

THE BLESSED AND THE DAMNED: PEACEMAKERS, WARLORDS,  
AND POST CIVIL WAR DEMOCRACY

Thorin M. Wright, B.A.

Thesis Prepared for the Degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS

August 2007

APPROVED:

T. David Mason, Major Professor

John A. Booth, Minor Professor

J. Michael Greig, Committee Member

James Meernik, Chair of the Department of  
Political Science

Sandra L. Terrell, Dean of the Robert B. Toulouse  
School of Graduate Studies

Wright, Thorin M. The Blessed and the Damned: Peacemakers, Warlords, and Post Civil War Democracy. Master of Science (Political Science), August 2007, 63 pp., 11 tables, 2 figures, 71 titles.

This thesis seeks to explain how democracies emerge out of the ashes of civil wars. This paper envisions transitions to democracy after a civil war largely as a function of the peace process. Democracy is thought of as a medium through which solutions to the problems and issues over which the civil war was fought can be solved without violence. Transitions to democracy are more likely if there is a large bargaining space and the problems of credible commitments to democratization can be solved. Democratization is more likely if four conditions exist in a state after the civil war: a negotiated settlement, credible commitments via international enforcement, demobilization, and a cooperative international environment. The hypotheses derived are tested through an event history analysis for two different standards of democracy. The results suggest that factors indicative of all four theoretical concepts contribute to the likelihood of democratization after a civil war.

Copyright 2007

by

Thorin M. Wright

## DEDICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

### Dedication

To my parents, for talking about politics around the dinner table.

To my friends, for putting up with me while I talk about politics.

To my professors for teaching me how to talk about politics.

### Acknowledgements

This project in some ways began when I was still an undergraduate and was greatly helped by people in my last semester in college and throughout my graduate work thus far. Specifically, I would like to thank Professors Peter VonDoepp and Patrick Brandt for encouragement and guidance during my undergraduate work. I would also like to thank Professors Andrew Enterline and Idean Salehyan for helpful comments and questions throughout my graduate work. I would like to thank my colleagues at *International Studies Quarterly*, Chris Fariss and Amber Aubone for always asking questions and making any thoughts I had better. I would like to thank Professor Steven Poe for being the best boss ever at the journal and also for always being there to listen. I would also like to thank my friends and family for being there and at least pretending to be interested in political science when I talk about it.

This work would be nowhere without a great committee. Professors David Mason, John Booth, and Michael Greig have been excellent counsel during graduate school. They

were all there to help me in the early parts of this project, when it was presented at a conference\* right up until the very last stages, always willing to listen to questions.

Finally, I would like to thank everyone who has been in my courses with me in graduate school. From these discussions came clearer thinking about this paper and every other project I have undertaken.

---

\* An earlier version of this thesis was presented as "Warlord Choices: A Competing Risks Analysis of Post Civil War Democratization and Autocratization." at the Southern Political Science Association Conference in New Orleans, January 4-7, 2007.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|   | Page |
|---|------|
| DEDICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....  | iii  |
| LIST OF TABLES.....   | vii  |
| <br>Chapter   |      |
| 1. THE BLESSED AND THE DAMNED: AN INTRODUCTION .....  | 1    |
| 2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH .....  | 4    |
| 2.1 Process Theory and Post Civil War Democratization.....  | 4    |
| 2.2 The Post Civil War Peace Process .....  | 8    |
| 3. WARLORD CHOICES: AN UPDATED THEORY OF POST CIVIL WAR<br>DEMOCRATIZATION .....                  | 11   |
| 3.1 The Warlord's Dilemma .....   | 11   |
| 3.1.1 The International Environment .....   | 17   |
| 3.2 Conditions for Post-Conflict Democracy: Hypotheses.....                                       | 18   |
| 3.2.1 The Importance of a Negotiated Settlement .....   | 19   |
| 3.2.2 The Need for Credible Commitments.....  | 20   |
| 3.2.3 Demobilization.....   | 23   |
| 3.2.4 Cooperative International Environment.....  | 24   |
| 3.2.5 "National Unity," Identity Conflicts, and Structural Conditions:<br>Control Variables ..... | 25   |
| 4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND ANALYSIS .....   | 27   |
| 4.1 Data: Case Selection and Choice of Analysis.....  | 28   |
| 4.2 Operationalization of the Variables .....   | 29   |
| 4.2.1 Democracy .....   | 29   |
| 4.2.2 Specification and Operationalization of Causal Variables .....                              | 30   |
| 4.2.3 Specification and Operationalization of Control Variables .....                             | 33   |
| 4.3 Model Specification .....   | 34   |
| 4.4 Empirical Analysis.....   | 34   |
| 4.5 Discussion of the Theory .....  | 40   |
| 5. CONCLUSION.....  | 42   |
| 5.1 Direction of Future Research .....  | 43   |
| <br>Appendix  |      |

|    |  |    |
|----|--|----|
| A. | CODING RULES FOR DEMOBILIZATION BEFORE FIRST ELECTION .. | 46 |
| B. | APPENDIX TO THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS.....                | 51 |
|    | BIBLIOGRAPHY.....  | 58 |

## LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

|         | Page   |
|---------|--|
| Tables  |  |
| 4.1     | The Model..... 35  |
| 4.2     | The Model and Predictions for Democracy ..... 36             |
| 4.3     | Cox Model, Democracy: Polity $\geq 5$ ..... 37               |
| 4.4     | Cox Model, Democracy: Polity $\geq 7$ ..... 39               |
| 4.5     | Summary of Results..... 41                                   |
| A.1     | Demobilization Before First Election ..... 49                |
| B.1     | Cox Model, Democracy: Polity $\geq 5$ ..... 52               |
| B.2     | Proportional Hazards Test, Polity $\geq 5$ ..... 53          |
| B.3     | Proportional Hazards Test, Polity $\geq 7$ ..... 54          |
| B.4     | Weibull Model, Polity $\geq 5$ ..... 55                      |
| B.5     | Weibull Model, Polity $\geq 7$ ..... 56                      |
| Figures |  |
| 3.1     | Institutional Choice Likelihood by Civil War Result ..... 12 |
| 3.2     | The Democratizing Warlord's Dilemma ..... 15                 |



## CHAPTER 1

### THE BLESSED AND THE DAMNED: AN INTRODUCTION

In the wake of a civil war, what factors contribute to the institutional arrangements political leaders will choose? There has been a burgeoning body of research on this subject in recent years, as many studies have taken up the question of post civil war democratization (Paris 1997; Wood 2001; Wantchekon 2004; Gurses and Mason 2006 specifically). While these studies have shown that post civil war democracy is much more likely than previously thought by the field, predicting whether or not a country will become democratic or autocratic is a difficult task. This paper develops a theory of what conditions make it more likely that state leaders will choose a democracy after a civil war ends. It builds on the empirical work done by Gurses and Mason (2006), employing their dataset to test a model of democratic and autocratic choices in the post civil war state. In particular, it focuses on the role of international actors and what influence they may have in the decisions made about institutional arrangements. It also contrasts largely with previous attempts to theorize the emergence of democracy after a civil war (Wantchekon 2004) by breaking apart previous work's assumptions and placing a focus on the story of how states get from the end of the civil war to an institutional arrangement. The theory in this paper presents a story of how a state gets from the end of a civil war to clear institutional choices.

This paper seeks to place a focus not on the causes of the civil war or the specific dynamics of violence or mobilization in the civil war that might impact a long-term peace. Nor does it focus on broad structural or cultural characteristics that have been associated with the emergence of democracy in relatively stable polities (e.g. Lipset 1959; Almond and Verba 1963). Rather, it focuses on the period after the civil war ends, when states are walking the fine line between regressing back into a civil war or developing consolidated institutional arrangements (whether democratic or autocratic) in which peace might endure. It builds on classic process theories of democratization (specifically Rustow (1970)) and a rationalist outlook on conflict outbreak (Fearon 1995). Democratization after the end of a civil war is

a function of four aspects of the peace process: *a negotiated settlement* to end the conflict, *credible commitments to peace* which are established via sustainable forms of international peacekeeping, *demobilization* of rebel forces to ensure that the warmaking abilities of rebels are diminished, preventing them from starting the war again, and *a cooperative international environment*, which helps to ensure that remobilization of potential violent challengers to the new government is unlikely.

For policy makers, this research question is of pressing importance. The conflict in Iraq has become to many observers a civil war. If an Iraqi democracy is an attainable goal for western foreign policy (Paris 1997), then it will most likely go through the same process as many of the post civil war democracies over the past half century. The theory developed in this paper speaks largely to policy options that the international community have available, constructing a story of democratization that is, from a policy standpoint, “easier” than work that focuses on structural or cultural factors. It is a story of how certain peace policies enacted by international actors can help or hurt the prospects a post-conflict state has for democratization.

Though the scholarly literature includes small-n qualitative research that focuses on the democratic transitions out of civil wars (Paris 1997; Manning 2001; Wood 2001), the field is lacking a specific transition theory with a large-n analysis that helps us understand the specific process between a civil war, one of the most destructive political phenomena that is studied, and the decision by leaders to become a democracy<sup>1</sup>. There is some quantitative literature that focuses on lasting peace after civil wars, which typically notes that democratization or political powersharing contributes to a lasting peace (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). However, there is no study that shows what factors link attributes of the post civil war environment to the achievement of democracy. This paper seeks to bridge the gap by theoretically placing the political transition after a civil war as a function of the peace process after a civil war. Analytically, this paper employs a more specific test of its hypotheses than previous works. Previous attempts at testing factors that contribute to democracy after a civil war (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Gurses and Mason 2006) tests levels of democracy at

---

<sup>1</sup>Doyle and Sambanis (2000) is a published exception and Gurses and Mason (2006) is an unpublished exception to this and will be addressed below.

certain years after the civil war ends. While this attempt allows for some causal inference, it is not specific enough to get the particular characteristics of transitions. By testing only for movement along a scale of democracy, it becomes difficult to know when a state actually “becomes” democratic. The previous works thus only allow analysts to tell whether or not states are headed in the direction of democracy. This paper employs event history models to determine when states reach well-established standards of level of democracy that would firmly indicate that a state is actually democratic. Thus, this paper helps explain what actually makes achieving democracy more likely.

The sequence of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 focuses on summarizing the relevant literature that pertains to this question. I focus largely on process theories of democratization (Rustow 1970; Huntington 1991; Wantchekon 2004) to derive my own theory for democracy out of civil wars. I also summarize and analyze previous literature that focuses on conflict resolution and building a long-term peace after civil wars (Mason and Fett 1996; Mason, Fett and Weingarten 1999; Walter 1999; Doyle and Sambanis 2000). In Chapter 3, I develop my theory of post civil war institutional choice, which is a peace process theory of post civil war democratization. The theory is to some degree both deductive and inductive, drawing from rationalist explanations of war and post civil war democracy (Fearon 1995; Wantchekon 2004), extending the logic of literature that theorizes on long-term peace (Walter 1997, 1999; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). It focuses on the decisions that leaders on both sides of the conflict are faced with in the wake of a violent domestic conflict and the effective use of policies by international actors to help those leaders make the decision of democracy. After developing the theory, in Chapter 4 I describe the method I employ to test the hypotheses derived from the theory, which is an event history analysis. I then test the hypotheses and find some consistent support for the conditions described in the theory. Finally, I conclude the study by discussing specific implications for researchers who are studying the very important questions of conflict resolution, conflict management, and democratization.

## CHAPTER 2

### PREVIOUS RESEARCH

#### 2.1. Process Theory and Post Civil War Democratization

I begin with a short overview of some of the major process theories of democratization (Rustow 1970; Huntington 1991; Przeworski 1991; Wantchekon 2004). These theories emphasize the decisions made by leaders as part of an interaction between governing elites, opposition elites, and groups outside the elites (including the masses). These theories appropriately lay the ground work for the study of post civil war democratization. In postwar settings, the former combatants must negotiate a way to design the new state. Institutions do not merely develop over a long period of time. Indeed, many of the success stories of post civil war democracy, such as Mozambique, became democracies in a short period of time after the resolution of the civil war. Process theory contrasts sharply with structural or cultural theories of democratization. Structural theories, such as those put forth by Lipset (1959) or Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992), emphasize certain societal characteristics, such as economic development, as encouraging the development of democratic political habits (such as contract enforcement and individually caring about what happens within the national political stage) or the expansion of the middle class (now politically relevant). The development of these structural characteristics forces elites to open up the system and democratize over time. Cultural theories, such as those put forth by Almond and Verba (1963) and Putnam (1993), emphasize certain characteristics of the people, such as normative belief systems, that are more synchronized with the tolerance and compromise required for a democracy to function properly.

