

Rethinking NATO*

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Resumo

Os últimos três anos testemunharam alterações de vulto nos assuntos internacionais. Os historiadores olharão sem dúvida para trás considerando que este ou aquele evento foi importante. Para os decisores políticos, que têm de lidar diariamente com estas preocupações num ambiente em evolução constante, a tarefa é ainda mais difícil.

Neste artigo o autor procura ilustrar uma visão pessoal sobre como a NATO tem respondido a estas alterações, como é que as percepções dos aliados são frequentemente díspares em relação às dos que se encontram fora da Aliança. Procurará também comprovar como as mudanças ocorridas no domínio militar e civil e os acontecimentos do 11 de Setembro anunciaram uma nova fase de mudança, a qual poderá incutir alterações radicais na natureza da Aliança tal como a conhecemos nos últimos 50 anos.

Esta é uma visão pessoal que não reflecte a posição oficial do Governo Britânico. Baseia-se antes em discussões com aqueles que se encontram no cerne do debate político e na experiência pessoal como funcionário civil no mundo diplomático e militar.

Abstract

The last three years have seen tectonic shifts in International affairs. Historians will no doubt look back and assert that clearly this or that event was the defining moment. For policy makers who have to grapple with day to day concerns in an increasingly fast moving environment, the task is much more difficult.

In this article I will try to set out one man's view of how NATO has responded to these changes, how the perceptions of those within the Alliance are often at odds with those outside, to show how circumstances have forced change on both the military and civilian arms and how the events of 11 September herald another round of change which may radically change the nature of the Alliance we have known over the past 50 years.

This is very much a personal reflection and not an official British Government view. It is based on discussions with those at the heart of the policy debate and on my own experiences as a serving officer both in the diplomatic and military world.

* The views and opinions in this article are the author's own and should not be taken as an expression of official policy. I am particularly indebted to my former colleagues in NATO, SHAPE, the EU and WEU.

Introduction

Since the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the Soviet Empire the future and need for NATO has been questioned on a regular basis¹. The Alliance has itself tried to answer the question of its new role, most notably in the two Strategic Concept documents signed by Heads of State and Government in 1991 and again in 1999. The very fact that there have been two strategic Concept² documents attests to the rapid changes in World society. The profound nature of that change is illustrated by the fact that within less than a decade after the fall of the Soviet empire three former Warsaw pact countries had been integrated into the Alliance as full members.

Yet throughout that same decade many commentators and politicians continued to question the need and relevance for NATO as the threat of a large-scale military invasion from the East became less and less credible. A more critical observer might even ask whether NATO was asking the right questions at all.

NATO was not alone amongst International Organisations in producing impressive sounding communiqués setting out in some length and with high flown language their new role and ambition. The CSCE³ became an organization. The European Community also renamed itself as the European Union and in keeping with it's more legalistic vocation agreed the Treaty of Maastricht. The humble Western European Union was brought out of hibernation and transferred to Brussels to be the EU's "Operational arm" The western security agenda seemed open to the highest bidder.

To a large extent this was a natural reaction to the dawning of a new era, an attempt to codify uncertainty and thereby impose an order upon it. All through the early 1990s various organisations took part in this war of communiqués. Perhaps the notable exception was the United Nations. Some argued that the end of Cold War rivalry would at last allow the UN to fulfil its vocation and assume responsibility for maintaining world peace.

Experience in real world crises was inconclusive and in many cases only served to reinforce existing trends in the policy debate.

Western nations had already begun to cooperate outside the traditional institutional framework in small scale Crisis Response Operations such as the European maritime protection and mine clearance operation during the Iran/Iraq war. Placed under a WEU flag, this appeared to lend credence to the idea of European only operations.

1 See for example "Why we will soon miss the Cold War" John Mearsheimer, *The Atlantic Monthly* August 1990.

2 NAC-5 (99) 65-24 April.

3 The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The Gulf War underlined the military might of America. The traditional supporters of Airpower were given a boost by the advent and success of precision guided munitions. The critics of NATO concluded that future operations would dispense with organisations based on complex consensus building machinery. Coalitions of the willing were the way forward.

By the same token European integrationists saw the need to redouble their efforts if the new world order was not to be dominated by the sole remaining Superpower. NATO supporters drew comfort from the fact that the coalition's success was based in no small part on 40 years experience of working and training together in the Alliance.

The Bosnia crisis at first seemed to show that despite the rhetoric, none of the existing western security institutions were able to play a decisive role. Lasting damage was done (at least in European and American minds) to the UN's credibility as a major actor in crisis management operations.

The Dayton Accords accurately reflected the trends of the period. Dominated and driven by United States policy makers, the main pretenders to the International and European Security Crown (UN, EU, OSCE and NATO) were all given a role in the international effort to stabilise and resolve the crisis.

As the 1990's drew to a close NATO seemed to have recovered its earlier standing. NATO intervention in Bosnia had been decisive. IFOR⁴ and SFOR had been a major success. A security dialogue with the former Warsaw Pact had been established based on the Joint Founding Act, and the Euro Atlantic Partnership. Three former Warsaw Pact members were on the point of joining as full NATO members. The challenge of a rival European (only) Security and Defence Identity seemed to have diminished after the EU Amsterdam Summit.

NATO prepared to celebrate 50 years of existence at its Washington Summit. Unfortunately the march of history has no respect for dates imposed by mere mortals. As the Alliance Heads of State and Government met in Washington, NATO was engaged in the first offensive operation in its history. A campaign that was to test the organisation to its limit, to prove both complex and politically painful, and to put a severe strain on relations with Russia.

Eight months prior to the Washington Summit Britain and France had also re-launched European Defence debate (now renamed ESDP) at the St Malo Summit. The Alliance was forced to re-engage with the European Union to ensure that the abolition of the Western

⁴ Acronym for the NATO "Intervention Force" and later "Stabilisation Force".

European Union and development of ESDP did not lead to a twin track Alliance with the European allies pursuing a different course to the North Americans.

Nor did the fall of Milosevic put an end to problems in the Balkans. Over the following two years NATO again found itself involved in new operations, in Southern Serbia and in FYROM.

Then came the 11 September terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, and the war in Afghanistan. Once again the pundits were vocal in questioning the need and relevance of NATO in a world faced by the threat of asymmetric warfare and rogue states⁵.

This year at the Prague Summit NATO leaders will need to answer those questions. The aim of this article is to explore how an organisation designed to counter a single threat with a necessarily bureaucratic approach has re-invented itself as one of the most successful crisis management instruments in the world today. How this has been achieved and what more needs to be done.

The extent to which NATO fulfils its vocation will naturally depend on the allies recognising the changes that have taken place and agreeing the way forward. This will require vision, courage and determination.

The Origin and reasons for Alliances

It is not the purpose of this article to summarise the wealth of literature on Alliance theory, but is perhaps worth noting that it is an area of policy which, except in times of national emergency, has often been contentious, with the detractors being almost as numerous as the proponents – too costly, too constraining, too dangerous, unreliable, unnecessary. The list of criticisms is long and the same arguments resurface again and again. Scepticism about the future and relevance of NATO is nothing new.

