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A LANDSCAPE OF EMOTIONAL MATURITY AND THE SELF

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Philosophy San Jose State University

> In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Philosophy

> > by Roland V. Wilson, II December 1998

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ABSTRACT

A LANDSCAPE OF EMOTIONAL MATURITY AND THE SELF

by Roland V. Wilson, II

In this thesis I define the nature of a person as a self. The self is a developmental process. I then define emotion. This leads to the subject of the paper -- emotional maturity. In emotional maturity, a person develops their self. Emotional maturity is a development of the self in that the self itself is a developmental process. The emotions are a part of that development as a whole. Once we understand the process of the self, we can see how the emotions fit in. Emotions mature as part of one's whole personality, that is, as part of one's whole development as a person.

To parents who sustain me, and to a life so much the better.

"One of the meanings of life is to conceive your self, to conceive yourself as you really are, and be that person."

> Roland V. Wilson, II 1995

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

The concept of emotional maturity does not seem have an undebatable meaning. A first step in discussing emotional maturity, then, is to place the issue in context. If it is the emotional maturity of a person that is at issue and it is emotions which mature, then the first subjects to discuss must be what a person is and what emotions are. Without answers to these questions, the meaning of emotional maturity would be lost.

One way of defining the meaning of person, it is suggested, is that a person has a self. In the philosophy of mind, one of the issues debated is whether or not people have a mind and if so what its nature is. This attempt to account for the mind and the attempt to arrive at a conception of the self have much in common. When we argue about what the mind is or what the self is, we argue about what context an account of it should be put in. Should it be a material account (i.e., the neurologist knows by the composition of the brain), a behavioral and functional account (i.e., we know who you are by your actions and not necessarily your thoughts), or some kind of abstract account of "personhood" (i.e., by examining personal thoughts)? In this way we make an account of the mind and so too can we define a person as a self.

Argument about what the mind is could actually be considered on all three of the contextual levels listed above. That is, the mind could be understood in terms of one overall context with three levels of matter, behavior and function,

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and personal thoughts.¹ Aside from trying to argue that this explanation actually obtains, the point is that trying to have any conception of the mind, e.g., as having different levels or layers, shows important problems we can have even on the outermost skin of the onion, so to speak. Acknowledging even very broad problems with such a theory of the mind and the self helps us to define emotional maturity. These are problems with being able to approach the issue at all and therefore understanding them becomes relevant and even necessary to understanding and defining emotional maturity.

The self, I suggest, is a thing that is intentional and embodied as an actor in the world. It is not my intention to argue for a certain conception of mind and self as having a particular status of being. Nevertheless, this thesis depends on a conception of self, and of psychology, as a background for a discussion of the more central concern of emotional maturity. So, the following chapter is a cursory examination of the nature of the mind. In it I will suggest that an account of the mind subsumes, in part, an account of the self. Later will be discussed more particularly what a self is and how this relates to emotional maturity.

It has been argued that the common conception of the self is radically wrong. One is tempted to consider one's self as an independent "I" separate or separable from others and even, hypothetically, from one's body, a pure self

¹ The problem with these changing over time remains an opaque problem. Nevertheless, the suggestion as to the mechanism of changing personality could shed light on this problem. That is, an explanation of personality can be considered the statement of criteria for personal identity.

aware only of one's own thoughts and experiences. This is the definition of a Cartesian $ego.^2$

Then there is the idea that a person could be defined in the exact opposite way. In behaviorism, all introspection and subjectivity is avoided. Strict behaviorism relegates itself to empirical examination of stimuli and behavior. Explanation of behavior (i.e., explanation of a person) in terms of belief, intention, and desire was considered unscientific.³

Behaviorism evolved into functionalism. A functional account of mind incorporates a physical account and a psychological account. We were left with functionalism since the pure physical account and the pure psychological account failed. But neither is the functionalist able to reduce a person to a state of thought, and cause and effect of behavior.

Dualists question whether the functional account is satisfactory. They feel that the point of view of the experiencer as an experiencer must be taken into account. A question arises, "What can I not be in doubt of in my experience?" One answer to this question is that I cannot doubt that I am experiencing. This answer points to the idea that one is the experiencer of one's awareness. It is this private experience that points to the need to account for personalization of experience. Functionalism fails to see the mind as intentional in this way.

This contrast between the physical, the mental, and the functional is well represented by debates between Aristotle and Plato. Aristotle criticized Plato for suggesting that a Form could exist as a separate object outside of its constituting matter. Given that, it would be fair to say that Aristotle should argue that the

² Simon Blackburn, <u>The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy</u> (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1996), 56.

³ Ibid., 39.

self is not separate from its activity or physical life (although this is contradicted in <u>De Anima</u>). We are not "behind" the appearances of a complex unity. Self awareness and one's experience are as obvious and understandable as knowing another person or seeing oneself in the mirror. We do not have a self hidden behind the appearances distinct from our body and its activity. As Nussbaum and Putnam put it:

Aristotle tells us that if we attend properly to the appearances the dualist's questions never even get going. 'It is not appropriate to inquire whether the soul and the body are one -- just as it is not appropriate in the case of the wax and its shape, and in general the matter of each thing and that of which it is the matter [of]' (DA 412b6-9). If you attend in the appropriate way to the complex materiality of living things, if you understand the common conception of what it is to be a living thing, you will not ask that question. The soul is not an 'it' housed in the body, but a functional structure in and of matter.⁴

Aristotle, then, at least as Nussbaum and Putnam see it, represents an early form of functionalism where the issue of subjectivity "never even gets going."

But not only can we and do we commonly talk about the mind in terms of beliefs, emotions, intentions, etc. (generally considered the dualist's domain), but there is also the common suggestion of a self (i.e., one we seem to introspect).⁵ In folk psychology there is an ease in discussing the idea of one's point of view that we do not see in some kinds of functionalism since, for functionalism, the existence of an intention cannot be objective empirical evidence for the cause of behavior.

⁴ Martha C. Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, "Changing Aristotle's Mind," Book unknown, Publisher unknown, 1992, 56.

⁵ It is not the suggestion of this paper that the self is an object of introspection.

So suppose we were to change functionalism to accommodate and compliment this folk psychology. In that case we would ask what of value folk psychology offers. Scott Christensen and Dale Turner offer a definition of folk psychology.

Briefly, folk psychology is the tag given to ordinary talk about the mind. It does not refer to talk about the biology of the brain and central nervous system; rather it refers to talk about beliefs and desires, intentions and fears, wishes and hopes. It is essentially the vocabulary we use to talk about and explain ourselves and others. It is the vocabulary of the mental.⁶

So, where does functionalism land between a 'mentality only' account and a 'physicality only' account of the mind? Christensen and Turner help us again by defining functionalism.

What is functionalism besides a reaction to the incommensurability [between] psychology and neurology? *Functionalism* holds that mental states are essentially defined by the set of causal relations between a) input to the system from the environment, b) other types of mental states, and c) output, characterized by behavior. [Functionalism is marked by] the functionalist [seeing] mental states as causally connected to other mental states, in addition to other inputs and outputs.⁷

Functionalism as defined here does not depend solely on a materialist, behaviorist, or materialist/behaviorist account of mental states, but includes the mental. It is based on causal relations between various systems, some of which are characterized as mental.

⁶ Scott M. Christensen and Dale R. Turner, eds., <u>Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of</u> <u>Mind</u> (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., Inc., 1993), xvi.

⁷ Ibid., xxiii.

Still functionalism lacks the kind of consideration for 'intrinsicness' of mental phenomena characteristic of folk psychology. In folk psychology, we are allowed to talk about the quality of mental states not only as a cause, as the functionalist does, but also as something intrinsic. Terms like "intrinsic intention," "intrinsic self," or "I" reflect something about the status of the self not captured by functionalism.

Self, in this folk psychological sense, is an entity. In advocating folk psychology on this point I do not mean to support the view that the self is constituted by a mental substance. A self is not separate from appropriate constitutive matter. For example, belief requires physically possible creatures which believe. Awareness requires experience of perception or having perceived. We are, then, at least, physical creatures. The material level is necessary for having a personality. The body is not inhabited by a spirit that comes and goes thereby animating and de-animating it. An account of the self must include a physical possibility of belief, intention, and so on.⁸

So, what is the self such that it is a cause of behavior, in a functionalist sense, <u>and</u> autonomous and intrinsic, in a folk psychology sense? What is the self aside from being a physical process? The brief answer is that if functionalism insists that our behavior is caused, then folk psychology adds that there is evidence of a self that is the cause (or the cause of the cause).

In functionalism we are missing the subjective element in the descriptive account of mind's input, intermix of mental states, and output. If we can successfully add the subjective as an entity in itself to functionalism, we will have

⁸ One reason for granting this, I will add, is that a person only has certain knowledge available to them. One of those limits is, for example, not having access to knowing whether another person is animated by a "spirit." In that case, we are limited to making account of a self on physical possibilities which are not so limited to our knowledge.

what would be an ideal account of the mind. There will be a "person" who is the actor or agent of behavior described by functionalism. This will be explained in depth in chapter three.

Our problem is solved by adding to functionalism the idea of being a "particular person." For example, if it were possible to somehow know that a person is experiencing something that is different from our own experience of that same thing, then in fact that person has raw sensations, imaginings, thoughts, etc. that are different than our own. A functionalist account would describe this person's experiences as the cause of their behavior. In folk psychology terms, if it were possible, we would have mental-type talk comparing this person's experience with our own. Not only is this person's experience different that ours, moreover, this person's experience would be theirs in a different way than our experience is ours. It is particular and peculiar to a world-view. So, by hypothesis, the language of folk psychology would be available for us to account for our subjectivity alongside the account of the functionalist. It would also be the case that we debate from the standpoint of a world-view.

This subjectivity points out the meaning of one being a particular person. If it could be argued that subjectivity determines personality to some degree or in some way, it follows, hypothetically, that potentially everyone's personality is relative in this way. Therefore, at least to the extent that subjectivity forms personality, personality is relative and particular. One can be described as the actor of one's life in functional terms whose reality is experienced in a particular way in folk psychology terms. One can be described as the particular person who has a particular perception from the view of a particular mental life. This points out the import and possibilities of the mental-type talk of folk psychology which can lead to conceiving a person as a self that synthesizes experience, thoughts, and actions.⁹ All this assumes, though, some kind of access to other's private thoughts.

By contrast, Paul Churchland and Stephen Stich argue that folk psychology ascriptions are radically false and that there simply are no such things as beliefs, desires, and other such faculties.¹⁰ If this is true, then we have to reject our common conception of ourselves.¹¹

The reason this objection arises is because of the problem of psychological privacy, of having access to a person's thoughts and personality. In functionalism, the problem is that it is hard to ascribe subjectivity as a cause of behavior. Subjectivity, as we have it above, is not necessarily a empirical thing, and empirical things are the grounds for the claims functionalists make. Privacy, then, makes subjectivity as a cause of behavior a problem for functionalism. On the other hand, where we speak of mentality in terms of folk psychology, the problem of privacy is skepticism. The reality we are aware of is really nothing but ideas since we actually conceive of nothing else in our awareness. This seems to imply that there is no public sensible world, that everything is subjective and private,¹² but for now I am only suggesting that the problem here

¹¹ Ibid., 144.

⁹ This concept will be expanded on in chapter three were we will discuss taste.

¹⁰ Terence Horgan and James Woodward, "Folk Psychology is Here to Stay," in Scott M. Christensen and Dale R. Turner, eds., <u>Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind</u>, (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., Inc., 1993), 145.

¹² This really depends, though, on how one might feel about epistemological, metaphysical, and ontological questions. I do not mean to suggest that reality consists of ideas, but merely to suggest that we only have immediate access to ideas, and therefore that all other data of awareness is mediated and therefore fallible. For example, "I am certain that I think I see a tree", is, it seems to me, a *less* fallible statement than, "I am certain that I see a tree."

is simply that we cannot communicate subjectivity past a boundary of privacy to others or others' subjectivity to us (i.e., we are not perfectly sympathetic).

I have suggested that people are subjective and have personal-type selves. Aristotle, or, more importantly, his contemporary functionalist followers, would say that we can describe people and their actions (assuming they are continent regarding their actions) without hypothesizing a self. We can describe their characters. But what causal relation is there between character and a person's behavior? And is there an intrinsicness to character that fits into a concept of the self?

It seems that we can, contrary to Aristotle and functionalism, make an account of character as self. That is, the object that functionalism describes is rational behavior, and this object includes a self. This must address the privacy issue and the subjectivity issue. It is suggested that this be done by placing the conception of character under an added level of abstraction and adding a kind of skepticism in the spirit of Berkeley. It will be suggested in chapter three, that by adding a level of abstraction, subjectivity is part of our nature.

Let's take an example. In Searle's Chinese Room, we have a room where a person, let's call him Searle, receives symbols. He then outputs the symbols he is supposed to output according to rules he has in the room with him.

As Weiss summarizes it,

What is on his mind when he is working in the room is of no importance at all as long as he acts according to the rules. . . . For the people outside the room . . . [as] far as they know there is someone in the room who *understands*

Chinese. From Searle's point of view it is obvious that he doesn't understand a word of Chinese.¹³ (emphasis added)

Suppose we make the experiment even harder, since there are some problems with just how sophisticated the room will have to be to fool the people it is "talking with." Suppose Searle is miniaturized and in the head of a robot with a computer on board that Searle can run.

Weiss describes the example this way:

If somebody yelled 'Fire' in Chinese, the robot would hasten out of the room. Let us assume that the robot has all the causal interaction with the world around him [i.e., it] a functionalist requires. Still the robot is like the original Chinese room in one relevant aspect: Again it is Searle -- sitting inside -- who controls the behavior of the robot [unaware of doing so]. And again all he does is manipulate meaningless symbols, decoding sensory information he does not understand, pushing levers the function of which he does not know. Viewed from outside, the robot may well look like a real mental system, but in his position -- namely by sitting inside the robot -- Searle knows that the robot just imitates understanding.¹⁴

To make it even more impressive, let's say that the robot looks like Searle. Sometimes Searle is running the robot looking out the front windows (so to speak) at the American embassy in China speaking English with the people at the embassy using the robot's machinery from inside (i.e., really conversing with people) and sometimes he is in the streets of China locked in the robot's head with all the windows closed as described above (i.e., not aware of conversing with people). The point is that we won't know when Searle is "at home with all the lights on" or if we are having a (Chinese) discussion with an incredible

¹³ Thomas Weiss, "Closing the Chinese Room," <u>Ratio</u> 3 (Dec. 1990): 166.

¹⁴ Ibid., 168.

facsimile. 'The way Searle answers . . . English questions is relevantly different form the way he answers . . . Chinese ones. The difference could be stated this way: In one case Searle answers consciously, in the other case not."¹⁵ The question becomes, how would we know?

Again Weiss puts the problem:

What is missing [for functionalism] is a first person point of view. The robot has no inside. Functionalism [supposedly] seems to be restricted to and content with a view from outside [but, this] third person point of view seems to leave something out. For example, only I can taste the flavor of my phenomenal states and my emotions. If I am depressed, nobody else feels my depression the way I do. What other people have is only the expression of my depression. These things cannot be captured from the third person point of view. [That is, they are private.]¹⁶

Let's finish with our robot hypothetical before we move on to the first person problem. Actually, the first person problem will be better addressed in chapter three.

What's the difference between having an experience of a robot and being correct about it being conscious (i.e., the robot is conscious or someone conscious is driving it) and having this experience and being mistaken (i.e., it's on automatic pilot)? Is it reasonable to assume, as a skeptic about our access to others' private mental states, that the person we are talking to, is either a person with a mental life, or is a robot so sophisticated that we could never be able to tell the difference?

The consciousness we impute to others could be in error. Granted, but the point to be made is that one <u>does</u> impute consciousness to others. What we

¹⁵ Ibid., 169.