Both structural and cultural theories of democratization require some societal prerequisite for democracy to occur, whether some form of economic or political development (structural) or some mass level of normative commitment to democratic values (cultural). Process theories require no sort of normative commitment by elites, groups or the masses. Nor do they require structural characteristics such as a well developed economy to have

democracy follow. Though both of these prerequisites certainly may aid democracy, they are not necessary or sufficient in process theory. Process theories instead focus on the interaction between the government and the opposition (typically just the elites). For post civil war states, these types of theories are the most appropriate. This is simply because in states after civil wars, there is almost no way for them to meet some of the major prerequisites of structural or cultural theories. Elites who have just fought a civil war do not seem to have much, if any, normative commitment to democratic habits and values. During a civil war, the state's economy is also likely to come to a near collapse, with rebel groups focusing on either black market or rent behavior to mobilize troops (Weinstein 2005). Further, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000) show that there is little clear evidence that states need to clear some benchmark of economic development to democratize, but they do show that higher levels of economic development make regimes (both democratic and autocratic) more likely to survive. Therefore, in the case of post civil war democracy, something else must explain the emergence of democracy besides broad structural or cultural characteristics.

The major early process theory of democratization comes from Rustow (1970). He emphasizes that leaders do not have to be normatively committed to democratic values. Rather they reach a democratic outcome through a conflict in which no one side can effectively win and the two sides compromise. Wantchekon (2004) echoes this, presenting this for a civil war setting, which I detail below<sup>1</sup>. Rustow's (1970) theory of democratization focuses on four stages that states go through in order to become democratic. His first stage is the only real pre-requisite presented in his theory, and this is the concept of "national unity". This essentially means that the relevant political actors must all agree on who is to be included in the state and what the state is. This pre-requisite is problematic for post civil war states, since some civil wars are fought for inclusion into the system or separation from the nation-state altogether, in the case of separatist conflicts or irredentist conflicts. This could mean that separatist conflicts are more difficult to resolve than civil wars that are fought over control

---

<sup>1</sup>Though Przeworski (1991) and Huntington (1991) are very notable and important process theorists of democratization, I focus primarily on the work of Rustow (1970) and Wantchekon (2004) here due to their relevance to civil war. Wantchekon's (2004) specific focus on civil wars makes it the ideal jumping off point for an empirical study.

of the central capital of the state, such as ideological conflicts. Indeed some of the civil war literature (Toft 2003) points out that territory can represent an issue that cannot be easily divided, making such civil wars especially difficult to resolve.

Rustow's (1970) other three phases are the preparatory phase, the decision phase, and the habituation phase. This paper is really only concerned with the preparatory phase (in this case, a civil war) and the decision phase (the point at which leaders actually choose institutional arrangements). The preparatory phase is the stage in which groups are in conflict over what the state should look like. Though probably not conceived of as violent conflict by Rustow, envisioning rather a process in which the government and opposition negotiate, the civil war itself represents the preparatory phase for such states. The habituation phase is essentially the process of democratic consolidation, in which the elites and masses develop democratic norms over time after being forced to live with democratic institutions for some time<sup>2</sup>. Rustow's theory provides a useful structure through which scholar's can think about the process of democratization. It is also useful because it applies to almost every case of democratization (except for a unilateral, unprovoked decision to democratize by an autocratic leader).

Probably the best known work on post civil war democratization is that of Wantchekon (2004). Wantchekon outlines a formal theory in which leaders of the government and the opposition choose to become democracies after a civil war if there is no way for one side to become a decisive victor. There is also, in his theory, the option of inviting in an external arbiter, but this external actor, which he terms "Leviathan", is one sided. The internal actors know this, and will never both invite the external enforcer. The two actors will choose democracy if they have a reasonable expectation to win the first election, which if the war was a stalemate, may be a reasonable expectation for both sides.

The major flaw with Wantchekon's (2004) theory, and one that this paper specifically addresses, is that he assumes that once "democracy" is chosen to end the war, the commitments by the two former combatants to democratize are credible and demobilization of forces takes place, which reinforces the peace necessary for democracy to survive. This is

---

<sup>2</sup>See Linz and Stepan (1996) and Diamond (1999) for excellent outlines and descriptions of democratic consolidation

a major problem with Wantchekon's theory. It is very similar to some rationalist work on civil war termination (particularly Mason and Fett 1996 and Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999), except that what is treated as a negotiated settlement in those works is represented as democracy by Wantchekon (2004). While negotiated settlements may lead to democracy, they are not the same concepts. In fact, the goal of this paper is to tell the story of what happens between a negotiated settlement and the choice of democracy. By assuming that the commitments to a negotiated settlement or democracy are credible, Wantchekon (2004) is violating some normal assumptions of the anarchic nature of conflict politics (Fearon 1995). Also, just from reading some case histories (Paris 1997) of attempts at post civil war democratization, I do not assume that demobilization is automatic. In the case of Angola, Paris (1997) notes, demobilization was set to occur *after* the first election. When the election happened there, the loser, still armed, rejected the results and resumed fighting.

Gurses and Mason (2006) present a large-n empirical analysis of the factors most associated with post civil war democracy. They examined the level of democracy at years five and ten after the civil war ended in order to gauge which factors lead to more positive movement toward democracy. Their analysis mainly focused on attributes of the civil war itself and factors from the post civil war environment. Their strongest predictors of positive movement toward democracy are civil war factors. Specifically, negotiated settlements are positively associated with more democracy and outright victories by either the government or the rebels are associated with less democracy. They also found that post civil war states emerging from ethnic wars are less likely to move toward democracy.

Another, more well-known study of post civil war reconstruction is by Doyle and Sambanis (2000). Their main goal is to gauge the impact of international peacebuilding policies in post civil war states. Among their standards of success is whether or not a state reaches a standard of democracy by year two and five after a civil war ends. They find that international peacebuilding policies are significant predictors of a stable peace as well as helping states reach a standard of democracy. Specifically, the multi-dimensional peacebuilding operation, which takes on tasks of observing elections and helping to rebuild infrastructure, goes above and beyond monitoring a cease-fire and securing a settlement. They can also help to build peace in the long term by aiding transitions.

The research by Doyle and Sambanis (2000), while a step in the right direction, suffers from some flaws. Specifically, their choice of analyzing the level of democracy at years two and five after the civil war ends is problematic. Their theory is generally about how features of the civil war affect institutional development after the war ends. However, by measuring democracy five years after the war ends, it is difficult to know how other factors may contribute to the level of democracy between the end of the civil war and year five. By employing a cross-sectional analysis, it is difficult to determine this kind of sequence of processes. This decision for years two and five is also somewhat arbitrary. If a country becomes a democracy in year six after a civil war ends, their analysis cannot explain it. This leaves the possibility of censoring out potentially important cases of post civil war democratization. Thus, a more precise analysis is necessary to more fully understand the phenomenon.

## 2.2. The Post Civil War Peace Process

Democratization is often depicted as part of the solution to creating a sustainable peace following a civil war. Democracy as an institutionalized means of resolving contentious political issues makes peace among political actors necessary. A large part of the attention in civil war literature is centered primarily on ending the civil war (Mason and Fett 1996; Mason, Weingarten and Fett 1999). But since this paper is focused largely on what happens after a settlement or outright victory, the more important research for this question concerns what happens after the civil war ends. Since this paper is also primarily about how the post civil war peace process affects transitions to democracy, much of this literature is described as the theory is developed. This section examines some of the major works that are about post civil war peace as a whole, rather than specific policies, such as peacekeeping, and how they affect the peace process.

How the civil war ends plays a large role in how the state will be structured after the war is over (Gurses and Mason 2006). The literature is mixed with regard to the effects of negotiated settlements and outright military victories on the duration of peace. Licklider (1995) shows mixed results for negotiated settlements and outright victories with regard to long-term peace, noting that military victories often including stripping one side of the



warmaking ability completely, thus lowering the likelihood of renewed conflict. Mukherjee (2006) formalizes an argument that contends that power sharing arrangements put forth after a military victory are more likely to result in a longer peace because there is no incentive to misrepresent capabilities because one side was an outright loser. With each side knowing the other's ability to win a war, the losers are much more likely to take whatever powersharing deal they can get and are not likely to try and alter it by returning to a losing war. However, power sharing after a negotiated settlement involves two sides who are likely to misrepresent capabilities in the hope of starting the war again and winning. However, Mukherjee (2006) also finds a positive effect for democracy on producing a stable peace.

On the other side, Poe, Mason, Colley and Quinn (2005) note that negotiated settlements result in better human rights records of states after a civil war than either military victories by the government or rebel groups. Gurses and Mason (2006) similarly note that negotiated settlements are associated with higher levels of democracy five and ten years after a civil war than are military victories. If negotiated settlements are more likely to result in democracy and strong democracies are more likely to prevent the onset of war than other types of institutions (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch 2001 also show this), then it seems that if states that experienced negotiated settlements become democracies, long-term peace is more likely.

The work of Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001), Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) and Walter (1999) are focused on how states translate negotiated settlements into a long term peace. Hartzell et al. (2001) find that negotiated settlements are more likely to produce a stable peace if the previous regime was democratic, if the wars were long, low intensity conflicts, if there were autonomy provisions for territorial claims, and third party enforcement. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) follow up with similar results finding that the more extensive power sharing arrangements and the presence of a third party to enforce the peace result in a longer peace for states whose civil war ended in a negotiated settlement. Walter (1999) focuses on some of the problems presented in Fearon's (1995) explanation for why interstate wars occur, specifically, the problem of credible commitments. She concludes her study by recommending that outside enforcement be present to enforce the settlement, but specifically that such enforcers must be committed to the cause. If such enforcers, like peacekeepers,

are not thought to be committed or capable by the former warring parties, it could result in defection by the former conflicting actors. She further recommends slower demobilization and democratization processes to reduce the insecurity felt by the former litigants, who fear a defection by the other side and a return to fighting.

To summarize, the research focused on what produces a stable peace in the wake of a civil war has mixed findings. Some (Licklider 1995; Mukherjee 2006) indicate that military victories are more likely to be conducive to a lasting peace, while others (Poe et al. 2005; Gurses and Mason 2006) indicate that negotiated settlements are more likely to lead to more positive outcomes such as less repression and higher levels of democracy. Wantchekon (2004) argues that negotiated settlements are the leading way for states to transition to democracy out of a civil war. The literature on negotiated settlements emphasizes a few key concepts, specifically democracy and third party enforcement of the peace process (Hartzell et al 2001; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Walter 1999; Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Below, I develop a theory that builds on the findings of previous research and puts together a story of how states get from the end of a civil war to democracy.

## CHAPTER 3

### WARLORD CHOICES: AN UPDATED THEORY OF POST CIVIL WAR DEMOCRATIZATION

The theory presented here on post-civil war democracy describes the conditions which may make democracy more likely after a conflict. It begins by describing the dilemma that former combatants face when choosing post conflict institutions and then explains how the presence of certain conditions may make the option of democracy more likely. The dilemma is essentially a prisoner's dilemma in which actors cannot credibly commit to cooperate to provide some type of public good (Olson 1965; Axelrod 1984; Ostrom 1990). This dilemma is applied to post civil war scenarios by previous works (Walter 1997, 1999 specifically), but deviates because of its focus on the movement toward democracy, rather than on building credible commitments around negotiated settlements (Walter 1997) or a long term peace and powersharing institutions (Walter 1999). After this discussion, I develop the specific hypotheses about four conditions that make democracy more or less likely. These conditions are: a negotiated settlement to end the war, credible commitments to choose democracy, demobilization before the first election, and the lack of a hostile international environment.

#### 3.1. The Warlord's Dilemma

Civil wars represent a situation in which a state is essentially ruled by force by warring factions in an anarchic system. It is very similar to the international system because during a civil war, the state cannot form a monopoly on the use of violence. After a civil war, uncertainty prevails for the new leaders of the state. This is the period in which leaders have to decide what shape the post war state will take. Will it be democratic with open institutions that have elected leaders? Will it be a state in which an elite power-sharing oligarchy takes root? Will it be a dictatorship ruled by a small cadre of elites? Though this theory only focuses on the first question, it is important to remember that there are many options for leaders to choose.

The major actors in this story are the leadership of the former government and former rebels. With regard to what they would like to happen institutionally, I assume they have similar preferences. Each group most prefers an autocracy with themselves as the benevolent dictator, ruling the country with justice as they see it. They each least prefer the malicious autocratic rule of their civil war opponent, in which oppression is rampant and freedom in short supply. I make these assumptions based on the idea that political leaders want to stay in office as long as they can (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow 2003). If they can be certain that they will be in office and in control of the agenda, they will opt for this. Autocracies are more certain than democracies, since elections present the opportunity of losing power with regularity. After a civil war, when the state can essentially be remade, it seems that both sides wish to create the state in their image, so to speak. Thus, even if actors do not have a malicious agenda against the other side, they would still prefer to be in complete control. In between the preferences of autocracy lies the institutionalized uncertainty of democracy. Democracy essentially is an institutionalized way of preventing each group's enemy from taking complete control of the state. It is not likely to be any group's first preference, because I assume that each actor will want complete control of the territory, use of force, and ultimately the policy agenda. Even if the stated goals of a rebel group or government were either to bring or restore democracy during the civil war, if they are given the option of total control, they will most likely take it. The way in which a civil war ends is likely to determine which of the above three options will become an available equilibrium outcome for institutional choice.

