied propagandists.¹⁵⁰

Footo was correct to cite the eminent Belgian poet, Emile Verhaeren, as a purveyor of the rumor: in *Belgium’s Agony*, he remarked that German soldiers thoroughly enjoyed mutilating Belgian children, who “[had] little hands that [were] delightfully easy to cut off.”¹⁵¹ Louis Raemaekers, the famous Dutch artist, was another likely culprit for

¹⁴⁶ Hayward, *Myths & Legends of the First World War*, 77-8.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 79-84.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 81.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Photographs: Figure 15.

¹⁵¹ Emile Verhaeren, *Belgium’s Agony* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915), 32

his harrowing depictions of suffering in German occupied territories.¹⁵² No work did more to validate the myth, however, than the “infamous” Bryce Report.¹⁵³ Representing the findings of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages—an investigative commission organized by the British government and chaired by Lord James Bryce—it “confirmed” the veracity of some of the most grotesque accounts of German debauchery in Belgium, including the sensational hand amputation rumor.¹⁵⁴ The report was published a mere seven days subsequent to the sinking of the *Lusitania*, was translated into thirty languages, and was sold at the thrifty “price of a newspaper”; this confluence of factors made it “an immediate bestseller” with “a critical influence on public opinion.”¹⁵⁵

In retrospect, scholars have widely interpreted the Bryce Report as a “hugely flawed” document shoddily constructed on hearsay and deficient methods of inquiry.¹⁵⁶ Prior to the report’s publication, in fact, “Bryce himself had been warned that no children with amputated hands had been seen or heard of at any of six given addresses in London.”¹⁵⁷ Nevertheless, fictitious narratives—such as the hand amputation rumor—survived in the Allies’ collective consciousness, informing the worldviews and decisions of the public, including Foote.

¹⁵² Louis Raemaekers, *Raemaekers' Cartoons: With Accompanying Notes by Well-Known English Writers* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1916), 3-13.

¹⁵³ Hayward, *Myths & Legends of the First World War*, 84.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 85.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

c. Import of Documents to Middle Class Mobilization

Foote’s letters aptly illustrate the salience of wartime rumors to the CRB and its successful mobilization of the middle class. The Commission officially subscribed to a policy of refraining from “hysterical exaggeration” in its public statements—but it nevertheless capitalized on tall tales emanating from Belgium.¹⁵⁸ Like many educated middle class Americans, Foote encountered largely true reports of German war crimes in Belgium—such as the campaign of *Schrecklichkeit* and the Sacking of Louvain—in ordinary newspapers; however, since the veracity of published reports ran the gamut, Foote and other middle class Americans were equally predisposed to reading spurious narratives, such as those in *Belgium’s Agony* and the Bryce Report, which “verified” accounts of German troops indiscriminately amputating the hands of Belgian children. Foote’s passionate desire to rear a Belgian boy and “avenge Belgium” in another war with Germany indicates that these sensational rumors—absorbed as facts when blended in the press with real war crimes—seem to have tapped into the proclivities of the child welfare-minded middle class, inciting a collective moral indignation and determination to support efforts to suppress child abuse. Ultimately, as evidenced by the conclusion of her second letter, the American middle class converted this anger into palpable financial contributions, answering the CRB’s appeals.

As aforementioned, the CRB’s historic fund—built on the donations of both the American upper and middle classes—was key to the movement’s success, “[providing] invaluable support before government subsidies were granted” by the United States and

¹⁵⁸ Gay and Fisher, *Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium*, Chapter XV: Part 5.

demonstrating “the strength of the world-wide moral support of the undertaking, which [became] an important factor in securing government assistance”; nonetheless, rumors suggesting the Commission’s demise after the United States’ declaration of war on Germany threatened to put a halt to these loans and derail the entire enterprise itself.¹⁵⁹ The following documents elucidate how the CRB combatted these rumors and maintained the American public’s support for the purpose of renewing United States government loans—the new primary source of CRB funding.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., Chapter XV: Introduction.

Chapter 3: Responding to the United States' Entry into World War I

On June 4, 1917, Harvey S. Mudd—a reliable supporter of Belgian Kiddies, Ltd.—messed the organization to announce his cancellation of regular financial contributions: “I have recently read the statement made by Mr. Hoover saying that the Government had undertaken the work of Belgian relief. There are many other calls for donations and under the circumstances I think it best to discontinue my contribution of \$50.00 monthly” (see Appendix E, Figure I). Eight days later, he received a reply from John V. N. Dorr, chairman of the Belgian Kiddies Committee, beseeching him to reconsider:

I am enclosing herewith circular recently sent out by the Commission for Belgian Relief regarding the change in conditions caused by the United States making a loan to France and Belgium sufficient to purchase all the food that can be transported. Although the urgency of the need is thus removed, the fact that the sums being advanced are loans and not gifts and that Mr. Hoover, Mr. Honnold and the other American Engineers connected with the work will continue to give their services without pay makes it seem right that we should continue our efforts to raise the Belgian Relief Fund to the amount originally proposed, \$120,000... Our entrance into the war can only give us a greater appreciation of and sympathy for those who have suffered so much (see Appendix E, Figure II).

On July 25—apparently believing Dorr’s letter and attachment had been sent on July 7—Mudd responded, emphatically acknowledging that the materials had prompted him to change his mind: “The monthly amount which I have been sending was discontinued because I understood from various sources that the contributions were no longer desired. Under the circumstances I shall be very glad to renew any help which I am able to give

until the amount raised by the American Engineers reaches \$120,000. I enclose herewith check for \$50.00 for the month of August (see Appendix E, Figure V).

The correspondence between Mudd and Dorr underscores a pivotal moment in the history of the CRB: the United States' entry into the First World War. This event not only transformed the political and military parameters of the entire conflict, but also compelled the CRB to recalibrate its organization, financing, and objectives—and in doing so, prompted rumors claiming the Commission's demise. The "circular" forwarded by Dorr—a letter from Hoover to the CRB's supporters—reveals how the organization addressed these misconceptions in order to maintain the American public's support for the purpose of renewing vital government loans. Ultimately, the outcome of the Mudd-Dorr correspondence, as well as the CRB's successful acquisition of renewed loans, suggests that the Commission indeed retained this support subsequent to the United States' entry—a factor that likely contributed to the movement's overall success.

I. Herbert Hoover: To Supporters of the Commission for Relief in Belgium – May 25, 1917

a. Survey of Pertinent Document Features

The letter is addressed to the "Supporters of the Commission for Relief in Belgium" in the United States—a liberal classification likely encompassing the entire gamut of American social groups that propped up the movement. Dated at May 25, 1917, it was composed and first disseminated shortly after the United States' declaration of war on Germany on April 6, 1917. The piece is attributed to Hoover, and although it is difficult to verify whether or not he penned it personally, it nonetheless appears to be an

official CRB document—meaning he almost certainly endorsed its message. Hoover

begins by making a stunning proclamation regarding the CRB's funding:

We are sure that the American people will be glad to know that through the sympathetic arrangements made by the President and the Secretary of Treasury, the cost of the relief of Belgium and the occupied territories of Northern France... will be borne for the next six months by the American Government. This has been made possible by a loan of \$75,000,000 from the United States to the Governments of Belgium and France. The money will be advanced by the Treasury in installments of \$12,500,000 per month, of which \$7,500,000 will be available for Belgian relief and \$5,000,000 for the relief in the occupied portion of Northern France. The way is open so that at the termination of the six months thus provided for, application may be made to the Government for further loans (see Appendix E, Figure III).

