

LC 14.2/2: IPO174C



Congressional Research Service
The Library of Congress

Washington, D.C. 20540

CIVIL DEFENSE AND THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR
IPO174C

We have received an increasing number of requests for information on the United States civil defense program and on the effects of nuclear war. This Info Pack contains material on nuclear weapons and on the anticipated physical, economic, and social consequences of nuclear attacks on the United States, basic information on the civil defense program, and material discussing some of the arguments, pro and con, surrounding the civil defense issue.

Those wishing more specific information on the civil defense program should write to:

Federal Emergency Management Agency
Office of Public Affairs
1725 I Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20472

We hope this information is helpful.

Congressional Reference
Division

March 12, 1982

FY 1983 Civil Defense Program

This paper outlines the Fiscal Year 1983 civil defense program requested by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is responsible for emergency-related programs spanning the full range of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery--in peace or war.

Revitalized Civil Defense Program

Following the Administration's review of civil defense programs and policies, President Reagan, on October 2, 1981, announced his intention to "devote greater resources to improving our civil defenses," as part of his plan "to revitalize our strategic forces and maintain America's ability to keep the peace well into the next century."

The fundamental purposes of the National Civil Defense Program are:

- (1) To save American lives in the event of a nuclear attack. It will save lives by dispersing people into rural areas where they will be least affected by the blast and thermal effects of the nuclear explosions, leaving radiation as the major hazard for the dispersed population. Our goal is to double the number of Americans that would survive from a major Soviet attack on the United States.
- (2) To make nuclear war less likely by improving our ability to deter the Soviet Union from an attack on the United States. In conjunction with our strategic forces, Civil Defense can help to persuade the Soviet leadership that the ultimate outcome of an attack by them on the United States would be worse for them than for us. It also reduces the ability of the Soviets to coerce the United States during a period of international crisis.
- (3) To provide an improved capability for States and localities to deal with the day-to-day emergencies that occur as a result of natural and technological hazards. These "dual-use" benefits of the civil defense program were recognized by the Congress in December 1981 amendments to the Federal Civil Defense Act.

FY 1983 Civil Defense Program

FEMA's budget for 1983 requests \$252,340,000 for civil defense activities --about \$1.10 per capita. As the first year of a moderate, multiyear program intended to deploy population protection capabilities, the requested FY 1983 budget is a first step toward rebuilding reasonable protection for our people. The program will be deployed in an orderly way--not as a crash effort--and in full partnership with States and localities.

The thrust of the program is to protect the U.S. population by relocating (evacuating) people from larger cities and other potential risk areas over a period of several days during an acute crisis, and providing them with fallout protection and support. Capabilities will also be improved to protect people in-place (at or near their homes, schools, or places of work) should time or circumstances preclude crisis relocation.

Studies indicate that a balanced, moderate-cost civil defense program emphasizing crisis relocation might save--in a large-scale attack preceded by strategic warning--up to twice as many Americans as the 40 percent expected to survive under present civil defense. Such a balanced program includes both plans for crisis relocation of people from potential risk areas, and operational systems and capabilities for execution of relocation plans and for protecting the population from fallout.

Based on extensive research and on experience in peacetime evacuations, crisis relocation could be highly effective if two conditions existed: (1) Completion of high quality plans, together with development of operational systems and capabilities; and (2) several days of warning time in which to move and protect the bulk of the approximately 145 million people living in our larger cities or near important military installations.

Surprise attack is considered highly unlikely. Most experts believe that an attack on the U.S. would come only in the context of a lengthy period of international crisis. Moreover, it is likely that we would have sufficient warning time because the Soviets must protect the bulk of their urban population by evacuation.

Evacuation experience in both peacetime and World War II is that most people will comply with official instructions, provided that these are understandable and make sense in terms of improving chances for survival. In fact, in a threatening situation, many people will leave potential danger areas on their own, whether or not they have been advised to do so.

The FY 1983 program will provide a basis for action, in future years, to permit full deployment of required capabilities. The FY 1983 program will accordingly accelerate activities already underway (e.g., crisis relocation planning, development of State and local Emergency Operating Centers) while, at the same time, improving the quality of plans and systems. The program will feature greater participation by State and local governments in managing the implementation and achievement of national goals and objectives. FEMA will also commence new programs in FY 1983 (e.g., survivable, high-performance warning and communications systems). The FY 1983 program also provides for analyses and pilot activities in the area of protection of key industries and related work forces.

FY 1983 Program Highlights

In the area of nuclear civil protection for the people, the FY 1983 request provides for accelerating development of crisis relocation plans. By end-FY 1983, augmented State planning staffs should have completed about 56 percent of the initial CRP's required by local jurisdictions throughout the United States. FEMA also proposes to accelerate the National Shelter Survey, which provides data needed as a basis for crisis relocation planning.

The most important factor in effective crisis relocation is public cooperation which, in turn, depends upon the public's understanding of official advice and instructions. FEMA therefore intends to work with the States to provide additional crisis relocation maps and instructions. These instructions are intended to be placed in local telephone directories in areas where crisis relocation plans have been completed. By end-FY 1983, such instructions should be published in telephone directories in jurisdictions including about 25 percent of the total U.S. risk population.

Additional FY 1983 activities will include resumption of selective shelter marking (suspended in 1973), as well as work to provide a basis for future quantity procurement of austere shelter supplies and ventilation kits. Shelter signs identify for the citizen those buildings providing protection against nuclear attack effects, while shelter stocks permit people to remain in shelters until the decline of radiation levels permits emergence from shelter.

FEMA's FY 1983 request will improve the coverage of the existing National Warning System, while preparing for deployment of a survivable radio-warning system and of a survivable system for communications between the National, Regional, State and State-Area levels.

FEMA proposes to accelerate the program started in FY 1981 to provide matching funds for development of State and local Emergency Operating Centers. EOC's are protected sites, with necessary communications, from which key local and State officials direct coordinated operations in peacetime or attack emergencies. FEMA proposes also to accelerate the program to provide fallout and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) protection for broadcast stations, as well as an emergency power generator. Such protected stations provide a critical component of readiness, the ability to provide authoritative information and instructions to the public in an emergency. Matching funds will also be provided to enhance existing State and local networks for emergency communications.

The FY 1983 request also provides for support of professional Radiological Defense Officers at the State-Area level, and extension of the State-level RDO structure being developed in FY 1982. Full-time supervisory RDO's are the keystone in developing radiological defense systems and capabilities. In addition, capabilities will be developed to produce and deploy, in future years, about 7 million sets of instruments required for the shelter and post-shelter periods.

In the area of training, the FY 1983 request provides for restoring capabilities to provide simulated-emergency exercises for local and State officials. Effective execution of plans to deal with peacetime or attack emergencies requires that key officials know what to do in case of emergency, and experience has shown that exercising is the most effective way of providing this knowledge. Other civil defense training activities will include increasing capabilities to provide survival information to the public during a period of developing crisis, starting training in the area of shelter management, and accelerating training of radiological defense personnel.

Finally, the FY 1983 request provides for a real increase in matching-fund support for the State and local civil preparedness structure. This would permit new jurisdictions to enter the program, and additional personnel to be supported in jurisdictions now participating. This will, in turn, improve capabilities for management of both peacetime and attack emergencies.

Reprinted by the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, December 1981.

In September of 1979 the House passed my amendment to the Department of Defense authorization bill that embodied the thrust of Presidential Decision 41. It set out the goals and elements that were to be included in an enhanced civil defense program, authorized a 5-year program and, most importantly, it stated that civil defense would be considered part of the U.S. strategic defense. Unfortunately, this amendment died in the conference committee that year in 1979.

In 1980 we renewed this effort and we were successful in a similar amendment, minus the 5-year authorization. It was adopted by both Houses of Congress. It was signed into law by the President. Thus, the House, the Senate, and the administration went on record in support of an enhanced civil defense program.

This year we fared just as well during the authorization process. The House in the Department of Defense authorization bill approved \$174 million for fiscal year 1982, an increase of \$41.2 million over the administration's request.

□ 1730

This was an endorsement of the House Armed Services Committee judgment that this level of funding is needed to implement the D-prime program, a 7-year funding effort to improve population survival in the event of nuclear war, thereby enhancing deterrence and crisis stability.

Unfortunately, we have not met with equal success in the appropriation process over this same period. Our attempts to get adequate funding for the civil defense program have been frustrated at every turn. In the decade prior to the fiscal year 1981 appropriation, we saw the resources allocated for civil defense decline steadily. Last year, we did manage a real increase of 10 percent over the fiscal year 1980 level. Although this fiscal year 1981 funding of \$123 million was far less than the \$167 million needed to begin D-prime last year, a number of us were encouraged. We thought that at least we had turned the corner and could build on the initiatives permitted by this increase, move toward full implementation of PD-41, and have a truly nationwide, comprehensive civil defense program.

Needless to say, our hopes have not been fulfilled by what has happened so far this year on civil defense funding. The HUD-independent agencies appropriation bill for fiscal year 1982 funds civil defense at \$128.8 million, an amount that is even below the \$132.8 million requested in the original Carter budget, and endorsed by the Reagan administration. We have been told that the new administration has endorsed PD-41, but so far this administration, like its predecessor, has not joined the fight to secure funding that is sufficient to make the lofty goals of that document a reality.

If given a chance, civil defense will work. It will save lives both during nuclear war and natural disaster. An enhanced U.S. civil defense program will serve to restore a measure of the strategic balance of power with the Soviet Union which has an active, well funded, and by all accounts a workable civil defense program. Moreover, an enhanced civil defense program is affordable, even with today's tight budgets. There can be no greater priority for spending tax dollars than to spend them on a program that will save the lives of U.S. citizens. The total cost of the 7-year D-prime program would be a modest \$2.3 billion. The 5-year version of the plan, known as the D program, would cost around \$2 billion. In either case, it is a small price to pay for the lives that would be saved.

Mr. Speaker, there is support for an enhanced civil defense program here in Congress and among the population as a whole. The number of Members participating in this special order reflects that fact. In addition, on this floor on July 17, the chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on HUD-Independent Agencies, Mr. BOLAND, told me in a colloquy concerning the D and D-prime programs, "I would be willing to fund a program at that level over that period if it has the administration's support. If we are going to put into place a civil defense program that is going to protect the people of the United States, not only in time of war but also against natural disasters, this type of program is necessary."

We have much to do, Mr. Speaker, and our time is running short. We must begin an enhanced civil defense program soon, and we must deal with the related areas of command, control, and communications, early warning systems, air defense, and ballistic missile defense. The time for study and reevaluation is over. The time for action is now.

Mr. MITCHELL of New York. Mr. Speaker, will be gentleman yield?

Mr. SKELTON. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from New York (Mr. MITCHELL).

Mr. MITCHELL of New York. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I wish to commend my good friend and colleague, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) on his holding of this special order on civil defense. He has been a long and strong supporter of an improved civil defense program for our Nation.

It is my belief one of the most pressing and unmet needs facing our Nation is for an adequate civil defense program—one which is responsive to existing threats and prepares us for future challenges.

To respond to this need, I proposed a comprehensive, 7-year civil defense program. Its cost of approximately \$2.6 billion, represents but a fraction of our estimated total defense expenditures for the period covered—the in-

CIVIL DEFENSE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I have often taken the floor of this House to talk on the subject of civil defense, in offering amendments to authorization and appropriation legislation and at other times during general debate when the subject of civil defense arose.

I have asked for this special order today because I believe it necessary once again that the Members of this body have the opportunity to express their support for this vital program, this program of civil defense. I want to thank my colleagues who are here today to join in this effort.

To begin this discussion, Mr. Speaker, it would be appropriate to review what has happened to civil defense and the civil defense program in recent years, both in terms of legislative action here in Congress and within the various administrations. In September, 1978, then President Carter issued Presidential Directive PD-41 which directed that the Nation's civil defense program should enhance the survivability of the American population and their leadership, thus enhancing deterrence and stability and reducing the possibility of Soviet coercion during a time of crisis.

PD-41, Presidential Decision 41, also contemplated a "dual use" civil defense to help deal with peacetime disasters and emergencies.

crease in funding over our present program amounts to approximately one-tenth of 1 percent of our Department of Defense annual budget.

The program I am advancing is one that will give us, for the first time in this nuclear era, the protection we must be assured of as we face our ideological adversaries who lack our commitment for the pursuit of peace. Simply put, my goal is to help to balance the strategic scales but, if there should be a war, to guarantee the survival of our Nation. We have no such guarantee today. It is time we did.

The 7-year plan would concentrate the use of the funds requested for: Crisis evacuation; research and development; emergency operating centers; training and education; and management and coordination.

In each one of these critical areas our present civil defense program fails the test of adequacy.

This program was not developed by me, rather it emerged over an extended period of time after protracted study by civil defense experts who have earned respect and a national reputation for their work in this area. It is a product of serious, well-intentioned people who share a concern about our present, have learned from lessons of the past and are determined to prepare us to live in peace. It is the program D-prime recommendation of the civil defense workshops which were held in Rosslyn, Va., in the fall of 1977 by the Systems Planning Corporation for the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency.

