

MEDIA INFLUENCE ON EXECUTIVE POLICE DECISION-MAKING: A CASE
STUDY OF POLICE AND MEDIA INTERACTION DURING THE OKLAHOMA
CITY BOMBING INVESTIGATION AND TRIALS

Steven S. Bellew, B.S.

Thesis Prepared for the Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS

May, 2001

APPROVED:

Tory J. Caeti, Major Professor
Robert W. Taylor, Committee Member and Chair of the
Department of Criminal Justice
Eric J. Fritsch, Committee Member and Program
Coordinator of the Department of Criminal Justice
David W. Hartman, Dean of the School of Community
Service
C. Neal Tate, Dean of the Robert B. Toulouse School of
Graduate Studies

Bellew, Steven S., Media Influence on Executive Police Decision-Making: A Case Study of Police and Media Interaction During the Oklahoma City Bombing Investigation and Trials. Master of Science (Criminal Justice), May 2001, 85 pp., references, 48 titles.

Because media influence public opinion, it is often surmised that media also influence the decisions of police executives. This exploratory case study examined the relationship between police and media during the Oklahoma City bombing investigation and subsequent trials of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols.

Findings indicate that media influence police executive decisions when police and media interact closely. It was found that during the Oklahoma City bombing investigation and trials, police on the outer perimeter were influenced most and police conducting the investigation or who were tasked to court room security were influenced the least. It was concluded, based on the consensus of respondents interviewed, that media *do* influence police executive decisions.

Copyright 2001

By

Steven S. Bellew

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to acknowledge the time and effort put forth by Professor Tory Caeti, Ph.D. of the University of North Texas Criminal Justice Department, for his assistance and sage technical advice during the planning, research, and completion of this research.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
Statement of the Problem	
Definition of Terms	
Significance of the Problem	
Research Hypotheses	
2. LITERATURE REVIEW.....	6
History of the Media	
Recipe for Conflict	
Shapers of Public Opinion	
Media Relations During Critical Situations	
The Police Public Information Officer	
The Mass Media and the Law	
Media and Police Relations Today	
Conclusion	
3. METHODOLOGY.....	32
Limitations	
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION.....	54
General Perceptions and Personal Background Information	
Police/Media Interaction at the Bombing Site	
Police/Media Interaction at the Bombing Trials	
Police/Media Interaction in the Courtroom	
5. RECOMMENDATIONS.....	68
APPENDIX.....	76
REFERENCES.....	82

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Over the years, the police and mass media have been engaged in an undeclared war with each other. The history of the relationship between police officers and the mass media is replete with hostility, suspicion, and at times violence from both sides. Due to this faulty relationship, police executives distrust the media and are forced to second-guess their own executive decisions. Previous studies show that the media views its role in society as being a watchdog of public officials and feels bound to report on how they wield their power. They also view themselves as the molder of public opinion.

The media feels that the First Amendment to the constitution gives them the right to any information that the police gather. The police, on the other hand, feel that it is their duty to protect the sensitive information that they obtain during the course of investigations or during emergency situations. Hence, they view the press as an adversary and a potential threat. The media's ability to form public opinion must be taken into consideration by police executives during their decision making process during any incident that the press responds to. This necessity is directly due to the influence that the media carries with the public. How the media reports police actions can determine whether lawsuits will be filed, whether the police will be able to obtain their needed budget requests, and can undermine the police executive's ability to form needed alliances with local civil leaders and politicians.

This thesis seeks to determine the extent that the media exerts pressure on police executives and to what extent they use subversive measures to seek to influence the executive's decisions. It also attempts to determine what causes the police executive to alter previous decisions and policies to enable the media access to information or sites that are not accessible to the general public. The thesis will use an inductive approach to focus the broad concepts of media influence, police thought process and functional communications between the mass media and the police into the explanation of how the media influences police executive decision making at certain critical incidents.

Definition of Terms

The types of news media and their need to gather timely information perpetuate the rift between the police and the media. The mass media is made up primarily of the television news media, the print press media, radio media, and more recently, the Internet media. The type of press that is most insistent upon the timely release of information is the television news media. Its reliance on pictures, video and the observance of deadlines for the evening news means that their personnel will try the hardest to obtain the information, usually at all costs. This usually ensures conflict with police authorities at a crime scene or disaster site due to overzealous news crews. The second type of press that poses a potential threat to police executives is the print press reporter. The print press reporters are allowed the luxury of researching background information prior to the news stories release. This type of media is less insistent on the release of information, but their news photographers still attempt to gain access to the inside of police lines for crime scene or disaster site information. Still another type of media is the radio media. This media is driven by the need for sound bytes. The ability to conduct interviews with

anyone associated with the news event will sedate their insatiable appetite for sound. Therefore, this type of media person can be readily found attempting to interview witnesses, victims, police officers and even other media personalities.

Significance of the Problem

It is the contention of this study that due to the extremely powerful influence that the media has on the shaping of public influence and their poor relationship with the police in general, it is surmised that the mass media also influences the decisions of police executives. This is indicated due to the conscious effort by police officials to take media actions into consideration and often even change prior decisions based upon the extent of media scrutiny, pressure and undue influence. This thesis uses an exploratory case study methodology incorporating the relationship between police and the media at the bombing site of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma and the subsequent trials of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols in Denver, Colorado.

During the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, the media attempted to gain entry into a bomb crime scene in order to take pictures of the scene and the devastation that results from this type of terrorist attack. It was the job of local, state, and federal police agencies to maintain a perimeter around the bombing site in order to allow the FBI, ATF and various other federal, state, and local investigative agencies to conduct their investigation. The perimeter officers had many conflicts with the news media due to their need for news and the officers need to protect that information prior to its proper release by the agencies conducting the investigation. Police executives at the scene constantly and consistently changed standing orders and allowed for “bending of the rules” to accommodate news media access to the video and

pictures for their newscasts. While these actions were not necessary, they were allowed and initiated to project a positive public image of the police. Due to the tremendous amount of pressure asserted upon the news media to cover this infamous piece of history, the news media pressed the limits of the boundaries placed upon them by the police and even caused for the arrest of one of the news media's biggest stars, Geraldo Rivera.

The same type of scenario was observed during the Oklahoma City Bombing trials of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols. Police executives constantly and consistently changed their orders of where the media were allowed to conduct interviews or where the media were allowed to go or not go. These actions caused an extreme amount of confusion during the trials but were performed because police executives wanted to accommodate news media agencies to ensure that negative public opinion of the police was not reported. This confusion came close to causing the arrest of well-known news media personality Ted Koppel. This same type of scenario occurs with increasing frequency due to the rise of high profile news that sensationalizes crime, criminals, and criminal trials. As the need for news increases, so will the resulting competition for the few seconds of sound bytes or the fleeting moments of video.

Research Questions

This thesis was constructed to attempt to enable the researcher to answer several questions regarding the nature between the influences the mass media asserts against police executives. It also attempts to determine to what extent the mass media causes those executives to change their decisions during critical incidents. This thesis will reveal in the following chapters the current literature available on the subject of mass media and police interaction at critical incident scenes (i.e. crime scene, disaster site, hostage

situation, high profile court cases, etc.). It will focus on the lack of information and research conducted on the interaction of the media during these types of situations and the extent to which the media influences executive police decisions. A thorough discussion of the case study methodology will be presented followed by a presentation of the results of the interviews conducted with police personnel, special agents, and media persons involved in the coverage of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma on April 19, 1995. A presentation of the results of interviews of police and media personnel covering the Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols bombing trials in Denver, Colorado will also be given. The text will also reflect the insight of the author, who also was a police officer at the Oklahoma City bombing trial. The next chapter will cover the results and a discussion of the findings of the case study followed by a chapter regarding recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

There is a dearth of literature on the subject of mass media and police interaction at critical incident scenes. The amount of literature on police and mass media relations is extensive but will not be totally covered here because this case study is only concerned with the influence of the media on police executive decisions, particularly at critical incident scenes. This research will cover the major themes of the available literature. Therefore, the literature survey will appear sparser than a normal literature survey due to the lack of research regarding this topic. The literature review will discuss the history of the media, police/media interactions, legal aspects of dealing with the media, a discussion of the duties of the police Public Information Officer (PIO), and media and police relations today. The literature survey will then discuss what is missing from the literature survey.

History of the Media

News has existed for as long as people have been able to communicate. The Egyptians, the Greeks, the Romans, all had forms of communicating information from one person to another. Information such as how much something cost, who was doing what task, and who was at war with whom, all were common news items. Printed news about crime and justice is nearly as old as printing, and a detailed account of a witchcraft trial can be found in an English newsletter as early as 1587 (Surette 1998). As populations grew and communication became stronger, so did the form the news took. Pamphlets devoted exclusively to crime existed by 1600 (Chibnall 1980; Surette 1998).

In the United States, newspaper weeklies became established as early as the mid-1600's. Termed broadsheets or broadsides, these early newspapers were regularly printed and distributed on a local or regional basis. Following the Revolutionary War, newspapers expectedly assumed the functions of describing and evaluating the progress of the new government. Thus, the role of journalists as a public watchdog over government had emerged (Selke and Bartoszek 1984). Before a modern printed news medium can develop, a society must first have a generally literate population and mass distribution systems in place. In the United States, these conditions were first met in the 1830's. In the eastern cities of New York, Boston, Baltimore, and Philadelphia, the nation's first mass distribution newspapers, appeared as municipal *penny press* papers distributed on street corners (Stevens and Garcia 1980). By the twentieth century, magazines focusing on crime, sex scandals, corruptions, sports, glamour, and show business flourished (Gorn 1992; Surette 1998).

With the exception of wartime, the newspaper industry grew along with the population increase brought by prosperity and a great influx of immigrants from Europe and Asia. Along with this growth came the growth of competition among news agencies. News agencies found themselves more and more in competition for stories as well as for customers. A thirst for news developed and with a thirst for news came the need for being the first on a story, to be able to be the first newspaper to break a story to the public, to have "the scoop" on the competition. This excessive need to be the first agency with the news caused reporters to follow police officers while on patrol in order to report on crime and occurrences within the region. It is easy to see that with the conflict of interests of the media and the police why conflicts between the two would arise.

In the 1920's, radio came into dominance as the home entertainment and information medium, with the number of stations growing from 32 to 254 between 1921 and 1922 alone (DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach 1975; Surette 1998). Since the radio didn't need pictures or video to present the news to their audience, the pressure that the media exerted upon the police was not entirely established by this time. Ultimately, the presentation styles developed by both the early print and electronic radio and film media combined with the competitive, profit-driven nature of media organizations to set the parameters for how current crime-and-justice news would be created and what it would contain (Surette 1998).

With these new avenues established for getting news out to the public came a new type of mass entertainment journalism, known as *yellow journalism* (Papke 1987; Surette 1998). This new style of journalism, exemplified by the Hearst and Pulitzer newspapers in New York, gave space and importance to disasters, scandals, gossip, and crime—particularly violent personal crime. Large melodramatic depictions of heroes, villains, and innocent victims became the norm (Surette 1998).

A propensity for the media to report on all of the actions of their elected officials as well as their proficiency at obtaining information on police executive actions (both on and off duty), has led to spectacular news stories of corruption, abuse of power, criminal activity, and ethics violations over the years. These actions in turn, ushered in an era of distrust and skepticism between the two professions. A tendency for the press to distort facts and truths as well as the police officers refusal to give basic information based on the fear that the press might misuse it, perpetuated the sense that conflict was normal and expected. Adding the fact that graft, corruption, and abuse was rampant among the police

and government officials, these continuing conditions led to a worsening relationship between the media and the police as well as to the normalization of the sensationalized story.

The 1960's brought forth the volatile civil rights and anti war era. For the first time in United States history, live action footage was broadcast into everyone's living room showing police violence and civil unrest. The police and the media were caught together under tense conditions attempting to achieve what were sometimes ambiguous and conflicting goals. The press showed the police dealing awkwardly with demonstrators and using questionable crowd control tactics. Police officials criticized the media for becoming overly involved in situations and contributing to the turmoil. Resentment continued to grow and finally erupted in violent confrontations between citizens, police and press at the 1968 Democratic National Convention (Selke and Bartoszek 1984). The public began to depend more and more upon the media to send them up-to-date news, the more sensational the better.

A very basic mistrust and perhaps even mutual dislike still found today between some journalists and some police can be traced at least partially to the improper actions engaged in by each group in the past. Law enforcement today has still not fully lived down the "ugly era" practices in which corruption, rampant brutality, and the spoils system patronage were the rule in all too many parts of America (Garner 1984). Most of the literature on the subject of the relationship between police and the mass media reach a consensus that the past has been littered with abuses on both sides. The police being suspicious due to the nature of their work and the media being aggressive at obtaining

information due to the nature of their work indicated that anytime these two entities interact the stimulus is present that can ultimately lead to conflict.