FIGURE 3.1. Institutional Choice Likelihood by Civil War Result

|           | Government Victory | Rebel Victory | Negotiated Settlement |
|-----------|--------------------|---------------|-----------------------|
| Autocracy | More Likely        | More Likely   | Possible              |
| Democracy | Less Likely        | Less Likely   | <b>More Likely</b>    |

There are basically three ways for a civil war to end, each with different degrees of uncertainty: a negotiated settlement, government victory, or a rebel victory (Mason and Fett 1996; Mason, Weingarten and Fett 1999). A victorious government likely signals a return

to policies and institutions that were in place before the civil war erupted. A victorious rebel group signals the emergence of institutions and policies preferred by the rebellion's core actors, with the spoils of government given to those who were loyal to and supported the rebellion (Weinstein 2005). The reason the institutional outcome is much more certain after a military victory is because the victor's have proven their ability to monopolize the use of force by defeating the other side. After defeating the other side, there is little incentive to include them in post civil war governance. A rebel victory may actually be the most decisive victory of the two. A rebel army typically starts very small and must build its strength over time. Thus, at the beginning of the war, the government has the upper hand. However, if the rebels can defeat the government outright, they have gained enough capability to control the state altogether (Mason, Weingarten and Fett 1996; Bapat 2005; Gurses and Mason 2006). A government victory may actually result in some concessions to the rebels to prevent remobilization in the future. However, a government victory is still not likely to yield itself to the uncertainty of elections. Thus, the most uncertain post civil war environment is when the conflict ended in a negotiated settlement. These are situations in which neither side could successfully defeat the other and must, in some way, compromise as to who will rule and how that will be done. Democracy has been defined as institutionalized uncertainty about who will rule, so it seems that a natural extension of a negotiated settlement is to choose democratic institutions. Indeed, Wantchekon's (2004) theory argues just this. However, in the wake of a negotiated settlement to end a civil war, there remains the credible commitment problem with regard to choosing and implementing institutional arrangements. Such commitment problems are *different* from those surrounding the negotiated settlement because leaders are faced with solving many commitment problems over a wide range of issues beyond just stopping the fighting. There are, for instance, implementation of the demobilization agreements, setting up branches of government, arranging and organizing elections, and so on. Thus, while it may make democracy a realistic option, a negotiated settlement does not imply that it will actually be implemented.

In order to implement democracy after a negotiated settlement, it is necessary to get the actors to cooperate yet again. They have cooperated thus far on ending the civil war. But,

as noted above, a whole new array of credible commitment problems have arisen concerning institutional arrangements. Relevant actors must cooperate and agree to 1) implement democracy in the first place, 2) hold elections and decide on when to hold elections, 3) implement the terms of the settlement in such a way that facilitates elections, and 4) begin the process of basic state building (as in building a police force, an economy, a new military, infrastructure, and so on). Thus, the dilemma that the former litigants face is essentially a modified prisoner's dilemma, one in which joint defection could lead back into war, a single defection from one side could lead either back into war or into an autocratic regime, and joint cooperation (could) lead to a democratic outcome. This presentation may be too simplistic, because I imply that their cooperation is really needed on one major issue: whether or not to adopt democratic rules of the game. In reality, however, the commitment needed by both actors involves many issues, some of which are noted above. However, to keep the theoretical story simple and clear, I summarize the dilemma in Figure 2, focused around the major issue of democracy vs. non-democracy. These represent likely outcomes of cooperation vs. non-cooperation by the potential democratizers. Even if both actors want a democratic outcome, absent credible commitments by both sides, they might well take the opportunity during a post settlement period to re-mobilize and build back their strength in order to secure themselves should another conflict erupt (Greig and Diehl 2005<sup>1</sup>).

---

<sup>1</sup>Greig and Diehl (2005) note that this is the "pessimistic" view of peacekeeping. These are situations in which actors are using the presence of cease-fires and peacekeeping operations to keep an eye on each other and build up their own strength in order to gain the advantage in capability after a cease fire.

FIGURE 3.2. The Democratizing Warlord's Dilemma

|               | Cooperate (R)    | Defect (R)       |
|---------------|------------------|------------------|
| Cooperate (G) | <b>Democracy</b> | Autocracy or War |
| Defect (G)    | Autocracy or War | War              |

Walter (1997, 1999) suggests third party enforcement as a way of getting around the commitment problems associated with the settlement. Such enforcement is also necessary after the settlement has been reached. This not only requires that there be guarantees of third party enforcement, but also that the settlement be enforced in order to help make commitments credible throughout the early state-building process. This implies a peacekeeping operation, but one that goes above and beyond the traditional definition of simply policing a cease-fire. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) show that multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations have a positive effect on post conflict democracy. These are missions in which peacekeeping actors go beyond simply separating the combatants to enforce peace, but also help to build infrastructure, take part in the delivery of goods and services, and monitor elections. However, they explain their effectiveness as being a function of the conflict's battlefield conditions, suggesting that such missions are necessary in the aftermath of only the most intensive conflicts. I believe that such missions may be appropriate for almost any civil war, if democracy is desired after it. These peacekeeping operations go well beyond calming down former combatants to enforce a settlement. They may provide election monitoring and infrastructure observation which can go a long way to making commitments to democracy by the former warring actors credible. Having this kind of extensive third party enforcement after a civil war is over may help greatly in helping actors gain enough confidence in each other to democratize effectively. In Mozambique, such a mission was in place, and some literature points to its success as helping to secure demobilization, observe founding elections, and sustain the overall transition to democracy (Walter 1999; Manning 2001). In fact, Walter (1999) points to the extensive UN presence as the key factor in the successful settlement of Mozambique's civil war and subsequent transition. Walter (1999)

further points that the commitment level of conflict management actors is important. The more willing conflict management actors are to fully do the job required of them, the more likely the conflict actors will feel secure enough to credibly commit to peace. Thus missions in which the peacekeeping actors are demonstrably committed to securing a long term peace are more likely to be effective.

Suppose states in which there were civil wars that ended in a negotiated settlement also have a an effective and extensive peacekeeping operation. Does that mean they will necessarily have democracy? Not at all. How certain policies are put into place during the post settlement phase is also crucial. I contend that the most important policy, prior to the first election, is demobilization. Walter (1997) suggests that actors demobilize slowly, since an immediate disarmament adds to actors' insecurities. However, while this may be an effective strategy for getting to the settlement, it has to be enforced strongly before the first election. The credible commitment problem arises again. Suppose the two former warring actors still have two separate armies and the new state holds an election. The winner is clear, but the loser still has an army. There is very little incentive for this actor to admit defeat and become the loyal opposition. What is more likely is to defect from the cooperation for democracy and start the war again. In fact, this is exactly what happened in Angola in the early 1990s (Paris 1997). After their founding elections following a civil war, in which there were international peacebuilding operations and international observation, the peace process broke down and the war started again. The loser of the election, the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola<sup>2</sup>) rebel group, did not accept the results and returned to war. Paris (1997) notes that observers pointed to a lack of full demobilization of both groups. While a slower demobilization might be helpful early on in the peace process, if states are trying to move from an uncertain political future with violence (civil war) to an uncertain political future without violence (democracy), the tools that make civil war possible must be severely weakened before democracy is to become a likely outcome.

---

<sup>2</sup>Translated from Portuguese in (Paris 1997).



### 3.1.1. *The International Environment*

Thus far, the story presented is essentially a two player prisoner's dilemma between the former combatants with an external enforcer (peacekeepers) as the solution. However, if more players join the game with a less than neutral agenda, then the game could change. Cunningham (2006) notes that the more actors there are at the bargaining table, the less likely a settlement is to be reached to end a civil war. The reason for this is that the more divergent preferences that are present at the bargaining table, the smaller the bargaining space is. After a civil war, the situation is similar. Even if there was a negotiated settlement to end the war, neighboring states (or major powers) may have an interest in who gains power after the war. Other states may not accept the uncertainty inherent in a democracy, believing that an elected leader opposed to their international agenda could hurt them. So, if another state intervenes in the negotiation process (militarily or otherwise), it could lead to the start of a new war or a more certain institutional arrangement, such as autocracy. States that are the most vulnerable to such interference from other states are those in which there was a military intervention or those located in a "hostile" neighborhood. A hostile neighborhood may reinforce the credible commitment problem. If a neighboring state is willing to sponsor one of the former litigants in the civil war by providing arms, soldiers, or sanctuary, then the former combatants may only be using the post war institutional negotiations to regain strength and build their capabilities to win outright in a renewed conflict. Thus, a renewed civil war seems more likely when states are part of a hostile neighborhood.

Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) theorize that states that intervene in a civil war may not encourage democracy because they do not have the willingness to help states along because it could be detrimental with their own domestic audiences. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) note that the presence of a military intervention is likely to extend the duration of a conflict. Gibler (2007) shows that more peaceful neighborhoods are more likely to encourage democratization and that settled borders are actually the reason for the observed democratic peace. All of these works conform to the logic presented above. States that are not involved in international crises are less likely to view domestic audiences as a threat sympathetic to enemy states and, therefore, are less likely to repress (Poe and Tate

1994). They are also less likely to see the formation of new or renewed rebellions based in other states (Salehyan 2008). Thus, post civil war states that are part of a cooperative international environment are more likely to have a wider bargaining space and are also more likely to risk the uncertainty of democracy. A cooperative international environment is not one in which democracy is necessarily likely, but one in which it is possible.

To summarize, post civil war democratization is not simply joint cooperation to agree to become democratic. Nor is it as simple as the cooperation to settle the civil war in the first place, as Wantchekon (2004) portrays it. Rather, it is a repeated game in which the actors have to have enough confidence in the commitments of each other to keep playing the game, over and over, until the elections are held and the winners take office. After a civil war, this is incredibly difficult. It takes third party enforcement, but not in the limited sense of just enforcing a peaceful settlement. Third party enforcement in a multi-dimensional mission is helpful for the myriad of credible commitment problems that arise when these actors are attempting to start a democratic state. However, conflict management timing and enforcement also seem crucial. One major difference between the success of Mozambique and the failure in Angola is that while both states had peacekeeping operations in place, one enforced demobilization before the first election and the other did not. Not demobilizing before the first election allows the loser of the first election to return to war when they feel insecure about how the government will operate. Further, if a state is part of a cooperative international environment, the bargaining space for institutional arrangements between the former combatants is likely to be much larger and they are more likely to choose democracy.

### 3.2. Conditions for Post-Conflict Democracy: Hypotheses

This section derives specific hypotheses drawn from the theoretical story presented above. It points to specific factors as affecting post civil war democratization, such as certain types of peacekeeping operations, how the civil war ends, when demobilization happens, and specifically what about the international environment is so important. I begin by discussing the conditions that make democratization more or less likely. The first condition is that negotiated settlements make democracy more likely and outright victories make it less likely.

Peacekeeping should make democracy more likely by helping to make commitments credible. Demobilization, if done before the first election, makes democracy more likely. If not done properly, it could launch the state back into war. Finally, a cooperative international environment, which if not in place could result in an autocracy or more war. I conclude the section by discussing generally the control variables that need to be incorporated for the empirical analysis that follows in subsequent chapters.

### 3.2.1. *The Importance of a Negotiated Settlement*

The second phase of Rustow's democracy path is the conflict phase. Obviously, post civil war states have gone through this already, albeit in a more extreme form than Rustow originally conceived. His third phase, the decision phase, is the focus of this paper. Essentially, I am in search of the conditions that make a democratic choice by conflict actors more likely. Four major conditions emerge as necessary for democracy to be a viable political option after a civil conflict. The first is some form of settlement between the warring actors. Negotiated settlements are noted in the literature as the civil war conclusion most conducive to post-war peace, better human rights performance and an increasing level of democracy (Licklider 1995; Mason and Fett 1996; Mason, Weingarten and Fett 1999; Poe et al. 2005; Gurses and Mason 2006). The settlement is important because during the war, one side could not completely dominate the other. The government could not effectively maintain a monopoly on the use of force, and the rebels could not effectively overthrow the government. Therefore, it is necessary for the two sides to settle in order to end the war. Power sharing is implied by a negotiated settlement. A transition to democracy is thus natural from a negotiated settlement to end the war. Democracy, which can be conceived as an institutional way of resolving political conflicts non-violently, seems the most likely course of action after a negotiated settlement. After a military victory by either a rebel group or the government, there is very little incentive to open the political system up and accommodate those with whom the victor was recently at war. Research on repression and political violence points out that the government, when faced with a domestic political crises, essentially has the choice to accommodate or to repress. Likewise, opposition groups also have the choice to become violent or remain peaceful. Once a civil war has begun, though, both parties have made the

choice to become violent against one another, and accommodation is essentially gone as an option until a stalemate occurs in the conflict. Once a military victory is achieved, however, and the enemy is disposed of, then it seems less likely that a victor would share power with anyone. Thus:

*Hypothesis 1.* Post civil war states established through a negotiated settlement are more likely to result in a democracy, *ceteris paribus*.

### 3.2.2. *The Need for Credible Commitments*

In addition to having some form of a settlement to end the war to encourage a permanent settlement (i.e. democracy), the settlement has to be viable. There is a need in post civil war states for *credible commitments* to a stable peace, in order for that stable peace to transition to a democracy. Fearon (1995), in his explanation of the outbreak of war<sup>3</sup>, notes that one factor that leads to the outbreak of violence is the lack of credible commitments in the international system. This is also problematic in a post civil war environment, even after a negotiated settlement. Without incentives or assurance that each actor will keep their end of the peace settlement, the end of violence is not guaranteed. Without an effective end of the violence, democracy is simply not a viable option.

