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A comparative analysis of San Quentin's boot camp program with New York's and Georgia's

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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SAN QUENTIN'S BOOT CAMP PROGRAM
WITH NEW YORK'S AND GEORGIA'S

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of
Criminal Justice Administration

San Jose University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science

by

Leo T. Ako Mbo

May 1998

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
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SAN QUENTIN'S BOOT CAMP PROGRAM WITH NEW YORK'S AND GEORGIA'S

by Leo T. Ako Mbo

This thesis compares three boot camp programs nationwide. San Quentin's Alternative Sentencing Program (ASP), New York's Shock Incarceration, and Georgia's Comprehensive Correctional Program, and examines whether there are differences amongst the three programs that account for the failure of San Quentin's ASP program. The findings indicate that there are four main differences amongst the programs (program capacity and eligibility criteria, program length, location, and rehabilitative focus) that may account for the failure of ASP. The thesis recommends the following policy changes that may improve ASP's program effectiveness: 1) increase program capacity, and increase eligibility criteria to keep program beds full; 2) increase program length to allow more time for recovery; 3) move the program from the prison site; and 4) increase drug treatment and rehabilitation activities.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Scope and Purpose

“Every time 17-year-old Roy smiles, he flashes his gold tooth embossed with a Jack of Spades - a menacing symbol of the drug-dealing life he once enjoyed. It supported him from age 14 until he was arrested three years later for attempted robbery. But Roy sounds like a religious convert when he describes his just-completed four-month stint at the Manatee County boot camp in Palmetto, Florida. “*It’s changed me completely around*” he says, citing the nonsense discipline as well as the talk-therapy sessions. Roy found the atmosphere a stark contrast from the state-run juvenile rehabilitation program he had previously attended, which *offered “no self-discipline, no respect, no manners.”* At boot camp, no profanity is allowed, and rule-breakers must do extra pushups or write essays on what they did wrong” (Glazer, 1994, p. 169).

The purpose of this thesis is to do a comparison of San Quentin’s boot camp program with two of the most successful State boot camp programs nationwide, New York’s and Georgia’s, in order to assess the differences. Also, an analysis of how any differences impact the effectiveness of San Quentin’s boot camp program will be explored, and policy implications and recommendations will be briefly discussed. To accomplish this, the following information will be presented: 1) a historical literature review of boot camps in general, including the rationale for boot camps, the basic goals, the typical characteristics and

selection criteria; 2) a detailed review of two successful State boot camp programs in New York(Shock Incarceration) and Georgia (Comprehensive Correctional Inmate Boot Camp Program), and a literature review of San Quentin's Alternative Sentencing Program (ASP), including program characteristics specific goals, selection criteria, and program effectiveness; 3) a comparative analysis of San Quentin's boot camp program with New York and Georgia's to assess the differences in program characteristics and effectiveness; and finally, 4) an analysis of if and how any differences between these three programs impact the efficacy of San Quentin's ASP and the policy implications and recommendations.

Why Boot Camps?

The criminal justice system has recently been characterized as a system in a state of emergency. In a little over ten years, the prison population has grown a staggering 150%. The Federal prison system has doubled its capacity in ten years (Cronin & Han, 1994). Currently, most State prisons are under court order to reduce the prison population, and the county jails are also over-flooded with prison bound inmates. Although the juvenile system is not in a similar crisis state as the adult system, it is showing the same pattern. From 1978 - 1989, juvenile arrest rates increased by approximately 35% even though the youth population in the U.S. declined by 11%. In the period between 1987 and 1991,

the number of juveniles under age 18 arrested for violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) increased by 50% (Cronin & Han, 1994). As juvenile crime rates have been on the rise and prisons are bursting at the seams, there has been an intensive search for alternative methods to deal with juvenile delinquents. In more recent years, we have seen a vigorous interest in "intermediate sanction" programs such as prison boot camps, also known as shock incarceration, as a viable correctional strategy in dealing with juvenile delinquency (Blau, Super & Wells, 1995). Since the inception of the first boot camp program in Georgia in 1983, boot camp programs have received popular support from the general public, public agencies and politicians as a viable and cost-effective alternative to traditional incarceration of juveniles (Bourque, Cronin, Pearson, Felker, Han & Hill, 1996). These programs respond to (at least in perception) all the concerns of the public and politicians. For example, boot camps promise to:

1. rehabilitate offenders by teaching self discipline, good work habits, and improving their health and fitness
2. deter future crime by teaching offenders in the program and future offenders that crime does not pay
3. punish the offender by placing him or her in a harsh environment, stripped of many privileges

4. protect the public by keeping the offender in a constrained environment under tight supervision while in the program and in some cases when they return home
5. save money by reducing the incarceration period, and by possibly terminating or reducing the potential for future criminal activities
6. reduce prison crowding by diverting offenders from prisons or releasing them earlier, which in the long run will reduce prison overcrowding if it also reduces recidivism (Cronin & Han, 1994).

The support of these programs by politicians and the public is evident in the remarkable growth of boot camps around the country. In 1984, just two states had boot camp programs, and 10 years later in 1994, a study showed that 36 states are operating boot camp programs with more states planning to start similar programs. The Federal Bureau of Prisons is also operating boot camp or shock incarceration programs, and county and local jails have begun questioning whether such programs might be effective there too (MacKenzie & Souryal, 1991). Not only did the number of states operating these programs increase, the capacity of existing programs increased as well. For example, Georgia's capacity expanded from 250 beds to 3,000 beds from 1984 - 1992 (MacKenzie & Souryal, 1994).

Characteristics of Boot Camp Programs

There are three basic types of boot camp programs today: 1) state or county boot camps for adults and juveniles; 2) federal boot camps; and 3) jail boot camp programs (United States General Accounting Office, 1993). Although most of these programs have the same basic goals, there are some differences between them. For example, the State adult and juvenile boot camps are more likely to serve male offenders who are not yet hardened criminals. They also tend to be longer than local programs. State Juvenile programs, unlike State adult programs, typically exclude some types of offenders such as sex offenders, armed robbers, and youths with a violent criminal record. Local programs tend to be smaller than State programs, are relatively new, and almost always operate under capacity. They are also more likely to serve female offenders. The Federal program's population tends to be older and have more previous incarcerations than that of State or local boot camps. A large number of participants in Federal programs are drug offenders and are rated as minimum security prisoners. Most Federal boot camp graduates are released into halfway houses where they are expected to work and their time is typically restricted. However, State boot camps for adults and juveniles tend to release their graduates directly into the community with some form of supervision. The typical stay in most State adult and juvenile boot camps is 90 to 120 days, and for Federal, the duration is about 180 days (Cronin & Han, 1994). For local boot

camp programs, the average length of stay is 15 -16 days, all of which are shorter than the typical duration of incarceration in a State prison, 16 - 18 months (Austin, Jones & Bolyard, 1993). Also, most boot camp programs have a minimum and maximum age limit. The minimum age limit is typically between 16 and 18, while the maximum age range is between 23 and 25. There are a few programs that allow participants over 30, and a few that do not have a maximum age limit. About 50% of the States allow female offenders to participate in their boot camp programs, although the number of beds available to women is often limited (MacKenzie & Souryal, 1994). This thesis will focus primarily on State boot camp programs for juveniles and adult males in the East Coast(New York), South(Georgia), and West Coast(Northern California).