Recipe for Conflict

Literature on the subject of police and media relations reaches a consensus that there is an extreme amount of animosity between these two groups. The literature also bears out the fact that this animosity had perpetuated itself over a long period of time and may even be the result of built in biases that solidify in the morals of the officers and reporters before they even begin their jobs. It is within the officer's legitimate authority to exercise the right to make literal life-and-death decisions over his fellow citizens in rare situations. All of this authority is huge in scope and is monitored carefully by the press. The news media help guarantee that such immense potential power does not go unaccompanied by equal amounts of responsibility and restraint (Garner 1987). It is this watchdog role that causes a lot of the animosity and distrust between the police and the media.

The literature points out that most of the preconceived assumptions about the differences between the media and the police are in place prior to an individual entering that profession. A study conducted by Altshull (1975) surveyed journalists and representatives of the criminal justice system (police officers, judges, prosecutors, defense counsels, probation officers and clerks). He found that there were significant and pronounced differences particularly between the police and the press with respect to the publication of crime news. It was found that negative attitudes toward the media exist among police officers even before their formal entry into the law enforcement field. Once students enter their respective professions, the impact of indoctrination and socialization

is clearly potent within the police academy (Harris 1973; Selke and Bartoszek 1984) and journalistic organizations (Tuchman 1978; Selke and Bartoszek 1984). A study conducted by Selke and Bartoszek (1984) reveals that apparently the animosity between journalists and police officers may have its seeds in the backgrounds and personal orientations of those who choose these professions. They further point out that the majority of recruits also believed that the media is not generally objective and is more concerned with printing what sells papers rather than merely covering new events.

Over the years the relationship between the media and the police has gone from bad to worse. Complaints of abuse and mistreatment of the media by police as well as the police being portrayed as corrupt, violent, and abusive in the media have perpetuated the poor relationship between the media and the police. Accusations of physical abuse, unfair treatment, and over-zealousness abound on both sides of the relationship. In the old times when police leaders could afford the questionable luxury of feuding openly with the news media, newsmen and police officers frequently viewed one another as adversaries; some still do (Garner 1987). Gerald Garner, one of the definitive authors on police and mass media relations, described the reason behind the stormy relationship between the two as, “A very basic mistrust and perhaps even mutual dislike still found today between some journalists and some police can be traced at least partially to the improper actions engaged in by each group in the past” (Garner 1984). The gripes of the news gatherers have included the following, compiled from a list presented by Garner in his book “Chief, the Reporters Are Here!” presented here much as the news people themselves would phrase them:

1. The police are obsessed with secrecy.

2. The police flat out lie to us.
3. They stick together and cover up their own misdeeds.
4. Cops are arrogant and exaggerate their own importance.
5. They are discourteous and obstructive.
6. They see everyone but cops as ignorant liberals who “can’t understand.”
7. They tend to oversimplify issues.
8. They expect favors and special treatment.

He also lists complaints that officers have regarding the media:

1. Reporters always believe the crook over the cop.
2. They [the press] only report part of the story.
3. They despoil crime scenes and create a circus.
4. They violate confidences and screw up cases.
5. They demand attention just when we are busiest.
6. Reporters are arrogant and exaggerate their own importance.
7. They edit and cut to quote you out of context.
8. They exaggerate and make big deals out of non-stories.

It is plain to see why there is such animus between the mass media and the police.

Garner conducts a closer examination of each group’s grievances against the other and reveals some common and highly disruptive factors at work (Garner 1987). These disrupters include:

1. **Build-in biases, stereotyping and personal prejudices.** Cops and reporters alike bring a lot of past experiences and emotional baggage to their professional relationships. When each has had bad experiences

or heard about bad experiences with the other, the relationship is off on the wrong foot before it really gets started.

2. **Incomplete information; hearing only one side of the story.** It seems to be a trait of the human animal that people are most likely to tell others of occurrences or incidents that back up or reinforce the feelings or position held by the speaker and his or her group. That's natural. It is perhaps this characteristic that causes the police officer (or reporter) to tell his peers only of the negative experiences that he has had in working with the other profession.

3. **Simple misunderstandings; a failure to communicate.** It is relatively easy to misunderstand someone else's meaning or intent. It is even easier when one already harbors a basic mistrust or suspicions regarding that someone and his kind. Bar fights, divorces and wars have resulted from a missed meaning or a misconstrued statement. Little wonder, then, that long-standing police-media feuds have started from similar crossed signals.

4. **Personal confrontations and personality conflicts.** Poor relations between a given police executive and a given reporter that have influenced negatively police-media relations in that jurisdiction for years have been traced back to a single incident in which the two individuals came to dislike one another intensely. Perhaps some wrong words were said or perhaps an invitation was not extended or a

telephone call not returned. There are many other possibilities.

Whatever the cause of the personal clash, the result has been poisoned police-press relations that are damaging to everyone.

This distrust between the media and the police transcends international boundaries. In Britain, the relationship between the British police service and the media has a checkered history and is extremely complex. While the media has been a main contributor to promoting favorable images of policing and mystifying police work, conflict is endemic to the relationship and the level of trust between the parties is constantly in the balance (Mawby 1999). Even though the same conflict exists in Britain as it does in the United States, the mass media in Britain tries to portray the British police service in a professional light. Despite this largely favorable picture, the police have generally been suspicious of their treatment by the media, although several content analysis studies have repudiated the basis of such suspicions (Crandon 1990; Chermack 1994; Mawby 1999). This suspicion, often mutual, has contributed to the ebb and flow of the relationship, which was likened to a stormy marriage by Sir Robert Mark, Metropolitan Police Commissioner from 1972-77 (Mawby 1999).

Part of the problem between the police and the media is the fact that the police are often held singularly responsible for the control of crime. Therefore, any negative coverage of crime news by the media tends to reflect badly on the police (Selke and Bartoszek 1984). Take the O.J. Simpson case for example. In many instances the press portrayed the police as incompetent people bent on ensuring the guilt of O.J. Simpson when in fact, the detectives were just trying to do their job to the best of their ability

under intense mass media scrutiny. It is easy to understand why people who enter the fields of journalism and policing are predisposed to be suspicious of the each other.

Police must also be aware of industrious members of the media. Tricks and ploys have been used against new officers to gain information about an incident. All it takes is one look at the uniform to tell which officers are new to the force and which ones are veteran police officers. Members of the media in an effort to expedite their information gathering function, will attempt to get close to the officer under the pretense of making small talk and cause the officer to give information relating to the incident to which they are responding. At other times, the media will use tricks or subterfuge to gain entry to an off-limits area or to gain information, much to the chagrin of the police officer.

Sometimes police officers can be their own worst enemy. New officers should be told by their field training officer what to look out for when dealing with the media as many new officers have a tendency to brag about their exploits and embellish their accomplishments to make up for their lack of experience on the force. Police executives should take this into consideration when assigning members of a police force to a perimeter or to media related duties.

To make matters worse, whatever the truth about crime and violence and the criminal justice system in America, the entertainment media seem determined to project the opposite (Carlson 1985; Dominick 1973; Surrette 1998). Their wildly inaccurate and inevitably fragmentary images provide a distorted reflection of crime within society and an equally distorted reflection of the criminal justice system's response to crime (Bortner 1984; Pandiani 1978; Surrette 1998). The police know this about the media, which makes it more difficult for the police to maintain a positive public opinion.

Shapers of Public Opinion

The research seems clear that the news media have pervasive, unintended, and unpredictable influences on public opinion. For instance, the news media can influence the importance the public attaches to a particular problem, the factors by which it evaluates its leaders, and the extent to which it makes connections between problems and causes (Benson Unknown).

The police need positive public opinion. Police mottos that appear on squad cars tell the whole story of how the police perceive their mission—“To Protect and to Serve.” The media sees themselves as the shapers of public opinion. They perceive their job as being not only to gather information and report it, but also to analyze and influence events, to help society understand what it is reading. The college journalism instructor would tell his students that the modern American newspaper has at least four purposes for existing:

1. To inform the public.
2. To influence public opinion in a positive manner,
3. To serve the public good, and
4. To further the nation’s economic well-being through advertising.

To this list of purposes the honest instructor must add one more: to survive and make a profit (Garner 1987). Put another way, a better understanding of the underlying dynamics of society can be gained by examining the points of contact between society’s primary information system—the mass media—and its primary system for legitimizing values and enforcing norms—the criminal justice system (Surette 1998). By and large, common perceptions will be formed on what is seen, read, and heard via the mass media (More and Kenney 1986).

In modern, advanced, industrialized societies with strong popular cultures, the mass media have emerged as a main engine in the social construction of reality process. In practical impact, the mass media increase in importance as other sources are less available (Cohen and Young 1981; Lichter 1988; Surrette 1998). In addition, the mass media tend to be more important in societies like the United States, because other organizations and institutions must depend on the media to disseminate information from and about them (Altheide 1984; Surrette 1998). In the end, the media dominate the distribution of shared social knowledge and their effect is fourfold (Altheide 1984; Surrette 1998):

- We record and analyze history in terms of what the media define as significant.
- People with potential historical importance must rely on media exposure to ensure their place in history.
- Media reports become an essential determination of what is held to be significant as media influence becomes ever more widely known and accepted.
- Institutions find they must present their own message and images within the accepted respectability and familiarity of media-determined formats.

The public's high interest in and retention of crime news, the large percentage of total news that is crime related, and the skewed content of crime news have raised concerns about crime-and-justice news similar to those expressed about the entertainment

media (Graber 1980; Haskins 1969; Sherizen 1978; Swanson 1953; Surette 1998). Three basic criticisms of crime news have been described (Marsh 1991; Surette 1998):

1. The majority of crime coverage pertains to violent or sensational crimes disproportional to their appearance in official data.
2. Implicit explanations are primarily from criminal justice system persons and are nearly always simplistic and individualistic.
3. The overemphasis on violent crimes and failure to adequately address personal risk and prevention techniques often lead to exaggerated fears at the expense of escalating racial divisions and fear of crime.

The news media's coverage of the criminal justice system also appears to lead the attending public to evaluate the system poorly while paradoxically leading to increased support of crime and justice policies that are more crime control and law enforcement oriented (Graber 1980; Surette 1998).

The Police Public Information Officer

Every police department should have a person assigned as the police Public Information Officer (PIO). This person is the representative of the police department in its dealings with the media and should be accomplished in writing, public speaking, law, police policies, and have excellent social skills. The person serving in the capacity of PIO may operate under any one of various job titles and have any number of duties in addition to his press responsibilities. He may be a patrolman or a captain, a civilian aide or the boss himself. As a matter of fact, it is not at all extraordinary for the chief or sheriff to handle press relations himself at the small to medium-sized police agency (Garner 1984).

The job of the police PIO probably evolved from the guidelines recommended by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals of 1973.

Standard 1.7 states:

Every police executive immediately should acknowledge in written policy statements the important role of the news media and the need for the police agency to be open in its relations with the media. The agency should promote and aggressive policy of presenting public information rather than merely responding to occasional inquiries.

1. The news media relation's policy should be included in the agency training curricula, and copies of it provided to all agency personnel, media representatives, and the public. The policy should acknowledge:
 - a. The right of the press to obtain information for dissemination to the public;
 - b. The agency's responsibility to respond to inquiries from the media, subject to legal restraints and the necessity to preserve evidence, to prevent interference with police investigations and other operations, and to protect the constitutional rights of persons accused of crimes;
 - c. The agency's responsibility to seek the cooperation of the media to delay publication—rather than imposing censorship or unilateral news moratoriums—when immediate reporting of certain

information may be detrimental to the community, to victims of crime, or to an investigation; and

- d. The mutual benefits to the police agency and the media when relations between the two are characterized by candor, cooperation, and mutual respect.
2. The news media relations program should provide regular liaison between the agency and the media through an officer or unit, depending upon the size of the agency and the nature and frequency of local news media demands.
3. Every police chief executive should establish a means of local, regional, or state accreditation of legitimate news media representatives or of recognizing accreditation by other agencies to assist media representatives in receiving police cooperation.
4. Every police chief executive, in cooperation with the media, should prepare a written policy establishing the relationship between his agency and the news media during unusual occurrences.

The relationship between the police and the news media in a democratic society is characterized by complementary rather than conflicting interests. The news media have a legitimate need for information about police activities; they offer an excellent channel for informing the public about the nature of police tasks and problems (NACCJSG).

