Interference between cues in human contingency learning: A review, new data and a potential general explanation based on propositional models

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Interference between cues (IbC)

Design

I	Phase 1	Phase2	Test
Same Outcome (Experimental)	A → O1 C → O3	B → O1 c → O3	A → ?
Different Outcome (Control)	A → O 1 C → O3	B → O2 C → O3	A → ?

IbC: Number of responses to O1 lower in the Experimental than in the Control Group

A potential general explanation based on top-down processes

- Priors and beliefs can top-down modulate bottom-up HCL (e.g., Waldmann, Hagmayer & Blaisdell, 2006).
- Obtaining IbC would requires:
- Univocity of the inverse correspondence between the set of cues and the set of outcomes, that is...
 - outcome-cue univocity
- If new data is inconsistent with this belief, cognizers try to incorporate the new knowledge without changing the *outcome-cue univocity* prior. For this...
 - participants can use the context as logic gate

A potential general explanation based on top-down processes

If we apply these assumptions to a IbC design...

- In the first learning phase [Cue A \rightarrow O1]
- 1. Given an Outcome O1, then Cue A must be true.
- In the second learning phase [Cue B \rightarrow O1]
- 2. Given an Outcome O1, then Cue B must be true.

If possible, participants use the context as a logical gate

Inconsistency

3. In Context X: Given an Outcome O1, then Cue A must be true In context Y: Given an Outcome O1, then Cue B must be true

- Previous experiments have shown that IbC is easier to obtain in diagnostic causal learning task (from Effects to Causes, Cobos et al., 2007; Luque et al., 2008).
- Previous experiments have shown that IbC is easier to obtain in tasks with multiple response options easily distinguishable from each other (Luque et al., 2008; 2009; 2012).


- Diagnostic task effect

- Previous experiments have shown that IbC is easier to obtain in diagnostic causal learning task (from Effects to Causes, Cobos et al., 2007; Luque et al., 2008).
- In this task, priors about how causal relations work facilitate outcome-cue univocity (Waldmann & Holyoal, 1992):
- > All other things held constant, given a Cause the Effect must be true.

• • •

In the first learning phase [Effect A \rightarrow Cause 1]

- Given the Cause O1, then Effect A must be true.
- In the second learning phase [Effect B → Cause 1]
- Given the Cause O1, then Effect B must be true.



- Multiple response options effect




3 response options

NO CAUSAL COVER STORY



Go/No Go

- Multiple response options effect




- Multiple response options effect

It would be easier to assume that the cues do not share the outcome when outcomes are easily distinguishable.



- Multiple response options effect

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- Overview

- First experiment: To test the effect of the outcomecue univocity belief in the lbC.
- Second experiment: To test whether the top-down process engage in IbC is

- Experiment 1. Univocity belief

■ In the 'Biunivocity group', we introduced trials than contradicted the outcome-cue univocity belief, in a non separable way: they could not use the context as a logic gate.

Group	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Test
Biunivocity group	D \rightarrow O3 (x10) F \rightarrow O3 (x10) C \rightarrow O2 (x10)	$A \rightarrow O1 (x10)$ $C \rightarrow O2 (x10)$	$B \rightarrow O1 (\times 10)$ $C \rightarrow O2 (\times 10)$	Υś
Univocity group	$D \rightarrow O3 (\times 20)$ $C \rightarrow O2 (\times 10)$	$A \rightarrow O1 (\times 10)$ $C \rightarrow O2 (\times 10)$	$B \rightarrow O1 (\times 10)$ $C \rightarrow O2 (\times 10)$	Υś

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It is not possible to keep the outcome-cue univocity belief

- Experiment 1. Univocity belief


Univocity N = 32Biunivocity N = 29

DV = O1- (O2+O3)
$$\rightarrow$$
 t(59) = 2.1; p = 0.038

DV = O1 (correct responses)
Univocity (Mean) = 54
Biunivocity (Mean) = 69
t(59) = 1.8; p = 0.076

DV = O2 Univocity (Mean) = 21 Biunivocity (Mean) = 6 t(59) = 2.2; p = 0.034

DV = O3t(59) = 0.5; p > 0.5



- Experiment 1. Univocity belief

- The 'Univocity' treatment produce:
 - Less correct responses in the Univocity than in the Biunivocity group.
 - More incorrect responses in the Univocity then in the Biunivocity group.

Why was the differences in the O2 number of responses (and not in O3)?

Outcome-cue univocity: The O3 had a related Cue (Cue C) and this relation was valid in the test context. Thus, the only 'free' outcome in the test context was O2.

Test

Univocity group

D \rightarrow O3 (x20) A \rightarrow O1 (x10) B \rightarrow O1 (x10) C \rightarrow O2 (x10) C \rightarrow O2 (x10)

A 01? O2?

O3?

IbC

- IbC as a consequence of
- 1. To assume a prior (univocity)....and
- 2. To change this prior (context-dependency).
- What kind of cognitive process is computing these operations?
- Propositional reasoning: A good candidate.
 - Top-down.
 - Flexible: Priors can be assumed/changed via instructions (Cobos et al., 2007) or via feedback-driven learning.

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 - Top-down.
 - Flexible: Priors can be assumed via instructions (Cobos et al., 2007). Also, these priors can changed via feedback-driven learning (Experiment 1).
- Experiment 2's aim: To directly assess the propositional processes' engagement in the IbC effect.

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 - IbC, second learning stage: Instructional vs. Trial-bytrial experienced.

