

**Interdependence in Southern Africa:  
An Examination of the Relations  
between Zimbabwe and South Africa**

by

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## **Abstract**

Most research on southern Africa focuses on the total dependency of the region's states--Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe--upon the dominant power, South Africa. This thesis examines the relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe and argues that these two states are more interdependent than dependency scholars would acknowledge.

Although a study of the historical period reveals that dependency theory, as defined by Raúl Prebisch, Andre Gunder Frank and A. Valenzuela, is helpful for understanding the development of relations between the two states, it is unable to account for many of the characteristics of the relationship which are found in the contemporary context, especially since 1980. An examination of various economic areas of interaction, including investment, trade and transportation, as well as the political realm, indicates that each state exhibits a degree of dependence upon the other. Thus, it is possible to characterize the relationship as one of "mutual dependence," or interdependence as defined by Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. Interdependence is further examined through the concepts of sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity signifies the

ability of a state to respond effectively to policy changes made by another state within a given area of interaction without incurring large costs, while vulnerability denotes that an actor is unable to respond, or only at great cost. By applying these concepts to the relationship between Zimbabwe and South Africa, it is determined that although South Africa tends to be sensitive while Zimbabwe is generally vulnerable, the degrees to which these two states are sensitive and vulnerable varies over time and issue area.

As the changes within South Africa start to affect relations with the rest of southern Africa, it will be necessary to understand the interaction between the states from an interdependency perspective if cooperation within the region will be successful. By applying an interdependence framework, this study aims at contributing to the understanding of relations among the countries of southern Africa in general, and between South Africa and Zimbabwe in particular.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AACZ	Anglo-American Company of Zimbabwe
ANC	African National Congress
ANP	Afrikaner National Party
BLS	Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland
BSAC	British South Africa Company
CAF	Central African Federation
CONSAS	Constellation of Southern African States
FLS	Frontline States
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
MNR	Mozambique National Resistance
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
NRZ	National Railways of Zimbabwe
PAC	Pan-African Congress
SACU	South African Customs Union
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SADF	South African Defence Forces
SATS	South African Transport Services
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organization
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union



ZAPU            Zimbabwe African People's Union

ZPRA            Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

# CHAPTER 1

## Introduction

On 30 September 1986, the South African government published details of a new trade agreement it had recently concluded with the government of Zimbabwe. Meanwhile, only a few days prior to the deal being made public, the President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe had emphatically underscored his government's commitment to the imposition and support of sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa.<sup>1</sup> Subsequent to South Africa's embarrassing revelation, Mr. Mugabe denied knowledge of the negotiations claiming that it was a "routine matter for officials."<sup>2</sup> This event represents the conflict within policy-making and between policy makers in the political economy of the region of southern Africa in general, and relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe in particular.

The geographic region of southern Africa is comprised of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Tanzania and Zaire may also be included as part of

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<sup>1</sup>Africa Research Bulletin, (Economic Series), (30 September 1986), p. 8352A.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid, p. 8352B.

a larger economic and political functional region. Within the region, a struggle for racial domination, political power and economic hegemony is taking place in which each state plays an important part. The leading actor is the white dominated state of South Africa which has sought to maintain its domination since colonial times through a variety of economic, military and political policies. During the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s South African attempts at maintaining its hegemony over the region was manifested in the 'total strategy' of destabilizing neighbouring countries using economic and military levers. The other states in southern Africa have attempted to combat this dominance through a variety of means as well. Attempts have been made by them to disengage themselves from the economic dominance of South Africa and to isolate politically the racist regime.

At the forefront of this struggle is South Africa's northern neighbour, Zimbabwe. The politico-economic relations between these two countries hold an important clue to understanding the dynamics of the regional struggle and demonstrate that policy making responds to a variety of stimuli, including changes in the international and regional setting as well as changes within each national context. The purpose of this paper is to gain a better understanding of the region of southern Africa by closer investigation of the relationship between two of the principal actors - South Africa and Zimbabwe.

South Africa is a large country which dwarfs its neighbours in economic terms. It has a relatively developed economy, substantial human

and natural resources, and political continuity. The neighbouring countries, by comparison, have fewer natural resources, smaller populations, underdeveloped economies which depend upon one or two primary commodities for up to half of their GNP, and have oversized bureaucracy and service sectors.<sup>1</sup> Zimbabwe stands out in the region as it has a fairly diversified economy with a large manufacturing sector, a substantial quantity of natural resources and a large skilled workforce. In addition, President Mugabe is a well respected and charismatic Third World leader who has led the fight against the domination of South Africa since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. The country's geographic, economic and political position within southern Africa make the relations between it and South Africa vitally important to the future of the region, regardless of the victor in the anti-apartheid struggle within South Africa.

Although other relations within the region are no less significant to understanding southern Africa as a whole, that between Zimbabwe and South Africa is of particular interest for several reasons. Firstly, the two countries share a very similar colonial history which has led various regional and international observers, as well as the South African and Zimbabwean governments, to make comparisons between the present situation in South Africa and the independence struggle within Zimbabwe. This, in turn, has led to predictions of a future for South Africa similar to that of post-independence Zimbabwe. Secondly, each state sees the other, for very different reasons, as a key to stability in the region. Thirdly, Zimbabwe and South Africa are the two most economically

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<sup>1</sup>Africa South of the Sahara 1990 (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1989), various pages.

developed states in southern Africa, which places them at the center of development strategies promoted by regional and international agents. Finally, Zimbabwe at this stage holds a key leadership position in the fight against the South African apartheid regime, while South Africa's perceptions of Zimbabwe have been crucial to the determination of South African regional policy.

The relationship between these two states has been explored by scholars generally through the framework of dependency theory. From this perspective, South Africa, the dominant actor, is said to dictate the economic and political orientation of Zimbabwean policies by exploiting its economic leverage over the latter, as well as by resorting to military tactics. In this analysis, however, it will be argued that although South Africa is the dominant actor, Zimbabwe exercises considerable independence of action and manipulates ties with South Africa to its advantage whenever possible. Thus, this study argues that while dependency theory provides an explanation for the historical development of Zimbabwe *vis-à-vis* South Africa, it is insufficient in providing a complete understanding of this particular relationship as well as regional relations. Specifically, it cannot explain the leverage Zimbabwe exercises over South Africa in certain areas of interaction. Therefore, dependency analysis must be complemented with an interdependence paradigm to provide a more thorough and balanced view of the relationship.

An examination of the literature on southern Africa reveals a substantive lack of work on this particular relationship from the perspec-

tive of interdependence. Most of the available literature is situated within the dependency framework, and focuses on the domination of South Africa.<sup>4</sup> These analyses see the activities of neighbouring states as responding to overwhelming South African pressure because their dependent position allows them no room for alternate and independent decision making. However, this work seeks to demonstrate that weak states such as Zimbabwe, are, nevertheless, able to exert influence over the dominant states such as South Africa.

In considering the relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe, it is discovered that South Africa is indeed affected by policies made by the Zimbabwean government, and that it reacts to those policies often with little success in achieving its objectives. Thus, it is found that South Africa is sensitive to policy-making in its neighbouring states and is therefore interdependent with its neighbours.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, this interdependency tends to be asymmetrical; weaker states such as Zimbabwe are more vulnerable to South African policy-making than the reverse. This paper will elucidate those points of interdependence between Zimbabwe and South Africa which reflect the areas of sensitivity and vulnerability of both states in the relationship between them.

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<sup>4</sup> See for example, Thomas M. Callaghy, ed., South Africa in Southern Africa: The Intensifying Vortex of Violence (New York: Praeger, 1983); Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilization Report (London: The Commonwealth Secretariat, 1989).

<sup>5</sup> The interdependence paradigm, including the concepts of sensitivity and vulnerability, are derived from Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1977). Briefly, interdependence in this paper will refer to all levels of mutual dependence, including that which is highly asymmetrical. Sensitivity refers to the ability of an actor to respond to a policy change made by a state with which it has interaction in a particular regime, or area of interaction, and the amount of time which is required to implement that response. If the actor is able to respond very quickly then it is said to be sensitive. If the actor is unable to respond, or is able to respond only with a great deal of effort over an extended period of time, it is said to be vulnerable. These concepts are further elaborated in Chapter 2.

Three limitations of this study must be noted before proceeding. First, due to a lack of access to primary sources, no new materials are being presented.<sup>6</sup> Second, other regional and international actors, although often very important, are only considered when they are necessary to provide further insight into the relationship being studied. Finally, with the election of President F.W. DeKlerk in South Africa it appears that a new era of South African domestic and foreign policy-making has begun. DeKlerk has initiated new policy directions which seem to signal a willingness to work towards ending apartheid and also to reduce tensions in relations with neighbouring states, including Zimbabwe. While the nature of the relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe is changing as a result of this new orientation, this thesis covers relations until 1989 only. It is recognized that the rapid transformations taking place within the region, and the new evidence emerging on the direction that they may take, challenge some of the arguments presented in this analysis. However examination of these changes and their implications for future relations are beyond the scope of this thesis.

The format of this thesis is as follows. The first chapter outlines the two theoretical frameworks which are being employed: those of dependency and interdependency. Briefly, dependency is understood to mean a condition in which the foreign and domestic politics and economics

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<sup>6</sup>Very little primary source material is available. The South African government does not publish detailed trade statistics with its African trading partners and statistics for Rhodesia's trade with South Africa between 1965 and 1980 are incomplete making analysis difficult. In an attempt to acquire information from the Zimbabwean embassy on Zimbabwe's relations with South Africa, I was told that the government there has no stated foreign policy position as it does not exchange embassies with the South African government. Other requests for information from the Zimbabwean embassy would have required more time than was available for completing this thesis. Where possible, government statistical sources and Hansard have been consulted. Where secondary sources present conflicting details of specific events, newspaper accounts in the Times (London) and the New York Times, which are assumed to be accurate, have been consulted to determine the exact details.

of one state (the weaker or peripheral state) are conditioned by the strategies of the dominant (or centre) state.<sup>1</sup> The definition of interdependency employed is that of R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye who define it as "mutual dependence."<sup>8</sup> In other words, policies and activities of one actor affect those of another, and vice versa. Moreover, this interdependence between actors can be unequal or asymmetrical. The chapter also examines the main body of literature dealing with southern Africa. These works are generally divided into the two schools of thought discussed above, with no attempt being made by the authors to integrate these frameworks.

The second chapter presents a historical survey of relations between the two countries from the establishment of Rhodesia in 1890 up to its independence as Zimbabwe in 1980.<sup>9</sup> This period is divided into several phases each representing the major changes in policy as determined by the changing regional and international setting. Thus, it examines the early colonial history of Rhodesia, the era between the establishment of Rhodesian self-government in 1923 until its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, the first period of UDI up to the Portuguese coup in 1974, the shift of Rhodesian dependence from Great Britain to South Africa during UDI, and the final six years until its independence and the formation of Zimbabwe in 1980. Throughout the discussion it is evident

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<sup>1</sup>Raúl Prebisch, "The Dynamics of Peripheral Capitalism," in Louis Lefebvre and Liisal North, eds., *Democracy and Development in Latin America* No. 1 (Toronto: Studies on the Political Economy, Society and Culture of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1980) p. 25. In Ronald H. Chilcote, *Theories of Development and Underdevelopment* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1984), p. 25.

<sup>8</sup>Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), p. 8.

<sup>9</sup>Zimbabwe refers to the state that was formed in 1980. Prior to that date, Rhodesia will be used to refer to the political unit which was known as Southern Rhodesia from 1890-1963, Rhodesia from 1964-1978, and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia from 1978-1980.



that the dependency perspective provides the most accurate understanding of the historical development of this relationship.

The third chapter builds on the themes developed in the previous section in attempting to understand relations between the two governments in the post-1980 period. A brief examination of the regional setting into which Zimbabwe emerged is followed by a detailed study of the economic (investment, trade and transportation) and political ties between Zimbabwe and South Africa. The analysis begins with the investment relationship between the two states in which Zimbabwe exhibits a high degree of dependency on South Africa. Relations in the areas of trade and transportation, however, are found to be more characteristic of interdependency than dependency. Finally, examination of political relations confirms that each state is sensitive to policies made in the other which implies mutual dependence or interdependence. Thus, overall the relationship between Zimbabwe and South Africa is found to exhibit the qualities necessary for both dependency and interdependency analysis.

The conclusion reexamines the themes discussed in the preceding chapters and speculates on the future of relations between the two states. The region is currently undergoing a period of revolutionary change with domestic transformation within South Africa being reflected in new regional and international policies. However, there is a great deal of continuity in South African policy-making, and the pattern of past relations between it and its northern neighbour holds a key to understanding future relations, whatever the outcome of the struggle within South Africa.

## CHAPTER 2

### **Dependency versus Interdependency in Southern Africa**

*A review of the literature*

Since 1968 two main perspectives have been presented in the literature on southern Africa: dependency and interdependency. Although both views have been treated as mutually exclusive explanations of the existing political and economic regional interactions by authors and observers, neither theory, upon closer examination, offers an adequate explanation of these relationships. This section will examine dependency and interdependency, as well as representative works which utilize these frameworks for their analysis of southern Africa in general, and the relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe in particular, to demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of these theories. Furthermore, this chapter will establish the necessity of a study which integrates dependency and interdependency as examined in the following chapters. This chapter is divided into four sections: the first examines dependency; the second looks at dependency in the literature on southern Africa; the third discusses interdependency; and the final section deals with the literature on interdependency in southern Africa.

## DEPENDENCY THEORY

The basic argument of the dependency school emerged from the work of Latin American scholars in the mid to late 1960s.<sup>1</sup> It was heralded as a major breakthrough in the study of underdevelopment, which to that point had been dominated by the eurocentric modernization theory.<sup>2</sup> The modernization paradigm was first developed to explain the economic development and growth of the western capitalist economies. It was based on the concept that underdevelopment was basically the result of a shortage of capital which was necessary to set off the process of capital accumulation and development.<sup>3</sup> Walt Rostow claimed that development was a logical progression through five stages--the traditional society; the pre take-off stage; take-off; the road to maturity; and the society of mass consumption--and in order to begin the process, a traditional society had to be pushed into the pre take-off stage where the prerequisites for growth were established.<sup>4</sup> In addition, the modernization theorists made distinctions between 'modern' and 'traditional' societies with the implication that the former was better than the latter.<sup>5</sup>

When modernization theory was applied to the underdeveloped countries, it became evident that the facts of underdevelopment differed

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<sup>1</sup> See for example: Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967); Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development, translated by Marjory Mattingley Urquidí (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

<sup>2</sup> Magnus Blomström and Björn Hettne, Development Theory in Transition. The Dependency Debate and Beyond: Third World Responses (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1984) p. 27.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>4</sup> Walt Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-communist Manifesto (Cambridge: University Press, 1962).

<sup>5</sup> Examples of the major works within the modernization paradigm include, Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964) and Rostow, Stages of Growth.

considerably from the theoretical assumptions. The underdeveloped countries appeared to be unable to reach the "pre take-off stage" not because they were too 'traditional' but because the western economic model was not applicable to their societies and they were involved in an international economic order the structures of which hindered their development. Thus, a new school, referred to as dependency, emerged to explain the position of the underdeveloped countries in the international economic system, and how they got to that position. Initially their analysis focused specifically on Latin America.

Scholars such as F. Cardoso and A. Frank attempted to explain the underdevelopment of Latin America in terms of the historical legacy left by colonialism and neo-colonialism.<sup>6</sup> Colonialism was defined as the period during which the European expansion forcibly integrated the areas which now make up the states of the Third World into the European economies. These regions became producers of raw materials and commodities which were the primary inputs for the industrial structure of western Europe. With the demise of the colonial empires following the Second World War, direct colonialism was replaced by neo-colonialism which perpetuated the domination of the Third World through indirect means such as multinational corporations, bilateral and multilateral aid and the establishment of military bases.<sup>7</sup> Dependency theorists argue that despite the formal independence of the underdeveloped states, they continued to be dominated by Europe because the developing countries were relegated to economic relationships

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<sup>6</sup>Cardoso and Faletto, Dependency and Development; Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

in which they acted as suppliers of raw materials for manufactured goods produced in the developed states. Thus, the developed economies expanded at the expense of Third World economies. In sum, the fundamental position of the dependency perspective as outlined by Latin American authors, is that the international order is such that "a certain number of countries have their economies conditioned by the development and expansion of another...placing the dependent countries in a backward position exploited by the dominant countries."<sup>8</sup>

#### DEPENDENCY AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

The dependency theory was quickly appropriated by scholars examining other Third World areas, and a tremendous body of literature emerged which demonstrated that the industrial capitalist countries were responsible, in large part, for the lack of development and economic growth in all peripheral areas, not just Latin America.<sup>9</sup> Scholars of southern Africa applied this view to their studies, and concluded that South Africa was the regional representative of western capitalism and the dominant centre which exploited its dependent, economically weak neighbours.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, "Modernization and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Latin American Underdevelopment," *Comparative Politics* (July 1978), p. 544. Raúl Prebisch also offers a comprehensive definition of dependency: "By dependence I mean relations between centres and the periphery whereby a country is subjected to decisions taken in the centres, not only in economic matters, but also in matters of politics and strategy for domestic and foreign policies. The consequence is that due to exterior pressure the country cannot decide autonomously what it should do or cease doing." Prebisch, "The Dynamics of Peripheral Capitalism," in Louis Lefebvre and Liisal North, eds., *Democracy and Development in Latin America*, No. 1 (Toronto: Studies on the Political Economy, Society and Culture of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1980) p. 25. Quoted in Ronald H. Chilcote, *Theories of Development and Underdevelopment* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), p. 25.