We are in trouble. The Soviets have an excellent civil defense system. We do not. Neither nation had an adequate program in the midsixties. But for more than a decade the Soviets have been spending over \$1 billion a year on civil defense. We have averaged less than \$100 million. They have a three-track program: Individual protection, community shelters, and population evacuation. We have only one, community shelters, and it is in disarray in spite of the dedicated and dogged efforts of many professional and amateur civil defense leaders.

Why is this a problem? Because it destroys the strategic balance. The best hope for peace, we are told, is the maintenance of the strategic balance. There are varying estimates on the effect of an all-out nuclear war. If the Soviets have time to put their civil defense program into operation—3 or 4 days prior to the holocaust—the results would be far more destructive to the United States, which does not have a plan—over 100 million dead—than the Soviet Union—5 to 20 million killed. Should we adopt the D-prime plan of the Interagency Study on Civil Defense, developed under the aegis of the National Security Council, they estimate we can save up to 85 percent of our population. Should the Soviets target population, they estimate up to two-thirds of our population will be preserved.

Most experts agree we enjoy "rough equivalence" with the Soviets in weaponry. From my perspective it appears to get rougher each year. But if Soviet weapons have a far greater destructive effect on us than our weapons on them, it is as though they had far more weapons. This makes a mockery of the strategic balance. It does not exist.

Once the balance of terror is gone the Soviets have an awesome edge in any confrontation, whether it be at the bargaining table, an act of adventurism in Europe, Africa, the Mideast or in all-out nuclear war.

It has been said that "eternal vigilance is the price of liberty." Events in Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan have shown that to be true. If Russia is able to grab up one or two more countries, we may be forced into war—with a strong possibility that the conflict could develop into a nuclear confrontation. Why not provide at least minimal protection for our civilians? Why not teach them to survive?

Why have we not done something about civil defense? Chiefly because far too many Americans are the victims of three misconceptions—the first being the overkill fallacy, wherein the casualties per kiloton in Hiroshima and Nagasaki are multiplied by the number of kilotons in the world's arsenal. This implies that by some means we can collect the entire target populations in the same density as existed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and keep them unwarned and vulnerable. A statement of identical validity is that the world's inventory of small arms ammunition, or for that matter, kitchen knives, can also kill the human population several times over.

Another widely held misconception is that much of the world's population would be destroyed by fallout from a large-scale nuclear war. "On the Beach" reflects how this thinking originated. The National Academy of Science estimates that the long-term effect of this fallout would only amount to a 2-percent increase in the cancer rate over a 15-year period. This increase could be countered by not rebuilding many of the cigarette plants that would be destroyed in such a holocaust.

Finally, victims of the doomsday scenario feel, mistakenly, that survivors of a large-scale nuclear war would have to live underground for weeks at a time. Not so, our scientists tell us. An individual can protect himself from the most dangerous type of radiation because it travels like light, in a straight line. A handkerchief, folded over six or eight times, can serve as an effective gas mask to provide protection from the less dangerous type of radiation.

That is the bad news. The good news is it is not too late do something about it. A relatively inexpensive remedy is to develop a civil defense system of our own. Some of our defense leaders suggest the way to compensate for

Soviet superiority—they no longer claim it does not exist—is to retarget our weapons. Retargeting would supposedly balance through civil defense—the potential saving of American lives rather than the potential destruction of Soviet citizens.

We must begin today to rebalance the strategic equation. How do you deter an attack unless you can convince an enemy that you will win the war that he is starting? I find it doubtful that anyone aware of the strategic imbalance believes we would fire any nuclear weapons if it meant the destruction of our society. Without a civil defense system that is precisely what it means.

Basically, this \$2.6 billion program requires the authorization of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to increase from \$174 million in 1982 to \$487 million in 1988.

For the first time ever the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Installations designated D-prime as the desired program for civil defense in the United States. The \$174 million authorized for 1982 represents the first year's cost of this 7-year comprehensive program.

The committee language is as follows:

The level of funding in the authorization of appropriations in subsection (a) represents the first year of a comprehensive 7-year upgraded funding program for civil defense known as the D-prime program, which is based upon the goal of achieving a comprehensive population relocation capability for time of crisis. The program originated in executive branch studies in the civil defense area that provided the basis for Presidential directive 41, issued in September 1978, and is consistent with the action of Congress in enacting title V of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 in Public Law 96-342.

The Congress of the United States will spend approximately \$225 billion for our offensive capability. Without the \$174 million for civil defense we are doing almost nothing to protect American citizens.

Does it not make good sense to spend a little more to provide a plan that would help prevent war, but in the event of war, would help protect all Americans?

I urge my colleagues to join me in helping to implement the D-prime program. Our total national defense demands no less.

□ 1740

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKELTON. I yield.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend the gentleman from Missouri for taking this special order on the vital issue of civil defense, and congratulate him and the gentleman from New York (Mr. MIRCHELL) for the contribution both of them made as recognized national leaders in alerting this country to the need of rebuilding civil defense, and fighting on the House floor for im-

proved funding for the civil defense efforts.

I have supported their efforts in the past and will continue to support them in the future. I hope all of our colleagues will pay close attention to the very substantial information that is being presented here in the course of this special order.

Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentleman from Minnesota very much.

Mr. DYSON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKELTON. I yield to my friend from Maryland.

(Mr. DYSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DYSON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity today to applaud my distinguished colleague's efforts on behalf of a strong home defense for the United States. Let me join him in requesting from the President the continued commitment he and his party have made for an effective civil defense program.

It is my concern, however, that perhaps during our current budget difficulties, the administration, with the consent of the Congress, will make this country's emergency preparedness a casualty of the budget ax.

For fiscal year 1982, the budget for the Federal Emergency Management Agency is \$128.8 million, which translates into 57 cents per capita that this Government is spending to protect the life and property of the American people from nuclear attack and assist them during times of natural and manmade disasters.

I realize that this subject is one of little interest to many of my colleagues and, to some degree, the American people who view the question of survivability in a nuclear attack impossible. Yet I believe the role of a nation's emergency preparedness has a dual function. The question of survivability is essential but also a viable and comprehensive program of civil defense will clearly demonstrate to our adversaries that the United States will yield no strategic advantage to the Soviet Union or any other nation.

I believe that it is important to again remind the Members of this House and the American people that it is not the United States which has embarked on the most ambitious and aggressive civil defense program during peacetime, but the Soviet Union, and my question is, why?

Studies conducted by our own experts show that the Soviets spend 20 times as much for civil defense as the United States—nearly \$2 billion annually. Why does a nation which cannot provide its people with basic consumer goods devote substantial resources to civil defense? Are they afraid of a U.S. sneak attack or is it mere paranoia?

I would argue that it is neither, but rather a calculated element of their overall strategic philosophy that nu-

clear war is winnable and that should be a sobering thought for all of us.

I am committed, as I believe this Congress is, to the restoration of this Nation's military posture. However, I believe, as does my colleague from Missouri, that an intricate element in our overall strategic strength lies in a no-nonsense emergency preparedness program.

I would therefore urge both my colleagues in the House and the administration to continue the progress made to date in the civil defense of the United States.

Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentleman from Maryland for his remarks. He has been a strong supporter of civil defense since he has been in Congress. I thank him for his contribution today.

Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKELTON. I yield to my colleague from Georgia.

(Mr. McDONALD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Missouri for yielding. I would like to applaud his having a special order to review and extremely important topic that, unfortunately, our Nation has disregarded for too long. We can see from the great interest by the news galleries over our heads, that is symptomatic of the problems that we face, that for whatever reason, the news media of this country have been active proponents by its sense of omission or commission of the MAD policy of mutual assured destruction.

Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Speaker, the subject of civil defense looms larger each day and becomes important with each passing hour as the United States moves into "the window of vulnerability" to our strategic forces. Our only hope to change the pathetic situation as regards to civil defense in this country, is to change the basic public attitude that has been built up by our opinion makers that we are in for mutual assured destruction and that no one will survive, so why even discuss it. This attitude is the grossest nonsense of all time. The United States has to survive and continue if civilization, as we know it, is to continue. Can we expect the athiest Marxists with their 100-percent materialism to preserve civilization if they prevail or will they turn the entire Earth planet into one vast Gulag? I think we all know the answer to that.

The theory of mutual assured destruction has done more than cripple our civil defense. It has almost crippled our national will to survive. It has convinced the man in the street that there is no use in civil defense as each side has enough bombs to kill each other 10 times over anyway. MAD has further, and insidiously in my view, prevented our Nation from having a real strategic goal in any future conflict with the Soviet Union in that it

assumes an awesome exchange of weapons followed by little else than just clouds of radiation.

Before every new conflict, we are told that weapons are so awful that the war will last not longer than a few days or weeks. The invention of the machine gun was supposed to make World War I very short. It did not, as armies learned to dig in deeply. World War II was supposed to be very short as the invention of the bomber plane would make it impossible to fight longer than a few weeks. Now, of course, we talk of the 3-week war or even in shorter terms because of nuclear weapons.

It is a strange thing that we do not find talk of mutual assured destruction emanating from Moscow. What we do find is that the defense hierarchy of Moscow talks of fighting and winning a nuclear war. We also find a vast system of civil defense that is building factories out in the country, has deep shelters in its cities, spends several billions on training civil defense personnel and plans to evacuate as many people as it can. Could it be that the Soviet Government values its citizens more than we do? The People's Republic of China also has a vast shelter system to protect its people and, obviously, intends to try and survive a nuclear strike. And, while neither the Soviet nor the Communist Chinese civil defense systems are perfect, they will be able to save a lot of people and much of their industrial capacity in any nuclear exchange.

As in the case of the infantry in World War I, we need to dig deeply into the earth and let that be our armour against a nuclear attack. We, too, need a shelter system, an evacuation plan, and a system to protect our industrial capacity. For a few hundred million dollars, we could start a serious civil defense program, start training the necessary personnel and start taking the steps necessary to our Nation's survival and abandon the MAD doctrine which can only lead to our Nation's destruction and/or surrender. Otherwise, we are doomed to live in the valley of the shadow for the next 5 years at least, our very existence dependent upon the whims of the Politburo in Moscow.

Mr. Speaker, let me once again commend my colleague from Missouri for this most important special order on the subject of civil defense.

Mr. SKELTON. I thank my friend and colleague from Georgia for his contribution today.

Mr. BRINKLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKELTON. I yield to my friend and colleague from Georgia.

Mr. BRINKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman very much. If the roll is called of civil defense and civil defense issues, the name of the gentleman from Missouri would head the list in terms of those who have made such a fine contribution to the

remedial legislation designed in the interests of the American citizen in time of war. Following Mr. SKELTON's name certainly would be the gentleman from New York (Mr. MITCHELL), Mr. WHITEHURST of Virginia, Mr. DICKINSON of Alabama, and many others of us who have felt for a long time that civil defense has been neglected.

Mr. MITCHELL of New York. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BRINKLEY. Of course.

Mr. MITCHELL of New York. I would just like to add that very nearly at the top of that list would be the gentleman from Georgia because of the splendid job he has done not only to develop the civil defense system, but in the leadership he has provided as chairman of the subcommittee that has jurisdiction over this subject.

Mr. BRINKLEY. I thank my friend and fellow pilot from the State of New York.

Where I am coming from is just a tad different. The Whiteman Air Force Base, I believe, you have instruments of war there that would be targeted by the Soviet Union; is that not correct?

Mr. SKELTON. That is absolutely correct. We have 150 ICBM missile silos that are at or in the Fourth Congressional District of Missouri that I represent. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. BRINKLEY. If I recall correctly, in the gentleman's district in the recent past, there has been severe flooding which we would term as a natural disaster.

Mr. SKELTON. Yes, we had—and of course I have told the gentleman of these because of his interest in the dual use of civil defense—we had a killer flood in the western part of my district, the Fourth District of Missouri, and we have had killer tornados on two occasions in which civil defense played a very important part.

Mr. BRINKLEY. And this brings me to the structure of which I speak, which is one of dual use which would provide a future in-place system of civil defense that would be tested and exercised by the Vikings, the Berserkers—the natural disasters that do certainly come along from time to time, which would provide us an adequate preparedness on which we could depend should that dire day ever come.

□ 1750

So I have been something of a missionary. I have preached the gospel of dual use, not only because of the certainty of natural disasters but because it would give us some self-confidence in our attack preparedness.

I also believe, Mr. Speaker, it would provide an important peacetime dividend, a cost-effective mechanism that would give us more bang for the buck. It would give us two for the price of one. If we are getting the utility of civil defense in peacetime, we also have it standing in the wings for a time of war.

I think that success is a matter of margins. I think that that capability which better prepares itself just a little bit more in a state of readiness would stand it in good stead in the event of war.

So I do speak for a dual use system, and I would say to the Members of the House that our subcommittee has at this time grafted in the defense authorization bill language which does bring natural disaster preparedness up to the same status, as a matter of statutory law, as that in the civil defense system. We are in conference right now, but we are trusting that that will become a matter of law and that this will be helpful to our civil defense system because of the fact that it serves as a powerful incentive. It would motivate our local and State people who are charged with the needs of a natural disaster situation, it would encourage them to do their job, and then we would have them in place in the event the attack disaster would come along.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I might mention the item which the last speaker referred to, and that is the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD). It has been said that the Soviet Union has sufficient firepower to kill every human being on Earth, and that we in the United States have sufficient firepower to kill every human being on Earth. Why is it, then, that we compete more and more in this arms race in which we are engaged?

