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Communication patterns in hostage negotiations

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COMMUNICATION PATTERNS IN HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

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COMMUNICATION PATTERNS IN HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

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Abstract

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There are many variables within crisis situations that contribute to the outcome of the event. This research focused on the communication process during crisis situations. Verbal communication is one of the key behaviors in crisis situations that directly affects outcome, and the analysis of that communication helps to make predictions that guide future crisis interventions. By analyzing the individual behaviors within verbal communication, it may be possible to more accurately predict outcome. In order to analyze individual behaviors, a behavioral coding system must be developed to document and track those behaviors. This research study presents the development of a behavioral coding system, the Crisis Communication Rating Scale (CCRS), and the reliability testing of this system. The evaluation of the CCRS was based on the reliability of two raters who coded hostage negotiation transcripts using the CCRS system. Reliability was measured using the Kappa statistic. Specific codes are discussed with respect to their development and relationship to the empirical literature. The approach to training novice raters to use the coding system is also described.

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Introduction

Definitions

Before examining research conducted in hostage negotiation, it is important to understand the fundamental terms used when discussing hostage negotiation. A *hostage* is a person held against their will by another person to ensure that specified terms are met. A *hostage incident* as described by McMains and Mullins (1995) is " any incident in which people are being held by another person or persons against their will, usually by force or coercion, and demands are being made by the hostage taker" (p.23). A *hostage negotiator* (i.e., crisis negotiator) is a person (usually a specially trained police officer) who communicates with a hostage taker and the police during a hostage incident in order to help resolve the situation peacefully (McCaffery, 1994).

Purpose for this Research

There is no linear progression of research in hostage negotiations. There are pockets of research examining various aspects of hostage negotiations such as the psychological properties of individuals who take hostages and different types of bargaining techniques used to bargain with hostage takers. None of these follow a consistent path of investigation. There are areas of hostage negotiation that have not been explored and warrant examination such as the verbal dialog between a crisis negotiator and hostage taker and how the hostage negotiator and taker interact with one another verbally during the negotiation. By examining the exchange of verbal behaviors by both the crisis negotiator and hostage taker, it may be possible to record the changes in verbal behavior and make predictions based on those changes. Research examining the

verbal exchanges between a crisis negotiator and hostage taker may lead to a greater understanding of the process of negotiation and possibly provide law enforcement agencies with a more comprehensive understanding of what is going on during a hostage negotiation situation.

Background

Police psychologist Harvey Schlossberg established the first hostage recovery program in New York City in 1973 (Schlossberg, 1980). Since then, almost every law enforcement agency in the United States has established either a hostage recovery team or has a crisis negotiator on staff (Rogan, & Hammer & Van Zandt, 1997). It is important to understand that crisis negotiators are primarily used for two types of events, barricade situations and hostage takeovers. A barricade situation occurs when an individual takes himself or herself hostage within a residence or building with the threat of suicide. A hostage takeover occurs when an individual or group of individuals take innocent people against their will as a tool for bargaining (Fuselier, 1981). Because of their increasing use in various types of crisis events, hostage negotiators are now called crisis negotiators (McMains & Mullins, 1995).

Due to the increasing need for crisis negotiators over the last three decades, and the increase in the number of hostage incidents, it is vital that the features of hostage takeovers be examined. These features include the psychological properties of hostage taking as well as the tools available to law enforcement agencies. Psychological properties include motivations for taking hostages and the psychological state of individuals who take hostages. Examples of the tools available to law enforcement

agencies to manage these situations include the use of chemical agents, special weapons and tactics teams, and crisis negotiators (Fuselier, 1981).

There are five main strategies available to the law enforcement community in order to neutralize a hostage situation (Fuselier, 1981). These strategies consist of containing and attempting to negotiate, demanding the hostage taker to surrender, using non-lethal chemical agents to force surrender, using sharpshooters to neutralize the subject or using special weapons and tactical assault. Most of these strategies are considered violent resolutions. Considering that a non-violent resolution is preferred by law enforcement agencies in order to reduce the number of innocent casualties, the only non-violent tool available is a crisis negotiator.

Crisis negotiators play an important role in a crisis event, as they are the mediators between police personnel and the hostage taker. It is the goal of a crisis negotiator to establish a relationship with the hostage taker and obtain information for the crisis team (Fuselier, 1981; McCaffery, 1994). It is vital that the crisis negotiator know as much as possible about the person taking the hostages, such as why that person has taken hostages and what that person may or may not do during the crisis event. This information will enable the crisis negotiator to better understand the hostage taker and determine the severity of the event. In addition, it is important to understand the types of behaviors that cause a hostage taker to react the way he or she does because these behaviors will dictate the course of the negotiation (McMains & Mullins, 1995).

Knowing which factors affect the mood of the hostage taker may provide the crisis negotiator with valuable information, and enable them to better manage the crisis

event (Strentz, 1994). An example of when mood may be important to the course of the negotiation occurs when the crisis negotiator decides to either agitate or calm the hostage taker. It was found that the majority of people who take hostages suffer from some form of psychopathology (Miron & Goldstein, 1979). Hostage takers typically fall into four diagnostic categories: paranoid schizophrenia, bipolar disorder (depressed type), antisocial personality, and "inadequate personality" (Borum & Strentz, 1992).

Hostage takers take hostages for many different reasons. They most commonly do so out of fear and unexpected situational circumstances where the opportunity to take hostages presents itself (Lancelely, 1981). Each hostage taker will react differently to a crisis negotiator, so examination of the vocal behaviors during a negotiation is necessary. In addition, there are different types of motivations for taking hostages which will change the context of the negotiation and the behaviors of interest (Fuselier, 1981). Prime examples include: criminals trapped during the act of a crime, prisoners in the act of revolt, and political terrorists using violence to promote change.

The goal of a crisis team is to resolve the situation peacefully, regardless of the type of person who takes hostages or the psychological state of that person. (Aguilara, 1994). This indicates that the most important factor of resolving a hostage situation is gathering information. The more information provided to the crisis negotiator, the greater chance the negotiator might be able to convince the hostage taker to release the hostages and surrender. In most crisis situations, the only means for interaction between law enforcement and the hostage taker is the telephone (McMains & Mullins, 1995). This indicates that verbal communication is usually the only way for a crisis negotiator to

interact with a hostage taker. Because verbal communication is usually the only form of interaction, those behaviors within the verbal communication context are the only behaviors that can be documented, examined, and manipulated. With that, more research examining crisis negotiation and the exchange of information between the crisis negotiator and hostage taker needs to be conducted.

Previous Research

In an attempt to determine what type of research is most important to crisis negotiators, Rogan and colleagues developed a survey and distributed it to crisis negotiators across the United States (Rogan, & Hammer & Van Zandt, 1997). These researchers found that crisis negotiators wanted research focusing on the dialog between the crisis negotiator and hostage taker and how that dialog affects the outcome of the crisis event. Basically, crisis negotiators wanted to know what was occurring as they spoke with hostage takers and whether research could be conducted to better explain the dynamic interaction between the crisis negotiator and hostage taker.

A closer examination of the verbal process of crisis negotiation by researchers has shown that the way in which a crisis negotiator communicates with a hostage taker does indeed affect the outcome of a crisis event (Donohue, 1992). This suggests that it is possible to manipulate the verbal behaviors between a crisis negotiator and hostage taker and shape the outcome of a crisis event.

Few research studies have examined the verbal process of crisis negotiation. Those studies that have were focused more on the general features of communication, not individual behaviors themselves. They examined how those features affect the

relationship between the crisis negotiator and hostage taker. These features included examination of bargaining and the establishment of relational limits in crisis negotiation (Donohue, Ramesh & Borschgrevink, 1991; Donohue & Roberto, 1996).

These research studies provided valuable information about the overall process of verbal communication in crisis negotiation but neglected to examine specific verbal behaviors that were presented, such as behaviors within bargaining or establishment of relational limits. By examining a series of specific behaviors, it may be possible to make predictions about which behaviors are effective and which are not effective in the progression toward a peaceful outcome (Fowler, Devivo, & Fowler, 1985).

Communication Research

The concept of using a non-violent approach to resolve a crisis situation is originally borrowed from the field of psychotherapy where the primary goal of a therapist is to build a relationship with the client and resolve suffering (Aguilara, 1994). This means that vocal language can be used as a tool to promote change. There are a number of theories that have examined the process of crisis communication and attempted to explain the dynamic interaction between a crisis negotiator and hostage taker. These studies have attempted to explain what to do in order to manage a crisis situation. Although there are different theories and approaches to managing a crisis event, researchers commonly agree that the way in which a negotiation is conducted will affect the way a negotiation is resolved.

Two Dimensional Communication Model

In 1979, Dr. Harvey Schlossberg and Frank Bolz of the New York City police department established the first non-tactical approach to resolving crisis situations (Schlossberg & Bolz 1979). This approach utilized verbal communication as the primary behavior for resolving crisis situations. Schlossberg and Bolz designed a two-dimensional communication model that separated negotiation dialog into two types of verbal communication, *instrumental* and *expressive*.

Methodology. Instrumental behaviors are actions that facilitate a form of progress toward outcome, such as the hostage taker making a compromise with the crisis negotiator to release hostages. According to Schlossberg and Bolz, the goal is to establish progression toward resolution by facilitating the basic demands and needs from the hostage taker by the crisis negotiator and vise versa. For example, if a hostage taker made a deal with the crisis negotiator to release hostages, he or she would be performing an instrumental act. The communication between the crisis negotiator and hostage taker was instrumental in the release of hostages. *Expressive behaviors* communicate the emotional significance of the hostage taker or negotiator, and the goal is to establish a relationship between the two. If a hostage taker displays an emotional response toward the negotiator, the hostage taker would be performing an expressive act. This model of negotiation enabled negotiators to better understand what was going on during the negotiation process and provided them with a useful tool to manage crisis situations. It was found that when *instrumental* and *expressive* behaviors are expressed together during the negotiation by both the hostage taker and negotiator, a relationship that is facilitative

toward a peaceful resolution is more likely occur than if *expressive* or *instrumental* behaviors were expressed alone. The Schlossberg and Bolz two-dimensional model of *instrumental* and *expressive* forms of verbal communication was the cornerstone for communication research in hostage negotiation.

The strength of the *two-dimensional communication model* is its ability to inform the hostage negotiator at a basic level what is going on during the negotiation process. It helps the hostage negotiator determine whether the hostage taker is being *instrumental*, such as the hostage taker seeking a solution to the problem, or being *expressive*, such as expressing emotions regarding the situation. The weakness of *two-dimensional communication model* is its inability to track the entire communication process. The *two-dimensional communication model* does not account for every type of verbal behavior presented by the hostage negotiator and hostage taker. It addresses a subset of verbal behaviors (instrumental and expressive) but does account for all other types that may be valuable in understanding what is going on during the negotiation.

Student-Teacher Interaction Model

The student-teacher interaction model is one of the first communication models that used observational coding to record behaviors for predictive purposes in an observed setting (Amidon and Flanders, 1967). *Observational coding* is the process of recording a set of behaviors in order to determine when and if those behaviors occur in an observed setting (Bakeman & Gottman, 1986).

Methodology. Amidon and Flander's original model was designed to observe and evaluate the interaction between teachers and counselors with their students. It used categories of verbal behaviors such as acceptance, praise, and scolding and recorded those behaviors as they occurred. The researchers transcribed those verbal behaviors and analyzed the behavioral interactions between the teachers, counselors and their students. More specifically, it examined how the behavior of the teacher or counselor was affected by the student behavior and vise versa.

