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# Organized Crime Violence in Mexico

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**CLAREMONT McKENNA COLLEGE**  
**ORGANIZED CRIME VIOLENCE IN MEXICO**

SUBMITTED TO

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FOR

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## **Abstract**

The following thesis outlines the current social and political situation surrounding organized crime violence in Mexico. Using Samuel P. Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* and regression analysis, the purpose is to highlight the lack of subnational data within Mexico. Political science and economic theories guide the reader to better understanding what types of policy change or reform may need to occur in Mexico's future years.

## **Acknowledgments**

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## **Abbreviations**

DTO	Drug Trafficking Organization
INEGI	Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía
LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project
OCG	Organized Crime Group
PAN	National Action Party
PRI	Institutional Revolutionary Party
Stratfor	Strategic Forecasting Inc.
SSI	Strategic Studies Institute
TBI	Trans-Border Institute
TOC	Transnational Organized Crime

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## **I. Introduction**

Discovering potential causations for violence is a worthwhile endeavor for any person attempting to develop political strategy or policy. Policy presents a puzzle for those holding positions of power that yearn to decrease violence in their particular constituency. There are many key factors when determining what course of action is best to decrease violence. However, this thesis described the major “pillars” of policy as education, health, wealth, politics, technology, and the media. Undoubtedly, different theories exist to explain violence. Conditions like industrialization, modernization, frustration, mobilization, corruption, aspiration, and consumption connect the pillars. In keeping with the puzzle metaphor, the pillars act as the pieces, and the conditions help fit together the pieces. While there may not always be a perfect fit, policy is born from the process of experimentation and historical context. There are pitfalls and shortcomings of policy, and most times, a regression analysis does not epitomize the entire issue. Nonetheless, researchers must continue to hypothesize and theorize why and how policy works.

Mexico is a fascinating case study due to its high levels of organized crime violence and simultaneous political stability. The current judicial, law enforcement, and educational reform, specifically on the local level, is needed and required for Mexico to decrease the current epidemic of violence perpetrated by organized crime groups. The process is currently under way with President Enrique Peña Nieto arranging the pieces of the puzzle. The following set forth theoretical as well as economic models for explaining possible root causes of violence. Unfortunately, policy reform will take more time,

research, and money. Without more personal surveys, a lack of transparency and proper data collection in Mexico makes academic research frustrating at times. The Trans-Border Institute and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) are two academic research centers that are invaluable sources of information, especially when studying outside of Mexico. The ensuing thesis investigated the case of Mexican organized crime violence at the sub-national level.

### *2013: Mexico and Violence*

Currently, the ubiquitous hook pertaining to Mexican crime rates has been to cite the over 60,000 organized crime related homicides throughout the Calderón administration (BBC, 2012b) (Trans-Border Institute [TBI], 2013).<sup>1</sup> However, while Mexican violence, specifically organized crime violence, has risen substantially over recent years, the simple fact remains, “violence is lower in Mexico than elsewhere in Latin America” (TBI, 2013, p. 1). A more comprehensive statistic is the homicide rate typically reported in per 100,000 of the population. *The Economist* (2012) produced an intriguing infographic, which compares the homicide rate of individual Mexican states (*entidades federativas*) with different countries. **Figure 1** is a duplication of this infographic published on *The Economist*’s website on November 22, 2012.

Violence is not new to Mexico. Camp (2011) argued that “the political development and institutional relationships following the [1910] revolution [were] the


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<sup>1</sup> The Trans-Border Institute (TBI) and their annual report *Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis*, provides the most comprehensive report on drug violence in Mexico. For a more detailed explanation of what constitutes a homicide linked to drug trafficking and organized crime, please see page 11 of the 2013 report. Also, due to different reporting techniques by the media versus the government, there is still debate on the exact number of homicides attributable to organized crime (Beittel, 2013).

foundations for the political relationships that characterized Mexico for the next century”.

Thus, the evolution of modern Mexican political, military, and civilian institutional

**Figure 1: Mexican Murder Rate Equivalents**



Source: The Economist (2012)

structure as well as ideology were born from the extremely violent Mexican Revolution of 1910 (Camp, 2011). According to O’Neil et al. (2010), “About 1.5 million Mexicans (about 7 percent of the total population) died in the conflict” (p. 413). Presently, the violence has included “assassinations of politicians and judges, attacks on rival organizations, attacks on the police and other security forces, attacks on associated civilians (i.e., the families of members of competing groups or of government officials), and seemingly random violence against innocent bystanders” (Paul et al., 2011). Additionally, mass gravesites have been discovered since 2010 through 2012. (TBI, 2013, p. 19). **Table 1** shows the range of the number of victims discovered at these mass gravesites or *narcofosas*.

Despite upward trends of violence in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, in 2012, Mexican violence seemed to either remain constant or decline imperceptibly (TBI, 2013, p. 1). Moreover, TBI found “total drug arrests soared further to a peak of 36,332 in 2012” which included

**Table 1: Mass Gravesites (*Narcofosas*), 2010-2012**

DISCOVERED	STATE	MUNICIPALITY	# VICTIMS
5/28/10	Guerrero	Taxco	55
6/30/10	Nuevo Leon	Benito Juárez	13
7/21/10	Nuevo Leon	Benito Juárez	51
4/13/11	Sinaloa	Ahome	13
4/24/11	Tamaulipas	San Fernando	177
6/1/11	Coahuila	Piedras Negras	n/a
12/27/11	Nuevo Leon	Linares	8
2/9/12	Veracruz	Acayucan	15
6/7/12	Quintana Roo	Cancún	6
7/9/12	Michoacán	Charo	2
7/9/12	Michoacán	Juárez	4
9/12/12	Guerrero	Acapulco	33
10/23/12	Colima	Tecomán	5
11/3/12	Tamaulipas	Gómez Farías	11
11/19/12	Guerrero	Eduardo Neri	10
11/27/12	Chihuahua	Ciudad Juárez	19
11/28/12	Guerrero	Acapulco	10
Various	Durango	Various	332
		<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>764</b>

Source: Trans-Border Institute (2013)

many high ranking organized crime leaders (TBI, 2013, p. 2). Recently, an analyst of the Congressional Research Center predicted a grim future for Mexico.

It is widely believed that the steep increase in organized crime-related homicides during the six-year administration of Mexican President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) is likely to trend down far more slowly than it rose (Beittel, 2013).

The question remains as to why organized crime violence in Mexico rose so dramatically since 2007.

#### *Government, the Executive Branch, and Reform*

Incrementally since the Revolution of 1910, Mexico has constantly been able to maintain civilian authority over the military, and as afore mentioned, violence has been an element of modern Mexico (Camp, 2011). From 1929 through 2000, the Institutional

Revolutionary Party (PRI) dominated Mexican politics (Camp, 2011). However, alongside the party, the executive branch has been the most dominant branch in politics (O'Neil et al., 2010).

Mexican presidents enjoyed near-dictatorial powers with few checks on their authority. Through the domination of the PRI, they not only controlled the judiciary but also handpicked the state governors. The Mexican legislature might have served as a check on the PRI, but until July 1997 it was controlled by it. (O'Neil et al., 2010, p. 417)

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the vast power and unchallenged authority of Mexican presidents have waned.

Since Fox's historic victory in 2000, Mexico's presidents have lacked a majority in Congress. As a result, some of the constitutional checks on presidential power that were long absent in the Mexican system have become more effective. (O'Neil et al., 2010, p. 418)

Nonetheless, Mexico's president still appoints and oversees a large cabinet of ministers that control various government secretariats (O'Neil et al., 2010). The Secretariat of the Interior, which presides over internal affairs, and the Secretariat of Economy have been regarded as the most prominent posts (O'Neil et al., 2010), and as important policy makers, they play substantial roles in the war on organized crime groups (OCGs). In regards to law enforcement, Sabet (2010) pointedly remarks that,

Executive power and police dependence on the executive appears to be one of the biggest obstacles to reform. In theory, executive appointment of police chiefs should make the police more accountable to citizens and executive discretion should facilitate rapid reform, but in practice, this power has led to window dressing reform, patronage appointments, poor policies, and a lack of continuity in reform efforts. Ironically, while executive control makes rapid change possible, it makes real reform difficult to institutionalize" (p. 266).

Still, in order to understand the violence over time, comparing the differences in policy between Mexican presidential administrations is vital. In July 2012, after an official recount due to claims of fraud, Enrique Peña Nieto was elected the 57<sup>th</sup> President

of Mexico (BBC, 2012a). President Nieto faces new as well as existing challenges, and like his predecessor Felipe Calderón, President Nieto will determine many of the policies regarding Mexican civil-military relations and the strategy to defeat Mexican OCGs. The geographic battlegrounds of violence appear to be most concentrated in the central and eastern border region, as well as in central Pacific coast states on the mainland (TBI, 2013). In any case, TBI (2013) stated “the worst violence has remained concentrated in fewer than 10 percent of Mexico’s 2,457 municipalities” (p. 1).<sup>2</sup> While the number of arrests and stagnant homicide rate appears to be good news, the military tactics employed by President Calderón has simultaneously fragmented these networks bringing “greater over all violence and a more diffuse distribution of violence to different areas throughout the country” (TBI, 2013, p. 2). During Calderón’s administration, two drug trafficking organizations became dominant.

These two are now polarized rivals—the Sinaloa DTO in the western part of the country and Los Zetas in the east. They remain the largest drug trafficking organizations in Mexico and both have moved aggressively into Central America (Beittel, 2013).

Undoubtedly, in order to properly develop policy, President Nieto must examine the power struggles between the cartels and geographical distribution of related violence (Beittel, 2013) (Walker, 2013).

The weaknesses of civilian institutions, specifically corruption and bribery of the police and government officials<sup>3</sup>, contributed to why the relatively strong military institutions were brought to the forefront of what has commonly been known as the “war

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<sup>2</sup> Included in the Appendix are multiple charts and graphs reproduced from the report detailing Mexican homicides over time.