¹⁶ Ibid., 170.

know of our own consciousness, awareness, and perception suggests that others not only have similar experiences to ours, but that others have a similar awareness to ours, that is, a similar perception of reality and world-view.

What is it, then, that qualifies the other as conscious? What is the nature of the mental life of the other even though there is this problem with access to it? Later we will look more closely at what the self is, but for now we need to see if such things exist and what problems there might be with making such a claim.

Remember that it was suggested that there be a compromise view which incorporated aspects of three theories into a three-level view. The mind is physical, functional (in the sense of it being describable in terms of the basic structure of functionalism), and abstract or conceptual (in the sense of including intrinsicality, subjectivity, and a self). Talk about the status of the mental should take into account all three levels. In that case, we are not only taking into account the physical data that points to the consciousness of the other. On a conceptual level, we recognize physically, functionally, and conceptually what is familiar though possibly nebulous or diffused for lack of perfect access to others.

There are a few things that might be said to be wrong with this conception of the self. One might argue that it requires access to the private states of others, which is epistemologically suspect, or whether something like a self exists if it is not perceivable.

Weiss is aware of these issues when he writes that we must be justified in our ascriptions of intentionality.¹⁷ It cannot just be in the eye of the beholder that

¹⁷ Ibid., 173.

a person has a mental life or not. Weiss states, to construe this distinction as dependent on the way we *ascribe* intentionality means, for Searle, to give it up. On the other hand, while there is no such thing as phenomenal color on a physical level, nonetheless, the distinctions we make between colors are definite and intersubjective. These are not at all arbitrary.¹⁸ As Terence Horgan writes, folk psychology, or something like it, must show genuine causal explanations for what is mental at the same time it is providing a useful framework for predictions about ourselves.¹⁹ That is, if a self really does exists, it will have to accord with a causal architecture.²⁰

The problem here is with intentionality, subjectivity, and mental life in general, and how these account for behavior and character. The question seems to be, when we impute these (intentions, etc.) to someone (or something), whether these end in an autonomous person or in an automated mechanism that mimics a person.

The question assumes a false dilemma between not knowing the other or knowing the other's awareness for certain. Apparently what would by required for justification of a causal explanation is sympathy. That is, whatever you experience in your brain, I experience by way of sympathy the exact same thing in my brain, (though, by hypothesis, I would be aware of my self in addition to you in order to objectify you). In this way, I could be as certain of your awareness as I could be of mine. I could be as certain of the existence of your autonomy and the existence of your beliefs, feelings, and subjectivity in general

¹⁸ Ibid., 177-8.

¹⁹ Terence Horgan and James Woodward, 146.

²⁰ Ibid., 159.

as I am of mine by comparing them with mine. The question seems to be whether we must rely on a physical account only (of e.g., behavior or neurology), *or* whether we must know the other intimately, i.e., feelings, thoughts, beliefs, etc.. But is this perfection of epistemological certainty really what is required, or can we come to a compromise that would entail the limits of our certainty and still account for one's conception of one's self and also one's experience of what seems to be a self of others? That is, can we move on to issues of criteria for defining a self?

If it is the intention to compare our self with others, we must first make an account of a self from our own point of view. Whereas, before, we were talking about imputing consciousness and the self to others, now we are asking about <u>our</u> self. We ask if we ourselves actually have a self.

We have argued so far mostly about the other's consciousness, but not enough yet about our own. It has been suggested that the self is not a delusion, that it is a concept in terms of our body, our behavior, and our thought, and that we posit this same type of self of others, even though we could be wrong. Using concepts of actuality and potentiality, we can make an account of one's self as a potential that is actualized. This suggests the existence of one's self-aware autonomy and intrinsic initiative over time actualizing development. It is this developed person that is the actuality, and the capacity to develop that is the potentiality.

We can conceive of our selves (i.e., we can objectify our selves) conceptually. If it can be shown that the self exists conceptually and is a demonstrable actuality, then it follows that it is a potentiality in respect to its development from something into something (or something more). We must be

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careful here. It is one thing to say that a self is a possibility, and quite another thing to say that it is a potential. A potential is something that exists, a possibility may not. So, the self is an actuality after it has exercised its capacity or faculty to develop (which it has after a point of beginning), and a potential prior to that development. We will talk more of this in chapter three.

To start to flesh out this idea of development we will start with selfconsciousness. G.E. Scott argues that self-consciousness makes it possible for individuals having it to be capable of communicating with themselves, i.e., with their own beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.. One can then have beliefs about one's own beliefs, etc.. Scott believes that this feature is essential for being a person.²¹ I suggest that a self is not merely a happening, but is long-term, goal oriented in terms of intentions about its own development. This is known from our experience of self-consciousness and a conception that we may have of the self.

Since it is taken for granted that we can examine our thoughts, at this point we should remember that there are those who would disagree (for many different reasons) that this is possible. However, the concept of self is a conceptual point and not an argument about what it is we experience upon introspection. The definition of self given in this paper does not posit introspection directly. The definition of self is a conception of development.

People are long-term, goal oriented entities who develop in terms of intentions about their own development. That is, people have selves. One element of this ability to develop is self-consciousness where we conduct an

²¹ G.E. Scott, <u>Moral Personhood</u> (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 24-5.

internal discourse with, or examination of, ourselves. This implies that we make decisions regarding our plans -- deleting them, changing them, or creating them. That is, self-consciousness and intentions regarding our selves suggest that people can examine their selves for purposes and develop.

Being self-conscious and having intentionality, then, seem to be part of the criteria for having a self and the capacity we have to "actualize" our selves over time. This is what we recognize in others. We can see that they have this self too (from all appearances).

Now we can talk about just what it is we are able to see in others. The only access to each other we have is through communication. Communication, it can be argued, is diverse and of course suffers the problems we have already seen in our discussion of privacy, but the accessibility to the exercise of the capacity of the self (i.e., self-consciousness and intention) is only in communication since we do not have access to each other's private mental lives. Regarding communication, it is sufficient to say that, as in the discussion on psychological privacy and skepticism, we impute a self to others based on what access we have to other's state(s) (or process(es)) of mind. It is not presumed to suggest that we could account for what is communicated, but given what we experience of our self, we communicate with others on this level and recognize another's self; that is, it is suggested, evidence of development.

So, in communicating with others, one posits the exercise of the capacity of that person's self. Positing this is a "judgment call" on our part because one must posit this based upon the quality of one's communication with others, that is, when others express their subjectivity, feelings, desires, beliefs, perception, intention, etc., and communicate these to us. So, it is communication which

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limits our certainty of knowing others' feelings, thoughts, beliefs, etc.. Communication delimits our problem of privacy.

Maybe we should go further into what communication is and what a self is, but for our purposes, it is enough to say that a self is a capacity that can be taken for, given the limits communication sets, autonomy and intrinsic initiative over time. In this sense, given our limitations, a self is publicly self-aware and intentional.

Finally, the ontological status of the self, then, is given in the existence of its potential and its actuality. The self exists conceptually as a developmental process, and therefore it exists both as a potential and, after exercised (actualized development), as an actuality.

Aristotle suggested that if one still has potential, then one has not reached one's actual end. That is, 'a way of being' "potentially" is to be unfinished and to be determined-by realizing one's end. So, one is not fully who one is until one is actualized in the end, an end which determines the process.²² We might say that this way of being is 'not yet.' In this paper though, it is not suggested that "potential" has the connotation of 'not yet' or 'determined by one's end.' As is said, the development process is a mechanism of the self. Implications regarding the goal (or proper goal) of development and whether one counts as 'being "fully" who they are and yet still developing' are yet to be drawn.

We have begun with a historical comment on the philosophy of mind and acknowledged some basic problems in this realm. Despite these problems, we

²² Charlotte Witt, "Hylomorphism in Aristotle," Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987): 675-6.

can support the idea that one has a self. We can accept that we have a capacity and an actual self and that other people have selves. We accept that we personally and others develop in a directed way over time.

CHAPTER II

JUSTIN OAKLEY'S THEORY OF EMOTION

In Chapter One of Justin Oakley's book <u>Morality and the Emotions</u>, Oakley examines the nature of emotion and provides a clear account of the definitions for emotion. This could be called the area of emotion theory. Only one or two thoughts will be added to his analysis. So here is a summary and explanation of one of his chapters which will show the context emotional maturity must be put in. Having dealt with emotion theory, we will then be able to go on to discuss emotional maturity in the following chapter. This can be a drawn-out discussion, but it is essential that we understand what an emotion is before we can begin to discuss what emotional maturity is. If we can know what emotion is, then we are probably halfway to that goal. Oakley presents several theories of emotion. His description of emotion culminates in what he will suggest is the definition of emotion: emotion must be constituted of feeling, desire, and cognition in a related way (referring to the particular emotion).

Bodily and Psychic feel theories of emotion. These first theories start off with two distinctions to be made at the outset. One is a distinction between felt feeling and unfelt feeling, and the other is between bodily feel and psychic feel. The word "feel" will be used to mean an awareness that is present to consciousness, i.e., noticing it or attending to it. So, one distinction to be made about feeling is being in the state of awareness of it, as opposed to not noticing it. One example of not noticing a feeling is the feeling of the clothes you are wearing against your skin right now. This distinction will be extended to unconscious emotional feelings, i.e., "unfelt feelings."²³ When we say feeling, though, we mean something one is aware of consciously.

As for the two kinds of feel, when we say bodily feel we mean to refer to a bodily happening; for example, palpitations, fatigue, shallow breathing, or other visceral changes we may feel when we have an emotion. On the other hand, when we feel, for example, hopeful of being offered a promotion from our employer, we do not necessarily associate this with a bodily feel of agitation. This is better considered as a mental agitation that we are aware of over the course of the morning until we have lunch with our boss and finally find out one way or the other. This is called the psychic feel.²⁴

Now, in what way can these definitions of feelings be said to constitute an emotion? One definition of emotion in this first theory suggests that bodily feel alone constitutes an emotion. However, if fear is defined as *just* the bodily feel of a pounding heart and weakness in the legs when I am stupefied by fear upon encountering a snake basking in the sun on the track ahead, and only after the snake has slithered away do I become aware of my pounding heart and the weakness in my legs, then how could I have had 'fear.' Fear, on this theory, requires that I be taking notice of my body at the same time as I have the emotion. That is, in this case there is no bodily feel to the emotion until after the fact. The bodily feel of fear in this example is unfelt, but this goes against our

²³ This, then, would be an oxymoron.

²⁴ Justin Oakley, <u>Morality and the Emotions</u> (London: Routledge, 1992), 7.

definition of emotion as fear *being* the felt bodily feel of a pounding heart and weakness in the legs. As Oakley points out, "it is possible and indeed quite common for us to have emotions without experiencing any *feelings* at all,"²⁵ given our definition of "feeling" as involving taking notice of it. So, intuitively, our example disproves the theory that the emotion of fear is merely a bodily feel since this fear is something we experience consciously.

Another suggestion is that an emotion is, by definition, simply a psychic feeling. However, it is possible to find examples of feelings which we are not aware of. For instance, if we have an emotion over a long period of time without feeling it over the whole of that time, as in the case of the expected promotion, nevertheless, we would still want to say that we feel hopeful.²⁶ In this case, given our definition of "feel" as being present to awareness, we will fail to define emotion as merely a psychic feeling. There must be more to the definition of emotion than psychic feeling if we want to say we feel hopeful even though we are not attending to the feeling of hope (i.e., there must be a psychic "unfelt" feeling of being hopeful). The theory that emotion is a psychic feel is proved wrong, then, if psychic feel requires attention to that feel. One can be hopeful without attending to the feeling.

Now, this is not to suggest that an emotion cannot ever be a psychic feeling, but only that emotion is not merely this since we seem to have emotions that do not have only this quality. The definition of emotion must be broader than bodily feeling only or psychic feeling only. Emotions have these along with other criteria which we will come to.

²⁵ Ibid., 8.

²⁶ Ibid.

The affect theory of emotion. In this theory, emotions are bodily and/or psychic feelings, or they are bodily and/or psychic "unfelt feelings." But this theory does not link these feelings with cognition or desire. Therefore accounting for such things as perception, thoughts, beliefs, and desires presents a problem for proponents of these affective theories which can only recognize such phenomena as some of the causal antecedents and effects which *typically* or *characteristically* produce or result from the affective states in question, be they felt or not, as opposed to incorporating these phenomena as part of the definition of emotion itself.²⁷

On this definition, for example, a warm-fuzzy psychic feeling along with perhaps acceleration of both heart and respiratory rates 'is' the emotion of affection, i.e., bodily feel plus psychic feel. What we want and believe with relation to the particular feeling or emotion, is not part of this definition of emotion. The definition, then, is insufficient to the task of differentiating between emotions. Fear and anger can both have the same bodily feel: heart and respiratory rates, sweating, or pupillary dilation, and the same psychic feel, distress or anxiety.²⁸

The same problem goes for defining emotion as bodily feel plus psychic unfelt feeling, or bodily unfelt feeling plus psychic feel, or bodily unfelt feeling plus psychic unfelt feeling. Emotion cannot simply be these since they are inadequate to making differentiations between emotions.

²⁷ Ibid., 19.

²⁸ Ibid.

Oakley speaks of unfelt psychic feelings, and unfelt bodily feelings, but we must also address issues of unconscious cognitions and unconscious desires. Oakley seems to be using the word "affect" to mean an unfelt quality of psychic feeling or unfelt bodily feeling. However he also uses the word "affect" to refer to emotions too, i.e., "unfelt emotions" or emotional affectivity. As has already been stated, an emotion, according to Oakley, has the three elements of feeling, cognition, and desire.

A problem with Oakley's wording arises here in that an unfelt feeling does not seem to be the same thing as having an "unfelt emotion." If we use the word "affect" to encompass emotions, then we might seem to refer to unfelt cognitions, and/or unfelt desires, and/or unfelt feelings as opposed to a particular unfelt emotion in itself. In fact, Oakley does not address issues of the unconscious specifically except to explicate his theory of "the psychic dimension of emotional affectivity." By now this phrase might sound somewhat ambiguous regarding an emotion and the elements that make it up. For now, it will be suggested, though, that emotions can incorporate unconscious feelings, unconscious cognitions, and unconscious desires as well as consciously in the dynamic way that Oakley suggests.²⁹

So, it would be here that we should talk more about the existence and nature of the unconscious if we are to use it in our account of emotion. That is, it will now be suggested that there is a mysterious something we are not aware of that we can use to help us account for, explain, and define our emotions and behavior, and that we really do have feelings, cognitions, and desires that we are not aware of.

²⁹ See Justin Oakley, p. 6–49, and his footnote 8 on p. 193.

Freud experienced the problem of having to explain the existence of this mysterious something that is not seen, touched, or even experienced.

How are we to arrive at a knowledge of the unconscious? It is of course only as something conscious that we know it, after it has undergone transformation or translation into something conscious. Psycho-analytic work shows us every day that translation of this kind is possible. In order that this should come about, the person under analysis must overcome certain resistances—the same resistances as those which, earlier, made the material concerned into something repressed by rejecting it from the conscious.³⁰

It is only as something conscious that we know the unconscious. It is not the aim here to demonstrate the existence of the unconscious, but to suggest that it is revealed to us that we are affected by unconscious emotions and so we infer their existence. As Oakley suggests,

[This] enables us to make sense of and give a rational explanation for what might otherwise appear to be merely a succession of disparate episodes. Thus, [suppose, in the case of grief, for example, a person has lost his mother.] [A] person who remembers happy occasions spent with his mother, perceives the world as cold and indifferent to him, feels mentally drained, and acts in subdued and withdrawn manner, may not thereby be undergoing or carrying out four detached episodes. If we allow that emotional affectivity can persist and *condition* our thoughts, desires, feelings, and actions, then we can give a deeper explanation of the occurrence of these features here as signs of our *underlying* grief. ³¹ (emphasis added)

On the other hand, we might ask, when are we 'not' under the influence of a psychic affect, and how could we know it? What's the difference between

³⁰ S. Freud, <u>New Introductory Lectures (1933) Standard Edition</u>, Lecture XXXI (Publisher unknown, 1933), 166.