The effectiveness of this system prompted the manipulation of the system for hostage negotiations by Fowler, Devivo, and Fowler in 1985. It followed the same set of recording rules but the categories of behaviors were changed to fit hostage situations. These categories included verbal behaviors such as trust building (i.e., establishing rapport and setting the scene to work together), finessing (i.e., maneuvering the perpetrator and artifice), tranquilizing (i.e., defusing, quieting, and calming) and squelching (i.e., scolding). The behaviors were then recorded and analyzed for behavioral trends. Specifically, individual behaviors were documented and examined for frequency of occurrence of behaviors that do or do not contribute to the establishment of a relationship.

These coding systems provide valuable information about hostage negotiation, enabling researchers to examine the behavioral trends of crisis negotiators and hostage takers. The previously described study was one of the first coding systems designed to analyze the verbal process of hostage negotiations.

The strength of the *Student-teacher interaction model* was its ability to record the verbal behaviors presented by the hostage negotiator and hostage taker. It was valuable because many analyses could be conducted on how the hostage negotiator and hostage taker interact with one another. The weakness to the *Student-teacher interaction model* was its inability to capture all relevant behaviors or clearly address how the behaviors were defined. It appeared that there was a lack of empirical supported behaviors. These behaviors should define how the coding system functions. It should address the theoretical and practical aspects of hostage negotiation situations and the training associated with being a hostage negotiator. It should directly relate to the way in which hostage negotiators are trained to interact with hostage takers. This will ensure that the types of behaviors elicited by a hostage negotiator follow the form in which they are trained.

Bargaining: Coercive and Cooperative Relationship Theory

Another example of research that attempts to explain the process of crisis communication is the examination of bargaining in hostage situations (Donohue, Ramesh & Borschgrevink, 1991).

Methodology. Donohue and colleagues analyzed nine transcribed hostage incidents provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). The purpose of the research was to determine why intense conflicts fall apart. Both coercive and cooperative relationships were involved. A coercive relationship occurs when either person in a conversation attempts to control the dialog. A cooperative relationship occurs when both

people in a conversation attempt to establish mutual benefit, defined as both people compromising during the negotiation to ensure the negotiation is not monadic but dyadic.

Donohue and Roberto examined two relational factors of negotiation that involve the process of maintaining either a coercive or cooperative relationship during hostage negotiations. These two relational factors were *control* and *distance*. These two variables stand as determinants in the negotiation process. *Control* is defined as a loss of connection where the negotiation becomes monadic and the demands from one party shift away from the other and remove balance from the negotiation. More control is given to one side of the party, causing a balance shift in the negotiation. *Distance* is defined as a separation between parties where either person moves physically or psychologically closer or further to one another during negotiation.

When a coercive relationship is forming in a negotiation, less distance between parties is found and less balance of control is established. In a cooperative relationship, distance is closer and control is more balanced. When control and distance work together during a negotiation, a relational paradox is created, causing disequilibria during negotiation and creating a conflict between parties causing the negotiation to halt. If one party is communicating differently than the other by displaying coerciveness rather than cooperativeness, then the negotiator or taker must change their bargaining technique or the negotiation will not resolve properly (Donohue & Roberto, 1993). Donohue and Roberto's research was valuable because it showed how the establishment of different types of behaviors could change how a crisis negotiator and hostage taker bargain with each other in a crisis event.

The strength of the *Coercive and Cooperative Relationship Theory* was its ability to inform negotiators at a finite level what is going on in the relationship between the hostage negotiator and hostage taker during the negotiation process. It helps the hostage negotiator determine whether the hostage taker is working toward the establishment of a relationship and how that relationship relates to bargaining. More importantly, *Coercive and Cooperative Relationship Theory* helps the hostage negotiator understand what he and she is doing within the relationship during the negotiation. The weakness of this model is that it strictly focuses on relationship building and how the hostage negotiator and hostage taker bargain with one another. Because of the strict focus of this model, other aspects of the negotiation that are not related to bargaining are not addressed or discussed, such as the gathering of situational information that may be useful in understanding the current state of the hostages, or expressive information that may be useful in understanding the emotional state of the hostage taker.

Negotiated Order Theory

In order to determine how crisis negotiators and hostage takers interact with one another during the negotiation process, a theory was formed based on previous research examining organizational functioning in business (Donohue & Roberto, 1996). Negotiated order theory examines how limits are established during a negotiation and how dealing with those limits will affect the negotiation process.

Methodology. Negotiated order theory states that the process of negotiation is built on a series of limits established during the negotiation. These limits are separated into *implicit* and *explicit* boundaries. *Implicit boundaries* are established when both

parties do not yet understand their limits within the negotiation. There is no direct bargaining taking place, only the establishment of a relationship. *Explicit boundaries* are established once *implicit boundaries* are set and each party understands their role in the negotiation. These boundaries can change as the negotiation progresses. In order to establish resolution, each party must understand their boundaries and continue to follow the rules that define the boundaries applied to them. This will ensure that both parties negotiate equally based on each other's boundaries. Once equilibrium is established, progression toward resolution can be made.

Once the boundaries of negotiation are set, the *relational limits*, (i.e., the limits set when building a relationship), are established. These *relational limits* create situations where negotiations move direction toward varied levels of *affiliation* and *interdependence*. *Affiliation* is the extent to which parties are attracted to or accept one another. *Interdependence* is the extent to which parties impose obligation on one another.

These different ways of direction are as follows: *moving toward the other* (high affiliation, high interdependence), *moving with the other* (high affiliation, low interdependence), *moving away from the other* (low affiliation, low interdependence), and *moving against the other* (low affiliation, high interdependence). By *moving toward the other,* parties will express mutual liking and minimize on individual rights that may upset the relationship. By *moving with the other*, parties retain mutual relations while demonstrating approval and positive affect for one another. By *moving away from the other*, withdraw from the negotiation and situation is present. Finally, in *moving against*

the other, parties send mutual disapproving messages to one another. Results demonstrated that strategies involving *moving away* and *moving against* created more difficulties in establishing a relationship with the hostage taker (Donohue & Roberto, 1996). *Moving toward* and *moving with* were predominant in establishing a bi-directional relationship during negotiations. These findings indicated that when a hostage taker increases the amount of communication or *moves toward* the crisis negotiator, a relationship between the taker and the negotiator is being established. The establishment of a relationship between the hostage taker and crisis negotiator may facilitate progression toward a peaceful resolution.

Results of the study showed that degrees of limits could shape the direction of negotiation. More specifically, the establishment of a relationship between the crisis negotiator and hostage taker is more likely to lead to resolution rather than conflict. This also indicates that a withdrawal of communication between the hostage taker and crisis negotiator is more likely to lead to conflict and may result in a non-peaceful resolution.

Negotiated Order Theory informs the hostage negotiator how to move verbally within the relationship with the hostage taker and how different types of movements relate to outcome. This theory can be compared with different negotiation models that address the recording and documenting of individual behaviors because those models show what the hostage negotiator and hostage taker are doing during the negotiation at a behavioral level. The weakness to *Negotiated Order Theory* is that it only informs the negotiator of the types of boundaries being established during the development of the relationship between the hostage negotiator and hostage taker and how those boundaries

are developed. This model does not inform the negotiator what to do in different hostage negotiation situations but informs the hostage negotiator only what is going on in these situations.

Summary of Research

Research studies discussed above by Schlossberg et al. (1979), Donohue et al. (1996) and Fowler et al. (1993) examined the process of crisis communication and the general rules for negotiating in regard to limits of negotiation and bargaining. Their research did not examine the specific verbal behaviors that cause these limits and shifts in how people bargain with each other. More specifically, none of the models discussed above address the entire communication process. The *Two-Dimensional Communication Model* does not address any behaviors that are outside of the *instrumental* or *expressive* categories. The *Student-Teacher Interaction Model* does not address the importance of how hostage negotiators are trained and how training relates to the behaviors outlined in their coding system. The *Coercive and Cooperative Relationship Theory* model focuses only on bargaining during hostage negotiation situations and does not address the other important aspects of the negotiation such as situational and expressive information. Finally, *Negotiated Order Theory* neglects to address how to use the boundaries established within a relationship effectively during hostage negotiations situations.

By doing a more finite examination of the negotiation process and examining specific verbal behaviors presented by the crisis negotiator and hostage taker, it may be possible to determine if those verbal behaviors, presented in different ways, affect the outcome of the negotiation. For example, it may be possible to determine if the

presentation of specific behaviors by the crisis negotiator or hostage taker lead to a peaceful resolution such as the hostage taker surrendering and letting the hostages free, versus a violent resolution such as the hostage taker being shot by the police.

Purpose of the Present Research Study

The purpose of this research study was to develop a behavioral coding system to identify and specify verbal events that occur during crisis negotiations and to determine whether this coding system exclusively and exhaustively captures relevant verbal behaviors during these situations. In addition to developing the coding system, the system will be tested for reliability. This behavioral coding system is ultimately designed to determine whether the way sets of verbal behaviors are presented during hostage situations lead to violent or non-violent outcomes. The ultimate goal of this coding system is to determine whether specific behaviors or groups of behaviors correspond to different situational outcomes. The aim of this coding system is to determine whether those particular behaviors correspond with non-violent or violent outcomes. This thesis project tested the reliability of a newly developed behavioral coding system by examining the comparison of two independent coders to a set criterion established by the developer of the coding system. Comparison between the two raters and the criterion were conducted with a set of written transcripts of hostage negotiations.

Design and Methods

Development of the Crisis Communication Rating Scale (CCRS)

In order to examine the complex interactions in hostage negotiations, a behavioral coding system with a set of observational codes was developed to record the behaviors or events presented by the crisis negotiator and the hostage taker.

To develop this behavioral coding system, an examination of the research literature in crisis communication and psychotherapy process research was conducted. Direct knowledge from professional crisis negotiators was collected. All of this information was put together to capture relevant observed behavior codes. This initial coding system was designed to rate the behaviors presented by the crisis negotiator and hostage taker. The coding system was designed so that coders are provided with *examples*, *marginal code examples* and *counter code examples* of each behavior. A *marginal code* is an example of an alternative code similar to the code in question. A *counter example* is an alternative code that is clearly not representative of the code in question, but has a similar attribute that may cause confusion. The manual also details how coders are to rate each turn using the coding system and how to decide on a code when more than one code is presented during each turn. A *turn* is a statement followed by a response. An example would be when the crisis negotiator makes a verbal statement to the hostage taker and the hostage taker responds verbally to that statement.

The CCRS Manual

Nine hostage transcripts were coded using the Crisis Communication Rating Scale (See appendix). For every statement made by the crisis negotiator and hostage taker, a

code was applied. For example, if the hostage taker made a threat, a code specific to that verbal behavior was applied to the threat statement made by the hostage taker. This code represents that statement and is used during the quantitative analysis.

The CCRS manual contains an introduction section that describes the purpose of the manual, necessary prerequisite training, sources of coder biases and general guidelines for assigning codes. Specific instructions on how to code each turn and how to make a decision about which code to apply to a turn are included. In addition, a definition, code example and explanation of the code example are provided for each code.

Codes. There are a total of twenty-nine behavioral codes in the CCRS manual. These twenty-nine codes are applied to both the crisis negotiator and hostage taker. These behavioral codes, their definitions and examples are provided in the CCRS manual. These behavioral codes are separated into three domains based on the type of the code. *Instrumental Communication* codes represent behaviors that serve as means to direct action, provide situational information or facilitate transition to relational communication. *Relational Communication* codes represent behaviors that serve as a means to form a personal relationship through statements that increase relative intimacy. *Aversive Communication* codes represent behaviors that do not facilitate the formation of a relationship and that may be detrimental to the relationship. There are eleven *instrumental* codes, twelve *relational* codes and six *aversive* codes. Each of these codes was applied to every turn in a transcript and was applied to either the crisis negotiator or hostage taker. For specific codes, please refer to the CCRS manual in the appendix.