While the job of the PIO may seem to be somewhat glamorous since it deals with the media on a weekly if not daily basis, it is not without its pitfalls. The press officer who betrays confidences, engages in organizational backstabbing, and otherwise enmeshes himself in the intrigues and political infighting will find his effectiveness as department spokesman diminished (Garner 1984). These types of actions can be found to at least some extent in every organization. The PIO is the person responsible for the timely dispersal of information from within a police department to the press. In some organizations the PIO is ostracized from the main body of officers due to the close relationship that the PIO must forge with the media. The PIO must use finesse when attempting to walk a fine line between his fellow officers and the media. The PIO has to be able to handle both aggressive officers as well as irate and aggressive media personnel with equal aplomb. The PIO must be able to determine the correct amount of information to release to the press without compromising the integrity of any ongoing investigations. Take for instance a report of police misconduct. The press needs basic information and details relating to the incident to be able to accurately report the incident to the general public. If the PIO fails to release any information or stalls the release of information, the press could jump to the conclusion that a government cover-up was underway and report that information on the evening news and morning newspapers.

The PIO will be responsible for bringing order to chaos during critical incident situations. The PIO must be able to act as the conduit of information to the media explaining the ground rules of where the media may film or not film, what areas are safe or are dangerous, as well as to be able to disseminate basic information about the situation to the media representatives. The PIO should relay information to media

representatives regarding, crime scene boundaries, where the media can and cannot go, and approximate times for press conferences. If a PIO earns a reputation for (1) getting the photographers as close as reasonably possible, (2) routinely giving out on-scene as much information as possible, and (3) returning promised telephone calls in a timely manner, he will very likely find the members of the media causing very few serious problems at a crime scene (Garner 1984).

The PIO is also responsible for dealing with complaints from the media directed towards the police as well as dealing with complaints directed from the police towards the media. Usually this type of situation arises due to misunderstandings between the media and the police and can be rectified by the judicious use of common sense and diplomacy; both an inherent trait that should be present in any potential PIO.

Mass Media and the Law

In the infancy of the United States, James Madison wrote:

“A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who would mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives” (Higginbotham 1989).

It was with that counsel in mind that the First Amendment was written, guaranteeing that the freedom of speech and of the press would contribute to an informed electorate and competent government (Higginbotham 1989).

Newsmen are fond of saying that “there is no law that authorizes the police to withhold news.” Somewhat argumentative police administrators have been known to

counter, First Amendment rights notwithstanding, that “there is no law that requires us to help you gather it, either” (Garner 1984). The freedom of the press can be traced back to the United States Constitution’s First Amendment that states:

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”

The states of the new union also tackled the issues of press freedom one by one, but with remarkable similarity. Once again, the idea translated into statute was to permit responsible journalists to print what they wished without “before the fact” intimidation or interference from government (Garner 1984). The press may report on any topic without fear of punishment or restriction unless prohibited by law or a court. This concept called the “prior restraint” concept basically ensures that the government does not have the right to place prior censorship on the media before it releases a story.

Law enforcement administrators must carefully consider these legal issues when developing media relation’s policies or philosophies. Successful media relations require that the police balance legitimate law enforcement interests and the public’s desire for information concerning the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies and personnel (Higginbotham 1989).

PIOs must be alert to what is stated to the media during press releases or during press conferences. A police spokesperson that delivers harmful or inaccurate information to the media may be guilty of libel even if the hurtful and damaging report he delivers to

the news media was the result of an oversight or error as opposed to a deliberate and malicious act (Garner 1984).

There are several prohibitions that would disallow the media to report a subject to the general public. The first prohibition is for national security reasons. The press cannot advocate violence or subvert the United States government with the intent to cause harm to the United States or its citizens. Also, if a court issues a gag order on the media due to the sensitivity of the information that is to be released based upon the contention that it would influence the trial proceedings then the press must be careful about what it reports about court matters.

The courts have upheld reasonable rules and restrictions upon the press at a crime or disaster scene as necessary to allow public officers to carry out their lifesaving or crime-solving responsibilities without hindrance. In the landmark case of *Branzburg v. Hayes* (408 U.S. 665), it was held that “newsmen have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is excluded (Garner 1984; Higginbotham 1989). The Supreme Court also observed “news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,” and that the press has the right to gather news “from any source by means within the law (Higginbotham 1989). In the case *Houchins v. KQED* (438 U.S. 1), the sheriff denied a request from KQED to view living conditions inside of its jail facility. KQED filed suit charging the sheriff violated KQED’s and the public’s First Amendment rights by failing to provide any effective means by which the public could become informed of jail conditions. In ruling for the sheriff, the Court held that “neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to

government information or sources of information within the government's control” (Higginbotham 1989).

It is apparent that the Supreme Court utilizes the First Amendment of the Constitution when analyzing the rights of the media to access information. But what are the elements that have to be met? Courts consider two questions in determining the scope of the media's First Amendment right to access news about a particular law enforcement activity: 1) Is the access predicated on a historical tradition of openness and will media access play a positive role in the functioning of the criminal justice process?; and 2) Is the particular law enforcement function or activity so important to the effective functioning of society that it may on balance be shielded from both the press and the public (Higginbotham 1989). What is deemed to be out of the scope of the media to collect information? The list of prohibited items consists of ongoing criminal investigations, police records or facilities that do not have a historical tradition of openness, crime scenes, public disasters, or other police functions where the media's presence would hinder, interfere, or jeopardize the safe and effective accomplishment of the mission (Higginbotham 1989).

The rise of docudramas involving the media and the police have given rise to new constitutional issues that arise when the news media participate in law enforcement activities. In the case of *United States v. Sanusi* (813 F. Supp. 149), nine defendants were charged with credit card fraud. A CBS news crew on the scene at the invitation of the U.S. Secret Service captured the ensuing service of the search warrant to gather evidence. One of the defendants Babatunde Ayeni, while preparing for his defense, subpoenaed the CBS News videotape. CBS refused to turn over the tape citing newsgathering privilege.

The U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the First and Fourth Amendment aspects of the case. The Supreme Court reached the conclusion that the newsgathering privilege is not absolute. The Court found that it can be overcome by a showing that the information sought is 1) highly material and relevant, 2) necessary or critical to the maintenance of a claim, and 3) not obtainable from other sources. Furthermore, the court pointed out that the newsgathering privilege does not shield the media from ordinary legal constraints and that members of the media could be liable for criminal or tortious trespass committed while in the pursuit of the news (Crawford 1994).

Media Relations During Critical Situations

The literature available on police and media interactions at critical incident scenes is sparse. Literature pertaining to the instant subject is usually relegated to a small paragraph or two in the duties section of the PIO job description.

Law enforcement personnel respond to a plethora of critical incidents or situations. Critical incidents include but are not limited to, hostage situations, natural disasters, suicides, homicides, bank robberies, armed robberies, hazardous material spills, and terrorist incidents. Police officers are responsible for the response to, securing of and dealing with any type of critical incidents. Actions of the police and information pertaining to the incident at a critical incident scene are obviously news fodder for the media. Once again, the expeditious response of the media will mean conflict between the police attempting to secure the scene and deal with the critical incident at hand and the media who are attempting to gather information and video footage for their respective employers. It is important to remember, however, that any community in this country could experience virtually any type of critical incident. Nowhere is there a greater chance

for misunderstanding and conflict between law enforcement and the media than at scenes of tactical operations, accidents, and disasters. Emotions are peaked and journalists as well as law enforcement officers will likely be working under stress (More and Kenney 1986).

Quite a few small cities have suddenly been thrust into national—even international—prominence due to an extraordinary event (Hudgins 1996). In the case of small police agencies, many of these local law enforcement officials have found themselves dealing with the vast hordes of media representatives who descended on their communities. With this influx, problems unlike any experienced before swept over those officials—usually the agency heads—charged with dealing with them (Hudgins 1996).

Garner (1984) poses an interesting question in his book “*The Police Meet the Press*,” how much freedom of movement should be granted the media representatives on a disaster scene? He states that the common sense answer seems the best one: give them just about all the freedom they want until and unless they abuse it, then necessary restrictions may be placed in effect. While this method may seem to be Garners’ best answer to the proper amount of media freedom of movement, it appears that the better choice may be to restrict their movements somewhat at the beginning and soften them once a determination has been made as to where the boundaries of the crime scene are or what areas are safe and what areas are not. It would appear that the police executive would have a media revolt on his hands were they to allow access and then restrict it later as opposed to restrict their movement at first and then allow greater movement after an initial assessment was accomplished. If a decision is made to bar the media from a particular area, then the reason for the banning should be communicated (Garner 1984).

Garner (1984) states that in establishing legitimate controls on press activities at a crime scene or the location of some other major police operation, safety and security concerns must be looked at in addition to the protected rights of the news media. He continues by relating that it would appear that press controls at the crime scene can be grouped under three general headings or requirements:

1. The representatives of the news media cannot be allowed, encouraged, or assisted to break the law;
2. The representatives of the news media cannot be permitted to endanger others by their crime scene actions; and
3. The representatives of the news media cannot be permitted to destroy evidence or otherwise impede an investigation or operation.

Each requirement should be relayed to law enforcement personnel and news media representatives in a plan that sketches what each agency should and should not do during their response to a critical situation. The following paragraph expounds on this theme.

According to Hudgins (1996), law enforcement managers have found themselves overwhelmed upon their arrival at a crisis scene. He states that in addition to considering tactical field issues, they must feed what seems to be a voracious media appetite for information. He further relays that although it is easy to take offense at their aggressiveness at a scene, we must understand their position. It is their responsibility to provide information – and such pressures as deadlines and the public interest drive their methods.

The easiest way for police executives to deal with any type of critical situations is to plan for them ahead of time. By making some sort of emergency operations plan and disseminating that information to the officers in the form of a police or standard operating procedure (SOP), all officers responding to a critical incident scene will know ahead of time to set up a press area, what the chain-of-command for the police at the scene is, where the PIO will be located, what information can be told to the press by the individual officer, and what are the parameters to the freedom of movement at the scene. Once an emergency operations plan is in place the smart police executive should ensure that it is implemented on a timely basis once a critical incident occurs or at the very least should be practiced with as many police personnel as possible on a regular basis to ensure proficiency.

During a critical situation, one designated spokesperson should deal with the media in a way that will be responsible to their needs without interfering with the ongoing actions at a crime scene or the follow-up investigation. If there is a written media policy already in place, confusion, interference and misunderstandings between the agency and the media can be avoided (Woodall 1998).

The police executive must also be prepared to deal with rumor control. Even though the detrimental effects of rumors on an organization are well known and in times of crisis and disaster, rumors abound and the media are in no way immune from falling victim to them (Hudgins 1996). Accurate and timely dissemination of information can help correct this malady. Media personnel who report on accurate and timely information presented by the police will be less likely to report made up information based on rumors or speculation.

Media and Police Relations Today

In the police professionalism movement of the century, many influential writers stressed the importance of improved police-press relations (Brandstatter and Radelet 1968; Banton 1965; Selke and Bartoszek 1984). Police executives should remember that the media has a substantial influence on public opinion and that the police need favorable public opinion to be able to effectively accomplish their police mission. Therefore, improving police-press relations is a must.

Even the media agrees that the relationship between the police and the media must improve and traditions of hostility broken. Journalists agree that they must defuse the hostility and establish a more positive, cooperative working relationship between the news media and emergency responders (Wertheimer 1995).

Public opinion polls consistently show that the public supports law enforcement when it acts responsibly and in the public's best interest. At the same time, those charged with the public's welfare need to remember three important points regarding the media. First, the media are not going to go away. Second, the media will run the story whether law enforcement officials like it or not. Finally, bad news does not improve when it stays in the spotlight (Vance 1997). Dealing with the media must be an ongoing concern for all police executives who wish to promote or maintain favorable public opinion. Enlightened leadership is the first step toward establishing sound relationships with the media (Vance 1997).

Nehrbass (1989), in his article *Promoting Effective Media Relations*, stated that with very few exceptions, the media are not enemies of law enforcement. They are simply trying to do a job, and they look to us for information and help. He further states

that most of the people “hurt” by the media suffered from the lack of knowledge of what they were talking about or did not know how to handle the problems that surfaced. Those hurt the most probably are those who lied to the media.

In order to promote better media and police relations, the police executive must learn probably the most significant lesson in effective media relations—truthfulness and reasonable accessibility. One lie will destroy your most precious media commodities—integrity and respect (Nehrbass 1989). Thus training of personnel, education on the mission and make-up of media organizations, and integrity are the requirements for building and sustaining excellent media and police relations.

