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Military institutionalism and liberal constitutionalism in Chile

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San Jose State University, 1993

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MILITARY INSTITUTIONALISM
AND LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHILE

A Thesis Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Political Science of
San José State University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts


by
Edmund C. Mercado
December 1993

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
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
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ABSTRACT

MILITARY INSTITUTIONALISM AND LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHILE

by

Edmund C. Mercado

This thesis is an analysis of the history and development of civil-military relations in Chile and the struggle for power between the Chilean armed forces and the civilian government. Chile developed an oligarchic form of democratic government quite spontaneously in the years after independence from Spain in 1818 and continued as a viable democratic regime with civilian control of the armed forces. After the glorious victory over Bolivia and Peru in the 1879 War of the Pacific, the Chilean government began a fateful policy of professionalizing its traditionally nonprofessional armed forces with the help of a distinguished military adviser from the imperial German Army. With the resulting institutionalization and politicization of the armed forces and the destruction of civilian control, Chilean constitutionalism has been imperiled ever since.

For Jessica, Sabrina, and Brianna

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"When the Army comes out, it is to kill."¹

--General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte²

¹*The New York Times*, 12 December 1971.

²Note: It is Chilean custom, as it is in some Hispanic countries, to carry the matronymic surname immediately after the patronymic. General Pinochet's father's surname was Pinochet. His mother's surname was Ugarte.

I. INTRODUCTION

History tends to yield a perspective whose clarity varies in direct proportion to the distance in time and space from events. Nineteen years have now passed since 11 September 1973, when a military junta headed by General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte deposed the Marxist government of President Salvador Allende Gossens and began a seventeen-year period of military dictatorship. Nearly 45,000 citizens were held in detention for interrogation. A 1991 presidential commission documented 2,279 deaths and disappearances for the period 11 September 1973 to 11 March 1990 as a result of political persecution by the armed forces, the secret police, and government-sanctioned death squads. The campaign of official killing was unprecedented in Chilean history. The collegial military regime swiftly evolved into a personal military regime, with General Pinochet assuming traditional constitutional authority as President of the Republic by December 1974 and *de facto* absolute power as supreme leader of the armed forces by July 1978. In 1980, riding the crest of an economic boom fueled by massive foreign borrowing and investment, the regime proposed and ratified a new authoritarian Constitution in a controlled plebiscite. In 1988, Pinochet lost a one-man presidential plebiscite and Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin was elected President in 1989. With democracy restored, it would appear to end an unpleasant chapter in Chilean history. Unfortunately, the 1980 authoritarian Constitution remains in force. Under its provisions, General Pinochet remains as commander in chief of the Army until 1998. President Aylwin will never have the authority to dismiss the commanders in chief of the armed forces. Chile has entered a new era in a civil-military struggle whose outcome must remain in doubt.

The Chilean coup was one of the most significant events in Latin American political history. It followed a trend of military coups in Argentina (1966 and 1976), Brazil (1964), Peru (1968), and Uruguay (1973) in which the armed forces had acted and ruled as a col-

legial political institution. Some of these military regimes were regarded as *bureaucratic-authoritarian* regimes. They were called *bureaucratic* because they installed professional military officers and civilian technocrats into traditionally civilian management and administrative positions in the executive bureaucracy to develop and implement political, economic, and social policy based on liberal *laissez-faire* economic rationality and military discipline. They were called *authoritarian* because they came to power through violent military coups, suspended the constitutional rule of law, closed off popular participation, and depoliticized the newly-mobilized popular sectors, often through the widespread, systematic use of institutionalized fear of the state security forces. Chile had a reputation as one of the most stable democracies in the world, whose armed forces were strictly nonpolitical and sworn to defend the Constitution. This impression, though widespread, was not entirely accurate. The conventional wisdom was that the Chilean armed forces, scrupulously professional and nonpolitical, were forced to intervene in the political process to save Chile from a Communist coup. But while the professionalism of the Chilean armed forces is a truism, their nonpoliticism has always been a fiction. Throughout their history, the armed forces have been steeped in political intrigue. They have wielded a heavy influence on government policy and enjoy institutional autonomy over internal military matters including personnel, planning, control, budget, training, and equipment. The implantation of the authoritarian regime produced a new political arrangement in Chile. The armed forces developed into a powerful shadow government coexisting with an elected civilian government which has limited control over it.

This thesis will propose that the permanence of the Chilean armed forces in an institutionalist posture capable of challenging civilian authority will lead to the failure of constitutionalist regime consolidation in Chile. The 1973 coup was not only a convulsion of civilian political warfare, but was also a long pre-destined institutional collision of the cooptative liberal democratic political regime and the military institutionalism of profes-

sionalized armed forces. Similarly, the post-Pinochet democratic regime will continue to find itself confronted by a military institution in its ascendance with 95,000 garrisoned troops under arms; a force superbly-trained, heavily-armed, and ready to defend its prerogatives against encroachments by civilian rulers.

II. THE RISE AND DECADENCE OF LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM

THE PORTALIAN PRESIDENTIALIST REPUBLIC

Until 11 September 1973, Chile enjoyed a democratic tradition which was remarkable by Latin American standards--or even by southern European standards, for that matter. Chile was the only political democracy to develop in the nineteenth century outside of North America and Western Europe. In a comprehensive cross-national survey of countries on a scale of political democracy, Kenneth Bollen ranked Chile in the top fifteen percent in 1965, with a higher score than those of the United States, France, Italy, and West Germany. In the same survey, Chile's 1960 score was higher than that of Britain.³ In 1846, two percent of the Chilean population were able to vote; a figure comparable to Britain in 1830 and Italy in 1871. In 1874, Chile abolished the property requirement. By 1876, it had 106,000 registered voters.⁴

Chile had won independence from Spain during the independence wars of 1810-1818 under the leadership of Generals José de San Martín and Bernardo O'Higgins. O'Higgins became Supreme Director of the new Republic of Chile. Poorly organized and equipped, and suffering from incompetent leadership, the independence armies of Chile became consolidated as the early Chilean Army before the institutionalization of the civilian government. In the post-independence period, Chile was ruled by a white Basque-Castilian aristocracy. Headquartered in the Central Valley town of Santiago, this landed aristocracy produced all government officials and Army commanders. In the afterglow of

³Kenneth A. Bollen, "Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy," *American Sociological Review* 45, no. 3, (June 1980): 370-390. Bollen's six components of his Index of Political Democracy include 1) press freedom, 2) freedom of group opposition, 3) government sanctions, 4) fairness of elections, 5) executive selection, and 6) legislative selection.

⁴ Arturo Valenzuela in Larry J. Diamond et al, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries*, Vol. 4, *Latin America*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989) 160-61.

the glory of the independence wars, the flower of Chile's aristocratic youth could receive officer's commissions based on their social standing regardless of their military qualifications. The profession of arms was a part-time aristocratic diversion from the duties of the manor.

General O'Higgins's fall from power in 1823 ushered in a seven-year period of instability marked by thirty changes of government administration in which, for the first time in the country's short history, rival factions of the aristocracy used the Army as a political tool to make and break governments. In this period, Diego Portales, a civilian administrator, rose to power in the government of President Joaquín Prieto Vial (1831-1841). While Prieto reigned as President and head of state, Portales ruled as untitled prime minister and head of government. Serving in succession as minister of finance, minister of the interior, and minister of war, he was responsible for a thorough reorganization of the Chilean state. It was Portales who established the basis for 150 years of Chilean civil-military relations. Portales firmly linked the Army to the aristocracy. He proposed a strict institutional separation of Army from government; that the Army should be officered by professional non-political military men drawn from the aristocracy; and that the Army must obey the orders of the legally-constituted civilian government. Thus, Portales established the principle of civilian control of the Army. This early nineteenth century arrangement corresponds to Eric Nordlinger's Traditional Model, in which civilian control of the Army was maintained due to the absence of a source of conflict between civilians and soldiers. The absence of conflict was due to the of the lack of differentiation between the civilian realm and the military realm and the lack of military institutionalization as an organization and as a profession. Military officers were aristocrats first and military nonprofessionals second, who were primarily interested in their economic and social prerogatives as noblemen rather than the political prerogatives of the fledgling military institution.

This traditional model of civilian control was most highly developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth-century monarchies, where the European aristocracy simultaneously constituted the civilian and military elite—a carryover from the feudal period in which nobles served as armed knights and lords of the realm. The same men wore both hat and helmet. And even as the two elites became somewhat distinctive, with different men serving primarily in one role or another, their interests and outlooks were not dissimilar. Military officers and civilian leaders came from aristocratic backgrounds, they were imbued with similar values, and they maintained familial bonds through blood and marriage.⁵

Under Portales's auspices, the Constitution of 1833 was written, creating a powerful centralized presidentialist state. Thereafter, the Basque-Castilian aristocracy practiced oligarchic democracy, electing and reelecting Presidents every five years until the last member of the aristocracy left office in 1920. Ominously for the future of civil-military relations, however, Portales was assassinated in 1837 in an abortive coup attempt against the government by a renegade garrison commander. The assassination of Portales by a military commander was the first significant military intervention in the civil affairs of the country.

Prieto was succeeded in the presidency in 1841 by General Manuel Bulnes, who consolidated civilian control of the Army. Bulnes was a constitutionalist general who resisted the temptation of using his military power to establish a personalist regime. He respected the Constitution, downgraded the power of the Army, and fostered the development of Congress. Bulnes turned the presidency over to Manuel Montt, a civilian, in 1851. Between General Bulnes in 1841 and General Pinochet in 1974, only two of Chile's Presidents--Admiral Jorge Montt Álvarez (1891-96) and Colonel--later General--Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (1927-31; 1952-58)--were career military officers.

The developing Chilean state soon clashed with the traditional aristocratic power of the landowners and the Catholic Church. The Conservative Party was Chile's first political

⁵Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977) 11.

party. The Conservatives supported the traditional order of the aristocracy and the Church against the encroachments of the secular state. The French Revolution of 1848 inspired the rise of the Liberal Party, Chile's second political party. The Liberals were also an aristocratic party but supported the secularization and decentralization of the state. By 1859, Chile's third political party, the Radical Party, appeared. The Radicals were composed of the new middle class bourgeoisie which rose in the mining industry and were also anti-clerical. The Radicals also pressed for further expansion of middle class participation in the political process. In the nineteenth century, the Liberal Party held the political center, with the Radical Party on the left and the Conservative Party on the right.

In 1879, war broke out with neighboring Peru and Bolivia over nitrate claims in the northern Atacama Desert. Known as the War of the Pacific, it was a disaster for Peru and Bolivia, as Chile occupied and annexed the vast Atacama Desert and emerged as the leading land and sea power on the continent. Victory in the War of the Pacific added much prestige to the 25,000-man Chilean Army. Such glory demanded increased resources from the civilian government. In 1886, the government appointed Colonel Emil Körner of the imperial German Army to head the new Chilean War Academy. Körner, a professor of military science at the famed Prussian *Kriegsakademie*, had been unable to rise above the rank of colonel after twenty years of service in the imperial German Army because he was a Saxon and not a true German. The Chilean Academy functioned as a staff school and the Army adopted the German general staff system. The Körner period marks the beginning of the ominous trend of the institutional modernization of the traditionally nonprofessional Chilean reserve Army to a permanent, fully-mobilized, professional standing Army.

THEORIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION

Arturo Valenzuela builds a convincing case that the development of Chilean democracy is a unique phenomenon which cannot be explained by conventional wisdom. Several theories militate in favor of the development of democracy.⁶

The Colonial Continuity Theory suggests that democratic institutions implanted during colonial times and relatively nonviolent separation from the imperial power would be conducive to democratic development. However, Spain was the seat of decadent absolutism and Catholic excesses and was hardly disposed to implanting enlightened institutions. Moreover, the wars of independence were quite violent and destructive. Surprisingly, Chile developed quite spontaneously a constitutional structure, transferring the legitimate sovereignty from the king to an elected President.

The Political Culture Theory suggests that enlightened democratic and egalitarian political traditions imparted to a nation-state from the mother country will serve as the foundation for the development of democracy. Nonetheless, Chile adopted many of Spain's authoritarian traditions and maintained repressive social relations in the rural sector up until the 1960s. Chilean democracy developed in the nineteenth century in spite of these authoritarian Spanish-Chilean traditions. The mere practice of aristocratic democracy established the foundation for a permanent democratic psychology which would last for 140 years.

The Economic Class Structure Theory suggests that democracy is the result of economic development and the participation of particular social classes. Unfortunately, in the nineteenth century, Chile was a poor, underdeveloped country with a small middle class. In fact, it was the aristocracy which established the incipient oligarchic democracy and ex-

⁶Arturo Valenzuela in Larry J. Diamond et al, *Democracy in Developing Countries* (1989) 171-182.

panded it only because it suited its own interests. Chilean industry did not develop until the early twentieth century. Thus, industrialization and the development of the middle and working classes did not play a crucial role in democratization.

The Political Determinants Theory emphasizes the criticality of discrete political acts and historical events which, in combination, produce conditions favorable to a democratic opening:

- (1) General Bulnes established the precedent for the peaceful transfer of power from all-powerful President to elected successor;
- (2) Portales developed a powerful and autonomous state apparatus which served as an incubator for a professional civil service;
- (3) successful management of the national budget and the economy provided sustained economic growth;
- (4) the refusal of the government to develop a professional military establishment until 1891 allowed the civilian state sixty years to consolidate itself before the subsequent challenge of the armed forces;
- (5) civilian control of the Army prevented military intervention in politics until 1891;
- (6) aristocratic support for the democratic rules of the political process helped to consolidate the expansion of middle class participation in the democratic process.

Every case is different. Arturo Valenzuela credibly suggests that the birth of Chilean democracy was a fortuitous historical accident which was allowed to consolidate itself due to favorable conditions which allowed the ruling elites to practice and institutionalize the rules of the political process.

Random historical events have certainly proven decisive in the development of democracy in Chile. The Latin American countries all share a common feudal Catholic Iberian colonial tradition, yet they have all taken divergent paths. One thing they have in

common is that they have all had difficulty maintaining democracy. The development of oligarchic democracy in Chile by the traditional aristocracy evolved into an elite competition for power which preempted much post-colonial anarchy and violent struggles for power. Oligarchic democracy established fundamental rules of the political process agreed to by the competing elites. This political consensus constituted a democratic infrastructure through which elite elections ingrained the practices and procedures of a democratic regime. The aristocracy undertook a strategy of cooptation or incorporation of new sectors in pursuit of its own political interests. This was democratization from above and, of course, posed no threat to aristocratic regime control.

One may speculate on the impact of political culture and why the United States and Canada in North America developed uninterrupted liberal democracy and why Latin America has had a checkered democratic experience. One may cite the influence of aristocratic British democratic tradition in North America. The feudal Catholic tradition of imperial Spain and Portugal in Latin America certainly was not the most promising beginning for liberal democracy. In Chile, the ruling aristocracy made a striking break with the authoritarian Spanish tradition in its political procedures, while maintaining traditional authoritarian social relations with the peasant class. In fact, as cited by Kenneth A. Bollen (1980), Chile outranked the United States and Britain in its level of democratization in the 1960s.

In the Chilean case, political culture does not appear to be a definitive determinant in the development of democracy for a number of reasons. First, the Chilean landed aristocracy was ideologically split from the beginning over the issue of independence from Spain. The wars for independence were bitter civil wars in which conservatives supported the Spanish crown and liberals favored independence. The liberals finally prevailed with the final defeat of the imperial forces in 1830. The landed aristocracy was also split over the issue of church and state. The conservative pro-imperial faction, the core of support for the

Catholic Church, formed the first political party in Chile, the Conservative Party. A faction of philosophical liberals influenced by the Revolution of 1848 in France, and secular in outlook, formed the Liberal Party. Second, due to the dependence of the Chilean state apparatus on foreign trade revenues, it was able to gain substantial political independence from the landed aristocracy without having to ask for income or property taxes. With control of the Army slipping away from the aristocracy to the state, the aristocracy sought to reassert its influence in Congress. Conservatives and Liberals were forced to participate in the game of aristocratic democracy in order to retain control of the state and rein in the all-powerful presidency. Finally, the rise of the new bourgeois class of entrepreneurs in the mining industries fought for their share of power through their own Radical Party in 1859. Essentially, Chilean democracy evolved as a means for powerful elites to bargain for power without resorting to force. When force was resorted to, as in 1891, it was of a relatively brief and genteel civil war.

The Chilean political experience owes much to its political leadership and its political institutions. Political leadership was decisive in Chile. Diego Portales built a powerful presidentialist state, firmly linking the Army to the aristocracy, and separating the Army from the government administration. General Bulnes followed in the tradition of the American General Washington by assuming the role of civilian President and downgrading the power of the Army to a level where it would not pose a threat to the civilian government. General Bulnes could have seized the opportunity, as did General Pinochet in 1974, to consolidate his own personal regime. Instead, Bulnes gave up power and retired in 1851. He was followed by a succession of civilian Presidents who owed a debt to him for the regime stability which he had consolidated. President Allende bears his share of responsibility for the democratic breakdown in 1973. From a 36% plurality, Allende proceeded to accelerate a fundamental political, economic, and social transformation from capitalism to socialism. In implementing this transformation, Allende pushed the powers of the

presidency to their outermost limits under the 1925 Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled that Allende was acting outside the law. If Allende did not violate the letter of the law, he surely violated the spirit of the law in seizing private property and turning it over to worker and peasant organizations and failing to control spontaneous expropriations and arms smuggling.

Chile's political institutions were also decisive in its democratic consolidation and breakdown. Portales firmly established the young republic as a strong presidentialist regime. The weak Congress finally challenged the President in 1891, causing a brief civil war and introducing thirty years of parliamentary rule. The presidency regained its primacy under the 1925 Constitution with support from the increasingly politicized armed forces and remained dominant until 1973. Arturo Valenzuela has shown that the zero-sum game in evidence in the election of a President was a destabilizing factor in the breakdown of Chilean democracy and that a parliamentary regime was more suited to Chile's fractious, class-based, multiparty system:

A parliamentary system of government would have defused the enormous pressures for structuring high-stakes coalitions around a winner-take-all presidential option, which only reinforced political polarization. At the same time it would have eliminated the stalemate and confrontation in executive-legislative relations. . . Allende's government might have fallen, but democracy would have survived.⁷

While it is certainly true that Allende's 36% plurality did not constitute a mandate to transform the society, a presidential runoff election would have produced a majority either for the leftist Popular Unity or the rightist Nationals. The zero-sum result under presidentialism reinforces majoritarianism and administrative stability.

A parliamentary regime can incorporate more participation, but only if the one man-one vote rule is observed through the apportionment of district representation where each mem-

⁷ Arturo Valenzuela in Larry J. Diamond et al, *Democracy in Developing Countries* (1989) 25.

ber of Congress is obliged to win a majority or through a system of proportional representation for all participating political parties.

Proportional representation is more democratic but is administratively unstable. Moreover, under a parliamentary regime, small parties often exercise inordinate influence in forming governments in closely divided parliaments. The powerful Chilean presidency was a major factor in the democratic breakdown to the extent that fundamental restructuring should not be attempted without majority support. More likely, Chile's fractious, class-based, multiparty system was destabilized by the polarization which overwhelmed the tradition of respect for the rules of the democratic political process. Instead of developing two similar capitalist multiclass political parties as in the United States, Chile developed six major ideological, class-based political parties: the Conservatives, Liberals, Radicals, Communists, Socialists, and Christian Democrats. As long as the political center dominated the regime and institutional legitimacy was maintained, democracy continued to function. When President Eduardo Frei vastly raised the political expectations of the poor and marginally poor through his agrarian reform and expansion of social welfare services, these expectations created demands for income and social services which a stagnating economy could not satisfy. These demands also constituted a threat to the ruling middle class.

The white Basque-Castilian aristocracy first ruled Chile and continued to control the presidency until 1920. This aristocracy developed oligarchic democracy before the development of a large urban middle class, which conventional wisdom would require for democratization. When the early mining industry produced the beginnings of a middle class bourgeoisie, it was the aristocracy which incorporated the new class through the adoption of the Electoral Reform Act of 1874, which increased the electorate from 22,000 in 1863 to 50,000 in 1872 to 150,000 in 1874.⁸ Middle class politicians now had access to congress-

⁸ J. Samuel Valenzuela, *Democratización vía reforma: La expansión del sufragio en Chile*, (Buenos Aires: Ediciones del IDES, 1985).

sional and ministerial careers. But industrial and rural social relations remained repressive. The working conditions of industrial workers produced much labor strife beginning early in the twentieth century as the working class found its political voice in the Communist Party. In fact, the working class was never fully represented in the presidency until the Allende government in 1971. Rural relations were based on the traditional landlord-peasant relationship until the 1960s agrarian reform by the Christian Democrats.

Barbara Stallings (1978) has constructed an elegant theory on the role of class conflict in Chile as the cause of the democratic breakdown.⁹ The 1958-64 administration of Jorge Alessandri marked the decadence of orthodox conservative middle and upper class rule as it collapsed in the exhaustion phase of import-substitution industrialization. The economy experienced prolonged stagnation and high inflation. The election of Eduardo Frei in 1964 marked the coming to power of a new breed of middle class technocrats who saw a vision of a dynamic new center party capable of capturing a majority of the electorate and ruling Chile for a generation. This new middle class rule sought to incorporate marginal-income urban dwellers into its coalition, bringing it into direct competition with the Communists and Socialists. The 1967 recession marked the turning point for the middle class technocrats. The frustration of raised expectations exploded in a wave of political demands upon a regime which could not satisfy them. These demands constituted a threat to middle class rule. The threat to the regime inflamed the increasing political polarization, strengthening the left and right at the expense of the collapsing center. The middle and upper class conservatives, outraged and betrayed by the Christian Democrats, reconstituted their political party under the National banner. The two-man presidential contest of 1964 which resulted in Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei's 56% landslide was not to be repeated.

⁹ Barbara J. Stallings, *Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile, 1958-1973*, (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1978) 227-240.

Socialist Salvador Allende, with overwhelming working class support, won election in an apparent historical accident. Allende could not have won in a two-man race. The accidental victory of the working class and Allende's determination to force a socialist transformation based on a 36% plurality seriously aggravated the already dangerous political polarization. His ill-conceived inflationary and redistributionist income policies destabilized the economy. Moreover, the working class did not fully appreciate the power of a middle class mobilized for class warfare and determined to induce the intervention of the armed forces. In Stallings's thesis, the workers were preoccupied with inflation-indexed wage increases, thereby making Allende's political life increasingly miserable. The workers were preoccupied with wage issues rather than supporting and defending their own government. In the end, in political tactics and strategy, the workers were no match for the middle class.

A large number of Chileans continue to be poor. A study by the Roman Catholic institute ILADES in December 1985 surveyed a representative sample of 4,000 households. It defined 55% as poor because they earned less than double the minimum subsistence cost--about \$20 per person per month--of feeding themselves properly. Of those 55% of the sample, 30% were classified as indigent, that is, their incomes did not reach their minimum food costs. The 55% poverty figure compares with a 1970 poverty percentage of 17% poor and 6% indigent by the same standards.¹⁰

¹⁰ILADES, (Santiago: n.p., 1985).

THE PARLIAMENTARY REPUBLIC

By international standards, the 1891 Chilean Civil War was a rather genteel affair, concluded in four months with a minimum loss of life. In 1891, five years after Colonel Körner's arrival, President José Manuel Balmaceda attempted to limit the size of the standing Army to 6,000 men in order to divert additional scarce resources to the Navy. To the newly institutionally-conscious Army officer corps, this was an intolerable civilian interference with the Army's institutional prerogatives. Balmaceda's enemies in Congress, seething over his autocratic governing style, his support of social and budget reforms, and his anti-clericalism, seized on the issue to provoke civil war. A majority of Congress voted to depose Balmaceda. Balmaceda responded by ruling by decree. Ironically, Congress enlisted the support of the Navy in its campaign to oust the President. The civil war split the Army. A majority of Army officers pledged loyalty to the President, but Körner, who had dreams of expanding the Army to 100,000 men, joined the rebels. Körner's mastery of modern strategy and tactics, and the Balmaceda government's inability to supply an adequate number of Army troops in the field, led to the victory of the Congressional forces. The 1891 Civil War marked the most serious military intervention to date in the civil affairs of the country.

The 1891 Civil War fundamentally transformed the government. It marked the death of the Portalian presidentialist republic and ushered in the new period of the parliamentary republic. From 1891 until the collapse of the parliamentary republic in 1924, the presidency was reduced to a ceremonial role with the Cabinet, acting as the government, being directly responsible to Congress. The new government promoted Körner to Brigadier General and appointed him chief of the general staff, in addition to his command of the War Academy. He opened a major drive to professionalize and institutionalize the Chilean Army. Körner introduced the Prussian-German general staff system in Chile and began by sending many of his officers to study in Germany.

Though the unified German Empire after 1871 was theoretically a constitutional monarchy, the kaiser had direct control of the Army as supreme war lord. The German general staff served as the High Command in wartime and as a national security planning staff in peacetime. It was composed not of field commanders, but of Army generals who were trained as strategists, academicians, and administrators. Their bureaucratic-administrative role gave them the freedom to develop strategies and theories in military science which enhanced the professionalism of the officer corps and the stature of the military institution. Among these strategies was General von Schlieffen's plan, a swift offensive attack plan against France's Maginot Line, which was developed as the blueprint for a military confrontation which the general staff envisioned with Britain and France. The consolidation of the imperial German general staff as a military institution ultimately undermined civilian control of the armed forces by bringing it into direct competition with the civilian officials of the War Ministry for political power. The general staff came to value military professionalism and loyalty to the institution as essential to national security, and therefore above loyalty to constitutionalism. The Körner reforms were to have far-reaching and serious implications for the Chilean state and society. Samuel Huntington has documented the structure, functions, and processes of the imperial German general staff.