Source of the Codes. Codes used in the CCRS were developed through research based on crisis communication, client-therapist interaction, marital interaction, and analysis of hostage negotiation transcripts used for the training of crisis negotiators at the FBI academy (Callaghan, Summers & Weidman, 2003; Donohue, Ramesh & Borschgrevink, 1991; Donohue & Roberto, 1993; Donohue & Roberto, 1996; Fowler, Devivo, & Fowler, 1985; Gottman, 1979). In addition, two professional crisis negotiators provided feedback regarding verbal behaviors found in hostage negotiation situations and provided guidance toward which verbal behaviors were more prevalent than others and which behaviors were unlikely to occur (Walker, 2002; Hober, 2003). These research studies and the information provided by two crisis negotiators were valuable in understanding the way crisis negotiators and hostage takers interact with one another in different crisis situations. The information gathered from the literature and the crisis negotiators was the foundation for the development of the codes used in the development of the CCRS coding system.

Pilot Data. Pilot data showed that the CCRS system exceeds acceptable levels of reliability when tested by developers of the coding system. An inter-rater reliability of .74 was established when four CCRS researchers, separated into two groups of two people, coded one hostage negotiation transcript independently. Coding results from the two groups were compared to a gold standard criterion establish by the entire group. (McClain, Unwin, Castoreno, Madrigal, Krounbi, Reyes, & Callaghan, 2003).

Data Source

Simulated Transcripts. Three written training transcripts provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigations that exist in the public research domain were used in this study. These training transcripts were simulated hostage incidents used for training purposes for crisis negotiators. These three training transcripts represented multiple hostage incidents (i.e. hijackings, kidnappings, and barricades). The outcome of these simulated transcripts were not provided and is not required for the coding of crisis transcripts.

Real Transcripts. Three real hostage negotiation transcripts provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigations in the public research domain were used in this study. It is important, especially with observational research, that non-simulated (i.e., real) transcripts of hostage situations be used to conduct analyses because it provides a closer representation of real events. These hostage transcripts were chosen because they represent a wide range of possible outcomes. These hostage situations include one barricade, one kidnapping and one hijacking. The hostage situations in these transcripts took place within the United States from the 1970s to early 1990s and are of public record.

The data collected and analyzed for this study are the codes from the stimulus materials (i.e. transcripts), not the transcripts themselves. The behavioral codes used to analyze these transcripts were used as data for this study. At no point did the researchers collect hostage negotiation transcripts for this study.

Transcription Process. Three audio recordings of real hostage situations were transcribed into written transcripts. These are the real transcripts used for analysis in this

study, not the simulated transcripts used for training purposes. Previous researchers investigating hostage negotiations examined these same hostage transcripts for research purposes and transcribed these negotiations from audio to written text. The content of every verbal exchange by the crisis negotiator and hostage taker were recorded and noted on the transcripts with a PN for primary negotiator and HT for hostage taker. The primary negotiator is the main person communicating with the hostage taker. When inflections from the voice of the crisis negotiator or hostage taker were audible, the appropriate grammatical structure was transcribed. For example, when an inquiry was made in a negotiation, a question mark was applied at the end of the written inquiry. When a statement was unintelligible, a blank with two brackets around it was applied indicating that unintelligible speech was found. Utterances were transcribed and not removed, such as "Um hmm" and "Un huh". It was important that utterances were transcribed from the audio recordings because these utterances usually represent affirming and non-affirming codes from the CCRS.

Coders were blind to the outcome of the real transcripts. This means that the coders were only given the transcripts to code and no additional information such as a published document by a media outlet that may inform them of the outcome of the hostage situation. The outcomes for each of the three real hostage transcripts were not presented on the transcript and outcomes were determined by available media coverage corresponding to each situation. Coders did not have access to any available media information, as they were stored in a separate folder.

Coders

Two individuals familiar with observational coding research methodology participated in this study. In its current stage of development, this manual is designed for use by researchers familiar with observational coding methodology. Before the participants began the research study they were asked to sign a consent form stating that participation in this research is completely voluntary, confidential, and that they may withdrawal from the research study at any time. The number of participants chosen for this study was based on literature that states only two participants are needed to establish inter-rater reliability when testing the usability of a coding system (Bakeman & Gottman, 1986). Inter-rater reliability determines the level of accuracy between two independent coders using the same measure.

Two coders were trained to use the CCRS and were asked to code three written hostage negotiation transcripts negotiated by trained FBI crisis negotiators. These individuals were familiar with observational coding research and received training for their task.

This research used two independent coders compared to a gold standard criterion established by two developers of the CCRS. A gold standard criterion is a key designed to compare scores. In this study, a gold standard for each transcript was constructed to determine how well each coder coded. Two developers of the CCRS system, not the two independent coders, developed the gold standard criterion. A comparison was made of the codes from the gold standard transcript and the transcripts from the coders.

Training

Two independent coders were trained using three simulated training transcripts that were not included in the data analysis. Because there is no standard training protocol for observational coding research, a protocol was designed for this particular research study. The development of the training protocol used to train the coders on how to use the CCRS is described later and was based on the initial piloting of this system. Training took approximately sixty hours in order to achieve a level of competency sufficient to code reliably. Reliability was measured using the Kappa statistic (Cohen, 1960). Competency was evaluated by periodically testing the coder's ability to code reliably, code independently of one another, and to ensure that the two coders did not drift during the training process. When drift occurs, it means that the coders are beginning to code inconsistently, thus reducing the reliability between the coders.

The two coders were trained as a group and presented with training transcripts until a complete understanding of the CCRS was established. These training transcripts were simulated hostage situations used for training crisis negotiators by the Federal Bureau of Investigations. The transcripts were simulated after actual hostage situations, providing a close representation of actual events. Because of their close representation to actual events, they were ideal for training purposes. Coders were provided with the CCRS and asked to review it prior to training. The coders then engaged in training sessions provided by the primary researcher and one expert coder. During training, discussions occurred where questions and answers were reviewed, discussed and explained.

Examples of codes were provided and exercises were given to test the participants understanding of the coding process (e.g., coders were given a particular code and a series of sentences. The coders were then asked to determine which sentence applies to a particular code based on its definition and provided examples). Finally, a test was given to determine their ability to accurately code. If either of the two coders did not meet a minimum index of agreement with the researcher and each other (assessed using the Kappa statistic; Cohen, 1960), further training was provided until coder reliability was met. This happened numerous times until coders began to code with greater reliability. The minimum level of agreement required for this study was .60. An agreement level of .60 is statistically considered *good* and acceptable for observational coding (Fleiss, 1981). Once the two coders completed their training and were prepared to code real transcripts, each coder was given the same set of three hostage negotiation transcripts and asked to code them independently. Coders were asked to code one transcript at a time. Following the completion of coding the first transcript, a reliability check was made to determine if coder drift was occurring. If coder drift were to occur, more training would have been conducted until greater reliability was established. Coder drift did not occur following completion of the first transcript. A more thorough discussion of reliability and its use in development of the CCRS is discussed below.

Reliability

In order to ensure that the CCRS demonstrates sufficient reliability (i.e., two or more people can code using the CCRS and achieve similar results), an inter-rater reliability check was conducted. Reliability was determined using the Kappa statistic.

Kappa was determined by the coder's ability to record the appropriate code for each statement made by the hostage negotiator and hostage taker. In order to determine reliability when more than one code was applied to a single statement, only the first response to each statement was included in the data analysis.

The first response to each statement was used because there were errors in the coding process. During training, punctuation rules outlined in the coding manual on how to deal with awkward forms of punctuation were discussed, but the coders did not apply the rules at all times. The awkward punctuation marks consisted of phrases separated by a series of dots or large blank spaces in the middle of sentences. The main problem was that the coders were not coding the same number of statements made from the hostage negotiator and hostage taker. For example, there were instances when one coder would combine and code the second and third statement and the second coder would code each of the statements independently. This caused some coding problems because there were a different number of codes in each turn for each coder. To address this inconsistency in the application of codes, only the first sentence coded was used in the analysis discussed below.

Kappa values were calculated for the coder's ability to code between each other and to the gold standard for all three transcripts. In addition, individual Kappa values were calculated for each code between each coder and the gold standard. Preliminary research analyzing the reliability of the CCRS using two independent coders compared to a gold standard indicated a Kappa value for inter-rater reliability at .74 (McClain, et. al., 2003). These results indicated that the CCRS could achieve a sufficient Kappa rating.

Results were based on coding from developers of the CCRS system. This means that expert coders were proficient in achieving a sufficient Kappa rating.

Procedures

Before participants began the research study, they were asked to sign a consent form stating that participation in this research is completely voluntary, confidential and that they may resign from the research study at any time. Participants were informed that the training is broken into stages. Training sessions were broken into weeks. A total of sixteen weeks were needed to train participants. Participants met for approximately two to three hours each week with the primary investigator and one expert coder.

Training Protocol

Week 1: Participants were informed about the purpose of the study, introduced to the CCRS and were given their own personal copy of the CCRS manual. Participants were asked to take the manual home, read it and pay particular attention to the introduction and procedures sections. Participants were given one week to read the manual for the first time.

Week 2: Training started with a discussion of the introduction and procedures sections. These sections were designed to ensure that participants understand how and why this manual is used for coding written transcripts and the possible coder biases associated with this type of research. At the end of the session, participants were given an oral exam of the introduction and procedures sections. The oral exam ensured that the participants completely understood how the manual works and how to use it during coding. Participants were asked to review the CCRS behavior domains, behavior codes

and examples associated with each code. This section was the focus of the next two training sessions.

Week 3, and 4: During training for the next two weeks, participants were instructed on the differences between each of the three behavior domains and all thirty behavior codes. A discussion of each of the codes and their examples were included. Participants were asked to study these codes intensively and to verbalize any confusion they had understanding the meanings or examples of the codes. At the end of the fourth week, participants were given a training transcript and asked to code it. This tested the participants understanding of each code and gave them an introduction to coding a transcript.

Week 5: During this session a comparison of each participant's coding ability was examined and a discussion was conducted regarding the codes that either of the two participants coded incorrectly. Participants were given two more training transcripts and asked to code them.

Weeks 6 through 14: During these sessions, the participant's coding ability was examined on the two transcripts and an inter-rater reliability check was conducted between the two participants to determine if they were coding consistently. If a *good* level of Kappa was met (Fleiss, 1981), coders would have been asked to code one more training transcript for their final training session. Because participants failed to meet an adequate level of reliability, an additional six weeks of training was needed to establish a sufficient Kappa level. Over the next six weeks, participants were given two more

training transcripts and asked to code them. The participant's Kappa level increased and the participants began to code more reliably.

Weeks 15 and 16: During this session, participants were given their first real transcript to code and asked to complete it over the course of the next two weeks. They were first asked to complete one transcript in order to check for coder drift. Once the researcher determined that coder drift was not occurring, coders were asked to finish the final two transcripts. Both coders met adequate reliability on their first real transcript and were given their final two transcripts.

Upon completion of the three transcripts, coders were asked to return the CCRS manual, were reminded of confidentiality, and were thanked for their participation in the study.

Results

Criterion Kappa and Reliability Drift Checks

There were a total of 2,551 verbal behaviors recorded by coder 1 and coder 2. There were a total of 1, 744 verbal behaviors used in the analysis to determine reliability. Not all behaviors recorded by coder 1 and coder 2 was used because only the first response to each statement was used in the analysis. The first response to each statement was used because the coders were unable to consistently apply the same punctuation rules for each turn in the transcript materials.

Prior to coding the transcripts used to determine reliability of the CCRS system, coders were consistently checked for reliability throughout their sixteen weeks of training. Reliability checks were conducted to determine the progress of each coder as

they became more efficient in using the coding system. These adherence checks were used to determine when the coders achieved a level of reliability that would be sufficient to code the real transcripts used in this study. Reliability checks were not conducted at each session. Coders were required to code each week and bring the results to the following meeting. Not all of the coding conducted each week was used for reliability checks but was conducted to enhance the coder's skills on specific codes and difficult phrases that frequently occurred. There were a total of four reliability checks conduced. Results of those reliability checks are presented in Table 1. Results of the reliability checks indicated that the two coders increased in reliability as training progressed.

