PROGRESS OR DECLINE? INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

AND BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS

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This dissertation is a cross-national, empirical study of human rights conditions in a dynamic international political economy. The scope of the examination covers 176 developed and developing countries from 1980 through 1993. Through evaluating the numerous theoretical aspects of human rights conceptualization, I draw upon Shue's framework[1] and consider whether there are indeed "basic rights" and which rights should fit into this category. Further, I address the debate between those who claim that these rights are truly universal (applying to all nations and individuals) and those who argue that the validity of a moral right is relative to indigenous cultures. In a similar vein, I empirically investigate whether various human rights are interdependent and indivisible, as some scholars argue, or whether there are inherent trade-offs between various rights provisions. In going beyond the fixation on a single aspect of human rights, I broadly investigate subsistence rights, security rights and political and economic freedom. While these have previously been addressed separately, there are virtually no studies that consider them together and the subsequent linkages between them.

Ultimately, a pooled time-series cross-section model is developed that moves beyond the traditional concentration on security rights (also know as integrity of the person rights) and focuses on the more controversial subsistence rights (also known as basic human needs). By addressing both subsistence and security rights, I consider whether certain aspects of the changing international political economy affect these two groups of rights in different ways. A further delineation is made between OECD and non-

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[1] Shue, Henry. 1980. *Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

OECD countries. The primary international focus is on the effects of global integration and the end of the Cold War. Domestic explanations that are connected with globalization include economic freedom, income inequality and democratization. These variables are subjected to bivariate and multivariate hypothesis testing including bivariate correlations, analysis of variance, and multiple OLS regression with robust standard errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

After the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the segmenting of society into nation-states began and the principle of national sovereignty started to take hold. Along with this idea of sovereignty came acceptance of the concept that internal affairs of states were strictly a national rather than international matter. The manner in which a government treated its citizens or respected their human rights was likewise a domestic issue. This situation continued until the mid- 1940s with the end of the Second World War and the creation of the United Nations. It was then and only then that the notion of "human rights" crept into the everyday vernacular of international politics (Weston 1992). In the wake of the atrocities of National Socialism in Germany, the concept of rights endowed to individuals simply because they are human beings finally came into widespread favor.

Since World War II there has been a proliferation of international human rights agreements, an unprecedented development in the history of international law. Organizations like Amnesty International, Freedom House and the U.S. State Department built upon these international instruments by issuing global reports on human rights practices beginning in the 1970s. More recently, these organizations and others have issued human rights news virtually worldwide via the internet, so scholars and practitioners alike now have the means toward a much better and more current

knowledge of countries' human rights performance.[1] As a result of these new

communications technologies and increasing globalization and interdependence,

governments are finding it increasingly difficult to violate their citizens' human rights

without attracting the attention and the ire of interested individuals, governments, and

international organizations around the world.

Notwithstanding the widespread acceptance of human rights issues as reflected in

U.N. and regional documents, observers may still ask why the study of human rights is

such an important endeavor to pursue. I would argue that while social science research

might generally have considerable implications for society, few areas of inquiry are as

vital to the well-being of the individual citizens of the world. It is hoped that

dissemination of these findings will help to increase our knowledge of human rights and

perhaps improve the current situation concerning these rights. While some might dismiss

these goals as naive or idealistic, I believe that providing a better understanding of

international human rights and the violation of those rights is an important first step

towards eliminating the most severe types of abuse.

Heinish (1994) describes a number of problems that have plagued comparative

human rights research. These include: 1) a normative controversy between disparate

conceptions of human rights which produce different preferences and potential rights

tradeoffs; 2) the issue of whether human rights are truly universal or relative and

culturally bound; 3) the question of narrowing a complex set of rights in an effort to

evaluate them empirically; and 4) the important but sometimes difficult task of

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[1] Examples of these include Freedom House (http://freedomhouse.org/), U.S. Department of State

comparing countries with highly divergent resources and attributes. This dissertation addresses each of these shortcomings.

1.1 Organization of the Study

The study, which investigates the dynamic international political economy and human rights, is divided into six chapters. Chapter Two reviews the growing and diverse literature in human rights. This includes early investigations into U.S. foreign policy and human rights as it pertains to foreign aid allocation. Further, the separate work concerning subsistence rights and security rights performance is compared and important factors identified. Potential controversies and contradictory findings are highlighted in order to guide the scope and methodology of this study.

Chapter Three examines the content and nature of human rights. First, I address the theoretical question of whether there are indeed "basic human rights" and if so, which rights fit into this category. This chapter takes a broader view than much of the recent literature that has simply concentrated on a single aspect of human rights (e.g., integrity of the person rights). In examining the components of basic human rights, I explore the origins of these rights in international law. This ranges from the beginnings of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the recent formation of the International War Crimes Tribunal. The issue here is whether there is indeed an international human rights "regime" and to what extent this regime controls or alters national sovereignty. A second, parallel controversy that is also dealt with is the issue of cultural relativism versus universality. Are human rights truly universal in the sense that they are the rights of every person simply because he or she is a human being? Or, as many in the non-western world argue, is the validity of a moral right or rule relative to

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(http://www.state.gov/global/human_rights/index.html) and Amnesty International (http://www.amnesty.org/).

the indigenous culture? While these normative questions are quite difficult to definitively answer, it is imperative that we confront the various schools of thought and evaluate their theoretical strengths and weaknesses.

Third, I empirically evaluate the assertion that rights are interdependent and indivisible. Here, the question is whether there are trade-offs, for example between the provision of security rights and basic human needs, as suggested by Donnelly (1989, 188) and as often argued by certain regimes. Or, on the other hand, are two or more of these rights intimately linked and therefore tend to be realized together, as suggested by Vance (1977), Howard (1983), Kyi (1995). Finally, I present exploratory results which describe the empirical landscape of various rights. Here, trend analyses are used to determine if these rights and freedoms are improving in the world and whether the national practices are converging or diverging.

Chapter Four provides the foundation of the multivariate research design, which attempts to explain actual variation in human rights practices around the world. Ultimately, the most theoretically interesting issue with which I am concerned is determining what makes some regimes promote human rights while others do not. While there is some convergence in human rights practices, there still remains a large disparity between those nations that adequately provide basic human rights and those that do not. This is an especially important objective since we can only provide intelligent prescriptions to insure human rights conditions if we as scholars can adequately explain human rights variations. Further, if we can eventually identify situations that indicate a government's propensity to violate human rights, we might assist in actually preventing the spread of abuse. To this end, I build upon the existing theoretical and empirical research to develop multivariate models that attempt to explain variation in the broadly conceived notion of basic human rights.

In choosing the specific dependent variables in this chapter, I draw upon the widely accepted framework of "basic rights" as offered by Shue (1980). He argues that there are at least three basic rights: security, subsistence, and liberty. I have chosen to highlight subsistence rights (also known as basic human needs) and security rights (also known as integrity of the person or physical integrity rights). This is an important distinction in the literature since almost all studies focus only on a single aspect of human rights. However, I believe that by examining both areas in a comparative fashion, we can gain even more knowledge of the dynamics of human rights practices. The important question here is whether certain factors affect various aspects of human rights (i.e., subsistence and security rights) in different ways.

Again breaking from the traditional human rights literature, I employ an international political economy model that centers on globalization and its effects on basic human rights. The general model includes both economic and political variables that can be further categorized into international and domestic factors. The primary international focus is on the effects of global integration and the end of the Cold War. It is hypothesized that increased global integration will provide an environment in which basic human rights are more likely guaranteed. This hypothesis is surrounded by the ongoing theoretical debate between realism/neorealism (Morgenthau 1948, 1967; Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981, 1987; Prestowitz 1988; and Grieco 1990) and liberalism/globalism (Keohane 1984, 1986; Axelrod 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1986, Keohane and Nye 1989; Oye 1986; Lake 1988; Snidel 1985, 1991; Suzuki 1994). As illustrated by Holsti (1985), globalism predicts that growing interdependence of nations will result in a global society or community. In the last two decades, the increasing speed of technological developments has transformed the way in which governments and individuals conduct their affairs. The ubiquity of the computer has revolutionized the financial and trade

markets into a worldwide market place. This has resulted in a dramatic rise in trade and an even greater increase in international capital flow. Further, in the aftermath of the debt crises of the 1980s, IMF and World Bank influences over developing countries' domestic economic policies (and indeed in the developed world's need to remedy the crisis) highlights this growing interdependence. With new financial and (potentially) political crises emerging in Asia and Russia, the degree to which many of the world's countries are intertwined is becoming quite apparent.

I further hypothesize that the incorporation of a nation into the international community should have a positive effect upon a regime's treatment of its citizenry. With the advances in worldwide communication, this argument makes intuitive sense. Further integration into the world community would result in information concerning domestic human rights abuses being dispersed more quickly to the outside world and therefore bringing pressure on the offending government (Webster 1994, 95). Continuing this line of reasoning, we could expect improvements in human rights practices as a result of expanded integration. As stipulated in the numerous international instruments discussed in Chapter Three (e.g., International Bill of Human Rights), the world community has agreed upon certain human rights standards. If governments choose to go against these accepted standards, they run the risk of bad publicity (which could indirectly injure them economically by way of reductions in foreign investment) and perhaps economic sanctions, which would be directly deleterious. In an age of increasing capital mobility, Keohane and Milner (1996, 19) argue that internationalization should even affect those countries not integrated into the global system (i.e., those countries whose economies are not open). While there have only been two studies that even allude to the linkage between globalization and variation in human rights practices (Gurr 1986, and Webster 1994), I move beyond these in both operational and methodological approaches.

The realist/neorealist perspective might suggest that the power politics involved in waging the Cold War would result in degraded human rights practices. Regime leaders on both sides of the superpower conflict might be more than willing to increase repression on their own citizens in order to combat threats to the state. Having said that, I break with conventional wisdom and hypothesize that human rights are less likely to be realized in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War as compared to the period of superpower stalemate. This would appear counter-intuitive to the realist perspective and the tensions present during the Cold War. However, if one observes developments since the end of the Cold War, this scenario seems more plausible. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent implosion of the Soviet Union, we have seen countries struggling in their move to a market economy and democracy. Market reforms in many instances have resulted in at least a short-term decrease in the average person's standard of living. Another problem that has arisen is the revival of nationalism among various groups that previously was restrained by the respective superpowers. As evidenced throughout the former Soviet empire, national animosities that were suppressed during the Cold War struggle have now bubbled over into severe conflicts. Obvious examples include the bloody confrontations in the former Yugoslavia, Chechnya, and Georgia. While tensions have at times eased, many of these regions still experience severe basic human rights violations. This line of reasoning is connected with the issues surrounding ethnic conflict and civil war and their deleterious effects on basic human rights.

The primary domestic factors associated with globalization include economic freedom, income inequality, and democracy. The concentration on economic freedom further distinguishes this work from others that traditionally center only on political rights or civil liberties. The argument here is that countries with higher levels of economic freedom are more likely to insure basic human rights. It has been shown that

economic freedom is tied to higher levels of economic development (Gwartney, et al. 1996). If increased levels of GNP are indeed correlated with better human rights practices as the literature suggests, then economic freedom should (at least indirectly) have an effect on basic human rights.[2]

Surrounding the issue of human rights and increasing levels of GNP are the potential development trade-offs with basic needs and income equality. It is argued here that a greater inequality in wealth will likely result in a government being less likely to guarantee basic human rights. This development vs. equality competition can take a "strong" and "weak" form. The weak equality trade-off stipulates that the relationship between the level of economic development and income inequality takes the form of an inverted U-curve.[3] The strong variation views inequality not so much an unintended casualty of, but rather a contributor to, development. Since only the relatively wealthy will be able to save and invest, (and if investment is the mainstay of robust growth), inequality is seen to benefit even the poor in the long run. The research design includes this factor to determine just what effect income inequality actually has on basic human rights.

Following the recent literature that finds a relatively strong, positive relationship between democratically controlled governments and the protection of human rights, I also incorporate the variable of democracy in my general research design.[4] There are a number of reasons why democracy could have a substantial influence on basic human

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[2] In terms of subsistence rights, a number of authors (Moon and Dixon 1985, Spalding 1986, Rosh 1986, and Park 1987) find that wealth is one of the most powerful explanations of well being. Mitchell and McCormick (1988), Henderson (1991) and Poe and Tate (1994) also find some support for this positive connection between GNP and respect for security rights.

[3] This U-curve hypothesis was first proposed by Kuznets (1955) and has since been widely debated (Colombatto 1991; Newman and Thomson 1989; Newman and Thomson 1991; Ogwang 1995; Ram 1988; Rock 1993).

[4] Scholars finding support for this notion are Henderson (1991, 1993), Poe and Tate (1994), Moon and Dixon (1985), Rosh (1986), Spalding (1986), and Moon (1991).

rights. Since the democratic process is built on bargaining and compromise, it provides a viable alternative for dealing with conflict. Another basis for this hypothesis is that democracies offer their citizens the ability to remove potentially abusive leaders before violations become widespread. Further, the civil liberties usually associated with democracies (such as freedom of speech, press, assembly, etc.) allow citizens and opposition groups to publicize abuse of the particular regime to not only the domestic consumers but also the international community. This could result in additional pressure on the domestic government.

Although this dissertation analyzes international political economy variables associated with increasing globalization, there are a number of other factors that have garnered much interest in the development literature as well as human rights studies. In my desire for the most comprehensive model of international political economy and basic human rights, I therefore control for a number of these variables including economic development, economic growth, international war, civil war, population level and population growth.

Building on the above research design, Chapter Five is centered on analysis and interpretation of the quantitative results. This begins by describing the sample and reporting summary statistics and bivariate correlations between the various factors. Next, the overall country performance (i.e., ranking) of governments' respect for basic human rights is discussed and a number of geographical and political trends are identified. Ultimately, the time-series cross-section multivariate models of subsistence and security rights are evaluated. For both dependent variables, I consider the various models for the global sample as well as the separate developing and developed world samples. Further, the economic and political variables are also considered as separate models. Extensive diagnostics are performed on the models and the "most appropriate" versions are

selected. Finally, a comparison of the subsistence rights and security rights is conducted in order to determine if certain aspects of the changing international political economy affect these two groups of rights in different ways. Chapter Six concludes with a summary of the entire project, highlighting policy implications of the findings and making suggestions for future directions in human rights research.

1.2 Significance of Study

This dissertation is significant for a number of reasons. First, it fills a gap in the existing human rights literature. It is true that in the last two decades increasing numbers of human rights investigations have been conducted. However, almost all have examined only one type of human rights. Here I consider the interactions of subsistence rights, security rights, economic and political rights. Second, I concentrate on important aspects of the changing international political economy. Very little empirical research has been performed which connects the timely issue of increasing globalization with human rights. The third element that distinguishes this work is the broad ability to generalize from its extensive coverage. But with very few exceptions, most previous studies have been somewhat limited in either their cross-national approach or the time period studied.[5] Though data availability is always a concern, numerous studies only look at a limited sample of the developed or developing world. The comprehensive sample used for this study considers 176 countries over 14 years. It appears that this is one of the largest time-series cross-sections for basic human rights data ever assembled. Further, important distinctions are drawn between the developing world and the industrialized countries which have significant policy implications. In short, this dissertation provides a

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[5] Indeed, many works evaluate only one time point (e.g., year) in their analysis.

comprehensive survey of the dynamic international political economy and its impact on worldwide basic human rights.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

2.1 Introduction

A movement toward more rigorous, empirical research on human rights has

lagged only a few years behind the trend toward wider dissemination of information.

Since empirical research on human rights has been ongoing for over two decades, it is no

longer completely accurate to say that the empirical study of human rights is still in its

infancy. Indeed, cumulation of findings has become evident on a variety of human rights

related topics. For much of the 1980s, the central focus in human rights research was on

human rights abuse as an independent variable to explain U.S. foreign policy (e.g.,

foreign aid expenditures). Scholars contributing to this extensive literature include

Schoultz 1980; Stohl, Carleton and Johnson 1984; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985;

Carleton and Stohl 1987; Gibney and Stohl 1988; McCormick and Mitchell 1988;

McCormick and Mitchell 1989; Hofrenning 1991; Poe 1990, 1991, 1992; Forsythe 1993;

Poe and Sirirangsi 1994; Poe, Pilatovsky, Miller, and Ogundele 1994; Blanton 1994;

Regan 1995; Poe and Meernik 1995; and Keith and Poe 1996. In his work on democracy

and economic rights in the developing world, McNitt (1988) argues that when human

rights are used as independent variables, there is "a strong tendency to reduce the

measurement of the abuse of human rights to a single indicator variable" (McNitt 1988,

90). He further warns that while this approach is methodologically defensible, it runs the

risk of oversimplifying a complex conceptualization.

2.2. Security Rights

Since the mid 1980s, however, research has branched out into explaining cross-national variations of legally recognized human entitlements, closely related to those that have been called "basic rights" by Shue (1980). One vein of research focuses specifically on explaining cross-national variations in security rights; the rights to be free from torture, execution, imprisonment, or the violation of what has come to be known as integrity of the person, or physical integrity rights. While somewhat rudimentary in their approach, a number of early researchers laid a substantial foundation on which human rights scholars could build.

In his work on state repression in 105 low-income countries from 1973-1980, Wolpin (1986) considers a large number of variables including external military relationships, internal military status, economic factors, cultural and religious composition, and historical as well as geopolitical conditions.[6] For his dependent variable, Wolpin (1986) constructs a composite index of political rights based on Gastil (1981) and Sivard (1981). Ultimately, he finds that military rule, military aid and ethnic fragmentation are negatively related to human rights while literacy and education are positively related. Though utilizing a relatively large sample with a plethora of independent variables, the study is nevertheless limited as a simple cross-sectional, bivariate investigation. Further, the relationships that are proposed are not particularly strong in their theoretical basis.

In a similar study of over one hundred countries during the 1970s and early 1980s, Park (1987) concludes that civil rights (Freedom House index) are positively related to governmental expenditures on welfare, ethnic diversity, percent of population that is Christian, and percent of population that is urban. Negative correlations are found

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[6] Wolpin (1986) defines low-income countries as those with per capita incomes of less than $3,000.

between political rights and governmental expenditures on education, military expenditures, and percent of population that is Muslim. As with Wolpin (1986), this work is limited both from a methodological (bivariate, cross-sectional) and theoretical standpoint.

Mitchell and McCormick (1988) utilize standards-based, five-point ordinal scales to examine the political and economic factors involved in security rights in 123 countries in 1985. Drawing from Amnesty International reports, they differentiate between murders/executions and imprisonment. From an economic perspective, they consider economic development, level of trade and level of foreign investment. Politically, the variables are British colonial history and nature of regime (authoritarian or totalitarian). They find that wealthier nations are indeed less likely to engage in torture and false imprisonment. However, they caution us that poor countries do not necessarily violate their citizens' security rights. In terms of governmental regime, they conclude that totalitarian regimes are more likely to erroneously imprison while authoritarian governments are more likely to rely on murder and execution. While this study incorporates a large sample size, it is still plagued by the cross-sectional and bivariate approach taken by the previous authors.

In continuing the search for political and economic explanations of security rights performance, Henderson (1991) increases the methodological sophistication of the field by employing multivariate regression with a sample of 152 countries in 1985. He finds that level of democracy and economic growth have a positive relationship with integrity of the person rights. In addition, higher levels of inequality were associated with a worsening condition in human rights. Building on this earlier work, Henderson (1993) concentrates on the effects of population level and growth rate on human rights (while controlling for democracy, investment, and economic development. Using a similar

sample, he concludes that population growth rates (but not population level) are negatively related to security rights realization. Although this research moves beyond the bivariate methods of previous work, it is a still a limited cross-section that does not consider the issue of change over time.

Many of the shortcomings in the previous literature were remedied with the more comprehensive work of Poe and Tate (1994). Utilizing two separate measures for integrity of the person rights (taken from both Amnesty International and U.S. State Department annual reports) for 153 countries from 1980-1987, the authors test a number of hypothetical linkages. These possible connections involve democracy, civil and international war, economic development and economic growth, population level and population growth, regime type, and British colonial history. Ultimately, they find that democracy and participation in civil and international war has a substantively important and statistically significant influence on security rights. There is also secondary support found for associating leftist regimes, population size, and economic development (inverse relationship) with abuse. These findings while supporting some previous hypotheses (Stohl 1975, 1976; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Henderson 1991) contradict others as well (Mitchell and McCormick 1988, Henderson 1993, Fein 1994).

Tate and Poe (1996) further their initial effort by isolating the democracy variable and investigate not only the direct influence it has on repression but also the indirect effects as well. This is accomplished through the estimation of a path model using a series of eight yearly ordinary least squares multiple regression on global cross-national data, 1980-1987. As hypothesized, democracy is still the strongest direct determinant of integrity of the person violations. In this model, population size and domestic as well as international war exhibit only direct effects on repression. Economic development is the only variable that manifests both an indirect and a direct effect on abuse. Population

growth, military regimes, and leftist regimes manifest only indirect influence on state terrorism. Economic growth and British colonial history appear to have no effects on either human rights violations or democracy. These results are quite similar and seem to conform (with different analytical design and statistical method) to the previous Poe and Tate (1994). It is important to note, however, that this study highlights the fact that economic development demonstrates a combined direct and indirect effect that is almost equivalent to the influence of democracy itself.

With the emphasis remaining on democracy, Fein (1995) reaches conclusions different from many of her colleagues in the field of human rights. In her study of 145 countries during 1987, she admirably questions the premise of a linear relationship between democracy and security rights and argues in favor of a curvilinear correlation. Although the study is limited in methodological rigor, it concludes that the chances for human rights abuse is greatest not in authoritarian countries with little or no democratic norms, but rather in those nations where democratization has been extended but not yet fully institutionalized. Fein calls this the "more murder in the middle" hypothesis.

Turning the independent and dependent variables around, Regan (1995) utilizes U.S. foreign aid as an independent variable influencing the dependent variable of security rights. Employing a rather complex index of integrity of the person violations, he analyzes 32 countries in Latin America and Asia, 1977-1988.[7] While justifying some exclusions in the stratified sample (out of a population of 54 nations receiving aid), he does not provide such reasoning for others. After controlling for a number of other variables (population, democracy, economic development, number of military personnel), he finds that foreign aid has little discernible effect on the human rights

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[7] Regan's (1995) additive index of repression is composed of five categories (disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrests, political prisoners, and political killings) coded on a four point scale (0 though 3). The maximum score for each country/year is 15. He argues that this expanded scale is more appropriate for trying to identify the process behind *changes* in human rights.

records of the recipients. This is true for both the Carter and Reagan administrations, which took vastly different approaches to foreign policy in general and human rights in particular. Further, Regan (1995) finds no support for the premise that democracy and population level have influences on human rights records. It is interesting to note that these results directly contradict the findings of previous authors (Henderson 1991, Poe and Tate 1994). Several reasons could contribute to this including the utilization of an altered dependent variable, small sample size, different methodology, and different time period.

2.3 Subsistence Rights

A second strand of research in human rights seeks to explain why subsistence rights, or basic human needs, are protected in some countries and not in others. While this literature is perhaps not as prevalent as that concerning security rights, it nevertheless achieves a respectable level of theoretical and methodological rigor. Indeed, even many earlier studies in this subfield avoid the shortcomings of other human rights research. Further, the focus of subsistence rights is more theoretically tied to the attributes of international political economy and therefore more applicable to my emphasis here. Two of the pioneers in this area are William Dixon and Bruce Moon. Dixon (1984) begins this trend by looking at the effects of trade concentration and economic growth on subsistence rights (i.e., basic human needs). Here, attention is on the rate of improvement in the provision of basic human needs (i.e., the Disparity Reduction Rate). It is measured as the average annual change in Morris' (1979) Physical Quality of Life Index.[8] With a relatively large sample of 72 countries from 1960 to 1980, he finds weak support for the proposition that trade concentration as a form of dependence is

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[8] See Chapter IV for a detailed description of the Physical Quality of Life Index.

detrimental to national development. When economic growth is added to the situation, however, trade concentration loses any effect.

Moon and Dixon (1985) quickly turn to political aspects in their look at state strength (government expenditures), democracy, and ideology in relation to basic human needs. The measurement used here for basic human needs is simply Morris' Physical Quality of Life Index. While controlling for divergent wealth in their large cross-section, they find that democratic practices and leftist ideology are associated with higher levels of basic needs provision while government expenditures (as a percentage of GNP) has a negative effect. This would be in keeping with the conservative notion that heavy government spending is a hindrance to growth. In a similar study, Spalding (1986) examines a number of economic and political factors for 97 countries in 1970 and 1980. She concludes that while wealth is one of the most powerful explanations, much of its effect comes from governmental health expenditures and the size of the modern sector labor force. Surprisingly, degree of capitalism has virtually no explanatory power. This would support the hypothesis of the deleterious effects of rapid industrialization on living standards. Further, it is determined that democracy has a strong effect even when controlling for level of aggregate wealth.

In looking at the influences of defense spending on physical quality of life, Moon and Dixon (1985) confirm that military expenditures, manpower, and military rule have some impact on the provision of basic human needs even when controlling for attributes of the larger political economy (e.g., democracy, overall government expenditure, GNP). In his examination of the military influence on basic human needs, Rosh (1986) contradicts the previous authors and concludes that military burden and per capita GNP have little if any effect on well being. Further, he finds that democracy is the most important factor after controlling for GNP. These results are divergent from Moon and

Dixon (1985) in part because Rosh (1986) concentrates only on the developing world and also includes additional variables such as a country's degree of incorporation or dependence on the world economy.

The most comprehensive study comes from Moon (1991) in which he considers many of the above variables (democracy, military spending/manpower/regime, per capita GNP) plus a number of additional influences (e.g., percent of labor involved in agriculture, British influence, dependency, socialist influence, length of independence, mineral exports, Buddhist and Islamic influence).[9] While evaluating the overall political economy of basic human needs, he finds many of his chosen factors to exhibit extreme statistical significance. He concludes that percentage of labor agriculture, military spending, dependency, and Islamic influence has a strong negative effect on personal well being. Democracy, socialist influence, wealth, British influence, and Buddhist influence had a positive impact on physical quality of life.

2.4 Tradeoffs Between Various Rights

Turning to the issue of potential trade-offs between various human rights, theorists and policy-makers have given much thought to how security rights, subsistence rights, and liberties relate to each other conceptually and normatively (e.g., Vance 1977, Shue 1980, Donnelly 1989, Herzog 1997), as since World War II they have been incorporated in the core U.N. treaties and covenants along with a wide array of other legally recognized human entitlements. From Shue's standpoint, each of these rights is a basic right in the sense that enjoyment of them is paramount to the enjoyment of all other rights (1980: 19). Donnelly (1989) rejects Shue's notion of basic rights, arguing instead that these three kinds of rights as well as others are interrelated and indivisible. Though

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[9] While Moon (1991) examines 120 countries at three different time points (1960, 1970, and 1980), the core of his analysis focuses on the early 1970s.

both of these scholars' arguments are persuasive (and too detailed to repeat here), it is unlikely that such philosophical questions will ever be answered with certainty.

What perhaps can be answered more definitively is the question of how these rights concerning security, subsistence, and liberties (Shue 1980) are *empirically related* to one another. To my knowledge, this important aspect has not been adequately addressed. Though a number of studies investigate the determinants of why one or another of these three rights are related, rarely have they been considered together in a single, unified empirical analysis, and thus our knowledge of them is rather fragmented.[10] Therefore, the objective in the initial portions of the study is to link these areas of human rights research both theoretically and empirically. This will be accomplished in Chapter Three.

After dealing with the broader conceptual and empirical relationships among these rights, I look more in depth at subsistence rights and focus on important factors in the increasingly dynamic international political economy. In the process, I attempt to integrate the various subfields of literature into a comprehensive model, which will yield utility in explaining variation in basic human rights performance throughout the world.

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10. A couple of exceptions that deal explicitly with more than one class of rights include Howard (1983) and Heinish (1994).

CHAPTER THREE

AN INVESTIGATION OF THE CONTENT AND NATURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS

3.1 Introduction

With so much attention being focused on human rights issues, human rights

scholars do not have the large burden of justifying the relevance of their research.

However, it would be inaccurate to state that there has been consensus on the nature and

extent of human rights.   Indeed, there has been a glaring lack of agreement as to what

human rights are and how the discipline should accurately measure rights related

concepts.[11] One of the most widely accepted frameworks of "basic rights" is offered by

Shue (1980), who argues that there are at least three basic rights: security, subsistence,

and liberty.   Indeed, these are incorporated in the core U.N. treaties and covenants that

provide a complex array of groups of rights - subsistence, personal, civil, political,

economic, social and cultural.   From Shue's perspective, a basic right is one that is

necessary for the enjoyment of all other rights.   This is not to say that these basic rights

are more important than others, but that they should be included in any human rights

policy.

Donnelly (1989), while acknowledging the substantial contribution by Shue

(1980), contends that there probably are not basic rights at all in the strict sense of the

definition.   In the case of subsistence, for instance, he argues that "one can subsist

without a *right* to subsistence" (1989, 38).   Here, I cannot favor one right over another

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[11] Numerous scholars (e.g., Machan 1975, Gewirth 1982, Nickel 1987, Forsythe 1989), have addressed
the philosophical or moral bases of rights. For a thorough investigation of the evolution of these rights,
see Shapiro (1986).

without violating Shue's qualification that basic rights are not more important or satisfying than any other rights.   Donnelly, therefore, posits that human rights must be interdependent and indivisible.   "All human rights are "basic rights" in the fundamental sense that systematic violations of any human right preclude realizing a life of full human dignity...." (1980, 41).

In this chapter I empirically evaluate this assertion that rights are interdependent and indivisible.   Here, the question is whether there are trade-offs, for example between the provision of security rights and basic human needs, as suggested by Donnelly (1989, 188) and as often argued by certain regimes.   Or, on the other hand, are two or more of these rights intimately linked and therefore tend to be realized together. This scenario is suggested by Vance (1977), Howard (1983), Kyi (1995), and the theories tested by a number of empirical analysts focusing on one, or another subset of rights.[12]

Before examining potential trade-offs, however, I should first address the theoretical question of whether there are indeed "basic human rights" and if so, which rights fit into this category.   This takes a broader view than much of the recent literature that has simply concentrated on a single aspect of human rights (e.g., integrity of the person rights).   In examining the components of basic human rights, I explore the origins of these rights in international law.   A parallel controversy that should also be dealt with is the issue of cultural relativism versus universality.   Are human rights truly universal in the sense that they are the rights of every person simply because they are a

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[12] See Davenport (1995) for a study that indicates economic development is tied to less government actions to restrict political liberties. The findings of Poe and Tate (1994) indicate that economic development and political liberties are linked to fewer personal integrity rights abuses. Though subsistence rights are not economic development per se, the two are strongly related (See Moon and Dixon 1985, 1992). Moon and Dixon (1985), Rosh (1986), Spalding (1986) and Moon (1991) find that political democracy is associated with higher levels of basic needs satisfaction, even when controlling for wealth (i.e., GNP). Howard (1983) disputes the notion that civil and political rights can or must be suspended until after economic development has been achieved. Kyi (1995, p. 280) argues that the three kinds of rights addressed in this paper are essentially intertwined, and that arguments that there are trade-offs between them are mere "pretexts for resisting calls for democracy and human rights."

human being? Or, as many in the non-Western world argue, is the validity of a moral right or rule relative to the indigenous culture? While these normative questions are difficult to answer definitively, it is imperative that I confront the various schools of thought and evaluate the theoretical strengths and weaknesses.

3.2 Cultural Relativism versus Universalism

> There is nothing … culture-bound in the great evils of human experience, reaffirmed in every age and in every written history and in every tragedy and fiction: murder and the destruction of life, imprisonment, enslavement, starvation, poverty, physical pain and torture, homelessness, friendlessness.[13]

> – Warren Christopher

> ... the very conception of the organization of society differs from one culture to another. The West places more emphasis on rights while Islam values obligations....The West emphasizes individual interests while Islam values collective good.

> – Abdul Aziz Said

Though a large body of literature and international law (which I discuss in the next section) exists that supports the idea of universal human rights, there remains much discussion and conflict concerning the global application of basic human rights.   Indeed, over the last fifteen to twenty years, the concept of cultural relativism has risen to challenge the Western notion of universality.   Cultural relativism stems from the epistemological assertion that norms of rationality are built on the consensus of the members of the culture to which those norms belong (Dromm, 1998).[14] Teson (1992, 43) defines it as "the position according to which local cultural traditions (including

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[13] Christopher, Warren. 1993. "Democracy and Human Rights: Where America Stands." 4 U.S. Department of State Dispatch 441, 442.

[14] For a examination of the differences and intersections of cultural relativism and historical relativism, see Mazrui (1998).

religious, political, and legal practices) properly determine the existence and scope of civil and political rights enjoyed by individuals in a given society." What might be considered a rights violation in one community could properly be considered legal in another. Contemporary examples of the tension between international norms and domestic customs include criminal punishment that involve mutilation and beating, female circumcision, and the subjugation of women.

Donnelly (1989) views this debate as a continuum ranging from radical cultural relativism to radical universalism. Radical cultural relativism claims that culture is the only origin of the validity of a moral right or norm. At the other end of the spectrum, radical universalism argues that certain moral rights and norms are universally valid and that culture is actually irrelevant. In the middle of these two extremes lie varying combinations of cultural relativism and universalism. Strong cultural relativism postulates that the primary source of a moral right or norm is culture. Having said that, universal human rights can serve as a control of the possible extremes of relativism. Moving slightly in the direction of univeralism, weak cultural relativism maintains that culture may be a significant source of the validity of a moral right or norm. Here, univeralism is assumed, but the extremes of this universalism are checked by the relativity of communities and rights (109-110).