Civilian power was concentrated in the hands of the Kaiser and his Chancellor while military authority was divided among a multiplicity of offices. The Reichstag never played more than a mildly harassing role in military affairs, and its efforts to increase parliamentary control over military policy were never strong enough to undermine civilian control. The officer corps, moreover, was unconditionally pledged to the Emperor, and by so binding itself, forswore the possibilities of enhancing its power by playing executive off against legislature. Military authority, on the other hand, was divided first between the Army and Navy and then further subdivided within each service. Each had a tripartite headquarters organization consisting of:

- (1) a ministry, normally headed by a professional officer, and concerned with the administrative, political, and logistical aspects of the service;
- (2) a cabinet, also headed by an officer, and occupied with personnel matters; and

(3) a staff, devoted to the planning of military operations.

None of these headquarters had command authority over the fleets and Army corps. Consequently, the six chiefs of the headquarters offices, plus the commanding generals and commanding admirals, all reported directly to the Kaiser, who was thus able to pick and choose from the military advice offered him. In addition, there was considerable rivalry in the Army among the War Ministry, the Military Cabinet, and the General Staff. The Ministry had initially been the dominant institution, but in the course of the nineteenth century, first the Military Cabinet and then the General Staff acquired pre-eminence. Eventually, of course, the General Staff was to dominate completely. . .

The effects of the limited scope and multiplicity of military authority were counterbalanced by the high level of that authority. All the top military leaders had the right to direct access (*Immediatstellung*) to the Kaiser as Supreme War Lord which weakened vertical controls over the military. Since the Kaiser was dependent upon their advice, the military chiefs, except to the extent that they disagreed among themselves, possessed almost complete autonomy and could run their institutions without external interference.¹¹

MILITARY INTERVENTION

The powerful Portalian presidentialist republic was replaced by the unstable parliamentary republic of 1891-1924. By 1906, Chile was the leading land and sea power in South America. Army officers from all over South America were sent to Santiago for training. In the years following 1906, Chile entered a long period of political and economic decline. The parliamentary republic coincided with the expansion of the urban working classes, which depended on Chile's fledgling nitrate and copper mining industries for employment. The parliamentary regime adopted democratic forms but maintained its aristocratic substance as the oligarchy gradually gave way to a coalition with the rising middle class. While labor unrest increased in the cities, the aristocracy was jolted by the rise of

¹¹Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, (1957; reprint, New York: Harvard UP, 1967) 102-3.

Marxism-Leninism in Russia in 1917. By 1920, the collapse of the nitrate and copper markets brought economic depression.

The Chilean Army was crushed and disillusioned by Germany's defeat in 1918. In the years after 1906, parliamentary politicians had gradually reduced the military budget to such a degree that neighboring Argentina, Brazil, and Peru forged ahead in training and equipment. Chilean military prestige and morale plunged to their lowest level in history by 1920. Disgruntled officers were largely divided into two generational groups:

- (1) the older high command, who were traditionally conservative nonpolitical officers who supported the parliamentary regime; and
- (2) the younger politicized officers educated in the Körner period who sought to reverse the political decline of the country and the Army by restoring the powerful Portalian presidentialist system.

In 1919, the government discovered a conspiracy involving Army and Navy officers to topple the parliamentary republic and restore the Portalian presidentialist republic.

President Juan Luis Sanfuentes, the last of the Basque-Castilian aristocratic Presidents, declined to support the conspiracy. Sixty military officers were tried and convicted of conspiracy. The Army's latest intervention in the political process had been a humiliating failure.

In the 1920s, a number of forces were at work to bring the Army into the political process:

- (1) the political and economic collapse of the country;
- (2) the final collapse of the ruling Basque-Castilian aristocracy as a ruling oligarchy;
- (3) the existence of politicized professional organizations within the Army;
- (4) a resentment against civilian politics, politicians, and political parties; and
- (5) the feeling of humiliation of the once-proud Chilean military tradition.

In 1920, Arturo Alessandri of the Liberal Alliance was elected President. Alessandri promised a modern labor code and low-income housing for workers to mitigate the harsh working conditions of the burgeoning working class and to defuse Marxist agitation. To the growing middle class he also pledged expanded public health and welfare services, public education, and women's suffrage. In essence, Alessandri promised to build a modern capitalist welfare state. Alessandri, an Italo-Chilean and the first President to rise from the burgeoning new bourgeoisie class, won a closely contested election. Promising political, economic, and social reform, younger politicized military officers accepted Alessandri as one of their own. For his part, Alessandri went out of his way to seek military support for his programs. But Chile was in the midst of an unprecedented political and economic crisis. The collapse of the nitrate market plunged the economy into depression and mass unemployment and left the government in the dangerous position of being unable to meet the payroll for government employees including civil servants and soldiers. The corrupt and patronage-ridden Congress effectively blocked Alessandri's program. With the government bankrupt and government employees unpaid for several months, the Congress was absorbed in passing salaries for its members.

In September 1924, a committee of politicized Army, Navy and police officers formed the Military and Naval Junta (JMN). In an implicit threat to Congress, they protested the congressional salary bill and presented Alessandri with a petition demanding that the conservative Congress pass Alessandri's blocked reform program. Alessandri attempted to get in front of the military movement in forcing the conservative Congress to pass his program, but he was never in control of it. When the junta refused to disband, Alessandri resigned and left the country. This began a period of unstable successive governments. By December 1924, the JMN had forced Congress to pass most of the Alessandri program. The liberal democratic Constitution of 1925 was adopted and symbolized the end of rule by the aristocracy and the consolidation of middle class rule.

A professional officer class will not become political on its own or fall under the influence of political officers unless several forces are at work. These forces are social, political, and economic distress unameliorated by a government which may or may not be representative of an unsuitable political system; professional self-consciousness or sense of identity engendered by specialized training and distinguishable status; some kind of recognized leadership group within the officer class; some kind of model, goal, or sense of mission to inspire military political action; and resentment of civilian politics, politicians, and parties to the point of wanting to punish or purge them. . . All these forces were at work in Chile early in the century, at no time more forcefully than during Alessandri's first term in office.¹²

The social welfare reforms were not enough to quell serious labor unrest. The Chilean Congress responded by electing Colonel Carlos Ibáñez President in 1927. Ibáñez established an authoritarian military regime which expanded public works projects, sought foreign loans and investment, and increased the military budget. But the Ibáñez government was not successful in attacking economic stagnation. The Great Depression of the 1930s brought renewed economic collapse in Chile and Ibáñez was forced to resign in 1931. In June 1932, a group of left-wing Air Force officers created the Socialist Republic. This quixotic group was led by the romantic Air Commodore Marmaduke Grove, who was moved by a genuine sense of justice and compassion for the poor. Grove was unable to consolidate armed forces support and the experiment was quietly ended in September 1932. The fall of the Socialist Republic marked the end of direct military rule for the next forty-one years until 11 September 1973.

Chile's tendency to develop a class-based, multi-party system continued with the development of the Communist and Socialist Parties. The Communist Party, founded in 1912, was a truly working class phenomenon which gained its support from the mining regions and dominated the National Labor Confederation (CUT). The Communists followed the Marxist-Leninist leadership of the Soviet Communist Party, although the Chilean

¹²Frederick M. Nunn, *The Military in Chilean History*, (Albuquerque: U of New Mexico P, 1976) 130-31.

Communists confined themselves to labor agitation rather than political revolution. The Socialist Party, founded in 1932 by Colonel Grove, was a predominantly lower-middle class party formed of a heterogeneous collection of Marxists, Trotskyites, anarcho-syndicalists, and other assorted leftists not fitting the disciplined Communist mold.

In 1932, Arturo Alessandri of the Liberal Alliance was again elected President, pledging to restore economic order and introducing a new economic development model: import-substitution industrialization (ISI) or dependent capitalist development. This is development dependent on foreign capital investment and capital goods to manufacture consumables and consumer durables for domestic consumption.

Latin American rulers had two options in responding to the global economic crisis. One was to forge even closer commercial linkages to the industrialized nations in order to secure a steady share of the market, whatever its size and dislocations. . . . An alternative tack, not necessarily inconsistent with the first, was to embark on industrialization. One of the goals of this policy, often supported by the military, would be to achieve greater economic independence. The idea was that by building its own industry, Latin America would be less dependent on Europe and the United States for manufactured goods. . . .

A second purpose was to create jobs for the working classes that had continued to grow in size and importance since the beginning of the twentieth century. . . .

But the most plausible form of industrial development was not simply to copy the paths traced by, for example, nineteenth century England. Instead, Latin America's economies started producing manufactured goods that they had formerly imported from Europe and the United States. Hence the name for this type of development, "import-substituting industrialization" (ISI).¹³

Alessandri was succeeded in 1938 by the first Radical President, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, running as a center-left Popular Front candidate in a coalition with the Communists and Socialists. The Radical government embraced import-substitution industrialization and inaugurated the Corporation for Development and Production (CORFO), the state agency

¹³Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America*, (New York: Oxford UP, 1984) 57-58.

which provided most of the nation's investment capital for private industry. With the election of the first Radical President, the middle class Radical Party became at the same time the largest political party and the largest party of the political center, with the working class Communists and lower middle class Socialists on the left and the aristocratic Conservatives and Liberals on the right.

During the 1930s and through the Second World War, copper prices rose steadily and production skyrocketed. The import-substitution industrialization economic model finally exhausted itself in the 1950s. In the aftermath of the end of the Second World War, copper prices fell and the economy stagnated once again, experiencing chronic inflation and increasing labor unrest in the working class. In 1948, in the wake of the Cold War, Radical President Gabriel González Videla dissolved the Popular Front coalition and outlawed the Communist Party. The Communists would be relegalized in 1958. In 1952, General Carlos Ibáñez made a political comeback and was elected President promising to solve all of Chile's problems, but distinguished himself by his ineffectiveness and a *penchant* for political intrigues. In 1955, a group of politicized Army officers formed *Línea Recta* (Straight Line), which urged Ibáñez to purge all officers who did not pledge absolute personal loyalty to him and urged him to resort to authoritarian rule with Army support to restore economic stability and social discipline. Ibáñez could not make up his mind and ended up discrediting himself with both constitutionalist and institutionalist officers.

IMPORT-SUBSTITUTION INDUSTRIALIZATION

Primary product industrialization was dominant in Latin America and in Chile throughout the first half of the twentieth century when the ruling oligarchy was content to sell its copper and nitrates to the booming world market during the First World War and the 1920s. This boom period was followed by the devastating depression period of the 1930s and the collapse of the copper and nitrate markets. The Second World War brought a booming recovery, but by this time the expanded ruling elites, now including the entrepreneurial middle class, sought to diversify the Chilean economy by initiating the new phase of import-substitution industrialization (ISI) or dependent capitalist development, whereby investment in capital goods of plant and equipment designed to produce consumables and consumer durable goods for the domestic market would reduce Chile's dependence on foreign imports.

Economic diversification is but one step in the process of the vertical integration of production in an industrial economy. Often referred to as "deepening of industrialization," vertical integration is the development, modernization and coordination of primary, intermediate, and secondary product industries to produce consumables, durables, intermediate products, and capital goods for the domestic market. Under ISI, the emphasis is on the production of intermediate and capital goods production. Historically, ISI has experienced an initial period of rapid growth as consumer goods are absorbed by the domestic market. These consumer goods are in great demand as they come onto the market, since they have not previously been available in large quantities at affordable prices. The national government places strict tariffs and import restrictions on foreign consumer goods to make domestic goods more competitive and attractive to the consumer. Once the domestic market is saturated with domestically-produced consumer goods, ISI enters the stagnation phase of slow growth and limited expansion.

First, industrialization through ISI was structurally incomplete. To produce manufactured goods, Latin American firms continually had to rely on imported capital goods [such as machine tools] from Europe, the United States, and now Japan . . . Second, the national demand for manufactured products was inevitably limited. Industries ran up against a lack of buyers, at least at prevailing prices and credit terms. . . Third, and closely related, was the relatively high degree of technology involved in Latin American industry. This meant that it could create only a limited number of jobs for workers. In other words, Latin American industrial development in this era had picked up the capital-intensive technology typical of the advanced industrial economies: in comparison to nineteenth century models of growth, it entailed more investments in machines and fewer in manual labor.¹⁴

Diversification of industry and research and development require massive amounts of capital investment. The economy experiences the crisis of recession and unemployment. In periods of recession, the government attempts to maintain orthodox economic stimulation policies for the production sector by inviting foreign capital investment to expand productive capacity and to encourage capital accumulation, infrastructure development, and job creation. At the same time, unemployed workers demand relief for lost income. Demands for income redistribution must be paid for out of the profits of the production sector, which is interested only in its right to practice free enterprise. This creates the politically explosive zero-sum economic crisis in which the economic benefits of one sector represent an immediate loss to another sector. Liberal democratic constitutionalism does not have an easy answer for the instability of the stagnation phase of import-substitution industrialization. Chilean ISI was exhausted in the 1950s. Writing in 1967, José Nun foresaw the collapse of Chilean democracy under just these conditions.

[T]he Chilean economy has been virtually stagnant since 1954. In these circumstances, it seems safe to assume that, in the short term, stability will be maintained as long as the government succeeds in preserving a compromise with the higher levels of the urban wage-earning sector . . . It is, therefore, probable that the pressures exercised by the lower strata of the urban and rural proletariat will become stronger in the future and--if the government fails to satisfy their demands--may cause breakdown of the stability which a lim-

¹⁴Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America* (1984) 60-61.

ited degree of democracy has made possible in Chile. Thus conditions would again favour a middle-class military coup, the possibility of which was widely rumoured when an electoral triumph of the Frente de Acción Popular was feared [in 1958].¹⁵

The exhaustion of the import-substitution industrialization economic development model in the 1950s and the stagnation and inflation of the 1960s led to a profound political crisis. Chilean political institutions were unable to produce a stable political consensus capable of guiding the country through a reform period during its mobilization and incorporation of the popular sector into a new ruling coalition with the middle and upper classes. The expressed policy of Allende to create a socialist revolution through the redistribution of income from the middle and upper classes to the working class produced a threat to the ruling classes so great that it produced a "termination consensus" to abandon the existing rules of the democratic process in favor of direct political combat to the death. This was a confrontation that the working class, preoccupied with wages and working conditions, was not prepared for. Under conditions of economic stagnation and a zero-sum economy, the lower and working classes confront the middle and upper classes under conditions of increasing political polarization in an effort to lay claim to their rightful share of the national income. Under a democratic regime, the middle and upper classes will attempt to incorporate whatever sectors they can and will repress those sectors which they cannot incorporate through their control of police, intelligence services, and the armed forces. This leads to the political polarization of one sector or social class against another and can result in violent confrontation. Samuel Huntington terms this condition *mass praetorianism*.

In all societies, specialized social groups engage in politics. What makes such groups seem more 'politicized' in a praetorian society is the absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group political action. In a praetorian system social forces confront each other nakedly; no political institutions, no corps of professional political

¹⁵José Nun in Claudio Veliz, ed., "The Middle-Class Military Coup," *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America*, (New York: Oxford UP, 1967).

leaders are recognized or accepted as legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict. Equally important, no agreement exists among the groups as to the legitimate and authoritative methods for resolving conflicts. . . In a praetorian society, however, not only are the actors varied, but so also are the methods used to decide upon office and policy. Each group employs means which reflect its particular nature and capabilities. The wealthy bribe; students riot; workers strike; and the military coup.¹⁶

In 1958, Jorge Alessandri, the son of the former President Arturo Alessandri, was elected President with strong support from the middle and upper classes. Alessandri, an independent supported by the traditional rightist Liberal and Conservative Parties, promised economic stabilization and growth through orthodox economic policies. Alessandri made stunning progress against inflation, bringing it down from 33% in 1958 to 7% in 1961. Unfortunately, his economic growth policy, fueled by domestic and foreign investment, was a failure. The middle and upper classes simply failed to produce an adequate level of capital accumulation. This forced the state to become the primary source of investment capital. By 1964, inflation was back up to a disastrous 46% while the economy continued to stagnate.

EDUARDO FREI

In 1964, the political right, sensing danger from the Socialist-Communist coalition candidacy of Salvador Allende, formed an alliance with the centrist Christian Democratic Party. The Christian Democratic Party was founded in the 1950s as a dynamic new progressive Catholic party. It challenged the stagnant Radical Party for the leadership of the center. Christian Democrats were predominantly middle class professionals, technocrats, and intellectuals who sought to apply Keynesian economic theories and agrarian reforms to expand economic production, health and educational services, and improve living standards

¹⁶Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven: Yale UP, 1968) 196.

in the rural sector. With much covert funding from the US Central Intelligence Agency, Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei won an overwhelming 56.1% victory over the left's 38.9%. Frei's "Revolution in Liberty" program saw profound political, economic and social reforms including the Chileanization of the American-owned copper mines and land reform. The period also saw the rise of the working class as a major political force in the country, directly challenging the economic power of the middle and upper classes. The period was characterized by rising tensions within the armed forces over low salaries and poor equipment, and also over the impending prospect of left-wing rule in 1970 presidential election.

Frei saw economic growth and social reform as mutually dependent, for expanded tax revenues from a more dynamic private sector would be required to finance expanded social welfare benefits for the underclass and working classes. Continued government investment in infrastructure and public works would be required to make up for the historically anemic investment from the private sector. Frei was able to raise wages for the poorest sectors without additional inflationary pressure because of excess idle capacity in the industrial sector. The agrarian reform was designed to improve rural living conditions and increase agricultural productivity. From 1965-70, 3.2 million *hectáres* of land were expropriated, of which 265,000 were irrigated. Frei pledged that "the efficient producer who does not amass land, who produces and complies with the law" would not be expropriated¹⁷.

The 1967 recession began to spell the end of the Frei period. The recession brought decreased government revenues. The promised expanded social welfare services had proven far more costly to implement than the government had anticipated. The cost of

¹⁷Eduardo Frei (1964) 51. Translated in Michael Fleet, *The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1985).

the land reform resettlement had also become exorbitant. The Frei government began to backtrack. The Christian Democratic Party fragmented into factions. The conservative Frei *Oficialista* faction in the government called for slowing down the reforms and holding the line against inflation. The left-wing *Rebelde* faction began to attack the slow pace of the reforms. A third social democratic *Tercerista* faction tried to reconcile the other two. The economy continued to stagnate in 1968 and 1969.

Under Eduardo Frei, it became evident that the system's low capacity to convert internal and external resources into physical, human, and institutional capital remained the foremost bottleneck to growth and economic independence. The transformation policies required increasing national savings, sacrifices, and investment. Neither Eduardo Frei's policies towards this end, nor the response to these policies by the people, was of a magnitude close to the one needed for success.¹⁸

In May 1969, the left-wing *Rebelde* faction broke with the party. Frei had sought to lead the Christian Democrats to majority-party rule, without resorting to the tradition of seeking coalition support. But Frei's bold political strategy backfired because he assumed that his landslide 1964 election victory constituted a permanent majoritarian constituency. In fact, he had failed to convert confirmed rightists from the Liberal, Conservative, and Radical parties, and also failed to convert diehard leftists from the Socialist and Communist parties.

Civil-military tensions reached a new high during Frei's administration. Since the professionalization of the armed forces beginning in 1886, civilians and military men had grown far apart and developed in separate worlds. They developed separate cultures and class consciousness. In the nineteenth century, officers were drawn from the aristocracy and moved with ease from amateur commander on the battlefield to lord of the manor in peacetime. In the twentieth century, officers entered a hermetically sealed world in youth when they entered the military academy and lived a life cut off from civilian influences.

¹⁸Markos Mamalakis, *The Growth and Structure of the Chilean Economy from Independence to Allende*, (New Haven: Yale UP, 1976) 243.

Furthermore, military men viewed civilian professionals with suspicion and hostility, considered them decadent, and reserved a special disdain for politicians. The civilian professionals viewed the low-paid soldiers and officers alike as lower class government employees; undesirable but utilitarian. President Frei's administration was staffed with many middle and upper class young Christian Democratic urban professionals, some foreign-educated, who could not identify with the military culture. While the military percentage of the gross domestic product remained relatively stable in the 1950s and 60s, the military percentage of the national budget declined steadily with the military standard of living.¹⁹ Frei paid for his expanded social welfare services by cutting the military budget. General Carlos Prats González, commander in chief of the Army, 1970-73, later wrote that Frei had "committed a grave historic error" by reducing military expenditures. By the 1960s, military salaries were so low that many officers in senior grades had to moonlight by holding second jobs such as driving taxis in order to support their families. Chilean military officers remember the 1960s as a period of institutional demoralization and personal humiliation. The military profession had become the career of the sons of the middle class. Very few sons of the upper class chose a military career in the 1960s. Military men despised the rabble-raising left-wing working class and envied the lifestyle of the middle and upper classes, but saw themselves increasingly squeezed out of the middle class and into the lower middle class. With tensions between the civilian and military sectors running high, conditions were ripe for a breakdown in civil-military relations.²⁰

On 21 October 1969, General Roberto Viaux led an uprising of the Tacna and Yungay regiments in Santiago. Known as the *Tacnazo*, the uprising took control of the regimental headquarters, the main arsenal, the noncommissioned officer's school, and the

¹⁹See Table 7.

²⁰See Table 6.

main recruiting center. General Viaux pledged loyalty to President Frei, but demanded higher salaries and better equipment. He also demanded the resignations of Defense Minister Tulio Marambio, himself a retired general, and the commander in chief of the Army, General Sergio Castillo. Frei replaced both Marambio and Castillo, agreed to all demands, and the *Tacnazo* peaceably dissolved. In replacing General Castillo, however, Frei reached far down the seniority list to appoint General René Schneider Chereau, seventh in seniority, as the new commander in chief of the Army. Schneider's appointment forced the retirements of six highly-respected senior officers suspected of disloyalty to the President: Generals Ramón Valdés, René Sagredo, Emilio Cheyre, Alfredo Carvajal, Alfredo Mahn, and Jorge Rodríguez. This was, in effect, a legal presidential purge of the Corps of Generals. The *Tacnazo* was the most serious breach of military discipline since the 1930s and it reverberated in the highly-charged political atmosphere for months. Coup rumors resulted in actual arrests of military officers, but the substance of these events was never made public.

In the aftermath of the 1969 Tacna uprising, General Schneider, a firm constitutionalist, pledged to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of power no matter who was elected President in 1970. He firmly rejected all overtures to join in a military conspiracy to seize power to prevent the election of the Marxist Salvador Allende.

General Schneider: "I insist that our doctrine and mission are to respect and uphold the Constitution. According to the Constitution, Congress is authority and sovereign in the case mentioned, and our mission is to assure that its decision is respected."

Question: "And if that results in a situation of serious internal turmoil that could degenerate into something even worse?"

General Schneider: "If an irregular situation arises, our obligation is to prevent it from impeding compliance with the Constitution. The Army will guarantee the constitutional verdict."²¹

²¹Quoted in *El Mercurio*, 8 May 1970. Translated in Genaro Arriagada, *Pinochet: The Politics of Power* (1988).

General Schneider's commitment to defend the Constitution and to guarantee the constitutional verdict of the electorate became known as the Schneider Doctrine.

SALVADOR ALLENDE

On 4 September 1970, Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens, leading the Marxist Popular Unity coalition of Socialist, Communist, Left Radical, and several minor leftist parties, won the presidency of Chile with a plurality of 36.6% of the vote. The rightist National Party candidate, former President Jorge Alessandri (1958-64), won 35.2%, while the ruling centrist Christian Democratic Party candidate, Radomiro Tomic, trailed with 28.1%.²² Allende had outpolled the Nationals by only 39,000 votes out of two million cast. Failing to obtain a majority, Allende had carried the working class and the industrial cities of the north. The Nationals had carried the middle and upper classes and had carried metropolitan Santiago by 41,000 votes, while the Christian Democrats had carried the port of Valparaiso, Chile's second city.

Although Allende won more than any other candidate, the relative clarity of his ideological position made him, at the same time, the last choice of the majority.²³

Allende had actually won a higher percentage of the vote in his 1964 two-man race when he won his high-water mark of 38.9% to Eduardo Frei's 56.1%.

²²Electoral Registry, Santiago.

²³James Prothro and Patricio E. Chaparro in Arturo and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., *Chile: Politics and Society*, (New Brunswick, NJ: n.p., 1976) 88-89.

Perhaps most important of all, survey research demonstrated that Allende could win only in a three-way race. . . Had Alessandri (or any other candidate of his stature) run in a three-way race in 1964, Allende might well have won six years ahead of time; had Tomic withdrawn in 1970, in all probability Allende would have lost.²⁴

TABLE 1
CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS, 1952-1970

1952	Carlos Ibáñez	Independent	46.8%
	Arturo Matte	Right	27.8
	Pedro E. Alfonso	Center	19.9
	Salvador Allende	Left	5.5
1958	Jorge Alessandri	Right	31.6
	Salvador Allende	Left	28.9
	Eduardo Frei	Center-Left	20.7
	Luis Bossay	Center-Right	15.6
	Antonio Zamorano	Left	3.3
1964	Eduardo Frei	Center-Right	56.1
	Salvador Allende	Left	38.9
	Julio Durán	Center-Right	5.0
1970	Salvador Allende	Left	36.6
	Jorge Alessandri	Right	35.2
	Radomiro Tomic	Center	28.1

Source: Electoral Registry, Santiago. Reproduced from James W. Prothro and Patricio E. Chaparro in Valenzuela and Valenzuela, *Chile: Politics and Society*, 1976, 91.

