

ATTRIBUTION TO DEVIANT AND
NONDEVIANT SOCIAL ROLES

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A questionnaire was used to study causal attribution to social roles as influenced by perceived deviance of the role, instructions to identify with the role, and participant gender. The perceived deviance or nondeviance of the roles was determined by a pilot study. The roles were varied randomly through 12 hypothetical events, and identification or nonidentification instructions randomly assigned. The participants were 194 male and female university students. Participants gave the cause of each event and rated the cause on five dimensions: internality, externality, stability, globality, and controllability. Causal attribution to deviant social roles was found to result in a significantly higher across-scales score and to be more internal, less external, and more global than attribution to nondeviant roles. Participant gender showed an interaction with deviance overall and on the dimensions of stability and globality due to significantly higher ratings by women participants than those by men. Identification instructions did not produce a significant effect.

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ATTRIBUTION TO DEVIANT AND NONDEVIANT SOCIAL ROLES

Attribution research studies aspects of the individual's perception of others. The term attribution has historically referred to: (a) attributions that lack causal status; (b) explicit causal attributions; and (c) responsibility attributions (Fletcher & Fincham, 1991). The cause given for another's behavior has been of particular concern for researchers.

In terminology following Heider (1958) and Kelley (1971), internality and externality of causal attribution have been the principal dimensions in research on perceived causation. That is, the cause of another person's behavior may be perceived to be within the observed person (i.e., due to personality) or in the person's situation (due to norms, for example, or physical laws). Similar terms, dispositional versus situational, are also used, following Jones and Nisbett (1971). Other dimensions of perceived causation--stability, globality, and controllability (discussed below)--are also often studied.

Aspects of the Internal Bias

Some tendencies in causal attribution have been well established. For example, the internal attribution bias is a basic error in person perception. It is our tendency to find the causes of others' behavior in the personality,

while discounting the effects of situation. Attributions of mental illness, for instance, usually locate the problem in the person, rather than in the context, or in an interaction of person and context, and so are internal attributions (Seligman, Abramson, Semmel & von Baeyer, 1979). Or, in an organization, managers may prefer to attribute substandard performance to a lack of employee competence or to laziness, which are internal loci, rather than features of the work setting (Hughes, 1996). The preference for internal attributions to others, with discounting of the situation, was first noted by Heider (1958), and termed the fundamental attribution error by Ross, Amabile, and Steinmetz (1977).

Research on internal attributions reveals a powerful and largely unconscious bias with many manifestations. The fundamental attribution error has two sides: Not only do individuals prefer internal explanations for others' behavior, but also discount situational influences (Kelley, 1971). To summarize research conclusions related to this error, it seems that: (a) individuals tend toward internal explanations of their own behavior when some time has elapsed since the event being explained (Antaki, 1988); (b) individuals discount their own influence on others' behavior in a social interaction (Jones, 1989); (c) individuals discount external influences when distracted

from them by interacting with another (Jones, 1989); (d) individuals discount external influences when in a situation that requires much cognitive processing (Jones, 1989); and (e) individuals discount the situation even when told of situational effects. Examples of this last finding are provided by Jones and Harris (1967) and Gilbert and Jones (1986), in studies where participants could not easily discount dispositions even when clearly informed about situational effects. The internal bias does not always prevail, however: Attributions become external in explaining one's own behavior (Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Krueger, Ham & Linford, 1996).

Why are internal attributions usually preferred? Five principal causes, discussed below, are found in the research: (a) the actor-observer effect; (b) the tendency to find causation where attention is drawn; (c) bias inherent in the normal operation of private information processing; (d) custom and tradition; and (e) self-serving biases.

Actor-observer effect. Much pertinent research can be integrated under the rubric of actor-observer effect. The individual's perspective on events is different when explaining others' behavior than when explaining one's own (Jones & Nisbett, 1971). In explaining others, Heider (1958) thought, the individual is salient to observers, but

the goals, relationships, or the reinforcement history of the person are abstract and invisible. External determinants are abstract relations that are effortfully discovered, while salience makes it easy to suppose that the other person makes events happen (cf. Owen, 1993). When explaining one's own behavior, a person sees the situation instead.

Research related to the actor-observer effect shows that attribution biases can be manipulated. For example, Storms (1973) was able to reverse attributions in an experiment utilizing videotape. First, he had Subject A converse with another subject while being videotaped. Then the two subjects judged whether Subject A's behavior was caused by personal characteristics or by the situation. Typically, Subject A thought his/her own behavior was a response to the situation, but the other subject attributed the behavior to Subject A's personal characteristics. Then Subject A was shown the tape and judged his/her behavior again. Usually Subject A changed to favor personal characteristics.

In a related experiment (Nisbett, Caputo, Legant & Maracek, 1973), participants rated persons on traits. They rated themselves, a friend, their father, and the television reporter Walter Cronkite. They could rate the persons on each trait or could check that the cause

depended on the situation. When they rated themselves, they most often thought his/her behavior depended on the situation. But they thought disposition was more important to the behavior of their friend and their father, and they thought Walter Cronkite's behavior was the most external. The experimenters thought this showed the actor-observer effect, and also noted that participants rated behavior most internal for people they knew least.

Nisbett and others (1973) also had students explain why they chose their majors, and why their best friends chose the majors they did. The students gave more external explanations for their own choice of major (such as It pays well, and their parents like it), but they gave internal explanations (e.g., I like it) for their friends.

There is a circumstance, the explanation of personal success and failure, in which the actor-observer effect is not evident. Failure is usually attributed to the situation, but individuals attribute their success to personal qualities (cf. Beckman, 1970; Johnson, Feigenbaum & Weiby, 1964; Wegner & Vallacher, 1977).

Persons find causes where their attention is drawn. An individual attributes relatively more to personality factors when more self-aware than usual. Carver and Scheier (1978), for example, used a mirror to focus participants' attention on themselves and found they could

make participants explain themselves more as would a stranger, by reference to personality.

Using another way to make participants more aware of themselves, Fenigstein and Carver (1978) gave students bogus feedback. The experimental group participants were told their own heartbeats were being fed back to them while they imagined they were in certain situations. The controls were told they were only hearing some noise. Compared to the controls, the students who received bogus feedback thought they were more responsible for outcomes in the imaginary situations. Self-conscious people probably see themselves more as others do, and so they attribute their behavior more to internal factors. Feedback in organizations, such as periodic reviews, might also be expected to contribute to this effect.

The internal bias can be so strong that it works even when people are informed of situational determinants. Reeder (1985) showed that the internal bias is often an error. He told students to write and read aloud essays against a drinking age of 18. Although observing participants heard the instructions, they thought the writers were personally opposed to the low drinking age. Actually, according to Reeder, the writers tended to be neutral.

The two prevailing attribution theories, those of

Kelley (1967) and of Jones and Davis (1965), are both represented in research into the fundamental attribution error. But the Jones and Davis theory of correspondent inferences is especially pertinent for explanation of the internal bias. Jones and Davis (1965) contend that individuals use simple rules of thumb to infer personality from behavior, certain behaviors being deemed likely to be associated with certain dispositions (i.e., correspondent inferences).

For example, a rule of thumb is that persons look for socially undesirable behavior, believing it will be more informative than behavior that follows the norms. Following norms requires attending to the situation, but when the violation of norms occurs, it becomes salient, and leads us to make internal inferences about the actors. (Taylor & Fiske, 1978)

Also, we make more internal attributions when we are led to think someone's behavior has personal consequences for ourselves, as it often does in organizations. It may be important for managers to become more aware of this. According to Jones and Davis (1965), behavior that gives pleasure or pain results in more internal attributions. Further, internal attributions are more likely when the person believes another's behavior is done to affect him or her.

