

KOREAN ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR: THE 1992 AND 1997 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS

Kyung-Tae Kang, B.A., M.A.

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APPROVED:

Jerry L. Yeric, Major Professor

Harold D. Clarke, Committee Member and Chair, Political
Science Department

John A. Booth, Committee Member

David Leblang, Committee Member

C. Neal Tate, Dean of the Robert B. Toulouse School of
Graduate Studies

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This is a study of Korean presidential elections. Its purpose is to determine how Koreans voted in the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections and to examine the factors that contributed to winners. In addition, the study compares the two elections by developing three models: candidate choice, voter turnout and political interest models.

Using post election data from the Korean Social Science Data Center a multinomial logit regression was used in the candidate choice model. It shows that Korean voters selected their candidates mainly in terms of interest in the elections, age, orientation toward the governing or opposition parties, the regional effects of the Southwest (Honam) and the Southeast (Yeungnam), and the evaluation of merged parties in 1992 or a united candidacy of parties in 1997. A Monte Carlo simulation was also employed to test the traditional assumption of candidate strength. It indicates that Kim Young-Sam had a more cohesive support from his older supporters in the 1992 election while Kim Dae-Jung had a greater cohesive support from his older supporters in the 1997 election. Both Kim Young-Sam's and Kim Dae-Jung's loyalists were crucial to the winning candidates in the 1992 and 1997 elections respectively.

How did people vote? To address this question a logit analysis of voter turnout was employed. Comparing the 1997 election to that of 1992 the findings suggest that low-probability voters in 1997 had: low efficacy, a negative evaluation of the Central

Election Management Commission, claimed to be independent, young, and lived in areas other than Youngnam and Honam. Their lower turnout was a significant factor in the opposition candidate, Kim Dae-Jung's election.

Finally, since political interest is closely related to political participation, an ordered logit model of political interest was developed. The results showed that the media and popularity of major candidates significantly contributed to Korean voters' interest in the elections.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND KOREAN POLITICS

Introduction

This is a study of Korean presidential elections. Korea is a nation in transition from a closed political system under the control of the military to one of open democratic elections. This study examines the past two presidential elections and three components that affected them—interest in the presidential elections, voter turnout, and candidate choice. By investigating the past two elections it is hoped that patterns of citizen behavior in the electoral process can be distinguished and that these patterns will help explain the tradition underway in Korean politics in general and presidential politics specifically.

There have been fifteen presidential elections in the modern Korea's history. The first Korean president, Rhee Syngman, was elected by the Korean National Assembly in 1948. According to H. Choi (1996), the 1952, 1956, and 1960 elections were mobilized by the government to re-elect Rhee. The March 1960 election was ultimately cancelled after his election due to severe fraud and later students' violent protest. Several months later, Yoon Po-Sun was elected as president in the National Assembly. The next three presidential elections, 1963, 1967, and 1971 elections, were held under the military government of Park Chung-Hee. H. Choi asserts that since there was little hope for change under the military regime, turnout rates in these elections were lower than earlier elections. Figure 1 on *p.* 208 confirms this assertion. There were four elections (1972,

1978, 1979, and 1981) between 1971 and 1987 in which presidents were elected at the National Conference for Unification (NCU) according to newly created Yusin authoritative constitution. Park was automatically elected both in 1972 and 1978, but was assassinated in 1979. The NCU elected Choi Kyu-Ha, his Prime Minister, the 11th president in 1980, and Chun Doo-Hwan the 12th president one year later due to many political crises.¹ Among 15 presidential elections, there were American-style competitions among candidates from different parties in only eight (1952, 1956, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1987, 1992, and 1997) and the remainder of elections was non-democratic. Only the most recent 1987, 1992, and 1997 elections were open and free democratic elections.

These three elections were completely different from other presidential elections held before 1987. In June 1987, the nationwide Democratic Movement pushed the Chun Doo-Hwan military government to accept a new Constitution that provided for free and open presidential elections. The new Constitution also set the term of a president to a single five-year term. The term was restricted to avoid past presidents' attempts to maintain the presidency. The past presidents' attempts became a major reason for earlier political unrest and insecurity. The 1987 presidential election was the first presidential election in which the electorate could decide its leader freely, although Roh-Tae-Woo, the co-leader of the 1979 military coup with former president Chun Doo-Hwan, was elected. Later two elections have increasingly represented the public's attitudes and opinions of the government, political parties, candidates, and issues. Finally, in the 1997

¹ For more information, please see the later part of this chapter.

election an opposition candidate, Kim Dae-Jung was elected, and was the first peaceful transfer of power from the ruling party to an opposition party.

Scholars of Korean politics, however, were not prepared for the sudden 1987 direct presidential election. Therefore, except for several polls conducted by the media before the election, there is a dearth of academic polls to describe or explain the electorate's voting behavior in the 1987 presidential election.

In the 1992 election, however, political scientists Lee Nam-Young, Cho Jung-Bin, and others, with the assistance of Central Election Commission (CEC), conducted its first post-election, academic surveys. These surveys were modeled from ones conducted in America, Canada, Britain, or other Western countries. These scientists repeated their surveys in the 1997 presidential election. Lee, Cho and others' efforts have resulted in an increase of interest in behavioral research and electoral studies in the 1990s (C. Park and G. Cho 1994). These authors assert, despite their own efforts and research, that most of the studies on Korean electoral studies are not systematic, empirical, or theoretical because of the short history of the study of behaviorism by Korean political scientists.

Data

The data used in this study are from post-election surveys of the 1992 and 1997 Korean presidential elections conducted by the Korean Social Science Data Center. The data were gathered by telephone interviews of 1,200 random voters by using stratified random sampling and excluding Jeju Island. They represent the most comprehensive and academic post-election data available on Korean presidential elections.

Selection Criteria

Currently in Korea the focus of electoral studies is on voter choice (J. Cho 1993a; J. Chung 1996; Y. Chung 1993; W. Kang 1998; H. Kim 1993a, 1993b; H. Lee 1998; N. Lee 1998; S. Lee 1998; C. Park 1993; S. Park 1989): why a candidate was elected in presidential or congressional elections or why one party obtained more votes than other parties. After 1995, which marked the first full-fledged local elections, several authors focused their attention to candidate and party choice in local elections (B. Ahn, I. Kim and J. Seo 1995; S. Ahn 1996; J. Kim 1993). Currently, Accordingly, there are many studies on voter choice in the Korean literature.

Thus, this study has selected independent variables based on both American and Korean literature about candidate choice (Chapter 2). Most electoral theories were developed half a century ago by American scholars (Campbell et al. 1960; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944). Their arguments confirming candidate choice have been tested by later scholars both in America or other countries. Korean scholars have also applied their theories to investigate voter choice (K. Cho 1996). While theories were being applied to Korean voters, however, certain conceptualizations had to be adjusted and some theories were not applicable due to specific Korean political context. For instance, there have been more than 90 political parties formed and disbanded since Korea's independence. As a result, Korean voters do not clearly identify with a particular party. Party identification, an important variable in Western voter choice literature, has not been useful in studies of Korean electoral behavior. Instead, Korean scholars have been forced to use general orientation toward the governing parties or opposition parties (C. Park and G. Cho 1994). Although many parties have appeared in the Korean political arena, fewer

than five were seriously competing with each other at any given time. The governing parties have been conservative in orientation and major opposition parties have been progressive. The Korean voters' attachment to the parties is understood within two broad psychological orientations: those who have orientation toward governing parties and those who have orientation toward opposition parties. This diluted version of party identification is more convincing because there was no change of government in Korea until the 1997 presidential election. Prior governments were changed only by military coups, and were similarly conservative with different persons in power.

Another unique characteristic of Korean politics is the strength of a few political leaders. For example, the three Kims—Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Pil—have dominated Korean politics for nearly four decades. The first two Kims have long been opposition leaders, fighting for democracy against military governments. Their political power originated from their charisma, devotion to democracy and an electoral system in which they were responsible for the nomination of the congressional candidates of their parties. Kim Jong-Pil was the second strong man following the coup of 1961. He was the founder of the Korean CIA and represented conservative voters for years. His political strength has remained stable, even after another coup in 1979.

Influence of the Kims has been intensified by Korean regionalism. While the Southeast (Yeongnam) has produced four presidents and has been the center of industrialization, the Southwest (Honam), an agricultural area, did not produce a president until 1997. The two regions' difference became more complex after the 1987 presidential election. The election was the first direct one after a long military rule. The major candidates that ran for the presidency also happen to represent the important

regions of the country. Roh Tae-Woo was from the northern part of the Southeast (Yeongnam), Kim Young-Sam was from the southern part of that region (Yeongnam), Kim Dae-Jung was from the Southwest (Honam) and Kim Jong-Pil was from the Central area (Chungcheong) of Korea, as shown in Figure 2 on p. 209 of the Korean map (K. Lee 1997). Each candidate claimed that he was fighting for the demolition of Korean regionalism, but in reality each was its captive and consciously or unconsciously made use of it in his electoral strategy.

Severe regionalism also affects electoral theories applied to the Korean electorate. Regional cleavage is so strong that sociological cleavages are minimal (S. Bae 1995; N. Lee 1993; D. Shin 1999). These authors assert that gender, education, or income does not matter in Korean electoral behavior. D. Shin, who is one of the best-known scholars of Korean politics in America, maintains that “on the whole, Korea is still a nation disjointed by high levels of particularism and clientelism (258).” Accordingly, many sociological variables that are commonly used in other countries are not used in this study.

A major goal of this study is to determine how Koreans voted in the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections and to determine why the winners were chosen and to compare these two elections. Because an opposition candidate won in the 1997 election for the first time, this study attempts to determine the factors behind this novel event. Because this study is restricted to only two recent elections, any difference between the 1992 and 1997 elections may not fully elucidate the dynamics surrounding the first win of an opposition candidate. Theoretically one would longitudinally study all past presidential elections for a complete understanding of Korean voting behavior. However,

since candidates could not compete freely until recent elections, studies of elections before the 1987 Democratic Movement are not possible due to the lack of data. Data are only available for the elections of 1992 and 1997.

The goal of this study is to develop three models from the post election survey data for the Korean elections of 1992 and 1997. These models are candidate choice, voter turnout, and political interest models. Chapter 2 seeks to improve the understanding of Korean electoral behavior by analyzing votes for the major candidates in these two elections. By using multinomial logit regression, the candidate choice model explains candidate choice in terms of voters' interest in elections, the voters' orientation toward the governing or opposition parties, the regional effects of the Southwest (Honam) and the Southeast (Youngnam), and the evaluation of merged parties in 1992 or a united candidacy of parties in 1997. In addition, considering strong leaders' influences on Korean politics, it is reasonable to imagine that support for the past candidates was carried over to the choice of the next candidates in consecutive elections. The sociological variable, age, is employed since most studies on Korean voting behavior confirm its significance on voter choice. Since interpreting multinomial estimates is usually complex, Chapter 2 employs many figures including histograms, odds ratio plots, and ternary plots. Histograms disclose strong regional impacts on the candidate choice and the odds ratio plots represent estimates of multinomial logit regressions. Ternary plots demonstrate how those who had voted for Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung, the most famous and strongest leaders, in an earlier election, voted for them in later elections

through the use of Monte-Carlo simulations.² Odds ratio plots vividly indicate effects of all independent variables on the choice of each candidate. In addition, considering that economic variables constrain voting behavior significantly, Chapter 2 also investigates their impacts on the choice of Korean presidential candidates. By using a reward-punishment theory, the chapter examines how subjective evaluation of living standards, family economy and national economy worked during the two elections.

This study investigates Korean voter turnout to find a clue to the choice of candidates. Many studies have argued that voter turnout clearly decides who wins in presidential elections. For instance, Herron (1998) maintains that Clinton benefited substantially by the low voter turnout of 50.1% in the 1996 American presidential election. An inspection of who voted and who did not is necessary in examining candidate choice in the Korean elections as well. Table 1 on *p.* 189 shows that South Korea's recent turnout rates were 89.2%, 81.9% and 80.6% in the 1987, 1992, and 1997 presidential elections, respectively. One of the most interesting aspects of Korean turnout is its pattern of decline. Although the turnout of the 1987 election is not examined here, this study examines why turnout decreased in 1997 and how this affected the candidate choice. The difference between the winner (40.3%) and the second candidate (38.7%) in the 1997 election was only 1.6% or 390,000 votes. This small difference is significant in explaining the first change of government.

In order to solve the puzzle related to turnout in Korean elections, Chapter 3 employs the logit model and has identified several indicators as significant: the voters' orientation toward the governing or opposition parties and interest in the presidential

² Ternary plots have long been used in geology and incorporated in political science to present voting

elections, the regional effects of the Southwest and the Southeast, the fairness of the Central Election Commission (CEC), democratization of the Korean politics (1992 only), political efficacy (1997 only), and finally the effects of rural areas. These factors have significantly affected voter turnout of the two elections, and the findings help to explain why the Korean electorate voted for the candidates in 1992 and 1997. Moreover, two sociological factors, age and education, are added to the model. Compared to the empirical studies involving candidate choice, there are only a few studies of Korean turnout (K. Kim 1986; W. Kim 1998; N. Lee 1993). All of these studies found age to be very significant, and it has almost linear relationship with Korean voter turnout. Therefore, the turnout model in Chapter 3 includes age. The model also includes another key sociological variable, education. Education is included in the turnout model because all the studies on American turnout unanimously agree that education is the single most important factor on American turnout (Conway 1991; Jackson 1995; Powell 1986).³ In a separate economic model of voter turnout, this chapter also investigates influences of several subjective past evaluation of economic conditions on voter turnout. Economic indicators used in the model are levels of standard of living, family economy and national economy.

It is well known in studies of turnout that voting rates of survey data are over-reported compared to those of official data (Abramson and Claggett 1984; Belli et al. 1999). Over-reporting data may not describe the real picture of how Koreans voted. The 1992 and 1997 election data do not include variables that adjust the turnout rates of

patterns. For more information, see Johnston and Pattie (1996).

³ Considering disagreeing arguments on the relationship between education and turnout, as found in other countries, it is tested by two-tail *t*-test.

survey data. Chapter 3 creates weighted variables to determine how much they are different, if any, in explaining variances of voter turnout between the original survey data and the weighted data.

Moreover, Chapter 3 divides respondents into three different groups: “High-probability respondents,” “Average-probability respondents,” and “Low-probability respondents.” Respondents are divided by major independent variables. For instance, in 1997, “High-probability respondents” are assumed to be those who regard the CEC as being fair, are older, are living in the Southeast and Southwest, and so on, while “Low-probability respondents” are those who regard electoral commission as being unfair, are younger, are living in regions other than in the Southeast and Southwest, and so on. “Average-probability respondents” are created by holding all independent variables at their mean. Different effects of these three groups on turnout are shown as the “interest in election” changes from low to high.

Finally, there are many studies that articulate that political interest is closely related to political participation, political knowledge, and other political activities (Booth and Seligson 1979; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944, 42-3; Milbrath and Goel 1977, 46-8; Van Deth 1990; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). If political interest is indeed a factor that effects political activities, it should be very useful in investigating what causes voters’ political interest in the Korean presidential elections.⁴ Empirical studies on political interest are nearly nonexistent in

⁴ Some scholars (Dalager 1996) have studied political interest generally, while others (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Brody 1978; Miller and Shanks 1996) have studied political interest specifically in elections. In this study, “interest in elections” is examined.

Korean scholarship. Even when political interest is studied, it has used it as an independent more often than as the dependent variable.

Different types of political factors are cited to influence political interest in election: partisanship, media influence in terms of presidential debates on television, television speeches by candidates or their supporters, and campaign ads on television. Considering the influences of major leaders on politics, the popularity of major candidates, such as Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Lee Hoi-Chang, should also increase voters' interest in the presidential elections. Based on theories developed in America and other countries, respondents with a higher sociological status are more likely to become highly interested in politics than respondents of lower status.

Studies have found these sociological variables are interrelated when affecting respondents' political interest (Baxter and Lansing 1983; Van Deth 1990). Chapter 4 employs their interaction terms in addition to the sociological variables. To test more thoroughly the impacts of these sociological variables and their interaction terms on political interest, Chapter 4 conducts bivariate significance tests as well as the joint Wald test for complex hypotheses.

Finally, Chapter 4 assumes that Korean political interest was most significantly affected by massive outdoor stump campaigning in 1992 and by the presidential debates in 1997.⁵ The influences of stump campaigning and presidential debates on political interest are investigated in relations to changing sociological status.

⁵ Stump campaigning was popular in 1992 and was outlawed due to high cost and violence in later elections. Presidential debates were first introduced in the 1997 election. Thus, chapter 4 examines how stump campaigning and presidential debates affected political interest in the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections respectively.

Political interest in elections has received less attention than voter choice or turnout in the election literature in Western countries and has barely been studied in Korea. This study, by using the ordered logit model, will examine what factors were associated with Koreans' interest in the elections of 1992 and 1997. Political interest should offer significant insights on both voter choice and voter turnout.

Methodology

One cannot simply employ linear regression analysis in the models of this study. Each model employs a different method depending on its dependent variable such as multinomial, binomial, or ordered logit (Long 1997; Whitten and Palmer 1996; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). When a dependent variable is binary, as used in the turnout model, one uses a binary response model such as logit to avoid violating major assumptions of the linear regression analysis. It is also important to apply a multinomial logit to the candidate choice model, whose dependent variables are multi-nominal. There are three categories (1=Lee, 2=DJ, and 3=Rhee) in the 1997 election, and there are also three categories (1=YS, 2=DJ, and 3=Chung) in the 1992 election, as shown in Table 1. In this sense the multinomial logit model can be a binary logit, which simultaneously estimates all possible comparisons among the outcome categories. The political interest model employs ordered logit since the political interest variable has four different, ordered categories: very interested, somewhat interested, not much interested, and not at all.⁶ SPSS 10, Stata 6 and Micro Soft Excel 2000 are main statistical packages used for analyzing and describing the three models of this study.

⁶ Compared to observations of the other categories, that of “not at all” of the dependent variable, interest in the election, is too small (19 in 1992 and 22 in 1997). The dependent variable has variance problem in both years. The difference between minimum and maximum predicted probabilities are so small that further

Strength of the Study

Unlike most studies on Korean electoral behavior, this study compares the two most recent presidential elections by using the most comprehensive data available. Findings confirmed in one election are tested in later election. The study develops models of turnout and electoral interest to aid in explaining Korean voter choice. This study chooses the same variables, or conceptually similar ones in the absence of identical independent variables, for both elections, to explain Korean candidate choice, voting turnout, and political interest. By using appropriate methods, the variance of presidential candidate choice is explained not only by its independent variables but also by the other two models. The three models are shown at Figure 3 on *p.* 210.

Note on Names

Following customs in the uses of personal names, this study presents American or Western surnames first, and their given names follow in the text and notes. Yet, Korean and Asian names are reversed: their surname or family names come first, and given names follow them (D. Shin 1999). In the case of authors' names, their first initials and last names are used because there are many common surnames among Koreans. In the references, however, presentation of names is the same, regardless of whether it is an Asian or Western name. Names in the references are noted according to the *Style Manual for the American Political Science Association* (Lane, Lindenfelser and Powell 1993).

Before moving examining each model, it is essential to have background information on

analysis cannot proceed with the original four different categories of the dependent variable. Accordingly, the political interest variable is recoded in such a way that “not at all” category is merged with its adjacent one, “not much interested.”

recent Korean politics and society. Some events are directly related to the 1992 and 1997 Korean presidential elections and others are indirectly related.

Background to Korean Politics

First Coup: Soldiers in Politics

For more than thirty years, from the 1960s to the early 1990s South Korea was under a military regime. The military had long dominated all sectors of Korean society. To better understand the elections held in the 1990s, one needs to understand the 1960s when Korean military culture started, and major current political actors started their political careers, sometimes competing against each other and sometimes cooperating.

General Park Chung-Hee directed a coup on May 16 of 1961 against the Chang Myon government. From that date until 1992 the military dominated Korean politics, economics, and culture. In response to military rule, students and opposition fought for democracy against the military. Recent and current Korean politics is the result of controversy between these military rulers and the opposition leaders. When General Park headed the first coup, he announced that he had to abolish the Chang Myon civilian government because the leadership was incompetent, bureaucracy was severely corrupt, and the economy was in a poor condition. According to Keon (1977), Park regarded economic growth as the only way to justify his coup and as the only modernizing force able to lift the country from misery. In fact, as Rao (1979, 15) indicated, Korea's per capita income in 1961 was less than \$100. In order to achieve his economic goal, Park had three major organizations created right after the coup.

The first organization was the Economic Planning Board (EPB). It has coordinated Korean economic planning and development until recently (Hahm and Plein

1997). Its minister was a deputy Prime Minister who led all economy-related ministers. The EPB equipped with all the advisory power in hand, propelled immediate economic development by promoting export. The second organization was the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). The KCIA was mainly organized by Kim Jong-Pil, Park's nephew (Huer 1989; M. Keon 1977). It was Lieutenant Colonel Kim Jong-Pil who prepared all the steps of the coup and strategies that might appeal to the public. Huer (1989) indicates that the KCIA was supposed to be created for national security and military information, but actually, it made political surveillance and control of the military and opposition possible. The third organization was the Democratic Republican Party (DRP), created in January of 1963. Huer also maintains that, although the KCIA controlled Korean politics, the military junta needed a more official and legal agency to govern opposition and domestic politics and the DRP became that means. There were many young colonels in the army who became active in politics, resulting in the DRP quickly dominated by young officers.

With these three powerful agencies truly under control, Park in 1962 formulated and directed the first Five-Year-Economic Development Plan (1962-66). The first plan became the model of later economic growth plans and more carefully planned successive ones—the second (1967-71), the third (1972-76), the fourth (1977-81) and later ones—were conducted based on success of the previous plans (H. Lee 1996). The economic plans included tax concessions, preferential loans for exports, local letters of credit, waste allowances, minimum export requirements for licensed traders, and government support for overseas marketing activities (K. Kim 1991, 108). Park himself presided over export-promotion meetings with ministers and business leaders every month, and suggestions

and solutions to increase exports were discussed and reflected in the immediate economic policies. In terms of economy, Park showed strong leadership, by providing a cooperative and elaborate planning necessary for the Korean economic growth.

Because he was economically successful, Park was an elected president in 1963. After the coup, he in fact was elected over popular opposition candidates (Pae 1992, 240). He defeated Yun Po-Son from the Civil Rule Party (CRP) in October of 1963, and again in 1967 defeated Yun, who this time represented the New Democratic Party (NDP). Park barely won in 1963, with a margin of 156,000 votes, but he easily won reelection in 1967, by more than a one million votes.

Yet there were still many that did not like Park's rule. Although he was formally elected, his victories were partly accomplished by strong funding and manipulating the KCIA (Her 1989; Macdonald 1988). Intellectuals such as journalists, students, and professors did not fully accept his authoritarian rule and did not believe in Park's "democracy" that was dominated by the military.

Forced Change of Constitution: Park's Third Run for the Presidency

After winning the 1963 and 1967 elections, Park could not run for the 1971 election because of the constitutional two-term limit. Many members in the governing DRP hoped Kim Jong-Pil would succeed Park (C. Kim 1976, 39). However, Park and his strong supporters in the party, the government and the military still wanted Park to become the next candidate despite constitutional constraints.

Several military confrontations with North Korea helped Park and his followers to proceed with their idea of amending the constitution in order for Park to run for a third term. For instance, North Korean commandos raided the presidential house in January

1968, and North Korea seized the U.S.S. Pueblo a few days later (Y. Kihl 1984, 51). These consecutive military and national security-related accidents intensified Park's supporters' insistence that they needed a powerful president who had strong leadership skills with a military expertise, so that the country would be safe. Another argument of his supporters was that Korea had established an excellent economic record. For instance, from 1961 to 1976 Korea's economy grew about ten percent per year (Rao 1979).

On September 14, 1969, the DRP-drafted amendment was passed by the National Assembly (C. Kim 1976, 35). The voting and passage was secret, excluding all opposition lawmakers and ruling party members who did not support the amendment. The amendment was thus approved by a popular referendum held in the next month.

Park was the ruling party candidate of the 1971 presidential election, and Kim Dae-Jung (46 years old) became his opponent from the New Democratic Party (NDP). Kim Dae-Jung won the NDP primary election over Kim Young-Sam after complex factional maneuverings. Announcing that this election would be his last bid for presidency, Park won over Kim with a margin of slightly less than a million. This margin was smaller than the 1.2 million differences in 1967. "A foreign news analyst has written that Park Chung-Hee was 'stunned' by the large vote for his opponent" (Keon 1977, 119). His support had shrunk because many voters, although impressed by the economic success, were dissatisfied with his amending constitution and running for a third time. Considering Park's enormous advantage in campaign funds, assistance of the media, police, and the KCIA, Kim Dae-Jung announced after the election that he had been cheated of victory and that he would be the nation's spiritual leader.

H. Choi (1996) maintains that modern regionalism originates from the 1971 presidential election. Two regions—Southwest and Southeast—similar in terms of the number of people and size of land, produced major presidential candidates, Kim Dae-Jung and Park respectively. K. Lee (1997) argues that Korean regionalism deteriorated as each candidate resorted to regional characteristics as part of their campaign tactics, the government suppressed Kim as a main political opponent after the election, and government officials, military soldiers, and even business from the Southeast were abnormally favored by government policies over those of the Southwest.

Yusin Constitution

The governing DRP, however, lost 16 seats in the National Assembly election held in the next month, although it still enjoyed majority (C. Kim 1976, 39). That prevented the ruling DRP from changing the constitution. On October 17, 1972, Park suddenly proclaimed martial law throughout Korea (S. Pae 1992). According to the martial law, all political parties were banned, press was severely censored, and all colleges were closed. Soldiers and tanks were stationed throughout the country and the National Assembly was dissolved. The most important content of the newly drafted constitution, the Yusin—meaning revitalizing reform—Constitution, was that Park was not constrained by any term-limit. Now he could run for presidency after his third term ended in 1975. Park could be re-elected indefinitely under the new constitution. Park worried about the reduced gap between him and the Kim Dae-Jung in the 1971 election compared to the 1967 election. The Yusin Constitution thus cancelled the direct presidential vote and created an indirect presidential election system. The electoral body,

named the National Conference for Unification (NCU), would be composed of 2,359 deputies directly elected by the public (S. Pae 1992, 295).

Another characteristics of the Constitution was that the President would dissolve the National Assembly whenever necessary and would nominate one-third of the lawmakers (S. Choi 1976). This group of lawmakers was called *Yujonghoe*, meaning Political Fraternity for Yusin. Yujonghoe constituted a strong supporting group for the government and the ruling party. Park called this system “Korean-style democracy,” but in reality it ended democracy in Korea. The Yusin Constitution was proposed to permanently solidify Park’s power with the excuse of promoting national security, reunification, and social stability.

While suppressing anti-government groups with force, Park had absolute power (Macdonald 1988). No opposition leaders could compete or argue with him. Kim Jong-Pil, who gave up his efforts to become presidential in the 1969 election, became Prime Minister in Park’s government. He was dubbed as permanent number two. Kim Dae-Jung, after being defeated in the 1971 election, traveled to Japan and the U.S. denouncing Park and his government, calling it “military dictatorship by tyranny.” Finally the KCIA kidnapped Kim Dae-Jung from a Tokyo hotel and attempted to kill him on a boat off the Japanese coast in 1973 (Cummings 1997). He survived with the help of American CIA and the protest of the Japanese government. Kim, acting as an active dissident, was involved in many anti-government demonstrations and joined with other prominent dissidents such as Yun Po-Son, Ham Sok-Hon, Moon Ik-Hwan and others.

Another opposition leader was Kim Young-Sam, the chairman of the largest opposition party, the NDP (S. Pae 1992). Kim Young-Sam was strongly convinced that

Park's iron rule was arousing dissention rather than unity and vehemently denounced Park's authoritarian rule during the 1970s. Finally, Kim Young-Sam called for Park's resignation and asked the American government, in his interview with *The New York Times* on September 16, 1979 to pressure the Park regime on human rights (Hinton 1983). Several days after the report, Kim was evicted from the Assembly and put into jail. His eviction was first time in Korea's parliamentary history that a congressman lost his seat by force. Hinton documents that the political turmoil led to the voluntary resignation of all of the opposition legislators. Their attempt to resign as lawmakers reflects the people's resentment toward the ruling party in general, and specifically Park's eviction of Kim from the Assembly.

End of Park's Era

College students across the country took to the street, calling for more freedom, and staged anti-government rallies. It was Pusan, Kim Young-Sam's hometown, where a full-fledged student demonstration erupted in September 1979 (Lie 1998). Students protested Kim Young-Sam's expulsion, asked for the removal of KCIA agents from campus, and demanded more freedom on the campus and in the press. Many citizens joined the students, battling riot police who used tear-gas. In response, the government declared martial law in the Pusan area on October 17 of 1979, but it could not stop student and citizen uprisings (Hinton 1983).

As political unrest increased, discipline in the ruling circle broke down and different opinions on how to deal with the crisis surfaced. In the end, even some strong followers of Park disliked his political methods. Finally on the night of October 26 of 1979, during a party in the presidential house at which Park, his chief bodyguard Cha

Chi-Chol, the Chief-of-Staff Kim Ke-Won, and the KCIA Director Kim Jae-Kyu were present, Kim Jae-Kyu assassinated Park and Cha (Clifford 1998; Hinton 1983; Y. Kihl 1984). Clifford argues that the immediate given reason for the assassination of Park and Cha was the KCIA Director's failure to predict and stop the turbulence in Pusan and its nearby cities, and the agency's naive dealings with the activists. However, according to Clifford, the real reason was that Kim Jae-Kyu thought Park's hard-line policy would be even tougher in the future and that the eighteen years of Park's absolute rule should be stopped.

Seoul Spring

With Park's death, his 18 years of tight reign ended. According to the Yusin Constitution, Prime Minister Choi Kyu-Hah became the tenth President from the NCU in December 1979. He was the only candidate and obtained more than 95% of the electoral votes two months after the assassination (Lie 1998). The new President promised in his inaugural address that the current Yusin Constitution would be replaced by one that would be approved by the public vote in approximately a year.

Koreans expected a direct presidential election first time since 1971, and they expected a free election for the first time in Korea's modern history. This euphoria was called Seoul Spring. President Choi released hundreds of students, political prisoners, farmers, and workers, including Kim Dae-Jung and famous poet named Kim Chi-Hah, and former President Yun Po-Son from house arrest (Hinton 1983). Hinton (1983, 50) reports that Martial Law Commander Lee Hui-Sung issued a manifesto that "politics is outside the realm of the armed forces."

Right after the new President's inaugural address, however, the NDP Chairman Kim Young-Sam and the National Coalition for Democracy and Unification, formed by Kim Dae-Jung, accused President Choi of becoming president by using the Yusin Constitution. The two Kims denounced Choi for extending the Yusin rule for over a year, a decision that was not supported by the opposition or by the people.

Meanwhile, the governing DRP was shocked by the death of its Chairman Park, but after the Choi's address, the party chose Kim Jong-Pil as the party's new Chairman. They would later select him as the party's presidential candidate for a next presidential election (Macdonald 1988). Politics seemed to be back to normal.

Since the military had been the final decision-makers in politics since Park's 1961 coup, and martial law was being declared across the country after Park died, no persons other than high military officers had an important impact on the transitional politics. There were two groups of officers in the army (Clifford 1998). One group, represented by the then Martial Law Commander Chung Sung-Hwa, had a more moderate attitude toward civilian politics. This group wanted the Yusin Constitution replaced by a more practical and democratic one. The other group, represented by Major General Chun Doo-Hwan, still wanted to retain the Yusin Constitution.

While most functions of the important military factions stopped after the assassination of Park, Chun and his supporters increased their influence in the army and in the political arena. The KCIA, which had controlled significant information and had wielded great power, was involved in the assassination of the President and in endless debacles. Chung Sung-Hwa, a senior officer, happened to be having dinner at a restaurant only 50 yards from the place of the shootings. Chung was a close friend of the

assassin, Kim Jae-Kyu, and had been invited to the restaurant by Kim. Whether General Chung knew of Kim's conspiracy or not, he was under suspicion of the conspiracy (Lie 1998, 120). As head of the Defense Security Command, a military intelligence body, Chun was investigating the shooting and his power suddenly became beyond that of any other persons' in the country.

Continued Participation of Soldiers in Politics

On the evening of December 12 of 1979, about two months after the shooting, several generals, including Chun Doo-Hwan, Roh Tae-Woo and others, ordered their troops to arrest the Martial Law Commander Chung (Clifford 1998). After a gun battle between Chun's soldiers and Chung's bodyguards, Chung was arrested. Another 16 generals, including Commander of the Capital Garrison Major General Chang Tae-Wan, Commander of the Third Army Lieutenant General Lee Kon-Yong, who were friendly to General Chung, were also arrested at the army headquarters and the Defense Ministry. The incident is called the second coup in the Korea's history (Kihl 1984). With this coup, the influence of the insurgent generals spread, and the authority of President Choi was further eroded. Chun took over the KCIA and became its Acting Director. Chun now held two powerful posts—the Defense Security Command that controlled the military and checked its loyalty, and the KCIA that controlled civilians and politicians. He was almost ready to assume the leadership of the country.

However, Chun's monopoly on power, together with the slow progress of democratization by the government, angered students who took to the streets across the country. Tens of thousands of students called for Chun's resignation from all his posts and the cancellation of the martial law (Y. Kihl 1984). Police and troops arrested leading

student activists and politicians, including Kim Dae-Jung, Kim Jong-Pil, former KCIA Director Lee Hu-Rak and others, mainly because the police and the government believed these “corrupt” politicians were responsible for social unrest and the student demonstrations.

Among the most disastrous skirmishes between students and civilians, and the military was what was called later the Kwangju Uprising (Clark 1987). The bloody uprising lasted for nine days in the Southwestern city of Kwangju, hometown of Kim Dae-Jung, where officially hundreds of students and civilians (unofficially thousands of them) were killed by the Special Paratrooper Forces wielding bayonets. The people in Kwangju asked for speedy democratization and instant release of their hero, Kim Dae-Jung. Broadcasting stations, police stations and other government buildings were burned or demolished by the angry citizens. This upheaval was the fiercest confrontation in South Korea since the Korean War.

Suppressing the Kwangju Uprising, the military stressed the importance of social stability and national security and devised a new constitution on September 29 of 1980 (Y. Kihl 1984). As the new Constitution was issued, all the existing political parties were dissolved and the National Assembly was banned. Y. Kihl further observes that political Renovation Committee, composed of 9 military officers, announced a list of 567 major politicians and activists. They were purged because they were believed to be responsible for arousing political and social corruption. These politicians included some of the most prominent in Korea, who intended to join the presidential race without the military obstruction: Kim Jong-Pil of the governing DRP, Kim Young-Sam, Chairman of the largest opposition NDP, and Kim Dae-Jung, who was even under a death sentence. The

ban of their activities had lasted for more than seven years, until the 1987 Democratic Movement. According to Y. Kihl, only obedient parties were allowed to be organized later in 1980: the army-backed new ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP), and major opposition Democratic Korea Party (DKP) and other small opposition parties. Several well-known politicians were involved in opposition parties, but most of them were more subservient to the government than Kim Dae-Jung or Kim Young-Sam.

During his seven-year term, Chun curbed activities of students and workers with more restrictive labor laws and national security laws. The Kwangju tragedy and the Southeastern (Youngnam) generals in the government, including Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo, aggravated regionalism that had been instigated by the former Park regime (K. Lee 1997).

President Chun's era was full of clashes by students and parents who wanted the release of their children from the police (S. Pae 1992). Among the demands of the students and their parents was the release of the political prisoners, a full investigation of the Kwangju Uprising, popular and direct election of the president, and changes in the Constitution. Kim Young-Sam began a 23-day-hunger strike that triggered a nationwide democratic movement (S. Pae 1992). The largest student demonstration occurred at Konkuk University on October 28 of 1986 and lasted for several days (C. Kim 1987, 68). Approximately 20,000 riot police threw tear gas canisters endlessly at the estimated 2,500 students. Describing the students as radical leftists and pro-North Korean Communists, the police cracked down on the university students. The National Coalition for a

Democratic Constitution (NCDC), headed by Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung,⁷ also demanded constitutional amendment.

Despite such demands, President Chun named Roh Tae-Woo as the Chairman of the ruling DJP on February 23 of 1987 and designated him as the party's indirect presidential candidate. The governing candidate was almost certain of being elected by the electoral college that was mostly pro-government. Nonetheless, designation of Roh as the ruling party candidate infuriated students and politicians. Activists, politicians, and leaders of religion, education, and women launched a pan-national campaign for the constitutional amendment (S. Pae 1992). The government mobilized almost all riot police available to curb the "illegal" campaign. Despite government constraint, pro-democracy forces demonstrated in nearly all the major cities, including Seoul, Kwangju, and Pusan at the same time in June of 1987. Citizens on the street offered food, emergency medicine, and sodas to the demonstrators, and some offered hideouts in case of a police search. More than one million people participated in these skirmishes late June of 1987 (S. Han 1988). With his back against the wall, the governing candidate for the indirect presidential election Roh Tae-Woo announced, in the name of June 29 Declaration, that Roh would ask President Chun to cancel his candidacy, and instead he would ask for direct presidential elections, the re-establishment of civil rights of all politicians, a new constitution, and other democratic measures. This request was the first time of the country's history that the majority of the ruling circle joined with those involved in the democratic movement, and it affected the democratization of other Asian

⁷ Kim Dae-Jung worked for Korean democracy in Japan, the USA and other countries and just returned back to the country.

countries such as the Philippines where Marcos would later step down. This uprising was eventually called the June Democratic Movement.

Democratization: the 1987 Presidential Election

A direct presidential election was to be held in the middle of December 1987. As Chun and Roh expected when they accepted the direct presidential election and other democratization policies, neither Kim Young-Sam nor Kim Dae-Jung could win because they split the opposition-oriented voters. Democratic and civilian leaders who participated in the democratization movement with the two Kims—Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung—against the Park and Chun military regimes strongly recommended to the two Kims that there should be a single candidate for the opposition (S. Han 1988). Yet, each Kim thought he could win, and thus neither would yield. Roh eventually won, assisted by the advantages of the governing party such as abundant campaign funds and a national organization—not to mention a divided opposition. With Kim Jong-Pil standing for the Central area, candidates represented major regions of the nation: Roh Tae-Woo from northern Youngnam (Southeast), Kim Young-Sam from southern Youngnam (Southeast) and Kim Dae-Jung from Honam (Southwest) (K. Lee 1997). Massive outdoor stump campaigning was common and hundreds of thousands of people would gather to see and hear the candidates attack each other and arouse regional animosity. Fighting occurred between supporters of different candidates, and some native people hurled stones at visiting candidates. Some candidates consciously or unconsciously made regionally antagonistic remarks to boost support in their areas and to attack opponents. A great number of paid voters were mobilized to the stump campaigns, becoming a financial burden for candidates as well as the seeds for political corruption. There were

severe intra-party conflicts among major presidential hopefuls, but the hopefuls never broke away from their parties. Yet after the Democratic Movement, the tacit agreement of cooperation was broken. The division between Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung was the main reason for the ruling candidate Roh's winning with only 36.5% of the votes (K. Lee 1997).

Roh's inauguration was the first peaceful transfer of power since the first modern government's establishment in Korea in 1948, although the transfer took place within the same party. Despite this positive historical significance, his presidency also provided negative implications. Roh himself had participated in the military coup in December of 1979 and was more accustomed to giving orders than making negotiations that are necessary in the democratic process. In addition, two-thirds of the electorate still did not support him, and this resulted in the defeat of the ruling DJP in the National Assembly election, held several months after the presidential election.

Merger of the Three Parties

Unlike the past Assembly elections in which all the ruling parties enjoyed majority, Roh's DJP got more votes than any of the opposition parties but failed to achieve a majority, receiving 125 out of 299 seats in the 1988 Assembly election, the first held since the 1987 Democratization Movement (S. Han 1989). This percentage may indicate that the electoral process and system were much more fair after the June Declaration. However, the small ruling party in both special committees and full plenary caused difficult times for Roh, whose presidential power was reduced by the new 1987 Constitution. Government-proposed bills could not easily pass in the Assembly due to

both reduced number of ruling legislators and the lack of experience of dialogue and negotiation.

Workers whose wages and benefits had been sacrificed for the growth-first policy during the Park and Chun administrations demanded their due piece of the pie in the new democratic era (H. Lee 1996, 27-28). The number of unionized workers skyrocketed. Walkouts and strikes occurred frequently and violently. Only one year after the Roh's inauguration, the problems of bubble economy—inflation of land price and consumer prices—occurred, due to the 1987 presidential election, 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, and aggressive democratic wage negotiations (H. Lee 1996). He reports that reduced productivity of the nation obstructed later economic growth. Many medium-sized and small companies went bankrupt, and the unemployment rate accelerated.

Roh's government was also experienced student demonstrations. Students wanted to know the true story of the Kwangju Uprising of 1980 and, more specifically, Chun and Roh's roles in the Uprising. Tens of thousands of students and workers participated in the student protest. Some students even burned themselves to death with paint thinner in an attempt to dramatize the cause of their demonstration.

Amidst this turbulence, many of middle class and conservative Koreans began to resent the oppressive control of the Assembly by the opposition and the ineffective minority government. Several parties noticed this public mood and realigned each other after calculating their roles or the possibility of success in the upcoming 1992 presidential election. The governing DJP merged with Kim Young-Sam's Reunification Democratic Party and Kim Jong-Pil's New Democratic Republic Party on January 23 of 1990 (Y. Kihl 1991). These three parties turned into a new coalition party, the Democratic Liberal

Party (DLP), and composed 217 of 299 seats in the Assembly. The realignment was the most conservative coalition since Roh and Kim Jong-Pil stood for conservative and stability-oriented Koreans. However, Kim Young-Sam was severely criticized for his involvement with coalition. Although Kim Young-Sam had been a lifetime opposition leader against the military regime, many commentators and people regarded Kim Young-Sam as shameful since Kim Young-Sam joined with Roh and Kim Jong-Pil who were the military dictators Kim Young-Sam had long fought against. This inconsistency was explained by Kim Young-Sam and his close supporters as his “great decision to save the country.” Without the merger, Kim thought the next presidential election would be won by another governing candidate. That is, military regime would rule the country permanently. Kim Young-Sam still saw the peacefully elected Roh government as a military government since Roh was a former four-star general and participated in the 1979 coup, and many of his ministers and advisers had been in the army. In short, Kim Young-Sam compared his merger decision to the old Korean saying, “entering a tiger’s den to capture the tiger.”