In general, boot camp programs have a military-style structure, drilling (e.g. calisthenics, running, marching in platoon or squad formation, etc.), and a rigorous physical training routine (Clark, Aziz & MacKenzie, 1994). They also enforce obedience to orders and rules, and discipline. Participants in the program begin their day before dawn and are involved in structured and routine activities for approximately sixteen hours till dusk. The military-style structure is often supplemented with rehabilitative programs such as drug counseling, academic or vocational programs, community service, and aftercare programs such as intensive parole. The underlying philosophy for boot camps is that through the rigorous environment and the availability of counseling and

educational programs. individuals can change their behaviors and develop necessary life skills that would make these young offenders more productive citizens of society (MacKenzie & Souryal, 1994).

Main Goals of Boot Camp Programs

Boot camps in general are designed to serve two basic goals. First, at the system level, the goal is for boot camps to provide an alternative to incarceration that would reduce prison overcrowding and therefore related costs. Secondly, at the individual level, the goal is to reduce recidivism either through deterrence or rehabilitation. Other goals often cited by various state programs are increasing public safety, providing incarceration alternatives that are palatable to the public, and improving the prison overcrowding problem. While boot camps share the same basic goals outlined above, their specific goals vary from program to program. For example, Georgia's boot camp programs' main objective is to "assist the offender in building respect for authority, a sense of self worth and respect, and to provide necessary tools to live a life crime- and drug-free once released" (Keenan & Hadley, 1995, p. 2). Whereas New York's goals are to "treat and release specifically selected state prisoners earlier than their court mandated minimum period of incarceration without compromising the community protection rights of the citizenry, and to reduce the demand for bedspace" (Clark, Aziz & MacKenzie, 1994, p. 2).

Selection Criteria Considerations for Boot Camp Programs

Selection criteria for participants in boot camp programs must be aligned with the objectives of the program. For example, a boot camp program whose intended goal is to reduce prison overcrowding should be open to a wide range of inmates or it will not materially impact the prison population. On the other hand, boot camp programs that aim to punish offenders must screen out offenders whose crimes are so heinous that the program would be too lenient or offenders for whom the program would be too harsh, e.g. older offenders. If the program's goal is public protection, then dangerous offenders have to be weeded out through the selection criteria. In most cases, selection criteria are defined by the authorizing legislation for boot camps, and others are added by the boot camp program managers. If eligibility criteria is too strict, programs may experience low capacity even though prisons or jails are bursting at the seams. To alleviate this problem, many boot camp programs should seek to expand their eligibility criteria (Cronin & Han, 1994).

CHAPTER II: METHODOLOGY

The methodology used in this thesis is a literature review and analysis of three similar boot camp programs in order to present a detailed description of the programs. Boot Camp Program Evaluation Studies that have been conducted by various evaluation teams were reviewed and analyzed in order to assess whether these three similar programs are equally successful in achieving their goals. In this section of the thesis, the survey methods that the evaluation teams of the various studies used are briefly reviewed.

The literature collected for this thesis was gathered between November 1997 and April 1998 and it included information from 1993 to 1997. The information was gathered through the following methods: 1) library research; 2) telephone calls to the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs to gather information on boot camps; 3) telephone calls to various State boot camp programs across the country to gather program literature; 4) telephone calls to Santa Clara County Jail to inquire about its Women's boot camp program PRIDE, and a visit to Alameda County Department of Juvenile Probation's Camp READY and Camp SWEENEY; 5) a visit to San Quentin to gather Alternative Sentencing Program literature and facilitate discussions with former ASP boot camp director (Lt. McCaulif). The States that were contacted (New York, Georgia, Alabama, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Louisiana, Illinois, Arizona, Colorado and Florida) had some of the most successful and longest

running boot camp programs in the country. Also, literature from several California programs (many of which have been discontinued) was examined to select San Quentin's ASP program as the focus of this thesis.

The literature review included an analysis of about 15 - 20 Evaluation Reports and National Institute of Justice Research in Brief Reports of various boot camp programs. About ten Criminal Justice journals (The Police Chief, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Social Justice, Federal Probation, Corrections Today, Crime and Delinquency, Journal of Crime and Justice, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, CQ Researcher, Justice Quarterly) were also reviewed. A literature analysis of a couple of contemporary (late 1990's) criminal justice books also yielded information included in this thesis.

Articles from various Criminal Justice journals were reviewed in order to develop the introduction to this thesis, which includes the scope and purpose of boot camp programs, the general characteristics and typical goals of the programs, and some general selection criteria and considerations for boot camp programs.

To present a description (history, goals, program characteristics) of the three boot camp programs, the literature that was received from the various boot camp programs was reviewed and discussed. For New York's Shock Incarceration program, the program description was gathered primarily from a 1997 Legislative Summary Report produced by the program director and an

independent book literature review. Georgia's program description was collected from a 1995 Georgia Department of Corrections Program Evaluation Report and a literature analysis of a book chapter. An overview of California's program was gathered from a 1996 Evaluation Report published by the Chief of the California Department of Corrections' Research Branch and a brief book literature review.

To assess effectiveness of the various boot camp programs (impact on changing inmate attitudes, recidivism, prison overcrowding, costs of incarceration), several evaluation studies conducted by other researchers were reviewed and the results analyzed and summarized in this thesis. Below is a brief description of the studies conducted by various researchers to assess the effectiveness of the three boot camp programs that are the focus of this thesis.

1994 Multisite Study by Doris Layton MacKenzie and Claire Souryal

In order to discuss the impact of New York and Georgia's boot camp programs, a multi-site study of eight boot camp programs (New York, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina, Texas, Oklahoma, and Illinois), started in 1990 and published in 1994 by Layton, MacKenzie, and Souryal of the University of Maryland was reviewed. The study compared a sample of "regular" prison inmates to a sample of boot camp programs in the eight states. In Georgia, a sample of "regular" prison inmates was compared to a sample of shock

incarceration inmates, while New York selected two samples: 1). offenders who refused to enter their boot camp program; and 2). offenders who were eligible but were not acceptable based on the program's selection criteria. Information was gathered from sample groups' institutional records and questionnaires administered to both groups at the beginning and at the end of the programs (MacKenzie & Souryal, 1994). Table 1 shows a summary of the results of this study for Georgia and New York across three program effectiveness variables (change in inmate attitude, reduction in recidivism, reduction in prison overcrowding).

Table 1
Summary of 1994 Evaluation of New York and Georgia's Boot Camp Programs

Program Effectiveness Criteria	New York	Georgia
Change in Inmate Attitude	<p><u>Positive Attitudes</u> Boot camp entrants became more positive than prison inmates about the boot camp experience over the course of the program as measured by a program attitudes scale.</p> <p><u>Antisocial Attitudes</u> When antisocial attitudes were measured, there were no differences between boot camp inmates and prison inmates. Both samples became less antisocial during their</p>	<p><u>Positive Attitudes</u> Boot camp entrants became more positive than prison inmates about the boot camp experience over the course of the program as measured by a program attitudes scale.</p> <p><u>Antisocial Attitudes</u> When antisocial attitudes were measured, there were no differences between boot camp inmates and prison inmates. Both samples became less antisocial during their time in</p>

	time in prison.		prison.	
Reduction in Recidivism (at 12 months)	<u>Shock Graduates</u>	<u>Prison Releases</u>	<u>Shock Grads.</u>	<u>Prison Releases</u>
New Crime	6.6%	10.3%	16.6%	16.3%
Technical Violation	3.3%	8.2%	5.0%	1.1%
Reduction in Prison Overcrowding	It was most likely that 75 -100% of the boot camp entrants in New York's program would have otherwise served time in prison. Due to the size of New York's program, if 100% of participants were prison-bound, between 1,037 and 1,668 beds could have been saved per year.		It is most likely that a smaller percentage of participants in Georgia's program would have been imprisoned (definitely less than 50%). If less than 50% of offenders would have been imprisoned, this boot camp program would have increased the demand for bedspace.	

