


UM Libraries Depository



103304909009





This Thesis Has Been

MICROFILMED

Negative No. T- 263

Form 26

THE THEORY OF SOCIAL UNITY

by

Claud Franklin Clayton, A. B.

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

in the

GRADUATE SCHOOL

of the

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

1916

*A. H. Brewer
A. H. Brewer
A. H. Brewer*

I.

THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF SOCIETY

The evolutionary origin of man doubtless lies somewhere in the middle or late miocene. (1) It is commonly held, and is doubtless true, that this remote mutant type of the human stock lived in groups. The requirements of reproduction, defense, and food getting, according to Professor Ellwood, made the life-process "essentially social from the start." (2) Group life was fundamentally a biological requirement. Hence, the reproductive process comes to figure as the very foundation of society or, again to quote Professor Ellwood, it is "the keystone of the arch in general sociology." (3) It appears, therefore, that the life-process was essentially social from the start, because in at least the fundamental biologic phases, the activities of individuals were necessarily coordinated. On this purely biological level, then, society first appears. (4)

But society developed with reference to subjective, as well as objective, foci. . (5) So the long period of infancy reacted upon the reproductive process to generate sympathy. For, as stated by Professor Ross: "Those lacking

(1) Cf. H. F. Osborn, Men of the Old Stone Age, Chap. I.

(2) Cf. C. A. Ellwood, Sociology in its Psychological Aspects, p. 125.

(3) Ibid., p. 128

(4) Cf. Professor Ellwood's statement that "Society is the co-ordination of the activities of individuals." loc. cit. p. 146.

(5) Cf. E. A. Ross, Foundations of Sociology, p. 61.

in this quality do not leave as many children as the self-sacrificing, and so are crowded out and replaced." (6)

The human species was thus forced into co-ordinated and harmonious relationships in carrying on the life-process. Harmonious adjustment between individuals was at a premium, and in consequence gregarious instincts emerged (7) which manifest themselves "as craving for the presence of others, distress at being left alone, nostalgia after separation from mates, and a capacity for social pleasure." (8) To this phase of human nature Professor Ross applies the term sociability. (9) Add to these two elementary traits of human nature the sense of justice (10) and resentment (11) and we have, according to Professor Ross, the elements which "are competent, under favorable circumstances to work out by themselves a true, natural order, that is to say, an order without design or art." (12) This conception of the "natural order" or primary phase of society, with slight modifications here and there, is quite well received among those sociologists who speak with authority in these premises. Professor Ellwood's view of the origin of society runs much to the same effect. Starting with the purely objective requirements of reproduction, defense and food getting, Professor Ellwood finds that in the mediation of these (group) activities

Ibid., Social control, p. 7. (6)
(7) Cf. Arthur Fairbanks, Introduction to Sociology, pp.88-89.
(8) Cf. E. A. Ross, loc. cit., p. 14.
(9) Ibid., Chap. III.
(10) Ibid., p. 23.
(11) Ibid., p. 37.
(12) Ibid., p. 41.

consciousness appeared. Hence, mind is social in character, because it developed as an instrument for carrying on group life. (13) The reproductive process, however, is the fundamental basis of association. (14) Professor Ellwood accordingly finds the family relation to be the natural order or primary phase of society. (15) The necessity of carrying on the reproductive process in the family relation thus gave rise to those altruistic and sympathetic impulses which lie at the root of man's social life. (16)

What comes into view, then, as the essential foundation of human society is the emergence of a group-nature (17) or social mind, (18) by which men are at once endowed with the capacity to associate and are disposed to find pleasure in the process.

Biologically, therefore, as concisely stated by Professor Ellwood, society originates from the fact that "the development of species and groups under similar biologic conditions gives rise..... to such organic and mental similarity that their individual units respond in like ways to like stimuli; and that this organic similarity is undoubtedly the fact that makes possible co-ordinated social activity." (19)

The purely biologic type of association ("animal society") is so held to be the precursor of the human type. (20) The primary phase of human society (21) thus appears as the product of pre-human co-operative activity. This co-operative activity, as before indicated, took effect primarily in reproduction, but secondarily, also, in the process of

(13) Cf. C. A. Ellwood, loc. cit., p. 130.

(14) loc. cit., p. 128. (15) loc. cit., p. 129. (16) loc. cit.,

(17) Cf. Charles H. Cooley, Social Organization, p. 135.

Chap. III. (18) Cf. G. E. Vincent, The Social

defense and food getting. So far, then, we are able to distinguish two types of co-operative (social) activity. The first of these is characteristic of the animal period, in which the reactions are mainly organic or instinctive. This gives rise to the instinctive (animal) type of society. The second type appeared with the emergence of the "group mind" and gave rise to the primary type of human co-operation. This type is characterized by the foundation of "spontaneous" groups and it "brought in the reign of peaceful pursuits and the beginning of widened communal interests." (22) But, according to Professor Giddings, this primary phase of social organization is to be regarded as the product of "nothing but the spontaneous action of resembling and sympathetic minds pursuing their own immediate practical interests." (23) The circumstance that individuals in the pursuit of their "immediate practical interests" spontaneously form groups receives its explanation from the fact that individual minds are "resembling" and "sympathetic." Individual minds are co-ordinated to start with. "The real reason for the existence of such co-ordinations, or co-adaptations," Professor Ellwood explains, "must always be found in the carrying on of a common life process by a group of individuals, else they would not exist." (24)

Obviously, however, society presents something more than the phenomena of these "spontaneous" or "primary" groups. So Professor Giddings continues: "When, however, these spon-

Mind and Education, pp. 18-19.
(19) loc. cit., p. 146; Cf., also, F. H. Giddings, Descriptive and Historical Sociology, p. 8. (20) Cf. C. A. Ellwood, loc. cit., p. 131. (21) Cf. E. A. Ross: "Natural Order", loc. cit., Chap. VI., Codey: "Primary Group", loc. cit., Chap. III., Ellwood: "Human Family", loc. cit., p. 129. (22) Cf. G. C. Wheeler, The Material Culture of the Simpler Peoples, Soc. Rev. Vol. VII.

taneously formed features of social organization have become so well established or so conspicuous that they challenge the attention of every member of the community, the social mind begins to reflect upon them. They become subjects of public discussion and of general approval or disapproval." (25) This process characterizes what may be called the third and highest type of co-operative activity, and constitute the reflective or distinctively intelligent type of social life. (26)

Beginning, then, as a group-life-process, at first mediated on the purely instinctive level, the social life gradually takes on higher forms, These higher forms of the social life appear as psychical elements for the more efficient mediation of the life process. It follows, that since these psychical elements appear within the common life process, and for the purpose of the better mediation of the activities connected with that process, their functional content will necessarily have a "social" as opposed to an "egoistic" reference. Thus the social life steps up, as it were, from the instinctive to the psychical level. At first mainly instinctive, the unity of society has now become almost exclusively psychical. Impulse, feeling, thought - the various mental phenomena that function in social life - emerge from the same fundamental life-process of the associating organisms. So that the instinctive unity which characterized the group in the earlier period is not broken, but merely receives higher manifestation and expression in the psychical unity which characterizes the group of the later period - the psychic

(23) Cf. F. H. Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, p. 172

(24) Cf. C. A. Ellwood, *loc. cit.*, p. 145.

(25) *loc. cit.*, p. 172. (26) Cf. G. C. Wheeler, *loc. cit.*, p. 78.

and rational phenomena emerge from the organic and instinctive relations. As Professor Ellwood expresses it: "...the unity or solidarity of society is an expression of the original and continuing unity of the life process." (27)

Such, in brief outline, is the generally accepted theory of the origin and nature of society.

In just what way this theory contributes to an explanation or understanding of society is, at least to the present writer, not clear. To start with group life as a biological phenomenon as an explanation of the emergence of co-ordinations or co-adaptations between individuals, and then hold that group life is made possible by means of this individual like-mindedness, is simply to reason in a circle.(28) It will generally be admitted that individuals of the same species and type will have such a degree of similarity as might be implied by such phrases as "like-mindedness", "mental co-ordination", etc. It was long ago observed that grapes are not gathered of thorns, nor figs of thistles. Individuals of a given species will breed true to type. The causes of this phenomenon is a biological question, but the explanation is to be found in the germ plasm, not in the carrying on of a common life-process or the relations of individuals in association. (29)

loc. cit., p. 388. (27)

(28) Professor Ellwood appears to fall into this error, when he says: "The real reason for the existence of such co-ordinations, or co-adaptations, must always be found in the carrying on of a common life process by a group of individuals, else they would not exist." loc. cit. p. 145. But he has previously stated that: "This regularity and co-ordination in mental interaction, inter-stimulation and response" is what "brings to a unity of aim the activities of the individuals of a group." loc. cit. p. 144. Italics not quoted.

(29) The point is not, of course, that associated life will have no bearing on the selection of types and variants of the racial stock. But it is quite a different thing to hold that associated life explains the existence of biological similarities between individuals.

Let it be granted that the pre-human stage was social, man may as well have emerged from that stage much worse adapted to "social" relations than he previously was. Indeed, in the view of Ward, this is precisely what took place. (30) The social relation from which man is assumed to have emerged was a type of animal association. Reproduction, care of offspring, defense, food-getting -- the forces which are commonly mentioned as giving rise to human society and creating the distinctive social attributes of man - all and several might have been carried on indefinitely without involving the necessity of man's rising above this purely animal type of association, except for circumstances which, in the views now under review, are given scant attention, or else are left entirely out of the reckoning.