Alliances can be traced back to antiquity, but their heyday was probably the period of the so called “classical” modern state system, which has been used to describe the period from the mid seventeenth century to the First World War, when the average figure was almost one alliance established per year⁶. It is worth noting that for much of the early part

5 See for example “The Cold War is over, but NATO is still stuck in its ways” Mathew Kaminski, Wall St Journal Oct 5 2001.” All dressed up and Nowhere to go” Frederick Kempe Wall St Journal 2 Oct 2001.

6 For a more detailed analysis of alliance theories See Ken Boyle “Alliances, Contemporary Strategy, Theories and Policies” Croom Helm, 1975 ISBN 0-85664-168-5.

of this period the acquisition of territory by force of arms was an accepted practice under international law.

In the 20th century alliances have had a mixed record. Blamed on the one hand with being part of the process that led to the First World War and on the other singularly failing to deter the advance of fascism in Europe in the late 1930s. It is hardly surprising therefore that the United States, particularly the US Congress was reluctant to enter into new Alliances in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.

Alyson Bailes, currently director of SIPRI⁷, has argued⁸ that the creation of the Western European Union (WEU) played a crucial role in persuading the United States that western European nations were prepared to make the necessary commitment to collective self defence and as such played an important role as a catalyst for the development of NATO.

It can be argued that the much maligned WEU has played a similar role during the period from 1993 to 2001, in both the development the European Security and Defence architecture and in influencing thinking and procedures in the Alliance as NATO transformed itself from essentially a military alliance to an organisation capable of playing a decisive role in crisis management.

That it was felt necessary to resurrect the WEU in this way tells us much about the tensions among the allies within NATO, in particular over changes to it's key tasks and also over the role that Europe could and should play in transatlantic security.

Alliances can be seen from a variety of perspectives and modern academic thinkers in the field of International relations have introduced some highly conceptual and philosophical elements.

Traditionally alliances have been thought of as arising out of nation states concern to maintain international or local stability via a balance of power. This can be because states want to increase their own ability to deter an attack or alternatively to exercise a restraining influence over a much larger partner by binding it into a formal alliance. NATO allies of the Cold war period certainly manifested both aspects.

NATO in the Cold War also established fairly clearly the lines between the Communist dominated and the "Free" Europe. The reasons why nations such as Sweden Finland and Switzerland did not join NATO were sometimes explained by the "Coalition" theorists namely that alliances tend to accrue new members until the participants are sure of

7 SIPRI – The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

8 "Defence Analysis" December 1999, Volume 15, Number 3.

winning and no further, or the “Affiliation” theorists who point to ideological factors or still others who focus on other domestic factors to determine alliance proneness. Elements of this thinking still echo throughout the current debate on NATO’s future role.

In his controversial articles entitled “The End of History”⁹ Francis Fukuyama also explored themes that strike a chord with many practioners in the world of Politico Military affairs post 1989. In particular he highlighted the decline of ideology with the corresponding emergence of new national leaders whose policies are more overtly pragmatic than those based on a preconceived world vision.

In his analysis of the individual’s need for recognition and respect from “the group” there is an immediate and self evident read across to why NATO membership continues to be a prime foreign policy objective for a number of European nations. Fukuyama also described the emergence of Muslim fundamentalism, or more accurately radicalism, as a response to states’ failure to address the aspirations of their people in a world dominated by liberal democratic values.

I have only briefly sketched over these themes as a backdrop to the current debate. However for the outside observer the difficulty with much of the academic analysis is that it can only hope to identify trends. Important though these are, in an alliance of nineteen members not all would accept or indeed recognise the validity of such trends. By the same token, the new pragmatism described by Fukuyama has often been a source of tension within an alliance where many decision makers and opinion formers spent the formative years of their careers during the certainties of the Cold War.

NATO and the Use of Force

Most analysts would agree that the crises and security challenges in the modern era are increasingly complex and multi faceted. Rogue states by definition do not comply with international standards of behaviour. States, which are threatened by internal threat, are often unable to exert control over extremist groups and the descent into civil war is notoriously bloody and vicious.

Fundamental to understanding the use of force in the modern era is the issue of escalation. Force is the ultimate deterrent, but the use of force is a cumulative process not

9 The End of History and the Last Man” Francis Fukuyama, Hamish Hamilton ISBN 014010134557.

an absolute. A show of force (the raised fist) may be sufficient to win an argument, but once force is applied and the first blow struck, the initiator must be ready to follow through with if necessary increasing levels of force¹⁰.

NATO's value, both during the Cold war and in the modern era lies in its ability to escalate pressure through a range of levels, if necessary (however unlikely) to that of the nuclear strike. NATO was to paraphrase Roosevelt the "Big Stick" which allowed the International community, and particularly the European nations, to "talk softly".

NATO's task during the cold war was largely one of deterrence. In the modern era the task is more likely to be one of compliance; both in the strict sense of ensuring that warring parties comply with the terms of peace settlements (e.g. the Dayton accords in Bosnia) and in the wider context (as in Kosovo) that states comply with internationally accepted norms of behaviour.

In the main, the NATO allies no longer have to deal with the risk that invading forces will overrun their territory. The new risks are mostly concerned with the threat to the world economic and political order and to regional stability.

The activities of Rogue states, outbreaks of civil war, the internal collapse of regional powers, neighbours or trading partners may have a significant impact on NATO allies. Terrorist outrages are horrifying, but none of these threats are likely to lead to the overthrow of allied governments and the subjugation of the entire population to an outside power, which for the allies was the singular menace of the Cold War.

The task of maintaining the Status quo in the Nuclear Age was quite different to that of the modern era. Massive Assured Destruction and Flexible Response were, whatever one's moral position, perfectly sound intellectual and military responses to the threat of invasion by a large well organised and resourced opponent such as the Former Soviet Union.

During the Cold war NATO, its structures and the conventional forces of the allies were not designed to defeat the Warsaw Pact on the plains of central Europe, but to act as part of an escalation, or trigger process which if activated brought the risk nuclear Armageddon.

The Cold War NATO provided a mechanism that would allow the allies to be locked into the global balance of nuclear power. Although administratively and procedurally quite complex the conceptual approach underpinning the design of NATO's Cold War decision making architecture was relatively straightforward.

10 See also Richard J Barnet "Reflections on the Use of Force" and Professor Robert O'Neill " The Use of Military Force: Constants Factors and new Trends.

Consensus was needed, not on the threat itself, but on the means to meet the threat (the Plan) and on the day, that the threat itself (i.e. invasion) had indeed materialised. NATO's extensive planning architecture devoted 40 years to developing scenarios and ways to meet this one massive challenge of a Soviet invasion. NATO's decision making structures were designed to achieve and support a consensus on the plan.

NATO allies had already largely given Consent that their national Armed forces should be developed and deployed to meet the objectives of the NATO plan. Once the threat materialised then Consent to use the forces would be transferred to NATO's Strategic Commanders (SACEUR and SACLANT).