Kim Jong-Pil, whose party obtained only 35 seats of 299 seats in the Assembly in the 1988 election, almost gave up hope of becoming president by himself (H. Cho 1996, 376-79). As a chairman of the smallest major party, a merger was the best way to increase his and his party’s status in Korean politics. Except for several stubborn members in the Kims’ parties, most lawmakers of Kim Young-Sam and Kim Jong-Pil followed their leaders and joined the merged party. The merger once again showed Korean politics was still personal and without an ideological axis. These leaders had formed, disbanded, or merged their parties depending on the situation and personal or

party advantage. In Korean politics, they were referred to “politics-9th dan,” following martial arts’ highest level when they showed the ability to create or disband political parties.

Nonetheless, many of Kim Young-Sam’s loyal supporters felt betrayed, and the only opposition leader, Kim Dae-Jung, severely attacked the merger and Kim Young-Sam as illicit connection and unprincipled political maneuver. The unpopularity of the merger was proved at the next National Assembly election on March 24 of 1992. The merged ruling DLP claimed only 149 of 299 seats, one vote shy of the majority (H. Cho 1996, 382). The party lost 68 seats since it had controlled 217 when the three parties merged each other, about two years before this. Their loss was a gain for the opposition parties. H. Cho further points out that Kim Dae-Jung’s Democratic Party garnered 97 seats, 15 seats more than before the election. The new Unification People’s Party was organized by Chung Joo-Young, Chairman of the largest business group, Hyundai, only two months before the election. Chung calling himself “economy-9th-dan,” compared to the politics-9th-dans of the other Kims, relayed to the voters that his expertise and experience in economics could invigorate the country’s failing economy.

Consolidation of Democracy: the 1992 Presidential Election

The December 1992 presidential election was significantly different from the past ones. Due to the single-term of presidency, the incumbent President Roh could not run again. All three major hopefuls were civilians. They did not worry about the potential military intervention in the election (H. Lee 1993). Many top military officers announced publicly their neutral stance on the presidential election and stressed its proper role of defending the country from external invasion. Even Kim Dae-Jung, who had once been

regarded as leftist or Communist, was welcome by the military if he was elected. This openness indicated a more open election than the 1987 election, where some general vowed to throw grenades at Kim Dae-Jung if he were elected.

Kim Young-Sam secured his candidacy in the ruling DLP's primary (J. Shim 1992). The primary was first held in the ruling parties. The DLP held the primary election in order to reduce any criticism of the merged party for its illicit union by many students and democratic leaders. In fact, after Kim was nominated, anti-governing party rallies were chanting "anti-Kim" and resignation of Kim as Chairman and presidential candidate of the DLP. Kim Dae-Jung, presidential candidate of the largest opposition Democratic Party asserted that Kim Young-Sam betrayed the public's democratic zeal that culminated in the 1987 people's revolution.

Another opposition candidate, Chung Joo-Young also criticized the ruling party's failure on the economy and vowed to restore the fallen economy (Steers 1999). Chung was Korea's version of Ross Perot. Chung's candidacy from the newly created United People's Party represented the friction between business circles and the government. It is true that big businesses were the engine of the Korean economy in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, and they led in the development of science and technology of industries. In addition, they provided medium-sized and small business with incentives and jobs. However, it is also true that their encouraging of economic success was directed by the government (Clifford 1998). The Economic Planning Board created by President Park right after his coup was the center of Korean economic growth. Yet, as country's economy grew rapidly in the late 1980s and 1990s, economic initiatives and directions of the government officials were no longer effective for businesses that had been

increasingly more internationalized and larger in size (H. Lee 1996). The economy was aided in the transition from a state economy to a more private economy. Big businesses regarded the government's orders and direction as intervention in the business, and government regarded businesses resistance as disloyal. Businesses' deep antagonism was expressed in Chung's bid for presidency. In addition, Chung called for the overthrow of the two Kims (H. Choi 1996). This was based on the fact that, although Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung had long contributed to democratization of Korean politics more than any other politicians or civil activists, they also symbolized personalization, Machiavellism, and absolute power inside their parties.

Another important issue of the 1992 election was regionalism. Most of the Southeast (Youngnam) voters chose Kim Young-Sam while most of the Southwest (Honam) voters chose Kim Dae-Jung. The final ballot count showed that Kim Young-Sam garnered a substantial margin of 41.9 percent compared to Kim Dae-Jung's 33.8 percent and Chung's 16.5 percent of the vote (H. Choi 1996, 280). Kim Dae-Jung accepted his defeat after the official electoral tally, congratulated the other Kim, and announced that he would quit politics since he was already 67 years old and the 1992 bid for presidency was his third.

Kim's Reform

After inauguration, the first thing President Kim Young-Sam did was to purge the military. Although the army got away with much of its praetorianism, there were still unofficial organizations in the army that had enjoyed the preferential benefits of their members against non-members. One of them was called *Hanahwoe*, meaning "One Association," organized by Chun Doo-Hwan. In the early 1960s, after Park's coup,

Captain Chun and his classmates from the Military Academy organized Hanahwoe, including Roh Tae-Woo, Kim Bok-Dong, and Chong Ho-Yong (C. Lee and H. Sohn 1994). Chun was the Chairman of the association, and its members regularly met secretly at his Seoul home. These core members recruited smart young Academy graduates. They shared politically important intelligence and other information on promotions and assignments. This kind of private organization was illegal in the army, which stressed unity of all. Yet members of the association increased and wielded their power within the army. Finally, members of the association were the main officers who attacked and seized the senior officers on December 12 of 1979, after the death of Park. President Kim found that Hanahwoe members still had an important position in the army, and it was necessary to get rid of them. He disbanded all private associations in the military and most political generals were demoted, dismissed or retired by force (C. Lee and H. Sohn 1994). Those involved in suppressing the Kwangju Uprising were especially damaged. The military was returned to normality and was under strong civilian control. Cleansing the military was the most important of all the reforms President Kim implemented (C. Lee and H. Sohn 1994).

President Kim realized that Korean politics was more underdeveloped than the economy. The reason for the political backwardness was that political leaders accepted slush funds or ruling funds from the businesses in return for offering special legal, commercial, monetary, or policy benefits. Slush funds have been used since President Park's era to win elections, manage partisans and parties, placate opponents, manipulate public opinion, or exalt military prestige (D. Shin 1999). According to D. Shin, it was this exchange of slush funds with benefits that was the seeds of political backwardness

and government corruption. In order to cut the mutual exchange, President Kim disclosed all the assets of his family, including his old father's and his sons' to the public first and then pressured others to follow his initiatives. In addition, Kim changed the name of the ruling party from the DLP to the New Korea Party (NKP) to represent "a clean break with the authoritarian past" in 1995 (D. Shin, 203).

Since the 1987 presidential election, Korean elections have been quite fair. Unlike elections under the military governments, most election results have been accepted by both the winning and defeated candidates, and most results were reported quickly on television. However, astronomical amounts of money were spent during the campaigns, especially on the massive street campaigns. It is without saying that the regulation of the amount of money should positively affect the mutual exchange of illegal benefits between candidates and those who want some kind of benefits after the election. The 1994 Election Malpractice Prevention Law limits the amount of campaign spending per candidate and increases electoral subsidies to parties and candidates (C. Lee and H. Sohn 1995). Candidates who spent more than the limit would be penalized, and the winners would be denied their electoral victory. The law, however, had intrinsic problems. It is very difficult to determine the exact amount of money spent during an election. Another problem was prosecutors usually were lenient to the governing candidates and harsh to the opposition candidates. Despite these problems, the law significantly contributed to the purifying of all of the electoral process.

The year 1995 was an important one for Korean democracy. The country restarted local elections that had to be interrupted 34 years earlier by the military coup. H. Choi (1996) asserts that local governments for the first time were able to rule

themselves without much of central control, providing a symbol of Korean democratization. Despite President Kim's efforts and interest in the democratization of Korean politics, his party was severely defeated in the 1995 local elections. His DLP obtained only 33% of the total votes, compared to the 40% of the Democratic Party, and the opposition won in Seoul area.

One of the major reasons for the low support of the DLP was decade-old regionalism (H. Choi 1996). Most President Kim's candidates running in his hometown, the Southeastern area, won their elections, while in the Southwestern areas the Democratic Party prevailed, supported by Kim Dae-Jung, and the Central areas (*Chung-Chung*) were secured by United Liberal Democrats, headed by Kim Jong-Pil. Only a few candidates could win outside their own regions.

The second reason for his defeat was Kim's personality. Although he fought for democracy for a long-time, he himself became undemocratic while fighting against an authoritarian, military regime. He became arrogant and self-righteous and made decisions by himself, without consulting with advisers. He changed ministers not when their abilities were discredited, but when fresh sentiments about politics were needed. Anti-Kim Young-Sam sentiments were rampant by 1995. His popularity—over 90% in his first year of presidency—declined severely (Schuman 1996). The Korean governing parties traditionally have received support from conservative and stability-oriented voters, such as businesses and the military government officials. Yet, President Kim's cleansing of the military, real-name transactions,⁸ and ethics law for the government

⁸ Financial transactions have long been committed under borrowed or false names in Korea. Because of such transactions, huge amounts of untraceable monies have circulated, and become one of the reasons for

officials, did not appeal to this segment of his traditional support base since those reforms reduced the benefit and privileges of the military.

After Kim Dae-Jung was defeated in the 1992 presidential election, he spent a year in Britain studying Korean reunification, wanting for the best time to return to the domestic politics (J. Shim 1995). The 1995 Local elections provided the best opportunity for him to return to Korea without serious suspicion. He organized the Asia-Pacific Peace Foundation and argued for “regional equal rights” (K. Lee 1997). His insistence was because his Southwestern region had been discriminated against by the former presidents—Park, Chun, and Roh—and incumbent President Kim, whose political base was in the Southeastern areas. He argued that it was time to end this political and economic discrimination. He further argued political parties that won the local election should be responsible for local politics in the regions and contribute to reducing regionalism.

No one opposed his newly packaged arguments. Opposition to the renewal of his politics was not strong at the time of local elections. Although he still officially denied that he had returned to politics, Kim Dae-Jung was ready for the 1996 local election, the 1996 National Assembly election, and even the 1997 presidential election. His return became successful when Cho-Soon, former minister of the Economic Planning Board, was elected as the Mayor of Seoul with Kim Dae-Jung’s and the Democratic Party’s full support. Kim Dae-Jung was the practical winner of the 1995 local election, with Cho-Soon’s win as Seoul’s Mayor (B. Koh 1996).

illicit collusion between politics and big business (J. Oh 1999). All financial transactions had to be made under real names after President Kim’s emergency order in August 1993.

President Kim recruited many younger and new aspirants to the party for the 1996 National Assembly election. Lee Hoi-Chang, who was a former Supreme Judge and Prime Minister during the beginning of Kim's tenure, joined the party as Chairman of the campaign headquarters for the Assembly election. Although he was a political novice, he had an unblemished image since he made many independent decisions not influenced by the military government when he was a judge, and he attempted to act as a true Prime Minister according to government organization laws. He did not consider the President's attitude or response. His activities infuriated President Kim, and he resigned before he was fired. Lee was recruited to the ruling party again, after a special meeting with the President several months before the election. President Kim seriously needed Lee's fresh, clean image and popularity to win the upcoming National Assembly election, while Lee needed to have electoral experience since he was known to be a presidential hopeful in the 1997 presidential election (C. Lee 1997). President Kim also recruited other well-known scholars or popular politicians in his party such as Park Chan-Jong, Lee Hong-Koo, and many young, new candidates.

Corruption and Failure of Reforms

In contrast to the readiness of the governing party for the Assembly election, the opposition was in disarray. After the victory of the 1995 local elections, Kim Dae-Jung successfully returned to the politics and organized his own party, the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP). While he was in Britain after his presidential failure in 1992, his party supporters remained in the Democratic Party (DP), headed by Lee Ki-Tack. Lee was a manager of the party instead of Kim, not a leader of the party, during Kim's absence. After the local elections, however, Lee would not yield to Kim as Chairman and

attempted to become the next presidential candidate by himself. Kim Dae-Jung, who wholeheartedly contributed victory of the DP in the local election, created his own party, and Kim's old supporters joined Kim's party. The NCNP became the largest opposition party, and the DP and its head, Lee Ki-Taek, damaged their political influence. Kim and Lee's fighting once again proved lack of ideology and the importance of a strong boss in Korean parties and politics.

In an effort to embarrass President Kim's clean politics and keep his vow that he would not accept even a cent from any others including businesses, the NCNP disclosed that Chang Hak-Ro, the President's current personal assistant, and confidant for 20 years, had received approximately 60 million won (\$73,000) in bribes (B. Koh 1997). The President's strong denial of acceptance of money propelled business circles to look for strong men who could take care of their business problems in return for money. The revelation of the bribe indicated both how deep the corruption in politics was and how widespread financial scandals in Kim's government were. Despite severe electoral damage from the disclosure to the governing party, other issues such as North Korean military maneuvers or regionalism, decided the 1995 local elections. Hundreds of armed North Korean soldiers marched to the northern section of the truce village of Panmunjom six days before the Assembly Election, showing the significance of national security (B. Koh 1997). In short, oppositional division, national security, regionalism, younger generations of candidates, and the new faces in the leadership of the ruling party were the main reasons for the victory of the 1996 Assembly election, despite corruption in the government. Electoral failure of the parties led by Kim Dae-Jung, Kim Jong-Pil, and Lee Ki-Taek stressed unity for the future electoral strategy.

Economically Korea has been in a difficult situation since the later half of 1996. Korea could not meet most requirements of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), such as import-export liberalization, free-trade policies, and far-reaching international standards (Clifford 1998). As opposition criticized the government's joining the OECD after it reached \$10,000 GNP per person in 1995, it might have been premature for the Korean economy to meet all requirements. To make matters worse, Asian monetary problems began at the same time. President Kim's government ascribed Korean economic difficulty to labor and attempted to regulate labor unions.

Finally, early in the morning of December 26, 1996, labor bills were passed without any opposition lawmakers present (*Economist* Jan 18, 1997). It was similar to a military operation. All ruling party members were bussed into the Assembly at 5:56 in the morning, from four downtown hotels, and passed the bills at 6:00 in the morning without debating any of them.

The government was, however, under severe attack by the media, the public, and the opposition for its reckless and undemocratic maneuvering. Eventually, after extensive talks with prominent public figures, including Stephen Cardinal Kim Soo-Hwan, the President had the Assembly nullify the original labor law and passed more moderate labor laws in March 1997 (Schuman and I. Kim 1997). For example, management would no longer have to pay striking workers. However, even with passage of the revised law, the country's economy had been on the downward slope. The Hanbo Steel Industry, the country's second largest steel maker, went into bankruptcy in January of 1997 (Clifford 1998). Hanbo's bankruptcy signaled both economic turmoil for Korea

and political difficulty for the ruling party. Chung Tae-Soo, the Hanbo President, was soon prosecuted for bribing higher government officials, party leaders, President Kim's close confidants, and his second son, Kim Hyun-Chol. "Little Kim," as was known, was summoned by the prosecutors, questioned at the National Assembly hearings, and later jailed. This kind of ordeal for a presidential family was unthinkable under the former governments. Kim Hun-Chol's imprisonment may ironically indicate the degree of the incumbent government's democratic maturity, media freedom, and the independence of the court system. Despite these long-term positive connotations, the incident surely indicated Kim government's continuation of corruption, and the failure of his reform movement. Kim's approval ratings of 90 percent at the beginning of his tenure plummeted to a record low of 13 percent in the last year of his tenure at that time (*Economist* Feb 15, 1997). Kim was a lame duck, and the opposition parties led the politics until the December presidential election.

As both the economy and Kim's popularity continued to fall, competition to be nominated in the primary election of the ruling NKP was fierce among seven hopefuls, known as "seven dragons." Final counting of the delegate voters showed Lee Hoi-Chang received more votes but failed to achieve a majority. In a run-off ballot Lee received about 60 percent and Rhee 40 percent. Lee was announced as the NKP's presidential candidate for the 1997 election on July 22, 1997 (Holley 1997). At that time, Lee was widely believed to be the next president, and some even called his wife "first lady" since no governing candidate had ever been defeated in past presidential elections. This euphoria, however, disappeared when the opposition NCNP disclosed that Lee's two sons had evaded compulsory military service. Most men and their parents were angry at the

news of the evasion by the seemingly healthy young men. Lee's popularity plummeted. One survey showed Lee ranked third among four potential candidates (*New York Times* Sept 7, 1997). With his popularity increasing, Rhee who could not run in the next election if he stayed in the party left the NKP and created his own party, New Party of the People (NPP), and announced that he would run for the presidency on September 14, only three months before the election (*Economist* Nov 8, 1997). The *Economist* also reported that his popularity was 27 percent—only 7 percent lower than that of Kim Dae-Jung and 11 percent higher than that of Lee late October. At 49, Rhee was the youngest candidate and sought support from younger voters.

However, Rhee In-Je could not avoid the harsh criticism for breaking rules (Y. Kim 1998). He pledged, with other candidates at the governing party primary election, that he would accept the outcome, but instead he defected from the party and became a candidate by creating his own party. His opponents argued that democracy is based on trust of each other and therefore whatever he asserted about future promises for Korean democracy should be suspected. His higher popularity declined as the election date came near.

Alliance of Two Kims and the First Inter-party Transfer of Power

Kim Dae-Jung, candidate of the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) and Kim Jong-Pil of the United Liberal Democrats (ULD), both realized that this election would be their last and that neither could easily win the election by himself. Despite unprecedented unpopularity of President Kim and his party, many voters also did not like the two old Kims, who also had played a part in demagoguery, Machiavellism, and corruption. The only chance to increase their electability was an alliance (D. Shin 1999).

Their simple calculation for winning the election was that Korean politics had been subjected to severe regionalism. One single candidate should be supported by the parties representing the two main regions. A similar strategy was proved by the election of Kim Young-Sam in the 1992 presidential election. Since Kim Dae-Jung's party had 79 legislative seats and Kim Jong-Pil's 49, and because the popularity of Kim Dae-Jung was higher in most national surveys, Kim Dae-Jung became the candidate. Kim Jong-Pil, instead, was guaranteed to become prime minister after changing the Constitution from a presidential system to parliamentary one around the mid-point of the new government. Kim Jong-Pil was a wholeheartedly pro-cabinet-system. His assertion was based on the fact that the underdeveloped Korean politics was partially due to too much power of presidents, and that all had ended unhappily. The first President Rhee was evicted from the office by student uprisings in 1959. President Park was killed by his close confidant. Presidents Chun and Roh were in jail due to their actions of the Kwangju Uprising and the use of slush funds. Despite their winning strategy, however, the two Kims' single candidacy drew severe criticism. The criticism was similar to the criticism Kim Young-Sam received before the 1992 presidential election. Among the most important was the fact that Kim Jong-Pil was the founder of the Korean CIA that later had kidnapped Kim Dae-Jung in August 1973 and attempted to kill him in the sea (Clifford 1998). His opponents, Lee Hoi-Chang and Rhee In-Je, accused Kim Dae-Jung of an unprincipled alliance.

There were many issues and events during the campaign, such as a disclosure of the hardly provable but widely believed political habit of slush funds by Kim Dae-Jung and the disclosure by the Agency for National Security Planning, the successor to the

KCIA, that Kim Dae-Jung received political funds from North Korea. These stories became sensational during the campaign but did not damage Kim's popularity. Many voters were rather sick of these kinds of old tricks and the same menus. Instead, Kim Dae-Jung's popularity was consolidated through several debates on television. Television debates by candidates were introduced for the first time in Korea in 1997 in order to replace massive street rallies that were very expensive and uncontrollable (J. Shim 1997). Unlike other candidates, Kim Dae-Jung showed to the nationwide voters his deep knowledge of economy, precise solutions to the current economic crisis, eloquence, and good responses to the questions. His eloquent manner on television significantly diluted his decades-old image as a leftist or hardliner, both to the conservative voters and the undecided voters. Televised debates, together with television commercials and speeches by nationally famous figures, proved his party's catchwords, "ready president," that had originally been created to camouflage Kim Dae-Jung's fourth run for president. In the election, Kim Dae-Jung obtained 40.3 percent, only 1.6 percent more than Lee, while Rhee received 19.2 percent (T. Park 1998). Kim Dae-Jung's margin of victory is the smallest winning margin ever. Kim's victory, the first peaceful transfer of power between parties in Korea's modern history, is compared to that of Nelson Mandela of South Africa and Lech Walesa of Poland. D. Shin contends that Kim's win stands for beginning of overcoming consistent regionalism in Korea because Kim Dae-Jung came from a regionally discriminated area—the Southwest. Whether it was a split vote of the Southeastern area between Lee and Rhee or lack of a native Southeastern candidate that reduced regionalism in the 1997 election, it is hoped that lateral transfer of power will

reduce decades-old conflicts between the two regions, and the country will be more harmonized in the future.

This study assesses candidate choice, turnout, and interest in elections in the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections. The study attempts to further the understanding of Korean presidential electoral behavior.

CHAPTER 2

CANDIDATE CHOICE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Introduction

This chapter analyzes Koreans' electoral behavior in an effort to explain why the electorate chose certain candidates in the past two presidential elections and what factors were involved in the transfer of power in 1997. As shown in Table 1 on *p.* 189, the dependent variable expressed in this chapter is preference for the three major candidates in the 1992 and 1997 Korean presidential elections. There were six candidates in the 1992 election, and Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung, and Chung Joo-Young obtained 82.2 percent of the total votes. There were six candidates in the 1997 election, and Lee Hoi-Chang, Kim Dae-Jung, and Rhee In-Je obtained 95.4 percent of the votes. Thus, the dependent variable, candidate choice, has three categories: Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung, and Chung in the 1992 model, and Lee, Kim Dae-Jung and Rhee in the 1997 model. By employing multinomial logit models and Monte Carlo simulations, this chapter examines what constrained the choice of candidates in the two presidential elections.

Literature Review

Political Orientation: Governing and Opposition

Campbell et al.'s (1960) seminal book, *The American Voter*, analyzed the 1952 and 1956 American presidential elections and found the electorate's party identification to be the most significant variable in explaining one's voting behavior. Although public

attachment to parties has declined since the 1960s (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Meier 1975; Miller and Shanks 1996; Nie et al. 1976; Teiseira 1992), it remains an important variable in American and other countries' elections (Campbell et al. 1966; Clarke, Stewart and Whiteley 1997; Fiorina 1981; Franklin and Jackson 1984; Miller and Shanks 1996; Stewart and Clarke 1998).

Despite the importance of political identification in the United States and other nations, it is not a meaningful factor in explaining Korean elections (J. Cho 1993b; K. Kang 1998; H. Kim 1993a; C. Park 1993; K. Park 1994; Lee and Glasure 1995). Studies of Korean parties assert that they are formed and disbanded so often that political identification is not formed among Korean voters. While comparing Taiwanese and Korean political parties, Huang (1997, 153) maintained that "the discontinuity of political parties contributed to the weakness of political parties and the party system in Korea." No party could survive long enough because party leaders have often been purged after uprisings, coups, or demonstrations. As C. Park and K. Cho (1994) indicate, while one's political party identification in Western literature refers to the loyalty to a specific party, the Korean electorate has shown coherent support for either the governing party or one or two of the major opposition parties, regardless of the number of different parties. A voter's leaning toward the governing or opposition parties in Korean politics is the closest similarity to party identification in Western politics. For instance, K. Cho (1996, 1998) studied the 1992 Korean presidential election and the 1992 general elections and reported that the governing/opposition orientation was statistically significant in the presidential election and in the general election. She concludes that those who have governing-party orientation tend to vote for the ruling Democratic Liberal Party, while

those who have opposition-party orientation tend to vote for major opposition parties.

Thus, one may hypothesize that the governing/opposition party orientation of the Korean voters should significantly affect the votes of the two Korean presidential elections.

Merger

Issues have been major indicators in explaining electoral behaviors and attitudes in the Western voting literature (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Clarke and Stewart 1984, 1995, 1998; Clarke, Stewart, and Whiteley 1997; Clarke et al. 1992; Converse et al. 1969; Crewe 1985, 1992; Key 1966; Lewis-Beck 1991; Miller et al. 1990; Page and Brody 1972; Yeric and Todd 1996). Unemployment, inflation, defense, and other social issues have been among some of the issues studied. The rise of issue orientation has been related to the downfall of parties. As new issues gained public attention in the United States in the 1960s, political parties did not always respond with answers for the electorate (Miller and Levitin 1976; Nie et al. 1976). For instance, race differed from the other social problems and it could not be neatly divided along the existing party lines. The Democratic Party enjoyed support both from Whites and African Americans and, therefore, was in a position where the party could not easily represent the demands of either group. The Republican Party, whose tradition included Lincoln and until the 1930s had enjoyed electoral support from African American voters, sought to increase its appeal to this segment of society.

While issues have been major indicators in American literature for several decades, they are a recent phenomenon in Korea. Before the 1987 election, authoritative regimes proposed, developed, and executed policies without any responsibility to the public (J. Cho 1993b; T. Kim 1995). Therefore, issues were not major factors in Korean

electoral behavior. However, after the 1987 election, issues such as the economy, democratization, and corruption became significant factors in Korean voting behavior. One newspaper survey in 1992 found that the political environment had changed regarding these issues. According to the survey, the public expressed its opinions about reducing exports (32.5%), high consumer prices (25.6%) and the lack of confidence in politics (21.6%) (Y. Jung 1993). Jung Yong-Tae (1993) concluded that the economy, consumer prices, political stability, and corruption were the main reasons that voters voted as they did in the 1992 presidential election. K. Park (1993), however, asserts that economic variables were not significant in his electoral choice model, while Kim Young-Sam's personal evaluation, regionalism, party orientation and age were significant. According to K. Park, the major reason that economic issue variables did not matter on party choice is that Korean economic policies were generally initiated and executed by government branches, not by politicians. Influences of ruling parties on economic performance were weak. H. Lee (1998) also claims that due to the strong effects of regionalism on electoral choice, economic variables were not important factors.

The most important factor in the 1992 Korean presidential election was the role of Kim Young-Sam, a leading opposition hopeful. Kim Young-Sam merged his party, the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), with the ruling Democratic Justice Party (Kim Dae-Jung) and Kim Jong-Pil's small New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) in 1990. Kim Young-Sam, who is usually referred to as YS, endured years of house arrest for his opposition to the military regimes and once staged a 23-day hunger strike to obtain more liberty in Korea. His thirty-years of political life stood for activism against authoritative governments (J. Lee 1995; Pae 1992). Nonetheless, after his defeat in the 1987

presidential election, Kim Young-Sam began to think that although the government had been somewhat democratized, his chance to win in the next election was slim. The government remained in strong control of political, social, and economic systems. Based on an old Korean saying that “if you want to catch a tiger, you have to enter the tiger’s den,” Kim Young-Sam joined President Roh Tae-Woo in 1990 (Sanger 1992). Kim Young-Sam thought that he needed electoral support from the other regions to win the presidency in the 1992 election (Clifford 1998). Although he was the leader of the southernmost Southeast region (Youngnam), his support was limited in the north of the Southeast because the current president, Roh, came from this area. Since the Korean political system does not allow an incumbent president to seek a second term, Roh wanted someone from his own area elected. Kim Young-Sam, contending that he was the only candidate to equally represent both the southern and northern Southeast, received Roh’s aid and support to merge their parties. Besides the Southeast area, Kim Young-Sam needed help from a leader in another area to secure his win. He chose the Central region. Kim Jong-Pil, known as JP, was the leader of this area. Kim Jong-Pil eventually accepted Kim Young-Sam’s initiative because of the knowledge that he could not become president by himself. It was better for him to accept the second post in a new Kim Young-Sam administration, thereby positioning himself for the governing party candidacy in the 1997 election.

Above all, Kim Young-Sam’s justification for the merger was that South Korea had suffered severe regional animosity among the three largest areas: the Southwest, the Southeast, and the Central area. During non-election times, serious regional animosities

are minimal. However, during the elections each region wants its leader to be elected so intensely that other candidates' personality, issues, and parties are diminished.

With the current president and Kim Jong-Pil's support, Kim Young-Sam believed he could easily win against Kim Dae-Jung, the only remaining major candidate in the 1992 election. Kim Dae-Jung, known as DJ, was surrounded by the tripartite merger. The merged camp saw many positive developments. Kim Young-Sam's grand plan to become the next president almost guaranteed his victory in the 1992 election. After completing the merger in 1990, President Roh's Democratic Justice Party that had been a minority in the National Assembly became the largest party. The coalition, the Democratic Liberty Party (DLP), controlled 220 seats in the 298-member single-chamber house (Clifford 1998). Kim Jong-Pil, whose party was the smallest before the merger, hoped to become the official presidential candidate in the 1997 election.

Their joining, however, was considered to be like mixing oil and water by some commentators. Kim Young-Sam had fought against conservative, authoritative, and military governments all his life. The other, President Roh, was a four-star general and a classmate of former president Chun Doo-Hwan. Both Roh and Chun were known to be responsible for the 1980 Southwest massacre. The union was further complicated by the inclusion of Kim Jong-Pil, the founder of the Korean CIA who carried out the military coup in 1961 with the former president Park Chung-Hee.

Moreover, there were many voters who did not like Kim Young-Sam's abrupt change from a thorny but purely democratic activist to a comfortable, pragmatic politician. This change was because the governing camp was still militaristic and perceived as the enemy of democracy. The public's distaste for the merger resulted in the

defeat of the merged DLP in a by-election held a few months after the merger. The coalition was defeated in Kim Jong-Pil's home region (J. Shim 1990a). Opposition to the coalition was strong throughout the country. Kim Dae-Jung and others opposing the merged coalition called the merger a hedge marriage and organized rallies; one was attended by approximately 300,000 people (J. Shim 1990b). The opposition to the merger resulted in violence and unrest. The coalition lost the general election two years later, which caused a severe loss of seats in the National Assembly (Clifford 1998). Therefore, the merger of the three parties was regarded as a significant factor in the 1992 election.

This issue of a merger repeated itself in the 1997 presidential election (T. Park 1998; D. Shin 1999). This time, Kim Dae-Jung, who was the accuser in 1990 and who had suffered from the merger, initiated coalition. He made a deal with Kim Jong-Pil. The merger was not identical in composition to the 1990 merger, but it did result in one united candidate from two different parties. After Kim Young-Sam was elected in the 1992 election, Kim Jong-Pil became the chairman of the merged DLP as scheduled. However in 1995, when several big accidents occurred, such as a gas explosion, the collapse of the *Sungsu* Bridge, and the *Sampoong* Department Store, President Kim Young-Sam's popularity dropped from 90 percent to 30 percent (S. Yoon 1995). The ruling DLP was then involved in a fierce controversy of how to restore the President's and the party's popularity and stabilize the political situation. Kim Jong-Pil was the DLP chairman, but his job was largely symbolic. He was in the minority and too conservative compared to the majority of the DLP members. In the spring of 1995, the DLP attempted to resolve political unrest at the sacrifice of Kim Jong-Pil's resignation as chairman and

his defection (B. Ahn 1997; S. Yoon 1995). Kim Jong-Pil then organized the United Liberal Democrats (ULD), based on the Central region of the country, the *Chungcheong* Province. Kim Jong-Pil once again became the party leader in that area.

At this politically turbulent moment, Kim Dae-Jung realized that his chance of becoming president in the 1997 election would be his last. He was 76 years old and it was his fourth attempt at the presidency. Therefore, he struck a deal with Kim Jong-Pil about 50 days before the election that Kim Dae-Jung would be the candidate representing both parties. The arrangement also included that, once elected, together they would change the political system from a presidential to a cabinet system during Kim Dae-Jung's early years in office (J. Kim 1997). This arrangement would mean that, around the year 2000, Kim Jong-Pil might become the first Prime Minister in the new parliamentary system.

Kim Dae-Jung believed that the deal would provide him with enough votes to win the election because of his electoral strength in his own area, the Southwest, combined with Kim Jong-Pil's regional support, according to J. Kim. Kim Dae-Jung's grand plan, known as DJP united candidacy, to become a next president seemed more feasible due to division of Kim Dae-Jung's main rival region, the Southeast area. The voters from the Southeast area split their votes between Lee Hoi-Chang and Rhee In-Je. Neither Lee nor Rhee was born or lived in the Southeast, but they were associated with President Kim Young-Sam and, therefore, considered acceptable candidates to voters of the region. This was the first time in Korea's electoral history that the Southeast did not produce a presidential candidate directly from its region. This change was due, in part, to the Constitution that limits incumbent presidents to one five-year term so that President Kim

could not run again. A second factor contributing to the change was that the ruling party split its votes in the primary election.

Despite the Kim Dae-Jung's strategy, many of his followers did not like the idea, as Kim Young-Sam's plan had been criticized seven years before. The criticism was similar to the criticism Kim Young-Sam received. Among the most important criticism was the fact that Kim Jong-Pil was the founder of the Korean CIA and a chief adviser of the past Park Chung-Hee administration that had kidnapped Kim Dae-Jung in August 1973 and attempted to kill him in the sea (Clifford 1998). Kim Dae-Jung was twice accused of a "shotgun wedding" by his competitors, Lee Hoi-Chang and Rhee In-Je. Voters were suspicious because Kim Dae-Jung led the opposition to the merged party in 1990, similar to his 1997 united candidacy. Accordingly, in both the 1992 and the 1997 elections, the issues of a merger and united candidacy were important. Therefore, one may hypothesize that the issues of a merger and united candidacy were very important to the voters' choice in the 1992 and 1997 elections respectively.

Interest in the Election

Participation in elections can be either active or passive. Active interest in the political process focuses on citizens' activities that attempt to influence the structure of government, selection of government authorities, or politics (Conway 1991; Parry et al. 1992). These activities may either support or oppose existing policies, authorities, or structures. Passive participation includes attending ceremonial or supportive activities or paying attention to what is happening in politics but does not include overt action to remedy the situation (Conway 1991; Dye 1994).

Political interest has been shown to be cyclical among U.S. voters (Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Weaver et al. 1981). Weaver et al. indicate that fewer than half of the panel respondents showed a high interest in presidential politics prior to the primary season. Their political interest continued to build during the primary season, and by July of election year, more than half of the voters expressed high interest in the presidential campaign (1981).

In addition, Jon Dalager (1996) asserts that political interest is a major factor affecting the voters' ability to correctly identify the issues. Using data from Senate campaigns, he found that, among more informed voters, political interest was positively related to correctly identifying the issues. Among the uninformed voters, the impact of the political interest was negatively related to identifying important issues. He concluded therefore that voters accept or interpret political event differently depending on their level of interest in politics. Many authors have examined interest in elections (Brody 1978; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Miller and Shanks 1996). For instance, *The People's Choice* (1944) examined the 1940 American presidential election with panel data from 6,000 voters who resided in Erie County, Ohio. Lazarsfeld et al. asserted that people with higher levels of interest in the elections had more opinions on issues, were involved more in the election, participated more in election events, and exposed themselves more to the political communications. Lazarsfeld et al. also maintained that many non-voters stayed away from the polls deliberately because they were thoroughly unconcerned with the election. Non-voters, according to their study, were 18 times as likely not to vote because of their less interest as voters who were highly interested in election. In this chapter, the role of political interest in the elections of 1992 and 1997 and its affect on the

vote were examined. Testing the effects of electoral interest on the voter choice is exploratory, and there is no theoretical or specific reason to believe that these patterns should not be applied to choice of candidates in the presidential elections of Korea.¹

Prior Vote

In countries where party affiliation has a significant effect on voting, voters select candidates based largely on their party label in succeeding elections (Campbell et al. 1960; Denver and Hands 1997; Fiorina 1981; Franklin and Jackson 1984). When Denver and Hands analyzed the impact of constituency campaigning on challengers and incumbents in the 1992 British general election, they found a strong influence of how the electorate voted in 1987 on its vote in 1992. For example, the 1987 vote for the Conservative Party was strongly associated with a vote for the Conservative Party in 1992. The association between the Labor Party vote in 1987 and 1992 was nearly identical. This means that in Britain, most voters who voted for one party in prior elections voted for the same party five years later.

In western countries, where parties are formed along ideology lines, (Epstein 1986; Reiter 1987) forming, disbanding, or merging/uniting of parties can hardly depend on the leaders and a few of their aides. In a country with newly emerging democratic norms and where parties have yet to be deeply rooted in the political system, however, identification with a single party is weak. Weakened parties in Korea boosted the status of a handful of leaders (T. Huang 1997). Instead the electorate identifies with the candidates or their successors. Currently in Korean politics, the selection of a leader is tied to personality and the perceived benefits the person can provide for those who

¹ Unlike other independent variables, “interest in elections” is tested by a two-tailed *t*-test.

support him (Jacobs 1985). The fact that the party leaders merged parties or made a united candidacy is a strong indicator of the personalization of political parties. Thus, those who voted for a candidate in an earlier election should vote for him or his protégée in a next election. As shown in Table 1, three major candidates in the 1987 and 1992 elections obtained the most votes. Three candidates—Roh, Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung—in the 1987 election are used as dummy variables in the 1992 model. Three other major candidates—Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Chung—in the 1992 election are used as dummy variables in the 1997 model.

The histories of all candidates except Roh Tae-Woo have been discussed earlier. Roh first appeared in politics after the 1979 coup with his Military Academy classmate, Chun Doo-Hwan following the assassination of President Park Chung-Hee in December of 1979. At the end of Chun's administration, Roh was the chairman of the governing Democratic Justice Party and already appointed the presidential successor. His popularity suddenly increased when he stunned the nation on June 29, 1987 by succumbing to the public's fierce and long-standing democratic movements and accepting the citizens' demands. He announced on the same day that the ruling DJP would accept almost all the public's and the opposition's demands to achieve a new constitution: direct election of the presidency, democratization and other political and economic reforms (S. Pae 1992).² He later became a ruling party presidential candidate and finally was elected president in the 1987 presidential election when the major

² Roh's initiating of the announcement was discovered later to have been strongly backed by President Chun (S. Pae). He declared that he would ask for approval of his proposals from the President, and if declined, he would resign all his posts since the President and Roh just wanted to make Roh's declaration more dramatic and pave the way to win in the coming election.

opposition candidates, Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung, and Kim Jong-Pil, divided their electoral base.

Neither rules nor parties have dominated Korean politics as much as personal influences. Hence, one expects that voters who supported a candidate in one election will vote for him or his protégée in next election. Dummy variables are employed for the three main candidates in each election to determine voters' relationship between their votes for former candidates and the effects of the votes in the next election.

While determining impacts of prior voters for particular leaders on the consecutive presidential elections particular attention is paid to comparing how much their older supporters of Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung are different on the choice of them in later elections. Since both Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung ran in the 1992 and 1997 elections, their previous effects are compared in the 1992 and 1997 models respectively. In Korean politics, it is widely believed that Kim Dae-Jung has more loyal and cohesive supporters than Kim Young-Sam although both of them have dominated Korean politics so long (K. Lee 1997). Yet, Kim Young-Sam was elected in 1992 with a large margin of 8.1 percent over Kim Dae-Jung while Kim Dae-Jung was barely elected in 1997 with a 1.6 percent margin over Lee, Kim Young-Sam' protégée. This study employs Monte Carlo simulation in an effort to determine who has more loyal supporters between Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung.

Regionalism

Since the early voting studies (Berelson et al. 1954; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944), region has been an important factor in explaining voting behavior. Charles Pattie and Ron Johnson (1995), in a study of Britain's voting also argue that Britain has a strong regional

factor in its voters' choices. Different parts of the country have different levels of economic development, and, accordingly, the state of the voters' regional economy affects party choice differently. The authors' argument is based on the observation that voters are more affected by the state of their regional economy than by their personal or national economies. Regionalism is also found to be an important indicator in Canada (Clarke and Kornberg 1993, 1994; Le Duch 1984; Gidengil 1989, Kornberg and Clarke 1994) and in France (Lewis-Beck 1984).

Korea is a nation whose regional divisions are predominately drawn along economic boundaries. The Southeast region of the nation is more developed and contains the bulk of the industrial facilities of the country. The Southwest region of Korea is its agricultural heartland. In addition to the economic division of the nation, there are also important historical differences. Most of Korea's ruling elite, including presidents, has come from the Southeast region. The Southwest region has produced neither national kings nor presidents. The influence of regionalism has been documented in many studies (B. Ahn, I. Kim and J. Seo 1995; K. Cho 1996, 1998; Kim and Yoo 1996; C. Park 1992). For instance, K. Cho confirms the significance of regionalism to voters' choice in the 1992 presidential election. Voters from the Southeast and Southwest regions of the country voted for candidates from their regions or the candidates' protegees. Thus, regionalism in terms of the Southeast and the Southwest should significantly affect the 1992 and 1997 Korean elections. Dummy variables for the Southwest and Southeast areas are used in the model.

Age

Initial studies of voting in the United States stressed sociological variables in their analysis (Berelson et al. 1954; Lazarsfeld et al. 1948). Among the variables found to have an impact on party support and voting was age. Age has continued to be an important variable in the study of Western democracies (Andersen 1979; Bone and Ranney 1976; Butler and Stokes 1974; Converse 1976; Franklin et al. 1992; Glenn and Hefner 1972; Johnston 1993). Following these studies, Kim and Yoo (1996) found age to be a significant variable in their study of 1992 Korean general and local elections. Park and Kim (1996) also found that older voters tended to vote for conservative parties such as the governing DLP, and the conservative opposition party, ULD, in the 1992 general election. This tendency may be because “they like to perpetuate their own idealized past and because they have more to conserve” (Lazarsfeld 1944, 23). In contrast, younger voters were more likely to vote for a progressive party such as the Democratic Party. Lazarsfeld et al. (24) offer a similar reason for this pattern: “younger voters are more liberal, more receptive to change.” Due to severe regional cleavage and leaders’ impacts on Korean politics, influences of other sociological factors are weak on electoral choice in Korea (S. Bae 1995; N. Lee 1993; S. Shin 1999). Age appears to affect the Korean voter in much the same manner as it does in Western countries. Based on these studies, one expects age to have a significant affect on the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections.