It is, indeed, a notable fact that man's nearest relatives, the anthropoids, carried on these elementary phases of the life process with much greater success than did the early mutant types of man. If selection had operated fundamentally on the basis of the reproductive process, it appears reasonably clear that the human type would have developed on lines parallel to the anthropoids, or else would have perished. It is, of course, an elementary fact, and beyond dispute, that a species survives only on condition that it has adequate capacity for carrying on the processes of reproduction, nutrition, etc. But perhaps no requirement of survival is more readily and efficiently mediated on the purely animal plane than reproduction. The processes of reproduction, care of offspring, food-getting, and defense are carried on by every species of the animal kingdom, excepting man, without involving types of co-ordination

(30) Cf. Ward's Statement that the advent of reason "serve to increase the degree of egoistic activity and waywardness, andto check the development of animal instincts." -Pure Sociology, p. 133.

or association above the animal plane. When selection operates along these lines it will serve to fix in the species those organic adaptations which will fit it for survival. Among the animals with which man was forced to compete for survival this selective process would take effect somewhat as follows: On the side of reproduction the species will be selectively endowed with certain mating instincts. The young will be born equipped for independent life from the start, or else one or both parents will be instinctively disposed to furnish such nourishment and care as may be required. Food and defense will be achieved through fierceness and prowess or else through speed, cunning, and stealth.

Man is not remarkable for his endowments along any of these lines. Indeed, nothing appears more plainly written in the history of man's evolution than the fact that these animal requirements of survival neither fixed the course of his development, nor played any but the most insignificant role in determining the origin and nature of society. Because, and only because, he was able to subordinate these requirements, and so shift the grounds of his survival, was the pre-human ancestor moved to put away his ape-like ways and become a man. Some account of the circumstances which led to this shift in the grounds of man's survival, and its bearing on the origin and nature of society will now be given.

What is known of the ancestry of man indicates that he and the anthropoid apes have a common ancestral stock. (31) This relationship, however, is so far removed in point of time, and the lines of evolution are so far divergent, as to make extremely dubious any generalizations upon the nature of man

(31) Cf. H. F. Osborn, loc. cit., p. 51.

based upon the behavior of the anthropoids. The origin of a given species is conditioned upon the emergence and selection of that complement of instinctive dispositions and capacities suited to the circumstances of the environment in which the species first appears and makes good its survival. The conditions which are present and which force the organic development of a living structure will inevitably fix in that structure a propensity to respond to the end of finding satisfaction for the organic needs thus set up. And the mutational development of such an organism will be a process of the development and selection of such instinctive categories as are selectively required for its survival. Structural modifications will have great significance in regulating the norms in which the instinctive capacities and dispositions of a new species must develop as a condition of survival. This is not to say that structure is the cause of function or, on the other hand, that function is the cause of structure. For the purpose in hand, structure and function are not apprehended in a relation of cause and effect, but simply as two aspects of the same organism, which, however, are competent to modify and condition each other. ⁽³²⁾ In speculations upon the origin of man it is customary, after the neo-Darwinian method, to make the significant structural modifications ⁽³³⁾ of man's ancestor the point of departure. These structural modification may not afford as secure a footing upon which to base an inquiry into the genesis

(32) Cf. Conklin, Edwin G., Heredity and Environment, p. 45.

(33) These are commonly given as follows:

1. Modification in the ento-cuneiform bone and assumption of the erect attitude.
2. Freeing of the hand
3. Change in the position of the magnum foramen
4. Acquisition of the opposable thumb

of human nature as might be desired. But they at least afford a safer ground for getting at the facts of human nature than the all too common generalizations derived from the behavior of animals, especially of the anthropoids. Among the mutant types and species given off by the generic ancestral stem was one that found the condition of survival imposed upon it to be that it slough off the ways of its animal neighbors and relatives and become a man. This primitive pre-human type, was forced to forsake the ways of its animal neighbors for the very good reason that it could not compete with them on their own terms and survive. Those structural mutations which differentiated the ancestor of man from his pre-human progenitor and from his anthropoid cousins were not such as to give him an advantage in the brute-struggle for existence which fixed the terms of survival. It appears that quite the opposite was the case. In bodily covering, strength, and locomotion, man, of all the higher vertebrates, was probably least fitted for survival on the plane of brute competition. (34) A further significant disadvantage which made against the survival of the species, on the animal plane, was that the pliocene ancestor of man had presumably become a relatively slow breeding animal. On the other hand, the mortality was high. Unable to escape by taking to the trees, slow in flight, weak in defense, this primitive mutant type was doubtless a comparatively easy prey to its enemies. In the struggle against the forces of nature, also, it was subject to comparatively rapid selective elimination because of the lack of natural protective covering.

(34) Cf. Heineman, T. W., *The Physical Basis of Civilization*, p. 22 ff.

In the face of these disadvantages it was thus inevitable that the slow-breeding, brute-like pregenitor of man should prove unfit to survive the rigid selective process to which he was exposed. He perished rapidly and completely, so that as far back as the researches of man carry no trace of his kind is known. (35)

The fact that this pre-human type was unfit to survive on terms of brute competition is of great significance in the evolutionary history of man. This significance may be expressed in the statement that the terms of (pre-human) survival were shifted from the grounds of organic adaptation to a relatively limited environment to that of intelligent (technic) adaptation to a much wider and more complex environment. (36) The factors that made so strongly against the survival of the pre-human type, as a matter of purely organic adaptation, at the same time made possible and brought about that form of intelligent adaptation which is peculiar to man among all the animals. With this shifting in the grounds of survival those disadvantageous structural acquirements of the early mutant types of the human stock will be seen to run to a different effect. The arboreal life of man's precursor had stimulated the development of the posterior and lateral portions of the brain and specialized the senses of vision, touch, and hearing. (37) But the development of the anterior centers of the brain, which give to man his distinctive powers, was consequent upon the assumption of the erect attitude and the specialization of the hand, as a tool.

(35) The pre-history of man begins in late pliocene times. But man in evolution goes back to miocene times. The Trinil race is the first glimpse of this comparatively long series of mutant types which antedates the origin of society. Cf. H. F. Osborn, loc. cit., Chap. I. (36) Cf. Conn, H. W., Social Heredity and Social Evolution, p. 35. (37) Cf. H. F. Osborn, loc. cit. Chap. I

The assumption of the erect attitude, the acquisition of the opposable thumb and of the large brain need not, however, be thought of as occurring in sequential series. (38) Man's unique powers of technic adjustment are consequent upon the specialization and use of the hand as a tool, in the sense that the shift in the grounds of survival caused the selective process to operate on those factors which contributed to the facile and efficient use of the hand as an organ of manipulation and adjustment. That is to say, the conditions upon which man could make good his survival were preeminently in the field of technic adjustment. While Lamarck may be wrong, as suggested by Osborn, (39) in holding "that the cultivation of skill with the hands and fingers lies at the root of man's mental supremacy", (40) he is yet right in the sense that this formed the basis of adjustment and the norm upon which selection operated in the specialization of the anterior regions of the brain for the storing of experience and the development of ideas. It need not be argued, in other words, that the use of the hands and fingers was alone competent to provide that man should take thought; but this necessary use of the hands as a means of adjustment may, nevertheless, be held to have determined that which he might advantageously take thought of. Because of the comparative helplessness of man as an animal and his consequent dependence upon the method of technic adjustment as the essential and fundamental condition of survival, his brain was by selective necessity developed with reference to those processes and ends which are connected with the manipulation of objects through the use of the hand

(38) Cf. H. F. Osborn, loc. cit., p. 59.

(39) Ibid., p. 58.

(40) Cf., also, T. W. Heineman, loc. cit., Chap. I.

as a tool. Thus the human brain was created under the discipline of workmanship. The process involved the handling of those objects which came to hand in terms of their usefulness or serviceability for the ends of life. In the mutational development of the species, therefore, what may be called the essential nature of man emerged under the surveillance of a general propensity and capacity for the utilization of tools (as opposed to natural, brute force or violence) as a means to the achievement of his (instinctive) ends. Veblen has called this propensity of man to apprehend phenomena in terms of serviceability or usefulness for the ends of life the Instinct of Workmanship. (41)

Among the several instinctive proclivities and aptitudes which collectively make up the nature of man, some doubtless trace their origin further back in the mutational history of the species than others. It is accordingly to be expected that these more primitive traits will not prove so readily amenable to the discipline of conduct as those traits of later origin. But, as has already been indicated, the complement of animal-like propensities with which man's precursor was endowed will have been subjected to a continuous and unremitting process of weeding out through the operation of selection acting on the norm of technic adjustment. In this process certain of the more elementary pre-human instincts doubtless survived and were assimilated into the new complex. The instincts, however, are not to be thought of as several discrete and relatively independent elements. (42) It is therefore not to be expected that these more elementary animal-

(41) T. B. Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, p. 15.

(42) Cf. Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*, Chap. III. Also T. B. Veblen, *The Instinct of Workmanship*, Introductory.

like propensities were inherited by man unimpaired. The instincts connected with reproduction, for example, might, if thought of as discrete physiological or neurological elements, be held to have been so carried over. But the several instinctive dispositions with which an organism is endowed constitute a unitary complex; the functional content of one is closely involved and correlated with that of others. The instincts mutually condition each other. Hence, those instincts which survived or emerged, and so went to make up the nature of man, were all and several selectively chosen by reason of their fitness or adaptability to the process of technic adjustment, which constitutes the primary condition of man's emergence and survival. It accordingly happened that those instincts connected with reproduction, defense, and food-getting - if carried over from the pre-human stage - were subjected to extreme and significant modifications in the assimilation of their functional content to the new hereditary (human) complex to which the more primitive instincts were necessarily subordinated as a condition of their survival. Some account of the bearing of this process on the nature of man must now be given.