Under the 1925 Constitution, Allende's minority plurality required ratification by the Congress. Political maneuvering and jockeying began immediately and continued on into October, with Allende trying to strike a bargain with the Christian Democrats. But Allende's ratification would not come easily. On 30 September, the Assembly of the

²⁴Mark Falcoff, *Modern Chile 1970-1989*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1989) 17-18.

Christian Democratic Party agreed to vote for Allende's ratification provided that Allende's Popular Unity Coalition agree to a series of congressionally-mandated constitutional amendments which came to be known as the Statute of Democratic Guarantees.

The Statute of Democratic Guarantees was an attempt to bind Allende publicly and explicitly to what he had always supported verbally, the maintenance of the norms of pluralistic constitutional democracy. It seemed to guarantee to the opposition that Chile could not become another Cuba by means of a similar process of takeover of the trade unions, universities, political parties, and the media. Of particular importance in the maintenance of these guarantees was the independence and commitment to the constitution of the armed forces, since both sides understood that if constitutional norms were respected, the military would remain out of politics, however much they might disagree with Allende's policies. If, on the other hand, the more extreme elements among Allende's supporters . . . were to bring about a situation in which Allende might be tempted to violate the guarantees, the military could appeal to the constitution in preventing or dissuading him from such a move.²⁵

The Statute of Democratic Guarantees was yet another piece of legislation which institutionalized the moderating, arbitrating role of the armed forces in the political process. It constituted an abdication of civilian authority and its delegation to military arbitration and political deliberation.

Meanwhile, on 22 October 1970, General Schneider was assassinated by right-wing conspirators in an abortive US-backed coup attempt. This coup attempt was directly encouraged and supported by US President Richard Nixon through the Central Intelligence Agency from early September through 22 October 1970.²⁶ Between 5 and 20 October 1970, the CIA contacted twenty-one selected Chilean military and police officers and delivered submachine guns to the group planning to kidnap General Schneider.²⁷ The guns

²⁵Paul Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976*, (Pittsburgh: U of Pittsburgh P, 1977) 84.

²⁶Seymour M. Hersh, *The Price of Power*, (New York: Summit Books, 1983) 258-296.

²⁷U.S. Congress, Senate, 94th Congress, First Session, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, (Washington: GPO, 1975) 244.

were delivered in US State Department diplomatic pouches which enjoyed diplomatic immunity from Chilean customs police. A subsequent inquiry by a Chilean military court was unable to identify the actual guns used in the attack on Schneider as American-supplied.²⁸ Schneider was the highest-ranking Chilean to be assassinated since Diego Portales in 1837. The assassination occasioned much public outrage and greatly strengthened the hand of the constitutionalist generals.

In appointing a successor to the late General Schneider, President Frei now reached down the seniority list to General Carlos Prats, fifth in seniority. This forced the retirements of Generals Camilo Valenzuela, Francisco Gorioitía, Eduardo Arriagada, and José Larraín—all suspected of disloyalty. The appointments to commander in chief of the Army of General Schneider in 1969 and General Prats in 1970 resulted in the forced retirement of ten generals in one year's time. This represented an unprecedented presidential purge of the Corps of Generals. General Prats, a loyal protégé of General Schneider, was a committed constitutionalist and pledged to continue the Schneider Doctrine.

On 24 October 1970, the Christian Democrats threw their support to Allende and the Congress declared Allende President by a vote of 153 in favor, 35 against, and 7 abstentions. Allende was inaugurated on 3 November 1970 pledging that his Popular Unity government would transform Chile from a liberal democratic capitalist social order to a Marxist socialist order within the country's established constitutional-legal structure and processes. Allende and his Marxist coalition partners were under no illusions that a Cuban-style violent revolutionary overthrow of the ruling middle and upper classes could be possible in Chile. For one thing, Chile enjoyed one of the most stable democratic traditions in Latin America. For another, the armed forces would not tolerate internal subversion. The Army, Navy, and Air Force were well-trained and well-equipped. The Carabineros, the

²⁸Ibid, 226.

paramilitary national police force, while not a part of the armed forces per se, were under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, and were sufficient to maintain the authority of the civil power without the intervention of the armed forces. Allende began on very good terms with the armed forces. President Frei had appointed General Carlos Prats González, fifth in line of seniority after General Schneider, as commander in chief of the Army on Allende's recommendation. Allende then appointed Admiral Raúl Montero, second in seniority, as Navy commander, and appointed General César Ruíz Danyau, third in seniority, as Air Force commander. These appointments were well-received as well within traditional bounds, and indicated that there would be no purge of the armed forces

The Allende government's program concentrated on redistribution of national income, agrarian reform, and nationalization of the copper industry. The redistribution of income was accomplished through an inflationary policy of large wage increases for workers and government deficit spending in order to stimulate the economy. It was aimed at increasing support for the government among industrial workers and rural farm workers. The government intervened to take over farms which had been illegally seized and occupied by leftist extremist farm workers, rather than escalate the already increasing political violence by using paramilitary force to return the property to its owners. This compromise of the principles of rule of law and private property constituted a threat to the middle and upper classes, which began looking to the armed forces for protection.

The nationalization of the American-owned ITT, Anaconda Copper, and Kennecott Copper investments was accomplished through a constitutional amendment with compensation to be paid over thirty years at an interest rate of 3%. By 1973, 35% of the total agricultural area was under state control and 30% of the national industrial production had been nationalized. Ninety percent of bank credit and 33% of wholesale distribution were

also under the control of the government.²⁹ Large wage increases and government spending led to triple-digit inflation by 1973. The deterioration of the economy during the transformation from capitalism to socialism contributed to increasing political polarization and violence as right-wing and left-wing extremists armed themselves for imminent political combat. By September 1973, Allende's government was besieged by a wave of strikes, demonstrations, counter-demonstrations, shortages, hyperinflation, and terrorism.

THE POPULAR UNITY GOVERNMENT AND THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS

The Popular Unity (UP) government's relations with the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) can be identified in three separate phases:

- (1) The Loyal Opposition Phase ran from September 1970 to September 1971.
- (2) The Hardline Opposition Phase ran from September 1971 to March 1973.
- (3) The Total Warfare Phase ran from March 1973 to September 1973.

The Loyal Opposition Phase was identified by the ascendance of Left Christian Democrats, the *Rebelde* and *Tercerista* factions which, though Christian and democratic, identified with Allende's socialist egalitarianism and sought an accommodation which was eagerly sought by Allende. Allende's more cynical Socialist and Communist Party strategists sought to incorporate leftist and some moderate social democratic Christian Democrats into a solid Popular Unity majority against the conservative Frei *Oficialista* Christian Democrats and the traditional rightist parties. A few keen observers saw, if not a permanent UP-PDC accommodation, at least an opportunity to preserve the constitutional order. PDC Deputy Pedro Felipe Ramírez warned the PDC to work with Allende:

²⁹Paul E. Sigmond, *The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976*, (1977), 107.

From even before the election we have been saying that the failure of the Allende government would lead Chileans to times as bitter as those through which the Uruguayan people have lived in recent years, under a repressive and dictatorial government, with an economy in collapse, and in a state of generalized violence. All possibility of change, even from the standpoint of building a socialism of the sort advocated by Christian Democracy, would be postponed for many years. There is no Christian Democratic "alternative" at the present time because there is no "alternative" [other than Allende] for the country.³⁰

Allende was critically wounded from that start by his inability to control his militant Socialist and Communist Party leaders and his inability to escape their control. They would not allow the accommodation with the Christian Democrats that Allende so fervently desired, yet they desperately required the support of Christian Democrats for the survival of the Allende government. Communist Party Leader Luís Corvalán wrote:

We wish to prevent reactionary forces from continuing in power, be it through a return to power by the traditional right or the retention of power by the Christian Democratic right. That is all. And for that reason we cannot accept an understanding with the entire PDC, or better said, with all Christian Democrats, since among them are not only people who want social change, but also those who wish to bring it to a halt.³¹

Similarly, Carlos Altamirano, the leader of Allende's own Socialist Party, opposed an accommodation with the Christian Democratic Party:

At the present time, the bourgeoisie is grouped around the Christian Democrats, and secondarily around the PN [National Party] and the DR [Radical Party]. The so-called left of the DC [Christian Democracy] with its continuation in that party of its indecision, is serving as a shield for the right and the reactionary sectors which participate in the great conspiracy against the government of comrade Salvador Allende and the workers. Only a policy of profound transformations and growing acceleration of the revolutionary process will force a definition on groups of Christian Democratic workers.³²

³⁰Pedro Felipe Ramírez, *Política y Espiritu*, (1971) a, 15. Translated in Michael Fleet (1985) 128.

³¹Luís Corvalán, *Ercilla*, (1968), 12. Translated in Michael Fleet (1985) 138.

³²Carlos Altamirano, see Jobet, (1971) 2: 173. Translated in Michael Fleet (1985) 139.

Allende's fatal dilemma was that he could not govern without the support of both the Socialist and Communist Parties and he could not stay in power without an accommodation with the Christian Democratic Party. Allende's ill-fated attempts to seek an accommodation with the PDC and his party leaders' intransigent efforts to split the PDC at the same time destroyed his credibility and produced an accommodation between the PDC and the traditional right parties in hardline opposition to Allende. This opposition accommodation was his ultimate undoing.

In the Loyal Opposition Phase, the Allende government and the PDC were divided over banking reform, nationalization of industry, and agrarian reform. The government sought outright nationalization and control of the banking system while the PDC sought ownership by employees and depositors. While the government offered a compromise with the PDC, it achieved effective control of the banking system by September 1971 by buying out shareholders with generous terms and seizing control of financially-troubled banks. The effective takeover made any compromise with the PDC moot, as no legislation was now necessary. The PDC accused the government of circumventing the Congress.

In May and June 1971, the government seized control of eight of the country's largest textile firms. The PDC demanded that nationalization proposals be submitted to Congress on a case by case basis. President Allende promised to submit the appropriate enabling legislation, but the legislation was never forthcoming. The seizure of private capital by the government caused the moderate social democratic wing of the PDC to fear along with the conservative Frei wing that Allende and the Popular Unity coalition were using constitutional forms to secure totalitarian designs.

On the issue of agrarian reform, the government proposed new organizational units, Centers of Production, large state farms to be established on a limited basis, and Centers of Agrarian Reform, intermediate-sized units of several small farms. All were to be established on expropriated lands and worked by landless migrant farmers, sharecroppers, and

salaried farm laborers. While the PDC recognized the need for further agrarian reform, the Christian Democratic small peasant farmers opposed the Allende scheme, so the party was obliged to oppose it. While Popular Unity-Christian Democratic relations were steadily deteriorating over policy issues by June 1971, Socialist and Communist Party newspapers opened an assault on former President Frei over alleged financial improprieties. Frei responded by accusing the Socialist and Communists of Stalinist tactics.

The Hardline Opposition Phase of UP-PDC relations began in September 1971. The Christian Democratic Party began to mobilize itself into a hardline opposition to the Allende government. Deteriorating economic conditions gave the PDC an opening to attack the government over its economic policies. The PDC supported the March of the Empty Pots in December 1971. In January 1972, Interior Minister José Tohá, a close Allende associate and UP moderate, was impeached by the Senate and removed from office for purely political reasons. Allende immediately appointed him minister of defense.

In early 1972 Christian Democrats joined with Nationals to defeat Popular Unity candidates in two important Congressional by-elections. The defeat of the UP candidates was stunning to the Socialists and Communists because Christian Democratic workers and peasants had failed to support the UP and had sided with the middle and upper-class professionals even after improved wage levels and living standards had been delivered by Allende. Stunned by this electoral setback, the Communist Party now sought an accommodation with the PDC in March 1972. The Socialist Party, intransigently opposing any accommodation with the PDC, broke off the talks. In June 1972, it was the PDC which was no longer interested in any accommodation with the UP. In May 1972, Senator Patricio Aylwin was elected the new PDC leader, pledging a campaign of total warfare he would live to regret in later years. This began the final Total Warfare Phase of UP-PDC relations.

. . . [I]n two and a half years of government we learn once again that the Marxists only understand the language of power. In their march toward their political objectives, neither solemn commitments, nor constitutions, nor laws matter. Marxists only understand when another force opposes them.³³

A national general strike began in the trucking industry on 12 October 1972 and quickly spread to merchant groups and professional organizations. The strike was finally broken in November when Allende announced the appointment of Army commander in chief General Carlos Prats as minister of interior, Admiral Ismael Huerta as minister of public works and transport, and Air Force General Claudio Sepúlveda as minister of mines. With Christian Democratic support now gone, Allende could stay in power now only with a military vote of confidence. Failing a military vote of confidence, Allende had to at least control the Army. On 2 September 1973, the Christian Democrats voted with the Nationals to issue a resolution in Congress declaring that the Allende government had lost its constitutional legitimacy. It was, in effect, a tacit endorsement of a military coup.

The 11 September 1973 military coup against the Allende government was the result of the convergence of political, economic, and social crises which stressed the established constitutional institutions beyond their capacity to withstand the mounting pressures of political violence, economic imbalances, and social class warfare. The institutionalized deadlock created by the 1925 Constitution, which did not provide for a presidential runoff election, produced a zero-sum minority government with a 36.6% plurality. The minority Allende government was doomed as a Socialist-Communist government. The constitutional regime could have been preserved only at the price of allowing itself to be dominated by the Christian Democratic Party and expelling the intransigent factions of the Socialist and Communist Parties. This was a price the UP was not prepared to pay.

³³Patricio Aylwin, *Ercilla*, (1973) a, 9. Translated in Michael Fleet (1985) 168.

The PDC was a petit bourgeois political force that enjoyed a strong following among both blue and white collar workers. Given their class experiences and political loyalties (the two were invariably interrelated), each of these forces had reason to fear the ascendancy of the Communists and Socialists. And as the Christian Democratic party began to oppose the Allende government more frontally, its support within these sectors grew apace.

The party's dominant petit bourgeois elements were nonetheless ideologically and strategically divided. All were upset by the manner and tactics of UP militants, but some would have opposed Allende's government however tactful or discreet it might have been. . .³⁴

³⁴Michael Fleet, *The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy*, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1985) 173-4.

III. THE PINOCHET REGIME

GENERAL PINOCHET

Augusto Pinochet Ugarte was born to a middle class family of a customs officer in Valparaiso on 25 November 1915 of French-Basque and Spanish origin. He was educated at the Military Academy as a cadet in 1933-36, attended the War College in 1949-51, was postgraduate at the War College in 1967, and was a member of the High Command of the National Defense Academy in 1968. He was briefly attached to the Chilean Military Mission in Washington, DC in 1956. He was a specialist in military geography, geopolitics, and logistics. He rose through the infantry branch of the Army.³⁵

In his memoir of the coup, Pinochet claims to have made the following speech to his colleagues upon learning of Allende's apparent election victory on 4 September 1970 at his Army Sixth Division General Headquarters in the northern town of Iquique:

The people of Chile do not know the road they have taken. They have been deceived into ignoring where Marxism-Leninism will take them. Fellow officers, I believe it will be the end of the independent life of our beloved Chile, and we will inevitably become a satellite of Soviet Russia. There exists a remote possibility that the Congress may reject Mr. Allende, or that perhaps he may change course, which I find difficult to believe, since he will now be controlled by the Communists close to him who will oppose any moderation of his policies. This is one of the bitterest nights of my life. I am in the final days of my career. The responsibility of saving Chile will remain in your hands. May God save the destiny of our fatherland.³⁶

Pinochet's personal account is very likely false. It is a curious statement because no officer has ever confirmed Pinochet's version of the coup. In the above passage, he appears to be setting the stage for a more heroic role for himself rather than his historic role as a vacillating opportunist. The armed forces were forbidden to engage in political deliberation by law

³⁵Embassy of the Republic of Chile, *Curriculum Vitae of the President of the Republic of Chile*, (Washington, 1987).

³⁶Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, *El día decisivo*, (Santiago: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1979) 47. Thesis author's translation.

and were charged with defending the 1925 Constitution. These remarks delivered in uniform would be considered a serious breach of discipline against the designated President of the Republic. Moreover, Pinochet was widely known for his political inscrutability, and there are no accounts of his having made strong political comments. Colleagues, friends, and family who had known him for years could never remember having heard him utter a single political comment.³⁷ Had the Frei Administration known of Pinochet's political leanings, he would most likely have been retired sometime in the 1960s.³⁸ Instead, General Prats went out of his way to advance Pinochet's career, and apparently had no doubts about his constitutionalism, and certainly would not have advanced an institutionalist general.

THE ARMY COMES OUT

The political, economic, and social crises which rocked the Allende government in 1971-73 forced Allende to bring military officers into his Cabinet to shore up military support. As an indication of the degree of trust Allende had for the constitutionalism of the commander in chief of the Army, General Prats served as interior minister and later as defense minister. Prats was instrumental in guaranteeing the fairness of the 1971 municipal elections, the 1973 congressional elections, and in negotiating an end to the 1972 truckers strike. Meanwhile, in early 1972, Prats named General Pinochet as his second in command as Army chief of staff. When Prats temporarily left his post as commander in chief to serve in the Cabinet, Pinochet was temporarily elevated as Acting commander in chief.

³⁷Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, *A Nation of Enemies*, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991) 48.

³⁸Mark Falcoff, *Modern Chile 1970-1989*, (1989) 297.

General Prats, as a member of the Cabinet, confronted a profound political and economic crisis of a deteriorating government which forced him to deliberate politics and to make political decisions.

Monday, 11 June, I resumed my functions as Commander in Chief, and I had a long meeting with the corps of generals. . . I explained my appraisal of the altered domestic situation that I had found on my return [from a trip abroad], and I asked for their opinions. Several generals expressed their points of view. The consensus was that the worst outcome would be military intervention. But there was great concern that governmental inaction on the worsening economic crisis could lead to chaos. I let the suggestion for a solution to the problem come from them, and they proposed exactly what I had been suggesting to the government's politicians. . . I committed myself to presenting the argument for the "political truce" as the collective opinion of the generals. . . As was evident, we were in the paradoxical situation that I personally was experiencing: we deliberated about politics (which was constitutionally forbidden), but we were motivated only by the patriotic and sincere desire to prevent the Institution [the Army] from being dragged to the brink of a *coup d'état* if a democratic formula could not be found.³⁹

While the politicization of the officer corps had a long history dating from the Körner period, the participation of the armed forces in supporting Allende's government intensified the politicization and polarization of the officer corps into rival camps. The constitutionalist camp, led by General Prats, remained loyal to the Allende government. The institutionalists, who viewed the Constitution as subordinate to the institutional security of the armed forces, demanded the withdrawal of all military participation in the government in order that it be allowed to collapse under its own weight. The military institutionalists were greatly strengthened by the escalation of the civilian political crisis.

On 29 June 1973, an Army tank garrison attempted a coup by surrounding the presidential palace. Known as the *Tancazo*, the revolt was swiftly put down by General Prats. On 3 July, Prats was beginning to lose his authority as commander in chief.

At 1.00 p.m., I met with the generals and explained the disconcerting situation. [Generals] Bonilla and Araya suggested that I renounce my position

³⁹Carlos Prats, *Memorias: testimonio de un soldado*, (1974; reprint, Santiago: Pehuén Editores, 1985) 402-3. Translated in Genaro Arriagada (1988).

as Commander in Chief and accept the post of Minister of Interior as a retired general. I contended that that was not the point because I had no political ambitions, and if I retired, it would be to relax at home. General Araya, who should have been grateful to me, shocked me with his incredible coldness, saying that I had a negative image with the lower officers. I responded that if that was the case, it had come about because the generals had not been faithful interpreters of my professional views.⁴⁰

On 6 August, Allende brought Army commander Prats, Navy commander Montero, and Air Force commander Ruíz into his Cabinet. Prats became defense minister; Montero became finance minister; and Ruíz became minister of public works and transport. In fact, all the commanders in chief were committed constitutionalists to the end, particularly Prats and Montero, who successfully resisted pressure from their colleagues until the end of August 1973. As minister of public works and transport, Air Force commander Ruíz was responsible for ending the ongoing truckers strike. He found his authority questioned by an Allende subordinate and resigned from the Cabinet. Allende responded by retiring General Ruíz as commander in chief of the Air Force and immediately faced an open insurrection in the Air Force. He offered the command to the second in seniority, General Gustavo Leigh Guzmán, and the third in seniority, General Carlos Van Schouwen, who both refused the command because it carried with it the requirement to serve in the Cabinet. Allende was finally forced to accept an Air Force brigadier general for his Cabinet and appointed General Leigh as Air Force commander.

General Prats had become a lightning rod for opposition attacks because of his support of the Allende government and was derisively called the “red general.” On 22 August, General Prats asked the Army Council of Generals for a vote of confidence but lost by a vote of 12 to 6. He was unable to obtain a majority and immediately submitted his resignation as commander in chief and as defense minister and retired from the Army. Prats, clearly confident of Pinochet’s constitutionalism, recommended him as his successor. For

⁴⁰Carlos Prats, *Memorias*, (1985) 425. Translated in Genaro Arriagada (1988).

his part, Pinochet guaranteed the neutrality of the Army and pledged to insure loyalty at all levels. There are several versions of the critical events which happened next. General Pinochet's version is that on 24 August, President Allende ordered him to retire four generals suspected of conspiracy: Generals Manuel Torres, Oscar Bonilla, Washington Carrasco, and Sergio Arellano. Pinochet denies a commitment to purge the Army and claims to have told Allende so.

Mr. President, it would not be difficult to do what you ask since I have all the Generals' letters of resignation in my desk (I actually lacked two); but if I were to do that, my standing as a man of honor would be undermined from that moment on because it would mean that you named me to this post to effect these resignations, and I won't be a party to that.⁴¹

According to General Prats, Pinochet apparently immediately tried and failed to remove the institutionalist generals, but that the chain of command had broken, and Pinochet had lost institutional control.

The Commander in Chief of the Army, General Augusto Pinochet, visited me. He said that he had had some very difficult moments. He had asked the Corps of Generals to give him freedom of action by handing in their resignations and all did so except for Generals Viveros, Javier Palacios, and Arellano; and since he had said that he would ask that the presidential prerogative [of forced retirement] be applied to them, all the "hard-liners" had sided with the malcontents. He added that he now thought he would leave the retirement of the generals pending until October.⁴²

presidential adviser Joan Garcés claims that Pinochet was ordered to purge the Army of coup conspirators, but that Pinochet feared "uncontrollable reactions."

Pinochet, having assumed the post of Commander in Chief, was to call for the retirement--that very week--of six generals suspected of sedition. . . Having assumed the position of Commander in Chief, . . . Pinochet indicated that, given the internal situation of the Army, it would be more appropriate to ask just three generals to retire, which he would do the following day. Nevertheless, under the pretext that he feared uncontrollable reactions, the Commander in Chief did not expedite the retirement of any of the con-

⁴¹Augusto Pinochet, *El día decisivo*, (1979) 115. Translated in Genaro Arriagada (1988).

⁴²Carlos Prats, *Memorias*, (1985) 495-6.

spirators. . . At the end of August, Pinochet explained to the President the overriding concerns that necessitated deferring the matter until the regular meeting of the Army Assessment Boards, in the second half of September. The retirements would then be presented as an “institutional” procedure carried out by Pinochet as Commander in Chief of the Army. Thus the retirements could not be criticized as ‘political.’⁴³

Apparently, the chain of command had finally snapped. Pinochet had lost hierarchical authority over the Army and found himself isolated from the institutionalists and vulnerable to ouster from below.

Finally, on 29 August, the Naval Council of Admirals demanded the resignation of Admiral Montero, who still supported the government. After resisting for several emotional days, Montero finally resigned on 7 September and Allende faced an open revolt in the Navy. Admiral José Toribio Merino Castro, the second in command, was designated as the Navy’s candidate for commander in chief, but Allende, claiming to be “at war with the Navy,” refused to appoint him. Merino assumed command by default.

General César Mendoza Durán of the Carabineros, the fourth junta member, was truly a commander without an Army. In the case of the Carabineros, General Mendoza, the fourth ranking officer, was informed on 10 September by General Leigh that he had been selected by the conspirators to become director general of the Carabineros on the day of the coup, 11 September, because of his known opposition to the Allende government.⁴⁴ In this way, the armed forces decapitated the high command of the Carabineros from its troops.

On 2 September, the Christian Democratic Party, together with the National Party issued a congressional resolution declaring the Allende government to have lost its legiti-

⁴³Joan Garcés, *El estado y los problemas tácticos en el gobierno de Allende*, (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1974) 50. Translated in Genaro Arriagada (1988).

⁴⁴James R. Whelan, *Allende: Death of a Marxist Dream*, (Westport, CN: Arlington House, 1981) 17.

mate authority. This resolution, passed in a highly-charged political atmosphere, in effect, openly invited the armed forces to intervene.