However, once the ability of actors to make credible commitments is introduced, the likelihood of an eventual transition to democracy increases. Credible commitments in the peacebuilding process over a range of issues allows for an extension of the future for cooperation between the government and former rebels, rather than making it a simple one shot game in which actors can more easily defect (Axelrod 1984; Walter 1997, 1999). If the two sides can successfully settle their conflict, then they may also be able to set up institutions that essentially make the settlement permanent via democracy.

There are a few ways, in a post civil war environment, in which credible commitments can become possible. One is through a neutral external actor, such as a peacekeeping force. Peacekeeping, sometimes derided for its perceived lack of success in fostering permanent settlements to violence between states and inside states, is usually treated as a black box by

---

<sup>3</sup>While Fearon is actually describing the outbreak of interstate war, it can easily be understood as being between two actors in a situation of state failure, as in a civil war or immediately after a civil war.

the literature. Some works have only looked at the presence or absence of any type missions to test their effect (Poe et al. 2005; Gurses and Mason 2006) rather than looking at specific mission dynamics, such as mission duration (Greig and Wright 2006), or mission type (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004). The major goal of peacekeeping missions is to secure the peace by instilling confidence on both sides by providing information to ensure that the commitments and actions taken by either side conform to the settlement (Diehl 1993, 5-7). The debate in the literature on peacekeeping centers around the effectiveness of peacekeepers. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) show that in certain contexts, peacekeeping has a positive effect upon peace duration. They also show that multi-dimensional peacekeeping forces, which can help to build an infrastructure and monitor the founding elections, are helpful in not only keeping a state peaceful for a period of time, but also in promoting democracy. Fortna (2003; 2004) also shows that on the whole, peacekeeping helps to promote longer periods of peace. Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001) indicate that settlements with third party enforcement are more likely to endure. Greig and Diehl (2005), however, examine peacekeeping more pessimistically, noting that it may simply provide an opportunity for combatants to replenish their strengths and begin fighting again. This is a separate problem from that of credible commitments, which is the problem of the incentive to misrepresent actual capabilities in order to gain an advantage in the conflict (Fearon 1995<sup>4</sup>). Empirically, Gurses and Mason (2006) shows that UN presence does not significantly improve democracy levels at year five or year ten after the fighting stops.

Essentially, however, much of the literature that focuses on the effectiveness of peacekeeping does not speak of ways in which certain missions may be “better” than others nor do they seek to explain the quality of peacekeeping through mission *dynamics* themselves. The literature that does treat mission types separately focuses on the mandate of the mission (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004), but not the intensity of interest with which peacekeepers operated. Walter (1999) notes that in order for peacekeeping to really be successful, the actors in the conflict must believe that the peacekeepers can be effective. She notes that

---

<sup>4</sup>Fearon’s (1995) work is actually about actors in interstate conflict. However, the logic of his argument has been applied in previous works for civil conflict (Walter 1997, 1999).

“if groups are uncertain whether peacekeepers will arrive, if they do not believe that peacekeepers can effectively verify compliance or protect them as they report to assembly areas, or if they are not convinced that peacekeepers will stay until demobilization is complete, then their role as a reassuring device will be undercut, and it seems highly unlikely that implementation will succeed,” (Walter 1999, 154). In a response to this problem of knowing whether or not peacekeeping operations do sustain until demobilization, Greig and Wright (2006) examine the likelihood that certain peacekeeping operations are more “committed” than others to peace in a civil war. That work found that there are certain factors that contribute to some peacekeeping missions lasting until the end of the civil conflict. For instance, we found that UN missions, missions led by major powers, and missions in which there are already cease-fires are more likely to sustain until the end of the civil war. For my purposes here, only the missions that stayed until the end of the civil war are of interest. Earlier works (Poe, Mason, Colley, and Quinn 2005; Gurses and Mason 2006), use only a simple dummy variable indicating the presence of UN peacekeeping operations. Greig and Wright (2006) demonstrate that peacekeeping is much more complicated than can be appropriately represented by a simple present or not present dummy variable, and a variable that represents the *quality* of peacekeeping should be taken into account. Missions deemed “sustained” by Greig and Wright (2006) will be missions that have a much greater influence on what form the institutions of post civil wars states will assume than those that did not sustain until the end of the conflict. Such missions instill more confidence between the actors and should also help to give rise to credible commitments. Thus, such peacekeeping efforts should also make democratic institutional choice more likely. Multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004), with an increased scope of the mission, should also be helpful in getting actors to democratize after the conflict. Thus:

*Hypothesis 2.* The presence of a multi-dimensional peacebuilding operation should make it more likely for a post civil war state to choose democracy, *ceteris paribus*.

*Hypothesis 2a.* The presence of a “sustained” peacemaking operation to help settle the conflict should make it more likely that a post civil war state will choose democracy, *ceteris paribus*.

### 3.2.3. *Demobilization*

Two other conditions make both a stable peace and democracy more likely after a civil war. Demobilization is the disarming of litigants throughout the state, which is sometimes followed by their integration into the new government’s army. This process, if properly implemented, makes a relapse into conflict less likely. One of the advantages post civil war states have in maintaining more lasting peace over post-interstate war regions is the fact that demobilization ostensibly should remove the warmaking capacity of one of the former combatants, leaving one army instead of two or more. Situations in which former rebels are also integrated into the army also provide them with a stake in the new government, independent of the electoral process. That should reduce the ability of and incentive for former rebels to remobilize. By offering the former rebels jobs as soldiers in the new regime, the new government removes some of the private incentive to return to violence. By giving former rebels a stake in the state independent of the electoral process, it also makes remobilization less likely even if the former rebels lose electorally. It also prevents complete control of the army by the former government actors, and thus could make recognition of elections more likely should the former government actors lose. This joint stake in the future state that is achieved independently of election results helps build confidence between former warring actors as to their commitment to a peaceful settlement. The literature disagrees about how demobilization should proceed. Walter (1997) suggests a slower demobilization, letting the conflict actors feel more secure as the peace agreement is enforced. However, I contend that demobilization needs to be at least strongly enforced by the time the first election happens. Otherwise, states may suffer the same fate as Angola, in which rebels who were not disarmed took up fighting again after they lost the election. Disarming slowly may be a good idea, but it seems that it needs to be accomplished before the uncertainty of the first elections to force compliance with results.

*Hypothesis 3.* Successful demobilization before the first election make democratization more likely in post civil war states, *ceteris paribus*.

#### 3.2.4. *Cooperative International Environment*

A cooperative international environment, though one of the most difficult concepts to specify, is also crucial for post civil war democratization. Though not part of the theoretical outline of credible commitments to peace and democracy, this concept nonetheless deserves some attention. Very few civil wars are between only in-state actors. Salehyan (2008) notes that the second leading cause for a militarized interstate dispute is actually rooted in a civil war. When a third party intervenes, it is typically on one side or another, pursuing its own interests for one side to win. While I believe that a third party that is actually neutral should make democratization more likely by providing credible commitments, the entrance of a third party into a conflict introduces much uncertainty into the mix after the conflict is over. Third parties could continue to support rebel movements or help to prop up repressive governments after the end of the conflict. Thus, it seems necessary for post civil war states to be in an international environment that is supportive (or at least not openly hostile) to democracy. The absence of hostile international actors should provide for more credible commitments and a lack of remobilization if there is no external funding for violence or repression.

There is a multitude of literature that examines how the international system and the spread of democracy interact. From the massive literature on the democratic peace, to democratic norm cascades, to the influence of the end of the Cold War, there is little doubt that there is some connection between the characteristics of the international system and domestic transitions to democracy. To some degree, all of the forces mentioned above are at play when states choose institutions in the aftermath of a civil war. The end of the Cold War, used by some (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) as a proxy for external funding of rebel groups, is likely to have an impact. Though it cannot be directly linked to funding for rebel groups the way that Collier and Hoeffler (2004) suggest, the Cold War was a period when the major powers were less concerned about the institutional make-up of an ally country than the stance it took in the bipolar competition. This is not the same as funding rebel



groups, though that is one form of intervention the major powers took during the Cold War (Huntington 1991; Blanton 2005). They also propped up and even encouraged autocratic regimes if they were allies (Blanton 2005).

*Hypothesis 4.* Post civil war states after the Cold War are more likely to choose democratic institutions than post civil war state during the Cold War, *ceteris paribus*.

The effects of the Cold War really only apply to major power stakes in post civil war institutions. They do not adequately speak to the interests of other regional actors in what types of post conflict states emerge. Many of the supporters of either rebels or the government during a civil war were not major powers or proxies for them, but were simply neighbors of the states in conflict. Gibler (2007), in his take on the democratic peace, notes that it is not actually joint democracy between states that produces democracy, but rather that that joint peace (in the form of settled borders) that produces democratic-dominant regions. He draws from older literature (Moore 1966) on democratization, noting that if states have to mobilize societies to fight wars internationally, then they are more likely to repress domestically (Poe and Tate 1994), hindering the chances that states will transition into full-fledged democracies. Because civil wars can spread into international wars (Salehyan 2008), interstate conflicts could greatly hinder the ability of a post civil war state to democratize.

*Hypothesis 5.* Post civil war states are less likely to democratize during periods of international crisis, *ceteris paribus*.

### 3.2.5. “National Unity”, Identity Conflicts, and Structural Conditions: Control Variables

Rustow (1971) describes the process of democratization. He argues that in order for democratization to occur a state must go through three phases. The first, which is really more of a pre-condition more than a phase, is national unity. This pre-condition is rather problematic for post civil war cases. The way Rustow describes the issue, he implies that the potential democratizers must agree that they are one people essentially. Many countries do not meet this pre-condition. Lijphart (1999) describes institutional arrangements that are very effective for democracy to be consolidated for states that are divided. What I think *is* necessary is not national unity so much as agreed upon issues of contention and an agreed

upon concept of what the state is. This means that the actors are competing for governing the same space. If an actor does not want to be a part of the state at all, or is only concerned with governance in one region, then they violate national unity. By agreed upon issues of contention, I refer to the condition whereby the potential democratizing actors are competing over the same policy space. They do not have to agree on how best to manage the issues at stake, but simply agree on what those issues are. This modified version of Rustow's pre-condition is particularly problematic for states emerging out of an irredentist or separatist conflict, or identity conflicts more broadly. These conflicts are out of step completely with the pre-condition. First, such conflicts are organized around whether a region should even be a part of the state. Thus, there is no agreement on what the state is or should be (Toft 2003). Secondly, the issues of contention (independence, federalism) are not likely to be part of the national political discussion, and instead are focused upon only the region itself. Separatist leaders are simply not concerned with what is going on in the capital, except to the degree that what goes on there affects their region. Unless the issues are nullified via some federal institutional arrangement, or autonomy is agreed to, then it seems that states emerging out of separatist conflicts may not be able to settle into a democracy. Further, countries that are fractionalized ethnically may be problematic for democracy, especially in a state with a history of ethnic repression. Both the factors of ethnic/identity wars and ethnic fractionalization are cultural demographic factors that I control for in testing in order to better distinguish the effect of process variables developed in the hypotheses.

I further control for structural conditions such as economic development, which has been shown over and over to be associated with democracy. I also control for concepts similar to those presented in the theory to better isolate the effect of the specific concepts presented in the theory. I control for any and all peacekeeping operations in order to make sure that specific types of missions are actually causing any effect. I also control for military powersharing pacts in negotiated settlements in order to better distinguish the effect of demobilization. Including these concepts as part of the empirical model should more accurately reveal the effects of the specific processes that are emphasized in the theory.

## CHAPTER 4

### RESEARCH DESIGN AND ANALYSIS

In order to test the question of what factors contribute to democratic transitions, there are some different research design options that could have been implemented. Gurses and Mason (2006) employ an OLS regression for the change in the level of democracy (as measured by Polity) at years five and ten after the civil war ends. While my dependent variable is essentially a choice to “go democratic” by leaders, I could simply employ a logit analysis at years five and ten after the war ended, keeping in line with previous works that study post conflict democratization (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). However, I deviate from this because I believe that the decision to measure the level of democracy at year five or year ten is rather arbitrary. Testing the model at five years and ten years gives one some understanding of the medium to long term impact of the variables, but it does not show exactly how states got to their five and ten year levels of democracy. The studies by Gurses and Mason (2006) and Doyle and Sambanis (2000) are really trying to gauge the long-term impact of the characteristics of the civil war (Gurses and Mason 2006) and the long-term impact of certain international policies like multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations (Doyle and Sambanis (2000)). Those research designs employed by those authors do provide some indication of long-term impacts. My study, however, is interested in what gets states to democracy in the first place and is not concerned with whether or not they are democratic after a certain amount of time. Thus, a research design similar to those previous studies would be inappropriate.