³¹ Justin Oakley, 13.

being unconsciously influenced and not being influenced if we do not know the difference? Well, sometimes we do know the difference. It's not the case that we are always aware, for example, that we are grieving "because of" something in particular that has happened. But sometimes we are in a continuous state of being downcast and languid and later become aware that our emotion of grief has set the tone of life because of a particular event, like the death of a loved one. As Oakley suggests, being in a state of affection, we go about unaware of the continuity of an unfelt emotion. Sometimes our emotions and actions appear to be discrete, but when an unfelt emotion has come to our awareness later, regarding our attitude or behavior, we are able to understand that our life has taken shape behind the scenes.

So, when are we not in this state of affection, if one is not aware of its influence at the start? The only answer could be that we only become aware of having been affected after the fact. For example, it is only later that we learn we have overcome our grief and have gone on with life unaffected. That is, the world does not seem colored the way it used to be.

Since what we are talking about is a mysterious energy permeating the mind and affecting the way we see the world, the thoughts we have, and the manner in which we act, the answer to the question of being affected is equally ethereal.³² We have to determine the effect our emotions have on our awareness, actions, and life over time. In fact, this is part of Oakley's thesis.

[That] it is partly because of this perception-guiding function of emotional affectivity that emotions of various kinds can be seen as morally significant.

³² Ibid., 10.

For emotions such as love, sympathy, and compassion enable us to see certain morally important features of the world as salient.³³

Remember though that this is just one aspect of emotion such that an emotion can be morally significant, but we're getting ahead of ourselves.

Cognitive and Affective theories of emotion. In these theories, the concept of cognition is added to a theory of emotion. As Oakley explains, though, we must conceive the idea of cognition quite broadly. We need not assent to cognitions, find them evidently warranted, or even take our cognitions to be true, for them to be part of our thoughts and emotions.

One example of this may be seen in cases of emotional 'inertia', where our emotion does not correspond to our professed beliefs or judgments: e.g., in certain dog phobias we avowedly believe that the neighbour's [sic] dog is harmless yet still seem to fear him when he approaches. Perhaps here our fear of the dog does not involve a *belief* that he constitutes a threat to us, since we are convinced that he is harmless, so the cognition involved in our fear here might rather be said to take the form of a *thought* that the dog will harm us. Other examples where we might have emotions without beliefs may be the emotions which we have towards fictional characters, and the emotions we have in our dreams, daydreams, and fantasies Therefore, the cognitive component of emotion should be read as encompassing a variety of ways of apprehending the world, ranging over beliefs, construals, thoughts, and imaginings.³⁴

³³ Ibid., 14.

³⁴ lbid., 14-15.

To go the next step, Oakley states that we also have unconscious cognitions. That is, we can have an emotion in which the cognitive element of the emotion is unconscious.³⁵

In the definition of a cognitive theory of emotion, it is suggested that cognition alone constitutes an emotion. However, it can be difficult to distinguish between emotions solely on this basis.

For example, the cognition of another person in distress seems to be involved in compassion, but we may well have this cognition and feel *Schadenfreude* or malice instead. Similarly, we may construe a certain situation as dangerous with feelings of either fear or excitement.³⁶

The way in which cognitive theorists try to repair this problem is to make the conception of cognition broader, approaching what we are calling psychic feelings. "So they might argue that in excitement we see the danger as a challenge, whereas in fear we see it as a threat."³⁷ Though the cognition of the danger is the same, the emotion is different because of the way the cognition is taken or because of how the cognition is seen.

It seems that now the cognitive element has taken on the appearance of a psychic feeling or psychic affect. But what is the difference between a thought and a psychic feeling, or, for that matter, an unconscious thought and an unconscious psychic feeling? Has our conception of cognition become too broad here, particularly in the context of a discussion of the unconscious?

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid., 15.

³⁶ Ibid., 25.

Setting aside the unconscious for the moment, the point is that, opposed to a cognitive theory, it is easier to add the feeling element to a theory of emotion than to try to explain how to account for construal of a cognition as fearful instead of exciting, or compassionate instead of malicious, or vice versa.

What seems to distinguish the emotions here are their feelings or affects rather than their cognitions. Thus, compassion involves being pained by another's distress, while in *Schadenfreude* and malice we find this cognition pleasurable. So also excitement, unlike fear, involves taking what we see as dangerous to be a pleasurable thrill.³⁸

And this is where we get our cognitive-affect theory of emotion from. We can combine the cognition of danger with the painful feeling of distress or anxiety to get the emotion of fear. But there is a problem with this theory too. It lacks the desire element of emotion. Otherwise, how could it be fear without the "desire" to flee?

Affective-Cognitive-Desire theory of emotion. And so we come to Oakley's own theory of emotion. Emotion is a complex which involves dynamically related elements of feeling, cognition, and desire.

For instance, take the analysis of anger given by these [cognitive theorists]. Now this emotion cannot be defined simply as a judgment that we or others have been injured or affronted, because we might make such judgments and perhaps be moved to try to help the offender overcome their unfortunate tendencies, but here it would seem incorrect to describe our state as one of *anger*. Much the same could be said if we were pained by the acknowledged injury or affront, but nevertheless wanted only to help the offender. The reason that we do not have anger in these cases, I would argue, is because we lack the appropriate desire. That is, anger seems to involve not just being

³⁸ Ibid.

pained by what we take as an injury or a slight, but also a desire to retaliate at who or what is responsible.³⁹

Here again Oakley takes this element of emotion in a broad sense and again suggests an unconscious (as well as conscious) place for it in emotions. "Regarding the element of desire in emotion, this need not of course be expressed in behavior, nor need it always be a conscious, felt striving."⁴⁰

Oakley also gives an interesting example here that shows some of the problems we might have in understanding how broad the concept of desire should be in this definition.

Although a person may profess to be motivated to stay with their [sic] partner out of love, others might find strong indications that they are really acting out of a suppressed desire to shun loneliness, and thus that they are really motivated by fear here.⁴¹

Oakley says, in this example, that there is a desire to shun loneliness and that this is a motivation of fear. Again, as with cognitions, the desire seems to have taken on the appearance of a psychic feeling, i.e., fear. But it is easier to analyze desire as wanting something than to try to account for it as having some feeling quality in itself. We will discuss this more shortly. In this way we could narrow the conception of desire as an element that is conceptually distinct.

⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid., 27.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 15.

Cognitive-Desire theory of emotion. This theory denies the affective element of emotion. In this theory, emotion is a feelingless (i.e., neither felt nor unfelt feeling) complex of cognitions and desires. For example, "love consists in just, say, believing that someone is attractive and that their welfare should be looked after, while wanting to benefit them for their own sake."⁴² However, while Oakley maintains that cognition must be accompanied by desire in emotion, he wants to suggest that we cannot have an emotion unless there is some affect or feeling present.

To take another case, there seems to be important differences between a person who has the cognition and desire involved in love and a person who actually has the emotion of love. Both people see another individual as attractive, both believe that she is a sincere and worthwhile person, and that her welfare should be promoted, and both people want to benefit that other person and share in her company. But the person who *loves* another seems to have more than just a certain set of cognitions and desires, as above. That is, he also cares about another individual, shares her pleasures and pains, has concern for her welfare, is interested in her projects and priorities, enjoys her company, feels warmly disposed towards her, and so on. Further, these affects may well be manifested in his behavior, especially towards her: he may speak keenly of her, have a cheerful manner, and pursue his activities with 'heartfelt' desire. The important point for us here is that in the absence of these affects, there is no love. . . . So, it would seem to be the case that emotions require affectivity.⁴³

Oakley is not trying to define love here, although, it is an interesting question as to what he might say on the point. In any case, this seems to be the ultimate example of an emotion that lacks the element of feeling and is therefore not an emotion at all, but merely kind thoughts and good intentions.

⁴² Ibid., 29.

⁴³ Ibid., 30.

Affectless-Desire theory of emotion. This theory also denies the feeling element of emotion. In this theory, emotions are simply desires, that is, an inclination to pursue something, a goal-directed, intentional action.

Love might be defined as just the desire to be with or benefit another, and envy could be defined as the desire to have something possessed by someone else.

While desire is indeed an important element of emotion, a theory of emotion based exclusively on desire seems inadequate, since it fails to recognize that being *affected* seems to be a conceptual requirement of our having an emotion at all. Having merely an inclination or an aim to injure an opponent, benefit some individual, or possess something had by another is not yet to have anger, love, or envy, respectively. These emotions require at least desiring with affect [or feeling], such that we long to fulfill our desire and are perhaps pained at its frustration, or in any case pleased at attaining the object of our desire.⁴⁴

There is also the problem here that cognition is not part of the definition. However, the cognition of at least the existence of the object of desire seems necessary. It could be argued, though, that the cognition is *causally* necessary, i.e., not 'part' of the emotion. Nevertheless, conceptually, it seems that cognition is part of emotion as we have seen in the other definitions. We don't even seem to be able to have some emotions without them. So, we require the conception of cognition as an element that is conceptually distinct.

Affective-Desire theory of emotion. In this theory, emotions are desires with a certain kind of psychic quality -- again, not requiring cognition, "although

⁴⁴ Ibid., 32.

perhaps a minimal belief or thought about the existence of a certain object would be allowed as a contingent causal antecedent of emotion."⁴⁵

So, for example, fear would on this view be analyzed as having a passionate and urgent desire to flee, while courage might be held to be just a vigorous desire to protect oneself and others, come what may. Similarly, grief would be defined as a kind of painful longing, while pride might be equated with a keen desire to parade oneself in front of others [with glee].

However, any attempt to define emotions in terms of affective or affectless desires fails, because while emotions do involve affects and desires, emotions also involve cognitions. For instance, having an urgent desire to flee [and the feeling of urgency] does not constitute fear, since we may well have this desire just because we are [also feeling] bored or disgusted by something, and in neither case would we actually be afraid. Along with the appropriate desire and affects, it seems essential to fear that we have a belief or thought of imminent harm to someone.⁴⁶

So much for an account of emotion. So far, Oakley has compellingly explained what emotion is, but only in the negative. That is, clearly we cannot have some particular emotions without the necessary components of emotion, but can the definition be put in a positive sense, i.e., what 'is' a particular emotion? What are all of the 'right sorts' of each of the three components that make up a particular emotion? Is love the feelings, affects, cognitions, and desires Oakley has listed in his examples? If that were the case there would be a lot of questions to ask. For example, does one person's love equate somehow to another's? This is the "raw feel" problem we had in our discussion of philosophy of mind.

As explained, our feelings of being loved are the love one imputes of another (e.g., one's partner) since we only have access to our own mind -- that is,

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 33.

our own private awareness of love is the only knowledge of love one can have. Given an understanding of emotion as defined here, however, one may have a better way of communicating that awareness than one did before. If a person knows something of the nature of emotion, then that person can communicate better one's feelings and cognitions and desires and relate this to associated actions, emotions, and even unfelt emotions over time. There is still the problem of privacy, i.e., what makes up a particular emotion as such? But now there may be less that is inexplicable.

Another problem with Oakley in this chapter is that we do not seem to have a perfectly clear picture of the nature of the unconscious. For example, can we make the same conceptual distinctions in the unconscious part of emotion that we have made in the conscious aspect of emotion? That is, can we equate a psychic affect with a psychic feeling; an unconscious cognition with a conscious one; an unconscious desire with a conscious desire? We should have to have a theory of the unconscious we don't yet have in order to answer these questions. Nevertheless, there is something to the idea that there is something going on behind our awareness. There is something underneath our consciousness that sometimes sets the 'emotional tone' of our life.

Another important problem is that Oakley has split emotion into parts and recombined the parts into examples of particular emotions.

That is, while it may be analytically useful to speak of separate 'elements' or 'components' of emotion, we might well wonder at the extent to which the elements which I have argued are involved in emotion are really separable at all. . . Indeed, we usually take these elements as entering into and 'enlivening' each other, rather than as independent mental entities which sometimes happen to coexist.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Ibid., 34.

Regarding this, Oakley merely states that this is just the way we speak of people and their emotions. He says this is a way of making emotion explicable. But as to how we usually take these elements to be, quite the opposite is true: we usually take these elements one at a time or independently (mistakenly on our part or not) and this is how we recognize them combined as they are in emotions. This does not detract from the statement, though, that we are able to see these elements together form our emotions.

Certainly these problems with Oakley's discussion on the nature of emotions do not detract from what will serve for the rest of this paper as a coherent theory which will allow us to discuss emotions and emotional maturity.

CHAPTER III EMOTIONAL MATURITY

So far, we have discussed very basic problems of psychological privacy, a consideration of reality in terms of that privacy, and the very existence of the mind and one's self. Also discussed was Oakley's definition of emotion. It is suggested that his conception of emotion can be used as a working definition to help define, examine, and account for emotional maturity.

Now that we have the conception of a person as a self, and a conception of emotion, we can discuss the issue at hand, recognizing the notable problems we have encountered so far. This background in the philosophy of mind and psychology shows the problems in defining emotion and the self. In the discussion that will follow, these problems are self-evidently relevant to the concept of emotional maturity where the concepts of self and emotion are basic to this paper.

Oakley's conception of emotion should suffice as a working definition of emotion since we will not need to account for the specific definition of any particular emotion. For example, we will not address the issue of what love is. We will only address the issue of emotion in the broad sense as Oakley defined it. But the definition of self we have so far is not sufficient. We will be going into that in more depth.

In this chapter, it will be argued that a conception of the self be broadened into part of the meaning of emotional maturity. One of the connotations for the concept of maturity is development. This fits in nicely with what is arguably the very meaning of self, that is, that the self is a developed state in the process of updating itself. From there the next steps are short ones to an understanding of maturity as emotional; what it is, how it works, and what it means. In the conclusion, the discussion turns to one or two implications of explaining emotional maturity in this way.

There are several ways one could try to understand or define maturity. One way to understand maturity is in terms of immaturity. For example, immaturity might be selfishness and rashness. Maturity on this account, then, could be being not-rash and not-selfish. Another way of defining maturity in this negative way is in terms of a psychiatric or diagnostic classification, that is, in terms of clinically-defined immature behavior. An example of immature behavior might be inappropriately 'making a scene' in public. Maturity then would be <u>not</u> that type of behavior. Maturity could also be understood as being contrasted with physical immaturity or under-development. But all of this is in terms of immaturity, that is, what is <u>not</u> maturity. So, what is maturity in a positive sense?

On one level, maturity might be defined in terms of that which is physically normal, average, appropriately developed, "ripe," or "ready" in some sense of a standard. In terms of the level of a state or process, one meaning of maturity is change from "old" to "new" where to be in a new state or process is to be better in some sense. Finally, on a conceptual level, maturity can mean a change over time to a way of thinking that is more developed.

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On each level there is the connotation of maturity as something good or better. This connotation presumes, though, the idea of a standard. While maturity is considered a change, the quality of this progress or development may be based on some unarticulated or unestablished criteria.

In order to discuss the qualitative aspect of this development, we would have to justify some criteria for concluding whether or not one has improved, but the point here is that the connotation for maturity is one of development, of a becoming. In this paper, the concern is with the idea of becoming and the nature of change as we mature. We will discuss what development is, what is developed, and how one develops.

It is suggested that the development process constitutes a self. Emotions are a part of that development. We can allow that the emotions fit into this conception of development and maturity once we understand the process and the state of the self. Emotions mature as part of one's whole personality, as part of one's whole development as a person. This claim is not based on introspection. Rather, a conception of the self and emotional and personal development is argued for.

In different contexts, Oakley has made the point that the emotions are conceptually necessary to our being as a whole and to being well.

