

THE VOICE BEHIND THE MICROPHONE:
MEDIA SYSTEMS AND UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING IN
HAITI AND CÔTE D'IVOIRE

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by
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Media Systems and United Nations Peacekeeping in Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire

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To my dishwasher, my comedic relief, my chauffeur, my procurer of sugar laden brain
food,

To the love of my life

Andrew, I could not have done this without you

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ABSTRACT

Since 1948, and the authorization of the deployment of military observers to the Middle East by the Security Council, *peacekeeping* has played a significant role in the United Nations mission. The relationship between the news media and its audience via the flow of information requires a critical examination, for the impact of the media on peacekeeping missions presents far-reaching ramifications. Perpetuated by the news media, globalized political discourses have become a mechanism that both constrains and directs peacekeeping. Certainly, radio and television broadcasts, as well as newspaper stories, have created a collection of voices that have shaped public views; however, despite the debate that has occurred concerning the media as a manipulator of public perceptions, much remains to be explored. Contemporary scholarship (e.g., the manufacturing consent model; the political consent model) focuses primarily on the interactions between government, media, and the public over the control and flow of information between those bodies. The goal of my research is neither to prove nor disprove these arguments, but rather to examine the ideologies and potential patterns of discourse among news sources. This paper intends to identify meaningful grounded theories by comparing different levels of media and their portrayals, perceptions, and discourses of current United Nations peacekeeping operations and peacekeepers in two former French colonies: Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire.

Keywords: popular geopolitics, United Nations peacekeeping, media, Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire, coding

Chapter One: An Introduction

Since the first United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission was deployed in 1948 there have been sixty-six subsequent operations spanning the globe. With the involvement and support of more than 120 countries, peacekeeping has become a global initiative. The post-Cold War era irreparably altered the purview of peacekeeping operations. Fraught with decolonization and the conception of new states, the transmogrification of the geographic landscape necessitated the inclusion of development policy in peacekeeping mandates; the soldier became as important as the post-conflict reconstructionist and to some extent, the journalist.

As its mandate expands to include development objectives, peacekeeping is inherently beginning to form a core role in the fields of “international peace and security, self-determination, human rights, and economic development” (Ratner, 1995, p. 209). However, the legitimacy of these operations still depends heavily on the success of each individual mission (Peace, 1997). Thus the UN has a compulsory function to justify the

necessity and wisdom of continuing peacekeeping missions to the international community. On the domestic stage, success is contingent to a large degree on the willingness of citizens to cooperate with peacekeepers. On the international stage, the role of the media as an information source enables individuals to form opinions and create positive or negative pressure concerning peacekeeping operations (Peace, 1997). Consequently, public perception in both the host country and abroad becomes crucial to the continuation and maintenance of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs). Locally the media may serve as a public forum for debate and resolution or, more broadly, as a monitoring entity. News media and social media can provide an indispensable environment for debate, airing of opinions, justification, and protest in which peacekeepers and the peacekept may informally collaborate. This is especially critical when taking into consideration the diversity of peacekeeping forces that are augmented by troops from a variety of countries with different cultural and sometimes linguistic backgrounds. Interactions between peacekeepers and the peacekept at the individual level, for this reason, can be inhibitive, discordant, or formal in nature. As a force that can shape public perception, potentially guide policy, and provide a channel for public opinion, the media has a responsibility to provide detailed and objective information to allow their audiences to make informed decisions (Neff, 1995).

While much of the literature on the role of media and politics argues whether the media or politicians are the intermediary through which discourse is presented to the public and whether the media or government officials are the perpetrators of that discourse, there remains a paucity of study on the actual discourses themselves and on specific topical areas like peacekeeping operations. Popular geopolitics seeks to examine the

representation or framing of global political space in terms of broader social and cultural discourses that permeate media society (Kelly, 2006). Frames¹ transform the chaos of information and experience into simplified and constructed ideas that are disseminated to the public; they are consistent messages that lie beneath the information contained in media reports. The study of frame analysis and popular geopolitics are often linked in studies of popular media, however little elaboration of these concepts has been applied to the role of media, frames of reference and power in relation to peacekeeping operations. The goal of my research is to examine the ideologies and patterns of discourse among news sources vis a vis their frames of reference. My research applies these theories to the relationship between the news media and peacekeeping. Although many studies have examined the relationship between the news media, the government, and the public, few have analyzed the role of media in shaping peacekeeping operations.

“Language is not neutral, but a highly constructive mediator. [...] The structure of the medium encodes significances which is derived from the respective positions within society” (Fowler, 1991). Language gives the world meaning and significance by organizing it into categories with relationships which may not be there “naturally” but which represent the values, discourses, ideologies, interests, and behaviors of human communities; linguistic and discursive codes provide an organized mental representation for our experience. My research aims to deconstruct the encoded significances of the language used by news media by analyzing the structure and content of news articles and radio transcripts by utilizing a textual analysis and grounded theory approach. More specifically, I intend to examine: the portrayal of UNPKOs and peacekeepers by

¹ “A frame is an underlying perspective: a consistent message beneath the information contained in the media reports” (Entman, 1991; Meyers, Klak, and Koehl, 1996). Frames of reference are ways of portraying or perceiving information and are often determined or guided by an individual’s worldview.

international, francophone, local, and social media sources; the discourses, ideologies, and frames of reference implicit in those portrayals; and how they compare to each other, throughout the media systems.

HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) have the unique ability to deploy and sustain international troops and police, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to create multidimensional operations. UNPKOs are guided by three basic principles: consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense and the defense of their mandate (United, 2011). Until the Cold War the operations were primarily limited to maintaining peace and security at the inter-state level. However, 1989 marked a dramatic shift in the scope of peacekeeping; conflict became not only inter-state, but increasingly intra-state and the UN shifted from retrograde to multidimensional peacekeeping that included enacting comprehensive peace agreements and establishing the foundations for sustainable peace. Contemporaneously, multidimensional peacekeeping operations facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants, reorganize local police forces, organize elections (build democratic institutions), protect human rights, and assist in restoring rule of law in addition to the actions of traditional operations in maintaining peace and security (United, 2011).

HAITI

The Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti were all multi-dimensional, having been established post-Cold War and were primarily in response to political controversy and human rights violations. In 1990 former priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected President of Haiti (Aronson, 1991). With a political platform grounded in liberation theology, Aristide imposed economic programs that preached a collaboration of the middle and lower classes (Dupuy, 1997, p. 130), streamlined the bureaucracy and improved education, health care, and workers' rights (Farmer, 1994, p. 168). Shortly after his election, backed by the US and the Haitian elite (who were wary of Aristide's economic, agrarian, anti-crime, and liberation theology based policies), General Raoul Cédras prompted a coup that toppled Aristide's government in 1991 (Hallward, 2008, p. 248). Sanctions imposed by the Organization of American States (OAS) after the coup did little to hinder the new regime. Instead the sanctions resulted in a massive increase in poverty as jobs were lost and a lack of fuel and agricultural products forced mass deforestation and famine (Haiti, 2008). Oppression continued until in 1993 US President Clinton brokered an agreement, the Governors Island Agreement and the Paris Plan (1993-94) between Aristide and Cédras (Dupuy, 1997, p. 138).

During this period of transition, from the Cédras regime to Aristide, the first of five successive UN Peacekeeping Operations was deployed in Haiti. The first, UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was initially designed to help implement provisions of the Governors Island Agreement (United, 2011). However, the mandate was later revised to allow the missions to assist the democratic government to sustain security, train the armed forces, create a police force, and aid in the organization of elections. Immediately

following the conclusion of this mission, the UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) was deployed to promote institution building, national reconciliation, and economic rehabilitation in addition to the continuation of the goals set forth by the UNMIH mandate (United, 2011). In 1995 Rene Preval, a pro-Lavalas candidate (Aristide's political party) was elected President and a peaceful transition of democratic power was achieved. A short four month mission, UN Transition Mission in Haiti, was deployed in late 1997 to aid in training the Haitian National Police in crowd control tactics, rapid reaction, and Palace security (United, 2011). Operational from 1997 to 2000 the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) "placed special emphasis on assistance at the supervisory level and on training specialized police units [...] mentoring police performance, guiding police agents in day-to-day duties and maintaining close coordination with technical advisers to the Police" (United, 2011).

At the conclusion of MIPONUH in 2000 Aristide was reelected President of Haiti (The February, 2004). In response to his return to power, the US invested in the Democratic Convergence and the National Front for Liberation and Reconstruction (FLRN) opposition groups led by Guy Phillipe (Hallward, 2008, p. 84). By February 2004 President Aristide was again forcibly removed from office in a coup staged by Haiti's business elite, former military and paramilitaries (primarily Guy Phillipe and the FLRN), and the US (US Delegation, 2004). One month after the coup, Gerard Latortue became the Prime Minister and led a violent campaign against masses of Aristide and Lavalas supporters (Hallward, 2008, p. 18). The most recent and current mission active in Haiti was established in 2004 following the departure of former Haitian President Aristide after this armed conflict. The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti's (MINUSTAH)

mandate was to “restore a secure and stable environment, to promote the political process, to strengthen Haiti’s government institutions and rule-of-law-structures, as well as to promote and protect human rights” (United, 2011). Over the course of the next five years the missions continued to further these goals until the 2010 elections were postponed due to the massive earthquake that devastated the country. The setback of elections and devastation caused by the earthquake in January created new issues for MINUSTAH to deal with. Despite this, the elections were rescheduled and in April 2011 Michel Martelly was declared the president of Haiti (United, 2011).

CÔTE D’IVOIRE

The post-independence period in Côte d’Ivoire (1960 – present) was a time of political (albeit authoritative) stability and socio-economic prosperity that ended with the death of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny in December 1993 (Background, 2004). What followed this power vacuum was a prolonged power struggle that culminated with the December 1999 coup, overthrowing President Henri Konan Bédié (Background, 2004). The presidential elections of 2000 were marked by issues of eligibility and nationality laws. Ultimately Alassane Ouattara was disqualified based on controversy regarding his eligibility. Consequently the Supreme Court eventually designated Mr. Gbagbo the winner of the election. Subsequent “national reconciliation” summits between President Gbagbo, Mr. Ouattara, Mr. Bédié, and General Gueï in October 2001, January 2002, and finally in July 2002 resulted in the formation of a broad based government in August 2002 (Background, 2004). The new government included all of the major opposition parties in Côte d’Ivoire.

These movements towards national reconciliation were tempered by rebel soldier attacks on and the successful capture of two of the state's cities, Bouaké and Korhogo. The movement spread as other disgruntled soldiers (protesting demobilization) and civilians joined and spread the movement throughout the northern and western regions (Background, 2004). As the movement grew, it coalesced into an umbrella political movement known as the Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI) (Background, 2004). The MPCI demanded the resignation of President Gbagbo, national elections, a review of the constitution, and an end to Southern domination of the state (Background, 2004). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in conjunction with neighboring states and the African Union (AU) successfully organized a ceasefire agreement between the MPCI and President Gbagbo in October 2002 (Background, 2004). In January 2003 the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement was signed (Background, 2004). This agreement includes the creation of a national government of reconciliation headed by a Prime Minister, delegated powers by the President (Background, 2004). Continual objections and disagreements prevented the true goals of the Agreement from being realized. The Prime Minister Diarra was given little power by Gbagbo and disagreement regarding the role of rebels within the new government abounded (Background, 2004). By May 2003 the United Nations Security Council had determined that the continual disregard for the provisions of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement necessitated the installation on a political mission, the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire, MINUCI, to facilitate the agreed conditions of the Agreement (Background, 2004). MINUCI was replaced by the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) in April 2004 (Background, 2004).

The mandate for UNOCI has been consecutively extended, most recently on 27 July 2011 as a result of the 2010 election crises (UNOCI Background, 2011). Despite the recognition of the international community, former President Gbagbo refused to cede power to the newly elected (November 2010) Alassane Ouattara. By April, the combined efforts of French LICORNE troops, UNOCI, and military forces loyal to President Ouattara successfully arrested Gbagbo and Ouattara was officially installed as President (Post-election crisis, 2011). Continued attacks by Gbagbo supporters and revenge killings on both sides has left the landscape torn asunder by violence, unable to heal because of widespread disorder, and host to significant humanitarian issues (Post-election crisis, 2011).

Chapter Two: Literature Review

A GLOBAL POLITICAL CULTURE OF PEACEKEEPING

Contemporary peace operations “aim increasingly to implement a preventative approach to the reoccurrence of conflict, creating an operational and political space in which international actors undertake peace-building activities” (Cockayne and Malone, 2005). As a result, peacekeeping efforts have become an increasingly integral component of international governing bodies and institutions. The forerunner of these organizations is the United Nations, which has engaged in numerous peacekeeping missions and implemented countless peace-building and development programs. Supported and led by Western states, the UN and its affiliate departments have the ability to influence and even alter the political landscape of a host state. It is therefore imperative that these missions are studied from multiple perspectives. Thus an examination of the perceptions of the news media and the peacekept in regards to the impact and presence of peacekeeping missions serves to create a more complete picture of the changes occurring within the

political landscape of a host country, catalyzed by United Nations peacekeeping operations.

The United Nations is a global governing body whose actions and agencies can be analyzed according to the concept of international governance wherein world politics are found to be regulated by certain rules, norms, or shared understandings. Determining and defining those rules, norms, and understandings are shared discourses. Discourse, as defined by Foucault, refers to:

“Ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. They constitute the 'nature' of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern” (Weedon, 1987, p. 108).

To some extent discourses are similar to worldviews: refined by social practices, identity, and personal experience. They do not only define the epistemologies through which knowledge is processed, assigned meaning, and internalized, but also define the frames of reference through which information and knowledge is presented. Frames, in turn, are constructed representations based on underlying perspectives and discourses that produce a particular understanding or perception of knowledge or information. These representations or frames then generate scripts: specific narratives and images of people, places, cultures, and conflicts that are presented via reference to discursively defined frames. Furthermore, scripts, refined through frames which are defined by discourse and worldviews (perceptions), result in the production or affirmation of worldviews and particular perspectives. Exercising this socially-constructed process in terms of power relations, Weedon (1987) stated that power is:

“A dynamic of control and lack of control between discourses and the subjects, constituted by discourses, who are their agents. Power is exercised within discourses in the ways in which they constitute and govern individual subjects” (p. 113).

Before an accounting of the changes enacted or perpetuated by peacekeeping operations on a host state’s political system can be analyzed, it is necessary to comprehend the underlying discourse that drives the framing and subsequent scripting of UNPKOs and the consequent impact of those scripts on perceptions and policy making.

From a broad perspective, international governance attempts to regulate the exogenous behavior of international actors and influence the domestic behavior of states by defining what constitutes acceptable and legitimate political discourse. Governance can be defined as “the employment of means to order, direct, and manage human behavior” (Wapner, 1995). The political discourse and methods of international governance are defined by a “global culture” that determines the type of order, direction, and method of management that international organizations like the UN employ (Paris, 2003; Lasswell, 1936; Meyer et al., 1997; Campbell, 1998; Zanotti, 2008; Stanley and Peceny, 1999). Agencies such as the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping “act on behalf of the international system to reconstruct the constituent units of that system in accordance with a widely shared conception of how political authority should be exercised” (Paris, 2000). Sociologists have developed similar theories concerning the ideological diffusion of neoliberalism in international politics through peacekeeping operations (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez, 1997). A global discourse or culture has emerged that is dominantly Western and considers its forms of political, economic, and social activity as more legitimate than others (Meyer et al., 1997). This has vast

implication for international policy and peace missions because it determines the ideological foundation and eventual policy implementation of the states that comprise international governing bodies. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations provide avenues for this ritual structuration and normalization through which post-conflict states are uniformly conformed to the international political culture and extricated from local or indigenous political processes.

If the UN and other inter-governmental organizations base their political actions on a global political culture or discourse, then it stands to reason that as global culture changes so too would their political discourse. Lasswell's (1936) theory of "world revolution" identifies the source of this global culture as international shifts in dominant thought which result in an ideological revolution. Peace-building may be seen as a vehicle of a "world revolution" where international peacekeepers serve as agents of this revolution by promoting institutions and values of liberalism on host states (Paris, 2000). Peacekeeping agencies like the UN are predisposed to adopt strategies that conform to international norms or "global culture;" thus shifts in peacekeeping policy can be associated with parallel shifts in the types of strategies that are viewed as normatively appropriate (Paris, 2003, p. 441). Global culture severely restricts the strategies that peacekeepers have available to them; "peacekeeping missions reflect not only the interests of key parties and the perceived lessons of previous operations, but also the prevailing norms of global culture, which legitimize certain kinds of peacekeeping policies and delegitimize others" (Paris, 2003, p. 443). Paris (2003, p. 443) identifies a specific case where the UN has exclusively upheld the notion of the Westphalian state ("a polity defined by exclusive jurisdiction over a bounded territory"), because it reflects the

“enduring centrality of territorial sovereignty in the normative structure of world politics.” An alternative type of peacekeeping, international trusteeship was presented as a viable approach to stabilizing a post-conflict state. However, because trusteeship strategies are viewed as contrary to the global culture, this form of peacekeeping has been summarily and repeatedly dismissed (Paris, 2003, p. 443). The international community routinely promotes liberal market democracies despite the potential constraints to development this may cause and in disregard of the individual state’s political landscape. The practice of peacekeeping has not been politically neutral; all operations have promoted “free and fair elections, the construction of democratic political institutions, respect for civil liberties, and market-oriented economic reforms - or the basic elements of Western style liberal market democracy” (Paris, 2000).

Although peacekeeping agencies are unwilling to divert from established concepts of statecraft, they have mirrored the international shift in acceptable forms of governance. After the Cold War, liberal democracy emerged as the “only model of government with any broad ideological legitimacy and appeal” (Diamond et al., 1990). As post- Cold War peacekeeping escalated, this new type of governance became the exclusive policy of political intervention in peacekeeping operations around the world (Paris, 2003, p. 443). Almost exclusively associated with democratization as means of creating order and ensuring international security, this process of normalization, is frequently carried out by the UN (Zanotti, 2004). Doctrines of “good governance” have translated the political debate on democracy into the technical language of functioning state institutions whereby the normalization process is realized (Zanotti, 2004). This idea of “governmentalizing democracy” results in international norms and aspects of the global democratic culture

being imposed on state governments (Zanotti, 2004). Robinson (1996) and Zanotti (2004) both found that the UN peace missions in Haiti sought to incorporate the state's domestic political system within the global political discourse.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE PEACEKEPT

Perspectives of the peacekept are often overlooked in peacekeeping literature beyond the acknowledgement that peacekeeping depends on the cooperation or consent of various parties (Fortna, 2008a). Furthermore, definitions of who is considered "peacekept" are limited to those government officials and rebel leaders that are the decision makers (Fortna, 2008a) or to the host country's elite and do not include local community leaders or the citizenry. While studies may focus primarily on the decision makers or elite, they usually analyze motivations or incentives, not perceptions. Fortna (2008a) examines the incentives of the elite and governmental peacekept to ascertain how peacekeeping affects their decisions. "The presence of peacekeepers changes the incentives of the peacekept by allowing the international community effectively to condition aid on compliance, by influencing domestic public opinion, and by providing a peace dividend (incentive), [...] for both rebel and government leaders and ran-and-file soldiers" (Fortna, 2008a, p. 171). Peacekeepers need to understand the local logics and rationales of actors, as well as how rationality and meaning of actions changes in the process (Pouligny, 2006, p. 189).

Three main motivations for the reservations the peacekept have about peacekeepers becoming involved in their conflict include undesirable international repercussions for host-state actors and non-host state actors and the consequences of hosting peacekeeping forces (James, 1990, p. 216). Similar to Fortna's research, James

looks at the negative implications peacekeeping can have for a host state, and how those implications in turn may lead to the resentment of the peacekeepers among the host state's population (specifically the decision makers). Implications identified include international criticism from negative media coverage, personal accounts of peacekeepers, potential problems linked to cultural gaps, and licentious peacekeepers (James, 1990, p. 225). Another implication of peacekeeping that has been found to affect the peace process is an issue of heavy-handedness on the part of the UN in altering the domestic political landscape of host countries. As a result of one incident in the Congo, countries such as Nigeria and Yemen were wary of or outright refused UN help in their own countries for fear of being deposed (James, 1990, p. 229).

Citizens of host countries have expectations about the UN mission in their country. Even before a mission is deployed, its mandate is assessed by local actors who then conceive of notions and ideas regarding the mission, its goals, and the people carrying it out (Pouligny, 2006, p. 96). In both study states, Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire, at least one media source provided the original language of the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) mandate document and subsequent documents pertaining to the renewal of the mandate. For this reason it is important to understand the social and political meanings of "peace" in the host country and to realize that their conceptualizations of social order and peace may be different from Western concepts (Pouligny, 2006, p. 96). For example, the Cable News Network (CNN) a Western international news outlet may have a different opinion on what constitutes a peaceful election with relatively little violence than a domestic news source. "Although reaction to such interventions may vary greatly, one may predict that they potentially affect large

components of the societies concerned precisely at a time when crucial elements of the relationship between political and social order are being renegotiated” (Pouligny, 1999, p. 403).

While Fortna (2008a and b) and James (1990) have analyzed the motivations and incentives that dictate the actions of peacekeepers and peacekept, Pouligny (1999 and 2006) examines the context and forum for the interactions that occur between peacekeepers and the peacekept. “Interactions with UN peacekeeping operations at the grassroots level often take place by design rather than by pure chance” (Pouligny, 1999, p. 411). In an effort to understand who the political negotiating partners of UN missions are, and how they are positioned in the local political arena, Pouligny (1999, p. 45) examines the networks and interactions of local actors, intermediaries, and UN personnel from a micro-sociological perspective. Because of changing notions of civil society, Pouligny analyzed the peacekept through local NGOs, collective actors who are primarily organized on a community basis (Pouligny, 1999, p. 406). “Most of the individuals at the head of development NGOs [in Haiti] that interact with members of UN missions also have close ties to political parties or even combine nongovernmental and political functions” (Pouligny, 1999, p. 408). This conclusion is her rationale for limiting the definition of peacekept to decision makers and elites: in addition to the directors of NGOs, they are the individuals most likely to engage in frequent interaction with peacekeepers. Despite this, I believe that the limiting the peacekept to elite decision makers contemporaneously limits the findings. Even by expanding the definition of peacekept to leaders of collective action groups, scope is limited. A broader definition of peacekept would undoubtedly uncover new trends in perceptions and opinions and would

provide crucial insight into the perceptions of host-state citizens who bear the brunt of the cost and effects of peacekeeping missions.

It is not sufficient, merely to identify the actors in the peace process. It is also necessary to conceptualize and analyze the political and social spheres in which actors participate in terms of an interactive and evolutionary framework; “what is considered to be political may vary from one political system to another [...] one social group to another, and may also change over time” (Pouligny, 1999, p. 405). Therefore it is important to “take into account all social practices and daily power relationships” because the contemporary concept of civil society and state creation is a “conflictual, unintentional, generally unconscious and, as a result, often paradoxical, historical process” (Pouligny, 1999, p. 405). Most of the population interacts with peacekeepers in a pragmatic way; their exchanges contribute to the “continuous transformation and reinvention of the local actors’ forms of organization and action and their systems of meaning” (Pouligny, 1999, p. 418). In addition, power relations among the elites, military, and citizenry and the historical construction of their visions and relationships with the state gives insight into how these various groups perceive the UN missions. Thus the study of interaction between actors operating in similar settings but subscribing to different worldviews can be meaningful.

Differing notions of peace and assumptions regarding the peace process by both the peacekeepers and peacekept can have significant repercussions for the success of a peacekeeping mission and the creation of stable peace and security in a host state. Often peacekeepers have little knowledge or understanding of the deep seated reasons of the conflict and cannot conceptualize the worldviews of the combatants and citizens

inhabiting host countries (Clapham, 1998, p. 43). Even conceptions of peace may differ between peacekeepers and the peacekept, leading to misunderstandings and an inability to cross necessary cultural boundaries in order to achieve a sustainable peace. For peacekeepers, “peace” is procedural in that it “presupposes that conflicts can be resolved by means from which violence is excluded; from this premise follows a belief in negotiation and compromise, validated by reference to the democratic rights of the majority and the universal human rights of minorities as the means through which disputes should be resolved” (Clapham, 1998, p. 43). This definition of peace stems from a Western political discourse that idolizes the promotion and installation of democracy. The peacekept, however, are often more substantive in their conceptions of peace, placing more emphasis on the question of who wins than how victory is achieved (Clapham, 1998, p. 43). It is also important to understand that the values or “conceptions of humanity” between peacekeepers and the peacekept, and even among the peacekept can be different. Peacekeepers see themselves as bringing solutions to the peacekept, whereas the peacekept see peacekeepers as bringing resources (Clapham, 1998, p. 44). These discrepancies can then cause tension between actors, especially when results do not conform to expectations. The peacekept and local combatants are unencumbered by the value system of peacekeepers, have a better grasp of local politics, and are interested in the long term, making an analysis from their perspective more meaningful than from that of peacekeepers.

CRITICAL AND POPULAR GEOPOLITICS

Critical geopolitics is broadly understood as the poststructuralist intellectual practice of deconstructing geographical and related disguises, dissimulations, and rationalizations of power (Kelly, 2006). The focus of critical geopolitics is on exposing the power involved in and often hidden by grand geopolitical themes. Fundamental to this process is the ability of policy makers and elites to frame and define international politics in particular ways (Kelly, 2006). These representational practices or frames of reference generate particular ‘scripts’ in international politics regarding places, people, and issues (Kelly, 2006). In turn, these ‘scripts’ then become the means through which hegemony is exercised. Scripts and the frames and discourses representative of them can be analyzed through a variety of mediums. Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992) have extrapolated that geopolitics must be re-conceptualized in terms of discourse because it is only through discourse that geopolitics is made meaningful and justified. It is through discourse that leaders act, through the mobilization of certain simple geographical understandings of foreign policy actions are explained, and through ready-made geographically-infused reasoning that wars are rendered meaningful (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992). Primarily concerned with how foreign places are represented in foreign policy discourse, Dodds (1993, p. 71) argued that:

“The practice of foreign policy is inherently geopolitical because it involves the construction of meaning and values of spaces and places. Instead of focusing on how, for example, the external environment influences foreign policy, critical geopolitics seeks to examine how geographical representations are constructed and how those representations in turn structure the perceived reality of places. Thus, geography, instead of being treated as a mere stage or backdrop on which events occur, is seen as a crucial element in the construction of worlds.”

A subfield of critical geopolitics, popular geopolitics, seeks to examine the representation of global political space in terms of a broader social and cultural phenomenon that permeates media society (Kelly, 2006). Within the realm of media, as in political relations, knowledge is power. As an institution and industry, the news media can be thought of as a factory that produces information. Sometimes openly subjective and other times claiming objectivity, the media is nevertheless in the business of selling a good story in the form of “truth.” “All power requires knowledge and all knowledge relies on and reinforces existing power relations. Thus there is no such thing as ‘truth’ existing outside of power” (Kelly, 2006). Postmodern international theorists have used this insight to examine the ‘truths’ of international relations to comprehend how the concepts and knowledge-claims that dominate the discipline in fact are highly contingent on specific power relations (Kelly, 2006). Essentially, truth is subjective or hegemonic, and popular geopolitics seeks to analyze that phenomenon in regards to the role of media and society.

The media plays a significant role in the process of meaning and value construction of space. Historically ingrained into conceptions of society and people is the idea of “domestic” versus “other.” This dichotomous trend is particularly common among media strategists who convey narratives and information through binary relationships (Dodds, 1993). As a result it becomes necessary to challenge how places and people are scripted by through media framing and discourse. “In the context of the media, we only need to look at television and the discussion of foreign affairs to note the role of the ‘expert’ in explaining events to us in the form of a simple story. In the case of the 1982 Falklands War and the 1991 Gulf War, the role of the academic and military armchair strategists was striking” (Newman, 1988). The media coverage of the Gulf War, which

included a mixture of Allied press briefings, pictures of Allied forces and commentary from the experts, produced a remarkably sanitized and controlled televisual spectacle” (Dodds, 1993, p. 72).

When assessing the power of discourse in the media, the privileged status of geopolitical language among the punditry remains instructive (Dittmer and Dodds, 2008, p. 438). As Gearóid Ó Tuathail noted, the appeal of geopolitical discourse is not hard to discern: for journalists geopolitics is concerned with the larger picture of power and danger, and geopolitical explanations are often framed in simple geographical and political terms that link complex phenomena. There has been increasing importance and prevalence of these trends since 9/11, highlighting the geopolitical division of states into “zones (for instance, the axis of evil) and dangers identified and located therein” (Dodds and Dittmer, 2008, p. 348). Those acts of identification via location contribute more generally to the production of identity and help secure particular national identities (Dodds and Dittmer, 2008, p. 348). By specifying and naming the geopolitical divisions and discourses, the media and government create an easily recognizable dichotomous identity that structures American perception.

While Dodds and Dittmer illuminated the issue of dichotomous perceptions present in popular geopolitics, Dalby (2000) examines multi-polar zonal divisions and representations of space. Despite the use of ancillary categories, both modes of analysis (dichotomous and multi-polar) engage in discretionary discrimination. “The world is actively 'spatialized,' divided up, labeled, sorted out into a hierarchy of places of greater or lesser 'importance' by political geographers, other academics and political leaders” (Agnew, 1998, p. 2). This process provides the geographical framework wherein decision making elites and the public act in the world in pursuit of their own identities and

interests. Critical and popular geopolitics “encompasses various ways of unpacking the geographical assumptions in politics, asking how the cartographic imagination of here and there, inside and outside, them and us, states, blocs, zones, regions or other geographical specifications, work to both facilitate some political possibilities and actions and exclude and silence others” (Dalby, 2000). The exclusion and inclusion of particular political possibilities is also discussed by Roland Paris (2004) from the stand-point of constraints on global culture, in which global culture manufactures constraints that prevent or support certain policies. In particular, Paris (2000) looks at how this phenomenon relates to peacekeeping operations and the trusteeship system. Applying simplified categorizations to states (e.g., global North and South, developed and undeveloped) has a marked effect on the structuration of policies that are deemed appropriate by policymakers, the media, and others. Thus the categorizations created by policy makers become mechanisms of constraint fueled by outlets such as the news media. Similar to prior arguments, framing zones of peace and turmoil creates a distinction between us and them that may have ramifications within political, social, and economic spheres. Uniform categorizations of places and people often reflect dominant global culture and leave little room for more localized interpretation or perceptions. Thus I find it important to examine the perceptions of peacekeeping from media outlets operating at a variety of scales- international, national, local, and participatory.

The media “(re)produce[s] the qualities of place, scale, and identity that collectively map the contours of the causes, consequences, and solutions to conflict” (Tracy, 2008, p. 10). An analysis of social media indicates its growing importance in a technologically advanced and accessible age by comparing US, British and Muslim news media regarding Muslim conflict. American discourse, he concludes, is in a “state of

confusion,” British discourse “animates a 'state of illusion', characterized by attempts to reconcile the reality of homegrown terror with national myths of Britain being an open, multicultural, tolerant place,” and Muslim oriented newspapers “(re)produce 'states of despair' where the legitimacy of the nation-state is challenged through disparate narratives of a victimized Muslim World united through a moral language that transcends difference” (Tracy, 2008, p. 12). By analyzing the content of various media outlets and making comparisons between them based on a common variable, Tracy (2008) is able to deconstruct individual discourses and extrapolate on the ramifications.

O’Tuathail (1996) examined types of alternative media perspective in his study of reporter Maggie O’Kane and her work on Bosnia. He argued that O’Kane’s dispatches were prime examples of an “anti-geopolitical eye, a way of seeing that disturbs the enframing of Bosnia in Western geopolitical discourse as a place beyond our universe of moral responsibility” (O’Tuathail, 1996). Bosnia was scripted in different contexts depending on who the audience was, but remained subject to a historical and geographical determinism that categorized the Balkans as a European Third World (O’Tuathail, 1996). To the populations of the West it was framed as a victim of the Holocaust and WWII. Conversely to Western institutions and policy makers it was seen as a potential “European Vietnam” (O’Tuathail, 1996). Differing scripts are employed by the international news media and local reports and news:

“Most of the mass media is given over to coverage of the latest state of play of diplomatic manoeuvres and the shifting geopolitical landscape, to the discourse of 'high politics'. This discourse and the structured way of seeing that accompanies it inevitably reproduces the state-centric and essentialist identity reasoning (Serb versus Croat versus Muslim; there is no language for hybridity) of the various parties involved. Rather, the most significant clash is one of discourses and not of institutions or essential subject positions” (O’Tuathail, 1996).

