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Fostering moral development in preschoolers : the RAD (read, act & discuss) technique

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FOSTERING MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN PRESCHOOLERS:

THE RAD [READ, ACT & DISCUSS] TECHNIQUE

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Child Development

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by

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
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
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ABSTRACT

FOSTERING MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN PRESCHOOLERS:
THE RAD [READ, ACT & DISCUSS] TECHNIQUE

by Ruth Alice Wachob

This thesis evaluated the efficacy of the RAD [Reading, Acting and Discussion] technique for fostering prosocial attitudes in a group of 36 multi-ethnic, low-income preschool children (4 – 5 yrs.). The control group listened to a book addressing prosocial values. The experimental groups [large group (16-18); small group (7-8)] listened to the story, discussed personal connections, dramatized scenarios involving moral dilemmas, and then examined possible consequences of different behavior choices. Children were pretested and post-tested to evaluate their responses to moral dilemmas related to the training. As many as 80% of the children who initially gave antisocial responses (46% *more* than the control group) changed to prosocial responses after small group RAD training. The RAD technique was especially beneficial for boys and limited English proficient (LEP) students. Small group training was essential for younger preschoolers and LEP students. Qualitative analysis of responses provided insights into the moral reasoning of preschoolers.

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INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Concern for the moral behavior of children is growing in our country. The situation is serious as evidenced by criminal and violent actions by children graphically illustrated in the news. A 14-year-old shoots a classmate after being shoved and taunted (Rozsa, 1997). A group of five 13- to 14-year-old boys in Mountain View, California beats and tortures another 13-year-old by dripping candle wax on his buttocks, face and inside of his mouth, shooting him repeatedly with a BB gun, and force feeding him leaves, coffee grounds and toilet water (Vasquez, 1996). A 14-year-old gang member shoots and kills a 20-year-old delivering pizza, and is the first person as young as 14 to be tried as an adult (Cannon, 1996). Two boys, 11- and 13-years-old open fire on their middle school killing four girls and a teacher, and injuring ten others (Labi, 1998). A 7-year- old child in Minneapolis has a criminal record after setting fire to a neighbor's garage, burglarizing a neighbor's home and stealing a $150 CD player from a store (Montgomery, 1996). And even more shocking is the tale of a 6-year-old boy who after having been ordered out of a neighbor's home, retaliated by trying to kill their 5 week old baby by beating him on the head and cracking the infant's scull with his feet, fists and a stick. Criminal justice experts believe the 6-year-old is the youngest child ever charged with attempted murder (Reed & Akizuki, 1996; Reed, 1996).

These individual incidents are undeniably shocking, but they are not isolated incidents. In 1994, 110,000 children, under 13 years of age, were arrested for felonies; 11,700 for crimes against people (including 39 murders) (Montgomery, 1996). Nationwide, over half of the arrests made on arson charges involved youths under 18 years, and 7% of those arrested were under the age of 10 (Perlmutt, 1996). In the U.S. in 1994, 13-15-year-olds were 4% of the population, but were 8% of the people arrested; 16-18-year-olds were 4% of the population, but were 13% of those arrested (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1996, p. 397). In California, half of all the people arrested in 1992 were between 11 and 24, even though that group was only 20% of the state's population (Gonzales, 1994).

Not only is juvenile crime widespread, but it has been worsening over the years. Statistics indicate that criminal acts by children are actually increasing. Between 1985 and 1994 murder and nonnegligent manslaughter by youths under 18 rose 150%, aggravated assaults rose 97%, motor vehicle theft rose 73%, violent crime rose 75% and robbery rose by 57% (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1966, p. 403). In Santa Clara County violent juvenile crimes nearly tripled from 1984 to 1994 (Gonzales, 1994). Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter rose for all male youths from 1984 to 1994, but the increase has been especially notable for black males, going from 33.4/100,000 14- 17-year-old black males in 1984 to 139.6/100,000, an increase of 318%! (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1966, p. 360) More and more, younger males are being arrested for

murder and nonnegligent manslaughter. In 1993, 162% more 13- 14-year-olds, 207% more 15-year-olds and 197% more 16- year-old males were arrested for murder and nonnegligent manslaughter than in 1985 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1966, p. 423).

Clearly there are problems with the moral behavior of some of the children in America and Americans are being called upon to take action. The popular press is involved. Time magazine has published articles on raising moral children and reviewed Robert Coles' book, The Moral Intelligence of Children (Coles, 1997). Character Education conferences for educators, parents and school administrators abound. At one such conference held by the Character Education Partnership in 1997, politicians, entertainers, educators, teachers and administrators told of successful programs and problems encountered. Many publishers and companies offer books and whole curriculums to aid in teaching morality/character education (Child Development Project (CDP); Heartwood's Early Childhood Curriculum; Creating a Values-Based Literature Program (The Center for Learning); Wise Skills (Legacy Learning); Lessons in Character and Americans of Character (Young People's Press); character education resources from National Professional Resources, Inc.; etc.). Lists of character education curricula and organizations to help schools implement character education programs are available (Martin, 1996).

The Federal government is becoming involved in character education. "The importance of character education to the Clinton Administration was reinforced in a ... meeting between CEP [Character Education Partnership] leadership and Secretary of Education Riley. ...the Department of Education will continue funding state-sponsored pilot projects through character education grants and programs..." ("Administration's Agenda," 1997, p. 1) Even the President of the United States in his State of the Union address in February of 1997 stressed the importance of character education. Mr. Clinton listed as one of his priorities for education, "... character education must be taught in our schools. We must teach our children to be good citizens" ("President Clinton's Message," 1997, p. A20, col. 3).

Some could argue that parents or organized religion should be responsible for teaching morality. In fact, a Phi Delta Kappa study of 10,000 people across the United States found that most people felt that the home has primary responsibility for teaching values, and the church and school have secondary responsibilities (Frymier, et al., 1995). However, John Martin (1996) pointed out that although children used to learn cherished values through storytelling and responsibility through chores on the farm, times have changed and many children spend minimal time with their parents and family. In addition, as David Brooks (1997) observed, some children come from good homes and some from weak homes. School is the only place where all children go. School is a place where character education can be

taught in a planned, purposeful way, and taught proactively, before the child is in trouble. In the opening session of same conference, Nel Noddings (1997) agreed that schools need to teach character education. She stated that the main aim of schools is to teach children to care about others, themselves and everything in the school, as well as provide a rigorous curriculum.

Intervention programs must begin early. Studies have shown that children arrested under 12 years of age were more likely to commit more numerous and more serious crimes than those first arrested as teenagers. The children do not "grow out of it;" they become worse (Montgomery, 1996).

Extrapolating from this information, one would want to begin character education or teaching about morals as early as possible. Preschool would be the logical choice, since the children's language skills are well established. T.V. producers apparently also believe that we can influence the moral development of young children. T.V. programs such as <u>Barney</u>, and <u>Puzzle Place</u> exhort children to be kind and considerate through skits and songs. However, the published curricula begin at kindergarten (Lessons in Character Kindergarten, Child Development Project, Wise Skills). Is this because the market is public schools (K-6 and above) or because the preschool child is too young to benefit from such instruction? Can preschoolers even apply reasoning to moral problems? Some moral theorists and researchers (Kohlberg, 1971, 1978; Scharf, 1978b) begin their moral development stages

with 7-8-year-olds, when children are at the concrete operational stage. Can an effective program be created to foster prosocial attitudes in preschoolers?

Many character education programs use literature as a basis for discussions with children (Heartwood Early Childhood Curriculum [1996]; Reading, Thinking and Caring [1992-1998]; Lessons in Character [1996–1998]). Would this technique work with preschoolers? Since preschoolers cannot do the writing exercises and many cannot do the drawing exercises included in these curricula, would dramatization of problems suggested by the stories enhance their understanding?

If preschool children could learn from a character education program based on literature, would the size of the instructional group make a difference? Dunn and Kontos (1997) writing about NAEYC's position statement on developmentally appropriate practice for early childhood education say that, "Education is more effective if a teacher works informally with small groups" (p.6). Accreditation Criteria and Procedures (Bredekamp, 1991) from the NAEYC states that smaller group size and lower staff-child ratios are strong predictors of compliance with indicators of quality such as positive interactions between staff and children and developmentally appropriate curriculum. The staff ratios recommended for 4-year-olds vary from 1:8 to 1:10. Would working with smaller groups (8-9 children at a time) improve the preschooler's comprehension and retention of the moral concepts addressed in a story?

If an effective program to foster prosocial attitudes for preschoolers could be created, who would most benefit from such a program? Lisbeth and Daniel Schorr (1988) wrote that one of the risk factors that contribute to "rotten outcomes" for children is poverty. Therefore, a low-income preschool group would be ideal subjects for research into an effective character education program for preschoolers.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the efficacy of the RAD [Read, Act and Discuss] technique for fostering sensitivity to a variety of prosocial attitudes in low-income preschool children. Would this program be more effective than the teacher just reading a book?

Furthermore, would this program be more effective when presented to a small group of 7-8 children rather than to a large group of 16-18 children, or would there be no difference?

Three prosocial values would be addressed: not stealing, honesty, and not excluding another from play. Would some prosocial values be more difficult for preschool children to adopt than others?

The participants in the study included children who had just turned 4-years-old as well as prekindergarten children, and fluent as well as limited English speaking boys and girls. Would age, sex or English fluency affect the effectiveness of the program?

Hypotheses

It was predicted that more of the preschool children in the experimental group (who both heard the story and participated in discussions and dramatizations) would be able to apply the prosocial value than the control group which received just the story. This outcome was expected since more examples (through dramatization) would aide in comprehension of the value, children would practice applying the value in the dramatizations, the negative affect resulting from not applying the prosocial value would be discussed and dramatized, more time would be spent on the value, and therefore more emphasis would be placed on the value.

It was predicted that more of the children who participated in the small group training (story, discussion and dramatization) would be able to apply the prosocial value than those that participated in the large group training (story, discussion and dramatization). This outcome was expected because it should be easier to engage each child in the activity if they do not have to wait as long for their turn to tell about their experiences or have a turn to dramatize an incident (and each child would have more turns). In addition, the children would not become so easily bored if they do not have to listen to so many other children speak.

There was no prediction made as to the difficulty of assimilating the three different prosocial values. It seemed probable that there would be differences since children do not mature at the same rate in all areas of

cognitive functioning. Bjorklund (1995) wrote that "a particular child may display a highly egocentric attitude in one situation yet show impressive perspective-taking skills in another" (p.88). However, there was no way to predict which values would be easier or more difficult to learn.

Some studies have seen differences between the sexes in their sense of morality (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987) and nonverbal empathy (Eisenberg-Berg & Lennon, 1980). However, Yarrow, et al. (1976) found no sex differences in naturally occurring and experimental prosocial behavior, and James Rest in a meta-analysis of other studies (1986), found no significant differences between the sexes. Observing the children prior to the study, more antisocial behavior was noticed in the male participants than female participants, which would lead one to believe the girls would do better. However, the ability to learn appeared to be the same between the sexes. Therefore, since there was evidence for both the existence and absence of sex differences in the area of morality, no prediction was made as to whether the percentage of boys or girls that learned the prosocial values would be higher, lower, or the same.

It was predicted that fewer of the younger four-year-olds would change from antisocial to prosocial responses than the older prekindergarten children. As children mature they become less self-centered, better at seeing things from another's perspective (Selman, 1980) and more able to see the consequences of their actions (Maccoby, 1980), all attributes needed to understand the discussions and dramatizations of the prosocial values.

However, would there be enough maturational difference between these two age groups to affect the results?

It was predicted that fewer of the extremely limited English proficient students would change from antisocial to prosocial responses than students fluent in English. The limited English proficient students would probably miss the finer points of the discussion, although they should understand most of the dramatizations. It was believed that comprehending less of the discussions and stories would decrease their ability to apply the values.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to design a program that will positively influence prosocial

thought/morals, one must know how morality develops, what influences the

development of early morality, how morality has been taught in the past, and

how successful these techniques have been. This chapter reviews the

literature in these areas and brings to light points to consider when creating a

program to teach morals to young children.

What is Morality?

Researchers and authors have proposed different definitions of

morality, depending on their theory of how morality developed, how

morality was best taught, and their selection of the factors involved in moral

thought and action. Webster's dictionary (1965) defined morality as a doctrine

or system of morals (relating to principles of right and wrong in behavior);

particular moral principles or rules of conduct; conformity to ideals of right

human conduct; ethical behavior; or virtue. Lickona (1991) describing good

character wrote, "Good character consists of knowing the good, desiring the

good, and doing the good – habits of the mind, habits of the heart, and habits

in action" (p.51). Windmiller, Lambert, and Turiel (1980) proposed, "To

behave morally is to have internalized the controls on behavior that inhibit

harmful acts and facilitate beneficial acts (acts that promote the well-being of

others)" (p. 138). James Rest (1986) wrote that "the function of morality is to

provide basic guidelines for determining how conflicts in human interests are to be settled and for optimizing mutual benefit of people living together in groups" (p. 1). DeVries and Zan (1994) wrote that a moral child would not only follow rules from obedience to authority, but would follow the rules for their own reasons. They felt it was not enough to perform prosocial acts such as sharing, helping and comforting if the reason was to please the teacher. They felt the child needed moral feeling, and not an arbitrary list of character traits such as "honesty," "integrity," and "generosity" which they termed a "bag of virtues" (p.30).

Theories of Moral Development

Investigators have conceptualized various theories of moral development each with their own perspective on how children learn to distinguish right from wrong. This section summarizes the current thinking on young children's moral development.

Piaget

Most reviews of moral development begin with the theories of Piaget (Damon, 1988; Lamme, Krogh & Yachmetz, 1992; Stone, 1974; Turiel, 1983). This Swiss psychologist observed boys playing marbles and girls playing îlet cachant' (hide and seek). Combining skillful questioning and observation, he developed a stage theory of moral development (Piaget 1932/1965). As with other stage theorists, he believed that children went through all the stages in order, but at their own rate. From 0 – 2-years-old, the sensorimotor stage

children played without rules. This was the premoral stage. As the children got a little older they played a private game, with their own rules, and changed the rules at will. In the years from 3 – 7 or 8-years-old, the children believed that the rules were sacred and unchangeable. Adults (or God) were the ultimate authority and had created all the rules and games. The children were classified as heteronomous at this stage: the rules were external to them and followed without any internal motivation (except to avoid punishment). The children at this heteronomous stage were moral realists who took the rules at face value and followed the rules out of obedience to authority. When applying the rules, the children did not take into account circumstances or the intention of the characters in the stories. When asked to evaluate misdeeds, children in this stage judged that those who had done more damage, but with good intentions (while engaged in service to the parent), should be punished more harshly than those who had done less damage, but were engaged in mischief. The letter of the law was to be followed, not the spirit. Due to their cognitive developmental stage, young children could not think beyond the surface observables. Consequently, the spirit of the rules was unknowable. Therefore, the letter of the rules must be followed if one was to be in compliance with parental edicts. Any act that showed obedience to the rule or adult was good; and conversely, any act not conforming to the rule was bad.

During the school years, the children had many give-and-take interactions with peers, began understanding cooperation, and were able to see things from another's viewpoint. At about the age of 11, children became more autonomous. They did more thinking for themselves and the reasons for following the rules came from within. Children in this stage took intent and motivation into account. They believed that rules were alterable by consensus and not immutable and fixed as they believed when they were younger.

Lying

Piaget (1932/1965) also explored children's conceptions about lying, one of the values examined in the present study. To a child under 6-years-old, a lie was seen "as an affirmation that does not conform with fact" (p.145). Therefore, mistakes, guesses, and even swear words were considered lies. For example, if a man was really 36 years old and someone said he was 30 years old, a child in this stage would consider the misstatement to be a lie. The further the lie was from the truth, the bigger the lie. Therefore, a child who said the man was 20 years old, would be telling a bigger lie than one who said he was 30 years old. Children over 6-years-old, knew that lies were something that was not true. Only 10- to 11-year-olds considered intended false statements as lies. This again showed that intentionality was not considered by the youngest children.

Up until the age of 7 or 8, children had difficulty adhering to the truth. This was done without consciously trying to deceive others. A child distorted reality in accordance with his desires and his "romancing." The youngest children only told the truth to avoid punishment. They believed it would not be naughty to tell lies, if they were not punished, a heteronomous response. As they grew older, children felt that rules were obligatory and lies were wrong, regardless of the presence or absence of punishment. Finally, the oldest children didn't lie because it destroyed the mutual trust and affection between people, an autonomous response.

More recent research has not unilaterally supported Piaget's theories about lying. Kay Bussey (1992) found that 71% of preschool children could accurately tell which characters in the story were telling lies and which were telling the truth. For all the children in their study (preschool, second, and fifth graders) it was the falsity of the statement, and not consequent punishment or that the incident involved a misdeed, that was the major determinant of its definition as a lie. Lies were judged as significantly worse than truthful statements for all ages (stronger for older children), and all the children evaluated lies as worse than misdeeds alone (they were not just cueing off the misdeed). However, consistent with Piaget's theory, preschool children evaluated vignettes as more negative when punishment was present than when it was absent (older students did not). Unlike Piaget, no age evaluated lies that were believed any differently than lies that were not

believed. Bussey also investigated children's reaction to telling the truth. Preschoolers did not evaluate truthful statements as more favorable than misdeeds. Therefore, while preschool children appreciated the naughtiness of lying, it was more difficult for them to appreciate the value of truthfulness about misdeeds. It was only as children got older that they reacted with pride for truthfulness.

Implications for the Present Research

Children in the present study would be classified as heteronomous by Piaget (1932/1965) and would be predicted to follow adult rules without any internal motivation. In addition, they would be expected to obey the rules due to the sacredness of the rules and the awe in which they held adults. When asked to explain why a person should follow a rule, or why a character should make a moral choice, one would expect children at this age to just repeat reasons supplied by adults, if they were able to supply any reasons at all. In addition, if Piaget's theory were correct, one would not expect preschool children to take into account the intention of other characters when enacting a scenario. In order to examine the validity of Piaget's theory in these areas, the children in this study were asked to explain the reasons for their character's decisions during testing. Just knowing the child's decision for their character would not be sufficient. As Rothman (1980) pointed out, different lines of reasoning could lead to the same decision.

Kohlberg

Lawrence Kohlberg (1971, 1978) also proposed a cognitive stage theory of moral development. Drawing on data from moral dilemma interviews with 50 Chicago area boys from 10- to 16-years-old, every 3 years for a period 20 years (as well as international populations), he differentiated six hierarchical stages. Individuals were said to progress through the stages in an invariant sequence. Typically, over 50% of an individual's thinking was at one stage, with the balance of their thinking at the next adjacent stage (Kohlberg, 1978).

Only the first four stages are discussed here since the last two concern college age students and adults. Since Kohlberg himself did not propose ages corresponding to his stages, the ages included in the following discussion came from Elliot Turiel (1983). The description of the stages draw on the work of Kohlberg (1971, 1978) and DeVries and Zan (1994).

The preconventional level of moral reasoning included stages 1 and 2, and was typical of children from 6- to 11-years-old. Children at this level thought about the cultural rules, labels of good and bad, and right and wrong, in terms of their physical consequences (punishment or reward) or in terms of the physical power of those in authority.

Stage 1: The punishment-and-obedience orientation. An action was considered to be good or bad depending on its physical consequences. The child was concerned with material damage rather than with intentions.

Right was defined as obedience to the authority figure (parent or other adults) or that which avoided punishment. Children did the right thing so that they would not be punished.

Stage 2: The instrumental-relativist orientation. At this stage, right was defined as that which satisfied one's own needs and was in one's own self-interest (and occasionally the needs of others). Since everyone had self-interests, what was right was viewed as relative. Kohlberg likened this stage to a marketplace: there were elements of fairness, reciprocity and equal sharing, but always interpreted in a pragmatic way. Children, at this stage, were concerned with strict equality. They would cooperate with each other in order to get what they wanted, but reciprocity was a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." In terms of justice, this was an eye-for-an-eye stage.

The conventional level of moral reasoning was typical of children from 12- to 17-years-old and included stages 3 and 4. Conventional level thought was more social, with right being manifested as maintaining the good regard of one's family or community, and actively maintaining, supporting and being loyal to your social order.

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation. Doing the right thing, was performing the behaviors that pleased or helped others and were approved by the immediate social system (family, class, etc.). Children at this stage frequently judged behavior by intention.

They would act to gain approval and try to be "nice." The Golden Rule was understood in a concrete way, i.e., by putting yourself in the other person's shoes.

Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. At this stage the larger social system began to become important. Right was defined by "doing one's duty, showing respect for authority," (Kohlberg, 1978 p. 50) and following the laws, for the common good.

The child's cognitive stage influenced his/her stage of moral development. Since moral reasoning was a form of reasoning, the child's logical stage placed limits on their moral stage. At approximately age 7, when a child entered into the concrete operational stage, (s)he could make logical inferences, classify, and handle quantitative relations about concrete objects. Kohlberg (1978) argued that the concrete operational thinker was limited to the preconventional moral stages 1 and 2.

To advance to the next moral stage, the child must have mastered an equivalent cognitive stage. However, being in a cognitive stage did not necessarily mean the a person had reached the corresponding moral stage (Stone, 1974).

It appeared from the previous discussion that Kohlberg did not consider the preschool child in any of his moral developmental stages since preschool children were not even at the concrete operational stage, and could not logically discuss his moral dilemmas. However, in his analysis of

Kohlberg's theory, Turiel (1983) proposed that the youngest children did not differentiate moral and nonmoral acts. The young child was only concerned with obedience to authority and strict adherence to the rules, to avoid punishment (not as Piaget said due to respect for authority and the sacredness of social rules). Right was associated with power, punishment and physical consequences. Kohlberg (1971) wrote about his 4-year-old son exhibiting a stage 1 sense of justice when the boy suggested killing and eating Eskimos because they killed seals. "It's bad to kill animals so it's all right to eat them [Eskimos]," an eye-for-an-eye type of justice (p. 52). Although preschool children do not exhibit concrete operations, they also appear to employ some of the reasoning typical of Stage 1.

Kohlberg did not believe that the stages were the "innate unfolding of the nervous system" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 42). The child was an active participant in structuring his perceived environment. He assumed that (a) the development of the moral stages represented the interaction of a child's structuring tendencies and the environment, (b) moral development had a cognitive core, and (c) morality had interactional origins. Morality was not the transmission of a fixed moral truth, but a child's restructuring of his experiences.

Kohlberg-Type Theories

Selman. Robert Selman (Selman & Lieberman, 1974) also developed a stage theory of moral development. Selman's theory was very closely aligned

with Kohlberg's.

In Selman's theory, children from 2- 4-years-old had no clear awareness of moral rules, and were not included in any of his levels.

Level I of Selman's theory contained two stages. Children in level I believed that "moral value reside[d] in external, quasi-physical happenings, in bad acts, or in quasi-physical needs rather than in persons and standards" (Selman & Lieberman, 1974 p. 71). In Stage 1 (5- to 7-year-old) children regarded rules as something to be obeyed, primarily to avoid punishment. In Stage 2, children exhibited a sense of naive fairness; the same for you and for me. The children were still egocentric; doing the right thing satisfied one's own need, and occasionally others'.

Level II included Stage 3 and Stage 4. In Level II children believed that "moral value reside[d] in performing good or right roles, in maintaining the conventional order and the expectancies of others" (Selman & Lieberman, 1974, p.71). In Stage 3 (end of primary years) children were concerned about the welfare of others and could put themselves in the other person's shoes. They looked for the approval of others and wanted to conform to what the majority would call "good" behavior. They included intention in their judgments of moral dilemmas. Stage 4 (late elementary years) was the law and order maintaining stage. The other stages will not be discussed as they concerned much older children.

Beck. Clive Beck (1971) devised a stage theory similar to Kohlberg's. However, his was not backed by research.

The first level, preconformity, contained two stages. Stage 1 was the simple authority orientation. At this stage children did not see the purpose of adult morality but respected it. The respect was based partly on early conditioning and partly on observations that important, powerful authority figures placed a lot of importance on morality and punished those who did not comply. Stage 2 was the simple independence orientation. Children in this stage had some inkling of the purpose of morality, but saw morality only as it served people's self interest, especially their own. Children in this stage had less respect for authority than Stage 1, but still feared punishment. Concern for others and understanding of their needs was still limited; morality was not a big part of life.

The second level was the conformity level. Stage 3 was the limited conformity orientation. Children in this stage wanted to please and help others, but did not see the need for an extensive system of general rules. Children at this stage had limited knowledge of the consequences of their actions. They respected the general moral and legal rules, partly because they felt the people who made them must have had some good reason for their concern. However, if the rules conflicted with obvious human needs, they set them aside.

Kohlberg-type Theories and Education

Kohlberg (1971, 1978), and Selman and Lieberman (1974) were concerned about the use of their theories to shape teaching programs. Movement to a higher stage required the experience of conflict or difficulty in applying their current level of thought to a moral problem. However, children exposed to reasoning more than one stage above their own stage, just translated the higher reasoning into ideas that were at their own level. The best procedure was to expose children to moral reasoning slightly higher (one stage) than their current level. This might facilitate a change to the next stage. Therefore, moral education programs "should focus on helping the child reach the next stage of development rather than directly teaching him fixed rules and values of the adult world" (Selman & Lieberman, 1974 p. 73).

Implications for the Present Research

In designing the dramatizations and discussions for the RAD program, the Kohlberg/Selman stage of the children was considered. According to these theories, the children were either premoral, with no clear awareness of moral rules, or in Stage 1, where they were just concerned with avoiding punishment. Again, if these theories were to be applied, the children should be exposed to thinking that was one stage above their current level to help facilitate moral development. However, it was not deemed sufficient to teach the premoral children that the only reason to behave morally was to avoid punishment. Nor was it deemed sufficient to teach Stage 1 children that the

only reason to do the right thing was to exhibit a sense of fairness. Instead, the discussions and dramatizations focused primarily on how the other person would feel as a consequence of the character choosing a morally correct/incorrect action.

Gilligan

Kohlberg's stages and theory focused heavily on justice. Carol Gilligan (1982) wrote that males and females did not focus equally on justice when solving real-life moral dilemmas. More women had a care orientation, and believed the welfare of others was intrinsically connected to their own welfare. With a care orientation, one perceived that people shared in each other's fortunes and misfortunes, actively offering aide and empathizing. More males had a justice orientation. With this orientation one would anticipate that people's interests and prerogatives would often came into conflict; what one person wanted would not necessarily be compatible with what another person wanted. Therefore, to be fair, it was necessary to have rules for justice. Males were oriented towards individualism and separateness, while females were oriented towards attachment and connectedness.

Gilligan (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987) believed that the differences in justice and care orientations originated in a young child's awareness of self in relation to others. A young child would feel helpless and powerless in relationship to his/her parents. This set the groundwork for justice. The

child also felt attachment, an awareness of self as capable and of having an effect on others, setting the groundwork for care. Gilligan believed that girls identified with their mothers, to whom they were attached and remained in physical proximity. For girls, the experience of inequality was less overwhelming and a care orientation prevailed. Boys, however, were attached to their mothers, but identified with their fathers. They could not see beyond their fathers' authority and physical power. The experience of inequality and the desire to overcome it, became more important to the boys than the girls, and hence their tendency to view relationships with a justice orientation.

In 1982, Gilligan posited a sequence of stages of moral development based upon the morality of care and relationships. Level 1 involved caring for one's self in order to ensure survival. Level 2 was represented by the maternal ethic, where one assumed responsibility for another's welfare, and valued care and responsibility for others. In order to grow to Level 3, an individual needed to realize that the self, as well as others needed care. At level 3 there was a realization of the interconnection between the self and others. However, writing in 1987 (Gilligan & Wiggins,1987), she said that development did not necessarily entail moral progress. Moral immaturity was not the absence of moral wisdom, but the absence of attachments necessary for making moral insights. In order to develop these insights a person needed experience with others and negotiated relations. She believed

that one should not ask how the moral self developed, but "what might be the developmental moments in relationships which both promote[d] and threaten[ed] moral progress" (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987, p.301).

Although earlier research supported the difference in justice vs. care orientations for males vs. females (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987), research reviewed by Rest (1986) showed that males did not score higher than females in studies using versions of Kohlberg's justice-oriented tests. In addition, gender differences vanished under new social circumstances, e.g., male lawyers had the same orientation to justice as female lawyers (Damon, 1988). Gilligan refuted these arguments (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987) by focusing on actual behavior instead of test results. She said that males showed more antisocial behavior in preschool, elementary school and in their percentages of violent crimes. She continued that Piaget and Kohlberg explained moral development as a function of peer group interaction, but boys and girls played different types of games. "If there are no sex differences in empathy or moral reasoning, why are there sex differences in moral and immoral behavior?" (p.279) The problem either lies in "how empathy and moral reasoning is measured, or the role of moral reasoning in moral development has been overstated" (p.279).

Implications for the Present Research

Gilligan (Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987) believed that boys and girls tended to use different orientations when confronted with moral

dilemmas. When testing scenarios were developed, care was taken so that some care and some justice situations were tested. In addition, caring about other's feelings *and* justice issues were addressed during the RAD training. In this current study, the children's responses were analyzed by sex to see if there were any gender differences in the quantity of care or justice responses.

<div align="center">Moral vs. Conventional Transgressions</div>

Elliot Turiel and others (Turiel, 1983; Turiel, Killen & Helwig, 1987) found fault with Piaget's research. Piaget based his theory of moral development upon children's answers to questions about games (marbles and îlet cachant'), a nonmoral situation. He did not consider that children might distinguish between moral and nonmoral rules. However, Turiel and others (Smetana, 1981; Wainryb & Turiel, 1993) discovered that even preschoolers could distinguished between conventional rules (those concerned with school rules, forms of address, attire and appearance, game rules, etiquette, sex role conventions and religious conventions), and moral rules (those concerned with physical harm and welfare, psychological harm, fairness and rights). Therefore, conclusions that Piaget drew about children's morality based on answers to questions about games (conventional rules) should not be generalized to children's morality about truly moral issues.

Indeed, where Piaget found that young children were heteronomous, Turiel (1983) reviewed research that found that children did not always view obedience to authority as right, regardless of the content of the commands.

Piaget also wrote that the heteronomous child knew something was wrong because it was associated with punishment. Turiel (1983) reviewed research that disputed that claim. The newer research revealed that 6-year-olds judged moral transgressions as wrong even if they were not associated with punishment, while conventional rule violations were acceptable in the absence of punishment. Smetana, Schlagman, and Walsh Adams (1993) found that preschoolers felt moral transgressions were more serious than conventional transgressions, that they should be more severely punished, and that they were more generalizably wrong than conventional transgressions. Children as young as 3- and 4-years-old judged actions in the moral domain independently of existing adult rules (Smetana et al., 1993). To them, it was still wrong to hit, even if there was no rule against hitting (Wainryb & Turiel, 1993).

Another aspect of Piaget's "heteronomous child" was that (s)he based the degree of seriousness of a transgression on the amount of physical damage, not on motive. Several studies concluded that this correlation might be true for objects, but not for people. Imamogu (1975) told 5-year-olds stories that varied in the degree of causality (intentional or accidental) and outcome quality (good or bad) affecting either objects or people. The children judged stories for the "badness" of the acts and their like/dislike of the actors. Imamogu observed that the children judged harm to people on the basis of intentionality, whereas damage to objects was judged on the basis of the

consequences. Berg-Cross (1975) tested 6-year-olds with single stories (not pairs of stories as Piaget did) that varied by intention and the degree of damage. The children chose how many punishments (0-4) the actor should receive and told why. Although the children still took into account the amount of damage (they gave more punishment in equivalent episodes that ended with large consequences than with small consequences), Berg-Cross observed that the children judged acts of intention as deserving more punishment than accidents, and judged damage to humans as worse than damage to material objects.

Turiel et al. (1987) noted that conventional transgressions were not always considered less important than moral transgressions, at all ages. For 6-year-olds, conventional transgressions (ex. wearing pajamas to school) were more serious than moral transgressions with minor consequences (ex. stealing a pencil). For 10-year-olds, all moral transgressions were more important than conventional transgressions.

Shweder, Mahapatra and Miller (1987) reported limitations with Turiel's (1983) theory that there are universal developmental processes leading the child to differentiate moral and conventional obligations. After interviewing American, Brahman and "untouchables" from India, Sweder et al. concluded that all cultures do not view social practices as conventions. They wrote that Turiel's theory underplays the "way ritual observances and customary practices involving food, sex, [and] dress . . . may be linked through

social meaning to mandatory moral principles like harm, justice and natural law" (p. 29). They concluded no domain distinction existed between morality and convention. For a more complete review of their research and Turiel's rebuttal, see the section on cultural differences.

In Turiel's view (1983), morality changed as the child grew, but the seeds of morality were present in young children. Three and 4-year-old children could make distinctively moral judgments. For example, Nucci and Turiel (1978) coded the social interactions generated by naturally occurring moral (a child harmed or someone taking possessions) and conventional (dressing or eating) transgressions in a preschool. For each type of transgression, the statements and physical reactions by other children were recorded. In cases involving a moral transgression, children were able to (a) tell about the pain or injury of the victim, (b) express emotion or physical reactions toward the transgressor, and (c) point out the consequences of the actions, e.g., pain experienced or loss incurred. However, the children rarely gave any response to transgressions of social conventions.

Smetana and Braeges (1990) investigated the age at which children distinguish moral and conventional transgressions. They showed 26-, 34-, and 42-month-old children scenes depicting moral (ex. one child hitting another, pulling hair, etc.) and conventional (ex. boy wearing nail polish, eating ice cream with fingers, etc.) transgressions. Questions revealed whether the children considered the transgression moral or conventional.

Children were asked: Is this okay? Is it bad? At another school is this okay? (generalizability) The teacher never told him it was bad. Is it still wrong? (contingency on rules) The teacher doesn't see. Is it still wrong? (contingency on authority) They found that children 26 months old did not distinguish moral from conventional judgments. It was not until 34 months of age that moral judgements were seen as more generalizably wrong than conventional judgements.

Children as young as 4-years-old did not simply accept the dictates of authority (Wainryb & Turiel, 1993). Acceptance depended on the status of the authority figure, their ability to sanction and punish, their expertise and knowledge, etc. Children would accept their parent's authority to regulate house chores, but the children would reject commands to steal or cause harm. Therefore, children did not accept the teaching of their parents as a whole; they interpreted and modified their social input. Wainryb and Turiel wrote that children had to construct their own moral sense. They could not incorporate ready-made cultural givens handed down through the ages. Unlike the manner in which informational assumptions were acquired, "moral concepts stem[med] from children's experiences - actions, interactions, observations, and interpretations- with the social world," especially experiences bearing on other's welfare or rights (Wainryb & Turiel, 1993, p. 12). A child constructed his moral sense, not based on given rules or adult

teaching, but by observing someone who was hurt and then constructing

prescriptives about how people ought to behave.

Implications for the Present Research

In constructing a program to increase prosocial/moral cognitive

responses in preschool children (the RAD program), only moral (not

conventional) values were addressed so as to avoid Piaget's pitfall of

analyzing situations that did not have a moral basis. In addition, the RAD

program included the dramatization of scenes highlighting the consequences

to the victim of moral transgressions. Whereas children might miss

naturally occurring instances of moral transgressions, which could help them

construct prescriptives about how people ought to behave, the RAD

dramatizations helped children focus their attention on the consequences of

moral transgressions, and thereby facilitated their construction of morality.

Damon

William Damon (1988) believed that morality arose naturally out of

social relations. Morality came with "rules of conduct, feelings of care, and

sense of obligation"(p. 2) almost from birth. He felt that empathy, shame,

guilt and anxiety over other people's violations of standards were present

early in life and provided a natural base for the child's acquisition of moral

values. These emotions helped orient the child toward moral events,

motivated the child to pay close attention to such events, and helped the

child recollect experienced events. A child learned to interpret his or her own

moral emotions in the light of the moral reactions of others; either through formal teaching by parents and teachers, or through spontaneous comments by peers.

Damon (1983) believed that children could achieve the stages of moral development at younger ages than Piaget theorized. Analyzing Piaget's own data, Damon (Lamme et al., 1992) noted that children as young as 4-years-old could communicate non-egocentrically with each other. There were some tasks in the area of sharing and perspective-taking that younger children could perform with ease, while other tasks proved more difficult.

Damon (1988) realized that children's moral issues were not the same as adults, e.g., they did not worry about shelter, earning a living, etc., but instead were concerned about friends, possessions, family, school rules, etc. Therefore, children's moral issues dealt with honesty, fairness (sharing possessions) and concern for others.

Damon (1988) studied the development of sharing (distributive justice) over a child's life. For toddlers, sharing was erratic, playful and whimsical in nature. By 4 years of age, a child could explain why they shared: empathetic reasons (to make another child happier), or pragmatic reasons (to avoid punishment or to be rewarded when the other child would share in the future). Sharing at this stage was still egoistic (sharing is right when I want to do it, otherwise it is not necessary to share). During the elementary years the principles of equality (all are treated the same), merit (extra reward for hard

work or talent) and benevolence (special consideration for the disadvantaged) come into play. Although parents felt responsible for their child's behavior and tried to foster sharing through counseling and setting examples, it was the give-and-take of peer requests, pressure, arguments, conflicts and acts of generosity that "provide[d] the most immediate spur" (p.43) to develop the standards of sharing. Children's friendships involved mutuality, reciprocity, joint participation, intimacy and close affectionate bonds that led a child to pay attention to the norms, standards and rules of procedure.

Damon (1980, 1988) also offered an explanation for why children obeyed their parents at different ages. Children under the age of 5 denied the existence of outside authority. They obeyed their parents because they wanted to; if a command conflicted with their personal desires, they believed they did not have to obey. At 5 years, obedience was pragmatic; children obeyed to avoid punishment. In middle childhood, children obeyed as a sign of respect for parental abilities (and physical power) and as a payback for parental nurturance. There was no such thing as 'getting away with it' because there was an inevitable association of wrongdoing with punishment. At the end of childhood, it was in one's own best interest to obey, because parents cared about their children and had more experience. If the parent was wrong, the child had the right to disagree. At the threshold to adolescence, obedience was matter of choice with the child deferring to the leader who cared about him. If the child knew more, the parent should listen to the child.

