

1996

Freedom and will

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FREEDOM AND WILL

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Philosophy

San Jose State University

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by

John R. LaFrance

May, 1996

UMI Number: 1379349

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ABSTRACT

FREEDOM AND WILL

by John R. LaFrance

This thesis investigates the relationship between freedom and will and argues for a will based on determination and necessity. Background theory is provided by a synopsis of the study of freedom and will done by various philosophical authorities. I explain the deterministic process involved with will by giving an account of the inductionist characteristic of human behavior and planning, an analysis of causalism and determinism relevant to the concept of human will, the application of pragmatism to psychology, and the teleological character of intentional acts.

The thesis conclusion emphasizes two issues. The first is the necessary use of inductive reasoning for executing rational choices. The second is the necessary dependence upon pragmatic value in making such choices. My argument is that human will is predetermined uniquely by inductive reasoning and pragmatic beliefs. This is shown by the contradictory nature between the concept of autonomy, and the principle of pragmatism which binds human intention to an individual's past experiences.

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OVERVIEW

The purpose of my thesis is to offer a theory which refutes the concept of "Free will" as it is understood in its deepest sense as "contracausal free will."¹ I consider both phrases to be synonymous with the phrase, "free choice." It is my aim to stress the dependence of human agency upon inductive and pragmatic reasoning which I believe are determining processes precluding free will. I will argue that this determination also renders the concept of "autonomy" empty of meaning. The concluding principles of my thesis follow from certain relationships which I believe lead logically to such principles and also from inquiry based on authorities who imply or corroborate my concluding statements and principles.

The deterministic theory developed here will be shown to be inescapable because of the human necessity to rely upon pragmatic values and relations concerning teleological objects of consciousness. That is, goal oriented behavior is determined and unfree to the extent that the goal(s) are defined. Since it is necessary for my conclusion, I will attempt to show that the application of pragmatic meaning to

¹ Joseph M. Boyle Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, Free Choice, A Self Referential Argument (Notre Dame, Indiana: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1976) 12.

intention is an inescapable and partially continuous process for any conscious agent.

I define an act of will in the following way: If the agent wants 'Y' or has 'Y' as a goal and believes that 'X' is required for 'Y', then in the absence of countervailing factors, the agent will do 'X'. The will in such a case refers to the intention and an attempt to act. "Free will" on the other hand implies that the agent in question produce a psychological influence within her/himself which somehow cannot be reduced to the causality which obtains between events. This is reiterated in what follows.

My thesis deals only with human will from the experiential standpoint and draws no conclusions about the efficacy of mechanism or neurophysiology in causing mental states or human actions. I believe that the case for a determined will is made simpler without an appeal to mechanism and physical determinism except where it can be shown that a *belief* by the agent in physical determinism provides a motivating influence to behavior. This kind of belief is the result of inductive reasoning upon which all humans rely during any deliberate action.² Although such reasoning can be considered fallacious in a logical sense, deliberate behavior is necessarily *causally dependent* upon

² Antony Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed., (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984) 171.

such reasoning. The two major principles discussed in the thesis are:

- (1) The principle of inductive reasoning, and
- (2) The principle of pragmatism.

I will attempt to demonstrate that for every human being, these two principles are responsible for all subjective rational action. Such principles form a deterministic continuum of choice and action inaccessible to human control.

In addition, there are certain distinctions between causal concepts which should be defined at the outset.

From studies done by Adler and Bunge, I have chosen six possible kinds of causation which will be tested for relevance in this thesis.³ They are the following:

- (1) *causa sui*
- (2) contingent causation
- (3) deterministic causation
- (4) autonomy
- (5) acausalism
- (6) interactionism

Causa Sui from the Latin means, "the cause of itself," and is usually retained for the powers of a deity.

³ The Institute for Philosophical Research, The Idea of Freedom, ed. M. Adler (New York: Doubleday Inc., 1958) 431; Mario Bunge, Causality and Modern Science, 3rd ed. (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1979) 3-30.

Contingent Causal, from M. Adler's definition, means that a given cause can produce a totally unpredictable effect. i.e. A can cause B, C, D, or E, a combination of any of them, or none of them.⁴ This is also known by some authors as a "free cause," and has been exemplified by the behavior of unstable atomic nuclei in the studies of nuclear physics.⁵ This phrase may be synonymous with the term "semicausal" as posited by Mario Bunge.⁶

Deterministic causation, also known as "necessary causation" from Adler's definition, is a causal nexus in which it is impossible for a cause(s) A to produce any effect(s) other than B, where B could be singular or multiple, and impossible for B not to be produced when A occurs.⁷ There is thus a unique correspondence between cause and effect in the case of deterministic causation.

Determinism can be considered as a particular type of causalism but some authorities consider causalism as a type of determinism. The term "determination" is the process that "determinists" espouse. It is taken in this thesis to be synonymous with "necessity." That is, it is a type of causation which specifies that a given cause will inevitably

⁴ The Institute for Philosophical Research 430.

⁵ Mario Bunge, Causality and Modern Science, third rev. ed. (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1979) 14.

⁶ Bunge 28.

⁷ The Institute 430.

yield a definite and unique consequent.⁸ Thus our futures are fixed and unalterable in the same way that the past is fixed and unalterable.⁹

The distinction between determinism and "determination" is somewhat minor for the purpose of this thesis, although "determination" usually refers to the theory that a given event or set of events is the effect of another set of events, and that the effects of second kind will always follow on the events of the kind which produced them. Such processes are considered "law like."¹⁰ Other definitions can be found in the glossary.

Autonomy is considered to be the "power of self regulation, the act of self governing, (and being thus self governed), self directing, or self determining."¹¹ As such it is a human form of "causa sui" in the sense that an autonomous being is presumed to be the cause of her/his own behavior. It can mean "independent" or "spontaneous" (see glossary).

Beings which appear to be "autonomous" in the above sense act "tropistically," "teleologically" and

⁸ Antony Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy, revised second ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979) 173.

⁹ Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich, (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995) 292.

¹⁰ Bunge 10.

¹¹ Peter A. Angeles, Dictionary of Philosophy (New York: Harper and Row, 1981) 22.

"cybernetically," because they are adaptive, goal oriented and to an extent, self regulated. Again definitions are in the glossary.

Acausalism is an empiricist doctrine which reduces causation to external conjunction or to the temporal sequence of events or experiences. In this doctrine laws are nothing but rules of scientific procedure. Acausalism can also refer to the nonexistence of causal bonds.¹²

Interactionism or *interdependence* can be included here because under certain circumstances an event A and an event B can occur simultaneously so that neither can be distinguished as cause or effect. Fundamentally, an agent would have to undergo a change when his/her concomitant cause underwent a simultaneous change, so that either could be considered the determinant of the other.¹³

Interactionism is a possible model for human conscious activity, as asserted in such theories as the "Anthropic principle."¹⁴ However, within such theories I would assert that there is still a deterministic principle such that the human agent cannot *control* the outcome of his/her observations and experiments. Initial conditions and a unique nexus or series of events still transpires.

¹² Bunge 29.

¹³ Bunge 28,162.

¹⁴ George Greenstein, The Symbiotic Universe (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1988) 224-237.

An important distinction should be noted at this time. By determination I am not indicating *predictability*. Events can be determined and not predictable by accessible means. That is, such events are predictable in principle but not by available means. This may often lie at the root of the indeterminist's defense.¹⁵

So these are the two questions: (1) Does necessity determine a person's choices which occur during the experience of will? That is, is each rational choice the effect of deterministic causation. If so, (2) Does the resulting determination allow us to assert the non existence of free will?

My thesis asserts the affirmative in the both cases. I argue for the *incompatibilism* of free will and determinism, with the assertions that:

(1) There exist "initial conditions" precedent to the conscious behavior of any individual.¹⁶ These conditions are a referent, or starting point for the determined will of the individual. At any given time during conscious thought, an

¹⁵ E.Rae Harcum, "Behavioral Paradigm for a Psychological Resolution of the Free Will Issue," Journal of Mind and Behavior, Vol. 12, No.1, Winter (1991): 108.

¹⁶ The term "initial conditions" used here refers to epistemological conditions within the experience of the agent which exist at the time when the agent makes a particular decision. Thus, I may believe I can lift a cup with my hand, because such motions have worked in the past but only when such motions are accompanied by the presence of a cup within my reach, my desire to drink, and the absence of constraints preventing me from my act, etc.

agent appraises his/her relationship to the world in terms of his/her goals.

(2) Wills are also caused by the dependence of an apparently lawlike relationship between the individual and his/her world with which s/he attempts to interact. The principle here is that any experience of free will as it relates to an intentional act is not only caused by the relationship between the pragmatic inclinations of the subject at a given time, but also his/her objects of consciousness which apparently reside in an experiential exterior world. The world outside the subject may not even exist with its laws and objects. However, to achieve his/her ends, the subject *must assume* that such an ontological composition exists in order for him/her to function with intention. This principle is a major fundamental claim of my thesis and is derived from Hume's principle of inductive reasoning. Such inductive reasoning although logically fallacious, is necessary and unavoidable in order that an agent be able to predict with likelihood the effects from causes of his/her physical action.¹⁷

In developing my argument, I have made further assumptions:

(1) The Galilean and LaPlacian theory of *physical* determinism entails the "identification with the state of the entire universe immediately preceding the event in

¹⁷ Flew 172.

question."¹⁸ Although this concept of determinism is an analogous one, I do not attempt to apply the principle of *physical* determinism to will.¹⁹ Instead, I borrow from Hume the absolutely necessary epistemological tendency of human beings to *believe* in physical determinism when they act deliberately. That is, they *necessarily* apply "constant conjunction" inferences and associations which allow and direct them to compose their deliberations and intentions for willful action.²⁰

The inductionist characteristic of causal inference, i.e. the tendency for human beings to causally associate one experience with another, is a necessary principle for psychological determinism to prevail. The pragmatic or practical approach has it that induction cannot indeed be validated, in the sense to be shown to be likely to work, but it can be rationally justified as a practical policy, because every alternative is less rational.²¹

¹⁸ Bunge 34.

¹⁹ See glossary, under "Determinism."

²⁰ Throughout the thesis, the assumed definition of "intention" will be that of the standard English dictionary; that is, a resolve, a purpose, or a concentration of the "will" upon a purpose or goal. See glossary as well.

²¹ A.R. Lacey, A Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1976) 80; Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy 106-108.

From "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding," in the section on "Liberty and Necessity," concerning actions of the will, Hume states:

.....for as it is evident that these have a regular conjunction with motives, circumstances and characters, and as we always draw inferences from one to the other, we must be obliged to acknowledge in words that necessity, which we have already avowed in every deliberation of our lives and in every step of our conduct and behavior.²²

The actions of the will, according to Hume, have a regular conjunction with motives and circumstances. I believe Hume to mean that motivation is simply our moment to moment inference of how we must apply a necessary combination of actions to produce a given effect, or achieve a given goal. We trust such actions because they are based on our inductive reasoning about cause and effect. We also deduce from our current circumstances, the specific actions necessary to achieve such goals. According to Hume these beliefs in causation then continually determine or necessitate every deliberation of our lives in "every step of our conduct and behavior," and do so in unambiguous and unique succession as each goal leads to the next.

(2) I have included the theories of *pragmatism* as stated by Peirce and James to indicate how our actions

²² David Hume, "An Enquiry Concerning Human understanding, Sect. VIII, (On Liberty and Necessity)," The Empiricists, ed. Richard Taylor (New York: Doubleday, 1974) 375.

follow from the meanings of our objects of consciousness. I am using the word "object" to mean objects in the sense of ontological entities such as tables, chairs, people or an entire environment.

Such theories of pragmatism are an extension of the empiricist doctrines of Hume because certain beliefs necessary for human volition are based on theories of inductive reasoning from Hume's arguments concerning "experience and habit."²³

I will attempt to show that such theories of pragmatism imply a deterministic constraint to the will. My thesis attempts to show that both the *ability* to make a certain choice and the *necessity* to do so are produced by the pragmatic differences between objects of a subject's consciousness.

(3) Finally, as one exemplary method of showing the determination of human conscious behavior, choice and will are shown to involve an infinite regression of pragmatic constraints. Such a regression can be visualized in different ways. But the regression principle alone demonstrates that there cannot be, even for seemingly spontaneous acts, any degree of contracausal freedom of the will. That is, any choice made by a subject cannot be

²³ David Hume, "Book I: Of the Understanding," A Treatise on Human Nature, ed. Ernest C. Mossner (New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1987) 312.

generated *ex nihilo* as a first or "free" cause by the subject.

The above criteria for human conscious behavior create an abundant field of evidence for my conclusion because they satisfy the principles of determinacy as defined in the glossary. My final conclusion asserts:

Human actions involving choice are uniquely determined by the agent's subjective appraisal of past and present conditions that envelop him/her, as well as past behavior which has produced such conditions. That is, in terms of the agent's psychology, they show that any act of human rational behavior emerges from initial conditions, and an adherence to (apparent) natural laws.²⁴

Additionally, some excerpts from certain philosophers have been included to indicate how they envision a deterministic continuum engulfing human patterns of behavior. It is my opinion that many philosophical authorities have made statements, although indirect, which do affirm determination of the will. In fact, there is a remarkable similarity in meaning between various excerpts from authorities who may not have ever uttered a denial of

²⁴ A.C. Grayling, Philosophy--A Guide Through the Subject, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 171; Bunge, 351. M. Bunge in Causality and Modern Science notes that the principle of determinacy is established by (1) the proposition that "nothing arises from nothing," which is equivalent to the proposition that there are always initial conditions in any genetic process, and (2) the principle of lawfulness. Grayling's interpretation is equivalent to Bunge's.

human freedom or free will. Although some of them, taken in greater context, may have denied any theory of determinism precluding human free will, the excerpts tend to affirm a denial of contracausal free will, if not a belief in determinism. Although the background and content of the many excerpts contained here may deviate in some respects, it is my opinion, as described in this thesis, that they all support a skeptical position in regard to certain theories of free will.

ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING
THE PRINCIPLES OF PRAGMATISM

My thesis attempts to show that the principles of pragmatism form the foundation of psychological determinism.

The major proponent of pragmatism is Charles Sanders Peirce. In one of his major works, "How to Make our ideas clear," he establishes the mental faculty of "doubt." He asserts that doubts most frequently arise from indecision and explains that:

However the doubt may originate, it stimulates the mind to an activity which may be slight or energetic, calm or turbulent. Images pass rapidly through consciousness, one incessantly melting into another, until at last when all is over--it may be in a fraction of a second, in an hour, or after long years--we find ourselves decided as to how we should act under such circumstances as those which occasioned our hesitation. In other words we have attained belief.²⁵

The process of indecision or as Peirce termed it, "the irritation of doubt," leads to thought which leads to belief which establishes in our nature a rule of action or a habit.²⁶

To determine the meaning of a thought, he says:

.....We have therefore simply to determine what habits it produces, for what a thing means is

²⁵ Justus Buchler, Philosophical Writings of Peirce, 2nd ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1955) 27.

²⁶ Buchler 28.

simply what habits it involves. Now the identity of a habit depends on how it might lead us to act, not merely under such circumstances as are likely to arise, but under such as might possibly occur, no matter how improbable they may be. What the habit depends on depends on what and how it causes us to act. As for the "when", every stimulus to action is derived from perception; as for the "how" every purpose of action is to produce some sensible result. Thus we come down to what is tangible and conceivably practical as the root of every real distinction of thought no matter how subtle it may be; and there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice.²⁷

Peirce indicates above that indecision, thought, belief and the habits that result are the causal nexus of behavior.

I would also assert that for any given act, will and freedom do not exist simultaneously. Thus the phrase, free will, does not bare the same kind of meaning as a "long time" or "large space." Before we act intentionally, we experience a period of time during which we are undecided as to what action to take. This indecision is Peirce's "doubt." It is during this period that we describe ourselves as having "freedom." When we make a decision to act, the freedom collapses and will commences. Thus, it is improper to modify the word "will" with the word "free."

John Dewey's pragmatic theory separates freedom and will as well. He understood that "freedom of will" would

²⁷ Buchler 30.

mean to act without a purpose or a goal. "Free will" would mean that an individual resorts to chance for a goal.²⁸

My interpretation of Peirce's theory is the following:

"Every real distinction of thought" refers to the thought itself which leads to the "belief" one arrives at after a state of indecision and doubt. The belief then provides the impetus for action. Such actions are however always based on what is "tangible and conceivably practical" in the relationship of the objects of our thought. The physical characteristics with which we are familiar from our past experience and the sensations and uses that we associate with our objects lead us to belief and decision as to how to act. Therefore seemingly willful, "free" and "arbitrary" physical actions must be a function of pragmatic value. Or if we prefer, we can take;

As for the "when", every stimulus to action is derived from perception;...

to be true, as well as the last sentence of Peirce's passage above which states that we can equate meaning with a possible difference of practice.