Whatever the circumstances and causes which led to the development of the structural modifications which physically differentiate man from the anthropoids, man thus became endowed with capacities which were unfit for use on the level of animal instinct. (43) The rigid requirements of the process of stimulus and response, characteristic of brute instinct,² could not give play to the wide variety of movements and complex adjustments of which the human organism

Cf. Eugene Davenport, Principles of Breeding, p. 401.

is physically capable, so that the mechanism of instinct for regulating behavior was necessarily assimilated to a more pliable and adaptive mechanism which would give play to those organs and capacities with which the human type was newly endowed. The more pliable mechanisms required by this new correlation of structure and function appeared in an organization (44) capable of intelligent behavior. The important effect of this new organization was the substitution in the human species of conduct for behavior through the mediation of the mechanisms of intelligence in achieving the (instinctive) ends of life. The net result of the substitution of intelligent action (conduct) for instinctive action (behavior) was not the elimination of the instincts, as is often held. The result is stated by Wallas as "the irradiation of instinctive action by intelligence"... so that the instincts ..."dispose us not merely to search through reason for the means of satisfying them, but directly to perform certain appropriate actions" (45) But it is precisely this latter that the organization of intelligence and instincts will not permit. (46) The performance of certain actions under the promptings of instinct does not tolerate the use of intelligence. And from this point of view Wallas' exception to the statement of Lankester "that the latter (intelligence)'can only develop in proportion as the former (instincts) become feeble and defective'" does not appear well taken. (47) On the other hand, to recognize that the performance of certain fixed actions under the promptings of instinct is replaced by the mediation of intelligence

(44) Cf. Conklin, Edwin C. *Heredity and Environment*, p. 46.

(45) Cf. Graham Wallas, *loc. cit.* pp. 36-38.

(46) Cf. L. F. Ward, *loc. cit.*, p. 133,

(47) Cf. Graham Wallas, *loc. cit.*, p. 42.

in the process, is not to admit that the instincts have thus become feeble and defective. Instinct and intelligence are simply phases of the same organic complex. Under the guidance of intelligence the actions designed to give satisfaction to instinctive needs become more variable, complex, and hence less rigid and immediate, but the instincts involved are none the less important and significant elements of human nature and their fundamental bearing upon human conduct is not displaced or impaired because of this difference in the method of achieving their ends. While the instincts in this way come to be subordinated to the requirements of intelligent action, yet, on the other hand, as Professor Veblen remarks, "it is only by the promptings of instinct that intelligence and reflection come to be employed." (48) The organization of instinct and intelligence, in other words, took effect in a new organic complex in which the instincts in question set up the ends which the organism was by nature disposed to achieve and prompted the exercise of intelligence to devise the means of achieving them. By selective necessity, therefore, the several instincts become closely fused and correlated with one another, since none could take effect save through the common mechanisms of intelligent adjustment. As a necessary result of this correlation the several instincts, as they took effect in human conduct, came to be characterized by a notable degree of vagueness and generality, so that they no longer exercised their functions in severalty, but mutually reenforced and conditioned one another. Comment upon this

(48) T. B. Veblen, *The Instinct of Workmanship*, p. 6.

significant phase of human nature commonly issues in the statement that the human instincts are subject to modification and repression. Such accurately does not appear to be the case. The instincts are hereditary traits. As such they are no more subject to modification or repression through training or education than are the more elementary physiological structures of the organism. By reason of this vagueness or generality, the promptings of the several instincts are not characterized by their urgency. But the temperate character of these demands does not subject them either to modification or repression. This characteristic temperateness, indeed, affords a possibility of holding the satisfaction of a given instinct in abeyance and so allows a measure of time and a margin of error in effecting those adjustments which the instinct in question will prompt the exercise of intelligence to achieve. So that while the requirements of a given instinct may be temporarily pushed into the background by more urgent demands which the given circumstances impose, these requirements are not thereby either repressed or modified. The promptings of the instinct in question are still present, and in the measure of their urgency and to the degree that they go unfulfilled, will the adjustment to the given circumstances prove irksome and futile.

It is this capacity for intelligent (technic) adjustment and the disposition to achieve his instinctive ends by this means that characterizes man and distinguishes him from the animals. What is here taken as the essential nature of man, therefore, is the necessary corollary of these structural modifications which first set the gap between him and his nearest relatives, the anthropoids. The cumulative effects

of these modifications was to shift the grounds of man's survival from the exercise of brute strength and prowess to the process of technic adjustment. In man, therefore, the selective process operated upon the norm of workmanship. The workmanlike capacities of man took effect in the organization of a new complex in which the several instincts were correlated to function through the mechanisms of intelligence. The functioning of any given instinct, therefore, even if carried over from the pre-human epoch, would be conditioned by the requirements of this human type of organization, and so when assimilated to this type would not take effect in human conduct in a manner analogous to the functioning of the same instinct in animal behavior. Moreover, it is here held that the complex of instinctive dispositions and capacities which so go to make up the nature of man constitutes a unitary whole. Hence, the instincts must severally take effect in human conduct to secure a balanced adjustment to the environment. Thus human nature comes to expression in an organization of the instincts and intelligence in which the former are so correlated as to function through the latter; hence, as they emerge in conduct the instincts take effect as "the conscious pursuit of an objective end which the instinct in question makes worth while." (49) The pursuit of the ends of life, under the requirement of technic adjustment, enforces the assimilation of the facts of experience into a system of knowledge. The accumulation of knowledge takes effect in the devising of ways and means, expedients of one kind and another, designed to secure a balanced adjustment of the several

(49) Cf. T. B. Veblen, *The Instinct of Workmanship*, p. 5.

instinctive demands. These conditions impose habits of life and of thought and so give rise to the human mode of association. The group of individuals whose life activities are integrated and conditioned through such a system of devices and expedients constitutes a society. Man alone is able to form societies, (50) because no other animal is capable of this mode of association. Social life thus emerges through man's capacity for effecting technic (as opposed to organic) adjustments to a complex physical environment, and the human mode of association appears as a matter of "selective adaptation of temperament and habits of thought" (51) to the artificial environment thus set up. (52)

The course of social (human) evolution will accordingly be seen to diverge from that of organic (animal) evolution. This divergence takes place as a result of man's different method of effecting adjustment to the environment and the consequent change in his mode of association. (53) The distinction between man and the animals (54) is not that the former is exempt from the laws of evolution, but simply that he adapts himself to them on different terms.

At just what period in the geologic sequence man effected the transition from animal association to society is not definitely known. The human stem was probably differentiated from the anthropoid in the late oligocene. (55) The place of man's origin is supposed to have been in southern Asia, from whence he migrated westward. (56) It is here that the Trinil race appears in late pliocene times. Professor Osborn

(50) Cf. L. F. Ward, loc. cit., p. 185; also, Arthur Fairbanks, Introduction to Sociology, p. 3. (51) Cf. T. B. Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, p. 213. (52) Cf. L. F. Ward, Outlines of Sociology, p. 92. (53) Cf. H. G. Keller, Societal Evolution, Chap. I. (54) Cf. H. W. Conn, loc. cit., Chap. I. (55) Keith, Antiquity of Man, Chap. XXVIII. (56) Cf. H. F. Osborn, loc. cit., p. 49.

thinks it probable that this race had achieved a stage of eolithic culture. (57) The origin of society, at any rate, is to be credited to these humble beginnings, through which man gradually achieved the mastery of nature and by means of which, through cumulative additions, he finally made good his survival. In short, society had its origin in the use of the method of technic adjustment for achieving the ends of life. It is this fact which Ward has in mind when he insists that the essence of society is human achievement. (58) Some exception may be taken to the use of the term achievement to designate all that is involved in the essentially human process of technic adjustment, but the broad fact is, as Ward rightly saw, the distinguishing feature of society. And it is only by viewing society in the light of this fact that we can hope to understand the nature of human relations, which, after all, is what sociology aspires to explain. This view of the nature of society, however, involves a conception of social unity in which reciprocal and harmonious adjustment to the environment can not figure as a moral ideal, (59) derived from the nature of man. Individuals will not respond (as indeed, it is notoriously evident they do not respond) in like ways to like stimuli. Social phenomena will not appear as the product of the (biologically) co-ordinated adjustments of individuals to each other. That is to say, the (necessarily) harmonious relations of individuals will not fix the norms of the social process (the process of co-ordinated interstimulation and response), but the social process (the process of technic adjustment) will fix the

(57) loc. cit., p. 86. (58) L. F. Ward, Pure Sociology, p. 16. (59) Cf. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, Chap. XV.

norms of the relations of individuals, and so determine to what degree these relations will be (necessarily) harmonious and to what degree (necessarily) otherwise. Co-ordinated social adjustment will not appear as a matter of a priori necessity. But the adjustments which men actually make will be derived from the broader social process, and hence subject to adaptation or even elimination. No type of social adjustment, therefore, is to be explained or understood by an appeal to the nature of man (or the animals below man), but only by an appeal to the technic process through which human nature expresses itself.

Nor can we reach any explanation of social unity by an appeal to a "natural order" or a "Primary Group", any more than business enterprise is explainable by an appeal to the "economic man". In short, social unity is a function of the social process, and the explanation of it is to be sought within that process, not elsewhere. But before proceeding with the discussion of this process, brief attention must be given to the method of social analysis, because certain misconceptions on this head exist to embarrass the approach.

II.

THE METHOD OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS

"Social phenomena," says Gumplowicz, "are necessarily derived from human nature and the nature of human relations."

(60) The study of these phenomena accordingly constitutes a difficult and perplexing problem, because of the extremely broad ground of their derivation, and the consequent difficulty of fixing upon some point of view from which they can be classified, interpreted, and understood. Sumner, indeed, has asserted that we have "no calculus for the variable elements which enter into social problems and no analysis which can unravel their complications." (61) Writers who have aspired to furnish such an analysis, however, are not few, and they have, for the most part, and in so far as their contributions have been at all illuminating or convincing, chosen to fix attention upon certain essential and significant elements which are so held to be the "determining forces" in the whole process. The elements that have thus come into prominence in the history of human speculation in this field have been many and various - ranging, perhaps it may do to say, from "Divine" oversight to "economic" determinism. Each succeeding "discovery" of a new principle of interpretation has made its way under the driving conviction that others are "erroneous", "inadequate", "one-sided", or what not, and so that the one under present advo-

(60) Cited by Ward, *Pure Sociology*, p. 5.