Since . . . emotions can be thought of as involving a certain manner of apprehending or viewing the world, our emotions create interests and purposes for us in the world, and our interests and purposes are clearly important for determining who we are and how we see ourselves.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Ibid., 64.

It might be argued, therefore, that emotional development bears on one's development in general.⁴⁹

Before an account of development of the emotions can be made, though, there must be a description of the development of the self in general. If we can sketch this account, then the development of emotions will have its place.

One's development is mediated by one's taste. Exigencies of life present themselves as opportunities to make changes in ourselves and our lives. Given that one has a self-conscious ability of self-examination, one can direct one's development. One has to make a selection among alternatives in one's life according to one's abilities and preferences.⁵⁰ In so doing, one grows and matures.

In the conception of development that follows, instead of a unity of mental faculties, it is suggested that a person is, so to speak, a unity of habits. If put that way, the case to be made is that a person has a self such that one develops with continuity and coherence, as a person whose identity has integrity.

⁴⁹ The interesting question arises of what development is based on. If development of the self is based on certain faculties of the mind, then could development be based in the intellect or the emotions or some other faculty? To what degree? In what combination? What would be best? What faculty would have priority, and what should have priority? The question here of course would be one of priority for the mature person. For example, if one were to visit a friend in the hospital only out of duty (intellectual reason), shouldn't it also be a duty to visit out of concern (emotional reason)?

⁵⁰ A problem will arise here when we ask if development is conscious in this way or really unconscious and not directed deliberately. Perhaps a distinction could be made between development and maturity, where maturity, by definition, requires more thought, deliberation, or intentional effort. Development, then, by contrast could be more mysterious, being perhaps in part unconscious and/or accidental.

But let's start at the beginning. The concept of development argued for begins with the idea of preference. It is necessary at this point, then, to discuss the nature of preference. What type of thing is it? Suppose that a preference is a reaction to a selection of an alternative among alternatives.

Oakley gives examples of three non-emotional types of mental activity. By separating the elements of emotion into desire, cognition, and affect or feeling, a distinction has been made between emotion and non-emotional phenomena.⁵¹ If this obtains, then the suggestion is that the mind is composed of elements that, in the case of emotion, may be joined. It is suggested here that preferences could be just such another element of the mind.

Oakley has noted this question of the mind's constituents himself.

In particular, it might be thought that, say, care, concern, and interest may be quite unemotional and dispassionate, and should not therefore be grouped with such phenomena as sympathy and compassion.⁵²

That is, there are cases where these are not emotions. When it is not possible to explain a particular awareness as an emotion, then the attention in question must be some other type of awareness. This is the question at hand.

Oakley suggests that feelings can be distinguished from cognitions and desires. For example, a feeling of lightness or buoyancy might be thought characteristic of an emotion, but if this feeling is not linked with cognitions and desires, then it would be better characterized as a bodily sensation or other

⁵¹ Assuming that the elements of emotion can be separate from each other, it would be possible to discuss intellection, for example, as separate from feeling. This would be consistent with most of the history of Western philosophy where the intellect must not succumb to the appetites of desire or the distraction of feelings.

⁵² Justin Oakley, 36.

feeling rather than an actual emotion. For unlike emotions, sensations and feelings need not involve cognitions or desires.⁵³ This seems to suggest that these elements can be distinguished as different faculties of the mind.

Is it possible that one could have simple awareness of a buoyant feeling? Could the feeling be attended by some cognition and/or some desire without being dynamically related as an emotion (as required by Oakley's definition)? Is it probable that these elements could be somehow independent or autonomous?

Of course a question of the nature of awareness is too broad for discussion here. The point is that preference must be defined on some theory of nonemotion or theory of awareness if our reactions to the possible courses of our lives are not necessarily emotional ones. The point is that this question is one that must be faced. What is the nature and function of awareness and how can that understanding be used to explain the attitudes of our deliberation? While the answer is not found here, hopefully the working definition of preference will serve in order to be able to discuss a theory of emotional maturity.⁵⁴

⁵³ Ibid., 21-2.

⁵⁴ More can be said regarding this subject of awareness. Oakley has pointed out that we can recognize in ourselves feelings of sensation like lightness or buoyancy and mental distress or dejection. Oakley has left open, though, whether feelings can be sorted out from the rest of awareness as a distinct and objectifiable part of a particular mental state. And then what of desire and cognition?

Oakley seems to have dealt with the concept of cognition as a part of awareness in a rather abridged way. The notion of thoughts, judgments, beliefs, opinions, construals, apprehensions, ideas, imaginings, attention, understanding, intuition, faith, memory, delusions, values, attitudes, intentions, decisions, and etc. have not been defined as mental elements, if they are such. And to make the problem of their mental status worse, we can suggest that these 'cognitive elements' can be conjoined in some way to comprise a mental state as such. Even worse than that, Oakley has noted that there are philosophers who have suggested that these cognitive elements can be "affectively charged," suggesting a state like emotion (lacking the desire element). The status of cognition then, as an element of the mental, becomes quite a mystery, especially as regards the idea of "cognitions with a certain kind of psychic feel quality." Without a theory of awareness and cognition and feeling, the notable questions above remain. Nevertheless, the problem is put in context. In order to analyze our state of mind, regarding the preferences of our deliberation, these are, at the least, necessary questions to ask.

So, to continue with the idea that a person is a unity of habits, it is suggested that a person has preferences about one's preferences. We can choose to enhance some preferences or shun others. This idea will be expanded to a conception of the self. Development explains the self in that development is a modification of our engagements in life and also how we go about that modification. One can intentionally direct the course of one's life by selecting what makes up one's preferences.

An advantage of explaining development this way is that a person can be recognized as a particular person. On an interpersonal level, one is recognizable by the people one has relationships with in terms of how one makes particular selections in the course of one's life. Selections of a course in one's life are definitive of one's self. That is, one has a particular taste for the course of one's life, directing it and shaping it the way one does.

We can also see this as an explanation of character. Character is the state of development a self is in at a particular time. People design their lives to have a certain set of engagements, and have set the course for those engagements (or have chosen not to). Therefore, we can explain how a person has a disposition to be one way or another. The familiarity with the character of people we know comes from their set of engagements in life. This goes beyond the particular engagements to a familiarity with the pattern formed by a set of a person's engagements over time. The person we know has a taste for that pattern. The person we know, then, has a set of engagements in life and a part of them that has an agenda which sets a pattern.

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Now we will have to discuss what this process is, how it works, and what it means. In Professor Andrew Ward's work,⁵⁵ I find one of the most succinct and articulate accounts of personality. It hinges on the idea of "engagements." Essentially, my question is a question of the mechanism of engagements. I would complement his theory with an account of the possibility of a "self." Professor Ward does not accept this idea of a self that exists "behind the appearances." For Ward, personality exists as a "web of engagements," so that the force that propels one in one's web is not a historical entity directing a person into any one of a person's particular engagements in life. But I argue that within the web of engagements is a pattern that defines the identity of a person as a self, directing and shaping the self. Development is not lost to an explanation of life as a patternless, additive experience, one experience upon another. Development shapes our life of experience and the course of life as one proceeds through it.

So, what is an engagement according to Ward? Ward holds that one does not have a single personality in the sense that one has a core to one's personality which is master of all the choices one chooses to engage. Maturity or immaturity, then, would not be determined in terms of the engagements of a core self. "Personality" in this sense is, "a person's way of understanding, perceiving, structuring, and relating to the world and her or his place in it."⁵⁶ These are "engagements" which makes up a "web of engagements." This web is a person.

For more on engagements, Dr. Ward quotes Fingarette in Self-Deception.

⁵⁵ That is, what he has turned out in readings over the course of the spring semester of March, 1993 at San Jose State University.

⁵⁶ Andrew Ward, "A Few Remarks," Unpublished lecture, March 4, 1993, Seminar on Value Theory (Philosophy 292), San Jose State University, 2.

There Fingarette writes that he uses the expression, " . . . in order to characterize, in most general terms, what someone does or what he understands as a human subject; it is how an individual finds and/or takes the world, including himself. It is a matter of the activities he engages in, the projects he takes on, the way the world presents itself to him to be seen, heard, felt, enjoyed, feared or otherwise 'experienced' by him. It is logically necessary that it should be typical of our description of an individual's engagement in the world that the description be cast in terms of such categories as aims, reasons, motives, attitudes and feelings, of understanding and 'perception' of the world and himself. What a person does not somehow take account of is not part of his engagement in the world, though it may have effects on the course of his engagements. (pp. 40-41)" As Mike Martin, Self-Deception and Morality (1986), p.84, says, according to Fingarette, an "engagement can be an activity, purpose, emotion, perception, belief, experience, or any other aspect of how we discover, interpret or take account of the world or ourselves."57

It would appear that an engagement can be literally anything.⁵⁸ If this criticism of an engagement obtains at all, then defining an engagement bears some scrutiny.

Let us explain how the term "engagement" will be used in this chapter. In existential psychology, it is suggested that, given a certain conception of metaphysics and epistemology, "consciousness is not a separate entity that subsequently relates to objects, so [that one is] not a separate being who then encounters [one's] world. Rather, [one is] essentially in-the-world, [one *is* one's]

⁵⁷ Andrew Ward, "Continuing Puzzlements," Unpublished lecture, March 11, 1993, Seminar on Value Theory (Philosophy 292), San Jose State University, 4-5.

⁵⁸ Particularly if literally everything is subjective, which is what the metaphysics of this paper might seem to suggest. If the metaphysics were to actually be stated though, it would be more accurate to say that the "concrete, factual, external world (i.e., 'facticity')" does exists, but that its significance, as it bears on experience and awareness, is usually pale in comparison to our attention to things like worry, attention to whatever is dominant to perception at the time, attention to the objective of whatever we are doing at the moment, etc., i.e., subjective reality.

disclosure of the world."⁵⁹ In this sense, we 'are' our activity; we are a doing, an experiencing. This concept of being a doing is in contrast to the concept of being a "being," i.e., a "separate" or distinguishable being who encounters the world.

This concept of "doing" precludes the concept of a historical self in that the next thing to "do" does not necessarily follow from a personal history.⁶⁰ Having a personal history is considered differently by Ward than we will have it here. For our purposes, engagement subsumes both of these concepts of being and doing, i.e., being and doing are not so separate. Take an example. If we are washing the dishes, in an existential way, *we "are"* washing the dishes. But this is opposed to the idea that we are persons who are mechanisms such that we wash the dishes. That is, we are persons inside, so to speak, who are, externally so to speak, mechanisms for doing.

In the existential sense, consciousness is consciousness-of. As Needleman puts it, "if consciousness is always consciousness of something, then what appears to consciousness is all of consciousness; there cannot, by definition, be an intentional act below the level of consciousness."⁶¹ These two ways of seeing ourselves marks the comparison we make between an engagement and an activity.⁶² In one sense, when we engage life, we are merely a consciousness-of. In the other sense, when we engage life, we are conscious and unconscious and we are also a self above and beyond the mechanism of consciousness. This latter view of having a self leads to many of the problems we have already come

⁶¹ Jacob Needleman, 155.

⁵⁹ Jacob Needleman, "Existential Psychoanalysis," vol. 3, in P. Edwards, ed., <u>The Encyclopedia of Philosophy</u> (NY: The Macmillan Co. and The Free Press, 1967), 155.

⁶⁰ See Sartre on "freedom," for-itself, and good faith.

⁶² Or, in terms I use more ordinarily, between an event and an action.

across, and some that will be apparent shortly (regarding unconscious aspects to development).

So, for the purposes of this paper, consciousness is more than consciousness-of; what more it is though, is abstract and unconscious.⁶³ This will give us the latitude to consider the mind as having the ability to engage life with more than we are consciously aware of. In this sense, our intentions and personality are not something we are completely aware of. So, for the purposes of this paper, our engagements in life form a web of engagements which Ward describes, but, even though we have not accounted for the unconscious or the metaphysics and epistemology that would allow for it, there are aspects of the self and self development that are unconscious and also helps to explain maturity.⁶⁴

The metaphysics of consciousness and the subject of engagements having been dealt with meagerly, it might not seem that a clear picture for a definition of engagements has been drawn. So take an example. Being a voter one moment is distinct from being a mother the next moment. The distinction is based on a conception of engagements. Actions are divided, so to speak, into the activities in a web by 'type' of activity. Consciousness-of as a voter is a voting activity, such that, arguably, the activities that might make up parenthood are a different aspect of ourselves. That is, we constitute ourselves in different aspects.

 $^{^{63}}$ The subject of the unconscious, though materially important it seems, will not be drawn out at this point.

⁶⁴ Fortunately for the purposes of this paper, the connotation of emotional maturity is more intentional than unconscious. Also, it must be noted that Dr. Ward would not agree with conceiving an engagement as the mental divided from its objects of conception, which is what the unconscious might be considered to be.

There are two problems here. One is that we can distinguish our activities as distinct engagements and the other is that we are more than each activity or the sum of them. These issues lead to conceiving an engagement as one continuous activity which has no bearing on us as persons. The problem is, how to distinguish ourselves, i.e., our personhood and our engagements.⁶⁵

I would like to think that we can agree on criteria for deciding when a person is at an activity and when it is no longer that activity and what a type of activity is, but the point is that the self bears on <u>all</u> of our activities even though we vary in those engagements. I suggest, then, that our self varies as different engagements of a changing web. I do not suggest, though, that the self is another part of the mind. It is not something added to awareness that is in charge of directing from above. The self is simply on an added level of complexity.

A person's nature is more than a composition of discrete experiences of life that touch together in sequence. In regard to personality, a self is a preservation of long-term personal goals, goals in the sense of planning to have or not have engagements in one's web in response to long-term wishes, preferences, and taste which are themselves preserved through change and time.⁶⁶ Taste can be construed in part as a fact of valuing out of which

⁶⁵ Without a better definition of engagements in the first place and without an articulated metaphysics, it would be impossible to go into detail regarding existential psychology as it relates here. Hopefully, though, it is not necessary at this point to articulate the metaphysical and epistemological theory and define 'types' of consciousness-of in order for the concept of engagements to be a coherent one. Perhaps a more practical approach will suffice for now.

⁶⁶ A distinction can be made between preference and taste. Preference is of the moment, as in, preferring this or that particular; as contrasted with taste which is more enduring and broader in scope, as in, usually preferring this or that or this or that kind.

development of personality is mediated. This is a long-term type of mandate of the kind of engagement-with-life preserved through variation of personality and engagements, and, if this obtains, this kind of valuing can be regarded as a self. And if this obtains, assuming that emotional maturity is not separate from the development of the self, then emotional maturity can be subsumed under this theory of the self.

In this sense, personality is not merely a web of engagements. I would argue therefore, that Ward's sense of the "web of engagements" of a person is incomplete to the task of defining personality. In my conception of personality, one develops one's web of engagements as well as being a web of engagements. Development defines a person. Ward might reply that shaping one's web or making plans about one's preferences or engagements is merely just one more engagement. In that case, though, the disagreement is more one of semantics than material since we could agree that one is directed when it comes to changes in one's web. What I would call a self he would call an engagement. However, there are problems aside from semantic ones.

Let us put it this way: the meaning of having a self on this theory is that a person has a lifetime mediated by taste which is reflected in the development of that person as that person's life and personality. This is shown in the taste and preferences of a person and that person's web of engagements.

A preference can be anything we see as good, that is, any engagement that is pleasurable, is seen as pleasurable, not painful, or as least painful. But there are also preferences mediating the preference of an engagement, that is, there are preferences for preferences. This is to say that "taste," or "meta-preference," is used for choosing preferences, engagements, pleasures, or the least painful thing in a "general" approach to a web of engagements. A self is choosing what is and will be one's web of engagements. So, we should remember that there are two levels of preference. One level is the engagement itself, and the other is the reaction to that engagement being in one's web.⁶⁷ A meta-preference then is a preference for a category of preferred engagements, for example, a locus of religious engagements or aesthetic engagements. This meta-preference can be thought of as taste. This is what I suggest is the mechanism of the self.