Conclusion

The literature on media and police relations fails to cover the topic of this thesis, to what extent does the media influence police executive decisions. The majority of the literature addresses items such as 1) how to conduct an interview, 2) what are your actions at an interview, 3) how to deal effectively with the media, 4) what is the job description of the Public Information Officer, 5) the animosity between the police and the media, 6) the functions of the media, 7) the functions of the police, and 8) the law pertaining to media access to information.

Although there is a large amount of literature on police and media relations, there is no literature relating to the behind the scene decisions that are made at the critical incident scene where the media asserts massive amounts of pressure on the police executive for access to the information that they desire. This phenomenon is due to the fact that the media helps shape public opinion and the police executive knows that they need positive public opinion to accomplish their law enforcement mission effectively.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This thesis uses an exploratory case study of the Oklahoma City Bombing and the subsequent bombing trials to determine the extent the media influenced the tactical decisions of the police executives responsible for the investigation and/or law enforcement security at the bombing scene and the federal courthouse in Denver, Colorado. This study seeks to answer the question of how does the media influence police decisions and why do the police allow the media to influence their decisions. The study question is that the media influence or involvement in an incident causes police supervisors/executives to change their decisions due to perceptions by the police that the media will cause negative public reaction to the police response to the situation. The unit of analysis will be the small group of police executive's associated with the investigation of the bombing site and the security of the bombing site and trial site as well as their reaction to pressure asserted by the mass media on the police executive's decision making at critical incidents. Also, personal insight and input will be given by the author who was a team leader for one of the federal agencies responsible for the security of the trial site.

This exploratory case study will use interviews conducted with federal and state police executives associated with the Oklahoma City Bombing at both the bombing site of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building and the trial site in Denver, Colorado. Personal insight by the author of this thesis will be provided to establish evidence of influence from the media to gain access to information or areas at both sites and in order to gain advantage over their competing media counterparts by attempting to pressure the police executives into changing directives or by circumventing the established protocol. This

insight will be based upon the authors' own observations, interviews, and personal experience.

It is expected that the interviews will provide evidence to indicate whether the media uses certain influence against police, police supervisors and executives to enable them to gain access to information or areas that were not readily available to other members of the media or the general public by manipulating the executives decisions to enable them this access.

Internal validity will be established by indications of a pattern determined by the fact that these types of tactics occur on a regular and recurring basis at the bombing/trial sites. It will also be established by a pattern that these types of tactics cause police executives to break or change established ground rules or procedures agreed to beforehand by the consortium and the police or by judicial decree.

External validity will be difficult to establish due to the limited scope of the case study, however citations in the literature lend credence to the fact that replication of these types of tactics as well as the results of these tactics are rampant throughout the United States and is prevalent in any situation in which police executives are responsible for decisions at critical incident situations.

Caution should be exercised with the certification of internal validity of this thesis. Problems associated with the internal validity is that of participant bias associated with the fact that the interviewer is a fellow police officer intricately associated and familiar with the media and police actions at the bombing and trial sites. While the author did not explain his association of other than that of researcher, the police executive's knowledge of the profession that the interviewer was associated with was extensive.

Prior to interviewing the subjects, the author of this study submitted an application to the University of North Texas Institutional Review Board outlining what the purpose of the research was about, how long it will last, a description of the study and procedures to be used, confidentiality procedures, and any potential risks and benefits that could occur as a result of participating in this research. The Human Subjects Application No. 00-200 was approved prior to the implementation of the interview process.

The interviews conducted for this thesis were non-custodial interviews using a standard open questioned format (see Appendix A) to enable the subject to be able to answer the question presented fully with follow-up questions used to clarify ambiguous or interrupted answers. The length of the interviews lasted from the shortest at forty-five minutes to the longest at one and a half hours. The subjects are guaranteed confidentiality, if requested, due to their high positions and status in their respective organizations. The interviews were conducted in a relaxed, non-coercive atmosphere away from the undue influence of supervisors or superiors who may indirectly influence the answers of the person being interviewed. A total of six interviews were conducted with highly placed executives of the federal and state police agencies at the bombing site and the bombing trial.

The security configuration at the bombing site consisted of concentric layers of security made up of outer perimeter, intermediate perimeter and inner perimeter. The inner perimeter was made up of United States Marshals. The intermediate perimeter consisted of federal officers and special agents from the Federal Protective Service and the outer perimeter was made up of officers from various state organizations. Due to the

reality that the inner perimeter did not make frequent contact with the mass media on a consistent basis, no interviews were conducted with these personnel. Also, since the United States Secret Service, Drug Enforcement Administration and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms were all involved in the investigative process and were not represented at the press conferences or have contact with the mass media on a consistent basis, they too were omitted from the interview process. The six subjects were chosen due to their high positions held within their respective governmental agencies and their ability to make tactical decisions for special agents or officers within their agencies. The subjects were also chosen because they are in a position in which they can speak for all of their respective officers or special agents based upon information or occurrences relayed to them by their subordinates. Also, the subjects were in a position that brought them into contact with the mass media on a regular and recurring basis.

Although the author knew most of the subjects prior to the beginning of the interview process, the author used snowball sampling to determine the remainder of the subjects. By discussing the research prior to departing after the completion of the interview, the author was able to qualify several other subjects with information that would enhance the research or omit those agencies with nothing to contribute to the research. The author had originally decided to interview police and mass media for this thesis but decided against that course of action since the thesis focuses on the media's influence on executive police decision-making, therefore, no media personnel were interviewed.

The questionnaire consists of basic questions aimed at obtaining responses used to determine whether or not negative influence was utilized in accomplishing assigned tasks

at the bombing/trial sites. It is further designed to determine to what extent undue influence was wielded. Due to the fact that this thesis is an exploratory thesis, the questionnaire was developed by the author and has not been utilized in any other research to date. The questionnaire was designed using basic investigative questions used to gather the greatest amount of information. Open-ended questions were used to get a full accounting for each section. Clarifying questions were asked after the answers were given to ensure accurate portrayal of the information. The questions were designed so that if the subject answered negatively to a question, the subsequent questions that were not pertinent to the answer were omitted. This method minimized superfluous questions and answers. At the end of each police interview, each subject was asked whether any of their policies or procedures was influenced or changed by the mass media and the pressure that the mass media asserted on the law enforcement personnel at the bombing site and the bombing trial.

The questionnaire begins with basic information questions such as:

1. What is your name? (If not claiming confidentiality)
2. What is your occupation?
3. What agency do you work for?
4. How long have you been employed at that agency?
5. What is some of the work that you have completed?
6. What are your general feelings about the police/mass media?

These questions were designed to establish the subjects' occupation and basic information about his or her expertise in the field in which they are working. The sixth question establishes a baseline about the subjects' general feelings about the mass media. This

questionnaire was developed for use either in directing questions to the mass media or to the police. The next set of questions determines the extent that the subject has a relationship with the mass media and what the subjects' general feelings about the other profession are.

7. Are there any specific incidents that you were involved in with the police/mass media? (If so, describe them),
8. What is your relationship with the police/mass media in general?
9. How do you view the police/mass media?
10. Do you feel that their job is important?
11. Do you hold any animus for the police/mass media?
12. How do you view your own job with the police/mass media? (As important or not. Explain)

Question seven was designed to determine the history that the subject had between the mass media and the police that predated the study. Question eight was designed to determine the present relationship that the subject had with the other profession, if any, and to determine whether it was an amicable relationship or not. Question nine was designed to elicit the subjects view on the mass media or police in general. Question ten asked the subject to reveal whether they believed the other profession was important to society or not. Question eleven was developed to determine if the subject holds any animosity towards the police or mass media to determine to what extent the questionnaire would be biased and question twelve asks the test subject to reveal their own view of themselves.

The next set of questions were used to establish whether the subject was at the bombing site of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma and how long the person was there.

13. Where you at the site of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma?

14. How long were you there?

The next set of questions dealt with the subjects' reasons for being at the bombing site along with whom they interacted with while they were there.

15. Why were you there?

16. What was your reason for being there?

17. Did you interact with the police/mass media during your time there?

18. In what capacity did you interact with the police/mass media during your time there?

19. Who did you interact with? (If known)

20. What agencies did you interact with? (If known)

Question fifteen and sixteen establishes that the subject was, in fact, at the bombing site of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building which would put that subject in a position to be able to make statements about actions observed at the bombing site. Questions seventeen through twenty was designed to establish whether the subject interacted with the police or mass media while at the bombing site to determine if the subject has knowledge of the other professions' actions at the site.

The next set of questions in the questionnaire was designed to determine if the police subject attempted to gather information and if not, what prevented them from

obtaining the information. One of the questions for this thesis is based on the premise that the police, due to intense scrutiny by the press, are forced to alter established policy in order to garner the mass media's favor.

21. Did you attempt to gather information?

22. Were you able to gather information that you sought?

23. Why were you unable to gather information that you sought?

24. Would you have liked to have gathered further information?

25. If you were able to gather information, what was the information used for?

Question twenty-one determines whether the subject was in the process of gathering information, such as a criminal investigator does, or if the subject managed the police force that was tasked to establish and maintain a perimeter around the bombing site or to provide security at the bombing trial. Question twenty-two determines whether or not the subject was able to gather all of the information that they sought and to determine the reason why they were not able to obtain the information if the subject responded negatively. Question twenty-three seeks answers for why the subject failed to gather all of the information that they attempted to gather. Question twenty-four determines whether the subject was able to gather all of the information that they sought or whether other means were deployed in obtaining information. Question twenty-five determines what the information that was obtained or not obtained was used for and to what purpose it was used.

The next set of questions was developed to determine whether conflict was present between the mass media and the police during the reporting and investigation of the bombing and if so, how the confrontation or conflict was resolved.

26. Did you have a confrontation with the police/mass media?
27. Why did you have a confrontation with the police/mass media?
28. Was the situation resolved?
29. How was the situation resolved?
30. Did you encounter any additional conflict with the police/mass media?

Questions twenty-six and twenty-seven attempt to determine to what extent conflict existed between the mass media and the police. Questions twenty-eight and twenty-nine determine if the conflict was resolved to determine if the resolution was in the form of favors to the media or use of force by the police. Question thirty is a follow up question used to gauge subsequent conflict with the police/mass media.

The next set of questions would have been posed to the media to determine if they believe that their actions at the bombing site caused the police to change their operating methods or policies in order to garner favor from the media in the form of positive press and attempted to determine what those actions were. Since the media was not interviewed, the questions were omitted.

31. (Media Only) Do you believe that your actions caused the police to change their method(s) of how they handled the mass media?
32. If so, what type of actions did you use to cause this change?

Question thirty-one was designed to elicit a response from the media that would verify or refute intentional or unintended influence by the media upon the police. Question thirty-two was designed to find out if the media was attempting to actively change the police procedures in order to be able to get the information that they desired.

In questions thirty-three to thirty-six, the questions seek to determine whether or not the media or police were able to accomplish all of the tasks assigned to them and if not, what kept them from fulfilling their responsibilities to their respective agencies. The rationale behind the questions was that if the media did not accomplish all of their assigned tasks of information gathering, then it was either due to prohibitory action enforced by the police, or other factors that could have occurred to keep the mass media from obtaining their information.

33. What were your tasks that you attempted to accomplish while at the bombing site?

34. Were you able to accomplish all of your tasks while at the site?

35. What tasks were you unable to accomplish?

36. Why were you unable to accomplish these tasks?

Question thirty-three attempted to identify the extent and types of tasks that the police or media were to perform at the bombing site. Question thirty-four determined whether or not the tasks were accomplished. Question thirty-five attempted to identify the types of tasks that were not able to be accomplished by the police or media at the bombing site and question thirty six seeks to determine the reason behind the failure to accomplish the tasks.

The following set of questions was designed to garner additional comments from the subject relating to secondary conflict at the bombing site.

37. Did anything unusual happen to you at the bombing site?

38. Were you involved in any conflicts at the bombing site?

39. If so, where, when, and with who were you involved in conflict?

Question thirty-seven was used to determine if anything out of the ordinary occurred to the subject at the bombing site. Due to the fact that additional information can be obtained by asking for information in various ways, this question is basically an additional way or portraying previously sought information. Question thirty-eight was also used to determine if the subject was involved in any secondary conflicts that may have been ancillary to previously stated conflicts. Question thirty-nine was meant to solicit specific information relating to the two previous questions.

The next set of questions seeks to determine whether the subject was at the bombing trials of either Timothy McVeigh or Terry Nichols in Denver, Colorado.

40. Were you at the bombing trials of either Timothy McVeigh or Terry Nichols?
41. Why were you there?
42. How long were you there?
43. What was your reason for being there?
44. In what capacity were you there?
45. What agency do you work for?
46. How long have you been employed at that agency?