Well, that is not exactly right. Those presumptions, those beliefs, would presume that on bombing day all the people of the world would go into the cities to which that firepower is targeted. The Soviet Union has different plans. It has a dispersal system which would take the people away from the population centers and thus save the lives of millions. That is the goal toward which the gentleman from New York (Mr. MITCHELL) has pointed. If we should go to a continental system such as the prime or the followon, it would serve the American people well because we would disperse the people and we would save millions, countless millions of lives.

Finally, in conclusion, I am going to explore with our subcommittee the addition of language which would permit the President to institute a volunteer system with reference to State and local governments under the authority of the Federal civil defense umbrella which might come into play and trigger the energies of national groups chartered by the Federal Government. I am speaking of those charters held by veterans' groups, Gold Star Wives, and others who might be an important backup in any dispersal system that we might have.

Once again, Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) for taking this time to emphasize the importance of civil defense and the fact that it is time that we "fish or cut bait."

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. BRINKLEY), and I do appreciate the gentleman's participating in our special order this evening.

The gentleman from Georgia has shown extraordinary leadership as chairman of the subcommittee in assisting civil defense, and he has in all meanings of the word been the "father of dual use"—dual use of civil defense, including natural disasters, along with the protection against nuclear attack. The gentleman from Georgia should certainly be thanked for the hard work he has done in this area.

Mr. KRAMER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKELTON. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. KRAMER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Let me first begin by saying how much I personally appreciate—and I am, hopefully, speaking on behalf of the people of the congressional district of which I have the privilege to be the Representative, the Fifth Congressional District of Colorado—and how much we appreciate the work of the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON), the work of the gentleman from New York (Mr. MITCHELL), and the work and efforts of our distinguished subcommittee chairman, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. BRINKLEY) in bringing to the followup stage this most critical and vital issue.

The MAD doctrine—mutual assured destruction—under which this country has operated its strategic umbrella now for almost two decades is, in my judgment, a discredited policy. It is one by which the acronym, MAD, truly and very characteristically identifies the significance of this policy, because it is a policy that emphasizes the disprotection of the American homeland and the American people. It is a policy that in effect holds American populations as unwitting pawns in a game of strategic balance and counterbalance. It purposely puts the American population at risk, because it says that to be able to protect yourself and your citizens is somehow destabilizing or is somehow going to upset potentially the other side.

Thus it has come about that we have no protection against incoming hostile bombers, we have no protection against incoming hostile missiles, and we have no way today of which I am aware of protecting the American people in the event that some calamitous or purposeful or inadvertent event is somehow triggered.

Since the gentleman has brought these matters to our attention during the course of our subcommittee meetings, I have often since reflected and wondered, what would happen if an American President faced a crisis of this kind. As I understand it, it would take about 4 days for the Soviets to fully implement the Soviet civil defense policy. What would an American

President do at a time when a crisis arose between us and the Soviet Union, when tensions were running high, if the Soviet Government implemented its civil defense policy 1 day at a time, knowing that if that policy were successfully implemented, the potential exists, as I understand the figures, that if an exchange were then to take place between us and the Soviet Union, the United States would lose upward to 150 million people from its population and the Soviets, although they would suffer a tremendous loss, could nevertheless minimize that loss to about 15 million, less than the number that was lost by the Soviets in World War II?

With those kinds of ratios staring an American President in the face and with a Soviet ultimatum then following, what action would an American President take?

Would he capitulate to Soviet demands, or would he have the capability of resisting?

Quite frankly, if I were an American President in that situation, I do not know what I would do, and I hope that no American President is ever put in that situation.

But until we pay attention to the capability of reversing the discredited doctrine of MAD and turning to the defense of the American homeland and the American people, that risk is one that we run against a very dangerous time fuse and a very dangerous time clock. And our subcommittee chairman has, I think, put it very artfully in terms of the statement, that the "time is now to fish or cut bait." Many have stated, "Well, the American people really don't care about civil defense. It is not an issue." Well, we can tell, I think, from the news attention that this matter is getting that it is not an issue. But I would submit that it is not an issue because the American people, as we sit here in this room, honestly believe that they do have a capability of protecting themselves, and the gentleman is doing a marvelous job of educating them so that they no longer believe that.

□ 1800

They do have a civil defense program that is capable of defending American populations, and that is the reason that so little excitement seems to be generated over the issue.

I really truly believe that the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON) does us a real service by educating us, by laying out these cold, bleak, hard facts as to just what great risks there are if we continue on this policy.

We can no longer continue to be solely an offensive country, building weapons that are capable of destroying people without some consideration of protecting ourselves and our people against those same weapons or types of weapons being directed against us.

I am privileged to be a part of this special order and again I commend the gentleman for bringing this vital issue

to the attention of the American people.

Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentleman very much. I appreciate the gentleman from Colorado's continued and very helpful support in the area of civil defense. The gentleman has been so sincere and working hard, and we do appreciate the gentleman participating today.

Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SKELTON. I yield to my friend from Georgia (Mr. GINGRICH).

Mr. GINGRICH. I thank my friend from Missouri for recognizing me. I appreciate the gentleman taking the leadership to speak today on an issue that is only of importance should war come, but then is of such importance that it should concern all of us in peacetime.

The question I think every American should ask is what is the cost of insurance and what is it worth to have it.

It is very clear to anyone who has looked at any field that the Soviet Union does believe that nuclear war is an instrument of political policy. It is very clear from anyone who has ever studied history that accidents do happen, mistakes are made, political leaders do frankly goof, and the net result can be a war no one wanted.

If we were to invest in civil defense on the scale that is reasoned, and legitimate and necessary, and nothing ever happened, we might at most have wasted some money. If we fail to invest in civil defense and something happens, we will have wasted lives.

I would far rather be the man who faced my grandchildren and said, yes, I was too cautious, yes, I cared too much, yes, I did too much, than be the man who faces the survivors and tries to explain why we did not do the things that were necessary.

It is clear that the Defense Department looks too narrowly at the question of strategic weapons and strategic defense. We are on the verge of designing an MX missile system which will guarantee that after an all-out Soviet first strike, missiles will survive but cities will not. Any reasonable examination of the plans for the MX mobile basing system will indicate clearly an assumption that it is possible that the Soviet Union might one day, for reasons of policy, explode 100, 200, 1,000, 3,000 hydrogen warheads on the North American Continent. In that environment, the fallout, the radiation, the downwind effect on the Midwest, on Chicago, on Detroit, and in some circumstances on Washington, would be so phenomenal that the impact on human beings would be so incredible that we stand a chance of saving literally millions of human beings.

Here is a society which will spend over \$1 billion to keep alive a person who has been in a car wreck and whose brain has ceased to function. Here is a society which will spend literally hundreds of thousands of dol-

lars a year to keep alive chronically ill people. Here is a society which believes in setting up kidney treatment centers at a cost of over \$1 billion a year.

Mr. SKELTON. If I may reclaim my time for a moment, I know the gentleman would be interested in knowing that in the year 1977 and the year 1978 the U.S. Government, through the U.S. Air Force, spent \$124 million to harden 150 ICBM silos in western Missouri, in my district, the Fourth District of Missouri.

During that same year, less than \$100 million was spent to protect the people of this Nation from the very same eventuality that they spent \$124 million to harden those silos. It is rather ironic. That is exactly what the gentleman is saying. And I yield to him again.

Mr. GINGRICH. I thank my colleague for enlightening me. I had no idea of those numbers and I think the gentleman is right. We harden missiles, but we do not harden human beings. We protect control centers but we do not protect people.

There is probably no single cause in terms of the amount of attention it does not get that deserves more attention, more investment, more thought, and more commitment than the cause of civil defense.

I challenge the Reagan administration and I believe this Congress will ultimately join in challenging the Reagan administration to build a pro-human, prosurvival, propopulation, strategic policy that is the equal to its weaponry, its hardware, and its strategic offensive policy, because if we look at the real world it is inconceivable to me, as I am sure it is inconceivable to my colleague, that any President would use any kind of strategy or diplomacy knowing that a Soviet first strike, even if it allowed the MX to survive, would, in the process, have killed literally millions of Americans from fallout, not from the blast, not from the immediate effect, but from the careless, wanton lack of preparation on the part of our Government and its leaders.

I simply want to close by saying again to my colleagues, I know that it is a long and lonely vigil. I know the gentleman and the dean of the Georgia delegation have led the fight. I want to commend both of you because I think literally there may be in our lifetime no single cause that saves more American lives than the cause of civil defense that the two of you have so eloquently espoused. I thank the gentlemen.

Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentleman for his very appropriate comments.

The gentleman reminds me that during the 1930's, beginning about 1934, there was a Member of Parliament in the United Kingdom that spoke of a great danger across the English Channel, and that great

danger and the great new fact, of which this Member of Parliament spoke was the fact that Germany was building a tremendous air fleet. Few paid attention. Few paid attention to him until about 1938, and people did begin to pay attention to Winston Churchill. They did begin to build Hurricane fighters and Spitfire fighters.

But what is more important, they began to make preparation for the use of the tunnel system, the subway system of London, should the eventuality ever come to pass that London were bombed, and thank goodness he was heeded.

He was heeded, and because of that literally thousands of British people are alive today because they had that protection, not just from the interceptors that were built, but by the use, the proper use of those tunnels, and the proper use of the subways in London.

Mr. Speaker, a number of our colleagues have spoken today and expressed, as I have attempted to, the sincere desire to have a strong civil defense for our Nation. I represent the 4th Congressional District of Missouri. In that district is Whiteman Air Force Base, which is the control center of 150 ICBM missiles, Minutemen II missiles. These missiles, as we all know, are targets of Soviet missiles should the unthinkable come to pass.

I want the people of western Missouri to be safe. But there are other Whiteman Air Force Bases in this Nation and there are other missile fields in this Nation, there are other strategic airfields and there are other strategic submarine bases, some 39 strategic first-strike areas that we think would be targeted first. The people that live in those areas, as well as the people that live in our cities and towns all across our Nation, deserve protection should the unthinkable come to pass.

Let it not be too late.

Mr. Speaker, I intend to persevere. Mr. Speaker, I intend that we eventually have a strong civil defense program that is properly funded and one that we in America can be proud of and one that will be part in truth and fact of our strategic defense.

With the help of the Members of this body we will have such a civil defense in the days ahead.

● Mr. FLIPPO. Mr. Speaker I would like to associate myself with the remarks that have been made by my colleagues about civil defense. The problem with civil defense has been that no one ever needs it, no citizen spends much time thinking about it, no pressure groups breath down our necks to do something until it is too late—until there is a disaster. Only then will our constituents turn to us and say, with justification: "Why didn't you plan for this?"

There is nothing politically expedient or glamorous about civil defense;

only the mundane, long-haul planning that all of us pray we will never need.

Congress can be proud that in the last few years we have made a start in planning for national emergencies. We have done our homework and found that civil defense has more uses than we thought. Not only will an effective plan provide stability during time of crisis and enhance our survivability, but the mere promise of stability and survivability provides a deterrent to our potential enemies and a powerful psychological weapon in our arsenal.

A strong civil defense network can be efficiently adapted to natural disasters so that we can marshal our resources to provide a coordinated response for floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, blizzards, or nuclear and chemical accidents.

We need to do more in this area. We can not afford to postpone our efforts to some unspecified future date. ●

● Mr. HUGHES. Mr. Speaker, I welcome this opportunity, offered by my distinguished colleague IKE SKELTON, to discuss the vital subject of our Nation's civil defense.

In the past, when conventional warfare was the sole source of confrontation between nations, conventional means for defending a nation's citizenry were sufficient. We could hide from enemy bombs and bullets using the same facilities we would use to hide from tornadoes or natural disasters in this country. In addition, our natural geographic isolation from our enemies provided sufficient disincentive to discourage our enemies from major attack with the exception of the bombing of Pearl Harbor.

Nuclear weapons and accurate missile guidance systems have changed our countries defense needs. Now, we can no longer afford to solely concentrate on weaponry designed for attack or defense from conventional attack, nor can we assume that our most significant enemy, the Soviet Union, can be wholly prevented from penetrating our defenses in the case of a nuclear conflict. So, at a time when we are spending record amounts on weapons systems which we hope will discourage the Soviet Union from ever beginning a conflict, we must also plan for a possibility which we fervently hope will never become reality—nuclear attack.

In the event of a full-scale nuclear confrontation between the United States and U.S.S.R., there is one inescapable reality—millions of human beings would die and life as we know it would be inalterably disrupted. But knowing that, we must not forget that the tragedy which would befall the United States in such an event could be significantly mitigated in the event of an attack. Millions of lives could be saved at a surprisingly low social cost.

According to data provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a system of civil defense which could save approximately 80 percent of our population from death in a nuclear war would cost

about \$2.6 billion over 7 years, or about \$1.67 per person per year. This system, called a "Crisis Relocation Plan," would cost about \$1.8 billion more than the current civil defense system, yet save about 90 million more human beings than current capabilities could. In the words of the FEMA report: "This works out to \$20 per life saved, which many consider an attractively low insurance premium."