In terms of teaching moral development, Damon wrote that moral development had three parts - moral reflection, moral emotion, and moral conduct - the head, the heart, and the habit (Damon, 1993). The RAD program focused on the first two components: moral reflection, thinking about the consequences of wrong doing; and moral emotion, putting oneself in another's place and imagining how he must have felt.

<u>Rest</u>

James Rest (1986) wrote that morality was rooted in the individual human psyche. Moral development began with early occurring empathy, but also involved caring and mutually supportive relationships, the desire of people to think of themselves as decent, fair and moral, and reflection on social experiences.

His "Four Component Model" included the four processes necessary for people to act morally. First, a person should be able to assess the situation. What were the possible actions and consequences of those actions? Second, a person should know which action was morally right. Third, one must give priority to moral values over personal values. Fourth, one must have enough ego strength and perseverance to follow through on their good intentions. In this model, neither cognition, social learning, nor affect alone was the controlling factor in determining moral behavior; all three were equally important.

Each component developed as the child grew. The first component, involved the development of perspective-taking. In the first year an infant was discomforted by another baby crying, but couldn't distinguish himself from others. As a toddler, the child knew himself from others, but tried to comfort others as he would comfort himself, e.g., giving a doll to a sad parent. At 2 or 3 years of age, a child could give effective help to others. In late childhood, a child knew that people had their own life history and identity. He or she could be aroused by the awareness of deprivations, not just by signs of distress.

The second component, knowing right from wrong developed in several stages. At first, the child got along with others by obeying commands. In the next stage, he progressed to exchanging favors and making deals. Later, long-term relationships were based on loyalty, mutuality and affection. As the child matured, he based his decisions on society-wide networks of cooperation, formal institutions and laws.

Rest reviewed several theories on how the third component, choosing the moral way, could evolve. Evolution might have bred altruism. Empathy, or shame and guilt might motivate morality. There might be no motivation to be moral; people might just have been responding to reinforcement and modeling to learn moral behaviors. Social understanding of how cooperation functions might motivate morality. Moral motivation might come from a sense of awe and self-subjugation to something greater

than one's self (religion, patriotism). The experience of living in a just and caring relationship might lead to moral commitment.

In a 10 year, longitudinal study, Rest presented Kohlberg-like dilemmas to Junior High, High School and college students, and asked them how they would solve the dilemmas. Ranking their top four reasons, he found that scores increased over time. He found that those whose moral development increased, loved to learn, sought new challenges, enjoyed intellectually stimulating environments, were reflective, planned and set goals, and took responsibility for themselves and their environs. One problem with Rest's work was that he worked with older students, so his work did not speak directly to the question of how morality developed during earlier periods of childhood.

<u>Williams & Williams</u>

Not all theories of moral development were stage theories with hierarchical, developmentally sequenced steps. Williams and Williams (Stone, 1974) asked children from 4 to 18 years of age about moral concepts, e.g., good, bad, fairness, lying, stealing and bullying. When the children explained their understanding of the right or wrong of each concept, the investigators found four kinds of responses, preceded by a premoral stage (see Table 1). At all ages, children gave all four kinds of responses. However, as the children grew older, they gave more kinds of responses.

There were implications from this study regarding the design of a

prosocial program for preschoolers. If it was true that children did not give

predominantly one type of answer at any given age, as in a stage theory, then

one would be justified in discussing many types of reasons for a given

prosocial behavior with a child. One would not be limited, solely, to reasons

just at the children's current stage and the next higher stage, as the Kohlberg-

type stage theory suggests.

Table 1

Williams and Williams: Four Types of Moral Responses

	considering	obeying
	expedient	irrational-inhibition
self	guilt avoiding	ego-ideal
	shame avoiding	
	empathetic	authoritarian
other	theoretical-generalization	conforming
	rational-utilitarian	legalistic
		mass communications

Note: From "The development of moral thought in children," by N. K. Stone, 1974, in D. D. Hearn (Ed.), Values, feelings and morals: Part I - Research and perspectives (p. 12). Association of Elementary-Kindergarten-Nursery Educators.

Behaviorial Learning Theory

Behaviorists explained moral development with a behavioral learning theory (Stone, 1974). Morality was a set of specific acts and avoidances which were learned through reinforcement and punishment, with little or no accompanying thought.

B.F. Skinner (1971) wrote,

> We do not say that a person does what he "ought to do" in driving a car because of any inner sense of what is right.... [His behavior has been shaped by reinforcement.] We are likely to appeal to some such inner virtue, however, to explain why a person behaves well with respect to his fellow men, but he does so not because his fellow men have endowed him with a sense of responsibility or obligation or with loyalty or respect for others but because they have arranged effective social contingencies. (pp. 107-108)

Social Learning Theory

Social learning theory began with the same basics as behaviorism, but added modeling, vicarious reinforcement and nurturance as important influences (Sieber, 1980).

Windmiller et al. (1980) explained, in detail, how morality is learned according to the social learning theory. Infants and children are rewarded or punished by their parents for their behavior. They learn to do the "right" behaviors through operant and classical conditioning. The children associate withdrawal of affection with misbehavior. The withdrawal of affection leads to anxiety. Therefore, when children misbehave, they feel anxiety (the conditioned response) which helps reduce the frequency of the behavior

when they are not observed. For example, the thought pulling sister's hair usually leads to satisfaction. However, pulling sister's hair has been associated with withdrawal of parental affection, which leads to anxiety. Therefore, through a conditioned response, the thought of pulling sister's hair makes the child feel anxious. This conditioning only establishes the groundwork, since most of the behaviors considered moral or immoral do not yet exist in such young children.

In addition to conditioning, observational learning (modeling) is important. In Bandura and McDonald's (1963) study, children imitated the source of power, rather than those who benefited from it. Other techniques of social learning include shaping (rewarding behavior that approximates the desired behavior) and development of substitute behaviors (punish undesirable behavior and teach a new behavior to substitute for the undesirable behavior) (Windmiller et al., 1980).

An emotional attachment to the caretaking adult was very important. (Sieber, 1980; Windmiller et al., 1980). If a child did not develop an emotional attachment to an adult in the first year, or if the attachment was not continued, internalization of moral values was unlikely to occur (Windmiller et al., 1980). The attachment figure needed to be present to help the child resist temptation. After a transgression, the attachment figure helped reduce anxiety by verbally punishing the child or by being present so

the child could engage in self-criticism, reparation, or confession in order to reinstate affection.

To be most effective, a parent would want to combine withdrawal of affection for misbehavior with options for ways to reinstate affection (Windmiller et al., 1980). Punishment alone led to avoidance of the punisher, not elimination of the behavior. Therefore, the parent would want to do the following: instill anxiety before the transgression; verbally convey a great deal of information about values and consequences; and help the child solve moral problems by finding satisfactory substitute behaviors.

Social learning theory would lead one to believe that the teacher in a preschool class would have great influence over her students, not only as an authority figure, but also as an important model, and frequently as an attachment figure. The preschool teacher who had a good rapport with her class, would have a stronger effect teaching the proposed RAD program, than a strange visitor or researcher coming into the classroom. Indeed, since the researcher was the classroom teacher in this study, the most favorable climate for social learning existed.

Aronfreed

Justin Aronfreed was considered to be a social learning theorist (Wainryb & Turiel, 1993). He combined behaviorism with cognitive and affective components in his theory of moral development (Aronfreed, 1971). He observed that when punishment was paired with taking a certain toy,

children would avoid that toy even when the experimenter was not there. In cases where the punishment was not explained, the 8- to 10-year-old children could not verbalize why they did not choose the toy. Aronfreed concluded that people could learn without evaluative thought. An important factor in this type of learning was punishment for transgressions, especially at the initiation of the act. However, humans could also use cognitive structures to evaluate behavior. If punishment was delayed, but the experimenter added a verbalization (explanation), especially about the child's intention, e.g., the child was being punished for wanting to pick up a toy, children also altered their behavior. Aronfreed added that affective components also influenced the child's behaviors.

As children grew older, they shifted form externalized (others will punish me) to internalized (conscience) evaluative structures. Aronfreed (1971) believed the change was due to social experience, not just maturation.

Aronfreed (1971) described two problems associated with assuming that children moved through stages as they matured. First, the stages of moral development appeared to be culturally bound, i.e., in some cultures there was no decline in the externally oriented components with age. Second, children might have greater verbal facility as they grew older and were better able to explain what they were thinking, without any fundamental change of values.

The problem with Aronfreed's (1971) experiment was that the "moral" issue involved the child not touching a toy. As pointed out in the section on

moral vs. conventional transgressions, the transgression in this experiment

was a conventional, not a moral, transgression. Therefore, Aronfreed's

conclusions would be called into question.

<div align="center">Freud</div>

Freud's theory of moral development was proposed in 1923 (Emde,

Johnson and Easterbrooks, 1987; Turiel, 1983). In order to perpetuate the

civilization, one needed to have moral development that would transform

children from their original impulsive, self-satisfying state, lacking in self-

control, to a self-controlled being with consideration for other's interests.

Initially this was done through external coercion. The explanation for the

internalization of these behavioral constraints, follows. Between 4 and 6

years of age children experienced conflict with external authority. They felt

libidinal desire for the opposite sex parent and rivalry with the same sex

parent. This led to unpleasant feelings and thoughts, including fear of bodily

harm (castration anxiety), a sense of powerlessness, and a feeling of being

excluded. At approximately 6 years of age, children underwent a

transformational event: they identified with the same sex parent, thereby

internalizing the parent's external authority, and incorporating his/her moral

standards. At this time the superego emerged. The superego enforced

surveillance over the ego (rational capacities and defensive functions), while

both the superego and ego controlled the id (instincts). As a result of the

superego formation, the child could cope with conflicts over intentions,

desires and fantasized actions, along with their anticipated consequences. With the superego in place, the child's sense of morality was more independent of others. The child no longer required the presence of a parent to enforce appropriate behavior, and the child's response was no longer based on his prediction of parental response. In addition, external conflict had become internal conflict. What had previously been experienced as parental disapproval would now be experienced as guilt.

Neofreudian theory

Many problems emerged when researchers sought empirical support for Freud's theory. School-age children with clear, unresolved oedipal struggles were nonetheless experiencing guilt and other superego phenomena (Emde et al., 1987). In addition, children under 5-years-old (who had not yet resolved their oedipal conflicts) demonstrated complex modes of dealing with conflict with some independence from parents and some degree of internalization. Kochanska, DeVet, Goldman, Murray and Putnum (1994) observed that children as young as 2-years-old demonstrated confession and reparation, signs of conscience. However, age three appeared to be a developmental landmark. At this age children showed more discomfort after wrongdoing, were more likely to apologize, were more empathetic, were more compliant to standards of conduct without supervision, and were more concerned about other's wrongdoing than at age two. This was not consistent

with the notion of a conscience suddenly emerging full-blown at the age of six.

Psychoanalysts, increasingly disenchanted with the usefulness of abstract metapsychological constructs, now rely more on the role of maturation and cognitive factors. They have included balanced communication, cooperation and even altruism into their new explanations. Comforting and helping behaviors in children under 3-years-old, pointed to an independent source of motivation for prosocial behavior in normal children. In Freud's time, the emotions involved with moral development were seen as reactive, intermittent and disruptive. Now they are seen as adaptive, ongoing, and part of an active process. Originally guilt was believed to be the moral emotion, arising in 4-6-year-olds. Now guilt and shame are seen as lowering self esteem.

<u>Sociobiological Theory</u>

According to sociobiological theory (Turiel, 1983), people were genetically selected to be altruistic (putting another's welfare before one's self). Individuals living in a society where people helped one another would survive more frequently than individuals living in societies where neighbors/kin did not help each other. Thus, natural selection would preserve the genes of organisms (people) who demonstrated altruistic behavior. This theory was based on a series of assumptions and has not been

empirically verified. One assumption was that if a behavior existed, it must have undergone natural selection.

Influences on Early Moral Behavior

Many of the theories of moral development relegated preschool children to a premoral stage (Beck, 1971; Freud, as cited in Emde et al., 1987; Kohlberg, 1971,1978; Selman & Lieberman, 1974) or to a stage where they were just obeying their parents (Piaget, 1932/1965). However other researcher's (Damon, 1983; Rest, 1986; Turiel, 1993) have found evidence of moral behavior in preschool children. This section examines the evidence of early moral behavior and the variables that influence early moral behavior.

Evidence of Early Moral Behavior

Empathy and Altruistic Responses

Empathy has been associated with moral behavior (Damon, 1988; Eisenberg-Berg & Lennon, 1980; Lamme et al., 1992; Lickona, 1991; Vitz, 1990). The earliest evidence of empathetic responses was the newborn's response to the cries of other infants (Sagi & Hoffman, 1976). Crying in a nursery appeared to be contagious. When a baby heard another baby cry, the infant showed distress and began to cry too.

Gauthier (1971) wrote that one could see the beginnings of moral behavior in a child's spontaneous desire to please others, and in his sympathetic responses to joy and sorrow in others. These responses were not necessarily associated with speech or thought.

Jerome Kagan (Damon, 1988) observed that in the second year of life, children showed distress to what they perceived as others deviating from moral standards. For example, children viewing a broken/damaged toy would infer that the buttons were torn off, or crayon marks mischievously drawn, and they would ask their mothers to right the wrong.

Toddlers were also sensitive to the distress of others and tried to relieve that distress. Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner and Chapman (1992) observed 13-15 month old children hugging and patting their mothers in response to their mothers' simulated distress. As the children got older, they developed a wider repertoire of empathetic responses. Children between 18-20 months gave physical comfort, as did the younger toddlers, but also reflected sympathetic concern for the victim (sad looks, sympathetic statements ("I'm sorry") or gestures), and exhibited many prosocial actions. The prosocial actions included: offering verbal comfort ("You be okay.") and verbal advice ("Be careful"); helping; sharing; distracting (ex. closing a picture book that made the mother sad); and defending the distressed person (ex. tried to prevent another from injuring or distressing their mother). The toddlers did not necessarily offer comfort appropriate for an adult, but offered something that would have comforted themselves (ex. a blankie).

Zahn-Waxler, et al. (1992) observed children from 13 months to 25 months. They discovered that empathetic concern, and prosocial actions increased with age. Where younger children would more frequently show

self-distress when faced with another's distress, older toddlers more frequently showed helping behaviors.

Several studies have focused on the frequency of altruistic behavior in young children. Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, and King (1979) trained mothers to record the nature and frequency of altruistic behaviors in their 1.5-2.5-year-olds at home. On the average, the children responded with altruistic behavior in 34% of the distress situations, when they were bystanders. Individual children varied in their rates of altruistic behavior from 5% to 70%. Yarrow et al. (1976) observed helping behavior in children between 3- and 7.5-years-old, both with naturalistic observation in a preschool and in a laboratory situation. They found no difference in the frequency of prosocial acts (helping, sharing, comforting) by age or sex. The frequency of prosocial acts in preschool was low, but there were not many occasions for them to occur. However, 80% of the children acted prosocially towards an adult in at least one situation. The authors expected more prosocial behavior with increasing age, due to greater capacity for role-taking and empathy. However, those abilities appeared to have been balanced by increased respect for privacy, and expectations for greater toughness with increasing age, so there was no significant increase in prosocial behavior with age. The authors discovered that the three prosocial behaviors they decided to observe did not fall under a unitary concept of "prosocial." Sharing and comforting were related, but helping was not.

In the pilot phase of the RAD program, a helping scenario was tested (helping a lost child, and helping a child whose leg was caught). As with Yarrow, et al. (1976), helping did not appear to be clearly related to other prosocial actions. It was decided not to include "helping" as one of the dilemmas presented to the children. Instead, clear moral transgressions were used.

Zahn-Waxler, et al. (1992) summarized previous research which documented the competencies which children as young as 2 years old could "bring to their relationships with others. . . . (a) the cognitive capacity to interpret the physical and psychological states of others, (b) the emotional capacity to affectively experience the other's state, and (c) the behavioral repertoire that permits the possibility of trying to alleviate discomfort in others" (p. 127).

Internalization of Rules

Another aspect of moral development is internalization of the rules. Emde et al. (1987) observed 12 – 24-month-old children at home and in the lab. By 24 months, all of the children showed evidence of internalizing the rules (do's and don'ts) as long as the parent was present and could be referenced. The do's were internalized earlier, e.g., put tissues in the trash, while the don'ts were internalized later, e.g., at 18 months children would continue their behavior even when the parent said don't touch. There was a marked variation in the age at which an individual child showed

internalization of the rules. Some showed internalization at 12 months, some at 18 months, but by 24 months, very few touched the prohibited objects and tantrums decreased. One problem with this research was that they investigated a conventional transgression (breaking the rule about not touching a toy), and not a moral transgression.

Solving Dilemmas

Buchsbaum and Emde (1990) found that 3-year-olds could grapple with moral dilemmas when the dilemmas were presented as a story stem along with a family of dolls with which they could act out their response. The children responded with empathetic and prosocial responses, and adherence to the rules. This evidence of early moral responses supports the possibility of young children discussing and learning about moral choices.

Perspective Taking

In the literature on perspective-taking, a major premise was that perspective-taking, the ability of putting oneself literally or figuratively in another person's place, was a prerequisite for moral behavior (Zahn-Waxler, et al., 1979). One had to be able to figure out how the other person felt or would feel, in order to understand the consequences of any behavior. Knowing how one's behavior affected another was at the root of moral decisions. Another, more concise definition of perspective-taking was, "the ability to infer cognitions of another person from previous and/or immediate information" (Dixon & Moore, 1990, p. 1502).

In Piaget's classic experiments on perspective-taking (Borke, 1975), a young child sitting on one side of a model of three mountains would assume that a doll sitting across from him would have the same view as himself. From this, Piaget concluded that young children could not take the perspective of another. However, Helene Borke argued that the mountains in the model were too similar and it was difficult for the children to discriminate cues for visualizing the other person's perspective. In addition, she professed that the ways Piaget had his subjects communicate the doll's viewpoint (selecting pictures of mountains showing the doll's viewpoint, arranging the mountains to look the same as the doll would see, or putting the doll in a position where he would see the view portrayed in a picture) were all too difficult for young children. When she simplified the task, by using toys instead of mountains, and having the children rotate a replica of the experimental display to indicate the doll's viewpoint, preschool children could assume the other's viewpoint with ease.

Consistent with Borke's findings, it has been this researcher's personal experience that during Show and Tell, preschoolers may hold a book facing themselves so no one else can see the pictures. However, virtually all the students, when asked to show the picture to the class, turn the book so their classmates can see, thereby demonstrating perspective-taking (when made aware of the other children's needs).

Not all evidence supports the idea that preschoolers have the ability to perform perspective-taking. Dixon and Moore's 1990 study produced evidence that preschool children were poor at perspective-taking. The researchers read stories to 5-year-old children who had just missed the kindergarten cut-off, as well as second and fifth graders. The children heard several variations of the stories: the mother in the story knew either the intention or consequences of her child's action, or both. Seventy-one percent of the preschoolers did not use perspective-taking, and 29% showed evidence of perspective-taking on one of the weighting measures. Similar to Piaget's mountains, this problem may have been stated in too complex a manner for the preschool children. Although this was intended to be a study of perspective-taking, it required the children to take into account the intention of the character. It might have been the aspect of intention that was beyond the preschooler's capabilities. (See the section on intentionality).

Damon

Damon (1983) believed that the development of role-taking (the ability take another's perspective) was continuous, not stage-like. "Rather, developmental changes in perspective-taking itself are more on the order of how often and how comprehensively the child considers the perspectives of others" (p.126). Lamme, et al. (1992) reviewed Damon's description of perspective-taking in children. From ages 2-6, children could place themselves in another's place and find the true source of distress. They were

also able to make an assessment of other's needs. They were more effective at sensing and treating discomfort in friends, than when they were younger. From ages 6-9, children became concerned about the general condition of people, not only about situationally caused distresses, e.g., poor, handicapped, and socially outcast people. They were open to prosocial activities to help those less fortunate than themselves.

Lamme, et al. (1992) applied Damon's research to moral education. "Role-taking, the ability to take another's perspective, is possible for children at younger ages than was previously thought. It is children's ability to take the role of the central characters in books that primarily helps them understand the moral lessons involved in the story" (p. 6).

Hoffman

Damon (1988) described Hoffman's stages of perspective-taking. The ideas were similar to his own, but the ages differed. At first, 0-12 month infants might exhibit "global empathy" in reaction to others' distress. At this age the infants could not distinguish the boundaries between their own feelings and needs, and the feelings and needs of others. They might cry if another was hurt, experiencing undifferentiated feelings of distress. In the next stage (1-2 years), children exhibited feelings of genuine concern. However, since the children were still egocentric, this concern did not always translate into effective action. A toddler might bring her own mother to a crying infant, or bring her beloved blanket to a sad adult. During the

following stage (2-9 years), children understood that everyone had their own perspective. They could react appropriately to another child's distress. In late childhood (10-12 years), children could display empathy for people who lived in unfortunate circumstances and might perform charitable acts.

<u>Selman</u>

Selman (1976) also developed a stage theory of perspective-taking. It was based on the following research. After children watched sound filmstrips with interpersonal and moral dilemmas, they were asked questions concerning their conception of people (ex. motivation, personality) and their conception of relationships between people (ex. friendship and trust).

Many authors have written about Selman's perspective-taking stages (Damon, 1988; DeVries & Zan, 1994; Lamme et al., 1992; Selman, 1976), and each had their own insight to add regarding the stages.

The youngest children (<3) did not have any conception of people as having minds or reasons behind their actions. There was no differentiation of perspectives at all.

Level 0 (3-6 years) Egocentric perspective-taking: At this stage, children could separate their viewpoint of self and other. They knew that they could be happy, when others were sad. However, they assumed that in similar situations, others would feel or act the same way as they did. (Ex. Dad looks sad. I'll let him hold my blanket.)

Level 1 (6-8 years) (or 5-9 years, DeVries & Zan, 1994) Subjective perspective-taking: At this stage children were aware of, and respected the fact that others could have different perspectives. They realized that people felt differently because they were in different situations or had different information. However, the children could only focus on one viewpoint at a time, and if pushed, always preferred their own perspective. (Ex. If I take the last piece of candy, my sister will not get as many as I did. But yellow is my favorite color, so she won't mind.)

Level 2 (8-10 years) or (7-12 years, DeVries & Zan, 1994) Self-reflective perspective-taking: People have many viewpoints and they themselves might have mixed feelings about a situation. Thinking about how others might feel in reaction to their own thoughts, could influence these children's own perspective.

Levels 3-5 are not discussed here since they deal with older children.

<u>Intentionality</u>

One specific aspect of perspective-taking is intentionality: taking into account the reasons another person is doing something.

Piaget (1932/1965) observed that 3-year-olds understood intention and could distinguish intentional and involuntary error in their own actions. They began to excuse themselves, saying a mistake they made was "not on purpose." However, as discussed in the Piaget section, they were not adept at considering the intentions of other people.

Dixon and Moore's (1990) study, described in the perspective-taking section, supported Piaget's observations.

Selman (1976) interviewed children of different ages to find out if they used intentionality when deciding how characters in stories should react. Intentionality involved perspective-taking; the child had to be aware of the other person's reasons. In one story, Holly fell out of a tree. She was not hurt, but she promised her father she would not climb trees. When her kitten went into the tree, she was the only one who could climb up the tree and get it down. What should she do? Children at level 0 (preschool age) made moral judgments which disregarded or confused intentionality. The actions of others might have been seen as based on underlying motives or sometimes were seen as based on the physical event or its consequences, so understanding was wavering and uncertain. With the kitten story, a 4-year-old responded that Holly should save the kitten.

> Why is that right? "Kittens are nice. She doesn't want it to get hurt."
> What will Holly's father do when he finds out? "Be angry."
> Why? "She broke her promise."
> Was it right to climb the tree? "No."
> Why not? "Because her father could punish her." (p. 160)

At first the child considered intentions (she didn't want the cat to get hurt). Then she focused on the father's actions, not the father's understanding of Holly's intentions.

Children at level 1 believed that acts intending good were right and acts intending bad were wrong. Higher levels involved older children, and are not reviewed here.

Jones and Nelson-Le Gall (1995) investigated the link between effort and intentionality with preschoolers, second graders and fifth graders. They told the children four sets of illustrated stories, which varied in outcome, intentionality and effort (the number of times a character did a bad thing). The preschoolers' judgments reflected a link between effort and outcome, but no link between effort and intentionality. Therefore, they made relatively strong negative judgments of high effort characters in unintentional outcome stories; they did not focus on intention when making moral judgments. The older children judged the hi-effort characters more negatively than the low-effort characters, only in the intentional conditions. They did take intentionality into consideration.

In conclusion, in all the studies reviewed for this thesis, preschool children did not (or rarely) take the intention of others into account.

<div align="center">Happy Victimizer</div>

After seeing sets of three line drawings illustrating stories with a victim and victimizer, almost all of the 4-year-old children, and most of the 6-year-old children judged that the victimizers would feel happy after committing undetected acts of dishonesty, physical harm and theft (Arsenio & Kramer, 1992). They realized that the victim would feel sad, but it was not

until 8-years-old that children thought the victimizer would be influenced by the victim's pain and would not be as happy. "Most 4-year-olds continued to expect that victimizers would feel happy even after being explicitly directed to the sadness and loss of the victim" (p.924)

The young children showed limited perspective-taking ability when they predicted that the two characters in the story would have different perspectives. However, they were not yet at Selman's level 2 where a person's reflections about how the other person feels influences his own thoughts. Although "even 4-year-olds are routinely aware that there are rules prohibiting basic moral transgressions involving lying, stealing, and physical harm," (Arsenio & Kramer, 1992, p. 917) their inability to have the victimizer sympathize with the victim, as evidenced in this research, might put serious limitations on the success of the RAD program. In the RAD dramatizations, the children's attention was focused on the victim's feelings. When a scenario led to an outcome where the victimizer felt happy and the victim felt sad, the outcome was classified as "not good," because both people were not feeling happy. This technique gave credibility to the children's belief that the victimizer was happy. However, it did not condone or reward the bad behavior.

Cognitive Level

Most research supported the notion that the child's cognitive level limited the level of their moral development.

Some research supported the idea that young children's cognitive level could support moral thought. For example Kagan (Schickedanz, 1994) found that 2.5-year-olds could infer the cause of an event. This would set the stage for cause and effect relationships, an important cognitive component in linking one's behavior to the consequences. Understanding cause and effect relationships, in turn, would set the stage for moral thought.

However, if one accepted Kohlberg's stage theory (1978), then the ability to think logically was of prime importance in moral reasoning. Moral reasoning was reasoning, so a person's logical stage would put a ceiling on their moral stage. At about the age of seven, children entered the concrete operational stage and could make logical inferences, classify and handle quantitative relations about concrete things. The concrete operational thinker was limited to Kohlberg's preconventional moral stages 1 and 2. Although logical development was necessary for moral development and set the limits for moral development, most children were at a higher stage in their logical development than in their moral development. For example, 50% of late adolescents were at the level of formal operations (cognitive stage) but only 10% were at the principled stages 5 and 6 (moral stage) (Kohlberg, 1978).

If one accepted the logic of the previous arguments, preschool children would not be able to think logically and would not be expected to perform moral reasoning. Indeed, in the form the dilemmas were set up in

Kohlberg's studies, preschool children would not be able to give logical explanations for their decisions.

Lee (1974) correlated Piaget's cognitive levels with Piaget's affective structures (moral development). She wrote that moral feelings emerged from parental discipline, during the concrete operations stage (2-7 years). [Note: Lee divided the concrete operation stage into two levels: formation (usually considered the preoperational stage) and attainment (usually considered the concrete operational stage)]. The children could carry out the rules imposed by their parents, but permanence was lacking; if the parent was absent (lack of external control), the rules were not followed. At this stage, rules were not generalized. Rules originated with the authority and could not be changed. Paradoxically, up until the age of seven, children could consent to many changes in the rules. This was because the children felt they didn't know the rules, and so accepted changes by another person as though the changes were merely corrections.

Lee tested boys from kindergarten to twelfth grade on Piagetian tasks and nine morally conflicting story situations. She found that the children's cognitive level was indeed correlated with their moral development. If children had attained the stage of concrete operations, it was a good predictor of a decrease in authority responses and an increase in reciprocity. If children had attained the stage of formal operations, it was a good predictor of societal responses.

If one accepted this line of reasoning, preschool children would not be able to think for themselves about moral issues. This would not bode well for a program aimed at having preschool children decide for themselves what would be the right thing to do in a given situation. The preschoolers might be able to learn a rule (e.g. don't steal), but wouldn't be expected to be able to explain the reason behind it.

Language

Some researcher's have looked for links between language development and moral development. Was a certain degree of language facility necessary to manipulate moral thoughts?

In the second year of life, children began using emotion language (including moral terms) to describe others' internal states as well as their own (Zahn-Waxler, et al. 1992).

Smetana and Braeges (1990) investigated the link between a child's language ability and his/her ability to distinguish between moral and conventional transgressions. They hypothesized that "distinctions in children's moral and conventional judgments [might] emerge at different ages because the language used to assess the criterion judgment questions var[ied] in difficulty" (p.332). To assess the child's language level they showed the child an object or a picture and then asked questions such as: Was the doggie dirty? If yes, is he dirty a little bit or a lot? After viewing a picture of a girl without an ice cream cone, is she happy or sad? The next picture had a

girl with a cone. Her mommy gave her a cone. Is she still sad? Then they showed the children scenes depicting moral (e.g. one child hitting another, pulling hair, etc.) and conventional (e.g. boy wearing nail polish, eating ice cream with fingers, etc.) transgressions. Questions revealed whether the children considered the transgression moral or conventional. Children were asked: Is this okay? Is it bad? At another school is this okay? (generalizability) The teacher never told him it was bad. Is it still wrong? (contingency on rules) The teacher doesn't see. Is it still wrong? (contingency on authority) They found that only those children who responded correctly to the language comprehension items paralleling rule and authority contingency distinguished moral and conventional transgressions. During their third year, children began making distinctions between moral and social-conventional transgressions. The distinction was more firmly established in the fourth year. However, from their experiment it was not possible to conclude whether the lack/mastery of the language skills caused the corresponding change in moral reasoning, or whether the language ability was just coincidentally associated with moral reasoning, due to other maturational/developmental changes.

Dunn, Brown and Maguire (1995) also looked at verbal fluency, as one variable in their study of kindergarten children with a happy victimizer test. They found that verbal fluency (MLU at 3 years) was correlated with high scores on moral orientation in kindergarten. By first grade, former verbal

fluency and high moral orientation were no longer associated. As with the previous study there was no way to know whether verbal fluency contributed to a higher score on moral orientation, or if another variable (such as intelligence) contributed to both verbal fluency and moral orientation.

In any case, by the time the children were 4-years-old (as in the present study) their command of language enabled them to explain many of their thoughts on moral problems and make other moral distinctions (Smetana & Braeges, 1990).

Gender

It is not clear whether gender plays a role in creating differences in moral development between boys and girls. Some research results have indicated the presence of gender differences in moral development, while other results have indicated no differences.

Gilligan (Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987) believed that there was a significant gender difference between males and females with regard to their moral development. She believed that girls developed a care orientation and boys developed a justice orientation. The orientation with which a person approached a moral problem would affect their moral reasoning, and therefore, their moral decisions for action. (See the Gilligan section for a more complete description of Gilligan's theory.)

Kochanska, et al. (1994) also discovered differences between the sexes in moral development. In a study of 2-4-year-old children, girls showed a more

pronounced pattern of affective discomfort. The "affective discomfort appear[ed] focused on emotional consequences of wrongdoing and affective response to others."(p.861). The behaviors observed were guilt, concern about the bond to the parent vs. the damage itself, a wish to be forgiven, apology, and empathetic resonance with others.

Other studies revealed little or no difference between boys and girls. In experimental and classroom settings, Yarrow et al. (1976) observed no difference in prosocial actions between 3-5-year-old boys and girls. Zahn-Waxler et al. (1992) scored the responses of 1-2-year-olds observing their mother's staged distresses (ex. choking, sad, hurt, etc.) There was no difference between prosocial responses for boys and girls. Girls showed more empathetic concern (reproduced or imitated the affective experience) than boys. This was only significant for instances where the child was a bystander (not causal) in a naturally occurring event. Girls also responded more frequently with self referential actions (e.g., if another was hurt, the child pointed to their own hurt) than boys, but only at 18-20 months, not at other ages.

Some studies revealed areas of similarities and differences between the sexes. In a study of 4-5-year-olds, Eisenberg-Berg and Lennon (1980) reported that boys scored higher than girls on a nonverbal empathy test (after hearing a story, the child pointed to a picture from a range of happy to sad faces to show

how he/she felt). However, during classroom observations, no differences in helping or sharing behaviors were observed.

To summarize the previous studies, there appeared to have been no difference in prosocial behavior between boys and girls, but differences were observed in affective responses.

Parenting

Another area that has a large influence on early moral behavior is the parenting experienced by the child. The family is the child's first socializing agent (Damon, 1988). Both parenting styles and the values stressed at home influence the child's moral development.

Parenting Practices

Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall (1978) observed that children who were more securely attached to their caregivers were most likely to comply with family rules. These children actively sought and accepted their adult's guidance and did not obey from coercion or fear.

Turiel (1983) described how different styles of parental discipline affected moral internalization. Parents who used power assertion used physical punishment and deprivation of material resources to control their children. Some parents used love withdrawal and temporarily withdrew affection or expressed dislike. Other parents used induction, or reasoning with their child, combined with pointing out the consequences of an action to

the child and others. The use of induction by parents was most highly correlated with measures of moral internalization. Power assertion was associated with an external moral orientation in the children. Love withdrawal had no consistent relationship with morals. Turiel wrote that these results supported "the proposition that judgements are central to moral decisions and reciprocal interactions regarding communication of justifications contribute to the process of [moral] development" (p. 176-177).

Another study supporting the importance of explaining the reasons behind a rule or decision, was performed by Dunn, et al. (1995). The children were asked how a victimizer would feel in several stories. They found that a higher proportion of kindergarten children whose mothers had reasoned with them at 33 months, thought the victimizer would have mixed feelings. Children of mothers who did not reason with their children were more likely to believe the victimizer was happy. When the mother had a pattern of explaining the reasons behind rules and decisions, the children were more advanced in their perspective-taking.

Although explaining to children the reasons they should behave in a certain manner, and helping them see connections between their actions and consequences to others was correlated with moral internalization and perspective-taking, other studies have highlighted the importance of the parents' affect when discussing moral behavior. Zahn-Waxler and colleagues (Dunn, 1987) found that the importance of maternal communication about

not hurting others lay not in the mothers' explanations of distress caused, but in the affective intensity with which it was delivered. The intensity of the mother's communication was correlated with the amount of sympathetic arousal and helpful action (stemming from others' distress) their children showed at a later time. Affective experiences were significant in the development of moral understanding.

Family

In addition to learning about morals from parents, children were affected by their siblings. Children learned about the rules of their culture during conflict and pretend play (Stone, 1974). In pretend play, children took part in social role playing, and learned about roles other than their own. Play within a family required interaction with siblings, negotiated rules, making suggestions, etc. as well as taking part in conversations about others' feelings.

Cultural Differences

As important as the discipline techniques the parents employed, were the values the parents taught. The preschool children in the present study were from nine different nationalities, and so conceivably could have come to this study with very diverse, culturally-based values. Cultural studies have shown that different cultures stress different values with their children.

Native Americans, for example, valued cooperation and concern for the group, modesty, harmony with nature, permissiveness, and were non-materialistic, while assimilated Americans valued competition with an

individualistic emphasis, over-confidence, conquest of nature, social coercion and materialism, to name a few differences (Hanson & Eisenbise, 1981; Soldier, 1992).

As opposed to mainstream Americans, Korean families put higher emphasis on loyalty, respect for parents and elders (filial piety), the importance of family bonds, propriety, patience, and had a family first attitude that encouraged competition in school for higher status (not for the sake of education) and a win at any cost attitude (Han & Washington, 1988; Lee, 1995).

Stevenson and Renard (1993) discussed the strengths and characteristics of African-American family life. African-American strengths included: "strong kinship bonds; ... adaptability of family roles; strong achievement orientation; strong religious orientations; ... teaching children to respect themselves;" (p.434) strict discipline of children; emphasis on family cooperation; love of children; an acceptance of children born out of wedlock; appreciation of expressive individualism, verbal and oral genius, and verve; an assumption that social events take precedence in time allotment decisions; and a focus on resilience in facing negative social forces that affect the family.

Hispanic families (Zayas & Solari, 1994) typically employed authoritarian parenting styles in order to instill in their children respect for adult authority, obedience, rule following, and obedience in the classroom. A good child was a quiet child who was respectful and affectionate. Anglos in contrast, preferred independent, verbally expressive, self-directed children. In

a Hispanic family, noncognitive, social skills were more important than cognitive skills. They also valued family closeness, and religiousity.

In a comparison of the perceptions of children from Sweden, India, and Kenya, (Ekstrand, 1994) Swedish culture put less emphasis on respect for elders and more emphasis on cooperation with other children than Indian or Kenyan culture. Children in Kenya and India were taught to obey adults, whereas the parents in Sweden taught their children to think for themselves. In all three cultures, children were supposed to be helpful, but that included working in Kenya.

As can be seen in this brief overview, different cultures might vary in how they regarded nature, the importance of family, respect for elders, competition, self-reliance, etc., but they did not vary in the core values regarding lying and stealing (two of the values tested in the present study). Some variance might be found in the area of exclusion of a friend from play (the third value tested), since cultures varied on the importance of family, cooperation and competition.

Kohlberg (1971) argued for the universality of the stages of moral development (and therefore a universality in the process of thinking about moral dilemmas). He tested his hypothetical dilemmas in various cultures (Malaysian aborigines, Taiwanese, Mexican, Turkish and Yucatan). Although he claimed the order of the stages was the same across different cultures, his graphs did not always support his conclusions, and he only checked six

cultures. Fraenkel (1978) did not believe in the universality of Kohlberg's

stages. He believed that a morality based on justice was the only type of

morality that was universally held and admired. Shweder et al. (1987) also

had evidence that the stages were not universal. They observed that certain

populations received higher stage scores than others. In addition, social class

correlated with stage level. Israelis of European origin, upper middle-class

Americans, and Western oriented people of the urban elite in Taiwan and

India received higher stage scores than people from lower social classes.