The above listed questions are designed to determine whether the subject was at either of the bombing trials, how long they were there, their reason for being there and other basic background information.

The following questions were designed to establish whether the subject interacted with the police or mass media while at the bombing trials to determine if the subject has knowledge of the other professions' actions at the trials.

47. Did you interact with the police/mass media during your time there?

48. In what capacity did you interact with the police/mass media during your time there?

49. Who did you interact with? (If known)

50. What agencies did you interact with? (If known)

Questions forty-seven designed to establish whether the subject interacted with the police or mass media while at the bombing site to determine if the subject has knowledge of the other professions' actions at the site. Question forty-eight determined the exact status of the subject and whether they were police management or media reporter. Questions forty-nine and fifty were used to specify any particular personalities or managers that were interacted with as well as the names of the agencies interacted with.

The next set of questions in the questionnaire was designed to determine if the subject attempted to gather information and if not, what prevented them from obtaining the information. Once again, the questions for this thesis are based on the premise that the police, due to intense scrutiny by the press, are forced to alter established policy in order to garner the mass media's favor.

51. Did you attempt to gather information?

52. Were you able to gather information that you sought?

53. Why were you unable to gather information that you sought?

54. Would you have liked to have gathered further information?

55. If you were able to gather information, what was the information used for?

Question fifty-one determines whether the subject was in the process of gathering information, such as a reporter or criminal investigator does, or if the subject managed the police force that was tasked to establish and maintain a perimeter and security at the

bombing trial. Question fifty-two determines whether or not the subject was able to gather all of the information that they sought and to determine the reason why they were not able to obtain the information if the subject responded negatively. Question fifty-three seeks answers for why the subject failed to gather all of the information that they attempted to gather. Question fifty-four determines whether the subject was able to gather all of the information that they sought or whether other means were deployed in obtaining information. Question fifty-five determines what the information that was obtained or not obtained was used for and to what purpose it was used.

The next set of questions was developed to determine whether conflict was present between the mass media and the police during the Oklahoma City Bombing trial and if so, how the confrontation or conflict was resolved.

56. Did you have a confrontation with the police/mass media?

57. Why did you have a confrontation with the police/mass media?

58. Was the situation resolved?

59. How was the situation resolved?

60. Did you encounter any additional conflict with the police/mass media?

Questions fifty-six and fifty-seven attempt to determine to what extent conflict existed between the mass media and the police. Questions fifty-eight and fifty-nine determine if the conflict was resolved to determine if the resolution was in the form of favors to the media or use of force by the police. Question sixty is a follow up question used to gauge subsequent conflict with the police/mass media.

The next set of questions were posed to the media to determine if they believe that their actions at the bombing site caused the police to change their operating methods or

policies in order to garner favor from the media in the form of positive press and attempted to determine what those actions were.

61. (Media Only) Do you believe that your actions caused the police to change their method(s) of how they handled the mass media?

62. If so, what type of actions did you use to cause this change?

Question sixty-one was designed to elicit a response from the media that would verify or refute intentional or unintended influence by the media upon the police. Question sixty-two was designed to find out if the media was attempting to actively change the police procedures in order to be able to get the information that they desired.

In questions sixty-three to sixty-six, the questions seek to determine whether or not the media or police were able to accomplish all of the tasks assigned to them and if not, to determine what kept them from fulfilling their responsibilities to their respective agencies. The rationale behind the questions was that if the media did not accomplish all of their assigned tasks of information gathering, then it was either due to prohibitory action enforced by the police, or other factors that could have occurred to keep the mass media from obtaining their information.

63. What were your tasks that you attempted to accomplish while at the trial(s)?

64. Were you able to accomplish all of your tasks?

65. What tasks were you unable to accomplish?

66. Why were you unable to accomplish these tasks?

Question sixty-three attempted to identify the extent and types of tasks that the police or media were to perform at the bombing trial. Question sixty-four determined whether or not the tasks were accomplished. Question sixty-five attempted to identify the types of

tasks that were not able to be accomplished by the police or media at the bombing trial and question sixty-six seeks to determine the reason behind the failure to accomplish the tasks.

The following set of questions was designed to garner additional comments from the subject relating to secondary conflict at the bombing trial.

67. Did anything unusual happen to you at the bombing trial(s)?

68. Were you involved in any conflicts at the bombing trial(s)?

69. If so, where, when, and with who were you involved in conflict?

Question sixty-seven was used to determine if anything out of the ordinary occurred to the subject at the bombing trial. Due to the fact that additional information can be obtained by asking for information in various ways, this question is basically an additional way of portraying previously sought information. Question sixty-eight was also used to determine if the subject was involved in any secondary conflicts that may have been ancillary to previously stated conflicts. Question sixty-nine was meant to solicit specific information relating to the two previous questions.

The next set of questions seeks to determine whether the subject was in the courtroom at the bombing trials of either Timothy McVeigh or Terry Nichols in Denver, Colorado.

70. Were you allowed in the courtroom?

71. Why were you in the courtroom?

Question seventy establishes the fact that the subject was in the courtroom and question seventy-one determines the reason why the person was in the courtroom.

The following questions were designed to establish whether the subject interacted with the police or mass media while in the courtroom at the bombing trials to determine if the subject has knowledge of the other professions' actions in the courtroom at the trials.

72. Did you interact with the police/mass media during your time there?

73. In what capacity did you interact with the police/mass media during your time there?

74. Who did you interact with? (If known)

75. What agencies did you interact with? (If known)

The next set of questions in the questionnaire was designed to determine if the subject attempted to gather information and if not, what prevented them from obtaining the information. Again, the questions for this thesis are based on the premise that the police, due to intense scrutiny by the press, are forced to alter established policy in order to garner the mass media's favor.

76. Did you attempt to gather information?

77. Were you able to gather information that you sought?

78. Why were you unable to gather information that you sought?

79. Would you have liked to have gathered further information?

80. If you were able to gather information, what was the information used for?

Question seventy-six determines whether the subject was in the process of gathering information, such as a reporter or criminal investigator does, or if the subject was present to testify at the bombing trial. Question seventy-seven determines whether or not the subject was able to gather all of the information that they sought and to determine the reason why they were not able to obtain the information if the subject responded

negatively. Question seventy-eight seeks answers for why the subject failed to gather all of the information that they attempted to gather. Question seventy-nine determines whether the subject was able to gather all of the information that they sought or whether other means were deployed in obtaining information. Question eighty determines what the information that was obtained or not obtained was used for and to what purpose it was used.

The next set of questions was developed to determine whether conflict was present between the mass media and the police inside of the courtroom during the Oklahoma City bombing trial and if so, how the confrontation or conflict was resolved.

81. Did you have a confrontation with the police/mass media?

82. Why did you have a confrontation with the police/mass media?

83. Was the situation resolved?

84. How was the situation resolved?

85. Did you encounter any additional conflict with the police/mass media?

Questions eighty-one and eighty-two attempt to determine to what extent conflict existed between the mass media and the police. Questions eighty-three and eighty-four attempt to determine if the conflict was resolved to determine if the resolution was in the form of favors to the media or use of force by the police. Question eighty-five is a follow up question used to gauge subsequent conflict with the police/mass media.

The next set of questions were posed to the media to determine if they believe that their actions at the courtroom of the bombing trials caused the police to change their operating methods or policies in order to garner favor from the media in the form of positive press and attempted to determine what those actions were.

86. (Media Only) Do you believe that your actions caused the police to change their method(s) of how they handled the mass media?

87. If so, what type of actions did you use to cause this change?

Question eighty-six was designed to elicit a response from the media that would verify or refute intentional or unintended influence by the media upon the police. Question eighty-seven was designed to find out if the media was attempting to actively change the police procedures in order to be able to get the information that they desired in the courtroom.

In questions eighty-eight to ninety-one, the questions seek to determine whether or not the media or police were able to accomplish all of the tasks assigned to them and if not, to determine what kept them from fulfilling their responsibilities to their respective agencies. The rationale behind the questions was that if the media did not accomplish all of their assigned tasks of information gathering, then it was either due to prohibitory action enforced by the police, or other factors that could have occurred to keep the mass media from obtaining their information.

88. What were your tasks that you attempted to accomplish while in the courtroom?

89. Were you able to accomplish all of your tasks?

90. What tasks were you unable to accomplish?

91. Why were you unable to accomplish these tasks?

Question eighty-eight attempted to identify the extent and types of tasks that the police or media were to perform in the courtroom at the bombing trial. Question eighty-nine determined whether or not the tasks were accomplished. Question ninety attempted to identify the types of tasks that were not able to be accomplished by the police or media in

the courtroom at the bombing trial and question ninety-one seeks to determine the reason behind the failure to accomplish the tasks.

The following set of questions was designed to garner additional comments from the subject relating to secondary conflict in the courtroom at the bombing trial.

92. Did anything unusual happen to you in the courtroom?

93. Were you involved in any conflicts in the courtroom?

94. If so, where, when, and with who were you involved in conflict?

Question ninety-two was used to determine if anything out of the ordinary occurred to the subject in the courtroom at the bombing trial. Again, due to the fact that additional information can be obtained by asking for information in various ways, this question is basically an additional way of portraying previously sought information. Question ninety-three was also used to determine if the subject was involved in any secondary conflicts that may have been ancillary to previously stated conflicts. Question ninety-four was meant to solicit specific information relating to the two previous questions.

The last question attempted to determine to what extent, if any, the subject had changed their mind about the other institution after their interactions with each other.

95. After your interaction with the police/mass media, have you changed your opinion of the other institution?

At the end of each questionnaire the following notice was posted to inform the subject that follow-up or clarifying questions could and would be asked to ensure accuracy and clarity of the information gathered for this study:

Note: The type and quantity of questions asked during the interview may vary slightly due to the type and amount of testimony obtained. These questions will be

used to clarify answers and describe in detail any episodes encountered during the interview.

The survey questionnaire was administered in a neutral setting at the subjects' office in an area that was comfortable and free of distractions. All of the interviews were recorded to ensure accuracy of all of the information gathered. The recordings were then converted into transcripts of the conversations and then the recordings were destroyed to ensure confidentiality. The transcripts were sanitized, unless the subject waived confidentiality, to protect those subjects claiming confidentiality to ensure that any information that pointed to that person's position or place of employment was omitted.

The information will be analyzed by using the comparison method. By comparing the collective responses for a given question, the researcher will be able to determine if a consensus is achieved. The use of a consensus will enable the researcher to determine to what extent, if any, the media had on executive police decisions during the bombing investigation and trials. It should be pointed out that due to the unique position of some of the police executives that were interviewed, some of the answers even though not a consensus will be significant in their findings.

The information will be categorized by the area in which that person participated in interacting with the media according to the location of interaction such as the bombing site, bombing trial perimeter or courtroom. This method of categorization will be used to enable the researcher to be able to determine the extent the media influences the police in each of the different sections of the bombing event. The categories will be broken down further into subcategories in which a determination will be made as to whether there was

conflict between the mass media and the police or not, and whether the media influenced the actions of the police executives at their respective locations or not.

Limitations

Several limitations exist in this methodology that could limit the use of this research in future applications. One obvious limitation is the narrow scope of the research. By limiting the number of participants in the study the ability to replicate the research is tenuous. The quality of the subjects chosen were exceptional, but due to several of the subjects limited contact with the mass media, the findings have a tendency to be weak.

Another limitation to this research is the fact that a critical incident of this magnitude is indeed a rarity. Replication of the research will be difficult to accomplish pending the happenstance of another bombing event of this magnitude. It is in fact a rare even when mass media from over twenty-eight countries come together to document an event such as the intentional destruction of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building and the murder of one hundred sixty eight men, women, and children. However, when similar events do take place, the interaction of the media and the police will be sure to ensue the catastrophic occasion. Until such an event occurs, replication will be a concern.

Direct participation by the author in the events mentioned in this research give rise to participant bias due to the direct action by the author because of the authors' profession as a police officer. However, every effort was made to attempt to portray events and responses in a neutral way. The authors' extensive experience with criminal investigations, interview and interrogation techniques and his intimate knowledge of the subject matter are all strengths in the development of this research.