One must choose the preferred (and undesirable) engagements in one's web using one's taste, or choose not to choose.⁶⁸ One must feel-about-including or feel-about-not-including or feel-about-ignoring the selection of an engagement in one's web. There really is no other choice if one is aware of one's engagements.

One can also change his or her taste. If taste does not always change by accident, then there must be a preference to change taste.⁶⁹ It is argued, then, that we value the pattern of our web and this valuing is mediated by taste, or meta-preference. Once one changes one's taste (that is, if a person can) that person has changed one's long-term attitudes about one's life, and therefore, no longer has consistent, long-term goals of what engagements to engage in.

⁶⁷ A helpful analogy might be that we can call up a file on a computer and change the writing of the text in the file. We can also call up the program that allows us to read, write, change, or delete the text. This would allow us to change the way we are able to write the text file. For example, we can add editing features to the program and therefore change how we write text. So, we can change the text and we can change the program that writes the text.

⁶⁸ Barring boundaries set by "facticity" to one's ability to change. (See Sartre).

⁶⁹ Ad infinitum? It seems that there could be regress problems here where we have taste of taste etc..

This way of talking about a self seems to me to be right. As has been said before, meta-preference seems to be what people think they become familiar with in their relationship with us. People we have a relationship with identify us in terms of not only the selections we have made in the course of our lives, but also the 'way' we have made selections in the course of our lives, i.e., characteristically. The self marks a particular taste which is definitive of the course of one's life, directing and shaping it. We say that a person is the particular person with a particular taste to have a certain set of engagements in life which forms a pattern over time. The person we know, then, has a pattern of engagements with life and an agenda for setting that pattern. People seem to be consistent over the long-term in their choice of engagements, in their individual reactions to their engagements with life. And when a person changes one's meta-preferences, one is a different person who has a new agenda consistent with a new overall tone to one's web of engagement. This new agenda should result in new engagements, that is, a new web, and we will have to get to know them all over again.⁷⁰ The point is that if a person changes one's metapreference, then a new web of engagements will result.

It must be noted before going on that there is no way of testing to see if the self has an unchangeable nature. Since it is my thesis that people can change their selves and their tastes, we will take up this discussion for a bit.

It could be that a meta-preference for an engagement is an unchangeable *a priori* inclination for a particular engagement or disinclination for a particular

 $^{^{70}\,}$ There is a problem here of just how many new engagements make up a new person with a new identity.

engagement, i.e., an instinct. This might depend on things like freedom, socialization, and facts of brain chemistry, etc.. It must be admitted, though, that in the end, this issue of the unchangeable nature of a meta-preference to have an engagement in one's web will remain.

I would argue, instead, that there is an unchangeable aspect to valuing.⁷¹ It is granted, for example, that there is a history to a person's taste such that socialization is mediated by such taste yet also partly (probably mostly) constitutes it. Such boundaries to freedom as social conditioning could lead to a meta-preference being an unchangeable fact. Yet, if some of our preferences are just facts, how will one know when one acts from unchangeable disposition or from autonomy?

Hypothetically, we are not in danger of discovering the boundaries of our freedom to revalue. That is, if one fails to supplant an engagement, we cannot know the difference between the cause being uncontrollable facts or weak will. A person can only know it was because of an uncontrollable fact or because one hasn't tried hard enough yet.

There appears to be a question here of how much freedom to change ourselves is usurped by socialization, etc. and to what degree taste (metapreference) can designate one's engagements to be in one's web. That is, we would have to investigate and experiment in order to see just what one's possible webs of engagements actually are. A rigid character, in this sense of fate and freedom, could be fateful in that one may have no control over one's preference

⁷¹ As Fingarette has said, what a person does not somehow take account of is not part of his engagement in the world, though it may have effects on the course of his engagements.

of an engagement or for engagements.⁷² Though, as was said, how would we tell the deference between the reasons for failure to change ourselves.

In any case, on this theory, a solution to the problem of addiction, for example, is to change one's self if one has that freedom. The sense of this is that one would choose to value the engagement that is one's addiction in terms of a new approach to one's whole web. That is, in order to change the engagement that is the addiction, we are probably talking about changing a meta-preference, as opposed to just one preference. This meta-preference probably regards a whole locus of engagements in one's web. So, the effort and method of change required for this more broadly-defined problem must, of course, be more involved than simply changing one preference.

This is how we can talk about our meta-preference problems. For instance, as Ward argues, "a person may discover herself or himself in an emotional engagement that is unexpected and perhaps even relative to other engagements, unwelcome."⁷³ But we have to ask, unwelcome in what sense? That is, why is it that one can be in⁷⁴ an engagement that is unwelcome? I want to suggest that it is not meta-preferred. In this instance, we might well select to revalue an engagement that is unwelcome or get rid of it. But the point is that we can regard this as a case of objectifying an engagement.

⁷² Dr. Ward offers an explanation of rigid character as a diminution of the number of engagements in one's web, in the sense that our life is narrow and meager.

⁷³ Andrew Ward, "Continuing Puzzlements," 2.

⁷⁴ I think Ward would suggest a distinction here between being "in" an engagement and "being" an engagement. Ward has suggested that we are our engagements (See Andrew Ward, "Continuing Puzzlements," 2).

So choosing to revalue is a valuing process, whether or not one is actually able to change. A self that revalues is one that copes with life by changing its mind, by developing, by maturing. Coping is not a willy-nilly organizing of a web of engagements, but an intentional organizing of a web over the long-term according to one's taste. So, it is the self that meta-prefers an engagement as welcome, unwelcome, or indifferent (or does not take account of it) and copes with that over time, shaping and directing its life.

It is true that one is not free to revalue a preference for an engagement if there are things about oneself that cannot be changed, for example, because of uncontrollable instincts. It could be that there is no possible web of engagements for an addict who has a particular preference of an engagement or for engagements due to that person's instinct to value that engagement or engagements. For example, a person that could not exclude drinking from his or her web once that person has come to value drinking as bad, that is, that the activity of heavy drinking should not be a preoccupation of that person's life. This could be a fact of one's *possible* webs. This is, strictly speaking, hypothetical, since the degree of unchangeability probably does not reach that far, although it might for someone. As has been said, how could one know that one was wrong about why he or she failed to change? It doesn't seem logically possible that one could.

One reason we have this issue of changeability is that we do not know, exactly, the nature of a disposition. We do not know the physical why and how of the mechanism for our motives and actions that would explain why people fail to supplant an engagement like addiction. And introspection of our dispositions is not reliable for knowing that change can be achieved if we just keep trying.

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However, there could be a way around this problem of explaining our failure to change. There exist parts of the mind that hold what must be called into awareness. Examples of aspects which are often hidden from awareness are memory, defense mechanisms, and the feeling in your feet. Unless called on, these are not noticed consciously. The existence of this subordinate aspect of the mind could lead to the needed factual talk about meta-preference. Remember that the self must actually be the cause of the related behavior we designate as character. We need actuality and continuity of a self in order to explain how there is a concrete, factual relation between the framework of the self and its action and change. If taste is a part of the mind, then on this theory the mechanism of self-change is meta-preference that can be called on to examine and to modify.

No-one's point of view is free from the particular tone of that point of view. Each point of view calls on this unconscious aspect of the mind. This tone comes from what I have suggested is the self and personality. It is a part of the mind in that people are able to objectify certain aspects of their thoughts and, by hypothesis, take away from that the objective to go about a new way of life, that is, to change. So, I suggest that there is a taste-part of the mind which waits to be called on in order to pass judgment on a preference or meta-preference as being to one's taste or not. This is the actual self. This results in an actual long-term agenda that is potentially up-datable.

So, if one has a like or dislike of an engagement (i.e., preference), and one can call on one's taste to discover whether one prefers having that like or dislike for an engagement (i.e., meta-preference) (or choose not to or to be indifferent), then whether or not these things can be changed, the actual existence of the self

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which is the cause of characteristic behavior is a taste-part of the mind. We call on this and make a choice as to whether we prefer having this like or dislike and make a plan to have it, not have it, or choose to ignore it (that is, if we take account of it). This is development of a web-of-engagements using one's taste.⁷⁵

Development of the self on the first level of preference is where one changes the actual like or dislike of an engagement. This is development <u>of</u> an engagement, as opposed to like or dislike 'for' an engagement. At this point it would be best to take an example of these two levels of development.

Suppose one enjoys the activity of dancing. There are at least two levels of preference we can talk about here. The first level is the enjoyment of the activity itself. The second level is whether one thinks that dancing should be a part of one's life, that is, whether the activity should be a part of one's web of engagements. But perhaps it is against this person's religion to dance. In that case, this person would probably prefer that the activity of dancing not be a part of his or her life. To remedy this problem one can develop a change in the engagement itself or change one's taste for the activity that one enjoys which is delegated by the values of one's religion. For example, one can change one's enjoyment into embarrassment (by some means we will eventually discuss); or one can change how one thinks of dancing from unholy to an uplifting thing,

⁷⁵ On a third level, of which I have suggested there might be an infinite regress to a fourth and beyond, we can find that our taste is not preferred and want to change an aspect of it. One might argue that in order to select a new taste or meta-preference, one must use one's meta-taste (creating the implication of meta-meta-taste and so on). However, we might get around this by suggesting that taste can fold in on itself and use itself to select the parts of itself to change, add to, or delete.

though here one might have to change one's religion in order to change one's taste for dancing.

If this idea of a self obtains, then the self is not nebulous or transitory. One will have to try to achieve a change in one's web to see if change is possible. It was suggested that this might not be possible, that there is an unchangeable aspect of the self.⁷⁶ This asserts a fact like an instinct or a fact like a source of talent or passion.

For example, if one is a newly freed slave, then that person could use one's meta-preference as a foundation of taste for one's development. One's socialized false consciousness could be re-educated into a new web based on a foundation of taste. It could also be that one has an unchangeable instinct for conservatism, justice, care, or masochism etc..⁷⁷ In that case, one has a concrete foundation to one's personality that could be a new beginning point of development.⁷⁸ Taste is that foundation, especially if there is a factual, unchangeable part of it.

Finally, we may change our selves or we may fail, but by using our metapreference to intentionally change our web of engagements over time, we thereby change the possible webs we could be. We change the expected

⁷⁶ This is allowed for, but a thorough explanation of it will not be offered here.

⁷⁷ I would not want to say, though, that these things are always or completely innate facts.

⁷⁸ Here is a broader example of this way of talking about the self, the implications of which can be dawn out better in the conclusion. A foundation of a self could place us into common realms of care (cultures where care is communicated). That is, if our foundation has a nature such that some of us are better able to be intimate with each other, and if this trait is possessed by a large population, then that group will develop webs of engagements that are more inter-connectable than others. As generally disposed to a realm of care (hypothetically) and having a moral center (in the sense that one has an identity), we are able to be playful with each other in a selective (i.e., possibly characteristically unchangeable) way with our particularly intimate others. This is what forming a community with common morals is all about: Agreeing that, "I like it." "I don't like it." <u>as a group</u>. One's capacity to collaborate playfully, it could be argued, originates in taste.

continuity of the pattern of our web of engagements. For example, we may revalue a particular preference or meta-preference such that we have an essentially new web with a new order to its form, a new general tone of continuity in the long-term. Then I have also suggested the possibility that a web could have a concrete foundation. Self is the life and taste we have, how it changes, and what it changes to.

Now that we have some idea of what the self is and what development is, we can talk about how development works and what this means to emotions and emotional maturity. Essentially the theory offered here is a developmental theory regarding intention and emotion.⁷⁹ This development is goal-oriented such that the taste a person has defines the pattern of one's life. This is maturation.

Since engagements can be emotions, development regards the emotions along with the rest of the engagements in one's web. This gives us emotional development -- i.e., development in terms of preference of an emotion and taste for emotions -- so that now we can discuss how emotional maturity works.

We spoke above about how we grow by selecting our preferences and thereby changing our minds, coping, and maturing. But we did not discuss how we are able to pick and choose our preferences. We can partly subsume that talk under the discussion to follow about how it is that emotions develop or mature. If we use the same meaning that we have for development of the self and apply it

⁷⁹ At some point a moral theory would be required too.

to emotion, then the conception of emotional development that we get is that we can pick and choose our emotions. This point, however, needs to be qualified.

Emotional development as we have it so far suggests the ability to plan to have or not have an emotion or type of emotion. More to the point though, is to suggest controlling one's emotions given their nature as potentials and actualities. What is actual is the repertoire and tendencies of one's emotional vocabulary. This is complicated by the fact that there is a wide range among people whose emotional development varies not only in degree, but also in kind. That is, some people seem to experience their emotions more intensely than others, and some people don't or can't have emotions others do. Whereas earlier we were discussing control of preferences, now we are talking about control of the emotional part of the self, i.e., control over the actuality and potentiality of emotions as part of the development of the self in general.

Using the conception of maturity as development, we can take the same steps as before that leads to a coherent picture of the self. The self's maturity occurred as a result of the causal connection between the actual structure of the self and activity of the self. Just as causal explanations of the self were justified as a relationship between the actual structure of the self and its activity, so too should explanations of the emotions be justified. I would suggest, then, that we can use our working definition of emotion as the actual structure of the emotions. In order to causally link up the structure of one's emotional ability to its activity, the emotions as conceptually defined by Oakley should be linked with development as defined by taste and change.

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Given the definitive ability to emote, we can now ask how emotions can be controlled for the sake of development. What we are talking about now is the potential of the emotions. We have the actuality of the emotions in one's ability to emote. But now, in keeping with the analogy of our concept of the self, we are asking about emoting as an engagement. It is this activity, i.e., experiencing a particular emotion, that we can objectify and decide if it should be a part of our lives. If we decide to make a change, it is a matter of taste and a question of the mechanism of change. But first we must discuss whether and how one can control one's emotions.

Oakley suggests that control and cultivation of emotions are two ways of being morally responsible for our emotions. While I will briefly consider moral implications of emotions in the conclusion of this paper, for now I will be using Oakley's ideas to suggest that one has the ability to control and cultivate emotions for the purpose of development. This is a suggestion of what people are like as opposed to what people should be like, which is more to Oakley's purposes in his book. Nevertheless, in showing how one can cause oneself to be in certain emotional states at certain times for moral purposes, Oakley has also shown, more basically, that one has certain abilities to manage one's emotions as such and as part of one's life. This seems to suggest abilities that constitute a mechanism for emotional development.

Emotional development, though, is not independent of the rest of one's development. This becomes clearer considering Oakley's definition of emotion where feelings are not separate from cognitions and desires. And the development of the self necessarily requires the possibility of beliefs, cognitions,

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intentions, and desires. So, emotions by their very nature are not separate from other faculties which develop.

Even though, as Oakley says, emotions by their very nature are passive in the sense that we are not usually able, at will, to have or not have them, we can still have "foresight" about having or not having them.⁸⁰ That is, while we might possibly have some emotions at will,⁸¹ and sometimes we cannot,⁸² the point is that sometimes we can control and cultivate emotions. If this is so, we may do this in order to grow emotionally according to our taste.

For example, suppose a person lacks emotions such as sympathy and compassion. Suppose further that this person considers this to be a defect of character leading to insensitivity.⁸³ This person prefers that this is not the way he or she wants to be. This is to say, this person considers that the way he or she is is not to this person's taste.

⁸² Sometimes we are not prepared to stop ourselves from having emotions. For instance, since desire is part of emotion, the desire to strike back at someone who is the object of one's anger, or the desire to flee that is involved in fear is usually too inculcated a response to be able to have the foresight to stop. Since these things are not under control and could not be under control, then one cannot count having these emotions as part of oneself, i.e., as part of what one is able to control or cultivate. It might be objected that one could cultivate a complete lack of the emotion of fear as a possible reaction (therefore controlled via foresight), but the point here is that emotional reactions that cannot be controlled or have cultivated a control of, cannot be an object for emotional development. These types of emotions or emotional reactions then are simply a part of the facts of life. As was suggested earlier, there can be concrete limits to one's ability to change. "[T]here will be cases where emotions of ours are determined by these deeper biological, social, and cultural influences in such a way that precludes our responsibility for those emotions." (Justin Oakley, 158)

⁸³ See Justin Oakley, 45.