Methods

Many social science studies recently adopted random utility models of discrete choice. That is, an individual selects the alternative with the greatest utility. According to Sheffi, Hall and Daganzo (1982), the utility of an alternative is composed of two

factors: a deterministic component and a random component. The former deals with the effect of the average preferences of the population and the observable characteristics of the alternative and the individual. The latter, however, explains the effects of deviation of the individual's preferences from those of the population average and the influences of unobserved characteristics of the individual and the alternatives. Finally, the random utility model forecasts the probability that an individual will choose a particular alternative that is greater than the utilities of all other alternatives as a function of the observable characteristics of the individual and the available alternatives.

The multinomial logit (MNL) model assumes that the random components of utilities are independently and identically distributed (IID) (Horowitz 1980; McFadden 1974). Due to the computational ease and widespread adoption of commercial software, MNL has been popular in social sciences, including political science (Powers and Cox 1997). Nevertheless, it is not always easy to satisfy MNL's major assumption that respondents with same observable characteristics have exactly the same preferences and that any effects of unobservable characteristics of respondents or alternatives are not correlated across respondents and alternatives. This assumption is widely known as the independence of irrelevant alternative (IIA) property (Greene 1997; Hausman and Kennedy 1998; Horowitz; Long 1997; McFadden 1984; Shiffi, Hall and Daganzo 1982). Horowitz succinctly expressed MNL as below.

$$U_{ij} = X_{ij}\theta + X_{ij}\delta_i + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

Where X_{ij} : a J -dimensional vector of observable characteristics of individual i and alternative j

θ : a vector of constant parameters

δ_i : a random vector showing the differences between preferences of individual i and the average preferences of other respondents with the same observable

characteristics
 ε_{ij} : a random disturbance

In MNL, the components of δ_i are all zero, and the additive disturbances ε_{ij} are assumed to be independently and identically distributed with the cumulative distribution function

$$F(e) = \exp[-\exp(-e)].$$

According to McFadden (1974), the probability that any individual i chooses alternative j is

$$P_{ij} = \exp(X_{ij}\theta) / \sum_{k=1}^M \exp(X_{ik}\theta).$$

After McFadden (1989) has resolved the computational problem, the multinomial probit (MNP) model began to be popularly employed in social sciences (Alvarez and Nagler 1995; Chintagunta 1992; Ho 1996; Horowitz 1980; Kamakura 1989). Instead of satisfying the rigid assumption of MNL, MNP assumes that utilities are multivariate, normally distributed, and permit preferences of respondents to vary among respondents with same observable characteristics. Unlike MNL, MNP permits effects of unobserved variables to be correlated across choices. In formula (1), MNP assumes that the components of δ_i for any individual i are assumed to have been drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with mean vector zero and a $J \times J$ covariance matrix Σ . The additive disturbances ($j = 1, \dots, M$) for any individual i are assumed to have been drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with zero means and an $M \times M$ covariance matrix Σ .
 alternative j :

$$P_{ij} = \Pr[U_{ij} > U_{ik} \text{ for all } k \neq j].$$

The ideal method to test a candidate choice hypothesis may be an MNP. Yet, the bulk of literature that incorporates different nominal categories in the dependent variable uses

MNL (Campbell 1997; Cho 1997; Hoffman and Duncan 1988; Kanaroglou and Ferguson 1998; Nownes 1992; Powers and Cox; Sigelman, Wahlbeck and Buell 1997; Whitten and Palmer 1996). For instance, Whitten and Palmer (235)--while comparing binomial logit, nested multinomial logit and multinomial logit models of electoral behavior in Dutch and British politics--mentioned that "given the computational difficulties of estimating MNP models, we recommend the use of MNL models." Whitten and Palmer moreover assert that estimation of MNP models does not always enhance empirical analyses whose dependent outcome has even three or four alternatives. Another well-known example of recommending MNL on electoral studies is a recent paper presented at the *American Political Science Review* by Powers and Cox (1997). By employing MNL they analyzed cross-sectional election data that were collected right after the Polish parliamentary election in 1993. They asserted that if a researcher is modeling influences of drop or addition of a party to the alternatives, MNL is not a good method. Yet, if a researcher is more interested in examining party or candidate choice at one point in time, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption is not a serious problem, and MNL can be applicable. Since this study also analyzes different candidate choice in two separate elections, MNL is used.

MNL is conceptually similar to binary logit because MNL simultaneously estimates all possible comparisons among the outcome categories (Long 1997). For instance, the outcome y of the 1992 model has several nominal categories, Kim Young-Sam (YS), Kim Dae-Jung (DJ) and Chung Joo-Young (Chung). Each category has cases N_{YS} , N_{DJ} and N_{Chung} . To make a formula simpler, there is only one independent variable,

x . When one analyzes how x affects the odds of Kim Young-Sam *v.* Kim Dae-Jung, the $N_{YS} + N_{DJ}$ cases are needed.³ The binary logit will be as follows:

$$\text{Ln}[\text{Pr}(\text{YS}|x) / \text{Pr}(\text{DJ}|x)] = a_1 + \beta_0, \text{YS|DJ} + \beta_1, \text{YS|DJ}^x$$

Here, a_1 is a constant, and the dependent variable is comparing the odds of Kim Young-Sam *v.* Kim Dae-Jung, and the dependent is natural-logged. One interprets the coefficient β_1 in such a way that the odds of Kim Young-Sam *v.* Kim Dae-Jung changes by a factor of $\exp(\beta_1, \text{YS|DJ})$, as x is one-unit changed. Similarly, the binary logit for Kim Dae-Jung *v.* Chung with cases of $N_{DJ} + N_{Chung}$ and the logit for Chung *v.* Kim Young-Sam with cases of $N_{Chung} + N_{YS}$ are as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Ln}[\text{Pr}(\text{DJ}|x) / \text{Pr}(\text{Chung}|x)] &= a_2 + \beta_0, \text{DJ|Chung} + \beta_1, \text{DJ|Chung}^x \\ \text{Ln}[\text{Pr}(\text{Chung}|x) / \text{Pr}(\text{YS}|x)] &= a_3 + \beta_0, \text{Chung|YS} + \beta_1, \text{Chung|YS}^x, \text{ and} \\ \text{Pr}(\text{YS}) + \text{Pr}(\text{DJ}) + \text{Pr}(\text{Chung}) &= 1, \end{aligned}$$

where $\text{Pr}(\text{YS})$, $\text{Pr}(\text{DJ})$ and $\text{Pr}(\text{Chung})$ are the probabilities of voting Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Chung respectively. Finally, the hypothesized relationships are specified by the following model:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Candidate Choice} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Orientation} + \beta_2 \text{Interest} + \beta_3 \text{Merger (1992 only)} \\ & \beta_4 \text{Single (1997 only)} + \beta_5 \text{exRoh (1992 only)} + \\ & \beta_6 \text{exYS} + \beta_7 \text{exDJ} + \beta_8 \text{exChung (1997 only)} + \\ & \beta_9 \text{SW} + \beta_{10} \text{SE} + \beta_{11} \text{Age} + \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

where Orientation: orientation toward governing or opposition parties

Interest: interest in the election

Merger: evaluation of the 1992 three-party merger

Single: evaluation of the 1997 single candidacy (alliance) between Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Pil

exRoh: those who voted for Roh Tae-Woo in the 1987 presidential election

exKim Young-Sam: those who voted for Kim Young-Sam in the 1987 and 1992 presidential elections

exKim Dae-Jung: those who voted for Kim Dae-Jung in the 1987 and 1992

³ The odds indicate how often one category happens compared to how often that category does not happen. The log of odds is referred to as logit.

presidential elections
exChung: those who voted for Chung Joo-Young in the 1992 presidential election
SW: those who live in the southwest (*Honam*) area
SE: those who live in the southeast (*Youngnam*) area
Age: age.⁴

Findings and Discussion

The 1992 Presidential Election

Table 2a shows the results of the MNL estimates of the 1992 presidential election.⁵ Since the logit model is non-linear, interpretation of parameter estimates is not straightforward. Furthermore, interpretation of parameter estimates of the MNL is fairly complex because the model has a comparison group or base category. Yet the signs of the coefficients and their magnitudes compared to one another suggest the direction and the size of the effect on the joint probabilities (Robins and Dickinson 1985). Moreover this chapter uses many figures to visualize logit coefficients and help readers understand major findings more easily. Comparison of variables between the 1992 and 1997 models and a more comprehensive evaluation of each variable will be shown later.

The second column (Kim Dae-Jung v. Kim Young-Sam) of Table 2a on *p.* 190 shows most coefficients of the independent variables affecting the categories of the dependent variable (candidate choice) are very strong; in this case, the vote for Kim Dae-Jung is compared to the vote for Kim Young-Sam. The results support our expectation of governing/opposition-party orientation. As the political orientation of the 1992 voters

⁴ See Appendix 1 for coding and variable descriptions. Distribution of variables used in the model is shown in Appendix 2a (1992 election) and Appendix 2b (1997 election). Translation was carefully done not to change the original meaning of the Korean questionnaire.

⁵ No multicollinearity problem has been found among the independent variables of the 1992 and 1997 models. STATA automatically removes the collinear variables. In addition, a model has multicollinearity problem when the largest Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is greater than 10, or the mean of all the VIFs is considerably larger than one (Chatterjee and Price 1991). Yet, no VIF of the variables is over 3, and their mean is only 1.65. Thus, there should not be multicollinearity problems in the model.

changed from the governing party to the opposition party, opposition candidate Kim Dae-Jung became more favorable. Kim Dae-Jung's support from opposition-oriented voters also means that the ruling party candidate, Kim Young-Sam, received more support from the governing party-oriented voters. Furthermore, voters with a stronger political interest supported Kim Dae-Jung over Kim Young-Sam. That is, those who were more interested in the 1992 presidential election tended to vote for Kim Dae-Jung, the first opposition candidate. Contrarily, voters who were less interested were more likely to choose Kim Young-Sam.

The 1992 merger had a negative effect for Kim Dae-Jung. As the voters considered the merger a good decision, they were less likely to vote for Kim Dae-Jung. This consideration is because the merger of the three parties was conducted by Kim Young-Sam, and there were many voters who supported the merger. Conversely, those who considered the merger to be a bad decision tended to vote for Kim Dae-Jung.

In addition, Kim Dae-Jung achieved more votes from voters who lived in his home-region, the Southwestern area. This indicator is highly significant and produced the most positive impact for Kim Dae-Jung. The voters living in the Southeast area, however, penalized Kim Dae-Jung. Kim Young-Sam drew most votes from the Southeast area. This result significantly confirms regional effects on the 1992 Korean presidential election. Regional effects on candidate choice are clearly shown in Figure 4 on *p.* 211. Figure 4 shows how the five major regions voted for candidates and total regional votes. Unlike other regions, the Southwest and Southeast are more noticeable. Kim Dae-Jung achieved insurmountable support from the Southwest while Kim Young-Sam achieved almost similar support from the Southeast. These histograms show how

much the 1992 election was affected by the Southeast and Southwest regionalism. Kim Young-Sam had more support than Kim Dae-Jung in terms of total regions and may be a good indicator of his win in 1992.

Returning to Table 2a, older voters, as expected, tended to vote for Kim Young-Sam. As is commonly found in Western electoral literature, older voters choose a conservative candidate, thus Kim Young-Sam was the choice for the older voters and Kim Dae-Jung, the progressive candidate, for the younger.

In terms of prior votes, voters maintained candidate loyalty from one election to the next.⁶ Even when the candidate was not running, their support was transferred to his protegee in the election. For example, voters who supported Kim Dae-Jung in the 1987 election were highly likely to vote for him again in 1992. The same is true of voters who had supported Kim Young-Sam in the prior election, as shown in the second column. Those who voted for Roh Tae-Woo in the 1987 election did not choose Kim Dae-Jung in the 1992 election. This is understandable because President Roh coalesced with Kim Young-Sam and created one large party, the Democratic Liberal Party, to compete against Kim Dae-Jung. Many of those who had voted for Roh cast their votes for his partner, Kim Young-Sam. This confirms the loyalty of the Korean electorate to candidates or their protegees. Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young-Sam have been lifetime political rivals. It is important to examine more closely how their supporters in the earlier election affect later election results. Their comparison will be shown later through simulation.

⁶ To care of any possible time impacts of the including prior-votes indicators on the model, a model excluding all prior-votes variables both in the 1992 and 1997 elections showed that all independent variables and the model itself were statistically significant.

Column three (Chung v. Kim Young-Sam) shows the support for Chung in the 1992 election, compared to Kim Young-Sam. Only about half of the variables are statistically significant, indicating that the combination of Chung v. Kim Young-Sam is not as significant as that of Kim Dae-Jung v. Kim Young-Sam. In fact in the election of Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung was second and Chung third. First, voters who favored the opposition party favored Chung. Although Chung was the owner of the largest business group, Hyundai, in Korea, his election strategy was markedly different from those of the governing party candidates. He divulged the inner workings of Korean politics: slush funds. He mentioned that he had donated 5-10 billion Korean won in cash between 1988 and 1990 to President Roh (Clifford 1992). He also suggested he would solve chronic housing problems as soon as he was elected. For many lower-class voters, it was astonishing but believable news because Chung's construction company was the largest in the nation, and yet the housing problem was one of the most serious problems in Korea. As a result, Chung drew more support from opposition-minded voters.

Since Chung was not in the merged camp, the electorate who supported the idea of a merger was less likely to vote for Chung. Conversely, Kim Young-Sam received support from the voters who were positive about the 1990 merger. Furthermore, because Chung's political hometown is not the Southeast area, he was significantly penalized by the Southeast voters. Kim Young-Sam, the leader of the Southeast, did not lose votes from this area to Chung at all. Thus, the third column also confirms the regional effects on the election. Moreover, older voters did not support Chung compared to Kim Young-Sam. As the older electorate chose conservative Kim Young-Sam over progressive Kim Dae-Jung, they also voted for Kim Young-Sam over Chung. Older voters, as Lazarsfeld

et al. (1944) noted, had many valuable things to conserve. They did not want to lose their assets when born-again opposition candidate Chung was in power.

Voters who had voted previously for Roh, Kim Young-Sam, or Kim Dae-Jung in 1987 were supportive of Kim Young-Sam and negative toward Chung in 1992, although these variables are not statistically significant at all. Those who voted for Roh and Kim Dae-Jung in 1987 did vote for Kim Young-Sam over Chung.

The final column (Chung *v.* Kim Dae-Jung) of Table 2a compares Chung and Kim Dae-Jung, the two opposition candidates. Most indicators show a negative relationship for Chung when compared to Kim Dae-Jung. Those opposition-oriented voters tended to choose Kim Dae-Jung over Chung in 1992. Although both Kim Dae-Jung and Chung were opposition candidates, the Korean electorate regarded Kim Dae-Jung more opposition-oriented. This is easily convincing. Kim Dae-Jung had been an opposition activist all his life, while Chung had been in opposition for only about two years before the presidential election. Chung's justification for his involvement in politics was to clean the corrupt political circle that had dominated the country's economics. Despite his assertion, many voters still thought his personal business success was due to his close relationship with politics. Hence, Kim Dae-Jung won more support from opposition-oriented voters. Furthermore, the electorate who regarded the merger a bad decision favored Kim Dae-Jung over Chung. Although both were not in the merged coalitions, voters knew that the merger initiated by Kim Young-Sam sought to win the 1992 election against Kim Dae-Jung. In fact, Chung organized the UNP after the merger. Chung could not be a rival of Kim Dae-Jung despite Chung's enormous wealth, unyielding effort and political ambition.

Those who voted for Kim Young-Sam in 1987 tended to vote for Chung over Kim Dae-Jung in 1992. Unlike the combination of Chung *v.* Kim Young-Sam, the earlier Kim Young-Sam supporters easily decided to vote for Chung over Kim Dae-Jung. Many previous Kim Young-Sam supporters might have been attracted toward Chung rather than Kim Dae-Jung because Kim Dae-Jung was too far away from both Kim Young-Sam and Chung in terms of their conservative ideology. Finally, those who voted for Kim Dae-Jung in 1987 strongly supported Kim Dae-Jung again in 1992. This also confirms the hypothesis of voters' close attachment to candidates in Korean elections.

In terms of regionalism, those who lived in the Southwest area strongly supported their regional leader, Kim Dae-Jung. The finding that Southeast residents voted for neither Chung nor Kim Dae-Jung may also support the regional hypothesis. Although regional support may simplify Korean electoral processes, it may conceal other campaign issues, characteristics of candidates, or party policies.

Finally, the variable of age in this column is not significant. Insignificance of age is unexpected considering the extreme ideological distance between the two candidates. Although Chung had been moderately progressive *after* he became involved in politics, Kim Dae-Jung was much more progressive and liberal in comparison. Older voters should have supported Chung over Kim Dae-Jung, but they did not. Thus, the conventional assumption that older voters generally vote for conservative candidates while younger voters for progressive ones does not apply to Kim Dae-Jung and Chung.

Since interpreting the MNL model is complex, odds plots were created for the MNL models. Odds ratios are calculated by e^b . They are amounts by which the odds favoring $y =$ each category are multiplied, with each 1-unit increase in the right-hand

variable, when controlling other independent variables (Long 1997). Graphs were created by using unstandardized coefficients. Figure 5a on *p.* 212 shows electoral effects of all dummy variables, and the Southeast, former votes for Roh, and Kim Young-Sam are not very distinguishable in their distances.⁷ These figures run from left (low effects) to right (high effects). Yet, the Southwest and prior votes for Kim Dae-Jung clearly distinguish candidates. Those who were living in the Southwest and voted for Kim Dae-Jung in the 1987 election represented his most significant support in 1992. Kim Young-Sam obtained more votes from the Southeast, those who voted for Roh and for him in 1987. Figure 5b on *p.* 213 shows the rest of variables used in the model and clearly shows influences of each variable on candidate choice. For instance, since opposition-party orientation is the opposite of ruling-party orientation, both effects are positioned almost exactly in the opposite position of its row space. Kim Dae-Jung achieved more voters from the votes with opposition-party orientation while Kim Young-Sam from voters with ruling-party orientation. Those who voted for Kim Dae-Jung in the earlier election are noticeable in their support of Kim Dae-Jung. Candidates are closer in other variables, suggesting that their less heterogeneous effects on choice of candidates.

1997 Presidential Election

Table 2b on *p.* 191 indicates impacts of independent variables on the values of the dependent variable (candidate choice) of 1997 model. The second column (Lee *v.* Kim Dae-Jung) compares Lee to Kim Dae-Jung in the 1997 Korean presidential election.

⁷ This does not mean that the Southeast, former votes for Roh and Kim Young-Sam are not significant. None of the candidates is overlapping in the figures, indicating significant effects of the explanatory variables on the choice of candidates.

Five indicators are statistically significant and negatively impact Lee as well, when compared to Kim Dae-Jung. As voters' political orientation changed from the governing party to the opposition party, they voted for Kim Dae-Jung. As in the 1992 election, opposition-oriented voters tended to vote for the long-time opposition activist, Kim Dae-Jung, over the ruling party candidate, Lee, in 1997. Conversely, the governing party-oriented voters voted for Lee.

Those who agreed with the united candidacy voted for Kim Dae-Jung over Lee. Kim Dae-Jung realized that the 1997 election would be his last chance to hold power and to change the political power from the governing party to an opposition in about four decades. Kim Dae-Jung conducted a united candidacy with another presidential hopeful, Kim Jong-Pil. Like in the 1992 election for Kim Young-Sam, Kim Jong-Pil's help was necessary for Kim Dae-Jung to be elected. Kim Dae-Jung's strategy of a united candidacy was the best possible way to win the election, considering his past mistakes in his electoral strategy. He made a serious mistake in the 1987 election. He thought that he would have a better chance of being elected in an election where he competed with three other major candidates: Roh, Kim Young-Sam and Kim Jong-Pil. Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young-Sam had been in the same party for a long time, but Kim Dae-Jung defected from the party, the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP), less than two months before the 1987 election. Kim Dae-Jung created a new Peace and Democracy Party (PDP) and ran in the 1987 election (S. Pae 1992). Thus, the division of the opposition candidates—Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung, and Kim Jong-Pil—roughly divided all the opposition-oriented votes. Roh, the governing candidate, could easily win the election. Roh achieved 36.7 percent, Kim Young-Sam 28 percent and Kim Dae-Jung 27

percent. Despite the public pressure to unify the opposition candidacy, Kim Dae-Jung refused to do so by arguing that if more candidates were competing with each other, he would have a greater chance to be elected. He asserted that his supporters were more cohesive than others. However, his successive failures in the 1987 and 1992 presidential elections finally forced him to seek alliance with Kim Jong-Pil in 1997. This strategy turned out to be successful. Nonetheless, there were many voters who did not like Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Pil's united candidacy. The united candidacy between Kim Dae-Jung's more progressive party and Kim Jong-Pil's conservative party was not based on any principle. Kim Dae-Jung had long criticized Kim Jong-Pil because Kim Jong-Pil was the co-organizer of the 1961 military coup and the founder of the KCIA. Moreover, the fact that Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Pil made a contract between themselves to change the Korean political system from presidential to parliamentary angered many voters. A direct presidential system was the system Kim Dae-Jung himself advocated to replace the authoritative government in the 1987 democratic revolution. This was supported by decades of student movements. As a united candidate, he negated life-long ideals of many of his causes. Although Kim Dae-Jung was eventually elected in 1997, many voters who disagreed with the united candidacy voted for Lee over Kim Dae-Jung.

In terms of interest in the election, Kim Dae-Jung achieved support from those who had a higher interest in the election, as in the 1992 election. Conversely, Lee's support consisted of voters with less interest in the election. It is not understood why the governing party candidates in 1992 and 1997 received more support from voters with lower interest in the elections while the major opposition candidate received more support from interested voters. It is probably because those who wanted a change of

government may have had a greater interest in the elections and therefore supported opposition candidates. Those who wanted the status quo may have had lower interest in the elections and supported the ruling candidate. Relationship between electoral interest and choice of candidates is analogous to energy in physics. When an object is to be moved, it needs much more energy than when it stays in one place. Similarly, voters who were more electorally interested—with more energy—preferred opposition candidates. This analogy is acceptable since the more well-known and popular opposition candidates garnered more support from those with more interest in the election than less famous opposition candidates. Additionally, interest in the elections may help solve the puzzle of the first transfer of political power. The 1997 election marked the first change of government in four decades in Korean politics. The change of government may be due in part to the low participation rate among those with a lower interest in the 1997 election. Figure 6 on *p.* 214 shows the difference between voting rates and interest in the elections in 1992 and 1997. The voting rates of those who were extremely or moderately interested in the elections were nearly identical in 1992 and 1997. Yet, the voting rate of those who were weakly interested in elections was 8.4 percent less in 1997 (81.5 percent - 73.1 percent). Moreover the voting rate of those who were not interested at all in the elections was 27.5 percent less in 1997 (59.1 percent - 31.6 percent). As Lazarsfeld et al. argued, many non-voters might have deliberately stayed away from voting because they were less interested in the election. In fact, the official turnout rate of 1997 is 80.6 percent, 1.3 percent lower from the 1992 rate of 81.9 percent. The 1.3 percent reduction in the turnout rate might have been ascribed to those who were less interested in the election. As shown in Table 1, the small difference (1.6 percent) of supports between the

winner, Kim Dae-Jung (40.3 percent), and Lee (38.7 percent) might have also been caused by the reduced number of the voters who were less interested in the 1997 election. Reduced participation in the election by those who were less interested in the 1997 should be a clue to the win of Kim Dae-Jung in the election because, as shown in Table 2b, these voters were more likely to vote for the ruling candidate, Lee. This finding will be examined in next chapter. Then why did the number of lesser-interested voters increase in the 1997 election compared to the 1992 election? There seem to be several explanations. Voters were less interested in the 1997 election because some were cross-pressured by the Korean political and economic situations. First, the governing party that used to have a single candidate produced two *ruling* candidates. Although Rhee was an opposition candidate, there was a rumor that President Kim also helped Rhee with electoral funds, party and government organization, and electoral information. In fact, both Lee and Rhee attempted to obtain support from Kim Young-Sam's political base, the Southeast. There were many Southeasterners who had a hard time choosing between them. Second, Korea had previously enjoyed an excellent economy was now experiencing an economic crisis. Those who were more affected by the severe economic hardship may have lost interest in the 1997 election. Finally, the opposition leader, Kim Dae-Jung, who used to be admired for his unyielding movement against military regimes, aligned himself with a conservative and authoritative politician, Kim Jong-Pil. Party coalitions occurred both before the 1992 and 1997 elections, but the timing of their occurrence was very different. The 1992 three-party merger was completed almost three years before the 1992 election, but the 1997 single-candidacy took place only about 50 days before the 1997 election. Most voters in the 1992 election were accustomed to the

coalition, but many of the 1997 voters were still shocked by the new coalitions. All these new unconventional political and economic developments produced cross-pressures for some voters, which may have led them not to vote. As they stayed away from the polls, the ruling party, an offspring of four decades of military regime, surrendered its political power for the first time in modern Korean history. More on the impacts of electoral interest on turnout will be examined next chapter.

Among the voters who voted for Kim Young-Sam in the 1992 presidential election, more voted for Lee than Kim Dae-Jung. This support is most likely explained by the fact that Lee had been the chairman of the governing party under Kim Young-Sam. It also illustrates the connection in Korean politics of voters to their candidates and their proteges. However, the reason the variable indicating votes for Kim Young-Sam in the prior election is statistically less significant and smaller in effect is that voters who had been supporters of Kim Young-Sam split their votes between Lee, the governing candidate, and Rhee, a former member of the governing party and a pro-government governor. Both Lee and Rhee sometimes praised Kim Young-Sam for his military reforms, business reforms and other successful policies, but sometimes attacked Kim Young-Sam for his mistakes or policy failures—economic breakdown, corruption of government officials and his close aides—depending on the reporters' questions or the occasion of Lee's and Rhee's speeches. Lee, aiming not to be tarnished by Kim Young-Sam's failure in economy, changed the ruling party's name from the New Korea Party to the Grand National Party (GNP) just before the 1997 election. Unlike in 1992, the governing party leader, Kim Young-Sam, did not clearly align himself with one candidate. This was partly because his close intervention in the election might have

caused criticism from the opposition for possible unfairness in the election and partly because he could rely on either Lee or Rhee to protect his post-presidency life, whoever won. Consequently, Lee gathered support, although weakly, from previous Kim Young-Sam voters.

Those who supported Kim Dae-Jung in the prior election remained supportive in 1997, and his supporters were so cohesive and loyal. In fact, Kim Dae-Jung was the only candidate who ran in four presidential elections (1971, 1987, 1992, and 1997 elections) and was also found to be a benefit. Kim Dae-Jung's strong achievement of coherent support confirms the candidate attachment hypothesis in Korean electoral behavior. Moreover, almost all the Koreans who live in Kim Dae-Jung's political region, the Southwest, supported his candidacy over Lee in 1997.

Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung have been the most popular political leaders in Korean politics. They still control Korean politics today. Kim Dae-Jung is the current President, and Kim Young-Sam is a former President. What were the influences of their former supporters on later elections? Monte Carlo simulation is used to determine their influences. As Tables 2a and 2b show that Kim Dae-Jung voters' impact was more cohesive and stronger than those of Kim Young-Sam. The Monte Carlo simulation shows somewhat different impacts of both of their older followers. The figures were created by simulating 1,000 sets of parameters from the 1992 and 1997 multinomial logit models.⁸

⁸ By employing a program, Clarify, that was recently developed by several Harvard scholars (King, Tomz, Wittenberg 1998; Tomz, Wittenberg and King 1999), these four figures use stochastic simulation techniques. According to these authors, many researchers present only the coefficients and *t*-values of independent variables in the models. Accordingly, they recommend that researchers report further interesting estimates on top of simple parameter estimates and standard errors. Simulation is one way of

Ternary diagrams of Figures 7a on *p.* 215 and 7b on *p.* 216 show possible impacts of previous Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung supporters in the 1992 election, while all other variables are set at their mean.⁹ The simulated observation dots inside the triangular diagrams demonstrate the stronger impact of former Kim Young-Sam followers on Kim Young-Sam in 1992 and the weaker strong impact of former Kim Dae-Jung supporters on Kim Dae-Jung in 1992. Compared to Figure 7a, Figure 7b exhibits that dots are elongated along the line of Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung, and they are less condensed than those of former Kim Young-Sam supporters. Coefficients of multinomial logit models in Table 2a indicate stronger influences of former Kim Dae-Jung supporters than those of former Kim Young-Sam supporters in the 1992 election. Yet, simulation results reveal that Kim Young-Sam would have had more cohesive supports from his older followers than Kim Dae-Jung in 1992.

In comparison to Figures 7a and 7b, Figures 8a on *p.* 217 and 8b on *p.* 218 look very distinctive. According to Figure 8a, dots are positioned almost in the middle of the triangular diagram. This means those who voted for Kim Young-Sam in the 1992 election would have been almost equally divided among Lee, Kim Dae-Jung and Rhee. The older Kim Young-Sam loyalists were led astray in 1997. Yet those who voted for

satisfying researchers' curiosity, for example, about how much the probability of candidate choice changes with a given independent variables. King, Tomz and Wittenberg argue that running a 1,000 algorithm indicates 1,000 times of re-running the election. After estimating the model and then choosing one value for previous Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung supporters, "Clarify" simulates the outcome of the dependent variable 1,000 times. The simulation reduces fundamental uncertainty stemming from estimates obtained by using one dataset. Simulated estimates can be presented in the regular tables, but ternary diagrams can present the finding more vividly.

⁹ Ternary diagrams are called in many different names: triangular diagrams or triplots. After they were introduced in geology, they have been used to present voting patterns and are called electoral triangles (Dorling, Johnston and Pattie 1996; Upton 1991, 1994). Governing candidates have been placed on the top, progressive candidate on the left and the other candidate on the right of the triangle. In the ternary diagrams, the point related to each candidate indicates the point where the candidate obtains all votes. As

Kim Dae-Jung in 1992 are united near the triangular point of Kim Dae-Jung, according to Figure 8b. Their response is similar to what Kim Young-Sam received from his supporters in the 1992 election. In summation, simulation results negate the traditional assumption that Kim Dae-Jung's support is always cohesive. His support was only cohesive in 1997 when Kim Young-Sam older supporters were split. Unlike conventional arguments, Kim Young-Sam had a greater cohesive support from his older supporters in 1992 than Kim Dae-Jung. Both Kim Young-Sam's and Kim Dae-Jung's loyalists were crucial for their wins in the 1992 and 1997 elections respectively.

Turning back to Table 2b, the Southeast and the Southwest provide significant constraints on the choice of Lee and Kim Dae-Jung. Lee received high supports from the Southeast while Kim Dae-Jung received higher support from the Southwest.

The histograms shown in Figure 9 on *p.* 219 indicate the electoral support for the 1997 presidential candidates by region. It shows that the electorate in the Southeast supported Lee over Kim Dae-Jung. This is significant for it indicates a weakening of regionalism in Korean presidential elections. Lee was supported in a region where he was not born and had never lived. Almost all the Southeasterners continued not to support Kim Dae-Jung although there was a marginal increase of favor for him compared to the 1992 election. Figure 9 shows that Kim Dae-Jung obtained the majority of votes from the Southwest. Yet Lee had lower support from the Southeast. Compared to the 1992 election, the Southeast in 1997 split its votes among the three candidates, although Lee obtained the most. His share was much smaller than Kim Dae-Jung's share in the Southwest. The total votes of the three candidates among all the regions indicate that

the more dots are condensed to a corner, the candidate related to the corner obtains more votes. If the dots

Kim Dae-Jung had slightly more votes than Lee and Rhee. In a close election this small marginal difference can often determine an election outcome.

While most explanatory factors are very significant on the choice between Lee and Kim Dae-Jung, some variables in the second column, however, are not statistically significant. The prior vote for Chung is one of these. Chung's support may be attributed to the fact that Chung's supporters were not strongly committed to either Lee or Kim Dae-Jung. The age variable was also not significant, which is an unexpected finding considering the ideological positions of the two candidates, where Kim Dae-Jung represented the progressive camp and Lee the conservative camp. One would expect that, on this dimension, age would have been more important than the data indicate. It was expected that the older voters would tend to be more conservative and the younger more progressive. The voters, however, did not clearly choose between Lee and Kim Dae-Jung along this dimension, despite their clear ideological differences. This indecision is probably because Kim Dae-Jung made many efforts to change his radical image to a soft and moderate position during the campaign. For example, he offered many conservative politicians or professionals admittance into his party. Kim Dae-Jung ushered in Lee Jong-Chan and Eum Sam-Tag, who had been senior officers of the KCIA for many years. Kim Dae-Jung sought the support of former high-ranking police officers, Lee In-Seop, Yoo Byung-Gug, and Kim Mal-Tae (S. Kim 1997). He also accepted the support of former three-star general, Cheon Yong-Tae, former chairman of Korean Political Science Association, Kihl Seong-Heum, and many other generals and scholars who in turn helped Kim Dae-Jung to appeal conservative or moderate voters. The

are positioned in the middle of the triangle graph, the three candidates would divide votes almost equally.

biggest ideology factor for Kim Dae-Jung was Kim Jong-Pil. Kim Jong-Pil and his partisans in the ULD were mostly pro-government politicians during the military regime. In terms of conservative ideology, no one could match them. The 1997 election was the first of Kim Dae-Jung's four presidential bids, in which Kim Dae-Jung was not criticized for being radical communist or leftist anymore. Accordingly, Kim Dae-Jung obtained votes not only from younger voters but from older voters as well.

The third column (Rhee v. Kim Dae-Jung) of Table 2b compares two opposition candidates, Rhee with Kim Dae-Jung. It reveals that Rhee received positive responses from voters in terms of only a few variables: prior vote for Kim Young-Sam and Chung, and the Southeast region. As noted earlier, people who voted for Kim Young-Sam in the 1992 election separated their votes between Lee and Rhee in the 1997 election. Rhee received moderate support from the old Kim Young-Sam supporters, as did Lee as shown in the second column (Lee v. Kim Dae-Jung). This moderate support should be one of the most important factors of change in decades. The ruling party, for the first time, produced two candidates. Nonetheless, divided support of the Southeast for Lee and Rhee does not indicate that Rhee was only cutting into Lee's share of votes, by looking at the prior vote for Chung in the 1992 election. In fact, Chung in 1992 and Rhee in 1997 had several things in common. First, their original ideologies were conservative, but by transforming to opposition candidates they were campaigning against the conservative ruling candidate. Second, they were forced to modify their policies. Finally, they had common political experiences. In 1997, Rhee benefited from Chung's former supporters.

The data indicate that Rhee was also more successful in Kim Young-Sam's region

of the Southeast than in that of Kim Dae-Jung. As seen in the second column (Lee v. Kim Dae-Jung) and simulation diagrams, Lee obtained considerable support from Kim Young-Sam's home-area, the Southeast area, and Rhee also achieved significant support from this area. This, in fact, is another indicator of the ruling camp dividing their support and contributing to Kim Dae-Jung's victory in 1997.

There are also many negative impacts for Rhee. First, those who were favorable to the idea of a united candidacy between a conservative ULD and a progressive NCNP tended to vote for Kim Dae-Jung, who initiated the idea, instead of Rhee. This resulted in Rhee, who was not involved in the united camp, receiving more support from anti-united-candidacy voters. Second, as voters' interest in the 1997 election strengthened, they tended to support Kim Dae-Jung, while those less interested tended to choose Rhee. Third, as in the 1992 data indicates, those with a higher interest in the election tended to choose the more famous opposition candidate in the 1992 election, and Kim Dae-Jung was well known for his opposition. Fourth, those who had voted for Kim Dae-Jung in the prior election remained loyal to him in 1997. Kim Dae-Jung's voters once again showed their strength by supporting him unconditionally. Fifth, residents of the Southwest did not vote for Rhee. They were much more supportive of Kim Dae-Jung, again showing the strong effects of regionalism. Finally, as voters aged, they supported Kim Dae-Jung more than Rhee even though Kim Dae-Jung was not as conservative during the election. This phenomenon is almost same as the finding that some older voters hesitated between Kim Dae-Jung and Lee, as shown in the second column. Kim Dae-Jung, during the military government, had even been regarded a communist, although he was not (Kristof 1997). Nonetheless, older voters showed greater support for Kim Dae-Jung over Rhee.

How can this be explained? As shown before, Kim Dae-Jung realized his past three failures to become president were due to his overly liberal image. He made every effort to address this image. When the radical Korean students took to the streets and asked for justice, human rights, and resignation of President Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung, who once had a close relationship with students, called for them to disband voluntarily (WuDunn 1997). He also accepted several former generals in his party to reduce hostility toward himself in the military. In terms of age, Kim Dae-Jung was most benefited in 1997.

The final column (Rhee *v.* Lee) of Table 2b is of particular interest because it compares two candidates who had been members of the same governing party and they attempted to attract supporters from their political mentor's (Kim Young-Sam) electoral base. However, not many variables are statistically significant, probably due to Rhee and Lee's similarities. As voters' political orientation moved from a pro-governing party to a pro-opposition party, they tended to support Rhee over Lee. Although Rhee had been a member of the governing party until three months before the election, and attempted to become an official candidate of the governing party, he benefited significantly from opposition-orientated voters. Rhee's former experience as an opposition lawmaker before the 1992 election and attack on the ruling candidate, Lee, might have placed him as the more opposition-oriented candidate. He also benefited from those who had voted for Kim Dae-Jung in the 1992 election. Those who voted for Kim Dae-Jung in the previous election generally continued to vote for Kim Dae-Jung in later elections. Yet, in combinations of candidates without Kim Dae-Jung, responses of previous Kim Dae-Jung voters draw special attention. In 1992, in the combination of Chung *v.* Kim Young-Sam,

the electorate who had voted for Kim Dae-Jung in the 1987 election was indecisive. These two candidates were not considered by the previous Kim Dae-Jung supporters. Yet in 1997, in the combination of Rhee *v.* Lee, the former Kim Dae-Jung electorate became decisive. Voters who had supported Kim Dae-Jung in 1992 voted in 1997 in significant numbers for Rhee over Lee. A major reason may have been the issue of Kim Dae-Jung's age. Many thought at 75 years old he was too old to be a presidential candidate. Although Kim Dae-Jung's supporters were more cohesive and loyal than those of other candidates, Kim Dae-Jung seemed to lose some of his old supporters in 1997. Thus, some ex-Kim Dae-Jung voters defected to the much younger Rhee who was 49 years old. Finally, as anticipated, the older voters were more likely to support the more conservative Lee than Rhee. Other variables did not produce significant differences in this column. Figures 10a on *p.* 220 and 10b on *p.* 221 visually show the findings of Table 2b. These figures describe a spatial representation of the key variables in the 1997 presidential election. Figure 10a shows all the dummy variables of the model and among the most significant in Figure 10a are Southwest region and previous Kim Dae-Jung voters. There is a greater distance between 2 (Kim Dae-Jung) and 1 (Lee) at row space of the Southwest. Those who voted for Kim Dae-Jung in the 1992 election also showed larger difference among the three candidates. Figure 10b shows that party orientation severely separated Lee and Kim Dae-Jung, suggesting major significance of ruling/opposition party orientation in the model. In contrast, Lee and Kim Dae-Jung are adjacent on the age row, again, suggesting that older voters could not easily decide between Kim Dae-Jung and Lee. The voters' indecision was beneficial to Kim Dae-Jung but detrimental to Lee, considering the normal voting behavior of older voters.

Although the individual estimates of the combination of the candidates of the dependent variable, candidate choice, have been examined it is not always easy to determine statistical significance across candidates. For instance, according to Table 2a, a prior vote for Roh shows a moderate significance between Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young-Sam (DJ v. YS), no significance between Chung and Kim Young-Sam (Chung v. YS) and weak significance between Chung and Kim Dae-Jung (Chung v. DJ). Thus prior vote for Roh is candidate specific. The similar indecisiveness of statistical significance holds for the 1997 election. To clarify the significance of these relationships, Wald and LR tests are used (Long 1997). These tests formally determine the effect of these variables on the dependent variable.

According to the Wald and LR tests, as demonstrated in Table 3 on *p.* 192, most of the independent variables are highly significant at the .01 level. Prior votes for Roh in the 1992 election are significant at .05 level. Furthermore, both Wald and LR tests show the same results of statistical significance for both the 1992 and 1997 elections, although the coefficients are slightly different. In short, Table 3 implies the model's parsimoniousness.

Yet, another way of interpreting a MNL model is employing discrete change in the predicted probabilities. Long (1997) has shown that partial change or marginal effects that indicate the slope of the curve relating to x_k to $\Pr(y=m|x)$, holding all other variables constant, are misleading. This misunderstanding happens especially when the probability curve is changing rapidly or when an independent variable is a binary one. Thus, discrete change of the variable is employed.

Table 4 on *p.* 193 shows the discrete change of independent variables in the 1997 and 1992 elections. Discrete change is the change in the predicted probability for a change in x_k from the start value x_S to the end value x_E (Long 136). The change of the binary variables is achieved by letting the variables vary from zero to one. The change of the other variables is the effect of the standard deviation change by computing mean of x_k to mean of $x_k + s_K$.

For instance, for a standard deviation increase in the united candidacy from disagreement with the united candidacy to agreement, the probability of voting for Kim Dae-Jung in the 1997 election increased by 0.16, holding all other variables constant at their means. In a similar manner, the probability of selecting Kim Young-Sam in the 1992 election in terms of merger increased by 0.14. Thus, Kim Dae-Jung received a positive response from voters who supported united-candidacy in 1997, and Kim Young-Sam received positive support from voters who supported the merger in 1992.

Moreover, among voters who had voted for Kim Young-Sam in the 1992 election, their probability of voting for Lee in 1997 was 0.06 greater than voters who had not voted for Kim Young-Sam, *ceteris paribus*. The probability of choosing Rhee, however, was slightly stronger, 0.10 greater than that of voters who had not. Rhee, in the 1997 election, achieved a marginally more favorable response than Lee did from voters who had selected Kim Young-Sam in 1992.