The benefits of such a system extend well beyond those in the event of nuclear conflict, which we must make every conceivable effort to avoid. First, such a system could actually deter the occurrence of conflict, by improving our defense. Second, it could reduce the Soviet's powers of coercion, by reducing a genuine civil defense gap between the United States and U.S.S.R. Third, in the event of natural disasters, nuclear powerplant incident, or other peacetime emergency, a civil defense evacuation plan could prove invaluable.

So let us not be shortsighted as we consider means to provide for our Nation's defense. Although a good offense may be the best defense, a good defense should not be forgotten.

We cannot forget the need to alleviate some of the terror of the nuclear age, to attempt to prevent the feared eventuality, and to save as many American lives as possible should the leaders of the Soviet Union or our own leaders ever think the unthinkable, and plunge us into an irreversibly tragic confrontation. Let us support civil defense. ●

● Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR. Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman from Missouri for securing a special order to give House Members an additional opportunity to discuss the posture of our Nation's civil defense. His concern over the possibility that Congress may compromise our civil defense capability by reducing its budget commitment for this program is to be appreciated. Indeed I share fully his commitment to maintaining a level of appropriations adequate to preserving civil defense as an essential and integral part of our overall national defense policy. The civil defense effort should not be surrendered or reduced.

In the process of reviewing and establishing defense priorities civil defense always seems to be the odd man out. Offensive hardware attracts attention away from the very real need to maintain passive defense programs, including civil defense. Neither effort should take from the other. They must be mutually supportive in their roles of deterring soviet aggression and the aggressive acts of other potential adversaries.

The result of this conscious disenchantment with passive defense has been the erosion of our civil defense posture over a period of years to the point where it no longer is a credible element within our strategic force structure. Civil defense, in my judg-

ment, must once again be considered in conjunction with our offensive and defensive forces if our national security is to be preserved. To erase it from our strategic formula is to threaten the very mission and purpose of our strategic nuclear force; namely the deterrence of nuclear war.

We no longer have the luxury of assured force superiority over the Soviets. Those days are long behind us and it is questionable today whether or not a balance of strategic military power—often referred to as a “rough equivalence”—exists. At best, we can say that, for the present time, the real strength and preparedness of the U.S. strategic Triad remains credible to the Soviet Union. However, the future of relative United States-Soviet strategic balance is cloudy. United States development and deployment of modern strategic weapons just are not keeping pace with the Soviet Union and our defense capability, in the eyes of the Soviets, may be waning.

The facts speak for themselves. To understand the extent of our vulnerability to Soviet nuclear attack requires only a brief review of the relative United States-U.S.S.R. strategic balance.

The current U.S. B-52 bomber force will require modernization beyond the mounting of cruise missiles. We cannot afford continued reductions in fleet size for the purpose of cannibalization of aircraft to keep remaining B-52's on line.

Current land-based ICBM forces will become more vulnerable with time as Soviet missile accuracy and MIRV capability improve.

The submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force represents the only U.S. strategic delivery system being modernized. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is modernizing a large portion of its forces, hardening its facilities and continuing its intensive research and development.

Since 1970, according to information provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States has put into production one variant of an existing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), one new type of submarine and submarine-launched ballistic missile system, and no new strategic bomber systems.

In the same period, Soviet efforts to improve and enlarge its strategic forces have brought them from a position of clear inferiority to one of superiority in many measures of capability. The Soviets have modernized the ICBM force through new deployment and modifications to deployed systems which have incorporated greater throw weight, more reentry vehicles per missile, and increased accuracy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff now report that the Soviets possess a “clear and growing advantage in ability to kill hard targets.”

Too, the Soviets continue to diversify and improve other elements of their strategic element structure. They continue to build modern, nuclear-

powered ballistic missile submarines more quickly than the United States, new generations of longer range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) thereby expanding the patrol area of the Soviet submarines making them and their missiles less accessible to U.S. interception. Further, while retaining their existing intercontinental bomber forces, the Soviets have deployed over 100 Backfire bombers and are adding about 30 each year. This bomber has sufficient range to be used as an intercontinental bomber against the United States.

While the United States can claim advantage in state-of-the-art technology, technology not employed or deployed does nothing to improve our defense posture.

These trends, which must be viewed with serious concern, have created what the President often refers to as the “window of vulnerability.” The very size of that so-called window makes survivability a top priority concern. It is more than clear that the strategic military balance between the United States and U.S.S.R. continues to shift toward our potential adversary in a very big way. Indeed, the imbalances are of such magnitude measured quantitatively and qualitatively as to confront the United States with the prospect of facing such imbalances well into the future. This is particularly true in light of the Soviets willingness to continue to invest heavily to keep the momentum going in their favor.

The realities of the United States-Soviet strategic balance render it essential that civil defense be maintained as a critical element in our national defense structure. The Soviets are approaching a first strike capability and the ability of the United States to survive such a strike becomes of ever-growing importance as a deterrent factor.

To note now seriously the Soviets view civil defense, one has only to look at their efforts in this regard. To complement their offensive capabilities, the Soviet Union maintains a large strategic defense force supplemented by what the Joint Chiefs of Staff refer to as “an extensive civil defense program,” both of which are far superior to their U.S. counterparts.

We must approach the Soviet level of effort for passive defense, including civil defense, if our strategic nuclear force is to continue to provide a credible deterrence to potential Soviet nuclear aggression. Our “window of vulnerability” remains too wide open without such an improved civil defense posture. We must take into account the civil defense commitment of the Soviets and strengthen our own civil defense program accordingly with the purpose of developing plans to be implemented during times of crisis.

The magnitude of Soviet civil defense efforts and capability, when coupled with high accuracy and more reliable missiles, could adversely affect

our ability to implement the U.S. deterrence strategy.

We have to own up to the fact that the worse case scenario might occur. Should it occur in the near future, the Soviet Union has a first strike capability of inflicting on currently unprotected Americans something in the order of 1.60 million fatalities. Enhanced civil defense efforts providing for a greater degree of survivability and continuity of government will serve to improve our deterrence posture.

In the interest of world peace, the Soviets cannot be permitted to believe that their civil defense system will improve their ability to wage war and enhance Soviet survival of a nuclear exchange. We need, instead, to impress upon the Soviets the ability of the United States to recover quickly from the effects of a nuclear attack, and in a condition permitting a U.S. retaliatory attack of a nature to inflict catastrophic damage to the Soviet Union.

Currently, our civil defense program lacks credibility, and I join my colleague and friend in taking this opportunity to express my full endorsement for maintaining a firm budget commitment for a strong and viable civil defense. ●

● Mr. LOTT. Mr. Speaker, I certainly agree with my colleagues on the floor today who are speaking to the importance of civil defense as an integral part of our Nation's defense posture. We must take caution against any misconceptions regarding the viability of civil defense.

Over the last 15 years, the Soviets have spent almost \$2 billion per year to construct a comprehensive civil defense system. This amounts to approximately \$5 per capita and compares to our own expenditure of some 49 cents per capita, most of which is earmarked for administrative expenditures.

Although estimates regarding the capabilities of the U.S.S.R. civil defense system vary, it is clear that the Soviets are making a conscious effort to protect their population in the event of nuclear war and have included all segments of their society in their defense planning.

The irony of our present situation is that the United States could develop a reasonably effective civil defense program given a few well-thought-out plans and relatively modest expenditures of time and money. All that is lacking is a Federal commitment.

Such a commitment is necessary to an effective partnership in civil defense between local governments and the Federal Government to prepare our communities and the Nation to survive a war. If this preparation is made, these same communities are also prepared to survive the common natural occurrences of floods, tornadoes, and hurricanes.

In view of current international tensions, the civil defense partnership

October 1, 1981

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 678:

must be upheld and strengthened.
Civil defense must once again become
an integral component in our strategic
debate.●

□ 1810

Civil Defense—the New Debate

The possibility of a new program for strengthening the U.S. civil defense against nuclear attack has been raised in Washington recently. Because the editors of Worldview believe a public debate on the program would be useful, we asked a number of people to respond to one or more of the following questions:

- 1. Do you understand it to be the policy of the Carter administration to give major priority to civil defense in the over-all defense posture of this country?*
- 2. Would such a direction be a positive or negative factor in terms of (a) American security and (b) reducing the chances of nuclear war? Why?*
- 3. What is different now from the debate over civil defense against nuclear attack that took place in the late Fifties and early Sixties?*
- 4. What are the ethical considerations you believe are relevant to the above questions?*

New Situation, New Response

Paul H. Nitze

George Kennan, in an interview published by the *New York Times Magazine*, affirmed the proposition that it is better to be "Red than dead." Since the end of World War II the United States has been engaged in a successful effort to demonstrate that the choice thus implied is wrong. We have demonstrated, at least to date, that it is not necessary to be either "Red or dead"; it has been possible both to remain free and to avoid a nuclear war. The essential task is to continue so to do.

In the last half of the 1950's, at the time of Sputnik, serious doubts arose as to whether a time would shortly arise when that issue—"Red or dead"—could become serious. It had not been a serious choice during the period when we had a nuclear monopoly, or even when we had an overwhelming and stable nuclear deterrent. But with the Soviet development of ICBMs, the technological practicality of which was first demonstrated by Sputnik, it became possible, perhaps probable, that the "better Red than dead" issue would arise in all seriousness in a few years.

The alternative solution originally given most attention was the initiation of a U.S. civil defense program. The Gaither Committee, a study group appointed by President Eisenhower, came to the conclusion that such a program could indeed be effective both in enhancing deterrence and greatly reducing casualties if deterrence were to fail. They also concluded, however, that higher priority should be given to immediate measures to improve the survivability of our strategic bomber crews so that a significant portion could be continuously on alert, and by assuring that the alert bombers could get off the ground in the time provided by the warning system. It was recommended that this be coordinated with a program to assure that as soon as possible we

deploy ICBMs in dispersed hardened silos and SLBMs in hard-to-find submarines at sea. An elaborate civil defense program was given second priority. The first priority recommendations of the Gaither Committee were put into effect.

The executive branch concurrently initiated a modest civil defense program designed to provide warning, identify and mark already existing shelter spaces, and partially stock them with supplies. New shelter construction was left to individual initiative. By 1962 we had deployed sufficient ICBMs in dispersed and hardened silos and enough Polaris submarine-based launchers to provide assured crisis stability and high-quality deterrence. After that time civil defense could be, and was viewed as, a low-priority requirement. To many it became, unjustifiably, a cause for derision.

Today the situation has changed; the Soviet Union has for a decade or more been devoting far greater effort to its strategic offensive capabilities than have we. We cut back our program to a third, if measured in constant dollars, of what it averaged during the six years from 1956 to 1962. The Soviet program has expanded to a point at which it is now estimated to be triple ours. There is now little doubt that our previous nuclear strategic superiority has been eliminated. Many, myself included, believe we are heading into a period of serious strategic inferiority and instability. Authorities in the executive branch take a less serious view than I, but they too are concerned. The "better Red than dead" or "better dead than Red" dilemma is again a serious concern.

Under these circumstances the question arises whether we should again consider a more active civil defense program. The executive branch is putting priority on measures to assure the continuing survivability, endurance, and capability of our ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. I wish the executive branch were doing even more in that direction and had acted earlier. In addition the executive branch is reported to be considering doubling, or thereabouts, the current civil defense program of \$90 million a year. In other words, they are considering adding to our civil defense program an

THE HONORABLE PAUL H. NITZE, who has held many high government positions, served until 1974 as the representative of the Secretary of Defense to the United States Delegation to SALT. He is Director of Policy Studies of the Committee on the Present Danger.

SOURCE: *Worldview* v.22, Jan/Feb 1979. pp. 40-48.

Reprinted by the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, with permission of copyright claimant. December 1981.

amount approximating .01 per cent of our overall defense budget. The purpose of this increased civil defense spending would be to give the United States in the event of a serious crisis the ability to evacuate most of our urban population to the countryside. The executive branch estimates that there are circumstances, were deterrence to fail, in which such measures would enable most of our population to survive. The main point, however, is that such a capability could add to deterrence and thus help us continue to avoid the "Red or dead" dilemma.

It is suggested that the Carter administration is thereby giving major priority to civil defense and that this raises ethical questions. The first part of the suggestion is evident nonsense; how can an item constituting .01 per cent of the defense budget be a major priority? A more pertinent question is whether it is enough to be effective. The second part of the question is, however, relevant.

The second part suggests it is somehow immoral to think about nuclear war and, having thought, to take those considered steps designed to improve the quality

of our nuclear deterrent. I am confused by this suggestion. Is it based on the hypothesis that it is wrong to take measures designed to avoid the "better Red than dead" dilemma? Or on the hypothesis that it is too late to make such measures effective and that we must now agree with George Kennan that it is "better to be Red than dead"? A corollary of that hypothesis would appear to be that accommodation of the new Soviet imperium is the best course available to us, even if such a course were to lead to the U.S. subjecting itself to the Kremlin's will. Perhaps the hypothesis is that the more dreadful we make the consequences of a nuclear war to ourselves, the more certain we will be to ensure that the president has no real alternative in a crisis but to surrender. To do otherwise would be to bring *Götterdämmerung* down upon ourselves, even though the Soviet Union, through well-designed military and defense programs, would suffer casualties perhaps a tenth of ours.