I choose instead to employ a duration model, or event history analysis, to determine what makes the choice of democracy more likely in any given year of peace after the civil war ends (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). For some countries the decision could come sooner rather than later. While five years is probably enough time to have elections and get a realistic take on what the level of democracy might be, such an approach has problems accounting for how factors, before a transition, affect the choice. A duration analysis will allow one to determine more specifically which factors impact the level of democracy *before*

it actually becomes a democracy. A model with snapshots of arbitrarily determined years after a war ends might not actually help to gauge what *causes* transitions to democracy. A duration model would measure the likelihood that a democracy emerges at any given year. This should give a clearer understanding of which factors impact the choice for democracy *before* a transition occurs.

#### 4.1. Data: Case Selection and Choice of Analysis

For my case selection, I choose the post war peace country-years as contained in the Gurses and Mason (2006) dataset, which was compiled out of the Doyle and Sambanis (2000) data. Their data set contained all country-peace years from 1947-1999, with ninety countries included in their analysis, and over 1300 country years. Their set includes the Polity scores for each country, and from that I code my dependent variable. Their data also contains some of the control variables employed, such as GDP per capita (for level of economic development), whether or not the conflict ended in a negotiated settlement, and whether or not the conflict was an ethnic war.

The analysis is an event history analysis, also called a duration model or a hazard model. This means that it runs a model that predicts for some type of “failure.” Each subject (a case in a regression model) in the model is the post civil war peace period. My subjects begin with the end of a civil war in a country and lasts until the peace ends. The hazard model is testing for the achievement of democracy. Once a subject reaches the threshold for democracy in the model, it is dropped out of the analysis. This removes the possibility that an individual case will become democratic twice in the analysis. Thus, only factors that help predict the achievement of the democratic standard for the specific model will emerge as significant.

Specifically, the duration model I employ is a Cox model. The Cox model, as opposed to the Weibull model (employed in Greig and Wright 2006), does not assume a duration dependence, which is to say it does not assume that a failure is more or less likely to occur as time goes on, which a Weibull model does (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). I have no theoretical reason to assume that as time goes on democracy is more or less likely to emerge, leaving it up to the variables to determine the shape of the hazard function.

For my event history analysis, I employ two models for two different standards of democracy. The first model tests the choice of democracy at level five or higher on the Polity scale (Marshall and Jaggers 2005). The second model tests the choice of democracy with a higher standard, seven or higher on the Polity scale. A standard of five has been used before in civil war studies (Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003). A standard of seven or higher is noted in human rights literature (Bueno de Mesquita, Downs, Smith, and Cherif 2005) as being one in which the benefits of democracy, such as respect for personal integrity rights, are received by the population. Below, I outline the differences between the two standards.

## 4.2. Operationalization of the Variables

### 4.2.1. *Democracy*

For this paper, a democracy is conceptualized under a limited institutional definition. A democracy is a set of institutions that are elected, have a constrained executive, and multiparty competition. Operationally, this definition is contained in the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2005). The Polity IV dataset provides scales in which countries are scored from negative ten to zero for their autocratic tendencies and a zero to ten for their democratic tendencies. The polity score is an aggregated twenty-one point scale ranging from negative ten to positive ten revealing a country's overall "democraticness". Democracy scores in Polity are compiled by weighting certain major components of democracy. The four major components are competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, the amount of constraint on the executive, and the openness of political participation. The component weighted the most heavily is executive constraint. An autocracy measure is also used to get the overall Polity score. This measure is generated from four components as well. The indicators are the same except that the autocracy score also takes into account how participation is regulated. The Polity score then is the overall score (democracy score - autocracy score). The standards I employ, five and seven, are then roughly scores of sixty percent and eighty percent of the overall possible Polity scores achievable, respectively. There is no explicitly listed difference between what makes a country a five and what makes one a seven. However, the component measure given the most weight is the degree of executive constraint. Therefore, it is quite likely that the major difference between a state that achieves a five and

one that achieves a seven is that the executives are more constrained in the latter (Gleditsch and Ward 1997).

Previous literature has taken on the question of unpacking the Polity scales to gain a deeper understanding of what they mean. Gleditsch and Ward (1997) note that there are several paths countries can take to receive certain scores. At one point in their research they display ten different combinations of components that can achieve a score of six on the democracy score. They also note that executive constraint is the single biggest predictor of overall scores. They further note that Polity does not have its own threshold for when a state becomes a democracy. Some civil war studies (Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003) uses a standard of five or higher on Polity. Some other studies contend that while positive scores on Polity indicate more democratic tendencies, states do not really see certain benefits associated with democracies (like respect for human rights) until they reach a threshold. In my study, consistent with previous literature (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005), that threshold is over a six on the Polity scale. I use both a score of five or higher and a score of seven or higher. A score of seven may indicate a full achievement of democracy, but a five is (I believe) indicative of leaders making the *choice* to become democracies. Since these states are essentially new states created out of the ashes of a civil war, a five may also be a more appropriate expectation. Thus in my analysis, I am using two duration models to predict the likelihood that in any given post conflict peace year that a state will reach the threshold of five or higher on Polity in the first model and whether or not they reach a seven or higher in the second model.

#### 4.2.2. *Specification and Operationalization of Causal Variables*

The major causal variables specified by the hypotheses are: how the civil war ended, credible commitments via sustained peacemaking operations before the war ends and multi-dimensional peacebuilding operations after a settlement is reached, demobilization before the first election, and the hostility of a state's international environment. *How the war ended* is measured with a series of dichotomous variables taken from the Gurses and Mason (2006) data which codes negotiated settlements, rebel victories, and government victories. I include in the model both the dummies for negotiated settlements and rebel victories,

leaving government victories as the reference category. This allows a test for whether the two different military victories might have different effects on the probability of democratic transitions, though both types of outright victory should be less likely to produce democracy than negotiated settlements.

The coding scheme for *sustained peacemaking missions* is taken from Greig and Wright (2006), which used the Mullenbach and Dixon (2006) third party intervention data. Sustained missions are the operations in which peacekeepers intervened while fighting was still ongoing and continued their mission through the end of the civil war. These missions make credible commitments to democracy more likely after the civil war because in those states that had these missions, conflict actors are more likely to have confidence in the third party guarantees, thus making them more likely to want to commit to democracy (Walter 1999). Termination of the civil war was taken (in Greig and Wright (2006)) from the Fearon and Laitin (2003) work which has a civil war ending with demobilization, outright victory, or settlement followed by two years of peace. This variable was the failure variable of interest in the previous study (Greig and Wright 2006), so in order to code the presence of such missions (coded as a one for sustainable, zero for everything else), I code a one for each country that had such a mission in place and a zero for the ones that did not have the sustainable missions. This is a cross-sectional variable that does not gauge what year such a mission ended, or how long it stayed, but merely whether or not a country had such a mission before the war ended.

*Multi-dimensional peacebuilding missions* are the type that receive a lot of emphasis in Doyle and Sambanis (2000). These are the missions that go beyond just security and enforcement of peace agreements and help to build infrastructure, observe elections, and contribute to statebuilding. The data for these mission types are taken from Fortna (2004), who includes all multi-dimensional peacebuilding operations, not simply those carried out by the United Nations. These were coded as anything above a three on Fortna's peacekeeping scale, which includes multi-dimensional missions as well as Chapter VII enforcement missions. Having both of these included in this one variable captures the most extensive of missions. This variable is also a cross-sectional dichotomous measure, coded with a one for countries that had such missions, and a zero for countries that did not have such missions.

*Demobilization before the first election*, is drawn by examining all of the states in the dataset using Keesing's archives and various other sources. My theory emphasized not that there is some notion of demobilization as a part of the settlement, but that it is enforced before the first election to make commitments to election results more credible and to help prevent the resumption of the war. Thus, I employ a dichotomous measure of demobilization enforcement and code a one for states in which disarmament was strongly enforced *before* the first election, and a zero for every other country. The details of the coding process for this variable are included in Appendix A, along with a list of all of the states in which demobilization was completed before the first election. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003), in their study of military power sharing, have data for which negotiated settlements have provisions for military power sharing, which includes disarmament and integration into one army. However, their data do not discriminate between those that were enforced fully by the first election and those that were not. I control for military power sharing in the model, however, to gauge the independent effect of demobilization timing.

The concept of a *cooperative international environment* is operationalized with two variables: the cold war, and the level of international hostility during the post civil war peace period. *Cold War* is simply a dummy variable coded one for all years before 1988 for all countries. I chose 1988 because it was during that year that the Soviet Union announced its pullout of Eastern Europe, signaling a much less direct Soviet foreign policy (Keller 1988). For the level of international hostility, I chose to use a common measure of interstate hostility, which is the presence of a militarized interstate dispute (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004). These data are taken from the Militarized Interstate Dispute 3 dataset, put together from the Correlates of War project (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). Any year in which a state experienced a MID with a hostility level of three or greater, I code as a one, and all years that did not were coded as a zero. I chose the level of three or greater because a level three indicates an actual display of force. A level one indicates some form of crisis, but no militarized action. A level two contains threats, but again no action. Thus, level three indicates some actual observable military hostility. I predict that such MID periods are much less likely to yield democratic transitions because governments tend to not tolerate much opposition during periods of international conflict (Poe and Tate 1994; Gibler 2007).



#### 4.2.3. *Specification and Operationalization of Control Variables*

The theory presented earlier included a number of control variables that must be included to have a fully specified model. Among these is a variable for *identity wars*, a variable taken from Doyle and Sambanis (2000). Their coding is a dichotomous variable, with a score of one indicating such wars and a zero otherwise. This variable is to get at the concept of national unity in Rustow (1970), in which actors that disagree about the nature of the state and who should be included are less likely to agree to democratize. The level of economic development is measured as GDP per capita, transformed into its natural logarithm. *Ethnic fractionalization* is simply the proportion of the population of the largest ethnic group from Fearon (2002)<sup>1</sup>. All of the above variables were taken from the Gurses and Mason (2006) data.

The other control variables contained within the analysis are any peacekeeping operations, military powersharing in the negotiated settlements, and military interventions. The purpose of having the *peacekeeping* control is to test whether there is an independent effect found for sustained peacemaking operations and multi-dimensional peacebuilding operations. The data for this variable are taken from Fortna (2004), which contains a simple dummy variable for whether or not a country experienced any type of peacekeeping, again a cross-sectional variable. Further, since some of the missions that were “sustained” did not necessarily have a presence in the post war period, I added all observations from the sustained peacemaking variable to the peacekeeping control. This better captures the independent effects of any peacekeeping versus the effect of sustained missions only. *Military powersharing* is a dummy variable that indicates whether a country had military powersharing as part of its negotiated settlement. These data are taken from Hartzell and Hoddie (2003). The purpose of this variable is to gauge whether or not the independent effect of demobilization before the first election is truly independent, or simply a function of having power-sharing as part of the settlement. I further control for whether or not a third party intervened militarily on one side or the other during the civil war. This is to better proxy the international environment. Previous works (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000, Cunningham 2006) show that

---

<sup>1</sup>Also used in Fearon and Latin (2003).

civil wars last longer the more actors are involved. Cunningham (2006) shows that the more actors involved also decreases the bargaining space. After a civil war, a multitude of actors involved in the bargaining over institutional choices may lessen the chances that democratic institutions are an equilibrium outcome. The data for this variable, *military intervention*, comes from the Correlates of War project (2000). I code a one for all states that had such interventions and a zero for the rest.

### 4.3. Model Specification

To summarize, I run two models with two different dependent variables. Each of the models are specified in the same way. Each model includes the theoretically derived variables of: *how the civil war ends, credible commitments via sustained peacemaking and multi-dimensional peacebuilding, demobilization prior to the first election, and a hostile international environment operationalized via the cold war and international crises*. Each model also includes the control variables of: *economic development (GDP per capita), ethnic fractionalization, identity conflicts, any peacekeeping operations, and military powersharing presence in the negotiated settlement*. Table 4.1 summarizes the model, each variable's coding scheme, and the source for the data. Table 4.2 summarizes the major expectations with each variable in the model.

### 4.4. Empirical Analysis

The first test I employ of factors that predict democracy after civil wars is a Cox hazard model. It should be noted that I also ran tests using the Weibull hazard model<sup>2</sup>. The major difference between the two estimation techniques is that the Weibull model assumes monotonic duration dependence, which is to say that as time goes on, a failure is assumed to be more or less likely. I have no theoretical reason to believe that as time goes on, democracy is more or less likely. Therefore, while I estimated Weibull results, I do not feel they are appropriate for my theory. The Cox model makes no assumptions about time dependence. The first Cox model is tested against the standard of democracy of a five or greater on the

---

<sup>2</sup>The results from the Weibull tests are presented in Appendix B.