Another noticeable phenomenon may be the regional effect. The probability of Southwest voters choosing Kim Dae-Jung in the 1997 election was 0.49 greater than that of voters from other regions, other things being equal. The Southwest support of Kim Dae-Jung is the greatest probabilities any candidate received in the study. In contrast,

candidates Lee and Rhee in 1997 achieved probability of only 0.18 and 0.10, respectively, from the Southeast more than voters from the other areas. Thus, division of the Southeast voters offered an advantage to Kim Dae-Jung, whose region was firmly united. In short, employing discrete change of the independent variables in the model also upholds findings obtained in the Tables 2a and 2b.

Economic Model of Korean Candidate Choice

Political, social, military or foreign issues have been major indicators in explaining electoral behavior and attitudes in the Western voting literature (Key 1966; Page and Brody 1972; Clarke and Stewart 1996; Carmines and Stimson 1989). The economy is also important. Past research in political economy indicates that the popularity of a government depends on the success of its economic policy (Tufte 1978).

Although many authors predict that economic variables constrain voting behavior, literature is divided on whether to use objective economic variables or subjective economic variables. Clarke et al. (1992, 51-74) debated the issue in detail in their book, *Controversies in Political Economy*. They listed three reasons for the shortcomings of employing subjective economic variables. First, citizens' evaluation of economic situations can often be distorted. Governments can publicize only good economic news even if the economy is in downturn. In addition, governments often blame a poor economy on outsiders such as "bankers, bureaucrats, corporations, the EEC, foreign countries, the IMF, OPEC, [and] unions" (55). Second, economic information the public receives is sometimes limited. Although reports on unemployment and inflation are frequently shown in the mass media, other aspects of the economy appear only in more obscure and less read sources. Examples here are structural issues or monetary policies

that are not easily accessible to the public. Third, the public's understanding of the economy is usually not sufficient. Economic phenomena are complex and often are the results of political and social activities. People tend to understand economy mostly by receiving episodic or dramatic economic reports—walkouts, severe GNP drop or change of export.

Accordingly objective economic variables that governments or economic institutions issue regularly instead of subjective economic variables may be preferred in studying voting behavior. Nonetheless, if the public does have the capacity to properly understand economic conditions, one should not negate the usefulness of employing subjective economic variables. Clarke et al. agree with individual citizens' misperception of economic reports, yet they admit that the public's economic understanding, as a whole, is accurate and unbiased. There are a multiple of economic reports everyday but collective understanding by the public is continuous and consistent. Most importantly, it is the public that votes and chooses the government regardless of the accuracy of their knowledge of economy. To test economic effects on the candidate choice in the Korean presidential elections, this study employs subjective economic variables in the 1992 and 1997 Korean presidential elections.

One of the best-known economic models is the reward-punishment argument (Carmichael 1990; Clarke, Rapkin and Stewart 1994; Clarke and Stewart 1996; Fiorina 1981; Happy 1989; Key 1966; Lanoue 1994; Lewis-Beck 1986; Page 1978). The model focuses on the performance of the incumbent party. If the party is viewed favorably by the voter, it will be retained. On the other hand, if the government's performance is not

perceived satisfactory, the voter will turn the incumbent out of office (Kramer 1971).¹⁰ This argument is simple: what voter would like a government that caused economic hardship for the nation or the public? For instance, Lanoue (1994) showed that retrospective economic judgment was indeed significant in the 1984 and 1988 American presidential elections. Happy (1989) also reported that evaluation of past economic performance of Canadian governments during the period of 1930 through 1979 constrained Canadian voters. The reward-punishment hypothesis is also found in Third World Countries. Pacek (1994), while studying the impacts of poor economic conditions in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland in the presidential and legislative elections in the early 1990s, found that voters in the economically hardest-hit areas severely punished incumbent reformist governments and preferred opposition candidates or parties. For example, poor unemployment rate negatively affected the incumbent candidate, Mazowiecki, in the 1990 Polish presidential election.

When evaluating past economic performance, voters are often divided into two different categories: personal versus collective (Lewis-Beck 1986). Personal voters evaluate economic conditions by their own personal experiences: their own employment status or family economy. Happy (1989), for example, used real personal income in his study of economic performance of Canadian governments.¹¹ Lanoue (1994) found that a

¹⁰ The other side of evaluation is prospective evaluation. That is, the decision to vote for a specific party or candidate is to choose about its future performance. For more on prospective evaluation, see MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson (1992) and Clarke, Rapkin and Stewart (1994).

¹¹ Happy used real personal income as a variable indicating evaluation of past personal economic condition. Although income usually is used as a measure of socioeconomic status (SES), income has been also used as an indicator of personal economic condition to show people's poverty in the literature (Rosenstone 1982; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). In this study, level of living standards is used to show respondents' evaluation of personal economic condition.

general evaluation of personal economy was a significant factor on choosing presidents both in 1984 and 1988 American elections.

Despite the importance of these personal economic variables on estimating incumbent candidates, Lewis-Beck (1986) maintained these pocketbook evaluations had a marginal effect on individual vote choice in his comparative study of four European countries. He explained that voters consider that they are responsible for their personal economic conditions. However, one of the reasons Lewis-Beck found poor performance of personal economic variables in his study must be that he used legislative elections. It is presidents that have more impact on the economic conditions of countries, and this distinction must be made. In addition, all the countries Lewis-Beck studied are advanced industrial economies such as Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. These countries have superior social security systems and even if citizens' economic conditions are poor, they need not worry about their lives. In fact, evidence of personal behavior is not absolutely absent. Nannestad and Paldam (1997) argued that Danes are considered pocket-oriented voters. Individual analysis of economic voting in Denmark between 1986 and 1992 shows that the perceived Danish personal economic situations over the last three months before elections was a key variable influencing support for parties. Korea is a developing nation and its citizens do not enjoy good social welfare benefit. Consequently, Koreans during economically poor times should penalize their leaders for their hardship.

This does not mean, however, that personal evaluation is the only factor in the choice of presidential candidates. When collective voters evaluate the economy, they resort to national economic situations: national unemployment or inflation rates, or general economic conditions. Personal economy cannot be favorable if the national

economic conditions are adverse. The collective or sociotropic hypothesis assumes that the engine of economic voting is the role played by government for the destiny of the macroeconomy (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Markus 1990). The government is supposed to reduce severe depressions and secure full employment and stable prices (Lewis-Beck 1991). Clarke et al. (1992, 123-40) found that opinions on the national economic conditions significantly affected voters' choices for Bush rather than Dukakis. The sociotropic retrospective evaluation was also evidenced in the Canadian federation election. The Mulroney-led Conservatives won a landslide victory over the Liberal government in the 1984 election mainly because the Canadians were very unhappy with personal and national economic conditions as well (Clarke and Kornberg 1992). The national retrospective theory of voting was also confirmed in many countries that conduct free and competitive elections. Wilkin, Haller and Norpoth (1997) showed that evaluations of GDP and inflation played major roles in partisan support in countries regardless of their political situations—fragmented party system, coalition governments, divided control or lack of party cohesion.¹²

While analyzing the impact of economic evaluation on the incumbent candidates or parties, mediated variables are sometimes used (Clarke et al. 1992, 123-40; Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck 1986). The Korean election data include a simple question on the 1992 election and a "mediated" one in the 1997 election. A simple question of past economic evaluation is "Compared to one to two years ago, would you say that the national economy has been better, almost the same, or worse?" However, a mediated

¹² Although this study employs Korean individual-level survey data, it cites several studies that have used aggregate data. It is assumed that major findings of economic influences on electoral behavior can be applied to analysis that uses individual-level data.

question combines two national and personal items together: “Compared to one to two years ago, would you say that your family’s economy has been strong or weak due to the national economic policies?” For simple items, respondents consider only one object, but for mediated items, they need to consider two objects at the same time (Lewis-Beck 1986).

Now it is necessary to review the Korean economy during election time before formulating economic hypotheses. Since the 1987 Democratic Movement, Korean society has engaged in a massive debate on the role of democracy. Workers demanded better wages and better working conditions. A fierce conflict between workers and management that resulted in concession to the workers was common. Workers were then paid much more after the pre-Democratic Movement. Between 1987 and 1992, unit labor costs increased 13 percent annually compared to only 2.4 percent in Japan and 11.7 percent in Taiwan (J. Mo 1999). Korean aggregate wage levels were actually one of the highest in Asia. The wage increases were considered justified and overdue by many, but rapid increases of wages caused negative effects on economy. “Rising wages not only added to inflationary pressure but also made Korean exports less competitive abroad” (J. Mo 1999, 112). J. Mo further indicates that the failure of Korean economy was also due to failed government policies. Government policy was not consistent with democratic pressures, moving from nonintervention process to tough crackdown on the protests. The election year of 1992 marked the worst economic year since 1981. The growth rate was only 4.7 percent, far below the expectation of 7 percent (J. Oh 1999). Many small- and medium-sized companies became bankrupt and the number of unemployed skyrocketed.

Finally, the government's economic policy resulted in its inability to meet international debt payments, forcing it to ask the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help on November 21, 1997, about one month before the presidential election. J. Mo and C. Moon (1999) maintained that “the greatest damage to the Korean economy came from ten years of policy gridlock under an immature Korean democracy” (173-74). Although the government attempted to reform labor markets, big-business (*chabol*), banking and financial system, policy confusion multiplied without firm resolutions. Around the fall of 1996, current account deficit grew to \$17 billion and the foreign debt amounted to \$140 billion (J. Oh 1999). Many managers and workers were laid off and *Hanbo*, an impregnable conglomerate in early January, and later Kia, the seventh-largest conglomerate, in Korea went bankrupt (Clifford 1998). Reduced government spending and private investment also reduced the number of employed, straining levels of standard of living. The two presidential elections were held under these adverse economies. With this in mind, this study may derive following hypotheses.

H1: Those who have higher level of living standards should vote for the ruling candidates (1992 and 1997 elections).

H2: Those who evaluate national economy more positively should vote for the ruling candidates (1992 election).

H3: Those who evaluate that national economy has affected family economy more positively should vote for the ruling candidates (1997 election).

Findings and Discussion

Multinomial logit model of candidate choice by using two past economic evaluations reflects somewhat conflicting findings, compared to the hypotheses. The

impacts of other independent variables are similar to those of models that do not include economic variables, and their analysis is not shown here. Table 5a on p. 194 shows candidate choice model that includes economic variables both in the 1992 and 1997 elections. In the second column of the 1992 model that compares choice of Kim Dae-Jung over Kim Young-Sam, those who evaluated national economy better in the past 1-2 years voted for the strong opposition candidate, Kim Dae-Jung. Reward-punishment theory indicates that if the incumbent government did a satisfactory performance, it is supposed to be rewarded in the election. Yet, the Korean voters in the early 1990s demonstrated an opposite direction. Those who were satisfied with past national economic performance of the incumbent government rewarded an opposition candidate, not the ruling party candidate. Conversely, those who were not satisfied voted for the ruling party candidate, Kim Young-Sam. It is hard to explain this phenomenon. However, the levels of standard of living support the traditional reward-punishment theory. Those who had higher levels of standard of living selected the ruling party candidate much more than those who had lower levels. The candidate was rewarded by the past economic performance of his government. The third column that compares the choice of another opposition candidate, Chung Joo-Young over Kim Young-Sam shows an evaluation of national economy and the levels of standard of living, which probably were not important. Voters were indeterminate on whom to choose between the two candidates. One probable but untested explanation for this asymmetry would be that Chung is the owner of the largest conglomerate of *Hyundai* and has long been involved in the business. In evaluating past economic performance, citizens might have judged him partly responsible for the nation's economy. In fact, as the nation's economy became

larger, there were more debates on whether conglomerates were beneficial for the economy. The *chabols* are ruled by a handful of family members, not by modern CEOs, and these businesses include many diverse and unrelated areas, reducing managerial effectiveness.

Since coefficients of the variable, “national economy,” is significant at .05 level between Kim Dae-Jung *v.* Kim Young-Sam but it is not significant at any conventional statistical level between Chung Joo-Young *v.* Kim Young-Sam, one might apply Wald test to resolve the ambiguity.

The Wald test in Table 5b on *p.* 195 indicates that the national economy and living standards have, in general, significant influences although weak. Figure 11a of the odds ratio plot on *p.* 222 also confirms the findings of Wald test.¹³ The reference group, Kim Young-Sam (1) is positioned at 1 in terms of factor change scale. Compared to Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung is positioned at right hand at the row of “national economy.” This means, as shown in the Tables 5a and 5b, those who were more positively evaluated national economy preferred the opposition candidate over the ruling candidate. Kim Young-Sam and Chung (3) are adjacent, indicating their indifference of choice. Yet, in the living standard row, Kim Dae-Jung is positioned to the left of Kim Young-Sam, indicating those with poor living standards chose Kim Dae-Jung over Kim Young-Sam.

¹³ The units of original coefficients are shown at the bottom of the figure. Since category 1 (Kim Young-Sam) is the reference category, it is positioned at 0, suggesting "national economy" does not change the logit of category 1 compared to category 1. Factor change that is the exponential of the value of the original coefficients is shown at the top of the figure. Category 2 is located at almost $1.29 = \exp(.26)$. Thus, a unit change in "national economy" increases the odds by a factor of 1.29. Interpretation of the figure is same with either use of logit coefficients or factor change. Logit coefficients and the odds ratio are greater with the greater distance. For more on odds ratio, see Long (1997).

The effects of economic variables on the candidate choice in the 1997 are very different from those of 1992 model. In the last column of Table 5a, the choice between an opposition candidate Rhee and the ruling party candidate Lee supports the reward-punishment theory. Although the variable is statistically weak and has a small impact, those who evaluated their past family economy affected by the national economic policy as better voted for Lee over Rhee. Standard of living level is 99% significant, reflecting more important influence on the choice of Lee over Rhee. The findings in the last column support the conventional reward-punishment hypothesis. Yet, the voters in the 1997 election did not distinguish Lee from Kim Dae-Jung in term of the two economic variables, as shown in the fourth column. The Wald test reveals significant effects in general and Figure 11b on *p*. 223 shows that Rhee was favored by the voters who were not happy with the poor family economic condition in their standard living. One very interesting finding is that although those who enjoyed a higher family economy and standard of living voted for Lee also voted for Kim, although their choices for Lee and Kim are not statistically significant.

The Korean economy was finally resuscitated by the IMF one month before the election and the very visible opposition leader Kim was regarded by many as the rescuer of the almost bankrupt Korea. He published economic books and demonstrated knowledge concerning the economy. This may well have had in voters' choices. To investigate this, one needs batteries of prospective evaluation. Voters' choice of candidates should be related to their evaluation of future national or personal economic condition.

Taken together, the reward-and-punishment theory is partly confirmed. K. Park (1993) made an important analysis of economic effect on Korean electoral behavior, although not empirically. Due to the constitutional restraint of presidential single-term, no incumbent president can run again in the 1990s. Accordingly influences of retrospective evaluation are not as strong and consistent as those found in other countries. In addition, it is hard to find specific issue difference among candidates. Conservative ruling candidates during the campaign announced they were reform-oriented without damaging stability while progressive opposition candidates announced they would pursue reforms that did not cause severe damage to the middle class. Furthermore, the ruling party candidates argue that they are not responsible for any policy failures the governments have made. Kim Young-Sam in 1992 and Lee Hoi-Chang in 1997 asked the incumbent presidents to leave their parties before the elections.¹⁴ The retrospective economic evaluations then indicate only weak, inconsistent influences on the choice of candidates. This does not, however, negate the usefulness of economic variables in studies of Korean electoral behavior. As C. Park argues, economic issues have been important ones in the 1990s since political and social issues such as political reform, democracy, or political stability has been somewhat accomplished in the late 1980s. A precise investigation of economic effects on the Korean voting behavior in the future needs a full range of economic indicators--retrospective and prospective evaluations of the national and personal economic condition--and indicators of issue-priority and objective ones as well.

¹⁴ President Roh had to leave his party and became non-partisan before the 1992 election and supporters of Lee burned President Kim in effigy to dramatically show that it is the President who was responsible for

Conclusion

Despite the long established importance of political party identification in studies of Western voting behavior, this measure is not important in understanding Korean elections. The primary reason this variable does not transfer to the Korean electoral process is that voters see new political parties appearing each election cycle. At this point in the history of open elections, Korea has not developed and sustained a party system, a situation similar to the early years of Western party systems. Koreans have, however, developed delineation between the governing parties and opposition parties. These findings strongly confirm this assertion, one made by Korean scholars. The electorate is factionalized along the support for the governing party and support for opposition parties. Kim Dae-Jung and Chung in 1992 and Kim Dae-Jung and Rhee in 1997, as opposition candidates, reaped strong support from those in the electorate who opposed the governing parties. Conversely, those in the governing party—Kim Young-Sam in 1992 and Lee in 1997—received strong support from those favoring the governing party. Moreover, when faced with two candidates from the opposition, the electorate was more likely to choose the candidate with a longer history of opposition. Kim Dae-Jung provided evidence of this in his candidacy against Chung in 1992 and Rhee in 1997. This study maintains that the reason the governing/opposition party orientation is stable is because the ruling party in Korea remained conservative in its orientation although it has undergone many structural and name changes during the past several decades.

the 1997 economic crisis, not the ruling candidate, Lee. The two ruling party candidates also changed

Second, interest in the election is important in accessing Korean presidential elections. The more interested individuals are, the greater the likelihood that they will support opposition party candidates. Governing party candidates received more support from those with weaker interest in the election and vice versa. Although this pattern held for both the 1992 and 1997 elections, impact of electoral interest was stronger in 1997. In addition, unconventional political and new economic developments, such as economic failure, division within ruling camp, unusual coalition and so on, might have caused cross-pressures for some voters who were less interested in the election. These voters did not vote in the 1997 election. As they stayed away from the polls, the nation saw the first transfer of government by election in its modern history in 1997. Thus, the fact that those less interested voters tend to vote for the governing candidates and the fact that many of them still voted in the 1992 election but not in 1997 should be crucial clues to resolve the first win of an opposition candidate in the 1997 election. Electoral interest will be scrutinized more in later chapters to resolve the power transfer.

Third, to elect a regional favorite son to power, each major region—the Southeast and the Southwest—needed electoral support from other minor regions. It was the Central region that cooperated with others in 1992, and provided for a united candidacy in 1997, that helped the coalition hold power.

Fourth, while regional and merged/united candidacy factors were most significant, preferences for candidates in prior elections also meaningfully affected votes of candidates. For instance, Kim Dae-Jung, who had run for the presidency four times, firmly maintained his supporters. The single five-year term limit placed on the Korean

names of their parties.

presidency has not restricted former presidents from performing an important role in politics. Korean politicians have sought to use their past loyalties to their success. Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung garnered most of their older followers. In 1997, Lee and Rhee enjoyed their political mentors' former popularity. One addendum to the fifth conclusion is that the Monte Carlo simulation indicates that, unlike the traditional assumption that Kim Dae-Jung's support was cohesive but not Kim Young-Sam's, Kim Dae-Jung's support was cohesive only in 1997 when Kim Young-Sam's older supporters were divided. Kim Young-Sam had a greater cohesive support from his older supporters than Kim Dae-Jung in 1992. Both Kim Young-Sam's and Kim Dae-Jung's followers were important for their wins in the 1992 and 1997 elections respectively.

Fifth, age was a significant factor in Koreans' voting behavior. The older respondents tended to vote for the conservative candidates while the younger ones for the progressive candidates, except in 1997 when they voted for the most progressive candidate, Kim Dae-Jung. This is probably due to Kim Dae-Jung's efforts to change his radical image to a soft and moderate position during the campaign.

Sixth, five players have dominated past two presidential elections, the three Kims—Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Pil, along with other major players such as Roh Tae-Woo, Chung Ju-Yong in 1992, Lee-Hoi-Chang, and Rhee In-Je in 1997. They have created, merged, and divided parties according to their personal plans, and most of the supporters and partisans have followed their directives and commands for the past three decades. Their influences are reflected in Korean politics as effects of regionalism, prior voting preferences, and merged or united candidacies. Accordingly, regionalism is strengthened by voters' loyalty to candidates of a region.

Each major region, especially the Southeast and the Southwest, have their representative leaders although 1997 marked loss of a firm regional representative in the Southeast.

Finally, the retrospective economic evaluations indicated only weak and inconsistent influences on the choice of candidates. Yet, this should not negate the usefulness of economic variables in studies of Korean electoral behavior. Since economic issues have been important ones in the 1990s, a closer monitor of these variables, when studying Korean voting behavior, will be needed.

In short, this chapter shows how Korean voters chose their presidents in the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections, and particularly how the opposition candidate, Kim Dae-Jung, won in the 1997 election. The general candidate choice model is parsimonious. Almost all the indicators in the model are considerably significant in explaining Koreans' voting behavior. Koreans were found to be affected, when selecting their leaders, by several indicators: their governing/opposition-party orientation, evaluation of the merged party or the united candidacy among/between totally heterogeneous parties, their political interest in elections, their devotion toward candidates chosen in the former election, Southwest and Southeast regionalism, and voters' age.

One suggestion stemming from this examination is that once the governing/opposition party orientation is a meaningful factor in Korean electoral behavior, future studies need to develop indicators that access its categories with greater clarity. Currently all studies and surveys have a few categories—governing-party orientation and opposition-party orientation, sometimes including independents. Likert style five- or seven-point scales of political party identification used in most Western literature should be developed to apply Korean governing/opposition-party orientation.

CHAPTER 3

WHO VOTES IN KOREA?

Introduction

The most common act of political participation is voting in elections. Conventional democratic studies (Pateman 1970; Powell 1982; Conway 1991) have argued that citizens in democratic countries are interested and participate in politics. Koreans have enjoyed free and open elections for more than a decade. Since the 1987 Democratic Movement, voting has become a regular political event through which Korean citizens have exercised their voice in democracy. Unlike low turnout rates of America (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Conway 1991; Miller and Shanks 1996), those in Korea have been high. During the three presidential elections of 1987, 1992, and 1997 the average turnout was 84.9 percent.¹

Turnout rates are important in determining who gets what (Lasswell 1936). Key (1949) and Burham (1987) asserted that politicians do not pay attention to non-voters and that they are isolated from politics. As the number of non-voters increases non-voting potentially presents greater damage to democracy. Countries with large non-voting population are more susceptible to autocratic or authoritarian control. This assertion, however, does not necessarily mean that countries with lower voting rates are on the brink of democratic breakdown, because two of the most democratic and stable countries are Switzerland and the United States whose turnout rates are lowest among democratic

¹ The official turnout in the three elections was 89.2 percent (1987), 81.9 percent (1992) and 80.6 percent (1997). See Figure 1.

countries (Franklin 1996). A simple comparison of one-time voting rates may not be meaningful. For instance, a Cambridge resident in England voted about four times between 1985 and 1990, while an Irvine resident in California voted about 44 times in a single year of 1992 (Dalton 1996). In terms of the amount of electing that goes on, America may be the highest among democratic countries. Therefore while turnout rates are theoretically important to democracy the frequency of voter participation may provide a practical explanation to the viability of democracy in countries that have low voter turnout.

Studies on turnout in America have received less attention than electoral choice from scholars (Miller and Shanks 1996). Voting participation in developing countries remains sparse (Barnes 1998). Recent studies of voting participation in developing countries include: Brazilian compulsory voting (Power and Roberts 1995), comparative analysis of turnout in Central America (Seligson et al. 1995), comparison of turnout among 29 developed and developing countries (Radcliff 1992), Korean political participation (Kim 1980), and others. Fewer numbers of turnout studies than those of candidate choice studies may come from the possibility that there exist no substantive differences between voters and non-voters on many issues (Erikson 1995; Gant and Lyons 1993; Shaffer 1982; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Teixeira (1992) specifically addressed this issue in American voters and found that although nonvoters are a little more liberal, their differences were not substantial enough to affect outputs of government had they voted. For instance, in some American presidential elections, even if all qualified non-voters participated in elections it would not have altered the results. Bennett and Resnick (1990), while studying non-voters after the 1984 and 1988

American presidential elections, assert that Reagan and Bush would have still won the elections with only 2 percent fewer votes even if all the non-voters had voted.

Not all the political scientists, however, agree with the notion that there are no substantive differences between voters and nonvoters. For example, Piven and Cloward (1982, 12) assert that in the United States presidential election of 1980 in which Reagan received 52 percent of the votes over incumbent Carter, had the non-voters voted the outcome would have been different. They base this assertion on the wide margin non-voters gave Carter over Reagan (51 to 37 percent). In addition, in most elections, the winner has benefited by non-voters. Bush, for instance, was assisted by low voting turnout (50.1 percent) in 1996 (Herron 1998). Herron's study indicates that most non-voters would have voted for Dukakis. Finally, Radcliff (1994) supports general political wisdom that the Democratic Party is more likely to benefit in elections as turnout increases. He notes that when Democrats have more supporters in the electorate, their numerical advantage is offset by defection of supporters to the Republican Party. When Democrats do not enjoy large margin, in contrast, they are rescued by defectors from Republicans.

Substantive differences between voters and nonvoters on elections are also reported in other countries. In Australia where there is compulsory voting a turnout of 95 percent is common. However, when turnout drops even slightly right-wing parties have benefited at the polls, and when it slightly increases left-wing parties have benefited (McAllister 1986).

Given the inconsistencies in the results of studies on turnout it is important to examine some of the possible causes of these findings. The studies that have shown a

substantial difference between voters and nonvoters on the "possible" election outcome also raise many unanswered questions. One of the causes of the differences between voters and non-voter has been attributed to non-voters providing answers to surveys that are spontaneous. Therefore the results of these studies do not accurately represent non-voters' opinions. Lijphart (1997, 4) argues that "Nonvoters who are asked their opinions on policy and partisan preferences in surveys are typically citizens who have not given these questions much thought... ." However he does agree with Herron (1998) that if they were mobilized to vote, their votes would be more likely to be different from those in the survey. Pacek and Radcliff (1995) offer a more positive explanation of the effects of non-voters. Examining nineteen national elections from 1950 through 1990, they report that for every percentage point growth in turnout there was a one-third of a percentage increase in the number of votes for left-wing parties. The authors further insist that turnout in most industrialized countries that has been declining partly parallels the decline of the left-wing parties, beginning in the 1960s. The literature raised several questions concerning the effects of turnout and the role of voters versus non-voters and needs greater attention in future research.

This chapter examines who voted in the 1992 and 1997 Korean Presidential Elections and seeks to determine whether the winner of the 1997 election won the election because of turnout level. While there was a slightly lower participation rate in 1997 than in 1992 (1.3 percent), this difference may contribute to explaining the first peaceful change of government in 1997 since Korea's independence. The difference of the winner (40.3 percent) and the second (38.7 percent) candidate in the 1997 election is

only 1.6 percent or mere 390,000 votes. Could this small difference in turnout help explain the outcome?

In order to solve the puzzle related to turnout in Korean elections, this chapter employs a logit model to analyze 1992 and 1997 post-presidential election data. Korean voting turnout will be explained by sociological characteristics such as education, age, and region, and by psychological characteristics such as sense of personal political effectiveness, evaluation of both democracy and fairness of the Central Election Commission (CEC), orientation toward political parties, interest in the election, and the effects of political mobilization.

Additionally, since the economy affects all citizens it is reasonable to assume that it would have a significant impact on Korean voter turnout. By employing several subjective past evaluation of economic conditions as control variables, this chapter examines their impacts on Korean voter turnout.

Over-reporting of Turnout Rates

Before moving forward to examine turnout there is one area that needs to be addressed—over-reporting. Unlike such other aspects of electoral studies as voter choice or political interest, the study of turnout presents a unique problem. There are two kinds of turnouts: official voter turnout and survey voter turnout, and they differ from 10 to 15 percent difference (Abramson and Claggett 1992; Belli et al. 1999; Burden 1999; Katosh and Traugott 1981). Voter turnout literally means “the percentage of the voting-age population that actually voted” (Conway 1991, 4). Official turnout rate is calculated by dividing the total number of votes cast for, say, the presidency by the total number of

voting age. However, these official turnout rates generally are smaller than studies that use random samples.

Why are actual turnout rates and survey results different? Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (1996) present three basic reasons why turnout of the American National Election Studies is over-reported. Since ANES surveys and other national surveys are similar in design and implementation, their reasons should apply to other survey research.² First, although interviewers ask respondents reasons for not voting, some respondents who have not voted deliberately answer that they had. Second, since many lower SES voters are excluded from the sample, NES surveys do not exactly reflect American voting age population. Third, those who were interviewed before an election date are instigated to vote more than those who were not. Thus respondents of NES surveys have higher turnout rates by over-representing likely voters.

Swaddle and Heath (1989) also report similar reasons of discrepancy between official (75 percent) and survey estimates (86 percent) of turnout in Britain. They found that some respondents who did not vote claimed they did because they actually could not remember or did not want to embarrass themselves at misperforming their civic duties. Another reason of over-reporting is that those who do not give permission for being surveyed when pollsters call may have different attitude toward politics or elections from those who give permission. They may be less interested in politics and are bothered in spending their time on surveying. Thus, turnout rates of surveys based on those who

² Surveys conducted at the University of Michigan since 1940s are called National Election Studies (NES). NES, before 1978, was called the Center for Political Studies (CPS), Survey Research Center (SRC), or commonly Michigan study (Burden).

permit to be interviewed are naturally higher than those of official estimates based on people including those who declined interviewing.

Except severely rare over-reported estimates such as 28 points higher than official turnout in the 1996 NES turnout (Burden *ibid.*), many moderately over-reported survey data have been used by many scholars without considering their possible negative impacts. Abramson and Aldrich (1982b) maintained that the SRC data do precisely represent the real world tendencies despite their systemic discrepancy of turnout. Teixeira (1987) also insists that although turnout has been over-reported by the NES data, they do provide real picture of American population. Despite these arguments, other scholars have attempted to avoid using over-reported data. Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) employed survey samples that are nearly 50 times larger than normal data. Sometimes voter validation is used to reduce the difference between official and survey estimates of turnout, according to Rosenstone and Legee (1994). NES checks whether respondents really voted by making calls to or sending staff to official agencies. NES committed voter validation method in several presidential election surveys. Yet, NES gave up voter validation because of expenses.

In an effort to adjust this discrepancy, this chapter employs weighted variables to deal with the over-reporting problem.³ This will permit one to compare two sets of findings, one from the original survey data and another from survey data weighted by the

³ For more on the use of weighted variables, see DuMouchel and Duncan (1983) and Winship and Radbill (1994).

official turnout rates, whether how much they differ in explaining the variance of the dependent variable, turnout.⁴

Literature Review

While their arguments have yet to be confirmed the debate has provided three models of turnout behavior: the sociological, social-psychological, and mobilization. These models provide the basis for analyzing the Korean presidential elections.

Sociological Model

The sociological model is associated with the seminal works of Berelson and Lazarsfeld and their associates.⁵ Their studies of voting behavior have provided the foundation for scholars since the 1940s (Lazarsfeld 1948; Berelson 1954). It is from these studies that sociological variables have become important to the understanding of why people vote as they do. They were the first to develop an extensive model to understanding American voting behavior. This model is straightforward and is used today in many studies of elections and participation. There is a long list of important studies that have used these variables in an attempt to understand political behavior. Among some of the more important are: Almond and Verba (1963); Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995); Brody (1978); Conway (1991); Milbrath and Goel (1977); Leighley and Nagler (1992); Rosenstone and Hansen (1993); Schlozman and Brady (1995); Seligson et al. (1995); Teixeira (1987, 1992); Verba and Nie (1972); Wolfinger and

⁴ The current 1992 and 1997 Korean Presidential Election data do not contain weight variables and weight variables adjusted by official turnout rate are created.

⁵ Several scholars call this sociological model SES model (Caldeira, Patterson, Markko 1985; Leighley and Nagler 1992), although they add race, age and other variables. This is probably because “SES” is a more widely known vocabulary in the scholarship. *The American Voter* that began massive studies on SES argued that when race, age, region, or religion was added to the use of income and education, a term “sociological” should be used instead of “SES.”

Rosenstone (1980). Conway indicates that there are differences among voters caused by three factors. First, one's life experiences change and as they do so does the individual's involvement. Second, higher-status respondents also engage in more political activities since they have more time, money, or interest. Finally, these respondents have the civic responsibility such as sense of obligation to participate and perceptions of government responsibilities that activate them to engage in politics. Presidential elections are better explained by sociological model than other elections. This is because presidential elections draw more lower status voters (Cox and Munger 1989; Patterson and Caldeira 1983). The following specific variables are employed in the analysis of 1992 and 1997 Korean Presidential Elections.

Education

Among many sociological variables, education has been found the most significant impact in electoral participation: the more educated, the more citizens participate in voting (Jackson 1995). In his study of seven European countries and Canada, Powell (1986, 27-8) found a ten-percent difference in voting turnout between respondents in the lowest educational level and those in the highest. Simply speaking, college graduates are more likely to vote than high school graduates. According to Conway, there are four major reasons education stimulate turnouts (1991, 23-25). First, those with higher education tend to have firm knowledge on the political system and thus recognize effects of their turnout on politics. Second, more educated citizens are pressured to vote by their social environments. Third, those who achieved higher education have the skills to cope with bureaucratic complexities related to voting. Finally and most significantly, education enables citizens to understand political and social

events and issues that are generally complex. Education provides them with cognitive skills that stimulate their voting participation.

Korea must be one of countries where Conway's reasons of educational importance in turnout should apply, and better educated Koreans should better understand Korean politics. However, other studies indicate that while education provides a strong indication of voting participation in countries with lower turnout rates, its impact is weak or negative in some countries with higher turnout rates. According to Seligson et al., three countries—Honduras (79 percent), Costa Rica (79 percent), and Nicaragua (75 percent)--have higher voting rates in early 1990s, and three countries—Panama (55 percent), El Salvador (44 percent) and Guatemala (41 percent) have lower voting rates among these Central American countries. What their significant finding is that education is associated with turnout in Panama, El Salvador, and Guatemala, but not in Honduras, Costa Rica and Nicaragua. For instance in Costa Rica, about 90 percent of those with elementary education voted, and about 85 percent with college education or above voted. Education is not a major constraint on turnout in Costa Rica. Torf (1995) who analyzed sixteen European countries also found that voters with lowest educational level voted a little more than those with highest educational level. He concludes that there is no generalization between education and turnout. Turnout rate is also higher in Korea and to clear different arguments on educational effect on voting turnout, education should be controlled in the model.

Age

Another major sociological variable is age. Studies have found that older people tend to participate in the election more often. Conway (1991, 17-21) also offers good

reasons that age affects turnout. First, younger citizens tend to vote less because their mobility is higher. Although legal consequences of mobility are not major constraints on voting these days, high mobility suggests fewer social and organizational ties in a community. Younger citizens, thus, are less interested in and less engaged in the local community. Conway argues that voting rates increase among citizens who have lived in a community for three to five years. Although Conway's explanation of low rates of voting among younger citizens due to higher mobility seems reasonable in America, it may not apply to Korean elections.⁶ Korean children generally live with their parents until they get married, which is about thirty years old for men and twenty-seven years old for women. By this time, they have lived with their parents in the community for long time. By the time they marry they will have been exposed to extensive political socialization from the family. This could be an important factor in determining political participation in Korean elections. When the younger people move to new places, their local interest may be reduced, but not the national interest. Above all, the country is small geographically. Moving to different parts of the country should not be very different from one's former place. Since Korean electoral system does not need registration, any lower voting among younger citizens should not be explained by their mobility.

It is Conway's second reason, marriage, which is more relevant for Korean electoral participation. Turnout among younger citizens increases as they get older and they are married.⁷ Married parents become concerned with community amenities and

⁶ Nearly no research has been done on mobility and turnout on Korean elections and mobility items are not available with current data.

⁷ Unfortunately, current data do not have an item on marriage status of respondents.

government policies as they or their children are involved with schools, military, tax, recreational facilities, hospitals and so on. Younger citizens, instead, may be more concerned with dating or getting jobs. Thus, a significant difference between younger and older voters is their stake in the community, and these different concerns offer different contribution on turnout. According to K. Kim (1986), 25.6 percent of Koreans in the twenties did not vote while only about nine percent of those over 50 did not vote in 1984 Congress elections. His finding has been also supported by later Korean scholars (W. Kim 1998; N. Lee 1993). Thus, among many sociological factors, this chapter selected education because the American literature on turnout unanimously maintains its significance on turnout.⁸ In addition, this chapter employs age since all the Korean studies confirm its impacts on turnout.

Region

The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968) defines a region as a homogeneous area with physical and cultural characteristics distinct from those of neighboring area. In terms of race, language, or culture, there are no different regions in Korea, since the country is essentially composed of one race, one language and the culture established for the last 5,000 years. The *Encyclopedia* further defines regionalism as what “properly represents the regional idea in action as an ideology, as a social movement, or as a theoretical basis for regional planning... .” Regionalism is not uncommon in Western countries. America has severe South-North difference in political participation (Miller and Shanks 1996; Niemi and Weisberg 1993; Teixeira 1987, 1992; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Wolfinger and Rosenstone maintain that traditionally Southern

⁸ Considering insignificance of education in countries of higher turnout rates, education is tested by two-tail

turnout rates were much lower than those of other regions partly because of poll tax, lack of party competition, and years of disenfranchisement of African-Americans. Although the turnout gap between southern and northern regions influentially reduced in the 1960s, regional differences are still noticeable.

In Korea, regional difference is a recent phenomenon, and political and economic characteristics distinguish especially two regions in the country: the Southeast and the Southwest areas. According to K. Lee (1997), Korean parties remain ruled by major leaders who retain their regional political bases. Therefore, it is expected that due to severe regionalism between the Southeast and the Southwest, more people from these regions should vote. To test this, dummy variables are created by using a residency question.

Despite the apparent explanatory power of sociological model, it does not completely explain recent low rates of American turnout. As Winders (1999) asserts, although socio-economic conditions improved after 1960, American turnout has been on the decline. Turnout is more complicated when we consider high voting rates of other Western countries that ranked similar in the increase of socio-economic improvement (Piven and Cloward 1989). Hughes and Conway (1997), using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) from 1964 through 1992, examined the impact of efficacy on turnout in American presidential elections. They conclude that among many factors that contribute to political participation in American presidential elections "demographic characteristics are among the most important (209)." Yet these characteristics have not changed significantly over time therefore while "... they help

t-test.

explain turnout in any one election, they are less helpful in explaining changes in turnout" (209). What had changed over the three decades of their study was political attitudes and these were strongly related to turnout. They conclude that, in American presidential elections, what is important to understand turnout is not demographic variables, for they are relatively stable over time, but certain attitudinal variables. This study needs to control more powerful variables from other theories that will more clearly explain Korean voter turnout, due to incompleteness of sociological model.

Psychological Model

The existing evidence suggests that turnout in the United States has declined as a result of changes in attitudes and beliefs toward the political system. The psychological model focuses on psychological forces of citizens in explaining for turnout (Brody 1978; Caldeira, Patterson and Markko 1985, 497; Conway 1991). Based on Campbell et al.'s (1960) study, these authors argue that people decide whether they participate or abstain in terms of divergent attitudes or orientation toward political life. They use several conceptual devices found in the psychological model: political efficacy, strength of party identification, political interest, and others.

Efficacy

Efficacy is a "political actor's subjective feeling that one could bring about change by one's own efforts (Hayes and Bean 1993a, 262). Scholars have divided efficacy into two categories, internal and external. Internal efficacy measures the sense of power and control the individual perceives to have in influencing the political system. This indicates the individual's own ability to understand and to participate effectively in political process. External efficacy refers to the faith and the trust people have in

government and those elected to govern (Young 1987; Huges and Conway 1997).

Efficacy stands for long-term evaluation of the value or effectiveness of voting (Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko 1985; Jackson 1995).

Since efficacy was first used in *The American Voter* (1960), it has been employed by many studies on turnout (Abramson and Aldrich 1982a; Ashenfelter and Kelley 1975; Cassel and Hill 1981; Hayes and Bean 1993; Hughes and Conway 1997; Miller 1980; Powell 1986; Reiter 1979; Shaffer 1981; Southwell and Everest 1998; Teixeira 1987, 1992; Timpone 1998). These authors consistently assert that the higher efficacy level of citizens, the higher their voting turnout. Why do efficacious people vote more than inefficacious people? In addressing this question, Abramson and Aldrich (511) conclude that "Those who feel politically capable may feel psychologically motivated to participate, whereas those who feel overwhelmed by the political process may withdraw from political activity." Teixeira (1987) finds that one major characteristic of efficacy is that it is normally not measured as an individual behavior, attitude or opinion regarding his/her influence on government, but measured with respect to a certain reference group. Questions regarding efficacy generally include expressions like "people like me... ." In other words, although it is true that turnout of an individual may not change the result of elections, people nonetheless go to the polls. This contradiction is overcome by the feeling that "their individually defined reference group (people like me)" can influence the government or elections.

Now, which efficacy indicator is more significant on turnout? Studies have shown that "politics seems complicated" was not a constraint on turnout (Ashenfelter and Kelley 1975). Powell (1986) compared turnouts in eight developed countries with

American turnout. He found that efficacy was significant, but compared to other variables--political interest, education, legal or institutional factors, "people like me have no say..." had only five percent explanatory power. Therefore, this study employs an efficacy indicator that is directly related to turnout. "Whether I vote or not is not important since too many people are voting" is used to test impacts of efficacy on turnout.⁹

Democracy (1992) and Fairness of the CEC

If efficacy is a major constraint on voting participation, the electoral environments where citizens vote should affect people's choice of participation. Based on rational choice theory (Downs 1957) that expands the conception of the category "D" to the value of democracy, Baloyra-Herp (1995) examined El Salvador elections. It was found that when possible fraud was rumored during the campaign election turnout was low, and when elections were perceived to be fair and open turnout was high. Following this logic as more Koreans perceive an improvement in democracy, like the proper counting of votes, their attitudes and opinions should be reflected in greater participation. Conversely, if they perceive improper counting of votes some will stay home. Due to data availability, this perception of democracy factor is used only in 1992.