He explains that the CRB's public appeals played a key role in this achievement, and that their efficacy ultimately "insured" the continuation of the relief movement:

We feel that the sympathy with our work and the support of the public have largely influenced the Government in finally granting the request of the Belgian and French Governments. Therefore our appeals have done more than to bring in immediate contributions; they have helped to insure the relief of Belgium and Northern France throughout the war (see Appendix E, Figure III).

Hoover believes that the "whole American nation" should feel "intense satisfaction" on account of the CRB being "firmly established as a distinctly American undertaking"; nonetheless, Hoover notes that the United States' loan of "\$12,500,000 per month is much less than the amount which [the CRB has] stated as necessary to supply the imports required" (see Appendix E, Figure III). This is because the new figure "will now cover all of the foodstuffs that we can hope to ship owing to the recent swiftly developed shortage of the world's shipping" (see Appendix E, Figure III).

Immediately afterwards, Hoover forcefully clarifies that the CRB will continue to be the sole official conveyor of international relief to Belgium and Northern France: **“It must be clearly understood that the Commission for Relief in Belgium will continue to assume the entire charge of purchasing and transporting all food into Belgium and Northern France (occupied portion). The Commission also will continue to be the only fully regularized vehicle by which money, food, and clothing can be sent into Belgium”** (see Appendix E, Figure IV). In a similar vein, he adds that the CRB’s “Commercial Exchange Department will continue as heretofore to effect transfers of money into Belgium” (see Appendix E, Figure IV). Hoover then outlines the process by which “individuals or committees outside of Belgium” can utilize this department to “send money to relatives or friends... [or] any of the specially deserving internal charities” (see Appendix E, Figure IV). According to Hoover, “Over \$5,000,000 has been transferred in this way since the belligerent governments gave their official sanction to the operations of this department” (see Appendix E, Figure IV).

In a radical departure from its previous strategies, Hoover pledges that the CRB will eschew public appeals upon receipt of the loans: “The Government payments will commence on June 1st; and we shall be glad to have remittances up to that date, but we make no appeal for contributions thereafter” (see Appendix E, Figure IV).

Notwithstanding this reversal, he assures that the beneficiaries of these prior appeals—“the children of Belgium”—will continue to “have the first call upon all food which is imported, and every effort will be made to maintain the supplementary meal which has been so important a factor up to the present in sustaining the health of millions of children” (see Appendix E, Figure IV). Nevertheless, Hoover warns that the CRB will not

be precluded from resuming public appeals in the future: **“Although the general relief of the countries involved will now be met by the Government appropriations, emergencies and special conditions may arise which could only be met by private donations. In such circumstances I hope that we may again call on you to help meet the demands of the situation, whatever that may be”** (see Appendix E, Figure IV).

Hoover concludes by promising that continued donations to the CRB will be well spent: **“Should any contributors desire to continue their gifts, notwithstanding the present position, they may be assured that their contributions will be expended sooner or later to great advantage, either during or after the war”** (see Appendix E, Figure IV).

b. Overview of the United States’ Entry and its Ramifications

As evidenced by Hoover’s letter, the United States’ entry into the First World War marked a new phase in the relief movement of Belgium and Northern France. For the better part of the past century, historians have belabored the reasons that brought the United States and Germany into armed conflict; but one of the key factors that uniquely affected the CRB involved Germany’s disruption of international shipping. On account of its anti-colonial sentiments, business concerns, and domestic ethnic divisions, the United States remained diplomatically neutral for much of the war; as a result, the belligerent countries were content to grant the CRB—staffed largely by Americans—neutral status itself.¹⁶⁰ According to Gay and Fisher, the CRB’s “neutral status was the essential condition of the Commission's existence as a body recognized and supported by the belligerents and endowed by them with privileges and immunities which permitted its

¹⁶⁰ de Groot, *The First World War*, 112-3. Burner, *Herbert Hoover*, 74.

operations within and across the opposing lines.”¹⁶¹ Of course, one of these core “privileges and immunities” enabled Americans to work for the CRB within occupied Belgium and Northern France.¹⁶² CRB officials understood, however, that the fate of the entire enterprise was inherently tenuous, “[reasonably assuming] that [the CRB losing] its neutrality would cause either the replacement of the Commission by another body of neutral membership or the discontinuance of relief.”¹⁶³

Hoover was rightly anxious about the prospect of a German-American conflict subsequent to Germany’s sinking of RMS *Lusitania* on May 7, 1915, but events in early 1917 forced him and the CRB to begin preparing for this nearly inexorable eventuality.¹⁶⁴ After months of indiscriminate U-boat strikes and mine deployments by Germany had froze German-American relations and sharply reduced trans-Atlantic shipping, Germany compounded the situation when it declared unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917.¹⁶⁵ On February 3—the same day President Woodrow Wilson terminated diplomatic relations with Germany—a CRB ship named the *Euphrates* was torpedoed, leaving only one survivor.¹⁶⁶ This tragedy exacted a profound emotional toll on Hoover, and in its wake, the CRB swiftly halted all of its shipping services and commenced talks to hand its operations over to Dutch and Spanish authorities—both representing neutral countries.¹⁶⁷ CRB overseas deliveries fell precipitously from 90,019 tons in January to

¹⁶¹ Gay and Fisher, *Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium*, Chapter XII: Introduction.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, Chapter II: Introduction.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, Chapter XII: Introduction.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, Chapter XII: Part 1.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, Chapter III: Part 3

¹⁶⁶ Hoover, *An American Epic, Volume 1*, 288.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 299.

10,116 tons in March.¹⁶⁸ In total, the CRB lost seven ships to torpedoes and two to mines during Germany's campaign of unlimited submarine warfare.¹⁶⁹ The CRB's decision to cease shipping, however, had "immediate results": "German authorities in Belgium, not wishing to be responsible for the discontinuance of relief, promptly reversed themselves and declared that the Americans might remain in the occupied territories, exercising the same privileges that they had hitherto enjoyed."¹⁷⁰ Consequently, CRB shipping resumed cautiously on February 24.¹⁷¹ Germany's submarine campaign nonetheless continued unabated, and by April 6, President Wilson had requested and received an official declaration of war from Congress.¹⁷²

This seismic political event yielded an extraordinary reconstitution of the CRB's organization, funding, and objectives. In order to preserve its neutral status, the CRB immediately recalled its American workers in occupied Belgium and Northern France, replacing them with Spanish and Dutch personnel; however, the entirety of the CRB's operations outside these areas continued to be directed and executed by the Americans.¹⁷³ This became the CRB's *modus operandi* for the remainder of the war.¹⁷⁴ Furthermore, as duly noted by Hoover's letter, the CRB successfully secured enormous loans from the United States government to help finance the enterprise—an achievement Hoover credited to the Commission's ubiquitous public support. After the United States' entrance

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 344.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 321.

¹⁷⁰ Gay and Fisher, *Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium*, Chapter XII: Part 2.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., Chapter V: Part 4.

¹⁷² Ibid., Chapter XII: Part 3.

¹⁷³ Kellogg, *Fighting Starvation in Belgium*, 209.

¹⁷⁴ Austin, "Creating a 'piratical state organization for benevolence,'" 11.

into the war, Congress began moving legislation to provide the Allies with large credits, as their cumulative “war expenditures had brought them to a desperate financial situation.”¹⁷⁵ The CRB then lobbied Washington to allocate these credits for the Commission.¹⁷⁶ On May 17, the CRB was awarded the six-month loan detailed in Hoover’s letter—but it came with a crucial congressional stipulation: “all American loans had to be spent in the United States.”¹⁷⁷ After six months, the United States government renewed the award at an increased rate of \$9 million per month for Belgium and \$6 million per month for Northern France—and from November 1918 until the CRB’s liquidation in March 1919, the United States more than doubled Belgium’s award at \$20 million per month.