(MacKenzie & Souryal, 1994)

To assess attitude change, the Jessness Antisocial Attitudes scale was used in addition to an attitude scale developed by the evaluators which consisted of 12 questions to measure the degree to which participants expected the program to motivate them to change.

To assess the impact on recidivism, the evaluators compared the performance of samples of boot camp program graduates to samples of prison parolees, probationers, and boot camp dropouts. Comparison samples were selected to be as similar as possible to boot camp program samples in terms of demographics, criminal history and types of crimes committed. Samples were followed for a period of two years. The evaluators used either the Offender

Adjustment to Community Supervision instrument (which provides information on offenders' contacts with the criminal justice system) or the State Department of Corrections database to collect recidivism data. Community supervision performance was analyzed using survival time models, which are unique in that they analyze the length of time until an event occurs (e.g., recidivism), rather than simply whether or not that event occurred.

To assess the impact of these programs on prison bedspace savings (prison overcrowding, costs), the evaluators used a model that estimated the number of beds saved based on program capacity, duration of imprisonment, recidivism rates, and dismissal rates. The models were run using different estimates of percentage of offenders who would otherwise be in prison if the programs did not exist (1, 25, 50, 75, 100%). The model estimated the total person-months of imprisonment saved by determining the difference between the average prison term and the average boot camp duration. That difference was multiplied by the program capacity. The initial months saved were then discounted by the probability that the persons would not have been incarcerated. Variations in the model were run to explore how changes in program characteristics would influence prison bedspace needs. Overall, the model predicts that greater bedspace savings would be realized if 75 - 100% of program participants would have been otherwise incarcerated. The model also

predicts that a boot camp program would increase a demand for bedspace if less than 50% of participants are prison-bound (MacKenzie & Souryal, 1994).

Alternative Sentencing Program Evaluation Study (July 1994 - December 1995)

In order to assess the impact of San Quentin's boot camp program on inmates' attitudes, recidivism, prison overcrowding and costs of incarceration, this study conducted by the Research Branch of the California Department of Corrections from July 1994 to December 1995 was reviewed. The study included four platoons of boot camp participants, program staff, and administrative staff of San Quentin State prison. Table 2 shows a summary of the results of this study across these four program effectiveness variables.

Table 2
Summary of 1996 Evaluation of San Quentin's ASP and Comparison
Samples

Program Effectiveness Criteria	San Quentin ASP Sample					Comparison Sample
Change in Inmate Attitude	<u>Boot Camp</u>	<u>Work Training</u>	<u>Parole</u>			It wasn't economically possible to administer the test to a comparable sample of offenders who were not in ASP, as these offenders are more likely to be sent to conservation camps and community correctional centers that are spread all over the State, often in remote areas.
Self Esteem	<u>B*</u>	<u>A**</u>	<u>B*</u>	<u>A**</u>	<u>B*</u>	
Mean	<u>A**</u>					
Std. Dev.	72	79	79	82	82 82	
Unobtrusiveness	17.3	15.6	15.7	15	16 14.6	
Mean	43	43	43	43	43 43	
Std. Dev.	4.9	5.2	4.9	5.7	5.7 6.8	
Responsibility	45	45	45	44	44 44	
Mean	4.7	4.7	4.7	6.4	6.4 7.0	
Std. Dev.	38	40	40	39	39 39	
Confidence	5.6	5.6	5.9	5.9	5.9 6.5	
Mean	61	62	62	60	60 62	
Std. Dev.	9.6	9.5	9.5	9.1	9.1 9.0	
Social Desirability						
Mean						
Std. Dev.						
	*Before **After					
Reduction in Recidivism						
Time to First Arrest or Hold	<u>No.</u>		<u>Percent</u>		<u>No.</u>	<u>Percent</u>
4 - 6 months	43		30.7%		46	33.3%
10 - 12 months	24		17.1%		10	
Return to Prison following	<u>No.</u>		<u>Percent</u>		7.2%	
Release to Parole	106		33.7%		<u>No.</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Yes	209		66.3%		101	31.9%
No					216	68.1%
Types of Offenses for First	<u>No.</u>		<u>Percent</u>		<u>No.</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Arrests	20		14.3%		24	17.4%
Persons	0		0%		6	4.3%
Firearms	47		33.5%		32	23.2%
Property	31		22.1%		40	29.0%
Drugs	11		7.9%		7	5.1%
Reduction in Prison Beds						
Boot Camp Days			31,714			
Work Training Days			15,213			
Standard Prison Days			28,776			99,086
Total Prison Days			75,703			99,086
Prison Beds (total/365)			207			271
Reduction in Prison Costs						
Total Cost			\$3,716,567			\$3,719,090

(Berecochea, 1996)

To assess attitude change, two psychological tests were administered to four platoons of ASP starting in January 1995. The "before" tests were administered within a week after offenders started the program and the "after" tests just before graduation. The Coopersmith "Self-esteem" test that measures the degree to which a person believes him/herself capable, significant, and worthy, and the Jessness measure of "Unobtrusiveness," "Responsibility," and "Confidence" test were used to assess attitude change. It was economically impossible to administer the tests to a comparable sample of offenders who did not participate in ASP since these offenders are most likely to be sent to conservation camps and community correctional camps in remote areas.

To assess the impact on recidivism, two measures of recidivism were used: 1) returns to prison from parole; and 2) arrests while on parole. To measure recidivism, a sample of ASP participants and a comparison group who were paroled from May 1993 to April 1994 was selected. The two groups were very similar on selected criminal history variables.

To assess the impact of ASP on prison bedspace savings, the evaluation team used the total time an offender eventually serves in custody. They defined this total time as a combination of time served in prison until first release and time on first parole, and time back in prison and back on parole for those who do not succeed on parole. These times were summed for ASP and comparison groups to estimate bed savings.

do not succeed on parole. These times were summed for ASP and comparison groups to estimate bed savings.

And finally, to assess the cost savings of ASP, the number of days spent in each phase of ASP were multiplied by the cost per day, and then summed to derive the total costs over the period of the study and parole. The evaluation team used “overcrowding” costs, which is the cost of adding just a few inmates or parolees, and not “per capita” costs, which is simply a division of the annual budget by average daily population. The reason why “overcrowding” costs was more appropriate is that ASP is relatively small, compared to the total prison population. Hence adding 150 or so boot camp participants to regular prison populations would add little to the costs of running the prison.

The information received from the various boot camp programs across the country, the information from the National Institute of Justice, and the Evaluation Studies and Reports conducted by several evaluation teams cited above all provided information that was invaluable to this thesis.