This and similar conflicts center around two fundamentally different understandings of what Bosnia represents. Although decisions are usually based on a single script, sometimes scripts are comingled which creates a dilemma in the Western imagination and in some cases, the media. The nature of the media as a detached, elevated, hegemonic entity make it imperative that researchers examine the geopolitical discourses and power structures underpinning news media and the ramifications of the proliferation of those discourses and frames of reference on audiences.

MEDIA AND FRAMES OF REFERENCE

News media texts do not simply replicate reality, but can be constructed so as to produce a particular understanding or perception of a problem (Robinson, 2001, p. 532). The media employs frames of reference, which are often indicators of particular underlying discourses, to portray or script their information in a particular way. “A frame is an underlying perspective, a consistent message beneath the information contained in the media reports” (Entman, 1991; Meyers, Klak, and Koehl, 1996). Frames transform the chaos into simplifications that can be easily portrayed to a target audience. Simplification can, however, lead to homogenization, limiting the number of perspectives put forth; not by the number of sources, but by the ideology underlying them (Sack, 1998, p. 19). Therefore, if a single perspective emerges from the media it must be determined whether it “is due to the measured and reasoned acceptance of a position or to the domination of one’s culture’s partial view over all others” (Sack, 1998, p. 19). When interpreting place images and their impacts on public perception, identifying and defining frames is crucial. Entman’s (2004) “cascading activation model” concludes that the government and policy makers take a more participatory role in this process by actively

shaping frames to reach the public through the media (p. 337). Media representation and framing are tied to a broader geopolitical concept rather than being an external matter of objective reporting (Ghazi-Walid, 2006, p. 160). Geographical framing practices are embedded within geopolitical cultures. Geopolitical cultures are defined as all states having a culture of conceptualizing their state and its unique identity, position, and role in the world in a specific manner. This culture is further delineated by the geopolitical cultures of other states and is conditioned by a series of factors: a state's geographic position, historical formation, and bureaucratic organization, discourses of national identity and traditions of theorizing its relationship to the wider world, and the networks that operate within the state (Dittmer and Dodds, 2008, p. 444). These factors combine to create geopolitically-significant discourses and subsequent frames that are defined by and indicative of the geopolitical cultural context of a particular state.

Framing this idea of geopolitical culture in terms of international relations and the media by Thornborrow (1993) states that "a national vocabulary [or discourse] strongly pervades this mechanism by adding moral accents and suggestions of logic that make international events more understandable and acceptable to a domestic audience." The world is viewed as a whole that is divided into "a hierarchy of places, blocs, and states that have attributes of political importance" (Kelly, 2006). Throughout the process of categorization we also make conceptual transformation of time into space wherein modernity and development are defined as being here and primitiveness is there (Kelly, 2006). This dichotomous phenomenon translates into new definitive geographies of danger, failed states, and environmental threats that inscribe the world in postmodern terms of stable centers and threatening peripheries (Kelly, 2006). Agnew further states that this process "provides the geographical framing within which political elites and

mass publics act in the world in pursuit of their own identities and interests” (Kelly, 2006).

A content analysis of US newspaper articles on Haiti from 2004-2005 showed that the most notable and reoccurring frames discovered in the articles pertained to violence, political unrest, poverty, economy, history, illicit drugs, landscape, refugee (Potter, 2006). “Haiti’s ‘bad press’ is bad indeed-not merely because it is defamatory ... [but also] because it obscures Haiti’s real problems, their causes, and their possible cures” (Farmer, 2006). A similar study conducted, surveyed six news sources broadcasted in three different languages from Canada and the United States(Adam, 1991). The goal of the research was to ascertain the discursive differences in their coverage of Nicaragua during the Iran Contra Affair. News sources shared a common identification of Nicaragua as a problematic country and “adopted the moral paradigm invoked by the US government of focusing upon the state of democracy and human rights” in order to justify US economic and military sanctions (Adam ,1991). Reports of human rights violations were kept to a minimum or were only tangentially acknowledged (Adam, 1991). Reliance on the US government’s version of events was significant. Little attention was given to historical social and political relations while much was given to official US positions and policy (Adam, 1991). The main discourses, frames, and scripts pervading the news broadcasts were drawn from US government sources, Cold War rhetoric, and stereotypes of Third World underdevelopment instead of structural, historical, and indigenous explanations. US news coverage applied cold war nomenclature and terminology to Nicaragua which led to the spread of a Cold War worldview (Adam, 1991). Neither the US nor the Canadian networks covered the grassroots movements against US intervention (Adam, 1991). Overall, Canadian news seemed to refrain from critiquing or

contradicting US news while not overtly endorsing it either (Adam, 1991). Another content analysis ascertained the way in which two Canadian newspapers represented Canadian Forces' peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan and how the myth of peacekeeping was maneuvered (Williams, 2009). The myth of peacekeeping was both "celebrated and denigrated," legitimizing the military's presence in Afghanistan while simultaneously "contributing to a discursive shift in the way that the Canadian Forces [are] represented" from a peacekeeping force to a "combat-capable" force (Williams, 2009, p. 6).

Positing possible explanations for the differences in coverage between four media outlets, Riez (2010) relied on a theory of media gatekeeping. The analysis demonstrated a general lack of coverage in the international periodicals with respect to the conflict studied: however, the *Guardian* and *Mail & Guardian* generally provided more nuanced and in-depth analysis of the conflict than *The New York Times* (Riez, 2010). The study highlighted the general lack of coverage in the international press but also further demonstrated the ways in which the US media differs from the European press, a point that few previous studies have expounded (Riez, 2010).

THEORIES OF MEDIA-STATE RELATIONS

The relationship between power, politics, the media, and the public is a highly and continually contested one. Researchers argue about the level of influence the media has on the public and the government, whether the government or the media is the source of political discourse and change, and the role of the media as an information disseminator. The "manufacturing consent" and "political consent" models are two primary theories that seek to explain media-state relations. From them a series of middle ground theories

have emerged to explain the degrees to which the media and the government influence the spread of information.

The manufacturing consent model implies that the media is influenced by the frames of reference of policy elites and that news accounts often support dominant perspectives (Robinson, 2001, p. 525). Two major divisions of manufactured consent theory: executive and elite. Under the executive version, media is believed to employ frames of reference from the perspective of members of the executive branch of the government (Robinson, 2001, p. 525). The function of the news media is not to criticize or challenge policies, but to achieve conformity between the media coverage and executive policy, thereby preventing the media from influencing policy (Robinson, 2001, p. 526). In effect, the media is a reflection of government policy and in some cases global cultural norms and thus has no discernable effect on them. Alternatively the elite version, encompassing a broader scope, maintains that news media conforms to the interests and agendas of all political elites (Robinson, 2001, p. 526). Robinson (2001) refers to the work of Daniel Hallin who concluded that media coverage during the Vietnam War began to reflect a division in support for the war only after political elites in Washington became anti-war (p. 526). Media controversy is often manufactured or legitimated with the consent of political elites and divergent media often work within the confines of “official Washington policy debates,” despite the controversial nature they attempt to invoke (Robinson, 2001, p. 527). Elite manufacturing consent theory in this method acknowledges that media coverage may be critical of executive policy, but only in those cases where there exists a conflict regarding policy among elites. Although the elite version allows for the possible argument that media coverage may reflect controversy

between elite factions, it does not examine the possibility that media coverage might influence policy formation or act as a sovereign actor. In addition, the manufacturing consent paradigm ignores the intentional and unintentional biases of human nature. Journalists are not given due consideration as humans who are ineluctably biased and might intentionally or unintentionally portray that bias in their media coverage.

In relative opposition to the manufacturing consent model, the political consent paradigm claims that while the media's role is often to reflect or mobilize support for the dominant frames that characterize the global culture, there are some cases in which the media will support marginalized groups (Wolfsfeld, 1997). Wolfsfeld (1997) argues that the most predominant factor that determines the ability of marginalized groups to control the media agenda and the objectivity of the news media is the elite's degree of control over the political environment (p. 24). However, little attention or concrete evidence as to whether this changes the balance of power between competing elite factions or to what extent it affects policy.

Noting the limitations of both the manufacturing and political consent models, Robinson (2001) combines the two models of media influence to create a stronger theoretical basis for media studies (p. 523). This convergence occurs during times of policy uncertainty, giving the media the ability to influence policy (Robinson, 2001, p. 533). Uncertainty is derived from a lack of consensus between elite factions or because of an ambiguous policy that arise as a result of a sudden crisis (Robinson, 2001, p. 534). During these occasions of uncertainty, the media may choose to adopt particular or opposing frames of reference that result in three possible outcomes for the government: (1) public opinion may be influenced by critical media coverage, (2) there may be

associated damage to the government's image and credibility caused by negative press, and (3) policy-makers may be influenced by the media and may question government policy (Robinson, 2001, p. 535). Furthermore, dissenting media coverage can pressure policy-makers to respond to the issue or to sell existing policy in order to influence the media debate (Robinson, 2001, p. 535). The aim of media sources are not to change or shift policy but to influence its timing or to compress the amount of time available for making policy decisions (Moeller, 2004, 386). In contrast, Moeller (2004) states that the media may be agenda setting, but it is not agenda determining (p. 387). Since the 1990s and the expansion of UN Peacekeeping missions, the UN has had to rely on "coalitions of the willing" in order to carry out their missions, potentially giving the media greater importance in the success of peacekeeping missions. "Educated by the media, the general public has discovered that the morality in peacekeeping-whether by governments or by international organizations-is chimerical" (Moeller, 2004, p. 389). From a different perspective, the relationship between media and the state can be best explained through "dialogical networks" where conversations can be carried out through public channels and the inter-textual character of talk in the media is the focus of analysis (Leudar and Nekvapil, 2004, p. 248). These theories give added agency to the media, but characterize the variations of "influence-relationships" between the media, the government, and the public.

Media influence is not limited to broad theoretical relationships of influence between actors, but can similarly occur at more localized or individual level. When discussing the role of the media and political power in the United States, Paletz and Entman (1981, p. 6) identify several, arguably unintentional, effects of that role: the

media can influence the decisions and actions of politicians or reduce their ability to control events; the media's openness to manipulation allows power holders to maintain their grasp; the media serves as a mechanism that can reallocate power among the powerful; and the media can foment discontent among the public. This gives particular agency to the media as a controlling power. A common form of media misrepresentation is omission (Parenti, 1993, p. 192). In some cases media misrepresentation occurs in the unequal balance given to actors involved in a conflict, meaning that the media may present multiple aspects of a story but does not incorporate those sides existing in the margins (Parenti, 1993, p. 198). Headlines are used to set the tone for a story and can change a reader's perception of the entire story and this "graying of reality" can neutralize sensational stories by blurring popular grievances and social inequalities (Parenti, 1993, p. 203-205). There are two additional points of "selection distortion" in the chain of news communication from world events to personal image (Galtung and Ruge, 1965, p. 65). Distortion can occur at the point between media perception (of world events) and media image, and again between personal perception (of the media image) and personal image. Techniques such as these are commonly used by the media to alter audience perceptions or to convey specific discourses. Often the media acts to guard the status quo interests rather than serve as critical watchdogs (Donohue et al., 1995). Coverage of social protest parallels this idea by favoring elite power structures over the complaints and views of protesters (Gitlin, 1980; Murdock, 1981). The protest paradigm examines the techniques of delegitimization and marginalization that facilitates the coverage of social protest in such a manner that promotes the elite over the protestor (D.M. McLeod and Detenber, 1999). Consequently, media coverage of social protest often focuses on details about disruptions with police, lawlessness, and public opinion

against protestors and other information that belies the reality of and undermines the protest (Dardis, 2006, p. 412).

Whitaker (2011, vii) analyzes American newspapers during conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq and the production of geopolitical knowledge and the domino theory's role as a geopolitical discourse. The phrase "domino theory" was used by the American news media as an "operational discourse to re-interpret arguments for military intervention in these international crises in an overwhelmingly negative light" (Whitaker, 2011). The core of this research argues that media references to the domino theory were a way in which American news writers perceived and/or choose to represent world affairs issues as part of an oppositional discourse. This discourse then operated as a promotional mechanism for certain elite decision-maker perspectives or agendas. Injected into the popular geopolitics of American by journalists chose to utilize the term domino theory in a way that colored the depictions embedded in their reporting on Bosnia (from 1993-1995), Kosovo (1999), and Iraq (from 2003-2007) (Whitaker, 2011, p. 6). The media plays an integral role as an information industry and has the ability, agency, and power to influence their audiences.

THE CNN EFFECT

The CNN effect is "a foreign policy of media-specified crisis management" the impact of media on foreign policy is conditional, dependent on particular situations and crises (Livingston, 1997, p. 2). The CNN effect has three primary roles (1) as a policy agenda setting agent, (2) as an impediment (emotional or security risk) to the achievement of desired policy goals, and (3) as an accelerant to policy decision-making. In some cases it is possible that the media plays a combination or all the above mentioned

roles. Particularly in cases of humanitarian crises, the media will highlight an issue, essentially compelling the government to respond by inciting the emotions of their viewers (Livingston, 1997, p. 6). However, the CNN effect is sometimes given more credit than it is due. Statistical evidence shows that many cases of humanitarian crises were not given any media attention until after the government provided some form of aid, making the government the catalyst and not the media (Livingston, 1997, p. 7). Under peacemaking (political), peacekeeping (retaining peace), and consensual humanitarian interventions media interest may be high in the early stages but unless there is continued violence, interest will flag (Livingston, 1997, p. 12). Emotional and security impediments may arise and there is a possibility that media coverage may act as an accelerant if there is violent conflict and peace is highly unstable (Livingston, 1997, p. 12). Parallel to Livingston's argument, Gilboa (2005, p. 336) assesses two potential consequences of the CNN effect: global news coverage has accelerated the foreign policy making process, and news coverage can affect the conduct of policy. However, Gilboa argues that the media cannot force the government to act a particular way. While the media can influence timelines and public perceptions, it cannot actively alter the decisions of policy elites.

The CNN effect is essentially a linear process whereby media coverage depicts suffering and violence, resulting in public demands that something be done to mitigate the crisis, and eventually pressuring Western governments into becoming involved (Jakobsen, 2000, p. 132). Contrary to Livingston's statements, Jakobsen (2000, p. 132) concludes that the CNN effect's true impact is advancing policy that supports short-term emergency relief efforts instead of long-term efforts towards state-building, redevelopment, and mitigation. Only dominant in select cases, the CNN effect demands

immediate accelerated action that often leads to inadequate policies. In cases where the media does succeed in bringing a crisis to the forefront of public and government attention, the government will often enact minimalist policies because of a fear of bad press (Jakobsen, 2000, p. 140), not because they want to show that they are responding. Another problem raised by selective media coverage is that of funding. Funding for peacekeeping operations and other humanitarian programs often follows the cameras (Jakobsen, 2000, p. 140). In situations where the media does not cover a crisis or quickly moves on, the funding quickly dries up as attention shifts (Jakobsen, 2000, p. 140).

MEDIA AND PEACEKEEPING

Historically, the UN has implemented media restrictions, but it is mainly in the context of individual state restrictions rather than mandated ones. Initial media coverage of a peacekeeping operation began in 1950 during the Korean War (Smith, 1993, p. 297). Informal censorship in the form of a commitment to keep secret sensitive military information was the singular initial restriction placed on journalism (Knightly, 1975, p. 337). Increasing UN losses resulted in the imposition of a formal system of censorship by the US military (Peace, 1997). While coverage of military operations became increasingly popular, those missions that focused on development received comparatively less press (Lehmann, 1995, p. 113). Diplomats tended to discourage press coverage of negotiations in progress and the lack of coverage meant that restrictions were not needed (Lehmann, 1995, 112). During the Persian Gulf War and the peacekeeping mission in Somalia, US military involvement was a strong impetus for media restrictions. Citing national security, the US military instituted a system of press pools, military escorts, limited access and press reviews (Steger, 1994, p. 972; Smith, 1993, p. 292). In some

cases censorship during UN mandated missions was not at the behest of individual states, but was maintained or imposed by the international body itself. Prior to the 1993 elections in Cambodia, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) attempted to alter the structure and practice of information distribution (Thompson and Price, 2003, p. 184) in an attempt to sway elections. Similarly, the UN attempted to manipulate public opinion through the media in Bosnia in 1995 after the Dayton Accords and again during the UN Interim Mission in Kosovo (Thompson and Price, 2003, p. 184).

Robert Karl Manoff once stated, “the media constitute a major human resource who’s potential to help prevent and moderate social violence begs to be discussed, evaluated, and, where appropriate, mobilized” (Holguin, 1998). In examining the link between media coverage and public opinion of peacekeeping operations, the wide availability of media equipment enhances the opportunities for all actors to manipulate information and to publicize decisions, plans and agreements through their own media. The creation of a UN radio station in Cambodia was successfully used to counteract negative perceptions of United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) within the local population, resulting in significantly greater participation in the country's first democratic election (Holguin, 1998). Another issue the UN Peacekeeping missions face in news coverage is the nature of news media. Holguin states that Western news organizations are more interested in bad news, because bad news sells. Unfortunately positive news, like successful reconstruction programs or democratization are given little air time. Jane Standley, former BBC correspondent in Central Africa, stated, “editors in London are not interested in redevelopment stories, they say those are too soft stories” (Holguin, 1998). In addition, stories that directly affect the Western world are given

precedence over others. This is part of the dualistic nature of global and Westernized perception that is pervasive in news media, particularly Western news media. Many journalists working in the field are known to have remained in the safest zones of a conflict area. Thus they rely heavily on sources like peacekeepers to relay information about the conflict (Holguin, 1998). It is not the sole influence of the media which can alter policy, but also the impacts of media as a propagandic tool that cannot be ignored. Members of the media are also in a unique position to act as mediators between and in concert with other actors, policy makers, government officials, the military, peacekeepers, and NGOs. While constraints exist, there is a greater freedom allotted to those whose purpose is to investigate.

There is a considerable need for peace correspondents, modeled after historical war correspondents, who have the ability and take the initiative to explain a conflict's origins, history, dynamics, and prospects for mitigation. Peace journalism seeks to explore the history of conflicts in order to make them appear transparent: it examines causes and solutions and gives voice to views of all participants (Hanitzsch, 2004, p. 484). Conflict is seen as the core problem, peace journalism is committed to the prevention of violence and war, focuses on the creativity of conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and peacemaking, and attempts to expose lies and cover-ups by all parties involved in the conflict (Hanitzsch, 2004, p. 484). While more news coverage has been given to peacekeeping operations, there remains a lack of understanding regarding the purview of modern operations. Also lacking is viewer's knowledge of the role and structure of the UN and the history of the conflict in host countries. Audience ignorance is exacerbated by the news media's failure to account for the scope of their public's

knowledge of peacekeeping operations (Holguin, 1998). The importance of good press and media coverage in peacekeeping situations is not only for purposes of awareness, but also international and local support and funding.

Current media discourses on peace journalism are couched in terms of war and violence journalism (Shinar, 2004, p. 3). Although the lack of an independent discourse for peace reporting insinuates a lesser importance on peace and resolution than on conflict and violence, the war/violence journalism discourse applied to peace journalism signifies a desire to bring it into the dominant forms of media discourse. Constitutive rhetoric is “mechanism that assigns meaning to new symbolic entities or processes through the combination of social or historical narratives with ideological objectives” (Shinar, 2004, p. 4). The use of constitutive rhetoric by the media can have an impact on the effects of peace media by creating “value-laden connotative discourse [that] legitimizes and integrates organizational and political myths into social structures, creat[ing] reference publics” (Shinar, 2004, p. 4).

The issues that exist between the media and peacekeeping are not limited to a lack of peace media and audience ignorance. Three primary areas in which the media contributes at least in part to the failure of these operations: the failure of the government and military to understand the media, the failure of the UN and its members to respond to anti-peacekeeping propaganda, and the failure of the UN to create a peacekeeping doctrine which accounts for the influence of the media (Badsey, 1997). Peacekeeping missions that do not account for indigenous media is more likely to fail and any project that ignores media as a potential opportunity to resolve or prevent conflict is not accounting for all options (Howard, 2002, p. 2). Consequently, the US military has

attempted to adjust and account for the role of the media in zones of conflict, with limited success. An example of the military's attempts to account for media involvement and the integration of the media sector in peace and stability operations is their 3-07 Field Manual. While it is noteworthy that the US military is acknowledging the role media plays in development, it offers no concrete terms for incorporating media development or for dealing with the media in post-conflict reconstruction (Himelfrab, 2009,p. 7).

A typological timeline, constructed by Howard (2002), accounts for the phases of media experience through post-conflict and reconstruction. With the dissipation of conflict and the entrance of peacekeepers, there may be a proliferation of media outlets including the formation of underground opposition media (Howard, 2002, p. 8). As combatants are demobilized and post-conflict development begins there is a rise in media-consuming audiences and a pro-active social and political media focus (Howard, 2002, p. 8). The instatement of a transitional government and the consequent easing of censorship allows for the reemergence of media associations with an emphasis on professionalism (Howard, 2002, p. 8). Conversely, it can also lead to the emergence of partisanship and the use of media to inflame and distort issues (Howard, 2002, p. 8). As the re-development phase continues and a legal framework for media is introduced, the education system resumes, civil society expands, and the technical infrastructure is expanded, investigative reporting and the expanse of media will increase (Howard, 2002, p. 8).

CITIZEN JOURNALISM AND RADIO TROTTOIR

Radio Trottoir or pavement radio is best defined as systematic rumor or gossip, but is assigned a certain amount of validity. Understood best as a part of oral tradition,

pavement radio is decentralized in the extreme, not controlled by any identifiable individual, institution, or group of people (Ellis, 1989, p. 321). Essentially anonymous and democratic, the story is transmitted on a merit basis. It must be valid and interesting enough for people to want to continue telling it. Pavement radio thrives on and is effective because of scandal, casting doubt, and always names names (Ellis, 1989, p. 322). Unlike a typical rumor mill, the transmission of information through pavement radio includes a validity system whereby stories are gauged based on the believability of the purveyor of information (Ellis, 1989, p. 322). While completely subjective and open for manipulation within the system of pavement radio there are those considered experts and those considered false informants. Credibility depends on who recounts the information and in what context; “over time pavement radio selects the most credible rumors and repeats them, helping to form popular consciousness” (Ellis, 1989, p. 323). In some cases, rumors become so widespread that politicians and political leaders are forced to address them directly (Ellis, 1989, p. 325). Contemporary pavement radio can represent a populist restraint on government; it cuts down to size politicians who are perilously unconstrained by paper constitutions that they do not respect (Ellis, 1989, p. 329). When referring to politically driven anti-government comics in Zimbabwe, Scott states that “such images are a ‘weapon of the weak’, deployed as part of the broader experiences and practices of ‘infrapolitics’” (Scott, 1990). These weapons of the weak are not limited to images but can also be language used by citizens to convey their experience, frustration, and may be a source of protest.

Similar to pavement radio, citizen or participatory journalism provides a forum for investigation into the insight and perception of citizens and the ways in which they

discern and experience the world around them. Citizen journalism has vast democratic implications and points towards new forms of gatekeeping and agenda setting potential (Goode, 2009, p. 1288). While most commonly associated with the internet, citizen journalism is not limited to the online sphere, nor is it confined to alternative news sources (Goode, 2009, p. 1288). Rather, ‘citizen journalism’ refers to a range of practices whereby ‘ordinary’ actors engage in journalistic practices (Lasica, 2003). Blogging, citizen journalism, and social news sites yield new possibilities for citizen participation at various points along those networks that shape and present news, and not just to provide new possibilities for citizens to break news. Instead of treating news as revelation, it is possible to situate citizen journalism within a “framework of mediation” that can account for a wide spectrum of news-making practices (Goode, 2009, p. 1292). Situating these practices within the framework of mediation, Bolter and Grusin (1999) argue that citizen journalism constitutes a complex and layered mix of representation, interpretation, reinterpretation, and translation “whereby news and comment, discourse and information, is reshaped as it traverses a range of sites and varying media platforms.” Broadly defined, citizen journalism feeds the democratic imagination because it fosters an unprecedented potential for news and journalism to become part of a conversation; something that resonates with the ideals of both Jürgen Habermas (1989) and James Carey (1998) thereby allowing citizens to be more than a passive audience.

Others are critical of the term “citizen journalism” because it imparts a level of legitimacy and self-congratulation that some feel should not be applied to most bloggers and others categorized by the term citizen journalists. While he commends the inclusion of user participation on news websites, he is hesitant to recommend that participants are journalists in their own right; they do not understand the basic rules of journalism

(Safran, 2005, p. 22). Journalism requires a “support structure [...] editing, questioning and challenging assumptions” (Safran, 2005, p. 22). It may be more appropriate to refer to this type of journalism as participatory: “a better model is participatory journalism, in which a news organization works with its audience to have that ‘conversation’ that is news (Safran, 2005, p. 22). Gatekeepers ensure that participatory journalism is not taken out of context or given greater meaning than necessary. Conversely, Schaffer (2005, p. 24) argues that citizen journalists are not attempting to engage in big-J journalism, but instead present a type of little-j journalism that includes journalistic components but which are more decentralized and special-interest in nature. “What we [journalists] need to do is listen, collaborate and learn from the knowledge in our audience. Sometimes this means turning over the microphone or pen, or letting people talk back through the Web, or Webcasting editorial meeting. But it really means opening up” (Skoler, 2005, p. 22).

The link between citizen journalism and risk communication is strengthening and the role that citizen journalism plays in regards to risk communications is increasing. “On the one hand, those nursing a growing distrust towards the dominant ‘objective’ media discourse tend to celebrate the localization of blog content or its potential for radical journalism whereas, on the other hand, the self-legitimizing dominant media discourse continues to dismiss bloggers for their lack of institutional norms, ethics and practices” (Maher, 2007). Opponents of participatory journalism remind us that participatory inherently means subjectivity and bias. As a constructed category, citizen journalists have, in reality, many intricate, diverse and contradictory attitudes towards news journalism (Matheson, 2004). In traditional media organizations, editors impose a form of censorship via regulations on data collection, fact checking, and review of content by lawyers employed to ascertain whether stories are libelous (Matheson, 2004).

Subjectivity is not the full purview of citizen journalists but includes professional journalists who may be prone to self-censorship on controversial. Thus, while citizen journalists may not be as self-regulating or reflexive about their material as professional journalists, nor are they constrained by censorship. Despite arguments regarding the merit, subjectivity, ethics and distortion, there are limits to citizen journalism's ability to reshape the news agenda (Mythen, 2010, p. 52).

Peacekeeping missions offer an opportunity for international cooperation and development among states. Their success is contingent, in large part, on the mission's ability to garner the support of the peacekept and the international community. Without the financial and material support of the international community the operations would be bereft of resources and without the support of the peacekept, little progress towards peace and development would be made in host states. For these reasons, among others, it is imperative that we study the way in which the news media portrays peacekeepers and peacekeeping missions. The role of various media sources as an informant, a forum for debate, or an upholder of the status quo is indicative of hidden discourse and significant frames of reference. By identifying and examining those underlying frames patterns of political discourse emerge and can be used to analyze the role of the media as a part of or influence on peacekeeping operations.

Chapter Three: Methods and Sources

A CASE STUDY

I am employing a case study approach of news media from Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire, the United States, and France. The physical orientation of the study sites is primarily Port-au-Prince and Abidjan where successive UN peacekeeping missions have been headquartered and around which many of the offices of the news sources I examined are located. Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire share a common historical context marked by French occupation during the colonial period, ongoing United Nations peacekeeping missions that began in 2004, and have the government as the primary source of internal conflict. These baseline similarities provide a crucial platform from which I can then compare and analyze the different levels of media and their corresponding portrayals of peacekeeping operations. Beyond the geographic location of the case study, the news sources themselves are analyzed as cases. Although based in states ranging from the United States to France and Haiti to Côte d'Ivoire both the international and domestic sources I

surveyed are available online and thus have a potentially international readership. Although, all articles and transcripts I analyzed from these internationally available sources are geographically confined to my study sites in Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire. I used purposive sampling to generate both the case study sites, Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire, but also in the choosing of particular news sources.

A QUALITATIVE APPROACH

In 1967 Strauss and Glaser established the Grounded Theory approach; an inductive process that takes a researcher from data collection to analysis. Grounded Theory is a naturally inductive anthropologic process that culminates in, instead of begins with, the creation of theory (Strauss and Glaser, 1967). Further clarifying the process of grounded theory creation, Strauss and Corbin (1994) stated that theory is derived from the plausible relationships between concepts and sets of concepts or categories. Part of the process of creating grounded theory is conducting constant comparisons between categories identified through a process of coding that can then be analyzed. In accordance with the initial stages of the grounded theory method, I collected a plethora of articles and transcripts from various domestic and international media sources regarding the actions and activities of the United Nations' Peacekeeping Missions in Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire. Once the articles were gathered, I organized them into themes, which were later coded as primary categories, based on their content. The procedure for coding in Grounded Theory analysis begins with the development of categories of information (open coding), making connections between the categories (axial coding), forming a narrative that connects the categories (selective coding), and resulting in a discursive set of theoretical statements or propositions (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).

Throughout this process of coding, and the subsequent analysis and establishment of category connections I employed a form of discourse analysis. “Discourses are systematically organized sets of statements which give expression to the meanings and values of an institution,” but they also determine what can and cannot be said and ultimately done about particular actions (Fowler, 1991, p. 42). Patterns arising from the coding process indicated particularly dominant frames, scripts, and discourses that were then deconstructed and analyzed using discourse analysis to aid in the formation of grounded theories. Ferdinand de Saussure established a sub-method of discourse analysis called semiotics. Between human beings and the world they experience there exist systems of socially constructed signs that acquire meaning by being structured into codes, like language (Fowler, 1991, p. 3). Codes or language can give the world meaning and significance by organizing it into categories with relationships that are not there “naturally” but which represent the values, discourses, ideologies, interests, and behaviors of human communities; codes provide an organized mental representation for our experience (Fowler, 1991, p. 3). It is imperative that an analysis of discourse or text does not merely examine and analyze the text and language used itself, but also the context of the author and the social production of the text. Discourse analysis must move in and out of the text, considering both what is said and who is saying it (Hook, 2001, p. 543): it is both the instrument and result of power (Hook, 2001, p. 540). An examination of the social construction of text in addition to the context surrounding the author and to some extent the audience allows for a more credible analysis of the portrayals of peacekeeping missions and peacekeepers by the news media. Publishing and broadcasting organizations are governed by the discourses of the society or political realm in which they function. Thus the textual content of articles can be an indicator of

the inherent discourses, frames, and scripts employed and believed by a publishing or broadcasting organization whose material is presented, in all its bias, to the public audience.

Outlined in greater detail in the following section, data collection proved to be a rather difficult and limiting endeavor. For the purpose of this study I selected various types of media, including television, radio, and newspapers in order to ensure a wide variety of news outlets that cater to a wide variety of socioeconomic populations. Radio is one of the most widespread sources I have used in my survey of media in Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire because in most conflict areas where there are peacekeepers, radio is considered the most powerful and widespread medium (Holguin, 1998). Not all of the news sources that I have chosen are the most popular or widespread in that particular country, but they all provide their articles and transcripts online. The news sources that I have drawn from are as follows: CNN (international but US based), Radio France International Afrique and Radio France Internationale Haiti, Fraternité Matin (Côte d'Ivoire), Nouvelle République (Côte d'Ivoire), Le Jour (Côte d'Ivoire), Bri Kouri Nouvèl Gaye (Haiti), Citizen Haiti, Kiskeya (Haiti), Le Nouvelliste (Haiti), and Radio Métropole (Haiti).

After compiling articles and transcripts from the listed news organizations I organized them according to theme, based on their content. It became clear through the initial division based on dominant themes that patterns were present and comparisons could be made between Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire. I then reread the articles and transcripts I had compiled into themes and began the process of open coding. Figure 3.1 and 3.2 show two samples of how I began the process of open coding. As I read through the articles, I

would underline sections, phrases, and words that directly commented on the peacekeeping operations in Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti or that I thought could be representative of the way that the news source views and portrays the operations.

Figure 3.1

Côte d'Ivoire – Nouvelle République

Article Reference #2 (first-tier coding)

Massive abuses under the UN

20/12/2010 05:40

The peacekeepers, ordered by Gbagbo to leave the country, are preparing to "all". The UN condemns massive violations of human rights.

Event in Paris yesterday. - (AFP)

The UN, which has raised an objection of inadmissibility to the requirement of Laurent Gbagbo withdrawal of peacekeepers to Ivory Coast, was "prepared for everything" yesterday, even if it wants to avoid a confrontation with the armed forces loyal to the president. "We redouble our vigilance," said the spokesman of the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). To prevent the risk of confrontation, "there are sensitive areas where we do not go, to the presidency" in particular, located in the administrative district of Plateau in Abidjan, he said.