The American loans ultimately revamped the financial structure of the CRB, becoming the organization’s primary source of funding: from May 1917 until its conclusion in March 1919, the CRB received \$386.6 million from the United States government—approximately 42% of all receipts accrued through the five-year enterprise.¹⁷⁸ In contrast, while Britain and France lent a combined \$270 million to the CRB prior to May 1917, the two countries only provided \$43.9 million afterwards.¹⁷⁹ The introduction of American loans was so transformative that “the [CRB no longer] felt justified in calling on the charity of the world for additional money with which to

¹⁷⁵ Gay and Fisher, *Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium*, Chapter IV: Part 6.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ Hoover, *An American Epic, Volume 1*, 337.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 415.

¹⁷⁹ Gay and Fisher, *Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium*, Chapter IV: Part 6. Hoover, *An American Epic, Volume 1*, 415.

purchase any food” destined for Europe.¹⁸⁰ Potentially on account of this new policy, it appears that many Americans began believing “that the American part in the relief of Belgium and Northern France ceased with the entrance of [their] country into the war”; coincidentally, “most organized efforts to raise funds for the [CRB] ceased” subsequent to the United States’ declaration of war—yet “a few committees continued to be active until the [Armistice].”¹⁸¹ The government loans were nevertheless enough to bring CRB shipping rates back to its pre-submarine warfare levels in spite of the decline in charity.¹⁸²

c. Import of Document to the Maintenance of Public Support

Hoover’s letter to the CRB’s supporters illuminates how the organization, in the aftermath of the United States’ declaration of war, attempted to maintain the American public’s support for the chief purpose of renewing government loans. By clearly expounding its new financial structure and affirming its status as the sole official channel of international relief into Belgium and Northern France, the CRB tackled rumors suggesting its operations had been entirely turned over to the Spanish and Dutch or the United States government—the latter believed by Harvey S. Mudd. Similarly, the message conveniently glosses over the prominent role of the Spanish and Dutch in the occupied territories, demonstrating that the CRB painted itself—perhaps disingenuously—as a more “distinctly American undertaking” on account of the United States’ generous loans. The CRB also raised the specter of government loans expiring

¹⁸⁰ Kellogg, *Fighting Starvation in Belgium*, 210-1.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 208. Curti, *American Philanthropy Abroad*, 234.

¹⁸² Hoover, *An American Epic, Volume 1*, 344.

after six months and suggested that public support would be vital to their renewal—even though it vowed to officially refrain from calling on public charity henceforth. But the Commission acknowledged that the government loans were insufficient because total shipping costs were expected to exceed the government's monthly allotments—making continued financial and moral support all the more necessary.

The CRB further shored up public support by outlining the process through which individuals and the few remaining committees—including Belgian Kiddies, Ltd.—could circumvent the congressional stipulation on CRB expenditures and continue providing direct monetary support via their exchange commission. The CRB also guaranteed that the children of Belgium and Northern France, whose plight had helped mobilize public support in the earlier phases of the war, would continue to receive supplementary meals and precedence in food distributions. Lastly, while the Commission promised that it would only call on public charity when necessitated by emergencies, it also acknowledged that continued contributions would be appreciated, assuring donors that their money would be well spent in support of the CRB in the United States or directly in Belgium and Northern France after the war. The Mudd-Dorr correspondence ultimately indicates that the CRB successfully retained the American public's support by clarifying to donors its continued salience and rectitude. Because the CRB eventually secured renewed loans—in fact, at higher rates—it is exceedingly likely that the Commission's successful maintenance of public support was instrumental to the achievement of the entire relief movement.

Conclusion

Many of the CRB's successful public appeals strategies would continue assisting humanitarian efforts after the war, finding new life with the American Relief Administration (ARA)—an organization that, in several ways, acted as a successor to the CRB. In January 1919, while concluding his stints with the CRB and the US Food Administration—a wartime government agency formed to export needed agricultural products to the European Allies and “encourage Americans to limit their food consumption”—Hoover was tapped by President Wilson to head the ARA.¹⁸³ In its first incarnation, the ARA was a “gigantic-government sponsored, humanitarian agency supported by thousands of donors” with a mission to feed war-torn Central Europe—including the United States' former enemies in Germany and Austria.¹⁸⁴ Employing the CRB's proven distribution system as well as its former volunteers, the ARA delivered four million tons of food to Central Europe in the nine months following the Armistice, rivaling the achievement of the CRB.¹⁸⁵

Notwithstanding its eventual success, the ARA had to first tackle the considerable challenge of mobilizing public support for vanquished enemies—a far greater obstacle to fundraising than any faced by the CRB. Yet the ARA—headed by many of the CRB's former leaders, including Hoover—adopted the older public appeals strategies to great

¹⁸³ Cabenes, *The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism*, 209-12.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 212-3.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 212.

effect.¹⁸⁶ In a pamphlet entitled “Why We are Feeding Germany?” Hoover argues for the economic and diplomatic imperatives of relief, appropriating themes and rhetoric that would most easily resonate with elite capitalists and statesmen:

“From the point of view of an economist, I would say that it is because there are seventy millions of people who must either produce or die... their production is essential to the world’s future and they... cannot produce unless they are fed. From the point of view of a governor... it is because famine breeds anarchy, anarchy is infectious, the infection of such a cesspool will jeopardize France and Britain, will yet spread to the United States.”¹⁸⁷

The pragmatic language applied in this pamphlet likely reflects the character of appeals made by Hoover and other ARA officials at posh fundraising dinners, where upper class attendees contributed thousands of dollars each.¹⁸⁸ The most successful of these events was held in New York City; there, the ARA sold 1,000 tickets at \$1,000 a piece while also raising \$1 million in pledges.¹⁸⁹ A short time after the dinner, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. promised to add \$2.3 million to the pledge total.¹⁹⁰ Thus, as an organization “[reliant] on advertising to motivate donors,” the ARA unequivocally benefitted from the shrewd upper class appeals first perfected by the CRB.¹⁹¹

The ARA also succeeded through traditional middle class appeals that underscored the plight of children—especially during its second incarnation. In the summer of 1919, the United States government privatized the ARA, enabling it to

¹⁸⁶ Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 166.

¹⁸⁷ Cabanes, *The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism*, 212-3.

¹⁸⁸ Austin, “Creating a ‘piratical state organization for benevolence,’” 331.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 332.

¹⁹¹ Cabanes, *The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism*, 304.

continue relief efforts in Central Europe.¹⁹² In 1921, however, a historically acute famine began ravaging Soviet Russia, prompting the ARA to expand its operations eastward.¹⁹³ Utilizing the same distribution networks and volunteers as the CRB and the ARA in Central Europe, the ARA in Russia provided 90 percent of all humanitarian aid during the two-year famine, delivering more than 768,000 tons of food, medicine, and clothing to save millions of individuals; but equally as integral to the ARA's success was the "massive" propaganda campaign it sponsored, for it generated "a keen sympathy on the part of the American public towards the Russian people" at a time when the United States was collectively wary of the Communist takeover.¹⁹⁴

Unlike the CRB, the ARA did not directly participate in public appeals, as Hoover reasoned that doing so would compound gratuitous competition amongst the myriad organizations legitimately working for Russian relief; nevertheless, it permitted organizations directly contributing to the ARA to continue its fundraising efforts—most notably the American Red Cross (ARC).¹⁹⁵ The ARC had emerged as one of the most influential middle class networks by 1918, boasting 20 million members—up from 20,000 in 1914—on account of its wartime operations outside the CRB's purview.¹⁹⁶ During the famine in Russia, the ARC entered into a partnership with the ARA whereby the ARC would "furnish relief entirely through the Medical Division of the [ARA]."¹⁹⁷

¹⁹² Ibid., 213.