<sup>9</sup>See for example, Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973).

<sup>10</sup>Samir Amin, Derrick Chitala and Ibbo Mandaza, eds., *SADCC Prospects for Disengagement and Development in Southern Africa* (London: Zed Books, Ltd., 1987).

It is traditionally assumed that Zimbabwe, although not as economically depressed as other southern African states, is dependent upon South Africa for its continued economic well-being.<sup>11</sup> Analysts of the dependency perspective explain Zimbabwe's political instability and economic underdevelopment in terms of the colonial inheritance. In other words, it is suggested that the imperial powers which had colonized the region, Great Britain and Portugal, manipulated the southern African regional economy and created a situation in which the South African state could economically dominate its neighbours, including Zimbabwe.<sup>12</sup> These artificially developed economic ties still exist and South Africa continues to exploit its dominant position *vis-à-vis* its northern neighbour through military and economic destabilization. Although, as shown below, acknowledgement is made by dependency theorists that there is a degree of interdependence between the two countries, this is thought to be highly one-sided and tending to work against Zimbabwean interests. In contrast, this thesis demonstrates that the relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe is best understood from a perspective of interdependence which emphasizes a mutual dependence, albeit an asymmetrical one. At the same time, the historical insights offered by dependency theory are also acknowledged.

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<sup>11</sup>Larry W. Bowman, Michael Bratton and Rukudo Murapa, "Zimbabwe and South Africa: Dependency, Destabilization and Liberation." In South Africa in Southern Africa: The Intensifying Vortex of Violence, ed. Thomas M. Callaghy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), pp. 323-354; Jeffrey Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Colin Stoneman, ed, Zimbabwe's Inheritance (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981).

<sup>12</sup>The two main imperial powers in southern Africa, Great Britain and Portugal, left a lasting impression on their respective colonies which have characterized relations within the region even since decolonization took place. The activities of both states influenced Zimbabwe's own struggle for independence and the outcome of that struggle. This will be elaborated on in Chapter 2.

The application of the dependency perspective to the study of southern Africa was first done by Larry Bowman.<sup>13</sup> It was his goal to identify the interrelations between the southern African states in order to demonstrate the importance of such relations for understanding and evaluating regional politics. In his paper, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa", Bowman presents the hypothesis that southern Africa represents a region of states which functions outside of the primary global power blocs, and must be analysed and understood in terms of the relations between regional states.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, Bowman emphasizes the role of South Africa and claims that its economic domination of the region is the "overwhelming structural characteristic" which unifies the region.<sup>15</sup> With respect to Zimbabwe, Bowman admits that prior to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence Zimbabwe had close, but not fully dependent, economic ties with South Africa.<sup>16</sup> However, he asserts the events of 1965 completely changed this relationship and made Zimbabwe "absolutely beholden" to South Africa for its very survival.<sup>17</sup>

Prior to Bowman's analysis, very little work had been done on southern Africa as a unit.<sup>18</sup> However, this soon changed as scholars

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<sup>13</sup>Larry Bowman, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa," *International Quarterly* 12, 3 (September 1968), pp. 231-61.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 231.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 238.

<sup>16</sup>On November 11, 1965 the government of Rhodesia lead by Prime Minister Ian Smith unilaterally declared independence from Great Britain. This declaration was viewed as illegal by the British government and immediately condemned by the international community which then imposed economic sanctions upon the Smith government. For further elaboration of this event and its implications for relations between Rhodesia and South Africa, see Chapter 3, pages 43 to 47 below.

<sup>17</sup>Bowman, "Subordinate State System", p. 242.

<sup>18</sup>Any analysis which had been done, examined the region in the context of the roles of the imperial powers within it. See for example Colin Leys, *European Politics in Southern Rhodesia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959). The lack of unified regional analysis prior to his writing is one of Bowman's chief complaints. He observes that "[t]he study of Southern African politics has always been fragmented because of the differing histories of the various countries and the wide variety of constitutional and legal forms under which they have been governed." He then sets out to establish a framework in which analysis of regional interrelations could be carried out. Bowman, "Subordinate State System," pp. 231-234.

adopted Bowman's concept of sub-system analysis in the face of revolutionary political developments within the region, such as the decolonization of Angola and Mozambique. As a consequence of increasing political instability within the region, resulting from the inability of the new governments in Angola and Mozambique to consolidate their power and the continued guerilla struggle within Zimbabwe, South Africa's dominant role attracted greater international scholarly attention. The focus of the new studies was South African policy responses to the changing regional situation, and the reaction these policies engendered within the neighbouring states. In sum, the concentration of scholars was with the overwhelming dependency of the region on South Africa.

In the late-1970s and early 1980s it became apparent that previously established economic ties within southern Africa allowed South Africa to employ a policy of destabilization against its neighbours.<sup>19</sup> Destabilization, critics suggest, is both a reinforcement to and a result of dependency. One of the most outspoken critics of destabilization, working within the dependency framework, is Joseph Hanlon. In two of his recent books, Apartheid's Second Front and Beggar Your Neighbours, Hanlon recounts, in considerable detail, the policy of destabilization employed by South Africa against its neighbours, and details how dependent economic linkages facilitate that destabilization.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>Destabilization refers to military and economic measures employed by South Africa, against neighbouring states, which cause political and economic insecurity within the affected states. A very good analysis of the consequences of destabilization for southern African states was done by Robert Davis and Dan O'Meara in their "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy Since 1978," Journal of Southern African Studies, 11, 2 (April 1985), pp. 183-211.

<sup>20</sup>Joseph Hanlon, Apartheid's Second Front: South Africa's war against its neighbours (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1986) and Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1986).



In Apartheid's Second Front Hanlon examines the process of destabilization on a regional level. The causes of destabilization are rooted in the threat to apartheid felt by the South African government on the home front.<sup>21</sup> Denying that internal unrest is a result of apartheid policies, the government looks toward external factors and blames African nationalism and communist infiltration in neighbouring states for the problems at home. Through destabilization the government believes it is able to mitigate these external threats.<sup>22</sup> Specific reference to Zimbabwe is limited in Hanlon's work. However, he does argue that South African participation in the Zimbabwean independence struggle and the destabilization campaign launched against Zimbabwe in 1981 were largely responsible for the economic chaos and political instability within Zimbabwe.<sup>23</sup> Hanlon considers South Africa to have played a major role in assisting the Smith regime to maintain control during the UDI period. In addition, South African influence during the pre-independence negotiations is believed to be responsible for Smith's appearance at the bargaining table.

The story which Hanlon tells is interesting as a narrative of dramatic events, however, his analysis is weak. He fails to come to terms with the fact that South African destabilization activity is often contradictory and harmful to its own interests, as will be discussed in chapter four. Moreover, he does not indicate or analyse the factors which set off the campaign against Zimbabwe by South Africa.

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<sup>21</sup>Hanlon, Apartheid's Second Front, pp. 13-19.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 96.

Beggar Your Neighbours is a much stronger appraisal of the dynamics of relations between South Africa and its neighbours. In it Hanlon elaborates on the evidence of South African military activities and economic sabotage which he presented in Apartheid's Second Front. In doing so, he attempts to show how the dependence of regional states upon South Africa facilitates the South African government's primary goal of defending its apartheid system. Hanlon outlines four goals of his study, but the most important one for this analysis is his intention to prove that South Africa deliberately undermines the stability of its neighbours and vigorously reinforces their dependence.<sup>24</sup> The evidence which Hanlon presents clearly demonstrates the aggressive behaviour of the South African government against its neighbours. Nevertheless, his analysis is inadequate for a complete understanding of regional relations with South Africa because he neither examines the consequences that economic ties with the region have for South Africa, nor does he account for the importance which political ties, or lack of them, hold for South African policy-makers. Moreover, by seeking to demonstrate that the southern African states are helplessly dependent upon South Africa, Hanlon inadvertently supports the South African view which he is attempting to discredit.<sup>25</sup> That is, he lends credence to the South African claim that because of the southern African states' dependence on it, international sanctions against South Africa will be harmful to these states also.

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<sup>24</sup>Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, p. 4.

<sup>25</sup>South African propaganda often points to the dependence of the region upon it when attempting to deter international sanctions and diffuse anti-South Africa sentiment in the West. South Africa Mainstay of Southern Africa published by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs in 1985 is a prime example of this attitude.

Phyllis Johnson and David Martin's edited volume Frontline Southern Africa, also takes the view that South Africa is the primary beneficiary of relations in the region, and that it follows a policy of 'destructive engagement' to promote its advantage.<sup>26</sup> In accordance with Hanlon, the authors claim that apartheid is the underlying cause of South Africa's practice of destabilization, and that the policy is so destructive to its neighbours that the region has been embroiled in a perpetual state of war.<sup>27</sup> The purpose behind this strategy, according to the authors, "is to create and maintain a dependence that will be economically lucrative and politically submissive--and will serve as a bulwark against the imposition of sanctions."<sup>28</sup> Thus, South Africa's primary concern is the maintenance of apartheid, and the direction of destabilization activity outwards to protect the status quo.

In their chapter on Zimbabwe, Johnson and Martin do acknowledge some degree of interdependence between South Africa and Zimbabwe. They note that the South African government faces a dilemma in its policy-making towards Zimbabwe which is the result of South Africa's vulnerability to the security, trade, and business policies of other southern African states, particularly Zimbabwe.<sup>29</sup> However, like Hanlon, this aspect is underemphasized by the authors as attention is directed primarily toward activities undertaken by the South African government which are designed to foster South African aims and interests.

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<sup>26</sup>'Destructive engagement' is the term utilized by Johnson and Martin when referring to destabilization. See Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, eds., Frontline Southern Africa: Destructive Engagement (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1988).

<sup>27</sup>Johnson and Martin, "Introduction" in Frontline Southern Africa, p. xxi.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. xxi.

<sup>29</sup>Johnson and Martin, "Zimbabwe: Apartheid's Dilemma," in Frontline Southern Africa, p. 57.

The strength of Johnson and Martin's chapter is the substantial evidence they document with respect to South Africa's destabilization activities within Zimbabwe. Occasionally, however, the authors focus almost exclusively on description of the destabilization tactics and overlook the implications South African actions have for its relations with the region. That is, they do not examine how these policies affect South Africa itself. In addition, like other literature within the dependency perspective, the authors' extreme bias results in a severely one-sided presentation in which the source of all of Zimbabwe's problems is South African aggression.

Despite its dominance in the literature on underdevelopment the dependency framework proved limited in its explanatory capacity. For example, although it was possible through the use of dependency theory to explain the backward economic situation of emerging independent states, the proponents of dependency failed to formulate development strategies which would effectively reduce dependency ties, and thereby promote economic growth.

#### **INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY**

In light of the limitations of the dependency theory, a separate line of argument was introduced. It examined relations between states with reference to what was termed interdependency. Interdependency was defined as "mutual dependence" by its main proponents.<sup>30</sup> Mutual dependence exists when interactions between actors, state and non-state, involve

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<sup>30</sup>Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977).

reciprocal costs and benefits for all parties involved in transactions which take place under conditions of reduced autonomy. Reduced autonomy results from constraints on attempts to achieve goals in one area of power, for example either political, economic, or military, by exerting pressure from another area.<sup>31</sup> Two leading interdependence theorists, R. Keohane and J.S. Nye, concede that no relationship exhibits pure interdependence. However, they note that pure dependency does not exist either for relations between actors display various levels of interdependence which may vary over time and with different issue areas.<sup>32</sup>

Keohane and Nye indicate that most interdependence is asymmetrical, or that interactions between interdependent partners in one issue area, such as trade, tends to favour one partner over another. The analysis of asymmetrical interdependence is further broken down by these scholars into "sensitivity" and "vulnerability" interdependence. The former refers to the speed of responsiveness by one partner to policy changes within another and the costliness of those policy responses within the affected partner.<sup>33</sup> The framework within which interaction between actors occurs is assumed to remain constant and is measured over a short period of time. Alternately, vulnerability assumes the possibility of a changing framework, measures policy changes over the long term, and assesses the susceptibility of an actor to suffer continued externally imposed costs even though internal policies have been adjusted.<sup>34</sup> The application of these concepts

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<sup>31</sup>Ibid., pp. 8-9.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.. An issue area refers to a specific area of interaction, for example, trade.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

to the relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe reveals that each country is sensitive to changes within the other and within the region, and that although Zimbabwe is vulnerable to policy changes within South Africa, the reverse does not seem to be the case. However, the evidence of South African sensitivity is adequate to challenge the dependency analysis.

#### INTERDEPENDENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Although interdependency was first presented in the mid-1970s, it was not considered applicable to the study of southern Africa until the late 1980s. Scholars began to re-examine the regional political, economic, and military dynamics in the context of interdependency.<sup>35</sup> They criticized the overwhelming emphasis previously placed on the dependency of the region upon South Africa. Dependency analysis was criticized for postulating that the failure of attempts by the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)<sup>36</sup> to break dependent ties proved the total dependence of SADCC members upon South Africa; interdependency theorists interpreted this failure as demonstrating that the benefits of dependency ties accrued to SADCC states and the costs incurred by South Africa as a result of reduction of such ties were greater than previously believed.

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<sup>35</sup>Ronald T. Libby, *The Politics of Economic Power in Southern Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

<sup>36</sup>The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was established by Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe on April 1, 1980. Its primary goals were to increase economic ties between member states while reducing dependence upon South Africa and the international economic system.

The relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe exemplifies the utility of the interdependency analysis of regional relations. The interdependency perspective does not reject the view that Zimbabwe is economically linked with South Africa and that it is a victim of destabilization activities. However, this view is balanced by the claim that South Africa depends upon those links, and others within the region, and is not able to unilaterally control policy-making in Zimbabwe. Interdependency theory points to the mutual benefits accrued by both parties, and notes that South Africa is also sensitive to Zimbabwean manipulation. Furthermore, interdependency theorists examine the alleged relationship between economic and military pressures on the one hand, and political influence on the other. The dependency argument indicates a strong causal link between the former and the latter, thereby indicating that South African economic and military pressures strongly influence the Zimbabwean political decision-making process. The interdependency perspective, however, finds such linkage tenuous and argues that political decisions, while not immune to the influence of economic or military pressures, are not wholly determined by them as the dependency view claims.

In 1987, Ronald Libby presented an interdependency analysis of southern Africa in his book The Politics of Economic Power in Southern Africa.<sup>37</sup> Libby's main assumption is that the region exhibits economic interdependence with, not unilateral dependence upon, the dominant regional economy, that of South Africa. Furthermore, he argues "that

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<sup>37</sup>Libby, Politics of Economic Power.

every state in the region--including South Africa--is to some degree able to manipulate regional economic ties to serve its own domestic and foreign policy objectives and at the same time is itself affected by these changes."<sup>38</sup> Libby's primary criticism of the dependency approach is that while it recognizes South Africa's strength and resilience in the face of international ostracism, its "uncritical application...has tended to stultify political analysis of the region."<sup>39</sup> Moreover, studies of the region which focused upon South African hegemony took little notice of how regional ties negatively affect the Republic. Within the dependency framework, the main prescription for the region is that of loosening ties or, preferably, completely disengaging links with South Africa. Libby believes that such a goal is "utopian"; the accomplishment of such an end is both impossible and undesirable.<sup>40</sup>

With respect to Zimbabwe, traditional scholarship has emphasized the political influence that South Africa exercised over this country as a consequence of its economic domination of the Zimbabwean economy. South Africa is thought to have exerted overwhelming influence over the Smith government, particularly during UDI. However, such an evaluation is challenged by the fact that Smith was a very independent actor who often frustrated the South African leadership.<sup>41</sup> For example, despite intense South African pressures on him, Smith continually refused to agree to

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<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 11.



conditions imposed by Great Britain for the granting of independence to Rhodesia.

Libby offers an alternative perspective which places Zimbabwe in a regional context in which South Africa is an important, but not the only, factor in Zimbabwean policy-making. He presents Zimbabwe as holding a regional economic position similar to that of South Africa in that both states hold a trade surplus with regional trading partners (with the exception of trade between Zimbabwe and South Africa which is dominated by the latter).<sup>42</sup> Libby also notes that Zimbabwe, like South Africa, produces agricultural surpluses of maize and other foodstuffs which are exported to regional states which have become dependent upon these food supplies.<sup>43</sup> By demonstrating that Zimbabwe plays a regional role which competes against that played by South Africa, Libby reveals that strict dependency analysis cannot account for the dominant economic role Zimbabwe plays in the region. Moreover, by presenting Zimbabwe as a competitor to South African dominance, he raises the possibility that South Africa is sensitive, and conceivably vulnerable, to policy changes within Zimbabwe.<sup>44</sup> Such a postulate further challenges dependency assumptions, and lends greater credence to interdependency analysis.

There are both strengths and weaknesses in The Politics of Economic Power. Libby's analysis of southern African relations provides a refreshing alternative to dependency analysis because he elucidates

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<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., pp. 15-16.

previously neglected characteristics of the regional relations. The exploration of these factors proves that a new investigation of regional relations is necessary since dependency evaluations are insufficient to explain some of the new findings. One criticism which may be made, however, is that in Libby's enthusiasm to present the interdependency view, he avoids discussion of the very real and destructive effects of South African sponsored violence in Zimbabwe. Although it was clearly not his intent to examine the evidence of this activity, consideration of destabilization activity within the interdependency argument could only have strengthened his position.

