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The Crisis of Secularism: How Democracy Fuels Moral Panics and Religious Fundamentalism

Pedja Ilic
San Jose State University

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Abstract

While identifying humanity's most cherished ideals, there is one notion that ultimately supplants all others: the notion of freedom. The concept itself and its encompassing rhetoric have been utilized ad nauseam by virtually all contemporary social orders to validate the levels of civilizational maturity and, perhaps more importantly, to set goals to which the same should strive. However, irrespective of its categorical position at the very summit of conscious human existence, its interpretational elasticity allows for a diminishing number of concessions. This paper offers critique and examines interactions between multiculturalism, cultural relativism, religion, and secularism within contemporary Western societies. It utilizes historical examples of overt and latent free speech and human rights violations to demonstrate futility and incompatibility of the conventional and fundamentalist religious ideologies with the concepts of egalitarianism and secularism. The Abrahamic religion of Islam serves as a centerpiece example of instances discussed. The paper further describes and employs sociologist Stanley Cohen's concept of moral panic in an attempt to anatomize the problem and the reactions stemming from it. The conclusion reiterates exigency of the matter and offers a glimpse into the perplexity, danger, and evolution of the soi-disant progressive Western democracies in relation to palpable prosperity of the human enterprise. Research materials comprise various internet-based and traditional print sources.

Keywords

secularism, moral panic, democracy, religious fundamentalism

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While identifying humanity's most cherished ideals, there is one notion that ultimately supplants all others: the notion of freedom. The concept itself and its encompassing rhetoric have been utilized ad nauseam by virtually all contemporary social orders to validate the levels of civilizational maturity and, perhaps more importantly, to set goals to which the same should strive. However, irrespective of its categorical position at the very summit of conscious human existence, its interpretational elasticity allows for a diminishing number of concessions. This paper offers critique and examines interactions between multiculturalism, cultural relativism, religion, and secularism within contemporary Western societies. It utilizes historical examples of overt and latent free speech and human rights violations to demonstrate futility and incompatibility of the conventional and fundamentalist religious ideologies with the concepts of egalitarianism and secularism. The Abrahamic religion of Islam serves as a centerpiece example of instances discussed. The paper further describes and employs sociologist Stanley Cohen's concept of moral panic in an attempt to anatomize the problem and the reactions stemming from it. The conclusion reiterates exigency of the matter and offers a glimpse

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The Crisis of Secularism: How Democracy Fuels Moral Panics and Religious Fundamentalism

Freedom of speech and expression are understood to be the pillars of democratic societies. Many people consider them as fundamental, inalienable human rights that have brought about a cornucopia of knowledge and overall societal progress we see today. However, increasing numbers of moral and ideological entrepreneurs exploit the liveness of these freedoms to advance individual and collective agendas, undermining sanctities of many human rights and liberties in the process.

Discussion

Despite the plethora of examples, perhaps the most paradoxical ones come from the doctrines of multiculturalism and cultural/moral relativism, both of which are intrinsic to freedoms of speech and expression. The essence of multiculturalism lies in a presupposed altruism, tolerance, and the notion of equality among all constituting members of the society. Conversely, cultural relativism holds that a particular culture is the primary source of the validity of a right or a rule (Donnelly, 2003). In the case of strong cultural relativism, where the culture accepts a few basic rights but allows for a wide range of variation and interpretation of its traditional beliefs, norms, and customs, the ideals of multiculturalism are often overtly violated. Therefore, the problem stems from the obvious contradiction between the two interrelated systems: the one of

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inclusiveness and the other of cultural domination. Further analysis uncovers levels of incompatibility of standards and values between two systems. Initially, cultural relativism, as a tool of the multicultural societal model, utilizes the language of democracy, freedom, and inclusiveness to justify its own existence. The setbacks appear shortly after cultural relativists begin implementing definitional types of strong cultural relativism and demanding tolerance and legalization of the practices and attitudes that violate not only the established secular norms and values of a particular geographical locale, but also the basic human rights and dignities. When the rest of the populace exercises its freedom of speech by expressing legitimate concerns regarding double standards enjoyed by cultural relativists and their constituencies, the response is increasingly seen in a wave of moral panic and self-righteous indignation, sweeping much of the planet. Case in point, September 11, 2012 marked both the eleventh anniversary of dreadful events in New York City and Washington D.C., as well as the worldwide moral panics contagion, spurred by the publication of a set of ludicrous videos on the website YouTube, initially titled *The Real Life of Muhammad and Muhammad Movie Trailer*, both soon to be known as the *Innocence of Muslims* (Zahos, 2012). The movie allegedly depicted the Islamic Prophet Muhammad in an inappropriate light, triggering a de facto moral outrage throughout the Islamic world, leaving 75 people dead and hundreds more injured (Kay, 2012).