- Experiment 2. Propositional processes

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 - IbC, second learning stage: Instructional vs. Trial-by-trial experienced.

Predictions:

- Associative models: More IbC in the Trial-by-trial condition (associative models are silent about instructions, though).
- Propositional theory: The same o more IbC in the Instructional condition.

Group		Phase 1	Phase 2	Test
Instructional —	Experimental	$A \rightarrow O1 (x10)$ $C \rightarrow O3 (x10)$	'Hereafter, given the Cue B, respond O1'	Υś
	Control	A→O1 (x10) C→O3 (x10)	'Hereafter, given the Cue B, respond O2'	Υś
Trial-by-trial —	Experimental	A→O1 (×10) C→O3 (×10)	$B \rightarrow O1 (\times 10)$ $C \rightarrow O3 (\times 10)$	Υś
	Control	$A \rightarrow O1 (x10)$ $C \rightarrow O3 (x10)$	$B \rightarrow O2 (\times 10)$ $C \rightarrow O3 (\times 10)$	Υś


- Experiment 2. Propositional processes

- In addition to the usual test (Time for responding = 5 s; unwarned), we an additional test without time pressure (Time for responding = ∞) and with a previous instruction warned that a test was next.
- This test included three trials one per each Cue.


> This test had to be very sensitive measuring the outputs of propositional reasoning processes.

Two different measures: Test-5s and Test-∞

- Experiment 2. Results Test-5s



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
■Trial-by-trial ■Instructions

- Experiment 2. Results Test∞

T-b-T	Exp N = 14	
	Con N = 12	
Instr	Exp N = 12	
	Con N = 11	

Instr: F(1, 45) < 1

lbC * Instr: F(1, 45) = 2.9; p=.09



- Experiment 2. Results Test∞

DV = O1 (correct responses)

IbC: F(1, 45) = 30; p<.001*

Instr: F(1, 45) = 2.5; p=.12

lbC * Instr: F(1, 45) = 5.8; p=.02*

DV = O2


lbC: F(1, 45) = 6.9; p=.01*

Instr: F(1, 45) < 1

IbC * Instr: F(1, 45) < 1

DV = O3

Nothing significant (means < 2)



- Experiment 2. Discussion

- Manipulation of the format of the interfering information (second learning stage).
- IbC in both conditions (Trial-by-trial and Instructions).
 - Additionally, a main effect of IbC in the number of responses to O2: more responses in the Experimental groups.
- The IbC was larger in the Instructions group.
- > Compatible with a propositional account of IbC.

General discussion

- **Experiment 1.** Previously to the beginning of the IbC design, we taught our participants that outcome-cue univocity was not a valid belief. As a result we obtained less interference.
- > Top-down modulation produces the IbC effect.
- Experiment 2. The IbC effect was larger when the interfering information is provided via instructions than the usual trial-by-trial treatment.
- > Top-down modulation, that is compatible with a propositional account, produces the lbC effect.

A (mini)review

- Main effects related with IbC:
- 1. The IbC itself.
- 2. Contextual effects.
- 3. Diagnostic causal learning effect.
- 4. Number of response options effect.

- 1.- E.g. Matute & Pineño (1998a,b).
- 2.- Luque et al. (2010); Matute & Pineño (1998a,b); Ortega y Matute (2000); Pineño et al. (2000); Pineño y Matute (2000).
- 3.- Cobos et al. (2007); Luque et al. (2008).
- 4.- Luque et al. (in preparation).

A (mini)review

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The explanation of IbC defended in this presentation could account all these effects.

A (mini)review

- Main effects related with IbC:
- 1. The IbC itself.
- 2. Contextual effects.
- 3. Diagnostic causal learning effect.
- 4. Number of response options effect.
- > ...and the responses to O2 in the experimental group!

The explanation of IbC defended in this presentation could account all these effects.

Many thanks!















References

■ Slide 2. Waldmann, M. R., Hagmayer, Y, & Blaisdell, A. P. (2006). Beyond the information given: Causal models in learning and reasoning. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 15 (6), 307-311.


Additional slides

The plants learning task explained

Diagnostic causal learning task

Diagnostic causal learning task:
LEARNING FROM EFFECTS (cues) to CAUSES (outcomes).

- The "plants" learning task
 - Cues: Rectangules of color
 - Outcomes: Different plants




Diagnostic causal learning task

Poisoned plants cover history

LEARNING FROM EFFECTS (cues) to CAUSES (outcomes).

- The participants had to learn the origin of a series of poisoning after eating different plants and had to decide if an antidote should be administered.
- Each plant caused a particular pH in the patients' saliva.
- There were three types of plants: a **POISONOUS** plant for which an antidote was effective; a **STRANGE** plant for which the antidote was in fact poisoning and a **HARMLESS** plant for which the antidote had no effect.
- On each trial, then, the participants had to decide the dose of antidote administered.



Points were the amount of antidote provided to the patient...

O1: POISONOUS plant for which an antidote was effective Participants gained the points.

O2: HARMLESS plant for which the antidote had no effect. Participants didn't gain or lose.

O3: STRANGE plant for which the antidote was in fact poisoning. Participants losed the points

	Phase 1	Phase2	Test
Same Outcome (Interference)	A → O1 C → O3	B → O1 c → o3	∀⇒ś
Different Outcome (Control)	A → O1 C → O3	B → O2 c → O3	∀ → ś

It was expected that participants pressed the space bar as much as possible in the Test Phase

