



U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS
TO LIMIT INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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COMPLIMENTS OF
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ABSTRACT

U.S. and the Soviet Union resumed negotiations to control intermediate-range nuclear weapons in November 1981 after a recess of about a year. The U.S. proposed a so-called "zero option" which would eliminate all deployments of American and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The Soviet Union's main proposal would reduce all intermediate-range nuclear weapons (including missiles and aircraft) intended for use in Europe to 300 units for each side by 1990. Issues include: (1) what weapons should be included in the negotiations; (2) should all weapons in a category be included or only those deployed in the region of Europe; (3) what account, if any, should be taken in the negotiations of intermediate-range weapons of Britain, France and China?

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I. Introduction

Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union to control what the U.S. calls "intermediate-range nuclear forces" (INF) and what the Soviets call "medium-range means" began on November 30, 1981. They followed a short period of introductory talks on "theater" nuclear weapons in the fall of 1980 during the Carter Administration.

In December 1979 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted a so-called "two track" decision, first, to deploy in Europe 572 intermediate-range missiles capable of striking targets deep within the European area of the Soviet Union, and, second, to seek negotiations with the U.S.S.R. to reduce or eliminate such missiles from the deployments of both sides.

One of the main reasons for the NATO decision to deploy intermediate-range missiles, which had not been part of NATO's armament previously, was to counter the newest generation of deployed Soviet weapons with range capabilities of striking all of Western Europe. These were the SS-20 ballistic missiles and the Backfire bombers. For reasons of defense and politics, NATO simultaneously adopted the decision to seek an arms control agreement on intermediate-range weapons.

II. Reasons for the 1979 NATO Decision

A. The Decision to Deploy Nuclear Missiles

The December 12, 1979, NATO decision was to modernize the alliance's theater nuclear forces by the deployment of 572 single warhead missiles: 108 Pershing 2 missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), both still under development by the United States. All 108 Pershing 2s and 96 GLCMs were to be deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany, 160 GLCMs in the United Kingdom, 112 GLCMs in Italy, and 48 GLCMs each in Belgium and the Netherlands. All were to be completely under U.S. command and control.

The Governments of Belgium and the Netherlands have since shown reluctance to base the GLCMs on their territory. There is no current plan to redistribute any of the missiles if one or more NATO governments should decide not to accept them. Since the official initial deployment date for the missiles will not occur until December 1983 or early 1984, this question is not immediate. 1/

A conventional explanation for the 1979 NATO decision to place the Pershing 2s and GLCMs in Europe is that the West German Government and other NATO governments were concerned that the advent of strategic nuclear parity between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. undermined the reliability of the American Government's commitment to use strategic forces as a deterrent of Soviet aggression against NATO Europe. The deployment of U.S. nuclear forces to Western Europe capable of striking targets in the Soviet Union would link the defense of NATO Europe to

1/ The question of the internal political controversies over deployment of the missiles in the countries which initially agreed to receive them is critically important. Domestic resistance could end up frustrating the December 1979 deployment decision. This subject is discussed in Stanley Sloan, NATO Theater Nuclear Forces: Modernization and Arms Control Congressional Research Service Issue Brief Number IB 81128, 1982, and in U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, NATO Today: The Alliance in Evolution, Staff Report (Committee Print) April 1982.

the U.S. strategic deterrent, thus guaranteeing that it would have an impact on decision-makers in Moscow. Defensive strikes by the U.S. nuclear forces in Europe against Soviet territory would entail, Europeans believed, retaliation against the U.S. homeland. Thus the purpose of "coupling" the U.S. strategic deterrent to the NATO deterrent would be achieved.

Another reason was that the new weapons were needed to carry out a significant phase of the "flexible response" doctrine of NATO, that is, to be able to meet effectively Soviet attack on any level, and not to permit "escalation dominance" to the Soviet Union at the intermediate-range level. Existing intermediate-range strike forces of NATO--mainly U.S. and British bombing aircraft--were aging and becoming relatively less effective. The West Germans and others wanted the intermediate-range theater nuclear missiles deployed in defense of NATO to counter the new Soviet theater forces coming onto the scene--SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers. The former especially were thought to be much more formidable threats to NATO Europe than the Soviet missiles deployed earlier--the SS-4s and SS-5s. The SS-20s have three MIRV warheads, are more accurate, mobile and with a longer range. They thus possess an improved defensibility and warfighting capability. Without the new U.S. weapons NATO would be deficient at the intermediate-range level to meet a Soviet offensive.

Another approach, however, was reportedly taken by some U.S. officials who were less interested in counterbalancing the new Soviet long-range theater weapons or in restoring NATO's flexible response capability than they were in posing a new "credible" nuclear threat to the Soviet Union, namely, a new set of weapons that could strike the Soviet Union's territory and hit vital military targets. 2/ They

2/ U.S. Senate Committee in Foreign Relations, Interim Report on Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Prepared by the North Atlantic Assembly's Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in Europe (Committee Print), December 1981, pp. 14-16.

believed that NATO should have an intermediate-range nuclear capability of substantial proportions in order to carry out warfighting missions for which NATO was not prepared either in doctrine or in weaponry. These would require an ability after absorbing an initial Soviet attack, to respond with effective power against Soviet offensive weaponry and facilities. To do this they believed that NATO should have considerably more than the 572 missiles planned under the 1979 decision.

It is evident that such a NATO warfighting capability, whether with 572 deployed missiles or with substantially more, could in effect constitute an arm of American strategic power. The targets in the Soviet Union of the Europe-deployed missiles would be among the same targets of U.S. ICBMs, U.S. officials have conceded. So the European missiles could substitute for ICBMs, or vice-versa. The Soviet Union has made clear that it regards the U.S. missiles in Europe as an additional strategic arm of grave potential danger to itself because it deems them to be first-strike weapons.

As recounted above, a principal reason for the decision to deploy intermediate-range missiles in NATO Europe was to calm European fears that the U.S. might be unwilling to respond with its strategic forces to a major Soviet attack on Europe. More immediately, the European anxiety was not that Soviet forces would attack Western Europe, but might try to take political advantage of a perception of U.S. vulnerability and of weakness in its commitment to NATO Europe, and "blackmail" the NATO governments. In short, the new American deployments were in part to fulfill a political objective of strengthening European morale and resolve in the face of the new Soviet offensive power.

The validity of this component in the NATO decision to deploy the INF weapons is open to debate. The deployment of Pershing 2s and GLCMs to NATO Europe is

based on a West European belief that these U.S.-controlled weapons are more likely to be fired in response to a Soviet attack on Western Europe than are the U.S. strategic weapons based in the continental U.S. But if the consequences of the U.S. decision to fire the Europe-based missiles are the same as those for firing U.S.-based missiles, namely, Soviet nuclear retaliation against the continental U.S., then why would U.S. willingness--or reluctance--be different in either one of these decisions? That can be one logical analysis. The Europeans, however, think more in terms of deterrence than of warfighting and many therefore believe that the Soviet Union is better deterred by the visibility of missiles in Europe than by those in the U.S. The demonstrations against the missiles in some NATO countries are evidence, however, that the deployment plans do not reassure every one.

B. The Arms Control Decision

While the NATO decision to deploy new intermediate-range systems rested on certain independent military considerations, there were other military as well as political factors that led the NATO governments to their simultaneous decision to pursue negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit intermediate-range nuclear systems. NATO and U.S. officials have stressed that both tracks of the 1979 decision were of equal importance. As recounted above, one objective of NATO officials, especially in West Germany, was to counterbalance the Soviet INF threat by the decision to deploy U.S. INF missiles. In addition, they intended to use the planned NATO deployments to negotiate a removal or reduction of the Soviet intermediate-range missile threat. Without the deployment decision NATO would have had little or no chance of negotiating successfully to remove or reduce the Soviet missile capability. As Eugene Rostow declared to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on February 23, 1982, "Our allies...are in agreement with us that preparations for

deployment must go forward and that...we must demonstrate that we are prepared to carry out our program, including the beginning of deployments in 1983, unless there is a negotiating result that makes deployment unnecessary. Without that clear determination, the Soviets would have no incentive to negotiate seriously."

In the context of the U.S. and NATO proposal for the "zero option", therefore, a purpose of the deployment decision is to achieve success in negotiating dismantlement of the Soviet intermediate-range missiles. If this negotiation succeeds, then the NATO deployment will be terminated. On the other hand, if the negotiations fail, NATO has expressed its determination to proceed with the missile deployment, because as indicated previously, there are other compelling reasons for doing so.

In addition to these military factors, there were also political motives for the decision to negotiate for reduction of intermediate-range missiles. They include:

1. Many in NATO did not wish East-West relations to be damaged any more than necessary by the deployment decision. By itself and without ameliorating elements the deployment could embitter relations with the Soviet Union. More concretely it might lead to an arms competition that could be costly and in the end not add to NATO security.