Reliability of the Manual

The overall Kappa value for coder 1 across the three transcripts, compared to the gold standard, was K =. 68. The overall Kappa value for coder 2 across the three transcripts, compared to the gold standard, was K = .68. The overall Kappa value of K = .68 by both coders indicate that there was good agreement (Fleiss, 1981) between the coders and the gold standard among the three transcripts.

The Kappa values between transcripts for each coder compared to the gold standard are presented in Table 2. Results indicated that for transcript 1 and transcript 3 there was good agreement between each coder and the gold standard. In transcript 2 there was good agreement for coder 2 but only fair agreement for coder 1.

The Kappa values for coder 1 compared to coder 2 across the three transcripts are presented in Table 3. Results indicated that for transcript 1 and transcript 3 there was

good agreement between coder 1 and coder 2. In transcript 2 there was fair agreement between coder 1 and coder 2.

The individual Kappa values for each coder compared to the gold standard across all three transcripts are listed in Tables 4 and 5.

Table 1.

Kappa Values for Each Drift-Check Session

Session	Coder1	Coder2
1	K = 0.57	K = 0.60
2	K = 0.64	K = 0.62
3	K = 0.72	K = 0.68
4	K = 0.85	K = 0.83

Table 2.

Per Transcript Kappa Values for Coder 1 and Coder 2 Compared to the Gold Standard

	Coder 1	Coder 2
Transcript 1	K = 0.70	K = 0.68
Transcript 2	K = 0.57	K = 0.63
Transcript 3	K = 0.68	K = 0.69
Overall	K = 0.68	K = 0.68

Table 3.

Per Transcript Kappa Values for Coder 1 Compared to Coder 2

	Coder 1 to Coder 2
Transcript 1	K = 0.69
Transcript 2	K = 0.54
Transcript 3	K = 0.68

Table 4.

Individual Kappa Values for Coder 1 across all Three Transcripts

Code	Kappa	Code	Kappa
AFS	0.94	PSN	0.24
DAS	0.00	PLE	1.00
DRS	0.81	AVD	0.00
DCS	0.82	CRT	0.00
FIT	0.62	DMD	0.00
IDC	0.75	DST	0.40
IIQ	0.61	EXP-A	0.33
REQ	0.29	THT	0.00
SIQ	0.95	SDC	0.72
PRS	0.00	BRG	0.29
CPS	0.50	RFS	0.77
DET	0.00	S-EPY	0.50
EPY	0.53	S-PTY	0.00
EXP-R	0.16	UCT	0.60
PDC	0.68		
PIQ	0.44		

Table 5.

Individual Kappa Values for Coder 2 across all Three Transcripts

Code	Kappa	Code	Kappa
AFS	0.95	PSN	0.17
DAS	0.00	PLE	0.00
DRS	0.80	AVD	0.10
DCS	0.97	CRT	0.00
FIT	0.65	DMD	0.00
IDC	0.72	DST	0.00
IIQ	0.68	EXP-A	0.40
REQ	0.50	THT	0.00
SIQ	0.67	SDC	0.68
PRS	0.00	BRG	0.00
CPS	0.00	RFS	0.84
DET	0.00	S-EPY	0.00
EPY	1.00	S-PTY	0.00
EXP-R	0.68	UCT	0.50
PDC	0.55		
PIQ	0.48		

Results of the individual Kappa values between coder 1 and coder 2 indicate that there was a spectrum of Kappa values ranging from poor to excellent. Most of the coders achieved either good or excellent Kappa values for each of the thirty codes. The codes where the Kappa rating was 0.00 for both coders indicates they did not occur in the three transcripts.

Discussion

Reliability

Prior to establishing a reliability check on the CCRS system, coders established the minimum level of agreement (i.e., Kappa of .60) on a series of four practice-coding transcripts. These results indicated that the coders were proficient to code the three real transcripts. In fact, the two coders were able to establish reliability on the four training transcripts at a much greater level (i.e. coder 1, K = .85, and coder 2, K = .83) by the time they were given their first real transcript. These results indicated that the coders should have had no problem establishing the minimum level of reliability on the three real transcripts used in this study. In the end, the coders did establish the minimum level of agreement for all three real transcripts compared to the gold standard.

Overall Kappa values indicated that the CCRS system is reliable when used by independent coders that were not developers of the system. A Kappa value of K = .68 was found for both coders and is considered a good level of reliability (Fleiss, 1981).

Kappa values for coder 1 and coder 2 for each transcript compared to the gold standard indicated that both coders evidenced a good level of reliability on transcript 1 and 3, but coder 1 evidenced a fair level reliability on transcript 2. The simplest

explanation for this deficiency in reliability is the complexity of the negotiation itself. Transcript 2 was an airline hijacking and contained a significantly difficult dialog because there were four different law enforcement personnel communicating at different times to the hostage taker. This constant changing of personnel made it difficult to understand the context of the situation and keep track of the details of the negotiation. This is a likely explanation because although coder 2 achieved a good level of agreement on transcript 2, coder 2 did have a lower level of reliability on transcript 2 compared to the other transcripts.

An examination of the reliability between coders across the three transcripts indicated that the two coders were very similar in their coding abilities. The only area where the coders drifted from one another was in transcript 2 where coder 1 had a more difficult time coding accurately than coder 2. Reasons for the drift were discussed above and most likely are a result of the transcript itself, in that transcript 2 was more difficult contextually and caused some confusions for the coder when trying to determine which codes to apply and where.

A close examination of the individual differences between codes and the two coders indicated that there were specific codes that were more difficult than others to detect. For coder 1, codes REQ, BRG, CPS and DST indicated very poor reliability. However, those codes did not occur frequently enough to establish proper reliability. For example, code CPS (compromise) only occurred three times throughout all three transcripts. Three occurrences do not accurately depict coder 1's ability to properly apply that code within a given transcript. Codes EXP-A, EXP-R, PIQ and PSN were four other

codes where coder 1 did not establish sufficient reliability. These codes occurred much more frequently than the four discussed above but were a bit more difficult than other codes to detect because they required a greater understanding of the context of the negotiation. For example, code PSN (persuasion) requires the coder to understand when either the hostage negotiator or hostage taker is persuading the other to perform an action, given the previous demands, compliances and actions already completed by both parties. Basically, this code is a bit subjective, and after further analysis, a more detailed and structured definition of the code will be constructed for the next version of the CCRS.

Another example of where codes can be subjective and difficult is the code PIQ (personal inquiry). The most difficult part of training coders to use the CCRS manual was explaining the differences between personal and situational information disclosures and inquiries. Even after considering the detailed explanation of PIQ and the numerous examples provided in the manual, there was still quite a bit of confusion when the hostage negotiator or hostage taker was disclosing or inquiring personal or situational information. Because of the unexpected poor Kappa scores on situational and personal codes, future versions of the CCRS will need to contain more examples and clearer explanations of these types of codes.

Coder 2 was similar to coder 1 in that coder 2 also had problems with the more subjective codes as noted above (PSN, PIQ, CPS, BRG, EXP-A, DST, AVD). Unlike coder 1, coder 2 missed some of the more difficult codes; that is, coder 2 did not correctly record some of the less frequently occurring codes. With that, most of the codes that

coder 2 missed did not occur more than four or five times. As mentioned before, this is not a good representation of coder 2's ability.

Overall, coder 1 and coder 2 established good reliability. An essential outcome for this study is that individuals who were not developers of the system could use the CCRS manual and could code with sufficient reliability.

Training

The process of training individuals to code using the Crisis Communication Rating Scale (CCRS) system was challenging. The estimated time to train coders was approximately thirty hours. This estimate was established from a pilot study previously conducted on the reliability of the CCRS system (McClain, et. al., 2002). The major difference between the pilot study and the current study is that the pilot study used developers of the CCRS as coders. This made the process of training much easier because the coders were familiar with the system and had already coded many training transcripts during the process of developing the system.

By selecting individuals without previous coding experience, it increased the actual training time to approximately fifty hours. A more detailed and intense training regimen was needed to ensure that the coders thoroughly understood each code and how to assign them properly in a transcript. The increased time of training corresponded to the results of practice tests given to both coders throughout the training process. The practice tests were given each week and results were discussed afterwards. Over time, coders gradually became more consistent and reliable. It was found that continuous distribution of practice tests during the training process was valuable because the constant

feedback increased the coder's ability to learn the codes and increased reliability over time. It was also found that having each participant code independently from one another in addition to their normal weekly group coding sessions was helpful in determining where each individual coder was having trouble.

Coders

Recruiting individuals to be coders was a difficult task because coding requires a great deal of time and energy. The individuals who coded in this study were college educated, highly motivated and familiar with research methodology. Familiarity with research methodology is important because individuals will understand the need to acquire reliable data in order to display accurate findings. These attributes were valuable during the training process because the coders were able to quickly understand the coding system and the differences between codes.

The most difficult part of observational coding research is the removal of personal biases when observing and recording behaviors. Because coders were asked to record behaviors for interactions that occur in the context of a dialog, biases regarding what happened within the dialog caused confusion and conflict between the coders. For example, in one of the transcripts there was a statement made by the hostage taker that appeared to be a demand, but after reviewing the dialog a few lines up and down the transcript, it was apparent the hostage taker was simply restating a request that had not yet been fulfilled. It was found that it is best to discuss biases every time there is a discrepancy between coders and to have the coders review the section on biases in the CCRS. Biases will occur throughout the entire coding process and do not only happen

with beginners, but with expert coders as well. It is a natural part of the coding process and is difficult to fully remove when performing observational coding.

Interpretation of codes

The CCRS system was developed for the purpose of coding interactions between a crisis negotiator and a hostage taker. An assumption was made that it would not be difficulty to understand what the hostage negotiator and hostage taker were saying during a negotiation. Unfortunately, there were instances where the coders did not agree with one another on what was actually being said within the negotiation, and this caused frustration for the coders when comparing codes. A discussion with the primary investigator and one developer of the system was required to clear up the confusion. It was found that when these situations occurred, it is best to explore the interpretations made by both coders and then apply the appropriate code for each of the different interpretations. Once interpretations were made by both coders, a discussion of the interaction in question was conducted, and a determination was made on which interpretation best fit the interaction. This task provided coders with a greater understanding of subjective dialog and how to deal with this type of dialog when it appears in a transcript. For the most part, these types of situations are context specific. An understanding of what is going on and what is about to happen will clarify the confusion, and if the coders read a few lines up and down in the transcript, it will clear up this confusion and coding may proceed.

It was found that coder frustration from coding incorrectly is a natural process of coding and should be addressed immediately. It was found that the most effective way to

show this was to not show the coder the correct code, but to have a discussion of why the incorrect code was applied and why the correct code is the one to be applied. The majority of these problems are addressed in the introduction section of the CCRS manual, but these problems will surface naturally during training. By not addressing the problem immediately, the coders remain confused and will continue to code incorrectly.

Future Direction (CCRS Research and Development)

Development of a decision hierarchy for the CCRS

When observational research is conducted in psychotherapy situations, observational coders record only one verbal behavior for each time the client or therapist speaks. The back and forth exchange between a client and a therapist is typically referred to as a turn. For example, if the therapist makes a one-sentence inquiry to the client, but the therapist receives a five-sentence response back from the client, regardless of the length of the statements both the client and the therapist will only have only one behavior recorded. This can be a problem in specific situations because the therapist or client may exhibit more than one type of behavior within a statement and a decision needs to be made as to which single behavior will be recorded for that statement.