<sup>3</sup> For a detailed approach to disaggregating corruption in Latin America with a focus on Mexico, see Morris (2008). He offers valuable insight the difference in measuring the perception versus participation in corruption.

on drugs” (The Economist [Economist], 2010) (Farah, 2010) (Sabet, 2010) (Shirk, 2010). However, this phrase, “war on drugs”, is a misnomer. This “war” reaches far past the production, transportation, and sales of illicit drugs (Farah, 2012). This “war” extends to the basic infrastructures of local and national Mexican civil institutions. Scholars, and the public alike, will observe how President Nieto decides to form his strategy and policy. The Mérida Initiative will continue between the United States and Mexico (Beittel, 2013), but there are early indicators that President Nieto will not rely as heavily on the military as Calderon (Justice in Mexico Project, 2013).

Mr. Peña Nieto pledged to place greater emphasis on crime prevention and violence reduction, making it clear that he no longer wishes to prioritize bringing down drug cartel leaders as his predecessor did. Mr. Peña Nieto also reconfigured Mexico’s security agencies, dismantling the Public Security Ministry (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública, SSP) and announcing the creation of a 10,000-person National Gendarmerie and a unified police command system at the state level (TBI, 2013, p. 2).

Strategic Forecasting Inc. (Stratfor), an intelligence agency, (2013) did not have optimistic projections in its *Annual Forecast 2013*. It made this statement in regards to combatting the splintered cartels,

There are no signs yet that some sort of truce among these groups will be possible in the coming year, and violence can be expected to continue much as it has in the past several years -- on a shifting geographical basis as each group competes for supply chain and market access at the expense of the others. Any government attempts to mediate a truce will be held in the strictest confidence to avoid a public backlash (Stratfor, 2013).

This leaves room for debate on whether President Nieto will enter some sort of tacit agreement with organized crime groups (OCGs) so that violence and homicide rates will decrease (Sanchez, 2012). This would not be the first time that this type of allegation has been made against the Mexican government. During the 1980s, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had similar accusations of a tacit agreement with cartels to decrease violence (Kilmer et al., 2010, p.37).

2013 poses many difficulties, and reforms must be made across many governmental institutions. Recently, Mr. Peña Nieto jailed Esther Gordillo, the leader of Mexico's powerful teachers' union (The Economist, 2013). She had been widely recognized as corrupt with allegations of embezzling 2 billion pesos or 159 million dollars (The Economist, 2013). At a minimum, Mexico's police, judicial, and education institutions need immediate and effective reformations (Ingram et al., 2011) (Justice in Mexico Project, 2012) (Moloeznik et al., 2011) (Sabet, 2010) (Shirk 2010) (Santibañez et al., 2005) (The Economist, 2013). Furthermore, LAPOP's *Cultura política de la democracia en México* (2011) found that 76.3 percent of Mexicans perceive their government in some way corrupt (p.88).<sup>4</sup> Daniel Sabet provided a poignant overview of corruption within Mexico from the perspective of the police.

It is a mistake to analyze the police as an isolated actor. Rather, the police force is embedded within a larger political, legal and cultural system. Politically, it is important to remember that the police leadership is appointed by, highly dependent on, and accountable to the elected president, governor, or mayor. While no president and only one governor has ever been convicted on collusion charges, there are no shortage of allegations of political collusion with organized crime and there appears to be widespread tolerance. Collusion and even tolerance effectively rules out the possibility of meaningful reform. Legally, there is considerable ambiguity in the justice system, discretion in the application of the law, and a tendency to elevate informal rules above the law. Culturally, citizens expect and sometimes even benefit from the ability to bribe officers. As officers frequently point out in rationalizing their own corruption, it is typically the citizen who will offer the bribe first (Sabet, 2010, p. 266).

### *Terms, Concepts, and Geography*

The language describing Mexican crime syndicates is changing, and attributing these homicides merely to illicit drug activities is inaccurate. From drug trafficking

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<sup>4</sup> The *Cultura política de la democracia en México* is one of the most comprehensive national survey data collected by a private organization in Mexico. It is a biennial report, and the 2010 report is referenced by Parás et al. (2011) in the Bibliography.




organizations (DTOs) to transnational organized crime (TOC) to organized crime groups (OCGs), scholars use different terms to describe Mexican cartels, which almost resemble a political institution more than illegal gangs. While drug production and trafficking account for a large proportion of Mexican cartel activity, these groups have clearly diversified into human trafficking, arms trafficking, money laundering, kidnapping, extortion, bribery, racketeering, and oil theft (Kilmer et al., 2010, p. 37). A recent monograph published by the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) detailed the threats of criminal-terrorist hybrid groups as well as the potential threat of trafficking weapons of mass destruction through these hybrid organizations (Farah, 2012, p. 1). Instead of the traditional definition of Mexican cartels as drug trafficking organizations, transnational organized crime (TOC) seems like more appropriate terminology due to their obvious connections with organizations in the United States, Russia, and Asia (Farah, 2012). Undeniably, the afore-mentioned threats posed by TOC in general extend into Mexico (Farah, 2012), but not all Mexican organized crime groups are transnational, and "[b]ecause of the limitations and inaccuracies of the terms DTO and [TOC], some observers give preference to the more generic term "organized crime group" [OCG] that is used extensively in this [thesis]" (TBI, 2012, p. 4).

As mentioned, Mexican violence has been concentrated in specific locations. **Figure 2** shows the areas of influence of the OCGs, and the corresponding Venn diagrams show the contention between the OCGs.<sup>5</sup> The violence stems from control of

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<sup>5</sup> Again, please be referred to the Appendix for more in depth maps and figures.


**Figure 2: Mexican Organized Crime Groups' Areas of Influence**



Source: RAND (Paul et al., 2011)

territory and corresponding trafficking routes (TBI, 2013). Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua account for nearly 60 percent of the drug related violence in Mexico (Camp, 2011). **Figure 3** displays the geographical distribution of the violence over time. As one can depict from the presented figures, the boundaries of the OCGs' area of influence as well as the US-Mexico border correlate very strongly with the amount of violence, measured in homicides. Obviously, protecting and enforcing the rule of law in these highlighted areas, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Durango, Guerrero, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, and Colima, are imperative to stability within Mexico. Interestingly, even though the OCGs operate on both sides of the border, the violence has not spilt over into the US (Kilmer et

**Figure 3: Municipal Level maps of Deaths By Homicide, 2006 through 2011**



Source: INEGI

Source: TBI (2013)

al., 2010). “El Paso is the second-safest city in the United States, with just 2.8 homicides per 100,000 (Borunda, 2009)—a rate that is lower than that of Paris or Geneva” (Kilmer et al., 2010, p. 1).

While independent smugglers exist, as **Figure 2** shows, seven major OCGs dominate the industry, but some of these organizations have splintered due to the aggressive policies of Calderón (TBI, 2013). Most notably, the Gulf Cartel has essentially disintegrated into smaller groups. Cartels are evolving:

initially there was one, very large cartel that is kind of the grandfather of most in the modern cartel groups that we know, and that was called the Guadalajara Cartel -- that became powerful really in the 60s and 70s in Mexico. That cartel ran into an issue in the mid-1980s when the cartel kidnapped and tortured and murdered a U.S. DEA agent by the name of Enrique Camarena (Stewart, 2013).

This spurred US involvement, and the Guadalajara Cartel was dismantled.

The post-Guadalajara cartel climate in Mexico has been one of vicious competition between competing cartels -- competition that has become increasingly militarized as cartel groups recruited first former police officers and then former special operations soldiers into their enforcer units. Today's Mexican cartels commonly engage in armed confrontations with rival cartels and the government using military ordnance, such as automatic weapons, hand grenades and rocket-propelled grenades (Stewart, 2012).

A RAND publication does an excellent job characterizing the OCGs (or DTOs),

These organizations appear to be hierarchical, with well-identified bosses and senior leadership, and durable, in the sense that some of them, such as the Sinaloa and Gulf cartels, have survived the removal of the head of the organization. The configuration of organizations is not stable; new DTOs emerge from established ones... Many of the leaders come from the state of Sinaloa, on the northern Pacific coast of the country. There is no suggestion that any of the major DTOs specializes in a particular drug (Kilmer et al., 2010, p.36).

As will be discussed in further detail, the geographic boundaries and the level of government authority determine the levels of violence within Mexico.

### *Political Order in Changing Societies and 21<sup>st</sup> Century Mexico*

As a guide for this thesis, Samuel P. Huntington's (1968) *Political Order in Changing Societies* was utilized to explain possible reasons for the organized crime violence. He began his book by explaining the "political gap" that exists in modernizing nations. He described politics through the following qualities: "consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, [and] stability" (Huntington, 1968, p.1). Huntington argued that countries deficient in these qualities are less effective in governing. These modernizing countries can suffer from "shortages of food literacy, education, wealth, income, health, and productivity" (p.2), but more importantly, he argued that they suffer

from “a shortage of political community and of effective, authoritative, legitimate government” (p. 2). Additionally, there exists a “gap” in modernizing countries between what can be rapid economic improvement and undifferentiated corrupt, ineffective, or weak political institutions. The political evolution needed in these gap nations can have devastating consequences as Huntington explicated:

With a few notable exceptions, the political evolution of these countries after World War II was characterized by increasing ethnic and class conflict, recurring rioting and mob violence, frequent military coups d'etat, the dominance of unstable personalistic leaders who often pursued disastrous economic and social policies, widespread and blatant corruption among cabinet ministers and civil servants, arbitrary infringement of the rights and liberties of citizens, declining standards of bureaucratic efficiency and performance, the pervasive alienation of urban political groups, the loss of authority by legislatures and courts, and the fragmentation and at times complete disintegration of broadly based political parties (p. 3).

His main thesis stemmed from the fact that a political gap existing in developing countries cannot always be diminished through economic strengthening, or in his own words:

What was responsible for this violence and instability? The primary thesis of this book is that it was in large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions. "Among the laws that rule human societies," de Tocqueville observed, "there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased." (Huntington, 1968, p.4) (Tocqueville, 1955, p. 2 & 118)

Huntington spoke of the importance of “civic morale and public spirit and political institutions” (p.4), and creating policy to strengthen these lofty and obtuse concepts is tedious and demanding. A subtitle in his book was “*Social Forces and Political Institutions*” (p. 8). These social forces and political institutions are comprised of what can seem like an endless number of variables. However, Huntington stated,

A social force is an ethnic, religious, territorial, economic, or status group. Modernization involves, in large part, the multiplication and diversification of the social forces in

society. Kinship, racial, and religious groupings are supplemented by occupational, class, and skill groupings. A political organization or procedure, on the other hand, is an arrangement for maintaining order, resolving disputes, selecting authoritative leaders, and thus promoting community among two or more social forces (p. 8-9).