From a heuristic standpoint, Glen Johnson (1988) states that contemporary deliberations concerning this debate take one of the following positions:

1. traditions other than Western liberalism lack concepts of human rights; the Western liberal tradition is either the only or the most legitimate concept of human rights;
2. non-Western ideas about human rights are not only comparable but compatible with the ideals of Western liberalism;
3. non-Western traditions may differ even to the point of incompatibility but is possible to reconcile various views;

4. human rights concepts differ and cultural relativism means that no particular view can be held more valid than others.(43)

Donnelly's (1982, 1989) framework, although challenging to categorize, best represents the first position. While conceding various notions of group rights (e.g., economic and social rights), he concentrates primarily on preserving the integrity of Western liberalism (1982, 315). He argues that his position is that of a very weak cultural relativist where deviations from universal human rights standards occur primarily in the form in which particular rights are implemented (1989, 110).

Taking an opposing stance is Manglapus (1978), who best fits the second position from the categories above. He claims that non-Western cultures exhibit much of the same "respect for the dignity of the individual, absence of arbitrariness, [and] availability of remedies against despotic rule (5). Pollis and Schwab (1979) are representative of the third approach that strives to reconcile the divergent view of Western and non-Western societies. They argue that the Western notion of rights emerged under a specific set of circumstances during a certain period of time. Therefore, they argue, it is ill-advised (and indeed, doomed to fail) to apply these exact human rights constructs onto the developing world.[15] However, they finally conclude that a reconciled concept of human rights centered on participation, restraints on the use of force and violence, and sanctions on those who violate their values is achievable (15). The fourth direction is reflected by Bradley (1980) in arguing that we need to explore a variety of views and that perhaps no particular position is more valid than the other.

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[15] This line of reasoning is reminiscent of the development debates that raged between the developmentalists (e.g., Lipset, 1959; Rostow, 1960; and Almond and Powell, 1966) and the dependencistas (e.g., Prebish, 1960; dos Santos, 1970; Frank, 1967; and Cordosa, 1972).

In placing my research in this context, it can be argued that this study is compatible with categories 1 and 2 and possibly 3.   As discussed in the following section, numerous international agreements and well-established international law provide a substantial basis to support a position of compromise and compatibility.[16] The most recent example of this was the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, June 1993) where a Declaration and Programme of Action was adopted by the representatives of 172 nations (Perry 1997, 481).   It states categorically and repeatedly that "the universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question" and that "they are universal, indivisible and interdependent and mutually reinforcing."[17] In a commentary on the Vienna conference, Donnelly (1994) muses that

> One of the more heartening results of the Vienna Conference was the repudiation of … the relativist position.   Despite lingering fears of Western neocolonialism, and a continuing preoccupation with the task of development in the former Soviet bloc and the Third World, the resolutions adopted at Vienna generally reflect a commitment to the true universality … of internationally recognized human rights (113).

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[16] Howard (1984) presents an interesting compromise strategy akin to the weak cultural relativist tradition. Basing her position on moral and practical foundations, she argues against an outright ban of such customs as child betrothal and widow inheritance, but pushes strongly for domestic legislation that would allow women and the families of female children to "opt out" of traditional practices. This would allow a person to choose his/her culture or the terms on which he/she will participate in the traditional culture (Donnelly, 1989).

[17] It should be noted that substantial cultural cleavages were still present in Vienna. Indeed, in order to achieve unanimity, the Declaration omits any reference to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights per se.

3.3 The Foundation of Human Rights in International Law

There are a number of significant reasons for looking in depth at the international legal foundation of human rights.   First, international human rights instruments provide a legal as well as philosophical basis for answering the question of "What are basic human rights?" Indeed, the types of rights on which I concentrate are detailed in these international agreements and protected by international law.   Second, international law provides the foundation for implementing human rights norms that can lead to reducing abuse around the world.   Though this might appear naive or idealistic, a number of legal decisions have proven otherwise.   In the 1980 case of *Filartiga v. Peña*., a U.S. federal court utilized existing human rights agreements to rule "that deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights regardless of the nationality of the parties" (Claude 1992, 337).[18] Further, the European Court of Human Rights Commission has shown similar effectiveness in holding foreign governments responsible for human rights abuse (Friedlander 1986).[19] The most recent example is the International War Crimes Tribunal founded by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.   While there have been no convictions as of yet, 46 persons (including Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic) have been charged with various crimes against humanity during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.   It is likely that with the first defendant, Dusko Tadic, now standing trial, more of the accused will be formally tried.[20] If we are serious about

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[18] *Filartiga v. Peña-Irala*, 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir., 1980). Similarly, *Letelier v. Republic of Chile* held that victims (or their relatives) could sue in federal court and collect damages from a foreign government responsible for injury of death resulting from political violence in the home country (Friedlander 1986).
[19] In *Ireland v. United Kingdom*, Great Britain was held liable for subjecting Irish suspects to torture and degrading treatment prior to 1973 (Friedlander 1986).
[20] This information was provided by the *War Crimes Tribunal Watch,* produced by the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting (http://www.peacenet.org/balkans/tribunal/html).

justifying the substance of basic human rights and insuring that these rights will be guaranteed, it is imperative that they be grounded in universal international law. Just as a local community looks to city ordinances and criminal laws to achieve a safe and orderly society, the international community likewise depends on the legal foundation undergirding the protection of human rights.

Before the advent of the Second World War, nations operated under traditional international law. This law governed the relations between states, which were the only entities, which possessed rights under the system. Individuals, though they may have benefited from such law, were not included in the rights recognized by international law. State governments were free to deal with their citizens beyond the reach of international scrutiny and were off-limits to the world community. Human rights, which cover relationships between individuals or between individuals and the government, were therefore, exclusively a domestic affair. By the late 1940s, however, the theory and implementation of international law had undergone a virtual revolution. During this period, individuals in addition to nations began to enjoy the protections of the new international order. The obvious catalyst for this change was the war itself and the circumstances surrounding the conflict. As Humphrey (1986, 60) states, "Whatever else it might have been, the Second World War was a war for human rights;..." Because of the atrocities evident during the war, world opinion supported a drastic revision of the nature and scope of international law. In creating the institutions of the postwar era, human rights became a central concern in hopes that the savagery of fascism could never again take hold.

In the fifty years following World War II, human rights law has boomed. During the initial aftermath, the newly founded United Nations began to navigate the difficult road toward an international bill of human rights. Indeed, many in the field would argue

that the world community as a result now operates under an international human rights "regime" that is relatively strong. In their most basic sense, regimes can be viewed as systems of norms and decision-making procedures that are accepted by nations as binding.[21] At the core of this regime are a number of major human rights agreements that impose obligations on governments as to the treatment of individuals under their respective jurisdictions. In a definite break with previous practice, these obligations limit the concept of national sovereignty in two crucial aspects. In the first case, the treatment of a state's subjects is now a legitimate concern of international law. Secondly, there results an international standard (established by consent) that can be utilized for evaluating the domestic laws and conduct of sovereign states within their own borders. These norms may therefore be regarded as ranking even higher than national constitutions in the hierarchy of laws (Sieghart 1983, 14-15).

Each of the human, and arguably, core or basic human rights discussed above are referred to and guaranteed under various provisions of the International Bill of Human Rights (the foundation of modern human rights law). In terms of the basic rights that I consider, all are referred to and guaranteed under various provisions of the International Bill of Human Rights. This consists of the three basic documents: Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted December 10, 1948), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (opened for signature December 19, 1966 and entered into force January 3, 1976), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (opened for signature December 19, 1966 and entered into force March 23, 1976). In addition, regional and secondary agreements such as the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), European Social Charter (1961), the

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[21] Beyond the seminal work of Krasner (1983) in this area, Donnelly (1986, 1989), Keohane and Nye (1977), and Young (1980, 1987) contribute to the literature on regimes.

American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (adopted by Organization of

American states in 1948), the American Convention on Human Rights (1969), and the

African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981) bolster these basic rights.[22]

Proponents of humans rights protection maintain that the International Bill of Rights was

necessary in part because of the absence of any definition or listing of human rights in

the original U.N. Charter:

> ..., the United Nations shall promote:
>
> a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of
>   economic and social progress and development;
>
> b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related
>   problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
>
> c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
>   fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
>   language or religion (Article 55).

Having said this, the Charter did provide for a Commission on Human Rights, which was

to draft a subsequent International Bill. The Commission agreed that the Bill would be

divided into three parts: 1) a declaration that was to serve as a manifesto of sorts without

legal force, 2) a multilateral convention (later called the Covenant) which would be

binding on those nations that ratified it, and 3) measures of implementation. For reasons

both ideological and logistical (i.e., because the two areas of rights required different

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[22] For simplicity, the following abbreviations will hereinafter be used: Universal Declaration of Human Rights - UDHR, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights - ICES, and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - ICPR, European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms - EHR, European Social Charter - ESC, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man - ADRD, the American Convention on Human Rights - AMR, and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights - AFR.

methods of implementation), the Covenant was separated into two separate agreements as listed above.

While the Universal Declaration was not meant to be legally binding according to international law (simply by its adoption by the General Assembly), the Declaration has been invoked on so many occasions (both outside as well as inside the U.N.) and utilized so often to interpret the Charter (which is quite vague) that its norms are now part of the customary law of states and therefore binding on these nations (UNESCO 1986, 61; Humphrey 1979, 33). In support of this argument, a few members of the Assembly (such as South Africa and the Soviet Union) voiced concern that the Declaration would impose new legal obligations. Indeed, all of the communist countries that then were members of the U.N., along with and South Africa and Saudi Arabia, subsequently abstained from the final vote (Tolley 1987, 23-24). Further, the International Commission of the Jurists argue that if the Declaration constitutes an authoritative interpretation of the Charter articles, it then has the legally binding effect of an international treaty (International Commission of Jurists 1968, 94-95).

Looking specifically at personal integrity rights, the rights to life free of imprisonment, torture or execution undertaken arbitrarily or for political purposes are amply recognized. For example, Article 3 of the UDHR states that "Everyone has the right to life....", while Article 6 of the ICPR goes further to say that every human being has the "inherent" right to life and that this right must be protected by law. The UDHR (Article 5), ICPR (Article 7) and other documents stipulate that no one shall be subjected to torture or cruel or degrading punishment or treatment. Finally, the right to personal integrity is firmly established by the UDHR (Article 3) and ICPR (Article 9), as well as a host of other documents that state that everyone has the right to "security of the person, "

and further defined by articles such as UDHR (Article 9) and ICPR (Article 9) which prohibit arbitrary arrest or detention.

Turning to the issue of "liberties," I investigate both political and economic freedoms. These two concepts, while definitely distinct entities, are nevertheless both related to the liberty dimension as presented by Shue (1980).[23] One of the most prevalent political rights covered by international law is the right to participate in government and public affairs. UDHR (Article 21) calls for the right to take part in the government of one's country directly or through chosen representatives.[24] The concept of participation is taken broadly here to include direct and indirect action. ICPR (Article 25) refers to the right to take part in "the conduct of public affairs." In terms of political liberties manifested as democratic institutions and elections, UDHR (Article 21) and ICPR (Article 25) call for "freely chosen" representatives.[25] According to these agreements, the resulting election is to express the will of the people. Further, it is stipulated that secret ballots must be incorporated into elections that are to be held periodically or at "reasonable intervals.[26]" Finally, the right to vote is to be by universal and equal suffrage as covered in UDHR (Article 21) and ICPR (Article 25).

Similar to political rights, economic freedom is also protected under the International Bill of Human Rights and other agreements. It is important to note that international law deals with two distinct aspects of economic rights. The first, which is usually associated with a more conservative interpretation, covers production-related

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[23] It should be noted that Shue (1980) does not make the specific argument that economic rights are necessarily required in order enjoy other rights.

[24] ADRD (Article XX) and AFR (Article 13) also demand this right to participation.

[25] This is also covered under EHR (Protocol 1, Article 3) and AFR (Article 13).

[26] An interesting term to note is that of "genuine election" in UDHR (21) and ICPR (25). Does this cover an election in which only one candidate or list of candidates is offered and no opposition to the governing party is present (or allowed)? While there was debate over this controversy during the drafting of UDHR and ICPR, the vague term "genuine" remained (Henkin 1981, 240, 461)

rights (i.e., protections of property and liberties involved in acquiring, holding, using, and transferring it).   The second aspect deals with consumption-related rights (which, consistent with Shue, are discussed in the next section on subsistence).   UDHR (Article 17) guarantees the right to own property "alone as well as in association with others."[27] Having said that, it is important to note the absence of the right to own property in either of the Covenants.   In terms of depriving one of this right to property, UDHR (Article 17) and other instruments allow for instances when the government can lawfully restrict this right (e.g., "in the public interest").   Only one of these requires the government to compensate individuals for this deprivation.[28] Some critics could argue that most of this area of international law is vague enough to allow some forms of "takings."

With regard to basic needs or subsistence rights, access to adequate food, clothing and housing are all guaranteed in UDHR (Article 25).   While the Declaration stipulates that everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family (including but not limited to food, clothing, and housing), the ECSC goes beyond UDHR in recognizing the right to "the continuous improvement of living conditions" and not simply the right to a stable condition of well-being (Article 11, Section 1).   International human rights laws also establish the right of everyone to have access to adequate health and well-being, when Article 1 of the UDHR calls for medical care and necessary social services while the ECSC (Article 12) recognizes the right to the enjoyment of the highest "attainable" standard of both physical *and* mental health.   A third aspect to the issue of basic human needs involve a government's guarantee of education for its constituents.   The right to education in general is recognized in UDHR

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[27] While ADRD (XXIII) recognizes the right to private property, it restricts it to "the essential needs of decent living." AMR (21), EHR (Protocol 1, Article 1) and AFT (14) speak of the "use and enjoyment of property," the "peaceful enjoyment of his possessions," and "the right to property," respectively. However, none of these specifically refers to ownership per se.
[28] This exception is AMR (Article 21).

(Article 26) and the ECSC (Article 13), and further specified in a number of other treaties and conventions. The UDHR (Article 26) and ECSC (Article 13) state that primary education should be a right of all citizens, and that this level of education should be compulsory.

3.4. Linkages between Security Rights, Subsistence Rights and Liberties

To my knowledge, no efforts have been made to examine basic human needs, personal integrity rights, and political and economic freedoms together, in a single study. Still a number of linkages have been theorized and empirically supported by previous studies. Figure 1 graphically depicts the types of human rights, and the relationships I plan to examine. Though my formulation of basic rights is similar to that of Shue (1980), I differ in that I separate liberties into two dimensions, political and economic.

Figure 3.1 Various Human Rights and Potential Relationships

a. Linkage One: Subsistence Rights and Security Rights

Little research has been done on the direct relationship between basic human needs fulfillment, and the realization of personal integrity rights. Previous empirical findings, though not directly addressing this issue, do give us some very good reasons to expect that the two are strongly related. Economic development, which is typically measured with per capita GNP or GDP variables, is not usually considered synonymous with the fulfillment of basic needs, in large part because the predominant measures fail to take into account inequality. However, a number of studies show that economic development has a strong, positive impact on basic human needs fulfillment. For example, Park (1987) in his limited study concurred that economic development is the strongest predictor of improved basic needs achievement. While their emphasis is on military expenditures, Rosh (1986) and Moon and Dixon (1985) also conclude that per capita GNP is closely associated with basic needs fulfillment.[29] Per capita GNP and other economic development variables have been shown to be related to the realization of personal integrity rights (e.g., Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1997). Indeed, the rationales for including economic development in models of personal integrity abuse could very well apply equally to the fulfillment of basic needs. As Henderson (1991) argued, "it is only logical to think that, with a higher level of development" (or when basic needs are being met) "people will be more satisfied and, hence, less repression will be needed by the elites (1991, 1226). Therefore it makes sense to hypothesize, at least initially, that greater fulfillment of peoples' basic needs leads governments to be more respectful of personal integrity rights, in large part because threats to the regime are less apt to occur.

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[29] While ultimately arriving at this conclusion, Rosh (1986) warns that the relationship is expected to be greatly reduced if research is concentrated on developing countries rather than the entire world.

Alternatively, however, we might expect that people at the lowest level of needs fulfillment would not have either the wherewithal or the energy to pose threats to the regime, no matter how displeased they are with the status quo. So perhaps the relationship discussed above only occurs after a certain threshold of needs fulfillment is met. Another possibility is that needs fulfillment interacts with domestic inequality, for persons are more apt to feel deprived, and therefore be willing to oppose the government, when their referent is others in the society that are much better off (e.g., Gurr 1970, Ellina and Moore 1992; Moore, Lindstrom and O'Regan 1996). I have found no empirical research that has posited a relationship in the other direction.

b. Linkage Two: Liberties and Security Rights

I expect a strong linkage between political liberties and the respect of personal integrity for a number of reasons. Though the two concepts are different, they are not entirely distinct conceptually, and I expect that empirically they are closely related. Abuses of personal integrity represent the most serious of means regimes may use to take away political liberties. Further, such abuses have the effect of terrorizing those not directly targeted by those acts, leading them to restrain their own political activities for fear of reprisal.

Recent literature on the determinants of personal integrity abuse has assessed the impact of a factor closely related to political liberty, institutional democracy, on those rights. Democracy was found to be one of the strongest predictors of personal integrity abuse, as greater democracy leads to decreased abuses (Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Richards 1996; Poe, Tate and Keith 1997). Those who have tested the effect of democracy on repression of personal integrity have cited several logics in support of that proposition. Henderson (1991) argued that because the democratic process is built on bargaining and compromise, it provides a substantive alternative for dealing with

conflict, while warning that democracy must truly be legitimate in the sense that functional institutions are in place that can insure participation of various interests. Poe and Tate (1994) pay close attention to the possible problem of tautology, choosing definitions of democracy and measures to avoid circularity of argument. They find support for the argument that an effective democracy provides "citizens (at least those with political resources) the tools to oust potentially abusive leaders from office before they are able to become..." repressive of these rights (855). Also relevant here are the thoughts of Dixon (1994, 15-17) in his investigation of democracy and international conflict. If Dixon is correct, leaders and citizens in democracies will tend to subscribe to the idea "bounded competition," that bargaining and compromise are the preferred avenues toward dispute resolution, much favored to the use of violence.

More directly relevant to the variables I am investigating is the argument that civil liberties usually associated with democracies (such as freedom of speech, press, assembly, etc.) enable citizens and opposition groups to publicize abuse of the particular regime. These freedoms could also result in publicity of potential abuses being exported to the international community (e.g., UN, EU, OSCE, and non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International) that could lead to further pressure on a domestic government. Though the findings would seem at first to be uniform in their support of the strong positive relationship between democracy, political and civil liberties and the respect for personal integrity rights, there are those that take contrarian positions. As described in the literature review, Fein (1995) questions the premise of a linear relationship between democracy and human rights and argues in favor of a curvilinear relationship.[30]

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[30] While I substantially cover the linkage between political freedom and security rights, I choose not to expand on the potential linkages between economic freedom and security rights. The simple reasoning here is that there is little if any theoretical justification for assuming that economic rights are associated with integrity of the person rights.

c. Linkage Three: Subsistence Rights and Liberties

Turning to political liberties and their effect on basic human needs, a number of scholars propose that democracies are better equipped to provide their citizens with these rights. Many of the arguments linking democracy with integrity of the person rights also hold for basic human needs. Moon and Dixon (1985), Rosh (1986), Spalding (1986) and Moon (1991) find that political democracy is associated with higher levels of basic needs satisfaction, even when controlling for wealth (i.e., GNP). These conclusions are bolstered by the fact that the authors utilize different measures of democracy. Spalding (1986) and Rosh (1986) offer the definition provided by Arat (1984, 1991) and Moon and Dixon (1985) and Moon (1991) use that of Bollen (1980, 1990).[31]

The linkage between economic freedom and basic human needs is somewhat more circuitous. As alluded to in the above discussion concerning the relationship between basic human needs and personal integrity, economic development has been directly tied to improvements in physical quality of life. Drawing from this literature, it can be further argued that economic freedom should be expected to be positively related to GNP. Economic theory suggests that higher incomes and increasing living standards are dependent on increases in the production of goods and services that are valued by society. Gwartney, et al. (1996, 91-92) suggest that as a nation reaches high levels of economic freedom, it will enjoy swift growth.[32] This should be especially pertinent to developing countries that can gain from incorporating successful business practices and technical advancements from the developed world. Because economic growth can be seen in part as a process of discovery, nations with greater economic freedom should tend

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[31] Both Arat (1991) and Bollen (1991) have further expanded on their operationalization of democracy in later works.

[32] This is contingent on the fact that this economic freedom is indeed credible and potentially long-lasting.

to have higher rates of growth than those with low levels of freedom. Therefore, higher levels of economic freedom should result in higher levels of per capita GNP as compared to lower levels of freedom.

Scully (1988) supports this position in his analysis of 115 market economies from 1960-1980. He finds that politically open societies, which guarantee private property rights and the market allocation of resources, grow at three times the rate and are two and one-half times as efficient as societies in which these freedoms are not guaranteed. In his cross-national study from 1960-1990, Leblang (1996) provides empirical evidence that nations who protect property rights grow faster than nations that do not. Gwartney, et al. (1996, 92-93) also show that on average, countries with more economic freedom have a higher per capita GDP. With the most recently available data (i.e., 1994), the average per capita GDP for the A rated economies was $13, 659 compared to those having a C grade with $7,888 and the F- grade with $1,650. If the argument holds from the previous section that increased levels of GNP result in higher physical quality of life, then economic freedom could (at least indirectly) have an effect on basic human needs.

In connection with the limited literature on this linkage, there is the issue of an inherent trade-off between political rights and subsistence rights. This "liberty trade-off" as defined by Donnelly (1989) argues that civil and political rights could hamper or completely sabotage even well-organized development plans. Here, officials freely elected may be forced by their constituency to choose certain policies because of short-term political considerations rather than sticking to more difficult, but economically essential, practices. Donnelly (1989, 166) stresses that this conventional wisdom is misguided and the trade-offs can actually be harmful to both development and human rights. In her examination of Sub-Saharan Africa, Howard (1983) bolsters Donnelly's assertion and finds that suspension of political rights until after economic development

has taken hold will result in neither development nor human rights being attained. This is not to say that civil or political rights should take precedence over basic human needs, but rather the two sets of rights are interrelated, not sequential. She makes the important distinction that civil and political rights should be seen as a means to an end as well as an end in themselves.

Streeten (1980) takes a divergent position in arguing that basic human needs can be met in ways that deny political rights, while political rights can be achieved in a manner that denies basic human needs.[33] According to Streeten (1980), this is so because of the positive nature of subsistence rights compared to the negative nature of political rights.[34] The primary point here is that negative rights can be provided with no resources (notwithstanding opportunity costs) while to realize positive rights (i.e., subsistence) requires substantial resources.

d. Linkage Four: Political Rights and Economic Freedom

Since the end of the Cold War, conventional wisdom has argued that democratic reforms should go hand in hand with movement toward a market economy with greater economic freedom. During the immediate aftermath of fall of the Berlin Wall, Western policy makers urged countries to throw off the shackles of communism and embrace both democracy and free markets. Well before the events of 1989 however, scholars hypothesized about the nature of democracy and economic freedom. In his influential work, Dahl (1985, 110) argued that, "If democracy is justified in governing the state, then it must also be justified in governing economic enterprise; and to say that it is not

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[33] He uses the example of a society organized as either a benevolent zoo or a less benevolent, well-run prison where physical needs are met at a high level but political and civil rights would be denied. He continues that political rights in the form of one man-one vote might conflict with the provision of these basic human needs.

[34] Streeten (1980) also includes civil and security rights as negative rights.

justified in governing economic enterprises is to imply that it is not justified in governing the state." Taking a Libertarian stance, Narveson (1992) warns that while democracy and economic freedom indeed go together, democracy should not be forced on the corporate structure in the form of "worker democracy."

Berger (1986) goes as far as arguing that a free economy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy.[35] It appears that this hypothesis has been confirmed many times while not being falsified this century. Since there have been numerous capitalist nations that have not been considered democratic, capitalism is obviously not a sufficient condition for democracy. However, there have been no regimes that exhibit genuine democracy that do not also subscribe to free markets. In *Capitalism and Freedom*, Milton and Rose Friedman (1962) echo this sentiment by arguing that economic freedom is a necessary condition for political freedom and that while there is some limited role for government in a free society, the primary entity should be the individual.

Further, Berger observes that there is a tendency for capitalistic states to gravitate in the direction of institutions that are also democratic. Examples of this include South Korea, Portugal Spain, Chile and Greece. There can be at least two reasons for this occurrence. First, capitalism is based on the rule of law and can only flourish in this environment. This capitalist allegiance to due process and law naturally leads to the typical institutions associated with democracy (e.g., separated powers, rule of law, limited government, protection of rights of individuals and minorities). Secondly, the newly created middle class of entrepreneurs begins to believe that they are not inferior to

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[35] In terms of economic development as a predictor of democracy, numerous scholars have debated the issue over the years. These include Shumpeter, 1950; Lipset, 1959; Cutright, 1963, Smith, 1969; Dahl, 1971; Muller, 1988; Mueller, 1992; Huntington, 1992; Diamond, 1992; Lipset 1993, Huber, et. al, 1993; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Muller, 1995; and Bollen and Jackman, 1995.

the upper echelon of politicians and aristocrats. As a result they soon demand a more representative government (Novak, 1996).

Having said this, the razor of capitalism cuts both ways. As we have seen in the struggle towards democracy and market reforms in Eastern Europe, citizens are not satisfied with democracy if it results in simply a chance to cast one's vote. Rather, people demand that their economic well-being improve as well. While many do not expect to reach the lofty levels of the West overnight, it is assumed that there will be tangible and relatively consistent improvement. This has led to the question of whether to implement democracy and market reforms sequentially or at the same time. In addition, the issue of the pace of reforms in both respects has been a serious area of disagreement among citizens as well as policy makers.[36]

In an interesting work, Arat (1988) asks whether democracy can survive where there is a gap between political and economic rights. Here, the analysis draws the distinction between democracies that have been long established and newly emerging democratic regimes. She argues that the gradual and sequential social and political change associated with "old" democracies enabled governmental institutions to take root without severe turmoil (i.e., the dissolution of the government). Lacking the means to exploit others as Western imperialism could, democratic leaders in the developing world which are aiming for rapid economic growth (i.e., without equitable distribution) often expose themselves to problems which could result in their replacement by authoritarian figures. While his concentration is not on the relationship between the two, Leblang (1996) evaluates the effects of property rights and democracy on economic growth. In this cross-sectional panel study from 1960-1990, he finds that economies of nations that

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[36] Scholars addressing this include Åslund (1992), Brada (1993), Merrell (1993) and Köves (1992).

protect property rights grow more rapidly and that the nature of the political regime indeed influences economic growth indirectly through its commitment to property rights.

3.5. Exploratory Analysis

In this preliminary section, I investigate the empirical behavior of the measures of subsistence rights, security rights, and the rights to political and economic freedom. My goal at this stage is simply to describe the empirical landscape by examining univariate and multivariate characteristics of the data. While I delve into a complete operationalization of these variables in the next chapter, the measures for these four concepts can be depicted as follows.

Subsistence rights are measured as the "Physical Quality of Life Index" (PQLI) as originally developed by Morris (1979). This index, which represents the combination of infant mortality, life expectancy and literacy, ranges from 0 to 100. Security rights that cover physical integrity violations such as execution, torture, forced disappearance, and imprisonment (whether arbitrary, political, or religious) are measured with the Political Terror Scale (Gibney and Dalton, 1996). This scale ranges from 1-5 with 1 being the most egregious violator of human rights. Political Rights are evaluated by Jaggers and Gurr's Polity III democracy measure that concentrates on institutions and restraints on authority. It is depicted by an eleven-point scale where 10 represents the most democratic regime. Finally, I turn to the Fraser Institute for the measure of economic freedom. This component index ranges from 0 to 10 with 10 being the most economically open.

Table 3.1 contains descriptive statistics of the Physical Quality of Life Index (Subsistence Rights), the Political Terror Scale index (Security Rights), Jaggers and Gurr's Democracy Score (Democracy), and the measure of economic freedom constructed by the Fraser Institute (Economic Freedom). Keep in mind that the PQLI,

Political Terror Scale, and Democracy measure I use are measured annually over the entire period 1980-1993. The economic freedom index is only available for 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1993. All measures are coded so that higher scores represent greater realization of the particular class of human right being measured.

Table 3.1 Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Median	Mode	St. Dev	Min	Max
World	2548						
Subsistence Rights	2217	67.66	73.2	-----	20.56	14.00	99.00
Security Rights	2208	3.56	4.00	4.00	1.15	1.00	5.00
Democracy	1900	3.86	1.00	0.00	4.36	0.00	10.00
Economic Freedom	420	4.57	4.40	-----	1.48	0.60	9.30
Non-OECD	2226						
Subsistence Rights	1923	64.00	67.40	-----	19.65	14.00	99.00
Security Rights	1912	3.38	3.00	3.00	1.12	1.00	5.00
Democracy	1603	2.76	0.00	0.00	3.83	0.00	10.00
Economic Freedom	340	4.36	4.20	-----	1.46	.60	9.30
OECD	294						
Subsistence Rights	294	91.61	91.80	-----	1.31	86.60	94.70
Security Rights	294	4.72	5.00	5.00	.46	3.00	5.00
Democracy	294	9.87	10.00	10.00	.42	8.00	10.00
Economic Freedom	80	5.47	5.65	-----	1.22	2.90	8.00

The summary statistics listed in Table 3.1 are reported separately for the entire world, the developing world and the developed world.[37] Due to the ordinal nature of the Security Rights and the Democracy Score, I have also included the median and mode for these measures. Comparing these segregated samples allows us to draw two conclusions. First, OECD countries perform better on all empirical measures: they have better physical quality of life (subsistence rights), stronger protection of security rights, more democratic institutions, and more secure economic rights than the non-OECD countries. Table 3.2 provides further comparison between the industrial and non-industrial world by listing difference of means and variance tests. The first two columns of Table 3.2 contain t-statistics for difference of means tests. The t-statistics allow us to reject the null hypothesis that OECD and non-OECD countries have equal means for all of these variables. Second, the developed countries are more homogenous than the developing countries. The variances of all four variables are smaller in the OECD group than in the non-OECD group. The difference of variance test located in the last column of Table 3.2 indicates that we should reject the null hypothesis of equal variances across these groups. Analyzing the univariate distributions of these variables did not reveal any significant outliers. Therefore, I do not suspect that any single nation or cluster of nations drives these summary statistics. From the above analyses, then, we can conclude that there is a substantial gulf between developed and less developed countries. Further, we can see that human rights are not only better protected in the OECD countries, but that they tend to be more stable.

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[37] The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is often used as a barometer for membership in the developed world. Its precursor , the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, was launched after World War II to administer Marshall Plan aid to Europe and was transformed into the present organization in 1961. Currently, it is composed of 29 members (primarily European and North American). During the period of this study, its membership included 24 of the wealthiest nations (http://www.oecd.org).

Table 3.2. OECD v. Non-OECD: Difference of Means and Variances Tests

Variable	Means: t-test1	Means: t-test2	Variance: F-test
Security Rights	20.12 (0.0000)	35.99 (0.0000)	5.98 (0.0000)
Democracy	31.76 (0.0000)	71.88 (0.0000)	80.97 (0.0000)
Subsistence Rights	24.08 (0.0000)	60.73 (0.0000)	223.59 (0.0000)
Economic Freedom	6.30 (0.0000)	7.05 (0.0000)	1.44 (0.0000)

* T-test 1 assumes equal variances between OECD and non-OECD countries. T-test 2 does not assume equal variances between OECD and non-OECD countries. In Columns one and two entries are absolute values of t-statistics with probability values in parentheses.   In column three entries are F-statistics with probability values in parentheses.

Moving to Table 3.3, I have presented bivariate correlations for the OECD and non-OECD groups as well as the sample for the entire world. One interesting finding gleaned from these data is that the developed and non-developed countries appear to be driving somewhat different sets of correlations. Looking at the entire world, we can see that those countries with more democratic institutions and economic freedom, also tend to enjoy better physical quality of life and greater protection of security rights. The correlations for the world sample are all significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level. These relationships are still statistically significant, albeit less pronounced, if the developing world is considered separately. Singling out the OECD countries, we find that the correlation between physical quality of life and economic freedom and between democracy and economic freedom remain relatively strong and statistically significant. Also, security rights and democracy perform equally well. The relationship between

subsistence rights and security rights and between subsistence rights and democracy, while weaker, still maintain statistical significance. The correlation between security rights and economic freedom for the OECD are not statistically significant at the conventional 0.05 level. One obvious reason for this result is the small amount of variation for these measures throughout the OECD sample.

Table 3.3 Bivariate Correlations

World

	Sec. Rights	Democracy	Subs.Rights	Econ Free
Security Rights	1.000			
N	2208			
Democracy	0.4347*	1.000		
N	1867	1900		
Subs. Rights	0.3577*	0.5876*	1.000	
N	2123	1838	2217	
Econ Freedom	0.2636*	0.3400*	0.3652*	1.000
N	412	394	417	420

Non-OECD

	Sec. Rights	Democracy	Subs.Rights	Econ Free
Security Rights	1.000			
N	1912			
Democracy	0.2095*	1.000		
N	1571	1603		
Subs. Rights	0.2076*	0.2751*	1.000	
N	1829	337	1923	
Econ Freedom	0.1238*	0.2092*	0.2751*	1.000
N	332	314	337	340

OECD

	Sec. Rights	Democracy	Subs.Rights	Econ Free
Security Rights	1.000			
N	294			
Democracy	0.3942*	1.000		
N	294	294		
Subs. Rights	0.1419*	0.1547*	1.000	
N	294	294	294	
Econ Freedom	0.1300	0.2312*	0.3235*	1.000
N	80	80	80	80

*correlation different from zero at the 0.05 level

Though instructive, descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations do not provide an adequate illustration of the trends of subsistence rights, security rights, democratic institutions and freedom in the economic realm. Are these rights and freedoms improving in the world? Are national practices concerning these rights converging or diverging?