The Nuclear Balance of Terror in the Cold War also introduced a distortion to Von Clausewitz famous dictum about war "being the continuation of politics by other means"; the idea in many capitals that somehow there existed a dividing line between Diplomacy and the use of military force.

The aim of the balance of terror is to achieve a "Mexican stand off" but to avoid reaching the point where the gun is pulled from the holster, since the scope for discussion beyond that point so severely constrained as to be almost suicidal to the party which attempts it. In essence the role of Diplomats becomes to prevent war, while that of the military to pursue it once diplomacy has "failed".

This view on the supposed dividing line between Military and Diplomatic actors is at odds with pre cold war historical experience, but it is still widespread. Elements of the argument can be found in the US government's EuroStrategy 2000 "Strengthening Transatlantic Security - A Strategy for the 21st Century" published under the Clinton presidency.

Unfortunately these ideas have all too often also been reflected in the design of national decision making structures. Thus greatly complicating the task of adapting Alliance structures.

For those nations who still face a real risk of territorial aggression by their neighbours, the issue of whether NATO remains principally a collective defence organisation is one of practical self-interest. They naturally do not wish to see any refocusing and possible weakening in NATO's military preparedness. For others for whom NATO represents the physical manifestation of US world dominance, constraining NATO's development beyond collective self-defence may allow other international organisations to develop, where the US is not such a dominant force.

The development of the European Union's ESDP can be seen as one such organisation, but it is also a recognition that modern crisis management requires a holistic response

which allows both civil and military capabilities to be used together, i.e. in a quite different way to the Cold War balance of terror.

The still widespread view that NATO should remain essentially a military alliance and should only deal with the use of force has had profound implications for NATO's ability to adapt its structures to meet the challenges of the modern era.

NATO has been reluctant to build links with other crisis management organisations. Despite a high degree of practical cooperation with civilian agencies in its Balkan operations, until relatively recently NATO's concept of Civil Military Cooperation (CMIC) was still largely based on an old model which aimed to solve the problem of how to keep civilians away from the battlefield and how to prevent an exodus of civilian refugees from clogging up the main military supply lines.

The supposed distinction between the Political/diplomatic aspects and the military aspects of crisis management has meant that this divide is largely maintained within NATO's internal structures in a way that risks duplication of effort and delays in decision-making.

Force Structures

In the early 1990's NATO began to redesign its Force and Command Structure to meet the challenges of the Post Cold War era. One striking change was the reduction in US dominance at the top of the NATO Command Structure with the decision to cut the post of the American Deputy SACEUR¹¹, and the corresponding increase in responsibility and role of the European DSACEUR. The process of change is still ongoing as NATO applies the lessons of its operations in the Balkans (which has also had the effect of increasing the European role in the Alliance's military structures).

The dominant political and economic driver of the period was the desire to capitalise on the supposed "peace dividend". However as with any major structural reform, NATO's military adaptation has been a slow process where vested interests and bureaucratic inertia resistance to change tried and tested ways of working have acted as a major brake on progress. The same can be said for the reform process of NATO's civil arm (see below).

The existence of an integrated multinational command structure has long been seen as one of NATO's major strengths. For the military, 50 years of working and training together

11 Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

in a multinational environment has built up an unparalleled degree of trust and experience. At a purely practical level the NATO command structure also provides a career path for the military that might not otherwise exist.

Although the larger powers have often retained national military procedures, the NATO “way” laid the bedrock and provided the confidence to act in coalitions outside the NATO framework.

For politicians the integrated command structure was originally a method to ensure that all the allies shared the same risk and were “locked into” the decision making process. In the post Cold war era the logic has to some extent been reversed with the integrated military structure becoming the mechanism that allows every NATO ally to be a stakeholder in any military operation.

One cannot ignore the fact that the NATO command structure, with its numerous headquarters and facilities was also important in both economic and social terms. More than one NATO Headquarters is located in a previously economically deprived area.

Thus while nations individually implemented major cutbacks, withdrawing from bases abroad, closing bases at home and cutting back the readiness of their Armed Forces, there have always been strong arguments and pressures working against radical change at multinational level.

As a result the first round of restructuring completed in 1999 left in place an architecture still better suited to the Cold War task of territorial defence. This was particularly true for the Joint Sub Regional Headquarters (JSRCs), which were specifically designed and intended as a static non-deployable asset.

This was not the outcome sought by the NATO military themselves who were increasingly to recognise that future operations (even for Article 5) were likely to be of an expeditionary nature. The experience of crisis management operations in the Balkans since 1995 has only served to reinforced the NATO military in this view.

Work on the major deployable multinational headquarters structure, The Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters (CJTF) has been underway for nearly a decade. The advocates of this project argue that it will provide a key capability both for European only operations and for NATO operations beyond the Alliance’s traditional theatre of operations, for example the possible Humanitarian support operation which was at one time mooted for Afghanistan.

Only time will tell whether the CJTF concept proves to be the type of capability NATO and the EU require. There are equally strong arguments for supposing that this level of command will only be required for high intensity operations close to if not actual war fighting.

In real world crisis management operations in the Balkans, NATO has made use of a lighter Force structure based around its high readiness Headquarters, The Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force Land (AMFL). NATO is currently developing the capability to deploy more such units including the Eurocorps.

The military command structure being established for the ESDP also uses a lighter force structure. The NATO experience in real world crisis management operations suggests that the Strategic level Commander plays a more crucial role than currently allowed for in the ESDP architecture. This is particularly the case in the early stages of an operation. Nations value having a trusted senior commander to whom they can have instant access. Giving this role to the commander in the field as implied under the ESDP arrangements risks placing an unacceptable burden on the officer who already has a major task in managing a complex multinational operation in a difficult environment.

It is striking that when the Operations in Bosnia and Kosovo were at their most intense, the middle level NATO Headquarters, in both cases AFSOUTH based in Naples, was not what the outside observer might expect. AFSOUTH has always played a key role for Air operations, but for ground operations the driving force was very much the relationship between NATO's Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) who was in direct contact with capitals and the theatre commander on the ground.

It was only when the operations had stabilised that AFSOUTH was given what would normally be considered its traditional role. This may offer some lessons for the development of a suitable command structure for "European only" operations under EU auspices and indicate how NATO's command structure could develop in future. NATO's experience has underlined the importance the nations attach to having a permanent strategic level commander (in particular SACEUR) to whom they can turn in times of crisis. The ESDP architecture currently has no equivalent post; although the possibility of developing the role of the Deputy SACEUR (the senior European commander in the NATO military structure) to fulfil this need has been discussed.

NATO's Political and Diplomatic role

The task of adapting NATO's Political /Diplomatic structures has also been a major challenge and the area where arguably most work remains to be done if NATO is to meet its full potential.

Both the 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts agreed to develop NATO's area of policy responsibility to develop the organisation towards a Politico Military forum; expanding the NATO remit to place more emphasis on "Security " matters rather than just a collective defence alliance¹².

Some would argue that in any case the United States has never needed NATO for self defence; that it was the military and industrial might of America and particularly President Reagan's SDI which eventually bankrupted the Former Soviet Union and brought about its demise. It can be argued that contribution to NATO was the price Europe paid to ensure US protection.