“Power and influence” becomes incredibly important, but as Rousseau put, quoted by Huntington and many others, “The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty” (Rousseau & Bosanquet, 1895).

Today, Mexico has difficulty accomplishing all of the requirements of a political organization proposed by Huntington (Parás et al., 2010). In 2010, 43.5 percent of Mexicans perceived that they were insecure or unsafe, and 26 percent, a 10 percent increase from 2008, had been victimized by a crime (Parás et al., 2010). Thus, the monopoly of violence simply is not secured by the state. Furthermore, as this thesis argued, Mexican cartels are fulfilling duties that should be provided by political institutions (Stratfor, 2008). So, rational political theory provides evidence that OCGs can be regarded as a political institution in Mexico.

For almost the entirety of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Mexico was a single party system (O’Neil et al., 2010).

Single-party rule is very good for organized criminal groups. Organized crime relies on monopolies very strongly as a business model, and political monopolies play an important role in their strategies. Organized criminals remove competitors from a given market -- either by physical force, corruption or coercion -- and then rake in the money once they have started supplying the goods that nobody else can. Single-party rule means that as long as the criminal group has the loyalty of that party (bought either with money, force or both), then that group enjoys political protection as it conducts its business. PRI still wields influence as a minority partner in Calderon’s government, and still controls many states, but it has fallen far from the dominant position in Mexican politics that it enjoyed during most of the 20th century. The political transitions going on in Mexico on both the national and local levels are affecting the cartels’ ability to run their businesses (Stratfor, 2008).

The relationship between the political, civilian, and military institutions are elucidated to attempt to find some correlation or possible causes for the extreme amount of organized crime violence throughout Mexico during the 21<sup>st</sup> century; and, Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* aided in conceptualizing as well as defining potential theories of the violent provenances.

#### *Violence Indicators and a Regression*

This thesis not only theorized about possible causes for the organized crime related violence, but also attempts to find correlations among different subnational dependent variables and organized crime violence as an independent variable. A majority of the data collected is aggregated from the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía* (INEGI), or National Institute of Statistics and Geography, but the organized crime homicide data are taken from TBI's yearly reports, *Drug Violence in Mexico*, which have been repeatedly cited throughout this thesis. The sample size of the regression will be all of the Mexican states, 31, and the Federal District, Mexico City. Though, with this small sample size, the results will most likely not be significant, but the hypothesis proposed is that the regression could illuminate factors that are more or less important in determining the violence. With the results from the regression and theoretical political science foundations, policy recommendations are framed in the Conclusion. Again, the importance of geographical location, specifically whether or not a state borders the United States, is certain. Thus, chapter V, entitled *Two entidades federativas- Chihuahua and Yucatán*, explicitly compares the most violent state, Chihuahua, with the least

violent, Yucatán. Obviously, there are numerous determinants as to why the violence is more in Chihuahua than Yucatán, and they are juxtaposed in brief detail.

As asserted, *Political Order in Changing Societies* hypothesized that modernization is a key determinant to violence. Not merely does the education and economic development of nation determine the levels of violence, but in fact, the modernization theory states that the processes of social mobilization, rationalization of authority, differentiation of new political functions, specialization of political structure, and participation in political affairs all contribute to violence within a country. These processes are represented by various dependent variables within the erstwhile acknowledged regression. The specific variables used in the regression are expounded upon in chapter IV.

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## **II. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order* and Mexican Violence**

No matter whether one has a positive or negative view of Huntington's work, he was undeniably influential in the field of political science. Huntington taught for over 50 years at Harvard University (Harvard Gazette, 2008).

Mentor to generations of scholars in widely divergent fields, he was the author or co-author of a total of seventeen books, on American government, democratization, national security and strategic issues, political and economic development, cultural factors in world politics and American national identity (Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, 2008).

Some scholars considered *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968) to be his most influential work (Putnam, 1986). With liberal tendencies, "the onset of the Cold War and tensions of the McCarthy years had a profound impact on Huntington, confirming him in a more conservative appreciation for order and stability" (Putnam, 1986, p. 838). In "Conservatism as an Ideology" (1957), Huntington explicated "The impulse to conservatism comes from the social challenge before the theorist, not the intellectual tradition behind him" (p. 470). This article foreshadowed the importance put upon political institutions in his later work *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Putnam, 1986). First, this chapter focused on the main theses and arguments in *Political Order* (1968). Next, a literary review offers critiques and praise of the book. Chapter III provides detailed explanations of how and why *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1986) is relevant to the current violence perpetuated by organized crime groups in Mexico.

### *Political Order in Changing Societies*

Huntington explored for a rationale of why violence might not be merely a result of poor economic conditions, which he referred to as the poverty thesis. In his first chapter,

Political Order and Political Decay, Huntington outlined his theory of why some developing nations see a rise in violence or political decay while becoming more economically prosperous. He argued that the modernization thesis is a better way of understanding why violence or political instability might arise. As the following quotation illustrates, political disorder arises from the process of modernization.

The apparent relationship between poverty and backwardness, on the one hand, and instability and violence, on the other, is a spurious one. It is not the absence of modernity but the efforts to achieve it which produce political disorder. If poor countries appear to be unstable, it is not because they are poor, but because they are trying to become rich. A purely traditional society would be ignorant, poor, and stable (Huntington, 1968, p. 41).

The thesis followed the logic that if a developing nation is modernizing in economic terms and not evolving its political institutions, then a “political gap” arises; and, this attributes to the instability and violence within the country.

In true academic fashion, Huntington theorized that the aspirations, expectations, political participations and social mobilizations of the people are affected by economic prosperity. If the advancements of economics is not accompanied with parallel political improvement, the “political gap” arises, and the nation must attempt to produce political institutions that embodies “consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, [and stability” (Huntington, 1968, p. 1). However, the large problem of how to properly measure abstract academic ideas such social aspiration or political effectiveness still exists over 30 years after *Political Order* (1968) was written. In the succeeding section, a further discussion of the weaknesses of Huntington’s arguments is provided, but many of the critiques pertaining to Huntington remain relevant to political science and international relations.

Political institutionalization is critical to community and political order (Huntington, 1968). As stated in the introduction, Huntington defined the important terms social forces and political institutions to better develop his modernization thesis, and he admitted that distinctions between social forces and political institutions are unclear (p. 8-9). Status groups are an especially ambiguous term. Though, the “breakup of a small homogenous class, the diversification of social forces, and increased interaction among such forces are preconditions for the emergence of political organizations” (p.11). Wallerstein (1969) made this poignant remark in his review of *Political Order*,

The secret, he feels, lies in the institutionalization of politics, the criteria of which he lays out quite explicitly in the opening chapter. And the key institution of modern politics is the political party (p. 440).

The strength of a political community relies on “the *scope of support* for the organization and procedures and their *level of institutionalization*” (p. 12). While scope is the extent which the group “encompass[es] activity in the society”, “[i]nstitutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability” (p. 12). Huntington defined the level of institutionalization of a political system by its adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence (p. 12). He continued to title the subsequent subsections: *Adaptability-Rigidity*, *Complexity-Simplicity*, *Autonomy-Subordination*, and *Coherence-Disunity*. Moreover, “political institutions have moral as well as structural dimensions” (p. 24). Public interests, morality, and trust are all to the success of a political institution, but the definition of these abstract ideas is difficult.

Traditionally the public interest has been approached in three ways. It has been identified with either abstract, substantive, ideal values and norms such as natural law, justice or right reason; or with the specific interest of a particular individual (“L’état, c’est moi”),

group, class (Marxism), or majority; or with the result of a competitive process among individuals (classic liberalism) or groups (Bentleyism) (p. 24).

However, the same critique can be applied that public interest is a near impossible concept to calculate. In other words, is it even possible for a complex society with more than one “social forces” to actually reach a general consensus? Huntington argued, “A society with highly institutionalized governing organizations and procedures is more able to articulate and achieve its public interests” (p. 24).

On page 32, Huntington shifted from the importance of the people’s trust in government to the issues of political participation, modernization and political decay. He described modernization as “a multifaceted process involving changes in all areas of human thought and activity” (p. 32). “The principal aspects of modernization, “Urbanization, industrialization, secularization, democratization, education, media participation do not occur in haphazard unrelated fashion” (p. 32). Lodge (1966), the quote within the previous quote, is one of the many scholars that Huntington utilizes throughout *Political Order* (1968) to reinforce his own theories. Huntington qualified modernization as increasing literacy, mass communications, and education as well as “increas[ing] health and life expectancy, increase[ing] occupational, vertical, and geographical mobility, and, in particular, the rapid growth of urban population as contrasted with rural” (p. 33). The aforementioned quantifiable aspects of modernization were considered in more detail in the following chapters.

So, which aspects of modernization are most relevant to politics? Huntington listed two: social mobilization and economic government. “Social mobilization, in Duetsch’s formulation, is the process by which “major clusters of old social, economic,

and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior”” (p. 33). Economic development is simply “the growth in the total economic activity and output of a society” (p. 33). He added crucial aspects to what specifies political modernization. Rationalization of authority, differentiation of new political functions with creation of specialized structures to perform the new functions, and escalation in political participation by social groups throughout society are the three broad headings of political participation (p. 44).