Through the voice of its Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, the UN, which does not recognize the election of Mr. Gbagbo and considers his rival Alassane Ouattara as the elected president, rejected the request of the incumbent.

More than 50 dead

Laurent Gbagbo and the Forces for Defence and Security (FDS) loyal to him have accused UNOCI military support the former rebel New Forces (FN) supporting his rival Alassane Ouattara. In addition to the withdrawal of peacekeepers, numbering 10,000, Mr. Gbagbo also demanded that the French Licorne force (900 men). France asked Gbagbo yesterday to "hold his troops' can end of the ultimatum it set for his departure.

The violence is "the last three days more than 50 dead and over 200 injured," said the High Commissioner for Human Rights of the United Nations, Navi Pillay, worrying about "massive violations of human rights ", including denouncing abductions reported that "hundreds of victims and their families. " These abductions, which occur especially at night "would be the work of pro-Gbagbo".

Clashed yesterday in Paris, supporters of the two presidents announced the Ivory Coast. According to the prefecture, "between 200 and 300" pro-Gbagbo militants had gathered in Republic Square where they intended to scroll to the Place de la Bastille when "hundreds" of pro-Ouattara arrived. Clashes then erupted between the two sides leaving two injured, one with knives. The police, numerous, occurred at the outbreak of clashes and conducted dozens of identity checks.

Figure 3.2

Haiti – Le Nouvelliste

Article Reference #20 (first tier coding)

Article 121: 12/09/2004

MINUSTAH was not there!

"... The white, I really do not know what they came to the country ... hell, they give us their weapons and ammunition and that way we can better take care of the vagabonds who sow ...". disorder in the country is thinking of a policeman on the work of UN forces in Haiti. The officer watched from a specialized unit on Thursday at noon in front of the Deputy Commissioner of the portal St. Joseph, the presence of chimeras Lavalas who fired gunshots in the area. But contrary to what was promised, MINUSTAH was not there!

Haiti: This Thursday, at midday, a sharp tension reigned for more than an hour, around-head beef market. Heavy detonations were heard. Retailers and passersby ran in all directions. At the right end of the market, one could see traces of the fire that broke out yesterday. Trestles of goods and iron beds were burned. The police stood guard in the area were alone. UN forces, until such times disturbing, were not around.

A desert of 0:00 to 12:00

For over a quarter of an hour between 11am and 40 noon, traffic stops completely in the zone. The boulevard becomes desert. Not far from the market, rising in the sky a gray smoke. A loss of sight, the Boulevard to the intersection of Aviation, one person noted. Some passers undecided about whether they should turn back or continue in that direction.

In front and around the Sub-Commission Portal Saint Joseph, less than a dozen police officers are stationed. Armed, the agents of the order would intervene in the event of an attack by bandits. They get "this morning in the vicinity, but they cannot pass to the Deputy Commissioner," told us the same officer mentioned above.

With each explosion, people start running. Merchants who still had their recalcitrant marchanises spread rush to pick them up. A commercial water walking busy icing his big aluminum container of water, while close to her, other people scamper at full speed after a loud bang.

MINUSTAH": the "white holiday

The shops and galleries of the warehouse area, employees or owners watch the street. Some simply close shop. In front of each door, a small crowd. Some say they will have to return to their hometown in the province. Others argue that they did not otherwise choose

to remain in the hell of Port-au-Prince. But all these thoughts always end up heading to MINUSTAH. "... The white, one wonders why they were sent here? ... they are tourists ... you see where you need them, they are not present. But if you go to the supermarket in the heights of Delmas and in restaurants, you will certainly find! "

When asked about the promises of the new Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations in Haiti, Ambassador Juan Gabriel Valdes, on strengthening the presence of MINUSTAH in warm areas, these people treat them as empty rhetoric. They advance to substantiate their assertion that the evidence is much greater today since this morning, shots and moments of panic are recorded in the area and no United Nations presence was noticed.

However, Bel-Air Patrol fixed MINUSTAH were noticed next to the Church of Perpetual Help. To 13h, three tanks of MINUSTAH down the Bel-Air, toward the Rue Macajoux.

To adapt to this troubling situation, even children are taking action. In a family in Port-au-Prince, three children aged between 4 and 9 write their names on a daily basis under their feet. "If I cut off the head, said one, like that my mom can identify with." Another, leaving each afternoon drive in the courtyard of his house, always address thanks to the Lord: "Thank God. We do not cut my head today." Gratitude in children.

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These underlined sections were then compiled (see Figure 3.3 and 3.4) and subjected to open coding. During open coding, I examined the text for salient categories of information that are supported by the text and that characterize the portrayals of peacekeeping operations by the media source. Figure 3.1 corresponds to Figure 3.3 (Article #2) and Figure 3.2 corresponds to Figure 3.4 (Article #20). The information in Figure 3.3 article number 2 contains the text that was underlined in Figure 3.1 and gives a sample of how I used the information from the article to identify and code categories. Article number 2, for example, contained the title “Massive abuses under UN” and implied that the UN was to blame for not mitigating violence and human rights abuses. This resulted in the “UN at fault” category. The categories listed along the right edge of Figure 3.3 are sub-categories that are related to the central category viewed in brackets. In the case of this article, axial coding revealed that the central category or phenomenon is one of “confrontation” while the categories listed to the right are part of a conditional matrix² and may compose the causal conditions, strategies for mitigating the phenomenon, the contest and intervening categories that shape those strategies, and the consequences of those strategies. At this phase of analysis, where primary categories are identified and axial coding has highlighted the connections between categories a coding paradigm, “a theoretical model that visually portrays the interrelationship” of these categories and information is established (Creswell, 1998, p. 151). Theories were then

² A conditional matrix is a diagram that helps the researcher visualize the wide range of conditions and consequences related to the central phenomenon (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).

created by combining and analyzing the results of the coding paradigm, the conditional matrix, and a discourse analysis and presenting it through selective coding³.

³ Selective coding is when a researcher identifies and writes a story line that incorporates the categories in the axial coding model (Creswell, 1998, p. 57). In the case of my study, this “story line” includes an analysis of the relationship between the conditional and coding matrices and the discourse analysis.

Figure 3.3

CÔTE D'IVOIRE (second tier coding)

Article #

1) [Elections, Justification] UNOCI critical of French dialogue critiquing UN's progress on elections; "much delayed presidential election" + "problems with voter registration" + "UNOCI says 6.5/15 million potential voters registered"; title "Cote d'Ivoire attacks French criticism" MEMO: the issue is elevated to state status implied by the title, but it is unclear whether the statement is made that the country of Côte d'Ivoire attacks French criticism or UNOCI hiding behind the much larger statement

2) [Confrontation] Title; "massive abuses under UN", peacekeepers ordered to leave country by Gbagbo – instead they are avoiding areas where the President and his supporters are located or controlling "to prevent the risk of confrontation there are sensitive areas where we do not go, UNOCI states that it is redoubling its vigilance, "prepared for everything" Gbagbo maintains that UN is aiding the pro-Ouattara New Forces ? MEMO: title implies a macro scale issue, the question is are those abuses really that widespread or is the author merely overstating the facts. ONUCI almost seems to be tentatively avoiding the president and his supporters – may lead to questions regarding sincerity or commitment, although G repeatedly accuses the UN of aiding or being pro-Ouattara, the UN repeatedly states that it is not ... what do events show?

3) [Role of UNOCI] "the UN along with Western and African States" = possibly indicating an immediate unconscious association between the UN and Western states (Western = discursive term), "The UNOCI mission deployed in 2004 to help end a civil war between Gbagbo's southern forces and northern rebels dubbed the New Forces, who back Ouattara" (what RFI considers the UN's role) + "Gbagbo's order increase fears of a new conflict" MEMO: perception may be that UN is not doing its job or that they will quake in the face of G's demand that they remove themselves from the country. If fears are increased, does that comment on the stability and relative success of the mission in alleviating the crisis and the fears of the peacekept?

Handwritten notes:

- next to 1): + / -
- next to 2): + / -
- next to 3): - / Neutral
- next to 1): delayed elections, Problems w/ voter registration, BUT, potential voters registered
- next to 2): UN at fault, "prepared", vigilance avoidance, confrontation, positive-negative dichotomy in article
- next to 3): consequences for those who attack UN, role + doubts of success

Figure 3.4

Haiti – Second tier coding

Article #

imply previously unofficial

19. [Critical, Role] “MINUSTAH has made its official entry into Haiti”
“MINUSTAH will assist in the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti, including providing operational support to the HNP and the Haitian Coast Guard by reinforcing the institutional level, by giving up the prison system, wrote the UN office in Haiti” “MINUSTAH is reminiscent of some previous missions UNSMIL MIPONUH, MINUAH UNTMIH and which had similar inconclusive results” “MINUSTAH was deployed at the end of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter is the strongest mandate of the UN, which implies the use of force to achieve the mission”

Role

critical of ability for success

violence justified

20. [Critical, Role] Title: “MINUSTAH was not there!” “... The white, I really do not know what they came to the country ... hell, they give us their weapons and ammunition and that way we can better take care of the vagabonds who sow ...”. disorder in the country is thinking of a policeman on the work of UN forces in Haiti. The officer watched from a specialized unit on Thursday at noon in front of the Deputy Commissioner of the portal St. Joseph, the presence of chimeras Lavalas who fired gunshots in the area. But contrary to what was promised, MINUSTAH was not there!” “MINUSTAH the white holiday” “... The white, one wonders why they were sent here? ... they are tourists ... you see where you need them, they are not present. But if you go to the supermarket in the heights of Delmas and in restaurants, you will certainly find!” “shots and moments of panic are recorded in the area and no United Nations presence was noticed. However, Bel-Air Patrol fixed MINUSTAH were noticed next to the Church of Perpetual Help. To 13h, three tanks of MINUSTAH down the Bel-Air, toward the Rue Macajoux.”

Role - questioned

doubt mission
“white holiday”

not present when needed - loss of trust

“tourists”

21. [critical] “Tourists of the UN”, “the first police offensive turned into a fiasco in Cite Soleil. Baffled by the force of resistance, the commandos of the national police were forced to retreat after hours of street fighting, in their flight covered by the peacekeepers. The effect of these evasions was disastrous”, ““Paralyzed with fear of bloodshed, the team of” technocrats “rushed to the bedside of Haiti relied for its defense until the reluctance of MINUSTAH, headed by a Brazilian general. “Tourists nice, but tourists, a ton University. More familiar with our beaches and nightclubs that malfamées streets.”

“tourists”

inability to cope with challenges

“tourists”

Figure 3.4 shows the same open and axial coding process outlined in reference to article number 2 (from Figure 3.3) in article number 20. To the left of the text from article number 20 is a dashed line. The line indicates that this article negatively portrays peacekeepers. Article number 2 in Figure 3.3 has a plus dash minus symbol. This indicates that the article is considered to be fairly evenly split between a positive and negative portrayal of peacekeeping operations. The process of axial coding and the categories created through open coding are also organized into concept maps that show the connections between primary and subsidiary categories (see Figure 4.10).

Articles and transcripts from news sources are not the only source of media text that I examined. In order to glean information about how the most individual level of news media portrays peacekeeping and peacekeepers I included in my portfolio of news sources transcripts and statements from twitter. After creating a twitter account, I used the search and hashtag mechanism to find tweets that included information about the peacekeeping missions in Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire. The hashtags that I used in my search were the French and English acronyms for the peacekeeping missions in both case study locations: #ONU CI, #UNOCI, and #MINUSTAH hashtags. I used a similar coding process to create categories for the tweets. Figure 3.5 shows a selection of tweets, the categories that I coded (shown in brackets), and any memo information that I included with the tweet. Since most of the tweets only had one category I did not engage in axial coding in this case.

Figure 3.5

Côte D'Ivoire Twitter Accounts

1. New leader for ONUCI: "I know also a plot international" [int'l plot]
MEMO: what does it say about the views, ideology of the tweeter that they use the phrase "international plot"?
2. ONUCI calls for large participation in elections [elections – call for participation]
MEMO: analysis of the statement "calls for"
3. The international organization Interpeace discusses with ONUCI the process of reconciliation [int'l organization – reconciliation]
MEMO: does this indicate that it is felt that only an international organization can formulate peace? What do they mean by a process of reconciliation? What is reconciliation?
4. ONUCI denounces the abuses by FRCI pro-Ouattara [violence – UN "denounces the abuses"]
5. The day before the elections, [elections] [onuci "urges" media to be responsible]
ONUCI urges the Ivoirian media to be responsible
MEMO: the implication is present that ONUCI does not trust the Ivoirian media to cooperate with their support of smooth and fair elections, what are the historical implications of this occurring?

Haiti Tweets

1. Important mission between MINUSTAH and PNH resulted in four arrests [justification]
MEMO: positive message about cooperation between MINUSTAH and PNH – justifying their presence and affirming their progress
2. MINUSTAH and PNH work together against crime in the neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince [justification]
MEMO: positive message about cooperation between MINUSTAH and PNH – justifying their presence and affirming their progress
3. MINUSTAH is willing to mitigate the impact of cholera in PaP [cholera] [justification]
MEMO: "is willing" not a very strong statement of intent, but otherwise a positive message for the work of MINUSTAH

4. 7 criminals were arrested by PNH and MINUSTAH for escaping prison and other crimes [justification] [critique]

MEMO: positive message about cooperation between MINUSTAH and PNH – justifying their presence and affirming their progress BUT they did escape in the first place ... maybe a little critical too

5. “Wish them luck” “continental action for MINUSTAH withdrawal from Haiti Saturday in Sao Paolo” [withdrawal]

MEDIA SOURCES

The oral code of communication ties itself to communities of language, ignoring formal political borders (Pinkerton and Dodds, 2009, p. 17). Transcendent of geographic boundaries the news media is uniquely placed to offer insight into the affairs of distant locations from a variety of perspectives. I have chosen to examine a variety of types of news partly because online accessibility is limited, but also because newspapers and radio broadcasts account for a variety of socioeconomic backgrounds. Although newspapers and journals have historically been the foundation of news reporting, radio is imbued with an aura of accessibility and democratic potential not found in paid for, limited distribution, print material. Radio and other forms of news transmission have become a form of soft power (Pinkerton and Dodds, 2009, p. 17). Control of this resource and the ability to use the media as a means transmitting ideas, propaganda, and information allows or prevents certain factions among a population a voice. In Haiti, there is a significant population of domestic-local and participatory news outlets. Greater censorship and less freedom of the media might account for the comparably fewer local and participatory media outlets in Côte d'Ivoire. While Haiti has enjoyed greater freedom of the press, for the past two decades, the media in Côte d'Ivoire has been categorized as "not free" (Karlekar, 2011). Despite this trend, in the past ten years in Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti, locally owned and operated radio station have become more prevalent; possibly in response to dominant foreign media and the implementation of democratic institutions.

Below are the profiles for each of the news sources from which I selected articles and transcripts to examine with the exception of Kiskeya on which I could not locate and biographical information. Throughout my thesis, I will often refer to the articles and

transcripts from CNN and RFI as from Haiti or Côte d'Ivoire even though the sources are based in the United States and France. This is merely for clarification so that readers understand when I am talking about a CNN or RFI article that refers to MINUSTAH (Haiti) or UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire).

CABLE NEWS NETWORK

The first to offer twenty-four hour news broadcasts, the Cable News Network (CNN) was founded by R. E. Turner in 1980 (Company, 2011). Turner Broadcasting, the manager of CNN, expanded in the 1990s and was acquired by Time Warner Incorporated (Company, 2011). Since its conception, Turner Broadcasting has expanded to encompass more than two hundred countries and broadcasts in over thirty languages (Company, 2011). CNN is also the namesake of the CNN Effect. Originally referred to as “the adverse psychological, economic, and financial consequences of CNN’s war coverage” (Gilboa, 2005, p. 327) the CNN Effect later became synonymous with how public opinion, shaped by the media, has set the pace and forced policy makers to make decisions (Gilboa, 2005, p. 328). Despite the fervent debate surrounding the validity and effects of the CNN Effect, many agree that it is most prominent and pervasive during periods of policy uncertainty (Robinson, 2011, p. 6). Heavily discussed and debated in the 1990s, Robinson (2005) argues that the CNN effect has receded in the past decade. The “war on terror” has resulted in a lesser importance placed on humanitarian concerns and aligned media concerns with policy-maker’s (Robinson, 2005, p. 346).

RADIO FRANCE INTERNATIONALE

Radio France Internationale (RFI) is a global public service radio station that offers twenty-four hour news broadcasts. Based in Paris, the network has a plethora of

correspondents and includes ten permanent bureaus abroad (About RFI, 2012). Originally designed as a culture-driven broadcaster instead of a politically driven one (Wood, 1992, p. 199), RFI was founded in 1975. Established by the French Government as part of the larger Radio France conglomerate, it operates under the auspices of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mytton and Forrester, 1988). The relationship between RFI and the French government implies potentially parallels between government policy and the manner in which information is framed on broadcasts. Indicative of this relationship this station seeks to “promote the French language” internationally, but particularly in francophone states (About RFI, 2012). Although French is the primary language, the station has expanded to include broadcasts in English, Kiswahili, Hausa, Spanish, Portuguese, Romanian, Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese and Polish (About RFI, 2012).

STATE FUNDED AND INDEPENDENT MEDIA IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE

Despite the lack of media freedom in Côte d’Ivoire, independent newspapers flourished in 1990 when opposition parties were legalized. Before the ink was dry, a mere year later, the state passed legislation that authorized the suspension or seizure of any publications that disparaged the head of state, gave away national secrets, or derided the nation (Bourgault, 1995, p. 214): severely limiting the voice of the new independent press. “Third world media, through gatekeepers associated with government control or guidance, can and do impress their preferences on the news they select for publication” (Skurnik, 1981, p. 107). Consequently, African papers tend to frame their information in sensationalism, emphasizing peaceful and violent domestic events and conflictual and cooperative international events (Skurnik, 1981, p. 107). This combination of sensationalism and the dichotomy between the critical and justification is not limited to

African newspapers. My research discovers that this framework continues throughout all of the sources that I investigated.

FRATERNITE MATIN

Fraternité Matin (FM) was created by President Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d'Ivoire as a tool of propaganda for his regime. "Houphouët's regime tolerated no independent rival to the government controlled Fraternité Matin and its sister periodicals" (Campbell, 1998, p. 76). Throughout his rule it was apparent that the newspaper was an extension of the President, tolerating no criticism of his actions or policies and presenting only those positions of opposition mandated through the President's system of Dialogue. Officially designed to foment development Frat Mat was founded by the Ivoirian government, with the aid of the French, in 1964 (Hachten, 1992, p. 124). Co-opted with the Société Nouvelles d'Éditions Industrielle, a French publishing company and a subsidiary of La Société Nationale des Entreprises de Presse, a state enterprise, the paper was initially completely French (Hachten, 1992, p. 188) and aimed towards educated French and Ivoirians. It is apparent that Fraternité Matin had close ties not only with the Ivoirian government, but also the French, making it an elite francophone source.

LE JOUR

Founded in 1994 by Diegou Bailly, Le Jour, was regarded as "the paper in the middle" and became known for its evenhandedness, lack of partisanship, and more sophisticated reporting of news (Campbell, 1998, p. 104). Unlike its fellows (Le Patriote and Frat Mat) it often reports from multiple sides of an issue and examines often murky topics in depth, actively promoted democratic institutions and values (Campbell, 1998, p.

105). Although Bailly's formal education was in France, he worked for a number of newspapers in Côte d'Ivoire upon his return from school (Campbell, 1998, p. 105). The anti-partisanship nature of the paper is clearly a result of Bailly's journalist ideology; "no journalist [...] is accountable before any government [...] they are accountable to their public, which is at once the master and the judge" (Campbell, 1998, p. 107). In addition to requiring independent news from his staff, he has been known to be outspoken about his criticism of the partisan nature of other Ivorian media.

NOUVELLE REPUBLIQUE

La Nouvelle République is a regional daily newspaper that was founded by Jean Meunier and Pierre Archambault in September 1944 (La Nouvelle, 2012). The paper sprung from the Resistance movement in France and was established in Tours after the liberation of the city at the end of World War II (Narboux, 2009). Archambault was a Catholic social activist ("Brotherhood of Our Lady of Castille") with limited experience as a pre-war newspaper correspondent. Management of the paper was taken over in 1972 by John Miller (Narboux, 2009).

LE PATRIOTE

Le Patriote is an Ivorian daily newspaper that was founded in 1991 by the Rally of the Republican of Côte d'Ivoire (RDR) (Infos, 2012). This newspaper has suffered censorship in the Ivorian crisis, in particular by the group the "Young Patriots." The RDR is a liberal party in Côte d'Ivoire, and a member of Liberal International. The paper was founded by Djéni Kobina in 1994 and has been chaired by Alassane Ouattara since 1999 (Infos, 2012). Kobina was born Ivorian in Western Côte d'Ivoire and studied in both Côte

d'Ivoire and France before becoming involved in the administrative side of education (Georges, 2005). Incarcerated in prison under the Houphouet regime, he later was a non-commissioned officer of the Ivorian army, Director of Office of Ivorian Government reserve and eventually became the National Secretary of the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI): responsible for relations between political parties (Geogres, 2005). In April 1994, he decided to break away from the PDCI and founded the RDR, a liberal political party falling to the center-left of the Ivorian national political spectrum (Geogres, 2005). Elected as Secretary-General of the RDR in July 1995, he died on 19 October 1998 leaving the RDR to be led by Alassane Ouattara (Geogres, 2005). The close ties between certain political factions, Ouattara, and Le Patriote indicates the presence of a bias in favor of Ouattara and his political sentiments. In actuality, the articles I examined from the paper are relatively anti-Gbagbo and does positively portray UNOCI who is returning Ouattara to power.

HAITIAN MEDIA

LE NOUVELLISTE

William Cherokee and Henri Chauvet founded Le Nouvelliste in 1899 after Cherokee had already made several attempts starting other papers (The Nouvelliste, 2006). After making the transition from editor to partner in 1909, Chauvet purchased the paper, passing the directorship on to George Chauvet in 1919 (The Nouvelliste, 2006). Shortly thereafter, George Chauvet convened a board to run the paper, sharing the burden with Leon Laleau and Frederic Duvigneaud. All three eventually pursued high positions in Haiti's government. The paper remained in family hands until 1969 when former editor Lucien Montas stepped in after the death of the current Chauvet (The Nouvelliste,

2006). It was not until 1983 that the paper returned to family leadership with the return of Max Chauvet from his studies abroad (Le Nouvelliste, 2006). An informational paper, its goal is to be objective but not necessarily neutral, print only verifiable facts, and leave little room for anonymous quotation (The Nouvelliste, 2006). “Since its inception, Le Nouvelliste newspaper has wanted [to be] moderate, liberal and independent. The direction of successive Nouvelliste have always preferred without stopping the primary purpose of the institution, a centrist newspaper” (The Nouvelliste, 2006). The paper emphasizes the pluralistic nature of its readerships by integrating stories about people from all socio-economic viewpoints and encourages analysis and debate. Although it began as a paper closely linked to the government, in the years since it was founded Le Nouvelliste has become (according to my research) a paper that caters to the more educated audiences, but does provide a “centrist” position.

RADIO METROPOLE

A pioneer in Haitian radio, Radio Métropole was the first to broadcast in FM since 1970. Founded by Herbert Widmaier Radio Métropole is a Haitian French language radio station based in Port-au-Prince. The station was one of the first to use the telephone as a tool of communication whereby listeners could listen immediately to the news (Histoire, 2012).

CITIZEN HAITI

The aim of Citizen Haiti “is to encourage voices from the ground to speak up and encourage people to take part in rebuilding the country” (About, 2011). They have partnered with Noula.ht, a crowd-source platform and call center designed to capture

peoples' concerns (About, 2011). Citizen Haiti was created and is financially supported by the International Organization for Migration as a means of communication with tent cities after the 2010 earthquake (About, 2011). An outpouring of letters from the country's 1,300 tent cities motivated IOM to initiate a “Voices of the Voiceless” program and latter expanded into a radio program called Chimen Lakay (About, 2011). Although primarily concerned with news and information that directly concerns inhabitants of tent cities, the graphic newspaper Chimen lakay is the largest circulating Kreyòl language newspaper in Haiti. While the organization that established and administers Citizen Haiti and Chimen Lakay is international they strive to include major components of citizen journalism. Their goal is to promote democracy by providing a forum for participatory journalism and initiate media projects that will eventually be managed by independent domestic Haitian media organizations.

HAITI LIBRE

“HaïtiLibre wants to be the voice of the people of Haiti. Together, take up this challenge” (Why, 2011). Managing Editor Joseph Marcellus together with his team of writers designed HaitiLibre as a citizen initiative that uses apolitical participative decoding to unify the diverse opinions of citizens (Why, 2011). Not merely a news outlet, HaitiLibre analyzes the news, understanding that Haitian media is strongly influenced by commercial aspects, pressure from various interest groups, fear of political retribution, and threats of death or kidnapping. “The information is reported, but rarely commented or questioned, the information is not always substantiated or verified and sometimes feeds rumors (Why, 2011). “Our files are not there to please but to serve as a catalyst to stimulate healthy reactions, emergence of the debate of ideas, promote the expression of

critical thinking, promote freedom of expression, share the information or perceptions of each, initiate a participatory process that is the essence of HaïtiLibre” (Why, 2011).

BRI KOURI NOUVEL GAYE

Bri Kouri Nouvèl Gaye (BKNG or Noise Travels, News Spreads) is composed of a team of six independent Haitian journalists and directed by Etant Dupain, who grew up in the poor neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince and are able to walk among average Haitians and tell their stories (Journal, 2011). The free newspaper, although young, has gathered a loyal following. Their mission extends beyond the reporting of news to community action projects, encouraging people to mobilize peacefully to demand their rights be recognized and respected (Journal, 2011). BKNG has organized a series of demonstrations including sit-ins at the prime minister’s office and a protest against the renewal of the MINUSTAH peacekeeping mission (Journal, 2011). In addition to demonstrations, BKNG is working with partners at the *Bureau des Avocats Internationaux* (BAI) and grassroots organizations in Haiti’s Popular University “to bring dialogue and debate into the camps” (Journal, 2011). More recently, BKNG has been supported in part by the Let Haiti Live organizations. Let Haiti Live is a project of TransAfrica Forum, an African American human rights and social justice advocacy organization in the United States (Let Haiti Live, 2011). It was created because of a lack of a vibrant press telling the stories of Haiti’s people in the national forum and because international journalists were being given a skewed interpretation and determining the discourse about Haiti for decades (Journal, 2011). Parallel to the divisions in Haitian society, TV stations and media sources owned and operated by the elite were dominating the media spectrum and producing a particular biased variation of events. Let Haiti Live decided to support the

creation of an alternative media project with the intent of “elevating and amplifying Haitian voices and perspectives on the current situation” (Journal, 2011). Especially in the aftermath of the earthquake, with more than a million people living homeless in the streets and the largest influx of international funding Haiti has ever seen, it was more critical than ever before to have an independent media option (Journal, 2011).

MEDIA SOURCE TYPOLOGY

From the historical information that I gathered regarding the various media sources that I surveyed, I created a typology. Each of the news sources are categorized based on a characterization of their founders, editors, journalists, target audience, funding, and base of operations. Figure 3.6 represents those categorizations and the resulting typology. Other than CNN which is based in the US and RFI in France, the news sources are divided into two colors: the blue represent sources disseminated in Côte d’Ivoire and the orange are found in Haiti. The Cable News Network (CNN) is broadcast internationally and targets a more educated middle and upper class audience. Broadcast in cable, it is not a channel that can be viewed by everyone, which results in selective viewing by those who can afford to purchase cable television. The regional newspaper Nouvelle République is also distributed internationally despite its regional French focus. Although the paper is placed in the more educated column, it might be considered a local newspaper in France. It is placed in the more educated section because in Côte d’Ivoire it would be read by a more specific spectrum of more educated individuals than a paper like Le Jour. Radio France Internationale is an internationally broadcasted radio network that has a variety of divisions including Africa (Afrique) and Haiti. The network is owned by and funded through the French government. Fraternité Matin is also a state or

government funded paper whose audience and publication is geared more towards the local elite. Both Le Nouvelliste and Le Patriote are locally founded and operated newspapers whose audience seems to be, but is not limited to a more educated public. Le Jour, Kiskeya, and Radio Métropole are all locally based and operated and are scripted for a wide audience. The difference between Le Jour and the local Haitian radio stations and BKNG is that BKNG has a more grassroots, participatory nature. While there is still an aspect of control over ownership and publication, one of their papers The Haitian Independent is composed of stories written by citizens, indicating a very participatory quality. Structurally dissimilar Citizen Haiti, HaitiLibre, and BKNG all provide varying emphasis on participatory media, but consider it a major component of their journalistic style.

ORIENTATION	International	Francophone-Elite	Local	Citizen
More Educated	CNN Nouvelle République (France)		Le Nouvelliste, Le Patriote	
State-sponsored (France)	RFI			
State-sponsored (Côte d'Ivoire)		Fraternité Matin		
Local			Le Jour Kiskeya, Radio Métropole	
Participatory			BKNG	Citizen Haiti, HaitiLibre, Express

Figure 3.6

Articles and transcripts were culled from a number of news sources internationally and domestically. A total of 177 articles and transcripts were collected: 33 from Côte d'Ivoire and 144 from Haiti. The Cable News Network (CNN) and Radio

France Internationale (RFI), international sources shared by both countries, provided 15 articles and 21 transcripts respectively. Nouvelle République (NR) (a French newspaper), Fraternité Matin (FM), Le Jour (LJ), and Le Patriote (LP) published the remaining 13 articles analyzed from Côte d'Ivoire. From Haiti, articles and transcripts were gathered from Le Nouvelliste (LN), Kiskeya (K), Radio Métropole (RM), Bri Kouri Nouvèl Gaye (BKNG) and its associated blogs Citizen Haiti (CH), Haiti Libre (HL) and Express (E). Data gathering was conducted online and articles and transcripts date from 2004 at the commencement of UNOCI and MINUSTAH until November 2011. The following chapters present and discuss the findings generated through the process outlined in the methods section and the coding of articles and transcripts amassed.

Chapter Four: Findings and Analysis

The newspaper and journal articles and radio transcripts compiled for this study date from 2004 to November 2011 and were selected from those news sources available online from the countries included in my case study. In addition three international sources were also selected: CNN, RFI, and Nouvelle République. The following sections will outline an analysis of the results gathered through the process of coding and comparative analysis to determine how different media systems portray UN peacekeeping missions and peacekeepers.

IDENTIFICATION OF PRIMARY CATEGORIES

Coding the articles and transcripts revealed a series of primary categories that linked many of the more diverse and infrequent sub-categories. These primary and subsidiary categories are organized into concept maps and structured according to peacekeeping mission and media source. These concept maps were created to identify the connections between primary and sub-categories and, through analysis, the underlying discourses implied by or indicative of those relationships.

The articles and transcripts from Côte d’Ivoire⁴ yielded ten primary categories (see Figure 5.1): Justification (25%), Confrontation (19%), Elections (19%), Post-Election Crisis (6%), Withdrawal (6%), Violence (6%), Role (6%), Media (6%), Reconciliation (3%), and Public Opinion (3%). Coded articles and transcripts from Haiti offered many of the same ten primary categories (see Figure 5.2), with a few variations: Critical of UN (43%), Elections (19%), Justification (11%), Cholera (9%), Violence (7%), Protest (5%), Withdrawal (3%), Mandate (1%), Role (1%), and Media (1%).