I begin by plotting the average subsistence rights scores (PQLI) across time in Figure 3.2. Overall, the average Physical Quality of Life has improved over the period 1980-1993. As illustrated in Figure 3.3, both OECD and non-OECD countries have progressively exhibited better performance in providing for the basic needs of their citizens. Here, it is obvious that the non-OECD countries are driving these conclusions for the world. Also, the road to improved subsistence rights has not been a completely smooth one. The most notable retrenchments occurred in 1984 and 1989. The latter is most likely attributable to the sudden fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War and the pull back of the superpowers (along with associated aid).

Figure 3.4 addresses the issue of convergence. For this, I plot the coefficient of variation [(standard deviation/mean)*100] against time. In terms of the world sample, the variation has decreased over time. As with previous evidence of discrepancy, it is clear that the OECD has remained very homogeneous while the developing world (though improving) still exhibits wide variation. A reexamination of Table 3.1 reveals similar findings with the standard deviation of the non-OECD group at 19.65 during this period while the OECD registered a low 1.31.

Figure 3.2 Trends in Subsistence Rights (World)

○ Mean PQLI Score--World   △ St.Dev PQLI Score--World

Figure 3.3 Trends in Subsistence Rights

○ Mean PQLI Score--World   △ Mean PQLI Score--Non-OECD
□ Mean PQLI Score--OECD

Figure 3.4 Coefficient of Variation in Subsistence Rights Scores

I continue on the same path in examining the security rights measure over time. At first glance, Figure 3.5 appears to indicate major changes in the mean Amnesty International score. The reader should note, however, that the vertical scale has a minimum of 3.5 and a maximum of 3.65, for a measure that ranges from one to five. With that in mind, using this global security rights scale as a guide, human rights performance demonstrated no obvious trend between 1980 and 1989, worsened somewhat from 1989 to 1992, and improved once again in 1993. The sharp rise in violation of these rights beginning after 1989 corresponds with the destruction of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. This corresponds to the experience with subsistence rights. In the security rights case, this situation was perhaps tied to the eruption of many post cold-war ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe, which led regimes to

increase security rights abuses in an effort to combat domestic challengers. In the wake of the Cold War, control of activities within the blocs was lessened, the perception of international threats dissipated and ethnic movements developed. These could be viewed as threats to existing regimes, thereby increasing the probability that these governments would resort to security rights abuse as a policy tool.

Figure 3.5 Trends in Security Rights (World)

Figure 3.5 also plots the yearly standard deviation of security rights scores, with evidence of similar trends. Variation in human rights practices increased (unevenly) between 1980 and 1988, and increased more dramatically from 1989 to 1993. Although security rights provisions are better guaranteed in 1993 than they have been since 1989,

there is more variation in world-wide security rights practices in 1992-1993 than in any

prior period. Again, this is perhaps attributable to the end of the Cold War. Figure 3.6

indicates that the conclusions regarding security rights practices are again driven by the

developing nations. Respect for security rights has slightly improved over time, although

not steadily. Looking at the coefficient of variation (Figure 3.7), we see that the non-

OECD is driving overall security rights performance in the world where there is strong

evidence of divergence. The OECD consistently has much less variation.

Figure 3.6 Trends in Security Rights

Figure 3.7 Coefficient of Variation in Security Rights Scores

○ C.V of Amnesty Scores--World   △ C.V of Amnesty Scores--Non-OECD
□ C.V of Amnesty Scores--OECD

Next, we turn our attention to the properties of the Polity III Democracy variable. Figures 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 show trends in the establishment of democratic institutions across the globe. Figure 3.8 illustrates a rather steady global movement towards the establishment of democratic institutions. Figure 3.9 suggests that this trend is being driven by changes in non-OECD group. Indeed, the OECD appears static, at least until 1990. This is reinforced by examining the bottom panel of Table 3.1 which shows that OECD countries have a mean democracy score of 9.87 and a median and mode of 10 for this period.

Figure 3.8 Trends in Democracy (World)

It is interesting to notice that this trend in the direction of greater democracy has accelerated since 1989 - a period that also experienced an increase in security rights violations, according to the analysis just conducted. This finding suggests that although democracy typically decreases abuse of security rights (as is indicated by the correlations previously presented), democratization in the aggregate may not always perform in this manner. Indeed, during this period it may have coincided with persons being subjected to more repression of these rights than before. Perhaps newly born democracies choose to use security rights abuse to maintain control, as suggested by Davenport's (1997) work on negative sanctions. This is also in keeping with Fein's (1995) thesis of "more murder in the middle," where countries in the middle range of democratization are expected to

exhibit greater degradation in human rights provisions. The remaining non-democratic regimes may also be alarmed by democracy movements operating from within and outside of their borders and increase repression in an effort to stifle dissent. This could more than erase any gains due to countries moving toward democracy in the aggregate. In terms of variation, Figure 3.10 also indicates that there is a degree of convergence in the non-OECD. The coefficient of variation in democracy scores has steadily declined during this period, indicating, possibly, that there is a demonstration effect or that more countries view democratic institutions as being more legitimate.

Figure 3.9 Trends in Democracy

Figure 3.10 Coefficient of Variation in Democracy Scores

○ C.V. of Demo Scores--World   △ C.V. of Demo Scores--non-OECD
□ C.V. of Demo Scores--OECD

Finally, we are left with economic freedom, a variable for which trends are difficult to interpret because of the limited available sample (i.e., measures are only provided for the years 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1993). Keeping that in mind, there is evidence that economic freedom has indeed increased across the globe. Figures 3.11 and 3.12 plot economic freedom (as measured by the Fraser Institute's index) against time. These two figures suggest that there has been a steady movement towards more protection of economic freedom in OECD and non-OECD countries alike. As is now expected, the OECD appears to be relatively homogenous in behavior while non-OECD countries exhibit more heterogeneous actions. However, it should be stated that variation across both sets of countries has been declining at least since 1990 (Figure 3.13).

Figure 3.11 Trends in Economic Freedom (World)

○ Mean Econ Free Score--World △ St.Dev. Econ Free Score--World

Figure 3.12 Trends in Economic Freedom

○ Mean Econ Free Score--World   △ Mean Econ Free Score--Non-OECD
□ Mean Econ Free Score--OECD

Figure 3.13 Coefficient of Variation in Economic Freedom Scores

○ C.V. of Econ Free Scores--World   △ C.V. of Econ Free Scores--non-O
□ C.V. of Econ Free Scores--OECD

3.6 Conclusion

While not answering all of my questions regarding the relationship between these four groups of "basic" internationally recognized human rights, this chapter did succeed in taking some important initial steps toward understanding the various linkages between basic human needs, security rights, democracy, and economic freedom. In what might be considered good news for citizens, as well as policymakers and scholars who have argued that these rights are *generally* complementary (e.g., Vance 1977, Howard 1983, Donnelly 1989, and Kyi 1995), bivariate correlation analyses provide no direct evidence of trade-offs. In these simple analyses, I found a tendency for these human rights to be achieved together, both in analyses of the full sample and in a subset of countries consisting of

non-OECD countries. Though when only OECD member countries were included in the analysis many of the relationships dissipated, this finding is probably due to the lack of variance in OECD countries and their relative homogeneity. Most of the significant findings throughout the chapter were driven by the non-OECD portion of the sample. Thus far it would appear that Kyi (1995) is essentially correct when he suggests that the trade-offs argument concerning development and other freedoms is merely a pretext used by regimes to counter the ever-increasing call for governments to live up to international political and security rights standards.

The results of my analyses of trends in human rights achievement and the variance in human rights performance also provide some very interesting findings. Each of the variables analyzed in this study showed a trend toward greater realization of rights since the beginning of the data series that I was able to examine. Thus, it would seem that it is possible (in the aggregate) to have each of these human rights become increasingly realized over time.

That said, there are also some findings that hint that the four categories of human rights we investigate do not always move together. In spite of increases in levels of Physical Quality of Life, economic rights, and democracy after 1989 and the end of the Cold War, the security rights measure shows that respect for personal integrity abuse actually decrease after 1989, until an improvement in 1993. This would suggest that, on a systemic level, moves toward democracy might actually be accompanied at first by greater repression. This would again lend credence to Fein's (1995) argument of "more murder in the middle." In addition, the correlations between the categories of rights are not so strong as to preclude the possibilities of trade-offs in certain cases.

Analysis of the variance in the scores yield further potentially important information. Though measures of the variation in economic rights and democracy

indicate the world is converging concerning respect for security rights and to a lesser extent with PQLI, there is evidence of a trend toward divergence. At least in the latter case, this could be a result of the increasing problems of inequality as will be discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH DESIGN: HYPOTHESES, MEASUREMENT, AND METHODOLOGY

4.1 Hypotheses: International Variables

The previous sections address the important topics of human rights
conceptualization and international law, as well as the potential theoretical linkages
between the various rights.   This chapter deals with the theoretically important task of
developing multivariate models that can better determine what aspects of the rapidly
changing global system actually affect basic human rights.   In order to achieve this, a
number of hypotheses are proposed and grounded in existing theoretical literature.
Differentiating between domestic and international determinants, I first begin with
external influences.

a. Global Integration

*Hypothesis: The greater (the lesser) the extent to which a country is integrated into the
international political economy, the more (the less) likely it will guarantee basic human
rights.*

This hypothesis is surrounded by the long-standing theoretical debate between
realism/neorealism (Morgenthau 1948, 1967; Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981, 1987; Prestowitz
1988; Grieco 1990) and liberalism/globalism (Keohane 1984, 1986; Axelrod 1984;
Axelrod and Keohane 1986; Keohane and Nye 1989; Oye 1986; Lake 1988; Snidel 1985,
1991; Suzuki 1994).   In short, realists view the world as a group of sovereign states with
national security at the heart of foreign policy.   Under this scenario, there is very little

incentive for international cooperation. Liberalism or globalism sees a system of regimes where integration is fostered and cooperation is not only possible, but likely.[38]

As illustrated by Holsti (1985), globalism predicts that growing interdependence of nations will result in a global society or community. This involves trade, technology, communication, and the "vast network of transnational relationships between private citizens, associations and companies (52)." Indeed, in the last twenty years, the increasing speed of technological developments has transformed the way in which governments and individuals conduct their affairs. The emergence of the computer has revolutionized the financial and trade markets into a worldwide market place. Since the 1970s, global trade has risen dramatically relative to previous levels, and relative to gross domestic product. As a result of this increase in trade and investment (along with technological innovation and deregulation of capital markets by governments), gross international capital flows rose to $600 billion annually. Indeed, as large as the growth in trade has been, the increased volume in international finance has even dwarfed progress in trade (Keohane and Milner 1996). Even in developing countries, international flows doubled from $52 billion in 1975-77 to $110 billion in 1985-89 (Turner 1991, 23). Further, in the aftermath of the debt crises of the 1980s, IMF and World Bank influences over developing countries' domestic economic policies (and indeed the developed world's need to remedy the crises) strengthens the argument that interdependence is increasing. Recent events surrounding the Asian financial crisis and Russian currency dilemma (and their subsequent impact on the U.S. and European economies) dramatize this growing globalization.

To my knowledge, there are only two scholars who have linked the level of incorporation into the global system with variations in human rights practices. Gurr

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[38] See Keohane and Nye (1989) and Krasner (1983) for examinations of the nature of regimes in general.

(1986) contends that since nations on the periphery of the system are not subject to retribution, they can engage in state terrorism against their citizens. Indeed, it appears that the most egregious violators have been those countries with little (or no) connection to the outside world (e.g., Cambodia under Pol Pot, Albania during the Cold War, North Korea until very recently). Because of this isolation, potential sanctions placed on them would have little effect. In employing an empirical test of Gurr's initial work, Webster (1994) finds marginal support for the hypothesis that linkages with the international system have a positive impact on states' respect for human rights.

Webster's findings notwithstanding, I hypothesize that the incorporation of a nation into the international community should have a positive effect upon a regime's treatment of its citizenry. With the advances in worldwide communication, this argument makes intuitive sense. Further integration into the world community would result in information concerning domestic human rights abuses being dispersed more quickly to the outside world and therefore bringing pressure on the offending government (Webster 1994, 95). Continuing this line of reasoning, we could expect improvements in human rights practices as a result of expanded integration. As stipulated in the numerous international instruments discussed previously (e.g., International Bill of Human Rights), the world community has agreed upon certain human rights standards. If governments choose to go against these accepted standards, they run the risk of bad publicity (which could indirectly injure them economically by way of reductions in foreign investment) and perhaps economic sanctions, which would be directly deleterious. In an age of increasing capital mobility, Keohane and Milner (1996, 19) argue that internationalization should even affect those countries not integrated into the global system (i.e., those countries whose economies are not open).

b. Cold War

Hypothesis: governments during the Post-Cold War era are more likely to violate their citizens' basic human rights.

On the surface, this position appears counter intuitive to the realist/neorealist perspective and the power politics involved in waging the Cold War. As the Second World War was coming to an end, strategic positions were already being taken by the Soviet Union and United States. Although they were both victors in the conflict, negotiations in splitting the spoils of the war soon exposed major rifts that would manifest themselves in a "cold war" that would ebb and flow over the next forty years. Acting in a realist fashion, both superpowers assembled satellite states, which would act as a check on the other's power. In order to maintain these client nations, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. employed threats as well as incentives in an attempt to prevent states from drifting into the opposing camp. The "carrots" would include foreign policy tools such as increased aid to the satellites. "Sticks," on the other hand, would involve demands by the superpower that the domestic government prevent any insurgents from wresting power away from the client (Webster 1994).

It could be argued that, as a result, regime leaders on both sides were more than willing to increase repression on their own citizenry in order to deter threats to the state. The U.S. threw support to such violators as Pinochet in Chile, Duvalier in Haiti, Stroessner in Paraguay, Mobutu in Zaire, Marcos in the Philippines, and the Shah in Iran. The Soviet Union, while famous for its repressive communist puppets in Central and Eastern Europe, can also be credited for propping up other dictators such as Mengistu in Ethiopia and Karmal and Najibullah in Afghanistan. For their part, the superpowers were comfortable in overlooking their clients' human rights violations while publicly speaking out against the other's atrocities. While criticizing civil and political rights

violations in Soviet-bloc nations, the U.S. allowed (and at times encouraged) similar violations within their allies' borders (Donnelly 1992). In short, both Washington and Moscow conceded that coercion by the domestic government was necessary in order to maintain their Cold War position.

The sudden end to the Cold War (which took most of the policy-making establishment and academia off guard) has nullified the justification for supporting such regimes. From the Soviet standpoint (both economically and politically), they can no longer maintain support for their former allies even if they wanted to. Much of the American aid given to repressive regimes was built on anti-Communist sentiment in the legislature as well as the nation at large. With the collapse of the "evil empire," the rationale for support is no longer applicable. As a result, one might expect that the protection of international human rights would substantially improve.

Having said that, it is equally plausible (and as I argue in the above hypothesis, more likely) that the end of the Cold War will have an adverse effect on human rights violations, especially if one concentrates on subsistence rights. From an economic standpoint, the difficulty in which the former Soviet states in Central and Eastern Europe have moved to a market economy could prove problematic in providing basic human rights. Market reforms in many of these countries have resulted in at least a short-term decrease in the average person's standard of living. With former Communists recently making inroads into the political gains of reformers in Eastern Europe and Russia, it appears that some citizens have been disappointed and expect more from the economic and political changes brought about by the end of the Cold War. This could eventually result in political instability with increasing opposition to further movement towards a market economy and democratic government. Here, it is possible that needs fulfillment interacts with domestic inequality, for persons are more apt to feel deprived, and

therefore be willing to oppose the government, when their referent is others in the society that are much better off (e.g., Gurr 1970, Ellina and Moore 1992; Moore, Lindstrom and O'Regan 1996).

Another problem surfacing with the close of the Cold War is the revival of nationalism among various groups that had been restrained by the respective superpowers. As we have seen throughout the former Soviet empire, national animosities suppressed during the post-war struggle have now bubbled over into severe conflicts. Obvious examples include the bloody confrontations in the former Yugoslavia, Chechnya, and Georgia.[39] While the tensions have at times eased, many of these areas still experience severe basic human rights violations, both in subsistence and security rights. This line of reasoning is connected with the issues surrounding ethnic conflict and civil war and their deleterious effects on basic human rights.

While there is an immense literature on realism and the Cold War in general, only a couple of scholars have attempted to make the connection between this conflict and human rights performance.[40] Gurr (1986) hypothesized that nations acting as proxies in major conflicts are more likely to utilize extreme violence on their own population. In order to combat internal threats to the state from the opposing ideological camp, the primary powers were pleased to supply the recipient regimes with money and weapons. Further, in cases where the intensity of the internal conflicts is high, Washington and Moscow were willing to accept not only immense financial costs but also increased repression in their client states. Though he is the first to even allude to the theoretical

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[39] Other problem areas include Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Sudan, and Zaire.

[40] The realist paradigm includes early philosophers such as Thucydides, Hobbes, and Machiavelli as well as the more contemporary work of Morgenthau (1948), Waltz (1979), Gilpin (1981, 1987), Prestowitz (1988) and Grieco (1990). For a general examination of the consequences of the *end* of the Cold War see Hogan (1992) and Rabie (1992).

relationship between the Cold War and human rights, Gurr (1986) does not move beyond hypothesis generation.

Wolpin (1986) also subscribes to this argument in his examination of repression in developing nations. He contends that the presence of foreign military personnel from both sides has a negative impact on the human rights policies of domestic governments. Though he does find substantial relationships between the two, the work is hampered by its failure to link the results with any overarching theory as Gurr (1986) does. More recently, Webster (1994) draws upon these two works and empirically tests the hypothesis. He finds that instead of exacerbating human rights violations, the Cold War actually improved human rights conditions in many parts of the world. While useful, this research is rather limited in the data used and overall scope. It is my intention to shed some definitive light on these conflicting results by utilizing a more comprehensive model with expanded data over a longer period of time.

4.2 Hypotheses: Domestic Variables

a. Economic Freedom

Hypothesis: The higher (lower) the level of economic freedom in a country, the more (less) likely the government will guarantee basic human rights.

Most research involving freedom has traditionally centered on such things as political rights and civil liberties. With ever more countries turning to a market economy, recent work has looked at the more narrow aspects of economic freedom and its effects on society. The philosophical underpinning of this effort is found in some of the classics of political and economic philosophy. Almost every advocate for economic freedom emphasizes the need for well-defined property rights that are guaranteed by law. John Locke, with his *Second Treatise on Civil Government*, can be credited with providing the foundation for legitimacy of private property and the government's

responsibility in protecting this right. In *Capitalism and Freedom*, Milton and Rose

Friedman (1962) carry on in the tradition of Locke by proposing a forthright statement of

economic freedom. Here, it is argued that economic freedom is a necessary condition for

political freedom and that while there is some limited role for government in a free

society, the primary entity should be the individual. The Friedmans expand on this by

proposing an economic bill of rights to complement the original Bill of Rights of the

U.S. Constitution. This list has provided a starting point for attempts to design a

measure to rate economic freedom.

Before I address the issue of how to operationalize economic freedom, it is

important for us to make the linkage between economic choice and basic human needs.

Tying in with the literature on economic development, it can be argued that economic

freedom is indeed related to GNP. Economic theory suggests that higher incomes and

increasing living standards are dependent on increases in the production of goods and

services valued by society. Gwartney, et al. (1996, 91-92) suggest that, as a nation

reaches high levels of economic freedom, it will enjoy swift growth.[41] This should be

especially pertinent to developing countries that can gain from incorporating successful

business practices and technical advancements from the developed world. Because

economic growth can be seen in part as a process of discovery, nations with greater

economic freedom should tend to have higher rates of growth than those with low levels

of freedom. Therefore, higher levels of economic freedom should result in higher levels

of per capita GNP as compared to lower levels of freedom.

Scully (1988) supports this position in his analysis of 115 market economies from

1960-1980. He finds that politically open societies that guarantee private property rights

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[41] This is contingent on the premise that this economic freedom is indeed credible and potentially long lasting.

and the market allocation of resources grow at three times the rate and are two and one-half times as efficient as societies in which these freedoms are not guaranteed. Gwartney, et al. (1996, 92-93) empirically show that on average, countries with more economic freedom have a higher per capita GDP. With the most recently available data (i.e., 1994), the average per capita GDP for the A rated economies was $13, 659 compared to those having a C grade with $7,888 and the F- grade with $1,650.[42] If the argument holds (from the previous section) that increased levels of GNP result in higher physical quality of life, then economic freedom should (at least indirectly) have an effect on basic human needs.[43]

b. Inequality

Hypothesis: The greater (the lesser) the inequality of wealth, the less (the more) likely the government will guarantee basic human rights.

The issue of inequality has been a concern for politicians since ancient times. A number of modern scholars have drawn attention to its widespread and persistent influence around the world, especially in developing countries (Ward 1978, Gurr 1985, Midgely 1987, Sterling 1974, Russett 1972, Douglas 1972, Grenier 1984, Kohli 1986). Not only is the problem of inequality an issue that governments must address, but in many instances a situation that is exacerbated by the regime itself. As many have noted, the elites use the state apparatus to safeguard their own economic interest and indeed protect the rich from the poor (Duff and McCamant 1976, North 1987, Claude 1987, Flynn, 1978, Scott 1985). For Gurr (1985, 1986), the central issue of inequality is that

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[42] The economic freedom ratings that range from zero to ten are also broken down into grades: countries with ratings of 8.0 or more were assigned an A; 7.0 to 7.99 a B; 6.0 to 6.99 a C; 5.0 to 5.99 a D; 4.0 to 4.99 an F; and less than 4.0 an F- (Gwartney, et al. 1996, 53). Details of the overall economic freedom index can be found in Appendix B.

the gulf between the "haves" and the "have-nots" will result in conflict and instability. Since the elite are not willing to accept a more equitable distribution, resorting to repression appears to be an efficient short term solution, especially in situations (as is usually the case) where resources are very limited. While the theoretical basis for this scenario is quite logical, empirical evidence has been less than unanimous. Although Muller (1985) finds support for the inequality hypothesis (as a correlate with political violence), Duff and McCamant (1985) find no relationship in Latin America between inequality and repression.

Surrounding the issue of basic needs and increasing levels of GNP is the notion that there is (or could be) a trade-off between development and provision of basic needs. The argument for development maintains that resources, which would be devoted to social programs to satisfy basic human needs, are instead channeled toward greater investment. This can be broken down into "strong" and "weak" needs trade-off. Strong needs trade-off would constrain consumption to obtain the highest percentage of total income for investment. Weak needs trade-off simply bars consideration of consumption-based human rights from development policy.

A trade-off can also occur between development and equality. As in the above case, the development vs. equality competition can take a "strong" and "weak" form. The weak equality trade-off stipulates that the relationship between the level of economic development and income inequality takes the form of an inverted U-curve. This U-curve hypothesis was first proposed by Kuznets (1955) and has since been widely debated (Colombatto 1991; Newman and Thomson 1989; Newman and Thomson 1991; Ogwang 1995; Ram 1988; Rock 1993). The strong variation views inequality not so much an unintended casualty of, but rather a contributor to, development. Since only the

relatively wealthy will be able to save and invest, (and if investment is the mainstay of robust growth), inequality is seen to benefit even the poor in the long run.

c. Democracy

Hypothesis: The more (less) democratic a government, the more (less) likely it will guarantee basic human rights.

Recent literature on human rights finds a relatively strong relationship between democratic forms of government and protection of human rights. It appears that there are a number of theoretical justifications for this conclusion. Henderson (1991) was one of the first to empirically test this hypothesis that the more democratic the government, the less likely that it will oppress its citizens. Because the democratic process is built on bargaining and compromise, it provides a substantive alternative for dealing with conflict. We are also warned by Henderson that democracy must truly be legitimate in the sense that functional institutions are in place that can insure participation of various interests. Poe and Tate (1994), in their pooled cross-sectional study of integrity of the person rights, substantially extend the findings of Henderson (1991, 1993) with different measures of democracy. In his investigation of democracy and international conflict, Dixon (1994, 15-17) continues the argument that "bounded competition" with its rules, procedures and guidelines socialize democratic leaders that bargaining and compromise are the only avenues to dispute resolution.

A second theoretical basis for expecting greater human rights guarantees with greater democratization is that democracies offer their citizens the ability to remove potentially abusive leaders before violations have become too severe. This usually includes not only the right to vote but also the capability to oust officials for unconstitutional behavior. This obviously assumes that a country will have constitutional guarantees for human rights - which most do indeed have. Thirdly, the civil liberties

usually associated with democracies (such as freedom of speech, press, assembly, etc.) enables citizens and opposition groups to publicize abuse of the particular regime. These freedoms could also result in publicity of potential abuses being exported to the international community (e.g., UN, EU, OSCE, and non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International) which could lead to further pressure on a domestic government.

Turning more specifically to democracy and its effect on basic human needs, a number of scholars have proposed that democracies are better equipped to provide their citizens with these rights. Moon and Dixon (1985), Rosh (1986), Spalding (1986) and Moon (1991) find that political democracy is associated with higher levels of basic needs satisfaction, even when controlling for wealth (i.e., GNP). These conclusions are bolstered by the fact that the authors utilize different measures of democracy. Spalding (1986) and Rosh (1986) offer the definition provided by Arat (1984, 1991) and Moon and Dixon (1985) and Moon (1991) use that of Bollen (1980, 1991).[44]

Table 4.1 Summary of Hypotheses

Independent Variable	Hypothesized Relationship with Basic Human Rights	Source of Independent Variable
H1: Global Integration	Positive	International
H2: Cold War	Positive	International
H3: Economic Freedom	Positive	Domestic
H4: Income Inequality	Negative	Domestic

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[44] Both Arat (1991) and Bollen (1991) further expand on their operationalization of democracy in later works.

H5: Democracy	Positive	Domestic

4.3 Control Variables

While the focus of this dissertation analyzes international political economy variables associated with increasing globalization, a number of other factors have garnered much interest in the development literature as well as human rights studies. In my desire for the most comprehensive (as well as parsimonious) model of international political economy and basic human rights, I therefore control for a number of these variables.

The first set of control variables includes economic development and economic growth. The prevailing hypothesis is that the richer a country's population, the more likely its government will guarantee subsistence as well as security rights. In terms of subsistence rights, a number of authors (Moon and Dixon 1985, Spalding 1986, Rosh 1986, and Park 1987) find that wealth is one of the most powerful explanations of well-being.[45] Having said that, Goldstein (1985) and Rosh (1986) question whether this linear relationship holds universally, especially at the higher levels of GNP. Mitchell and McCormick (1988), Henderson (1991) and Poe and Tate (1994) also find some support for this positive connection between GNP and the respect for security rights. Again, support for this argument is also not without its detractors (Duff and McCamant 1976).

Turning to the rate of economic growth, intuition tells us that a strong economic growth rate will provide more goods for a society and therefore lessen the potential friction between a government and its people. However, Olson takes a different approach by strongly arguing that "rapid economic growth is a major force leading

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[45] While ultimately arriving at this conclusion, Rosh (1986) warns that the relationship is expected to be greatly reduced if research is concentrated on the third world rather than the entire world.

towards revolution and instability" (1963, 530). In what he calls a "revolution of rising expectations," rapid growth will increase the problems of inequity and rising expectations about what the government should do outstrip what the regime is actually capable (or willing) to do (540-541). Continuing this line of inquiry, Gurr (1968, 1986) argues that this "relative deprivation" may occur because rapid growth almost never is rapid enough to keep up with the ever-increasing expectations. From an operationalization standpoint, I follow a number of authors (McKinlay and Cohan 1975, 1976; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994) in using gross national product per capita for level of economic development and percentage growth in GNP per capita for economic growth.[46]

The next pair of control variables addresses the government's involvement in either international and/or civil war. A number of studies argue that participation in international conflict (Stohl 1975, 1976; Rasler 1986; Poe and Tate 1994) and civil conflict (Nieburg 1969; Tilly 1978; and Skocpol 1979, Poe and Tate 1994) will have a deleterious effect on human rights. To operationalize both international war and civil war, I utilize the scales proposed by Small and Singer (1982). The first defines a country as being involved in an interstate war if 1) there was a total of a thousand or more battle deaths suffered by all of the participants in the conflict or 2) the particular country suffered at least a hundred fatalities or had a thousand or more personnel taking part in the hostilities (pp. 50, 55). The second scale categorizing civil conflicts stipulates two criteria. The first criterion for an actual civil war would demand that the regime in power be *directly* involved in the conflict. Also, there must be a viable resistance where

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[46] While GNP is considered the traditional and most popular approach, there have been several alternatives offered. These include energy consumption (Henderson 1991) and a number of basic human needs measures reviewed in the subsistence rights section above. The primary difficulty in employing measures such as energy consumption is that accurate data do not exist for many of the years and countries that are included in this study. The basic needs measures obviously would be problematic in that one of my dependent variables (subsistence rights) utilizes components of these indices.

either both sides must be "organized for violent conflict" or "the weaker side, although initially unprepared [must be] able to inflict upon the stronger opponents at least five percent of the number of fatalities it sustains" (215). As a result, I do not categorize massacres and/or genocides as civil wars.

The final variables, which I control for, look at population issues. It has been argued that the larger a nation's population and population growth rate, the greater its government's tendency to violate basic human rights (Henderson 1993, Poe and Tate 1994).[47] Henderson emphasizes the stresses put on all aspects of society as "individuals and groups compete for every conceivable good." While the "extent of scarcity varies from country to country, [but] in the more hard-pressed countries, burgeoning demands will keep governments off-balance and will incline them to resort to repression. This high level of population can push countries into repression in a variety of ways. From a basic statistical standpoint, larger populations increase the possibility for repressive acts to occur (Poe and Tate 1994, 857). Secondly, unsustainable populations can result in environmental devastation, which in turn injures the economy and lessens the regime's ability to meet its citizens' demands (Henderson 1993, 324). For my uses here, I incorporate the natural logarithm of total national population. The log is employed to overcome the skewed distribution of total population that would otherwise hamper the statistical assumptions.

In terms of population growth, increasing populations tend to counter any economic growth that may be present. Second, increasing populations exacerbates the already difficult problem of ethnic conflict, "as when an increase in the size of an ethnic

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[47] In the end, Henderson (1993) finds that population pressures, as evidenced by population growth rate, are related to integrity of the person violations by governments. On the other hand, population size itself demonstrated little or no affect on government repression. The results from Poe and Tate's (1994) study, however, indicate that population size has a positive impact on human rights abuse while population growth has no statistical effect on repression.

group leads to a demand for a larger share of society's political and economic rewards" (Henderson 1993, 324). Third, a rising growth rate tends to result in a relatively large number of young persons (as compared to the overall population) whose needs and demands are enormous (e.g., education, jobs). Also, this demographic group is more likely to be involved in challenging the government when it comes to meeting these demands. In measuring population growth, I utilize the average percent increase in national population from year to year, throughout the thirteen-year period of the design.

Table 4.2 Summary of Control Variables

Independent Variable	Hypothesized Relationship with Basic Human Rights	Source of Independent Variable
H6: Economic Development	Positive	Domestic
H7: Economic Growth	Negative	Domestic
H8: International War	Negative	International
H9: Civil War	Negative	Domestic
H10: Population Level	Negative	Domestic
H11: Population Growth	Negative	Domestic

4.4 Operationalization: Dependent Variables

a. Subsistence Rights

For the sake of clarity, it is imperative for us to specifically define and operationalize the phenomena that I attempt to explain. In terms of basic human needs, many would agree that these include unpolluted air and water; sufficient food, clothing and shelter; and minimal public health care. While the provision of these is somewhat more controversial than security (i.e., integrity of the person) rights, they are nonetheless

essential if one is to realize a relatively healthy and substantive life. If a person is lacking in these basic human needs, the result can be just as painful and deleterious as when a person's physical security is violated. The acceptance of these rights was illustrated in U.S. foreign policy through the unveiling of the "New Directions" or "Basic Needs Mandate" by Congress in 1973. This marked a major departure in foreign aid from the development assistance policies of the 1960s to the proposed goal of meeting the needs of the poorest people in the poorest countries. This was to be accomplished by concentrating assistance on food production, nutrition, health care and education (Sartorius and Ruttan 1989).

In his extensive examination of basic human needs, Moon (1991, 7-9) argues that the provision of these needs requires few compromises concerning alternative normative goals. This addresses the ongoing debate concerning the trade-off between growth and equality.[48] According to the U-curve hypothesis originally proposed by Kuznets (1955), inequality associated with economic development will at first accelerate and then, after a period of time, begin to decline. This stems from the intersectoral shifts in the early stages of development, which exacerbate inequality. While the theory has won support from numerous scholars (Ahluwalia 1974; Robinson 1976; Chenery and Syrquin, 1975, Okun 1975; Ogwang 1995) others have found conflicting results (Adelman and Morris 1973; Chenery et al. 1974; Ram 1988). Moon joins other scholars (Isenman 1980; Hicks 1980; Berry 1984) in concluding, "...just as growth does not eliminate poverty, egalitarianism does not slow material progress" (1991, 8). He further argues that provision of basic needs may even be necessary for rapid economic development.

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[48] Donnelly (1989: 163-166) provides a succinct overview of the trade-offs between development and basic needs, equality and liberty.