Next, Huntington explained the relationship between modernization, violence, and corruption which will be touched upon in more detail later in this chapter. He concluded his first chapter, Political Order and Political Decay, with reiterating the importance of the “City-Country Gap” as well as providing urban-rural power and stability scenarios amongst different types of political and social regimes. He adamantly stressed the importance of regarding the urban and rural populations separately until the country reaches modern stability, which he defined as the “countryside accept[ing] modern values and city rule” (p. 76).<sup>6</sup> Moreover, he began explaining how political institutionalization and participation can differ in a civic versus praetorian regime. A set of theories was reproduced from this first chapter to summarize how social mobilization and economic development can lead to political instability:

- (1) Social mobilization  
Economic development = Social frustration
- (2) Social frustration  
Mobility opportunities = Political Participation
- (3) Political participation  
Political institutionalization = Political instability (p. 55)

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<sup>6</sup> For more on different phases and changes in urban-rural power/stability, please see the Appendix.

For the purpose of this thesis, the first chapter from *Political Order in Changing Societies* was the most applicable. This was where a bulk of the theory and explanation of the modernization theory occurred. Nonetheless, the subsequent chapters were as follows: Political Modernization: America vs. Europe; Political Change in Traditional Societies; Praetorianism and Political Decay; Revolution and Political Order; Reform and Political Change; and Parties and Political Stability. The chapter, Political Modernization: America vs. Europe, was not in the scope of this thesis. The chapter, Political Change in Traditional Societies, focused on the following question: What political conditions, more specifically, what power conditions are conducive to policy innovation in modernizing societies? (p. 140). Huntington theorized that “evidence suggests that policy innovations are encouraged by a power distribution which is neither highly concentrated nor widely dispersed” (p. 140), and he continued to describe the possible policy innovations to promote group assimilation amongst different political systems and power configurations.

The next chapter, Praetorianism and Political Decay, mentioned the Mexico revolution. The most useful information from this chapter described how Mexico evolved from praetorianism to civic order through the soldier as the institution builder.

Perhaps the most striking example of political institution building by generals is Mexico, where at the end of the 1920s Calles and the other military leaders of the Revolution created the National Revolutionary Party and in effect institutionalized the Revolution. The creation of this institution made it possible for the political system to assimilate a variety of new social forces, labor and agrarian, which rose to prominence under Cárdenas in the 1930s. It also created a political institution which was able to maintain the integrity of the political sphere against disruptive social forces. During the nineteenth century Mexico had the worst record of military interventions in politics of any Latin American country. After the 1930s, its military stayed out of politics, and Mexico became one of the few Latin American countries possessing some form of institutional immunity to military coups d'état ( p. 255).

Next, the chapter, Revolution and Political Order, was discussed in further detail later in this chapter. While revolution in modern Mexico seems to be an outlandish idea, the historical contexts of violence and revolution in Mexico are long-standing. Finally, the last two chapters of *Political Order in Changing Societies* were not examined in this thesis.

#### *A Literary Review of Political Order in Changing Societies*

As mentioned, scholars debated on the merit and applicability of *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968). The first criticism that was more cosmetic than substantive was the flow of the book. Wallerstein (1969) stated

The main criticism to make is that Huntington has not written a book. Bound volumes of notes have been published so frequently of late that we scarcely notice anymore. To be sure, Huntington's notes are often argued with brilliance and panache, but the hard work of turning these notes into a coherent, carefully argued, integrated statement that seeks to account systematically for order and change in modern societies is yet to be done (p. 441).

This was not the only criticism of Huntington's work. Hanifi (1969) argued that political stability was not the only important variable to be considered. Moreover, Hanifi (1969) suggested that

Huntington's thesis would have been more tenable had he cast political stability and political institutions, respectively, as the stabilizer and legitimatizer of change. It is unfortunate that the specialized subdisciplines of the social sciences, such as political science and economics, have held the unfounded primary assumption that in the limited sphere of their subject matter (about whose scope there is still disagreement within each of these subdisciplines) lies the key to understanding the sociocultural dimensions of man.

There was a clear bias towards anthropology, and he questioned the worth of any contributions to "understanding the sociocultural dimensions of man" derived from political science and economics (Hanifi, 1969).

Sklar (1969) questioned whether declining classes and political decay were the true causes of violence. Sklar (1969) explained

Violence is the typical resort of declining rather than rising classes. It is also more likely to occur as the result of political repression rather than political decay. A rising class that encounters repression may attempt to overcome it by using violence against violence. Furthermore, the causes of decline and repression may be attributable, at least in part, to international relationships that are not examined in this book (571).

This echoed the poverty thesis which Huntington tried to debunk or challenge with his modernization thesis. Undoubtedly, the close relationship between violence and poverty needs further research and study. A recent International Development Research Centre study examined the interactions between urbanization, poverty, and violence (Muggah, 2012). Thus, the debate over the causations of violence remains relevant in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and there is no clear cut hypothesis or regression that will determine the causations of violence. Instead, policy makers must look at the problems of violence holistically. The poverty thesis can be seen as one of the largest critiques of Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Lastly, Sklar (1969) disagreed that "the more man wages war against 'his ancient enemies: poverty, disease, ignorance,' the more he wages war against himself" (p. 572).

Kazemi (1969) had plenty of objections for Huntington:

I find myself in disagreement with Huntington's view that social mobilization can be slowed down effectively and that this will help political stability. In the first place, forced slowdown of social mobilization can only be accomplished (and at that partially) by an oppressive political system... Secondly, forced slowdown of social mobilization is likely to lead to a great deal of discontent among those who are kept at their social, economic, and political positions by the government... Furthermore, there is hardly any discussion of other political institutions (such as bureaucracy) which could conceivably play a role as important as political parties... Measurement of institutionalization on the lines proposed by Huntington presents additional difficulties (p. 177-78).



However, Kazemi (1969) conceded that “Many will disagree with Huntington's general analysis and his conclusions. But they will have to give him credit for clarifying some of the central issues of modernization.” Kazemi (1969) presented one of the best overall critiques of Huntington’s work. Oppression and bureaucracy were consistently missed in Huntington’s theory of modernization, and there was merit in many of Kazemi’s remarks. Again, the recurring argument against many scholarly works in political science, international relations, and economics was presented by Dennon (1970) “Too much of the book consists of very general observations on a very large subject. It is also too present-oriented, concerned with the strategies and tactics of actors currently on stage.” There were positive reviews as well, but the negative reviews revealed the problems with applying scholarly political science and economic theory to complex and innumerable variables that influence policy and reform. Obvious positive opinions exist, and Bayley (1969) was an excellent overview of how and why *Political Order in Changing Societies* contributes a great deal to the study of political science.

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### III. *Political Order, Mexico, & Violence*

The following chapter compared the theses explained in *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968) with two critical time periods in Mexico. First, the Mexican Revolution of 1910 was briefly covered due to its important historical context as well as direct relationship to Huntington's book. Beginning on page 315, Huntington used the 1910 Revolution as a paradigm of political development by revolution. Second, a comparison between Huntington's theories and 21<sup>st</sup> century Mexico, specifically 2007-2011, operated as an outline for a significant portion of the dependent variables, or violence indicators. Simply, this section applied Huntington's theories to the Mexican case study. Keep in mind Huntington's words. "In terms of the theory of natural law, governmental actions are legitimate to the extent that they are in accord with the 'public philosophy'" (p. 27).

#### *1910: Modern Politics is Born in Mexico*

First, the 1910 revolution example was used in Huntington's chapter, *Revolution and Political Order*. He explained the risks of modernization stemmed by revolution. Huntington produced different sources of revolution like the *industrial labor*, *lumpenproletariat*, and *middle-class intelligentsia*, but he cited Mexico as a successful case of political development by revolution. The revolution, as Huntington argued, was brought on by "phenomenal economic development" (p. 315). He explained, "The whole apparatus of a modern economy was dropped into place within a generation: railroads, banks, heavy industry, stable currency, and gild-edged national credit abroad" (p. 315-16). Moreover, this was accompanied by a growing gap between the rich and poor.

Huntington (1968) also pointed to the fact that "by 1910 one per cent of the population owned 85 per cent of the arable land and 95 per cent of the ten million people

engaged in agriculture owned no land whatsoever” (p. 316). He exposed the fact that the political system was unprepared to govern the impacts of modernization in conjunction with demands for more political expression. The Mexican political system prior to the revolution was described as “one of uninstitutionalized personal and oligarchical rule, lacking autonomy, complexity, coherence, and adaptability” (p. 316). However, it was replaced by revolutionaries with

a highly complex, autonomous, coherent, and flexible political system, with an existence of its own clearly apart from social forces and with a demonstrated capacity to combine the reasonably high centralization of power with the expansion of power and the broadened participation of social groups in the political system (p. 317).

Moreover, a key reformation was the proceeding absence of the military in politics.

Huntington gushed about the post-Revolution military.

The subordination of previously autonomous social forces to the governing political institution was nowhere more dramatically revealed than in the changing role of the military in Mexican politics. Before 1910 the politics of Mexico was both the politics of the military and the politics of violence (p. 319).

Huntington mentioned the exceptionality of the 1910 revolution as a success case of the modernization thesis throughout the book, “albeit a revolution led by middle-class generals rather than middle-class intellectuals” (p. 255).

*Mexico, LAPOP, Modernization, and the Political Gap*


Now, Huntington’s *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968), specifically his modernization thesis, were compared and contrasted with the current violence epidemic in Mexico. When trying to dissect this complex topic, it can be helpful to think of violence, measured in drug homicides from 2007-2013, as the independent variable and the modernization thesis as the indicators or dependent variables. Huntington placed importance on the rise of expectations of people undergoing modernization. This rise in

expectations was usually paralleled by an increase in monetary wealth or general living standards. The political gap argument exists when this economic development is not accompanied with parallel political development. While Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is an excellent indicator of economic expansion, political development is more difficult to quantify. Comparing violence to statistical variables is a useful analogy and exercise, but remember that violence posed by the cartels is a real and everyday problem to millions of Mexican citizens.

Mexico's brutal drug trafficking-related violence has been dramatically punctuated by more than 1,300 beheadings, public hanging of corpses, killing of innocent bystanders, car bombs, torture, and assassination of numerous journalists and government officials (Beittel, 2013).