Libby is not the only scholar who is beginning to point out South Africa's interdependence with, rather than dominance of, the region. Susanna Smith indicates that investment and trade with the region is crucial to the South African economy, particularly given the fact that South Africa is subject to international sanctions and faces increasing Western trade protectionism.<sup>45</sup> Stephen Lewis notes that southern Africa is strategically, economically and financially important for South Africa, and he states that "[w]hile South Africa is undoubtedly a dominant partner in many respects, it benefits substantially from its economic relationships with the SADCC states."<sup>46</sup> Thus, he believes that interdependence is a much more accurate description of the relationships in the region.<sup>47</sup> Richard Payne agrees that South African economic dominance is overemphasized as it is also reliant on states in the region, and therefore, vulnerable to any

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<sup>45</sup>Susanna Smith, *Frontline Africa: The Right to A Future* (Oxford: Oxfam 1990), p. 123.

<sup>46</sup>Stephen R. Lewis, Jr., *The Economics of Apartheid* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990), p. 89-90.

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*

sanctions it uses against them.<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, he argues that South Africa's ability to use the sanctions weapon on goods or transportation is limited to the extent that South Africa's continued industrial growth is determined by its neighbours' abilities to purchase South African products and to use its transportation routes.<sup>49</sup> Therefore, there is a degree of dependence which South Africa exhibits on its neighbours limiting its range of activities against these neighbours. A new analysis of the region, which takes into account South Africa's interdependence with its southern African neighbours, is necessary before a complete understanding of the interaction between states is possible.

#### CONCLUSION

Both the dependency and interdependency perspectives have much to offer for the analysis of relations between states in southern Africa, however, neither on its own is sufficient for a complete understanding of the region. The dependency perspective is generally preferred by most scholars as it is backed up by a considerable volume of evidence. However, most of its advocates tend to present only one side of the picture. Zimbabwe is regarded to be a merely reactive state which responds primarily to South African initiatives. When Zimbabwe's reaction does not fit the perceived South African objectives, Zimbabwe is congratulated for fending off the aggressor. However, when Zimbabwe appears to act in the way South Africa desires, dependency ties are blamed and it is

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<sup>48</sup>Richard J. Payne, *The Nonsuperpowers and South Africa: Implications for U.S. Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 214.

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 216. The potential for the SADCC states, particularly Zimbabwe, to redirect its trade traffic through other non-South Africa routes is often pointed to as a primary reason for destabilization activity in Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

believed that Zimbabwe did not have an alternative course of action. This clearly is a very narrow reading of the complex interaction which is taking place between two independent states each pursuing their own best interests.

Although the interdependence view presents an alternative framework for analysis of southern Africa which is necessary to formulate a complete understanding of regional economic and political relations, it is also insufficient for a comprehensive explanation. The fact that regional states are highly dependent upon South African markets and investment for economic growth, and that South Africa's transportation network plays a vital role in linking regional economies with external markets, must be realized for a complete understanding. Although these dependency ties cannot be overlooked, proponents of interdependency often do so. Advocates of the interdependence paradigm also encounter some practical methodological difficulties. Interdependency also suffers from a lack of obtainable new evidence. The South African government has effectively obscured politically sensitive statistical evidence on trade and investment which would prove South Africa's dependence upon the region. In addition, the complexity of the policy-making network in South Africa makes it difficult to discover links between South African policy-makers and those of neighbouring states.

Having outlined the strengths and weaknesses of the dependency and interdependency theories as applied to southern Africa, it has become evident that a new analysis which takes into account aspects of both

perspectives is necessary. This thesis contributes to this reevaluation at a micro-regional level by examining the relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa. The relationship between these two countries may be used as a barometer measuring changes in the regional situation, and in the relations between South Africa and the southern African region as a whole. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, the relationship between Zimbabwe and South Africa exhibits characteristics of both dependency and interdependency. The final conclusion which must be drawn is that only a conjunctive analysis applying both perspectives of inter-state relations can effectively explain the relationship between these two states.

## CHAPTER 3

### **A Historical Review of Relations Between South Africa and Zimbabwe**

Present relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe reflect the legacy left during the colonial period, and the pattern of interaction established prior to the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980. A brief survey of the period between 1890, the year Rhodesia was founded, and 1980 strongly supports the application of the dependency analytical framework to the study of the development of relations between South Africa and Rhodesia. In each major era of Rhodesia's history, South Africa played a conspicuous, and occasionally a decisive role in Rhodesia's political and economic development. South Africa influenced the establishment and formation of Rhodesia prior to 1890 until 1923, influenced Rhodesia's economic development during the ninety years of its existence, and impelled the Rhodesian government to transfer power to the black majority to allow the country's independence in 1980. Furthermore, domestic affairs in Rhodesia mirrored policy-making in South Africa, particularly with respect to the domination by the minority white ruling elites in the political and economic arenas of both countries. Finally, linkages were established between the two states in the areas of investment, trade and transportation. The dominant position held by South Africa within these areas is the

central focus of dependency analysis since with the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, Rhodesia became even more dependent upon South Africa.<sup>1</sup> Dependency analysis, therefore, provides the best framework for understanding relations between the two states prior to 1980.

### EARLY HISTORY UNTIL 1923

The history of the European presence in southern Africa began with the discovery of the Cape sea route by Portuguese explorers in the fifteenth century.<sup>2</sup> It was not until 1652, however, that a permanent white settlement was established at the Fort de Goede Hoop by the Dutch East India company. The Company had little interest in governing the settlement or in promoting its expansion. Nevertheless, the original Dutch settlement grew very quickly through immigration and natural increase. Crowded conditions, which ensued as settlers adopted pastoralism and became farmers, caused many of the farmers, or Boers,<sup>3</sup> to move into the interior of the continent.

As the Boers spread out from the Cape they came into greater contact with the African populations in the area. Initial contacts with the

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<sup>1</sup>Rhodesia, as a colony of Great Britain, was fairly dependent upon the British market and upon British inputs. However, its political autonomy and peripheral position in the British Empire lessened Rhodesia's dependence upon Britain as compared with other British colonies such as Zambia.

<sup>2</sup>The historical background information was compiled from the following sources: Donald Denoon, Southern Africa since 1800 (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1972); John E. Flint, ed., The Cambridge History of Africa, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); L.H. Gann, A History of Southern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1934 (London: Chatto and Windus, 1965); C.F.S. Muller, ed., Five Hundred Years: A History of South Africa (Pretoria: H&R Academia, 1969); A.J. Wills, An Introduction to the History of Central Africa: Zambia, Malawi, and Zimbabwe, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985); Moura Wilson and Leonard Thompson, eds., The Oxford History of South Africa, vol. 1: South Africa to 1870 (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).

<sup>3</sup>The Boers were Afrikaners, a new ethnic group which emerged in southern Africa, spoke Afrikaans (a derivation of Dutch), and became the dominant white group in South Africa.

Khoi, San and Xhosa people in the coastal areas were friendly, however, relations between the European and indigenous peoples soon dissolved as a result of different cultural expectations and values. Moreover, the Afrikaners developed attitudes of racial superiority which were reinforced with the importation of slaves for farm labour, and all Africans came to be seen as "an alien feeble community, deficient in technology, military strength and the attributes of western civilization."<sup>4</sup> Despite evidence to the contrary, these racial attitudes characterized all interaction with the blacks, and was institutionalized in the establishment of the apartheid system in the early 1900s.

British influence in southern Africa began in earnest in the late 1700s, and the end of the Napoleonic wars brought the Cape colony under permanent British rule in 1806. By this time a distinct Afrikaner culture had emerged, and Afrikaners saw themselves as a truly African people and the rightful occupants of the territory which comprised southern Africa.<sup>5</sup> They viewed the British as imperialists who threatened the Afrikaner way of life and position in Africa. Thus, British control resulted in a further movement of the Afrikaner population into the interior, which in turn increased conflict with the African tribes.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Donald Denoon, *Southern Africa since 1800*, p. 13.

<sup>5</sup>Colin Vale, "South Africa and Zimbabwe: Too Close for Comfort," *South Africa International*, vol. 12, no. 2 (October 1981) p. 360.

<sup>6</sup>Eric A. Walker gives a very interesting account of the African tribes in southern Africa, the conflict between them, and conflict with the Afrikaners in *A History of Southern Africa*, 3rd Ed. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957). A shorter more recent version is presented by Denoon in *Southern Africa since 1800*. The major Boer migration, known as the Great Trek, is chronicled in S. Patterson, *The Last Trek: A Study of the Boer People and the Afrikaner Nation* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957).



Initially, the British were content to remain along the coast and limited their activity in the interior of the continent. It was not until the mid-1800s that the British began an earnest quest for colonies in southern Africa. One of the primary catalysts for this movement was the discovery of mineral wealth in the northern part of South Africa and the belief that the area to the north, later known as Southern Rhodesia, was also rich in gold.<sup>1</sup> The quest north was led by Cecil Rhodes, a South African based British imperialist with a dream of British domination from "Cairo to the Cape" and a nose for economic gain.<sup>2</sup> In 1888, Rhodes' partner Charles Rudd convinced Lobenguela, the chief of the Ndebele tribe, to grant to the British in the Rudd concession, the mineral rights of his land known as Zambesia (which included all of Matabeleland up to the Zambezi river and Mashonaland). Rhodes was then granted the territory by the British government to be administered under the British South Africa Company.<sup>3</sup>

Beginning in 1890 Rhodesia, which was named after its founder, was governed by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) which had been created by Cecil Rhodes. The British were initially unenthusiastic about Rhodes' expansion into the interior of the continent. Nevertheless, the territory was colonized as a result of three factors: the "scramble for

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<sup>1</sup> Colin Leys, *European Politics in Southern Rhodesia*, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Arthur Keppel-Jones, *Rhodes and Rhodesia: The White Conquest of Zimbabwe 1884-1902* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983), pp. 25-26; Wills, *History of Central Africa*, pp. 124-25.

<sup>3</sup> L.H. Gann, *A History of Southern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1934*, pp. 74-83; D.M. Schreuder, *The Scramble for Southern Africa, 1877-1895: The Politics of Partition Reappraised* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980) pp. 219-226. For further elaboration of the people involved and the reasons behind the Rudd Concession and the establishment of southern Rhodesia consult Arthur Keppel-Jones, *Rhodes and Rhodesia*.

Africa" which was taking place at the end of the 1800s;<sup>10</sup> the discovery of mineral wealth in northern Transvaal which raised hopes of a similar discovery further north; and Rhodes' own imperialist dreams for British domination in Africa.<sup>11</sup> The hoped for mineral wealth never materialized, and Rhodes' dream was never fulfilled, but Rhodesia became important to the British for another reason--as a bulwark against Afrikaner expansionism.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the Afrikaners in South Africa were becoming a dominant force in the region and challenged Britain's influence. Moreover, the Afrikaners viewed British northward expansion as a threat to their self-determination and as an infringement on territory they believed was rightfully theirs. Tensions grew between the Afrikaner states and the British resulting in the Anglo-Boer War in 1899. The two Boer republics, the Transvaal and Orange Free State, were defeated by the British in 1902 and became colonies. However, within the next five years they were granted responsible government, and in 1910 they joined together with the Cape Colony and Natal to form the Union of South Africa.<sup>12</sup>

With the formation of the Union, British influence decreased dramatically. The Afrikaners had never accepted British rule and resented

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<sup>10</sup>The scramble for Africa generally refers to the division of Africa among the European powers which took place during the 1880s. Denoon, *Southern Africa since 1800*, p. 74.

<sup>11</sup>Herbert J. Spiro, "The Rhodesias and Nyasaland," in *Five African States: Responses to Diversity*, Gwendolen M. Carter, ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 365.

<sup>12</sup>Thomas Karis, "South Africa," in *Five African States: Responses to Diversity*, ed. Gwendolen M. Carter (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963) p. 475.

British interference in their relations with the indigenous people. Moreover, the goals of both states were completely different. South Africa was primarily concerned with national survival, while Great Britain was mainly interested in consolidating its empire for economic purposes. Yet with the formation of the Union, provision was left for the future incorporation of the British southern African possessions, the High Commission Territories and Rhodesia.<sup>13</sup>

#### THE RHODESIAN REFERENDUM AND SELF-GOVERNMENT

When the British South Africa Company's mandate expired in 1922, the British government decided that the future of Rhodesia would be determined through a referendum by the Rhodesian electorate. In keeping with colonial policies at the time, this electorate was comprised primarily of whites, although a few blacks did qualify--14,700 and 60 respectively.<sup>14</sup> Two options were presented in the referendum: (1) to become part of the Union of South Africa (the option favoured by both South Africa and Great Britain); or (2) to proceed to self-governing status with responsible government. The final vote was 5,989 for joining the Union, and 8,744 for responsible government.<sup>15</sup> Thus, on 1 October 1923 Southern Rhodesia was born after rejecting political union with its southern neighbour. In voting

<sup>13</sup>Denoon, *Southern Africa since 1800*, p. 110. The High Commission Territories included Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland were British Protectorates. The British assumed that they would eventually be incorporated into the Union of South Africa until the victory of the National Party and the imposition of *apartheid* in that country made such a move unacceptable to the indigenous people, the British and the international community. Jack Halpern, "Botswana--Recent History," *Africa South of the Sahara 1990* (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1989) p. 269.

<sup>14</sup>Howard Simson, *Zimbabwe: A Country Study*, Research Report no. 53 (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1979) p. 14. The minimum qualifications to be eligible to vote was "the ability to complete the application form, and the occupation of a house valued at £[150] or the receipt of an income of [one hundred] pounds a year." Wills, *History of Central Africa*, p. 206.

<sup>15</sup>Leys, *European Politics in Southern Rhodesia*, p. 13.

for responsible government, the new state of Rhodesia technically became a British colony, although constitutionally it was a 'self-governing' one. This meant that the British government maintained 'reserve powers', and could interfere in the internal politics of Rhodesia whenever it desired. However, the British rarely did this.

The decision for self-government by the Rhodesians was not necessarily a foregone conclusion given the similar racial attitudes in Rhodesia and South Africa, and the increasingly dominant position held by the latter in the Rhodesian economy. In Rhodesia similar attitudes towards the Africans existed, and legislative developments followed much the same path as in South Africa. The most obvious similarity was with regard to land distribution. In both Rhodesia and South Africa, the best land was reserved for white occupation and use, while the Africans were restricted to marginal, unproductive soil. This had the effect of creating a vast black labour force which could be employed at very low pay in unskilled positions in industry and mining.<sup>16</sup>

Three factors may be identified which undermined prospects for unification between South Africa and Rhodesia. First, the Rhodesians, who were primarily of British descent, were worried about losing their identity in a firmly established Afrikaner society in South Africa. Neither the settlers nor the British South Africa Company cherished the prospect of rule by the Afrikaners: "Rhodesians themselves, as their adverse vote in

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<sup>16</sup>Denoon, *Southern Africa since 1800*, p. 111; Roger Martin, *Southern Africa: The Price of Apartheid. A Political Risk Analysis*, Special Report No. 1130 (London: The Economic Intelligence Unit, 1988), p. 19.

the 1923 referendum made clear, looked with considerable misgivings on the prospects of closer political ties with what appeared to be an alien anti-British group."<sup>17</sup> Secondly, the Rhodesians were fearful of becoming a secondary province in the Union. Remaining independent of the Union would help the British population to maintain their identity and would allow separate economic and cultural development. Finally, "until perhaps the 1950s, there seemed to be no imminent risk of the Imperial Government failing to defend the settlers against African aspirations."<sup>18</sup> By the time it was realized that Africanisation was inevitable, "it was too late to establish links with the Union, and impossible to reverse the trends of the previous half century."<sup>19</sup>

The vote for self-government by the Rhodesians reflected the changing regional setting in southern Africa. Firstly, the results revealed the further demise of British influence in South Africa. Great Britain had hoped that the Rhodesians would approve union with South Africa since its population was primarily English speaking. Britain presumed that as such the Rhodesians would represent British interests in South Africa. As for the Rhodesians, the fact that they were English and wanted to protect their culture from being engulfed by Afrikaner nationalism was the primary concern which shaped their decision to opt for self-government.<sup>20</sup> Secondly, the referendum reflected British and Rhodesian fears of the increasing regional influence of South Africa. The fact that both the

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<sup>17</sup> J.E. Spence, "Tradition and Change in South African Foreign Policy," *Journal of Commonwealth and Political Studies* 1, 2 (May 1962), p. 138.

<sup>18</sup> Denoon, *Southern Africa since 1800*, p. 166.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, Africanisation refers to the acquisition of power and control of government by the indigenous black Africans.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 163.

British and Rhodesians were concerned about South African expansion and domination indicated that the largest state in southern Africa was a force which had to be respected. Finally, the outcome established the ambiguous relationship which characterized relations between South Africa and Rhodesia up to independence in 1980, and even to the present. Although the Rhodesians jealously guarded their political independence from South Africa, economic integration was not limited nor was the adoption of institutional arrangements based on South African models of racial separation and white domination.<sup>21</sup>

Although Rhodesia avoided becoming a formal adjunct of the South African state, it could not escape becoming a *de facto* province of its neighbour in economic terms. South African involvement in the Rhodesian economy was already very substantial by the time of the referendum, as a result of the activities of the South African based British South Africa Company which governed the territory until the referendum. In addition, from the beginning, Rhodesia's economy was trade oriented, and South Africa was an important partner, although not as important as it would become later. This early involvement by South Africa in the Rhodesian economy established the foundations of Rhodesia's later dependence on South Africa.