Assuming that basic needs should be provided (or at least not withheld) by sovereign governments, the question of measurement still needs to be solved. For decades, social scientists studying the problems of the developing world have used gross national product (in addition to its components and growth) as a yardstick of progress. Benefits of this measure include its widespread availability for comparison cross-nationally and/or over time. This utilization rested on the premise that economic growth would filter down to the poor or if that did not occur, governments would take action to alleviate the inequality. History has taught us that growth indeed did not spread to those most in need and governments did not always step in to assist. In addition, numerous other problems with GNP as a measure of overall well being have been exposed by scholars (e.g., Hicks and Streeten 1979; Morris 1979; Moon 1991). First, it is an index of aggregate production rather than personal income or consumption Second, the issues involving the evaluation of output from different countries in a common measure is very troublesome. Thirdly, the economic cost of a good is not a measure of its ability to enhance welfare. Finally, goods required to meet basic needs may simply not be available at any price, irrespective of income or GNP (Moon 1991, 22).

As a result of the above shortcomings, there have been numerous attempts by agencies such as the UN, AID, OECD and UNESCO to find superior measures. The primary focus in this effort has centered on social indicators of certain basic needs. These basic needs and their common indicators are:

Health   (life expectancy, health expenditures, doctors per thousand
             population, hospital beds per thousand population)

Education   (literacy, primary school enrollment, education expenditures)

Nutrition   (caloric supply per head, caloric supply as percent of requirements)

Water supply	(percent of population with potable water, infant mortality per thousand population)
Sanitation	(percent of population with access to sanitation facilities, infant mortality per thousand population)
Housing	(No acceptable indicator available)

This process can be further broken down into consideration of indicators that reflect either inputs or results. Indicators reflecting results or outcomes are on the whole preferable since I am striving to evaluate the actual performance of governments in providing basic human needs to its citizens. For instance, health expenditures and primary school enrollment tell us nothing about the distribution of these services or the quality and therefore success of the effort.[49] (Hicks and Streeten 1979, 571-578; Moon 1991, 24).

Additional efforts (many funded by the United Nations) have been made to combine individual indicators into composite indices. Examples include Drewnowski and Scott's (1966) "Level of Living" index, McGranahan et al.'s "Development Index," and the work of the United Nations Economic and Social Council which combined seven social and economic indicators. For numerous reasons such as lack of data/comparability and attempting to combine too many indicators, most of these indices have not been implemented by many scholars.[50]

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[49] At least one attribute in favor of inputs would be in attempting to measure the intention and commitment of a particular government to provide services. Fraser (1994) utilizes both of these approaches in comparing human rights practice versus promise. For our purposes here, however, I will concentrate on those indicators reflecting only outputs.

[50] A notable exception is the Human Development Index, which is the most recent measurement offered by the United Nations. It combines indicators of national income, life expectancy and educational attainment. Although it is an improvement over some previous attempts, it however presents several shortcomings. These include only measuring human development since 1990 and mixing ends and means (i.e., income is means of achieving human development while standards of health and educational achievement are ends).

The most widely utilized composite was developed by Morris (1979) under the auspices of the Overseas Development Council. This "Physical Quality of Life Index" (PQLI) is a composite of three indicators: infant mortality per thousand live births, life expectancy at age one, and basic literacy as the proportion of population fifteen years and over who are literate. Ultimately, the overall PQLI composite is the unweighted arithmetic mean of these three indicators. The measure for life expectancy at age one (LE^1) considers 38 years as the "worst" case scenario (since 1950) and 85 years as the "best" performance. The index for each country is designated by the formula

$$LE^1 - 38 / 0.47$$

Since most sources usually report data only for life expectancy at birth, LE^1 can be calculated by the standard formula

$$LE^1 = LE^0 - 1 + IMR(1-SURV) / 1 - IMR$$

Where LE^0 is life expectancy at birth; LE^1 is life expectancy at age one; IMF is infant mortality rate per 1,000 births, SURV is the average survival period for the first year and is assumed to be three and one half months (0.3 years). The infant mortality rate (IMR) index utilizes 250 per 1,000 live births as the "worst" performance and 0 per 1,000 live births as the "best" possible performance. Specific country measures are determined by the formula[51]

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[51] For those already familiar with the PQLI, it must be noted here that the original formulas of Morris (1979) have been slightly modified (updated) for methodological reasons. These changes have been applied to the entire data set (all countries and years). The original index defined life expectancy at age one as $LE^1 - 38 / .39$ and infant mortality as $229-IMF/ 2.22$ (Morris 1979, p. 45). Because of rapid increases of IMR and LE^1 in a number of higher-ranking nations, it was soon possible to obtain a score in excess of 100. If IMR or LE^1 rise above 100, their weights in the composite measure will be

$$250 - IMR / 2.50$$

Infant mortality and life expectancy at age one arguably capture the combined effects of public health, nutrition, family environment, and social relations. On the surface, it might appear that infant mortality and life expectancy measure the same things (i.e., health). In reality, they indicate different aspects of social performance. In looking at the historical pattern of the two, it becomes evident that the factors affecting changes in life expectancy at age one are not the same as those affecting infant mortality. An example of this is shown by Western countries since 1950 where mortality rates of persons over age one were typically falling while infant mortality rates refused to decline. Infant mortality rates eventually came down, but in a separate and later occurrence. The sources of survival improvements (whether nutrition, environment, medicine, etc.) did not impact each age group in the same manner or at the same rate. Even during the 1990s, countries that have similar life expectancies do not always have the same infant mortality rates and vice versa (Morris 1979, 35).

Essentially, infant mortality reflects social conditions inside the home, especially the well being of women. Life expectancy at age one indicates conditions in the external environment. The indicator for literacy indicates the potential for development and ability of the underclass to gain the advantages and responsibilities of this development. As Morris (1979, 35) correctly argues, literacy is a superior measure than school enrollment or numbers of classrooms or instructors. These are only indicators of inputs

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disproportionate in relation to literacy, which by definition cannot be over 100. Therefore, the high end of IMR scale has been altered from 7 per 1,000 to 0 per 1,000 live births. The low end of the scale was increased from 229 to 250 per 1,000 live births. The high end of the LE[1] has been increased from 77 to 85 years. The bottom end of the scale remains at 38 years. Finally, the formula used to convert life expectancy at birth data to life expectancy at age one has been slightly altered to where SURV (the average survival period during the first year) is 0.3 rather than 0.2 (Morris 1996, 7).

and do not guarantee any improved results or at best indicate the educational benefits going typically to elite groups. Indeed, basic literacy component not only measures gains to the very poor but can also record literacy gains obtained through informal as well as formal processes.

In constructing his index, Morris (1979, 30-34) lays out six criteria that all composite measures should meet. These are: 1) it should not assume that there is only one pattern of development; 2) it should avoid standards that reflect the values of specific societies; 3) it should measure results, not inputs; 4) it should be able to reflect the distribution of social results; 5) it should be simple to construct and easy to comprehend; and 6) it should lend itself to international comparison. The PQLI indeed meets all of these criteria.

Some scholars have questioned the index approach in general and the PQLI in particular (Bayless and Bayless 1982; Goldstein 1992; Hicks and Streeten 1979; Larson and Wilford 1979). One argument is that a loss of information may result from an index of indicators that measure similar aspects of basic human needs. Provided the components are indeed highly correlated, then nothing is gained from the index. Conversely, if the components move in different directions, combining them could mask the changes that might be detected by using the individual indicators. Perhaps the most troubling criticism is brought on by the apparent arbitrary nature in equally weighting infant mortality, life expectancy and literacy.

While Morris (1979) originally laid out an extensive justification for his index, Moon (1991) also succinctly addresses many of the criticisms of the PQLI. First, using the index instead of a series of collinear indicators greatly reduces the burden of analysis. Comparison studies (Moon and Dixon 1985; Moon 1991) indicate that the intercorrelations among the three ingredients and the overall PQLI are extremely high.

In addition, it can be assumed that the separate items measure different aspects of a single theoretical construct. If this is the case, then a single index is more appropriate than multiple measures. This approach is especially applicable if the underlying construct has related components. Employing single indicators may result in a restricted interpretation of the problem and a governmental response that does not detect that the measure is a proxy for a concept, not the concept itself (Streeten 1981, 22). Therefore, nations might implement policies that might lead to an improvement in a specific indicator while not completely addressing the overall shortcoming in basic needs. Also, by using a combination of the three indicators, I can lessen any impact of the idiosyncrasies of any single item.

Much of the harsh criticism of the PQLI has come from the basic weighting scheme of placing equal emphasis on infant mortality, life expectancy and literacy (Bayless and Bayless 1982; Goldstein 1992; Hicks and Streeten 1979; Larson and Wolford 1979). The primary objection is that there is no theoretical basis for assigning equal weights to the components. Morris (1979, 47-49) forcefully argues that since there is no overriding theoretical justification for treating any one indicator as more important than another, we must employ equal weights. Moon (1991, 27) echoes this position and stresses that reweighting the components in various plausible alternatives produces measures with a Spearman rank order correlation consistently over .98. This level of intercorrelation is well above that usually considered sufficient to warrant a composite index. After evaluating all of the advantages and disadvantages of the numerous approaches to measuring basic human needs, I am persuaded that the PQLI is the best measure currently available.

b. Security Rights

The next aspect of human rights I examine is that which pertains to the "integrity of the person" or "physical integrity" (Stohl and Carleton 1985; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Henderson 1991, 1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Fein 1995; Poe, Tate, Keith and Lanier 1996; Cingranelli and Richards 1997). As the above authors have indicated, abuses that violate the integrity of the person are execution, torture, forced disappearance, and imprisonment/detention of persons, either arbitrarily or for their political and/or religious beliefs. For Shue (1980), these constitute violations of what he calls security rights, while Poe and Tate (1994) refer to them as both integrity of the person violations and state terrorism interchangeably, since these government actions are used to force compliance in others. Although these deplorable acts have obvious deleterious effects on the victims, governments can further use them to control their citizens after the fact. As Amnesty International illustrates in their report on *Torture in the Eighties*, states utilize torture as a tool

> "...to intimidate the victim and other potential dissidents from further political activity.... Intimidation of rural populations by means of torture and killings has been part of government strategies to bring the population or land areas under government control" (1984, 5).

For my purposes here, the rights insuring protection against the above violations are referred to as either integrity of the person rights or security rights.

Though I have presented what has become a rather conventional definition of integrity of the person rights, measurement of their realization is a bit more difficult. One of the best guides in this endeavor is Jabine and Claude's (1992) *Human Rights and Statistics: Getting the Record Straight*. While better measurement and statistical

availability will continue to be called for, numerous scholars (e.g., Milner 1995, Poe and Tate 1994; Stohl and Carleton 1985; Stohl, Carleton and Johnson 1984) argue that empirical tests are appropriate and necessary with currently obtainable data.

In measuring these rights, researchers may choose between what have come to be known as events-based approach and standards-based approaches (Stohl et al. 1986; Lopez and Stohl 1992). The events approach would involve coding cases of repressive events from newspaper accounts. Typically, the number of these events is summed for a particular period (a month or year) and the number of events is considered a measure of repression. Some difficulties with this approach as a means to measure levels of human rights violation have been identified (Stohl et al. 1986; Lopez and Stohl 1992; Poe and Tate 1994). First, typically a few major Western newspapers have been used to find mention of events and consequently, a Western bias in reporting often arises. There is also apt to be a bias in favor of closed societies that would tend to have less of their abuses reported internationally. An example of the need for this would be the case of North Korea. With such a closed society, it would not be surprising that there are no (or at least very few) reports of government repression in North Korea. This would be of particular concern in cross-national analyses like the ones I plan to conduct, and also for personal integrity abuses in particular, which, it would seem, governments would want to be kept under a veil, hidden from the world press.

I therefore opt, instead, to use the standards-based approach, which calls for coders to read various reports on governments' human rights practices, and to classify countries according to a set of predetermined criteria. Though not without its own weaknesses, this approach does allow the researcher to exercise judgment in coding, thus decreasing some of the problems associated with bias. The standards-based measure I employ is the five point Political Terror Scales, or PTS (Gibney and Dalton 1996)

scales, which were created from the annually published human rights reports of Amnesty International.   As in previous studies by Poe and Tate (1994) missing cases are filled in using similar codings gained from the U.S. State Department Reports. Though an alternative measure, gathered mainly from the U.S. State Department is also available, I have not used it here because of my concerns regarding the well-known allegations that the U.S. State Department Reports exhibits biases (e.g., Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1993; Innes 1992; Poe and Tate 1994). Innes (1992) argues convincingly that the State Departments reports have improved over time. Still, since I aim to later conduct analyses of trends in realization, the accuracy of the early years of those reports are a special concern, and thus I use Amnesty's reports as the major data source.

The PTS has been widely used in the study of human rights and are the only measures currently available for a worldwide sample, and all of the years I wish to cover.[52] Having said that, the PTS scale is no stranger to criticism. McCormick and Mitchell (1997) argue that the concept of human rights is not unidimensional as PTS portrays, but rather is multidimensional (especially concerning the components of imprisonment and the use of torture and killing). In their attempt at improving upon the PTS, Cingranelli and Richards (1999) persuasively argue in favor of a unidimensional approach and dispute the claims made by McCormick and Mitchell (1997). While Cingranelli and Richards' (1999) scale is enticing, it is only available for five of the years in my study. Therefore, at this time, I have chosen to utilize the Political Terror Scale. The scales cover the 1980-1993 time frame. They are coded so that a "5" represents a country where these rights are not abused, while the lowest score, "1" is

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[52] Among the studies using these indices include Poe and Sirirangsi 1993, 1994; Gibney and Stohl 1988; Carleton and Stohl 1987; Stohl and Carleton 1985; Stohl, Carleton and Johnson 1984.

assigned to countries that are the worst human rights disasters.[53] The scale is presented in its entirety in the Appendix A.

4.5 Operationalization: Independent Variables

a. Global Integration

While there are many definitions of globalization (Gurtov 1991, Hirst and Thompson 1996, Mittelman 1996, Clark 1997), interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1989, Jones 1984), and internationalization (Keohane and Milner 1996) my conceptualization is rather straightforward. For our purposes here, I define globalization as the degree to which nations are economically and politically incorporated into the overall international system. To date, the only empirical work considering interdependence and human rights is Webster (1994). While he makes a significant contribution by initially testing the hypothesis, his single measurement scheme is not sufficient. Therefore, for the measurement of global integration, I utilize three separate but associated components. These are integration into the postwar Bretton Woods system, trade openness, and financial openness.

For my measure of Bretton Woods regime integration, I look to Webster's (1994) measurement of membership in the World Bank, the GATT and the IMF. For each membership category and year, a simple dichotomous rating is applied ("one" if it is a member and "zero" if it is not). The values for the three categories are then summed so that the highest possible score for a nation is three and the lowest is zero.   The data indicating membership come from various issues of *The Political Handbook of the World*.

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[53] In order to be consistent with the scales of the other variables, the original five-point security rights scale is recoded so that countries with more severe human rights violations exhibit a lower rating while nations with fewer violations are assigned a higher rating.

Following the work of Heston and Summers (1994), I choose to measure trade openness as the sum of imports and exports divided by the gross domestic product. Unfortunately, there has been little success in accurately estimating financial openness for the vast majority of countries throughout the world. Data on gross financial inflows and outflows as a percentage of gross national product simply is not available at this time. Until very recently, studies of capital controls were limited to indirect measures such as covered interest differentials (Kasman and Pigott 1988, Frankel and McArther 1987, Ito 1986, Dooley and Isard 1980, Giavazzi and Pagano 1985) or a dichotomous indicator of whether or not nations imposed restrictions on capital flows (Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi-Ferretti 1994).

In moving beyond the simple dichotomous discussion of whether countries impose restrictions on capital, I have tracked the trends for each of the various capital controls for both the OECD and non-OECD nations as reported by the IMF. The first type of controls involves restrictions on the current account. These actions include 1) restrictions on payments for current transactions, 2) import surcharges, 3) requirements of advance import deposits, 4) surrender or repatriation of export proceeds. Further, controls can involve restrictions on the capital account. This can involve 1) restriction on payments for capital transactions, 2) limitations on non-resident accounts, 3) licensing of inflows and outflows of various forms of capital (real estate, securities, banknotes, bank loans, bank deposits), and 4) special reserve requirements on banks' foreign positions. Finally, capital controls can manifest themselves in the form of exchange control restrictions. Here, one may find dual or multiple exchange rates existing for commercial or financial transactions in addition to possible bilateral arrangements (IMF 1994, Epstein and Schor 1992). The results are illustrated in Table 2. [54]

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[54] This sample includes 164 countries (21 OECD and 143 non-OECD).

Table 4.3 Total Occurrences of Capital Controls per Year

Year	Import Surcharges	Advance Import Deposits	Restrict Capital Trans.	Restrict Current Trans.	Restrict Export Proceeds	Separate Exchange for Capital Trans.
1980	45	23	87	55	90	24
1981	49	21	90	60	92	28
1982	43	19	90	67	93	28
1983	43	25	89	68	94	28
1984	42	20	89	68	90	26
1985	44	18	92	70	93	30
1986	42	22	93	67	93	31
1987	43	22	94	68	92	30
1988	43	17	91	66	92	28
1989	41	17	87	62	90	25
1990	42	19	92	66	90	24
1991	42	19	87	64	90	19
1992	23	12	62	50	60	22
1993	19	9	64	46	64	21

While this is an instructive first step, it does not provide us with an acceptable operationalization for further empirical tests. Therefore, I have chosen to combine these measures of capital controls into one overall indication of international financial openness. This variable ranges from zero to six (according to how many individual capital restrictions were imposed for a given country in a given year). In order to

simplify interpretation, I have recoded this measure where zero indicates the least open economy and the value six indicates the most open international market.[55]

b. Cold War

One of the explanations for human rights variations is the presence or absence of the Cold War. For purposes of this analysis, a very simple measure is employed - a dummy variable signifying the presence or absence of tensions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Although the reforms of Glasnost and Perestroika became evident soon after Gorbachev's rise to power in the mid 1980s, the actual release of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union did not actually occur until late 1989 with the culmination of the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Therefore, for this variable, 1980-1989 is given a score of one to signify the presence of the Cold War and 1990-1993 is coded as a zero to indicate the absence of Cold War.

c. Economic Freedom

In defining economic freedom, it is perhaps easier to begin with an identification of losses in freedom. Jones and Stockman (1992) point out that constraints imposed by a third party on voluntary transactions will result in a loss of economic freedom, which is the sum of the losses in consumer and producer surplus in those constrained transactions. From a positive framework, I can say that individuals possess economic freedom when a) property they acquire without the use of force, fraud, or theft is protected from physical invasions by others and b) they are free to use, exchange, or give their property to others as long as these actions do not violate the identical rights of others (Gwartney, et al.

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[55] For a comparable measurement of international financial openness, see Quinn (1997). While Quinn provides a more complex measure of financial openness, his sample of only 56 countries is somewhat limiting for my application here.

1996, 12).[56] In choosing an appropriate measure of economic freedom, I am faced with essentially three options - the Fraser Institute, Freedom House, and the Heritage Foundation. Fraser Institute provides the most complex index incorporating 17 components that cover four areas of economic freedom. These areas include 1) money and inflation, government operations and regulations, 3) takings and discriminatory taxation, and 4) international exchange. A zero to ten rating scale is used for each component. Details of the Fraser index are shown in Appendix B.

Building on their success of the widely-used measures of political rights and civil liberties, Freedom House offers a composite measure incorporating six indicators: 1) Freedom to hold property; 2) Freedom to earn a living; 3) Freedom to operate a business; 4) Freedom to invest one's earnings; 5) Freedom to trade internationally; and 6) Freedom to participate in the market economy.[57] As noted in its *World Survey of Economic Freedom*, Freedom House acknowledges that there is a striking degree of similarity between its ratings and those of the Fraser Institute and Heritage Foundation. Having said that, I choose to use the overall superior Fraser measure for my analysis. First, it is more comprehensive both in its combined indicators and its historical nature covering the period from 1975-1995. Further, the Fraser Institute better addresses a number of very complex methodological issues that arise in creating an index such as this.[58]

d. Inequality

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[56] It is important to note the distinction between economic freedom and political and civil liberties. Nations may indeed exhibit high levels of political rights and civil liberties while at the same time achieve a relatively low level of economic freedom. Examples include Sweden, India and Israel.

[57] Assigned values for this composite range from 0 to 3 for the first four indicators and 0 to 2 for the last two indicators.

[58] This work is a culmination of six symposia from 1984 through 1993 where some of the most respected economists cooperated to forge an acceptable measure of economic freedom. See Walker (1988) *Freedom, Democracy and Economic Welfare*; Easton and Walker (1992) *Rating Global Economic Freedom*; Block (1991), Ec*onomic Freedom: Toward a Theory of Measurement*; and Gwartney, et al. (1996), *Economic Freedom of the World: 1975-1995*.

While the issue of income inequality is a potentially potent factor in international political economy and basic human rights, obtaining an acceptable data source has for years been a vexing problem. Previous data sets used in the existing literature on inequality have included Paukert (1973), Jain (1975), and Fields (1989).[59] These early attempts, while important, fall short in providing sufficient numbers of high-quality observations, widespread coverage of countries, and adequate data over time to allow for any time series analysis. Paukert (1973) supplies 55 (18 high quality) observations, Jain (1975) provides 405 (61 high quality), and Fields (1989) presents 105 (73 high quality) observations. In terms of country coverage, they range from a high of 36 (Fields 1989) to a low of 18 (Paukert 1973). A more recent effort from the World Bank goes a long way in correcting many of these deficiencies. Deininger and Squire (1996) build on the wide array of existing data and apply a stringent set of quality standards to improve the overall product.[60] Persuaded by their arguments, I employ their latest data set that covers 108 countries from 1947 to 1993.[61]

Starting where Fields (1989) left off, they apply a more stringent criterion for inclusion of observations. At the core of their representation of income inequality is the GINI index, based on the Lorenz curve that plots the share of population against the share of income received. For inclusion in the data set, Deininger and Squire (1996) require that observations be based 1) on household surveys, 2) on comprehensive coverage of the population, and 3) on comprehensive coverage of income sources. They argue that estimates of inequality should be based on individual units in household surveys rather than information from national accounts. Using national accounts

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[59] The data set for Paukert (1973) forms the basis for subsequent work by Lecaillon et al. (1984).
[60] Ultimately, the data set proposed by Deininger and Squire (1996) includes 2621 observations (682 high quality) for 108 countries from 1947 to 1993.
[61] While these data covers 108 countries from 1947 to 1993, not all countries are represented for every year.

involves assuming a general functional form according to which different types of income are distributed. If these assumptions concerning patterns of inequality across countries over time are included in the database, they cannot be tested.

If a non-representative subset of the population is utilized, it could obviously result in biased estimates. Because of this, data must be based on a representative sample covering the entirety of the population even if taken from household surveys. In order to prevent errors in inference from a flawed sample, Deininger and Squire (1996) drop numerous observations from Latin America where many of the household surveys are limited to urban areas.[62] Their third criterion, that measurement of income (or expenditure) must be comprehensive (covering both different income sources as well as population groups), demands that long time series on inequality for a number of countries be excluded. [63]

e. Democracy

The researcher is also faced with many choices when facing measurement of political rights. For our purposes here, I focus my measurement on the concept of "democracy." Well-known scholars such as Lipset (1963, 27), Dahl (1956, 67-90), Downs (1957, 23-24) and Lenski (1966, 319) have proposed definitions that emphasize elections and political liberties which should expand political efficacy, but here I adopt the definition of Bollen (1980, 1993) who draws from the above authors. He defines political democracy as "the extent to which the political power of the elite is minimized and that of the nonelite is maximized" (1980, 372).

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[62] Other countries that experience reduced observations according to this criterion are Japan, Israel, Malawi and Madagascar)
[63] This includes Greece, Morocco, New Zealand, Sweden, and Nigeria.

The measure that most closely meets my definitional and practical means is Jaggers and Gurr's Polity III democracy measure, which covers 161 nations from 1946 through 1994. Jaggers and Gurr (1995) argue that there are three essential, interdependent components of democracy in the context of Western liberal philosophy. First, institutions and procedures must be present where individuals can voice their preferences about alternative political policies and leaders. Second, it is vital that there be adequate constraints on the power of the executive. Finally, the state must guarantee civil liberties (e.g., freedom from slavery/servitude, torture, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, inhuman punishment). Operationally, their indicator of democracy is drawn from codings of the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, the competitiveness of political participation, and the level constraints of the chief executive. The eleven-point scale and the associated weights of categories are presented in Appendix C.

Jaggers and Gurr (1995) provide an excellent comparison of Polity III with some of the most utilized constructs of democracy. These include Arat (1991), Bollen (1980, 1991), Coppedge and Reinicke (1990), Freedom House (annual 1978-1994), Gassiorowski (1993) and Vanhanen (1990). In assessing the validity of the Polity III indicators (utilizing the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient), Jaggers and Gurr (1995) find a high correlation (ranging from a low of .85 with Arat and Gasiorowski to a high of .92 with Freedom House indicator of political rights) with these alternative measures, in spite of the methodological and conceptual diversity in the various indicators.[64]

4.6 Methodology

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[64] For the reader's convenience, a summary of the operationalization of all variables and data sources can be found in Appendix D.

In previous chapters I address the more theoretical and philosophical questions by employing basic qualitative analysis of the literature and history concerning international political economy and basic human rights. This includes the question of whether there are indeed "basic human rights," which rights should be included, and what bases these have in international law. Further, the issue of cultural relativism and universality of human rights has been dealt with in a similar fashion.

Turning to the important issue of potential trade-offs between the various rights, I utilize a number of statistical approaches. First, I conduct a series of trend analyses in which I plot the mean individual rights scores (subsistence rights, security rights, democracy, and economic freedom) over time to ascertain what empirically has occurred since the early 1980s. Additionally, I plot the standard deviation scores for individual rights in order to determine whether they are converging or diverging. The overall sample is further divided between OECD and non-OECD countries to examine the differences between the two. In investigating the potential linkages between these rights, I first conduct simple bivariate correlations. Drawing upon the substantial theoretical literature in Chapter Two, I also estimate bivariate regression equations of the linkages. This includes regressing subsistence rights on security rights (linkage one), democracy on security rights (linkage two), democracy on subsistence rights (linkage three), and economic freedom on democracy (linkage four).

In moving beyond these preliminary steps to formulate an overall multivariate model of international political economy and basic human rights, I draw upon the review in Chapter Two, which reveals that much of the existing literature is somewhat lacking in its scope and methodological approach. One criterion for judging empirical research is to what extent a particular study is generalizable to the greater population (in this case, almost 200 countries of the world). But for a few exceptions (Poe and Tate 1994,

Heinish 1994, Henderson 1993, Park 1987), the vast majority of work in the field utilizes a less than comprehensive sample of countries. This obviously restricts the generalizability of any results. In addition, the study of integrity of the person violations has typically involved cross-national, cross-sectional samples that do not allow for any change that might occur in within countries. Finally, only a few scholars (Poe and Tate 1994, Heinish 1994, Webster 1994, Henderson 1991, 1993) move beyond simple bivariate studies and utilize multivariate analysis.

Therefore, in order to test my multivariate model of human rights variation, I choose to employ pooled cross-sectional time-series (PCT) analysis or time-series cross-section (TSCS) as it is sometimes called. TSCS research designs involve regression in both space *and* time. Traditionally, political scientists have dealt with space in the much-used cross-sectional designs. Also, we have dealt with time considerations in time-series regressions and through techniques developed by Box and Jenkins. While we appear to be comfortable conducting comparative analyses across space and dynamic analyses over time, as a discipline we have (until very recently) been reluctant to combine the two in a dynamic comparison (Stimson 1985).[65]

TSCS analysis is conducted with the use of longitudinal data for two or more "units." The units in my database are individual countries. Therefore, each country - with values for all years and variables - is stacked on the next country. By employing TSCS for my analysis, I am inheriting all of the formidable strengths of its design properties and the special statistical problems that go along with such designs (Stimson 1985, 914). As illustrated in the previous paragraph, TSCS eases any potential problem of limited sample size by multiplying the number of cases available over time (T) by the

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[65] In the econometric literature, these pooled models are sometimes referred to as "panel models." This is not to be confused with panel analysis in political science that refers to surveys, which are conducted with the same subjects (respondents) over time.

number of units (N), thereby yielding N x T cases for the analysis. Also, from a theoretical standpoint, TSCS highlights the extent to which variation in the dependent variable is attributable to regressor variables (covariates) common to all units or to unspecified properties of the units themselves (Clarke 1994). As pointed out by Przeworski and Teune (1970), these should be familiar concerns for students of cross-national comparative inquiry.

Turning to the potential difficulties or statistical challenges to TSCS, Stimson (1985, 919-920) argues that there are basically two problems that arise form utilizing data that varies both over time and across unit. First, the all-too-familiar problem of autocorrelated errors in a time series highlights the over time difficulty. Secondly, the across-unit problem comes from potential heterogeneity in the expected value of the dependent variable by the pooling of data from different units. This heteroskedasticity problem might be especially troublesome with such a large sample such as this where the worldwide diversity among nations (units) is a given.

In actually conducting analysis on pooled data, the researcher is faced with a number of choices. Perhaps the most utilized model for pooled data is ordinary least squares (OLS). While acceptable for simple pooled data sets, its assumptions (i.e., Gauss-Markov) illustrate the difficulties in combining data across space and time. If all of the assumptions hold, the OLS estimator is said to be "blue." This means that it is unbiased (mean of estimate equals population value), consistent (as sample size increases, value of estimate approaches population parameter), and efficient (estimator has minimum sampling variance). OLS regression essentially ignores that the data are actually "pooled." Each case is considered independent of the other cases rather than part of a set of related observations. As a result, OLS assumes constant variance and uncorrelated errors. As discussed in the above paragraph, however, it is quite likely that

autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity will accompany data that is stacked and pooled. Because of this potential, Stimson (1985) argues that OLS regression may not be the first choice for researchers utilizing TSCS data.

Another possible method available to the those working with TSCS is least squares with dummy variables (LSDV). This covariance model introduces dummy variables to control for the significant between-unit differences. In this case, the dummies would be variables for countries (units). While this approach is quite effective in addressing the heterogeneity problem, it does nothing for the autocorrelation (time serial) problems. In addition, if there are many units (as in this instance of over 150 countries) and few time points (here, 14 years - or 13 years with a lagged endogenous variable), the process will not be very efficient because of the large loss in degrees of freedom.

The next option available is the error components model. While the transition from OLS to LSDV is rather simple and orthodox, the generalized least squares (error components) model is neither orthodox nor simple (Stimson 1985, 922). This approach can be seen as a search for an efficient estimator. Rather than conceptualizing the unit effects as fixed, the GLSE model views them as random. In addition, it gains some efficiency by assuming the absence of time-serial correlation. Here, the autocorrelation is assumed to come from unit effects (Clarke 1994, 5). This procedure is accomplished by capturing the unit effects with an estimate of r. This estimate (r) is assumed constant across all lags in a unit. This procedure is similar to that of Cochran-Orchutt (albeit for heteroskedasticity). While the GLSE method does gain efficiency by dropping the unit dummies, the assumption of no true time-related autocorrelation is often incorrect, especially if the number of time-points for each unit is substantial.

A fourth possible method is the GLS-ARMA. This approach, which is suitable for data with a small number of units and numerous time points, addresses both the problems of unit heteroskedasticity and true time-series correlation. This iterative approach begins by selecting unit dummy variables. Residuals from properly modeled unit dummies should exhibit the following traits: 1) the summed unit means will be approximately zero, 2) the unit residual variances will be approximately equal, and 3) the pattern of autocorrelation within each unit will be stationary" (Stimson 1985, 928). Though similar in appearance to GLSE, the critical difference is its specification of within unit over-time partitions as ARMA processes rather than the "fixed specifications of GLSE." The choice between the two approaches, therefore, revolves around whether the problem of the pooled design is unspecified unit effects. While the GLS-ARMA approach is rather powerful, the fact that it is designed for time-serial dominance (i.e., t > N) leads the researcher to lean towards the GLSE (if compared to GLS-ARMA) for a cross-sectionally dominant data set. If there is indeed timewise autocorrelation present and if there is cross-sectional dominance (as indeed may be the case here), Stimson (1985) concedes there is no estimator developed specifically for this situation.

In their exploration of time-series cross-section data analysis, Beck and Katz (1995) argue that the frequent use of generalized least squares on TSCS data is potentially troublesome. A review of the literature indicates that most time-series cross-section GLS analysis is performed using an application first described by Parks (1967) in which an estimate of the error process is generated and used to evade or overlook the assumption underlying GLS - that the error process is known.[66] This procedure is what Beck and Katz call "feasible generalized least squares." Through Monte Carlo trials on

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[66] This procedure was illustrated at length in Kmenta's (1986) text, *Elements of Econometrics*. It is occasionally called Parks-Kmenta, or simply Kmenta.

existing studies, Beck and Katz indicate that violating this assumption may not be advisable because of FGLS's underestimation of standard errors, often between 50 and 300 percent (1995, 634). Consequently, this method may lead to overly optimistic estimates of statistical significance.[67]

Ultimately, Beck and Katz (1995) argue in favor of using OLS regression with certain improvements. As noted previously, one problem with OLS is that even though estimates of beta (ß) are found to be consistent, the reported standard errors of that estimate may not provide accurate estimates of variability (i.e., in the case of cross-national panel data like in this human rights data set). In order to test whether these standard errors are consistent, Beck and Katz (1995) suggest utilizing a simple variant of White's (1980) procedure. The calculation generalizes White's heteroskedastic consistent covariance matrix estimates to the panel situation. In differentiating from White's heteroskedasticity consist standard errors, Beck and Katz (1995, 638) refer to these estimators of variability as "panel-corrected standard errors" (PCSEs).[68] Persuaded by their arguments, I utilize the Beck and Katz procedure for the model estimation in Chapter Five.