Information processing. Erroneous thinking may be a by-product of cognitive processing to simplify the perceived stimuli (Anderson, 1974). Proponents of this view find it unnecessary to impute pathology or to blame emotion for misperceptions. They argue that persons distort in cognition even without an underlying neural defect or a motivation to do so. The core problem seems to be egocentricity; that is, the limitation that everything is viewed from the standpoint of personal needs.

A Tradition of Internal Attribution? Are internal explanations more customary than the external? Children may learn to explain by personal characteristics because they hear adults do so (Feldman, 1990). Tradition in Western culture is thus probably a factor in acquisition of internal attribution bias (Ross, 1981). Certain internal explanations are more socially desirable than are external attributions, as reflected in the norm that one should not claim to be a victim of circumstance (Jellison & Green, 1981).

The internal bias has perhaps also distorted academic psychology. Wegner and Vallacher (1977) think that the history of personality theory is the history of observer-like internal attributions. If this is so, the reduction of behavior to environmental stimuli, as in behavior analysis (e.g., Johnston & Pennypacker, 1980), provides a

balancing trend.

Self-serving biases. Serving functions other than development of a factual account, attributions may enhance the person's sense of control, maintain self-esteem, express emotion, and present the self a certain way (Harvey, Turnquist, & Agostinelli, 1988). Miller (1978) emphasizes that self-serving attributions may both improve our self-esteem and our self-presentation to others.

The most researched of the possible causes is the actor-observer effect (cf. Krueger, Ham, & Linford, 1996; Robins, Spranca, & Mendelsohn, 1996). With the exception of the explanation of success and failure (as noted above), the other supposed causes appear to be the actor-observer effect seen in different aspects. If persons find causes where their attention is drawn, this change in perspective happens in the actor-observer effect. Although not usually so interpreted, the actor-observer effect can be understood as information processing. As for custom and tradition, children may learn to attribute in ways consistent with the actor-observer effect. With regard to the self-serving biases, the actor-observer effect may be a pattern of their use.

Attribution may, of course, be studied in various ways (cf. Joiner & Wagner, 1996). Kinderman and Bentall (1996) offered the participant a choice of three responses for

locating causation--in oneself, in others, or in the situation. Wylie (1990) drew attributions from videotaped sessions of mothers interacting with infants. She defined attribution as a mother's statement about the child in the child's presence. Taylor and Koivumaki (1976) had six behaviors rated on a single dispositional-situational (i.e., internal-external) scale.

Most attribution research has tended toward use of four scales (i.e., internality-externality, stability, globality, and controllability) because they seem to offer coverage of most attribution issues (Weiner, 1986). Joiner & Wagner (1996) provide a meta-analysis of the use of these dimensions and others in studies of parental attributions about children. The internality-externality dimension is sometimes termed locus of causality, or just locus (Fletcher & Fincham, 1991). Associates of C. Peterson and M. E. P. Seligman tend to use internality-externality, stability, and globality scales, neglecting controllability (e.g., Seligman et al., 1979); but associates of Weiner prefer internality-externality, stability, and controllability (e.g., Graham, Weiner & Zucker, 1997), neglecting globality (e.g., Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky & Seligman, 1982). The different emphasis reflects Weiner's particular concern with issues of responsibility and blame (e.g., Graham et al., 1997).

All dimensions mentioned are used together by Anderson and Arnoult (1985), who found perceived controllability to be important, and by Butler, Brewin and Forsythe (1986) and Munton and Antaki (1988).

Students of learned helplessness have argued that the three dimensions of internality-externality, stability, and globality include controllability differences (Anderson & Arnoult, 1985). However, Anderson & Arnoult (1985) contend that expectancies of success largely depend on whether the perceived cause is also perceived to be controllable by the person. Controllability should not be assumed to be implicit. Also, as controllability itself needs to be supplemented (cf. Anderson & Arnoult, 1985), all four dimensions should be used.

Attribution research, as outlined above, has established some general principles. However, research has not fully distinguished the various possible social roles of the target character (Weary, Stanley & Harvey, 1989). Further research should investigate attribution to persons that differ on various dimensions. A dimension linking many participant variables is perceived deviance. Also to be discussed below, attribution to deviant persons may be expected to interact with participant gender.

Attribution and Deviance

An area lacking sufficient investigation is

attribution to persons considered socially deviant (e.g., substance abusers, criminals, the mentally ill). Deviance is a basic dimension in social perception, a fact attested by numerous publications on bias in person perception, stereotyping, norm violation, defensive attribution, etc. Attribution may be expected to differ for deviant persons, compared to nondeviants, especially with regard to increased internal bias (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Wilder, Simon, and Faith, 1996). The perception of deviant persons is crucial to how they are treated socially (e.g., prejudice and discrimination).

Persons may be perceived differently because they are interpreted according to a variety of a priori models for them. According to Trope (1998), perceivers may hold to the fundamental attribution error, believing that their own behavior is externally caused, but another's behavior is internally caused. A person might believe that in-group behavior, more than out-group, should be interpreted as due to personality. Or a person may believe that, for different persons, similar behaviors of the persons are nevertheless due to different situational causes. For example, a perceiver who stereotypically believes that American blacks are motivated for sports, and that Asian Americans are motivated for schoolwork, may use athletics in assessing achievement for blacks, and academics for

Asian Americans. Thus, if the situation is not believed to be stereotypically appropriate to the target person, situational factors may be discounted. (Trope, 1998)

Attribution researchers have sought to understand attribution to the mentally ill, as well as attributional processes causing illness, such as negative self-attribution (Valins & Nisbett, 1972). The etiology of depression is an example. Depression is more generalized among persons whose attribution for negative events is global--believing for example that they completely lack a desirable trait--than in persons who find a more specific cause (Bunce & Peterson, 1997).

In a study by Kunda and Oleson (1995), attribution was more external for certain deviants. This may be a way to facilitate maintenance of a stereotype. That is, deviant others who have a trait that is inconsistent with the stereotype are considered to be influenced by the situation, and therefore their behavior is not typical of them. This maneuver allows preservation of the stereotype. (Kunda & Oleson, 1995) However, internal attribution would more often be expected (Taylor & Fiske, 1978; Wilder, et al., 1996). It is yet to be determined what factors are controlling internal or external attributions for deviant targets.

Therefore, there is reason to believe that attribution

to deviant persons will differ from that to nondeviant targets on the internality-externality dimension and on globality. Attribution is likely to differ on the stability dimension as well: Deviant persons have sometimes been rated as more stable (Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993).

Attribution and Gender

Gender differences in many abilities are usually expected by lay people, and so they were expected in attribution research as well. Attributions have been found to vary with the gender of the attributer, and also with the gender of the target persons (Dobbins, 1985; Nolen-Hoeksema & Girgus, 1995). Inuit participants, for example, were presented with brief vignettes followed by rating scales. Attitudes toward deviance, in this case mental illness, were affected by the respondents' gender, among other factors. (Kirmayer, Fletcher & Boothroyd, 1997)

However, further characterization has been difficult. Research on gender differences in attribution has been substantial, but without conclusions of much generality. Literature reviews (e.g., Deaux, 1984; Hansen & O'Leary, 1985) are evaluated by Swim & Sanna (1996), who found more than 50 studies on gender-stereotyped attribution for others' successes and failures. They conclude that target gender affects attribution, but note that the effect sizes

are small. They believe that in previous work: (a) often the significant results may be due to measurement artifact, (b) the effects have little practical consequence, and (c) this research does not demonstrate gender stereotyping that reduces women's work performance. (Swim & Sanna, 1996)

The argument in favor of more such research is that the small percentage of people affected by this is nevertheless a large absolute number, and the lifetime effects may be cumulative. Also, other research methods have verified that different explanations are given for men's and women's behaviors. Although the effect is small, nonetheless it is real. (Swim & Sanna, 1996)

Two interpretations dominate the empirical research.