¹⁹³ Ibid., 189-93.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 193-242.

¹⁹⁵ Harold H. Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia, 1919-1923: The Operations of the American Relief Administration*, 2nd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1935), 545-6.

¹⁹⁶ Cabanes, *The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism*, 220.

¹⁹⁷ Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia*, 461.

The ARC was thus one of the organizations allowed to fundraise under the ARA's auspices, following Hoover's directive to "make some distinction between the Russian people"—particularly the guiltless children—"and the group who [had] seized the government."¹⁹⁸

Over the course of the First World War, "visual propaganda" came to supersede the customary published appeals that the CRB favored.¹⁹⁹ Propagandists assisting the belligerent governments refined this art by utilizing "forceful images, touching stories, [and] moralistic narration" in their films and photograph collections.²⁰⁰ After the war, the ARC exploited the advent of this new propaganda genre on an incredible scale: its *American Red Cross Magazine*—delivered to all 20 million members—illustrated "the spectacle of suffering on every page [to clamor] for readers' compassion and charity."²⁰¹ These renderings surely enabled millions of middle class Americans to identify the difference between starving Russian children and the unsavory Bolsheviks, making financial contributions to the ARC both reasonable and painless. The ARC's use of visual propaganda ultimately proved fruitful, allowing it to ship \$3.8 million worth of medical supplies for the joint ARA-ARC effort in Russia.²⁰² In sum, the public appeals of the CRB—and later the ARA—augmented "the two largest humanitarian operations of the

¹⁹⁸ Cabanes, *The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism*, 215.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 220.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

²⁰² Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia*, 558.

early twentieth century,” saving millions of lives and setting a standard for prudent public relations in subsequent humanitarian movements.²⁰³

²⁰³ Cabanes, *The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism*, 15.

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
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Appendix A



• Figure I

Gentlemen, I have the pleasure to present our friend, Mr. Hemphill, whom you all know so favorably by repute.

MR. A. J. HEMPHILL: Mr. President, and Gentlemen: It has been my privilege to be associated with the work for relief in Belgium for about two years. This great work never would have been undertaken had not Mr. Hoover been in London at the time when Germany and the German troops went through Belgium, took away practically all the food stuffs that were able to be taken, and, by October, Belgium was suffering the approach of famine. Mr. Hoover saw the necessity for some sort of an organization, and with his remarkable genius for organization, and with the co-operation of the American Ambassadors throughout Europe, Mr. Hoover then undertook the formation of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, which was really an offshoot of the organization, with a head in London, to relieve and help returning American travellers who were stranded in Europe at the time of the outbreak of the war.

In building up this organization Mr. Hoover dragooned into his service a number of engineers whom he found in London, or who were returning through London, and through his engineering ability, and with the help and co-operation of the people his own magnetism compelled association with him, he took these men; he organized them into groups and sent them into Belgium, and then undertook, with the permission of the Comité National in Belgium the distribution of food.

From that day until this he has prevented starvation in Belgium. He has not prevented privation because privation exists to a most unspeakable extent. The children are not properly nourished; of adults now we have over two million and a half in the bread lines. All this work has been done by an American who felt that in doing this work he was building up a monument which we sadly need in Europe. It is about the only beacon light that can be pointed to as being worthy of this great nation. If it were not for the work that Mr. Hoover has done in Belgium, I do not believe that the United States would have a friend abroad. That is a harsh statement, but fortunately this is our hope of redemption.

Now, gentlemen, I do not think with this group I need make any appeal for Belgium because Mr. Hoover is going to tell us the story, but we do need co-operation, and we do need better organization in this country to help us carry forward the work that, I tell you, is going to put us on the map on the other side in a way that is worthy of the American name.

I have the greatest honor and pleasure in introducing my colleague, Honorable Herbert C. Hoover, Chairman of the Committee for Relief in Belgium. (Prolonged applause; members and guests all stand).

MR. HERBERT C. HOOVER: Mr. President and Fellow-Members: I feel greatly embarrassed and greatly moved by the words I have heard and by the action of the Club. It was a response which I received within twenty-four hours after arriving here, in a mood of a great deal of discouragement. I have to beg for forbearance because I am so poor at making public addresses that I cannot express that appreciation which is in my heart.

I feel that I have to justify to you the action which your Governors have taken by giving you some description and some explanation of what we have done, and the work we are trying to do.

I always find three difficulties in talking about Belgian Relief—four in fact. One is that I have never delivered a public address on the subject. My entire public appearances have been in combative moods where I have had to defend the Belgian Relief, and I can assure you that I have a torrent of words on these occasions.

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With friends, it is more difficult. If some one would get up and assault this enterprise, I assure you that I could do pretty well.

My next difficulty is one of some delicacy as to the position which I hold, that it is vitally necessary for us to be absolutely neutral, not only in deed, but in word, lest we should, by some act of ours, increase the sufferings of ten millions of people.

A third difficulty I have is to visualize to men who have not been in Europe since the war began the actual situation which exists in an occupied territory. Perhaps, if you would endeavor to imagine New York and about five adjoining counties occupied by an enemy army, blockaded from without, and surrounded with a wall of steel, the normal flow of food, seventy per cent. of which food normally comes from without, stopped, you would awaken within thirty-six hours to find your markets empty, and your bakeries stopped.

Add to this that your railways would be taken over for military purposes; that your telephones and telegraphs would be suppressed; that your newspapers would be prohibited; that every form of communication and intellectual life would cease instantly; that you could not move outside your own wards and your own villages; that you could not assemble except by special permission; that every street corner and every crossroad would be occupied by a sentry; that the normal feeling of security which every man has, that he has at least an appeal to justice, is gone, submerged in the fact that he is subject only to an army—even then you have an inadequate picture because it is almost impossible to convey to you the psychology of a people in such a stress.

The feeling that the food supply of the community, the food supply to the individual, may cease at any moment; that your women and children are in imminent jeopardy, and the feeling of every thinking man that disturbance by the population only means blood in the streets; that there is no possible salvation or solution; a population which shivers with rumors—it goes beyond ability to describe.

That has been the situation of Belgium and Northern France with 10,000,000 of people, for nearly two years with one exception, and that exception was the Commission for Relief. The Commission for Relief has not only been the salvation of their food supply, but has been their protection in their despair.

Now you will say at once, and I will answer it at once, that it is the duty of the occupying army to provision the civilian population. I commit no indiscretion when I repeat to you the official statement by the German Government on the one side and the British Government on the other. The Germans state that the shortage in food supply in Belgium is due to a blockade; the ports are open except for the Allied Navies; the blockade is illegal and is inhumane; that as a result of the blockade they have not a sufficient supply of food of their own; that they invite relief and that they will support it in Governmental measures, and that in the name of humanity it ought to be done. The British Government, on the other hand, says, that the prime responsibility and the prime wrong was the occupation of Belgium; that, therefore, the responsibility rests on the occupying army, and that in tradition and International Law it is the obligation of an occupying army to provision the civilian population. The Englishman goes further than that and contends that the situation is this: As the British people are fighting for the independence of Belgium that Belgium comprises not only her territory but her people; it is, therefore, useless to re-establish the independence of Belgium if she is to be found an empty husk, and, therefore, they not only will support the relief morally but financially.