Primary Category	Frequency	Percent
Justification	8	25%
Confrontation	6	19%
Elections	6	19%
Post-Election Crisis	2	6%
Withdrawal	2	6%
Violence	2	6%
Role	2	6%
Media	2	6%
Reconciliation	1	3%
Public Opinion	1	3%
Total	32	

Primary Category	Frequency	Percent
Critical of UN	61	43%
Elections	27	19%
Justification	15	11%
Cholera	13	9%
Violence	10	7%
Protest	7	5%
Withdrawal	4	3%
Mandate	2	1%
Role	1	1%
Media	1	1%
Total	141	

Justification refers to text from an article or transcript that validates the presence and work of the UNPKO or peacekeepers. Some of the justification text is derived from quotes made by UN officials that are included in articles and transcripts and some are the less obsequious statements embedded in the news story’s text. **Confrontation** and **violence** are very similar categories, but are used to describe the variation in intensity of

⁴When I refer to articles and transcripts as being “from” Côte d’Ivoire or Haiti what I am referring to are those articles and transcripts from sources that contain information or a reference to the peacekeeping missions in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI/ONUCI) and Haiti (MINUSTAH).

violence in the interactions between peacekeepers and the peacekept. The division was initiated as a result of the distinction between combatants and civilians as the recipients of interaction with peacekeepers. Interactions primarily transpire between peacekeepers and civilians in Haiti and between combatants and peacekeepers in Côte d'Ivoire. This distinction, although not stated implicitly in the texts, is why both confrontation (19%) and violence (6%) are found in articles and transcripts relating to UNOCI, but only violence (7%) is found in articles relating to MINUSTAH. The **elections** category refers to the presidential elections conducted in Haiti in 2006 and 2011 and in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010. Unlike the shared categories, the **post-election crisis** relates specifically to the situation in Côte d'Ivoire and the **cholera** outbreak to Haiti. The desire by the peacekept (in Haiti), UN and government officials (in either country), and Gbagbo (in Côte d'Ivoire) for the peacekeeping operations hosted to consider withdrawal or have withdrawal demanded of them is conveyed through the **withdrawal** category. The **role** and **mandate** of the UNPKOs in both Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire is discussed repeatedly in terms of what it is, what it should be, and whether it is being carried out. **Reconciliation** is a term used in correlation to the process of reconciliation that is discussed as an ancillary role of peacekeeping. In both Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire the peacekeeping mission has a responsibility to aid in reconciliation between conflicting political factions and among the peacekept. The **critical**⁵ category, like justification is a very broad spectrum classification. Any article or transcript in which the overall theme, tone, or significant portions of the text are critical of the UNPKOs or peacekeepers is grouped under this categorization. The critical category is commonly accompanied by several sub-categories

⁵ This category sometimes appears as "critical to the UN": it is the same category, merely phrased differently.

that may further explain the specific criticisms outlined. **Protest** is the final primary category. For various reasons, the peacekeepers have protested or led demonstrations against UNPKOs in both Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire. Indicative of the peacekeepers' criticism of the PKOs, the protest category is frequently accompanied by or considered under the purview of the critical frame. For a full list of all categories and sub-categories coded and further defined see Appendix B and C.

The most notable difference between the primary categories of both states is perhaps the most frequently coded categories. While a significant percent of Haiti's articles fall under the "Critical of UN" (43%) category, the most frequent category in Côte d'Ivoire is "Justification" (25%). As later sections will reinforce, this trend is a common pattern among Ivoirian and Haitian articles and transcripts, and is mirrored in the descriptions of interactions and the tweets about both missions. The dichotomy between Critical and Justification extends through the remaining primary and sub-categories. Depending on whether the category reflects positively or negatively on peacekeepers, a number of them could be coded under "Justification" or "Critical." Confrontation refers to the physical confrontations between the peacekeepers and peacekeepers. If the confrontation script reflects positively on peacekeepers and reinforces the idea that their mission is ending conflict and reinstating peace and security, then "Confrontation" could be coded under the greater "Justification" category. Similarly, if the confrontation script reflected negatively on peacekeepers, for instance if peacekeepers harmed citizens instead of combatants, the "Confrontation" category could be coded under the "Critical of the UN" categorization. The same logic applies to the peacekeepers' role in securing and promoting democratic elections, their ability to

mitigate a post-election crisis, whether withdrawal is suggested because of the success of a mission or demanded by the peacekept, and whether the role or mandate of the mission is questioned because of dissatisfaction or reinforced as a means of justification.

Depending on whether the “Violence” frame, like confrontation, is negatively referring to peacekeepers violently oppressing protests or positively combating actors engaging in a civil war, the “Violence” category may be considered part of the “Critical” or “Justification” frame and script. Categories like “Protest,” “Media” and “Cholera” could either be considered critical or justification depending on the way peacekeepers handle the protest or the outbreak and what is said in reference to the media. Not all primary categories would fit into “Critical” or “Justification” all the time however. In some instances, an article or transcript presents information that is impartial and does not necessarily reflect positively or negatively on peacekeepers.

In Côte d’Ivoire and Haiti, Elections (19%), Violence (6, 7%), and Withdrawal (6, 3%) seem to be of relatively equal frequency and importance. Elections and Violence are often significant moments in a peacekeeping mission, would be considered very newsworthy, and are more likely to be covered by international news sources because of their sensationalism. In addition, elections represent the imposition and potential success of Western political systems like democracy on the Third World. This is why the “Elections” category is predominant in the international news sources, CNN (US) and RFI (France). Figure 4.3 and 4.4 show the frequency of the “Elections” category in Côte d’Ivoire and Haiti for CNN (20%, 40%) and RFI (20%, 38%).

Frequencies of primary categories according to source are shown in Figure 4.3 and 4.4. While confrontation seems to be of significant interest to international sources

(CNN 60%, RFI 20%, and Nouvelle République 50%) it is not even present in the categories found in local sources. This frequency of the confrontation category in the international news is compatible with Shinar's assertion that the lack of defined peace journalism has led to journalism framed by war and violence rather than post-conflict reconstruction and the development of peace (Shinar, 2004, p. 3). Justification and elections however are present across the spectrum of media systems in Côte d'Ivoire.

Côte d'Ivoire Figure 4.3			
Source	Primary Categories	Frequency (within source)	Percent (within source)
CNN	Confrontation	3	60%
	Justification	1	20%
	Elections	1	20%
RFI	Elections	1	20%
	Role of UNOCI	1	20%
	Confrontation	1	20%
	Withdrawal	1	20%
	Justification	1	20%
NR	Justification	2	50%
	Confrontation	2	50%
FM	Media	1	100%
LJ	Elections	1	100%
LP	Justification	4	25%
	Elections	3	19%
	Violence	2	13%
	Post-Election Crisis	2	13%
	Public Opinion	1	6%
	Reconciliation	1	6%
	Role of UNOCI	1	6%
	Media (UN Radio)	1	6%
	Withdrawal	1	6%
	Total	32	

The primary concern of the international media sources in Haiti are elections (CNN 40% and RFI 44%) and the primary concern of domestic sources, with the exception of Radio Métropole, is unanimously critical (Le Nouvelliste (49%, Kiskeya 38%, Radio Métropole 29%, BKNG 60%, and Citizen Haiti 100%). Radio Métropole, unlike the other domestic sources, discusses elections the most frequently. RFI's second most frequent primary category is "critical". Protests and cholera are included in the most frequent categories of international sources because they are sensational events: events that are more likely to catch the attention of audiences and are thus deemed more newsworthy.

Domestic sources in both countries offer a greater variety of categories and consequently more varied information in their publishing and broadcasts. International sources tend to follow a specific pattern, presenting information that justifies the presence and thus the funding of UNPKOs to audiences who ultimately support those missions and policy-makers who are responsible for the continuation of those missions, or report on "shocking" events like protests, disease outbreaks, and elections. The pattern is apparent when identifying the similarities in categories found in CNN and RFI articles about MINUSTAH and UNOCI. Figure 4.3 and 4.4 identify the primary categories of CNN and RFI which can be organized into two scripts, justification and confrontation, which support Shinar's argument about the lack of peace journalism and the need for international sources to justify the UNPKOs and the shocking events elections, the cholera outbreak, demands by Gbagbo for the withdrawal of UNOCI, and protests.

Haiti: Figure 4.4			
Source	Primary Categories	Frequency (within source)	Percent (within source)
CNN	Elections	4	40%
	Cholera	3	30%
	Protest	2	20%
	Justification	1	10%
RFI	Elections	7	44%
	Critical of UN	6	38%
	Protest	2	12%
	Cholera	1	6%
LN	Critical of UN	39	49%
	Elections	9	11%
	Justification	9	11%
	Violence	8	10%
	Cholera	7	9%
	Mandate	2	3%
	Protest	2	3%
	Withdrawal	2	3%
	Media	1	1%
K	Critical of UN	5	38%
	Justification	4	31%
	Elections	2	15%
	Violence	1	8%
	Withdrawal	1	8%
RM	Elections	5	36%
	Critical of UN	4	29%
	Cholera	1	7%
	Justification	1	7%
	Protest	1	7%
	Role	1	7%
	Violence	1	7%
BKNG	Critical of UN	4	60%
	Cholera	1	20%
	Withdrawal	1	20%
CH/HL/Express	Critical of UN	3	100%

IDENTIFICATION AND FREQUENCY OF SUBSIDIARY CATEGORIES

While a preponderance of the most recurrent concepts are reflected by the primary categories, in some instances, a sub-category is prominently featured. Primary categories are concepts that link all of the sub-categories and in some cases link other primary categories to each other. Figure 4.5 and 4.6 list all categories that have appeared in articles and transcripts more than once⁶. Of the principal eleven categories listed in Figure 4.5, four are considered sub-categories: Ineffective (23), Insecurity (18), Violence equals an increase in patrols (17), and Occupation (10). With the exception of a fraction of the elections category, violence equals an increase in patrols, and justification, all of the most frequent categories reflect negatively on MINUSTAH and UN troops. A number of the categories listed in Figure 4.5 are adjectives used by various news sources to portray the actions and character of peacekeepers. Ineffective (23), insecurity (18), occupation (10), failed (9), blame (8 – refers to whether blame is assigned to peacekeepers for importing cholera), violation of sovereignty (5), fear (4), and tourists (4) are all adjectives used to negatively portray peacekeepers. Comparatively, no blame (8), success (7), and cooperation (4) are used to positively portray and to some extent justify the presence of peacekeepers. It is obvious that the negative portrayals outweigh the positive. Another concept that is repeatedly discussed is cost, the cost of MINUSTAH, the cost of peace, and whether or not paying the cost will result in eventual peace.

⁶For a complete list see Appendix E and F

Haiti Figure 4.5 (See Appendix E for remainder of chart)	
Category	Frequency
Critical of UN	68
Elections	30
Ineffective	23
Protest	21
Insecurity	18
Violence = increase patrols	17
Justification	16
Violence	15
Withdrawal	15
Cholera	14
"Occupation"	10
Failed	9
Role	9
Blame	8
No Blame	8
Assault (peacekeepers on peacekept)	7
Cost	7
Success	7
Mandate Renewal (insecurity still)	6
Media	5
Sovereignty (violated)	5
Cooperation (MINUSTAH HNP and peacekeepers with peacekept)	4
Development (change mandate)	4
Fear	4
Tourists	4
Attacked (MINUSTAH)	3
Goals	3
High Participation	3
Inefficient	3
Prepared (UN claim)	3
Security	3
Agenda (political maneuvering)	2
Confrontation (peacekeepers against PNH)	2
Democracy (like badly fitting suit)	2
Deterrent	2
Military	2
Not Occupation	2
Peaceful (relatively)	2
Relocation (inadequate)	2

All of the most frequent concepts, coded from articles and transcripts citing UNOCI, with ten or more repetitions are primary categories. Opposite the negative trend in Haiti, articles and transcripts about UNOCI describe the mission in primarily positive terms. With the exception of fear (2), the scripts of neutrality (3), effectiveness (2), reinforcement (2) and success (2) positively portray peacekeepers and their actions. This provides further support for the idea that in general MINUSTAH and by extension peacekeeping in Haiti is portrayed negatively and UNOCI is portrayed more moderately and positively.

Côte d'Ivoire Figure 4.6	
Category	Frequency
Justification	16
Role of UNOCI	11
Violence	10
Elections	9
Contradictions	4
Mandate (Violence = stronger mandate)	4
Post-election crisis	4
Confrontation	3
Neutrality	3
Withdrawal	3
Effectiveness	2
Fear	2
Media	3
Negative Propaganda/Media	2
Protest	2
Reinforcement	2
Success	2
(See Appendix F for remaining categories)	

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PRIMARY AND SUBSIDIARY CATEGORIES

The most frequently related categories, including primary and subsidiary, in articles and transcripts from Haiti and Côte d’Ivoire are depicted in Figure 4.7. Of those discussing UNOCI, “justification” and the “role of the mission” (4) are the most frequently connected: an article or transcript that is trying to justify UNOCI will include a discussion of the current or projected role of the mission.

Most Frequently Connected Categories (sources combined)			
State	Category	Category	Number of Connections
CDI	Justification	Role	4
Haiti	Critical	Ineffective	20
	Protest	Violence	9
	Critical	Role	9
	Protest	Cholera	7
Figure 4.7			

Of the articles and transcripts examined about MINUSTAH, the most frequently connected categories are Critical and Ineffective (20), Protest and Violence (9), Critical and Role (9), and Protest and Cholera (7). Consciously or unconsciously the news sources these connections originate from connect these categories repeatedly, implying a certain pervasive perception and framing represented by those connections. The ineffectiveness of the mission is always seen as critical or negative, which is as one would suspect. Protests in general are linked with violence, whether the demonstrations begin that way or are agitated by individuals whose goal is to spread insecurity (as the UN claims). When examining the role of MINUSTAH, news sources are often questioning the role that the mission plays in maintaining peace in Haiti. The cholera

outbreak has caused a number of protests by the peacekeepers, some of which became violent.

Identifying the most frequently connected categories only reveals prevailing perceptions amongst the breadth of news sources. A more specific analysis of the most frequently connected primary and sub-categories arranged by source reveals a plethora of links made between diverse categories. Figure 4.8.1 outlines connections between primary and sub-categories that have occurred at least twice in a particular source's text⁷. Of those sources whose articles and transcripts contained categories that were linked multiple times, several trends emerged. Many of the connected categories under the Côte d'Ivoire umbrella follow a confrontation-justification pattern, essentially balancing the positive and negative news they present. Counter to Haiti, negative here does not refer to negative portrayals of peacekeepers but rather the nature of the new events themselves. Confrontation phenomenon are framed and classified as negative because they represent violent interactions between actors. The most frequent connection made in CNN articles is confrontation-justification (2). Mirrored in the most frequent category links in Nouvelle République and Le Patriote is the dichotomous pattern between confrontation, which indicates some level of violence or a clashing of wills, and justification, which indicates a desire to positively portray and promote UNOCI. In Nouvelle République the contradiction is between the justification-role (2) and confrontation-violence (2) links. In Le Patriote it exists between justification-role (2) and justification-success (2), and violence-role (2) and post-election crisis-violence (2).

⁷Not shown are RFI transcripts and Le Jour and Fraternité Matin articles about UNOCI because they did not have any connections made more than one time.

Figure 4.8.1: Côte d'Ivoire

Source	Typology	Primary Category	Sub-Category	# or times related
CNN	International/ More Educated	Confrontation	Justification	2
NR	International	Justification	Role	2
		Confrontation	Violence	2
LP	Local/More Educated	Justification	Role	2
		Justification	Success	2
		Violence	Role	2
		Post-Election Crisis	Violence	2

Figure 4.8.2⁸				
Source	Typology	Primary Category	Sub-Category	# of times linked
Haiti				
CNN	International/More Educated	Elections	Minimal violence	3
		Cholera	Protest	3
		Elections	Peaceful	2
		Protest	Violence	2
		Cholera	Violence	2
		Cholera	No Blame	2
RFI	International	Critical	Ineffective	3
		Elections	Protest	2
		Protest	Occupation	2
LN	Local/More Educated	Critical	Ineffective	14
		Critical	Failed	7
		Critical	Role	5
		Justification	Cooperation	4
		Violence	Assault (by peacekeepers)	4
		Cholera	Protest	4
		Critical	Cost	4
		Critical	Insecurity	4
		Critical	Occupation	4
		Cholera	No Blame	3
		Elections	Ineffective	2
		Elections	Insecurity	2
		Elections	Fear	2
		Elections	Success	2
		Violence	Insecurity	2
		Violence	Withdraw	2
		Cholera	Blame	2
		Cholera	Critical	2
		Protest	Violence	2
		Protest	Withdrawal	2
Protest	Attacked by students	2		
RM	Local	Critical	Role	2
		Elections	Violence	2

⁸Kiskeya, BKNG, Citizen Haiti, HaitiLibre, and Express are not shown because there are no connections between primary and sub-categories made more than once.

In general the most frequent category found in articles and transcripts about MINUSTAH was “Critical of the UN” (43%). This is not to insinuate that all sources examined are homogenous in their critique of the peacekeeping mission. RFI connects ineffectiveness with critical (3 times): indicating that the source is most critical of MINUSTAH’s lack of success in implementing and defending the tenets of its mandate. Le Nouvelliste criticizes MINUSTAH for its ineffectiveness (14), its failure to execute the goals outlined in its mandate (7), its role (5), cost (4), insecurity (4), nature of occupation (4), and its involvement in or handling of the cholera outbreak (2). Radio Métropole is primarily critical of MINUSTAH’s role (2). The critical frame seems to be most closely tied to the perceived ineffectiveness of MINUSTAH and questions regarding the success of its mandate and role in Haiti. While not as frequently cited, cost, insecurity, and mismanagement of the cholera outbreak are symptoms of the primary criticisms indicated.

The links between elections and other categories is indicative of different sources’ views regarding the relative success or failure of elections and the progression of those views between the elections in 2006 and those in 2011. CNN connects “elections” with “minimal violence” (3) and “peaceful” (2) conduct in both the 2006 and 2011 elections: maintaining a relatively consistent view. In contrast, domestic source Le Nouvelliste, makes the most connections between “elections” and “Ineffective” (1), “Insecurity” (2), and “Fear” (2) during the 2006 elections. The disconnect between the portrayal of elections and peacekeepers during elections by the international and domestic news is significant. A similar, but less pervasive pattern occurs in the time period surrounding the 2011 elections. CNN maintains its stance that elections were peaceful (1) and there was

“minimal violence” (1). In this instance, RFI acts more like the domestic news sources than CNN in its conceptualization of the elections. The international French radio equates “elections,” at least in Haiti, with “protest” (2). While this election-protest relationship does not inherently portray peacekeepers and MINUSTAH negatively, it does not lend to a positive outlook when elections are connected with protests instead of categories like peace or success either. Less critical, but still not convinced *Le Nouvelliste* depicts elections as a “success” (1), but describes peacekeepers role in them as “ineffective” (1). Radio Métropole, a domestic local station, connects “elections” and “violence” (2). Opinions regarding the elections changed somewhat from 2006 to 2011, viewing peacekeeper’s role in them as generally more positive from one election to the other. However, the general pattern of increased negativity in the more local news sources continues: with RFI and sometimes *Le Nouvelliste* (domestic, educated) essentially bridging the divide.

The “violence” script in Haiti can be divided into three primary frames: “protest”, violence incited by peacekeepers, and implications, with several delineations from each of those groupings. CNN and *Le Nouvelliste* group “violence” with “protest” twice and *Le Nouvelliste* more specifically groups “violence” with the student protest and consequent “student attack on peacekeepers” twice. “Violence” is also connected to “cholera” (CNN, 2), “assault by peacekeepers” (LN, 4), “insecurity” (LN,2), and “withdrawal” (LN,2). The relationship between violence and cholera is connected by violent protests conducted by the peacekept who blame UN troops for importing the epidemic. In addition to the problems caused by the cholera epidemic, the persistence of violence indicates continuing insecurity and the perceived impotence of peacekeepers.

These perceptions in turn have led to demands by the peacekept for the withdrawal of troops. Le Nouvelliste indicates these relationships in its connection of violence with protest, insecurity, withdrawal, and assault categories and sub-categories. Whether Le Nouvelliste is representing the sentiments of the peacekept and their negative perception of peacekeepers or is simply portraying their experiences and opinions and cataloging the events taking place on the surrounding landscape, is the question.

As mentioned in prior statements, cholera is often equated with violence because the peacekept have led a number of demonstrations against peacekeepers they believe imported and spread the cholera epidemic that has swept the country. CNN maintains that the spread of the epidemic is not the fault of Nepalese peacekeepers (cholera-no blame, 2). Le Nouvelliste offers a split between their blame of peacekeepers: “no blame” (3), “blame” (2). However, cholera is twice connected to “critical of the UN”, indicating that Le Nouvelliste may lean towards, if not outright blame, criticism of MINUSTAH’s mismanagement of the situation. While CNN staunchly supports the innocence of the peacekeepers, Le Nouvelliste (as in the case of the 2011 elections) is divided in its judgment. This may be a result of their location in the Haitian media hierarchy as domestic, but more educated and catering to an audience that is most likely middle and upper class, rather than pandering to the average citizen’s sentiments. Both sources connect cholera with protest, CNN three times and Le Nouvelliste four times: indicating a strong causal relationship between the cholera outbreak and protests against MINUSTAH.

These connections are only the *most frequent* identified for each news source. The following section will ascertain and examine all connections made by each source

providing a comprehensive analysis of how the different media sources, and ultimately typologies, portray UNPKOs.

CONCEPTUAL (CATEGORICAL) CONNECTIONS MAPPED

The construction of concept maps revealed a tripartite pattern. In the most general sense, sources contained sensational phenomena and categories that could be classified under the purview of an overarching frame of justification and frame of critique. The characterization of this framework should not negate the complexity of categorical differentiation, neo-colonial subtext, typological patterns, and the conscious and unconscious concept connections that underlay the simplicity.

INTERNATIONAL SOURCES

In addition to providing coverage of sensational items like the 2010 election in Côte d'Ivoire and the demands by Gbagbo for the withdrawal of the mission, articles and transcripts from CNN, RFI, and Nouvelle Republique (international sources) showed a predilection for framing their reports in terms of confrontation or justification (see Figures 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11). Articles by CNN coded for confrontation also included justification, contradictory statements, neutrality, violence, democracy, and the statement by the UN that increased violence would mean the continuation of the mission. Articles with a justification frame included the confirmation of UNOCI's neutrality, but were tempered by reports of protest and the peacekeeper's doubts regarding the effectiveness of the mission. Not only is the confrontation-justification dichotomy present at the primary category level, but sub-categories found within the articles mirror this relationship and temper the portrayal of peacekeepers by CNN. RFI links confrontation with violence, justification to UN troop reinforcement in the wake of Gbagbo's demands that UNOCI

withdraw from Côte d'Ivoire, and the subsequent fears of a resurgence in conflict lead to questions concerning the role of UNOCI. RFI follows the pattern exemplified in CNN: confrontation versus justification only in this case the justification frame is expanded to include role and withdrawal. The pattern continues in Nouvelle République. Justification is linked to the role of UNOCI (protection and development) and the success of the mission signaling the time for a potential withdrawal. Confrontation is again linked to violence but also to the response of UNOCI to that violence in increased vigilance.

Figure 4.9: Côte d'Ivoire




Figure 4.10: Côte d'Ivoire





Figure 4.11: Côte d'Ivoire



The international sources covering MINUSTAH, CNN and RFI, present a binary relationship similar to Côte d'Ivoire, but with a critical frame instead of confrontation. In addition to supplying numerous articles and transcripts on the sensational topics of elections and cholera, CNN and RFI offer three other primary categories which can be divided into a positive-negative critical-justification dichotomy: critical, protest, and justification. In Haiti, unlike in Côte d'Ivoire, RFI does not include a justification category, only critical and protest (Figure 4.15). This may be the result of the France's direct involvement in events in Côte d'Ivoire in the form of LICORNE troops aiding UNOCI and the lack of direct involvement in Haiti. The critical and protest categories can be combined under the critical frame umbrella and the negative portrayal of MINUSTAH. RFI links protest with the outbreak of violence, the demand for withdrawal by the peacekept, and terms like "occupation" that have significant negative connotations when applied in a neo-colonial framework to MINUSTAH. The critical frame links concepts like role confusion, peacekeeper assault on peacekept, protest, cost, inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and terms like "timid" and "impotent" with the UN mission. While RFI is characterized by a dominant critical frame, CNN provides a stronger justification frame. MINUSTAH is portrayed as equivalent to the promotion and achievement of democracy: which CNN perceives to be the mission's goal (Figure 4.14). The violence incited during protest, the UN and subsequently CNN claims, is politically motivated and calculated to disrupt elections. Further fortifying their defense of MINUSTAH, in response to the protests motivated by the outbreak of cholera, CNN reminds the audience that MINUSTAH is not at fault for the epidemic. The article is concluded with the mention of the upcoming elections, a sign of hope for the peacekept

and justifying the presence of peacekeepers via their role in bringing elections about and providing election security.

Figure 4.14: Haiti






Figure 4.15: Haiti



DOMESTIC SOURCES

Fraternité Matin only produced a single article directly related to UNOCI during the time period that I examined (see Figure 4.12). The primary concern of this article is the media in Côte d'Ivoire, specifically the controversial anti-UN pro-Gbagbo television station called Radio diffusion Télévision Ivoirienne (RTI). The article states that RTI has changed “gone are the dance of men of culture devoted to hatred , anti-colonialism to a mouth contradicted by their internal despotism, no more hate for [...] and others at RTI” (Article 14). However the article retains a subtle suspect anti-UN tone that leads me to question their ability to objectively evaluate the legitimacy of RTI as a source of news.


Figure 4.12: Côte d'Ivoire



Le Jour, like *Fraternité Matin*, yielded a miniscule number of articles. In fact, the only mention of UNOCI at all is in reference to election procedure and election law (see Figure 4.12).


A plethora of categories were coded from *Le Patriote* articles (see Figure 4.13). The primary categories are justification, UN radio, role, reconciliation, elections, post-election crisis, withdrawal, public opinion, and violence. These categories can be divided between the umbrella of the justification and critical themes. The role of the UN radio in the creation of peace, the success of elections, the accomplishment of UNOCI's mandate and role, the ability of UNOCI to overcome the post-election crisis, the violence managed during elections, and the subcategories associated with the primary justification category itself (neutrality, security, cooperation between peacekeepers and the peacekept) are under the scope of the justification frame. In contrast, the critical frame includes the post-election crisis and resulting call for reassessing UNOCI's role, the attack on UNOCI, fear resulting from the violence in the post-election crisis, and the peacekept's criticism of peacekeepers for not protecting them from that violence. It is clear that this domestic-educated source is similar to the international source's (CNN and RFI) positive portrayal of UNOCI and their balance of positive and negative reporting style.

Figure 4.13: Côte d'Ivoire



Le Nouvelliste provided the largest volume of articles and copious amounts of categories: elections, justification, mandate, media, violence, cholera, protest, withdrawal, and critical (see Figure 4.16.1). Portions of the elections, violence, cholera, protest, withdrawal, mandate, and critical categories are framed critically. In contrast, justification, elections, part of cholera and mandate, and media are framed in terms of the justification of MINUSTAH. Furthermore, protest phenomena are framed in terms of violence (conducted by students against MINUSTAH) and result in demands for the withdrawal of the mission. Demands for withdrawal are the consequences of instability, blame for the cholera outbreak, controversies involving the mission, the violation of peacekept sovereignty, the creation of a dependent relationship, and the perception of MINUSTAH as an occupying force. While the mandate category is primarily positive, representing the desire by multiple parties for a development designated mandate instead of a military one, one of the articles does mention the cholera epidemic and blames MINUSTAH for its presence.

Figure 4.16.1: Haiti



The violence category as represented in Le Nouvelliste articles can be grouped in three primary types: assault, confrontation, and general violence. The general violence classification includes violence conducted by armed gangs and organized crime. Comparatively, this classification is a minimal portion of the totality of the violence category. Confrontation includes protests and general altercations between peacekeepers and the peacekept. A majority of the assault categorizations refer to acts of violence conducted by peacekeepers on the peacekept, but in one case refers to an attack on peacekeepers. These different types of violence all result in insecurity and a desire for the withdrawal of UN troops. (see Figure 4.16.4)

Figure 4.16.4: Haiti

Le Nouvelliste (LN)

Violence

Organized crime
- Withdrawal (questioned)
- Media (local allows criminals to speak freely)

- Protest (politically motivated to disrupt elections)
- Insecurity

Confrontation (peacekeepers against peacekept)

- MINUSTAH attacked
- Insecurity

Assault by MINUSTAH

Assault by peacekeepers on PNH

- Assault (peacekeepers on peacekept)
- Withdrawal (demanded by students)
- "Tourists"

- Assault (peacekeepers on peacekept)
- Peacekeepers threaten peacekept

Pertaining to the critical frame the largest volume of articles from *Le Nouvelliste* are categorized critically (see Figure 4.16.6). Articles assigned to this category include information and categories from those previously mentioned, but are connected by their overarching critical perception of peacekeepers and MINUSTAH. The most frequent theme among critical categories is how they portray the progress (or lack) of the PKO. Perhaps the three terms most indicative of the peacekept and *Le Nouvelliste*'s perception of MINUSTAH's progress are "white holiday," "tourists," and "occupation." The remaining codes and categories used to describe MINUSTAH's involvement in Haiti (see Figure 4.16.6) can be framed in terms of "white holiday," "tourists," and "occupation." Perceiving the peacekeepers as tourists on a holiday explains their lack of concern, continued insecurity, absence during times of violence, and failure to complete the tenets of their mandate. Viewing MINUSTAH as an occupation force is indicative of the mission's disregard for development in areas other than political, the disregard of Haitian sovereignty, referring to the renewal of mandates as a "ritual" or "formality" only, and *Le Nouvelliste*'s characterization of the mission as a "merchant." Several articles question the operation's respect for sovereignty, citing cases where there has been a clear disregard for the freedom of individuals: "UN daily parade on private property," access to neighborhoods restricted, and allowing travel in these areas only to residents and visitors who are issued passes. In this instance, the disregard of citizen's sovereignty caused as much anger as the lack of communication between peacekeepers and the peacekept regarding the peacekeepers actions and the reasons for those actions. Another theme under the critical umbrella category is perceptions and portrayals of the role of MINUSTAH. Several articles question the role of MINUSTAH, alluding to the lack of clear goals and communication between peacekeepers and the peacekept. MINUSTAH's


role is perceived as being a “tutor,” changeable, a deterrent, to serve Western interests, and as implementing democracy. Democracy however, is seen as a “badly fitting suit” imposed because democracy promotion is part of the global peacekeeping discourse rather than being the ideal political situation for Haiti.

Figure 4.16.6: Haiti

Le Nouvelliste (LN) Critical									
- Role questioned - "White holiday" - "Tourists" - Absent (during violence)	- Role questioned - Ineffective (uncertainty, no intervention, betrayal) - "Tourist" (passive, lazy) - Modest commitment	- Mandate renewal = "ritual" - "formality" - Ineffective (lack of ambition, grand design) - "Occupation" - Role (as tutor)	"Occupying force"	- Destabilizes - Role (changed) - "Occupation" - Create military (loss of trust in peacekeepers)	- Failed (Human Rights violations despite UN presence)	Failed	- Ineffective - Failed (absent) - Instability	- Ineffective (inaction despite violence) - Failed (language barrier) - Violence	Failed
Divisive of AFJ	Help Kidnappers	Passive	- Sovereignty (infringed) - UN daily parade on private property - "Occupation" (managed by UN) - "arrogant, racist, anti-foreign, racist force, contempt"	- Sovereignty (infringed) - Neo-colonial memory	- Failed (stability and peace) - Inaction	Ineffective (sporadic response)	- Not Impartial (MINUSTAH FM) - Media (objectivity in question) - Propaganda "designer label bias" - Ineffective	Ineffective (uncaring of timeline)	- Ineffective (occasionally helpful) - Presence (sporadic)
"Ceremonia"	Insecurity	Insecurity	- Insecurity - Agenda (political maneuvering) - "Silence" (uncaring)	- Insecurity (superficial changes, hand-aid solutions) - Deterrence (only benefit)	Withdrawal (doubt possibility)	Withdrawal (doubt possibility) - More change = more peacekeepers	- Ineffective (no reconstruction) - "Delays the burning of the social powder keg" - "Merchant" - Democracy (like a badly fitting suit)	- Failed - Ineffective (violence increasing)	- Ineffective (lax and tolerant) - Agenda (guided by own political agenda) - Image (concerned with)
- Cost (expensive) - More money = more peace	Violence = increase in patrols	Cost (of peace)	- Role (serve Western interests) - Violence (pressured by int'l community to use)	Continuation of mission	- "Coercive" Development (change mandate)	Development (change Mandate) - Deterrent (MINUSTAH functions as)	- Negative propaganda - Fear (unfair competition between MINUSTAH M and local media)	Retraction demanded by MINUSTAH	

The justification frame is most strongly supported by the justification category, but also includes parts of the mandate and media frames. In one article published by *Le Nouvelliste* the UN reiterates the importance of the media and freedom of the press (see Figure 4.16.1). The remainder of the justification category includes a variety of articles that promote the instances of cooperation between peacekeepers, the peacekept, and the Haitian National Police (HNP) (see Figure 4.16.2). Articles advocating MINUSTAH's respect of sovereignty, democracy promotion, success in police reform, determination, and outlining future goals that the mission plans to accomplish augment the justification category.