First, Deaux (1984) argued that attributions reflect whether the performance in question is consistent with expectations for the gender. Women targets receive attributions to unstable causes (e.g., work, luck) because people expect success to be less likely for women. Men receive attributions to stable causes (e.g., ability, task difficulty) because success is expected to be more likely for men. Women's failures are consistent with expectation, and so are attributed to stable causes, but men's failures are attributed to unstable causes. (Deaux, 1984)

In contrast, Hansen & O'Leary (1985) contended that

women's successes are more likely to be discounted than men's. The discounting of the possibility that the performance is due to ability results in attributions to other causes, such as effort, task difficulty, or luck. Again, expectation is a factor responsible for this. The common expectations are that women try harder, but work on easier tasks, that they have good luck, or that they have lower performance and ability levels than men. For women, successes and failures are considered unimportant to others' assessments of the women's abilities. (Hansen & O'Leary, 1985)

It is often observed that men and women share certain stereotypes of male and female roles. But it is also found that female targets in harassment vignettes evoke differential attributions from male and female participants depending on the type of sexual harassment. This shows that the role of the target is crucial to some attributions, as well as the vignette. Perception of women, in particular, reflects categorization according to gender role rather than occupational role. Attributes of the female gender role (e.g., mother, sex object) conflict with the worker role, as the male gender role does not. Gender harassment often occurs when the target woman is

perceived by male co-workers as a role-deviate, such as being a woman who is too masculine. (Burgess & Borgida, 1997)

Even when performances do not differ from those of men, evaluations of females' performances are more negative than those for males' performances. And attribution bias is greater for some tasks than others. Traditionally masculine tasks are valued more highly than traditionally feminine tasks, and the negative attributional biases are stronger for tasks of high value. (Nolen-Hoeksema & Girgus, 1995)

Summary of Literature Review

In explaining others, internal explanations seem to be preferred any time conditions are not ideal for an external attribution. A number of general statements can be made on the basis of the research cited above.

1. Persons make internal attributions about others, but external attributions about themselves.
2. Causes are found where the perceiver's attention is drawn.
3. There is evidence such as the internal bias is a feature of the way persons process information.
4. The internal bias is employed to actively maintain

stable person perception.

5. The internal bias is often an error.

6. Self-consciousness makes persons attribute more like strangers observing them--that is, internally.

7. Perceivers attribute to traits and attitudes--that is, internally--even when aware that situational determinants are operating.

8. The passage of time causes an internal shift in attribution.

9. If perceivers believe another's behavior personally affects them, they are likely to make internal attributions concerning the other.

10. Perceivers often make internal inferences to those with deviant behavior and those who are otherwise salient.

11. Different explanations of this bias may be the actor-observer effect seen in different aspects.

12. Attribution seems to be motivated like a self-serving bias.

13. Our culture promotes internal attributions, especially in the service of moral training.

14. A gender interaction is likely to occur in attribution because males and females attribute

differentially. Responding may vary with participant gender as well as with the gender of the targets of attribution.

This bias's problematic aspects seem to center on our insufficient awareness of what causes behavior--not only others' behavior, but our own. Persons are very susceptible to situational pressures and at the same time not fully aware of their influence on behavior. Even when persons become aware of such distortions, inaccurate explanations are invented.

Overview

This paper discusses an experiment utilizing questionnaires to investigate attribution to individuals in social roles perceived to be deviant. Consistent with the internal bias, attributions may be more internal, stable, global and controllable when the attribution target is socially deviant. This seems likely because attribution ratings tend to follow patterns of internal-stable-global-controllable versus external-unstable-specific-uncontrollable, where the first pattern is associated with blaming, and the second with lack of blame (Weary et al., 1989).

In this study, participants each completed a questionnaire, with hypothetical events and scales derived from the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson et al., 1982), but supplemented by the addition of the controllability dimension advocated by Weiner (Graham et al., 1997; Weiner, 1986). Thus, the effect was studied on five attribution dimensions: Internality, externality, stability, globality, and controllability. These are repeatedly identified as the prime variables for attribution research at this time (Anderson & Arnoult, 1985; Peterson & Villanova, 1988; Seligman et al., 1979). Weiner (1986) provides an important discussion of the variables, excepting globality. Previous research has resulted in the recommendation to treat internality and externality as separate dimensions rather than as one (as discussed below) (Robins et al., 1996; Solomon, 1978; Weary et al., 1989).

The target character in each event was varied so as to represent a deviant or nondeviant social role. For the first experimental condition, deviance, the target character represented a role socially perceived to be deviant (e.g., alcoholic, illicit drug abuser, child abuser) in half the questionnaires distributed, and the target was nondeviant (e.g., accountant, salesperson, medical doctor) in the other half. A pilot study

(described below) established empirically what roles are perceived as socially deviant.

Because of the importance of gender in attribution, and in particular the previous work that showed an interaction of attribution ratings with participant gender (Rohlman & Clark, 1997), gender is studied in this research as well. Each participant's gender was self-recorded on the questionnaire.

Also studied is the effect of instructions to identify. Previous work (Rohlman & Clark, 1997) suggests the value of further attribution research on identification. Despite the internal bias, if the participants are instructed to identify with the target, attributions may be shifted toward the external relative to attributions without induced identification (Rohlman & Clark, 1997). To study the effect of identification, half the distributed questionnaires contained instructions to identify with the target character in the events, and half contained instructions not requesting identification (see Appendix B).

Thus, opposing tendencies are juxtaposed: Deviance promotes an internal shift, but identification promotes an external shift. Instructions to identify may cause an external shift, but if the target is perceived as socially deviant (e.g., alcoholic or homeless) by participants,

attribution to the target will probably be even more internal than for a nondeviant main character (Krueger & Clement, 1994). If identification is induced for a deviant target, the external shift may be either more or less than for a nondeviant target.

Hypothesis 1: There will be a significant overall effect ($p < .05$) of deviance across all the attribution scales in this study. More specifically, in the deviant social roles condition, regardless of instructions condition or participant gender, attribution ratings will be significantly (a) more internal, (b) less external, (c) more stable, (d) more global, and (e) more controllable when compared to the attribution ratings for nondeviant targets. Means across scale scores for deviance and nondeviance conditions will be compared for statistical significance. Mean scores of individual scales also will be compared, as the extent of the shift will likely differ from scale to scale.

Hypothesis 2: A significant effect ($p < .05$) of participant gender on attribution ratings will occur.

Hypothesis 3: In the nonidentification condition, attribution ratings to the target will be significantly ($p < .05$) (a) more internal, (b) less external, (c) more stable, (d) more global, and (e) more controllable than in the instructions condition.

Pilot Study

Method

Participants. The participants were 121 students at the University of North Texas, 22% male and 78% female, responding to a posted bulletin announcing the research. They received extra credit upon completion of the questionnaire.