As he states in "The Fixation of Belief,"

Our beliefs guide our desires and shape our actions.....So it is with every belief according to its degree. The feeling of believing is a more

²⁸ John P. Murphy, Pragmatism from Peirce to Davidson, (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990) 72.

or less sure indication of there being established in our nature some habit which will determine our actions.²⁹

Peirce reaffirms the same principles when he states in the same passage that:

The final upshot of thinking is the exercise of volition.³⁰

It appears from the above excerpts that we can conclude that Peirce's statements imply psychological determinism of choice as a consequence of pragmatic theory. This is because an agent when indecisive, begins to thoughtfully weigh the pragmatic characteristics of his/her situation. This thought leads to belief about how the agent should act next, which then produces purposeful action. The agent's thought involves past inductive experience based on the agent's lawlike presumptions. Every moment brings an agent into a new and distinctive perceptive experience from which s/he chooses his/her next action based on such distinctions brought about by thought. Such a process of thought involves propositions and inferences from the agent's past which leads to actions based on certain conclusions. Peirce notes that such action however:

²⁹ Buchler 10.

³⁰ Buchler 29.

involves further doubt and further thought, at the same time it is a stopping place, it is a new starting place for thought.³¹

and that thought must again lead to a belief and another rule of action.

My intent is not to assert that Peirce intended to disprove the existence of free will. I endorse his statements concerning reasons for actions and indicate where they do imply a form of determinism based on the subject's awareness of his/her pragmatic environment.

Certainly Peirce made certain statements regarding will which refute determinism. This I believe is because he was aware of the concept of experimentation.³² Experimentation can allow a certain risk for previously unknown variables to create new phenomena. If these new phenomena continually emerge whenever the experiment is repeated, then belief in their law-like character rests on such inductive reasoning. Thus, new beliefs and habits of action can form. Such new beliefs and habits of action come about, not as the result of intention however, but as the result of actions based on risk and uncertainty. In "The Essentials of Pragmatism" Peirce describes the process of experimentation thusly:

What are the essential ingredients of an experiment? First, of course, an experimenter of flesh and blood. Secondly a verifiable hypothesis.

³¹ Buchler 29.

³² John P. Murphy, Pragmatism from Peirce to Davidson, (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990) 29-30.

This is a proposition relating to the universe environing the experimenter, or to some well known part of it, and affirming or denying of this only some experimental possibility or impossibility. The third indispensable ingredient is a sincere doubt in the experimenter's mind as to the truth of that hypothesis.³³

Again the element of doubt presents itself as part of a conjecture. The point worth making in the case of experimentation is that new laws and habits of action can emerge from the risk of experiments which verify hypotheses. Purposeful human activity later results from the use of such hypotheses. Consider further this statement from Peirce:

Whenever a man (Homo Sapiens) acts purposefully he acts under a belief in some experimental phenomenon. Consequently the sum of the experimental phenomena that a proposition implies makes up its entire bearing upon human conduct.³⁴

These principles are also in agreement with Hume's assertions about inductive reasoning.

A passage from Hume's "Treatise on Human Nature" reads:

Experience is a principle which instructs me in the various conjunctions of objects for the past. Habit is another principle which determines me to expect the same for the future; and both of them conspiring to operate upon the imagination make me form certain ideas in a more intense and lively manner, than others which are not attended with the same advantages.³⁵

³³ Buchler 260.

³⁴ Buchler 262.

Hume is asserting that experience and habit "make us form certain ideas in a more intense and lively manner than others which are not attended with the same advantages." This implies at least a causal pattern created by the tendency for thought to form associations and use inductive reasoning to make choices. Experience and habit lend themselves to belief in the Peircean sense because when we find ourselves in a state of indecision, we contemplate what we consider to be facts from the past concerning successful actions to achieve goals. Bruce Aune concurs on the motivational characteristics of habits:

.....Anyone who reasons is guided by habits, and these habits (together with current interests and aims) provide the rational mechanism by which conclusions are selected. Those who actually affirm a volitional premiss in their reasoning will thereby be expressing or forming an appropriate intention.³⁶

From a prior passage of Peirce's we note:

.....the identity of a habit depends on how it might lead us to act, not merely under such circumstances as are likely to arise, but under such as might possibly occur, no matter how improbable they may be. What the habit depends on depends on what and how it causes us to act.³⁷

³⁵ David Hume, "Book I: Of the Understanding," A Treatise on Human Nature, ed. Ernest C. Mossner (New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1987) 312.

³⁶ Bruce Aune, "Action, Inference, Belief and Intention", Philosophical Perspectives, 4, Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, (1990): 265.

³⁷ Buchler 30.

Another passage of Peirce's indicates a causal nexus of idea formation in the process of thought:

habits are established by induction. General ideas are followed by the kind of reaction which followed the particular sensations that gave rise to the general idea. A conscious continuum of feeling pervades the phenomena and affects other ideas.³⁸

Peirce wrote to William James once, "All realities influence our practice. And that influence is their meaning for us."³⁹ James later followed suit:

To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve--what sensations we are to expect from it and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects whether immediate or remote, is then for us, the whole of our conception of the object, so far as the conception has positive significance at all.⁴⁰

The significance of James' statement is that when we choose an action, we must be choosing a way of interacting with objects, and we can only do this by applying beliefs

³⁸ "Peirce: Collected Papers," Masterpieces of World Philosophy, ed. Frank N. Magill (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990) 489.

³⁹ William James, Pragmatism and The Meaning of Truth, ed. F. Burkhardt (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1978) 29.

⁴⁰ James 29.

from past experiences. Thus when we choose an action at a given moment, it is because events from the past have created beliefs that certain sensations will occur as a result of such activity.

We can take Dewey's variation of pragmatism as well:

When the contemplative mind, isolated from the stimuli of the moment, takes large views, its activity is more like deciding what to do, than deciding that a representation is accurate.⁴¹

This excerpt might indicate that one's perceptions represent indicators of how to act rather than evidence of truth.

⁴¹ Richard Rorty, The Consequences of Pragmatism, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982) 163.

TERMS AND RELATIONS REGARDING
FREEDOM AND WILL

My thesis considers only rational and deliberate actions of human beings, and no others. That is, it considers "volition" to be synonymous with the experience of "free will" and "free choice." If it can be shown that the causes of these actions and experiences are independent variables producing an agent's volition, then there is a logical ambiguity, if not outright contradiction concerning an act that is considered both free and willed. If it can be shown that such causes of volition are not random in principle, then not only is the will not free, but it is determined as well. Determination denotes cause and effect relationships which are specific. I would propose that the same is true of pre-established beliefs arising from inductive reasoning, and the choice of action which follows such beliefs.

Also, it should be remembered that not all willful acts are successful. However, it is the case that will always precedes attempted acts which may or may not be successful. This is self evidently demonstrated by the fact that before we can consciously act, we must have an act in mind.

Certain cases of will or desire do not proceed immediately to yield an action. An agent may will to postpone an action or an attempt at action, but the

instances in which will does immediately produce action, or conjoin with it, are of pertinence to my thesis.

Additionally, if it can be asserted anywhere that will is only an epiphenomenon which does not causally link awareness with behavior, then the concept of free will as a cause of action is immediately suspect in *that* case, and can be excluded from analysis.

There are many classifications of adherents and assailants on the subject of free will. The major categories of philosophers concerned with the free will question are "compatibilists" who are usually associated with "soft determinists," and "incompatibilists" who usually fall into opposing camps known as "libertarians" and "hard determinists."⁴²

The usual argument in favor of *general determinism* of the will includes the following propositions:

(1) All our choices and actions are causally necessitated in accordance with deterministic laws.

(2) If (1) is true, then we do not have free will.

Therefore,

(3) We do not have free will.⁴³

It is important to note that *general determinism* is a concept within which *physical determinism* is held as a

⁴² Lacey, A Dictionary of Philosophy, 125-126.

⁴³ Mark Thornton, Do We Have Free Will?, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989) 40.

variation.⁴⁴ What I am arguing for is a *psychological* determinism based on the principles of pragmatism which are not necessarily dependent on physical determinism. Pragmatism is based on a *belief* in such determinism.

Hard determinists do not believe in free will at all, soft determinists (often associated with compatibilists) generally believe that human free will is obtained in the absence of constraints which lie beyond the boundary of the individual agent.⁴⁵ Strictly, however, compatibilism asserts that neither the existence of determinism nor the existence of free will precludes the other.⁴⁶ Most compatibilists do not deny proposition (1) above, but do deny (2) and therefore the final consequent (3). The major disagreement between compatibilists and incompatibilists involves the belief by incompatibilists that free will cannot involve causality.⁴⁷

The compatibilist's point of view consists in his/her insistence that the phrase "could have" simply means that

⁴⁴ Bunge 33-34. This thesis argues that inductive reasoning leads to efficient causation of human action through willing, but in stating such, I avoid the use of reductionist theories, such as asserting that neurological activity is a cause of psychological experience.

⁴⁵ Flew, 126.

⁴⁶ Galen Strawson, Freedom and Belief, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) 5.

⁴⁷ Flew, 126.

the agent could have done otherwise had s/he so chosen.⁴⁸ The possibility that the agent's desires, wants, volition, intentions etc. are determined does not preclude the fact that the agent still can exercise these activities if allowed to do so.⁴⁹

Thus, for the compatibilist, freedom or free will can only be prevented by phenomenologically causal influences extrinsic to the preference of the agent. For the compatibilist these are exigencies or influences which control the finality of our acts, but do not necessarily control the wishes, desires or intentions which are elicited from within.⁵⁰ "Liberty" which closely approximates the type of free will espoused by compatibilism, in this sense, is not opposed to the principle of necessity or determination in general, but to constraint.⁵¹ The analysis of will I have done does not question the existence of "liberty" but excludes it from experiences that can be classed within the realm of "free will."

⁴⁸ Kadri Vihvelin, "Freedom, Causation and Counterfactuals," Philosophical Studies 64 no.2 June, (1991): 177.

⁴⁹ Richard Double, The Non-Reality of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) 55.

⁵⁰ The Institute for Philosophical Research 401.

⁵¹ Paul Edwards, Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science, ed. Sydney Hook (Washington Square: New York University Press, 1958) 106.

The important questions restated in slightly different fashion are whether the determination of any willful act can be included or excluded as (1) falling under the power of the agent, and if such an act is (2) created *ex nihilo* by the agent. Libertarianism espouses (2) above; It holds the view that we have free will and that free will is incompatible with determinism; therefore we possess contracausal free will.⁵² The libertarian insistence on contracausal free will results in a dualism between "mind" and "world" in which the human mind must be in some way causally and substantially independent from the world *for which* it makes its decisions.⁵³ This position will be shown to be self contradictory. There is however an elaborate defense for libertarianism that investigates the application of hegemony of the mind over the brain.⁵⁴ In contrast, my thesis does not consider the neurophysiological function of the brain as a necessary defense of psychological determinism and thus, it avoids the hegemonic challenge.

In the above regard, my thesis defends determinism of the will and incompatibilism within the domain of conscious and purposeful behavior. That is, where purposeful behavior exists, free will can not exist.

⁵² Thornton 147.

⁵³ Thornton 133.

⁵⁴ John Thorp, Free Will (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980) 119.

Absolute physical determinism arguably does not obtain throughout the Universe because of such influences as the inherently unpredictable behavior of certain unstable atomic nuclei. It is hypothetically possible to create an experiment in which human decisions are governed by the random prompts from the expulsion of "beta" particles or baryons etc. from an unstable element such as Uranium. This is physical indeterminism but does not influence the question of whether the will is "free" in the autonomous sense; i.e. in the sense that people can ultimately control their actions.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Martin Gardner, The Whys of a Philosophical Scrivener, (New York: Quill, 1983) 107.

FREEDOM, WILL AND TELEOLOGY

The intent in this section is to demonstrate the difference between freedom and free will and to further show that the will is constrained and directed uniquely by circumstances beyond the control of the agent. Freedom on the other hand is simply a state in which conditions exist favorable to the agent's will.

I will attempt to show that human will is never exempt from influences exterior to the willing agent. My explanations for this are discussed in the remaining chapters of my thesis.

One question I attempt to answer is whether the concept of free will is *compatible* with regular and invariant causal laws which may be responsible for human predispositions and beliefs. I believe that the relationship between free will and such causation is an *incompatible* one, not only from the standpoint of pragmatism, but from the consequential situations which constantly arise for an agent and upon which volitional activities depend. Such determinism is limited only to the question of *freedom of the will* however. I would propose that there is a causal nature underlying the existence of will at all times. This causation is a *necessary causation* and not a *contingent* or *free* one, nor is it a result of *autonomy* in the sense that the agent could have *ex nihilo* created such cause.

It would seem impossible for a will to operate at all if it did not have an object or a specific goal on which to act. When conditions are present which are followed by an action based on will, then such conditions can be considered causes of that active will because these conditions are both necessary and sufficient conditions for such action to occur.⁵⁶

I believe it is apparent that even the ends or goals we achieve may be considered as circumstances which lead to even further ends. The circumstances do not totally constrain our behavior into one unique and specific alternative until we exercise our internal or intrinsic propensities to choose one goal over all other alternatives. That is, prior to a choice, we are *uncertain* of what option we will choose until we choose it. I believe Peirce uses the term, "doubt" for such an experience. Such doubt is what precedes the deliberation process which leads to choice.

As to the difference between *freedom* and *free will*, let us take what Mortimer Adler calls, "natural freedom of self determination." It deals, as Adler suggests, with "what one shall do or shall become." What must be observed here is the word "what" which refers to possible opportunities which exist circumstantially in the world and which the agent has

⁵⁶ Patrick J. Hurley, A Concise Introduction to Logic, 4th ed. (Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1991) 470.

already contemplated. The fact that I am a being that "needs food" is equivalent in meaning to the fact that I must depend upon metabolic fuel for my survival. This is a circumstance of living. Pragmatically, "food" exists and is what it is because we need it to fuel our lives. Otherwise the word "food" would be meaningless. The same kind of process is at work in the characters and motivations of those deciding a profession and who strive with diligence to prepare and excel in some vocation which fascinates them and whets their imagination.

For instance, some incessant acoustic harmony may resonate in the mind and heart of a young individual destined to become a pianist. The notes, chords, harmonies and compositions that are possible within any musician's repertoire can only exist because of the existence of the physical properties of certain materials (including air), the structure of the human ear, and the memory of the person hearing. But if such conditions did not exist, there would be no musical instruments and no one could aspire to become a pianist.

Adler concludes that the myriad of philosophers he studied conceive natural freedom of self determination to be "self determining and self determined."⁵⁷ According to Adler it is also independent of any "state of mind or character which a person may or may not acquire in the course of their

⁵⁷ The Institute 423.

lives."⁵⁸ To possess "natural freedom of self determination" is "to be able by a power inherent in human nature to change one's own character creatively by deciding for oneself what one shall do or shall become."⁵⁹ Adler comments at another juncture about "self determination":

What must be excluded here are plans or decisions that result wholly from processes over which the individual does not exercise control. A plan or decision is 'self determined' as well as 'self determining' only if it does not emerge irresistibly out of the individual's past or is not formed in him and for him by influences impinging on him at the moment.⁶⁰

At yet another juncture, Adler notes the seeming paradoxical nature of "self determination":

According to authors who affirm man's inherent power of self determination, the self determining act is self-determined, and so free, rather than other-determined and so unfree, only if all these other causes, whatever their influence, do not determine the individual to make this rather than that decision or adopt this rather than that plan.⁶¹

If the "self determining" self is free to determine itself, It cannot do so without predication from exterior

⁵⁸ The Institute 149.

⁵⁹ The Institute 606.

⁶⁰ The Institute 423.

⁶¹ The Institute 424.

exigencies and relationships that must exist to help the self define itself. Without such predication, no comparisons can be made. No models can be followed. No analogies can be refined. No standards or definitions for any real entities can exist. To desire to do something specific, I must know specifically how that activity differs from some other activity. Otherwise I could not exercise a preference for the first activity.

Without such conditions as a starting point, I submit that an individual cannot decide for him/herself what s/he shall do, nor can s/he become independent of an exterior world. Such an individual envisions his/her future state within and in relation to her/his goal within that future world. Volition is apparently exercised because the individual establishes a preference for action based on preexisting intentions and beliefs.⁶² In other words, it is the agent's prior values and goals which drive the agent to act in a particular way. It is because of desire for *changing* or *improving* one's relationship to a future worldly goal that prompts one to want to change something about him/herself.