I await with interest the other articles in this series. I trust they will contribute to clarifying the hypotheses upon which the ethical issues should be judged.

To Clarify the Issue

Hans J. Morgenthau

It is impossible to state with assurance what the policy of the Carter administration is with regard to civil defense. As in so many other fields of policy, the policy of the Carter administration with regard to civil defense is contradictory in different respects. Successive statements of the same officials contradict each other. The statements of different officials contradict each other. Official statements are contradicted by the actual policy pursued. The realities of the situation militate against the policy announced.

For the purpose of clarifying the issue let us assume that the administration is committed to a greatly expanded civil defense effort over several years, meaning primarily the evacuation of the bulk of the civilian population from the cities. Such a policy is, according to the *New York Times*, "farcical" on several grounds.

First, where is the civilian population to be evacuated to? Let us suppose the goal of the evacuation would be Upstate New York and Connecticut. Has anybody visualized the problems of logistics such a move would entail? Since a comprehensive shelter program appears to be excluded, where would these millions of people find shelter and nourishment, even if they were able to overcome the problems of chaotic mass traffic? Even if all these problems were overcome, the enemy need only change slightly the targets of a few of its multimegaton missiles in order to put the evacuated millions out of

commission. The only change the evacuation of the civilian population would bring about would be the place of demise. The city populations, instead of dying in their respective cities, would be annihilated in their respective places of evacuation. Die they must, if not at home, so at their place of refuge; if not through blast, then through fire and fallout.

This argument supposes that evacuees arrive at their destination according to plan. But what if the evacuees of neighboring cities arrive at the same destination? If, for instance, the evacuees of Boston meet those of Hartford? Are we not going to be witness to a war of all against all, everybody trying to get to a place of safety before everybody else, and everybody fighting everybody tooth and nail, since allegedly sheer survival is at stake?

However, we are only at the beginning of our troubles. So far we have dealt with what one might call the technical problems of evacuation, which appear to be insurmountable. Now let us take a look at the military and political context. Soviet military doctrine stresses the importance of surprise in military operations, especially nuclear war. Evacuation would signal to an enemy the likelihood of nuclear war, either perceived as an enemy move or intended by the evacuating government. Are the prospective belligerents likely to wait until the evacuation is completed, or are they going to start the nuclear war as soon as the evacuation is started? Evacuation would be tantamount to an Act of War, forcing the hand of one or the other, or more likely of both of the prospective belligerents. Far from being a factor in

HANS J. MORGENTHAU is Chairman of the *Worldview* Editorial Board and University Professor, Department of Political Science, at the New School for Social Research.

preventing nuclear war, evacuation would be a factor in making it inevitable; for it would signal to all concerned that the evacuating government is ready for nuclear war.

The argument against evacuation is similar to that made against shelters almost two decades ago. The idea of evacuation assumes that nuclear war is similar to conventional war, only more destructive than the latter.

Some Moral Reflections

James T. Johnson

There can simply be no doubt that protection of noncombatants is a major priority of the Western tradition on warfare, generally called the "just war" tradition. Its general concerns are two: to define when the violence of war is allowable (the problem of justification) and to set limits to what may be done in even a just war (the problem of limitation). Paul Ramsey, for example, finds both these concerns in the thought of Augustine of Hippo and argues that for him and for Christian just war theory generally they should be regarded as requirements of divine love. A Christian, on this view, has a duty in love to protect innocent persons being unjustly threatened by violence or subjected to it, and he may utilize counterviolence, if necessary, to effect such a defense. At the same time, the use of such counterviolence is limited by a number of restraints also derived from love, foremost of which is a duty also toward the unjust assailant not to harm him any more than necessary to defend his victim.

A similar pattern of reasoning emerges in Jewish tradition. Talmudic ethics allows use of violence against one who pursues with the intent of doing harm; yet the counterviolence that is permitted is limited by two constraints: First, one may do no worse to the pursuer than what he seeks to do, and, second, one may do no more than needed to make the pursuer leave off his evil intention. Secular contributions to Western just war tradition have provided analogous ideas: The medieval code of chivalry, for example, defined the knight as having a duty to protect noncombatants, while the concept of limited war originally defined and put into practice by such military theorists as Frederick the Great sought to ensure absolute protection of noncombatants outside a combat area and relative protection inside such an area. The requirements of defending noncombatants against the ravages of war is thus at the very core of Western thought on how war can be a moral enterprise.

Still, there are numerous ways to defend against violence: running away or, more generally, putting the threatened out of reach of the threatener; interposing an

In truth, nuclear war, by virtue of its unimaginable destructiveness, is qualitatively different from conventional war. In conventional war you can rationally resort to evacuation and shelters. In nuclear war there is no place to hide. You have to prevent it in order to avoid destruction. Once deterrence has failed, only one question remains: How do you want to die—at home or elsewhere, in a shelter or above ground?

impregnable shield between threatener and threatened; warding off the attack of an assailant with skillful parries; fighting back or striking pre-emptively in an attempt to disarm or disable the assailant; threatening to retaliate violently if the original threat is carried through. If all the above methods would be equally effective in a given situation, then the sequence of this list defines an order of moral priority among these methods: Those presented first are preferable to those presented later.

The old civil defense program, which aimed at building shelters to protect city populations against nuclear blast and fallout, was a form of shield defense, while the new program recently announced by the Carter administration represents an attempt to defend by putting threatened noncombatants out of reach of the violence of nuclear attack. Similarly, ABMs constitute a defense oriented at fighting back with intent to disarm, while mutual assured destruction (MAD) strategy is a version of defense by the threat of retaliation. Prima facie, the Western just war tradition would seem to favor civil defense programs over these last types of defense against countercity nuclear attack, since civil defense aims to maximize the restraints on use of violence in defense. But such a prima facie judgment would be, in this case, wrong.

Just war tradition permits violence if it is necessary to an effectual defense, and such violence is allowed up to and including the level of violence employed by the "unjust" or "pursuing" attacker. It is clear that in this moral tradition one may kill if necessary to prevent an innocent person from being killed. The permission to resort to such a response in kind includes permission to threaten to do so. Thus we are all well off the scent if we take the concern of just war tradition to defend noncombatants to rule out the threat of retaliation, or if we take it to imply that programs of civil defense, which are inherently nonviolent, are *ipso facto* to be preferred over means of defense that threaten violence against the attacker. This tradition is concerned with the protection of noncombatants, and that requires an effective defense. This in turn requires that moral analysis take into account the relative effectiveness of various possible modes of defense as well as their abstract moral preferability in terms of the level of violence each entails.

JAMES T. JOHNSON, who heads the Department of Religion at Douglass College, Rutgers University, is author of *Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War*.

The only thing that can be said in favor of mutual assured destruction as a defensive strategy is that for quite some time now it has worked to help prevent a nuclear war. But that is a great deal to say for it. And given the proposed scale of the Carter civil defense program, this program will not replace such a strategy of retaliation but can only supplement it. Were this new program the leading edge of an effort to substitute civil defense entirely for MAD, we would have to weigh the

implications of such a substitution. But as a supplement to existing strategic defense policy, it presumably aims at maintaining a balance between the superpowers as to what level of destruction could be sustained by their societies in the event of a nuclear interchange. Thus it is an effort to bolster the stalemate. A full moral analysis of this new civil defense program therefore would have to weigh it within this larger context of a continuing reliance on defense by retaliatory threat.

Reasons in Opposition

John C. Bennett

Before our government embarks on the proposed forms of civil defense I hope that the following reasons for *not* doing so will be taken very seriously.

Preparations for the evacuation of cities in a society as free as ours would involve such drastic actions that they would be more of a signal than we would intend of our readiness for nuclear war. Combined with any build-up of strategic nuclear arms that suggested a first-strike capability to the other side, they would be more provocative than appears to us, to whom they would seem innocent and defensive. This reminds me of the account by Thucydides of the great pains the Athenians took to conceal from the Spartans the fact that they were rebuilding their walls after the Persian wars. What could be more innocent and defensive than a wall!

Greater account must be taken of the fears of the Soviet Union. In the long run they may fear China more than the U.S. We are their powerful adversary, who for decades expressed, more unofficially than officially, hostility to the Soviet Union. How much of a residue there is in the USSR of a dogmatic belief in the inevitability of war between the two systems, I do not know. A two-front war is in their minds, and they even speak of China as an eastern member of NATO. They know that the countries of Eastern Europe that are supposed to be in their camp are not reliable allies. They even fear the U.S. may come to have a powerful presence in Iran. There is in the background something the Russians remember and exaggerate and we have forgotten: the American military presence in Siberia in 1917-20. It is also not forgotten that the U.S. is the only nation ever to use atomic bombs, that most of the victims were civilians, and that the U.S. since World War II has dropped more bombs on other nations than have the rest of the nations combined. We do not see ourselves in this light at all. Indeed, what others see is quite out of line with our own present intentions as a nation. But fears and provocations depend on what others see.

The second reason for not going ahead is what such a

form of civil defense as the preparation to evacuate cities would do to our own people. Again, this would necessitate taking such authoritarian measures in a nation so unaccustomed to them as to make a great impression on the American people, leading them to become accustomed to nuclear war as more than a remote possibility. Official explanations, which in such matters always seem too optimistic, might create the sense that nuclear war could be survived, not only by a large majority of our people, but also by our free institutions and other aspects of our life that we believe most worth defending. Such an outcome is highly doubtful. The secondary effects of nuclear explosions would be played down, and the more remote genetic effects on future generations would not be considered. It might be better to die instantly in Manhattan than slowly in New Jersey. We cannot trust the Pentagon's weighing of the intangible effects of nuclear war.

"... better to die instantly in Manhattan than slowly in New Jersey."

Also, participation by the people in such preparations might well increase our own fear of the Russians and our hostility toward them. We have long had a tendency to be obsessed by a combination of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism, but in recent years we have in large measure moved away from it. For the American people once more to be controlled by this obsession would distort our policy and increase anxieties on the other side. I fear that preparations for evacuation of cities that are thorough enough to be significant would signal the end of détente and of any promise of curtailing the arms race. This would be true even if we learned that Russia's more authoritarian government had taken some steps to prepare to evacuate its cities. It could do this with far less mind-changing dislocations than could our government. Before estimating its significance, we should recognize the grounds I have mentioned for Russian fears and its history of invasion by others.

JOHN C. BENNETT, a member of the Graduate Theological Union at Berkeley, is former President of Union Theological Seminary in New York.

The Misguided Concept

Thomas J. Downey

Anyone who believes that the Soviet Union, because of its civil defense program, is better able to survive a nuclear war than the United States is totally misguided. And anyone willing to accept such a foolish argument is blind to three basic facts.

First, the massive urban evacuation program would have limited effectiveness in reducing the disastrous effects of a nuclear attack on the general population, even supposing that such a scheme could be effectively carried out on a national scale. Second, targeting for population destruction is not in any case a primary goal of our current strategic planning. Third, if Soviet strategic planners are contemplating a first-strike scenario against the United States (as many American hawks state in their arguments for an American civil defense evacuation scheme), they would be unable to employ their urban evacuation plan, because to do so would obviously destroy the element of surprise needed for any first strike to succeed.


What would Soviet urban evacuation on a massive scale—if it could actually be accomplished with Russia's very limited transportation system—actually accomplish? Millions of city dwellers fleeing to the countryside would present tremendous logistical problems even under the best of conditions, and the Russian climate and terrain are not noted for mildness and hospitality. An American nuclear counterstrike would be designed to destroy the Russian industrial base for waging war and the entire economic structure of the enemy for recovery. It is presently estimated that two-thirds of the Soviet industrial base would be destroyed within hours. With a shattered economic base, a crippled transportation system, and the "means of production" in ashes, Soviet evacuees would be left with only stockpiled food, medicine, and heating oil. There would be no hope of replenishing these essentials. Furthermore, flight to rural areas is no defense against drifting clouds of nuclear radiation; and radiation, not blast effect, is the primary cause of death in the civilian population, whether urban or rural. Also, if a counterstrike occurred before evacuation were complete, the civilian evacuees would be much more vulnerable on the road than they would have been at home. It should be remembered too that food-producing areas are also important strategic targets, and this further limits the imagined safety of flight to the countryside.

Though nuclear-targeting doctrine in the Seventies does not have the aim of slaughtering the civilian population, a very high proportion of the population in any country receiving a nuclear attack would be killed, in the attack and from its aftereffects, whether they fled the urban areas or not. Neither Russia nor the United States

THOMAS J. DOWNEY (D-New York) serves on the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

can possibly hope to protect its civilian population to the extent that nuclear confrontation could be thought safe. Nuclear war would be the greatest possible mistake for both sides.

It would be morally irresponsible to lead the American people to believe that safety from a nuclear attack could be found through evacuation. Conversely, we must not give the Soviet Union the impression that we believe they have an advantage or a chance of survival because of their evacuation program. They do not; and, furthermore, any use they might make of evacuation would be crisis destabilizing, accelerating toward conflict. In the event of a crisis situation—say, Soviet inter-



Civil Defense the Last Time Around

Basement Concrete-Block Fallout Shelter (Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization diagram). A pair of slippers lies in readiness for the shelter's one (!?) inhabitant.

ference with the supply of oil to the West from the Persian Gulf—the United States must make it abundantly clear to the Soviets that an implementation of their urban evacuation program would be seen as a prelude to a strike against us and that our nuclear forces would be put on alert accordingly. If the U.S. had an evacuation scheme and put it into effect, the Russians would no doubt go on alert, and the movement toward nuclear confrontation would be similarly accelerated. Not only is civil defense evacuation ineffective in protecting the general population and useless in planning a surprise first strike, it could actually increase the risk of nuclear war in a crisis confrontation.