Now it is not for me to say what is right and what is wrong in these various contentions. It is not the right of any American to refuse to intervene to save a mass of

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• Figure II

10,000,000 people from being ground between these millstones. Every thinking man in Europe knew that this situation must ensue and ensue quickly after the occupation.

The Belgian people themselves sent up the first plea to the Americans for help, and through the American Ambassadors in London, Brussels, and Berlin we opened the gate through this wall of steel, and we have tried to defend and have defended it since. These gentlemen, in their official capacities, could do no more than intervene for us, and they must, perchance, leave it to the many organizations to carry it forward. Under International agreements which surround the matter and which are recognized by both of the belligerents, we are under the control of both.

Initially we appealed to the world for charity, as we had practically no resources except perhaps of some banking arrangements which we had created. We had a generous response to our appeal. When we started out, three to four million dollars a month seemed to be compassable by the charity of the world. None of us anticipated that more than three or four months of such a situation could exist. Within two or three months it was well understood that this was not a war of days, but would be a war of months, or perhaps years; that there was no solution to it except Governmental assistance, and that it required wider and broader charity than had ever been known.

We built up Governmental assistance, first, through the Belgium Government at the Havre from their slender resources, and then through the Allied Governments. We had added to our responsibilities, however, in addition to the Belgium civilian population, the civilian population of Northern France. So that relief has grown in organization from a moderate charitable enterprise to one, I think, without a parallel in history.

Up until the end of January we had spent over two hundred and fifty millions of dollars; we had imported into Belgium two and one-half million tons of concentrated food supplies, and we are now issuing over two hundred and twenty million pounds of bread every month, and twenty-five to thirty million pounds of fats and distributing five million tins of condensed milk—but I won't worry you further with these statistics.

It will occur to every business man to know something of this organization. Everyone has a right to know whether it is efficient; whether it is honest, and whether it accomplishes its purpose. Now there have been three tenets in this organization: the first is de-centralization; second, voluntary service, and third, high ideals.

We realized from the start that it was necessary to have the co-operation of every intelligent man in Belgium and Northern France, and the assistance of every commercial house into whose realm we might tread. We have never appealed for assistance in any quarter, either to banks or commercial houses, or experts of any sort, that we have not received the fullest and most skillful advice.

We have built up by degrees some four or five thousand committees recruiting charity throughout the world, and we have recruited about thirty millions of dollars, of which about nine millions came from this country.

Our central organization consists of sub-committees here in New York, with my friends, Mr. Honnold as Director and Mr. Hemphill as Treasurer; a committee in London, and another in Rotterdam and again in Brussels. We cooperate again with the large committees in Belgium.

The basis of our distribution organization lies in the creation of a committee in every commune, some 4,000 in all, each of which assists in the distribution of the food supply to the population. In addition, we have regional committees and central committees in all the important cities over each of which is a general manager.

Thus you will see we have built up about 8,000 sub-committees and have facilities for the collection of money on the one side and its distribution on the other.

4

The distribution end is the most interesting end and the one which is confronted with the greatest difficulties. I cannot speak too highly of the devotion of the Belgian and French people to this cause. I cannot speak of the devotion those people have shown without emotion. For over two years there has been a constant consultation of committees—not any bi-weekly meetings. It has been a work of most exacting character, lasting from early morning until late at night. The problems have been enormous.

If one is going to provision an entire nation, with the slender resources we could command, the first measure is the repression of the food consumption of the country by at least fifty per cent. The human family can live on that proportion of its normal food, and our only hope of success was to do it. When you exert a repression of that kind on food supply you must get absolute justice in distribution, lest, if one man gets too much, it means some other man must starve.

If you couple the difficulties of an organization of that kind with the normal difficulties of shipping in these times, with the difficulties of financing in an organization that has never yet seen sixty days of certainty ahead, that has never seen the day that its contracts did not exceed its assets by from five to twenty-five million dollars; if you couple that with the incidental tragedies of the loss of six ships within a single week; with the difficulties of dealing with a people of so different a national character as the Americans in co-operation with Belgians and French, whose whole mental attitude is so different from ours, with the difficulties of dealing with an occupying army which, by necessity in any army, must be arbitrary in its methods, the difficulties of protecting the native food supply, which was as vital to us as our imports; the difficulties of negotiating with practically every Government in Europe in a matter which to them was entirely a side-issue, even then you could have but a dim picture of Belgian Relief because no one who has not engaged in the work and seen its vital importance can realize the terror that goes through the Relief at every slight break for fear it may fail.

Now relief work consists not alone in the distribution of food, but in the handling of destitution. There is in Belgium about fifty per cent. of unemployment, and about seventy per cent. in the North of France. These people are absolutely destitute. They must have the means with which to obtain food; it is not enough to give them rations, they must have the means with which to buy their own production and their own local food supply. They must be clothed; they must be housed and they must be kept warm. All of this entails a vast organization of committees and sub-committees horizontally and vertically through the population, endeavoring constantly to remedy one weakness after another, because it is a situation of constant degeneration. The shortage of fertilizer, the shortage in seeds, the shortage in labor and cattle necessarily make each succeeding harvest poorer and poorer.

So that every month or every few months there develops some new weakness; some class begins to show the signs of under-nourishment. We had such a case about five months ago, when we first heard of glandular tuberculosis among the adolescent children. We brought an American physician over and he co-operated with the very skillful Belgian physicians and together they developed the fact that this was a clean case of under-nourishment; a shortage of the necessary food supplies. We always try to apply a rough and ready remedy, and with our Belgian colleagues and the French we decided to install public feedings in the schools, and to give one meal a day as a supplement to the normal family ration; to give it direct to the children so as to be sure that it went to the right place.

5

• **Figure III**

That service required an expenditure of two and one-half million dollars a month, of which one-half was for internal supplies, and which many families have themselves advanced from their own slender resources. The million and a quarter for the imported portion of that food supply amounted to about \$1 per child per month. We appealed to the American public to assume that responsibility, and it failed. We have not received the response which we should have. This failure is one which appears to us in a probably larger measure than it does to you.

The Belgians have come to look upon Americans as their sole saviours; they look upon the American flag as the flag which is fighting to protect them. Within six weeks time I have visited in the slums of Brussels where 1,500 children were sitting down to their one meal, and when they saw me those youngsters arose and warbled the first stanza of the Star Spangled Banner in French. Now I, knowing that that food supply was not American, could feel nothing but shame.

Europe has begun to take stock of this Relief Commission. We started off with high promises as to American support and American ideals; we have rested on the belief that we had the undoubted backing of the American people in our endeavor to keep this gate open. Oftentimes we have had to defend the portals of the enclosure, and we have always used as our last and final weapon that interference with the Belgium Relief would offend the sensibilities of the American people more deeply than anything that has happened in this war. And yet Belgium Relief is being paid for with foreign money.

But of more importance than this purely moral question is the fact that our finances are in great jeopardy. As time goes on, the situation becomes more desperate in Europe; our necessities grow greater; it is growing more and more difficult to see our way through. Today our budget calls for about \$18,000,000 to \$19,000,000 a month, if we are not to reduce the already short food supply of these people.

We are receiving \$14,000,000 a month from the Allied Governments. There is no hope of any increase in that, and there is always the possibility that at some stage we may lose it altogether. In any event, we are from \$3,000,000 to \$5,000,000 a month short. We have to raise this money by public charity and the few financial concessions which we are able to secure, and we thought that perhaps the American people would take off our shoulders the burden of those 1,250,000 children.