Conceptually similar to the perceived democracy variable is the role of Korean Central Election Commission (CEC) that supervises the campaigning process. Booth (1995) maintained that the supervision of elections had a positive role in the movement toward democracy in Central America. The perceptions of the citizen regarding the "fairness" of an election are vital to participation in a democracy. In the case of Korea, if

⁹ Efficacy items are available only in the 1997 data. Instead, general evaluation of democracy is used in the

people think of the CEC only as a government institution and view it as unfair they will be less likely to vote. If however, they perceive the CEC as an impartial and fair overseer of the elections they will be more likely to vote. Therefore the perception of the CEC should be a significant indicator of turnout in Korean presidential elections.

Orientation toward Governing and Opposition Parties

Although some researchers (Cassel and Hill 1981; Hill and Cassel 1983) argue that unpopularity or inability of American political parties is not related to lower turnout, other studies (Abramson and Aldrich 1982a; Brody 1978; Conway 1991; Shaffer 1981; Teixeira 1987, 1992) have found weaker partisanship, caused by social disorder in the 1960s, and Vietnam and Watergate in 1970s, substantially lowered voting turnout in the United States. Abramson and Aldrich, for instance, found that between two-thirds and seven-tenths of turnout reduction between 1960 and 1980 was caused by the weakening of party identification, together with reduced political efficacy. There is a rich body of literature that asserts that psychological involvement with parties greatly affects voting turnout (Campbell et al., 1960; Jackson 1993, 1995; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Miller and Shanks 1996; Powell 1986; Southwell and Everest 1998; Teixeira 1987; Timpone 1998; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Teixeira (16-18) explains why partisanship affects turnout precisely. Partisanship provides identifiers with “an interpretive framework for the issues of a campaign” as well as feeling of “making the actual outcome of the election a matter of personal importance.” The framework and feeling people have towards parties are expressed in voting participation, and their level of participation among partisans is much higher than among non-partisans. Verba and Nie (1972) documented

1992 model.

that partisan effects on electoral participation are independent, regardless of socioeconomic factors. All citizens, despite different sociological variables, showed one results: strong partisans were more active in electoral participation than weak partisans or the Independents.

In addition, according to Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (1996), during the last 40 years of presidential elections (1952-1996) strong party identifiers have voted much more than any other identifiers. Abramson et al. showed that the percentage of strong party identifiers among Whites was never below 35 percent between 1952 and 1964, while White Independents made up about 8 percent. Although the number of strong identifiers in the United States has been reduced recently, the different voting trends of strong and weak identifiers have remained the same.

In Korea parties do not have the history or allegiance that they have in the United States. Since Korean parties are not institutionalized, parties are formed, merged and disbanded too often. Therefore, we cannot directly use party identification to analyze voting turnout in Korea. In their place, the general orientation toward the governing parties and the opposition parties are used.¹⁰ While Korean voters do not have strong and enduring identification with a particular party, there are voters who identify with the governing party while other voters prefer opposition parties regardless of their names. There has never been a peaceful change of governments until the 1997 presidential election. Most governing parties have been conservative while most major opposition parties have been progressive. Korean voters accordingly have obtained distinct feelings toward governing and opposition parties. Thus, those who are not interested in parties or

in which parties are elected, should not participate in the election. It is expected that the probabilities of turnout among Korean voters who have governing or opposition party orientation should be higher than that of turnout among who do not have.¹¹

Political Interest

The significance of studying individual interest in politics is that it is closely related to other common political activities such as talking politics with others, political participation, and political knowledge. Compared to efficacy, political interest deals with short-term impact in the election (Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko 1985).¹² This psychological concept has also been examined for decades in America (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995; Herron 1998; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944, 42-43; Milbrath and Goel 1977, 46-8; Shaffer 1981; Verba, Nie and Kim 1971).

Milbrath and Goel (1977), and Verba, Nie and Kim (1971) once reported that psychological involvement in public affairs is different depending on modes of political activities. Political interest is more closely related to participation in election campaign, participation in community activities, and political protest, but is less essential to voting turnout, and contacts with public officials. Kleppner (1982) supports these arguments, noting that American political interest did not decline between 1960 and 1978, and arguing that political interest did not cause the drop in turnout during this period. However, there are studies that link political interest to the decline in turnout. In his comparative studies by using pooled data from Britain, West Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, Finland, and Canada, Powell (1986) showed that levels of political interest

¹⁰ For more on Korean parties and a concept of “orientation toward parties,” see Chapters 1 and 2.

¹¹ Those who are oriented toward governing or opposition parties are coded 1 and those who are not (Independents) are coded 0.

offers substantially different impacts on turnout. For instance, predicted turnout rate of those who were not interested in politics at all was only 72 percent while that of those who were very interested was 90 percent.¹³ Other studies that employ more refined methods find that general political interest very significantly affects electoral turnout. Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995) conducted simple regression and two-stage least squares (2SLS) and also found that political interest was more significant on overall political participation in the 2SLS than in OLS. As the authors articulated, this is probably because any error with which political interest was measured was corrected by 2SLS.

In addition, studies that employed specific interest in elections rather than general political interest show significantly positive effects of the electoral interest on voting turnout. Bennett (1986) used an apathy index created by including direct interest in elections and documented that between the 1960s and 1980s, voting turnout was almost same among those who were very involved in public affairs, while a significant drop of turnout occurred among voters whose index was "very apathetic," "slightly apathetic," and "neutral." Brody and Sniderman (1977) incorporated "electoral interest" instead of general political interest in their model and found that interest in the elections more strongly predicted voting turnout than duty, efficacy, and concern about the outcome.

This study uses "direct interest in elections" in the turnout model. In short, "as more ardent basketball fans are more likely to attend basketball games" (Casswell and

¹² For more on political interest, see chapter 4.

¹³ These estimates are probit estimates (39). Those estimates conducted by logit and OLS show similar results.

Luskin 1988, 1325), it is expected that the more people are interested in the election, more likely they are to vote.

Political Mobilization Model

Mobilization model stresses that contextual and political opportunities are major constraints on political participation (Leighley 1995). Examples of contextual and political opportunities are: campaign spending and simultaneous races for higher offices (Boyd 1989; Caldeira and Patterson 1982; Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko 1985; Copeland 1983; Cox and Munger 1989; Jackson 1993; Patterson and Caldeira 1983), or informal discussion of politics (Gilbert 1993; Kenny 1992; Leighley 1990; Weatherford 1982), effectiveness of party, or candidate organization contacting (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992; Wieldhouwer and Lockerbie 1994).

Since these kinds of variables are not available with current Korean data, another type of mobilization concept is used. Many earlier scholars such as Deutsch (1961), Lerner (1958), Milbrath (1965), Verba and Nie (1972) and Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) argued a mobilization model: more exposure with community or more interaction with others in the cities increases political activity. Deutsch (1961) and Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) maintained that high literacy, education, modern communication, consensus on the rules of the game are closely related to democracy, and that these are higher in urban than in rural areas.

However, as Verba, Nie and Kim has found in their six countries except in Yugoslavia, turnout is higher in rural areas where in cities since the traditional close communal life is most often dissolved. Milbrath and Goel (1977) illustrated this relationship in their study of Japanese electoral participation and rural areas. They assert

that voting rates of Japanese rural areas invariably have been eight to ten percent higher than those of cities. They contend that many urban areas have grown so fast that city dwellers do not easily integrate themselves to their community. Urbanization, overcrowding, and crime destroy human spirits and people became anomic. In contrast, people in rural areas have greater community integration and hence they cooperate with each other. With the increasing spread of mass communication and education in rural areas, more people incorporate themselves into community. Milbrath and Goel also mentioned a phenomenon in Japan that is similar in Korea. Rural areas in Japan contain an authoritative tradition by which people obey leaders of the community. These “rural political machines” are more powerful than “urban machines.”

According to C. Yoon (1990), Khil, Kim, and Ahn (1987), Korean rural areas were also pre-modernized and therefore it was easier to mobilize people, while it was harder to mobilize people living in urban areas. This is because rural people are more vulnerable to pressure for mobilization by individual politicians or government officials. C. Kim (1980a, 1980b) accordingly defined mobilized voters in the rural areas as apolitical voters since their electoral participation does not connote a personal political meaning. Rather they went to polls because they had to follow the heads of family, villages, opinion leaders, or government officials. C. Kim (1980a, 1980b) and K. Cho (1996) studied this phenomenon and concluded that political organizations mobilize rural people.

In fact Korean rural segment has been found to be easily mobilized. Turnout rates of Seoul and cities have been lower than those of rural areas in nearly all the elections (C. Yoon 1990). For instance, the turnout rate was 66.7 percent in Seoul, 73.5 percent in

cities, 86.3 percent in mixed areas of cities and counties, and 88.1 percent in rural areas in 1967 presidential election. This pattern of lower turnout rates in cities or urban areas and higher turnout rates in rural areas have been present in every election and this phenomenon is referred to as *dojeochongoh* in Korea.

Higher turnout in the rural areas is also found in Western countries (Eagles 1991; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Mishler 1979; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). For instance, Mishler reports that despite long distance to the polls, voters in the rural areas are most consistent voters in Canada. Involvement in community affairs of farmers and rural villagers is twice that of other citizens in Canada. Unlike many Korean rural voters, however, Canadian voters were not heavily persuaded to the polls. Mishler ascribes higher voting rates in the Canadian rural areas to the country life that people tend to know each other better and interact more socially.

However, the substantive difference of turnout between rural and urban areas cannot be sustained forever. As rural areas became more developed and mass communication is more pervasive, the distinction between rural and urban areas declines. Moreover, due to recent severe regionalism in Korea, voters in large cities in the Southwest and Southeast vote more than those living in rural areas of other regions (M. Kim 1995; J. Lee 1995). N. Lee (1993), after examining the 1992 National Assembly Election, finally reported that urbanization was not significant in his model of turnout. By analyzing 1980, 1984, and 1988 Canadian elections, Eagle (*ibid.*) argues that “whatever forces were responsible for the higher turnouts associated with rural Canada earlier in this century much have eroded by the 1980s. None of the three elections show a significant effect of rural-urban differentials in his model.

According to Mulgan (1997), Japanese farmers are also losing their electoral power since absolute size of the agricultural electorate has been reduced. The number of Japanese farmers has been halved between 1960 and 1994. The reduced number of farmers has been precipitated by rapid urbanization and modernization across the agricultural industry. Thus, recent rural villages are not the same as old villages. As Mulgan mentioned, this reduced size of rural villages has happened in other Asian countries such as Taiwan and Korea. Although there are many studies suggesting that people from rural areas vote more than other Koreans, it is also true that the differences between rural areas and others has declined recently. To explore these different arguments, a measure indicating rural area is incorporated in the model.¹⁴

Methods

In social science binary dependent variables are commonly used (Kilwein 1997; Krain 1997; Poirier 1994; Swenson 1996; Swers 1998). Common examples of these in logit models include workers choosing whether to join workers' unions, married-women deciding whether to work, or voters deciding whether to vote. Since there are only two choices in the dependent variable, one is unable to use regular regression analysis because it may cause a problem for estimating coefficients. For instance, the regression line may yield a negative probability for extremely low values of independent variables. For extremely high values of independent values, the regression line may indicate a probability much higher than one. Outcomes of lower than zero or higher than one are not feasible in the example because there are only two choices of zero or one in the

¹⁴ The question used for the mobilization variable is not very specific. The question is "where do you live?" Its choices are 1) large cities, 2) small or medium cities, and 3) rural areas. It does not indicate

dependent variable. To avoid this problem, one may employ the linear probability model (LPM) that converts probabilities to zero or to one. As Kennedy (1998, 234) mentions, LPM is popular due to its computational ease, but sometimes LPM provides “outcomes with certainty” even when they may not happen. One can express LPM as

$$E(Y_i) = 1 * f_i(1) + 0 * f_i(0) = f_i(1) \quad (1)$$

Here $f_i(1)$ is the probability that a voter decides to vote. Accordingly, the expected value of y given x is the probability that $y = 1$ given x . One can rewrite (1) as

$$E(Y_i) = \alpha + \beta X_i \quad (2)$$

Formula (2) indicates that as x_k increases by one unit, predicted change in the probability of voting is β_k . β_k is constant since the LPM is linear. However, in many cases the increases may not be same. As illustrated by Long (1997, 39), a woman with more children will have a lower probability of being employed. The first child may reduce probability of being employed by 0.3, the second by 0.2, and the third by 0.05. This means the model is not linear.

According to Kennedy, a better solution to the problem of LPM is squeezing the estimated probabilities inside the 0-1 interval without actually creating probability estimates of zero or one. One alternative, commonly employed model is the logit model that has an S-shaped curve bounded between zero and one. It is usually defined as

$$E(Y_i) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\alpha - \beta X_i}} = \frac{e^{\alpha + \beta X_i}}{1 + e^{\alpha + \beta X_i}} \quad (3)$$

where $E(Y_i) = P(Y_i = 1)$.

One uses natural logarithms and changes the formula (3) to

different areas in terms of size of the areas or number of people living. By using this question, rural area is coded 1, and other regions 0.

$$\log \pi_i / (1 - \pi_i) = \alpha + \beta X_i$$

where $\pi_i = E(Y_i)$.

Here $\pi_i / (1 - \pi_i)$ is the ratio of the odds of $Y_i = 1$ against $Y_i = 0$. Logit is the ratio of the two expected responses. In other words, logit is the natural log of the odds. While using logistic errors produce the logit model, using normal errors produces the probit model.¹⁵ The choice between logit and probit is a personal preference. “These two functions [logit and probit] are very similar and in today’s software environment; the choice between them is a matter of taste because both are so easy to estimate” (Kennedy 234). Since the dependent variable of this chapter, voting turnout, has two categories, “voted” and “not voted,” the logit model is used to analyze the outcome variable in terms of several covariates.¹⁶

Findings and Discussion

Tables 6a and 6b on *p.* 196-7 show models based on survey data and weighted data respectively, and they appear very similar in terms of the significance as well as direction for each variable. Basic models of 1992 and 1997 contain the same independent variables, and the 1992 full model includes “democracy,” and the 1997 full model also includes “efficacy.” The models based on survey data and those using weighted data look similar, as does their goodness of fit of models. In order to assess the fit of models, McKelvey and Zavoina’s R^2 is used.¹⁷ Tables 6a and 6b show that in terms of the 1992 model, R^2 is slightly higher in the weighted model than in the original survey

¹⁵ Variance of the logit model is assumed $\pi/3 \approx 3.29$, and that of the probit model is assumed 1.

¹⁶ Descriptions and coding of variables used in the model are shown in Appendixes 3, 4a and 4b.

¹⁷ According to simulation studies of Hagle and Mitchell (1992) and Windmeiher (1995), McKelvey and Zavoina’s R^2 is most appropriate when the underlying binary or ordinal latent variables are used.

data. Yet, in terms of 1997 model, R^2 is slightly higher in the survey model than in the weighted model. Nonetheless, their differences are minor that they can be disregarded. As Abramson and Aldrich (1982b) and Teixeira (1987) argued that turnout reports at the NES data, although over-reported, depict the real picture of American society, Korean over-reported data also seem to provide their electoral participation. However, before making a firm conclusion that even over-reported data can describe electoral participation of the whole Korean population, more studies using voter validation, bigger samples or other methods should be conducted in the future. It is too early to generalize that over-reported data can be used to clearly infer general population based on only two datasets and the use of weighted variables.

One final diagnostic may be applied to evaluate the quality of the survey models. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves graphically show that the 1992 and 1997 models using survey data have moderate predictive power, as shown in Figures 12a on *p.* 224 and 12b on *p.* 225.¹⁸ The area beneath the curve in 1992 is almost 79 percent, and that in 1997 is about 83 percent indicating the models' moderate performance.

Since findings are similar between the actual survey data and the weighted data, findings of survey data are used to explain Korean voter turnout. Unlike conventional findings on education and turnout, education is not significant in either 1992 or 1997. Whether respondents have an elementary education or a college education, their chance of voting is the same. To find out how different levels of education affect turnout more

¹⁸ ROC curve is a graph of sensitivity compared to 1- specificity (Green and Swets 1974). Sensitivity reflects observed positive outcome cases that a model correctly classifies, while specificity reflects negative outcome cases that the model correctly classifies. The 45-degree line in the graph shows no predictive power of a model that is 0.5. As the predictive power increases, the area under the curve is also increasing.

precisely, predicted values of education can be plotted while all other variables are controlled. Figures 13a on *p.* 226 and 13b on *p.* 227 show predicted values and 95 percent confidence intervals of education in the 1992 and 1997 elections. Education appears to be positively related with the probability of voting, but it is not statistically significant.¹⁹ For instance, in 1992 respondents with elementary education have a probability of about 0.95 of voting, while all other variables were controlled at their mean. Similarly respondents with college level of education or above have an approximate probability of 0.96 of voting. The probability difference between the lowest and highest education levels is nearly same. The confidence interval around the probabilities is widest around elementary education. This means the observations are sparser at the elementary level of education compared to other levels of education. Figure 13b looks very similar to Figure 13a.

Education is one of the most important factors in American voter turnout. Conway (1991), for instance, mentioned that those who have a higher education have the ability to understand complex political and social events and issues, and to deal with bureaucratic complexities normally related to voting. Those who have lower educational levels may not vote, although they might want to, due to complexity of the process. In contrast, voting in Korea is less complex. Voters go the poll with residence identification or driver license and mark the one person they prefer among several candidates. Even considering all kinds of elections held—presidential, parliamentary, mayoral, and local

STATA does not provide ROC curves for weighted data and goodness of fit of survey data, and weighted data cannot be compared with ROC curves.

¹⁹ Figure 13a and 13b actually look slightly increasing as educational level changes, but it is only because the probability in the Figures is between about .91 and about .98. If their probabilities are shown between 0 and 1, the lines look almost horizontal.

parliamentary elections, Korean voters cast their votes less than once a year. In addition, regional cleavage makes it easier for voters to choose a candidate if they are having a trouble selecting one. The insignificance of education in relation to voter turnout in Korean elections may parallel the findings of Seligson et al. (1995) in Central America. They found that education was significant in Panama, El Salvador, and Guatemala, where the voting rate is low; education was not significant in Honduras, Costa Rica and Nicaragua where the voting rate is high. The turnout rates of Korean elections are a little higher than those of these three latter countries. Thus, this finding disagrees with relationship between education and turnout found in the American literature, but it is close to the findings of some Central American countries.

In contrast to education, age is to be found moderately distinctive in 1992 and strongly distinctive in 1997. Younger respondents did not tend to vote while older voters tended to in both elections. As Conway argued, voter turnout increases as people age. Getting older means people may get married, and parents get more often involved with their communities, government policies, or regulations. In Korea, the findings on age support not only the well-established American theories on age, but also confirms that probabilities of voting among older voters are much higher than those among younger voters, as suggested by all studies done by Korean scholars.

Regional influences were different in 1992 and 1997. More voters in the Southwest areas went to the poll in 1992 than other Koreans. Yet, the voting probability of those living in the Southeast is lower, although statistically not significant, than other Koreans. Considering the serious regionalism of both the Southeast and the Southwest areas, the findings about the Southeast are somewhat surprising. A possible explanation

involves coalition building of the major leaders. A few years before the 1992 election, Kim Young-Sam was politically based in the southern Southeast, Roh Tae-Woo was from the northern Southeast, and Kim Jong-Pil was from the Central area. Then they merged, creating a huge conservative coalition under the name of the Democratic Liberty Party. Kim Young-Sam, as a presidential candidate of the coalition, increased his chance of winning under this new coalition. However, Kim Dae-Jung, candidate of the largest opposition party, was campaigning alone against this coalition. Accordingly, voters living in the Southwest felt that their candidate might be in a particularly disadvantaged situation, and significantly more Southwesterners voted, as reflected in Table 6a. Those in the Southeast, however, felt that their candidate was in an advantageous situation, and their turnout rate was not significantly different from that of other Koreans. In sum, despite regionalism between people living in the Southeast and the Southwest, evaluation of their candidate's chance of winning affected their decision of electoral participation.

Compared to the regional effects of 1992, both the Southeast and the Southwest are, however, significant in 1997 and the Southeast is much stronger than the Southwest in both basic and full models. The different effects of the Southeast and the Southwest may be explained by the same reason. When the candidate based in the Southeast was in a better position than the Southwestern candidate in 1992, Southwestern regional effects were greater than those of the Southeast. Exactly the opposite coalition happened in 1997. When the candidate based in the Southwest was in a better position than the Southeastern candidate in 1997, Southeastern regional effects were greater than the Southwest. Kim Dae-Jung allied with Kim Jong-Pil one month before the election, and he could garner broader support not only from his region but also from Kim Jong-Pil's

Central area. Yet the ruling candidate, Lee Hoi-Chang, was campaigning alone against the two Kims' alliance.²⁰ Actually, Lee's support was reduced in the Southeast. Rhee In-Je defected from the ruling party and announced that he would create his own party and run for the presidency. Accordingly, voters in the Southeast felt that their candidate—Lee or/and Rhee—was in a difficult position due to coalition of Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Pil. This does not mean, however, that the 1997 Southwest regionalism is as weak as the 1992 Southeast regional effect on turnout. Compared to the non-effect of the 1992 Southeast regionalism, that of 1997 Southwest is much stronger even though their candidate is in a more advantageous situation. Their full support is probably because their candidate, Kim Dae-Jung was running for the candidacy for the 4th time, and they knew that it would be his last bid. Southwesterners knew that if he had failed in the 1997 election, the Southwest area would not have a presidential candidate as popular as Kim Dae-Jung for a long time. For that reason, the Southwestern effect on turnout was strong in 1997 although Kim Dae-Jung was in an advantageous position.

The psychological model of voting asserts that voter participation depends on people's attitudes towards politics. In the model of Korean presidential voting, most psychological factors look very significant. Electoral interest is the most consequential element in the 1992 and 1997 models. Those who were more interested in the election turned out more than those who were not. This finding is similar to that of Brody and Sniderman's (1977) studies and other analyses of American voting. They reported that electoral interest provides the most significant impact on American electoral participation

²⁰ In fact, Cho Soon, former Mayor of Seoul, joined Lee but his contribution was minimal.

compared with other variables: duty, efficacy, or concern about the outcome. Importance of electoral interest on turnout now is more supported.

While electoral interest was found to be very significant, Korean voters' orientation toward the governing party and the opposition parties did not matter in 1992. Whether voters preferred the ruling party, opposition parties or the Independents did not substantially affect voter turnout. This may indicate a party's unpopularity or insignificance, or the stage of development of political parties in Korean politics.

Unlike in 1992, party orientation was very significant in the 1997 election. More voters among those who preferred either the governing party or opposition parties voted than Independents. This indicates that those voters who were attracted to either the governing party or its opposition parties cared more about the election outcome than did independents. Why was this orientation significant in the 1997 election and not in 1992? In January 1990, when the three conservative parties merged together, Roh Tae-Woo's Democratic Justice Party was the ruling party, and Kim Young-Sam's Reunification Democratic Party and Kim Jong-Pil's New Democratic Republican Party were opposition parties. The merging of the ruling and opposition parties resulted in greater confusion toward the parties in the 1992 election as opposed to the 1997 election. In 1997 Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Pil entered into a contract where Kim Dae-Jung would be presidential candidate, thus providing a single candidate for the electorate. And since both Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Pil had represented the opposition parties the line between governing and opposition parties was much clearer in 1997. As a result party orientation was more significant to turnout in 1997.

Baloyra-Herp (1995) has shown in the El Salvador elections and other countries, if political or electoral systems are not working properly, voters may consider that their votes will not be counted properly or only candidates from the ruling party will be benefited. In these situations, the voting rate will go down. Table 6a supports this argument. Those Korean respondents who regarded the Central Election Commission (CEC) as working fairly voted more than those who did not in both 1992 and 1997. According to Table 6a, perceived fairness of the CEC is more significant in 1992 than the perceived general level of democracy. This suggests that the fairness of the electoral apparatus is more important to Koreans' decision to vote than is their overall evaluation of the larger political system's democracy. The role of the CEC, the electoral overseers, should be very important on voting turnout in Korea. If higher turnout is an indicator of a healthy democracy, then in the future the CEC should continue to be independent and neutral in supervising whole electoral process.

The final psychological factor, efficacy, matters greatly to voter turnout. The efficacy distinctiveness is very convincing. When voters believe that they can effect government they participate in the political process at a greater rate, and with greater intensity. As Powell (1986) indicated in his studies of eight developed countries and Timpone (1998) argued in his analysis of NES data, as the level of voter's efficacy increases turnout also increases. The variable used for efficacy is "whether I vote or not is not important since too many people are voting." Hence if the voters considered their votes were important they would have a high degree of efficacy and would vote, and vice versa.

The mobilization hypothesis argues that in the rural areas of Korea people were dependant on family, friends and village leaders for their political information. As a consequence they were easily mobilized to vote. This was particularly true during the 1970s through the mid1980s. In studies of Canada and Japan this same pattern was found to occur up to the 1970s (Milbrath and Goel 1977; Mishler 1979). In Korea since the mid 1980s this rural mobilization has declined just as in Canada (Eagle 1991) and Japan (Malgan 1997) did in the 1980s. There are several factors that help explain reduced mobilization in Korea. One reason is the movement of people out of the rural area into the urban area. Second, political campaigns have increasingly relied upon the mass media that contribute to more independent decision-making, as J. Lee (1995) indicated.

Contingency tables also confirm rural residence's lack of effect on turnouts. Tables 7a on *p.* 198 and 7b on *p.* 199 show that more respondents living in rural areas seem to vote more than respondents living in cities. For instance, about 95 percent of people living in rural areas voted in 1992 while about 93 percent of respondents living in cities voted. This pattern was repeated in 1997 when approximately 94 percent of voters from rural areas voted compared to 92 percent from city areas. However, χ^2 indicates that the relationship is not statistically significant. The impact of rural voting on turnout in Korean presidential election seems to have diminished.

Since interest in elections was shown to be the most important factor shaping turnout, as shown in Tables 6a and 6b, Figures 14a on *p.* 228 and 14b on *p.* 229 are created to indicate the effect of interest in elections on turnout among three different kinds of groups: High-probability Respondents, Average-probability Respondents and Low-probability Respondents. These three groups are created based on statistically

significant variables in Tables 6a and 6b. “High-probability Respondents” are defined as those who show positively significant relationship to turnout in terms of significant independent variables. The “Average-probability Respondents” consist of respondents by controlling all variables at their mean, and the “Low-probability Respondents” are those who show a negative relationship to turnout. These figures clearly describe influence of important variables on turnout as the voters' electoral interest changes.

In the 1992 election, the three groups are defined by three items: age, Southwest regional effect, and evaluation of the CEC's fairness. First, the top line indicates “High-probability Respondents” who are over 30, voters living in the Southwest and those who evaluate the CEC to be fair are most likely to vote. Their probability of voting is greater than 0.9 and slowly increases as their level of electoral interest increases. Second, the bottom line shows “Low-probability Respondents,” and they were in their 20s, living outside of the Southwest, and those who evaluated the CEC to be unfair. When their interest is only weak (1), the probability of their voting is about 0.6, but it increases up to about 0.9 as their interest increases to high (3). This change in the likelihood of voting is most conspicuous among three kinds of groups in 1992. Thus, interest in the election increases the likelihood of “Low-probability Respondents” becoming Voters. Even those who are low in their interest still show that they would go to the poll. Third, the middle line indicates “Average-probability Respondents.” They are almost identical to that of “Low-probability Respondents,” but their starting probability (about 0.8) is higher than that of “Low-probability Respondents” when their interest is low. Generally, Figure 14a indicates that voting probability of the three different kinds of groups in 1992 increases as their electoral interest increases from low

to high. Their lowest probability is 0.6, meaning that even if their electoral interest were low, they would probably vote in the 1992 election.

Compared to Figure 14a, Figure 14b looks very different. Three groups of voters were created by a combination of statistically significant variables in the 1997 model: efficacy, evaluation of the CEC fairness, age, party orientation and voters living in the Southeast and the Southwest, while their interest in the elections varies. First, “High-probability Respondents” are those who would had high efficacy, perceived the CEC to be fair, had governing/opposition party orientation, lived in the Southeast and the Southwest, and were over 30 years old. This provided nearly linear monotonous pattern, even as their electoral interest increased. They are most likely to vote regardless of their electoral interest. Second, those “Average-probability Respondents” whose line was created by holding all independent variables at their mean were affected moderately by different levels of electoral interest. As their interest in the election increases, their probability of voting also slowly increases. Their probability of voting is very high with lowest probability at about 0.8.

One of the most interesting findings of Figure 14b is regarding those “Low-probability Respondents.” These were voters who had low efficacy, evaluated the CEC as unfair, were Independent, in their 20s, and lived in areas other than the Southeast and the Southwest. Unlike other groups in 1992 and 1997, their probability of voting rapidly increased from about 0.2 up to about 0.8 as their campaign interest increases. Unlike their counterparts of 1992, turnout probability of the “Low-probability Respondents” in 1997 is very low when their interest in election is low or even moderate. Their turnout would not be feasible since their probability of voting much lower than 0.5. This is a

very significant finding of the 1997 election. Those who had lower efficacy, perceived the CEC to be unfair, were Independent, in their twenties and lived in other than the Southeast and the Southwest probably would not vote when their electoral interest was below the moderate level. As shown in Chapter 2, those who were more interested in the election voted for opposition candidates while those who were less interested would vote for the governing candidate. In 1992, less-interested voters participated in the election, and this is one explanation of why the ruling candidate, Kim Young-Sam, won the election. In contrast, in 1997 this group of voters did not vote, and it was a major reason the ruling candidate, Lee, did not garner enough votes to win. If those less-interested voters had followed the pattern of 1992 and voted, Lee might have won the 1997 election. Figures 14a and 14b clearly suggest that there are substantive differences between “High-probability Respondents” and “Low-probability Respondents.” While studying impacts of who voted and who did not on the result of elections, Piven and Cloward (1989) found that non-voters preferred Carter by 51 % to Reagan by 37%. If all the non-voters in the 1980 U.S. presidential election had voted, Reagan might not have been elected. Herron (1998) also documented that Bush was significantly helped by lower voter turnout (50.1%) in 1988. This is because most non-voters would have strongly supported Dukakis. The 1997 Korean presidential election was similar in that Kim Dae-Jung severely benefited by a lower-turnout rate. It was the second lowest turnout among Korea’s nine direct presidential elections.

Economic Model of Turnout

Minimal or scarce effort has been made to explain the effects of economics on Korean voter turnout. Since the economy affects all citizens it is reasonable to assume

that it would have an impact on voter turnout. There are three major economic theories that have been associated with voter turnout. The first argues economic conditions have no or weak impact on turnout. Fiorina (1978) and Conway(1991) maintain that there is not a fundamental relationship between financial conditions and turnout. Schlozman and Verba (1979) argued that it is the social characteristics of the unemployed that drives decisions of electoral participation rather than the differences between the employed and the unemployed. Dugan and Taggart (1995) used aggregate time-series data for the U.S. House and presidential elections between 1880 and 1960 and found that the impact of changing economic conditions on turnout is negligible. Their main argument of no relationship between economy and turnout was that voters have two separate mental dimensions—political and economic—and that they are not related. Poor economic conditions may not be simply improved by increase or decrease of turnout. It may be more related to who is in charge of the government.

The second is the so-called “mobilization model” (Schlozman and Verba 1979) that explains that economic adversity boosts voter turnout. Southwell (1996) noted that a 4.4 percent increase of turnout in the 1992 U.S. presidential election was likely caused by a participation of "have-nots." This argument is related to the reward-punishment theory in that incumbent candidates or parties are evaluated in terms of their economic performance in the elections. Those voters who are hurt more economically are more mobilized to cast ballots. However, do those who are economically less off have enough resources to go to the polls?

Finally, there is the argument that difficult economic condition reduces electoral participation (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Sniderman and Brody 1977). Caldeira,

Patterson and Markko (1985) found that unemployed voters were 12 percent less likely to vote than the employed ones. Rosenstone (1982) specifically studied the different kinds of the financial difficulty that voters experience. Voters who are financially worse-off, unemployed and poor are less mobilized to vote. Rosenstone indicates that for his group of voters, severe “opportunity costs” may interrupt their turnout (41). These voters have to survive in a less secure environment. They cannot easily spend their valuable time on outward political activities. Under the poor economic conditions, as shown in Chapter 2, those Korean voters who were poor or evaluated past economy negatively should have different behavior of voting turnout from the others. Thus, following hypotheses are deduced.

H1: Those who have higher level of living standards should vote more than those who have lower level of living standards (1992 and 1997 elections).

H2: Those who evaluate national economy more positively should vote more than those who evaluate national economy more negatively (1992 election).

H3: Those who evaluate that national economy has affected family economy more positively should vote more than those who evaluate that national economy has affected family economy more negatively (1997 election).

Findings and Discussion

Logit model of Korean turnout in Table 8 on *p.* 200 shows that the findings of the other factors are nearly the same with those of turnout models (Tables 6a and 6b) that do not include economic variables and their explanation is not repeated here. Although the “national economy” and “standard of living” in 1992 are statistically weak, they support an argument that difficult economic situations reduce turnout. Those who viewed the economy better in the past 1-2 years voted more than the others who did not in the 1992.

Moreover, those who had higher levels of standards of living vote out more than those in the lower level. Their turnout was affected by severe opportunity costs, as argued by Rosenstone.

Figures 15a and 15b on *p.* 230 and *p.* 231 respectively show predicted values and their 95 percent confidence intervals of national economy and living standards in the 1992 election. Both figures were created with all other independent variables controlled at their mean, while national economy and living standards respectively varying. Both of them are positively related to turnout. In Figure 15a, those who evaluated the national economy more weakly have a probability of about a 0.95 of turnout. However, respondents who evaluated the national economy better have an approximate probability of 0.97 turnout. Figure 15b looks similar to Figure 15a. The difference between the lowest category and the highest category is about 0.03. The confidence interval of the probabilities is most narrow around respondents who were in the middle in their levels of standard of living, suggesting more observations in that category than others. In short, these two figures generally show marginal influences of the national economy and living standards on voting in the 1992 election.

The effects of economic variables on the turnout, however, are nearly non-existent in the 1997 election. Probability of voter turnout of those who regarded that their family economy influenced by the better national economic policies were almost the same as that of those who regarded that their family economy worsened by policies. Moreover, different levels of standard living caused a similar impact on the turnout. As Fiorina and Conway ask, is there no fundamental relationship between financial situations and turnout? Do voters have two separate mental dimensions of politics and

economics? Family economy and living standards were marginally significant in the 1992 election, but they were not in 1997 when the country was almost bankrupt. It is premature to declare the null effects of economy on voter turnout due to the sparse measures currently available regarding the economy. As in the candidate choice model, one needs to examine more economic indicators to examine their precise influences on voting turnout.

Conclusion

In order to examine the extent of over-reporting in the surveys, weighted variables were created and examined against the actual survey data. Comparing the two data sets, the findings and fitness of models look so similar to each other that one may reasonably conclude that even over-reported data clearly depicted the Korean population.

Among several psychological factors, electoral interest was the most important both in 1992 and 1997. Those who were more interested in elections participated in the elections more than those less interested. Korean voters indicated that they would not vote if the CEC were perceived to be unfair. For them, the role of the CEC supervising elections is crucial for fair elections. In other words, only those who regarded the CEC to be fair in both elections would vote.

Moreover, the debate of the role of regionalism in Korean elections has generated severe controversy, particularly the role of the rural voters. This controversy needs to be reevaluated in light of the rapid mobility that is occurring in Korea. As people move from rural areas to urban areas their traditional means of electoral knowledge—the family, friends, and village leaders—has been broken. In addition, the number of people living in the rural areas is steadily declining making them less attractive to the

presidential candidates. The style of campaigning is also undergoing a profound change as well. Where once campaigns were personalized and large rallies were held, since the 1990s they have been primarily conducted through the media.

Finally, unlike expectation, the economic model of voter turnout shows marginal influences of the national economy and living standards on turnout in the 1992 election. The effects of economic variables on the turnout, however, are nearly non-existent in the 1997 election. As found in the economic model of candidate choice in Chapter 2, past evaluation of economic conditions are not consistently important on turnout in both presidential elections.

One of the most profound findings of this chapter was the role of “Low-probability participants.” These “Low-probability participants” whose interest in the election was lower showed a greater likelihood of not voting in the 1997 election than in the 1992 election. Those who had lower efficacy, who evaluated the CEC to be unfair, who were Independent, who were in their 20s, and lived in areas other than the Southwest or the Southeast had a higher probability of non-voting when their interest was lower in the 1997 election. Considering that highly interested voters tend to choose opposition candidates while low interested voters tend to choose the ruling candidate in Korea, abstention of low interested voters in 1997 benefited Kim Dae-Jung and was a major reason of the first peaceful transfer of power in Korea.

CHAPTER 4

INTEREST IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Introduction

One of the better-known aspects of mass belief systems in political science is "interest in politics." The psychological concept has been examined for decades in America (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944, 42-3; Milbrath and Goel 1977, 46-8; Van Deth 1990; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). The significance of studying individual interest in politics is that "citizens who are interested in politics--who follow politics, who care about what happens, and who are concerned with who wins and loses—are more politically active" (Milbrath and Goel 1977, 46). In other words, political interest is closely related to common political activities such as talking politics with others, political participation, and political knowledge.

Unlike other areas of electoral studies such as candidate choice or voting turnout, research on political interest has received less attention. While political interest has received less attention than other measures in the study of American voting behavior, there have been few systematic attempts to ascertain its importance in Korean voting. Drawing from the literature on political interest developed in the United States, this chapter develops electoral interest models for the 1992 and 1997 Korean presidential elections. Since the 1987 Democratization Movement, Koreans' interest in presidential elections has increased. As shown in Chapters 2 and 3, interest in elections was a major predictor of candidate choice and voter turnout. Those who were highly interested in the election chose opposition candidates, but those who were less interested preferred ruling candidates. In addition, less interested voters did not vote in the elections, contributing to

the win of Kim Dae-Jung in 1997 who had been dubbed as permanent opposition leader, in the 1997 election. The intent of this chapter is to develop a clearer understanding of what motivates the Korean electorate to become interested in elections. Through the use of an ordinal logit model the sociological factors, their interaction terms, stump campaigns, media effects—presidential debates, campaigning commercials, and speeches on television—and candidate popularity to explore their impacts on political interest in Korean presidential campaigns are examined.

In addition to employing a more appropriate method fit for ordinal characteristics of the dependent variable, political interest, binomial analysis of sociological variables as well as joint tests of these variables and their interaction terms are used. Interaction terms usually cause high multicollinearity, becoming a major reason interaction terms of sociological variables have not been often used, despite theoretical importance. By making sociological variables centered, these variables are free of multicollinearity and their coefficients are accurately interpreted. Finally, it is assumed that Korean political interest was significantly affected by massive outdoor stump campaigning in 1992 and presidential debates in 1997. Influences of stump campaigning and presidential debates on political interest are more closely investigated while controlling voters' age. In Korean electoral behavior, age seems most important among sociological predictors. This study has incorporated age in the candidate choice model and found out that older voters significantly tended to vote for governing candidates and while younger voters tended to vote for opposition candidates. Age was also found to effect Korean voter turnout substantially. Although the younger voters in general lack political interest, as people age, they began to regard politics relevant for their lives. Thus, impact of stump

campaigning and presidential debates on electoral interest in the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections should also depend on different age groups.

Operationalization of Political Interest

There are many ways of operationalizing political interest. Van Deth (1990, 281-87) has employed the most comprehensive measure of political interest. To reduce ambiguity and unreliability of the self-rating question of political interest, Van Deth included in his scale for political interest: subjective interest, general interest in the survey, reading about politics in the newspaper, discussing politics with friends, attending a political meeting, and closeness to political parties. His six indicators represented "one for subjective interest, another for external observation, three for positive salience of politics, and one for party identification (286)." He used this scale to compare political interest among three countries, the Netherlands, West Germany and the United States. He found that during the late 1970s the level of political interest was highest in the United States, moderately lower in West Germany and lowest in the Netherlands.

Another method measuring political interest was developed by Verba and Nie (1972, 367-69). Their "Index of Psychological Involvement in Politics" was composed of several indicators such as general interest in politics, engagement in political discussions and media utilization for political purposes. Both of these methods of operationalizing political interest use people's general political interest. This general interest, however, may not be the same as particular interest in elections. Lipset (1981, 196-6) viewed political interest to be closely related to political crisis. For instance, Americans' political interest was very high during national emergencies such as the taking of U.S. hostages in Teheran, Watergate, and the Vietnam War (Bennett 1986, 51-52). With these exceptions,

people's interest in politics was usually higher during election campaigns than during non-election years. Thus, general political interest cannot fully capture the interest of particular campaign. Almond and Verba (1963) in their seminal work, *The Civic Culture*, used an indicator they named "Civic Cognition" to test for political interest. Bennett (1986) and Bennett and Bennett (1989) called theirs "Political Apathy Index" after combining political interest and electoral interest. By indexing the general and particular campaign interest variables, these authors were able to measure more precisely voters' political interest.

In this study, direct "interest in election" is used due to the lack of indicators in the dataset.¹ This study, then, examines only partial political interest of Korean voters. However, this restriction still allows us to use a measure similar to those used in American electoral studies. For instance, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954), and Verba, Schlozman and Bradley (1995), and others have relied on a single variable, interest in elections that has been commonly used since the 1950s (Dalton 1996). This study examines specifically Korean voters' interest in the 1992 and 1997 Korean presidential elections. The survey question used was "How much were you interested in the [Presidential] election?"—"very interested, somewhat interested, not much interested or not at all."

¹ It should be noted that the data used in this analysis represent the most comprehensive study of the Korean electorate to date. However, due to the nature of the data only a partial examination of political interest of Korean voters is allowed.

Literature Review

Sociological Effects

Many studies have shown that there is a higher relationship between sociological variables and interest in elections (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 143-80; Hayes and Bean 1993b; Inglehart 1981; Jennings 1998; Milbrath and Goel 1976, 107-27 and 116-8; Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1994; Van Deth 1990, 301-12; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Among the sociological variables, education is the most significant (Bennett 1986, 68). For example, those who have higher level of education typically have greater skills and knowledge to assist them in understanding of politics better. Campbell (1962, 20) speculated that education is more likely to increase people's acquaintance with political facts, allows personal implications of political events, or maximize people's confidence in their own ability to act competently politically. Baxter and Lansing (1983, 43) argued that if voters were not equipped with "a broadened world view and a set of reasoning skills," they could not be interested in elections. Even if some voters are interested in elections, their interest may be extinct when faced with complexities.