Undoubtedly, serious attention must continue to be given to civil defense preparedness, but rather than expending time, energy, and money in planning a massive evacuation scheme, simply because "the Russians are doing it," I believe that our civil defense efforts would be better served by planning to maintain calm and rational order in American cities in a crisis, whether caused by threat of war or natural disaster. In the event of a serious confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR the main concern of American civil defense authorities should not be herding our urban citizens into the countryside but, rather, maintaining safety and order in our cities and preventing a panic-stricken chaotic flight to the ill-conceived safety of the countryside.

The Illusion of Protection

Richard J. Barnet

The policy of the Carter administration is to increase substantially civil defense expenditures. In terms of money it is not a "majority priority," since the administration plans to lock us into overall military expenditures on the order of \$1.8 trillion in 1977 dollars by 1988. The justification for the increased civil defense expenditure is that it is a "modest" increase in response to demands for a much bigger program and a counter to the Soviet program. There is a strong pork barrel element in the program too. Just as civil defense was the justification for building the nation's highway system, it is now being quietly presented to local officials as a way to get some money into local communities in a time of austerity. It is also a way to buy off opposition to a SALT treaty, or so it is thought.

All such justifications for the program are utterly irresponsible. To spend billions on civil defense when crucial programs essential to the strength of the nation are being slashed is pathological. Appeasing critics of the SALT treaty by throwing them a "harmless" bone is self-defeating, for the program lends credibility to their view of reality, not that of the treaty advocates, and creates a climate in which it is easier to defeat the treaty.

The idea that we should "match" the Soviets, or even, within very broad limits, be influenced by what they do in civil defense, is puerile. If they were developing a program that suggested an ability or an intent to eliminate virtually all civilian casualties, that would be cause for concern. It would suggest an effort to create what we used to call a "credible first-strike posture." But that is not the case. The Soviet program becomes threatening only if we assume that the leaders are prepared to sacrifice a substantial portion of their population, or more. For their program, as the CIA has reported, cannot protect their population. According to PRM-10, a study of the National Security Council, the Soviets would suffer more than a hundred million casualties in a nuclear war. The Soviets spend money many ways the U.S. would be foolish to imitate. Civil defense is one of them.

A civil defense program is a waste of money not only because it cannot protect the society from the effects of a nuclear war, it is harmful because it fosters the illusion that Americans can be "protected." It causes the government to make outrageous claims such as the one that 140 million Americans can be saved by evacuating the cities (anyone who has ever tried to leave a city in a normal holiday weekend, let alone a nuclear alert, knows how easy that is). It reinforces the fatalism and acceptance of nuclear holocaust, which is the most powerful dynamic pushing us toward the ultimate catastrophe. If nuclear war is initiated, it will be because those who start it believe that it cannot be avoided. Only an insane

RICHARD J. BARNET is a Senior Fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.

leader of the U.S. or the USSR would choose nuclear war over peace. No conceivable national interest on either side would justify the risk. But if the choice is believed to be nuclear war now or nuclear war later, then the decision to pre-empt or to "prevent" the more terrible future war might seem plausible. The drill for death that seems so pathological when done on a small scale, as at Jonestown, brings us closer to war because it conditions us to accept the inevitability of war. The most important effects of the civil defense program are not physical. The program cannot be large enough to avert an unimaginable catastrophe or to assure the survival of a democratic society in the United States. The significance is psychological. It is a crucial mechanism for helping brainwash a generation into accepting the lethal myth that there is no alternative to security but to hide.

I remember a popular book about Nazi Germany called *Education for Death*. It was one of the most telling critiques of the moral bankruptcy of a regime that preached the inevitability of war and drilled the whole society into accepting that belief. Anything that legitimizes nuclear war by perpetuating the illusion that it is simply an extension of old-fashioned war and not an historic watershed betrays an arrogant disregard for the future of the planet. We are only beginning to understand that the ecological effects of the productive system are much more serious than previously believed, because the life-support systems—air, water, soil, etc.—are interlocking. We have no idea of the real extent or duration of the damage caused by irradiating vast areas of the planet and no notion of the real harm it would do to future generations. All we can be reasonably sure of is that the effects will be worse than we plan for. To foster the belief that nuclear war is "manageable" or "winnable" or justified for any political purpose is a way of avoiding the real ethical issue—that this generation is not the owner of the earth, only a steward or a trustee. To assert the right to destroy it is the ultimate blasphemy.

Some Possible Problems

David T. Johnson

While the Carter administration is clearly paying more attention to civil defense and will undoubtedly request more funding for crisis-relocation planning, this does not yet constitute giving "major priority" to civil defense. Most policymakers seem to believe civil defense can play only a very limited role in mitigating the effects of nuclear weapons.

Many of the questions related to the desirability or undesirability of more stress on civil defense are essentially unanswerable. We simply cannot know with assurance how it will affect U.S. security or the chances of

DAVID T. JOHNSON is Director of Research at the Center for Defense Information, Washington, D.C.

nuclear war. Plausible points can be made on both sides, but it is mostly speculation. Nobody who feels strongly one way or the other is likely to have his views changed. The debate will be predictably inconclusive.

What masquerades as rational decisionmaking on most issues of nuclear weapons and nuclear war is really a strikingly subjective process in which no one should have much confidence. Decisions are reached, such as the decision to expand civil defense preparations, on the basis of a hodgepodge of relevant and irrelevant considerations. Different people and groups will oppose or support the decision for their own reasons. Shifting tides of prejudice and habit will play a determining part.

It is certain the debate over civil defense in 1979 will be primarily presented as an issue of whether the U.S. should be strong vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. More intellectual types will be appealed to on the basis of the presumed moderate, prudent, humanitarian character of the Carter civil defense insurance policy. In the existing climate there will be less than adequate attention paid to some possible problems arising out of the new civil defense thrust.

The Soviet threat. Regardless of whatever plausible-sounding arguments are made for the Carter civil defense program, an unavoidable consequence of selling the program to the American people and the Congress will be an increase in their fear and suspicion of the Soviet Union. Of course this is the whole point of the exercise for some people. Others, perhaps even President Carter and Defense Secretary Harold Brown, may be less pleased with this side effect. It may complicate, rather than help, the SALT ratification process.

U.S. military weakness. Both President Carter and Secretary Brown have on numerous occasions downplayed the effectiveness of Soviet civil defense activities in shielding the Soviet Union from the effects of an American nuclear strike. They have expressed firm confidence in the American deterrent irrespective of Soviet civil defense. However, the effort to promote the new U.S. civil defense program will undoubtedly stimulate widespread concern in the U.S. about the possible potency of Soviet civil defense. It will inspire unnecessary anxieties about U.S. nuclear strength.

Perceptions. Increasingly, American military programs are being argued for on the grounds of what other countries might think of the U.S., their "perceptions" of U.S. power or weakness. Officials seem willing to advocate programs that are needed just to improve "perceptions," even if their strictly military justification is less than compelling. The Carter administration's civil defense program has just this character. In April, 1978, the *New York Times* quoted from a secret ten-page memorandum from Secretary Brown to the president:

As you know, the Soviets have shown great interest and considerable activity in this field. While I do not believe that the effort significantly enhances the prospects for Soviet society as a whole following any full-scale nuclear exchange, it has obviously had an effect on international perceptions, particularly in contrast to our small and static civil defense program. For that reason alone I believe at least modest efforts on our part could have a high payoff [emphasis added].

An expansion of U.S. civil defense justified primarily on the basis of "international perceptions" (perceptions that Secretary Brown appears to find in error) seems somewhat dubious. It may encourage equally questionable decisionmaking on other defense issues.

Camel's nose. More civil defense preparations may be the camel's nose under the tent. Once the American people are convinced of the efficacy of some "limited civil defense measures, they will be appealed to on the same grounds for additional means of protection. Expansion of U.S. air defense capability and stepped-up ABM research and potential deployment of new ABM systems are likely follow-ons. If a little protection is good, why not more?

Fear of nuclear war. Another apparently unavoidable—if unintended—consequence of the new stress on civil defense will be that it will serve as a signal of the greater possibility of nuclear war. It is more likely that this increased fear will be mobilized in the direction of military build-up and "tough" foreign policy actions than in the direction of reducing nuclear arsenals.

The heart of the danger in the civil defense issue today was reflected in the words of Clyde Mitchell, director of Oklahoma City's civil defense program: "We don't want to lay down and die in Oklahoma City. Folks around here say, yes, eventually we are going to come to a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. It's sort of inevitable."

The Background Music

Paul Ramsey

The trial balloons recently sent up about protecting our population in the event of nuclear war focus on the staged evacuation of cities—not, as in the early Sixties, on bomb shelters. The aim today is more on countering nuclear threats, less on protecting people or defending the nation. A capability to maneuver people (like troops) is needed to give the president an option to yielding to nuclear blackmail.

This is what is called crisis management, and it has a "logic" of its own. For example, the U.S. would have to be able to move people out of cities, or protect them there, in vastly greater numbers than Russia needs to do simply to make things even. We have far more of our population in far more and far more populous metropolitan areas than has Russia. The president, if he is sensible, is more likely to yield to power-moves under cover of nuclear threats than is Russia. He must blink first. Under such conditions, who now has the more credible deterrent?

The main question to be raised about civil defense in a nuclear age never was whether this is feasible or not.

PAUL RAMSEY is Harrington Spear Paine Professor of Christian Ethics at Princeton University.

(The plans—long in existence—for the staged evacuation of Oklahoma City are reported to be practical [*New York Times*, December 1, 1978]. Oklahoma City is a good-size Russian city!) Listen to the background music in some of these responses in *Worldview* and the forthcoming national debate over this proposal (if there is one). It will be evident that the morality and feasibility of massive deterrence is the issue. Yesterday, today, and forever in a nuclear age this will be the issue, not one component part of such a strategy. Those who accept the desirability or the irreformability of mutual assured destruction (the MAD policy) will argue that civil defense is infeasible. The background music, however, is that such defense is undesirable because MAD is the only sound or moral strategic policy. By this we get peace, with—it will also be supposed—fewer bucks and no bangs.

I myself doubt there will again be serious discussion of the morality or immorality of the Deterrent State such as there was in the early Sixties. For what can be better than peace, even if the means are immorally aimed at civilian hostages? Peace with butter—and a national health plan.

In the early Sixties I was one of two theologians who dared address the matter of "shelter morality." L.C. McHugh and I* probed mainly the micro-problem of what one should do in the event of a breakdown of all government and human beings were returned to a "state of nature" or, at least, to that stage of society in which the paterfamilias or limited local chieftains served also as the highest known political authorities, before the emergence of the differentiation of "government" in larger societies. To such a primitive political situation, I argued, we would be returned by nuclear destruction of modern organized states; and that then the remaining "magistrates" should do what they must to save life when all lives cannot be saved—protecting by whatever means the capacity of a bomb shelter to save life, perhaps against desperate human beings banging at the door, whom to admit would mean all would be lost. The Princeton faculty planned, in those days, to designate the underground levels of Firestone Library as a place of refuge for ourselves and the students, for whom we had first responsibility, then as a community shelter to the extent the facilities allowed. This was proper planning, but only if the larger context was proper.

Father McHugh may have been told to write no more; and it would have saved personal energy if I also had been so told—since few then or now in the church or in American political society seem able to be convinced that the chief thing wrong with fallout shelters or city evacuations is not their infeasibility but, rather, their participation in the gross immorality of our MAD deterrence policy. The articulate élites in our nation and in the churches seem to believe that they can accept the Deterrent State while still braying against civil defense

*L.C. McHugh, S.J., "Ethics at the Shelter Doorway," *America* (September 30, 1961); Paul Ramsey, "Shelter Morality," *Presbyterian Life* (November 15, 1961), with correspondence, January 1, 1962. Father McHugh concentrated more exclusively on the micro-problem than I—if anyone wants to know.

and even against vats of Pentagon poison. Thus the neutron bomb was opposed, even though it is a more discriminate weapon. It kills *people* was the vocal reason. The real reason was: We ought to do nothing to weaken or alter our single-minded intention to destroy entire populations on the condition that we are attacked—to *prevent* that attack, of course!

Looking back, I should have introduced this further micro-point. I should have made the case for a just revolution against the Deterrent State that *means* to make no defense of its people. In a thrice the theory of justifiable *revolution* can be directed against a government such as ours that means to maneuver its citizens (whether to protect them or not) as if we all are soldiers, and that also treats the entire citizenry of an adversary as if they were combatants, pawns in the power struggle between nations.

"How explain [the churches'] acceptance of the systematic political intention of the U.S. to do evil that good may come?"