The incompatibilist who is a determinist argues that such concepts as Adler's natural freedom of self determination is non-existent because the effort of the

⁶² Aune 256

human being to determine his/her character or self must presuppose motives, intentions and beliefs over which the individual has no control.⁶³ In addition, there is very likely a logical flaw in the concept of self determination.⁶⁴

I would submit that freedom is the opportunity to make an effort toward behavior regardless of constraint. Such an effort may be successful or not. But freedom, in any case, is not synonymous with free will.⁶⁵

It is true that agents can choose to act without being able to complete their action successfully, but even in the absence of exterior constraints, there still exists a deeper constraint upon the agent's choice. The concept is Locke's:

Wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally in man's power, wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it, there he is not free, though the action is voluntary.⁶⁶

Liberty, for instance, is a form of freedom in relation to the agent's environmental circumstances which may curtail it. But, even when oppression, compulsion and coercion are

⁶³ Edwards 106.

⁶⁴ Bunge 244.

⁶⁵ Murphy 72.

⁶⁶ The Institute 208.

absent in the human experience such that human liberty prevails, the discretion and motives of that liberty still must be organized toward goals if they are to be of any use, and as such have direction under the command of *intention* or *deliberation* which is not a random experiential phenomenon.

In addition, I would submit that intention or deliberation *self evidently* arise from non random influences.⁶⁷ An act toward a goal is always *precise* to the extent that the goal is defined and resolved. The result of deliberate action may not be predictable however, but this is not a demonstration of free will, because the element of unpredictability was not do to the act of will.

Circumstances it will be agreed can work for or against one's freedom, but as I will explain further, it is always the circumstances which shape our pathways of behavior. The existence of any object which the agent takes as a goal is a circumstantial situation. Such a situation is pragmatic. The fact that the agent has such a goal is itself a pragmatic circumstance with which the agent must deal. Even if the agent refuses to pursue a given goal, the refusal itself becomes a goal which still involves the original goal in an indirect way.

The extent of exterior circumstances are more pervasive than one might think. For instance, if I feel that I have freedom to move about and do as I please, I must be reminded

⁶⁷ See glossary under "random."

that I can only do so based on nature's laws, which I presume are consistent and universal as predictors of consequences, based on my past learning from the very beginning of my childhood. My deeds and my objectives are structured in a framework that I can compose in such a way to achieve certain ends. Only by utilizing certain modular characteristics of natural laws can I bring about these objectives.

Take any teleological task for instance. If I am hungry, and no one is preventing me from going to the refrigerator or the market, I am "free" to do so. However, this freedom is based on my dependence on psychophysical constraints such as the spatial and temporal world in which I live and my own limited method of maneuvering through that world. I can walk to the refrigerator because I have learned as a child to do so. I have come to depend on the surfaces under my feet, gravity, the friction produced by these entities, and my own motor skills to transport me to a given destination. My reasoning about the past and the repetitive nature of my experience has trained me to use such skills to achieve my goals. Hume's "Treatise on Human Nature" involving repetition of conjoined experiences is a well justified testimony to this fact.⁶⁸ Hume is concerned mainly with sense experience. Kant's synthetic a priori judgments add a refinement to the epistemology of Hume's inescapable

⁶⁸ Thornton 16.

conjunctions, because according to Kant the mind acts upon sensation to create knowledge by way of classifying, categorizing and by spatial and temporal orientation.⁶⁹ Thus, the meaning of our world is determined by the regularities and mental structuring which we cannot avoid. A vital refinement of Hume's inductive principles are found in Kant's categories of understanding. The most important of these is that of "cause and effect" which is a sub-category under "relation."⁷⁰

The application of Humean and Kantian epistemology is necessary to show how our rational deliberative judgments are ultimately determined.

Though I may be "free" circumstantially to choose one alternative over another, for instance walking to the refrigerator instead of getting in my car and driving to the market, I am influenced by my beliefs about the consequences of each alternative and by my belief about how to do either. I am limited by the skills and tools which I *believe* can produce for me my goals. The alternate ways I must behave to achieve my final goals are, for instance, the walk to the kitchen, the opening of the refrigerator, the reaching for the food, the placing of it in my mouth and the chewing etc. as opposed to the mechanics of driving an automobile,

⁶⁹ Flew 190.

⁷⁰ Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Max Muller (New York: Doubleday, 1966) 62.

obeying of traffic laws and traversing the street grid on my way to the market. All these constrain the alternate ways in which I achieve my final goal, which is to eat. Each alternative has advantages and disadvantages depending on my inner propensities. Such inner propensities and habits, as Peirce called them, form a pragmatic bias which causes behavior to conform to the theory that both Peirce and James postulated. If such a bias does not exist, then no inclination toward an alternative can produce a choice. Peirce's statement about habit is perhaps more powerful than first glance would indicate:

.....What the habit depends on depends on what and how it causes us to act.⁷¹

Peirce did not intend to assert that all choices are determined by habit formation, but his statement indicates this, and I would submit that it can be shown to be true.

The Jamesian Theory of Truth implies that all objects of consciousness represent pragmatic consequences of particular purposes or goals. Objects of consciousness have meaning only in terms of how I relate to them as a result of purposes which lead to such active relationship. By acting upon a belief, we test it, and if the consequences which follow from adopting it promote the purpose in hand, and so have a "valuable effect upon life," the truth claim of the

⁷¹ Buchler 30.

belief is validated. This is the Jamesian Theory of Truth.⁷² But if conscious experience is a continuum as our individual lives progress, then each act toward a purpose we engender brings us to a new relationship with our objects of consciousness. I believe that this process continually creates new situations and new purpose for us in a causal continuum.⁷³

A case in point is the hunger example. Perhaps the food in the refrigerator is bland to my taste and not as spectacular as the varieties found at the market. Perhaps I am too lethargic to go to the market. If I go to the refrigerator, I am limited by a few varieties of food. The styles of food preparation that I choose will dictate my kitchen activities. My own preferences for lettuce, onion etc. will influence me as well as any number of other factors weighing on my choices for action such as the time involved in preparation, the indigestion factor, etc. The meanings of all these objects to me are their usefulness to me. Even if ineffable, such qualities of usefulness are distinctive from each other, and as such, form guiding constraints for certain choices. How can I choose between tomato or onion unless they each have distinguishing properties, some of which meet the whim of my palate? My

⁷² C.E.M. Joad, Guide To Philosophy (New York: Dover Publications, 1957) 451-453.

⁷³ John Patrick Diggins, The Promise of Pragmatism, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994) 241.

choices are continually determined by such properties as antecedents. If such subjective properties did not exist, I would have no objective on which to base a choice. It would be impossible for me to choose any alternative which does not serve me by way of a pragmatic distinction between such an alternative and another. Without such a distinction, regardless of its subtlety, I would not perceive a difference in alternatives and would not be able to make a choice. As Peirce asserted:

As to the when.....Every stimulus to action is derived from perception.⁷⁴

Eating is a constraint and a circumstance because it is necessary in order to satisfy my hunger or preoccupation with palatable pleasures. It is obvious to me when I am hungry. It is part of my perceived condition.

On the other hand, if I should choose to deny myself the luxury of a meal, I must do so for a reason also, whether its a decision to diet, the fact that I am rushed for an appointment and don't have time to eat, or for no other reason than I have a need to prove my will to "resist." In each and every activity of a deliberative nature, a necessary condition for my rational choice is the recognition of the difference in practical value of my alternatives. I cannot choose something that I cannot

⁷⁴ Buchler 30.

recognize. What I must recognize is the practical functions of the object with which I choose to interact. What I choose to do is based on a purpose which employs the nature of all objects which are necessary for me to complete my goal. In this way goals sought in the short term employ objects in appropriate ways, but in the long term, goals utilize smaller constituent goals, each of which comprise objects used in appropriate ways as well.

There are junctures in the experience of an agent during which choice seems free. But I would assert the following explanation for a so called act of "free will."

When the choice is made, even if seemingly free from influences beyond the agent, it must be a function of the pragmatic differences in objects, as well as a function of the exact purposes for which the object is used. An agent has a purpose in mind prior to the choice which actualizes the agent physically toward such choice. The agent may even try to freely choose a purpose, but such a choice must be made for a pragmatic reason based on the nature of the sensation and experience which the agent anticipates as s/he contemplates the use of the object in a particular way. Cybernetic activity comprises this process. I submit that such anticipation of sensation and experience is not under the control of the agent, as is evidenced by the fact that such prior experience always precedes the formation of the purpose for which the agent acts. A strictly deliberate act is one in which the agent has trust, because s/he has

experienced completion of a similar act in the past and developed habits of action pursuant to such a goal.

The same principle holds true for choice between any number of acts. At a given time for a given purpose, an agent will choose a given act because of prior experience in which the agent has learned to have trust and expect success.

From the above discussion some of the ground work is laid for the final thesis conclusion that determination of voluntary acts is always the result of a predisposition of the agent based on the belief and desire about the circumstances and consequences of his/her acts, as these acts relate to a goal. It is my belief that there are beliefs, values and desires which continually precede the agent's acts toward any goal. Such beliefs, values and desires serve as pre-existing psychologically causal conditions which satisfy the criteria for a deterministic process because they are teleological. Beliefs, values and desires are antecedents of deliberate action. They alter and direct the agent's activities toward goals. The agent can only apply such motivating causes or combinations of them, but can never influence them intentionally without applying additional beliefs, values and desires based on past experience.

The relational characteristic of an individual to the world seems to be due to a combination of an inner nature and outer circumstance. I would assert that for a study of

the will, it is not important to distinguish what is interior or exterior to the "self," because the self always interprets its motivation in terms of what is outside it. If *I* am tired, it is because *my body* needs rest. In such a case, the body is an object exterior to the rationale which creates the mind. The self makes bodily adjustments and establishes conditions which facilitate sleep. As Bradley believed, the notion of the "self" is definable only in terms of what is "other."⁷⁵

As I have already argued above, in a very important sense, to act toward a goal is to be dependent upon that goal. An agent chooses among many opportunities to act in a certain way. Such an act is dependent upon the pragmatic structure of the world in terms of the agent's sentient capabilities which the agent confidently uses in turn to satisfy needs and desires.

If we assume that human volition is *not* dependent upon the pragmatic structure of the world, it would follow that to be entirely *free* in one's choice, one's intention must have no connection or relation with any goal it seeks. This would guarantee a choice free from influences which could affect such choice. This is absurd however.

Also, to be totally free, one could not be involved with any constituent processes used to achieve such a goal.

⁷⁵ Flew 48; Garrett L. Vander Veer, Bradley's Metaphysics of the Self (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970) 255-258.

Any mental or physical process which leads to a goal must contain relationships involving preliminary goals related to the final one. Such preliminary goals include the pragmatic uses of objects in the simple sense, and the long range goals of various life strategies. Since will is exercised subsequent to the existence of a goal in the mind, then the will and action which follows it are always dependent upon such goals. But as we have said, this condition must be ruled out as part of any conscious voluntary action which is said to be *entirely free*.

As agents with volition, we are tied by our *relationship* to the world. To be totally independent, an agent would have to have absolute creative power to originate that with which s/he had no prior relationship. But to intentionally do this requires a purpose based on ideal pragmatic objectives. Such objectives are then related to their originator as functional ideas. It is understandable why some authorities conclude that to regard inner processes as if they could actually arise in complete isolation from external circumstances leads to solipsism.⁷⁶ This kind of solipsism seems absurd.

Whether or not inner natures or outer circumstances actually exist, is less important than the self evident fact that our needs, wants, desires and volitions, etc. are what

⁷⁶ Bunge 195.

they are because of the nature of our relationship to the apparent world as this relationship is sensed by us.

Part of Bradley's philosophy is that every appearance, no matter how misleading, is part of reality. Every sentient experience inseparably combines sensor and sensed, so that there is no boundary between self and world.⁷⁷

I am presuming in this thesis that objects of our sense must exist prior to the sensation they produce. That which senses must exist prior to the act of deliberate manipulation of any object of sense. For this reason, such pragmatic objects can be considered antecedents of our will in the sense that they prompt us, in a given situation, to act from our belief based on past inductive reasoning.

Our activities spring from our belief of how this world apparently is constructed and how we believe we can make use of it to attain our goals which arise as a result of our pragmatic relationship to all other existence. Our choices depend upon our belief in the world's evident nature and essence. But our belief depends upon our prior purposes and choices as well. William James' theory of truth is a variation of Peirce's pragmatism but is slightly modified.

C.E.M. Joad explains William James' pragmatic philosophy in the following way: "If the belief furthers the purpose which led us to ask the question, it is true; if

⁷⁷ Flew A Dictionary of Philosophy 48.

not, false."⁷⁸ Actually, in a deeper sense the question really is, "Does the activity I decide upon further the purpose for which I ask the question, 'Is this activity a cause?'" The utility or use we have for the objects in our world form the definitions we have of them. If we affirm those beliefs to be true that further our purposes, as Jamesian pragmatism suggests, then purpose is the antecedent of such belief, and we are faced with having to admit the primacy of free choice. But if purposes or choices of action are chosen by their agents, they must be chosen for pragmatic reasons. These reasons arise from the agent's inductive reasoning processes which make up her/his history.⁷⁹

For instance, if I have the purpose of procuring a specific food, I may go to a given market to find it. But let us say that I try to freely choose my purpose, and after consideration, I choose instead to eat the "left-overs" I have in my refrigerator. Suppose I insist that I have done so arbitrarily. That is, I insist that both the market and the refrigerator hold equal value as conditions to achieve my goal, which is to satisfy my hunger. But either alternative holds a specific pragmatic quality as a possible goal which must be first *recognized* as distinct from any

⁷⁸ C.E.M. Joad, Guide To Philosophy (New York: Dover Publications, 1957) 451-453.

⁷⁹ Diggins 241.

other alternative in order to be chosen. If the pragmatic qualities were not distinct, no choice of either alternative could be rationally made. Further, in order to choose one or the other of the alternatives rationally, the agent must choose the *pragmatic qualities* associated with it. This is an intentional act, and as such is governed by Peirce's principle of doubt, thought, and belief leading to an action. The belief must be based on a combination of habits which thought has drawn from the past to produce the belief.

The agent must make a pragmatic distinction in order to choose, for this is the *only* way for the agent to sensually identify the goal. Also, choosing a specific goal is equivalent to choosing its pragmatic qualities. Pragmatic choice is the *only* meaning that choosing a goal can have. Thus, the activity chosen must be indicative of the agent's immediate preference for certain pragmatic qualities even if the agent insists the action was in some way spontaneous. Such pragmatic qualities are chosen by the agent because in the past they have been associated with satisfaction of the same goals. The pragmatic qualities of an action or a purpose are the necessary causes of action. The intrinsic disposition of the agent can only be activated and directed by these causes and no others. Such causes can then be considered sufficient to produce the choice of action in which an agent engages, however spontaneous such action may appear. Thus the agent cannot be a source of contracausal

"free will" in choosing an action or a purpose for which an action is carried out.

The above problem concerns the part of choice where purpose is antecedent to belief. Take the converse of this proposition. Suppose belief is antecedent to purpose. Belief has already been shown to be a result of inductive reasoning and pragmatic thought which leads to an activity.⁸⁰ Bruce Aune also points out that beliefs are not controlled by human agency.⁸¹ Following this premise, if our beliefs are not under our immediate voluntary control, then they cannot be free in the deepest sense any more than purposes can. From this standpoint, if beliefs are not free for us to choose, then neither are the purposes which are generated by beliefs or the physical actions which follow them.

It is a principle of Pragmatism that purposes and beliefs alternate to form a continuum which produces for any agent all her/his intentional actions.⁸² I would assert that, with the exception of instinctual behavior, the discretion and specificity of these actions is produced by all the inductive and pragmatic reasoning an agent has accumulated up to a given moment. To be able to act intentionally, one must be reasonably assured of the meaning of one's act. In order to be so assured of such meaning, one

⁸⁰ Buchler 30.

⁸¹ Aune 257.

⁸² Diggins 241.

must have had enough prior experience or experiences to rely on inductive reasoning from which one can deduce or come to believe that certain acts will produce certain consequences.⁸³

The wishes an individual has for his/her identity and behavioral manifestations can only be realized in a conceptional form which takes its meaning from the world around it. I cannot wish to be a concert pianist unless I have heard a piano and understand that humans play them. There are keys, fingers, notes, chords, harmonies, etc. and it is physically impossible to play a piano keyboard with three octaves if the being doing so has only hands and no arms, or hands and not fingers. Also, if I choose to be a pianist rather than an engineer, it is because of the specific differences I see in the rewards of becoming one as opposed to the other. These are subjective values that result from environmental and intrinsic facts. I, as agent, can influence my goals and purposes about these facts, but my intentions to do so result from combinations of objects which become goals causing me to act.