For a majority of Mexico's modern history, political institutions have been consistently powerful (O'Neil et al., 2010). PRI established dominance over politics from 1917 through 2000 (O'Neil et al., 2010). However, beginning in the 1980s, PRI's dominance began to erode as it faced economic challenges and accusations of large electoral fraud (O'Neil et al., 2010). Two concurrent terms, 2000 and 2006, of Mexico's presidency were representatives of PRI's main opposition, the National Action Party (PAN) (O'Neil et al., 2010). So, the argument could be made that Mexican political institutionalization was waning throughout the 1980s culminating with the presidential elections of 2000, Vicente Fox, and 2006, Felipe Calderón. Plus, there was parallel economic development leading into 2007 (**Figure 4**), but further exploration of perceptions and actualities of Mexico's political institutions is needed.

**Figure 4: GDP over TIME**



Source: The World Bank

Unfortunately, unbiased data collection on the Mexican people's opinions is underdeveloped. However, LAPOP has been collecting recent public opinion data biannually since 2004, and this coincides nicely with being a predictor of the escalation of violence, starting in 2007. Since the first poll was taken in 2003, opinions and data on many local and midterm elections were collected. "The political context" provided by LAPOP was as follows:

These elections failed to motivate the electorate: abstention reached 58 percent, a high point in recent years. Compared with 10 years ago Mexico today is a more democratic country that enjoys a freer press and unbridled democratic competition even if this means that citizens are were less interested in voting in the 2003 midterm elections than they were 10 years ago when the participation rate reached 77 percent (Buendía et al., 2004, p. 3).

This could be interpreted as public philosophy not being in accord with government actions. Additionally, the 2004 report described "Mexican politics at a crossroads".

The economic situation and the electoral results of 2003 demonstrate the frustration of Mexicans associated with the difference between expected and actual change. Simply put, President Vicente Fox raised expectations during his successful campaign for the

presidency and did not deliver promised results. Also, in early 2004 several corruption scandals that were given unprecedented coverage in the press increased discontent and disinterest with politics and politicians. Mexican politics is at a critical juncture and this makes the systematic evaluation of Mexican democracy is an important task (Buendía et al., 2004, p. 3).

This would seem indicative that Huntington's political gap theory may have merit as the intensification of violence occurred a mere three years later.

Next, the 2006 LAPOP survey<sup>7</sup> was significant not only because of the proximity to 2007, but also the number of major elections occurring throughout the survey period.

The LAPOP 2006 survey in Mexico was done during the last month of the campaign to elect a president of the Republic, to renew both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, as well as holding local elections for governorships and mayoralities in several states of the Republic (Parás et al., 2006, p. 8).

As "the political context" continued, 2006 represented a further splintered political system.

The 2006 political race, shows an equilibrium of forces unprecedented in the Mexico's history, especially when considered at the level of states. Today, as never before, more states are governed by different parties. At a municipal level, a wide-ranging distribution of power is even more evident. Open political competition provides the citizenry with the opportunity to evaluate and compare the government programs of the different parties, and the electoral system allows them to judge, with their vote, whether it is wise for a given political party to repeat one additional period of governance, or whether a change would be wise (in Mexico, the reelection of specific presidents and governors is not permitted, nor is the immediate reelection of deputies, both local and federal, or mayors) (Parás et al., 2006, p. 8).


**Figure 5**, showing the distribution of states governed by different political parties, followed the analysis. Again, the political gap hypothesis seemed to parallel 21<sup>st</sup> century Mexico, and the O'Neil et al. (2010) quote from the introduction is recalled, "Single-party rule is very good for organized criminal groups".

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<sup>7</sup> 2006 was the last *Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico* translated into English. The 2008 and 2010 reports are only available in Spanish.

While increasing democratic tendencies is not the same as political institutionalization, the 2008 *Cultura Política de la Democracia en Mexico* (*Cultura*

**Figure 5: States Governed by Differing Political Parties, March 2006**



Graph I.7. States Governed by Differing Political Parties, March 2006.  
Source: Instituto Federal Electoral, Mexico.

Source: Parás et al. (2006)

*Política*) listed four central elements of democracy, adapted from Norris (1999), that may be affected by governance.

- 1) *Creencia en la democracia como el mejor sistema posible. Creencia en el concepto Churchilliano de democracia, a saber, que la democracia a pesar de todos sus problemas es mejor que cualquier otro sistema;*
- 2) *Creencia en los valores esenciales de los que la democracia depende. Creencia en las dos dimensiones clave que definen la democracia según Robert Dahl (1971), derecho de oposición e inclusión.*
- 3) *Creencia en la legitimidad de las instituciones clave de la democracia: el ejecutivo, el legislativo, el sistema de justicia y los partidos políticos.*
- 4) *Creencia de que se puede confiar en otros. La confianza interpersonal es un componente clave del capital social. (Parás et al., 2008, p. 15)*

These four elements outlined the core theses of the 2008 report entitled *El impacto de la gobernabilidad* or the impact of governance. Again, the core focuses of the LAPOP

reports were the political culture of democracy, hence the title. So, this was not the exact same as Huntington's political institutionalization, but since Mexico democratic, it served as a good proxy. The contextual preface from the 2008 report was an excellent overview of Mexico's public opinion as well as the driving questions behind the polls.

*México se enfrenta, como muchos otros países de América Latina, a la labor pendiente de su consolidación democrática. La transición votada, como se le denominó a la transición mexicana por vía de las urnas y que culminó con la elección presidencial de 2006, ya quedó atrás. No obstante, el controvertido proceso electoral de ese año ha devuelto a las instituciones mexicanas, y en particular el Instituto Federal Electoral, la asignatura de organizar procesos electorales limpios, equitativos, transparentes y, sobre todo, creíbles. En esta primera década del siglo XXI, que se perfila a concluir, México también se enfrenta a la necesidad de imponer el estado de derecho. La joven democracia mexicana, como otras democracias emergentes, da pasos hacia adelante pero camina flanqueada por el crimen organizado y por la corrupción. A su vez, México también se debate, a través de los más recientes cambios a la ley electoral, entre la ampliación y la restricción de las libertades y los derechos políticos de sus ciudadanos. Por si fuera poco, el país encara enormes retos en cuanto a la gobernabilidad y la concentración de poder en la hoy llamada partidocracia. Además, fuera de las cuestiones puramente políticas, la pobreza y la desigualdad continúan afligiendo a una sociedad que no ha terminado de regresar a los niveles que tenía hace 30 años. ¿Cuáles son los retos que, además de estos, se circunscriben a las actitudes y las percepciones de los ciudadanos? ¿Qué tan arraigada es la legitimidad democrática después del agrio episodio postelectoral de 2006? ¿Se registran avances en las actitudes democráticas de los mexicanos o, más bien, retrocesos? (Parás et al., 2008, p. 15)*

The 2010 report is the most recent *Política Cultura*.<sup>8</sup> The second chapter of the report focused on the perceptions and experiences of citizens during hard times in the Americas. 97.1 percent of Mexicans believed that there was a current economic crisis, and nearly 40 percent felt that either the past or then present government was culpable (Parás et al., 2011, p. 19 & 23). Mexico also led Latin America in the highest percentage of homes that had at least one member lose a job in the past two years (**Table 2**). In addition, over a third of Mexicans saw a decrease in household income (Parás et al., 2011, p. 31). On average, Mexico had a negative change in perception of satisfaction

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<sup>8</sup> The 2012 *Política Cultura* is listed as coming soon on the Vanderbilt-LAPOP website. <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/mexico.php>



**Table 2: Homes with at least one member who lost their job in the last two years**





Gráfico II.8. Porcentaje de hogares con al menos un miembro que perdió su trabajo en los últimos dos años

Source: LAPOP 2011

with life (Parás et al., 2011, p. 37). **Figure 6** provides a list of possible determinants of the change in perception of satisfaction. Obviously, the economic crisis of 2008-09 had a large impact on daily life in Mexico.


Returning to the idea of democracy as a proxy for political institutionalization, the 2010 *Política Cultura* compiled a list of possible determinants of support for democracy (**Figure 7**). Thus, in Mexico, economics most definitely affects people's perceptions of politics. The end of the first part of the 2010 report touches upon support for a military coup, a subject out of the scope of this thesis; but, due to certain societal and cultural

**Figure 6: Determinants in the change in perception of satisfaction with life in Mexico, 2010**



**Gráfico III.5. Determinantes de cambio percibido en la satisfacción con la vida en México, 2010**

**Figure 7: Determinants of support for Democracy in Mexico, 2010**



**Gráfico III.9. Determinantes de apoyo a la democracia en México, 2010**

Source: LAPOP 2011

context, Latin American nations have a predisposition to military coups (Ames, 1987).<sup>9</sup> Mexico also has strong leanings towards the military, and most citizens support and trust the military, especially in regards to combatting organized crime violence (Camp, 2010). However, the amount of public support of a military coup in Latin America (**Figure 8**) would most likely worry most citizens in the “Global North”. Mexico recorded that 47.1 percent believed that a military coup would be justified.

The second part of the 2010 *Política Cultura* dealt with the controversial issues of

**Figure 8: Justification of a military coup in the Americas 2008 vs. 2010**





Gráfico III.22. Justificación de un golpe militar (policia) en las Américas, 2008 vs. 2010

Source: LAPOP (2011)

<sup>9</sup> Ames (1987) estimated that 51 military coups occurred from 1945 to 1982. For more information on Mexican armed forces and combatting organized crime, please see Camp (2010).

rule of law, crime, delinquency, corruption, and civil society. The basic responsibility of a government is to keep its citizens safe, and in 2010, 43.5 percent of Mexicans felt that they were unsafe (Parás et al., 2011, p. 72). Nearly 40 percent of Mexican households had been the victim of a crime with over half of those crimes occurring on the local level (Parás et al., 2011, p. 75-6). Being ineffective on the local level, especially when dealing with crime, is a reoccurring problem of the Mexican government. Just this past week, April 24, Governor Angel Aguirre Rivero signed a pact to legalize vigilantes, or local self-defense forces (Bargent, 2013). Furthermore, organized crime groups are expanding into different municipalities. **Figure 9**, showing the growth of different cartels over time, is reproduced from a news article explaining why the ruthless Zetas expanded faster than their rivals (Dudley & Rios, 2013).