Typically in preliminary tests, one would analyze the various models using Durbin-Watson to determine potential problems from serial correlation. However, with this large, unbalanced data set (i.e., not all countries have data for all variables for all years), the Durbin-Watson statistic is not applicable. Since there is still the suspicion of autocorrelation (and its detrimental effects concerning OLS regression), I have chosen to

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[67] Beck and Katz (1995, 644) go as far to say that it is "… impossible to use the Parks method if the length of the time frame, T, is smaller than the number of units, N." Indeed, this is precisely the case here with my comprehensive data set.

[68] For a critique of the Beck and Katz approach, see Maddala (1997).

incorporate a lagged endogenous variable into the general models. Not only are there methodological justifications for this procedure but theoretical ones as well.[69]

In an effort to balance the sometimes conflicting goals of being as comprehensive and as parsimonious as possible, I begin with the following general models for estimating the variance of subsistence rights and security rights, respectively.

General Subsistence Rights Model

Subsistence Rights$_{tj}$ = a + B$_1$ Subsistence Rights$_{(t-1)}$ + B$_2$ Bretton Woods Membership$_{tj}$ + B$_3$ Trade Openness$_{tj}$ + B$_4$ Financial Openness$_{tj}$ + B$_5$ Cold War$_{tj}$ + B$_6$ Economic Freedom$_{tj}$ + B$_7$ Income Inequality$_{tj}$ + B$_8$ Democracy$_{tj}$ + B$_9$ Economic Development$_{tj}$ + B$_{10}$ Economic Growth$_{tj}$ + B$_{11}$ International War$_{tj}$ + B$_{12}$ Civil War$_{tj}$ + B$_{13}$ Population Level$_{tj}$ + B$_{14}$ Population Growth$_{tj}$

General Security Rights Model

Security Rights$_{tj}$ = a + B$_1$ Security Rights$_{(t-1)}$ + B$_2$ Bretton Woods Membership$_{tj}$ + B$_3$ Trade Openness$_{tj}$ + B$_4$ Financial Openness$_{tj}$ + B$_5$ Cold War$_{tj}$ + B$_6$ Economic Freedom$_{tj}$ + B$_7$ Income Inequality$_{tj}$ + B$_8$ Democracy$_{tj}$ + B$_9$ Economic Development$_{tj}$ + B$_{10}$ Economic Growth$_{tj}$ + B$_{11}$ International War$_{tj}$ + B$_{12}$ Civil War$_{tj}$ + B$_{13}$ Population Level$_{tj}$ + B$_{14}$ Population Growth$_{tj}$

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[69] Beck and Katz (1996) argue in favor of utilizing lagged endogenous variables to address difficulties associated with autocorrelation. From a theoretical standpoint, it is expected that a country's basic human rights policies (at time t) will be influenced by the preceding human rights practices of that particular regime (at time t-1).

Following the path taken in Chapter Three, I continue by limiting the general models from the entire sample (world) to the subsamples of the industrialized countries (OECD) and the developing countries (non-OECD). This method is chosen to determine whether various factors affect basic human rights differently in the developed and developing world.

Next, the general international political economy models are reduced into their economic and political components. Here, I am searching for ways to determine the manner in which political and economic variables in a global system are driving basic human rights practices. The limited economic and political models are as follows:

Economic Model for Subsistence Rights

Subsistence Rights$_{tj}$ = a + B$_1$ Subsistence Rights$_{(t-1)}$ + B$_2$ Bretton Woods Membership$_{tj}$ + B$_3$ Trade Openness$_{tj}$ + B$_4$ Financial Openness$_{tj}$ + B$_5$ Economic Freedom$_{tj}$ + B$_6$ Income Inequality$_{tj}$ + B$_7$ Economic Development$_{tj}$ + B$_8$ Economic Growth$_{tj}$

Political Model for Subsistence Rights

Subsistence Rights$_{tj}$ = a + B$_1$ Subsistence Rights$_{(t-1)}$ + B$_2$ Cold War$_{tj}$ + B$_3$ Democracy$_{tj}$ + B$_4$ International War$_{tj}$ + B$_5$ Civil War

Economic Model for Security Rights

$$\text{Security Rights}_{tj} = a + B_1 \text{ Security Rights}_{(t-1)} + B_2 \text{ Bretton Woods Membership}_{tj}$$

$$+ B_3 \text{ Trade Openness}_{tj} + B_4 \text{ Financial Openness}_{tj} + B_5 \text{ Economic Freedom}_{tj} + B_6$$

$$\text{Income Inequality}_{tj} + B_7 \text{ Economic Development}_{tj} + B_8 \text{ Economic Growth}_{tj}$$

Political Model for Security Rights

$$\text{Security Rights}_{tj} = a + B_1 \text{ Security Rights}_{(t-1)} + B_2 \text{ Cold War}_{tj} +$$

$$B_3 \text{ Democracy}_{tj} + B_4 \text{ International War}_{tj} + B_5 \text{ Civil War}$$

Finally in the last section of Chapter Five, I compare the models for both subsistence rights and security rights. By analyzing these two aspects of basic human rights across separate models (general models, OECD and non-OECD models, economic and political models), we can hopefully obtain a more complete picture of the true dynamics that are driving basic human rights practices around the world.

CHAPTER FIVE

DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

5.1 Describing the Sample

As alluded to in Chapters Two and Three, the data set utilized for this analysis is one of the largest compiled for evaluating variations in both subsistence rights and security rights. If our goal is to make empirical research generalizable to the greater population (almost 200 countries of the world), we must strive to incorporate the most extensive data available. I have attempted to do just that with this project (A list of all the countries included in this study can be found in Appendix E). A review of the literature shows that with few exceptions, the work in both of these subfields (subsistence rights and security rights) have presented a limited and usually biased sample of countries or time periods, or both.

In dealing with security rights, most research has until very recently been limited to cross-sections (e.g., Heinish 1994, Henderson 1993, Park 1987). Poe and Tate (1994) have gone a great distance in remedying this shortcoming with their comprehensive data set of 153 countries from 1980-1987. In dealing with subsistence rights, those utilizing the Physical Quality of Life Index have not outperformed those writing on security rights. This includes Dixon's (1984) study of 72 developing countries for 1960 and 1980, Spalding's (1986) coverage of 97 nations during the 1970s and Moon's (1991) seminal work that examines myriad of variables for 120 countries during the early 1970s.

Finally, Morris'(1996) update of his 1979 study analyzes 127 countries, but only for four years – 1960, 1981, 1985, and 1990. Building on the work of scholars before me, I have compiled what may be the most comprehensive study yet concerning subsistence rights and security rights. The pooled cross-sectional time-series (PCT) or time-series cross-section (TSCS) employed here covers over 150 countries for 14 years from 1980 through 1993. This ranges from 156 countries for subsistence rights and 152 countries for security rights in 1980 to 168 countries for subsistence rights and 176 countries for security rights in 1993. This extensive data set is important in that it now allows us to compare over time the variation in basic human rights for the largest number of countries in both the developed and developing world.

Before discussing the actual modeling of basic human rights practices, I think it instructive to examine the overall performance of government's respect for subsistence and security rights. Tables 5.1 through 5.4 list all available nations in rank order according to subsistence rights and security rights performance at the beginning and ending time periods (1980 and 1993, respectively).[70] A cursory look at Tables 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate much of the conventional wisdom concerning subsistence rights. As one might expect, there is a wide variation in Physical Quality of Life throughout the world. This ranges in 1980 from a high of 92 (Japan) to a low of 14 (Dijibouti). In 1993, Japan still remains the leader with an index of 94.7 while Sierra Leone takes over the unenviable last position with an index of 24.2.   In both periods, many of the industrialized countries can be found at the top of the list. Perhaps not surprisingly, the

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[70] The security rights ranking within groups (i.e., 1-5) is simply arranged according to alphabetical order.

United States is found toward the end of this group (number 13 and 16, respectively).[71] Just below the industrialized world, the reader finds a number of Eastern and Central European countries. On the surface, this might appear counterintuitive. However, taking into account the sweeping social programs in the former Soviet bloc, the situation does seem logical. With a more extensive social safety net, it could be argued that greater provision of subsistence rights is expected. Further, the 1993 table indicates a slight decline (in relative rank) of some of these countries during the period (e.g., USSR, Hungary, Poland, and Czech Republic). This reflects the hardships incurred in the transition to a market economy and democratization. A striking example of former Soviet support is Cuba which ranks seventh in 1980 and falls to twenty-eighth thirteen years later. Just below the grouping of Eastern Europe, one can find a number of Latin American nations. Consistency in this respect can be found across both tables for the beginning and end of the period (1980 and 1993). While typically congregating towards the middle, the wide diversity of Asian countries is exhibited with rankings at the top (Japan), middle (Vietnam), and bottom (Nepal). Clustered at the bottom of the rankings, the continent of Africa is disproportionately represented.

Turning to security rights in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, we find a number of similarities and differences as compared to the subsistence rights data. As discussed in Chapter Three with our comparison of various rights, security rights overall have improved since 1980. However, our earlier analysis also revealed that security rights had a precipitous drop immediately after the fall of Eastern Europe. This is in keeping with Fein's (1995) "more murder in the middle" thesis as countries begin the difficult process of democratization. From 1980 we can see the distribution of the Political Terror Scale

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[71] Higher than expected infant mortality and literacy rates (compared to other OECD countries) and accompanying high levels of inequality might produce this result.

ratings "flatten out" with the middle rating (Level 3) being squeezed into the highest and
lowest ends of the scale. For example in 1980, the most egregious human rights
violations (Level 1 and 2) were exhibited by fifteen percent of the countries, while in
1993 that number had risen to twenty percent. The middle category (Level 3) fell from
thirty-four percent of the reported countries to only nineteen percent in the last year of
the study. Finally, the upper echelon (Level 4 and 5) move from fifty-two percent in
1980 to sixty-percent in 1998. These findings support the preliminary analysis in
Chapter Three which indicate that although security rights are better in 1993 than they
have been since 1989, there is more variation in global human rights practices in 1992-
1993 than at any other period. This is probably in response to the collapse of the Berlin
Wall and the end of the Cold War. A graphical illustration of this dispersion of security
rights at the beginning and end of the period can be found in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1 Political Terror Scale Ratings at Beginning and End of Period

Table 5.1 Country Rankings for Subsistence Rights in 1980

COUNTRY	PQLI	COUNTRY	PQLI	COUNTRY	PQLI	COUNTRY	PQLI
Japan	92.0	Cyprus	85.5	Western Samoa	68.2	Lesotho	48.5
Iceland	91.9	Jamaica	84.7	Jordan	66.3	Comoros	47.3
Sweden	91.3	Uruguay	84.1	Nicaragua	66.2	Botswana	46.8
Denmark	91.1	Grenada	84.1	El Salvador	66.1	Algeria	46.6
Norway	91.1	Singapore	83.4	Syria	65.9	Zaire	46.6
Switzerland	91.1	Costa Rica	83.3	Peru	65.7	Gambia	46.4
Cuba	91.0	Argentina	83.0	Dom Rep	65.3	Ghana	45.7
Netherlands	90.8	Bahamas	83.0	Guyana	64.9	Morocco	45.2
Australia	90.6	St. Vincent	82.4	UAE	64.4	Cameroon	43.2
France	90.4	Panama	82.0	Qatar	63.0	Papua New G.	42.7
Canada	90.3	Yugoslavia/Serbia	80.9	Tunisia	61.1	India	42.3
Finland	90.1	Chile	79.9	South Africa	61.1	Saudi Arabia	42.0
United States	90.1	S. Korea	79.9	Zimbabwe	60.9	Oman	41.4
Belgium	89.6	Portugal	79.2	Cape Verde	59.5	Rwanda	41.0
United Kingdom	89.5	St. Lucia	79.0	Turkey	59.4	Haiti	40.5
New Zealand	89.4	Fiji	78.8	Tanzania	59.4	Nigeria	39.1
Germany	89.3	Mongolia	77.7	Honduras	59.0	Mozambique	39.0
Ireland	89.1	Albania	77.1	Guatemala	58.0	Liberia	38.8
Luxembourg	89.1	Sri Lanka	77.1	Sao Tome/Princip	57.0	Cote d'Ivoire	38.6
Italy	89.0	Venezuela	77.0	Myanmar (Burma)	56.8	Laos	38.1
East Germany	88.8	Mauritius	76.3	Equatorial Guinea	55.8	Pakistan	37.4
Austria	88.3	Paraguay	75.8	Indonesia	55.4	Sudan	37.0
Malta	88.1	Mexico	74.6	Iran	54.8	Yemen, South	36.9
Poland	87.7	Thailand	74.3	Iraq	54.0	Somalia	34.7
Barbados	87.3	Vietnam	74.0	Kenya	53.7	Togo	34.5
Czechoslovakia	87.3	Lebanon	73.7	Libya	53.4	Benin	33.8
USSR/Russia	87.2	N. Korea	73.3	Vanuatu	53.0	Bhutan	33.5
Hong Kong	87.1	Bahrain	73.2	Uganda	52.5	Central Afr. Rep.	33.4
Hungary	87.1	Colombia	72.5	Swaziland	52.1	Burundi	32.2
Spain	86.6	Kuwait	72.5	Gabon	51.8	Angola	29.3
Bulgaria	86.5	Suriname	72.5	Namibia	51.8	Malawi	28.7
Trinidad	86.4	Seychelles	71.4	Egypt	51.7	Nepal	28.7
Romania	86.3	Philippines	71.4	Congo	51.5	Guinea	28.5
Dominica	86.3	China	69.3	Bolivia	50.0	Mauritania	27.8
Greece	86.0	Ecuador	68.8	Bangladesh	49.9	Niger	25.2
Israel	85.6	Brazil	68.5	Zambia	49.1	Senegal	25.1
Taiwan	85.5	Malaysia	68.4	Madagascar	48.7	Sierra Leone	25.0

Chad	24.9	Yemen, North	24.1	Upper Volta (Butkina Faso)	14.2
Mali	24.5	Maldives	18.0	Dijibouti	14.0
Ethiopia	24.4	Afghanistan	18.0		

Table 5.2 Country Rankings for Subsistence Rights in 1993

COUNTRY	PQLI	COUNTRY	PQLI	COUNTRY	PQLI	COUNTRY	PQLI
Japan	94.7	Belize	87.2	Dom Rep	79.7	Morocco	61.6
Iceland	93.8	Argentina	86.7	Philippines	79.4	Zimbabwe	59.5
Sweden	93.8	Brunei	86.6	Western Samoa	79.4	Ghana	58.5
Switzerland	93.5	Hungary	86.4	Ecuador	79.3	Cameroon	58.1
Australia	93.3	St. Lucia	86.4	Lebanon	78.4	Zaire	58.0
Canada	93.1	Yugoslavia/Serbia	86.2	Vietnam	78.0	India	57.9
Netherlands	93.1	Portugal	86.2	Mongolia	77.1	Papua New G.	56.9
France	92.7	Bulgaria	86.1	Moldova	77.1	Comoros	56.8
Norway	92.6	N. Korea	86.1	Maldives	76.7	Tanzania	56.3
Belgium	92.4	Grenada	85.7	China	76.5	Haiti	56.2
Italy	92.4	Venezuela	85.5	Nicaragua	75.9	Gabon	55.8
United Kingdom	92.2	Romania	85.3	Peru	75.7	Namibia	55.8
Austria	92.2	Suriname	85.1	UAE	75.2	Zambia	54.4
Germany	92.1	Panama	84.9	Brazil	75.1	Pakistan	53.9
Finland	92.0	USSR/Russia	84.8	Turkey	75.0	Congo	53.0
United States	91.9	Sri Lanka	84.7	Honduras	74.9	Togo	51.7
Spain	91.8	Seychelles	84.4	Saudi Arabia	73.8	Laos	51.3
Luxembourg	91.8	Fiji	83.8	El Salvador	73.5	Cote d'Ivoire	51.1
New Zealand	91.6	Georgia	83.6	Botswana	73.1	Nigeria	50.9
Ireland	91.6	Croatia	83.4	Tunisia	72.2	Ethiopia	50.6
Denmark	91.6	Armenia	83.2	Syria	71.7	Burundi	48.6
Barbados	91.5	Albania	82.8	Indonesia	71.3	Bangladesh	47.7
Israel	91.3	Thailand	82.5	Vanuatu	70.8	Liberia	47.4
Cyprus	91.0	Paraguay	82.4	South Africa	69.5	Senegal	47.2
Hong Kong	91.0	Slovakia	82.4	Iran	68.9	Equatorial Guinea	45.7
Greece	90.9	St. Vincent	82.4	Lesotho	68.2	Sudan	45.4
Costa Rica	89.8	Qatar	82.3	Algeria	68.1	Rwanda	45.3
Cuba	89.6	Mexico	82.1	Iraq	68.1	Mauritania	44.6
Taiwan	89.6	Kuwait	82.1	Bolivia	67.3	Nepal	43.9
Jamaica	89.5	Lithuania	81.7	Myanmar (Burma)	66.6	Central Afr. Rep.	43.9
Bahamas	88.9	Bahrain	81.1	Libya	66.6	Cambodia	43.8
Czech Republic	88.5	Malaysia	81.0	Guatemala	66.4	Yemen, North	43.3
Singapore	88.5	Colombia	80.9	Cape Verde	65.2	Uganda	42.1
Malta	88.0	Mauritius	80.9	Kenya	64.7	Angola	41.3
Chile	87.9	Belarus	80.6	Oman	64.6	Malawi	40.0
Dominica	87.6	Guyana	80.1	Madagascar	64.5	Benin	39.1
Poland	87.6	Latvia	80.1	Swaziland	64.3	Chad	38.2
Uruguay	87.5	Estonia	80.1	Sao Tome/Princip	63.0	Bhutan	38.0
S. Korea	87.4	Ukraine	80.0	Solomons	61.7	Niger	36.6
Trinidad	87.2	Jordan	79.8	Egypt	61.6	Dijibouti	35.8

Mozambique	35.8	Gambia	34.3	Guinea	32.7
Somalia	35.8	Upper Volta	32.9	Afghanistan	30.9
Mali	34.4	(Burkina Faso)		Sierra Leone	24.2

Table 5.3 Country Rankings for Security Rights in 1980

COUNTRY	AI	COUNTRY	AI	COUNTRY	AI	COUNTRY	AI
Australia	5	Cameroon	4	Upper Volta (Burkina Faso)	4	USSR/Russia	3
Austria	5	Central Afr. Rep.	4	Albania	3	Spain	3
Bahamas	5	Comoros	4	Angola	3	Sudan	3
Barbados	5	Congo	4	Bahrain	3	Taiwan	3
Belgium	5	Cote d'Ivoire	4	Bangladesh	3	Thailand	3
Botswana	5	Dijibouti	4	Benin	3	Tunisia	3
Canada	5	East Germany	4	Bolivia	3	Vanuatu	3
Cape Verde	5	Ecuador	4	Brazil	3	Venezuela	3
Costa Rica	5	Equatorial Guinea	4	Bulgaria	3	Vietnam	3
Cyprus	5	France	4	Cambodia	3	Yemen, North	3
Denmark	5	Gabon	4	China	3	Yemen, South	3
Dominica	5	Gambia	4	Cuba	3	Yugoslavia/Serbia	3
Fiji	5	Germany	4	Czechoslovakia	3	Zambia	3
Finland	5	Gibraltar	4	Dom Rep	3	Zimbabwe	3
Iceland	5	Greece	4	Egypt	3	Chile	2
Ireland	5	Hungary	4	Ghana	3	Colombia	2
Jamaica	5	Israel	4	Grenada	3	Ethiopia	2
Japan	5	Italy	4	Guinea	3	Haiti	2
Kuwait	5	Kenya	4	Guyana	3	Honduras	2
Luxembourg	5	Lesotho	4	Jordan	3	India	2
Malta	5	Madagascar	4	Laos	3	Indonesia	2
Mauritius	5	Malawi	4	Liberia	3	Iraq	2
Netherlands	5	Malaysia	4	Mali	3	Libya	2
New Zealand	5	Maldives	4	Mauritania	3	Nicaragua	2
Norway	5	Niger	4	Mexico	3	Paraguay	2
Papua New G.	5	Nigeria	4	Morocco	3	Philippines	2
Qatar	5	Oman	4	Mozambique	3	Turkey	2
Senegal	5	Panama	4	Myanmar (Burma)	3	Uganda	2
Solomons	5	Portugal	4	Nepal	3	Uruguay	2
St. Lucia	5	Rwanda	4	Pakistan	3	Zaire	2
St. Vincent	5	Sao Tome /Princip	4	Peru	3	Afghanistan	1
Sweden	5	Seychelles	4	Poland	3	Argentina	1
Trinidad	5	Sierra Leone	4	Romania	3	El Salvador	1
UAE	5	Sri Lanka	4	S. Korea	3	Guatemala	1
United Kingdom	5	Suriname	4	Saudi Arabia	3	Iran	1
United States	5	Swaziland	4	Singapore	3	Syria	1
Western Samoa	5	Switzerland	4	Somalia	3		
Algeria	4	Tanzania	4	South Africa	3		
Burundi	4	Togo	4				

Table 5.4 Country Rankings for Security Rights in 1993

COUNTRY	AI	COUNTRY	AI	COUNTRY	AI	COUNTRY	AI
Australia	5	Singapore	5	Niger	4	Senegal	3
Austria	5	Slovenia	5	Panama	4	Swaziland	3
Bahamas	5	Solomons	5	Paraguay	4	Syria	3
Barbados	5	Spain	5	Romania	4	Tunisia	3
Belarus	5	St. Lucia	5	S. Korea	4	Uganda	3
Belgium	5	St. Vincent	5	USSR/Russia	4	Yemen, North	3
Belize	5	Sweden	5	Suriname	4	Yugoslavia/Serbia	3
Botswana	5	Turkmenistan	5	Switzerland	4	Zambia	3
Brunei	5	UAE	5	Taiwan	4	Afghanistan	2
Canada	5	United Kingdom	5	Tanzania	4	Algeria	2
Cape Verde	5	United States	5	Thailand	4	Brazil	2
Costa Rica	5	Vanuatu	5	Trinidad	4	Cambodia	2
Czech Republic	5	Western Samoa	5	Ukraine	4	Dijibouti	2
Dominica	5	Albania	4	Upper Volta	4	Egypt	2
Estonia	5	Argentina	4	Uruguay	4	El Salvador	2
Fiji	5	Armenia	4	Uzbekistan	4	Ethiopia	2
Finland	5	Azerbaijan	4	Vietnam	4	Georgia	2
France	5	Bahrain	4	Zimbabwe	4	Guatemala	2
Gambia	5	Benin	4	Bangladesh	3	Haiti	2
Germany	5	Bolivia	4	Bhutan	3	Indonesia	2
Grenada	5	Bulgaria	4	Cameroon	3	Nigeria	2
Iceland	5	Central Afr. Rep.	4	Chile	3	Papua New G.	2
Ireland	5	Cote d'Ivoire	4	China	3	Peru	2
Japan	5	Cyprus	4	Comoros	3	Philippines	2
Kazakstan	5	Denmark	4	Congo	3	Rwanda	2
Kyrgyzstan	5	Dom Rep	4	Croatia	3	Sierra Leone	2
Latvia	5	Ecuador	4	Cuba	3	Somalia	2
Lithuania	5	Eritrea	4	Equatorial Guinea	3	Tajikistan	2
Luxembourg	5	Gabon	4	Guinea	3	Togo	2
Malaysia	5	Ghana	4	Honduras	3	Turkey	2
Malta	5	Gibraltar	4	Iran	3	Venezuela	2
Mauritius	5	Greece	4	Kenya	3	Angola	1
Moldova	5	Guyana	4	Kuwait	3	Bosnia-Herz.	1
Mongolia	5	Hungary	4	Lebanon	3	Burundi	1
Namibia	5	Israel	4	Libya	3	Chad	1
Netherlands	5	Italy	4	Madagascar	3	Colombia	1
New Zealand	5	Jamaica	4	Mali	3	India	1
Norway	5	Jordan	4	Mexico	3	Iraq	1
Oman	5	Laos	4	Morocco	3	Liberia	1
Poland	5	Lesotho	4	Mozambique	3	Myanmar (Burma)	1
Portugal	5	Macedonia	4	Nepal	3	South Africa	1
Qatar	5	Malawi	4	Nicaragua	3	Sri Lanka	1
Sao Tome/ Princip	5	Maldives	4	Pakistan	3	Sudan	1
Seychelles	5	Mauritania	4	Saudi Arabia	3	Zaire	1

In continuing our examination of the overall nature of the data, I now focus on the summary statistics for not only the dependent variables of subsistence rights and security rights but also the substantive independent variables and control variables. In order to further delineate the study, I consider the complete sample as well as differentiating the developed and developing world. The results can be found in Tables 5.5 through 5.7.

Table 5.5 Summary Statistics for the World

Variable	N	Mean	Median	St. Dev	Min	Max
Subsistence Rights	2217	67.66	73.2	20.56	14	99
Security Rights	2208	3.56	4	1.15	1	5
Bretton Woods	2099	2.46	3	.80	0	3
Trade Openness	1704	72.21	61.45	47.49	6.32	423.41
Financial Openness	1662	3.05	3	1.63	0	6
Inequality	357	35.71	33.29	9.14	19.49	62.30
Cold War	2492	.71	1	.45	0	1
Economic Freedom	420	4.57	4.4	1.48	0.6	9.3
Democracy	1900	3.86	1	4.36	0	10
Economic Development	2185	3908	1190	6086.60	53	36670
Economic Growth	2160	3.16	3.01	12.89	-95.5	128.57
International War	2240	.08	0	.27	0	1
Civil War	2221	.10	0	.30	0	1
Population Level	2444	15.52	15.65	1.84	11.05	20.89
Population Growth	2440	2.19	2.19	4.35	-48.45	126.01

Table 5.6 Summary Statistics for OECD Countries

Variable	N	Mean	Median	St. Dev	Min	Max
Subsistence Rights	294	91.61	91.8	1.31	86.60	94.70
Security Rights	294	4.72	5	.46	3	5
Bretton Woods	273	2.92	3	.36	1	3
Trade Openness	273	69.72	60.81	39.93	17.62	211.94
Financial Openness	252	4.42	5	1.60	0	6
Cold War	294	.71	1	.45	0	1
Economic Freedom	80	5.47	5.65	1.22	2.90	8
Inequality	114	31.99	32.21	3.95	24.42	41.72
Democracy	294	9.87	10	.42	8	10
Economic Development	294	15243.67	14020	6388.83	4370	36410
Economic Growth	294	6.84	6.53	9.38	-13.96	33.94
International War	294	.08	0	.27	0	1
Civil War	294	0	0	0	0	0
Population Level	294	16.30	16.10	1.70	12.34	19.36
Population Growth	294	.55	.44	.51	-1.25	3.45

Table 5.7 Summary Statistics for Non-OECD Countries

Variable	N	Mean	Median	St. Dev	Min	Max
Subsistence Rights	1923	64.00	67.40	19.65	14	99
Security Rights	1912	3.38	3	1.12	1	5
Bretton Woods	1826	2.39	2.5	.83	0	3
Trade Openness	1431	72.69	61.69	48.80	6.32	423.41
Financial Openness	1410	2.80	3	1.51	0	6
Coldwar	2198	.71	1	.45	0	1
Economic Freedom	340	4.36	4.2	1.46	.6	9.3
Inequality	243	37.45	36	10.29	19.49	62.30
Democracy	1603	2.76	0	3.83	0	10
Economic Development	1887	2148.08	910	3662.09	53	36670
Economic Growth	1863	2.61	2.67	13.25	-95.50	128.57
International War	1943	.08	0	.27	0	1
Civil War	1924	.12	0	.32	0	1
Population Level	2136	15.41	15.55	1.84	11.05	20.89
Population Growth	2132	2.42	2.43	4.61	-48.45	126.01

From the above table we can see a number of similarities and differences between the industrialized world and the developing countries. On average, OECD countries perform better on both dependent variables (subsistence and security rights) as well as on many of the independent variables (financial openness, democracy, economic development, economic growth, and population growth). For other variables, the difference is less pronounced. For instance, the mean economic freedom measure for the developed world is 5.47 while for the developing world it is 4.36 (on a 1 to 10 scale). It is also equally likely to find developed and developing countries involved in an international conflict. Another surprising finding is the relatively consistent presence of inequality among the entire sample. Here, the OECD exhibits a GINI index of approximately 32 while the non-OECD exhibits slightly more inequality at just over 37 (on the GINI index).[72] Counter to some critics, who claim that unfettered capitalism results in huge disparities in income, the findings here are quite interesting and warrant further investigation.

Also, for two measures of globalization (membership in Bretton Woods institutions and trade openness) there is little difference between the two groups. This is in stark contrast to the variation in financial openness where the OECD is much less likely to impose capital controls. For the contemporary environment of financial crises in key regions of the world (Asia, Latin America, Russia), the issue of capital restrictions is even more pertinent. While some of the largest industrialized nations are loath to impose financial restrictions, this is obviously a tempting tool for some policy makers, at least in less developed areas.

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[72] The GINI scale which plots the share of population against the share of income ranges from a low of 1(perfect equality) to a high of 100 (total inequality).

The next step in evaluating the empirical evidence concerning basic human rights involves employing simple bivariate correlations. Here, I utilize a simple Pearson's correlation matrix to examine the relationships, if any, between the independent variables and subsistence rights and security rights.[73] The findings are summarized in Table 5.8. While at this stage we cannot assume any causal linkage between the variables, there is striking evidence of correlation between many of our substantive factors and the two aspects of human rights. A quick glance at Table 5.8 reveals similar influences on subsistence rights and security rights. Except for Bretton Woods, all of the primary variables in question indicate statistically significant correlation with physical quality of life. Trade openness, financial openness, economic freedom, and democracy are seen to be positively related to subsistence rights while inequality and the Cold War are negatively related. Likewise, security rights are positively correlated with Bretton Woods, trade openness, financial openness, economic freedom, and democracy. Inequality is negatively associated with security rights but the Cold War presents little influence. Both lagged endogenous variables (subsistence rights$_{t-1}$ and security rights$_{t-1}$) also indicate a high positive correlation with their respective basic human right. The control variables have a mixed showing with economic development and economic growth correlating positively with subsistence rights. Civil war has a negative influence on both subsistence and security rights. In addition, all of the other control variables [economic development, economic growth, international war, civil war (-), population level (-) and population growth (-)] exhibit a correlation with security rights.

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[73] The correlation coefficients reported here are a measure of the linear association between each basic human right (subsistence rights and security rights) and the other variables of interest. A value of 1.00 indicates a perfect positive correlation while –1.00 indicates a perfect negative correlation. A zero value represents no relationship.

Table 5.8 Bivariate Correlations
(Pearson's r with pair-wise deletion. Number of cases listed in parentheses)

Subsistence Rights			Security Rights	
Variable	**Subsistence Rights**		**Variable**	**Security Rights**
Subsistence Rights $_{t-1}$	.98* (2003)		Security Rights $_{t-1}$	.84* (2177)
Bretton Woods	.001 (2014)		Bretton Woods	.11* (2029)
Trade Openness	.17* (1671)		Trade Openness	.35* (1665)
Financial Openness	.19* (1605)		Financial Openness	.35* (1602)
Cold War	-.10* (2217)		Cold War	.004 (2202)
Economic Freedom	.36* (417)		Economic Freedom	.26* (412)
Inequality (Gini Index)	-.33* (347)		Inequality (Gini Index)	-.24* (353)
Democracy	.58* (1838)		Democracy	.43* (1867)
Economic Development	.52* (2077)		Economic Development	.41* (2133)
Economic Growth	.10* (2071)		Economic Growth	.13* (2124)
International War	.01 (2149)		International War	-.17* (2205)
Civil War	-.21* (2132)		Civil War	-.46* (2195)
Population Level	-.03 (2160)		Population Level	-.42* (2187)
Population Growth	-.21 (2158)		Population Growth	-.04* (2183)

In conducting correlation analysis, the researcher must also look for associations among the independent variables to guard against the vexing problem of multicollinearity. This problem occurs if there is a linear or near linear relationship among independent variables. Indeed, this is a common occurrence with times series and cross sectional data. If two variables are highly correlated with one another, it can pose serious difficulties with inferences drawn from our regression estimations. The problem results in inflated standard errors which causes the t statistic to be smaller, thereby resulting in a failure to reject the null hypothesis (Type II error).[74] Initially, it was

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[74] In order to check for the presence of multicollinearity, I employed two procedures - an ocular test that examines the Pearson's r correlation matrix and the Klein test that regresses each independent variable on all the other independent variables. For the ocular test, I take a relatively conservative stance and look for any correlations exceeding .60. For the Klein test, I look for any R^2 which approaches 1.00.

suspected that the measures for globalization, while theoretically separate aspects of integration, might exhibit collinear relationships. Luckily, there is no sign of multicollinearity among these globalization indicators.[75] Having said that, there are indications that incorporating population level and the lagged value for subsistence rights could be problematic. Physical Quality of Life at $_{t-1}$ is collinear with economic development and democracy.[76] Also, population level appears closely related to trade openness.[77] Since population level is simply a control variable, I decided to drop it from my analysis and retain the more substantively important trade openness. I also decided to refrain from drawing inferences from models utilizing the subsistence rights at $_{t-1}$ although I do report the results for comparative purposes.