What seems to be transparent is an increased frequency and magnitude of moral panic outbreaks triggered by the set of instances based almost exclusively within a domain of free speech and expression. On November 2, 2004, the world was presented with yet another striking example of religious

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fundamentalism and free speech antagonism with the assassination of Theodoor "Theo" van Gogh, a Dutch film director, producer, columnist, and author. In August 2004, Van Gogh produced and published a short movie titled *Submission* in cooperation with Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali-Dutch parliamentarian, feminist, and activist. The movie depicts the appalling struggles of many women in the Muslim world, void of compassion and basic human dignity. Authors artistically point out that the legitimacy of these human rights violations stems directly from the Islamic sacred texts of the Quran (Hall, 2006). The publication of the movie sent shockwaves throughout the Muslim countries and generated an immediate condemnation, coupled with countless threats of violence and death to both Van Gogh and Ali. Shortly after, Ali went into hiding, while Van Gogh retained an intentionally open profile and criticism of organized religions.

Van Gogh was a provocative and controversial figure. He would often criticize Dutch multicultural establishments for catering to the very type of cultural relativism described earlier. His friendship and support of Dutch sociologist and politician Wilhelmus Simon Petrus Fortuijn, better known as Pim Fortuyn, only made it easier for moral entrepreneurs to place him on the extreme right of the political spectrum. Fortuyn was a Marxist professor, a champion of gay rights, women's rights, liberal drug laws, and euthanasia. Yet, because of his direct criticisms of loopholes within cultural relativism and immigration of an aggressive Muslim minority, he was labeled as the far-right populist by his political opponents, the label he categorically rejected (Lang, 2002; Levant, 2010). In a 2001 interview with a Belgian journalist Walter Zinzen, Fortuyn described his and the views of his party Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) as pragmatist, not

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populist, resolutely distancing himself from the rest of the European right-wing party leaders and their ideologies (Zinzen, 2001). Fortuyn advocated cultural assimilation and integration of immigrants in Netherlands, in opposition to multiculturalists' favoritism of cultural relativism and alleged risks it brings to the secular societies. Both Van Gogh and Fortuyn received numerous death threats from various fundamentalist groups for merely exercising their rights of free speech and expression within democratic societies. However, fear mongering and intimidation failed to dictate their lives and work. Quite tragically, those death threats would substantiate with Pim Fortuyn's assassination in May 2002, following with Van Gogh's two years later in November 2004. Fortuyn was assassinated by Volkert van der Graaf, a left-wing, environmental activist. Van Der Graaf admitted in court that the reason for killing Fortuyn was to stop him from exploiting the weak members of society in the bid for political power (Evans-Pritchard & Clements, 2003). Van Gogh was the target of Mohammed Bouyeri, a Dutch-born Moroccan Islamist. Bouyeri savagely murdered Van Gogh in downtown Amsterdam three months after Submission's initial release (Vermaat, 2005). The assassinations of Theo van Gogh and Pim Fortuyn only affirmed the sanctity of free speech and expression, as well as the unwillingness and/or inability of organized religions and other ideological enterprises to face legitimate criticisms and condemn violations of basic human rights and dignities uniformly carried out under disguises of tradition, culture, and faith.

Another grotesque globetrotting mass hysteria and moral panic was spurred by the *Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten* Muhammad cartoons controversy. *Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten* is a Danish daily newspaper that posted a series of

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editorial cartoons on September 30, 2005 depicting the Islamic prophet Muhammad. The publication was followed by what can be labeled as an established pattern of vehemence and condemnation from the entire Islamic world, once again graphically manifested through the numerous attacks on European diplomatic missions, embassies, churches, and people, namely Christians (Spiegel Online, 2006). General sentiment echoing the Muslim world was that the cartoons were racist, Islamophobic, and, above all, blasphemous (Anderson, 2006). The controversy quickly reached the world's diplomatic circles, including national and supranational bodies, such as the United Nations, the European Union, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. While western democracies generally criticized cartoon publications for the lack of consideration toward Muslims and the religion of Islam, they reaffirmed the importance of unobstructed free speech and expression as rudimentary to the secular democratic societies. Predominantly Muslim nations were unified in their condemnation of cartoons, with many countries either severing or reexamining diplomatic ties with Denmark and demanding apologies for alleged insults to the prophet and the religious beliefs of Muslims. Member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation even developed a plan that would introduce legislative measures against Islamophobia, blasphemy and defamation of the religion to the European Union (OIC, 2008).