In *El día decisivo*, Pinochet portrays himself as the spiritual architect of the coup of national salvation. Several reputable accounts portray him instead as an interested non-committal neutral, while Air Force commander Gustavo Leigh and Navy commander José Merino were the leading institutionalists.⁴⁵ Nonetheless, the Navy and the Air Force could never have staged a coup by themselves. All conspiracies were aimed at convincing the Army to intervene. Pinochet maintained official constitutionalism but soon found himself isolated from the institutionalists and in danger of being ousted. Still, Pinochet vacillated. Years later, Air Force General Nicanor Díaz recalled:

In all this, no one had talked to Pinochet. The idea existed that he opposed the coup. We all believed it.⁴⁶

Pinochet played the crucial last-minute “swing-man,” bringing the powerful Army into the conspiracy and thus ensuring guarantees of being named leader of the junta. On 8 September, Army General Sergio Arellano, a leading institutionalist, visited Pinochet at his home and confronted him with the planned *coup d'état*. Implicit in Arellano’s visit was the threat to Pinochet: “Get off the dime” and get on board the coup bandwagon or give up the command of the Army. General Arellano’s son later wrote of his father’s version of events:

Saturday the eighth, other Army generals were informed separately. Around 8.30 p.m., my father went to General Pinochet’s house to fill him in on the background of the project. Pinochet’s reaction was a mixture of surprise and annoyance. When he realized that the only thing needed was his adherence to a decision that had already been made, he seemed over-

⁴⁵Florencia Varas, *Gustavo Leigh: el general disidente*, (Santiago: Editorial Aconcagua, 1979) 129-30. Sergio Arellano Iturriaga, *Mas allá del abismo*, (Santiago: Editorial Proyección, 1985) 43.

⁴⁶Sergio Marras, *Confesiones*, (Santiago: Ornitorrinco, 1988) 105-8. Translated in Constable and Valenzuela (1991).

whelmed. My father told him that General Leigh was at that moment awaiting his call in order to begin coordination. Pinochet asked for a few minutes, promising to call later. For now he needed to reflect. But Leigh never got the call he was waiting for. The morning of Sunday the ninth, Leigh decided to visit Pinochet, but Pinochet was not at home. Leigh went to Pinochet's house again at five in the afternoon and ran into Admirals Sergio Huidobro and Patricio Carvajal and Navy Captain Ariel González, who had brought an agreement to be endorsed by the Commanders in Chief. Having received no information to the contrary, the admirals concluded that the contract between the Commanders in Chief of the Army and Air Force had taken place the previous day. No explanations were provided. General Pinochet stated that he was aware of the plan and that he agreed with it, and he signed it on the spot.⁴⁷

General Arellano's 1985 version is consistent with General Leigh's 1979 version. On 9 September 1973, Leigh went to Pinochet's home to enlist his support. At the same time three Navy officers arrived with a letter from Navy commander Merino in Valparaíso, declaring that he was prepared to strike on 11 September. Leigh confirmed to Pinochet that the High Command of the Air Force was now committed to a coup.

In fact, we made an agreement as I have so often repeated, on 9 September, Sunday, at five in the afternoon, when I went to see General Pinochet at his house. . . [General Pinochet] was very calm as he listened to my argument that we could not see the situation reversing itself.
 [Pinochet:] "What are you planning to do?"
 [Leigh:] "Because we have gone as far as we can, I think we are at a point where if we don't do something, the country will fall into chaos."
 [Pinochet:] "Do you realize that this could cost our lives and many others as well?"
 [Leigh:] "I realize that."
 [Pinochet:] "Well," he said, "I also believe that the time to act is near." We were having this conversation when, without any previous arrangement, Admiral Huidobro, Admiral Carvajal, and Commander González arrived with a handwritten note from Admiral Merino that said, "Augusto, Gustavo, all is lost, if you are in agreement to act on the eleventh at six in the morning, sign this paper," And he had signed it. I wrote "Agreed," and General Pinochet did too. "If this gets out," said Pinochet, "it could have grave consequences for us."⁴⁸

⁴⁷Sergio Arellano Iturriaga, *Mas allá del abismo*, (Santiago: Editorial Proyección, 1985) 43. Translated in Genaro Arriagada (1988).

⁴⁸Florencia Varas (1979) 129-30. Translated in Genaro Arriagada (1988).

Had Pinochet failed to join the coup at this point, he would probably have been ousted and replaced by the next most senior pro-coup general, which would have been Manuel Torres. Pinochet, sensing his authority slipping away, signed on to the coup. From all available evidence, it appears that Pinochet never conceived or led the coup on his own. Rather, he let the coup come to him and was the principal beneficiary of it. He was merely in the right place at the right time.

TABLE 2
THE ARMY CORPS OF GENERALS IN AUGUST 1973
IN ORDER OF SENIORITY

RANK	FIRST COMMISSION	ORIENTATION
COMMANDER IN CHIEF		
Carlos Prats	1934	Constitutionalist
DIVISION GENERAL		
Augusto Pinochet Chief of Staff	1937	Officially Constitutionalist until 9 September 1973
Orlando Urbina	1937	
Rolando González	1938	
Manuel Torres	1938	Institutionalist
Ernesto Baéza	1939	Institutionalist
Oscar Bonilla	1939	Institutionalist
BRIGADIER GENERAL		
Ervaldo Rodríguez	1939	
Ricardo Valenzuela	1939	
Hector Bravo	1939	
Mario Sepúlveda	1939	Constitutionalist; Resigned September 1973
Guillermo Pickering	1939	Constitutionalist; Resigned September 1973
Hernán Brady	1939	
Pedro Palacios	1939	
Raúl Contreras	1940	
Raúl Benavídes	1940	
Joaquín Lagos	1940	
Gustavo Álvarez	1940	
Carlos Forestier	1940	Institutionalist
Arturo Viveros	1940	Institutionalist
Sergio Nuño	1941	Institutionalist
Sergio Arellano	1941	Institutionalist
Augusto Lutz	1942	Institutionalist
Javier Palacios	1942	Institutionalist
Washington Carrasco	1942	Institutionalist

Source: Adapted from Genaro Arriagada, *Pinochet: The Politics of Power*, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988) 95, 152.

Note: The generals not designated under orientation were not identified as active pre-coup conspirators, but followed orders once the coup was underway. Generals Sepúlveda and Pickering resigned without formally applying for retirement. This was interpreted as a protest against the coup.

At dawn on 11 September 1973, the armed forces formed a junta led by General Pinochet of the Army, Admiral Merino of the Navy, General Leigh of the Air Force, and General Mendoza of the Carabineros. The director general of the Carabineros, General José Sepúlveda, and his second in command, General Jorge Urrutía, were unaware that their junior colleague, General Mendoza, had been designated by the junta as the new director general of the Carabineros. Sepúlveda and Urrutía remained loyal to Allende to the last and withdrew only after the Carabinero Special Services Guard, receiving assurances from the Army, dropped their weapons and withdrew from the palace. The junta demanded Allende's resignation. When Allende refused to surrender, the Air Force rocketed the nineteenth century presidential palace. Allende was offered safe conduct out of the country several times before and during the assault. As the palace burned, Allende committed suicide according to his personal physician, who was present.⁴⁹ The fact that Allende's death was a suicide offers some insight to his state of mind. Allende was clearly personally overwrought by the political pressure of the collapse of his government. The democratic breakdown was the result of an unfortunate series of events, including Allende's revolutionary program and the opposition's counter-revolutionary reaction. Years later, former President Frei analyzed Allende's failure.

... [H]e expected to be able to out-manipulate and outmaneuver everyone, pull all the strings, and somehow ride out the internal contradictions of his own government
 ... [T]here was an element of fatalism about the whole Popular Unity experiment. At times Allende seemed reconciled to the fact he was going to fail, and predisposed to accept it. During the last phase there was much talk about death and suicide . . . [A]t times this fatalism and gloom would alternate with an unwonted optimism, informed by the idea, or rather the delusion, that he was going to inaugurate here in Chile a whole new political system, and become, say, someone like Tito. Allende was going to go

⁴⁹Shirley Christian, "Leftist Journal in Chile Concedes Allende Suicide," *The New York Times*, 17 September 1990, A7.

down in history as the man who had finally found a legal, peaceful road to socialism, the road which had eluded so many others.⁵⁰

It was the breakdown of the commitment to the rules of the democratic political process which led to the polarized political paralysis and informal civil war which allowed the armed forces to step into the political vacuum. The populist mobilizationist policies of the centrist Christian Democrats polarized the left and the right. The left, particularly the mercurial Socialists, felt threatened by the Christian Democrats' inroads among the rural and urban poor and marginals--their natural constituency. The right felt betrayed by the Christian Democrats' agrarian reform. The Christian Democratic policies led to enormously heightened expectations among the poor and marginals, which ended in frustration in the 1967 recession. The failure of the Christian Democrats to deliver on their promises destroyed their political credibility and fragmented the party into three factions. The political divorce of the Christian Democrats and the right led to the collapse of the center as a viable democratic political force, to the benefit of the extremes. Under the Popular Unity government, short-term political gain superseded long-term commitment to the rules of the democratic political process. But the failure of the Popular Unity to coopt the Christian Democrats led to the reconciliation of the PDC and the right. Together, they viewed the termination of the democratic regime and military intervention as an acceptable price to pay to destroy the Marxist government.

On 11 September 1973, the Chilean armed forces took the extraordinary step of forming a government junta of the commanders in chief. While the Army was historically a powerful political institution in its own right, the incorporation of the far less powerful Navy, Air Force, and Carabineros into a formal institution exercising absolute executive, legislative, and judicial powers was a clear departure from a state of constitutional rule of

⁵⁰Quoted in Mark Falcoff, *Modern Chile*, (1989) 315-16.

law. The fundamental test of any civil government is the point at which its civil police and courts of law cease to function and a state of rule of law ceases to exist. At this point, the state may introduce military force to fill the power vacuum. This is one instance in which military forces designed for national defense against a foreign invader may justifiably be deployed within the national territory with the intention of restoring public order under the threat of inflicting violence upon the civilian population. In the American precedent, President Lincoln called on the Army in 1861 when the state of South Carolina fired on the federal installation at Fort Sumter. The coup succeeded only because of overwhelming support in the Army Corps of Generals. The Navy and the Air Force could not have acted together without the Army. The high command of the Carabineros, accepting the reality that they were outnumbered and outgunned, deferred to the Army and accepted General Mendoza as their newly-designated director general. Moreover, the paramilitary national police force, then under the control of the minister of interior, had been compelled to control and contain hundreds of anti-government demonstrations to which they were sympathetic. Though the Carabineros draw their members from the working class in the largest numbers, they have never demonstrated a proletarian proclivity and may have welcomed their new junta-designated director general.

The junta immediately implanted a modern *bureaucratic-authoritarian* regime. That is, a regime in which planned a fundamental political, economic, and social restructuring of the society through its monopoly of the management of fear of official force. In March 1974, the junta issued its Declaration of Principles, which pledged:

The right to dissent must be preserved, but the experience of recent years shows the need to subject it to acceptable limits. Never again must a naive democracy allow within its midst organized groups acting under the guise of misunderstood pluralism, to foster guerrilla violence to attain power or, feigning a respect for democracy, to further a doctrine or morality whose

objective is the construction of a totalitarian state. For this reason, Marxist parties and movements will no longer be admitted into our civic life.⁵¹

This was the essence of the new authoritarian regime. It decreed that democracy was to be “protected” with authoritarian measures. This “protected democracy” was later institutionalized in the 1980 Constitution, a document which recognized the permanent independence of the armed forces as autonomous institutions of the state, rather than the instruments of civil authority.

REPRESSION

Up to 45,000 citizens were arrested and detained in soccer stadiums and prisons in the weeks following 11 September 1973. A group of left-wing Air Force officers including General Alberto Bachelet were arrested on charges of infiltrating the Air Force. General Bachelet died in prison in March 1974, apparently of a heart attack. On 30 September 1974, General Prats and his wife, in exile in Buenos Aires, were assassinated in a car-bombing. Three independent inquiries linked the assassination to Chilean intelligence agents. Exiled former Christian Democratic Senator Bernardo Leighton and his wife were seriously wounded in an assassination attempt in Rome in 1975. In September 1976, exiled former defense minister and former ambassador to the US Orlando Letelier and his American assistant Ronni Moffit were assassinated in a car-bombing on Embassy Row in Washington, DC. This assassination led to a lengthy US legal process which resulted in the conviction of American Michael Townley as the assassin and the indictment of the DINA Director, General Juan Manuel Contreras. The Pinochet government refused to ex-

⁵¹Government Junta of the Republic of Chile, *Declaration of Principles of the Government of Chile*, (Santiago, March 1974). This is a handsomely printed soft cover document containing Spanish, English, German, and French translations.

tradite Contreras. The case languished in Chilean military courts for thirteen years and was officially closed twice. On 18 November 1991, at the request of President Patricio Aylwin, the Chilean Supreme Court upheld new Chilean indictments of Contreras and General Pedro Espinoza, the former DINA chief of operations, on murder and passport forgery charges. The passports were those used by DINA agents, including the American Michael Townley, to travel to Washington to murder Letelier. In 1978, Pinochet had declared an amnesty for all human rights violations committed by the armed forces between 1973 and 1978 on the grounds that the country was in the midst of civil war and rights violations were unavoidable. However, due to pressure from US President Carter, he specifically excluded the Letelier case.⁵² None of these incidents are intended to conclude that Pinochet was personally responsible, but DINA was under his personal control and pro-government death squads operated in Chile with Pinochet's tacit sanction.

On 4 March 1991, the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, a special human rights commission named by President Patricio Aylwin, Pinochet's elected successor, documented the deaths or disappearances of over 2,279 persons between 11 September 1973 and 11 March 1990. The bodies of 900 were never found. These numbers are far lower than the exaggerated initial reports of up to 10,000 dead. Ninety percent of the killings took place between 1973 and 1978. Only 132 members of the armed forces were killed in the same period; some by leftist guerrillas and some by the armed forces on treason charges.⁵³

⁵²Associated Press, "Indictment of Chilean Police in Ex-Envoy's Death is Upheld," *The New York Times*, 19 November 1991.

⁵³Nathaniel C. Nash, "Chilean President Confronting Army," *The New York Times*, 26 March 1991.

TABLE 3
DISAPPEARANCES

	Disappeared	1975 Population	Disappeared per per 100,000
Argentina	8,960	28.0 million	32.0
Brazil	125	125.0 million	1.0
Chile, confirmed dead	2,279	11.0 million	20.7
Uruguay	26	2.6 million	1.0

Sources: Argentina: *Nunca Mas: The Report of the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared*, (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1986) 284.

Brazil: *Brasil: Nunca Mais*, (Petropolis: Editora Vozes, 1985) 291-293.

Chile: National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, Santiago, 1991.

Uruguay: Charles Gillespie, "Party Strategies and Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives on the Uruguayan Case," Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, (1987) 460.

Adapted from Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1988) 70.

CONSOLIDATION

General Pinochet, as commander in chief of the 53,000-man Army, the largest and most powerful institution of the armed forces, had the upper hand in imposing his will upon his theoretically co-equal junta colleagues. Pinochet was immediately designated as President of the junta by his colleagues, Admiral Merino, General Leigh, and General Mendoza.⁵⁴ This act conforms to Martin Needler's thesis, that a vacillating, opportunistic neutral, such as Pinochet--a last-minute "swing man"--could be installed as a provisional President of a military regime. According to this thesis, the coup conspirators are hard-pressed to assemble a viable pro-coup coalition with sufficient support to sustain a success-

⁵⁴Government Junta, *Decree Law 1*: "Designates General of the Army Augusto Pinochet Ugarte as President of the Junta, who assumes said office on this date." 11 September 1973.

ful coup. If a coalition is difficult to assemble, additional support will have to be purchased in exchange for concessions. In this case, a last-minute hold-out may be

. . . placed at the head of the provisional government that emerges after the revolt is successful. . . An interesting and paradoxical situation is thus created. The “swing man” becomes the leading figure in the new government; yet he is the person who was least committed to the objectives of the coup. . . and who was the last-minute addition to the conspiracy perhaps out of sympathy with, or not even aware of, the more fundamental aims of the group that hatched the original plan. Indeed, a situation can actually be created in which the head of the new government actually sympathized with the aims of the conspiracy not at all, but joined it at the last minute only to avoid pitting brother officers against each other, possibly precipitating a civil war.⁵⁵

Regardless of Pinochet’s vacillation on the coup, the Army’s superior firepower guaranteed that it would have the most to say in the running of the country. In a press conference, Pinochet, repudiating any personal ambition on his part, declared that the junta leadership would be rotated among the four commanders. In a national television address on the evening of 11 September, the four new junta members spoke to the nation. General Pinochet announced that the Congress would remain “in recess” but that the Supreme Court and the Controller General’s office would remain in operation.

I do not want to appear to be an irreplaceable person. I have no aspiration but to serve my country. . . Today it [the leader] is me, tomorrow it will be Admiral Merino, then General Leigh, and so on. . . As soon as the country recuperates, the Junta will turn over the government to whomever the people desire.⁵⁶

The junta decreed itself the supreme executive and legislative body and was designed to function as a politically-deliberative collegial body of co-equal commanders. It adopted the Unanimity Rule. All statutory legislation and executive decrees introduced by a junta member became law only by unanimous consent of the four members. Any one

⁵⁵Martin Needler, “Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America,” *American Political Science Review* 60, (September 1966) 616-626.

⁵⁶Augusto Pinochet, *Ercilla*, 21 March 1984, 9.

member could block legislation. The arbitrary unilateral authoritarian actions of the junta were clearly unconstitutional. The junta superimposed the new military regime upon the existing structure of the 1925 Constitution and established itself as a legal executive and legislative body, while maintaining the Supreme Court as its judicial arm. In effect, it established a new authoritarian military legality.

The Supreme Court, for its part, did not require any intimidation and willingly participated in an exercise of judicial improvisation by recognizing the legality of the junta as a legitimate government acting within the Constitution. It recognized the regime's human rights abuses as constitutional, while ignoring its illegal acts. Military tribunals which issued summary justice and executions were allowed to operate throughout the country. The military regime seduced Supreme Court justices with official cars, drivers, and flattery. Under the Allende government, the conservative and Christian Democratic-dominated court system issued thousands of arrest warrants for illegal expropriations of farms and factories by peasants and workers which were not enforced by Allende's minister of interior. Allende viewed the courts as a bastion of the reactionary forces aligned against him. By mid-1973, the relations between the Allende government and the courts had broken down completely. Conservative judges and justices across the country welcomed the military coup.

The final collapse of the military principles of vertical chain of command and noninterference in politics had made the coup possible and the randomness of time and space had made Pinochet commander in chief of the Army. With the chain of command restored, Pinochet immediately set out to depoliticize the officer corps and remove them from power. He began by systematically purging the Army of all of the pro-coup generals. By April 1974, he had managed to retire fifteen of the twenty-five Army generals including the four closest to him in seniority. Generals Oscar Bonilla and Augusto Lutz, who had played leading roles in the coup, were soon both dead; Lutz from a mysterious illness after a party

in October 1974 and Bonilla in a helicopter crash in January 1975.⁵⁷ General Manuel Torres was forced to retire in early 1974. General Sergio Arellano was forced out in January 1976. General Hernán Brady was forced to retire in 1977.

By December 1973, about 1,500 Chileans had been killed either by the armed forces, or by regime-sanctioned death squads.⁵⁸ On 14 June 1974, the junta coordinated its separate armed forces intelligence services into one: the National Intelligence Department (DINA). The powerful DINA security forces carried out a violent purge of leftists and suspected leftists. DINA was theoretically responsible to the four junta commanders. In reality, Pinochet used it to effectively seize control of the country and silence his opponents. General Pinochet swiftly overwhelmed General Leigh for leadership in the junta. Leigh later complained to his biographer about Pinochet's tactics.

I was constantly recalling [Air Force personnel] from DINA, but do not believe that it was because they were doing unsavory things. Rather, it was because of the absolute preeminence of the Army in DINA. They requested personnel from all branches, but it turned out that the officers who we sent to DINA were not given any executive work, only administrative jobs. In practice, the organization was directly subordinate to the President, although legally it was supposed to be subordinate to the Governing Junta. So I pulled my people when I realized that I had no power over DINA.⁵⁹

On 17 June 1974, Decree Law 527 formalized the *fait accompli* of 11 September 1973. It officially superimposed the military regime onto the 1925 constitutional structure. The junta was recognized as the legislature. Pinochet, as President of the junta, assumed executive authority as supreme chief of the nation. In December 1974, Pinochet, now firmly in control of the Army and the DINA state security apparatus, demanded the title of

⁵⁷Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, *A Nation of Enemies*, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991) 56.

⁵⁸Constable and Valenzuela, *A Nation of Enemies*, (1991), 20.

⁵⁹Florencia Varas, *Gustavo Leigh: el general disidente*, (1979) 78. Translated in Genaro Arriagada (1988).

President of the republic. Admiral Merino and General Mendoza, recognizing Pinochet's primacy as the commander in chief of the Army, acquiesced. Only General Leigh, outraged but powerless, managed a feeble show of resistance before reluctantly signing the decree. By this time, Merino, Leigh, and Mendoza must have realized that they could directly challenge Pinochet only at their peril. With Pinochet installed as President of the republic, the junta immediately ceased to be a junta. The armed forces were no longer ruling as an institution. Within fifteen months of the 11 September 1973 coup, Pinochet has purged the coup conspirators, vanquished his rivals, assumed personal control of the DINA state security apparatus, outmaneuvered and overshadowed his junta colleagues, and consolidated one-man control of an authoritarian regime.

Immediately after the coup, when the junta members were co-equal colleagues, the Unanimity Rule had worked as a check on the power of each junta member. Suddenly, as President of the republic, Pinochet found that the Unanimity Rule worked to his advantage. He could vote unanimously with the junta on issues on which they agreed, or he could paralyze the junta with his own veto, invoke his new presidential authority, and act unilaterally without the junta's approval. When General Leigh vetoed Pinochet's initiative to hold a referendum endorsing his leadership in 1977, Pinochet ignored the veto, invoked presidential authority, and held the referendum.

Pinochet further consolidated his hold on power by restoring the nineteenth century prestige of the armed forces. Military officers were heavily represented in appointments to the Cabinet, the ministerial bureaucracy, ambassadorships, and provincial governorships. Salaries were raised several times over. In 1989, a colonel received 191,000 pesos per month. At the October 1989 exchange rate of 175 pesos per US dollar, this amounted to a salary of about US\$1,000 per month compared to a teacher who was typically receiving

US\$250 per month.⁶⁰ Military officers suddenly received entree to the elite private clubs and social circles for the first time in decades. The sons of the middle and upper classes flooded the military academies with applications. Pinochet cleverly instilled in his officers and men an overwhelming pride which translated into solid hierarchical support. Chilean military officers likely have no intention of giving up their newly hard-won middle class status. In the 1990s, Chilean officers continue to enjoy a high standard of living while those of neighboring South American countries are declining due to recession, inflation, and military budget reductions.

In Venezuela, for example, real wages for the military have fallen 30 percent in five years; in Bolivia they are down almost 50 percent. Argentine officers earn less than half what they did in the early 1980s, and Brazil has cut military pay more than 25 percent. Because of wage cuts, militaries have seen their social standing go from that of the middle class to the lower middle class. . .⁶¹

THE REGIME OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY

In the absence of parliamentary oversight after 11 September 1973, military personnel matters became the exclusive prerogative of the commanders in chief of the armed forces. The absence of collective leadership within each armed service led to one-man institutional control. The military regime opened a new period of military legislation on careers, promotions, and retirements. Under the 1925 Constitution, officers were promoted by seniority. The promotion of lower-ranking officers was the exclusive prerogative of the President. Superior officers were nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The President appointed the commanders in chief of the armed

⁶⁰Constable and Valenzuela, *A Nation of Enemies*, (1991) 60.

⁶¹Nathaniel C. Nash, "Will More Guns for the Generals Aid or Threaten Democracy?" *The New York Times*, 5 April 1992.

forces, who served in office at the President's pleasure. However, if the President appointed a commander who was not of the highest seniority within an armed service, all officers who were senior to the new commander were required by law to retire.⁶² Hence, the commander in chief of an armed service is always the most senior general or admiral. The system was designed to preserve institutional hierarchy, provide career stability for the officer corps, and to preserve civilian control and nonpoliticism.

Under the military regime, the commanders in chief of the armed forces were given life terms of office and extraordinary appointment powers within their institutions. Whereas before, professionalism and performance were key determinants in an officer's career, under the military regime, an officer's political loyalty to his superior officer could be more important than his performance, thus undermining the professionalism of the armed forces. These extraordinary circumstances produced a government based on the absolute discretion of the commanders, or a regime of the commanders in chief. The man who became commander in chief of his institution ruled it with unprecedented discretion. This was the one single significant limitation on General Pinochet's power: even as President of the republic, he could not appoint or dismiss Navy, Air Force, or Carabinero officers.

Within the Army, his own branch of the military, General Pinochet's authority has been enormous and unchecked since 11 September 1973. Such a degree of unregulated power, particularly over officers' careers, would be inconceivable in a democratic government. In the other branches of the military, however, President Pinochet lacks the authority to name or retire the commanders in chief, a power previously exercised by Chile's constitutional Presidents. . . This limitation on the power of the reformulated presidency became increasingly apparent as differences developed between Pinochet and General Leigh, the Commander in Chief of the Air Force. . . The *Statute of the Governing Junta* had defined the positions of Commander in Chief and Junta Member as lifetime posts that could be forfeited only

⁶²Genaro Arriagada in Valenzuela and Valenzuela, *Military Rule in Chile*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986) 135-6.

through 'death, resignation, or any kind of total disability of the incumbent'.⁶³

This unusual institutional situation was soon to change.

It must have been a bitter irony for General Leigh. The man who had done so much to plan and promote the coup turned out to be Pinochet's most outspoken opponent in the junta. Their policy and personality clashes grew increasingly frequent after Pinochet was designated President of the republic in December 1974. In July 1978, Leigh gave an interview to an Italian newspaper, which was reprinted in Chile, in which he called for a return to political normalization. Pinochet immediately demanded that Admiral Merino and General Mendoza join him in signing a decree declaring Leigh "incompetent" to serve on the junta. Merino and Mendoza complied. The decree was essentially illegal since Leigh was, in fact, physically and mentally capable of serving.