I should have argued that every head of household, or local councilman, is *in principle* already a chief magistrate who may be called upon to overthrow the magistrates in power who have abandoned the intention to wage only just war. That, in short, MAD has placed us *before* such deterrence fails in a situation like the one *when* deterrence fails. I should have argued with John Calvin that "if there be, in the present day, any magistrates appointed for the protection of the people and the moderation of the power of kings . . . I am so far from prohibiting them in the discharge of their duty, to oppose the violence and cruelty of kings, that I affirm that if they connive in their oppression of their people, such forbearance involves the most nefarious perfidy, because they fraudulently betray the [lives and] liberty of the people, of which they know that they have been appointed protectors by the ordinance of God." Such connivance now takes the stark form of taking hostages and giving the people of one's own nation over to be hostages to deter a nuclear enemy. Any "forebearance" to raise democratic opposition to massive deterrence or, that failing, to bring about radical reform in military policy, to raise a revolution against such government, is indeed a nefarious perfidy.

The greatest betrayal, however, has been that of the churches. How explain our acceptance of the systematic political intention of the U.S. to do evil that good may come? Especially, how can this be excused on the part of spokesmen of churches whose stance is cooperation with political institutions when just and necessary; disagreement, opposition, and efforts to reform when they are not? How excuse the exertions of political participatory religious influence that seizes so many occasions to fasten the hold of an unaltered MAD policy upon us, instead of undertaking the difficult intellectual and

practical task of finding and supporting those military policies and weapons decisions that can transform this system?*

A nonpacifist Christian should experience an enduring moral sorrow over the exclusive attention of the church to other concerns in recent years, and over its *misattention* to this one. Even Christians who stand within the tradition of involvement in the constraining realities of politics know, or should know, that the state can become a beast or a drunken "harlot sitting on the seven hills."

This is a moment of mortal peril for our nation, all the more because it is unrecognized. By mortal peril I do not so much mean survival as our place in the future moral and political history of mankind. Symbolically, but only symbolically, the critical moment was Martin Luther King, Jr.'s, Riverside Church address linking the plight of the poor and the blacks to the Vietnam war (April 4, 1967). Then liberals supposed there would be a "peace dividend" resulting from extrication from that war. King only tapped beliefs already deeply imbedded in the mentality of the articulate liberal elite, especially in the churches.


There was no such "peace dividend" in sight of any realistic analysis at that time. It is not surprising, then,

*It is rather late, if not too late, to cite in support of options to our confirmed MAD policy the following experts who are no way contaminated by theological political reasoning: Arthur Lee Burns (*Adelphi Paper*, No. 69, "Ethics and Deterrence: A Nuclear Balance Without Hostage Cities?" [London: Institute for Strategic Studies, July, 1970]); Donald G. Brennan of the Hudson Institute, who first coined the MAD acronym (*New York Times*, Op. Ed. page [May 24 and 25, 1971]); and Bruce M. Russett ("Short of Nuclear Madness," *Worldview* [April, 1972]). In this and other articles Russett advocated a *countercombatant* deterrent. The Russians are adequately deterred by a credible threat that the U.S. can and will wipe out their army on the Chinese border; there is no need to aim at their civilian population. For the record I may add that in earlier writings on the morality of warfare and of deterrence my expression "*counterforce*" took its meaning from its opposite, "*counterpeople*." I never meant to say the U.S. should develop the overwhelming power to destroy Russia's missile *forces* with impunity. Russett's expression "*countercombatant*" exactly expresses my meaning—including their military forces, of course.

that those already addicted to such expectations have since continued to befuddle U.S. foreign policy by the same hopes. This leads such people to place greater and greater reliance on "minimum" deterrence, meantime blinding themselves to sound discussion of any such policy by rhetorical persuasions that we already had too much.

So I seriously suggest that any sensible person—for his own serenity, if for no other reason, whether possessed of the apostle John's ultimate faith or not—refuse to discuss or get agitated about any single item or all the separate items together that are on our present military agenda *unless* he or she has some expectation of opening again the discussion of the basic immorality and the final irrationality of the present shape of mutual deterrence. This would be a sound political resolution whether the specific issue is bomb shelters or staged city evacuation or the neutron bomb or the Trident submarine or SALT II, or whether we already have overkilled and can safely cut the defense budget, or our commitment to NATO to increase the budget by 3 per cent, beyond inflation, or whether we can abandon altogether our continent-based missiles and depend on the other two parts of the tripod (submarine and air-based city-destroying missiles), or should learn to move the Minuteman missiles around or instead increase their throw-weight or multiple accuracy.

These are only some of the options in contention. Discussion of them is "sound and fury signifying nothing," unless and until we relate them each and every one to the radical transformation of mutual massive nuclear deterrence. As long as any of these options is only a subordinate aspect of MAD, it too is equally M-A-D, however feasible or infeasible when considered alone. If a sound discussion of military strategy could be launched, it would not have as a basic premise "more bang for the buck." But neither can the premise be—to which the religious are inclined—the notions that we can have enough immorally intended but planned-not-to-be-used bangs with fewer bucks, or that what was once called "minimum deterrence" is a good idea because it promises that we can turn our attention to the priority of domestic claims on the Federal budget, or that distributing more butter could possibly justify the peacekeeping means our nation now relies on.

97th Congress } 1st Session }	COMMITTEE PRINT	{ No. 2
<p>THE FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ACT OF 1950</p> <p>As Amended Through February 1, 1981</p> <hr/> <p>PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES</p>		
		
FEBRUARY 1981		
<p>Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives</p> <hr/> <p>U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 1981</p>		
26-261 O		

Of particular interest is Title V - Improved
Civil Defense Program effective September 8, 1980
as P. L. 96-342.

TITLE V—IMPROVED CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM

SENSE OF CONGRESS

Sec. 501. [50 U.S.C. App. 2301] (a) It is the sense of Congress that—

- (1) a civil defense program providing for the relocation of the population of risk areas, including the larger United States cities, during a period of strategic warning resulting from an international crisis may be effective in protecting the population;
 - (2) the present civil defense program should be improved; and
 - (3) an improved civil defense program can be developed which could enhance the civil defense capability of the United States.
- (b) It is further the sense of Congress that an improved civil defense program should be implemented which—
- (1) enhances the survivability of the American people and its leadership in the event of nuclear war and thereby improves the basis for eventual recovery and reduces the Nation's vulnerability to a major attack;
 - (2) enhances deterrence, contributes to perceptions of the United States-Soviet strategic balance and crisis stability, and reduces the possibility that the United States might be susceptible to coercion by an enemy in times of increased tension;

²⁴ The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was completely revised by the Act of August 30, 1954, and was redesignated as the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. That Act is classified principally to chapter 23 (section 2011 et seq.) of title 42, United States Code.

- (3) does not suggest any change in the United States policy of relying on strategic nuclear forces as the preponderant factor in maintaining deterrence;
- (4) includes planning for the relocation of certain segments of the population during times of international crisis; and
- (5) is adaptable to help deal with natural disasters and other peacetime emergencies.

ELEMENTS OF AN IMPROVED CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM

SEC. 502. [50 U.S.C. App. 2302] (a) In order to carry out the sense of Congress expressed in section 501, the President shall, to the extent practicable, develop and implement an improved civil defense program which includes—

- (1) a program structure for the resources to be used for attack-related civil defense;
- (2) a program structure for the resources to be used for disaster-related civil defense; and
- (3) criteria and procedures under which those resources planned for attack-related civil defense and those planned for disaster-related civil defense can be used interchangeably.
- (b) In developing a program structure for attack-related civil defense pursuant to subsection (a), the President shall give consideration to including in such program structure the following elements:
 - (1) Nuclear civil protection planning for more rapid population relocation during times of international crisis.
 - (2) Nuclear civil protection planning for improved in-place population protection during times of international crisis in the event circumstances preclude population relocation.
 - (3) A survey of the shelters inherent in existing facilities.
 - (4) Planning for the development during times of crisis of additional shelter.
 - (5) Development of capabilities for shelter management.
 - (6) Marking and stocking of shelters.
 - (7) Development and procurement of ventilation kits for shelters.
 - (8) The development of emergency evacuation plans for areas in which nuclear powerplants are located.
 - (9) The improvement of civil defense warning systems.
 - (10) The improvement of systems and capabilities for direction and control of emergency operations by civil governments at all levels, including further development of a network of emergency operating centers.
 - (11) The improvement of radiological defense capabilities.
 - (12) The improvement of emergency public information and training programs and capabilities.
 - (13) The development of plans for postattack economic recovery and the development of plans for postdisaster economic recovery to the extent that planning for postdisaster economic recovery planning does not detract from planning for postattack economic recovery.
 - (14) The improvement of and training in self-help nuclear war survival skills.

- (15) Civil defense-related research and development.
- (16) The development of other appropriate systems and capabilities to increase the lifesaving potential of the civil defense program.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS

SEC. 503. [50 U.S.C. App. 2303] The powers contained in titles II and IV of this Act shall be used in developing and implementing the program required by section 502.

○



Congressional Research Service The Library of Congress

Washington, D.C. 20540

CIVIL DEFENSE BUDGET

In response to requests for information on the fiscal year 1982 and 1983 budget outlook for civil defense, we have gathered the following information. The FY 1982 appropriation figures for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which has the responsibility for civil defense activities, are from the Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-101), as verified by FEMA. The figures for the FY 1983 budget request were provided by FEMA. The budget information is provided in three major categories.

CIVIL DEFENSE PORTION OF FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY BUDGET

	in thousands of dollars unadjusted for inflation	
	FY82 (actual)	FY83 (request)
I. State and Local Assistance		
A. State and Local Assistance	48,982	66,320
B. Radiological Assistance	8,950	28,950
C. Nuclear Attack--Civil Preparedness	11,637	46,200
D. Emergency Operating Centers	6,545	14,870
E. Communications and Warning	2,591	0
	79,705	156,340
II. Emergency Planning and Assistance		
A. Research	8,717	22,040
B. Training and Education	10,163	16,510
C. Telecommunications and Warning		
1. Telecommunications and Warning	10,305	15,391
2. Communications and Warning	0	9,861
	29,185	63,802
III. Salary and Expenses	24,364	32,198
Total	133,254	252,340

Source: FEMA Budget Office, February 10, 1982

Congressional Reference Division

New Civil-Defense Aim: Empty Major Cities

Will Reagan's plan to evacuate target areas improve chances for peace—or risk nuclear war? Views are split over a big switch in U.S. strategy.

Amid rising controversy over President Reagan's nuclear-arms policy, a White House plan for a vast new civil-defense program has ignited a political firestorm.

The plan spelled out in late March calls, in case of a nuclear showdown with the Soviet Union, for evacuating to the countryside the 145 million Americans living in 400 high-risk areas in big cities and near vital military bases.

Key to the proposal is the assumption that risk of a nuclear war would be obvious days before it actually began—not a surprise attack of the sort that formed the basis of the last civil-defense program, which called for sending people to nearby shelters.

Experts predict that an all-out nuclear attack today probably would kill some 139 million of the nation's population of 231 million. Proponents claim the new plan would cut the death toll to about 46 million.

"Our goal is to double the number of Americans that would survive from a major Soviet attack on the U.S.," said Louis O. Giuffrida, director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Strategic aim. The plan also has a strategic purpose: To prevent a situation from developing during an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation in which the Soviets could empty their cities but the U.S. could not, thus perhaps encouraging the Russians to believe they could strike first and win.

Critics, some of them already at odds with the administration over the issue of a nuclear-weapons freeze, retorted that the new civil-defense program is part of an effort by the Reagan administration to convince Americans that it is possible to fight—and win—a nuclear war. Merely putting the plan into effect, opponents warned, would edge closer the possibility of an atomic holocaust.

Others attacked the program on a pragmatic basis, arguing that monumental traffic jams and gen-

eral chaos would result if officials tried to empty America's largest cities. Still other opponents contended that money could be better spent in other ways to increase the nation's defenses.

The new civil-defense scheme differs significantly from those put forward in the 1950s and 1960s, largely because of the enormous rise in the number of nuclear weapons now aimed at the U.S.

Once it was assumed that an atomic attack would destroy some cities but leave many others intact. Now the assumption is that 400 targets—all the U.S. cities of more than 50,000 population, the bomber and nuclear-submarine bases, the missile silos and other military and industrial sites—might be hit almost simultaneously.

The number of Americans living or working in those high-risk areas totals 145 million, and for them there would be no place to hide.

The new plan is to move them out into the countryside to host areas where they would be relatively safe from blast, heat and the initial burst of nuclear radiation. They would require protection—perhaps for weeks—from

deadly radioactive particles carried by the winds.

The new approach is predicated on the conviction of civil-defense planners that the U.S. would get several days' notice of an impending Soviet nuclear attack during a period of growing tension, as occurred in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Aside from being tipped off by an exchange of demands and threats, officials count on the detection by intelligence sources of other signs of danger such as movement of ships and troops and a higher alert status for Russian nuclear forces.

Ruled out: Surprise. Administration experts consider a bolt-from-the-blue surprise attack very unlikely, because this would bar evacuation of Soviet cities and leave the Russian population defenseless against a return blow from the United States. "Even if we have as little as 3 hours' warning, our program will save lives," says Giuffrida of FEMA. "If we have a week's warning, our program will be of significant benefit."