This ties back to a problem found in this study regarding punctuation. Because there were awkward punctuation marks in the transcripts, it caused an inconsistency between coders on where and when to apply codes. Because of this problem, a decision hierarchy will be included in the next version of the CCRS system. A decision hierarchy is the most effective way to deal with a multiple code problem. It is a hierarchal structure

set up to inform coders of which behavior to apply when presented with more than one behavior within a statement.

Having multiple behaviors within a single statement was not a problem with the current research study because the coders were not required to make any decisions regarding multiple behaviors when coding, though coders did have trouble determining when and where to apply codes because of awkward punctuation in the transcripts. These problems can be removed with a decision hierarchy. Because the purpose of this study was to establish reliability, the coders were required to code every sentence by both the hostage negotiator and hostage taker and apply a single behavior code for each sentence. This does not mean that the CCRS does not need a decision hierarchy but that a decision hierarchy was not needed for this study in order to determine reliability.

Currently there is no decision hierarchy for the CCRS. However, the next version of the CCRS will contain one. The decision hierarchy will be developed based on hostage negotiation policies and procedures that state certain pieces of information are more important to a negotiation than others when it comes to managing a hostage negotiation situation (Misino, 2004). Because of the complex individual differences between hostage negotiation situations, a context dependent decision hierarchy will be developed and tested for usability. A context dependent decision hierarchy determines which code will be applied when more than one code is presented in a statement based on the context of that negotiation. This means that coders will be required to thoroughly understand what is going on during the negotiation at all times in order to determine which code to apply. For example, when a coder is presented with a statement by either

the hostage negotiator or hostage taker that is more than one sentence long, coders will be required to determine the subject of the statement and apply the appropriate code.

There will be two steps to using the decision hierarchy. The first step will require the user to consult the decision hierarchy and determine which category of behaviors to select based on the previously established hostage negotiation policies and procedures discussed above. The second step will require the user to determine which behavior code, within the selected category, to record.

LAG Sequential Analysis

One effective tool used for examining individual behaviors is sequential analysis. Sequential analysis is a statistical tool that examines a series of behaviors and determines the chances of those behaviors occurring, given the occurrence of another behavior or set of behaviors (Bakeman & Gottman, 1986). Sequential analysis has been used in many areas of verbal interaction such as marital interactions, student-teacher interactions and crisis situations (Bakeman & Gottman, 1986, Bednar & Curington, 1983, & Fowler, Devivo, & Fowler, 1985). These areas of interaction have different goals, but the underlining process is the same. Each area of negotiation has a desired outcome and the verbal behaviors presented during negotiations are what shape the direction of that desired outcome. Examining specific behaviors as they occur throughout the negotiation allows tracking and analysis, which may lead to the prediction of future behaviors.

Recent research, examining such effects, indicated that changes in individual behaviors during a negotiation correspond with how the relationship progresses during a negotiation. More specifically, a three-stage categorical model of individual behaviors

designed to analyze relational changes during crisis negotiation was used to examine crisis events. A series of behaviors selected to represent different stages of relationship changes in negotiation were used to analyze crisis events. It was found that as the relationship progressed and changed, the frequency of behaviors from each category would either increase or decrease according to the stage of the relationship (Taylor, 2002). This particular research study indicated the importance of tracking those behavioral changes and how those changes affect the establishment of the relationship between the hostage negotiator and hostage taker. Future CCRS research will use lag sequential analysis to examine different styles of negotiation to determine if those styles correspond to different situational outcomes. There may be a difference between one negotiation style that leads to less violent outcomes compared to another negotiation style that may lead to more violent outcomes.

Dissemination of the CCRS for "real world" application

The CCRS was designed for training purposes, that is, as a tool for crisis teams to evaluate the effectiveness of their negotiations. The CCRS system does not tell the crisis negotiator what to do or what should have been done, but what happened. The CCRS system displays verbal behaviors so crisis negotiators can see how verbal behaviors were exchanged during the negotiation. The CCRS can help crisis negotiators refine their negotiation skills by objectively displaying what happened after each and every statement made by both the crisis negotiator and the hostage taker and relating this to the outcome of the situation. It is the goal of this researcher to export the CCRS to local and federal law enforcement agencies for the training of crisis negotiators. Because the CCRS is

designed for research and practical application, the process of training coders in this study was important to the future development of CCRS because researchers are not the only individuals who will be using the CCRS system. The current research study indicated that it is possible to train individuals to use the CCRS system who are not developers of the system or who have had previous experience developing other observational coding systems.

Using the CCRS for suicide intervention and police interrogation

An examination of the CCRS for use with suicide intervention and police interrogation is currently being explored. Research in both suicide intervention and police interrogation has indicated that there is a fundamental difference in the way in which verbal behaviors are presented during interactions. There are also similarities of the types of behaviors in these situations. It appears that suicide intervention is not fundamentally different than hostage negotiation in that there is considerable relationship building and gathering of personal information. However, the goals of the two types of negotiation are a bit different. In hostage negotiation, the primary goal of the negotiation is to resolve the situation without any harm to law enforcement personnel and the hostages. In suicide intervention the primary goal is to provide support and guidance, such as reasons for living, to convince the person that suicide is not their only option. There appears to be a great deal of relationship building and problem solving in suicide intervention than in hostage negotiation, and this appears to happen much more quickly (i.e., it starts at the beginning of the call) (Lester, 2001).

Examining research in police interrogation, it was found that there is less relationship building and more demand for situational and personal information (Gudjonsson, 2003). There is a shift in the how the verbal behaviors are presented. This may be because the police interrogator is not trying to preserve life, or prevent a person from inflicting harm on others, but he or she is attempting to gather different types of information such as situational and personal information. This means that there is less relationship building and more extraction of information, unlike in hostage negotiation and suicide intervention situations where building a relationship is essential to the negotiation.

Due to the fact that the only difference between hostage negotiation, suicide intervention, and police interrogation is the way verbal behaviors are presented, there should be no reason why the CCRS could not be used with suicide intervention and police interrogation situations with a few modifications.

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Appendix A

Human Subjects-IRB Approval Form

San José State
UNIVERSITY

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To: Bryan U. McClain
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San Jose, CA 95125

From: Pam Stacks
Interim AVP, Graduate Studies & Research

Date: February 12, 2004

This letter acknowledges that the Human Subjects-Institutional Review Board has received the request for extension of the following study:

"Identifying Variables in Transcribed Crisis Intervention."

Since there are no major changes to the protocol, the Human Subjects-Institutional Review Board has granted this project a one-year extension effective from the date of this letter. Data collection beyond February 12, 2005 requires an extension request.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at (408) 924-2480.

Appendix B

Crisis Communication Rating Scale: The CCRS System

For use with transcribed hostage situations

Research Center for Innovative Psychological Assessment and Treatment

Bryan U. McClain, 2004

Rev. 5-7-04

I. INTRODUCTION

This ratings manual includes the *Crisis Communication Rating Scale* (CCRS) and its instructions for use. It is designed for rating transcripts of hostage situations for the purpose of negotiator training. It is used to code the behaviors of the hostage negotiator and hostage taker as they occur throughout a hostage negotiation transcript.

It is vital that the user (rater) of this manual be familiar with each code and complete adequate training before using this manual for analysis of actual hostage events. It is recommended that training be provided on simulated transcripts until the rater can identify each code and make the proper distinctions between codes.

The manual begins with a general overview and instructions for using the rating system. Next, the manual describes each code for the behaviors of both the hostage negotiator and hostage taker.

Each code contains

1. the definition of the code.
2. a complete description of the code's purpose.
3. general guidelines for rating a turn using that code.
4. marginal examples of the code (if applicable).
5. counter examples of the code (if applicable).

II. GENERAL OVERVIEW

1. *Coding Negotiator and Taker Behaviors:*

This training manual is designed to record the behaviors of the hostage negotiator and hostage taker. These behaviors as they occur by the hostage negotiator and hostage taker are called turns. A turn is a statement followed by a response. An example of a turn would be when the hostage negotiator makes a verbal statement to the hostage taker and the hostage taker responds verbally to that statement. It is vital to the validity of the manual that the proper distinction between the hostage negotiator and hostage taker is made prior to the recording of an event.

2. *Prerequisite Training:*

Raters are recommended to have at least a minimal understanding of crisis situations and crisis communication. This means that raters should understand the basic principles and procedures utilized in crisis situations and how and when communication is used as a means to resolve these situations. This can be achieved by the examination of research journals and books exploring the process of crisis communication and crisis negotiation.

Rating is a complex task that requires the rater to be as objective as possible when assigning a code to a behavior. Objectivity will lead to more accurate rating. Furthermore, raters must be aware of possible biases they may have and exercise good judgment when making a decision on which code to assign. In addition, raters must adhere to the rules and ethics of confidentiality put forth by the institution using this coding system and should refrain from discussing the process of rating with anyone other than the principal investigator. Confidentiality is required to protect the rights of the hostage negotiator, hostage taker and any other person present in the transcript.

3. *Utterances:*

One word utterances embedded in a turn by either the hostage negotiator or taker are not coded unless they represent an affirmative or disconfirming response to an inquiry. This would consist of a "yeah", "yes", "nah" or "no". For example:

N: *So you're saying that you want a radio?*
T: *Yeah. (AFS)*

This is an example of an affirmative statement where the utterance would be recorded and **not** removed from the transcript. An example of an unwanted utterance that should be removed is shown below. The response of "hw" is unintelligible and is an un-codeable response.

N: *So you're saying that you want a radio?*
T: *hw*

4. Avoid Halo Rating:

Halo rating is when the rater makes inferences about a situation or person within the transcript. These inferences are the result of unchecked biases and will effect proper coding of transcripts. To use the scale correctly, it is essential that raters code exactly what is written in the transcripts, not what raters think SHOULD occur in the transcripts.

The rater ***must*** be aware of the following situations that may lead to coding errors (biases).

i. The rater being influenced by appreciation of the hostage negotiators skill, style or statements. This can occur

when the rater begins to believe that the negotiator is performing his or her job well and begins making inferences about codes. For example, believing that the negotiator is always making the correct responses or statements throughout the negotiation.

ii. The rater being influenced by the rater's personal feelings about the hostage negotiator or taker. (i.e. how much the rater likes or dislikes the hostage negotiator or taker).

iii. The rater believing that he or she would have done something the same or different than the hostage negotiator or taker within a given transcript.

a. *Carry over effects resulting from a consistent pattern of behaviors:*

In deciding which code to assign when rating a turn, the rater must not rate turns based on previous behaviors but rate the response of the current behavior. For example, if the hostage negotiator engages in a large number of demand behaviors, the rater must continue to evaluate each negotiator behavior independently and objectively. The rater should not allow a consistent pattern of previous behaviors to affect the rating of current target behaviors.

b. *Rater bias resulting from evaluation of skill or effectiveness of the hostage negotiator.*

The rater may feel the hostage negotiator is highly skilled based on a particular tactic used during the negotiation process or simply due to the credentials of the hostage negotiator. In this situation, the opinion of the rater may interfere with properly coding behaviors. *Each turn must be coded according to the turn itself, not the skill level or credentials of the hostage*

negotiator. This type of bias will most likely affect raters who have some type of relationship with the hostage negotiator. This is usually seen in small law enforcement agencies or negotiator training facilities.

c. *Rater bias resulting from the rater's relationship with the hostage negotiator.*

The rater might assign a code inaccurately because of either a positive or negative relationship with the hostage negotiator. Positive bias is most common when the rater works for the hostage negotiator and building a working relationship with him or her is essential to the performance of their duties. Negative bias is most common when the rater is familiar with the hostage negotiator but not convinced that the hostage negotiator is adequately skilled in negotiation. *Turns must be recorded according to procedures outlined in the ratings manual, regardless of the relationship between the rater and hostage negotiator.*

d. *Rater halo resulting from whether the rater likes or dislikes the hostage taker.*

The rater may code inaccurately simply because they have developed feelings for the hostage taker given specific circumstances. This will cause a decrease in accuracy. As stated in section (c) above, *Turns must be recorded according to procedures outlined in the ratings manual, regardless of the relationship between the rater and hostage taker.*

e. *Rater halo resulting from the rater believing that something was done either the same or different than how the rater would have done it.*

This coding system is designed to assess the behavioral interaction between hostage negotiator and hostage taker. This coding system is **not** designed to

assess whether the rater agrees or disagrees with a behavior or the reaction to a behavior.