However, a meta-analysis of 20 cross-cultural studies using the Defining

Issues Test (DIT), a Kohlberg dilemma type test, showed more similarities

than differences between cultures (Rest 1986). Therefore, it appeared that

although there were differences between cultures, there were also similarities.

Shweder et al. (1987) compared 5-year-old American and Brahman

"untouchables" from India, to see which violations were classified as moral

and which were classified as conventional. They found that the children

tended to invest their practices with moral force and viewed even distinctive

cultural practices from a moral perspective (as opposed to Turiel's (1983)

theory). The Indians showed no distinction between morality and

convention (e.g., it was a sin to eat beef, for a son to address his father by his

personal name, for a widow to wear inappropriate colors, etc.). By 5-years-old

the children were "well on their way to expressing culturally appropriate

judgments about what [was] morally right and wrong" (p. 60). What the

children from the two cultures felt was right and wrong was virtually independent of one another, but similar to their own adults. [Note, however, that children from both cultures considered stealing flowers wrong (Damon, 1988).] Turiel et al. (1987) criticized Shweder's work for an over-reliance on the subject's attribution of importance or seriousness of the transgressions as indicating a moral orientation. They said that Shweder et al. (1987) should have used assessments that took into account the child's justifications rather than just the seriousness of the transgression. Turiel believed that some of the situations that Shweder et al. had classified as conventional transgressions were really moral transgressions. When Turiel's group reclassified Shweder's 39 situations by including those transgressions that caused harm to a spirit (or if harming the spirit caused harm to the family) with the moral transgressions, both cultures were able to distinguish between moral and conventional transgressions, and the theory of conventional vs. moral transgressions was still supported.

The key to defining a moral transgression appeared to be causing harm to another. In all of the values chosen in this study, harm was caused to another, either by taking something that was theirs, breaking their trust by lying to them, or by hurting their feelings and excluding them from play. Theoretically, all should be considered moral transgressions in any culture.

Teaching Morals

In designing a program to teach morals to preschool children, a review of philosophies for teaching morals and an examination of extant moral/character education programs can provide techniques that have proved effective in the past and examples of pitfalls to avoid in the future.

Early History in America

The founding fathers thought character education was important. Benjamin Franklin said, "Nothing is more important for the public weal than to form and train up youth in wisdom and virtue" (Brooks & Goble, 1997, p. 15). Until shortly before 1900, character building was considered an essential part of the formal education process at all levels. Horace Mann (1796-1859) endorsed free public education with the aim of teaching social efficiency, civic virtue and character, rather than mere learning for sectarian ends (Brooks & Goble, 1977). In 1916, John Dewey said, "It is a commonplace of educational theory that the establishment of character is a comprehensive aim of school instruction and disciplines" (Brooks & Goble, 1977, p. 61). (Later, Dewey was not as enthusiastic about character education.)

Early children's literature contained many moral lessons (Brooks & Goble, 1997). Since the seventeenth century, children listened to Mother Goose nursery rhymes at their mother's knee. Rhymes such as, "If wishes were horses, beggars would ride," instructed children in moral principles. Seventeenth and eighteenth century primers for reading and spelling also

included moral principles. For example, the <u>New England Primer</u> included the following sentence for "F. The idle fool is whipped at school" (Brooks & Goble, 1977, p. 12). The <u>McGuffey Reader</u>, popular at the beginning of this century, had straight forward stories which included a moral; the good child was rewarded and the bad child punished (Lickona, 1991).

Sharon Andrews (1994) compared the top 25 values taught in readers at the end of the nineteenth century, to the top 25 values taught in readers in the 1990's. Examining the top 10 values on both lists, some values stayed the same, e.g., bravery, value of family love, work ethic, the value of reading/writing, and the consequences of doing right/wrong. Although honesty and kindness were on both lists, they were no longer in the top 10 today. Values that used to be in the top 10, but were no longer on the current-day list, included trust in God's presence and power, obedience and patience. Values that were on the 1990's top ten, but were not even listed on the earlier list were appreciation of difference, self-concept/identity, and conservation of nature/animals.

<u>Pedagogical Theory and Techniques</u>

Many philosophers, educators, and researchers have published their ideas about the best way to teach moral/character education. This section provides an overview of many of the theories and ideas that have been suggested.

Piaget

Piaget (1932/1965) envisioned an educational setting that would enhance moral development according to his developmental theory. The educational system would need to promote cooperation among children, not individual student work, for through cooperative exchanges the children would develop autonomous thinking. The adult's role would be to help the children reflect on those cooperative interactions, not to tell the children what to do.

Values Clarification

In 1966, Professor Louis Raths, from Columbia University, developed a program for working with values in the classroom (Damon, 1988; Lickona, 1991). With this program, teachers were not supposed to teach values, but to help students clarify their own values. The theory was that children should be free to pick their own values. Adult moralizing and indoctrination were seen as hazardous to intellectual growth. Adults were not to instruct students in right and wrong, just introduce subjects, e.g., Have you ever shoplifted? One technique was the values whip. The teacher posed a question and then students gave answers, e.g., "What is something you are proud of? What is something you believe strongly? What is some issue about which you have taken a public stand recently?" (Lickona, p. 10) Another technique was "the clarifying response." If a student said or did something implying a value, the teacher was supposed to ask a noncommittal question that encouraged the

child to discuss the value more fully (e.g., ask about what the value meant, or whether the student had thought of alternatives). Other techniques included ranking, continuum, role-playing and either-or choices (Scharf, 1978a).

Most authors in the field today disparage the values clarification program. The values clarification program treated children as grown-ups who had values that were already sound. It did not take into account the idea that children need help developing sound values in the first place (Lickona, 1991). This program trained children to tolerate all values whether they were right, wrong, or evil (Damon, 1988). Furthermore, the programs seemed to be relatively ineffective. For example, Damon (1988) concluded that "Based on these studies [values clarification programs with school-age subjects], there is no evidence that values clarification has [had] a systematic, demonstrated impact on students' values" (p. 140).

Kohlberg Discussions

Lawrence Kohlberg advocated a "rational decision making" program which focused on the process of reasoning about moral issues, not on content (Lickona, 1991). Kohlberg (1971) said that the aim of a moral education program was to teach about morality, not to teach morality. The idea of the program was to "focus on helping the child reach the next stage of development rather than directly teaching him fixed rules and values of the adult world" (Selman & Lieberman, 1974, p. 73). His cognitive-developmental approach (Damon, 1988) assumed that some moral positions

were superior to others, e.g., honesty and dishonesty were not two alternatives with equal moral status. In the course of development, children developed more advanced modes of thought which were ethically superior to previous modes, because they solved wider ranges of social problems.

Kohlberg's program (1971) engaged students in discussions about hypothetical moral dilemmas. Children could understand all arguments up to their present moral stage. Exposing students to arguments just one stage higher than their current level, could lead to significant upward stage movement in junior high and high school students, and in prison inmates (Hunt, 1971; Kohlberg, 1971; Selman & Lieberman, 1974). If discussion participants were exposed to arguments more than one stage above their current level, they really did not understand them. They would restate those arguments in terms of their own stage of thinking (Rest's 1968 unpublished doctoral dissertation as cited in Kohlberg, 1971) and their developmental stage did not advance.

Kohlberg realized that maturity of moral reasoning was not the only factor in moral action (Kohlberg, 1978). However, he argued for focusing on moral reasoning because (a) it was the most influential factor, (b) it was the only distinctively moral factor (ex. strong or weak will made a difference but was not consistent with morality since it differed at different stages), and (c) moral judgment changes were stable and irreversible (a higher stage was never lost), but "behavior [was] situational and reversible in new situations"

(p. 40). He reviewed research that showed that the moral maturity of boys at age 13 was a good predictor of their adult moral maturity at age 24 and 27. "Mature 13-year-olds retain[ed] their edge in development, presumably because development is stepwise, [and] the advanced pupils [had] fewer steps to go through" (p. 74).

Role of the teacher. The goal of the teacher was to foster higher forms of moral judgment, by exposing children to reasoning forms one stage higher than their current stage (Damon, 1988). The teacher's opinion was entered as only one opinion in the discussion, but the idea that some judgments were more adequate than others was conveyed (Kohlberg, 1978). Besides initiating discussions and giving his/her opinion, the teacher's role also included drawing out students' reasons for their statements.

Teachers were advised to ask different kinds of questions to help students clarify their thinking, e.g., clarifying probes (what do you mean by...), specific probes on one of Kohlberg's issues (what do you owe a friend?), inter-issue probes (what to do when two issues collide), role switching (from the parent's point of view...), and universal consequence probes (what if this reasoning applied to everyone?) (Beyer, 1978).

Differing from most Kohlberg-type teaching methods, Beck (1971) did not suggest that teachers try to introduce reasoning just one stage higher than their students' stage. He recommended a buckshot method, instruction at

three or four stages at once, for students in stages 1-4, since at any grade the students were spread over at least two stages.

Curriculum design. Kohlberg (1971) cautioned that one must take the child's developmental level into account when formulating a teaching curriculum. Teachers must make sure that the kinds of behavior demands made on children, matched the children's already existing moral values. For example, to a 5- to 7-year-old, hurting or stealing was morally wrong, but cheating was not. Therefore, teachers should not treat cheating as a moral issue with young children, whereas it would be appropriate with older children.

Dilemmas could be presented in several formats, orally by the teacher, through film strips, short reading, or role play (Beyer, 1978).

Discussion topics. The discussion subjects needed to reflect genuine and difficult moral conflicts that did not have handy (adult) right answers. In this way the children had to debate and think about their responses (Kohlberg, 1971). Kohlberg believed that pat stories, where virtue triumphed or everyone was nice, did not stimulate moral growth. Beyer (1978) described a good dilemma as one that was short, had few characters, was open ended with no obvious right answer, involved two or more moral issues, and offered a choice of action (what should he do?). Scharf (1978b) also suggested using dilemmas with conflicting claims (e.g., tell the truth vs. hurt feelings), dilemmas focused on a particular stage (e.g., for stage 2 and 3 children, issues

of concern for others vs. individual self interest), and dilemmas involving real life experiences. Selman and Lieberman (1974) suggested using enjoyable stories.

Possible moral issues for dilemmas were punishment, authority, contract, property, roles and concerns of affection, life, civil liberties, the roles and concerns of authority, personal conscience, distributive justice, truth, and sex (Beyer, 1978; Kohlberg, 1978). Beck (1971) listed 14 topics appropriate for children from 5- 9-years-old. Walsh (1994) presented 13 moral dilemma topics, supposedly to be used in early childhood education. However, the topics appeared to be much too difficult for preschool children.

Instead of using discussion as the only technique for teaching morality, some authors advocated the addition of other elements to the discussion of moral dilemmas. Damon (1988) suggested: role taking (of real and imaginary others); exercises to train children's capacities for empathy, listening skills and communication skills (important for formation of advanced moral judgments); and popular readings that demonstrated moral values at or just about the students' developmental level. Wilson (1972) suggested combining moral dilemma discussions with direct teaching about morality. One problem with this combination of techniques was that the transfer from direct teaching was not known. He argued that just because the effectiveness of direct teaching of morals was not proven, was no reason to disqualify the method. He wanted to teach the students about Phil (concern for other

people as equals), Emp (being aware of the feelings and emotions of other people), Gig (knowledge of facts pertaining to a problem), and Krat (noticing that there was a problem and then deciding upon an action). He also gave tips for teaching the discussion format to a class.

Robert Selman (1976) used Kohlberg-type dilemma discussions, but his perspective-taking theory was the basis for his educational recommendations. Although perspective-taking unfolded in a developmental sequence, education could help by providing necessary experiences, and accelerating the rate of development through the stages. Selman used audio-visual filmstrips, role play, and guided peer group discussions based on social and moral dilemmas typical of elementary age children. Through "the *exercise* of the child's reasoning and the *exposure* to the reasoning of peers," (p. 151) the child's perspective-taking ability could develop and change. Similar to Kohlberg he exposed children to reasoning slightly above their own level. The teacher's role was to keep the discussion focused and encourage the children to give reasons for their opinions, not just search for the right answer. Selman's (1976) aim however, was not to accelerate perspective-taking. Movement through the stages was a long-term process that took several years. Rather, his aim was to stimulate and exercise the children's social perspective-taking in social judgment situations, and prevent retardation of social understanding. Direct short-term vertical training of higher levels was relatively unsuccessful. "But the horizontal application of

thought to a wide range of content areas lays the groundwork for subsequent

vertical development" (p. 155).

Effectiveness. As stated previously, exposing students to arguments

just one stage higher than their current level, could lead to significant

upward stage movement in junior high and high school students (Hunt,

1971; Kohlberg, 1971; Selman & Lieberman, 1974). Kohlberg (1978) reviewed

studies where junior high and high school students tested higher after

dilemma discussions and continued to test higher a year later. Sullivan

(1980) reported that principled discussions with fifth and sixth graders for a

semester yielded no difference between experimental and control groups at

the end of the semester. However, the experimental group scored higher

than the control group one year later. He also reported that when high school

classes used informal topic selection, there was a significant increase in stages

in the experimental over control groups. However, when textbooks were

used and the teacher selected the dilemmas, there was no difference between

experimental and control groups in this study.

In a meta-analysis reviewing 55 studies that had used the DIT (Defining

Issues Test - similar to Kohlberg dilemmas) with children above the sixth

grade (Rest, 1986), it was concluded that programs had to last more than a few

weeks to be effective, and moral dilemma discussion programs had more

effect than any other program examined on DIT scores. The second most

effective type of program were programs that emphasized personal

psychological development. Programs emphasizing the academic content of social studies or literature were totally ineffective.

Therefore, when taught effectively, over a long enough period of time, moral dilemma discussions could raise the moral development stage of students. The catch, however, was that moral dilemma discussions had only proved effective with older children.

Implications for the present research. Could information from the Kohlberg moral dilemma discussions be applied to younger children?

Selman and Lieberman (1974) used a similar program with second graders. Presented with film strips, role plays and dilemmas tailored to the age group, the children were interested in the program. However, no data was provided about the effectiveness of such a program. Even if this program was effective with second graders, second graders are at a much higher cognitive level than the preschoolers in the current study.

Julia Walsh (1994) presented a paper regarding the use of Kohlberg's techniques in an early childhood program. However, the program combined a hodgepodge of theories, and was poorly designed and conceptualized. The dilemma discussion topics appeared to be much too difficult for preschool children, and there had been no testing on the effectiveness of such a program. In summary, it did not appear that it would be an effective program for preschool children.

Since moral dilemma discussions were really designed for use with children who were at least at the concrete operations level, it did not appear to be a useful technique to use with preschool children.

Explanation of Reasons

A more age-appropriate technique for young children, than moral dilemma discussions, was explaining the reasons for a desired behavior. Research described in the parenting section above, established a link between parents reasoning with their child (and pointing out the consequences of an action), with measures of moral internalization (Turiel, 1983). In addition, the research (Dunn, et al., 1995) linking parental explanations of the reasons behind rules and decisions, to more advanced perspective-taking in their children, was reviewed.

Zahn-Waxler, et al. (1979) asked mothers to observe altruistic behavior in 1.5 - 2.5-year-olds. Mothers who frequently explained consequences of behavior to their children when they had harmed another child, had children with significantly higher reparation scores. These explanations had to be embellished with the mother's intensity of feelings, judgmental reactions, principles of conviction and/or disappointment. If the explanations were conveyed in a neutral tone, they had no effect. In addition, mothers' verbalization of absolute principles about not hurting others was the variable most predictive of having children who would be more likely to show

reparation. Unexplained prohibitions were associated with little reparative behavior.

Implications for the present research. From Zahn-Waxler, et al.'s (1979) research with toddlers, one can conclude that explaining the reasons for doing/not doing something, with conviction and emotion, and examining the consequences for the victim, will lead to more altruistic/moral behavior. In addition, stating absolute principles, e.g., we don't hurt people's feelings at school, would be an effective method of teaching morality/prosocial behavior. Indeed, the RAD program dramatizations, combined with questions asking how each of the characters would feel in different scenarios, and statements of absolute principles, should help children examine the consequences of the actors' actions, and clarify the reasons behind the moral values.

Turiel

Wainryb & Turiel (1993) believed that children could not incorporate ready-made cultural givens handed down through the ages. Their model of moral development was constructivist. Each child needed to construct his/her own morality based on his/her own experiences, observations, and interactions with the social world, especially experiences bearing on another's welfare or rights. They suggested discussing hypothetical dilemmas, guiding the students' informational assumptions, and adding parent and teacher interventions to provide a rich context for fostering children's

comprehension of social concepts. The same process would also foster understanding of the distinctions and relationships between moral and social concepts. They noted that "Just say no," doesn't work. There is little evidence that abnegation is effective.

Implications for the present research. There were some elements of constructivism in the RAD program. The children explored how the victims felt and evaluated the characters' actions in terms of the outcomes. This could facilitate the construction of rules for moral behavior by the children.

Damon

William Damon (1988, 1995) eschewed the overindulgence and self-elevation of American children. He did not support constructivism as it was applied in early childhood education. To him, constructivism was associated with low student expectations and poor performance. In addition, he did not approve of child centered programs because he felt that children needed a challenge; the motivation to learn could not come solely from within.

The moral education program he promoted was of "respectful engagement." The child's own decision making capacities were to be respected and fostered, but the child was not to be given the message that whatever he decided was automatically right. The child had to be actively involved with making moral decisions. The moral education program must help children reason autonomously about moral problems, because they will make decisions on their own in real life. Moral discussion groups led by

trained teachers would engage the child, where lecturing would not. He suggested looking for moral situations in day to day life, literature, and history.

His program contained four necessary elements. 1) Create a dialogue or project with an adult and child sharing common interests. 2) Structure a dialogue or project so as to introduce the adult's intellectual or moral agenda to the child. 3) Encourage the child to participate actively in a dialogue or venture and allow the child to express his beliefs (even if they seem wrong). 4) Express, in a way the child can understand, the adult's own perspective.

In addition to reflection and discussion, the child also needed to learn to act right habitually, and acquire multiple means of blocking antisocial responses (empathic, rational, normative [respect other's rights], and behavioral [habit of good conduct]). He also described the school-wide involvement that would foster competence and character in all children. In such a school, the teachers would indirectly communicate their values through their own sterling behavior, e.g., being scrupulously honest with the students.

In a section on parenting, Damon (1988) wrote, "regulating one's private emotional life is a difficult task for anyone, child or adult. *Early learning* [italics added] can play a critical role in mastering this task, preventing the serious risk of later failure" (p. 127).

Implications for the present research. Damon believed that a moral education program should start when children are young. The RAD program was designed for preschool children. He said that the children should be actively engaged in the activities. The dramatizations, especially in the small group setting, actively engaged the children.

Beck

Clive Beck (1971) claimed that children often did not benefit from moral experiences "because they [didn't] know how to interpret them intellectually" (p. 1). He believed that the development of intellectual and nonintellectual values took place together. The child did not need to first learn the theory behind the value and then later apply it.

Implications for the present research. According to Beck's theories, a good moral education program would help children interpret moral experiences intellectually and give them experience applying the moral values. The RAD program helped children analyze the short dramatized scenarios. As the children thought about how the characters would feel, and projected what would happen if they applied or failed to apply a value, they interpreted the dilemma intellectually. By acting out the possible prosocial or antisocial choices a character had, the children could apply the value, albeit in a structured format.

Character Education

The opponents of character education (Kohlberg, 1978; Kohn, 1997) opposed this method of moral education because they said that character education was just ineffective indoctrination, teaching a culturally defined bag of virtues. Although many of the criticisms were true, closer examination of the work of several character educators showed a more complex and reasoned approach.

Wynne. Educator Edward Wynne (Damon, 1988) believed that moral reasoning programs were not as good as character education programs in the great tradition of early American schooling (1880-1930). These earlier programs espoused the values of promptness, neatness, respect for authority, and honesty. He believed that the traditional form of moral education was connected to more socialized conduct in youths. He advocated giving schools awards for high social and academic expectations. Schools should encourage service to the community and group loyalty though activities that required cooperation.

Bennett. Former Secretary of Education, William Bennett also endorsed character education (Damon, 1988). He was critical of cognitive reasoning and values clarification programs because they emphasized reflection and neglected habit, removed morality from real and natural contexts, and presented morality as exercises in problem solving and decision making rather than as the day-to-day good behavior it should be. Instead of

having to think about moral dilemmas every ten minutes, it was better to have character and just do the right thing. In terms of instruction, he believed that moral education should be included in the teaching of history, literature, etc. and not be taught as an isolated subject.

Lickona. Lickona (1991) believed that there were three components of good character: moral knowledge, moral feeling and moral action. Moral knowing included moral awareness (to see a situation called for a moral judgment), knowledge of moral values, perspective-taking, moral reasoning, decision-making (examining options and consequences) and evaluation of one's own behavior. Moral feeling included conscience (knowing right from wrong and feeling obligated to do what was right), self-esteem, empathy, loving the good, self control and humility to face the truth. Moral action was comprised of three components: (a) competence (employing listening and communication skills to conceive and execute a plan of action), (b) the will to mobilize the moral energy needed to put duty before pleasure and stand up to peer pressure, and (c) the habit of making correct choices. Lickona believed that the teacher's role was to be a respectful, caring, good model who would show upset at transgressions. He suggested storytelling as a good vehicle for character education, for a good story could stir strong feelings. Stories teach "by attraction rather than compulsion; they invite rather than impose" (p. 79). Besides storytelling, Lickona suggested teaching values throughout the curriculum, through literature, and by setting up the classroom as a moral

community (cooperative rule setting, established consequences for breaking rules, positive incentives, discussions, and class meetings to build community).

Brooks and Goble. Brooks and Goble (1997) supported character education because they assumed (without support) that the root cause of crime and irresponsible behavior was inadequate ethical instruction. They believed there were three components (the "3 P's") to character education. The first component was *principle*. The principles were either defined as the "6 pillars" of trustworthiness, respect, responsibility, fairness, caring, and citizenship, or as the two virtues of respect and responsibility. The second component was the *process* used to solve problems. Brooks and Goble suggested the STAR (stop, think, act, review) or the STOP process from Young People's Press. The purpose of the "process" was to examine alternative behavior choices, and predict the personal and social consequences of one's acts. The third component was *practice*. They suggested using a curriculum that included practicing measurable behaviors; behaviors which fostered personal social responsibility, e.g., being on time, or paying attention. Brooks and Goble suggested a stand alone character education program in the schools, so that the curriculum would be covered systematically and not in a haphazard fashion. Instruction would be through infusion, example, modeling and direct instruction. Some of the key elements of their program were: direct instruction, to learn the meaning of the words, identify

appropriate behaviors and practice and apply values; using positive language (telling what to do, not what not to do); providing not only the content but the process with which to implement the values; an advertising campaign of visual reinforcement to keep the words at the forefront of the students' attention; a whole-school climate of character education; student participation and ownership of the program to choose goals and the means for achieving them; parental involvement; and evaluation.

Problems with character education. Damon (1988) believed that morality was learned best through natural consequences, not by character education, but pointed out that there was no evidence of a deleterious effect of morality training. Elliot Turiel (Damon, 1988) felt that the message of character education was that the examined life was corrupting. Analysis, intellectual scrutiny and informed self-correction, which were usually considered part of a good education, were miseducative in the area of moral education.

Alphie Kohn (1997) wrote a critical review of character education practices. "What goes by the name of character education nowadays is, for the most part, a collection of exhortations and extrinsic inducements designed to make children work harder and do what they're told" (p. 429). He described character education as the process of inculcating habits (unreflective actions) and acculturating students to conventional norms of good, not educating children nor developing principled caring members of the community. In

addition, he believed that character education programs used ineffective practices. For example, they targeted one value after another, each with its own day or week, a practice that was unlikely to result in lasting commitment. Children were rewarded for being good, but Kohn believed that extrinsic rewards eroded intrinsic motivation and the children would be less likely to think of themselves as caring or helpful people. In addition, awards were given to limited numbers of students, so other people were seen as potential obstacles, instead of comrades. Through didactic stories, banners and murals that delivered homilies, drill, exhortation and directed recitation, children were taught the "correct" answers. Teachers know that memorizing the right answers does not help people arrive at a deeper understanding of ideas in math. Why accept this method of teaching for character education?

Instead, Kohn endorsed a program, such as the Child Development Project (described in a subsequent section), where parents and teachers would act as models and pose challenges that would promote moral growth; where children could experience class meetings and have opportunities to practice perspective taking; and where complex literature was used to spur reflection and open-ended discussions.

Programs and effectiveness. In 1990, an independent consulting firm evaluated the efficacy of the Los Angeles Unified School District's Value Education Project, in 31 schools (Brooks & Goble, 1997). The program, based on Lessons in Character from Young People's Press (1996–1998), instructed

children in the six pillars of character, highlighting a different character trait each month. Each teaching kit included literature that varied by grade: realistic read alouds for kindergarten, multicultural alphabet stories in first grade, literature plus activity book journal for grades two through five, and stories about real life workers each illustrating one of the pillars of character for sixth grade. The kit included lessons for each week of the month, with 10-15 minute lessons planned for four or five days each week, so the children had multiple exposures to the theme. Children were also taught to use the STAR process skills (stop, think, act and review) for problem solving/ decision making. The consulting firm observed that all forms of reported discipline problems decreased. There was a 40% decrease in the number of tardies, a 39% decrease in the number of minor problems sent to the office, and a 25% decrease in the number of major problems sent to the office. These changes coincided with higher student morale, slightly lower teacher morale, increased parental involvement, and increased student responsibility ("students... acted more responsibly, did not blame others, [and] resisted peer pressure..." [p.124]).

The STAR Character Education Project was evaluated in Pittsburgh over a one year period (Brooks & Goble, 1997). In the STAR program, students were taught to stop, think, act and review, as part of the problem solving/decision making element of an overall character education program aimed at teaching responsibility. Fifth graders at three schools (an urban,

suburban and inner-city school) were the subjects, since they had been in the program the longest. The study included classroom observations, as well as questions for the students. The students were asked if they could remember the monthly STAR themes, asked what STAR meant, and asked if they practiced the self report. "Although the students in our study were not consistent models of ideal STAR behavior, there was a strong sense that they did try to enact appropriate behavior and that the frequent discussion helped to focus their attention on the program goals" (p. 133). However, the students in the STAR program were not compared to students at the control school, nor were behavior referrals to the office monitored. The researchers' conclusions were that the STAR program met local needs and "was a highly valued, language-based social skills program which had a strong positive influence on the behavior of students in each school" (p. 134), but these results were not well documented.

Implications for the present research. Lickona (1991) pointed out that one component of good character was moral knowledge, which included knowing right from wrong, knowledge of moral values, perspective-taking and evaluation of one's behavior. The training of the RAD program addressed these points. In the dramatizations, the children could see the consequences of the positive and negative behaviors with respect to three values (knowledge of moral values). Taking the role of the parent, the wronged person, or the person who had to make the moral decision helped

the children practice <u>perspective-taking</u>. After each scenario the group

evaluated the choices made by the actor (<u>evaluation</u>). By the end of the

training, it was clear what the right course of action would be with respect to

the three values addressed (<u>knowing right from wrong</u>).

In his review of various programs, Lickona (1991) reported the results

of an unpublished research study by Patricia Grimes. She found that role

playing was the most effective method to stimulate student interest and

involvement. This is added support for the use of role playing in this study.

Even if direct instruction was not the most effective way to teach moral

education (Damon, 1988, believed that morality was learned best through

natural consequences), Damon pointed out that there was no evidence of a

deleterious effect from morality training.

<u>Child Development Project (CDP)</u>

One well-documented program frequently classified as a Character

Education program, is the Child Development Project. This school-based

program was designed to foster children's social, ethical and intellectual

development. The assumptions that formed the foundation of the program

were that children needed autonomy, competence and belonging. Teachers

aimed to create a "caring communit[y] of learners" (Solomon, Battistich &

Watson, 1993, p. 2). Elements of the CDP program included: cooperative

learning; open-ended, value-focused literature discussions, dealing with

interpersonal and cross-cultural issues; activities to promote kindness,

concern for others, and fairness; exposure to prosocial examples; developmental discipline (no extrinsic incentives, students involved in making class decisions, class meetings, instruction in interpersonal and self-control skills); interpersonal helping, including cross-age tutoring and buddies; and a focus on prosocial values (fairness, kindness, responsibility and interpersonal respect) (Lickona, 1991; Solomon et al., 1993).

Effectiveness. Students in K-6 CDP schools, surpassed comparison students in supportive and friendly behavior, positive behavior, spontaneous helping, caring and cooperation, encouragement to others, and general harmoniousness (Brooks & Goble, 1997; Lickona,1991). The students showed more concern for others on the playground but were not less assertive than at a control school (Lickona, 1991). In hypothetical conflicts, the CDP students paid more attention to the needs of all parties, were less likely to suggest aggressive solutions, and came up with more alternative plans (Lickona, 1991). In 1985, children in the CDP program in the San Ramon School District had higher CAP (California Assessment Program) scores than comparison schools in reading, written language and math (Brooks & Goble, 1997). Analyzing the results by grade, Solomon et al., (1993) discovered that children's scores for helping reasoning, conflict resolution, and response to transgression generally increased between kindergarten and eighth grade, and were higher for the CDP students than the control students. However, kindergarten children in the control group had higher scores for helping

reasoning than the CDP classes. It was only by second grade that there was a significant difference in favor of the CDP students in all three categories tested. Self-esteem was significantly higher for students in the CDP program than controls when tested in eighth grade (but not fourth).

Implications for the present research. One strategy employed in the CDP program that was incorporated into the RAD program was the use of value-focused literature discussions. After CDP discussions about a story, the students often wrote and/or drew pictures related to their discussion. Writing and drawing elements were not included in the RAD program, due to their inappropriateness for many of the preschool students. Some children were not drawing representational pictures; others drew the same "person" character to represent anything from a person to wolf. Therefore, the preschooler's drawing did not clearly distinguish between different ideas. And of course, none of the children could write on their own.

The fact that a significant positive change was not seen in all three scores for the CDP children until second grade, indicated that the training needed to continue over many months/years before the children incorporated the prosocial values included in the program. Since the RAD program was only tested over a couple of months, there was no expectation that the children would change their helping reasoning, response to transgressions, etc. They were only tested for cognitively accepting and

understanding, and then hypothetically applying the prosocial values presented.

Empathy Training

Feshback (Damon, 1988) reported on the effectiveness of a 10 week empathy training program in an elementary school. While meeting three times per week with an empathy trainer, prosocial activity increased during the training. There was a decrease in aggressive behavior after the program, but no more than with nonempathetic social problem solving training.

Just and Caring Community

Several authors have emphasized the necessity of whole school environments for moral education.

Kohlberg (Damon, 1988) wrote in 1985, about the just community in theory and practice. He advocated transforming schools into participatory democracies: with school norms endorsed by students and teachers; with a sense of group solidarity and communal loyalty; and where antisocial acts were generally condemned. For example, school theft was treated as a community problem by a tribunal of students and teachers. They decided that all staff and students would be assessed a small sum to pay back the thefts. Besides running the school as a participatory democracy, teachers would lead moral discussions and role-taking exercises, and incorporate curriculum materials dealing with conflicts, fairness and moral choice. Kohlberg's examples were focused on the high school level.

Nel Noddings (1992) believed that caring, "a way of being in relation, not a set of specific behaviors," (p.17) was essential in the school setting. Caring was characterized by engrossment (attention), motivational displacement and desire to help. Moral education had four components. The first was modeling (showing how to care in our relations with others). She felt that children must have adequate experiences with being cared for before they could care for others. The second component was dialogue, a common search for understanding. Adults were not supposed to have the final word, and should not come to the discussion with a preconceived conclusion. Dialogue would provide each person with knowledge of the other and clear up errors. The third component was practice, providing opportunities for children to gain skills in caregiving. Experiences could include working together on school projects, care of buildings and grounds, volunteer work by older students, and relating to nonhuman life, such as pets. The fourth component was affirming and encouraging the best in others on an individual basis. Children needed to learn to care for themselves (through nutrition education, physical education, recreation, etc.). They also needed to learn to care for those in their inner circles (friends, parents, teachers) as well as learning to care for strangers and distant others (plants, animals, the earth). Noddings believed that education should be arranged around themes of care rather than the traditional disciplines of mathematics, art, etc. In the classroom, children should engage in discussions to learn to treat each other

ethically. Children should also learn to care deeply for ideas that engage them. Noddings wrote that this was much easier in preschool and kindergarten than in high school.

DeVries and Zan (1994) felt it was essential to foster community and cooperation, and give children power to make decisions, vote and resolve conflicts. The classroom should be organized for peer interaction, child responsibility, and for constructivist activities. In order to promote the construction of moral values, the teacher needed to uphold fairness, submit social and moral issues to children for discussion, and capitalize on issues that arose in the life of the classroom. Moral discussions promoted reflection about social and moral issues, and contributed to moral development, by promoting perspective-taking and moral reasoning. Moral dilemmas could be hypothetical, could come from the life of the classroom, or could come from books. The authors cautioned that many books presented moral lessons, not moral dilemmas. The following guidelines were provided for moral discussions. First, an issue that lends itself to differences of opinions should be chosen. After multiple rereadings, the children will discover the dilemma. The teacher would then ask open-ended questions about the fairness of the decisions, the feelings of the characters, alternate choices the characters could have made, etc. The teacher could accept all opinions and positions; a consensus was not necessary.

Andrews (1994) also encouraged schools to help children live the democratic principles in the classroom. She pointed out that true democracy was not present in the school system since children have no choice about attending school. However, democratic ideas such as mutual consideration, care for others, patience, risk taking, critical thinking skills and respect for peers should be present. She said, "I offer several instructional structures as a place to begin the development of values necessary to the formation of a caring and democratic citizenry" (p. 159). However, no research was provided to support the effectiveness of the teaching strategies presented. Teaching techniques included: allowing children choices in their selection of books and centers; discussing decisions made by story characters and related personal decisions; having the children figure out the moral of a story; round-table justice, having noninvolved peers help solve disagreements; and collaborative learning. She presented a bibliography of chapter and picture books classified into over 30 moral topics, e.g., work ethic, bravery, obedience, kindness, honor, freedom, and patience.

Implications for the present research. Noddings (1992) wrote that teaching children to care was much easier in preschool and kindergarten. The RAD program was designed for preschool and kindergarten, in order to begin the teaching of prosocial attitudes to young children. In addition, examining the consequences of one's behavior and caring about how those consequences affect other people is one aspect of care.

All of the authors in this section emphasized the importance of doing more than just having a character education program. It should be noted that the RAD program was not a stand-alone program in the preschool classroom from which the subjects were drawn. The children also participated in formal conflict resolution lessons, helped set the classroom norms, participated in class meetings to help make decisions about classroom matters and work out social problems, and were assisted in applying conflict resolution techniques in the day-to-day conflicts that occurred in the classroom.

Teaching Strategies

Teaching from Narratives

Many of the teaching philosophies described in this section advocated the use of literature or stories in teaching morals. This section presents a more in-depth examination of the benefits of using narratives and some considerations to take into account when using narratives to teach morals.

Paul Vitz (1990) believed that narratives (oral, written or cinematic) were an essential component of effective moral education. He described two qualitatively different kinds of thought: propositional thought, which was "logical argumentation aimed at convincing one of some abstract, context-independent truth" (p. 710); and narrative thought, which presented concrete human and interpersonal situations, in context, in order to demonstrate their particular validity. "To the extent that a child's understanding of moral issues is an interpersonal, emotional, imagistic, and story-like phenomenon,

to that same extent Kohlberg's model fails to respond to much of the child's mental life" (p. 711). In addition, stories can be used to illustrate, explain and test objective rules and maxims.

Vitz (1990) also described brain theory as related to the use of narratives. The right brain was active when a story employed words associated with images, and was told for its emotional and imagistic meaning. When the left brain was active, language would be devoid of much emotion, limited in image, context-free and would be used to express a universal truth. Therefore, the use of narratives would reach the right brain thinkers in the classroom.

Narrative thought is necessary for the development of moral thinking. Vitz (1990) pointed out that moral development begins with empathy, an emotional response to something happening to someone else. This empathy would develop into a narrative mode of thought; the morality of the situation would be evaluated on the basis of anticipated consequences for another, i.e., making a scenario of who might be victimized. "Empathetic responses can, as the child develops, easily lead to his or her postulating of moral principles" (p.714).

Lamme et al. (1992) believed that children moved from developing empathy for story characters, to developing empathy in real life. Kazemek (1985) wrote that when using literature, the teacher did not exhort the children to follow moral precepts, but explored moral problems with

another's perspective. Books with feminine morality, biographies with real-life role models, or multicultural books that did not perpetuate stereotypes helped children see other's point of view (Bamford & Kristo, 1996; Kazemek, 1985). Children developed compassion, understanding and acceptance by examining life through the eyes of others (Bamford & Kristo, 1996).

Role-taking, the ability to take another's perspective, has been shown to be possible for children at younger ages that was previously thought possible (Lamme et al., 1992). "It is children's ability to take the role of the central characters in books that primarily helps them understand the moral lessons involved in the story" (p.6). As children learned how and why characters in the book behaved as they did, they compared the characters' actions to their own. They placed themselves in the role of protagonist and considered what they would do in the protagonist's place. Therefore, even 4-year-olds could begin to role-take, an important first step in developing morality, and could use quality literature containing moral dilemmas.

Kohlberg believed that cognitive disequilibrium promoted the development of moral reasoning (Vitz, 1990). The disequilibrium was created by discussions that exposed the child to the thoughts of other people at the next higher stage. As opposed to Kohlberg's view, Haan (1985) saw morality as a "social emotional dialectic of practical reasoning among people" (p. 996). In a number of group experiments comparing cognitive disequilibrium with interpersonal conflict, she concluded that development arose from

emotional, interactive experiences of moral-social conflict and not cognitive disequilibrium. She believed that the best situation for moral development was one in which a person experienced a moderate amount of interpersonally based moral conflict (too much conflict was debilitating). "Besides actual, lived, interpersonal conflict, stories could also facilitate the development of moral thought. After all, narratives through vicarious experience, provide a rich array of exactly such situations. Good empirical evidence for this assumption remains to be established, however"(Vitz, 1990, p. 715).