Cultural Relativism, the Trojan Horse of Fundamentalism

The three described instances converge at one common juncture: the crisis of secularism. In addition to impenitent threats to secular norms and values stemming from some of the

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world's non-democratic monarchies, dictatorships, theocracies, and transitional governments, the particular threat to secularism described here originates internally within Western secular democracies. Given the interpretational elasticity of the freedoms of speech and expression, topics of morality, religion, secularism, and human rights are bound to collide and generate serious disagreements. It becomes quintessential to point that, while the arguments from all sides need to be heard and considered before any rational decisions can be made about labeling and addressing the problems of diminishing secular norms and values, and resulting contraventions of basic human dignities in western democracies, not all arguments have equal moral and factual significance. Under a practical assumption that both multiculturalism and secularism value the principles of egalitarianism, particularly non-instrumental egalitarianism, under which equality, fairness, and coexistence are the intrinsic components of moral and just societies, it becomes clear that such values are entirely incompatible with a number of different religious, fundamentalist, and otherwise ideological groups.

Various organized monotheistic religions, namely the Abrahamic ones, openly voice discontent with secular egalitarianism. They perceive it as a threat to their hegemonic doctrines, which are in a perpetual need of an unquestioning obedience and recognition as the supreme rules of the land. In theory, and arguably to some lesser extent in practice, the existing legal statutes within secular democracies grant freedoms of religion and affiliation to all citizens of a society. Such laws, however, are the main point of contention in regards to cultural relativism. Given the combination of existing laws and flexibilities of interpreting the freedoms of speech and expression, it comes as no surprise that instances of male and

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female genital mutilation (Islam, Judaism), polygamy (Islam, various Christian derivatives), extreme moral and psychological conservatism (Islam, Orthodox Judaism, Christianity), and grievous violations of basic human dignities (virtually all organized monotheistic religions) readily pass the test of cultural relativism and are defended as constituting parts of one's culture, religion, beliefs, and tradition. The underlying message here seems to be that regardless of how primitive, barbaric, and savage potential crimes against humanity might be, for as long as they are cloaked under veils of faith-based ignorance, cultural relativism will shield them from criticisms and contempt. Having a resolute attachment to a specific philosophy or otherwise a set of irreducible beliefs as the sole source of objective truth is extremely dangerous and intellectually futile.

Within the last few decades in particular, Islam in Europe has perfected the role of a victim and became the religion of permanent offense, requiring increasingly fortified legislative barriers to prevent further alleged defamations, blasphemies, and offenses. The Catholic Church, for instance, finds secularism more threatening than Islamic religious fundamentalism because secularism stands equally for the freedom of religion and the freedom from religion, meaning less unearned power, privilege, and influence for the political organization of religion and the people who benefit from it: the clergy. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the clergy, together with the evangelists of the west, regards secularism, tragicomically, as the work of Satan (Harris, 2010). What becomes readily transparent is the unrepentant abuse of secular norms and values by the religious fundamentalists and political ideologues. They employ the exact freedoms of speech and expression granted to them by egalitarian democratic societies to hack the limbs of secularism

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and humanism. Perhaps the relevant question to be asked here is how can anyone remain indifferent in the face of such a blunt hypocrisy? The ideals of fairness and justice, however relative they indeed might be, are most certainly skewed in the context of issues discussed.

Despite transparent zealotry, religions have been enjoying a rather peculiar privilege of immunity from criticism and sanctions in secular democratic societies. However, when Islamic religious fundamentalists, for example, call for the full implementation of Sharia (Islamic) Law in Western societies, under which women are treated as property and the punishment for apostasy, homosexuality, and religious impartiality is death, they effectively pulverize any possibility of a balanced argumentation and dialogue. Within a domain of increasingly dangerous and apparently non-negotiable propositions like these, there can be no compromising solution. The same principle applies to the suggestions of similar caliber stemming from other monotheistic organized religions, although Islam ubiquitously leads the way.