From these descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations, we can move now to the multivariate analyses for both subsistence rights and security rights. The following sections consider general human rights models, restricted sample models of developed and developing countries, and narrow models that concentrate on economic and political factors separately. Finally, in section 5.5, I summarize these findings in an overall comparison of subsistence rights and security rights. All of the models in sections 5.2 and 5.3 are estimated assuming a first order autoregressive process. Previous models were estimated assuming no autoregressive process and analysis of the standard errors indicated that the AR1 approach was more appropriate. As noted in Chapter Four, another concern with TSCS data is the problem of heteroscedasticity. According to the Cook and Weisberg (1983) test, our data indeed are heteroscedastic (variance of error terms is not constant). The statistical software utilized here (Stata 5) allows specifying

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[75] The correlations were as follows: Bretton Woods and financial openness = .11, Bretton Woods and trade openness = -.03, financial openness and trade openness = .2132.

[76] The correlation between Physical Quality of Life at $_{t-1}$ and economic development was .53. The correlation between Physical Quality of Life at $_{t-1}$ and democracy was .59.

[77] The correlation between population level and trade openness was -.58.

such an error structure. Also, estimations do not include the economic freedom and inequality variables in the same models because of the extremely low number of cases that result from this intersection. As discussed in Chapter Four, all of the coefficients are unstandardized OLS with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) being reported as suggested by Beck and Katz (1995). All regression estimation procedures were conducted with Stata 5 (StataCorp, 1997).

5.2 Subsistence Rights Models

a. General Models

As discussed in the previous section, a number of multicollinearity problems must be addressed in order for our analysis to be accurate. In looking at subsistence rights, physical quality of life at $_{t-1}$ is collinear with economic development and democracy. Because of the importance of these variables in my study, I choose to concentrate on models that do not incorporate the lagged endogenous variable for subsistence rights. For comparison purposes, however, I also report the various models *with* the lagged endogenous variable in Appendix F.

In presenting the various models, I proceed in the following manner. In each section, I first address the general model without the economic freedom and inequality variables. I begin here because this approach provides the largest number of observations. From Chapter Four we know that the economic freedom data is only available for 109 countries for 4 years (1980, 1985, 1990, 1993). In addition, the inequality data provided by the World Bank (Deininger and Squire, 1996) only covers 357 cases during our 14 year time period.[78] Next, I systematically consider the general model by separately adding economic freedom and inequality.

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[78] Ultimately, the data set proposed by Deininger and Squire (1996) includes 2621 observations (682 high quality) for 108 countries from 1947 to 1993.

To review the proposed hypotheses, it is expected that global integration, economic freedom, democracy and Cold War will have a positive effect on basic human rights. Inequality is believed to have a negative impact on these rights. Of the control variables (economic development, economic growth, international war, civil war, and population growth), all are expected to have a negative influence except economic development, which should have a positive influence.

In my first general model (shown in Table 5.9), I find that global integration as measured by trade openness has a positive effect on subsistence rights. The other two measures of global integration (Bretton Woods and financial openness) are not statistically significant. Actually, financial openness is even exhibiting a negative influence on our dependent variable. As expected, democracy and economic development are highly significant and in a positive direction.[79] The other control factors (economic growth, international and civil war, and population growth) have virtually no impact on a country's respect for subsistence rights. In terms of overall goodness of fit, the χ^2 indicates that the overall model is significant. The adjusted R^2 is also reported from the basic OLS regression and shows that the model can explain some 56 percent of the variance in subsistence rights.[80] Finally, the high F statistic attests to an overall statistical significance of the regression. The F test measures the statistical significance of the entire range of independent variables. It tests the joint hypothesis that all coefficients except the intercept are zero. High values of the F statistic force us to reject the null hypothesis that the constraints are true (Kennedy 1994, 57). The probability > F reported in each table tells us the probability of a greater F statistic if we draw samples

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[79] The significance for all variables is shown at the 95%, 99%, and 99.9% confidence level.

[80] The adjusted R^2 is simply the coefficient of determination adjusted for the number of independent variables incorporated into the model. Essentially, this represents a penalty for not maintaining parsimonious models. The formula is $R^2 = 1 - (1 - R^2)(N-1/N-k)$ where k is the number of independent variables plus the constant. As the number of independent variables becomes large, the difference between R^2 and adjusted R^2 grows.

randomly from a population in which the null hypothesis is true (Hamilton 1998, 132). If we include the lagged dependent variable of subsistence rights $_{t-1}$ (see Table 5.36 in Appendix F) which is highly significant, all other influences are eradicated. As alluded to previously, this finding is questionable noting the multicollinearity problem.

If economic freedom is added to this general model (Table 5.10), the results are slightly altered. First, economic freedom is found to be highly significant. Also, our Cold War variable becomes significant and in a positive direction. This makes theoretical sense in that the end of the Cold War ushered in liberalized economic policies for numerous countries and provided a broader basis for subsistence rights. While trade openness is influential above, none of the measures of global integration appear significant. However, democracy and economic development retain their largesse. The χ^2, F statistic, and R^2 again indicate a good fit. With the inclusion of economic freedom or inequality, the reader must be mindful that the sample is greatly reduced (here, only 71 countries for 3 years).[81]

Next, inequality is incorporated into the general model for subsistence rights (Table 5.11). While this intersection restricts the model to 48 countries over 12 years, the result is quite similar to the original model. Cold War is no longer significant while trade openness, democracy, and economic development are again highly influential. Surprisingly, inequality itself is anemic in its power over the dependent variable (and indeed is incorrectly signed). As before, the χ^2 and F statistic indicate a good fit and the R^2 shows the model explaining 77 percent of the variance.

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[81] Adding the highly significant subsistence rights $_{t-1}$ variable (see Table 5.37 in Appendix F), economic growth and international war exhibit large negative influence.

Table 5.9 General Subsistence Rights Model

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	Z
Constant	54.97***	2.46	22.26
Bretton Woods	.34	.77	.45
Trade Openness	.02**	.009	2.96
Financial Openness	-.81	.09	-.86
Cold War	-.59	.49	-1.19
Democracy	1.04***	.11	9.16
Economic Development	.001***	.00009	11.43
Economic Growth	-.01	.01	-1.14
International War	-.39	.68	-.56
Civil War	.40	.86	.04
Population Growth	-.03	.02	-1.51
Number of Cases	1082	Adjusted R^2	.56
χ^2	397.07***	F	139.35***
Probability $> \chi^2$	0.00	Probability $>$ F	0.00

Table 5.10 General Subsistence Rights Model (with Economic Freedom)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	55.27***	5.69	9.70
Bretton Woods	-.45	1.71	-.26
Trade Openness	.04	.01	.13
Financial Openness	.04	.36	-.84
Cold War	-.83**	.98	2.53
Economic Freedom	1.50***	.59	5.01
Democracy	1.14***	.22	4.02
Economic Development	.0005**	.0001	-2.33
Economic Growth	-.07	.03	-.14
International War	-.21	1.50	-.85
Civil War	-2.87	3.34	-.52
Population Growth	-.04	.09	
Number of Cases	192	Adjusted R^2	.61
χ^2	122.15***	F	29.19***
Probability $> \chi^2$	0.00	Probability $>$ F	0.00

* p $\leq$ .05   ** p $\leq$ .01   *** p $\leq$ .001

Table 5.11 General Subsistence Rights Model (with Inequality)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	71.50***	5.56	12.84
Bretton Woods	.47	1.14	.41
Trade Openness	.03**	.01	3.08
Financial Openness	.10	.12	.81
Cold War	.31	.76	.41
Inequality	.01	.09	.16
Democracy	.49*	.22	2.21
Economic Development	.0005***	.00009	5.81
Economic Growth	-.002	.02	-.08
International War	-.25	1.08	-.23
Civil War	.16	1.61	.10
Population Growth	-2.78**	.92	-3.00
Number of Cases	196	Adjusted R^2	.77
χ^2	138.94***	F	67.56***
Probability $> \chi^2$	0.00	Probability $> F$	0.00

* $p \le .05$ ** $p \le .01$ *** $p \le .001$

b. OECD Sample for Subsistence Rights

In order to glean more knowledge about the nature of international political economy and its effects on basic human rights, I divide the sample into the developed and developing world. The general models estimated here and in Section C mirror those in the previous section. For obvious reasons, the number of cases in all of these scenarios is necessarily reduced. Table 5.12 reveals the OECD general subsistence rights model without economic freedom or inequality. Similar to the estimation for the entire sample, economic development is still highly significant and positive. Economic growth is influential and in a negative direction as hypothesized. Population growth, unlike for the entire sample, exhibits a significantly positive effect that is unexpected. This means that population growth for industrialized nations is not the negative influence as with developing nations (see Tables 5.15 and 5.16) but rather can provide economic

opportunities that might better provide basic human rights. Another interesting finding is that the consistent effect of democratic institutions evaporates with the OECD countries. Though this might appear troublesome at first, we must remember that there is very little variation in this measure for the industrialized world. Similarly, none of the global integration variables appear statistically significant for the same reason. One should also note that civil war was automatically dropped from the estimation because of the absence of civil war in developed countries. While the χ^2 and F statistic continue to indicate a substantial model overall, the OECD model not surprisingly is only able to explain 39 percent of the variance as revealed by the R^2.[82]

Incorporating economic freedom into this equation (Table 5.13), we see an opposite effect from the general sample. Here, economic freedom is significant but in a *negative* direction. Though puzzling, there could be an explanation for this phenomenon. Perhaps at higher levels of economic development and integration, any further liberalization might actually harm a country's ability to provide increased subsistence rights. Further, economic development and economic growth are seen to be significant in the hypothesized directions. The coefficient for economic development, however, appears quite small. Again, the χ^2, F statistic, and R^2 continue to show strength.[83]

Next, I add inequality to the general OECD model. Similar to the two other OECD models and distinct from the world sample inequality model, no measure of global integration has any effect on subsistence rights. Democracy and economic development, however, remain highly significant and positive. Like the economic freedom model immediately above, economic growth exhibits a significantly negative impact as expected. Further, the χ^2 and F

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[82] Adding subsistence rights $_{t-1}$ to this model (Table 5.38 in Appendix F) results in a significant lagged variable and economic development in the hypothesized direction. However, democracy is seen as *negatively* significant.

[83] Table 5.39 in Appendix F shows that adding subsistence rights $_{t-1}$ results in a significant lagged variable in the correct direction and democracy again being *negatively* significant.

statistic continue to indicate a statistically significant model overall, but the R^2 signifies only 35

percent of the variance is explained.[84]

Table 5.12 General Subsistence Rights Model (OECD)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	87.38***	3.31	26.37
Bretton Woods	-.24	.30	-.78
Trade Openness	-.002	.004	-.56
Financial Openness	.0002	.02	.009
Cold War	.02	.20	.12
Democracy	.33	.32	1.03
Economic Development	.0001***	.00002	5.08
Economic Growth	-.01**	.006	-2.67
International War	-.11	.20	-.54
Civil War	(dropped)		
Population Growth	.36*	.21	1.71

Number of Cases	211	Adjusted R^2	.39
χ^2	60.10***	F	16.35***
Probability $> \chi^2$	0.00	Probability $> F$	0.00

* $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$

[84] Incorporating subsistence rights $_{t-1}$ (Table 5.40 in Appendix F) ameliorates all variable significance except for the lagged variable itself.

Table 5.13 General Subsistence Rights Model (OECD with Economic Freedom)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	(dropped)		
Bretton Woods	29.49***	1.21	24.22
Trade Openness	-.001	.005	-.35
Financial Openness	-.005	.09	-.05
Cold War	-.23	.46	-.50
Economic Freedom	-.26**	.10	-2.62
Democracy	.32	.37	.86
Economic Development	.0001***	.00004	3.73
Economic Growth	-.10***	.01	-8.12
International War	.14	.37	.39
Civil War	(dropped)		
Population Growth	.04	.33	.13
Number of Cases	46	Adjusted R^2	.65
χ^2	617973.44***	F	9.65***
Probability > χ^2	0.00	Probability > F	0.00

Table 5.14 General Subsistence Rights Model (OECD with Inequality)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	70.38***	6.45	10.91
Bretton Woods	(dropped)		
Trade Openness	-.002	.005	-.05
Financial Openness	.06	.03	1.54
Cold War	.33	.28	1.15
Inequality	-.05	.05	-.96
Democracy	2.10***	.68	3.074
Economic Development	.0001***	.00002	4.15
Economic Growth	-.01*	.01	-1.64
International War	.13	.28	.46
Civil War	(dropped)		
Population Growth	-.15	.28	-.54
Number of Cases	103	Adjusted R^2	.35
χ^2	42.03***	F	6.69***
Probability > χ^2	0.00	Probability > F	0.00

$* p \leq .05 \quad ** p \leq .01 \quad *** p \leq .001$

c. Non-OECD Sample for Subsistence Rights

Turning our attention to the developing world, I estimate the same three models as before but only for the non-industrialized countries. Table 5.15 exhibits many similarities with the model comprised of the world sample. Indeed, trade openness, democracy and economic development exhibit strong positive significance as they did for the entire sample. Additionally, Cold War and population growth both have a large negative impact on subsistence rights. The latter two have no significant effect on the global sample; and population growth actually has the opposite effect on the OECD sample.

This is an interesting finding because it indicates that different processes are driving subsistence rights in the developed, as compared to the less developed world. We can intuitively see that the Cold War (and its subsequent end) and population growth would affect subsistence rights in the developing world in ways that it would not the industrial countries. While deleterious pressures were placed on many non-OECD countries by the superpowers during the Cold War, the tensions, it could be argued, had less effect on the industrialized nations. This negative Cold War effect is contrary to my expectation and would support the conventional wisdom that argues that the Cold War fostered greater repression as the developing countries struggled as pawns of the superpowers. Considering the issue of population growth, more people in an industrialized country can typically mean a larger pool from which to draw workers. This can have a positive effect on economic development and therefore physical quality of life. Also, negative population growth in a developed society could mean importing non-citizen *Gastarbeiter* or guest workers, which could lead to problems for subsistence rights. For the developing world, population pressures can mean increasing stress on a system that already cannot provide the basic subsistence for many of its citizens. Finally,

the χ^2 and F statistic continue to show an adequate goodness of fit for the model, but the R^2 signifies it can only account for 39 percent of the variance.[85]

In terms of the non-OECD model with the addition of economic freedom, Table 5.16 reveals a number of similarities and differences from the entire sample as well as the OECD sample. First, the issue of global integration does again achieve statistical significance as it did for the OECD countries but in a different manner. Only one measure of globalization (Bretton Woods) is statistically significant and it is in the negative and opposite direction as the OECD model. This phenomenon is difficult to explain. Economic freedom mirrors the significant and positive influence (as hypothesized) that was present with the world sample. This is counter to the negative effect economic freedom has for the OECD counties. As stated in the last subsection, perhaps at higher levels of economic development and integration, any further liberalization might actually harm a country's ability to provide increased subsistence rights. The positive effects of democracy and economic development in the non-OECD sample are consistent with the global sample. In looking at population growth, we find that its negative influence for the non-OECD countries does not carry over for either the members of the OECD or the world as a whole. This could be due to the suspicion that the developing world is more sensitive to overpopulation issues, especially in relation to providing subsistence rights. In terms of the overall performance of the model, the χ^2 and F statistic are again statistically significant while the R^2 indicates it explains 49 percent of the variance.[86]

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[85] Table 5.41 in Appendix F indicates that if by adding subsistence rights $_{t-1}$, the only significant variables are the lagged variable itself (+), Bretton Woods (-), and economic development (+).

[86] Table 5.42 in Appendix F shows that adding subsistence rights $_{t-1}$ results in significant positive influence by the lagged endogenous variable, trade openness, Cold War, and population growth.

By substituting economic inequality into the above model, we see a number of interesting findings as illustrated in Table 5.17. Like the OECD model, none of the globalization measures have an impact on subsistence rights. Also, the new variable in question (inequality) has no significant effect. Perhaps most intriguing is that the stalwarts in the global and OECD sample (democracy and economic development) also have no discernible influence. Further, the Cold War exhibits a negative statistical significance contrary to our prediction, while it did not for either the OECD or entire sample. Finally, civil war is reported to have a *positive* effect that is neither expected nor statistically significant for the other models. The author is unable at this time to adequately explain this phenomenon. I initially suspected that with such few cases (70), exacerbated problems of multicollinearity among the variables could be emerging. However, careful examination of the matrix of correlations between the estimated regression coefficients reveals no such evidence.[87] Finally, the goodness of fit indicators are also rather confusing. While the F statistic points to an overall significant model, the χ^2 is not found to be statistically significant. The amount of variance explained is 63 percent. From the above description, it is obvious that this model presents some difficult interpretation problems.[88]

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[87] The suspected culprit was the correlation between coefficients on civil war and economic inequality. However, this correlation was only .07. The highest correlation present was between the constant and the coefficient on economic inequality (-.57).

[88] Incorporating the lagged endogenous variable results in subsistence rights $_{t-1}$ and civil war having a positive effect while economic growth and international war exhibit negative effects.

Table 5.15 General Subsistence Rights Model (Non-OECD)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	54.99***	2.58	21.28
Bretton Woods	.15	.80	.19
Trade Openness	.02**	.01	2.55
Financial Openness	-.13	.12	-1.11
Cold War	-1.66**	.59	-2.80
Democracy	.82***	.11	6.92
Economic Development	.001***	.0003	4.19
Economic Growth	-.01	.01	-1.07
International War	-.25	.89	-.28
Civil War	.67	.85	.78
Population Growth	-.04*	.02	-1.70
Number of Cases	871	Adjusted R^2	.39
χ^2	113.13***	F	57.37***
Probability $> \chi^2$	0.00	Probability $>$ F	0.00

Table 5.16 General Subsistence Rights Model (Non-OECD with Economic Freedom)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	67.34***	6.37	10.56
Bretton Woods	-6.14***	1.89	-3.24
Trade Openness	.01	.02	.48
Financial Openness	-.73	.63	-1.15
Cold War	-2.72	1.73	-1.57
Economic Freedom	1.69*	.87	1.94
Democracy	1.71***	.28	6.06
Economic Development	.002***	.0005	4.26
Economic Growth	-.07	.05	-1.23
International War	4.14	2.88	1.43
Civil War	2.14	3.91	.05
Population Growth	-.21*	.10	-2.00
Number of Cases	146	Adjusted R^2	.49
χ^2	146.21***	F	14.31***
Probability $> \chi^2$	0.00	Probability $>$ F	0.00

* $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$

Table 5.17 General Subsistence Rights Model (Non-OECD with Inequality)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	55.78***	6.99	7.97
Bretton Woods	-.27	.70	-.39
Trade Openness	-.009	.03	-.26
Financial Openness	.37	.24	1.55
Cold War	-1.45*	.78	-1.86
Inequality	-.09	.07	-1.24
Democracy	-.11	.12	-.91
Economic Development	-.0005	.0007	-.69
Economic Growth	.002	.02	.08
International War	1.36	1.02	1.33
Civil War	1.77*	1.10	1.60
Population Growth	-.54	.56	-.96
Number of Cases	70	Adjusted R^2	.63
χ^2	15.63	F	20.34***
Probability $> \chi^2$	0.15	Probability $> F$	0.00

$* \ p \le .05 \quad ** \ p \le .01 \quad *** \ p \le .001$

d. Separating Economic and Political Explanations of Subsistence Rights

As laid out in the research design in Chapter Four, I now consider a reduced version of the general subsistence rights model, concentrating on the separate economic and political explanations. The overall economic model is as follows:

$$\text{Subsistence Rights}_{tj} = a + B_1 \text{ Bretton Woods Membership}_{tj} + B_2 \text{ Trade Openness}_{tj}$$
$$+ B_3 \text{ Financial Openness}_{tj} + B_4 \text{ Economic Freedom}_{tj} + B_5 \text{ Income Inequality}_{tj} + B_6$$
$$\text{Economic Development}_{tj} + B_7 \text{ Economic Growth}_{tj}$$

As in the previous three subsections, I begin with the most general model and then systematically add the variables of economic freedom and inequality.

Table 5.18 displays the results from the general economic model. Indeed, with this first iteration there are not many surprises. In terms of global integration, our measure of trade openness is statistically significant and in the predicted direction (positive). This supports the findings from our general model for the world sample (Table 5.9) and for the non-OECD countries (Table 5.15). Likewise, the other measures for globalization (Bretton Woods membership and financial openness) have no discernible effect. Also in lockstep with our general model for the world and for developed countries, this model indicates that economic development is a significant factor. In terms of overall goodness of fit, the χ^2 indicates that the overall model is significant. Also, the high F statistic also attests to an overall significance of the regression. Having said that, the adjusted R^2 shows the limits of the economic variables in that collectively they only explain 38 percent of the variance in subsistence rights.

Adding economic freedom to our analysis provides yet more information (Table 5.19). As before, the reader is cautioned as to the reduction of cases that occur because of this addition (i.e., the model declines from 127 countries over 12 years for the general economic model to 72 countries over 3 years for the economic freedom model.) Economic freedom appears to have a significantly positive effect on subsistence rights as predicted and seen in the overall model for the world (Table 5.10) and developing countries (Table 5.16), respectively. Economic development also exhibits influence as seen in all of the general models (world sample, OECD, and non-OECD). In terms of global integration, trade openness is also seen as having a significant and positive impact. Finally, the χ^2 and F statistic continue to show an adequate goodness of fit for the model, but the R^2 still remains relatively low for the economic model at 0.40.

Substituting our inequality variable for economic freedom (in the economic model with subsistence rights as the dependent variable), we encounter some interesting

results (Table 5.20). First, economic inequality itself is still unable to exhibit any influence on subsistence rights as was the case for all of the previous general models which utilized inequality (world, OECD, and non-OECD sample). Secondly, economic development remains the consistent performer with a significant and positive effect. Turning to the question of global integration, this model presents some confounding information. The trade openness measure shows positive influence as it did in the previous economic models above (Tables 5.18 and 5.19). However, the Bretton Woods indicator exhibits a negative effect on subsistence rights. It is unclear why the Bretton Woods measure would behave differently from its counterpart, trade openness. Finally, the F statistic and χ^2 again indicate that the model as a whole is significant, while the R^2 represents 49 percent of the variance explained.

Restricting the general model to include only political variables provides little utility in explaining the dynamics of subsistence rights. From Chapter Four, recall that the restricted political model consists of the Cold War, democracy, international war and civil war. Table 5.21 reveals that two factors, democracy and Cold War, are indeed significant and in the hypothesized direction. Interestingly, neither the presence of civil war nor international war has any significant effect on subsistence rights. While the χ^2 and F statistic indicate a good fit overall, the model is only able to explain 37 percent of the variance.

Table 5.18 Economic Model for Subsistence Rights

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	59.09***	2.05	28.80
Bretton Woods	.88	.55	1.58
Trade Openness	.02*	.01	2.05
Financial Openness	-.10	.07	-1.39
Economic Development	.0009***	.0001	8.50
Economic Growth	-.006	.01	-.60
Number of Cases	1127	Adjusted R^2	.38
χ2	80.03***	F	140.47***
Probability > χ2	0.00	Probability > F	0.00

Table 5.19 Economic Model for Subsistence Rights (with Economic Freedom)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	62.01***	5.16	12.01
Bretton Woods	-2.16	1.59	-1.36
Trade Openness	.06**	.02	2.81
Financial Openness	-.56	.49	-1.14
Economic Freedom	1.40*	.71	1.97
Economic Development	.001***	.0001	7.47
Economic Growth	-.06	.04	-1.47
Number of Cases	198	Adjusted R^2	.40
χ2	90.82***	F	24.55***
Probability > χ2	0.00	Probability > F	0.00

* p ≤ .05   ** p ≤ .01   *** p ≤ .001

Table 5.20 Economic Model for Subsistence Rights (with Inequality)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	74.48***	5.00	14.88
Bretton Woods	-2.32*	1.15	-2.13
Trade Openness	.54**	.02	2.48
Financial Openness	.31	.26	1.17
Inequality	-.02	.09	-.27
Economic Development	.001***	.0001	9.15
Economic Growth	.06	.04	1.45
Number of Cases	197	Adjusted R^2	.49
χ^2	155.69***	F	36.79***
Probability $> \chi^2$	0.00	Probability $> F$	0.00

Table 5.21 Political Model for Subsistence Rights

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	65.23***	.81	79.61
Cold War	-1.12***	.33	-3.34
Democracy	.56***	.07	7.50
International War	-.58	.56	-1.02
Civil War	-.26	.67	-.38
Number of Cases	1808	Adjusted R^2	.37
χ^2	76.56***	F	271.51***
Probability $> \chi^2$	0.00	Probability $> F$	0.00

$* p \leq .05$ $** p \leq .01$ $*** p \leq .001$

5.3 Security Rights Models

a. General Models

In this section, I apply the subsistence rights models developed in the last section to our second dependent variable of security rights, or integrity of the person rights as they are sometimes called. In presenting the various models, I proceed in the following manner. First, I consider the general model without the economic freedom and inequality variables. Next, I add economic freedom to the general model and then substitute our inequality measure. Similar to the subsistence portion of this dissertation, I further delineate the sample and evaluate the models separately for the developed and developing world. Finally, I disaggregate the general model and consider economic and political variables in separate models. Because of the theoretical and methodological reasons presented previously, I estimate all of the subsequent models with the lagged endogenous variable for security rights (Security Rights $_{t-1}$). However, I also estimate the general models without the lagged endogenous variable for the sake of more direct comparison with the analyses of subsistence rights. These can be found in Appendix F as Tables 5.44, 5.45, and 5.46.

In our first general model (Table 5.22), we find that 9 out of our 11 independent variables exhibit statistical significant effects on security rights. Not surprisingly, previous security rights practices in a country have a tremendous impact on current policies. Concerning our issue of global integration, trade openness and financial openness positively influence these rights. Our third measure of globalization (Bretton Woods membership) has no discernible effects. The presence of Cold War has a significantly positive effect as hypothesized. This is contrary to conventional wisdom which states that during the Cold War, Moscow and Washington allowed and even encouraged domestic governments to repress in order to maintain their superpower advantage. With the sudden end to the Cold War, one might expect the protection of international human rights would substantially improve. However, I argue that the Cold

War was actually a stabilizing factor that suppressed potential domestic aggression. As expected, and as we have seen before, democracy and economic development are quite influential in explaining levels of human rights abuse. Looking at domestic and international war, these exhibit negative effects that would support the findings of Stohl (1975, 1976), Rasler (1986), and Poe and Tate (1994). Population also has a negative effect in support of my hypothesis. In terms of overall goodness of fit, the χ^2 indicates that the overall model is significant. The adjusted R^2 is also reported from the basic OLS regression and shows that the model can explain over 70 percent of the variance in subsistence rights. Finally, the high F statistic attests to an overall significance of the regression.

While adding economic freedom does nothing for the overall explanatory ability of the above model (Table 5.23), it provides us with one the most interesting findings thus far.[89] Rather than having a positive effect as it consistently did with subsistence rights, economic freedom is found to have an unexpected *negative* impact on security rights. As I observed in Chapter Four, it appears that there is a linkage between economic freedom, economic development and subsistence rights. If the argument holds that increased levels of GNP result in higher physical quality of life, then economic freedom should (at least indirectly) have an effect on basic human needs. It is assumed that this would have the same effect on security rights. This finding is consistent across the non-OECD sample (Table 5.29) and the economic model described later (Table 5.31). From this analysis, it appears that while improving subsistence rights, higher levels of economic freedom can actually lessen security rights. A second important point is that the consistent strength of democracy fails to show significance as does financial

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[89] As in the above model, the χ^2 and F statistic indicate an overall significant model and the amount of variance explained is an identical 72 percent. Once must also keep in mind that the number of cases is reduced from 1087 to 192.

openness. Security rights $_{t-1}$, trade openness, and Cold War once again provide positive effects on security rights. Finally, international and civil war as well as population growth exhibit the same negative influences.

Next, I substitute economic inequality for economic freedom (Table 5.24). As with the general model, security rights $_{t-1}$, trade openness, financial openness, democracy, Cold War and economic development all reveal positive effects on our dependent variable. Civil War continues to have a negative impact but is not followed by international war. Ultimately, the model exhibits similar overall significance and explanatory power as above.

Table 5.22 General Security Rights Model

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	.53***	.12	4.30
Security Rights $_{t-1}$	.67***	.02	29.12
Bretton Woods	.05	.03	1.58
Trade Openness	.001***	.0004	3.65
Financial Openness	.026**	.01	2.25
Cold War	.22***	.04	5.081
Democracy	.01***	.005	3.51
Economic Development	.00001***	.000003	5.89
Economic Growth	-.001	.001	-.09
International War	-.19**	.06	-2.93
Civil War	-.44***	.07	-6.16
Population Growth	-.02***	.005	-3.39
Number of Cases	1087	Adjusted R^2	.72
χ^2	4137.34***	F	291.32***
Probability $> \chi^2$	0.00	Probability $> F$	0.00

$* p \leq .05$ $** p \leq .01$ $*** p \leq .001$

Table 5.23 General Security Rights Model (with Economic Freedom)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z

Constant	1.25***	.39	3.20
Security Rights $_{t-1}$	.47***	.06	7.55
Bretton Woods	.84	.10	.82
Trade Openness	.003**	.001	2.79
Financial Openness	.01	.03	.36
Cold War	.29***	.09	3.14
Economic Freedom	-.08*	.04	-1.89
Democracy	.04**	.01	2.87
Economic Development	.00004***	.000009	4.63
Economic Growth	-.002	.003	-0.77
International War	-.29*	.16	-1.79
Civil War	-.64**	.24	-2.66
Population Growth	-.02***	.006	-3.27

Number of Cases	192	Adjusted R^2	.72
χ^2	457.49***	F	45.22***
Probability > χ^2	0.00	Probability > F	0.00

Table 5.24 General Security Rights Model (with Inequality)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	1.92***	.51	3.74
Security Rights $_{t-1}$	.30***	.07	3.89
Bretton Woods	-.002	.09	-.02
Trade Openness	.003**	.001	2.40
Financial Openness	.04*	.01	2.26
Cold War	.20*	.10	1.95
Inequality	-.01	.01	-.99
Democracy	.06**	.02	2.45
Economic Development	.00003***	.00001	3.29
Economic Growth	-.003	.002	-1.35
International War	-.09	.17	-.51
Civil War	-.79**	.29	-2.74
Population Growth	-.01	.07	-.26

Number of Cases	198	Adjusted R^2	.79
χ^2	225.72***	F	69.42***
Probability > χ^2	0.00	Probability > F	0.00

b. OECD Sample for Security Rights

As with the subsistence rights models, I estimate the security rights models separately for the developed and developing world (Table 5.25). The general model using the OECD sample exhibits many of the same traits as the entire world sample. First, security rights $_{t-1}$, Bretton Woods, trade openness, and democracy have a positive influence. Second, economic growth has a negative effect as expected. Population growth, however, has a positive impact that is counter to our hypothesis. This is the same finding as for the OECD with subsistence rights as well. Perhaps this could mean that population growth for industrialized nations is not the negative influence as it is with developing nations but rather can provide economic opportunities that might better provide basic human rights. The overall model is significant and can explain over 50 percent of the variance.

Table 5.25 General Security Rights Model (OECD)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	-55	.88	-.063
Security Rights $_{t-1}$	.35***	.07	4.46
Bretton Woods	.32**	.13	2.36
Trade Openness	.002**	.0009	3.03
Financial Openness	-.006	.01	-.43
Cold War	.05	.07	.72
Democracy	.23**	.08	2.69
Economic Development	.00001	.000006	1.50
Economic Growth	-.006*	.002	-2.18
International War	-.05	.11	-.49
Civil War	(dropped)		
Population Growth	.15**	.05	2.75

Number of Cases	211	Adjusted R^2	.54
χ^2	126.81***	F	26.53***
Probability $> \chi^2$	0.00	Probability $> F$	0.00

* $p \le .05$ ** $p \le .01$ *** $p \le .001$

With the addition of economic freedom to our model (Table 5.26) we see different results as well as a much reduced sample (i.e., only 16 countries over 3 years). As before, previous security rights policies and democracy exhibit a positive effect. The global integration variables, however, either fade away or have a negative influence (i.e., Bretton Woods). There doesn't appear to be any theoretical basis for this transformation. The only other statistically significant variable is international war, which once again provides decreased security rights. Unlike with the general security rights model with economic freedom, the OECD sample does not result in economic freedom exhibiting a surprisingly *negative* impact. Indeed, it is not statistically significant in either direction.

Table 5.26 General Security Rights Model (OECD with Economic Freedom)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	(dropped)		
Security Rights $_{t-1}$	.50***	.14	3.41
Bretton Woods	-1.80***	.46	-3.83
Trade Openness	.001	.003	.34
Financial Openness	.02	.02	.95
Cold War	-.19	.15	-1.23
Economic Freedom	.02	.03	.63
Democracy	.79***	.13	5.79
Economic Development	-.00001	.00001	-.96
Economic Growth	-.001	.002	-.48
International War	-.19*	.11	-1.65
Civil War	(dropped)		
Population Growth	.04	.11	.36
Number of Cases	46	Adjusted R^2	.64
χ^2	1314.93***	F	8.65***
Probability $> \chi^2$	0.00	Probability $>$ F	0.00

* $p \le .05$ ** $p \le .01$ *** $p \le .001$

Finally, the substitution of inequality for economic freedom in our OECD model results in security rights $_{t-1}$, democracy, and population growth influencing security rights in a positive manner. While this is still a reduced sample, it does provide more cases (N=103) than the economic freedom example. Explanatory acumen and overall significance of the model are relatively unchanged.