If one considers that Defence is about protecting the metaphorical "castle walls" and Security is about forging alliances with neighbours (often by marriage if one continues the medieval analogy) in order to keep the enemy even further away from the castle, then Cold War NATO was indeed much more a security organisation for the United States.

This premise gives rise to the key issues that NATO must tackle if it is to remain a viable force in the politics of the 21st century. If in contrast to the US, for the majority of European Allies NATO has largely been and for some still is, predominantly an organisation concerned with Defence will they be prepared to adapt the organisations structures and modus operandi to effectively bridge the gap between security and defence.

The principal actors in this process of adaptation and change are the Secretary General his staff and the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The extent to which these bodies are able to adapt to the new challenges will be the benchmark for determining whether NATO has a future.

The Alliance has been remarkably fortunate in the calibre of the three men who have occupied the post of Secretary General since the end of the Cold War; the late Manfred Woerner, Javier Solana, and currently Lord Robertson of Port Ellen. Three very different individuals who brought quite different strengths to the post, but who have all taken the new agenda forward and developed the role of the Secretary General.

It is often suggested that in today's world of instant communication, jet travel, videoconference links, etc. the role of ambassadors and diplomats has been marginalized. Senior politicians and decision makers can deal directly with each other. The Internet, and

12 In paragraph 20 of the 1991 Strategic Concept document the allies sought to link this new role back to Article 4 of the original North Atlantic (Washington) Treaty, and to establish "The Alliance as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern".

24-hour news coverage means that senior politicians have to be ready to react in much shorter timescales.

Technological advances have certainly brought great change to the world of diplomacy and high-level decision-making they have not changed the fundamentals of negotiation or consensus building.

High-level shuttle diplomacy (be it physical or virtual) has its place but successful negotiation, as in the commercial world depends on effective delegation to intermediaries who can, develop the outlines of agreement, test and flesh out differences, dividing real obstacles from misunderstanding and prepare the ground for an eventual accord.

Although most large bureaucratic institutions encounter considerable internal resistance to change, for NATO the task of adapting has been made more complex, as mentioned in the preceding sections, by profound differences of view in several allied Capitals about the desirability of such changes in the nature and functioning of the Alliance. Some considered that other organisations notably the European Union or the OSCE were better suited to deal with security matters¹³.

The NATO International Staff structure underwent an initial re-organisation in the early 1990's, but it has essentially remained much the same as during the Cold War. One potentially significant development was the creation of the Balkans Task Force to cover NATO's intervention and supporting role in Bosnia. (See below on how this has worked in practice).

Although NATO has a well developed committee structure The North Atlantic Council remains by far in a way the most important actor, jealous of its power and privilege and the only body capable of driving forward such fundamental change.

The North Atlantic Council like so many high level committees has its own dynamic, a combination of the personalities of the Ambassadors who make up its membership and its own peculiar ethos.

There is little to be gained by dwelling on the former, other than to make two remarks. Firstly that an organisational structure that is too "personality dependent" may like the proverbial Statue with feet of clay, not be sustainable in the longer term. Secondly to underline the importance of the Ambassador/mission being linked to the capital's decision making "inner sanctum". Generally speaking this is so, but given the speed of

13 See Senator Roth's comments in Congressional Record N.º 12 Vol. 138 on proceedings of the 102nd Congress, Second Session.

modern communications and the pressure for instant response, it becomes crucially important.

This brings us to a problem peculiar to NATO Ambassadors in that they are representing at the same time and often on the same issue at least two if not three arms of government – the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and the Head of government/state.

In the WEU experiment it was decided that Ambassadors should sit alongside their military counterparts so that WEU Council meetings would be truly Politico/Military. Some nations were uncomfortable with this arrangement for historic reasons, but the advantages in terms of rapid decision-making were self-evident. This arrangement was replicated throughout the WEU structure.

Largely in response to the WEU initiative and in order that the two organisations could meet together below the level of the Council, NATO created a Politico/military committee in the form of the Policy Coordination Group (PCG). However elsewhere the NATO committee structure remains essentially divided into military and civilian bodies. As discussed above there is a strong element of Cold war thinking in this reluctance to see crisis management as very much a joint process.

It is perhaps illustrative in this context to look at the terms of reference agreed for the European Union's Political Security Committee¹⁴ which has been set up to oversee the EU Security and Defence Policy.

It can be argued that in establishing this body the European allies were attempting to establish a template for how the NAC might work in future. The key phrase in this text is that the PSC will exercise the "political control and strategic direction" of a military crisis-management operation.

If this means that the Council and the PSC will set the political parameters for the operation then this is helpful guidance. If on the other hand the Council/PSC assumes that their task is one of day-to-day control then we are wandering dangerously close to micromanagement.

Modern crisis management is far too complex to be run by committee. The task of such bodies is to provide consensus for action and to delegate authority to others to implement that decision.

14 Annex III of Annex VI of the EU Presidency Report to the Nice Council.

Recent NATO Balkan experience as a model for the future

Despite the experience of operations in Bosnia where NATO (albeit in the form of IFOR and subsequently SFOR) had to work closely with a wide variety of international organisations on a daily basis, NATO did not establish a framework at Brussels level to deal with other International Organisations on a regular basis.

Little attempt was made to develop an executive diplomatic arm that could establish such links; nor was it foreseen that in an emerging real world crisis NATO might require to deploy representatives to the region to act as the organisation's eyes and ears on the ground.

In the run up to and during the Kosovo crisis the lack of a diplomatic arm became a quite serious problem, particularly after NATO deployed troops to The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to support the OSCE sponsored Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) in late 1998.

The FYROM authorities were naturally concerned that assisting the International Community in this way might provoke an aggressive reaction from President Milosevic, to which they were well placed to respond.

Although NATO did appoint a "Special Envoy", the former German Ambassador Eiff, an experienced diplomat who had the trust of the local authorities, his appointment and the lack of practical support for his role was symptomatic of the ad hoc "one man show" approach which dominated NATO thinking.

As General Wesley Clark vividly describes in his book on the period "Waging Modern War"¹⁵ senior NATO military commanders both at strategic level and on the ground were increasingly asked to carry out a quasi-diplomatic role.

When NATO anti-radar missiles inadvertently landed in Bulgaria during the Air Campaign it was the NATO military commanders who visited Sofia, appearing on national television to explain and reassure this vital ally.

This situation continued to the end of the Kosovo crisis when the key "peace" documents the Military Technical Agreement with the FRY and the Undertaking to Demilitarise with the Kosovar guerrillas, were again essentially drafted by NATO's military arm and negotiated by the commanders on the ground.

¹⁵ "Waging Modern War" General Wesley Clark, Publicaffairs Ltd, 2001 ISBN 1903985080.

Two years later Ethnic Albanian guerrillas in the Presevo valley of Southern Serbia began an insurrection that subsequently spread over the border into neighbouring FYROM. Since the vast majority of KFOR's logistical support transited this area, NATO had reason to be concerned. Once again NATO's early effort to defuse the emerging crisis was led by the NATO military commanders on the ground and their civilian staff.