In addition to literature providing examples of interpersonal conflict, literature also has "the potential power . . . to establish models of human action" (Kazemek, 1985. p. 2). Coles (Vitz, 1990) examined case histories of children making real life moral decisions. He discovered many impressive moral responses from children too young to be even at Kohlberg's stage 4. He concluded that children could not always verbalize their morality; morality was expressed in action. Vitz concluded that "a very effective way to introduce children to the moral life, short of actually placing them in morally challenging situations, [was] to have them hear, read, or watch morally challenging narratives" (p. 716).

Apart from other theoretical considerations, Vitz (1990) pointed out that people really enjoyed narratives. Adults frequently voluntarily spent hours reading romances, westerns, mysteries, etc. However, people rarely read abstract and propositional conceptualizations for fun. Additionally

"except for occasional service projects for the school or the community at large, there is relatively little direct practice in morality that schools can provide" (p. 718).

However, narratives cannot stand alone as a teaching technique. Even staunch supporters of the use of narratives for teaching morality (Lamme et al., 1992; Vitz, 1990) agree that moral reflection, guided by a teacher or others, must be added.

When choosing literature, Bamford and Kristo (1996) suggested selecting books where issues emerged from the story, rather than being stated blatantly, stories told from the child's perspective, and stories that did not perpetuate stereotypes. Lamme et al. (1992) also did not want the teacher to lecture or guide the children by directly pointing out moral behavior in a story. They believed that children would show more advancement if they had the opportunity to reason and think things through at their own level.

To increase the value of a book for moral education, the teacher should add thoughtful discussion, writing and reflection (Lamme et al., 1992). Teacher questions should be open ended, e.g., (a) What did you notice in the story? (b) How did the story make you feel? (c) Why did this happen in the story? (d) How did that make the characters feel? (e) How did that make you feel? (f) What does this remind you of in your own life? and (g) Did you learn something from this story?

Commenting on group size, Lamme et al. (1992) wrote, "In our experience with children we have concluded that a small group discussion generally results in higher levels of response than a large group . . . . Responses are higher when children give opinions and have discussions than when they just answer teacher questions" (p. 20).

Effectiveness. None of the programs reviewed for this thesis used narratives alone for teaching morals. The following programs employed literature as an important component of their program.

The Heartwood Program was a multicultural, literature-based curriculum designed to promote elementary students' ethical understanding of seven attributes, courage, loyalty, justice, respect, hope, honesty and love (Buttram, Kruse & Sidler, 1992). In this program, adults read stories to the children, the children discussed the content of the story and their reactions to the story, and then did related classroom activities. The program was field tested in 1991-92 by the Pennsylvania Department of Education in 16 districts across the state. The teachers felt that the students were learning about the moral attributes, but were unable to document any specific effects. Several problems with the implementation of the program were noted: lessons were only taught every second or third week, due to limited time with students; lessons were only allotted 20 minutes, but activities took longer to complete; and teachers said the program had not been in effect long enough to observe the program's impact on students.

Jones and Gower (1994) evaluated a program for third and fourth graders that incorporated literature, discussion, journal writing and group projects over a 10 week period. Children were evaluated with a 25 question "opinionare" (a lower score was desirable). The fourth graders had significantly lower post test scores, but the third graders showed no significant differences after training.

Implications for the present research. Vitz (1990) described theories of different thought processes (propositional and narrative thinking). Narrative thinking engaged the right brain while logical discussions engaged the left brain. It would make sense for a teacher to include both narratives and logical discussions to address both types of thinking and memory. Given the age of the subjects (4- 5-years-old) and their developmental lack of readiness for logical thinking, narratives, which stimulate narrative thinking, appear to be more appropriate than logical discussions for teaching morals to preschoolers.

Coles (Vitz, 1990) believed that morality in children was expressed in action, since children could not always verbalize their morality. The dramatization of scenarios in the RAD program allowed the children to express their morality in action. This would allow children who were not ready to describe the reasons for a morally correct action, to demonstrate their morality.

Vitz (1990) wrote that stories could introduce interpersonally based moral conflict to the classroom. The books chosen for this project all contained either intrapersonal or interpersonal moral conflicts.

Lamme et al., (1992) indicated that 4-year-olds could take the role of characters in books to help them understand the moral lessons involved in the story. Although the RAD technique did not have children assume the roles of characters in the story, they did assume roles in the scenarios. Lamme et al.'s conclusions supported the efficacy of using role-playing with 4-year-olds.

Lamme et al. (1992) stated that small group discussions resulted in higher levels of response from the children. It is logical to hypothesize that higher response levels would be linked to higher task engagement and therefore increased learning. If this is the case, then one would expect more children to be able to learn and apply the prosocial values with small group training, than with large group training.

The evaluations of literature based programs did not show them to be very effective. This did not mean that the use of literature, per se, was the cause of their poor results. Rather, it could be concluded that the techniques used along with the literature were ineffective. The RAD program did not use journals or worksheets, as did the programs described in this section. Dramatization and discussion sessions, closely spaced in time, could reverse the problems found with previous studies.

Group Size

Lamme et al. (1992) suggested using small groups for discussion, but did not specify how many children should be in a small group. Other studies have examined the effect of class size on learning. Mosteller (1992) studied the effect of class size in kindergarten through third grade students, in Tennessee. Children in classes with 13-17 children per class showed substantial improvement in early learning and cognitive studies, over children in classes with 22-25 students. The effect on achievement for minority students was initially twice that for majority students.

NAEYC accreditation standards for early childhood programs (Bredekamp, 1991) recommend staff ratios for 4-year-olds from 1:8 to 1:10. Group size and lower staff-child ratios were strong predictors of compliance with indicators of quality such as positive interactions between staff and children, and developmentally appropriate curriculum.

Frede (1995) examined the effect of small class size on preschool children from low-income families. She found that "smaller groups of children and lower ratios of children to staff (for example, five preschoolers to one adult rather than seven to one) both resulted in better social and cognitive outcomes for children" (p. 119).

Given the preceding information, it was not clear exactly what small group size would produce optimal results for small group instruction with 4- to 5-year-old children.

Implications for the present research. Studies (Bredekamp, 1991; Frede, 1995; Lamme et al., 1992; & Mosteller, 1995) indicated that smaller class size would lead to better outcomes for instruction. One variable investigated in this project was group size during training. A small group size of 7-8 students was utilized in this project. The studies reviewed suggested group sizes ranging from 5 - 10 preschoolers or up to 17 elementary school age students. The data obtained from this study would ascertain if 7-8 students was a small enough group to make a difference in the children's performance.

Moral Belief vs. Moral Behavior

A significant problem encountered when teaching morality, was that knowledge of the morally correct response did not always correspond with morally correct behavior. Freud (Emde et al., 1987; Turiel, 1983) believed that a person's behavior was controlled through unconscious rather than through rational processes. Behaviorists, believed that behavior was determined by conditioning. Moral judgements or verbalized values might differ from learned behavior, due to conflict between an individual's needs and interests. Therefore, one also needed self-control to bridge the gap between moral thought and moral behavior (Turiel, 1983).

Hartshorne and May

Hartshorne and May (1928-30) studied the correlation between moral knowledge and moral behavior. They expected children who could recite the 10 commandments or the Boy Scout code would cheat less on a test of the

capitals of the U.S. and a test involving placing marks with their eyes closed. They found no correlation to predict who would cheat on the tests. They concluded that moral conduct was contextually determined and that one could not predict moral action from moral beliefs.

Damon (1988) criticized their work, pointing out that the children may have been behaving morally according to a child's code. Children might have perceived loyalty to, and cooperation with friends as the salient moral issues; not honesty. Turiel (1983) argued that cheating was not clearly a moral issue to begin with but rather possibly a conventional one. In addition, Turiel maintained that the five point scale Hartshorne and May (1928-30) used to assess the wrongness of an act, did not assess the children's reasoning or judgement. Stone (1974) pointed out that the children in the Hartshorne and May study might have been verbalizing answers that they believed the adults wanted to hear, but did not really subscribe to themselves.

Damon

Damon (1977) also found that social context influenced moral decisions. In one of his studies, the subjects were told that a class raised money for candy bars by selling artwork they had made. The children needed to decide how the candy should be distributed: equally, more to those who drew the best pictures, more to those who drew the most pictures, or more to poorer students. When the story was enacted with real candy bars, the

solutions always favored the research subject. When the story was enacted with cardboard candy, the subjects were more generous.

Kohlberg's Stages

Kohlberg (1971) wrote, "People's verbal moral values about honesty have nothing to do with how they act. People who cheat express as much or more moral disapproval of cheating as those who do not cheat. . . . If a person cheats in one situation, it does not mean he will or will not cheat in another" (p. 75). One cannot do moral actions without moral judgement. However, one can have principles and not live up to the principles (Kohlberg, 1978).

Rothman (1980) stated that just knowing what a person said s(he) would do, was not sufficient; one needed to know his/her reasoning. The person who said s(he) would not cheat because they could get caught, was quite different from the person who said s(he) would not cheat because it would break a bond of mutual trust. Kohlberg's stages took into account a person's reasons for the proposed actions. Several studies have been done correlating moral behavior and the subjects' moral stage. In Blasi's review of the research, he discovered a significant relationship between moral thinking and moral behavior. That they were independent dimensions was "revealed to be a well-advertised myth" (Turiel, 1983, p.191). The relationship between moral thinking and moral behavior was substantiated by Kohlberg's (1978) claim that 15% of principled thinkers cheated, 55% of conventional subjects cheated and 70% of preconventional subjects cheated. Of course, the

relationship was not absolute; 15% of the principled thinkers still cheated and 30% of preconventional thinkers did *not* cheat.

Studies involving people at the highest levels of moral development (levels 5 and 6) found that more mature moral action was highly correlated with more advanced moral judgements. When subjects were at the principled level (levels 5 and 6), they were much less likely to cheat (20% cheated) than if they were at a lower level (75% cheated) (Kohlberg, 1971). In Milgrim's experiment (Kohlberg, 1971), students were asked to give increasingly higher shocks to another subject (stooge victim). Seventy-five percent of those at level 6 quit the experiment, while only 13% of those at levels less than 6 quit the experiment. In Berkeley, stage 6 college students, were least likely to comply with requirements of authority that, to them, seemed indefensible, and were most likely to participate in sit-ins (Rothman, 1980).

The correlation between moral development stage and moral behavior was not as high for moral development levels below levels 5 and 6. Mischel and Mischel (Turiel, 1983) only found a modest, but statistically significant, correlation between moral reasoning and moral behavior (r = .3). "Although the relationship between stage of moral reasoning and behavior choice is not necessarily linear with respect to developmental stage, it seems most consistent for those at stage 6" (Rothman, 1980, p. 119). Therefore, Rothman

concluded that older children (at higher stages) were more likely to have their moral judgments match their moral actions than were younger children.

The clearest relationship between stages of moral judgment and naturalistic behavior was seen when comparing delinquent and non-delinquent subjects. Delinquents were at lower stages of moral reasoning than nondelinquents (Rothman, 1980; Turiel, 1983). Weaker relationships were found when considering honesty (cheating on tests or games, and failing to return property), and altruism (sharing, helping others in need) (Turiel, 1983). There was little relationship between the stages of moral judgement and situations where social pressures were discrepant with the subject's moral choice (experimenter told the subject to administer electric shocks).

One problem with Kohlberg's stages was that people performed at their stage only 45% of the time (Damon, 1980). Other variables influenced a person's decisions (hypothetical vs. real, specific parameters, and the variety of moral issues that might concern an individual) so one would not expect to see consistent behavior. Another problem, described by James Rest (1986), called into question the validity of Kohlbergs' hierarchy of levels. The highest level of Kohlberg's moral stages was liberal and the next lower level was conservative. In one experiment, the liberal thinkers were asked to answer as conservatives, and vice versa. The actual conservatives, who were pretending to be liberals, scored higher than the actual liberals who were pretending to be conservative did. If the Kohlberg level actually reflected

moral development, how could the conservatives score higher? This evidence indicated that being liberal or conservative was a choice, not that liberal thinkers were at higher cognitive level.

Empathy and Altruistic Behavior

While some researchers searched for relationships between the espousal of moral virtues and moral behavior, or between moral reasoning and moral behavior, others investigated links between empathy and altruistic (one aspect of moral) behavior.

For adolescents and adults, empathy was related to sharing with others, cooperation and generosity. However, mixed results were obtained with preschoolers (Eisenberg-Berg & Lennon, 1980). Eisenberg-Berg and Lennon found that empathy was not related to prosocial behavior in 4- to 5-year-old children. However, they did qualify their results by saying that their test could have been measuring the children's ability to give socially acceptable answers and conceivably did not actually measure empathy.

Factors Involved in Moral Behavior

Inconsistencies between moral thought and moral action exist. The assumption was that findings of consistency between moral thought and moral action meant that thought was causal to action, and findings of inconsistency meant that thought was not causal to action (Turiel, 1983). However, other factors influence moral action. Moral thought could be one of the factors, but it was not the sole factor.

One factor was pragmatic considerations. For example, more Berkeley students might have decided against participating in sit-ins if they knew they would be suspended for participating (Turiel, 1983). The saliency of each domain being coordinated by the subject in the situation was another factor. In experiments where the subject gave "shocks" to another person if the other person said an incorrect word pair, many subjects said shocking the other person was wrong, but 65% continued to administer shocks. This percentage varied if the authority did not give instructions to continue, or if the subject had to see or touch the other person to give the shocks.

Another factor that influenced the moral thought – moral action relationship was distractibility. Hartshorne and May (Kohlberg, 1971) discovered that high stability of attention in a monotonous task was a predictor for resistance to cheating (r=.68). Grim, Kohlberg, and White (1968) also found that distractible children cheated more often, especially when they were at the conventional level. Rothman (1980) suggested that greater ego strength might have given the children who resisted cheating the ability to control their impulses as well as the ability to delay gratification. Ego strength would therefore mediate the effect of moral reasoning on moral behavior.

Asendorpf and Nunner-Winkler (1992) tested the hypothesis that ego control and/or inhibition affected moral motive strength in preschool children. A child was rated as having high moral motive strength if he attributed appropriate feelings for the transgressors and victims in the stories

presented, and could justify his answer. Ego control was determined by a Q-sort done by the child's teacher comparing the subject to an ego-controlled child. Inhibition was measured by a parental scale that rated the child's inhibition towards strangers. They concluded that higher moral motive strength and higher temperamental inhibition reduced immoral behavior. Neither moral motive strength nor inhibition alone predicted resistance to cheating with much accuracy; both had to be present. Ego control was not related to moral motive strength

Gauthier (1971) maintained that there were three aspects of conscious moral behavior. The first was action, which required only practical knowledge of what one was doing. The second was conceptualization, which involved the theoretical knowledge related to what one was doing. The third was moral awareness, which involved appreciation of what one was doing and responsiveness to those with whom one interacted.

Rest (1986) developed a four component model to predict moral behavior. One variable was cognitive concepts of justice. He explained that no single variable would ever strongly predict behavior. He also described a "utilizer dimension," the degree to which people used justice concepts to make decisions. When this utilizer dimension was added as a mediator variable to five studies relating moral judgement to behavior, the amount of variance accounted for in the behavioral measures was doubled.

Implications for the Present Research

There was consensus, in the literature reviewed, that one would not perform moral actions without moral judgement, even though one could have principles and not live up to the principles. The present study was concerned with teaching and testing morals/prosocial values only in the cognitive domain. Students' prosocial behavior in the classroom was not monitored. It was not expected that a limited-time program that only addressed the cognitive aspects of moral behavior would produce measurable behavioral changes. However, since moral thought or reasoning was a precursor to moral behavior, it was deemed necessary for students to acquire, at least cognitively, the prosocial values.

Rothman (1980) stated that just knowing what a person said they would do, was not sufficient; one needed to know their reasoning. Therefore, a child would always be asked why they chose a certain action during the testing sessions in this experiment. A child in the present study might have said that he would take the ring found on the sidewalk. It would be important to know the child's reasons. Did he intend to keep the ring for himself, or would he take the ring in order to find the original owner?

Chapter 3

METHODOLOGY

This study sought to address the following questions: (a) Would

reading, discussing and dramatizing the prosocial values addressed in a

children's story book help more children learn to apply those values, over

just hearing the book alone? (b) would small group instruction increase the

efficacy of such training? (c) would some prosocial values be more difficult to

assimilate than others? and (d) would there be any difference between boys

and girls, younger and older, and limited English proficient and English

proficient students in their response to the training sessions?

In order to answer these questions, preschool children were invited to

hear selected stories that each addressed a moral value. If the children were in

the Control Group, they only heard the story. If the children were in one of

the experimental groups, they participated in the RAD training. After

hearing the book, they discussed the actions and feelings of the characters, and

applied the value to their own lives. After discussion, the children in the

experimental groups acted out scenarios that applied the prosocial value.

There were two sizes of experimental groups. In the Experimental – Large

group, all of the RAD training was conducted with the entire class of 16-18

children. If the children were in the Experimental – Small group, the RAD

training was conducted with half of the class at a time, 7-8 children. In order

to assess the effectiveness of this training, the children's responses to pre- and post-training test scenarios were compared.

Participants

The participants were 36 preschool students who were enrolled in a State Preschool in the bay area in northern California. All of the children were from low-income families (all qualified for free or reduced lunches). During registration for the State Preschool program, each parent was informed of the research project and all signed permission slips that allowed their children to participate in the research project. The experiment was conducted between March 11 and April 24, 1997. The average age of the children at the beginning of the experiment was 4 years 8 months, with ages ranging from 4 years 2 months to 5 years 3 months. The average age of the boys and girls was identical.

The preschool included children from nine nationalities. Not all of the children were native English speakers. Children were judged to be proficient, limited or extremely limited English speakers before the experiment began by the classroom teacher (who was also the researcher) through informal classroom observations and dictations. Limited English proficient (LEP) children were judged to have somewhat limited vocabularies, they could understand most of what was said and had some trouble expressing themselves. Extremely limited English proficient (ELEP) children were judged to have very limited vocabularies, might have trouble

understanding what was said, and would have much difficulty expressing themselves. Proficient (P) students were either native English speakers or were fluent in English, in their both speech and understanding. Most of the participants had been in the class for seven months, and all understood some English. There were 6 ELEP, 7 LEP, and 23 P students in the study. All the children were included in the study, and all received the same training.

The preschool had a morning and afternoon class. When the classes were formed at the beginning of the school year, they were balanced for number of students, age, sex, English proficiency, and behavior problems. However, by the time the research project began in the spring, the groups became less balanced due to some children leaving the class, and new children entering the class. During the course of the study, one child left the morning class, and one transferred from the afternoon to the morning class between parts of the experiment. Two students were subsequently admitted to the afternoon class. Since the boy who changed classes was in the Experimental Small Group twice, his data was deleted the second time he was in an Experimental Small Group, in case there were any order effects. The morning class became Group A (with 18 participants at any given time) and the afternoon class became Group B (first with 16 and then with 17 participants at any given time). All but one of the students in the class (he was nonverbal) participated in the experiment. Table 2 displays the changes

in the Groups between the beginning and end of the experiment in terms

of sex, English proficiency and age.

Table 2

Comparison of Numbers of Participants in Sample by Characteristics at the

Beginning and End of the Experiment

Characteristic	N at beginning		N at end	
	Group A	Group B	Group A	Group B
Males	11	8	11	7
Females	7	8	7	10
English Proficient	11	11	10	12
Limited	4	3	5	2
Extremely limited	3	2	3	3

Average age (in years and months)

	4 - 10.0	4 - 10.6	4 - 10.3	4 - 9.6

Materials

Three books, each representing a different prosocial value, were used

for the study. In the first part of the experiment, The Empty Pot, by Demi, was

used to illustrate the value of telling the truth. When a young boy, Ping,

admitted that he was the only child in China unable to grow a flower

from the seeds distributed by the Emperor (previously cooked seeds), he was

rewarded for his honesty. In the second part of the experiment, Jamaica's

Find, by Juanita Havill, was used to demonstrate the consequences of taking

something that is not yours. In this story, Jamaica found a dog at the park and

took it home. That night, Jamaica felt uncomfortable about keeping the dog.

She took it back to the Lost and Found at the park and the girl who lost the

dog was very glad to get it back. In the third part of the experiment, Best

Friends for Francis, by Russell Hoban, was used to show how hurting words

and exclusion hurt others. Frances excluded her little sister from playing

baseball by saying she was too small. Then Frances' friend, Albert, excluded

Frances by saying she couldn't go wandering with him, or play baseball

because she was a girl. Frances and her little sister planned an outing and

excluded Albert. When they saw that each person could add something to the

outing, all were included and had a good time. The text of this story appeared

to be too long to hold the interest of a preschool class. A shortened version

was prepared and pasted over the original text in the book. The shortened

version of the text may be found in Appendix A.

Puppets were used for the pretest, administered the week before each

book was introduced. Each child chose one of six multicultural hand puppets

to be "their" character in the pretest situation. For the post-test, each child

picked one of seven multicultural DUPLO® people to be "their" character.

Although the kind of problems presented in the pretest and post-test were similar, the props differed. For example, in the pretest of the first part of the experiment, dealing with lying, the child was presented with a crushed golden cardboard jewelry box, and in the post-test, a small plastic swan with a broken neck was used. In both cases the researcher's character claimed to have broken the object and asked if she should tell her mom she broke it, or say someone else did it. In the second part of the experiment, dealing with stealing, the puppets were tempted to take something that did not belong to them. Pilot testing (using kindergarten children) revealed that the same toys were not equally attractive to boys and girls. Male and female kindergarten children were asked individually to rate the attractiveness of six toys. From this information the "found" objects were determined for each sex. Therefore, in the pretest, boys "found" a Buzz Lightyear toy (from Toy Story) and girls "found" a flocked pony. In the post-test, boys "found" a clear rubber ball with a marbled cat's eye center and girls "found" a "ruby" ring. In the third part of the experiment, dealing with exclusion and saying hurting words, the "friends" [the researcher and two students' characters] had three plastic monkeys from a "Barrel of Monkeys" game. In the post-test, small plastic teddy bears, from "Teddy Bear Bingo," replaced the monkeys.

During the dramatization sessions, props from around the classroom were used. These included things such as plastic dinosaurs and farm animals, a stuffed dog, a small pail, and a toy car.

Procedure

The research was conducted at the students' school by their teacher. Therefore, the children were familiar and comfortable with the researcher and their environment. All parts of the research study were videotaped.

Pretest

In the week before the children heard the book, pairs of children were pretested to evaluate their understanding of the target value. During pilot testing, done with the previous year's class, testing 2 children at a time appeared to be the best procedure. When testing groups of 3 or 4 children, some of the quieter children did not participate. With 2 children, there was the risk that one of the students would copy the response of the other, but the vast majority of students held to their own point of view. In addition, discussions between the 2 children helped reveal their thinking processes.

Each pair of children was taken into a quiet room and sat at a table with the researcher. The researcher and each of the students took a puppet to be "their kid" in the story. The researcher's character set the scene with a problem related to the value to be evaluated (e.g., "There's a toy horse. It's not mine and not yours. What should we do with it?") The children each had a turn to respond. Responses might have been prosocial (find the owner), antisocial (take it) or not related (play with it). The researcher's character then suggested an antisocial action and asked the other children's characters if she should do it (e.g. "I really like that horse. I'll take it home

and keep it. Is that okay?") As appropriate, the researcher asked each child why (s)he would do or say whatever they suggested. Children were also questioned on how the character who lost the toy would feel. For Part 1, the researcher tried to ask each child the same questions and any others that would facilitate a clarification or elucidation of the children's moral understanding.

One might be concerned that continuing to ask probing questions would cause a child to change their response. Would a child perceive additional questioning as implying that his/her answer was wrong, and cause him/her to give a different response? Happy victimizer research by Arsenio and Kramer (1992) suggested that this would not be a problem. They found that none of the 4-year-olds in their study changed their original judgements in response to the probing questions that were part of their procedure. "They appear to be uninfluenced by probes in general" (p. 924).

A response sheet, with each child's name and space for each child's responses was used to record what each child said. For Part 2 and Part 3, the pre-planned questions (and room for responses and other questions that might arise) were preprinted for each child. In all parts, the children's responses were recorded in writing during the session and were videotaped for future transcription. For analysis, each child was given a number and the names were deleted. Each session lasted about 5 minutes.

Control and Experimental Conditions

There were three conditions under which the children were exposed to the books and their prosocial values. In the Control group, the teacher read the book to the children at Circle Time. All the children present in the class (18 in Group A and 15 in Group B [reduced number due to absences]) heard the story together. Any unusual vocabulary or passages that might be difficult to understand were explained to the children. No discussion was encouraged. If a child contributed something, the teacher just noncommittally said, "Um-hmm" and went on with the story.

There were two experimental conditions. The procedure was identical for both experimental conditions; only the size of the group varied. In the Experimental - Large Group condition, the entire class (18 students in Group A and 16 students in Group B [numbers sometimes reduced due to absences]) participated together in the training at Circle Time in the classroom. In the Experimental - Small Group condition, half of the class (8-9 students) was taken to an empty adjacent conference room for the training.

Under both experimental conditions, the book was read to the children and predetermined questions were asked. Some questions helped clarify what happened in the story, some questions asked the children to reflect on incidents in their own lives where they faced problems similar to those encountered in the story, some questions asked the children to think about how characters in the story felt at certain moments, and some questions asked

what the children might do if faced with the same dilemma as characters in the story. Some questions were closed questions, but most were open ended. The children discussed possible answers and the teacher could follow up on a child's answer. She was not limited solely to the questions on the list. A few questions were asked during the reading of the story, but most were asked after the story so as not to interrupt the dramatic flow of the book. Reading the book and the ensuing discussion usually took about 30 minutes.

The training continued the next day for both Experimental Groups. The children took turns acting out scenarios suggested by the teacher. These usually started with a situation suggested by the story, but then branched out to other situations where the value brought out by the book would be involved. The teacher would set the scene and suggest the initial course of action and/or dialogue. Then she might ask the children how they felt, or what they might do. What would be the consequence of those actions? How would people feel then? The same scenario was usually repeated several times and the class would work through four or five scenarios and variations. The dramatization sessions lasted for about 30 minutes for each group.

<center>Post-test</center>

As with the pre-testing, pairs of children were taken to a small quiet room and sat at the table with the researcher. The researcher and each of the students picked a DUPLO® child to be "their kid." A situation similar to the pretest was presented, except the prop was changed. For example, for the girls

in the stealing pretest, the researcher asked if she should take the toy

horse they found. In the post-test, the researcher asked if she should take the

ring they found. The questions followed the same pattern as the pretest.

Responses were recorded in the same manner as during the pre-test. Each

session lasted about 5 minutes.

<center>Testing and Training Schedule</center>

The following schedule was followed for each of the three prosocial

values studied.

Day 1: Pretest day: (All three groups - Experimental-Large Group,

Experimental-Small Group and Control Group) As previously

described, pairs of children were pretested to evaluate their

understanding of the value being tested. Pretesting was done with

puppets in a small quiet room adjacent to the preschool classroom.

Day 2: Training /Reading + Discussion (Experimental Groups) OR Reading

(Control Group): The book was presented to all groups. As previously

discussed, the Control group heard the story with no discussion. The

Experimental - Large Group discussed the story as an entire class at

Circle Time. If the experimental condition called for small groups, the

class was divided in half, and half the class at a time read and discussed

the book in a small nearby conference room during Activity Time. The

children were divided so that there would be roughly the same

number of outgoing children and children who needed extra attention

in each group. Reading the story took 8-10 minutes for the Control Group. Reading the book plus discussion took about 30 minutes for either of the experimental groups.

Day 3: Training/Dramatization (Experimental Groups only): On the day following the reading/discussion training, children in the experimental groups acted out scenarios involving the value in question. In the Experimental - Large Group condition, the whole class acted out the scenarios at Circle Time in the classroom. In the Experimental Small-Group condition half the class (not necessarily in the same groups as the day before) was taken to the same small conference room used previously, and the group of 8-9 children acted out the scenarios. All the groups acted out a set of pre-planned scenarios, plus any others suggested by the children. The dramatization of scenarios lasted approximately 30 minutes for each group. No activities related to the story or value in question were scheduled for the children assigned to the Control Group condition for this day.

Day 4: No Research-related Activities: On the day following the training involving dramatization, no children were involved in any activities related to the experiment.

Day 5: Post-Test day (All three groups: Control, Experimental - Large Group, Experimental - Small Group) As previously described, pairs of children

were taken to a small quiet room and their understanding of the value was evaluated. The researcher and each of the students picked a DUPLO® child to be "their kid" and a situation similar to the pretest was presented. Responses were recorded in the same manner as during the pre-test. Each session lasted about 5 minutes.

Parts of the Experiment

There were three parts of the experiment. Each part focused on a different moral value. The three values chosen concerned honesty, stealing, and exclusion. These values were chosen because (a) preschool children faced dilemmas with these moral values at school and at home, and (b) dilemmas related to these values involved conflict between characters (external to self) and had prosocial and antisocial responses which were easily observed. For example, the researcher could easily code, and the children easily notice the prosocial response of asking a new child to join a play group. However, it would be much more difficult to code and portray an essentially internal value such as feeling good about yourself.

Since there were only two groups of participants, only two of the three conditions, i.e., Control group, Experimental - Large Group, or Experimental - Small Group, could be tested for any given value. The designation of which conditions would be assigned to each part of the experiment was made, and then moral values were randomly assigned to the parts. The morning class was arbitrarily designated as Group A, and the afternoon class as Group B.

Table 3 shows the value studied and conditions used for each of the three

parts in order.

_____

Table 3

Value Addressed and Conditions Employed for Each Group at Each Part

_____

Part	Value	Group A	Group B
1	Honesty/Lying	Control	Expt.-Small Group
2	Stealing	Expt.-Large Grp.	Control
3	Exclusion /Hurting words	Expt.-Small Grp.	Expt.-Large Group

_____

Part 1

The first part centered on the value of honesty and used the book, The Empty

Pot. Group A was the control group and only heard the book. Group B was

the Experimental -Small Group, hearing the story, discussing it and

dramatizing it in two small groups.

The pretest questions and scenario (Day 1) were identical for both

groups. Each of the two children and the researcher had a "kid" puppet. A

crushed golden cardboard jewelry gift box was placed on the table. The

researcher's puppet said, "Uh-oh. I broke my mom's box and I don't want her

to be mad at me. What should I do? What should I say?" Each child was

given time to respond. Then the researcher's character said, "Should I say I did it, or someone else?" Then the children were asked, "Why should I say [their answer]?" Finally the children were asked how the researcher's mom would feel and why. Other questions were asked if they would help clarify the child's answers and at the end of the session, each child was asked if they had anything else they wanted to say about the story.

On Day 2, Control Group A heard the story at Group Time in the classroom. Experimental - Small Group B, in two groups of 8 students, heard the book and discussed it in the small conference room adjacent to the preschool classroom. (See Appendix B for an outline of the discussion questions, dramatization scenarios, and test questions.)

The initial discussion questions helped clarify the facts of the story. Why was the Emperor mad when the other children said their seeds grew? Questions and comments were factual, focusing on the fact that cooked seeds could not grow, and that these children did not tell the truth, they lied. The children were instructed to look at the Emperor's face in the picture. How did he feel when the children lied? The next set of questions focused on why the emperor was happy that Ping's seed did not grow. Everyone in the group who wanted to answer this question was given a chance to comment. The third set of questions focused on how hard it is to tell the truth. The children looked at Ping's face when he brought the empty pot to the Emperor and commented on how he felt.

The teacher then told a true story from the past of a boy who had taken all the classroom's magnetic marbles, put them in his pocket to take home and then said he did not know where the marbles were. The children were invited to guess how the teacher felt about his lying.

Each child had a chance to tell about when somebody lied or told the truth. The child telling the story was asked how they felt about it. "How do you fell when somebody lies to you?" "What if they told the truth, how would you feel?" Almost all of the children had a story to tell.

To bring closure to the activity the teacher made sure the children understood the meaning of telling a lie and telling the truth. She told a hypothetical story about a brother who had eaten his preschool sibling's cookie and then said he didn't do it. (Crumbs on the face confirmed his guilt). Was the brother lying or telling the truth? How would you feel about the lie?

The following day, Day 3, small groups of 7 and 8 children from Experimental - Small Group B went into a nearby conference room for the Dramatization segment of the training.

In the first set of dramatizations a child pretended to knock down a flower pot (sand pail) and spill the dirt on the floor. The mother came in and asked who did this. For the first skit, the researcher/teacher was the mother. In all the other skits, students played both parts. The teacher asked the child who "spilled" the dirt if he/she wanted to tell the truth or lie. The skit was then acted out with the child's choice of action. This was repeated several

times. When the child told the truth, the mother said, "I'm sad because my pot got knocked over. But I'm really proud that you told the truth. I won't be too mad." The audience was invited to say how the mom and child felt. If the child "lied" and said someone else did it, again the children were asked how each person felt. The actor portraying the mother was asked what she wanted her "child" to do. One girl said, "I want her to tell me the truth." Variations on the skit were introduced. The child who knocked over the "flowerpot" was told to hide the "flowerpot" in the "closet" so the dad wouldn't be mad at him. The scene was played out, with the "child" again deciding if s(he) wanted to tell the truth or lie. As in all the dramatizations, the children in the play and audience were asked how the characters felt. This time, the child told the truth and people on the sidelines reminded the actors that the dad needed to ask where the flowerpot was! After returning the pot and "picking up" the dirt together, (actor's ideas) the audience suggested dad should give his kid a hug for telling the truth. The children really got involved with the skits and the details. In another father and son scene with the flower pot, where the child decided to tell the truth and say he did it, the teacher focused the questioning on how hard it was to tell the truth. In the final variation the "child" agreed before the skit began to be a liar and the teacher played the mother. After mom asked who spilled the dirt (mom had peeked in the window and saw the child do it), the child answered, "Not

me," as agreed. The teacher then talked about how she could not trust and believe someone who lied. How did the characters feel then?

The second scenario centered on a child (Child 1) who dropped a toy dinosaur inadvertently, didn't realize it, and kept walking. Another child (Child 2) picked up the toy and then the first child returned. When Child 1 said, "I lost that toy," Child 2 could either tell the truth and give it back, or lie and say that it was his. The scene was played six times, sometimes telling the truth and sometimes lying. Each time the children were asked how it felt for the characters. After the first lying version, all the children were asked if there was another way, or something else Child 2 could do. The children suggested saying sorry, and giving back the toy. The teacher also added that Child 2 could say they made a mistake. Child 2 chose to say she made a mistake and gave back the toy. The audience suggested a hug at that point, but the actors declined. The latter scenario was enacted again and the teacher focused on how it felt to say you made a mistake. After another dramatization of telling the truth, the teacher became Child 1 and had Child 2 lie and say it was theirs. Child 1 talked about how she didn't want to be with people who didn't tell the truth and lied. The children were asked if Child 1 would like to be Child 2's friend.

In the third scenario, one child (the "sibling") pretended to eat a cookie and get crumbs on his face. The second child (the "preschooler") came in and asked if the sibling ate his/her cookie. The sibling either chose to tell the

truth and said s(he) ate it, or lied and said someone else ate it. The first time it was acted out the teacher was the preschool child. When the sibling told the truth she said, "I'm sad you ate my cookie, but I'm glad you told the truth. Next time, don't eat my cookie! Okay?" The scenario was repeated several more times, each time asking how the characters felt with their decision and when a lie was involved, what else could they could have done. Sometimes the emphasis was on how it felt to tell the truth when you made a mistake, or how people didn't want to be with others who lied. In one case, the sibling said one of the members of the audience ate the cookie. In that scenario, the teacher was playing the preschool child and started to "yell" at the audience member for eating the cookie. The role play was stopped to ask how everyone was feeling. When the sibling admitted to a mistake, he was thanked for telling the truth. The teacher commented on the fact that nobody hit anybody; we just talked.

On Day 5, an identical post-test was administered to Group A and Group B. Both of the students and the researcher chose a DUPLO® person to be their character. The researcher's character pretended to break the neck of a small plastic swan (the neck was broken before testing began). "Uh-oh. I broke my mom's swan and I don't want her to be mad at me. What should I do? What should I tell her?" Each child was given time to respond. Then the researcher's character said, "Should I say I did it, or someone else?" Then the children were asked, "Why should I say [their answer]?" Finally the

children were asked how the researcher's mom would feel and why. Other questions were asked if they would help clarify the child's answers and at the end of the session each child was asked if they had anything else they wanted to say about the story.

Part 2

The second part centered on the value of not taking something that is not yours. The book used was Jamaica's Find by Juanita Havill. Group A had the Experimental - Large Group training (book, discussion and dramatization in one large group of 18 students) and Group B was the Control Group, only hearing the story. (See Appendix B for an outline of the discussion questions, dramatization scenarios, and test questions.)

The pretest questions and scenario (administered on Day 1) were identical for both groups. Each of the two same-sex children and the researcher had a "kid" puppet. If the subjects were boys, there was a Buz Lightyear toy on the table. If the subjects were girls, there was a flocked pony on the table. The researcher's puppet said, "There's a toy on the sidewalk. What should we do?" Each child was given time to answer. If the response had to do with taking it or returning it (anything except playing with it), the child was asked, "Why?" The researcher then said, "Let's take it, okay?" Since many children added that the toy was really theirs in the story, the clarifying phrase, "It's not mine and it's not yours" was added to the script. The researcher's character said, "It's not mine and not yours, but I really like

this toy. Is it okay that I take it?" and the children's responses were recorded. The researcher concluded by asking "Why [repeat of child's last response]". Other questions were asked if they could help clarify the child's answers and at the end of the session each child was asked if they had anything else they wanted to say about the story.