TABLE 4.1. The Model

| <b>Variable</b>                             | <b>Coding</b>  | <b>Source</b>   |
|---|--|---|
| <b>Democracy</b>                            | Dummy ( $\geq 7$ ; $\geq 5$ )                        | Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2005)                               |
| <b>How the Civil War Ends</b>               | Dummy  | Gurses and Mason (2006)   |
| <b>Sustained Peacemaking Operations</b>     | Dummy  | Greig and Wright (2006); Mullenbach and Dixon (2006)                |
| <b>Multi-Dimensional Peacebuilding</b>      | Dummy  | Fortna (2004)   |
| <b>Demobilization before First Election</b> | Dummy  | See Appendix A  |
| <b>Cold War</b>                             | Dummy (before 1988)                                  | None  |
| <b>Hostile International Environment</b>    | Presence of MID $\geq 3$ during Peace Period (Dummy) | Correlates of War (Ghosn, Palmer, Bremer 2004)                      |
| <b>Control Variables</b>                    | <b>Coding</b>  | <b>Source</b>   |
| <b>Economic Development</b>                 | lnGDP  | Gurses and Mason (2006)   |
| <b>Ethnic Fractionalization</b>             | Percent Share of Largest Group                       | Gurses and Mason (2006); Fearon and Laitin (2003)                   |
| <b>Identity Wars</b>                        | Dummy  | Gurses and Mason (2006); Doyle and Sambanis (2000)                  |
| <b>Any Peacekeeping</b>                     | Dummy  | Fortna (2004); Greig and Wright (2006); Mullenbach and Dixon (2006) |
| <b>Military Powersharing</b>                | Dummy  | Hartzell and Hoddie (2003)  |
| <b>Military Intervention</b>                | Dummy  | Correlates of War (Sarkees 2000)                                    |

polity scale. Each country is included for every year in their peace period until they either reach the “failure” (in this case, democracy), the peace ends, or the dataset ends (in 1999). Table 4.3 shows the results of the first test, with robust standard errors clustering on post war peace periods. I report only the hazard ratios and not the coefficients due to ease of interpretation. Coefficients in hazard models do not yield themselves to inference as well as the hazard ratios, which are simply how many times more likely an event is to occur due to

TABLE 4.2. The Model and Predictions for Democracy

| <b>Variable</b>                             | <b>Expected Direction</b> |
|---|---------------------------|
| <b>Negotiated Settlement</b>                | Positive                  |
| <b>Rebel Victory</b>                        | Negative                  |
| <b>Sustained Peacemaking</b>                | Positive                  |
| <b>Multi-Dimensional Peacebuilding</b>      | Positive                  |
| <b>Demobilization before First Election</b> | Positive                  |
| <b>Cold War</b>                             | Negative                  |
| <b>Hostile International Environment</b>    | Negative                  |
| <b>Control Variables</b>                    | <b>Expected Direction</b> |
| <b>Economic Development</b>                 | Positive                  |
| <b>Ethnic Fractionalization</b>             | Negative                  |
| <b>Identity Wars</b>                        | Negative                  |
| <b>Any Peacekeeping</b>                     | Positive                  |
| <b>Military Powersharing</b>                | Positive                  |
| <b>Military Intervention</b>                | Negative                  |

the presence of an independent variable. To interpret these ratios, one should subtract one from the ratio. Ratios less than one are negatively related to the variable of interest.

The results in Table 4.3 show that over the last fifty years, there were thirty-five post civil war countries that became polity level five or greater democracies. The overall model statistics of the  $\chi^2$  tests indicate that the model is a good fit. Negotiated settlements to end the civil war are significantly associated with post conflict democracy, as the theory predicted and previous literature has shown (Wantchekon 2004, Gurses and Mason 2006). Negotiated settlements determine the bargaining space over which institutional arrangement will be decided after a civil war. The results indicate that states that had a negotiated settlement are about three and half times more likely to become democracies than states whose war ended with an outright government victory. Demobilization also has a profound effect on post civil war democratization. The results indicate that countries that demobilize before the first election are about ninety percent more likely to democratize than countries that do not.

TABLE 4.3. Cox Model for Democracy: Polity  $\geq 5$ 

| Variable                                    | Hazard Ratio [S.E.] | P-Value (2-tailed) |
|---|---------------------|--------------------|
| <b>Negotiated Settlement</b>                | 4.665 [2.609]***    | 0.006              |
| <b>Rebel Victory</b>                        | 1.224 [0.590]       | 0.675              |
| <b>Sustained Peacemaking</b>                | 1.683 [0.849]       | 0.302              |
| <b>Multi-Dimensional Peacebuilding</b>      | 0.586 [0.294]       | 0.287              |
| <b>Demobilization Before First Election</b> | 1.929 [0.658]**     | 0.054              |
| <b>Cold War</b>                             | 1.214 [0.498]       | 0.636              |
| <b>Hostile International Environment</b>    | 0.815 [0.410]       | 0.684              |
| <b>Economic Development</b>                 | 1.572 [0.276]***    | 0.010              |
| <b>Ethnic Fractionalization</b>             | 0.498 [0.352]       | 0.324              |
| <b>Identity Wars</b>                        | 0.820 [0.301]       | 0.589              |
| <b>Any Peacekeeping</b>                     | 2.573 [1.382]**     | 0.078              |
| <b>Military Powersharing</b>                | 0.517 [0.262]*      | 0.192              |
| <b>Military Intervention</b>                | 0.219 [0.123]***    | 0.007              |

Subjects: 95; Failures: 35 N= 751 1-Tailed Significance: \*=0.10, Wald  $\chi^2$ : 89.35;  $p > \chi^2$ : 0.0000  
 \*\*=0.05, \*\*\*=0.01

Military power-sharing agreements have a significant negative effect, however. The analysis shows that states that had such agreements are about fifty percent less likely to democratize than states that did not have such an agreement. This result is slightly puzzling, since these two variables are conceptually related. One possible inference to draw from this is that an agreement on military powersharing is ineffective so long as it is not enforced, and that the timing of such a policy is important. This confirms some of the findings of Mukherjee (2006) about the weakness of power sharing agreements emerging out of negotiated settlements. Economic development is also significantly associated with post war democracy, a well noted finding throughout most of the democratization literature.

Neither sustained peacemaking missions or multi-dimensional peacebuilding operations show any significant effect, but the peacekeeping control does. This may be due to an

issue of multi-collinearity between sustained peacemaking operations and the peacekeeping control. They correlate at roughly seventy percent. In order to get at whether or not there is any independent effect of sustained peacemaking, I estimated two other models with this standard of democracy in which the peacekeeping control is removed in one and sustained peacemaking is removed in the other. The results of these tests, presented in Appendix B, show that when the peacekeeping control is removed, sustained peacemaking operations are significant. If sustained peacemaking is removed, the peacekeeping control retains its significance. The major inference I draw from the results of the separate tests is that *peacekeeping matters*, but I am unable to infer that specific mission characteristics have any independent effect. This inference, while not confirming my specific hypotheses about peacekeeping, does confirm the idea that credible commitments do arise out of external enforcement. The positive influence of peacekeepers goes beyond monitoring and enforcing a cease-fire agreement, but also helps states to democratize.

Finally, though hostile international environment and the cold war variables show no significant effect, military intervention does. The results show that states that had an outside military intervention into their civil war are almost one and half times less likely to democratize. Military interventions into civil wars indicate a limited bargaining space that arises out of hostile external actors. So, while the specific variables that emerged out of the hypotheses did not appear significant, the fact that military interventions has a significant negative impact upon post civil war democratization indicates that a hostile international environment is detrimental to democratization.

As a robustness check on the above results, I also tested for states reaching level seven or higher on Polity. Table 4.4 shows the results of the Cox model for this standard. It also reports only the hazard ratios, with robust standard errors clustered on peace periods. At first glance, the model also has a highly significant  $\chi^2$  statistic. This model shows twenty-six failures of the ninety five subjects.

These results largely confirm the findings in the first test, but with two key differences. Like in the first test, negotiated settlements, economic development, the peacekeeping control, military powersharing, and interventions are significant and in the same direction, with

TABLE 4.4. Cox Model for Democracy: Polity  $\geq 7$ 

| Variable                                    | Hazard Ratio [S.E.] | P-Value (2-tailed) |
|---|---------------------|--------------------|
| <b>Negotiated Settlement</b>                | 5.349 [3.153]***    | 0.004              |
| <b>Rebel Victory</b>                        | 1.410 [0.939]       | 0.605              |
| <b>Sustained Peacemaking</b>                | 0.698 [0.438]       | 0.567              |
| <b>Multi-Dimensional Peace-building</b>     | 0.665 [0.333]       | 0.415              |
| <b>Demobilization Before First Election</b> | 1.063 [0.557]       | 0.907              |
| <b>Cold War</b>                             | 1.551 [0.819]       | 0.406              |
| <b>Hostile International Environment</b>    | 0.459 [0.240]*      | 0.137              |
| <b>Economic Development</b>                 | 1.732 [0.407]***    | 0.019              |
| <b>Ethnic Fractionalization</b>             | 0.440 [0.376]       | 0.337              |
| <b>Identity Wars</b>                        | 0.759 [0.366]       | 0.568              |
| <b>Any Peacekeeping</b>                     | 4.007 [2.635]**     | 0.035              |
| <b>Military Powersharing</b>                | 0.436 [0.240]*      | 0.132              |
| <b>Military Intervention</b>                | 0.125 [0.088]***    | 0.003              |

Subjects: 95; Failures: 26 N= 821 1-Tailed Significance: \*=0.10, Wald  $\chi^2$ : 44.14;  $p > \chi^2$ : 0.0000  
 \*\*=0.05, \*\*\*=0.01

similar effects. The major differences between the results presented in this test and those in the first model are the results for two theoretical variables, demobilization and a hostile international environment. Demobilization is nowhere near significant in predicting whether a state becomes a level seven democracy. However, if a state experiences a militarized interstate dispute in a given year, it is about fifty percent less likely to be a seven or higher on polity.

There are a few possible reasons why these results contradict the first model. Demobilization may help with the choice to become a democracy (which a level five certain indicates), but it may be that other factors, structural or otherwise, may influence the movement toward a fuller democracy. The results on hostile international environment are particularly interesting. As noted earlier, the major determinant of a higher Polity score is the degree of

executive constraint (Gleditsch and Ward 1997). I also noted earlier that during an international crises, states are more likely to repress their population (Poe and Tate 1994). Other studies (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005) note that executive constraint is the component of Polity that is the best predictor of a strong human rights performance. Drawing all of these findings together, it may be that the states that reach level five are still able to repress their population during periods of international crises, so that involvement in a MID would not hinder a state's ability to become a five. However, the repression that may happen during an international crisis would prevent a state from achieving a score of seven or greater. This confirms some of the ideas presented by Gibler (2007) that contends that democracy emerges out of international peace.

#### 4.5. Discussion of the Theory

While the empirical analysis does not clearly confirm the theory developed in this paper, it does lend some credence to it. Every concept presented in the theory was significant in some form. Specifically, hypothesis 1, which predicted that negotiated settlements would be more likely to encourage democracy, is significant across all tests<sup>3</sup>. The results for the peacekeeping control and military interventions are also significant. Those variables represent the concepts of credible commitments through international enforcement and a hostile international environment, respectively. Demobilization had a strong impact on whether or not a state achieved a democracy score of five, but did not impact the transition to a level seven. Economic development, long associated with democracy, is also significant. Involvement in a militarized interstate dispute, conversely, had no impact on a state becoming a five, but was significant and negative for states becoming sevens. The difference between the results for both models may have more to do with the characteristics of the Polity dataset and criteria for achieving the respective scores. It does seem, though, that demobilization does impact democratic choice, but not necessarily democratic achievement. Demobilization may not actually mean that a state will become a full liberal democracy. However, it does contribute to peace and stability by preventing remobilization, which helps to put states on the right track to politics by peaceful means through a democratic government.

---

<sup>3</sup>It is also significant in both Weibull tests, see Appendix B



There were some insignificant variables in the analysis, two of which deserve attention. Specifically, neither identity conflicts or ethnic fractionalization has a significant impact on democratization. The fact that these two variables are not associated with democratization may mean that ethnic divisions simply are not a major hindrance to democratization that some literature (Horowitz 1985) has suggested.

Table 4.5 presents a summary of the hypotheses and which ones are confirmed by the statistical analysis. Overall, the theory cannot be confirmed nor dismissed completely. But, the results do indicate strong evidence that the concepts presented in the theory do have a strong impact on whether or not a state becomes a democracy after a civil war. The most robust finding is that negotiated settlements are much more likely to lead to democracy than an outright victory. Conflict management (through some form of peacekeeping) and demobilization before the first election also contribute to democracy, while a hostile international environment prevents states from becoming democracies.

TABLE 4.5. Summary of Results

| Hypothesis                           | Confirmed?          |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Negotiated Settlements            | <b>Confirmed</b>    |
| 2a. Multi-Dimensional Peacebuilding  | Not Confirmed       |
| 2b. Sustained Peacemaking            | Not Confirmed       |
| 3. Demobilization                    | Partially Confirmed |
| 4. Cold War                          | Not Confirmed       |
| 5. Hostile International Environment | Partially Confirmed |

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

This thesis addressed the question of what determines democratization in the wake of a civil war. The question is of interest both theoretically and from a policy standpoint. Theoretically, it is interesting because it asks how states can go from the most chaotic form of politics, a civil war, in which anarchy is the rule into the most open and peaceful form of politics, democracy, in which opposing sides on policy debate each other and winners and losers are determined absent violence. It is quite a transition indeed.