CHAPTER III: LITERATURE ANALYSIS OF TWO SUCCESSFUL BOOT CAMP PROGRAMS (NEW YORK AND GEORGIA), AND CALIFORNIA'S SAN QUENTIN BOOT CAMP PROGRAM

Introduction

The three programs chosen for this thesis (New York's Shock Incarceration program, Georgia's Comprehensive Correctional Boot Camp program, and California's San Quentin's Alternative Sentencing Program) were selected because they share the common core characteristics of boot camp programs: military style structure, physical training, strict discipline, and hard labor. They also represent a cross-country view of boot camp programs ranging from the East Coast, the South, and the West Coast. These three programs also share strict selection criteria that place restrictions on the types of offenders considered suitable for the program. All of these programs target young offenders convicted of non violent crimes and offenders with no serious criminal background. This chapter outlines the specific characteristics and reviews the effectiveness of each program in changing offenders attitudes, reducing recidivism, decreasing prison overcrowding, and reducing costs.

New York's Shock Incarceration Program

New York has the largest boot camp program for State prisoners in the country with 1,390 male inmates, 180 females, and 222 beds for orientation and screening (Bourque, Han & Hill, 1996). The program is called Shock and is a two phase program focusing on both treatment and intensive parole supervision. Phase 1, is an intensive incarceration program built around the therapeutic program called "Network" which seeks to foster a positive environment to support successful reintegration of inmates into the community. Phase 2, is an intensive parole supervision program, where inmates receive drug treatment, counseling, job training and placement, and other needs. New York's program, established in 1987, has as its main goals, education, drug treatment, and counseling(providing a therapeutic community), and to reduce the demand for prison bedspace. The program provides a minimum of 675 hours of drug treatment to each participant during the course of six months (New York State DOCS Shock Incarceration 1997 Legislative Report). The average duration of the program is 180 days, and the average age of eligibility is between 16 and 35. Inmates in the program spend about 12 hours each week in academic activities, and in 1996 it is estimated that inmates performed about 1.2 million hours of community service. Participation in the program is completely voluntary and participants can drop out at any time. The dropout rate was reported at 35% in 1997. Upon graduation from the program, participants are released into the

community under intensive supervision conducted by the Division of Parole. For inmates who return to New York City after graduation, an aftercare program called "Aftershock" helps them with employment, drug treatment, and counseling. To be eligible for selection into the boot camp program, participants must be under the age of 35, with no previous violent criminal or sex offense record. Both male and female offenders are eligible. Participants are also examined for mental and physical problems that might affect their participation in the program (Clark, Aziz & MacKenzie, 1994).

Program Effectiveness - Change in Inmate Attitudes?

A 1994 Evaluation of Shock Incarceration Programs, which examined inmates attitudes in the beginning of their participation in a boot camp program and again near the end of the program, found that offenders in boot camp programs leave the prison with a less antisocial attitude than before entry into the program. In addition, offenders are more positive about their prison experiences and their future. The evaluation also compared the attitude changes of boot camp participants to offenders serving time in traditional prisons and found that although the attitudes of offenders in prison was also less antisocial, unlike the boot camp offenders, their attitudes toward their prison experiences and their future did not change in a positive direction. Interviews with boot camp inmates reveal that most inmates believe that the experience had been positive and changed them for the better (MacKenzie & Souryal, 1994). Another

reason why recidivism rates may be lower for program participants is because people who want to change are more likely to complete the program.

Program Effectiveness - Reduced Recidivism Rates?

A study that compared the recidivism rates of offenders in New York's Shock Incarceration program to offenders in conventional prisons showed that boot camp offenders had lower recidivism rates on one measure of recidivism. They were less likely to be returned to prison for a technical violation. However, offenders were no less likely to be returned to prison for a new crime. Graduates of the New York Shock Incarceration program were intensively supervised in the aftercare program where they received employment and drug treatment counseling, which probably explains the reduced technical violations. So the link between lower recidivism rates and boot camps is weak and as a result, one cannot conclude that the Shock Incarceration program significantly affected recidivism rates (MacKenzie & Souryal, 1994).

Program Effectiveness - Reduced Prison Overcrowding?

In order for a program to materially affect prison overcrowding, the program must be large in relation to the rest of the institutional system, it must serve offenders who would otherwise have been incarcerated elsewhere rather than placed on probation, its participants must graduate, they must spend less time in boot camp programs than they would have spent in prison, and they must not return to prison (Cronin & Han, 1994). An analysis performed by Clark, Aziz and MacKenzie in 1994 revealed that the boot camp program in New York reduced overcrowding, primarily due to the large size of the program. The New York Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) estimates that Shock Incarceration has freed up enough space to accommodate an additional 1,954 inmates (Clark, Aziz & MacKenzie, 1994).

Program Effectiveness - Reduced Costs?

In 1993, a national review of Boot Camp programs conducted by the General Accounting Office (GAO) revealed that New York's Shock Incarceration program is the "best example of reported cost savings." In 1993, DOCS estimated that the Shock Incarceration program saved approximately \$2 million in care and custody costs for every 100 boot camp graduates (about \$20,000 per inmate per year). In September of 1993, for the first 8,842 inmate graduates, New York reportedly saved an estimated \$176.2 million. In 1997, DOCS reports

that for every 100 inmates released, New York saved \$2.4 million on care and custody (Clark, Aziz & MacKenzie, 1994). As of November 1997, for the first 18,269 graduates, the department had saved an estimated \$537.6 million in operational and capital construction costs. And these estimates do not factor in the value of community service performed by inmates which amounted to 1.2 million hours in 1996 (Clark, 1997).

Georgia's Comprehensive Correctional Inmate Boot Camp Program

Georgia was the first State to start a boot camp program (1983) as a response to the growing prison admission rate and the continual shortage of bedspace in prisons (Bourque, Han & Hill, 1996). In 1991, Special Alternative Incarceration (SAI) was the number one boot camp program in Georgia. SAI was a two part program with the first phase focusing on short term prison confinement and the second phase focusing on after care community supervision. Today, Georgia's Comprehensive Correctional Boot Camp Program is an extension of the SAI program and it incorporates boot camps for both probationers and sentenced inmates. It also incorporates special programs for State prisoners and detention centers for certain non-violent offenders. This thesis will focus on Georgia's Comprehensive Correctional Inmate Boot Camp program only, which is a 120-day program consisting of hard manual labor,

strenuous physical training, military-style discipline. Participation in the program was limited to young, first time offenders sentenced to the program by judges as a condition of probation. The program currently targets male offenders only, although Georgia is planning to develop a facility for female offenders (Bourque, Han & Hill, 1996). The main goals of the boot camp program are: 1) to protect the public; 2) to relieve crowding in the state's prisons by diverting about 12,000 lower risk offenders to boot camps annually; 3) to change offenders attitudes and behaviors; 4) to reduce costs. The average age of offenders in the program is 20, and most offenders are serving time for burglary, theft, and drug offenses. 87% of inmate participants graduate from the program and 40% of inmate failures are a result of disciplinary actions (Keenan & Hadley, 1995). Participants spent about 2 hours per week involved in rehabilitative or therapeutic activities. Upon graduation, release on parole is automatic if there is an acceptable parole residence. If not, the graduates move on to a corrections facility until an acceptable residence becomes available or until the parole board places them in a transitional center. The only special aftercare provision for boot camp graduates is the automatic referral to drug abuse counseling (Keenan & Hadley, 1995).

Program Effectiveness - Change in Inmate Attitudes?

A 1994 Multi-Site Evaluation of New York and Georgia's boot camp programs which compared the attitude changes of boot camp participants to offenders serving time in traditional prisons found that boot camp entrants became more positive about the boot camp experience and their future over the course of the program. Despite differences between Georgia and New York's boot camp program goals, structure and implementation, the results of the Change in Attitude finding are consistent (MacKenzie & Souryal, 1994).