Since this is the first in-depth study of police/media interactions at critical incident scenes of this magnitude, the prospects of this methodology will assist in the implementation of SOP's directing appropriate responses at these types of incidents. This type of research will also ensure proper and expeditious treatment of the mass media at critical incidents and can be used to determine the appropriate type of handling by the PIO.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The results of the interviews varied depending on the subject being interviewed. The police executives that were interviewed came from two federal police agencies and one state agency. All of the executives were explicitly involved with either the criminal investigation of the bombing or the security at the bombing site or the trial site. Five of the executives were present at the bombing site and all six of the executives were present at the bombing trials of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols. Due to the fact that the police executives interviewed came from different organizations with many working together for the first time, different viewpoints were established and relayed to the researcher. This variance due to individuality was best dealt with by using consensus to determine whether a mannerism is congruent across the entire spectrum of questions. The questionnaire was divided into four sections. The first section dealt with basic issues for identifying the subject and determining the subjects' level of expertise in a given area. The second section dealt with actions and reactions due to the interaction of the mass media and the police at the Oklahoma City Bombing site. The third section dealt with the interactions of the police and mass media at the bombing trials of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols in Denver, Colorado. The fourth section dealt with their interaction inside of the courtroom of the bombing trials. Caution should be used in interpreting the results of the interactions inside of the courtroom. All of the media and police interactions inside of the courtroom were amicable due to the fact that Judge Maetsch was present in the courtroom at the time of the interactions.

General Perceptions and Personal Background Information

The findings of the first section revealed that all of the subjects interviewed came from police executives or upper level supervisors. All came from federal or state law enforcement agencies. All of the executives except one were present at the Oklahoma City bombing site.

Police/Media Interaction at The Bombing Site

In reviewing the questions asked about their general feelings about the mass media, one of the respondents replied, "I don't like the media." Subject number one further stated that he believes that the media attempts to sensationalize all of their stories and that if they can't get the news due to the police keeping them from their investigation, then the mass media will make up facts and broadcast lies to the American public. Subject number three agreed with the assessment of subject number one. Subject number three further stated, "Many times they can hinder an investigation that law enforcement has ongoing by releasing information that law enforcement does not want released because it could aid in the identification, or could be used in subsequent interviews or interrogations of subjects." The other subjects believe that the mass media are necessary and if used properly can even be advantageous to law enforcement. They stated that law enforcement should attempt to garner a lasting relationship with the mass media and work towards common goals. The consensus of the subjects interviewed appears to lean toward using the mass media instead of fostering the adversarial relationship that appears to be rampant in many police departments across the country.

The next question dealt with identifying any specific incidents in which the police executives were involved with the mass media. Subject number one dealt with the media

on a daily basis and had problems with keeping them out of the bombing site perimeter. In one particular incident, he arrested TV personality Geraldo Rivera at gunpoint after he attempted to infiltrate the perimeter dressed as a doctor and the subject recognized him. Doctors were entering and leaving the bombing site at all hours of the day and night to assist criminal investigators with identifying the cause of death and to pronounce victims as being deceased or to render aid in the unlikely event that a victim was found alive. Mr. Rivera dressed in a white physicians coat and carrying a stethoscope, attempted to enter one of the checkpoints disguised as a doctor. Unfortunately for Geraldo, the subject recognized him, drew his sidearm, and told Mr. Rivera to lie down on the ground. Mr. Rivera was handcuffed and turned over to the United States Marshals Service for transport to the city jail. Subject number one further relayed that Mr. Rivera was released in a political move to keep the media from criticizing the police. In fact, the police released Mr. Rivera and told him that he had not been arrested but only detained. Subject number six relayed that, while at the bombing site, the bombing occurred at 9:02 a.m. and the first FBI news conference wasn't until 4:00 p.m., leaving the mass media seven hours without any official information on the bombing and leaving it up to the so called, "experts." He further stated that the "experts" were all wrong in their respective assessments of the situation.

Another subject stated, "To be quite honest with you, I've never had a problem with the media because what I've found in any contact I've had with them if you set the parameters for them up front, for example in a major case, if at the very start you set very certain rules and guidelines you agree to, that you will follow and they will follow, you usually don't have a problem." The subject further stated, ". Now, both you and I are aware

of certain situations like up in Oklahoma City where people not necessarily in the mainstream press tried to go past what the rules were, tried to sneak through security perimeters in an effort to get a scoop on the story. That's usually the exception, not the rule. Your mainstream, ABC, NBC, CBS, your newspapers and stuff, will go by the rules to get it because if you cooperate with them, they'll cooperate with you. For the most part they've been very good. In a situation where you do have an explosion, you set up your perimeters, you explain to them why, although they usually already know, but if you can explain to them and give them a little sound byte, that helps them out. If you give regular updates to them, that satisfies their needs. Of course you also, as bad as this may sound, knowing that they also have deadlines, trying to help them with those deadlines so that you can get them information so that they can meet their 5 and 6 and 10 o'clock news reports, and also, if possible give them sound bytes for those broadcasts; they're happy as can be."

One subject relayed that the fact that the media were kept in a defined press area that it kept the press from viewing benevolent actions by the executives that, if reported, could have been slightly detrimental to the investigation. One subject presents the following example: "I personally talked to six or seven family members. You get to hear what happened, what relationship they had to someone in the building. One lady in particular had dinner and a fight with her brother on the telephone about their parents the night before. He was in the credit union the morning of the bombing to sign a loan on a new vehicle. He was killed when the bomb went off. The last words that she had with her brother were in anger. They fought, screamed, and hollered at each other and hung up without apologizing, without making amends. She'll always carry that memory with her.

The guilt she felt the loss that she felt were enormous; I mean this woman was absolutely devastated. You could tell by the way she was acting, the tears, the emotion, she was absolutely devastated over what had transpired, the circumstances surrounding her brother's death. I allowed her into the compound, put her on the golf cart that I used, took her in front of the building and told her you can't take anything from this site, you can't leave anything at this site, it's a crime scene. But if you want to sit here a few minutes and say a prayer about your brother, talk out loud to your brother; come to grips with what's happened and try to get some closure about what transpired, then take all the time you need. We sat there for a half hour to forty-five minutes in complete silence. She never got off of the golf cart. She never touched anything, she never left anything, she was probably 50 to 75 yards from the building and she just sat there and cried. Said a few prayers, cried on my shoulder, literally put her head on my shoulder and cried, I would say for 45 minutes and then said she was ready to go. She was parked three or four blocks from the federal building so I gave her a ride back to her car and she got off the golf cart. One of the local civic agencies were handing out these little guardian angle pins and I had gotten several and was wearing one on my uniform. I took it off my uniform, pinned it to her sweater and told her it was her brother and that he was there to look out after her. To this day, five years later, I still get Christmas cards from this lady; I gave her my business card. I still get Christmas cards from her, it's the only time I hear from her but I get Christmas cards from her. What I did made an impact on her; it helped her deal with the loss of her brother. I did that on several occasions. Was I supposed to? No. Did I violate some rule about people being in the facility and compound? Yes, I did. But it was what I could do to help people with their loss."

One problem that the police had with the media was reported by several of the subjects. News personality Connie Chung gave a stinging report on her opinion of the lackluster response of the Oklahoma Fire Department, which was met with disdain by the police officers at the scene of the bombing. The subject's relayed that at the two "Port-O-Let" toilets at the bombing site for rescue and security personnel, a makeshift sign was placed on the outside of both in memoriam to their disapproval of the comments of Ms. Chung. One sign read "Connie Chung's Mansion" and the other read "Connie Chung's Dressing Room." Needless to say that this incident caused some stress, both good and bad, between the mass media and the law enforcement personnel at the site.

All of the remainder of the subjects with the exception of subject number five who was not at the bombing site had no conflicts with the media at the bombing site due to their high positions within their respective organizations. In fact, the other subjects stated that once the media understood the ground rules and were given information and a sound byte, they stayed out of trouble with law enforcement.

Therefore, since only two of the respondents had a conflict with the media, it would be prudent to establish that because of the high positions of the other individuals involved, that they were somewhat removed from frequent contact with the media except during press conferences or official interviews.

The next section dealt with the relationship of the police with the media in general, how they viewed the media, whether they feel that the media's job is important and whether they hold any animus towards the press. All of the subjects stated that their relationship with the mass media ranged from good to exceptional. A majority of the respondents stated that they understood the mission of the press and utilized them to

assist in their law enforcement efforts. They further believed that most of the media had integrity and attempted to get the truth out to the American public. All of the subjects also believed that the problem with conflict with the media was not prevalent with the national media such as CNN, ABC, CBS, and NBC, but with the local affiliates. These are the small stations that compete on a local basis for the big media outlet's funds to enable them to continue operations. The only negative comment was from subject number two who was concerned that at several points during the Oklahoma City bombing, the news media stopped reporting the news and started making the news.

All respondents agreed that the job the mass media does is important. One respondent even cited the fact that without media assistance the "Texas Seven" would have been extremely difficult to capture. However, the subjects disagreed that the media tries to report the news with an unbiased eye. In one response the subject stated that because one of the reporters reported that the bombers in the Oklahoma City bombing were Middle Eastern, the reporter wound up losing his job and the news station was sued.

For the question of whether or not the police hold any animus towards the media, all subjects except one did not harbor ill feelings toward the mass media. In one instance, the subject was upset that on ABC's 20/20 news magazine the media reported several outrageous conspiracy theories without determining if the stories were true or not. The report also diminished the credibility of the media in this subject's opinion.

The consensus is that with few exceptions, the media is viewed favorably by police executives, but caution that while the main media venues attempt to portray the news in an unbiased, truthful manner, the local media venues fail to establish the same credibility due to the intense competition for resources.

The next question determined how the police viewed their own jobs. All of the police view their jobs as being important. One subject stated that not everyone in law enforcement belongs there, but that law enforcement performs a function that society needs. It is self evident that their responses are biased.

The next set of questions determined that five of the six respondents were at the Oklahoma City bombing site, for how long, why they were there, and their reason for being there. All of those executives present at the bombing site arrived shortly after the bombing event occurred and was there until the implosion of the building, approximately six weeks later.

The next section determined whether the police interacted with the media, the capacity of that interaction, and whom the subject attempted to interact with. All of the subjects were involved with the media on a daily basis. The subjects that interacted with the media interacted in the capacity of law enforcement security of the bombing site and trials and as criminal investigations spokesperson during news conferences. All subjects stated that they interacted with all of the major nationwide media agencies and attempted to establish rapport with and assist the local news media to as great an extent as possible. The consensus here is that law enforcement interacted with the national as well as local mass media on a regular and recurring basis without a large amount of conflict.

The next section determined whether there was any conflict between the mass media and the police at the bombing site. The consensus is that there was not much conflict at the site due to the fact that the media were told what the ground rules were from the start and were told that they would be arrested if they chose to disregard the rules. With the exception of the Geraldo Rivera incident and continual attempts at the

local news media to gain access to the outer perimeter, conflicts with the media were minimal.

The next set of questions that the subjects answered dealt with their ability to gather information at the Oklahoma City bombing site. The research attempted to determine if the media was causing the police to alter their practices through influence and exuberant reporting techniques. All subjects reported that they were able to gather all of the information that they sought to gather. Three of the subjects did not attempt to gather information due to their duties directing law enforcement personnel. The other two subjects were directly involved in investigating the bombing crime and did not have any problems with the media due to their being isolated from the media by the security perimeter.

Therefore, the consensus is that the media did not have any direct influence at the bombing site. However, there was one incident in which law enforcement had to do a task that was out of the ordinary as a result of media influence. The police placed a tarp line around the building when they were sifting through a pile of evidence due to the fact that there were still several bodies buried in the rubble.

The next section dealt with whether anything unusual happened at the bombing site. This section was used to solicit additional information that may have been omitted previously. One subject related that he was injured while putting up the tarp line. One subject relayed the surrealism of standing at ground zero and looking up at the devastation that wrecked the building but left a delicate glass vase undisturbed and about burglar alarms going off in adjacent buildings and then taking several days to finally die out.

The impact of these findings of this section would indicate that police executives responsible for the outer and intermediate perimeters were more likely to have to have conflict with the media but did not change their decisions substantially in reference to the media due to the type of incident in which the police were involved. Therefore, the impact of these findings would validate changes in police SOP's to ensure that the media, who are generally well regarded by police executives, are kept well informed by the police PIO and that a general media holding area would be needed at future events to ensure less conflict and confusion between the police and the mass media.

Police/Media Interaction at the Bombing Trials

The next section deals with the bombing trials of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols. Only three of the respondents and the author of this thesis were at the Oklahoma City bombing trials of Terry Nichols and Timothy McVeigh. The first section of questions listed the reason the police officers were at the trials. Two of the respondents were responsible for the establishing, maintaining, and patrolling the perimeter around the courthouse and for providing personal security for the prosecution team. One of the respondents was responsible for testifying on the evidence collected at the bombing site.