On 24 July 1978, Pinochet surrounded key Air Force bases with Army troops and forced Leigh into retirement almost literally at gunpoint. Pinochet appointed General Fernando Matthei, ninth in seniority after Leigh, as the new Air Force commander and junta member. The first eight generals in seniority were obligated by law to retire. The next ten generals below Matthei in seniority refused to accept him as commander in chief and resigned in solidarity with Leigh.⁶⁴ In effect, Pinochet had seized control of the Air Force and purged an unprecedented eighteen generals in a single day. The lesson was not lost on the Navy and the Carabineros. Twelve years later, on 21 March 1990, ten days after the inauguration of President Patricio Aylwin, General Leigh, in retirement and working

⁶³Genaro Arriagada, *Pinochet: The Politics of Power*, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988) 36.

⁶⁴Constable and Valenzuela, *A Nation of Enemies*, (1991) 68-69.

as a real estate broker, was gravely wounded in an assassination attempt at his offices by gunmen identified with the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front.⁶⁵

Pinochet's control of the armed forces was now absolute. He appropriated the title of Supreme commander of the armed forces and required that all newly-appointed generals and admirals submit an undated, signed letter of resignation before taking office. General Pinochet's 1978 purge undoubtedly left bitter feelings within the ranks of the Air Force. Pinochet now moved swiftly to restore the pre-1973 subordination of the armed forces to presidential authority.

It also gives us great satisfaction to state that our Armed Forces and Forces of Order [Carabineros] have not been politicized, as they have understood that the functions of the state rest with their Commanders in Chief and Director General respectively. . . The high officers are responsible for informing their subordinates about matters of government, an obligation that the President of the Republic himself has assumed. . . to inform not only the officers but all garrisons about the national situation and actions of the Government. But all this should be done without ever falling into political deliberation, which has caused the erosion of unity and prestige when some military governments, in other countries as well as in our own history, have slid into this error. [Avoiding political involvement] has allowed the Armed Forces of our national defense to maintain optimum professionalism and preparedness.⁶⁶

On 11 September 1973, the Chilean armed forces, acting as a political institution instead of as the instrument of civilian authority, established a collegial institutional military regime. The four armed services ruled directly through their commanders in chief. The four commanders initially ruled as equals, with General Pinochet, as President of the junta, the first among equals. The superior fire-power of the Army guaranteed that the Army would have much to say in the running of the country. The consolidation of authority by Pinochet, first within the Army in 1974, and finally with the purging of the Air Force in

⁶⁵Shirley Christian, "Political Violence Erupts in Chile, Darkening Return to Democracy," *The New York Times*, 25 May 1990.

⁶⁶Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, *Presidential Message*, 11 September 1979. Translated in Genaro Arriagada (1988).

1978, resulted in the evolution of the collegial military regime into a personal military regime of the commander in chief of the Army. Pinochet had built a personal military regime by consolidating control of all four armed services, then removing them from executive-administrative power and depoliticizing them, making them subordinate to traditional constitutional presidential authority. The armed forces no longer ruled as a collegial institution at all, but merely served as the personal instrument and principal support of the commander in chief of the Army. Pinochet ruled alone through his hierarchical authority as commander in chief of the Army. He tested the far limits of military institutionalism by subordinating military institutional autonomy to his personal authority.

Pinochet managed to purchase a large country estate in the Andean foothills east of Santiago on his general's salary. He was, however, careful to avoid the unseemly excesses of a Somoza and did not seek to appropriate large chunks of the economy to his personal fortune. Pinochet loved power and its trappings more than he loved personal wealth. A spartan soldier at heart, he sought to avoid personal decadence, which he regarded as purely a civilian trait. With the inviolability of the chain of command restored, no officer could challenge him in an authoritarian institution. He could have ruled as head of the Army alone, but the additional office of the presidency brought with it the vast authority of the 1925 Constitution and an improvised legitimacy to an illegitimate ruler. So impregnable was his political and military position that Pinochet could not be challenged for power while he lived.

On 7 September 1986, Pinochet miraculously escaped assassination when the Communist guerrilla group Patriotic Front ambushed his motorcade en route from his country estate to the presidential palace in Santiago. The presidential limousine was strafed by machine-gun fire and struck by a rocket which failed to explode. Five presidential bodyguards were killed. Pinochet, outraged, swiftly turned the incident to his advantage. In a dramatic television appearance that evening, a disheveled Pinochet denounced the ter-

rorist attack as he pointed out the bullet scars on the limousine with a bandaged hand. Several days later, the five slain presidential bodyguards were given a hero's funeral, presided over by Pinochet himself. He thus reinforced his presidential prestige after years of sagging political support. Pinochet had deftly used the symbols of patriotism and nationalism to discredit the leftist alternative to his regime for the last time before the 1988 presidential plebiscite.

IV. THE ELEMENTS OF MILITARY INSTITUTIONALISM

THE ARMED FORCES

The Chilean Army consists of 53,000 active-duty personnel (1984) organized into six divisions, one armored division, and one cavalry division. This includes 24 infantry regiments, one special forces battalion, two armored regiments, eight cavalry regiments, nine groups of artillery, one engineer regiment, and six independent engineer battalions. It is armed with medium and light tanks, armored cars, armored personnel carriers, and 105mm and 155mm howitzers.⁶⁷ The Army is the senior armed service and takes the first order of precedence over the Navy and the Air Force. The Chilean armed forces are based on the German general staff system. Under the Chilean system, the Army is headed by a commander in chief. He is simultaneously its institutional leader and chief administrative officer. He is the senior Army general. Under the 1980 Constitution, the commander in chief serves a four-year term and cannot be dismissed by the President. The commander in chief is chairman of the Corps of Generals, an institution which is not the same as the general staff, which is composed of administrative officers rather than field commanders.

The American system underscores the importance of the principle of civilian control of the armed forces. Civilian control of the armed forces has been of paramount importance to governments which value professional, cohesive military forces which are free from the divisiveness of the political process. Under the American system, the President of the United States is a civilian and is commander in chief of the armed forces. Only Congress may raise a standing Army and has exclusive control of appropriations. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the President's senior military adviser. The Army

⁶⁷Adrian J. English, *Armed Forces of Latin America*, (New York: Jane's, 1984) 134-36.

chief of staff is the President's senior military adviser on land warfare. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are staff officers and are outside the formal chain of command to the active military units unless so designated by the President. They are always within the political chain of command on policy issues and serve at the discretion of the President. The secretary of defense is a civilian, the chief administrative officer of the armed forces, and technically outranks all military officers. The President may command the armed forces directly at any time, but generally delegates command authority to the secretary of defense and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This system of delegated authority protects the President as commander in chief from a loss of personal and institutional legitimacy in the event of a military disaster in the field. It is easier to replace a general than a President. On occasion, the President may shield the armed forces from military disaster, as in the case of the 241 American Marines who were killed in a car-bombing in Beirut, Lebanon in October 1983. While there was some doubt as to the initial wisdom of President Reagan introducing American Marines into an internecine civil war as peacekeeping forces, Reagan absolved his loyal commanding general of any responsibility and diffused the crisis by celebrating the honor of the Marine Corps.

The Chilean Army is a repository of conservative middle class and traditional aristocratic values. In the early nineteenth century, the Latin American officer corps was recruited almost exclusively from the aristocracy. By 1900, the majority of Latin American officers were being recruited from the middle class, with a minority coming from the aristocracy.⁶⁸ One 1964 study of retired Argentine generals found that only 23% were descended from the aristocracy. Seventy-three percent were the sons of the upper middle class, 25% were from the lower middle class, and only 2% were from the working class.⁶⁹

⁶⁸Lyle N. McAlister in John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society*, (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1964) 102, 145.

⁶⁹José Luís de Imaz, *Los que mandan*, (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1964) 58.

The development of the nitrate and copper export industries at the turn of the century led to enormous social change in Chile. By 1920, 46.4 percent of the population lived in cities of 2,000 or more; 28 percent lived in cities of 20,000 or more (Germani, 1971; Rouma, 1948). The rapid industrialization of the period produced growing working and middle classes. The increasing income and educational levels of the middle class brought it into competition with the traditional aristocracy for prestigious professional, civil service, and military careers. Moreover, the system of competitive entrance examinations implemented by General Körner gave the sons of the middle class an even playing field with the sons of the aristocracy for officer's commissions. The Chilean officer corps became increasingly middle class in composition dating from the 1879 war with Peru and Bolivia until middle class dominance was established in the 1940s.⁷⁰ A survey of Chilean Army officers retired between 1952 and 1964 found that 20% were the sons of businessmen, 26% white collar professionals, 26% military officers, 20% farmers, and 9% were the sons of white collar workers.⁷¹ However, due to the declining prestige of a military career in the 1960s because of inflation and the declining real wages of officers, the Army began to recruit officers from the working class.⁷²

⁷⁰Liisa North, *Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and Peru*, (Berkeley: U of California P, 1966) 17-20.

⁷¹Roy Allen Hansen, *Military Culture and Organizational Decline: A Study of the Chilean Army*, doctoral dissertation, Department of Sociology, (Berkeley: University of California, 1967) 172.

⁷²Roy Allen Hansen (1967) 210.

TABLE 4
GROWTH OF THE CHILEAN ARMY 1879-1984

Year	Army Personnel
1879	2,500.0
1884	25,000.0 ⁷³
1900	6,000.0 ⁷⁴
1928	25,000.0 ⁷⁵
1950	45,000.0 ⁷⁶
1964	20,000.0
1973	32,000.0 ⁷⁷
1984	53,000.0 ⁷⁸

⁷³Frederick M. Nunn, *The Military in Chilean History*, (1976) 70.

⁷⁴Nunn (1976) 112.

⁷⁵Nunn (1976) 171.

⁷⁶Nunn (1976) 249-252.

⁷⁷James W. Wilkie, ed., *Statistical Abstract of Latin America, Vol. 20*, (Los Angeles: UCLA, 1980) 146. Lawrence L. Ewing and Robert C. Sellers, eds., *Armed Forces of the World*, (n.c.: Sellers & Associates, 1966).

⁷⁸Adrian J. English, *Armed Forces of Latin America*, (1984) 134-36.

TABLE 5
 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
 ARMED FORCES OF SOUTH AMERICA

Country	Population	Military Personnel Army, Navy, Air Force	Inhabitants per Soldier
Chile	13.2 million	95,800	138
Peru	21.6	120,000	180
Ecuador	10.6	57,800	183
Colombia	33.0	136,000	242
Bolivia	7.3	28,000	260
Paraguay	4.3	16,000	269
Venezuela	19.7	71,000	277
Argentina	32.3	75,000	431
Brazil	150.4	324,000	464

Sources: International Development Bank, *Latin America Weekly Report*

Reproduced from *The New York Times*, 26 January 1992.

TABLE 6
SOCIAL ORIGINS OF CHILEAN ARMY OFFICERS, 1952-1964

Father's Occupation	
Worker	1%
Farmer	19%
White Collar Worker	8%
Professional	24%
Businessman Manager Landowner	22%
Military Officer	26%

Source: Roy Allen Hansen, *Military Culture and Organizational Decline: A Study of the Chilean Army*, doctoral dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, (1967) table 40.

Adapted from Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power*, (1972) 47.

TABLE 7
COMPARATIVE MILITARY EXPENDITURES

	% of GDP	% of Budget
1940		
Argentina	2.3	23.2
Brazil (1947)	2.8	24.0
CHILE	2.5	25.2
Peru (1942)	2.2	21.2
1950		
Argentina	3.0	24.6
Brazil	2.3	26.8
CHILE	2.4	17.9
Peru	2.6	20.0
1960		
Argentina	2.9	20.9
Brazil	2.0	20.7
CHILE	3.4	15.6
Peru	2.1	14.7
1970		
Argentina	2.0	16.1
Brazil	2.0	17.2
CHILE	3.3	13.0
Peru	3.3	17.2

Source: Reproduced from Frederick M. Nunn, *The Military in Chilean History*, (1976) 250.

While military expenditures continued to decline as a percentage of the national budget, the percentage of gross domestic product increased to a 1960 high and declined slightly in 1970. Under the Pinochet regime, the military percentage of gross domestic product rocketed from 3.3% in 1970 to 7.4% in 1980.

TABLE 8
COMPARATIVE MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND PERSONNEL

	Percent of GDP		Military Expenditures Percent of National Budget			Armed Forces Personnel Per 1,000 Population	
	1976	1980	1972	1980	1986	1972	1980
Argentina	2.4	2.6	10.0	11.8	5.2	5.7	5.6
Brazil	1.3	0.5	8.3	4.3	3.1	4.1	3.7
Chile	6.1	7.4	6.1	—	10.7	7.7	10.5
Uruguay	2.2	2.6	5.6	11.6	10.2	7.1	9.7
Venezuela	2.2	2.7	10.3	5.9	4.9	3.9	3.2
Colombia	1.2*	2.0	—	—	—	2.2	2.4
Peru	8.0	5.7*	14.8	12.5	—	5.2	8.6
Costa Rica	0.7	0.7	2.8	2.6	2.2	1.1	1.3
Dominican Republic	1.7	1.5	8.5	10.3	8.1	3.5	5.2
Mexico	0.6	0.6	4.2	2.3	2.5	1.5	2.1

*Data Uncertain

Sources: Stockholm Institute of Peace Research, *World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1986* (New York: Oxford UP, 1986); World Bank, *World Development Report 1983, 1988* (New York: Oxford UP, 1983, 1988); United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers," (Washington, DC: GPO, April 1984).

Reproduced from Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries, Volume 4, Latin America*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989) 34.

The Navy and the Air Force have a far more aristocratic tradition and still recruit a large number of their officers from the middle and upper classes, while the Carabinero officers tend to come from the lower middle and working classes.⁷⁹ The highly technological officer training of the Navy and Air Force is easily transferable to civilian industry, while the Carabinero officer training involves police administration skills and are not as highly respected in most professional circles. The Navy is the second most senior service and holds the second order of precedence. It consists of 29,000 active-duty personnel (1984) including Marines and Naval Aviation. It contains four detachments of Marines, each including amphibious assault, combat support, coastal defense, and frogman commando units. Naval Aviation includes one maritime squadron, one general purpose squadron, one heli-

⁷⁹Liisa North in Abraham F. Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch, *Armies and Politics in Latin America*, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986) 174-175.

copter squadron, and one training squadron. It is equipped with three missile destroyers, four submarines, two missile frigates, two missile attack craft, and four torpedo attack craft. Admiral José Toribio Merino Castro served as commander in chief of the Navy from 7 September 1973 until his retirement at age 74 in March 1990. Merino was an authoritarian hard-liner with a *penchant* for making outrageous off-the-cuff comments.

Admiral Merino: "Let us put it realistically: the world today has one enemy--communism. A monolithic, impenetrable enemy that has acquired technology as good as that of the democratic system but used exclusively for destruction. And it is attempting to dominate the entire world. So, what system should be chosen to combat this monolithic bandit that does not show its face, whose religion is the lie? Only war, I do not doubt that, and before the end of this century. And what possibility do we have of surviving a war, if the Congress of the United States, which is the country best equipped to fight it, calls on a general or an admiral and has him reveal to the whole world the US strategy for attacking Russia? It's insane."

Question: "In that case, if the only means of interaction is war, can there be only military governments?"

Admiral Merino: "What other way is there? Which way? How?"⁸⁰

Merino seemed to have a good sense of his personal and political limitations and acquiesced in Pinochet's consolidation of one-man rule. Thereafter, he remained Pinochet's and the junta's most consistent supporter. Merino retired from the Navy when Pinochet stepped down from the presidency in March 1990 and was replaced as commander in chief of the Navy by Admiral Jorge Martínez Busch.

Chile has the world's fourth oldest independent Air Force. It unified several small air squadrons as the new Air Force on 21 March 1930 under the leadership of Air Commodore Arturo Merino Benítez. It takes the third order of precedence. It consists of 11,000 active-duty personnel (1984). Equipped with 1960s era British-built Hawker Hunter jet fighters, the Air Force is organized into three fighter squadrons, two light strike

⁸⁰Malú Sierra, "José Toribio Merino: Merino antes que gobernante," *Ercilla* 2, 165, (26 Jan-1 Feb 1977) 20-24. Translated in Genaro Arriagada (1988).

squadrons, three transport squadrons, one helicopter squadron, one fighter-bomber training squadron, one navigational training squadron, and five groups of anti-aircraft artillery. General Gustavo Leigh Guzmán served as commander in chief of the Air Force from August 1973 until Pinochet illegally removed him from office on 24 July 1978. After Leigh called for a timetable for regime democratization in an interview with an Italian newspaper, Pinochet demanded and received the signatures of Admiral Merino and General Mendoza on an executive decree declaring Leigh “incompetent” to continue in office. Pinochet then seized control of all Air Force bases and the Defense Ministry with Army troops. Leigh was physically trapped in his office in the Defense Ministry. Pinochet appointed 51-year-old Air Force General Fernando Matthei Aubel, ninth in line of seniority after Leigh, as the new commander in chief of the Air Force. The eight Air Force generals senior to Matthei were forced to retire. In a symbolic gesture of solidarity with Leigh, nine of the ten Air Force generals below Matthei in seniority retired in protest. Matthei accepted the appointment under circumstances that made him appear disloyal to the Air Force and a sycophant for Pinochet. He immediately expressed his confidence in the President.

I believe General Pinochet is fully aware of his value, his courage, his management capacity, and the tremendous power he has at this moment. . . No one can stop him in what he seeks to achieve: to carry ahead the process of institutionalization he proposed. He has always said so: ‘It is not that I *want* power; I *have* it, and I will make use of it to give Chile a true normality.’⁸¹

General Matthei publicly supported Pinochet’s war against the left, but in later years became the junta’s strongest proponent of regime democratization. It was General Matthei who told a livid Pinochet on the night of his 5 October 1988 electoral loss in the presidential plebiscite that the Air Force was bound to recognize the victory of the pro-democracy forces.

⁸¹Fernando Matthei, *Ercilla* 2 (August 1978) 9.

The Carabineros are the paramilitary national police force. They are technically not part of the armed forces, but are the Forces of Order. After 11 September 1973, the Carabineros were integrated as one of the four institutional members of the junta, but are the most junior institution and take the fourth order of precedence. They consist of 27,000 personnel (1984) organized into six zones corresponding to the Army's six divisional areas. Operational units include Traffic Control, Highway Patrol, Riot Control, Forest Rangers, Frontier Guards, Customs Control, and the Presidential Guard. In addition to standard police equipment, they are equipped with light infantry weapons, armored personnel carriers, and under the Pinochet regime, regularly used riot police, tear gas, and water cannon to control protest demonstrations. General César Mendoza Durán served as director general of the Carabineros from 11 September 1973 until Pinochet forced him to resign in 1985 in a scandal in which Carabinero officers were implicated in the kidnap-assassinations of several Communist union leaders. Pinochet, who was then reeling from a deep economic recession and concerted political opposition, sacrificed Mendoza to relieve the political pressure on the regime. Pinochet replaced Mendoza with the second in command, General Rodolfo Stange. Under the 1980 Constitution, Stange may remain in office until 1998.

Chilean democracy could not have been consolidated in the nineteenth century without civilian control of the armed forces which, as stated, was established by the presidency of General Bulnes in 1841-51. Latin American polities dominated by military regimes in the nineteenth century have consistently failed to produce stable democratic regimes in Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Paraguay. General Pinochet attempted, not a consolidation of civilian control of the armed forces, but an institutionalization of an authoritarian regime. Once in power, Pinochet moved immediately to downgrade the Army as an independent political power by restoring and consolidating his own authority as commander in chief. He moved to reestablish the military chain of command by beginning

a gradual purge of coup conspirators and politicized officers who could conceivably pose a threat to his hegemony. The Army now existed as Pinochet's political base of support and his most important constituency. His political power derived from his hold on the office of commander in chief. Once Pinochet had consolidated absolute control over the Army, he was able to proclaim himself President of the republic, thus acquiring traditional constitutional authority. He then reestablished presidential authority over all military appointments and promotions. Though Pinochet's intentions were not democratization, he did restore the subordination of the armed forces, if not to civilian control, to his personal control.

A permanent system of military rule is almost a contradiction in terms. The Army cannot govern directly and durably without ceasing to be an Army. And it is precisely the subsequent government, the successor regime that legitimates the prior military usurpation.⁸²

Allende's government effectively ended with his fateful decision to bring the commanders in chief of the armed forces into his Cabinet. It was a tacit admission that he could no longer govern without a military vote of confidence. His government, which never commanded majority support, had lost its legitimacy in the eyes of a political opposition which was no longer respecting the rules of the democratic political process and was openly lobbying the armed forces to intervene and take over the government. Allende had effectively played into the hands of the opposition by drawing the already highly-politicized armed forces directly into the center of the super-heated political crisis and giving them the opportunity to politically deliberate whether his government deserved the confidence of the armed forces.

⁸²Alain Rouquié, "Democratization and the Institutionalization of Military-Dominated Polities in Latin America," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986) 111.

MILITARY PROFESSIONALIZATION

The armed forces were originally designed for the defense of the national security in wartime. They are often used to maintain a balance of power or to implement policies of coercive diplomacy. They are also symbols of nationalism and patriotism and project power outside the country. National security exists in several dimensions. National defense is the defense of the nation-state from attack by foreign powers in the event of war. The Prussian military scholar Carl Clausewitz (1780-1832) viewed war as the pursuit of political policy by other means.

It is clear, consequently, that war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means. What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means. War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of course, is no small demand; but however much it may affect political aims in a given case, it will never do more than modify them. The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.⁸³

Internal security is the defense of the nation-state from internal subversion by anti-government forces. Situational security is the defense of the nation-state from political, economic, or social deterioration which threaten the national integrity. Not having faced the threat of a foreign invader since the War of the Pacific in 1879, it was in the realms of internal security and situational security which the Chilean armed forces indulged their ambitions.

In Samuel Huntington's view, the Industrial Revolution, the centralization of authority in the modern nation-state, and the increasing technical complexity and functional specialization in the division of labor meant that it became impossible for a single individual to become an expert in the management of force and at the same time be an expert statesman in civil administration.⁸⁴ This led to the development of military science as a new profes-

⁸³Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1976) 87.

⁸⁴Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, (1976) 32.

sion with its own body of knowledge requiring advanced specialized skills. The modern career of officership is a civil service profession. Entrance is generally based on a system of competitive examinations and stringent qualifications designed to produce an applicant pool of the best and brightest officer candidates. The profession of officership requires the development of complex intellectual skills involving the mastery of a large body of technical, specialized knowledge and expertise in the management of force requiring years of comprehensive study and training. The modern career officer may spend up to four years in a war college training in the traditional disciplines of strategy, tactics, and logistics for an officer's commission. To this he may add several years of specialized graduate study in engineering or social sciences. A commissioned officer is now the social equal of the traditionally prestigious doctor of medicine, or attorney at law. The career of officership also develops a conception of professional responsibility and accountability. The career officer is responsible to his professional code of ethics. Consequently, the profession has the power to call its members to account and to enforce a standard of professional conduct.

Finally, the career of officership develops a sense of corporateness or institutionalism. The officer corps develops a consciousness of itself as an elite class of professionals which imparts an *esprit d'corps* of unity and cohesiveness. Loyalty and obedience are the supreme military virtues and are the foundation of the hierarchy. The officer corps develops a patriotism to its own institution, whether it is an Army, Navy, Air Force, or police force. The hierarchy of rank is linked by a chain of command. To maintain institutional order, the chain of command must be unbroken. The right to command is based on the prerogatives of rank. In a military institution, the rights and powers of authority derive strictly from rank. Loyalty and obedience are owed to the rank, not to the person.

The military mind is characterized as impatient with dissent, inexpert in the art of persuasion, and ignorant of the importance of minorities in our land. The democratic give-and-take, it is said, is missing in military life, the frictions of debate are not tolerated. The military mind is therefore not pliant. It is given to regimentation of people and ideas, being intolerant of dis-

agreement. Military life is undoubtedly more ordered than civilian affairs. To me, it is a refreshing attribute of military men that they follow orders. The business of preparedness is so complex and costly that it had better be ordered. When there is a clearly defined chain of command and an individual who has the authority and responsibility for making a decision, military men will argue before him with vigor, in spite of what their critics say, but when the decision is made, they will loyally abide by it.⁸⁵

The focus of civil-military relations in a civilian government are the relations primarily between the officer corps and civilian authority. The impact of the 1886-1906 professionalization of the Chilean officer corps from their aristocratic nonprofessional post-independence traditions was profound. Within five years of the appointment of the imperial German Colonel Emil Körner as head of the new War Academy, the Chilean Army and Navy played crucial political roles in the 1891 Civil War. Körner himself split the Army and commanded the Congressional Army which drove President Balmaceda from office.

⁸⁵H.E. Smith, "What is the Military Mind?", *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 79, (May 1953) 511.

TABLE 9
ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY ACADEMIES

	School	Established	Branch
Great Britain	Woolwich	1741	Artillery, Engineering Infantry, Cavalry
	Sandhurst	1802	
Sweden	Karlberg	1792	
France	Ecole Polytechnique St. Cyr	1794	Artillery, Engineering Infantry, Cavalry
		1808	
United States	West Point	1802	
Italy	Modena	1805	Artillery, Engineering
Prussia	Berlin	1810	
	Koningsberg		
	Breslau		
Russia	St. Petersburg	1832	
Chile	War Academy	1890	
Argentina	War College	1900	

Sources: All countries except Chile: *Armeernas varldshistoria*, part III, tables 9 and 15. Chile: Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America*, p 70. Argentina: Darío Canton in van Doorn, J.A.A., ed., *Military Profession and Military Regimes*, (The Hague: Mouton, 1969).