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<sup>21</sup>Larry Bowman, Michael Bratton and Rukudo Murapa, "Zimbabwe and South Africa: Dependency, Destabilization and Liberation," in Thomas M. Callaghy ed. *South Africa in Southern Africa: The Intensifying Vortex of Violence* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983) pp. 326-27.

**FROM SELF-GOVERNMENT TO ILLEGAL INDEPENDENCE, 1923-1965**

During the period between 1923 and the early 1960s, relations between the two countries appear to have been fairly stable and unremarkable. Economic interaction continued and South African investment held an important, although not dominant, position within the Rhodesian economy. Other events were transpiring at the international and regional levels, however, which shaped policy-making in Rhodesia and South Africa and influenced relations between the two countries in 1965 and the years that followed.

At the international level, the first wave of nationalism by non-whites in the colonized areas was taking hold and many colonial territories were gaining independence. The major colonial powers in Africa, such as Great Britain, France and Belgium, emerged from the Second World War considerably weakened and unable to continue administrating their colonial empires. This, combined with rising nationalism in the colonies, led to a gradual dismantling of these empires. The gaining of independence by India in 1949 and Ghana in 1957 provided the impetus and encouragement for the emergence of independence groups in many Africa territories, and within the twenty years following the war, many of them had gained independence.

In both South Africa and Rhodesia, white nationalism was gaining strength as was demonstrated by the first election victory of the Afrikaner National Party (ANP) under Dr. Daniel Malan in 1948 in South Africa, and

the consolidation of power under Dr. Godfrey Huggins, leader of the governing United Party in Rhodesia.<sup>22</sup> Under Dr. Malan, the government legalized the policy of apartheid. This policy, which literally meant 'apartness', had been a feature of South Africa's domestic policies since the 1913 Native Lands Act, and was characterized by the segregation of whites and blacks. However, under the ANP, apartheid was entrenched through legislation such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949, and the Population Registration Act in 1950.<sup>23</sup> The idea of apartheid was further consolidated by Prime Minister Hendrick Verwoerd, who articulated the ideology of 'aparte ontwikkeling' (separate development).<sup>24</sup> In theory, this meant that blacks and whites would follow their own paths for political and economic development, but in practice it meant that whites would develop at the expense of the blacks.

In Rhodesia, the United Party followed a similar policy called the 'double pyramid'. This policy was entrenched by the Land Apportionment Act of 1931, the Industrial Conciliation Act (1934), the Native Registration Act (1936), and the Native Passes Act (1937).<sup>25</sup> Set against a background of increasing black power in Africa, the racist policies of the South African and Rhodesian governments did not foreshadow a promising future for the relations of these two countries with the rest of the continent.

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<sup>22</sup>Huggins formed the United Party in 1933 when disputes arose among members of the Reform Party which he was leader of over a new railways bill which appeared to favour the main companies in Rhodesia, namely BSAC and its subsidiaries. The primary aims of Huggins were to "intensify white immigration, widen the sector of secondary industry, and wrest from the Imperial Government as much further independence as was possible short of dominion status." Furthermore, he perceived the European society in Rhodesia to be a white "island in a sea of black," and intended that it remain so. Wills, *History of Central Africa*, pp. 254-55.

<sup>23</sup>T.R.H. Davenport, *South Africa: A Modern History*, 3rd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), pp. 361-3.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 375.

<sup>25</sup>Wills, *History of Central Africa*, pp. 253-54.



In both South Africa and Rhodesia the rapid decolonization of Africa was viewed with a great deal of concern and posed a considerable policy dilemma. In South Africa, the Afrikaners were uncomfortable with the myriad of black states emerging to the north and apprehensive of the effects this might have on black nationalist movements within South Africa. The main goal of the ANP government, therefore, was to strengthen white control within South Africa, to increase South African influence throughout the rest of Africa, and to carve out a sphere of influence in which South Africa would assert a leadership role.<sup>26</sup> More specifically, South African policy-makers had three central objectives during the 1950s and early 1960s which were:

1. The maintenance of friendly relations with other African territories.
2. The search for status in the British Empire and Commonwealth.
3. The incorporation of the three High Commission territories: Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.<sup>27</sup>

The South African government was unable to achieve any of these objectives.

The first objective failed because the new states of Africa had struggled to free themselves from white oppression and were not amicable towards a white dominated country.<sup>28</sup> In 1961 South Africa's search for status in the Commonwealth ended when it was forced to withdraw as a result of pressure from the increasing number of black states within the organization. Finally, the High Commission territories of Basutoland,

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<sup>26</sup>James Barber and John Barratt, *South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security 1945-1988* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) pp. 18-19, 115.

<sup>27</sup>J.E. Spence, "Tradition and Change," p. 136.

<sup>28</sup>South Africa was soundly condemned for its racist policies by the Organization of African Unity, formed in 1963. In addition, most African states, with the exception of Malawi, cut official diplomatic ties with South Africa.

Bechuanaland and Swaziland became the independent states of Lesotho in 1966, Botswana (1966) and Swaziland (1968).

With the failure of these policy objectives, the necessity of readjusting its foreign policy focus became evident to the South African government. The articulation of the new policy had two aspects--political and economic. The primary political concern was the maintenance of a white buffer zone, or *cordon sanitaire*, which separated South Africa from the march of black nationalism.<sup>29</sup> The potential 'destructive' effects of this movement was made evident by the government's reaction to the internal crisis during the 1960s which saw violence in the black townships. Rather than see the black uprising in townships, such as Sharpeville, as rebellion against the imposed apartheid system, President Verwoerd blamed "subversive outside influences: liberalism, multiracialism, [and] communism," for the demonstrations which took place.<sup>30</sup> To counter these external influences, the South African government gave greater support to the white ruled Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, and to Rhodesia.

Economically, the South African government was interested in increasing trade ties with other states in southern Africa and the continent. South Africa had already cultivated close economic ties with its

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<sup>29</sup>The *cordon sanitaire* was comprised of Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies--Mozambique and Angola.

<sup>30</sup>Barber and Barratt, *South Africa's Foreign Policy*, p. 90. The Sharpeville demonstration was one of a number carried out by the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1960 as part of a campaign to protest against the 'pass laws' which regulated the movements of Africans within South Africa. This particular demonstration, which outraged international opinion, was marked by South African police shooting the unarmed crowd which had surrounded the station. The South African government responded by banning the ANC and PAC. J.D Omer-Cooper, "South Africa--History," *Africa South of the Sahara 1990*, p. 904.

immediate neighbours, the High Commission Territories, when together they had formed the South African Customs Union (SACU) in 1902. By the 1950s, South Africa was seeking to increase trade ties with other states in the region and the continent. This emphasis on economic cooperation became an important characteristic of South Africa's foreign policy, and by 1964 Verwoerd was advancing the concept of a 'co-prosperity sphere' which would include all states in southern Africa. It was hoped that increased economic cooperation would result in legitimization of South Africa's internal situation. By promoting the political and economic objectives, the South African government was attempting to maintain white domination within South Africa, while encouraging economic interaction with black states which were antagonistic towards South Africa's domestic policy.

The decolonization of Africa also posed a policy dilemma for the Rhodesian government. As in South Africa, the consolidation of white dominance within Rhodesia was a government priority. When in 1953 Britain created the Central African Federation (CAF), which joined Rhodesia (Southern), Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in an economic union, problems quickly arose as a result of the racial policies which the Rhodesian government espoused.<sup>31</sup> From the beginning Rhodesia was the dominant partner. In 1954, it accounted for 49 per cent of the Federation's GNP, while Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland accounted for 42 and 9 per cent respectively.<sup>32</sup> Its economy also attracted the most foreign

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<sup>31</sup>Arthur Hazlewood, "The Economics of Federation and Dissolution in Central Africa," in Arthur Hazlewood ed. *African Integration and Disintegration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967). This is an excellent overview of the economics and politics of the CAF. For more in depth coverage of the politics during federation see A.J. Wills, *History of Central Africa*, pp. 326-46.

<sup>32</sup>Hazlewood, "The economics of federation and dissolution," p. 195.

investment from Britain and elsewhere, dominated in manufacturing and became the most diversified.<sup>33</sup> The two northern territories, which had been brought into the federation reluctantly, resented the economic imbalance which was occurring, although they were receiving some economic benefits from it.<sup>34</sup> Even more, however, they abhorred the domination of the whites and the racial policies being implemented in Rhodesia while they were struggling for independence.<sup>35</sup> Thus, the federation was dissolved in 1963, and independence for Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia followed shortly thereafter with Nyasaland becoming Malawi on 6 July 1964, and Northern Rhodesia becoming Zambia on 24 October that same year.

Rhodesia, on the other hand, was not granted independence because of its racial policies. Consequently, the government of Rhodesia, under Ian Smith, declared independence illegally in 1965. This decision of the Smith government resulted in the isolation of Rhodesia by black Africa, and caused Rhodesia to build closer ties with South Africa.

#### UDI: DECLARATION TO THE PORTUGUESE COUP, 1965-1974

Ian Smith's illegal Unilateral Declaration of Independence on 11 November 1965 brought his country into a closer relationship with South Africa than had ever been imagined by those who had rejected the Union proposal in 1923.<sup>36</sup> Smith justified his action by claiming that the

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<sup>33</sup>Ibid..

<sup>34</sup>Spiro, "The Rhodesias and Nyasaland," p. 367.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid..

<sup>36</sup>A very interesting account of the first years of UDI before the Portuguese coup is offered in Robert C. Good, U.D.I. The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

Rhodesians deserved to be independent since they had been self-governing since 1923 and had a strong economy. The government in London, however, declared the move illegal, refused recognition, called for the immediate imposition of sanctions, and appealed to the United Nations for similar measures to be implemented by the international community.

Although within Rhodesia the whites were jubilant, Rhodesian blacks and most of the rest of the world denounced the action. The membership of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Third World members of the Commonwealth condemned the action and protested against what they felt was an inadequate British response.

The notable exception to the prevailing international sentiment against the Rhodesian government was South Africa. The South African response to UDI was cautious, neither condemning nor supporting the Rhodesian move. Nevertheless, South Africa's stance towards the Smith government had important consequences for relations between the two states, which became closer during the UDI period. In October 1965, South Africa's Foreign Affairs Minister Dr. Muller announced that South Africa would not interfere should Rhodesia decide to declare independence unilaterally: "This is a matter which only concerns Rhodesia. South Africa's policy is not to interfere in other countries' affairs."<sup>31</sup> Most importantly, the South African government declared that it would not impose sanctions against the Rhodesians. Only one year earlier, Smith had

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<sup>31</sup>South Africa Digest, 29 October 1965, p. 2. Quoted in Gail-Maryse Cockram, Vorster's Foreign Policy (Pretoria: H&R Academica (Pty.) Ltd., 1987) p. 176.

secured a trade agreement with South Africa which provided for the lowering of tariff barriers between the two countries.<sup>38</sup> When Rhodesia's largest trading partner, Great Britain, announced that it was imposing sanctions, a closer economic link between Rhodesia and South Africa was inevitable. Thus, with the South African government's position clearly stated, Smith was able to feel confident of the neutrality, if not support for his decision, of South Africa, even though South African president Verwoerd had apparently advised against such action in private.<sup>39</sup>

Whether or not Smith had reason to believe that South Africa would continue to support UDI is difficult to determine. Policy statements from Pretoria on regional policy immediately following UDI were very ambiguous. UDI was not really welcomed by the South African government as it would cause regional instability, and put Pretoria in an awkward position with respect to its relations with other African governments.<sup>40</sup> Nevertheless, on 25 January 1966, Verwoerd outlined the principles of South African foreign policy which would be applied at this time:

[W]e do not allow interference in our own matters, and if we do not allow such interference then we should not interfere in those of others. [Secondly,] since we have been threatened over and over again with, and to a certain extent have experienced, boycotts and sanctions, we have taken up the clear attitude that under no circumstances, neither under pressure nor under force, will we participate in either boycotts or sanctions.<sup>41</sup>

Smith apparently perceived this to mean that South Africa supported his action and would continue to do so.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>38</sup>Cockram, *Vorster's Foreign Policy*, p. 175.

<sup>39</sup>Verwoerd is said to have observed, "I have offered advice to three Rhodesian premiers. The first two were wise enough to take it." Quoted in Good, *U.D.I.*, p. 21.

<sup>40</sup>Barber and Barratt, *South Africa's Foreign Policy*, p. 136.

<sup>41</sup>South Africa, House of Assembly, *Debates*, 25 January 1966, cols. 51-2, 54. Quoted in Cockram, *Vorster's Foreign Policy*, pp. 176, 177.

<sup>42</sup>Wills, *History of Central Africa*, p. 373.

The main impetus behind Smith's action was, ironically, similar to that of the other African states seeking independence: to be free of colonial rule. Although Britain maintained the right to interfere in domestic policy in Rhodesia, it had never exercised that right. In 1961 Britain had provided Rhodesia with a new constitution in which it reduced its limited powers even further, but maintained control over foreign policy and "retained formal legal right to interfere in the internal affairs" of Rhodesia.<sup>43</sup> The residual powers which remained, however, were disquieting to the whites who felt that the time had come for their country's complete independence, as it had been self-governing since 1923. The white Rhodesians were also suspicious of Britain's desire to see African states reach majority rule, which was an extremely distasteful objective in a society where the well-being of the white minority was sustained by an exploited black majority.

Neither Smith nor the South African government were comfortable with the idea of majority rule in Rhodesia. Smith held the belief that the fate of Rhodesia and South Africa were inextricably interwoven and "that to accept the principle of majority rule for one would spell disaster for both."<sup>44</sup> Similarly, Verwoerd held the opinion that,

most South Africans believed that should Black supremacy be established in Rhodesia or placed in the offing, it would damage the peace and harmony in Southern Africa, lead to economic deterioration and unemployment, and create either distress or danger on South Africa's border--over and above the disaster which the white Rhodesian would suffer.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Simson, *Zimbabwe*, p. 15.

<sup>44</sup> Barber and Barratt, *South Africa's Foreign Policy*, p. 216.

<sup>45</sup> Cockram, *Vorster's foreign policy*, p. 178.

However, both South African presidents, Verwoerd and Vorster, thought declaring independence unilaterally ill-advised. Nevertheless, they were more concerned with ensuring that sanctions against Rhodesia would fail, thereby preventing their application to South Africa.<sup>46</sup> The border between the two countries therefore remained open, and Rhodesia was able to withstand the pressure of sanctions, which had at any rate been half-heartedly imposed.

By turning to South Africa for support in its attempt to dislodge itself from British control, the Rhodesian government created a second irony of UDI. As Johnson and Martin point out, "although [UDI] temporarily severed formal ties with Britain, it increasingly reduced the country to the status of a colony or province of South Africa."<sup>47</sup> As UDI continued, Rhodesian dependence on its southern neighbour in the areas of trade, investment, and later transportation grew as South Africa became its lifeline.<sup>48</sup> UDI, therefore, was instrumental in deepening Rhodesia's dependency on South Africa, and set the groundwork for future relations between the two states.

#### **RHODESIA AND DEPENDENCY: FROM GREAT BRITAIN TO SOUTH AFRICA**

As table I shows, trade between the two countries at the time of UDI, although not large, was still important for Rhodesia. In 1965, 25.3 percent

<sup>46</sup> Colin Legum, *The Battlefronts of Southern Africa* (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1988) p. 143.

<sup>47</sup> Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, *Frontline Southern Africa: Destructive Engagement*, p. 88.

<sup>48</sup> Lee Cokorinos, "The Political Economy of State and Party Formation in Zimbabwe," in *The Political Economy of Zimbabwe*, ed. Schatzberg, p.



**Table I: Rhodesia's Trade with South Africa 1964-1971**  
(US\$ millions)

Year	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
GNP US\$ mil-	926.80	1,015.0	1,003.8	1,092.0	1,173.2	1,344.0	1,482.6	1,704.7
Exports Z\$	274.9	322.8	200.0	194.4	187.8	231.9	264.6	287.7
Exports US\$	384.86	451.92	280.00	272.16	262.92	324.66	370.44	403.99
to SA US\$	28.1	47.5	n/a	80.0*	80	85	95	90
% of Total	7.30	10.51	n/a	29.39	30.43	26.18	25.65	22.28
% of GNP	3.03	4.68	0.00	7.33	6.82	6.32	6.41	5.28
Imports Z\$	216.6	239.6	169.5	187.1	207.1	199.5	235.0	282.5
Imports US\$	303.24	335.44	237.30	261.94	289.94	279.30	329.00	396.69
from SA US\$	75.7	77.6		160*				
% of Total	24.96	23.13		61.08				

Note: Import values for 1966 and 1968-1979 are not available. Neither are export values for 1972-1979.

Sources: International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics*, 1976; "Rhodesia," *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1968-69, exports to and imports from South Africa for 1964 and 1965; Michael Parsonage and Michael Williams, "Britain and Rhodesia: The economic background to sanctions," *World Today* 29, 9 (September 1973) p. 381, exports to South Africa 1967-71.

of Rhodesia's exports went to Zambia, while 21.9 per cent went to Britain.<sup>49</sup> South Africa by comparison only received 10.5 per cent.<sup>50</sup> In terms of imports, South Africa supplied 23 per cent and Britain 30 per cent.<sup>51</sup> With the imposition of sanctions, however, the proportions changed dramatically as trade was directed away from Great Britain and Rhodesia's neighbours towards South Africa. By 1967 South Africa was both Rhodesia's largest supplier of imports, and most important export market making Rhodesia highly dependent upon its neighbour for its continued economic survival.<sup>52</sup> Although comprehensive statistics for this period are unavailable, Table I

<sup>49</sup>"Rhodesia," *Africa Contemporary Record 1968-69*, ed. Colin Legum (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1969), p. 386.