Furthermore, secularists within Western countries are faced with a relatively new problem of so-called moderate Islam. Unlike its radical fundamentalist offshoots, moderate Islam is supposed to be the antidote to open hate speech, racism, sexism, and bigotry, while providing the pathway toward genuine integration and multiculturalism. However, the term moderate becomes increasingly relative when recognized that the religion of Islam does not preach universal brotherhood, but rather the universal Islamic domination. It preaches violence and hatred in its holy scriptures, not just a few times, but page after page. It shows open contempt for other beliefs and values. It defines itself in aggressively divisive terms between Muslims and the

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infidels, who must be conquered and converted, forcing Islamic norms and values wherever they go. Many of its followers regard violence as the legitimate response to criticism (Condell, 2012). Unlike nearly all of the Old Testament verses of violence, the verses of violence in the Quran are mostly open-ended, meaning that they are not restrained by the historical context of the surrounding text. They are part of the eternal, unchanging word of the prophet and are just as relevant or subjective as anything else in the Quran (Roberts, n.d.) Therefore, it becomes very difficult to dissuade fundamentalist elements within religious groups from engaging in menacing rhetoric and violent behavior. Doing so would literally mean going against the currents of the Holy Scriptures. What the position of a moderate Muslim does is take a hypocritical standpoint of engaging in what can be called cultural terrorism - demanding unquestioning respect of ideas and practices which are diametrically opposed to the existing secular norms and values - while labeling all criticisms of Islam as racist and Islamophobic. Islamophobia itself is a non-existing, purpose-generated, propagandist concept serving as a cynical weapon of abovementioned cultural terrorism, aimed at the critics of Islam and conveniently accompanied with the treats of gruesome violence and death. Islamophobia tries to create an artificial sense of guilt in Western societies, offering the choice between submission and permanent conflict; it tries to redefine existing secular values as prejudices; it tries to silence legitimate criticisms and the free exchange of ideas, which, again, are the pillars of secular democratic societies. The existence of an apparent double standard does little to deter religious fundamentalists and perhaps even less to change the motives of spineless bureaucrats and politicians who use multiculturalism and cultural relativism to further political interests. Far from

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being an oppressed minority, Muslim immigrants in Western countries are indeed an aggressive minority; a minority of whom homosexuals, Jews, atheists, and non-Muslims must be keenly aware in various neighborhoods of many European metropolises (Levant, 2010). Many of the points expressed above would indeed be controversial if they were not contained within the Holy Scriptures of all Abrahamic religions and made readily available for everyone to see and interpret accordingly.

It would be intellectually dishonest, however, to neglect mentioning the group that, most likely, carries the biggest burden in these ideological conflicts: millions of secular Muslims, fully integrated members of societies whose name has been shamelessly hijacked by religious extremist elements. While exercising their religious beliefs, they are often exposed to the radical religious preachers, disguised under titles of moderate Islamic scholars. These brazen moral entrepreneurs actively coerce otherwise peaceful believers into exercising specific interpretations of the holy Islamic scriptures, often strongly opposed to their already established secular ways of life. Conversely, the rest of the secular populace scrutinizes them for allegedly departing secular realms and catering to extremist's hate-mongering. They are unfortunately stuck between a rock and a hard place particularly because Islam preaches religious and cultural dominance, while discouraging inclusiveness and multicultural tolerance (Condell, 2012). Multiculturalism in itself is a brilliant concept; however, it inevitably succumbs to the pressures of moral relativism and moral blackmail, essentially becoming uniculturalism, where the only culture one is allowed to criticize and disapprove of is one's own (Hitchens, 2010).

Perhaps the biggest problem arises when the public, educational institutions, mass media, governments, and other

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legislative bodies of secular societies succumb to self-censorship on the pretexts of cultural relativism and direct threats of violence from the very same pits of morality that religions purport themselves to be. Fundamentalists know this very well; violence seems to be the only currency worthy of everyone's attention. It further seems that secular societies would tolerate any amount and severity of threats, as long as nobody calls them intolerant and undemocratic. This instance posits as the ultimate non sequitur: yet, Western democracies seem to struggle with these concepts (Harris, 2010). The broader concern here is that secular societies, based on their strong defense of fundamental rights and dignities, including increasingly malleable freedoms of speech, expression and opinion, will unfortunately spell their own demise by catering to the intolerant fundamentalist ideas, inherently incompatible with secular morals and values. In this sense, secular societies are indirectly becoming more authoritarian at the expense of their own citizens.