From the above considerations, I would deduce that any theory of "self determination" cannot be a valid theory. Intrinsic preferences, by their very nature, cannot be chosen by the agents who own them. In order to invent our brains, minds and preferences we would need a purpose to do

⁸³ Diggins 142.

so. That purpose would refer to an ideal which existed as an object for such preferences. A contracausally free self could only choose preferences which were unrelated to its goals, or preferences which had no goals. This is an absurdity. Further, even if mankind did intentionally invent his/her own brain and human nature, there would be no reason for modern psychology to discover it. An inventor cannot intentionally invent a tool without an understanding of the fundamentals by which it operates, as well as an understanding of a world already in existence in which the tool will function.

Consider a further example. If I have a choice between tea or some other beverage, and I choose tea, my choice must be so because of the nature and relationship of my preferences to the tea, my preferences to all other beverages, their relationship to each other, and the other circumstances in my environment as I see them. My choice may simply be driven by nothing more than the fact that "absence makes the heart grow fonder." It may also be driven by the fact that I am "sick and tired" of all the other beverages I have at my disposal. These are circumstances defining my preference for action.

As Peirce and James revealed, the pragmatic constituents of my immediate perception are the stimulus for my action.⁸⁴ Such immediate experience is also based on much

⁸⁴ Buchler 30.

past experience as well, so that the determinants have a history. If I try to deny this, then I deny the existence of the salient features of my experience and find myself philosophically arguing for choice based on indifference and the lack of discretion.

Consider Peirce's statement from a prior passage:

we find ourselves decided as to how we should act under such circumstances as those which occasioned our hesitation. In other words we have attained belief.⁸⁵

I believe "circumstances" in the above passage to mean the immediate pragmatic circumstances which the agent faces at the moment s/he makes a choice.

Consider the concept of "control." Mario Bunge insists that "control over the environment and over ourselves" is not a lack of dependence but rather "control of bondage rather than its impossible absence."....."a conscious mastering of determination rather than the unawareness of it or the illusory escape from laws."⁸⁶

Adler's statement concerning natural freedom of self determination was, "What must be excluded here are plans or decisions that result wholly from processes over which the individual does not exercise control."⁸⁷ It would seem then

⁸⁵ Buchler 27.

⁸⁶ Bunge 182.

⁸⁷ The Institute for Philosophical Research 423.

that self determination cannot be independent of circumstances. Choices are based on the *conformity* of particular intrinsic inclinations, and rationale to the extrinsic conditions which must be appropriated to fulfill the goals of human beings. I would assert that the earliest inclinations and desires we have must conform to this principle if they are at all rational and not simply instinctual.

A mechanical analogy may serve to illuminate this point. Consider an airplane auto pilot. The auto pilot system controls the airplane's path by a system of sensing feedback instruments which regulate the physical requirements (such as direction and altitude) needed for a proper flight to a destination. Although the cybernetic instrumentation needed for such regulation can *control* the airplane, the auto pilot system as a *unity*, does not *control* its own constituent instruments. They must and can only respond to changes in the environment to which they are designed to be sensitive. Conditions in the environment produce functional changes in the instruments which ultimately result in a change in the behavior of the airplane. The physical adjustment of the airplane again produces changes in the environment bringing about a state of relations between the airplane and such environment which ever more closely approximates the course of a flight path based on the destination. This is cybernetics. The

instruments within the auto pilot system can *coordinate* information to operate the system, but the auto pilot cannot *control itself*.⁸⁸ Any system acting cybernetically toward a goal, does not control its own constituent elements. Any control of constituent elements within such a system must come from criteria, stored prior in time and based on specific predictable responses of the elements of the system to their environment.⁸⁹

In terms of freedom of the will, an event outside our "control" brings about an effect which is also outside our "control," only if we have no "control" over whether it brings about that effect.⁹⁰ In the case of human motivation, it would follow that humans have control over the causes of their motivations only if they can *prevent* those motivations from being caused. But prevention of a specific effect implies (1) a foreknowledge of the nature of its cause, and (2) a secondary motivation to prevent the first motivation from occurring.⁹¹ Again we are faced with an infinite regress. An agent's rational behavior is always determined

⁸⁸ Donald MacKay, "Do We Control Our Brains?" The Behavioral and Brain Sciences (1985): 8, 546.

⁸⁹ Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics, 4th ed. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1969) 43.

⁹⁰ Thornton 36.

⁹¹ The Institute 476; Here Adler cites Locke from "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding."

because s/he can only control one behavior with another which has behind it a motivation which cannot be controlled.

One of my major considerations in this thesis involves the controversy over the meaning of the term "free will." I believe it is the mistake of the compatibilists to assume that the basis for a free act rests in the initiating of choice even if choice itself contains determinants internal to the system which does the choosing. My thesis takes the position that intrinsic predispositions are ultimately not controlled by the agent. Thus the intrinsic factors influencing will are linked passively to the circumstances surrounding the agent at the time of choice.

C.D. Broad makes a compelling comparison of causal phenomena by distinguishing between causal influences which are either "occurrents" or "continuants." An agent's *predispositions* and *power* to act at a given moment are, according to Broad, a "continuant" type of causal influence (much like gravity), which means that they are an enduring existent. According to Broad, both the theories of determinism and indeterminism employ "occurrent" causation. Broad argues for the non-existence of "non-occurrent" causation however. Since libertarian doctrine rests upon a concept of freedom based on "non-occurrent" causation, Broad denies the existence of a libertarian theory of freedom.⁹² I

⁹² The Institute 432; Adler footnotes Broad's papers, "Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism", and "Ethics and the Philosophy of History." Both papers contain

believe Broad's theory tends to support this thesis in that he implies that predispositions are not under the control of the agent in the libertarian or contracausal sense.

I would also submit that "non-occurrent" causation as Broad terms it, would include available physical energy which an agent has at her/his disposal, and which could be included as a necessary condition present in order that volition take place. On the other hand, a percept or a condition of belief arrived at after a given thought process, is an "occurrent cause" because it is an event rather than a continuing condition. An agent's predisposition or inner propensity is a "continuant" or "non-occurrent" type of condition, and in Broad's sense is then not a cause. Even if we were to postulate that such existing conditions were causes, it must be admitted that they are beyond the control of the agent.

denial of libertarianism, or freedom as a result of "non-occurrent" causation.

THE DEPENDENCY OF WILL UPON THE WORLD

Considering the phenomena of sensation as pragmatic, Peirce states:

Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects; and if we fancy we have any other, we deceive ourselves, and mistake a mere sensation accompanying the thought for a part of the thought itself.⁹³

It is obvious that some actions produce preferable sensations, and others do not. What is "preferable" however is simply what the agent wishes to achieve, in terms of sensation and pragmatic use, as a goal to his/her willful action. Such preference always precedes a given rational action. The agent envisions a given action leading to the achievement of a goal. S/he then desires to act in that way. It is such precedence of a goal that indicates an influence which determines behavior. The goal exists prior to the action and is experienced instinctively to be the reason for the action.

If Peirce's pragmatism is a law determining human action, then determinism obtains and free will in the incompatibilist sense is not possible. Peirce's quotes indicate that any choice of action would be based on the agent's preference for sensation and pragmatic use at a

93 Buchler 31.

given juncture in time, no matter how complex that sensation is. Simple acts build into larger and more complex habitual patterns which the agent then fits into her/his behavior so s/he may create and navigate through a reality which is similar to the ones s/he has depended upon in the past for meaning, continuity, familiarity, and survival.

The motives and goals behind human activity are vastly more sophisticated than the term "sensation" would imply, but pragmatically, the term "sensation" can represent that sort of "cash value" of which William James speaks in his similar analysis.⁹⁴ It is my opinion that Peirce's phrase, "tangible and conceivably practical," referring to all distinctions of thought, is equivalent to the term, "cash value" as introduced by James.⁹⁵ It is also equivalent to Hume's principle regarding experience and habit which makes an agent form some ideas in a more "intense and lively manner" than other ideas.⁹⁶ There is a practical modification of one's senses contained in every possible alternative to action, but only one alternative will transpire at a given moment because only one alternative is

⁹⁴ A. J. Ayer, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (New York: Random House, 1982) 75.

⁹⁵ Ayer's analysis of the term "cash value" applies to words or statements, and is primarily derived from the work of William James. "Cash value" of a statement consists in the experiences one would have if the statement were discovered to be true.

⁹⁶ Hume, A Treatise 312.

in the utmost "conceivably practical" at that moment. It will be seen below how such pragmatic expectations by an agent do determine the path of his/her choices, because, as Peirce insists, "Every stimulus to action is derived from perception," and "There is no distinction in meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a difference in practice."⁹⁷ Perceptions change continually, as any new action leads to a new perception. And that subsequent perception with its new meaning then leads to the next action.

One point worth mentioning is that any single object of consciousness can be utilized many possible ways, as there are many possible alternative actions or choices open to the agent. This is perhaps the fundamental principle of pragmatism and inductive reasoning. But my thesis extends this principle to include the entire field of an agent's perception at a given moment, including implications from the past. These inclusive considerations made by the agent determine her/his choice of action because they include the agent's entire history of habits and because such considerations leave no possibility for unintentional behavior. When an agent takes a risk as in the cases of gambling, walking through an unknown forest blindfolded, or conducting an experiment, one cannot exercise intentional behavior beyond the preliminary actions involved. The gambler cannot intentionally choose how the slot machine

⁹⁷ Buchler 30.

will act, and the blindfolded individual cannot choose the tree s/he stumbles across. But new information and phenomena can result from such behavior. Such new phenomena can be used inductively for prediction in the future for new choices of action.

Consider the concomitance of all simultaneous pragmatic factors and circumstances of which the agent is aware. These comprise the variables which define the determinants of the agent's choice at any given time. These circumstances may be almost imperceptible and untestable. However, if they do not have specific and unique pragmatic value to the agent, then the agent does not have any pragmatic rationale or reason for specific and unique action toward them based on intention. That is, the agent is incapable of discretion.

Even if there were no causal relationship at all, we are still bound to act as though there are. We have no other alternative because of the indispensable tool of induction that we use to assure the predictability of our actions. That assurance is never complete. Here Hume and Peirce substantiate one another.

Every intentional act refers to a unique goal. Peirce insists that any object is defined by all the practical effects it could render to an agent. If it is the case that goals, which consist of arrangements of objects, are defined functionally by a limited set of specific propositions, and since pragmatic meaning of a preliminary goal or object is necessary for its agent to choose his/her specific behavior

toward a final goal, then it follows that the agent's understanding of pragmatic differences is a motivating ingredient causing the agent to make a particular choice at a particular time. If the agent cannot discern the pragmatic difference between two alternatives, s/he cannot choose between them.

It is not necessary that this theory say anything about *what* that choice will be. However, it does imply that if the agent makes a choice, that particular choice *must* be prompted by the pragmatic distinctions of which s/he is aware at the time. For without an awareness of the pragmatic conditions and relationships between objects and between objects and agent, only random behavior can occur. Intentional behavior is goal oriented and non-random in principle. Without pragmatic distinctions in objects or goals, then no purpose is possible, and no intention as well.

Goals can be considered causes because they are pragmatic distinctions. Pragmatic behavior always involves goals. Therefore it is "cybernetic." I invoke the term "cybernetic" as "regulated goal seeking behavior," "teleological" as "purposive behavior," and "tropistic" as a more crude form of "adaptive."⁹⁸ These characteristics of

⁹⁸ Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics, 4th ed. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1969) 43; A Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Antony Flew 350; Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, ed. Bosley Wolf (Springfield, Mass: G. and C. Merriam and Co., 1975) 1253.

human experience are self evident, as well as evident to others because our "willful" actions are orderly, meaningful and complex. Any willful action performed by a human being can be subdivided into a series of continuous smaller actions which coordinate to finalize or culminate the main action. In the animistic sense, the "goal" in any willful action is precisely what Aristotle proposed. It is the "final" cause of the action:

The final cause is an end, and that sort of end which is not for the sake of something else, but for whose sake everything else is, so that if there is to be a last term of this sort, the process will not be infinite but if there is no such final term, there will be no final cause No one would try to do anything if he were not going to come to a limit....The reasonable man always acts for a purpose; and this is a limit, for the end is a limit.⁹⁹

The goal, which exists in the mind and ostensibly in the world of the agent, is the purpose for which the action was undertaken.

Since the Renaissance, final as well as formal causes, in the Aristotelian sense, have not been treated as viable causes by science or philosophy because they were considered beyond the reach of experiment. They were not empirically testable.¹⁰⁰ I would propose that as an idealistic process,

⁹⁹ Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955) 51; An explanation of Aristotle's final cause also appears in book II of the "Metaphysics."

¹⁰⁰ Bunge 32.

formal causes are just as efficacious in determining action as scientifically established causal laws. Both kinds of causes have been established by inductive reasoning. It may not be possible to account for all particular goals and final causes of behavior, but this does not preclude the proof of their existence.

The pragmatic relationship between agent and phenomena bears on the major question concerning choice. Choice involves the extent to which an individual can *control* his/her own behavior. This question is important for answering the further question of whether or not choice can in any way be independent of pre-existing influences affecting the agent in the sense of an independent variable in mathematics.

When we consider responsibility for our acts, we envision the concept of "autonomy" which is most often defined as an act of self-regulating, self-governing, and self determining.¹⁰¹ Ostensibly, an autonomous act is an act such that no other influence but the agent alone is responsible for initiating her/his will to act in a particularly unique way. An autonomous agent is an agent who is then considered by many proponents of free will to be free in the contracausal sense. "Contra-causal free will" as defined previously, is choice consisting of "creative

¹⁰¹ Peter A. Angeles, Dictionary of Philosophy, (New York, Harper and Row, 1981) 22.

novelty" such that no conjunction of relevant causal laws and any set of true propositions describing states of affairs obtaining prior to a choice entails the proposition that this choice is made.¹⁰² In the case of choice originating as the result of inductive reasoning, or from pragmatic values, there are certain definitive propositions which do lead to a conclusion that a given choice will be made by the agent.

The condition of being self regulating logically has the presupposition that the individual is "free" to literally control or will his/her own will. If we accept that the will is responsible for causing the act, then for the individual to be responsible totally, s/he must also be able to cause her/his will. If s/he cannot do this, then s/he is not free in the deepest sense.

The proponents of the compatibilist or soft determinist tradition of free will imply that "exterior" as well as anterior circumstances, or constituent mental processes, although valid as causes or reasons for the individual's actions, cannot preclude his/her right to praise or his/her culpability. They agree that if "exterior" circumstances could be included as influences (such as coercion or hypnotism) on a person's actions, the individual could not be held responsible for his/her acts. But they deny the

¹⁰² Boyle Jr., Grisez, and Tollefsen, Free Choice, A Self Referential Argument 12.

possibility that the individual when successfully exercising his/her own will is simply responding to intrinsic influences that are not under his/her control, and which do determine his/her will.¹⁰³ They insist that in any choice, one having so chosen "could have done otherwise," even though determinism may insist that the person's actions were dependent upon innate or inherent ingredients unknown to them.

For the concept of will to have meaning, there must be an activity of the human consciousness which first processes input from an environment and then actively translates this input into an appropriate response based on a pragmatic goal.¹⁰⁴ That is why I believe Peirce must insist that every real distinction of thought consists in what is "tangible and conceivably practical." There is always some goal in mind when an agent wills. A human agent avoids one condition for the sake of some goal which is threatened by that condition. As Daniel Dennett admits, we cannot *change* circumstances but we can accommodate ourselves to them.¹⁰⁵

We must adapt to our conditions based on our final goals. Such goals presuppose other goals preceding the final

¹⁰³ Mark Thornton, Do We have Free Will? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989) 47-48.

¹⁰⁴ E. Rae Harcum, "A Behavioral Paradigm for the Psychological Resolution of the Free Will Issue," Journal of Mind and Behavior Vol.12, No.1 Winter (1991): 95.

¹⁰⁵ Daniel Dennett, Elbow Room, The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 1984) 54-58.

ones as reasons for them. Means and ends are organically related in an unbroken continuum.¹⁰⁶

Let us say that I believe that the safety of my life is of paramount importance. It is possible that human behavior based on goals could have other more benevolent alternatives, but these also would have pragmatic reasons preceding them. For the moment, assume the following.