Reproduced from Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power*, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972) 30.

Bengt Abrahamsson maintains that professionalization of the armed forces does not lead to increased civilian control but, in fact, leads to an increasing separation of the armed forces from society and loss of civilian control. First, he defines professionalization in two dimensions: professionalization₁, the historical transformation of the military profession, and professionalization₂, the process of transformation of individuals:

My general thesis is simple. Military professionalization₁ involves the creation and maintenance of a complex, effective, and well-organized social institution. Military professionalization₂ involves the indoctrination and internalization of certain values, outlooks, and behavior elements.

Professionalization₁ has created a politically powerful and often highly independent social structure; and professionalization₂ molds the individuals who are going to man it. *To the extent, then, that military professionalization in the above senses is effective--and to the extent that there are differences between military and civilian values and objectives--civilian control of the military establishment will be impaired.* In other words, in a situation where civilian authorities want to pursue policies that are in disagreement with those preferred by the military, those authorities will meet greater resistance from a high-professionalized than from a low-professionalized officer corps. Or again: military men are not and cannot be neutral and objective servants of the state: they hold certain beliefs, have certain corporate interests and can be expected to favor and to pursue political actions that are consistent with those beliefs and interests.⁸⁶

In Abrahamsson's view, the consequences of the historical transformation of the military profession have been:

- (1) the growth in the size of the officer corps,
- (2) the increasing technical differentiation of the officer corps,
- (3) the expansion of recruitment from the aristocracy to the bourgeois and working classes, and
- (4) the development of a fully-integrated military bureaucracy, including the general staff, and permanent logistical services and support staffs.

The modernization of warfare has produced the need for specialized education and training, which resulted in the establishment of war colleges in the nineteenth century. In addition, the increasing convergence of military strategy and political policy has resulted in an increasing role expansion of military officers into the realm of political affairs.⁸⁷

⁸⁶Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power*, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972) 17.

⁸⁷Bengt Abrahamsson (1972) 37-38.

CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES

Professionalization of the armed forces prepares the institutional basis for the development of political power in their own right. The transferability of skills from the military realm to the civilian realm opens the way for military intervention in politics. The development of a functionally-differentiated military bureaucracy has produced the ability of the military to assume political power and to administer it over a long period of time. The modern military officer is qualified to serve in civilian administrative positions. In addition, the modern officer corps is professionally-trained to make political judgments as part of its military expertise. This has led to an expansion of its political functions. The military's mastery of a large body of scientific and technical expertise, its professional code of ethics and values, and its sense of corporateness increase its autonomy as a heavily-armed institutional power which consumes a large percentage of the national resources. The modernization and growth of the armed forces demand strict planning and control by the civilian government.

Samuel Huntington conceives of two dimensions of civilian control of the armed forces: subjective and objective.

(1) Subjective Civilian Control

The armed forces under subjective civilian control are descended from the traditional armed forces manned and officered by aristocratic nonprofessionals and amateur soldier.

Subjective civilian control is based on the traditional citizen-soldier. It involves the maximization of civilian power exclusively through the negation of any social or professional differentiation between the armed forces and civil society. Civil society maintains control of the armed forces through exclusive reliance on constitutional governmental institutions such as the dual control system of the presidency and Congress or parliamentary oversight. This includes the so-called "Israeli Model" of a nation-in-arms in which civil society and the armed forces are one and the same. The armed forces can never challenge civil society

because there is no inherent conflict. The officer does not serve his commander, he serves the Nation. The armed forces identify completely with civil society and there is no sense of institutionalism which differentiates them from civil society.

(2) Objective Civilian Control

Objective civilian control is based on the modern professional career soldier. This is the "Prussian Model" of the development of the modern military profession as a distinct and specialized career. Officers and men are recruited as very young men who are impressionable and malleable. They are indoctrinated in martial values, trained in military science, and live isolated lives apart from civil society in a hermetically-sealed world as members of a highly specialized professional institution. Professional career military officers are the elite corps of experts and specialists who are trained to give the best possible military advice to civilian authority. As public officials, they are sworn to defend the constitution. As men of honor, they are bound to refrain from political activity. Finally, objective civilian control depends on strict military subordination to civilian authority. In the Prussian view, the professional armed forces are superior to the nonprofessional armed forces because the professionals have superior *esprit d'corps* due to their long-term commitment to their career and to their institution.

The one prime essential for any system of civilian control is the minimizing of military power. Objective civilian control achieves this reduction by professionalizing the military, by rendering them politically sterile and neutral. This produces the lowest possible level of military political power with respect to all civilian groups. At the same time it preserves that essential element of power which is necessary for the existence of a military profession. A highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state. . . The achievement of objective civilian control has only been possible, of course, since the emergence of the military profession. Subjective civilian control is fundamentally out of place in any society in which the division of labor has been carried to the point where there emerges a distinct class of specialists in the management of violence.⁸⁸

⁸⁸Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, (1967) 84-85.

Abrahamsson dismisses Huntington's notion that objective civilian control of the armed forces results from professionalization and Huntington's definitional negation of military intervention in politics from military professionalism. Huntington accepts professional military obedience to civilian authority as an article of faith. It hangs by the slender thread of military goodwill and loyalty even in times of political and economic disorder and civil-military tension. It is an anomaly that a professional military institution which exists forever apart from civil society could forever remain loyal to civilian authority.

Abrahamsson envisions a system of civilian control which emphasizes civilian oversight by civilians who are specially-trained in military science and who are prepared to match the professionalism of the officer corps in presenting competent judgments to the government. Due to the limitations imposed on parliamentary oversight by the demands of a vast political agenda and a shortage of specialized staff expertise, this function should devolve to the national security staff of the head of government.

As a general conclusion, civilian control cannot rely on the expansion of military autonomy, but rather has to work for its restriction. To check the military's quest for professional independence is important for increasing the political freedom of choice of civilian governments. It should be clear that few patent solutions for eternal peace could be achieved this way; the military is not the only group interested in the exploitation of conflicts to achieve indigenous goals. The aim of civilian control has to be expressed in limited rather than utopian terms: the problem is to achieve a degree of control which will leave civilian governments a fair choice as to what methods--military or non-military--should be applied to achieve solutions of international crises and conflicts.⁸⁹

Chile had consolidated civilian control of the Army under the presidency of General Bulnes by 1851. The drive to develop a permanent professional military establishment, which began in 1886, fundamentally reversed this tradition and set in motion a chain of events which would lead to a pervasive military influence in the political affairs of the country. Once the Chilean government appointed Colonel Körner to train the Chilean offi-

⁸⁹Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power*, (1972) 160.

cer corps in 1886, Chile became the leading exponent of the expansion of military autonomy in Latin America. More than any European power, Prussia developed the career of officership to the pinnacle of prestige as a priesthood of highly skilled professionals, and the Chilean Army is the Prussian Army's direct descendant in Latin America. In the twentieth century, civilian control of the armed forces has been represented by Eric Nordlinger's so-called "liberal model."

The liberal model of civilian control is explicitly premised upon the differentiation of elites according to their expertise and responsibilities. Civilians holding the highest governmental offices--be they elected, appointed, or anointed--are responsible for and skilled in determining domestic and foreign goals, overseeing the administration of the laws, and resolving conflicts among social, economic, and political groups. Military officers are trained and experienced in the management and application of force, responsible for protecting the nation against external attack and the government against internal violence. . .Soldiers who are imbued with these beliefs and values--what might be referred to as the civilian ethic--are attitudinally disposed to accept civilian authority and to retain a neutral, depoliticized stance even when in sharp disagreement with the government.⁹⁰

The state, as the political agent of society, makes a contract with the officer corps. The state exercises a monopoly on the use of force. The state grants the soldier an officer's commission, which is his license to practice his profession as an administrator in the use of force in the name of the state. The officer is motivated by love of country, profession, and loyalty to his Army, Navy, Air Force, or police institution. He must also swear loyalty to the state, as represented by its executive authority, the government. He is obliged to maintain the national security, to present informed military counsel, and to obey the orders of the government. That is, he accepts the principle of civilian control of the armed forces. Clausewitz was one of the earliest exponents of civilian control of the armed forces.

The only question, therefore, is whether, when war is being planned, the political point of view should give way to the purely military . . . : that is, should it disappear completely or subordinate itself, or should the political

⁹⁰Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977) 12-13.

point of view remain dominant and the military be subordinated to it? That the political view should wholly cease to count on the outbreak of war is hardly conceivable unless pure hatred made all wars a struggle for life and death. In fact, as we have said, they are nothing but expressions of policy itself. Subordinating the political point of view to the military would be absurd, for it is policy that creates war. Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa. No other possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of view to the political.⁹¹

Huntington identifies the conflicts inherent in the supreme military virtue of obedience. Conflict is inevitable in civil-military relations.

(1) Military Obedience and Professional Competence

In a conflict between military obedience and professional competence, the officer is obliged to obey his commanding officer even if he doubts the professional competence of the commander, for superior professional competence must be assumed in a commanding officer at all times. It is dangerous for an officer to make a judgment to disobey professionally-incompetent orders to advance the greater military objective. The benefits of attained military objectives rarely justify the institutional instability caused by disobedience.

(2) Military Obedience and Political Competence

In a conflict between military obedience and political competence, the officer must assume the superior political competence of the statesman even when the officer is convinced of the disastrous consequences of the political policy. The officer is barred from political deliberation.

(3) Military Obedience and Military Competence

In a conflict between military obedience and military competence, the officer is obliged to assume the superior military competence of his commanding officer and obey orders. However, if the orders come from a civilian statesman, the officer is obliged to disobey orders which the officer is convinced endanger the national security. This is justified because

⁹¹Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, (1976) 607.

the statesman is not assumed to have superior military competence and has no inherent right to make tactical military decisions. The officer is held accountable for disobedience.

(4) Military Obedience and Legality

In a conflict between military obedience and legality, the officer must assume that the commanding officer or the statesman is acting in good faith in giving legal orders. However, the officer is not obliged to deny his own moral being and has the discretion to study the law and make his own judgment. If the officer is convinced of the illegality of the order, he is justified in disobeying. The officer is, of course, held fully accountable for disobeying orders at all times.⁹²

In return for the services of the officer, the government is obliged to celebrate the heroism and devotion to duty of the armed forces in the awarding of decorations for outstanding service. It is also obliged to respect the honor, prestige, traditions, and values of the armed forces as symbolized by their uniforms, insignia, and rituals of pomp and pageantry. Finally, the government is obliged to provide a standard of living befitting the honor of the soldier while on active duty and in retirement. Because of the armed forces' investment in the status-quo, and society's investment in them, the armed forces are an inherently conservative institution committed to political stability.

General Pinochet has institutionalized military control of the national budget. The civilian governments of President Aylwin and his successors will not have control of military expenditures.

⁹²Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, (1967) 74-78.

. . . [T]he civilian Government does not control arms spending. By law, 10 percent of Chile's copper revenues, or about \$300 million a year, goes to the military. This has made Chile the biggest spender on the continent in percentage of gross domestic product. Argentina, for example, spends 1.8 percent of its national product on its military, down from 4 percent in the early 1980s. Brazil spends 5 percent. Chile spends 5 percent to 6 percent.⁹³

MILITARY PRAETORIANISM

There is an inherent risk in a national policy of developing a permanent military establishment professionally-trained beyond the traditional disciplines of strategy, tactics, and logistics. A civilian authority which develops military officers as a civil service class of professional managers and administrators trained in politics and civil administration can contribute to the breakdown in the differentiation of functions between civilian leadership and military leadership. The risk entails the development of a standing military power capable of challenging the civilian leadership for political power.

The new tasks of the military require that the professional officer develop more and more of the skills and orientations common to civilian administrators and civilian leaders. The narrowing difference in skill between military and civilian society is an outgrowth of the increasing concentration of technical specialists in the military. The men who perform such technical tasks have direct civilian equivalents: engineers, machine maintenance specialists, health service experts, logistic and personnel technicians.⁹⁴

We may refer to the politicization and political intervention of professionalized armed forces as *military praetorianism*.

Praetorianism refers to a situation in which military officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force. This term is taken from one of the earliest and most famous instances of military intervention. The Praetorian Guards of the Roman Empire were

⁹³Nathaniel C. Nash, "Will More Guns for the Generals Aid or Threaten Democracy?" *The New York Times*, 5 April 1992.

⁹⁴Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960) 9.

established as a special military unit for the protection of the emperor. They ended up using their military power to overthrow emperors and to control the Roman senate's "election" of successive emperors. . . Thus praetorianism (or military intervention) occurs when officers more or less overtly threaten to carry out a coup d'état unless certain demands are met, when they stage an unsuccessful coup, when a coup brings about or prevents the replacement of the government by another group of civilians, and, most important, when the officers themselves take control of the government.⁹⁵

Chile led Latin America in the development of a professional military establishment in the 1890s. In Prussia, the expansion of administrative services and management staffs in the military led to the rise of the general staff as a political institution unaccountable to parliamentary authority. The Prussian generals owed their loyalty to the kaiser. The minister of war was responsible to Parliament, but could control the general staff only through the kaiser. The general staff represented the pinnacle of Prussian military professionalism.

Throughout the nineteenth century the General Staff tended to be the organizational stronghold of Prussian professionalism. In the early decades it had to struggle for position and recognition against both the War Ministry and the Military Cabinet which tended to be the center of aristocratic reaction. Under the leadership of von Moltke, however, who became its chief in 1857, the General Staff rapidly acquired preeminence. The scientific and rational expertise of Moltke became the dominant ideal of the German officer corps. From the 1860s on, service in the General Staff was the most coveted duty in the German Army. The wine-red trouser stripe of the General Staff officers became the symbol of a new elite within the officer corps, the cream of the profession, signifying the highest standards of knowledge, competence, and devotion to duty.⁹⁶

Military officers can claim to be constitutionalists while advancing praetorian military institutionalism. Just prior to the 1962 Argentine coup against the civilian President Arturo Frondizi, which preempted a strong showing by the outlawed working class Peronist Party in congressional elections, a faction of so-called "legalistic" military officers issued a statement of their philosophy:

⁹⁵Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, (1977) 2-3.

⁹⁶Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, (1967) 50-51.

We believe that the armed forces ought not to govern. On the contrary, they should be subordinate to the civil power. This does not mean that they should not gravitate in the country's institutional life. Their role is at once silent and fundamental. They guarantee the constitutional pact which our ancestors bequeathed us, and they have the sacred duty of forestalling and containing any totalitarian enterprise which may arise in the country whether from the government or the opposition.⁹⁷

When the officer corps develops praetorian values, its loyalty to its military institution supersedes its loyalty to the political constitution. When praetorian military officers begin making political judgments, they invade the forbidden realm of constitutional law, and begin making constitutional judgments. Loyalty to the government becomes conditional, and leads to the incremental breakdown of the civilian ethic. General Juan Carlos Onganía, commander in chief of the Argentine Army, in a speech at West Point in 1964 declared:

Obedience is due to a government when its power is derived from the people and pursues the constitutional precepts set forth by the people, for the people. This obedience, in the last instance, is due to the constitution and to the law, and it should never be the result of the mere existence of men or political parties who may be holding office because of fate or circumstances. It should therefore be clear that the duty of rendering such obedience will have ceased being an absolute requirement if there are abuses in the exercise of legal authority that violate the basic principles of a republican system of government, when this is done as a result of exotic ideologies, or when there is a violent breakdown in the balance of independence of the branches of government, or when constitutional prerogatives are used in such a way that they completely cancel out the rights and freedoms of the citizens.⁹⁸

This speech was delivered two years after the Army installed civilian President José María Guido to replace the ousted President Frondizi. Argentina was then reeling from praetorian military infighting both within the armed forces and against the government, and two years before General Onganía's successful June 1966 coup which made him President of Argentina.

⁹⁷Quoted in Lyle N. McAlister et al, *The Military and Society* (1964) 118.

⁹⁸Quoted in Lyle N. McAlister et al, *The Military and Society* (1964) 117.

The imperial German general staff effectively seized control of the government in the First World War by intimidating the kaiser with its monopoly of military expertise and its success in the field. The threat of the general staff to resign in time of national crisis was enough to cow the kaiser into acquiescence. Moreover, the authoritarianism of military discipline renders it susceptible to authoritarian ideologies.

Fascism fulfilled many an old daydream of officers everywhere; for instance, it abolished the politician, with his awkward queries on budgetary matters, and at the same time it effectively stopped criticism on the conduct of military affairs through press or books or from the platform. . . A further lure was the fact that military men were conceded the highest rank in society under fascism; military institutions furnished the examples for all other organizations in the state. . . Besides such apparent conveniences to Army men, fascism provided enlarged armies, bringing rapid promotion.⁹⁹

In contrast to Argentina, whose armed forces left power in disgrace in 1983 in the wake of the humiliation of the 1982 Falklands War, the Chilean armed forces maintained an unparalleled level of prestige. General Pinochet was defeated at the polls and retired as President in 1990, but the armed forces were not defeated.

They finished with a sense of pride as the most successful Army in the political arena, while armies in Brazil, Argentina, and Peru all have a sense of disaster . . . They are very arrogant. . . We have the last Prussian Army in the world . . . They are obedient, hierarchical and still have enormous respect for their commander in chief. That is not about to change.¹⁰⁰

The defeat of the Argentine armed forces by the British in 1982 caused a massive loss of public confidence. In defeat and dishonor, they were held up to ridicule not only at home, but in the eyes of the world. While still in effective military control of the country, the armed forces were forced to turn the disaster over to the despised politicians. The humiliation of the Argentine armed forces permitted a more rapid consolidation of civilian control

⁹⁹Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism*, (New York: Meridian, 1959) 411.

¹⁰⁰Genaro Arriagada in Nathaniel C. Nash, "Chile's Army Stands Tall, and Casts a Shadow," *The New York Times*, 26 January 1992.

and democratization than will be possible in Chile. Chile failed to consolidate permanent civilian control of the armed forces because of its deliberate policy of professionalization of a permanent military establishment. The professionalization of the armed forces resulted in a historic reversal of civilian control.

By 1900, a majority of Chilean military officers were recruited from the middle class. As the nineteenth century Basque-Castilian aristocracy gave way to the middle and upper class coalition of the twentieth century, the armed forces became identified with middle class rule. With the military interventions between 1924 and 1932, the Chilean armed forces had assumed the role of praetorian arbiters of political power. The post-World War I recession and the Depression of the 1930s weakened civilian political institutions.

The extent to which military institutions and individuals become politicized is a function of the weakness of civilian political organizations and the inability of civilian political leaders to deal with the principal policy problems facing the country. The extent to which a politicized officer corps plays a conservative or a reform role in politics is a function of the expansion of political participation in the society. . . . Once middle class urban groups become the dominant elements in politics, the military assume an arbitral or stabilizing role. If a society is able to move from middle class to mass participation with fairly well-developed political institutions . . . the military assume a nonpolitical, specialized, professional role characteristic of systems with "objective" civilian control. . . . If, however, a society moves into the phase of mass participation without developing effective political institutions, the military become engaged in a conservative effort to protect the existing system against the incursions of the lower classes, particularly the urban lower classes. They become the guardians of the existing middle class order. They are thus, in a sense, the door keepers in the expansion of political participation in a praetorian society: their historical role is to open the door to the middle class and to close it on the lower class.¹⁰¹

The middle and upper class, Nationals and Christian Democrats alike, easily justified the prospect of inviting the armed forces to remove the Allende government, restore order, and return power to civilians within a matter of months. The armed forces are easily

¹⁰¹Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven: Yale UP, 1968) 221-222.

brought into politics, but they are not so easily removed. The armed forces are a statist, authoritarian institution, not a democratic institution, and once installed, will pursue their own institutional agenda without taking account of the wishes of their civilian allies. Many officers are imbued with liberal democratic values, but others may nurse years of resentments and perceived slights under the tight reign of civilian technocrats and armchair warriors who deign to practice their own military theories in what many officers regard as an exclusive professional military realm. These erstwhile obedient officers can become aggressive praetorian hard-liners and give vent to their authoritarian inclinations, given the supreme opportunity.

The seizure of power by the military in a coup designed to veto the expansion of political participation brings only temporary relief to the political system. The groups which participate in the coup are usually united only by their desire to stop or to reverse the tendencies which they consider subversive of political order. Once the military are in power, the coup coalition begins to split. It may fragment into many small cliques, each attempting to push the radicals and the moderates, the hard-liners and the soft-liners . . . The struggle between the moderates and the radicals may focus on the number of issues, but typically the key issue is the return of power to civilians. Invariably, the junta which comes to power in a veto coup promises a quick surrender of power and return to normal civilian rule. The hard-liners argue, however, that the military must stay in power to bar permanently the civilian groups which they ousted from power and to impose structural reforms on the political system. The hard-liners are usually *etatists* in economics and authoritarian in politics. The moderates, on the other hand, usually view the aims of the coup as more limited.¹⁰²

The Chilean armed forces in 1973 were determined not to repeat the mistakes of the Argentine generals in 1955, 1962, and 1966 by leaving the politicized popular sector intact and returning power to civilians. The 1973 Chilean coup was not merely a veto coup with the armed forces acting as moderators or guardians. In 1973, the Chilean armed forces, acting as hard-liners, waged a conventional war against the left. They sought to emulate the successes of the Brazilian generals in 1964 by crushing the politicized popular sector

¹⁰²Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (1968) 231.

and fostering the capitalist Chilean economic miracle. The Chilean armed forces did not succumb to Huntington's thesis of political fragmentation. This was due largely to the rapid consolidation of power by General Pinochet and the regime's evolution from a collegial military regime to a personal military regime within fifteen months. Military dissidents were instantaneously purged. When Air Force commander Gustavo Leigh publicly called for political normality in 1978, General Pinochet forced him from office with Army troops and purged the Air Force of seventeen generals. General Pinochet imposed and maintained an authoritarian regime for sixteen years which killed over 2,200 Chileans but still was not able to depoliticize the popular sector. He was, however, successful in instilling a profound psychological fear in the electorate of overstressing their fragile political institutions.

V. THE AUTHORITARIAN INSTITUTIONALITY

AUTHORITARIANISM

A political regime is constituted by the formal and informal set of rules which govern the civil-political relations between the state and popular institutions which interact in a society and seek consensus within a political context. It is the consensus of these contending elements which forms the government within the context of the regime type. The state is constituted by the social relations of domination which exist within the hierarchy of social classes organized around an economic system which supports it.¹⁰³ While the state is manifested in the relations of domination, it is concretely represented by the institutions which are legitimately recognized to exercise a monopoly of force in the society. While the state exercises force or the threat of force to maintain internal security and national defense, its legitimacy is based on the acceptance of the relations of domination.¹⁰⁴

The essence of an authoritarian regime is the exercise of executive power unchecked by constitutional rule of law. It becomes identified by:

- (1) The permanent state of internal war, state of siege, or state of exception.
- (2) The nullification of the rule of law.
- (3) The duality of the state: The Prerogative State, which exercises power and violence unchecked. The Normative State, which administers government business on a day-to-day basis.
- (4) The nonexistence of the doctrine of the separation of powers: In the authoritarian state, all power is the property of the state. Power is exercised not of the peo-

¹⁰³Fernando Henrique Cardoso in David Collier, ed., "The Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes," *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1979) 38-39.

¹⁰⁴Guillermo O'Donnell, "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State," in David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, (1979) 286-288.

ple, by the people, for the people; but of the state, by the state, for the state.

Sovereignty resides in the state and not in the people. There is no need for a separation of powers because the state cannot abuse itself.

(5) The virtue of authority: The honor of authority is assumed. Authority cannot be questioned just as the soldier never questions the orders of his commander.

Authority is immune from accountability. It is above reproach and above question.

(6) The nonexistence individual rights: Under the authoritarian state, the individual is always safe and secure in his person as long as he does not come into conflict with the state. If the individual is in state custody, the state is justified in using all means at its disposal to defend itself from threats to national security from the individual.

An authoritarian regime may dissolve legislative and judicial institutions entirely or may leave them intact and incorporate them through intimidation. A democratic parliament may be purged of its democratic elements and transformed into an authoritarian parliament. A constitutional judiciary may be purged of its constitutional elements and transformed into an authoritarian judiciary. In the case of Chile, the 1973 Supreme Court, made up of Conservative and Christian Democratic appointees, actively provided constitutional sanction to the military regime throughout its sixteen years of authoritarian rule and campaign of official killing.

Authoritarian regimes are political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism: without elaborate and guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor extensive political mobilization (except some points in their development); and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵Juan J. Linz in Stanley G. Payne, *Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century Spain*, (New York: n.p., 1976) 165.

The authoritarian regime is identified by the termination of the constitutional rule of law. Legal rights and civil liberties are suspended or abolished and replaced by martial law under a state of siege or a state of emergency. An authoritarian constitution may be drafted by a commission appointed by the regime instead of a democratic constitutional assembly. The authoritarian constitution may be approved by a controlled plebiscite to lend the form and structure, if not the substance, of popular participation and the majesty of democracy. The repudiation of democratic government is justified as an irresponsible practice of politics which is not equipped to confront the reality of Marxist subversion, which only authoritarian measures are prepared to contain.

The authoritarian regime may be civilian or military. Civilian authoritarian regimes, such as Nazi Germany, are generally ruled by a single authoritarian political party. Military authoritarian regimes are ruled by the armed forces constituted as a political institution and actively engaged in political deliberation. The military leaders, the commanders, form the ruling political body. Under military rule, career military officers hold high executive policy-making positions in the government. Essentially, the armed forces become the government. The armed forces are politicized; they become an elite, politically-deliberative institutional body representing the middle and upper classes, unaccountable to constitutional rule of law or civilian control.