2. For some years the NATO alliance had managed its relations with Moscow on the twin principles of "defense and detente." This dual guidance illuminated NATO conduct in general and was accepted as appropriate in this significant instance.

3. Moreover, an influential segment of domestic opinion, especially in key countries like Western Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, needed to be persuaded that some concomitant action would be taken to condition the military decision, if possible, in order to make it politically more acceptable at home.

Foundations for the December 1979 decision on arms control had been laid by a Special Group set up by NATO to examine the implications of such a decision. It established certain principles to guide the negotiations to be conducted by the United States, and these were approved by the NATO Ministers. They included--

1. The negotiations should proceed on a step-by-step basis, focusing first on reducing the Soviet missile force--especially the SS-20s. Aircraft should not be included initially in order not to make the negotiations too complex. The Soviet Backfire bomber was noted as a special problem which should be dealt with preferably in the context of negotiations for SALT III. The negotiations would have to be conducted within a SALT III framework. (The demise of SALT II was not then expected).

2. Limitations should apply to worldwide intermediate-range systems with subceilings on those in striking range of NATO. It was assumed that not all systems would be eliminated, although the existence of the so-called "zero option" was acknowledged. Therefore at some point some adjustment would have to be made in the decision to deploy INF systems. But the exact numbers of SS-20s and NATO systems that could be tolerated was not decided.

3. Equality in ceilings and rights should be assured in the agreement.

4. The agreement should be verifiable.

III. The U.S. Proposal for INF Negotiations

Soon after the December 1979 decisions by NATO the U.S. approached the Soviet Union to make arrangements for arms control talks. Moscow at first reneged, demanding that NATO drop its decision to deploy intermediate-range missiles as a condition for negotiations. In July 1980 President Brezhnev told Chancellor Schmidt of West Germany that it dropped its preconditions and was ready to arrange negotiations. By September, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. agreed to meet in Geneva beginning October 17, 1980. The session lasted until November 17, 1980. By that time the national elections had produced a new President with a different approach to arms control who would enter office in January 1981. The 1980 session was of little continuing significance.

The Reagan Administration wished to reexamine arms control policy in the light of its own philosophy and to prepare its own negotiating positions. By September 1981 Secretary of State Haig and Foreign Minister Gromyko had agreed that talks could begin November 30, 1981, in Geneva. President Reagan on November 18, 1981, at the National Press Club, set forth the NATO-approved U.S. proposal for the negotiations. The President declared, "The United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launch cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles."

This simply worded proposal was elaborated in a draft treaty presented to the conference. The draft has not been made public.

The trade offered by the United States, with the backing of NATO, was simple. The Soviet deployments--now about 300 SS-20s and about 300-350 SS-4s and SS-5s--no matter where located, would be dismantled and the U.S. would "cancel deployment" of Pershing 2s or GLCMs. Deployment of the U.S. missiles was scheduled to begin near the end of 1983 or early in 1984.

U.S. officials have not offered any alternative to this proposal. They have said they have no fallback position and have discussed none with NATO. However, they have promised to negotiate fairly and said they are ready to listen to any counterproposal.

Many observers and officials in the NATO countries are doubtful that the Soviet Union will trade off over 600 existing missiles with about 1200 warheads for 572 non-existent U.S. missiles with 572 warheads. They concede that a compromise at some level above zero would be a more reasonable expectation.

But another point of view has been advanced by Paul Warnke, former ACDA Director and prominent U.S. spokesman for arms control causes. Warnke has declared that he favors the "zero option" because the Soviet Union is very much afraid of Pershing 2s and ground-launched cruise missiles. Consequently, he thinks that a result can be negotiated close to the zero option, if not the zero option itself. He said that evidence of Soviet concern about such weapons is the fact that they tried very hard to get them included in the SALT II Treaty. 3/ Evidently he was referring to the negotiations aimed at restricting the deployment of GLCMs. This was incorporated in the protocol to the treaty the terminal date (December 31, 1981) of which has now passed. On this basis, therefore, he argued, the Soviets should be willing to dismantle their SS-20s.

ACDA Director Eugene Rostow has characterized the President's "zero option" proposal as one for "unequal reductions to achieve equal results." He acknowledged, "there's no way of expecting the Soviet Union to accept those proposals within the parameters of the nuclear equation as such." But he declared that looking at the problem "in the larger political and military setting" there would be "very powerful

3/ New York Times, March 21, 1982. (Text of debate between Warnke and Rostow)

forces that should induce the Soviet Union to want a period of stability in their relationship with the West." 4/

The philosophy revealed by Rostow's explanation of the U.S. proposal, is one that has been typical of the Reagan Administration's approach to nuclear arms control. Administration officials have contended that the U.S. determination to proceed with new weapons programs, even though it does not have the weapons in hand, would be enough to induce the Soviet Union to agree to surrender its alleged strategic superiority. It is their belief that Moscow would be reluctant to engage in a costly arms race which it could not win.

One of the problems with this approach is that the Soviet Union is sensitive about appearances and it has repeatedly spoken in terms of equality in such a way as to convey the impression that it does not want to appear as making unequal concessions. Second, the Soviets have also made it abundantly clear that they do not believe that the balance in Europe is simply one of Pershing 2s and GLCMs versus SS-20s, SS-4s and SS-5s. It also involves other medium-range systems. So the result, which Rostow would consider equal, the Soviet Union does not recognize to be equal. It has rejected the "zero option" proposed by the United States on the grounds that it would upset the military balance in Europe to the disadvantage of the U.S.S.R.

4/ New York Times, March 21, 1982. Ibid.

IV. The Soviet Proposals for INF Negotiations

The Rostow thesis that the Soviet Union could be willing to acquiesce in a disproportionate reduction of armaments in order to reach a more stable strategic relationship with the United States has some slight confirmation from Brezhnev himself. The Soviet leader told Der Spiegel magazine in November 1981 that the Soviet Union in the SALT II Treaty was willing to accept reductions in numbers of deployed weapons bigger than the U.S. in order for both sides to arrive at parity.

It is true that the SALT II Treaty obligated the U.S.S.R. to make larger reductions in existing forces than the U.S. but that does not assure that he or other Soviet leaders will assent to unequal reductions in the future. It will depend greatly on the context of the negotiations and the entire pattern of mutual concessions. President Brezhnev has expressed willingness to make large reductions in arms but not in a ratio disadvantageous to the Soviet Union. In the INF bargaining thus far Brezhnev has advocated formulae weighted against the U.S. and in the Soviet favor.

Brezhnev, early on, proposed that from the beginning of negotiations (November 30, 1981) both sides should observe a moratorium on deployments of medium-range missiles and other systems until a treaty was concluded. This proposal dated from 1979 and was reiterated by Brezhnev at the 26th Communist Party Congress in February 1981.

The U.S. and NATO did not think this would be an equitable arrangement because the U.S.S.R. in 1981 already had more than 200 SS-20s deployed. These would not be reduced or eliminated by the moratorium but the U.S. missile deployments would be blocked.

The Soviet proposal for a moratorium seemed more of a political arrow aimed at Western European opinion than a serious proposal. More indicative of Brezhnev's

attitude toward the forthcoming negotiations were certain general principles he supported. Brezhnev said he wanted the negotiations to be based on the principle of parity and equal security. He also wanted to lower "the level of confrontation." And he added, "...we shall be prepared to agree on rather substantial reductions from both sides."

In February 1982, TASS, the Soviet news agency, issued in English a review of the INF negotiations describing the Soviet Government's reaction to the U.S. proposal and presenting a new Soviet proposal. The TASS release denounced the U.S. "zero option" plan as "unrealistic" and not serious. It branded that part of the proposal which called for the liquidation of medium-range missiles in the Eastern U.S.S.R. as "having nothing whatsoever in common with the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe." Referring to its version of the numerical balance of medium-range weapons in Europe, TASS claimed that the U.S. proposal would upset the existing medium-range nuclear balance in Europe and give NATO a lop-sided advantage. 5/

The Soviet Union, TASS said, is prepared to agree on a real "zero option", a total renunciation by both sides of all medium-range nuclear weapons trained on targets in Europe, and moreover, all tactical nuclear weapons as well. This proposal would create a nuclear-free zone in Europe.

Recognizing the extreme nature of the proposal, TASS offered an alternative. "If", TASS said, "the West is not prepared for such a radical solution," then the Soviet Union had another proposal. It offered an agreement along the following lines:

- (1) It must include all medium-range nuclear weapons, that is, those with a combat radius of 1000 kilometers or more, deployed in Europe, in adjacent waters or intended for use in Europe.

5/ Moscow Broadcast TASS in English, February 9, 1982, (FBIS). Also see below, "The Battle of the Numbers," p. 21.

(2) Both sides, each with approximately 1000 weapons, should reduce to 600 units by the end of 1985 and 300 units toward the close of 1990.