(61) Cf. Wm. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 97.

cacy is "right," "true," and "good," or to use the modern term for expressing the same fact - "synthetic." This synthetic view is not to be taken as a distinctively modern achievement. Philosophers and preachers of all the ages have been its spokesmen, arguing variously at different times, but throughout consistently insisting that the causal factors in human experience must be viewed as a whole, that is to say, synthetically. Whatever at the given time may be apprehended by the advocates of the synthetic view to represent the summation of the forces that are relevant causes in human conduct will accordingly furnish the cause and the explanation of all that may be seen to take place. Whether it be "reason," the "Divine Will," or the "Order of Nature" in which the causal forces reach a synthesis, human conduct emerges as a manifestation of this synthetic cause, from which it is so held to receive at once its meaning and its explanation. Let no one urge that these elementary forces, as they run to their effect, are what shape and direct human conduct to its "synthetic manifestation." To so employ these elementary forces as a basis of explanation would be, as will readily be seen, to subject one's self to criticism and annihilation at the hands of those who hold securely to the broad, synthetic view. To urge the causal bearing of these forces will necessarily appear as one-sided from the point of view of the higher synthesis. The peculiar merit of the synthetic view appears to be, indeed, that it affords a vantage ground from which everything can be taken into account to explain whatever, from this lofty height, may appear to need explanation. It happens frequently enough - so much as to

involve the suspicion that the view derives its chief merit from this - that the synthetic category is used as a cudgel to demolish various species of "determinists" by simple citation of the deadly circumstance that they have failed to take everything into account. When so used, as a single category of interpretation, it would appear to have achieved, of course, the same one-sidedness which the view purports to avoid and condemn. But it is held that the synthetic category is susceptible of use as a single causal factor, because it is the summation of all the forces involved. The use of the synthetic category, therefore, is not one-sided, since, clearly, everything is thus taken into account.

The peculiar difficulties of interpreting social phenomena, before referred to, have made some method of simplification, some key to the complex process, a desideratum from the start. Under the first impulse of the scientific point of view various "materialistic" explanations of social phenomena appeared. For the most part these materialistic analyses did not fit well into the "Natural Order" synthesis, so that this latter became increasingly less tenable as a category of interpretation. Consequently these latter-day matter of fact investigations were felt to be wholly destructive, and the imperative necessity of a restatement of the unity of human experience became increasingly evident and pressing. There emerged what may be regarded as the modern synthetic view.

This latest synthetic view is embodied in the system of the modern school of Psychological Sociologists. Defining human experience, "beyond the conditioning physical side,"

as "incessant exchange of mental stimuli," Professor Small asserts that "the unity of experience is a psychical unity."

(62) This appears to say, with Professor Ellwood, that the process of mental interaction between individuals subjects them to a common (psychical) environment, and so brings their activities to unity. The play of these psychic forces in the process of interstimulation and response will accordingly be the object of attention in investigating social phenomena. Physical forces may be lumped together as stimuli, (64) and practically disregarded, because "a process may be largely physical, but because it emerges at some point in consciousness, and gets its meaning from its conscious part, it may be described as psychical." (65) Passing by, for the moment, the implication here given that consciousness is an independent and unchanging entity in this process, the final outcome of the theory comes easily into view. Since the physical environment figures merely as the condition of, or at most, the incitement to, this "incessant exchange of mental stimuli," it follows that the social unity will be "created by this process of mental interaction between psychical individuals." (66)

Such is the new synthesis - what Professor Small terms "the sociological reassertion of the wholeness of human experience." (67) Moreover, this new synthetic conception is fully endowed with the customary merits and virtues.. Professor Ellwood asserts that it "is not merely synthetic of certain biological and intellectual elements, but is synthetic of all factors. It is, in fact, inclusive of all the factors that

(62) Cf. A. W. Small, *The Meaning of Social Science*, p. 84.
 (63) Cf. C. A. Ellwood, *loc. cit.*, p. 144. (64) *Ibid.*, p. 280.
 (65) Cf. C. A. Ellwood, *Is Society a Psychical Unity*, A.J.S., V.X, p. 668. (66) Cf. C. A. Ellwood, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, p. 388. (67) *loc. cit.*, p. 84.

have in any way gone to make the social life of man." (68) Accordingly, when human relations are apprehended in terms of psychical phenomena in which the elementary physical forces are merged and from which they receive their meaning, these forces may conveniently be, as formerly, dismissed, because they are all present, or accounted for, in the one synthetic category. And so it follows that "the social life must be interpreted, if interpreted scientifically, not in terms of mechanical causation, but in terms of interstimulation and response." (69) It will thus readily be observed, as, indeed, Professor Ellwood elsewhere remarks, that "'Psychical' in this broad sense, includes, not only the conscious, but whatever pertains to, has reference to, or gets its meaning from consciousness." (70)

From this all inclusive category there is, apparently, no escape. But certain questions obtrude themselves, and they are the old questions. Whence this synthesis? What produces it? Is it both the cause and the effect, the beginning and the end of - (what?) - itself? Must it, indeed, be said that all forces end in consciousness, get their meaning from consciousness and so, that social phenomena are the exclusive product of ideas and that social analysis is a process of the classification of these? Ward takes this position - il-
(71)
logically enough for him, but quite consistent with the logic of the position under review. In his statement of the psychological method of analysis, however, Ward makes reasonably

(68) loc. cit., p. 84. (69) loc. cit., p. 390 - C. A. Ellwood.

(70) A. J. S., V. X, p. 668. (71) Cf. Ward's statement:
"No amount of care devoted to it (spiritual civilization) alone could make it flourish in the absence of suitable conditions, and with such conditions it requires no special attention. It may therefore be dismissed from our consideration."
- Pure Sociology, p. 18.

clear in what way the social life (conceived as a psychological process) may be held to "contain the end of its development within itself." (71) "It is found", says Ward, "that the progress of intelligence produces regular and necessary changes in human ideas." (72) This is mere tautology. For what, indeed, is "the progress of intelligence", if not "changes in human ideas"? (73) But tautological though it is, the statement appears to do justice to the logic of the psychological theory. The relation of cause and effect is here apprehended as a process of (psychical) interstimulation and response, in which both cause and effect are a function of the single (psychical) category. The method of investigating social phenomena, from this point of view, will, therefore, as Ward has rightly observed, be "that of regarding events as the product of ideas and classifying ideas." (74) And so the return is fairly made to the pre-Darwinian method of classifying phenomena as the product of a synthetic category, representing the summation of all forces that may be held to act in the life of man. The "Order of Nature" has been replaced by "mental interaction" or "psychical interstimulation and response."

Whether or not this latest statement of the synthetic view may have merits other than those that have been indicated, the method of interpretation which its adoption imposes

(71) Cf. C. A. Ellwood, loc. cit., p. 389.

(72) Outlines of Sociology, p. 133.

(73) Cf., e. g., the following definition by Charles E. Woodruff: "By intellectual development is meant the accumulation of ideas which is better expressed by culture, civilization, or social organization and it includes all the inventions which increase food and wealth." - Some Laws of Intellectual and Racial Development, Journal of Race Development, Oct., 1912, p.156.

(74) loc. cit., p. 133

is certainly at variance with the point of view of post-Darwinian science. (75) In this latter view, the use of a category of forces is quite irrelevant. As here concerned, phenomena emerge in a process of sequential change, through the operation of cause and effect. But this sequence is not apprehended to run to its conclusion at any point - reaches no summation, either on the side of cause or effect. The point of attention, therefore, in modern (i. e. post-Darwinian) science, in reaching what it is permissible to call a "scientific" explanation of a given phenomenon, is neither on the side of cause, nor of effect. A phenomenon is regarded as the manifestation of a causal sequence, and when this sequential relation can be traced out the phenomenon is (scientifically) understood. Not, however, until the causal sequence is so traced out is the phenomenon (scientifically) explained. And so, from a scientific point of view, it is difficult to follow the argument that a physical process which emerges in consciousness can get its meaning from consciousness. It can have no meaning, for scientific purposes, except as a relation of causal sequence. And this relation is not explained, but denied, by asserting that a (physical) cause gets its meaning (?) from its (psychical) effect. This is simply to substitute a categorical explanation for a statement of the causal sequence as it actually runs. It accordingly happens that the psychological theory, while taking account of everything, explains nothing.

Professor Bernard has offered a convincing criticism (76) of the psychological theory of society, with especial refer-

(75) Cf. T. B. Veblen, *Evolution of the Scientific Point of View*, A. J. S., March, 1903, pp. 585 ff.

(76) Cf. L. L. Bernard, *The Transition of an Objective Standard of Social Control*

ence to its bearing on social control. He rightly observes that the "subjective 'social forces' of these classificationists are only forms of consciousness by which the subject recognizes more or less efficiently the presence of personal activities, of stimuli-response processes; while their more objective 'social forces' are only abstractions by which we symbolize and present to ourselves more or less perfectly the objective social processes." (77) This statement is strategic; from it Professor Bernard should have been led at once to a conception of the method of social analysis. He should have perceived at once that the method by which these (organic) stimuli-response processes, on the one hand, and the objective social (technic) processes, on the other, get over into "abstractions," "symbols," "concepts," is the method of social evolution; and that the method of social analysis is to state the logic of this causal sequence. And, indeed, Professor Bernard appears, in the main, to have arrived at this conception. So, "society is a self-existent, an organic and self-perpetuating unity" and "sovereigns, parliaments, public opinion" are created by society" as incidents and forms of its existence..... Social analysis must be primarily an analysis of the social unity, rather than of the variable and indefinite phenomena 'mind' and 'feeling,' which are merely phenomena and forms of the greater social whole."(78)

In just what terms an analysis of social phenomena would run is not made clear, but Professor Bernard elsewhere remarks that two things must be kept in mind: "(1) the perspective of social development, and (2) the unitary nature of society."(79)

And this might be accepted, except that human society is arbi-

(77) loc. cit., p. 75.