Finally, the authoritarian regime is distinguished from the totalitarian regime in that the authoritarian regime exercises power without accountability to constitutional rule of law in the political sector but leaves the economic sector to the free market. It restricts or abolishes political parties and closes participation from the popular sector. It does not seek popular mobilization, but instead seeks popular demobilization through intimidation and fear. Its maintenance of free market capitalism offers hope of political liberalization and incremental democratization. It is sometimes identified with a white revolution; a revolution from above. It may seek extensive political, economic, and social reforms which it sees as

inevitable from above before they are demanded from below. It is a capitalist preemption of anti-capitalist political power.

The praetorian state, or military dictatorship, takes three forms: personal, oligarchical, and corporatist. The military dictatorship is often buttressed by an auxiliary structure, a military party, whose major sources of support and recruitment are the military, state bureaucrats, and technocrats. . . In Latin America the military shares its rule with technocrats, industrial managers, bureaucrats, and the right-wing or reformist intelligentsia. But some Latin American military regimes (Chile and Peru, for example) do not engage political parties for support. . . The praetorian state draws its major support from the military establishment though the military may not interfere in administration of the state, the economy, the police, and the military party.¹⁰⁶

The Pinochet regime evolved from collegial military to personal military within fifteen months. The military regime began to construct an authoritarian institutionality through the issuance of hundreds of decree laws.¹⁰⁷

(1) Decree Law 1, 11 September 1973, established the Government Junta.

(2) Decree Law 5, 12 September 1973, declared a state of internal war.

(3) Decree Law 12, 24 September 1973, dissolved the Central Labor Confederation (CUT).

(4) Decree Law 25, 19 September 1973, dissolved Congress.

(5) Decree Law 77, 13 October 1973, declared illegal all political parties of the left.

(6) Decree Law 78, 17 October 1973, declared the remaining political parties in recess.

(7) Decree Law 81, 6 November 1973, established new crimes against the internal security of the state.

¹⁰⁶Amos Perlmutter, *Modern Authoritarianism*, (Binghamton: Vail-Ballou, 1981) 39-41.

¹⁰⁷Contraloría General de la República, *Recopilación de Decretos Leyes*, (Santiago, 1974).

- (8) Decree Law 128, 16 November 1973, governed the exercise of constituent, legislative, and executive powers by the Government Junta.
- (9) Decree Law 427 of 1974 augmented Decree Law 128.
- (10) Decree Law 640, 10 September 1974, downgraded the state of internal war to a state of siege.
- (11) Decree Law 788, 4 December 1974, obliterated the Constitution of 1925 by declaring that decree laws issued by the junta took precedence over the Constitution in areas of conflict.

State corporatism was never seriously considered as an integral part in the institutionalization of the authoritarian regime. Corporatism is a system of special interest intermediation in which numerous state-sanctioned, functionally-differentiated social and economic units and organizations are hierarchically-ordered for representation in the government. All corporatist units are fundamentally sanctioned by and are ultimately subservient to the state. The system provides the forms of representation without the substance. It is designed to preserve the political capital of the authoritarian head of government by resolving conflict before it reaches him. It allows the head of government to divide and rule by mediating conflict only when necessary and perpetually keeping any potential opposition off balance, but always with the Army and the internal security force in the background.

General Pinochet was not interested in any state corporatist scheme which would dilute his personal authority. Since special interests were controlled through repression, there was no need for intermediation. The opposition never seriously threatened the regime. Pinochet welcomed the participation of upper-class technocrats in his government as administrators and advisers, but not as full ruling partners. They found an ally in Pinochet who represented their class and economic policies, but one who was not beholden to them for power. His appointment of a succession of Cabinets, or "governments," be-

came the focus of upper-class entrepreneurial representation. Pinochet turned to the technocrats mainly for economic advice, which the armed forces, as a state institution, were somewhat lacking in expertise.

The corporatist state, which is usually oligarchical in nature, is dominated by a coalition of conservative or reformist politicians, the military, technocrats, and bureaucrats. Its most conspicuous political feature is the absence of an autonomous or powerful party. At most, the party is merely an instrument of the despot or the corporatist oligarchy. The rivalry between the state, the technocracy and the military is purely functional; the despot, even though his rule may be ephemeral, is in complete control, as Salazar and Franco have demonstrated.¹⁰⁸

Opposition political activity was controlled by systematic repression and state terror. The regime sought the depoliticization of the public to a state of political sterility or nonpoliticism. As public nonpoliticism was the objective of the regime, the formation of an official government party was not necessary. Moreover, the government had no need of an official party to administer interest group intermediation. For these reasons, the Pinochet regime did not resemble the most thoroughly institutionalized corporatist-authoritarian regime of its time: the Salazarist regime of Portugal between 1927 and 1974. The Portuguese regime involved at least five cumbersome layers of state-sanctioned and organized interest-group representation:

- (1) Primary units composed of local community centers and neighborhood organizations.
- (2) Intermediate organizations such as officially-sanctioned unions and professional societies.
- (3) Corporations representing important institutions such as the armed forces, the civil service, the business community, and the Church, were elected by their intermediate organizations.

¹⁰⁸Amos Perlmutter, *Modern Authoritarianism*, (1981) 38.

(4) The Corporative Chamber was composed of corporations and constituted the second chamber of the national legislature.

(5) The Ministry of Corporations administered the entire apparatus and was under the authority of the prime minister.

Nonetheless, even with several layers of institutionalized corporatist bureaucracy, the Portuguese regime, as did the Chilean regime, maintained the Army and the secret police as its most important regime institutions.

Regimentation from above of interest representation into a preordained set of hierarchical categories; official recognition and control over internal finance, leadership selection and demand articulation; formal monopoly on representation; imposition of a symbiotic relationship between such "semivoluntary" associations and the central bureaucracy--this is corporatism. Corporatism is the "cornerstone of the sistema" and a key element of authoritarian rule in general.¹⁰⁹

Having consolidated de facto absolute authority by December 1974, Pinochet began to look to the future. All talk of the early democratization promised in September 1973 ceased. On the six month anniversary of the coup, the junta issued its Declaration of Principles, in which it rejected an early democratization and instead hinted at a thorough political and economic restructuring. Pinochet basically had two options:

- (1) He could follow the traditional praetorian precedent of ruling for several years, implementing his required reforms, then returning power to a democratic regime, or
- (2) He could permanently consolidate military institutionalism in a new authoritarian regime.

The second option would entail some risks. For one, authoritarian regimes are inherently unstable. It would require years of repression to transform Chile into a stable authoritarian regime. For another, Chile was firmly linked to the West and could count on no support

¹⁰⁹Philippe C. Schmitter, "The 'Portugalization' of Brazil," in Alfred Stepan, *Authoritarian Brazil*, (New Haven: Yale UP, 1973) 206.

from its major trading partners in North America and Europe for a hard-line authoritarian adventure. With the democratization of Greece in 1974 and Spain and Portugal in 1976, there remained no capitalist authoritarian regimes in Europe to provide a development model or even moral support.

In order to institutionalize his regime beyond his lifetime, Pinochet nonetheless found it necessary to form an alliance with the ultraconservative middle and upper class technocrats who flocked to staff his ministries. It was when Pinochet turned to the technocrats for political advice, that he made his gravest political mistake. His carefully developed political shrewdness, enhanced by seven years of power, failed him in 1980 when he agreed to limit his presidential term to eight years in the 1980 authoritarian Constitution, which would be ratified in a controlled plebiscite. Pinochet gradually fell under the sway of conservative politicians and technocrats. For their part, the civilian technocrats came to a consensus that Pinochet as President-for-Life probably could not be ratified in an open democratic plebiscite and managed to convince Pinochet to submit his presidency to a democratic plebiscite in 1988. While the September 1973 Cabinet had only one civilian member, by 1980 Pinochet was relying on an overwhelmingly civilian Cabinet in his capacity as President, in addition to his military household in his capacity as commander in chief of the Army.

Normally military affairs are left to military men and not to civilians. . . Nationalism is a simple ideology, easily shared by all classes, makes for an emphasis on the Army as a bearer of national prestige. If the break with the past was made by a military coup, the position of the Army is likely to be even more enhanced. . . On the other hand we find the Army presented as essentially apolitical, above parties and classes, hoping to transfer its powers to the "people" once order is re-established and the corruption of the previous regime cleaned out. . . The more a regime becomes consolidated, the fewer purely military men staff the government, except when there are no alternative sources of elites. In this sense it may be misleading to speak of a military dictatorship, even when the head of state is an Army man. In fact he is likely to carry out a careful policy of depoliticization and profes-

sionalization of the Army, while he maintains close ties with the officer corps to hold its loyalty.¹¹⁰

Seven years of absolute power, the deference of subordinates, and the cheers of controlled audiences caused Pinochet to believe that he could would have no problem winning a carefully controlled presidential plebiscite. After having survived the arms embargo and human rights criticisms of the 1977-81 Carter Administration in Washington, he never expected that the 1981-89 Reagan Administration would also apply pressure to guarantee a truly democratic election. When the plebiscite came in 1988, Pinochet found himself entrapped in his own constitutional mechanism, never having considered that he would one day be confronted with forces beyond his personal control. On 11 March 1980, Pinochet presented the new Constitution to the public to be ratified by a controlled plebiscite on 11 September 1980. This 33,000-word document was drafted by constitutional lawyers appointed by Pinochet and without an elected constitutional assembly as is normally the case in western liberal democratic regimes. The government's hand was strengthened by its monopoly control of television and radio and campaigned vigorously for the new Constitution. Also, the year 1980 marked the peak of the 1977-80 economic expansion, which was fueled by massive foreign loans and investment.

The plebiscite is an ingenious political instrument which may be used by a ruling power to create the form of democracy without the substance. It allows the ruling power the freedom to define the context of political debate. It allows the ruling power to create the issues. It also allows the ruling power the freedom to campaign for its own agenda through its unlimited access to the news media without exposing the head of government to running for election. The plebiscite is used to legitimize the authoritarian regime by creating new political institutions which lend the form of democratic institutions to the regime

¹¹⁰Juan J. Linz in Stanley G. Payne, *Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century Spain*, (1976) 179-180.

and producing the aura of legitimacy. The legitimization of authoritarian institutions brings the stability of permanence when the electorate ratifies the agenda of the ruling power in a controlled plebiscite.

The plebiscite is the election of choice for the authoritarian regime. Nearly all electorates respond to appeals to nationalism, patriotism, and positive media images. It can be controlled to produce the desired result in nearly all cases. It is theoretically democratic in that the voter makes the final decision. However, in the process, the voter never defines the rules of the process. Finally, the plebiscite violates the principle of representative democracy. A constituent assembly elected by district representation or political party proportional representation would enable the voters to send representatives who would create a political constitution by consensus, however untidy the process. On 11 September 1980, the seventh anniversary of the coup, the government held its constitutional plebiscite. On 13 October 1980, the government announced that 67% of the electorate had voted in favor of the new Constitution. While the extent of fraud can never be documented, the length of time between, the 11 September plebiscite and the 13 October results does not instill confidence in the electoral process.

The 1980 Constitution created a National Security Council with seven voting members, four of which--a solid majority--are the commanders in chief of the armed forces. Any two commanders may convoke the Council against the wishes of the President, and the four commanders together may outvote him on any issue. The National Security Council removes the balance of state power from the civilian government and places it with the armed forces. The President's civilian Cabinet must, in effect, accede to the authority of the National Security Council in its essential capacity as a permanent "war cabinet." The Council is also perfectly capable of administering the government without the President or Congress, with the commanders in chief serving as a permanent junta.

The ratification of the 1980 Constitution automatically elected Pinochet to an eight-year presidential term which ran from 11 March 1981 to 11 March 1989. He would face the next one-man presidential plebiscite in 1988. If approved, he would serve another eight years until 1997. In the event that he were rejected, an open presidential and congressional election would occur in 1989, and he would serve one additional year until 11 March 1990.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE

In the wake of the end of the Second World War in 1945, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union chilled into a prolonged Cold War. In the new nuclear age the US abandoned the doctrine of total war in its response to Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe and adopted the Truman Doctrine of limited war. Two enduring legacies of the Truman Doctrine were:

- (1) the policy of containment of Communist expansion through limited war, and
- (2) the Marshall Plan of economic assistance to rebuild Europe.

The US dispatched arms and assistance to Greece and Turkey in 1947 and an armed forces commitment in South Korea in 1950. In addition, the entire US defense and national security establishment was reorganized in 1947. The War Department was reorganized as the Defense Department. The Central Intelligence Agency was also established. The United States concluded the Rio Treaty of 1947, which created the Rio Pact, a collective security alliance with the governments of Latin America. The Organization of American States was established in 1948. An American military mission arrived in Rio de Janeiro in 1948 and remained there until 1960. The Brazilian *Escola Superior da Guerra* (Higher War College) was established by Brazil's President, General Eurico G. Dutra in 1949. The National Security Doctrine (NSD) began to be developed in the United States and was gradually ex-

ported and to, and implemented in, Latin America, where it was expanded and reformulated through the ongoing programs of US military aid to the Latin American armed forces and the training of Latin American officers at United States war colleges. US foreign policy in Latin America became characterized by the following:

- (1) US foreign policy became a militarized policy of national security.
- (2) Rather than a postwar demobilization, US national security required the maintenance of a massive national defense establishment.
- (3) Latin America became a natural focus of national security experimentation.
- (4) Any Latin American government not in sympathy with the United States constituted a threat to US national security.
- (5) The lack of political or socioeconomic stability in Latin America could also constitute a threat to US national security.

Latin American governments became eligible for massive US military aid and training as a means of permanently linking the Latin American armed forces to the United States. A system of national security education was developed. Virtually all Chilean generals and admirals have had advanced training in the United States. National security education became dominated by several themes:

- (1) Anti-leftist: The conviction that leftist opposition to US policies constituted Communist sympathies or the infiltration of Soviet influence.
- (2) Civil-military operations: The expansion of the prerogatives of the armed forces into the political sphere of operations.
- (3) Military leadership: The increased visibility of commanding officers in government policymaking and administration.

(4) Anti-democratic: The suspicion that democratic institutions were prone to corruption and susceptible to Communist subversion.

In Brazil and Chile, the National Security Doctrine sought the creation of an alliance between the armed forces and middle and upper-class professionals and technocrats capable of constructing a new social order. The NSD has three major objectives.

(1) Political Order: In the political policy, the NSD sought the institutionalization of an authoritarian regime capable of acting as a police state. Its ideal politics is anti-politics. It seeks to depoliticize civil society, often through the use of state terror.

(2) Economic Stability: In the economic sphere, the NSD sought capitalist economic development, the protection of private capital, free enterprise, and the suppression of labor union power. Free market economists were dispatched to Chile from the University of Chicago to write the blueprint for what became Chile's "economic miracle" of the 1970s. This is orthodox economic stabilization.

(3) Socioeconomic Development: In social policy, the NSD sought social unity through strict subordination to state authority and the homogenization of culture. American-style popular culture has dominated Chilean society in the years since 1973.

The Truman Doctrine of limited war became refined in the Kennedy period by the theory of flexible, controlled response developed under Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Socioeconomic instability which constituted a threat to national security would be met with counterinsurgency warfare. The increasing militarization of politics made civilian control of the armed forces in Latin America increasingly dependent on

Huntington's model of objective control. Jorge Tapia Valdés opposes Huntington's concept of objective civilian control of the armed forces as politicizing them by charging them with solving political and social problems for the politicians.

The ideas of Huntington with respect to civil-military relations are representative of a strong tendency among numerous American authors and social scientists who have had great influence on the formation of military leaders and on the content that these military leaders have given to the doctrine of national security. . .

In synthesis, we can affirm that the American doctrine of national security, in its application to Latin America, consists of increasing the role of the armed forces with the end of assuring subversive control or of social agitation in each country on the continent and to guarantee internal political stability. This has prepared the armed forces not only to practice a type of limited war against insurgency, but to participate in directing the social and economic processes of the country.¹¹¹

The experiences of Brazil and Chile demonstrate two different scenarios of the development of the military as security community. In Brazil, the intelligence community institutionalized itself and expanded its power to the status of a new state within the existing state, quite out of the control of its creators. In Chile, General Pinochet maintained exclusive personal control of the DINA throughout the military regime.

The Pinochet regime adopted the National Security Doctrine to justify the war against subversion. Under Pinochet, the body politic came to be regarded as a living organism suffering from infection which is in need of emergency medical treatment. Counterinsurgency warfare was waged as a radical surgical extraction of the Marxist-Leninist cancer from the body politic as a means of promoting a process of healing and recuperation from the political infection.

Such exclusion appears as a necessary condition for healing the body of the nation, an organism with infected parts upon which, for its own good, it is necessary to perform the surgery of excluding the popular sector and its allies. This exclusion involves redefining the scope of the nation to which

¹¹¹Jorge A. Tapia Valdés, *El terrorismo de estado*, (Mexico City: Editorial Nueva Imágen, 1980) 64-65. Thesis author's translation.

neither the agents that promoted this illness nor the parts that have become infected can belong. They are the enemy with the body of the nation, the “not-we” of the new nation that is to be constructed by the institutions of [bureaucratic-authoritarianism].¹¹²

From the time of his appointment as commander in chief of the Army on 23 August 1973, General Pinochet began an ideological odyssey. It took him from his public pronouncements of legalistic constitutionalism in the defense of the liberal democratic capitalist state to justifying the 11 September 1973 coup. It was, he explained, a necessary military intervention in the defense of the liberal democratic capitalist state. From there, he gradually embraced authoritarianism as the best means of defending capitalism. He later justified the 2,279 Chilean dead on the grounds that the country was gripped by civil war. He often returned to this theme of a war against subversion.

. . . The world today faces an unprecedented form of war. Communism penetrates, imposes upon democratic governments a line of action which favors its own advancement. The universal character of the Leninist-Marxist revolution fits in perfectly with the imperialistic hegemony of the Soviet geopolitical school. In this war, nothing can be of greater use to communism than the declaration of ideological neutrality by states which are not yet under its control.¹¹³

Once on firm ground as President of the republic and supreme military commander, Pinochet embraced full-scale authoritarianism. He finally rejected liberal democratic constitutionalism and justified the intervention of the armed forces as the best-equipped institution to confront the threat of Marxist subversion.

Marxism is an intrinsically perverse doctrine, and everything that springs from it, as healthy as it might appear, is consumed by the poison that corrodes its roots. This is the meaning of the statement that its error is intrinsic, and therefore global in the sense that no dialogue or transaction is compatible with it. . . [It is] a permanent aggression, today in the service of Soviet imperialism . . . [T]his modern form of permanent aggression gives

¹¹²Guillermo O'Donnell in David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, (1979) 294-295.

¹¹³Quoted in full in Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies, Jr., *The Politics of Anti-Politics*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1978) 205.

rise to an unconventional war, in which territorial invasion is replaced by the attempt to control countries from within. . . . Another product of the preceding analysis is the understanding that power must be vested in the Armed Forces and the Forces of Order, since only they have the organization and the means to confront Marxism transformed into permanent aggression. . . . Chile has ceased to be an ideologically neutral state, as was advocated by philosophical liberalism, and has resolutely adopted a clear, solid, and vigorous doctrine¹¹⁴

General Leigh was initially the most outspoken and articulate of the junta members and was seen as the most natural leader. In his junta inaugural speech, he picked up on the theme of a diseased body politic and pledged to wage a war against the left.

Three years of the Marxist cancer . . . have brought us to a situation of economic, moral, and social disaster. We are certain that the great majority of the Chilean people are determined to struggle against Marxism and to extirpate it to the final conclusion.¹¹⁵

In assessing the counterinsurgency campaign of the Chilean military regime, it would be useful to compare it with neighboring Brazil. In April 1964, the Brazilian armed forces deposed leftist President João Goulart and established a true bureaucratic-authoritarian or exclusionary-authoritarian military regime in which the armed forces ruled as a cohesive political institution. Army General Humberto Castelo Branco was named President by the Army High Command. The new military government created the *Serviço Nacional de Informações*, SNI, (National Intelligence Service). The SNI was the conception of General Golbery do Couto e Silva. Golbery was the leading ideologist of the Brazilian Higher War College in the 1950s and 60s, a senior adviser to the Brazilian military Presidents, and the first director of the Brazilian SNI. The decree law creating the

¹¹⁴Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, *Presidential Message*, 11 September 1976. Translated in Genaro Arriagada (1988).

¹¹⁵*El Mercurio*, International Edition, 9-15 September 1973, 4.

SNI was written by General Golbery. In addition to Golbery, all five Deputy Directors were retired military officers. The SNI decree law established the following:¹¹⁶

- (1) The SNI was directly responsible to the President.
- (2) The SNI's mission was to collect intelligence on national security.
- (3) The SNI was to report on the activities of all government ministries.
- (4) The SNI was to establish lines of communication with state governors, private corporations, and local governments.
- (5) The SNI was to evaluate intelligence and to function as the staff of the National Security Council.
- (6) The SNI was to pass all appropriate intelligence to the government ministries.

President Castelo Branco, a relative moderate by authoritarian standards, was succeeded as President by General Artur Costa e Silva (1967-69). Under Costa e Silva, the Brazilian military regime took a hard-line authoritarian turn against urban and rural guerrilla resistance, resorting to kidnapping and torture. Moreover, the SNI was militarized and active-duty Army generals took all six top positions. General Costa e Silva was succeeded as President by another hard-line authoritarian, General Emilio Médici (1969-74). Under General Médici, the Brazilian military regime reached the apex of its hard-line authoritarian period. The SNI veered out of the control of the government and soon became a power unto itself, acquiring several new prerogatives:¹¹⁷

- (1) The SNI was responsible for all domestic and foreign intelligence.

¹¹⁶Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1988) 16.

¹¹⁷Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, (1988) 17.

- (2) The SNI Director had Cabinet-level rank and direct access to the President.
- (3) The SNI established the National Intelligence School, which gained a monopoly on all intelligence training in the country.
- (4) The SNI became an increasingly autonomous branch of the armed forces.
- (5) The SNI maintained a field office in every federal and state ministry which inspected all correspondence, analyzed national security policy implications, and screened all personnel.
- (6) There was no system of oversight except the President.

General Golbery's new class of military intellectuals came to view the armed forces as a legitimate political institution in their own right. This is a dramatic departure from the Old Professionalism school of thought which held that the armed forces were required to be politically nondeliberative, disciplined, and subordinate to civilian control. The New Professionalism school of thought embraces the right to make political judgments within the context of the officer corps as a politically-deliberative collegial body.

The area of politics is permeated . . . by adverse pressures, creating a form of universalization of the factors of security, enlarging the area of the politics of national security to a point where it almost absorbs all the national activities.¹¹⁸

What is certain is that the greater probability today is limited warfare localized conflicts, and above all indirect Communist aggression, which capitalizes on local discontents, the frustrations of misery and hunger, and just nationalist anxieties.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Planejamento estratégico*, (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1955) 38-39. Translated in Alfred Stepan in Lowenthal and Fitch, eds., (1986).

¹¹⁹ Golbery do Couto e Silva, *Geopolítica do Brasil*, (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1967) 198-199. Translated in Alfred Stepan in Lowenthal and Fitch, eds., (1986).

In late 1973, the soft-line *Castelista* faction of former President Castelo Branco enjoyed a resurgence and was able to secure the election of General Ernesto Geisel to the 1974-79 presidential term. It fell to General Geisel to begin the political liberalization which would ultimately result in the return to civilian rule in 1985. But General Geisel's course was fraught with danger and uncertainty. He used authoritarian methods to secure a political liberalization.

Alfred Stepan identifies three components of a military regime:

- (1) The Military as Government. The Military as Government consists of military officers selected to manage the administrative machinery of the state.
- (2) The Military as Security Community. The security community are military or civilian personnel who gather intelligence and perform national security special operations, which may include violent political repression.
- (3) The Military as Institution. The Military as Institution includes the superstructure of line and staff officers who lead and serve the armed forces as a lifelong career.

General Geisel's challenge was to maintain his political support based on his prestige in the Military as Institution to strengthen his hand as leader of the Military as Government in order to downgrade the power of the SNI and the security community.

President Geisel took over the military when hard-liners still had great power within the military as institution. One way to keep them from mobilizing against his agenda was to not violate hierarchy in purely military appointments, and even to give the hard-line some initial representation in the military as government while he slowly changed the balance of forces within all three arenas of the polity.

By temperament and governing style he was a "monarchical centralist" and extremely authoritarian, but it was against the military as institution--especially the High Command--that he attempted to exercise dictatorial power.

His major goal was to remove the military from routine involvement in national politics.¹²⁰

General Jorge Rafael Videla, as commander in chief of the Argentine Army, led a military coup against the democratically-elected Peronist government in March 1976. As President of Argentina, Videla waged the infamous 1976-80 "Dirty War," a full-scale counter-insurgency war against heavily-armed guerrilla groups. Thousands of suspected Argentines were arrested and imprisoned, including the future President, Carlos Menem. General Videla declared in 1978:

A terrorist is not just someone with a gun or bomb, but also someone who spreads ideas contrary to western civilization. . . All the necessary people will die in Argentina to assure the country's security.¹²¹

The Argentine military disaster in the 1982 Falklands War humiliated the Argentine armed forces and forced their disengagement from power in 1983. Under the democratic government of President Raúl Alfonsín, the former armed forces commanders were forced to stand trial for human rights violations. Admiral Emilio Massera, the commander in chief of the Argentine Navy, served on the same junta with General Videla. On trial in 1985 for human rights violations, Massera defended his role in the "Dirty War."