On Day 2, Control Group B heard the story at Group Time in the classroom. Before Experimental - Large Group A heard the story in the classroom, the teacher asked the class if they had ever lost anything. After each response the teacher asked the child how they felt about it? After hearing the story, some clarifying questions were asked such as why Jamaica took the dog home with her. The feelings of the person who lost the dog were highlighted. The children were asked to look at the illustrations again and consider how Kristen (the child who lost the dog) felt as she searched the park for the dog, and then how she felt when she found the dog in the Lost and Found. The children were asked what they would do if they found a toy in the park. The discussion concluded with the teacher asking if it was a good idea for Jamaica to take the dog home. The children all chorused, "No." The teacher then asked "Why not?"

On Day 3 only group A received training. The story was quickly reviewed and the dramatizations began.

In the first dramatization, a stuffed dog was placed on the floor and a child pretended to find the dog at the park. The child was asked what she

would do. She decided to take it to her friend's house [maybe she lost it]. Then the person who really lost the dog came to the park and looked for her dog. It was not there. The child and audience were asked how she felt.

In the second scenario, a child found a toy dog at the park and was asked what she would do. She also thought to take it home, but was reminded of the sad outcome of the previous scenario. When asked for another idea, the child suggested leaving it. When the child who lost the dog came and found the dog, he was asked how he felt.

The third scenario was set in the school playground. A child found a toy dinosaur on the ground. When asked what he would do with it, he decided to leave it. The child who lost the dinosaur came back, and was asked how he felt when he found it.

The next time that scenario was reenacted, the teacher suggested that the school had a Lost and Found. The boy who found the toy, took it to the Lost and Found in the office. The child who lost the dinosaur looked in playground and then found it in the office. The children were asked how all the characters in the play felt. The children chose to enact this scenario twice.

In the next dramatization, the child agreed in advance to "make a mistake" and take the toy car home. The child playing the parent was coached to ask if it was his child's car. The child responded that he found it. The "parent" was coached to ask if it was somebody else's car. The teacher asked the "child" if they made a mistake and how they felt?

In the last dramatization, two friends were walking together, and one picked up a toy car that wasn't theirs to take home. The teacher asked the child who didn't pick up the car what they could say to the one who picked it up. The child told him, "No." The teacher asked why shouldn't he take it home. The child responded that it was somebody else's. When the teacher asked what they should do, they decided to turn it in to the Lost and Found. Then the child who lost the car looked for it, and found it at the Lost and Found. The session ended by talking about how the people in the play felt at the end.

On Day 5, the post-test was the same for Group A and Group B. Each of the two same-sex students and the researcher chose a DUPLO® person to be their character. If the subjects were boys, there was a small clear rubber ball, with a rainbow cat's eye center, on the table. If the subjects were girls, there was a "ruby" ring on the table. The scenario and questions (except for the change of props) were identical to the pretest.

Part 3

The third part focused on excluding others from your group and saying things that hurt other people's feelings. The book, Best Friends for Francis by Russell Hoban was used to illustrate this value. Group A was the Experimental - Small Group, hearing the book, discussing it and doing the dramatizations in small groups, and Group B was the Experimental - Large

Group, hearing the book, discussing it and dramatizing it as a whole class of 16.

The pretest questions and scenario (administered on Day 1) were identical for both groups. Each of the two children and the researcher had a "kid" puppet and were playing with three plastic monkeys. Another puppet, came over and asked, "Can I play with you?" Each child was given time to respond. Then the researcher's puppet said, "We're the friends, right? Let's tell her/him she/he can't play with us." If there was no response, the researcher asked, "What should we tell her/him?" After the children had a chance to respond, the researcher said, "I don't want her/him to play with us. I'll tell her/him to go away. Do you think it's okay I say, "Go away"? Depending on the child's answer, they were asked why it was okay, or not okay. Sometimes the researcher added, that girl/boy had funny hair. "Let's tell her/him she/he can't play." The questioning ended by asking, "How will she/he [the rejected puppet] feel? Then each child was asked if they had anything else they wanted to say about the story.

On Day 2, Experimental - Small Group A, in two groups of 7 and 8 students, heard the story and discussed it in the small conference room adjacent to the preschool classroom. Experimental - Large Group B heard the story and discussed it as a whole class of 17 students, in the preschool room. Both groups were asked the same discussion questions. (See Appendix B for an outline of the discussion questions, dramatization scenarios, and test

questions.) Questions during the reading of the story helped highlight the emotions of the characters when they were excluded from the group's play. These included questions on how Frances felt when Albert said she couldn't come wandering, or play baseball. After the story the children considered how Gloria, the little sister, felt when Frances said she couldn't play baseball, versus how she felt when they were playing all together at the end. The discussion continued with the teacher asking the children if anybody had said hurting things to them, i.e., something that made them feel sad. After each incident related by a child, the teacher asked how it felt when that person had said hurting things to him/her. What would have been a better thing to say?

On Day 3, Experimental - Small Group A dramatized various scenarios related to exclusion in two groups (of 8 and 9 children) in a small conference room adjacent to the preschool. Experimental - Large Group B dramatized similar scenarios in the classroom with a full class of 16 students (numbers varied due to absences).

In the first scenario, two children pretended to be sitting at Circle Time. Another child came over and one child was coached to say, "You can't sit here. You're not my friend." The class then discussed how that felt. What could be a better thing to say?

The same scenario was repeated, and the pair was asked if they were going to be mean or do it the nice way. If they chose to reject the child, the

rejected child was asked to state the rule (anyone can sit/play, at school).
The scenario was repeated until a positive and negative response was given.
In each case, the feelings of the participants were considered. Attention was
drawn to their faces for evidence of how they felt. (The children really got
into acting out the scenes and their faces reflected their happiness or distress.)

The second scenario had two friends with two dinosaurs playing
together. A third child came over and asked, "Can I play?" The scene was
played with both positive and negative responses, with the children choosing
their response. In each case the children were asked how the people felt. If
the friends said the third person could play, the group brainstormed on what
to do when there was only two dinosaurs and three people. Various
solutions were enacted so the scene was played many times.

The second scenario was repeated again, but this time the focus was on
what the rejected person could say. When the student came up with a
hurting response, such as, "I'm not going to be your friend," the class
discussed what else could be said, without hurting anybody's feelings.
Invoking the rule was emphasized.

In the third scenario, one friend said the newcomer could play and the
other said the newcomer could not play. The children talked it over and the
teacher suggested that maybe one made a mistake and wanted to change their
mind. She asked if they were thinking how [the rejected child's name] felt.
What other way could this scene go? This scene was repeated.

In the fourth scenario, the teacher played the role of a child and asked if she could play. The other child responded "No" (prearranged). The teacher responded that it was the rule that you have to let people play. The other child was coached to repeat his, "No." The teacher then modeled getting help from adult to say the rule.

In the fifth scenario one child was asked to tell the teacher she couldn't play because she was wearing glasses. The class was asked how the teacher felt and the teacher modeled telling the other child how that hurt her feelings and repeating the rule that all the children can play. The child who rejected the teacher was asked if they wanted to change what they said.

In the last scenario, two children (with their permission) played out a scene where one child told the other he couldn't play because he had funny hair. The group talked about how the rejected child felt and what would have been a better thing to say.

To conclude, the teacher asked if it was nice to say certain phrases, such as: "You're not my friend" or "You can't sit next to me". Each child was given a chance to come to the front of the group and tell something that was a good thing to say, or tell something that was a bad thing to say. For each child the teacher asked if they had a good thing to say or a bad thing to say. Virtually all the children wanted to come up, and all gave appropriate examples and classified them correctly.

On Day 5, both groups had the identical post-testing. Each of the two children and the researcher had a plastic DUPLO® toy child and were playing with three small plastic bears. The researcher then introduced a plastic toy person with a differently shaped body. Except for the props, the post-test story and questions were identical to the pretest questions. (Except the newcomer was described as having a funny body instead of funny hair).

Scoring the Testing

The following procedure was used to score the pre- and post-testing sessions. Transcriptions of the pre- and post-tests were prepared from the videotapes and answers recorded by the researcher on the scoring sheets.

The children's initial responses were classified as antisocial or prosocial, as applicable. Then the response to the negatively leading question by the researcher was scored. For the first value, honesty, the question was, "Should I tell her I broke the swan or somebody else?" For the second value, involving stealing, the question was, " This ring/ball is not mine, but I really like it. Let's take it, okay?" For the third value, involving exclusion, the question was "We're the friends. Let's tell him he can't play with us. Okay?" If the child answered with the antisocial response (e.g., Tell her someone else broke the neck. Yes, we can take it and keep it. Yeah, he can't play.), (s)he was given a (-). If the child answered with a prosocial answer (e.g., Tell her you broke the swan. No, you can't take it; it's not yours. He can play.), (s)he was scored as a (+). If the child vacillated between prosocial and antisocial

responses during the testing period, (s)he was scored as a (±). If the child

gave an irrelevant answer, their response was acknowledged, but then the

negatively leading question was repeated. With a repetition of the question

(if needed) all the children's responses fell into the previously described

categories.

The difference between the pre-test and post-test was calculated (Table 4).

Table 4

Change Between Pretest and Post-test with Corresponding Change Score

Pretest	Post-test	Change Score
-	-	0
-	±	+
-	+	++
±	±	0
±	+	+
±	-	-
+	-	--
+	±	-
+	+	0

Note. For the pretest and post-test scores, + = prosocial
response; ± = mixed response, and - = antisocial response.

If the child remained (+) or remained (-), a change score of "0" was assigned. If the child went from a (-) to a (±) a change score of one [+] was assigned. Likewise a change from (±) to (+) was rated as a difference of one [+]. A change from (-) to (+) was rated as a difference of two [++]. Similarly, (±) to (-) or (+) to (±) was a difference of one [-], and a change from (+) to (-) was a difference of two [--].

Besides noting the direction of change of social vs. antisocial responses, the quality of the responses in the pre- and post-tests was examined. After all testing was complete, the responses for all the children participating in each part of the experiment were reviewed for recurrent comments and common themes. Categories of common responses and explanations were established (e.g., not nice, it's not yours), as well as categories of responses that would support or discredit theories reviewed in the literature (e.g., perspective taking, use of rules, parent as authority, and care vs. justice responses). For example, in Part 1 dealing with the value of honesty, it was noted when the children stated the rule, mentioned a positive reaction to honesty, recommended lying to avoid punishment, considered other's feelings, gave helping responses, etc.

After the categories were established, the transcripts were re-analyzed to determine the incidence of each type of response for each child. Then the frequency of each type of response category was tabulated, either for the group or for a subset of students, e.g., boys.

Chapter 4

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The results and discussion section contains analyses of preschoolers'

responses designed to answer the questions posed in Chapter 1. (a) Would

reading, discussing and dramatizing the values addressed in a book (RAD

technique) increase the number of children who could apply the prosocial

values, over just listening to and seeing the story? (b) Would small group

instruction increase the efficacy of such training? (c) Would some prosocial

values be more difficult to assimilate than others? (d) Would there be any

difference between boys and girls, younger and older preschoolers, and

limited English proficient and English proficient students in their response to

the training sessions?

The first section of this chapter describes the results for each part of the

experiment. The quantitative results are given first. Pretest results indicate

how similar the two groups were; post-test results indicate the efficacy of the

two different conditions employed in that part of the experiment (Control,

Experimental - Large Group, or Experimental - Small Group). In the next

section, qualitative analyses of the results are presented. These results shed

light on the preschoolers' thinking processes and conceptions as they

encountered moral problems.

The next section of the chapter compares the three training conditions,

to see which condition(s) were the most effective for promoting prosocial

values. The analysis is first done by group (i.e., did those in the large group trainings regardless of value, do the same or better than those in small group trainings) and then by individual, i.e., looking at each individual child, did a pattern emerge showing more gain with a certain training regime?

These two sections lead to answers to questions (a) and (b). Would reading, discussing and dramatizing values addressed in a book increase the number of children who could apply the prosocial values, over just hearing the book alone; and would small group instruction increase the efficacy of such training?

The next section looks at these latter results with a different slant. Under the same training conditions, were some values more or less difficult for the children to learn? The results in this section help answer question (c), would some prosocial values be more difficult to assimilate than others?

The last part of this chapter addresses how individual differences affect the effectiveness of the RAD training. Gender differences, age effects and the effect of English language proficiency are each analyzed in separate sections. The results are first examined to see if any initial (pre-test) differences existed between the groups, i.e., boys vs. girls, younger vs. older, and between those of differing English proficiency. Then the efficacy of the training conditions was analyzed for each group. This part of the chapter develops answers to question (d) above.

Part 1

Part 1 compared the Control condition and the Experimental - Small

Group training condition using the value of honesty.

Quantitative

Pretest

Control Group A and Experimental - Small Group B had similar

results in the pretest (see Table 5). About one half of each group advocated

lying (61% for Control Group A and 50% of Experimental Small Group B) and

about one half of each group offered mixed or prosocial responses.

Table 5

Part 1 - Pretest Response to the Question, "I'll tell her someone else did it, okay?"

	Control Grp. A		Expt. Small Grp. B	
Response	n	%	n	%
-	11	61	7	50
±	0	0	4	29
+	7	39	3	21
Total	18	100	14	100

Note: (-) = antisocial response
      (±) = mixed antisocial and prosocial responses
      (+) = prosocial response

Post-test

Looking at the change between the pretest and post-test, more positive

changes occurred in the Experimental - Small Group B than in the Control

Group A (see Table 6).

Table 6

Part 1 - Change between Pretest and Post-Test Response to the Question, "I'll

tell her someone else did it, okay?"

Group	No Change n	%	++ Change n	%	+ Change n	%	- Change n	%	-- Change n	%
Control-A	13	72	2	11	0	0	1	6	2	11
Expt. Sm.-B	5	36	3	21	4	29	1	7	1	7

Note: (++) = change from antisocial to prosocial answer
(+) = change from mixed response to prosocial
(-) = change from positive response to mixed response
(- -) = change from positive response to antisocial response

Most of the children in Control Group A (72%) showed no change after

just hearing the story. This contrasted with Experimental Group B having

only one-third unchanged after participating in the RAD training. In

addition, Experimental - Small Group B had more students change to more

prosocial responses. When all of the positive change scores (++ and +) were

added together for each group, Experimental Small Group B had 50% of the

students give more prosocial responses, while only 11% of Control Group A gave more prosocial responses, a difference of 39%. The change to more antisocial responses was similar for both groups (14-18%).

One problem with examining the data in this manner was that children who initially gave prosocial answers in the pretest, and subsequently gave prosocial answers in the post-test, were classified as unchanged. Even if they had added to their understanding during the training, the post-test scoring did not measure any gain due to ceiling effects. Therefore, only the data from those children who could have shown improvement (those whose antisocial or mixed response scores remained unchanged) were analyzed (see Table 7).

Table 7

Part 1 - Change between Pretest and Post-Test Responses for Children Who Initially Gave Antisocial or Mixed Responses

	Unimproved		Improved	
Group	n	%	n	%
Control - A	9	82	2	18
Expt.-Small - B	4	36	7	64

Note. Total number with an antisocial or mixed response in the pretest: Group A - 11; Group B - 11

When the data were examined in this manner, 64% of the children who initially gave antisocial or mixed responses in Experimental - Small Group B moved towards a more prosocial response after the training, while only 18% of Control Group A showed the same improvement (a difference of 46%). Clearly, more children moved towards more prosocial answers after the training that included discussion and dramatization than with just reading alone.

<div align="center">Qualitative</div>

Discussion

The children in Experimental Small Group B really became involved with, and contributed to the discussion of The Empty Pot on Day 1. The initial questions were factual and focused on comprehending the text. When asked why the emperor was happy that Ping's seed did not grow, several comments from the children showed they understood the theme of the book. They said, "Because he told the truth," "All the kids didn't tell the truth, but that one boy [Ping] did." The children commented on how Ping felt when he brought the empty pot to the Emperor. Most of the children focused on the fact that he was crying because his seed did not grow. It was difficult for them to see that he would feel embarrassed or scared of the consequences of telling the truth.

After the teacher told the story of a boy who had taken the magnetic marbles from the classroom, one boy in the class volunteered a story about a

kid who took his story [book], and then told the truth, and brought it back. The class talked about how all the people in that story would feel.

Spontaneous Prosocial Responses

Before the leading question (Should I tell her I did it, or someone else?) was asked during testing, some children spontaneously offered prosocial responses to the initial question (Uh-oh. I broke my mom's ____. What should I say? What should I do?).

Reparative/Altruistic Responses. The children's most frequent response to the initial question of what should be done or told to the mother about the broken item, was reparative. Since helping and reparative behavior was not addressed during the training, both groups would be expected to show similar numbers of children with altruistic responses, i.e., a naturally occurring baseline of altruistic responses in preschool children of this age.

Approximately half of the children during the pretest (55% of Control Group A, 43% of Experimental - Small Group B) and a third of the children in the post-test (33% of Control Group A, 36% of Experimental - Small Group B) wanted to fix the broken object and suggested taping or gluing it, or offered the mother something of value as reparation. Since not all of the same children suggested fixing the object in both the pre- and post-tests, all together 55% of Group A and 64% of Group B suggested fixing the object. Helping was also a frequent response, with a third of the children offering to help the researcher's character (33% of Control Group A, and 36% of Experimental -

Table 8

Qualitative Response Frequencies for Pretest and Post-test Responses

In Part 1

Type of Response	Control Grp. A				Expt. Small Grp. B			
	Pretest		Post-test		Pretest		Post-test	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Spontaneous Prosocial								
Reparative/Altruistic								
Fix	10	55	6	33	6	43	5	36
Help	2	11	4	22	4	29	2	14
Sorry	3	17	1	6	2	14	3	21
Tell what happened	0	0	3	17	1	7	5	36
Spontaneous Antisocial	0	0	2	11	2	14	3	21
Response to Leading Question								
Lie to avoid punishment	3	17	4	22	2	14	1	7
Tell truth								
To avoid punishment	2	11	1	6	0	0	1	7
Make mom happy	0	0	2	11	0	0	3	21
Rule	2	11	2	11	0	0	2	14
Omnipotent Adult	1	6	1	6	0	0	1	7
Intentionality	1	6	1	6	1	7	1	7
Perspective Taking								
Predict mom's feelings*								
Accurately	12	80	14	78	11	85	13	93
Inaccurately	3	20	4	22	2	15	1	7

Note: *Pretest of Part 1: not every child was asked how the mother would feel, so percentages were calculated for the number of children who were asked that question.

Small Group B). Table 8 indicates the frequency of the different qualitative responses in Part 1 of the experiment.

Besides helping to fix the object themselves, one boy offered a different form of moral support when he said, "Maybe I can come with you [to tell your mom]." It was interesting to note that more children offered to help during the post-test of Control Group A (22%) than during the pretest (11%), while in Experimental - Small Group B fewer children offered help in the post-test (14%) than in the pretest (29%). One explanation for this pattern may be that the children in Experimental - Small Group B had their attention focused on the dimension of telling the truth through the training. This could have detracted from their inherent interest in helping others. However, the difference in the percentages was not large, and the difference in actual numbers was only 2 children in each case, so there may not have been any significance to the difference.

In this study, between one third and one half of the children displayed altruistic behavior as a bystander. This proportion of altruistic behavior was similar to that found in two-year-olds by Zahn-Waxler, et al. (1992). They found that in naturally occurring distresses, where the child was a bystander, one half of the 2-year-olds showed prosocial responses. The results from the present study are also similar to results by Radke-Yarrow, Scott, and Zahn-Waxler (1973) dealing with 3.5 - 5.5-year-olds. In that study, 33 - 40% of a Control group showed helping behavior to at least one of four incidents of

distress (diorama, picture series, and behavioral incidents).

Sorry. Control Group A and Experimental - Small Group B had similar proportions of children tell the researcher's character to say she was sorry (17% and 14% respectively). However, the percentages were not as close for the post-test. In the post-test, only 6% of Control Group A directed the researcher's character to say she was sorry while 21% of Experimental - Small Group B directed the researcher's character to say she was sorry. Although the RAD training never mentioned saying "sorry" for breaking something, the children were repeatedly asked to consider the feelings of the parent or wronged party. More children in the Experimental - Small Group B may have suggested saying they were sorry due to raised consciousness of other's feelings. However, since the numbers of children involved were small, the increase in spontaneously saying "sorry" may have had no significance.

Tell what happened. In the pretest, only 1 child (in Experimental - Small Group B) spontaneously said to tell the mother what had happened (e.g., it was accidentally broken). However, the post-test showed a difference between the Groups. Fewer in Control Group A (17%) suggested telling the mother what really happened, than in Experimental - Small Group B (36%). The RAD training appeared to have influenced more children to be 'up front' with the mother and spontaneously tell her what happened, i.e., admit to wrong-doing and tell the truth.

Spontaneous Antisocial Responses

Before the leading question (Should I tell her I did it, or someone else?) was asked, some children spontaneously gave antisocial responses. Two children in the pretest of Experimental - Small Group B spontaneously suggested antisocial responses to the above question. One girl suggested hiding the evidence when she said, "You should put the lid on the box, so your mama won't think you broke it. So she won't be mad at you." One boy said, "You can tell her you didn't broke it." In the post-test, 2 participants from Control Group A, and 3 participants from Experimental - Small Group B spontaneously suggested antisocial responses. They all suggested saying, "That someone else did it." One variation was, "Dog did it." This increase in spontaneous antisocial responses may have been the result of carry over from the pre-test scenario, where the children may have remembered the researcher asking the children if she should say she did it, or someone else did. The researcher's question may have been interpreted as a suggestion to say, someone else did it.

Responses to the Leading Question

After the children responded to the open-ended question of what to do or tell the mom about the broken box (or swan), the children were asked if the researcher's character should say she did it, or someone else did it.

Lying to avoid punishment. Once the suggestion was made that the researcher's character might tell the truth or lie, many of the children advised

lying to avoid punishment. Kohlberg (Kohlberg, 1971, 1978; Turiel, 1983) suggested children follow the rules and tell the truth to avoid punishment. The responses of 3 of the subjects (1 in the post-test of Experimental - Small Group B and 2 in the pretest of Control Group A) gave limited support this theory. One girl said, "Tell the truth. If you won't tell the truth then she [mother] will be mad. If you will tell the truth, then she won't be mad." One boy said, "[Say] you did it because you don't have to get in trouble and you don't make a lie."

However, for the most part, the children in this sample would lie to avoid punishment. The groups were evenly matched in suggesting lying to get out of punishment in the pretest (14% and 17%). In the post-test, there was a slight increase in the number of children who suggested lying to avoid punishment in Control Group A (from 17% - 22%). One answered the researcher's question, "Should I tell my mom I did it?" with "No." When asked why, he said, "Because you don't want to get in trouble right?" Another boy said, "I know what you can do. You can hide it. You can hide it 'cause nothing won't happen to you. And she'll say you are a good girl." Some elaborated on their lie. One girl said, "Pretend somebody sneaked in her room and then tear it [box] up and then put it back." In Experimental - Small Group B, fewer children (only 1 child) suggested lying in the post-test than in the pretest (7% vs. 14%) and fewer children suggested lying in the post-test of Experimental - Small Group B than in the post-test of Control

Group A (7% vs. 22%). This trend indicated that the RAD training decreased the number of children who would suggest lying to get out of punishment. It is interesting to note that the one boy in Experimental - Small Group B who advised the researcher's character to lie, knew that one should tell the truth. However, he suggested saying that the dog did it. Why? "Your mommy will get mad." When asked how the mother would feel, he said, "Sad." Why would she be sad? "Because she [the researcher's character] lied." For this boy, who knew you should tell the truth, it was more important to avoid angering the mother than to tell the truth.

Telling the truth. For a few of the children who advised the researcher's character to tell the truth, the reason was very simple. You told the truth, because that's the way it was. When one boy, who advised saying the researcher's character broke the box, was asked why the character should say that, he very realistically replied, "Because you broke it." One might have thought that these children had not yet developed the cognitive sophistication to lie and rearrange events to suit their needs. However, this was not the case. One of the girls who vacillated between telling the truth and lying said at one point, "Say you did, because you're the one who broke it." This girl could lie (she was the one who suggested pretending that somebody sneaked into the room and tore the box). For her, during the pretest, neither moral reason, nor goodness or badness was involved with telling the truth. She was just reporting events accurately.

For more of the children in the class, a more complicated reason existed for telling the truth, which involved the parent's response. During the pretest, 11% in Control Group A (0 in Group B) talked about avoiding punishment from the mother if you told the truth. One boy advised saying that the researcher's character broke the box and explained why. "Cause you won't get in trouble. You won't lie." The other boy said to say, "You did it, because you don't have to get in trouble and you don't make a lie." In the post-test, more children in Experimental - Small Group B were able to give reasons for telling the truth. One of the children focused on telling the truth to avoid punishment (as in pretest Group A). "Tell the truth. If you won't tell the truth then she [mom] will be mad. If you will tell the truth, then she won't be mad." Three of the 14 children (21%) in Group B focused on the positive results of telling the truth. In answer to the question, "How would the mom feel?" they answered, "Happy that you tell the truth," "I think happy. Because you told the truth," and "Happy...Cause she told she broke it." However, Control Group A also had children who answered similarly (but a smaller percentage), with 11% children responding, "She'll feel happy... when you don't make a lie," and "Say you did it, cause that will make her happy."

Some children advocated telling the truth because they were following the rule. In the pretest, 11% of the children in Control Group A and 0 in Experimental - Small Group B, stated a rule about telling the truth or not lying. ("You won't lie." "...don't make a lie."). In the post-test, 2 of the

children (11%) in Control Group A (1 from the pretest and another student) stated the rule. ("Don't lie and tell the truth." "You should just tell the truth and you don't make a lie.") In the post-test, for the first time in Group B, 2 students stated the rule ("Tell the truth." "Cause you tell the truth every time."), an increase of 14%.

More children advocated telling the truth after the RAD training, and more responded with positive reasons (to make mother happy) or by stating the rule, instead of to avoid punishment. That some children did not only state the rule, parroting the adult line, but could also anticipate the effect of lying on others, was encouraging. None of the children mentioned that telling the truth would make mom feel happy in the pretest, but several did in the post-test, with a higher percentage in Experimental - Small Group B.

Omnipotent Adults

According to Piaget's (1932/1965) theory of moral development, preschool age children consider their parents as omnipotent and all knowing. A few of the children's responses seem consistent with this theory. Two children, one in the post-test and the other in the pre- and post-test, indicated that mother would know who broke the object even if they lied. After telling the researcher's character to hide the broken object, the researcher asked one boy how the mother would feel. He said, "She'll feel, 'I know you did it and you go in your room for 10 minutes.' "

Intentionality

According to Piaget's (1932/1965) theory of moral development, one would not expect preoperational children to utilize intentionality or another's motivation in their moral reasoning. At this stage, the children should just be concerned with the magnitude of the lie or the magnitude of the mess resulting from wrong-doing. However, a small proportion, 4/32 children (1 in each group's pretest and 1 in each group's post-test), did take into account the child's motivation when advocating telling the truth and explaining (and excusing) circumstances to the mother. "You should tell your mom you did an accident." Say, "I broked the box. [Why?] 'Cause a accident broked it." Say, "I did it. [Why?] You clean your house. Tell when broke - clean," [i.e. it broke when you were cleaning], where cleaning was an activity desired by mothers. One girl utilized intentionality but did not use it to help excuse the breakage. She said, "You should tell her. You did it on purpose. Not us. We saw you." [You can't lie; there were witnesses.]

Piaget (1932/1965) wrote that at the age of three or four years, children began to use motivation to excuse themselves from wrong-doing, saying it was "not on purpose." However, the 3- and 4-year-olds in *his* study, did not take into account the intentions of others, and judged them by established rules. Several of the children in *this* study appeared to have projected themselves into the researcher's character and recommended what they would have done for themselves, i.e., excusing the breakage as an accident.

Perspective Taking

Some studies of perspective taking have indicated that preschoolers can see things from another's point of view and know what others are feeling. Other studies have indicated that preschoolers cannot take another's perspective. Still other studies have taken an intermediate stance and maintain that a preschooler knows that others can be happy when he is sad, but will assume that in similar situations, others will feel or act the same as he would (Dixon & Moore, 1990; review by Maccoby, 1980; Selman, 1976).

Two of the children in this study showed perspective taking when they spontaneously mentioned how the mother would feel. One girl in the pretest suggested telling mom that someone else broke the box, "Cause you don't want to hurt her feelings." Another girl also didn't want the researcher to tell her mom that she broke the box. She recommended, "Tell her don't come, and show her a present. . . . She wants to have a present to make her happy. Put something in the box and tell mom to be happy." From these comments, one can conclude that these children were thinking about how the mother would feel, trying to protect her feelings, and make her feel better about the damage.

Most of the children (80-85% in the pretest) were accurate in predicting how the mother would feel when her box was broken. Most children responded she would be sad or mad, focusing on the destruction of her box (not on her reaction to telling the truth or a lie). One girl said, "She should be

sad, so sad." A few responded appropriately that she would be happy they did not tell a lie, or told the truth. However, in the pretest a few, (20% in Control Group A, and 15% in Experimental - Small Group B) did not answer appropriately or did not know how the mother would feel. One boy answered, "Maybe sad, or happy or mad." When his partner said that the mother would be sad, he plaintively responded, "But [partner's name], I didn't know that." However, after the training, all but 1 of the children (7%) in Experimental - Small Group B were able to assign appropriate feelings to the mother - either sad or mad her box was broken, or happy that the child told the truth. The one child who did not answer appropriately, excused the researcher's character from blame by saying, "She's [the mother] happy, because . . . your mom didn't want it [the box]." This child had previously exhibited a pattern of not accepting responsibility for her actions in class. In contrast, in the post-test of Control Group A, 4 children, or 22%, did not assign appropriate feelings to the mother. One of the boys suggested telling the mother that the father had broken the swan. When asked how the mother would feel, he responded, "Happy." Why? "You can tell her that . . . your dad did it." In other words, mom would have been happy that the child did not do it. He looked at it only in regard to the mother's feelings for the child, a very limited, one-sided view. This situation was a good example of Selman's Level 0, egocentric perspective taking. At that level, 4-6-year olds assume that others will feel or act the same as they would.

One might have expected that the same children who could not project, or projected inappropriate feelings for the mother during Control Group A's pretest, would have the same difficulty in the post-test. However, only 1 child did not know how the mother would feel in both the pre- and post-tests. All of the other 3 children, who could not project or projected inappropriate feelings for the mother in the post-test, had been accurate in the pre-test. These children had regressed after just hearing the story, or displayed a wider natural variation in responses.

Therefore, on the whole, most of the children of this age were able to predict accurately how another would feel in a certain circumstance, and the training improved the children's predictive abilities in this situation.

Part 2

Part 2 of the experiment compared the efficacy of the Experimental - Large Group training vs. the Control condition of reading the book alone. The value used in Part 2 was stealing.

Quantitative

Pretest

The groups did not appear to be evenly matched in the pretest. Nineteen percent more children in Control Group B agreed that the researcher's character should take the toy (antisocial response), than in Experimental - Large Group A (60% vs. 41%). (See Table 9)

Table 9

Part 2 - Pretest Response to the Question, "Let's take it, okay?"

Response	Expt. Large Grp. A		Control Grp. B	
	n	%	n	%
-	7	41	9	60
±	4	24	2	13
+	6	35	4	27
Total	17	100	15	100

Note: (-) = antisocial response
(±) = mixed antisocial and prosocial responses
(+) = prosocial response

Eleven percent more of Experimental - Large Group A vacillated between the prosocial and antisocial responses than Control Group B (24% vs. 13%). Looking at the number of children who either told the researcher to return the toy or leave it (prosocial responses), Experimental - Large Group A offered more prosocial answers (35%) while Control Group B offered 8% fewer prosocial responses (27%). Therefore, initially, more children in Control Group B leaned toward antisocial responses and fewer children leaned toward prosocial responses than in Experimental - Large Group A.

Post-test

The change between post-test and pretest scores was virtually identical

for both groups when analyzed strictly by change scores (See Table 10). There

was $\leq 7\%$ difference between any of the change categories between

Experimental - Large Group A and Control Group B.

Table 10

Part 2 - Change between Pretest and Post-Test Response to the Question, "Let's
take it, okay?"

Group	No Change		++ Change		+ Change		- Change		-- Change	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Expt. Lg.-A	9	53	4	23	3	18	1	6	0	0
Control-B	9	60	3	20	2	13	0	0	1	7

Total N Group A = 17, Total N Group B = 15
(++) = change from antisocial to prosocial answer
(+) = change from mixed response to prosocial, or antisocial to mixed
        response
(-) = change from mixed response to antisocial response
(- -) = change from positive response to antisocial response

Since the percentage of change between pre- and post-tests was

virtually the same for each group regardless of the training, it appeared, at

first, that with this book and this value, there was no advantage gained by the

extra training over just reading the book. Children in the Control group did

learn and increased their prosocial responses after hearing the book alone. In fact one girl in Control Group B referred to the story during the post-test when she said, "Remember the story, when the little girl left her puppy there, and the other little girl picks it up?" The improvement in Control Group A could be attributed to either or both of two factors. The first factor was that the book, Jamaica's Find, was well written and could stand alone for instruction. The second possible factor had to do with order effects. The children who were in Control Group B in Part 2 had been in Experimental - Small Group B in Part 1. Having experienced the RAD training in Part 1, the children in Group B could have been primed to focus on the moral dilemma introduced in the book in Part 2 of the experiment. After discussing and dramatizing a moral problem in a small group, there may have been a carry-over effect that made just hearing the story more effective for Control Group B. This could have contributed to an increased number of (+) change scores in Control Group B vs. the limited number of (+) change scores for Control Group A (in Part 1), whose participants had had no previous small group training.

However, Group A and Group B were not evenly matched at the beginning of Part 2. Control Group B gave more antisocial responses in both the pretest and the post-test. Conversely, this meant that Experimental Large Group A had more children give prosocial responses in the pretest, and therefore had fewer children who could show improvement (they had

already given prosocial answers in the pretest). If one examined just the

children who could improve, i.e. gave antisocial or mixed responses in the

pretest, Experimental - Large Group A had a larger proportion of those

children change to prosocial responses than Control Group B (see Table 11).

Table 11

Part 2 - Change between Pretest and Post-Test Responses for Children Who

Initially Gave Antisocial or Mixed Responses

Group	Unimproved		Improved	
	n	%	n	%
Expt. Large - A	3	30	7	70
Control - B	6	55	5	45

Note. N with antisocial or mixed responses in pretest: Grp. A=10; Grp. B=11

In Experimental - Large Group A, 70% of the children who initially

gave antisocial or mixed responses changed to a more prosocial response. In

Control Group B, only 45% of the children who initially gave antisocial or

mixed responses changed to a more prosocial response. Therefore, there was

a difference of 25% between the improvement of Experimental - Large Group

A and Control Group B. The effect of the training was even more striking

when only the change scores for children who had initially given antisocial

responses were examined. In Experimental - Large Group A, 71% of the

children who initially gave antisocial responses changed to a more prosocial response. In Control Group B, only 33% of the children who initially gave antisocial responses changed to a more prosocial response (38% fewer than Experimental –Large Group A). Analyzed in this manner, the Large Group RAD training really <u>did</u> make a difference.

<div align="center">Qualitative</div>

<u>Discussion</u>

As with Part 1, the children joined in the discussion of the book. The initial questions were factual and helped clarify the meaning of the story. In response to the question of why the little girl, Jamaica, took the dog home with her, one child said Jamaica thought the dog was hers, while another said Jamaica knew it wasn't hers. After further discussion involving the whole class and using pictures and text to help clarify the point, it was agreed that the dog really belonged to someone else.

Subsequent questions led the children to speculate about what they would have done if they were placed in the same predicament as a character in the book. The children were asked what they would do if they found a toy in the park. A child initially answered, "Don' t take it." Then others added to take it home "to the people who want it" [i.e., the people who lost it]. One child told the class a personal story illustrating the 'right' thing to do. When his sister found a shovel at the park, she dug with it at the park, but didn't take it home.

Spontaneous Answers

For many children, the spontaneous response to the testing session question, "There's a toy. What should we do with it?" was to play with it. However, some children did spontaneously address the issue of taking the toy or returning it. Table 12 describes the frequencies of the different qualitative responses given during testing, in Part 2.

Spontaneous prosocial responses. Two categories of spontaneous prosocial responses were observed: return the toy, and don't take the toy.

Return the toy. In the pretest, 4 children spontaneously suggested to return the toy, 3 (18%) in Experimental - Large Group A and 1 (7%) in Control Group B. One child said, "Give it back to somebody that it was theirs." Another said, "Maybe somebody dropped it." When the researcher asked what we should we do, the child said, "Bring it back to them." In the post-test, 24% in Experimental - Large Group A, and 27% in Control Group B, spontaneously suggested to give it back. Since both groups showed similar proportions of this spontaneous response (to return a lost item directly to the owner), it appeared to be a naturally occurring altruistic response of preschoolers, enhanced by books that help children think about taking something that is not theirs. (Note: the training never addressed trying to return a found item directly to the person who lost it.)

Don't pick up the toy. In the pre-test, 3 children in Experimental - Large Group A spontaneously told the researcher's character not to pick up

Table 12

Qualitative Response Frequencies for Pretest and Post-test Responses

In Part 2

Type of Response	Expt. Large Grp. A				Control Grp. B			
	Pretest		Post-test		Pretest		Post-test	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Spontaneous Prosocial								
Return	3	18	4	24	1	7	4	27
Don't take	3	18	3	18	0	0	1	7
Spontaneous Antisocial	2	12	1	6	1	7	1	7
Response to Leading Question								
Prosocial								
Return or leave it	6	35	4	24	2	13	5	33
Reasons								
Not yours	6	35	9	53	2	13	5	33
Obey rule to avoid								
punishment	1	6	0	0	1	7	0	0
Antisocial Reasons								
Attractiveness of toy	0	0	0	0	2	13	0	0
It's nobody's	1	6	0	0	3	20	1	7
It's mine	4	24	2	12	1	7	2	13
Perspective Taking	1	6	3	18	1	7	1	7
Parent at Authority	1	6	1	6	3	20	6	40

the toy. One girl said, "Don't pick it up. Cause it's somebody else's." Another said, "Don't pick it up because it's not yours." The post-test showed an increase in this category. In Experimental - Large Group A, 2 additional children (and 1 who had previously said the same thing in the pretest) instructed the researcher's character not to take the toy home, while 1 child in Control Group B did the same. Although the same proportion of children spontaneously told the researcher not to pick up the toy in the pretest and post-test of Experimental - Large Group A (18%), one result of the training was that 2 children who had not thought of telling the researcher 'don't pick up the toy' in the pretest, employed that line of reasoning in the post-test.