**Figure 9: Number of municipalities in which criminal organizations operate, 1991-2010**



Source: Coscia & Rios (2012)

What becomes apparent is that Mexico’s political institutions, especially on the local level, are riddled with corruption and crime. The 2010 *Política Cultura* stated that 76.3 percent of Mexicans view their country as corrupt, and 35 percent, second of

LAIPOP countries, reported that they had been victimized by corruption (**Figure 10**) (Parás et al., 2011, p. 85).

**Figure 10: Victimized by corruption in comparative perspective**





Gráfico IV.11. Victimización por corrupción en perspectiva comparada (2010)


In addition, 39 percent of Mexicans acted outside the rule of law, and only 56.8 percent of Mexicans support the political system (Parás et al., 2011, p. 92 & 101). **Figure 11** shows the confidence of Mexicans (2010) different institutions. The Army and the Catholic Church rank the highest with 72.2 and 70.4 percent respectively. The national police and political parties rank the lowest with 36.4 and 35.4 percent confidence. **Figure 12** shows Mexican confidence in institutions over time. Both of these figures give insight to political institutionalization in Mexico. Moreover, only 44.6 percent, third lowest of LAPOP countries, are satisfied with democracy. These numbers seem to support the idea that a political gap exists in Mexico.

**Figure 11: Confidence in institutions in Mexico, 2010**



**Gráfico V.11. Confianza en las instituciones en México, 2010**

**Figure 12: Confidence in institutions in Mexico, 2004 through 2010**



**Gráfico V.12. Confianza en las instituciones en México por año**

Source: LAPOP (2011)

The last chapter of the 2010 *Política Cultura* discussed in this section focused on civil society and citizen participation. Interpersonal confidence among Mexicans have stayed relatively constant from 2004 to 2010 (Parás et al., 2011, p. 122), but it was the distribution of confidence among different levels of education that stood out among LAPOP’s analysis. **Figure 13** shows confidence levels spread across three different indicators: perception of insecurity, level of education, and age. Most interpersonal

**Figure 13: Mexican interpersonal confidences over perception of insecurity, level of education and age, 2010**




Gráfico VI.5. Confianza interpersonal por percepción de inseguridad, nivel educativo y edad en México (2010)

Source: LAPOP (2011)

relations or participation was a religious meeting, and *Participación en reuniones de una comité o junta de mejoras* fell from 16.9 to 13 percent, a relative 23 percent decrease, over the LAPOP survey years (**Figure 14**). However, from 2008 to 2010, interest in politics rose from 35.2 to 28.6 percent (Parás et al., 2011, p. 135). Again, there can be

arguments for and against Huntington's theses, but it is necessary to not only look at Mexico on the national level, but also the subnational.

**Figure 14: Mexican participation in civil organizations, meetings, 2004 through 2010**




Gráfico VI.7. Participación en reuniones de organizaciones cívicas por año en México  
Source: LAPOP (2011)

*Ejecuciones, Institutionalization, and Other Indicators: A subnational focus*

While the LAPOP surveys are critical to further academic research on Mexican policy, this thesis approached the issue of organized crime violence on the subnational level. Truly in depth political science and economic analysis covering organized crime violence in Mexico requires a subnational focus. While specific Mexican subnational data on organized crime violence and corresponding indicators are difficult to collect, this thesis attempted to develop a valid regression analysis of these variables. Chapters IV provided more in depth examination of these regressions. This section aimed to identify possible subnational indicators in correspondence with the previously developed Huntington theses.



The 2010 *Política Cultura* reported that only 9.4 percent of Mexicans, compared with 24.9 percent of US citizens, participated in local government meetings (Parás et al., 2011, p. 141). However, this participation has decreased in Mexico from 12.8 percent, in 2004, to 9.4 percent in 2010 (Parás et al., 2011, p. 142). **Figure 15** shows how support of the political system across different indicators, and it is the last figure reproduced from the *Política Cultura* reports. Again, while LAPOP provides invaluable data on the

**Figure 15: Support of the political system across size of localities, support for democracy, satisfaction with the current president, political interest, and satisfaction with local government services**




Gráfico VII.14. Apoyo al sistema por tamaño de localidad, edad, apoyo a la democracia, satisfacción con el desempeño del presidente actual, interés en la política y satisfacción con los servicios del gobierno local en México (2010)

Source: LAPOP (2011)

national level, further data on the subnational level still needs to be addressed and examined.

The *Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía* (INEGI), the national statistics institute, provides the most reliable statistics on the Mexican subnational level. Thus, academics and policy makers alike are primarily restricted to the data provided by the INEGI. The only other source of subnational data used in this thesis is the Trans-Border Institute. TBI has collected and aggregated homicides that could be attributable to organized crime violence. Their sources were mainly Mexican periodicals and self-reporting. As mentioned in the introduction, there is still debate on the exact number of homicides attributable to organized crime or *ejecuciones*.

Due to the ambiguous nature surrounding Huntington's theses, finding specific variables that paralleled concepts such as modernization, institutionalization, and the political gap was not a perfect science. Recall that social forces, consensus, community, effectiveness, adaptability, complexity, and expectations all contribute to defining Huntington's main theses. Thus, the data provided by TBI and INEGI acted as proxy variables for violence and its complementary explanatory variables. Some of the variables, which will be reviewed in chapters IV and V, included GDP, post offices, total schools, medical personnel, unemployment, labor disputes, and jail capacities. Moreover, some dummy variables were included to account for rural v. urban populations and US-Mexico border v. non-border states. Additional analyses of appropriate indicator variables were provided in the subsequent chapters.

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#### **IV. Violence Predictors and Regression Analysis**

Huntington described modernization as “a multifaceted process involving changes in all areas of human thought and activity” (1968, p. 32). Clearly, not every process of human thought and activity can be replicated in an econometric model, but this thesis attempted to choose appropriate variables that corresponds to Huntington’s main theses. Appropriately, this Mexico case study focused on the subnational level. As mentioned, Mexican subnational data is somewhat limited. For instance, subnational population figures were compiled from the Consejo Nacional de Población and INEGI. Then, 2007 and 2008 population data were generated through Stata manipulation. In fact, through careful analysis of INEGI data, it was possible to find pivotal time periods in Mexican data collection. In 1994 and 2005, there were obvious increases in data availability. It is possible that the INEGI delays or simply does not publicize all the data collected by their institution, but this thesis only utilizes information readily available to the public.

In order to find significant violence indicators, the following regressions used panel data over time. The dependent variables were lagged by a year so that they could act as predictors of violence. While this thesis primarily refers to dependent variables as indicators, the proper interpretation of the following regressions is actually predictors of violence.<sup>10</sup> This decision was made due to the lack of data before 2005 and after 2009, from the INEGI, but it is useful to policy development either way. Consequently, there were two time series. The first time period, relating to the dependent variables, spanned

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<sup>10</sup> Certainly, a semantic argument could be made that indicators are not the same as predictors. However, the lack of data on Mexican *ejeucciones* restricts the time period that can be used in regression analysis. In order for the regression to include five years of data, this adjustment was necessary.


from 2005 to 2009. The second time period, relating to the independent variable, covered from 2006 to 2010.

#### *Defining the violence predictor variables*

First, the dummy variables were defined. As previously stated, geographic distribution of the cartels' power and influence corresponds with *ejeucciones*. Thus, dummy variables were generated to test this hypothesis. The dummy variable created to account for this geographic distribution was border versus non-border states. Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas were given a value of 1 with all other states given a 0 value. Huntington argued that urbanization also attributed to violence. Cities tend to be the wealthiest locations both in terms of economic monetization and political diversity, and these both contribute to modernization. In order to test this hypothesis, *entidades federativas* with an urban area surpassing 500 square kilometers were given a value of 1 with all other states given a 0 value. **Figure 16** compares different Mexican states by total surface area and urban surface area. As **Figure 16** depicts, 11 states met the 500 square kilometer threshold.

Next, variables were chosen through a process of elimination based on the sample size restrictions. The sample size consisted of all the Mexican states and the Federal District, 32 groups in total, over 5 years, 2006 to 2010. So, the total number of observations was 160. The important violence predictors obtained through this process were as follows: GDP per capita, farm aid provided through PROCAMPO, number of electricity users, number of airports, number of post offices, number of public buses in circulation, number of commercial banks, municipality expenditures, general deaths, total

**Figure 16: Mexican states urban surface area versus total surface area, in square kilometers**



Source: INEGI

number of schools, number of medical personnel, consultations per doctor, non-active members in the economy, working age population, unemployment rate, labor disputes, labor solutions, murders offenses recorded by the courts, number of public libraries, and jail capacities.

A problem occurred when trying to regress these dependent variables against *ejeucciones*. Population size was not taken into account, and in order to compare these variables on the same scale, the values needed to be normalized. So, state populations were generated through the process mentioned above. 2005 figures were provided by INEGI. 2006 and 2009 figures were provided by the Consejo Nacional de Población.

2007 and 2008 figures were extrapolated through Stata by dividing GDP by GDP per capita, both of which contained complete data sets. Besides state population and *ejeucciones*, all other data sets were supplied by INEGI. All of the variables, independent and dependent, included in the following regressions were normalized by state population.

### *Regressions*

To begin, GDP per capita seemed to be the most comprehensive proxy variable for Huntington's modernization thesis. The argument was an increase in wealth would correspond with more modernization, and this would lead to more violence. The basic panel regression equation is as follows:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \beta'X_{it} + u_{it}$$

In this first regression, the  $\beta$  was simply GDP per capita;  $\alpha$  was a Stata generated constant;  $u_{it}$  was the error term or what remains unexplained by the independent variable; and,  $y_{it}$  was *ejeucciones* per capita. For simplicity, the fixed effects model is used for all of the regressions in this thesis. After running the *xtreg* command in Stata, surprisingly, GDP per capita was insignificant in predicting organized crime homicides per capita. This could have been due to other variables, or causal factors, that were not accounted for or simply omitted variable bias.