Figure 4.16.2: Haiti



Kiskeya's transcripts reflect the prevailing critical-justification framework. The elections, withdrawal, and violence categories fall under the critical frame. The violence category is linked to the assault of the peacekept by peacekeepers which portrays MINUSTAH negatively. Furthermore, the reassurance that the withdrawal of the mission is progressing acknowledges the desire of the peacekept to be free of the peacekeeping operation. While transcripts by Kiskeya state that MINUSTAH is not an occupying force and argues that they have provided security, the source also considers the mission "unlawful" and inefficient. (See Figure 4.17)




Figure 4.17: Haiti

Radio Métropole provides fewer articles under the justification frame compared to other local sources. The dismissal of the notion that MINUSTAH is an occupying force, and one article reiterating the goals of the mission (democracy and protection) and stating that it has been relatively successful with elections are minor justifications compared to a bevy of criticisms (see Figure 4.18). The critical frame encompasses categories from elections (insecurity, violence, and confrontation), critical (post-earthquake housing inadequate, ineffective, role confusion, insecurity, and the demand for withdrawal), cholera (proof of MINUSTAH's culpability), violence (protest, attacks on peacekeepers by the peacekept, and politically motivated insecurity), and protest (violence and anger over the cholera outbreak).




Figure 4.18: Haiti

The local and citizen participatory news sources were overwhelmingly critical of MINUSTAH. Citizen Haiti characterized peacekeepers as ineffective, leaving the peacekept to be terrorized by neighborhood gangs and violence, and were critical of the UN cover up of a sex abuse incident between a peacekeeper and a Haitian citizen (see Figure 4.20). Citizen Haiti and HaitiLibre both mentioned the cholera outbreak, Citizen Haiti blaming MINUSTAH for the epidemic, and HaitiLibre acknowledging the violence that characterized one of the cholera protests. With widespread protests and violence, the peacekept and the news are remarking on the lack of security: a criticism of MINUSTAH's inability to cope with and manage the post-outbreak anger. Express criticized MINUSTAH, stating that peacekeepers resemble "tourists" and are similarly ineffective when confronted with violence in the streets. BKNG outlined comparable criticisms, arguing that MINUSTAH is costly and ineffective and is unable to mitigate violence, insecurity, and properly handle protests (see Figure 4.19). The local source contended that the peacekeeping mission wants to humiliate Haitians by augmenting the UN troops with soldiers from the Dominican Republic and several articles referred to the mission as neoliberal colonialists conducting an occupation and creating dependence. This negative portrayal of MINUSTAH continues in another article demanding the withdrawal of the mission because of its inability to create security, its cost, failures, and illegality (alluding to the view of MINUSTAH as an occupation which infringes on the sovereignty of Haiti as a state).

Figure 4.19: Haiti





Figure 4.20: Haiti




ELECTIONS

Originally scheduled to be conducted in late 2009, by July 2009 RFI was already reporting that plans for the Ivoirian elections were problematic (Appendix D, reference number 1). When elections were finally conducted on 28 November 2010 after numerous delays, *Le Patriote* reported violence had occurred but that was managed by UNOCI during elections and the subsequent post-election protests. Reports of the fear of a return of conflict in the wake of protests about the elections were conducted by RFI however. Despite the fears of post-election conflict, the news was primarily hopeful about the success of the elections.

Leading up to the 2006 presidential elections in Haiti the news, *Le Nouvelliste* in particular, warned of insecurity, fear created by armed gangs, the improvisation of MINUSTAH in their preparation, and the failure of the mission to unite Haitians in support of a particular candidate (see Appendix D). Overall, the sentiments made by *Le Nouvelliste* were negative in the pre-election landscape. *Le Nouvelliste* characterized the elections as insecure and ineffective and reported on the widespread fear felt by peacekeepers and predicted its impact on elections would be low participation (see Figure 4.16.3). Both *Le Nouvelliste* and *Kiskeya* reported on MINUSTAH's perception of elections, as "games". After the elections took place on 7 February 2006, both *Radio Métropole* and CNN praised the success and high participation observed during elections and CNN repeatedly stated that violence was limited and peace abounded.

Figure 4.16.3: Haiti



Throughout the course of the much delayed 2011 presidential elections in Haiti, both domestic and international news sources framed reports of MINUSTAH critically. Only those articles and transcripts that included direct quotations from MINUSTAH officials had positive things to say about the mission's preparation for and the success of elections and reiterated that it has been proven that Nepalese peacekeepers are not responsible for the cholera outbreak. These relatively positive articles and transcripts (see Appendix D reference numbers 121, 122, 127) were circulated just a few days prior to elections by *Le Nouvelliste* and RFI and again about one week after elections by RFI. Excluding the statements quoted from UN officials and these documents, all other articles and transcripts printed surrounding the election period negatively portrayed MINUSTAH. The cholera outbreak in mid-October 2010 resulted in numerous articles and transcripts debating the cause of the epidemic, assigning blame, and discussion about the repercussions on the Haitian social and political landscape. Burgeoning protests and clashes between peacekeepers and the peacekept resulted in insecurity and a proliferation in violence. UN officials denounced the violence and repeatedly made statements that a thorough investigation of the origin of the cholera outbreak revealed that the epicenter was not the Nepalese peacekeeper's camp. They also claimed that the violence during protests and in general was a politically motivated ploy to spread fear and insecurity, preventing people from feeling safe enough to vote. Kiskeya was widely critical of MINUSTAH's role in the 2011 elections, claiming that the mission was unprepared and describing the mission as a "little monster" whose "domination imploded" and their "political stupidity" does not even provide "a façade of democracy" (see Figure 4.17).

About five months after the mandate was renewed in October 2010, seven months before the next renewal would take place and a couple months before election results were to be announced, the first discussion of changing MINUSTAH's mandate to one more focused on development occurred. At the end of February 2011 and the beginning of March, *Le Nouvelliste* printed two articles talking about a desire to alter the mandate and consequently the role of MINUSTAH (See Appendix D reference numbers 107 and 108). The timing, between mandate renewals and elections and election results is not serendipitous. Articles just prior to these two by *BKNG* and *Le Nouvelliste* talk about the ineffectiveness of MINUSTAH, its cost, the lack of reconstruction, and describe the mission as “delaying the burning of the social powder keg” that is Haitian society (See Appendix D, reference number 70 and 71). As the dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the conclusion of MINUSTAH grows with each mandate renewal, it is only natural that the suggestion to alter their role is going to be presented. After a relatively successful democratic election, the peacekeepers and others are stating that it is time for MINUSTAH to focus on reconstruction and the development of facets other than political.

CHOLERA

The cholera outbreak in October 2010 swept through all levels of the news media in Haiti and abroad. As the death toll rose and the disease spread, the news continued to argue over where blame was to be assigned and the response of MINUSTAH to the epidemic and the violence that accompanied it. While CNN insisted that peacekeepers were not to blame for the outbreak (Figure 4.14), RFI maintained that despite the UN's denial of responsibility, they had proof that Nepalese peacekeepers were to blame (Figure 4.15). While predominantly supportive of the blame category, *Le Nouvelliste* published

three articles that said MINUSTAH was not at fault and four that stated it was (Figures 4.16.1 and 4.16.5). Participatory and local sources, Citizen Haiti, BKNG, and Radio Métropole blamed MINUSTAH for the outbreak. Radio Métropole and BKNG even stated that like RFI they had evidence that proved MINUSTAH's culpability (Figures 4.19 and 4.18). Radio Métropole, Citizen Haiti and Haiti Libre, Le Nouvelliste, and CNN connected (sometimes in multiple articles) protests with the outbreak of cholera.

Although the domestic news continued to print information about the cholera outbreak and MINUSTAH up until the time I stopped collecting articles, CNN only provided information about it from 11/15/2010 to 11/20/2010 and RFI from 10/27/2010 to 11/26/2010. This pattern is indicative of the periodicity or fickle nature of the international news cycle. Because it is geographically removed from the location on which it is reporting, the amount of news that it is producing about that particular place is less. In addition, the themes of news that they choose to report on is different from what domestic news produces. International sources are concerned with the big events like elections, natural disasters, abundant violence (occasionally), and human rights abuses (I would include cholera in this group). Unlike domestic news sources that provide information on a plethora of different topics. While this concept is not new, it is significant to note the examples presented in the case of cholera in Haiti.

CNN and Le Nouvelliste made other connections between the cholera phenomenon and categories other than blame and protest. Both sources charted in their articles the progression and consequences of the cholera outbreak and questions over its source. Panic over the epidemic, rising body counts, and debate over the cause of the disease led to widespread protests and violence, causing insecurity and the demand by the

peacekept that peacekeepers withdraw from Haiti. Both CNN and Le Nouvelliste quote MINUSTAH's remarks on the political underpinnings of the violence at protests and consider it an attempt to disrupt upcoming elections. An article from Le Nouvelliste makes an interesting comment, saying that the aversion to the UN mission is a recurrent phenomenon (article number 80): indicating that with or without the cholera epidemic, Haitians would dislike and find fault with the PKO. This begs the larger question of whether all the negativity and criticism attributed to the presence of MINUSTAH in Haiti versus the relatively positive presence of UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire is based on actual events or something more personal and particular to Haitians.

Figure 4.16.5: Haiti

Le Nouvelliste (LN)

Cholera

- Blame (imported by MINUSTAH)

- Blame
- Critical (polluters)

- Protest
- Violence (politically motivated)

- Protest (politically motivated to disrupt elections)
- No Blame
- Critical (aversion to mission is recurrent phenomenon)

- Insecurity (panic adds fuel to the fire)
- Protest
- Withdrawal (demanded by protestors)

- No Blame
- Protest

- No Blame

THE PORTRAYAL OF PEACEKEEPERS: POSITIVE, NEGATIVE, AND NEUTRAL

All of the articles and radio transcripts collected were analyzed to determine whether they portrayed peacekeepers positively, negatively, a combination of positively and negatively or neutrally (impartially). Appendix J provides a full list of all articles and transcripts and their distinction as reflecting positively (P), negatively (N), positive and negative (P/N), or neutrally (Neutral) on peacekeepers and UNPKOs. Originally, I had divided articles and transcripts into three categories, but I soon discovered that some articles and transcripts had a positive negative pattern whereby they would introduce information that portrayed peacekeepers negatively and would follow it up later in the article with something positive. These positive and negative combined portrayals are found in articles and transcripts from both international (56%) and domestic media (44%). CNN (20%) and RFI (0%) articles about MINUSTAH account for only 20% of P/N portrayals in Haiti while CNN (50%), RFI (about 17%), and Nouvelle République (about 17%) articles about UNOCI account for 83% of P/N portrayals in Côte d'Ivoire. A majority of the P/N articles contain information about an event that reflects negatively on peacekeepers and is accompanied by a discussion of why it is then necessary to continue to host the peacekeeping mission, or an explanation of the successes of peacekeepers in other areas. The preponderance of these types of articles in Côte d'Ivoire versus Haiti further supports my claim that news sources from Côte d'Ivoire are moderating their voices and tempering their message indicating a more positive trend than found in blatantly negative Haitian media. Often these types of articles are coded under a "Justification" category (64%) because even though they present a negative portrayal of peacekeepers, they attempt to divert attention towards the positive efforts and successes

of peacekeepers and justify their presence in spite of the occasional negative action or event.

On a macro scale the differences between portrayals of peacekeepers in Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire is significant. In Haiti, negative portrayals (69%) are the most prevalent, while positive (18%), neutral (9%), and positive/negative (4%) make up decreasing portions of portrayals (see Figure 5.21). Interestingly, the frequency of negative portrayals of MINUSTAH and UN peacekeepers is maintained throughout the varying scales of media from international to participatory. The participatory media sources, written and owned by the peacekept, BKNG, CH and HL, and Express portray peacekeepers negatively in 100% of their articles. The implication being that the peacekept are using participatory news sources to air those opinions, and those opinions paint peacekeepers and peacekeeping missions in a negative light. International government owned French radio station RFI (81%) and domestic but geared toward the more educated peacekept Le Nouvelliste (72%) paper however, the contain a large volume of negative portrayals (see Figure 5.21). The plethora of negative portrayals (at least half of all articles and transcripts) from the sources mentioned in addition to international source CNN (50%), and domestic local source Radio Métropole (50%) indicates significant criticism by the international and domestic communities (the peacekept) of the presence, maintenance, role, and progress of MINUSTAH.

Although less staggering than the number of negative portrayals, positive portrayals comprise 18% of all the articles and transcripts containing information pertaining to MINUSTAH. While the domestic participatory sources (0%) and RFI (6%) have little positive to impart about the mission, the domestic local sources are almost

equally positive and negative. 38% of the material from Kiskeya and 36% from Radio Métropole positively represents peacekeepers. Domestic educated Le Nouvelliste and International Educated CNN claim 16% and 20% of their articles as positive.

HAITI	Typology	Positive	Negative	P/N	Neutral
CNN	Intl/More Educated	2 (20%)	5 (50%)	1 (10%)	2 (20%)
RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	1 (6%)	13 (81%)	0	2 (13%)
Le Nouvelliste	Local/More Educated	13 (16%)	57 (72%)	3 (4%)	6 (8%)
Kiskeya	Local/Local	5 (38%)	6 (46%)	1 (8%)	1 (8%)
Radio Métropole	Local/Local	5 (36%)	7 (50%)	0	2 (14%)
BKNG	Local/Participatory	0	6 (100%)	0	0
CH and HL	Citizen/Participatory	0	2 (100%)	0	0
Express	Citizen/Participatory	0	1 (100%)	0	0
Total		26 (18%)	97 (69%)	5 (4%)	13 (9%)

Figure 4.21

Unlike the negative or critical portrayal patterns in the media accounts of MINUSTAH, the dominant trend of those concerning UNOCI is away from the negative and towards the positive. Overall, 50% of articles and transcripts from Côte d'Ivoire positively portray UNOCI and peacekeepers, 22% are neutral, 19% are positive/negative, and 9% are negative (see Figure 4.22). As discussed in the previous section many of the positive/negative articles are associated with the “Justification” category and use the positive portrayal of peacekeepers to downplay the negative and reinforce the importance and necessity of the mission. Indicating a desire by the international community to see to the continuation of peacekeeping missions and to convey to their audiences that despite some negative experiences UNOCI is effectively implementing its mandate, the largest percentage of P/N portrayals are found in Ivoirian international sources. Emulating the pattern between the critical nature of media when discussing MINUSTAH versus the more moderate Ivoirian media, a much larger percentage of articles and transcripts about

UNOCI are neutral. Positive portrayals account for 50% of all the articles and transcripts and are most significant in the domestic and international educated and to some extent the local elite sources. Noticeably evident is the 69% of articles from, local/educated source, Le Patriote that portray peacekeepers positively compared to the 16% from Le Nouvelliste. While there is a significant difference between the percent of articles and transcripts each source dedicates to positive and negative portrayals, the disconnect between Haiti and Côte d’Ivoire is palpable.

CÔTE D'IVOIRE	Typology	Positive	Negative	P/N	Neutral
CNN	Intl/More Educated	1 (20%)	0	3 (60%)	1 (20%)
RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	1 (20%)	2 (40%)	1 (20%)	1 (20%)
Nouvelle République	Intl/More Educated	2 (50%)	0	1 (25%)	1 (25%)
Fraternité Matin	Local Elite/State	1 (100%)	0	0	0
Le Patriote	Local/More Educated	11 (69%)	1 (6%)	1 (6%)	3 (19%)
Le Jour	Local/Local	0	0	0	1 (100%)
	Total	16 (50%)	3 (9%)	6 (19%)	7 (22%)
Figure 4.22					

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MANDATE RENEWAL AND CATEGORIES

(Appendix D) Between February 2004 and December 2010 the UNOCI mandate was renewed twelve times. In the month prior to the December 2010 renewal of the mandate, the news stressed the violence and confrontation between Gbagbo’s and Ouattara’s forces despite the presence of the UN. After the mandate was renewed, CNN acknowledged the confrontation occurring, but followed it with an emphasis on the importance of democracy and that continuing violence means an extension of the mandate. Effectively, CNN was justifying the continuation of UNOCI.

Contemporaneously, *Le Patriote* published articles detailing the post-election crisis, confusion about the role of UNOCI, an attack against UNOCI, and violence, but maintained that the mission was neutral and effective. The paper also reiterated CNN's remarks about the mandate strength increasing with increasing violence among Gbagbo's and Ouattara's forces. Comparatively, the *Nouvelle République* and *Le Patriote* articles before and after the May 2011 mandate renewal positively portray UNOCI. While the international sources (CNN and *Nouvelle République*) steadfastly supported a positive portrayal of UNOCI during both mandate renewals the domestic news, *Le Patriote*, shifted from a slightly negative stance in 2010 to a positive one in 2011: potentially signaling a turning point in the conflict and the promotion of peace by UNOCI.

From the creation of MINUSTAH in April 2004 until the mandate was most recently renewed in October 2011, the articles and transcripts prior to mandate renewal become increasingly critical. Prior to the mandate renewal in October 2007 the news provided both positive and negative portrayals of MINUSTAH before each mandate renewal. During the October mandate renewal and after, the tones changes to one of criticism and at times exasperation. After the mandates are renewed, articles are often a mix of criticisms and justifications. Denying the occupatory nature of MINUSTAH, highlighting cooperation between the peacekeepers and peacekept, and outlining the goals of the mission are some of the positive categories and sub-categories that follow mandate renewals. Negative portrayal categories following mandate renewals are critical of the success of MINUSTAH, demanding withdrawal and naming the mission an occupying force. As sources have become increasingly critical of the continuation of MINUSTAH, *Radio Métropole* has continued to insert positive portrayals of the mission


after the mandates have been renewed. In contrast to the positivity exhibited during the most recent mandate renewal in Côte d'Ivoire, Haitians news sources have become increasingly critical of the continuation of MINUSTAH.

Chapter Five: Interaction and Confrontation in the Media

When examining the articles and transcripts it became apparent that a subset of interaction-event information existed. Interaction events are instances or cases where peacekeepers and the peacekept interact in some manner and are subsequently portrayed in the news media. The framing and coding of these events contributes to the understanding of the overall framework that contextualizes the news' portrayal of peacekeepers. Furthermore, the way that peacekeepers are portrayed by a particular news source in light of an interaction event can provide insight regarding patterns of discourse adopted by different types of media sources.

Of the 177 articles I am analyzing from both Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire, 51 describe interaction phenomena between peacekeepers and the peacekept. Appendix G provides information regarding the individual articles and the text describing those interactions. Of the Haitian articles that do mention interaction events, a majority (56%) are from Le

Nouvelliste⁹. Figure 5.1 shows the news sources that compose a percentage of interaction themed articles about MINUSTAH. Both international sources, CNN and RFI, represent 25% of interaction themed articles. Domestic media sources account for 75% of the interaction themed articles. Proximity to the interaction events and the subsequent importance to the journalists and editors who are members of the peacekept suggest that locally based radio stations and newspapers are more prone to report information about the interactions between peacekeepers and the peacekept. Distanced physically and culturally, international sources like CNN and RFI may not assign similar magnitude to macro and micro scale interaction between the actors in the peace process.



⁹However, the largest accumulation of articles is from Le Nouvelliste slightly skewing the statistic.

Unlike the Haitian news sources, fewer from Côte d'Ivoire contained information about interaction events. Figure 5.2 shows the percentage of interaction themed articles from Côte d'Ivoire by source and includes CNN, RFI, Nouvelle Republic, and Le Patriote. Fraternité Matin and Le Jour did not yield any articles that include interaction event information¹⁰. The volume of articles generated by Le Patriote compared to CNN, RFI, and Nouvelle République almost guarantees that it will have a greater percentage of interaction themed articles, which is part of the reason why it accounts for 50% of the interaction themed articles about UNOCI. International based sources Nouvelle République (10%), RFI (10%), and CNN (30%) account for the remaining half of interaction themed articles. The proximity frame I discovered in the Haitian media exists similarly in media about UNOCI. Domestic source, Le Patriote, is more likely to provide information about the interactions between peacekeepers and the peacekept, because of its relative location in comparison to the interactions occurring. Although the division between domestic and international source's discussion of interaction events, individually, none of the international sources are comparable to the number of interaction themed articles published by Le Patriote: maintaining that interactions between domestic actors and the peacekept are of more concern to the domestic news than the international.

¹⁰This is most likely due to the miniscule number of articles available from Fraternité Matin (1) and Le Jour (1) that included references to UNOCI.

Interaction-Themed Articles by Source (Cote d'Ivoire)




Figure 5.2

Extending the focus of the analysis, I categorized the interaction events described in the media according to whether they portrayed peacekeepers positively, negatively, or neutrally (impartially). Figure 5.3 presents these results catalogued by media source and their typological categorization. Overall, the media presented Haitian peacekeepers and their interactions with the peacekept as 20% positive, 68% negative, and 12% neutral. Following the general pattern observed in the results regarding the portrayal of peacekeepers on twitter and through various articles and transcripts, the majority of MINUSTAH portrayals are negative. Sixty-six percent of the interactions described by CNN negatively portray peacekeepers. Although RFI dedicates fewer articles to the discussion of interaction events (25%)¹¹, half of them are negative and half are neutral.

¹¹ Compared to 60% of CNN's articles including information about interactions.

Part of the difference between CNN and RFI may be due to the private ownership of CNN compared to government owned and operated RFI. In general, however, the international media is primarily negative or critical in their portrayal of peacekeepers in their interactions with the peacekept.

The margin between positive, negative, and neutral portrayals is more distinct for the local-educated, local, and participatory media in Haiti. Compared to the international media (10% positive, 60% negative, and 30% neutral) locally based media portrays peacekeeper-peacekept interactions as 23% positive, 71% negative, and 6% neutral. The local media is less impartial than the international media, thus providing a larger percentage of positive and negative portrayals. Although the participatory media does not provide a large number of articles to survey, they are 100% negative in their portrayal of peacekeeper-peacekept interactions.

Source (Haiti)	Typology	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Occurrence of Interaction Theme (by Source)
Cable News Network	Intl/More Educated	1 (17%)	4 (66%)	1 (17%)	60%
Radio France Internationale	Intl/State/Educated	0	2 (50%)	2 (50%)	25%
Le Nouvelliste	Local/More Educated	6 (26%)	15 (65%)	2 (9%)	29%
Radio Métropole	Local/Local	0	3 (100%)	0	21%
Kiskeya	Local/Local	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	0	15%
Bri Kouri Nouvèl Gaye	Local/Participatory	0	2 (100%)	0	33%
Citizen Haiti	Citizen/Participatory	0	1 (100%)	0	50%
	Total	8	28	5	
	Total Percent (all sources combined)	20%	68%	12%	

Figure 5.3

In comparing CNN and RFI on Figure 6.3 and CNN, RFI, and Nouvelle République in Figure 5.4 it is apparent that the international sources portray peacekeeper-peacekept interactions differently in different countries. Transcripts and articles from CNN, RFI, and Nouvelle République describing interaction events are all (100%) neutral. Le Patriote, a locally based newspaper, portrays the peacekeeper-peacekept interactions as positive (60%) and neutral (40%). Following a similar pattern as found in the twitter accounts and articles and transcripts, the media in Côte d’Ivoire seem to be more moderate than those in Haiti.

Source	Typology	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Occurrence of Interaction Theme (by Source)
CNN	Intl/More Educated	0	0	3 (100%)	60%
RFI	Intl/State/Educated	0	0	1 (100%)	20%
Nouvelle République	Intl/More Educated	0	0	1 (100%)	25%
Le Patriote	Local/More Educated	3 (60%)	0	2 (40%)	31%
Figure 5.4	Total	3	0	7	
	Total Percent	30%	0%	70%	

DISCUSSION

Extrapolating on the reasons why a majority of interactions between peacekeepers and peacekept are portrayed negatively in Haiti and positively or neutrally in Côte d’Ivoire is crucial. The implications of a predominantly critical framing of interactions in reference to one PKO compared to the positive and impartial framing of another could be staggering when accounting for how these portrayals influence or reflect the perceptions of the peacekept.

A potential explanation for the lack of negative portrayals from international sources in Côte d'Ivoire is portentous of the existing pattern of the justification frame found extensively elsewhere in articles and transcripts about UNOCI. The history of media freedom in Côte d'Ivoire has been marked by a lack of freedom of speech and extreme government censorship. While the country has experienced short periods of partial media freedom, for the past two decades the media has been classified by Freedom of the Press as being "not free" (Karlekar, 2011). This history of oppression and remembered violent censorship may continue to discourage certain facets of the media from printing negative portrayals of the peacekeepers who are a significant political actor in Côte d'Ivoire. In addition censorship and the harsh punishment of journalists may have discouraged, in particular, the establishment of participatory media: which was very critical of MINUSTAH personnel in Haiti.

The nature of interactions plays a role in whether peacekeepers are portrayed positively or negatively. While international sources consistently portrayed interactions between peacekeepers and peacekept neutrally, open coding revealed that they focused primarily on the confrontations between UN troops and their attacks on or attacks by Gbagbo and Ouattara's forces (see Appendix G). A majority of the local sources presented interactions in a frame of justification, praising the work of UNOCI and expounding on their success. CNN and RFI, international sources that provide information about MINUSTAH also framed interactions in terms of confrontation. The difference is that in Haiti the confrontation is between peacekeepers and non-combatants, thus reflecting negatively on peacekeepers. The only positive interactions described by RFI and CNN are in reference to MINUSTAH providing security for elections (see

Appendix G). Coding of the remaining domestic-local sources revealed a distinct critical-violence justification pattern that is parallel to the critical-justification pattern present in the rest of the articles. Interactions as described by Radio Métropole, BKNG, and Citizen Haiti are part of a critical-violence frame, often negatively portraying the peacekeepers. The two transcripts from Kiskeya that report on interaction between peacekeepers and peacekept are evenly divided between critical and justification. Of the twenty three interaction events described by Le Nouvelliste, six fall under the justification frame and seventeen under the critical-violence frame.

Sixty percent of the articles and transcripts about the interactions between peacekeepers and the peacekept in Côte d'Ivoire and seventy-three percent in Haiti have a violent theme. Regardless of whether these interactions reflect positively or negatively on peacekeepers the fact that interactions between peacekeepers and the peacekept are primarily in terms of violence is crucial. It may seem obvious but when a majority of interaction events are characterized by a violent frame that means that they are not characterized by a frame of peace. The violence frame is counter intuitive to the goals and purpose of a peacekeeping mission. If peace is achieved, interactions between peacekeepers and the peacekept should reflect this. However in both Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire this is clearly not the case. For Côte d'Ivoire with its positive portrayals of peacekeepers and lack of critical framing is closer than Haiti with its intertwined critical-violence frame indicative of the negative portrayals of peacekeepers in their interactions with the peacekept.

Chapter Six: The Role of Twitter

A sample of tweets was collected by searching for the tags MINUSTAH (the acronym for the current United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti) and the French and English acronyms for the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire: ONUCI or UNOCI. The searches revealed four hundred and seven tweets, from which I chose to examine one hundred and sixty four (40%). The repetition of tweets and the practice of re-tweeting mean that of those one hundred and sixty four tweets there were seventy three different tweets. However, even among those seventy three there are several that are very similar in wording and theme. Using open coding, I divided the tweets into the following theme based categories and sub-categories: Critical, Cholera, Withdrawal, Justification, Protest, Cost, Arrest, Reconciliation, Violence, Political Tension, Deploy Forces, and Post-Colonial. Figure 6.1 shows the number of different tweets that were found in each category and the percent of tweets found in each category. The numbers in parentheses indicate the number and percentage of tweets that were assigned a sub-category in addition to a primary category.

Haiti		
Category (sub-category)	Total Number of Tweets per Category	Percent (Category/Total)
Critical	16 (10)	27 (34)%
Cholera	11 (2)	19 (17)%
Withdrawal	11	19 (14)%
Justification	9 (1)	15 (13)%
Protest	5 (2)	8 (9)%
Cost	1	2 (1)%
Arrest	1	2 (1)%
Reconciliation	1	2 (1)%
Violence	1	2 (1)%
Political Tension	1	2(1)%
Deploy Forces	1	2 (1)%
Post-Colonial	(5)	0 (7)%
Total	58 (78)	
Figure 6.1		

Including both the critical category and sub-category, a third (34%) of tweets were found to be in some way critical of MINUSTAH or UN troops. Debates about the spread of the cholera outbreak and culpability made up about 17% of tweets. Information pertaining to the potential withdrawal or demands of the withdrawal (14%) of MINUSTAH and that justified the actions and presence of MINUSTAH made up a portion of the tweets as well (13%) seemed to be equally important to Tweeters. Protests and demonstrations received about 9% of the tweet volume and statements alluding to the neoliberal or neo-colonial nature of MINUSTAH comprised 7% of twitter statements

. Côte d'Ivoire	Total # of Tweets per Category	Percent (Category/Total)
Elections	4	27 (25)%
Reconciliation	4	27 (25)%
Violence	3	20 (19)%
Critical	2 (1)	13 (19)%
Justification	2	13 (12)%
Total	15 (16)	
Figure 6.2		

Although, the number of tweets collected, fifteen, from a search of twitter under the tags #UNOCI and #ONUCI were less than those collected about the peacekeeping mission in Haiti (58), they providing interesting insight. Again, through open coding, I identified several key categories that were repeatedly discussed throughout individual tweets. Figure 6.2 identifies those categories: Elections, Critical, Violence, Reconciliation, and Justification and shows the number of different tweets per category in numerical value and as a percentage. The parenthetic number in the critical category signifies tweets coded under another category that included a critical sub-categorization. Calculations were conducted with both the parenthetic values and the primary ones. Both elections (25%) and reconciliation (25%) were tweeted about the most in reference to UNOCI, but elections were not even mentioned in any of the tweets about MINUSTAH¹². The violence (19%), critical (19%) and justification (12%) categories made up significant portions of the remaining 50% of the tweets surveyed.

¹²This is most likely due to the time period in which the tweets were collected and the limitations regarding archived tweets. Tweets were gathered over the course of several days at the end of October 2011 and tweets archived prior to one week before the tweets were collected was unavailable.

Haiti					
Category (sub-category)	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Tweet Frequency	Frequency Percent
Justification	30 (4)	0	0	30	25 (22)%
Cholera	4	18 (2)	1	23	19 (16)%
Critical	0 (7)	20 (14)	1	21	17 (27)%
Protest	0	21 (2)	0	21	17 (14)%
Withdrawal	0	9	6	15	12 (9)%
Post-Colonial	0	(7)	0	0	0 (4)%
Arrest	0	0	4	4	3 (2)%
Reconciliation	3	0	0	3	2 (2)%
Violence	0	1	0	1	1 (1)%
Political Tension	0	2	0	2	2 (1)%
Deploy Forces	1	0	0	1	1 (1)%
Cost	0	0	1	1	1 (1)%
Total	38 (49)	71 (96)	13	122 (158)	
Percent (PNN/Total)	31 (31)%	58 (61)%	11 (8)%		
Figure 6.3					

Typical of twitter a number of the tweets were re-tweeted or repeated. Tweet frequency by category and sub-category is shown in Figure 6.3. Whereas diversity among tweets in each category was highest in the Critical (34%), Cholera (17%), Withdrawal (14%), Justification (13%), and Protest (9%) categories, the categories with the highest numbers of tweets that were re-tweeted are Justification (30), Cholera (23), Critical (21), Protest (21), and Withdrawal (15). Interestingly, the same categories are present in both diversity and frequency, but in different orders. If the sub-categories were added to the categories and the percents calculated, the order would be altered slightly. Since many of the tweets that were placed in the other categories also have an element of critique as a

sub-category, factoring that in would mean the critique category is the most frequent. However, including the parenthetical numbers would result in some tweets being calculated multiple times because they have two categories instead of one. Thus, the parenthetical results should be considered only in complement to the non-parenthetical ones.

I would argue that frequency indicates those topics of greatest importance to twitter users whose population may include members of the peacekept. Categories and phenomena that are repeatedly addressed indicate that they are of great importance to those engaging in and determining the topic of the discussions. The data that I have gathered indicates that twitter users talking about MINUSTAH and the UN in Haiti are most concerned with justification, cholera, critiquing, protest, and withdrawal. Interestingly, while a significant number of tweets about MINUSTAH refer to the withdrawal of the country, there are no tweets referring to withdrawal and protest and ONUCI. Furthermore, while all of the tweets about justification and reconciliation reflect positively on peacekeepers and peacekeeping missions, the majority of tweets that were critical of the mission, or discussed violent events, protests, the cholera outbreak, the withdrawal of MINUSTAH, and political tension negatively portrayed UN peacekeepers and MINUSTAH. Those tweets that were assigned to the neutral category represent impartial information sharing, as far as the content of the text is concerned.