Design and procedure. A questionnaire was developed to determine empirically what social roles are perceived as deviant, information needed for the main study. The Social Roles Questionnaire (see Appendix A) listed 126 social roles (e.g., alcoholic, accountant, prostitute, firefighter). The hypothetically deviant role labels were drawn from psychology and sociology journals, and randomly listed among a variety of nondeviant roles. The research was announced by posted bulletin. Participants were instructed to indicate by a check-mark whether each role was socially perceived to be deviant or nondeviant. Also, participants indicated whether the role was perceived to be appropriate for men, appropriate for women, or appropriate for both genders.

The 121 questionnaires returned were tallied. The criterion for role selection was 80% agreement among participants that a role was either deviant or nondeviant. A further requirement was that the retained role be

socially perceived as appropriate for either gender, not exclusive to one. As a gender effect may occur in attribution, the experimentally presented roles required balancing for gender. That is, if a role were retained, the role had been rated appropriate for males as often as it was rated appropriate for females, or, alternatively, the majority of participants rated it appropriate for both males and females.

Results

The resulting 12 deviant and 12 nondeviant roles needed for the main study questionnaire are listed in Table 1.

Discussion

Most of the roles sorted as deviant and nondeviant follow common sense expectations. However, two of the nondeviant roles, disabled person and divorced person, might be in question as to their perceived nondeviance had they not been empirically classified. The participants were not limited to considering deviance to be negative, but they seem to have assumed this.

Table 1

Deviant and Nondeviant Social Roles

Deviant

1. illicit drug abuser
2. child abuser
3. alcoholic
4. nude model for a sex magazine
5. embezzler
6. neurotic person
7. psychotic person
8. murderer
9. prostitute
10. drunk driver
11. nonpatriotic person
12. juvenile delinquent

Nondeviant

1. accountant
2. salesperson
3. school administrator
4. waiter/waitress
5. scientist
6. pharmacist
7. disabled person

8. medical doctor
 9. newspaper journalist
 10. portrait painter
 11. divorced person
 12. bank teller
-

Main Experiment

Participants

Questionnaires were completed by 194 participants, 23% male and 77% female, at the University of North Texas. All were students, 93% undergraduates and 7% graduate students. Mean age was 22.8 years ($SD = 5.0$). Participants were acquired by posted bulletin. In three group administration sessions, it was observed that all participants could complete the questionnaire within an hour. (See Appendix C for a sample Eagle Attribution Questionnaire, representing one random combination of instructions condition, hypothetical events, and deviant and nondeviant roles.) No problems regarding the questionnaire arose in these sessions. Questionnaires for all conditions were made available in equal numbers for students to pick up. Participants received extra credit and were paid \$2.00

each.

Experimental Design and Procedure

The design is within-subjects for the deviance factor, to improve comparability of the deviant and nondeviant targets by reducing error associated with differences in subject variables, but between-subjects for instructions condition and participant gender. That is, the design is 2 X 2 X 2 (Instructions X Deviance X Participant Gender) with repeated measures on the second factor.

Eagle Attribution Questionnaire. The 12 hypothetical events (see Table 2) were drawn from the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson et al., 1982). External validity was promoted by sampling a variety of naturalistic situations. Further, the variation among hypothetical events provides an important source of control. Although there might be atypical responding to any one hypothetical event, the error should distribute across events (Schulman, Castellon & Seligman, 1989).

The suitability of the ASQ as a source was determined by consideration of research on its validity and reliability, which suggested it could serve as an appropriate basis for the instructions and for the internality, stability and globality scales used in this

Table 2

Hypothetical Events

1. You meet a friend who compliments you on your appearance.
 2. You have been looking for a job unsuccessfully for some time.
 3. You become very rich.
 4. A friend comes to you with a problem and you don't try to help.
 5. You give an important talk in front of a group and the audience reacts negatively.
 6. You do a project that is highly praised.
 7. You meet a friend who acts hostilely to you.
 8. You can't get all the work done that others expect of you.
 9. Your spouse (boyfriend/girlfriend) has been treating you more lovingly.
 10. You apply for a position that you want very badly (e.g., important job, graduate school admission) and you get it.
 11. You go out on a date and it goes badly.
 12. You get a raise.
-

study (Kinderman & Bentall, 1996; Peterson, 1991; Schulman, Castellon & Seligman, 1989; Whitley, 1991a, 1991b).

The ASQ has stimulated much research on attributional style (also called by the more specific term explanatory

style). The pioneer researchers offer this definition: "It is one's tendency to offer similar sorts of explanations for different events" (Peterson, Buchanan & Seligman, 1995, p. 1). Another definition is offered by Metalsky and Abramson (1981): Attributional style is "a tendency to make particular kinds of causal inferences, rather than others, across different situations and across time" (p. 38). To find a style requires considering what is consistent in different explanations. The dimensions of internality-externality, stability and globality are often studied for this determination, but the study of other dimensions is invited by authorities in this field (Peterson, et al., 1995).

Several combinations of scales for the measurement of explanatory style are reviewed by Joiner and Wagner (1996). Explanatory style has been found to be consistent across events and stable over time, although the correlations are moderate. "Explanatory style is as coherent an individual difference as most personality constructs" (Peterson, et al., 1995, p. 17). Because the construct of explanatory style is defined broadly, as above, and not so specifically as to limit its use to the ASQ, the overall measures across scales for the conditions in this study may be interpreted

as contrasting explanatory styles.

Explanatory style as a personality trait appears to be multiply determined, with possible origins in modeling, performance feedback, personal successes and failures, interpersonal trust, broad social factors, and a genetic component, and detectable by the age of 9 years (Buchanan & Seligman, 1995).

The ASQ presents the 12 hypothetical events with instructions to imagine them vividly, and to write the major cause of each event. The events are simple but ambiguous, requiring the participant to project his or her interpretation. (Reivich, 1995) It then presents three 7-point scales for internality-externality, stability, and globality. The score for each dimension is made by averaging ratings across events. Scores are summed across the three ASQ dimensions to yield a composite score for good events and another for bad events (further discussed below). The overall explanatory style score is the remainder obtained when the composite score for bad events is subtracted from that for good events. (Hjelle, Belongia & Nesser, 1996; Peterson, Buchanan, & Seligman, 1995) In this study, in analogy to the ASQ, overall means for each condition is obtained by averaging across the five scales.

The EAQ difference between the means of conditions is an analogous measure of attributional style, though not the same measure as that of the ASQ. The EAQ utilizes two of the ASQ scales without change. The EAQ separates the internality-externality scale into an internality and an externality scale, and adds a controllability scale. Another difference is that one instructions condition of the EAQ does not request identification by the participants, as does the ASQ, although the EAQ does ask the participant to identify with another's role (deviant or nondeviant) in the other instructions condition. In the identification instructions condition, following the ASQ, the wording of the hypothetical event is in the second person (e.g., "You, an ILLICIT DRUG ABUSER, meet a friend. . . ."), as this is consistent with the induction of identification, but with the social role label inserted. The wording is changed to the third person (e.g., "An ILLICIT DRUG ABUSER meets a friend. . . .") for the nonidentification condition. The social role label is capitalized so that it would not be missed by participants in skimming.

Each hypothetical event, as presented in the Eagle Attribution Questionnaire, represents a combination of (a) identification or nonidentification instructions (see Appendix B for both versions); and (b) a deviant or

nondeviant social role (see Table 2). Each participant received a booklet with either identification or nonidentification instructions. Hypothetical events for the deviant condition present a brief account involving a role perceived as socially deviant, as determined by the pilot study. Each booklet contained, in random order, the 12 hypothetical events with deviant roles and the same 12 events with nondeviant roles.