Program Effectiveness - Reduced Recidivism Rates?

Georgia's recidivism rates for boot camp graduates were significantly lower than for offenders in traditional prisons or placed under intensive supervision at follow-up periods ranging from 1 to 5 years. The findings in a study conducted in October, 1994 by Roberta Cronin and Mei Han of Georgia's SAI program showed that boot camp participants fared about the same as offenders placed in diversion centers and much worse than offenders on standard probation. But by the five year follow-up point, approximately 50% of all boot camp graduates were re-incarcerated. It is fairly difficult, however, to draw any firm conclusions from the recidivism analysis since the evaluation encountered many practical obstacles related to random assignment. Therefore, the results are open to criticism that the comparison groups may have been

different to begin with or that the selection process was biased. For example, the results may mean that boot camp inmates presented less of a correctional challenge or were more highly motivated than other groups. It is possible that they are in the boot camp program because they are motivated to change for the better, and that explains why they are not committing new crimes. Also, since boot camp graduates were used as the point of comparison, and not all boot camp participants, the influence of failures or dropouts may have been eliminated. Again, similar to the New York analysis, the link between lower recidivism rates and boot camps is not compelling (Cronin & Han, 1994).

Program Effectiveness - Reduced Prison Overcrowding?

Program design is critical to the successful reduction of prison overcrowding. Programs that allow the department of corrections to select boot camp participants are more likely to alleviate prison overcrowding because they increase the probability of selecting offenders who would otherwise be sentenced to prison. A major factor influencing prison bedspace savings is whether the boot camp program targets prison-bound offenders (MacKenzie & Souryal, 1991). An analysis conducted by MacKenzie and Souryal in 1994 suggests that a much smaller percentage of boot camp participants would have been sentenced to prison in Georgia than in New York where 75 -100 of participants were prison bound (MacKenzie & Souryal, 1994). Upon an

examination of Georgia's program, Corbett, Jr. and Petersilia concluded in a study that a significant number of offenders who would otherwise have been on probation were admitted into Georgia's program. So it is likely that a much smaller percentage of offenders sentenced to Georgia's program would have otherwise served time in prison. If a program is designed such that less than 50% of the offenders would have been imprisoned, the boot camp program is more likely to increase the demand for prison bedspace (MacKenzie & Souryal, 1994). Therefore, Georgia's program as it was designed is most likely to increase (not reduce) the need for prison bedspace because these probationers would not otherwise have been incarcerated. New York has experienced a larger reduction in prison overcrowding than Georgia, primarily due to the selection criteria of its program and the significantly larger size of New York's boot camp program (1,500 beds) compared to Georgia's 250 beds (Corbett Jr. & Petersilia, 1994).

Program Effectiveness - Reduced Costs?

MacKenzie and Souryal (1994) point out that two ways of reducing the cost of incarceration are: 1) by lowering the per diem costs of keeping inmates in prison, and 2) savings realized if offenders are institutionalized for less time, as in Georgia's Comprehensive Correctional Inmate Boot Camp program. For offenders entering Georgia's Inmate Boot Camp program for four months at \$26.00 per day, the total cost per offender to participate in the program is

approximately \$3,120.00. By comparison, a similar offender in a traditional prison would spend nearly 21 months in prison at a cost of \$48.56 per day, a total of about \$30,301.44 per inmate. Strictly in terms of institutional costs, for every 100 offenders, Inmate Boot Camps save as much as \$27,181.44 per inmate over regular prisons. Although the program is cheaper than prison, studies show that it is more expensive than intensive probation. Other hidden benefits to the program are the reduced costs associated with crimes that might have been committed by offenders who are incapacitated in the program for 120 days who otherwise might be on probation, and thousands of community service hours provided by the program. Overall, total cost savings estimates are not available for Georgia's program (Keenan & Hadley, 1995).

San Quentin's Alternative Sentencing Program (ASP)

The California Department of Corrections Alternative Sentencing Program (ASP) in San Quentin was founded in January 1993 as an intensive ten month program for selected first-time non-violent offenders. The San Quentin Alternative Sentencing Program was a five year pilot project and was discontinued on January 1, 1998. The program capacity was 176 beds and was limited to males. The goals of the program were: a) to provide a cost-effective alternative to traditional imprisonment for selected low risk offenders; b) to decrease prison overcrowding; and c) to maintain public safety by reducing recidivism. Eligibility into the ASP program was limited to participants who:

- 1) Have not previously been incarcerated in a State or Federal prison.
- 2) Have never served a term in the California Youth Authority for an ineligible offense specified in Penal Code Section 1173.2.
- 3) Have no prior conviction as an adult for an ineligible offense specified in Penal Code Section 1173.2.
- 4) Are sentenced to State prison for no less than 12 months, nor more than 36 months.

Any offenders who have committed violent offenses such as murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, other lewd or forced sex acts, arson, or assault with a deadly weapon, were not eligible. Also, offenders committed for possession, purchase,

sale, transportation, or manufacturing of illegal substances, and those convicted of all robbery and first degree burglary could not participate in the program.

The program had two phases: phase 1 - 120 day boot camp program in San Quentin's minimum security unit, phase 2 - an aftercare program consisting of a 60-day Work Training in a community-based facility, and 120 days of intensive parole supervision (Bourque, Han & Hill, 1996).

Phase 1 of ASP - The Institutional Phase

The institutional phase of the ASP program was built around achieving positive changes in inmates' attitudes and behavior through the use several techniques. The program included: military-style instruction and discipline, physical training, structured work training program, group and individual therapy, drug and alcohol abuse counseling, educational programs, and community living skills. Overall, the program emphasized self control, learning to accept personal responsibility, teamwork, and respect for others.

Approximately eighty (80%) percent of boot camp participants graduated from the boot camp phase and entered the Aftercare phase (Bourque, Han & Hill, 1996).

Phase 2 of ASP - Aftercare

ASP's aftercare program is multi-tiered. The first component is the 60-day Residential Work Training Program immediately after graduation from the boot camp phase. The Northern California work training site is located in a

Community Correctional Facility on the Alameda Naval Air Station grounds in Alameda County. During the work training program, participants work 40 hours a week in the community under supervision. The purpose of this component of the program is to develop employment skills as well as to provide inmates an opportunity to apply the skills learned in the boot camp phase such as personal discipline and responsibility. After the Work Training component, participants are released on intensive parole supervision for 120 days. Intensive parole also emphasizes employment, education, and a continuation of therapy and substance abuse counseling. Participants are expected to maintain full-time jobs while in aftercare and an additional 30 hours a week in rehabilitation activities such as counseling and therapy (Bourque, Han & Hill, 1996).

Program Effectiveness - Change in Inmate Attitudes?

To assess the impact of the program on participants' behavior and attitudes, a Coopersmith test of "Self-esteem" and the Jessness Behavior Checklist tests of "Responsibility," "Unobtrusiveness," and "Confidence" was administered to four platoons in January 1995. The Coopersmith "Self-esteem" test is designed to the degree to which a person thinks him/herself is capable, significant, successful, and worthy. The Jessness test is designed to rank people on their tendency to intrude in the lives of others and to deal with frustration in

socially acceptable ways. The results of the tests are displayed in Table 3 as follows:

(Table 3)
Differences in Psychological Test Scores Before and After Each Stage of ASP

	Boot Camp (n=132)		Work Training (n=124)		Parole (n=91)	
	<u>Before</u>	<u>After</u>	<u>Before</u>	<u>After</u>	<u>Before</u>	<u>After</u>
"Self-esteem"						
Mean	72	79	79	82	82	82
Std. Deviation	17.3	15.6	15.7	15.0	16.0	14.6
"Unobtrusiveness"						
Mean	43	43	43	43	43	43
Std. Deviation	4.9	5.2	4.9	5.7	5.7	6.8
"Responsibility"						
Mean	45	45	45	44	44	44
Std. Deviation	4.7	4.7	4.7	6.4	6.4	7.0
"Confidence"						
Mean	38	40	40	39	39	39
Std. Deviation	5.6	5.6	5.9	5.9	5.9	6.5

(Berecochea, 1996).