The next set of questions dealt with the police and media interaction during the bombing trial. One subject interacted with the media as little as possible. The other subject and the author had intense, regular, and recurring interaction with the media on a daily basis. This interaction was at checkpoints leading into areas allocated for use by the media for reporting the news as well as ensuring that they abided by the established rules of behavior established by the court. This interaction was with all members of the

national mass media (ABC, CBS, NBC, Fox and CNN), as well as members of their affiliate stations.

The next question concerned attempts by the police to gather further information at the trial. One subject conducted ongoing investigations related to the Oklahoma City bombing while the trial proceeded. The other subject and the author gathered ongoing criminal intelligence for possible use against suspected terrorist acts during the trials. The subject that continued to investigate the bombing event stated that there would always be issues unresolved that he would have liked to answer. None of the subjects indicated that they had any problems gathering information, which would indicate that the media did not influence or prevent the police from obtaining information at the bombing trials.

In determining the extent of conflict between the police and the mass media, the consensus of the subjects indicated that the media were generally well behaved due to the rules set down prior to the trial by the court on the conduct of the mass media. Also, the over exuberance of the media was kept in check by the threat of taking the reporters press pass and not allowing them the chance to report on newsworthy items from the trials. The only problems indicated were isolated incidents with the national news media and with the local affiliates over-zealousness in attempting to report the trials and all actions associated with the trial. One of the subjects reports that the police were forced to change standard arrest policy during the arrest of an assault subject. The subject relayed, "We had an assault during the trial. We were chasing the guy and the media was right there covering everything that we were doing. Watching us chase him, filming us. You do act different. There's no doubt. You know you get all pumped up, you can handle it one way; you just knock the guy down and the other way you have to do it all together different or

you're going to be put as the bad guy on T.V. that, "this is what the police does." The officers had to handle the subject with utmost care to avoid creating false police brutality claims by the twenty or so media cameras in the officer's face while attempting to make the arrest. The author of this thesis provides another example. One the first day of the Timothy McVeigh trial, the rule was established that no filming would take place by the media in front of the tenth circuit court of appeals. Ted Koppel and his producer were filming the reactions to several teenagers in reference to the massive police buildup in the area for the trials and how it had affected the teenagers lives. The author approached Mr. Koppel, re-advised him of the rule and asked him to stop filming and move the shoot to another place. Mr. Koppel and his producer became visibly irate and combative. The author then told Mr. Koppel that if he didn't settle down, he would be arrested for disorderly conduct. Mr. Koppel and his producer calmed down, apologized, and departed the area without further incident.

Another example of how the media influenced police decisions deals with a medical emergency that the author dealt with during the Oklahoma City bombing trial. The media had been instructed and had agreed to shoot video only in the bullpen area in front of the federal courthouse where the McVeigh trial was being held. The day that the testimony on the children that had been killed in the bombing took place, during the noon break the victims relatives were coming out of the courtroom and the author was standing adjacent to the bullpen performing the security detail. One of the victims' relatives fainted and struck the ground immediately adjacent to the authors' location by the bullpen. The author bent down to administer first aid and was pushed away by the news media in their effort to "get the shot" for the evening news. The author and several other federal police

officers forced the media to back away and were able to summons an ambulance to attend to the fallen relative.

It was literally impossible to establish any sort of security around the Defense Council for Timothy McVeigh due to the early establishment of what is termed in media vernacular as a “gang bang.” This is there the individual who has garnered the media’s attention is literally surrounded by a large group of cameramen, sound personnel, producers, and reporters.

Another incident in which the media interfered with the police at the trial was during a situation that occurred on the first day of the Timothy McVeigh trial. One this day the United States Marshals Service, the Federal Protective Service and the Denver Police Department expected a large amount of protestors. One individual showed up carrying a sign that indicated that God wanted to sue the United States government for being corrupt. The individual was evidently mentally disturbed. To make matters worse, the individual was screaming this mantra as loud as he could and making somewhat of a nuisance of himself. The media had nothing to report because the jury selection was taking place. When one of the federal police officers asked him what thought he was doing, the man replied, “God wants me to protest against the United States government” to which the quick thinking officer replied, “Well. God told me that he wants you to leave!” The man stopped yelling and departed the area never to return. The police officer turned around to find twenty video cameras catching the action for the evening news and the story was deemed front-page news by one of the local newspapers. It was this type of constant pressure and scrutiny by the media that led to influence on the executive police decisions during the trials.

One of the subjects and the author reported that during the trial, the police regularly changed their policies and procedures to keep on the good terms with the press. There would be certain security measures in place in one area and when one of the big media agencies wanted to shoot in a certain area, the police would change the rules to allow them access to that area except for the area directly in front of the courthouse. The consensus of the remaining subjects is that the media regularly influenced police actions at the bombing trial.

The findings for this section would indicate that the media used aggressive reporting techniques and applied pressure in order to force the police to allow specific media outlets access to certain areas that were not open to the other mass media organizations. There is also sufficient evidence to suggest that the establishment of a bullpen area for the media and establishment of rules and court orders will mediate any conflict between the police and the mass media or influence on executive police decisions but not eradicate the process.

Police/Media Interaction in the Courtroom

Three of the subjects were allowed in the courtroom to testify for the prosecution and one other subject and the author were allowed in the courtroom for security purposes. The only interactions that the police and the media had were at security checkpoints where the mass media checked into the courtroom. Due to court orders issued by Judge Maetsch and the prevalence of law enforcement in the courtroom, interaction between the mass media and the police was amicable and friendly.

CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDATIONS

The thesis establishes some support that the more frequent and intense the interaction between the mass media and the police, the more conflict that ensues. There is evidence to support the premise that the mass media influences the police in such a way as to enable them to cause the police to alter security practices to enable the media access to specific areas not available to other media organizations to keep the media from reporting them in a negative way. This brings up the interesting question: should the police be more flexible in the way that they handle the media at critical incidents? The answer is yes.

The research established that the most of the police believe that the media have a necessary place in society and perform a valuable function by informing the public of contemporary events that occur in society. Also, the police at the bombing site indicated that, with the exception of Geraldo Rivera, the media were well behaved and adhered to the rules set down by the law enforcement community. The police also believed that it the fault in the conflict between the news media and the police lies with the local or smaller news affiliates rather than the large national news organizations. The research also determined that this situation is brought about by the smaller news organizations need for the larger organizations funds to ensure continued operation of the smaller affiliates.

The conflict that arises between the police and the mass media are due to their competing goals. The basic goals of the police are: 1) to secure the crime scene; 2) conduct the criminal investigation; 3) ensure the safety of everyone at the crime scene;

and 4) to render aid to anyone who is injured. The basic goals of the media are: 1) to investigate the situation for newsworthy material; 2) to get the basic information that is available at the scene; 3) to ensure the timely reporting of the gathered information to the public; and 4) to ensure that the information reported is as accurate as possible. Due to these competing goals between the police and the mass media, a relationship of give and take must be established. The media is there to gather information to report to the public. The police are there to keep onlookers including reporters out of the crime scene and to ensure that information given to the reporter's flows through the appropriate channels from the police to the mass media. Therefore, in the give and take scheme of things the police should ensure that as soon as the perimeter is established, the PIO must establish a press area where hourly press conferences or information releases are accomplished. The PIO should ensure that SOP's exist and are disseminated to the press for how the police will react to critical incidents and who the PIO will be. The SOP should also ensure that at any incident of this magnitude, the PIO will be notified and will respond with the initial units. The SOP should ensure that the PIO sets up a press area that far enough away to ensure the safety of the press but advantageous to the press to ensure that they are able to get adequate video of the situation. Once this area is established, the information should be disseminated to all of the police patrols located on the perimeter so that any wayward media personnel will be able to locate the press area. The SOP should also establish basic "ground rules" that the media have agreed to beforehand and understand to ensure the proper conduct of police and media personnel. This method of containment ensures that both the goals of the police and the goals of the media are met.

Another area of give and take is brought about by this containment method of establishing a media “bullpen” as it was referred to at the Oklahoma City bombing trials. By the police keeping the media in a central location near within sight of the situation, the police are able to accomplish their mission of keeping the crime scene pristine for the conducting of the criminal investigation and control of the information that is relayed to the media. The media in return are rewarded for their behavior by getting official information on a regular basis and being able to get video from an unobstructed vantage point. The give and take of the relationship should also ensure that feedback from the media to the police in the form of complaints of lack of information from the police or the inadequate ability to obtain certain shots of video should be met with compromise from the PIO. If the location of the media “bullpen” is inadequate or poorly located, the PIO should seriously consider moving the location or opening a secondary location for the press. After all, it is the PIOs job to ensure continued good relations with the mass media without jeopardizing the ongoing investigation. In the end, the goals of the police and the mass media at critical incident scenes are the same: to obtain the who, what, when, where, how, and why an event occurred and to report their findings.

Recommendations for future research should continue to focus on the extent that the mass media influences police executives’ decisions during critical incidents episodes in other parts of the United States. This influence could be as simple as a review of department standard operating procedures and changing the policy that deals with how the police interact with the press or how the police set up media staging areas at critical incidents. It could also encompass how police executives handle press conferences at situations such as hostage negotiations, barricaded subjects, homicides, robberies, bomb

threats, bombing events, weapons of mass destruction and a plethora of other situations in which law enforcement and media response is expected.

One of the problems that occurred with the response of the Oklahoma City Police Department during the bombing event was that, even though the department had SOP's that covered critical incidents and natural disasters, they were not as prepared as they would have liked to have been for a bombing event of this magnitude. With the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) being faced by police departments all over the country and based upon the fact that most of these weapons can be manufactured at home, it is a wise police executive indeed who establishes a new SOP or policy dealing with police response to a massive critical incident. Based upon the findings of this research and upon the experiences of the author, the following recommendations for police response SOP's should be taken into account when establishing these procedures:

1. Establish an appropriate perimeter around the incident site. Ensure that enough space is allocated for emergency vehicles and collection of evidence—the perimeter can always be brought in later as the investigation progresses.
2. Determine safety requirements such as whether or not there is a WMD incident or not, if the scene is safe for rescue personnel or not, if there is a secondary explosive device or not, etc.
3. Establish a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and ensure that it is properly manned.
4. Determine medical and manpower needs and ensure that they enough are dispatched and are able to proceed unimpeded to the incident scene.

5. Establish a triage/ambulance area in a safe location.
6. Establish a media briefing area and disseminate the information to all of the officers on the perimeter. These officers will likely come in contact with the media more than intermediate or inner perimeter officers but all should be notified of the briefing areas location. The PIO should ensure that everyone is briefed on the rules of conduct and a timetable for the dissemination of information. This should be followed immediately by initial information about what type of event has taken place and what is being done by the respective government agencies. The PIO should remember that the media is looking for the initial response of the government, the timeliness of the government's response, and what the government is doing at the time to bring the incident under control.
7. Establish contact with all of the state and federal agencies responsible for investigation or emergency support of this type of incident such as the FBI, ATF, State Police, Explosives Ordinance Disposal (EOD), Hazmat (Hazardous Material Specialists), NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) Specialists, National Guard, FEMA, etc. to ensure a rapid response.

It should be noted that these suggestions for SOP's at massive critical incidents are by no means conclusive and can be changed to add or delete any item or rearranged in order to meet any special needs of local law enforcement communities across the country.

Many factors led to less than superior media relations during the Oklahoma City bombing investigation and trial that ensured partial failure by both the media and the police to achieve and maintain their respective goals. One factor is the massive lapse of

time between the actual bombing event and the time of the first official news conference with the FBI, ATF, Oklahoma City Police Department, and the Oklahoma City Fire Department. Due to this extended period of time without official word from the governmental agencies involved, the media, pressed for information for their live broadcasts, were forced to use speculation from their own “experts” to “make” the news rather than report it. This was detrimental to both the investigation and the credibility of the mass media. It was detrimental to the investigation because it “tainted” any possibility for assistance from the general public in the apprehension of the perpetrators as well as biased the general public even more that the people who committed the crime may have been Middle Easterners. It damaged the credibility of the mass media because it turned out that the so-called “expert’s” were seriously wrong about who caused the catastrophe.

Good relations can be established between the mass media and the police by ensuring cooperation between the two entities. Knowing the ground rules beforehand can lead to less confusion, better communication, and ensure mutual respect instead of animosity between warring factions of the media and the press. Also, the establishment of training sessions in police academies to assist the recruit in understanding the mission of the media and their need information as well as how to courteously deal with the media can go a long way to ensuring the extinction of current bias’ towards the press by the police.

Research should be completed that focus’ more on the conflict between police and the media. Even though police training is beginning to incorporate training aimed at establishing a lasting rapport between the mass media and the police, studies should

continue to determine and change the underlying stimulus that causes these conflicts to arise in the first place.