Another main indicator is age. The older tend to become more interested in elections. The younger voters traditionally lack interest in politics and elections. In addition, they tend to move more often than their older counterparts. It is not until one reaches one's thirties that their lives become more stable: employment or family, they are about to conceive politics as relevant for their lives (Van Deth 302-3).

Gender is also significantly related to political interest. While studies show

that the stereotyping role of the female is longer true (Van Deth 1990), there are many studies that suggest that women are less interested in the politics. According to Lazarsfeld et al. (1940, 45), for instance, "33 percent of the men but only 23 percent of the women professed great interest in the election." Lipset (1981, 206) found that women in most countries were expected to have less concern with politics due mainly to the demands of a homemaker and mother.

Although existing literature argues that sociological factors are strongly significant, their effects on political interest have not been thoroughly studied. For instance, while studies indicated these sociological variables are interrelated on their effects on political interest (Van Deth 1990), there are few empirical studies to test these arguments. According to Sapiro (1983, 91), women have had a more difficult time obtaining formal education. Recently there is more opportunity for women to go to colleges than there was prior to the Second World War. Although women, in general, are less interested in politics, the more educated women tend to be interested in national and international affairs. In examining the relationship between education and interest in presidential elections for men and women, Baxter and Lansing (1983) claim that the interest gap between men and women decreases with increases of educational levels. They found that education effects campaign interest for women more than men. Despite their theoretical arguments on interaction effects, thorough empirical analysis has been rare due to the problem of multicollinearity between sociological variables and/or their interaction terms. Multicollinearity is caused by large variances and the estimates of the regression coefficients are highly imprecise (Kmenta 1997). The best way to take care of multicollinearity is to exclude the problem variable from the model. However, this raises

the question of which is more important, methodological or theoretical considerations? Although it is true that any finding contaminated by collinearity cannot be interpreted properly, theoretical arguments about sociological interaction terms and political interest cannot be totally disregarded, unless the collinearity is far too serious (Studlar and Moncrief 1997). Moreover, if there is a remedy such as using centered variables, one does not have to exclude variables that cause multicollinearity. Examination of these variables should satisfy both theoretical and methodological considerations. This chapter includes interaction terms between age, gender, and education in the model of interest in elections.

Another sociological indicator that should significantly affect Korean electoral interest is region. Since the early electoral studies (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944), region has been a major factor in explanation of voting behavior. Korea has endured severe regionalism that is mainly economic. Despite their similar size of population and land, the Southeast region of the country is more developed and contains the largest area of the industrial facilities, while the Southwest region is the nation's agricultural heartland. This regionalism has had a direct impact on presidential elections, with all past four presidents coming from the Southeast (C. Park 1993; K. Cho 1998; K. Lee 1997).

Media Effect

Most studies of political interest or campaign interest have focused on the factors such as age, education, and gender. Until recently the impact of mass media has been neglected (Weaver, Drew and Wu 1998). One reason is the difficulty in measuring this media impact. Another is rapid growth of the media, and finally the literature on the

media is inconclusive. Before the Second World War, direct effects were assumed, and after the war, studies found that effects of media had minimal effects (Kinder and Sears 1985, Patterson 1980; Klapper 1960; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954). However, more recent and refined models deny both these two extreme arguments. Media perform a significant role in agenda-setting, framing—how the media select to portray the issues they deal with—and priming—when an activated part of thought spreads to other parts of the network—(Krosnick and Brannon 1993; Beck 1991; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Roberts and Maccoby 1985). Media impact is also contingent on audience characteristics (Erbring, Goldenberg and Miller 1980). Those who perceive media as favoring certain candidates tend to regard media as hostile rather than neutral or supportive (Beck 1991).

The study of media's affects on the electoral process have focused primarily on its portrayal of who is winning or the impact of campaigning events, but rarely have there been studies on the media's impact on arousing interest in politics. Only recently have scholars begun to address this aspect of the media and elections. One study indicated "those with high levels of interest in politics were more likely to seek reinforcement, more likely to seek media help in making voting decision, more likely to seek information, and also more likely to follow the media coverage, to enjoy the excitement of the campaign" (Miller 1991, 20). His argument is that people's interest in politics continuously affects their media use. Those who have low interest in politics may not want or seek political information. However, we need to be more careful about direction of the relationship between media and political interest. The precise role of the media in the electoral process is yet to be determined, but what is accepted is that the media's role in the political process is increasing (Zaller 1992). Most American voters claim that the

media is their primary source for political information and television is the most believable form of news (Glynn et al. 1999).

There has been a long history regarding the media and politics. A central issue involves the causal relationship. Do the media cause people to discuss politics, or does the people's interest in politics cause the media to report on the election? While a number of studies have attempted to address this issue, the result is that none have been successful and most agree that relationship is two-way. However, nearly all agree that media perform an increasingly important role in the electoral process. The media may not tell the voter what to think, but they do tell them what to think about. Mondak (1995), for example, suggests that media exposure fuels political discussion, not vice versa. He collected data from a post-election survey by a quasi-experimental design. He surveyed Allegheny County in Pennsylvania and Cuyahoga County in Ohio simultaneously. Voters in the Cleveland, Ohio could read local newspapers while those in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania could not during the 1992 campaign owing to a newspaper strike in Pittsburgh. Before the author started his experiment, he had found that there was a strong similarity across many individual-level sociological characteristics between these two areas so that any difference between the two cities was not caused by the sociological characteristics of the two cities. The Pittsburgh newspaper strike significantly affected local House campaigns. Pittsburgh voters did not discuss the local elections as much as their counterparts in Cleveland, since Pittsburgh residents obtained less information on the local congressional elections. Mondak's study indicates that news reports offer some topics of the political discussions, not vice versa. One can therefore deduce from his study that mass media surely propel voters' interest in

elections. Glynn et al. finally argued that “even the most politically disenfranchised and disinterested people find major campaigns hard to avoid, especially given their play on television” (1999, 440).

Do the media perform a similar function in Korean elections as in America? Holt-Bucha and Kaid (1995) and Gurevitch and Blumler (1990, 311) assert that practices of the American political communications industry are popular in other countries. According to these authors, American video-politics is characterized by the dominant role of television, the prevalence of images rather than issues, and the professionalization of political actors.

To examine the role of the political communications in Korea this chapter examines the effects of street speeches, televised campaign advertisements and speeches in the 1992 election, and televised presidential debates, campaign commercials and campaign speeches in the 1997 election.² Hellweg, Pfau, and Brydon (1992, 101-2) argued that American presidential debates on television were among the most watched political programs and were one of the most important events to occur during the campaigning. They found that eighty percent of Americans viewed at least one debate in the 1960 election, and nearly 90 percent watched at least one in 1976. Presidential debates have reached more than 100 million people. Joslyn (1990) indicated that unlike other kinds of political campaign, presidential debates do not allow the candidates to manipulate the audience. In addition, voters learn from debates about issues and differences between candidates (Hellweg, Pfau and Brydon 1992; Zhu, Milavsky and Biswas 1994). Finally, Weaver and Drew (1995) claimed that viewing presidential

debates was the strongest predictor on being interested in the 1992 U.S. presidential election. Televised presidential debates were introduced for the first time in the 1997 Korean presidential election and were seen by millions of viewers (Shim 1997). Television emerged as a powerful campaign method in Korean politics. Presidential debates have become an important means of communication and should draw attention to the election in Korea.

Electoral interest model of this chapter also controls campaign commercials and speech on television. They were also introduced in Korea to reduce tension, disorders, and huge expenses associated with stump campaign (H. Kwon 1997; Tak, Kaid and Lee 1997). Korean electoral interest must have been provoked by televised campaigning speeches made by the candidates and nationally well-known persons who support a candidate. The television coverage of questions and answers at the *Kwanhoon Club* where major candidates answered almost any kinds of questions from the reporters were very popular (H. Kwon 1997). Additionally, there has been an explosion of televised political advertisements. “No other medium [than electoral commercials on television] can bring a given message to millions of viewers nationally” (Glynn et al. 1999, 432). Each presidential candidate was allowed to place ten commercials on the electronic media (five on radio and five on television) in 1992 (Tak, Kaid and Lee 1997) and to place twenty commercials in the 1997 election (Shim 1997). Thus, one expects that campaign speeches and political advertisements on television should have a substantial impact voters' interest in the presidential elections.

Prior to the 1997 presidential election, major candidates gave speeches directly to

² These variables are measured by asking respondents whether they experienced the events or not. For

the people with tens of thousands of people gathering in a single area. Since “giant political rallies were norm of the past Korean elections” (J. Shim 1997, 17), one expects that street speeches would increase electoral interest of a large number of voters. Politicians who had rhetorical skills and eloquence before mass audiences became popular leaders, such as Kim Young-Sam or Kim Dae-Jung. Yet, these open speeches also produced disruptions based primarily on regionalism. When candidates from a different region were speaking in these large open areas people often hurled stones at the candidates and fight occurred between supporters of the candidates and those from the local region. Some candidates, consciously or unconsciously, made more regionally antagonistic remarks in order to increase support in their own home region (H. Choi 1996). Stump speeches also had the problem that candidates attempted to show their popularity and mobilize supporters by paying people to attend these speeches. Preparing for street speeches was very expensive for candidates and was one of the main reasons for corruption in Korean elections. Two presidents, Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo, were sentenced to prison on charges of corruption tied to their excessive campaign expenditure—expenditures where a large proportion was of the money was allocated for stump speeches (J. Shim). Shim further asserts that Kim Young-Sam spent more than one billion dollars in the 1992 election mostly to gathering crowds for his rallies. To resolve this kind of vicious cycle, Korea banned massive street speech from the 1997 presidential election. Despite its negative side effects, stump campaigning should be an important contributor to electoral interest in the 1992 election.

more, see Appendixes 5-6b.

Candidate-Centered Politics

In order to examine voters' interest in Korean presidential elections, this chapter develops a model that also includes the popularity of major candidates. Unlike many Western countries, Korea does not have strong independent parties. The Liberal Party that had dominated Korean politics right after its independence was created and developed by President Rhee to keep power and to erect supra-partisan politics (K. Yoon 1995). Governing parties developed later were also created to publicize policies and issues initiated by administration or the KCIA under the military rule. Thus, ruling parties were pseudo-military group that followed the orders from the leader and failed to adjust different interests of the society (K. Yoon). To fight against the military governments and their parties, opposition parties were also authoritatively managed and only loyalty to the leadership in the party was allowed. When General Chun took power after assassination of President Park in late 1979, he banned most existing parties and politicians including Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung because they were “corrupt,” and allowed only docile parties. These parties cooperated with the ruling Liberal Justice Party and became “friend parties” to the ruling party (S. Koh 1995). Both Kims formed the New Korean Democratic Party just prior to the 1985 Assembly election, and it won 103 seats in the election to lead democratic reforms. Thus, Korean politics has been dominated by a few well-known figures. It is boss politics. Major presidential candidates such as Kim Dae-Jung, Kim Young-Sam or Lee Hoi-Chang who was nominated in 1997, all have wielded powers in Korean politics. This results in personal loyalties, not party loyalties. Therefore, it is expected that voters' personal orientation toward a candidate should arouse their interest in politics. Respondents' identification

with two major candidates in each election— Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung in 1992 and Kim Dae-Jung and Lee Hoi-Chang in 1997—is incorporated to the model to determine their impacts on interest in elections.

Methods

The first step in analyzing political interest in Korean elections is an examination of the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the model, as shown at Appendixes 5, 6a and 6b. All the independent variables employed in the model are free of multicollinearity.³ This chapter controlled several interaction variables between age, education and gender based on the literature of political interest to determine their interactive significance on voters' campaign interest. By using centered sociological terms, models of this chapter are free of multicollinearity that is commonly found in incorporating interaction terms.

Since the dependent variable, electoral interest, is ordinal, as shown in Table 9a on *p.* 201, ordinal logit regression is employed instead of regular OLS. Problems of using OLS for models whose dependent variable is ordinal are similar to those of using OLS for models whose dependent variable is dichotomous, as shown in Chapter 3.

³When there is a severe multicollinearity problem in the model, STATA automatically deletes variables that cause the problem. None of the variables including interaction terms both in the 1992 and 1997 models were deleted. By applying the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) rules to the models (Chatterjee and Price 1991), the basic models that do not include interaction terms are free of collinearity problems. Yet, full models that include interaction terms cannot avoid high multicollinearity. For instance, the largest VIF is 30.09 that is much greater than the cutoff-point, 10, and the mean of all the VIF is 7.01, that is also much larger than 1, the cutoff-point, in the 1992 model. In the 1997 model, VIF is 32.03 and its mean is 7.96. Thus, the interaction terms surely cause multicollinearity problem to the full models. Since these high multicollinearities are caused by adding interaction terms to the regression model, one remedy to improve computational accuracy is to use centered independent variables in such a way that $x_{ik} = X_{ik} - Xbar_k$, where $Xbar_k$ is mean of X_{ik} . After using these centered sociological variables, none of these causes any multicollinearity problem. In the 1992 model, for instance, VIF of “men” is only 1.07 whereas that of “men” is 30.09 before employing centered variables. The highest VIF is 1.90 and mean is 1.43 and the mean is not considerably greater than 1. The 1992 model is free of multicollinearity. In addition, in the

McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) three decades ago introduced models using ordinal level dependent variables through the extension of binary logit. According to Long (1997), as an ordered dependent variable y is considered to offer incomplete information about the underlying latent variable y^* , the measurement equation can be expressed:

$$y_i = m, \text{ if } \tau_{m-1} \leq y_i^* < \tau_m \text{ for } m = 1 \text{ to } J \quad (1)$$

where, τ 's are threshold.

The final categories 1 and J runs from $\tau_0 = -4$ and $\tau_J = 4$. For example, by using three ordinal categories of our dependent variable, electoral interest, measure equation can be:

$$\begin{aligned} y_i = 1 &\Rightarrow \text{not much interested if } \tau_0 = -4 \leq y_i^* < \tau_1 \\ y_i = 2 &\Rightarrow \text{somewhat interested if } \tau_1 \leq y_i^* < \tau_2 \\ y_i = 3 &\Rightarrow \text{very interested if } \tau_2 \leq y_i^* < \tau_3 = 4 \end{aligned}$$

The structural model using ordered dependent variables is

$$y_i^* = \alpha + \beta x_i + g_i e$$

where, x_i is a row vector. The first column is 1 for the intercept and column $k + 1$ is shown as x_k for the i^{th} observation. β is column vector of structural coefficients.

As with other logit model, ordinal logit model has a logistic distribution of g with mean of 0 and a variance $\pi^2/3$. Its probability density function is

$$f(g) = \exp(g) / [1 + \exp(g)]^2$$

and its cumulative distribution function is $\Lambda(g) = \exp(g) / [1 + \exp(g)]$. Finally the ordered logit model is:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Interest in Elections} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Edu} + \beta_2 \text{Age} + \beta_3 \text{Men} + \beta_4 \text{Age*Edu} + \beta_5 \text{Men*Edu} \\ & + \beta_6 \text{Men*Age} + \beta_7 \text{SW} + \beta_8 \text{SE} + \beta_9 \text{Stump (1992 only)} + \\ & \beta_{10} \text{TVspeech} + \beta_{11} \text{TVads} + \beta_{12} \text{TVdebate (1997 only)} + \end{aligned}$$

1997 model, the highest VIF is 1.88 and mean is 1.44. Thus one can accurately interpret the coefficients of the model. For more on interaction terms, see Allen (1997) and Neter et al. (1996).

$$\beta_{13}YS (1992 \text{ only}) + \beta_{14}DJ + \beta_{15}Lee (1997 \text{ only}) + g e$$

where Edu: Education

Age: Age

Men: Gender

Age*Edu: interaction term for age and education

Men*Edu: interaction term for men and education

Men*Age: interaction term for men and age

SW: those who live in the Southwest (*Honam*) area

SE: those who live in the Southeast (*Yongnam*) area

Stump: Stump campaigns, available only in 1992

TVdebate: presidential debates on television, available only in 1997

TVads: campaign ads on television

TVspeech: speeches of candidates or their close supporters on television

YS: popularity of Kim Young-Sam, available only in 1992

DJ: popularity of Kim Dae-Jung

Lee: popularity of Lee Hoi-Chang, available only in 1997

Findings and Discussion

Table 9a shows that the dependent variable for the 1992 and 1997 data, interest in elections, has four ordinal categories: not at all, not much interested, somewhat interested, and very interested. Distribution of all categories looks fine, except the first one, "not at all," where there were only 19 observations in 1992 and 22 in 1997.⁴ Instead of excluding it, the "not at all" category is merged with "not much interested" category. The newly merged categories are shown in Table 9b on *p.* 202. Justification for the use of the three merged categories is shown in the last column of Table 10 on *p.* 203. Table 10 shows the predicted probabilities of the dependent variable of the 1992 and 1997 models. The 1992 model shows moderate ranges of predicted probabilities with the "not

⁴ The dependent variable, electoral interest with four categories, had variance problems in both 1992 and 1997. In the 1992 model, minimum predicted probability of "not at all" is .00 and maximum predicted probability is only .07, producing their difference at approximately .07. In addition, in the 1997 model, minimum predicted probability of "not at all" is .00, and maximum predicted probability is about .21. Their difference is also about .21. Since variations of the first category, "not at all" in both 1992 and 1997 models are too small, one cannot proceed further with the analysis of this dependent variable including four different categories.

much interested" (.450) and "somewhat interested" (.406) categories and greater ranges with "very interested" (.777). In the 1997 model, ranges or variations of predicted probabilities of all three categories look better than those of the 1992 model. The "somewhat interested" category has a moderate range (.436) since its minimum expected probability is .033 and maximum expected probability is .469. Yet, the other two categories have greater ranges: not very much interested (.687) and very interested (.906). In summary, the dependent variable, electoral interest in both years that includes three categories, has sufficient variations. Therefore, one can proceed with further analysis.

Findings of the ordinal logit regression are shown in Table 11a on *p.* 204 and goodness of fit of the models is in Table 11b on *p.* 205. The overall X^2 tests of all basic and full models that include interaction variables both in 1992 and 1997, is nearly zero. Therefore, one can easily reject null hypotheses that all coefficients in the models, except constants, are zero. Goodness of fit of models is only moderate. For instance, McKelvey and Zavoina's R^2 of the 1992 basic model is 14 percent and that of the 1997 basic model is higher, 25 percent.⁵ These somewhat lower explanatory powers of the models may indicate the models' poor specifications probably caused by important omitted variables, outliers, measurement errors, or abstract theories (Kennedy 1998). Most studies on political interest, however, have very low explanatory powers.⁶ Studies of political

⁵ Simulation studies of Hagle and Mitchell (1992) and Windmeiher (1995) indicate that McKelvey and Zavoina's R^2 is most accurately represent explanatory power of models that include ordinal outcomes.

⁶ R^2 is a coefficient of determination and is the square of the correlation coefficients between y and $yhat$. Most practitioners search for higher R^2 because a high R^2 is usually a good fit of models. Yet, a greater R^2 does not always indicate a good model. Since R^2 is significantly affected by the range of variation of the dependent variable, a high variance of the disturbance terms causes low R^2 . For more on R^2 , see Green (1997) and Kennedy. Average R^2 of local political interest among five different countries is .075 (Hayes and Bean 1993). R^2 of interest model based on SES variables, personal resources and family is .18 (Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997). Political interest model composed of marital and employment status has R^2 of .16 (Sapiro 1983). Finally, political Apathy Index examined by Bennett (1986) has the highest

interest should seek more meaningful indicators and comprehensive theories on political interest that clearly and fully explain voters' political interest. Full models that include three interaction terms in both years also do not have high explanatory powers.⁷ Comparing the difference between initial log likelihood and final log likelihood of these full models show nearly the same amount of goodness of fits as those of the basic models. That is, their addition to the models is only marginally useful for the models in general.

The basic models are described first. As expected, education was found to moderately affect electoral interest in 1992 but not in 1997. Respondents with higher education in 1992 were more likely to become highly interested in the presidential election, but different levels of education had no distinguishable effect on interest in 1997. In contrast, older voters were strongly interested in the 1997 election but not in the 1992 election. In terms of gender, men and women were almost equal in electoral interest in both years. Although statistically not significant one may argue that men were more interested in 1992 but women were more interested in 1997, judging by the directions of the coefficients. In fact, in a recent survey on 500 Korean high school students by the Bureau of Korea Women's Development, 34.4 percent of the girls answered they are interested in politics, while only 32.8 percent of the boys were (*Joongangilbo* Oct 21, 1999). Electoral interest of adult respondents polled after the presidential election and these high school students cannot be directly compared, but the political interest of Korean women has recently increased. Regional effects on electoral

explanatory power: from 23percent in 1972 to 28percent in 1960.

⁷ STATA does not provide R^2 of McKelvey and Zavoina or others except pseudo R^2 for models including interaction variables.

interest are very unexpected. Those living in the Southwest areas should have greater interest in the election since they supported their regional representative, Kim Dae-Jung. His election was a way to increase their political and economic status. Compared to the Southwest area, those in the Southeast showed less electoral interest in both years. This low interest may be a result of having already produced four out of the six presidents since Korea's independence in 1948. Their loss of interest may be a result of complacency.

Because of different electoral regulations in 1992 and 1997, the stump speech factor is only available in 1992 and television debate is only available in 1997, while campaign ads and speeches on television are available in both elections. Unlike sociological factors, participation at stump campaigning and viewing campaign activities through media were moderately or strongly significant to electoral interest in both years. Among many predictors of electoral interest in 1992, campaign speeches on the street were found to be most important. Television speeches by candidates or major party members tended to show significant effects on interest in elections in 1992. These two factors represent the nationwide popularity of outdoor rallies and candidate speeches on television that are similar to street speeches. Contrary to the expected outcome, campaign commercials on television did not matter in 1992. This lack of impact is probably because the commercials were not professionally created in 1992 and it was the first time campaign advertisements on television were used in Korea.

While television commercials in 1992 were not significant, however, they produced an important electoral impact in 1997. The technology for making advertisements had improved and their role in the 1997 campaign was an important

factor. Prior to the 1997 election commercials were composed of dull speeches, but by 1997 the candidates developed “pithy sound-bites” (Shim 1997, 17). Television speeches by candidates or their supporting figures also prompted voters towards higher electoral interest. Among several campaign activities, television debates in 1997 had a dominant impact, just like stump speeches had in 1992.

Those who preferred major candidates were more likely to have a greater interest in elections. Voters who liked Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung more showed higher electoral interest in the 1992, while voters who liked Kim Dae-Jung and Lee Hoi-Chang more than other candidates showed greater campaign interest. The impacts of the two major candidates on interest in the 1992 election were very similar, but those of the 1997 major candidates were quite different. Kim Dae-Jung not only had a greater impact than his opponent, Lee, but also than any other predictors in the 1997 model. His personal popularity may not have directly transferred to his win of the 1997 election, but it appears to have helped him.

In general, personal campaign experience and media events, and the preferences of major candidates seem to have a more consistent impact on electoral interest than sociological indicators. In other words, political recognition is more significant to electoral interest than factors that voters have formed through their lives.

The full models include the interaction terms on top of all the variables used in the basic models. It is apparent that the impact of regionalism, participation at the campaigning places, media impact, and the preferences for major candidates of the full models is similar to these variables in the basic models. A primary function of the full model is to determine how much impact these interaction terms had on campaign interest.

An interaction effect occurs when the effect of one variable changes, depending on other variable. Only the interaction term of age and education provided a strong impact in 1992 while gender and age was moderately significant in 1997. This selective significance suggests that the overall interaction terms of sociological factors do not have a significant and consistent impact on electoral interest.

Interpretation of interaction terms is easy when one of the two variables is a dummy, but it is complex when both variables are either ordinal or interval. For instance, the interaction effect of men and age variables in the 1997 full model, as shown in Table 11a is interpreted as follows. As Korean voters aged, their electoral interest also moderately increased among men compared to women. Older men were more interested in the 1997 presidential election than older women. However, interpretation of the interaction term of age and education in the 1992 full model is complex. According to Neter et al. (1996), interpretation of the interaction terms containing ordinal or interval variables depends on the coefficient signs of the two variables and their interaction term. For instance, when both signs of β_1 and β_2 are negative, and the sign of their interaction term, β_3 , is positive, the effect of β_3 is of an “interference” or “antagonistic” type on the dependent variable.⁸ The interpretation of the interaction term of age and education is as follows. The electoral interest gap between older and younger voters was reduced as educational levels of these voters increased in 1992.

The basic and full models show that not only sociological variables but also their interaction terms are found not to have a consistent and important influence on electoral

interest in the two presidential elections. To determine the precise effects of these variables on the interest in elections, a bivariate relationship between sociological factors—education, age, and gender—and electoral interest is presented first, as shown in Figure 16 on *p.* 232. Although there was no relationship between gender and electoral interest in 1997, the relationship between other sociological factors and electoral interest is statistically very significant in both years. The strength of their relationship is weak or moderate. Age was negatively related to electoral interest in 1992 since a larger number of older voters were not “much interested” in the election compared to younger voters. Yet, age was positively related to electoral interest in 1997. Many older voters were more interested than younger voters. Unlike the relationship between age and electoral interest, education was positively related to interest in the 1992 election, but negatively related in the 1997 election. As educational levels increased, the number of “not much interested” voters in 1992 decreased and the number of “very interested” voters decreased in 1997. Finally, men were slightly more interested in the 1992 election, but gender difference was not found in the 1997 election. Men and women had almost same amount of interest.

Bivariate analysis of sociological factors shows their relationship with interest in elections is consistent compared to the result of the ordinal logit regression. This finding is different from that of the logit regression. The ordinal logit regression shows that none of the sociological variables had a significant effect in both 1992 and 1997 at the same time. Their effects are weak or moderate and specific to each election. Compared to the

⁸ According to Neter et al. (1996, 308-15), when both signs of β_1 and β_2 are negative, and the sign of β_3 (interaction effect) is negative, the effect of β_3 is of a “reinforcement” or “synergistic” type on the dependent variable.

findings of the basic and full models of ordinal logit regression, bivariate analysis of education, age, and gender, with that of interest shows a more consistent relationship with electoral interest. Before making a firm conclusion on the effects of sociological factors on electoral interest, however, it is important to examine their joint effects on electoral interest.

Table 12 on *p.* 206 shows joint Wald tests of complex hypotheses. Two or more variables are tested at the same time to determine whether they had a jointly significant impact on electoral interest (Long 1997). Since the Wald test has a X^2 distribution, each set of sociological variables has X^2 and its statistical significance. Table 12 shows that among combinations of age and education, gender and education, and gender and age, only the joint effects of age and education are consistently significant across all models. Joint effects of gender and age are statistically significant only in the 1992 basic and full model. Yet, the combination of gender and education is only significant in the 1992 basic model. These three combinations of two sociological variables also indicate their irregular impact on interest in Korean elections. In addition, the joint effects of the three interaction terms were significant in 1992, but not in 1997. However, joint effects of all three sociological variables were consistently significant across all basic and full models. Their joint significance was also confirmed by the combined significance of all the three sociological variables and their three interaction variables.

To recapitulate, the ordinal logit analysis of sociological variables and their interaction terms indicate poor performance of these factors on electoral interest, but one cannot completely deny their impacts on electoral interest. The bivariate relationship of sociological variables and electoral interest was still statistically significant, although

weak, and gender was not distinguishable in the 1997 election. The importance of a single sociological variable, combinations of two, or their interaction terms as explanatory factors on the electoral interest is overall irregular or weak. Yet, their impact on electoral interest is noticeable when combined as all the three sociological variables, or all the three sociological variables and their interaction terms.

Since stump campaigning in 1992 and presidential debates in 1997 influenced voters' interest in elections more significantly than other predictors, it is useful to determine how much they precisely affected each category of the dependent variable, interest in elections. Korean voters are divided into two groups for each of the elections: those who participated in stump speeches and those who did not in 1992, and those who watched presidential debates on television and those who did not in 1997. Table 13 on *p.* 207 shows that among those who did not view street campaigning, the probability of voters being "somewhat interested" or "very much interested" in the 1992 election was almost the same: 44 percentage to 43 percentage. Among those who watched street campaigning, the probability of being "somewhat interested" in the election dropped to 23 percent while those who were "very interested" increased to 73 percent. About two-thirds of those who watched stump campaigning became very interested in the 1992 election.

The effect of a major campaign event in 1997, presidential debates on television, was nearly identical to that of stump campaigning in 1992. Among those who did not watch presidential debates, only a quarter of the voters were "very interested" in the election. Yet, the number of those who became "very interested" when they viewed debates on television, almost doubled to 46 percent. In short, in both 1992 and 1997,

interesting campaigning events such as stump campaigning and televised presidential debates drew the attention of many voters. “Very interested” voters were most positively affected by stumps and presidential debates. While Table 13 shows the impact of the two campaigning events on each category of interest in the elections, figures below visually describe their impact on electoral interest depending on different age groups.

Figures 17a, 17b, 18a and 18b on *p.* 233-6 respectively provide conditional expected probabilities for age across different outcomes of the dependent variable.⁹ Figures 17a and 17b compare two groups in 1992 to determine how much each category of electoral interest is different in terms of age. Figure 17a indicates that among those who did not experience stump campaigning, as age levels increase, different expected probabilities of interest are visualized. In terms of voters who were “not much interested” in elections, different age levels slightly increased their electoral interest. Almost the same pattern is found among “somewhat interested” voters, although their probabilities are much higher than those who were “not much interested.” Unlike these two groups of voters, however, 1992 voters who were “very interested” in elections should show slightly decreasing probabilities of interest as age levels increase. Age positively affects respondents who are “not much” or “somewhat interested” in the 1992 election, but negatively affects “very interested” voters.

Figure 17b shows a group who experienced stump campaigning. Line patterns of Figure 17b look adequately different from those of Figure 17a. “Not much” and “somewhat interested” voters of Figure 17b have similar shapes of electoral interest, as age levels expand. Yet, the probabilities of these two groups of voters in 1997 are lower

than those of the same groups in 1992. This means those who are “not much interested” or “somewhat interested” in the election are negatively affected by experiencing stump campaigns. Although stump campaigning once drew as many as one million people at one time, they were occasions of violence. These negative aspects of stump campaigning reduced interest in elections of those who experienced it. However, although age weakly and negatively influences electoral interest, the probabilities of those who were “very interested” were much higher than those voters who did not experience them. This group was positively affected by street speeches, unlike the other two groups. In short, among those who experienced stump campaigns, the levels of impact of "not much interested" or "somewhat interested" voters were reduced, compared to the levels of those who did not attend stump campaigns. For those with “very interested” voters, interest among stump-experienced voters was still higher than interest among those who did not attend stump meetings. In terms of age, its effect on electoral interest was weak in 1992. Slopes of lines are gentle. One may argue, although statistically only minimally significant, that there were more “very interested” people among younger voters while there were more “not much” or “somewhat interested” people among older voters in 1992.

Figures 18a and 18b were created by comparing those who watched television presidential debates in 1997 and those who did not. A conditional variable of these two figures is also age. According to Figure 18a, among those who did not watch presidential debates, the line indicating "not much interested" voters gently goes down as voters become older. That is, there were more “not-much interested” voters among younger voters than among older voters, unlike the same group in 1992. The shape of the line is

⁹ Since most ranges between maximum and minimum predicted probabilities, as shown in Table 10, are

similar to voters who are "somewhat interested." Unlike these two groups of voters, respondents who are "very interested" show steeply increasing probabilities as they become older. Age only positively affects this group. In summation, among those who did not watch presidential debates, age positively affects "very interested" voters, while age negatively affects "not much interested" and "somewhat interested" voters.

Compared to Figure 18a, Figure 18b shows almost the same patterns, but their predicted probabilities are totally different. An important difference between Figures 18a and 18b is that presidential debates more negatively affect those whose electoral interest was "not much interested" or "somewhat interested." Compared to the probabilities of those groups who did not watch presidential debates, the probabilities of "not much interested" or "somewhat interested" respondents who watched debates are lower. Presidential debates lessened their levels of electoral interest. Presidential debates sometimes contained verbal attacks, assertion or policies without sound foundations, and some of the same questions in different rounds of debates that might have lowered their interest in elections. Age effect on the "not much interested" electorate is nearly negligible and that on "somewhat interested" voters is minimal and negative. In contrast, those who were "very interested" in elections were very positively affected by viewing presidential debates. Their levels of becoming electorally interested were about 25-30 percent higher than that of those who were "very interested" but did not watch presidential debates. The first-ever presidential debates aroused lots of excitement in these highly interested voters. Further, age positively affected this group and there were more "very interested" voters among older voters than younger voters. In short,

between .2 and .8, the lines of these figures are linear.

presidential debates provided a significant impact on election interest depending on age. For those who viewed debates and were “very interested”, predicted probabilities are highest and positively increasing, as age goes up. Those voters who were “not much” or “somewhat interested” voters were not affected by viewing presidential debates and age impact was weak.

In sum, depending on the voters' experiences in the four groups—those who experienced stump speeches and those who did not in 1992, and those who watched television debates and those who did not in 1997—age significantly affected voters with three different kinds of interest in 1997 but not in 1992. Both street speeches in 1992 and presidential debates in 1997 produced two extremities: voters who were “not much interested” or “somewhat interested” were negatively affected, and those who were “very interested” were positively affected. Age also produced other kinds of extremities: there were more “not much interested” or “somewhat interested” voters among older voters than younger voters in 1992. However, there were more voters who were “very interested” among younger voters in 1992. Yet, age impact was significant in 1997 and overall older voters were “very-interested and younger voters were “not much” or “somewhat interested.”

Conclusion

This chapter attempts to understand what motivates the Korean electorate to become interested in the presidential elections. Through the use of an ordinal logit model this chapter has examined the sociological factors and their interaction terms. In addition, included in the model were stump campaigns, media effects—presidential debates, campaigning advertisements, and speeches on television—and candidate

popularity. Examination of these predictors on interest in Korean elections is based on the earlier finding that electoral interest highly matters on the choice of presidential candidates and voter turnout. Chapters 2 and 3 found that the Korean electorate who was highly interested in the election was more likely to go to the poll and vote for the ruling candidates while the less-interested citizen was less likely to turn out. When they went to the polls, the less interested voter was more likely to vote for opposition candidates.

By employing centered age, education and gender variables, this chapter accurately interprets impact of these sociological factors and their interaction terms on electoral interest, which commonly suffer from multicollinearity. The ordered logit model of electoral interest shows that age, education, or gender and their interaction terms are overall not significant or consistent in creating interest in Korean elections. Only age was consistently significant: it was marginally significant in the 1992 model and substantially significant in the 1997 model. When it comes to interaction terms, interaction effect of age and education in the 1992 model was very important, indicating that the interest gap between younger and older voters declined with increases of educational level. In the 1997 model, the interaction term for sex and age was moderately important. Older men were more interested in the election than older women. Except these several cases, sociological factors and their interaction terms did not matter on Korean electoral interest.

These findings do not mean, however, that social indicators are irrelevant to Korean electoral interest. Bivariate relationships between sociological factors and electoral interest are consistently significant, although their strength is weak. Additionally, joint tests of education, age and gender, and their interaction terms clearly

showed their significance for electoral interest. That is, although joint tests of combinations of two sociological variables, and the three interaction terms are not so consistently important, they are still significant constraints on Korean electoral interest when three social variables combined, or if the three sociological factors and their interaction variables considered as a group. Another interesting finding is that voters in the Southwest region were not as interested in elections as their fellow Koreans, while those from the Southeast had a significantly lower interest in elections in the 1990s. Considering the severe political and economic regionalism of these two areas, this finding should be given more attention in future studies. In conclusion, although two datasets can hardly become generalized, scholars should be more careful in employing sociological variables in their models since the effects of sociological factors are, in general, mixed on electoral interest.

Electoral interest of Korean voters was also greatly affected by the preferred candidate's campaign. Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young-Sam in 1992 and Kim Dae-Jung and Lee Hoi-Chang in 1997 provided a great deal of campaigning interest for the voters. This chapter shows that Kim Dae-Jung had a similar influence to that of Kim Young-Sam in 1992 but offered a greater impact than Lee in 1997, contributing to Kim Dae-Jung's win that year.

In addition, speeches by candidates or their close supporters on television had a significant impact on interest in elections in both 1992 and 1997. Yet, campaign advertisements on television were not important in 1992, probably because when they were first introduced on television in 1992, their quality was poor and did not appeal to voters. Five years later, however, their impacts mattered significantly.

It was street speeches and presidential debates that considerably affected interest in the election. Up to the 1992 election, massive stump campaigns were the norm in Korean elections. They mattered substantially in arousing voters' interest in elections. Despite their popularity, stump campaigns were too expensive, caused severe violence, and were banned in the 1997 election. Instead, the 1997 election introduced presidential debates on television. First time broadcasting of debates among major candidates drew millions of viewers across the country. While presidential debates replaced the significant role of stump campaigns, stump campaigns and presidential debates on television were two of the most important campaign events in the 1992 and 1997 elections, respectively.

Comparing two groups in terms of stump experience in 1992 and viewing of presidential debates in 1997, while controlling age, showed more the precise effects of these two election events on campaigning interest. In both elections, it was "very interested" voters whose interest predominantly and positively affected by the experience of stump speeches and presidential debates, as their age increased. "Not-much interested" and "somewhat interested" voters were not significantly affected by the campaign events. Age impact was also minimal.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

As Angus Campbell et al. examined American electoral behavior in two presidential elections, 1952 and 1956, in their book, *The American Voter*, this study investigated Korean voting behavior in the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections. The purpose of this study has been to examine how Koreans voted in the two elections. It was in the late 1990s that Korean voters elected an opposition candidate for the first time since its independence in 1945. To examine the Korean voting behavior, Korean presidential election data from the Korean Social Science Data Center were used to develop three models. The first was a candidate choice model that focused on what factors were most important in electing a president. The second was a turnout model that examined the factors most closely associated with voting turnout. The final model was a political interest model that examined what factors were associated with the voter's interest in the election.

Characteristics of Korean Electoral Studies

The context in which an election is held is critical for a complete understanding of electoral behavior of a country. Most electoral theories were developed half a century ago by American scholars. Their arguments on electoral behavior have been tested by later scholars both in America or other countries. Korean scholars have also applied their theories to investigate voter choice. While theories were being applied to Korean voters, however, certain conceptualizations had to be adjusted and some theories were not applicable due to specific Korean political context. There are several unique features that help in the comprehension of the Korean elections under study. Three factors are

particularly important to the Korean political system—political parties, the influence of the three Kims, and regionalism. Unlike other democratic countries, political parties of Korea are not mature. More than 90 parties have attempted to take power in the modern history of Korea and about five parties have seriously worked at one time during the last half century. Despite the many parties born and then disbanded, there was no change of government from the governing to opposition parties until the 1997 election.

Furthermore, all the ruling parties were conservative and most of the major opposition parties were progressive. These circumstances make it extremely difficult for the Korean electorate to develop deep attachments to a political party. Instead they have two distinctive orientations towards parties: one towards ruling parties and the other toward major opposition parties. This has forced Korean scholars to employ party orientations towards governing or opposition parties instead of party identification commonly used in Western countries. This study complies with these scholars.

Related to weakened status of parties is an enormous influence of a few political leaders in Korean politics. The three Kims—Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Pil—have ruled Korean politics for the last four decades. They played the key role in the outcomes of the three recent elections. When the three were divided, a ruling candidate, Roh Tae-Woo won the 1987 presidential election. When Kim Young-Sam in 1990 initiated three-party merger that included Kim Jong-Pil, he won in the 1992 election. Finally, in 1997 Kim Dae-Jung allied with Kim Jong-Pil and won over the protégée of Kim Young-Sam, Lee Hoi-Chang.

The influence of the Kims is also connected to regionalism. Although modern regional animosity began during the Park regime in the 1970s, recent regionalism

recurred in the 1987 election where four major presidential candidates consciously or unconsciously exploited the regional theme. Especially candidates representing the Southeast (*Youngnam*) and the Southwest (*Honam*) competed to take or hold power, based on the size of the voters and their regional differences.

Many studies have argued that regional cleavage has been so serious in Korean politics that sociological cleavages are no longer important. Therefore, unlike many studies on Western and other Third World Countries, this study employed a few sociological predictors. Only when there is a strong evidence of their significance based primarily on American and Korean literature were sociological variables used. For instance, electoral choice model incorporated age only and voter turnout model employed age and education. The political interest model used several sociological variables—age, education, gender, and their interaction terms, as argued by American studies although nearly no studies committed by Korean scholarship on political interest.

Candidate Choice Model

To achieve the first goal of understanding what factors contributed to victories in the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections a multinomial logit regression model was developed. Since interpretation of coefficients of multinomial logit regressions is usually complex, many figures were used to aid their interpretation. Kim Dae-Jung achieved most of his votes from the Southwest in 1992 while Kim Young-Sam received most of his votes from the Southeast in the 1992 election. Since the Southeast did not produce a candidate who directly represented the region for the first time in nearly forty years, the region divided its votes between Lee Hoi-Chang, the ruling candidate, and Rhee In-Je. This division contributed to Kim Dae-Jung's victory. The analysis also confirmed that

voters are intimately attached to leaders in Korean politics. In 1992 Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung retained most of their earlier supports and in 1992 Kim Young-Sam also enjoyed the support of former President Roh. In 1997 Lee received the support of the older Kim Young-Sam supporters. While Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young-Sam had been permanent political rivals, it has been widely known in Korea that the former Kim had more loyal supporters. As suggested by conventional arguments, the multinomial logit model showed that Kim Dae-Jung had more loyal supports than Kim Young-Sam. Yet, Monte Carlo simulation that re-ran the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections 1,000 times each showed that supporters for Kim Dae-Jung were more cohesive in 1997 but not in 1992. Those who had voted for Kim Dae-Jung in the 1992 election voted for him in great numbers in 1997. Those who had voted for Kim Young-Same in 1992 were almost equally scattered among the three major candidates, Lee, Kim Dae-Jung and Rhee in 1997. The simulation confirmed the traditional view of more loyal supporters of Kim Dae-Jung. Yet, unlike the conventional argument, most of who had voted for Kim Young-Sam in the 1987 election voted for him again in 1992 while Kim Dae-Jung lost many of his past supporters in 1992. The simulation showed significance of loyal voters in Korean elections to be elected.