The data in Table 3 shows that the psychological tests used for the study did not show substantial changes in measured self-esteem, unobtrusiveness, or

responsibility, with one exception. This can be interpreted that the program has little or no impact on personal attitude. However, the results did show that participants felt they had experienced significant psychological changes, especially after completing the boot camp phase. A relatively large difference in the self-esteem score at the boot camp reflects the psychological changes. It is important to note two major methodological problems that plague the results of these psychological tests. First, the tests were not administered to a comparable sample of offenders who did not participate in the ASP program, and second, ASP dropouts were not tested either due to insufficient time and resources. As a result of these methodological challenges, the test results are not statistically significant; rather, the conclusions are based on the pattern of data (Berecochea, 1996).

Program Effectiveness - Reduced Recidivism Rates?

A study was conducted with a sample of 336 ASP participants in 1995 to measure whether ASP was accomplishing its goal to reduce recidivism (or at least to not increase it). The study used two measures of recidivism: returns to prison from parole and other arrests while on parole. The results of the study showed that of those who successfully completed ASP, only five (5) percent are returned to prison within a year following their release on parole. There was no statistically significant difference between ASP participants and the comparison

sample group in either the percent returned to prison or proportion arrested on parole. This means the program neither reduced or increased the recidivism rate, at least as measured by returns of prison or arrests while on parole.

However, the study showed that more of the control group went back to prison for "crimes against the person," while the ASP participant sample group were more likely to be returned to prison for property crimes. ASP seems to reduce the likelihood of subsequent involvement in violent criminal activities compared to offenders in regular prison. As for arrests, the ASP group was typically on parole longer when their first arrest occurred than the comparison group (Berecochea, 1996).

Program Effectiveness - Reduced Prison Overcrowding?

The study conducted to assess the total prison bed savings of ASP is based on the premise that the total time an offender eventually serves in custody is a combination of time served in prison until first release and time on first parole. Time back in prison and back on parole also adds to total time served, for those who do not succeed on parole. These times were summed for ASP participants and the comparison group to estimate bed savings of ASP. The number of days was accumulated over the two year period from release from the reception center to the end of the follow-up period or discharge. The two

sample groups were released to parole from May 1993 to April 1994, about a two year period. Table 4 below presents the bed savings data:

Table 4
Estimated Prison Bed Savings for ASP

	<u>ASP</u>	<u>Comparison</u>	<u>Savings</u>
Boot Camp Days	31,714		
Work Training Days	15,213		
Standard Prison Days	28,776	99,086	
Total Prison Days	75,703	99,086	23,383
Prison Beds (total days/365)	207	271	64
.....			
Time in the reception centers is not included in these figures.			

(Berecochea, 1996).

Over the two year period, the number of days analysis shows that ASP would be expected to save 64 prison beds (Berecochea, 1996). A prison bed savings of 64 over a two year period does not seem significant to conclude that ASP reduces prison overcrowding given the total prison population.

Program Effectiveness - Reduced Costs?

A comparative study between ASP participants and a comparison sample group was conducted in 1995 where the number of days spent in each phase of ASP and the comparison group were multiplied by the cost per day, and then summed to calculate the total costs. The costs estimates are based on time spent in ASP and on regular prison and parole through December 1995, using

“overcrowding” cost estimates, not per capita costs. The results are presented in Table 5 below.

Table 5
Estimated Costs for ASP and Comparison Groups

<u>ASP</u>	<u>Alternative Sentencing Program</u>			<u>Overcrowding Cost</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>Boot Camp</u>	<u>Work Training</u>	<u>ASP Parole</u>	<u>Regular Prison</u>	<u>Regular Parole</u>	
Cost per day	\$47.69	\$49.45	\$11.33	\$31.08	\$4.74	
# of days	31,724	15,213	27,379	28,776	52,041	
Total Cost	\$1,512,918	\$752,283	\$310,143	\$894,421	\$246,803	\$3,716,567
<u>Comparison Group</u>						
Cost per day				\$31.08	\$4.74	
# of days				99,086	134,799	
Total Cost				\$3,079,810	\$639,280	\$3,719,090
Difference	\$1,512,918	\$752,283	\$310,143	\$2,185,389	\$392,477	\$2,523

(Berecochea, 1996).

The data shows that the net cost of ASP and ASP parole (\$3,716,567) is about the same as the net cost for the comparison groups in regular prison and regular parole (\$3,719,090). The estimated difference of \$2,523 is not significant enough to conclude that ASP reduces net costs. In conclusion, ASP neither increases nor decreases the cost of keeping offenders incarcerated and on parole. This is primarily because the savings in time in prison and on parole are not large enough to overcome the relatively high average daily cost of ASP. However, if the program were to be greatly expanded to keep all 176 beds full all of the time so that it could result in saving the equivalent of the population of an entire prison, the net savings of ASP would increase significantly.

CHAPTER IV: RESULTS

Introduction

Recall from Chapter I that the primary purpose of this thesis is to compare San Quentin's ASP boot camp program to two successful programs in New York and Georgia, in order to assess the differences in program characteristics and program effectiveness. The second focus is to determine if these differences account for the success or failure of San Quentin's ASP. So far, the characteristics of all three boot camp programs have been reviewed, and an analysis of the effectiveness of each program has been presented. This chapter of the thesis will focus on three things: 1) a comparison of the characteristics of the San Quentin program with New York and Georgia's programs; 2) a comparison of the effectiveness of San Quentin's program with New York and Georgia's programs; and 3) whether these differences account for the success or failure of San Quentin's boot camp program. Table 6 presents a comparison of program characteristics for San Quentin's ASP, New York's Shock Incarceration program, and Georgia's Comprehensive Correctional Inmate boot camp program. San Quentin differs from New York and Georgia in the following areas: bed capacity, program goals, location of the program, selection criteria, rehabilitative focus, graduation percentage, and aftercare supervision level (Bourque, Han & Hill, 1996).

Program Characteristics Contrasts

San Quentin's program is the smallest of all the three boot camp programs with a bed capacity of only 176 males as compared to New York's 1,390 males and Georgia's 1,256 male inmates. ASP's program length of 120 days is two months less than New York's (180) and is similar to Georgia's (120 days), although Georgia's program is extendable to 150 days and New York's for an additional 30 days(7 months).

The eligibility criteria for ASP appears to be the most restrictive as the program is not open to anyone who has been in State or Federal prison before, regardless of the severity of the crime for which they were incarcerated, or served a term in the California Youth Authority. Also, only offenders sentenced to prison for 1-3 years are eligible for ASP. New York's program is open to State and Federal prisoners (who are eligible for release within 3 years) as long as they do not have an indeterminate sentence, and participants are selected from offenders already sentenced to New York's Department of Correctional Services (NYDOCS). Georgia's program has few restrictions in terms of prior prison incarceration and sentence range. While Georgia's participants are sentenced to the program by a judge and parole authorities, San Quentin's participants are selected solely by corrections authorities, and New York's program participants are selected by corrections authorities with judge's agreement (Bourque, Han & Hill, 1996).