I have not come here to defend myself. I am here being tried for having won a just war. If we had lost it, we would not be here, neither you nor I, because the judges of this high chamber would have been exchanged for turbulent popular tribunals, and a fierce and irreconcilable Argentina would have been substituted for the old fatherland. But here we are, because we won the military war but lost the psychological war . . . The winners are being judged by the losers, and I ask myself, which side are my judges on?¹²²

¹²⁰Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, (1989) 42-43.

¹²¹Stephen Kinzer, "Argentina in Agony," *The New Republic*, December 23-30, 1978, 18.

¹²²Ascanio Cavallo, Manuel Salazar, and Oscar Sepúlveda, *La historia oculta del regimen militar*, (Santiago: La Época, 1988) 376-77. Translated in Constable and Valenzuela (1991).

The Chilean armed forces had a formal agenda which included, not only the seizure of political power, but the annihilation of leftists, their sympathizers, and the purification of the Chilean body politic.

From the outset, they articulated two basic aims. The first was to destroy the parties of the Left and their collaborators. The Chilean military did not interpret its intervention as a simple military coup aimed at replacing a government, but as an all-out war to crush an enemy that it believed had infiltrated close to half the population. . . Their second objective was to engineer a fundamental restructuring of Chilean political institutions and political life, aimed a "cleaning" impurities from the body politic while creating a new political order of committed and patriotic citizens, dedicated to modernizing the country and projecting its grandeur to a hostile world.¹²³

The armed forces perceived a threat to their institutionality in a socialist revolution regardless of whether it be violent or peaceful. Having experienced the humiliation of the 1924-32 period and the more recent civil-military tensions of the 1960s, they seized their supreme opportunity to fundamentally reform and restructure Chilean society politically and to permanently institutionalize their authoritarian vision.

These revolutionary movements aroused a deep fear and hatred in the armed forces, the bourgeoisie, and even broad sectors of the middle classes. In some cases the government turned to both legal and illegal repression . . . The paranoia of the armed forces was reflected in their national security doctrine, their conception of a dirty war, and their turn to lawless repression on a scale that affected not only those involved in radical activities, but sectors sympathetic to them, intellectuals and clergymen critical of the social order, their families, and innocent bystanders or witnesses of illegal repressive acts.¹²⁴

¹²³Arturo Valenzuela in Larry J. Diamond et al, *Democracy in Developing Countries*, (1989) 188.

¹²⁴Arturo Valenzuela in Larry J. Diamond et al, *Democracy in Developing Countries*, (1989) 28.

VI. CIVIL-MILITARY COEXISTENCE

DEMOCRATIZATION

On 30 August 1988, General Pinochet was nominated by the commanders in chief of the armed forces to run for a second eight-year term in a one-man presidential plebiscite. As required by the 1980 Constitution, which was conceived and custom-designed for him by his hand-picked constitutional commission, Pinochet scheduled a one-man, yes-or-no plebiscite for 5 October 1988. The opportunity for even a controlled presidential plebiscite after fifteen years of authoritarian rule brought the opposition out in full force. After fifteen years of repression and official anti-politics, the Christian Democratic Party survived as the largest and most vocal opposition to the regime. The PDC was joined by Socialists, Communists, and several smaller parties to form a coalition to vote No on Pinochet. Pinochet delighted in reminding the Christian Democrats that they were among the strongest proponents of the 1973 coup. On 12 April 1988, he declared:

... These sectors owe their very existence to the Armed Forces and the Forces of Order; or have they already forgotten that they once knocked on the doors of the barracks, clamoring for shelter, protection, and justice?¹²⁵

After a spirited campaign in which the government dominated the electronic media, the complete official returns were: No, 54.7%; Yes 43%.¹²⁶ Despite the healthy eleven point margin of victory for the opposition, this amounted to a strong showing for Pinochet. After fifteen years of dictatorship, 2,279 dead and disappeared, and a consistent policy of repression and torture,¹²⁷ it is surprising that his personal regime was able to amass the

¹²⁵*Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Latin America*, 14 April 1988. Translated in Mark Falcoff (1989).

¹²⁶Shirley Christian, *The New York Times*, 7 October 1988.

¹²⁷America's Watch Committee, *Chile Since the Coup*, New York, (August 1983).

support of 43% of the electorate; far more than had been expected, when opposition political parties had predicted that Pinochet could reasonably expect no more than 15% support, according to early polls. One possible explanation is the strong 1985-88 economic expansion. In this respect, Pinochet managed to increase the rightist vote from the 1970 percentage of 35.2% for the National Party to 43%.

Pinochet was outraged by his defeat. He felt he had been outmaneuvered by his enemies and entrapped in the mechanisms of his own 1980 Constitution. He was confronted by a problem: Whether to invalidate the election result and retain power or to surrender. Invalidating the election would mean invalidating his carefully institutionalized eight-year-old Constitution, which the armed forces were sworn to protect. Pinochet seriously considered this option. At an all night meeting with Pinochet, the commanders in chief of the armed forces gently reminded him that they were sworn to uphold the Constitution.

As commander in chief of the Army, Pinochet undoubtedly could have remained in power had he wished to. He could have done so by destroying his painstakingly-built fifteen-year-old authoritarian institutionality, but to have done so would have required a new effort to reconstruct a new authoritarian institutionality under conditions which were now overwhelmingly against him. Much of the conditions which favored Pinochet from 1973 to 1988 included:

- (1) the highly anti-Allende post-coup atmosphere among the public;
- (2) the united support of the armed forces;
- (3) the support of the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan Administrations in Washington; and
- (4) the fortuitous 1978-80 economic boom which won him the 1980 Constitution.

In 1988, Pinochet was now fifteen years removed from the favorable conditions of September 1973. The Navy, Air Force, and Carabineros were bound to support the 1980 Constitution. The public had already expressed its overwhelming mandate in opposition to Pinochet. The economy had settled into a respectable but slow-growth mode. Finally, the Reagan Administration was now favoring democratization.

It appears that Pinochet missed an opportunity to follow the path taken by other military men on horseback such as General deGaulle in 1958, or Portugal's General Antonio Ramalho Eanes in 1976 who served as constitutional Presidents. By using excessive violence and repression in consolidating his regime, he lost his legitimacy as a credible democratic leader. The armed forces were received as heroes and saviors by the Nationals and Christian Democrats after the political and economic disorder of the Allende government. A nonviolent approach would have been more suited to Chile's democratic traditions.

PATRICIO AYLWIN

On 14 December 1989, former Christian Democratic Senator Patricio Aylwin, leader of the *Concertación* coalition of 17 center-left parties, was elected President with 55.2% of the vote. He will serve a transitional four-year term from March 1990 to March 1994 and may not succeed himself. Aylwin's successor will be elected to an eight-year term in 1994. Former Pinochet Finance Minister Hernán Büchi, leader of the National Renovation coalition of center-right parties and architect of the 1985-88 economic recovery, won 29.4%. Millionaire businessman Francisco Errázuriz, a conservative populist, won 15.4%¹²⁸ Combining Büchi's and Errázuriz's percentages to 44.8%, the results were

¹²⁸*El Mercurio*, International Edition, Santiago, (14 to 20 December 1989).

very close to the results of the 1988 plebiscite of 54.7% for the opposition and 43% for Pinochet. Aylwin's percentage is also reminiscent of President Eduardo Frei's overwhelming 56% against Salvador Allende in 1964. A staunch anti-communist, Aylwin is from the right wing of the Christian Democratic Party which supported Pinochet's 1973 military coup against Allende. In 1989, the Socialists and Communists, seeking to avoid dividing the anti-Pinochet vote, supported Aylwin's candidacy, but were not happy about it. They have never forgiven the center-right Christian Democrats for betraying Allende and the pre-1973 democratic regime.

Pinochet retired as President in March 1990 but will remain commander in chief of the Army until 1998, when he will be 83 years of age and will have held the post for 25 years. Admiral Merino retired in March 1990. Aylwin cleverly sought to divide the armed forces by pointedly asking Air Force commander Fernando Matthei and Carabinero Director General Rodolfo Stange to remain in office as a reward for their roles in the democratization. The vote of confidence in Matthei and Stange distinguished them from Pinochet's illegitimacy. There is no civilian control of the Army. Chile now has an elected government whose Army has demonstrated its prerogative to assume executive and constitutional powers. There is the potential for an evolution to a state of civilian control, but this evolution is not contemplated by the 1980 Constitution.

On 4 March 1991, President Aylwin's National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation documented that Pinochet's government was responsible for 2,279 deaths and disappearances between 1973 and 1990. Stung by the report, Pinochet issued an unrepentant denunciation.

Its content reveals an unpardonable refusal to recognize the real causes that motivated the action to rescue the nation on 11 September 1973. . .The

Chilean Army certainly sees no reason to ask pardon for having fulfilled its patriotic duty.¹²⁹

Pinochet's defeat in the presidential plebiscite was a personal repudiation, but military institutionalism will live on. The 1988 plebiscite and the 1989 presidential election were purchased by the democratic opposition at the price of the acceptance of the 1980 Constitution. This concession was necessary because of the inability of the opposition to force Pinochet from power through civil disobedience. The opposition was unable to maintain a 1983 general strike which might have paralyzed the economy. Though the correlation of forces overwhelmingly favored Pinochet, the balance of power would have shifted at the point where the Army would consider civilian losses excessive. The Chilean Army may well have been prepared to kill more than the 2,279 dead between 1973 and 1990.

The transitional 1990-1994 term of Christian Democratic President Patricio Aylwin has been marked by the continuity of the high level of military institutionalism. In December 1991, a \$200,000 shipment of eleven tons of Chilean small arms and rockets bound for Croatia in violation of a United Nations ban on such arms sales was intercepted in Budapest, Hungary. The shipment was part of a planned \$6 million arms sale. News of the illegal arms sale provoked a confrontation between Aylwin and the armed forces. The state arms manufacturer, Famae, shipped the arms to intermediaries representing Croatian forces. Defense Minister Patricio Rójas claimed to have no knowledge of the arms sale. The government forced out the director of Famae, General Hector Letelier, a Pinochet loyalist, but indicated that a number of high-ranking generals were suspected of complicity in the arms sale, including General Pinochet, commander in chief of the Army.¹³⁰ In

¹²⁹Nathaniel C. Nash, "Pinochet Assails Chilean Rights Report," *The New York Times*, 28 March 1991.

¹³⁰Nathaniel C. Nash, "Chilean Arms Shipment to Croatia Stirs Tensions," *The New York Times*, 11 January 1992.

March 1992, the armed forces held their 1992 International Air and Space Show. It is the largest annual display of the latest military hardware in Latin America. At stake was the \$200 million contract to replace the Air Force's 1960s era British-built Hawker Hunter jet fighters, a decision which will be made by the armed forces, which by law control ten percent of Chile's copper revenues. Such incidents at the midpoint of Aylwin's term of office demonstrate the weakness of the government's position and the powerful autonomy of the armed forces.

Arturo Valenzuela believes that the democratization of 1988-89 was possible because the armed forces had not become politicized by their years in power. As an example, he cites Pinochet's post-coup purge of the leading pro-coup generals and the armed forces' recognition of the opposition victory. The armed forces could have invalidated the election results by invalidating their own 1980 Constitution. They were clearly not about to destroy nine years of regime institutionalization. There is also reason to believe that the armed forces, though removed from executive-administrative power, are still strongly politicized. General Jorge Zincke, the vice-commander in chief of the Army, declared in 1989 that the Army would accept an opposition President only if he respected the 1980 Constitution: "Otherwise, we have the example of 1973," he said. In October 1989, Pinochet warned the opposition that he would not tolerate human rights trials of armed forces personnel: "The day they touch any one of my men, the state of law is ended."¹³¹

General Pinochet will step down as commander in chief of the Army in 1998. Six years may be an eternity in politics, but is not in the history of a nation. President Aylwin's successor will be elected to the 1994-2002 presidential period. The next President will be restricted to appointing one of the top four senior generals as the new

¹³¹*La Época*, Santiago, 11 October 1989, 13. Translated in Constable and Valenzuela (1991).

Army commander. This general, will have been first commissioned a second lieutenant around 1962 and shall have about thirty-six years of service. He was probably a captain at the time of the 1973 coup and is probably now one of the current generals. Groomed during the twenty-five year command of General Pinochet, he is quite possibly firmly loyal to Pinochet and is imbued with praetorian institutional qualities. It would require at least a generation of thirty or forty years of stable civilian rule to thoroughly reindoctrinate the armed forces of the Pinochet era into more civilianized services, a prospect which is highly uncertain.

As Huntington has noted, a truly professional officer corps has no interest in political behavior which fragments institutional unity and undermines military discipline. But, as Nordlinger has noted, increasing levels of professionalization in the officer corps lead them to take a greater interest in the politics of national and internal security affairs, foreign policy, and weapons research and development as these spheres of influence come into conflict with domestic social priorities in the struggle over budgetary policy. It is not reasonable to expect the Chilean armed forces to quickly embrace the principles of obedience and loyalty to civilian politicians after a century of praetorian tradition.

The successful 1975-81 Spanish democratization produced a dangerous military backlash. Spain held its first democratic election since 1936 in 1977, two years after Franco's death. In February 1981, five years into the constitutional monarchy of King Juan Carlos, an Army insurrection seized the Parliament and asked the king to support a *coup d'état*. The support of the king would surely have brought more conservative generals to the coup coalition. Instead, the king supported the government. Without the king's prestige attached to the pro-coup forces, key generals were loathe to risk ending up on the losing side.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The collapse of the Christian Democratic Party and the resurgence of the right made Allende's election possible. The split of the landslide winning 1964 coalition divided the majority constituency in 1970. Given his 39% high-water mark plurality in 1964, Allende could never have won in a two-man race. Allende won as a Marxist but could not remain in power as a Marxist. His Socialist and Communist Party supporters repudiated any accord with the Christian Democrats. The Christian Democrats did not have the power to coopt or incorporate him into the Christian Democratic agenda, but they did have the power to bring him down.

The abandonment of the rules of the democratic political game led to the breakdown of the liberal democratic regime. The old constitutional order would have survived had the parties not engaged in a frenzy of irresponsible political behavior. Allende should have recognized that, given his minority support, he had to accept the humiliation of cooptation by the Christian Democratic Party. The Socialists and Communists, by vetoing any *rapprochement* with the PDC, revived the 1964 coalition of the PDC and the right. The center-right coalition made a calculation that accepted constitutional regime termination and military rule as a reasonable price to pay to be rid of Allende. Allende should have realized the limitations on his agenda inherent in the existing institutional system. He had exhausted his legislative political capital in his first year. From then on, he should have reached a *rapprochement* with the Christian Democrats. While he was in no position to repudiate the extremists of the Popular Unity coalition, he had the option of reigning as President while allowing the Christian Democrats to dictate the agenda. The Christian Democrats, rather than seeking Allende's humiliation, should have made it as easy as possible for him to defuse the explosive political situation. This would certainly have involved the gutting of

much of his program, but the price the left paid for a fight it could not hope to win was far greater than it could have possibly imagined.

The National Security Doctrine legitimized military intervention, authoritarianism, and state terrorism in the name of counterinsurgency warfare. Military institutionalism is an inevitable result of high levels of military professionalization coupled with the abdication of professional civilian oversight. High levels of social and professional differentiation from civil society created institutional patriotism in the armed forces. This was manifested in loyalty to the military as institution over the Constitution itself and the establishment of the military prerogative of intervention. Presidents Alessandri and Frei followed the worst possible military policies in the 1960s by accepting armaments from the United States while simultaneously allowing the standard of living of military officers to fall in the 1960s. This seriously exacerbated existing civil-military tensions. They should have followed the exact opposite course by accepting no arms which could threaten the government, such as jet fighters, helicopter gunships, bombs, air-to-ground missiles, and tanks. They should also have maintained high officer salaries and perquisites to keep their minds off the lack of high technology weaponry. Instead, Alessandri and Frei followed exactly the correct course which would infuriate the officer corps and give them the arms with which to vent their fury. Huntington's objective civilian control hangs by the slender thread of military goodwill and loyalty to civilian authority. This model assumes political and economic stability. It does not take into account the institutional stresses imposed by political and economic disorder. The temptation to bring in the armed forces to restore order becomes irresistible.

The failure of the armed forces to consolidate a truly institutional military bureaucratic-authoritarian regime as in Brazil and Argentina, was the direct result of the failure of the Army Corps of Generals to restrain the ambitions of General Pinochet in the critical first months of the regime. Once installed in power, the generals were strangely willing to defer

to General Pinochet, thinking that they had nothing to fear from one of their own. For all their institutional bravado in waging an internal war, the Army Corps of Generals were political neophytes. They failed utterly as politicians in managing real political power. The Prussian tradition of strict hierarchical subordination to rank was much in evidence in how the generals related to Pinochet once he was installed as President of the junta. They failed to impose collegial rule and a balance of power within the regime. Their acquiescence in the forced retirements of the only generals who could challenge Pinochet made a personal dictatorship inevitable. At no time did Pinochet lead the coup on his own. He allowed events to lead him and only lent his name to the coup conspirators when his fall appeared imminent. Ironically, the weakest leadership figure ultimately became the strongest.

The democratic restoration of 1990 was not a collapse of military rule. The democratic political elites made a deal with the devil. The same political parties which were unwilling to save the constitutional order of 1973 were now anxious to behave responsibly and cohesively to create a new democratic political game. But the price for access to power was the acceptance of General Pinochet's authoritarian Constitution of 1980. Pinochet fully expected to be elected President in 1988, but became entrapped in the electoral mechanism of his own Constitution. In the final analysis, the survival of the western liberal democratic political culture worked against the acceptance of an authoritarian regime by civil society in a free election, but the armed forces continue to loom as a permanent threat to democratic regime consolidation.

Liberal constitutionalism cannot be consolidated until civilian control of the armed forces is restored. Unfortunately, the new democratic regime will not regain civilian control in the near future. The government's room for maneuver is limited. It is too dangerous for a democratic regime to downgrade the power of the armed forces in a short period of time. The restoration of civilian control is not a near-term option. It would require the implementation of a consistent national security policy over twenty to forty years of stable

liberal constitutionalist rule. The government will have to build a coalition including rightist parties which is willing to amend the Constitution to restore the right of the President to appoint senior officers who accept his views. It would also require the extraordinary good luck of a sympathetic commander in chief of the Army, in the tradition of General Schneider, who would be willing to cooperate with the government to purge the Army of its authoritarian officers.

Huntington's subjective civilian control model of a nation-in-arms should be the model of choice for Chile. An Army of aristocratic nonprofessional officers and citizen-soldiers has not existed in Chile since before the 1891 Civil War, but this should be the model of choice for a small, poor, developing country with a limited institutional capacity to control a powerful military establishment. Unfortunately, the subjective control model is an impossibility for the foreseeable future. Instead, the democratic regime will be forced to move first toward Huntington's objective control model. This model of civilian control of the autonomous professional armed forces can be attained only through a thorough reindoc-trination of a new generation of officers under a stable democratic regime.

Abrahamsson has demonstrated that the objective civilian control model results in the increased politicization of professionalized armed forces. Objective civilian control will first require a permanent multi-party cadre of civilian national security professionals to staff the Defense Ministry and Congressional armed forces Committees' staffs. This permanent cadre will be required to deal from a position of institutional strength with generals having thirty to forty years of experience in national security affairs and public administration. This effort must be multi-party because the constitutional amendments required to restore presidential control may not be possible if conservative parties veto any effort to amend a virtually unamendable authoritarian Constitution. Conservatives may require the security of twenty to forty years of stable democratic rule with a low level of threat perception. This

was successfully demonstrated when the conservative technocrats grew weary of Pinochet's personal idiosyncrasies and opted instead for a new democratic political game.

If the democratic regime ever successfully evolves to the point of objective civilian control, a consistent policy will be required to maintain high officer salaries while gradually reducing troop strength and arms purchases. Conceivably, peacetime officers may come to appreciate that fewer expensive armaments will buy them increasingly upper-class incomes and lifestyles. All of this speculation does not ignore the established fact that the Chilean officer corps already enjoy simultaneously the highest levels of income, armaments, and constitutional prerogative in their history. The degree with which civilian authority can act with strength, consistency, and unanimity will have to be matched by the armed forces' willingness to accept subordination to civilian authority. This remains an open question. The ultimate outcome of the struggle between the new democratic regime and the armed forces at the pinnacle of their power must remain uncertain. The status quo may indeed prove to be irreversible if the armed forces seek to maintain it by force.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 10
CHILEAN GOVERNMENTS

PRE-PORTALIAN

General Bernardo O'Higgins 1817-1823

Alternating

Ramón Freire 1823-1831

Francisco Pinto 1823-1831

AUTOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Penquista-South Central Valley Dynasty

Independence Generation

Joaquín Prieto Vial 1831-1841

General Manuel Bulnes Prieto 1841-1851

Manuel Montt Torres 1851-1861

José Joaquín Pérez Mascayano 1861-1871

LIBERAL REPUBLIC

Post-Independence Generation

Federico Errázuriz Zañartú 1871-1876

Aníbal Pinto Garamendía 1876-1881

Domingo Santa María González 1881-1886

Mid-Century Generation

José Manuel Balmaceda 1886-1891 Military Intervention, Civil War

Admiral Jorge Montt Álvarez 1891-1896

PARLIAMENTARY REPUBLIC

Federico Errázuriz Echaurren 1896-1901

German Riesco Errázuriz 1901-1906

Pedro Montt Montt 1906-1910

Ramón Barros Luco 1910-1915

Juan Luis Sanfuentes Andonaegui 1915-1920

POST-ARISTOCRACY REPUBLIC

Liberal

Arturo Alessandri 1920-1924 Self-Imposed Exile

MILITARY INTERVENTION

Arturo Alessandri Returned 1925-1926

Emiliano Figueroa 1926-1927 Resigned

MILITARY REGIME	
Colonel Carlos Ibáñez del Campo	1927-1931 Resigned
Radical	
Juan Estéban Montero Rodríguez	1931-1932 Resigned
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC	June-September 1932
Colonel Marmaduke Grove	
Liberal	
Arturo Alessandri	1932-1938
Popular Front	
Pedro Aguirre Cerda	1938-1941 Died in Office
Juan Antonio Ríos Morales	1942-1946
Gabriel González Videla	1946-1952
Independent	
General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo	1952-1958
Conservative	
Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez	1958-1964
Christian Democratic	
Eduardo Frei Montalva	1964-1970
Popular Unity	
Salvador Allende Gossens	1970-1973 MILITARY INTERVENTION
MILITARY REGIME	
General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte	1973-1990
DEMOCRATIC RESTORATION	
Christian Democratic	
Patricio Aylwin	1990-1994

Source: Adapted from Frederick M. Nunn, *The Military in Chilean History*, (1976).

TABLE 11
CHILEAN INFLATION

1950	17.0%
1951	23.0
1953	56.0
1954	71.0
1955	80.0
1957	25.9
1958	33.3
1959	38.6
1960	11.6
1961	7.7
1962	13.9
1963	44.3
1964	46.0
1965	28.8
1966	22.9
1967	18.1
1968	26.6
1969	29.3
1970	34.9
1971	22.1
1972	163.4
1973	508.1

Source: Central Bank, *Boletín Mensual*, Santiago. National Planning Office (ODEPLAN), Santiago. National Bureau of Statistics, Santiago.

Reproduced from Barbara Stallings, *Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile, 1958-1973*, (1978).

TABLE 12
OCCUPATIONAL BREAKDOWN OF CHILE'S ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE
POPULATION, 1970

Administrative, executive, and managerial personnel	50,000	1.9%
Professional or technical workers	185,000	7.1%
Clerical workers	249,000	9.5%
Sales workers	214,000	8.2%
Industrial and independent workers	1,050,000	40.6%
Domestic workers	303,000	11.6%
Farm workers	550,000	21.1%

Source: Wilkie (1977), 192.

Reproduced from Michael Fleet, *The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy*, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1985) 21.

TABLE 13
PARTICIPATION OF POPULATION IN NATIONAL INCOME BY CLASS

SOCIAL CLASS	1960	1964	1970	1972
Bourgeoisie	27%	36%	32%	27%
Petite Bourgeoisie	22	16	15	12
White Collar	29	28	32	36
Blue Collar	22	20	21	25

Source: Adapted from Barbara Stallings, 1978, 56.

Reproduced from Michael Fleet (1985) 95.

TABLE 14
CHILEAN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN 1989 US DOLLARS

1969	\$810
1970	840
1971	990
1972	1,080
1973	1,080
1974	1,140
1975	860
1976	880
1977	1,030
1978	1,330
1979	1,680
1980	2,100
1981	2,600
1982	2,220
1983	1,930
1984	1,680
1985	1,450
1986	1,350
1987	1,370
1988	1,510
1989	1,770

Source: The World Bank, *World Tables 1991*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1991) 180-81.

TABLE 15
INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN SELECTED YEARS

	Gini Index
1968	.50
1970	.50
1973	.45
1980	.53
1984	.55

Source: Aristides Torche Lazo in Felipe Larraín, *Desarrollo económico en democracia*, (Santiago, 1987) 186.

Reproduced from Mark Falcoff, *Modern Chile 1970-1989*, (1989).

TABLE 16
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES IN INDUSTRY, GREATER SANTIAGO, 1958-73

1958	8.2%
1959	9.0
1960	7.1
1961	6.9
1962	5.7
1963	5.5
1964	5.4
1965	4.6
1966	5.8
1968	5.3
1969	4.7
1970	6.3
1971	4.8
1972	3.5
1973	2.9

Source: University of Chile, Institute of Economics and Planning, Santiago.

Note: Figures are averages of March, June, September, and December unemployment rates, except for 1973, which is March and June average only.

Reproduced from Barbara Stallings, *Class Conflict and Economic Development in Chile 1958-1973*, (1978).