In addition, multinomial logit regression and odds ratio plots discovered that all the predictors in the candidate choice model were very significant. The party orientation towards ruling or opposition parties constrained voters' choice of their candidates. Those who had governing party orientation substantially voted for Kim Young-Sam in 1992 and for Lee in 1997, while those who had opposition party orientation voted for Kim Dae-Jung both in 1992 and 1997. While party orientation mattered, evaluation of the three-

party merger in 1992 and single candidacy in 1997 were also important factors in candidate choice. After being defeated in the 1987 presidential election, Kim Young-Sam thought that the only way to win the next presidential election was to ally himself with other regional representatives, given the regional influence on Korean politics. The merger of his Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) with ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) and Kim Jong-Pil's New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) broadened his electoral support. At the same time, many voters disliked the merger. Kim Young-Sam had been a life-long opposition leader fighting for democracy and against military government. Almost the same story was repeated in 1997. After being defeated in 1992, Kim Dae-Jung realized that he could not become a president by himself. He made a single-candidacy contract with Kim-Jong-Pil who had been kicked-out from the merged New Korea Party. Kim Dae-Jung became a presidential candidate representing his and Kim Jong-Pil's parties, thereby appealing to both the Southwest and Central regions. Yet, many voters still did not like their contract because of the same reason they had criticized the three-party merger in 1990. Accordingly those who agreed with the merger and the single-candidacy contract voted for Kim Young-Sam in 1992 and Kim Dae-Jung in 1997 but those who disagreed with the merger and the single candidacy did not. In terms of the sociological terms, age was important. Older voters tended to vote for conservative candidates, that is, ruling candidates in Korean politics, and younger voters voted for progressive candidates or opposition candidates. In the 1997 election, however, Kim Dae-Jung also obtained supports from older voters. Kim realized that one of the major reasons for his past failures in the presidential elections was his overly liberal image. He accepted many conservative figures—former generals, police officers or the

KCIA members in his party. By his efforts to tame his strong image, he was benefited considerably from the older electorate.

Finally interest in the election was found to be very important. Those who were more interested in the election were more likely to vote for opposition candidates and those who were less interested were more likely to vote for ruling candidates. Relationship between electoral interest and choice of candidates can be compared to energy in physics. When an object is to be moved, it needs far more energy than when it stays in one place. Similarly, when voters wanted status quo, their interest was lower. When voters wanted the Korean government changed, their interest in the election was higher. This finding is very important to the explanation of the first peaceful change of government in Korea. Kim Dae-Jung, as an opposition candidate, was strongly aided by those who were highly interested in the election. The governing candidate, Lee's supporters were less interested in the election. The prediction of Lazarsfeld et al. half a century ago was strongly confirmed in the Korean elections. Those who were less interested in the election did not go to the polls. More voters who claimed to be less interested participated in the 1992 election and the ruling candidate, Kim Young-Sam, was benefited. Yet, in 1997 the less interested did not vote and the opposition candidate, Kim, was the beneficiary. This is because Lee's loss of support was a gain for the major opposition candidate, Kim Dae-Jung, and contributed to his win. While candidate choice is the ultimate act in the electoral process the results depends on voters turning out to vote. What were the main factors that contributed to the voters going to the polls in the Korean elections was examined in the voter turnout model.

Voter Turnout Model

In analyzing voter turnout, one need not avoid a problem of over-reporting of turnout. In the Korean data, there is about a 12 percent discrepancy between official figures and survey estimates of turnouts in the 1992 and 1997 elections. Since the original datasets do not contain weighted variables to adjust this difference, weighted variables were created to address the over-reporting problem. As Abramson, Aldrich or Teixeira claimed, findings and fitness of the models were so similar that one may conclude that even moderately over-reported Korean data could depict the real world.

Binomial logit regression of turnout found that most predictors mattered on the Korean voter turnout. Two sociological variables were controlled in the voter turnout model. As prior studies of Korean voter turnout indicated, age was found to be very important. Older voters were more likely to vote than younger voters both in 1992 and 1997. Yet, the level of education was not significant. The finding is consistent with that of several Central American countries. Studies of Honduras, Costa Rica and Nicaragua where voting rates are high have also found that the level of education is not important to turnout.

Compared to education and age, region had a mixed impact on turnout. In the 1992 election, the Southwest region was significant while the Southeast was not. In 1997, both regions were significant, although the Southeast was statistically more significant. The reason for the two regions' different influences was caused by the voters' different evaluation of the candidates representing their area. When voters of either region felt that a candidate from the other region had a greater chance to be elected, their probability of voting was higher than that of the other Koreans. For instance, when Kim

Young-Sam, the Southeast candidate, was in a better position to be elected than Kim Dae-Jung in 1992, the Southwest regional effect on voting turnout was significant. In 1997, when Kim Dae-Jung of the Southwest was in a more advantageous position, the Southeast regional effect was more significant. One interesting phenomenon in the 1997 election is that the Southwest regional impact was also significant. A possible explanation may be that voters living in the area knew that the 1997 election would be the last election bid for the aging Kim Dae-Jung, thus arousing a higher turnout.

The debate over the role of rural areas in Korean elections has generated a great deal of controversy. Up to 1980s, the rate of turnout in the rural areas was higher than that of urban areas. Yet, this argument needs to be reevaluated as Korean society is rapidly changing. As rural areas became more developed and mass communication is more pervasive, the distinction between rural and urban areas declines. Moreover, due to recent severe regionalism in Korea, voters in large cities in the Southwest and Southeast vote more than those living in rural areas of other regions

While most psychological factors were important to Korean voter turnout, party orientation had no effect on voting turnout in the 1992 election, while it had a major effect in the 1997 election. One explanation for the lack of party orientation influences is the three-party merger conducted before the 1992 election among the ruling DJP and two opposition parties, RDP and NDRP, confused Korean voters' orientation toward ruling/opposition parties in the 1992 election. Voters who had supported opposition parties could not easily change their attitude and favor a new ruling party that included opposition parties. Many of those who had been positively oriented toward the governing party also found it difficult to continue to support them in the 1992 election. In 1997,

however, the single-candidacy contract alliance between opposition candidates, Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Pil, did not cause the same confusion. Thus, those who had ruling/opposition party orientation had higher probability of voting than Independents in the 1997 election.

Turnout decision of Korean voters was also substantially dependent on the perceived fairness of the Central Election Commission (CEC). For the electorate, the role of the CEC as election supervisor was crucial. Those who regarded the CEC as fair turned out at a higher rate than those who did not. Furthermore, both elections showed that those who were politically efficacious also went to the poll more.

Among several psychological factors, electoral interest was the most important both in 1992 and 1997. Those who were more interested in elections participated in the elections more than those less interested. This finding greatly aids in the explanation of the 1997 candidate choice. Had those less-interested voters voted in the 1997 election, as they did in 1992, the ruling candidate, Lee, might have been elected. In order to clearly determine how these less-interested voters affected turnout, voters were divided into three groups: High-probability respondents, Average-probability respondents and Low-probability respondents. Considering that Low-probability respondents were in the twenties, were living in other than the Southwest and regarded the CEC unfair, it was expected that they would not vote in 1992. Yet, many of them actually voted even when their interest in the election was low, contributing to the election of the ruling candidate, Kim Young-Sam. However, most Low-probability respondents did not participate in the 1997 election. These were those who were in the twenties, were living in other than the Southwest and the Southeast, evaluated the CEC to be unfair, had lower efficacy, and

were Independent. They did not go to the polls, aiding the win of the major opposition candidate, Kim Dae-Jung.

The turnout model discovered interest in elections was very important to turnout. The candidate choice model found that those who were highly interested in the election were more likely to vote for the opposition candidate and those who were less interested were more likely to vote for the ruling candidate. Findings of these models indicate that interest in the election is a necessary component of the Korean candidate choice. The interest in election model directly addresses this issue.

Interest in Elections Model

Using ordered logit regression, the interest in election model attempts to understand what motivated the Korean electorate in the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections. Since empirical studies on political interest are nearly non-existent in Korean scholarship several of the traditional sociological variable found consistently in American literature are used in the model—age, education, and gender. Their interaction terms were also chosen as predictors in the model of interest in elections, based on this literature. Despite theoretical importance of these interaction terms, analysis of them has been neglected probably due to higher intercorrelation between the sociological variable and their interaction terms. To avoid this problem, the model used centered sociological variables and cured the multicollinearity problem completely and interpretation of regression coefficients was accurate.

The model found that age, education, or gender, and their interaction terms were overall not consistently important to interest in the Korean presidential elections. Only age is consistently significant: older voters were more interested in the election than

younger voters although it was marginally important in 1992. Yet direction of age impact was different in the two elections. Older voters were more interested in the 1997 election while younger voters were more interested in 1992. Only two interaction effects were significant: age and education in 1992 and men and age in 1997. Thus, the electoral interest gap between younger and older voters was reduced with the increase of educational levels of these voters in the 1992 election. Older males were more interested in the election than older females in 1997. The long-term characteristics of sociological variables may not be of sufficient significance to explain specific election interest. As S. Bae and D. Shin argued, since regional cleavages are clearly noticeable, evidence of sociological cleavages are minimal in their electoral effects in Korea.

Despite the irregular impact of sociological predictors and their interaction terms in the ordered logit regression, analysis of bivariate relationship and joint test of these variables indicated they were statistically significant to electoral interest in Korea. Generally, bivariate relationships between sociological factors and electoral interest were consistently significant between the two elections, although their strength is weak. Joint tests of the combination of not only all three sociological variables, education, age and gender, but also of these three variables and their interaction terms were found to be statistically significant. Thus, overall individual impact of sociological factors and their interaction terms is weak in the two elections, their bivariate relationship and joint effects as a group mattered on the Korean interest in the elections. The interest in election model additionally incorporated regional impact, as did models of candidate choice and voter turnout. The model produced an unexpected finding: the Southwest regionalism was statistically not significant and those in the Southeast were substantially less interested in

the two presidential elections. Their lack or reduction of interest should be carefully monitored in the future considering their higher activities of turnout and loyal support for the candidates representing their regions.

Compared to smaller impact of sociological variables and the regional variation on Korean electoral interest, presidential candidates were very important to electoral interest. Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung greatly increased voters' interest in the 1992 election as did Lee Hoi-Chang and Kim Dae-Jung in 1997. The two life-long democratic leaders, the two Kims, produced an increase in interest in the 1992 election while Kim Dae-Jung aroused interest in 1997.

Finally, several campaign events were examined. Media effects were enormous. Televised speeches by candidates and their close supporters had an important influence on electoral interest in both elections. Televised campaign ads also mattered significantly in 1997, but not in 1992. The poor quality of production and the early stages of development of television in campaigns help explain weak relationship found in 1992, but by 1997 these problems were resolved and television ads were associated with arousing interest in the campaign.

Among several campaign events, stump campaigns and presidential debates were most important to interest in the election. During the 1992 election stump speeches and public rallies were the primary means of political communication and were associated with an increased interest in the election. However, the expense and violence connected with them led to their banning and the televised presidential debates in the 1997 presidential election greatly boosted interest in the election.

While controlling age, the interest model also found that the three categories of the dependent variable, electoral interest, were affected differently by voters' experience or non-experience of these two major campaign events. Voters were found at the two extremes: 1) those who claimed to be "not much interested" or "somewhat interested" were negatively affected, and 2) those who claimed to be "very interested" were positively affected by watching either stump campaigning in 1992 or presidential debates in 1997. The impact was largest in 1997. In addition, age performed a different role in election interest depending on the election. In the 1992 election, older voters were more likely to maintain that they were "not much interested" in the election, while younger voters were more interested. In the 1997 election the older voters were more likely to be "very interested" in the election, while younger voters were "not interested" or "somewhat interested."

Future Research

Among the past fifteen presidential elections, this study has examined the two most recent elections, 1992 and 1997. The availability of data constrained the study to these elections. As a result the findings here must be viewed with caution because two elections do not provide the temporal sequence needed to confirm patterns of Korea's voting. Future studies should continue to investigate Korean electoral behavior by incorporating more data including panel data or time-series data.

In addition, it should be noted that many commonly used predictors of voting behavior were not incorporated in the models. For instance, economic indicators including future and past economic evaluations, and personal and national economic evaluations were only partly tested in this study. Korean electoral data should also

include more variables consistently: marriage status, mobility, a full range of economic variables, democracy, corruption, major issue variables, and general and specific political interest indicators.

Table 1

Major Candidates in Recent Korean Presidential Elections

	1987	1992	1997
Governing Candidate	<u>Roh Tae-Woo</u> (Roh) (Elected) (36.7%)	<u>Kim Young-Sam</u> (YS) (Elected) (42.0%)	Lee Hoi-Chang (Lee) (38.7%)
1 st Opposition Candidate	Kim Young-Sam(YS) (28.1%)	Kim Dae-Jung (DJ) (33.9%)	<u>Kim Dae-Jung</u> (DJ) (Elected) (40.3%)
2 nd Opposition Candidate	Kim Dae-Jung (DJ) (27.1%)	Chung Joo-Young (Chung) (16.2%)	Rhee In-Je (Rhee) (19.1%)
3 rd Opposition Candidate	Kim Jong-Pil (JP) (8.1%)		
Turnout Rate	89.2%	81.9%	80.6%

Note: 1st, 2nd and 3rd candidates are ordered according to their votes achieved at the election. Names in the parenthesis are their nicknames or shortened ones to distinguish them easily. The percentage under candidates indicates their respective vote rate.

Table 2a

Multinomial Logit Estimates of the 1992 Korean Presidential Election

	<u>Log [DJ v. YS]</u>	<u>Log [Chung v. YS]</u>	<u>Log [Chung v. DJ]</u>
<u>Pol orientation</u>	1.38***	.99***	-.39**
(opposition ↑)			
<u>Interest</u>	.48**	.08	-.40*
(very much ↑)			
<u>Merger</u>	-.88***	-.37***	.51***
(good ↑)			
<u>Prior Vote</u>			
87Roh	-.80**	-.26	.55*
87YS	-1.35***	-.42	.93***
87DJ	2.12***	-.21	-2.33***
<u>Region</u>			
Southwest	3.43***	-.11	-3.54***
Southeast	-.78***	-1.12***	-.34
<u>Age</u>	-.24**	-.35***	-.11
(older ↑)			
Constant	-2.28***	-1.21**	1.07

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (one-tailed t -test except "interest"). Comparison group is put behind slash(/).
 DJ stands for Kim Dae-Jung, YS for Kim Young-Sam and Chung for Chung Joo-Young.
 χ^2 (18): 861.29*** McFadden's R^2 : 0.48 McFadden's Adj R^2 : 0.46

Table 2b

Multinomial Logit Estimates of the 1997 Korean Presidential Election

	<u>Log [Lee v. DJ]</u>	<u>Log [Rhee v. DJ]</u>	<u>Log [Rhee v. Lee]</u>
<u>Pol Orientation</u> (opposition ↑)	-1.76***	-.11	1.65***
<u>Interest</u> (very much ↑)	-.39**	-.68***	-.29**
<u>United Candidacy</u> (agree ↑)	-.90***	-.67***	.23
<u>Prior Vote</u>			
92YS	.60**	.76***	.16
92DJ	-1.59***	-.67**	.92**
92Chung	.29	1.10***	.82**
<u>Region</u>			
Southwest	-2.45***	-2.29***	.16
Southeast	1.29***	1.10***	-.19
<u>Age</u> (older ↑)	.01	-.27***	-.29***
Constant	6.19***	3.19***	-2.99***

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (one-tailed t -test except “interest”). Comparison group is put behind slash(/).
 Lee stands for Lee Hoi-Chang, DJ for Kim Dae-Jung and Rhee for Rhee In-Je.
 $\chi^2(18): 834.95***$ McFadden’s $R^2: 0.41$ McFadden’s Adj $R^2: 0.39$

Table 3

Wald and LR Tests That Each Variable Has No Effect in the 1997 and
1992 Korean Presidential Elections

Indicators	W (Wald Test)		G ² (LR Test)	
	1997	1992	1997	1992
<u>Pol Orientation</u>	148.98***	74.53***	194.12***	81.39***
<u>Interest</u>	14.57***	5.94**	14.84***	6.14**
<u>United Candidacy</u>	44.67***		46.85***	
<u>Merger</u>		29.56***		31.09***
<u>Prior Vote</u>				
92YS	6.41**		6.49**	
92DJ	14.65***		15.75***	
92Chung	8.05***		7.89***	
87Roh		5.26**		5.21**
87YS		12.65***		13.14***
87DJ		37.80***		42.37***
<u>Region</u>				
Southwest	20.44***	35.35***	31.11***	54.58***
Southeast	24.86***	18.59***	27.18***	20.18***
Age	11.89***	14.06***	12.38***	14.81***

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (one-tailed t -test except "interest").

Table 4

Discrete Change in Predicted Probabilities of the 1997 and 1992
Korea Presidential Elections

Indicators	1997				1992		
	Lee	DJ	Rhee		YS	DJ	Chung
<u>Pol Orientation</u>	-0.28	0.19	0.09		-0.25	0.20	0.06
<u>Interest</u>	-0.02	0.09	-0.07		-0.06	0.06	-0.01
<u>United Candidacy</u>	-0.12	0.16	-0.05				
<u>Merger</u>					0.14	-0.14	-0.01
<u>Prior Vote</u>							
92YS*	0.06	-0.16	0.10				
92DJ*	-0.24	0.27	-0.03				
92Chung*	-0.05	-0.17	0.22				
87Roh					0.14	-0.14	-0.00
87YS*					0.22	-0.21	-0.01
87DJ*					-0.37	0.48	-0.12
<u>Region</u>							
Southwest*	-0.26	0.49	-0.23		-0.54	0.68	-0.15
Southeast*	0.18	-0.28	0.10		0.21	-0.11	-0.10
<u>Age</u>	0.03	0.04	-0.06		0.07	-0.04	-0.05

Note: The discrete change is the centered change of one standard deviation around the mean. The discrete change of the dummy variables is 0 → 1 change. *Dummy variables.

Table 5a

Economic Model of Candidate Choice in the 1992 and 1997 Korean
Presidential Elections

	1992		1997	
	Ln [DJ v. YS]	Ln [Chung v. YS]	Ln [DJ v. Lee]	Ln [Rhee v. Lee]
<u>Pol orientation</u>				
(opposition ↑)	1.43***	.99***	1.75***	1.64***
<u>Interest</u>				
(very much ↑)	.54***	.08	.42***	-.31**
<u>Merger</u>				
(good ↑)	-.94***	-.37***		
<u>United Candidacy</u>				
(agree ↑)			.91***	.25**
<u>Prior Vote</u>				
Vote for Roh	-.80***	-.26		
Vote for YS	-1.23***	-.43	-.63***	.12
Vote for DJ	2.20***	-.22	1.64***	.92**
Vote for Chung			-.32	.78**
<u>Region</u>				
Southwest	3.62***	-.04	2.43***	.11
Southeast	-.70***	-1.13***	1.32***	-.18
<u>Age</u>				
(older ↑)	-.27***	-.34***	.00	-.29***
<u>National Economy</u>				
(better ↑)	.26**	-.01		
<u>Family Economy</u>				
(better ↑)			.07	-.21*
<u>Standard of Living</u>				
(higher ↑)	-.40**	.05	.03	-.59***
Constant	-2.24***	-1.30*	6.46***	-1.39**

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (one-tailed t -test except "interest"). Comparison group is put behind v.
Fit of the Model: in 1992 χ^2 (22): 865.23***, McFadden's R^2 : 0.49, and McFadden's Adj R^2 : 0.47, and in 1997 χ^2 (22): 845.09***, McFadden's R^2 : 0.42, McFadden's Adj R^2 : 0.41. DJ: Kim Dae-Jung, YS: Kim Young-Sam, Chung: Chung Joo-Young, Lee: Lee Hoi-Chang, and Rhee: Rhee In-Je.

Table 5b

Wald Tests That Each Economic Variable Has No Effect in the 1997 and 1992
Korean Presidential Elections

Indicators	<u>1992</u>	<u>1997</u>
National Economy	4.18*	
Family Economy		4.76**
Living Standards	3.16*	7.16***

Note: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (one-tailed t -test).

Table 6a

Logit Model of Turnout by Using Survey Data in the 1992 and 1997
Korean Presidential Elections

	1992		1997	
	Basic Model	Full Model	Basic Model	Full Model
Education	.07	.10	.03	.05
Age	.24**	.23**	.34***	.43***
Southwest	1.16**	1.25**	1.30**	1.15*
Southeast	-.12	-.11	.82***	1.09***
Democracy		.32*		
Efficacy				.65***
Fairness of CEMC	.52***	.49**	.51**	.49**
Party	-.23	-.24	.59***	.59***
Interest	1.40***	1.40***	1.41***	1.28***
Rural Area	.37	.38	.40	.38
Constant	-1.94**	-2.16***	-3.12***	-4.62***
X^2	80.03***	82.04***	140.31***	149.66***
McKelvey and Zavoina's R^2	.29	.29	.36	.39

Note: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. All t -tests are one-tail tests except that of "education" and "rural area."

Table 6b

Logit Model of Turnout by Using Weighted Data in the 1992 and 1997
Korean Presidential Elections

	1992		1997	
	Basic Model	Full Model	Basic Model	Full Model
Education	.06	.09	.03	.04
Age	.27**	.26**	.36***	.43***
Southwest	1.23**	1.34***	1.20*	1.10*
Southeast	-.16	-.15	.83***	1.04***
Democracy		.34*		
Efficacy				.57***
Fairness of CEMC	.56***	.53***	.39**	.37**
Party	-.29	-.31	.53**	.53**
Interest	1.42***	1.43***	1.40***	1.25***
Rural Area	.34	.35	.36	.33
Constant	-3.19***	-3.40***	-3.93***	-5.08***
X^2	77.55***	81.18***	103.25***	81.18***
McKelvey and Zavoina's R^2	.30	.31	.35	.37

Note: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. All t -tests are one-tail tests except that of "education" and "rural area."

Table 7a

Relationship between Turnout and City/Rural Areas, 1992

	Cities	Rural Areas	Total
Did not Vote	65 (7.10%)	14 (4.98%)	79 (6.58%)
Voted	851 (92.90%)	270 (95.07%)	1121 (93.42%)
Total	916 (100%)	284 (100%)	1200 (100%)

Note: $X^2(1) = 1.65, p = 0.20$

Table 7b

Relationship between Turnout and City/Rural Areas, 1997

	Cities	Rural Areas	Total
Did not Vote	85 (7.75%)	11 (4.98%)	91 (7.54%)
Voted	952 (92.25%)	164 (93.71%)	1116 (92.46%)
Total	1032 (100%)	175 (100%)	1207 (100%)

Note: $X^2(1) = 0.46, p = 0.49$

Table 8

Economic Model of Turnout in the 1992 and 1997
Korean Presidential Elections

	<u>1992</u>	<u>1997</u>
Education	.04	.04
Age	.24**	.34***
Southwest	1.11**	1.31**
Southeast	-.10	.83***
Fairness of CEC	.51**	.49**
Pty Orientation	-.26	.59***
Interest	1.40***	1.40***
Rural Area	.27	.35
National Economy	.19*	
Family Economy		-.06
Standard of Living	.33*	-.27
Constant	-2.85***	-2.45**
$X^2(10)$	83.68***	141.05***
McKelvey and Zavoina's R^2	30	38

Note: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. All t -tests are one-tail tests except that of "education" and "rural area."

Table 9a

Distribution of Electoral Interest (Original Four Categories)

Interest in Election	1992			1997		
	N	%	Cum. %	N	%	Cum. %
Not at all	19	1.58	1.58	22	1.84	1.84
Not much interested	104	8.62	10.20	124	10.35	12.19
Somewhat interested	336	27.86	38.06	468	39.07	51.25
Very interested	747	61.94	100.00	584	48.75	100.00
Total	1206	100.00		1198	100.00	

Table 9b

Distribution of Electoral Interest (Recoded Three Categories)

Interest in Election	1992			1997		
	N	%	Cum. %	N	%	Cum. %
Not much interested	123	10.20	10.20	146	12.19	12.19
Somewhat interested	336	27.86	38.06	468	39.07	51.25
Very interested	747	61.94	100.00	584	48.75	100.00
Total	1206	100.00		1198	100.00	

Table 10

Predicted Probabilities of the Dependent Variable, Interest in the Elections

Categories	N	Mean	Sd	Min	Max	Range
<u>1992</u>						
Not much interested	123	.112	.065	.013	.463	.450
Somewhat interested	336	.374	.098	.094	.496	.406
Very interested	747	.514	.157	.116	.893	.777
<u>1997</u>						
Not much interested	146	.096	.096	.005	.692	.687
Somewhat interested	468	.276	.131	.033	.469	.436
Very interested	584	.629	.213	.055	.961	.906

Table 11a

Ordinal Logit Model of Interest in the Korean Presidential Elections

Electoral Interest	1992		1997	
	Basic Model Coef.	Full Model Coef.	Basic Model Coef.	Full Model Coef.
edu	.20**	-.13*	-.03	-.05
age	-.10*	-.09*	.28***	.28***
men	.14	.15	-.08	-.05
age*edu		.13***		.03
men*edu		-.11		.17
men*age		.12		.21**
SW	.35*	.34*	.25	.24
SE	-.50***	-.50***	-.51***	-.50***
stump	1.28***	1.27***		
TVspeech	.80***	.79***	.42***	.44***
TVads	.15	.14	.33***	.33***
TVdebate			.94***	.90***
YS	.20***	.18***		
DJ	.22***	.21***	1.07***	1.08***
Lee			.35***	.35***
_cut1	.33 (.53)	-.24 (.41)	.82 (.45)	.19 (.29)
_cut2	2.46 (.53)	1.92 (.41)	2.83 (.46)	2.21 (.30)

Note: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, and *** $p < .01$. All t -tests are one-tail tests. Values in the parentheses are standard errors of cut-points.

Table 11b

Goodness of Fit: Ordinal Logit Model of Interest in the Korean Presidential Elections

	<u>1992</u>		<u>1997</u>	
	Basic Model	Full Model	Basic Model	Full Model
<i>N</i>	922	922	1117	1117
X^2	(10)=111.20	(13)=123.96	(10)=235.50	(13)=239.06
Prob> X^2	.00	.00	.00	.00
Initial Log Likelihood	-889.41	-889.41	-968.61	-968.61
Final Log Likelihood	-832.81	-827.43	-850.85	-849.08
McKelvey & Zavoina's R^2	.14		.25	

Table 12

Joint Wald Tests of Sociological Variables and their Interaction Terms

	age edu	men edu	men age	age edu men	age*edu men*edu men*age	age*edu men*edu men*age	age edu men
<hr/>							
<u>1992</u>							
Basic Model	18.48***	7.95***	3.35*	21.53***			
Full Model	8.72***	3.96*	2.83	10.97***	10.74***	32.25***	
<hr/>							
<u>1997</u>							
Basic Model	31.81***	0.55	21.00***	32.42***			
Full Model	30.09***	0.53	19.80***	30.43***	3.52	35.96***	

Note: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .50$, and *** $p < .01$. All t -tests are one-tail tests.

Table 13


Conditional Predicted Probabilities of Stump Campaign (1992) and of Television Debate (1997) on Electoral Interest (%)

		Not much Interested	Somewhat Interested	Very Interested
Stump (1992)	Not Watched	13	44	43
	Watched	4	23	73
TV debate (1997)	Not Viewed	28	47	26
	Viewed	13	41	46

Note: These probabilities are obtained from the predicted logit coefficients. All other variables are pressed at their mean.

Figure 1

Turnout Rate of Korean Presidential Elections



Note: Numbers in the parentheses are the order of presidency.

Figure 2


Map of Korea



Note: Source of the map is D. Shin (1999, xxi). This study divides Korea into five regions: 1) the Southwest (Honam) includes Cholla Pukdo, Chonju, Cholla Namdo, and Kwangju, 2) the Southeast (Youngnam) includes Kyongsang Pukdo, Taegu, Kyongsang Namdo and Pusan, 3) the Central area includes Choongchung Pukdo, Choongchung Namdo, and Taejon 4) Seoul area includes Seoul, Kyonggi Do and Incheon and finally 5) Kwangwon Do.

Figure 3


Hypothesized Model of Candidate Choice, the 1992 and 1997 Korean Presidential Elections



Note: "92" in the parenthesis indicates that the variable is used only for the 1992 model and "97" in the parenthesis indicates that the variable is used only for the 1997 model.

Figure 4


Candidate Choice by Region, 1992



Note: 1 represents Kim Young-Sam (YS), 2 represents Kim Dae-Jung (DJ), and 3 represents Chung Joo-Young (Chung). The Southwest indicates Honam, the Southeast indicates Youngnam, and the Central area indicates Chungchung area.

Figure 5a


Effects on Candidate Choice (Odds Ratio), 1992



Note: 1 represents Kim Young-Sam (YS), 2 represents Kim Dae-Jung (DJ), and 3 represents Chung Joo-Young (Chung). The Southwest indicates Honam and the Southeast indicates Youngnam.

Figure 5b

Effects on Candidate Choice (Odds Ratio), 1992



Note: 1 represents Kim Young-Sam (YS), 2 represents Kim Dae-Jung (DJ), and 3 represents Chung Joo-Young (Chung).

Figure 6

Effects of Electoral Interest on Voter Turnout





Figure 7a


Effects of Those Who Voted for Kim Young-Sam in the 1987 Presidential Election on the 1992 Presidential Election



Note: The ternary plot was created by simulating 1,000 sets of parameters from the 1992 multinomial logit regression. YS represents Kim Young-Sam, DJ represents Kim Dae-Jung, and Chung represents Chung Joo-Young.

Figure 7b


Effects of Those Who Voted for Kim Dae-Jung in the 1987 Presidential Election
on the 1992 Presidential Election



Note: The ternary plot was created by simulating 1,000 sets of parameters from the 1992 multinomial logit regression. YS represents Kim Young-Sam, DJ represents Kim Dae-Jung, and Chung represents Chung Joo-Young.

Figure 8a


Effects of Those Who Voted for Kim Young-Sam in the 1992 Presidential Election on the 1997 Presidential Election



Note: The ternary plot was created by simulating 1,000 sets of parameters from the 1997 multinomial logit regression. Lee represents Lee Hoi-Chang, DJ represents Kim Dae-Jung, and Rhee represents Rhee In-Je.

Figure 8b


Effects of Those Who Voted for Kim Dae-Jung in the 1992 Presidential Election
on the 1997 Presidential Election



Note: The ternary plot was created by simulating 1,000 sets of parameters from the 1997 multinomial logit regression. Lee represents Lee Hoi-Chang, DJ represents Kim Dae-Jung, and Rhee represents Rhee In-Je.

Figure 9


Candidate Choice by Region, 1997



Note: 1 represents Lee Hoi-Chang (Lee), 2 represents Kim Dae-Jung (DJ), and 3 represents Rhee In-Je (Rhee). The Southwest indicates Honam, the Southeast indicates Youngnam, and the Central area indicates Chungchung area.

Figure 10a


Effects on Candidate Choice (Odds Ratio), 1997



Note: 1 represents Lee Hoi-Chang (Lee), 2 represents Kim Dae-Jung (DJ), and 3 represents Rhee In-Je (Rhee). The Southwest indicates Honam and the Southeast indicates Youngnam.

Figure 10b


Effects on Candidate Choice (Odds Ratio), 1997



Note: 1 represents Lee Hoi-Chang (Lee), 2 represents Kim Dae-Jung (DJ), and 3 represents Rhee In-Je (Rhee). The Southwest indicates Honam and the Southeast indicates Youngnam.

Figure 11a


Economic Effects on Candidate Choice (Odds Ratio), 1992



Note: 1 represents Kim Young-Sam (YS), 2 represents Kim Dae-Jung (DJ), and 3 represents Chung-Joo-Young (Chung).

Figure 11b

Economic Effects on Candidate Choice (Odds Ratio), 1997



Note: 1 represents Lee Hoi-Chang (Lee), 2 represents Kim Dae-Jung (DJ), and 3 represents Represents Rhee In-Je (Rhee).

Figure 12a

ROC Curve of the 1992 Turnout Model




Figure 12b

ROC Curve of the 1997 Turnout Model




Figure 13a

Turnout as a Function of Education in the 1992 Presidential Election




Figure 13b

Turnout as a Function of Education in the 1997 Presidential Election





Figure 14a


Probabilities of Turnout in terms of Interest in the 1992 Presidential Election



Note: These probabilities were obtained from covariates of the logit model shown in Table 6a, while controlling interest in the election. For example, the effect of electoral interest on “High-Prob Respondents” is plotted by employing voters who would have high probabilities of voting: those who regard the CEC fair, age 30 and over voters and Southwesterners and all other variables constant. The effect of electoral interest on “Low-Prob Respondents” is plotted by using those who regard the CEC unfair, voters in their twenties, voters living in other than the Southwest and all other variables at their mean. Finally, the effect of electoral interest on “Average-Prob Respondents” is plotted by holding all independents variables at their mean and allowing only electoral interest to vary.

Figure 14b

Probability of Turnout in terms of Interest in the 1997 Presidential Election



Note: These probabilities were obtained from covariates of the logit model shown in Table 6b, while controlling interest in the election. For instance, the effect of electoral interest on “High-Prob Respondents” is plotted by using those who would have high probabilities of voting: voters who have higher efficacy, those who regard the CEC fair, voters over 30, those who have party orientations, those living in the Southeast and the Southwest, and all other variables constant. The effect of electoral interest on “Low-Prob Respondents” is plotted by using those who have lower efficacy, those who regard the CEC not fair, voters in their twenties, Independents, those living other than in the Southeast and the Southwest, and all other variables constant. Finally, the interest effect on “Average-Prob Respondents” is plotted by holding all independent variables at their mean and allowing electoral interest to vary.

Figure 15a

Turnout as a Function of Evaluation of National Economy in the 1992
Presidential Election




Figure 15b

Turnout as a Function of Evaluation of Living Standards in the 1992
Presidential Election






Figure 16


Bivariate Relationship between Age, Education and Gender, and Interest (%) in the 1992 and 1997 Presidential Elections




Note: $X^2 = 49.44^{***}$ Gamma = -.05




Note: $X^2 = 70.01^{***}$ Gamma = .28




Note: $X^2 = 59.45^{***}$ Gamma = .15



Note: $X^2 = 18.01^{***}$ Gamma = -.16




Note: $X^2 = 12.84^{***}$ Cramer's V = .10



Note: $X^2 = 4.31$

Figure 17a


Predicted Probabilities of Interest in the 1992 Presidential Election in terms of Different Age Levels among Those Who Did Not Experience Stump Campaigns



Note: 1: 20s, 2: 30s, 3: 40s, 4: 50s, and 5: 60s or older voters.

Figure 17b


Predicted Probabilities of Interest in the 1992 Presidential Election in terms of Different Age Levels among Those Who Experienced Stump Campaign



Note: 1: 20s, 2: 30s, 3: 40s, 4: 50s, and 5: 60s or older voters

Figure 18a


Predicted Probabilities of Interest in the 1997 Presidential Election in terms of Different Age Levels among Those Who Did Not View Presidential Debates



Note: 1: 20s, 2: 30s, 3: 40s, 4: 50s, and 5: 60s or older voters.

Figure 18b

Predicted Probabilities of Interest in the 1997 Presidential Election in terms of Different Age Levels among Those Who Viewed Presidential Debates



Note: 1: 20s, 2: 30s, 3: 40s, 4: 50s, and 5: 60s or older voters

APPENDIX 1

CODING AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS OF CANDIDATE CHOICE MODEL

- 1) Vote: Dependent variable. Nominal variable. 1 for Kim Young-Sam (YS) , 2 for Kim Dae-Jung (DJ), and 3 for Chung Joo-Young (Chung) for 1992 election. 1 for Lee Hoi-Chang (Lee), 2 for Kim Dae Jung (DJ) and 3 for Rhee In-Je (Rhee) for 1997 election.
- 2) Party Orientation: Political orientation on whether voters are toward the governing party or opposition party. 1 for leaning to governing party, 2 for neither (independent), and 3 for leaning to the opposition party.
- 3) Merger (United candidacy): Whether the merger of the three parties is a good decision or not in 1992 election, and 1 for bad decision, 2 for don't know, and 3 for good decision. Whether the united candidacy in 1997 election is agreeable or not, and 1 for disagree, 2 for don't know, and 3 for agree.
- 4) Interest in elections: Interest in presidential election. 1 for not at all, 2 for not much interested, 3 for somewhat interested, and 4 for very interested.
- 5) Prior vote for the 1992 model: There are three dummy variables that indicate previous candidate supporters. Prior vote for Roh: 1 if voters voted for Roh in the 1987 presidential election, and 0 for else, prior vote for YS: 1 if voters voted for YS in the 1987 presidential election, and 0 for else, and prior vote for DJ: 1 if voters voted for DJ in the 1987 presidential election, and 0 for else.
- 6) Prior vote for the 1997 model: There are three dummy variables that indicate previous candidate supporters. Prior vote for YS: 1 if voters voted for YS in the 1992 election, and 0 for else, prior vote for DJ: 1 if voters voted for DJ in the 1992 election, and 0 for else, and prior vote for Chung: 1 if voters voted for Chung in the 1992 election, and 0 for else.
- 7) Southwest: Dichotomous variable. 1 for voters living in the Southwestern area (*Honam*) and 0 for else.
- 8) Southeast: Dichotomous variable. 1 for voters living in the Southeastern area (*Youngnam*) and 0 for else.
- 9) Age: Age in years. 1 for 20s, 2 for 30s, 3 for 40s, 4 for 50, 5 for 60s and over.
- 10) National Economy: Whether Korean economy has been stronger or weaker in the last one or two years. 1 for much weaker, 2 for a little weaker, 3 for about the same and 4 for a little stronger. Available only in 1992.
- 11) Living standard: 1 for poor, 2 for middle, and 3 for rich.
- 12) Family Economy: Whether family economy has been stronger or weaker in the last one or two years. 1 for much weaker, 2 for a little weaker, 3 for about the same. Available only in 1997.