While San Quentin's program is located within San Quentin State prison, New York's program is privately contracted with Vera Institute of Justice for parolee participation in the Neighborhood Work Project, Fellowship Center for Relapse Prevention Counseling and an Episcopal Mission Society for operating its Community Network program. Like San Quentin, Georgia's program is also located within the larger prison. Approximately 80% of ASP's participants graduate from the program, as compared with New York's 63% and Georgia's 87% graduation rates.

Upon graduation, San Quentin program participants begin a four month intensive parole supervision program which includes full-time employment and 30 hours per week of rehabilitative activities. New York's participants begin a six month period of intensive community supervision followed by traditional supervision. Also as part of New York's six-month intensive supervision program, supervision standards include home visits, mandatory substance abuse counseling, weekly curfew checks and random drug test. Georgia's program participants begin standard parole supervision.

As for the rehabilitative focus of the three programs, San Quentin's program has several programs such as Group and Reality Therapy that deal with drug abuse. ASP's focus on substance abuse rehabilitation however is moderate (1 ½ hrs -3hrs/day), given that 90 percent of the program inmates have substance abuse histories. New York's program on the other hand focuses

intensively on rehabilitative activities (5.6 hours/day). Georgia's program has the least focus on rehabilitative activities (2hrs/week).

Table 6
Comparison of Program Characteristics

Program Characteristics	San Quentin's Alternative Sentencing Program	New York's Shock Incarceration Program	Georgia's Comprehensive Correctional Inmate Boot Camp Program
Year Program Began	1993	1987	1983
Bed Capacity	176 males	1,390 males	1,256 males
Length of Boot Camp Program	120 days (some cases extendable)	180 days (extendable to 7 months)	120 days (extendable to 5 months)
Selection Criteria			
Age Range	No Limit	16 - 35	17 - 30
Sentence Range	1 - 3 years	Eligible for release within 3 years	9 months - 10 years
Prior Incarceration Permitted?	No, if in a State or Federal Prison.	No, if have served an indeterminate sentence	Yes
Violent Offenses?	No	No	No
Voluntary Entry?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Program Goals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide cost-effective alternative to traditional imprisonment for non-violent first-time offenders • Decrease prison overcrowding • Maintain public safety by reducing recidivism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduce demand for bed space • Treat and release selected State prisoners earlier than their court-mandated minimum sentences without compromising public safety 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect the public • Ease overcrowding • Changing offenders attitudes and behavior • Reduce costs of imprisonment
Program Graduation Rate	80%	63%	87%
Placement Procedure	California Department of Corrections	Department of Corrections and Judge's approval	Judge and Parole Authorities
Located in Prison?	Yes	No (private contractor)	Yes
Rehabilitative Focus	Medium (1 1/2 - 3hrs/day)	High (5.6 hrs/day)	Low (2 hrs/week)
Transitional Residential Phase?	5-day residential work furlough program	90 days temporary housing and support as needed	No
After Care Supervision	120 days or intensive parole supervision: including 30 hours/ week in a rehabilitative program, full time employment, continue outpatient substance abuse program if needed	180 days of intensive parole supervision: including securing a job within a week of release, enrolling in an academic or vocational program within 2 weeks of release, mandatory substance abuse counseling, maintain curfew, random drug tests, home visits, employment verification	Standard parole supervision

Program Effectiveness Contrasts

In Chapter III, analysis of program effectiveness was presented for each of the three boot camp programs along the following variables: change in inmates attitudes, reduction in recidivism rates, reduction in prison costs, and reduction in prison overcrowding. In this section, the three programs are compared in terms of how effective they are in attaining these goals, and the information is presented in Table 7 below.

A comparison of the three programs reveals that San Quentin's Alternative Sentencing Boot Camp Program is the least effective of all in achieving any of its program goals. Recall its main goals are to: 1) provide a cost-effective alternative to traditional imprisonment for non-violent first-time offenders; 2) decrease prison overcrowding; and 3) maintain public safety by reducing recidivism. As shown below in Table 7, ASP neither reduces the demand for prison bed space (64 beds in 2 years), reduces prison costs (\$2,523 net costs savings), nor reduces the rate of recidivism significantly enough to conclude that there was a positive effect. In comparison, New York's Shock Incarceration program reduced prison bed space by 1,954, and saved an estimated \$537.6 million in care and custody costs for the first 18,269 graduates from the program as of November, 1997 (Clark, Aziz & MacKenzie, 1994). New York's program also reports significant attitude change in its program participants as compared to San Quentin's program which reports little attitude

change except in the self-esteem measure immediately after the boot camp phase. Georgia's program in comparison to San Quentin's also shows a consistent change in inmates attitudes similar to New York's program participants. Georgia's program also reports a reduction in prison institutional costs of \$27,181.44 for every 100 inmates/year. Both San Quentin and Georgia's programs do not reduce prison overcrowding. In fact, the design of Georgia's program might tend to increase prison overcrowding.

Statistically significant conclusions about reduction in recidivism rates could not be drawn for any of the three programs because of difficulties in sampling data and methods. Some of the problems in measuring it include: determining the time after release at which recidivism should be measured, comparing inmates with different characteristics, tracking inmates who may have been arrested in other jurisdictions, and even deciding what recidivism means (e.g. rearrest, reconviction, or committing the same type of crime). The evaluation studies used in this thesis used three different recidivism measures to assess the impact of boot camps on recidivism rates for the three programs. Therefore, a comparison of the three programs is not statistically significant. However, the data patterns suggest that San Quentin's program neither reduces nor increases recidivism rates; New York's program either reduces recidivism rates or they remain the same; and Georgia's recidivism rates also remain the same for Inmate Boot Camp program participants.

Also, note that even though New York's program is the most successful of the three, it has the lowest graduation rate (63%), San Quentin's ASP is 80%, while Georgia has the highest (87%). Graduation rates tend to be higher in programs in which the sentencing judge has authority over entry decision-making as in Georgia, rather than the Department of Corrections as is the case in New York and San Quentin (MacKenzie & Souryal, 1994). Also, New York's graduation rate may be lower than Georgia's because New York's program has voluntary entry and dropout, while Georgia does not have voluntary dropout. It's unclear what explains the difference between New York and California's San Quentin program given that they both have voluntary entry and dropout and entry decision-making is made by the department of corrections. Perhaps the difference in program length between the two programs accounts for the difference. Also, New York's program may have stricter expulsion policies than San Quentin's ASP.