(3) Each side should determine which weapons to reduce, and to carry out replacements and modernization of armaments "whose framework is to be determined additionally."

(4) The main means of reduction would be destruction, but this would not exclude the possibility of withdrawing a part of armaments behind some agreed lines.

(5) There should be adequate control of compliance.

(6) During negotiations each side will abstain from additional deployments and the medium-range arms of both sides deployed in the region are to be frozen quantitatively and qualitatively. If the U.S. agreed to the moratorium on deployment of medium-range arms for the period of negotiations the Soviet side would be prepared as a gesture of good will to reduce its medium-range arms in the European area of the U.S.S.R. on a unilateral basis.

The U.S. response to the Soviet proposal to reduce to 300 missiles by 1990 was that, if it were linked with the Soviet moratorium, it could exclude virtually all U.S. missiles and other intermediate-range vehicles from Europe while leaving 300 Soviet SS-20s intact. The British and French INF weapons, which would have to be counted on the NATO side, would make up most of the 300 weapons allotted to NATO. Thus the Soviet plan, according to the U.S. interpretation, would establish and perpetuate an overwhelming Soviet advantage.

This construction by the U.S. of the effect of the Soviet proposal does not exclude the possibility that, if the latter were subject to certain conditions and amendments, it could offer an opportunity for a U.S. counterproposal. Its principle of a staged reduction of weapons to a terminal equal level is one that appears to coincide with the U.S. objective of reductions to an equal and equitable level.

Five weeks later the Soviet Union introduced another proposal into the discussion. On the same day that the INF negotiations recessed for two

months--March 16--Soviet President Brezhnev, in a major foreign policy address, announced a number of important new initiatives relevant to the INF negotiations. These were evidently new positions which had not been proffered in the negotiations themselves.

The significant points in terms of the negotiations on INF were as follows:

(1) The Soviet Union would unilaterally cease deploying any additional medium-range armaments in the European area of the U.S.S.R. (It became apparent from later Soviet statements that the moratorium applied just to SS-20s, not to all medium-range armaments. The geographic area is generally considered to be that to the west of the Ural Mountains. It evidently did not apply to a continuation of deployments to the east of those mountains.) Brezhnev added that the moratorium would apply to both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of these armaments.

(2) He announced that during the current year the Soviet Union would unilaterally reduce a number of medium-range missiles. Presumably these will be older SS-4s and SS-5s.

(3) President Brezhnev said the Soviet moratorium would be in effect until an agreement was reached with the United States "on the basis of parity and equal security" to reduce medium-range nuclear weapons "designed for use in Europe", or until the United States made "practical preparations to deploy" Pershing 2 and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe.

What Brezhnev meant by "practical preparations", is not clear. Preparation of deployment sites are now underway in Britain and Italy but the Soviet Union has not announced an end to the moratorium.

A White House press release, Statement by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary, dated March 16, 1982, condemned the Brezhnev "unilateral moratorium" as "neither unilateral nor a moratorium." It charged that the proposal sought to maintain Soviet weapon superiority, divide the West and secure for the Soviet Union "unchallenged hegemony" over Europe. The White House paper denied that the Brezhnev proposal was "unilateral" because it was linked to the condition that NATO's December 1979 deployment decision not be implemented.

The White House stated that the Soviets now had three hundred SS-20 missiles deployed with nine hundred warheads. Moreover, it asserted that the Soviet Union had prepared new sites for SS-20s to the west as well as east of the Urals, thus demonstrating that they did not really intend to stop their SS-20 buildup. The Soviet proposal was not really a moratorium, according to the White House, because it was limited only to Europe and did not include the Asian Soviet Union where SS-20s could be freely deployed and still strike Western Europe.

In short, the United States Government condemned the Soviet initiative as propaganda and a refusal to negotiate seriously, and rejected it. The U.S. affirmed its intention to continue to implement both tracks of the December 1979 decision. A number of observers discounted the Brezhnev moratorium because they believed the Soviet Union had planned about 300 SS-20s from the beginning. The White House disclosure that additional sites for SS-20s were prepared seemed to belie this expectation. Nevertheless, while the U.S.S.R. might have the capability to deploy more, there was a practical saturation point in reference to manpower and other resources.

The Brezhnev proposal mentioned the possibility of an agreement with the United States for a reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons "on the basis of parity and equal security" and specifically recalled the earlier proposals of the Soviet Union as described above. It left a clear opening for negotiation.

U.S. and other NATO spokesmen on sundry occasions after the announcement of the unilateral moratorium by Brezhnev declared that they saw no evidence that the Soviet Union had actually stopped deploying SS-20s and that additional launch sites for those missiles were still under construction.

President Brezhnev told the Soviet Komsomol in Moscow on May 18 that the U.S.S.R. was already reducing the number of medium-range missiles in the European

part of the U.S.S.R. and he promised that no additional medium-range missiles would be deployed east of the Urals (outside Europe) or in any location where they could reach Western Europe. The promise evidently did not apply to missiles which could strike other areas.

He also responded to the U.S. proposal that all missiles deployed in the eastern part of the Soviet Union should be included in the negotiations. He called it "absurd," and asserted that negotiations on limiting missiles should be conducted only with those countries that had missiles opposing the Soviet missiles. In other words, he evidently meant it would be proper to negotiate only with China regarding missiles in the eastern U.S.S.R. 6/ It was a separate question, in Brezhnev's expressed judgment, whether any such negotiations would be conducted.

Subsequently, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko told the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament in June 7/ that the Soviet Union is "prepared to agree on a total renunciation of all types of medium-range nuclear weapons targeted in Europe." The key phrase is "all types"--presumably including all aircraft and SLBMs, including those of the U.S. and other NATO countries.

He repeated what appeared to be a more generalized modification of the TASS release in February, declaring that the Soviet Union was prepared "to reduce gradually, but substantially, by the hundred medium-range nuclear weapons on both sides...." But his statement showed no sign of Soviet willingness to agree with the U.S. proposal to concentrate reductions solely on missiles.

In summary, both sides have opened the negotiations by making vigorous political, public proposals. There is virtually no chance that either side's initial

6/ This assumes that no other country adjacent to the eastern U.S.S.R. has medium-range missiles at present. See section below, "China and the Zero Option."

7/ New York Times, June 16, 1982, p. A20.

position will be accepted by the other. Neither side can afford to continue on continue on an inflexible course because, if the U.S. does, it risks losing the support of its European allies for deployment of the U.S. INF missiles, and if the Soviet Union does, it will run the danger of convincing the NATO Europeans that there is no alternative but to proceed with the deployment of the missiles as originally agreed. It would appear to be in the interest of both sides to arrive at some compromise solution which will permit some lower level, less threatening deployment of INF weaponry on both sides.

V. Characteristics of U.S. and Soviet Missiles

The characteristics of the missiles which the U.S. contends should be the priority subjects of the INF negotiations have influenced the proposals which each side has made.

A. U.S. Missiles

The Pershing 2 is a mobile land-based ballistic missile that is scheduled to replace the 108 Pershing 1As now under U.S. command in Western Germany. An additional 72 Pershing 1As under West German command are not affected by this program. 8/ The Pershing 2 will have a nuclear warhead with selectable yields designed for a number of different uses employing both air and surface bursts. Its maximum yield is reported to be up to 200 kilotons. Because of its higher accuracy, with radar terminal guidance, it has lower yields than the Pershing 1A for various missions, thus reducing collateral damage. Its range is reported to be about 1000 miles compared to 400 miles for the Pershing 1A.

The deployment of the first of 108 missiles is scheduled for December 1983 (possibly slipping to early 1984) and deployment completion is scheduled for December 1985. Development and testing of the Pershing 2 have been delayed and there is some uncertainty whether it can be deployed by the end of 1983 or early 1984. In an effort to meet the scheduled deployment date the Pentagon has ordered production to start before testing is complete.

The ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) is an air-breathing missile designed to be launched from mobile, ground-based but air-transportable platforms. Its range is expected to be about 1500 miles and it will fly low with terrain-matching guidance and have relatively good terminal accuracy within several hundred

8/ See p. 19 below.

As a result they possess only a minor capability of neutralizing or damaging Soviet feet of the target. It will have a selectable yield warhead with a maximum yield in the 100-200 kiloton range. Its low flight profile--under several hundred feet--plus its subsonic speed of the order of 600 miles per hour, along an irregular flight path is expected to give it good penetrating capability against enemy air defenses.

Although there have been reports of slippage in the GLCM program it is scheduled for initial deployment in December 1983. U.S. Air Force Commander Lew Allen declared recently that GLCMs will be deployed on schedule. 9/

The Pershing 2s and GLCMs will derive pre-launch survivability from their mobility. Normally they will be concentrated at certain depots, and upon warning they will move to their dispersed firing sites.