APPENDIX 2A

VARIABLES USED IN BUILDING KOREAN CANDIDATE CHOICE MODEL, 1992

A7 Who did you vote for in the election?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Missing	79	6.6	6.8	6.8
	Kim Young-Sam(1)	544	45.3	46.5	53.2
	Kim Dae-Jung(2)	327	27.3	27.9	81.2
	Jeong Joo-Young(3)	115	9.6	9.8	91.0
	Lee Jong-Chan(4)	2	.2	.2	91.2
	Park Chan-Jong(5)	91	7.6	7.8	99.0
	Paek Gi-Wan(7)	1	.1	.1	99.1
	No response(8)	11	.9	.9	100.0
	Total	1170	97.5	100.0	
Missing	System	30	2.5		
Total		1200	100.0		

Mean 1.80

Median 1.00

Std Dev 1.36

A22 The merger of these three parties—DJP, DP & RP?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Extremely good decision(1)	69	5.8	5.8	5.8
	Good decision(2)	313	26.1	26.1	31.9
	Bad decision(3)	298	24.8	24.9	56.8
	Extremely bad decision(4)	175	14.6	14.6	71.4
	Don't know(5)	342	28.5	28.6	100.0
	Total	1197	99.8	100.0	
Missing	System	3	.3		
Total		1200	100.0		

Mean 3.34

Median 3.00

Std Dev 1.29

A14 Who did you vote for in the 1987 (13th) Presidential election?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Rho Tae-Woo(1)	426	35.5	35.9	35.9
	Kim Young-Sam(2)	261	21.8	22.0	57.9
	Kim Dae-Joong(3)	257	21.4	21.7	79.6
	Kim Jong-Phil(4)	70	5.8	5.9	85.5
	Other(5)	7	.6	.6	86.1
	Did not vote(6)	61	5.1	5.1	91.2
	Did not have voting rights yet(7)	104	8.7	8.8	100.0
	Total	1186	98.8	100.0	
Missing	System	14	1.2		
Total		1200	100.0		

Mean 2.64

Median 2.00

Std Dev 1.86

A35 What is your political party orientation?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Governing party(1)	213	17.8	17.9	17.9
	Leaning to governing party(2)	247	20.6	20.7	38.6
	In the middle(3)	325	27.1	27.3	65.9
	Leaning to opposition party(4)	279	23.3	23.4	89.3
	Opposition party(5)	128	10.7	10.7	100.0
	Total	1192	99.3	100.0	
Missing	System	8	.7		
Total		1200	100.0		

Mean 2.88

Median 2.00

Std Dev .74

A1 Interest in election

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very much(1)	584	48.7	48.7	48.7
	Fairly(2)	468	39.0	39.1	87.8
	Not very much(3)	124	10.3	10.4	98.2
	Not at all(4)	22	1.8	1.8	100.0
	Total	1198	99.8	100.0	
Missing	System	2	.2		
Total		1200	100.0		

Mean 1.65

Median 2.00

Std Dev .74

Q1 Residency of Respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Seoul(1)	308	25.7	25.7	25.7
	Pusan(2)	106	8.8	8.8	34.5
	Daegu(3)	64	5.3	5.3	39.8
	Incheon(4)	54	4.5	4.5	44.3
	Kwangju(5)	33	2.8	2.8	47.1
	Daejeon(6)	29	2.4	2.4	49.5
	Kyunggido(7)	174	14.5	14.5	64.0
	Kangwon(8)	43	3.6	3.6	67.6
	Chungbook(9)	38	3.2	3.2	70.8
	Chungnam(10)	53	4.4	4.4	75.2
	Jeonbook(11)	57	4.8	4.8	79.9
	Jeonnam(12)	58	4.8	4.8	84.8
	Kyungbook(13)	81	6.8	6.8	91.5
	Kyungnam(14)	102	8.5	8.5	100.0
Total		1200	100.0	100.0	

Mean 6.25

Median 7.00

Std Dev 4.63

S56 Age

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 20	17	1.4	1.4	1.4
21	36	3.0	3.0	4.4
22	23	1.9	1.9	6.3
23	20	1.7	1.7	8.0
24	36	3.0	3.0	11.0
25	33	2.8	2.8	13.8
26	31	2.6	2.6	16.3
27	32	2.7	2.7	19.0
28	40	3.3	3.3	22.3
29	35	2.9	2.9	25.3
30	32	2.7	2.7	27.9
31	30	2.5	2.5	30.4
32	34	2.8	2.8	33.3
33	33	2.8	2.8	36.0
34	41	3.4	3.4	39.4
35	39	3.3	3.3	42.7
36	46	3.8	3.8	46.5
37	28	2.3	2.3	48.8
38	29	2.4	2.4	51.3
39	25	2.1	2.1	53.3
40	33	2.8	2.8	56.1
41	25	2.1	2.1	58.2
42	27	2.3	2.3	60.4
43	18	1.5	1.5	61.9
44	22	1.8	1.8	63.8
45	32	2.7	2.7	66.4
46	19	1.6	1.6	68.0
47	21	1.8	1.8	69.8
48	16	1.3	1.3	71.1
49	17	1.4	1.4	72.5
50	19	1.6	1.6	74.1
51	16	1.3	1.3	75.4
52	17	1.4	1.4	76.8
53	22	1.8	1.8	78.7
54	20	1.7	1.7	80.3
55	12	1.0	1.0	81.3

S56 continued Age

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 56	20	1.7	1.7	83.0
57	16	1.3	1.3	84.3
58	14	1.2	1.2	85.5
59	16	1.3	1.3	86.8
60	14	1.2	1.2	88.0
61	13	1.1	1.1	89.1
62	7	.6	.6	89.7
63	6	.5	.5	90.2
64	6	.5	.5	90.7
65	12	1.0	1.0	91.7
66	6	.5	.5	92.2
67	9	.8	.8	92.9
68	9	.8	.8	93.7
69	10	.8	.8	94.5
70	9	.8	.8	95.2
71	4	.3	.3	95.6
72	8	.7	.7	96.2
73	3	.3	.3	96.5
74	4	.3	.3	96.8
75	3	.3	.3	97.1
76	5	.4	.4	97.5
77	8	.7	.7	98.2
78	6	.5	.5	98.7
79	1	.1	.1	98.7
80	3	.3	.3	99.0
81	5	.4	.4	99.4
82	2	.2	.2	99.6
83	2	.2	.2	99.8
84	2	.2	.2	99.9
92	1	.1	.1	100.0
Total	1200	100.0	100.0	

Mean 41.28

Median 38.00

Std Dev 14.89

A 21. S Korea's economy strong or weak in the past one to two years?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Much stronger (1)	25	2.1	2.1	2.1
	A little stronger (2)	91	7.6	7.6	9.7
	About the same (3)	325	27.1	27.2	36.9
	A little weaker (4)	363	30.3	30.4	67.3
	Much weaker (5)	391	32.6	32.7	100.0
	Total	1195	99.6	100.0	
Missing	System	5	.4		
Total		1200	100.0		

Mean 3.84

Median 4.00

Std. Dev 1.03

S52. Level of living

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very rich (1)	6	.5	.5	.5
	Rich (2)	67	5.6	5.6	6.1
	In the middle (3)	836	69.7	69.7	75.8
	Poor (4)	241	20.1	20.1	95.8
	Very poor (5)	50	4.2	4.2	100.0
Total		1200	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.22

Median 3.00

Std. Dev .63

APPENDIX 2B

VARIABLES USED IN BUILDING KOREAN CANDIDATE CHOICE MODEL, 1997

Q2X1 (If Voted) Who did you vote for in the election?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Lee Hoi-Chang(1)	404	33.5	37.1	37.1
	Kim Dae-Joong(2)	447	37.0	41.0	78.1
	Lee In-Je(3)	189	15.7	17.3	95.4
	Kwon Young-Gil(4)	44	3.6	4.0	99.4
	Heo Kyung-Young(5)	3	.2	.3	99.7
	Sin Jeong-Il(7)	2	.2	.2	99.9
	9	1	.1	.1	100.0
	Total	1090	90.3	100.0	
Missing	Missing	117	9.7		
Total		1207	100.0		

Mean 1.91

Median 1.91

Std Dev .90

Q17 Do you agree with the DJP single candidacy (byetwee DJ and JP)?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree(1)	390	32.3	32.4	32.4
	Disagree(2)	454	37.6	37.7	70.0
	Don't know (3)	350	29.0	29.0	99.1
	4	1	.1	.1	99.2
	5	10	.8	.8	100.0
	Total	1205	99.8	100.0	
Missing	Missing	2	.2		
Total		1207	100.0		

Mean 1.99

Median 2.00

Std Dev .83

Q4 Who did you vote for in the 1992 presidential election?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Kim Young-Sam(1)	472	39.1	39.5	39.5
	kIM Dae-Joong(2)	308	25.5	25.8	65.2
	Jeong Ju-Young(3)	77	6.4	6.4	71.7
	Lee Jong-Chang(4)	14	1.2	1.2	72.8
	Park Chan-Jong(5)	68	5.6	5.7	78.5
	Kim Og-Seon(6)	4	.3	.3	78.8
	Paek Gi-Wan(7)	3	.2	.3	79.1
	Did not vote(8)	63	5.2	5.3	84.4
	No response(9)	40	3.3	3.3	87.7
	Did not have voting rights yet(10)	136	11.3	11.4	99.1
	11	1	.1	.1	99.2
	12	1	.1	.1	99.2
	15	1	.1	.1	99.3
	20	1	.1	.1	99.4
	22	3	.2	.3	99.7
	23	1	.1	.1	99.7
	30	1	.1	.1	99.8
	32	1	.1	.1	99.9
	33	1	.1	.1	100.0
	Total	1196	99.1	100.0	
Missing	Missing	11	.9		
Total		1207	100.0		

Mean 3.53

Median 2.00

Std Dev 3.71

Q1 Interest in election

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very much(1)	747	61.9	61.9	61.9
	A little(2)	336	27.8	27.9	89.8
	Not very much(3)	104	8.6	8.6	98.4
	Not at all(4)	19	1.6	1.6	100.0
	Total	1206	99.9	100.0	
Missing	Missing	1	.1		
Total		1207	100.0		

Mean 1.50

Median 1.00

Std Dev .72

Q14 How do you describe your political party orientation?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Leaning to governing party(1)	311	25.8	25.9	25.9
	Leaning to opposition party(2)	510	42.3	42.4	68.3
	Neither(3)	373	30.9	31.0	99.3
	5	8	.7	.7	100.0
	Total	1202	99.6	100.0	
Missing	Missing	5	.4		
Total		1207	100.0		

Mean 2.07

Median 2.00

Std Dev .79

id15 Residency of Respondents

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Seoul(1)	273	22.6	22.6	22.6
Pusan(2)	102	8.5	8.5	31.1
Daegu(3)	68	5.6	5.6	36.7
Incheon(4)	67	5.6	5.6	42.3
Daejeon(5)	33	2.7	2.7	45.0
Kwangju(6)	33	2.7	2.7	47.7
Woolsan(7)	25	2.1	2.1	49.8
Kyunggi(8)	213	17.6	17.6	67.4
Kangwon(9)	43	3.6	3.6	71.0
Chungbook(10)	38	3.1	3.1	74.2
Chungnam(11)	50	4.1	4.1	78.3
Jeonbook(12)	52	4.3	4.3	82.6
Jeonnam(13)	56	4.6	4.6	87.2
Kyungbook(14)	75	6.2	6.2	93.5
Kyungnam(15)	79	6.5	6.5	100.0
Total	1207	100.0	100.0	

Mean 6.71

Median 8.00

Std Dev 4.79

age Age

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 0	2	.2	.2	.2
20	37	3.1	3.1	3.2
21	23	1.9	1.9	5.1
22	25	2.1	2.1	7.2
23	39	3.2	3.2	10.4
24	28	2.3	2.3	12.8
25	46	3.8	3.8	16.6
26	34	2.8	2.8	19.4
27	40	3.3	3.3	22.7
28	34	2.8	2.8	25.5
29	33	2.7	2.7	28.3
30	31	2.6	2.6	30.8
31	27	2.2	2.2	33.1
32	28	2.3	2.3	35.4
33	25	2.1	2.1	37.4
34	39	3.2	3.2	40.7
35	41	3.4	3.4	44.1
36	35	2.9	2.9	47.0
37	28	2.3	2.3	49.3
38	30	2.5	2.5	51.8
39	25	2.1	2.1	53.9
40	39	3.2	3.2	57.1
41	28	2.3	2.3	59.4
42	17	1.4	1.4	60.8
43	28	2.3	2.3	63.1
44	16	1.3	1.3	64.5
45	24	2.0	2.0	66.4
46	20	1.7	1.7	68.1
47	17	1.4	1.4	69.5
48	26	2.2	2.2	71.7
49	11	.9	.9	72.6
50	43	3.6	3.6	76.1
51	21	1.7	1.7	77.9
52	22	1.8	1.8	79.7
53	25	2.1	2.1	81.8
54	18	1.5	1.5	83.3
55	15	1.2	1.2	84.5

age continued Age

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 56	16	1.3	1.3	85.8
57	17	1.4	1.4	87.2
58	10	.8	.8	88.1
59	21	1.7	1.7	89.8
60	12	1.0	1.0	90.8
61	6	.5	.5	91.3
62	11	.9	.9	92.2
63	11	.9	.9	93.1
64	8	.7	.7	93.8
65	14	1.2	1.2	94.9
66	10	.8	.8	95.8
67	8	.7	.7	96.4
68	5	.4	.4	96.9
69	7	.6	.6	97.4
70	7	.6	.6	98.0
71	4	.3	.3	98.3
72	2	.2	.2	98.5
73	3	.2	.2	98.8
74	4	.3	.3	99.1
75	1	.1	.1	99.2
76	2	.2	.2	99.3
79	4	.3	.3	99.7
80	1	.1	.1	99.8
82	1	.1	.1	99.8
84	1	.1	.1	99.9
90	1	.1	.1	100.0
Total	1207	100.0	100.0	

Mean 40.04

Median 38.00

Std Dev 13.98

Q27. Would you say that your family's economy has been stronger or weaker due to the national economic policies?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Much stronger (1)	20	1.7	1.7	1.7
	A little stronger (2)	31	2.6	2.6	4.2
	About the same (3)	309	25.6	25.7	29.9
	A little weaker (4)	407	33.7	33.8	63.7
	Much weaker (5)	374	31.0	31.1	94.8
	Don't know (6)	63	5.2	5.2	100.0
	Total	1204	99.8	100.0	
Missing	Missing	3	.2		
Total		1207	100.0		

Mean 4.06

Median 4.00

Std. Dev 1.01

Q29. Level of living

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very rich (1)	8	.7	.7	.7
	Rich (2)	73	6.0	6.0	6.7
	In the middle (3)	969	80.3	80.3	87.0
	Poor (4)	128	10.6	10.6	97.6
	Very poor (5)	29	2.4	2.4	100.0
	Total	1207	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.08

Median 3.00

Std. Dev .53

APPENDIX 3

CODING AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS OF TURNOUT MODEL

- 1) Turnout: Dependent variable. Dichotomous variable. 0 for not voted and 1 for voted.
- 2) Party Orientation: Political orientation on whether voters are toward the governing party or opposition party. Recoded as 1 + 2 = 1, and 3 = 0. 0 for neither (Independent) and 1 for leaning to the ruling party or opposition parties.
- 3) Interest in elections: Interest in presidential election. Recoded as 1 = 3, 2 = 2, 3 + 4 = 1. 1 for not much interested, 2 for somewhat interested, and 3 for very interested.
- 4) Southwest: Dichotomous variable. 1 for voters living in the Southwestern area (*Honam*) and 0 for else.
- 5) Southeast: Dichotomous variable. 1 for voters living in the Southeastern area (*Youngnam*) and 0 for else.
- 6) Age: Age in years. 1 for 20s, 2 for 30s, 3 for 40s, 4 for 50, 5 for 60s or over.
- 7) Education: 1 for elementary school, 2 for middle school, 3 for high school, and 4 for college or over
- 8) Fairness of CEMC: evaluation of how much the Central Election Management Commission is fair. Recoded as 1 + 2 = 1, 3 = 2, 4 = 3. 1 for unfair, 2 for fair, and 3 for very fair.
- 9) Democracy: evaluation of general level of democratization. Recoded as 3 + 4 = 0, and 1 + 2 = 1. 0 for undemocratic and 1 for democratic. Available only in 1992.
- 10) Efficacy: indicating whether respondents' vote is important or not. Recoded as 1 + 2 = 1, 3 = 2, and 4 = 3. 1 for agree, 2 for disagree, and 3 for disagree totally. Available only in 1997. Since the question has a negative expression, the order of the choices was not changed.
- 11) Rural area: whether voters live in rural area or city. Recoded as 1 + 2 = 0, and 3 = 1. 0 for big and medium cities and 1 for rural area.
- 12) National Economy: Whether Korean economy has been stronger or weaker in the last one or two years. 1 for much weaker, 2 for a little weaker, 3 for about the same and 4 for a little stronger. Available only in 1992.
- 13) Living standard: 1 for poor, 2 for middle, and 3 for rich.
- 14) Family Economy: Whether family economy has been stronger or weaker in the last one or two years. 1 for much weaker, 2 for a little weaker, 3 for about the same. Available only in 1997.

APPENDIX 4A

VARIABLES USED IN BUILDING TURNOUT MODEL, 1992

A6 Did you vote in the election?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes(1)	1121	93.4	93.4	93.4
	No(2)	79	6.6	6.6	100.0
	Total	1200	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.07

Median 1.00

Std Dev .25

A28 What do you think of Korean politics?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very democratic(1)	31	2.6	2.6	2.6
	Democratic(2)	636	53.0	53.6	56.2
	Undemocratic(3)	439	36.6	37.0	93.3
	Very Undemocratic(4)	80	6.7	6.7	100.0
	Total	1186	98.8	100.0	
Missing	System	14	1.2		
Total		1200	100.0		

Mean 2.48

Median 2.00

Std Dev .66

A48 How fair was the Central Election Commission during the election?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Vary fair(1)	104	8.7	8.8	8.8
	Fair(2)	834	69.5	70.3	79.1
	Unfair(3)	230	19.2	19.4	98.5
	Not at all fair(4)	18	1.5	1.5	100.0
	Total	1186	98.8	100.0	
Missing	System	14	1.2		
Total		1200	100.0		

Mean 2.14

Median 2.00

Std Dev .57

A35 What is your political party orientation?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Governing party(1)	213	17.8	17.9	17.9
Leaning to governing party(2)	247	20.6	20.7	38.6
In the middle(3)	325	27.1	27.3	65.9
Leaning to opposition party(4)	279	23.3	23.4	89.3
Opposition party(5)	128	10.7	10.7	100.0
Total	1192	99.3	100.0	
Missing System	8	.7		
Total	1200	100.0		

Mean 2.88

Median 2.00

Std Dev .74

A1 Interest in election

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Very (1)	584	48.7	48.7	48.7
Somewhat (2)	468	39.0	39.1	87.8
Not much (3)	124	10.3	10.4	98.2
Not at all (4)	22	1.8	1.8	100.0
Total	1198	99.8	100.0	
Missing System	2	.2		
Total	1200	100.0		

Mean 1.65

Median 2.00

Std Dev .74

Q3 Size of your residence

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Big city(1)	594	49.5	49.5	49.5
Medium city(2)	322	26.8	26.8	76.3
County (Rural)(3)	284	23.7	23.7	100.0
Total	1200	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.74

Median 2.00

Std Dev .82

S51 Education

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Elementary School or less(1)	236	19.7	19.7	19.7
Middle School(2)	205	17.1	17.1	36.8
High School(3)	439	36.6	36.6	73.3
College or above(4)	320	26.7	26.7	100.0
Total	1200	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.70

Median 3.00

Std Dev 1.07

Q1 Residency of Respondents

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Seoul(1)	308	25.7	25.7	25.7
Pusan(2)	106	8.8	8.8	34.5
Daegu(3)	64	5.3	5.3	39.8
Incheon(4)	54	4.5	4.5	44.3
Kwangju(5)	33	2.8	2.8	47.1
Daejeon(6)	29	2.4	2.4	49.5
Kyunggido(7)	174	14.5	14.5	64.0
Kangwon(8)	43	3.6	3.6	67.6
Chungbook(9)	38	3.2	3.2	70.8
Chungnam(10)	53	4.4	4.4	75.2
Jeonbook(11)	57	4.8	4.8	79.9
Jeonnam(12)	58	4.8	4.8	84.8
Kyungbook(13)	81	6.8	6.8	91.5
Kyungnam(14)	102	8.5	8.5	100.0
Total	1200	100.0	100.0	

Mean 6.25

Median 7.00

Std Dev 4.63

S56 Age

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 20	17	1.4	1.4	1.4
21	36	3.0	3.0	4.4
22	23	1.9	1.9	6.3
23	20	1.7	1.7	8.0
24	36	3.0	3.0	11.0
25	33	2.8	2.8	13.8
26	31	2.6	2.6	16.3
27	32	2.7	2.7	19.0
28	40	3.3	3.3	22.3
29	35	2.9	2.9	25.3
30	32	2.7	2.7	27.9
31	30	2.5	2.5	30.4
32	34	2.8	2.8	33.3
33	33	2.8	2.8	36.0
34	41	3.4	3.4	39.4
35	39	3.3	3.3	42.7
36	46	3.8	3.8	46.5
37	28	2.3	2.3	48.8
38	29	2.4	2.4	51.3
39	25	2.1	2.1	53.3
40	33	2.8	2.8	56.1
41	25	2.1	2.1	58.2
42	27	2.3	2.3	60.4
43	18	1.5	1.5	61.9
44	22	1.8	1.8	63.8
45	32	2.7	2.7	66.4
46	19	1.6	1.6	68.0
47	21	1.8	1.8	69.8
48	16	1.3	1.3	71.1
49	17	1.4	1.4	72.5
50	19	1.6	1.6	74.1
51	16	1.3	1.3	75.4
52	17	1.4	1.4	76.8
53	22	1.8	1.8	78.7
54	20	1.7	1.7	80.3
55	12	1.0	1.0	81.3

S56 continued Age

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 56	20	1.7	1.7	83.0
57	16	1.3	1.3	84.3
58	14	1.2	1.2	85.5
59	16	1.3	1.3	86.8
60	14	1.2	1.2	88.0
61	13	1.1	1.1	89.1
62	7	.6	.6	89.7
63	6	.5	.5	90.2
64	6	.5	.5	90.7
65	12	1.0	1.0	91.7
66	6	.5	.5	92.2
67	9	.8	.8	92.9
68	9	.8	.8	93.7
69	10	.8	.8	94.5
70	9	.8	.8	95.2
71	4	.3	.3	95.6
72	8	.7	.7	96.2
73	3	.3	.3	96.5
74	4	.3	.3	96.8
75	3	.3	.3	97.1
76	5	.4	.4	97.5
77	8	.7	.7	98.2
78	6	.5	.5	98.7
79	1	.1	.1	98.7
80	3	.3	.3	99.0
81	5	.4	.4	99.4
82	2	.2	.2	99.6
83	2	.2	.2	99.8
84	2	.2	.2	99.9
92	1	.1	.1	100.0
Total	1200	100.0	100.0	

Mean 41.28

Median 38.00

Std Dev 14.89

A 21. S Korea's economy strong or weak in the past one to two years?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Much stronger (1)	25	2.1	2.1	2.1
	A little stronger (2)	91	7.6	7.6	9.7
	About the same (3)	325	27.1	27.2	36.9
	A little weaker (4)	363	30.3	30.4	67.3
	Much weaker (5)	391	32.6	32.7	100.0
	Total	1195	99.6	100.0	
Missing	System	5	.4		
Total		1200	100.0		

Mean 3.84

Median 4.00

Std. Dev 1.03

S52. Level of living

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very rich (1)	6	.5	.5	.5
	Rich (2)	67	5.6	5.6	6.1
	In the middle (3)	836	69.7	69.7	75.8
	Poor (4)	241	20.1	20.1	95.8
	Very poor (5)	50	4.2	4.2	100.0
Total		1200	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.22

Median 3.00

Std. Dev .63

APPENDIX 4B

VARIABLES USED IN BUILDING TURNOUT MODEL, 1997

Q2 Did you vote in the election?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes(1)	1116	92.5	92.5	92.5
	No (2)	91	7.5	7.5	100.0
	Total	1207	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.08

Median 1.00

Std Dev .26

Q3 Whether I vote or not is not important since too many people are voting

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree totally(1)	28	2.3	2.3	2.3
	Agree(2)	112	9.3	9.4	11.7
	Disagree(3)	369	30.6	30.8	42.5
	Disagree totally(4)	688	57.0	57.5	100.0
	Total	1197	99.2	100.0	
Missing	Missing	10	.8		
	Total	1207	100.0		

Mean 3.43

Median 4.00

Std Dev .76

Q1 Interest in election

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very (1)	747	61.9	61.9	61.9
	Somewhat (2)	336	27.8	27.9	89.8
	Not much (3)	104	8.6	8.6	98.4
	Not at all (4)	19	1.6	1.6	100.0
	Total	1206	99.9	100.0	
Missing	Missing	1	.1		
	Total	1207	100.0		

Mean 1.50

Median 1.00

Std Dev .72

Q14 How fair do you think was the Central Election Commission during the election?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very fair(1)	202	16.7	17.0	17.0
	Fair(2)	866	71.7	72.8	89.7
	Unfair(3)	110	9.1	9.2	99.0
	Not at all fair(4)	12	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	1190	98.6	100.0	
Missing	Missing	17	1.4		
Total		1207	100.0		

Mean 1.94

Median 2.00

Std Dev .55

Q14 How do you describe your political party orientation?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Leaning to governing party(1)	311	25.8	25.9	25.9
	Leaning to opposition party(2)	510	42.3	42.4	68.3
	Neither(3)	373	30.9	31.0	99.3
	5	8	.7	.7	100.0
	Total	1202	99.6	100.0	
Missing	Missing	5	.4		
Total		1207	100.0		

Mean 2.07

Median 2.00

Std Dev .79

area Size of your residence

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Big city(1)	601	49.8	49.8	49.8
	Medium city(2)	431	35.7	35.7	85.5
	County (Rural)(3)	175	14.5	14.5	100.0
	Total	1207	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.65

Median 2.00

Std Dev .72

id15 Residency of Respondents

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Seoul(1)	273	22.6	22.6	22.6
Pusan(2)	102	8.5	8.5	31.1
Daegu(3)	68	5.6	5.6	36.7
Incheon(4)	67	5.6	5.6	42.3
Daejeon(5)	33	2.7	2.7	45.0
Kwangju(6)	33	2.7	2.7	47.7
Woolsan(7)	25	2.1	2.1	49.8
Kyunggi(8)	213	17.6	17.6	67.4
Kangwon(9)	43	3.6	3.6	71.0
Chungbook(10)	38	3.1	3.1	74.2
Chungnam(11)	50	4.1	4.1	78.3
Jeonbook(12)	52	4.3	4.3	82.6
Jeonnam(13)	56	4.6	4.6	87.2
Kyungbook(14)	75	6.2	6.2	93.5
Kyungnam(15)	79	6.5	6.5	100.0
Total	1207	100.0	100.0	

Mean 6.71

Median 8.00

Std Dev 4.79

edu Education

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Elementary School or less(1)	140	11.6	11.7	11.7
Middle School(2)	125	10.4	10.4	22.1
High School(3)	450	37.3	37.5	59.6
College or above(4)	485	40.2	40.4	100.0
Total	1200	99.4	100.0	
Missing Missing	7	.6		
Total	1207	100.0		

Mean 3.07

Median 3.00

Std Dev .99

age Age

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 0	2	.2	.2	.2
20	37	3.1	3.1	3.2
21	23	1.9	1.9	5.1
22	25	2.1	2.1	7.2
23	39	3.2	3.2	10.4
24	28	2.3	2.3	12.8
25	46	3.8	3.8	16.6
26	34	2.8	2.8	19.4
27	40	3.3	3.3	22.7
28	34	2.8	2.8	25.5
29	33	2.7	2.7	28.3
30	31	2.6	2.6	30.8
31	27	2.2	2.2	33.1
32	28	2.3	2.3	35.4
33	25	2.1	2.1	37.4
34	39	3.2	3.2	40.7
35	41	3.4	3.4	44.1
36	35	2.9	2.9	47.0
37	28	2.3	2.3	49.3
38	30	2.5	2.5	51.8
39	25	2.1	2.1	53.9
40	39	3.2	3.2	57.1
41	28	2.3	2.3	59.4
42	17	1.4	1.4	60.8
43	28	2.3	2.3	63.1
44	16	1.3	1.3	64.5
45	24	2.0	2.0	66.4
46	20	1.7	1.7	68.1
47	17	1.4	1.4	69.5
48	26	2.2	2.2	71.7
49	11	.9	.9	72.6
50	43	3.6	3.6	76.1
51	21	1.7	1.7	77.9
52	22	1.8	1.8	79.7
53	25	2.1	2.1	81.8
54	18	1.5	1.5	83.3
55	15	1.2	1.2	84.5

age continued Age

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 56	16	1.3	1.3	85.8
57	17	1.4	1.4	87.2
58	10	.8	.8	88.1
59	21	1.7	1.7	89.8
60	12	1.0	1.0	90.8
61	6	.5	.5	91.3
62	11	.9	.9	92.2
63	11	.9	.9	93.1
64	8	.7	.7	93.8
65	14	1.2	1.2	94.9
66	10	.8	.8	95.8
67	8	.7	.7	96.4
68	5	.4	.4	96.9
69	7	.6	.6	97.4
70	7	.6	.6	98.0
71	4	.3	.3	98.3
72	2	.2	.2	98.5
73	3	.2	.2	98.8
74	4	.3	.3	99.1
75	1	.1	.1	99.2
76	2	.2	.2	99.3
79	4	.3	.3	99.7
80	1	.1	.1	99.8
82	1	.1	.1	99.8
84	1	.1	.1	99.9
90	1	.1	.1	100.0
Total	1207	100.0	100.0	

Mean 40.04

Median 38.00

Std Dev 13.98

Q27. Would you say that your family's economy has been stronger or weaker due to the national economic policies?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Much stronger (1)	20	1.7	1.7	1.7
	A little stronger (2)	31	2.6	2.6	4.2
	About the same (3)	309	25.6	25.7	29.9
	A little weaker (4)	407	33.7	33.8	63.7
	Much weaker (5)	374	31.0	31.1	94.8
	Don't know (6)	63	5.2	5.2	100.0
	Total	1204	99.8	100.0	
Missing	Missing	3	.2		
Total		1207	100.0		

Mean 4.06

Median 4.00

Std. Dev 1.01

Q29. Level of living

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very rich (1)	8	.7	.7	.7
	Rich (2)	73	6.0	6.0	6.7
	In the middle (3)	969	80.3	80.3	87.0
	Poor (4)	128	10.6	10.6	97.6
	Very poor (5)	29	2.4	2.4	100.0
	Total	1207	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.08

Median 3.00

Std. Dev .53

APPENDIX 5

CODING AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS OF POLITICAL INTEREST MODEL

- 1) Interest: Interest in elections: Interest in presidential election. Recoded as 1 = 3, 2 = 2, 3 + 4 = 1. 1 for not much interested, 2 for somewhat interested, and 3 for very interested.
- 2) Age: Age in years. 1 for 20s, 2 for 30s, 3 for 40s, 4 for 50, 5 for 60s or over.
- 3) Education (edu): 1 for elementary school, 2 for middle school, 3 for high school, and 4 for college or over
- 4) Gender: Dichotomous variable. 1 for men and 0 for women.
- 5) Ageedu: Interaction term for age and education.
- 6) Menedu: Interaction term for gender and education.
- 7) Menage: Interaction term for gender and age.
- 8) Southwest (SW): Dichotomous variable. 1 for voters living in the Southwestern area (*Honam*) and 0 for else.
- 9) Southeast (SE): Dichotomous variable. 1 for voters living in the Southeastern area (*Youngnam*) and 0 for else.
- 10) Stump: Dichotomous variable. 1 for voters who watched stump campaigning, and 0 for voters who did not. Available only in 1992.
- 11) TVdbt: Presidential debates on television. 1 for voters who viewed debates on television, and 0 for voters who did not. Available only in 1997.
- 12) TVspeech: For 1992 model, this variable is dichotomous: 1 for those who watched candidate speeches on television and 0 for those who did not. For 1997 model, this variable is ordinal: 1 for almost never, 2 for almost all the speeches, and 3 for all the speeches.
- 13) TVads: For 1992 model, this variable is dichotomous. 1 for those who viewed campaign ads on television and 0 for those who did not. For 1997 model, this variable is ordinal. 1 for almost never, 2 for almost all the speeches, and 3 for all the speeches.
- 14) YS: indicating how much voters like Kim Young-Sam (YS). 1 for dislike, 2 for not very much, 3 for fairly and 4 very much. Available only in 1992.
- 15) DJ: indicating how much voters like Kim Dae-Jung (DJ). For 1992 model, this variable is ordinal: 1 for dislike, 2 for not very much, 3 for fairly and 4 very much. Available only in 1992. For 1997 model, this variable is dichotomous: 1 for those who like Kim Dae-Jung most and 0 for else.
- 16) Lee: indicating how much voters like Lee Hoi-Chang (Lee). 1 for those who like Lee Hoi-Chang most and 0 for else. Available only in 1997.

APPENDIX 6A

VARIABLES USED IN BUILDING POLITICAL INTEREST MODEL, 1992

A1 Interest in election

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very (1)	584	48.7	48.7	48.7
	Somewhat (2)	468	39.0	39.1	87.8
	Not much (3)	124	10.3	10.4	98.2
	Not at all (4)	22	1.8	1.8	100.0
	Total	1198	99.8	100.0	
Missing	System	2	.2		
Total		1200	100.0		

Mean 1.65

Median 2.00

Std Dev .74

S51 Education

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Elementary School or less(1)	236	19.7	19.7	19.7
	Middle School(2)	205	17.1	17.1	36.8
	High School(3)	439	36.6	36.6	73.3
	College or above(4)	320	26.7	26.7	100.0
	Total	1200	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.70

Median 3.00

Std Dev 1.07

Q4 Gender

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male(1)	582	48.5	48.5	48.5
	Female(2)	618	51.5	51.5	100.0
	Total	1200	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.52

Median 2.00

Std Dev .50

Q1 Residency of Respondents

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Seoul(1)	308	25.7	25.7	25.7
Pusan(2)	106	8.8	8.8	34.5
Daegu(3)	64	5.3	5.3	39.8
Incheon(4)	54	4.5	4.5	44.3
Kwangju(5)	33	2.8	2.8	47.1
Daejeon(6)	29	2.4	2.4	49.5
Kyunggido(7)	174	14.5	14.5	64.0
Kangwon(8)	43	3.6	3.6	67.6
Chungbook(9)	38	3.2	3.2	70.8
Chungnam(10)	53	4.4	4.4	75.2
Jeonbook(11)	57	4.8	4.8	79.9
Jeonnam(12)	58	4.8	4.8	84.8
Kyungbook(13)	81	6.8	6.8	91.5
Kyungnam(14)	102	8.5	8.5	100.0
Total	1200	100.0	100.0	

Mean 6.25

Median 7.00

Std Dev 4.63

A301 Speeches on the street?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes(1)	266	22.2	22.2	22.2
No(2)	934	77.8	77.8	100.0
Total	1200	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.78

Median 2.00

Std Dev .42

A302 Speeches on TV?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes(1)	1084	90.3	90.3	90.3
No(2)	116	9.7	9.7	100.0
Total	1200	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.10

Median 1.00

Std Dev .30

A303 Campaign ads on TV?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes(1)	854	71.2	71.2	71.2
No(2)	346	28.8	28.8	100.0
Total	1200	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.29

Median 1.00

Std Dev .45

A171 How much did you like Kim Young-Sam?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Very much(1)	329	27.4	28.0	28.0
Fairly(2)	382	31.8	32.5	60.6
Not very much(3)	161	13.4	13.7	74.3
Dislike(4)	164	13.7	14.0	88.2
Don't know(5)	138	11.5	11.8	100.0
Total	1174	97.8	100.0	
Missing System	26	2.2		
Total	1200	100.0		

Mean 2.49

Median 2.00

Std Dev 1.34

A172 How much did you like Kim Dae-Joong?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Very much(1)	235	19.6	20.1	20.1
Fairly(2)	278	23.2	23.7	43.8
Not very much(3)	266	22.2	22.7	66.5
Dislike(4)	214	17.8	18.3	84.8
Don't know(5)	178	14.8	15.2	100.0
Total	1171	97.6	100.0	
Missing System	29	2.4		
Total	1200	100.0		

Mean 2.85

Median 3.00

Std Dev 1.35

S56 Age

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	20	17	1.4	1.4	1.4
	21	36	3.0	3.0	4.4
	22	23	1.9	1.9	6.3
	23	20	1.7	1.7	8.0
	24	36	3.0	3.0	11.0
	25	33	2.8	2.8	13.8
	26	31	2.6	2.6	16.3
	27	32	2.7	2.7	19.0
	28	40	3.3	3.3	22.3
	29	35	2.9	2.9	25.3
	30	32	2.7	2.7	27.9
	31	30	2.5	2.5	30.4
	32	34	2.8	2.8	33.3
	33	33	2.8	2.8	36.0
	34	41	3.4	3.4	39.4
	35	39	3.3	3.3	42.7
	36	46	3.8	3.8	46.5
	37	28	2.3	2.3	48.8
	38	29	2.4	2.4	51.3
	39	25	2.1	2.1	53.3
	40	33	2.8	2.8	56.1
	41	25	2.1	2.1	58.2
	42	27	2.3	2.3	60.4
	43	18	1.5	1.5	61.9
	44	22	1.8	1.8	63.8
	45	32	2.7	2.7	66.4
	46	19	1.6	1.6	68.0
	47	21	1.8	1.8	69.8
	48	16	1.3	1.3	71.1
	49	17	1.4	1.4	72.5
	50	19	1.6	1.6	74.1
	51	16	1.3	1.3	75.4
	52	17	1.4	1.4	76.8
	53	22	1.8	1.8	78.7
	54	20	1.7	1.7	80.3
	55	12	1.0	1.0	81.3

S56 continued Age

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 56	20	1.7	1.7	83.0
57	16	1.3	1.3	84.3
58	14	1.2	1.2	85.5
59	16	1.3	1.3	86.8
60	14	1.2	1.2	88.0
61	13	1.1	1.1	89.1
62	7	.6	.6	89.7
63	6	.5	.5	90.2
64	6	.5	.5	90.7
65	12	1.0	1.0	91.7
66	6	.5	.5	92.2
67	9	.8	.8	92.9
68	9	.8	.8	93.7
69	10	.8	.8	94.5
70	9	.8	.8	95.2
71	4	.3	.3	95.6
72	8	.7	.7	96.2
73	3	.3	.3	96.5
74	4	.3	.3	96.8
75	3	.3	.3	97.1
76	5	.4	.4	97.5
77	8	.7	.7	98.2
78	6	.5	.5	98.7
79	1	.1	.1	98.7
80	3	.3	.3	99.0
81	5	.4	.4	99.4
82	2	.2	.2	99.6
83	2	.2	.2	99.8
84	2	.2	.2	99.9
92	1	.1	.1	100.0
Total	1200	100.0	100.0	

Mean 41.28

Median 38.00

Std Dev 14.89

APPENDIX 6B

VARIABLES USED IN BUILDING POLITICAL INTEREST MODEL, 1997

Q1 Interest in election

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very (1)	747	61.9	61.9	61.9
	Somewhat (2)	336	27.8	27.9	89.8
	Not much (3)	104	8.6	8.6	98.4
	Not at all (4)	19	1.6	1.6	100.0
	Total	1206	99.9	100.0	
Missing	Missing	1	.1		
Total		1207	100.0		

Mean 1.50

Median 1.00

Std Dev .72

edu Education

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Elementary School or less(1)	140	11.6	11.7	11.7
	Middle School(2)	125	10.4	10.4	22.1
	High School(3)	450	37.3	37.5	59.6
	College or above(4)	485	40.2	40.4	100.0
	Total	1200	99.4	100.0	
Missing	Missing	7	.6		
Total		1207	100.0		

Mean 3.07

Median 3.00

Std Dev .99

sex Your gender

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male(1)	614	50.9	50.9	50.9
	Female(2)	593	49.1	49.1	100.0
Total		1207	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.49

Median 1.00

Std Dev .50

Q13X1 Candidates' discussions on TV?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	All the discussions(1)	333	27.6	27.6	27.6
	Almost all the discussion(2)	684	56.7	56.8	84.4
	Almost never(3)	167	13.8	13.9	98.3
	Never(4)	18	1.5	1.5	99.8
	5	1	.1	.1	99.8
	6	1	.1	.1	99.9
	7	1	.1	.1	100.0
	Total	1205	99.8	100.0	
Missing	Missing	2	.2		
Total		1207	100.0		

Mean 1.90

Median 2.00

Std Dev .71

Q13X2 Candidates' speeches on TV?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	All the speeches(1)	397	32.9	32.9	32.9
	Almost all the speeches(2)	629	52.1	52.2	85.1
	Almost never(3)	136	11.3	11.3	96.4
	Never(4)	43	3.6	3.6	99.9
	5	1	.1	.1	100.0
	Total	1206	99.9	100.0	
Missing	Missing	1	.1		
Total		1207	100.0		

Mean 1.86

Median 2.00

Std Dev .76

Q13X3 Candidates' ads on TV?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	All the ads(1)	428	35.5	35.5	35.5
	Almost all the ads(2)	616	51.0	51.1	86.6
	Almost never(3)	124	10.3	10.3	96.9
	Never(4)	37	3.1	3.1	100.0
	Total	1205	99.8	100.0	
Missing	Missing	2	.2		
Total		1207	100.0		

Mean 1.81

Median 2.00

Std Dev .74

Q8 Which candidate do you like most?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Lee Hoi-Chang(1)	359	29.7	31.6	31.6
	Kim Dae-Joong(2)	437	36.2	38.4	70.0
	Lee In-Je(3)	263	21.8	23.1	93.1
	Kwon Young-Gil(4)	72	6.0	6.3	99.5
	Heo Kyung-Young(5)	3	.2	.3	99.7
	Kim Han-Sig(6)	2	.2	.2	99.9
	9	1	.1	.1	100.0
	Total	1137	94.2	100.0	
Missing	Missing	70	5.8		
Total		1207	100.0		

Mean 2.06

Median 2.00

Std Dev .94

id15 Residency of Respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Seoul(1)	273	22.6	22.6	22.6
	Pusan(2)	102	8.5	8.5	31.1
	Daegu(3)	68	5.6	5.6	36.7
	Incheon(4)	67	5.6	5.6	42.3
	Daejeon(5)	33	2.7	2.7	45.0
	Kwangju(6)	33	2.7	2.7	47.7
	Woolsan(7)	25	2.1	2.1	49.8
	Kyunggi(8)	213	17.6	17.6	67.4
	Kangwon(9)	43	3.6	3.6	71.0
	Chungbook(10)	38	3.1	3.1	74.2
	Chungnam(11)	50	4.1	4.1	78.3
	Jeonbook(12)	52	4.3	4.3	82.6
	Jeonnam(13)	56	4.6	4.6	87.2
	Kyungbook(14)	75	6.2	6.2	93.5
	Kyungnam(15)	79	6.5	6.5	100.0
	Total	1207	100.0	100.0	

Mean 6.71

Median 8.00

Std Dev 4.79

age Age

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 0	2	.2	.2	.2
20	37	3.1	3.1	3.2
21	23	1.9	1.9	5.1
22	25	2.1	2.1	7.2
23	39	3.2	3.2	10.4
24	28	2.3	2.3	12.8
25	46	3.8	3.8	16.6
26	34	2.8	2.8	19.4
27	40	3.3	3.3	22.7
28	34	2.8	2.8	25.5
29	33	2.7	2.7	28.3
30	31	2.6	2.6	30.8
31	27	2.2	2.2	33.1
32	28	2.3	2.3	35.4
33	25	2.1	2.1	37.4
34	39	3.2	3.2	40.7
35	41	3.4	3.4	44.1
36	35	2.9	2.9	47.0
37	28	2.3	2.3	49.3
38	30	2.5	2.5	51.8
39	25	2.1	2.1	53.9
40	39	3.2	3.2	57.1
41	28	2.3	2.3	59.4
42	17	1.4	1.4	60.8
43	28	2.3	2.3	63.1
44	16	1.3	1.3	64.5
45	24	2.0	2.0	66.4
46	20	1.7	1.7	68.1
47	17	1.4	1.4	69.5
48	26	2.2	2.2	71.7
49	11	.9	.9	72.6
50	43	3.6	3.6	76.1
51	21	1.7	1.7	77.9
52	22	1.8	1.8	79.7
53	25	2.1	2.1	81.8
54	18	1.5	1.5	83.3
55	15	1.2	1.2	84.5

age continued Age

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 56	16	1.3	1.3	85.8
57	17	1.4	1.4	87.2
58	10	.8	.8	88.1
59	21	1.7	1.7	89.8
60	12	1.0	1.0	90.8
61	6	.5	.5	91.3
62	11	.9	.9	92.2
63	11	.9	.9	93.1
64	8	.7	.7	93.8
65	14	1.2	1.2	94.9
66	10	.8	.8	95.8
67	8	.7	.7	96.4
68	5	.4	.4	96.9
69	7	.6	.6	97.4
70	7	.6	.6	98.0
71	4	.3	.3	98.3
72	2	.2	.2	98.5
73	3	.2	.2	98.8
74	4	.3	.3	99.1
75	1	.1	.1	99.2
76	2	.2	.2	99.3
79	4	.3	.3	99.7
80	1	.1	.1	99.8
82	1	.1	.1	99.8
84	1	.1	.1	99.9
90	1	.1	.1	100.0
Total	1207	100.0	100.0	

Mean 40.04

Median 38.00

Std Dev 13.98

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