⁸⁰ Justin Oakley, 130-1.

⁸¹ If one can, then the question as to how to develop control is moot. One would have this ability as merely another part of one's life.

In the next pages, we will be discussing different ways of controlling and cultivating emotions. We can start with the most ancient and well known methods. For Aristotle, as Kosman puts it,

It is . . . possible to engage in a certain range of conduct deliberately designed to make one the kind of person who will characteristically feel in appropriate ways, at appropriate times, and so on.⁸⁴

Oakley adds that this implies a strong link between our actions to modify our emotion and changing them.

As an example of actions we can take to modify our emotions, Oakley offers this.

If we occasionally suffer from unpredictable bouts of deep depression we may resolve to use various strategies for dealing with our depression when we feel it overtaking us. Thus, we might resolve to try turning to our favorite novel, putting on a record we usually enjoy, going out to a movie, or visiting close friends.⁸⁵

In this example of depression, the issue regards actions to keep from experiencing an emotion immediately. When we put this in terms of emotional development, we say that choosing these actions is in character, that is, it is preferred by the person in question according to his or her personality.

But we have to know the reasons for the action. It could be that the person in question prefers not to experience the emotion, its debilitating affects, or inflict his or her mood on others. When we analyze the reasons, we can know if the person's action is a case of emotional development. We could know on what

⁸⁴ Justin Oakley, 145-6.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 141.

level of preference or meta-preference the action is. It would also help to know how central those reasons are to this person's life. That is, we could know that the reasons for the control of the emotion are characteristic of his or her personality.

In this particular case, we might say that the person above has as part of her self a preference for not inflicting her mood on others as her reason for acting to curb herself. Based on this way of looking at her actions, we would say that her actions are definitive of her self. Because she finds it distasteful to cause the harm her mood would inflict on others, she has taken particular actions regarding her depression. That is, this is development of an agenda to control her depression for reasons of taste, e.g., reading a novel instead of moping around and making others uncomfortable. This expands on her engagements according to her taste by adding the goal of these actions in particular situations. She could have other reasons for these actions of course, but the point is that if this is an example of development, then the reasons for her actions are based on taste and definitively change her life.

The strategy in this instance is not based on directly changing one's character or emotion, but on actions that change one's life. In this example, she revalued the engagement that is her depression and developed emotionally by changing what constitutes who she is. That is, according to her taste, she developed a plan, and this effects her character.

Take another example. Suppose that a father plays chess with his daughter and gets angry with her if she wins.⁸⁶ We can look at this in two ways.

⁸⁶ This is assuming that this is something that one takes note of. That is, there are parts of one's personality that one likes, parts that one doesn't like, and parts one doesn't care about. Parts that one doesn't care about must be distinguished from the parts that one is not aware of. To be in the position of a person who is aware of a personality trait and not care about that trait is

On one level, he can try to control the anger itself, i.e., the preference or engagement of the emotion itself. On another level, he can try 10 inculcate within himself an agenda, i.e., a meta-preference or the taste to not have the anger. In that case, we can look at the anger as an engagement itself or as relative to other engagements.

Suppose that because the father doesn't want to get angry with his daughter, he chooses not to play chess with her. How is this preferred? One way to put it is that he has already developed his taste to the point where he does not want to see himself as petty or cruel. So, he takes steps to change by, e.g., not getting into this particular situation. This is an example of how we can value our engagements (i.e., preferences) using meta-preference. The father sees it as distasteful to be such a petty person. This has led him to manage his anger toward his daughter in this situation by developing a plan toward a particular activity with his daughter; that is, his attitude can be explained as a meta-preference.

Of course the father could have other reasons for not playing chess with his daughter. But if this is a case of emotional development, then the reason would have to be some change of engagement. The point is that the mechanism is taste.

different than being unaware of a trait or some of one's preferences. The latter is to not be in the position of a person who can choose to regard a character trait for the purpose of change.

This would be an opportune moment to discuss the issue of unconscious development. While this thesis is meant to address the issue of the mechanism of development, I do not have an account of the unconscious. This leads to problems of explaining any of the development in the form of what Freud called defense mechanisms, for example. But let me put it this way, one problem with this conception of emotional development will be that people do not seem to be deliberative about the control and cultivation of all of their emotional life. That is, purposeful changes are part of one's self, but is there development of the self that is not purposeful? For example, we do not always change our taste on purpose. This problem will end up not being solved. While we may better be able to understand the self and development, I do not yet have an answer to the accidental unconscious nature of it.

Now suppose that the father prefers activities that constitute his relationship with his daughter. In this case, a choice of the father to stop playing chess ends in his taste for maintaining a relationship, that is to say, the metapreference for the engagements that are those activities and maintaining them. It is because of this preference for the preferences that make up his relationship with his daughter that a preference to play chess with his daughter is no longer preferred. In this example, the engagement is incompatible with what the father has a taste for. Again, this is an example of a meta-preference (for maintaining a relationship) for a preference (of playing chess and getting angry).

Now suppose that the father doesn't play chess because he loves his daughter. This is a similar case. He has the preference for the engagement of his love. The engagement of love for his daughter entails her benefit as the father's desire, beliefs that entail his appreciation of her as a person, and feelings of warmth toward her. If he loves his daughter then this would supposedly be incompatible with a risk of harming her with his anger over losing a game of chess to her. So again he would choose not to play chess with his daughter, but the particular aspect of personality being demonstrated is different. His preference to play chess is distasteful relative to his love for his daughter.

But how might an engagement of love take priority over an engagement of anger? The scope of the preferred engagement of chess -- meaning a preference to play chess and of a reaction of anger if he looses -- does not have the centrality and the scope which the father's love of his daughter has. The engagement of love is enmeshed in his web by its associations with a large part of his life, it is therefore more important than the engagement of chess. This is an example of

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what I think Dr. Ward would refer to as the centrality of the engagement.⁸⁷ It therefore has priority.⁸⁸

What was considered to be a choice of the father to not risk getting angry at his daughter is explained in this context as a development of and due to personality development and emotional maturity. It is part of the father's taste to be the caring, deliberative, and loving person he would wish to be or see himself as. Realizing control of his anger in this case is another development of this taste. Using what is his agenda, or taste, toward his engagements with his daughter, he has added to that a control over his engagement of chess, or anger, which is a new part of his web of engagements. This mechanism of change is concomitantly developing and having already been developed; not capricious, accidental, or detached, but an intentional goal or aim based on the nature of personality.

But what of changing the emotion itself? That is, suppose the father controls his emotion of anger itself when he loses a game of chess to his daughter. While it is true that, as Oakley has said, the least susceptible element of emotion to manipulation and control is feeling⁸⁹ it is possible to modify our

- ⁸⁸ See Justin Oakley, 145.
- ⁸⁹ Justin Oakley, 130-1.

 $^{^{87}\,}$ See Andrew Ward, "A Few Remarks," 3-4 on addiction, centrality, and rigidity of character.

For Ward, a central engagement is an engagement that is central to one's web. That is, the engagement is enmeshed by other engagements in one's web that relate to it. Due to the number of engagements that can be closely affiliated with the engagement, the engagement is considered more interconnected with the part of one's life in question than other peripheral engagements that have a few number of associations with engagements. The latter then would be peripheral engagements.

emotions directly.⁹⁰ This has a special meaning according to the theory of self that has been discussed. This means changing preference or meta-preference.

So, how do we control an emotion? One way is to change our attitudes toward a situation in which we have the emotion. We can change what I have called our taste or meta-preference. We can change our attitude relative to a whole locus of our engagements and thereby control our experience of a particular emotion. Or we could change our experience of an emotion by changing an element of an emotion itself. As has been suggested, an emotion has three elements, i.e., feeling, cognition, and desire.

There are two propositions here regarding the modification of an emotion directly. We can stop ourselves from experiencing an emotion if we can eliminate at least some element of it. That is, by definition, we cannot experience an emotion without all of its elements present. Or, if we can control all of the elements of an emotion to make them present, then we could be able to experience that emotion. So, hypothetically, by changing our beliefs, desires, and feelings, that is, by having or not having those elements, we can experience an emotion or stop ourselves from experiencing it.

Taking control can be done by first examining the emotion to be modified, that is, what elements make it up. For example, take a particular experience of fear. Fear might be analyzed as the bodily feel of a pounding heart and weakness in the legs along with the psychic feel of distress or anxiety, a belief that there is a threat to us, and the desire to flee. Suppose that our fear of a neighbor's dog is this complex. Now that we have a particular emotion and a particular example of it, we need a particular occasion of it or situation in which

⁹⁰ Ibid., 136.

it must be dealt with. It is this situation that creates the reason to deal with it, i.e., for making a change in character. Otherwise this particular experience of the emotion is not something that is taken account of in the long term and would therefore be ignored in terms of taking action to modify the emotion.

Suppose that a fence that holds the dog back is close to the gate which you have to exit by, and that the dog barks at you from the fence right next to the gate every morning you leave for work. The fear that you experience every morning has actually caused you to be late and forget things that you needed for work that day. Your fear has become a problem by interfering with your job. In other words, the fear has interfered with the locus of engagements that make up your job, and therefore becomes distasteful.

Now we dissect the emotion into its elements and see if we can find some way of controlling one of the elements in order to keep from experiencing any fear. As we said, the fear is composed of the bodily feel of a pounding heart and weakness in the legs along with perhaps the psychic feel of distress or anxiety, a belief that there is a threat, and the desire to flee, and the object of the fear is the neighbor's dog in the morning at the gate. All of this might be changed in order to modify the emotion, but we will concentrate on giving an example of controlling elements of the emotion. So, we would try to control the belief that the dog is a threat or the desire to flee or the feelings themselves. The goal is to change the emotion into something compatible with the engagements of work.

For example, this could mean changing the emotion of fear into an adventurous thrill. Oakley points out in one of his examples (that has already used in Chapter Two) that the difference between excitement and fear is that in excitement, the cognition of the danger is seen as a challenge, whereas in fear it is

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a threat⁹¹ because of the way the cognition is taken or because of how the cognition is seen. So, we need to find a way of taking what we see as dangerous to being a pleasurable thrill. We need to change what we "believe about our belief" of danger, that is, we seem to believe that the danger is ominous, but we need to change this to be a belief that the danger is strictly entertaining or 'pretend.^{'92} It would seem that here we would have to have a discussion about the imagination: what it is, how it works, and how to use it. But for now I'll have to assume that it is understood that a person has the ability to suspend and/or replace a belief and/or disbelief, about danger for example, under some circumstances.⁹³ The point is, the solution to the predicament of the dog, the

⁹³ We will see in the next few pages that there is much discussion that can go on about the nature, mechanism, and amalgamation of the faculties of mind that can have some effect on modification of the emotions (e.g., imagination, judgment, attitude, or ability to understand or communicate). Though these issues can be in the philosophical domain, as opposed to the pragmatic domain, they are set in at this point. For the most part resources are not available in this paper to address these issues. This thesis is meant to address the issue of the mechanism of development, not how to do it (though it should clearly point to ways of pragmatic or helpful answers to questions of how-to).

It will be suggested, though, that when one has the mental freedom (for example, from an oppressor or from socialization in general), one can exercise one's imagination to create choices of action to take in order to achieve a goal with detailed causes and events. This is the power of imagination. Imagination is the ability to create choices for one's self which would thereby allow one to control the outcomes of events in one's life.

However, imagination, in this sense seems to be taking on quite a bit. "(Buff:) We now stress the ability to 'think differently,' to question dominant assumptions about what is supposed to be natural or necessary, to envisage new possibilities, to analyze and restructure

⁹¹ Ibid., 25.

⁹² Oakley would point out here that the difference between fear and excitement in this example is based in the feeling element and not the cognitive element. That is, the way of taking the cognition or how the cognition is seen is not a <u>belief</u> about the belief of danger, but a <u>feeling</u> about the belief of danger, e.g., fear or excitement about the danger. Nevertheless, I think I could argue that we could change the cognition of the cognition, e.g., <u>believing</u> that the knowledge of danger is real or not real, and obtain the alternate emotion as intended. This would not be a contradiction of Oakley's argument for differentiation of an emotion based on feelings, but a different mechanism with the same results. This would contradict, though, Oakley's point that the distinction between fear and excitement cannot be achieved based on the element of cognition alone. See Justin Oakley, 25.

fear, and the work is consistent with taste and related engagements of the solution and that this change can occur on a level of the elements of an emotion. If this obtains, then we will need to know more about how to control our beliefs.

To go farther in explanation would be meaning to say the same things of the other two elements. That is, an element is changeable in terms of a conception of the self, the emotions, and development in whatever way we can find of modifying the element itself. But what other ways of modification might there be beside the imagination's magical transformation of belief? There are the other two elements of desire and feeling to deal with. In our example, the desire element is the desire to flee. It could be that the desire to flee is something that is too short-term to 'get a grip on,' but for the purposes of our example, let's suggest that the desire to flee could be changed by another emotion.

Suppose that the person in question has an interest in dog breeding (or might develop the interest). If the dog in question happens to be a hound dog, then instead of the desire to flee, the person might desire to listen to the dog's voice. The steps to take in order to make this change in the desire element of the emotion might be to first become interested in the dog's voice, desire to listen to

experience...The talents for developing, improving, reconstructing, revising, and creating are related but distinct—oops, *powers*." (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, "Power and Powers: A Dialogue Between Buff and Rebuff," in <u>Rethinking Power</u> (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. 11.) However, as she (Rebuff) admits, "But it requires and presupposes the power to effect a dramatic reorientation on oneself as well as on others." (ibid., 3) This admission could be Rorty's undoing. For Rorty's argument to work, one must have the 'power' to reorient oneself without necessarily being free to reorient oneself.

That is, it sounds like new choices are coming from nowhere and that they are acceptable and actionable. Remember, we are talking about the tougher case to make. We are talking about people who might have false consciousness. Imagination in this sense is a latent power of the brainwashed to imagine and change their mind.

But how could this be? Rorty is right in using the word "talent" above to describe imagination. This implies the kind of latency we need to solve our problem. A talent is something that could be undiscovered until revealed by the necessity of adversity. Once these talents of imagination are discovered, they can do their work of empowering.

it, and then to see this as more important than the desire to flee. Again though, I cannot explain how this transformation from one desire to the other is accomplished, assuming it is possible at all. It could be that it is possible and that there is some valid explanation, but the nature of the transformation is not clear. As with the nature of imagination, it can only be assumed that people have the ability to suspend and/or replace their desires and/or aversions, about wanting to flee for example, under some circumstances.⁹⁴ In any case, even though we cannot explain how one desire could replace another, we can devise some method of modification that might pragmatically obtain under the circumstances given the conception of an ability to divide an emotion from its element of desire. So, one controls the emotion by cultivating a new element of desire and thereby stops experiencing the emotion of fear (by definition of fear) when one leaves for work. This solution is preferred by one and is therefore definitive of one's self.

This leaves the element of feeling. In our example we have feelings of fear composed of the bodily feel of a pounding heart and weakness in the legs along with the psychic feel of distress or anxiety. One thing that can be suggested is that feelings seem to be quite effected by the passage of time. While it may not be practical to wait for the feeling to just go away, a feeling may diminish of its own accord over a period of hours or even minutes.

On the other hand, there are long-term feelings and emotions that afford more of an opportunity to be eliminated. This is true in the case of ridding one's self of an emotion such as love for example. Or a feeling or emotion may be developed over the long-term in the case of trying to experience it (e.g., love).