Following this first regression, all of the previously listed dependent variables were tested for significance solely against organized crime related homicides. Obviously, omitted variable bias was a consistent problem throughout these regressions, but by determining which variables were significant on their own, the exercise allowed for

further regressions to be developed. The following variables, all normalized by population, were found to be significant, at the 95 percent confidence level, with corresponding t statistics in parentheses: number of electricity users (3.05), number of post offices (-3.65), number of commercial banks (4.44), municipality expenditures (4.35), general deaths (8.50), total number of schools (3.04), number of medical personnel (2.71), unemployment rate (5.28), labor disputes (4.32), labor solutions (2.21), and murder offenses recorded by the courts (7.85). While some of the results were unexpected, some of the variables correlate directly with *ejeucciones* per capita. So, significance was probable. For instance, general deaths and murder offenses recorded by the courts should intuitively appear to correlate with *ejeucciones*. Respectively, general deaths and murder offenses correlated with the independent variable by 32.11 and 64.31 percent. The only significant variables with under 10 percent, positive or negative, correlation with *ejeucciones* were number of post offices (-9.55%), municipality expenditures (5.41%), total number of schools (3.99%), and number of medical personnel (0.54%).

Next, the four previous significant dependent variables were tested for multicollinearity. Unfortunately, total schools and post offices were highly correlated, 57.25%, and medical personnel was highly correlated with the other three. Nonetheless, post offices, municipality expenditures, schools, and medical personnel were regressed against organized crime violence. Only post offices (-1.99) and municipality expenditure (1.98) remained constant. If they were interpreted as being a significant dependent variable, even with the multicollinearity problems, One additional dollar expended on

municipalities per capita would increase *ejeuccion* per capita by .0000393, and one additional post office per capita would decrease the *ejeuccion* per capita by a large .173. This large value leads one to speculate whether certain outliers were at play, but organized crime violence is by no means linear. So, post offices, which are relatively constant, may have been over estimated by Stata.

Numerous regressions can be formulated, but the first stated significant dependent variables consistently prevail as the only significant variables when running fixed effect regressions. Moreover, a R squared value did not breach 20 percent meaning that less than that was actually explained by the dependent variables. The only possible way to breach that mark was to add general deaths or court murder cases, and there were obvious problems with using those variables. While both the border and urban variables were found to be significant, each would have increased organized crime homicides per capita by less than .0000. Lastly, as they were removed due to collinearity, the dummy variables were run against *ejeuccion* in a random effects model. Thus, in this instance, it seems that econometrics and regression analysis, while useful, were not able to significantly further the discussion pertaining to Mexican organized crime violence.

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## **V. Two *entidades federativas*- Chihuahua and Yucatán**

With over 22,000 organized crime homicides occurring in Chihuahua, it was by far the most violent state in Mexico from 2006 to 2012. In comparison, Yucatán only tallied 35 *ejecuciones* (TBI, 2013). The question remained unsolved after the regression analysis, and whether it was due to sporadic data or seemingly unpredictable violence, there are clear limitations to what econometrics can provide. In many regards, Chihuahua and Yucatán are complete opposites. Sitting on the border of the United States, Chihuahua is over 1,000 miles from Yucatán, which is approximately 250 miles from the Belize border. Again, the juxtaposition is stark when comparing the sizes of the two *entidades federativas*. Chihuahua, Mexico's largest state, is over 95,000 square miles, and Yucatán is less than a sixth of the size, 15,294 square miles (INEGI, 2005).

### *Border versus Non-Border States*

While there are many differences between Chihuahua and Yucatán, the variable that seems most significant is the location. Simply, US-Mexico border states are integral to not only the trafficking of illegal goods and services, but also legal trade between Mexico and the US. Moreover, while Huntington's theses suggest that economic prosperity is somehow positively correlated with violence, in GDP per capita, Chihuahua only surpassed Yucatán by 21,000 pesos or 1,700 USD (INEGI, 2008), and the variation of GDP annual percentage was nearly identical for the two states (**Figure 17**) (INEGI). If the economic theory behind the modernization thesis was incompatible with Chihuahua and Yucatán, possibly urbanization was significant factor in the amount of violence. However, when normalized for size, urban area was actually a larger percentage of Yucatán than Chihuahua.


**Figure 17: GDP annual percentage change, Chihuahua and Yucatán, 2003-2008**



Source: INEGI

Another difference between the two states is their respective populations. Chihuahua has nearly 1.5 million more people than Yucatán (INEGI. 2010). It was surprising to find that, historically, Yucatán had more illiterate citizens, and only recently has Chihuahua surpassed Yucatán in this category (**Figure 18**). So far, this was the only piece of evidence supporting Huntington's theses. He argued that less educated people would have lesser expectations and less modernization. However, further exploration would show that Chihuahua citizens had over double the amount of households with computers, but basic infrastructure, such as running water and electricity were even among the *entidades federativas*. So, no clear distinction could be made whether Huntington's theses were valid.

**Figure 18: Number of illiterate citizens, Chihuahua and Yucatán, 1994-2008**



Source: INEGI

The conclusion that can be drawn from this two state analysis was more consistent and reliable data needs to be taken in Mexico on a yearly basis. While it would be a hindrance to the public, hopefully, the Mexican government has the data, but chooses not to publicize it. At least, the men and women in charge of reform and policy would have access to crucial information. Variables, such as computers per household, population, and even public libraries, are either not recorded each year or riddled with *no*

*disponible*. Without complete data sets, political science and economic analyses become much more time intensive and speculative.

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## **VI. Conclusion**

While many topics and issues surrounding Mexico's institutions were out of the scope of this thesis, a few notes on policy and reform are required. First, it is imperative that the United States and Mexico work together. It is the opinion of this author that cartels, organized crime groups, drug-trafficking organizations, or whatever will become the new term describing Mexican crime syndicates are the largest national security threat to the US. Mexican cartels operate in every major US city, and every day, Americans use illegal drugs smuggled from Mexico. Additionally, the seriousness of the threat posed by OCGs in Mexico should not be taken lightly.

According to the Mexico's National Council Against Addiction (CONADIC), the use of marijuana, cocaine, and methamphetamine in Mexico increased steadily from 2002 to 2008. Northern states are disproportionately impacted by the increased availability of drugs resulting from failed smuggling attempts and TCOs' use of drugs as payments (U.S. Department of State, 2012).

The symbiotic relationship of drugs for guns between Mexico and the United States needs to stop immediately, or more bloodshed will follow.

As stated repeatedly throughout this thesis, more transparent and consistent data needs to be collected on the subnational level in Mexico. Without it, policy will continue to be determined in back rooms, and Mexican citizens will continue to distrust their government. The only way out is legitimate rule of law and education. While politicians, technocrats, and bureaucrats all have their individual calling, this author believes that Mexico will prosper through education, but the only way to do so effectively is for rule of law to be respected and wanted. This is being shown by the current vigilantes springing up across the country, and if the government does not heed these ominous warnings, it

could find itself in direct opposition with the public philosophy. Currently, President Nieto is attempting to reform these very two problems, but once again, only education and rule of law will bring peace to *los ciudadanos mexicanos*.

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Unpublished master's thesis, Texas State University-San Marcos, Dept. of Geography. Retrieved March 24, 2013, from

[https://digital.library.txstate.edu/bitstream/handle/10877/4486/Barry\\_Walker\\_The\\_sis1234.pdf?sequence=1](https://digital.library.txstate.edu/bitstream/handle/10877/4486/Barry_Walker_The_sis1234.pdf?sequence=1).

Wallerstein, I. (1969, November). [Review of the book *Political Order in Changing Societies*]. *American Journal of Sociology*, 75, 440-41.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2775720.pdf>

## Appendix A: Tables and Charts

TABLE 8: LEVEL OF TRUST TOWARD THE ARMED FORCES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU TRUST THE ARMED FORCES?


Selected Countries	Percentage Response
Canada	79.3
United States	74.8
Mexico	70.8
Brazil	68.4
Venezuela	54.5
Peru	52.1
Argentina	36.3

Explanation: Response on a 1-7 point scale with 7 meaning "a lot," recalibrated on a 0-100 scale. National average was 59.2 for twenty countries in the sample of U.S., Canada and Latin America.

Source: Figure 1, Daniel Montalvo, "Do you Trust Your Armed Forces," AmericasBarometer Insights, No. 27, 2009, 1.

Source: Camp (2010)

Drug Homicides over time (in weeks), 2008-2012



Source: TBI

Empirical relationship between the support of the system and tolerance of politics:

Mexico, 2010

Tabla V.2. Relación empírica entre apoyo al sistema y tolerancia política: México, 2010

Apoyo al sistema (legitimidad)	Tolerancia	
	Alta	Baja
Alto	Democracia estable 27.5%	Estabilidad autoritaria 35.3%
Bajo	Democracia inestable 17.9%	Democracia en riesgo 19.4%

Source: LAPOP

Victimization of a crime, by household, 2010




Gráfico IV.3. Victimización por delincuencia a nivel individual y del hogar en México (2010)

Source: LAPOP

Perception of current economic crisis




Gráfico II.2. Porcentaje de la población que percibió que hay una crisis económica

LAPOP 2011 p. 19

Who is culpable for the current economic crisis? (% of the population in Mexico)




Gráfico II.6. ¿Quién es culpable de la crisis económica? (Porcentaje de la población total en México)

LAPOP 2011 p.23



Percentage of people who reported a decrease in household income by place of residence and level of wealth in Mexico 2008-2010




Gráfico II.14. Porcentaje de personas que reportó una disminución en el ingreso del hogar según lugar de residencia y nivel de riqueza, 2008-2010 en México

LAPOP 2011 p. 31

Support of democracy in Mexico, 2004 through 2010




Gráfico V.14. Apoyo a la democracia en México por año

LAPOP 2011, p. 116

Percentage of citizens that reported voting in the last elections, 2004 through 2010




Gráfico VI.10. Porcentaje de ciudadanos que reportó haber votado en las últimas elecciones, por año en México

Source: LAPOP (2011)

Electoral participation over interests in politics, level of education, sex, and age in Mexico, 2010




Gráfico VI.12. Participación electoral por interés en política, nivel educativo, género y edad en México (2010)

Source: LAPOP (2011)

Participation in local government meetings in comparative perspective, 2010




Gráfico VII.1. Participación en reuniones del gobierno local en perspectiva comparada

Source: LAPOP (2011)


## Political Modernization: Changes in Urban-Rural Power and Stability

TABLE 1.5. Political Modernization: Changes in Urban-Rural Power and Stability

Phase	City	Countryside	Comments
1. Traditional Stability	Stable Subordinate	Stable Dominant	Rural elite rules; middle class absent; peasants dormant
2. Modernization Take-off	Unstable Subordinate	Stable Dominant	Urban middle class appears and begins struggle against rural elite
3. Urban Breakthrough	Unstable Dominant	Stable Subordinate	Urban middle class displaces rural elite; peasants still dormant
A4. Green Uprising: Containment	Unstable Subordinate	Stable Dominant	Peasant mobilization within system reestablishes stability and rural dominance
A5. Fundamentalist Reaction	Stable Dominant	Unstable Subordinate	Middle class grows and becomes more conservative; working class appears; shift of dominance to city produces rural fundamentalist reaction
B4. Green Uprising: Revolution	Unstable Subordinate	Unstable Dominant	Peasant mobilization against system overthrows old structures
B5. Modernizing Consolidation	Stable Dominant	Unstable Subordinate	Revolutionaries in power impose modernizing reforms on peasantry
6. Modern Stability	Stable Dominant	Stable Subordinate	Countryside accepts modern values and city rule


Source: *Political Order in Changing Societies*

Border v Non Border states over time (2007-2010)



Source: TBI

Municipal Level Homicide Maps, January through November, 2012



Source: SNSP. Note that data were unavailable for municipalities in Jalisco and Yucatán.