Spontaneous antisocial responses. Some children spontaneously suggested taking the toy. In the pre-test, 2 children from Experimental - Large Group A, and 1 child from Control Group B suggested taking the toy. Some were very direct in answering, "There's a toy. What should we do?" "Take it," said one boy. Another explained, "Everybody don't want to play with it," to justify taking it home. In the post-test, only 1 child in each group (different children than in the pre-test) spontaneously suggested taking the toy.

Responses to the Leading Question

Initially, children gave their spontaneous response to "There's a toy. What should we do with it?" Then the researcher asked the leading question, "Let's take it, okay?" [or if the children said it was theirs, the researcher said, "It's not mine and it's not yours. Is it okay we take it?"]

Prosocial Responses to the Leading Question

Thirteen of the children suggested returning the toy, turning it in to the office, or leaving the toy, once they were asked if it was okay for the researcher to take the toy, even though it was not hers. All but three of them suggested returning the toy. More children in Experimental - Large Group A suggested such a course in the pretest than Control Group B (35% vs. 13%). In the post-test, the proportions were similar, with 24% of Experimental - Large Group A and 33% of Control Group B. The RAD training did not seem to affect the number of children who suggested a course of prosocial action. (Other prosocial responses, not counted in this section, included telling the researcher not to take the toy.)

The following sections give some insight into the reasons the children gave for their prosocial responses.

It's not yours. Many children justified returning, or not taking the toy, with the very factual reason that it did not belong to them or the researcher, i.e., it's not yours. "Cause it was theirs." "Cause it's not yours." "Because it's some people's." "Cause it's somebody else's." In the pre-test, more in Experimental - Large Group A gave this reason than in Control Group B (35% vs. 13%). In the post-test, the proportion of children giving this answer was again higher in Experimental - Large Group A than in Control Group B (53% vs. 33%). Note that both groups increased the factual, "it's not yours" answer by 20%, so no greater gain was obtained with the RAD training, than without

it. This is not surprising since the RAD training did not emphasize "not yours" as a reason for not taking something that is not yours.

To be friends. One boy gave a more inter-personal reason for giving the toy back. "Because it'll be friends," which was interpreted to mean it would be the friendly thing to do, or the person who lost it will be your friend.

Obey the rules to avoid punishment. According to Kohlberg's theory of moral development (Kohlberg, 1971, 1978; Turiel, 1983), young children obeyed the rules to avoid punishment. Damon (1980, 1988) also wrote that children over 5-years-olds obeyed to avoid punishment (children under 5-years-old obeyed the rules if they wanted to).

However, only 2 children (6%) gave answers that indicated they would follow the rules to avoid punishment; the majority just stated the facts, as written above. Both comments were made during the pre-test in response to the question "Can I take it to my home?" One boy replied, "No, because somebody will call the cops. Then they will bring him to jail." In response to the same question, a girl shook her head no. When asked why, she said, "Police come." Although these two children gave responses that supported Kohlberg's theory, the majority of the children did *not* give answers that indicated they followed the rules to avoid punishment. It's true that fear of punishment played an important role in this study. The difference was, that the children in this study did not *follow the rules* to avoid punishment; they

lied to avoid punishment (results from Part 1). Avoiding punishment was not the motivating factor for following the rules for most children.

<u>Why obey rules?</u> In Piaget's theory of moral development, young children obeyed the rules out of respect for authority and the sacredness of the rules (Piaget, 1932/1965). No children in this study indicated that they would obey the rules due to respect for authority (e.g. God says not to steal, the law says don't steal, etc.). Childrearing practices may have changed since Piaget performed his study. With experts advising parents against strict authoritarian parenting (Maccoby, 1980), and lack of discipline or inadequate disciplinary methods being characteristic of delinquents' families (Brooks & Goble, 1997), American parents may not be as strict with their children now as they were in Switzerland in the 1920's and 1930's. In addition, fewer parents may have gone over the rules of morality with their preschool children (e.g., just a few children recited rules about not lying and none stated rules about stealing per se).

Turiel (1983) cited evidence that children could make decisions about obeying authority/rules using criterion other than respect for authority or fear of punishment. This more closely reflects the results from the present study.

<u>Plans to return.</u> Some of the children outlined explicit plans for returning the toy. One boy excitedly said, "I have a good idea. We can go to every house around our house and ask if that's their toy." Another girl

elaborated, "Give it to the people who dropped it. . . . If we have the number, we could call them and they can come over our house, if they know where our house is, and we could give it to them." Even with limited English, one girl explained, "You can give... You can knock the person's door [and say], "Is it yours?" From an adult point of view, these plans seem impractical and unsafe, but they were considered reasonable and were suggested by many of the children.

Antisocial Responses to the Leading Question

Some children really embraced the antisocial response when it was suggested by the researcher. After the researcher suggested, "Let's take it, okay?", one boy responded, "Yeah, that's okay. Come on, do it."

Several reasons were given by the children to explain why they could take the toy that was found.

Attractiveness of the toy. Two children found the attractiveness of the toy reason enough to take it.

Researcher: Let's take it. Okay?
Girl: Yes.
Researcher: Why?
Girl: Because it looks beautiful.

Another girl had trouble not claiming the ring for her own (or for her family). After the researcher explained several times that the ring did not belong to either of us, the following dialogue illustrated how the attractiveness of the ring helped her decide that we should take it.

Researcher: And if we don't know what kid this belongs to, is it okay that I keep it?

Girl: Yes!

Researcher: Did you have any more to say about the story?

Girl: You can call your mom when you go up the stairs and when your mom comes down the stairs, she will look happy and she will say, "Gorgeous!"

It doesn't belong to anybody. In the pretest, 1 child from Experimental - Large Group A and 3 children from Control Group B justified taking the toy, by saying that it didn't belong to anybody.

When one boy could not determine who the toy belonged to (after pretending to telephone and visit the researcher's character's mother), he asked, "Well who dropped it then?" After the researcher answered that she didn't know, but it was not ours, the boy responded, "Well, you can keep it."

Another boy gave the same explanation when he said it was okay to take it " 'cause it's nobody's." A third boy decided that once it was dropped and left, it was fair game. He said it was okay to take it "Because somebody down that [dropped it].... You go home, you play him [it]."

Another variation on this theme was that nobody wanted this toy:

Researcher: It's not mine and not yours. It's okay we take it?

Child: Yes, I take it.

Researcher: Why is it okay?

Child: Because I think everybody don't want to play with it. I think we take it.

Curiously, all of the children in this category were boys. This could be a coincidence, or boys could possibly have more of a "finder's keepers" attitude. One might hypothesize that boys looked at the problem objectively (if you

can't find out, or don't know, who the toy belongs to, you might as well take it), and girls looked at it in relational terms (knowing that the person who dropped the toy still is attached to the toy), following the arguments of Gilligan and Wiggins (1987). However, many of the girls also did not consider the feelings of the person who lost the toy when they planned to keep it. They just never stated it overtly. In addition, several of the boys in the study did try to return the toy and made elaborate plans for finding the owner.

Only one of the boys in the post-test (in Control Group B) held on to the conviction that the lost toy did not belong to anybody. After the RAD training, the one boy in Experimental - Large Group A who had initially said "everybody don't want to play with it," showed that he was now very aware that the toy belonged to someone else in the post-test. When the researcher asked if she could take the ball home, he said, "No. . . . Because I think anybody [somebody] wants it. The 'nother people's coming. [He brought in another character to be the person who lost the ball] Where's my ball? There's my ball." Both the RAD training, and to a lesser extent, hearing the story alone, helped the children realize that a toy found on the ground, was lost by someone who still wanted it.

Mine. In the pretest, 4 children in Experimental - Large Group A and 1 child in Control Group B wanted to take the toy home because they claimed it was theirs. Even after the researcher clarified the story with the line, 'It's not

mine, it's not yours', children still claimed 'it's mine.' For example, the

researcher had just said, "It's not mine, it's not yours, it's not yours (second

child tested). Is it okay to take it in our house?" One boy still responded, "It

was mine. I forgot it." Another exchange went as follows:

> Researcher, "Remember not yours, not mine."
> Child, "Not yours either." (to second child being tested)
> Researcher, "Why is it okay for you to take it?"
> Child, "Cause I used to have one of these guys. It's mine."

Even after the training, 2 children in Experimental - Large Group A

and 2 from Control Group B still insisted they could take the toy because it

belonged to them. This was a very persistent phenomenon.

It is not clear what mechanism or thought process was being utilized

when the children repeated that the toy was theirs even after being reminded

that it was not theirs in this story. Were the children just trying to give their

input into the story-line to have the outcome they desired (ownership of a

desirable toy)? Or was the line between truth and fantasy very vague for these

preschoolers, i.e., because they wanted it to be so, it was so? Or was it a

conscious manipulation of the truth? Piaget (1932/1965) said that due to

unconscious egocentrism, the child altered the truth in accordance with his

desires and neglected "the value of veracity."

Perspective Taking

As in Part 1, several children in Part 2 gave evidence of perspective

taking. They considered the situation from the point of view of the people

who found the toy (researcher's and children's characters), and the person

who lost the toy. During the pretest, one child in each group thought about

the person who lost the toy. One boy responded to the researcher saying,

"Let's take it. Okay?" with "No." When asked why, he said, " 'Cause the man

will come back and look for it."

After the RAD training more children considered things from another

perspective than without the training. In the post-test, 18% of the children in

Experimental - Large Group A, and only 7% of the children in Control Group

B (same child as in the pretest) took the perspective of the person who lost the

toy. One boy anticipated how another person would feel in the following

exchange:

> Researcher: I'll take it okay?
> Boy: No.
> Researcher: Why?
> Boy: Cause it might be the people's. They'll be mad at you.

A girl showed the same insight:

> Researcher: I really like it. I can take it home?
> Girl: Shakes head no.
> Researcher: Why?
> Girl: Because. Someone will get mad.

The following quote demonstrates that the girl anticipated the thought of the

person who lost the toy when he came back.

> Researcher: Why do you think I should not keep it?
> Girl: Cause somebody might come out and think where their ring
> went.

Although the numbers of children who considered the perspective of

more than one party were small, the RAD training appeared to help increase

the awareness of others in some children.

Parent as Authority

One fourth of the children relied on their parents as authority figures

to either decide if it was permissible to take the toy, or to give permission for

them to take the toy (either in the pretest, post-test or both). Piaget

(1932/1965) theorized that children saw their parents as the ultimate

authority. Specifically, 3% of Experimental - Large Group A, and 20% of

Control Group B relied on their parent as an authority figure in the pretest.

Some children had no idea of what was the right thing to do, and

anticipated that their mother would tell them what to do. With one girl,

whatever mom said, that's the way it would be.

> Researcher: Would it be okay if you took it too?
> Child: Yeah.
> Researcher: It's not mine and it 's not yours. Is it okay if we take it?
> Child: I think not. No, you can tell [ask] your mom.
> Researcher: What will my mom say?
> Child: She'll say, "No, you can't have it."
> Researcher: Why will she say I can't have it?
> Child: Cause your mom say, "Yes," you can have it.

Other children said that their mother gave them permission to have

the toy, i.e., used the authority of their parent to confer legitimacy on their

claim to the toy. One boy responded to the statement that the toy was not the

researcher's or the child's with, "It's okay if I take it home." When asked why,

he responded, "Because your mom and my mom said it's okay." Another girl

said, " 'Cause my mom said I could keep it home."

In Experimental - Group A, the same child who used her parent as an authoritative reference in the pretest, repeated this behavior the post-test. However, without the RAD training, 4 additional children in Control Group B used parental authority to explain their decision to take, or not take the toy in the post-test. Without the RAD training, these children had no cognitive basis upon which to make their own moral decision, and fell back on what Piaget (1932/1965) would have considered a lower stage of moral development, using their parents as the ultimate authority. In this case, it appears that the RAD training really did help advance the moral development of some of the children.

Evidence of Learning

Besides the increased number of children who gave prosocial responses after training, some children incorporated specific aspects of the training into their post-test responses that indicated that they could apply what they had learned during the training sessions.

In the post-test of Experimental - Large Group A, 3 children incorporated parts of the training scenarios into their responses (not present in the pretest). One girl suggested bringing the toy to the Lost and Found. One boy told why the researcher's character should not take the toy by saying, "Cause it might be the people's. They'll be mad at you. And you might make a *mistake.*" [During the training, several scenarios had the child make a

mistake, i.e., take the toy, and then deal with returning the toy.] Another boy

actually added another character to the post-test, to reflect what had been done

during the training.

> Researcher: I really like this ball. Is it okay I take it to my house?
> Child: No.
> Researcher: Why?
> Child: Because I think anybody wants it. The 'nother people's coming.
> [Then the child brought in another character to be the person who lost
> the ball]
> Child as New character: Where's my ball? There's my ball!

In the post-test of Control Group B, one girl added a comment at the

end of the testing session that attested to the effectiveness of the specific book

used in Part 2. She said, "Remember the story, when the little girl left her

puppy there, and the other little girl picks it up?"

Carry-over from Part 1. Evidence of children applying the training

from Part 1 of the experiment was observed 15 days later during Part 2.

During the pretest of Part 2, one girl explained why the mother would be mad

if the researcher's character took the toy. "Because your mom feel, tell the

truth."

The other possible carry-over from Part 1 was the order effects

previously discussed in the Part 2 post-test results section.

Part 3

Part 3 of the experiment compared Experimental - Large Group and

Experimental - Small Group training conditions, using the value of

exclusion/hurting words.

Quantitative

<u>Pretest</u>

The two groups were very evenly matched in the pretest (See Table 13).

Table 13

<u>Part 3 - Pretest Response to the Question, "Let's tell him he can't play with us, okay?"</u>

	Expt. Sm. Grp. A		Expt. Lrg. Grp. B	
Response	n	%	n	%
-	6	37.5	6	38
±	4	25	5	31
+	6	37.5	5	31
Total	16	100	16	100

Note: (-) = antisocial response
  (±) = mixed antisocial and prosocial responses
  (+) = prosocial response

In each group, 16 students were present for the pretest, all the training and the post-test. The child who had transferred from the afternoon (Group B) to the morning session (Group A) was not included with the data. A concern arose about his duplication of the Small Group training, for he had experienced the Small Group training when he was in Group B and then would have been in

the Small Group training in Group A. However, he was absent for part of the training and the post-test in Part 3, so he was not included in the data for this part.

In both Experimental - Small Group A and Experimental - Large Group B, 38% gave antisocial responses and agreed that the new character should not be allowed to play with the "friends." In Experimental - Small Group A, 25% gave mixed prosocial and antisocial responses, and in Experimental - Large Group B, a similar proportion, 31% were in this category. In Experimental - Small Group A, 37.5% gave a prosocial response, insisting that the new character be allowed to play with the "friends." In Experimental - Large Group B, a similar proportion, 31% gave prosocial responses.

Post-test

Examining the change between pretest and post-test scores, Experimental - Small Group A appeared to do somewhat better than Experimental - Large Group B (see Table 14) in the number of prosocial changes. Experimental - Small Group A had a higher proportion of students whose responses became more prosocial ([+] or [++]). Just over 50% of Experimental - Small Group A changed toward more prosocial responses, vs. 31.5% of Experimental - Large Group B. In other words, 19% more children moved towards a more prosocial response when working in a small group, than when working in a large group. Similarly, there were more children in Experimental - Large Group B whose scores did not change after the training

(56% of Experimental - Large Group B did not change while only 37.5% of

Experimental - Small Group A showed no change). However, both groups

showed improvement. Both groups also had equal numbers of students (2

each) who moved towards a more antisocial response.

Table 14

Part 3 - Change between Pretest and Post-Test Response to the Question, "Let's
tell him he can't play with us, okay?"

Group	No Change		++Change		+ Change		- Change		-- Change	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Expt. Sm.-A	6	37.5	2	13	6	37.5	1	6	1	6
Expt. Lg.-B	9	56	2	12.5	3	19	2	12.5	0	0

Total N Group A and Group B = 16
(++) = change from antisocial to prosocial answer
(+) = change from mixed response to prosocial, or antisocial to mixed
     response
(-) = change from mixed response to antisocial response, or prosocial to mixed
response
(- -) = change from positive response to antisocial response

Although the pretest results were very similar, they were not identical.

In order to minimize ceiling effects, it was deemed prudent to look more

closely at the students who could show improvement (those who initially

gave antisocial or mixed responses), to see how many of them improved

under the two conditions (see Table 15).

Table 15

Part 3 - Change between Pretest and Post-Test Responses for Children Who

Initially Gave Antisocial or Mixed Responses

	Unimproved		Improved	
Group	n	%	n	%
Expt. Small - A	2	20	8	80
Expt. Large - B	6	55	5	45

Note. Total number with an antisocial or mixed responses in the pretest:
Group A - 10; Group B - 11.

Examining the data in this way, the effectiveness of Small Group

instruction became clearer. Experimental - Small Group A had 35% more of

their mixed or antisocial response students improve than Experimental -

Large Group B (80% for Group A vs. 45% for Group B). In addition, only 20%

of the Experimental - Small Group A mixed or antisocial response students

remained unchanged, where 55% of the Experimental - Large Group B

appeared to be unaffected by the training.

More children may have improved after the Experimental – Small

Group training than after the Experimental – Large Group training because

the children were more highly engaged in the Experimental – Small Group

training. Lamme et al. (1992) observed that smaller group size was linked with higher response rate. If children responded more frequently, they would be more involved in the discussions. In addition to having more opportunities to talk during discussions, children in the Experimental – Small Group had more turns acting out scenarios than in the Experimental – Large Group. Therefore, children in the Experimental – Small Group had more opportunities to practice the prosocial skills and/or experience negative consequences for antisocial responses, were more involved in the discussions, and were more likely to have any misconceptions corrected than in the Experimental – Large Group. All of these factors could have contributed to more children improving with small group vs. large group training.

<u>Qualitative</u>

Discussion

The children were interested in the discussion of the book, <u>Best Friends for Francis.</u> When the children were asked if anybody had said hurting things to them, i.e., something that made them feel sad, they could identify with the problem. Many children had instances of hurt feelings to relate, e.g., someone saying they wouldn't be their friend, a girl who moved away at Circle Time and said, "Don't sit with me," and older siblings who told their preschool siblings to go away, they could not play.

Spontaneous Answers

A majority of the children in the pretest spontaneously gave a positive response to the new character when he/she asked at the beginning of the test, "Can I play with you?" Responses in Groups A and B were virtually identical. Three-quarters of the children in each group said that the new child could play. Seventeen percent of Experimental - Small Group A and 25% of Experimental – Large Group B gave antisocial responses.

Post-test spontaneous responses were noticeably different for Experimental Small Group A and Experimental – Large Group B. During the post-test of Experimental - Small Group A, 81% gave positive responses and 25% gave a negative response. (One child gave both a positive and a negative response.) These proportions were similar to the pretest. However, for Experimental - Large Group B, only 56% spontaneously gave a positive response in the post-test while 44% gave a negative, antisocial response. The children in Experimental - Large Group B appeared to have been more influenced by the researcher suggesting antisocial exclusion in the pretest, than the children in Experimental - Small Group A. Although both groups were exposed to identical amounts of antisocial persuasiveness in the pretest, the small group training appeared to be more effective in promoting prosocial responses and resistance to antisocial suggestions.

Qualitative response frequencies for pretest and post-test responses are tallied in Table 16.

Table 16

Part 3 - Qualitative Response Frequencies for Pretest and Post-test Responses

Type of Response	Expt. Small Grp. A				Expt. Lrg. Grp. B			
	Pretest		Post-test		Pretest		Post-test	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Spontaneous								
Prosocial	12	75	13	81	12	75	9	56
Antisocial	3	17	4	25	4	25	7	44
Insufficient toys	1	6	1	6	1	6	2	13
Response to leading question								
Prosocial reasons								
Rule	2	13	3	19	2	13	1	6
It's mean/nice	2	13	2	13	3	19	7	44
Excludee's feelings	1	6	1	6	2	13	1	6
Friends	1	6	2	13	0	0	0	0
He's nice	0	0	0	0	1	6	2	13
Fair	1	6	0	0	0	0	0	0
Defense of excludee	2	13	4	25	3	19	1	6
Antisocial reasons								
Not enough toys	3	19	1	6	3	19	2	13
Too many friends	2	13	0	0	0	0	0	0
New child is mean	0	0	0	0	1	6	0	0
Rule	0	0	0	0	1	6	0	0
Researcher said so	0	0	0	0	1	6	2	13
Prejudice	1	6	3	19	1	6	1	6
Perspective Taking	4	25	7	44	3	19	4	25
Parental Authority	0	0	1	6	2	13	2	13

<u>Antisocial responses.</u> Most of the spontaneous antisocial responses were prompted by the children's concern that there were not enough toys for another "child". The tests started with three characters (the researcher's and two students') and three toys (three monkeys in the pretest and three bears in the post-test). Four of the children gave this reason spontaneously as their reason for excluding the new child.

<u>Prosocial Responses to the Leading Question</u>

After the researcher suggested that we were the friends and we didn't want another child to play with us, many children still gave prosocial responses, saying that it was not okay to tell the new character to go away and that the new character *could* play with the group. One boy said, "I want to be friends with her. She's my friend. She comes at school with me." Especially in the post-test, some children passionately wanted to include the new character.

> Researcher as new character: Can I play?
> Child: Yes. You have to share.
> [Then the two subjects argued over who would share with the new "kid".]
> Child: I will share too. I share [with] him. (Then her doll kissed the new doll.)

<u>Rule</u>. The children gave a variety of reasons to defend their prosocial responses. Some stated a rule as an explanation. In the post-test of Experimental - Small Group A, one child said, "So let him play, cause it's good when you say, 'You can play.'" One boy in the pretest stated a rule about

friends. " 'Cause you need to be friends with others. . . . Be friends with each other." Five children focused on cooperation. Three children gave rules concerning sharing: "You have to share;" "Share. I play then he play first. Share;" and "Because you have to share." Of the two other students, one said, "You got to play together," and the other said, "I should give him my monkey so he could play. Take turns. That would be nice. Cause he's my brother. . . I'll give him my monkey. I'll take turns with my monkey so he's yellow and I'm blue [monkey's colors], and that's okay." Although the same percentage of children stated a rule to support a prosocial response in the pretest in each group, slightly more children used rules in the post-test for Experimental - Small Group A (19% for Experimental - Small Group A vs. 6% of Experimental - Large Group B). The increase may be attributed to the superior effectiveness of small group training. However, it should be noted that only a small proportion of the children cited rules as an explanation.

Nice/mean. Eleven children explained their prosocial response by stating that it would be nice to let the new character play, or mean to say he could not play. The two groups were evenly matched during the pretest with 13% of Experimental - Small Group A and 19 % of Experimental - Large Group B stating this reason. However, in the post-test, many more in Experimental - Large Group B gave this response (44%) than in Experimental - Small Group A (13%). The mean/nice explanation was the most common prosocial explanation for disallowing exclusion given by the preschoolers.

In rejecting the researcher's suggestion to exclude the new child, the children were judging the goodness/badness of the act of exclusion. When asked if it was okay to tell the new character to go away, one boy said, "No." When asked why, he said, "Cause it's bad." Others said, "It's mean," "It's too mean," "It's not nice," or "Don't do that, cause that's bad."

> Researcher: He has different hair. Let's tell him he can't play, okay?
> Child: No, that's not nice.
> Researcher: What should I say better?
> Child: You have fine hair.

Another child was incensed at the mean treatment.

> Researcher: We've been playing and we're friends, right? Let's tell
>   him he can't play with us. Okay?
> Child: No, that's not nice.
> Researcher: Why is that not okay?
> Child: Cause that's very, very mean!

The children in Kohlberg's Stage 3 (Kohlberg, 1978) are in the "good boy - nice girl stage" where children are concerned with good behavior that "pleases or helps others and is approved by them. . . . One earns approval by being 'nice' " (p. 50). This stage appears to match the explanations given by the children in this section. However, Kohlberg's Stage 3 is part of the conventional level. He wrote that at approximately age 7, children enter the concrete operational stage of cognitive development, and the concrete operational thinker is limited to the preconventional moral stages 1 and 2. Our preschool children should not even be at the concrete level (they are preoperational). Explanations dealing with niceness and meanness should be

coming from children much older than the preschool children in this study. Although Kohlberg's Stage 3 children would use the "good boy - nice girl" explanation, clearly Kohlberg would not expect such a large proportion of preschoolers to use this explanation.

For the previously cited children, the action itself had a good or bad valence without reference to any other consequences. However, this was not the case for all of the children. One girl explained why the new child should not be excluded by saying, " 'Cause it's a bad thing. Because [it] makes them sad." She included the effect of the action on another person.

Excluded child's feelings. Five children cited the feelings of the excluded character as a reason not to exclude them. They spontaneously talked about the feelings of the excluded child, i.e., this was not in response to the question about how the excluded child would feel.

> Researcher: We've been playing and we're friends, right? Let's tell her
>   she can't play with us.
> Child: No, that's a not good thing.
> Researcher: Why shouldn't we say that?
> Child: 'Cause.
> Researcher: 'Cause why?
> Child: 'Cause it makes them sad.

The two groups were evenly matched in the number of responses in this category, and very few children (6%-13%) talked about the feelings of the excluded person when explaining why they should not be excluded.

Friends. Three children in Experimental - Small Group A (1 in the pretest and 2 in the post-test) used a different reason to explain why the new

character should be allowed to play . Their explanations had to do with the

new child being their friend. "He can play. He's my friend." "I like him."

One girl combined several reasons: the newcomer's feelings, a rule (about

friendship), that's a bad thing to say, and most important of all, be friends.

She included dire consequences for the exclusionary behavior.

> Researcher: We've been playing and we're friends, right? Let's tell
> him he can't play with us. Okay?
> Child: No. That is not good. To be friend.
> Researcher: Why is that not okay to say?
> Child: Because you make him sad every day.
> Researcher: Well I don't want him to play with us. I'll tell him to go
> away? Okay?
> Child: No. You have to be the friend every day.
> Researcher: He has a different body. Let's tell him he can't play. Okay?
> Child: No. You have to be everybody's friend. He can be my friend.
> Researcher: How will he feel if I say he can't play?
> Child: Because he feel sad and then he don't be your friend and
> everybody don't be your friend. And then he will take your
> game away too. Because everyday he wants to play with people.

These children in Experimental – Small Group A had a strong feeling of

caring and unity with others in the class.

He's nice. Three children in Experimental – Large Group B (1 pretest, 2

post-test) defended the right of the newcomer to join the group by citing his

positive attributes, usually saying he was nice.

> Researcher: Well, I don't want him to play with us. I'll tell him to go
> away. Okay?
> Child: No.
> Researcher: Why is that not okay?
> Child: Because he's nice. We could take turns.

Experimental - Large Group B used niceness and meanness as explanations

more frequently than Experimental - Small Group A. Experimental - Large

Group B had more children say that it was mean/not nice to exclude the

newcomer, and they also were the only ones to use the "niceness" of the

newcomer as a reason to include him.

Justice and fairness. Only one child talked about justice and fairness.

After the researcher said that we shouldn't let the new child play, the boy said,

"Hey, it's not fair if he doesn't come." In Kohlberg's theory of the stages of

moral development, consideration of issues of fairness and justice would not

be expected until Stage 2, the instrumental-relativist orientation (if one

considers this boy's reference to fairness as "naive egalitarianism") (Kohlberg,

1978; Selman & Lieberman, 1974). Stage 2 thinking is part of Kohlberg's

preconventional level which would not be expected to be prevalent until a

child was at least seven years old and in the concrete operational stage. Yet

here a 4-year-old, in the preoperational stage, introduced justice as a rationale

for letting the newcomer play. It's true that only one child was at this stage,

and the ages associated with the stages are only averages, with each child

moving at their own rate. However, having any of the children bring up this

concept was surprising.

Defense of excluded child. Several children came to the defense of the

excluded character and some even chastised the researcher's character. One

boy said, "No. I want him to play with me and that's all! [Then addressing

new character,] Right friend?" In the following exchange, the girl stood up to

the researcher and showed she could predict consequences for the characters'
actions.

>Girl [speaking to the researcher]: But [if] you will not [be] nice, I will not
>be friends with you."
>Researcher: But this one has funny hair.
>Girl: But you don't funny that boy. You have to nice.
>Researcher: How will he feel if I tell him go away?
>Girl: Feel sad. And that friend will go away and never be your friend.
>And you will be sad too.

Another girl echoed those sentiments: "Because it's so mean. And you better
let him play, else I'll go in my house." One boy brought punishment to the
researcher's character. He had the researcher's character's father punish her.
"His dad. He hit him." [pointing to the researcher's puppet] Another girl
defended the newcomer to the researcher's character and at the end made
excuses for the researcher's negative behavior.

>Researcher: He has a different body. Let's tell him he can't play. Okay?
>Girl: No. I wanna hurt you [talking to the researcher's doll].
>Researcher: So should I tell him go away or no?
>Girl: No.
>Researcher: How will he feel if I say he can't play?
>Girl: You can't talk [like] that. But you small girl.

Another girl chastised the researcher's character when she was asked if she
had anything more to say. "Bad kiddy, bad kiddy." Another girl added at the
end of the scenario, "Why are you not letting him play?" When the
researcher explained she was just being mean in the story, the girl heatedly
replied, "Well, then let him play!"

In the pretest, the groups were evenly matched with 13-19% (A and B

respectively) of the children defending the newcomer. However, in the post-test, more of the children in Experimental - Small Group A tended to defend the newcomer (25%) than in Experimental - Large Group B (6%). It appeared that the small group training enhanced Group A's concern for, and defense of the newcomer. The greater sense of unity and caring parallels the results found in the "friends" section.

In this sample, more girls than boys (5:2) chastised the researcher for her antisocial behavior. With such a small sample, it is difficult to know if this is a real difference between the sexes or just an artifact of sample size. A more comprehensive discussion of gender differences will be presented in a later section.

Antisocial Responses to the Leading Question

Although many children spontaneously invited the new character to play, once the researcher said that the kids in the initial group were the friends and they didn't want anybody else to play, many children switched to negative, antisocial answers, agreeing that the new child should not play. Sometimes children who thought the new character should be allowed to play at that point, were later swayed when the researcher suggested that the new character was different and should not be allowed to play.

Not enough toys. As with the spontaneous antisocial responses, the most common reason the newcomer was not allowed to play was that the child perceived that there were not enough toys. Six of the 15 children who

gave reasons for their antisocial responses cited the insufficient number of

toys as the reason they should exclude the newcomer.

> Researcher as new character: Can I play with you?
> Child: No.
> Researcher: Why?
> Child: Because there's two monkeys for me and her.

[However, some children who recognized that there were not enough toys for

another child, still gave a prosocial answer and invited the newcomer to play.

"She can share with me. Here, I lost. So you can play."]

During the pretest, 3 children in each group justified an antisocial

response by saying there were not enough toys. After the training, the

number decreased, with only 1 child in the Experimental - Small Group A

and 2 in the Experimental - Large Group B still giving the same reason. The

children who changed to prosocial answers and no longer said there weren't

enough toys, still realized there were not enough toys, but made a point of

sharing with the newcomer, or getting more toys. Part of the training

involved problem solving about what could be done when insufficient toys

were available. Although the small group training appeared to reduce the

number of children who would exclude due to insufficient toys more than

the large group training, (6% vs. 13%), the numbers of children involved and

the percentage difference between the groups were small and might have

been insignificant.

Too many friends. Two children in the pretest of Experimental - Small

Group A rejected the newcomer because they didn't want too many friends.

One girl, after a spontaneous positive response, embraced the researcher's

antisocial response and rejected the new person on the grounds that she

didn't want "too much friends."

> Researcher: Can he play?
> Child: No way.
> Researcher: Why should we say, 'No way?"
> Child: Cause I don't like to be friends. I don't like too much friends. I
> don't like you [to the new character].

Another girl echoed this sentiment, "Cause we have too much friends and

too much kids."

One girl in the pretest made up a rule to exclude the new child and

then assigned him negative attributes to further her justification.

> Researcher: We've been playing and we're friends, right? Let's tell
> him he can't play with us. Okay?
> Child: He can't play with us.
> Researcher: Why?
> Child: Because there's only two people at a time.
> Researcher: We're the friends. I'll tell him go away. Okay?
> Child: Go away. Go away.
> Researcher: Why did you say, go away?
> Child: Because they always be mean to us.

Researcher said so. Other children also took the researcher's antisocial

suggestions to heart and used them as their own reasons to exclude the new

character. In the beginning of the tests, the researcher said, "We've been

playing and we're friends, right? Let's tell him he can't play with us." Three

of the 15 children who gave an antisocial response to the leading question

justified that antisocial response with the researcher's reasons: "Because we're the friends," or "Because you said he can't play," (1 in the pretest and 2 in the post-test of Experimental - Large Group B). Note that none of the children in Experimental - Small Group A were swayed by the researcher to use her antisocial reasons to reject the newcomer. One might expect the children to follow the researcher's lead in the pretest, before any training, but the fact that none of the children echoed the researcher's words in the post-test of Experimental - Group A, may have significance. It is possible that each child was more involved in the small group training vs. the large group training, and had more practice making his/her own decisions, thereby becoming more resistant to outside influence. Alternately, dealing with the small number of children who echoed the researcher's suggestion, the differences between the groups might have been attributed to natural variation between children in the groups, and independent of training group size.

Prejudice. Once the researcher suggested that the new character should be excluded because he looked different, 6 children picked up on that idea as a reason to exclude the new child (this category included children who gave this response after the leading question in the pretest or at any time in the post-test [because they had heard the suggestion in the pretest]). Some boys in the post-test gave the following reasons for exclusion. "You can't play. Got a hat." "Because he no have feet." "Because his face is different." In the pretest, one boy elaborated more fully.

Researcher: He has different hair. Let's tell him he can't play. Okay?
Child: She has black hair and black face. [looking at another puppet.]
Researcher: Could she be your friend or no?
Child: No friend.
Researcher: Why?
Child: 'Cause she's got black eyebrows and I have orange.

A third boy started his started prejudicial remarks at the outset of the post-

test, and then really took off with the idea.

Researcher: Can I play?
Child: Well he doesn't have any hands. He can't touch nothing. He can't hold nothing.
Researcher: Some people have no hands and they play.
Child: Well he can't walk. He doesn't have any legs.
[Second child shows that new character can move]
Child: Well he doesn't know how to skateboard, do you know I got a skateboard?
Researcher: We've been playing and we're friends, right? Let's tell him he can't play with us. Okay?
Child: Yeah.
Researcher: Why is that okay?
Child: Cause he's not my friend and I'm the boss. And he can't do whatever he wants, because I'm the boss. And I can tell the cops.
Researcher: He has a different body. Let's tell him he can't play. Okay?
Child: And you don't have any ears, that's why you can't play. You can't hear nothing. And you don't have any teeth, so you don't chew nothing. And you can't bite no bears. I bite bears. [The toys were bears in the post-test.] You don't got a neck either.
Researcher: How will he feel if I say he can't play?
Child: Sad. And we can leave him sad and don't help him.
Researcher: Is that a good thing to do?
Child: No. But I want to do that and I'm a super hero [and flies away].

With allusions to being the boss and a super hero this boy clearly enjoyed

exerting power over the new character by putting him down, excluding him

and bossing him around. It is very worrisome when a preschool child can

show this much antipathy just to build himself up.

Was it coincidence that 5/6 of the children who used prejudicial reasons for excluding the new character were male? With such a small sample, the imbalance may have been a result of sampling error, or boys may really use prejudicial reasoning more than girls.

Two more children in the post-test of Experimental - Small Group A adopted the researcher's "prejudice" than in Experimental - Large Group B (19% vs. 6%). In the previous section, more children with small group training resisted the researcher's suggestion to reject the newcomer, because he wasn't one of the friends. However, in this section more children with large group training resisted the researcher's suggestion to reject the newcomer, based on prejudice. Since more children in Experimental - Small Group A embraced the researcher's prejudice, the explanation that the small group training helped children think for themselves is not supported in this case. Individual variation between children in the groups is probably the reason for the small differences between the groups rather than the training group size.

Disregard for other's feelings. All of the children were able to correctly predict how the newcomer would feel if rejected (sad or mad). However, many children were still willing to reject the newcomer, despite the consequences of hurt feelings.

> Researcher: How will he feel if we say go away?
> Child: Sad. She's crying.
> Researcher: But it's still okay we tell her go away?

Child: [Nods yes]

Another child was very explicit about ignoring the excluded child's feelings.

Researcher: How will he feel if I say he can't play?
Child: Sad. And we can leave him sad and don't help him.

Perspective-Taking

Similar to the results of Part 1 and Part 2, the children in Part 3 of the experiment showed evidence of perspective taking. Almost half, 14/32 or 44%, were able to see things from another's point of view. In the pretest, the groups were evenly matched with 25% of Experimental - Small Group A and 19% of Experimental - Large Group B showing evidence of perspective taking. In the post-test, both groups showed increased numbers of children taking the perspective of the newcomer, (Experimental - Small Group A - 44%; Experimental - Large Group A - 25%. However, the increase for Experimental - Small Group A was larger (19%) than the increase for Experimental - Large Group B (6%). Although both large and small group training increased the children's ability to empathize with others and see things from another perspective, the small group training was more effective and affected more children.

The children exhibited perspective taking in various ways. Sometimes the children spontaneously told how the excluded person would feel. When explaining why it was not a good thing to tell the new character to go away, one girl said, " 'Cause it makes them sad." A boy said, "Unh unh. That can

hurt his feelings." In the pretest the same boy said, "Maybe that would make him sad. Did you know he looks kind of sad?" A girl also predicted future actions when she said, "That makes him mad and he will go tell the teacher or talk to the kid what said that."

Other children also showed evidence of knowing what the rejected child was thinking. "He wants to be our friend." "Tell him to stay here because he wants to play with us." One child responded to the question of why we shouldn't say he couldn't play by saying, "Because he doesn't like that, and he wants to play and he wants a bear, and he likes us."