In order to achieve and maintain safety I must achieve power. In order to achieve power, I must maintain my health and vitality. In order to maintain health and vitality I must maintain my physical fitness. To me, physical fitness means being able to expend energy with little effort. In order to have this ability, I must keep my fat to weight ratio as low as possible because I have read that fat not only creates weight which tires me out, but it comprises lipids which produce a certain resistance to the flow of blood through my veins and arteries. I assume that this in turn strains the heart's ability to pump blood through my body. Since my body at certain times demands a certain quantity of energy usage necessary for work, my heart will be prompted to pump harder to transmit the needed quantity of lactose and oxygen which I assume are necessary for my muscular expenditure. Thus I resolve to keep my weight at an acceptable level. I further assume that expending energy at a high rate will burn fat, and I know that I get tired when

¹⁰⁶ Diggins 241.

I do that, so I further assume that exercise which makes me tired, will help me burn fat. I further assume that walking will tire me out, because it always has before, and so that must mean that I am expending the necessary quantity of energy to burn a necessary quantity of fat. Thus I deduce that I must take long walks if I am to stay physically fit. In order to obtain the opportunity for time consuming walks, I must arise earlier in the morning, because most days are work days and I don't have time to walk after work. In order to get up earlier, I must go to bed earlier because it has been my experience that I cannot wake up in time to prepare myself for the day, take my walk and get to work on time if I have stayed up past a certain hour.

But I am a slave to television. I cannot both watch television and go to bed, so I turn the television off at an acceptable hour. Or, if I have a video cassette recorder, and if I desire to experience the thrills of a particular program which plays beyond my designated time to retire, I must program the recorder to record the program so that I may later watch the program. But if I don't have a recording device, I must spend time to purchase one. But if the designated program does not contain the level of interest which warrants the purchase of a VCR, then I will not purchase one. This depends on the nature and content of the television program.

Since all intentional behavior implies goals, then all such behavior is a form of adaptation. We act for reasons,

the content of which lead to our decisions. The reasons are inescapable, because they presuppose further reasons. Such further reasons are also inescapable because they must be based on practical value in order to even be conceived. Bruce Aune describes this process in a similar way. Aune agrees that our intentions are the result of our motivating attitudes which are the result of habit formation. He also states that habits often select volitional conclusions when their purely indicative counterparts could be drawn with equal validity.¹⁰⁷

In order to decide whether to give up a particular television program, I must use my knowledge of its content, as compared to content in which I have no interest. Without such a distinction, I cannot initiate the thought which resolves the indecision to act. When I do resolve such indecision it is because of a unique habit or habits of action that I have developed from the past.¹⁰⁸ This, I believe is an important though extreme implication of Peircean pragmatism.

¹⁰⁷ Aune 265.

¹⁰⁸ Magill 486; Magill interprets Peirce's concept of thought as consisting of a collection of habits which resolves the Peircean "doubt" or "appeases the irritation of indecisiveness" and leads to an act. Magill also notes that the "Conceptual Pragmatic Interpretation" of Peirce's theory implies that "to have a concept is to have a particular belief regarding what sensible effects would arise should a certain type of action be performed."

The telephone rings and I will to walk over to it to pick up the receiver. The action of "walking" for instance, must be undertaken in a particular manner in order to be successful. The physical constraints and learned mechanical skills of the human being dictate the nature and method of movement in the case of walking. Suppose though, I will to not walk to the phone. This is a possibility. But if the reason, in either case is dependent upon "exterior" circumstances that I weigh as *priorities* for one behavior or another, then I am influenced by these exterior circumstances in as much as they produce motives in my mind which lead to my choice. To be totally autonomically "free," I must be able to choose either alternative, irrespective of any practical data I may receive as a result of contemplation as to consequences of my action.

It would seem that freedom cannot prosper as a presupposition for responsibility if such freedom arises as a result of data upon which I *must* base a decision to act. Since I cannot create the data, and since the deliberation process I use is determined from propositions obtained from such pragmatic and inductive data, I cannot control my decision. Again, as Peirce suggested, "every stimulus to action is derived from perception."¹⁰⁹ Our perception is the data which links us with the world, and from which we derive our decisions to act.

¹⁰⁹ Buchler 30.

Some of the data I may use to make a decision include emotions such as anger, apprehension, fear, avoidance, needs, etc. If I feel emotional compulsion toward an act for instance, and I *do not* carry out the act, I am doing so based on my will to *not* act. In this case I am willing an "avoidance" which is still a will based on sensation and knowledge of exterior circumstances. It is not a form of behavior which is "free" of exterior influence. My rational response to answer or not is based entirely on the circumstances and ramifications concerning the meaning to me of the telephone ringing. These are conditions over which I have no control.

Also, my wishes and concerns about answering the phone may be somewhat vague to me, but if they do not exist, then my response to either answer or not can only be arbitrary. There cannot be a willful choice in such case, any more than the roll of a die is the basis of choosing a number.

Let us assume for the moment that in order to be free from the influences which determine my will, I must either not will at all, or I must *will* my will. If I could *will* my will, It may seem as though I could be free of exterior influences and thus autonomous. On the other hand, to not will at all, is simply to be indifferent. Such a case is immaterial to our argument. A passage of G.L. Vander Veer's pertains to this principle.

Responsibility demands that an act be mine,
and 'by mine' we mean that it comes from the self

I know in feeling and in explicit self awareness, that is from the "empirical" self. If a choice merely "happened" in me, I would renounce it as something foreign. This suggests that choices must find their source in the person. On the other hand, responsibility implies that before choosing I really can go in either direction and not merely think that I can. This suggests that my choices cannot find their source in me and must be without a sufficient cause. But these two requirements are self contradictory, and therefore cannot be combined into a single theory.¹¹⁰

But suppose I am able to "choose" my will, or *will* my will. I must do so for a reason or with a value which is again independent of the exterior conditions, circumstances and consequences involving my immediate experience and behavior. If this secondary willing is in any way a function of such circumstances, then that will is not free. However, a will entirely free from immediate circumstances is totally disassociated from any goal pertinent to my immediate experience and thus useless as will. It is my assertion that will cannot be deliberately rendered independent of its objects by a secondary will.

At the center of the argument concerning free will is the concept of choice. The typical way of approaching the problem of choice is to ask in retrospect, if the agent "*could have done otherwise.*" Relevant arguments include the statement by G. E. Moore which is as follows:

¹¹⁰ Garrett L. Vander Veer, Bradley's Metaphysics and the Self (London: Yale University Press, 1970) 255.

S could have done other than A. = S would have done other than A if s/he had willed to do so.¹¹¹

If S claims to be free of extrinsic influences during any choice, then the only causes of S's deliberative behavior must come from within S.

If there is an element of cause from *within* the agent, we must ask whether the agent is at liberty to *influence* this cause *intentionally* if we are to maintain a definition of will which contains an autonomy of the kind Vander Veer notes, for instance.¹¹² If the agent does not have such ability, then we must relinquish our belief in free will for this reason also.

If the agent *is* at will to influence his/her desire, however, then we must ask, as we did previously, whether *this* will had a cause. Suppose this "secondary will" did have a cause. Then we can again ask whether it originated extrinsically or intrinsically. If intrinsically, then we must again ask if the agent could influence this "secondary cause" *intentionally*. If the agent is not at liberty to influence this "secondary cause" *intentionally*, then at this level we must again admit that the agent cannot be acting willfully. The regress becomes infinite.

It is true that certain factors might have been different in the chain of causes leading to the choice in

¹¹¹ Bruce Aune, "Cans and Ifs, An Exchange", Free Will, ed. Gary Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) 36.

¹¹² Vander Veer 255.

question. Any contingent causal or deterministic causes which were unpredictable, such as nuclear radiation, earth quakes, trauma, experimental data, etc. could have produced different results in the agent's behavior. These factors could have influenced the agent to cause him/her to have chosen differently and thus to have acted differently. But such factors could not have originated from intention. They are exterior to the agent's will.

Ultimately, the agent cannot control his/her will without responding to another will which functions specifically to regulate the first will.

Philosophers Joseph Boyle, Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen maintain the following definition for free choice:

Someone makes a free choice if and only if he makes a choice (C) in the actual world, and there is a possible world such that he does not make (C) in this possible world and everything in this possible world except his making C is the same as in the actual world.¹¹³

This statement is a good definition of contracausal free will. I would dispute this statement on the following grounds. Peirce's principle stating that every stimulus to action is derived from perception would be violated. Also, the pragmatic explanation for willful action stipulates that one desire leads to a choice which leads to a new state of the world which leads to a new desire and another choice.

¹¹³ Boyle, Grisez, Tollefsen 11.

There is no meaningful explanation in the process for contracausal free will. A willing agent cannot choose to relate in any other way than that prescribed by the meaning or pragmatic value of the object or objects.¹¹⁴ There is always a pragmatic predisposition preceding a choice.

J. L. Austin believes that one alternative to the phrase "could have" is the phrase "might have."¹¹⁵ Dennett believes that this principle is the key to the resolution of the riddle about the word "can."¹¹⁶ I believe that such a phrase as "might have" implies a physical possibility regarding action which is not necessarily the result of autonomy in the complete sense.

Of course, at each stage of causation, it will be noted that it is possible that some phenomenon within the brain or mind of the agent could produce causation inconsistent or incoherent with purposeful activity, thus satisfying a certain criteria for freedom, in that such phenomena could be considered indeterminate in their origin. These phenomena could include contingent causation and quantum mechanical varieties of causation, etc. But as noted above, these kinds of conditions do not satisfy criteria for will since they do not contain *regulated* activity directed toward a goal. Thus,

¹¹⁴ Strawson 320; R.D.Ellis, "Agent Causation, Chance and Determinism," Philosophical Inquiry Vol. 6 (1983): 40.

¹¹⁵ Dennett 148.

¹¹⁶ Dennett 148.

they would not be intentional activities. Also, human memory is a continuum of events and responses to events which, in principle, have no lacuna or discontinuity during willful activity. Random signals in the brain producing willful actions would contain such discontinuities because the mind would have experiences unconnected by memory. James poetically describes the situation thus:

The chaplet of my days tumbles into a cast of disconnected beads as soon as the thread of inner necessity is drawn out by the preposterous indeterminist doctrine.¹¹⁷

It is possible that the agent's choice could be based on random input, but if the agent is aware of the teleological end to his/her choice, the influence on that choice must in any case still come from within or without. Since for contracausal free will or autonomy it is the intrinsic contribution with which we are concerned in this case, we see that a random contribution cannot contribute to any "willful" activity since the individual could not have been *biased* from within to act in any particular way. Such an act could not be goal oriented.¹¹⁸

From the above considerations it can be seen that any cause produced from within the mind set of the agent cannot

¹¹⁷ Martin Gardner, The Whys of a Philosophical Schrivener (New York: Quill, 1983) 108.

¹¹⁸ Gardner 106.

be a willful cause of action that is also "free" in any way from prior pragmatic relationships that the agent has developed. It is then evident that will is shaped by its pragmatic environment. Such pragmatic environment is appraised by the agent in terms of past experience and future consequences. The conception of the will's pragmatic objects are anterior and antecedent to the will. Any will directed toward such objects presupposes their pragmatic value. The objects, their posture in the world, and the inner predisposition of the individual determine the pragmatically useful criteria for the decision to be made by her/him. Thus free will defined in terms of "autonomy" is non-existent.

If autonomy *could* be exercised to change this "inner nature," it could not be classed as will unless the individual had a worldly objective or goal in mind in doing so. Suppose a person considers themselves rude and impolite for instance. In order to be kinder and gentler to other humans such a person may wish to exercise "kind" acts. One must envision "kindness" and "kind acts" as being a possible real activity before one can have such a goal. This would include all the pragmatic ramifications surrounding "kindness" and the feelings of others, etc. Such goals or objectives thus refer back to objects in the world in which the individual tries to exercise control over her/himself or other objects. Without such dependence on exterior teleological exigencies, the very idea of a will is

meaningless. I believe this line of reasoning is supported by the discussion of contracausal free will earlier in the thesis.¹¹⁹

If, as Peirce suggests, "All realities influence our practice," and "Every stimulus to action is derived from perception," then all the data received by a conscious or unconscious agent at any given time must comprise the totality of influences which define that agent's actions at that moment. We thus act in a particular and precise way, at a particular time, because of a particular "effect of a practical kind" our objects have for us. At any instant of our cognitive experience, "there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a difference in practice."¹²⁰

If I have a goal involving objects in my world, that goal involves my will. But that will is never independent from the state of my world as I see it at a given time. I can never extricate myself from the chain of determining reasons by which I exert choice. When an agent's actions arise from reason, the agent is never in control of his/her actions.¹²¹ Our choices in any case refer to our objects of

¹¹⁹ Boyle Jr., Grisez, and Tollefsen 12.

¹²⁰ Buchler 30.

¹²¹ Susan Wolf, Freedom within Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) 52.

consciousness and our reasons for practically engaging them.¹²²

If an individual has a desire to alter his/her character, personality or desire, s/he must have, as we have seen, a reason to do so, based on the existence of exterior objects, anticipations, former experiences, models, scripts and possible predictions. These forms of emotive experiences or rationale are necessary for the existence of willful actions. But they only qualify as constituents of what Adler calls the "passive self." As such, they do not produce free will in its most independent sense.¹²³

Not only do differences in objects of consciousness determine choice, but one object of consciousness can be used in different ways, as we have previously seen. The detriments of a milk glass which is half empty are contrasted with one which has the benefit of being half full. In such cases it would seem that the value is subjective and controlled by the agent, but ultimately the question arises as to the reason the agent assumes an attitude leading to his/her will. Such an attitude, let us say, being thankful for half a glass of milk (rather than none), has a pragmatic reason from the agent's past which underlies its meaning, if the difference between "half full" and "half empty" is to have meaning at all. The agent must

¹²² Harcum 95.

¹²³ The Institute for Philosophical Research 610-612.

act willfully as a response to what s/he considers to be circumstantial as well as pragmatic and teleological. What meaning can a half full glass of milk have for someone who has never a need for milk, or who does not even know what milk is, or for someone who always gets their milk in quantized amounts, no greater and no less than half of a glass?

Empirical propositions asserting fact utilize unique references which are pragmatic references. They have meaning in terms of how things function between themselves and in relation to humanity. The major issue is that we *cannot* escape this kind of necessity. To choose to act in a certain way, I must first *believe* that I can act in that certain way. Then I must believe that it is preferable to act in such a way. But both beliefs imply pragmatic reasons. Thus, if a choice occurs, it is a *consequent* of certain pragmatic appraisal.

Even if necessity does not operate in the *physically* true sense, we are condemned to live as though it does. Our inferences regarding causality are based on inductive reasoning. Our inferences regarding strategies for achieving goals are based on our inferences regarding causality. Distinction between choices of action are based on our choice of goals. Our choices of specific goals at specific times are dependent upon how we perceive ourselves in relation to the world at that given moment and upon more remote goals, such as survival, with which we cannot

dispense. Choice is only meaningful if the meaning of the choice is understood in terms of prior experience and not just linguistic description.

As an example, suppose someone asks me which of two colors, teal or fuchsia, I like best. If I have never experienced either of them, I cannot choose.

Suppose further that a chart is placed before me with each of these colors on it, without any names. Suppose I truly have no preference as to a favorite. Then choice is impossible.

But I must choose. The only criteria I have for choice is what I see before me. My perception of the difference of these colors, and the fact that they are different, are the only facts which can determine my action, if such action is possible.

But if I choose, I am admitting a preference which is prompted by the difference between the objects of my awareness. I thus discriminate. I choose one color because I have an affinity for it which is greater than any affinity I can have for the other. Without the color differentiation, I cannot make a choice. Thus, there is no influence of any kind involved in such a choice which is under my control. If I am able to divorce my consciousness from any bias, I am disabling my power to choose.

The goals pursued by a subject are an outgrowth of the pragmatic relationship which the subject has with his/her extrinsic world. His/Her stratagem of achieving those goals

is then uniquely established by the Humean concept of induction. The individual believes that behaving a certain way will cause him/her to achieve the goal. When the individual comes to a crossroads, s/he will experience indecision as Peirce asserts, and then deliberate pragmatically. The criteria for decision which Peirce calls belief, is again a residue of the pragmatic properties of the subject's relationship to the world. Nothing else would produce coherent and concurrent behavior to achieve the goals, since pragmatism tells us that all stimulus to action is derived from perception, and there is no meaning so subtle as to consist in anything but a difference of practice.¹²⁴

Frank Magill, in analyzing Peirce's Collected Papers, states:

By conceiving through the use of the senses the effects of the action of a thing, we come to understand the thing; our habit of reaction, forced upon us by the action of the thing, is a conception of it, our belief regarding it.¹²⁵

Singular things form aggregates. I would propose that singular habits can form aggregates or compositions of habits. If we act based on the pragmatic necessity of a single "thing," the same must be true of groups and

¹²⁴ Buchler 30.