(78) loc. cit., p. 89.

(79) loc. cit. p. 85.

trarily defined as the "co-ordinated adjustment or co-adaptation of men to physical, biological, and social environment." (80) The adjustments which individuals make to the environment are frequently neither co-ordinated nor co-adapted. Professor Bernard recognizes the fact that such conditions do not actually obtain in society. (81) His conception of society, therefore, has reference, not to what society is, but to what it ought to be. This co-adjustive process, therefore, becomes an absolutistic category in terms of which Professor Bernard would evaluate phenomena. And so, his method of social analysis is to evaluate objective social processes in society with reference to their fitness or unfitness for this co-adjustive (social) process, that is to say, with reference to their bearing on human welfare. While criticizing and abandoning the subjectivistic method of analysis, therefore, Professor Bernard has fallen into the same erroneous method of categorical interpretation employed by the subjectivists. He has merely shifted the analysis to the objective side and set up co-adjustment or co-adaptation as the category of interpretation. Now, for some purposes - for purposes of social amelioration, within the limits set by the current social situation - there can be no question that evaluations of objective processes with reference to human welfare is both illuminating and desirable. But to trace out the deleterious effects of an objective process and to point its relation to what society ought to be neither explains the process, nor society, nor the relation of the one to the other. Yet this appears to be precisely what professor Bernard means by "a scientific analysis of social phenomena." (82)

(80) loc. cit. p. 89.

(81) Ibid. pp. 40, 490.

(82) Ibid., p. 86.

Indeed, as soon as Professor Bernard defined society in terms of co-adaptation or co-adjustment, and admitted (83) that actual human relations are not of this type, he cut away the ground of a scientific analysis of social phenomena from under himself. The definition is not all-inclusive of the process which it purports to represent. Social welfare is no more a competent category of social analysis than is mental interstimulation and response.

If in leaving the subjectivists, Professor Bernard had stuck closer to the middle of the road, instead of going completely to the other side, he would easily have avoided this human welfare method of analysis. In view of his generally sound discussion of the nature of society, this peculiar method of analysis comes in as something like a wart on the smooth surface of his argument. This is not readily understandable, except, perhaps, that Professor Bernard is writing from the standpoint of social control; and it is to be noted that he elsewhere, in a somewhat different connection, - observes with reference to the acceptance of a proposition that otherwise 'there can be no effective and convincing argument for social conformity and co-operation.' (84)

As has already appeared, a "scientific" analysis is essentially a statement of the conditions under which phenomena appear, that is to say, a statement of the relation of causal sequence between those forces which, by virtue of being so related, give rise to the phenomena that are to be analyzed and

(83) "But the really social individual is not the one who acts with individual referenceThe person who attempts to understand the world and to work for efficient social control and expression is the one who operates with reference to social processes in the wide, whose end is the securing of a co-ordinated or social adjustment to nature or the whole process of life.... He attempts to discover the conditions of the most effective social life and then to bring these conditions about and to ad-

described. The analysis will thus be seen to center on the "interval of sequence," so to speak, within the causal complex of forces which so operate in the process. Now, to place a categorical interpretation upon social phenomena, such as co-ordinated mental interstimulation and response, or co-adjustment to the environment, is simply to go outside the process as it actually runs, and thus beg the question, so far as scientific analysis is concerned. A scientific analysis of social phenomena will address itself to a statement of the conditions under which these phenomena appear, and the causal relations within these conditions by virtue of which they do appear, and in terms of which they take their effect. From this point of view no special category of "social" forces will be relevant to the analysis. That is to say, those conditions which purport to make for harmonious adjustment of individuals to each other will not be classified as "social forces," and so erected into a category of interpretation in this field, as opposed to those conditions which are presumed to run to a different, or opposite, effect. Phenomena are not to be classified as "social" because they represent harmonious relations or co-adjustments to the environment, but because they are to be described in terms of the sequential relations of that causal complex from which these phenomena emerge. Accurately, therefore, there are no social forces. The most that can be done in the way of a statement of the social forces is to state the conditions which are necessarily comprised in this causal complex, and by virtue of which the sequential relations - cause and effect - arise.

Professor Hayes states the conditions of social life

just himself to them....

This type as such is just emerging." loc. cit., p. 41.

(84) loc. cit., p. 90.

as: (1) Geographic, (2) technic, (3) psychophysical dispositions, (4) social. (85) By social conditions Professor Hayes means "the already prevalent ideas and sentiments by which each individual and each generation is surrounded." And by technic conditions he means "the material products of human work, which, having once been produced, are the conditions of further activities." (85)

In tracing the origin of society it was shown in what way these conditions emerged in the life of man, and so gave rise to social life. It appeared that the norm of the development of society is fixed by the process of technic adjustment, because it is on this process that the social life depends. But the circumstances under which this development takes place are not merely such as are imposed by the adaptation of habits of life and of thought to the requirements of those mechanical expedients which subserve the instinctive needs of man. The process of technic adjustment, the social process, — the systematic use of mechanical devices for the achievement of the ends of life — is itself subject to limitations, inhibitions, and perversions, both from the nature of man and from the geographic environment, as well as from the technic and social conditions which the process itself cumulatively creates. From this circumstance the social life will be subject to many vicissitudes and vagaries in the nature of conflicting elements of knowledge, derived from different instinctive grounds and from these sources of habituation. And these elements of knowledge, from whatever source derived, will necessarily be assimilated to the social process, and so pervert or inhibit the adjustment by that much. (86)

(85) Edw. C. Hayes, Introduction to Sociology, p. 24 ff.

(86) Cf. T. B. Veblen, The Instinct of Workmanship, Chap. II.

While the requirement of technic adjustment will thus determine the manner in which knowledge must be turned to account in carrying on the social life, this requirement by no means constitutes the only source from which such knowledge may be derived. The scheme of mechanical ways and means through which the social life is carried forward will not, therefore, effectually achieve a co-ordinated adjustment of individuals to the environment. The system itself will be a more or less integrated and congruous whole. But the adjustments which individuals make to this system will, necessarily, often be conflicting and antagonistic, ranging in divergence with such effectual differences of bias, of whatever character, as may exist between the individuals so making their adjustments. It is with these adjustments that individuals actually make that social analysis is concerned. And, as we have seen, they are the product of a complex of conditions, acting differently on different individuals, but all necessarily going in to effect the technic process by means of which individuals must achieve their ends. The adjustments which individuals make has little necessary reference to what is good for society, but only to what is required by the conditions under which they act. So societies rise and disappear. Social analysis must trace the causal bearing of these complex conditions, as they take effect in the social process, in order to explain the relations of individuals and of groups in society.

III.

THE GENESIS AND NATURE OF SOCIAL UNITY

The belief in the unity of society is not new. It is probable that the theory of social unity grew out of the common sense perception of certain broad uniformities in human relationships, suggesting a general underlying unity which conditions, directs, and regulates the method of living together. But the development of special theories of the unity of society came about mainly through attempts to justify forms of political and social coercion, rather than through actual analysis of the social process itself. It accordingly happens that the elaboration of such theories follows, more or less definitely, broad stages in the development of human thought. It is not necessary to the present purpose, nor is it intended, to trace the the genesis of these several theories. However, it may be in place to make brief note of the main types.

The first grew out of what we may term the metaphysical stage of thought. The early attempts of social groups to find a sanction for social coercion took the form of "laws" handed down from the gods. Group control was given a purely metaphysical and arbitrary sanction. This theocratic conception of social unity ran parallel to the theory of government, and was doubtless designed to afford a theoretical foundation for social compulsion.

The second, or legalistic, stage of the theory of

social unity was founded on essentially the same idea as the first. The headship of the king is substituted for the headship of God. While the legalistic, or contract, theory of social unity is classical in origin, it owes its development and application to modern society to that school of seventeenth and eighteenth century political philosophers of whom Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau were the leaders. This theory was revived in a period of political and social ferment. Individualism was seeking to triumph over formalism and authority. The contract theory, therefore, was developed with a legalistic and executive reference, and sought by emphasizing the intellectual elements in human relationships to exalt the individual and reduce the social bond to the nature of a contract.

The subsequent trend of thought and investigation made dissatisfaction with such a theory inevitable. Darwin's Origin of Species just as surely predicted the emergence of a new explanation of social unity as it demonstrated the evolutionary character of animal life and the relative unimportance of the individual. The legal and individualistic theory was replaced by a biological and evolutionary interpretation of society. The comprehensive statement of this view was given in Spencer's theory of the Social Organism. His elaborate division of society into regulative, distributive, and assimilative functions was simply a more or less comprehensive biological analogy. So eager and intense was the effort to refute the intellectualistic interpretation of social development and drive home the idea of the evolutionary and organic nature of society, that upholders of the theory of the social organism lost sight of what the theory was for. Much ^{that} was written, therefore, ran in the form of meaningless analogies.

These several stages of thought, were it to the particular purpose in hand, could, of course, be shown to have been necessary features of the life of the particular period. However, all that is in point here is to note that these several theories of social unity - Metaphysical, Legalistic, Biological - represent the application of derivative conceptions to the social life.

All are based either upon formalism or analogy, and were developed with reference to the logic of current ideas, rather than through actual analysis of society. In consequence none of these theories has had a degree of finality sufficient to enable it to withstand disintegration with the transition to an epoch of social development different from that in which it originated.