This failure is crushing to our national pride; it undermines our ability to defend these people, and what is more, it is fraught with the utmost suffering, to a point which should touch the heart of every American deepest.

I feel that the failure is perhaps partially or largely due to ourselves. I can assure you that my colleagues and myself have a sufficient labor in maintaining the detailed aspects of this organization; in buying \$18,000,000 worth of food and distributing it to the Belgian people, and the few hundred other things which tax the capacity of most men.

We have not the time nor do we have the capacity to effectuate an organization in the United States which would give us the response that I believe the American people are willing to and are capable of giving, and it is to such organizations as yours we appeal to carry on the work in our behalf.

I make this appeal here with a certain feeling of confidence because I know I am appealing to men largely from my own section of the United States. Many of you have been my friends for years; many of you are of my own profession—you are miners. Sometime ago, in a moment of desperation, I assessed the mines in Australia where I had a connection for many years. I told each one

what I thought they ought to do. I received a total, within, I think, about two months, of \$750,000, from a country already combed to the bottom for relief and distress work.

We appealed to the miners in Johannesburg, and the laborers in the mines gave 10 per cent. of their wages, and the owners duplicated the amount.

I feel that in this stress the American miner might also give some help, and it was with that feeling of peculiar satisfaction that the first gentleman who rang me up on the telephone when I arrived here was a miner, and said that "My assessment is about \$100,000." (Applause).

Now, gentlemen, this matter is one of more importance even than the feeding of 1,250,000 children, as large as that may be. This Relief has come to be America's greatest exhibit in Europe. We are undertaking to do it with faith in the American people; we are undertaking to do it knowing that the American people will help in an American way. We want to give a demonstration of that great strain of humanity which we know runs through our people because we know the character of the people that make up this Republic.

Now, gentlemen, if we succeed it will be because we have received the support of the American people instead of being forgotten. (Prolonged applause).

PRESIDENT HAMMOND: Gentlemen: The Rocky Mountain Club is heartily interested in this fine movement, and will appoint Committees to be composed of members of the Rocky Mountain Club in the East, in the West, and to consist also of every man interested in this beneficent movement to solicit subscriptions here and throughout the West, and I have the pleasure to tell you, as Mr. Hoover has already notified you, of a very generous contribution by one member of the Rocky Mountain Club, who, unfortunately, has made me promise to withhold his name, for the sum of \$100,000 to start this movement. (Applause).

Are there any questions that any gentleman here present would like to ask Mr. Hoover as to methods or suggestions to raise this money, or any recommendation Mr. Hoover might be able to make in that way?

The Rocky Mountain Club will constitute itself, each individual, a Committee of One to further this great cause.

Gentlemen, on behalf of the Board of Governors of the Rocky Mountain Club I thank you for your enthusiasm and for your promise of support, and we all thank Mr. Hoover for his very interesting and very convincing address as to the need of assistance from America, and I am sure you will all recognize with him the great opportunity this country has to prove to the rest of the world that the promises made in the early part of the campaign by Mr. Hoover and other Americans associated with him in this great work will be carried out, and that America will assist, materially assist in the amelioration of the condition of destitute Belgium. (Applause).

Is there any other business before the meeting? Any other gentleman with \$100,000?

• Figure IV

ROCKY MOUNTAIN CLUB
OF NEW YORK

65 WEST 44TH STREET

JOHN HAYS HAMMOND,
PRESIDENT

WILLIAM B. THOMPSON,
VICE-PRESIDENT

February 15, 1917.

Dear Mr. Mudd:-

Our fellow-member, Herbert C. Hoover, Chairman of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, in his appeal in behalf of 1,250,000 Belgian children, facing starvation in that stricken country, so moved the Governors of the Rocky Mountain Club that they decided that all the energies of the Club should be entirely devoted to assisting Mr. Hoover in the noble work he has undertaken. It was decided, to further this end, that the erection of the clubhouse, as announced at the annual meeting, January 9th, and which our rapidly increasing membership made necessary, should be deferred.

At the dinner given in his honor by the Governors, January 29th, Mr. Hoover presented the situation in Belgium, and in order that you may understand it, we enclose a copy of his speech. He tells what has been done, what is being done and what must be done in the future. Never has a story of human suffering so aroused our sympathies as did Mr. Hoover's presentation of the plight of the children of Belgium, and the present situation makes it most urgent that these funds be provided immediately.

The people of Belgium have come to look upon the United States as their saviour. Of \$250,000,000 spent by the Commission, less than \$9,000,000 has come from this country, notwithstanding that the Commission has purchased supplies aggregating \$150,000,000 from the United States. Let us do our utmost to place this country right before the Belgians and the rest of the World. Mr. Hoover has said:

"It is up to our country to say whether or not this work, the greatest work that America has ever undertaken in the name of humanity, shall through its pretensions, become a word of contempt. We have fought a good fight. We have tried to keep the lamp of humanity alight and to implant true Americanism in Europe. If we fail it will be the failure of the American people."


Shipments of food will be allowed to go forward regardless of what may happen, as an understanding has already been reached between Holland, Spain, Germany and the United States to carry on this work.

Our fund will be known as the ROCKY MOUNTAIN CLUB - HOOVER FUND FOR RELIEF IN BELGIUM. The underfed children of Belgium, 1,250,000, must be nourished now or they will suffer great privation and the tendency toward disease will increase. The need is urgent and immediate! Do not delay! It costs \$1,250,000 a month to provide each child with one meal a day for a month.

Several of our members have contributed generously, and we hope that you will do likewise and get your friends to do the same. Make your check payable to William B. Thompson, Treasurer, and forward as soon as possible. Every Dollar subscribed buys a dollar's worth of food. No deduction for expenses. They have been provided for.

Mr. Seely W. Mudd,
1208 Hollingsworth Bldg.,
Los Angeles, Cal.

Very truly yours,



President.

**ROCKY MOUNTAIN CLUB—HOOVER FUND
FOR RELIEF IN BELGIUM**

65 WEST 44TH STREET
NEW YORK CITY

RECEIVED
MAR 1 1917
answered _____

GENERAL COMMITTEE

THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Honorary Chairman
EDWARD H. CLARK
Chairman
WILLIAM B. THOMPSON
Treasurer
KURNAL R. BABBITT
BERNARD M. BARUCH
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JOHN D. RYAN
EUGENE P. SHOVE
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CHESTER THORNE
GEORGE TURNER
THOMAS J. WALSH
BULKELEY WELLS
WILLIAM WALLACE, Jr.
CHARLES W. WHITLEY

February 23, 1917

Mr. Seely W. Mudd,
1208 Hollingsworth Bldg.,
Los Angeles, Calif.

Dear Mr. Mudd:

It was with the deepest satisfaction that I heard of your willingness to act as a Member of the General Committee of the Rocky Mountain Club - Hoover Fund for Relief in Belgium. This letterhead will indicate to you the other members of the Club who have agreed to serve on our General Committee.

Although our campaign has hardly gotten under way, we can already report a very satisfactory start. Receipts to date total \$138,420, the result of forty-nine contributions.

Although it is not my idea to burden you with onerous work in connection with this committee, I feel sure that you will want to do everything possible to further the success of our campaign.

Again thanking you for the evidence of your co-operation, I remain,

Cordially yours,

John Hays Hammond

President.

ROCKY MOUNTAIN CLUB-HOOVER FUND FOR RELIEF IN BELGIUM, 65 WEST 44th ST., N.Y.

(COPY)

Colorado Springs, Colo., March 6, 1917.

Mr. John Hays Hammond, President,
Rocky Mountain Club Hoover Fund,
65 West 44th Street, N. Y. C.