<u>Authority Figures</u>

<u>Researcher.</u> For a very few children, having the researcher's character say that the group of friends should reject the new character, caused them to change their initial prosocial responses to an antisocial response. One boy had held firmly to prosocial answers through the first leading questions (exclude because we're the friends, exclude due to different appearance). However, towards the end it appeared that the researcher's authority over-rode his natural inclinations.

Researcher as new character: Can I play with you?
Child: Yeah. How 'bout we share. I share my bear.
Researcher: We've been playing and we're friends, right? Let's tell him he can't play with us. Okay?
Child: Nah. I'm giving him my bear.
Researcher: Well, I don't want him to play with us. I'll tell him to go away? Okay?
Child: Sure, if you want to.
Researcher: Why is that okay to say?

Child: Maybe because no more bears.
Researcher: But you said we could share. Is it okay or no.
Child: No.
Researcher: He has a different body. Let's tell him he can't play. Okay?
Child: Unh unh, that can hurt his feelings.
Researcher: How will he feel if I say he can't play?
Child: Mad and angry and sad.
Researcher: Do you have any more to say about this story?
Child: How about we just push him away like this.
Researcher: But you said he could play.
Child: But he couldn't. I pushed him off the mountain.

Parental authority. Five children in the study invoked parental authority during the test. The parent was not used to determine which course of action was correct as in the previous parts of the experiment. In Part 3, the children used the parent to punish the researcher's character for excluding the newcomer, right the wrongs done to the newcomer, or to justify including the new child.

The first quote, exemplifies the justice dealing/punishment aspect of the parent.

Child: He's happy [excluded child].
Researcher: Why?
Child: His dad. He hit him. [pointing to the researcher's puppet]

Other children said that someone would "tell" a parent that the researcher's character was being bad. One girl explained that you could not exclude the new "child" for having a different body, "Because it's mean and bad too. And she will tell her mom on you, too." In other words, you better be good or her mom will punish you. This echoes Kohlberg's theory that children obey the rules for fear of punishment by their parents (Kohlberg,

1971, 1978). Another child also involved the parent with tattling. When asked how the excluded child would feel if he couldn't play, he replied, "Sad. And he will go home and tell his mommy, 'A little boy is saying I'm fat and I have a hat.' " It is not clear whether the parent would be told about the incident for comfort, or for retribution against the offender.

A third use of the parent's authority was to justify the newcomer's inclusion in the group. One boy said that the new child could play, "Because his mom said he can."

Direct Evidence of Learning

During the post-testing, evidence that many children had learned from the training was observed. In addition to the fact that many of the children changed from antisocial responses to more prosocial responses, several children also incorporated parts of the training into the post-test scenario.

Phrases. One way the children evidenced their learning was by incorporating new ideas and word phrases into their post-test response. Several children used the phrase "it will hurt his feelings" in the post-test. They did not use this phrase (or concept) in his pretest, but the phrase was used repeatedly in the discussion and dramatization session. Another phrase that was used in the training was saying , "You can play," to others to invite them into the group.

> Researcher: He has a different body. Let's tell him he can't play. Okay?
> Child: No.
> Researcher: Why?

> Child: Because he can play with us, 'cause he's our friend, so let him
> play. And you are our friend. So let him play cause it's good
> when you say, "You can play."

Incorporating scenes. Some of the children brought segments of scenes from the training into the post-test. For example, when an insufficient number of dinosaurs was available for a new person in the dramatization, the researcher suggested the new child could bring over another dinosaur. This idea was incorporated by one of the girls, even though the toys involved in the post-test were bears.

> Researcher as the new character: Can I play?
> Child: If he wants to play, I will get a dinosaur, and give it to him so he
> can play.

Telling the truth. In the post-test two girls brought in the concept of telling the truth, more than a month (38 days) after Part 1 ended. However, they did not apply the concept of telling the truth with the same logic as an adult would.

> Researcher: How will he feel if I say he can't play?
> Child: You just have to ask him if he wants to play. And tell him the
> truth.

She knows that telling the truth is a good thing, so seems to throw that in at the end to make sure her Duplo character is being the best she can be.

> Researcher as new character: Can I play?
> Child: No you can't. There's no more bears.
> Researcher: We've been playing and we're the friends, right? Let's tell
> him he can't play with us. Okay?
> Child: Yeah.
> Researcher: Why is it okay to say he can't play?
> Child: Cause he'll feel happy.

Researcher: He'll feel happy if you tell him he cannot play?
Child: Yes, he'll feel happy that you're telling the truth.

This girl knew that people feel happy when you tell the truth, and she told the truth (there's no more bears, so you can't play). However, she didn't realize that the excluding statement was not "right" to begin with. She did not have the mature judgment to know when it was appropriate to apply the rule of telling the truth. Actually, as she listened to her partner give a prosocial answer, allowing the newcomer to play, she decided to share her bear with him. Later she told how it was mean and bad to say he couldn't play because of a different body. She had difficulty thinking about the two values of kindness and truth at the same time, and then applying the one that was more salient in the situation.

Comparing All Three Conditions

Since only two conditions were involved in each part of the experiment, one can only directly compare the efficacy of two conditions at a time. Two methods will be presented for comparing the efficacy of all three conditions.

The first method involves looking at the children in groups. One could examine the percentage of students in a group who improved under each condition and see which method, Control, Experimental - Large Group, or Experimental - Small Group, showed the most change toward more prosocial responses.

A second method involves looking at the performance of each individual child and determining under which condition or conditions improvement (or no improvement) was observed from pretest to post-test.

By Group

When the results from all three parts of the experiment were combined, two groups had undergone each of the three conditions: Control, Experimental - Large Group, and Experimental - Small Group. One would not expect to see identical percentages of improvement when comparing results for the same experimental conditions in different parts of the experiment, for the following reasons. First, the three concepts/values may have not been of equal difficulty. Second, the children may have had different levels of experience with the different values before the training. However, since the number of children in each group who gave antisocial or mixed responses in the pretest was always 10 or 11, the initial knowledge about the three values appeared to be balanced and this consideration can be discounted. Third, the books used in the study were not equally good as stand-alone instructional materials.

A comparison of the improvement observed under the different training conditions, for children who initially gave antisocial or mixed responses is presented in Table 17. The actual percentages from Tables 6, 10, and 14 were listed and then the average of the two groups who participated in each condition was calculated (weighted for the number of children in each

group).

Table 17

Inter-group Comparison of Improvement between Pretest and Post-Test for

Children Who Initially Gave Antisocial or Mixed Responses

Condition	Part	n	Unimproved %	Average %	Improved %	Average %
Control						
Group A	1	11	82		18	
				68		32
Group B	2	11	55		45	
Expt. Small Grp.						
Group A	3	10	20		80	
				29		71
Group B	1	11	36		64	
Expt. Large Grp.						
Group A	2	10	30		70	
				43		57
Group B	3	11	55		45	

Note: n = number who initially gave antisocial or mixed responses.

Focusing on the average improvement for each condition, results indicated that both Experimental conditions facilitated more improvement in prosocial responses than the Control condition of reading the book alone. On the average, the Experimental - Small Group showed 39% more improvement than the Control Group and the Experimental - Large Group showed 25% more improvement than the Control Group. Children did

better in the Experimental - Small Group than the Experimental - Large Group, with the Experimental - Small Group showing 14% more improvement than the Experimental - Large Group. However, with the small number of participants, this difference may not be significant.

With further examination of Table 17, one might conclude that no real difference existed between the Control Group and the Experimental - Large Group, since Control Group B showed 45% of the group improving and Experimental - Large Group B also showed 45% of the group improving, at different times. However, this was comparing results between parts of the experiment dealing with different values and different books. When the results within a part of the experiment were examined, as was done in Part 2, 25% more of the Experimental - Large Group improved than the Control Group. Therefore, the comparison of averages in the previous paragraph, appears valid.

By Individual

Arranging the data so that the results of each child could be compared across conditions allowed another interpretation of the data.

No Improvement

One way to examine the data is to see which categories were ineffective for a particular child. The data were analyzed for each child to see which teaching conditions did not lead to improvement, when improvement was possible.

Tabulated by categories. The conditions under which children who

gave antisocial or mixed responses in the pretest did not improve (or gave

more antisocial responses in the post-test) and the number and percentage in

each category, are listed in Table 18.

Table 18

Training Conditions Under Which Individual Children Did Not Show

Improvement Between the Pre- and Post-Tests, When Improvement Was

Possible

	C	S	L	CS	CL	SL	CSL
n	9	1	1	1	1	1	5
%	35	4	4	4	4	4	19

Note. C = Control Group; S = Experimental - Small Group;
L = Experimental - Large Group
Number of children completing all 3 conditions = 26
Number of children who showed improvement whenever possible = 7
(27%)

Children who gave prosocial responses in the pretest and post-test were

not listed as "not showing improvement" under that condition, for there was

no improvement to be shown. For example, a child who gave antisocial or

mixed responses in the pre-test and did not improve in the Control (C) and

Experimental - Large Group Conditions (L), but did give more prosocial

answers in the Experimental - Small Group Condition (S), was classified as CL (did not improve in C and L when improvement was possible). A child who did not improve in the Control (C) condition, scored as prosocial in the Experimental - Small Group (S) pre- and post-tests, and improved under the Experimental - Large Group (L) condition was scored as C (C was the only group in which he could have improved, but he did not improve). Only children who had completed testing under all three of the conditions were included.

In this study, 73% of the children did not show improvement under at least one of the conditions. The largest proportion (35%) did not show improvement under the Control condition. As found in the previous section, the Control condition, just reading the book, was least effective in facilitating prosocial responses for the greatest number of children.

However, a comparison of the ineffectiveness of the Experimental - Large Group and Experimental - Small Group conditions did not reveal any difference. One child did not learn in the small group alone, and 1 child did not learn in the large group alone. [However, when the data from the children who did not complete all three parts of the experiment were included, 2 children (6%) did not improve in the small group, but 4 children (11%) did not improve in the large group. The more inclusive data indicated that the large group training was less effective than small group training.] Since there was 1 child in each of the CS, CL and SL groups, this data also did

not indicate the inferiority or superiority of the Experimental - Large Group or Experimental - Small Group condition.

Also of note was the CSL category, where 5 children (19%) did not show improvement under any of the conditions. Were there any traits in common among these children that contributed to the ineffectiveness of the training in their cases? The children in this category were not particularly young, with 1 child at 4.5 years, 2 children at 4.7 years, 1 child at 5.0 years and 1 child at 5.2 years. (The age span for the entire group was 4.2 - 5.3 years.) The group consisted of 4 males and 1 female, but being male did not prevent other boys from benefiting from the training. Two of the children were extremely limited in their English proficiency (ELEP) (6 ELEPs in the total class) and 1 was limited English proficient (LEP) (7 LEPs in the total class). Two of the children were native English speakers. Although problems with comprehending and expressing themselves in English may have contributed to the problem, English proficiency was neither necessary nor sufficient to cause the children to fail to improve.

Pooled data. Instead of grouping together the children who did not improve by the categories of conditions in which they did not improve, as above, one could count how many children did not improve in a condition located in any combination (e.g., total number of C's found in C, CS, CL, and CSL). For this calculation, all of the children were included, but when a percentage was calculated, it was the percentage of the number of children

who had completed that condition. When the data were examined in this manner, 54% of the children showed no improvement, when improvement was possible under the Control condition. Clearly, this was the least effective of the three conditions for improving prosocial responses. Similar to the results reported above, virtually no difference was observed between the Experimental - Small Group and Experimental - Large Group conditions, with 32% of the children showing no improvement in the small group and 35% of the children showing no improvement in the large group. (See Table 19)

Table 19

Training Conditions Under Which Individual Children Did Not Show Improvement, When Improvement was Possible, Using Pooled Data

Condition	n	%
Control (C)[a]	19	54
Expt. - Small Group (S)[b]	10	32
Expt. - Large Group (L)[c]	12	35

Note: [a] Number who completed Control Group training = 35
[b] Number who completed Expt. - Small Grp. training = 31
[c] Number who completed Expt. - Large Grp. training = 34

Improvement

Each individual child's record was evaluated to determine under which conditions the child improved, i.e., gave more prosocial responses in the post-test than pretest, when improvement was possible.

Tabulated by categories. The number (and percentage) of children who showed improvement in each of the training condition combinations is listed in Table 20.

Table 20

Training Conditions Under Which Individual Children Showed

Improvement Between the Pre- and Post-Tests, When Improvement Was

Possible

	C	S	L	CS	CL	SL	CSL
n	2	5	5	2	0	5	1
%	8	19	19	8	0	19	4

Note. C = Control Group; S = Experimental - Small Group;
L = Experimental - Large Group
Number of children completing all 3 conditions = 26
Number of children who showed no improvement in any condition,
when improvement was possible = 6 (23%)

Results indicated that very few children improved under the control condition. Many more children improved after the small or large group RAD

training.

Pooled data. In order to determine whether the large or small group training was more effective, the number of children who improved in a condition located in any combination was calculated (e.g., total number of C's found in C, CS, CL, and CSL). The pooled data for children who participated in all three parts of the experiment are listed in Table 21. Table 22 repeats the same calculations, but for all the children who participated in any training condition.

Consistent with results calculated for nonimprovement, the smallest number of children improved in the Control Group condition (only ~ 20%). Again, consistent with the results calculated for nonimprovement, more children improved after the large or small group training, than after just hearing the book alone. Slightly more children improved in the Experimental - Small group condition than Experimental – Large Group condition. If one examines the results for the children who completed all three conditions, 8% more children in the Experimental - Small group condition improved than in the Experimental – Large Group condition. Including the results from all of the children who completed any condition, 13% more children in the Experimental - Small group condition improved than in the Experimental – Large Group condition.

Table 21

Training Conditions Under Which Children Showed Improvement, When

Improvement was Possible, for Children Who Completed All 3 Conditions

Condition	n	%
Control (C)	5	19
Expt. - Small Group (S)	13	50
Expt. - Large Group (L)	11	42

Note: Number who completed all 3 types of training = 26

Table 22

Training Conditions Under Which Children Showed Improvement, When

Improvement was Possible, for Children Completing Any Condition

Condition	n	%
Control (C)[a]	7	20
Expt. - Small Group (S)[b]	15	48
Expt. - Large Group (L)[c]	12	35

Note: [a] Number who completed Control Group training = 35
[b] Number who completed Expt. - Small Grp. training = 31
[c] Number who completed Expt. - Large Grp. training = 34

Comparing the Three Values

One of the questions initially posed in this study was whether any of the three values addressed in this investigation would be more difficult than the others for preschoolers to understand and apply. Table 23 compares the improvement (and lack of improvement) between pretest and post-test scores for children who initially gave antisocial or mixed responses. Instead of examining the data for the effect of training conditions as in Table 17, the data are arranged to show differences between values, i.e., under similar training conditions, did the children show more/less improvement for certain values? For each training condition, the value that showed less improvement (was harder) is listed first. Also for each condition, the difference between the percentages of non-improvement (or equivalently, improvement) is calculated.

Employing logical reasoning to rank the difficulty of the values, one can conclude from the results of the Control Groups and Experimental - Small Groups that lying was more difficult than stealing or exclusion, and from the Experimental - Large Group one can conclude that exclusion was more difficult than stealing. Therefore, the most difficult value for these preschoolers was lying, followed closely by exclusion (only 16% behind) and then the easiest to master was stealing.

Table 23

Inter-group Comparison of Improvement between Pretest and Post-Test for

Children Who Initially Gave Antisocial or Mixed Responses, with Emphasis

on Value

			Unimproved		Improved	
Condition	Part	Value	%	Difference (%)	%	Difference (%)
Control						
Group A	1	Lying	82		18	
				27		27
Group B	2	Stealing	55		45	
Expt. Small Grp.						
Group B	1	Lying	36		64	
				16		16
Group A	3	Exclusion	20		80	
Expt. Large Grp.						
Group B	3	Exclusion	55		45	
				25		25
Group A	2	Stealing	30		70	

Note: N for each group was 10 or 11

A possible explanation for the apparent differences in children's ability

to relate to different values depends upon the children's development and

the time when different behaviors appear. The following argument is based

on the assumption that children will find it more difficult to relate to training

based on later emerging behaviors, since they will have had the least amount

of time to build up a personal experience base and schema in these later emerging areas.

The hardest concept for the children was lying/honesty. Of the three values addressed, lying was the most recent behavior to have surfaced. Literature on 3-year-olds doesn't mention lying (Ames & Ilg, 1976b), but literature on 4-year-olds (Ames & Ilg, 1976a) describes typical 4-year-old lies and how parents can deal with them. Assuming, therefore, that lying begins around age four, most of the group had only 6 months to a year, a relatively short time, to personally experience lying and its consequences.

The value of intermediate difficulty was exclusion. Most children move away from parallel play and into cooperative play between three and four years of age (Ames & Ilg, 1976b). Therefore, most of the children have had experiences with the consequences of exclusion for 1 - 2 years. This length of time is intermediate between their experience with lying, and their experience with taking things that are not theirs.

The least difficult value was stealing. Children are chastised for taking things that are not theirs as soon as they are mobile, around 1 year old. Therefore, the children in the study had the most time, about 4 years to encounter problems dealing with taking things that were not theirs.

Wainryb and Turiel (1993) wrote that "moral concepts stem from children's experiences - actions, interactions, observations, and interpretations - with the social world," (p. 212) especially experiences bearing

on other's welfare or rights, and not from rules given by adults. If this is true, the amount of time the children had to experience the values addressed in this study would have a bearing on how ready and open they were to the concepts taught during the trainings, and how relevant and meaningful the stories and dramatizations would have been.

Gender Differences

Initial Understanding

The first question addressed was whether boys and girls came into the training with different perceptions, experiences and knowledge that would cause their pretest scores to differ. Table 24 separates the girls' and boys' pretest scores, and is further broken down by the value addressed.

By Value

In Part 1, dealing with honesty and lying, the girls and boys pretest scores were very similar. In Part 2, dealing with taking something that is not yours, it appeared that girls had fewer antisocial responses and more prosocial responses than the boys (by about 20% in each response category). In Part 3, dealing with saying hurting words and exclusion, the results were opposite to Part 2. More girls in the pretest gave antisocial responses and fewer gave prosocial responses than boys (with differences of 19% and 15% respectively). The percentage of boys or girls who gave mixed responses was equivalent within each part of the experiment.

The next subsections discuss the two values that showed gender

differences.

Table 24

Pretest Responses Analyzed by Gender and Value

Pretest Response	Girls N	n	%	Boys N	n	%
Lying	15			19		
-		9	60		11	58
±		2	13		2	10
+		4	27		6	32
Stealing	17			18		
-		7	41		11	61
±		3	18		3	17
+		7	41		4	22
Exclusion	17			18		
-		8	47		5	28
±		4	24		5	28
+		5	29		8	44
Total	49			55		
-		24	49		27	49
±		9	18		10	18
+		16	33		18	33

Stealing. The higher percentage of prosocial scores in the pretest for the girls, may indicate that girls know more about what is right and wrong in regards to stealing than boys.

Hurting words. The boys in this sample appeared to be kinder and more welcoming than the girls, with regard to saying hurting words and exclusion. This tendency may be related to the differing patterns observed in boys and girls during conflict. Physical aggression is more common in boys, while girls "generally use words rather than physical force" (The New York Hospital - Cornell Medical Center, 1988, p. 108). This pattern of behavior seems to be borne out by the results of this section where the girls used more verbal aggression than the boys.

Totals

When the girls' pretest responses were added together by category (antisocial, mixed and prosocial), combining the results from the different parts of the experiment, and the same was done for the boys, identical percentages for antisocial, mixed and prosocial responses were found for boys and girls. Although it appeared that girls might have been weaker in some areas (exclusion and saying hurting words), and boys might have been weaker in other areas (stealing), on the whole, neither boys nor girls were more morally advanced.

A comparison between the results from this study and previous gender research proved difficult. In Chapter 2 a review of the literature revealed that

there was no difference in prosocial behavior between preschool boys and girls, but there were differences in affective responses. One might say that the present study also revealed no difference in prosocial behavior between preschool boys and girls. However, the children's responses during testing could not be strictly classified as "prosocial *behaviors*" as the term was used in the research. In the studies reviewed, the children's own behavior was recorded as they interacted with other people. In this study, the children's behavior decisions for a character were observed. The children's behavior in a real situation was not observed. From previous studies we know that what a person says should be done, and what they actually do, are not always the same (Hartshorne & May, 1928-30). Therefore, although the nature of behavior observed was not the same as in previous studies, both the present study and previous research revealed no overall differences between boys' and girls' prosocial behavior.

Effectiveness of the Training

The second question addressed on the subject of possible gender differences, was whether the gender of the child made any difference in their receptivity to learning by the methods presented in this research project. The pre-test to post-test change for children who pre-tested with antisocial or mixed responses was examined. The changes were classified as showing improvement ([+] or [++]), or showing no improvement (stayed the same or [-] or [--]), and then categorized by the child's sex and the value addressed

during the training session. For each training condition, the number of

children of each sex who showed improvement, regardless of value, was

combined, and listed as the total (same procedure for no improvement) (see

Table 25).

Large Group

The improvement was very similar for boys and girls in the

Experimental - Large Group training. The girls may have improved more in

Part 3 (exclusion) where they had 50% improvement and the boys had only

33% improvement. However, this 17% difference is only a difference of one

child and is probably just an artifact of the small sample size. The percentage

of the total number of girls who improved from an antisocial or mixed

response was 56%, which was very similar to the percentage for the boys, 50%.

Small Group

During Part 1 (honesty/lying) the girls and boys responded similarly to

the Experimental - Small Group training, with 57% of the girls improving

and 43% of the boys improving. During Part 2 (stealing) a larger percentage of

girls (80%) improved than boys (57%). This was a larger gain for the girls to

add on to their initially higher pretest scores, so they did much better by the

end than the boys. Again, as with the results from the Large Group, the

significance of this difference and whether it is due to the small sample size,

is not possible to ascertain.

Table 25

Change Between Pretest and Post-Test Responses for Children Who Initially

Gave Antisocial or Mixed Responses Analyzed by Sex and Value

	Girls				Boys			
	Improved		No Improvement		Improved		No Improvement	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Large Group								
Stealing	2	67	1	33	5	64	3	36
Exclusion	3	50	3	50	2	33	4	67
Total	5	56	4	44	7	50	7	50
Small Group								
Lying	4	57	3	43	3	43	4	57
Exclusion	4	80	1	20	4	57	3	43
Total	8	67	4	33	7	50	7	50
Control Group								
Lying	2	25	6	75	0	0	6	100
Stealing	4	67	2	33	1	20	4	80
Total	6	43	8	57	1	9	10	91

However, when the lying and exclusion improvement scores were

combined, the percentage of girls and boys who improved during

Experimental - Small Group Training was not very different, 67% and 50%

respectively.

Control Group

The largest gender difference was observed in the Control Group. When the girls just heard the book in Part 1 (lying), 25% improved while none of the boys improved. Similarly for Part 2 (stealing), 67% of the girls improved after just hearing the story, while only 20% of the boys improved. When the improvement scores are combined, 43% of the girls improved under the Control condition, while only 9% of the boys improved under the Control condition. This appears to be a real difference between the sexes. The girls learned more from the book alone and could apply what they learned better than the boys could.

Care vs. Justice

Gilligan and Wiggins (1987) believed that more girls approached moral problems from the perspective of care and interpersonal relationships, while more boys considered points of justice. The data were examined to see if a difference of care and justice orientations existed between the boys and girls. In general, children who gave responses that considered other's feelings were counted as having a care orientation. Children who gave responses that considered rules were counted as having a justice orientation. Specifically, for the honesty/lying value, those stating a rule were classified as having a justice orientation, and those who spontaneously considered another's feelings were classified as having a care orientation. For the value of not

taking something that isn't yours, those that justified their answer by saying

the toy was "not yours," "theirs," or "someone else's" were classified as using

a justice orientation. The children that spontaneously considered another's

feelings (ex. "Someone will get mad.") were classified as having a care

orientation. For the exclusion/hurting words section, those that stated a rule

such as "Because you have to share" or appealed to a sense of fairness, were

classified as having a justice orientation. Those that spontaneously

considered the feelings of the excluded character, said he could play because

he was a friend, or said he was nice, were considered to have a care

orientation.

Data were analyzed from pre- and post-tests. If a child gave responses

indicating a care orientation as well as justice orientation (only 4 subjects),

they were counted for both. The responses were examined for each value and

then for all three values pooled together. (See Table 26)

For lying and for exclusion, a higher percentage of boys showed a

justice orientation than girls; and a higher percentage of girls showed a care

orientation than boys. For the stealing situation, the two groups were

virtually identical. The validity of including the stealing data was

questionable because the determination of which responses showed a care

orientation and which responses showed a justice orientation seemed

arbitrary and overlapping. This topic did not seem to elicit mutually

exclusive, i.e., care vs. justice, responses. None of the children explicitly

Table 26

Justice vs. Care Orientation Analyzed by Gender

	Justice				Care			
	Boys		Girls			Boys		Girls	
Value	n	%	n	%		n	%	n	%
Lying[a]	4	22	1	7		0	0	2	13
Stealing[b]	8	44	8	47		2	11	2	12
Exclusion[c]	5	28	3	18		4	22	6	35
Totals	17	31	12	24		6	11	10	20

Note. [a]N(boys)=18 N(girls)=15
[b]N(boys)=18 N(girls)=17
[c]N(boys)=18 N(girls)= 17

stated a rule, e.g. you should not steal, so what was classified as a justice

response may not have really been a justice response. However, if the

stealing data were included and each gender's justice responses across all

three parts of the experiment were totaled, a higher percentage of boys (a

difference of 7%) gave justice responses. Comparing the total number of girls'

care responses across all three parts of the experiment to the total number of

boys' care responses, a higher percentage of girls (a difference of 9%) gave care

responses than boys. [If the stealing data were omitted, a slightly higher (12%)

difference was calculated between the sexes for a justice orientation (again

with more boys showing the justice orientation), and an slightly higher (11%) difference between the sexes for the care orientation (again with more girls showing the care orientation).] The percent difference was small, but consistent with Gilligan and Wiggins theory (1987). Note however, that individual girls and boys gave both care and justice responses.

Age Differences

The children ranged in age from 4 years 2 months to 5 years 3 months at the beginning of the experiment. In order to see if the age of the child had any effect on the efficacy of the RAD training, the data from the youngest and oldest children were grouped for examination. The children that were 4 years 6 months or younger were considered the "younger children", and those that were 4 years 11 months or older were considered the "older children". Each group covered 4 months (1/3 year). There were 7-8 children in the younger group (numbers of participants varied between the parts of the experiment due to enrollment) and 12 children in the older group.

Initial Understanding

Pretest scores were examined to see if the younger children differed from the older children in their initial knowledge and understanding of the moral questions involved in the experiment. Table 27 shows how well the younger and older children did on the pretest, first for each value and then as pooled data across all the values.

Table 27

Pretest Responses Analyzed by Age and Value

Pretest Response	Younger			Older		
	N	n	%	N	n	%
Lying	7			12		
-		6	86		7	58
±		0	0		1	8
+		1	14		4	33
Stealing	8			12		
-		7	88		4	33
±		0	0		2	17
+		1	12		6	50
Exclusion	8			12		
-		2	25		3	35
±		3	37.5		5	42
+		3	37.5		4	33
Total	23			36		
-		15	65		14	39
±		3	13		8	22
+		5	22		14	39

Analysis by Value

Lying. For the value of honesty/lying, more younger children than older children initially gave antisocial responses (86% vs. 58%). More of the older children initially gave mixed or prosocial responses (41% vs. 14%). The difference in each case was 28%. With respect to honesty, the older children appeared to have come to the training with a more prosocial attitude than the younger children.

Stealing. For stealing, 88% of the younger children initially gave antisocial responses, versus only 33% of the older children, a difference of 55%. More of the older children gave prosocial answers (50% vs. 12%). With regard to stealing, the older children definitely knew more about socially acceptable conventions that the younger children.

Exclusion. In the case of exclusion and hurting words, the differences between the groups were very small or nonexistent. Ten percent more of the younger children gave antisocial answers than the older group. However, the same percentage (75%) of each group gave mixed or prosocial answers. In fact, looking specifically at prosocial responses, a small percentage (4.5) of the younger group gave more prosocial answers than the older group. It appears that by the age of 4 years 6 months, children know as much about exclusion as they will one half year later.

<u>Totals</u>

When all the antisocial scores were summed across the three values for the younger children, and the same procedure was followed for the older children, more of the younger children initially gave antisocial responses. In fact, 26% more of the younger children gave antisocial responses than did the older children. More of the older children gave mixed responses (9% more) and more of the older children gave prosocial responses (17% more). If the mixed responses and prosocial responses were added together, the older children initially gave 26% more mixed and prosocial responses than the younger children. On the whole then, more of the older children came to the research project with a more prosocial orientation.

Selman and Lieberman (1974) believed that 2- to 4-year-old children had no clear awareness of moral rules. In this study, only 12% - 14% of the young 4-year-olds gave prosocial responses in the pretest for stealing and lying respectively. Although these were small percentages, there were still some young 4-year-olds that had an awareness of moral rules. However, such a small percentage of young 4-year-olds did not give prosocial responses for all the values. Over a third (37.5%) of the young 4-year-olds gave prosocial responses for exclusion. Therefore, the current results indicate that some young 4-year-olds do have a clear awareness of moral rules, but the majority of young 4-year-olds do not. In addition, younger children have more knowledge about some values (e.g., exclusion) than other values (e.g., lying

and stealing).

Effectiveness of the Training

Did older and younger children benefit from the training to the same degree? To answer this question, the improvement (or lack of improvement) between the pretest and post-test was examined, for the children who initially gave antisocial or mixed responses, or whose prosocial answer became more antisocial. (See Table 28)

Control Group

The younger and older children had similar scores after just hearing the book. When the results from lying and stealing were added together, 33% of the younger children showed improvement and 20% of the older children showed improvement.

Large Group

More of the children in the older group improved in the Large Group condition than in the younger group. When the results from the stealing and exclusion sections were added together, 67% of the older children improved versus only 29% of the younger group, a difference of 38%. Since the number of subjects was very small, the data are not conclusive. However, the results seem to indicate that older children were able to learn more from the large group training than the younger children. A possible explanation for this difference is that the younger children were more distractible in a large group.

Table 28

Change Between Pretest and Post-Test Responses for Children Who Initially

Gave Antisocial or Mixed Responses Analyzed by Age and Value

	Younger				Older			
	Improved		No Improvement		Improved		No Improvement	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Large Group								
Stealing	1	50	1	50	2	100	0	0
Exclusion	1	20	4	80	2	50	2	50
Total	2	29	5	71	4	67	2	33
Small Group								
Lying	2	100	0	0	2	50	2	50
Exclusion	1	50	1	50	3	100	0	0
Total	3	75	1	25	5	71	2	29
Control Group								
Lying	1	33	2	67	0	0	5	100
Stealing	1	33	2	67	2	40	3	60
Total	2	33	4	67	2	20	8	80

<u>Small Group</u>

Both the older and younger groups did equally well in the small group training, with 75% of the younger children showing improvement and 71% of the older children showing improvement. The younger children may have done as well as the older children in the small group training because the young children were more involved (having more turns) in the small Group training. Lamme et al. (1992) linked smaller groups with higher response rate. When the children were more involved, there were fewer opportunities for their attention to wander. With the proper small group environment, even the younger four-year-olds could learn as well as the fives.

Effect of English Language Proficiency

A lack of English language proficiency could reduce the efficacy of the RAD training program. If a child could not follow the discussion, or missed some points in the dramatizations, s(he) could misinterpret what they heard and form incorrect conclusions. To test this hypothesis the data were separated into three groups: children who were extremely limited English proficient (ELEP), children who were limited English proficient (LEP), and children who were English proficient (P). The distribution of English language proficiency was 6 ELEP's, 7 LEP's and 23 P's.

<u>Initial Understanding</u>

Pretest scores were examined to determine if the ELEP or LEP children

differed from the P children in their initial knowledge and understanding of

the moral questions involved in the experiment. The pretest performance of

the ELEP, LEP and P children is shown in Table 29 (for each value separately

and then as pooled data across all the values).

<u>Analysis by Value</u>

The initial responses during the pretest were not the same for the

different language groups. In addition, the differences in the pretest

responses between the language groups were not consistent over the three

values. The next sections analyze the pretest data by value.

<u>Lying.</u> More children in the ELEP group gave antisocial responses

(80%) than did those in the P group (45%), with the LEP being intermediary

between the two (71%), but very close to the ELEP group. About 35% more

children in the P group gave prosocial responses (53%) than both the ELEP

(14%) and the LEP (20%) groups. Results suggested that either the ELEP and

LEP children were less aware/less in favor of the prosocial responses, or that

they were more easily guided by the researcher's leading negative questions.

<u>Stealing.</u> Similar to the lying section, about 40-50% more ELEP and LEP

students gave antisocial responses than did the P students. If the mixed and

prosocial answers were combined, both the ELEP and the LEP students had 20-

29% of the children in their groups give mixed or prosocial answers. This

Table 29

Pretest Responses Analyzed by English Proficiency and Value

Pretest Response	ELEP			LEP			P		
	N	n	%	N	n	%	N	n	%
Lying	5			7			20		
-		4	80		5	71		9	45
±		0	0		1	14		3	15
+		1	20		1	14		8	53
Stealing	5			7			20		
-		4	80		5	71		6	30
±		1	20		0	0		7	35
+		0	0		2	29		7	35
Exclusion	6			6			20		
-		4	67		2	33		6	30
±		1	17		1	17		7	35
+		1	17		3	50		7	35
Total	16			20			60		
-		12	75		12	60		21	35
±		2	12.5		2	10		17	28
+		2	12.5		6	30		22	37

compared to 70% of the P students giving prosocial answers, a difference of about 45%. Again, it appeared that either the ELEP and LEP children were less aware/less in favor of the prosocial responses, or that they were more easily guided by the researcher's leading negative questions.

Exclusion. In the exclusion category, the LEP students performed more like the P students than the ELEP students. While two thirds of the ELEP students gave antisocial responses, only a third of the LEP and P students gave antisocial responses. More LEP and P students gave prosocial answers than the ELEP students did. Only about a third of the ELEP students gave mixed or prosocial responses, while about two thirds of the LEP and P students gave mixed or prosocial responses.

Combined. Combining the responses from all of the values, the scores for each response category (antisocial, mixed response and prosocial responses) were examined for each language ability group. The results indicated that more of the ELEP students gave antisocial responses and more of the P students gave prosocial responses, with the LEP students falling in between (except in the ± category). [If the mixed responses were added to the prosocial responses, the LEP group fell between the ELEP and P group in all categories.]

Implications. The ELEP and LEP students came from families that had recently immigrated to the United States. Conceivably, these children came to the preschool program with different training in morals and prosocial

values than the P students whose parents had grown up in the United States. However, a more likely possibility was that these children were more sensitive to cues from the teacher. The ELEP children may have been less sure of what to do in class, due to not understanding everything that was said. If the teacher suggested an action (be that negative or positive), the ELEP children might have felt more obligated to follow the suggestion since they did not have a firm understanding of the situation. Possibly, the LEP children, understanding more, might feel slightly more competent and independent to make their own decisions.

Effectiveness of the Training

Did lack of English language proficiency affect the efficacy of the training? Did ELEP and LEP students gain as much from the training as P students? To find out the answers to these questions, the improvement (and lack of improvement) between the pre- and post-tests was examined, taking into account the children's English language proficiency. Specifically, changes (or lack of change) for children who pre-tested with antisocial or mixed responses were examined, and categorized as showing improvement (I) or showing no improvement (NI). In addition, if a child changed from a prosocial to more antisocial response, the child was added into the no improvement category. (See Table 30)

Table 30

Change Between Pretest and Post-Test Responses for Children Who Initially Gave Antisocial or Mixed Responses Analyzed by English Language Proficiency and Value

	ELEP				LEP				P			
	I		NI		I		NI		I		NI	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Large Group												
Stealing	1	33	2	67	3	75	1	25	3	75	1	25
Exclusion	0	0	3	100	1	100	0	0	4	44	5	56
Total	1	17	5	83	4	80	1	20	7	54	6	46
Small Group												
Lying	1	50	1	50	1	33	2	67	5	62.5	3	37.5
Exclusion	2	67	1	33	2	67	1	33	4	67	2	33
Total	3	60	2	40	3	50	3	50	9	64	5	36
Control Group												
Lying	0	0	2	100	0	0	4	100	2	25	6	75
Stealing	0	0	2	100	0	0	1	100	5	56	4	44
Total	0	0	4	100	0	0	5	100	7	41	10	59

Note: I = Improvement   NI = No Improvement
Children whose score changed from social to antisocial were included in the no improvement column.

Large Group

Although the numbers were small, it appeared that fewer ELEP children showed improvement (average of 17%) than either LEP children (average of 80%) or P children (average of 54%) when trained in the large group setting. The smaller proportion of improved ELEP than LEP students could be explained by the fact that the ELEP students had difficulty understanding the discussion and implications of the dramatizations, while the limitations of the LEP students did not interfere with their comprehension.

More LEP students improved than P students did. If this is a genuine finding, i.e., the LEP students really did benefit more from the training and this is not a statistical anomaly caused by the small sample size, then a possible explanation is that the LEP students concentrated harder on the training so that they could understand what was said. This extra focus could have led to greater retention of the material. If one accepts this explanation of concentration linked to language proficiency, one could hypothesize that the ELEP students found understanding English to be such an effort, that they took breaks from concentrating on the training (or had breaks due to lack of comprehension). Breaks in concentration would lead to missed information, diminished comprehension, and ultimately less improvement in change scores. In fact, upon re-examination of the videotapes, several of the ELEP students were observed to be looking around the room during the reading of

the books, an indication of broken concentration.

Small Group

It appeared that Small Group training acted as an equalizer for English language deficiency. All three groups showed virtually the same proportion of improvement: ELEP - 60%, LEP - 50%, and P - 64%. The extra attention and participation engendered by the small group training appeared to make up for any gaps in understanding or attention brought about by lack of English proficiency.