The Pershing 2s and the GLCMs will be under exclusive United States command and control. However, the decision by the U.S. President to release them during a time of conflict is subject to agreements and procedures within NATO affecting all nuclear weapons of the alliance. These procedures are hidden in official secrecy and cannot be discussed here. Suffice it to say that some governments within the alliance have manifested a desire that the U.S. have full responsibility for the INF weapons. However, the Italian Government has publicly stressed the NATO consultative process that will give Rome a voice in any decision to fire the weapons based on Italian soil.

The question of control of the Pershing 1As now under the command of the West German military is different. The warheads for these missiles are under the control of the United States and the missiles themselves are under the control of the West German government. Consequently, both must assent to fire a weapon.

9/ Stars and Stripes, April 5, 1982.

The U.S. and West German governments are negotiating to determine whether the 72 West German controlled Pershing 1As will be replaced by new Pershing 1Bs, which are a modified version of the Pershing 2 with a reduced range that will not permit them to strike Soviet territory from West German sites. Presumably, their range would permit them to strike Soviet and other Warsaw pact military targets in East Germany, Poland and possibly other Eastern European areas, but not in the Soviet Union.

Many observers believe that the U.S. plan to utilize the planned deployment of Pershing 2 and GLCM units as a bargaining element in the "zero option" proposal lacks strength because it represents only a promise, threatened by lack of public support in NATO Europe, versus actually deployed Soviet weapons. Although the Pershing 2s and GLCMs are not actually deployed, they are on the way and they represent a threat that the Soviets consider extremely grave. The Pershing 2s have a range that could reach almost to Moscow and the GLCMs have an even longer range. The Pershings have a travel time of roughly eight minutes or less and are looked upon by the Soviets as surprise first-strike weapons that could be aimed at vital targets, such as command centers and key communication headquarters on Soviet territory. The Pershing 2 would be virtually impossible to stop. Soviet observers say they are capable of being employed in an initial preemptive attack that would knock out essential means of retaliation as a precursor to a more general nuclear attack on Soviet soil.

The deployment of only 108 Pershing 2 missiles in Germany, even though they can strike Soviet territory--including some major cities--in only five to eight minutes, does not by itself, constitute a first-strike capability. One hundred such missiles cannot come anywhere close to destroying enough Soviet offensive facilities to constitute a first-strike capability. The number is too limited and their range is such that large expanses of the Soviet Union could not be struck.

ICBM silos, most of which are out of range. They possibly could neutralize some SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 launching sites, but only a fraction. Although the Pershing 2s are fearsome anti-city weapons and can be effective against other, softer military targets, the group planned for deployment is primarily a responsive rather than a first-strike force.

The ground-launched cruise missiles do not appear to bother the Soviets as much as the Pershing 2. The penetration capability of the GLCMs is mentioned above. On the other hand, the cruise missiles fly at the speed of subsonic aircraft and the Soviet Union's extensive air defenses, including thousands of interceptor aircraft and surface-to-air missiles, could offer formidable opposition. The relatively long flight times of cruise missiles also afford a chance for Soviet warning systems to alert defenses.

One reason NATO has kept limited the number of Pershing 2s and GLCMs planned for deployment is that it did not wish to become over-provocative to the Soviet Union. It is evident, however, that the presently planned total of 572 units is not necessarily an indefinite ceiling and that additional units might be planned later. Moreover, technological improvements, such as penetration aids and multiple warheads, could be added later to increase the effectiveness of GLCM.

Some Executive branch officials are reported to favor deploying more than 108 Pershing 2s if there is no agreement on limiting INF armaments. The Army has ordered more than 108 of the missiles in order to have a sufficient number for development and testing purposes as well as for deployment. There are also budgetary plans for ordering more copies of the missile in future years. One of the reasons advanced by the Pentagon as justification for ordering additional copies is that it would help to reduce the unit cost of the missile, which like many military hardware programs is escalating. Where additional units of Pershing

2s might be deployed other than in NATO Europe is not clear at the moment. However, it is conceivable that they might be deployed, for example, in Eastern Asia for targeting on the Soviet Union. There would seem to be no other practical targets for weapons of this type, from the U.S. perspective at this time, except on the territory of the Soviet Union.

B. Soviet Missiles

The Soviet Union started deploying SS-4s and SS-5s in the late 1950s. They were fixed silo based missiles with single, one megaton warheads. A maximum of about 700 were deployed at one time but this figure has gradually been reduced in recent years as the SS-20 came on line. The SS-4 has a range of about 1000 miles, the SS-5 about 2200 miles. There are possibly 300 SS-4s now deployed and 50 SS-5s. They are old, of out-dated design and probably deteriorating. Their accuracy of a mile or more is comparatively poor.

The Soviet Union began to replace them with SS-20s beginning in 1977, although on a somewhat less than one for one basis. The SS-20 is mobile and has a reload capability. The former enhances its invulnerability and the latter its warfighting capability.

The deployed model of the SS-20 has three independently targetable warheads of 150 kilotons each with a range of 3000 miles. There are some reports of other models with different numbers of warheads and a longer range. Figures used by U.S. officials almost invariably assume that all deployed have three warheads. The intelligence community estimates of range differ from the State Department estimates of 2600 to 3100 miles. Its accuracy is reported by one NATO group as 440 feet over a 2500 mile range. 10/ Other reports say 1000 to 1200 feet.

10/ U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Interim Report on Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Prepared by the North Atlantic Assembly's Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1981, p. 9 (Committee Print).

When the Soviet Union recently announced a moratorium on deployment of the SS-20s, there were about 300 in the field. The State Department asserted, however, that five additional sites appeared to be under construction in the U.S.S.R. That was an indication that additional units might be deployed if the conditions of the moratorium were not met. Since then, as reported above, Brezhnev has declared that the moratorium is being implemented and that unilateral dismantlement of other missiles is underway. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt charged on June 30 in Brussels that construction on SS-20 sites which had been begun by the time of the Brezhnev announcement of a moratorium in March was continuing, that two of these sites in the Western U.S.S.R. had been completed, and that construction on the other sites was still underway. No new sites had been started since the announcement, but Burt charged that the Soviet statements had been "misleading". Burt said that the Soviet Union now had about 315 SS-20 launchers with 945 warheads. TASS responded, "Mr. Burt knows he is lying...." 11/

A characteristic of the Russian SS-20 missile is that its longer range, greater accuracy, three warheads and reduced yield make it a more versatile attack weapon than the older, larger yield, less accurate and shorter-ranged SS-4s and SS-5s. Thus the Soviets might be more inclined to use it because it could be effective against military targets while reducing collateral economic or human damage.

11/ Washington Times, July 1, 1982, and New York Times, July 2, 1982.

VI. The Battle of the Numbers

A. Conflicts in Statistics

A significant feature of the INF negotiations is a public battle of statistics over the numbers and kinds of weapons falling into an intermediate-range category affecting the military nuclear balance in Europe.

In counting up the units on each side the Soviet Union claims that the numbers have remained about the same for years--nearly 1000 units on each side, 986 for NATO and 975 for the Soviet Union. 12/ On this basis Moscow claims that a nuclear balance has existed and still exists in Europe.

The Soviet Union has consistently contended that all medium-range 13/ armaments "intended for use in Europe" should be included in reckoning the balance and should be the subject of the Geneva negotiations. The Soviet Government includes in this count on the Western side, Pershing 1 missiles, fighter bombers of various types (F-111s and FB-111s, F-4s, A-6s and A-7s), and British and French missiles and bombers. On the Soviet side it counts its SS-4s, SS-5s and SS-20s, plus certain submarine missiles and medium-range bombers (Backfires, Blinders and Badgers).

12/ U.S.S.R. Ministry of Defense, Whence The Threat to Peace, p. 65. Cited hereafter as "Whence."

13/ The Soviets use this term rather than "intermediate"-range. The Soviet Union defines medium-range weapons as those with a range (or action radius) of 1000 kilometers (600 miles) or more, excluding intercontinental strategic weapons, which are defined in the SALT II Treaty as those with a range of 5500 kilometers (3350 miles).

The Soviet count of both sides is as follows: 14/

<u>U.S.</u>		<u>SOVIET</u>	
Pershing 1 missiles	108	Land-based missiles	496
(Range: 400 naut. miles)		(SS-20s, SS-5s, SS-4s)	
Fighter-bombers	555	Submarine missiles	18
(F-111s, F-4s, A-6s, A-7s, FB-111s)		(SS-N-5s)	
BRITISH			
Polaris missiles	64	Medium-range bombers	461
Vulcan bombers	58	(Backfire, Badgers, Blinders)	
			<u>975</u>
FRENCH			
Land-based missiles	18		
Submarine missiles	80		
Mirage-4 bombers	33		
WEST GERMAN			
Pershing 1 missiles	72		
	<u>986</u>		

14/ New York Times, November 30, 1981. It cites as sources, President Brezhnev and a paper by Lieut. Gen. Nikolai Chervov of the Soviet Union. The latter is an officer on the Soviet General Staff.