Table 5.27 General Security Rights Model (OECD with Inequality)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	-2.86**	1.13	-2.52
Security Rights $_{t-1}$	.38***	.11	3.47
Bretton Woods	(dropped)		
Trade Openness	.002	.001	1.50
Financial Openness	-.01	.01	-.68
Cold War	.10	.12	.81
Inequality	-.007	.01	-.52
Democracy	.55***	.16	3.44
Economic Development	.00001	.000009	1.53
Economic Growth	-.002	.003	-.58
International War	-.16	.20	-.81
Civil War	(dropped)		
Population Growth	.21**	.07	2.88
Number of Cases	103	Adjusted R^2	.60
χ^2	225.80***	F	15.59***
Probability $> \chi^2$	0.00	Probability $> F$	0.00

$* p \le .05$ $** p \le .01$ $*** p \le .001$

c. Non-OECD Sample for Security Rights

The general model utilizing the developing world sample reveals that the non-OECD countries are indeed driving the complete sample. Indeed, the security rights model as illustrated in Table 5.28 provides virtually identical results as the general model

for the entire world (Table 5.22). Security rights $_{t-1}$, trade openness, financial openness, Cold War, Democracy and economic development have positive effects on developed countries' security rights performance. The control variables of international war, civil war and population growth all affect the dependent variable in a negative fashion as predicted. Also, the overall significance of this non-OECD model and explanatory ability is only slightly less than the world sample model.

With the addition of the economic freedom variable, we also see a very similar outcome as compared to the complete global sample (Table 5.23). Rather than having a positive effect as it consistently did with subsistence rights, economic freedom is found to have an unexpected *negative* impact on security rights (see the section on general models above for a discussion of this perplexing phenomenon). The only altered variable is that of democracy which regains positive statistical significance for the non-OECD countries. Security rights $_{t-1}$, trade openness, and Cold War also increase the level of security rights in the developing world.

Finally, if we substitute the inequality variable for economic freedom, we see much of the significance of the economic freedom model evaporate (Table 5.30). The only positive influences retained are the lagged endogenous variable (security rights $_{t-1}$) and democracy. The presence of civil war is the only statistically negative effect on security rights. Compared with the OECD sample for economic freedom (Table 5.26), we find no significance (positive or negative) for international war or Bretton Woods membership. The model taken as a whole is still significant and can account for almost 60 percent of the variance.

Table 5.28 General Security Rights Model (Non-OECD)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	.54***	.13	4.08
Security Rights $_{t-1}$	.67***	.02	27.89
Bretton Woods	.04	.03	1.10
Trade Openness	.001***	.0005	3.22
Financial Openness	.03*	.01	2.00
Cold War	.25***	.05	4.78
Democracy	.01***	.005	3.11
Economic Development	.00001*	.000006	2.19
Economic Growth	-.0008	.001	-.53
International War	-.22**	.07	-2.83
Civil War	-.43***	.07	-6.09
Population Growth	-.01***	.006	-3.16
Number of Cases	876	Adjusted R^2	.65
χ^2	1940.43***	F	155.33***
Probability > χ^2	0.00	Probability > F	0.00

Table 5.29 General Security Rights Model (Non-OECD with Economic Freedom)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	.98**	.39	2.45
Security Rights $_{t-1}$	.60***	.06	9.40
Bretton Woods	.05	.09	.59
Trade Openness	.004***	.001	3.49
Financial Openness	.01	.03	.48
Cold War	.35**	.11	2.99
Economic Freedom	-.11**	.04	-2.44
Democracy	.03**	.01	2.68
Economic Development	.000006	.00002	-.23
Economic Growth	.001	.003	.28
International War	-.38*	.22	-1.72
Civil War	-.44*	.21	-2.01
Population Growth	-.01**	.005	-3.21
Number of Cases	146	Adjusted R^2	.62
χ^2	391.96***	F	21.77***
Probability > χ^2	0.00	Probability > F	0.00

Table 5.30 General Security Rights Model (Non-OECD with Inequality)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	1.24**	.44	2.80
Security Rights $_{t-1}$	.57***	.08	6.85
Bretton Woods	-.11	.08	-1.37
Trade Openness	.001	.001	.82
Financial Openness	.073	.05	1.43
Cold War	.05	.14	.37
Inequality	-.01	.009	-1.34
Democracy	.06**	.02	2.98
Economic Development	.00005	.00005	1.04
Economic Growth	-.005	.004	-1.19
International War	-.32	.24	-1.34
Civil War	-.52**	.25	-2.03
Population Growth	.10	.07	1.48
Number of Cases	104	Adjusted R^2	.59
χ^2	193.85***	F	16.27***
Probability $> \chi^2$	0.00	Probability $> $ F	0.00

$* \ p \leq .05 \quad ** \ p \leq .01 \quad *** \ p \leq .001$

d. Separating Economic and Political Explanations of Security Rights

As in the subsistence rights section, I also consider a reduced version of the general security rights model, highlighting the separate economic and political influences. Again, the overall economic model is:

$$\text{Security Rights}_{tj} = a + B_1 \ \text{Bretton Woods Membership}_{tj} + B_2 \ \text{Trade Openness}_{tj} + B_3 \ \text{Financial Openness}_{tj} + B_4 \ \text{Economic Freedom}_{tj} + B_5 \ \text{Income Inequality}_{tj} + B_6 \ \text{Economic Development}_{tj} + B_7 \ \text{Economic Growth}_{tj}$$

Like in the previous subsections, I begin with the most general model and then systematically add the variables of economic freedom and inequality.

Figure 5.31 displays the results from the general economic model. Indeed, with this first iteration there are not many surprises. All of the variable coefficients are virtually identical to those in the general model (Table 5.22). In terms of global integration, our measures of trade openness and financial openness are statistically significant and in the predicted direction (positive). This supports the findings from our general model for the world sample (Table 5.22) and for the non-OECD countries (Table 5.28). Also in lockstep with our general model for the world and for developed countries, this model indicates that economic development is a statistically significant factor (although the coefficient is again rather weak). In terms of overall goodness of fit, the χ^2 indicates that the overall model is significant. Also, the high F statistic also attests to an overall significance of the regression. Indicating further strength of this limited economic model, we find the adjusted R^2 shows only slightly less explanatory value (.72) than the complete general model (.74).

Adding economic freedom to our analysis provides yet more information (Table 5.32). As before, the reader is cautioned as to the reduction of cases that occur because of this addition (i.e., the model declines from 1136 cases for the general economic model to 197 cases for the economic freedom model.) Economic freedom appears to have a similar significantly positive effect on security rights as predicted and seen in the overall model for the world (Table 5.23) and developing countries (Table 5.29), respectively. Economic development also exhibits influence as seen in the general models for the world sample and non-OECD.[90] In terms of global integration, trade openness is also seen as having a statistically significant and positive impact. Finally, the χ^2 and F

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[90] It is not surprising that economic development does not exhibit influence for the OECD sample because of such small variance in the measure.

statistic continue to show an adequate goodness of fit for the economic model, while the R^2 drops only slightly to .69.

Table 5.31 Economic Model for Security Rights

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	.37***	.11	3.33
Security Rights $_{t-1}$	.76***	.02	36.58
Bretton Woods	.04	.03	1.27
Trade Openness	.001***	.0004	4.02
Financial Openness	.03**	.01	2.68
Economic Development	.00002***	.000002	6.72
Economic Growth	.001	.001	.92
Number of Cases	1136	Adjusted R^2	.72
χ^2	3747.52***	F	501.75***
Probability $> \chi^2$	0.00	Probability $> F$	0.00

Table 5.32 Economic Model for Security Rights (with Economic Freedom)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	.75*	.41	1.80
Security Rights $_{t-1}$	.68***	.05	12.42
Bretton Woods	.04	.10	.41
Trade Openness	.003**	.001	2.58
Financial Openness	.03	.03	1.06
Economic Freedom	-.07*	.04	-1.66
Economic Development	.00004***	.000009	4.37
Economic Growth	.003	.004	.71
Number of Cases	197	Adjusted R^2	.69
χ^2	546.15***	F	65.95***
Probability $> \chi^2$	0.00	Probability $> F$	0.00

$* \ p \leq .05 \quad ** \ p \leq .01 \quad *** \ p \leq .001$

Substituting our inequality variable for economic freedom (in the economic model with security rights as the dependent variable), we encounter some interesting results (Table 5.33). First, economic inequality itself is still unable to exhibit any influence on security rights as was the case for all of the previous general models that utilized inequality (world, OECD, and non-OECD sample). Secondly, economic development remains the consistent performer with a significant and positive effect (albeit still with a relatively weak coefficient and substantive effect). Turning to the question of global integration, this model presents some confounding information. The trade openness measure shows positive influence as it did in the previous economic models above (Tables 5.31 and 5.32). However, the Bretton Woods indicator exhibits a negative, but statistically insignificant effect on security rights. It is unclear why the Bretton Woods measure would behave differently from its counterpart, trade openness with this sample. Finally, the F statistic and χ^2 again indicate that the model as a whole is significant, while the R^2 represents a respectable 76 percent of the variance explained.

Table 5.33 Economic Model for Security Rights (with Inequality)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	.98***	.38	2.57
Security Rights $_{t-1}$	.70***	.05	12.16
Bretton Woods	-.06	.07	-.85
Trade Openness	.002*	.001	1.88
Financial Openness	.01	.02	.85
Inequality	-.003	.006	-.55
Economic Development	.00003***	.000008	4.24
Economic Growth	-.002	.003	-.074
Number of Cases	199	Adjusted R^2	.76
χ^2	578.54***	F	104.22***
Probability > χ^2	0.00	Probability > F	0.00

* $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$

Restricting the general model to include only political variables provides similar utility (as compared to the economic model) in explaining the dynamics of security rights. From Chapter Four and the above section on subsistence rights, recall that the restricted political model consists of the Cold War, democracy, international war and civil war. Table 5.34 reveals that like before, all of the factors are indeed statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction. While the coefficients are slightly different from the general security rights model, the substantive effects remain the same. Finally, the χ^2 and F statistic again indicate a good overall fit as well as a slightly lower (but still quite similar) R^2 explaining some 71 percent of the variance. Since the explanatory power for the political model appear very close to the economic model, analysis including encompassing tests might shed further light on this competition.[91]

Table 5.34 Political Model for Security Rights

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	.77***	.06	12.35
Security Rights $_{t-1}$	.74***	.01	44.38
Cold War	.06*	.03	2.18
Democracy	.02***	.003	7.68
International War	-.12**	.04	-2.72
Civil War	-.45***	.05	-8.56
Number of Cases	1882	Adjusted R^2	.71
χ^2	5623.64***	F	944.77***
Probability $> \chi^2$	0.00	Probability $> F$	0.00

* $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$

5.4 Model Selection and Diagnostics

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[91] As revealed in the next section on diagnostics, Ramsey RESET results indicate that there is the potential for model mispecification and omitted variables in both the restricted economic and political models. Therefore, encompassing tests were not performed at this time.

In this chapter I estimate a vast array of models (i.e., some 26 separate models in all) to explain variation in subsistence rights and security rights. My approach has been to start broadly and then subsequently to narrow the focus. While this is illuminating, it is important for us to evaluate which models represent the most useful account of human rights practices around the world.

In terms of overall goodness-of-fit, most of the models performed well. Virtually all the models exhibit a statistically significant χ^2 and F statistic. As noted previously, the χ^2 and F statistic indicate that the overall model is significant. The F statistic measures the statistical significance of the entire range of independent variables. It tests the joint hypothesis that all coefficients except the intercept are zero. High values of the F statistic force us to reject the null hypothesis that the constraints are true (Kennedy 1994, 57).

Another commonly used indicator of goodness-of-fit is the coefficient of determination, or R^2. In all of these models, I report the adjusted R^2 to account for the number of independent variables incorporated into the model. The security rights models for the world sample (both the general and restricted economic and political models) appear to explain approximately 75 percent of the variance. The OECD and non-OECD versions reveal from 54 to 65 percent of the variance in security rights. For the subsistence rights models, the performance is less consistent. The general models for the world sample explain from 56 to 77 percent of the variance in subsistence rights. The performance for the OECD and non-OECD samples as well as for the restricted economic and political models typically explain only 35 to 49 percent of the variance. While this R^2 information is instructive for each individual model, it unfortunately provides us little assistance in choosing one model over another. In order to compare two or more R^2 values, the number of observations must be the same and the dependent

variable must be the same. It is obvious from my study here that these conditions are not met.

A more comparable statistic that we can consult is the root mean square error or the standard deviation of the residuals for each model. This is a measure that focuses on the trade-off between goodness-of-fit and complexity (i.e., more complex models are penalized by inclusion of a loss function). Here, the smaller values indicate the "better" models. As was the case with the other goodness-of-fit measures (χ^2 and F statistic) there is little that differentiates the various models. As a whole, however, the security rights models perform better than the subsistence rights models. All of the root MSEs for the security rights models are less than .68. Typically, the subsistence rights models (general, non-OECD, and restricted economic and political models) exhibit root MSE values in the 11 to 16 range. The root MSE for the OECD sample, though, is only around 1.0. Again, while somewhat informative, the root MSE does not provide us with a definitive choice in model selection.

Another diagnostic tool at our disposal is the Ramsey (1969) regression specification error test (RESET) for omitted variables. This test amounts to estimating y = xb + zt + u and then testing t = 0 (joint F test). If we reject the null hypothesis, then we can expect that there is indeed specification error. Conducting this test for all of the general models (both for subsistence rights and security rights) resulted in finding no evidence of omitted variables. However, when the Ramsey RESET was applied to the restricted economic and political models for subsistence and security rights, it is determined that there are indeed potentially important variables omitted. Therefore, we can at least narrow our focus to the more general models. The reader is reminded that the general models for both dependent variables are of three types: 1) the general model with all economic and political variables except economic freedom and income

inequality, 2) the general model including economic freedom, and 3) the general model including income inequality (but without economic freedom).[92]

In choosing among the general models, I am forced to resort to a combination of objective and subjective criteria. From an objective standpoint, we could base our decision on choosing models with statistically significant variables. Most of the general models, however, exhibit relatively similar performance in this regard. Since income inequality consistently shows no sign of statistical significance, we can put aside those models that include that variable. That leaves us with choosing between the general model with the variable of economic freedom and the one without economic freedom. Although economic freedom does exhibit statistical significance, the case selection and number of observations for this model is unacceptably low (as compared to the model excluding the variable). In the subsistence rights model without economic freedom, we have 1082 observations representing 121 countries over 12 years. This is reduced to 192 cases representing only 71 countries over 3 years. A similar situation exists for the security rights models. In the judgment of this researcher, it is prudent to choose the model that covers four times the number of time periods and 75 percent more countries in order to get a more accurate assessment of the dynamics of basic human rights performance.[93] The results of these models can be found in Table 5.9 (subsistence rights) and Table 5.22 (security rights).

Now that I have settled on the primary model for both subsistence rights and security rights, it is important to conduct a number of regression diagnostics to guard against any potential threats to our inferences. First, a number of checks were already performed during the model development stage. As detailed in Section 5.1, the potential

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[92] See the beginning of this chapter for the rationale behind this approach.
[93] However, for discussion purposes, I consider the economic freedom results in my comparison between subsistence rights and security rights.

problems of multicollinearity, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity have been sufficiently addressed. Also, as illustrated previously in this section, Ramsey RESET procedures indicate that our models are well specified and that no variables have been omitted. Another concern, especially when we consider the substantive significance of variables, is that of exogeneity. The variables x_i are said to be weakly exogenous if y does not explain x_i (i.e., there is no "feedback" from y to x_i) (Kennedy, 1992, 89). The procedure utilized for this assessment is the Hausman (1978) specification test. This tests for contemporaneous correlation between the regressors and the error. It shows that our variables are weakly exogenous.

Next, I turn to the consideration of outliers and their effect (if any) on the model estimations. Regression outliers are observations whose dependent variable value is unusual given the value of the independent variable. A case is influential if deleting that case from the sample substantially changes the regression results. In observing separate plots of the residuals versus the predicted values for the subsistence rights and security rights models, we find only two instances of outliers – Rwanda in the case of subsistence rights and Chad in the case of security rights.

Continuing this evaluation of potentially influential outliers, I generated a new variable equal to Welsch and Kuh's (1977) influence statistic DFITS. This measures the influence of the ith observation on the model as a whole. The idea here is to measure the difference between predicted values for the ith case when the regression is estimated with and without the ith observation. In estimating the DFITS for the security rights model, I detected 22 potentially influential cases out of 1089 observations. For the subsistence rights model, the number was 19 cases out of 1084 observations.[94] To look more closely

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[94] Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980, 28) suggest that DFITS values greater than $2 \sqrt{k/n}$ deserve further investigation. I have therefore used this cutoff to identify potential offenders.

at these outliers, I employ DFBETAs, which are a direct measure of influence (i.e., measure how much each case affects each coefficient). Assessing the outliers for each variable (for both subsistence rights and security rights) highlighted a number of potentially influential countries (typically two or three for each variable). In order to assure myself of no confounding influence from these outliers, I reestimate the models excluding these cases. Though there is an expectedly slight difference in the overall performance of the model, all of the variables continue to exhibit roughly the same magnitude and direction of influence (i.e., positive or negative) over the dependent variables. Further, there is no theoretical justification for excluding these. Therefore, I retain all of the cases for the model estimations.

5.5 Comparing Subsistence Rights and Security Rights Models

Most of the interpretation of the models and independent variables up to this point has concentrated primarily on objective measures such as statistical significance. It is important, however, to move on to substantive significance and draw the distinction between the two. A statistically significant coefficient essentially means that the sampling problem has been solved; that is the sample size is large enough to guarantee that another sampling would produce similar results (McCloskey 1986, 5). However, a "permanent" coefficient is not necessarily a meaningful one. Determining whether a variable is substantively important is far more difficult than simply selecting statistically significant coefficients. As McCloskey (1986) argues, a variable is substantively significant if its 1) coefficient is large, 2) variance high and 3) character exogenous. I have reported (with the Hausman test) that the variables in question are weakly exogenous. Also, one can see from summary statistics in Table 5.5 that notwithstanding the dichotomous measures (Cold War, international war and civil war), all of the

independent variables except for Bretton Woods exhibit a relatively high variance.[95] The question of substantive significance for our variables, therefore, rests on the magnitude of the coefficients. A summary of the variable significance on basic human rights is illustrated in Table 5.35.[96]

To review the proposed hypotheses, it is expected that global integration, economic freedom, democracy and Cold War will have a positive effect on basic human rights. Income inequality is believed to have a negative impact on these rights. Of the control variables (economic development, economic growth, international war, civil war, and population growth), all are expected to have a negative influence except economic development, which should have a positive influence. I address each one separately and make comparisons between the effects on subsistence rights and security rights.

While there are methodological reasons for including the lagged endogenous variable, there are also substantive aspects that can be gleaned from the strength of the coefficients. Supporting the findings of Poe and Tate (1994), security rights$_{t-1}$ exhibits a consistently strong effect on contemporary security rights. These large, statistically significant coefficients indicate that the Political Terror Scale ratings on individual countries are rather entrenched aspects of a system that is difficult to manipulate. In the subsistence rights arena as indicated by Table 5.36 in Appendix F, the lagged endogenous variable (subsistence rights$_{t-1}$) has an overwhelming effect on contemporary subsistence rights. However, as noted in Section 5.2, subsistence rights$_{t-1}$ is collinear with economic development and democracy. Indeed, a quick glance illustrates the confounding effects of including this variable. While the overall model supposedly

[95] Though the variance is not specifically reported in Table 5.5, it can be revealed by simply squaring the reported standard deviations.

[96] Results are based on the general models (Tables 5.9 and 5.22, respectively). Although they were ultimately excluded from the general models, economic freedom and income inequality are also examined (from Tables 5.10 and 5.11 on subsistence rights and Tables 5.23 and 5.24 on security rights).

explains virtually all of the variance (R^2 = .98), the highly statistically significant lagged Physical Quality of Life drowns out all other influences.[97]

Table 5.35 Summary of Variable Significance on Basic Human Rights

| Independent Variable	Subsistence Rights	Security Rights
Subsistence Rights$_{t-1}$	Stat. Significant (+) Subst. Significant	---------------
Trade Openness	Stat. Significant (+) Subst. Significant	Stat. Significant (+) Subst. Significant
Cold War	(-)	Stat. Significant (+) Subst. Significant
Inequality	(+)	(-)
Economic Development	Stat. Significant (+) Subst. Significant	Stat. Significant (+)
International War	(-)	Stat. Significant (-) Subst. Significant
Population Growth	(-)	Stat. Significant (-) Subst. Significant

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[97] Therefore, these results are only reported in Appendix F.

Turning to the important question of global integration, my first measure of globalization (Bretton Woods institutional membership) is typically lacking in its statistical and substantive significance for both arenas of basic human rights. As stated above, its variance is rather low (with an index ranging from 0 to 3) and it does not exhibit either large or statistically significant coefficients. These findings are similar to those of Webster (1994) who utilizes an identical measure. The only situation in which this does not hold is for security rights in the separate OECD sample (Table 5.25). This is somewhat surprising because one would expect most if not all OECD countries to be fully integrated into the Bretton Woods system. A possible contributing factor to this could be that a couple of countries (especially Switzerland) consistently register an extremely low value in this category. With such a reduced sample size in the OECD, this could alter the results.

The second aspect of global integration (trade openness) is found to be statistically and substantively significant for both dependent variables. For subsistence rights, a 100-point increase in trade openness would result in a 2-point increase in a country's Physical Quality of Life Index. While it might seem unlikely that a country could shift its trade openness (measured as exports + imports/GNP) by such a margin, a number of countries did approach this level (e.g., Guyana from 1989 to1990). The impact appears to be uniform for both developed and developing countries alike. The effect of trade openness on security rights, while not as substantial, still has a positive influence. For all of the variables in the security rights model, it is important for us to acknowledge the dynamic effect mediated by the lagged endogenous variable. As illustrated in Figure 5.2, the impact of a sizable change in trade openness increases

substantially over time.[98] We can see that the small initial change of .1 in the Political

Terror Scale would approach a threefold increase within 8 years.

Figure 5.2 Increase in Security Rights Due to Increase in Trade Openness

The third leg of globalization is financial openness as measured by a composite

index of various capital controls. While not statistically significant, it could be argued

that the impact of financial openness on subsistence rights does have some substantive

importance. As indicated in Table 5.9, the addition of two capital controls (out of a

possible six) would result in a 1.62 *decline* in PQLI. Movements from a completely open

system to the most restrictive situation results in a 5-point drop in PQLI. While not

typical, this complete reversal in openness has occasionally occurred (e.g., Dominica

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[98] To calculate the effect of any of these variables at time$_{t+1}$, I multiply the effect at time$_t$ by the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable and add the direct effect of the independent variable at time$_{t+1}$. An asymptotic pattern emerges after several lags of repeating this process (Poe and Tate 1994).

from 1989 to 1990). This is counter to our hypothesis of financial openness having a

positive impact on subsistence rights. Having said that, we must not make too much of

this since there is no evidence of statistical significance.

In its influence on security rights, financial openness exhibits a statistically and

substantively positive effect. Continuing our assumption of a move from the most

restricted to the most open (e.g., Dominica 1985 to 1986), an initial impact of .15 on the

Political Terror Scale translates into almost a .5 increase in security rights (Figure 5.3).

While this also holds for the non-OECD sample, it does *not* for the OECD countries.

Not only is the impact insignificant from a statistical standpoint, but its weak coefficient

is in the opposite direction. This could mean that at higher levels of economic

development, further moves towards globalization (financial) is immaterial at best.

Figure 5.3 Increase in Security Rights Due to Increase in Financial Openness

Turning to the analysis of the Cold War's effect on basic human rights, we see negligible effects on subsistence rights but statistically and substantively significant impact on security rights. This supports the assumption that in a post-Cold War world, renewed nationalism and conflict among various groups that was restrained by the respective superpowers is now free to emerge. While the immediate impact of the Cold War is not great (a .22 improvement in security rights as compared to the post-Cold War era), it quickly moves over a .5 point gain within three years when factoring in the lagged security rights effect. Real world examples of this effect are witnessed with the continuing struggles and human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia. While this finding is keeping with our theory, it is surprising that the Cold War effects would not be even more substantial for the subsistence rights. One could expect that the recent difficulties in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe concerning the movement towards a market economy would prove problematic in providing basic human needs. It is possible that our timeline is too short and this scenario may eventually play out in the coming years. We will have to wait and see.

While not included in my most general models, the findings for economic freedom warrant further discussion.[99] For subsistence rights, economic freedom exhibits statistical and substantive significance. A potential three-point rise in economic freedom (over three years) will result in a 4.5-point gain in Physical Quality of Life.[100] Though not common, a number of countries have approached this level of change in economic freedom (e.g., Costa Rica, Haiti, and Canada from 1990-1993). This expected outcome follows my original hypothesis that greater economic freedom should foster economic

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[99] Again, this is primarily because of the large reduction in observations since economic freedom is only available for four years during our time period.

[100] Keep in mind that the economic freedom data (for our period) is only available for 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1993.

development, thereby enhancing the provision of basic human needs. However, the

situation changes dramatically when we turn our attention to security rights. As

illustrated in Table 5.23, the impact of economic freedom on security rights provides us

with an interesting finding. Rather than having a positive effect as it consistently does

with subsistence rights, economic freedom is found to have an unexpected *negative*

influence on security rights. This finding is consistent across the non-OECD sample

(Table 5.29) and the economic model (Table 5.32). Figure 5.4 indicates the change over

time when combined with the lagged dependent variable. While security rights exhibits

statistical significance, it is less clear that substantive significance has been obtained.

The initial decline of .08 on the Political Terror Scale as a result of a 1 point annual

increase (3-points over 3 years) in economic freedom only approaches a .25 drop by the

end of a decade. Though interesting, this effect is surely not monumental.

Figure 5.4 Decrease in Security Rights Due to Increase in Economic Freedom

The important factor of democracy achieves continued support in this study with statistical and substantive significance for both dependent variables. In terms of subsistence rights, a 1-level drop in democracy (on the 0 to 10 Polity III scale) will result in a greater than 1-point drop in the Physical Quality of Life Index. At the other end of the spectrum, if a country were to achieve the highest democratic score in one year and then abandon democracy (e.g., obtaining the lowest democratic score) in the next period, we would witness a more than a 10-point decline in subsistence rights. This large degradation in physical quality of life would have dramatic impact on a country's basic human needs. These findings strongly support the previous work in this area (Moon and Dixon 1985, Rosh 1986, Spalding 1986, and Moon 1991). This is especially true since I utilize a different measure of democracy than the previous authors (i.e., Polity III). Spalding (1986) and Rosh (1986) offer the definition provided by Arat (1984, 1991) while Moon and Dixon (1985) and Moon (1991) use that of Bollen (1980, 1991).

Some may question the feasibility of this assumption of complete abandonment of democracy. While unlikely, there have been precedents for this. One such occurrence is the overthrow of Chilean democracy under Salvador Allende by the authoritarian Augusto Pinochet in the early 1970s. Indeed, Chile obtained the maximum democracy score in 1973 and then dropped immediately to the lowest possible score. Another potential example could be the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the ascension of national socialism in Germany (Poe and Tate 1994, 861).

While statistically significant, democracy's substantive impact on security rights is less pronounced. Once again assuming our complete abandonment of democracy from one period to another, a country would experience an initial decline of .1 in the Political Terror Scale. With the utilization of the lagged endogenous variable, however, there is a combined effect as illustrated in Figure 5.5. If the cessation of democracy were to

continue in our sample country, it appears that the human rights index would only decline by .3. With the security rights scale range from 1-5, this small change would be difficult to assess in terms of political prisoners held or increased torture or execution. This finding, while supporting the established literature, does not exhibit the same magnitude as previous studies (e.g., Henderson 1991, 1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Tate and Poe 1996). This could once again call into question (as does Fein 1994) the truly linear nature of democracy and its effects on security rights.[101]

Figure 5.5 Decrease in Security Rights due to Decrease in Democracy

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
[101] Having said that, democracy's effect on security rights does exhibit greater influence in some of the other models with much smaller time frames or samples. This is especially true if we concentrate on the OECD sample. Here, the initial decline in the Political Terror Scale is .23 if a country abandons democracy and a .68 reduction if the cessation were to continue over the entire decade.

In the existing literature of both subsistence and security rights, much has been said concerning economic development and economic growth. In the present study, economic development is statistically significant for both dependent variables. Substantively, it appears that the variable is only significant for subsistence rights. In the unlikely event that a country obtained a ten thousand dollar increase in per capita GNP, we could see a remarkable ten-point improvement in the Physical Quality of Life Index. With a more reasonable increase of one thousand dollars (albeit very difficult for the poorest countries), we could expect a one-point increase in basic human needs provision. The weak coefficient for security rights, however, prevents economic developments from moving beyond statistical significance. In our optimistic example of a ten-thousand dollar increase in per capita GNP, the security rights index would initially only be increased by .1. Within five years, the cumulative effect would still only be a .27 increase in the Political Terror Scale. With a one-thousand dollar improvement in per capita GNP, the immediate effect would be .01 while the compound influence over 5 years would only be .24. Within a decade, the change in security rights would reach a relatively meager .29. Looking at economic growth (i.e., the percentage change in per capita GNP), I find no support (either statistical or substantive) to confirm my hypothesis that greater levels of economic growth will have adverse effects on subsistence and security rights.[102]

The dummy variables controlling for the presence of international and civil wars achieve substantively important and statistically significant coefficients for security rights but exhibit no such influence over subsistence rights. This is somewhat surprising since it was expected that internal and external conflict would be deleterious to basic

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[102] It can be noted that for both subsistence and security rights, the impact of economic growth (although not statistically significant) is in the hypothesized direction (i.e., negative).

needs of persons as well to their personal security. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 illustrate the decreases in security rights due to civil and international war, respectively (assuming the continued involvement in each type of conflict). Perhaps not surprisingly, civil war has a much greater impact than does an international conflict. During an international foray, some of the political and economic infrastructure needed to maintain acceptable human rights practices might remain intact. On the other hand, when the conflict is internal, strains appear to permeate the society. The immediate drop of .44 on the Political Terror Scale as a result of a civil war would continue to decrease over one point before the third year and stabilize at 1.3 by the end of a decade (Figure 5.6). This would mean that if a country with the highest security rights rating (5) become engaged in civil war, we would at least expect that there would be some political prisoners being held, and that torture and political murder might become more common (other factors remaining equal). As depicted in Figure 5.7, if a country were involved in an international conflict, the initial decline of .19 in security rights would stabilize at .57 within ten years. Though substantial, the actual impact over this period is much less than with the civil war example.

Figure 5.6 Decrease in Security Rights Due to Civil War

Finally, my examination of population growth pressures on human rights indicates, once again, differing influences on subsistence rights and security rights (Figure 5.8). While population growth exhibits statistically and substantively important impact on security rights, it appears to have virtually no effect on subsistence rights. Depending on the degree of growth that is present in a particular country, we can see modest to dramatic decreases in the guarantees of security rights. If a country experiences a blistering fifty percent increase in its overall population, we see an immediate one point decrease in the Political Terror Scale. Though not common, there were a number of countries in this fourteen-year sample that had extreme fluctuations in population due primarily to conflict and/or famine (e.g., Slovenia, Rwanda, Guinea, UAE, North Yemen). If this continued for the better part of a decade (very unlikely), we would expect a three-point degradation in security rights. In our previous country example with the

highest security rights rating (5), the situation after a number of years would involve widespread occurrence of murders and disappearances. Obviously, more common high growth rates of five and ten percent would yield less dramatic impact. An initial decrease of .1 (five percent rate) and .2 (ten percent growth rate) would achieve a cumulative .3 and .6 change in security rights, respectively by the end of a decade.

Figure 5.8 Decrease in Security Rights Due to Increase in Population Growth

Therefore, from the above comparison between subsistence rights and security rights, it seems that there are no apparent trade-offs in guaranteeing both types of human

rights. Typically, those variables that have a positive (negative) effect on subsistence rights also have a positive (negative) influence on security rights. The only possible exception is with economic freedom, which has a significantly positive impact (both statistically and substantively) on subsistence rights but has a negative effect (statistically significant) on security rights. Another interesting result to note is that a number of variables (Cold War, international war, civil war, and population growth) affect security rights while having virtually no effect on subsistence rights. This could indicate that altering the level of basic human needs may be a more complex and difficult process than is the case with security rights.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has attempted to answer a number of important questions in the

human rights community. After an extensive review of the existing literature in Chapter

Two, Chapter Three examined the content and nature of human rights. The first

theoretical question posed was whether there are indeed "basic human rights" and if so,

which rights fit into this category. This research takes a broader view than much of the

recent literature that has simply concentrated on a single aspect of human rights (e.g.,

integrity of the person rights). From a theoretical standpoint, I draw upon Shue (1980)

who argues that there are at last three basic rights: security, subsistence, and liberty. In

examining the components of basic human rights, I explore the origins of these rights in

international law. The issue here is whether there is indeed an international human rights

"regime" and to what extent this regime controls or alters national sovereignty. Though

the latter is more difficult to answer, it is apparent that an international human rights

regime backed by international law is now firmly entrenched. Examples of this legal

basis include the original Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights.[103] There is indeed substantial evidence indicating the existence

of basic human rights (including security rights and subsistence rights) that are

guaranteed by (though not always enforced by) international law. While enforcement

surrounding human rights norms and sovereign nations will perhaps always be

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[103] In addition to these global agreements, a number of regional (and potentially more powerful)
agreements include the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the
European Social Charter, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the American
Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights.

problematic, a number of legal decisions suggest that enforcement is indeed possible. Examples include *Filartiga v. Pena*, *Letelier v. Republic of Chile, Ireland v. United Kingdom*, and the case of Dusko Tadic that has just gone before the recently instituted War Crimes Tribunal (as a result of the Balkans conflict). Another contemporary and complicated case involves the detainment of Augusto Pinochet by the United Kingdom and the attempt by Spain to have him extradited and tried for crimes against humanity (i.e., for atrocities committed against Spanish nationals in Chile in the 1970s during the reign of Pinochet).