Control Group

The results from the previous section revealed how important Small Group training was for the ELEP students. The results from the Control Groups confirmed the importance of the training employed in this study. Just reading the book was absolutely useless for the ELEP and LEP students. None of the ELEP or LEP students showed improvement in the Control group, whereas 41% of the P students showed improvement after just hearing the story. Discussion and dramatization really helped clarify meaning and understanding for those without full English proficiency.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter will review the major findings from this study, thereby

answering the questions posed in Chapter 1. A review of the results from the

qualitative sections of the research will provide insights into the moral reasoning

of preschool children. Next, practical implications from the study will be

discussed. Finally, suggestions will be made for future research that may be able

to answer questions raised by this study.

Major Findings

Effectiveness of the RAD Program

The primary purpose of this research project was to evaluate the efficacy

of the RAD training program with low-income preschool children. Could a

program composed of reading books that brought up moral dilemmas,

discussing the values addressed in the books, and dramatizations of scenarios

related to those moral values, influence children to make more prosocial

decisions?

The RAD training was effective: 64% to 80% of the children who had

initially given antisocial responses changed to prosocial responses after small

group RAD training (depending on the value). As many as 46% *more* children

gave prosocial responses after the RAD training than when they were just read

the book, depending on the value addressed and the size of the group.

Combining results from all the values and group sizes, 32% more of the children

who participated in the RAD training gave more prosocial responses than those

who were only read the book (percentages calculated from the number of children who could show improvement in their prosocial response scores).

Effect of Group Size

Was the RAD program more effective when used with large group (16-18) or small group (7-8) training? The small group training was somewhat more effective than the large group training. On the average (combining results from different values), 71% of the children who could show improvement, improved with small group training, but only 57% of the children in the large group showed improvement, a difference of 14%. When the results for each child were examined individually, to see which condition(s) led to improvement when improvement was possible, 8 % (sample included children completing all three conditions) – 13% (sample included all children tested) more children in the small group showed improvement than in the large group.

However, during Part 3, where the small group experience was compared directly to the large group experience using the same value, 35% more of the children in the small group changed to more prosocial responses than did children in the large group (80% improvement for small group vs. 45% improvement for large group).

The small group training was more effective in promoting spontaneous prosocial answers and resistance to antisocial suggestions. In Part 3, more children who had gone through the small group training defended the excluded child than those who had gone through the large group training. In addition, there was more of a sense of unity and caring expressed by children who had

been through the small group training than the large group training.
Specifically, 12% more children in the small group used the explanation that the
new child should not be excluded because he was a friend, and 19% more
children came to the defense of the excluded character.

Small group training increased the number of children stating the
prosocial rule more than did large group training. In Part 3, both small and large
group training increased the number of children who stated the rules about
exclusion to justify including the new character. However, there was a 13%
greater increase after small group training than after large group training.

Small group training increased the level of perspective taking to a greater
degree than large group training. During Part 3, there was a 19% greater
increase in perspective taking after small group training than after large group
training.

The size of the group made more of a difference to some children than to
others. The sections on age and English language proficiency will discuss the
importance of small group instruction for younger children and those with
limited English proficiency.

Earlier in this manuscript it was proposed that more of the children in the
small group improved than in the large group because the children in the small
group were more engaged in the training. The small group children were more
involved in discussions, had more turns acting out scenarios, had more
opportunities to practice the prosocial skills and/or experience negative
consequences for antisocial responses, and were more likely to have any

misconceptions corrected.

Difficulty of Values

Were some prosocial values more difficult for preschool children to adopt than others? When one compared the children's improvement under the same training conditions, but for different values, it became obvious that some values were easier, and some were more difficult to adopt. Honesty was the most difficult value, not stealing was the easiest value, and not saying hurting words or excluding was of intermediate difficulty.

Earlier in this paper a theory was proposed to explain why some values were more difficult than others for the children to adopt. The longer a child had experience with moral dilemmas in a certain moral area, the easier it was for the child to benefit from the training. The child could make more personal and meaningful connections to the discussion and dramatizations if he/she had more time to build up a personal experience base and schema for these areas. Early emerging behaviors would form a firm basis for learning about moral values related to these behaviors, and make them easy to learn. However, later emerging behaviors would not yet have had time to create a firm knowledge base and schema. A child would find moral values based on later emerging behaviors more difficult to adopt. Since preschool children experience problems with taking things that are not theirs for the longest period of time (the last 3 years of their life), problems with exclusion for an intermediate amount of time (about the last 2 years of their life), and problems with lying for the shortest

amount of time (less than 1 year), the theory is in agreement with the results from this study.

Gender Differences

Did children differ, as a function of gender, on their initial response in the pretest or on the efficacy of the training? Were some prosocial values more (or less) difficult for boys than girls? Were other gender differences observed?

Initial Responses

Boys and girls did not have the same initial level of understanding for all the values tested. Twenty percent more boys gave antisocial responses regarding stealing, while 19% more girls gave antisocial responses regarding saying hurting words and exclusion. Boys and girls gave similar responses for lying. However, when results from the different parts of the experiment were combined, identical percentages for antisocial, mixed and prosocial responses were found for boys and girls. Although girls appeared to have been weaker in some areas (exclusion and saying hurting words), and boys might have been weaker in other areas (stealing), on the whole, neither boys nor girls were more morally advanced.

Efficacy of Training

A small but consistent gender difference was observed in the effectiveness of the training. The girls always improved slightly more (3-23% more) than the boys. Combining the results from different values, about half of the boys improved with small or large group training. More girls improved with the RAD training than did the boys: 56% of the girls improved after large group

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training, and 67% of the girls improved after small group training.

The difference between the boys' and girls' improvement scores was particularly noticeable in the Control Group. On the average, 34% *more* girls improved in the Control Group than did the boys (range 25% - 47% more improvement). Few, or none, of the boys could learn from the book alone (0 in Part 1 and only 1 boy in Part 2). Although some girls could learn from hearing the book alone, boys needed the RAD training to bring their improvement scores closer to the girls' scores.

Other Gender Differences

On the average, a higher percentage of boys gave justice responses than did the girls, and a higher percentage of girls gave care responses than did the boys. The average difference between the boys and girls scores was small (11-12% difference) but was consistent with the conclusions of Gilligan and Wiggins (1987).

Other gender differences revealed by this study were that girls chastised the researcher for antisocial behavior 5:2 over boys, and 5/6 of those who used prejudice to exclude the new character were boys.

Age Differences

The children in the study ranged from 4 years 2 months to 5 years 3 months. Since the older children (4 years 11 months – 5 years 3 months) had more time to experience behaviors related to the values tested, would their responses differ from those of the younger children (4 years 2 months – 4 years 6 months)? Would the younger and older children respond similarly to the

training, or would some training conditions be more/less effective for the younger children than for the older children?

Initial Responses

On the average, more of the older children began the training with a prosocial attitude and more of the younger children began the training with an antisocial attitude. From pretest results, 17% more of the older children gave prosocial responses and 25% more of the younger children gave antisocial responses. For some values, the difference between younger and older students was more pronounced. For stealing, for example, 38% more of the older students gave prosocial responses and 55% more of the younger children gave antisocial responses. For other values, e.g., exclusion, there was virtually no difference in initial knowledge for the younger and older students. It appeared that by 4 years 6 months, the children knew as much about exclusion as they would one-half year later.

Effect of Training Group Size

The size of the training group was more important to the younger children than to the older children. Although younger and older children had similar change scores in the Control and Experimental - Small Groups, 38% more of the older children improved in the Experimental – Large Group training than did the younger children. For the younger children, the change scores in Experimental Large Group training were small and equivalent to the change scores for the Control Group, i.e., only about one third of the young children showed improvement. However, more of the younger children showed

improvement when they were trained in the Experimental Small Group, i.e.,

three fourths of the young children showed improvement. In contrast, similar

numbers (≈70%) of older children improved with Experimental - Large or

Experimental - Small Group training, with children in both Experimental - Large

and Experimental Small Groups responding more prosocially than children in

the control condition (see Table 31).

Table 31

Efficacy of Training Conditions for Younger and Older Children

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Age Group	Amount of Improvement under Training Conditions
Younger	Experimental Large Group = Control Group
Older	Experimental Large Group = Experimental Small Group
Younger & Older	Experimental Small Group = Experimental Small Group

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The conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that older children

learn equally well in large or small groups, but younger children need to be

taught in smaller groups to benefit from the RAD training. However, the

numbers involved in the calculations were small, so these results may not be

conclusive.

Effects of English Language Proficiency

The participants in the study had different levels of English proficiency:

Extremely Limited English Proficient (ELEP), Limited English Proficient (LEP),

and English Proficient (P). Did the children's ability to understand English affect their pretest responses and the efficacy of the training conditions?

Initial Responses

In the pretests, ELEP students gave the most antisocial responses, LEP students were generally intermediate between the ELEP and English Proficient students, and the P students gave the most prosocial responses. Thirty-five to fifty percent more of the ELEP students gave antisocial responses in the pretest than did the P students.

Earlier in this thesis a theory was proposed to explain the link between a lack of English proficiency and antisocial pretest responses. Since the ELEP students, and to a lesser extent the LEP students, did not understand all of what was said, they would be unsure of their own conclusions. Their insecurity might lead to an increased willingness to accept the researcher's negative suggestions as the correct course of action.

Efficacy of Training

Language proficiency influenced the efficacy of the three experimental conditions.

Under Experimental – Large Group training conditions, the most improvement was observed in the LEP group, intermediate improvement was observed in the P group, and the least amount of improvement was observed in the ELEP group. A theory was proposed to explain these results. LEP students concentrated intensely during training in order to understand what was said. This extra focus could have led to greater retention of the material for the LEP

students, than for the P students. ELEP students found understanding English to be such an effort, that they took breaks from concentrating on the training (or had breaks due to lack of comprehension). Breaks in concentration would lead to missed information, diminished comprehension, and ultimately less improvement in change scores.

No ELEP or LEP students showed improvement in a Control Group, while 41% of P students improved under Control Group conditions. RAD training was essential for students who lacked full English language proficiency. Discussion and dramatization really helped clarify meaning and understanding for those without full English proficiency.

All language proficiency groups showed similar improvement (50-64% improvement) when involved with Experimental - Small Group training. Small group training was essential for the ELEP students. Only 1 ELEP student improved in the Experimental - Large Groups and no ELEP students improved in the Control Groups. Small group training acted as an equalizer for English language proficiency. The extra attention and participation engendered by the small group training surmounted any gaps in understanding or attention caused by lack of English proficiency.

Insights into the Moral Reasoning of Preschool Children

The qualitative sections of this study help provide insights into the moral reasoning of preschool children.

Lying

Students in this study suggested lying to avoid punishment or parental anger. This finding does not agree with Kohlberg (Kohlberg, 1971, 1978; Turiel, 1983) who suggested that children follow the rules and tell the truth to avoid punishment. Although the children in this study did try to avoid punishment, the behavior chosen to avoid punishment was not the same as theorized by Kohlberg. Piaget (1932/1965) believed that children obeyed authority due to respect for authority. None of the children in this study gave responses that would support that theory.

Influence of Training on Telling the Truth/Lying

After the RAD training, 7% fewer children in the Experimental – Small Group suggested lying to avoid punishment than in the pretest. Furthermore, 15% fewer children in the Experimental – Small Group suggested lying to avoid punishment than in the Control Group post-test. In addition, more children in the Experimental – Small Group spontaneously told the mother what had happened (36% Experimental – Small Group vs. 17% Control) and more children advocated telling the truth after the RAD training (Experimental - Small Group: pretest - 0%; post-test – 43%). Moreover, more children chose to tell the truth for positive reasons, such as making mother happy or the need to tell the truth.

Reparation/Altruistic Behavior

During the pretest of Part I, 59% of the children in the study suggested reparation to the mother (fix the box, give something else of value) and 34% volunteered to help the researcher's character. These percentages were similar to

results reported in the literature. Zahn-Waxler, et al. (1992) observed that one-half of two-year-olds exhibited altruistic behavior in naturally occurring distresses, when the child was a bystander. Radke Yarrow, et al. (1973) observed that 33-43% of 3.5 - 5.5-year-olds showed helping behavior in response to other's distress.

More children suggested the researcher tell her mom she was sorry for breaking the swan after the RAD training (21% Experimental – Small Group vs. 13% Control Group). Since there was nothing about saying you were sorry in the RAD training, it appears that the RAD training raised the children's consciousness of other's feelings.

Altruistic behavior was exhibited in Part 2 as well. About one-fourth of the children in the post-test spontaneously suggested returning the toy to its owner. Returning the toy to the (unknown) owner was not suggested during the training, or in the text of the book, so this appears to be a naturally occurring altruistic response of preschoolers. Similar to "saying you're sorry", above, this response also increased after the RAD training.

<div align="center">Perspective Taking</div>

Previous studies have not agreed on the ability of preschool children to take the perspective of another person (Dixon & Moore, 1990; Maccoby, 1980; Selman, 1976). Many of the children in this study were capable of perspective taking. Over 80% of the children were able to correctly predict the mother's feelings when her box was broken (pretest Part I), and training improved the children's predictive abilities.

During Part 2, four boys justified taking the toy in the pretest because "it's nobody's." After the training, those children realized that a toy found on the ground belonged to someone else and that the other person would still want it. The training helped expand their awareness of others. Eleven percent more children considered the point of view of the child who lost the toy after the training.

During Part 3, children in both small and large group training increased their perspective taking. Initially, 19% (Experimental - Large Group) to 25% (Experimental - Small Group) of the children took into account the excluded child's feelings. After the training, more children were able to see things from the excluded child's point of view. Perspective taking increased by 19% in the Experimental – Small Group, but only by 6% in the Experimental - Large Group. Strangely, even though some children could correctly predict the excluded child's feelings and knew he would be sad, they still chose to disregard his feelings, and exclude him. Their egocentric choice to exclude was not made through ignorance of the emotional consequences to the excluded child or the inability to take the perspective of another.

Parent as Authority

In Part 2, one-fourth of the children used the parent as an authority to help decide if it was permissible to take the toy. Piaget (1932/1965) also noted that children used their parents as authorities, especially in relationship to making rules. The RAD training helped reduce the children's dependence on their parents to make moral decisions. After the RAD training, 36% fewer

children in the Experimental – Large Group post-test cited parental authority as a justification for taking the toy, than in the Control Group post-test. After experiencing the RAD training, children had a moral basis for their reasoning and decision making; they did not have to depend as heavily on an external parental authority.

In Part 3, parental authority was invoked in a different capacity. Parents were not called upon to help decide the correct course of action, but to punish wrongdoers or right wrongs.

<u>Explanations: Level of Moral Reasoning</u>

Many children could offer explanations for their moral choices. For example, in Part 3, children who chose not to exclude the new character gave the following reasons: rules about sharing and turn taking, being nice, and considering the excluded child's feelings. Children did not need to refer to parental authority or fear of punishment to justify their reasoning, as would have been expected from 4- or 5-year-old children at Kohlberg's (Kohlberg, 1971, 1978; Turiel, 1983) and Piaget's (1932/1965) lowest levels. Although some children did cite rules as explanations for a moral choice, they did not seem to advocate following the rules without internal motivation, solely parroting adults (Piaget, 1932/1965). Many children in this study could think for themselves and frequently gave reasons in their own voice. The children in this study did refer to "being nice" or "being mean" as reasons for their decisions. These explanations could be equated with Kohlberg's Stage 3, the good boy/nice girl stage. However, children would not be expected to enter this stage until the age

of 12. Therefore, Kohlberg's and Piaget's developmental levels do not seem to be a good fit for the qualitative responses obtained from this study.

<u>Why Children are Excluded</u>

The most common reason for excluding the new character was a "practical" reason: there were not enough toys or, conversely, there were too many kids. After the RAD training, fewer children excluded the newcomer due to an insufficient number of toys. The children had learned strategies of sharing, turn taking, or bringing over more toys. The small group training was more effective than the large group training in reducing the exclusion of the newcomer on the basis on insufficient toys.

Implications of These Results

The RAD program is an effective program for increasing prosocial responses to moral dilemmas in preschool children, at least at the cognitive level. The RAD program would be a beneficial addition to preschool techniques for enhancing social-emotional development.

The results from the gender section indicate that a program such as the RAD program is essential for preschool boys. Some girls were able to pick up prosocial values after just having the book read to them, but boys were unable to learn from the book alone. They needed the additional discussion and dramatization to change from antisocial to prosocial responses.

The results of the age and English proficiency sections indicate that younger 4-year-olds, and children not proficient in English must receive their RAD instruction in small groups of eight or fewer children, instead of receiving

large group instruction. Conversely, it appears that older children (such as those in kindergarten) and those who are proficient in English, could also do well in a RAD program presented in a larger group setting of approximately 18 children. It should not be necessary to take the additional time to teach kindergarten lessons in a small group format (if the children are proficient in English).

Future Research

One limitation of the present study was that it included too few participants to employ statistics that could confirm statistically significant differences between groups. A replication of this study with a greater number of participants would make it possible to confirm whether the gender, age, English language proficiency, and other differences observed in this study were statistically significant, or were only the result of normal variation observed in a small sample.

In addition, a larger sample size would allow the sample to divided into three groups so that all three conditions (Control, Experimental – Large Group, and Experimental - Small Group) could be tested at the same time for each value. Since the values used in this study differed in difficulty for preschool children, and the books were not equally good at transmitting prosocial values, it was difficult to compare training conditions when they had been tested with different values and different books. Using the same book and same value for all three testing conditions would allow direct comparison of the effects of group size and effectiveness of the training.

Further research might examine the preschooler's ability to relate to a

larger variety of values. A proposed theory, that prosocial values related to earlier developing behaviors were easier for the children to adopt, explained the results from the values addressed in this study. Would a repetition of this study, including additional prosocial values, support the validity of this theory?

Another area for further research involves examining the efficacy of the RAD program with children of different ages. Moreover, what would be the optimal group size for training at each age? Could the benefits of the RAD program be extended to 3-year-olds if the training was done in small groups? Would groups of five or six 4-year-olds learn more than groups of eight? Would English speaking kindergarten children learn as well in whole-class instruction as in small groups?

The present study was conducted with a culturally diverse, low-income population. A replication of the study involving a large number of children from all socio-economic groups would permit the examination of the effect of socio-economic status on the preschool child's ability to adopt prosocial values. It would also be interesting to correlate prior knowledge (pretest scores) of prosocial values with socio-economic, cultural and religious backgrounds.

One question that was raised in the study was that of "order effects". Children who had been in the Experimental – Small Group during Part 1 of the study, seemed to do especially well in the Control Group in Part 2. It was as if being involved in the small group training sensitized them to be alert to moral issues raised in subsequent books. Were they primed to examine issues on their own? Future research might investigate the possibilities of a carryover effect of

the training. Would children who had participated in small group RAD

trainings give more prosocial responses after just hearing a book than those

without the training, with values and books other than those tested in this study?

If so, the value of the RAD training would be even more far reaching than

currently reported.

Over one hundred children's books relating to moral values were

reviewed during the design stage of this project. Very few books were found

that were clearly related to a prosocial value, lent themselves to discussion, had

engaging story lines, and were not overly "preachy." Although books

promoting moral values are "in" now, there is a need for more quality literature

that can be used with preschool children.

If the study were to be repeated, deeper probing questions could reveal

more of the children's thought processes. For example, were the children just

repeating rules they heard, or did they have a reason for believing in the rules?

When a child gave a rule, such as "everybody can play" as a response, the

researcher could have asked, "Why should everybody be allowed to play?"

Whether the child could, or could not, give reasons for following the rule,

(beyond the authority figure says so) would refute/support Piaget's (1932/1965)

and Kohlberg's (Kohlberg, 1971, 1978; Turiel, 1983) stages of moral development.

Another area for more in-depth questioning would be questions about lies

and lying to help clarify modern-day children's conceptions about lying. Piaget

(1932/1965) believed young children defined a lie as a falsity of statement, but

Bussey (1992) believed that even young children knew a lie was intended to

deceive. Possible questions for future research might include the following: How did you know she told a lie? Why is it bad to lie? What is a lie?

The RAD training was effective with many preschool children, but did not reach a small percentage of children. What other techniques or activities could be added to the RAD program to reach the children who did not improve?

Finally, the effect of the RAD program on actual prosocial behavior might be investigated. In naturally occurring (or subtly staged) events in the preschool, would children who had participated in the RAD training act in a more prosocial manner? For example, a "lost" toy could be left in the playground. The behavior of small groups of children (or individuals) could be observed as they found the desirable toy. Subsequent questioning could help researchers understand the children's reasoning for their decisions.

For the time being, however, the results of this study would seem to suggest that researchers, practitioners and parents stand to gain considerable insights into the processes of moral development of young children through the rigorous implementation and evaluation of literature-based education programs such as the RAD technique.

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Appendix A

Shortened Text Adapted from

<u>Best Friends for Francis</u>

by Russell Hoban

[New text was pasted over original text in the book used to present the story.]

On a lovely summer morning, Frances took her bat, her ball and some chocolate chip cookies and went outside.

"Will you play ball with me?" Frances's little sister Gloria called to her as she was leaving.

"No," said Frances. "You are too little."

Gloria sat down on the back steps and cried. Frances walked over to her friend Albert's house, singing a little song:

Sisters that are much too small

To throw or catch or bat a ball

Are really not much good at all,

Except for crying.

When Frances got to Albert's house, he was just coming out, and he was carrying a large, heavy-looking brown paper bag full of lunch.

"Let's play baseball," said Frances.

"I can't," said Albert. "Today is my wandering day."

"Where do you wander?" said Frances.

"I don't know," said Albert. "I just go around until I get hungry, and then I eat my lunch."

"Can I wander with you?" asked Frances.

"I only have one lunch," said Albert.

"I'll bring my own," said Frances. "I'll run home and get it right away."

"No," said Albert. "I think I better go by myself. The things I do on my wandering days aren't things you can do."

"Like what?" said Frances.

"Catching snakes," said Albert. "Throwing stones at telephone poles. Walking on fences. A little frog work. Looking for crow feathers."

"I can do all that," said Frances, "except for the frog work and the snakes."

"That's what I mean," said Albert. "I'd have to ruin the whole day, showing you how. I'll see you tomorrow."

Then Albert went off to wander, and Frances walked slowly home.

When Frances got home, Gloria said, "Will you play ball with me now?"

"You can't bat and you can't catch," said Frances, "and you can't throw either."

"I can if you stand close," said Gloria.

"All right," said Frances and she played ball with Gloria.

The next morning when Frances went to Albert's house, Albert was playing ball with his friend Harold.

"Can I play?" asked Frances.

"She's not much good," said Harold to Albert, "and besides, this is a no-girls game."

"Can't I play?" said Frances to Albert.

"Well, it *is* a no-girl's game," said Albert.

"All right," said Frances. "Then I will go home and play a no-boys game with my sister Gloria, Mr. Fat Albert. So ha, ha, ha."

Frances walked home, and as she walked she sang:

Boys to throw and catch and bat

Are all the friends that Mr. Fat

Albert will have from now on.

He will not have me.

When Frances got home, Gloria said, "How did you play so fast that you are home so soon?"

"It was a fast game," said Frances.

"You're lucky that you have a friend to play with," said Gloria. "I wish I had a friend."

"I thought Ida was your friend," said Frances.

"Ida is away at camp," said Gloria, "and when she is here she only wants to play dolls or tea party. She never wants to catch frogs or play ball."

"You know how to catch frogs?" said Frances.

"Yes, do you want me to show you how?" said Gloria.

"Later. Do you want to play ball now?" said Frances.

"All right," said Gloria.

"If any boys come, they can't play," said Frances, "and I think I will be your friend now."

"For frogs and ball *and* tea parties and dolls?" said Gloria.

"Yes," said Frances.

"Then you will be my best friend," said Gloria. "Will it be just today, or longer?"

"Longer," said Frances. "And today we will do something big, with no boys. We'll have an outing with a picnic and songs and games and prizes."

Mother helped Frances and Gloria get everything ready and packed in Frances's wagon.

They packed a picnic lunch, two sacks for a sack race, a jar with two frogs that Gloria had caught for the frog jumping contest, and balloons, and lollipops for prizes.

Frances had made a sign to carry on the outing too. It said:

BEST FRIENDS

OUTING

NO BOYS

Frances and Gloria held the sign high as they passed Albert's house, and Frances sang:

When best friends have an outing,

There are jolly times in store.

There are games and there are prizes,

There is also something more.

There is something in a hamper,

That is very good to eat.

When best friends have an outing,

It's a very special treat,

With no boys.

"What's in that hamper?" asked Albert as he came running out of his house.

"Oh, nothing much. Just hard-boiled eggs and carrot and celery sticks. Some peanut butter-and-jelly and some cream cheese-and-jelly sandwiches too, and pizza, and cole slaw and potato chips of course. Ice-cold root beer soda and watermelon and strawberries and cream for dessert.

And there's some other things I forgot, like black and green olives and pickles and popsicles and some pretzels and things like that. And some napkins and a checked tablecloth, which is the way girls do it."

"Could I come along on the outing?" said Albert. "That wagon looks very heavy to pull, and you will probably get all tired out unless I help you."

"I don't know," said Frances. "You can see by the sign that this is a no-boys outing and it is only for best friends."

"What good is an outing without boys?" said Albert.

"It is just as good as a ball game without girls," said Frances, "and maybe a whole lot better."

"Can't I be a best friend?" asked Albert.

"I don't think it is the kind of thing you can do," said Frances, "and it would ruin my whole day to have to explain it to you."

"I can do it," said Gloria. "I can be a best friend, and I can catch frogs too."

"I can catch frogs *and* snakes. I'll get my snake pillowcase right now," said Albert.

"Well, I'm not sure," said Frances. "Maybe you'll be best friends when it is goodies-in-the-hamper time, but how about when it is no-girls-baseball time?"

"When we are best friends, there won't be any no-girls baseball," said Albert.

"All right," said Frances, and she crossed out the NO BOYS on the sign.

Then they started off again. Albert pulled the wagon to the outing place while Frances and Gloria walked ahead with the sign.

Everybody had a good time at the outing. First Albert caught a snake for Gloria, and then they played games. Gloria won the sack race, Frances

won the egg toss, and Albert won the frog-jumping contest with a frog he
caught right there at the pond. So everybody won a prize. Then they sang
songs together.

And then they ate lunch.

"Maybe we packed too much," said Frances. "I'm not sure we can eat it
all."

"That is what best friends are for," said Albert. "I will help you finish it
all."

That is what Albert did, and when the picnic was over, the hamper was
not heavy at all.

"I call that a good outing," said Albert.

And he gave Frances and Gloria a ride in the wagon while he pulled it
all the way home.

The next morning Albert came over with a bunch of flowers for
Frances.

"Thank you," said Frances.

Then Gloria sat down on the steps and cried.

"Why are you crying?" said Frances.

"Because now you have Albert to be your best boyfriend and bring you
flowers and play ball with," said Gloria, "and you won't be my best friend
anymore."

"Yes, I will," said Frances. "And besides, I am not sure that I am going to let Albert be my boyfriend."

"Then let him be mine." said Gloria.

"Not so fast," said Frances. "It was only yesterday that you got to be big enough to play baseball. But I will give you half the daisies Albert gave me."

So Frances gave Gloria half the daisies, and Gloria stopped crying.

Then Harold came over, and everybody played baseball -- Gloria too.

APPENDIX B

Discussion Questions, Dramatization Scenarios, and Test Questions

<u>Telling the Truth/Lying</u>

<u>The Empty Pot</u>

by Demi

<u>Summary of book</u>: When Ping admits that he is the only child in China

unable to grow a flower from the seeds distributed by the Emperor (cooked

seeds), he is rewarded for his honesty.

<u>Discussion Questions</u>

1- Why was the emperor frowning when he looked at the flowers the other

children brought?

Clarifying questions: Did they grow the seeds he gave them?

What did they do that was bad?

How did the emperor feel?

Why was the emperor mad at them?

How does it feel when someone lies to you?

2- The Emperor is looking at Ping and he's happy. Ping's seed did not grow.

Why was the emperor happy when Ping's plant didn't grow?

If no answers: What was wrong with the seeds the emperor gave?

Should dead, cooked seeds grow?

Emphasize the words truth and lie.

Repeat question so that all the children who want to can say why the emperor was happy.

3 - Look at Ping's face when he brings the empty pot? How did he feel? Is it always easy to tell the truth?

Teacher's example - One time a boy took all my magnetic marbles from school and put them in his pockets to take home. I asked if anyone knew where my marbles were and he said he didn't know. But his pockets were fat with marbles. He really had them, but he lied and said he didn't know where they were. How do you think I felt about the lie?

Consequences - the boy got in trouble for lying.

4- Do you know of a time when someone lied - did not tell the truth?/ or someone told the truth?

How did you feel about that?

How does it feel when someone lies to you?

What would happen if they told the truth? How would you feel?

5- How do you think that boy who took my marbles felt?

Compare to Ping in the story showing his pot to the Emperor.

6- What if there was one cookie in the house. Make believe you have a

brother and he ate it. (You know he ate it because he has cookie crumbs

on his mouth.) You ask, "Did you eat my cookie?" and he says, "No."

Is he telling the truth or lying?

How do you feel?

<u>Dramatizations</u>

Each scenario is acted out a several times so that all the children who

want to have a turn will have a turn.

1) A child knocks the dirt out of a flower pot. It's a big mess. When parent

comes in he/she asks, "Who did this?" What could the child say?

- Act out alternatives - lying (someone else did it), hiding mess

After lying adult says, "I don't want to be with someone who lies."

(not friend, can't believe, etc.)

- Telling the truth; Was it hard to tell the truth? How did it feel to tell

the truth?

-Each time - How does that feel for the parent? for the child?

After all alternatives; Which feels better for the mom? for the child?

Finish with a repeat of telling the truth - I'm sad it spilled. It's okay you

made a mistake but I feel really good you told me the truth.

2) Child 1 walks by and drops a toy. Child 2 comes up and says, "It's mine. I left it here before. I'll take it home." Is he telling the truth?

Child 1, who dropped the toy, comes back and Child 2, who picked it up says, "It's mine."

How does Child 1 feel about that? How do the people who watched feel about that? What could the child who picked it up do? How will it feel to give it back? Should he do it?

- Repeat with Child 2 deciding to tell the truth or lie.

If tells the truth, how do they feel?

If lies, how do they feel? Maybe made a mistake and wants to change his response. How does it feel to change what you say?

If lies, Child 1 can tell how they do not want to be with people who lie.

They can't trust them and don't want them for a friend.

Finish with a repeat of telling the truth:

Emphasize - Lying was a mistake, or picking it up was a mistake.

I'm glad you told the truth. I like to be with friends who tell the truth.

3) A child ate a cookie that was not his and there are cookie crumbs on his face.

- He tells the person who comes that he did not eat the cookie.

Does the other person believe him? How does the other person feel about the liar? Can he trust him? Does he want to be with him?

-Repeat, this time telling the truth. Is it hard to tell the truth? How do the people feel?

- The child decides to lie and names someone else in the group as the one who ate the cookie. The child whose cookie was eaten "yells" at the third person. Stop the drama and discuss how everyone feels. What's another way this could have been done?

- End with telling the truth. Thank you for telling the truth.

Test questions

Pre-test: Using puppets and a broken box.

Post test: Using a plastic swan with a broken neck.

• Uh-oh. I broke my mom's box [swan] and I don't want her to be mad at me.

• What should I do? What should I tell her?

• Should I say I did it or some one else?

   • Why?

• How would my mom feel?

  • Why?

• Do you have any more to tell about this story?

Taking Something that is not Yours

Jamaica's Find

By Juanita Havill

Summary: Jamaica finds a hat and dog at the park. She turns the hat into the Lost and Found, but takes the dog home. That night, after talking it over with her mother, Jamaica feels uncomfortable about keeping the dog. She takes it back to the Lost and Found the next day, and the girl who lost it is very glad to have it back.

Discussion

1- Before reading the book: This is a book about somebody who loses

  something. Did you every lose anything? How did you feel about that?

  Give everyone a turn to speak if they want to.

After reading the book:

1- Why did Jamaica take the dog home?

  Did she really think it was hers?

  Is there something else she could have done?

2- Look at p.28. What is Kristin doing?

  You can't see Kristin's face. How do you think Kristin was feeling

    when she looked for her dog?

3- Look at p. 32. How did Kristin feel when she got her dog back?

  How did Jamaica feel? Why do you think Jamaica felt happy?

4 - What would you do if you found a toy you really liked in the park?

What could you do if they have a Lost and Found?

Dramatization

Each scenario is acted out a several times so that all the children who want to have a turn will have a turn. However, everyone does not have a turn with each scenario.

1) What would you do if you found a dog in the park?

Children act our course of action chosen. The child who lost the dog returns to find it. Repeat until the children have seen the consequences of taking it home and leaving it in the park.

How do they feel with each possible ending?

2) What would you do if you found a toy in the playground?

Then the person who owns it comes. How do they feel?

- Is there another way? Is there something else you could do if you found a toy that wasn't yours?

3) The school has a Lost and Found. What would happen if you found a toy on the playground and then took to the Lost and Found?

Then child who lost it comes and looks for it on the playground and then at the lost and found. How do they feel when they get it back?

4) What if you made a mistake and took something that wasn't yours.

Parent asks child if the toy is theirs. Is that somebody else's car?

What could you do? How would it feel to return it?

5) What if your friend found toy that wasn't theirs and picked it up to take it

home? What could you say to him? What could you do?

<u>Test questions</u>

<u>Pre-test:</u> Using puppets and a Buz Lightyear for the boys and a flocked pony

for the girls

<u>Post test:</u> Using DUPLO® people and a small marbled rubber ball for the boys

and a ring for the girls

* Look, there's a [toy].

* What should we do with it?

* Let's take it okay?

  * Why is that [okay/not okay]?

* It's not mine and it's not your, but I really like it? I'll take it, Okay?

  * Why?

* Do you have any more to tell about this story?

Hurting Words/Exclusion

Best Friends for Francis

by Russell Hoban

Summary: Frances excludes her little sister by saying she can't play baseball because she's too small. Then Francis' friend Albert excludes Frances by saying she can't come wandering or play baseball because she's a girl. Frances and little sister, Gloria, plan an outing and exclude Albert. When they see that each person can add something to the outing, all are included and have a good time.

Discussion Questions

During the Story:

1. How do you think Frances felt when Albert said she couldn't come wandering?

2. How did Frances feel when they said she couldn't play baseball? What would she want them to say?

After the Story:

3. How did Gloria feel when Frances said she couldn't play baseball? (p. 4) Why was Gloria crying?

   If you were Gloria, what would you have wanted Frances to say?

4. Contrast P. 4 and p. 23. How do they feel when they are playing all together?

5. Why was Gloria sad on the page where Albert gave Frances flowers?

6. Has anyone said something to you that hurt your feelings? Has someone said hurting words that made you feel sad?

   - How did you feel when they said that?

   - What would be a better thing to say?

Dramatization

Each scenario is acted out several time so that all the children have a chance to be in a dramatization.

1. Two children are sitting together at Circle Time. Another child comes over to sit with them. One of the original children says, "You can't sit here, you're not my friend."

   How did the new child feel?

   What would be a better thing for the original children to say?

   (Something that would not hurt their feelings.)

Repeat scenario 1, varying the original children's responses, positive and negative. If there is a negative response, what could the rejected child say?

[Suggest stating the class rule that anyone can sit where there is room.]

2. Two friends are sitting on the floor, each with a toy dinosaur. A third child comes over and says, "Can I play?" The seated children say, "You can't play with us. You're not our friend."

    - How does [the new child] feel?

Repeat the scenario, and this time the friends say, "Yes". However there are only 2 dinosaurs.

    - What can they do?

        Act out answer - Ex. get more dinosaurs

    -How does that feel?

Repeat the scenario, with a negative answer.

    What can [the rejected child's name] say? Ex. State rule, You have to let children play at school.

When the friends invite the newcomer to play -

        There's only 2 dinosaurs. What can they do? Make believe there are no more dinosaurs.

            Act out the children's suggestions (Ex. Take turns, get another kind of toy, etc.)

Repeat the scenario with children choosing to make positive or negative responses.

    How did that feel?

3. Two friends are playing together. Another child comes over and asks to play. One friend says "Yes," and the other friend says, "No."

-Do you think [name] made a mistake?

-To the person who said yes: Talk to your friend. What would be a

better thing to say?

- If there's a spontaneous shift to the positive response, - Were you

thinking about how [Name] felt when you said, "No?"

Repeat scenario.

4. The teacher takes the role of a child and another child agrees to answer

negatively.

Teacher acting as child: Can I play?

Child: No.

Teacher acting as child: It's the rule you have to let me play.

Child: No.

Teacher acting as child: I need some help. I'll ask my teacher for help.

Teacher (child actor) comes over. Teacher acting as child says: I need

some help to say the rule.

Teacher (child actor) tells the rule.

Child responds.

5. The teacher takes the role as a child and another child agrees to insult the

teacher in the play.

Child: You can't play. You are funny. You have glasses.

How does the teacher feel?

Discuss how people can't help how they look and how it hurts to talk

about physical differences.

Is it okay to call people names?

6. Review: Is it nice to say you're not my friend?

Is it nice to say you can't sit by me?

How do people feel when you say that?

Each child has a chance give examples of a bad thing or a good thing to say.

They tell if it's a good thing or a bad thing. If they say a bad thing

[hurting words/exclusion] - What is the good thing to say?

Test Questions

Pretest: Using puppets and 3 plastic monkeys

Post Test: Using DUPLO® people and 3 plastic bears

The characters of the two children being tested and the researcher (acting as a

child) are playing with the toys. Another character comes up (played by

the researcher) and asks, "Can I play?"

-Record children's responses

• We've been playing and we're the friends, right? Let's tell him he can't play

with us. Okay?

• Why is that okay/not okay?

• Well, I don't want him to play with us. I'll tell him to go away. Is that

okay?

  • Why?

Pretest: • He has different hair. Let's tell him he can't play. Is that okay?

Post-test: • He has a different body. Let's tell him he can't play. Is that okay?

•Why is that okay/not okay?

• How will he feel if we say he can't play?

•Why will he feel ____?

• Do you have any more to tell about this story?

IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (QA-3)

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