However in the intervening period the European Union had been strengthening its own crisis response capability via the development of the European Security and Defence Policy. It had deployed a small unit of its unarmed monitors, the ECMM into the region and more importantly had begun to develop a political and economic partnership with FYROM with the signature of a Security and Stabilisation Agreement.

Thus both NATO and The European Union had a stake in the stability of FYROM. Under the leadership of the EU Secretary General, (former NATO Secretary General) Dr. Javier Solana, the EU began to play a greater role, working alongside Lord Robertson and NATO, in resolving the crisis.

In many ways this was a significant change in the role usually played by a NATO Secretary General. Although it would be a simplification to suggest that hitherto the NATO Secretary general's role was limited to chairing the Council and supervising the International staff, it is true to say that, in contrast to his counterparts at the UN and the EU, The NATO Secretary General had not previously been given such autonomy to act and negotiate on behalf of the organisation¹⁶.

Both NATO and the EU had the considerable advantage, in contrast to the OSCE, (or by the same token the UN) of possessing readily deployable assets, in terms of men and equipment, to support on the ground the efforts of the two senior level negotiators.

Gradually the NATO civilian machine in Brussels began to become more involved and a team led by the head of the Balkans Task Force, Peter Feith was deployed to the region. The BTF had rarely if ever been used in this way before and its deployment not only provided a day to day back up and reinforcement to the work of the Secretary General, but also greatly improved the ability of the Council to monitor events and provide strategic level political guidance.

The subsequent signature of agreements between political representatives of the various ethnic groups brokered by the NATO and EU negotiators paved the way for NATO

¹⁶ This process of accruing power to the post of Secretary General can be traced back to the role played by Dr Solana during the Kosovo air campaign, when the Council delegated considerable powers to the Secretary General and the SACEUR over the selection of targets. See "Waging Modern War; *ibid*.

to undertake Operation Harvest under which the Albanian guerrillas formally surrendered their weapons.

In the next phase the lead role on the ground would pass to the European Union and OSCE monitors, but in a repeat of the NATO Extraction Force for the Kosovo Monitoring Mission (KVM) mentioned above, NATO troops would provide a small military force¹⁷ to ensure that unarmed monitoring teams could be extricated should they find themselves at risk or taken hostage.

At the time of writing discussions are under way for the European Union to take over the “extraction” role from NATO using the new architecture established under the ESDP. Indeed there were some who argued in the early stages of the crisis that there was no need for NATO to take on the military role, that the EU was ready to assume this responsibility.

There are several reasons why this view could well be mistaken. Firstly the institutions of the ESDP are relatively new and untested. Politicians must have confidence in an organisation if they are to entrust the lives of their young men and women (and by extension their own political careers) to operations that will put them in harms way. NATO has earned that trust over 50 years of its existence and 7 years of testing crisis management in the Balkans.

Moreover NATO has, as discussed above, the ability to escalate the use of force and it has demonstrated the willingness to do so. The EU is an unknown quantity. Its ability and willingness to escalate the use of force unproven. The risk that warring parties might miscalculate the EU’s resolve had to be a factor in deciding to use NATO.

Twelve months later the events in FYROM have served to erode much of the institutional rivalry between NATO and the EU. A healthy dose of real world practical experience has been injected into an ESDP debate, which risked becoming overly centred on institutional theology. The role of the Strategic commander (as exemplified by the post of SACEUR and DSACEUR in NATO) is better understood. In sum the prospect for a successful transition to the first operation under the ESDP are more auspicious.

However the ability to escalate, the trust and confidence it evokes means that NATO is likely to remain the organisation of choice for the more challenging crisis management operations and almost certainly if the United States wishes to play a major role. If NATO can also apply the lessons for the development of NATO’s diplomatic and civil arm this can only serve to increase the organisations effectiveness.

¹⁷ Task Force Amber Fox.

New Strategic Partnership with Russia

At the time of writing the relationship between Russia and the Alliance stands on the brink of major evolution. The main catalyst for this were the events of 11 September when at least some in the Russian leadership recognised that there might be positive benefit in working with NATO (see below).

The decline from Empire is almost invariably a painful process, as the former western colonial powers, Britain, France and Portugal ought to recognise only too well. It should therefore come as no surprise that NATO has found developing a balanced relationship with Russia both challenging and problematic. Moreover, if the end of Cold War certainties has posed major intellectual and conceptual challenges for Western decision makers and opinion formers, then for Russia the process of coming to grips with the new era is arguably even more difficult and painful.

In the eyes of many Russians, particularly the political elite, NATO is an obstacle to Russian involvement in Europe. The 1999 Kosovo conflict, in particular the air campaign, only served to reinforce Russian fears about the Alliance and their own vulnerability. Unable to have any decisive influence over NATO's campaign, Russia was forced to fall back on dangerous and theatrical gestures such as their independent "dash for Pristina" ahead of the main KFOR deployment in June 1999 in an effort to show that Russia remained a force to be reckoned with.

Paradoxically despite their very different perceptions, Russia has had a clear plan and agenda for its relations with NATO: to establish a role equal to other allies, i.e. joint decision-making/or a veto and some would say to weaken the influence of the Alliance.

By contrast, despite the Founding Act, NATO has struggled to develop an overall concept, objective or game plan for its relationship with Russia.

Lord Robertson regularly called for a bolder approach with Moscow. Unfortunately NATO has had few "carrots" to offer. Indeed until recently attempting a pro-active engagement on issues to stimulate reform could have soured the relationship further. Despite generally good cooperation on the ground between Russian and NATO forces in Bosnia and Kosovo, officials within Russia's Politico/ Military structure (the Alliance's natural interlocutors) have been reluctant to engage. The one area where NATO could provide real assistance is in military reform but quite naturally this is a highly sensitive, if not embarrassing issue for them given the parlous state of the Russian military machine.

By comparison the European Union, under the Russian Common Strategy is well placed to offer incentives to reform. The EU offers a high level economic dialogue focusing

on WTO accession and institutional reform, underpinned by EU funding and a parallel political dialogue on ESDP. These are all things Russia wants.

The EU focus is on consolidating the rule of law, the administration, social and health sector reform, support for civil society coupled with police and judicial co-operation, in tackling organised crime. The underlying conceptual approach is to minimise the impact on western European economies and society by encouraging reforms that will provide Russia with a “soft landing” as it declines from its super power status.

NATO shares that objective, but needs to move from an incremental policy and to be firm in resisting Russian attempts at wedge driving. This argues for establishing a practical framework agenda that describes what NATO wants to achieve in its relationship with Russia, including both long and medium term objectives.

President Putin’s announcements following the events of 11 September offered the possibility of a radical new approach. The NATO/Russia Summit in Rome this year offers a major opportunity to establish a new relationship.

NATO Allies share a common threat and one where there is an evident advantage in pooling Russian and Allied expertise in combating that threat. Time will tell whether the NATO allies collectively can rise to this challenge, whether the new NATO/Russia Council will prove to be the mechanism within which formal cooperation can develop, and more importantly whether Russia below the level of the Presidency is willing to follow President Putin’s lead without seizing the opportunity to pursue old agendas.