The theoretical approach that I took combines rationalist works surrounding the peace process with process theories of democratization. The story is about the decision leaders make after a civil war and not about structural or cultural components of the polity. It conceptualizes post civil war democratization as largely a function of the peace process. The major dilemma is getting the former litigants to credibly commit not only to peace but to an institutional arrangement that introduces permanent uncertainty and cooperation. After a civil war, when both sides have been shooting at each other, this is a very difficult task. However, I predicted that if certain conditions were in place, democracy would become more likely. A negotiated settlement to end to conflict should make democracy more likely. If the litigants can cooperate to end the conflict, they are more likely to cooperate to adopt democratic institutions, preferring that neither side take complete control of the state to the other side taking complete control. Committed conflict management, through the form of peacekeeping operations, should instill confidence in the former litigants to cooperate with each other for democracy. Demobilization before the first election should also contribute to democratization since it takes away the warmaking ability of former litigants and essentially forces them to accept election results rather than return to organized violence. A cooperative international environment was also thought to contribute to democracy. If states are not mobilizing their citizenry for an external threat, they are much less likely to crack down and repress the citizenry. Also, a cooperative international environment is much less

likely to support potential rebellions or to interfere with the internal workings the would be democratizing state.

I conducted an event history analysis for two different standards of democracy. The results confirmed that negotiated settlements can lead to democratization after a civil war. They also confirmed that the other concepts developed in the theory play an important role in post civil war democratization. Peacekeeping showed a significant positive impact upon democratization. Demobilization also showed significant and positive as a predictor of post civil war democratization. Further, a hostile international environment hinders the ability of states to go democratic after a civil war. The empirical tests also confirmed that economic development, as is well shown throughout democratization literature, is significantly associated with democratic transitions. Cultural factors, such as ethnic fractionalization and ethnic wars, showed no significant impact on democratization. Overall, the theory developed in this paper received support empirically.

### 5.1. Direction of Future Research

This paper has shown that more attention needs to be devoted to international factors and how they affect post civil war transitions. Specifically, this work shows the need to incorporate a more dynamic understanding of how international phenomena like peacekeeping operations and conflict management policy timing can influence post war political decisions. The bulk of the previous literature on peacekeeping tends to look at peacekeeping operations as sort of a black box that are either present or not (Gurses and Mason, 2006; Poe et al., 2005). Peacekeeping actors are political actors as well, and their decisions to stay the course of the entire mission have shown in this analysis to have an influence on post war institutional choice (Greig and Wright, 2006; Mullenbach, 2005). A more complete understanding of how conflict management actors influence domestic decision making is needed. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) treat multi-dimensional peacebuilding as being a function of conflict conditions, as though peacekeeping actors will automatically match a mission to a conflict. However, it seems more likely that the actors responsible for conflict management, such as the UN or regional organizations, are making a political calculation when they decide how many troops are necessary and what mission type is needed. Future work should address this hole in the

literature. Though the only significant peacekeeping variable associated with post civil war democratization was the “black box” treatment, the insignificance of the two more dynamic peacekeeping variables may be a result of either multi-collinearity or the crudeness of the data. If a more precise dataset for all of the variables was coded, perhaps the timing of conflict management policies and the importance of conflict management dynamics would reveal themselves.

Development on how conflict management policies are carried out should also be encouraged. I took one step toward this by coding the completion of demobilization before the first election. The question of why former combatants demobilize at all, given their insecurities after a civil war, is an interesting research question in its own right. Other policies, such as infrastructure rebuilding and police training, could also have a dramatic impact upon how states recover from the devastation of a civil war. These topics deserve more attention in the future.

Further developments should also focus on other international factors, such as the influence of mediation processes, military interventions on one side or the other of the civil war, and foreign aid distributions for one side or the other. Who is intervening, providing shelter to rebels, or mediating in the conflict may have a very significant effect on post civil war arrangements. Finally, other international phenomena such as refugee flows are indicated by previous literature to have an impact on the dynamics of civil conflict, and should be recognized as this project moves forward (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). While this thesis touches on some of these concepts, they are treated rather crudely in the analysis. More precise measurements of the actions of external forces should be developed and more data needs to be collected.

The subject of this project is also very limited. Further work should also be done that focuses upon other institutional arrangements that are possible after a civil war. Democracy is but one of many options that leaders face. An interesting question would be to theorize what makes dictatorships more likely after a civil war, or why elites choose oligarchic power sharing pacts rather than opt for the uncertainty of democracy. Understanding the answers to these questions could add greatly to our field’s understanding of how international factors

could affect domestic politics and what impact such institutional choices could have upon the international environment.

The research field that focuses on civil wars and post civil war politics is fundamentally interesting. It deals with some of the major questions in political science: war, institutions and institutional development, the interaction between international and domestic politics, and democracy. The basic questions of politics have to be answered by these leaders after the end of a conflict. The state must be rebuilt and the question of who gets what, when, and how is fundamental to the post civil war statebuilding process. This paper is a step in the right direction of linking international politics and policies to life in states after a civil war ends. However, this research project, like any other, is not complete and much more work deserves attention on the major political questions that surround and arise from this paper.

APPENDIX A  
CODING RULES FOR DEMOBILIZATION

## APPENDIX A

### CODING RULES FOR DEMOBILIZATION

To create this variable, I had to code data originally. The work by Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) and Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) provided a starting point. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) code military powersharing as part of a negotiated settlement. That variable is included in my analysis as a control variable. In order to gain a more precise estimate of the importance of policy timing and because I believe that disarmament is the most important part of a military powersharing agreement, I had to code for enforcement as well. Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) do code for whether or not a military powersharing agreement was partially, fully, or never implemented. However, these military powersharing agreements cover a wide range of issues, not just disarmament. They can cover everything from how power is divided within the military leadership or how many soldiers come from each group. I am specifically interested in demobilization. Demobilization before the first election is the most crucial for the transition to democracy (not necessarily for democracy's consolidation) because it takes away the ability of the election's losers to start the war again.

I began with the data from Hartzell and Hoddie (2003), and with the use of Keesing's World Archives, I went through each of their listed negotiated settlements (they list thirty-eight) and coded a one if the country significantly demobilized before the first election and zero if they did not. I then went through non-negotiated settlement states in my dataset to examine whether or not demobilization and/or elections were a part of the post conflict state even after an outright victory. If elections were scheduled and demobilization accompanied them, I also coded a one if demobilization was complete before the first election. All other states received a zero. The searches were conducted by entering the term "country and demobilization", then if that yielded no results I entered the term "country and disarmament". If that also yielded no results I simply entered the country name for the war and post civil war peace period of about two years. In addition to Keesing's, I also consulted some other works that contained case studies of peacekeeping operations. These were the

United Nations' (1996) *Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping* and the Rand Corporation's (2005) *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq*. If there were no results in Keesing's or the other sources for either elections or demobilization, then states were coded as a zero.

This university's subscription to Keesing's only covers the period of 1960 to the present. My dataset goes back to 1947, however. In order to get codings for those states not covered by Keesing's, I consulted multiple sources. First, I began with the method of consulting my committee chair, David Mason, a civil wars expert. He went through the list noting which states had elections after their civil war. Most of the states in this list did not have elections, and thus were not candidates for receiving a one for demobilization before the first election. For the states that Dr. Mason was not able to give any information on, I consulted *The Encyclopedia of World History*, edited by Stearns (2001). This provided enough information to code nearly all of the cases missing from the first round. There were two problematic cases remaining from this round of coding, Bolivia's (1952-1952) revolution and the Huk rebellion (ended in 1952) in the Philippines. For these two cases, I consulted two secondary sources. For Bolivia, I looked through Klein's (2003) *A Concise History of Bolivia* and for the Philippines, I consulted Kerkvliet's (2002 [1977]) *The Huk Rebellion*. From the examination of the remaining cases, only one is coded as a one. Bolivia's revolution destroyed the former military, garnering a complete replacement by the rebel army. Elections followed four years after the revolution. However, given my coding rules, this should be coded as a one. In future work on demobilization, should this variable be of interest for the study, perhaps a more nuanced coding scheme will be necessary to take into account the differences between formal, organized, and negotiated demobilization processes and forced demobilization through violence. However, for this research, the more crude variable is sufficient.

This is a very rudimentary coding process. However, due to the lack of any systematic database on the timing of demobilization, this is the best for the this project at the moment. A more ideal approach would take more time, but would be to create a database noting the day that the civil war ends, and to gauge the extent of demobilization by number of arms demobilized versus how many were intended to be demobilized before the first election. An



ideal database would contain dates for all three major events: end of the conflict, completion of demobilization, and the first election. Table A below lists the countries that had successful demobilizations before their first elections after the civil war.

TABLE A.1. Demobilization Before the First Election

| <b>Countries</b> | <b>War Years</b> |
|------------------|------------------|
| Bolivia          | 1952-1952        |
| Bosnia           | 1992-95          |
| Croatia          | 1992-95          |
| El Salvador      | 1979-92          |
| Guatemala        | 1978-94          |
| Haiti            | 1991-95          |
| Lebanon          | 1975-91          |
| Mozambique       | 1976-92          |
| Namibia          | 1973-89          |
| Nicaragua        | 1981-90          |
| Papua New Guinea | 1988-98          |
| Sierra Leone     | 1997-2001        |
| Zimbabwe         | 1972-79          |

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX TO THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

## APPENDIX B

### APPENDIX TO THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

This appendix contains the alternate models for peacekeeping, the results of the proportional hazards test on the two sets of results presented in the main body, and the results of the Weibull tests on the main models. I begin with the alternate peacekeeping models, displayed in Table B.1. The table presents the hazard ratios along with the two-tailed p-values. Though not presented in these tables, the tests were conducted with robust standard errors clustered on peace periods. I discussed the major findings of Table B.1. in Chapter 4, but I want to note that the effect of multicollinearity between sustained peacemaking operations and the peacekeeping control may be affecting the significance of the sustained operations. As the table shows, sustained peacemaking is significant when the peacekeeping control variable is dropped from the analysis. However, the peacekeeping control retains its significance from the models shown in Chapter 4 when sustained peacemaking operations are dropped. The major message from all of this that that peacekeeping operations do significantly contribute to states become democracies after civil wars, but that the effect of specific mission characteristics may be masked because of the crudeness of the data. Since these are cross-sectional dummy variables and are not affected by changes over time, they simply may not properly illustrate statistically the differences between missions.

TABLE B.1. Cox Model for Democracy: Polity  $\geq 5$  (2-tailed p-value in brackets)

| Variable                                    | No PK Control                                | No Sustained PK                              |
|---|--|--|
| <b>Negotiated Settlement</b>                | 5.045 [0.002]                                | 4.478 [0.008]                                |
| <b>Rebel Victory</b>                        | 1.141 [0.798]                                | 1.225 [0.682]                                |
| <b>Sustained Peacemaking</b>                | 3.199 [0.003]                                |  |
| <b>Multi-Dimensional Peace-building</b>     | 0.676 [0.433]                                | 0.586 [0.306]                                |
| <b>Demobilization Before First Election</b> | 2.749 [0.001]                                | 1.712 [0.139]                                |
| <b>Cold War</b>                             | 1.102 [0.797]                                | 1.259 [0.570]                                |
| <b>Hostile International Environment</b>    | 0.946 [0.921]                                | 0.668 [0.350]                                |
| <b>Economic Development</b>                 | 1.486 [0.007]                                | 1.595 [0.007]                                |
| <b>Ethnic Fractionalization</b>             | 0.499 [0.278]                                | 0.500 [0.347]                                |
| <b>Identity Wars</b>                        | 0.932 [0.836]                                | 0.781 [0.515]                                |
| <b>Any Peacekeeping</b>                     |  | 3.465 [0.003]                                |
| <b>Military Powersharing</b>                | 0.447 [0.142]                                | 0.543 [0.228]                                |
| <b>Military Intervention</b>                | 0.255 [0.005]                                | 0.254 [0.010]                                |
| Subjects: 95; Failures: 35 N= 751           | Wald $\chi^2$ : 75.73; $p > \chi^2$ : 0.0000 | Wald $\chi^2$ : 93.95; $p > \chi^2$ : 0.0000 |

Tables B.1 and B.2 display the proportional hazards tests for the two Cox hazard models run in the analysis as well as the alternate results for the Weibull hazard models. These tests are conducted to determine if the hypotheses tests are reliable and to see if there are any major time effects that could be making the model provide inaccurate results.