As the roles should not be confounded by occurring nonrandomly with the same hypothetical event, they were randomized among the events during preparation of the questionnaires. Both events and roles were randomized in presentation sequence in the questionnaire to control for practice and fatigue effects. Randomization was achieved by, first, making numerous photocopies of each possible combination of role and event for the 24 roles and 12 events. For each booklet, taking the top sheet of each set, 12 events were drawn from the large photocopied and shuffled sets containing deviant roles, and another 12 from the nondeviant sets. Each role was therefore equally likely to appear in any one event; no hypothetical event was disproportionately associated with a particular role. For example, if event one had the role alcoholic in the first questionnaire prepared, in the second questionnaire alcoholic might be in event seven instead and another role

in event one.

Thus, each participant received a set of 24 randomly assigned hypothetical events, from either the identification or the nonidentification condition (randomly assigned), 12 from the deviant and 12 from the nondeviant sets, presented in random order. Identification and participant gender conditions were randomized for participants by allowing each to draw his or her questionnaire from a shuffled set of questionnaires representing both conditions equally. For the identification condition, the hypothetical events were preceded by instructions, adapted from the ASQ, requesting the participants to imagine that the event were happening to them (see Appendix B). The events were worded in the second person, so as to invite imagination that the event happened to the participant (identification with the social role). In the nonidentification condition, the instructions requested rating, but without the identification request, and the events are worded in the third person (e.g., "He/she is an alcoholic"). The standard instructions for the ASQ, which request identification, were minimally adapted (see Appendix B) to omit the instructions to identify, but still to otherwise parallel the EAQ identification instructions.

Instructions to the participants state that he/she is

to carefully read each hypothetical event and answer a sequence of questions. The first question asks the participant to write the cause of the event, a feature of the ASQ that probably improves careful consideration of the event and results in an explicit attribution. The five questions (for internality, externality, stability, globality, and controllability; see Appendix C) each provide a 1-7 rating scale for the response.

The dependent variable data for each subject consisted of the set of ratings on the five scaled questions for each of the 24 events presented, the code for the pertinent instructions condition (identification or nonidentification), and the participant's gender. Age and student status (undergraduate, graduate, not a student) were also recorded so as to characterize the sample.

Selection of events. The hypothetical events are a series of "good" and "bad" events (six each), such as inability to get a job, or a pleasant surprise, drawn as noted from the ASQ. Bad events proved to be better predictors than good events, especially in the case of depressive deficits (Schulman et al., 1989). Explanations for at least four or five bad events are required in the assessment of explanatory style. Of course, multiple events are needed for assessment of a cross-situational style. Good events as well as bad are needed for external

validity. The hypothetical events of the ASQ are not employed as a psychometric instrument in this study, but serve as an externally valid, balanced foundation for its research questionnaire. The variation among hypothetical events provides an important source of control: To the extent that there are nonrepresentative features in any combination of social role and hypothetical event, such error should distribute across events. Hence, one such event would not suffice.

Dimensions. On the seven-point scales, a rating of one indicates the least internal, least external, least stable, least global and least controllable explanations. A rating of seven means the most internal, external, stable, global, and controllable explanations. When a rating cannot be assigned because of a lack of information, a four should be assigned. Even though the stability and globality dimensions are significantly intercorrelated and probably often overlap in reality, it is important to rate each of these two dimensions independently of the other. (Cf. Schulman et al., 1989)

Internality and externality scales. Internality is not a coherent dimension in either the original ASQ (cf. Peterson et al., 1982) or the Expanded Attributional Style Questionnaire (Peterson & Villanova, 1988). The locus of control dimension is multidimensional, and it may be that

internality is multidimensional, too (Peterson & Villanova, 1988). Solomon (1978) argued against a single internal-external scale. Behind such a scale is the assumption of an inverse relationship between the internal and external attribution dimensions. If the cause is rated high in internality, an inverse relationship would require that it be low in externality. Solomon compared bipolar ratings, combined ratings, and ratings made on independent scales. Bipolar ratings are made on one scale, such as the internality-externality scale. Combined ratings are initially made on two scales, but to represent them the external rating is subtracted from the internal. Independent scales are two scales which are not combined, such as separate internality and externality scales. Solomon (1978) concluded that internal and external attributions are not inversely related because the ratings appear to involve other dimensions. "Consequently, only studies that report internal and external attributions separately allow us to draw unambiguous conclusions" (Weary et al., 1989, p. 29).

Some examples of appropriate ratings on the internality scale follow. A seven rating would apply to a cause found in the target character's personality, such as abilities, motivation, knowledge, decisions, or behavior, or his or her illness, physical characteristics,

disability, age or demographic classifications (such as conservative, married). A rating of seven on the externality scale would be appropriate for explaining an event as due to the behavior of a person other than the target character, or by task difficulty, time available, the weather, a natural disaster, or other circumstances. Lower ratings on either scale indicate an interaction between the target character and situation. This description is an adaptation of the discussion of the internality-externality scale by Schulman et al. (1989).

Stability scale. Stability refers to how well the cause of the hypothetical event persists through time. That is, is the cause chronic (i.e., stable) or temporary (unstable)? The stability of the cause of the event, not the event itself, is assessed. In judging permanence or transience, one may ask hypothetically if the cause can be changed. Although a specific event might never happen again, its causes may. (Cf. Schulman et al., 1989)

Globality scale. Does a cause affect an individual's whole life (i.e., global) or just a few areas (specific)? Globality is rated at a point in time. Lack of information may result in difficulty in rating this dimension. That is, it may not be evident how general are the effects of the cause, and what are the pertinent domains of the target's life. For example, poor verbal ability would be

more consequential for a journalist than for a mechanic. A physical injury would be more significant to an athlete than an office worker. (Cf. Schulman et al., 1989)

Controllability scale. The locus of control scale is also held to be multidimensional (Peterson & Villanova, 1988). The study of response to uncontrollable events was associated with the origin of the study of explanatory style (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978).

In rating the scales, participants may ponder a wide variety of considerations. An attribution regarding aptitude of the target, for example, is uncontrollable although stable, as is objective task difficulty. But luck and mood are unstable and uncontrollable. Help from a friend is uncontrollable from the target's perspective, as the friend may not offer help again. Effort is controllable, but stable in some cases and unstable in others. (Fiske & Taylor, 1991)

Results

Repeated measures analysis of variance was used to compare the means of each of the five rated dimensions for the deviance condition, as well as the condition means overall, with inclusion of the between-subjects variables of identification and participant gender (see Table 3). Univariate post hoc tests were performed on the stability and controllability scales, where interaction effects were

evident. Table 4 provides the means and standard deviations for the scales.

An overall effect was found (between the deviance and nondeviance condition means, averaging across all five scales ($F[1,94] = 4.03, p = .048$). As predicted, deviant social roles produced significantly more internal, less external, and more global attributions than did nondeviant targets. However, deviant and nondeviant social roles did not produce significantly different attributions on the stability or controllability dimensions. Table 3 gives the F values of these tests and Table 4 gives the corresponding means and standard deviations.

An interaction occurred between deviance and participant gender ($F[1,94] = 6.35, p = .013$), again confirming hypothesis, with effects seen on two scales discussed below.

Analysis of the individual item scales shows the following differences. On the internality scale (represented by item B on the EAQ; see Appendix C), perceived deviance resulted in a statistically significant difference ($F[1,95] = 7.77, p = .006$). Attribution to the causes of deviant social roles is more internal ($M = 65.66$) than ratings for nondeviant social roles ($M = 61.75$). This outcome is consistent with prediction.