In contrast to earlier civil-defense programs that called for widespread civilian preparation in the form of fallout shelters and stocking of emergency supplies, the new plan requires virtually no involvement by most Americans until a nuclear war appears imminent. If that happens, this is how the plan is supposed to unfold:

- Each target city would have its own evacuation plan, with a corps of civil-defense workers trained to direct the exodus. Evacuation maps, along with instructions on where to go and what to do, would be printed in telephone books.

- When people from the cities reached the countryside, many would be put to work. Some would operate kitchens for mass feeding. Others would be handed shovels and told to stack dirt around shelters for protection against radiation from nuclear fallout.

- Evacuees would be housed in schools, churches and other public buildings, not in private homes. Engineering students hired during the summers already have checked out 975,000 of the 1.6 million shelters needed.

- Each person would be allotted an area of 40 square feet—about 6½ feet on a side. If a cloud of nuclear fallout were expected, evacuees would move into much more crowded fallout shelters.

- During peacetime, 20,000 shelter-management instructors would be trained. In a crisis, they would conduct crash courses to teach a million others.


- Seven million radiation de-

© HERBLOCK IN WASHINGTON POST



Picnic

High-Risk Areas in a Heavy Nuclear Attack



vices would be available to tell survivors when they could leave the shelters and where they could safely travel.

■ News and instructions would come from some of the 2,770 broadcast stations that would be protected from fallout and the disrupting effects of radiation given off by a nuclear explosion.

Critics of the plan seized on a comment by T. K. Jones, a longtime civil-defense advocate and now a deputy under secretary of defense, in an interview with the *Los Angeles Times*. "Everybody's going to make it if there are enough shovels to go around," Jones said. "Dig a hole, cover it with a couple of doors and then throw 3 feet of dirt on top. It's the dirt that does it."

Under angry questioning by members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 31, Jones said he did not mean to imply that a nuclear war is "winnable." But he insisted that the Soviet Union, using simple earthen shelters to protect its citizens, is much better equipped to survive an atomic exchange than the U.S.

Budget boost. The Reagan civil-defense plan is estimated to cost 4.2 billion dollars over seven years, not counting inflation. As a first step, Congress is being asked this year for 252 million dollars, nearly double the civil-defense spending in the 1982 budget.

Some administration spokesmen were more restrained than FEMA officials in describing the new program. Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Perle told members of Congress that the plan is "little more than insurance—insurance that in circumstances short of a central strategic exchange, some lives might be saved that would otherwise be lost."

Perle also gave a gloomy picture of what might happen if the plan were

ever put into effect: "Evacuation would gravely deepen the crisis and would indeed be destabilizing. Evacuation would be accompanied by dread fear and most likely panic."

Others were far more critical. Senator Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) described the proposal as "faulty and perilous" and "a cruel and dangerous hoax on the American people."

Retired Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, whose naval career included a stint as deputy head of the staff that selects strategic targets in the Soviet Union, said the plan "generates a mind-set toward nuclear war."

It is impossible to hide from a nuclear attack, Gayler said, adding: "I've done the targeting. If you want to evacuate your cities, I'll target the evacuation areas."

Several communities—among them Cambridge, Mass.; Sacramento County, Calif.; Brattleboro, Vt., and Boulder County, Colo.—already have refused to take part in evacuation plans.

On April 1, the Senate Armed Services Committee dealt the plan a blow when it refused to provide the funds needed to get started on the program.

Twice before—in the early 1950s after the Soviets developed their own nuclear weapons, and again in the early 1960s when the Berlin and Cuban crises brought the threat of war—the U.S. set civil-defense plans in motion. In both cases, the drives faded out after the crises had passed.

In today's climate of rising worry over a nuclear conflict and concern over sharply increased budget deficits, Reagan's new attempt to overhaul U.S. civil-defense policy faces the toughest test yet. □

By ORR KELLY

Civil Defense—Soviet Style

MOSCOW

The Soviet Union has spent billions to create what may be the world's most extensive civil-defense system, but to the average Muscovite there is little to show for the effort.

Some of the subway stations have heavy blast doors, and civil-defense instructions are posted in some workplaces. Every factory or institution of any size has a full-time civil-defense warden who is responsible for being prepared for an emergency. Grammar-school children are taught how to crouch under desks and to shield their eyes from a nuclear blast.

There is no evidence, however, that the Soviets have ever tested on a large scale the evacuation of a major city—the one tactic that experts in the United States say could save as many as 100 million Russian lives.

Yet, behind the scenes, the Soviets have done far more than the U.S. to protect their leadership, their essential work force and their population.

Blast shelters capable of housing 110,000 key officials and workers have been built around Moscow, near factories and in other parts of the country.

Top leaders also have standby mobile command posts in planes, ships and railroad cars.

Head for farm areas. In a crisis, the Russian people would be ordered to leave the cities—many of them on foot—and to assemble in rural collective-farm areas. Soviet booklets contain detailed descriptions of how civilians would be expected to prepare their own makeshift fallout shelters.

While some U.S. experts worry that the Soviet civil-defense program might embolden the Kremlin to take chances in a crisis, one Moscow resident sums up the feeling of the man in the street: "Of course we have to take some civil-defense precautions. But we don't kid ourselves that it would save us in nuclear war. The major thing is to prevent nuclear war from happening."

By NICHOLAS DANILOFF

Civil Defense Agency: 'Trying to Do Something'

By BERNARD WEINRAUB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 7 — It was midmorning in an elevator at the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and two secretaries were chatting.

"I'm going to pig out tonight on some pizza," said one. "Lots of cheese."

"That's what I need," said the second dreamily. "Pizza! Something to look forward to so I don't go crazy in this place." The elevator creaked open on the seventh floor, and the two stepped out, their laughter echoing in the hall.

It was a rare moment of levity in the glistening silent hallways of the agency that is in charge of the nation's civil defense, a little-known department whose own officials, until recently, used words like "backwater" to describe it.

No more. President Reagan's proposal to seek a seven-year, \$4.2 billion program to "provide for survival of a substantial portion of the population in the event of a nuclear attack," coupled with a national debate about nuclear disarmament and demands by some members of Congress for a nuclear weapons freeze, has suddenly placed the spotlight on an agency that was created without fanfare by President Carter in 1978.

Signs in Hallways


FEMA (pronounced to rhyme with Lima) is housed in a sleek new building beside a motel near Independence Avenue. Its hallways are cluttered with signs reading "Security Is Everybody's Business" and its mood is decidedly somber and frenetic.

"I don't think anybody's walking around here with long faces because of the pressure but, yes, we're taking this very seriously here," said James L. Holton, the agency's spokesman.

"I had lunch with an old friend," he went on, "and much of the conversation turned to civil defense. My friend finally said, 'Gee, do you have trouble sleeping at night? You have to deal with this, day in, day out. It kind of gives me the willies just talking about this doomsday stuff.'"

"Well I never thought of it that way, and I realized that maybe I have a sense of relief. I have a sense of control. I know we're trying to do something about this situation."

There are 2,000 employees at the agency in Washington, and 1,000 in 10 regions across the United States. Although the agency was created largely to deal with floods, droughts, hurricanes and other disasters, the renewed emphasis on civil defense has plainly seized it. Key officials are busy working on "crisis evacuation" plans



Louis O. Guiffrida, director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and a page from a brochure for teachers of grade school children.

for more than 400 "risk areas," cities with populations of more than 50,000, as well as sites in the upper Middle West and Southwest where missiles are stored underground.

"Look, to simply lie down and say the problem is too big to handle doesn't solve the problem, does it," said the agency director, Louis O. Guiffrida, a former Army colonel and National Guard general who helped organize civil defense and "emergency management" in California when Ronald Reagan was Governor.

Seated in his office, the tense, blunt-spoken Mr. Guiffrida heatedly objected to criticisms by academics, Congressmen and others that planning for civil defense creates an illusion that it is possible to fight and win a nuclear war.

Pointing at a photograph of his wife and five children, the 61-year-old former Army officer said in a shaky voice: "That's my family. You think I would participate in something that

was a hoax? I resent that. You think we want nuclear war? My God!"

Mr. Guiffrida said essentially that so long as the possibility of a nuclear attack existed, the nation should prepare. The key factor, he said, is the assumption that the risk of war will be apparent days, even weeks, before enemy missiles are launched. In the meantime, he said, millions of people can be moved rapidly to "host areas" in the countryside.

Over all, he observed, "the program can improve the chances of survival for between 70 and 80 percent of the people."

"Sure, it'll be a hell of a mess," said Mr. Guiffrida. "You'll use anything at your disposal — trains, planes, cars, shoes. It'll be terrible. It boggles the mind. But do we just throw up our hands and say, 'Forget it, the job's too big? Do we live up?'"

"Nobody's suggesting you could move New York City in 15 minutes," he added. "That's stupid. But we

could do New York if we had a plan in place, we could do New York in five days, a week."

In planning for the eventuality of nuclear war, the agency has undertaken an educational program aimed at adults and children. One "emergency management instruction" brochure for teachers of grade school children includes a page that says: "Color what you need in a shelter." Below are pictures of items that one presumably needs in a shelter: water, crackers, a telephone, a radio, an apple. There are also pictures of foods that children should not color since they would obviously spoil or melt, items such as fish, tomatoes and cake.

"Food is a real problem, and the first thing to do is to encourage people to take care of their daily supply of food with them, like canned goods, dried food, dry rice," said Lee Thomas, associate director for state and local programs and former safety director for the state of South Carolina.

"What do you do when 50,000 people move into an area that normally supports 5,000? You start working out a logistical plan. You get food distributed to the local Piggly-Wiggly store in a host area as opposed to a target area. It can be done with planning."

'Legal and Moral' Duty Seen

Critics insist that the program is unrealistic, that panic, vast traffic jams and chaos would envelop major cities if a nuclear attack loomed. But Mr. Thomas and other agency officials maintain that the Government has a "legal and moral" responsibility to create a plan designed to save lives. So, on the seventh and eighth floors of the building, officials are working into the night and on weekends to do just that.

"We don't, in all sincerity, believe the planet is doomed if there's an attack," said Mr. Holton. "We don't accept the belief that there would be absolute devastation."

Walking along the hall, Mr. Holton was asked about the recent interest in the agency and the accompanying controversy. He smiled. "For an agency that was backwater, we're making a lot of people very nervous now," he said.

Reprinted by the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, with permission of copyright claimant, August 1982.

A10

Reagan Nerve Gas Request Deleted in Military Bill

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 16 — A Senate-House conference committee, finishing work on a \$178 billion Defense Department budget authorization bill, announced today that it had deleted a White House request for money to begin production of new nerve gas shells.

The conferees said the bill also trims civil defense spending and slightly cuts funds for production of the MX missile.

These steps, reportedly taken in a secret session late Friday night, reversed earlier votes in which the committee had voted to sustain President Rea-

gan's request for \$54 million to begin making of binary nerve gas munitions.

The committee met for more than two weeks in closed session to reconcile slightly differing versions of legislation that would set spending targets for procuring defense weapons and equipment, for research and development and for operating and maintaining the armed services. Today it agreed to authorize \$178 billion for the 1983 fiscal year, just \$5.4 billion less than the Administration had requested in February. The Administration's request for \$183.4 billion represented an increase in military spending of almost 35 percent

over the 1982 spending figure.

The United States suspended production of lethal gases in the early 1970's. Binary munitions contain two non-toxic chemicals that mix and become nerve gas while the gas shell is in flight. The Senate voted to approve the President's \$54 million request to begin nerve gas production, but the House passed an amendment striking the binary gas program from its authorization bill.

'Sharp Divisions' on Nerve Gas

Senator John Tower, Republican of Texas, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said in a

statement today that the conferees had "deferred without prejudice the request for funds for production of binary chemical munitions because of the sharp divisions on this issue which exist in the Congress."

This meant, one Congressional staff member said, that "Congress is not giving the White House money for the gas now but is making no value judgment and is leaving open the possibility of a new program next year."

The House had voted to approve all \$257 million requested by the Administration for civil defense measures in the case of a nuclear attack, but the Senate had cut that request to about \$108 million. The conference committee compromised with a figure of \$152.3 million.

At one point last week, the conference committee voted to approve the full Ad-

ministration request to begin production of nine MX intercontinental ballistic missiles, with funding of \$1.14 billion in the 1983 fiscal year for this purpose. However, Senator Tower said the committee had voted to provide \$989 million to procure just five MX missiles.

Written Plan for MX Missiles

The committee also voted to require that a \$715 million authorization for research on how and where to base the MX missiles and \$150 million for materials for MX basing not be spent until President Reagan has submitted a written plan on how to base the missiles.

Other significant actions by the conference committee included:

A decision to spend \$825 million to procure the Army's AH-64 attack helicopter. Sharp increases in the esti-

mated cost of the helicopter had aroused criticism earlier this year.

A vote to cancel immediately production of the A-10 fighter bomber, which the Air Force had intended to phase out in the 1984 budget year.

A vote, reported earlier, to begin procurement of 50 Lockheed C-5 air cargo planes, as well as three Boeing 747 freight aircraft that were added as a sort of "consolation price" for members of Congress who had fought for a proposal to substitute 747's for the C-5's. Senator Tower praised the work of the committee.

But Senator Gary Hart, Democrat of Colorado, said the conference report was "largely a charade" in which a majority of conferees had been "too eager to yield whenever its bill differed from the wish list of the Pentagon."