Outreach, Partnership for Peace and Enlargement

The Outreach programme and its military expression, Partnership for Peace (PfP) has been one of the Alliance great success stories. What began as a largely political process now has a very real military underpinning. It is perhaps the area that demonstrates best the Alliance’s ability to adapt its procedures and objectives and rise to new challenges.

Whether the outreach programme should lead to eventual NATO enlargement remains a contentious issue. Those who seek to preserve the simplicity of the old architecture argue that allowing in new members risks complicating the decision-making structures. They point to the experience of the Western European Union or the OSCE to argue that an Alliance of 20-30 members will be unworkable, that the impact on NATO’s Integrated military structure would undermine NATO’s ability to conduct operations, that the Alliance would not be able to meet its fundamental collective defence commitments.

Against this argument are those who have argued, notably in North America for the “Big Bang”. Allow all the aspirant nations into the alliance.

Experience may suggest that advocates of the “Big bang” may be closer to what NATO needs, but there are other models that imply a major reorganisation of the way NATO does business. Bearing in mind that any decision to enlarge the Alliance is above all a political decision, it is worth looking at how the outreach programme has developed and changed over time in coming to a view on the best model for the future.

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War the allies needed to establish a political dialogue with central and eastern European states, a mechanism which would publicly demonstrate that these countries were now part of the “Free World”, and to assist with military reconversion and to ensure that Communist dictatorship was not replaced by a military one.

Although in the early 1990s NATO was still predominantly a military alliance, the Strategic concept had set out an ambitious new Agenda. The development of the Outreach programme is arguably the one area where the Alliance has lived up to its ambitions.

Most former Warsaw pact nations very much shared NATO’s objectives. NATO was seen as an effective institution, driven by the US. Membership involved accepting clear achievable standards, but the hurdle was not as great as the major economic and legislative reforms required for European Union membership.

The first steps along the path in the form of participation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) allowed those outside the Alliance to demonstrate that they were now part of the NATO architecture. At the same time the NACC ensured that NATO’s decision-making structure, in particular its military structure was preserved.

NACC provided an extremely useful testing ground and a forum where former enemies could begin to work together to learn about and from each other. However political discussion in the NACC soon began to lack substance and there was pressure, both inside the Alliance and amongst the Partner countries for at least some Partners to be made full Allies.

NATO’s parallel military cooperation was also established in 1994 under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. It began as an attempt to help non-NATO countries to reconfigure their Armed forces, both to ensure that they remained under civilian control and to assist them via the Partnership Planning and Review Programme (PARP) to become interoperable with NATO forces in possible Non Article 5 operations.

This latter aim took on real significance with NATO’s decision to deploy ground forces to Bosnia in 1995. The counter argument against those who suggest that enlargement

would damage NATO's ability to conduct operations is the real world example of 7 years experience of running very successful operations in the Balkans in cooperation with more than 30 other nations.

In 1997 NATO decided to admit Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary as new members and confirmed its "Open Door" policy to admitting additional countries. In parallel the NACC was reinforced in a new format of the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

Enlargement has been considered in classic terms. New members gaining positions in the NATO military and civilian hierarchy. But the line between ally and non-ally is becoming blurred in important areas.

NATO's article 5 Defence Guarantee is not an automatic call to arms. The relevant wording is "The Parties agree that ... if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, ... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force"¹⁸.

This builds on the lesser-known Article 4 which states that:

"The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened".

Nations participating in Partnership for Peace have also gained the right to request formal consultations with NATO if they consider themselves under threat¹⁹. This right has indeed been invoked, most notably by Albania and the FYROM during the Kosovo conflict. The subsequent commitments given by the NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, to those two countries governments, while not formally "Security Guarantees" came very close to an ad hoc and time delimited version of Article 5.

In parallel Non-NATO nations have and continue to work with NATO in real world crisis management operations. In early operations in Bosnia the non-allies had effectively

18 Article 5: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area".

19 Partnership for Peace Invitation Document issued by the Heads of State and government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 10 January 1994. Paragraph 3 "NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security".

no say in how these operations were set up (planned) or conducted. Nor did they gain significant command positions in NATO's operational command structure.

While at present there seems little prospect that we will see generals from Partner nations commanding NATO operations (the number of personnel and equipment they are currently able to contribute would not justify senior command positions), the 1997 EAPC Basic Document sought to increase Partners decision-making opportunities "to the maximum extent possible (and) relating to activities in which they (partners) participate".

This process has continued under the "Enhanced Politico Military Framework" under which Partner nations participating in NATO operations are given the opportunity to comment on draft operational planning before it comes to the NATO Council and well before their involvement via the EAPC. This is a significant new development allowing non-allies real influence at an early stage in the decision making process. Formally NATO allies retain the final decision making power and the only sanction non-allies have is to refuse to participate or to withdraw from an operation. However, NATO has already moved a long way down the road to the type of "variable geometry", which was tried in the Western European Union.

The process underway in NATO to involve non-allies is in stark contrast to that being developed in the EU for the involvement of non-members in the European Security and Defence Policy. The Documents agreed at the EU Nice Summit in 2000²⁰ offer consultation opportunities in a model that harks back to the NACC and the arrangements set up for Partner involvement in NATO's original IFOR operation. Although pressure from NATO allies has led to a more flexible interpretation of the Nice texts there are good reasons for supposing that the EU will be unable to go much further at least in the short term.

The EU institutions that deal with Security/Defence policy also deal with the Common Foreign Policy. So there are real practical difficulties over the participation by non-members in ESDP discussion in the EU. So far the EU Member States have not found a way to involve non-members to discussions on ESDP while excluding them from discussion on Foreign Policy issues.

There is also the issue of the way that the EU places greater emphasis on legal issues.

The EU ethos and experience is very different to that of NATO, which has developed a generally pragmatic approach, through which political level decision by the NATO Council is generally sufficient to implement even far-reaching changes.

20 Annex VI to Annex VI of the EU Presidency Report to the Nice Summit.

Although both the EU and NATO are based on International Treaties, the EU has developed a large amount of legal case law (the EU Acquis) and tends to operate in what to the outside observer might seem a rather legalistic manner where a legal opinion is regularly sought from the EU Council legal Service before decisions are taken. In some ways this is a relic of the EU's original function as effectively a supra national legislature where the major output were EU Directives which would then be implemented into the legislation of the Member States.

The result is that, one organisation operates on a basis akin to English common law i.e. through precedent and practical interpretation, while the other operates as though bound by the continental Civil Code where everything that is not specifically allowed is illegal. Unfortunately the overall impression left is that the European Union remains a more exclusive organisation rather than the openly stated "inclusive" arrangements that exist in NATO.

The role for NATO in the aftermath to the attacks on WTC and the Pentagon

If the fall of the Berlin Wall was the defining act of the end of the Cold War then surely the *Al Qaeda* attack in New York and Washington on September 11 was one of the key defining acts of the modern era.