Furthermore, research should also focus on establishing policies similar to the ones utilized at the bombing site and the bombing trials for establishing boundaries for the mass media and to determine ground rules prior to or as soon after the event has occurred. Determining ground rules prior to or soon after a bombing event or trial establishes control of the media and enables law enforcement and the media to conduct their missions in a orderly, safe, and non-conflicting way. Research should attempt to determine what are the motivators behind the mass medias' insatiable appetite for sensationalism and identify methods for mitigating conflict and competition among the mass media and law enforcement.

Future research be able to determine whether placing the media in a centralized area and holding periodic press conferences would help deter sensationalism and prevarication in the mass media. This research should also determine if placing the media in a central holding area will in fact, enable law enforcement to better control the mass media and the information that they disseminate. This type of research would be of great assistance to law enforcement and enable them to conduct criminal investigations without interference from the mass media.

Researchers may also want to conduct research on the effectiveness of establishing press credentialing during media events such as press conferences. The premise is that by issuing a press pass and conducting a limited background investigation of the media personnel, the pass supposedly gives leverage for enforcement to law enforcement personnel if the media person enters into conflict with law enforcement.

This leverage would be in the form of the pulling or taking away of the press pass and thus severely limiting the access that the press person would have to the established press areas. Another excellent topic of research along these lines, is whether or not criminal background investigations are necessary for the media or if it is a waste of government money.

Unfortunately, it is necessary that in order for this type of research to occur, a critical incident of the magnitude that would interest the mass media must happen before this type of research can be accomplished. This fact is a very limiting factor in deciding to conduct research of this type given the scarcity of bombing events like the Oklahoma City Bombing. Conducting research on a related critical incident would enable the researcher to gather information that may lead to the same conclusions, but the researcher will be limited in their ability to replicate the study on a large scale given the limited amount of serious critical incidents in the United States.

APPENDIX A
RESEARCH PROJECT QUESTIONNAIRE

RESEARCH PROJECT QUESTIONNAIRE*

Title of Study: Media Influence on Executive Police Decision-Making: A Case Study of Police and Media Interaction During the Oklahoma City Bombing Investigation and Trials.

Principle Investigator: _____

1. What is your name? (If not claiming confidentiality)
2. What is your occupation?
3. What agency do you work for?
4. How long have you been employed at that agency?
5. What is some of the work that you have completed?
6. What are your general feelings about the mass media?
7. Are there any specific incidents that you were involved in with the mass media? (If so, describe them)
8. What is your relationship with the mass media in general?
9. How do you view the mass media?
10. Do you feel that their job is important?
11. Do you hold any animus for the mass media?
12. How do you view your own job with the police? (As important or not. Explain)
13. Where you at the site of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma?
14. How long were you there?
15. Why were you there?
16. What was your reason for being there?

17. Did you interact with the mass media during your time there?
18. In what capacity did you interact with the mass media during your time there?
19. Who did you interact with? (If known)
20. What agencies did you interact with? (If known)
21. Did you attempt to gather information?
22. Were you able to gather information that you sought?
23. Why were you unable to gather information that you sought?
24. Would you have liked to have gathered further information?
25. If you were able to gather information, what was the information used for?
26. Did you have a confrontation with the mass media?
27. Why did you have a confrontation with the mass media?
28. Was the situation resolved?
29. How was the situation resolved?
30. Did you encounter any additional conflict with the mass media?
31. (Media Only) Do you believe that your actions caused the police to change their method(s) of how they handled the mass media?
32. If so, what type of actions did you use to cause this change?
33. What were your tasks that you attempted to accomplish while at the bombing site?
34. Were you able to accomplish all of your tasks while at the site?
35. What tasks were you unable to accomplish?
36. Why were you unable to accomplish these tasks?
37. Did anything unusual happen to you at the bombing site?
38. Were you involved in any conflicts at the bombing site?

39. If so, where, when, and with who were you involved in conflict?
40. Were you at the bombing trials of either Timothy McVeigh or Terry Nichols?
41. Why were you there?
42. How long were you there?
43. What was your reason for being there?
44. In what capacity were you there?
45. What agency do you work for?
46. How long have you been employed at that agency?
47. Did you interact with the mass media during your time there?
48. In what capacity did you interact with the mass media during your time there?
49. Who did you interact with? (If known)
50. What agencies did you interact with? (If known)
51. Did you attempt to gather information?
52. Were you able to gather information that you sought?
53. Why were you unable to gather information that you sought?
54. Would you have liked to have gathered further information?
55. If you were able to gather information, what was the information used for?
56. Did you have a confrontation with the mass media?
57. Why did you have a confrontation with the mass media?
58. Was the situation resolved?
59. How was the situation resolved?
60. Did you encounter any additional conflict with the mass media?

61. (Media Only) Do you believe that your actions caused the police to change their method(s) of how they handled the mass media?
62. If so, what type of actions did you use to cause this change?
63. What were your tasks that you attempted to accomplish while at the trial(s)?
64. Were you able to accomplish all of your tasks?
65. What tasks were you unable to accomplish?
66. Why were you unable to accomplish these tasks?
67. Did anything unusual happen to you at the bombing trial(s)?
68. Were you involved in any conflicts at the bombing trial(s)?
69. If so, where, when, and with who were you involved in conflict?
70. Were you allowed in the courtroom?
71. Why were you in the courtroom?
72. Did you interact with the mass media during your time there?
73. In what capacity did you interact with the mass media during your time there?
74. Who did you interact with? (If known)
75. What agencies did you interact with? (If known)
76. Did you attempt to gather information?
77. Were you able to gather information that you sought?
78. Why were you unable to gather information that you sought?
79. Would you have liked to have gathered further information?
80. If you were able to gather information, what was the information used for?
81. Did you have a confrontation with the mass media?
82. Why did you have a confrontation with the mass media?

83. Was the situation resolved?
84. How was the situation resolved?
85. Did you encounter any additional conflict with the mass media?
86. (Media Only) Do you believe that your actions caused the police to change their method(s) of how they handled the mass media?
87. If so, what type of actions did you use to cause this change?
88. What were your tasks that you attempted to accomplish while in the courtroom?
89. Were you able to accomplish all of your tasks?
90. What tasks were you unable to accomplish?
91. Why were you unable to accomplish these tasks?
92. Did anything unusual happen to you in the courtroom?
93. Were you involved in any conflicts in the courtroom?
94. If so, where, when, and with who were you involved in conflict?
95. After your interaction with the mass media, have you changed your opinion of the other institution?

*Note: The type and quantity of questions asked during the interview may vary slightly due to the type and amount of testimony obtained. These questions will be used to clarify answers and describe in detail any episodes encountered during the interview.

REFERENCES

- Altschull, J. 1975. "The Press and the Police: News Flow and Ideology." Journal of Police Science and Administration. 3: 733-747.
- Barak, G. 1996. "Media, Discourse, and the O.J. Simpson Trial: An Ethnographic Portrait." Pp. 104-22 in Representing O.J.: Murder, Criminal Justice and the Media, edited by R. Surette. Springfield, IL: Thomas.
- Benson, A. and Aric Press. Unknown Date. "The Police, the Media, and Public Attitudes." <http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/170610-4.pdf>.
- Bortner, M.A. 1984. "Media Images and Public Attitudes toward Crime and Justice." Pp. 15-30 in Justice and the Media, edited by R. Surette. Springfield, IL: Thomas.
- Carlson, J. 1985. Prime Time Law Enforcement. New York: Praeger.
- Chermack, S.M. 1994. "Body Count News: How Crime is Presented in the Media." Justice Quarterly. 11(4): 561-582.
- Chibnall, S. 1981. "Chronicles of the Gallows: The Social History of Crime Reporting." Pp. 179-217 in The Sociology of Journalism and the Press, edited by H. Christian. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Cohen, S. and J. Young, eds. 1981. The Manufacture of News. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Crandon, G. 1990. "The Media View of the Police." Policing and Society. 6: 573-581.
- Crawford, K.A. 1994. "News Media Participation in Law Enforcement Activities." FBI: Law Enforcement Bulletin. 63(8): 28-32.
- DeFleur, M. and S. Ball-Rokeach. 1975. Theories of Mass Communication. 3rd ed. New York: D. McKay.
- Dominick, J. 1973. "Crime and Law Enforcement on Prime-Time Television." Public Opinion Quarterly. 37: 241-250.
- Doppelt, J. 1992. "Marching to the Police and Court Beats," Pp. 113-30 in Public Opinion and the Press, edited by J.D. Kenamer. Westport, CT: Praeger.

- Doppelt, J. and P. Manikas. 1990. "Mass Media and Criminal Justice Decision Making." Pp. 129-42 in The Media and Criminal Justice Policy Making, edited by R. Surette. Springfield, IL: Thomas.
- Entman, R.M. 1989. "How the Media Affect What People Think: An Information Processing Approach." Journal of Politics. 51: 347-70.
- Fishman, M. 1978. "Crime Waves as Ideology." Social Problems. 25: 531-43.
- Garner, G. 1984. The Police Meet the Press, First Edition with a 2 page Preface by the Author. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publisher.
- Garner, G. 1987. Chief, the Reporters are Here! The Police Executive's Personal Guide to Press Relations, First Edition with a 2 page Preface by the Author. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publisher.
- Gorn, E. 1992. "The Wicked World: The Construction of Ideology in a Newspaper Crimefighting Campaign." Crime and Delinquency. 35: 421-436.
- Graber, D. 1980. Crime News and the Public. New York: Praeger.
- Hall, S., C. Chritchler, T. Jefferson, J. Clarke, and B. Roberts. 1981. "The Social Production of News: Muggings in the Media." Pp. 335-67 in the Manufacture of News, edited by S. Colen and J. Young. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Harris, R. 1973. The Police Academy. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Haskins, S. 1969. "Too Much Crime and Violence in the Press." Editor and Publisher 102: 12.
- Higginbotham, J. 1989. "Legal Issues in Media Relations." FBI: Law Enforcement Bulletin. 58(7): 24-30.
- Hudgins, V.L. 1996. "Crisis Management and Media Relations for Small Agencies." The Police Chief. 63(2): 50-52.
- Lichter, S. 1988. "Media Power: The Influence of Media on Politics and Business." Florida Police Review. 4: 35-41.
- Madison, J. 1910. 9 Writings of James Madison 103. G. Hunt, ed.
- Marsh, H. 1991. "A Comparative Analysis of Crime Coverage in Newspapers in the United States and Other Countries from 1960 to 1989: A Review of the Literature." Journal of Criminal Justice. 19: 67-80.

- Mawby, R.C. 1999. "Visibility, Transparency and Police-Media Relations." Policing and Society. 9: 263-286.
- McCombs, M. 1994. "News Influence on Our Pictures of the World." Pp. 1-16 in Media Effects: Advances in Theory and Research edited by J. Bryant and D. Zillman. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- More, H.W. and John P. Kenney. 1986. The Police Executive Handbook. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publishing.
- National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (NACCJSG). 1973. "News Media Relations." Police. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Pp.44-46.
- Nehrbass, A.F. 1989. "Promoting Effective Media Relations." The Police Chief. 56(1): 40-44.
- Pandiani, J. 1978. "Crime Time TV: If All We Knew Is What We Saw." Contemporary Crises. 2: 437-458.
- Papke, D. 1987. Framing the Criminal. Hamden, CT: Archon Books.
- Selke, W. and G. Bartoszek. 1984. "Police and Media Relations: The Seeds of Conflict." Criminal Justice Review. 9(2): 25-30.
- Sherizen, S. 1978. "Social Creation of Crime News." Pp. 203-224 in Deviance and Mass Media, edited by C. Winick. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Snow, R. 1984. "Crime and Justice in Prime-Time News." Pp. 212-32 in Justice and the Media, edited by R. Surette. Springfield, IL: Thomas.
- Stevens, J. and H. Garcia. 1980. Communication History, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Surette, R. 1998. Media, Crime, and Criminal Justice. Images and Realities, Second Edition with a 5 page Preface by the Author. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
- Surette, R. 1999. "Media Echoes: Systemic Effects of News Coverage." Justice Quarterly. 16(3): 601-631.
- Swanson, C. 1953. "What They Read in 130 Daily Newspapers." Journalism Quarterly. 32: 411-421.
- Tuchman, G. 1978. Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality. New York Free Press.

Wertheimer, D. 1995. "Conversations with Cops – Into 'Lion's Den': Photographer Talks with Public Safety People." News Photographer. 50(11): 24,55.

Woodall, E. 1998. "Why Have a Written Media Relations Police?" The Police Chief.

CASES CITED

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 33 L. Ed. 2d 626, 92 S. Ct. 2646 (1972).

Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1977).

United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).