The Soviet Union contends that the SS-20s have not changed the existing balance in Europe because when they have been deployed "old models" (evidently SS-4s and SS-5s) have been scrapped. They explain that while the SS-20 carries three warheads, their total explosive yield is less than that of the dismantled missiles. The whole process has reduced the total number of missiles as well as the aggregate yield of warheads, they assert. 15/ However, the total number of warheads has been increased.

In his speech of November 18, 1981, in which he proposed the "zero option," President Reagan denied the Russian claim that a balance of medium-range systems existed in Europe. He asserted that the Soviet Union had a six to one advantage in such systems. The State Department released the following figures to substantiate this ratio: 16/

<u>U.S.</u>		<u>SOVIET</u>	
Missiles	0	SS-20s	250
F-111 fighter-bombers	164	SS-4s and SS-5s	350
F-4s	265	SS-12s and SS-22s	100
A-6s and A-7s	68	SS-N-5s	30
FB-111s	63	TU-26 Backfire bombers	45
(In U.S. for use in Europe)		TU-16 Badgers and	
	<u>560</u>	TU-22 Blinders	350
		SU-17, SU-24 and MIG-27	
		fighter-bombers	<u>2,700</u>
			<u>3,825</u>

15/ Whence, p. 65.

16/ Department of State Bulletin, January 1982, p. 31.

B. Appraising the Balance

According to these State Department figures, the U.S. had 560 aircraft based in Europe or for use in Europe, including FB-111s, F-111s, A-4s and A-7s and the Soviet Union had 3825 missiles and aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons at intermediate-ranges. In addition to the categories mentioned by the Soviet Union, the State Department figures included 100 SS-12 and SS-22 ballistic missiles, the first with a range of approximately 500 miles, that is, less than the 1000 kilometers considered by the Soviet Union as the cut-off distance, and the second with a larger range, plus 2700 fighter-bombers (SU-17, SU-24 and MIG-27). 17/

Obviously there are substantial differences of viewpoint not only in regard to the types of aircraft and missiles that should be included in the balance but also their numbers.

The State Department alleged that the Soviet figures claiming nearly 1000 systems on each side concealed the fact that the Soviet Union had a monopoly of the "most threatening" systems, namely about 600 SS-20s, SS-4s and SS-5s with 1200 warheads. NATO has no comparable missiles.

The Soviets claimed a balance existed in 1979, State declared, but since then had added some 350 SS-20 warheads, so how could there be a balance now?

State explained that to make its table it included Soviet systems comparable to the U.S. systems in the Soviet count. Thus it included 2700 nuclear-capable tactical aircraft on the Soviet side comparable to the U.S. F-4. Moreover, the Soviets counted carrier-based aircraft on the U.S. side but included none of their own.

17/ New York Times, November 30, 1981, p. A12. For a discussion of the SS-12/22's, see below, "Short-Range Nuclear Missiles in Europe."

The counting game has many problems. It demonstrates the complications of trying to limit counts to a particular geographic area when weapon units can readily be moved into or out of that area. For example, the U.S. counts all SS-20s including those east of the Urals, partly on the ground that they can be moved from there to European Russia. The Soviet Union excludes some deployed in the Asian U.S.S.R.

The reckoning of nuclear-capable fighter-bombers is particularly difficult. In the first place "nuclear-capable" in nearly all instances really means "dual capable"--conventional and nuclear--and such aircraft may or may not be employed in a nuclear role. Moreover, not all aircraft of a particular type have a nuclear capability. Some might have and some might not. The U.S. evidently counts all Soviet nuclear-capable fighter-bombers, at least of some models, but does not include all U.S. F-4s, F-16s, which are nuclear-capable, and other tactical aircraft like F-14s and F-15s which might be. Nor does the U.S. count all A-6s and A-7s on aircraft carriers, all of which can be moved in principle to within striking range of the Soviet Union.

VII. Inclusion of Systems in the Negotiations

There is a major difference between the two sides on the question of which systems to include in the negotiations.

A. The U.S. Position

The U.S. has insisted that the INF negotiations be restricted to SS-4s, SS-5s and SS-20s on the Soviet side and to Pershing 2s and GLCMs on the U.S. side. Otherwise, U.S. policymakers contend, the negotiations could get too complicated. This position aims mainly at the Soviet weapons, the SS-20s, which are described as the greatest source of danger to the U.S. and the NATO allies. The SS-4s and SS-5s, although deployed for two decades, were not thought to be as threatening in the past because they were deterred by the U.S. strategic umbrella. They do not have the range, accuracy and reduced vulnerability of the SS-20s. But with the advent of strategic parity between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., they too have acquired a threatening aura, although not as prominent as that of the SS-20s.

Moreover, the U.S. maintains that restriction of the negotiations to missiles avoids the complications that could arise over disputes in regard to criteria for inclusion of aircraft and inclusion of the British and French systems. NATO has approved the U.S. approach of giving priority to missiles, leaving aircraft to be negotiated at a later stage, and of excluding the British and French systems.

B. The Soviet Position

All systems contributing to the balance in Europe should be included, according to the Soviet Union. Moscow maintains that its medium-range missiles are a counter to NATO's forward-based aircraft and that an agreement confined only to missiles would upset the balance. Negotiations, it says, should not be limited to systems "randomly chosen." The Soviet Union concedes that it might be simpler to

deal only with missiles but it insists it cannot sacrifice its security for the sake of simplicity.

Generally speaking, the wider the sweep of the net to take in additional categories of weapon systems on each side, the more complicated the negotiations could become. This is so because the various weapons systems are not completely comparable, although similar in many cases, and there is a tendency for each side, as it contemplates adding additional systems to the negotiations, to minimize its own systems and maximize those of its opponent. In some cases, however, a broader range of coverage could facilitate agreement by offering more opportunities for trade-offs.

Definitions have been adopted by both sides to govern what systems should be included. The Soviet definition has explicitly included systems with a range exceeding 1000 kilometers or about 600 miles. An apparent exception to this is its inclusion of Pershing 1 missiles with a range of about 400 miles. Moscow may have included them as "stand-ins" for the Pershing 2 missiles, which are slated to replace them. A basic concern of the Soviet Union is those systems that can strike its territory from anywhere in the European region.

The above table of intermediate-range weapons issued by the U.S. is explained officially as based on the Soviet definition of range. However, the U.S. has not officially adopted a specific range as a criterion of inclusion of systems in INF arms control negotiations. It might have not done so because of the disputes that could be incurred over what systems meet the range criterion, or even over how the criterion itself might be framed. In regard to the SS-20s a criterion important to the U.S. is whether they can hit targets in NATO Europe.

C. Deficiencies in Criteria

Both range and mobility, which have been among criteria for inclusion of weapon systems in the proposals of both sides, have certain shortcomings. The range of a weapon system (provided one can even define "weapon system") has shortcomings as a criterion, for example, because from its location a weapon may not be able to hit the area of concern or, if it can, it might have a totally different mission which would occupy it elsewhere. In other words, range could be irrelevant or even misleading because it could involve systems that should not be involved.

Mobility itself is not a reliable criterion for inclusion of a system because it could lead to an unmanageable comprehensiveness. Moreover, acceptance of mobility as a criterion could be highly detrimental to the United States. For instance, all U.S. aircraft carriers are mobile and could move to locations where they could strike the area of concern. Yet only 2 or 3 are normally deployed adjacent to Europe.

Moreover, all U.S. tactical aircraft (including nuclear-capable aircraft) are mobile, even on an intercontinental scale. Such U.S. aircraft, for example, routinely fly, assisted by aerial refueling, from the U.S. to Western Europe and sometimes to Western Asia and other distant spots. They are capable of striking Soviet targets from bases in the continental U.S. in a matter of hours.

The Soviet Union has attempted to deal with the mobility problem in regard to the SS-20s by including only those whose normal peacetime deployment sites enable them to strike targets in the adversary's European (defined) area. President Brezhnev expressed adherence to this principle in regard to removing weapon systems from the European U.S.S.R. He has said that they would not be relocated to any site from which they could strike Western Europe. 18/

18/ See above, p. 15.

The difficulties in establishing criteria for including weapons in negotiations centered on a particular geographic area or on a particular category of systems rest on the fact that so many weapons, because of their characteristics, location, ownership or other circumstances have a strategic, general or worldwide application, as well as theater, specific or geographically focused applications. They do not fit exclusively into one or another category. This is one of the main reasons why it may become desirable eventually to merge the INF and START negotiations.

In the meantime, inclusions or exclusions of weapons from the INF negotiations will probably best be accomplished on strictly ad hoc terms and by agreement case by case between the parties rather than by application of generalized criteria.