The tweets are additionally divided up within each category according to whether they reflect positively, negatively, or neutrally (neither positive nor negative) on MINUSTAH, the UN, and peacekeepers. Overall, Figure 6.3 shows that 31% of tweets reflected positively on MINUSTAH and peacekeepers, while 58% reflected negatively,

and 11% were essentially impartial or neutral. Again, if the parenthetical accounts (and thus the sub-categories added) were factored in those percentages would only change marginally to positive 31%, negative 61%, and neutral 8%. This trend indicates that a majority of the tweets sampled reflected negatively on MINUSTAH and peacekeepers and that most of them 89-92% reflect some type of bias or subjectivity on the part of the author.

Côte d'Ivoire	Positive	Negative	Neutral	Tweet Frequency	Frequency Percent
Elections	15	0	1	16	38 (36)%
Critical	0	9	0 (2)	9 (2)	21 (25)%
Violence	0	0	8	8	19 (18)%
Reconciliation	6	0	1	7	17 (16)%
Justification	2	0	0	2	5 (5)%
Total	23	9	10 (12)	42 (44)	
Percent (PNN/Total)	55 (52)%	21 (21)%	24 (27)%		

Figure 6.4

Although there were no tweets whose content discussed the Haitian elections, many of the categories are shared by both tweets about MINUSTAH and ONUCI. Election themed tweets accounted for about 38% of the statements surveyed and were predominantly positive in their view of ONUCI and the involvement of peacekeepers in the election process and post-election crisis. Critical tweets, as expected, were primarily negative in their recounting of the activities and decision of ONUCI, but accounted for 21% of the all tweets. Almost equal in volume, the violence (19%) and reconciliation (17%) categories inhabit opposite sides of the PNN scale¹³. Tweets about violence were surprisingly neutral in their portrayal of peacekeepers, mainly recounting the events and clashes between Ouattara and Gbagbo forces with little opinion about the role of ONUCI. As one would expect, tweets about reconciliation were primarily positive. In contrast to the frequency of tweets justifying the presence of MINUSTAH in Haiti, only 5% of tweets were dedicated to justifying the presence of ONUCI in Côte d'Ivoire. The parenthetical percentages of frequency indicated in Figure 6.4 include the two tweets with critical sub-categories and show the subsequent changes in calculations. Overall, the tweets about ONUCI were positive (55%), with significantly less negative tweets (21%) than those about MINUSTAH (58%), and over twice as many tweets were considered neutral (24%) or impartial (compared to MINUSTAH at 11%).

	Positive	Negative	Positive/Negative	Neutral
News Articles (Haiti)	18%	69%	4%	9%
Tweets (Haiti)	31 (31)%	58 (61)%	NA	11 (8)%
News Articles (Côte d'Ivoire)	50%	9%	19%	22%
Tweets (Côte d'Ivoire)	55 (52)%	21 (21)%	NA	24 (27)%
Total (average of both Countries)	24%	59%	5%	12%
Figure 6.5				

¹³The PNN scale refers the categorization of a tweet or article as (P)ositive, (N)egative, or (N)eutral.

Going a step further in the comparison, Figure 6.5 shows the overall percent of positive, negative, and neutral articles in the Haitian and Ivoirian media compared to tweets from the corresponding countries. Comparisons can be made between the volume of positive, negative, and neutral articles and tweets about peacekeepers and their mission in Haiti. While not equal, the percentages do indicate a continuity between the percent positive, negative, and neutral, signifying a pattern between the Haitian news in general and the opinions of tweeters. Both the positive and negative tweets about ONUCI are almost equal to the percent of articles that positively or negatively represent ONUCI.

DISCUSSION

The growing role of social media in international politics, policy, and activism has made the study of the role of citizen journalists imperative. Recent events in North Africa and parts of the Middle East like Syria have begun to show the world that social media outlets and citizen journalists can play a crucial role in political change through the dissemination of information and the organization of collective action. Despite this, or maybe because of it, there have been numerous documents that argue the validity, representation and general role of citizen or participatory media¹⁴. Debates about validity however, disregard a crucial aspect of the study of citizen journalism: public opinion. Regardless of whether or not citizen journalism should be considered a legitimate form of journalism, social media sites and the information contained within them, can be used to identify and analyze public opinion. Sites like twitter and facebook could be used to further examine the opinions and ideas of citizens, or in my case, the peacekept to understand how they conceptualize peacekeepers and their interactions with them, what

¹⁴ I use citizen media and journalism interchangeably with participatory media and journalism.

they think about peacekeeping missions, their progress, critiques, and goals. Little research has been dedicated to understanding these concepts in regards to the peacekept. My study of twitter accounts dealing with the peacekeeping mission in Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire have revealed significant information about the way that people (and in some cases the peacekept themselves) process and view the actions of and interactions with peacekeepers and PKOs. These findings can be used to generate a broader understanding of the role of social media and citizen journalism during PKOs.

Inherent problems with twitter data prevent conclusive results, but there is valuable insight to be gleaned from an examination of public opinion via social media. Time limitations, the result of twitter and other types of social media being more recent inventions prevent historical research. I was unable to find any tweets with the hashtags #UNOCI, #ONUCI, or #MINUSTAH prior to 2010. Twitter in particular does not provide demographic data on the profiles of its users. This prevents me from determining whether a user or author is a Haitian citizen (peacekept) or someone else. Although I make the assumption that at least some of the tweets that I have analyzed are written by the peacekept, it is fair to say that because of access to mobile devices and the internet is limited in places like Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti that it would be a relatively small percentage. Despite these limitations with using twitter data, I have identified some valuable information from my research.

I have found that there exists a greater number of neutral or impartial tweets about Côte d'Ivoire compared to Haiti, a trend that is mirrored in the same evaluation of news articles from both states. While the restrictions of my research do not allow me to prove the origins of this pattern, I believe that it stems from the differing levels of media

freedom that both countries have experienced historically and are experiencing currently. A Freedom of the Press survey from 2011 ranked the media in Haiti as 101-Partly Free and Côte d'Ivoire as 150-Not Free (Karlekar, 2011). Historically, Côte d'Ivoire has had longer periods of media control. According to the Freedom of the Press Surveys (1980-2011) from 1979-1987 print media was partly free and broadcast media was not free. From 1988-1991 the media fluctuated from not free to partly free. Since 1992 the Ivoirian media has been classified under various ranks of not free. In contrast, Haitian media began as partly free, was considered not free from 1980-85, free from 85-86, broadcast was not free from 86-87, print was partly free from 86-87, both were not free from 1988-94, partly free from 1994-2001, not free from 2001-2006, and partly free from 2007 to the present. The numerous fluctuations and past several years of partial media freedom in Haiti versus the past two decades of no media freedom in Côte d'Ivoire has had a significant impact on the social media in addition to the print and broadcast media. I believe that the decades of censorship, lack of freedom, and media manipulation in Côte d'Ivoire has carried over into hesitancy to voice strong opinions in abundance on twitter. In contrast the fluctuating history of media freedom and current history of partial media freedom in Haiti has cultivated a sense of freedom to express stronger opinions more frequently on social media sites like twitter. Since I do not know the demographic data of the authors of the tweets I have surveyed, I am unable to state with absolute certainty the significance of these conclusions.

I would now like to consider the text and framing of some of the tweets I have studied in more detail. Appendix A provides a comprehensive list of the translations of all of the tweets I have surveyed, their frequencies, and other relevant reference data.

The most frequently tweeted tweet for Côte d'Ivoire was "ONUCI encourages the filling of candidature to the CEI" (11). CEI is the French acronym for the Independent Electoral Commission. The Commission is an independent administrative authority with financial autonomy, whose role is the organization and supervision of elections in Cote d'Ivoire (Présentation, 2012). The candidates are selected by the Council of Ministers and are chosen from among the various institutions, bodies, and parties that make up the government of Côte d'Ivoire (Présentation, 2012). Coded under the category "Elections" this tweet was re-tweeted a total of eleven times. Tweets containing information pertaining to the elections were more prevalent than all of the other categories coded: emphasizing authors' primary interest in and concern with elections. From the tweets about MINUSTAH, the most frequent was "Certain hundreds of people protest MINUSTAH in Hinche" (7): re-tweeted fourteen times and was referred to in two other tweets. While the most frequent tweet about ONUCI reflected positively on the UN in Côte d'Ivoire (positive because of their encouragement of the establishment of an institution that will aid in the progression of democratic elections) in Haiti the most frequent tweet is about protest and reflects negatively on MINUSTAH (in the sense that the peacekeepers are indicating that they no longer agree with the actions of MINUSTAH and want them to withdraw from Haiti). This pattern is mirrored throughout the tweets and articles about ONUCI and MINUSTAH. There exists a much larger percentage of negative tweets and articles about MINUSTAH than ONUCI in general. More specifically, a portion of the negative tweets and articles about MINUSTAH are couched in post-colonial, neo-colonial discourse and are bold in their criticisms of the mission. Conversely, in Côte d'Ivoire there is a lesser percentage of negative tweets and articles and among them there are no bold post-colonial antagonistic criticisms.

It is apparent through even a cursory examination of several tweets and some articles that there is still an element of neo-colonial framing represented. Interestingly this pattern is only observed in the Haitian media and not in that of Côte d'Ivoire even though both are francophone states with a history of colonialism¹⁵. Although I can only extrapolate the cause, I believe that this is due to the recent political history of both states. Although less than democratic at times, in the decades following decolonization, Côte d'Ivoire endured a time of relative peace and prosperity. The death of President Houphouët-Boigny in 1993 led to a period of political uncertainty and dictatorship under Gbagbo that culminated in the 2004 incursion of UN troops and the establishment of a peacekeeping mission. The key difference between the political unrest in Haiti and in Côte d'Ivoire is the continual occupation of the country by foreign troops. Throughout the history of Haiti, it is noted that the US repeatedly became involved in the political mechanizations of the country and did not hesitate to occupy Haiti on several occasions. Although Côte d'Ivoire experienced the intrusion of French forces during their time of political unrest, it was not until 2002: quickly followed by the UN mission in 2004. This difference, I believe is one of the core reasons why the post-colonial frame is so prevalent in Haitian media, but is practically not existent in the Ivoirian media that I have analyzed.

¹⁵ This is even more unusual when one considers the fact that decolonization occurred in Côte d'Ivoire far later than in Haiti.

#	Category	Sub-Category	Tweet Text	Frequency	PNN
17	Critical	Neo-Colonial	“Hey MINUSTAH, you’ve got guns, but the land is mine. AYITI is not for sale! Tell your boss in the UoUo”	1	Negative
24	Critical	Neo-Colonial	“The imminent political chaos in Haiti --- under that crazy “tet kale” head shaved --- is exactly what the imperialists wanted. Now MINUSTAH will stay forever.”	1	Negative
19	Withdrawal	Neo-Colonial	“Whites go home! (MINUSTAH out of Haiti)”	1	Negative
30	Withdrawal	Neo-Colonial	“Whites go home!” (on minustah’s presence in Haiti)	3	Negative
31	Withdrawal	Neo-Colonial	“Whites go home!” on growing international calls for MINUSTAH to leave Haiti	1	Negative

Figure 6.6

Figure 6.6 details the text of tweets that alluded to a neo-colonial frame of reference, the theme of their primary category, and the number of times that particular tweet was re-tweeted. The last three tweets, numbers nineteen, thirty, and thirty-one all deal with a desire for the withdrawal of MINUSTAH, and have almost the exact same text content. The statement “Whites go home!” is punctuated with an exclamation point, indicating that the statement is meant forcefully and could be considered a demand rather than a request. It is also recognizing that “Whites” or peacekeepers are not from Haiti, but rather a foreign force that has invaded Haiti and therefore should not consider Haiti a permanent residence like a “home.” The reference to “Whites” is another interesting generalization. Although it is clear that by “whites” the authors are referring to MINUSTAH, it is unclear whether they are referring to the Brazilian (South American) or Nepalese (Asian) peacekeepers themselves, or the UNPKO body and through them, the UN in general. Although a member of the larger region of Latin America, Haitians

distinguish themselves in part because of their skin color: which is darker than many other Latin American states, by generally using the term “blanc” or “white” to mean foreign. This generalized racialization is significant when compared to the colonial and post-colonial history of Haiti and its occupation by white-western states (France and the United States). The continual use of white to represent foreigners even after the colonial and post-colonial periods is indicative of the lasting power conceptualizations and perceptions cultivated during those eras. In a more aggressive neo-colonial analysis it could be said that the authors are referring to the Western-dominated UN and by default the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping (UNDP) as a more metaphorical “Whites.”

Tweet number seventeen “Hey MINUSTAH, you’ve got guns, but the land is mine. AYITI is not for sale! Tell your boss in the UoUo” is a blatant reference to Haiti’s colonial and neo-colonial history. As I mentioned previously, Haiti has been occupied by the United States several times and has been host to a number of UNPKOs in the 1990s through the present. During times of US occupation and in the intervening years of involvement in Haitian politics, Washington has taken the opportunity to exploit Haiti’s resources and labor force. When the author states “AYITI is not for sale”: it is with those neo-colonial memories in mind. “Hey MINUSTAH” calls our attention to the peacekeeping mission, but also indicates that the author is talking directly to MINUSTAH via twitter. The author views MINUSTAH as a military force “you’ve got guns” and to some extent as a foe (the enemy), not as a force of aid, who is trying to forcibly take away the peacekept’s land “but the land is mine.” “Tell your boss” indicates that the author is aware of a higher authoritative power that control the peacekeeping

mission, whether they are alluding to the Western powers that control the UN, to the President of the UN, or to another authority figure in the chain of command. The entire concept indicated by the tweet regarding the international power with the ability to use violence, force, and guns to override sovereignty and take land that is not theirs for economic gain is a pillar of the neo-colonial discourse.

Another tweet, “the imminent political chaos in Haiti --- under that crazy “tet kale” head shaved --- is exactly what the imperialists wanted. Now MINUSTAH will stay forever” suggests a neo-colonial frame of reference. In this case, the author clearly states that imperialists are actively functioning in the world and will be pleased with the political chaos that elected President Michel Martelly “that crazy tet kale” will invoke. “Tet Kale” means shaved head and is a name used by Haitians in reference to former singer, now President Martelly. There is not particular significance attached to the term, nor is it derogatory in nature. “Imperialist” according to this tweet desire political instability in Haiti. This reference evokes memories of imperialistic measures taken by the US in an effort to destabilize Haiti both in the early 1900s and in the 1990s.

As previously mentioned, there are several limiting variables associated with research of social media outlets like twitter. In spite of this, new mobile technology, increasing usage and access to mobile devices and the internet, real time streaming information sharing, and the ability to attach locational information and supporting data (like videos and pictures) to tweets has led to the potential for interesting research. A more in depth and broad spectrum analysis of the use of social media sites like facebook and twitter use by the peacekept in various countries around the world should be conducted. Many researchers, academics, and analysts have written numerous papers and

action plans about how to better conduct peacekeeping missions. What I find continually missing are the voices of the peacekept. While the UN may bring the troops and technology to resolve conflicts and political instability, they remain foreigners: foreigners who will return home at the conclusion of their mission's mandate. The peacekept have lived these conflicts, have experienced all the facets of it, and in my opinion have valuable knowledge that can aid in the conclusion of conflict, the stability of peace, and the reconstruction of their country. Why should they not be heard?

Chapter Seven: Theories and Conclusions

MEDIA SOURCE PROFILES

As an internationally recognized source who caters to a more educated audience who is of a particular socio-economic class, CNN would be the public source most likely to be mined for information about the missions by policy makers. With this in mind, their purpose for including the positive and negative in each article is to divert attention towards the positive efforts and successes of peacekeepers and justify their presence in spite of the occasional negative action or event. The repetition of this pattern in both Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti indicates a desire by the international community to ensure the continuation of peacekeeping missions. Even though CNN is slightly more critical of MINUSTAH in Haiti, the news source continues to supplement the critical with a frame of justification.

Radio France Internationale is government owned and operated radio station that broadcasts in both Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire. Broadcasts from RFI Afrique reflect the trend

among international sources and their preoccupation with sensational phenomena and is relatively moderate in their portrayals of UNOCI. Significantly different, MINUSTAH is portrayed by RFI Haiti very negatively. The difference is in proximity and involvement. RFI's headquarters in France place it geographically closer to Côte d'Ivoire than Haiti. Even more important is France's involvement and cooperative efforts with UNOCI. LICORNE (French) troops arrived in Côte d'Ivoire two years prior to UNOCI forces and continue to combine their missions. In Haiti there is little physical French presence, making it of less concern than Côte d'Ivoire. Since RFI is an extension of the French government it is naturally going to be more moderate and representative of French political discourse in its reporting on UNOCI. Whereas the lack of French political and military involvement in Haiti at this time, allows the news source freer rein in its reporting. The result is modest negativity regarding UNOCI and a plethora of criticisms in reference to MINUSTAH. Lacking the sensationalism of CNN and RFI Afrique, Nouvelle République, provides a greater number of positive portrayals of peacekeepers than negative and is less moderate than RFI.

With the exception of a fraction of the categories coded from sensational phenomena (elections and cholera) and those categories and concepts falling under the justification frame, all of the most frequent primary and subsidiary categories reflect negatively on MINUSTAH and UN troops. Although the Haitian domestic media is characterized by varying levels of positive and negative portrayals, all contain a significant critical-negative frame. The critical frame is related most frequently to the perceived ineffectiveness of MINUSTAH and questions regarding the success of its mandate and role in Haiti. By examining the specific critiques outlined in news articles

and radio transcripts, the UN and peacekeepers may glean insight into how to better evaluate and implement peacekeeping missions around the globe.

Although it began as a paper closely linked to the government, in the years since it was founded *Le Nouvelliste* has become (according to my research) a paper that caters to the more educated audiences, but does provide a “centrist” position. Predominantly critical of MINUSTAH, *Le Nouvelliste* is a domestic source that caters to a more educated audience and thus provides often contradictory reports that portray peacekeepers positively and negatively. As stated above, terms like occupation and tourists are used to negatively portray peacekeepers.

Radio Métropole and Kiskeya are both defined as domestic local sources, radio stations widely broadcasted and with a general population target audience. Unlike the other domestic sources, the radio stations provide relatively equal numbers of reports that positively and negatively portray peacekeepers. However there is a subtle skew in favor of critical portrayals that is common throughout all Haitian media.

Bri Kouri Nouvèl Gaye, Citizen Haiti, HaitiLibre, and Express comprise participatory media sources and are overwhelmingly critical of MINUSTAH. These sources are driven by the perspectives and reports of Haitian citizens and are consequently most likely to reflect more honest perceptions of the peacekept. That they are overwhelmingly negative and critical in their portrayals is significant. While these few sources do not represent the totality of participatory media, it provides a glimpse of the perceptions of the peacekept in relation to MINUSTAH. Future research might

examine a wider breadth of participatory media sources to ascertain whether this critical frame is dominant throughout peacekept-led media.

In Côte d'Ivoire positive portrayals are framed in terms of justification and negative portrayals are framed in terms of confrontation. The confrontation frame does not inherently portray peacekeepers negatively. In this case, negative is used to describe the events themselves rather than the peacekeepers specifically. Confrontation phenomenon are framed and classified as negative because they represent violent interactions between actors. A number of the connected categories under the Côte d'Ivoire umbrella follow a confrontation-justification pattern, balancing the positive and negative news they present. Or rather balancing the negative news with positive portrayals of peacekeepers. This dichotomous pattern between confrontation, which indicates some level of violence or a clashing of wills, and justification, which indicates a desire to positively portray and promote UNOCI is mirrored in articles from domestic sources *Nouvelle République* and *Le Patriote*. This frequency of the confrontation category in the international news is compatible with Shinar's assertion that the lack of defined peace journalism has led to journalism defined by war and violence rather than post-conflict reconstruction and the development of peace (Shinar, 2004, p. 3).

Le Jour presents an impartial portrayal of UNOCI, but the tone of *Fraternité Matin* is relatively anti-UNOCI. Historically, a puppet of the government, *Fraternité Matin* seems to reflect a position that is anti-UNOCI because part of the mission's goal is carrying out democratic elections and placing Ouattara in power instead of allowing former President Gbagbo to retain his political standing. "Third world media, through gatekeepers associated with government control or guidance, can and do impress their

preferences on the news they select for publication” (Skurnik, 1981, p. 107). On the opposite side of the political division, is pro-Ouattara, pro-UNOCI *Le Patriote*. In this case, since UNOCI has a responsibility to see that democratically elected Ouattara makes a successful transition into the government and Ouattara is a figure of power in the operation of *Le Patriote* that makes *Le Patriote* a pro-UNOCI paper. This trend is exemplified throughout their reports on and positive portrayals of the mission.

UNITED NATIONS PRESS STATEMENTS

Although several of the news sources in both states discussed included quotes from UNPKO officials and representatives, those quotations merely represent a window into the UN’s portrayal of peacekeepers. Press releases from the UN presented a pervasive justification script that framed peacekeepers as the saviors of the conflict in Haiti and continuously outlined the need for the continuation of the mission. While violence and instability are mentioned, the scope is repeatedly downplayed or blamed on demonstrations designed to disrupt elections or the progress of peacekeeping. The peacekept are described as being receptive to the infiltration of the peacekeeping operation and fully supportive of their intervention and peace-based mission. Elections were portrayed as successful and any incidents of violence or voting issues were downplayed significantly. Predictably, allegations regarding the cholera outbreak and Nepalese peacekeepers were thoroughly denied and the UN seemed committed to mitigating the spread of the epidemic. Democracy was repeatedly mentioned and promoted as the epitome of good governance and considered to be the only appropriate type of governance implemented in Haiti.

In early press releases from Côte d'Ivoire (2004) it was clear that although the UN was hopeful that reforms in Gbagbo's administration would be made, the UN did not trust Gbagbo and was somewhat disenchanted with him despite their purported impartiality. By 2008, there is a much more positive outlook and progress was made in both the electoral and security sectors. However, the progress in security is tempered by the admission that there is still much work to be done in this area. Overall, the press releases from the UN about Côte d'Ivoire seem to be more staid in their depictions of the progress and problems arising in the state and UNOCI solely in the mitigation of them.

Press releases examined in both Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire downplayed the violence and critical aspects of the missions. The UN seemed to be much more critical of the government in Côte d'Ivoire than in Haiti, but that is a reflection of their attitudes towards the political system and individuals rather than a criticism of the peacekeeping mission and its inability to direct Gbagbo. It was clear in the information presented regarding the events in Haiti that the UN was downplaying or graying negative situations and praising the success of elections. A definitive pro-democracy and elections equating to success discourse was present in the UN press releases. International sources, particularly CNN, emulated this trend: indicating a definite relationship between the discourse underlying the international Western media and the goals and pervasive discourse of the UN and its powerful member nations (within which those international media sources I examined are located and in some cases owned by).

CONCLUSIONS

Framing is an inescapable aspect of media: representing perceptions, navigating discourses, and influencing portrayals. Merely indentifying how international, domestic, elite, local, and participatory media portray peacekeepers through text provides an incomplete analysis. A comprehensive analysis must also examine the manner in which those portrayals are framed relative to media power structures. A comparison of the summation of media portrayals of UN peacekeepers in Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire revealed the existence of a positive-negative script that is supported and reinforced by justification and critical frames. This framework exists at both the macro level and when examining trends among individual and specific groups of media sources and the topics and categories they contain.

At the macro level, coding revealed that the most frequent categories describing the portrayal of peacekeepers in Haiti is “critical” and in Côte d'Ivoire is “justification.” While media from both locations encompasses both positive and negative scripts, these primary categories are indicative of the overall tone and framing of peacekeepers and peacekeeping missions. Analysis of the most frequently coded secondary categories in each state reveals a similar pattern. MINUSTAH is described as ineffective, lacking the ability to provide security and to mitigate violence and fear, is failed and occupatory in nature, and peacekeepers themselves are equated with tourists. Contradictorily in Côte d'Ivoire secondary categories are part of a positive script, extolling the neutrality of the missions, its effectiveness, and success.

The justification and critical categories that frequently appear in media portrayals are further defined or framed by the categories linked to them within the articles and transcripts. Among all portrayals in Côte d'Ivoire, the justification category was most commonly linked with the role category. In this case the role of the mission was regarded as positive, successful, and well defined, indicating a positive, productive and successful framing of UNOCI by the media. The critical category, which represents the dominant portrayals of MINUSTAH, was most often framed in terms of ineffectiveness, and doubts and criticisms regarding the role of the mission. Furthermore, protest and violence were often linked, indicating a negative relationship and perceptions regarding MINUSTAH handling of protests and demonstration. These connections, uncovered through axial coding, indicate that not only are positive-negative divisions at the macro level, but also within the media describing each mission and the manner in which those positive and negative scripts are individually defined by the media in those respective states.

An examination of the nature of the portrayals in each article revealed that 69% were negative in Haiti and only 9% were negative in Côte d'Ivoire. An examination of these figures over time showed that collective portrayals of MINUSTAH have become increasingly negative (see Figure 7.2), while portrayals of UNOCI have become increasingly positive (see Figure 7.1). Although positive portrayals of MINUSTAH increased slightly in 2006 and 2009, this is most likely a result of elections occurring or expected rather than indicative of the overall trend. The progression of portrayals over time marked by the nature of articles found surrounding the time period when mandates are renewed shows a comparable pattern. In Haiti sentiments become increasingly negative and more articles begin questioning the role of MINUSTAH. In Côte d'Ivoire,

international sources remained positive throughout the subsequent mandate renewals and domestic sources become increasingly positive.

Côte d'Ivoire	2009	2010	2011
<i>Positive Portrayals</i>	50%	64%	79%
<i>Negative Portrayals</i>	50%	36%	21%
Figure 7.1			

Haiti	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
<i>Positive Portrayals</i>	25%	26%	33%	23%	20%	21%	19%	18%
<i>Negative Portrayals</i>	75%	74%	67%	77%	80%	79%	81%	82%
Figure 7.2								

The positive-negative script is additionally reflected in those concepts and categories that exist only or to a much greater degree in the media about MINUSTAH. The cost of peace is repeatedly discussed in conjunction with MINUSTAH by domestic sources, but is never mentioned by any sources in Côte d'Ivoire. This represents a significant difference in the way in which each mission is perceived by the peacekept. Questioning the cost of peace indicates that the peacekept are in doubt of, questioning, and thinking critically about the role of the mission, its impact on Haiti, and whether the mission is progressing in a manner conducive to eventual peace. That the peacekept are asking these questions signifies a few things: that the mission needs to be revised, that the peacekept are taking an active role in trying to critique the mission, and that the peacekept are doing more than blindly condemning MINUSTAH. Furthermore, because this concept of the “cost of peace” is often mentioned in conjunction with the occupation frame, the implied criticism may stem, in part, from the longevity of the mission (the first UNPKO in Haiti was in 1994).

Although a neo-colonial script appeared in the media coverage of Côte d’Ivoire it was to a much lesser extent than in portrayals of MINUSTAH. Often indicated by the use of overt connotation laden terms like occupation, occupying force, Western, and democracy promotion, the neo-colonial frame accentuates the neo-liberal post-colonial history of Haiti. Repeatedly occupied and subjected to the various manifestations of imperialism, predominantly by the United States (but also including France) the cultural and political memories associated with this era of Haitian history are reapplied via a neo-colonial frame to characterize, conceptualize, and represent perceptions of the peacekept in reference to MINUSTAH. This framing pattern is not merely present in the articles and transcript gathered, but also in the tweets I accumulated. To some extent, the neo-colonial framing is seen most clearly in the articles describing elections. While domestic articles maintain that the promotion of democracy is like making Haiti wear a “badly fitting suit,” CNN repeatedly praises the success of successive elections and the promotion of democracy in the Third World. Tweets include terms like white to describe foreigners and refer to the sale of Haiti and the vindictive nature of imperialists. Additionally, unlike media coverage of UNOCI, the terms “occupation (and variations thereof),” “tourist,” “white holiday,” and “violation of sovereignty” are used to describe peacekeepers and MINUSTAH. These terms are indicative of a significant underlying discourse that also appears in a neo-colonial script.

The different characterizations and framings of the role of the missions in Haiti and Côte d’Ivoire further reinforces the distinct positive and negative scripts dominating the portrayals of each mission. Most mentions of the role of UNOCI positively highlight the justification frame. The role of MINUSTAH, however, is much more controversial.

Several articles question the role of the mission in Haiti, alluding to the lack of clear goals and communication between peacekeepers and the peacekept. MINUSTAH's role is perceived as being a "tutor," changeable, a deterrent only, to serve Western interests, and as an implementer of democracy. These frames, while not all overtly negative are connotatively negative within their respective contents. For example, the use of "tutor" implies that MINUSTAH is the educated and knowledgeable teacher and therefore higher ranking than Haiti who is equated to an unschooled child in need of outside help. While not completely negative, the perceptions regarding the role of UNOCI are putatively positive compared to MINUSTAH.

Interaction events, while mirroring the positive-negative script and justification-critical framework, present an additional violent script. Sixty percent of the articles and transcripts about the interactions between peacekeepers and the peacekept in Côte d'Ivoire and seventy-three percent in Haiti have a violent theme. Regardless of whether these interactions reflect positively or negatively on peacekeepers the fact that interactions between peacekeepers and the peacekept are primarily in terms of violence is crucial. It may seem obvious but when a majority of interaction events are characterized by a violent frame that means that they are not characterized by a frame of peace. The violence frame is counter-intuitive to the goals and purpose of a peacekeeping mission. If peace is achieved, interactions between peacekeepers and the peacekept should reflect this. The lack of peaceful-positive interaction, particularly in Haiti, signifies the need for changes to be made in the implementation of the missions or at least for reassessment to occur. For Côte d'Ivoire with its positive portrayals of peacekeepers and lack of critical framing in the violence theme is less worrisome than Haiti with its integrated critical-

violence frame indicative of the negative portrayals of peacekeepers in their interactions with the peacekept. The implications of a predominantly critical framing of interactions in reference to one PKO compared to the positive and impartial framing of another could be staggering when accounting for how these portrayals influence or reflect the perceptions of the peacekept. Haitians associate interactions with peacekeepers as being negative, undesirable, while Ivoirians positively associate interactions with peacekeepers.

The negative-critical framing of the violence script in Haiti and the positive-justification framing of the violence script in Côte d'Ivoire may be the result of differing definitions of violence. Preponderant among interaction themed articles, the violence theme can be divided into two distinct categories. Confrontation interactions in Côte d'Ivoire between peacekeepers and the peacekept: where the peacekept are considered combatants "Gbagbo's forces," "Ouattara's forces" or "soldiers." In contrast in Haiti, violent interactions transpire between peacekeepers and civilians. Attacks against combatants are acceptable, even praised, but attacks against civilians are reprehensible. This distinction is a major contributor to the critical frame that pervades Haitian media.

Twitter accounts mirrored the trends found in articles and transcripts from traditional media sources. Portrayals of MINUSTAH on twitter 61% negative in nature and those about UNOCI were 52% positive. The similarities between the articles and transcripts and the twitter accounts indicates that the information derived from the media is indicative of the perceptions of the peacekept to some extent. If information from the media accounts was used by the UN or by peacekeepers, this commonality becomes significant. A history of oppression and remembered violent censorship may continue to discourage certain facets of the media from printing negative portrayals of the

peacekeepers who are a significant political actor in Côte d'Ivoire. In addition censorship and the harsh punishment of journalists may have discouraged, in particular, the establishment of participatory media, which was very critical of MINUSTAH personnel in Haiti. With that in mind, a comparison between the positive and negative portrayals of articles and transcripts and tweets revealed the existence of a particular continuity. There exists a greater number of neutral or impartial portrayals of peacekeepers in tweets about UNOCI compared to the plethora of negative portrayals described in tweets about MINUSTAH. Furthermore, the most frequent tweet about UNOCI was in connection to elections (impartial portrayal) while the most frequently re-tweeted tweet about MINUSTAH was protest (negative portrayal). While the restrictions of my research do not allow me to prove the origins of this pattern, I believe that it stems from the differing levels of media freedom that both countries have experienced historically and are experiencing currently.

For the most part, international sources are primarily concerned with sensational topics like confrontation and elections. Unlike the domestic sources, whose audience is limited, the international sources like CNN, RFI, and Nouvelle Republique reach a significantly more widespread population. They are also media organizations tied closely, funded, and owned by factions of the Western world. To the international community and the UN, the success of a peacekeeping mission is measured by successful elections and the implementation of a democratic political system. This ideology is clearly reflected in the discourse and frames projected by these international media sources. Their preoccupation with elections and in particular CNN's positivity regarding the elections in

Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire is indicative of a global discourse that promotes democracy and measures success through the completion of elections.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UN AND UNDPKO

The United Nations, specifically the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) would greatly benefit from utilizing a process, similar to the framework outlined in my research, to evaluate peacekeeping operations. Among academics and policy makers the evaluation of success relative to peacekeeping operations has been widely debated. The UN, for example, measures success by the mitigation of violence, the implementation of elections and the transition to a democratically elected government. Others are more complicated in their definitions of success, examining the representation of different ethnic groups and political factions, the cessation of violence and racial tensions, among other variables. I recommend a vastly different method for evaluating these missions than formerly suggested. Media, particularly local and participatory types are essentially representative of at least some of the perceptions, opinions, and frames of reference of the peacekept. As such, they offer previously untapped source of evaluation and consideration regarding peacekeeping missions. The peacekept are the individuals who are most directly impacted by the success or failure of a particular mission and as residents of the host state and in some cases having intimate knowledge of the conflict that brought the peacekeepers are, arguably, in the best position to offer insight that would lead to a successful and more effective mission.