5. *Use of Guidelines:*

   The descriptions and definitions of items in the Crisis Communication Rating Scale are intended to be guidelines for use in coding hostage transcripts. In all descriptions of codes, information is given to make a decision about which code should be recorded. The guidelines also provide marginal and borderline cases when applicable and demonstrates how to determine which code should be assigned based on this information.

6. *Examples of Codes:*

   For most of the items in this manual, the examples are used to illustrate the differences between codes and should be used to clarify the functional definition of each code. A functional definition describes what the code captures and how it is represented in the transcript. For example, the functional definition of a threat is an intention to perform an action such as harm. If the hostage taker tells the hostage negotiator that he or she is going to kill a hostage, then the function of the behavior is to convey an intention to harm a hostage.

   Raters will notice that with further clarification of the hostage situation, the example of each code may change based on the context of the hostage event. These examples are merely used to illustrate the code and give greater understanding of its function.

7. *Examples in the manual occur in three forms:*

1. Relevant description of the code: A relevant description of the code provides a detailed explanation and example of the code.
2. Marginal example of the code (*if applicable*): A marginal code is an example of an alternative code similar to the code in question.
3. Counter example of the code (*if applicable*): A counter example is an alternative code that is clearly not representative to the code in question, but has a similar attribute that may cause confusion.

When an example is given, the letter "N" indicates the hostage negotiator and the letter "T" indicates the hostage taker.

8. *Multiple code decision hierarchy:* When it appears that more than one code needs to be assigned to a single turn, a decision hierarchy is used. The hierarchy should be used if it is unclear which codes should be assigned when there are two or more. The decision hierarchy is located at the end of the manual on page 57. Although two or more codes may apply to a single turn, only one code is given.

III. INSTRUCTIONS TO RATERS

1. *Rate every turn.* This manual is designed so that every turn is recorded with a code. **Remember to rate every turn and do not leave any turns unrated.**

2. *Code the function of the turn.* This is a functional rating system. Code only the function of the interaction. The function of a behavior is defined as what the behavior does, not what it appears to do. If the hostage negotiator responds to the hostage taker with deescalating talk (DET code), then record the function of the *response* to that turn.

The number of codes examined to determine the correct code for a given turn should be kept at a minimum. A total of six turns previous to the target code is set as the limit to provide a context to the rater and ensure accurate recording of behavior patterns. This limit helps keep the rater on task and prevent biasing of previous behaviors.

3. *Reference code definitions when unsure about code assignments.* It is recommended that raters frequently review the manual especially when there is a question about a code. Raters should always review the marginal examples, counter examples and the decision hierarchy.

Errors can occur if the code description and examples are not reviewed prior to recording a turn. It is important that the rater refers to the manual frequently and understands each code before recording it.

4. *Refer to manual notes.* Periodically there will be notes added next to each code. These notes will clarify the use and definition of the code. **ALWAYS read the code notes.**

5. *Read before rating.* Do not anticipate what the hostage negotiator or hostage taker is about to say; only record what is said as it is written in the transcript.

CRISIS COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOR CODES

All codes should be coded as they occur in the context of the negotiation. This means that no codes should be recorded unless the hostage negotiator is communicating with the hostage taker. Do not record codes for intra-negotiator communication or hostage-to-hostage taker communication.

CCRS codes are placed into one of three domains. These domains represent the higher-level behaviors of the codes. These domains are as follows.

1. Instrumental communication refers to behaviors that serve as a means to direct action, provide situational information, or facilitate (assist) a transition to relational communication.

2. Relational Communication refers to behaviors that serve as a means to form a *personal relationship* through statements that increase relative intimacy.

3. Aversive Communication refers to behaviors that do not facilitate the formation of a relationship and that can be detrimental to the relationship.

Within each domain are a series of behaviors. These behaviors with their definitions and examples for use are described below. These codes are also separated by domain located at the end of the manual (see Appendix I).

Note: **Examples given were extracted and modified from simulated hostage situations. Remember, examples should be used to represent the function of the code and not used as a literal example of the code. Text in red highlights the portion of the interaction that represents the function of the code or the portion of the interaction to be coded.**

I. INSTRUMENTAL BEHAVIORS

1. Affirmative Statement (AFS)

Definition: Code AFS when the hostage negotiator or taker responds to a statement with an affirming response such as "yes", "yeah" or "ok". This would include short affirming statements made in response to simple questions.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of an **AFS** code:

a. The hostage taker uses affirming statements.

N: *Yeah... so you're saying that you want a radio?*

T: *Yeah. (AFS)*

Explanation: This example represents a simplistic but common occurrence of affirming statements. The hostage taker affirmed to the hostage negotiator that he wanted a radio with "Yeah".

2. Direct Assistance (DAS)

Definition: Code DAS when the hostage negotiator or taker makes a statement indicating an intention to provide assistance to the other person. The statement may appear as a question, a response to a plea for assistance, or may occur spontaneously as an offer to perform an action.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of a **DAS** code:

a. In the following example the hostage taker is requesting to have the heat turned on.

T: *It's really cold in here. We need heat. Can you get some heat on in here?*
N*: I'll talk to someone and see if we can get the heat turned on. (DAS)*

Explanation: In this example, the hostage negotiator provided direct assistance. The hostage taker wanted the heat turned on and the hostage negotiator stated an intention to assist the hostage taker.

MARGINAL EXAMPLE

The following is a marginal example that should not be recorded with a DAS code but with a **PRS (Persuasion)** code:

a. The hostage negotiator persuades the hostage taker to come out of the building and give up.

T: There is absolutely no way that I am going back to jail. Never.
N: You got to listen to me. If you come out now it's not that bad. You won't be in that long. You probably will have to go to jail for a little while but it's better than getting sent up for life or worse if you do anything else. Come

on man. Just come on out. (PSN)

Explanation: In this example the hostage negotiator was attempting to persuade or promote a change in behavior by convincing the hostage taker to come out and give up. This would not be recorded as direct assistance because no offer or promise of assistance was made.

3. Directive Statement (DRS)

Definition: Code DRS when the hostage negotiator or taker makes a command toward another individual to perform an action with no ultimatum. This would include direct instructions or commands to perform specific actions such as "walk to the window" or "open the door".

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of a **DRS** code:

a. The hostage negotiator directs the hostage taker to the window.

N: Move to the window to collect your food. (DRS)
T: Fine, but I can't see out from the window.

Explanation: In this example, the hostage negotiation made a direct statement to the hostage taker to move to the window to collect the food. There were no threats, stated or implied consequences or compromises made preceding or following the statement.

COUNTER EXAMPLES

The following is a counter example that should not be recorded with a DRS code but with a **DMD (Demand)** code:

a. The hostage taker demands that a car be given to him with a full tank of gas.

T: You getting that car? You getting that car?
N: We're working on getting that car.
T: You got fifteen minutes left for the car or this conversation is over! (DMD)

Explanation: This is not an example of a Directive Statement because a consequence followed the instruction to perform an action. Since a consequence followed the

directive statement, this example would be coded as a demand. Directive statements do not contain consequences.

The following is a counter example that should not be recorded with a DRS code but with a **REQ (Request)** code:

b. The hostage negotiator is making a simple request from the hostage taker.

N: Can you move closer to the window so we can see each other? (REQ)

T: I will have to think about that.

Explanation: In this example, the hostage negotiator requested that the hostage taker move closer to the window so they can see each other when communicating. The request was phrased as an inquiry, rather than as a statement, and the requested action was voluntary. Because of this, the example would not be recorded as a directive statement.

4. Disconfirming Statement (DCS)

Definition: Code DCS when the hostage negotiator or taker makes a statement to disconfirm a simple question. The speaker may respond to a question or request with short utterances such as "no", "not yet", or "nah".

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of a **DCS** code:

a. The hostage taker responds to the negotiator with a disconfirming statement.

N: *We were going to talk about letting those people go now. What about it?*

T: *Not yet. (DCS)*

Explanation: In this example the hostage taker did not affirm a request made by the hostage negotiator. A "Not yet" response was given. This response is a clear example of a disconfirming statement.

5. Fill Talk (FIT)

Definition: Code FIT when the hostage negotiator or taker makes a statement without situational relevance that initiates or maintains conversation. This would include conversation that is not relevant to the situation or to the participants in the conversation such as sports, weather, current events, etc.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of a **FIT** code:

a. The hostage taker starts the negotiation process.

T: *Can you believe this rain? (FIT)*
N: *Yeah it's really coming down. (FIT)*

Explanation: This example took place in the beginning of the negotiation process and was the first dialogue between the hostage taker and negotiator. There was no discussion of the hostage situation or the person, only the weather.

6. Impersonal Disclosure (IDC)

Definition: Code IDC when the hostage negotiator or taker provides information about a third party that does not include information about the speaker or the situation. This could include information about a hostage, family member, or friend.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of an **IDC** code:

a. The hostage taker discloses information about his mother and her location.

N: Why did your mother leave?
T: She had to go to work but she should be back soon. She takes the bus home. That's why you can't find her anywhere.

Explanation: In this example, the hostage negotiator inquired about the hostage taker's mother and the hostage taker disclosed information about his mother's location and her schedule. This is coded as impersonal disclosure because the disclosed information was about a third party: the hostage taker's mother.

MARGINAL EXAMPLE

The following is a marginal example that should not be recorded with IDC but with **SDC (Situational Disclosure):**

The following is an example of an **SDC** code:

a. The hostage taker discloses situational information.

N: I need to know what is going on in the building.
T: Everyone is ok. (SDC)
N: Ok, but how many is everyone?

Explanation: In this example, the hostage negotiator was asking for explicit situational information about the scene and the number of people in the building and was provided with the requested information. This example would not be recorded as impersonal disclosure because there was no discussion about a third party.

COUNTER EXAMPLE

The following is a counter example that should not be recorded with IDC but with PDC **(Personal Disclosure):**

The following are examples of a **PDC** code:

a. The hostage taker reveals information about his past.

N: You must feel that you're under a great deal of pressure.
T: No pressure, I've been trained for this kind of thing. (PDC)
N: What do you mean by training?

Explanation: In this example the hostage taker provides information about his personal history, specifically that he has received some kind of training. This example would not be recorded as impersonal disclosure because it was about the individual directly involved in the hostage event, not a third party individual.

7. Impersonal Inquiry (IIQ)

Definition: Code IIQ when the hostage negotiator or taker makes an inquiry about a third party that does not include information about the speaker or the situation. This can include questions regarding the hostages, family members, friends, or anything regarding a third party that does not include information about the situation or personal information from the listener.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of an **IIQ** code:

a. The hostage taker is seeking information about the number of police officers located outside the building.

N: *Ok, I'm going to have my partner wave to you from outside, and that will be a signal to you to throw your gun out the door.*
T: *What's your partner's name? (IIQ)*

Explanation: In this example, the hostage taker was inquiring about the hostage negotiator's partner, who was a third party not included in the conversation between the two.

MARGINAL EXAMPLE

The following is a marginal example that should not be recorded with an IIQ but with a **SIQ (Situational Inquiry):**

a. The hostage negotiator inquires about situational information.