¹²⁵ Magill 487.

compositions of "things" which ultimately comprise the environment we experience at any given time.

As Peirce asserted, belief is a "rule for action." When an agent does not know what to do, s/he feels uneasy. The agent's uneasiness will not leave him/her until s/he settles upon some mode of action by way of thought.¹²⁶ The agent's thought consists of comparisons made about the pragmatic arrangement of the agent's environment, past history, and the consequences of various alternative actions. Finally, belief is reached and the action that follows it. The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit.¹²⁷ What the habit is, according to Peirce, depends on *when* and *how* it causes us to act.¹²⁸ According to Peirce, belief must be present, in order that volition occur.¹²⁹ The agent must believe in the usefulness of an object before s/he can choose to use it in a particular way. If the agent has learned to believe that a certain action is appropriate given certain circumstances, this is then a habit. I believe this rule must apply for any and all purposeful actions no matter how inane and arbitrary such "habits of reaction" can seem.¹³⁰

¹²⁶ Buchler 27.

¹²⁷ Magill 486.

¹²⁸ Buchler 30.

¹²⁹ Buchler 29.

¹³⁰ I refer to my last quote of Frank N. Magill.

Peirce, in asserting his theory of the fixation of belief, was restating what Hume had realized. Humans always draw inferences from connections between their motives, circumstances and characters.¹³¹ Inference is a logical operation yielding unique conclusions. It is my opinion that pragmatic beliefs can be imperceptibly minute in their fundamental components. But these beliefs can leave nothing to choose as a goal oriented action which has not been established as a rule of habit, if what Peirce asserts is true.

I believe that if we interpret pragmatic theory strictly, the pragmatic meanings of the object combinations in an agent's immediate environment are the causal determinants of the agent's active choices. Such meanings include the contents of his/her immediate and total conscious awareness at any given moment. To the extent that the environment and its constituent objects change in any way, at any time, even minutely, we are reminded;

As to the when....every stimulus to action is derived from perception.....there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice.¹³²

¹³¹ David Hume, "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding", The Empiricists, ed. Richard Taylor (New York: Doubleday, 1961) 375.

To the extent that an agent can recall pertinent experiences, I believe the above statements imply that each and every experience for an agent causally contributes to the agent's next rational action, and that such contributions are the only ones that exist to produce such action.

Although it defies our belief in spontaneity, strict pragmatism shows that we can only "choose" by way of our knowledge and dependence on the pragmatic meanings in our alternatives. Since, as Peirce suggests, each of these perceived meanings corresponds to nothing but a difference of action, and since we are consciously acting for a specific reason, or to test the consequences of new actions, our will and our action form a continuum which is determined uniquely by antecedent influences that do not originate within us.

Another factor which indicates that human intentional behavior is determined is that human beings can only perform one act at a time. Our willful actions always conform to the pragmatic usefulness we *prioritize* at any given moment, however undevised these may seem at the time. Certain actions must take place before others. When they do, time is used, and this affects how the remaining actions will be chosen.

NEW HABIT FORMATION

There are some intentional actions in which goals are incompletely defined. I would assert that the will which produces such acts is determined but in such cases the agent intentionally produces an act which will lead to uncertain or random events.

Activities such as sleep, risky behavior, experimentation, or gambling form discontinuities in our purposeful behavior. But I would submit that these activities result in effects on our behavior which again are beyond our control. We do not voluntarily behave at all when sleeping. Risky activities contain uncertainty and to that extent are not the result of habitual behavior based on inductive reasoning. It is my conjecture that new habits can be developed from such activities however, because the agent may discover consequences which s/he may trust in the future. Experimentation also is behavior which can be used to *establish* inductive principles, as Peirce admits, but an experiment itself is a risk lacking the certitude of belief. In such a case there is doubt in the mind of the experimenter about a pragmatic consequence of action.¹³³ Gambling is only purposive or goal oriented to the extent that the agent initiates a random activity with an improbable outcome.

¹³³ Buchler 260.

None of the above activities are completely intentional, but they can follow from inductive reasoning on the part of the agent. For instance, a gambler can be obsessed with the possibility of making a large sum of money with very little effort. S/he has seen it happen in the past. The scientist is preoccupied with the possibility of a new deterministic process which can be verified by experiment. This experience is somewhat inductive because the scientist or agent may have some analogy or new paradigm in mind which is based in some way on old models. S/he may test an hypothesis involving a series of phenomena to ascertain their causal relationships.¹³⁴ Until verification however, no belief in the Peircean sense is established and no habit or scientific law is established as well.

Such activities can create new habits of action from new patterns of inductive reasoning and pragmatic discovery. Habits and phenomena can be combined to yield new habits and new phenomena. I do not believe that such activities can be classified as resulting from free will however, because (1) the agent who has engaged in them had to have had a predisposition to engage in an uncertain act and (2) such acts are not the result of a well defined intention.

It matters not whether causation is a viable ontological principle or that our childhood or parental

¹³⁴ Patrick J. Hurley, A Concise Introduction to Logic, 4th ed. (Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1991) 470, 533-537.

scripts change drastically from time to time. The human brain is not subject to "hardwired" algorithmic responses for all its behavior.¹³⁵ It can learn, invent, and reprogram itself, but always, for adaptive reasons, in the sense that it has an ability and a necessity to synthesize new habits of behavior from its interaction with the environment.

This process according to Edelman includes "Neural Darwinism," "global mapping" and "particular categorical responses" to the environment.¹³⁶ This is the formation of new habits. It is also determination because a specific experience produces a specific response. Goal seeking is a continuum within the behavioral process even though the goals change, meander, modify and equivocate.

The above types of behavior are not in my opinion contradictory examples of my thesis. They do not involve goal oriented acts in which the goal seeking is purely the result of inductive reasoning. They are important however, in that they can be beginnings of new habits and phenomena which emerge but are not created ex nihilo by an agent.

¹³⁵ Gerald M. Edelman, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire (U.S.A: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992) 198.

¹³⁶ Edelman 89-90.

FURTHER EVIDENCE OF A DEPENDENT WILL

The mind, the body and any interaction they perform, are always part of the greater whole of existence, of which they form a dependent component. It matters not even that causalism may be a fallacy. What matters is that we are dependent upon our *belief* in lawfulness and consequences. We are constrained, whenever we seek a goal, to act as though determinism were true, because we are expecting pragmatic consequences which are the results of our inductive reasoning. In fact, the goal itself is chosen because of pragmatic beliefs which an agent has accumulated but not chosen. This *dependence* upon the *belief* in a lawlike structure of our acts is the determination from which we cannot escape.

Consider the following example.

If I am cold, I get out of my chair and walk over to the thermostat and adjust it to turn on the heater. If my home has no modern heating, I act differently. I may be undecided. I weigh the possible solutions. I finally attain a state of belief as to what to do and I walk to the fire place and strike a match under a small pile of rubble, or I put on heavier clothing. My intentional action is governed by my habits and my deliberation with regard to my mental and physical state and its engagement with my environment at a given time. These parameters and relationships are a function of empirical and pragmatic regulatory principles

over which I have no control. They lead to actions from my habits and my reasoning which in all probability will lead to consequences which will suite me.¹³⁷

Any "reason" for action is a function of the structure of our world and our relationship to it, as we see it at that time. We are conscious of a past and how it came to create our present, and we expect the consequences of our future acts to conform to the purposes we hold in mind based on the same or similar experiences in our past. The purposes ultimately are out of our control as well. As we have already seen, a regress of reasons or values can be brought about by this analysis.¹³⁸ From our habit and experience, we must use such rationale *continually* to accurately reposture our relationship to the world. This is true regardless of our immediate intention or reason. Each reason, as a link in the chain, *depends* on prior reasons for its meaning.

suppose an agent insists that a free act is one which is intentional, but no more necessary than some other act. Since the act is intentional there must be a motivating objective behind the action because there is a goal in the terminus of the act. I pick up the phone instead of the pencil for instance. In these acts the alternatives are the phone and the pencil. To be true to her/his definition of freedom, the agent cannot know what her/his objective was in

¹³⁷ Aune 256.

¹³⁸ Galen Strawson, Freedom and Belief 320.

acting because this would be admitting a reason for acting in such a way. If an agent can honestly state that s/he did not know *why* s/he acted in such a way, then s/he must admit that the action was involuntary, instinctive, or unconscious. In such a case, our control over such an experience is clearly impossible and thus unqualified to be defined as will. Since it is only with deliberate actions that we are concerned, we need not worry about lack of values or reasons for action in the case of such automatic responses to stimuli. It may be extremely difficult to distinguish voluntary from involuntary behavior, but by its definition, involuntary behavior is unwilled, and so beyond the control of the conscious agent. As we have seen, willful action always follows a rationale or reason, in the pragmatic sense, which is equivalent to "volition" on the part of the willing subject. Reaching for a coffee cup at a given time instead of a pencil is indicative of a particular purpose.

Pragmatic differences also exist for a single object used in different ways. My choice may be to hold the coffee cup by the handle or to grasp the entire cup, depending on what habit is called upon to represent my preference at a given time. If I act with absolute intention toward the cup in any way, the choice is always determined by pragmatic factors beyond my control which have formed habits.

If my reasons for grasping the cup arise intrinsically, they must be partially the result of my perception of the

pragmatic differences in the two ways of holding the cup. Otherwise, I could not coordinate and guide my actions to do either. Further, if I insist that I am free and not predisposed to choose one or the other action, then there is no pragmatic information or influence prompting my physical coordination in the act. There would be no goal. In such a case the Peircean "doubt" or indecision could never be resolved by thought, and therefore could not lead to belief or action. There would be no habit from the past to prompt me to act in a particular way. Will, in this sense, could not exist because there would not be an object of intention.

Let us then presume that I *am* predisposed toward a given choice in regards to handling a coffee cup. Are my predispositions chosen by me in such a case? if so, why? If for no reason, then they must have originated randomly. Then how can my actions be so meaningfully and willfully directed?

The answer is that habits developed from past experiences are responsible for such predisposition. Such past experiences then are antecedent to the habits, thoughts and actions that become the consequences later produced. This is the causal principle of learning.

We can further elucidate this process by use of the "Buridan's Ass" problem in which we have a hungry donkey

standing between two piles of delicious hay.¹³⁹ One pile is to the donkey's right and the other to its left. Both piles are equally sumptuous and equal in size and distance from the donkey. The problem is similar to that of choosing between two colors I have never heard of or seen. All conditions indicate that there is no advantage to choosing one alternative over the other. Can a choice be made?

There is simply no criteria here with which to make a choice. But this is due to the identical pragmatic nature of the alternatives. Notice that in this case, there is no difference in the nature or descriptive quality of each pile of hay, and so the donkey cannot make a choice based on one alternative as opposed to the other. The pragmatic meanings in each hay pile are identical as goals to the donkey, so no choice is possible.

Peter van Inwagen insists that this is also true in the case of competing desires known as the "chocolate/vanilla" decision. In this problem, it is assumed that the agent has the ability to desire both chocolate and vanilla equally at the same time. Although vacillation with a final decision occurs, it is the equivalent of a "coin toss," the outcome of which is not under the agent's control.¹⁴⁰ There is no criteria for

¹³⁹ Peter van Inwagen, "When is the Will Free?" Philosophical Perspectives, 3, Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory (1989): 415.

¹⁴⁰ van Inwagen 415.

deliberation because the choice will have no consequences beyond the consumption of one flavor or the other.¹⁴¹

Some pragmatic distinction as to the ends and goals of the agent must be made between two alternatives as a necessary condition for a choice to be made between them. If this distinction cannot be made, then no willful choice is possible. In the case of the donkey, I would submit that the Peircean "doubt" cannot be resolved by any deliberation leading to belief and action, assuming the donkey is even capable of deliberation and thought in the human sense. In the past the donkey may have developed habits about eating hay, but they cannot be executed unless the donkey can apply, on the basis of a pragmatic difference, a past habit of preference.

What is indicated here, is that "willful" deliberative action cannot arise "ex nihilo" from the subject who seemingly can control his/her motivation. Such deliberative action arises from subtle and complex pragmatic determinants which comprise the subject's perceptual experience prior to choice. Thus there is no possibility of contracausal free will.

If we assert that an agent's current desires "could have been different" then we are asserting that the situation and objects experienced by the conscious agent in that case had a slightly different pragmatic value. For if

¹⁴¹ van Inwagen 415.

they did not, the agent would not have been predisposed to act in a different way.

A desire is either caused or uncaused in any case. If it is uncaused, then certainly the concept of autonomy loses its content, for autonomy requires initiation by an agent.¹⁴² Also, the desire cannot be in total, uncaused because the objects of desire play at least a teleological role as purposeful ends and goals. That is, the agent has a pragmatic attraction to the goal. Further, if the cause then is totally outside the agent, such as in the case of hypnosis, then s/he is most certainly not free or autonomous. If the desire has an intrinsic component of cause, and if the agent is not aware of this cause, then the agent certainly is not at will to influence it either.

If the agent is at will to influence his/her desires, then we can ask if this "secondary" will had a cause. If the "secondary" will had a cause then we can then ask if it originated extrinsically to the agent or intrinsically to him/her. If from an intrinsic source, then again we must ask if the agent could have influenced this "secondary" cause. Thus again we are faced with an infinite regress. If the agent was not able to influence the secondary "cause" by virtue of not being aware of it, then at this level, again, the agent cannot be acting "willfully" or "autonomously."

¹⁴² See glossary under autonomy.

A variation of the regressions showing full determination of an agent's behavior by exterior influences can be found in R.D. Ellis's work.¹⁴³ Ellis has a similar approach to the regressions that have been envisioned above but uses the phrase "feature already operable in...", to indicate anything that truly could be predicated of an agent at some time.¹⁴⁴ My thesis uses the word "reason" or "intrinsic secondary will" to represent a "predisposition" of the agent which must relate to the pragmatic characteristics of the agent's environment. These "reasons" for certain pragmatic usage of environmental objects are determined by the agent as a result of habits formed in the past by inductive reasoning. For this reason, the agent's reasons for action can always be shown to be intentional but dependent upon what the agent considers to be the consequences of such action. This concept is supported by Jamesian pragmatism as well as Peircean pragmatism.¹⁴⁵

There are two important results of Ellis's paper which I interpret as strongly supporting my thesis:

(1) The fact that the agent lacks control over factors affecting his/her behavior.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³ R.D. Ellis, "Agent Causation, Chance and Determinism," Philosophical Inquiry Vol. 6 (1983): 29.

¹⁴⁴ Ellis 34.

¹⁴⁵ C.E.M. Joad, Guide To Philosophy (New York: Dover Publications, 1957) 451-453.

¹⁴⁶ Ellis 30.

(2) Causal influences sufficient to determine the agent's behavior and which are exterior to the agent can be found for all previous moments of the agents past.¹⁴⁷ Although Ellis's paper is concerned with a more broad field of determinants than my thesis, his phrase, "feature already operable in" must include an agent's decisions, preferences, beliefs, values, desires, intentions and all mental activities pertaining to the agent. These are features which can be predicated of the agent.¹⁴⁸

The implications of pragmatic theory for human behavior can be simplified into a logical correlate in the following way. Assume that we let P represent the agent's immediate perception of his condition in the world. This includes his/her perception of immediate objects, his/her memories and his/her plans. Suppose further that we let PR represent the pragmatic meaning of this perception to the agent and we let Δ represent a slight incremental difference in each given quantity. We then have the following proposition describing pragmatic theory:

$$\Delta P \supset \Delta PR.$$

But Peirce's pragmatism also implies:

$$\Delta A \supset \Delta P,$$

where there has been a slight difference in the agent's choice of action, A, *following and corresponding to* a unique

¹⁴⁷ Ellis 39.

¹⁴⁸ Ellis 34.

difference in the agent's perception.¹⁴⁹ The existence of a given action follows uniquely from its determinant which is the pragmatic appraisal made by the agent. Then,

$$\Delta A \supset \Delta PR$$

and

$$\Delta PR \supset \Delta A.$$

This implies that an agent cannot make a voluntary decision or choice to act without a predetermining reason; that is, without some unique pragmatic difference in his/her environment.

This also implies that, temporally, any rational action must lead to a new pragmatic environment which again must yield a specific new action.