By analyzing domestic and participatory news sources through the systematic compilation and examination of articles and transcripts, UN policy makers may find

useful insight into the problems and successes of operations that can be used to create more effective and sustainable missions. One of the few positive-portrayal articles about interactions between MINUSTAH troops and the peacekept in Haiti described a peacekeepers playing soccer with the children of a impoverished community in Port-au-Prince. When interviewed the peacekeeper described an ability to connect with members of the community because he was able to relate their situation (socio-economic, community structure, housing situation, etc) with his family in Brazil. This type of cross-cultural connection and understanding is a crucial part of a successful and effective mission and was outlined in a simple news article.

Furthermore, a more in depth comparison-based examination of the cause of the positive-justification script in Côte d'Ivoire versus a negative-critical script in Haiti may provide useful insight that can benefit future missions. More specifically, through the identification of categories, I have discovered the primary complaints that Haitians have with MINUSTAH. This same type of analysis could be used in other peacekeeping missions to evaluate areas of weakness and dissatisfaction. Identification of those problems then becomes the first step to solving them and ultimately creating a more successful and effective peacekeeping mission.

At the core of an effective peacekeeping operation is the commitment of both peacekeepers and the peacekept to ending conflict and creating peace. It is not enough to force an end to conflict or to implement peace, a certain level of support from the peacekept themselves must exist in order for peace to be lasting and development to be sustainable. By identifying and accounting for the concerns and criticisms of the

peacekept through various methods, including an examination of the media, the UN shows its solidarity and may gain more respect or willingness from the citizenry.

Within the domestic Haitian media, some of the most frequently coded categories are occupation, tourists, violation of sovereignty, and white holiday. Variations of these categories can be found in all of the domestic sources, including RFI Haiti and are indicative of the general sentiments of the peacekept and the portrayal of MINUSTAH. Perceiving the peacekeepers as tourists on a holiday explains their ineffectiveness, continued insecurity, absence during times of violence, and failure to complete the tenets of their mandate. Viewing MINUSTAH as an occupation force is indicative of the mission's disregard for development in areas other than political, its longevity, the disregard of Haitian sovereignty, and is specifically exemplified by the referrals to the renewal of mandates as a "ritual" or "formality" only. Several articles question the operation's respect for sovereignty, citing cases where there has been a clear disregard for the freedom of individuals: "UN daily parade on private property," access to neighborhoods restricted, and allowing travel in these areas only to residents and visitors who are issued passes. In this instance, the disregard of citizen's sovereignty caused as much anger as the lack of communication between peacekeepers and the peacekept regarding the peacekeepers actions and the reasons for those actions. These sentiments combined with the frequent connections made between criticism and ineffectiveness, doubts about the role of the mission, and connecting protest and violence indicates areas of the mission in Haiti that clearly need to be addressed. They are also representative of the most important issues and criticisms according to the peacekept.

Overall, those sources typologically defined “local or domestic educated” produced the largest volume of articles regarding the peacekeeping missions in both states. These sources, *Le Patriote* and *Le Nouvelliste*, provided more in depth analysis stories and despite some contradictory stories provide a good basis for an initial analysis or evaluation of the perceptions of the peacekept in reference to the UNPKOs. If the UN were to pursue a line of inquiry that mirrored my research and examination of the news media, I would suggest they pay special attention to sources like these.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MEDIA

If the UN or the DPKO can use the media as a tool to evaluate peacekeeping operations, understand the perceptions of the peacekept, and potentially garner more support for the mission then the media itself has a responsibility to be the voice of the peacekept. In particular domestic and participatory media should portray the peacekept’s praise, criticisms, regarding of peacekeeping missions and take seriously their role as an information machine and investigative tool for their audiences. The media is situated in a unique position in that it can be a voice for the voiceless, ask questions and investigate where others cannot and be a forum for conversation and debate between actors. These responsibilities must be taken seriously if the UN is going to use the media as a tool for evaluation of missions. If so, the media could provide a unique forum for debate about the issues and potential solutions surrounding conflict and the effective mitigation of it by peacekeepers, allowing input from various domestic actors and members of the peacekept that may not be among the recognized elite.

Therefore, I would encourage the media, both internationally and domestically to be open to this idea of a forum for conversation and that individuals, collective action committees, and local leadership use media outlets to air the concerns and praises of their constituency. This would potentially provide invaluable information to the UN that could be used to better manage current and future peacekeeping operations.

The significance of participatory media should not be overlooked by either UN policy makers or the peacekept. The value and validity of participatory or citizen media is widely contested. Concerns regarding the lack of filtering, subjectivity, journalistic integrity, and legitimacy as a source or factual news is widely debated among academics and journalists. It cannot be argued that participatory media is fast becoming a major force in the globalization of information. Most recently in the Arab Spring and the conflict in Syria, where news organizations are banned, the role of citizen journalism has been widely noted. Its importance relies on more than its democratic nature and lack of filtering by major news corporations and agenda minded editors. Participatory journalism is representative of the most individual level of perception and portrayal possible in the news media. As such it may provide the most honest (if strongly biased) opinions, perceptions, and responses to peacekeeping missions. Although other types of news sources are representative of the perceptions of the peacekept, none more so than participatory sources who come straight from the source as it were. In a period of vast globalization of information and personal technology participatory media is a crucial medium for the presenting and spreading of ideas and information. While access to the internet and mobile phones may still be low in developing countries, the spread of

information via these technologies is not to be underestimated; particularly among the rising population of educated and internationally informed college age youth.

IMPLICATIONS FOR GEOPOLITICS

Since the media “(re)produce[s] the qualities of place, scale, and identity that collectively map the contours of causes, consequences, and solutions to conflict” (Tracy, 2008, p. 10) it is strategically placed at a crossroads between geopolitics and peacekeeping analysis. My research has opened up the examination of peacekeeping and the role of participatory media from a critical-popular geopolitical standpoint. The media and consequently the frames and discourse it presents have been and will continue to be a crucial factor in the representation of information and perspectives and the influence of perceptions. Little research has been conducted in the areas of popular geopolitics and peacekeeping, particularly from a critical standpoint. My research represents an initial foray into one potential area for significant research. By examining various levels of media (international, domestic educated, local, participatory, and social), their portrayals of peacekeepers, and the way in which those portrayals are framed, accounting for the subjectivity and individual biases, policy makers can gather information about the perceptions of (criticisms and praises) the peacekept via the news media. Furthermore, while I merely examined the portrayals and framing of MINUSTAH and UNOCI, future research may analyze how or whether those frames and portrayals influence the perceptions of the peacekept and to what extent domestic and participatory sources reflect the perspectives of the peacekept. The lack of knowledge and understanding and disregard for the perspectives and perceptions of the peacekept over the course of peacekeeping missions makes these findings crucial.

The importance of participatory and different forms of social media should not be undervalued. Recent events throughout the world have reinforced the importance and critical role of citizen journalism and its ability to disseminate information unedited and unpolluted by global frames. The global implications and participation in addition to the local significance of citizen journalism make it, in my opinion, an investigation priority for critical geo-politicians. Further research might examine the role of participatory journalism specifically in regards to its role in forming and influencing the peacekept's perceptions of UN peacekeeping missions and how it can be used to evaluate and analyze the success or implications of those missions in addition to other non-UN peacekeeping and conflict resolution operations.

Appendices

Appendix A: Tweets about UNOCI						
#	State	Category	Sub-C	Tweets	Freq.	PNN
1	CDI	Critical		New leader for ONUCI: “I know also a plot international”	4	Positive
2	CDI	Elections		ONUCI calls for large participation in elections	7	Positive
3	CDI	Reconciliation		The international organization Interpeace discusses with ONUCI the process of reconciliation	4	Positive
4	CDI	Violence		ONUCI denounces the abuses by FRCI pro-Ouattara	7	Positive
5	CDI	Elections		The day before the elections, ONUCI urges the Ivoirian media to be responsible	2	Neutral
6	CDI	Violence		Ivoirian military accused of abuse by ONUCI	2	Negative
7	CDI	Reconciliation		ONUCI meets with representatives and officials about national reconciliation	14	Negative
8	CDI	Reconciliation		ONUCI launched a caravan of reconciliation	3	Positive
9	CDI	Justification		UNOCI press release reaffirms freedom of assembly and expression UNOCI	1	Neutral
10	CDI	Elections		ONUCI aids in the security of elections	4	Positive
11	CDI	Elections		ONUCI encourages the filling of candidature to the CEI	2	Negative
12	CDI	Critical		Ivoirians of ONUCI you have blood on your hands	1	Positive
13	CDI	Justification		The new leader of ONUCI urges a political commitment on the path to peace	1	Positive
14	CDI	Violence	Critical	Procession of ADO come from the airport launches mortars and rockets, ONUCI accompanies	1	Negative
15	CDI	Reconciliation		Ouattara and Banny in the ocean. The reconciliation in question	1	Neutral

Appendix A: Tweets about MINUSTAH						
#	State	Category	Sub-C	Tweets	4	Positive
1	H	Justification		Important mission between MINUSTAH and PNH resulted in 7 arrests	1	Negative
2	H	Justification		MINUSTAH and PNH work together against crime in the neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince	4	Neutral
3	H	Cholera	Justification	MINUSTAH is willing to mitigate the impact of cholera in PaP	1	Negative
4	H	Justification	Critique	7 criminals were arrested by PNH and MINUSTAH for escaping prison and other crimes	2	Negative
5	H	Withdrawal		“Wish them luck” “continental action for MINUSTAH withdrawal from Haiti Saturday in Sao Paolo”	1	Positive
6	H	Critical		“report on MINUSTAH rape of Haitian boy ... sad”	3	Negative
7	H	Protest		Certain hundreds of people protest MINUSTAH in Hinche	3	Negative
8	H	Reconciliation		MINUSTAH – Peace Tribunal	1	Negative
9	H	Withdrawal		Haiti: asking for the withdrawal of MINUSTAH and cancel debt	1	Negative
10	H	Justification		MINUSTAH and PNH – anti-criminal operation	1	Positive
11	H	Protest		Protest event against MINUSTAH in Hinche	1	Neutral
12	H	Justification		UN peacekeepers support police in efforts to curb crime	1	Positive
13	H	Justification		Minustah supports the Haitian National Police in Operation “Hope” aimed at curbing crime in Port-au-Prince	2	Neutral
14	H	Critical		Haitian activist for human rights, Me. Gerard Gourgue, has sharply criticized the presence of MINUSTAH beyond the purely police operation	3	Negative

15	H	Critical		News Haiti-MINUSTAH: The mission still awaiting the outcome of the investigation into the rape of a young Haitian	1	Negative
16	H	Justification		PNH and MINUSTAH launch a campaign to dispatch awareness	1	Negative
17	H	Critical	Post-colonial	“Hey MINUSTAH, you’ve got guns, but the land is mine. AYITI is not for sale! Tell your boss in the UoUo”	1	Negative
18	H	Arrest		Haiti-Belizaire Arrest: Restlessness of MINUSTAH	1	Negative
19	H	Withdrawal	Post-colonial	“Whites go home! (MINUSTAH out of Haiti)”	1	Negative
20	H	Political tension		MINUSTAH restless about climate of political tension created by arrests	3	Negative
21	H	Justification		“Could be operation Hope underway? MINUSTAH attempting to “strengthen a secure operational environment”	1	Negative
22	H	Cholera	Critique	Haiti-MINUSTAH: the collective mobilization for compensation for victims of cholera does fall	1	Negative
23	H	Protest	Critique	Popular Haitian motivation/mobilization against MINUSTAH	1	Negative
24	H	Critical	Post-colonial	“The imminent political chaos in Haiti --- under that crazy “tet kale” head shaved --- is exactly what the Imperialists wanted. Now MINUSTAH will stay forever.”	1	Negative
25	H	Violence	Critique	MINUSTAH accused of genocide	1	Neutral
26	H	Justification		Five months into his presidency, Martelly discusses why he wants MINUSTAH to stay in Haiti	1	Negative
27	H	Cholera		Is MINUSTAH responsible for the spread of cholera in Haiti?	1	Negative
28	H	Deploy Forces		MINUSTAH deploy forces in Bel-Air	1	Negative
29	H	Withdrawal		The call from the popular base in Haiti to withdraw MINUSTAH can’t be confused with a call for are turn of the army	1	Negative
30	H	Withdrawal	Post-colonial	“Whites go home!” (on minustah’s presence in Haiti)	3	Negative

31	H	Withdrawal	Post-colonial	“Whites go home!” on growing international calls for MINUSTAH to leave Haiti	1	Negative
33	H	Critical		Reflections following a delegation: how minustah hurts Haiti	1	Neutral
34	H	Cholera	Critique	MINUSTAH still continuing to foul up Haiti, Haitians upset with UN base run-off into foul smelling pool	7	Negative
35	H	Critical	Haiti Military	MINUSTAH seems to be excluded from the remobilization	1	Negative
36	H	Critical	Haiti Military	Haiti plan to restore army faces UN hurdle– Haiti – Can MINUSTAH prevail?	2	Negative
37	H	Critical		A market abuse by an officer of MINUSTAH	1	Negative
38	H	Critical		Haiti-Politics – The Young Haitian who leaked the MINUSTAH rape video receives death: they should be arrested	1	Negative
39	H	Critical		MINUSTAH brutally beat up a street vendor in Clercine yesterday afternoon	1	Negative
40	H	Cholera	Critique	Because of MINUSTAH Haiti grapples with highest cholera rate in world	1	Negative
41	H	Critical		The suppression of democracy in Haiti – Minustah	1	Negative
42	H	Withdrawal		Haiti Initiative criticisms on the withdrawal of MINUSTAH from Haiti	1	Negative
43	H	Withdrawal		MINUSTAH out of Haiti now	1	Negative
44	H	Cholera	Protest	Large anti-UN protests in Haiti “They’ve brought us disease and humiliation”	1	Negative
45	H	Withdrawal	Critique	Critiques on the withdrawal phasing of MINUSTAH	1	Neutral
46	H	Critical		Keeping the peace, or conspiring against it? – Minustah	1	Negative
47	H	Critical		MINUSTAH troops supported Haiti police in Les Cayes prison massacre, role should be investigated	1	Negative

48	H	Withdrawal	Critique	Wonder if the UN would pull out if Haiti government removed immunity for its troops and insisted on investigation	1	Negative
49	H	Cost		US urged to keep funding UN Peacekeeping	1	Negative
50	H	Cholera		In one year, Haiti is the country most affected by cholera in the world more than 465,000 infected	3	Negative
51	H	Critical		MINUSTAH's gang rapes	1	Negative
52	H	Cholera	Critique	Calling for restitution from UN troops	1	Neutral
53	H	Cholera		Will MINUSTAH pay restitution for cholera?	7	Negative
54	H	Critical		How MINUSTAH hurts Haiti	1	Negative
55	H	Cholera	Critique	A year of cholera from the UN	2	Negative
56	H	Protest	Cholera	Protests today for the 1 st anniversary of the cholera outbreak in Haiti	1	Negative
57	H	Cholera		Haiti-Cholera: MINUSTAH to international prosecution against the mission of peacekeepers	1	Negative
58	H	Withdrawal	Protest	protests remain confident about the departure of MINUSTAH	1	Negative
59	H	Protest	Cholera	Anti-UN protest marks anniversary of cholera outbreak	1	Negative

Appendix B: Categories (Haiti)						
#	Source	Category	Sub-Category	Sub-Category	Sub-Category	Sub-Category
79	CNN	Cholera	Protest (clash with pkers, react with violence)	Violence	Fear	No Blame (no blame specifically)
81	CNN	Cholera	Protest (politically motivated)	Withdrawal (protestors demand)	No Blame (no outright blame assigned)	
83	CNN	Cholera	Protest	Violence		
114	CNN	Elections	Violence (little)	Peaceful (relatively)	High Participation	
120	CNN	Elections	Security	Peaceful (relatively)		
129	CNN	Elections	Violence (unrest, mobs)	Withdrawal (demanded)		
113	CNN	Elections	Violence (little)	Success		
163	CNN	Justification	Democracy (promotion and achievement)	Earthquake		
143	CNN	Protest	Violence	Apology (by UN)		
149	CNN	Protest	Violence (politically motivated, disrupt elections)	No Blame (Cholera)	Elections	
76	RFI	Cholera	Blame (denies responsibility)	Blame (proof)		
161	RFI	Critical of UN	Assault (pker rape pkt)	Protest		
61	RFI	Critical of UN	Aid (US)			
105	RFI	Critical of UN	Ineffective (slow reform)	Timid	Impotent	Role (confusion)
165	RFI	Critical of UN	Ineffective (structurally deficient)	Earthquake		
166	RFI	Critical of UN	Inefficient	Ineffective (without direction)	Earthquake	
134	RFI	Critical of UN	Military force	Cost (cheaper than MINUSTAH)		
117	RFI	Elections	Security	Insecurity	Election (concerns pkt)	

122	RFI	Elections	Prepared	No Blame (Cholera, proof)		
123	RFI	Elections	Chaos	Mess		
124	RFI	Elections	Protest (elections)			
128	RFI	Elections	Protest	Fraudulent Elections		
132	RFI	Elections	Inefficient (voting conducted poorly)			
140	RFI	Elections	MINUSTAH critical of candidates			
147	RFI	Protest	Critical	Occupying force, army of occupation	Withdrawal	
151	RFI	Protest	Violence	Occupation		
75	LN	Cholera	Blame (imported by MINUSTAH)			
77	LN	Cholera	Blame	Critical (Polluters)		
78	LN	Cholera	Protest	Violence (politically motivated UN claim)		
80	LN	Cholera	Protest (political motivation, disrupt elections)	No Blame	Critical (aversion to mission is recurrent phenomenon)	
82	LN	Cholera	Protest	Withdrawal (protestors demand)	Insecurity (Panic, add fuel to the fire)	
84	LN	Cholera	No Blame	Protest		
86	LN	Cholera	No Blame			
20	LN	Critical of UN	Role (questioned)	White Holiday, Tourists	Presence (absent during violence)	
22	LN	Critical of UN	Sovereignty (infringement)	Critical (Foreign involvement/PC memory)		
23	LN	Critical of UN	Sovereignty (infringement)	UN daily parade on private property	Occupation (managed by UN)	UN agents (arrogant, racist, anti- women, use of excessive force, contempt

24	LN	Critical of UN	Occupying force			
25	LN	Critical of UN	Destabilizes	Role (changed)	Occupation	Military (creation of because loss of trust)
26	LN	Critical of UN	Failed (HR violation despite UN presence)			
27	LN	Critical of UN	Failed			
28	LN	Critical of UN	Ineffective	Failed (absent presence)	Instability	
29	LN	Critical of UN	Ineffective (inaction despite violence)	Failed (language barrier)	Violence	
30	LN	Critical of UN	Failed			
31	LN	Critical of UN	Failed	Ineffective	Violence (increasing)	
32	LN	Critical of UN	Help Kidnappers			
33	LN	Critical of UN	Ineffective (sporadic response)			
35	LN	Critical of UN	Ineffective (lax and tolerant)	Agenda (guided by own political agenda)	Image (concerned with)	
36	LN	Critical of UN	Development (change mandate)	Deterrent (MINUSTAH functions as)		
37	LN	Critical of UN	Insecurity			
38	LN	Critical of UN	Passive			
41	LN	Critical of UN	Impartiality (MINUSTAH radio station - not)	Media (objectivity in question)	Propaganda (designer label bias)	Ineffective (MINUSTAHs decisions are absurd)
42	LN	Critical of UN	Ineffective (uncaring of timeline)			
43	LN	Critical of UN	Ineffective (occasional help)	Presence (in most neighborhoods)		
44	LN	Critical of UN	retraction desired by MINUSTAH			

46	LN	Critical of UN	Ceremonial			
47	LN	Critical of UN	Insecurity			
48	LN	Critical of UN	Continuation (of mission)			
49	LN	Critical of UN	Withdrawal (doubt possibility)	More change = more pkers		
50	LN	Critical of UN	Violence = increase patrols			
53	LN	Critical of UN	Withdrawal (doubt possibility)			
55	LN	Critical of UN	Divisive (of AHJ)			
56	LN	Critical of UN	Role (questioned)	Ineffective (Uncertainty, no intervention, betrayal)	Tourist (passive, lazy)	Ineffective (Modest commitment)
57	LN	Critical of UN	Insecurity	Ineffective (Superficial changes, band aid solutions)	Deterrence (only benefit)	
62	LN	Critical of UN	Insecurity	Agenda (political maneuvering)	Silence (uncaring)	
63	LN	Critical of UN	Cost (Expensive)	Cost (more money = more peace)	Cost (of peace)	
64	LN	Critical of UN	Cost (of peace)			
66	LN	Critical of UN	Mandate Renewal = ritual, formality	Ineffective (lack of ambition and grand design)	Occupation	Role (as tutor)
71	LN	Critical of UN	Ineffective (no reconstruction)	Ineffective (delays the burning of social powder keg)	Merchant	Democracy (like badly fitting suit)
73	LN	Critical of UN	Role (serve western interests)	Violence (Pressured by intl community to use)		
74	LN	Critical of UN	Coercive	Development (change mandate)		
39	LN	Critical of UN	Failed (stability and peace)	Inaction (of peacekeepers)		

97	LN	Critical of UN	Critical	Negative propaganda	Fear (unfair competition)	
109	LN	Elections	High Participation	Success (technically correct)		
110	LN	Elections	Insecurity	Fear (armed gangs)		
111	LN	Elections	Insecurity	Ineffective (improvisation)	Failed (to unite Haitians)	
115	LN	Elections	Fear (of violence - discourage voting)			
116	LN	Elections	Games (elections equated with)			
121	LN	Elections	Prepared			
125	LN	Elections	Ineffective (voter registration)			
127	LN	Elections	Success (no manipulation of ballots)	Justification		
130	LN	Elections	Success	Violence (isolated acts)		
90	LN	Justification	Cooperation (pkers and pkt)			
91	LN	Justification	Sovereignty (respect)	Cooperation (MINUSTAH HNP)		
92	LN	Justification	Cooperation (MINUSTAH HNP)			
93	LN	Justification	Cooperation (MINUSTAH HNP)			
94	LN	Justification	Democracy (construction of regime of)			
95	LN	Justification				
96	LN	Justification	Sovereignty (question)	Aid (UN agencies to assist govt)		

98	LN	Justification	Success (police reform, etc)	Goals (jobs, institutions, social services)	Hopeful	
168	LN	Justification	Determined	Earthquake		
107	LN	Mandate	Development (change mandate)	Blame (cholera)		
108	LN	Mandate	Development (change mandate)			
89	LN	Media	Media (importance of press)	Media (freedom in question)		
144	LN	Protest	Violence	Withdrawal (demanded by students)	Attacked (by students)	
145	LN	Protest	Violence	Attacked (by students)	Withdrawal (demanded by students)	
137	LN	Violence	Violence (org crime)	Withdrawal (questioned)	Media (local allows criminals to speak)	
148	LN	Violence	Protest (politically motivated. Disrupt elections)	Insecurity		
153	LN	Violence	Confrontation (pkers against PNH)	Claim (victims of crossfire)		
156	LN	Violence	Attacked (MINUSTAH)	Insecurity		
157	LN	Violence	Assault (by MINUSTAH)			
158	LN	Violence	Assault (by pkers on PNH)			
159	LN	Violence	Assault (pkers on pkt)	Withdrawal (demanded by students)	Tourists	
155	LN	Violence	Assault (pkers on pkt)	pkers threaten pkt		
139	LN	Withdrawal	Sovereignty (violated)	Dependency	Occupying Force	Instability (violates social stability)
141	LN	Withdrawal	Blame (cholera)	Controversy (occasional)		

40	K	Critical of UN				
52	K	Critical of UN	Inefficient			
58	K	Critical of UN	Unlawful			
60	K	Critical of UN	Withdrawal (uncertain)			
99	K	Critical of UN	Mandate Renewal (no surprise (sarcastic))			
118	K	Elections	Unprepared	Prepared (UN claim)		
126	K	Elections	Critical (domination imploded)	Occupation (little monster)	Discredited (games)	Violence (political stupidity, not even democratic façade)
51	K	Justification	Critical			
88	K	Justification	Not Occupation			
101	K	Justification	Security			
102	K	Justification	Mandate Renewal			
154	K	Violence	Assault (pkers on pkt)			
138	K	Withdrawal	Progressing			
87	RM	Cholera	Blame (proof)			
19	RM	Critical of UN	Role (rule of law, security)	Ineffective (past missions = inconclusive results)		
34	RM	Critical of UN	Role (confusion)	Insecurity		
54	RM	Critical of UN	Withdrawal	Mandate Renewal (insecurity still)		
112	RM	Elections	High Participation			
119	RM	Elections	Insecurity			
131	RM	Elections	Violence	Confrontation (fatal clashes)		

133	RM	Elections	Success (enthusiastic voters)	Violence (isolated acts)		
136	RM	Elections				
103	RM	Justification	Not Occupation			
150	RM	Protest	Violence	Cholera		
106	RM	Role	Goals (protection, democracy)	Success		
142	RM	Violence	Protest (pkt attack pkers)	Insecurity (politically motivated)		
167	RM	Critical of UN	Relocation (inadequate)	Earthquake		
85	BKNG	Cholera	Blame (proof)			
67	BKNG	Critical of UN	intl community wants to humiliate H	Occupied (country)		
70	BKNG	Critical of UN	Ineffective	Cost (wastes money)	Occupation (dependence, neoliberal colonialist)	
72	BKNG	Critical of UN	Relocation (forced evictions)			
146	BKNG	Critical of UN	Violence	Insecurity	Protest	
152	BKNG	Withdrawal	Failed	Insecurity	Illegal	Cost (bloated)
68	CH	Critical of UN	Ineffective (pkt terrorized)	Blame (cholera)	Assault (sex abuse, UN cover up)	
69	CH/HL	Critical of UN	Violence	Protest (cholera, became violent)	Insecurity	
21	Express	Critical of UN	Ineffective	Tourists	Ineffective (Fiasco, baffled by resistance)	Ineffective (flight, evasion, reluctance)

Appendix C: Categories (Côte d'Ivoire)						
#	Source	Category	Sub-Category	Sub-Category	Sub-Category	Sub-Category
8	CNN	Confrontation	Justification	Mandate (Violence = continuation of)	Democracy (important)	
9	CNN	Confrontation	Violence	Media		
10	CNN	Justification	Neutrality (confirm)	Protest	Effectiveness (doubts)	
11	CNN	Confrontation	Justification	Contradictions	Neutrality	
12	CNN	Elections	Justification	Election Problematic		
1	RFI	Elections	Justification	Election Problematic		
3	RFI	Role of UNOCI	Post-Colonial	Fear (of more conflict)		
6	RFI	Confrontation	Violence			
15	RFI	Withdrawal	Reinforcement	Neutrality (not)		
16	RFI	Justification	Reinforcement (Gbagbo demands forces leave = rein.)			
2	NR	Confrontation	Violence (UN at fault)	Role (increased vigilance)		
4	NR	Confrontation	Violence	Accusation/Blame		
7	NR	Justification	Role of UNOCI	Withdrawal (potentially?)		
17	NR	Justification	Role of UNOCI	Development (change mandate)		
14	FM	Media				
13	LJ	Elections				
169	LP	Justification	Post-election crisis	Neutrality	Role confusion	
170	LP	Role of UNOCI	Elections (positive response initially)	Post-election crisis (overcome)	Mandate (accomplished)	
171	LP	Justification	Success (economic)	Role	Security	
174	LP	Elections	Violence (managed during protest)	Protest		
176	LP	UN Radio?	Role (= Peace)			

177	LP	Elections	Negative Propaganda/Media	Justification (UN above fray and suspicion)		
179	LP	Elections	Certification (peace, inclusion, media, voters list, results)	Role (UN in monitoring capacity)		
180	LP	Post-Election Crisis	Effective (UN firm stance)	Mandate (Violence = stronger mandate)	Attack (against UNOCI)	
181	LP	Public Opinion	Fear	Critical of UN (lack of protection)		
182	LP	Reconciliation				
183	LP	Justification	Cooperation (Gesture of trust by community)			
184	LP	Violence	Negative Propaganda/Media	Goals/Role		
185	LP	Justification	Success (Optimism)			
186	LP	Withdrawal	Violence	Justification		
187	LP	Violence	Justification	Role	Mandate (violence = continue mission)	Media (right to freedom of speech)
188	LP	Post-Election Crisis	Violence	Role (Assessment of needs)		

Appendix D: Categories by Date

HAITI

#	Date	State	Source	Category	Sub-Category	Sub-Category	Sub-Category	Sub-Category	PNN
MR	4/30/2004								
19	6/1/2004	H	RM	Critical of UN	Role (rule of law, security)	Ineffective (past missions = inconclusive results)			N
MR	6/30/2004								
88	7/9/2004	H	K	Justification	Occupation (not)				P
20	12/9/2004	H	LN	Critical of UN	Role (questioned)	White Holiday, Tourists	Presence (absent during violence)		N
21	12/28/2004	H	Express	Critical of UN	Ineffective	Tourists	Ineffective (Fiasco, baffled by resistance)		N
22	12/29/2004	H	LN	Critical of UN	Sovereignty (infringement)	Critical (Foreign involvement/PC memory)			N
23	2/21/2005	H	LN	Critical of UN	Sovereignty (infringement)	UN daily parade on private property	Occupation (managed by UN)	UN agents (arrogant, racist, anti-women, use of excessive force, contempt)	N
24	3/11/2005	H	LN	Critical of UN	Occupying force				N
25	3/11/2005	H	LN	Critical of UN	Destabilizes	Role (changed)	Occupation	Military (creation of because loss of trust)	N
26	3/23/2005	H	LN	Critical of UN	Failed (HR violation despite UN presence)				N
27	3/23/2005	H	LN	Critical of UN	Failed				N
89	5/4/2005	H	LN	Media	Media (importance of press)	Media (freedom in question)			P
28	6/1/2005	H	LN	Critical of UN	Ineffective	Failed (absent presence)	Instability		N
90	6/8/2005	H	LN	Justification	Cooperation (pkers and pkt)				P
29	6/10/2005	H	LN	Critical of UN	Ineffective (inaction despite barrier)	Failed (language barrier)	Violence		N

30	6/16/2005	H	LN	Critical of UN	violence) Failed					N
137	6/16/2005	H	LN	Violence	Violence (org crime)	Withdrawal (questioned)	Media (local allows criminals to speak)			N
31	6/21/2005	H	LN	Critical of UN	Failed	Ineffective	Violence (increasing)			N
MR	6/22/2005									
32	6/24/2005	H	LN	Critical of UN	Help Kidnappers					N
91	7/8/2005	H	LN	Justification	Sovereignty (respect)	Cooperation (MINUSTAH HNP)				P
92	7/29/2005	H	LN	Justification	Cooperation (MINUSTAH HNP)					P
93	8/19/2005	H	LN	Justification	Cooperation (MINUSTAH HNP)					P
33	10/24/2005	H	LN	Critical of UN	Ineffective (sporadic response)					N
153	12/7/2005	H	LN	Violence	Confrontation (pkers against PNH)	Claim (victims of crossfire)				N
34	12/27/2005	H	RM	Critical of UN	Role (confusion)	Insecurity				N
109	2/2/2006	H	LN	Elections	High Participation	Success (technically correct)				P
110	2/3/2006	H	LN	Elections	Insecurity	Fear (armed gangs)				N
111	2/3/2006	H	LN	Elections	Insecurity	Ineffective (improvisation)	Failed (to unite Haitians)			N
E	2/7/2006									
112	2/7/2006	H	RM	Elections	High Participation					P
113	2/7/2006	H	CNN	Elections	Violence (little)	Success				
114	2/8/2006	H	CNN	Elections	Violence (little)	Peaceful (relatively)	High Participation			P/N
115	3/2/2006	H	LN	Elections	Fear (of violence - discourage voting)					N
94	3/3/2006	H	LN	Justification	Democracy (construction of regime of)					P
95	4/7/2006	H	LN	Justification						P
35	5/1/2006	H	LN	Critical of	Ineffective (lax	Agenda (guided by	Image (concerned with)			N