Table 3

Tests of Effects for Deviance, Participant Gender,
and Identification

Source	<u>df</u>	Mean Square	<u>F</u>	Sig.
Deviance (Total)	1	892.42	4.03	.048
On Internality (B)	1	213.86	7.77	.006
On Externality (C)	1	210.56	5.93	.017
On Stability (D)	1	5.42	.27	.605
On Globality (E)	1	471.31	12.93	.001
On Control. (F)	1	29.01	.80	.373
Gender	1	248.78	.20	.655
Dev (Tot) X Gen	1	1406.62	6.35	.013
Gen X Dev (Stab)	1	132.08	6.57	.012
Gen X Dev (Cont)	1	150.47	4.15	.044
Identification	1	16.57	.01	.908
Ident X Gen	1	686.24	.55	.458
Ident X Dev	1	327.61	1.48	.227
Dv X Gn X Id	1	259.61	1.17	.282
Error (Dev)	94	221.39		

On the externality scale (item C), again the predicted significant difference ($F[1,98] = 5.93, p = .017$) was found. Externality exhibits a lower mean ($M = 49.97$) in the deviant condition, moving opposite to the other scales, than in the nondeviant condition ($M = 52.66$). Attribution to the causes of deviant social roles is less external than ratings for nondeviant social roles.

On the stability scale (item D), the principal hypothesized comparison on deviance was not significant, but an interaction with participant gender occurred ($F[1,97] = 6.57, p = .012$), consistent with the hypothesis that gender interacts with attribution. Univariate examination of simple effects (see Tables 5 and 6) shows that males did not change their stability ratings as a function of deviance condition, but females significantly differed between deviant and nondeviant social roles ($F[1,76] = 6.12, p = .016$), rating deviant targets higher on stability ($M = 63.43$) than nondeviant targets ($M = 61.61$). Mean ratings of females and males did not significantly differ on stability for either the deviant targets ($F[1,97] = 0.23, p = .635$) or nondeviant targets ($F[1,97] = 3.38, p = .069$).

On the globality scale (item E), the principal hypothesized comparison was significant ($F[1,98] = 12.93, p$

Table 4

Means and Standard Deviations for Scales

Scale	Mean	<u>SD</u>
<u>Deviant</u>		
Total	301.01	28.61
Internality	65.66	8.56
Externality	49.97	11.51
Stability	63.20	7.58
Globality	62.27	10.64
Controllability	59.53	9.46
<u>Nondeviant</u>		
Total	292.36	25.83
Internality	61.75	7.96
Externality	52.66	9.97
Stability	62.95	6.92
Globality	58.16	9.74
Controllability	56.36	9.67

< .001), due to perceived deviance. Deviant social roles are attributed higher globality ($\bar{M} = 62.27$) than are

nondeviant roles ($M = 58.16$).

Table 5
Tests of Interaction Effects

Source	<u>df</u>	Mean Square	<u>F</u>	Sig.
Gen X Dev for Stability				
Males	1	15.36	.90	.354
Females	1	131.24	6.12	.016
Gen X Dev for Controllability				
Males	1	10.23	.25	.623
Females	1	1402.09	17.10	.000

On controllability (item F), the hypothesized main effect of deviance was nonsignificant. An interaction of deviance with participant gender occurred on controllability ($F[1,99] = 4.15, p = .044$). Univariate examination of simple effects (see Tables 5 and 6) shows that males did not change their controllability ratings

between deviance conditions, but females significantly differed between deviant and nondeviant social roles ($F[1,80] = 17.10, p < .001$), rating deviant targets higher on controllability ($M = 59.31$) than nondeviant targets ($M = 55.15$). Mean ratings of females and males on

Table 6
Means for Stability and
Controllability Interactions

Scale	Means	
	Dev	Nondev
<u>Males</u>		
Stability	63.05	64.23
Controllability	58.59	59.28
<u>Females</u>		
Stability	63.43	61.61
Controllability	59.31	55.15

controllability did not significantly differ for deviant targets ($F[1,99] = 0.57, p = 0.452$) or for nondeviant targets ($F[1,99] = 1.18, p = 0.280$). The source of the

gender interactions is in the effect of target deviance limited to females for the stability and controllability scales.

Discussion

Deviant persons receive attributions significantly different from those made to nondeviant persons. Attribution to deviant targets is significantly more internal than to nondeviants, an observation consistent with blaming and defensive attribution. Deviance is thus one of the many qualities that result in increased internality of attribution. Attribution is also less external, a feature detected by the use of two scales in the place of one unitary scale. The internal and external scales moved somewhat reciprocally, but not entirely so, as was to be expected in consideration of Solomon's (1978) work. Many participants did not consider the two scales to be reciprocal in the sense that a high rating on one would logically imply a low rating on the other. Future study may usefully compare ratings on unitary bipolar scales (e.g., internality-externality) with separate internal and external scales.

That attribution to deviant targets is more global suggests that deviance colors perception of the targets. Social perception of the deviant is biased by the evident belief that the deviance affects all aspects of

personality. Such beliefs exaggerate the perception of deviants as different from the self. In sum, deviant targets are perceived as responsible for their condition (i.e., higher internality), and their deviance pervades the personality (i.e., higher globality).

Interactions with participant gender occurred, consistent with hypothesis, across-scales and on the stability and controllability scales. For men, mean ratings did not change between deviant and nondeviant targets. But women rated deviant targets higher in stability than nondeviant targets--that is, they indicated that the deviant target's disposition and situation would persist longer in time. Women also rated the deviant targets higher in controllability--that is, the deviant targets were attributed more control over what happens to them. A possible explanation is that women believe that deviant traits are more stable through time--a sort of pessimism about the likelihood of change. Higher controllability ratings are inconsistent with the opinion that deviant targets have limitations, but they are consistent with the judgment that deviants have the possibility of change. The higher ratings may represent an emphasis on personal responsibility. The women's ratings on the two scales may be summed up this way: Deviant persons can change for the better, but their improvement is

less likely than for nondeviants.

For the most part, however, men and women agree in their perception of deviant social roles. The combination of higher internality and globality ratings is consistent with defensive attribution, in which the perceiver denies personal similarity to the target if the perceiver is likely to be in a similar situation (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). The gender interaction means that women add higher stability and controllability to the combination. It is likely that a pattern of attribution is distinctive for deviant social roles, analogous to depressive attribution (cf. Seligman et al., 1979).

Contrary to hypothesis, identification was not found to be a significant factor in this study. Apparently the tendency toward an external shift was not sufficient to overcome the tendency to internal bias. Instructions to identify possibly can make attributions shift somewhat externally under some circumstances (Rohlman & Clark, 1997), but not against the internality bias for deviant social roles.

What difference was made by including the controllability scale? Controllability did not show the main effect of deviance in this study, but the gender interaction on this scale is further confirmation, in addition to Rohlman and Clark (1997), that the gender of

the observer affects the kind of attribution made. Gender effects in attribution should be further explored.

Evidence that an external shift can be produced by instructions to identify (Rohlman & Clark, 1997) suggests the value of further research along these lines, although the effect was not evident in this study. Related manipulations that tend to enhance identification, such as emphasizing the similarity of the target character to the participant, or the induction of empathy or sympathy, might also produce an external shift. Such research would be pertinent to better understanding across social barriers such as gender and role.