T: All right, I'm ready to cooperate.
N: You told me that you have a hunting rifle; do you have any other weapons in there? (SIQ)

Explanation: In this example, the hostage negotiator requested explicit situational information. More specifically, the hostage negotiator requested information about weapons that were in the hostage taker's home. This would not be recorded as impersonal inquiry because the hostage negotiator was inquiring about the situation, not a third party.

COUNTER EXAMPLE

The following is a counter example that should not be recorded with an IIQ but with a **PIQ (Personal Inquiry):**

a. The hostage negotiator asks the hostage taker about his intended action.

T: *I'm done playing games. It's time to get serious.*
N: *What are you gonna do? (PIQ)*
T*: I'm going to take care of things.*

Explanation: In this example the hostage negotiator inquired about the actions of the hostage taker. This would be coded as a personal inquiry because the inquiry was about the intentions of the hostage taker.

8. Request (REQ)

Definition: Code REQ when the negotiator or taker makes a statement indicating a voluntary action that is desired by the individual. This would include appeals to the listener to perform an action with the recognition that the listener has the option of compliance or noncompliance.

EXAMPLE

The following are examples of a **REQ** code:

a. The hostage negotiator is making a simple request from the hostage taker.

N: Can you move closer to the window so we can see each other? (REQ)

T: I will have to think about that.

Explanation: In this example, the hostage negotiator requested that the hostage taker move closer to the window so they can see each other when communicating.

MARGINAL EXAMPLE

The following is a marginal example that should not be recorded with a REQ but with a **PLE (Plea for Assistance)** code:

a. The hostage taker asks the hostage negotiator for help in a nonspecific way.

T: *You gotta help me. I don't wanna die. (PLE)*

N: *You're not gonna die. Don't worry I'll talk you through this.*

Explanation: The hostage negotiator made a desperate plea for assistance that did not involve a specific request for action; it functioned primarily as a request for reassurance. This would not be recorded as a request because there was no specific request for action, only a plea for help.

9. Situational Disclosure (SDC)

Definition: Code SDC when the hostage negotiator or taker provides information about the situation alone. This can include statements about the surroundings, the hostages as a group, or other information regarding the situation that does not include personal information about the speaker.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of an **SDC** code:

a. The hostage taker discloses situational information.

N: I need to know what is going on in the building.
T: Everyone is ok. (SDC)
N: Ok, but how many is everyone?

Explanation: In this example, the hostage negotiator was asking for explicit situational information about the scene and the number of people in the building and was provided with the requested information.

MARGINAL EXAMPLE

The following is a marginal example that should not be recorded with a SDC but with **IDC (Impersonal Disclosure)** code:

a. The hostage taker discloses information about his mother and her location.

N: Why did your mother leave?
T: She had to go to work but she should be back soon. She takes the bus home. That's why you can't find her anywhere.

Explanation: In this example, the hostage taker disclosed information about his mother and her location. This would not be recorded as a situational inquiry because the type of disclose was not relevant to the situation but rather to a third party associated with the hostage taker. In this case, the third party was the hostage taker's mother.

10. Situational Inquiry (SIQ)

Definition: Code SIQ when the hostage negotiator or taker makes an inquiry regarding information specific to the present situation. This can include information regarding the hostage group, location, surroundings and weapons.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of an **SIQ** code:

a. The hostage negotiator inquires about situational information.

T: All right, I'm ready to cooperate.
N: You told me that you have a hunting rifle; do you have any other weapons in there?

Explanation: In this example, the hostage negotiator requested explicit situational information. More specifically, the hostage negotiator requested information about weapons that were in the hostage taker's possession.

11. Uncertainty (UCT)

Definition: Code UCT when the hostage negotiator or taker makes statements indicating doubt regarding decisions, feelings or actions related to the current situation. This can include non-committal responses using words such as "maybe" or "unsure".

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of an **UCT** code:

a. The hostage taker displays uncertainty toward a question posed by the hostage negotiator.

N: You want this to be over, right? You want things to go back to the way they were before?
T: Maybe, I don't know. I'm not sure what I want anymore

Explanation: In this example, the hostage negotiator asked the hostage taker if he wanted the siege to end. The hostage taker displayed uncertainty toward his decision to end the siege by responding with "I don't know" and "I'm not sure".

II. RELATIONAL BEHAVIORS

12. Bargaining (BRG)

Definition: Code BRG when the hostage negotiator or taker proposes an action that accommodates the needs of either one or both parties and where the offer is only needed by one party.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of a **BRG** code.

a. The hostage taker makes a request for food and drink. The hostage negotiator makes a deal with the hostage taker to release a hostage in exchange for food.

T: *I am starting to get hungry. I will let the girl out but I want some food and something to drink?*
N: *I'll tell you what; I will get you some food for the little girl, deal? (BRG)*
T: *Fine.*

Explanation: In this example of bargaining, only one party altered their request but both parties benefited. During the bargaining, each party requested something but only one party was required to alter the original request. The negotiator agreed to provide food in exchange for the previously agreed upon release of a hostage.

MARGINAL EXAMPLE

The following is a marginal example that should not be recorded with a BRG but with a **CPS (Compromise)** code:

a. The hostage taker makes a request for food and drink. The hostage negotiator makes a deal with the hostage taker to release a hostage in exchange for food.

T: I am starting to get hungry. Do you think I could get some food and something to drink?
N: I'll tell you what; if you release just one of the hostages I will get you something to drink, deal? (CPS)
T: Yes, deal.

Explanation: In this example a compromise was made between both parties. During the negotiation, each party requested something and both received their desired outcomes. The negotiator was willing to give the hostage taker food and drink and the hostage taker agreed to release one of the hostages. This is not coded as bargaining because both parties had to give something up to achieve their desired goal.

13. Compromise (CPS)

Definition: Code CPS when the hostage negotiator or taker proposes an action that accommodates the needs of both parties and usually involves a partial alteration of the original demand or request.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of a **CPS** code.

a. The hostage taker makes a request for food and drink. The hostage negotiator makes a deal with the hostage taker to release a hostage in exchange for food.

T: I am starting to get hungry. Do you think I could get some food or something to drink?
N: I'll tell you what; if you release just one of the hostages I will get you something to drink, deal? (CPS)
T: Yes, deal.

Explanation: In this example a compromise was made between both parties. During the negotiation, each party requested something and both received their desired outcomes. The negotiator was willing to give the hostage taker food and the hostage taker agreed to release one of the hostages.

MARGINAL EXAMPLE

The following is a marginal example that should not be recorded with a CPS but with a **BRG (Bargaining)** code:

a. The hostage taker makes a request for food and drink. The hostage negotiator makes a deal with the hostage taker to release a hostage in exchange for food.

T: *I am starting to get hungry. I will let the girl out but I want some food and something to drink?*

N*: I'll tell you what; I will get you some food for the little girl, deal? (BRG)*

T: *Fine.*

Explanation: In this example of bargaining, only one party altered their request but both parties benefited. During the bargaining, each party requested something but only one party was required to alter the original request. The negotiator agreed to provide food and drink in exchange for the previously agreed upon release of a hostage.

14. De-escalating Talk Behavior (DET)

Definition: Code DET when the hostage negotiator or taker attempts to resume facilitative reciprocal conversation in which each party is responding to one another. Specifically, providing assurance through calming statements.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of a **DET** code:

a. The hostage negotiator tries to calm the hostage taker when the hostage takers verbal behaviors become agitated.

T: What the hell is going on out there? You better not be trying anything!
N: Now just calm down, there's nothing going on. Just stay cool. (DET)

Explanation: In this example, the hostage taker became agitated and used calming statements. The hostage taker was out of control and required calming statements.

COUNTER EXAMPLE

The following is a counter example that should not be recorded with a DET but with a **THT (Threat):**

The following are examples of a **THT** code:

a. The hostage taker makes a clear threat to the negotiator.

N: *C'mon John, you can do it. Just let the ladies out.*

T: *I'm sending them out messed up. (THT)*

Explanation: In this example the hostage negotiator requested that the hostage taker release hostages, but the hostage taker responded with a statement indicating intent to

perform harm. This would not be recorded as de-escalating talk because there was a threat made to the hostage negotiator. De-escalating talk is the opposite of a threat, it is used to remove the behaviors that follow a threat or other behaviors that breaks apart reciprocal conversation.

15. Empathy (EPY)

Definition: Code EPY when the hostage negotiator or taker makes a statement indicating identification with or an understanding of the emotional state of the opposing person.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of an **EPY** code:

a. The hostage negotiator makes a statement indicating an understanding of the hostage taker.

T: I am not gonna turn myself in, I'm scared. I don't want to go back to that place.
N: Look, I know you're scared. I can understand why you don't want to go back to prison. (EPY)

Explanation: In this example, the hostage negotiator made a statement about what the hostage taker must have been feeling. This statement could serve to build a rapport.

COUNTER EXAMPLE

The following is a counter example that should not be recorded with an EPY but with a **S-EPY (Situational Empathy)** code:

a. In this example, the hostage negotiator displays situational empathy toward the hostages.

T: Just give me what I asked for and I'll let her out.
N: You have to understand that she's very scared right now and she's in pain. She needs help (S-EPY)

Explanation: In this example, the hostage taker made a statement that he would let a hostage out it he was given what he asked for and the hostage negotiator displayed empathy toward the situation and the fear experienced by the hostage. This would not be recorded as empathy alone because the empathy was directed toward the situation not the emotional state of the hostage taker himself.

16. Expressive: Relational type (EXP-R)

Definition: Code EXP-R when the hostage negotiator or taker makes a statement that indicates the emotional state of the speaker without disclosing information or opinions, such as crying or sighing.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of an **EXP** code:

a. The hostage taker responds to the hostage negotiator with a harsh statement.

N: Come on now, you trust me don't you?
T: [Crying]. (EXP-R)

Explanation: In this example, the hostage negotiator inquired about the level of trust between the two and the hostage taker responded with crying. This would be recorded as expressive, relational type because the response by the hostage taker reflected his emotional state with crying.

17. Personal Disclosure (PDC)

Definition: Code PDC when the hostage negotiator or taker provides personal information that would otherwise remain unknown. Disclosure can be voluntary and can include information regarding personal history, motivations, or emotions.

EXAMPLE

The following are examples of a **PDC** code:

a. The hostage taker reveals information about his past.

N: You must feel that you're under a great deal of pressure.
T: No pressure, I've been trained for this kind of thing. (PDC)
N: What do you mean by training?

Explanation: In this example the hostage taker provides information about his personal history, specifically that he has received some kind of training.

b. The hostage taker reveals his use of drugs prior to taking hostages.

N: Have you used drugs today? The only way I can help is if you tell me the truth.
T: I have a problem sometime with drugs but today I only smoked some. (PDC)
N: What did you smoke?

Explanation: In this example the hostage taker provided information about his previous and current drug use.

COUNTER EXAMPLE

The following is a counter example that should not be recorded with an PDC but with a **PIQ (Personal Inquiry)** code:

The following is an example of a **PIQ** code:

a. The hostage negotiator asks the hostage taker about his intended action.

T: I'm done playing games. It's time to get serious.
N: What are you going to do? (PIQ)
T: I'm going to take care of things.

Explanation: In this example the hostage negotiator inquired about the actions of the hostage taker. This would not be recorded as personal disclosure because there was not disclosure of information, only a inquiry about information.

18. Personal Inquiry (PIQ)

Definition: Code PIQ when the hostage negotiator or taker makes an inquiry regarding personal information that is directed to the other person. Personal inquiries include questions concerning the emotions, thoughts, intentions, desires, actions, and personal history of the other person.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of a **PIQ** code:

a. The hostage negotiator asks the hostage taker about his intended action.

T: I'm done playing games. It's time to get serious.
N: What are you going to do? (PIQ)
T: I'm going to take care of things.

Explanation: In this example the hostage negotiator inquired about the actions of the hostage taker.