D. The Nuclear Forces of Great Britain and France

Both Great Britain and France have missiles and bomber aircraft that can strike Soviet territory. The Soviet Union contends that these two countries have the following numbers of intermediate-range systems. 19/

<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>Number</u>
Polaris missiles	64
Vulcan bombers	56
<u>France</u>	
Land-based missiles	18
Submarine-based missiles	80
Mirage-4 bombers	33

19/ The same numbers are published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies and other sources.

NATO accepted as an element in its negotiating position for the INF meetings that the British and French nuclear forces should be excluded. There were various reasons for this stand. First, NATO took the position that its decision to deploy Pershing 2s and GLCMs would be strong enough to gain Soviet agreement to dismantle SS-20s without placing other forces on the negotiating table. Second, the British and French Governments contend that their nuclear arms are strategic weapons and are not to be considered in the same category as the SS-20s. 20/ Third, the U.S. contends that the British and French systems are "independent national systems," and that it is inappropriate for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to negotiate over the systems of third countries. The U.S. "will not agree to include or compensate for British and French forces," according to ACDA Director Eugene Rostow. 21/

The Soviet Union has conceded that Britain and France need not participate in the negotiations or sign an agreement but has insisted that their armaments must be regarded as a component of the balance. Brezhnev grants that they need not be reduced--only that they be taken into account in the final result. "It is the overall result, overall balance that is important to us," Brezhnev has asserted on this point.

If East-West arms control negotiations make progress on the intermediate-range and strategic levels the problem of determining how the British and French nuclear forces relate to the limitations agreed upon must be dealt with at some point. In the SALT negotiations the Soviets at times pressed for calculating the British and French nuclear armaments in the strategic balance and thus in the agreement but when opposed by the United States it conceded that they and other U.S. and allied

20/ See below, p. 33.

21/ Statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, February 23, 1982.

"forward-based systems" could be left out of the SALT II Treaty. It was contemplated, however, that in future negotiations "theater nuclear systems," would be included. NATO agreed in its December 1979 two-track decision that negotiations on the "theater," later called "intermediate-range," systems would be pursued within the SALT framework. It was not then foreseen that the SALT II Treaty would be rejected, as it later turned out. Now NATO and the U.S. plan that INF discussions should take place in stages and that British and French forces should not be included in the current stage. Nor is there any indication of whether or when they will be included in subsequent stages. Nor has there been any U.S. indication that it plans to take them into account in the START negotiations.

The British and French "Eurostrategic" nuclear forces are in fact targeted on the Soviet Union and are joined to the nuclear forces of the United States by a military alliance. It would be reasonable to acknowledge that the Soviet Union has a security interest in having them accounted for in some way if agreements to reduce intermediate-range or strategic armaments are realized.

If the U.S. and the NATO governments genuinely intend to achieve nuclear arms control agreement with the Soviet Union based on an equal recognition of security interests, the British and French forces must be accounted for in arms control negotiations at some point. At present it is not clear whether this might be in the INF or START negotiations. The Soviet Union during the many years of negotiations with the U.S. on controlling nuclear armaments has thus far been concessionary in regard to the British and French forces. It cannot be expected that as negotiations proceed it will indefinitely remain so. This is especially true since both Britain and France are now strengthening and are planning other improvements to their nuclear forces that will substantially increase the number and accuracy of nuclear warheads that can strike the Soviet Union.

E. Submarine-based Missiles

Both sides assert that the Soviet Union has ballistic missiles on submarines for use in Europe but differ on their number. The U.S. says 30 SS-N-5s, the Soviet Union says 18. The SS-N-5 has a range of about 700-800 miles and a one-to-two-megaton warhead.

In addition the Soviet Union correctly counts 64 Polaris missiles on four British submarines and 80 missiles on five French submarines. The former have a range of 2500 miles with three 200 kiloton warheads each, and the latter a range of 1600 miles with a megaton warhead. As mentioned previously, the U.S. claims that these must be excluded because the U.S. cannot negotiate on behalf of Britain and France. It does not claim that the British and French weapons are not targeted on the Soviet Union or that they are covered by any other arms negotiations.

The U.S. does not count two or three of its Poseidon submarines (32 to 48 missiles) assigned to NATO for targeting because these have been included in the category of strategic weapons that were the subjects of SALT negotiations and presumably will be included in START negotiations. The Soviet Union does not count them or any of its own strategic submarine missiles for the same reason, although at least some of them too might be targeted on Europe. The dual status of SLBMs as both theater and strategic weapons demonstrates the difficulty of clearly differentiating between them for arms control purposes.

VIII. The Shift from a Theater to Intermediate-Range Orientation

A. The U.S. Position

Prior to the resumption at the end of November 1981 of U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, a basic premise of the talks, it appeared from public press reports, was that they centered on "theater nuclear weapons," that is, those deployed in, or in the vicinity of Europe. But the Reagan Administration changed the public description of the talks from a "theater" orientation to one centered on certain weapon systems. Thus it changed the title of the negotiations to "intermediate-range forces" (INF), without a geographic limitation.

Reagan officials proposed that all units of the SS-20 wherever deployed should be included in the negotiations. According to the U.S. argument even SS-20s deployed outside the European U.S.S.R. in Soviet Asia had a range capable of striking many targets in Western Europe, or targets in Western or Eastern Asia, including countries allied with or friendly to the United States. In addition, they were mobile and, no matter where deployed, could be moved from where they were to where they could strike NATO countries. Eugene Rostow declared to the House Foreign Affairs Committee in February 1982 that "even those (SS-20s) deployed in the far eastern part of the U.S.S.R. present a threat to the basic security interests of the United States in the Far East and the Middle East," and this was a valid reason for bringing these missiles under discussion.

In short, the U.S. position is that the criteria for including the SS-20 should take into consideration not only the distance the reentry vehicles can travel from launcher to targets but also the weapon's capability of moving from place to place. These two factors together could in effect endow it with certain characteristics of an intercontinental range weapon. Finally, the criterion of threatening U.S. interests in geographic areas other than Europe introduces a

complicating concept into the negotiations. The negotiations are no longer confined to the European theater.

The argument of the U.S. regarding the range/mobility capability of the SS-20 could logically be turned around by the U.S.S.R. to apply to all Pershing 2s and to all GLCMs, and indeed to all U.S. weapon systems with similar characteristics. The U.S.S.R. could follow the U.S. lead and contend that all units of these weapons wherever they are should be subject to the agreed limitations.

If the Soviet Union applied the U.S. criteria to other intermediate-range weapons--e.g. nuclear-capable tactical bombers based on land or sea--it could logically maintain that all of them wherever deployed, in the United States or anywhere on the globe, should be included because of their mobility. Such aircraft, for example, are routinely flown from the United States to Western Europe, or transported to the vicinity of the Soviet Union by naval aircraft carriers. There would also be no logical reason why the U.S. criteria could not be applied to all cruise missiles based at sea (SLCMs) capable of reaching Soviet territory from an adjacent sea location and on vessels anywhere possessing the mobility to move to such locations.

If comprehensive agreements on strategic weapons are reached at some future time, it could be desirable to seek reductions or limitations on all intermediate-range nuclear weapons everywhere in the world. Because of the sweeping nature of worldwide restrictions and their possible impact on various regional security situations, the U.S. might prefer to adopt criteria for the limitation and reduction of intermediate-range weapons less comprehensive in their implications than those in current proposals.

B. China and the "Zero Option"

The non-viability of the U.S. "zero option" is perceived especially in its effect on Soviet deployments of SS-20s against China. A substantial percentage of Soviet SS-20s are targeted on China. It is often reported that about one-third (100) are targeted on China while another third (100) are stationed in West Siberia with an option to target Europe or China. The latter has a number of ballistic nuclear missiles of varying ranges--probably a hundred or more, and increasing--capable of being targeted on the extensive territory of the Soviet Union. 22/ The "zero option" would dismantle the Soviet intermediate-range missiles deployed against China but would have no effect on Chinese missiles targeted on the Soviet Union. It is not reasonable to expect that the Soviet Government will accept such an arrangement, although it has other missiles and aircraft that can strike Chinese territory.

22/ International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1981-1982*, pp. 72-73.

X. Short-Range Nuclear Missiles in Europe

Both NATO and the Soviet Union have deployed ballistic missiles with ranges less than the Pershing 2 and the SS-4. These shorter-range missiles are relevant because the Soviet systems, if they are forward deployed, can strike some of the same targets in NATO territory that the intermediate-range missiles can. Likewise, some NATO missiles can strike Warsaw Pact, but not Soviet territory.

The Soviet missiles include the SS-12/SS-22 and the SS-X23. The SS-12 has a range of 500 miles with a megaton warhead. The SS-22 is a somewhat longer-range version (625 miles) with a smaller yield warhead. The U.S. claims that there are about 100 SS-12/SS-22s. But the Soviet Union is reported as saying there are only half that many and that the SS-22 does not exist. 23/ The SS-X23 is an experimental missile with a range possibly around 300 miles. It evidently has not been deployed.

Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in December 1981 that the U.S. would also seek limitations on the SS-22 and SS-X23 missiles. Otherwise, he said, the INF agreement would be "hopelessly vulnerable to circumvention." That would be so, he explained, because the SS-22, if moved toward the Warsaw Pact front line, could cover "some 85 percent of the NATO targets assigned the SS-20," while the SS-X23 could strike "as much as 50 percent of European NATO." 24/

He did not explain why the omission of Warsaw Pact nuclear-capable aircraft as well as submarine-based missiles, would not permit circumvention. Nor why

23/ The SS-22 is a NATO designation. The Soviets might look upon it as just a variation of the SS-12, or as only a test model.

24/ Washington Post, December 2, 1981, A22.

weapon systems under the NATO flag that could strike Warsaw Pact territory would not also permit circumvention.

180 Pershing 1As are currently deployed in Western Germany. They are reported to have a range of about 400 miles and a warhead of variable yields from 60 to 400 kilotons. The 108 of these under U.S. command will be replaced by the Pershing 2s. The 72 under Western German control will remain and might be replaced later by an improved Pershing 1. This latter missile could strike Warsaw Pact countries but not the Soviet Union.

The U.S. asserts that the SS-12/SS-22s should be counted among intermediate-range weapons. The Soviet Union contends that they should not because their range is too short. However, the Soviets count the 108 U.S.-commanded Pershing 1As, presumably as surrogates for the Pershing 2s scheduled to be deployed later.

The Soviet Union and the U.S. possess shorter range missiles other than those mentioned herein but they have more the character of battlefield weapons.

The claims that each side makes regarding inclusion in the intermediate-range balance of weapons at the lower end of the range scale point up the difficulties of arriving at clear criteria for inclusion of systems in the arms control negotiations. In order to keep the negotiations manageable it is necessary to place limits so that the numbers and varieties of weapons do not become too great. In the last analysis, this can probably best be achieved by agreement between the two sides in regard to particular, specified weapon models rather than by a rigid application of general criteria.

XI. Verification

The Reagan Administration has made only general remarks about the kind of verification needed to assure compliance with an INF agreement. The kinds of monitoring required will depend on the limitations agreed upon, which are far from settled.

The President and other Administration officials have repeatedly asserted that for the kinds of limitations and reductions they advocate, more than national technical means (NTM) of monitoring will be necessary to assure the U.S. that the Soviets are complying.

According to Eugene Rostow additional means could include "cooperative measures, data exchanges and collateral constraints." On-site inspection might or might not be necessary.

Rostow told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 23, 1982, that the U.S. would want to know about Soviet production of missiles and warheads, "We cannot confine ourselves just to what is deployed. After all the threat cannot be measured that way." Paul Nitze, U.S. Representative to the INF negotiations, affirmed to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 24, 1982, that the U.S. proposal would also require a prohibition of production and testing of the missiles that would be banned under its terms.

Rostow reminded the House Foreign Affairs Committee in November 1981 that in his Der Spiegel interview, Brezhnev had agreed in principle to cooperative means of verification to supplement NTM. Specifics of what would be appropriate could be worked out in negotiations. The Soviet Union had also affirmed this position in "diplomatic and official communications," according to Rostow. There have also been other manifestations of Soviet willingness to consider methods of monitoring other than NTM provided they are appropriate to agreed limitations.

While Rostow and other U.S. officials have emphasized that there could be requirements for verification of INF restrictions beyond NTM, no such specific requirement has been made public.

However, Rostow told Congress the fact that the "zero option" calls for a complete ban rather than just a numerical limitation "should ease the verification problem in any INF agreement." Rostow referred to the belief that a total prohibition of deployment of a weapon system would make it easier to detect a violation than a partial prohibition that left some units of the system still deployed.

XII. Concluding Observations

A. Strengths and Weaknesses of the U.S. Position

The INF negotiations are still in an initial stage. Both sides have taken positions that are one sided and are accusing each other of not negotiating seriously, seeking unilateral advantage, and trying to gain military superiority. In short, each is still in a largely propaganda-waging, rather than a down-to-earth negotiating posture.

This is not unexpected. However, in some respects the pressure to achieve productive results is greater on the United States than it is on the Soviet Union. The United States is working against a NATO-imposed deadline, namely, the end of 1983, the date when the first U.S. INF weapons are scheduled to be deployed. The United States is also working against another deadline, namely, the presidential election of 1984. The incumbent administration arguably has a responsibility for achieving an arms control agreement derived from its repudiations of the 1979 SALT II Treaty. The latter was the product of seven years of intense negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but the Reagan Administration has, in effect, said that under current circumstances its proposals are better able to achieve U.S. arms control objectives. Moreover, it has claimed it can achieve an agreement by exercising pressure on the Soviet Union through its weapons programs. It is reasonable to expect that its record on these claims will be a subject of debate in the 1984 presidential elections.

The United States negotiating position is handicapped insofar as the Soviet Union already has its weapon systems in place whereas the weapons systems which the United States has introduced into the bargaining are still only a promise. Another complication of major significance is the fact that the determination of some of its allies to cooperate in the deployment of the promised weapon systems is shaky and in constant need of reaffirmation.

But despite the uncertainties and weaknesses affecting the U.S. position, it has taken a bold stance by proposing the "zero option". It has proposed trading off the entire promised U.S. deployment against the entire existing Soviet deployment of intermediate-range land-based ballistic missiles. It has done so on the premise that its bargaining stance is strong because the Soviet Union deeply fears the deployment of the new weapons and will be willing to pay a substantial price to head it off. While the Soviet Union knows that there is a lack of firm support in some countries for the NATO pledge to deploy the intermediate-range systems if no arms control agreement is achieved, it also knows that attempts to take advantage of these uncertainties may not be successful. It is also aware that the military bargaining positions of the United States and NATO, as far as intermediate-range forces are concerned, will be greatly strengthened if the new systems are deployed. Moscow knows that after deployment occurs--and it cannot be sure that deployment will not materialize--it will be in a much weaker position to deal with the new balance.

Since the INF systems (572) decided upon by NATO for deployment did not match the Soviet systems either in range or number of warheads, some NATO officials never considered them as meeting a "zero option" standard. They assumed that some compromise level would be agreed in U.S.-Soviet negotiations. What compromise numbers might be acceptable to both sides, however, is not evident at present.

B. Need for Agreement on Data

There are many weighty issues to be resolved before both sides can reach common ground for a viable agreement. Many, although not all, are outlined in the above discussion. A basic issue still to be resolved is the achievement of an agreement to exchange better information on each side's relevant armaments. U.S.

officials have often emphasized the need for better exchanges of data than have occurred in the past. It is difficult, if not in many cases impossible, for any sound agreement to be reached if either or both sides do not have reliable data regarding the weapon systems which are the subjects of the agreement. From the public evidence, each side's knowledge of the other's weaponry, while extensive in many cases, shows gaps and contradictions.

A notable product of the political interchange between the U.S. and NATO on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other over the past couple of years in regard to matters of arms control and of justifying certain weapon deployments before the grandstand of public opinion, is that both sides have published extensive compendiums of information about opposing weapon systems. Even more noteworthy is the fact that the Soviet Union has, for the first time, engaged in this kind of public debate.

Recently the Soviet Union has volunteered its own data on Soviet and Western forces. In the early days of arms control negotiations, the Soviet Union frequently, if not always, relied on data supplied by the United States or other Western powers on nuclear weapons as the base line data for the negotiations. It did not offer information about its own nuclear weapons or its estimates of opposing arms. This reliance upon Western information about nuclear armaments was overcome in the negotiations on the SALT II Treaty. That was one of the beneficial results of those negotiations.

According to the terms of that treaty, the two signatories, the Soviet Union and the United States, were periodically to publish figures on weapons that were subjects of treaty controls. The Soviet Union actually furnished two successive sets of data on its own forces before it became clear that the United States would not ratify the treaty. Now in two publications which have received wide distribution, the Soviet Union has offered information about numbers and characteristics

of its own weapon systems and of weapon systems possessed by the United States and other Western powers. These data, to the extent that they are relevant, are being used in the INF negotiations, although there is obviously only partial concurrence on the figures.

Eugene Rostow, the Director of ACDA, has asserted that the Soviet Union was pushed into publishing figures regarding its forces by its arguments that parity existed between the nuclear forces of both sides, both on the European and strategic planes, and that U.S. rearmament programs would upset the existing balance.