Source: TBI

Following Five Figures: Stratfor through the BBC

Mexican drug cartels' main areas of influence, 2010-11



Mexican drug cartels' main areas of influence, Nov 2011



### Mexican drug cartels' main areas of influence, Jan 2012



### Mexican drug cartels' main areas of influence, Apr 2012



### Mexican drug cartels' main areas of influence, Nov 2012



<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-10681249>



Where Mexico Would Fit Among 30 Insurgencies Worldwide, 1978-2008

Case	Good Factors (of 15)	Bad Factors (of 12)	Good – Bad Factors	Outcome
Afghanistan (post-Soviet)	0	10	-10	Loss
Somalia	1	10	-9	Loss
Chechnya I	2	10	-8	Loss
Rwanda	2	10	-8	Loss
Zaire (anti-Mobutu)	0	8	-8	Loss
Nicaragua (Somoza)	0	8	-8	Loss
Sudan (SPLA)	2	9	-7	Loss
Kosovo	1	8	-7	Loss
Afghanistan (anti-Soviet)	1	7	-6	Loss
Papua New Guinea	3	9	-6	Loss
Burundi	2	8	-6	Loss
Bosnia	1	6	-5	Loss
Moldova	2	6	-4	Loss
Georgia/Abkhazia	1	5	-4	Loss
Liberia	3	7	-4	Loss
Afghanistan (Taliban)	4	6	-4	Loss
Nagorno-Karabakh	4	4	-3	Loss
DR Congo (anti-Kabila)	4	4	-3	Loss
Tajikistan	5	3	-3	Loss
Kampuchea	1	3	-2	Loss
Nepal	3	5	-2	Loss
Nicaragua (Contras)	4	4	0	Loss
Mexico (VDTOs)	6	4	+2	Loss
Croatia	8	3	+5	Loss
Turkey (PKK)	11	5	+6	Loss
Uganda (ADF)	8	0	+8	Win
Algeria (GIA)	9	1	+8	Win
El Salvador	12	2	+10	Win
Peru	13	2	+11	Win
Senegal	13	0	+13	Win
Sierra Leone	14	1	+13	Win


At 4, Mexico is better than the worst-scoring winner but also close to many losers.

At +2, Mexico is in the empirical gap between winners and losers over the past 30 years.

At 6, Mexico is better than any loser but worse than any winner.


Source: RAND

Estimation of OCGs' revenues generated through exporting drugs



Derived from NSDUH 2011 and Kilmer & Pacula (2009)

Institutional Trust in Mexico 1990-2010



Source: Camp

Breakdown of Mexico's Estimated 454, 574 Law Enforcement Personnel (June 2007)

Police	Number	Percent
Federal Preventive Police and National Migration Institute	18,296	4.97%
State ministerial police	25,615	6.95%
Federal ministerial police	5,900	1.60%
State preventive police	94,587	25.68%
Mexico Federal District preventive police	77,132	20.94%
Municipal preventive police	146,785	39.85%
Total Police	368,315	100.00%
Non-police public security officials	Number	Percent
Public ministers and specialists	24,453	28.35%
Prison personnel	30,403	35.25%
Police administrators	31,403	36.41%
Total	86,259	100.00%

Note: There is no authoritative tally of Mexico's police forces and federal agencies have provided conflicting numbers. The figures reported by Zepeda Lecuona are the most comprehensive but the estimates of federal police forces contradict other government estimations. Data cited below on the federal forces provided in the Calderón administration's annual report puts the total number of PFP and AFI in 2007 at 21,761 and 7,992 respectively.

Source: Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona. 2009. Mexican Police and the Criminal Justice System. In David Shirk ed. *Police and Public Security in Mexico*. San Diego: University Readers. Using statistics from the Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública.

Source: Sabet (2010)

## Federal Investigative Police Performance Indicators

	Average monthly federal crimes reported	Average time to complete investigation (days)	Percent of investigations that go before a judge	Percent of sentences of cases investigated	Backlog of judicial warrants
2005	7,284				
2006	9,146	270	22.4	14	
2007	11,441	151	18.3	12	44,625
2008	11,341	152	19	11	43,566
2009*	10,594	157	15.3	9	39,054

\*Based on the first six months of the year.

Source: *Tercer Informe de Gobierno*. Data on the judicial warrant backlog came from the PGR. 2009. *Informe de Labores*. Mexico City: Procuraduría General de la República.

Note: Among the states the national average was 12% with states like Sonora reaching up to 36%. Eduardo Bours. 2009. *Sexto Informe de Trabajo*. Hermosillo: Gobierno del Estado de Sonora.

Source: Sabet (2010)

## Change in the Size of the Federal Police Forces and Spending

	AFI	PPF	Total federal forces	PGR budget (thousands of pesos)	SSP budget (thousands of pesos)
2001	4,920	10,241	15,161	\$5,451.2	\$5,156.8
2002	5,525	10,830	16,355	\$6,991.9	\$6,389.0
2003	6,122	12,535	18,657	\$7,267.0	\$6,259.6
2004	8,078	14,415	22,493	\$7,521.3	\$6,397.6
2005	7,676	11,756	19,432	\$7,572.3	\$6,976.9
2006	8,127	12,907	21,034	\$8,862.4	\$8,676.0
2007	7,992	21,761	29,753	\$9,439.5	\$17,626.9
2008	5,996	31,936	37,932	\$8,950.2	\$21,140.3
2009*	4,974	32,264	37,238	\$12,309.9	\$32,916.8

\* Data from June 2009 when the PFP became the PF. Budget for 2009 is the total amount authorized by Congress.

Note: As both the PGR (Attorney General's Office) and the SSP (Public Security Secretariat) are larger than the AFI (Federal Investigations Police) and the PFP (Federal Preventive Police), the budgets presented are larger than the budgets of these police agencies. For example the PGR also includes public ministers and the SSP includes prison wardens and guards.

Source: Tercer Informe de Gobierno de Felipe Calderón.

Source: Sabet (2010)

## Select Indicators on Municipal Forces, 2008


City	Minimum education requirement	Percent of qualified applicants accepted to the academy	Percent of police with a high school degree or greater	Duration of cadet training (months)	Basic monthly salary (pesos)
Ahome	High School	54.00%	55.15%	12	\$6,269
Chihuahua	High School	15.67%	47.07%	10	\$8,745
Cuernavaca	High School for traffic police	.	55.80%	.	\$5,952
Guadalajara	Secondary	26.60%	34.17%	8	\$7,916
Mérida	Secondary		28.39%	3	\$4,672
México DF	Secondary	22.02%	40.03%	6	\$8,186
Monterrey	Secondary	65.91%	33.97%	6	\$7,243
Puebla	High School	.		.	\$7,226
S.L. Potosí	High School	12.82%	35.27%	8	\$6,506
Torreón	Secondary	45.07%	.	6	\$6,625
Zapopan	Secondary	32.30%	34.55%	6	\$9,050

City	Vehicles per police	Budget per police officer (pesos)	Internal affairs employees per 100 police	Average annual firings as a percent of police?
Ahome	0.13	.	0.50	3.12%
Chihuahua	0.68	\$240,183	0.44	0.97%
Cuernavaca	0.26	\$184,471	1.13	1.40%
Guadalajara	0.23	\$121,161	2.94	0.76%
Mérida	0.25	\$147,007	0.64	1.71%
México DF	0.18	\$181,774	0.84	3.09%
Monterrey	0.25	\$260,976	3.72	1.90%
Puebla	0.38	.	0.43	
S.L. Potosí	0.22		1.35	3.81%
Torreón	0.46	\$39,880	0.40	16.05%
Zapopan	0.19	.	1.14	0.36%

Source: Sabet (2010)


Source: Information provided by police departments in response to the Police Professionalism Survey administered in early 2009 by the author.

Spending on education and in economic development (thousands of millions of pesos of 2008)




Jayasuyriya & Wodon (2007)

Mexico's per capita GDP from 1980 to 2007 (in 2007 pesos)



Source: Rodriguez (2009)


Figure 8: Mexico's degree of economic openness and international competitiveness



Source: Rodriguez (2009)

## Evaluations of Traditional Criminal Justice System

*Do you agree with this statement: The traditional criminal justice system was effective and/ or efficient.*




Source: TBI




## Evaluations of the 2008 Reforms to Mexican Criminal Procedure

*What is your general opinion of the 2008 criminal procedure reform? [CIII.1]*


### Responses of Judges



### Responses of Prosecutors



### Responses of Public Defenders




Source: TBI

### Expectations Regarding Effect of New System on Criminality

*Do you agree with this statement: The new criminal justice system will help reduce criminality [CIII.8]*

Responses of Judges



Responses of Prosecutors



Responses of Public Defenders



Source: TBI