COUNTER EXAMPLE

The following is a counter example that should not be recorded with a PIQ but with a **PDC (Personal Disclosure)** code:

The following are examples of a **PDC** code:

a. The hostage taker reveals information about his past.

N: You must feel that you're under a great deal of pressure.
T: No pressure, I've been trained for this kind of thing. (PDC)
N: What do you mean by training?

Explanation: In this example the hostage taker provides information about his personal history, specifically that he has received some kind of training. This would not be recorded as a personal inquiry because no information inquired about.

19. Persuasion (PSN)

Definition: Code PSN when the hostage negotiator or taker makes statements to persuade the opposing individual to perform actions or behaviors. These statements promote a change in behavior or thoughts through statements such as a suggestion for action.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of a **PRS** code:

a. The hostage negotiator persuades the hostage taker to come out of the building and give up.

T: There is absolutely no way that I am going back to jail. Never.
N: You got to listen to me. If you come out now it's not that bad. You won't be in that long. You probably will have to go to jail for a little while. But it's better than getting sent up for life or worse if you do anything else. Come on man. Just come on out. (PRS)

Explanation: In this example the hostage negotiator was attempting to persuade or promote a change in behavior by convincing the hostage taker to come out and surrender.

COUNTER EXAMPLE

The following is a counter example that should not be recorded with a PSN but with a **THT (Threat)** code:

The following are examples of a **THT** code:

a. The hostage taker makes a clear threat to the negotiator.

N: *C'mon John, you can do it. Just let the ladies out.*

T: *I'm sending them out messed up. (THT)*

Explanation: In this example the hostage negotiator requested that the hostage taker release hostages, but the hostage taker responded with a statement indicating intent to perform harm. This would not be recorded as persuasion because there was no attempt to promote a change in behavior.

20. Plea for assistance (PLE)

Definition: Code PLE when the hostage negotiator or taker requests unspecified assistance from the other person.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of a **PLE** code:

a. The hostage taker asks the hostage negotiator for help in a nonspecific way.

T: You gotta help me. I don't wanna die. (PLE)
N: You're not gonna die. Don't worry I'll talk you through this.

Explanation: The hostage negotiator made a desperate plea for assistance that did not involve a specific request for action; it functioned primarily as a request for reassurance.

COUNTER EXAMPLE

The following is a counter example that should not be recorded with a PLE but with a **DMD (Demand)** code:

The following is an example of a **DMD** made by a hostage taker

a. The hostage taker demands that a car be given to him with a full tank of gas.

T: You getting that car? You getting that car?
N: We're working on getting that car.
T: You got fifteen minutes left for the car or this conversation is over! (DMD)

Explanation: In this example a demand was made for a car, but the car had not yet been delivered. There was a consequence following the demand, but no threat was

made. This would not be recorded as a plea for assistance because no assistance was requested and because a consequence followed the request.

21. Praise (PRS)

Definition: Code PRS when the hostage negotiator or taker makes a statement indicating approval of the other person's thoughts or actions.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of a **PRS** code:

a. Hostage negotiator praises the hostage taker.

N: That was good of you to ask for water for the hostages. (PRS)
T: Well, I'm not really an evil person

Explanation: In this example the hostage negotiator praised the hostage taker for asking for water for the hostages. This is a clear example of a statement of approval made during dialogue.

COUNTER EXAMPLE

The following is a counter example that should not be recorded with a PRS but with an **EPY (Empathy)** code:
The following is an example of an **EPY** code:

a. The hostage negotiator makes a statement indicating an understanding of the hostage taker.

T: I am not gonna turn myself in, I'm scared. I don't want to go back to that place.
N: Look, I know you're scared. I can understand why you don't want to go back to prison. (EPY)

Explanation: In this example, the hostage negotiator made a statement about what the hostage taker must have been feeling. This statement could serve to build a rapport. This would not be recorded as praise because the hostage negotiator did not display approval but understanding of the hostage takers feelings.

22. Reflective Statement Behavior (RFS)

Definition: Code RFS when the hostage negotiator or taker responds to a statement of personal or situational disclosure through paraphrasing or reiteration. This occurs when the speaker paraphrases or reiterates the immediate previous statement made by the other person. A reflective statement may be used to build a rapport through the demonstration of understanding or serve to clarify a statement made by the other person.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of a **RFS** code:

a. In this example, the hostage negotiator paraphrases the statement of the hostage taker.

T: I'll walk right out of here right now if you bring that bitch to me.
N: Sounds like you do not like your wife very much. (RFS)
T: That's right.

Explanation: In this example the hostage negotiator paraphrased the statement made by the hostage taker, making a reflective statement about his feelings toward his wife.

23. Situational Empathy (S-EPY)

Definition: Code S-EPY when the hostage negotiator or taker makes a statement indicating identification with or an understanding of the situation, such as the emotional state of the hostages or third parties.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of a **S-EPY** code:

a. In this example, the hostage negotiator displays situational empathy toward the hostages.

> *T: Just give me what I asked for and I'll let her out.*
> *N: You have to understand that she's very scared right now and she's in pain. She needs help. (S-EPY)*

Explanation: In this example, the hostage taker said he would let a hostage out if he was given what he asked for and the hostage negotiator displayed empathy toward the hostage and her fear.

24. Self-Pity Behavior (S-PTY)

Definition: Code S-PTY when the hostage negotiator or taker shows sorrow for himself or herself. This would include statements of worthlessness about the self.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of a **S-PTY** code:

a. The hostage taker makes a statement about his feelings of inadequacy.

N: All right, just follow my instructions and we can end this without anyone getting hurt.
T: It's no use. I can't do anything. Otherwise this never would have happened. (S-PTY)

Explanation: In this example the hostage taker indicated feelings of self-pity by focusing on his belief that he cannot properly manage the situation. This is a value judgment about the self and is a type of disclosure.

III AVERSIVE BEHAVIORS

25. Avoidance Behavior (AVD)

Definition: Code AVD when the hostage negotiator or taker shows action of eluding or withdrawing from the topic of conversation. Specifically, the person may refuse to respond to the question without answering it, change the topic, ignore the statement, or respond with silence.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of an **AVD** code:

a. The hostage negotiator tries to reason with the hostage taker and to convince him to let the hostages go. The hostage taker then avoids the dialogue.

> *N: I can tell you are a nice person. You don't want to hurt anyone, come on and let those people go, huh?*
>
> *T: It is really cold in here. Really cold. (AVD)*

Explanation: In this example the hostage negotiator requested the hostage taker release the hostages but the hostage taker avoided the dialogue by changing the topic.

26. Criticism Behavior (CRT)

Definition: Code CRT When the hostage negotiator or taker makes statements indicating disapproval of the other person. This includes statements of disapproval regarding decisions, feelings, past experiences or the current situation.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of a **CRT** code:

a. The hostage negotiator displayed criticism toward the comment made by the hostage taker.

> *T: It would just be easier if I weren't around anymore. You know, permanently.*
> *N: That's a stupid idea and I think you should just drop it.*

Explanation: In this example, the hostage negotiator made a critical response to the hostage taker when he made a comment regarding killing himself. This is a clear example of disapproval of the ideas of the hostage taker. There was no empathy toward the hostage taker at all.

27. Demand Behavior (DMD)

Definition: Code DMD when the hostage negotiator or taker makes an authoritative request where a specific consequence is stated.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of a **DMD** made by a hostage taker

a. The hostage taker demands that a car be given to him with a full tank of gas.

T: You getting that car? You getting that car?
N: We're working on getting that car.
T: You got fifteen minutes left for the car or this conversation is over! (DMD)

Explanation: In this example a demand was made for a car, but the car had not yet been delivered. There was a consequence following the demand, but no threat was made. This code and example is distinguished from request because requests do not have consequences. This code and example is distinguished from a compromise because there was no bargaining. The hostage taker demanded a car, but did not provide anything in return. When a compromise is made, both parties give something up to achieve resolution.

MARGINAL EXAMPLES

The following is a marginal example that should not be recorded with a DMD but with a **REQ (Request)** code:

a. The hostage negotiator is making a simple request from the hostage taker.

N: Can you move closer to the window so we can see each other? (REQ)

T: I will have to think about that.

Explanation: In this example, the hostage negotiator requested that the hostage taker move closer to the window so they can see each other when communicating. The action was completely voluntary and there was no consequence following the request. Because no consequence followed the request, this would not be recorded as a demand, but as a request.

The following is a marginal example of a **DRS** code:

b. The hostage negotiator directs the hostage taker to the window.

N: Move to the window to collect your food? (DRS)
T: Fine, but I can see you.

Explanation: In this example, the hostage negotiation made a direct statement to the hostage taker to move to the window to collect the food. There were no threats, consequences or compromises made preceding or following the statement.

COUNTER EXAMPLE

The following is a counter example and should not be recorded with a DRS but with a **THT (threat)** code:

a. The hostage taker makes a clear threat to the negotiator.

N: C'mon John, you can do it. Just let the ladies out.

T: I'm sending them out messed up. (THT)

Explanation: In this example the hostage negotiator requested that the hostage taker release hostages, but the hostage taker responded with a clear and direct threat. This could not be recorded as a demand, because no requests were made, only a threat.

28. Distrust Behavior (DST)

Definition: Code DST when the hostage negotiator or taker indicates doubt regarding the other person's statement. Specifically seen through an accusation of lying or a statement of non-belief regarding the statement made by the other person.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of a **DST** code:

a. The hostage negotiator noticed the lack of trust with the hostage taker.

T: Get me some blankets and we'll talk about the hostages.

N: You said we'd talk about the hostages when you got the pizza. It's been two hours and nothing. (DST)

Explanation: In this example, the hostage negotiator commented on his lack of trust. The hostage taker stated that he would talk about the hostages once he got the pizza, but he still has not spoken about them and is now requesting blankets.

29. Expressive: Aversive Type (EXP-A)

Definition: Code EXP-A when the hostage negotiator or taker makes a statement that indicates the emotional state of the speaker without disclosing information or opinions, such as cursing.

EXAMPLE

The following is an example of an **EXP** code:

a. The hostage taker responds to the hostage negotiator with a harsh statement.

N: Come on now, you trust me don't you?
T: Go to hell asshole. (EXP-A)

Explanation: In this example, the hostage negotiator inquired about the level of trust between the two and the hostage taker responded with a harsh statement. This would be recorded as expressive because the response by the hostage taker reflected his emotional state with cursing.

30. Threat (THT)

Definition: Code THT when the hostage negotiator or taker implies or states an intention to perform an action such as harm.

EXAMPLE

The following are examples of a **THT** code:

a. The hostage taker makes a clear threat to the negotiator.

N: *C'mon John, you can do it. Just let the ladies out.*

T: *I'm sending them out messed up. (THT)*

Explanation: In this example the hostage negotiator requested that the hostage taker release hostages, but the hostage taker responded with a statement indicating intent to perform harm.

MARGINAL EXAMPLES

The following is a marginal example and should not be recorded with a THT but with a **DMD (demand)** code:

a. The hostage taker demands that a car be given to him with a full tank of gas.

T: You getting that car? You getting that car?
N: We're working on getting that car.
T: You got fifteen minutes left for the car or this conversation is over! (DMD)

Explanation: In this example a demand was made for a car, but the car had not yet been delivered. Demands can include a statement intention to do harm and can appear as threats, but threats do not include requests.

b. The following is a marginal example and should not be recorded with a DMD but with a **EXP-A (Expressive: Aversive Type)** code:

N: Come on now, you trust me don't you?
T: Go to hell asshole.

Explanation: In this example, the hostage negotiator inquired about the level of trust between the two and the hostage taker responded with a harsh statement. This would be recorded as expression because the response by the hostage taker reflected his emotional state with cursing. This would not be recorded as a threat because no intention to perform harm to the hostage negotiator was stated.