Dear Mr. Hammond:

I returned to Colorado Springs a few days ago, but did not come across your letter of February 24th until today.

Several days ago, after reading your letter of February 15th, I notified Mr. H. Alexander Smith - who is at the head of a local committee, which for several weeks has been raising funds for war relief purposes - that I would raise my monthly subscription from \$150.00 per month to \$500.00 per month. I am today sending Mr. Smith my check for \$350.00 to bring my February subscription up to \$500.00, and in the future I shall mail him each month my check for \$500.00 for the Belgian Relief Fund, with instructions that it be sent to the Rocky Mountain Club Hoover Fund.

The action of the Rocky Mountain Club in postponing the building of its new club house has met with great approval in this section of the country. Mr. E. P. Shove and I, during the last few days, have been trying to get members for the Rocky Mountain Club, and Mr. Shove expects by to-morrow to have about 20 new members names. We thought it would be a good idea to get these new members, so that afterward we could get them interested in the Rocky Mountain Club Hoover Fund. Mr. Shove will most likely send in to-morrow the applications for membership in the Club. They all will make very desirable members for the Club.

Colorado Springs has been gone over with a fine-tooth comb for war subscriptions, and I think without a doubt that it has subscribed much more than its share in comparison to other sections of the West in proportion to its population. In some sections of the West the people hardly know there is a war going on, and apparently they do not seem to take any interest in the matter. Some of them claim they are "pacifists," and apparently do not approve of protecting American rights, but to my mind they are not only too proud to fight, but they are afraid to fight.

I assure you that I shall do whatever I can to obtain subscriptions to the Rocky Mountain Club Hoover Fund, and these subscriptions will be sent through Mr. Smith to the Hoover Fund in New York.

With my best regards,

Sincerely yours,

SP/L

(Signed)


SPENCER PENROSE

*Mr. Penrose is one of the General
Committee*


Appendix B



- Figure I



- Figure II



- **Figure III**

Some Reasons Why We, Especially, Should Help Belgium Now

BECAUSE, through Prof. Brackett, this neighborhood knows the facts and the great need at first hand.

BECAUSE the C. R. B. is an American institution and we have given so little, in comparison with other nations, to support it—9 million dollars, 9 cents per capita, less than 4 per cent of the total subscribed.

Because its working expense is less than three quarters of a cent in the dollar.

BECAUSE America has made much more in profits out of Belgian relief than she has contributed towards it.

Because in occupied countries where the Commission is not working all the children under five are already dead.

Children not actually starved below weight are NOW being taken out of the bread line!

OK

"Belgian Kiddies, Inc."

Recognizing that 1,250,000 Belgian children are slowly starving for lack of a supplemental meal, that an effort is being made to meet this need in shares of \$12.00 each, which will care for one child for a whole year, I agree to give \$ 1.00 monthly for 1 year shares in the "Belgian Kiddies."


Signed Hazel E. Mason

Address 605 N. Park Ave

This form should be filled in, signed and sent with your contribution to Prof. F. P. Brackett, Claremont, who will forward all funds directly to the Commission for Relief in Belgium. If it is preferred to pay in monthly instalments, this should be specified.

Contributions will be acknowledged, from time to time, in the local press.

• Figure IV

Appendix C

- **Figure I**

COMMISSION FOR RELIEF IN BELGIUM

Appeal for Children

THE Commission for Relief in Belgium was organized in London, October 22, 1914, by a group of Americans under the leadership of Mr. Herbert Hoover, Chairman, who was appointed by Dr. Page, the American Ambassador to Great Britain. In addition to Dr. Page, the Commission has as Patrons the Spanish Ambassador to Great Britain, the Spanish Minister in Belgium, the Netherlands Minister to the Belgian Government at Le Havre, the American Ambassadors to Berlin and Paris, and the American Ministers to Brussels and The Hague.

It is officially recognized by the belligerent governments as the only regularized channel by which money or food can be imported into Belgium.

- **Figure II**

All charitable contributions reach their destination free of expense.

Agreements with the belligerent nations provide for the safe conduct of ships chartered to the Commission, and for the distribution, under the Commission's supervision and solely to the civil population, of the foodstuffs and clothing imported.

Under these agreements \$173,658,913 in food and clothing had been imported into Belgium and Northern France at the end of October.

Over \$100,000,000 of this was expended in the United States—more than twelve times the amount so far contributed by this country.

The funds necessary for carrying on the work are provided by:

Subsidies from the Allied Governments.

The Exchange Department.
Charitable Contributions.

Until recently the financial resources barely sufficed to provide the destitute with the meagre ration authorized. Now the following factors have greatly increased the requirements:

The higher cost of the food imported.

The pressing need for an extra ration to the children.

It is estimated that the monthly requirements for Belgium in the coming year will be at least \$10,000,000, and that at least \$3,000,000 must be obtained through the operations of the Exchange Department and Charitable Contributions. The Exchange Department so far has provided an average of only \$150,000 per month; consequently, fully \$2,850,000 per month has to be raised through benevolence. Less than this sum will mean hunger and sickness.

The most appealing part of the proposed programme concerns the

• **Figure III**

children, of whom there are 2,575,000 in Belgium. Fully 1,000,000 of these are absolutely dependent. Recently Belgian physicians reported that while the ration to the destitute was sufficient to maintain both adults and children for a short space of time, it had proved inadequate over a prolonged period, and, more particularly, had failed to provide the necessary nourishment for growing children, their power of resistance being in consequence greatly impaired. Following this information, the Commission invited a specialist in children's diseases, Dr. Lucas, of the University of California, to visit Belgium and make a report. With a Commission passport, he was able to travel freely throughout Belgium and to investigate the various hospitals and schools, also to discuss the question with local physicians and authorities. All agreed that there was an alarming

increase of tuberculosis and certain other diseases, particularly among children, and that this was clearly due to malnutrition. Only one practical method has been suggested for arresting this distressing tendency, and that is to provide supplementary nourishment. It has been decided to serve a special noonday lunch each day in the schools and other public institutions, which will at least safeguard the coming generation. This meal will cost one dollar per month for each child, or \$1,000,000 per month for the 1,000,000 children who are suffering. The Commission feels justified in asking the American people to assume this responsibility.

The requirements have been simply and concisely stated.

The need is urgent and irresistible.

What is your answer?

The Commission for Relief in Belgium
120 Broadway, New York City

- **Figure IV**

—“*who for two years have not eaten according to their hunger.*”
Maurice Masterlinck.

WHO?—One million, and still more, Belgian children.

RESULT.—**MALNUTRITION**—directly resulting in tuberculosis for many, and increasing the tendency in all.

THE NEED.—One supplementary meal each day in schools and other controlled establishments.

COST.—One dollar a month for each child—\$1,000,000 a month for all these children.

QUESTION

For how many children will you be responsible?

I hereby pledge myself to give \$.....a month for.....months to the Commission for Relief in Belgium, to supply.....Belgian children with a supplementary meal.

Name.....

Address.....

Date.....


THE COMMISSION FOR RELIEF IN BELGIUM, 120 BROADWAY, NEW YORK CITY

• **Figure V**



- **Figure VI**

Appendix D



- Figure I

of children ^{2.} who answer this description. Since I expect to devote my life to this child, after legally adopting him, I wish to have just the sort of little boy that appeals to me.

I am a teacher in the Evansville High School. My salary is ^{\$}1,250.00 a year. About ^{\$}300.00 of this I give to my mother. I think that I can keep myself and a child on what remains. Also I am expecting ^{to} make more money soon, as I have just received my ^{P.M.} 9. M.