36	6/20/2006	H	LN	UN	Critical of UN	Development (change mandate)	and tolerant)	own political agenda)					P/N
156	6/22/2006	H	LN	Violence	Attacked (MINUSTAH)	Insecurity	Deterrent (MINUSTAH functions as)						N
37	7/18/2006	H	LN	Critical of UN	Insecurity	Insecurity							N
38	7/27/2006	H	LN	Critical of UN	Passive	Passive							N
96	8/3/2006	H	LN	Justification	Sovereignty (question)	Aid (UN agencies to assist govt)							P/N
39	8/4/2006	H	LN	Justification	Failed (stability and peace)	Inaction (of peacekeepers)							N
MIR	8/15/2006												
116	10/12/2006	H	LN	Elections	Games (elections equated with)								N
154	10/24/2006	H	K	Violence	Assault (pkers on pkt)								N
155	11/8/2006	H	LN	Violence	Assault (pkers on pkt)	pkers threaten pkt							N
157	1/29/2007	H	LN	Violence	Assault (by MINUSTAH)								N
40	1/31/2007	H	K	Critical of UN									N
97	1/31/2007	H	LN	Justification	Critical	Negative propaganda	Fear (unfair competition)						P/N
41	2/9/2007	H	LN	Critical of UN	Impartiality (MINUSTAH radio station - not)	Media (objectivity in question)	Propaganda (designer label bias)						N
MIR	2/15/2007												
42	3/5/2007	H	LN	Critical of UN	Ineffective (uncaring of timeline)								N
43	3/14/2007	H	LN	Critical of UN	Ineffective (occasional help)	Presence (in most neighborhoods)							N
44	3/30/2007	H	LN	Critical of UN	retraction desired by MINUSTAH								N
98	7/24/2007	H	LN	Justification	Success (police reform, etc)	Goals (jobs, institutions, social)	Hopeful						P

46	8/27/2007	H	LN	Critical of UN	Ceremonial	services)			N
138	9/5/2007	H	K	Withdrawal	Progressing				P
99	10/15/2007	H	K	Critical of UN	Mandate Renewal (no surprise (sarcastic)				N
MR	10/15/2007								
47	10/26/2007	H	LN	Critical of UN	Insecurity				N
48	1/22/2008	H	LN	Critical of UN	Continuation (of mission)				Neutral
49	2/21/2008	H	LN	Critical of UN	Withdrawal (doubt possibility)	More change = more pkers			N
50	2/22/2008	H	LN	Critical of UN	Violence = increase patrols				N
51	4/2/2008	H	K	Justification	Critical				P/N
158	8/6/2008	H	LN	Violence	Assault (by pkers on PNH)				N
52	10/10/2008	H	K	Critical of UN	Inefficient				N
MR	10/14/2008								
159	1/21/2009	H	LN	Violence	Assault (pkers on pkt)	Withdrawal (demanded by students)	Tourists		N
53	1/28/2009	H	LN	Critical of UN	Withdrawal (doubt possibility)				N
144	2/9/2009	H	LN	Protest	Violence	Withdrawal (demanded by students)	Attacked (by students)		N
145	3/11/2009	H	LN	Protest	Violence	Attacked (by students)	Withdrawal (demanded by students)		N
54	3/21/2009	H	RM	Critical of UN	Withdrawal	Mandate Renewal (insecurity still)			N
55	7/16/2009	H	LN	Critical of UN	Divisive (of AHJ)				N

101	8/20/2009	H	K	Justification	Security	Dependency	Occupying Force	Instability (violates social stability)	P
139	9/18/2009	H	LN	Withdrawal	Sovereignty (violated)	Dependency	Occupying Force	Instability (violates social stability)	N
56	10/6/2009	H	LN	Critical of UN	Role (questioned)	Ineffective (Uncertainty, no intervention, betrayal)	Tourist (passive, lazy)	Ineffective (Modest commitment)	N
57	10/13/2009	H	LN	Critical of UN	Insecurity	Ineffective (Superficial changes, band aid solutions)	Deterrence (only benefit)		N
MR	10/13/2009								
102	10/14/2009	H	K	Justification	Mandate Renewal				P
58	10/17/2009	H	K	Critical of UN	Unlawful				N
103	10/19/2009	H	RM	Justification	Occupation (not)				P
60	11/6/2009	H	K	Critical of UN	Withdrawal (uncertain)				Neutral
117	12/19/2009	H	RFI	Elections	Security	Insecurity	Election (concerns pkt)		N
118	1/8/2010	H	K	Elections	Unprepared	Prepared (UN claim)			P
168	1/12/2010	H	LN	Justification	Determined	Earthquake			P
163	1/19/2010	H	CNN	Justification	Democracy (promotion and achievement)	Earthquake			P
61	1/20/2010	H	RFI	Critical of UN	Aid (US)				Neutral
165	2/12/2010	H	RFI	Critical of UN	Ineffective (structurally deficient)	Earthquake			N
166	3/12/2010	H	RFI	Critical of UN	Inefficient	Ineffective (without direction)	Earthquake		N
62	3/19/2010	H	LN	Critical of UN	Insecurity	Agenda (political maneuvering)	Silence (uncaring)		Neutral
167	4/12/2010	H	RM	Critical of UN	Relocation (inadequate)	Earthquake			N

143	5/26/2010	H	CNN	Protest	Violence	Apology (by UN)			N
63	5/27/2010	H	LN	Critical of UN	Cost (Expensive)	Cost (more money = more peace)	Cost (of peace)		N
64	5/27/2010	H	LN	Critical of UN	Cost (of peace)				N
105	7/25/2010	H	RFI	Critical of UN	Ineffective (slow reform)	Timid	Impotent	Role (confusion)	N
66	9/24/2010	H	LN	Critical of UN	Mandate Renewal = ritual, formality	Ineffective (lack of ambition and grand design)	Occupation	Role (as tutor)	N
67	9/29/2010	H	BKNG	Critical of UN	intl. community wants to humiliate H	Occupied (country)			N
119	10/12/2010	H	RM	Elections	Insecurity				Neutral
MR	10/14/2010								
106	10/15/2010	H	RM	Role	Goals (protection, democracy)	Success			P
146	10/15/2010	H	BKNG	Critical of UN	Violence	Insecurity	Protest		N
147	10/16/2010	H	RFI	Protest	Critical	Occupying force, army of occupation	Withdrawal		N
75	10/26/2010	H	LN	Cholera	Blame (imported by MINUSTAH)	Blame (proof)			N
76	10/27/2010	H	RFI	Cholera	Blame (denies responsibility)				N
77	11/6/2010	H	LN	Cholera	Blame	Critical (Polluters)			N
68	11/13/2010	H	CH	Critical of UN	Ineffective (pkt terrorized)	Blame (cholera)	Assault (sex abuse, UN cover up)		N
78	11/15/2010	H	LN	Cholera	Protest	Violence (politically motivated UN claim)			N
79	11/15/2010	H	CNN	Cholera	Protest (clash with pkers, react with violence)	Violence	Fear	No Blame (no blame specifically)	N
80	11/16/2010	H	LN	Cholera	Protest (political motivation, disrupt elections)	No Blame	Critical (aversion to mission is recurrent phen.)		N

148	11/16/2010	H	LN	Violence	Protest (politically motivated. Disrupt elections)	Insecurity			Neutral
69	11/17/2010	H	CH/HL	Critical of UN	Violence	Protest (cholera, became violent)	Insecurity		N
81	11/17/2010	H	CNN	Cholera	Protest (politically motivated)	Withdrawal (protestors demand)	No Blame (no outright blame assigned)		N
149	11/18/2010	H	CNN	Protest	Violence (politically motivated, disrupt elections)	No Blame (Cholera)	Elections		N
82	11/19/2010	H	LN	Cholera	Protest	Withdrawal (protestors demand)	Insecurity (Panic, add fuel to the fire)		N
150	11/19/2010	H	RM	Protest	Violence	Cholera			N
151	11/19/2010	H	RFI	Protest	Violence	Occupation			N
83	11/20/2010	H	CNN	Cholera	Protest	Violence			Neutral
84	11/22/2010	H	LN	Cholera	No Blame	Protest			Neutral
120	11/24/2010	H	CNN	Elections	Security	Peaceful (relatively)			Neutral
121	11/25/2010	H	LN	Elections	Prepared				P
122	11/26/2010	H	RFI	Elections	Prepared	No Blame (Cholera, proof)			P
E	11/28/2010								
123	11/29/2010	H	RFI	Elections	Chaos	Mess			N
124	11/29/2010	H	RFI	Elections	Protest (elections)				N
125	12/3/2010	H	LN	Elections	Ineffective (voter registration)				N
126	12/3/2010	H	K	Elections	Critical (domination imploded)	Occupation (little monster)	Discredited (games)	Violence (political stupidity, not even democratic façade)	N
127	12/6/2010	H	LN	Elections	Success (no manipulation of ballots)	Justification			P
128	12/6/2010	H	RFI	Elections	Protest	Fraudulent Elections			N
140	12/7/2010	H	RFI	Elections	MINUSTAH critical of candidates				Neutral
129	12/8/2010	H	CNN	Elections	Violence (unrest, Withdrawal (demanded)				N

70	1/12/2011	H	BKNG	Critical of UN	ineffective	Cost (wastes money)	Occupation (dependence, neoliberal colonialist)						N
71	2/15/2011	H	LN	Critical of UN	Ineffective (no reconstruction)	Ineffective (delays the burning of social powder keg)	Merchant	Democracy (like badly fitting suit)					N
107	2/23/2011	H	LN	Mandate	Development (change mandate)	Blame (cholera)							N
108	3/3/2011	H	LN	Mandate	Development (change mandate)								Neutral
131	3/17/2011	H	RM	Elections	Violence	Confrontation (fatal clashes)							N
132	3/20/2011	H	RFI	Elections	Inefficient (voting conducted poorly)								N
130	3/21/2011	H	LN	Elections	Success	Violence (isolated acts)							P
133	3/21/2011	H	RM	Elections	Success (enthusiastic voters)	Violence (isolated acts)							P
EA	4/21/2011												
134	4/21/2011	H	RFI	Critical of UN	Military force	Cost (cheaper than MINUSTAH)							N
152	4/21/2011	H	BKNG	Withdrawal	Failed	Insecurity	Illegal	Cost (bloated)					N
141	5/27/2011	H	LN	Withdrawal	Blame (cholera)	Controversy (occasional)							N
136	6/23/2011	H	RM	Elections									P
72	7/19/2011	H	BKNG	Critical of UN	Relocation (forced evictions)								N
73	8/8/2011	H	LN	Critical of UN	Role (serve western interests)	Violence (Pressured by intl community to use)							N
85	8/10/2011	H	BKNG	Cholera	Blame (proof)								N
74	8/17/2011	H	LN	Critical of UN	Coercive	Development (change mandate)							N
86	8/25/2011	H	LN	Cholera	No Blame								Neutral
87	8/26/2011	H	RM	Cholera	Blame (proof)								N
161	9/5/2011	H	RFI	Critical of UN	Assault (pkr rape pkt)	Protest							N
MR	10/14/2011												

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

#	Date	State	Source	Category	Sub-Category	Sub-Category	Sub-Category	Sub-Category	P/N
MR	2/27/2004								
MR	4/4/2005								
MR	12/15/2005								
MR	1/24/2006								
MR	12/15/2006								
MR	1/10/2007								
MR	7/16/2007								
MR	7/29/2008								
1	7/24/2009	CDI	RFI	Elections	Justification	Election Problematic			P/N
MR	7/30/2009								
MR	1/28/2010								
MR	5/27/2010								
E	11/28/2010								
174	12/17/2010	CDI	LP	Elections	Violence (managed during protest)	Protest			P
3	12/19/2010	CDI	RFI	Role of UNOCI	Post-Colonial	Fear (of more conflict)			N
4	12/19/2010	CDI	NR	Confrontation	Violence	Accusation/Blame			Neutral
2	12/20/2010	CDI	NR	Confrontation	Violence (UN at fault)	Role (increased vigilance)			P/N
186	12/20/2010	CDI	LP	Withdrawal	Violence	Justification		Media (right to freedom of speech)	P
MR	12/20/2010								
8	12/21/2010	CDI	CNN	Confrontation	Justification	Mandate (Violence)	Democracy (important)		P/N

169	12/21/2010	CDI	LP	Justification	Post-election crisis	= continuation of) Neutrality	Role confusion		P/N
180	12/21/2010	CDI	LP	Post-Election Crisis	Effective (UN firm stance)	Mandate (Violence = stronger mandate)	Attack (against UNOCI)		P
184	12/31/2010	CDI	LP	Violence	Negative Propaganda/Media	Goals/Role			P
9	1/13/2011	CDI	CNN	Confrontation	Violence	Media			Neutral
15	1/18/2011	CDI	RFI	Withdrawal	Reinforcement	Neutrality (not)			Neutral
177	1/19/2011	CDI	LP	Elections	Negative Propaganda/Media	Justification (UN above fray and suspicion)			P
176	2/11/2011	CDI	LP	UN Radio?	Role (= Peace)				P
10	3/9/2011	CDI	CNN	Justification	Neutrality (confirm)	Protest	Effectiveness (doubts)		P/N
181	3/21/2011	CDI	LP	Public Opinion	Fear	Critical of UN (lack of protection)			N
187	3/25/2011	CDI	LP	Violence	Justification	Role	Mandate (viol = continue mission)		Neutral
6	3/31/2011	CDI	RFI	Confrontation	Violence				N
11	4/4/2011	CDI	CNN	Confrontation	Justification	Contradictions	Neutrality		P/N
12	4/5/2011	CDI	CNN	Elections	Justification	Election Problematic			P
16	4/5/2011	CDI	RFI	Justification	Reinforcement (G demand forces leave = rein.)	Reinforcement (G demand forces leave =)			P
7	5/4/2011	CDI	NR	Justification	Role of UNOCI	Withdrawal (potentially?)			P
183	5/13/2011	CDI	LP	Justification	Cooperation (Gesture of trust by community)	Cooperation (Gesture of trust by community)			P
MR	5/13/2011								
17	6/4/2011	CDI	NR	Justification	Role of UNOCI	Development (change mandate)			P
13	6/16/2011	CDI	LJ	Elections					
185	7/19/2011	CDI	LP	Justification	Success (Optimism)				P

Appendix E: Combined Categories by Source (Haiti)		
Source	Category	Frequency
CNN	Violence (unrest, mobs)	7
	Elections	5
	Protest (politically motivated)	5
	Cholera	3
	No Blame (no outright blame assigned)	3
	Peaceful (relatively)	2
	Withdrawal (protestors demand)	2
	Apology (by UN)	1
	Democracy (promotion and achievement)	1
	Fear	1
	High Participation	1
	Justification	1
	Security	1
	Success	1
	Total	34
RFI	Fraudulent Elections	9
	Critical of UN	7
	Protest (elections)	5
	Ineffective (without direction)	3
	Inefficient (voting conducted poorly)	2
	No Blame (denies responsibility)	2
	Occupying force, army of occupation	2
	Aid (US)	1
	Assault (peacekeeper rape peacekept)	1
	Blame (proof)	1
	Chaos	1
	Cholera	1
	Cost (cheaper than MINUSTAH)	1
	Impotent	1
	Insecurity	1
	Mess	1
	Military force	1
	MINUSTAH critical of candidates	1
	Prepared	1
	Role (Confusion)	1
	Security	1
Timid	1	
Violence	1	
Withdrawal	1	

	Total	47
Le Nouvelliste	Critical of UN	43
	Violence = increase patrols	17
	Ineffective (voter registration)	16
	Justification	10
	Elections	9
	Insecurity (Panic, add fuel to the fire)	9
	Withdrawal (questioned)	9
	Failed (to unite Haitians)	8
	Cholera	7
	Protest (politically motivated. Disrupt elections)	7
	Media (objectivity in question)	5
	Occupying Force	5
	Role (serve western interests)	5
	Sovereignty (violated)	5
	Assault (peacekeepers on peacekept)	4
	Blame (imported by MINUSTAH)	4
	Cooperation (MINUSTAH HNP and peacekeepers with peacekept)	4
	Cost (of peace)	4
	Development (change mandate)	4
	Success (technically correct)	4
	Attacked (MINUSTAH)	3
	Fear (unfair competition)	3
	Mandate Renewal = ritual, formality	3
	No Blame	3
	Tourists	3
	Agenda (political maneuvering)	2
	Democracy (like badly fitting suit)	2
	Deterrent (MINUSTAH functions as)	2
	Instability (violates social stability)	2
	Aid (UN agencies to assist govt)	1
	Ceremonial	1
	Coercive	1
Confrontation (peacekeepers against PNH)	1	
Continuation (of Mission)	1	
Controversy (occasional)	1	
Dependency	1	
Destabilizes	1	
Determined	1	
Divisive (of AHJ)	1	
Games (elections equated with)	1	

	Goals (jobs, institutions, social services)	1
	Help Kidnappers	1
	High Participation	1
	Hopeful	1
	Image (concerned with)	1
	Impartiality (MINUSTAH radio station - not)	1
	Inaction (of peacekeepers)	1
	Merchant	1
	Military (creation of because loss of trust)	1
	More change = more peacekeepers	1
	Negative propaganda	1
	Passive	1
	Peacekeepers threaten peacekept	1
	Prepared	1
	Absence	1
	Presence	1
	Propaganda (designer label bias)	1
	retraction desired by MINUSTAH	1
	Silence (uncaring)	1
	UN agents (arrogant, racist, anti-women, use of excessive force, contempt)	1
	UN daily parade on private property	1
	White Holiday, Tourists	1
	Total	235
Kiskeya	Critical of UN	7
	Justification	4
	Elections	2
	Mandate Renewal (no surprise (sarcastic))	2
	Violence	2
	Withdrawal (uncertain)	2
	Assault (peacekeepers on peacekept)	1
	Discredited (games)	1
	Inefficient	1
	Occupation (little monster)	1
	Occupation (not)	1
	Prepared (UN claim)	1
	Progressing	1
	Security	1
	Unlawful	1
	Unprepared	1
	Total	29

Radio Métropole	Elections	5
	Critical of UN	4
	Violence (isolated acts)	4
	Insecurity (politically motivated)	3
	Role (rule of law, security)	3
	Cholera	2
	Protest (peacekept attack peacekeepers)	2
	Success (enthusiastic voters)	2
	Blame (proof)	1
	Confrontation (fatal clashes)	1
	Goals (protection, democracy)	1
	High Participation	1
	Ineffective (past missions = inconclusive results)	1
	Justification	1
	Mandate Renewal (insecurity still)	1
	Occupation (not)	1
	Relocation (inadequate)	1
	Withdrawal	1
	Total	35
Bri Kouri Nouvel Gaye	Critical of UN	4
	Cost (wastes money)	2
	Insecurity	2
	Occupied (country)	2
	Blame (proof)	1
	Cholera	1
	Failed	1
	Illegal	1
	Ineffective	1
	International Community wants to “humiliate” Haiti	1
	Protest	1
	Relocation (forced evictions)	1
	Violence	1
	Total	19
Citizen Haiti, HaitiLibre, Express	Critical of UN	3
	Ineffective (flight, evasion, reluctance)	2
	Assault (sex abuse, UN cover up)	1
	Blame (cholera)	1
	Insecurity	1

	Protest (cholera, became violent)	1
	Tourists	1
	Total	10

Appendix F: Combined Categories by Source (Côte D'Ivoire)			
Source	Category	Frequency	
CNN	Contradictions	4	
	Justification	4	
	Elections	2	
	Neutrality	2	
	Democracy	1	
	Effectiveness	1	
	Mandate (Violence = continuation of)	1	
	Media	1	
	Protest	1	
	Violence	1	
	Total	18	
RFI	Elections	2	
	Justification	2	
	Reinforcement	2	
	Confrontation	1	
	Fear	1	
	Not Neutral	1	
	Post-Colonial	1	
	Role of UNOCI	1	
	Violence	1	
	Withdrawal	1	
	Total	13	
NR	Justification	3	
	Role of UNOCI	3	
	Violence	3	
	Confrontation	2	
	Accusation/Blame	1	
	Development (change mandate)	1	
	Withdrawal	1	
	Total	14	
	Media	1	
	Total	1	
LJ	Elections	1	

	Total	1
LN	Justification	7
	Role of UNOCI	7
	Violence	5
	Elections	4
	Post-election crisis	4
	Mandate (Violence = stronger mandate)	3
	Success	2
	Negative Propaganda/Media	2
	Attack (against UNOCI)	1
	Certification	1
	Cooperation	1
	Critical of UN	1
	Effective	1
	Fear	1
	Goals/Role	1
	Neutrality	1
	Protest	1
	Public Opinion	1
	Reconciliation	1
	Security	1
	Media	1
Withdrawal	1	
Total	48	

Appendix G: Interaction (Côte d'Ivoire)					
#	Date	Source	Typology	PNN	Interaction Text
9	1/13/2011	CNN	Intl/More Educated	Neutral	attacks on pkers
8	12/21/2010	CNN	Intl/More Educated	Neutral	pkers attacked on several occasions, clashes between pkers and military forces
11	4/4/2011	CNN	Intl/More Educated	Neutral	UN fire on G camp
6	3/31/2011	RFI	Intl/State/Educated	Neutral	O forces fired on UN helicopter
7	5/4/2011	NR	Intl/More Educated	Neutral	UN fire on military camps
169	12/21/2010	LP	Local/More Educated	Positive	attack on peacekeepers, dams built to interrupt supply routes, G forces knocking on doors of UNOCI troops demanding to search for weapons, UN response to those events is praised and deemed just - within the mandate of acceptable actions
183	5/13/2011	LP	Local/More Educated	Positive	chiefs of a local village take up a gathered collection of arms left behind by forces and gives them to UNOCI
187	3/25/2011	LP	Local/More Educated	Positive	established a call center to take note of HR violations allegations, free medical consultations, distributed water
180	12/21/2010	LP	Local/More Educated	Neutral	patrols, UNOCI attacked, more violence = stronger mandate
184	12/31/2010	LP	Local/More Educated	Neutral	pkers did not fire into a crowd contrary to statements made by RTI, UNOCI patrol was attacked

Appendix G: Interactions (Haiti)				
#	Date	Source	PNN	Interaction
81	11/17/2010	CNN	Negative	"smoke from many fires mixed with teargas fired by peacekeepers and hung over the city", at least one demonstrator killed in riots by peacekeeper,
79	11/15/2010	CNN	Negative	Protestors clash with peacekeepers, peacekept are fighting soldiers of MINUSTAH, peacekeepers respond to violence with violence
129	12/8/2010	CNN	Neutral	protestors face off UN troops
149	11/18/2010	CNN	Negative	protests - alleged that peacekeepers shot peacekept
113	2/7/2006	CNN	Positive	provide security for elections,
143	5/26/2010	CNN	Negative	UN troops gather at university to quell demonstrations - fire rubber bullets and use pepper spray, tear gas, protestors threw rocks, MINUSTAH was not supposed to enter University grounds
151	11/19/2010	RFI	Negative	clashes between peacekeepers and peacekept, violent protestors, scenes of guerilla urban warfare
147	10/16/2010	RFI	Neutral	demonstrators attack peacekeepers
161	9/5/2011	RFI	Negative	MINUSTAH soldier implicated in rape case
132	3/20/2011	RFI	Neutral	MINUSTAH troops patrolling polls
29	6/10/2005	LN	Negative	accused of inaction during violence in capital
156	6/22/2006	LN	Neutral	attacks on MINUSTAH patrols
137	6/16/2005	LN	Negative	civilian casualties during operation
80	11/16/2010	LN	Negative	clash between demonstrators and soldiers = death, coexistence difficult because of outcry over cholera epidemic
148	11/16/2010	LN	Negative	clashes between peacekept and peacekeepers – peacekeeper killed peacekept
90	6/8/2005	LN	Positive	Collaboration between peacekeepers and peacekept on operations
93	8/19/2005	LN	Positive	cooperation between HNP and MINUSTAH, arrests, shoot out
116	10/12/2006	LN	Positive	election guards, public awareness campaign
141	5/27/2011	LN	Positive	engage in all-out charm with peacekept
78	11/15/2010	LN	Negative	Fighting between peacekeepers and peacekept-initiated by violent demonstrators
43	3/14/2007	LN	Positive	joint cooperative efforts between MINUSTAH and HNP, play football with teens and hand out food
20	12/9/2004	LN	Negative	lack of presence when soldiers were needed

153	12/7/2005	LN	Negative	Peacekeepers deliberately opened fire on PNH, UN claim victims of crossfire
158	8/6/2008	LN	Negative	PNH brutalized by UN soldiers
121	11/25/2010	LN	Positive	provide election security
23	2/21/2005	LN	Negative	residential blockades by peacekeepers, peacekept must wear identifying badges, visitors must identify themselves at checkpoints, peacekeepers treat area as their private property, their vehicles parade on roads not suited to the wear
159	1/21/2009	LN	Negative	student and professor brutalized by MINUSTAH soldiers
145	3/11/2009	LN	Negative	students attack peacekeepers after they enter university grounds illegally
144	2/9/2009	LN	Neutral	Students impose acts of aggression on UN troops
82	11/19/2010	LN	Negative	tent camp bombarded by peacekeepers tear gas, demonstrations against MINUSTAH, peacekept threw stones at peacekeepers who responded with tear gas = became "urban guerilla warfare"
155	11/8/2006	LN	Negative	UN soldier attacked photographer
157	1/29/2007	LN	Negative	UN troops allegedly assaulted students
139	9/18/2009	LN	Negative	victims of repression by MINUSTAH
150	11/19/2010	RM	Negative	clashes between peacekept and peacekeepers
142		RM	Negative	violent demonstrations resulted in MINUSTAH and peacekept injuries, peacekeeper killed peacekept in self defense
167	4/12/2010	RM	Negative	aid in relocation, but peacekept say new situation is still not adequately prepared
154	10/24/2006	K	Negative	clashes between peacekeepers and gangs, peacekeepers accused of killing civilians
40	1/31/2007	K	Positive	Peacekeepers popular in particular neighborhoods, where they are able to identify the community as similar to their home community
152	4/21/2011	BKNG	Negative	2007: peacekeepers perpetrated massacre in Cité Soleil
72	7/19/2011	BKNG	Negative	mass forced evictions in post-earthquake camps by UN troops
68	11/13/2010	CH	Negative	sex abuse (peacekeeper on peacekept)

Appendix J: PNN according to Typology (Côte d'Ivoire)			
#	Source	Typology	PNN
9	CNN	Intl/More Educated	Neutral
12	CNN	Intl/More Educated	P
8	CNN	Intl/More Educated	P/N
10	CNN	Intl/More Educated	P/N
11	CNN	Intl/More Educated	P/N
1	RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	P/N
3	RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	N
6	RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	N
15	RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	Neutral
16	RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	P
2	NR	Intl/More Educated	P/N
4	NR	Intl/More Educated	Neutral
7	NR	Intl/More Educated	P
17	NR	Intl/More Educated	P
14	FM	Local Elite/State	P
13	LJ	Local/Local	Neutral
169	LP	Local/Local	P/N
181	LP	Local/Local	N
182	LP	Local/Local	Neutral
187	LP	Local/Local	Neutral
188	LP	Local/Local	Neutral
170	LP	Local/Local	P
171	LP	Local/Local	P
174	LP	Local/Local	P
176	LP	Local/Local	P
177	LP	Local/Local	P
180	LP	Local/Local	P
183	LP	Local/Local	P
184	LP	Local/Local	P
185	LP	Local/Local	P
186	LP	Local/Local	P
179	LP	Local/Local	Positive

Appendix J: PNN by Typology (Haiti)			
#	Source	Typology	PNN
79	CNN	Intl/More Educated	N
81	CNN	Intl/More Educated	N
129	CNN	Intl/More Educated	N
143	CNN	Intl/More Educated	N
149	CNN	Intl/More Educated	N
83	CNN	Intl/More Educated	Neutral
120	CNN	Intl/More Educated	Neutral
113	CNN	Intl/More Educated	P
163	CNN	Intl/More Educated	P
114	CNN	Intl/More Educated	P/N
76	RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	N
105	RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	N
117	RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	N
123	RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	N
124	RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	N
128	RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	N
132	RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	N
134	RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	N
147	RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	N
151	RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	N
161	RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	N
165	RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	N
166	RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	N
61	RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	Neutral
140	RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	Neutral
122	RFI	Intl/State/More Educated	P
20	LN	Local/More Educated	N
22	LN	Local/More Educated	N
23	LN	Local/More Educated	N
24	LN	Local/More Educated	N
25	LN	Local/More Educated	N
26	LN	Local/More Educated	N
27	LN	Local/More Educated	N
28	LN	Local/More Educated	N
29	LN	Local/More Educated	N
30	LN	Local/More Educated	N
31	LN	Local/More Educated	N
32	LN	Local/More Educated	N

33	LN	Local/More Educated	N
35	LN	Local/More Educated	N
37	LN	Local/More Educated	N
38	LN	Local/More Educated	N
39	LN	Local/More Educated	N
41	LN	Local/More Educated	N
42	LN	Local/More Educated	N
43	LN	Local/More Educated	N
44	LN	Local/More Educated	N
46	LN	Local/More Educated	N
47	LN	Local/More Educated	N
49	LN	Local/More Educated	N
50	LN	Local/More Educated	N
53	LN	Local/More Educated	N
55	LN	Local/More Educated	N
56	LN	Local/More Educated	N
57	LN	Local/More Educated	N
63	LN	Local/More Educated	N
64	LN	Local/More Educated	N
66	LN	Local/More Educated	N
71	LN	Local/More Educated	N
73	LN	Local/More Educated	N
74	LN	Local/More Educated	N
75	LN	Local/More Educated	N
77	LN	Local/More Educated	N
78	LN	Local/More Educated	N
80	LN	Local/More Educated	N
82	LN	Local/More Educated	N
107	LN	Local/More Educated	N
110	LN	Local/More Educated	N
111	LN	Local/More Educated	N
115	LN	Local/More Educated	N
116	LN	Local/More Educated	N
125	LN	Local/More Educated	N
137	LN	Local/More Educated	N
139	LN	Local/More Educated	N
141	LN	Local/More Educated	N
144	LN	Local/More Educated	N
145	LN	Local/More Educated	N
153	LN	Local/More Educated	N
155	LN	Local/More Educated	N
156	LN	Local/More Educated	N

157	LN	Local/More Educated	N
158	LN	Local/More Educated	N
159	LN	Local/More Educated	N
48	LN	Local/More Educated	Neutral
62	LN	Local/More Educated	Neutral
84	LN	Local/More Educated	Neutral
86	LN	Local/More Educated	Neutral
108	LN	Local/More Educated	Neutral
148	LN	Local/More Educated	Neutral
89	LN	Local/More Educated	P
90	LN	Local/More Educated	P
91	LN	Local/More Educated	P
92	LN	Local/More Educated	P
93	LN	Local/More Educated	P
94	LN	Local/More Educated	P
95	LN	Local/More Educated	P
98	LN	Local/More Educated	P
109	LN	Local/More Educated	P
121	LN	Local/More Educated	P
127	LN	Local/More Educated	P
130	LN	Local/More Educated	P
168	LN	Local/More Educated	P
36	LN	Local/More Educated	P/N
96	LN	Local/More Educated	P/N
97	LN	Local/More Educated	P/N
40	K	Local/Local	N
52	K	Local/Local	N
58	K	Local/Local	N
99	K	Local/Local	N
126	K	Local/Local	N
154	K	Local/Local	N
60	K	Local/Local	Neutral
88	K	Local/Local	P
101	K	Local/Local	P
102	K	Local/Local	P
118	K	Local/Local	P
138	K	Local/Local	P
51	K	Local/Local	P/N
19	RM	Local/Local	N
34	RM	Local/Local	N
54	RM	Local/Local	N
87	RM	Local/Local	N

131	RM	Local/Local	N
150	RM	Local/Local	N
167	RM	Local/Local	N
119	RM	Local/Local	Neutral
142	RM	Local/Local	Neutral
103	RM	Local/Local	P
106	RM	Local/Local	P
112	RM	Local/Local	P
133	RM	Local/Local	P
136	RM	Local/Local	P
67	BKNG	Local/Participatory	N
70	BKNG	Local/Participatory	N
72	BKNG	Local/Participatory	N
85	BKNG	Local/Participatory	N
146	BKNG	Local/Participatory	N
152	BKNG	Local/Participatory	N
68	CH	Citizen/Participatory	N
69	CH/HL	Citizen/Participatory	N
21	Express	Citizen/Participatory	N

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