It can be noted however, that an agent's choice of action may not depend on all the pragmatic constituents of his/her environment. My rising in the morning at 8:04 AM to make coffee may hold no more significance for me than rising at 8:00 AM. The point to be made is that the pragmatic facts that do make a difference in the agent's conscious behavior do so as complete determinants of such behavior.

Finally, the equation shows that at no time can the agent freely choose his/her series or locus of choices. The cause of the agent's actions are the pragmatic meanings which the agent relies upon to act as a willing individual.

¹⁴⁹ Buchler 30.

Although this kind of necessary causation is not *physical* determination, it determines physical actions on the part of the agent, and thus is equivalent in its effect to physical determination.

If the so called "self" is completely independent from the world, then it cannot be influenced by such a world. That is, if the agent is not aware of opportunities, consequences and contingencies in his/her world, then s/he cannot act with volition within that world. An agent's active volition depends on possible goals which presuppose the existence of worldly objects. Such goals must include meanings which relate the agent to the world. It is the agent's presuppositions about such objects which must precede any goal addressed by the agent. If there are no such presuppositions which connect the agent and the world around him/her, then no intentional interaction with such a world can take place. If, for instance, I am blind, it is impossible for me to choose the color of a coat in order to purchase it.

Dr. Harry Frankfurt has postulated a regress which is based on desires that are either "wanton" or are initiated by "higher order volitions" (values). An individual can "want" to "want" something, but according to Frankfurt, this condenses into just "wanting" that something.¹⁵⁰ This

¹⁵⁰ Gary Watson, Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) 107-110.

indicates the difficulty of ever achieving freedom from needs which are presupposed by our voluntary actions.

Without a deterministic structure to the world in which practical contingencies and consequences define all goals, teleological or cybernetic action would not be possible. "Purpose" would be a meaningless word. "Opportunities" could not exist, and neither would volition. Volition is a goal oriented concept. It implies the coincidence of opportunity with an agent's predisposition toward action. Any decision based on practical thought must finally arise as a result of the agent's belief in the consequences of specific behavior and his/her desire to exercise that behavior. One cannot preclude the determinants of one's actions in a willful manner, because one must have a reason for doing so. This amounts to having secondary determinants which lie beyond the agent's control.

A guilty conscience can arise from a conflict determinable in a world where certain forms of behavior are believed to be redeeming and thus desirable, while others are grounds for condemnation (but also very desirable). Thus, it is ultimately the pragmatic structure we expect in our world which determines which volition or which desire is manifested. It would seem that a *value* cannot be acted upon, but it can produce a *desire* which can be acted on. In such case, I would say that the conflict between values and desires reduces to that between desires only. From this condition, thought produces a decision. I may value my

cardiovascular health, and from the deterministic world around me I presume that long distance walking or running can benefit me. Then at certain times, when I so desire, I will engage in running. Other times, though I still value my health, I may preclude exercising for some indulgence of another kind.

For the will to be really free there would have to be no distinguishing pragmatic characteristics between possible alternative actions. However, this then eliminates the possibility of choice altogether. Any meaningful goal oriented behavior that is asserted as being free must arise from the intention of the human being. Yet, in being absolutely free, it would also be independent of any reason arising in connection with, or in relation to any outside influence. When choice is exercised as activity, the precise activity is as Peirce suggests. It is prompted by perception.¹⁵¹

As mentioned previously, if it were possible to remove any outside influence or relation upon the agent's sensorium then no cybernetic or teleological experience can transpire. No goals can exist. No strategies can be defined. No conscious action can be executed. No empirical judgments can be made. Thus no *intention* can occur, and thus finally, no will.

¹⁵¹ Buchler 30.

Again, the only cognitive causes possible for a given behavior are the cause the subject thinks s/he can impart, and the pragmatic use the subject has for the objects of consciousness at the time. Even if actions are seemingly spontaneous they must obey the necessary underlying preference for consequences which the agent thinks not only probable but valuable because of her/his past experience. If these values are not causes, in the case of "spontaneous" actions, then such actions have no willful basis at all, and must be classed outside the realm of this thesis. Thus a truly spontaneous act cannot be an act of will.

Locke also understood the limitations of freedom. A passage from *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* reads:

.....By making the action of willing to depend on his will, there must be another antecedent will, to determine the acts of this will, and another to determine that, and so in infinitum; for wherever one stops, the actions of the last will cannot be free.¹⁵²

This again demonstrates that specific acts of conscious will always have meaning in terms of existing phenomenological objects of consciousness and their relations. For the agent, these objects exist in a particular composition at the time of choice. Such objects as a unified whole produce the conscious ingredients which necessitate the agent's choice because the objects are

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nothing more than the implications they bring from the agent's past. These are the only objects with which humans are capable of being consciously interdependent.

I can choose to pick up a pen in order to write, or I can pick up a telephone to call a library, my mother, a good friend, or because I want to dust off the table. The action I take must be a function of my motives, desires, values, my character, and possibly my reflections on all of these factors, as they relate to the structure and interrelationships of my immediate as well as my remote environment. My relationship to my mother, as well as to my good friend, is at issue, as well as the urgency to dust the table top. The very fact that I have a telephone and not just stationery for writing, the time of day, my fears, annoyances and countless other factors influencing my disposition all lead me to a given distinctive and unique act of the will.

As an agent, I have self evidence of the unique quality of pragmatic necessity as a result of the cybernetics and goals of my willful behavior. If my will were truly free in the sense of being arbitrary, then I would not experience a particular goal in mind prior to acting.¹⁵³ But the very fact that I understand my exact immediate intentions when I

¹⁵³ Unconscious or reflexive behavior, if it exists, would be an exception. I am assuming that such behavior is not a result of one's rational will in the sense that a deliberate act is.

act, proves to me that some distinct pragmatic aspects of my objects of consciousness are determining my behavior, through the relationship with me that they produce.

There may be highly complex neurophysiological processes which produce the pragmatic distinctions in an agent's mind, but pragmatic analysis does not need to account for them. Self evidence of causalism is produced by an agent's awareness of relationship with the objects and the pragmatic belief which the agent experiences prior to a intentional act which is based on that relationship.

CONCLUSION

From the work of classical and more radical empiricists mentioned above, I believe that there is a strong indication that all the willful actions of any individual, be they either sequential or separated by intervals of time, follow necessarily from prior predispositions which are inaccessible to human control.

As described in the beginning of my thesis, a somewhat alternate method of describing the criteria for psychological determinism is the application of the following two principles:

(1) Initial conditions:

(A) Any given state of affairs in which the agent finds him/herself will serve as initial conditions for a given series of acts by the agent.

(B) Each decision to act is based on the pragmatic conditions as the agent perceives them at the time. These conditions include reflection upon contingency, time allotment, consequences, and revision of former beliefs based upon new phenomena arising from uncertain actions and vaguely defined goals.

With each choice that is put into action, the agent faces new initial conditions and a new situation which is the effect of his/her last choice.

(2) The second requirement for a deterministic process is satisfied by the necessary application of natural laws in

which the agent believes. The agent acts toward goals constantly and does so by way of his/her experience of inductive reasoning, habit, and pragmatic inclinations toward the world. Consciously, s/he can only use behavior which is dependable in terms of natural laws s/he has learned from the past.¹⁵⁴ On a larger scale, the pragmatics involved are first elementary, becoming more complex as the individual learns and grows as a human being. Although risk and experimentation are frequent in human activity, purely voluntary actions cannot be free from the unique relationships transpiring between the agent and the phenomenological objects of his/her experiences. These experiences are not initially chosen, but develop as part of the pattern of learning and maturation of a sentient being.¹⁵⁵ R.D. Ellis's paper cited above uses a regress based on a temporal continuum of an agent's intrinsic features, all of which have causal antecedents which are extrinsic to the agent.¹⁵⁶ Part of such a continuum of experiences which pertains to perception can be accounted for by a deterministic learning process.

¹⁵⁴ Grayling 171; This is an application of the Humean principle of induction again, but the fulfillment of requirements for determinacy can again be seen involving the genetic principle and the principle of lawfulness. Here, the lawfulness is the necessity that the agent exert a given action to procure a given end in a given situation.

¹⁵⁵ Edelman 170.

¹⁵⁶ Ellis 38.

Intention is not rooted in freedom, because the very nature of any *intention* depends on the constituents of an agent's subjective awareness concerning his/her objects of consciousness and his/her own innate and inherent qualities of character and inclination which again only have meaning in terms of purpose. The content of any purpose concerns the pragmatic nature of the world in which the agent perceives her/his existence. These constituents and qualities cannot be chosen.

Suppose we presume a "devils advocate" position. If the above predispositions could be chosen by the agent, such choice would be either a specific pragmatic choice or a choice which has certain activities which were not the result of inductive reasoning. Such a choice would be a random choice.

A choice that is random in principle would consist of the agent making a choice toward a goal of some kind, but not being specific in terms of the degree of precision. A coin toss is the most obvious example. The agent can intend to *toss* the coin, but does not intend that the coin land with one particular face showing. The agent does not control which face ends up showing, but only responds to his/her intention to *toss* the coin into the air. The goal is simply to *toss* the coin.

There are no facets of this activity which are autonomously free.

If we postulate that the agent could have chosen his/her own desire to toss the coin, we must notice that such a desire presupposes a prior feature in the agent's experience which if chosen by the agent, must again lead to another deeper feature of the agent's experience, if the agent's ability to create desires is to be specific and not random.¹⁵⁷

Also, in acting randomly, one cannot control the consequences of one's acts. But such consequences become factual determinants for the development of new habits and future acts based on them.

If, on the other hand, the agent's choice were pragmatic and thus specific, it would have to have reasons which relate to the phenomenal world around the agent. This again leads to the regress of reasons for reasons. If an act were random in principle, however, such choice or will could not be goal oriented. It could not contain any unique elements of preference or discrimination. This could not be will at all.¹⁵⁸ Every decision a person makes is completely attributable to causal and or contingent causal factors, preceding the decision, over which the person has, or has had no control.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ Ellis 39.

¹⁵⁸ Murphy 72.

¹⁵⁹ Ellis 32.

Recognition of empirical details and distinctions in the environment is essential in order to make a choice as opposed to acting randomly. Empirical distinctions correspond uniquely to pragmatic distinctions. Both involve knowledge or memory of experiential regularities in nature. It is the pragmatic distinctions that the agent makes in recognizing alternatives which determine the choice to be made. Each goal oriented choice must conform to a habit or series of habitual actions which the agent believes will achieve the goal. The habits are produced by past choices the agent has made which s/he trusts, and unless s/he is willing to risk her behavior to finding a new way of achieving the goal, such a series of inductive beliefs and habits of action become the unique causes of the agent's action. The final goal itself is also a cause based on a habit formed from inductive principles.

The pragmatic distinctions eliciting actions based on the agent's past habits are both *necessary* and *sufficient* causes in that they produce unambiguous purposeful actions. Such distinctions are nothing more than the pragmatic differences which James asserts as "conceivable effects of a practical kind.....what sensations we are to expect from it.....what reactions we must prepare."¹⁶⁰

¹⁶⁰ William James, Pragmatism and The Meaning of Truth, ed. F. Burkhardt (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1978) 29.

Empiricists such as Hume believed that mental associations produce our tendency to reason inductively which leads to our belief in causation.¹⁶¹ If cognitive thinking always involves associations from one state of awareness to the next, or from one state of awareness to another in the more distant past, it would indicate that any choice or decision which has pragmatic goals could not be at all independent of the immediate world surrounding the subject. This kind of association exists as a function of memory, because if experiences cannot be associated and compared, then thought cannot form a history composed of events which connect in a meaningful continuum.

What we think about what we perceive produces what we do. Cognitive independence from the apparent state of an outside world is then impossible if will exists. Such independence would have to suggest that when purposeful action is initiated, the agent would not have been influenced by factors exterior to his/her mind, or his/her "executive" as Harcum terms it.¹⁶² It would follow that free will in the contracausal sense is impossible. From pragmatic theory, the existence of any state of affairs always implies

¹⁶¹ Diane Collinson, Fifty Major Philosophers, A Reference Guide (London: Routledge, 1987) 83-85.

¹⁶² Harcum, E. Rae, "A behavioral Paradigm for the Psychological Resolution of the Free Will Issue," Journal of Mind and Behavior Vol.12 no.1 (Winter, 1991): 95.

a response based on an association from the subject's past experience.

It must be remembered that *predictability* is not in question as evidence for the existence of determination. The inability to predict behavior does not prove the existence or non existence of free will. All that is necessary in order to demonstrate determination of will is that agents exercise intentional acts. When this occurs, determination obtains.

I am not asserting a comprehensive *physical* determinism, because there are ways of theorizing experiments where intentional consciousness is not wholly determined from past experience. Radioactive brains, atomic clocks, etc. can involve causal models which include random events in principle and thus can affect the intentional behavior of the agent in non-deterministic ways. Scientific experimentation involves testing and risk which often leads to new phenomena which were not decided upon previously or intentionally produced. These phenomena lead to belief in the process which produced the new phenomena. Such belief then has a later bearing on purposeful conduct.¹⁶³

The same holds true of gambling, the result of which is due in part to random behavior. The intention and will of an attempt to win money from a slot machine stops when the money is put into the slot and the handle is pulled. The

¹⁶³ Buchler 262.

gambler cannot "intend" the outcome of such action beyond that point. The outcome may make her/him rich and her/his actions from that time on may reflect such good fortune. However, such acts are determined beyond her/his control for two reasons: (1) The tendency to engage in an act of gambling is determined by her/his habits and beliefs from the past, and (2) the outcome of the gamble is based on low probabilities which are independent of the agent's intention.

It would be absurd to believe that our choices are in any way independent of the meanings of the objects in our world, their expected relationship to us, and to each other. The causes of human choice are the equivalent of efficient causes whether they are *interpreted* to emerge from the objects or from the subject's inner nature. Even if the subject had control over his/her nature, this control must ultimately relate to an end or goal that has meaning in the phenomenological and empirical world.¹⁶⁴

In this thesis I have tried to demonstrate by various means that a subject can do no other than to *respond* to her/his objects of consciousness during willful action. I would therefore submit finally that:

(1) The meaning of the term "free will" must then be reclassified into a realm other than that which implies individual control and autonomy.

¹⁶⁴ Harcum 95.

(2) I also further conclude that a particular act of willing is a matter of necessity. It is the result of a *determination* in which the individual plays the role of an intermediary or compliant participant. His/Her only possible response is perhaps one of latent or *compatibilist* type control which is dictated by his/her subjective relationship to the objects of the world and their relationship to each other, at each and every moment of intentional action. Ultimately this means dependence only on the "objects" of consciousness which appear to be independent of the conscious individual's mind.

Again it is to be stressed that this thesis is approached from an idealist standpoint which means that it does not need verification from materialist theories which assert the existence of "things in themselves." But the *apparent* necessity of reliance upon apparent objects of consciousness exterior to the self is still an operable framework for determined will within the empiricist theory. An agent *must* act based on his/her pragmatic *belief* about such objects. This process as described before, can be represented simply by:

$$\Delta A \supset \Delta PR$$

and

$$\Delta PR \supset \Delta A,$$

where a certain difference in a pragmatic state leads to new and different action.¹⁶⁵

To the extent that the self is considered as a unity, and its constituent activities left unanalyzed, then "autonomy" can still have meaning for the dualist and compatibilist, because the subjective inclinations of an agent may not be predictable. But if the internalized self and the functions of its *constituents* are considered as part of a pragmatic continuum, then autonomy loses meaning and so does independence.¹⁶⁶ Each agent is unique in her/his pragmatic appraisal of her/his environment. Such appraisal, although subjective is also determined from inductive reasoning, pragmatic considerations, and as Peirce concludes, habit.

This thesis thus renders a disputation of contracausal free will, and it is my opinion that such a kind of will is non-existent.

When the workings of the mind are seen to relate to goals and objects which are possible consequences of behavior and ends to be achieved, then it is seen that the mind cannot initiate, invent, or choose an arbitrary path of behavior in any case. The mind subordinates its instructions

¹⁶⁵ Some pragmatic differences (such as the time of day or the ambient room temperature) need not influence a person's choices, but when a choice is made, it is a tenet of this thesis that some other change(s) in the person's pragmatic environment must have determined the choice.

¹⁶⁶ Harcum 95.

to a familiar and reliable world for the purposes and predispositions it has inherited. That world is one of *psychological and pragmatic determinism* for the mind.

To the extent that the mind's choices were at all possibly independent of its understanding of and pragmatic relationship to a world outside of it, its choices could not refer to goals or objects in that world, and so its intention could not take the form of a will based on any meaningful end.¹⁶⁷

Examples of this kind of experience would have to be based on statements of activity for which the verbs, predicates and percepts were meaningless within the world in which the agent actually imagines her/himself to exist. This is purely impossible.