⁹⁴ Oakley points out that desire, like an emotion, is not exactly modifiable at will. (See Footnote 81 above and Justin Oakley, 217.)

To stick with the example at hand though, it would seem that there really is little that could be done at the moment the dog barks to control the psychic feeling of fear, but it might be possible to prepare beforehand. It could be that over time, one could get used to the feeling or "wear it out" successively day by day. That is, while one still has the desire to flee and the belief of ominous danger, one develops a callus over the feeling such that one would have no feelings of fear. Or if necessary, beyond that one might develop a callus over the feeling of fear such that one would have no feelings of fear at all, i.e., of anything. I would say though, that this is unwise, impractical, extreme, and arduous.⁹⁵

Bodily feel is also a short-term feeling that would be hard to control. It might be suggested that one simply take slow long breaths in and out. This could have some effect on the bodily feel of a pounding heart and weakness in the legs. Or one could take some sedative to calm oneself, but then it would probably be difficult, if not illegal, to drive to work. In any case, again, the point

⁹⁵ Interestingly, there do seem to be examples of people who have gone to such extremes in order to cope with their environment. Take for example children who are victims of sexual abuse. It might be considered that they fit into this conception of dealing with a situation by transforming their selves and their emotions into being-in-the-world-as-sexual or sexual-victim. That is, without being able to deal with the situation by simply leaving (i.e., by analogy with our dog example, instead of using the gate where the dog is, jumping the fence at the other end of the yard), they must deal with the situation by developing their selves in relationship to the situation. Supposedly they would develop to a point where the contradictions of taste in their web of engagements can no longer be sustained. Otherwise, they would develop as people coping with their engagements according to taste, or develop unawares. So, it would seem that one could develop along the most extreme lines. This example, however, is probably more of a case of developing unawares than intentionally choosing to change in one way or another.

Also, I would like to point out that this can be seen as an example of false consciousness and rigid character. As has already been suggested of the relation of false consciousness and imagination, false consciousness can cause one to lose one's ability to create choices for oneself which would otherwise empower one. There seems to be a false consciousness here of having no choice but to deal with a sexual situation, meaning that the person has fewer choices of engaging life. This compromise leads to rigidity of character, i.e., a narrowing in the number of engagements in one's web. (Though I believe that false consciousness may also lead a person to having more choices of engagements than ordinary consciousness.) So, we have here an example of development in the direction of rigid character. We can discuss the ethics of this in the conclusion of the paper.

is that the modification in question is sought because of one's agenda, i.e., pursuing one's projects according to one's taste by developing the characteristic means necessary.

These means are definitive of the nature of one's growth, shaping and directing one's growth because they are to taste. In this example, the person has modified his emotion and so has changed his mind, literally, in terms of his self. He now has the engagement of a person with the taste to have changed his mind in the way he has. In other words, he has shaped and directed his development, and the self is shaped and directed by development.

Now, how does one go about experiencing an emotion that one does not have? That is, how does one develop a particular emotion?⁹⁶ On the elemental level, the goal is the same as in the example of eliminating an emotion, but this time we must control <u>all</u> of the elements instead of at least one. The idea is to acquire all of the elements at the right time, for the right purpose, to the right degree, etc.. The problem here is as it was with the whole project of defining emotion in the first place. We do not know what a particular emotion is in the positive sense of knowing the necessary criteria. Nevertheless, we can see that given the criteria of emotion in general, we can at least approach the question by developing each element of an emotion with the goal of experiencing it. In the next example of the mechanism of emotional maturity, this process of contriving

⁹⁶ This is not to ask how one develops or cultivates a type or kind of emotion (i.e., if there is a distinction to be made here between the particular and the general that obtains).

the experience of an emotion should become clearer as we talk about emotional capacities and love.⁹⁷

Pertaining to the former, it might have been noticed, a preference changed into meta-preference. That is, elements of an emotion involved a locus of engagements as opposed to simply one emotion. The process of modification of an emotion on the level of an element placed the emotion (which was presumed to be merely one preference) on a level of a combination of the three elements of the emotion. This is to say that an emotion can be referred to as a unit or as disassembled into a set of engagements.

In a process of modification, the elements of an emotion are preferred or not according to taste relative to other engagements or a locus of engagements. Alternately, one is indifferent or one does not take account of this situation for lack of knowledge of it.⁹⁸ So, one prefers the engagement of an emotion or meta-

⁹⁷ In this paper, we will address an account of conscious emotions and emotional maturity, and how unconscious elements of emotion may effect these consciously since, as Freud said, it is only consciously that we are aware of what lies submerged anyway. (S. Freud, <u>New Introductory Lectures (1933) Standard Edition</u>, Lecture XXXI (Publisher unknown, 1933), p. 166.) It might have been noticed, though, that the issue of unconscious elements of emotional maturity has not been addressed. In Freudian terms, modification of unconscious emotions is a process of exorcism. That is, having repressed something into unconsciousness, it escapes occasionally inappropriately until it is exorcised from the unconscious by psychoanalysis. Theories of the unconscious aspect of this mechanism, referred to here by Freud, will not be presented in this paper.

⁹⁸ Again, this is assuming that this process is something that this person takes note of, that is, there are parts of one's personality that one likes, parts one doesn't care about, and parts that one doesn't like. The idea of parts that one doesn't care about must be distinguished from the idea of parts that one is not aware of. To be in the position of a person who is aware of his ability to dissect his emotion into elements and not care about those elements is different than being one who is unaware the elements of his emotions. The latter is to not be in the position of a person who can choose to regard that ability and those elements for the purpose of change.

This is not to say that only philosophers of psychology can be emotionally mature. But it must be pointed out that, "A further knowledge of ourselves and our emotions may be the first

prefers the engagements of its elements as welcome, unwelcome, or indifferent (or as one unaware) and copes with one's emotion over time, shaping and directing one's emotional life.

As was suggested, a better example of modification of an emotion by modifying its elements would be modification of an emotion that we have over a longer period of time, like love. So let's move on to modification of a long-term emotion on the level of meta-preference. Oakley was quoted as saying that we can change our emotions by changing our selves. This can be interpreted to mean that we can change our taste or meta-preference, that is, that we can change our attitude relative to a whole locus of our engagements.

For example, one might want to begin loving someone, or, already in a loving relationship with someone, there may come a point at which one wishes to stop loving the other. Hypothetically, love is a composition of the three elements of emotion: feeling, desire, and cognition. We will look at the problem of loving someone we do not yet love. To acquire the emotion of love for someone, we need to acquire all of the elements of the emotion. Also, this is a project of solving a particular problem in one's life, and any solution will be consistent with one's taste for development.

In this sense, we can choose to regard a locus of preferences for the purposes of changing our personalities or our emotional lives. Conceiving of our self this way will help us immensely in constructing an engagement like love, for example, that is composed of elements. First, we will discuss what these

step to changing our emotions." (C. Calhoun and R. Solomon, eds., <u>What is an Emotion?</u> (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 37.) That is, it could be that certain knowledge of emotions is necessary before one could be able to make a change in how one feels.

elements are, then how to develop them and how this represents emotional maturity.

For the element of feeling, as Oakley has pointed out, we do not go about with conscious feelings of love all the time we are in love with someone for a number of years. In fact we might be angry at our beloved from time to time. Nevertheless, we may experience a certain tone to our actions of unnoticed affects such that, even if we got angry at our beloved, a psychic emotional tone of love effects our lives over a long period of time.⁹⁹ In this sense, going to the movies, going for walks, or talking about our beloved to our friends are not discreet and separate actions, but are linked by the emotion that lies beneath, unnoticed and manifest.¹⁰⁰ Oakley would point out here that these unfelt feelings or unfelt emotions importantly lead to certain care, understanding, and introspection which love and loving relationships entail.¹⁰¹

Aside from the affects of love; perceiving, wanting, and being moved also make up the elements of love. For the cognitive element:

It might be claimed that love is an emotion consisting in the complex of the following cognitions: the construal of another individual as attractive, the judgment that they are a worthwhile person, that their welfare should be promoted, and that they are stimulating company, are trustworthy, and should be accorded equal rights in a relationship.¹⁰²

- ¹⁰¹ See for example Justin Oakley, 51-52, 115.
- ¹⁰² Justin Oakley, 26.

⁹⁹ Justin Oakley, 8, 11, 19-20.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 30, 58.

But, of course, more is required. We must desire to be with the other, to benefit her, and to make her happy.¹⁰³ Along with these cognitions, desires, and affects, we may also have conscious feelings. He also *cares* about the beloved, "shares her pleasures and pains, has *concern* for her welfare, is *interested* in her projects and priorities, *enjoys* her company, *feels warmly disposed* toward her, and so on" (emphasis added).¹⁰⁴

If these are the elements that make up love, then there is a definite path to follow for cultivating it. This cultivation is based on the idea of a self. On a level of meta-preference, a person will acquire engagements by choosing among preferences to cultivate. That is, one finds those preferences to be preferred or distasteful consistent with one's taste. So while, in this case, a person would be choosing to cultivate engagements that he or she may not already have, taste for these engagements will be the test of whether they will be inculcated into a web of engagements or not. This is one example of emotional maturity.

Oakley suggests that we are able to inculcate capacities for particular emotions. I would suggested that this is really on a level of meta-preference where we can change our taste toward a locus of our engagements. In this sense, a capacity, meta-preference, and taste all seem to be on the same level of explication. The intent on a project of change demarcates an approach to preferences to be changed (e.g., the project of trying to love someone). An attitude toward a locus of related engagements delimits a capacity for those

¹⁰³ Ibid., 27.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 30.

preferences. The meaning of "attitude" here constitutes the limits of our capacities and has the same connotation as "meta-preference." Here, capacity for change is an ability to have the project of a preference for the preferences that make up the engagements which are the elements of love.¹⁰⁵ This is the very mechanism of the self.

Oakley has more to offer regarding issues of the self. He suggests that we can decide to encourage emotions which we approve of or reflect us as we are or want to be while other emotions are those of which we disapprove or do not reflect us as we are or want to be and commit ourselves to discouraging those.¹⁰⁶ In order to change our "capacity" for the emotion in question, we must be able to change our characteristic values. So, Oakley writes that, "a reorientation of our values is the most important step we can take towards developing and repudiating various emotional capacities."¹⁰⁷ What Oakley calls values is again much like what I have called taste. The conception of capacity and values would be consistent with a conformity to taste. In any case, Oakley's conception of values will be considered as such for the purposes of our discussion. So, we must develop emotional capacities and values which, in terms of taste, are actually attitudes toward loci of engagements. This is a change in metapreference, meaning that a person develops control of one's emotion by characteristically cultivating meta-preference.

So, how does one go about this cultivation. As has been suggested, we must approach the problem from the point of view of our attitude toward a

¹⁰⁵ Note footnote 54 on awareness and the definition of preference as a reaction to a selection of an alternative among alternatives.

¹⁰⁶ Justin Oakley, 137-8.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

whole project of inculcating an emotion and all of its elements such that they fit into our web of engagements according to taste. In this sense, we will add a particular engagement — which, by a hypothesis of the definition of love, is an element of love — as one part of a whole new locus of engagements that make up the emotion of love for another. Adding a particular engagement is not exactly a new concept at this point. We have discussed so far, in our examples of fear and anger, how one may go about modifying one's emotion by changing one's belief or changing one's desire in order to not have the experience of an emotion. In the present example of love though, we must <u>acquire</u> all of elements of the emotion (in a related way to each other). This will give us another example of emotional development.

We might start with our beliefs or cognitions (i.e., the ones in our list from Oakley). Oakley writes that, "the construal of another individual as attractive, the judgment that they are a worthwhile person, that their welfare should be promoted, and that they are stimulating company, are trustworthy, and should be accorded equal rights in a relationship."(sic)¹⁰⁸ Again, we have breathtaking problems here of knowing just what cognitions are necessary in order to achieve the emotion of love, how many there are, how the cognitions must be related to the other elements of love, etc.. Nevertheless, if the project of development is to taste, then there should be some personal mark on the nature of the love such that these concerns can take shape around the person's character and characteristic identity. In this sense, the love contributes to and is an aspect of development by a particular person; a person who has a particular pattern to his

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 26.

web of engagements and goes about developing that pattern in accordance with taste.

So notwithstanding the insoluble problem of defining love (i.e., in terms of trying to meet the criteria of love that is truly correct), we can try to find the means to inculcate an attitude¹⁰⁹ toward our project of developing love for someone and developing engagements of the elements of love. In our example, it is given that we are trying to solve a particular problem in our lives. There is someone we wish to love, but we don't. This problem presents itself in a whole context of changing human events. In this sense, we are conscious of the facts that make up the situation and therefore can construct definite goals with particular causes, actions, and events. Therefore, we are interested in the project of developing the cognitions, desires, and feelings of love for a particular person in a particular situation.

So, one tries to find out if the other is a worthwhile person, if she is stimulating company, and if she is trustworthy.¹¹⁰ One would try to believe she is attractive, that her welfare should be promoted, and that she should be accorded equal rights within a relationship. Again we have the problem of just how it is that one can invent these beliefs or construals if one doesn't have them. That is, we really need a theory to account for how the mind would be capable of this. But again, the point is that this is a change of cognition. If it is possible to change one's mind in this way, then this process is a process of development. So

¹⁰⁹ It should be pointed out here that the difference between mere development and maturity would be to add that this should be the "right" attitude in order that this change to be one in the direction of being "better."

¹¹⁰ Here we can use the example of a woman as the beloved.

we need to investigate how to invent cognitions that have the priority of importance and feeling of certainty required for our assimilation of them.

This explanation of development is not exactly what Oakley means by encouraging an emotion by developing a capacity. Oakley probably meant we should approach the question of a capacity more broadly. It seems that Oakley meant that we may encourage an emotion or "kind or type of emotion" by having a capacity for it in general (i.e., a potential). In the example of love given above, the problem presented having the ability to have a particular emotion in particular circumstances, whereas, in referring to a capacity, Oakley could have meant care, cherishing, concord, having tenderness, etc., toward others in any case.

The conception of capacity we are using is an attitude which delimits the scope of our ability to modify an emotion. It is attitude toward changing that indicates the capacity for planing a solution to a problem. That is, it is metapreference that we have a capacity for. Oakley's concept of capacity would mean that we approach our entire web of engagements with the project of inculcating the ability to love as such, i.e., the ability to love at all. It helps to make a distinction between a goal of loving and the plan to love for reasons. These are different problems which probably relate to solutions which call for different projects of change.

Changeability, in this sense, relates to capacities which are set by our attitude toward the problem. Our attitude is a preference for a locus of engagements (e.g., the locus of engagements that constitute trying to love someone) which demarcates our approach to a project of change. This preference

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is our attitude toward the engagements which constitute our project.¹¹¹ This is the sense in which we are on a venture of changing our self.¹¹²

The next part of love to develop is the desires that are required. We must desire to be with the other, to benefit the other, and to make the beloved happy. Here we wish to change what we want. The means of change are probably not at will, so we must devise some method of cultivation. Aristotle had suggested that one way of inculcating emotional capacities is by, (as Oakley put is) "engaging in actions which are characteristically associated with particular emotions...[so that] after some time and effort, the emotions themselves may come more naturally."¹¹³ But what kind of effort? How much time? What is the mechanism of the change? How do we account for it? What are the faculties of mind that are required? We just don't have these answers.

Nevertheless, let us suggest a means for changing desires. The connotation for "desire" is not much different than that of "will." While they both seem to have a connotation of 'wanting something,' one seems to be 'at will.' Desire seems to be more long-term in nature or deliberative. Given this distinction, we might then pose the meaning of desire as will over a period of time. In the definition of taste, it was suggested that we needed to be able to account for taste by recalling it or taking notice of it from some present and consciously unfelt part of the mind. Desires seem to be ready in this same way,

¹¹¹ This is to say, an attitude can be a preference for the meta-preference for loving another.