The trends as with most defining moments in history had been apparent for some time, state sponsored terrorism crossing international boundaries goes back over 30 years. Islamic fundamentalism, or perhaps more correctly radicalism, has been a force in world politics for almost as long. The concept of Rogue States is well established, if not universally accepted. The fact that the attacks were followed by widespread speculation about the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by terrorists only echoed the deepest fears of some policy makers. Even Hollywood has explored this theme in its disaster movies.

However what was abundantly apparent in the immediate aftermath of the attacks was that while The International Community had recognised the emerging problem (the various risks to transatlantic security are clearly identified in NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept) it had not put in place an effective mechanism, still less articulated an agreed policy to deal with the problem.

The campaign against the Taliban and *Al Qaeda* has been pursued as a classic ad hoc coalition of nations formed to deal with a specific crisis as for example in the 1991 Gulf War.

This can be explained in that the United States and her allies, have front line experience in counter terrorism, counter proliferation and the war on drugs. They are also amongst the states that have the best-developed mechanisms and capabilities to identify, track and interdict terrorism.

The clear advantage of such a campaign is that agreeing the military strategy amongst relatively few nations is greatly simplified. The disadvantage is that the task of maintaining political consensus at international level is at once more difficult and in long term more time consuming and manpower intensive. A glance at the diaries of the senior US policy makers would serve to show at a glance how much high level time and effort is being expended on this one policy issue.

Most nations are prepared to adopt such a policy stance at times of war and that indeed is the term that President Bush has used to describe the campaign. However he has also said that it will be a long drawn out affair.

In the early stages of the campaign the US Administration also referred to “a Grand Coalition” something much broader, more proactive and holistic an approach than “Fortress America”. This may be the shape of the future. If so it would represent a profound change in the way nations and International Organisations do business.

However, for the majority of nations, and for many of our International Organisations, whose decision makers and opinion formers still carry much Cold War baggage, this is a very confusing and uncertain time. As Nicole Gnesotto and Philip Gordon have described²¹ it is easy enough to fall back on stereotypes and accuse America of being “a unilateralist superpower which acts alone and sees only military solutions to world problems”.

When NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington treaty following the 11 September attacks some thought this meant that NATO might take a leading role in the campaign. Clearly this did not occur but the decision was nevertheless a landmark event, not only because Article 5 had never been invoked before, but also because it demonstrated a move towards NATO taking on the kind of political role that the Strategic Concepts envisage. The invocation of Article 5 was an extremely important political signal of solidarity and one which was appreciated and welcomed by the American public and media.

It was subsequently revealed in the press that NATO military planning was in fact initiated by the military arm of NATO, not for an offensive operation since it was clear that the United States wished to pursue the campaign using its own national resources, but for

21 International Herald Tribune, 13 March 2002.

a NATO humanitarian airlift to support the international aid agencies in their efforts to supply aid to Afghan refugees, both inside and outside the country.

As we now know, the plan was not put into effect. The use of military assets in such a task is very much a last resort, both for reasons of cost and as a general rule the international aid community prefers to use civil assets if at all possible.

However the very fact that NATO was prepared to countenance such an operation is significant, particularly after the years of internal wrangling among the allies over where NATO geographic responsibilities lay, the so called “Out of Area” debate. In an increasingly globalised world it is unrealistic to argue that transatlantic security cannot be deeply affected by events outside NATO’s traditional borders.

That is not to say that NATO will on its own be the best or even the most appropriate instrument to use in every emerging crisis, or that the organisation is likely to develop a “global reach”. It is also clear that at the time of writing the major players in the war against terrorism still appear reluctant to constrain their national policy options by involving the major international organisations.

Even if bilateral or multilateral coordination between nations is likely to remain the principle driving force behind the campaign against international terrorism, in the longer term, it is very much in the long term interests of the United States and her allies to ensure that the campaign against international terrorism continues to enjoy widespread international support and that the burden of combating this threat to world order is shared amongst other members of the international community. The current major players will need to encourage other nations to build their own capabilities to meet the terrorist threat and to ensure that these capabilities complement their own.

The main medium term and long-term policy objectives could be summarised as follows - to maintain the political consensus for the campaign - to separate moderate opinion from the extremists - to deny terrorist groups safe havens and resources, both material and financial - to develop new, and refine existing, national and international capabilities to meet the threat, specifically the capability to identify and track terrorists and to interdict their activities - and in the longer term to establish an environment²² where international terrorism is effectively monitored, controlled and ultimately eliminated.

There is little appetite for creating new costly international organisations. So achieving these objectives will require coordination of, diplomatic, military, economic and media policy and amongst the political elites (parties) in a way that has rarely been done before.

22 Including an effective legal (UN and EU) framework for counter terrorist action.

Such a holistic approach, where a variety of international organisations each have their part to play, mirrors what a modern commercial company would recognise as a project team or task force approach.

For such an approach to work requires the International Organisations and the nations themselves to have a clear view where their strengths lie, what each is trying to achieve and where they need to bring in, or develop links with, other organisations to ensure that the overall policy is coherent.

The G7/8 has been mentioned as a possible leading player and has the advantage of grouping together powerful and likeminded nations and covering both economic and political issues. It perhaps has the potential to act in the same way as the Contact Group has done in the Balkans, but with a much greater geographical scope. However, given its limited membership other International Organisations will have roles to play in providing strategic consensus and as force multipliers in action against the terrorist threat, as well as in dealing with its consequences.

The UN has an essential role to play in providing overall legitimacy for action, also a means to build up and maintain the widest geographic scope for political consensus. The UN Agencies (together with the EU, OSCE and NGOs) will continue to play an important role in alleviating the effects of world crises and underdevelopment, and thus addressing some of the root causes of terrorism, i.e. political and economic disenfranchisement.

The International Financial Institutions (IMF, World Bank, etc) also have a key role to play in this task. Although they have a traditional antipathy to policies where political criteria have a greater bearing than the purely economic and hence they have often argued against. Conditionality, the current shift away from infrastructure towards social projects may mean they are able to complement the role played by UN, EU etc in tackling the root causes of terrorism.

It is questionable whether the European Union's CFSP or ESDP bodies are sufficiently developed to take on a major new area of work effectively, particularly in any operational context. The EU has serious constraints in discussing within its formal structures any highly classified issues (which by necessity must underpin any attempt to track down terrorist movements).

However the EU has, a major role to play in building consensus and the essential framework for non military aspects of interdiction; for example in the areas of extradition arrangements, harmonising border controls, anti terrorist legislation, domestic security measures etc. The EU also has a key role in building consensus for economic sanctions and their implementation.

NATO is the natural forum for Europe and North America to discuss the security and defence aspects of the anti-terrorism agenda. As such NATO could play a key role in creating the hard-core of political consensus, which allies can then pursue in other fora.

NATO also benefits from an existing Politico/Military infrastructure with room to adapt, including an existing security/intelligence architecture. Past experience suggests that developing NATO as an intelligence-gathering instrument may be difficult, but there are ways NATO can be used as a mechanism for sharing assessments rather than exchanging raw data, which most allies do not have the background information to analyse. The experience gained in NATO in its work with other international agencies to tackling the problem of organised crime in Balkans may show the way forward.