Latter day interpretations of the unity of society are prevalingly subjectivistic. Professor Giddings is especially inclined to emphasize the biological basis of society. Thus it is the likeness of individuals which Professor Giddings holds "is the basis and cause of social cohesion or unity." (87) This biological similarity, according to Professor Giddings, receives its social significance because it emerges in the mental life of man as a common consciousness of kind. This constitutes the elementary basis of society. But the social bond becomes wider than this. It may be natural, growing out of blood or race relationships; formal, growing out of social heredity; or rational, growing out of intellectual reflection and deliberate adaptation. (88) Social unity, therefore, becomes the sum of the mental states and attitudes assumed by indivi-

(87) F. H. Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, p. 32.

(88) *Ibid.*, Chap. VI.

duals in their relations with one another, and rests upon a common consciousness of kind. Professor Thomson, writing as a biologist, has also pointed out that the essential condition for the formation of society is found in the continuity of the germ-plasm, which gives a common hereditary complexion to the individuals in the group. (89) This biological similarity of individuals is, indeed, of far-reaching significance in society. But it is after all, a biological phenomenon which, while entering into social relations, constitutes, as we have already seen, but one of the several factors which bear upon human association.

The limitations of the view which describes the unity of society as psychical, and as the product of mental interaction, have, perhaps, already been sufficiently pointed out. Professor Romanzo Adams had devoted an article to the criticism of this view, in which is presented his own conception of the social unity. (90) "Society", according to Professor Adams, "is an objectively organic unity in that the purposes and ends of society are not consciously experienced by society as a whole, but are reflected in the experience of the psychic individual." (91) It is difficult to conceive the sense in which society is here understood to have purposes and ends. Doubtless appreciating this difficulty, Professor Adams, on the next page, italicizes the following sentence: "It is only as social ends are transmuted into conscious valuations that there is any real end." But conscious valuations are personal. Precisely so, Professor Adams insists; and it is because society is not conscious, and social ends must necessarily exist in conscious

(89) Cf. J. Arthur Thomson, *Heredity*, p. 518.

(90) Cf. Romanzo Adams, *The Nature of the Social Unity*, A. J. S., V. X., p. 217.

(91) *Ibid.*

(individual) valuations, that the unity of society is objective. That is to say, society - as a unity - has ends and purposes, but these ends and purposes lie outside of the social group - as a unity - in the experiences of conscious individuals. (92) It appears, therefore, that Professor Adams' criticism of the subjectivists reduces to a logical distinction. For if society - as a unity - is to be described as psychical, this necessarily implies a social over-soul or mind, in which is contained the ends and purposes of society. Many who conceive the unity of society as psychical, insist, however, that no such over-soul is presumed to exist, and that its existence is not implied by the theory of the psychical unity of society. (93) But logically it would seem that if conscious individuals are united psychically, a psychic medium must exist between them. (94) Professor Adams asserts that society is not a unity in this sense, but only in the sense "that all the activity of its various members may be thought of as constituting a whole." (95) Individual activity may be so thought of collectively because it "is socially conditioned ... derives its meaning from the fact that the actor is a social being, (and so) does practically tend to maintain the situation - the social process..." (96) But since the ends of this collective activity do not exist in a social psyche or consciousness, Professor Adams holds that social unity must logically be described as an objectively organic unity whose constituent parts are psychic individuals." (97) This amounts to calling the psychological theorists to order

(92) loc. cit., p. 226.

(93) Cf., e. g., C. A. Ellwood, loc. cit., Chap. XV.

(94) Cf. Henry M. Bernard, "Some Neglected Factors of Evolution, where the theory of the psychical unity of society is carried to its logical conclusion, and it is argued that the existence of such a psychic medium must be accepted.

(95) loc. cit., p. 226. (96) loc. cit., p. 223. (97) loc. cit., p. 226.

on a point of logic. Fundamentally, the positions do not differ. The unity of society, according to Professor Adams' position, is objective, not in the sense that it exists outside of consciousness, but that it exists in the conscious ends of individuals, not in social consciousness. The purposes and ends of individuals, while objective from the point of view of society, are yet the purposes and ends of society, because the individual actor is a "social being" who realizes his ends through (socially non-purposive) co-operative activity. Professor Ellwood, who, as is well known, insists that the unity of society is psychical, makes the distinction which Professor Adams has here insisted upon, "Society," Professor Ellwood says, "...must be thought of as a complex unity made up of many individual psychic units that are in interaction. The mental life of groups is unified only functionally." (98) The difference appears to turn on a question of logic, Professor Adams insisting that the term "psychical" can not logically be applied to the unity of society, since the psychic factor is individual, not social. But Professor Adams does not get outside of individual and conscious relations. His conception of the social unity is, therefore, to be classed with the subjectivists, but with the difference noted.

Professor L. L. Bernard has presented the conception of the organic and objective unity of society much more satisfactorily. Professor Bernard describes the social unity as "a unity of functioning, a mutual dependence growing constantly greater with social development...." (99) The development of society represents "the growth in essential or organic unity

(98) loc. cit., p. 330. (99) loc. cit., p. 7.

of the group in the co-operative struggle for survival. It is in this sense that the group is organic, that society is an organism." (100) The objective expression of this growth in organic unity is found in increasing co-operation, growth of specialization, and division of function or labor. (101) But within the contemporary groups so unified by the growth of specialization, division of labor, etc., there is, beyond reasonable dispute, relatively less co-operation, relatively more conflict, absolutely greater divergence of interests, than existed in primitive groups before specialization and division of labor had taken place, or than exists in any of the simpler societies to-day. On the other hand, increased specialization and division of labor has increased the mutual dependence of individuals, not on each other, but on the socially created means of livelihood, beyond the possibility of comparison with individuals in the simpler societies. Professor Bernard is quite right, therefore, in stating that the social unity is "a mutual dependence growing constantly greater with social development..," but it can not be asserted that society is a "social organism", in the sense that it implies a "unity of functioning." To trace out the manner in which the social unity grows constantly greater, will require an account of the genesis of social unity; and to state the nature of social unity, some account of the character of this mutual dependence must first be given. (102)

It will be recalled that the social life emerged as a result of man's capacity and disposition to achieve his instinctive ends by means of technic adjustments. The biological similarity of individuals doubtless had great weight in bringing about the life in groups which seems to have character-

(100) Ibid. (101) Ibid. (102) For what follows and for much

ized the human species from the start. Social life, however, and social unity is something more than a mere matter of group life. We have spoken of the genesis of social unity, and this word was used advisedly. The unity of society is a product of the social process itself, and, as has before been remarked, must be sought within that process.

The life of an individual in society is dependent upon the technic adjustments which that group makes to the environment. These adjustments require a body of information, which is itself the property of the social group, and which grows by cumulative additions in the life history of the society. In the course of time this information grows into a system of usages which gives a characteristic trend to social development. To this body of information which is so held and carried forward by the social group, Sumner applies the term mores. "We must conceive the mores as a vast system of usages, covering the whole of life, and serving all its interests; also containing in themselves their own justification by tradition and use and wont, and approved by mystic sanctions until, by rational reflection, they develop their own philosophical and ethical generalizations, which are elevated into 'principles' of truth and right." It is this vast system of usages, carried along from generation to generation, and elaborated into principles of conduct that individuals in society bring to bear, along with such matter of fact information as may have been achieved, in the performance of the business in hand. In the more primi-

of what has preceded, general acknowledgement of indebtedness is due to Professor T. B. Veblen, Where possible this obligation is indicated by specific references in the footnotes to Professor Veblen's published works. But, through classroom work and otherwise, the present writer's indebtedness to Professor Veblen is general, rather than specific, so that it has not

tive states of society this body of preconceptions and matter of fact information is, almost wholly, the common property of each individual of the social group. Such facts of observation and experience as are not comprehended in the current scheme will, necessarily, be assimilated to the logic of that scheme, so that the growth of knowledge will have a more or less definite trend in the life history of the society. But with this growth of knowledge will go a corresponding elaboration in the arts of life, and a degree of specialization will set in leading to a division of employment within the social group.

The temperamental bias of the racial type (or types) which makes up the group will have much to do with the extent and character which this division of employment will achieve. It is perhaps to be taken without argument that the hereditary traits of a given racial type will, by selective necessity, be suited to that environment in which the type emerges and makes good its survival. (104) Heredity is transmissible by type. The type is stable. Authorities who are competent to speak on the matter find that this transmissibility of type holds as well for the mental and moral as for the physical traits of the given racial stock. (105) Where there is a modification in hereditary physical traits, it may be assumed that a change has taken place in the temperamental traits as well.

always been possible to follow the customary method of direct citation by way of acknowledgement. Such citations of this character as it has seemed feasible to introduce will not be taken, therefore, as indicating the full extent of the present writer's sense of this general indebtedness.

(103) Cf. William G. Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 79.

(104) C. F. T. B. Veblen, *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution*, Introductory.

(105) Cf. J. Arthur Thomson, *loc. cit.*, p. 525.

The temperamental bias of a given race may thus be suited to one or the other of two broadly divergent lines of cultural growth; and this circumstance will be largely regulated by the exigencies of the physical environment in which the type emerges and survives. This is to say, cultural growth may work out predominantly along matter of fact lines; or, on the other hand, along lines of putative efficiency, where ^{the} temperamental bias favors anthropomorphic conceptions, resulting in the elaboration of a system of magical practices and beliefs. Those peoples that have carried on their life in a restricted environment and under a rather simple cultural scheme will presumably be temperamentally adapted to the mode of life which their long continued environmental and cultural situation requires. So, for example, among the Eskimo, attempts at technological innovation have for the most part proved abortive. This people appears to be racially endowed for the environmental situation from which they have emerged and the relatively simple cultural scheme which that situation imposed. It accordingly happens that among the Eskimo, where the means for acquiring a livelihood are extremely meagre, and climatic conditions are severe, the division of employment follows closely the matter of fact lines of efficiency. Most of the work of getting a living is carried on by individuals working in pairs. Whatever principles of imputation are employed, therefore, are turned to account by the individual workers, and are not held in trust and conserved by a special class whose efforts are devoted to the performance of this "labor." Hence, the body of magical practices and usages employed have been

more or less rigidly selected by the actual concurrence of events. In the case of the Eskimo, therefore, the elaboration of the arts of life has been mostly on the side of matter of fact adaptation; so that the division of employment within the group makes for matter of fact as against putative efficiency. This people has been able to work out its system of mechanical ways and means to practically the highest degree of perfection which the circumstances of their material environment will permit.