<sup>50</sup>International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics*, 1976.

<sup>51</sup>Robert Davies, "Foreign Trade and External Economic Relations," in Colin Stoneman, ed., *Zimbabwe's Inheritance* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981) p. 201.

<sup>52</sup>Davies, "Foreign Trade and External Economic Relations," p. 201.

shows that exports to South Africa tripled between 1965 and 1967, and they remained above twenty percent of Rhodesia's total exports over the following years of UDI.

**Table II: Rhodesia's Top Ten Industrials, 1970**

Company	Total Assets
* Rhodesian Breweries	30.85
* Hippo Valley Estates	25.68
* Rhodesia Cement	10.33
BAT	8.65
Rhodesia Sugar	8.52
* Premier Portland Cement	7.68
Salisbury Portland Cement	7.40
Rhodesia Tea	6.84
* Plate Glass	6.14
Johnson and Fletcher	5.72

\* Wholly or Partly South African controlled.

Source: John Sprack, *Rhodesia: South Africa's Sixth Province*, 56. Rand values in original source have been converted at 1970 exchange rate R=1.3959US\$.

Investment from South Africa, which had been substantial prior to UDI, also increased to command a greater market share. Before UDI foreign capital shares were dominated by the British (60 per cent), South Africa (33 per cent) and the United States (5 per cent).<sup>53</sup> By 1979, forty-three South African subsidiaries were in Zimbabwe and five of the top ten companies were controlled by or associated with South African companies (See Table II). In addition, many other South African companies had gone off-shore to assume a different corporate identity and to project a better

<sup>53</sup> Colin Stoneman and Rob Davies, "The Economy: An Overview," in Colin Stoneman, ed., *Zimbabwe's Inheritance*, 118.

public image. It is estimated that approximately 119 out of 150 British companies had holdings which may have originated in South Africa.<sup>54</sup> This makes the actual South African share impossible to determine; however, it is accurate to assume that it increased substantially during UDI.<sup>55</sup> Increased investment originating from South Africa further reinforced Rhodesia's growing dependence upon that country.

The third area of interaction, transportation, did not become a major aspect of the relationship between the two countries until the collapse of Portuguese colonial rule in 1974. Portugal had also refused to impose sanctions on Rhodesia, and Mozambique, a Portuguese colony, was Rhodesia's primary transportation route to the international market. The main rail lines used by Rhodesia were those to Beira and Maputo. Before 1974, 80 per cent of Rhodesia's trade traffic went through Mozambique, but, in 1976 the new Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) government closed the borders.<sup>56</sup> This forced the diversion of traffic through South Africa. A line across the Beit Bridge to Durban was built, and by 1979 100 per cent of Rhodesia's rail traffic went through South Africa, making Rhodesia totally dependent upon the South African Transport Services (SATS) for the movement of its goods. The redirection of the South Africa oriented transportation system now poses difficulties for the post-

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<sup>54</sup>John Sprack, *Rhodesia: South Africa's Sixth Province* (London: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1974), p. 56.

<sup>55</sup>Pauline R. Baker, "Political risk assessment: Contrasting Perspectives of Zimbabwe," in Michael G. Schatzberg, ed., *The Political Economy of Zimbabwe* (New York: Praeger, 1984) pp. 166-167; Simson, *Zimbabwe*, p. 43. Stoneman and Davies estimate that the British and South African shares together were worth US\$1,000 million in 1980. Stoneman and Davies, "The Economy," p. 119.

<sup>56</sup>The FRELIMO government was opposed to white domination and had just fought its own independence struggle against Portuguese rule. Mozambique joined the rest of the African community in imposing sanctions against Rhodesia.

independence government which is attempting to reduce this dependence upon South Africa.

As a result of the increased dependence of Rhodesia on South Africa, sanctions were not entirely disruptive of Rhodesia's economy. Not only did Rhodesia find alternative sources for investment and manufacturing inputs, it also became more self-reliant. As Howard Simson argues, "sanctions led to a successful reorientation of economic policy towards 'self-reliance'.<sup>57</sup>" This reorientation was most clearly seen in the manufacturing sector, which although already well developed, increased its contribution to the GDP from 17 per cent in 1966 to 24 per cent in 1974.<sup>58</sup> Even though most of the economic inputs required for this sector came from South Africa, "[a]t independence, thanks to the trade embargo during the UDI years, Zimbabwe inherited the most developed economy among the Front Line States."<sup>59</sup> Nevertheless, the primary impact of sanctions was the increased integration of the Rhodesian and South African economies, and the heightened dependence of the former on the latter. It is these links which have led scholars to argue that South African-Zimbabwean relations may be characterised as a core-periphery relationship.

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<sup>57</sup> Simson, *Zimbabwe*, p. 15.

<sup>58</sup> David Wield, "Manufacturing Industry," in Colin Stoneman, ed., *Zimbabwe's Inheritance*, p. 155.

<sup>59</sup> Nguyuru H.I. Lipumba, "The State of the Economies of the Front Line States and the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa," in Ibrahim S.R. Msabaha and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., *Confrontation and Liberation in Southern Africa: Regional Directions after the Nkomati Accord* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987) p. 81. The Front Line States, comprising Tanzania, Botswana, Zambia, Angola and Mozambique, had been formed in 1974 to aid the freedom struggle of the Zimbabwe nationalist forces.

**UDI: FROM THE PORTUGUESE COUP UNTIL ZIMBABWEAN INDEPENDENCE, 1974-1980**

Relations between the two countries changed once again with the overthrow of the Portuguese government and the independence of Portugal's colonies in southern Africa, Angola and Mozambique. The new regional setting which resulted forced a revision of South Africa's policy towards Rhodesia. As was demonstrated above, the relationship between the two states had become closer as a result of sanctions being imposed on Rhodesia, and as a result of South Africa's desire to maintain white domination in southern Africa. With the independence of Angola and Mozambique the *cordon sanitaire* was shattered, making the white regime in Rhodesia a political and military burden for the South African government. The South Africans were attempting to engage in a detente initiative with their newly independent neighbours and were trying to present a good public image as a supporter of black independence. However, the South African government's continued support for the Smith regime blatantly contradicted its pretensions and frustrated its ambitions for regional leadership.

As UDI dragged on and negotiation after negotiation ended in failure, South Africa came under increasing pressure from the United States and Great Britain to use its dominant position with respect to Rhodesia to impel Smith to reach a settlement. The South African government itself was becoming increasingly disenchanted with the illegality of UDI, the intransigence of Smith, and the constant world attention focused on the

region; it perceived that a reorientation of regional policy was necessary.<sup>60</sup> Moreover, the regional situation had changed with the emergence of Marxist governments in both Angola and Mozambique bringing the 'communist threat' closer to the South African borders. In addition, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) government in Angola supported the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) guerillas who were fighting for the independence of Namibia from South Africa. The white society in South Africa saw itself imperilled and sought to strengthen the home front and reduce its external military commitments.

In Rhodesia the civil war against the nationalist guerilla groups was intensifying. In August 1967 South Africa had sent troops into Rhodesia to help the Rhodesian forces combat the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZPRA--the military wing of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, ZAPU) whose guerilla forces were based in Zambia.<sup>61</sup> This action further increased Rhodesia's dependence on South Africa. The defense against ZPRA guerillas had been fairly successful. However, another guerilla force, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), under the command of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), had gained the support of the FRELIMO government in Mozambique, and was straining the resources of the Rhodesian army, causing the South African government to reassess its military commitment to Rhodesia.

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<sup>60</sup>Patrick O'Meara, "Zimbabwe: The Politics of Interdependence," in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds., Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis, 2nd Ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 35.

<sup>61</sup>Larry W. Bowman, "South Africa's Southern strategy," International Affairs (London) 47, 1 (January 1971) p. 24.

ZANU and ZAPU were also gaining increasing political legitimacy, and were demonstrating that there would be no settlement in Rhodesia without their agreement. The leaders of the two groups, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo of ZANU and ZAPU respectively, were both self-proclaimed Marxists and had joined together to form the Patriotic Front (PF) which was supported by the Front Line States in the negotiations to end UDI. The South African government, which preferred a less radical leadership in its northern neighbour, was uneasy about the popularity of the PF leaders and regarded them as "criminal Communist terrorists."<sup>62</sup> To avert the possibility that the PF leaders would govern the post-UDI Rhodesia, the South African government pressed for a faster resolution of the impasse between Smith and the British government.

The Rhodesian regime had become totally dependent on South African economic and military support for its survival. South Africa had achieved both its objectives of limiting the effects of sanctions and weakening the guerilla resistance. However, the costs of attaining these goals was now outweighing the benefits. Rhodesia was becoming an obstacle to detente initiatives, particularly toward Mozambique. The FRELIMO government of Mozambique abhorred South Africa's duplicity in attempting to normalize relations while supporting the racist Rhodesian regime. With FRELIMO's open support of ZANLA, the eastern front would open up along the long border between Rhodesia and Mozambique, and continued defense of Rhodesia would require increased military commitments. This would in turn

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<sup>62</sup>Richard Leonard, *South Africa at War: White Power and the Crisis in Southern Africa* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1983) p. 54.

result in greater international criticism and condemnation. A peaceful solution directed by South Africa, on the other hand, would increase regional stability and perhaps benefit South Africa's relations with its neighbours and the rest of Africa. "Thus, the role of white Rhodesia was being rapidly transformed from that of vital defence outpost to that of a sacrificial lamb for a new regional order."<sup>63</sup>

From 1974 onwards therefore, South Africa pushed for a peaceful political solution with the goal of ensuring the establishment of a moderate black government in Rhodesia. In 1978 Smith reached an internal settlement with Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the leader of the moderate African National Congress (ANC) party, who subsequently became the first Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The agreement, however, left too much power in white hands and was not recognized by the international community or the Patriotic Front. Therefore, in September 1979 the Lancaster House Conference began.<sup>64</sup> It was here that Zimbabwe's fight for independence ended.

The final meetings between Smith, the British government and the nationalist representatives were marked by tension, but also compromise. A new constitution which would place total power in the hands of the black majority was debated. The Zimbabwean House of Assembly would consist

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<sup>63</sup>M. Tamarkin, *The Making of Zimbabwe: Decolonization in Regional and International Politics* (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1990) pp. 22-23.

<sup>64</sup>The Lancaster House Conference, which was held in London, was the final meeting between the British government, Smith and the Zimbabwean independence leaders. It was the only meeting which Mugabe had been allowed to attend. He agreed to the conditions of the agreement negotiated at that conference only after President Machel of Mozambique placed considerable pressure on him. For a more detailed examination of the Lancaster House talks and the people involved, see D. Martin and P. Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War* (London: Faber and Faber, 1981); Michael Charlton, *The Last Colony in Africa: Diplomacy and the Independence of Rhodesia* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); and, Tamarkin, *The Making of Zimbabwe*.



of 80 members elected from a common African roll, and 20 seats reserved for whites making a total of 100 seats. Elections were to take place the following spring in February 1980. Under pressure from Zambia and the FLS, ZANU leader Mugabe finally agreed to sign the peace accord which brought an end to the guerilla fighting. Smith also finally succumbed to South African pressure and signed the accord.

South Africa's role did not end with the agreement. There was still an election to be won and South Africa supported Bishop Muzorewa. Millions of Rand were put into his campaign by the South African government.<sup>65</sup> Even if Mugabe won, the South African government did not believe it would be with a majority which would open the door for a coalition government led by Nkomo and Muzorewa, and supported by South Africa. When the results of the election were announced on 4 March 1980, it was clear that South Africa had underestimated the popularity of Mugabe, who won with an overwhelming majority of 57 of 80 black seats equalling 63 per cent of the popular vote.<sup>66</sup> Nkomo, who campaigned separately under the PF banner, won only 20 seats and 24 per cent of the vote, while Bishop Muzorewa was soundly defeated gaining only 3 seats and 8 per cent of the vote.<sup>67</sup> South Africa's northern neighbour now joined the ranks of 'radical' black governed states which Pretoria had hoped to avoid.

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<sup>65</sup>Douglas Anglin, "Zimbabwe: Retrospect and Prospect," *International Journal*, vol. 35, no. 4 (Autumn 1980), p. 680.

<sup>66</sup>O'Meara, "The Politics of Interdependence," p. 47.

<sup>67</sup>*Ibid.*

Almost immediately relations between the two states deteriorated. Mugabe was an outspoken opponent of apartheid, and sought to reduce the dependence of his country on South Africa which had been so carefully cultivated during the UDI years. Another defeat had been delivered to South Africa's regional policy which forced the government to once again redefine its regional objectives. Instead of an easily manipulated neighbour, South Africa was facing a neighbour who would not quietly acquiesce to South African pressure despite overwhelming economic dependence. Although South Africa attempted to manipulate the ties it had with Zimbabwe, Mugabe consistently refused to succumb to South African pressure. In addition, Mugabe was able to manipulate those ties against South Africa. The dynamics of this interaction is the subject of the following chapter.

#### **CONCLUSION**

The above analysis of the historical development of relations between South Africa and Rhodesia has demonstrated that dependency was the overriding characteristic during that period. Beginning with the founding of Rhodesia, South Africa played an important role in influencing the internal development of that country. South Africa had always been an important trading partner for Rhodesia, as well as a primary source of investment. When Ian Smith declared unilateral independence from Great Britain, he did so with the confidence that South Africa would support his action because of both the economic and political investments South Africa had made in his country.

The dependency analysis of the UDI years explains why Smith on the one hand, was able to maintain power for almost fifteen years, and on the other hand, finally agreed to allow black majority rule. In both cases, South Africa's domination of Rhodesia's economy was the key factor. By supporting the Rhodesian economy, and supplying military assistance, South Africa sustained Smith's government. However, when the costs of supporting Smith started to outweigh the benefits, the South African government reoriented its policy towards Rhodesia and forced Smith to hand over power.

However, the outcome of the election in 1980 also indicates that economic power is not always sufficient to achieve desired political ends. As investigation in the following chapter of the relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa reveals, political autonomy can remain despite economic dependence, allowing the weaker state to pursue an independent political agenda which can affect the political and economic decisions made by the dominant partner. Thus, the independence of Zimbabwe brought a new level of interaction to the relationship between it and South Africa. This new interaction necessitates a new interpretation of the relationship between the two states which is based on interdependency rather than dependency. The consideration of the relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe within the interdependency framework is the theme of chapter 4.

## CHAPTER 4

### **Economic and Political Relations Between South Africa and Zimbabwe since April 1980**

Although since 1980 the relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe has continued to exhibit many of the characteristics of dependency which were evident in the pre-independence era, in the post-independence period relations have developed in a way which also demonstrates aspects of interdependency. The main strength of interdependency analysis of the post-1980 era lies in the application of the concepts of vulnerability and sensitivity to the study of interactions between the two states.

Briefly stated, vulnerability and sensitivity refers to the reaction of one actor to the decisions made by another actor in a regime in which the two states interact. An actor is said to be sensitive when it can react quickly and relatively easily in instituting alternative strategies to the policy changes of another state within a given area of interaction. It is vulnerable when it is unable to react or to do so only at a high cost. When these concepts are applied to the relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe, it becomes evident that both states are interdependent, as they display mutual though asymmetrical dependence on each other. Both

are either sensitive or vulnerable to the policy changes of the other in different areas of interaction (or regimes). Their degrees of sensitivity or vulnerability can also vary over time. It must be stated though, that while South Africa and Zimbabwe do exhibit mutual dependence, South Africa is more likely to show sensitivity to policy changes in Zimbabwe, while Zimbabwe is more apt to show vulnerability to South African policy changes.

The independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 heralded a new era of relations with South Africa. The regional setting had been transformed once again as a result of the victory of Robert Mugabe in 1980. The new Marxist government in Zimbabwe vehemently opposed the apartheid policies of its southern neighbour. In addition, Mugabe was determined to reduce his country's economic ties with South Africa, which had resulted from the implementation of sanctions against it during Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence. In order to fight apartheid and to reduce his country's economic reliance on South Africa, Mugabe pursued a variety of strategies. The effect of these policies on South Africa demonstrates that some degree of interdependence exists between South Africa and Zimbabwe.

In pursuit of the objectives stated above, Zimbabwe became a member of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) which was formed in Lusaka, Zambia in April 1980 by the independent black majority ruled states in southern Africa.<sup>1</sup> Mugabe further demonstrated

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<sup>1</sup>The founding members of SADCC included Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The organization's mandate was to reduce dependency ties with South Africa and other western states, and to promote regional development through regional economic cooperation. The Lusaka Declaration outlined four goals which were to be pursued by the member states: "1) the reduction of

his government's opposition to South African dominance by officially joining the Frontline States (FLS), which now turned their attention to supporting the independence struggle in South West Africa (Namibia), and the struggle for black rule in South Africa.<sup>2</sup> Finally Mugabe cut all diplomatic and formal political ties with the South African government, and closed the Zimbabwean embassy in Pretoria.<sup>3</sup>

The formation of SADCC and the participation of Zimbabwe in it was a direct blow to South Africa policy-makers who had been promoting a similar economic cooperative effort, the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), but with South Africa at the helm. The inclusion of Zimbabwe in SADCC was particularly distressing for South Africa, as the government there had hoped that Zimbabwe would join CONSAS thereby increasing the organization's legitimacy and South Africa's economic dominance. Zimbabwe, as the economically strongest black ruled state in southern Africa, increased the potential for SADCC to achieve successfully its goal of reducing southern Africa's dependence upon South Africa.<sup>4</sup> With Zimbabwe as a member of SADCC, South Africa's dream for securing regional hegemony peacefully was shattered.<sup>5</sup> The FLS support for nationalist movements in South West Africa and South Africa also posed a

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economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on [South Africa]; 2) the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration; 3) the mobilisation of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies; and 4) concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of our strategy for economic liberation." "Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation," in Colin Legum, ed., *African Contemporary Record* vol. XIII, 1980-1981 (New York: African Publishing Company, 1981), p. C32.