Table 7
Comparison of Program Effectiveness

Program Effectiveness Attributes	San Quentin's Alternative Sentencing Program	New York's Shock Incarceration Program	Georgia's Comprehensive Correctional Inmate Boot Camp Program
Change in Inmates Attitude	Little to None (One exception: high self-esteem score shows significant psychological changes especially after completing the boot camp phase)	Yes (boot camp offenders left program with less antisocial attitude. Offenders are more positive about their prison experiences and their future)	Yes (boot camp offenders left program with less antisocial attitude. Offenders are more positive about their prison experiences and their future)
Reduced Rates of Recidivism	Inconclusive <u>Return to Prison:</u> comparison group went back to prison for "crimes against the person," while ASP participants went back for property crimes. <u>Re-Arrests:</u> ASP group was on parole longer than comparison group)	Inconclusive (boot camp offenders were less likely to be returned to prison for a technical violation. However, offenders were no less likely to be returned to prison for a new crime)	Inconclusive (same as offenders placed in diversion centers. In five years 50% of all boot camp graduates were re-incarcerated. Inconclusive due to random sampling problems)
Reduced Prison Overcrowding	No (64 beds in 2 years)	Yes (1,954 beds saved)	No (may instead increase prison overcrowding)
Reduced Costs	No (\$2,523 net savings which is so small, given the inexactitude of the cost estimates, as to call zero)	Yes (estimated \$537.6million in operational and capital construction costs for the first 18,269 graduates from the program as of November, 1997)	Yes (\$27,181.44 for every 100 inmates/year for institutional costs alone)

Do These Differences Account for the Failure of San Quentin's Boot Camp Program? What are the Policy Implications?

To some extent, the above program characteristics differences do explain the failure of San Quentin's ASP in achieving its program goals. This section explores which specific program differences between San Quentin's ASP and New York and Georgia's boot camps programs impact ASP's effectiveness in achieving its program goals. Policy implications around these specific differences that impact ASP's efficacy will also be discussed.

The first factor that may explain the failure of San Quentin's ASP is the difference in program capacity between San Quentin's ASP, New York's Shock Incarceration, and Georgia's boot camp program. ASP's program capacity of 176 is one-eighth the size of New York's program, and still it has difficulty keeping the 176 beds filled to capacity. Many factors contribute to the low capacity including strict eligibility criteria and difficulty in selecting eligible offenders. ASP's original plan allowed for inmates with three-year terms to participate, however the final penal code section specified that only those with 24 months left to serve of their sentences qualified. The candidate pool for ASP is also narrowed due to the competition with other Department of Corrections programs such as Community Correctional Facilities, Minimum Support Facilities, Conservation Camp, Fire Camp, etc. (Berecochea, 1996). Widening the net of ASP participants by expanding eligibility criteria will greatly increase the

program's capacity, and possibly its effectiveness in reducing prison overcrowding and costs. For example, eligibility criteria can be expanded to allow first-time commitments to prison for petty drug pushers, expand participation to counties outside of Northern California, lengthen the maximum sentence from current 1-3 years.

The second factor that may explain the failure of ASP is the program length. The 120 days for the boot camp phase of the program may not be enough to bring about long-term changes in participants' attitudes and behaviors, or increase the levels of educational and vocational competencies for participants. ASP boot camp participants interviewed indicated that they would rather have spent more time in the boot camp and less time in the work training phase of the ASP program (Berecochea, 1996). Also, other successful programs such as New York's have a longer boot camp phase. The length of the ASP boot camp program should be reviewed as well as other program phases and lengthened based on the needs of the inmates.

The third factor that may account for ASP's failure is the co-location of the program in San Quentin State Prison. Boot camps are special programs that operate very differently from regular prison institutions. Locating the program in San Quentin resulted in conflicts of interests with the rest of the prison and surrounding community (Berecochea, 1996). Locating the boot camp program off site may improve access to community services such as educational and

vocational training, increased employment opportunities, and drug counseling and prevention centers. This may also help graduates readjust to community living better than if they are in a prison site (Clark, Aziz & MacKenzie, 1994). Again, New York's Shock Incarceration program is a good model that supports the benefits of moving the boot camp off the prison grounds. The program should be re-located to a new location conducive to ASP activities off the larger prison grounds, and use program participants labor to cleanup and prepare new location to keep costs low.

The fourth and final factor that may explain ASP's failure in terms of program effectiveness is its narrow rehabilitative focus (e.g. lack of adequate substance abuse counseling and treatment services to program participants). About 90% on ASP participants have a prior substance abuse history, yet ASP does not heavily emphasize substance abuse treatment like New York's Shock Incarceration program. The program's few hours of drug counseling is not being offered by trained and qualified drug counselors like those in New York's Shock Incarceration Substance Abuse Treatment program (Berecochea, 1996). ASP should expand the quantity of time spent addressing substance abuse problems and treatment, and train more staff on substance abuse counseling in order to better target the needs of its inmate population. The program should expand its focus from substance abuse education and focus heavily on substance abuse treatment as well.

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION

In comparison to successful boot camp programs like New York's Shock Incarceration and Georgia's Comprehensive Correctional Inmate Boot Camp program, is San Quentin's ASP boot camp program effective? The answer is no. This thesis investigated and presented program effectiveness data in four main areas (change in inmate attitude, reduction in recidivism rates, reduction in prison overcrowding and reduction in prison costs) to reach this conclusion. The three boot camp programs compared in this thesis share the basic core components of boot camp programs: strict rules, military-style environment, hard work, education and vocational training programs, and substance abuse counseling. What particular components of San Quentin's Alternative Sentencing Program led to its failure in fulfilling its program goals? To answer this question, this thesis investigated and compared the program characteristics of San Quentin's ASP to New York and Georgia's programs. The comparison revealed four main differences: program capacity (which is impacted by eligibility criteria), program length, location of program, rehabilitative focus of the program.

Did the program capacity explain the failure of ASP in achieving its goals?

To some extent, it is one of the main reasons ASP failed. Studies have shown that program size has a huge impact on the ability of boot camp

programs to reduce prison overcrowding (Cronin & Han, 1994). One of the reasons why New York's Shock Incarceration Program is so successful at reducing prison overcrowding is the larger size of the program. San Quentin's smaller program capacity (which has always operated under capacity due to its strict eligibility criteria) should be expanded to increase capacity.

Did the program length explain the failure of ASP in achieving its goals?

Probably. The shorter length of San Quentin's ASP's boot camp and aftercare phases may not allow enough time to bring about long-term behavioral and attitude change for participants. For example, the brief duration of the boot camp program is inconsistent with what is known about the length of effective drug treatment programs. Again, New York's program has a longer boot camp and aftercare phase to address participants educational and drug treatment needs.

Did the program's location in San Quentin Prison contribute to the failure of ASP in achieving its goals?

It is likely that the location of San Quentin's ASP in the larger prison which results in conflicts of interest with the rest of the prison population, may also impact its effectiveness. Locating the program off-site provides participants with greater access to community services that will help program graduates readjust to community living better than if they are in a prison site.

Did the program's narrow rehabilitative focus contribute to the failure of ASP in achieving its goals?

Probably. For a program where 90% of participants have substance abuse histories, ASP's narrow focus on rehabilitation and treatment shows that it does not target the needs of its program population. To achieve real positive changes in inmate behaviors, ASP needs to employ a rehabilitative program that targets substance abuse education as well as treatment by trained staff and drug counselors.

Although no one of these differences alone contributed to the failure of ASP in achieving its program goals, all of the differences combined definitely make San Quentin's ASP one of the least successful boot camp programs in terms of program efficacy. To re-instate the San Quentin ASP program, this thesis has suggested many recommendations especially around the four areas that have contributed to ASP's failure. In order for San Quentin's ASP to be re-instated, these recommendations along with others from a more extensive research study of San Quentin's Alternative Sentencing Program, should be examined and incorporated into the program design. Also, successful programs like New York's Shock Incarceration with which ASP shares similar goals, should be examined from a design and implementation perspective, and modeled in order for San Quentin's ASP to experience similar success in achieving its goals.

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





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IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)



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