TABLE B.2. Proportional Hazards Test for Polity  $\geq 5$ 

| Variable                                    | $\rho$   | $\chi^2$ | <i>df</i> | $\mathbf{p} > \chi^2$ |
|---|----------|----------|-----------|-----------------------|
| <b>Negotiated Settlement</b>                | 0.03341  | 0.09     | 1         | 0.7698                |
| <b>Rebel Victory</b>                        | 0.07435  | 0.16     | 1         | 0.6924                |
| <b>Sustained Peacemaking</b>                | -0.07987 | 0.25     | 1         | 0.6152                |
| <b>Multi-Dimensional Peace-building</b>     | 0.04994  | 0.14     | 1         | 0.7057                |
| <b>Demobilization Before First Election</b> | 0.19773  | 1.13     | 1         | 0.2873                |
| <b>Cold War</b>                             | -0.00511 | 0.00     | 1         | 0.9740                |
| <b>Hostile International Environment</b>    | -0.17208 | 1.05     | 1         | 0.3056                |
| <b>Economic Development</b>                 | -0.04867 | 0.11     | 1         | 0.7354                |
| <b>Ethnic Fractionalization</b>             | 0.07339  | 0.27     | 1         | 0.6011                |
| <b>Identity Wars</b>                        | -0.04711 | 0.08     | 1         | 0.7788                |
| <b>Any Peacekeeping</b>                     | -0.08978 | 0.49     | 1         | 0.4847                |
| <b>Military Powersharing</b>                | 0.00478  | 0.00     | 1         | 0.9677                |
| <b>Military Intervention</b>                | 0.26080  | 2.98     | 1         | 0.0842                |
| <b>Global Test</b>                          |          | 5.41     | 13        | 0.9650                |

The results of the proportional hazards tests show that there is only one violation of the proportional hazards assumption in either Cox model. This is likely a result of the fact that most of the variables are actually coded as cross-sectional characteristics of the conflict and the post conflict state, rather than being the time sensitive characteristics that they often are in reality. Only military interventions shows some violation of the proportional hazards assumption. This means that this variable may be to some degree time dependant. However, I have confidence in the results presented in Chapter 4 on this variable as military interventions is also significant across both time dependant Weibull models presented below.

TABLE B.3. Proportional Hazards Test for Polity  $\geq 7$ 

| Variable                                    | $\rho$   | $\chi^2$ | <i>df</i> | $\mathbf{p} > \chi^2$ |
|---|----------|----------|-----------|-----------------------|
| <b>Negotiated Settlement</b>                | -0.11041 | 0.42     | 1         | 0.5170                |
| <b>Rebel Victory</b>                        | -0.10060 | 0.35     | 1         | 0.5536                |
| <b>Sustained Peacemaking</b>                | -0.05892 | 0.12     | 1         | 0.7314                |
| <b>Multi-Dimensional Peace-building</b>     | 0.05562  | 0.04     | 1         | 0.8363                |
| <b>Demobilization Before First Election</b> | 0.25577  | 0.99     | 1         | 0.3204                |
| <b>Cold War</b>                             | -0.04137 | 0.04     | 1         | 0.8360                |
| <b>Hostile International Environment</b>    | -0.07809 | 0.16     | 1         | 0.6936                |
| <b>Economic Development</b>                 | -0.07877 | 0.30     | 1         | 0.5813                |
| <b>Ethnic Fractionalization</b>             | -0.07593 | 0.14     | 1         | 0.7088                |
| <b>Identity Wars</b>                        | 0.11680  | 0.41     | 1         | 0.5228                |
| <b>Any Peacekeeping</b>                     | -0.06973 | 0.33     | 1         | 0.5682                |
| <b>Military Powersharing</b>                | 0.00066  | 0.00     | 1         | 0.9975                |
| <b>Military Intervention</b>                | 0.36812  | 2.15     | 1         | 0.1426                |
| <b>Global Test</b>                          |          | 3.63     | 13        | 0.9945                |

Though I believe there is not much reason to assume monotonic duration dependence for my analysis, I run tests with the same model as in Chapter 5 using a Weibull test. A Weibull hazard model makes the assumption that as time goes on, a subject is either more or likely to experience a “failure” of some sort (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). In the case of my analysis, the Weibull model assumes that the further removed in time from the end of the civil war, a country will either be more or less likely to experience a democratic transition. Tables B.4 and B.5 are the results for the Weibull models.

TABLE B.4. Weibull Model for Polity  $\geq 5$

| Variable                             | Hazard Ratio [S.E.] | P-Value (2-tailed) |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| Negotiated Settlement                | 13.080 [11.074]***  | 0.002              |
| Rebel Victory                        | 1.521 [1.004]       | 0.525              |
| Sustained Peacemaking                | 1.289 [1.067]       | 0.759              |
| Multi-Dimensional Peace-building     | 0.450 [0.327]       | 0.271              |
| Demobilization Before First Election | 1.918 [1.136]       | 0.272              |
| Cold War                             | 0.932 [0.457]       | 0.886              |
| Hostile International Environment    | 0.519 [0.311]       | 0.273              |
| Economic Development                 | 1.406 [0.317]*      | 0.131              |
| Ethnic Fractionalization             | 0.368 [0.378]       | 0.331              |
| Identity Wars                        | 0.753 [0.376]       | 0.570              |
| Any Peacekeeping                     | 4.422 [3.745]**     | 0.079              |
| Military Powersharing                | 0.351 [0.262]*      | 0.161              |
| Military Intervention                | 0.088 [0.085]***    | 0.012              |

Subjects: 95; Failures: 35; 1-tailed sig.: \*=0.10, \*\*=0.05, Wald  $\chi^2$ : 106.78;  $p > \chi^2$ : 0.0000  
 N=751 \*\*\*=0.01

TABLE B.5. Weibull Model for Polity  $\geq 7$ 

| Variable                             | Hazard Ratio [S.E.] | P-Value (2-tailed) |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| Negotiated Settlement                | 10.218 [7.639]***   | 0.002              |
| Rebel Victory                        | 1.677 [1.319]       | 0.511              |
| Sustained Peacemaking                | 0.597 [0.530]       | 0.562              |
| Multi-Dimensional Peace-building     | 0.945 [0.586]       | 0.927              |
| Demobilization Before First Election | 0.497 [0.392]       | 0.375              |
| Cold War                             | 0.972 [0.567]       | 0.961              |
| Hostile International Environment    | 0.325 [0.181]**     | 0.043              |
| Economic Development                 | 1.599 [0.468]**     | 0.109              |
| Ethnic Fractionalization             | 0.337 [0.396]       | 0.355              |
| Identity Wars                        | 0.676 [0.387]       | 0.492              |
| Any Peacekeeping                     | 5.269 [5.377]**     | 0.103              |
| Military Powersharing                | 0.303 [0.203]**     | 0.075              |
| Military Intervention                | 0.062 [0.061]***    | 0.005              |

Subjects: 95; Failures: 26; 1-tailed sig.: \* = 0.10, \*\* = 0.05, Wald  $\chi^2$ : 37.34;  $p > \chi^2$ : 0.0004  
N=821 \*\*\*=0.01

The results of the Weibull tests are not that much different from the results in the Cox models. The  $\chi^2$  statistics for both models are significant. The only two differences across the two models compared to the Cox models presented in Chapter 4, in terms of statistical significance, is that demobilization and military powersharing do not display significance in the first model. This may indicate that the effect of demobilization or a powersharing agreement dwindle over time. Another difference is that the impact of negotiated settlements is shown to be much stronger in these tests. I do not spend much time or space trying to infer anything from the Weibull results, as I do not believe that the decision to become a democracy is time dependant. It seems just as likely that any institutional choice, such as a power-sharing oligarchy or a dictatorship, would emerge years after a civil war. However, the results of these tests do provide robust evidence that negotiated settlements, peacekeeping,



and the international environment *do* contribute to states becoming democracies after a civil war.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Balch-Lindsay, Dylan and Andrew Enterline. 2000. "Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration." *International Studies Quarterly* 44: 615-42.
- Blanton, Shannon Lindsey. 2005. "Foreign Policy in Transition? Human Rights, Democracy, and U.S. Arms Exports." *International Studies Quarterly* 49:647-67.
- Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M. and Bradford S. Jones. 1997. "Time is of the Essence: Event History Models in Political Science." *American Journal of Political Science* 41:1414-61.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and George W. Downs. 2006. "Intervention and Democracy." *International Organization* 60: 627-49.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, George W. Downs, Alastair Smith, and Feryal Marie Cherif. 2005. "Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human Rights." *International Studies Quarterly* 49:439-57.
- Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War" *Oxford Economic Papers*. 56:563-95.
- Correlates of War Project. 2000. "Cow Intra-State War, version 3.0" dataset. Online at <http://www.correlatesofwar.org>.
- Correlates of War Project. 2004. "Militarized Interstate Disputes Dataset, version 3.0" dataset. Online at <http://www.correlatesofwar.org>.
- Cunningham, David E. 2006. "Veto Players and Civil War Duration." *American Journal of Political Science* 50: 875-92.

- Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Diehl, Paul F. 1993. *International Peacekeeping*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga Timilsina. 2005. *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq*. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation.
- Doyle, Michael and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000. "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 94: 779-801.
- Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49: 379-414.
- Fearon, James D. 2002. "Ethnic Structure and Cultural Diversity around the World." Presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Boston.
- Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97: 75-90.
- Fortna, Virginia Page. 2003. "Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars." *International Studies Review* 5: 971-114.
- Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004. "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War." *International Studies Quarterly* 48: 269-92.
- Gibler, Douglas M. 2007. "Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly*, forthcoming.
- Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993-2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21: 133-54.
- Gleditsch, Kristian S. and Michael D. Ward. 1997. "Double Take: A Reexamination of Democracy and Autocracy in Modern Polities." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41: 361-83.

- Greig, J. Michael and Thorin M. Wright. 2006. "Stay the Course? A Competing Risks Analysis of the Sustainability and Termination of Peacekeeping Operations." Presented at the Peace Science Society (International) Conference. November 10-12, 2006, Columbus, Ohio.
- Greig, J. Michael and Paul F. Diehl. 2005. "The Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma." *International Studies Quarterly* 49: 621-45.
- Gurses, Mehmet and T. David Mason. 2006. "Democracy Out of Anarchy: How Do Features of A Civil War Influence the Likelihood of Post-Civil War Democracy?" Working paper; earlier version presented at the 2006 International Studies Association Conference, San Diego.
- Hartzell, Caroline, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild. 2001. "Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables." *International Organization* 55: 183-208.
- Hartzell, Caroline and Matthew Hoddie. 2003. "Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management." *American Journal of Political Science* 47: 318-32.
- Hegre, Havard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2001. "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992." *American Political Science Review* 95: 33-48.
- Hoddie, Matthew and Caroline Hartzell. 2003. "Civil War Settlement and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Agreements." *Journal of Peace Research* 40: 303-20.
- Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Jones, Daniel M., Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer. 1996. "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15: 163-213.
- Keesing's Record of World Events*. Various Years. Keesing's Worldwide.
- Keller, Bill. 1988. "Soviet Military Wary of Arms Cuts." *The New York Times*. A-3, December 22.

- Kerkvliet, Benedict J. 1977 [2002]. *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
- Klein, Herbert S. 2003. *A Concise History of Bolivia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Licklider, Roy. 1995. "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993." *American Political Science Review* 89: 681-90.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53: 69-105.
- Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South American, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Manning, Carrie. 2001. "Competition and Accommodation in Post-Conflict Democracy: The Case of Mozambique." *Democratization* 8: 140-68.
- Marshall, Monty and Keith Jaggers. 2005. *Polity IV Project: Dataset User's Manual* Part of the Polity IV project, available at [www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity](http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity)
- Mason, T. David and Patrick J. Fett. 1996. "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40: 546-68.
- Mason, T. David, Joseph P. Weingarten, Jr. and Patrick J. Fett. 1999. "Win, Lose or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars." *Political Research Quarterly* 52: 239-68.
- Moore, Barrington. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Mukherjee, Bumba. 2006. "Why Political Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to Enduring Peaceful Resolution of Some Civil Wars, But Not Others?" *International Studies Quarterly* 50: 479-504.
- Mullenbach, Mark J. 2005. "Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions." *International Studies Quarterly* 49: 529-55.

- Mullenbach, Mark and William Dixon. 2006. "Third Party Peacekeeping Missions: 1945-2005." Dataset
- Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Paris, Roland. 1997. "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism." *International Security* 22: 54-89.
- Poe, Steven C. and C. Neal Tate. 1994. "Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 88: 843-852.
- Poe, Steven C., T. David Mason, Cynthia Colley and Jason Quinn. 2005. "Human Rights, Democracy, and Sustaining the Peace After Civil War." Working Paper.
- Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens. 1992. *Capitalist Development and Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rustow, Dankwart. 1970. "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model." *Comparative Politics* 2: 337-363.
- Salehyan, Idean. 2008. "No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International Conflict." *Journal of Politics*. Forthcoming.
- Salehyan, Idean and Kristian Gleditsch. 2006. "Refugees and the Spread of Civil War." *International Organization* 60: 335-66.
- Sarkees, Meredith Reid. 2000. "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 18: 123-144.

- Stearns, Peter N., ed. 2001. *The Encyclopedia of World History*, 6 ed. New York: Houghton Mifflin Co.
- Toft, Monica Duffy. 2003. *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and Indivisibility of Territory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- United Nations. 1996. *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping*. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information.
- Walter, Barbara F. 1997. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement." *International Organization* 51: 335-64.
- Walter, Barbara F. 1999. "Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace." *International Security* 24: 127-55.
- Wantchekon, Leonard. 2004. "The Paradox of "Warlord" Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation." *American Political Science Review* 98: 17-33.
- Weinstein, Jeremy. 2005. "Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49: 598-624.
- Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2001. "An Insurgent Path to Democracy: Popular Mobilization, Economic Interests, and Regime Transition in South Africa and El Salvador." *Comparative Political Studies* 34: 862-88.