<sup>2</sup>James Barber, "Zimbabwe: The Southern African Setting," *The World Today*, vol. 44, no. 10 (October 1988), p. 169.

<sup>3</sup>In explaining his actions, on 28 June 1980, Mugabe stated that "We cannot have any political and diplomatic relations with South Africa until it puts its own house in order and kills the repugnance and revulsion we have to apartheid." *Africa Research Bulletin (Political, Cultural and Social Series)* June 1980, p. 5702C.

<sup>4</sup>Carol B. Thompson, "Zimbabwe in Southern Africa: From Dependent Development to Dominance or Cooperation?" in *The Political Economy of Zimbabwe*, Michael G. Schatzberg, ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), p. 198.

<sup>5</sup>Richard Leonard, *South Africa at War: White Power and the crisis in Southern Africa* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1983), p. 202.

security threat to the South African government. Thus, both SADCC and the FLS were seen as threatening South African economic domination and self-proclaimed regional leadership role. The creation of SADCC and the activities of FLS demonstrate that Zimbabwe was able to affect the direction of South Africa's external policies.

In response to the perceived threats, the South African government launched a concerted destabilization initiative against Zimbabwe and the other southern African states. This policy, outlined in 1978 as the "Total Strategy" against the "Total Onslaught" of communism in southern Africa, involved economic and military tactics intended to undermine the economies and governments of the neighbouring states.<sup>6</sup> In addition, South Africa employed 'divide and conquer' techniques which involved offering "greater economic 'incentives'" to collaborators such as Malawi.<sup>7</sup> It also embarked on economic sabotage to frustrate attempts by the SADCC states to diversify their markets and transportation routes, as well as to find alternative sources of investment and imports.<sup>8</sup>

The initial policy decisions of South Africa and Zimbabwe appear to support dependency analyses of the pattern of relations between them since 1980. Nevertheless, a greater understanding of contemporary relations between the two states is achieved through an analysis which is

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<sup>6</sup>The logic behind the "Total Strategy" and a description of the tactics used to most effectively carry it out are examined in Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy since 1978," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 11, no. 2 (April 1985), pp. 183-211.

<sup>7</sup>Davies and O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa," p. 199.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*

based on the interdependency framework, and applies the concepts of vulnerability and sensitivity.

Overall, South Africa appears to be the dominant actor given its overwhelming economic and military strength in relation to Zimbabwe. However, an examination of specific areas of interaction, such as investment, trade, transportation and politics, indicates that degrees of sensitivity and vulnerability have changed over time and are different in each regime.<sup>9</sup> That is, although South Africa may be powerful overall, in specific areas of interaction Zimbabwe is able to influence the policies of the South African government. In essence, South Africa is sensitive to certain policies pursued by Zimbabwe, and Zimbabwe is either sensitive or vulnerable, depending on the area of interaction.

In the area of investment the characteristics of dependency are more evident than those of interdependency, demonstrating Zimbabwe's dependency on South Africa in this regime. In the areas of trade and transportation a low degree of interdependence exists, while in the political sphere there is significant interdependence between the two states. Each of these areas is examined below.

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<sup>9</sup>The economic areas of investment, trade and transportation are the areas in which interaction between the two states is most active. Zimbabwe is independent in energy supply, except for petroleum which is transported through South Africa, and in banking and finance. In other economic areas such as communication and labour, interaction is minimal, while in tourism insufficient information is available for the analysis being undertaken in this paper.



**ECONOMIC RELATIONS -- INVESTMENT**

In the area of investment, Zimbabwe is unquestionably dependent on South Africa, as investments from the latter dominate the economy of the former. It is this situation, in particular, which has led many observers and scholars to argue that the dependency framework best explains relations between the two states.

Historically, the South African based British South Africa Company (BSAC) played a primary role in the founding of Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) and the structuring of its economy. South African investment continued to permeate the country's economy up until independence through the ownership of major industries. At independence, "up to a third of total foreign capital stock and a quarter of total capital stock" was controlled by South African companies.<sup>10</sup> The most important of these was the Anglo-American Company of Zimbabwe (AACZ), which was the heir of BSAC and the largest multinational company in Zimbabwe. AACZ had interests in every sector of the Zimbabwean economy including mining, manufacturing, agriculture and finance.<sup>11</sup> In addition, five South African dominated companies were ranked in the top ten of all companies, both foreign and domestic, which had holdings in Zimbabwe.<sup>12</sup>

Dependency scholars, such as Joseph Hanlon, point to the preponderance of South African investment as a powerful tool which can be

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<sup>10</sup>Jeffrey Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) p. 35.

<sup>11</sup>Thomas Lines, "Investment Sanctions and Zimbabwe: Breaking the Rod," *Third World Quarterly* vol. 10, no. 3 (July 1988), pp. 1187-94.

<sup>12</sup>Roger Martin, *Southern Africa: The Price of Apartheid. A Political Risk Analysis*, Special Report No. 1130 (London: The Economic Intelligence Unit, July 1988), p. 20.

manipulated by the South African government to influence policy-making in Zimbabwe.<sup>13</sup> For example, Hanlon estimates that ownership of the mining sector is broken down into 15 per cent domestic, 45 per cent South African, 30 per cent British and 10 per cent other foreign.<sup>14</sup> Mining contributes 7 per cent of Zimbabwe's GDP (1988), generates 34 per cent of the country's export revenue (1988), and employs 5.3 of the workforce (1984).<sup>15</sup> With the high level of foreign ownership in this sector, particularly South African, Hanlon claims that the Zimbabwean government's hands are tied when making investment legislation or attempting to gain control of the mining and other industries.<sup>16</sup> In addition, foreign investment is generally viewed by dependency theorists as preventing development in developing countries, in this case Zimbabwe, since surplus capital is usually withdrawn from the country.

Yet, despite the considerable investment South Africa holds in Zimbabwe, the conclusion that this translates into direct control of policy-making there is tenuous.<sup>17</sup> Due to the historical legacy, Zimbabwe is highly dependent upon foreign investment. Since much of this investment comes from South Africa it would appear that Zimbabwe would be highly

<sup>13</sup> Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, pp. 199-201.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 305. Richard Payne places South African investments in the mining industry at ninety per cent. Payne, *The Nonsuperpowers and South Africa: Implications for U.S. Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 219. The difference in these two figures may be accounted for if Payne assumes that South African industries have taken on different corporate identities through subsidiary investment from Great Britain and other foreign countries, while Hanlon presents only obvious parent company investment. See also Pauline R. Baker, "Political risk assessment: Contrasting Perspectives of Zimbabwe," in Michael G. Schatzberg, ed., *The Political Economy of Zimbabwe*, pp. 166-67.

<sup>15</sup> "Zimbabwe," *Africa South of the Sahara 1990* vol. 19 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1989) pp. 1113, 1115.

<sup>16</sup> Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, p. 218. Thomas Lines concurs with this assessment by noting, "At present a large proportion of Zimbabwean industry is, in whole or in part, in South African ownership. South Africa earns substantial revenues from it and could use this ownership as an effective lever against any serious attempts to oppose Pretoria's interests." However, he admits that through careful planning, this influence could be minimized and even eliminated and presents a possible way to limit South African power in this area. Lines, "Investment sanctions...", p. 1183.

<sup>17</sup> Martin observes that "It might be expected that this high degree of ownership would bring with it a large element of control. In practice in Zimbabwe it does not." Martin, *Southern Africa: The Price of Apartheid*, p. 20.

vulnerable to South African pressure. However, as Jeffrey Herbst points out, the relationship between the Zimbabwean government and all foreign investors, including those from South Africa, is highly complex. Upon closer examination, it is discovered that despite heavy South African investments in its economy, Zimbabwe is able to pursue autonomous policy objectives which challenge dependency assumptions.<sup>18</sup>

Prior to independence, ZANU under Mugabe's leadership was committed to decreasing the overall foreign control in the Zimbabwean economy.<sup>19</sup> However, on gaining power, the new government discovered that the previous government had put in place several safeguards to limit the influence of foreign companies in government policy-making. Foreign control, nevertheless, remained pervasive. At independence, however, Mugabe proceeded cautiously in moving against foreign capital.<sup>20</sup>

In contrast to Hanlon's argument that South African investment is the key factor which has influenced Mugabe's decision-making in his foreign investment policies, Herbst gives five other reasons, besides South African domination and destabilization, which have affected Mugabe's behaviour.<sup>21</sup> First, a provision was included in the Lancaster House Constitution which "committed the Zimbabweans to compensating property-owners for any assets taken over by the government."<sup>22</sup> Buying out all

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<sup>18</sup>Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe*, pp. 110-141.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, p.113.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 116.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 116-117.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 117.

foreign firms was estimated at costing more than US\$ 2 500 million.<sup>23</sup> Second, seizing foreign capital would have alienated western aid donors who supply much needed foreign assistance for economic development in Zimbabwe. Third, the government wanted to prevent a mass exodus of white skilled labour as had happened in Mozambique after its independence. Fourth, the tax revenue gained from a productive private sector was necessary to pay for the social programmes which the ZANU government implemented after 1980. Finally, the government did not have a well-defined programme for gaining control of those economic sectors it saw as priority areas and those which should be under its jurisdiction.

Zimbabwe, unlike most other African states, has a highly developed economic base as a result of the import substitution policies of the Smith government during UDI. The Mugabe government recognized the large role that investment played in developing the Zimbabwean economy, and has minimized its interference in foreign investments which had been established prior to 1980.<sup>24</sup> The need for maintaining investment, however, conflicts with the government's anti-apartheid rhetoric and uncoupling policies from South Africa as much of the investment comes from South Africa. The Zimbabwean government, therefore, has been encouraging investments from companies based in countries other than South Africa in order to diversify its investment base.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Colin Stoneman and Robert Davies, "The economy: an overview," in Colin Stoneman, ed., *Zimbabwe's Inheritance* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 123.

<sup>24</sup> Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe*, p. 122.

<sup>25</sup> Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, *Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989), p. 122.

Through public acquisition, the Zimbabwean government has gained control over certain important operations previously controlled by AACZ. For example, the government has won control of the country's newspapers, it owns almost completely the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO), and it has acquired a controlling interest of 40 percent in the Wankie Colliery, which is Zimbabwe's only coal mine and which produced 3.5 million tonnes in 1984, 95 per cent of which was for the local market.<sup>26</sup>

Thus, although South Africa continues to dominate foreign investment, the Zimbabwean government has followed a gradualist policy to assert its control over the economy, thereby lessening the vulnerability of its economy to South African pressure. This has prevented the alienation of white business interests and thus their catastrophic withdrawal, while at the same time exerting government influence and control over key sectors. Therefore, while dependency theory has validity in explaining South Africa's economic position in Zimbabwe, it cannot explain satisfactorily why Zimbabwe is able to adopt measures to counter this dependency. The interdependence framework allows for this. It also helps to explain the constraints facing South Africa in its dealings with Zimbabwe.

The importance of investments in Zimbabwe to Anglo-American and other South African companies gives the Zimbabwean government bargaining leverage *vis-à-vis* those companies, as well as the South African government, as they represent important domestic economic interests and powerful lobby groups in South Africa. Threats to impose sanctions on those

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<sup>26</sup>Lines, "Investment Sanctions," pp. 1192, 1197.

companies (with the support of the international community) may be a tool which the Zimbabwean government can use in exerting pressure on the South African government.<sup>27</sup> Delinking completely, however, might not be effective as it may eliminate the defense Zimbabwe has against direct South African intervention and destabilization, since the South African investment interests would no longer be a primary concern to the South African government.

From the above therefore, it is obvious that South Africa is not always able to dictate policy orientations in Zimbabwe. It is susceptible to retaliation from both the Zimbabwean government and the international community. In such a context, the interdependence framework best captures the nature of the relationship between the two states.

#### **ECONOMIC RELATIONS -- TRADE**

Both South Africa and Zimbabwe have export-oriented economies. For South Africa, exports accounted for an average of 26 per cent of GDP between 1980 and 1987; for Zimbabwe the figure is 22 per cent.<sup>28</sup> Since exports account for a high proportion of their respective GDP, both states are vulnerable to international market forces which they are unable to control. At the specific level of interaction of trade between the two states, it appears that South Africa is again the stronger, but is also

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<sup>27</sup> Lines, "Investment Sanctions," p. 1185.

<sup>28</sup> IMF, *International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1990*. For South Africa the range is from 22.2% in 1983 to 32.2% in 1980. For Zimbabwe the range is from 18.2% in 1983 to 26.6% in 1987. Percentages are derived from current export and GDP values in local currencies. If export values of both goods and services are considered the respective figures are 29.3% for South Africa and 27.4% for Zimbabwe.

susceptible to actions taken by the Zimbabwe government to reduce its vulnerability to South African pressure.

The major trading partners for both states are western countries. However, while South Africa is also an important partner of Zimbabwe, the

**Table III: Major Trading Partners for Zimbabwe and South Africa**

Zimbabwe's Top Trading Partners				
Exports (1988, US\$ millions), (% of Total)		Imports (1988, US\$ millions), (% of Total)		
1.	Germany	180.1(12.6%)	South Africa	255.8(24.9%)
2.	United Kingdom	139.1(9.8%)	United Kingdom	103.7(10.1%)
3.	South Africa	135.7(9.5%)	Germany	101.7(9.9%)
4.	Japan	112.8(7.9%)	Botswana	73.8(7.2)
5.	United States	100.9(7.1%)	United States	37.8(3.7%)
South Africa's Top Trading Partners				
Exports (1988, US\$ millions)		Imports (1988, US\$ millions)		
1.	Italy	1,966(9.1%)	Germany	3,332(19.2%)
2.	Japan	1,777(8.2%)	Japan	2,047(11.8%)
3.	Germany	1,570(7.3%)	United Kingdom	1,911(11.0%)
4.	United States	1,445(6.7%)	United States	1,691(9.7%)
5.	United Kingdom	1,304(6.1%)	Taiwan	626(3.6%)
6.	Africa	1,164(5.4%)	10. Africa	349(2.0%)

Source: IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook*, 1989.

reverse is not true. As Table III shows, for both countries, four of the top five export markets are Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Thus, both states are highly dependent upon the markets of the largest industrialized countries. More importantly for this study is

the position of South Africa as a dominant trading partner for Zimbabwe. The trade imbalance between these two countries is a second area cited by dependency theorists to demonstrate South African influence in Zimbabwe. They argue that the trading relationship is such that South Africa is able to manipulate Zimbabwean decision-making, and hinder Zimbabwean economic growth through destabilization and economic sabotage. However, as in investment, the application of interdependency theory reveals that South Africa is also sensitive to and affected by Zimbabwean policy-making.

**Table IV: Zimbabwe-South African Trade since 1980**  
(US\$ millions)

Year	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
<b>Zimbabwe's Exports to South Africa</b>									
Total Exports	1 415.0	1 320.9	1 073.3	1 023.2	1 010.8	956.1	1 000.6	1 136.8	1 425.1
Exports to SA	92.5 <sup>a</sup>	282.7	189.9	189.5	184.6	103.4	130.3	111.5	135.7
Exports to SA as percent of Total	6.54	21.40	17.69	18.52	18.26	10.81	13.02	9.81	9.52
<b>South Africa's Exports to Zimbabwe<sup>b</sup></b>									
Total Exports	25 684	20 924	17 834	18 618	17 632	16 767	18 575	21 547	21 748
Exports to Zimbabwe	162.9 <sup>a</sup>	362.4	330.5	256.5	184.3	169.1	210.7	217.4	255.8
Exports to Zimbabwe as percent of Total	0.63	1.73	1.85	1.38	1.05	1.01	1.13	1.01	1.18

Sources: IMF, *International Financial Statistics 1990*, *Direction of Trade Statistics 1983, 1991*.

a. Zimbabwe, Central Statistical Office, *Statement of External Trade, 1980*. Data for August to December 1980 only.

b. South Africa does not report trade data with individual African countries. Exports to Zimbabwe are presumed to equal imports from South Africa as reported by Zimbabwe.



Since 1980 Zimbabwe's trade with South Africa has remained constant. As Table IV shows, the export trade balance has usually been in South Africa's favour. The positive trade balance South Africa holds with Zimbabwe is important to the South African government since its international trade balance is consistently negative.<sup>29</sup> In addition, a favourable balance of trade in the service sector provides South Africa with approximately US\$ 50 million per year from freight and port charges.<sup>30</sup> This revenue is particularly important for the South African Transport Services (SATS) which handles much of Zimbabwean and other southern African trade transportation.<sup>31</sup>

Table IV also indicates that Zimbabwe's exports to South Africa have been decreasing as a percentage of its total exports. This decrease may indicate that either Zimbabwe has found alternative markets, or that Zimbabwean goods have become less competitive in the South African market. Given that up to 1985, exports to South Africa were decreasing faster than exports as a whole, and that after 1985 total exports from Zimbabwe increased while exports to South Africa continued to decline (see Table IV), it would appear that Zimbabwe has been able to find new markets for its products. In doing so, Zimbabwe has lessened its vulnerability to South African market fluctuations and government policies which discriminate against Zimbabwean goods, such as increasing customs duties.