Moral Panics

Dissecting the dynamics of mass hysteria in all three instances described above, one can establish every constituting part of a moral panic. According to Stanley Cohen's groundbreaking study of the subculture of Mods and Rockers in 1960s Great Britain, published in his book *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, there are three specific elements needed for the construction of a successful moral panic. First, a suitable object/enemy (Prophet Muhammad) as a soft target, easily denounced, and without tangible defensive power; second, the victim (religion of Islam and/or all Muslim believers) a cohesive group of individuals easily identifiable among themselves; and third, a consensus that actions being denounced (publication of

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cartoons, or otherwise defamation of the prophet and religion) are not insulated entities (“it is not only this instance”), but rather an integral, perhaps institutionalized, hatred toward a specific group of people and a set of beliefs and practices, by intolerant, pretentious infidels (other religious groups and non-believers).

The phenomenon itself was characterized by the rise of two subcultures in the early to mid-1960s Great Britain: the Mods (hipster-like figures recognized by fancy modified scooters, the following of the latest fashion trends accompanied by the specific types of music and epitomizing the notions of cool and modern) and the Rockers (raw and rough-around-the-edges anti-authoritarians, also known for their leather clothing, modified motorcycles called cafe-racers, the preference of rock-n-roll music, and reportedly intimidating masculine appearances). Seaside resort-towns of Brighton, Margate, and Clacton in the country’s south have traditionally been the places where numerous tourists from the rest of the country fair to spend family holidays. However, the Easter weekend of 1964 would end up with a quite different-than-usual “holiday spirit.” Cohen describes how numerous social and economic factors in post-war Great Britain created an atmosphere that gave rise to subcultures like the Teddy Boys and Mods and Rockers. Boredom and lack of identity among youth would be some of the major reasons for the exponential rise of the phenomenon. Initially, in search of any kind of recreational activity, numerous mods and rockers would depart their boredom-filled hometowns and descend to seaside resorts like Clacton. Once there, it was only a matter of time before something occurred. Quite unsurprisingly, numerous fights would break out between opposing factions, providing excellent entertainment for the thrill-seeking adolescent masses. Almost instantaneously, the media took handle of the events in

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Clacton and manufactured nothing short of an alternative-reality of the phenomenon, enthroning the Mods and Rockers to the kingdom of folk devils and triggering an outbreak of public condemnation and moral panics.

Cohen explains approaches to the process of deviance, its amplification through the mass media - the long-standing agents of moral indignation, which utilize sensationalism, scandals, bizarre and strange circumstances - all molded into what will eventually become a moral panic. The sequential model developed by disaster researchers is used to describe the phases of a typical disaster to differentiate between various segments of the Mods and Rockers phenomenon. The author is further aided by sociologist Neil Smelser's value added schema, namely by its sixth determinant: the operation of social control. The disaster sequence has seven distinct stages (I warning, II threat, III impact, IV inventory, V rescue, VI remedy, and VII recovery) that, according to Cohen, might not have exact parallels with the Mods and Rockers. Cohen thus condenses and combines the sequence into four separate stages (warning - covering phases I and II; impact; inventory; and reaction - covering phases V, VI, and VII) and uses it to lay out the sociological analysis of the phenomenon, likely the first of its kind. Within described themes and phases, Cohen traces the development and reverberation of the societal reaction, particularly as reflected in the mass media and the actions of the organized system of social control. Having gathered and analyzed data, Cohen revisits the warning and the impact phases, further examining the effects of the societal reaction. Contextual and historical placement of the growth of folk devils and moral panics concludes the book.

However, in the case of moral panics engulfing Islamic world, there is no distinctive gradual phasing of reactions to the

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perceived incident; the inventory phase is almost continuously exaggerated and distorted, without any help from the media. Not surprisingly, religions tend to hold a perpetual offensive guard against potential criticisms, often to the extent of a paranoid schizophrenia. Reaction phases are somewhat more easily distinguished, namely the rescue and remedy themes. Opinion and attitude themes are already well established, coinciding with a “perpetual offensive guard” analogy. Within the rescue and remedy phases, the deviancy is maximally amplified. At this particular point, the media indeed plays a pivotal role, triggering reactions with an unsurpassed speed on a global scale. This rapidly enveloping dynamic was perhaps best seen with the publication of the Innocence of Muslims video. Virtually overnight, exploiting globally reaching social and mass media, the Islamic world, which consists of over one billion people, has crossed the threshold of moral panics, exploding in a violent and destructive fashion. Arguably, there were millions of Muslims physically unable to see excerpts from the movie; however, word of mouth, clerical antagonizing, and government official’s condemnations of the movie have indirectly amplified already lingering mutiny and deviance. The warning phase was nonexistent, excluding the “perpetual offensive guard” theme; however, impact phase more than adequately supplemented any deficiencies found in inventory, opinion, and attitudes themes.