Suppose someone says, "I am going to swim through a black hole," which is a statement pertaining to a virtually impossible achievement. Such a statement still contains verbs and predicates which imply acts and objects about which the agent has learned through inductive reasoning. An effort could be mustered to complete such an act, but such an effort would still not be a result of free will. The idea of swimming through a black hole would hold pragmatic value for such an agent. Thus, the meaning of such an idea would help determine her/his intention to exercise such an act. The method for attempting such an act could then be broken

¹⁶⁷ Boyle Jr., Grisez, and Tollefsen 12.

down to include causal explanations and procedures derived from past experimentation which have led to inductive inference.

I submit that to be totally free, the inner processes of the mind would have to arise and subsist in complete isolation from external circumstances. Ideas to be acted upon could not contain any processes of reason or material contingency which normally limit human action. If such action is consummated, it would have to occur in a world of the agent's own making. This is solipsism.¹⁶⁸ Therefore, the postulate that human agency is capable of being a "prime mover," a "free agent" or an "initiator" implies the necessary ability on the part of the human agent to have created all with which s/he interacts. This would have to be accomplished prior to any conscious interaction with or cognition of such a world and with absolutely no *motive* for doing so. Having a motive presupposes a psychological relationship with the outside world, or an ideal or goal which has certain structural characteristics. Such a form of solipsism is clearly untenable and incoherent.

As mentioned before, another type of behavior of a similar sort would be games of pure chance in which the agent does not control the outcome of a random process which will affect her/his future. Dice can be thrown and lottery

¹⁶⁸ Bunge 195.

tickets bought, but the resulting truth values are not under the control of the agent beyond a given probability.¹⁶⁹

Experimentation, scientific or otherwise, involving the testing of hypotheses can produce new phenomena and new apparent natural laws based on inductive reasoning. Before the results of any experiment are established, the causal patterns are, however, based on probabilities, and thus uncontrolled by the agent. When the agent has achieved verification of a given principle then the new laws discovered become new determinants because they become incorporated into habits. Thus, experimentation is not an act based on free will.

Further, I believe that the above theory strongly indicates a determination of willful behavior beyond the control of an agent. Such determination is satisfied by the existence of initial conditions and the subject's *belief* in natural law to be used in goal achievement. Such goals emerge as the agent physically interacts with her/his environment by use of inductive reasoning and evaluation of pragmatic distinctions. Such reasoning produces necessary and sufficient conditions for any act of will.

I thus offer this thesis as a strong conjecture that will cannot be free in the autonomistic sense and that psychological determinism exists for all willful acts.

¹⁶⁹ Flew 358.

Refinement of such theory may be needed as exceptions arise through investigation.

As summed up by Marvin Minski, in a most brief explanation of the problem, human behavior is either governed by chance, or arises as a result of deterministic factors, both of which comprise the universe, as well as the individual. In neither case does such behavior involve a will which is autonomously "free."¹⁷⁰

¹⁷⁰ Marvin Minski, The Society of Mind (New York: touchstone Press, 1988) 306.

GLOSSARY

AUTONOMY- Action arising from the will and purported to be free of influences from anything other than the agent willing; Liberty; independence from the will of others; The quality or state of being self governing, self regulating and self determining;¹⁷¹ independence from the will of others; the right to follow one's own volitions. An "autonomous" self is one that functions in an integrated way(as opposed to responding randomly and inconsistently to stimuli as they arrive); choosing and directing activities relevant to its own needs. An autonomous act is one which is undertaken, carried out without outside control.¹⁷²

CAUSE- event generation; mode of energy transfer; an event or set of events or conditions which always are found to accompany or precede another event or set of events or conditions. If B always is found to occur subsequent to A, and if the absence of B is preceded by the absence of A, then it can be said that A is a "necessary" cause of B.¹⁷³ In this way A is said to "determine" that B obtain. In the concept of "constant conjunction," this is the principle

¹⁷¹ Angeles 22.

¹⁷² G. and C. Merriam and Co. 77.

¹⁷³ Bunge 47. This definition of "necessity" is based on a process involving sequences of events that are constant and unique. There are arguably, wider definitions of "necessity," however.

which is presupposed by human consciousness to explain events and in making decisions for deliberate behavior.¹⁷⁴ It is also similar to the principle of logical implication and its contraposition, or subjunctive conditional.

If some other events or conditions such as E, G or F, are found to follow subsequent to A, in an unpredictable manner, then A is said to (possibly) be a "contingent" or "free" cause of E, G, or F. The converse of this statement is also an example of "contingent" causation. That is, either E, F, or G could have caused A.¹⁷⁵

CHOICE- the resulting conscious action of exercising the following: will; option; alternative; selection; discretion; decision; volition. A free choice is defined by one authority in the following way: Someone makes a free choice if and only if s/he makes a choice (C) in the actual world, and there is a possible world such that s/he does not make (C) in this possible world and everything in this possible world except her/his making C is the same as in the actual world.¹⁷⁶

CYBERNETICS- The field of communication and control theory, whether in the machine or in the animal (taken from

¹⁷⁴ David Hume, "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section VIII (Of Liberty and Necessity)," The Empiricists, ed. Richard Taylor (New York: Doubleday, 1961) 375.

¹⁷⁵ The Institute 433.

¹⁷⁶ Boyle, Grisez, Tollefsen 11.

the Greek word for "steersman") and originally coined by Norbert Wiener and Arturo Rosenblueth.¹⁷⁷

DETERMINATION, DETERMINACY (DETERMINISM)- This principle is subsumed within the *principle of sufficient reason*.¹⁷⁸ The two components of the *determinacy* principle (proponents of which are called *determinists*) under which the general law of causation is subsumed, are the *genetic principle* (nothing comes out of nothing), and the *principle of lawfulness* (nothing unconditional, lawless, arbitrary occurs). Events are produced and conditioned in definite and unique ways, though not necessarily in a causal manner. For a given output O, there are earlier events sufficient for the production of O. Things, their properties and the changes of properties, exhibit intrinsic patterns (objective laws) that are *invariant* in some respects.¹⁷⁹ An example of determination which is not causal would be *statistical determinism*.

Determinacy is defined also as a process whereby events occur as the result of 2 requirements: (1) initial conditions and (2) natural laws. (This follows from the analogy to LaPlace's principle that every state of the Universe can be

¹⁷⁷ Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 1961) 11.

¹⁷⁸ Bunge 256.

¹⁷⁹ Bunge 351; Gerald Dworkin, Determinism, Free Will and Moral Responsibility (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1970) 3.

identified with the state immediately preceding it).¹⁸⁰ The simplest definition of determinacy is that "every event happens with absolute inevitability," but such a definition is too broad for this thesis because we are concerned with only the rational behavior of human beings.

This thesis treats determination of behavior as an efficient cause because the theory implies that a specific event(s) must lead to another specific event manifested as a physical effort toward action.¹⁸¹

It is important to note that conditions other than perception are present during any thought process which leads to a choice for action. The agent's physical characteristics, internal constituents including energy, sensing capabilities etc. are necessary conditions for successful action. But my thesis involves the causes of specific choices only and which may or may not lead to successful action of the kind willed by the agent. In such a case, the *belief* the agent has about strength, coordination and other necessary conditions for her/his successful action

¹⁸⁰ Bunge 34; Angeles 60.

¹⁸¹ Bunge 4; A strict definition of causality is Bunge's, which is that *the same cause always produces the same effect*. Such a definition has a logical correlate which insists that a given cause is a necessary and a sufficient condition for the occurrence of a given effect (See Hurley). I am proposing that such causality is equivalent to *causal determination* to the extent that only intentions are taken as the effects, but not the entire set of all occurrences what so ever.

are all subsumed within the agent's thought which leads to the agent's conclusion that a certain act *must* be produced at a given time. The causal process is from perception to specific will. As such, the causal process in question does not include the actual physical abilities of the agent as necessary conditions since they may not conform exactly to the agent's thought, and because my subject of inquiry deals with the causes of will and not necessarily of action. Even if necessary physical properties and capabilities of the agent are taken into account, they too would be "features already operable" in the agent which s/he could not control.¹⁸²

In such case as the *will* is determined by pragmatic principles involving perception, the cause and effect relationship has the logical correlate of a necessary and sufficient condition.¹⁸³ The symbology would be the following:

$$\Delta A \supset \Delta PR$$

and

$$\Delta PR \supset \Delta A.$$

¹⁸² Ellis 34.

¹⁸³ Patrick J. Hurley, A Concise Introduction to Logic, 4th ed. (Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1991) 470.

FREEDOM- A necessary condition for autonomy; absence of external constraint; sometimes divided into "freedom to" and "freedom from;" could possibly exist even during such time as a subject experiences no desire for it, or when a subject does desire it and makes an effort to achieve it but fails because of constraint; freedom in this thesis is not synonymous with free will, but is only considered as a field of possible states or directions that the will may take.

FREE WILL- The experience of acting independently or without the influence of any source other than innate and intrinsic initiative. The exercise of the ability to act in any capacity one wishes regardless of success or failure; "Contracausal free will" as defined here, is choice consisting of creative novelty such that no conjunction of relevant causal laws and any set of true propositions describing states of affairs obtaining prior to the choice entails the proposition that this choice is made.¹⁸⁴

INDUCTION- In one particular form, it is represented by the "post hoc fallacy," or the assumption that because one event precedes another, it therefore was the cause of the other;¹⁸⁵ In its most general form, any rational process where from premises about some things of a certain kind a conclusion is drawn about some or all of the remaining things of that kind; The pragmatic or practical approach has

¹⁸⁴ Boyle Jr., Grisez, and Tollefsen 12.

¹⁸⁵ Flew 284.

it that induction cannot indeed be validated, in the sense to be shown to be likely to work, but it can be rationally justified as a practical policy, because every alternative is less rational.¹⁸⁶ In this thesis, the emphasis is on the necessary reliance of human will upon the inductionist or post hoc fallacy during teleological behavior. That is, an agent has experienced a specific effect by acting in a particular way, and thus continues to rely upon this act or behavior to produce the same result in the future.

OBJECT OF CONSCIOUSNESS- This thesis holds that objects of consciousness are the phenomena of an agent's conscious experience. They consist of universals as well as particulars, sensations, a priori and empirical judgments. Simple objects build into complex ones. Ultimately objects have their totality in the agent's entire environment, or the "limits" of his/her world at any time. They contain past events and future goals, both singular and multiple. In this way, the entire Universe is itself the collective of all objects of the agent's consciousness and is itself an object of the agent's consciousness.

OSTENSIBLE CAUSATION- This is my term for a subject's causal world view which results from inductive reasoning and associative memory. Such a world view creates a necessity for human beings to rely on the inductionist fallacy or "constant conjunction" of events in the past, in order to

¹⁸⁶ Lacey, A Dictionary of Philosophy 106-108.

make conscious choices about the future. A general law or principle is inferred from past observed instances, and depended upon for resolving decision making processes. Thus, in this thesis, conscious teleological causation is, as Bunge alternatively describes it, an epistemological category of relation, as opposed to an ontological category. That is because the concept of causation belongs to our description of experience rather than being a system of ontological interdependence.¹⁸⁷ That is why I call it ostensible causation.

PRAGMATISM- As coined by Charles Sanders Peirce, a doctrine about meaning; The core of Pragmatism is that the meaning of a doctrine is the same as the practical effects of adopting it. Meanings involve pragmatic characteristics such as how an object(s) can be used. Such meanings are based upon inductive reasoning from an agent's past experiences which have led her/him to successful achievement of goals. "Pragmaticism" as Peirce called it, equated the meanings of objects of consciousness to their functional qualities and to the habits of action that they invoke within humans. Another implication of Pragmatism is that natural selection must have adapted us to be cognitive creatures because beliefs have effects: they work.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁷ Bunge 4-6.

¹⁸⁸ Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994) 297.

Peirce's concept was slightly modified by James, Schiller, and Dewey. It developed to become a doctrine of truth based on James's passage: "Ideas become true just so far as they help us get into satisfactory relations with other parts of our experience."¹⁸⁹ This thesis extends pragmatic theory to include a theory of volition.

PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON- A principle which states that for every fact there is a reason why it is so and not otherwise.¹⁹⁰

RANDOM- Without definite aim, direction, rule or method; lacking a definite plan, purpose or pattern; being or relating to a set or an element of a set of events, all of which have equal probabilities of occurrence.¹⁹¹ Specifically in this thesis, random events in principle are events not following as necessary effects or effects determined uniquely by another given event or set of events.

REASON- To calculate; to think; to formulate; a motive; a statement offered in explanation or justification; a sufficient ground of logical defense;¹⁹² in the case of this thesis, multiple variables acting as motives concurrently, which produce willful behavior; predisposition; behavior

¹⁸⁹ Flew 284.

¹⁹⁰ Flew 344.

¹⁹¹ G. & C. Merriam Co. 955.

¹⁹² G. & C. Merriam Co. 962.

based on the presupposition that certain causal laws can be used in the benefit of the user to achieve some goal.

Multiple mental reasons acting concurrently can produce a single effect in an individual, but such reasons can be mental *conditions* instead of events, i.e. the statement, "I will walk to the market since I don't like to drive," indicates the mental predisposition of wanting to walk instead of drive, and this, along with hunger, determines the behavior; the power of comprehending, thinking or inferring in orderly rational ways.

SELF- Here there is no complete definition, but I have compiled a series of concepts which have been agreed upon by many philosophers. Starting with (1) Descartes who explained the self as "thinking substance," or a "soul," (2) "ego" as in Hume's denial that we are ever intimately conscious of what we call our "self,"¹⁹³ (3) that consciousness that endures throughout change and is aware of its unity, its endurance and the change, (4) the entire sequence of mental events of which one can be aware at any given moment,¹⁹⁴ (5) Dennett defines "self" as a "locus of self control," meaning the sum total of the parts an individual can control directly.¹⁹⁵ This causes difficulty when we speak of a self

193 Flew 322.

194 Angeles 251.

195 Dennett, Elbow Room 81.

"having a body," or "having a mind." (6) Sartre defines "Reflective Consciousness" as the "attempt on the part of the consciousness to become its own object."¹⁹⁶ I am conscious of myself counting, for instance. Here the "self" we are after is the self which is conscious of the counting self.¹⁹⁷ For Bradley, the distinction between self and non-self occurs within a "center" of experience which, although remaining as a continuum of past experiences, has subordinate or momentary centers of experience which relate to the agent's objects of consciousness.¹⁹⁸

TELEOLOGY- The theory or study of purposiveness in nature.¹⁹⁹

VOLITION- An act of will preceding a physical movement. Presumed to be part of a causal nexus in this thesis, volitions cannot originate in the agent as a "first cause," because, they (volitions) are always dependent on the relationship between the agent's predisposition and his/her environment. Volitions generally are not synonymous with desires, wants or wishes, because these experiences do not

¹⁹⁶ Jean Paul Sartre, To Freedom Condemned, trans. Justus Streller, ed. Wade Baskin (New York: Philosophical Library, 1960) 126.

¹⁹⁷ Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966) 14.

¹⁹⁸ Anthony Manser and Guy Stock, The Philosophy of F.H. Bradley (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) 289.

necessarily precede action, although they can lead to a volition. Donald Davidson makes distinctions between wants, desires, intentions and will in his book, Actions and Events.²⁰⁰

WILL- The experience of intention preceding an act; The power to control and determine our actions in the context of our desires and intentions;²⁰¹ Choice; Volition; Preference; deliberation; actions of choosing; desiring; disposition to act according to principles or ends; insistence; persistence;²⁰² The experience of teleological behavior in humans.²⁰³ Francis Crick in collaboration with Dr. Patricia Churchland and Dr. Antonio Damasio has tentatively established a location for free will within a region of the brain known as the Anterior Cingulate Sulcus which is adjacent to Brodman's Area 24. His reasoning involves (1) the fact that the Anterior Cingulate is the intermediary between the higher sensory cortex and the motor cortex parts of the brain and, (2) tests involving patients who have had

199 Flew 350.

200 Donald Davidson, Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) 83-102.

201 Angeles 318; My thesis denies the existence of "power to control and determine" as it is used by Angeles to imply "autonomy" of the agent. I submit that will does however, "transmit" a causal power correspondent to a given goal.

202 G. & C. Merriam and Co. 1341.

203 Thesis definition.

brain damage in that area and who then cannot respond willfully to questions, but remain consciously aware.²⁰⁴

²⁰⁴ Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994) 267.

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