A second parallel controversy that is also addressed is the issue of cultural relativism versus universality. Are human rights truly universal in the sense that they are the rights of every person simply because they are a human being? Or, as many in the non-western world argue, is the validity of a moral right or rule relative to the indigenous culture? While not definitively answering this question, it is clear that this project suggests a compromise strategy (not unlike Howard, 1984) similar to the weak cultural relativist tradition. Universalism is assumed but the extremes are checked by the relativity of communities and rights. The compromise suggested by Howard (1984) would strive for domestic legislation that would allow citizens to "opt out" of traditional practices (e.g., childhood betrothal and widow inheritance) that may not correspond to international norms. In an indication of greater movement towards more universally accepted human rights practices, the most recent resolutions adopted at the Vienna Conference (June 1993) appear to give supporters encouragement (Perry 1997, 481). The Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by 172 countries states categorically and

repeatedly that "the universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question" and that "they are universal, indivisible and mutually reinforcing."[104]

Third, I empirically evaluate this assertion that rights are interdependent and indivisible. Here, the question is whether there are trade-offs, for example between the provision of security rights and basic human needs, as suggested by Donnelly (1989, 188) and as often argued by certain regimes. Or, on the other hand, are two or more of these rights intimately linked and therefore tend to be realized together, as suggested by Vienna Conference and Vance (1977), Howard (1983), Kyi (1995)?

In considering differences between the developed and developing world, preliminary analyses indicate that OECD countries overall enjoy greater subsistence and personal integrity rights, more democratic institutions and more economic freedom. In addition, OECD countries are apparently a more homogeneous group than non-OECD countries.[105] From this, we may conclude that there is a considerable divide between developed and less developed countries, and that not only are human rights more realized in developed countries, but that they are more stable as well.

Though not all of my questions regarding the relationship between these four groups of "basic" internationally recognized human rights were answered in Chapter Three, there are some important findings in our search for understanding the various linkages between basic human needs, security rights, political rights, and economic freedom. In what might be considered good news for citizens, as well as policy-makers and scholars who argue that these rights are *generally* complementary, bivariate correlation analyses provide no direct evidence of trade-offs. In these initial, simple

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[104] It should be noted that substantial cultural differences remained at Vienna. In order to achieve unanimity, the Declaration omits any reference to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights per se.
[105] Further analysis of the univariate distributions of these variables does not reveal any significant outliers; I do not believe that any individual nation or cluster of nations is driving these summary statistics.

analyses, I find a tendency for these human rights to be achieved together, both in analyses of the full sample and in a subset of countries consisting of non-OECD countries. However, when only OECD member countries are included in the analysis, many of the relationships dissipated. This finding is probably due to the lack of variance in OECD countries and their relative homogeneity. Most of the significant findings throughout Chapter Three were driven by the non-OECD portion of the sample. Therefore, it would appear that Kyi (1995) is essentially correct when he suggests that the trade-offs argument concerning development and other freedoms is merely a pretext used by regimes to counter the ever-increasing call for governments to live up to international political and security rights standards.

The results of my analyses of trends in human rights achievement and the variance in human rights performance also provides some very interesting findings. Each of the variables analyzed in Chapter Three (subsistence rights, security rights, political rights, and economic freedom) showed a trend toward greater realization of rights since the beginning of the data series that I examine. Thus, it would seem that it is possible, in the aggregate, to have each of the human rights I survey to become progressively more realized over time.

Having said that, there are also some findings that hint that the four categories of human rights investigated do not always move together. In spite of increases in levels of subsistence rights, economic rights, and democracy after 1989 and the end of the Cold War, the Amnesty measure (security rights) shows that respect for personal integrity abuse actually decreased after 1989, until an improvement in 1993. This would suggest that, on a systemic level, moves toward democracy might actually be accompanied at first by greater repression. This would lend credence to Fein's (1995) argument of "more murder in the middle." In addition, the correlations between the categories of rights were

not so strong as to preclude the possibilities of trade-offs in certain cases. Future work could concentrate on certain case studies to shed further light on these findings.

Analysis of the variance in the scores yields further potentially important information. Though measures of the variation in economic rights and democracy indicat the world was converging concerning respect for security rights and to a lesser extent with PQLI, there was evidence of a trend toward divergence. At least in the latter case, this could be a result of the increasing problems of inequality as alluded to in Chapter Four.

In Chapter Four, I developed a research design aimed at determining why some regimes promote human rights while others do not. This is an especially important objective since we can only provide intelligent prescriptions to insure human rights conditions if we as scholars can adequately explain human rights variations. Further, if we can eventually identify situations that indicate a government's propensity to violate human rights, we might assist in actually preventing the spread of abuse. To this end, I build upon the existing theoretical and empirical research to develop multivariate models that attempt to explain variation in the broadly conceived notion of basic human rights.

Drawing upon the widely accepted framework of "basic rights" as offered by Shue (1980), I select subsistence rights and security rights for my dependent variables. This is an important distinction in the literature since almost all studies focus only on a single aspect of human rights. By examining both areas in a comparative fashion, I believe we gain even more knowledge of the dynamics of human rights practices. The important question here is whether certain factors affect various aspects of human rights (i.e., subsistence and security rights) in different ways.

In a further break from the traditional human rights literature, I employ an international political economy model that centers on globalization and its effects on

basic human rights. The general model includes both economic and political variables that can be further categorized into international and domestic factors. Building on the work of scholars before me, I have compiled what I believe to be the most comprehensive study yet concerning subsistence rights and security rights. The pooled cross-sectional time-series (PCT) or time-series cross-section (TSCS) employed here covers over 150 countries for 14 years from 1980 through 1993.[106] This extensive data set is important in that it now allows us to compare over time the variation in basic human rights for the largest number of countries in both the developed and developing world.

Before estimating the various globalization models, I consulted summary statistics that provided useful information. On average, OECD countries perform better on both dependent variables (subsistence rights and security rights) as well as on many of the independent variables (financial openness, democracy, economic development, economic growth, and population growth). For other variables, the difference is less pronounced. For instance, the mean economic freedom measure for the developed world is 5.47 while for the developing world it is 4.36 (on a 1 to 10 scale). It is also equally likely for OECD or non-OECD countries to find themselves embroiled in an international conflict. Another interesting finding is the relatively consistent presence of income inequality throughout the entire world. Here, the OECD exhibits a GINI index of approximately 32 while the non-OECD exhibits slightly less equality at just over 37 on the GINI index, which ranges from 1 (perfect equality) to 100 (total inequality).

In terms of globalization, two of our indicators (membership in Bretton Woods institutions and trade openness) reveal little difference between the developed and

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[106] This ranges from 156 countries for subsistence rights and 152 countries for security rights in 1980 to 168 countries for subsistence rights and 176 countries for security rights in 1993.

developing countries. For the third measure, financial openness, there is stark variation in that the OECD is much less likely to impose capital controls. In the context of recent financial instability in Asia, Latin America, and Russia, the issue of capital restrictions is even more pertinent. While many of the largest industrialized nations are loath to impose financial controls, this is still a very tempting policy tool for some leaders, especially in less developed areas.

In Chapter Five, I estimate a comprehensive array of models (i.e., some 26 separate models) to explain variation in subsistence rights and security rights. Further analyses were conducted to separate the differences in OECD and non-OECD countries. After exhaustive diagnostic tests, a single model for each dependent variable was chosen.[107] The subsistence rights model estimated the effects of global integration (Bretton Woods membership, trade openness, and financial openness), Cold War, democracy, economic development, economic growth, international war, civil war, and population growth on a country's Physical Quality of Life index. The security rights model estimated the impact of security rights $_{t-1}$, global integration (Bretton Woods membership, trade openness, and financial openness), Cold War, democracy, economic development, economic growth, international war, civil war, and population growth on a country's Political Terror Scale rating.

To review the proposed hypotheses, it was expected that global integration, economic freedom, democracy and Cold War would have a positive effect on basic human rights.[108] Income inequality was thought to have a negative impact on these rights. Of the control variables (economic development, economic growth, international

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[107] As discussed at length in Chapter Five, a multicollinearity problem with the lagged dependent variable for physical quality of life prevents us from incorporating it into our general subsistence rights model.

[108] While economic freedom is not retained in the final models because of data availability and a subsequent high reduction in the number of cases, I discuss its impact from the other models.

war, civil war, and population growth), all were expected to have a negative influence except economic development, which was thought to have a positive effect.

As to the actual impact of globalization on basic human rights, this study indicates mixed results (see Table 5.35). Typically, the first indicator of global integration (Bretton Woods institutional membership) lacks statistical and substantive significance for both subsistence and security rights. This supports the work of Webster (1994) who uses an identical measure. Moving on to trade openness as a measure of global integration, I find that a country's liberal trade policies are statistically and substantively significant for both dependent variables. As illustrated in Chapter Five, all of the influences on security rights are enhanced by the lagged endogenous variable (security rights $_{t-1}$). The impact on basic human rights appears to be uniform for both developed and developing countries alike. This appears to support the liberal position in the liberalism versus realism debate (at least in terms of human rights). As argued by Holsti (1985) it is logical to believe that increased interdependence of nations will result in a global society or community. This also supports the initial work of Harrelson-Stephens and Callaway (1998) in which they find that levels of trade affect the security rights practices of a state. From a U.S. foreign policy standpoint, this could have serious implications for trade relations with countries exhibiting "unacceptable" human rights practices. On the surface, this might suggest that the U.S. is prudent in its relationship with China (e.g., continuing MFN status) and is counter-productive in its isolation of Cuba.[109]

Considering the third leg of our globalization measures, financial openness is found to be statistically and substantively significant in terms of security rights.

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[109] It should be stated that in individual circumstances such as with South Africa, multilateral sanctions and the subsequent reduction in trade and interdependence could be argued to be effective.

However, it does not reach statistical significance for physical quality of life. If we examine the differences between the developed and developing world, we find some very interesting results for security rights. While the above holds for the non-OECD sample, it does not for the OECD countries. Not only is its impact insignificant from a statistical standpoint, but its meager coefficient is in the opposite direction. Though we should not make too much of this, it could mean that at higher levels of economic development, further moves towards global integration (at least financially) are ineffectual at best.

Similar findings result when I consider the impact of the Cold War on basic human rights. Again, there are negligible effects on subsistence rights but significant impacts on security rights. This supports my break with conventional wisdom that suggests that the Cold War should have a negative influence on human rights. Rather, in a post-Cold War world, it seems that renewed nationalism and conflict among various groups is now reemerging. Having said this, it is still surprising that the post-Cold War effects would not be even more substantial for subsistence rights. One might expect that the recent difficulties concerning the movement toward a market economy would prove problematic in providing basic human needs. As time passes and we have a longer post-Cold War period with which to compare, these findings might change somewhat.

Though not included in the final models because of data availability, the findings for economic freedom warrant inclusion in the summary.[110] In support of my hypothesis, increased economic freedom is tied to increases in levels of Physical Quality of Life. A three-point rise in economic freedom results in an impressive 4.5-point gain in subsistence rights. Therefore, it appears that liberalizing economic restraints should

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[110] The only reason that economic freedom is not included in the final models is because of the large reduction in observations due to availability of the data (i.e., only available for 4 years during our time period).

foster economic development, thereby enhancing the provision of basic human needs. The findings for economic freedom in relation to security rights are not significant.

In support of the extensive literature on democracy, this study finds that democratic regimes have a substantial impact on subsistence rights and to a lesser extent on security rights. Considering subsistence rights, we see a one-to-one relationship between level of democracy (as measured by Polity III) and the dependent variable. These findings echo the results of the previous work in this area (Moon and Dixon 1985, Rosh 1986, Spalding 1986, and Moon 1991). The outcome is even more impressive since I use a different measure of democracy than previous authors do. Though still statistically significant, the influence of democracy on security rights is less pronounced. This is true even when considering the cumulative effect of the lagged endogenous variable. While it does not conflict with previous security rights literature (e.g., Henderson 1991, 1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Tate and Poe 1996), it does once again beg the question as to whether democracy is truly linear in its effect on political terror (Fein 1995).

Turning finally to my inclusion of a number of control variables, we once again find inconsistent results when comparing subsistence rights and security rights. In many areas of human rights research, much has been written on economic development and economic growth. In this dissertation, economic development is found to have a relatively substantial effect on Physical Quality of Life while having a minuscule impact on security rights. In terms of economic growth, I find no support of the notion that economic growth will have adverse effects on basic human rights.

The remaining control variables (international war, civil war, and population growth) can be seen as heavily influential on security rights but have virtually no effect on subsistence rights. As expected, the presence of international or civil conflict results in

a degradation of integrity of the person. In support of Poe and Tate (1994), I find that while both are quite deleterious, a strictly domestic conflict is more damaging than if the conflict is truly international. This makes intuitive sense in that during an international war, a portion of the political and economic infrastructure needed to maintain acceptable human rights practices might remain intact. Similarly, a relatively high population growth rate can be detrimental to guaranteeing these rights. This tends to support the findings of Henderson (1993) and refute those of Poe and Tate (1994).

As the reader is now well aware, there appear to be both similarities and striking differences in the manner in which the international political and economic processes drive various human rights practices. While acceptable subsistence rights and security rights can be achieved together (as indicated in Chapter Three), the multivariate section indicates that certain aspects of the international political economy affect the two in different ways. In terms of similarities, it is obvious that global integration (i.e., trade openness) and democracy have similarly positive influences on basic human rights. However, there are even more variables that affect subsistence rights and security rights in a dissimilar manner. From a policy-making standpoint, however, it should be noted that none of the variables substantively affect the two aspects of human rights in opposite directions. Therefore, governments, international organizations and non-governmental organizations should not worry that one set of policies might substantially improve some human rights while harming others. It is apparent though, that some factors can have an important influence on one area of human rights while having little if any effect on another.

While this dissertation attempts to answer many important theoretical and practical questions, a number of issues still remain. Indeed, this project provides fertile ground for numerous directions of future research. One area that continues to need

further exploration is in measurement of human rights. In terms of subsistence rights, it would be instructive to compare the most recent measure of basic human needs (the UN Human Development Index) to the measures listed in this work (primarily PQLI). This would require a rather time-consuming process since the HDI only covers countries since 1992. In looking at security rights, insight could be drawn in incorporating Cingranelli and Richards' (1999) latest personal integrity measure and comparing it to the Political Terror Scale in a time series cross section study such as this. Again the difficulty here is in that the measure is only provided every three years.

Looking to more substantive matters, the important issue of democratization warrants further review. Though I find statistical and substantive support for much of the previous literature arguing that democracy has a strong positive effect on human rights, the findings for some of the various models here still questions the strictly linear relationship between democracy and basic human rights. Another unresolved issue is that of population pressures and their effect on basic human rights. As indicated above, this study supports the findings of Henderson (1993) and calls into question those of Poe and Tate (1994). This is somewhat surprising since this dissertation is methodologically closer in nature to the Poe and Tate (1994) study. Also, the time period is more similar to that of Poe and Tate (1994).

In terms of the trend analyses in Chapter Three, this broad survey focuses on aggregate data for a pooled cross-sectional time series data set. While this is typically an advantageous strategy, it could at times obscure individual processes at work. Looking below the surface and investigating time series data for particular countries would allow us to provide interesting tests of the relationships suggested by our aggregate analyses. Therefore, it might be illuminating to investigate a few case studies in order to highlight the potential trade-offs among various rights. While I find that these rights can indeed be

realized together, that does not preclude the individual instance of trade-offs in particular countries. Examples might include countries such as China, Singapore, South Korea, India, and Russia.

In addition, further research might investigate the linkages between these kinds of rights while making a potentially important distinction between levels and actual changes in human rights performance. This distinction may be particularly important in our attempt to better understand the linkage between democratization and the abuse of personal integrity, for though levels of democracy are related to less personal integrity abuse, our results suggest that a systemic movement toward democracy may have affected increased repression, at least in the short-term. Another tack could involve comparing the effort expended by governments and the actual performance in providing various human rights. While we are ultimately concerned with the realization of human rights, the reality of political and economic forces within a country may alter a regime's ability to meet the international standard.

APPENDIX A

POLITICAL TERROR SCALE

The security rights scale utilized here follows that employed by Poe, Tate, Keith and Lanier (1996); Poe and Tate (1994); Poe and Sirirangsi (1993, 1994); Stohl and Carleton 1985). However, in order to be consistent with the scales of the other variables, the five-point Political Terror Scale scale is recoded so that countries with more severe human rights violations exhibit a lower rating while nations with fewer violations are assigned a higher rating.

1. The terrors of [level 2] have been expanded to the whole population.... The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

2. The practices of [level 3] are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances are a common part of life.... In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

3. There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views is accepted.

4. There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few person are affected, torture and beating are exceptional.... Political murder is rare.

5. Countries [are] under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional.... Political murders are extremely rare.

For further details on coding and content analysis, see Gibney and Dalton (1996).

APPENDIX B

COMPONENTS OF FRASER INSTITUTE

INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM

I. Money and Inflation
(Protection of money as a store of value and medium of exchange)

   A.   Average annual growth rate of the money supply during the last five years minus the potential growth rate of real GDP
   B.   Standard deviation of the annual inflation rate during the last five years
   C.   Freedom of citizens to own a foreign currency bank account domestically
   D.   Freedom of citizens to maintain a bank account abroad

II. Government Operations and Regulations (Freedom to decide what is produced and consumed)

   A.   Government general consumption expenditures as a percent of GDP
   B.   The role and presence of government-operated enterprises
   C.   Price controls - the extent that businesses are free to set their own prices
   D.   Freedom of private businesses and cooperatives to compete in markets
   E.   Equality of citizens under the law and access of citizens to a nondiscriminatory judiciary (This variable is included only in the 1995 index)
   F.   Freedom from government regulations and policies that cause negative real interest rates

III. Takings and Discriminatory Taxation (Freedom to keep what you earn)

   A.   Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP
   B.   Top marginal tax rate (and income threshold at which it applies)
   C.   The use of conscripts to obtain military personnel

IV. Restraints on International Exchange (Freedom of exchange with foreigners)

   A.   Taxes on international trade as a percent of exports plus imports
   B.   Differences between the official exchange rate and the black market rate
   C.   Actual size of trade sector compared to the expected size
   D.   Restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage in capital transactions with foreigners

Source: Gwartney, et al., *Economic Freedom of the World: 1975-1995*. Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 16.

APPENDIX C

DEMOCRACY INDICATORS IN POLITY III

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================================================================
Authority Coding                              Democracy Score
================================================================

Competitiveness of Political Participation

      (a) Competitive                             3

      (b) Transitional                            2

      (c) Factional                               1

      (d) Restricted                              0

      (e) Suppressed                              0

Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment

      (a) Election                                2

      (b) Transitional                            1

      (c) Selection                               0

Openness of Executive Recruitment

      (a) Election                                1

      (b) Dual: Hereditary/Election               1

      (c) Dual: Hereditary/Designation            0

      (d) Closed 0

Constraints on Chief Executive

      (a) Executive Parity or  Subordination      4

      (b) Intermediate Category 1                 3

      (c) Substantial Limitations                 2

      (d) Intermediate Category 2                 1

      (e) Slight to Moderate Limitations          0

      (f) Intermediate Category 3                 0

      (g) Unlimited Power of Executive            0

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APPENDIX D

DATA COLLECTION AND SOURCES

Variable	Indicator	Sources
Subsistence Rights	Physical Quality of Life Index - Infant mortality rates - Life expectancy at age one - Literacy rate	Original Index - Morris (1979) Raw data for intervening years - *World Bank World Tables* *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook*
Security Rights	5 Point Political Terror Scale	Gibney and Dalton (1996) Poe and Tate (1994)
Global Integration	New Globalization Index - Mem. in IMF, World Bank , GATT - Trade openness (exports+imports/GNP) - Financial Openness	*Political Handbook of the World* *World Bank World Tables* IMF *Exchange Rate Arrangements &* *Financial Restrictions: Annual Report*
Cold War	Dummy Variable ("1" for years prior to 1990, "0" for 1990 and beyond)	N/A
Economic Freedom	17 Point Economic Freedom Index	Gwartney, et al. (1996), Fraser Inst.
Inequality	GINI Index	*Deininger & Squire (1996)*
Democracy	Polity III - 11 point scale	Jaggers and Gurr (1995) Polity III Dataset (U of Maryland)
Control Variable	--------------------------------------	---
Economic Develop.	GNP/Per Capita	*World Bank World Tables* *Penn World Tables*
Economic Growth	% growth in GNP/Per Capita	*World Bank World Tables* *Penn World Tables*
International War	$\geq$1000 total battle deaths $\geq$100 deaths in 1 country $\geq$1000 military personnel involved	Small & Singer (1982) Poe and Tate (1994) Sivard (1991) Brogan (1990)
Civil War	Government directly involved Effective resistance	Small & Singer (1982) Poe and Tate (1994)
Population	Natural log of total national population	*World Bank World Tables*
Population Growth	Ave. % increase in national population	*World Bank World Tables* Poe and Tate (1994)

APPENDIX E

COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS

Afghanistan	Dom. Republic	Libya	Singapore
Albania	Dominica	Lithuania	Slovenia
Algeria	Ecuador	Luxembourg	Solomons
Angola	Egypt	Macedonia	Somalia
Argentina	El Salvador	Madagascar	South Africa
Armenia	Equatorial Guinea	Malawi	Soviet
Australia	Eritrea	Malaysia	Union/Russia
Austria	Estonia	Maldives	Spain
Azerbaijan	Ethiopia	Mali	Sri Lanka
Bahamas	Fiji	Malta	St. Lucia
Bahrain	Finland	Mauritania	St. Vincent
Bangladesh	France	Mauritius	Sudan
Barbados	Gabon	Mexico	Suriname
Belarus	Gambia	Moldova	Swaziland
Belgium	Georgia	Mongolia	Sweden
Belize	Germany	Morocco	Switzerland
Benin	Ghana	Mozambique	Syria
Bhutan	Gibraltar	Myanmar	Taiwan
Bolivia	Greece	(Burma)	Tajikistan
Bosnia-	Grenada	Namibia	Tanzania
Herzegovina	Guatemala	Nepal	Thailand
Botswana	Guinea	Netherlands	Togo
Brazil	Guyana	New Zealand	Trinidad
Brunei	Haiti	Nicaragua	Tunisia
Bulgaria	Honduras	Niger	Turkey
Burundi	Hungary	Nigeria	Turkmenistan
Cambodia	Iceland	Norway	UAE
(Kampuchea)	India	Oman	Uganda
Cameroon	Indonesia	Pakistan	Ukraine
Canada	Iran	Panama	United Kingdom
Cape Verde	Iraq	Papua New G.	United States
Central Afr. Rep.	Ireland	Paraguay	Up. Volta
Chad	Israel	Peru	(B. Faso)
Chile	Italy	Philippines	Uruguay
China	Jamaica	Poland	Uzbekistan
Colombia	Japan	Portugal	Vanuatu
Comoros	Jordan	Qatar	Venezuela
Congo	Kazakstan	Romania	Vietnam
Costa Rica	Kenya	Rwanda	Western Samoa
Cote d'Ivoire	Kuwait	S. Korea	Yemen, North
Croatia	Kyrgyzstan	Sao Tome and	Yugoslavia/Serbia
Cuba	Laos	Princip	Zaire
Cyprus	Latvia	Saudi Arabia	Zambia
Czech Republic	Lebanon	Senegal	Zimbabwe
Denmark	Lesotho	Seychelles	
Dijibouti	Liberia	Sierra Leone	

APPENDIX F

SUBSISTENCE MODELS ESTIMATED WITH SUBSISTENCE RIGHTS $_{t-1}$

AND

SECURITY MODELS ESTIMATED WITHOUT SECURITY RIGHTS $_{t-1}$

Table 5.36 General Subsistence Rights Model

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	3.26***	.66	4.90
Subsistence Rights $_{t-1}$	.97***	.007	135.81
Bretton Woods	-.39	.20	-1.89
Trade Openness	.002	.001	1.53
Financial Openness	-.06	.05	-1.077
Coldwar	.06	.16	.45
Democracy	.01	.02	.45
Economic Development	.00002	.00001	1.60
Economic Growth	.006	.008	.76
International War	-.27	.27	-.97
Civil War	-.15	.24	-.65
Population Growth	.01	.01	.97
Number of Cases	1002	Adjusted R^2	.98
χ^2	107965.91***	F	6506.95***
Probability > χ^2	0.00	Probability > F	0.00

Table 5.37 General Subsistence Rights Model (with Inequality)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	1.71*	1.02	1.67
Subsistence Rights $_{t-1}$	.99***	.01	90.40
Bretton Woods	-.09	.12	-.78
Trade Openness	-.0008	.0007	-1.11
Financial Openness	.03	.03	.87
Coldwar	-.26	.17	-1.48
Inequality	-.006	.01	-.60
Democracy	-.02	.03	-.78
Economic Development	-.000002	.00001	-.19
Economic Growth	-.01*	.006	-1.83
International War	-.78***	.20	-3.74
Civil War	.56*	.33	1.67
Population Growth	.14	.09	1.61
Number of Cases	176	Adjusted R^2	.99
χ^2	50539.47***	F	3524.37***
Probability > χ^2	0.00	Probability > F	0.00

* $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$

Table 5.38 General Subsistence Rights Model (OECD)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	20.39***	3.58	5.69
Subsistence Rights $_{t-1}$	.79***	.03	20.28
Bretton Woods	.24	.18	1.27
Trade Openness	.001	.001	.90
Financial Openness	-.32	.02	-1.53
Coldwar	.02	.10	.21
Democracy	-.24**	.10	-2.39
Economic Development	.00002**	.00001	2.71
Economic Growth	.0004	.004	.11
International War	-.17	.12	-1.36
Civil War	(Dropped)		
Population Growth	.08	.10	.79
Number of Cases	196	Adjusted R^2	.79
χ^2	1202.73 ***	F	78.88***
Probability > χ^2	0.00	Probability > F	0.00

Table 5.39 General Subsistence Rights Model (OECD with Economic Freedom)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	37.90***	7.11	5.32
Subsistence Rights $_{t-1}$	.67***	.07	8.62
Bretton Woods	(dropped)		
Trade Openness	.004	.003	1.31
Financial Openness	.02	.04	.51
Coldwar	(dropped)		
Economic Freedom	-.03	.07	-.44
Democracy	-.84**	.27	-3.03
Economic Development	.00002	.00003	.72
Economic Growth	.03	.02	1.10
International War	-.56	.46	-1.22
Civil War	(dropped)		
Population Growth	.05	.21	.25
Number of Cases	16	Adjusted R^2	.87
χ^2	3674.12***	F	22.54***
Probability > χ^2	0.00	Probability > F	0.00

* $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$

Table 5.40 General Subsistence Rights Model (OECD with Inequality)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	16.05**	5.8	2.76
Subsistence Rights $_{t-1}$	.84***	.058	14.44
Bretton Woods	(dropped)		
Trade Openness	-.00007	.002	-.02
Financial Openness	-.005	.03	-.16
Coldwar	.39	.24	.16
Inequality	-.005	.02	-.02
Democracy	-.23	.36	-.64
Economic Development	.00002	.00001	1.60
Economic Growth	-.005	.006	-.84
International War	-.25	.27	-.93
Civil War	(dropped)		
Population Growth	.01	.11	.17
Number of Cases	95	Adjusted R^2	.73
χ^2	411.31***	F	25.52***
Probability > χ^2	0.00	Probability > F	0.00

Table 5.41 General Subsistence Rights Model (Non-OECD)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	3.45***	.72	4.78
Subsistence Rights $_{t-1}$	.97***	.007	130.48
Bretton Woods	-.39*	.20	-1.93
Trade Openness	.0005	.001	.31
Financial Openness	-.07	.07	-.90
Coldwar	.06	.19	.34
Democracy	.02	.03	.84
Economic Development	.0001**	.00004	2.47
Economic Growth	.006	.009	.66
International War	-.36	.35	-1.04
Civil War	-.14	.23	-.63
Population Growth	.008	.01	.55
Number of Cases	806	Adjusted R^2	.97
χ^2	46702.55***	F	3486.78***
Probability > χ^2	0.00	Probability > F	0.00

* $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$

Table 5.42 General Subsistence Rights Model (Non-OECD with Economic Freedom)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	Z
Constant	(dropped)		
Subsistence Rights $_{t-1}$	.90***	.03	26.175
Bretton Woods	-.20	.67	-.31
Trade Openness	.03*	.01	2.07
Financial Openness	-.94	.66	-1.42
Coldwar	4.08*	2.19	1.86
Economic Freedom	.62	.51	1.22
Democracy	.05	.10	.49
Economic Development	-.00009	.0002	-.40
Economic Growth	.03	.03	.88
International War	-1.01	1.10	-.91
Civil War	1.31	1.74	.75
Population Growth	.13***	.04	3.45
Number of Cases	47	Adjusted R^2	.97
χ^2	67269.93***	F	398.78***
Probability > χ^2	0.00	Probability > F	0.00

Table 5.43 General Subsistence Rights Model (Non-OECD with Inequality)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	1.34	1.38	.97
Subsistence Rights $_{t-1}$	.99***	.01	72.82
Bretton Woods	-.10	.14	-.73
Trade Openness	.0005	.002	.29
Financial Openness	.13	.12	1.07
Coldwar	-.19	.29	-.65
Inequality	-.004	.01	-.36
Democracy	-.02	.03	-.67
Economic Development	-.00008	.00008	-1.03
Economic Growth	-.01*	.01	-1.79
International War	-1.42***	.43	-3.23
Civil War	.70**	.34	2.47
Population Growth	.17	.12	1.34
Number of Cases	90	Adjusted R^2	.99
χ^2	26094.39***	F	1131.51
Probability > χ^2	0.00	Probability > F	0.00

* $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$

Table 5.44 General Security Rights Model

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	.1.97***	.19	10.19
Bretton Woods	.15**	.06	2.50
Trade Openness	.004***	.0009	5.22
Financial Openness	.03*	.01	2.26
Coldwar	.33***	.06	5.25
Democracy	.06***	.009	7.76
Economic Development	.00005***	.000005	9.65
Economic Growth	.0006	.001	.39
International War	-.29**	.10	-2.87
Civil War	-.97***	.12	-8.12
Population Growth	-.007	.005	-1.34
Number of Cases	1088	Adjusted R^2	.51
χ^2	715.02***	F	117.14
Probability > χ^2	0.00	Probability > F	0.00

Table 5.45 General Security Rights Model (with Economic Freedom)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	2.53***	.40	6.21
Bretton Woods	.15	.12	1.24
Trade Openness	.005***	.001	3.33
Financial Openness	.01	.03	.32
Coldwar	.33***	.10	3.20
Economic Freedom	-.12**	.05	-2.42
Democracy	.76***	.01	4.44
Economic Development	.00007***	.00001	6.74
Economic Growth	-.002	.003	-.64
International War	-.39*	.19	-2.06
Civil War	-1.16***	.31	-3.76
Population Growth	-.01	.009	-1.21
Number of Cases	193	Adjusted R^2	.52
χ^2	248.12***	F	20.88
Probability > χ^2	0.00	Probability > F	0.00

* $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$

Table 5.46 General Security Rights Model (with Inequality)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	2.71***	.42	6.35
Bretton Woods	.01	.09	.19
Trade Openness	.004**	.001	2.75
Financial Openness	.05*	.02	2.26
Coldwar	.35**	.11	3.05
Inequality	-.01*	.01	-1.84
Democracy	.10***	.02	4.11
Economic Development	.00005***	.00001	4.93
Economic Growth	-.006*	.003	-1.79
International War	.01	.15	.08
Civil War	-1.46***	.27	-5.25
Population Growth	.05	.07	.79
Number of Cases	198	Adjusted R^2	.64
χ^2	327.80***	F	37.67
Probability > χ^2	0.00	Probability > F	0.00

Table 5.47 General Security Rights Model (OECD)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	-.33	1.14	-.29
Bretton Woods	.26	.19	1.35
Trade Openness	.004	.001	3.21
Financial Openness	-.001	.01	-.10
Coldwar	.01	.08	.19
Democracy	.39	.10	3.88
Economic Development	.000005	.00008	.78
Economic Growth	-.006	.003	-2.27
International War	.03	.13	.25
Civil War	(dropped)		
Population Growth	.17	.06	2.48
Number of Cases	211	Adjusted R^2	.35
χ^2	51.91***	F	13.81***
Probability > χ^2	0.00	Probability > F	0.00

* $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$

Table 5.48 General Security Rights Model (OECD with Economic Freedom)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	(dropped)		
Bretton Woods	-1.58***	.50	-3.13
Trade Openness	.005	.006	.96
Financial Openness	.01	.02	.71
Coldwar	-.19	.25	-.75
Economic Freedom	-.009	.03	-.25
Democracy	.94***	.12	7.58
Economic Development	-.00001	.00001	-.57
Economic Growth	.007	.005	1.51
International War	-.09	.12	-.76
Civil War	(dropped)		
Population Growth	.12	.17	.72
Number of Cases	46	Adjusted R^2	.45
χ^2	465.11***	F	4.84****
Probability $> \chi^2$	0.00	Probability $>$ F	0.00

Table 5.49 General Security Rights Model (OECD with Inequality)

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Panel Corrected Standard Errors	z
Constant	-3.00	1.03	-2.89
Bretton Woods	(dropped)		
Trade Openness	.004	.001	2.57
Financial Openness	-.002	.01	-.12
Coldwar	.006	.13	.04
Inequality	.002	.01	.12
Democracy	.72	.16	4.45
Economic Development	.000009	.00001	.93
Economic Growth	-.003	.003	-.93
International War	-.09	.21	-.43
Civil War	(dropped)		
Population Growth	.26	.07	3.34
Number of Cases	103	Adjusted R^2	.44
χ^2	196.54***	F	9.29***
Probability $> \chi^2$	0.00	Probability $>$ F	0.00

* $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$

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