The external validity of this study was promoted by an empirical identification of deviant targets, but generality can be further improved by studying other targets and target dimensions in the future. Deviance and gender, studied here, are only two of many dimensions of interest. Future research will doubtless vary targets on many dimensions. Attribution to managers by their personnel, for example, may be of interest to industrial/organizational psychologists. The perceived age of the targets is another dimension for research. The possibility that women are more pessimistic than men about the improvement of deviant persons should also be explored by

education might emphasize how the internal bias may be predicted and manipulated. In legal arguments, in journalism, and even in psychotherapists' case reports, understanding may be facilitated by narratives that are ethically sensitive to attribution effects.

APPENDIX A
SOCIAL ROLES QUESTIONNAIRE

Researcher's copy

**USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS
INFORMED CONSENT**

I, _____, agree to participate in the investigational procedure of obtaining my anonymous responses to a written questionnaire. The purpose is to determine what social roles are generally believed to be deviant or nondeviant. The participant will benefit by learning about the study of an aspect of social roles in social psychology.

I understand that I will read a questionnaire and respond by marking whether each role is deviant or nondeviant, and whether each role is primarily a male role, a female role, or appropriate to both genders. This may take about 30 minutes.

I have been informed that the information obtained in this study will be recorded by a code number and that no record of my name will be associated with my responses to the questionnaire. I am to sign this consent form only, and separate it from the questionnaire. Under this condition, I agree that any information obtained from this research may be used as thought best by the researchers for publication or education.

I understand that there is no personal risk or discomfort directly involved with this research and that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue participation in this study at any time. A decision to withdraw from the study will not involve any penalties.

If I have any questions or problems that arise in connection with my participation in this study I should contact the principal investigator, James E. Rohlman, at (817) 565-2671 (UNT Psychology Dept.) or (940) 387-4437 (home).

This project has been reviewed and approved by the UNT Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects [(940) 565-3940].

(Date)

(Signature of Participant)

----- TEAR HERE AND RETAIN COPY BELOW -----

Participant's copy

**USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS
INFORMED CONSENT**

I, _____, agree to participate in the investigational procedure of obtaining my anonymous responses to a written questionnaire. The purpose is to determine what social roles are generally believed to be deviant. The participant will benefit by learning about the study of an aspect of social deviance in social psychology.

I understand that I will read a questionnaire and respond by marking whether each role is deviant or nondeviant, and whether each role is primarily a male role, a female role, or appropriate to both genders. This may take about 30 minutes.

I have been informed that the information obtained in this study will be recorded by a code number and that no record of my name will be associated with my responses to the questionnaire. I am to sign this consent form only, and separate it from the questionnaire. Under this condition, I agree that any information obtained from this research may be used as thought best by the researchers for publication or education.

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This project has been reviewed and approved by the UNT Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects [(940) 565-3940].

(Date)

(Signature of Participant)

SOCIAL ROLES QUESTIONNAIRE

Instructions

Do not sign this form.

Here we are asking you to report, to the best of your knowledge, “what most people think.” On the list below, please circle the **D** next to the social roles you believe to be considered *Deviant*, and circle the **N** (for *Nondeviant*) next to the others.

Also, circle **M** if the role is considered to be a male role (appropriate for men primarily), circle **F** if it is a female role (appropriate for women primarily), or circle **M & F** if it is a role for which either gender is considered appropriate.

Please mark all roles, although some similar terms occur. Thank you.

Female _____ Male _____

-
- | | | | | | | |
|-----|---|---|--------------------------|---|---|-------|
| 1. | N | D | accountant | M | F | M & F |
| 2. | N | D | illicit drug abuser | M | F | M & F |
| 3. | N | D | embezzler | M | F | M & F |
| 4. | N | D | mentally retarded person | M | F | M & F |
| 5. | N | D | convict | M | F | M & F |
| 6. | N | D | wife-batterer | M | F | M & F |
| 7. | N | D | salesperson | M | F | M & F |
| 8. | N | D | sex felon | M | F | M & F |
| 9. | N | D | divorcee | M | F | M & F |
| 10. | N | D | invert | M | F | M & F |
| 11. | N | D | schoolteacher | M | F | M & F |
| 12. | N | D | prison inmate | M | F | M & F |
| 13. | N | D | gay person | M | F | M & F |
| 14. | N | D | retardate | M | F | M & F |
| 15. | N | D | heroin abuser | M | F | M & F |

16.	N	D	housepainter	M	F	M & F
17.	N	D	killer	M	F	M & F
18.	N	D	exhibitionist	M	F	M & F
19.	N	D	school administrator	M	F	M & F
20.	N	D	politician	M	F	M & F
21.	N	D	pacifist	M	F	M & F
22.	N	D	police officer	M	F	M & F
23.	N	D	clerk	M	F	M & F
24.	N	D	convict	M	F	M & F
25.	N	D	divorced person	M	F	M & F
26.	N	D	medical doctor	M	F	M & F
27.	N	D	salesperson	M	F	M & F
28.	N	D	mail carrier	M	F	M & F
29.	N	D	car thief	M	F	M & F
30.	N	D	gangster	M	F	M & F
31.	N	D	waiter/waitress (waitperson)	M	F	M & F
32.	N	D	store clerk	M	F	M & F
33.	N	D	hired killer	M	F	M & F
34.	N	D	mechanic	M	F	M & F
35.	N	D	bookkeeper	M	F	M & F
36.	N	D	sales representative	M	F	M & F
37.	N	D	nude model for sex magazine	M	F	M & F
38.	N	D	social worker	M	F	M & F
39.	N	D	sanitation worker	M	F	M & F
40.	N	D	golf pro	M	F	M & F
41.	N	D	TV technician	M	F	M & F
42.	N	D	pedophile	M	F	M & F
43.	N	D	scientist	M	F	M & F
44.	N	D	hermaphrodite	M	F	M & F
45.	N	D	chemist	M	F	M & F
46.	N	D	nightwatchperson	M	F	M & F
47.	N	D	polygamist	M	F	M & F
48.	N	D	used car salesperson	M	F	M & F
49.	N	D	security guard	M	F	M & F
50.	N	D	pervert	M	F	M & F

51.	N	D	jazz musician	M	F	M & F
52.	N	D	portrait painter	M	F	M & F
53.	N	D	obsessive-compulsive person	M	F	M & F
54.	N	D	disabled person	M	F	M & F
55.	N	D	news photographer	M	F	M & F
56.	N	D	nonpatriotic person	M	F	M & F
57.	N	D	newspaper journalist	M	F	M & F
58.	N	D	TV broadcaster	M	F	M & F
59.	N	D	abortionist (M.D.)	M	F	M & F
60.	N	D	sculptor	M	F	M & F
61.	N	D	military officer	M	F	M & F
62.	N	D	firefighter	M	F	M & F
63.	N	D	scientist	M	F	M & F
64.	N	D	robber	M	F	M & F
65.	N	D	police officer	M	F	M & F
66.	N	D	businessperson	M	F	M & F
67.	N	D	pharmacist	M	F	M & F
68.	N	D	hippie	M	F	M & F
69.	N	D	plumber	M	F	M & F
70.	N	D	electrician	M	F	M & F
71.	N	D	restaurant cook	M	F	M & F
72.	N	D	child abuser	M	F	M & F
73.	N	D	bootlegger	M	F	M & F
74.	N	D	organized crime gangleader	M	F	M & F
75.	N	D	street gang leader	M	F	M & F
76.	N	D	felon	M	F	M & F
77.	N	D	drug addict	M	F	M & F
78.	N	D	junkie	M	F	M & F
79.	N	D	extortionist	M	F	M & F
80.	N	D	depressed person	M	F	M & F
81.	N	D	airline pilot	M	F	M & F
82.	N	D	murderer	M	F	M & F
83.	N	D	child molester	M	F	M & F
84.	N	D	homosexual	M	F	M & F
85.	N	D	schizophrenic person	M	F	M & F