However, the information issued by both sides to support its claims shows certain contradictions and inadequacies. To cite an example, the information available to the public on the Soviet SS-20, a principal subject of the negotiations, is apparently not as solid as it might be in order to assess precisely its military capabilities. Although the intelligence community has evidently kept track of the number deployed, there appear to be differences of opinion in regard to the range of the SS-20, possibly because it has been tested in various models and with different numbers of warheads. It may not be a firm fact that every unit of the deployed SS-20 has three warheads although all are publicly counted as if they do. There are also differences in regard to the yield of its warheads. The dispute that has recently erupted between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. over the question whether the Soviet Union has or has not completed additional deployment sites for the SS-20 after Moscow announced a moratorium on their deployment is unusual and disquieting. The directly contradictory statements issued by each side suggest the existence of a serious problem of interpretation of data which is puzzling to the public and which merits further exploration by those concerned with the adequacy of monitoring procedures.

If there are gaps in the available information about the SS-20, the amount of reliable information available on the SS-22 and the SS-23 is meager indeed.

The more relevant of these appears to be the SS-22 because it has a longer range and is closer to the capabilities of the SS-20 than either the SS-21 or the SS-23. But there appears to be uncertainty whether or not it is deployed and if so in what numbers.

The amount of confusion that exists in regard to intermediate-range aircraft on each side that are capable of delivering nuclear weapons, is also extensive.

Before the issues in these negotiations can be addressed intelligently, especially the matter of which systems should be included, there must be a franker exchange of information than has yet occurred. Thus far the claims of both sides have been so exaggerated, each in its own favor, that it will presumably take much discussion and concession on both sides before common understanding can be achieved.

C. Why the "Zero Option"?

How should one appraise the far reaching character of the "zero option" as it was proposed by the Reagan Administration? It could have been proposed in a less extreme form, for instance, it might have applied only to those intermediate-range missiles of the Soviet Union that are deployed in Europe, that is, west of the Urals, or at most those missiles east of the Urals with a range sufficient to strike NATO countries in Europe. Or the proposal might have been made in terms of reducing intermediate-range missiles to some common level greater than zero, in terms of either launchers or warheads. Why, therefore, was the zero option proposed in an extreme form as far as intermediate-range missiles are concerned with no fall-back position, either acknowledged or, according to currently available evidence, discussed with NATO allies?

There are a number of possible explanations, including the following. First, the proposal is a hard opening position and the Reagan Administration intends to bargain stubbornly for all or as much of it as long as it can without making any

concessions. Second, the administration might have intended to hold a stiff line until the START negotiations could get underway and both sets of negotiations could be coordinated more intelligently after the proposals of both sides were on the table. This would have required just a relatively short "no concessions" stance. Third, another possible explanation is that the Reagan Administration, assessing the state of opinion in Europe, the lagging pace of the INF weapons programs, the time frame for conduct of negotiations before the 1984 presidential campaign, and other factors, decided that the INF negotiations were a lost cause and that they would depend on the START negotiations as a means of scoring gains in the arms control area before the next presidential campaign. Under this interpretation, the "zero option", because it has an appeal to important arms control groups in Europe, would not entail undue criticism of the Reagan Administration if it did not lead to a successful agreement.

Still another possible explanation is that the Reagan Administration did not really want the INF negotiations to go very far very fast but preferred to be able to deploy the Pershing 2s and the GLCMs because it did not believe that it could win major concessions from the Soviet Union on intermediate-range missiles until the deployment of the U.S. systems had at least begun.

Finally, it is possible that the administration believed that the best negotiating position for both the INF and START negotiations would lie in a merger of the two into one. The SALT III negotiations were originally envisioned in the SALT II Treaty as combining intermediate-range and strategic weapons and Reagan officials might have decided that this option should be kept open for future decision. Under these circumstances, therefore, it adopted an unyielding and comprehensive "zero option" stance until that decision could be made.

The fact that administration officials, including Ambassador Edward Rowny, the U.S. negotiator for START, have said they do not expect much progress in either

the INF or START negotiations until the deployment of Pershing 2s and GLCMs begins, suggests an administration decision to adhere to its opening proposals in both of these negotiations until that event occurs, unless the Soviet Union should offer significant concessions. It also might suggest it expects the two sets of negotiations to be merged at some point.

D. Relationship of INF to START Neogtiations

There are a number of possible interactions between the INF and START negotiations.

1. Comparative Priority

One factor that can affect the impact of the INF negotiations is the comparative priority they are given in relationship to the START negotiations. There exists already a widespread belief in Western Europe as well as among many observers in the United States, that the United States would not necessarily be a reliable ally if the Soviet Union should decide to launch a nuclear attack solely upon Western Europe. The United States, many believe, would not necessarily extend its strategic nuclear umbrella over NATO Europe if such an onslaught should threaten. This, as has been explained in this paper and in many other places, was one of the main reasons for the NATO decision of December 1979 to deploy intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe.

Even now there exists some uneasiness in Western Europe that with the deployment of intermediate-range missiles, especially if this deployment should be expanded later, the United States might rely, at least in the first instance, upon the Europe-based nuclear missiles to retaliate against a Soviet nuclear attack before resorting, if it ever did, to a strategic nuclear response. If now the United States should lag in reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union to limit intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe and should give priority to the

conclusion of a START agreement with the Soviet Union, one significant result could be to reinforce the fears of Western Europeans that the United States was reducing even more its capability of extending a strategic nuclear defense to NATO Europe and it was leaving Western Europe to rely upon Europe-based U.S. nuclear weapons and its own resources for defense. In other words, if the U.S. gave the conclusion of a START agreement priority over a solution of the intermediate-range weapon problem in Europe, it could have the effect of politically decoupling the U.S. strategic deterrent from the Europe-based nuclear deterrent, the very result the U.S. and NATO were trying to avoid when they made their December 1979 decision.

To avoid such an undesirable consequence, the United States could move ahead rapidly to reach an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces with the Soviet Union, either before or at least simultaneously, with an agreement on strategic arms reductions. An alternative would be to fold the INF negotiations into the START negotiations so that they would become one integrated diplomatic effort between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Other observers contend, however, that visible success in the START negotiations before substantial progress or a satisfactory conclusion of the INF talks occurred would have a positive, encouraging effect upon West European opinion. The NATO governments and people would adjudge success in START as an augury of success in the INF negotiations. It would create an atmosphere congenial to resolution of INF negotiations to advance toward an agreement.

2. Coordination or Merger?

From the military viewpoint, the weapons that are the subjects of the START and INF negotiations form a continuum of nuclear capabilities from medium to long ranges and from small to large warhead yields. In a military sense, no part of

this array of weaponry can be exclusively separated from the rest so that it can become an isolated means of warfare if conflict ever occurred. In this continuum targets can be shifted from one category of weapon to another. Consequently, unless all are brought under control, there exists at least a potential of circumvention. In order to cover the entire continuum, the negotiations for START and INF must be closely coordinated or integrated.

One approach to assuring close coordination between the START and INF agreements, if they are not integrated into one negotiation with the aim of reaching a single agreement, would be to make the effectuation of one agreement contingent upon the effectuation of the other. This is not an unprecedented device in international diplomacy.

One advantage of closely meshing or merging the INF and START agreements would be that it could obviate certain disputes which have taken place in the past, such as that over the Backfire bomber as to whether or not it qualified for inclusion in the SALT negotiations. If the agreements were closely coordinated, then a system like the Backfire would fall in either one or the other and therefore need not be a matter of serious dispute. Another advantage is that the problem of circumvention would be greatly diminished or eliminated. An additional advantage is that it would greatly improve the certainty of military planning on each side if the whole spectrum of nuclear weapons, except possibly those at the low end, were subject to known restrictions for a defined period of time.

A disadvantage of closely meshing or merging the two agreements is that more problems would have to be solved and the period of negotiation could become more extended. One of the advantages of dividing up the process of negotiation and concentrating on a limited span of armaments for each agreement is that this can simplify negotiations.

What is the attitude of the Reagan Administration toward combining or at least meshing the two sets of negotiations? It has established procedures which recognize the close relationships between the two negotiations. First of all, there will be only one backstop committee in Washington that will be supporting and guiding the positions of the two U.S. teams in the two sets of negotiations. Second, both negotiations will be taking place in Geneva where the two delegations can closely cooperate with each other and indeed might even combine their operations in certain respects. Eugene Rostow, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee in November 1981, "it may be--I wouldn't exclude it at all, depending upon how these talks evolve--that at a given point we could combine them. After all, they are separate only for reasons of historical accident."

Apparently, one of the main reasons the Reagan Administration at this time wants to keep the two sets of negotiations separate is the fact that each set of negotiations at the present moment is focused only on a limited number of weapons systems and does not include all weapons systems that pertain to the military balance in the particular sphere of each negotiation. The U.S. in the INF negotiations wants to focus only on certain missiles and to exclude other systems such as aircraft. In the START negotiations it wishes to give priority to ballistic missiles and it is not at all clear at what stage it believes that air-breathing systems should be brought into the picture. With proposals like these it would make little sense to combine the negotiations because they would lack essential linkages and would be incomplete even when added together. But in the final reckoning no nuclear arms control settlement can be complete unless all significant and relevant systems are covered.