A typical case of a different sort is afforded by the Melanesians. The selection of the mores among the Melanesians has not been mainly carried out under the extreme exigencies of a rigid material environment, and this people appears to have a temperamental bias toward supernatural interpretations of phenomena. With the elaboration of the arts of life, therefore, the division of employment among the Melanesians has resulted in the growth of a special class which holds the group under tutelage and superintends the development of mechanical ways and means by rigid application of customary usages and practices. This tutelary group has developed into secret societies, holding a large body of the information required for carrying on the group life without the general possession of the whole number of the individuals constituting the society. (106)

In consequence there is a two-fold inhibition upon the development of this people. The first is that selection operates upon the basis of customary (magical) usages; and the second is that a large body of the information (putatively) necessary for carrying on the life of the group is held under monopoly.

It appears, therefore, that the system of usages

(106) Cf. William I. Thomas, *Source Book of Social Origins*, p.792.

which regulates the life of a given society may be subjected to two methods of selection. One method works out along the lines of putative efficacy and efficiency, and so tends to inhibit the free elaboration of the mechanical ways and means upon which the life of the society necessarily depends. And it will necessarily follow that these imputed principles of efficiency incorporated into social usages will, in the proportion that they dominate the life of the society, serve to inhibit its progress. The second method of selection operates on the basis of matter of fact, mechanical efficiency, and affords to individuals in the society whose life history is thus dominated such fulness of life as their instinctive needs, under the limitations imposed by the material environment, may require. (107) The temperamental fitness of a given type for its peculiar environment and culture may, however, have more far-reaching significance. Cultural conditions will have much to do in deciding whether a given racial type shall survive. A change in environmental or cultural status will have a marked effect upon a given type. Where changes of this character are unusual and extreme the result may be the total elimination of the racial type. A degree of variation may take place, affording a range of possible specialization of type, but where the requirements of the new situation exceed the relatively narrow limits of specialization, the racial type is destined to disintegration and decay. (108) Something of this kind appears to have figured largely in the cultural decay which marked the close of the Mousterian and Magdalenian epochs of the old stone

(107) Cf., also, H. G. Keller, *Societal Evolution*, Chaps. III, IV, V.

(108) Cf. F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 325 ff.

age. (109)

It will be noted that the several limitations upon the division of labor- environmental, temperamental, cultural - come to a single effect. Their bearing on the social life is determined by the manner in which they affect the accumulation and conservation of that body of matter of fact information, in the acquisition of which societies first emerged, and by means of which, alone, they can survive. The unity of society is nothing more, nor less, than the common dependence of individuals on this body of accumulated matter of fact information. If this body of information is carried along with relatively slow additions, the society is described as stationary; if, through whatever circumstance, there is an appreciable deduction from this volume of information, the society is described as declining or retrogressive; if there is continuous and rapid additions to matter of fact knowledge, the society is described as progressive. "United we stand; divided we fall" can not be said of individuals in society. Stand or fall, individuals in society are united. It is the fact that individuals must make technic adjustments to survive, and that the method by which these adjustments are made is the property of the social group, that gives unity to society. The unity of society is thus the unity of a process. But the relations of individuals in carrying on this process are not necessarily co-ordinated. No unity of this kind can, therefore, be asserted.

The number of individuals held together by a common dependence of this sort will, of course, be regulated by the extent of the division of labor. As has already been indicated the development of the division of labor is primarily

dependent upon racial capacity and the physical environment. But certain corollary conditions affect the case. The size of the group will count for a great deal, since it is only with numbers that a very wide division of labor can take place. Where the division of labor is extended to include a number of adjacent groups there must be free communication^{and} relatively peaceable conditions. It will be seen that the temperamental bias of a given people will count for a great deal in this connection. A people unusually endowed with predatory aptitudes can never, themselves, work out a culture marked by a wide division of labor, since this depends primarily upon the elaboration of the mechanic arts. It invariably happens, therefore, that a predatory people will build its culture upon a subject (peaceable) population. (110) Classical instances of this kind are furnished by the Hebrews and by the Greeks. The civilization of the former people appears to have reached its greatest height during the reign of Solomon. The Hebrew culture was of pastoral derivation, and was founded upon the conquest and subjugation of the peaceable peoples in Palestine. The course of trade during Solomon's reign made it possible to levy extensive tolls upon the caravan routes. It was during this period that the Hebrew dominion reached its greatest extent and power. The subsequent diversion of the trade routes removed the material foundation of this power, with the resultant decay of the Hebrew civilization. It is a remarkable and significant fact that this people has never again been able to weld themselves together into a national unity. Wherever the more or less hybridized descendants of this racial type are distributed it is yet to be noted that they tend to gravitate toward

(110) Cf. Ernst Grosse, *The Beginnings of Art*, Chap. III.

positions of a business, professional, or administrative character, that is to say, positions which require the exercise of those racial traits possessed by **their predatory ancestors.**

The case of the Greeks runs much to the same effect. The wonderful artistic and intellectual civilization of the Greeks was built upon a foundation of slavery and subject peoples. It was from these sources that the Greeks derived the material foundations of their culture. It accordingly happened that this culture crumpled into decay with the loss of the colonial empire upon which it rested. The great oriental dynasties of the East, also, were built upon much the same foundations, and the causes of their decay are to be accounted for in like manner. The case of Spain is also interesting in this connection. The ascendancy of Spain, like that of Greece, was achieved through the upbuilding of a great colonial empire. There was a consequent growth of customary usages and practices in the Spanish Dominion, and a corresponding decay of matter of fact information and insight. When the Spanish empire was later deprived of these tributary possessions, it was accordingly left stranded under a long accumulation of customary usages and practices from the sway of which she has not until this day emerged.

Retrogression may be due to other circumstances. A change in the environment, for example, requiring a change in the industrial arts, when this change is inhibited by customary practices and usages will result in the natural decay or retrogression of the group. The incursion of an alien people, bringing a more elaborate system of technology and imposing it upon a racial type not adapted to this cultural situation, will commonly result in the decay of the culture of the people so

subjugated. Thus, for example, the missionary endeavors of the Western people among the more primitive cultures, and the introduction of the Western methods of life, have commonly resulted in the disintegration and decay of these simpler peoples. (111)

Where the social process is carried on in a relatively peaceable culture, undisturbed by predatory incursions, the limitations upon cultural advance are of a somewhat different type. Here the system of usages usually works out through a matriarchate into a type of patriarchal oversight and supervision of the ways and means by which the group carries on its life. (112) While the margin upon which the group depends for its subsistence, in the way of matter of fact information and insight, may be small, it is yet the inherent property of the group and is commonly carried forward over long periods unimpaired. Additions to this matter of fact information may be of slow growth, due to the inhibition of customary usages and practices, but such as is accumulated is likely to be held as a continuous possession. It will accordingly happen that a people of this type will have a long continued cultural history, marked by extremely slow advance. A tutelary system of this sort may practically result in what is known as a stationary society. Known instances appear to indicate, however, that this is, in some cases, practically entirely a matter of racial aptitudes. The case of the Eskimo has already been cited in this respect, but a far more significant instance is furnished by the Ainu people of the Japanese archipelago. These people have long been in continuous contact with the more progressive

(111) Cf. Frieda S. Miller, *The Economic Conflict of Western and Primitive Culture*, Hamilton's, *Current Economic Problems*, p. 67.

(112) Cf. Ernest Grosse, *op. cit.*

Japanese, and yet the cultural results of this contact with a superior people are of the most meagre sort. While in the case of the Ainu the limitation upon cultural advance seemed to be almost wholly a matter of racial aptitude, the case of the Eskimo seems to present the phenomenon of a combined limitation of an environmental and racial sort.

The most striking examples of progressive societies are furnished by those peoples which by temperament and environmental situation have been able to work out their life histories under the dominance of matter of fact principles of efficiency.

The circumstances under which the peoples that make up the Western world emerged appear to have peculiarly fitted them for cultural development along these lines. (113) These peoples appear to have been of comparatively late origin. They appear never to have existed in Western Europe except as a hybrid type. (114) There is consequently a wide range of variation in temperament and aptitude in the racial composition of the western people. The environment of Western Europe, also, was suited to wide cultural contact, and offered numerous opportunities for development in the mechanic arts. A wide division of labor was early worked out among these people. Since, as has already appeared, at least a measurable condition of peace is a necessary condition to a wide division of labor, the hybrid type which worked this out was presumably inclined to peaceable, rather than war-like pursuits. The evidence is to this effect.⁽¹¹⁵⁾ But when the system of technology had been sufficiently elaborated to afford a considerable surplus, there

(113) Cf. T. B. Veblen, *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution*, Chap. I.

(114) Cf. W. Z. Ripley, *The Races of Europe*, pp.121 ff.