NATO also has the potential to become the main forum for developing the military response to terrorism by encouraging other nations to develop capabilities to identify, track and interdict international terrorism

The NATO Outreach programme (via both EAPC and PJC) and Mediterranean Dialogue could be used to help non-NATO states buy-in to NATO anti-terrorism doctrine and to develop similar capabilities and links with allies capabilities. President Putin's apparent willingness to work with NATO opens up new possibilities. However, if NATO is to fulfil this potential it will need to improve its links with other organisations something that it has traditionally been reluctant to do.

The final model as far as NATO is concerned may be close to the mechanism adopted to deal with the problem of apprehending war criminals from the Bosnian conflict or more correctly, Persons Indicted For War Crimes (PIFWCs). In this little known area of policy, consensus for action against certain individuals is separated from the action itself, which is carried out by a smaller group of nations on behalf of the others.

Thus in the field of counter terrorism, there would need to be a strategic level consensus in a broad range of International Organisations, including NATO, that country X or organisation Y is a concern from an international anti-terrorism perspective. This would allow a range of both sanctions and other measures to bear aimed at removing the causes of terrorism. Below that level there might be agreement on a classified list of individuals or organisations linked to terrorism within that country or organisation. As with PIFWCs, action against those individuals/organisations would be the prerogative of the nations with the capability to take such action.

Conclusions

The enlargement debate brings into sharp relief the many questions surrounding NATO's future role. In essence what type of organisation is the NATO of the 21st century.

If NATO is still essentially a military alliance for collective defence, then perhaps the key question centres on whether the existing allies, and in particular the nuclear weapon states, are prepared to extend a collective security guarantee to the applicant nation and in the last analysis put its own national survival at risk to defend that nation.

If on the other hand NATO has become a major crisis management organisation where projecting and maintaining security is the key task, then the major determinant is whether the addition of new members will still allow the organisation to function effectively and whether the new members are able to contribute effectively to the tasks and challenges facing the organisation.

Either way, pressure to enlarge is unlikely to reduce, as Fukayama observed, individuals and nation states have for the most part a strong motivation for recognition and respect. Membership of NATO remains a sought after "badge of office".

The events of 11 September showed that the analysis of NATO's strategic Concept was essentially correct. The threats that the majority of nation states that make up the Atlantic community are most likely to face are not invasion and the overthrow of the state by military means. Only a relative few applicant countries seek NATO membership for this reason.

The significant threats to nation states in the developed world are threats to states' internal security and to their external security interests. The *Al Qaeda* attacks showed that such threats can involve extreme levels of violence and high loss of life. Everyone is conscious that Weapons of Mass Destruction could produce much greater levels of destruction and casualties, but this is not likely to lead to the overthrow of the State and the subjugation of the entire population.

The Strategic Concepts sketched out a radical new agenda for NATO, and it is perhaps too easy to be critical of NATO for falling short of its ambitions. Change is costly and threatening perhaps no more so than in the field of military affairs. It is worth recalling that the catchwords of the early 90s were the "Peace Dividend" and "Downsizing".

In fact the experience of NATO operations in the Balkans has shown the Alliance to have been remarkably effective in adapting its military arm to meet the new crisis management and security tasks. The network of relationships established under Partnership for Peace allow for a degree of flexibility and interoperability with non-allies

that could scarcely be imagined a decade ago. NATO planners have shown the ability to plan effectively for operations far beyond the traditional geographic limits of the Alliance.

The challenge on the military side now lies with the nations rather than NATO itself. Agreement to further streamlining NATO's regional commands has been mooted by the NATO military before. The funds saved could be better spent on developing the High Readiness forces that NATO needs and uses.

Too many nations have yet to reconfigure their armed forces away from the task of territorial defence, where if required the whole population can be mobilised, and towards expeditionary operations. As a result many key national military resources are blocked in reserve formations that are difficult to deploy for crisis management operations. The ESDP is in part an attempt to overcome this problem and as such is a welcome development. It is complementary to NATO's own Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), which underlines the fact that for many allies defence spending still remains below target.

The real challenge for NATO as an organisation probably lies more in the adaptation of its civil and politico/diplomatic side and its ability to develop links with other organisations.

The real world example I have given of NATO's role in the 2001 crisis in FYROM may offer some pointers on the way forward, in particular the need to develop the role of the Secretary General so that he is able to act under his own authority to allow a stronger NATO voice in international political affairs; in a process where the Secretary General would inform the NATO Council, but not seek (or be given) formal guidance. In so doing, The Secretary General can serve, not only as the voice of the Alliance leaders, but on occasions as their conscience.

Such changes will need practical underpinnings, in particular the ability to deploy civilian negotiators to work alongside other International Organisations in defusing an emerging crisis. For example, in many organisations the post of Political Director has been created to act below the level of Secretary General on purely policy issues and to provide the key contact point for outside contacts. NATO currently has no such post.

During the Cold War the NATO committee structure was designed for a slow moving bureaucratic task. Today's NATO has to produce decisions and guidance to its military commanders often in a fast moving environment.

All the above suggests the time is right for a review of the internal structures of the organisation in Brussels.

As I have argued earlier there is also a strong case for further reducing the civil/military divisions in the current committee structures and by extension their supporting international staffs.

The threat of international terrorism and asymmetric warfare, brought into sharp relief by the events of 11 September presents a huge challenge to NATO, but also opportunities.

Some would argue that NATO's greatest service after 11 September has been in providing discipline to hold the US and the Europeans (and indeed, now also Russia) together against common "new" threats, while allowing the American "sole superpower" to be exposed to the views of its friends and allies.

There has always been an anti-NATO lobby within parts of the American society. Those who argue against any constraints on US policy (and who see the chimera of European caucusing at the core of the ESDP debate). One can hope that, as in the past, wiser counsels will prevail; those who recognise that a more political NATO need not be a recipe for weakness, but actually a more effective means of maintaining western solidarity, and an essential element in successful security action elsewhere.

In adapting to the challenges of the modern era, the "Old NATO", dominated by the United States has given way to a more complex set of relationships. The "New NATO" is no longer simply the means to provide the US with a bulwark against Soviet expansion, but one of the key instruments for promoting stability. At a time of increasing interdependence, (when for example just under ten percent of US Jobs depended on European investment) the importance of ensuring international organisations such as NATO are effective should be self-evident.

As I have argued NATO is well placed to play a leading role in key aspects of the campaign against the new menace of international terrorism. Russia and other non-allies seem ready to use NATO, but NATO still has to prove that it has the flexibility to adapt its decision making procedures to this and the other new tasks, to make the best use of the unique variable geometry established as part of its Outreach programme and thus to bring in the widest possible participation.

This year NATO leaders will have the opportunity at the Rome and Prague Summits to set out their agenda for the "new" NATO. But as always the real test will lie in how the organisation itself implements those decisions. Past experience suggests that NATO can and will rise to the challenge.