Conclusion

It is of utmost importance to ask questions and examine the reactions stemming from the religious domain, triggered by what most people consider as perhaps tasteless but nonetheless trivial instances of free speech and expression. Can these reactions be examined outside of the world of the religious fundamentalism

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and ideological extremism? As is the case with many other issues encompassing the entire human enterprise, socioeconomic, political, and number of other factors pose substantial problems. Although cloaked under veils of faith-based ignorance, they are indeed legitimate problems, often instigated by the very entities that condemn such impulsive reactions as barbaric, backward, and unworthy of integration into an otherwise “civilized” world. Are the reactions of this kind nothing more than the weapons of the weak? Has moral outrage been left as the only defense mechanism of the oppressed after centuries of fighting Western imperialism, globalization, and the fairly recent manifestations of neoliberal capitalism? Are Western hegemonies utilizing economic and political advantages to wage modified, but in many respects even bloodier crusades against those who are unable or unwilling to conform? Questions like these are guaranteed to spawn armies of proponents ready to legitimize viewpoints likely impervious to criticisms, creating ideological fortresses identical to those they have set out to condemn and dismantle. The biggest risk is that the issues of basic human rights and dignities will be used as arbitrary talking points and verbal weaponry in a perpetual ideological warfare, void of substance and genuine consideration.

Despite the vociferous scrutiny of organized religions expressed throughout the paper, one must not omit mentioning the threats to the secular democratic models and basic human dignity that stem from the agencies of social control, native to the so-called progressive Western societies. Within the realities of rabid consumerism, manufactured consent, unharnessed corporate malevolence, grievous social problems, perverse concentration of wealth and power in the hands of the capitalist elites, coupled with the top-down organizational structures that

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command an unprecedented control over the lives of all have-nots, the most elemental freedoms are transformed into perishable privileges. External critics, including highly criticized religious fundamentalists, are fully aware of the legitimate “democratic” shortfalls listed above. Consequently, it becomes clear why they utterly despise flagrant hypocrisy of the Western exceptionalism, and reject all criticisms stemming from it.

In the end, how is one to compromise between the two prevailing realities? Literal interpretation of the Holy Scriptures can be conclusively ruled out. Arguably, the majority of concepts described were never compatible with the principles of genuine human flourishing. Conversely, entrusting confidence to the financial oligarch of the West, under false pretexts of civilizational maturity and social stability, offers no definitive consolation either. However, the concept of multiculturalism becomes indispensable in a nowadays globalized world, thus requiring conversations like these to take place. What seems to be necessary is the presence of a definitive set of norms and guidelines that would sanctify altruism and tolerance and create the society where veritable multiculturalism can actually thrive. Fortunately, the existing secular norms and values offer just that. Therefore, the people in search of similar societal arrangements should embrace secularism and ensure that their traditions and religious and cultural beliefs do not infringe on the basic human rights and dignities of the rest of the society. If, however, such arrangements are not possible within current political, financial, and governmental structures, the people must be resilient in devising fundamentally different societies based on self-governance and bottom-up hierarchies where genuine human flourishing just might have chance. Contemporary societal structures are designed to be demonstrative of a unique and

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impervious-to-change system. Being cognizant of such imposed limitations does not require an extraordinary feat of mental gymnastics. All it takes is an open, critical mind and a sufficient determination and courage to state the obvious and lead by an example. Although easier said than done, the task of bringing about the revolution of the collective human enterprise certainly remains necessary and possible.

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Pedja Ilic was born and raised in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Since 2004, he resides in Silicon Valley. In 2012, he graduated from the Department of Justice Studies at the San Jose State University, where he intends to continue graduate studies. His academic interests comprise concepts and relations between justice and expanding systems of social control; human and non-human animal rights; religion and its ideological enterprises; and social, economic, and environmental sustainability. Pedja cherishes the ideals of freedom, honesty, and critical inquiry. In his spare time, he enjoys nature, cycling, and reading.

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