(115) Cf. A. H. Keane, *Ethnology*, Chap. VI.

appears to have emerged a predatory variant of this original peaceable hybrid type. So that the racial types which figure in the ^{modern} culture tend to breed true, either to this original peaceable type or to the later predatory variant. (116)

For the most part, the western culture has developed along the lines of matter of fact adaptation, as against the elaboration of putatively efficient usages, customs, and practices. There has consequently ensued a vast elaboration in the system of technology, so that the division of labor now practically unifies all the various national groups of Western Christendom. As this division of labor takes effect in modern life it serves to create a wide divergence of interest among the several classes to which the division of labor has given rise. It accordingly happens that the social life is not carried forward by means of a co-ordinated adjustment of individuals, but conflicting interests, class war, and national animosities are rather the rule than the exception. Class divisions are usually stated as falling into three types. The first of these is composed of those individuals in society whose life activities are directly connected with the mechanical processes of production. These individuals make up the laboring class. Superimposed upon these are the business classes, devoted to the exploitation of the industrial processes for the purpose of pecuniary gain. A third class is made up of those individuals employed in the wasteful consumption of the economic surplus produced by the machine process. These individuals make up what is commonly referred to as the leisure

(116) Cf. T. B. Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, Chap. IX.

class.

It will be seen, therefore, that the great society rests upon widely divergent bases. There is a wide difference in temperament among the peoples that make up this culture. There is a wide difference of class interest, and hence conflicting ideals, usages, and practices. And, moreover, the process itself is carried on along lines which conflict with each other. The regime of business is incompatible with the logic of the machine industry. (117) The interests of that predatory variant which mainly makes up the dominant classes, run to dynastic politics and warlike enterprise, and these aristocratic pursuits are incompatible both with business and the machine industry. Because of the wide difference in the temperamental grounds upon which the Western culture is founded, it is impossible that social regulations can rest upon the rigid enforcement of the habitual modes of conduct. (118)

The machine industry requires the existence of conditions of peace. And this requirement is at variance with the temperamental bias of those individuals which chiefly make up the dominant classes. There is among these individuals, therefore, by reason of their temperamental bias, and re-enforced by their habits of life, a continued attempt to direct the activities of national groups along lines of dynastic politics

(117) Cf. T. B. Veblen, *The Theory of Business Enterprise*, Chap. IX.

(118) Graham Wallas rightly says: "The problem, therefore, of the adaptation of our nature to our environment cannot be solved by merely enforcing those habits which are most convenient under existing circumstances. A habit can neither be formed without risk of failure in the process, nor permanently retained, when formed, unless it is adapted, not only to the facts of the outer world, but also to the whole of our inner nature."
- *The Great Society*, p. 80.

and warlike enterprise. But particularly within the leisure class division of the predatory element, there is practically no satisfactory outlet for these propensities, such, for example, as is afforded by business enterprise or politics. There is, therefore, among the individuals whose life activities are held securely within the range of pursuits permissible to this class, a growing sense of the futility of life. The most marked effect of the predatory bias here works out in a declining birth rate.

The minute division of labor possible under the machine industry results in continued industrial expansion. To this expansion there seem to be certain necessary limitations. The machine industry is ill adapted to climatic regions marked by extreme heat or cold. It seems, moreover, to require a hybrid type to successfully carry it forward. Hence, where the Western culture has been carried among primitive peoples, it has commonly resulted in the decay of these peoples. So far, no pure bred race has been able successfully to adapt itself to the requirements of the machine technology. The assimilation of the negro to the machine industry appears to be impossible. In so far as this is taking place, it is through a process of hybridization, rather than through the habitual adaptation of the negro to the requirements of the Western culture. So, also, if the future of civilization, as it expands to include wider and wider racial groups, follows this line, a new hybrid type must necessarily emerge. Whether this hybrid type will prove adapted to machine processes, or the Western culture is destined to collapse, is a question which the future only can decide. But the possible dis-

integration of the Western culture need not wait upon the necessarily distant future. The present tendency to resume warlike pursuits may easily achieve this result. If the Western culture might be presumed to choose the road to its destruction, the warlike course has this to offer-- that the cultural state to which it leads is known, while the future is, at best, uncertain. In any case, those who look for a serene and stable social life, free from the conflict and dissention which must necessarily characterize the further development of the machine industry, are not without grounds for such a hope founded on the experience of the past. A full blown regime of status affords as secure a basis of social order and control as could well be desired. Warlike enterprise and the traits that go with it are necessarily at variance with the machine industry, so that the adoption of these pursuits ought in time to restore that orderly relation of individuals in society which exists when men give more thought to the worship of God than to the business of getting a living. This reversion may well be marked by a stratification of classes and practical social stagnation, such, for example as characterized the period known as the Dark Ages. The influences making for this result are not found among the business and leisure classes alone. The war between capital and labor appears to be developing a class of captains of labor whose success is dependent upon about the same range of aptitudes which is required for a type devoted to warlike enterprise and predation.

From all of which it will appear that the unity of the society which makes up the Western culture is broader,

because it has a broader spiritual and material foundation. The dependence of the individual upon the group is correspondingly enlarged, and the disciplinary adjustments are more rigid. The modern culture came with the machine; it will go with the machine, and the direction in which it will go will be determined by the changes which take place in the modes and expedients by which individuals in society effect their adjustments to the environment.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adams, Romanzo, The Nature of The Social Unity, A. J. S. V. X.
- Baldwin, James Mark, Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development. Fourth edition. New York, 1906.
- Bateson, W., Mendel's Principles of Heredity. 1902.
- Bernard, Henry M., Some Neglected Factors in Evolution. 1911.
- Bernard, Luther Lee, The Transition to an Objective Standard of Social Control. Chicago, 1911.
- Castle, W. E., The Relative Importance of Selection and Mutation. Scientific Monthly, January, 1916.
- Conklin, Edwin G., Heredity and Environment. Princeton, 1915.
- Conn, Herbert William, Social Heredity and Social Evolution.
- Cooley, Charles H. Social Organization. A Study of the Larger Mind. New York, 1902.
- Davenport, Eugene, Principles of Breeding, Boston, 1907.
- Dewey and Tufts. Ethics. New York, 1910.
- Ellwood, Charles A., Sociology in its Psychological Aspects. New York, 1912.
- Ellwood, Charles A., Is Society a Psychological Unity? Am. J.S. V. X.
- Fite, Warner, Individualism. Four Lectures on the Significance of Consciousness for Social Relations. New York, 1911.
- Giddings, Franklin H. Principles of Sociology. New York, 1905.
- Giddings, Franklin H. Descriptive and Historical Sociology. New York, 1908.
- Giddings, Franklin H. Elements of Sociology. New York, 1914.

- Gross, Ernest, The Beginnings of Art. New York, 1897.
- Haddon, A. C. Evolution in Art. London, 1895.
- Hamilton, W. H. Current Economic Problems. Chicago, 1915.
- Hayes, Edw. C. Introduction to the Study of Sociology. Chicago, 1914.
- Heineman, T. W., The Physical Basis of Civilization.
- Hobhouse, L. T., Social Evolution and Political Theory. New York, 1911.
- Keller, A. G. Societal Evolution. New York, 1915.
- Osborn, H. F., Men of the Old Stone Age. 1915.
- Ratzenhofer, Gustav, The Problems of Sociology. A.J.S. V. X.
- Ripley, W. Z. The Races of Europe. A Sociological Study.
New York, 1899.
- Ross, E. A., The Foundations of Sociology. New York, 1912.
- Ross, E. A. Social Control. A Survey of the Foundations of Order. New York, 1914.
- Small, A. W. The Meaning of Social Science. Chicago, 1910.
- Sorley, W. R., The Problem of Decadence. Soc. Rev., 1908.
- Sumner, Wm. G. Folkways. Boston, 1907.
- Thomas, William I. Source Book for Social Origins. Chicago, 1909.
- Thomson, J. A., Heredity. Edinburg, 1908.
- Veblen, T. B., Evolution of the Scientific Point of View.
A. J. S., March, 1903.
- Veblen, T. B., The Instinct of Workmanship and the State of the Industrial Arts. New York, 1914.
- Veblen, T. B., The Theory of the Leisure Class. New York, 1912.
- Veblen, T. B., The Theory of Business Enterprise. New York, 1904.

- Veblen, T. B., Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution. New York, 1915.
- Vincent, G. E., The Social Mind and Education.
- Wallas, Graham, The Great Society. New York, 1914.
- Ward, Lester F., Pure Sociology. Second edition, New York, 1914.
- Ward, Lester F., Outlines of Sociology. New York, 1913.
- Wheeler, G. C., The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples. Soc. Rev. V. VII.
- Woodruff, Charles E., Some Laws of Racial and Intellectual Development. Jour. of Race Development, October, 1912.

378.7M71
XC578

UNIV. OF MO.
OCT 19 1916
RECEIVED



This thesis is never to go from this room. Neither is it to be checked out overnight.

Social Uni tySpecSheet. txt

MU Li brari es
Uni versi ty of Mi ssouri --Col umbi a

Di gi ti zati on Informati on Page

Local i denti fi er Soci al Uni ty

Ci tati on

AUTHOR Cl ayton, Cl aud Frankl in.
TITLE The theory of soci al uni ty.
IMPRINT 1916.

Capture i nformati on

Date captured 06/2014
Scanner manufacturer Zeutschel
Scanner model OS 15000
Scanning system software Omni scan v. 12. 4 SR4 (1947) 64-bi t
Optical resol uti on 600 dpi
Color settings 24 bi t col or
File types ti ff
Notes Some page curvature due to tight bi ndi ng.

Source i nformati on

Content type text
Format book
Source ID 103304909009
Notes Inside front cover has two labels pasted in.
Title page has signature and perforated
property stamp.
Some pages have handwritten corrections or
erased text.
Last line of text on page 19 is off the page.
Some type is faint.
Purple ink property stamp on page 3 of bibliography.
Pocket and date due slip pasted in at end.
Inside back cover has stamp, barcode, and
call number.

Deri vati ves - Access copy

Compressi on Ti ff: compressi on: 1
Edi ti ng software Adobe Photoshop CS5
Edi ti ng characteri sti cs Pages cropped and resized.
Resol uti on 400 dpi
Color gray scal e / col or
File types pdf
Notes Pages typed si ngl e-si ded. Bl ank pages removed
from access copy.