¹¹² Beyond being perfectly deliberative about our project though, as we have it here, the concept could be modified. Perhaps we can still be deliberative without being perfectly intentional. Oakley quotes Sankowski, "Much more than a person's overt behavior goes to modify and determine his emotions. His evaluations and beliefs generally, his habits of thought, many of his choices and decisions—all these, and more, effect his capacities and tendencies in emotion." (Justin Oakley, 145)

¹¹³ Justin Oakley, 137.

one might say, unconsciously. So, if the meaning of desire is to have an intention over time, then it might be suggested that it could be changed by noticing it, setting an intention in its place, and maintaining it over time.

Suppose that the person in our example tried to learn more about the other in the hope that his new knowledge about the other would be something he valued and would desire.¹¹⁴ Suppose he learned that the loved one has some interest which he can share with her. He might then desire to be with her by sharing the activity. Hopefully he can internalize this desire as a set (probably unfelt) aim or intention. In the same way he might learn of something else that would allow him to want to benefit her. For example, he might learn that the beloved is in need of someone to teach her to drive a car or help throw a party. Hopefully he can internalize a desire to help her. Hopefully he can generalize his desires and order them in such a way that it is no longer necessary for him to continue trying to learn to desire her happiness anymore.

In this way, the person in question cultivates his desires as part of his project of developing the control of his love for the beloved. The point of course is that this is in accord with his taste and becomes part of his character, that is, becomes part of his self in terms of new engagements and changed metapreference.

The next step is the cultivation of his feelings, i.e., so that he cares for her, shares her pleasures and pains, has concern for her welfare, is interested in her projects and priorities, enjoys her company, feels warmly disposed toward her, and so on.¹¹⁵ Here again we can speak of Oakley's conception of emotional

¹¹⁴ Suppose that our lover is male.

¹¹⁵ Justin Oakley, 30.

capacity. While he meant that an emotional capacity is a capacity for being able to have the emotion at all, nevertheless, the approach he presents for developing an emotional capacity is still valid.

We could begin to develop our emotional capacities through reading the works of writers . . . and seeing the films of directors such as Bergman, in order to enlarge our perspective of life.¹¹⁶

It is worth noting that a fundamental way in which fiction enlightens us is through our responsiveness to and identification with the plight of various fictional characters in emotions such as sympathy, admiration, pity, and fear which we have in regard to them. Perhaps we would not learn much about the world or the 'human condition' through fictional works if we were not emotionally moved by such works Thus, 'seeing through another's eyes' in love, and the enlargement of understanding we may thereby gain, can be thought of as the deepest form of a perfectly general way of reaching insight, as is shown in the enlightenment we may find through our emotional responses to fiction.¹¹⁷

Oakley is suggesting that when we learn from fiction, we gain a more open mind and have deeper understanding because we see the world when we are appropriately affected as opposed to when we are not affected. It follows from this that feelings can be inculcated by fantasy. Fantasy here means more than imagination. I would offer that fantasy has the connotation of comprising more of a certain sense of reality ¹¹⁸ than imagination has.

Nickolas Pappas writes that the experience of poetry is a matter of entering into a point of view of the world found there. 'That is, when we come to see what Homer is saying, we make the appearance of the world to him [to be]

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 137.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 52.

¹¹⁸ See Jerome Neu, <u>Emotion, Thought, and Therapy</u> (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 148.

the goal of our inquiry. I do not mean by this that we agree with Homer, only that what we want to know is what he sees."¹¹⁹ Pappas says that we have learned not to look for knowledge, but rather, to appreciate a representation. We gain something from looking at life in a different way, from the view of another, but what kind of awareness is this?

What lon knows, when he understands a Homeric passage about charioteering, is not something about charioteering, but Homer *on* charioteering. That is the claim to knowledge implicit in his ability to interpret Homer.¹²⁰

[Ion's] knowledge of Homer-on-the-world amounts to his seeing every subject through Homer's eyes . . . He likes best what is most idiosyncratic about Homer's treatment of a subject -- not because he thinks that the truth lies in what is characteristically Homeric, but because he prefers the way everything looks from Homer's point of view.¹²¹

Ion here has chosen an alternative to "true" reality or knowledge (whatever is meant here by "true"). This means to suggest a way of conceiving that is different that ordinary reality. We could define it as intuition where emotional engagement and imagination is a valid mode of perceiving a reality accessible through fantasy. Clearly people are able to fantasize about and even sympathize with fictional characters and situations. Of course, this is not to suggest that we know what the mechanisms of intuition, imagination, perception, conception, knowledge, or fantasy are. Nevertheless, I will argue that this is a means of cultivating feelings.

¹¹⁹ Nickolas Pappas, "Plato's Ion: The Problem of the Author," <u>Philosophy</u> 64 (1989): 387.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 384.

¹²¹ Ibid., 385.

Fantasy has something in common with playfulness. For example, a block of wood becomes a toy train or a rock becomes a spaceship. On a broader level though, as Ward suggests, playfulness is an ability to switch between engagements.¹²² The sense of engagements here is along the lines of: worlds we may inhabit. By "worlds" I mean, for example, that one's being and personality is constituted by the culture we inhabit at the moment and contrasted with the one we've just come from. One may move from the world of one's Hispanic culture to one's Anglo culture. Another example might be moving from one's world as a student to one's world as an employee. Moreover, "those of us who are 'world' -travelers have the distinct experience of being different in different 'worlds."¹²³ That is, "traveling to someone's 'world' is a way of identifying with them . . . because by traveling to their 'world' we can understand what it is to be them and what it is to be ourselves in their eyes. "124 So, we are playful in the sense that when we are in another world, our attitude is, "conditioned by the lack of seriousness among participants as well as the ability to move from one engagement [or 'world'] to another [e.g. another world of our own or another's world]."¹²⁵ In this sense, Ward would point out, where people cannot be inter-subjective in this way, they cannot play with each other or learn from each other.

Inter-subjective playing is the concept we are trying to get at, but not in just the way we have it here. Playing as we have it above is in terms of

¹²² Andrew Ward, "This and That, That and This," Unpublished lecture, Probably April 21, 1993, Seminar on Value Theory (Philosophy 292), San Jose State University, 2.

¹²³ Maria Lugones, "Playfulness, 'World' -Traveling, and Loving Perception," in Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearshall, eds., <u>Women, Knowledge, and Reality</u> (NY: Routledge, 1996), 426.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 432.

¹²⁵ ¹²⁵ Andrew Ward, 'This and That, That and This," 2.

constituting ourselves in relationship to others, but in fantasy, those others are imagined. In this sense, we form relationships with fictional others, and in a playful way, take on conception of the representations of a reality of the other, for example, what love is in 'their' world and *what 'our' love is* in their world. From there, by hypothesis, we can internalize feelings from their world and transpose them into ours (i.e., worlds we go to; i.e., our other engagements).

If this is a coherent conception of fantasy, then we can see how we might theoretically have some access to the raw feel others feel. If we sympathize with the fictional other in their world as they see it, then by hypothesis, we have learned of a feeling. Of course this must then be applied to our project of developing our feeling of love for a particular other in a particular situation. In that case, we would need to closely associate our fantasy world with the world of the beloved in such a way that the care, concern, interest, and warm enjoyment we learn in our fantasy world is not unfamiliar to the world where we have our project of cultivating love of the beloved.¹²⁶ We would then switch our world of fiction for love of the beloved as our object of love. Of course, again we have no idea how this switch can be accomplished since we do not have an account of fantasy's effect on the rest of the mind's faculties. This investigation must be left to the sagacious abilities of the reader. Still, the method seems valid in its means, even if we do not know the nature of our ability.

The point is that emotional maturity consists in cultivating an emotion in order to reach a particular goal. In so doing, the person in question makes a choice which is definitive of his self. He can develop an emotional capacity according to taste which changes the very nature of how he goes about his life,

¹²⁶ One might want to be careful, though, which world one ends up preferring to spend most of one's time in.

what makes up his life, and what his life should accordingly come to in the future. The former is one example.

Now let's reflect on some of the ramifications of what has been suggested in this chapter. Problems loom large. As was said earlier, there has not been presented an articulated account of the unconscious. This leads to problems of explaining any development in the form of, for example, what Freud called defense mechanisms. A problem with the conception of emotional development presented here is that people do not seem to be deliberative about the control and cultivation of all of their emotional lives. While it has been argued that purposeful changes are part of one's self, a question remains. Are there parts of development that are not there purposefully? Though it seems counter-intuitive that taste could change by accidentally adding a contradictory preference, taste might change accidentally by adding some preference that is not distasteful. We may now better be able to understand emotional maturity, but we do not yet have an answer to an accidental unconscious nature of it.

Also among our problems is correctly judging and being appropriate with our timing, degree, or kind of emotion. This restates a problem with defining emotions in the positive sense, and being able to compare our emotions for intensity and "raw feel." Problems of this kind regard a question of the very meaning of maturity as development in the right direction or of the right kind. In describing the mechanism of emotional maturity, it was not intended to show how to develop maturity or emotional maturity. Nevertheless, the idea of a mechanism that is an ideal example of the process of emotional maturity is one where we learn how to be a whole emotional person. It involves a conception of people as having a self, a conception of development as a set of engagements, and a conception of emotions as controllable. Now we are in a position to address the subject of emotional maturity with regard to these issues. In the final chapter we will address issues of morality, appropriate development, and appropriate emotional development and other issues where we wish to consider people as responsible and living a good life.

CHAPTER IV

Since one of the connotations of maturity is development, the meaning of emotional maturity that we come to is to control and cultivate our ability to emote. Since this conception of emotional maturity is subsumed under a conception of the self, by describing the mechanism of the self as a process of development, we can also account for emotional maturity. The implications of this way of looking at emotional maturity, by looking at one's self, reveal important problems about what the mind is and how the mind functions in order for us to cope with and thrive in life.

More broadly though, these problems can be put in terms of an attempt to account for appropriate personality development and appropriate emotional development. That is, problems of accounting for emotional maturity can be useful for examining what appropriate development is when conceived in terms of personality as a web of engagements. Or what is the most fitting timing, degree, and kind of emotion? This, for example, is a problem of being able to define, in a positive sense, what the criteria for appropriateness should be. We may be in a position to address the issue of criteria for appropriateness if we explore what a person is and what emotions are.

We can address issues of morality, appropriate development, and appropriate emotional development and other issues by asserting that there is a personal mark on our development, that we have a personal identity. Since these concerns take shape around a conception of a person's identity, issues of morality and appropriateness can be placed in the light.

If a person has a particular pattern to one's web of engagements and goes about developing that pattern in accordance with one's taste, then one is identified as that person. We identify this person because we are familiar with the pattern of this person's web and the part of this person which sets that pattern. So, if each person has an identity, then they can be held morally responsible as the particular persons responsible. Also, people can be responsible for their development (as 'better' or 'worse' or appropriate) because it is <u>their</u> personalities. They can be responsible for who they are because they set that agenda. In this sense, while we do not have the answers to questions of morality and appropriateness, they are put in context for a possibility of answers.

In demonstrating the mechanism of the self and the emotions, we have seen how the faculties of the mind can perform in order for us to cope with and thrive in life. As we mature, we develop our abilities. We develop the infrastructure of our selves and our lives. Even though the nature and mechanism of the faculties of mind have not been accounted for, we have seen how our faculties can interrelate in order for us to develop. In this we see how it is possible to mature personally and emotionally. Although we need to know more about our mental faculties in order to use them and control them as tools, the important thing is that we have some conception of personality that puts the issue in context. We are more than the sum of our experience and abilities. Personality is a process and a state of mind over and above consciousness, experiencing, and self-awareness. The development of one's self and one's emotions define a person as that person defines his or her self and his or her emotions, and so our lives are defined by our own unique design (i.e., design as a noun and also a verb).

Given the uniqueness of design, I suggested that a person's point of view is not free from a particular tonal quality of the self. This tone comes from personality. People are able to objectify certain aspects of their thoughts and take away from that the objective to go about a new way of life. I suggested that there is a taste-part of the mind which waits to be called on in order to pass judgment on preference or meta-preference as being to one's taste or not. This results in an actual long-term agenda that effects our attention, awareness, abilities, projects, perception, etc. and is potentially up-datable in order to refocus this effect of the agenda.

Our problem though is to know just what to do to make this change. In chapter three, it seemed that we could devise for ourselves methods for modifying our emotions without knowing the mechanisms of our mind's faculties. We have the advantage, though, of knowing more about the nature of how the self functions. This makes it possible to investigate changing. Moreover, it seems quite right to have to invent experiments for methods of change in order to investigate the possibilities of change. By changing our minds through modification, we can cope with our lives and, in particular, with our emotional lives.

We intentionally organize the pattern of our web of engagements over the long-term according to taste, where it is the self that prefers an engagement as welcome, unwelcome, indifferent, or does not take account of it and copes with that over time, shaping and directing our lives. We just have to learn more about how to go about it.

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Finally, on this theory, we may change our selves or we may fail and not change our selves for reasons of either bad faith or unchangeable facts. But if we do change, it can be made sense of by explaining that we use our preferences to intentionally change our web of engagements over time. We can understand changing our selves in the sense that we have changed the expected continuity of the old pattern of our web. For example, we can revalue a central engagement such that we have a web with a new taste for engaging life, and therefore new possibilities for life. We thereby change the possible webs we could be. If we assume though that there is something to the idea that there are unchangeable facts about us, it is possible to suggest that the distinctiveness of a web comes from a foundation to these possible webs, i.e., what can potentially be and not be.

If one does have a foundation for one's taste, then the self is more than simply intentionally and accidentally determined. It is also predetermined. It could be that one was born with a meta-preference for conservatism, justice, care, or masochism.¹²⁷ A web could be based on that foundation. This is to say that one has a foundation to one's personality that could be a basis of one's development. Autonomy and self actualization, then, is the possibility of a self limited by the fact of one's nature as born a certain way. While it is not necessary that the idea of personality be founded on something so concrete in order to be coherent, this facticity would justify the predetermined meta-preference in question as natural. However, one would have to try to achieve a change in one's web in order to see if this was the case.

There is another advantage to this way of talking about the foundation of the self or facticity of the self. The facticity of a foundation of the self could place

¹²⁷ I would add that the meaning of these words lack a connotation informed by the context of the meaning of personality given in this paper.

us into common realms of care (i.e., cultures where care is communicated). That is, if our foundation has a nature such that some of us are better able to be intimate (i.e., predisposed to a language) with each other, and this trait is possessed by a large population, then that group will develop webs of engagements that are more inter-connectable than others' webs. As generally disposed to a realm of care, by hypothesis, and having a moral center in the sense that one has an identity, we are able to be playful with each other in a selective, facticity way with our particularly intimate others. This is what being associated with a community is all about, agreement that "We like it." or that "We don't like it." as a group. One's capacity to collaborate playfully can be said to originate in taste. So, on the one hand, while a self that might lead one to be predisposed to rigidity of character would be a "bad" self. On the other hand, a self might help place us into common realms of care. That would be a "good" self.

Of course, this statement of an ethical system is too blunt. We do not have time or space to develop and explicate an ethical philosophy where we would know what is appropriate for us to be and do, but the important point is having an identity that admits of a moral center by definition. To be intentional regarding the nature of our personality makes us responsible for who we are. This is the very definition of the self on this theory. A person has a particular pattern to one's web of engagements and goes about developing that pattern in accordance with taste. So if development is to taste, then there should be some personal mark on the nature of our development which shapes our character and characteristic identity and so we take responsibility for our selves, our tastes, our engagements, our webs of engagements, and the pattern that they form over time. In this sense, we understand our responsibility as a person. We understand that we mature as people and that our emotions are part of that maturity. If this line of investigation were completed, it would lead to a meaning of characteristic human flourishing. It might end that not only are we our engagements, experience, and abilities, a process and a state of mind beyond these, but that there is a meaning and a purpose to life and it is us.

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
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
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




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