86.	N	D	alcoholic	M	F	M & F
87.	N	D	druggist	M	F	M & F
88.	N	D	rapist	M	F	M & F
89.	N	D	TV repairer	M	F	M & F
90.	N	D	phobic person	M	F	M & F
91.	N	D	computer programmer	M	F	M & F
92.	N	D	banker	M	F	M & F
93.	N	D	unwed mother	M	F	M & F
94.	N	D	bank teller	M	F	M & F
95.	N	D	mortician	M	F	M & F
96.	N	D	military officer	M	F	M & F
97.	N	D	soldier	M	F	M & F
98.	N	D	firefighter	M	F	M & F
99.	N	D	highway worker	M	F	M & F
100.	N	D	psychotic person	M	F	M & F
101.	N	D	sex deviate	M	F	M & F
102.	N	D	burglar	M	F	M & F
103.	N	D	neurotic person	M	F	M & F
104.	N	D	criminal	M	F	M & F
105.	N	D	thief	M	F	M & F
106.	N	D	drug pusher	M	F	M & F
107.	N	D	spouse abuser	M	F	M & F
108.	N	D	welder	M	F	M & F
109.	N	D	prostitute	M	F	M & F
110.	N	D	transexual	M	F	M & F
111.	N	D	U.S. Communist	M	F	M & F
112.	N	D	conscientious objector	M	F	M & F
113.	N	D	carpenter	M	F	M & F
114.	N	D	nude life drawing model	M	F	M & F
115.	N	D	paramedic	M	F	M & F
116.	N	D	homeless person	M	F	M & F
117.	N	D	drunk driver	M	F	M & F
118.	N	D	surfer	M	F	M & F
119.	N	D	convicted speeder	M	F	M & F
120.	N	D	novelist	M	F	M & F

121.	N	D	child molester	M	F	M & F
122.	N	D	kidnapper	M	F	M & F
123.	N	D	amputee	M	F	M & F
124.	N	D	sailor	M	F	M & F
125.	N	D	invalid	M	F	M & F
126.	N	D	juvenile delinquent	M	F	M & F

APPENDIX B

INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS:

IDENTIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS

NONIDENTIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS

EAGLE ATTRIBUTION QUESTIONNAIRE

INSTRUCTIONS

Do not sign this form.

Please give us some information about yourself.

Sex: M F **Age** _____

_____ **Undergraduate student**

_____ **Graduate student**

_____ **Not a student**

Please try to vividly imagine yourself in the situations that follow. If such a situation happened to you, what would you feel would have caused it? While events may have many causes, we want you to pick only one—the *major* cause if this event happened to *you*. Please write this cause in the blank provided after each event. Next we want you to answer some questions about the event, using rating scales.

To summarize, we want you to:

- 1. Read each situation and vividly imagine it happening to you.**
- 2. Decide what you feel would be the *major* cause of the situation if it happened to you.**
- 3. Write one cause in the blank provided.**
- 4. Use the rating scales to answer the questions that follow.**
- 5. Go on to the next situation until finished.**

(I)

EAGLE ATTRIBUTION QUESTIONNAIRE

INSTRUCTIONS

Do not sign this form.

Please give us some information about yourself.

Sex: M F **Age** _____

_____ **Undergraduate student**

_____ **Graduate student**

_____ **Not a student**

Please try to vividly imagine the situations that follow. If such a situation happened, what would you feel would have caused it? While events may have many causes, we want you to pick only one—the *major* cause. Please write this cause in the blank provided after each event. Next we want you to answer some questions about the event, using rating scales.

To summarize, we want you to:

- 1. Read each situation and vividly imagine it happening to the character identified.**
- 2. Decide what you feel would be the *major* cause of the situation if it happened to that character.**
- 3. Write one cause in the blank provided.**
- 4. Use the rating scales to answer the questions that follow.**
- 5. Go on to the next situation until finished.**

(II)

APPENDIX C
SAMPLE EAGLE ATTRIBUTION
QUESTIONNAIRE

Researcher's copy

**USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS
INFORMED CONSENT**

I, _____, agree to participate in the investigational procedure of obtaining my anonymous responses to a written questionnaire. The purpose is to study an aspect of how people explain others' behavior. The participant will benefit by learning about attribution research in social psychology.

I understand that I will read a questionnaire and respond with brief written answers and by marking rating scales. This may take 60-90 minutes. I will receive three extra-credit points and \$2.00 upon return of the questionnaire.

I have been informed that the information obtained in this study will be recorded by a code number and that no record of my name will be associated with my responses to the questionnaire. I am to sign this consent form only, and separate it from the unsigned questionnaire. The consent form will be filed separately, without link to the questionnaire. Under this condition, I agree that any information obtained from this research may be used as thought best by the researchers for publication or education.

I understand that there is no personal risk or discomfort directly involved with this research and that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue participation in this study at any time. A decision to withdraw from the study will not involve any penalties.

If I have any questions or problems that arise in connection with my participation in this study I should contact the principal investigator, James E. Rohlman, at (817) 565-2671 (UNT Psychology Dept.) or (940) 387-4437 (home).

This project has been reviewed and approved by the UNT Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects [(940) 565-3940].

(Date)

(Signature of Participant)

----- TEAR HERE AND RETAIN COPY BELOW -----

Participant's copy

**USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS
INFORMED CONSENT**

I, _____, agree to participate in the investigational procedure of obtaining my anonymous responses to a written questionnaire. The purpose is to study an aspect of how people explain others' behavior. The participant will benefit by learning about attribution research in social psychology.

I understand that I will read a questionnaire and respond with brief written answers and by marking rating scales. This may take 60-90 minutes. I will receive three extra-credit points and \$2.00 upon return of the questionnaire.

I have been informed that the information obtained in this study will be recorded by a code number and that no record of my name will be associated with my responses to the questionnaire. I am to sign this consent form only, and separate it from the unsigned questionnaire. The consent form will be filed separately, without link to the questionnaire. Under this condition, I agree that any information obtained from this research may be used as thought best by the researchers for publication or education.

I understand that there is no personal risk or discomfort directly involved with this research and that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue participation in this study at any time. A decision to withdraw from the study will not involve any penalties.

If I have any questions or problems that arise in connection with my participation in this study I should contact the principal investigator, James E. Rohlman, at (817) 565-2671 (UNT Psychology Dept.) or (940) 387-4437 (home).

This project has been reviewed and approved by the UNT Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects [(940) 565-3940].

(Date)

(Signature of Participant)

EAGLE ATTRIBUTION QUESTIONNAIRE

INSTRUCTIONS

Do not sign this form.

Please give us some information about yourself.

Sex: M F **Age** _____

_____ **Undergraduate student**

_____ **Graduate student**

_____ **Not a student**

Please try to vividly imagine yourself in the situations that follow. If such a situation happened to you, what would you feel would have caused it? While events may have many causes, we want you to pick only one—the *major* cause if this event happened to *you*. Please write this cause in the blank provided after each event. Next we want you to answer some questions about the event, using rating scales.

To summarize, we want you to:

- 1. Read each situation and vividly imagine it happening to you.**
- 2. Decide what you feel would be the *major* cause of the situation if it happened to you.**
- 3. Write one cause in the blank provided.**
- 4. Use the rating scales to answer the questions that follow.**
- 5. Go on to the next situation until finished.**

(I)

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