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<sup>29</sup>IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1980-1990*.

<sup>30</sup>Roger Martin, *Southern Africa: The Price of Apartheid*, p. 20.

<sup>31</sup>See pp. 76-82 below for a discussion of transportation ties between South Africa and Zimbabwe.

Despite progress in reducing its dependency on the South African market and vulnerability to South African import policies, Zimbabwe continues to be highly dependent upon South Africa for imports. As Table V shows, imports from South Africa comprise a substantial portion of Zimbabwe's total imports. Alternatively, imports from Zimbabwe are

**Table V: Zimbabwe-South African Import Trade since 1980**  
(US\$ millions)

Year	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
<b>Zimbabwe's Imports</b>									
Total Imports	1 259.5	1 477.5	1 428.5	1 050.5	965.0	893.7	985.2	1 051.2	872.8
Imports from South Africa	162.9 <sup>b</sup>	362.4	330.5	256.5	184.3	169.1	210.7	217.4	255.8
Imports from SA as % of Total	12.93	24.53	23.14	24.42	19.10	18.92	21.39	20.68	29.31
<b>South Africa's Imports<sup>a</sup></b>									
Total Imports	14 201	18 440	18 376	16 229	21 650	22 984	26 894	28 682	39 528
Imports from Zimbabwe	92.5 <sup>b</sup>	282.7	189.9	189.5	184.6	103.4	130.3	111.5	135.7
Imports from Zimbabwe as % of Total	0.65	1.53	1.03	1.17	0.85	0.45	0.48	0.39	0.34

Sources: IMF, *International Financial Statistics 1991*, *Direction of Trade Yearbook 1984, 1991*.

a. See (a) Table IV.

b. See (b) Table IV.

negligible for South Africa. The dependence upon South African imports is even more profound when the types of goods imported from South Africa are considered (see Table VI).

Trade statistics published by Zimbabwe in the first three years of independence (1980-1983) indicate that Zimbabwe's imports from South

**Table VI: Exports and Imports by Sector**  
(Z\$ '000, excluding gold)

Sector	1980*		1981		1982	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
0. Food and Live Animals	6,106	4,679	24,860	3,160	6,118	2,204
1. Beverages and Tobacco	7,191	399	18,645	853	14,542	719
2. Crude Materials except Fuel	10,728	4,906	29,633	9,186	26,094	7,037
3. Mineral Fuels and Electricity	1,188	5,990	339	49,800	38	34,893
4. Animal and Vegetable Oils		83		298		1,070
5. Chemicals	1,018	20,800	2,375	50,879	2,398	46,699
6. Manufactured Goods Classified by Materials	17,985	33,648	39,217	80,343	28,309	63,581
7. Machinery and Transport Equipment	4,418	27,468	8,069	64,615	4,261	68,483
8&9. Misc. Manufactured Articles and Commodities not elsewhere Classified	10,812	6,703	68,970	20,518	55,299	14,762
<b>Total</b>	<b>59,446</b>	<b>104,676</b>	<b>192,177</b>	<b>279,652</b>	<b>137,817</b>	<b>239,448</b>

Source: Zimbabwe. Central Statistical Office. *Statement of External Trade, 1980-1982*. Table 3: Imports Classified by Principle Countries by SITC Sections; Table 4: Domestic Exports Classified by Principle Countries by SITC Sections.

\* Data for August to December 1980.

Africa are dominated by manufactured goods and manufacturing inputs (Table VI). Although Zimbabwe's well developed manufacturing sector accounted for 30 per cent of its GNP in 1986 and 35.5 per cent of exports,<sup>32</sup> its dependence upon South African industrial inputs makes this sector vulnerable to South African pressure.

One of Zimbabwe's primary strengths is its efficient agricultural sector. In good years it is able to produce a substantial surplus which not only makes it independent of South African food supplies, but also

<sup>32</sup>"Zimbabwe—Statistical Survey," *Africa South of the Sahara 1990*, p. 1118.

gives it the potential to be the breadbasket for SADCC members, most of which import food from South Africa.<sup>33</sup> Zimbabwe's agricultural sector has produced maize surpluses for export since 1985, with a temporary suspension in 1987 due to drought concerns.<sup>34</sup> With its agricultural strength, Zimbabwe challenges South African domination in supplying the SADCC food needs for maize. South Africa responded to that challenge in 1981 when it recalled locomotives it had leased to Zimbabwe when Zimbabwe had produced a huge agricultural surplus. The recall complicated the distribution of the surplus, but Zimbabwe was able to reduce its sensitivity in this area by obtaining locomotives from the United States and Canada, and later by purchasing locomotives from South Africa. South Africa itself has occasionally needed to import additional food supplies from Zimbabwe, and in 1986 negotiated an agreement with Zimbabwe whereby it would import 300,000 tons of maize at higher than market prices.<sup>35</sup>

Zimbabwe's trade relationship with South Africa has remained constant despite Mugabe's rhetoric in support of sanctions. Although in 1981 South Africa threatened to end a trade agreement which had been negotiated with the Smith regime, the threat was not carried out and new trade agreements have been negotiated since then, which provide for tariff preferences for each country's exports.<sup>36</sup> Zimbabwe also has negotiated a trade agreement with Botswana which allows Zimbabwean exports to Botswana to enter the South African market without tariffs due to

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<sup>33</sup>Stephen R. Lewis, Jr., *The Economics of Apartheid* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990), p. 84.

<sup>34</sup>Linda Van Buren, "Zimbabwe--Economy," *Africa South of the Sahara* 1990, p. 1112.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*


<sup>36</sup>Lewis, *The Economics of Apartheid*, p. 92.

Botswana's participation in South African Customs Union (SACU).<sup>31</sup> Thus, Zimbabwe benefits from various trade ties with South Africa.

#### ECONOMIC RELATIONS -- TRANSPORTATION

Control of the transportation network in southern Africa was at the heart of power struggles in the late 1800s between Cecil Rhodes and the Afrikaner leaders, and remains a primary concern for both the Zimbabwe and South African governments today. Zimbabwe continues to face the same dilemma which challenged the earlier governments: that of being both a trading nation and a landlocked state. As a country with an export

#### MAP: *Transportation Links in Southern Africa*



Source: *Africa Research Bulletin (Economic Series)*, August 31, 1986, p. 8307A.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 94.

oriented economy which participates in the international trading system, access to markets is crucial for the continued growth and development of Zimbabwe. Furthermore, as in the areas of investment and trade, Zimbabwe faces a political dilemma in having to deal with a government whose racist policies it strongly abhors. South Africa's geographical position as a country bordered by water on three sides, and its economic strength have allowed it to develop the largest and most efficient ports in southern Africa.<sup>38</sup> It also boasts the best railway system in the region which is operated by the South African Transport Services.<sup>39</sup> This railway network dominates the regional transportation system into which all SADCC countries are tied, either directly or indirectly.<sup>40</sup> The integration of the region's railways is often cited by dependency theorists as the main ingredient in the dependence of the region on South Africa. Yet, as is demonstrated below, South Africa is sensitive to transportation policies made by the neighbouring states, in particular Zimbabwe. The sensitivity of South Africa indicates that interdependence, albeit asymmetrical, is evidenced.

Until 1975 Zimbabwe's transportation system was oriented toward Mozambique through which passed the closest, cheapest and most economical routes for trade. Before the FRELIMO government closed the Mozambican border to Rhodesian goods, over 80 per cent of Rhodesian

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<sup>38</sup>There are five ports in South Africa: Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth, Saldanha Bay and Richard's Bay. They are by far the most efficient ports in Africa and have the largest capacities and most advanced handling facilities on the continent. Kent Hughes Butts and Paul R. Thomas, The Geopolitics of Southern Africa: South Africa as Regional Superpower (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1986), p. 22. In 1987, the total of cargo handled (landed, shipped and transhipped) equalled 92,805,000 metric tons. "South Africa--Statistical Survey," Africa South of the Sahara 1990, p. 924.

<sup>39</sup>Butts and Thomas, Geopolitics, p. 3.

<sup>40</sup>Butts and Thomas argue that the dependence of the region on the South African transportation system makes it possible to consider southern Africa as a "functional region, that is, an area organized around a particular function." Ibid., p. 3.

trade went through the ports at Beira and Maputo.<sup>41</sup> With the closing of the border, Rhodesia was forced to redirect its trade and transportation system south across the Beit Bridge through South Africa to the port at Durban.<sup>42</sup> Thus, while in 1975, 63 per cent of Rhodesia's rail traffic went to Beira and Maputo, with the building of the Beit Bridge line to Durban all of Rhodesia's rail traffic was directed through South Africa by 1979.<sup>43</sup> Even after independence in 1980, only one percent of Zimbabwe's rail traffic went through Beira, with the rest distributed evenly between the two South African ports of Durban and East London.<sup>44</sup> Early attempts by the Mugabe government at redirecting traffic through Mozambique resulted in 28 per cent of all rail traffic being sent through Mozambique by 1981 and over half by 1982.<sup>45</sup> Thus, in only two years, Zimbabwe was able to reduce its dependence upon the SATS rail network and return to using traditional transportation routes. It can be stated, therefore, that because Zimbabwe was able to adjust its policies within a relatively short period of time and with minimal long-term costs incurred, that Zimbabwe was sensitive to South Africa in the area of transportation. Zimbabwe's ability to respond also challenges the dependency theorists who see little manoeuvring opportunities for the weaker state.

These initial attempts by Zimbabwe to redirect its rail traffic were seen by South Africa as threatening its economic domination and security. As noted above, South Africa gains substantial revenue from its service

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<sup>41</sup>James Barber, "Zimbabwe: The Southern African Setting," *The World Today*, vol. 44, no. 10 (October 1988) p. 169.

<sup>42</sup>Jean LI. Griffiths, "The chequerboard of southern Africa," *Geographical Magazine*, vol. 51 (October 1978), p. 27.

<sup>43</sup>Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, p. 187.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 193.

sector, primarily from SATS.<sup>46</sup> Any effort to separate from the SATS network by SADCC states signifies a loss of revenue collected and reveals South Africa's sensitivity to policy changes in neighbouring states. However, South Africa was able to respond quickly and harshly to the moves by Zimbabwe. In early 1981 South Africa recalled 150 railway technicians, withdrew 25 locomotives it had loaned to Rhodesia and made the transit of Zimbabwean trade through South Africa extremely difficult.<sup>47</sup> In addition, the South Africa Defence Forces (SADF) sponsored guerillas in Mozambique to sabotage the rail lines to both Beira and Maputo, thereby effectively isolating Zimbabwe from its markets and suppliers, and forcing Zimbabwe to use the longer and more expensive routes through South Africa.<sup>48</sup> Zimbabwe was extremely vulnerable to these actions, particularly the delay of goods at the South African border, and lost export earnings amounted to an estimated US\$4.2 million a week until normal trade relations were resumed at the end of 1981 under pressure from the United States.<sup>49</sup> Furthermore, the additional freight costs to Zimbabwe for transporting through South Africa were considerable.<sup>50</sup> Zimbabwe's initial sensitivity to South African policies in the area of transportation shortly changed to vulnerability once South Africa undertook harsher measures. The costs then incurred by Zimbabwe in adopting alternative transportation routes were extremely high.

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<sup>46</sup> See p. 72 above.

<sup>47</sup> Africa Research Bulletin (Political Social and Cultural Series), April 1981, p. 6024C; Johnson and Martin, "Zimbabwe," p. 88; Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p. 268.

<sup>48</sup> Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, pp. 186-190.

<sup>49</sup> Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p. 268; Hanlon, Apartheid's Second Front, p. 96.

<sup>50</sup> Johnson and Martin, Apartheid Terrorism, p. 54. Johnson and Martin estimate that the additional costs for transporting goods through South Africa since 1980 equals US\$824.2 million using the 1988 exchange rate of 1.822\$/US\$.



South Africa continues to place pressure on Zimbabwe through the transportation system in a number of ways. The South African government persisted in its direct and indirect support of the sabotage efforts of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) guerillas.<sup>51</sup> In addition, customs delays at the South African border are common and are particularly disruptive when applied to fuel shipments.<sup>52</sup> Despite these delays, SATS is more attractive to Zimbabwean exporters as it offers its services at rates lower than those which can be offered by Mozambique. Moreover, the reliability and efficiency of the SATS system as compared to Mozambique railways and ports attracts Zimbabwean business.

Although South Africa is able to place pressure on Zimbabwe through the transportation network, the extent of this pressure is limited for a number of reasons. First, in addition to that which comes from Zimbabwe, South Africa depends on rail traffic from a number of southern African states, including Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zambia and Zaire. The trade of two of those states, Zambia and Zaire, must pass through Zimbabwe in order to reach South Africa. As Table VII shows, the quantity of this trade is considerable. The need to maintain this traffic is of interest to both the South African government and South African business. Second, SATS is a primary revenue earner for the government, and necessary for South African businesses which have links with and investments in southern African countries. Although these businesses do not like competition from alternate suppliers which might use non-SATS

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<sup>51</sup>Johnson and Martin note that since 1986 there have been 195 successful sabotage attacks along the Beira line, however damage has been limited. Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*, p. 56.

<sup>52</sup>Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front*, p. 97.

**Table VII: Rail Traffic between South Africa and Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe, 1981-1985 (Tonnage)**

State		1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	1984/85
Zaire	From	528 954	293 948	288 037	278 936
	To	97 384	99 104	113 352	115 504
Zambia	From	164 911	156 485	224 498	122 366
	To	303 393	238 132	272 175	390 203
Zimbabwe	From	936 328	951 319	987 925	797 281
	To	1 394 659	912 826	747 635	1 175 098
Total	From	1 630 193	1 401 752	1 500 460	1 198 583
	To	1 795 436	1 250 062	1 133 162	1 680 805

Source: *Africa Research Bulletin (Economic Series)*, 31 August 1986, p. 8308AB.

lines, they are also not favourably disposed toward delays along SATS which lower their earnings.

Zimbabwe has been able to counter South African pressure by supplying troops to defend the Beira rail line, although this does place a heavy burden on the country's defence budget.<sup>53</sup> The National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) have purchased more locomotives to reduce its susceptibility to arbitrary recalls of locomotives leased from SATS.<sup>54</sup> In addition, the Mugabe government has been encouraging the use of Mozambican transport lines on political grounds by stating that Zimbabwean business should not patronize a system run by a government antithetical to African interests. However, until the security situation in Mozambique improves, business will continue to utilize South African routes, thereby

<sup>53</sup> Johnson and Martin, "Zimbabwe," p. 92.

<sup>54</sup> In February 1981, Alsthom-Atlantique of France had signed a contract with the NRZ for 30 locomotives. *Africa Research Bulletin (Economic Series)*, February 15-March 14 1981, p. 5851C.

continuing Zimbabwe's vulnerability to South African pressure. Alternately, South Africa will also continue to be sensitive to Zimbabwean attempts at reducing its vulnerability. Moreover, the costs of destabilizing the region's transportation system are becoming increasingly unpalatable, politically and economically to South Africa. In the area of transportation, therefore, the interdependence framework, with its concepts of sensitivity and vulnerability best explains the impact which South Africa and Zimbabwe have on each other.

#### **POLITICAL RELATIONS**

The political relationship between Zimbabwe and South Africa is often overlooked or underemphasized in analyses of linkages between the two countries. Instead, economic ties, which are the most obvious, receive overwhelming attention, particularly by dependency analysts. A closer examination of the political ties between the two states, once again reveals that the interdependence framework best describes the political interaction of these two states. While Zimbabwe's decision-making is heavily influenced by South African policies, Zimbabwe's policies also affect policy-making in South Africa, although to a lesser extent. Thus, similar to the other areas already discussed--investment, trade, transportation--an asymmetrical but interdependent political relationship between Zimbabwe and South Africa is evident.

As a result of its vulnerability to South Africa in the areas of trade, investment and transportation, Zimbabwe must be cognizant of the means

by which South Africa can manipulate it, and this must be reflected in its policy making. This was most clearly shown when Mugabe declared that his government would implement sanctions against South Africa on 1 January 1986, but was unable to carry out his plan.<sup>55</sup> Not only had he overestimated the international support such a move would garner, he had underestimated the capacity of Zimbabwe's economy to survive a complete disassociation from South Africa. Furthermore, he lacked support from his cabinet and Zimbabwean business interests. Finally, Zimbabwe would have faced severe repercussions from South Africa which, most likely, would have retaliated with increased destabilization.<sup>56</sup> Thus, economic vulnerability causes the Mugabe government to move cautiously when making economic policies which would effectively decrease this dependence.

Although South Africa is able to influence Zimbabwean economic policy-making because of Zimbabwe's reliance in the aforementioned economic areas, South Africa is nevertheless affected by aspects of the Mugabe government's policies. Initially, the victory of Mugabe and ZANU in the independence elections had a profound effect on South Africa's regional policy making. This was recognized by an opposition member of the South African House of Assembly, who stated that the independence of Zimbabwe under Mugabe,

will have a profound effect also on the whole of Southern Africa. It will certainly change the strategic map of our subcontinent. With the bush war over, with sanctions lifted and with transport links reopened, it could have a significant effect on the economy of this region. More than this: The

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<sup>55</sup>"Zimbabwe," *Africa Contemporary Record 1986-87*, ed. Colin Legum (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1988), p. B910.