3.

THE JUNIOR AND SENIOR
HIGH SCHOOLS
EVANSVILLE, INDIANA

ERNEST P. WILES, PRINCIPAL

degree from Indiana University, and expect to get a much better position soon.

I inclose a photograph, which will help you to form an estimate of my character. I am thirty-seven years of age.

I wish a boy, because I wish to bring him up to avenge Belgium, if the occasion ever arises, when Germany must be beaten a second time.

I want this child because he needs me; but also, because I need him. May I hear from you soon?
Very sincerely yours,
Helen C. Foote

610 Upper First St.,
 70469 Evansville, Ind.

Mr. W. L. Honnold,

My dear Mr. Honnold:

I
 Thank you for your very
 prompt answer to my letter.
 I am very glad indeed to
 know that you do not know
 of any children mutilated
 by the Germans. I shall be
 able to hate the Germans
 now a little more calmly.
 I no longer desire the ex-

• Figure IV

termination of the whole race.
 My belief in the existence of miste-
 used children was based upon
 the Bryce reports (or rather ^{whom}
 others have told me of it); the
 cartoons of Rammakers; and "Bel-
 gium's Agony", by Ver-
 haeren. I still believe that
 these two men, ^{at least,} must be telling
 the truth; but I certainly do
 not believe all that I read
 in the newspapers. I intend
 to write to Mr. Verhaeren and
 ask him for the truth in the
 name of America, a name that
 ought to be sacred to him. If he
 answers the letter, I shall pub-
 lish it -


Since my plan to adopt
 an orphan in the flesh does not
 seem practical; I shall, a
 little later on, contribute worthily

To the support of some Belgian child. The Little Theatre Company here, to which I belong, may contribute to the support of several more. A few of us are urging this plan very strongly.


Thanking you,
I remain
Very sincerely yours,
Theodore C. Foote.

~~May~~
June 10, 1917.

- Figure VI

Appendix E

- **Figure I**



- **Figure II**

The Commission for Relief in Belgium

HONORARY CHAIRMEN
THEIR EXCELLENCIES

THE SPANISH MINISTER IN BRUSSELS
THE AMERICAN MINISTER IN BRUSSELS
THE AMERICAN MINISTER AT THE HAGUE
THE NETHERLANDS MINISTER TO BELGIUM

THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR IN LONDON
THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON
THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN BERLIN
THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN PARIS

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NAMED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES TO CO-OPERATE WITH THE COMMISSION

ALEXANDER J. HEMPHILL
Chairman

S. READING BERTRON
C. A. COFFIN
R. FULTON CUTTING
ELBERT H. GARY
W. L. HONNOLD
J. F. LUCEY
HENRY L. STIMSON
OSCAR S. STRAUS
FRANK TRUMBULL
FRANK A. VANDERLIP
JOHN BEAVER WHITE

HERBERT C. HOOVER
Chairman of the Commission

W. L. HONNOLD
Director in America
ALEXANDER J. HEMPHILL
Treasurer

EDGAR RICKARD
Assistant Director

EDWARD J. WILLIAMS
Assistant Treasurer

E. G. BROENNIMAN
Purchasing

H. C. DAVIS
Transportation

GEO. BARR BAKER
Special Appeals

G. W. GIDDINGS
Secretary Appeal Committee

DELOITTE, PLENDER, GRIFFITHS & CO.
Auditors

165 Broadway, New York

Telephone
CORTLAND 1030

May 25, 1917.

TO SUPPORTERS OF THE COMMISSION FOR RELIEF IN BELGIUM:

We are sure that the American people will be glad to know that through the sympathetic arrangements made by the President and the Secretary of Treasury, the cost of the relief of Belgium and the occupied portions of Northern France, so far as it is feasible under present shipping conditions, will be borne for the next six months by the American Government. This has been made possible by a loan of \$75,000,000 from the United States to the Governments of Belgium and France. The money will be advanced by the Treasury in installments of \$12,500,000 per month, of which \$7,500,000 will be available for Belgian relief and \$5,000,000 for the relief in the occupied portion of Northern France. The way is open so that at the termination of the six months thus provided for, application may be made to the Government for further loans. We desire to state that although the Commission has endeavored for many months to secure this gratifying result, we feel that the sympathy with our work and the support of the public have largely influenced the Government in finally granting the request of the Belgian and French Governments. Therefore our appeals have done more than to bring in immediate contributions; they have helped to insure the relief of Belgium and Northern France throughout the war.

The Commission has long desired Government recognition in order that its work should be more firmly established as a distinctly American undertaking, and we feel that you will join with us in intense satisfaction that the work has now become a responsibility and a duty shared by the whole American nation.

It will be noted that \$12,500,000 per month is much less than the amount which we have stated as necessary to supply the imports required for the limited ration we have endeavored to provide. The explanation lies in that this amount will now cover all of the foodstuffs that we can hope to ship owing to the recent swiftly developed shortage of the world's shipping. Our statements in regard to the amount necessary have been correct and the balance between the \$12,500,000 and the former estimate required to give the limited ration will now of necessity be supplied by encroaching upon the country's stock of milk cattle which had been reserved to maintain a supply of fresh milk for the children and to serve as a nucleus from which to re-stock the country after

- **Figure III**

the war. The importation of meat, particularly fats, has always been one of the most expensive items in our programme.

It must be clearly understood that the Commission for Relief in Belgium will continue to assume the entire charge of purchasing and transporting all food into Belgium and Northern France (occupied portion). The Commission also will continue to be the only fully regularized vehicle by which money, food and clothing can be sent into Belgium.

The Commercial Exchange Department will continue as heretofore to effect transfers of money into Belgium. By depositing dollars in our New York office or pounds sterling in London, the equivalent in francs will be paid to any person in Belgium provided the name and correct address be supplied. This service extends over practically all of Belgium except for a small restricted portion under military control. Individuals or Committees outside of Belgium can send money to relatives or friends, or support by direct money contributions any of the specially deserving internal charities which use local currency to advantage in payment of wages or in purchasing home-grown products. Over \$5,000,000 has been transferred in this way since the belligerent governments gave their official sanction to the operations of this department.

The Government payments will commence on June 1st; and we shall be glad to have remittances up to that date, but we make no appeal for contributions thereafter.

The children of Belgium will have the first call upon all food which is imported, and every effort will be made to maintain the supplementary meal which has been so important a factor up to the present in sustaining the health of millions of children.

Although the general relief of the countries involved will now be met by the Government appropriations, emergencies and special conditions may arise which could only be met by private donations. In such circumstances I hope that we may again call on you to help meet the demands of the situation, whatever they may be.

Should any contributors desire to continue their gifts, notwithstanding the present position, they may be assured that their contributions will be expended sooner or later to great advantage, either during or after the war.

Finally I wish for myself and my colleagues of the Administration of the Commission to express my sincere appreciation of the generous response which you have made to our appeal, and to you I tender my heartfelt thanks.

HERBERT HOOVER,
Chairman Commission for Relief in Belgium.

- **Figure IV**

July
25th
1917

Mr. J. V. B. Dorr,
17 Battery Place,
New York, N.Y.

Dear sir:

I beg to acknowledge your letter of July 7th, enclosing Mr. Hoover's statement of May 25th.

The monthly amount which I have been sending was discontinued because I understood from various sources that the contributions were no longer desired. Under the circumstances I shall be very glad to renew any help which I am able to give until the amount raised by the American Engineers reaches \$120,000. I enclose herewith check for \$50.00 for the month of August.

Yours very truly,

HSM/M

- **Figure V**