<sup>56</sup>Margaret Lee, "Political and Economic Implications of Sanctions against South Africa: The Case of Zimbabwe," *Journal of african Studies*, vol. 15, nos. 3-4 (Fall/Winter 1988) p. 56.

independence of Zimbabwe under Prime Minister Robert Mugabe will have a profound impact also on South Africa.<sup>57</sup>

This observer recognized that Mugabe's electoral triumph required a re-evaluation of South Africa's regional and domestic policies particularly with respect to South Africa's two main concerns, internal political stability and economic security.

The new Zimbabwe government under Mugabe increased South Africa's concern for political stability in a number of ways. First, the potential and promise of Zimbabwe to be a successful black ruled state gave "the disadvantaged races of South Africa new hope, and enhanced confidence in the justice of their demands and in the inevitability that they will ultimately have to be conceded."<sup>58</sup> This new hope was reflected in increasing unrest within the South African townships which eventually received international attention in 1983 and 1984. Furthermore, the victory of Mugabe sent the message to South Africa that "those who stand for genuinely popular political aspirations, who are willing to sacrifice and if necessary fight for freedom, can expect strong popular support."<sup>59</sup> All others who attempt to operate within the established system would face the same fate as Bishop Muzorewa, leader of the moderate South African supported African National Congress party, in his humiliating defeat.<sup>60</sup> This possibility is of great concern to the white regime in South Africa

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<sup>57</sup> Statement by C.W. Elgin. South Africa, House of Assembly, Debates, vol. 86 (17 April 1980), col. 4169.

<sup>58</sup> "South Africa watches Mr. Mugabe," The Times, April, 1980, col. 13b. See also Xu Dewen, "Zimbabwe Counters South Africa," Beijing Review, vol. 25, no. 5 (February 1, 1982) p. 8., and Martin, Southern Africa: The Price of Apartheid, p. 43.

<sup>59</sup> Leonard, South Africa at War, p. 54.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

which sees the maintenance of its power and position as its single most important objective.

Second, Mugabe's policy of reconciliation was also threatening to the white regime in South Africa. When Mugabe took office, he indicated that he would seek to reconcile the differences between the country's white minority and black majority. The success of this policy would undermine the South African government's excuse that majority black rule in South Africa would threaten the security and position of minorities in the country in general, and the whites in particular. Furthermore, "if Zimbabwe succeeds in building a democratic, harmonious, nonracial state with a better quality of life for all, the whole rationale of apartheid crumbles."<sup>61</sup> This would allow liberal and reformist whites to gain political sympathy, thereby threatening the power of the National Party in South Africa.

Finally, internal political security is the primary concern of the South African government. It is committed to preventing liberation groups such as the African National Congress (ANC) from establishing bases close to the South African border.<sup>62</sup> Zimbabwe is of particular importance in the maintenance of South African security because Zimbabwe's border is only 450 kilometres from Pretoria. Although Mugabe has stated that he would not allow guerilla bases to be established within Zimbabwe, his vocal political support of the ANC is of great concern to the South African

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<sup>61</sup>Thompson, "Zimbabwe in Southern Africa," pp. 211-212. See also Sheikh R. Ali, *Southern Africa: An American Enigma* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987), p. 24.

<sup>62</sup>Gavin Cawthra, *Brutal Force: The Apartheid War Machine* (London: International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, Canon Collins House, 1986) pp. 140-1; Roger Martin, *Southern Africa*, p. 6.

government.<sup>63</sup> Mugabe has also declared that if sufficient military and financial support for military action against South Africa was evidenced by African and western countries, and the FLS were asked to "offer our countries as bases,...the Frontline states would consider the matter in a different light...".<sup>64</sup> The implications of such a statement by Mugabe are carefully considered by the South African government, which witnessed the support that ZAPU and ZANU had received during their liberation struggle from Zambia and Mozambique, and attributed the success of the guerilla movements in Zimbabwe to that support. The same success would be likely for South African black nationalist groups if they had the military support of the neighbouring states, especially Zimbabwe.

Each of these political challenges brought a response from the South African government. The primary response to the possibility that Zimbabwe would offer a model for South African liberation movements was to ensure that Mugabe would not be successful. To do so the South African government employed a variety of destabilization tactics which attempted to undermine the stability of Mugabe's government. Increasing the rift between the two main tribes in Zimbabwe, the Ndebele and the Shona, would demonstrate that a black government was incapable of achieving stability within Zimbabwe, and by implication within South Africa. By supporting espionage activities carried out by whites, the South African government could demonstrate that Mugabe's reconciliation policy was a

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<sup>63</sup> Barber, "Zimbabwe: The Southern African Setting," p. 171.

<sup>64</sup> Quoted from an interview with the Observer, London, 27 May 1984, in Colin Legum, The Battlefronts of Southern Africa (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1988), p. 350.

failure thereby mitigating the second challenge.<sup>65</sup> However, neither of these tactics have been entirely successful as Mugabe has managed to maintain power and a degree of stability, while whites who initially left Zimbabwe are returning. The policies of the Zimbabwean government caused the South African government to react which indicates sensitivity to former by the latter. Furthermore, the objective of the South African government, to force Zimbabwe to act according to South Africa's preferences, was not achieved thereby demonstrating that Zimbabwe is able to remain independent from South African policy-making.

South Africa has also found it difficult to deal with the third challenge. In an effort to deter guerilla incursions along the Zimbabwean front, the South African government provided concessions to white farmers to remain on their farms along the border area. However, despite fines for deserting and rewards for remaining, most of the farming area along this border was abandoned by the whites. By 1987 40 per cent of all farms along the Zimbabwean border were unoccupied and "a guerilla unit [could] march from the Limpopo river through to Pietersburg (100 miles south of Zimbabwe) without having to set foot on a farm occupied by whites."<sup>66</sup> Thus, it was fundamentally important that the South African government receive assurances from Mugabe that he would not allow ANC and PAC (Pan African Congress) bases to be established in his country. South Africa therefore attempted to pressure Mugabe into signing a non-aggression

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<sup>65</sup>South Africa's involvement in espionage activities is well documented in Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, and Johnson and Martin, *Frontline Southern Africa*.

<sup>66</sup>Christopher Coker, *South Africa's Security Dilemmas* (New York: The Center for Strategic and International studies, Washington D.C., Praeger, 1987) p. 20.



agreement similar to the Nkomati Accord signed by Mozambique in 1984. Mugabe refused to consent to such a pact, but gave assurances that at present he would not allow the ANC or PAC to establish military bases. Nevertheless, Mugabe continues to frustrate South African desires by remaining a vocal political supporter of nationalist movements in South Africa, and allowing diplomatic representation of these groups in his country.

In terms of economic security, South Africa is committed to keeping its neighbours reliant on it for markets, investment, and imports of manufactured and agricultural goods. The continued dependence of southern Africa on South Africa fulfils a twofold purpose. First, it is used as a propaganda tool by South Africa to hinder the implementation of comprehensive international sanctions. In publications such as South Africa: Mainstay of Southern Africa, the South African government details the economic interconnectedness of the region and indicates that any sanctions levelled at South Africa would hurt the southern African states more than the intended target.<sup>67</sup> One senior South African official has also stated that the "relatively underdeveloped countries [in the region] depend...on imports of capital and intermediate goods from South Africa" for their industrial output, and that finding alternative trade and transportation routes would be very difficult since existing ones "represent the most economic and efficient arrangement feasible in terms of physical capacity, operation and maintenance."<sup>68</sup> By exploiting the needs of

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<sup>67</sup>South Africa, South Africa: Mainstay of Southern Africa (Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1985), p. 1.

<sup>68</sup>Theo Malan, "Sanctions and Economic Interdependence in Southern Africa," South African Newspoint, no. 1 (Ottawa: South African Embassy, 1987), pp. 2-3.

southern Africa and by playing on western concerns for the development of this region, South Africa effectively hindered comprehensive sanctions from its major trading partners. This continued until international opinion became sufficiently outraged by South Africa's *apartheid* policies in the mid-1980s that the governments of many western countries had little choice but to implement sanctions.

Secondly, the continued dependency of southern African states upon South Africa provides the South African government with opportunities to destabilize its neighbours and keep them weak and dependent. South Africa also hoped that economic links would lessen the anti-*apartheid* rhetoric emanating from regional states, in particular from Zimbabwe. The establishment of SADCC which proclaimed a mandate to reduce dependency on South Africa, and the inclusion of Zimbabwe which made this objective a possibility, threatened the continued effectiveness of the manipulation of economic ties by South Africa to foster its interests.

To undermine the economic potential of Zimbabwe, South Africa employed several destabilization tactics including covert destabilization, espionage, guerilla incursions and economic sabotage.<sup>69</sup> The economic effects of the destabilization campaigns against Zimbabwe were very costly to that country.<sup>70</sup> Nevertheless, Mugabe stood firm against these pressures by remaining an ardent critic of *apartheid*. In addition, Mugabe

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<sup>69</sup>Covert destabilization capitalizes on the internal divisions between tribal groups and their political representatives which causes "the weakening, or the destruction, of a regime by an outside agency in such a way that it seems to have happened by a natural internal process." Victoria Britain, *Hidden Lives, Hidden Deaths: South Africa's Crippling of a Continent* (London: Faber and Faber, 1988), p. 107.

<sup>70</sup>See sections on investment, trade and transportation above.

joined in the cry emanating from Africa for the implementation of comprehensive sanctions against South Africa. In a statement to the United Nations General Assembly on 3 October 1986, Mugabe called on the United Nations to,

condemn strongly the Pretoria regime for [terrorism and military destabilization] and for recruiting, training, financing, directing and infiltrating bandits and mercenary elements into neighbouring countries to destabilize and overthrow their Governments.<sup>71</sup>

He also called for "concrete actions against [the] international monster" of apartheid.<sup>72</sup> He gave his full support to the sanctions package agreed upon by the United Nations, and the one embraced by the Commonwealth heads of government in 1985.<sup>73</sup> Although Zimbabwe was unable to implement sanctions itself, Mugabe's call for sanctions was politically important as it demonstrated his country's commitment to the overthrow of apartheid in South Africa to the international community.<sup>74</sup> South Africa's response to Zimbabwe's political policies of supporting guerilla groups, opposing apartheid, calling for sanctions, and Mugabe's ability to maintain a degree of political stability within Zimbabwe indicates that South Africa is affected by and politically sensitive to these policies. This sensitivity demonstrates that interdependency theory is a valuable tool for analyzing

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<sup>71</sup>"Address by Mr. Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister of the Republic of Zimbabwe," United Nations, General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Twenty-first Meeting, 3 October 1986, p. 7.

<sup>72</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>73</sup>The sanction package agreed to by the Commonwealth heads of government in October 1985 included:

- 1) a ban on all new government loans to the South African government and its agencies and an agreement to take whatever unilateral action might be possible to prohibit imports of Krugerrands; 2) a ban on the sale and export of oil to South Africa; 3) a ban on new contracts for the sale and export of nuclear goods, materials, and technology; 4) a ban on the sale and export of computer equipment capable of use by the South African military forces, police, or security forces; 5) an embargo on all military cooperation; 6) a strict and rigorously controlled embargo on imports of arms, ammunition, military vehicles, and paramilitary equipment from South Africa; 7) the cessation of government funding for trade missions to South Africa or for participation in exhibitions and trade fairs; and 8) the discouragement of all cultural and scientific events except where they contribute toward the ending of apartheid or have no possible role in promoting it.

J.P. Hayes, Economic Effects of Sanctions on Southern Africa (Sydney: Gower, 1987) pp. 11-12. In Lee, "Sanctions against South Africa," pp. 52-53.

<sup>74</sup>Lee, "Sanctions against South Africa," p. 52.

the relationship between these two states; it shows that while South Africa is a dominant actor in the region, it is not unaffected by the policies of its neighbours, especially Zimbabwe.

#### **CONCLUSION**

The examination of the economic and political relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa has revealed that aspects of both dependency and interdependency are evident. Although Zimbabwe is economically dependent on South Africa and is affected by South African attempts at maintaining and increasing that dependency, Zimbabwe has had some success at reducing the impact of South African policies. In addition, the Zimbabwean government is able to implement policies to which South Africa is sensitive. The responses of the South African government, which often do not achieve their ultimate objectives, signify that South Africa is also affected by Zimbabwean policies. This mutual but asymmetrical dependence confirms that interdependency analysis is applicable to the study of the relationship between these two states, and that it complements dependency analysis.

## CHAPTER 5

### Conclusions

The examination of the relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe until 1989 has demonstrated that a framework of analysis which takes into account the theories of dependence as well as interdependence is necessary in order to gain a complete understanding of the interaction between the two states.

Dependency analysis, applied in the orthodox sense articulated by Prebisch, Frank and Valenzuela, provides insight into the historical development of relations between South Africa and its neighbours, especially Zimbabwe. It indicates how and why the relationship was dominated by South Africa and how Zimbabwe, as the colony of Rhodesia, came to be dependent upon and integrated with the South African economy. Dependency analysis establishes the effect which colonialism had upon the development of the two states in placing Zimbabwe in a subordinate position to South Africa. Finally, it demonstrates how South Africa was able to reinforce those ties during the years of Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence.

The internationally recognized independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, however, challenged dependency assumptions. Free from the political colonial ties which limited its sovereignty prior to 1980, Zimbabwe has exhibited a high degree of political and economic independence. Furthermore, South Africa has been found to be somewhat dependent upon its neighbour. In other words, it responds to and is affected by policy changes made by the Zimbabwean government. To account for this, interdependency theory, based on the assumption of mutual dependence, was applied in the examination of contemporary relations between the two states. In doing so, it was revealed that the concepts of sensitivity and vulnerability, when applied to the responses of the two states to each other, provided insight into explaining the behaviour of the two governments.

In examining four areas in which the two states interact, the areas of investment, trade and transportation and the political realm, it was found that each state exhibits a different level of susceptibility to the actions of the other state within each regime. Overall, South Africa tended to exhibit sensitivity in that it was able to respond quickly and usually effectively to Zimbabwe's actions in each area considered. However, occasionally South Africa was unable to react effectively to policies or decisions made by the Zimbabwean government, particularly in the political arena. Alternately, Zimbabwe appeared to be more vulnerable to South African action, especially in the economic areas. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe has demonstrated a capacity to lessen its vulnerability in the economic areas which were examined. In the political realm, interdependence was

most clearly exhibited with both states being sensitive to each other's political policies.

In illuminating the interdependence of these two states, this thesis does not deny the overwhelming economic dominance of South Africa in comparison to Zimbabwe. Neither does it ignore the military power South Africa exerts over Zimbabwe and the region of southern Africa. These are very clear and obvious characteristics of regional relations. However, the purpose of examining interdependency ties is to attempt to gain insight into the possible future for regional relations were South Africa to become a majority ruled state, as is likely in the near future.

Events within South Africa are transpiring very rapidly. In the three years since F.W. de Klerk became President of South Africa, replacing P.W. Botha, a new era in South African domestic and foreign policy-making appears to have begun. The release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, the reinstatement of the ANC, and changes to the apartheid system, including desegregation of public areas and of some parts of the education system, foreshadow the eventual dismantling of the racist system and the establishment of a non-racial majority ruled state. If this were to occur, the regional economic and political setting would once again undergo substantial change.

The potential of that change for regional relations was made clear when, in April 1991, a breakthrough meeting took place between Mugabe and Mr. Desmond Krough, the senior advisor to the governor of the South

African Reserve Bank.<sup>1</sup> This meeting, which was the first between Mugabe and a high level South African official since 1980, may be a watershed in relations between the two states. It demonstrated Mugabe's recognition that the progress made in South Africa has been sufficient to warrant the end of its international isolation, and that perhaps South Africa could play a new role within the region.

Although it is difficult to predict what a new South African role might be, two aspects of its present position in the region will contribute to determining that role. First is South Africa's economic domination, and second is its interdependence with the region. South Africa's economic domination, if it persists, might either make it into a leader of economic organizations such as SADCC in which it could potentially lend substantial development assistance to the neighbouring states. Alternatively, its economic domination may hinder the development and economic growth of regional states since it would likely attract the most foreign interest and sympathy, along with investment and development assistance.

The interdependence of the region will also affect the position of South Africa. Interdependence within southern Africa requires further study in order to determine the direction future economic relations could take. With respect to the relationship studied in this paper, it seems likely that majority rule in South Africa will lead to even greater interdependence, since the spectre of apartheid will be removed allowing greater cooperation in the areas of investment, trade and transportation.

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<sup>1</sup>Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series), April 1991, p. 10075C.



Such cooperation is likely between South Africa and Zimbabwe if the ANC makes up the post-apartheid government given the persistent support Mugabe has given to this organization since 1980. Greater cooperation in trade and transportation will be beneficial to both states. As was argued in chapter four, South Africa is an important trading partner for Zimbabwe, although this has been more significant as a source of imports rather than a destination for exports from Zimbabwe. With greater cooperation, the vast South Africa market may be opened to Zimbabwean exporters which may have been prevented from exporting to South Africa because of the latter's racial policies. South Africa's advanced railway system, if operating efficiently, could offer Zimbabwe greater access to world markets and suppliers.

Although the changing nature of relations within the region may challenge the arguments presented in this thesis, the two theoretical frameworks utilized here provide a basis for examining future relations. Areas of interaction which were examined in the pre-1989 context will continue to require attention as a new regional setting emerges. Previously, by ignoring these areas of interaction, potential strengths of the region have previously been excluded from investigation. Examination of the interdependence in the region indicates that many levels of cooperation exist which must be considered now in order that effective policies may be made in the future. Thus, while dependency analysis allows us to understand the past, interdependency analysis points to the future.

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